

### 3. Europe at the threshold of the 21st century: a world-historical and geopolitical consideration

#### I

According to the myth, which the Sunday orators, i.e. grandiloquent speakers, in the European Union feed on and live off (*or*: which feeds the festive speeches of European politicians), the peoples of the European continent, taught by bitter experiences, have now finally taken the path (*or*: entered and started going down the road) of Reason, and they have underpinned their firm will towards peaceful living together through economic and political institutions (*or*: they embodied in economic and political institutions their volition for peaceful co-existence or cohabitation). The establishment and consolidation of these same institutions would accordingly come to, i.e. amount to, work for the sake of peace, whose undermining would be equal to a return to times of ill-fated, disastrous and awful remembrance (memory). The myth is smug and self-complacent, in so far as it underlines the teachability and ethical-rational motivation of the actors or orators (public speakers) concerned (*or*: because it presupposes the ability of the acting subjects (or at any rate of the rhetoricians) to be taught by the past and to act on the basis of ethical and rational motives). The truth seems more prosaic – and more painful. The bloody conflicts between the great Western and Central-European nation-states have in our days become inconceivable because Europe has lost world domination, so that also the inner-European antagonisms now lack determinative, serious and weighty significance; that is why their intensity necessarily perpendicularly falls (falls perpendicularly (vertically)). In the imperialistic age (epoch), the antagonism of

European Powers with regard to one another not only did not prevent overall European expansion, but even intensified it, since every one of these Powers wanted to keep pace with their expanding competitors and rivals (*or*: did not want to lag or fall behind in relation to the others). At the time or in the epoch of European world domination, the planet grouped itself therefore around the axis of the inner-European antagonisms; now the European nations have to, in view of planetary antagonisms, group themselves, i.e. form their own group(s) or join (band) together, unite or merge (*or*: form a coalition or coalitions). This world-historical caesura (break or turning point) underlies, or forms the basis of/for, Europe's reshaping and rearrangement (new arrangement). It constituted at the same time for Europe a predicament or state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation), which indeed as the result of the explosion of mass production and mass consumption after 1950, as well as the giant reserves from the imperialistic era, was not perceived materially (from a material point of view) as such, but whose political aspect became visible and recognisable in the weighty, momentous occurrence (*or*: determinative fact) that precisely both great Powers, which after 1945 replaced Europe in planetary events (*or*: which succeeded Europe at a planetary level), stood positively and negatively as godfathers (in regard) to the European efforts and endeavours at unity and unification. Positively, the patronage of the United States, and negatively, the angst and fear before the Soviet Reich or Empire, set in motion a process, which even after the previous (recent) catastrophes, pure Reason by itself would hardly have triggered amongst the calm, relaxed and the otherwise safe (not in danger, not at risk) Europeans (*or*: the pure Reason of the Europeans would not at all by itself bestir, if the Europeans had been left alone and they did not run any risks from the outside).

The character of the predicament or state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation) of the aforementioned world-historical caesura (break or turning

point) also stood out from a broader perspective. The end of Europe's world domination temporally coincided with the end of the European New Times, just as the beginning of these same New Times<sup>1</sup> initiated the epoch of European world domination. This means: the New Times were not only a (seen in terms of the history of ideas) specifically European (*or*: European in the specific, distinguishing sense of the term), but just as much an (economically and politically understood) Eurocentric phenomenon. The driving out or outflanking of the European coefficient by the planetary coefficient and, interrelating with that, of oligarchical and imperialistic liberalism by mass democracy (as the first social formation in history until now with a genuinely planetary claim, or of a planetary range) had to thus accompany the dilution (attenuation), debilitation or evaporation (disappearance (into thin air)) of the content pertaining to the history of ideas of the New Times, and flowed into or ended up in an essentially new world situation. The detailed circumstances, particular forms and individual implications of this turn cannot be discussed here (*or*: We cannot discuss here the details, the particular forms and the separate, in part consequences and repercussions of this world-historical turn).<sup>1</sup> However, the reminder of the overall process remains necessary in order to be able to make clear to ourselves the entire extent of the European predicament or state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation) at the latest after 1945 – of which one should be mindful. Because depending on whether the European process of (or attempt at) unification is comprehended as an answer to the state of need (emergency situation), or as a victory of Reason, different tasks, deontologies and strategies arise. Whoever above all saw peace-loving Reason at work (*or*: Whoever considers that peace-loving Reason held sway), is poorly immune to

---

<sup>1</sup> I would like to refer the reader to the following works of mine: *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* (= *The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form*), Weinheim 1991; *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg* (= *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*), Berlin 1992; „Marxismus, Kommunismus und die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts“ (= “Marxism, communism and the history of the 20th century”), in: H. Fleischer (Hg.) *Der Marxismus in seinem Zeitalter*, Leipzig 1994 [see here Ch. II, I]; „Was heißt schon westlich?“ (= “The universalisation of technique (technology) and world culture”), *FAZ* of 19.12.1994 [see here Ch. VI, 3].

or poorly prepared for bad, malign and nasty inner-European surprises and developments, and moreover runs the risk (*or*: is exposed to the danger) of expanding his view to the whole planetary landscape or scene, i.e. of ascribing (attributing) to the European Union the character of a model, and to expect and hope for the solution to world problems by a world state, which, would be based and rest on consensus, and would be (constitute) a European Union in magno. However, it is not readily understandable why nations like for instance China, which have confidence and believe in their independent and in practice unlimited possibilities of unfolding and development, should appropriate or adopt the Reason or logic of a demographically weak(ened) continent, which for several decades after the loss of its empires was (stood) in the shadow of Americans and Russians, and is still dependent on the former (i.e. the Americans). And furthermore: who will undertake with regard to the world state, the same positive and negative role, which Americans and Russians played with regard to Europe?

