Panagiotis Kondylis

Planetary Politics after the Cold War

References and Reminders

A more thorough discussion of the concept of mass democracy, which is fundamental for the analyses of this book, is found in my work *The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form* (*Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform*) (Weinheim 1991). The thoughts on the future of war (Sec. III) start from the theoretical conclusions and conclusions regarding the history of war of my book *Theory of War* (*Theorie des Krieges*) (Stuttgart 1988). Finally, the reader should refer to my monograph *Conservatism* (*Konservativismus*) (Stuttgart 1986) in respect of the question of the antiquatedness of political concepts (Sec. IV) as regards their social implementation and implementation in the history of ideas.

Section IV and both parts of Section V were published in abridged form and with other titles in *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung* 5.10.1991, 12.2.1992 and 25.4.1992.

P.K.

CONTENTS

I. Planetary politics in the mass-democratic age

1. Form and historical phases of planetary politics

In trying to determine their historical position and imagine their historical perspectives, the respective (individual and collective) subjects as a rule seek, as far as possible, accurate prognoses of developments and events, as if they wanted to and could take hold of the future with their hands. Fears and hopes very frequently flow in such prognoses, and of course it can be observed in many cases that the more concrete the prognoses come across as, the more they are monstrous inventions of uplifting or depressing feelings. People strive for, where possible, accurate prognoses because above all they want to know how they should behave or for what they should prepare themselves. In this respect, prognoses constitute anticipated deeds, and the practical impetus has such a strong effect that the rather narrow limits of historical foreseeability are jumped over thoughtlessly. The history of events and event chains must, at any rate, be basically regarded as unforeseeable, which for (political) praxis means that detailed instructions can hardly be given with regard to future action and that this action must in the end be left to the "tact of judgement", as the great theorist of war[1] formulated it. However, a more or less thorough apprehension of the character of those driving (motive) forces and those historically active subjects, which through their movements and their

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[1] Carl von Clausewitz.

encounters bring into being the variety of form of events and therefore mark out the field of possible action, is conceivable. Future events are, in other words, discernible as form and possibility, not as content and event, and the contribution of such a knowledge to praxis consists in that it drills and refines the "tact of judgement", but neither generates nor replaces it.

A future-oriented description of the situation today, which wants to take the place of the thankless attempt at the prediction of events, must emphasise those aspects of the relevant historical factors to which it credits event-constituting force. It must, therefore, track down the particularity of the situation and, if historical continuities exist, it must make the transformations of the constants found comprehensible. The historical continuities of planetary politics extend over the entire New Times, i.e. such politics has been taking cohesive and continuous form since the age of the great discoveries and in the course of the formation of the colonial system and the world market, in fact planetary politics is only now coming into being in a real sense. In former times, there was indeed also the representation of a comprehensive oikoumene, however in political reality - even in that of the great empires - the one Oikoumene was subdivided into two, three or more, in practice, relevant oikoumenes, which hardly did not come into contact with one another or at the most had contact through friction(s) on their peripheries. The Roman oikoumene in the end remained (radically) different to the oikoumene of the Parthians, despite their protracted (border) struggles, just as later the Arabic and Frankish world, after the violent fixing of the dividing line between them, had to live for a long time, while existing side by side, also in essentially closed political spaces - to say nothing of the (Eur)asian or American oikoumenes. The world-historical novum[2] since

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[2] New (novel) thing; novelty; political innovation.

the 16th century consists in the advent of Powers whose relevant oikoumene in practical terms embraced the whole planet, that is, whose interests stretched to every point on the planet or at least could be extended everywhere if competition or expansion's own (internal) dynamics required this. Politics becomes planetary to the extent that developments in any region of the planet whatsoever can mobilise the forces and readiness to act of interested Powers - as no development and no place can be regarded from the outset and forever as uninteresting for certain Powers.

Two points must be paid attention to here. First, the planetary character of politics does not result from the subordination of political action urbi et orbi[3] to certain norms which meet with universal recognition. Rather, things are the other way around: norms with a universal character or at least a universal claim come into being as ideational concomitants of political phenomena of planetary range and aim at regulating the relations between planetary Powers at least in times, which in accordance with the general feeling on each and every respective occasion, are normal. These norms are fixed by Powers which can pursue to varying degrees of intensity planetary politics, that is, they are fixed by the subjects and not the objects of planetary politics. Because, secondly, planetary politics does not mean that all nations, peoples or states actively shape planetary events to their entire extent or that all those who actively participate in the shaping of these events do it equally and in the same way. Planetary politics, however, creates a situation in which all sides are forced to see that they fix their political behaviour more or less, directly or indirectly while being mindful of the correlation of forces on the whole planet,

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[3] In the city [of Rome] and in the world; everywhere.

although the radius of action of Powers is very different. Great Powers, which as active subjects of planetary politics live up to the name "planetary Powers" must, in any event, always act by taking into account the planetary situation and the planetary consequences of their action. But even Powers, which because of their geopolitical and economic potential can pursue an active foreign policy only at the regional level, must keep in mind the planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture) at least in so far as one or more planetary Powers has vital interests in the region in question. The friendly or inimical, but unavoidable contact between middle and small Powers with planetary Powers constitutes the way the middle and small Powers participate in planetary events. The prevailing world situation is reflected in every region of the planet in the constellation which arises from the presence there of planetary Powers as well as from the interrelating actions and reactions of local Powers. The result is that, given the relatively high density of planetary politics, there is hardly any international politics at the regional level without planetary aspects and implications. Just as planetary Powers cannot accept the independence of regional matters and regional claims, so too regional Powers for their part seek, in so far as they have not been turned in the meantime into an appendix of a planetary Power, to exploit to their advantage the existing relations between the planetary Powers, whereby they intentionally or unintentionally contribute to the planetarisation of regional politics.[4]

The thus outlined form-related (i.e. formal) structures of the relations between great, middle and small Powers can also be found in preplanetary epochs. Constellations, which appeared in one of the earlier oikoumenes or even in the small universe of the Greek city-states, were repeated very often - at least when seen as form-related (i.e. formal)

[4] Kondylis's own Greek translation (p. 14) reads "to the subordination of regional politics to planetary politics".

structures - in the planetary New Times, in which though, as a result of the drastic change of the social character of political subjects, the range of political events reached the outermost limits of earthly space. This ascertainment confirms our thesis that a description of the constants and of the possible constellations in the framework of today's planetary politics is not sufficient for an adequate apprehension of the present world situation without a social-historical clarification of the character of the acting political subjects. In other words, it is not decisive to register the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar structure and then conjecture who will occupy which pole, in relation to which one could (almost) make precarious and subjectively tinged prognoses, of which we spoke in the beginning. Such transitions are not a historical novum, and the propulsive and aggravating element of today's phase of planetary politics does not lie in them; rather in their present-day form, they constitute symptoms and manifestations of deeper processes, which can be investigated only through an analysis of the character of the subjects of contemporary planetary politics. Just as little does the banality that the development of technology, and in particular of informatics and telecommunications, has made the planet smaller, mutual dependence greater and co-operation more necessary, enhance understanding. Undoubtedly, planetary politics has today attained a density which knows no precedents and analogies from the distant or recent past, nevertheless this density is not simply due to the automatic effect of technology, but interrelates with social-historical developments in which technical development for its part is embedded. Not just any network of interhuman relations brings forth such technology and not just any network of interhuman relations (i.e. society) in its formation can be influenced by such technology.

A retrospective consideration and a proper periodisation of new-times planetary politics indeed show us that its large phases cannot be characterised by, for instance, a sudden change from monopolar or bipolar structures to multipolar structures and vice versa, but rather by the different degrees of density, in relation to which each and every respective characteristic intensification of the density takes place at turning points which mark changes in the social-historical character of the political subjects. This ascertainment does not imply any theoretical defence of the primacy of domestic politics, and indeed in the sense which was often asserted on the part of "progressive" historians. Because we do not mean that only certain developments in the interior of political entities set in motion striving for power in foreign policy as such and in general, which would fail to appear if the said striving for power's bearers did not want to, through those developments, consolidate their position in regard to domestic policy. Domestic policy indeed conditions the means and methods of foreign policy, it determines who takes foreign policy in hand and in the process foreign policy is also used in terms of (the goals of) domestic policy - the necessity of driving foreign policy towards the aim of the preservation and of the consolidation of power of the political entity in question inside of each and every respective relevant political universe, is however preceded by the decision over the concrete bearer of responsibility as regards foreign policy, and in this respect the necessity of exercising foreign policy remains an independent constant. Whoever directs foreign policy *must* serve the aforementioned paramount aim, but he *cannot* serve it other than through the means and methods which are typical of his social-political essence. Regardless of the reasons which bring into being the striving for power in foreign policy as such and in general, this striving for power finds expression in forms which correspond to the social-political character of the political subject, that is,

to the group or class setting the tone (inside the political subject). That is the point of view from which a parallelism between the large phases of planetary politics and the decisive changes in the social history of the New Times can be worked out.

The first of these large phases begins with the voyages of discovery, the campaigns of conquest and the building up of colonial trade in the 16th century, and lasts until the Industrial and Liberal Revolution. During the three centuries which this period of time approximately encompasses, the subjects of planetary politics or the planetary Powers in the main were estate-based states with strong feudal-patriarchal characteristics[5], which were balanced by absolutist and mercantilist tendencies. The loose character of the early colonial system and the low density of planetary politics generally corresponds to the relative looseness of the early colonial system and the then planetary politics' inner organisation and the limited needs of their still mostly agrarian and autarkic economy. The modern states coming into being just then, have at their disposal the administrative apparatus which would allow them an effective control over the total planetary space just as little as they are capable of subjugating their own territory to a uniform legislation which also encompasses all areas of life. And just like in their interior spaces, the sites of what is new in the economy and administration leave the impression of larger or smaller islands in a sea of estate-based patriarchalism, so too the economic and military branches of the planetary Powers in the various continents constitute knots in a sparse network and operate like scattered outposts inside of a, for the most part, unexplored, exotic, magical-unreal space whose dimensions only gradually penetrate the consciousness as concrete magnitudes. The room

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[5] The Greek version (p. 17) states: "states where the hereditary [landed] aristocracy, the clergy and various trade-handicraft [commercial-small industrial] elements dominate".

to move of planetary politics frequently consists of disjointed territories; the cohesion between them is brought about not so much through the intensification of communications (and transportation), but rather through the endeavour of the planetary Powers at consolidating their own respective spheres of influence and at delimiting them against other spheres of influence. This endeavour was intensive and triggered fierce struggles, nonetheless these struggles were conducted, in accordance with today's criteria, at a leisurely tempo and through the mobilisation of relatively small forces in a few decisive positions.

The degree of density and the general character of planetary politics changes substantially in the course of the subsequent phase, which is marked by the victorious Liberal and Industrial Revolution. The planetary network now becomes denser not only because modern industry needs and creates much greater possibilities of communication, while it simultaneously awakens or intensifies the need for exchange at many levels, but just as much because the modern state, which consistently put aside the remnants of estate-based society, makes the administrative means available for the organisation of large territories. Now countries, which previously were watched over only through military bases and trading posts, can be brought under more or less tight control. Thus, the possibility is offered of making out of the network of former (military) bases (and trading posts), compact spaces, as well as of splitting up the spaces between the planetary Powers. We are here dealing with the classical epoch of imperialism, which not by chance coincides with the heyday of European liberalism. The planetary Powers are in one or another form liberal and imperialistic at the same time, because only through the liberal-capitalistic unleashing of the industrial economy as well as through the creation of bourgeois states did imperialism gain not

only the impetus, but also the instruments of its unfolding. Social groups, with which at the high level the bourgeoisie had to now and then share political power (e.g. noblemen who as military officers in the colonies sought a substitute for their lost or endangered social position in the homeland), and at the low level possessionless strata, which in their country of origin could not hope for a rosy future, of course participated in the imperialist undertaking. In spite of the, for these reasons, interrelated general popularity of imperialism in the interior of planetary Powers, imperialism remained a bourgeois-liberal venture both as to its driving force as well as in a historical and structural respect. That is seen not least in the parallelism between the internal structure of the liberal-capitalistic states and the structure of the imperialistic system in toto: the separation and relation between ruling and colonial peoples inside of the imperialistic system corresponded with the separation and relation between bourgeois and proletarians in the liberal-capitalistic states. The effect of liberal capitalism, however, operated in parallel both in the interior of the planetary Powers and inside of the imperialistic system: the large mass of the population was detached, through industry and the party system[6], from the fetters of patriarchalism and was thrown into the melting pot of mass society just as the large mass of the proletarian peoples was torn out of its isolation, in order to be integrated into international society which was becoming increasingly denser. The imperialistic system initiated a massification process at the international level just as industrial capitalism had to drive forward massification inside each and every respective national framework.

It is evident that the difference or the distance between the subjects and the objects of planetary politics in both its aforementioned phases was

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[6] The Greek text (p. 19) uses the following phrase: "the functioning of multi-party parliamentarism".

fundamental for the functioning of the planetary system, especially as this difference or distance was sanctioned under international law and moreover was underpinned by arguments taken from the philosophy of history and of culture. Planetary politics was shaped by the planetary Powers deep into (i.e. until almost the middle of) the twentieth century, whereas the rest of the Powers constituted, to this or that extent, the objects of a politics which was dictated by the planetary Powers as sovereign subjects. This state of affairs changed at an increasingly quicker tempo in the course of our century[7], and indeed in the same sense and in the framework of the same world-historical process, as in the interior of the advanced nations, which as a rule also constituted the planetary Powers, mass democracy gradually displaced oligarchic liberalism, that is, the principle of equality through "affluence for all" was substantialised, advancing democratisation put in the place of a more or less closed oligarchy the game of the open elite, and in the place of fixed hierarchies an in principle unlimited social mobility, and the dominant ideology took on an individualistic, egalitarian and at the same time (value-)pluralistic[8] character. Through the massive appearance of new nations and states, legally equal amongst themselves, planetary politics now gains a density and mobility analogous to the density and mobility of mass societies or mass democracies, which followed oligarchic liberalism. For the first time in human history a true world society comes into being, which is indeed characterised by considerable actual inequalities and heterogeneities (i.e. non-uniformities), nevertheless on the other hand this world society professes the in principle equality of its members and recognises the same rights for them. Just as in the interior of developed mass democracy, so too inside of world society, equality

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[7] The 20th century.

[8] For "(wert)pluralistischen" Kondylis's own Greek translation (p. 20) reads: "(even in relation to ethical [moral] values)".

has not been realised materially and in an all-round way, yet it is guaranteed under international law as well as at the level of declarations, and is constantly propagated; racist and other (similar) teachings, which gave their blessing to colonialistic and imperialistic relations of domination and even before the First World War were all over Europe much more self-evident than what one wants to admit today, are now frowned upon and are superseded, on the one hand by universalistic anthropological and ethical principles, and on the other hand by the favourable appreciation of various cultures, their uniqueness and their contribution to universal culture.

After the collapse of the classical imperialism of the (former) planetary Powers, which projected the liberal separation between bourgeois and proletarian within the world of nations, now the "underdeveloped" countries were no longer looked upon as ignorant children, who need the wise guardianship of White Man, but rather as those in need or as (inferior) partners, to whom the same prospects of advancement as the former proletarians in the industrial nations must be given. While putting those principles into force, which in the interior of advanced mass democracies had already found practical application, at the international level it is expected that the lower strata of world society, through affluence and democratisation, will become integrated with the higher strata, and that finally the planet, seen as a whole, will resemble a giant market and at the same time a giant social state, in which the resources and riches could be redistributed in favour of those have hitherto been disadvantaged. However, the leading Powers do not expect a global social balancing out from such a direct redistribution, which would bring with it unwelcome and in the long term perhaps also pointless sacrifices for the rich, but rather from fast economic growth in the "underdeveloped"

countries - just like in the advanced mass democracies the affluence of the broad masses came about more through the creation of new wealth thanks to the development of technology and rising labour productivity than through the drastic redistribution of wealth already in existence. Growth in the until now weak regions of the world economy seems to, incidentally, be precisely an advantage for the strong national economies so that eventually the same process might be repeated on a world scale as in the Western mass democracies, in which the social rise of the worker (as consumer) in the long term boosted industry, although industry had to, in the process, bear some of the load of the welfare state while gnashing its teeth.

The following aspect of the complex analogy between mass democracy and the world economy must now be particularly emphasised. Just as inside the former, so too inside the latter the behaviour of (collective) subjects is determined less through actual and apparently difficult to remedy inequality and more through the in principle recognised right to equality - and indeed not merely equality of formal (legal) rights, but equality of enjoyment (or pleasure). The solemn recognition of this right, and even if only at the level of the declarations of the principle, creates the horizons of expectation which inspire long-term action, although in the everyday life of realpolitik[9], consideration of the actual inequalities in power and wealth continues to normally be the decisive factor. Nonetheless, inequality is from now on only the reality which one must take into account, not a principle to which one must submit. That is why the appearance of the lower strata of world society on the international stage becomes all the more self-assured and the boundaries between the subjects and the objects of planetary politics become increasingly fluid.

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[9] Kondylis's Greek text (p. 22): "the pragmatistic exercising of politics".

This dramatic and epoch-making change becomes manifest if we contemplate the status of quite a few Asian and Arab states in planetary politics fifty years ago in comparison to today. It started, not by chance, with the seizure of power of the Bolsheviks, in order to take world-wide dimensions during the Cold War and to then become irreversible. In their endeavour to mobilise the coloured and colonial peoples against the capitalistic metropolises, the communists have substantially contributed to the spreading of today's prevalent principles of equality, and at the same time they forced through their competition the camp of the (former) colonial Powers to gradually adopt the same vocabulary and the same positions. And the antagonism between East and West, especially during the Cold War, has in still another respect considerably heightened the density of planetary politics in its mass-democratic phase. The irreconcilability of the conflict, which could only be overcome through the elimination of one of the two sides, in actual fact or potentially turned every region of the planet into a contested place, that is, it moved everything that was for one side a much sought-after aim into the centre of world interest: because this suffices in order that the same object can become for the other side a much sought-after aim as well[10]. The immobility of both camps inside of the existing borders during the Cold War, despite some change in the periphery, was a consequence of the atomic deterrence, and in any case is not comparable with the division of the planet into spheres of influence as it was partly practised during the preceding phase of planetary politics, that is the phase of imperialism.

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War necessarily increase the material and ideational expectations which thrive on the basis of the generally recognised material principle of equality. Because the

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[10] Another way of translating this phrase is: "because it is enough for one side to desire an object so that the other side also desires the same object immediately" (c.f. Kondylis's Greek text p. 23).

victor of the Cold War, the mass-democratic West, seems to show a path to the future, which after the disappearance of the great adversary is the only possible and only promising path. The coupling of freedom and affluence, which the West propagated in its political-ideological struggle against communism, increasingly gained, as it were, the status of apodictic evidence[11], and since, even where there is no political freedom in the Western sense, the solution to economic problems in the framework of what is politically allowed on each and every respective occasion is left to the free activity of subjects as economic actors. The confirmation of the "Western model" through the manifest failure of the planned economy seems to have forever put aside doubts and unfruitful temptations, and in this respect this confirmation seems to have had a liberating effect (on the mind) and at the same time an effect of pointing the way forward. Nonetheless, one would be evading the main matter if one did not pose the elementary question as to why precisely such concerns and problems have moved to the centre of planetary politics. Still more concretely, this same question can be formulated as follows: what is the social-historical and political identity of the collective subjects which must connect their political activity with such objectives, regardless of what they may otherwise foster as national or geopolitical aspirations? As far as it concerns the industrially highly developed Western countries, it cannot be stressed enough that they achieved the coupling of freedom and affluence, to which they attribute their victory in the Cold War, not as liberal but as mass-democratic social formations, as they left behind oligarchic liberalism through the process of democratisation and bridged the gap between bourgeois and proletarian[12] through mass consumption and social mobility, which in the end did

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[11] The Greek translation (p. 23) is: "gradually came to be regarded as a self-evident axiom".
[12] Kondylis adds "which sociologically ought not be confused with the gap between rich and poor since this gap exists in all historically known societies" in his Greek text (p. 24).

away with both the bourgeois as well as the proletarian as clearly outlined sociological types (see Sec. IV). The countries which want to follow the path of the West do not have in mind bourgeois liberalism as an ideal, but exactly mass democracy, and for that matter, do not have at their disposal either a socially decisive bourgeoisie capable of (political) domination, or corresponding political traditions; should they therefore ever approach the West, then it will happen only at the level of mass democracy. They have to heed mass-democratic objectives because in the meantime they constitute mass societies, they have, that is, more or less, nolentes (or) volentes[13] said goodbye to agrarian patriarchalism and (agrarian) traditionalism and, if they want to have a social-historical position in the modern world, then this can only be at the threshold of mass democracy.

This classification may seem disconcerting in an era in which all kinds of nationalisms, regionalisms and traditionalisms are being revived, and the wheel of History is being turned back. Nevertheless, whoever is practised in the art of distinguishing between the face value of ideologies or of programmes and their objective functions, or whoever has enough of a historical sense in order to be able to see that the invocation of a principle often serves the realisation of its opposite, cannot be put off by such nationalisms, regionalisms and traditionalisms. A closer examination of traditionalistic currents can show how they must exactly through the radicalisation of tradition turn into movements of modernisation if they want to remain politically relevant (see Sec. II). Patriarchal-traditional elements still in existence are not historically decisive, even if they quantitatively predominate in certain regions of the world. The colonialism of the imperialistic Powers had already inaugurated the transformation of patriarchally-clan-like organised societies into mass

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[13] Those who are unwilling or willing; willingly or unwillingly; whether they like it or not.

societies, while this colonialism subjected formerly autonomous groups to a unified administration, in order to eventually force them into the melting pot of states with arbitrarily drawn borders. The population explosion and even the anomie dominant in large parts of the world have for their part forcefully contributed to the massification of traditional societies. To that were also added the social consequences of communistic domination in many countries, in which earlier, in many cases still pre-capitalistic structures, were violently destroyed, i.e. the existing social units were atomised (i.e. smashed or broken up or fragmented into individuals) and then the individuals were incorporated into political and economic or administrative mass organisations without consideration for traditional affiliations and loyalties.

The unstable mass societies, which came from this long and many-sided massification process, are confronted with both great questions which in the advanced mass democracies of the West seem to have been more or less satisfactorily solved. First, it is a question of democratisation, namely the inevitable participation of mobile and insistent masses in political and social events. In so far as this participation takes place through the granting and exercising of political rights, which are frequently understood as human rights and are demanded as such, such said rights should not be judged ethically-abstractly, but looked at as the practical means which cause the constant expansion of the circle from which the ruling elite can be recruited in order to supersede the old oligarchies. Because such rights, e.g. freedom of speech, do not first see the light of day through democratisation; in the pre-democractic state of affairs (i.e. situation) their exercise was merely restricted to the circle of those ruling, and their transference to others concretely means that all the more people become able to rule or may announce claims to domination. In its

essential and primary interrelation with the massification process, democratisation even takes place in mass societies which hardly know or recognise political rights in the Western sense, so that in them political activity must unfold through other channels; Caesars or homines novi[14] here take care of democratisation, who disregard patriarchal oligarchies and put aside autonomous clan-based rule in order to distribute power and domination to their followers, as well as mass movements, irrespective of what colour, which derive their loyalties partly from charismatic leaders, partly from universal principles, before whom individuals feel equal amongst one another in their common subjection.

Yet with democratisation on its own the job is not done in the newly coming into being or being shaped mass societies. Economic modernisation and economic growth must be added, and indeed not only because the growing population needs nourishment or because the defence of a poor state increasingly meets with difficulties under today's technical conditions. Another, namely social motive is connected with these motives, which in themselves have a sufficiently pressing effect. Only economic modernisation and intensification of the economic effort can ultimately create social structures which tie individuals to permanent functions and an overarching (social) whole so that the acute danger of anomie can be brought to a halt. The patriarchal-traditional forms of social organisation could only function with a limited number of people, the comprehensibility of the social whole (i.e. the concise and controllable magnitude of the group) was therefore the condition of their existence, which ceases to apply when the number of people increases so much that they cannot be pressed any more into the narrow limits of conventional institutions. Anomie and social disintegration automatically

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[14] "New men" who seek political office, public power etc. (more specifically, in ancient Rome, these men were inter alia the first in their families to serve in the Senate or be elected as consul).

set in when the old framework cannot absorb all people, the old framework in fact breaks into pieces under their pressure while there is no stable new framework. In this intermediate state of affairs only modernisation and expansion of the economy can be a remedy, because only the interrelated division of labour can organise large masses in the form of a social whole and accordingly discipline them. Massification can consequently prove to be the force which in itself presses for both democratisation as well as for economic modernisation.

Democratisation and economic growth on a highly technicised (i.e. advanced technical) basis constitute for their part the bridge for the transition of a mass society to a mass democracy of the Western type. The latter of course arose from a mass society as well, which in the course of the Industrial Revolution conclusively destroyed feudal-patriarchal Europe and drove people in herds into cities. This pre-democratic mass society therefore here coincided to a great extent with the rule of oligarchic liberalism. Therein lies the important and for the future perhaps decisive difference between Western development and the course of things in (most of) the other societies in which the massification process is not carried out in those forms which in the West set the course for a more or less painless transition to modern mass democracy. In the West, the hierarchies of liberal class society were gradually brought down through the tempestuous development of technology, the progress in (or refinement of) the division of labour, social mobility and mass affluence. Atomisation (i.e. the breaking up (or smashing or fragmentation) of society into individuals) and social leveling followed these changes or accompanied them and were legitimised in fact through reinterpretations (i.e. meta-interpretations) of already victorious liberalism. In (most of) the other societies, however, social leveling and atomisation have long

ago spread without being sufficiently offset by technical and economic progress; because of that, social leveling and atomisation very often set the forces of anomie free, which then have to be contained by totalitarian or authoritarian, religious or Caesaristic mass movements.

This discussion already points to the source of possible conflicts in the framework of today's planetary politics. A number of observers might think that the unanimity achieved for the time being after the end of the Cold War as regards the superiority of the Western system and the founded in this unanimity, commonality of objectives, will lead to consensus and co-operation. Peaceful co-existence in mutual harmony however does not at all result from the commonality of objectives in itself, but from the agreement over which position every side will take up during the pursuit of the common aim and what advantages every side will derive from the common aim's possible realisation. If the opinions over this, in practice, decisive question diverge, then the commonality of the aim does not for instance contribute to the easing but precisely to the intensification of the conflicts, and indeed for the same reason that the butcher is in a state of enmity not with the fruiterer but with the butcher next door. The commonality of the aim means rivalry over the same resources, over the same spaces and over the same prizes. Precisely successes, which would have been achieved with Western methods, could bring those who are successful both into conflict with the West as well as into conflict with one another. But the absence of such successes could bring about the same effect too. In the field of tension (or area of conflict) between the unavoidability of the objective and the impossibility of its realisation, imponderable or even explosive reactions could be given vent

to[15]; a sense of historical hopelessness and aggressive disenchantment must overcome nations which would see that they are not in a position of bringing about what, in accordance with the general view, is to be expected of anyone who does not want to be the pariah and the leper of the modern world. The emerging universality of the objectives will constitute also in this respect more of a cause of tension than a factor of mutual understanding. This universality cannot be damaged by the fact that every side will apprehend and will realise the universally recognised aims and (corresponding) values as its concrete power position and situation dictates to it on each and every respective occasion. It will not, incidentally, be a world-historical novum if mass democracy as a planetarily unfolded social formation (i.e. a social formation of planetary dimensions) has various forms which are due to the different level of development and different conditions of development; in respect of slavery, feudalism or bourgeois liberalism it was not any different.

