

#### 4. Conflict of cultures or conflicts without culture(?)<sup>i</sup>

When Samuel Huntington<sup>ii</sup> – in adopting an expression by Bernard Lewis – declared the “clash of civilisations” to be the key phenomenon of the world-historical epoch beginning, a shudder and shiver descended upon many (*or*: went through wide circles) in the West. Not so much because Huntington as one more scholar next to many others, doubted the ending of history, i.e. that the end of history had come about, through economic universalism (*or*: the universalism of economic liberalism and of “human rights”), but rather because of the suspicion that a conflict of cultures (*or*: a clash between civilisations) must be grimmer and harsher than other conflicts and clashes, that is, a kind of race war, and hence more dangerous for mankind than every simply economic or political antagonism. Thus, to the prophet of more awful things and new woes one pitted partly (at times) humanistic empty words and meaningless phrases, partly (at other times) the belief and conviction in respect of the weakening and dismantling of cultural contrasts and oppositions through the mental and intellectual-spiritual consequences of a united world economy. In that way, however, Huntington’s thesis can at the very outside be spirited away or exorcised. One can directly refute it only with a counter-thesis which likewise indeed reckons with, and includes, conflicts in the future, and at the same time makes plausible that precisely because of these conflicts’ character, the cultural aspect cannot dominate – that therefore precisely the character of the conflicts determines the role and particular weight of the cultural factor and of the cultural self-understanding and of the cultural consciousness of the actors and subjects – not the other way around.

Whoever against that considers cultural differences to be the deeper causes of conflicts, must demonstrate which characteristic elements of the cultures concerned drive towards conflict and why the said elements develop this effect today (*or*: act in particular today with such intensity). Otherwise, the cause of conflict does not have to then be cultural even if the parties of the conflict represent different cultures. Yet Huntington did not proceed methodically so stringently. He talks as if cultures are basically stable substances, conflictual because of their irreducibility (*or*: which beget conflicts because they do not accommodate alteration). Of course, the mere existence of a foreign (alien) culture could be perceived as a provocation, since it belies the self-evidence and bindedness of one's own values (*or*: since in itself it falsifies the conviction that our values are self-evident and generally binding). However, this is not a necessary or sufficient cause of conflict. Because on the one hand, there are extreme conflicts, which came into being or emerge (originate, arise) on common cultural ground – for instance civil wars –, on the other hand, the unease and discomfort as a result of the relativisation of one's own values by foreign (alien) values turns into and becomes (a sense/feeling of) an existential threat and enmity only when that relativisation as a symbolic act is comprehended (*or*: only when a cultural community comprehends this relativisation as a symbolic act), in regard to which sooner or later real acts would have to follow (*or*: tangible acts as opposed to tangible riches, assets and goods will follow). No community lives in fact alone from values, and that is why none wants to die in war for values without any existential reference.

If cultures were the necessary result of irreducible substances and conflicts, then the dividing lines between the cultures would have to be unshakable and unalterable, that is, friendships and enmities eternally, i.e. which would live forever. Also, their self-consciousness would have to outlast the changing of the outside and inside world (*or*: survive every internal and external change).

Historical experience, nonetheless, teaches otherwise (*or*: something very different)<sup>iii</sup>. The setting or placing of a culture vis-à-vis (across from) others, and vis-à-vis (across from) itself, can change slowly or quickly, through the double change in position in the constellation, and subversion of the arrangement, of the historical subjects. The logic of this constellation is in essence, or of its essence, a *political* logic. That is why political logic ultimately determines the historically relevant or weighty interpretations of culture. Because cultural differences cannot flow into, or are not even able to end up in, conflicts if the cultural subjects are not constituted as political collectives or political groups, which for their part interpret culture in accordance with their own goals. Political settings of a goal (i.e. political goals and political objectives) – especially if they are connected with the endeavour and effort at self-preservation – normally prevail against the voice of culture (and of race). A collective or group may wave (fly) the flag of culture as often as this appears to be politically opportune, yet cultural considerations and concerns do not at all determine the said collective or group’s specific acts, and indeed such considerations and concerns are pushed aside when (as soon as) they stand in the way of vital settings of a goal, i.e. goal settings, objectives, goals. It would be absurd to assume that Japan (or at least the Chinese of Taiwan<sup>iv</sup>) would in the future determine or regulate its stance and relations vis-à-vis the United States on the one hand, and China on the other hand, in accordance with the criterion of cultural nearness (proximity). One would also err greatly if one would politically and militarily put pressure on Russia in the belief it belongs to the Christian cultural circle, and could because of that never ally with China against the “West (Occident)”. The United States would rather see the Turks than the Russians in the role of peacekeepers or regional governors, deputies (deputy power of (keeping) order) in the Caucasus, and many Arabs make common cause with “unbelievers” against fundamentalists (*or*: “fundamentalist” co-religionists and people of the same ethnicity).

