

## ADDENDUM TO THE GREEK EDITION<sup>i</sup>

### Preconditions, presuppositions, parameters and illusions of Greek national policy/politics

The diagnosis of the driving forces of today's planetary politics, as it is undertaken in this book, tends to the delineation of certain future prospects, whose realisation (coming to pass) I personally do not wish, but which – as an analyst – I ought to put forward with lucidity. Before us, an epoch of planetary and regional clashes is opening, which will render very difficult – if they do not foil (frustrate, thwart) – the fixing and consolidation of international order, since these clashes and confrontations' short-term and medium-term political, economic and geopolitical causes will be increasingly fused with long-term ecological and population pressures, begetting chronic crises and out-of-control paroxysms. Under these circumstances, the end of the ideologies of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which held sway and predominated in the 20<sup>th</sup> century too, will not bring about the placating (appeasement) of contrasts, oppositions and conflicts, but only their shifting and displacement to an elemental, existential and biological field, at whose (epi)centre, the problem of the distribution of goods on a world scale, will be overtly, i.e. easily, found. Whatever today is offered as a new compass for the orientation of political action and as a panacea – especially the universalism of human rights – in all probability will be

transformed into a new battlefield, where the battle of interpretations will be connected with even more tangible forms of battle (combat, fighting). In the tug-of-war between an unfeasible and unattainable universalism, and a defending of collective interests inevitably organised on a narrower local (regional) basis, and narrower basis as regards population, the nation organised by and as a state (in terms of a state), does not break up and disintegrate – as many expected – into supra-national constructs, but takes (on/up) a new historical role, more or less different to that which the bourgeois nation played in the more distant (remoter) past; and in the more recent past, the crystallisations of communistic nationalism. The primary concern of the state [[nowadays]] is the securing of a place (position) in the dense and intensely competitive world society – however, this concern will be fused (will become a kind of syneresis) all the more with (regard to) a request or demand of elemental survival, to the extent that the margins for movement (room to move) in the womb, i.e. from within, world society become narrower and tighter. This new de facto (out of objective reality) function of nationalism remains determinative and crucial regardless of the usually self-complacent and smug mythologies through which one understands himself by drawing upon the real or fantastical, near (recent) or distant (far) past.

Of course, the mythologies, even the most arbitrary, are capable of positively influencing national life by mobilising and gathering together forces. But the precondition and prerequisite for this to happen is an objective national vitality, an abundance of tangible power, which allows a nation to move – we would say – at the height of its illusions. Wherever, conversely, the nation shrinks and withers and decays, there, the distance between national mythology and national reality has – at least over the long run – fatal consequences. Today's Greece constitutes precisely a case of a withering and decaying nation, which misconstrues its fixated mythological ideas (i.e. its mythological fixations and

obsessions) regarding itself as realistic self-awareness and self-knowledge. It is not at all strange that this psychological situation most frequently presents symptoms of pathological autism; because the essential backdrop and framework for healthy self-awareness and self-knowledge, is knowledge of the wider, broader surrounding world and environment, in which an individual and collective subject is called to act, by evaluating as far as possible soberly its (i.e. the subject in question's) possibilities, and by substituting the anaemically (insipidly and unhealthily) egocentric principle of pleasure with the physiologically egocentric principle of reality. Just like lower animal organisms, so too, today's Greeks react with intense reflexive movements and motions only to whatever stimulates them directly and specifically; the statements of some "philhellene" in Hawaii or some "mishellene, i.e. anti-Greek" in Greenland (and let's not talk at all about all the related phenomena one learns from Brussels or Washington), delight or excite, accordingly, the spirit(s)-intellect(s) much more than what the essential – albeit also often vague – magnitudes of politics and of the economy, (pre)occupy such spirit(s)-intellect(s). Even when discussion shifts to the main area of foreign policy (external politics), what dominates is the momentary, the vacillating and the nearby, not the careful and documented, backed-by-evidence, weighing up of long-lasting (enduring, long-term) more general trends, which perhaps one day will weigh upon the fortunes of Greeks at least as much as what is being acted out at this moment in countries sharing borders (conterminous) with Greece<sup>ii</sup>. Thus, whereas suddenly (in a country (i.e. Greece) where nationally vital Albanian, Slavic and Turkish studies are represented only embryonically), our country has filled and become replete with profound and spiteful (venomous) experts on the Balkans, there is no serious and permanent discussion about the burning as never before question in respect of European unification, about which powers for which reasons promote it, and which powers will potentially thwart such a unification, about the related Greek views and proposals (do they exist?), and about the place and position of the

Greek nation inside these exceptionally contradictory processes – not about the place/position of an imaginary Greece inside an equally imaginary Europe, but about a provincial and parasitical Greece with enormous, and perhaps insurmountable, difficulties of adapting to an intensely recalcitrant – towards Greece – Europe, and a Europe deeply divided as to its own identity and its own prospects<sup>iii</sup>. Also, very few people seem to be interested in the political repercussions of the ecological narrow paths, i.e. difficult ecological circumstances, or the recent consequences of the migration of the peoples to a country so frail ecologically, and so exposed geographically, as Greece<sup>iv</sup>.

However, the lack – and indeed denial – of self-awareness and self-knowledge is not apparent only indirectly in the narrowness of the political world image, which discussions about national policy/politics usually use as a motive, cause or triggering event. Such lack is apparent also directly, in the manner of conducting these discussions. At their (epi)centre are found, that is, more or less set-in-stone (with strong foundations), thoughts and opinions about which turn this or that specific development will take, and whether this or that act is recommended or not, something which most often leads to the well-known and beloved talk about politics and round-table rhetoric (i.e. when “experts” of all sorts gather around a table to “say wise things” on television, etc.)<sup>v</sup>. The cornerstone of every problem examination is not, however, touched upon: what is the identity and the entity (existential make-up) of the political subject, as regards the acts, the omissions and the future of that political subject about which there is talk? More specifically and more concretely: what is today’s physiognomy of Greece, and what arises from this physiognomy as to Greece’s ability to exercise a national policy/politics in today’s *planetary* circumstances? The answer to such a question would demand an inventory of (the) Greek national potential in the widest sense of the term, and such an inventory would today be particularly afflictive, baleful and painful, if it took place without

apologetic needs in any direction whatsoever. Moreover, it would give rise to a justified disposition of pessimism, since everyone sees, theoretically (in theory) at least, that whoever wants to exercise effective (effectual) national policy/politics, in now necessarily wider spaces, must – apart from and before the well-aimed conception and comprehension of the general circumstances, and diplomatic ability – have at his disposal a thriving (blooming, flourishing) national entity (existential make-up) imprinted in a multi-dimensional network of social, economic, military and psychological factors. There is no doubt that if Greece could gather and concentrate to a high degree these factors on a permanent basis – and before today’s Balkan(s) crisis broke out –, Greece would exert a different radiance, and would have greater possibilities of influencing developments. The internal decomposition (disintegration, decay), which no-one allows to proceed for as long as it does not appear one is confronting immediate danger<sup>vi</sup>, deprives one of the requisite means and margins (room, space) for manoeuvres when need tightens its grip.