It must be expected that very many conflicts of the planetary age underway will occur from the perspective and with the self-understanding of the ideological subjects as opposites between different historical traditions. The decisive factor, nevertheless, will be overlooked if one wanted to describe the situation by means of such categories. What is decisive is contained in the question as to which driving forces today mobilise traditions and lead them onto the field of combat to face one another. These driving forces are not latent in the traditions themselves, which for that matter take root for the most part in worlds dead long ago, but are the driving forces of modern mass-democratic objectives, which have already captured the whole planet. If one does not see this, one is

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[15] Alternatively, the Greek version (p. 29) reads: "When it is believed that certain aims must be necessarily set and realised, while at the same time it is ascertained that their realisation is impossible, there, explosive reactions are most likely to ensue".

not able to appropriately judge either today's planetary conjuncture (or constellation) nor the role and the weight of traditions in it. The blanket assertion that there have always been conflicts, and indeed bloody ones, between people and there will be conflicts in the future as well, would also be minimally enlightening. This assertion is right, but we are here dealing with an anthropological and not a sociological and historical statement, which must remain empty if it cannot answer the question as to what constitutes the most common and most likely cause of conflict in this concrete planetary situation. No science of man and of politics can get by without resorting to constants, however no concrete political analysis is possible if it neglects the specification of constants in each and every respective situation. For an analysis of planetary politics in the mass-democratic age such a specification is advisable particularly with regard to the relations between the political and the economic as well as to the functions of statehood.

2. *The economisation of the political* (or *The fusion of politics with the economy*)

The question of the relations between the political (i.e. politics) and the economic (i.e. economics) had to be posed in the New Times, as a radical change, whose world-historical meaning can be compared only with the "Neolithic (Agricultural) Revolution", namely the Industrial Revolution which erupted after long and lively merchant-capitalistic activity, created the impression of the independence, in fact the social primacy of the economic factor (amongst the forms of social action). That was not merely an academic or unpolemical impression, because the triumphant economic had a tangible social bearer, who had a real *political* interest in

the spreading of the perception that "politics" (i.e. the domination (or rule) of monarchs and strata which stem from the pre-capitalistic world) is, in comparison to the economy which is obviously necessary for life, not only secondary, but even a hindrance and in the long term dispensable; the here implied sharp separation of the political from the economic appeared to be confirmed by the attempts of anti-bourgeois (conservative and absolutist) forces at controlling, if possible, the state and at turning it into a bulwark against the unfolding of the capitalistic bourgeoisie. Yet even after its partial or complete political imposition, the bourgeoisie did not substantially change its convictions regarding the relations between the political and the economic. Politics continued to appear as a more or less necessary evil, however here the thesis of the independence of society vis-à-vis the state, and of the economy vis-à-vis politics, fulfilled an additional ideological function; it intended to deny or hush up the concrete help which the state in several ways and in roundabout ways was able to give the capitalistic economy, and to make the state out to be the mere guarantor of the common good (or public interest), which exercises its absolutely indispensable activity somewhere in the background and as discretely as possible. Socialists, above all of Marxist provenance, raised an objection to this fiction; nevertheless, despite the social-political conflict of liberalism and Marxism, liberal economism found its way into the Marxist thoughts world (i.e. system of ideas) in the form of the sociological axiom also pertaining to the philosophy of history, that the economy constitutes the base upon which the political and ideological superstruture is built up. The common dogmatic confession of faith of liberalism and Marxism in the primacy of the economy and society vis-à-vis politics and the state is reflected in the social utopia of both liberalism and Marxism, which are variations on the theme of the withering away of the state and politics. The Marxist vision

of the future of a classless society, in which the subjects as economic actors would govern themselves without having to exercise politics in the traditional sense, corresponded to liberal wishful thinking in respect of the replacement of war with trade inside of a unified world in which partly the "invisible hand", partly universal-ethical principles would prevail. It is obvious that both outlines (i.e. historical programmes) were founded on the belief in the possibility of an economisation of the political (or the fusion of politics with the economy), i.e. a coming undone of political functions within economic functions, and that this belief for its part was based on the assumption of the independence and the social priority of the economic.

The economisation of the political could not be realised either with liberal or with Marxist signs (i.e. symbolism). The trader (and the businessman) had to call for the help, rather than the putting aside, of the politician and the military officer, whereas the Marxists who came to power practised an unprecedented politicisation of the economic (i.e. subjected to an unprecedented extent the economy to political goals) instead of following the reverse path. The economic could not develop the expected independent law bindedness, and indeed for the simple reason because this independent law bindedness was an ideological assumption and not reality. That does not lie in the fact that - as one often argues against historical materialism - ideational, political, geographic etc. magnitudes are at least equal to the economy as historical factors, but is due to the original and essential interweaving of factors of the economic with factors of power and domination; the "economy" is no less than "politics" or "intellectual(-spiritual) life" a question of the concrete grouping of people, of concrete relations of concrete people between one another. But we cannot pursue here this highly tricky and at the same time fascinating

question any further. The inability of both liberalism and Marxism to economise the political (i.e. fuse politics with the economy) each in their own sense, gains its retrospective interest from the way an entirely differently crafted economisation of the political took place under the conditions of Western mass democracy. This mass-democratic economisation of the political has namely neither brought about the sovereign autocracy of the separated economic nor the discontinuance of the political, but created a state of affairs in which politics must constantly and systematically deal with economic questions, that is, it must go beyond the mere laying down of general guidelines, while changes in the political correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) very often take place by means of redistributions (of the national income) and also through more or less institutionalised economic struggles - as well as conversely. The economy is indeed in large part in private hands, however the economic is at the centre of public attention, and the political elite are judged on their performance not least on the basis of the results of their activity with regard to the economy.

The existing discrepancy between the private ownership of a very large part of the economy and the public character of economic matters in mass democracy must be noted very carefully. It implies that the privately managed economy is under constant political pressure to prove its productivity and its suitability at serving the material common good more effectively than for instance a planned economy. Precisely because public expectations are linked to the privately managed economy, it is in a state of osmosis with the state and the political - it, that is, reckons on the support of "politics" in order to fulfil its social task. Striving for profit and status (i.e. social prestige) in fact motivates the bearers of the private economy more than the pure love of people, but "politics", which cannot

possibly evade the pressure of mass-democratic expectations, must keep in mind the effects of the activity of the private economy for the collective and must, despite all of its possible sympathy for the "entrepreneur", take into account the vox populi. The successes of the private sector of the economy in the Western mass democracies after the Second World War and the private sector's new self-confidence after the collapse of the communistic state economies all too often let the social and political prerequisites of private economic activity be forgotten and leave, at least to the favourably inclined to private economic activity, the impression that the liberal economistic dream has been realised beyond traditional "power politics". It is moreover overlooked that the public sector, despite all the "privatisations", quantitatively and often also qualitatively remains superior, and the "neoliberal" intoxication of the last decade has also not been able to replace or restrict the public sector to a considerable extent. The economisation of the political under mass-democratic conditions does not in the least mean therefore the political's abolition or the increasing weakening, but a necessary interweaving of the *political* concept of the common good with economic questions against the background of a mass-producing and mass-consuming society.

The concept of the economic was connected with the concept of the common good, and concern over the economy with concern over the common good, because mass democracy, by virtue of its social character, must strive for the gradual conversion of the formal right of equality into a material right. However, the materialisation of formal rights can only be brought off through the continuously higher output (i.e. performance) of the economy and through redistributions of the profits generated (within the national income), which increases the purchasing power of the large

masses. The priority of concern over the economy is inseparably interrelated with the *political* process of democratisation, that is why the economisation of the political in the sense we explained above constitutes a specific feature of mass *democracy*, which only with difficulty goes together with other social formations, i.e. with other power relations and relations of domination. Incidentally, the economisation of the political is already founded on the necessity of making elementary provision for the existence of enormous congregations of people and consequently of maintaining an indispensable precondition of (social and) political order. The unheard-of and, one might say, scandalous novum of highly technicised industrial and service society in comparison to earlier agrarian societies, namely being able to supply masses of people with the ample consumption of nourishment (i.e. food) and energy, who do not directly produce that sort of thing, must be fought for daily through innumerable combined actions, and in its fragility it is not allowed to be left to coincidences and uncontrolled improvisations. This novum turns into a political issue of the highest order, and no mass-democratic politics can endure if it is not able to guarantee elementary provision for the existence of the large masses.

In this direct dependence of modern mass existence on a highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) and productive economy lies the primary reason for the spreading of the mass-democratic economisation of the political over (the whole field of today's) planetary politics. The mass societies of the Second and the Third World stand before the pressing and complicated task of feeding enormous crowds of people, which moreover most of them quickly multiply. The necessity, caused already because of this, of an interweaving of political and economic endeavours becomes understood in all its depth if we remind

ourselves again that the economy and the division of labour, as a result of the progressive dissolution of traditional patriarchal social structures, increasingly undertakes the role of socially disciplining forces in order to keep a tight rein on anomie. The political therefore is economised already to the extent a central political magnitude, internal order, is dependent on the performance of the economy. The transference of the thus understood connection of the political and the economic from the interior of states to the wide level of planetary politics results in the widespread view that the international order would best be consolidated on the basis of general economic growth and the effective performance (and division) of labour amongst the various nations. In the process it is assumed that such a development, if it proceeds harmonically, would make the demand for a more or less dirigiste (i.e. administrative) redistribution of world wealth of itself objectless. Nevertheless, this latter demand arises for its part from the transference of another essential aspect of the mass-democratic economisation of the political to the level of planetary politics. The economisation of the political indeed also means that politics is exercised over distributions and redistributions of economic goods, which become all the more urgent the more the interpretation of the principle of equality gains ground and, apart from the redistribution of economic goods, forces the redistribution of political goods, that is, of power and domination. The already begun material interpretation of human rights is interwoven with such egalitarian political-economic objectives and comes to the same practical result (see Sec. V, 2).

The economisation of the political in the present phase of planetary politics means, finally, that politics is increasingly dependent on the most modern technology for the achievement of power aims in the traditional strategic and geopolitical sense of the word. Certainly, this was no

different during the entire period of the Second Industrial Revolution, however the Third Industrial Revolution, whose great development was not coincidentally accompanied by the building up of Western mass democracy after the Second World War, resulted in the disposing of, on the basis of electronics and automation, the boundaries between "civilian" and "military" technology. For the development and use of advanced military technology, one does not have to use other methods of work and very frequently too neither other devices (or machines) than those used in the civilian economy, so that skipping the transition from the civilian to the military sector becomes increasingly unproblematic (cf. Sec. III). That again implies an increasing difficulty in raising the level of military technology above civilian technology to a significant extent, that is, treating the development of military technology as a separate and privileged area as was partly still possible during the time of the Second Industrial Revolution. The concern over the safeguarding of politics' traditional means of power is therefore mixed more and more with concern over the safeguarding of politics' traditional means of power's economic preconditions, the political is in this respect economised to the same extent that the economic can pass from civilian to military functions without any profound differentiation.

With such a possibility of adapting the civilian economy to military goals or, formulated more generally, when the economy has such political possibilities (from military presence to development (i.e. foreign) aid), the traditional liberal distinction between the political ("politics") and the economic ("economy") becomes obsolete and misleading. Both these terms in their contradistinction may only just be used conventionally and for the sake of understanding in order to outline priorities in accordance with common notions. That is why the, in many places, celebrated

revaluation of the economic factor and of the economic matters after the political-military race (i.e. competition) of the Cold War cannot be looked upon as the incipient realisation of the liberal utopia of the replacement of war with trade, which starts out from the assumption of the autonomy of the economic in its contrasting to the political. It can hardly be disputed that the network of international economic relations in recent decades has considerably thickened, multinational enterprises have multiplied and the joint manufacture of highly technical products on the part of two or more nations occurs more frequently. Nonetheless, this development by no means is so widespread that it has reached the point of no return beyond all interventionisms and protectionisms, and that is why we cannot know whether this development will entail the putting aside of all borders or the establishing of new economic empires against which others will have to delimit themselves. Historical analogies show, at any rate, that tensions can grow precisely in times of the increasing interweaving of interests: proximity, not distance, generates friction(s). Large-scale interweavings proceed, as a rule, so that an economic Power can penetrate deep enough into the territory of another economic Power, roughly equivalent, in order to inspire unrest or angst (or fear) in this latter economic Power, but not far enough in order to establish a comprehensive community of interests on one or another basis; as the former economic Power gains partners by its penetration, it simultaneously creates foes which feel threatened by the competition and do not want to shy away from the use of political means for the safeguarding of their economic interests. A community of interests is rather to be expected amongst partners of unequal strength, in relation to which the weaker side, with pleasure or reluctantly, adapts to the stronger side and through this adaptation more or less lives well. However, it is not such partnerships which determine the course of planetary politics.

Our conclusion can hence, once more in accordance with the use of the conventional dualistic terminology, read as follows: behind the economisation of the political, as it was shaped in the mass-democratic age, the possibility of the politicisation of the economic constantly looms. If the economy is the command and the fate of the times, then striving for power must, i.e. the struggle over the consolidation or changing of certain relations between people, pave the way for itself through the economy. It is a logical and anthropological mistake to identify striving for power with politics, in the sense of the non-economic, and from the discontinuance of politics to conclude the inevitable elimination of striving for power.[16]

3. End or change in function of sovereign statehood?

There has often been talk in our century of the end of modern (sovereign) statehood as this was constituted in the European New Times. The supporters of universal-ethical views, which thrive in the mass-democratic thoughts world (i.e. ideological universe) precisely as the reverse side of a radical individualism, have connected with this end of modern sovereign statehood emancipatory hopes, others on the other hand, fear the loss of real political guarantees for internal and international order. In order to be able to look at things soberly, we must first of all leave behind us both the democratic as well as the authoritarian legend of the modern sovereign state. If we see in the democratic legend a power or rather a violence, which in the interests of those ruling,

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[16] This is because power as an anthropological constant or category is something, when broadly defined, permeates all human behaviour and social action, including economic activity, since it is an inseparable part of self-preservation, i.e. living or survival, and of course intersects at all points within the spectrum of the social relation and its polarity of friendship and enmity. See Kondylis's key theoretical works: *Macht und Entscheidung* [Power and Decision] (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1984) and *Das Politische und der Mensch* [The Political and Man] (Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1999).

suppressed movements of freedom and demands of equality from below, the authoritarian legend makes the modern sovereign state out to be an autonomous entity standing above all classes and particular interests, a mortal God guarding the public interest. In both cases the political-ideological intention led to the negative or positive hypostatisations which are barely suitable for the comprehension of the respective functions of the new-times states. Since its formation this state at times came to help reform, at other times reaction, sometimes the defence and sometimes the combating of existing interests. Democrats and socialists did not feel unwell if they enjoyed state power, whereas authoritarian-minded people promptly lost respect for the mortal God whenever this mortal God granted its favour to others. That means: the new-times state has been an infinitely plastic and adaptable instrument, in its already centuries-old history it has allied itself with very different social strata and served the most different objectives, while on each and every respective occasion it changed its extent, its form of organisation and its physical bearers. Yet talk of the end of statehood could not and would not take into account the historical facts and course (in their fluctuations). This talk above all audibly protested from the authoritarian point of view, and indeed on the one hand, against the increasing mass-democratic orientation of state politics in the 20th century, on the other hand, against what seemed to be the inability at acting as regards exercising foreign policy of a "liberal" or mass-democratic state. Here this talk had in mind an obviously normative concept of the ("true") state which was acclaimed as a fact formative for an entire historical epoch. The attack of this authoritarian (in its social inspiration actually old-liberal) perception against the mass-democratic state, which of course from the point of view of this authoritarian perception's normative concept of the state could no longer be a "true" state, focused not least of all on the economisation of

the political, which supposedly deprived the state of its former dignity as guardian of the common good and made it the weak-willed organ of private interests. In the course of this, the *political* aspects of the economisation of the political were overlooked, which we indicated in the previous sub-section. Not only are the provision for existence (as a barrier against anomie) and redistribution political acts par exellence, but also the economisation of the political turned the state to a great extent into the largest employer and the administrator of the lion's share of the national income. One must of course overlook the highly political character of these developments if one holds to a one-sided and long ago overtaken concept of politics.

With regard to the planetary politics of this century, the thesis of the end of (sovereign) statehood asserted that the subjection of the foreign policy activity of states to universal-ethical principles would have to destroy sovereign statehood because this subjection criminalised (and made punishable) the raison d' état (state (national) interest) as legitimate guideline of state action and consequently deprived this state action of its only sovereign basis. In the Cold War it seemed that (sovereign) statehood was under fire from both sides, because both conducted their struggle in the name of universalistic and internationalistic, that is, liberal and proletarian principles, to which the loyalty of the individual was supposed to apply more than to one's own (no matter how obtained) state (of origin). This description of the situation indeed contains important observations and yet does not exhaust all aspects of the problem in such a way that from this description the end of sovereign statehood in itself and in general might be concluded. First of all, it is not historically and methodologically correct to contrast the ideological self-understanding of a stylised (European) past with partial aspects of the (planetary) reality of

the present. Even in its heyday the raison d' état did not at all spurn the propagandistic alliance with Christian and ethical (that is, universalistic) principles, just as the propagation of universal-ethical principles as guidelines of international politics in this century contains a sizable portion of raison d' état (i.e. it favoured to a large extent the interests of certain states). Statehood in fact constituted an argument under international law for one's own matters and one's own state[17], however one could often lack the necessary respect for one's own rules when it was a matter of another's state; because respect normally lasted only as long as the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) compelled respect. For that reason, sovereign statehood on European soil took a particularly distinctive shape as a system of states, having come into being, which either were equally strong as one another or could atone for any lack of strength through expedient alliances. That which was called "classical (sovereign) statehood", thrived under particular conditions which had to do with a certain power constellation (i.e. correlation of forces) *between* the large European states and not necessarily with the internal development of states as specifically new-times constructs. Because of that, essentially only those states which compromised this constellation (or system of European powers) were furnished with the attributes of (sovereign) statehood. The Napoleonic wars and the (arbitrary) way in which sovereign statehood was handled in those world-historically important years prove, by the way, ex negativo[18] the dependence of "classical (sovereign) statehood" on a certain situation, in which the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) made possible and even required certain rules of the game. It was an oligarchic sovereign

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[17] Kondylis's Greek translation (p. 42) is: "whenever one's own interests and one's own state were threatened".

[18] From (Out of) the negative. Indicating what something is by showing what it is not.

statehood[19], if one may say so, and it faded not so much because its principles ceased to apply, but rather because these principles were extended to a broader - initially European and then planetary - space, in which states could not form amongst themselves any constellation (or political combinations) whatsoever of the aforementioned sort.

The Cold War actually called into question this partly fictive, partly, through the particularities of European foreign policy, conditioned "classical (sovereign) statehood", because one side was strongly at the programmatic level in favour of the putting aside of all state borders and states, that is, in favour of the fraternisation of all peoples inside of a classless world society, in relation to which this side esteems the attachment to this ideal as more important than loyalty to one's own respective state (of origin); the other side, again, contrasted to totalitarian practices, universal-ethical principles, and to shutting oneself off behind the Iron Curtain, a vision of an open and unified world. Had these positions been able to be put into action, then of course the substance and the form of (sovereign) statehood would have withered away and been lost. However, reality proceeded by differentiating itself from these ideals and principles, it namely channeled the programmatic declarations in such a way that they could be instrumentalised in favour of that (sovereign) statehood which they were supposed to have abolished if they were taken at face value. On the communistic side, proletarian internationalism was used for the ends (goals) of the sovereign statehood of the erstwhile Soviet Union, and at the same time communistic movements of the greatest energy were interwoven with nationalistic objectives since the struggle against the capitalistic colonial masters pushed communism towards belief in nationalism; states such as China or

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[19] The Greek version (pp. 42-43): "It was a sovereign statehood based on the oligarchy of a few states".

Vietnam for instance came from such movements, which asserted their state sovereignty in a proud, one might almost say, "classical" way. On the other hand, in the Western camp the rejection of proletarian internationalism led to a positive attitude towards the nation and towards the independent state as the natural political units. Concurrently, also in the West, the universalistic starting point was frequently put at the service of imperial aspirations of the leading sovereign state power (i.e. of the United States). Already the massive summoning of universalistic-human rights principles for the shaping of international politics after the First World War had incidentally shown exceedingly clearly how these principles can be handled selectively and turned into instruments of power politics of certain states against other states. The concrete and particular application of abstract and universal principles in fact means the weakening of the sovereign statehood of one state, however it simultaneously means the strengthening of the sovereign statehood of another state. (Sovereign) statehood could then only have been destroyed through the spreading of universal principles if these were taken at face value and applied consistently.

This short retrospective account should sharpen the mind in respect of today's constellation (i.e. conjuncture), in which the gaining of the upper hand of human rights universalism - along with the effect of international organisations and economic interweavings - seems to be initiating the end of (sovereign) statehood. Seen in terms of today's politics, this gaining of the upper hand corresponds to the vital interests of several sides which want to articulate quite a few tangible demands in the language of human rights (see Sec. V). In a structural respect, we are dealing with a further aspect of the planetarisation of mass-democratic phenomena (i.e. the transfer of mass-democratic phenomena to the planetary level), since the

sociological facts of mass-democratic atomisation (i.e. fragmentation of society into isolated individuals) and mass-democratic value pluralism find expression in the ethical language of human rights universalism. The (practical) consequence of such atomisation and value pluralism's planetary application would in any case be an abolition of state sovereignty through the intervention of foreign Powers which would legitimise themselves (and their actions) by invoking human rights; the distinct boundary between domestic and foreign policy, without which the sovereign state hardly exists, would consequently be wiped out, which could be regarded as the counterpart of the blurring of the boundaries between the private (sphere) and the public (sphere) in the interior of mass democracy. - Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful whether planetary politics will go down this direct path and will bid farewell to (sovereign) statehood through the consistent application of universal-ethical and human rights principles. Because it cannot therefore be expected that, in practice, effective interventions in the domestic politics of present-day states for the purpose of the imposition of these principles could be undertaken by all possible sides in the direction of all possible sides. The great Powers will prove to be in this regard much more agile and efficient so that the actual difference between the subjects and objects of planetary politics will continue to exist under the resplendent cover of generally recognised equality as provided for by human rights. Put another way: human rights universalism will not exert its influence in abstracto, at face value and irrespective of the constitution of its each and every respective representative. Human rights universalism must do this (i.e. exert its influence) through concrete actors which will instrumentalise it; when, however, a universalism is instrumentalised, then it is eo ipso[20] particularised, that is it is put at the service of state

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[20] By that very act or quality. The Greek text reads "ipso facto" ("by the fact itself") rather than "eo

39

ends (goals). From this perspective, the general confession of faith in universal-ethical principles ought not endanger (sovereign) statehood, if this is not at risk because of immanent weaknesses; admittedly, sovereign statehood will be obliged under various circumstances to play hide and seek, so long as it does not resort to the open violation of those principles. The art of pretending and of rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification), at any rate, definitely will not disappear from the world in the age of human rights.

In spite of the lesser or greater mixing of domestic and foreign policy as a result of a general acceptance of universal ethical principles, the total abolition of the boundaries between both domestic and foreign policy and consequently the abolition of (sovereign) statehood will not necessarily occur. Rather, what will happen here will be like what happens with the interweaving of economies: borders become (much) more porous in normal times, but they do not fall, however they remain in the background as ultima ratio[21] in case of emergency. Sovereign statehood is today still far from having betrayed itself to such an extent that it cannot take back what it has wanted to hand over until now in one or another form - provided of course it has the actual power to do this. One should not overrate the political meaning of international law or of international organisations and interpret the attempts at their extension as purposeful and irreversible actions towards the abolition of sovereign statehood. International law and international organisations have, in view of the density attained by planetary politics in the meanwhile, become indispensable, however it remains an open question as to whether they will constitute the common field of (mutual) understanding or the common battlefield. Because international law and international

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ipso".

[21] The last argument (resort, means).

organisations' formation is obviously in the interests of all those involved, but that cannot always be the case with their each and every respective handling (i.e. manipulation and operation).

Likewise, it would be a rash action to project in a straight line into the future those phenomena of mass-democratic life, in which lamenting cultural critics (i.e. critics of contemporary culture) see signs of decay, and harmless "alternative thinkers" sure signs of emancipation, to prophesy their avalanche-like increase and to take them for the beginning of the feared and hoped-for end of (sovereign) statehood. Undoubtedly, inside of the developed mass democracies it can often appear that state power has lost its undisputed authority and has been degraded to one of several authorities of power competing amongst themselves, that what is statelike and what is private (i.e. the state and private citizens) henceforth stand at the same level or that the spreading of hedonistic stances undermines the ideological and psychological fundamental forces of statehood. In relation to this two remarks are appropriate. First, the structural necessity of such phenomena for the functioning of mass democracy as economy and institutional network must be underlined; of course, not all their side effects and concomitants are foreseeable and controllable, however many social formations, which proved to be extremely tough, had to live in history until now with the ambivalence of (controversial) institutions and (vacillating social) stances. Secondly, one may not regard phenomena, which in relatively quiet and prosperous times set the tone externally, as relevant or decisive for every future situation. (Sovereign) statehood will have to loudly announce its presence inside of developed mass democracy then, when an internal or external danger appears on the horizon or when a sudden about turn in the constellation (i.e. conjuncture) commands reorientation. We shall see

41

which reasons make (sovereign) statehood indispensable for the less developed mass societies during the discussion of the question of nationalism (Sec. II). In both cases, there is today no alternative to the state as form of organisation.

We have already pointed out the "neoliberal" overestimation of the functional independence of the private economy as well as the new, pre-eminently political tasks, which falls to the state as a result of the economisation of the political. The private economy can hardly develop without strong institutional guarantees and without the economic and fiscal (i.e. financial policy) framework established by the state, and it would be highly misleading to misjudge the inner interrelation between the general expansion of state functions and the general flourishing of the private economy after the Second World War, although on the other hand the consequences of excessive and inexpedient bureaucratisation are well known. In any case, the private economy very frequently lives directly from the fact that the state lets the private economy undertake tasks instead of doing them itself - and then the private economy perhaps even lives best, as its great effort in respect of the undertaking of public works indicates. The actual economic indispensability of the state becomes clearer when we consider to whom protests and demands are directed as soon as the private sector stagnates. In other words, the private economy cannot be made liable for anything and answerable for anything that has to do with the common good. However, only consideration for the common good (irrespective of whom defines it bindingly on each and every respective occasion) can prevent descent into anomie and consequently also the collapse of economic activity - especially a very complicated economic activity. The actual autonomisation of an internationalised private economy while disregarding (weakened) states

would bring about a state of affairs of profound anomie, i.e. a return to the law of the jungle (i.e. lawlessness in which a raw version of the survival of the fittest is the norm). However, given the present constitution of world society, anomie can be effectively combated only in the realm, and with the means, of conventional (sovereign) statehood. This connection of economic functions with the colossal future task of the containment of anomie will constitute in the dawning phase of planetary politics the foundation upon which (sovereign) statehood will continue to assert itself in older and newer forms. It is certainly superfluous to especially emphasise the role of conflicts regarding foreign policy or of emergencies for the preservation and, should the situation arise, the reinforcement of (sovereign) statehood. We want to hence conclude here with the observation, moreover, that state organisation will still remain the refuge of both the large as well as the small nations before the political uncertainties (i.e. imponderables) of universal-ethical and human rights principles. Because only as organised state power can a large or small nation defend itself against the interpretations of these principles, which it suspects of screening the power cravings (i.e. lust for power) of other nations. Only as a state can, in particular, a large nation stand against, in case of need, the whole international community. And only as a state can a small nation talk to a large nation, which is also *a* state, as an equal to an equal.

