

4. Mirror, not lever: the United Nationsⁱ

When in the Autumn of 1995, the 50 years since the founding and establishment of the UN were celebratedⁱⁱ, the public rhetoric one more time followed a beaten path, formulating and expressing wishes and exhortations. Nonetheless, the subject, to which such wishes and exhortations are addressed, remains vague and indefinite, and the more vague and indefinite is the hypostasis or being(ness) (existence) which is called the UN, so much the more comfortably does one move at the rhetorical level. However, rhetorical needs do not suffice on their own to keep alive fictitious hypostases (being(nesse)s or existences). In this case, the tendency to hypostatisation, or to the personalisation of an organisation which has many members, is connected with the retrogressive projection of a desired future reality in and onto the present. In other words, the UNⁱⁱⁱ is considered to be, or is looked at, as a thinking and acting subject to the extent that one is meant to have to see in it the germ (*or*: it is apprehended as the core) of a sovereign world state, and at the same time the lever of this sovereign world state's realisation.

It is a matter here, of an optical illusion. This optical illusion does not come into being out of, or is not created by, the fact that a world state is theoretically and historically inconceivable (unthinkable), but out of an, in the best case – optimistic as to goal – interweaving of two very different things with each other (*or*: but by the fact that two different things are connected, in the best case [[scenario]], with hurried optimism). Because neither the existence of the organisation of the United Nations confirms the possibility of a world state, nor could the lack thereof (i.e. of a world state), or its startling failure, prove its impossibility. The existence of the organisation, i.e. the UN, is in fact founded

and established on the – by statutes or constitutionally – safeguarded, secured respect of the state sovereignty (sovereignty of the state) of its members, and these members with state sovereignty understand their membership primarily not, for instance, as a contribution to the achievement of a world state, but exactly as the protection of their own sovereign rights, with their festive and celebrated recognition on the part of the international community overall; whenever they want to, or must, relinquish or forego a part of those rights, they do it in all practical cases through agreements amongst one another, not for instance through the direct cessation of these rights to the United Nations.

This United Nations as an organisation of voluntary members (or of states who are members of their own free will), would barely survive the abandonment of (*or*: if it relinquished) the principle of state sovereignty, which represents and constitutes literally the accepted by all lowest – irrespective of human rights and of other accomplishments – common denominator (*or*: lowest common denominator, beyond the achievements of every member in the sector of “human rights” etc. etc.); no other right of say, participation and of co-decision (i.e. jointly deciding with others) would compensate the loss of sovereignty, above all in the eyes of the weaker nations, for which the equal sovereignty of all [[nations/states]] remains the most effective form of having equal rights, i.e. of legal and real equivalence.

Universalism and particularism

Since now, for these and for other reasons, no spontaneous and simultaneous relinquishment by all states of the central rights of sovereignty can be expected, the establishment of a world state via the United Nations is only conceivable if the hegemony of one Power or the condominium (i.e. joint sovereignty and domination) of some Powers inside of this organisation (of the UN) would

actually stand the UN's principles in force today on their head (i.e. turn these principles upside down). In this sense, we mean (*or*: With this concept we said) that a failure of the United Nations by no means proves the impossibility of a world state, but such a failure would possibly become conducive to the matter of a world state (*or*: but indeed it could promote a world state's realisation). Because the world state – howsoever it is structured – could namely be founded and established through other (different) methods than through the general (i.e. by all states) voluntary renunciation of sovereignty, and indeed with other (different) aims and goals than those which are formally propagated by the United Nations, provided that a planetary Power or an alliance of such Powers would have at its or their disposal the economic, military and demographic potential to force and impose the unification of the planet for its or their own goals.

Now if the United Nations and the world state constitute two very different things, how is then the fact to be explained that there exists between the presence and existence of such a world organisation (i.e. the UN), and, the growing (progressive) unification of the world, that is, the increasing degree of density of planetary politics, nevertheless, a really obvious interrelation? Also, this time or on this point, one should beware (*or*: we must protect ourselves from) a second widely disseminated optical illusion, which incidentally frequently underlies the optical illusion mentioned above, i.e. between the UN and the world state. One confuses the (in actual fact) growing and progressive unification and homogenisation of the planetary field of tension with the (hypothetical) growing and progressive commonality of interests of the collective actors, or put differently: out of the necessary unification of processes and of questions and problems on a world scale, the necessary unification of the aims, goals and of the answers and solutions, is erroneously concluded and documented. This impression can come into being because the constantly

increasing degree of density of planetary politics in the twentieth century forces its determinative and crucial subjects, in relation to that, to formulate their matters of concern in the vocabulary of universal objectives, goals (settings of their aim), and universal social models spanning the entire world.