Further below we shall talk about the micropolitical reasons which obstruct the relentlessly and inexorably posing of – and to all their extent – the great political questions: what are the more general preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions) for the exercising of a long-lasting, enduring and successful national policy/politics? How must a nation be structured such that the nation in question is able to confront, in the framework of the humanly possible, any contingencies whatsoever, also even abrupt changes in and of the conjuncture? Let us note in advance that the general reluctance (unwillingness) of direct and head-on confrontation with this capital matter is reflected inter alia in the resounding manner (way) with which national policy is conducted as a policy/politics of pursuing “national rights (i.e. what is considered to be “as of right” for the nation of Greece)”. This is not in itself bad, and in various concrete instances can in fact present advantages in respect of tactics, if it is not

undertaken so awkwardly, unskilfully and unconvincingly (i.e. not taking into consideration the view and psychology of those non-Greeks being addressed), as it is often the case. However, here we want to refer to something else. The emphasis attributed to (placed on) the concept of “right/what is just”, as a rule, is directly analogous to (the) national meagreness and diplomatic cursoriness and superficiality (flippancy, shallowness); there is a diffuse impression that once Greece (the whole of Greece!) appears in the international foreground and raises its voice as regards its rights, the society (community) of nations will leave aside its own cares, concerns and worries, and will interest itself in Greek requests and demands, roughly dumbfounded (dazed, stunned) by such demands’ ethical shine(/shining/radiance/effulgence/lustre/glitter). The projection of the, by definition, superior ethical dimension seems to release and free one from humble labours and toiling, and from the dizzying labyrinths of specific (concrete) politics and policy; it seems, that is to say, that it suffices for one to have [[what is]] right and justice on one’s side in order to have done nearly everything which depends on him; it is up to the rest of the world to perceive and understand the Greek view of what is right and just, and to act accordingly. The Greek side most frequently has considered and considers as incomprehensible that others can have (honestly or not) a different view (perception) as regards what is right/just; also, the Greek side has been, and is, at difficulty in respect of being reconciled with the thought others do not always take at face value its assertions, and that they also use other sources of information, or listen to other points of view. That, however, which the Greek side above all refuses to comprehend on a permanent basis, since it has set a trap for itself in relation to the overcompensating (over-replenishing) [[effect]] of moralising (moral(istic)) alibies, is that every assertion and every pursuit of a cause counts only as much as the national entity standing behind such assertions, claims etc.. Whoever, for instance, permanently begs for loans and subsidies in order to fund sloth and shiftlessness, as well as his organisational

inability, cannot expect to impress anyone ever with the rest of his “rights and what is just”. Neither can anyone expect that he will ever be taken seriously (into consideration) in the international political game(/match) if he has not understood, and if he does not behave as having understood, that, behind and beyond the non-binding declarations of principles or of abstract compliments (cordiality/cordialities), the concurrence(/coincidence/convergence) or the divergence of interests creates and consolidates(/solidifies/fixes) friendships and enmities. Yet on that basis, someone who has the material possibility of offering as much as what is sought as (a) quid pro quo(/something in return), can move. In other words, movements on the political-diplomatic field bear fruit not in accordance with [[what is]] “right and [[what is perceived to be]] just(ice)”, which – by the way – every side defines for its own account, i.e. in its own interests, but in accordance with the historical and social weight of the corresponding collective subjects, which everyone evaluates on average similarly, as occurs also with merchandise(/goods/commodities/wares) in the marketplace<sup>vii</sup>. Furthermore, no protection and no alliance secures and ensures conclusively whomever is found together with it, i.e. within such an alliance, in which there is a relationship of one-sided dependence. The value of an alliance for a certain side is defined by the especial or particular (specific) weight of this side inside the framework of the alliance. Powerful allies are useless to whomever does not have at his disposal himself a respectable specific/special weight, since in accordance with this here (i.e. this here special/specific weight), the interest of powerful allies rises and falls (fluctuates). Perhaps, one considers these data “inhuman” and sad; if, however, he conducts national policy whilst ignoring them, sooner or later he will find himself in a situation where the sadness for the ethical slump of others will be succeeded by lamentation for one’s own calamities and woes.

In talking about the presuppositions, preconditions and the parameters of a Greek national policy inside today's planetary conjuncture, it is not possible to not retrospectively have a look at, and examine the course which lead to today's crisis or emaciation of the Greek national entity. In order to remain at the essential points with as much brevity as possible, we shall say that this course includes two great phases. The first refers to the continuous and irreversible geopolitical shrinking of Hellenism after the catastrophe of 1922<sup>viii</sup>, which only to a tiny degree was suspended by the union of the Dodecanese with Greece<sup>ix</sup>. A central peculiarity of modern Greek history was the lack of coincidence (i.e. concurrence) between nation and state, not because the state, which was under the control of the Greek nationality/ethnicity, also contained to a notable degree foreign/alien nationalities; not because the state was broader/more extensive than the nation, as was the case in other instances (e.g. the Russian); but for precisely the opposite reason: the nation was from the very beginning much broader (more extensive) than the state. This chasm between nation and state closed, again, only in part with the expansion of the state, so as to include the body of the nation. This occurred with the union of the Ionian Islands [[in 1864]] and especially with the Balkan Wars [[1912-1913]]; since then, however, the course was reversed: the nation increasingly coincided with the state because the nation was exterminated or displaced in as many regions it was found outside of the state, that is, because the nation shrunk geopolitically. The geographic coincidence/concurrence of the nation and of the state, as it exists today to a great degree, was realised when – after the Hellenism of Asia Minor – the Hellenism of Russia, of the Balkans and of the Middle East [[was ravaged and/or displaced and]] disappeared. The temporarily (for now) most recent act of this tragedy was acted out in Cyprus, where, well before the pernicious, calamitous and ruinous coup of 1974, Greek diplomacy showed how much it is unable to engage in enduring and effectual national policy/politics inspired not by sentimentalisms and all kinds of rhetoric about “national rights and what is

nationally just”, but by knowledge and the prudent (wise) weighing up of international factors.

It is not necessary to explain in particular what advantages a nation has extending beyond the limits and boundaries of its state. Not only does the main trunk (body) of the nation, which lives inside the state, continually accept life-giving and revitalising (rejuvenating) blood transfusions from the outside, but the same nation-state, having its eye on those of the same ethnicity living abroad, has a sense of a broader historical responsibility and mission. Whoever will comprehend without biases (prejudices) what today’s Turkish dynamism owes to this feeling/sense, will easily understand about which thing we are talking, given that the corresponding Greek experiences appear to have been blown away and extinguished since long ago<sup>x</sup>. In actual fact, a crucial and determinative feature of today’s Greek national life, i.e. of national life after the geopolitical shrinking/shrinkage of Hellenism, is the absence of *historical* aims and goals capable of mobilising consciously, and over the long-term, collective forces. Regarding that, one ought not to kid oneself either by standardised-clichéd patriotic inflammatory-over-the-top expressions, or the dull, lacking-in-appetite rearguard battles which are fought in relation to the Cypriot question/matter – nor must one also construe as such an aim or goal “accession to and integration into Europe”: because a mass desire for the consumer good-and-easy life pushes towards this accession and integration, which in order to be realised, would not hesitate very much to convert the accession and integration into a humiliating, abasing national selling-off.

This observation brings us to the second of the two great phases of national of the national shrinkage/shrinking of Hellenism this century. If the first had mainly a geopolitical character, the second, which began after the relative completion of the first, is characterised by the symptoms and repercussions of a parasitical consumerism indifferent to its long-term national consequences,

particularly as to what concerns the independence of the country and the autonomous self-reliance of its national decisions<sup>xi</sup>. We do not name this consumerism parasitical in order to downgrade it ethically, whilst contradistinguishing the “higher/superior” and “spiritual(-intellectual)” ideals of life (life ideals), as various intellectuals do. It would be unreal (out of this world) and foolish for someone to want to cut the Greek people in their totality from the new possibilities of production and of technology – and furthermore, it would be dangerous, because such a severance (cutting off) would go with a more general economic and military delay, tarrying, lagging and falling behind (retardation). The term “parasitic(al) consumerism” is used here in its literalness in order to state or declare that today’s Greece, being unable to itself produce as much as it consumes, and not having enough self-restraint – and dignity – so as not to consume more than what it is able to itself produce, consumes in a state of parasitism, and indeed in a dual direction: it behaves parasitically in the interior, i.e. domestically, where it mortgages the resources of the future by converting them into current interest to be paid on loans, and it behaves parasitically towards the outside (world), where it has also borrowed huge amounts – not to make investments bearing fruit in the future, but mainly to pay with such amounts enormous quantities of consumer goods, which again it imported from abroad. This development was jointly caused within the framework of the postwar (i.e. post-WW2) progressive, advancing intertwining of international economic processes generally, and of European economies specifically; nonetheless, it would be a mistake to consider this development as something fated (predestination) which erupted over (or suddenly, intensely and violently befell upon) a weak and defenceless Greece, captive irrevocably in the nets of “international capital”. All those entrenched behind vulgar (profane, for-sale, marketable) “left-wing” and “people-friendly” rhetoric, whilst denying measuring – and weighing up – the magnitude of their own responsibilities, the depth of the coefficients (factors) of today’s national crisis, and the painfulness