4. *Openness of constellations* (or *Potential formations of the planetary conjuncture*)

Since there is human history and historical memory, the difficulties of the present lead to the idealisation of the past - even of the most recent past.

No sooner was the Cold War at an end and the voices, which in dramatic tones warn of a looming international disorder, have already multiplied so that one could gain the impression that until recently order and harmony still prevailed in the world. In reality, neither order nor disorder have been able to be absolute and lasting in history: absolute and lasting disorder would have soon resulted in the disintegration of social life, absolute and lasting order would forever put an end to conflicts of all sorts, that is, absolute and lasting order could never again be unhinged. When we talk of order in international relations of all times, we may sensibly mean by that only a correlation (i.e. constellation) of forces, which thanks to its relative stability prevents serious conflicts at key points in the system, although such conflicts often break out in the periphery and although every now and then tremors are also felt in the centre. Whenever order - with these restrictions - has prevailed, it was based, in any event, on two preconditions. First, there existed a direct or indirect balance of power (or forces) (namely established through alliances) between the major Powers and simultaneously a more or less clear hierarchy in the relations between leading and subordinate Powers; secondly, a guiding idea or guiding principle existed which was in fact accepted by many a (as a rule, subordinate) Power with reservations or contrary to their respective will, however with regard to the guiding idea or guiding principle's political substance and its political consequences it did not allow any room for misunderstandings. Two examples from planetary politics in the last hundred years should illustrate this. The approximate balance of power between the European imperialistic Powers was accompanied by the clear hierarchy between master and servant in an almost world-encompassing colonial system; and this hierarchy was legitimised through the self-imposed civilising mission of those Powers which saw themselves as common executor (i.e. enforcer)

44

of the same civilising mission and at the same time as members with equal rights of a Christian, liberal etc. West. The situation was similar during the Cold War: both great Powers balanced one another in terms of power politics, in relation to which one was in command unchallenged in its camp by invoking the (appropriately interpreted) principle of proletarian internationalism, whereas the other as the representative and indeed as embodiment of the liberal principles of the West, held the reins, albeit more loosely.

With regard to the planetary constellation after the Cold War, the question must therefore be posed as to which guiding principle will move which Powers towards which notions of order and towards which acts interrelated with these notions of order. As expected, the guiding principle of the victor of the Cold War has now become the guiding principle of world politics, namely, human rights universalism. However, the use of this principle as a weapon against communism was politically much easier than its practical transformation into a viable concept of order of planetary politics. There, where the principle of human rights universalism, if possible, is substantialised in corresponding civil rights, it is based on a developed (i.e. advanced) division of labour as a substitute for the dissolution of traditional (human) ties (or bonds), on mass consumption and on the matching mentalities and modes of behaviour. Yet the political constituent elements of the planet are by no means held together by the (same) forces which ensure the cohesion of Western mass democracies, and that is why the planetary applicability of the aforementioned guiding principle seems highly questionable. It would be theoretically conceivable and ethically orthodox to entrust, with this guiding principle's planetary realisation, a world organisation in whose framework large and small states would be active in agreement with one

45

another in pursuing this goal of the planetary realisation of the said guiding principle. The touchstone for the thus understood ability at acting and efficiency (or practical effectiveness) of this world organisation would be the case in which a great or even a planetary Power could be punished on the initiative of smaller states, if necessary with direct intervention, should the great or planetary Power be guilty of the violation of generally recognised ethical-legal principles. There was never of course in practice any question of that during the Cold War and it also seems today simply inconceivable: China remains a completely self-assured permanent member of the (United Nations) Security Council and works together there with those Powers which impose or threaten to impose on it economic sanctions because of the flouting of human rights; just as little have the United States been made to suffer (or been punished) because of false steps in respect of international law. The reverse case, in which on the initiative and through the might (or strike power) of a great Power a small Power is brought to human rights reason (i.e. corrected according to the logic of human rights), does not prove the least as regards the ability of a world organisation at making human rights universalism the guiding principle of planetary politics. Because until now it has never occurred that a great Power would have acted, when undertaking such an action of enforcing human rights, against its own interests in relation to power politics. Precisely the imposition of human rights principles on condition of their instrumentalisation in terms of power politics attests to the fact of the impossibility of human rights principles being converted at face value into praxis - something which certainly goes very well with the general confession of faith in them. Their selective handling, which is unavoidable as long as world organisations are only capable of acting under the leadership of great Powers, will necessarily cause duplicity and confusion. To that is added

the uncertainty of the international legal situation on the basis of the fact that norms theoretically ought also apply to places where they do not (cannot) apply in actual fact. Universal law does not take effect, rather it floats above its putative areas of application.

If what matters is the (specific) weight and the particular aims of the great Powers inside of the world organisation, then one could imagine that they will jointly and in the long term direct whatever happens in the world by means of the tactically flexible invocation of human rights principles, that is, on the whole they will maintain the status quo or they will undertake some change which will guarantee greater stability. However, for that to take place, long-term unchanged relations between these Powers on the basis of their potential today and their status today - perhaps with small adjustments - are required. As guarantor of this system a great Power would have to be made the head of the other Powers, which would then coordinate and lead these other Powers, without in fact acting in important matters against their will, but also without granting them exclusive and closed spheres of influence. In favour of this possibility is the fact that immediately after the Cold War and under the Cold War's still fresh impression, acute and irreconcilable competition between (the) great Powers, with which the great Power as guarantor of the system in question could not live, does not seem to be prevalent; incidentally, only in retrospect can one know with which conflicts a situation is pregnant. In addition, the indispensable primus inter pares[22] is also in existence, which can co-ordinate opinions and actions with one another and if necessary undertake (to process) all of these opinions and actions (in practice) alone. Indeed, there is, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only one great Power in the world, which fully deserves the description

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[22] First amongst equals.

"planetary": the United States. It is the only Power which has at its disposal a dense and worldwide strategic-military network as well as the entire range of logistics and weapons which permits interventions in every situation and every position on the planet with each and every respective suitable means. The foundations of this might (strength) were already laid during the Second World War, and the Cold War made the erection of today's mighty construction inevitable. This extraordinary historical constellation (i.e. conjuncture) will not be repeated in the foreseeable future, and because of that no other great Power - assuming it would have the economic potency - will so quickly come into possession of such strategic advantages, unless it goes, before all the world, on a direct collision course with the United States and can also survive the competition with it. Should, in any case, a modus vivendi[23] between the great Powers be consolidated, in which - because of general weakness or because of equal strength or after the weighing up of the advantages and disadvantages - every one of the great Powers possesses a sufficient unfolding space inside of a common system of security, then it may be assumed that the United States would be the primus inter pares, even if the accent must be put on the "primus" rather than on the "pares".

Now, as we said, such a constellation (or arrangement) presupposes stable relations and limited ambitions of the great Powers supporting it. Furthermore, this constellation requires that the leading Power is ready at any time to use the means in its exclusive possession for goals which are not always its own, nevertheless they could be considered common goals. That will necessarily be done with irreparable loss of forces (wear and tear) if the other Powers do not help the leading Power economically and financially. That again must take place on an, as it were, institutionalised

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[23] Mode (way) of living (e.g. between those whose opinions differ but nonetheless agree to disagree).

basis, so that the leading Power is not left standing as the others' headless mercenary in the hour of need; an adjustment of world trade in its favour would be e.g. a plausible consequence of such a planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture). As leading Power of the West during the Cold War, the United States depended to a relatively small extent on such assistance from its allies (in the first years after the Second World War in fact precisely the opposite was the case), yet now it seems the situation in respect of this has changed. The great Powers which would be the security partners of the United States[24] in the framework of the constellation (i.e. conjuncture) outlined here, would have to become convinced that the benefit from being the United States' security partners would cover the economic and possibly also political costs. If the benefit is estimated, for lack of visible dangers or because of the wrong assessment of the existing dangers, as not being high enough, then friction(s) must come about between the leading Power and the rest of the great Powers. Because the intimated political-military-economic division of labour would above all be convenient for the leading Power, whereas the others would rather live in a world in which the one great world's policeman was completely - but without risk - superfluous. The centrifugal forces would have to be reinforced, should it repeatedly come to light that the leading Power becomes partly or completely involved only when its own interests are affected, or that it - again, out of consideration for its own concerns - favours one great Power and puts the other great Powers at a disadvantage. It is also not easy to imagine that the leading Power would be ready to carry out a large deployment (with extreme decisiveness), if the interests of a sole allied Power were exclusively at stake. Likewise, it is hard to image the full and

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[24] Kondylis's Greek text (p. 54), after "the partners of the United States" reads: "on the occasion of the realisation of such a plan for the consolidation of planetary security".

unconditional sympathy of the other Powers in such a case. And finally, one must, even in joint undertakings, expect constant differences of opinion over the chosen course of action in which different interests would be reflected.

If the friction(s) inside of this constellation reach(es) such an intensity that the necessary basis of (mutual) trust falls apart or the earmarked mechanism of coping with crises in critical situations breaks down, then the transition to other constellations (arrangements) becomes inevitable. It is plausible that in such a case great Powers, which already have at their disposal their own relatively closed economic and political unfolding space, will free themselves from the obligation of joint action and will go their own way, at whose end would be the formation of large spaces with a ban on intervention in respect of other Powers. This consideration remains popular and bobs up time and again (for that matter, it lingers sometimes also in the common talk of the "multipolar" system), because it satisfies the need for order and for symmetry and moreover it lets subjective wishes, in accordance with the promotion of this or that Power to a Power in a large space, be articulated in an objectively sounding legal or political language. Not from nowhere did similar thoughts and plans, which were in many cases founded by means of the (science of) "geopolitics" just then coming into being, gain their greatest popularity in the age of imperialism, as the division of the planet into large spaces was for the most part reality. The division of the planet into large spaces was likewise reality, even though with essentially different signs (i.e. symbolism), during the time of the Cold War, however at that time the words "geopolitics" and "large space", because of their popularity with the National Socialists, were frowned upon. One often sees today a real basis for the creation of large spaces in the

development of the highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) economy which from its internal dynamics breaks out of national borders, yet during its internationalisation it does not spread aimlessly, but shows tendencies towards the formation of a chain of massed points of (rallying and) concentration inside of certain regions of the planetary space. Every one of these regions lies in the wider area of the country in which the strongest (national) economy is located, and must be characterised by the fact that the trade carried out constitutes the main volume of trade both of the strongest (national) economy as well as of the dependent (on the strongest economy) (national) economies, whereas the trade with other countries or regions is not necessary for life. The weaker or smaller (national) economies can prosper - not despite, but precisely - because of their dependence on the strongest (national) economy because the quantitative and qualitative growth of this latter economy creates increasingly new possibilities of work and an increasingly complicated division of labour, which in part asks too much of the workforce of the strongest (national) economy and functions (at least) in several entirely specialised but also elementary sectors, as it were, through the delegating of tasks to third parties. This division of labour can make progress in so far as that the dependent (national) economies at times are able to develop the self-confidence of relative autonomy until they are then taught otherwise of a better state of affairs by the symptoms of fatigue in the locomotive (i.e. driving force) of their respective economies.

Observers, who expect the coming into being of geopolitically clear-cut large spaces thanks to the automatic mechanism of a large expanding (national) economy and the integration of neighbouring (national) economies, basically vary the old leitmotif of the replacement of war with trade, which is understandably enough going through a renaissance after

the Cold War. However, the path which leads to such large spaces is not at all so linear as economistic thinking suggests. As we have already remarked, economic integrations are still by no means advanced to such an extent that the political emergency brake could not be pulled at any moment - of course with the corresponding cost; new editions of the Edict of Nantes, this time against foreign investors, would nowadays, even without religious motivation and even in the knowledge of the economic consequences, be conceivable. Yet resistance against the formation of genuine large spaces under the aegis of each and every respective strongest (national) economy must not only come from nations which are in the region in question and fear a surprise attack (or being reduced to a state of servitude), but also from the outside, namely from a great Power which already possesses at least in its infancy its own large space, and over and above that, possibilities of planetary action which it does not want to see limited by bans on intervention imposed by other great Powers (dominating in other large spaces). This great Power today is the United States. An economic great Power which would undertake the construction of a, in every respect, sovereign large space would have to cut from the planetary political-military network of the United States a fairly large piece and then not merely replace this piece with its own political-military potential, but furthermore be in a position to make its presence felt beyond the bounds of its own large space both in normal as well as in unsettled times; a power (dominating) in a large space would have to therefore also more or less be a planetary Power. Today's great economic Powers[25] will not so quickly and not so easily be in the situation of achieving that, and indeed not so much because this cannot be managed technically with the appropriate effort, but rather out of the ambiguity of their position. They became great - and in fact aspirants to a

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[25] The Greek texts (p. 57) includes "(Japan and Germany for instance)".

large space[26] - during the Cold War and in the greenhouse of the United States (if one may put it this way) and are still under its military umbrella. Moreover, they fear that the total or partial curtailment of the American political-military network could give rise to imponderable dangers; that is why they remain directly or indirectly dependent on the United States in order to set up an (economic) large space whose political-military autonomisation would have to lead to conflict with exactly this United States. If we disregard the paradoxical relationship of the today's great economic Powers with the United States, there are also other important obstacles which stand in the way of the formation of genuine large spaces - and indeed even if it came to an (of course in itself implausible) voluntary and quick withdrawal of the United States to the Western hemisphere: we have recently experienced that empires can also collapse without visible pressure from the outside. The regions which qualify as large spaces do not consist of a unique recognised great Power and several smaller Powers which have rightly or wrongly come to terms with the existing hierarchy, but in them are found two, three or more major Powers in relation to which the supposed aspirant to a large space (i.e. prospective hegemon of a large space) amongst them is monitored by the other Powers with understandable mistrust. It is more than doubtful that this situation will change in the foreseeable future. Developed East Asia cannot be joined together into a large space as long as China has not yet had the last word vis-à-vis Japan and the world[27]. And "Europe" for obvious and incidentally generally well-known reasons will never have a unified political and military will on the basis of the hitherto intended procedures; other procedures or driving forces are also not in sight. The

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[26] The Greek version (p. 57) reads: "so much so that they have the ambition of hegemony in a large space".
[27] Perhaps if Kondylis had lived to 2010 he may have added something about the possibility of China attempting to create its own large space and the difficulties and opposition it would encounter.

great advantage of the United States in a possible conflict with aspirants to a large space in the Asian or European region would consist (precisely) in the political room to move which such discord provides it.[28]

Instead of the formation of genuine large spaces, another phenomenon will perhaps characterise the phase of planetary politics already underway: the advent and the consolidation of various middle Powers with a regional hegemonic claim. These middle Powers can exploit the many gaps which will constantly open up inside of the politically amorphous large spaces between the disputing great Powers and under the tired gaze of the leading great Power. They would have increasingly serious prospects of realising their regional power aims if the great Powers, which for political and psychological reasons wish to avoid repeated and dedicated deployments abroad, wanted to use them, as it were, as regional governors (i.e. deputies). This tactic is already emerging, however it will probably only partly produce the expected results; it will at least just as much bring into being counteracting forces and will involve the great Powers concerned in exactly those local conflicts which they would prefer to avoid. The unavoidable gradual lessening of the military chasm between middle and (some) great Powers would contribute, for its part, to the regionalisation of planetary politics

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[28] In his article "Europa an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts", Tumult, 22 (1996), and, in *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg: Manutius, 2001, especially pp. 126-129 («Η Ευρώπη στο κατώφλι του 21ου αιώνα: μία κοσμοϊστορική και γεωπολιτική θεώρηση» στο *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1998, ειδικά σσ. 117-119; "Europe on the threshold of the 21st century"), Kondylis refers to not only the USA's geopolitical interest in limiting Russian geopolitical power, but also to the fact of Germany's (and the EE's) dependence on USA-led NATO possibly pushing Russia towards closer ties with China, despite the fact that the long-term survival of Europe could possibly only be guaranteed by its emergence as part of a great Eurasian Power or alliance of Powers including Russia, given Europe's dire demographic decline and lack of natural resources. In other words, Germany and Europe's lack of initiative will most likely see them unable to survive the fierce competition that will likely drive the USA, Russia and China apart (or possibly together in the case of the latter two Powers), as well as in the face of the (North) African and Middle Eastern (and Asian) population explosion and the attendant ecological and political implications (even the medium-term survival of weak (nation) states such as (some of) those in Southern Europe becomes particularly doubtful). Mackinder's theorem regarding Eurasia retains its value, but instead of Germany being the focal point for holding Eurasia, the shift in the world balance of power away from Europe now means that the focal point moves to the Siberian and Central Asian regions.

in the form of a tense co-existence of more or less heterogeneous major states, which direct their attention principally towards their own geopolitical surroundings and would maintain changing relations with the rest of the middle and great Powers. Certain simple or complex political and economic units could (perhaps) in the course of this be more active than other such units and group smaller Powers around themselves, without however in this way bringing about a radical change in the overall picture. Such a constellation would not necessarily cause an equalisation or homogenisation of its constituent parts. Rather, it would be based on an actual hierarchisation of the regions (of the planet) so that some regions would be planetarily important and some others planetarily secondary. Moreover, it is to be expected that the political units which take part either as subjects or as objects, or as subjects and objects at the same time, in the current phase of planetary politics, are characterised by the variety of form of their constitutions (i.e. polities or systems of government), but also of their inner texture (or composition). Western mass democracies will exist next to authoritarian pseudo-parliamentarisms and Caesaristic regimes or dictatorships promoting development - and economically or nationally cohesive spaces next to multinational states or loose linguistic and religious state communities as well as breakaway regions. World society can in this respect be imagined as a motley mass society which knows only regionally viable and efficient forms of coming together, and otherwise is held together either by means of occasional concentrated planetary actions of great Powers or of the leading Power - or else merely by the nightmare of the question of survival of the whole of humanity.

That is why the openness of constellations[29] is an essential feature of the phase of planetary politics (currently) underway. That can mean that on the basis of the existing starting position either one of several constellations (arrangements) will prevail in the long term and an entire age will be shaped, or else that various constellations will alternate or finally the overall picture will be constituted by a mixture of all of the constellations with different regional centres of gravity. As we explained at the beginning, prognoses can and may only have regard to the possible unfolding of structures, not to concrete events. Prognoses can only apprehend orders (i.e. well-ordered situations), and the provident capacity has its limits there where orders (i.e. well-ordered situations) cease to exist and only unconnected events are left over. However, disorder consists of events without cohesion and direction, and such disorder hence can be examined only as to its possible causes, but not concretely apprehended in advance.

5. From the economisation to the biologisation of the political? (or *From the economic to the biological character of politics?*)

Disorder - normal disorder inside of every political order is not meant here, but elemental and unbridled disorder - comes into being not because a party (or one side) consciously strives after disorder and forces its victory over order. Disorder comes into being temporarily during the struggle between the representatives of two different perceptions of (the "correct") order, until one party (or side) asserts itself over the other party or side), or else because the principles which ought to support order, during their practical application encounter insurmountable obstacles and

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[29] In Greek (p. 60) Kondylis writes: "the malleability of combinations and the open character of arrangements".

in the process bring to light an entirely unexpected inner logic which can (even) reverse these principles' face value. In today's planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture) there are indications that exactly this could be the fate of both great guidelines which should henceforth guide the action of the actors of (those exercising) planetary politics: the economisation of the political (the fusion of politics with the economy) and human rights universalism. Their close social connection and the commonality of their historical destiny both inside of the Western mass democracies as well as at the planetary level can today hardly be doubted. Both aspects of the economisation of the political - that is, the providing of a minimum subsistence for (or an elementary existence to) large masses on a highly technicised (i.e. high-technology) basis and through the highly developed (i.e. advanced) division of labour, and the redistribution of goods for the purpose of the materialisation of formal rights - are ideationally founded in human rights universalism which awards to all individuals equal dignity irrespective of every other affiliation, quality or bond (tie). One will certainly scandalise our ethicists (that means: the ideologues of *our (own)* society), if one ascertains as a sociologist that in that universalism both social atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals), which is indispensable for the highly developed (advanced) division of labour against the background of unlimited mobility, as well as the democratic claim of material equality, are reflected ideologically. Nevertheless, this same ascertainment has to be clear to anyone who thinks soberly if one formulates it in the vernacular and thinks of the old experience: where there is little bread to be distributed, room for dignity also narrows. If that is the case, then the question must be posed as to what extent the Western concept of order (or plan for the creation of a new planetary order) could be unintentionally, and on the quiet, turned into a trigger of disorder,

57

should the realisation of the Western concept of order's premises, i.e. the overcoming of the shortage of goods and the dignified (i.e. in accordance with human dignity) (that is, democratic) redistribution of sufficient goods at the planetary level, fails to materialise. Theoretically the answer is clear: (economic) bottlenecks would lead to instability, and long-lasting crises to states of affairs, in which the economisation of the political would be intensified towards an identification of politics with the distribution of not quite enough (even ecological) goods[30]. If however politics is reduced in times of greatest need (i.e. hardship or distress) to the distribution of goods, then a biologisation of the same politics must occur (i.e. politics will take on a biological character) in two respects: not only would the (direct or indirect) aim of political struggle be a biological aim, namely survival in a more or less narrower sense, but also the distinctive (i.e. distinguishing) features (distinctions) which (in the course of this) would serve as criteria for grouping (group formation) (in the political struggle) would most likely be of a biological nature, since the traditional ideological and social distinctions would have become invalid by means of human rights universalism.

The avoidance of such a state of affairs is now hoped for on account of a convergence of the planetary average level with the average level of Western mass democracies. This average level of Western mass democracies is based on preconditions which can only be recreated with great difficulty. At the same time it is not merely a matter of historical and cultural given facts whose meaning in itself can be decisive, although this meaning is easily underestimated if one does not know from long experience how wide-ranging, differences in mentality can be and branch out. Yet even if one overlooks these differences in mentality, one faces

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[30] In the Greek text (p. 62) Kondylis adds: "(it should not be forgotten that in such goods elementary ecological goods are today also even included, e.g. water [aquatic] resources)".

the fact that the extensive distribution and redistribution of huge masses of goods, which inaugurated and consolidated Western mass-democratic conditions could take place only against the demographic background of a, for decades, stable and sometimes even declining population. At the planetary level on the other hand, the growth rate in the production of goods lags behind the growth rate of the population, or at best the growth rate in the production of goods exceeds this growth rate of the population to a small extent, so that either the shortage of goods increases or no appreciable redistribution is feasible. Countries[31], which are not at the Western level, yet have a stable population, again have a dubious advantage; because they (through that stable population) lack the social pressure and at the same time the social mobility which the economic progress of the Western nations caused (along with this economic progress) during the First and the Second Industrial Revolutions. The West has enjoyed the double advantage of a growing population in the age of liberal capitalism and a stable population in the age of mass democracy. It is well-known with how many human victims, with what methods of exploitation and under what living conditions the economic progress in the era of liberal capitalism was accomplished - and exactly the political, ethical and psychological impossibility of going down the same path today must have an effect as a disadvantage in a purely economic respect. To cherish material and political expectations without having behind them the purgatory of liberal capitalism of a Western kind, that is an explosive situation for many countries, and it would become an explosive situation for the entire planet should such expectations also be simultaneously asserted (or formulated as demands) under the influence of a materially interpreted human rights universalism by all sides. It would (into the bargain) barely help if the Western nations paid the price

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[31] The Greek version (p. 63) includes the phrase: "like the Eastern European ones [countries]".

of logical and moral consistency and with historically unprecedented self-denial transformed the mass-democratic ideal of material equality into planetary praxis. Even if the Western nations (- something which is improbable -) were willing to make up for the lack of output (i.e. performance) of the majority through the redistribution of the output (i.e. performance) of the minority, this would mean an equality in general poverty.

A biologisation of the political can set in already because planetary politics in the (near) future will have to more and more intensely come up against a biological factum brutum[32]: the population explosion. The public consciousness in the affluent regions still shies away from thinking through the extent and consequences of this breathtaking world-historical process without euphemisms and prevarications, and the reason for that lies not merely in the effect of the well-known displacement (or suppression) mechanisms which guard (or protect the soul) against nightmares. This inhibition or awkwardness springs just as much from the simple fact that on the basis of the ideologically dominant human rights universalism one cannot (begin to) theoretically and in practice grapple with a phenomenon like the population explosion. Typically, religious and other ethical movements which want to take the concept of human dignity seriously with ultimate consistency reject birth control - and typically other ethicists, who do not want to go so far, can justify their rejection of birth control only with reference to practical necessities and to roundabout ways of arguing, but not through a direct invocation of the unadulterated concept of human dignity. Indeed it is inconceivable what one could say against the population explosion on the mere basis of this concept of human dignity (and without having recourse to any other

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[32] Brutish fact (event, deed, action).

factor). The population explosion (in fact) constantly produces humans, every one of these humans has his own unique and inviolable (or sacrosanct) dignity, and although quantity is not always conducive to quality, nevertheless the quality of dignity is defined in such a way that it must not suffer under the pressure of quantity; because of that, ten or twenty billion inviolable (human) dignities would possibly be better than five billion, since they could increase the cumulative dignity of the human genus (race) - in any case, they cannot do any harm if one does not want to accept that the quality of dignity subsides because of its great quantity. One could dismiss such thoughts as jokes in bad taste (and our ethicists would, as I fear, think nothing better of them), nonetheless in these thoughts it is seen that attempts to cope with the problem of the population explosion with the (conceptual) instruments of human rights universalism, must lead to witty paradoxes. Human rights universalism, if it wants to remain true to itself, may not in fact look at the population explosion even as an ethical problem, since such (ethical) problems cannot be quantified either downwardly or upwardly. In this respect it can be said that human rights universalism constitutes the ideological concomitant or even (the unintentional) legitimation of the population explosion, exactly as human rights universalism is socially interwoven with the process of atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) and the highly developed (advanced) division of labour in Western mass democracies; human dignity, self-contained and indifferent now even vis-à-vis metaphysical kinds of founding (substantiations or justifications), is the rapidly growing self-admiration of rapidly multiplying humanity. However, what is missing here is not only the possibility of an answer to the banal, yet burning question of quantity. Also, the ecological question cannot be conclusively answered, which is why some contemporary ethicists have also had to take refuge in

such animistic spectres as the "dignity of Nature". The ecological question is far more concrete and it is: can the planet secure "dignified (i.e. in accordance with human dignity)" living conditions for x-number billion people without being irreparably destroyed in the near future? Is it ecologically tenable that a Chinese or an Indian, who possesses the same dignity as a North American, uses up the same (amount of) energy (and the same quantity of raw materials) per capita as the North American? If the answer here is not in the affirmative, then one must at least concede that the concept of human dignity in this case will be detached from the materially interpreted ideal of equality, that after all the concept of human dignity must discard its specific and today's decisive mass-democratic meaning in order to again achieve its pre-democratic connotations which could be reconciled with the ideals of poverty and also with very tangible social hierarchies.