## II

The precise visualisation and comprehension (conceptualisation) of the European state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation) in the world-historical context (*or*: in the context of world history) constitutes only the beginning of a substantial or substantive question formulation (or examination of the problem) – and leaves, incidentally, in praxis (practice) all possibilities open<sup>ii</sup>. Because the state of need (emergency situation) and crises can activate both centripetal as well as centrifugal forces, bringing about both solidarity as well as discord (disputes, strife, conflict). A group of individuals or of nations must, if it wants to be competitive, beforehand make or adopt an organisational form, that is, [[it]] must clarify the question/problem of the bearer of the

decision (*or*: distinguish how and by whom the decisions will be made and taken). Solidarity (in the sociological, not for instance in the psychological sense) comes about when this question and problem is solved bindingly, regardless of where the bindedness rests; otherwise, either a direct conflict comes into being, or centrifugal forces prevail according to (*or*: on the basis of the) principle “whoever can, save yourself (he who saves himself, [[so]] save yourself = every man for himself/run for your lives)”. Which of both directions or roads, Europe will take, still is in 1995 not to be said with final certainty. Until recently, affluence and prosperity could still be distributed, and everyone profited from that absolutely, i.e. in absolute magnitudes, to an absolute extent, although some in comparison to the rest (others) drew a greater benefit. However, the hour of truth will first strike (sound, ring), when the order of the day will not be the distribution of affluence, but that (distribution) of considerable burdens (weights, encumbrances, loads). A guilty conscience, which had at least indirectly motivated the hitherto German willingness to pay (*or*: the hitherto generosity of the German cash register), could be converted into an unwillingness or aggressivity, if the lesser performance, output and efficiency of others would require extraordinary sacrifices by the Germans as a counterbalance (equaliser, kind of balancing) on a pan-European scale. Until today, there are hardly any clear signs on the part of other European nations that they are ready for privations (*or*: to make sacrifices) for the sake of third parties; and the propensity towards (inclination to) social behaviour [[marked by]] solidarity ebbs (waned, diminishes) for the time being also inside of the individual (*or*: various) European nations.

To these considerations, the structural or internal logic of a unification process is added. The first steps are, in the course of this, always the easiest, and the last the most difficult to take. However, without the final steps, the first steps more or less hang in the air, they do not commit to anything decisive (*or*: they do not

constitute definitive or decisive commitments), even if they are not reversed and canceled; one must constantly keep in mind, nevertheless, the possibility of a retreat or retrogression after a long stagnation, especially if one considers (thinks) that even multi-national construct(ion)s, which made up one single economic and political unit (entity, unity), broke up and disintegrated in no time (in a flash) during severe crises (*or*: in epochs of deep crisis) (the Soviet Union provides (is) the latest example of that, and one would be deluded if one wanted to ascribe to its crumbling simply the rebelling of its peoples (folks) against “totalitarianism”: the economic-political unit (entity, unity) was in fact abolished, [[and]] not founded anew in circumstance of freedom). The, anyhow, increasing or greater difficulties during the final steps of a unification process will presumably or probably increase and intensify in Europe’s case because of a strategic mistake committed relatively early on. What is meant is the widening and extension of the original nucleus (core) through the admission (intake) of weaker, nevertheless equivalent, coequal members, i.e. with equal rights (whether already the admission of Great Britain constituted a strategic mistake as de Gaulle thought, may remain an open question, i.e. unexamined, here). Very probably, the speedy deepening of economic and political unity between the countries of the original nucleus, as well as the demonstrating to the outside world of this deepening in regard to deeds with planetary weight, would have unfolded, developed or exercised the effect of a magnet which the remaining European nations would have been drawn to like iron filings. In such a case, longer waiting times/periods for candidates would then not have substantially harmed them, given the, anyhow, growing interweavings, intertwining and dependencies existing in all actuality. Present-day suggestions and actions, which aim at an economically and politically staggered (graded, graduated) Europe (*or*: a Europe “of two or more speeds or gears”), seem like attempts to make up and atone for those early mistakes, of course under considerably worse(ned) and more difficult circumstances. Nonetheless, the mistake does not

have to be irreparable, rather one can say in retrospect that it could not have been avoided in so far as the European, above all German dependence on the United States at the time of the Cold War, set in and of itself certain limits and boundaries to a qualitative deepening of European unification, which did not exist in regard to the quantitative widening, extension or expansion. In any event, the European Union today has reached a point where a renewed widening should or would have to be interpreted only as flight or an escape before the compelling, urgent task and duty of deepening, and as an indication of organic weakness. Quantity in politics is not necessarily converted into quality; very often the contrary to that in fact happens: the qualitative element is dissolved in the pulp, mush, mash of quantity.

However, he who weighs up the possibilities of European unification has to detach and release himself, or break away, not only from quantitative criteria. Just as much, must he make himself free of rectilinear notions, representations and perceptions regarding the course of the unificatory process. This is supposed (or ought) to mean: not everything which taken at face value, promotes and boosts unification, in actual fact benefits and favours unification too. Not even agreement and consensus in themselves offer more of a guarantee than dissent and disagreement in respect of that [[possibility]], that one is coming, i.e. is drawing nearer, to European unification. Because there is a consensus which applies to platitudes and signals inertia (sluggishness, lethargy), and a dissent or even a splitting from which those emerge, who can thereafter function as locomotives of further development (evolution). The same applies to individual organisational plans or institutional projects. The monetary (currency) union constitutes e.g. a step or undertaking which logically and in abstracto promotes the unificatory process. Yet should its imposition put in the world, i.e. beget, severe and fierce struggles over distribution and major instabilities, then that which was thought and planned to be the path or road to

unification, turns into the cause of hopeless strife (dispute(s) and a battle without a way out). On the other hand, economic inconveniences and troubles could be accepted, or one could run the risk of such economic troubles, if favourable political effects and results were expected from monetary union – in this case, however, a concrete bearer would have to, in relation to that, take care and ensure that these effects actually take place (*or*: the anticipated results become reality). Thus, causes, plans and ways of acting and behaving are ambivalent. Because ideological prejudices and partialities do not constitute the best practical advisor and counsellor; especially when it is not a matter of the frequently disguised ideology or ideologies of (national) economists, but of the blatant, screaming ideology of those who pontificate for or against the national state, i.e. nation-state. Also here, at first glance, it seems as if the (at least actual) abolition of the nation-state *eo ipso* will clear the way for European unification. Whoever believes this, expects from such states only narrow-minded and egotistical acts/actions (yet nation-states for their part founded the European Community (European Union)!), and that is why he equates and identifies the positive with the putting aside and obliteration of the negative. A narrow, effective and long-term co-ordination of the action of two or three of the more significant nation-states would, nonetheless, be for the European cause much more beneficial and helpful than a unification which primarily would reflect the paralysis or the abdication (resignation) of the nation-state governments (governments of the nation-states). And the other way around: the overall European, i.e. pan-European authority, which would successfully take over (take charge of) the essential sovereign competencies of the nation-state governments, would have to, given the extraordinary weight, load and burden of its tasks and duties, in a number of respects, be considerably stronger or more powerful than those governments of nation-states.