and sorrowfulness of the possible ways out of this crisis, offer such ostensibly (seemingly) learned and fancy explanations. The primary reasons which set in motion the process of the national selling off [[of state and national assets and wealth]], and the related political weakening of Greece at an international level, are endogenous and are reduced (put down) to the functioning of its political system and the behaviour of all this political system's subjective factors. In other words: the Greek social and political body (corpus) in its totality benefitted from the unprecedented post-war development of the international economy, and drew short-term benefits and gains from it, with the quid pro quo (or the price to be paid) being the long-term downgrading of Greece on the scale of the international division of labour, and at the same time, Greece's general national downgrading. This took place in the form of a silent (tacit), but permanent, and for the most part, conscious and shameful social contract, in whose context (within whose framework), each and every political leadership – “right-wing”, “liberal” or “socialistic”, parliamentary or dictatorial: on this crucial point the divergences and deviances were at a minimum – undertook the function of quickly and parasitically reinforcing the consumer possibilities of the “people” for the price of the people's political favouritism and tolerance, that is to say, [[to control]] the handling and management of political power, domination, control and governance, and [[to engage in]] the plundering of related social and material privileges. Of course, this transaction, [[mode of]] exchange and these dealings characterised Greek parliamentarism since its very beginnings (incunabula, early stages of infancy), however, the unheard-of and unprecedented postwar international economic conjuncture attached to Greek parliamentarism possibilities also unprecedented: in exchange for the buying (soliciting) and restraining, i.e. controlling, of the electoral/voting clientele, not simply wearisome (tedious, boring, irksome) state-governmental positions could now be offered, but in addition, multi-coloured masses of consumer goods and a plethora (abundance) of tempting consumer possibilities. Whereas the first offer

entailed mainly the selling off of the state apparatus/mechanism and of state resources within the internal market(place), the second – and much more generous and munificent – offer, ended up – with inner necessity – in the selling off (clearance sale) of the whole of the nation in the international market(place)<sup>xii</sup>. This selling off started with the great, countercurrent and simultaneously supplementary, waves of migration and of tourism<sup>xiii</sup>, in order to climax – perceptibly changing appearance (face) and emotional investment – in the buying (purchasing) of Austrian biscuits for dogs, and in the organisation of three-day trips to London for shopping, securing in the meanwhile corpulent (fact) subsidies for a surplus agricultural production, and the further swelling and expansion of a semi-paralysed public service (group/body of public servants). Never before was the state and the nation found, thanks to the ungrudging mediation of the “political world/people”, in such admirable and awe-inspiring accord (harmony, solidarity, togetherness) with the card player of the provinces and with the low-life woman (crude, vulgar, usually also a hussy and or slut) of Athens<sup>xiv</sup>.

Parasitical consumerism, as we defined it above, effected or provoked such a dissipation, waste and scattering of resources, particularly in the 1980s, that the narrowness (i.e. relative lack) of resources would from then on follow – and for a very long period of time – Greek national policy/politics like a heavy shadow; today’s, and inevitably tomorrow’s, attempts and efforts of the “political world/people” as regards the solution to this pressing problem do not constitute a structural confrontation of the problem, but deep down (basically) aim at the creation of circumstances of transient relief which will permit again the recycling of the previous vicious cycle and game between political parties and voters. It is superfluous or unnecessary to explain what long-term consequences the narrowness/tightness of resources existing today for the future of the (i.e. our) nation, has, i.e., for its economic competitiveness, for its paideia

(education) and for its defence. On account of this narrowness or lack of resources, Greece starts the road race (track/running event) in the stormy incipient phase of planetary politics with a further significant disadvantage. It's economic hypoplasia (i.e. incomplete or arrested development), which was funded and beautified consumeristically with the extended loss of its economic independence, will restrict and limit greatly the margins of its political choices and activities, especially when its positions clash with those of the Europeans and its other funders/financiers/backers<sup>xv</sup>. For this clash, which cannot be excluded/precluded from assuming or having explosive dimensions, we shall say a few things immediately below. In any case, today's picture of Greece in the international, and above all, European community space/realm, foreshadows Greece's course and outcome. One must – as occurs as a rule in the blissful (blessed, calm, serene, beatific) Greek territory – be ignorant of this space (area, realm), or have suffered from incurable nationalistic blindness and deafness, to not know that in the eyes of Greece's partners, Greece today is an unwanted interloper/intruder, an undignified beggar, who asks for billions of dollars every year in order to consume much more than what its productive possibilities, capacity, and productivity of its labour, allow, and which moreover, in order to safeguard its parasitical affluence/prosperity, does not hesitate to prevaricate (evade/dodge [[responsibilities]], meander) and to deceive, whilst its provincialism and its at times childish egocentrism did not allow it ever to formulate some substantial thought or proposal of general European or international interest. It is not important if everyone without exception shares this picture/image and if all of its details hold true; its general dissemination and especially its general agreement with real data (facts) has weighty political significance. Here, the deep internal relationship between the politics/policy of parasitic consumerism and the fortunes of a country inside the society (community) of nations already appears most clearly.

The repelling and counterbalancing mechanisms, with whose help the multi-labyrinthine (very complicated) and very resourceful (of multiple ways of finding solutions and getting out of sticky situations, etc.) modern Greek soul circumvents the humiliations without ever being able to vanquish them head-on, are old, tried and tested, and known. Because the beggar descends (hails), at least geographically, from the place (country) of Pericles, he himself believes he has the right to appear in an ancient Greek chlamys<sup>xvi</sup>, whose whiteness nothing – not even blatant forgeries (counterfeiting, misrepresentations) and abuses would not be able to taint (tarnish, sully, besmear, besmirch). Parallely, the periodic patriotic bouts of elation (excitement) and of peevishness, from various starting points and motives, allow the psychologically convenient covering over/up of nationally pernicious and ruinous collective practice/praxis – by the highfalutin and grandiose national spirit and conviction/conscience; of short-sighted eudaemonic activity – by hovering, floating and undecided delirium and raving. Also, they render possible the illusion of concord and solidarity, when individual aspirations and personal pursuits in reality diverge so much, that it is most arduous for such individual aspirations and personal pursuits to be coordinated, with the determinative and crucial axis/keystone being the commands of an enduring, long-lasting national policy; the vociferous display of concord and solidarity thus substitutes (replaces) the existence of, in practice, binding, efficient and productive consensus on specific matters and specific solutions. Hence, whatever would have to constitute a psychological foundation for the exercising of national policy is converted into a psychological alibi for the frustration of the exercising of this national policy's preconditions, since permanent patriotic inebriation (intoxication) permanently hinders its felicitous bearers from crystallising their rhetorical self-sacrifice in common pragmatic political decisions, that is to say, in regard to a distribution of responsibilities, tasks and works, offers and earnings, inside a long-term and binding programme of national survival. The more the discussion shifts in the direction of such

decisions, the quicker the inebriation fizzles out and evaporates so that the individual and “sectoral/departmental” logic of parasitic consumerism predominates. As a connecting web and as a common denominator, what therefore remains is a blue-and-white soap bubble<sup>xvii</sup>.