We have already noticed that in the face of the growing - or even only strongly feared - shortage of goods, the biologisation of the political (i.e. the biological character of politics) is grasped both in the aims of politics (the goods necessary for survival) as well as in the criteria for grouping. The population explosion takes place not in fact in the abstract form of an accumulation of neutral numbers, but in the highly concrete form of the multiplying of human beings who belong to certain nations and races and occupy or want to occupy certain space. Angst (or fear) in the face of quantity in difficult situations will most likely, for broad masses, change into a hatred against quality. A significant historian has impressively described the effect of angst (or fear) as the psychological trigger of fascistic movements[33]. This same elementary angst (or fear), this time

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[33] Presumably the author is referring to Wilhelm Reich or Erich Fromm, though this, owing to the author's death, cannot be verified - unless a reference was made e.g. in Kondylis's hand-written manuscript of the original text.

merely with other targets to attack and with other signs (i.e. symbolism), is already emerging in reactions inside of Western mass democracies[34] as well as in the character of many nationalisms worldwide (see Sec. II). A gross misjudgement of the situation would follow if one wanted to close one's mind to the fact that long-term and strong trends in today's planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture) will feed rather than weaken such angst (or fear). And it would likewise be a grave error to deduce the still relatively small movements, which in the West and elsewhere loudly articulate this angst (or fear), simply from the racist and the fascistic thoughts world (i.e. ideas). Whoever here senses incorrigible or still inexperienced ideologues and pities their stupid supporters, is wrong, and moreover he attributes to these movements an intellectual(-spiritual) dimension which they do not have. Something much more elemental is at work here, namely the aggression of an animal when an alien animal penetrates into its territory. Ideological rags, which can be found (both) on the right and on the left, are then quickly stitched together to form "programmes" and "principles", however neither what is essential lies in that nor will these movements fail because of ideological inadequacy if other circumstances give them a boost.

The apprehension of political magnitudes on the basis of biological categories or perceptions has in the Western world an old and solid tradition even if well-meaning censors of the history of ideas want to see

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[34] The translator's view is that it still remains to be seen, as of 2014, whether "extreme" nationalist ideological and political reaction to the mass (legal and illegal) settlement of non-Western foreigners in Western countries will seriously put a dent in the prevalence of the human rights individualist, internationalist, anti-national or "anti-White" broader group/kinship ideologies, propaganda and life stances. Presumably the (re)appearance of mass authoritarian or "populist-nationalist democratic" movements and ideologies in the West would be contingent on the breakdown of hedonistic mass consumption and "value pluralism" - something Kondylis implies at the end of this paragraph. However, in the following paragraph, another possible scenario is referred to which sees the absence of any kind of national collective action, i.e. the case of the movement of countless masses of people across all borders and the confrontation (as struggle for survival) of man against man, individual against individual in circumstances of generalised anomie. Another scenario referred to at the end of this Section is the possible emergence of a new asceticism, perhaps with a new religiosity, which will seek to contribute to political order through social disciplining.

such perceptions either as blemishes or short-term divergences from the noble path of the (civilised) West. For the unbiased observer, the ascertainment is important that the gross reductionism manifesting itself in the said biological categories or perceptions sometimes was met with broad approval and was even socially acceptable precisely in times which, in terms of intellectual(-spiritual) refinement, otherwise did not leave anything to be desired. These biological categories or perceptions' effect (i.e. influence) - and at the same time their far-reaching self-evidence - in liberal Europe in the second half of the 19th century can be mentioned as an example. This epoch is particularly interesting for our formulation of the question (i.e. examination of the problem) because precisely at that time planetary politics was distinguished by a clear increase in its degree of density. Biologistic thought served many times as a reference framework for coping with the questions which the relation, that has now become closer, of the peoples with one another posed. From the European point of view, the imperialistic hierarchy was supposed to be founded through this biologistic thinking and the world-historical mission of white man was legitimised. The biologisation of the political can, however, take place not only directly on the basis of the notion of hierarchy, but can also come on the scene as an indirect and unintentional side effect of human rights universalism. Because this human rights universalism puts aside ideological and social distinctions so that humans, who bump into one another only as humans and not for instance as communists or liberals, bourgeois or proletarians, cannot make up any other distinctive (i.e. distingushing) characteristic and criterion for grouping (in order to regulate the relations) amongst themselves apart from that which manifestly stays with each and every respective individual human being from birth. It will, in the course of this, often be irrelevant as to whether one, out of consideration for current legitimation

needs, puts forward national factors behind which biological factors are hidden. This putting forward of national factors behind which biological factors are hidden can happen only for as long as the confrontations occurring take place between nations living apart, however this putting forward would be pushed into the background if masses of humans looking for goods forced open the borders between nations and the direct confrontation of man against man began. Human rights universalism paves the way - incidentally thoroughly consistently - to this forcing open of borders in so far as it attempts to extract the individual in certain respects from the jurisdiction of the nation state and to commission international authorities in respect of the protection of human rights. Hence, the consciousness is gradually formed that one floats between humanity and the nation, and that what was thought of as the legal safeguarding of human dignity turns into a prelude to the uncontrolled migration of the peoples - and to the just now mentioned direct confrontation of man against man. We must come back to the political dark side of human rights later (Sec. V, 2).

This exposition is not the gloomy prognosis of a development which will occur with absolute certainty and will unleash an elemental disorder. It is rather a matter of an emphatic extrapolation (or condensation) of the - indeed weighty - reasons which suggest (the conclusion) that the mass-democratically inspired concept of (permanent planetary) order is realisable only with great difficulty. The intent here is descriptive and analytical; the accusation should not be made that someone has not put across the correct concept of order, and such a concept should also not be suggested. For that matter, I know of no alternative proposal to be taken seriously, and what is astonishing in today's constellation (i.e. conjuncture) is exactly the almost unanimous confession of faith in mass-

democratic aims and values. That can only mean that the aforementioned concept of order does not so much constitute a consciously chosen and arbitrarily arranged construct, which could be replaced by any other concept of order whatsoever, but rather is the necessary resultant of the social and historical forces having an effect today. Under these circumstances, one must believe with the zeal of a preacher in the power of one's own words in order to want to put forward one's own personal wishes. Instead of that, I would like to conclude (this section) with two remarks. The possible practical realisation of the mass-democratic world programme, that is, the convergence of the planetary political and economic average with the Western average would (anyway) not bring about the end of bloody conflicts and wars. Wars do not take place only between the poor and the rich; the worst wars of this tragic century were waged between the richest nations, and History has not allowed us to know that tragedies will be completely abolished or in the future History will stage them only with poor protagonists. Secondly, the failure of the mass-democratic concept of order (or plan for the formation of new planetary order) can lead not only to a long and wild disorder, but also to a brutal order in which politics, reduced to the distribution of goods, would impose a strict social disciplining exactly for the purpose of coping with the task of the distribution of goods. The ideal of equality could then be preserved and continue to be interpreted in the democratic-material sense, but not the hedonistic stances, which ideationally bear (the weight of) mass consumption in today's Western mass democracies[35]; a new asceticism and perhaps a new religiosity under the circumstances of a high population density and shortage of goods would put an end to the pluralism of mass-democratic views and values. It cannot be stressed

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[35] Following "hedonistic stances" the Greek text (p. 70) states: "in which mass consumption in today's Western mass democracies is ideationally founded".

enough and repeated too much: pluralism is only possible where there is room for many and for much (i.e. for many people and many things).

II. Nationalism between radicalised tradition and mass-democratic modernisation

The robust and militant nationalisms which promptly sprang from the ruins of the Soviet empire touched off (triggered) disconcertment and embarrassment for many people in the West. The long, earnest preoccupation with mass consumption and the corresponding refinement of manners and of psyches gradually brought forth here another perception of the purpose of man on this earth, so that one could no longer rightly understand how civilised beings could be so enthusiastic about something so primitive as the nation. To that was added a sense of vague and only half pronounced concern, because in the face of such an outbreak of emotions, which for a long time have been considered outdated, doubts must have crept in over the West's own situation and future, namely the question arises as to whether also Western, and indeed West European societies, could relapse. Even a normal, as it were, conjugal quarrel between Western nations is henceforth observed by all sides with such secret thoughts, and one begins to think about the precarious character of the supra-national institutions created in the meantime and queries the irreversibility of the direction followed or at least the completibility (or perfectibility) of the common (European) project. The attempt to have West European nationalisms through the

European Community definitively put (placed) ad acta[36] (i.e. made irrelevant) was in fact based on special political preconditions, i.e. apart from the growing integration of dynamic (national) economies there was for the first time a common foe of all West European nations whose dangerousness greatly exceeded (their) every mutual mistrust, and there was also American political and military patronage. After the discontinuance of both latter preconditions (i.e. the existence of a dangerous common foe and American political and military patronage), the growing integration of West European national economies could also prove to be fragile or at least politically secondary. Such half-suppressed doubts in respect of one's own affairs and situation frequently are carried over into the noisy or quiet angst (or fear) before East European and Balkan nationalisms. The politically and strategically absolutely justified concern over the presumable knock-on effects of wars or unrest in other parts of the continent would at any rate be slighter if the European Community could be from the outset certain of the unity and the resolve of its action. Instead of that, the lack of firm common ground in the present lets reminiscences of the conflicts of interest of the nationalistically shaped past become vivid - and indeed regarding the same places and the same actors.

The psychologically explicable fixation on the past however suggests misjudgements in respect of the character of nationalism in the present. The interpretation of nationalism as a kind of incursion of the past into the present is again very often connected with anthropologically underpinned perceptions or perceptions underpinned by the philosophy of history which put the tenacious continued existence of the nationalistic cast of mind down to the ineradicable need of man for emotional and

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[36] Into archives.

substantial bonds with a corresponding identity, that is, in nationalism they see an expected rebellion against the instrumental rationality of the technicised world and at the same time against the utilitarian rationality of the (state under the) rule of law. But regardless of whether one feels for and welcomes or fears and condemns the rebellion: in respect of the analysis of today's concrete situation, as we remarked at the start of the previous section, there is little to be gained as long as the constants or long-lived historical magnitudes are not specified in more detail. "Irrational" or "emotional" needs work differently in every situation and in every era, that is why they can hardly be properly evaluated as historical and social factors if one does not ask through which content and which notions they are concretised, which foe they have and which aims they want to pursue. A general reference to "the" nation without a more detailed description of the world in which the nation holds its own, unfolds - and wants to define itself, does not suffice. Even if certain nations over longer periods of time perennially are grouped (approximately) in accordance with the same pattern as friends and foes, we must pose every time anew the question as to the driving forces moving such nations and look into the relation of these driving forces with the predominant world-historical tendencies. It is demonstrably false to attribute friendship or enmity between nations to immutable racial given facts or inflexible psychical archetypes and to overlook the infinite plasticity of the interests and the aims constantly being newly defined; "eternal enmities" merely result from situations of permanently conflicting interests.

If Western observers were not worried and embarrassed in respect of the reasons just stated, they would have had to look at the revival of East European and Balkan nationalism as a normal phenomenon in a century

whose first half also in Europe, and in whose second half outside of Europe, was under the influence of nationalism. This then of course becomes evident only if one dispenses with the navel-gazing of a supra-nationally talking and acting Western Europe[37], if one brings to mind the planetary dimension and simply counts how many (sovereign) states there were forty years ago in comparison to today. The large number of newly added states spread through a huge nationalistic wave on the African and Asian continents, many of them were the result of long struggles, which also involved many sacrifices, in the course of which national identities (consciousnesses) were consolidated. An approach to the comprehension of the historical character of this nationalism is offered to us if we contemplate its fundamental difference to European bourgeois nationalism of the 19th century, which developed under the early or late influence of the French Revolution. The Revolution constituted the nation through the political catchwords of freedom and equality, which in concreto[38] meant the homogenisation of the national space through the putting aside of estate-based privileges (i.e. privileges of the aristocracy and the clergy) and local or feudal autonomies. Therefore bourgeois nationalism in its antifeudal-antiparticularistic stance[39] was a conquest towards the interior, namely an occupation of the national space through social forces which were willing and able to nationalise this space, i.e. to unify (standardise) it politically, legally and economically. Certainly, the unification (standardisation) of the national space inwardly made its borders more clear-cut outwardly and this had to entail conflicts with neighbouring states, irrespective of whether these neighbouring states were estate-based-absolutist or national-liberal states. However, the

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[37] The Greek (p. 73) reads: "a Europe which would like to perceive itself as a supra-national entity [unity]".

[38] In a concrete sense.

[39] Kondylis's Greek translation (p. 74) of "seiner antifeudal-antipartikularistischen Einstellung" is: "since it turned against the separatist and localistic tendencies".

historical centre of gravity of bourgeois nationalism did not lie in these conflicts, which are to be looked upon as bourgeois nationalism's (inevitable) side effects, but in the aforementioned conquest and homogenisation of each and every respective available internal space.

The priorities were reversed during the anti-colonial nationalisms of the 20th century. Not that here no endeavours at unification towards the internal space occurred; on the contrary, such endeavours were undertaken very energetically by some nationalisms, above all the communistically oriented nationalisms, however they could also more or less slacken if for instance at the head of the nationalistic movement stood patriarchal-traditionalistic forces. Whereas, that is, the European nationalism of the 19th century had an identifiable social bearer, namely the bourgeoisie (even in countries like e.g. Germany in which the national question one way or another was solved through the political action of a wing of the conservative forces, this happened under the pressure of the bourgeois programme and in order to take the wind out of the bourgeoisie's sails), very different strata or elites undertook each and every respective political guidance of the nationalisms of the 20th century. Because here the fundamental problem and the main matter of concern was a different one, it was namely not (primarily) a matter of the conquest of the internal national space, but of the independence towards the exterior against a foreign ruler or at any rate of the freedom of movement in foreign policy against a threatening neighbour. Nationalism was from now on primarily the effort of every particular nation to win a fixed and indisputable place inside of the world society being formed. In view of the density which planetary politics in the meantime had reached through imperialism, nationalism had to exactly fit in with the character of planetary politics. Henceforward, the constitution of the nation as an

independent state constituted the only possibility of its participation in a world society which one could not stay away from without committing long-term political and economic suicide.

From this perspective, the new editions of East European and Balkan nationalisms can be better understood. The question of the homogenisation of the national space is not posed here - especially as communistic rule practised, over and above homogenisation, leveling and atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) -, but the main effort concerns the immediate and as far as possible most advantageous incorporation in world society. The disintegration of multinational states into national states is connected with this effort: every nation wants to arrange its own management of the aforementioned incorporation, that is, take into its own hands the representation of its interests, since it believes it could achieve more for itself through direct contact with the rest of the members of world society - and furthermore, its economic self-determination, that is, the ending of the real or supposed exploitation on the part of a foreign nation, will permit an optimal utilisation of its resources. With regard to this latter desideratum (i.e. the ending of the real or supposed exploitation by a foreign nation), these nationalisms are partly similar to anti-colonial movements since they denounce as colonialistic the autocratic behaviour of the hegemonic nation in the (former) multinational state. How modern the coupling of national-cultural and economic matters of concern (or demands) is, how much this coupling articulates desires as regards redistribution and in this respect has a genuine mass-democratic impetus - is seen today precisely in the interior of some West European mass democracies where ethnicities and minorities are belatedly rediscovered

or even partly constructed[40] when it comes to pinning the blame for the relative poverty of their regions on the "foreign rule" of the metropolises and demanding appropriate redress.

Undoubtedly, the hasty autonomisation and separation of the nations in the former communistic dominion (or territory) has very much to do with redistribution and expectations of affluence. The political passivity of the great majority of people living there points to the fact that they would also be content with nationally (much) looser political solutions should these guarantee a considerably higher standard of living. The political and intellectual elites who give priority to the national cause nevertheless necessarily prevail quite unchallenged since exactly no other practical solutions are in sight. The nation constitutes the nearest minimal (political) unit which can articulate wishes of redistribution both against yesterday's confederates as well as against world society (economic aid, military aid). Individuals or private clubs do not then have any prospect, that is, whoever wants to ask for and gain something, and whoever, moreover, does not want to share that something with others, he can only appear as a nation in the sense of the aforementioned nearest minimal (political) unit. The nation therefore today constitutes the smallest possible interest group inside of world society - of course on condition that it is constituted as a sovereign state. Unrest does not simply come because nations have rediscovered themselves and they want to enjoy their cultural identity in peace, but because nations must constitute themselves as states in order to achieve their, as they hope, effective and lucrative incorporation in world society (more precisely: their convergence with the prosperous strata of world society). Unrest during the constitution of the nation as state is again inevitable for two reasons.

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[40] The Greek translation (p. 76) is: "rediscover, and sometimes invent, with great delay their identity".

The fluidity and the openness (or uncertain outcome) of the circumstances (i.e. developments) setting in as a result of the dissolution of the old imperial and hegemonic structures offers every nation a unique opportunity to now demand everything from its neighbours which it considers its own; incidentally, the joining together of all national forces reinforces the new state and provides a better starting position for the future inside of the world society. On the other hand, the constituting of the national (i.e. nation) state is of necessity accompanied by the decision as to who will rule in it, who, that is, will represent the nation and who should bindingly interpret its will - a decision, which as is known, as a rule, is taken after much internal discord.

The apparently inexorable urge (or propensity) of nations, which just shook off an imperial or hegemonic yoke, to safeguard their borders and at the same time their identity as well as their political and material claims through the form of organisation of the state, must be judged as an important sign of the role and the viability of (sovereign) statehood as such in the phase of planetary politics now underway. Nations, which at zero hour had the choice between various possibilities of political organisation, passed by without much thought federal and supra-national solutions in general and gave their preference to sovereign statehood. Moreover, it is illuminating that these nations simultaneously declared their faith in the principle of human rights universalism. However, in this way they did not want to undertake something which would have led partly or totally to the overcoming of sovereign statehood as form of political organisation, but they use this declaration of faith not least of all in order to achieve as soon and as easily as possible their main aim, namely their incorporation in world society. The role of the long-suppressed thirst for freedom should (in the course of this) neither be

overlooked nor trivialised, the predominantly human rights orientation of East European and Balkan nationalism was however primarily due to the fact that here the foe, that is, the imperial or hegemonic lord thought little of human rights in the Western sense. Against its proletarian internationalism, which concealed exactly the imperial or hegemonic claim, nationalism therefore had to be summoned, and against its totalitarian or despotic praxis, human rights universalism was summoned. The constituting of the nation as state and the appropriation (adoption) of human rights universalism on the other hand jointly make possible the accession of the defeated in the Cold War to a world society, in which, understandably, from now on the ideology of the victor sets the tone.

If we understand the multi-faceted inner logic of the appropriation (adoption) of human rights universalism on the part of the new European (and Eurasian) states, then one cannot be surprised by very likely future developments in their realm. First of all, in many cases only partial implementation of human rights universalism's principles is to be expected in political praxis, which then might head towards an authoritarian pseudo-parliamentarism. Yet still more important is the following. If the appropriation (adoption) of human rights, parliamentary etc. principles is connected with the wish and expectation of finding quick Anschluss (i.e. union or participation) in respect of the affluence and freedom of the West, then a failure in this endeavour must change the positive attitude (or positioning) towards the West and its ideology. The relation of these nations towards the West is afflicted from the outset by an ambivalence, this relation is burdened by a reservation, in view of the uncertainty of these nations' practical success. Ambivalent, even though in a different sense on each and every respective occasion, is also the relation of those nations with the West, which were constituted as states

not through their freeing from a communistic ruler, but exactly through the struggle against the West, or at any rate they feel they exist in contrast to the West and Western values. Here again we must distinguish between two main types. The largest nation in the world, the Chinese nation, still continues to demarcate itself against the West through the communistic disguise of its nationalism. In practical terms this means that it strives for quick and extensive economic progress on the basis of modern (that is, Western) technology, while at the same time it rejects the political transformation of human rights universalism into a parliamentary system. The difference of its own national traditions vis-à-vis Western ones is indeed underlined every now and then[41] for obvious reasons, however traditionalism as world theory (i.e. world view) or as way of life is not set against the West, but on the contrary, technical rationality is openly and programmatically promoted in parallel with the dissolution of traditional social structures.

The situation looks different in the other anti-Western version of nationalism, which after the Iranian Revolution received much attention and frequently was taken for a novum, although preforms of a mixing of traditional, and indeed Muslim, with national-anti-Western, elements can already be found in "Arabic socialism" of Nasserite inspiration, which was then varied by the so-called Baath parties. In this case, traditionalism does not simply constitute a defence of the threatened local manners and customs, but it emerges aggressively as a world-theoretically founded declaration of war against Western society, its way of life and its values. One would nonetheless be ill-advised as an analyst to conclude from these slogans a wish to remain in the pre-democratic and preplanetary world. This traditionalism opens in its way a path to incorporation in

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[41] The Greek text (p. 79): "when this seems expedient".

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world society just like for other nations and under other circumstances the confession of faith in the human rights ideology of the West also opens a path to incorporation in world society. That will be better understood if we consider that in the perception of those concerned, incorporation does not mean admission at any price, but the effort at obtaining the most advantageous position possible: in this way the nationalistic elan and zeal is in fact explained in a world in which the density of planetary politics attained in the meanwhile does not allow any long-term (political) hermit existence.

The by no means traditionalistic effect of traditionalism is now brought about through its radicalisation. The possibility of such a radicalisation can of course only be comprehended if we free ourselves from the favourite conservative notion that tradition is, as it were, a supra-personal hypostasis which floats above peoples and individuals and evades the arbitrariness of their decisions. Far from it. Traditions, especially in the modern world, exist and take effect in accordance with the interpretation of concrete bearers, they are constructed - on the basis of pre-given, but also freely processed or invented - materials, and are summoned against other traditions or interpretations of tradition. The first step towards the radicalisation of tradition takes place when he who is able to interpret tradition bindingly represents the opinion that tradition is not the dead past, but the living present, that is, whoever wants to live in accordance with tradition must not turn away from today's world and meticulously (with scholastic precision) reconstruct the past in order to nest in the past again, but find in tradition faith and guidelines with whose help the tasks of the present could best be dealt with. Tradition should not mean encapsulation in time and in space, but constitute a force turned towards the outside which is able to provide more than rearguard action.

If tradition is instructions (directions) for action in the present and if the present moves, as is obvious, in broader spaces and larger dimensions than the past, then tradition must detach itself from its old particularism and turn into an overarching idea[42], which embraces masses in a unified (uniform) way. As such an idea - for instance as a religious idea against the background of a nationalistic activism which turns against an "atheistic" and "materialistic" foe - traditionalism generalises and unifies loyalties, that is, it accepts conventional locally conditioned patriarchal loyalties only in so far as they represent under the new conditions the overarching idea, and awakens a sense of a comprehensive common bond and equality, since the status of individuals - all individuals - is now defined in accordance with the new criterion of service to the idea. The congregation (or rallying) and homogenisation of masses of people, achieved through this service to the idea, constitutes the first modernistic component or effect of radicalised traditionalism. The second lies in its power (i.e. ability) to motivate and to mobilise these masses to an extent which was simply inconceivable for genuinely traditional societies. Tradition becomes a motive for political action when it is not only lived (experienced), but is (really) demanded - obviously they are two very different moods. The woman who demonstrates in favour of the retention of traditional dress, and takes to the streets in militant mood together with other women, is no longer the woman who has worn this dress for ages. Certainly, this dress did not always have only one use, but also a symbolic value, however formerly it stood for instance for the traditional position of woman vis-à-vis man, now on the other hand it is supposed to primarily symbolise that the woman who wears it wants to pointedly delimit herself against another culture, and no longer that she unconditionally accepts in the former sense the social superiority of man.

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[42] In the Greek text (p. 81), "an idea of great scope [a large range]" is the chosen translation.

While, that is, tradition is militantly demanded and not lived (experienced) in accordance with an interpretation which became self-evident, the content and the polemical point of its symbols change, the modification or even reversal (inversion) of the old content takes place on the quiet exactly in the name of the dogged defence of "tradition". Therefore the job of the interpretation of tradition becomes more important than the real remnants of tradition. That is the point of extreme psychological importance for the unfolding of the process of modernisation under the aegis of radicalised traditionalism. One, such veiled unfolding actually also brings with it inhibitions, simultaneously it offers, however, a considerable (psychic) relieving of the tension of existence, which in certain situations is needed more pressingly than freedom from inhibitions. Modern content can be appropriated (adopted) much more easily in traditional disguise, without in the process the humiliating feeling coming into being that one is aping the hated West or that one is betraying one's own identity; and the impression that one anyway has never deviated from one's own tradition protects one, on the other hand, from disappointments, should it turn out that the attempt at modernisation has failed.

These observations bring us to a third modernistic aspect of radicalised traditionalism, which should be of no small significance for the future. This aspect in itself incidentally constitutes eloquent proof of the fact that radicalised traditionalism makes up an inhibited and disguised process of modernisation under the pressure of a very dense planetary politics, not sterile "reaction" in the familiar sense. It is obvious that neither in its theory nor in its praxis (and in its praxis even less than in the theory) modern technology (technique) and industry are not rejected out of hand nor is a return to pre-industrial methods of economising striven for. In

respect of this crucial field, radicalised traditionalism does not permit itself free rein and illusions as regards the political weight and fate of a nation, which for the safeguarding of its traditions would consciously and programmatically do without the means of modern technology and industry. But on the basis of the inner logic of historical movement, the use of modern means proves to be more decisive than the propagating of traditionalistic goals. Precisely the inevitable daily contact with the means, the division of labour and the interhuman relations conditioned by the said contact and division of labour, shape the social whole in the long-term. The incorporation of increasing parts of the population in modern economic relations or in modern armies will bring about the inescapable restructuring of the village, the tribe, the clan (or kinship group) and the family, and even if many facades are supposed to remain intact for reasons of political symbolism or anti-Western self-understanding[43], nonetheless these facades' function will no longer be the old function. If the mechanisms of the psychological relieving of the tension of existence, of which we spoke before, worked, then the process of modernisation can proceed to a great extent without most people feeling an unbearable contradiction between means and ends (goals) or between modernistic praxis and traditionalistic ideology. Symbol-bearing acts like the regular ostentatious prayer of the devout and the equally ostentatious cutting off of the hand for thieves, are even possibly carried out in the search for (over)compensation all the more persistently the more political modernisation takes place in the form of massification, and economic modernisation takes place in the form of the developed (advanced) division of labour. It would not be, for that matter, the first time since the beginning of the industrial age where movements, which arrived on the scene with traditionalistic slogans have conducted rapid modernisation.

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[43] The Greek translation (p. 83) is: "the projection of the [an] anti-Western identity".

The set phrase (or claptrap) "blood and soil" did not at all prevent e.g. the National Socialists from driving forward technical-industrial development and from unconcernedly thinning the ranks of the "peasantry".

Whether as (attempted) imitation of the West or as traditionalistic refusal (rejection) of the West: contemporary nationalism, which wants to, in fact must, participate in the planetary becoming (i.e. planetary events) follows, through various (straight) paths and detours, mass-democratic logic and ultimately has mass-democratic objectives. As has already been observed (Sec. I, 1), in the future most probably different types of mass democracy will develop, which will diverge from the - in itself already diverse - Western type. In this respect it is not a matter of indifference whether a nation defines itself as modernistic or traditionalistic, on the other hand however, one should not expect that today's nationalism will be tied to achievements which characterise its past. Those who expect from the "resurgence of nationalisms" a new creative epoch of national cultures in their individuality, will above all experience disappointment. "Culture" in general and as such was a bourgeois value and "national culture" was the culture from the perspective of bourgeois nationalism. There can be no doubt that the *concept* of national culture will survive for a long time, since it will obviously continue to fulfil legitimation tasks and will be further required as a weapon towards the outside as well as an identity-constituting factor in the interior. It can even be predicted that under certain circumstances entire nationalistic mythologies and self-complacent collective epopees will come into being. However, all of this is still not cultural creativity. The great questions of content and form are posed at the level of world society in the mass-democratic age, and indeed already from the time of the great turn (i.e. change or watershed) around 1900, - and only questions which are posed here spur today truly

creative intellectual(-spiritual) activity. No matter how much one still likes to chew over one's own national culture: as an exclusively *national* culture in the future it will hardly be anything more than a couleur locale, "interesting" peculiarity or sight worth seeing inside of the motley pantheon or pandemonium of mass-democratic world society. In no other example is this tendency seen so clearly as in the inability of traditionalistic nationalism to adhere simply and just to (pure) traditional elements.