Huntington put the concept of the cultural circle or culture (civilisation) at the centre of attention in order to underline the fact that the boundaries and limits of the nation-state had now been broken open (blown up, blasted). The combining or equating of the planetary-supra-national dimension of world events (world becoming) with the cultural dimension is, however, by no means compelling (*or*: does not at all constitute, however, a logical necessity). “Culture” is not logically or historically the direct or immediate generic term (supra-concept) vis-à-vis “nation”<sup>v</sup>. That is why after the – supposed – overcoming of the nation, culture does not definitely constitute the next political criterion for grouping<sup>vi</sup>. Yet still more than the underestimation of the national (factor), the conflict of cultures (clash of civilisations) is guilty of talking about an overestimation of, i.e. it is guilty of overestimating, the cultural factor, and this at a historical moment in which the modes, ways and manners of living and life, world-wide, have approximated (neared) one another so much, and narrowed cultural differences so much, like never before, even if they continue to be considerable. How can the paradox be explained that some political actors exactly now stress cultural differences, and accordingly, mislead some political observers? Why can the specific weight of the real or invented cultural peculiarity increase and grow subjectively, even though it objectively is becoming slighter (*or*: is being decreased)? The emphasising and stressing of this peculiarity serve demarcation (delimitation). Demarcation means, nevertheless, in today’s world of necessity, not hermetic encapsulation, i.e. shutting and cutting oneself off, or isolation, which would amount to historical suicide. Rather, it should form or create an as far as possible favourable starting position with regard to a struggle over distribution of a planetary extent and magnitude (*or*: of planetary dimensions). That it is a matter of that struggle, and not of culture in itself, arises from a simple and fundamental fact. No political movement which champions its own cultural values against “Western” cultural values, has hitherto neglected or failed to adopt and introduce as quickly and comprehensively as possible,

Western technologies and forms of organisation, into the civil and military sector, in order to consolidate, strengthen and increase its own position of power, regardless of the consequences for its indigenous (native, local, home-grown, domestic) traditions. The cultural difference is then summoned (*or*: Cultural differences are then mobilised), when the main external foe belongs to a foreign (alien) cultural circle and culture, or when it appears to be expedient to stamp and denounce (decry) the internal foe as the marionette or pawn of such an external foe<sup>vii</sup>. Sociological investigations have proven that the fundamentalist avant-garde in the Muslim lands and countries, for the most part recruit from the intelligentsia as well as technical experts (i.e. the intelligentsia of technicians). They make use, incidentally, of words of the cultural struggle for the mobilisation of the masses similarly to how formerly (in days gone by) the Leninist avant-garde made use of the catchword of class struggle. Elites ruling already, who for instance stand up for and make much of their “Asian (Asiatic) values” (e.g. Singapore), may do this from a position of power, which they have secured through a really (as a matter of fact) revolutionary reshaping and conversion of their respective societies. If they had not succeeded in this field, then the invocation of their own cultural values would rather have seemed like pathetic, pitiable compensation and over-replenishment, something which is often also the case for those who have failed – the Greek reader does not have to search far to find examples<sup>viii</sup>. If success is presupposed, the invocation of culture is tantamount to the claim to be regarded as an autonomous subject and no longer as a – colonial – object.