Even though modern Greek quick-tempered and short-fused patriotism constitutes, due to its permanent overcompensating (over-replenishing) functions, an endemic phenomenon, nevertheless, its polemical points change their aim according to the season, and sometimes turn against its still yesterday’s real or imaginary friends and allies. Inside today’s conjuncture of planetary politics, where nationalism takes on new functions and draws from such functions a new vitality, it would not be logical to anticipate the eclipse of Greek nationalism<sup>xviii</sup>. Also, the hypothesis would be plausible that international fluctuations would potentially add to older and more neighbourly opponents of Greek nationalism, new, more distant and at the same time more invincible opponents, against which the said Greek nationalism would harbour the same feelings of helpless rage and rabidness as e.g. against “Americans and NATO” in the 1970s<sup>xix</sup>. The consequences would be particularly weighty if this time some of the most significant partners within the framework of the European Community were to turn into such opponents, which would do (as is most probable for them to do) two things: on the one hand, they would ignore whatever Greeks consider to be their national rights by adopting in the corresponding matters either the position of Greece’s opponents, or in any case, a position in accordance with their own regional interests; and on the other hand, they would deny funding any further Greek parasitical consumerism, enforcing on the Greek economy a strict diet of getting healthy in terms of the economy, and by bringing the Greek standard of living back to the height [[i.e. low]] which its abilities permit<sup>xx</sup>. An outbreak (flare-up) of Greek nationalism on the occasion of serious disputes with European Community partners would

mean at least de facto that today's Greek dream of parasitical consumerism within the womb – and at the expense – of a united Europe would collapse<sup>xxi</sup>. The vicious circle/vicious game of loaned prosperity with payment being national selling off (i.e. the selling off of national assets), could perhaps be prolonged for a long time inside the greenhouse of a Europe in a coalition or league, owing to the fears of the Cold War, and economically robust, thanks to American political-military support. However, as much as it seems strange, the end of the Cold War brought about the end of such greenhouses; the European Powers are called upon for them themselves to now pay the expenses of their regional and world obligations or desires, and a new period is beginning whereby everyone counts – up to their last shilling or nickel (five-cent coin) – (political and economic) revenues (income) and expenses, whilst preparing themselves for the new and acute rivalries and competition looming on the horizon<sup>xxii</sup>. Under these circumstances, Greece would have to have at its disposal singular and irreplaceable geopolitical or strategic advantages in order to exchange for them, its parasitical consumerism – yet, it does not have those advantages at its disposal, and that means that even also the continuation of the national selling off to the more powerful Europeans and other partners not only will not be able to secure in part free sustenance, but cannot even guarantee at least the political-military protection of Greek national existence (hypostasis). The seeking of a protector is in vain, not because the proud Greeks do not ask for and do not want protection, but because no-one offers it without objection and irrevocably. This is today's state of affairs in respect of the Greek nation, after about seven decades of geopolitical and social-political shrinking (shrinkage).

Thus, posed again – via other paths and with other coordinates – is the classic problem of national survival, which many believed they would solve comfortably and jovially with “European unification”. Others again advocate

that every formulation of such problems, and generally any kind of concentrating whatsoever of political thought on the nation, signifies an atavism to be rejected. Whoever does not want to confuse his wishes with reality ought to ascertain that – as much as this seems to be sad as regards the prospects of world society – the nation, as a basic unit of political grouping (group formation), and consequently its survival, as the guarantee for the natural and political-social survival of specific people, have not in the least, in practice, been surpassed either at a European, or at a world level. In this book we explained why the perception is erroneous that economic mergers and international standardisations (formalisations, unifications) of law (right) or of ethics can by themselves create supra-national unities. As the behaviour of great European and extra-European [[i.e. non-European]] Powers after the Cold War – to whomever follows and observes such behaviour carefully – shows, these great Powers do not at all consider that the merging of economies will abolish national economic and other interests, or that the relocation (moving) of the centre of gravity towards matters of the economy, will efface (wipe (blot) out, eliminate) national antagonisms. The smaller nations, including the Greek nation, ought to deduce their conclusions from these observations. The fusion (merging) of politics with the economy does not mean the abolition of politics, and indeed of national politics (policy), but begets (provokes, brings on) an all-the-more close connection between economic and national success or failure. This is crystal-clear in the narrower military sector; equally obvious will it, however, become as to the whole national-economic spectrum, to the extent that energy, population, ecological and related factors obtain in the phase of planetary politics now underway, privileged significance for the survival of individual nations. In such a case, only he who does timely and persistent preparation will be saved in the long run – and a small nation perhaps needs greater foresight than large nations.

As someone perceives and understands (fathoms), the mass-democratic removal or obliteration (elimination, eradication) of the programmatic bourgeois-liberal separations (divisions, segregations, dissociations, demarcations) between the government(al), economic, political, cultural or ethical sphere etc. made the problem of the economy, and at the same time that of national survival, much more synthetic, composite and complex than what it was in the epoch of 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalism. The sphericity of the contemporary economic problem demands sphericity and collectivity of effort for its resolution, that is to say, it demands its conception and comprehension as a problem of national survival. Given mass-democratic pluralism and the weakening of traditional ideological cohesive-cohering bonds, the efficient social division of labour, and the harmonising of individual efforts so that social parasitism from above and from below is limited as much as possible, constitute a condition of social cohesion of greater essence than in previous societies. Today's Greek nation would have to view its economic rationalisation precisely as a fight against parasitism, as the replacement of a social co-existence where one "branch" lives by sponging off and sucking dry directly or indirectly (i.e. through the government(al) handling and management of public resources) some other "branch", whilst everyone lives all together by mortgaging the national future, [[with such a replacement being carried out]] by a social cohesion in the aforementioned functional sense [[of mass-democratic removal and obliteration of bourgeois-liberal separations between the various social spheres]]. This entails so many things, so many and radical changes to so many different levels that it is more than doubtful whether it can today be realised, i.e. put into practice, to a determinative (crucial, great) extent. But here we are talking only about what are the necessary preconditions of a national policy (politics), i.e. a policy (politics) with the purpose and goal of national survival, without also arguing that such a national policy is feasible anymore. The correct therapy does not always start in time.

The fact, which unimaginably complicates today's Greek situation by making this situation seem in principle without having a way out, is that the transcending (overcoming) of parasitic consumerism more specifically, and of social and of historical parasitism more generally; the rationalisation of the economy and of the national effort as a whole, do not run and bump into the organised interests of a minority, which at the end of the day (after all) could be put aside (sidelined) with any means whatsoever, and especially with the (moral) support of the great majority. Things are exactly the reverse. The vast majority of the Greek people of all social strata has in the meanwhile interwoven, according to ways which are classically simple or infinitely inventive, its existence and its (pre)occupations, engagements and involvements with the cast of mind (mindset, mentality), and with the practice, of parasitical consumption and of social parasitism. In order to be more precise, of course, we have to add that in relation to contemporary Greece, the concept of parasitism can only be used as an oxymoron: because here it is not a matter of a more or less healthy national body or trunk, which has a number of superfluous and redundant elements of vigour and of vitality so as to also feed and nourish some parasites which are quantitatively negligible, but it is a matter of a flabby (floppy, pulpy, flaccid) body which behaves parasitically as a whole to the detriment of its whole self, that is to say, it eats its own flesh and most often its own (pieces of) excrement<sup>xxiii</sup>. The social and individual behaviours, which as if by fate flourish in such a microbiological environment mashed and jumbled up in centuries of servilely kowtowing to Ottoman Turk Mohammedans, Balkan patriarchalism and client-voter/politician parliamentarism, constitute the extreme opposition and the main barrier towards every conception as well as comprehension of, and solution to, the problems of national survival on the basis of long-term and organised collective effort. Today's psycho-spiritual pauperisation and wretchedness of the Greek people in its totality is not meant, nevertheless, here in the narrow sense of various ethicists and moralists, but

primarily as a political magnitude: it rests on the persistent and self-interested (self-seeking, selfish) disregard of the hard, undefeatable and ineluctable relationship which exists between performance (efficiency, results, output, productivity) and enjoyment (pleasure), and as an extension of that, on the indifference vis-à-vis the undermining of the national future on account of enjoyments and pleasures not covered by the corresponding performance (efficiency, results, etc.). As a mitigating factor or extenuating circumstance, one must perhaps consider that most Greeks do not know or realise what “performance (efficiency, etc.)” is at all in the contemporary (current) sense, and often believe that they are performing and being efficient and producing results (output) because they sweat a lot, shout a lot and run around from morning until night. However, that only changes the practical result a little bit. The disharmony between enjoyment (pleasure) and performance etc. was tolerated for as long as enjoyment (pleasure) was very inadequate, and for as long as performance etc. was not measured always with the means of advanced competitive economies. But during recent decades both of these terms were converted or turned inside-out: the economic borders fell[[, i.e. were eliminated or opened]], at least in so far as the measure of performance (productivity, efficiency, results, output) was concerned, since it is not possible for the (continually increasing) imported goods to be evaluated with one measure of performance etc., and exported goods with another measure of performance etc., and thus whoever wants to import goods without selling himself off must export an equal *performance* etc.; the perceptions and views about what enjoyment (pleasure) means were oriented, again, on a mass scale towards the models of advanced consumer societies, so that the distance from them (i.e. the said advanced consumer societies) becomes felt by most or nearly everyone as (de)privation. Thus, the distance between enjoyment and performance became explosive, with the result that of recent times certain elementary economic truths became topical again which Greece thought had overcome them with the

simple method of borrowing. Given, however, the casts of mind and the behaviours which we pointed out above, these truths did not act as a catalyst for productive acts, but rather as a catalyst for/of recriminations, whose infertility intensified collective bewilderment (perplexity) aboulia, i.e. lack of will power and ability to decide and act independently. In actual fact, for anyone who is not because of his profession and selfishly (self-interestedly) obliged (as a politician, for instance) to nurture and to disseminate illusions, it is obvious that the country is sinking into social lethargy and into collective inaction, that is to say, the social act has been substituted with/by reflexive movements (motions): the puppet or wriggler (child who fidgets) moves too, but it does not act. The sense of decomposition is general and predominates in all discussions, whilst the equally diffuse and pervasive dysphoria (dejection) lets and blows off steam and becomes relieved all the more easily, all the more often, in provocative aggressivity and in ostentatious vulgarity.