In conclusion, two (further) possible functions of contemporary nationalism must be contemplated. The just mentioned possible coming into being or swelling of nationalistic mythologies could in part serve as a substitute for the just nullified grand, utopian blueprints underpinned by the philosophy of history, that is, the said coming into being or swelling of nationalistic mythologies could, as it were, produce (various kinds of) short- and medium-term utopias. To the extent that vigorous nationalisms would usurp a supra-national, for instance religious idea and would represent it with a claim to exclusivity, the short- and medium-term chiliasm could be put at the service of the hegemonic ambitions of middle and major Powers. In the course of this however, a fragmentation of the bearers and the interpretations of the supra-national idea in question must always be expected. On the other hand, it is conceivable that nationalism, in circumstances of a growing shortage of goods, would foster at the planetary level the biologisation of the political (i.e. it would contribute to politics itself taking a biological character). (Possible) bottlenecks in the distribution of goods would have to - as long as these bottlenecks at least did not lead to a struggle of all against all - deepen the points of delimitation between the groupings of world society and would possibly make racially conceived nationality the decisive characteristic of

differentiation and classification[44]. From this perspective, it is a telltale sign that the groupings, which today for the first time (want to) walk onto the stage of planetary politics in the form of sovereign states in order to announce their interests in the planetary struggle over distribution and redistribution now beginning, were constituted as a matter of preference, in fact almost spontaneously, on the basis of a true or supposed blood community as the closest thing to a common denominator.

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[44] As of 2014, this certainly does not seem to be the case in Western countries, apart from the opinion of small minorities within the (indigenous, in macro-historically relative terms) European peoples, though nationalism with strong racial overtones is definitely alive and well in many non-Western countries. However, the bottlenecks referred to have by no means arisen to any significant extent in the Western world, and the twenty-first century is still young.

III. The new shape of hot war

If war constitutes the continuation of politics with other means, if, that is, the texture of the dominant political circumstances is reflected in the conduct of war, then it is no wonder that war in the mass-democratic age must be democratised. Here it is not a matter, of course, of the introduction of universal conscription next to general (universal) suffrage, from which many socialists formerly[45] expected the democratisation of the armed forces. Rather, the means of (the conduct of) war are democratised, and indeed in the course of an ambivalent development, during which the previous overall social relation between civilians and military personnel is changed to the detriment of the military personnel, however simultaneously, the new flexibility of weapons and forms of war make easier, in fact provoke, military deployments. In light of the very close connections between technological possibilities and strategy or tactics in war existing at the latest since the Second Industrial Revolution, this development (of the (ambivalent) democratisation of the means of war) had to start from the technologically advanced Western mass democracies; and in view of the density of planetary politics reached in the meantime, this development must, above all after the end of the Cold War, embrace the whole of, from now on more mobile, world society[46]. In the course of this, the blurring of the boundaries between civilian and

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[45] Kondylis's Greek text (p. 87) states: "in the 19th century".
[46] Instead of "the whole of, from now on more mobile, world society" the Greek text (p. 87) reads: "the whole of world society which is entering a phase of intense mobility".

military technology has a pioneering effect, which was fostered by the Third Industrial Revolution. The more civilian and military technology is dependent on (the services of) electronics and informatics (information technology), the more the distance between them decreases, not indeed at the lower, but surely at the higher and the highest levels; however precisely here (at the higher and highest levels) the decisions are made over the guidance of the entire available apparatus, in order to then set in motion the available apparatus's parts (sections, members) through the same technology, which provides the data for the taking of the fundamental decisions. The smooth transition from civilian to military technology and vice versa implies that for the promotion of military technology no special efforts on a large scale are needed, as much as the application of generally valid (kinds of) knowledge in the military sector, as well as these kinds of knowledge' particular military detailed processing, require time and specialists. The pressure of reducing (the) costs (of production), under which civilian technology finds itself, affects the manufacture of military products favourably, while, moreover, the parallel advances in both sectors shorten the length of time which the development of new weapons systems requires (from these weapons systems' design until their readiness for use (or action)). In the extreme case, progress in civilian technology eo ipso enables its direct military use.

Because of that, the previous, frequently politically privileged position of the military officer is impaired (downgraded) in so far as the weapons industry gradually ceases to be surrounded by the grim aura of the arcanum imperii[47], and the civilian technician can partly supersede, partly direct the military officer; simultaneously the self-understanding of the

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[47] Secret of power ((imperial) government).

military officer changes, that is - to contrast two common stereotypes with each other - the modern sober technician takes the place of the "warhorse" (i.e. bellicose warrior). The possibility of a reduction in the number of personnel in the armed forces during the armed forces' increasing technicisation also contributes to the belittlement (downgrading) of the social position of the military officer, at least inside of the Western mass democracies. Nevertheless, these developments (events) point to an elimination of the military factor just as little as the economisation of the political (the fusion of politics with the economy) excludes the politicisation of the economic (economy). Under certain political and psychological-ideological conditions it can be even assumed that military modernisation or the consolidation (improvement) of the military (sector) can be conducted more comfortably and more effectively through its interweaving with civilian (non-military) technology and behind civilian technology's harmless facade. Precisely this interweaving can e.g. allow Powers[48], which in the strategic constellation (conjuncture) of the Cold War could indeed be economically strong but militarily had to remain second-rate, to very quickly make up for the deficiencies in the military sector, since they can simply adapt their advanced technology from civilian to military use. The same technological abundance of the West also fills the channels through which modern weapons, and indeed often in civilian packaging, reach extra-European spaces. The middle and major Powers of these spaces are of course more or less removed from an interweaving of civilian and military technology at the high level, yet they require, above all, those weapons, which are produced at this level. Incidentally, these middle and major Powers cannot see why they should not possess what the great Powers already have and do not want to simply scrap. A ban on the middle and major Powers from procuring nuclear

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[48] Kondylis adds "like Japan and Germany" to his Greek version of the book (p. 89).

weapons or other modern armaments[49] could ultimately only be justified by the assumption that the great Powers alone would know how to handle (use) such weapons and armaments rationally (and sensibly), but not the middle and major Powers themselves. Such a discriminating distinction[50] however cannot be drawn without disdaining the declared anthropological and universal-ethical principles of equality of the West[51]. That is why it seems the conclusion is compelling (mandatory) that humans with equal (the same) dignity may also possess the same weapons.

If the process of democratisation on a highly technicised (an advanced technical) basis in the West changes the military profession into a "job" amongst others - of course into such a job of which in case of emergency completely special performances (i.e. achievements) are still expected -, the democratisation of war at a planetary level takes place through the watering down or the ending of the monopolies of military technology (technique). One cannot help thinking of the saying of the philosopher[52] - "Mankind required gunpowder, and forthwith it was there" -, when one looks at today's forms which the convergence of political and military factors take. Strategic atomic weapons become obsolete and let smaller, more flexible and relatively easily acquirable weapons take precedence precisely from the moment that the middle and major Powers, which are able to possess and need such strategic atomic weapons, come on the scene. The revaluation of weapons, which can be used with high precision in very different local situations, corresponds to the fragmentation (splintering) of political forces after the Cold War. The

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[49] At this point in the Greek text (p. 89) Kondylis adds: ", which would be specifically directed [specifically turn] against them [the middle and major Powers],".

[50] Rather than "discriminating distinction" the Greek (p. 89) reads: "distinction which is so disparaging [derogatory] for so many".

[51] Kondylis's Greek translation (p. 89) is: "the declared Western principles of the equality of humans and of universal ethics".

[52] G.W.F. Hegel.

situation looked precisely the other way around during the Cold War, although in the Cold War's final years this reverse situation slackened through the development of middle- and short-range missiles (or rockets). Nonetheless, the fact that strategic atomic weapons by no means lost their meaning depended on the logic of the overall constellation (situation). The fundamental irreconcilability of the two giant and massive (compact) camps, which stood stiffly (rigidly) opposite each other and rather seldom found byways in order to outwit one another or to consult (and understand) each other, was reflected in the most vivid way in the bilateral piling up of apocalyptic arsenals. The characteristic quality of these strategic weapons was that they could not concentrate their tremendous destructive energy towards a certain militarily sensible (legitimate) target; the strategic weapons had to sow destruction on a massive scale, that is, much more than what was necessary for the politically desirable subjugation of the foe. Precisely this ungainliness of these strategic weapons, if one may say so, secured for them a deterrence function. The exercising of politics with the said strategic weapons meant deterring (i.e. acting as a deterrent), however waging war with them was more or less unpredictable.

After the Cold War, the planetary landscape is no longer dominated by two massive bulwarks standing opposite one another and (which are also) strategically equipped[53], but rather the planetary landscape resembles an electronic board on which small red lights lying closely side by side constantly turn on and off. The world war which did not take place has been apportioned to a number of regional conflicts of which some could attain planetary relevance. Inside of the fragmented (splintered) planetary space and beyond the shadow of an atomic world war, wars become more

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[53] The Greek text (p. 91) is: "and which have strategic armaments at their disposal" rather than "and strategically equipped".

feasible; the superseding of strategic nuclear weapons by precision weapons corresponds to the replacement of the old (nuclear) deterrence by the new conduct of war. The openness of the new planetary constellation (conjuncture) commands flexibility in the use of military means, while the variety of possible targets to attack, every one of which can in turn go on the attack, demands a rapid concentration of the means and that target accuracy which constitutes one of the astonishing results of the new weapons technologies. The planetary Power which has won the Cold War must now, if it wants to remain a planetary Power, perfect with the help of new civilian-military technology that concept (i.e. strategic dogma) which initially was formed inside of the old deterrence strategy as the said concept's supplement; however "flexible response" cannot now merely mean the ability at reacting, at every stage of any escalating confrontation, with the military means which correspond to the seriousness of the situation without immediately having to resort to extremes, but - more generally - "flexible response" must mean the ability at intervening in every conflict with the right equipment on each and every respective occasion.

As is self-evident, a planetary Power, which by means of frequent flexible responses wants to put down or bring under control planetarily relevant conflicts, must concern itself with not allowing the possible originators of such conflicts or at least its own possible opponents (i.e. foes) to (at the same time) come into possession of nuclear weapons, but also of weapons of high precision; the same would be in the interest of Powers which feel that (in certain regions) they are represented by the planetary Power. From this perspective, the oligarchy of the bearers of ultra-modern weapons seems a more effective guarantee of peace than an egalitarian weapons democracy. Nevertheless, it can be said that the

spreading of the aforementioned weapons in the long term cannot be prevented for two reasons. The political reason is the necessity, in which the great Powers including the planetary Power are found, to delegate regional police (policing) tasks (duties) to allied middle or major Powers. It is to be expected that these middle or major Powers will make the fulfilment of their tasks (duties) dependent on the supply of modern armaments and they will take advantage of the possible defence of foreign interests for the consolidation (and extension) of their own regional power position. The economic reason for which the export of highly developed (advanced) weapons technology will more likely intensify is partly reduced to the aforementioned interweaving of civilian and military technology and is connected with the pressure of competition. To the extent that more and more middle Powers are able to sell the usual conventional weapons to those interested, the leading (chief) producers must offer highly developed (advanced) weapons systems in order to - above all amongst themselves - remain competitive. The already mentioned shortening of the time between an invention with regard to weapons technology and its practical implementation will also contribute to all the respective newest achievements in this sector finding rapid diffusion. In the course of this, the technological chasm (gulf) between the producer and the buyer will not necessarily constitute an insurmountable obstacle because the operation of the systems is less complicated than their structure.

The spreading (diffusion) of highly developed (advanced) weapons technology in countries which scarcely or only rudimentarily produce such weapons will surely not be able to bring about an automatic equalisation of the military potential of exporters and importers. The same amount and quality of material (materiel) has in every country a

different value (and status) which is determined by the general technological and cultural level; the truism of the priority of the human factor will therefore - at least in this sense - (further) retain its validity. Moreover, countries, which are exclusively or mainly dependent on the import of weapons technology, can only ever import and master a part or fragment of the same weapons technology (with success), but not the overall context inside of which these parts or fragments reach their maximum performance. Accordingly, only sections of the armed forces familiarise themselves with the operation of modern devices (apparatuses) (and machines), that is, highly developed (advanced) technicisation is basically restricted to elite units, while the great mass of troops in its way of conducting operations and mentality more or less remains unaffected by this highly developed technicisation. From that follows a considerable lack of homogeneity, at the same time however also the necessity of maintaining mass armies. Because a significant numerical reduction in the same mass armies without a (parallel) decrease in their fighting (combat) power could only be carried out on condition of an extreme technological refinement of management (and control) systems for reconnaissance, target detection and weapon guidance, which would multiply firepower, heighten mobility (agility, manoeuvrability) and economise on munitions thanks to high target (i.e. aiming) accuracy. That is why sizable differences in level would undoubtedly arise should ever a country which exports highly developed (advanced) weapons technology wage war against a country which imports such weapons technology. This case could occur not infrequently in the future, however the effects of the democratisation of the means of war will not be made noticeable only in such a case. In regional conflicts, which (now) become more probable as a result of the emergence of middle and major Powers, the marked technological lead of a local Power must influence the

correlation (circumstances) of forces (i.e. balance of power), even if the bulk of the armed forces on all sides has otherwise remained at an outdated stage of technological development. Technologically underdeveloped countries, which display an acute need for (acquiring) modern armaments, do this exactly with regard to foreign or their own hegemonic claims (aspirations) and to the conflict situations arising out of them.

The first-mentioned case (of the two cases above) would now occur if e.g. a supra-regional great Power wanted to oppose the hegemonic claims of a certain regional Power and in the course of this was determined to bring its technological superiority fully to bear. The question which would then be posed would have to read as follows: can a regional Power, which in any case is not a match for a great Power in an all-round struggle, nevertheless cause the great Power such damage that this acts as a deterrence? The answer, which the future will give to this question, should have enormous consequences for the formation of the constellation (conjuncture) in today's phase of planetary politics. It can be regarded as certain that the firepower of all sides as well as the mobility of this firepower's use will increase. Increasingly more countries will have at their disposal missiles (or rockets) with an increasing range and (increasing) target accuracy, all the more frequently will ballistic missiles be equipped with chemical or biological weapons. Should the interested great Powers prove to be incapable of constructing effective early warning and interception systems or of preventing the spreading (diffusion) of such weapons through constant well-aimed interventions, then they must, sooner or later, sustain heavy losses even in ultimately victorious military confrontations with regional powers. It is therefore to be expected that countries, which because of their general economic

situation cannot cherish any hope of familiarising themselves with ultra-modern technology in its entire breadth, will at least strive for the acquisition of weapons which would not fail in their deterrence effect even in respect of the great Powers. If this possibility is realised, then the political and military distance between middle, major and great Powers will be smaller than what one would presume on the basis of each and every respective existing general difference in technological level.

The different degree of technicisation of armies already indicates that in the future there will be a number of forms of battle and kinds of conduct of war. An ideal image of the modern, that is, in every way technicised conduct of war will indeed be outlined, however that does not at all mean that in certain situations other forms of battle (combat, fighting) could be decisive - both between technologically equivalent (equal) as well as between technologically non-equivalent (unequal) foes. That would be possible not only because external adversity would prevent the use of hypersensitive technology, but also on account of the fact that weapons can be destroyed with simpler means than those which are required for their manufacture, although of course every direct confrontation of technically highly developed (advanced) weapons with less developed weapons ceteris paribus[54] must turn out to be in favour of the former. Thus, for instance at a technologically higher level, the destruction of defence systems in outer space by space bombers can more easily be carried out than the space defence systems' construction, whereas at a technologically lower stage, terroristic actions and commando operations (should) gain in military significance (importance) precisely under the circumstances of a hyper-technicisation. It is to be expected that a

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[54] With other things the same; all other things being equal (or held constant).

particular technique (technology) for the neutralisation of peak military technology will be developed and that in general a main focus of efforts with regard to weapons technology will be concentrated on the area which lies between nuclear weapons and traditional conventional weapons.

Nevertheless, the nuclear weapons and the connected with them forms of war will by no means disappear from the broad spectrum of possibilities of today's conduct of war. Conventional weapons of a new sort can in fact already undertake the tasks (function) of tactical atomic weapons, no-one however can guarantee that all future belligerents, regardless of the course of war, would refrain from the use of these tactical atomic weapons. Furthermore, an agreement of all states over the non-proliferation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and over the destruction of the existing tactical and strategic nuclear weapons faces what are, in practical terms, insurmountable obstacles. The great Powers - even if we disregard the rivalry between them - cannot do without tactical and strategic nuclear weapons already because (otherwise) the abstruse (paradoxical) situation could occur that an atomically armed middle Power blackmails much stronger states. Such weapons give, again, to the weaker states possibilities of deterrence and secure for them at this level a certain parity with the stronger states, which they can hardly achieve at the conventional level. And finally, no side can be absolutely certain that a general destruction of nuclear weapons is possible in practice and will also be lasting. The readiness shown in recent years by both leading atomic Powers to in part reduce their potential (i.e. arsenal) should not be interpreted as the beginning of a gradual, yet complete destruction of this same potential (i.e. arsenal); not least, the said readiness stems from

insight into the obsoleteness of strategic nuclear weapons of the old kind after the development of precision weapons.

Highly technicised military Powers are understandably strategically and tactically even more dependent on the advances and the changes in technology than other Powers - particularly (then) when it is a matter of the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) between them. An important technical invention or (technical) renewal (i.e. innovation) would here have to most probably entail restructurings on a grand scale (U-boats (i.e. atomic (nuclear) submarines) would cease e.g. to be privileged carriers of weapons of deterrence if the sea (ocean) could be made transparent). In the case of highly technicised and roughly equivalent (equal) opponents, which would fully exploit the above-mentioned possibility of an extreme pullback of their military organisation through the use of the latest management (and control) systems, one could presume an extensive dependence of the conduct of war on exactly these systems without a considerable massive deployment of troops. A war for instance between Japan and the United States[55] could for the most part be waged in outer space and in the ocean by the use of automated air (aerial, aviation) means as well as surface and underwater vessels (surface vessels and submarines). But that is only one end (i.e. extremity) of a wide-ranging spectrum of forms of war, which are theoretically and in practice possible on the basis of today's planetary given facts. A more precise anticipatory (advance) classification of these forms of war presents serious difficulties because the possible belligerents represent (only) all conceivable stages of political and

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[55] Kondylis is not of course suggesting that this is a likely or even vaguely possible scenario in the present era, however, apart from illustrating what might happen between two technologically advanced combatants, he reminds us that throughout history we have seen that today's allies might become, but by no means necessarily, tomorrow's foes. It is the investigation of the (past or present) concrete situation which is always paramount when one seeks to specify actors, causes, outcomes etc..

military development - incidentally, their number increased considerably after the breaking up of both camps of the Cold War and the growing autonomisation of many a region in the world and many a state. The local wars, which now consequently become more likely, should in a strategic and conceptual respect be all the more amorphous, the more they are conducted in spaces which do not really (directly) interest any great Power. At the other end (i.e. extremity) of the aforementioned spectrum we can hence put wars which, with relatively antiquated means of battle (combat, fighting) and an approximate equilibrium of forces (balance of power), drag on for a long time without significant strategic and tactical achievements.

Even though, however, hypothetical classifications of the future variety of the forms of war are theoretically risky and in practice pointless, one could, starting with the factors which have (hitherto) been discussed, formulate criteria in order to at least approximately apprehend each and every respective character of future war from a broader perspective as regards the history of war (in general). Our typological effort would gain clearer contours if we, moreover, made comparisons with classical forms of war from the past with the help of a familiar - even if often misunderstood - terminology. A basic clarification could here first of all be given by the ascertainment that, given the present social-political texture of the actors of planetary politics, "total" wars, like those into which the First and Second World War developed, are hardly to be expected. So-called "total" war was the manner of the conduct of war of nations which were in an already ripe phase of the Second Industrial Revolution. "Total" war was possible through the economic capacity (ability) of the mobilised working "civilian population at home (on the home front)" to incessantly supply the fighting "front" with masses of

(war) material (materiel) which were then used in battles of material (materiel) (i.e. battles in which much (extensive) (war) material (materiel) was used) and which was used up relatively quickly. However the means of war of all belligerent (warring) sides were not sufficient - even during the massive use (deployment) of the air force in the Second World War -, to strike a mortal blow to, beyond the destruction of the foe's material (materiel) on the front, the economic sources of the supply of material (materiel) from amongst the "civilian population at home (on the home front)", and exactly this inability (incapacity) made possible the long duration of "total" war. Through the introduction (appearance) of atomic or long-range nuclear weapons, which at the same time meant the beginning of the Third Industrial Revolution, this situation changed in two decisive respects: the "civilian population at home (on the home front)" could in a short time be put out of action through concentrated strikes, *and* its "total" mobilisation in times of war would be superfluous in so far as the production of atomic weapons, which now matters the most, did not require any such mobilisation; therefore, a much more extensive destruction of the foe could be achieved with a considerably smaller mobilisation. It is to be assumed that in future wars between economically highly developed nations and irrespective of whether atomic weapons come into use or not, (actually) highly technicised means of war will be used, whose production, especially in view of the interweaving of civilian and military technology[56], will not once require a particularly conspicuous collective effort. Nations, which have gone through the Second Industrial Revolution, either (already) possess such means of war or can quickly acquire them, while at the same time cases will occur increasingly often in which nations which have hardly known the Second Industrial Revolution, in part possess the means of war which

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[56] In the Greek text (p. 99), Kondylis adds: "which has progressed considerably".

were produced on the basis[57] of the Third Industrial Revolution. The forms of war which could result from the crossing (intersection) of such factors and such actors, would scarcely resemble "total" war in the true (historical) sense of the word explained above. Only theoretical and historical confusion can in fact be brought about if one described as "total" amorphous wars which are waged on a border between states (countries) and only last for a long time because both sides are economically and militarily weak, not because they are exceedingly strong.

If one wants, in view of the most probable non-appearance (absence, eclipse) of "total" war under today's circumstances, to talk about (the possibility of) a return to "war of annihilation", then one must (again) keep in mind the historically sharply outlined (historically given and clear) meaning of this term and carry out the necessary modification bearing in mind today's planetary situation. In spite of the impression which has been spread by war historians, "war of annihilation" did not constitute either a synonym nor a precursor of "total" war, but the exact opposite of "total" war. The "annihilation" exclusively referred to the inimical (rival) armed forces, and here again it did not necessarily or primarily mean (their) physical elimination, but (their) neutralisation in a military sense, that is, it implied that war is waged exclusively between armies and through armies, without the mobilisation and also without the intentional (deliberate) destruction of the civilian realm (i.e. the civilian population and its property); the wars of 1866 and 1870 for instance can serve as classic examples of such a conduct of war. The conduct of a war of annihilation understood in that sense would today be conceivable between highly technicised (i.e. technologically hyperdeveloped) Powers

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[57] Instead of "on the basis" Kondylis uses "with the technological possibilities" in the Greek version (p. 99).

which would exclusively rely on their management and (control) systems and their precision weapons in order to break the foe's military spine (backbone, organisation) and force the foe to capitulate; if such a possibility is real, then the deliberate destruction of civilian (non-military) objects or deliberate attacks on the civilian population are not only superfluous, but they fragment their forces in (virtually) one action, whose success depends not least on speed and concentration. If, however, both sides were below the level of high technicisation (i.e. below a high technological level), a war of annihilation would be stricto sensu[58] problematic. A war of annihilation could indeed be waged relatively effortlessly by a technologically highly superior Power against a technologically weak foe, should however the weaker side possess (atomic) (or other) long-range weapons, which could use them for the purposes of retaliation, then this of necessity limited retaliation would be directed against the civilian population rather than against military targets: because the military force (power, strength) of the, at any rate, superior foe would not be broken by limited means, but civilian casualties could (well) set in motion political chain reactions which would possibly paralyse the militarily superior Power.

The striking difference in the quality of the available means of war would, in any case, result in a considerable difference in character between the war of annihilation of the 19th century and that of the 21st century. The former was waged by armies which for the most part had to be deployed on the spot, that is, the 19th century's war of annihilation's preparation took place in front of the whole world, even if it only lasted for a few weeks or days. That again allowed the observance of the proprieties of international law, i.e. there was always time for a formal

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[58] In a strict (or narrow) sense.

(i.e. official) declaration of war without (thereby) the course and the outcome of the war being essentially affected. Conversely, the growing importance of a surprise massive use of modern (teleguided) long-range weapons - especially in a situation of approximate parity - would (have to) clearly debase international manners in respect of this crucial point. Lightning preventive wars would become more likely and more numerous should it emerge that already for technical reasons only such wars can be won. The difference between offensive and defensive wars would then completely fade and in general the boundaries between war and peace would become increasingly fluid. Well-aimed strikes of a "surgical" or simply rapacious character could in time be looked upon as a normal state of international affairs, especially if great Powers often made use of them in order to punish smaller Powers partly for insubordinate acts, partly in order to prevent these smaller Powers' armament with highly developed (advanced) weapons. International public opinion could get used to a spreading (proliferation) and routinisation of such violence (force) by means of the fact that this would every time claim relatively few victims, although the cumulative result would perhaps be still more regrettable than a systematically waged war - it indeed can even be ascertained that such habituation is already very advanced. A thoroughly limited and scattered (dispersed), but quasi institutionalised exercising of military violence (force) would necessarily be mixed, by the way, with other, even criminal forms of exercising of violence (force). Violence (force), whose extent would only seldom reach that of a real war between states (countries), would also be more difficult to bring under control. Such circumstances could in the long term lead to worldwide anomie or bring into being a great and centrally controlled exercising of violence (force) in order for the smaller and scattered (dispersed) exercising of violence (force) to be bridled. In any case, one

must assume that the way in which world society will tackle the problem of anomie, will considerably influence both the structure of the future world order, as well as the character of future wars.

IV. The antiquatedness of political concepts

Not only in the days of the failed Moscow putsch, in August 1991, could one time and again (hear and) read that the "conservatives" of the KGB and the CPSU wanted to obstruct the path to the market economy and to parliamentarism. And many journalistic organs, which verified (rebuked) with the adjective "conservative" those otherwise characterised as "Stalinists" or "orthodox communists", completely uninhibitedly ascribed, sometimes on the same page, the same attribute to political personalities like Reagan or Thatcher, Bush or Kohl. From that, a credulous reader, who would want to take at face value the printed word offered to him, would have to logically infer a commonality of views and of aims between the aforementioned Western politicians and the Soviet enemies of "Perestroika". Common sense could protect us from such an absurdity; however this common sense has not proved to be self-willed enough in order (for it) to take steps against the schizophrenia of the prevalent political vocabulary, and it seems therefore to have even accepted the said political vocabulary without murmuring (complaining). The assertion that conservative is the defender of each and every respective Establishment (i.e. existing social order), irrespective of how the Establishment (i.e. existing social order) looks in every individual case, of course offers a way out; in this way, conservative politicians, who live in entirely different societies, stand up for entirely different,

indeed opposite programmes. If however political content[59] does not serve as a yardstick for political classifications, then these classifications must be founded on psychological or anthropological factors, on commonalities in the attitude to life and in the sense (i.e. awareness) of life[60]. But even if one meant in good conscience to insinuate such commonalities for instance between Helmut Kohl and the Russian putschists, nevertheless this interpretive approach would furnish little that elucidates the analysis of the concrete situation. Because in such situations it is always a matter of the predominance of certain (political) content(s), or aims defined in terms of content, in view of the shaping of a national or international collective (i.e. political entity), in relation to which the friendly or inimical groupings result from the positioning of every one of the respective acting subjects vis-à-vis exactly these contents and aims. The legitimation of these contents and aims in political *struggle* is admittedly carried out most often with the invocation of anthropological assumptions; a political *analysis* cannot nevertheless deduce from form-related (i.e. formal) and in themselves abstract anthropological constants, concrete contents, without falling (turning) into a bad metaphysics.