The struggle over distribution in certain situations must be dressed up (*or*: is necessarily disguised) as a cultural struggle (struggle over culture) after two other great contentious issues have been omitted. Since, in fact, the most hard-boiled, the most fanatical or staunchest traditionalist cannot get around being equipped, armed, supplied and fitted out in terms of what is modern (*or*: the

necessity for modern technical equipment), the alternative: “tradition or modern technique (technology) and economy”, has become obsolete. Likewise obsolete, however, at the latest since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, is the question of whether the developed countries ought to decide in favour of the “Western” or the “Soviet” social model. Generally, the disappearance of the Marxist-Leninist(ic) vocabulary from the rhetoric of world politics effected a shift or displacement of the centre of gravity and main focus of political argumentation. The contrasts and oppositions are no longer articulated in the terminology of analyses of class or of imperialism, but increasingly in the language of cultural values, for instance “human rights”<sup>ix</sup>, in relation to which of course there is no lack of direct or indirect references to the past and to the present of colonialism and of imperialism. Whereas or whilst technique (technology) in its world-historical colourlessness is universalised and globalised, and through its compulsions (coercions, constraints) unifies the form of economic organisation, the concept of culture becomes a means of delimitation in the struggle over distribution, which is sharpened and made acute exactly as a result of that universalisation, globalisation and unification. And as soon as the struggles are sharpened and made acute, every difference is built up, bloated and politicised, as long as it possesses symbolic and mobilising value. Even when the parties of the conflict belong to different cultural circles and cultures, and invoke their cultural identity, this is no proof of the cultural cause of the conflict. Thus seen, it is certainly also conceivable that that which one today calls the “North-South-opposition”, tomorrow could come on the scene in the shape or form of an opposition between Western-Christian and Muslim or Confucian culture. Yet even then, there would be significant national exceptions.

The talk of the conflict of cultures (*or*: So the theory about the clash of civilisations) contains therefore at most and at best a partial, distorted, twisted and badly formulated truth. It could, nonetheless – and I think this is

Huntington's intention —, serve as an ideological polariser of the West (under American leadership)<sup>x</sup>, if this West, for economic and strategic reasons, should come into intense and or violent conflict with non-Western Powers. Then the public mood and spiritual(-intellectual) climate in the West would change abruptly. And those who preach the present-day media-legitimate and media-righteous “understanding between cultures”, and who they themselves aspire to promote — through financed and paid-for participation in congresses — the exotic multi-cultural assembly and get-together in attractive environments and ambiances, would defend themselves and fight (if they defended themselves and fought at all) against this abrupt change in the public mood and spritual(-intellectual) climate, in vain. A verbal understanding at a round table still before the solution of contentious material issues and material bones of contention does not cost anything, and for that reason, has no effect and does not bring about anything as well. Because not “mutual understanding” in itself makes the solution of the contentious issues and bones of contention possible, but the reverse: only this (appearing on the horizon, at least) solution creates or begets the willingness and readiness for that understanding of the other. The manner which a culture — through its significant and influential representatives — interprets another culture is a function of the actual, real relations between the cultures, and accordingly changes and is transformed. The same applies to the declaration itself of wanting to understand the other as “an equal towards or vis-à-vis an equal”. If the same world Powers, which in 1919 turned down and rejected Japan's request, and would not give written form to, codify, establish and sanction the equality of the races in the Treaty of Versailles, in 1996 officially make a great effort at the understanding of foreign (alien) cultures, then this does not necessarily mean that an advance or progress has occurred in understanding. But it does indicate a dramatic shift in the world correlation of forces<sup>xi</sup>.

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## ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and *have nothing whatsoever to do with P.K.. Readers can and in fact probably must simply ignore them and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in the mirror and say "Oh my God, I'm really ugly, and retarded". I do it every day, and it's the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.*

<sup>i</sup> The FAZ title: „Globale Mobilmachung. Konflikt der Kulturen oder Konflikte ohne Kultur?“ (= “Global mobilization. Conflict of cultures or conflicts without culture?”). The German text in the book does not have a question mark, whereas the Greek text has a question mark. The Greek title could actually be translated as “Clash of civilisations or clashes in the absence of civilisation?”.

<sup>ii</sup> Poor old Samuel, who was not without at least some merit as a thinker, receives some fairly brutal treatment from P.K. in a footnote regarding the concept of “conservatism” in P.K.’s monumental – and a personal favourite of mine: *Konservativismus*. To be translated into English by 2040-2045, if alive and “sane”?