Today's situation in respect of (the) "political world (people)" is not essentially a far cry from the general situation of the chosen people (i.e. the people chosen by God), and also constitutes a most powerful obstacle to the rationalisation of national policy (politics). If the "political world/people" sometimes appear to be worse than the "people", whereas it/they are simply the same, the reason is that the "people", or as many people who speak on each and every respective occasion for the "people", have a tactical advantage vis-à-vis the "political world": those who speak from, or on behalf of, the "people" can call the "people" unable (incapable, incompetent, impotent, incapacitated), or corrupt, without being afraid of unpleasant consequences – on the contrary, indeed, they acquire the much-valued (precious) and redeemable titles of public castigators and censurers. Woe betide, however, a parliamentary politician if he dares to call the citizenry (municipality) idiots/idiotic or self-interested (self-seeking, selfish) and indifferent to the national future; his career to a great

degree depends on his ability to praise the great psychical virtues and discernment, good judgement or at least the infallible instinct “of our people”<sup>xxiv</sup>. Nevertheless, we do not have any indications to hypothesise that many Greek politicians nowadays confront the dilemma of the choice between frankness and career. They themselves, in their greatest majority, are so kneaded, i.e. mixed up in and connected with, the various (not necessarily always the same) manifestations of that which constitutes today’s psycho-spiritual pauperisation and wretchedness of the Greek people that they do not even need to hide a contempt which they do not have enough of a level to sense; probably by admiring the people, they admire their own selves as the people’s leader, and probably by showing understanding towards others, they beg for clemency and lenience for themselves. Between them, incidentally, if not an unambiguous and clear conscience, at any rate, the practice that they also constitute – just like all the other social groups too – a branch with particular, special interests, with the only difference being that this branch services its particular, special interests by handling and selling off general interests for the benefit of most populous third parties, has been consolidated. The extreme and more pernicious and ruinous case of this practice was the inclusion of the country on the path/road of parasitical consumerism, and the modernised consolidation of social parasitism, in exchange for the favouritism “of the people”, that is, the possession of power, dominance, domination (authority, control, dominion, (holding) sway). Such a “political world” will not ever be able as a whole to pose/posit/set and solve the problem/question of national policy and national survival, but only opportunistically and verbally; it is not only the same procurer (promoter, pimp, panderer), but also the product of social parasitism, incapable as of its nature to oppose the “people” when the “people” demand the selling off of the nation in order to consume more and work less. Apart from that, this “political world” is incapable of doing something different than whatever it does on account of its level and its quality

(fundamental characteristic). That today's Greek "political world", parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, is constituted at the very most by lightweight up to ridiculous and farcical persons, does not constitute an open secret (common knowledge) at all; it constitutes a source of a wry public smile, often with the cooperation and joint action of the same people being laughed at and made fun of. The few, who have knowledge and a conscience, who had something and maintain something within or amongst their shallow, careerist or simply pseudo-magkes (i.e. (pretend) Greek-style tough and crafty, wise guy(s)) colleagues, also swallow their tongue or speak with added verbal gyrations when the topics and themes become marginal, i.e. risky, for their political survival.

The partyisation of the great matters (themes, topics) of national policy (politics), i.e. the turning of the great issues of national policy into issues of [[base]] party politics, and their wild internal exploitation is universally known (very well known) already from the fact that everyone lays the blame for such exploitation on everyone else – and thus perpetuate this exploitation. At this point, the national inadequacy of the Greek "political world" becomes crystal-clear, and so does at the same time its organic communication and interaction with today's situation of Greek society, which renders it incapable of coming up against and opposing Greek society, and of guiding it. The fragmentation of perceptions and of views about Greek national policy/politics, its micropolitical handling and its connection with matters of personal prestige, reflect the fragmentation of the social body, the disorientation of the whole, owing to the self-interested (selfish, self-seeking) and parasitical orientation of individuals and of groups. In this context (Within this framework), it would of course be in vain for anyone to expect of contemporaneous Greek intellectuals to give whatever the – according to the evidence, i.e. proven/concluded to be, more competent and pertinent – "political world" is unable to give. Not only because

they themselves (i.e. our contemporaneous Greek intellectuals) are fragmented into groups, also fragmented into – largely – autistic individuals, not only because their general education and learning reminds one – as to this education’s quality and its constitution – of the speculator-double-crosser and improvisatory character of Greek national activity; not only because they usually know even less about world political-economic developments than all the superficial and nonsensical stuff that is written in Greek newspapers; but for an additional reason too: because they perceive and apprehend politics on the basis of philological or moralistic categories, and make (undertake) political adjudications at the level of corresponding wishy-washy generalisations. Most or nearly most “leftist” intellectuals spent their life as if they were Canonarchs leading readings and chants in church in proper tones about the economy being the “base” and the rest [[of society]], the “superstructure”, without nonetheless ever being informed of what national income means, or the balance of payments, and without ever trying to understand the specific, concrete problems of their country starting (also) from such magnitudes<sup>xxv</sup>. For others again, who preach the superiority and or the omnipotence of “culture/civilisation”, or of the “spirit(-intellect)”, looking at things from on high or ignorance of economic, geopolitical or military factors, can also roughly constitute a title i.e. badge of honour. Of course, an old and tested sociological distinction tells us that an intellectual and a scientist are two different things, since the main concern of the second (i.e. the scientist) is the deduction or inference (derivation) of findings from the methodically processed gathering and classification of empirical material, whereas the first (i.e. the intellectual) is interested more in appearing as the spiritual leader of society through the declaration of various ethical, aesthetic and other ideals. From this point of view, one should not have to expect from Greek *intellectuals* to offer whatever by definition they cannot give<sup>xxvi</sup>. Greece’s disadvantage in relation to other countries is the lack of a political science constituted on a pragmatistic basis and exercised by *scientists*,

which counterbalances inside the public dialogue, the nonsensical, incoherent chatter, the empty words of hope and the philosophies of the vine, i.e. philosophising without being serious and whilst under the influence of alcohol.

