IV. The global economy, global democracy and the global struggle over distribution

1. Globalisation, politics, distribution (*or*: Globalisation: politics, economy and distribution)

From the materially interested side, but also from the gullible, [[those]] who (*or*: Circles with tangible material interestsⁱ, but also various gullible people, who) out of temperament and idiosyncrasy, are inclined to warm up to and embrace more hopeful perspectives and prospects, it is propagated (*or*: propagandise the view) that growing, progressing globalisation would entail and bring about the ever increasing equalisation of the collective circumstances, relations and collective aims and goals of life, and consequently create commonalities between humans, necessarily making bloody conflicts obsolete and superfluous; because, as is said, globalisation is supposed to in fact weaken or even dissolve and abolish exactly the alleged, putative originators and causes of such conflict, i.e. nations and states. This perception or view was proclaimed as, and advanced to – above all after the collapse of communism – an article of faith and self-evident truth, so that this perception or view's premises and its inner conclusiveness, i.e. logical consistency, are not sufficiently questioned.

The sermon (preaching or homily)

Not any activity whatsoever, e.g. the preaching of brotherhood and love, is regarded as the vehicle and bearer of globalisation and of the equalisation of circumstances and of goals (values), but one activity completely concrete: the expanding and intertwined economy. A first premise of the above-mentioned perception and article of faith is therefore the assumption of, and belief in, the primacy of the economic, i.e. the economy, and indeed in its contrast and opposition to the political, since politics is equated with power politics ("the politics of power") and is contradistinguished to the allegedly immanent peacefulness of the economy. But this dichotomy between politics and economy appears only possible, if one defines both sectors so narrowly (that is, economy is reduced to the technical process of production and politics to administration and management), that the reference to, or any substantive relation with, social praxis gets, i.e. is lost. Historically and sociologically, the dichotomy is untenable and baseless; it constitutes an ideological construction or weapon, which first of all, as is known, was used by ascendant liberalism against the absolutist state, and today remains popular with, and the favourite argument of, supporters of the economy and various economic circles, who of course otherwise do everything in order to instrumentalise and mobilise politics and governments for their own goals in order to not come off worse or lose out regarding orders from the state (or: for their own goals, and by no means do they thumb one's nose at state orders and credits). The construction was, incidentally, already since the 17th century connected with the world-historical prognosis that trade and commerce will replace war. What has happened since then, we know well.

Reason for conflict

The general reason why the economic and the political (politics and the economy) – in every socially and historically important sense of the terms – are and remain inseparable, is obvious. Economy and politics equally concern the concrete relations of concrete people with on another, and every economic change effects a shifting and displacement of the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) for the benefit of certain people and to the cost of others. Economic aims and goals are not pursued and achieved in a social-political vacuum, but are measured in the performance(s), efficiencies and output of the competitors, and are accordingly evaluated. Whatever all people can accomplish, and whatever all people can enjoyⁱⁱ is just as economically as politically valueless (or: has neither economic nor political value) – because value always means: particular value. For that reason, absolute gains and profits, i.e. such which indicate a betterment in comparison to an earlier state of our own affairs, are, or appear to be, far less important than relative gains and values, i.e. such which are achieved in comparison to the present state of affairs of our competitors. If one side believes that its relative disadvantages cannot in the foreseeable future be made good/made up for through any kind of economic effort whatsoever, then it must choose between capitulation before the power of the "invisible hand" (A. Smith), and, the politicisation of economic conflict. Because since primeval times, there are only two possibilities of acquiring goods: by producing them, or by taking them from those who have produced them, irrespective of whether with the sword (spear) or through trade quotas. The concept of "vital interests" exists just as much in the economy as in politics, in fact, one could characterise and consider this concept their great common denominator. Wherever the political is thoroughly economised (or economised throughout), i.e. turned into a part of the economic sphere of

human-social activity, the economic, of all things, can therefore rapidly change and turn into the politicalⁱⁱⁱ.