This is most often overlooked both by the friends as well as the foes of the nation-state, since both, even if under or with reverse(d) signs, i.e. symbolism, conceptually confuse nationality or the nation, and, statehood or the state, with each other. The compound or composite term “nation-state” seems to lead to and favour such confusion, although it in reality says or connotes that the nation-state makes up only a species – amongst other states – of the genus “state”. The advocates and proponents of the nation-state fear, on the one hand, the lack of statehood or the absence of the state, that is ungovernability (ungovernableness), if the governmental power is exercised from a distant centre outside of the nation; on the other hand, they expect a wasting or withering away of national forces and consequently a general levelling and cultural impoverishment in the event the nation should be deprived of the support of the state. However, effective governing is a question or matter of political will and organisational form, not of nationality, as much as it must take this nationality into consideration; and national cultures, which in themselves can even flourish in a multi-national state, are today undermined by planetary forces, against which the nation-state as such is not capable of doing much (*or*: undertaking many things) anyhow. The nation-state’s foes share for the most part all of the diagnoses and prognoses above – only that these foes of the nation-state welcome the result. In the putting aside of the factor “nation”, they (and therein the cosmopolitan “Left” enters into an only seemingly paradoxical alliance with multi-national concerns) behold – and they also regard this putting aside of the factor “nation” as – a pleasing step for the weakening or abolition of traditional statehood in general, towards the development of a post-national or trans-national consciousness of autonomous citizens as the new ideational basis or foundation of political activity etc. etc.. Now, the “mature citizen’s” consciousness draws, as a rule, its intellectual-mental-spiritual nourishment from commercial television rather than from the refined offering or sophisticated proposals of political ideologues such as “communitarians” or

“liberals”, so that the dwindling or disappearance of nationalistic fanaticisms does not necessarily benefit a superior public spirit and sense of citizenship (*or*: does not necessarily amount to a higher political spirit, morale or mindset). On the other hand, a – for the European Union, long-term fatal – ungovernability, can only be avoided through the fact of not only simply evaporating the sovereign rights of the nation-state, but of such sovereign rights being assigned or transferred to a new *sovereign*. The end of the sovereign nation-state and the end of sovereign statehood in general remain two historically and logically different magnitudes, even if Europe leaves behind or divests itself of the political forms of the past, without being able to create clear new ones. However, every step to such new forms raises questions which only a new sovereign, that is, a state at least coming into being, can answer. Not least, it must clarify bindingly the question: “who belongs to me by way of right?”, which appears in diverse, multifarious variations (“who may (*or*: who has the right to) jointly decide or co-determine [[things with me]]?”, “who may wander in, i.e. immigrate (*or*: who has the right to enter as a migrant)?”). This specific question must be posed and answered by every political collective, regardless of how it is structured and how extensive it is (*or*: irrespective of its structuring and its size), because it concerns its very own constitution. That is why those who believe that with the nation-state, this supposed originator of all evils (trials and tribulations, woes, suffering), every border and every separation or segregation will also come to the end, are greatly mistaken, erring woefully. The direct opposite of that can be the case under circumstances which are clear as day and easily portended: European unification is carried out and takes place – logically (*or*: as is reasonable and plausible) – in a time of growing globalisation, but precisely growing globalisation brings with it growing pressure on Europe.

### III

In principle, one can imagine that Europe in the foreseeable future will grow together, and succeed in self-compressing, towards a sovereign acting political entity (unit(y)), or that it will not succeed in this. In the first case, it is asked whether unity could come about and be realised through the hegemony of one nation or on another path, i.e. in another way, manner or mode. For the place or role of the hegemon only two candidates (since all indications in relation to that are that Great Britain wants to be content or satisfied in preventing the hegemony of another European Power), are obviously brought up for consideration: France, because it raises, i.e. makes the claim regarding that (at least in the diplomatic and military field), and Germany, because it possesses the material prerequisites and preconditions for that, and moreover enjoys or has at its disposal an in actual fact acknowledged precedence in the economy (*or*: economic sector). Yet an open struggle between France and Germany as regards European hegemony cannot today, already because of the – spoken of at the outset – drastic change in Europe’s position in the world, develop a genuine dynamic anymore; on the path of direct confrontation against the background of the possible exercising of violence, no hegemon is to be ascertained anymore (*or*: from direct confrontation given the possibility of armed conflict (clashing, clashes), a hegemon cannot be established any longer). One side can certainly influence the other significantly and permanently, or over the long run “be head and shoulders above” and able to dominate the other side; however, it is doubtful whether from that a real, regular hegemony could be formed and would come into being. European hegemony calls for more than decisive influence on the shaping of the monetary (currency) union, or on the organisation and carrying out of a military deployment and or intervention; Europe’s hegemon would have to represent, to the eyes of the world, Europe with deeds (*or*: before the eyes of the whole planet, the European continent,

with acts), which would concern the entire world. In relation to that, neither France, nor Germany will be in a position in the future to do something like that, and with the passage of time, in fact, their planetary weight as individual countries will be diminished (decreased) rather than augmented (enlarged, increased).

The German side could, after several disappointments (disenchantments) on the old continent, flirt with the thought of achieving hegemony in Europe with American help, that is, of steering and directing European fate or destiny in agreement and harmony with the Americans – after all, it was due in fact (also) to American resistance that two German hegemonial efforts or attempts in this century failed. American circles have in fact expressed the wish for a privileged relationship with a reunified Germany.<sup>2</sup> Yet at the same time, it remains unclear whether they have in mind a Germany which would use American support primarily to achieve Europe's unification in accordance with its – as well as of course American – perceptions, or a Germany, which basically should take on the role of the American regional governor (i.e. deputy) in Eastern Europe against Russian cravings and desires for expansion (*or*: expansive aspirations), regardless of what became of European unification. Either way, an energetic and if need be aggressive American option, i.e. choice in favour of America, by Germany, would be a highly interesting, but (probably) daring, risky and dangerous game. Not only because it, sooner or later, would lead to a rapprochement between France, Great Britain and Russia, but also because of the reason that no conclusive and lasting stance could or would be expected from the American side on this question. The legend of the “special relationship” of Great Britain and the United States may perhaps be exaggerated and overdone, however, the British always have their certain discreet influence in Washington. And the influence of forces and lobbies inside of the United

---

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g. D. Hamilton, *Jenseits von Bonn. Amerika und die „Berliner Republik“*, Frankfurt/M.-Berlin 1994. The author is a close collaborator of the American ambassador in Bonn.