All of this does not apply only with regard to the concept of conservatism. The journalistic, but also the scientific language (speech or linguistic) usage, appears no less muddled when we turn to the other fundamental concepts around which the political vocabulary of the last one hundred and fifty years positively or negatively has revolved. Certainly, ambiguity (or multiple meanings) accompanies political - and not only political - fundamental concepts from the time of their birth, the

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[59] Kondylis's Greek version (p. 103) states: "the positioning of every side vis-à-vis concrete [specific] problems of content".
[60] The Greek translation (p. 104) by the author is: "common experiential elements".

said ambiguity is unavoidable because of the polemical use of these concepts, and yet it differs from that referencelessness (i.e. lack of specific reference) or amorphousness of their content, which indicates their historical decline. As long as concepts are alive and bear the weight of social phenomena, they can be interpreted positively or negatively, narrowly or widely and varied according to every one of the respective strategic or tactical needs, nevertheless they explicitly or implicitly refer to an identifiable and identical bearer. Whoever in the 19th century said "conservative", primarily meant the social-political matters of concern of the anti-liberal nobility (i.e. hereditary aristocracy) and large patriarchal ownership of land, which felt threatened by the advances of industrial capitalism, whereas at times advocates of the planned economy and of dictatorship in the East, at other times proponents of the market economy and of parliamentarism in the West, at times ecologically motivated friends of untouched nature, at other times the religiously minded foes of the miniskirt, are cited as social bearers of that which one today calls "conservatism" on each and every respective occasion. "Liberal" also originally meant primarily a politics which articulated the economic or constitutional perceptions of the bourgeoisie, not for instance a pleading for the freedom of (right to) abortion or the unrestricted right of asylum (or abolition of the death penalty). The non-bindedness of the vocabulary bears witness to its obsoleteness. Indeed, politics of the 20th century for the most part has been acted out under the influence of concepts which had more or less lost or progressively lost their real historical content. That could in fact be noticed by the distant (i.e. uninvolved) observer, however the actors (further) needed[61] the vocabulary of the 19th century because this vocabulary was necessary for polemical reasons. In addition, the long struggle between the Western system and communism

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[61] The Greek (p. 105) reads: "continued to use".

contributed significantly to the spreading of a language (speech or linguistic) usage which in neither of the two camps had its exact factual correspondences (equivalents). Precisely because of that, the end of the Cold war and indeed the Cold War's outcome, reveals just how empty of content political language has become in the meantime. That cannot of course be a final judgement of the said political language's effectiveness in the past and in the future.

The three fundamental concepts of the political vocabulary of the last one hundred and fifty years, namely "conservatism", "liberalism" and "socialism" (or social democracy) in actual fact embodied, only at the time of their (incidentally almost parallel) formation, three real and clear social options. Because only around 1848 did aristocracy (nobility), bourgeoisie and proletariat stand face to face on a single battlefield. That triptych however shrunk already in the course of the 19th century to a diptych because the already weakened aristocracy was absorbed for the most part into the (grand) bourgeoisie, as the aristocracy gave up nolens volens[62] its patriarchal rule in the countryside and shared, to various degrees and in various forms, in capitalistic economic life as well as in the parliamentary game. After the statics (i.e. static nature) of societas civilis[63] had given in to capitalistic dynamics, there could not be talk any

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[62] Whether willing or unwilling.

[63] In Kondylis's works "societas civilis" is an ideal type which as such never totally concretely existed in any kind of "pure form", but which can be seen by the reader as referring, inter alia, to the estate-based (feudal and patriarchalist) forms of societal organisation in (Western) Europe mostly preceding both a) the Thirty Years' War, the peace treaties of Westphalia (1648), the ensuing system of state sovereignty and of course the French Revolution, as well as b) the rise (at an advanced stage) of the bourgeoisie and (later) of industrial capitalism. For Kondylis, "societas civilis" (which is roughly synonymous with his use of "ancien régime"), with its "medieval" or traditional world theory (i.e. world view) based on relatively fixed (pyramidal) hierarchies in (unchanging) nature and (unchanging) society and "blind" faith in God, or what some of its liberal critics called "magic" in the context of "medieval chaos" and or "absolutism", is contrasted to the bourgeois liberal ideals and myths of

more of conservatism in the real sense of the preserving of a god-given, eternal and hierarchical order on earth. If, nonetheless, the concept of conservatism continued to remain alive, then it owed this less to the vitality of its natural social bearers and more to the polemical fury of its triumphant adversaries. Above all, the Left in all its shades was now ideologically interested in making the bourgeois-liberal main opponent out to be a renegade in respect of its own "progressive" past and as continuer of "obscurantistic" or "reactionary" positions and practices, which allegedly still immediately beforehand characterised the hustle and bustle (activity) of the "feudal party". From this perspective, "conservative" was defined in contrast to the Left, "conservative" was therefore something to the extent that it conflicted with the objectives of the Left, and indeed regardless of whether it otherwise in actual fact changed society: because if the Left possessed by definition a monopoly on progress, then the changing of society in a direction which ran counter to the wishes of the Left could not be recognised as "genuine" change. This thought schema for decades formed an entire school not only in

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Reason, Nature, Man and History (and Progress) as well as values such as "tolerance" and "individual freedom of opinion" (in part) accompanying the rise in social (particularly economic) power and influence of the bourgeoisie, which in turn often commenced before the bourgeoisie achieved significant political power in the form of liberal oligarchies, and before the (First) Industrial Revolution reached its climax in the first half of the nineteenth century. (From around the middle of the nineteenth century, social democracy as ideology and program of political demands and action "from below" in mass societies made itself strongly felt, and it chronologically commenced after or contemporaneous with oligarchic bourgeois liberalism, and leads into the (ideal type of) mass democracy of the twentieth century with its mass production, mass consumption, advanced technology and division of labour, atomisation and unlimited social mobility, and ideology of, inter alia, (both legal and material) "equality" and "pluralism". See Kondylis's books: *Der Niedergang der bügerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humoniora, Weinheim 1991) and *Konservativismus* [Conservatism] (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1986) - the reader should always keep in mind that this footnote, like all other footnotes, is the creation of the translator and not of Kondylis).

international politics. Also, the established "progressive" political science and sociology in Germany helped in the predominance of the perception that conservatism is not a historically bound and transitory concept, but a (permanent) positioning (stance) which is defined anew in each and every respective context and correspondingly comes to fruition (has an effect) in practice. Especially at a time of philistine fellow travelling (with communistic positions) (namely such a fellow travelling in which all the back doors (loopholes) are kept open) was intellectually chic, one placed value on the ascertainment that the political scientists of the Eastern Bloc shared this conviction.

The liberals had to, for their part, appropriate the concept of conservatism when they noticed that the original bourgeois sense of the notion (concept) of liberalism faded, while its reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) with an anti-bourgeois democratic-egalitarian intent constantly gained ground; the ideas and the social-political praxis of classical liberalism, which wanted to expressly delimit itself against egalitarian socialistic-democratic endeavours, were now called "conservative". These egalitarian socialistic-democratic endeavours of course often arrived on the scene with the claim of creatively managing the "true" inheritance of liberalism and of consistently thinking through "genuine" liberal thought to its logical conclusion, while the said egalitarian socialistic-democratic endeavours deduce material rights from formal rights and social equality from legal equality. Under these circumstances and in light of this reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation), liberalism as theory and concept necessarily more or less seemed suspicious to classical liberals themselves who thought in terms of bourgeois categories. The great catchwords of freedom and equality, which had already been propagated in the 17th century in the language of

secular natural law, actually allowed, with much good will, an extensive interpretation, however this possibility was generally understood only in the 19th century. Because the originators of the aforementioned catchwords merely had in mind the putting aside of the estate-based barriers and hierarchies (within the classes (or ranks) of the ancien régime), however the social inequalities, which would constitute the bone of contention for the democrats who came later, were in the originators of the said catchwords' eyes perfectly natural, and that is why they could hardly imagine that if natural rights fully applied, the master would no longer be master and the servant no longer servant; a reminder of the debates of the 19th century over the right to vote suffices in order to clarify this point. In any case, things came to a point that, with reference to an ethically charged concept of liberalism, even dirigiste (i.e. state-controlled administrative) tendencies towards the welfare (social) state were approved, and indeed bearing in mind the high status of the individual in the liberal thought framework. As highest value, the individual ought therefore to now enjoy the protection of society through the mediation (agency) of the state and to obtain from the state guarantees for his free and all-round development. These positions constituted of course a drastic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of the classical liberal concept of individualism; nevertheless here the legitimacy of this reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) is not of interest, but the fact that it was undertaken and influenced practical politics. The more mass society shaped by (the dominant influence of) the bourgeoisie approached modern mass democracy, the more closely was the concept of liberalism connected with partly ethical-dirigiste (i.e. statist), partly radically individualistic tendencies born of the (Western mass-democratic) cultural revolution[64]. For obvious social-historical reasons, language (speech or

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[64] The full effect of this cultural revolution in Western mass democracies was acutely felt in the 1960s

linguistic) usage was proper in regard to this (factual) situation only in the United States, whereas language usage in Europe continued to have the said ambiguity (two meanings).

Thus, in the 20th century the concept of conservatism could be used for (bourgeois-)liberal ends and the concept of liberalism for an altogether anti-bourgeois politics. However, the concept of socialism or of social democracy was just as polysemous (i.e. ambiguous) and wavering in the course of time. The Bolsheviks' seizure of power could not unify the pre-existing socialisms under the banner of the only victorious socialism and therefore give to the idea of socialism an exclusive and unambiguous content. On the contrary, it brought about a definitive split in the socialistic movement into a revolutionary and a reformistic wing, while at the same time the particular unfolding of communism in some regions of the Third World had as a result the label "socialism" being applied to regimes, which apart from the ideological make-up, were nothing other than nationalistic dictatorships. The reformistic socialism of the Western mould took up, for its part, the aforementioned ethical reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of liberal-individualistic commonplaces, whereas the attempts of apostate Marxists (and Marxist-Leninists) to break away from "Stalinism" as theory and praxis and to bring into being an "unadulterated" socialism, enriched, with ever increasing new variations, a game which long ago had become confused - and boring.[65]

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and 1970s. See Kondylis, P. *Der Niedergang der bügerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humoniora, Weinheim 1991).

[65] Anyone familiar with the almost innumerable Trotskyist, Maoist and other communistic groups and parties (particularly until the 1990s) and their never-ending squabbles and "correct" interpretations of "proletarian internationalism" or ways to build the "true" "vanguard revolutionary workers' party" or promises of the coming of "real" "communism", "emancipation" and "justice" so that life can be "genuinely enjoyed by everyone and not just by the few who do not suffer oppression and are not exploited" by "capitalism in its advanced stage of decay" or suffer under "the deformed workers' state" of, or the "state capitalistic", Soviet Union, etc., etc., etc., will know exactly what Kondylis means.

Therefore, we have now come to the consequences of the Cold War for the eventful fate of the modern political vocabulary. Because the Cold War, that is, the political-military antagonism between the Western camp and the communistic camp after the Second World War, has not merely partly brought about and partly increased the ambiguity and practical non-bindedness of the concept of socialism. It exercised a similar influence on the content of the meaning of liberalism and conservatism. In its new function as counter concept of "totalitarianism", liberalism also of course meant economic liberalism and consequently the private ownership of the means of production, however the main emphasis was not placed on this prosaic fact, which incidentally was dismissed by the (communistic) opponent as sheer "rule by a handful of capitalists", but on the opportunities for the development of society and of the individual connected with economic liberalism. Liberalism accordingly was in principle unlimited renewal and openness (open possibilities), tolerance and human dignity (or freedom) - in short, Freedom with a capital "F". This same freedom was meant when one used the concept of democracy synonymously with liberalism and contrasted the "Western democracies" to the "communistic tyrannies". "Liberalism" and "democracy" were therefore here comprehended axiologically-normatively rather than determined by concrete social content and forms of rule (i.e. domination). On the other hand, the communists spoke of "conservatism" or "reaction" in order to describe the system of "state-monopolistic capitalism", which in accordance with their perception was not capable of any essential progress, rather it was condemned to permanent crises and sacrificed the development of society and of individuals to the unscrupulous striving for profit of a ruling clique. Interestingly, many of those who otherwise as anti-communists called themselves "liberals" or "democrats" when they wanted in this way to defend eternal truths and values which communism

threatened, often confessed their faith in "conservatism". The anti-communistic confession of faith in "conservatism" became more concrete when it was a matter of a defence against those who in the interior of the Western states conducted the aforementioned democratic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of liberalism and that is why they were, rightly or wrongly, accused of being fellow travellers of the communists.

At the very latest after the outcome of the Cold War everyone must now know that the communistic and left-wing diagnosis of the "conservative" or even "reactionary" character of the Western system, as this Western system was formed after the Second World War in the major industrial nations, was not simply untenable, but really meaningless. One can and may reject this system for many different aesthetic or ethical reasons - but not because it is "conservative", because, that is, it hinders the technical progress and the interrelated *with it* reshaping of society. Regardless of how one assesses technical progress, possibilities of consumption and freedoms as values, one cannot dispute the superiority of the West in these sectors. The reproach of "conservatism" was directed literally nonsensically against a system which revolutionised the development of the productive forces to a hitherto unknown extent in world history and put at the individual's disposal material and ideational possibilities which likewise constitute an exception as an astonishing world-historical novum. If quite a few bearers or supporters of this system want to carry on calling themselves "conservative", (then) the reason for it lies partly in the fact of the aforementioned polemical needs, but partly also in their ethical-ideological self-understanding, which does not want to be reconciled with the insight that this system in the meanwhile long ago lives on the basis of the constant undermining (or destruction) of old values, indeed even of basic biological given facts - it lives, that is, on the

basis of that which one in truly conservative times called "hubris". However, no matter how such "conservatives" call themselves in the future: the victory of the West in the Cold War will make "progressives"[66] of all hues speechless or at least muddle up their vocabulary as it now hardly seems plausible to associate the more vital or, in any event, victorious system with a sluggish conservatism. Since the activity of "progressive" intellectuals above all consists in incessant talk, it is for them particularly difficult to cope with sudden radical changes in the familiar vocabulary. In Germany at any rate in recent years and months, "conservatism" is used less and less and all the more half-heartedly in a pejorative sense.

We have therefore come to (arrived at) a point where we must touch upon a very important terminological and factual question. If it is namely wrong to perceive (understand) the outcome of the Cold War as a victory of the conservative West over the revolutionary East, then it is likewise an optical illusion to celebrate the collapse of communism as the prevailing of liberalism. One can talk in this way only if one understands by "liberalism" the counter concept of "totalitarianism", as (this) was usual during the Cold War. We have already indicated that in this contradistinction the specific bourgeois sense of liberalism was lost. That was by no means coincidental. In the course of the discussed democratic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of the concept of liberalism and undoubtedly in connection with the gradual social decline of the bourgeoisie, which was in the process of change itself, the bourgeois substance of classical liberalism had been considerably diluted even

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[66] Kondylis is of course referring to a group of people including supporters and sympathisers of communistic or leftist regimes and or communistic or Marxist theories, and not merely to supporters of various lifestyle causes so prominent in the post-Soviet era - the former having roots in the "Old Left" of the 19th and early 20th centuries and the latter mostly springing from the "New Left" of the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.

before the Second World War. Bourgeois mass society found itself on the path to modern mass democracy already from the time the mechanisation of everyday life started and the worker was discovered as consumer. This decisive turn occurred only after the Second World War, and not least under the influence of the Cold War, in terms of its massive breakthrough (i.e. on a broad front). Because regardless of the social-historical tendencies having an effect in the long term, the transformation of bourgeois-liberal mass society into modern mass democracy was promoted and accelerated (also) through the endeavour at preventing the danger of a communistic seizure of power through the rapid improvement of the standard of living of the masses. This process was accompanied by an extensive democratisation in all sectors and by the formation of new elites in the economy and politics, which largely displaced or succeeded the old bourgeoisie; their own personal composition changes, for that matter, much quicker than that of former ruling groups as a result of generally increased social mobility. Managers, technocrats and yuppies are as sociological types and bearers of functions something essentially different than the bourgeois; bourgeoisness (i.e. bourgeois morals, manners and ethos) as lifestyle today fulfils, if one keeps in mind the overall picture, the same picturesque-chic functions (or tasks) (within "high society") which once were carried out by the survivors of noble lineage (old noble families). Extreme atomisation (i.e. splitting or segmentation of society into individuals), social mobility and value pluralism or permissiveness reveal - in conjunction with the parallel ongoing leveling of hierarchies and authorities, that is, in conjunction with democratisation - a general picture, which only by failing to appreciate central sociological factors and factors[67] pertaining to the history of ideas, may be described as the picture (image) of a bourgeois-

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[67] Rather than "factors", the Greek text (p. 113) provides "fundamental magnitudes".

114

liberal society. Modern mass democracy of course arose from the inside (womb) of bourgeois society, but it constitutes a structurally new social formation. For that very reason the political vocabulary, which was formed in the bourgeois age, has lost in this new social formation of mass democracy its real content and meaning, although the competing elites still have to use it in the absence of another political vocabulary, in order to ideologise their practical matters of concern (desires), to be symbolically distinguished from one another, and to consequently make themselves more interesting.

So the West defeated the East only when bourgeois class society gave way to mass democracy, whereby the communistic criticism of capitalism became obsolete and unattractive. To say it as a paradox: the farewelling of Utopia in the East became possible by the realisation of Utopia in the West. Indeed, in Western mass democracy for the first time in world history the shortage of goods was overcome and the structuring of society was achieved in accordance with functional and performance criteria, that is, equality based on an extreme atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) was realised in principle, while at the same time the self-realisation of the individual was declared, as it were, the supreme purpose of the state. The gaps (i.e. deficiencies or failings) and dark side (i.e. drawbacks) of this picture are known only too well, but they do not change the fact that this - distorted, grotesque, burlesque or however one wants to call it - realisation of Utopia in the end took the wind out of the sails of the communistic critique of liberalism and capitalism. Consequently, modern mass democracy at one blow made the concepts "conservatism", "liberalism" and "socialism" objectless. Through the extreme atomisation of society and unlimited (social) mobility, which mass democracy absolutely needs on the basis of

its way (mode) of functioning, mass democracy broke up the large collective subjects with which those concepts were connected so long as they possessed a concrete historical content and (concrete historical) reference. The said concepts' common fate was incidentally brought about by their common origin and career (i.e. path or course). They came into being during the world-historical turn from societas civilis to mass society or from agrarian to industrially shaped civilisation, and they gave answers, from different social-political and world-theoretical standpoints, to the great questions which this turn had to, in the process, pose. The process, which we here mean, began (in fact) with the pious subjection of man to God and ended with man's haughty dominance over Nature, it started with the in principle (or self-evident) inclusion of the individual in a social group (or class) and ended up in the atomisation of society, it was driven by fixed hierarchised heavenly and earthly substances and resulted in any combinable functions whatsoever (i.e. functions combinable at will). These key terms (already) contain the central themes (and formulations of a question) of the New Times which were specified in the particular examination of problems of philosophy and social theory. In this respect, conservatism, liberalism and socialism belong in a specific way to the New Times, and that is why the ascertainment in regard to the growing loss of content and irreality of these concepts during our century raises the question as to whether the New Times as historical epoch have reached their conclusion. From this perspective, the dissolution of Marxism cannot even be simply interpreted as the victory of liberal ideas. Because seen from the point of view of the history of ideas, Marxism took its essential premises from liberalism: just like this liberalism, Marxism sought a synthesis of economism and humanism, while at the same time it wanted to understand the world (on the basis) of history as progress. From this viewpoint, the defeat of Marxism meant the putting

aside of the last systematically organised remnants of humanistic liberalism and the final victory of a thinking which one may for the time being call postmodern, if one, in course of this, (continuously) keeps in mind this postmodern thought's concrete mass-democratic roots and functions.

Insight into the obsoleteness of the political vocabulary after the victory of Western mass democracy over communism is not merely indispensable with regard to academic purposes[68]. Because planetary politics will be shaped in the future against the background of the fact that those participating in planetary politics will heed mass-democratic values and aims, from the simply quantitatively understood constant raising of the standard of living, to the qualitative equalisation of opportunities and of pleasure, both inside of individual nations as well as in respect of the relations of nations with one another. That means first of all that economic questions and disputes will attain a greater political weight, that is, that the political (politics) will be increasingly understood and handled by the economic (economy), whereas the traditionally primary question as regards the best state and the best constitution (i.e. polity or system of government) will be pushed into the background. Remarkably, after the end of the Cold War an almost worldwide concord (agreement) over this question prevails, namely there is a willingness to imitate the political institutions of the West in this or that variation. That is interrelated with the economisation of the political (i.e. the fusion of politics and the economy) in so far as it is assumed that such institutions boost economic progress. At the same time, (very) serious problems appeared on the horizon of the planet becoming narrower (more cramped), as for instance the ecological or overpopulation problem,

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[68] The Greek translation (p. 115) is: "for the purposes of academic research".

117

which can hardly be apprehended and dealt with on the basis of the (intellectual) categories and thought habits of conservatism, liberalism and socialism. One knows in fact that in the meantime: conserving has long ago become a question of organisation, freedom in mass societies can easily lead to disintegration or explosion, whereas rigorous (rigid) planning gives birth to (begets) evils which it itself cannot remedy. It would nevertheless be wishful thinking to think that the ineluctable detachment from traditional political content and concepts as well as the economisation of the political (or fusion of politics with the economy) will abolish or even (just) mitigate the conflicts between the interested (human) groups. The detachment from traditional political content and concepts, and, the economisation of the political, will without doubt largely de-ideologise politics, i.e., they will reduce or will ruin the influence of those ideologies which since the French Revolution were supposed to legitimise political action. Yet it is short-sighted to attribute the political struggles conducted in the last two centuries merely to ideological fanaticism and await ex contrario[69] the end of struggles from the "end of ideologies". De-ideologised struggles will possibly be (still) more fierce than the ideologically conducted struggles, should certain goods prove to be scarce in an era in which the overcoming of the shortage of goods is considered the supreme aim of mankind. The de-ideologisation and the economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) means in the final analysis that henceforth (as of now) they (struggles) will be fought over tangible material goods without significant ideological mediation(s). In order to be precise, one would have to then describe de-ideologisation as a partial return to the animal kingdom. Whether it is nice and desirable for the farewelling of Utopia to go so far, remains of course a question of taste.

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[69] From the contrary view or standpoint.

V. Planetary politics and universal ethics

1. The philosophical turn towards ethical universalism

During the past two decades ethical(-philosophical) thought took a turn which interrelates with world-historical developments and gives cause for corresponding thoughts. In respect of ideal-typical pointing (or intensifying), we can say that it is a matter of the turn from naturalism, historicism and relativism towards ethical universalism or towards universalistic ethics. As regards a retrospective survey of the history of ideas in the time after the Second World War, this turn cannot of course appear as a sudden caesura. As is known, natural law thought went through a real resurrection as a result of the experiences with National Socialism, since for many thinkers the impression came into being of an, if not intentional, then at any rate objective complicity between the relativism of legal positivism and totalitarian amoralism. Under the same impression and with a similar motivation, modernised reformulations of Kantian and idealistic ethical(-philosophical) ideas were undertaken. On the other hand, ethical universalism still does not prevail unchallenged. Sceptical meta-ethics, in which the efforts as regards the moral philosophy of the Analytical School had to lead to, and so-called cultural relativism, which relies above all on ethnological findings, continue to (well) assert themselves in the Anglo-Saxon world, whereas in the Romance-speaking (or Latin) countries (of Europe), the jovial-indifferent

and tolerant gospel of postmodernism has spread. Germany's intellectual in-crowd (fashionable intellectuals) indeed willingly flirt with postmodernistic harmlessness (i.e. painless inanities), yet the reasons are also generally well-known that a more or less unambiguous confession (i.e. declaration) of faith in ethics and Reason in this country has become a compulsory exercise (or ritual act).

Although our contemporary ethical universalism has its forerunners in the still recent past and its rivals in the present, nevertheless it can be looked at as a novum and at the same time as a bearer of a change. Indeed, ethical universalism already constitutes in its various forms the most influential current of ethical thought, in relation to which its influence seems all the more stronger the more one turns away from the narrower spectrum of intellectual(-spiritual) production and turns towards the broader social spectrum. Ethical universalism's force is visible not least in that it dictates to a great extent to politics, and politicians, their rhetoric, and over and above that shapes and supports socially necessary intellectual(-spiritual) forms of self-evidence and forms of conformism. No less characteristic is ethical universalism's, in the meanwhile, frequently proven ability at forcing its rivals into (adopting) its logic. In this way, ethical relativism, both of the analytical as well as of the postmodernistic mould, is in the habit of being legitimised with reference to the proposition that only the insight of all sides into the relativity and perspectivity of standpoints and of values can ultimately create the ideational foundation for tolerance and peaceful co-existence; a universal ethical ideal consequently serves in a logically questionable manner to socially justify a scepticism in relation to which from the beginning every justification must be fragile. Logical leaps nonetheless indicate (pressing) practical constraints - in this case, out of the necessity to adapt oneself to

a thought style and a strategy of argumentation which has been surrounded by an aura of the indisputable and of what is immediately clear (or self-evident). Mass democracy, which in the meantime has appropriated certain life forms and ideas of the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s[70] in a watered-down form, indeed allows value pluralism and permissiveness, in fact mass democracy partly even lives off them, however on the other hand, mass democracy may not and cannot let unbounded freedom (i.e. the freedom to do whatever one wants) in ethical(-philosophical) thought be followed by unbounded freedom in social action (activity). That is why it ought not therefore be expected that the verbal Nietzscheanism of postmodern *ideology* inside of postmodern *reality* will be transformed into the form setting the tone of social praxis. Not only has universalistic ethics imbued the broader social consciousness, in which universalistic ethics of course mixes with various versions of "live and let live", but also national and international institutions, which base their work on ethical principles with universal validity, increase in number and are consolidated.