Therein lay the basic feature, and at the same time the forward-striving basic contradiction (i.e. the basic contradiction moving things forward), of that politics at the latest since (*or*: particularly after) 1917, when the United States and the Soviet Union entered upon the world stage and came to (arrived at) the world fore(front): universalisms and universalistic ideologies were represented especially by the great nations, which, in the course of this, wanted to secure and ensure a planetary pre-eminence, as well as a monopoly of the interpretation of universalistic ideas. In the roundabout way of, or through, this interpretation, exactly the universalistic proclamations were particularised and specialised end(goal)-rationally and expediently, i.e. in accordance with the goals and the interests of the interpreter. The relation(ship) between universalism and nationalism could therefore not be grasped generally and abstractly, but it varies according to the international weight and the claim and aspirations of the nation (coming) in(to) question on each and every respective occasion.

The Second World War constituted an until then unprecedented condensing of planetary politics in the sense that it was ultimately a matter of world domination (*or*: here domination over the whole globe was at stake) – and the Cold War, which followed it, likewise showed that from now it, i.e. planetary politics, could only be about world domination (*or*: the much-sought-after, enviable prize of major[[-league]] (large-scale) international politics would be world domination). The initiative of the United States in regard to the founding and establishment of the United Nations indicated the willingness of the West's leading nation to continue to remain active in world politics (*or*: to continue to

play an active world role) in the name of universalistic principles; and the co-acting, i.e. participation or involvement of the Soviet Union, expressed its determination and resoluteness to be present in that world forum, and with the shaping of world events, to assert its own universalistic standpoint (*or*: to impose its views, forming world politics, from its own universalistic point of view). It is not at all surprising and paradoxical that a common forum came about precisely at a time when the tensions between the protagonists were already emerging, becoming delineated and looming on the horizon; possibly hiding in this circumstance was the true core (kernel, nub, essence) of that which the United Nations had to represent anyhow (*or*: in this fact, the true character of the UN was probably hiding). To the double-sidedness, i.e. ambiguity, of a world situation, in which universalistic principles and world-political endeavours and pursuits of the leading nations were no longer to be separated from one another[[, i.e. both Great or Super Powers were acting on the same battlefield – the whole world, globe, planet]], corresponded the ambivalent character of an organisation, which offered (a) common ground in the form of principles (required for interpretation, i.e. to be interpreted), and simultaneously a framework for various kinds of probing and sounding out, manoeuvres and propagandistic appearances. Certainly, this ground and this framework always constituted a meeting place – but the festival ground or fairground is a meeting place; the battlefield is also a meeting place; and the United Nations has served until now – as an institutionalised meeting place – all possible goals. Its main function has consisted in being the mirror of, or the mirror in which one saw, the constellations, i.e. correlations, of forces, which were (being) formed outside of it. That can easily be proved: the United Nations did not exert any remarkable or significant influence on the course and outcome of the Cold War; it acts or behaves conversely: the peripeteiae [[= sudden changes in events and or circumstances]] of the this same Cold War decisively stamped the United Nations' history.

The question is now whether the world organisation, i.e. the UN, after the Cold War, could be transformed from a mirror to a lever, which would achieve, or be capable of contributing particularly to, the creation of a world order. What is meant is of course a world order according to the principles proclaimed in 1945, because another world order would actually imply the dispensability of the United Nations (*or*: that the United Nations is superfluous), even if these above-mentioned principles would have been used by the originators and creators of the new world order simply as means for a purpose or goal. If the question is posed thus, the reminding is inevitable – and instructive –, that the United Nations never made its own existence dependent on the preservation of those principles, in whose name it, i.e. the UN, was founded and established. It never occurred to anyone to demand the expulsion of a member-state because of the worst breaches of human rights, because of flagrant violations against (of) international law in force, or even because of the flouting of resolutions of the United Nations. Whoever believes, after the Cold War, this would be different, is wrong and kidding himself. Wherever, of course, the spirits are fed and nourished with universalistic rhetoric, there the banality moves out of sight and out of mind, i.e. is forgotten, that principles of “human rights” and of international law can only turn into principles for acting (action), when their keeping and observance is guaranteed. Right, i.e. law, becomes right/law not through its declaration, but through its (f)actual and uninterrupted, unailing legal recoverability and fundamental, in principle, legal enforceability (*or*: possibility of being demanded, and of enforcing its application). For that reason, until today there are in fact no human rights, but merely civil rights: human rights could only be proclaimed and granted by a world state, vis-à-vis which all humans would be directly and immediately of the state, i.e. citizens of the world state, that is, their rights would be obtained directly from such a world state as the representative of the whole of mankind (humanity), and not through the mediation and intervention of a particular, separate state; because only he who