States, who would not be indifferent to (*or*: vis-à-vis such a turn in) American foreign policy precisely on this point, can prove to be essentially stronger.

Amongst the shapers, i.e. planners, of American foreign policy, a – just like that, without a second thought – agreement could be entered into [[regarding a very close relationship with Germany, which would lead to a rapprochement between France, Great Britain and Russia]], only as to the general principle that the United States could make use of a strong Germany inside of a NATO led and absolutely controlled by the USA itself. In a similar sense, the USA has in the past and in the present, encouraged European efforts and attempts at unification under the (not always) tacit condition or presupposition that Europe will constitute an integral constituent part or element (*or*: complete section) of a West led, subjugated and commanded by the United States. The logic of leadership calls for the general giving orders (commands, directions, instructions) (sooner, preferably) to brigadiers and colonels, not to sergeants and corporals (non-commissioned officers).

Naturally, no-one can absolutely exclude that a future Germany, with the goal of achieving a hegemonial position in Europe, will enter into a close and privileged alliance with the Americans (*or*: United States), and (pre)conditions can be imagined under which such an undertaking or venture could even be met with success. But the success would demand political abilities, which are not precisely the strong side of Germans, i.e. political abilities which do not flourish in Germany. The lack of centuries-long world-political experiences of the great imperialistic nations of Europe (above all of England and of France (*or*: headed by England and by France)), can be compensated for with difficulty (*or*: is not replenished or made up for easily), and, as is known, the fine mixtures, blends, assortments out of the demonstration of power, flair and effective rhetoric, i.e. the fine combinations which the demonstration of power, sensitive handling and effective rhetoric jointly constitute, do not represent and have never been the

usual products of German political laboratories in this century. The present-day dominating and ruling partly universal-ethical, partly economic basic tenor of German world politics (*or*: today's foreign policy of Germany) constitutes actually a new variant of the same old flight into simplification, another expression of the same old perplexity, bewilderment and embarrassment vis-à-vis the immense complexity of the political – only this time with reversed signs and symbolism. The really dogged, determined and obstinate turn towards the ethical and the economic is supposed to make possible breaking away and detachment from the “special way or path (Sonderweg)” of “power politics (the politics of power)”, and the affluence and prosperity of the last forty years seems to prove, to the general satisfaction [[of Germans]], that ethics not only does good to the soul, but also to the tummy (stomach, belly). The dichotomy of economy and politics is nonetheless mere fiction, since the economy is just as much as politics, the concrete relations of concrete people with and towards one another; the economised political is no less political than the theologised, moralised or aestheticised political (*or*: politics which has been converted into economy is no less political than politics which is converted into theology, ethics and aesthetics). If, that is, the German side indeed wants the political unification of Europe, yet it mainly strives after and wants it for reasons of economic effectivity (effectiveness), then it must know that such a unification understood in this way can even intensify the economic struggles over distribution and re-distribution. The economic element, which today is adored, extolled and idolised as the remedy for, or panacea contra, power politics and nationalism, will then prove to be the tough, slow-moving and dogged vehicle, i.e. conduit, exactly for nationalistic-power-political aspirations and tendencies (*or*: for nationalistic aspirations and tendencies pertaining to the politics of power (power politics)).

In light of the ascertainment that Germany today knows most probably just as little as in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century what it should set about doing with its remarkable and most significant potential, one would almost like to regret that God apportioned the «vingt millions de plus» (= “twenty million more [[in population]]”<sup>iii</sup>) to this people (folk) and country, or [[state]] that France does not have at its disposal the demographic and economic assets and advantages of its envied neighbour. The land (country) of Richelieu and of de Gaulle would have also had most probably – with sufficient material preconditions – enough self-confidence, self-conviction and skill, to in itself snatch or grab hegemony in Europe, and to represent the continent in the world both worthily, as well as energetically (*or*: both with dynamism as well as with dignity). The Germans have, at any rate, much to learn from the politically superior elite of France, and they would be making a mistake of the first order if they here – with raised finger – played the role of the moral praeceptor, i.e. paedagogue – and indeed despite the fact that they in the meanwhile have advanced to being the second-largest weapons exporter in the world, and with that, already belong to the dubious group of the *demi-vierges* (= half-virgins). France’s open or secret claim(s) may be greater than its actual possibilities, but Germany also constitutes, seen planetarily, a fairly middle Power, whose movements moreover are under constant supervision, and will probably continue to be so in the future too. *Rebus sic stantibus* (= Matters standing, i.e. being the way they are), and in view of the above-mentioned world-historically determined antiquatedness of a sharp hegemonial conflict between leading European nations, one can only conclude that if a substantial European unification ever came about at all, it would have to proceed via a close German-French joining together and co-operation with each other. It is to be underlined (*or*: We are obliged to underline) one more time that the external/outward<sup>iv</sup> institutional form of this joining together and co-operation in itself counts for little in itself, and that under certain conditions the harmonic and dynamic going, i.e.

proceeding, together between two separate(d) nation-states, which would be conscious of their position and situation, and would be capable of carrying along the other nation-states, could potentially serve the European cause more than a half-hearted and limp political union.