The characteristic content-related novum of this turn[71] becomes noticeable in the nonchalance with which universal-ethical (universalistic ethical) thought disregards empirical, both anthropological as well as historical, factors. If one in the middle of the sometimes breathtaking succession of intellectual fashions (fads) has not yet forgotten that (only)

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[70] See *Der Niedergang der bügerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humoniora, Weinheim 1991) in which detailed ideal-typical analysis is made inter alia of the era's tendency to undermine a whole range of values inherited from the bourgeois epoch such as e.g. the distinction between "high" and "low or popular (mass)" culture, the emphasising of a consciousness closer to the Dionysian element than the Apollonian element, or of fantasy and difference (and new experiences) over Reason and identity (and cultural inheritance), as well as an ideology of historically extreme individualism, "self-realisation" and "minority rights"; mass entertainment steeped in sex, violence, coarse language; "bad manners", provocative dress etc.. Hedonism, mass consumption, multiple sexual partners, the primacy of youth over age, etc. also made up some of the key elements of the 60s and 70s (mass-democratic Western) cultural revolution.
[71] Kondylis's Greek translation (p. 119) is: The characteristic novelty [innovation] of this turn, if we see it from the point of view of its intellectual(-spiritual) content,".

just recently every enlightened (or seasoned and immoral) intellectual considered as important, first of all, the social determination of all forms and norms (rules) of behaviour, and asserted that the suspicion of ideology[72] applied to (absolutely) everything one could think of, then one must be astonished at the ascertainment that in the meanwhile ethically(-philosophically) inspired theories of justice, which on an avowedly unhistorical basis pertain to contract theory, are formulated and discussed - without anyone protesting or laughing about that. In recent years in fact so-called "moral realism", which wants to detect moral properties (qualities) on things themselves in the same way that one can ascertain in relation to them colour or volume, is sought and offered to an increasing extent. Of all the variants of ethical universalism, communication theory[73] is that theory which more than other theories courts sociological explanations (or interpretations) and justifications, however these variants of ethical universalism pay tribute to an already past Zeitgeist (i.e. spirit or general outlook of the time) and to Marxist reminiscences, and neither touch upon communication theory's willingly proclaimed belief in universal ethical principles nor upon the internal structure of the theory. Communication theory is actually much closer to moral realism and metaphysical thought in general than it itself wants to admit. Because it projects into (inside) an axiomatically presumed (primordial or original) texture of "genuine" communication that which it ethically expects from "genuine" communication, that is, it makes, in accordance with an age-old tried and tested pattern or ruse (model or trick), out of the Ought an Is, in order to then derive this same Ought from the Is constructed in this way. Regardless of its ethical merits, communication theory will not be suitable (any good) as a scientific theory so long as it does not offer what

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[72] Kondylis adds "and of "false consciousness"" to his Greek version of the book (p. 119).
[73] The best known such theory, and the theory Kondylis is presumably referring to, is J. Habermas's "theory of communicative action".

one ought to reasonably expect from every scientific theory: that it, namely, first of all explains those phenomena which contradict it[74]. How, in view of the asserted structure as regards its essence (i.e. the texture) of (true) human communication[75], have enmity (between people) and (their) mutual annihilation in history until now so often been possible? A normatively laid out communication theory, which would seriously be prepared to answer this question, would run into the same difficulty on account of its basically theological character as every normativistic metaphysics does too - namely it runs into the difficulty of deciphering (or explaining) the origin and persistent effect of evil.

In all its variations, universalistic ethics is therefore characterised by an effacement (or blurring) of the difference between Is and Ought (polemics against this difference between Is and Ought in recent years has not by chance become all the more fierce) as well as by the detachment from empirical anthropology and history. Compared with the classical ethical(-philosophical) tradition - from the pre-Socratics up to the Enlightenment via Plato, Aristotle and Christianity - (in the process) a loss in the content of reality and the sense of reality[76] is to be noted in so far as that tradition started from the fact and from the necessity of the unremitting struggle of Reason against the escalating yearning (thirst or urge) of ineradicable drives (urges) and passions, and directly or

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[74] This notion is related to "saving the phenomena", i.e. no empirical observation contradicts or goes against the (crystallised) generalisations being made about what is being observed and explained. Apart from "saving the phenomena", absolute logical consistency, non-normative value neutrality and conceptual clarity are other pillars of scientific theory (See e.g. Kondylis's: *Das Politische und der Mensch* [The Political and Man] (Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1999), "Interview: Skeptische Wahrheitssuche gegen normative Entscheidung (Fragen von Marin Terpstra)" in Kondylis, P. *Machtfragen* (WBG, Darmstadt 2006, pp. 157-172), *Το Αόρατο Χρονολόγιο της Σκέψης* (Νεφέλη, Αθήνα 1998) and "Science, Power and Decision" [Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung, also in *Machtfragen*, pp. 129-156] translated by C. F. (www.panagiotiskondylis.com)).

[75] The Greek translation (p. 120) offers clearer phrasing in English for the English reader: "If the texture of true human communication is that which the said communication theory asserts, how..."

[76] The Greek text (pp. 120-121) reads: "a loss in the content of tangible reality and a blunting [weakening] of the sense of the [what is] real".

indirectly placed this struggle at the centre of its considerations[77]. On the contrary, universalistic ethics does not today seem have serious, as well as theoretically articulated worries about the ability of man to become permanent master over the darker strata of his existence. Universalistic ethics' (theoretical) efforts rather apply to epistemologically consolidated definitions of Reason, of (ethical) obligation etc., from which then - quite tautologically though - the ethical desiderata (demands) and the beneficial social consequences of the realisation of the said definitions of Reason, obligation etc. are deduced. With the programmatic or actual putting aside of anthropological and historical factors, every binding teaching in respect of virtue and duty must also not apply, and the (theoretical) constructions pile up inside the vacuum of logical coherence; not by chance, the use of mathematical formulae has in the meantime become naturalised in respect of (i.e. adopted into) ethical tracts (i.e. treatises). Man is in the process reduced to a single point, namely to his rationality (or reasonableness) and his ability at rational discourse or calculation, so that he, without resisting and as it were through a pre-established harmony, promptly joins in all the theoretical games of ethicists (i.e. moral philosophers) and at least on paper is able to behave in accordance with these ethicists' expectations. Having been reduced to rationality (or reasonableness)[78], humans now resemble one another like pins, in relation to which, as is known, not even the heads are distinguishable from one another. Because if the heads or the individual rationalities (or reasonablenesses) (the forms of Reason of the various individuals) are not identical to one another, then universal ethical aims can hardly be contemplated, let alone realised, that is, Reason cannot be the foundation

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[77] For the complete picture, read Kondylis's masterpiece as regards the history of ideas: *Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus* [The Enlightenment in the framework of new-times rationalism (The European Enlightenment)] (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1981).
[78] The Greek (p. 121) is: "the dimension of Reason".

and cannot be the vehicle (conduit) of universal mutual understanding. The world is therefore broken down, in actual fact, into a community of homogenous intellects(-spirits), which one again could derive - if one had the metaphysical courage - from a single intellectual(-spiritual) world substance (as the substance of Being).

This unequivocally unhistorical characteristic of universalistic ethics, which truly comes across as a novum after the long predominance of historicism and of sociological-ethnological relativism, bears witness par excellence to the rootedness (origin) of today's versions of this ethics in the mass-democratic thoughts world (i.e. in mass-democratic ideas). Because it can be proven that anthropological and historical consideration constituted an essential feature of the bourgeois perception of the world, which necessarily foundered in the post-bourgeois or "postmodern" or mass-democratic age[79]. Incidentally, the structural relationship (or affinity) which exists between the universalistic thought style and its present-day opponents in puncto unhistoricity (i.e. as regards their common unhistorical orientation) is instructive. Cultural relativism is based to a large extent on ethnological models which are functionalistically conceived[80] and ethical values are understood as effective components (constituent elements) of an in itself closed system of social factors complementing one another. This functionalistic ethnology found its sociological pendant (i.e. counterpart) in ethically

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[79] Kondylis is clearly suggesting that stricto sensu "postmodern" is not an acceptable scientific term to describe a period in history (unlike "post-bourgeois" or "mass-democratic") simply because one could not sufficiently explain in terms of differentiae specificae how the "postmodern" era differs from the "modern" era given that macro-historically the former (through further industrialisation) simply increases the massification, atomisation, urbanisation, general undermining of the Christian God and of strict social and cultural hierarchies etc. of the latter. However, the term "postmodern" is nonetheless used, given that after World War 2 the mechanisation of everyday life and the cultural revolution occurred *on a mass scale*, and in order to assist today's reader's orientation in terms of familiar terminology (see *Der Niedergang der bügerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humoniora, Weinheim 1991)).
[80] The Greek text (p. 122) is: "ethnological models established [constituted] on the basis of the criterion of social functionality".

neutral system theories, which in their inflexible unhistoricity are (here) of interest for the context of our discussion because in the final analysis these system theories necessarily explain social action (activity) like universal-ethical thought (ethical universalism) (also) explains it, i.e. by postulating a rationality (or reasonableness) functioning and calculating in the same way in respect of individuals (i.e. with the axiomatic acceptance of a Reason which weighs things up and functions in the same way in all individuals).[81]

But ethical universalism appears in another important respect as a genuine intellectual(-spiritual) product of the mass-democratic age. The reduction of man to a mere rational (reason-able) humanity (state of being human) translates the fact of extreme atomisation (i.e. splitting or segmentation of society into individuals), which is constitutive for democratic mass society, into the idealising language of philosophy. Exactly this reduction and this atomisation make the transition to universalism possible, since the proclaiming of Reason as the sole decisive aptitude or predisposition (i.e. psycho-intellectual(-spiritual) force) of man puts aside all substantial bonds (e.g. those with the family or with the nation) and consequently all barriers and boundaries between all individuals on this planet. Reason can set itself with ethical absoluteness (i.e. as something ethically absolute) and unite all individual humans with one another only (then) after the process of atomisation (i.e. splitting or segmentation of society into individuals) is well advanced. The internal common bond (interrelation or togetherness) and the parallel progress of atomisation and universalism characterises world society gradually coming into being since the time of decolonisation. Present

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[81] For a fully referenced discussion of ethnology, functionalism, system theories, (ethical) universalism in the 20th century and other related social theories see Kondylis's magnum opus: *Das Politische und der Mensch* [The Political and Man] (Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1999).

ethical universalism owes its momentum or verve (drive or impetus) and its remarkable success to this new planetary reality. From the point of view of the optimistic ethicist it could appear that the growing influence of universal-ethical thought (universalistic ethics) is due to growing insight (or good sense)[82] and to the collective wish to make a new, ethically inspired and founded beginning after bitter historical experiences and in the face of great future tasks (duties); the epistemological elimination of History in the name of Reason would then be the correlate of the actual removal (putting aside) of obstacles which History had until now placed in the way of universal (mutual) understanding.

Reality is more prosaic. The universalisation of ethics constitutes a concomitant of the progressive unification of the world market and of planetary politics in the same sense and to the same degree as, for instance, the gradual standardisation of economic and legal rules or customs (habits or practices). The unification of ethical discourse makes mutual daily understanding easier and promotes international physical and intellectual(-spiritual) mobility just as a unified semiotics also does that. In this respect, the common places of universalistic ethics constitute a part of the international lingua franca already being formed, and whoever disseminates the said common places of universalistic ethics has good prospects of rapid international success. We must though add that the intellectual (thought) work which is done by philosophers and other theoreticians in relation to the said ethical discourse, becomes perceived and is judged in its conceptual peculiarity and technical quality only inside of the narrower and broader circle of their guild; the said intellectual work only has an effect towards the outside when it is

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[82] Kondylis's translates the German into Greek (p. 123) as: "some progress in human good sense [or wisdom]".

vulgarised (i.e. popularised), selectively dealt with and fused with analogous approaches (in part even of mystical inspiration). Under these circumstances, those aspects of universal-ethical (universalistic ethical) thought, which are connected with current questions in dispute or come on the scene as applications of general ethical principles in relation to concrete and at the same time planetarily relevant activities, meet with particular and broad interest. The swelling of (i.e. huge increase in) the literature regarding human rights as well as regarding medical and ecological (i.e. environmental) ethics corroborates this.

It would of course be naive to put down the growing influence of universalistic ethics to the growing ethicisation of world society. And as the real reasons for universalistic ethics' spreading are not those which its originators or supporters would like to assume, so too most probably its real effects (results) will not coincide with its hoped-for effects (results)[83]. We want to now turn briefly to this highly political question.

2. The political dark side (i.e. drawbacks) of human rights

Talk of human rights has moved into the centre of the political vocabulary during recent decades. An optimistic observer could draw from that a conclusion that politics has now set itself the task, after the bitter experiences of the century, of moulding the world in accordance with ethical principles. However, often in the historical past it was the case that during the combining of the ethical (ethics) and the political (politics), the ethical (ethics) was subjugated to the logic of the political (politics) - and in addition, that the reasons for the mobilisation of the

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[83] Kondylis is here referring to the "heterogony of ends" (Heterogonie der Zwecke) (see *Das Politische und der Mensch* for this descriptive concept's analytical use in the broader context of social(-historical) theory).

ethical (ethics) itself were primarily political. The situation was not essentially different also in the recent past, and this entitles us to underline certain political aspects and implications of the (examination of the) problems of human rights.

Human rights universalism was used during the Cold War on the part of the West as a political weapon against communism - not without a long-term result (outcome). However, human rights universalism's political role was not at all exhausted with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, rather the opposite is to be expected. Because in the meantime human rights universalism has developed its own logic and dynamism while at the same time several sides have a vital interest in invoking it. Not only the victors of the Second World War against fascism and not only the West against communism: also, the numerous peoples, which in the course of decolonisation achieved their independence, have usurped the language of human rights, in order to justify with ultimate arguments their claim to equal rights in the framework of the world society (precisely) coming into being. Human rights consequently became the lingua franca, the great ideological common denominator of this world society - and exactly the universal confession of faith in human rights' nominal (i.e. face) value makes their concrete interpretation and application so complicated. Because if the universalisation of ethics and of rights interrelates with the coming into being of a world society, then world society will be afflicted by contradictions and tensions which (over)burden today's world society in a dramatic way. The worldwide recognition of human rights principles will not then constitute the foundation for worldwide ethical (mutual) understanding, but rather the common battlefield upon which every one of the competing sides will struggle for the imposition of their own interpretation of the aforementioned principles and against all other

interpretations. We must emphatically warn against the illusion that the nominal (i.e. face) value of ideas can prevent their polemical instrumentalisation. Were it so, wars would never have taken place between nations which all sincerely declared support for the religion of love.

The possibility of the transformation of human rights into a new field of tension (area of conflict) attaches (is connected) to an elementary fact, which, on the basis of the existing willingness of all sides to (spontaneously) identify their own objects (goals) with the objects (goals) of (all of) humanity, is hardly perceived. It is a matter of the fact that in today's constitution of world society there can be no talk of human rights stricto sensu. With that we do not mean for instance the "human rights violations" in many countries, but something fundamental (i.e. the very essence of the thing). Human rights, i.e. rights, which humans possess in their mere quality (i.e. characteristic) as humans, can only then have real meaning and existence if all humans can enjoy them without restriction everywhere on earth, and indeed in the place of their free choice, by virtue of their naked humanness and irrespective of their origin or other prerequisites. As long as this does not happen, i.e. as long as a Chinese does not have the same rights in the United States as an American and an Albanian does not have the same rights in Italy as an Italian, one may, if one does not want to strain (twist, distort) concepts (the meaning of words), only talk of civil rights[84], but not of human rights. A state-organised political unit always grants that which today is euphemistically called "human rights" to its own nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens), and the validity of that which the said political unit grants can only be guaranteed inside of each and every respective (state) territory. No state

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[84] Kondylis is obviously referring to "state-bound" or "political" rights provided by sovereign states within their respective jurisdictions.

can therefore guarantee that rights, which are regarded as human rights par excellence, as for instance the right to bodily (i.e. physical) integrity and freedom of speech[85], can be enjoyed outside of its borders. And conversely: no state can, without breaking up (i.e. eliminating itself), grant to all humans without exception certain rights, which are generally regarded as civil rights, as for instance the right to vote and the right of settlement (i.e. permanent residence). In other words: not *all* humans can *as* humans possess *all* rights (no matter whether these are called human or civil rights in the prevalent terminology), regardless of where they find themselves. Rights, which are given and guaranteed by a state and are in force with the reservation that (sovereign) statehood exists (i.e. subject to the existence of (sovereign) statehood), would be able to be described as human rights (only) if the attribute of man could be exclusively allocated by the state concerned to its own nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens). But even if the state in question did this, it still (again) could not thereby manage that its nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens) would be treated in other countries as citizens having absolutely equal rights and as possessors of universal human rights. Humanity as a constituted and unified political subject could (only) grant human rights as *human* rights. Only the end of (sovereign) statehood in every one of today's known forms would inaugurate the age of real human rights.[86]

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[85] In the more than two decades since *Planetary Politics...* was published, it has become apparent that "freedom of speech" is being redefined under the pressure of maintaining social order in Western mass democracies, where increasing "multiracialism and multiculturalism" have given rise to the concept of, however defined, "hate speech" and its prohibition. Consequently, it is not clear anymore that "freedom of speech" is as highly valued as it was during and immediately after the Cold War.

[86] Provided of course a world state could ensure that all humans fully enjoy all human rights everywhere and anywhere in the world (See Kondylis, P. "»Menschenrechte«: begriffliche Verwirrung und politische Instrumentalisierung" in P. Kondylis *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Manutius, Heidelberg 2001, pp. 61-67 [««Ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα»: εννοιολογική σύγχυση και πολιτική εκμετάλλευση» στο Κονδύλης, Π. *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Θεμέλιο, Αθήνα 1998, σσ. 61-67; English translation: Stafford, S. and Petridis, R. ""Human Rights": Conceptual Confusion and Political Exploitation" in *Telos*, no. 166, Spring 2014, pp. 161-165]).

Human rights universalism indeed started (out) from the rich countries of the West and was first politically instrumentalised by them (i.e. first used by them as a political tool), however it increasingly finds a hearing and advocates in the less developed and the poor countries of the East and of the South which understandably see in this human rights universalism a welcome means to highlight their claims in relation to the distribution of the world's wealth and the world's resources. The said less developed and poor countries are of course faced with a dilemma, because they are nolentes (or) volentes not in a position to apply in their interior those principles (fully), in respect of whose realisation (i.e. implementation) at the international level they expect a noticeable improvement in their position (or situation) as nations and states. The perception, which is widespread in the West too, that only the improvement of these less developed and poor countries' material position (or situation) will enable the ethicisation of their internal social-political life, helps them at some time (or other) come out of this catch-22 situation (or tug of war). It is to be expected that from possible advances in this direction the less developed and poor countries will derive a right to greater "help (aid)" on the part of the rich nations. Either way, the West will come under moral and political pressure which it cannot easily evade. Whoever wants to explain the debacle of real (actually existing) socialism with reference to the fact that this real socialism could not redeem (i.e. carry out) both its eschatological as well as its direct (material) promises, must also seriously think about the possibility that the nations, which want to follow the path of the West but could not go down that path, will eventually in their disappointment turn against the West and at the same time against its universalistic ethics. Because the less developed and poor countries will be disposed to interpret their failure as the betrayal of the full (i.e. well-fed or satiated) and egotistical West of the West's own ethical

principles. In the expectations which the West has awoken through the world export of its ethical universalism, an explosive potential is hiding (latent). The victory of the West's ideas has not relieved the West, but on the contrary loaded it with tasks (or duties) and a burden of guilt under whose pressure it itself could fundamentally change.[87]

This pressure will necessarily increase to the extent that universal human rights will be interpreted materially, in relation to which mutatis mutandis[88] that which happened for the first time in the 19th century will be repeated, when the socialists demanded the material interpretation and realisation of the formal (legal) freedoms and rights propagated by the bourgeoisie. The Christian perception of human dignity was not originally connected to a notion of a material "minimum (level) of existence (i.e. living conditions)", whatever "progressive" theologians like to think about that. In accordance however with today's opinion, a minimum (level of) human dignity and a minimum (level of) consumption belong together; whoever goes hungry is merely a human without (substantial) rights, not for instance someone whom god-willed material deprivation gives the opportunity to be completely released from concern over material goods. If now human rights are interpreted materially and are connected with expectations (or requirements) in respect of consumption, then human rights must come into conflict with the existing shortage of goods at the world level, i.e. they must be transformed into weapons in the struggle over the distribution of scarce goods. Whoever as someone belonging to a rich nation stands up for the strict observance of human rights will have to share his human rights with

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[87] See translator's footnotes 28, 34 and 44 for various thoughts regarding possible changes in and of the West.
[88] Changing [only] those things which need to be changed; or, [only] the necessary changes having been made.

other, unknown to him, humans, and from that fairly certainly a confrontation will follow during which (one side's) human rights will take the field against (another side's) human rights.

In any case, it must be regarded as certain that the more humans invoke human rights, the more extensive their interpretation will become. In other words, this means that more and more humans will demand more and more ideational and material goods in the knowledge that these ideational and material goods belong to them as of right. In light of this observation, which can hardly be refuted, one must prepare oneself for the fact that the function and meaning of human rights will change in the future. Especially as materially understood human rights cannot mean the same (thing) irrespective of whether two or whether five or whether ten billion humans simultaneously and consistently make a claim to the possession and active exercising of the said materially understood human rights. What the "principle of responsibility" will dictate after the new doubling of the world population that is expected in the coming decades, no-one can today say with certainty (cf. Sec. I, 5). The fact that the commands of universal ethics and in particular human rights are still practised with the far-reaching reservation of the rights of state sovereignty must at any rate be interpreted as a presentiment of future friction(s) and as a precautionary endeavour at keeping open a safety valve. Even states which fully recognise human rights and guarantee them within their own boundaries, reserve the right (for themselves) to carry on denying foreign nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens) the enjoyment of these same rights in their territory; already the ancient democracies jealously guarded the sharp dividing line between their own citizens and foreigners. The propagation of human rights is therefore connected today - and in the future the propagation of human rights will

do this more forcefully - with the sometimes even bluntly expressed wish that dear fellow man should kindly (remain and) enjoy his dignity to the full in his own country of origin. An unrestricted application (implementation or enforcement) of human rights, i.e. a consistent and legally safeguarded reduction of humans to their naked humanness, without any consideration for nationality and citizenship, would automatically entail the abolition of (sovereign) statehood and of all barriers in respect of freedom of movement and freedom of settlement (or permanent residence) - a vision of terror (a true nightmare) for EC-Europeans and North Americans[89]. Universal ethicists (i.e. the champions of universal ethics), who are extremely imaginative when it is a matter of declarations of principle(s) and in practice non-binding theoretical hair-splitting, have typically until now been lost for words regarding the concrete consequences of a consistent application (implementation or enforcement) of human rights (i.e. of the rights of man in his mere humanness) at the planetary level.

While the West can practise human rights only with the reservation of sovereign statehood (state sovereignty), it becomes entangled in a contradiction which understandably seems more flagrant and unbearable to those who knock on its door. This contradiction would only deepen (even more) should the West be tempted to impose human rights (that is to say: rights which apply to the citizens of the West) through political or even military interventions in other parts of the World. Because such

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[89] Kondylis is obviously not referring here to the hundreds of thousands of, or few million, "non-White" and or "non-Christian" people entering the European Union and the USA (every year) in the last two decades, but to the movement of tens (and tens) of millions of people in the event border controls were completely removed in an attempt by Western countries to be "true" to their own human rights propaganda (c.f. Kondylis, P. »Europa an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts« , p. 133, in *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg: Manutius, 2001 («Η Ευρώπη στο κατώφλι του 21ου αιώνα: μία κοσμοϊστορική και γεωπολιτική θεώρηση», σ. 123, στο *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1998; "Europe on the threshold of the 21st century") where Kondylis makes it clear that the connection between increasing anomie and the sudden mass movement of millions and millions of people from "Third World" countries to a "First World" country is not a question of "race" and cultural quality or character per se, but of quantity).

interventions would have to of necessity be implemented selectively (a campaign against China e.g. would be out of the question), and that is why such interventions would quickly lose credibility; it must even be expected that fanaticised masses in countries like e.g. Iran would launch the motto (slogan) "Down with human rights!" in exactly the sense of the Spanish combatants who, (standing) before a firing squad, shouted against Napoleon "Down with freedom!". Over and above that, it is not acceptable in the long run to violate the sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) of others in the name of human rights and to shut one's own sovereign statehood off against that which others hold to be *their* human rights. In other words: the West will find itself obliged to offset the imposition of formal human rights in other countries with concessions to the material interpretation of these same human rights - and to spend some (money) for this offsetting (i.e. pay the price for this balancing act). In short, the first duty of the liberator will be to nourish the liberated.

There is also a still deeper reason for which a growth in the tensions in the human universe - and indeed not despite, but during the simultaneous spreading (diffusion) of universal-ethical principles (i.e. the principles of universal ethics) - can be presumed. The ethically-normatively charged word "human (man)" functioned linguistically as an honorific adjective so long a one demarcated it against other adjectives which seemed to indicate the merely historically determined, abolishable and to be abolished distinctions between humans; in the language of ethical universalism "human (man)" (has) always meant something nobler and higher than words like Jew or Greek, Christian or heathen, black or white, communist or liberal. If (however) all particular counter (i.e. partial) concepts in respect of the universalium (i.e. the universal (concept)) "human (man)" cease to apply, the word "human (man)" will no longer

constitute an adjective, that is, it will no longer point to a higher quality, but it will be converted into a noun for the description of a certain animal species. Humans will all be called "humans" just as lions (are called) lions and mice - mice without further national or ideological differentiation. It may sound paradoxical and yet it is so, that man (has) differentiated himself from all the other animal species exactly because he was not merely man free of all other attributes (i.e. without any other predicate or complement). Not only did culture come into being through the overcoming of bare humanness (or the bare human quality) and the gradual attainment of historically determined attributes (predicates or complements), but also altercations and the struggles between humans gained, thanks to the presence and the effect exactly of these attributes (predicates or complements), emotional (or sentimental) and ideological dimensions which went far beyond the what is merely animal (bestial) (i.e. the world of animals). That is why it is not excluded that the reduction of man to his mere humanness (or human quality) will inaugurate and will accompany an epoch in which humans will have to fight against one another for goods which are absolutely necessary for the naked survival of the animal species "man" - in the worst case for air and water. In accordance with a well-known paradox of historical action (i.e. the historical activity of humans), the imposition of universal ethics will then bring about effects (consequences) entirely different to the originally intended effects (or consequences).[90]

It is for factual (objective) reasons indeed superfluous, but perhaps advisable for other reasons and reasons suggesting themselves, in conclusion, to make clear that these thoughts cannot mean that human rights universalism is to be held responsible for (all) bad things (that

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[90] See footnote 83.

happen) (i.e. for all evils) or that a (declared) belief in (the adoption of) ethical relativism would be the appropriate solution for the great aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of our already begun planetary history. Things take their course, and this course is determined by ideas - in the sense of independent forces which intervene from the outside in a becoming (i.e. in events) and are able to direct this becoming or these events - far less than what the producers and consumers of ideas believe or want to make others believe[91]. Nevertheless the predominance (prevalence) of human rights universalism taking place today remains symptomatic of certain important political developments - and it is better to think about these developments than not to do so.

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[91] Kondylis is here, by way of his always incomparable ability at elucidating key matters of social theory, alluding to the fact that neither the simplistic Marxist base-superstructure analytical tool is valid (at least in many cases), nor is the mass-democractic ideological position of the primacy of signs, language, discourse etc. (so favoured by "deconstuctionist", "postmodern", "poststructuralist" etc. polemicists with programs of individual or "minority group" "emancipation" or "liberation") vis-à-vis social action and social facts of any (substantial) scientific use. For an analysis of the social relation, social action, language, rationality and other related social, political and anthropological factors in understanding societies and human action or behaviour scientifically, i.e. in a descriptive, non-normative, value-free manner, see *Das Politische und der Mensch*).

What was communism?