<sup>iii</sup> P.K. now commences a discussion which, apart from underlining the primacy, but by no means necessary exclusivity, of the political in determining group friendships and enmities at the planetary level vis-à-vis the cultural (and the racial), also refers, inter alia – and at least indirectly, to dominating, dominant and or imperialistic cultural projection and influence which can accompany (geo)political power projection more generally (including by way of implication when immigrants are assimilated into a culture of the country migrated to), but with strictly scientific phrasing, for even in relations of dominance there are interactions which flow both or many ways, and which (can) include elements of acceptance by the side being dominated, and some degree of influence on the dominant side by the weaker side(s), etc.. What is interesting is that only in the Age of European Imperialism, but more significantly of American Hegemony do we see all the traditional cultures of the West – but also further afield – homogenised to an extent hitherto unheard of in world history. And if someone has a sense – albeit subjective, as ultimately it must be – of the historical, but even only recently, clear superiority of one’s own culture compared to a “barbarian” culture, as in the case of the few remaining Greeks today with high levels of collective consciousness, then one becomes absolutely DISGUSTED by at least some aspects of the foreign (e.g. Anglo-Zio-American; also cf. Powell and Pressburger’s Englishness vs. Americanism), particularly if the dominating foreign includes the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE input of a particular historically repulsive group which no-one “in their right mind” can stand or put up with even for one second as a group (particularly as regards their elites), even though one can deal with individuals on an ad hoc basis, “no problemo”. Of course, reality owes nothing to no-one, today we die, tomorrow *you* die, and grosso modo that’s the way it works – albeit the deaths not infrequently are separated by centuries or longer. “Disgust” then is not a psychological state per se which can be “cured” – because all human states of thinking are one way or another “psychological states” and any “cure” or “therapy” is a matter ultimately of degree of socialisation – but ultimately is related to the aesthetic choice or decision one makes and or accepts as being made by the collective before him as to one’s fundamental world view, values and anti-values, likes and dislikes, etc., i.e. it is a question of relations of forms of power which make up culture and identity. The psychopathologising which certain people purport to be so good at is just another way for *them* to try and rationalise and justify their GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystal(lisation)s, accumulations and

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concentrations of forms of power. But *their* turn will come, sooner or (much) later. That is certain. (My discussion here on “disgust” and values/anti-values, likes/dislikes, the aesthetic aspect of existence, has to do with the fundamental questions of rationality-irrationality, culture, power, identity, understanding and meaning, group-individual, which in parvo are dealt with in *Power and Decision*, and in magno in *The Political and Man*). – And to be fair, because “fair is fair”, throughout all of human history there is a myriad of examples of “disgust” arising from relations of forms of power felt by individuals and or groups towards other individuals and or groups across a whole spectrum of social classes, castes, (sub-)races, nations, ethne, (sub-)religions, etc.. The phenomenon is universal because it is social-ontological/anthropological. The phenomenon is concretised in concrete circumstances of relations between concrete people(s). The group I referred to above will *meet their destiny* either by the acts of the Chinese, Mohammedans, others and or some combination thereof. If my group is dead and can’t do anything, then I curse and point the bone at your group. YOU are not going to assimilate me any more than is absolutely necessary for me to survive in the society in which you wield GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of power. (Obviously, “disgust” in the much narrower sense of feeling repulsion at e.g. discovering a piece of shit in one’s sandwich etc. is not of interest here).

<sup>iv</sup> P.K. wrote this article in 1996, so given Mearsheimer’s and L. Goldstein’s thoughts on Taiwan’s possible future (see articles at: [www.nationalinterest.org](http://www.nationalinterest.org)), Taiwan may have no choice in the future but to contemplate very carefully its cultural nearness to mainland China! By the way, some of Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s movies are so (racially-ethnologically) patriotic in their deeper meaning that he – to me at least – is indistinguishable from Mao and Deng, no matter how paradoxical that might seem at first glance!