represents the whole of mankind can look at and consider a human in his mere property, i.e. characteristic and quality as a human, free of, or beyond, national attributes^{iv}.

With that, a second reason interrelates, as to why the universalistic principles in themselves declared by the United Nations are hardly suitable as a lever of action and of practice with regard to, and for the purpose of, a generally acceptable world order: their need for interpretation, or their vagueness, grows and increases exactly to the extent of their spreading, diffusion and (nominal) application. This applies in particular to so-called human rights, whose interpretation becomes, or is made, all the more elastic and unbinding, the more they dominate world-political discourse. Especially their material (economic and ecological) interpretation makes the distance between poor and rich possessors of human rights visible, whereby exactly that is proven to be a point of contention which should have constituted the basis of understanding. The Climate [[Change]] Conference of Berlin (1995) was, regarding this, exceptionally instructive for anyone who wants to be taught.

Something different to contempt for, or the arbitrary – as one likes – interpretability of, principles, yet just as widespread and paralysing (crippling, inhibitory, suspensory) for the United Nations, is these same principles' selective application, that is to say, action in accordance with two measures or yardsticks. Hence, it is the full right of the United States to be worried about the supposed atomic weapons of North Korea or of Iran much more than about Israel's real atomic weapons; however, this behaviour hardly seems in the eyes of others, i.e. third parties, to be appropriate to commend someone as an impartial executor of universal principles. Undoubtedly, the partiality of the small [[Powers, actors, subjects]] is not less than the partiality of the great [[Powers, actors, subjects]], yet this is (or strikes one as) all the more unpleasant (to behold), the more the great [[Powers etc.]] with reference to (*or*: by invoking

(self-appointedly or unsolicitedly)) their own world-political responsibility, claim privileges for themselves, which must remain denied to other states.

The monopoly of violence and self-interest

With regard to its ability at taking a decision (making decisions) and at acting (action), the United Nations had the good idea, or felicitous inspiration, to shelve the principle of the unanimity of the League of Nations, and to vest in the Security Council of the Great Powers special competencies, authority and powers. This, just like the right of veto of every Great Power, implied (implies) of course the admission that universalistic principles are primarily the matter of the Great Powers, yet on the other hand, one wanted with the institution of the Security Council to take a step in the direction of a kind of world government. Voices which, or those today who, plead in favour of an assigning of the monopoly of violence (monopoly on violence) to the United Nations (read: the Security Council), pick up the thread of, and espouse, such notions and views, which for their part are traced back and reduced to the idea (notion) of the world state. With similar logic, the striving and endeavour are founded and established to restrict the possession of atomic weapons to the permanent members of the Security Council. Yet works or deeds, which according to Locke are always the best interpretation of words, show that this restriction is not necessarily to be comprehended as a constituent part, or aspect, of a comprehensive strategy for the monopolisation of violence, or for disarmament. The proof is obvious: in the Security Council sit in personal union, i.e. in a relationship of being the same and identical person, or both, the sole possessors of atomic weapons^v, and at the same time, the greatest exporters of weapons in the world.

The indication of this duplicity or hypocrisy is not supposed to be here a moralistic accusation (*or*: does not happen here with an intention of ethical