The sociological dysmorphia, i.e. malformation, of select or handpicked groups, but also of the wider whole of today's Greek society, does not simply hinder and obstruct the application of an effective national policy which in itself has ([[or]] could have) been planned on paper. It obstructs this very same effective national policy's conception and outlining. In actual fact, the basic views which are delineated on this theme/topic are neither cohesive and detailed (rather there would have to be talk of slack, loose and in part interlocking tendencies), nor are they deprived (and out of luck/fortune) as to unilateralism and as to baselessness. The "European orientation" of our country today appears as the dominant and more widely accepted national policy, with its end (final, ultimate) goal being Greece's organic accession and incorporation in an economically and politically-militarily united Europe, with whose help Greece would both modernise its economy and would ensure its integrity – in short, it would solve the problem of its national viability. I am very much afraid that from this perspective – for the most part – not real possibilities are being reflected, but pious wishes mixed with mythological constructs. Just as, i.e. unwearied and untiring Greek mythological fantasy only a little while ago attributed all woes and sufferings (trials and tribulations) to the gloomy, dismal plans and machinations of the United States, so too now it anticipates all good [[to come]] from the opposite mythologem, that of generous and solidary (characterised by solidarity) "Europe". It is not difficult for someone to perceive and apprehend that, from a psychological viewpoint, the European panacea constitutes one more disguise of late local(ised) eudaemonism, which dreams of inexhaustible sources of subsidies, and at the same time the at least indirect securing of borders by foreign arms, so that Greece is fortified on all sides and

“sits back and relaxes”. Nonetheless, even also a knowledge of international affairs as incomplete as that which is encountered as a rule in Greece, would be enough for an essential presupposition and precondition of the European perspective and prospect to be considered in practice unsound, i.e. the conviction that “Europe” will someday constitute, if not a real political unity, at any rate, an aggregate (ensemble) of states able to act in every case unitedly and decisively; both the intensity of the planetary competition and rivalries, as well as the making acute of the problem of intra-European hegemony, particularly after German reunification, will more likely/probably reinforce the centrifugal rather than the centripetal forces<sup>xxvii</sup> on the European continent, and to say nothing at all of the imminent widening/expansion of the European Community or of future developments in Eastern Europe. The creaks which are heard in the foundations of the European political system, as well as in the largest European countries, whilst the prestige of the establishment political parties collapses (tumbles), [[and]] whereas new parties are arriving on the scene; the looming in the immediate future economic stagnation, and the narrowness, i.e. limits of resources related to and following that; ecological and population upheavals and turmoil: all of that, together with other things, events and phenomena, will throw, i.e. send every nation back to its own strengths, powers and forces, since it is easier for everyone to participate in common prosperity than for one [[country]] to carry the load of another [[country]]. In this case, inside the belly/womb (within) “Europe”, we would more likely have a coalition of the powerful for the purpose of freeing themselves from the weak or incapable (useless), rather than brotherly distribution towards the relieving of all those who tarried or were lacking.

But even if we accept the opposite (contrary) case/instance, that is to say, “Europe” unites, next to its economic, also its political-military volition, then again it is not in the least also certain that this volition will coincide on crucial

points with the Greek volition – if until then, Greek national volition exists. At any rate, the final months of 1992 showed, and the following months will show ever more perspicuously, that Greece’s European partners by no means share the desires and pursuits of Greece as far as Greece’s relations with its immediate (direct) neighbours are concerned (indeed some of these European partners regard Greece as a fanciful, whimsical noisemaker and troublemaker), and that they are disposed to regulate their stance vis-à-vis the related problems on the basis of their own views and their own interests. Whoever vis-à-vis this reality also starts again their moralistic and ethicising laments and would rend or tear their clothes in rage or grief seeking [[what is]] “right and what is just”, would merely prove that he is still at the infant stage of his political age. It would be much more dignified – and more fertile – if the Greek nation gritted its teeth and bit the bullet and drew a bitter, but vital double conclusion: today’s Greece constitutes within the framework of the international community a small-time province<sup>xxviii</sup>, which, to a great extent [[because]] of its own culpability, is not only weak and impotent, but also contemptible and not to be taken seriously or into consideration, and for that reason during every great crisis Greece will find itself equally alone as for instance also in 1974<sup>xxix</sup>. Of course, such a sober ascertainment must do and be everything but lead to a – not in the least sober – disposition to cut loose from every alliance and every kind of accession to, and incorporation in, supra-national organisations/set-ups. But, if we remember all of what we said earlier in relation to the presuppositions and prerequisites for the activation of alliances, and we transfer them to the relations of Greece with the European Community, we shall see that only a powerful (and in times of need, self-sufficient and autarkic) Greece will add political weight and gravity to European accession, whilst being respectable to its partners; as experience shows on a daily basis, accession of or on its own neither constitutes an economic or political panacea, nor does it strengthen Greece automatically inside its particular geographic region. Perhaps it appears to be paradoxical, but

in the context of an effectual and long-lasting, enduring national policy, becoming European – and modernisation more generally – must proceed precisely so that a hardened and unable-to-be-changed-or-destroyed Greece is not an accessory (part, component, appurtenance) or laughing stock, prey and plaything of “Europe”; so that Greece is in a position, if needed/need be, to go its own way as dictated by its own interests when they clash with those of its European partners<sup>xxx</sup>.

So, “European accession and integration” will by no means solve the great problems of Greek national policy in the linear manner which many Greek “Europeanists” imagine, posing from now as sophisticated, cunning, and hyper-mature “Europeans”. Additionally, however, the said great problems would not be solved by a Hellenocentric doubling back and withdrawing into ourselves, which on the one hand is useful so one can remember now and then that in the final analysis one must stand on one’s own two feet since one cannot get out one’s own skin (i.e. consistently deny to himself who he is), yet is rendered damaging and harmful when as a proposal it attaches to various inanities totally ignorant of history which contradistinguish the “spiritual” East to the “thinking-in-terms-of-matter” West, etc.. Such perceptions and views can be of use only as ideological overcompensations (over-replenishments) of frequently humbled peoples and with the slightest contribution to contemporary (modern) culture/civilisation; they are not offered, however, as a compass for a national policy/politics on today’s planet. Because, putting at the centre of attention ethical or metaphysical magnitudes, deceives or cheats the spirits(-intellects), since these ethical or metaphysical magnitudes cover up/overlay – under intellectualistic arbitrary sayings (equivocations) – the determinative and crucial meaning and significance of the method of economising for a contemporary society, and the existential dangers (risks) of an essential neglectfulness (laxity) and failure to act (delay, tarrying) on this point. Here it must be underlined that the usual

contrasting or opposition of the modernising tendencies vis-à-vis the cultivation of the national tradition is simplistic and misleading. Only effectively proceeding in respect of – and the fruitful going about – the modernising effort, allows successful rivalry (competition, emulation) with other nations and thus donates (gives away), or endows one with, that self-conviction which permits the problem-free (trouble-free) regular and or close contact and dealing with national tradition, and renders aping [[other cultures and or ways, habits, modes, traditions, customs, etc.]] psychologically superfluous. On the contrary, the inability of a nation to compete with/against other nations in regard to what today – for good or ill – is considered the central field of social activity sets in motion a double overcompensating (over-replenishing) mechanism: aping as the attempt at substituting with pretences and superficialities (veneers, guises, surface appearances) whatever you do not possess as substance/essence (i.e. substantively and in depth), and, the worship of tradition (Tradition) as a counterbalance (counterweight) to aping. From that point of view, Hellenocentrism based on repenting for one's misery so that one can be pitied and helped by others, and, cosmopolitan aping, constitute symmetrical and related magnitudes, as much as they phenomenally represent two worlds inimical as between themselves. Only modernisation on the basis of long-lasting (enduring, long-term) national policy/politics and of national renewal will create the circumstances of psychological health so that *both* the necessity for modernisation (in the form of technical-economic rationality) is affirmed *and* the narrowness of tradition is felt; *and* the dangerous antinomies of the modern world are ascertained coolly and dispassionately *and* national tradition is lived and experienced without inferiority or superiority complexes (complexes of inferiority or of superiority).