<sup>v</sup> Whilst all “nations” must sit in human culture understood generally, universally and social-ontologically, a specific “nation” does not mechanically and hierarchically relate with a specific “culture”. Relations are interrelations, they are interactive, mutually influencing one another, and it is the political and the outcome of its interrelations and interactions at any given historical point in time which defines “nation” for that particular historical point in time, etc..

<sup>vi</sup> What is very interesting is that even if the forces of The Satanic Circus Monkey, i.e. advance hyper-imperialistic globalisation, succeed in keeping USA and European borders relatively open or fully open, eventually so much anomie will be unleashed that forces of very strict, blood-drenched law and order could come to the fore, or, simply things will descend into Chaos, wilde and eternal Anarchie and Pandaemonium of which Milton, mutatis mutandis, wrote so famously and brilliantly.

<sup>vii</sup> HAHHAHAHAHAHA!!! “Poor old Trump”... politics will always be politics, particularly when we are leaving times of “normalcy” and entering “times of trouble”.

<sup>viii</sup> I would add that since 1996, de-Hellenisation has proceeded to such an extent under the dominant Zio-USA-Germano-Euro-Lobotomised model of “good globalisation” vs. “bad nationalism” – whilst Israel, for instance, does what it does – that nowadays even that pathetic compensation P.K. referred to is not even sought. Today we have full spectrum Zio/American-Lobotomy. There’s no other way for me to describe it. Of course, no-one is saying Greece should not be in the EU or in NATO. What is being said is that Greece has done nothing to survive both demographically and as a Greek (Hellenic) state within those international structures (productivity, exports, technology, education, administration and government, secure borders, etc.). It has actually done the exact opposite, and is now facing break-up. That means nothing to non-Greeks, but to the few Rhomioli remaining it means Historical Death Time.

<sup>ix</sup> P.K. does not refer to “human rights” as legal rights because in a previous article he explained that sensu stricto there are no “human rights” as a matter of real-world law for all humans simply because they are humans, and which could only be granted by a world state, which is obviously non-existent, and currently only a theoretical or speculative – if at all a – possibility. What exist are “civil rights” – provided by specific, concrete states – which people call, as a kind of cultural value signalling, “human rights”.

<sup>x</sup> The Trump-Bannon-?rei?art-?evan?-J. ?e?er?on-et al. side of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-Elite Rule appears to be at least in part in favour of this approach, whereas the Satanic Circus Monkey ?ew ?or? ?imes-?as?ing?on ?ost-??ardia? Homo-Globo-Globo-Homo Neo-Psycho-Con-Dem-Tard side of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-Elite Rule insists on the Femino-Faggot-Zio-Lobotomy-Psycho-Utopia narrative. Serious realists, whilst not using my language of course, hope for a world-wide Equilibrium or Blocpolitik, etc., – leaving the more specific matters of cultural texture and politics to the minutiae of every Bloc, Sphere, Space and or state – and obviously there are a whole host of positions in between. Whatever the case, it seems to me that the West as fundamentally White Greco-Roman-Christian-Secular-based-evolved

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Culture is OVER, and it's a question of what can be "saved". And with a continuing Universal Western Mass-Democratic Hedonistic-Consumeristic Zio-Lobotomy, and with hundreds of millions of Africans and Asians et al. potentially on the march in the coming decades, I am very sceptical that much at all can be saved, let alone salvaged.

<sup>xi</sup> I direct this particularly to "white nationalists": you are in your own "dream world". Even in Spengler's day, it was clear that world-historical momentum had turned against the almost exclusively relatively white nations. These nations through the two world wars and mass democracy exhausted and auto-lobotomised themselves out of existence. Now, absolutely realistically, the question is what can be saved with what remains and obviously the first thing that "needs" to be done, if someone wants to do something, is to end the dominant Zio-lobotomy model of the circusisation, apeification and discofication of society in a cultural and not just racial sense, though the latter is one of a number of major factors, clearly. And that might only happen primarily because of external factors, and events and occurrences arising externally. In any event, scientific observation as people engage in Science, does not care – it only describes and explains, non-normatively, like P.K., and not in the language I use. Someone engaged in a normative realist analysis, would normally try to engage in science in terms of description and explanation, but adds a normative component because he chooses to support a particular side, e.g. his nation.