censure or reproach). It is not a matter of a sin which would or could be overcome through repentance and asceticism, but is a matter of a necessary functional concomitant of the fundamental datum, or basic given fact, which is established in, and marks, the United Nations itself; namely, the interweaving between universalistic principles and particularistic matters of concern at the level of action of nations with planetary interests and a planetary radius of action. This interweaving and its variations become visible and are evident both in that which is bemoaned as the “failure” of the United Nations, as well as in that which is notched up, registered or recorded as its “success”. This “success” one sees above all in interventions for peace-making and the consolidation of peace, or for the redress of injustice in relations between states. Yet the United Nations acts also in such cases not as a self-sufficient, self-reliant (independent) lever, which can if necessary re-dispose, i.e. rearrange, a constellation or a certain correlation of forces, but as a mirror of the existing correlation or arrangement of forces, especially in the circle of the Great Powers. Such interventions have hitherto borne fruit when a Great Power out of its own interest, took in hand the matter of concern, and could carry through and finish off the said matter[[, project or job]], in relation to which no other Power had a vital interest or a real possibility to stand in the way and obstruct it (e.g. the Gulf War). Common or joint action can also be initiated and taken on, when in the case concerned, the interests of no side are directly affected, or when no side amongst them (i.e. amongst the two or more sides) fears a decisive predominance of another side. Then – with as less expenditure and effort as possible – good will can be demonstrated, and the role of the protagonist can be justified in world politics (e.g. Cyprus)^{vi}. The ability at acting or action shortly, i.e. quickly, achieves or runs and bumps into its limits (there) where, under the pressure of this role, something must be undertaken and happen, but for lack of vital interests, no clear concept(ual) plan exists or is developed (e.g. Somalia, Rawanda), and over and above that, the participants have just as vague as

different ideas, notions and sympathies at the back of their mind (e.g. Bosnia, where in the end whatever we said in the case of the Persian Gulf was repeated).

The interrelation between the ability at acting and action, and the readiness and willingness to pay the corresponding toll in blood (i.e. blood toll, death toll, toll of lives) has also been, in the meanwhile, emphasised; only one does not rightly know in the West through which loyalties should the said toll in blood be made reasonable (plausible, convincing) and should make sense (stand to reason) (*or*: In the meanwhile, everyone knows that the ability towards/vis-à-vis action is appended to, or abuts with, the willingness to pay the corresponding toll of blood. Nevertheless, the West does not know on the basis of what legality and loyalty (consciousness of the law) can it make understandable to people, the necessity of paying this toll). Whoever no longer feels the slightest desire or disposition to die for one's own nation, will do it even less so for the peace of other nations, or even for the still more abstract peace of a still more abstract humanity, especially when it runs, bumps into and encounters the obstinate resistance of humans who, against consumeristic refinement, want to be primitive enough to sacrifice their life for that which they see as their national cause or matter (affair). The ideological and practical difficulties of the West on this point spring from the fact that even in the age (epoch) of money, some things still must be (are necessarily) measured in (*or*: certain things continue to be measured with) blood.

Definitely the main reason for the lack of ability at acting and action of the United Nations lies, nonetheless, not first of all therein (i.e. in the fact that some things are still measured in and with blood and not in and with money), but in the already stressed (aforementioned) interweaving of universalism and nationalism at the level of the Great Powers; hence, the necessity of achieving a harmonisation of interests of the latter Great Powers before – at the planetary level – there can be dealings, or action is undertaken, by invoking universalistic

principles. The momentary superiority of an interested Great Power, especially in a certain case or large space (region), may or can indeed chop this Gordian knot in two, but untie it, [[it can]]not (*or*: cut this Gordian knot, but it is not possible for anyone to untie it). If we understand by (*or*: By saying) ability at acting, i.e. action, not the occasional interest-led actionism, i.e. activism (*or*: occasional and selfish feverish acts), but coordinated long-term activity for the application of declared principles, thus it is hardly to be expected that also an – already considered and studied – organisational reform of the United Nations could bring about something in this sense or direction. It would merely take into account, and record, the transition from bi-polarity to multi-polarity, and in this respect, it would democratise the world organisation, i.e. the UN. However, democratisation, and, the ability at acting/action, are two different things, particularly if – together with the new World and or Great Powers – their antagonisms towards the old World/Great Powers, or amongst one another, would creep and nest in(to) the highest bodies or organs of the United Nations.