#### IV

Remaining with the assumption or hypothesis that Europe could in the future act planetarily, i.e. at the planetary level, as a closed and cohesive political collective, we must pose the obvious question: where and to what (*or*: where and for what purpose or goal)? In a multi-polar world, with [[the passing of]] time, competition and rivalry are sharpened and made more acute, because every active participant must (*or*: will be obliged) to measure his forces with those of several others. The planetary character of all that is happening, i.e. of events, and of action, does not of course mean that the actors or acting subjects ought to spread themselves equally (isomerically) across the whole globe, and declare and show that they everywhere have the same vital interests. As is self-evident, they have their more or less fixed home base (house basis (foundation)), out of which they mainly operate with regard to certain focal points or centres of gravity (*or*: from which they start acting by concentrating their attention on certain weighty, significant fields). Even for a planetary power of pure water, i.e. a purely planetary power, as the present-day United States is, Afghanistan is not as weighty and serious, i.e. important, as the Middle East. It is no different for a planetarily active Europe. Politicians and entrepreneurs, but also observers, who nowadays (these days) keep an eye out for, and seek, the most favourable unfolding space or field for the unfolding of Europe, set their sights, as a rule, on the Far East, perhaps not so much out of a geopolitical thirst for action, but rather for reasons of convenience, if one considers that it is far



simpler and cheaper to profit through the participation in an upswing or upturn already set in motion, than paving the way for and initiating such an upswing or upturn on one's own (i.e. according to one's own direction and management), and with long-term European settings of an aim, i.e. objectives and goals. Certainly, the presence of European forces in a space, in which what is truly promising, or rather what is of great significance for the future – happens, is recommended in every respect. However, Europe could only have an appreciable or considerable weight there in the event it does not merely sell know-how, which is to be bought, or can be bought, from the genuinely Pacific Powers (the genuine Powers of the Pacific (Ocean)), Japan and the United States, but holds all the trumps (aces, cards), which both with regard to its own development, unfolding and activities, as well as in far-Eastern eyes (in the eyes of the Far East), are immediately recognised as such.

We are talking about Russia, and indeed, Siberia. Siberia (and Central Asia) constitutes the last rich-in-raw materials and in practice (in reality) empty-of-men great surface on an already densely populated planet<sup>v</sup>. Whoever believes that “knowledge” and “information” have made raw materials and the question of space obsolete, is merely falling for (*or*: has fallen victim to) the modish, i.e. stylish and in fashion, and not unselfish, cyberspace mythology. The very same United States, which through their scientists and futurologists proclaim the “overthrow of matter”, simultaneously sustain a political-military network spanning the world, which secures them privileged access to crucial resources.<sup>3</sup> Americans and Japanese promptly took advantage of and exploited the weakening, and then the collapse, of the Soviet Union in order to make their economic entry into (or to economically invade) Siberia, for the time being, or

---

<sup>3</sup> The Janus face, or double face, of American ideology and politics is patently visible if one compares the cyberspace manifesto (E. Dyson, G. Gilder, G. Keyworth, A. Toffler: *The Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Charta for the Knowledge-Age*, Progress for Freedom Foundation, Washington 22.8.1994) with publications like e.g. the following: K. Kessel: *Strategic Minerals: U.S. Alternatives*, Washington DC, National Defence, UP 1990. Cf. on this theme or topic P. Kondylis: „Die verflüchtigte Materie“, *FAZ* of 4.10.1995 [here Ch. VI, 2].

first of all, of course in the form of ruthless deforestation, but always with the tremendous reserves of Arctic oil and of industrially or strategically important minerals and ores in mind.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the great and first aspirant (or suitor) to the Siberian (and Central-Asian/Central-Asiatic) space and its riches is called – China. China is not, in the course of this, driven to this space merely by distant memories and historically founded claims, which played their role in the armed confrontations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, but by really elementary forces. To the, for instance, 1,2 billion residents (inhabitants) of today's China, roughly a further 500 million are to be added<sup>vi</sup>, and already their feeding, nutrition and nourishment, especially in view of the constantly rising standard of living, will put world agrarian resources to an extremely hard or tough test.<sup>5</sup> The hunger for energy and raw materials will grow at least at the same tempo. Many hundreds of millions will stand before an almost empty immense space, which offers much of that which they urgently need most. The temptation and the need will be so great as to bend or buckle the ability to withstand or resist such temptation and need, and the world-political constellations and combinations, which would form, develop or arise around this disputed or controversial issue, would of course exert a determinative and decisive influence on the course of planetary history in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – especially if China remains a united state and simultaneously announces and projects Asiatic-continental and Pacific-Oceanic ambitions, i.e. projects claims in the Asian-continental space and in the space of the Pacific Ocean<sup>vii</sup>. As soon as such a situation would be delineated and emerges (would emerge), Russia would come under pressure and would proceed to seek allies. If it does not find such allies, then Russia will be forced to make concessions to China, or even to

---

<sup>4</sup> D. Lee, J. Blair: "Oil in the Wilderness: An Arctic Dilemma", *National Geographic Magazine* (December 1988), pp. 858-871; especially V. Kvint: "Eastern Siberia could become another Saudi Arabia", *Forbes* 17 (September 1990), pp. 130-133.

<sup>5</sup> L. Brown: *Who will feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet*, W. W. Norton, New York 1995.

enter into a joining together, i.e. union or combining with China, from which an almighty bloc (*or*: coalition) would be created and come into being.

A long-term European politics vis-à-vis Russia should orientate itself to these geopolitical perspectives or prospects. It is undoubtedly the perfect or clear right of the United States to want to safeguard its planetary autocracy<sup>viii</sup> inter alia through the constant holding down or even through the dismemberment or breaking up of Russia (into pieces). However, a united Europe would have little to gain if it came on the scene basically as the strategic representative or regional governor (i.e. deputy) of America in Eastern Europe, and as the proponent and supporter of all the separatist tendencies in the territory (realm or dominion) of the former Soviet Union. European, especially German short-sightedness, as it is made apparent and has made itself felt in the support for the American plan for NATO-expansion up to Russia's borders, cannot but, in relation to that, nourish and feed absolutely legitimate Russian mistrust, and push, drive that gigantic Eurasiatic land (country) into aggressive isolation, or into the arms of China. Whoever only halfway knows about (*or*: Whoever is even just superficially familiar with) Russian history must know that no stable *entente cordiale* (= *cordial (genial) agreement, understanding or concord (amity)*) with Russia is possible, if the right is not a *limine* recognised to it to function as the great Power of order, i.e. to maintain and keep order, in the Caucuses, in Central Asia and in the whole of the Siberian space. Europe would have nothing to lose if Russia successfully fulfilled this function; completely on the contrary in fact. The danger of a Russian hegemony over a united, politically closed (and unified), active/acting, highly industrialised Europe of 350 million people would not exist (*or*: And there would not exist any danger of Russian hegemony on a rich and united/unified Europe, capable of acting politically in a united manner). *Such* a Europe would have nothing to fear from Russia, whilst Russia would have everything to hope for from *such* a Europe.