Where peace ends

These facts of the case or this situation can also be grasped and summarised as follows: the political penetrates (forces its way into, infiltrates, permeates) the economic not so much via the question or processes of production and of communication, but primarily via the question or problem of distribution. Typically enough, the debate over globalisation revolves around processes and suggestions which concern the interweaving and intertwining of world industry and of world trade, as well as the condensation/condensing (thickening) of the worldwide network of communication – the secret of a generally, i.e. on a world scale, acceptable distribution of resources, goods and wealth, nobody has hitherto let out and revealed. However, peace between political units and entities or humans in general is put in danger not so much through the manner globalisation produces and communicates (is produced and communicated), but primarily through how globalisation distributes (is distributed) [[resources and goods are distributed]] (or: not so much on account of the mode of production and of communication, as on account of the terms and of the inequalities of distribution).

The globalisation of production and communication exacerbates and aggravates the question and problem of distribution in a double respect (*or*: from two points of view). On the side of those rising (ascending) (*or*: In the interior of the rising (ascending) economic powers), social processes are triggered or set in motion, which can more rapidly increase and multiply rather than satisfy the expectations for *relative* gains and profits – and, as is known, the half-satiated are often more aggressive than the half-hungry (half-starved)

(*or*: half-dead from hunger). Even the limited satisfaction of those expectations creates, after all, in view of the vast (enormous) human masses standing behind such limited satisfaction, a significant wealth, in relation to which the relative (pro)portion of those who have made it in world income a long time ago, is constantly sinking (i.e. going down or getting less) (*or*: in relation to which the relative portion of the developed countries in world wealth continuously decreases), and indeed with the result that the global struggle over distribution is transferred into the interior of the rich nations, which now have to tighten the belt (of the greater part of the population (*or*: of at least broader strata of the people)) in order to remain competitive.

Whoever believes that here it is a matter of a short-term or medium-term restructuring to be carried out and managed, which has to succeed with some patience and skilfulness, has hardly comprehended the extent of the planetary transformation going on and being effected. The highly industrialised "West or North" continues to look at the process of globalisation from the confident and misleading vantage point of that part of the world which still has at its disposal more than a good three quarters of world('s) wealth^{iv} and of world energy – and crucial, in the course of this, is moreover the American view of things, which of course, despite ideological confessions of faith in the automatic mechanism and automatic effect of the economic (or: the economy), rests on today's politicalmilitary giant lead (or: military and diplomatic precedence) of the United States. The by far superior Power tends in relation to that, to see globalisation first of all as the widening of its own unfolding space or field of action/activity, and can or will hardly imagine the long-term consequences of a reversal of the trend. Yet in the confidence and self-conviction of the "West", the first doubt – and the first shudder (shiver) – have already, especially in Europe, crept in, where coming into consciousness all the more intensely is the fact that the deeper cause of the permanent crisis is the intensity of world trade and the continual

decline in the particular European weight within the world economy. The doubts and the shudders (shivers) will be reinforced under the pressure (of imported and self-made or endogenous) demographic and ecological factors. The borders, which the trends and tendencies of globalisation have in the meanwhile torn down, as a result of the sharpening (exacerbating, aggravating) of the struggles over distribution will be erected anew, regardless of where they will go this time (*or*: even though we do not know exactly by whom and where they will be put this time)^v.

New borders (boundaries, bounds)

This sharpening or exacerbating is to be expected all the more so, since the second premise of the article of faith or perception referred to at the beginning, that namely, the equalisation of the circumstances, relations and aims (goals) of life must lessen and diminish conflicts, is simply false. The commonality of aims and goals begets or brings about friendship if the aim/goal is supposed to be pushed or carried through, i.e. imposed or attained, against a third party; however, it (the said commonality of aims/goals) sows enmity when the attainment or achievement of the common aim/goal by the one side makes the common aim's attainment (the common goal's achievement) by the other side either impossible or even worthless (i.e. without value, valueless). Friendship, therefore, does not arise out of the common setting of the aim/goal (or common objective) as such, but out of the agreement over which rank (i.e. position [[in the pecking order or hierarchy]]) or turn each side will take up or have in the pursuit of the common aim/ goal, and which advantages and benefits it will draw, i.e. extract, out of the common aim's realisation. If regarding this no agreement is reached, then exactly as a result of the commonality in regard to the aim/goal, conflict must be sharpened and exacerbated (aggravated) (or: If on this crucial point no agreement is achieved, then conflict will become more acute exactly because the goal is common), and indeed for the same reason for which the butcher does not become the foe of the fruiterer across [[from him/the street]], but of the butcher next door (next to him). Commonality of aim or goal means struggle over the same resources, same markets, same spaces and the same prizes. And if the commonality as regards the aims/goals of consumption is extended, then the Chinese and the Indian must use just as much energy and raw materials as the North American. With what consequences? (*or*: And if the commonality of the goals is extended to the goals of consumption as well, then the Indian and the Chinese will have to consume as much energy and just as many other raw materials as the North American. What will be the consequences for the planet?)