Political provincialism

Whoever thinks in respect of the longer term, must keep in mind that the world in 1995 or 1998^{vii} still finds itself in a state of awkwardness and embarrassment, and of orientationlessness, i.e. lack of orientation, after the unexpected end of the Cold War. This awkwardness etc. often manifests itself and appears as a peaceful and peaceable voice or disposition, which will retreat to the extent new fixed poles of attraction and clear alternatives on the basis of clear contrasts and conflicts of interests are formed. What a multi-polar Cold War will look like, no-one can say with certainty. What is certain is that the United Nations will depict or reflect a multi-polar Cold War, rather than obstruct it. Such thoughts and prognoses are of course in Germany, for well-known reasons, largely taboo

(*or*: are most often repelled on account of ethical and humanitarian qualms). The reader of American or French political and strategic journals and periodicals notes with relief^{viii} that not everyone in the West is ready and prepared (*or*: Whoever, however, closely follows the more authoritative political and strategic publications (printed materials) knows that not everyone in the world is willing) to lapse into political provincialism in the name of ethical universalism. Since those who are actually ready for that, most often invoke and stress the role and possibilities of the United Nations, it appears to be useful and beneficial (*or*: for that reason, we are obliged) to repeat: the United Nations is a mirror, not a lever. Every political situation creates the institutions in which this same political situation is reflected (mirrored), or which reflect (mirror) it, and the unprecedented degree of density of planetary politics after the Second World War, found expression in a world organisation. That is not a blessing in itself, but it also does no harm. In mirrors, one can only see that which is reflected and mirrored in them.

The present and the future of the world are decided by means of the relations of the great (and middle) Powers towards (with, *vis-à-vis*) one another, and the age-old (long-ago) known secret of peace is the equilibrium (balance, balancing) of their interests. If this exists, then universalistic principles also find their generally acceptable interpretation^{ix}; if it does not exist, then these same principles are converted into points of contention and weapons. Sluggish and languid thought takes a liking to the simple representation of a higher, superior Power, which, guided by noble intentions and principles, creates, as it were, order from above. With regard to that, in practice it is required to start construction from the roof. But order, in so far as it is possible in human affairs, lies in the foundations, and order is capable of being jointly shaped, moulded and formed only by those who themselves stand on firm foundations. That is why the decisive and leading European nations would therefore be ill-advised

(or: would not be doing any good) to use their eager and diligent participation and involvement in undertakings and ventures of the United Nations as a substitute and alibi for their own inability to obtain (lay) solid planetary foundations under their own feet (or: inability towards (vis-à-vis) the constitution (formation, composition) of firm and solid planetary foundations).

ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and ***have nothing whatsoever to do with P.K.. Readers can and in fact probably must simply ignore them and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in the mirror and say "Oh my God, I'm really ugly, and retarded". I do it every day, and it's the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.***

ⁱ Initial title in the FAZ: „Der Traum vom Weltstaat“ (= “The dream of a world state”).

ⁱⁱ The German text starts with “The United Nations, whose fifty-year continued existence is to be celebrated this year”, but because the Greek opening paragraph includes about ten lines not in the German text, I had to use the Greek text since the German opening sentence is not grammatically consistent with the rest of the Greek-language opening paragraph.

ⁱⁱⁱ This is the point where the Greek and German texts coincide again.

^{iv} Of course, even if such a world state or e.g. a European state did that, it doesn't mean that all or even most of its people would necessarily see themselves as just world citizens or European citizens. Personally, I could be a citizen of *x* state all of my life, and even live there all of my life, and yet MY SPIRIT, SOUL, HEART, EMOTIONS (and nearly all of my MIND) belong TOTALLY AND ABSOLUTELY AND WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION WHATSOEVER TO MY ANCESTORS, who are DEAD on the other side of the planet. So, things are “not that simple” – to put it mildly.

^v Under the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, only the permanent members of the UN Security Council: the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China are meant to have nuclear weapons – though apparently – or it is alleged – India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have them too.

^{vi} P.K. is saying that for the USA (or rather Zio-USA) and the (Zio-)UK, it is irrelevant whether Turkey controls historically Hellenic lands or not – all they care about is that they have their (part-)Control over the region, and that from the point of view of Greece and Hellenism, if you're not good enough to militarily etc. defend – let alone unite – your lands, well, then you're FUCKED and that's that, because REALITY is not going to be "nice" to anyone, and definitely does not "owe" anyone anything.

^{vii} The Greek version says "1998" which suggests P.K. might have put together the Greek version of this book in the months before he died.

^{viii} Does this mean that P.K. was not disinterested in the fate of the West? Or simply that for the sake of Science, the German Scene was "laughable" – to put it mildly?

^{ix} This can, inter alia, exist when one Super Power can impose its own Ideological Principles over a large part of the world, e.g. the USA from 1945 to c. 2010/2020 or to ?.