And in the framework of a large-scale geopolitical re-ordering of, or new order, in Eurasia, questions like Russian influence on Eastern Europe or the angst and fear of Eastern European peoples would be taken care of and solved of their own accord.

The great planetary and world-historical chance or opportunity of a united Europe would therefore be, or go by, the name of Eurasia. First of all, and in principle, of course, in the tangible sense of the securing of sources of energy and indispensable raw materials at a time in which, regarding this, bottlenecks and narrowness loom on the horizon, and the related antagonisms are sharpened and made more acute. But over and above that, in the sense of the mission driving and propelling things forward, which broadens horizons, and accordingly awakens and mobilises forces. Naturally, that the chance or opportunity would objectively exist does not in the least self-evidently mean that it would also have been recognised as such, and moreover perceived in order to seek its exploitation. Its practical utilisation and exploitation would, in other words, presuppose something more than the perspicacity (sharp eye) of a government. Tasks, jobs and works like the geopolitical reordering (new order, rearrangement) of Eurasia and the opening up of further and enormous areas and spaces in its north and in its east (*or*: in its northern, eastern and central section) are not executed and managed by ageing and spoilt populations. Hence, in a demographic respect, China will have the decisive advantage vis-à-vis Europe, should both sides lay claim to (raise/make a claim on) the Siberian and Central Asian space<sup>ix</sup>; and even if the use of superior technique (technology) could balance (or even) out or obliterate to some degree or to a certain point this advantage and factor, then Europe would be under time pressure (the pressure of time) anyhow (*or*: Europe again would be pressured as regards time or temporally). In relation to these and such difficulties or hindrances and obstructions, one can still think further, and refer to others. However, this does

not change or transform the certainty that in Europe, without its own sources of energy and raw materials, a Europe, whose ageing population at most will make up three or four percent of the world population<sup>x</sup>, and a Europe cut off from the great strategic theatres of planetary history in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – such a Europe would sooner or later wither away and be erased<sup>xi</sup>. Mackinder's theorem regarding Eurasia still always retains for the most part its value. But the thesis that whoever dominates Germany, would also be the Master (Lord, Ruler) of (over) Eurasia (*or*: whoever possesses Germany, possesses Eurasia too), was meaningful only in a Eurocentric world. In a planetary world, in which the formidable (enormous, tremendous, immense, powerful, mighty) shadow of China spreads out more and more, the Siberian space could deliver (hand over, provide, yield or constitute) the key to world dominance or world rule (domination) (*or*: the key to world domination could be the Siberian and Central Asian space)<sup>xii</sup>.

Eurasia would be the great *positive* centre of gravity of the planetary politics of a politically united or unitedly lead, i.e. jointly governed, Europe. However, there would also be *negative* centres of gravity, i.e. such, where primarily defensive tasks would have to be dealt with and managed (*or*: where on the first line of defence, defensive duties would have to be processed). North Africa might or can, in this context, be named as the such an example of prime importance. In Central and Northern Europe, one is not so conscious and aware perhaps of the significance of the consequences which demographic, ecological and political developments in North Africa could have for European equilibrium (equilibria) as for instance in France and Spain. Looking away does not defuse (neutralise or tone down) the problem one bit. The manner in which the European nations will confront such challenges, will show to what extent they are ready to practise solidarity through a common mindset and unanimous and coordinated action – as well as exercising sovereign rights (rights of

sovereignty), which, as we have said, not least of all consist in demanding a binding answer to the question: “who belongs to these European nations (*or*: who belongs to this political entity and who does not)?”<sup>xiii</sup>.

## V

Let us now turn to the opposite possibility that, namely, a condescence of Europe, i.e. [[the]] growing together [[of Europe’s member nations and or states]] into a sovereign political collective, also capable of united and independent acting, fails to materialise. Three reasons could lead to that. First, it would be possible that the development of planetary politics as a whole degrades, i.e. downgrades or demotes Europe’s political unification to a subordinate matter of concern, in relation to which the European nations would have to hurriedly accede to a broad “Western” camp under extra-European leadership. Beloved, languid convenience and habits, and abhorrence of and before the dangers of autonomy and/or sheer necessity could, in other words, stabilise the political-military – not least of all exercised through NATO – hegemony of the United States in the West for a long(er) time, above all if and when the opposition between rich Powers and poor Powers (or those striving and aspiring upwards, i.e. ambitious, rising Powers), irrespective of in what form, would become so sharp(ened) and acute that the former (rich Powers) would have to, or would prefer (*or*: would be obliged or would desire (like)), to carry on and conduct their common struggle in closed form and under a united leadership, not for instance as an alliance of two blocs with equal rights. In such a case, European unification would basically only make such progress and advances which would facilitate the American leadership, i.e. simplify the work and tasks of such leadership; for that (*or*: in exchange), the Americans would take care of the access of their allies to sources of raw materials and of energy;

the freedom of trade routes, and, fire-extinguishing services in regions alight and burning [[with trouble]]. If some European believes that he can leave the basic world-political dirty work (i.e. the basic dirty work of world politics) for the most part to the Americans, and that he, i.e. the European, is better served with American leadership than with his own autonomous effort and exertion, then he will naturally tend to not look at Europe's political sovereignty and planetary ability at acting, i.e. action, as the most urgent matter of concern, and would push such sovereignty and ability along (or advance such sovereignty and ability) to the extent that this would not thwart or militate against the American claim(s) to leadership. Such a strategy, which one might or could name the strategy of voluntary (and) selfish subordination, could obviously come to pass only under three long-term conditions: [[1]] that the quid(s) pro quo or trade-offs expected from the Americans (for instance in international trade) do not essentially exceed the bearable, i.e. tolerable, measure or amount and limits; that the Americans would also be prepared to throw their own forces and powers fully onto the scale(s), i.e. that the Americans would also be ready and willing to fully bring to bear, or bring into play, their own forces, even if exclusively European concerns and interests were at stake or at risk; and that the United States perhaps on a not all-too-distant day (*or*: in the foreseeable future) will not be under the pressure of phenomena and manifestations of internal disintegration, decomposition and dissolution (decay, breaking down and breaking up), paralysing them world-politically i.e. paralysing them as a factor of and in world politics. And still one more remark is appropriate or called for here (*or*: And we must observe something else here). Even if a polarisation of planetary politics drove towards and forced a union (joining together, merger) or coalition of the "West" (read: today's highly industrialised North) under American leadership, the particular form of polarisation could put/place the struggle around the control over the Siberian and Central-Asiatic (Central-Asian) space in the foreground, i.e. bring such a struggle to the fore. For the

“West” it could, in other words, be in the future vital and essential to prevent the formation or creation (development) of a Russian-Chinese bloc or front.