And the final tendency – about which we shall not speak in depth – in relation to Greek national policy/politics, does not have at its disposal any notable and

mass political bearer<sup>xxx1</sup>, but rather is diffuse like the previous tendency [[of using and abusing Hellenocentrism and Hellenic Tradition to overcompensate for an inability to effectively and successfully modernise including vis-à-vis other nations and or states.]] It spreads to varying degrees of unclarity and ambiguity mainly inside the area or realm of the broader Left, even though sometimes it acts as a fellow traveller with the politics and policy of European accession and integration, if and since from such accession, the blunting of nationalisms is anticipated, and the promotion of peace or the fraternisation between the peoples through the elimination (obliteration) of borders, the catholic (general, universal) application (enforcement) of human rights etc. etc.. Such, deep down apolitical<sup>xxx2</sup>, pious wishes constitute in essence the left-wing version or variation of mass-democratic eudaemonism, which dreams of a situation where collective efforts and collective sacrifices are superfluous, and dresses its unwillingness with regard to such efforts and sacrifices with pseudo-ethical deontologies. After the collapse of the communist(ic) movement, similar and related perceptions and views fulfil an additional psychological function. Many people, whose hopes, diagnoses and prognoses were utterly falsified, and who now do not have enough dignity to become silent and to ask themselves if they are perhaps unable to understand what is happening in the world, but rather, conversely, continue undauntedly their ambitious political career, or writing career, by invoking or appealing to their indissoluble and eternal faith in “the future of man/humans” and in “progress” – many such people, therefore, today seek substitutes for the old orthodox socialist(ic) utopias in murky pacifisms and in universalistic moralising and ethicising. They think that with the stressing the great(est) common denominator – and with the reminding – of their always undiminished humanistic mindset, they will build a bridge between their positionings of yesterday, and of today, [[and]] in this way will erase from the memory of others, their political gaffes and blunders, and entertain the well-founded doubts regarding their intellectual(-spiritual) abilities as far as the

conception and comprehension of political situations is concerned. Yet their endeavours and hard work (toiling) seem to go to waste. Because their new theological rantings and ravings too, are as very distant and as far away as their old such rantings and ravings are from the driving (motive) forces of contemporary planetary history, and from the character of politics. He is politically an infant who refers to the allegedly general contemporary trends in respect of the transcending of the nation-state, and with regard to the gradual collapsing and elimination of borders, by remaining silent about the fact that armies, i.e. masses of tourists crossing or passing through one's borders, and the troops of a neighbouring country passing through one's borders, are two very different things. And equally politically infantile are those who imagine that "human rights" can constitute the immovable criterion for the exercising of national politics by neglecting the specific influence and use of human rights in every political conjuncture. In order to say it honestly, bluntly and explicitly: it would be something like national suicide if today Greece primarily cared about the human rights of the Muslims of Bosnia, supporting, inter alia, also their right to self-determination and to form a second Muslim state in the Balkans. It appears, however, that the instinct of national self-preservation functions mutely on the one hand, but also infallibly in regard to the zealots of pacifism and of human rights beside (near, amongst) us. None of them rallied and protested in favour of the Muslim Bosnians like for instance they would rally and protest in favour of Turkey's Kurds; moreover, no-one seemed to be particularly bothered when a few years ago the Turkish minority of Bulgaria was systematically being persecuted. Such acts and omissions are not of course dictated by bad faith or conscious calculation; rather, they express subconscious automatisms which in turn render obvious the factual inability of a realistic national policy/politics being supported by pure[[ly]] (unmixed) universal principles.

Let us repeat, in closing, that the purpose and goal of these brief observations was not – nor could it be – the formulation of specific proposals regarding the specific problems which Greek foreign policy (external politics) confronts today. We wanted to stress the simple and elementary truth that an effective and long-lasting, enduring national policy can flow and result only from a thriving and flourishing national entity *conditio sine qua non*. What someone, who has at his disposal this necessary precondition and prerequisite, will do as regards individual matters of concern, depends on each and every respective correlation of forces, on all his respective needs and pursuits. In order for one to walk, one must first of all have legs; the where, how and when to go, one does not always know in advance, and one does not always determine it himself. Most often, today's Greek national policy reminds us of someone who does not fret and worry and is not concerned, because he does not have legs, whilst believing at the crucial moment he will grow wings. Such a stance does not foreshadow anything good; in actual fact, a sober assessment probably ends up at a finding that it is extremely doubtful if Greece will take the strenuous, labourious, painful and rough road/path of internal rectification and recovery, which alone would give it the preconditions for the exercising of a national policy (politics) capable of coping with the exceptionally arduous circumstances of today's planetary conjuncture. Greece will probably continue to hover and float awkwardly between European hopes and over-compensating (over-replenishing) neurotic nationalism, belonging to Europe – with its aping, and to the Balkans – with whatever is most pure which it has: its misery and provincialism. This is what behooves one, – who today attempts a diagnosis beyond desires and fears, sympathies and antipathies –, to say. Neither am I ignorant of, nor do I forget, the extremely honourary individual exceptions to the norms and rules which govern and control the functioning of today's Greek society. However, the exceptions cannot constitute the object of a brief sociological and political analysis, when the norms and rules are so glaringly

obvious, and so burdensome. Many perhaps will find various expressions of those which were used in the description above overly, excessively and exceedingly caustic. They will of course be those who still have not understood that in Greece, there are no longer any margins and there is no room for minced words, doublespeak and discreet hints, allusions and insinuations.

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## **ENDNOTES**

**All endnotes are by the Translator, have absolutely nothing to do with P.K., and readers are advised to ignore all of them except for the first endnote, which is informative and apolitical. The other endnotes are mostly exercises in silliness (though containing at least some empirical truth!) and do not imply or otherwise support any kind of normative-political-ideological programme of change whatsoever. EVERYBODY MUST OBEY AND ABIDE BY THE LAW AT ALL TIMES WITHOUT QUESTION!**

<sup>i</sup> Κονδύλης Παναγιώτης, *Πλανητική πολιτική μετά τον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο* (= *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*), έκδ. Θεμέλιο, Αθήναι, 1992, σσ. 151-179. Translated by C.F., ©, October 2018. When I translated *Planetarische Politik...* into English in 2014, I didn't translate this Addendum, probably because I was lazy. But everything P.K. wrote contains invaluable insights for everyone, even if the main topic under discussion (today's "Greece") is not of particular interest e.g. to non-Greeks.

<sup>ii</sup> A reference to the beginning of the "Yugoslav Wars" (1991-2001), which were of course just as much German and Zio-USA wars in the Balkans as "Yugoslav Wars", given Russia's inability at the time to play any meaningful role. The 2018 Zio-USA demand for the inclusion of Skopje/FYROM in NATO as "(Northern) Macedonia". from the Greek point of view does not bode well for the future (as to e.g. possible future German-imperialistic moves to take control of the whole region of Macedonia incl. re: pipelines, trade, etc., i.e. breaking up Greece even further), as is the case with the great Mohammedan-Asiatic-African invasions (violence, crime, disease-spreading, raping, etc.) picking up a full head of steam from 2015 (but having begun in the 1990s), owing to both Ephialtes of Trachis Greek Zio-Lobotomised traitors; and – in addition to Turkey having every geopolitical and other reason in the world to flood the former Greece with Mohammedan and other APE-ANOMIC "animals", i.e. humans – owing also to Zio-USA and German imperialisms (incl. Middle Eastern and Central Asian wars and conflict etc.), along with all the Satanic Circus Monkey Billionaires promoting "open borders", etc..

<sup>iii</sup> Because of ignorance, and the events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the history of the modern Greek state, Greece is by and large seen as "a Western country-protectorate" when the 3,500 to 4,000 year-old history of Hellenism posits Greece – at least macro-historically seen – as its own Space between Western Europe and the Persian and

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later Turkic and Mohammedan East (given that as far as the history of Hellenism is concerned, the Indian and Chinese East was in the main too distant to have any significant impact).

<sup>iv</sup> P.K. is saying this in 1992 about migrants – including Greeks and those of Greek origin – from Northern Epirus, Albania and the former Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc! What would he have said about the Great APE-ANOMIE Asiatic-African Mohammedan invasions of Crime, Disease Spreading, Raping, Violence, Pestilence, etc. promoted by Satanic Circus Monkey Billionaires and German and ZIO-USA (and of course Turkish) imperialisms in the 2000s and 2010s!!!

<sup>v</sup> These clowns are more often than not FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISED “Professors” and “Experienced Award-Winning Journalists” – not to mention the nearly always TOTALLY RETARDED politicians – who have been instructed by ZIO-USA-Embassies and or ZIO-USA and German funded “Institutes, Think Tanks” etc., to further the interest of ZIO-USA and or German (and even Turkish) imperialisms.

<sup>vi</sup> I interpret this as being P.K. sarcasm and irony – that as long as there is no immediate danger, things are left to decay as if there were no problem, and when the “hour of truth” strikes/arrives, no-one is prepared and ready to do what needs to be done, having in the interim fallen asleep at the wheel, etc..