Equalisation as a result of globalisation is also considered and declared in another sense the precursor and harbinger of peaceful developments (evolution, unfolding) such that its mental effects would contribute to the reduction and dismantling of national cultures, and consequently nationally and culturally determined conflicts. Whether the global alignment or equating of the methods of economising, i.e. economic activity, and the way of life of people will necessarily generate and form a united world culture, may remain an open question here (*or*: we do not need to examine here). At any rate, this world culture could only then provide or constitute a guarantee of peace only if bloody conflicts until now (*or*: in the past) had taken place between nationally and culturally different collective subjects. Civil wars teach us something else (*or*: However, history has known of very many civil wars, and they also were often the worst). So, the only thing for which economic and cultural globalisation can guarantee) is merely the transformation of all wars into civil wars.

Whoever anticipates world peace from the weakening or breaking up in itself of nation states forgets that war was not put in the world first by nation states (*or*: wars are a phenomenon much older than nation states). He forgets that the nation state by no means represents and constitutes the sole conceivable sovereign political collective, and that is why the world-historical alternative choice does not have to read "world society or nation state". And finally, he forgets that far worse than every conflict between organised political collectives can be the direct fighting (struggle) of man with man under conditions of global anomie^{vi}.

ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and <u>have nothing whatsoever to do</u> <u>with P.K.. Readers can and in fact probably must simply ignore them</u> <u>and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some</u> <u>of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes</u> <u>are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in</u> <u>the mirror and say "Oh my God, I'm really ugly, and retarded". I do</u> <u>it every day, and it's the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly</u> <u>profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.</u>

ⁱ I love the use of the term "circles" – with "tangible material interests" (HAHAHAHAHA!!! – what the fuck does that mean? HAHAHAHAHA!!!) in the Greek text, written especially for us Greeks – because P.K., notwithstanding the incomparable scientific rigour of all his analyses, was always a human being with a Tribe (!) and when one has a Tribe, one is very, very, **very** aware of *other* tribes.

ⁱⁱ E.g. all human activity under "communism" as dreamed about by the communist utopians.

ⁱⁱⁱ In his usual unique fashion, P.K. is basically telling the reader that there is no such thing as "let's all trade with one another, and then – even though in practice and in effect we're total atheists and live only for and in This World – as if "by magic", it will "just happen" that everything will be alright, and everyone will become

more prosperous, but especially us, because globalisation (because we said so) and we ourselves are "beautiful" even though many people think we are "disgustingly ugly" (and we deal with that problem by psychopathologising them, even though we are the absolute and total psychos believing in our own fairy stories, all along serving our own in-group interests). And of course, anyone with half brain knows exactly where all this GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-led Madness is going to End.

^{iv} Unless I'm mistaken, that has dropped to about 50% today.

^v P.K., always cautious and precise, does not give a time-frame for borders going up again, nor exactly where they will be erected (e.g. they might still be open in some or many places in 2018, but in 2048? 2088?). Nor does he exclude the possibility of pathetic states like the former Greece euthanising themselves out of existence.

^{vi} P.K. with his usual mastery does not go into whether nations or which nations will survive, be substantially transformed, go extinct, or which states will continue and which will be broken up or set up. That is up to reality and its interrelations, interactions and correlations of forces. One thing, however, is certain. Reality owes absolutely nothing to anyone: not to individuals and not to groups, but death. The rest is struggle (co-operation and or conflict). The next victory will be one victory closer to the next defeat.