[[2]] The second reason, which could turn the coming into being of a European sovereign political collective into a secondary (incidental, peripheral, irrelevant) or even obsolete (outdated) matter of concern, would be rapid advances in a world society (*or*: the quick unification of world society), which would have absorbed all at once, i.e. gobbled up and devoured, limits and borders, nation-states and large spaces. I hold this expectation to be unrealistic, and I want to explain very briefly why this is so. Those who harbour and cherish such expectations are thinking of the present-day globalisation of production and communication taking place; however, they hardly speak about the decisive question and problem of distribution. Yet concord and peace between nations and political units (entities, unities), or between humans, is not at all placed at risk and in danger so much through the way, manner or mode humans produce and communicate, but primarily through how that which is produced and communicated is distributed (*or*: as on account of the mode of distribution). One constantly reads suggestions regarding the deepening of the international division of labour in industry and trade, and regarding the condensing of the world-wide communication networks – but the secret of the generally acceptable distribution of resources and of goods, no-one has revealed until now, not even the rich and wealthy “West”. It is to be assumed or supposed that the sharpening of struggles over distribution will limit, restrict and confine the globalisation of production and communication; nonetheless, prior to that, this same globalisation will have sharpened the struggles over distribution. Because this globalisation sets off and triggers social processes which can raise expectations without being able to completely satisfy them – and the half-satiated is more aggressive than the half-hungry and half-powerless (*or*: and he who’s belly is half-full is more aggressive than he who is half-dead from



hunger). The borders, which have been torn down by the tendencies of globalisation, will consequently be erected anew through violent struggles over distribution (*or*: will be re-erected and re-established by frightful struggles of distribution). That of course does not mean that the future struggles over distribution must be conducted by means of the present-day political collectives or subjects. The alternative (solution) does not simply read: “world society or nation-state”, as both the adherents and supporters of the latter (nation-state) fear, who identify and equate the nation-state’s abandoning with the abandoning of the nation, and this again with a colourless cosmopolitanism; or, as regards also the proponents and fans of the former (world society) in assuming that every blow against the nation-state is the harbinger and precursor of eternal peace. Nonetheless, the nation-state does not constitute the sole conceivable sovereign and political collective delimited from the rest of the political collectives, and no statistic(s) has proved that war between nation-states has been more frequent or crueler, more terrible and wilder, than other wars. Even the replacement of all political collectives by the political collective “world society” could obligatorily entail the discontinuation, ending and abolition of wars, only if history had known merely of wars between ethnically different political collectives, and no civil wars. The sole thing for which a world society can vouch (*or*: The only thing which a world society can guarantee) is, first of all, simply the conversion of all wars into civil wars.

[[3]] Thirdly, the European unification process (process of unification) can be thwarted by the imponderable forces (and powers) of anomie. These forces are not necessarily in the planetary age homemade, i.e. of European origin, they – or at any rate their direct triggers or catalysts – can just as well be imported. The import(ing) of world-wide, ecological adversity or catastrophes gone out of control can of course hardly be warded off and averted (*or*: cannot of course be prevented or obstructed), however, the import(ing) of unbearable demographic

loads, encumbrances and burdens, is not completely beyond the possibilities of the acting, i.e. action, of the political will (*or*: constitutes at least in part a matter of political volition), unless the burden has in the meantime ruined, destroyed or sunk political will. One may, in pardonable humanistic naivety somewhat underestimate the significance of the demographic factor or, immersed in sublime thoughts, simply pass that factor by (*or*: absorbed in lofty thoughts, simply overlook it). Yet whoever openly and in earnest wanted to assert that the wandering in, i.e. immigration of 30 or 40 million people into today's France or Germany would not bring about any anomic phenomena or manifestations, he is – I cannot express it differently – an idiot. Here, the sheer quantity is crucial, and the determination of this quantity constitutes a question of sovereign political judgement. Such a judgement has for its part not the slightest to do with “racism”, i.e. we are not talking about the racial or cultural quality of the immigrants, especially since the anomic phenomena and manifestations would equally occur and appear if one would like to regard the immigrants as racially or culturally of equal value and or even superior. Demography already has as quantity its fatalities (i.e. inevitabilities, mischiefs or mishaps) (*or*: its logic) and triggers or provokes specific actions and reactions. In calm and harmless seminar rooms, i.e. studies, academic reading rooms etc., where ethical universalists (*or*: where the fans and supporters of ethical universalism) are encountered, one can in total comfort and with every convenience feel like a supra-national pure human amongst supra-national pure humans, but already in the throng and congestion of humans in a public means of transport, one tends not to be so spontaneous and one loses one's willingness, in relation to that, to interpret the process in the public means of transport and all that is happening around and above him [[as signifying]] that here merely one human dignity is found amongst several others (*or*: by saying that he is participating simply in a gathering of humans of equal ethical eminence and dignity). Only the certainty that it is temporally limited makes one such process or suffocating situation

bearable, and it can easily be imagined what would follow if this certainty no longer existed, and if permanent and large population density was supposedly paired, or went, with massive impoverishment and pauperisation as a result of intensifying global economic competition. Some European countries would then take the authoritarian path (*or*: the road of authoritarianism), some others would react by entrenchment[[, i.e. defensively insisting on its own course of action, etc.]]; in any case, the naked and blind drive (urge, impulse) of self-preservation would choke back and stifle every common, joint or mutual European sense or spirit of solidarity. As we remarked: pressure and crisis can let loose centripetal forces; however, they can just as much let loose centrifugal forces too.