<sup>vii</sup> Everyone interested and with a brain can see that in 2018 the USA has e.g. 10 points of Power, Russia has 7 points of Power (but also has the capacity or potential to land Knock Out blows), China is “being wise” pretending it’s still at 5 points, and Greece is not even worth 1 point, whereas Turkey could be heading towards 5 or 6 points, if it plays its cards right.

<sup>viii</sup> Whilst modern Greece’s second greatest prime minister – Venizelos – as a “British-French Imperialist Agent” achieved much in expanding the Greek state to include Greek population groups outside of the Greek state before he came to power, civil strife and loss of elections, found the Greek Army overstretching way too much incl. for our “allies” (small or tiny Powers don’t have much of a choice on who their “allies” are) by heading towards present-day Iraq instead of securing Smyrna and its surrounds, and this resulted in the Catastrophe of 1922. The Soviet Union was also pro-Turkey at that time – and that did not help our cause at all.

<sup>ix</sup> 1948. Of course, a macro-historical view of Hellenism would date the commencement of our woes to e.g. 1071 or 1204 A.D. (if not the Schism of 1054), but it is not P.K.’s purpose to go back that far in this Addendum.

<sup>x</sup> In the case of Turkey, one only needs to observe Erdogan’s visits to Europe to see how the Turkish diaspora respond to Mother Turkey. In our case, since the 1990s, which coincided with the Advance of Zio-Satanic ethno-nihilism and “multi-culturalism” in Greece including the funding of “Greek intellectuals” by Germans and ZIO-USA-UK Satanists and other Billionaires who GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY “just happen” to be ZIO-Satanists, it has become apparent that there is no desire on the part of the Greek state to do anything constructive with people of Greek origin living abroad, and now – under FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMY, the auto-genocidal notion of “anti-racism”, whereby you AUTO-GENOCIDE yourself out of existence so other races can exist and even conquer you (!!!), whilst the Satanic Circus Monkey Compound and Bunker has FULLY SEALED BORDERS –, I’d say there’s next to no hope for anything constructive to take place. All one can do is CURSE SATAN and its SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY and wish the MEN – whether they are Han, and or Hindu, and or Rus, and or Ape, and or ??? – the best of luck in doing what they have to do. The representatives of SATAN and TOTAL EVIL must – and eventually, sooner or later, they will – meet their FATE!!!

<sup>xi</sup> Whatever relative autonomy existed – as little as it was – has by 2018 well and truly “disappeared” under ZIO-USA-UK and German and Turkish imperialistic auspices regarding the territory of “Greece” which is literally aborting and Ape-invasion-Zio-worshipping itself out of existence, whilst the Satanic Circus Monkey Compound and Bunker has FULLY SHUT BORDERS, through which not even a quarter of one mosquito can pass. On the other hand – and to be fair to the imperialistic or hegemonic Powers – if small countries don’t know how, and or don’t want to, survive under imperialistic hegemony, then that’s – at the end of the day – their problem and FULLY their own responsibility, notwithstanding all the machinations of the Zio-Protestant-Catholic-US/UK-Satanists, the Teuton-HUNS, the Turkic Barbarians, et al..

<sup>xii</sup> To my Greek compatriots: if P.K. wrote this in 1992, what would he write in 2018? It’s over Brothers and Sisters, though, for as long as there is life, you must fight the good fight as best you can – there is no other choice, *καὶ ΘΕΟΣ ΒΟΗΘΟΣ!*

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**xiii In this sense my woman and I were cursed before we were born, and the least we can do is CURSE SATAN in return! DEATH TO SATAN! Who is the representative of Satan again who GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY is involved in printing and circulating the money for centuries now including via European and ZIO-USA imperialisms? Who? Who? Who? I wonder who? DEATH TO SATAN and IT's EVIL-DEVIL REPRESENTATIVES!** [[On the other hand, reality cannot be changed by

cursing, so we all have to do the best we can with what we've got – there's no other choice – but if it pleases me to “let off steam” by cursing SATAN, then so I shall CURSE THE EVIL, FILTHY, DISGUSTING, ULTRA-UGLY SATANIC MOTHER-FUCKER and PARENT OF THE SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY (SCM). DIE SCM, DIE! DIE! DIE! Obviously, any “Professors” or “Diplomats” or “Politicians” or “Public Personae” or “Seekers of Fame and Fortune” et al. out there have to use different language. Obviously, I, though, am not one of them, and the best way to keep people away from P.K. – particularly THE VILE (MIS)INTERPRETERS – those EVIL, SATANIC PIECES OF EXCREMENT – is to SWEAR AT AND CURSE SATAN... AND (ALMOST) EVERYONE ELSE!]]

<sup>xiv</sup> When it's your people who are not having children, are not working, are not producing what is necessary to collectively survive, and when you love your people, your identity, your history, your myths, your culture,... it really does hurt. And P.K. has said it all – and far more dignified than me, because he would never have (primarily) blamed others – not even SATAN. DEATH TO SATAN! [[As to calling a woman a “low-life” or “slut”, one could argue that the language is value-judgemental, inappropriate, rude, etc., but at the end of the day it's just a dramatic way of saying: “a woman who does not act – at least outwardly – in accordance with patriarchal Christian Tradition as to child-rearing and family life and prefers to hang around bars, clubs, dives, etc. engaging, inter alia, wantonly – based primarily on impulse and pleasure-seeking without consideration for both personal and public matters of health, social cohesion, the biological reproduction of our Race, Ethnos, Genos, etc. – in sexual encounters with almost anything that is alive and moves”. And of course the men are just as much to blame as the women if birth-rates are well below the replacement level and the MASS APE-ANOMIE INVASIONS are not resisted, but even encouraged or welcomed in not a few instances of both generalised ZIO-LOBOTOMY and or of NGO-SATAN money-making.]]

<sup>xv</sup> To me, this clearly means, if you can't stand on your own two feet as a nation-state, then you can't even *consider* the option of e.g. allying yourself with Russia – or rather using the threat of going over to Russia to get a better deal from your current ZIO-USA-UK overlord, which of course is what the Heart commands (but not necessarily the MIND) against the INHERENTLY EVIL DEVIL-SATANISM of femino-faggotising, Other-worshipping, Islamophilic, Homophilic, Negrophilic, FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISED, autophobic, self-phobic, Heterosexualphobic, misandrist, Christophobic, Russophobic, anti-Hellenic, Protestanto-Catholic-ZIO-FULLY FUCKED-IN-THE-HEAD-AND-HYPER-DEMENTED, low birth-rates-and-auto-genocide-yourself-out-of-existence ZIO-USA (and with Israel having FULLY SHUT BORDERS!). DEATH TO SATAN! (But let's not forget, in the real world of realpolitik there is no realistic choice but to be with the Sea-Naval Zio-Anglo “Forces of EVIL” – so really what should be said is that *we* are “fucked up” and “fucked-in-the-head” for blindly following Satan's social model – we can be ZIO-USA's ally geopolitically, but still retain our Race, Genos, Ethnos, Culture, Tradition, etc. if we are good enough and to the extent such a thing is realistically doable – and of course we've done the exact opposite of what we should have done, and the results are obviously there for everyone to see).



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<sup>xxix</sup> ZIO-USA-Kissinger-UK approval of Turkey conquering about 40% of Cyprus, and with the pathetic Greeks being unable to defend an island that has been a part of Hellenism for more than 3,000 years.

<sup>xxx</sup> Present-day Greece (with Cyprus) (2018), in the demographic-economic-military-political-collective psychological-etc. state it's in, has no hope whatsoever of choosing between "going it alone" or allying itself with "Orthodox Brothers" Serbia and Russia (pulling Bulgaria along too), etc.. That's simply a reality "on the ground" – like it or not.

<sup>xxx1</sup> SYRIZA (= totally ZIO-USA-UK-Israel-Germany-Turkey lobotomised, compliant and servile) in part became a mass, as well as "not notable" (in the positive for Greece sense), political bearer during its years in government, 2015-present(2018).

<sup>xxxii</sup> In so far as they are not realistic political goals but ultimately come – for the purposes of our own theoretical-intellectual abstraction – from an existential desire to keep on living and overcome death, i.e. through the drive of self-preservation and the extension of one's own power, etc. – but not on the basis of cool-headed, dispassionate realism.