## VI

The reader will hopefully have observed that here we are neither making known (*or*: neither have expressed) personal preferences or apprehensions and aversions, nor have we attempted to prophesy (prophesise) concrete events or incidents – such prophecies constitute, incidentally, as a rule, exactly only the objective (or objectified) expression of preferences or of apprehensions and aversions. We described possible constellations and combinations of pre-given or already given factors, and we conjectured (guessed) the possible outcomes of a multi-dimensional dynamic, without being able, or wanting, to exclude one or another outcome amongst them, i.e. amongst all possible outcomes. The description of open constellations and combinations of course seems in comparison to the prognosis of events or incidents, to be simpler in the sense that there are a number of possibilities, but only one reality (*or*: since there are several possibilities, whereas the reality is one [[reality]]). Nonetheless, already the apprehension of possibilities demands not merely the logical ability of a combinatory game (*or*: the ability at a logical game (game of logic) of the

combination or of combinations), but above all, the eye or sense for driving forces and great interrelations and contexts. As to the practical value of such thoughts and considerations, one can at the very most say the following: for the acting subject(s), some imagined constellation or hypothetical combinations can be a motive or motives; some others can be the hindering or hampering of action (*or*: inhibitory factors in respect of their acts). All the same, he who acts, or those who act, must orientate their action to the intellectual(-spiritual) option or choice in favour of a certain constellation and or combination. Options and choices are necessary because history is open – but again, not so very open that every mistake can be atoned for all of the time (*or*: so that any error whatsoever can accommodate rectification whensoever).

---

## ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and *have nothing whatsoever to do with P.K.. Readers can and in fact probably must simply ignore them and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in the mirror and say "Oh my God, I'm really ugly, and retarded". I do it every day, and it's the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.*

<sup>i</sup> 1492 is a convenient date as regards Colonial Exploration and Conquest, though in the history of ideas, Kondylis starts mainly with the 13<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Aquinas).

<sup>ii</sup> I have to admit, upon proof-reading this article it occurred to me that today's Western-led, i.e. Germano-Franco-led Europe is, *mutatis mutandis*, before a demographic and geopolitical crossroads not unlike when my people last projected Power, in the 11<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> centuries before 1204 and the mass (i.e. for those years) build-up of Turkic forces which culminated in 1453. That means, the West qua Europe – and it can just as easily be

---

because of Rampaging Ape Hordes as Bearers of Full Ape Anomie as compared to a more Organised Invading and Conquering Army – is probably DEAD.

<sup>iii</sup> The 2016 difference in population between Germany and France is about 15 million.

<sup>iv</sup> The Greek text reads “internal/inward”. I suppose both are potentially correct.

<sup>v</sup> I am aware of the potential resources of the Mediterranean Sea and elsewhere which have come to light since P.K.’s death, but I do not see how they alter his basic argumentation – apart from perhaps adjusting things by a few or some decades, or by moving the loci and foci of (potential) competition and conflict around somewhat. Ditto re: the renewal of shale oil extraction in our century.

<sup>vi</sup> It turns out, or at least it seems, that P.K.’s information in 1995 was **TOTALLY WRONG!** The projected population of China in 2030 is said to be 1,45 billion, so P.K.’s “500” should have read “250”, though the “mistake” makes no difference whatsoever to his analysis.

<sup>vii</sup> I’m not sure that by about 2030 the said pressures re: population, agrarian and other resources, energy and other raw materials, will be (fully) in effect and at play, though they could be by about the middle of the century due to a whole range of other factors, including much higher levels of consumption of the then existing population, and notwithstanding that it is said China’s population is set to decline by the year 2100 to 1.1 billion. Of course, the “ambitions” and “claims” referred to, would no doubt include the New Silk Road or One Belt, One Road.

<sup>viii</sup> In so far as, in the 1990s, the USA was in a position to “pick and choose” who it wanted to bomb, etc., or did “whatever it wanted” with that disgusting fully Zio-lobotomised drunk, Yeltsin, etc..

<sup>ix</sup> Let’s not forget that this was written well-before the coming to power of Putin.

<sup>x</sup> In 1820, Europe had about 21% of the world population, 28% in 1913 and 13% in the year 2000 (but this figure is probably inflated because it certainly includes a large slice of non-Europeans (less than or around 10% is probably the real figure), and of course **FULL SPECTRUM SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY ZIO-LOBOTOMY** and all the **DISGUSTING ANIMALS** (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste) associated with that **LOBOTOMY**, control Wikipedia – everyone knows that: ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_population\\_estimates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_population_estimates)).

<sup>xi</sup> Therefore, from one point of view, there is some logic to the Elite and Governments of Europe facilitating the Great Invasions, esp. from 2015, **BUT** the Ape-Anomie Effects is the pay-off, and such Effects are by no means Trivial – in fact there is already ample evidence, that long-term, such Effects can be Fatal, and who would in his right mind ever believe or trust the **SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY** that “everything is going to be alright because we are all humans who belong to the human race” and other such empirically and factually vacuous, ideologically sharpened statements and imbecilic **FULLY RETARDED, MORONIC, CRETINOUS, FULLY ZIO-LOBOTOMISED** slogans of anti-White and anti-Christian **HATE**, anyway?

<sup>xii</sup> P.K.’s vision obviously goes very deep into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and perhaps even beyond.

<sup>xiii</sup> Prescient re: what happened in Libya and the great African (incl. invited) Zio-Lobotomised Mass Ape-Anomie Invasions of Europe (i.e. pushed by the **GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY** Satanic Circus Monkey Western USA-centred Mass Media and associated **SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY BILLIONAIRES** of **TOTAL FULL-SPECTRUM BRAIN-WASHING AND OUT-OF-CONTROL ZIO-LOBOTOMISED HATE FOR WHITE CHRISTIAN AND WHITE SECULAR PEOPLES**); P.K. probably could have mentioned the sub-Saharan African population explosion too. Elsewhere, i.e. incl. in other articles, he does that, and also mentions the Middle-Eastern Arab world. In any event, in the year 2018, it seems Hungary, Poland, etc. and perhaps Italy, are putting up or starting to put up some resistance to the Great, inter alia, **FULLY FUCKED-IN-THE-HEAD AND GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO-PUSHED EFFACEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES FROM THIS WORLD**. If the Satanic Circus Monkey succeeds in this Task of Satan it has Set Its Devil Self, then **IT** can be rest assured that **IT’S TURN WILL COME, FOR THE APE and or HAN MAN and or SOMEONE ELSE**, but a **MAN** and not a woman or any other kind of filthy pussy or anal cavity, **WILL SPARE NO-ONE!**