It is understandable and unavoidable that the explanations (or interpretations) regarding the defeat of communism in the Cold War, in the period immediately following the Cold War, are frequently mixed with the loud or discrete self-celebrations (or jubilations) of the victors. Human is the wish of the convinced and consistent Cold Warriors, now with reference to the fact of the outcome of the Cold War, to talk up as the verdict of historical justice and as proof of their own foresight that which previously constituted the content of their polemics - and all too human is the endeavour of those who still recently denounced every "blind anti-communism" as a mortal (i.e. deadly) sin of the human-progressive intellect(-spirit) and did not want to in any way provoke, and in many ways wanted to appease, the dictators of the East, after the unexpected for them turn of events, through ostentatious complaints against "totalitarianism" and through active participation in the unmasking and persecution of guilty parties and of fellow travellers, to (exactly) make be forgotten[92] that which yesterday still separated them from today's actual victors, so that they do not have to share the bitter lot (fate) of the outcasts. In the general euphoria, which is produced either way, it seems that, at any rate, the view has been consolidated that (supposedly) History, after a just as enigmatic as terrifying divergence, is returning to the royal path of freedom, and human nature can develop

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[92] Kondylis adds "and to reject" to the Greek text (p. 133).

anew, since thanks to its resistance the attempt at totalitarian re-education failed. The Whig interpretation of English history is consequently extended to a Whig interpretation of world history in general.

That view and this interpretation will undoubtedly dominate the intellectual(-spiritual)-political scene until the next great historical overturning or radical change lets yesterday's atrocities be displaced from memory[93] or lets them appear in other dimensions. Nevertheless, one does not have to wait so long in order to be able to see that the abovementioned view and interpretation are suitable as the object of an analysis pertaining to the critique of ideology rather than as the key to the understanding of the historical character of communism. If today's Western political and economic system is not unconditionally interwoven with human nature (how otherwise could human nature have survived in the far longer period of time of its existence?) and if History has no ethical aims (goals) or possibly is heading towards even worse catastrophes than those which communism brought about, then the historical assessment of communism must obviously be undertaken on the basis of other criteria. We must namely ask which were the great motive forces of the epoch in which communism unfolded, and in what relation was communism with these forces, to what extent it represented these driving forces and boosted them or hampered them or, despite all of communism's interweaving with universal tendencies, it served particular (i.e. specific or distinct) goals (ends) in terms of power politics, and in the process was modified on each and every respective occasion. From such a perspective, of course, the world-historical or Messianic self-understanding of communism can be taken at face value just as little as its foes' self-assessment (i.e. the idea its foes have about themselves).

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[93] The Greek translation (p. 133) reads: "psychologically covers up".

Ethical-normative ideas are not made up in order to be taken (or understood) and to be realised at face value, but in order to constitute an identity and to be used as weapons of this identity in the struggle against other identities. Whoever cannot understand that will also not be able to ever comprehend either ethical-normative ideas' internal intellectual (thought) structure nor their external historical effect.

The two world-historical decisive and closely connected with one another processes of this century are the unprecedented condensing of the network of planetary politics and the worldwide leveling of all known hierarchies from the past through mass democracy. Communism (has) substantially contributed to both of them, said more precisely, communism was a force which arose from these processes and for its part intensified them. Communism's theoreticians and practitioners from the beginning conceived of and planned their politics in planetary dimensions. They believed that the creation of a world market by capitalism meant a decisive world-historical turn and that world history (i.e. History) only after its unification can reveal its until then hidden meaning, namely the setting up of classless society; the abolition of classes was supposed to in fact entail the abolition of states and borders, that is, an even more fundamental unification of the world. In this utopia of classless world society, the planetary character of the future of humanity was already reflected in mystified form. However, this (general) plan (or concept) also contained a wider, politically more concrete aspect. If capitalism was the first genuinely planetary social formation which History has known, then on its enemies' flags the motto had to be written: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"[94]. The revolution against a worldwide foe had to therefore be a world revolution, and the

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[94] Mostly known in English as: "Workers of the world, unite!".

General Staff of the world revolution was supposed to guide the proletarian army according to superordinate (higher) criteria, i.e. to subordinate the struggle at the national level to the tactical or strategic needs of the world struggle. The authoritarian centralism which the founders of the First International had in mind was the consistent concretisation of this concept (of a classless world society), which certainly at first did not bear any fruit, and in the era of the Second International further weakened. When this authoritarian centralism could be translated into praxis (i.e. put into practice), proletarian internationalism was already an instrument in the hands of a great Power which wanted to become a world Power. However, that does not have anything to do with what we are dealing with here. In all the phases of this development - and regardless of whether the world revolutionary strategy had in mind (as first objective aim) the storming of the capitalistic strongholds or the breaking of the world capitalistic chain at its weakest points - there was (always) consciousness that the movement as a whole participated in a worldwide process, that it developed worldwide, and world-historical, tendencies, and that its course depended on the world-political situation, which must be taken into account at all times. Worldwide, the movement pursued the same long-term aims and, worldwide, the class enemy felt the same shivers down their spine. The appropriation and binding interpretation of proletarian internationalism by the Soviet great and world Power reinforced the pressure which heightened the degree of density of planetary politics. Now indeed there was a centre which regarded the entire planet as a chessboard and incorporated in an extensive plan its individual moves on the flanks or in the centre. The universal power claim veritably or potentially transformed every place on the planet into a contested position, and indeed into such a

position in relation to which every time the struggle for the Whole was conducted in miniature.

The worldwide communistic movement also condensed the network of planetary politics in another important respect. At a time when the colonial system of European imperialism was till at its zenith, the worldwide communistic movement called for the abolition of the difference between the subjects and the objects of planetary politics, that is, it espoused the political emancipation, the state organisation and the equal rights under international law of the colonial peoples; the General Staff of the world revolution not least (of course) focused its attention on these peoples, since the General Staff had opted for the strategy of the breaking of the weakest points (links) of the world capitalistic chain. Notwithstanding all the motivation and praxis on the basis of power politics of the Moscow General Staff[95], it can hardly be disputed that its mottoes exercised an enormous influence on the intellectual and political elites, being formed, of the colonial peoples, and that moreover its mere existence constituted strong material support for the young nations in all the phases of decolonisation. Colonial Powers, which until then hardly deigned to make egalitarian gestures, had to now fear the competition with the communistic metropolis and gradually discovered the equality of all nations, all races and all people[96]. The collective self-confidence of the (former) colonial peoples and the peoples of the "Third World" in

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[95] The Greek text (p. 136) reads: "As much as the General Staff of Moscow was driven by the motivation of power and acted in respect of the criterion of the acquisition of power".

[96] Cf. Kondylis's telling insight at the end of his article, »Konflikt der Kulturen oder Konflikte ohne Kultur?« in Kondylis, P. *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg: Manutius, 2001, p. 94 («Σύγκρουση των πολιτισμών ή συγκρούσεις ερήμην του πολιτισμού;» στο *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1998, σ. 92; "Conflict of cultures or conflict without culture (Clash of civilisations or clash without civilisation)?"), where he states: "If the same Western Powers, which in 1919 dismissed (rejected) Japan's request and did not want to enshrine (enact or codify) the equality of races in the Treaty of Versailles, in 1996 try hard to achieve understanding of foreign cultures, this does not necessarily mean that progress in understanding has occurred. However, it does indicate a dramatic shift in the (world) balance of power (or correlation of forces)".

general, as it became noticeable above all in the decades of decolonisation, seems today to have evaporated or to only still be represented by a few middle and major Powers, however its meaning for the formation of planetary politics after the Second World War can hardly be overestimated. The said collective self-confidence was not merely based on the new possibilities of political work (i.e. action) hinted at after the consolidation of Soviet communism, but just as much on the sense of world-historical role, in fact mission, which likewise directly or indirectly sprang from communistic influence. From the perspective of the communistic interpretation of History, the proletarian peoples had to fulfil at the world level a task (or duty) analogous to that of the proletariat in the interior of the developed capitalistic nations; in this way, they got for the first time a world-historical identity and were assigned a world-historical position. Therein, incidentally, lay the hitherto unnoticed political relevance of the well-known Stalinistic five-stage schema of the course of History[97]. In the rigidity with which this schema was formulated and defended one only saw dogmatic stubbornness, but it was a matter of something much more substantial. If all nations, with ultimately insignificant divergences or modifications, must go through all the stages of historical development, then the distinction between advanced peoples or peoples capable of progress and forever backward peoples does not apply; the question of the historical uniqueness of the Occident and of the unrepeatability of its achievement in terms of its civilisation and culture cannot be posed at all. The five-stage historical (five stages of History) schema is therefore transformed into a command in favour of development, a promise - even more: into the certainty of

[97] The Greek (p. 137) is: "schema of the five stages which the course of History obligatorily [mandatorily] traverses [travels (across)]".

participation in a development at whose end all nations will stand at the same stage (or tier).

Communism could hence be a planetary movement and demand the participation of all nations in the planetary becoming (i.e. in planetary events), because its social blueprint made a claim to universal application. The differences in the level of development of the various nations were indeed admitted and were even emphasised when looking for the appropriate strategy and tactics in the local political struggle, nevertheless, ultimately, they appeared as, seen from an overall historical point of view, transient phenomena which the faster tempo of historical development (i.e. History) would supplant in the sense of the aforementioned schema. The national form was supposed to be filled with a socialistic content: the communist ideologues found in this formula the theoretical middle way in order to reconcile the universal social blueprint with particular (i.e. separate or distinct) realities which obviously could not be put aside from the world from one day to another. In any case, the social direction was clear. The future society of the equal was now inaugurated in so for as the hierarchies of wealth and of (social) status of the old regime were eliminated by means of violence; the elite which assumed power, exercised it in the name of equality and with the declared aim of the realisation of equality. In this way, an immense process of massification was instituted above all in countries in which pre-capitalistic-patriarchal social structures still set the tone and bourgeois individualism was weak or alien. The shattering of the village community and of the rural clan (or kinship group), equal rights for women, the incorporation of individuals in large economic, occupational (professional or vocational) or political organisations - in fact even brutal uprooting and deportation have promoted this process in a different sense on each

and every respective occasion. Not only the new structuring (restructuring) of society, also the spying (or policing), the persecution, the terror favoured leveling and atomisation (i.e. the splitting or segmentation of society into individuals).

From an economistic-evolutionistic standpoint, one could of course remark that the disintegration of pre-capitalistic societies would have taken place over time anyway thanks to gradual industrialisation and the opening towards the world market, therefore the thus understood effect of communism was basically historically superfluous or even harmful in its hardness (i.e. harshness). We would agree with such a judgement if individual historical questions arrived on the scene separately from one another and in order, so that they could be ordered and dealt with, with the corresponding end(goal)-rational unambiguity - if, that is, economic questions e.g. were only economic questions and if only subjects thinking in terms of economics dealt with their solution away from or beyond other interests and points of view. However things are not in the least like that. Every historical question, economic or other question, is posed and tackled inside of a concrete network of power (relations), the question's formulations and its solution take place in accordance with the texture of this network, which results from a dynamic of human relations. History does not give power to him who can solve its questions as painlessly as possible, but on the contrary: History forces him who has (seized) power to channel his energy in the way the questions, which History posed, command him. The result is the coping with each and every respective question (for instance that of economic or social modernisation) from the point of view, and with the means, of the possessor of power (i.e. the ruler). We shall (still) see below that the process of massification and of democratisation, which the communists promoted in their dominion (or

territory), was shaped in the, in the meantime, well-known manner because it was connected with the striving of certain nations to win (secure) a new and stronger position inside of planetary politics.

However, communism also indirectly assisted the prevailing of the mass-democratic mainstream of the 20th century, and indeed through its negative and its positive influence inside of the industrially developed countries of the "capitalistic camp". The influence which communism exercised on the positioning and the (mode of) behaviour of its "class enemy" can be called negative. The danger of revolution and the certainty that the internal revolution could henceforth be supported by the great red land of the East, prompted a bourgeoisie, which was already changing and increasingly had to share its social predominance with the ascendant economic and political elites, to a rethink, which was analogous to that of[98] the colonial masters vis-à-vis the colonial peoples - in fact it was at the same time frequently a matter of the same (social) stratum and the same persons. This rethink found expression in the bourgeoisie's readiness to make the moderate socialists or that which the Bolsheviks called the "labour aristocracy", participants in government business (duties), as well as to accept institutions of the welfare (social) state and redistributions in the framework of what is unavoidable on each and every respective occasion. Now the pressure for more welfare (social) state and a more just distribution of material and political goods was for the most part due to what we may call the positive influence of communism on the "capitalistic camp". This consisted in the gradual imbuing of an otherwise in large or for the most part anti-communistically inclined public consciousness with the ideal of material equality. The demand for the consistent social materialisation of the

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[98] After "political elites," Kondylis's Greek text (p. 140) is: "to reorientate its thought in a way analogous to the readjustment of the stance of".

formal-legal equality of liberalism stood at the centre of communistic agitation and incidentally resulted directly from the tradition of the Marxist critique of capitalism. Typically, precisely this demand, in whatever of its variations, became a commonplace of the mass-democratic thoughts world (i.e. ideology), in fact it became banal self-evidence; inequality in respect of pleasure may only take place on the basis of unequal performance, and also then inequality in respect of pleasure is not immune to the command of social redistribution. It is of course very well-known that mass-democratic reality is more or less removed from material equality as well as from the consistent application (implementation or enforcement) of the performance (or achievement) principle - however it is also certain that in no other past society did equality as an ideal to be materially concretised have this generally recognised (social) status (or high standing).

Yet, the direct or indirect redistributions that have taken place, above all the overcoming of the shortage of goods, have made, at any rate, partly the appearance, partly the dream of material equality possible. The pendant (i.e. counterpart) of this economic process at the social level was the dissolution of the classical bourgeoisie as well as of the classical proletariat, and over and above that the replacement of the more or less closed ruling class by more or less open elites whose composition constantly changes. The paradoxical result of all of that was a caricaturish realisation of the original communistic ideal of classless society in relation to which of course this original communistic ideal's ethical-humanistic aspects were (forgotten or) barely or only just kept alive as individual "self-realisation"; social "alienation (estrangement)" remained, and the power struggles remained too. Considering this historical paradox, we must of course pose a very interesting question as to what

extent utopias pre-empt real tendencies of historical development, i.e. to what extent each and every respective utopian draft (plan or project) is constructed so that it reflects in an idealised form the much more banal reality of a social formation already being formed. Utopia would then be in this (its) unconscious historical determination[99] not simply the antipode of "political realism", but a trigger of energies (acts, deeds or actions), which realise what is historically possible as the abridged version or caricature of the original draft (plan or project). If Utopia has fulfilled this (its) function, then it can resign[100]. And only an optical illusion or an intellectually(-spiritually) sluggish adherence to an obsolete vocabulary can conceal the fact that communism as utopia and as politics only (then) collapsed when its original foes, namely the bourgeoisie and classical liberalism, had (already) died a (slow and) peaceful death (see Sec. V, 2). The end of the Cold War also marked the visible end of the ideas and the forces which in the final analysis came from the 19th century. What starts now and what is still coming moves on another social (historical) level and can only be intellectually dealt with, with the help of other categories and concepts.

We already intimated that communism promoted central world-historical tendencies not abstractly and generally, but first in its interweaving with great nations' striving (i.e. efforts) after a strengthening of their power position inside of world society becoming all the more dense. This is a point of extreme importance if we want to understand the historical course of events and avoid ideologically inspired talk which makes comparisons between "(social) systems" in a historical vacuum in order to then for instance infer the superiority of the "Western system" on the

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[99] "If Utopia is determined historically in this sense and without it itself knowing it [that it is determined historically], then it is..." is how Kondylis translates the start of the sentence in Greek (p. 141).
[100] The Greek text is (p. 142): "it leaves [abandons] the scene [stage]".

basis of immanent structural criteria. What can be compared with one another are concrete nations and societies with specific traditions, culturally determined mentalities and corresponding technical-economic possibilities. Communism, as we have known it since 1917, was always bound to such a pre-given framework and its deficiencies as well as its achievements always bore the stamp of a long and extremely characteristic historical past. If we see things in this way, it is more sensible - and more just -, to not talk of the defeat of Utopia by realism but for instance of the victory of the considerably richer and more productive industrial nations of the West over the poorer and less productive Soviet Union. Because it is not at all certain that a capitalistic Russia, considering the other social and cultural factors, can (ever) seriously compete with the United States economically, and it may also be doubted that a free market economy in a politically independent Pakistan would ever overtake a planned economy in a politically independent Germany. It is often asserted that exactly communism was the cause of impoverishment and of economic failure. However the opposite could have also occurred. With the exception of certain European countries which were conquered by the Red Army and because of that their already differently proceeding development was actually hampered and they were socially set back, communism prevailed with its own (indigenous or native) forces only in nations which in any event had only covered a short distance on the technical and cultural path of the modern era. The perception that the freedom of economic activity can in itself be a panacea, irrespective of other historical and cultural preconditions, is refuted at any rate by the mass squalor in many Latin-American, African and Asian countries.

In order that this thesis be sufficiently substantiated, we would actually have to examine the history of communism in the two great nations in which it was independently victorious and held or still holds, for a longer period of time, power, and we would have to again regard this history not as the history of the defeat of Utopia, but rather as the history of answers to nationally burning questions. It should be clear that when two nations with the geopolitical potency and with the traditionally strong self-confidence of Russia and China usurp a world-historical idea and an ideology with a universal character, they then thereby announce their claim to become world Powers and to constitute subjects - not objects - of planetary politics; incidentally, even the United States could hardly be able to appear in the role of a world Power without an ideology presenting itself as universal (i.e. as having universal demands). The more or less symmetrical relationship between the physical size of these nations (as an indication of their potential position in the world) and the range of the world-historical ideas adopted by them was fundamental and indispensible for the history of communism. Had communism namely only prevailed in Albania or Zanzibar, then it would remain an oddity for ethnologists; only the planetary potency (i.e. power) and (planetary) ambition of its bearers lent to the world-historical idea of communism its great, threatening seriousness. And once this relation between bearer and idea was restored, the (great) nation concerned was obliged to henceforth act in the name of History, to dress national matters of concern in dogmatic statements. What was passed off as praxis which theory dictated, resulted from internal or external political necessities. That however means that a lot of things, which from the point of view of the opponent appear as ideological paranoia and thereby motivated crimes (i.e. crimes with corresponding motives), can be effortlessly explained from the national perspective and they must not at all be attributed to the

supposedly inner logic of Utopia, irrespective of the concrete national conditions and objectives. We shall take a central event of Soviet history as an example whose meaning is almost without exception misunderstood even though there are repeated and extremely clear (relevant) explanations of the Soviet leadership at that time - to say nothing of the logic of the (historical) situation. The forced industrialisation since the end of the 1920s was tackled (undertaken) not least in the well-founded expectation of a new great war in which the Soviet Union would have been at the mercy of its industrially far superior foes, had the Soviet Union not in the shortest (possible) period of time been able to make up for its delay (slow progress) in the sector of heavy industry and of the production of modern equipment (including armaments). Yet industrialisation did not mean only tanks and aeroplanes (aircraft), but also very many people who were able to operate machines and modern devices in general (including those which the allies (then) supplied during the war), it meant, that is, ultimately the destruction of the pre-industrial village community in which the great mass of people still lived. In full knowledge of the brutality and the suffering which all this brought with it, one can today soberly ascertain: without forced collectivisation and forced industrialisation, national-socialistic Germany would have won the war against the Soviet Union. Let the ethicists (of ethe) (or moralists) undo this Gordian knot, the Bolsheviks had to cut it.

A decisive structural feature of communistic regimes also arose from the necessities of national power politics: their extreme centralism, that is, that which lent to them the character of "Oriental despotisms". In countries like for instance Albania, centralism meant apart from the consolidation of party control, at the same time, the formation of a nation (i.e. nation-building), namely the violent subordination (or inward

forcing) of the largely independent and mainly patriarchal loyalties of trusting clans (or kinship groups)[101] under a steamroller called the nation; this nation, again, had to have communistic signs (i.e. symbolism), because all the other signs (i.e. symbolism) (for instance religious signs (i.e. symbolism)) were connected with old patriarchal loyalties for lack of a national bourgeoisie. Both great nations, in which communism prevailed, had to for their part deal with other tasks with the help of centralism. In China the trauma (traumatic memory) of the falling apart of the Middle Kingdom into several small partly half-feudal, partly military despotisms had and still has an effect - the trauma (traumatic memory) of a powerlessness which had to be paid with grave humiliations. The West may believe that through today's human rights rhetoric it has received absolution for its colonial past, but it will be sadly mistaken in assuming that an old and proud people like the Chinese would ever forget cannon boat diplomacy and the Opium Wars. In any case, the centralistic cohesion (or unification) of the state and the nation constituted here an indispensable precondition both of the independence as well as of the demanding participation in the now dense planetary politics. Russia aimed at a still more demanding participation in that dense planetary politics; however, in order to achieve this participation, Russia had to secure the unity (cohesion) of the gigantic multinational state ruled by it through a rigorous centralism which incidentally had an already long tradition behind it. Opinion can be divided over the political and ethical value (merit) or anti-value (demerit) of such a state, one thing however is definite in light of the latest developments: if anything, the said gigantic multinational state could only be held together with centralistic and authoritarian methods - regardless of where one would like to put the

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[101] Or as translated by Kondylis into Greek (p. 145): "of independent clans [or kinship groups] with local and personal loyalties".

boundary between "inevitable" and "pointless" coercion. The internal combining (or interrelation) between authoritarian centralism and world power standing (or status)[102] in the case of Russia was seen on an even larger scale when the Red Army conquered large parts of Europe. However, whereas Russia thanks to communism could secure at least its hegemonic position in the Soviet Union and simultaneously pursue an imperial world politics, the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, who could not harbour suchlike ambitions in respect of power politics, have, seen on the whole, had to only suffer damage because of communistic rule. *They* have been the greatest, in fact the true victims of a catastrophe whose effects can perhaps never more be entirely rectified. Nevertheless, also here the interweaving of communism and national power politics should not be forgotten: communism *was* in these countries Soviet occupation.

During the Cold War reference was made quite a lot to the internal interrelation between communism and the world power politics of the Russian nation, because the polemics of the West was intensely interested in the uncovering of the concrete political content of the slogan "proletarian internationalism". But after the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and of the Soviet Union one in the West is less willing to interpret the course of events as a victory of nations over nations; it would presumably sound prosaic and not particularly glorious if one simply said that the more numerous and the economically far more superior camp in the end prevailed against *Russia*. It is an old custom to celebrate every great victory as the victory of higher ideals or superior social systems and the victory's supposed inevitability is passed off as the necessity of the prevailing (i.e. victory or predominance) of exactly these ideals or

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[102] Kondylis translates "Weltmachtstellung" into Greek (p. 146) as "a powerful global political presence".

systems. The wish to emphatically underline the superiority of the Western system in the central sector of the economy drives now e contrario (and although this is not at all logically necessary) to put the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and indeed of Soviet communism, down to a (serious) failing (or malfunctioning) of the planned economy, which, beyond the usual inflexibilities and blockages, ineluctably culminated in a total paralysis. This explanation, which of course is caught up in an economistic way of thinking, can invoke (as an argument) the collapse of the Soviet planned economy, as we saw it taking place in actual fact, as well as its since long ago well-known lower productivity in comparison with the Western economy. However, the *necessity* of the total breakdown does not at all follow (logically) from these in themselves correct observations, and it was also not asserted by any expert for instance in the 1970s with full conviction - on the contrary: the voices in the West betrayed, after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, much more angst (or fear) before the arrogant appearance of a world power, which after a tremendous effort stood at least on the borderline of military parity with the West, rather than (self-)confidence and carefreeness in the face of the Soviet Union's forthcoming economic debacle.

If one can put aside the economistic prejudices and apologetic or panegyrical needs, (then) one must ascertain that the collapse of the Soviet planned economy did not bring about the dissolution of the communistic system, but that precisely the opposite occurred: in view of the institutionally anchored extensive subjection of the economic (economy) to the political (politics) in the Soviet system, the uncertainty, disruption and finally the decomposition of the organised bearer of political power necessarily entailed economic chaos - entirely irrespective of whether this development in the political (politics) was (also) prepared

by differences of opinion over the economic (the progress of the economy). Where the political (factor), that is the party apparatus (or machine), controls the administration (or management) and the distribution system, where, that is, the dividing lines of the Western state under the rule of law between party, state and economy are unknown, there economic collapse must follow political collapse. And political collapse resulted ultimately from the - on top of everything, in terms of detail, clumsy - attempt, to reform a system which could not be appreciably reformed without abolishing itself. It is of little help to summon a classical metaphysical term and to assert that the system was not reformable of its "essence": every system must in fact give up its "essence" should its reform exceed a certain limit. The non-reformability of the (Soviet) system must rather again be understood in its close interrelation with its nationally determined formation, with national political traditions and (national political) objectives: what could "reform" mean and how would it take effect in a multinational state in which the centrifugal forces in politics were kept in check not least (also) through the central directing (or management) of the economy?

No-one can say with absolute certainty whether the reform process (in the Soviet Union) was inaugurated on account of the oppressive practical (situational) constraints or through a subjective decision, which was (highly) consequential because owing to the hierarchical structure of the system, decisions, which were taken at the highest positions, had to have an effect on the whole[103]. Quite likely, the end of communism in the Soviet Union was just as little a historical necessity as its victory by means of the putsch of 1917. Western observers should, at any rate, be on guard against adopting, with other signs (i.e. symbolism), ill-fated (or "of

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[103] The Greek text (p. 149) is: "decisions taken at the top pervaded [permeated] the social whole from one end to the other end".

blessed memory") Hegelian-Marxist determinism in order to be able to prove that the breakdown of the Soviet Union was a command of world(-historical) Reason or of iron economic laws. One will perhaps after several years judge the performance (or achievements) of the planned economy *in Russia* with greater understanding should it be proved that also under the conditions of the free market the Russians will not be considerably better off economically[104]. And one will likewise evaluate differently the historical performance of the centralistic steering (i.e. management or directing) of the multinational Soviet state should developments in its former territory raise time and again the old aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) of political philosophy as to whether, namely, despotism is preferable to civil war or not. - Either way, communism in its original sense is dead. In China it can still (just) fulfil national and internal functions (or tasks) in respect of power politics, however the utopian momentum or verve and the legitimation pertaining to the philosophy of history have irrevocably gone. The "realists", however, would be ill-advised to exult over that. On each and every respective occasion an individual utopia dies, not Utopia *as such*. And individual atrocities and crimes fade in the course of time, not atrocity and crime *as such*. The communists were the latest to have temporarily embodied both sides of the human paradox in closest connection with each other. As champions of a humanistic utopia and as executors (i.e. enforcers) of naked terror they like hardly any other movement shaped the grandeur and the tragedy of their era. They were simultaneously dreamers and politicians thirsty for power, desperados and strategists, demagogues and secret agents, crusaders and technocrats, heretics and

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[104] Or alternatively, in the Greek (p. 149): "the economic activity of the Russians will not significantly improve".

inquisitors, victims and executioners. World history will not easily forget these strange people, who broke into the 20th century with such violence.

Regarding the translation

The translation is from the German text compared, at all points, with Kondylis's own Greek version of the book. The translator is firmly of the view that whilst the translation must be readable in English, faithfulness to the German text (with due regard given to Kondylis's own Greek version) is not to be sacrificed in order to achieve a completely "fluid" English book. The many words and phrases in parentheses are either direct translations of the German text including parentheses, or words and phrases included in the Greek but not in the German text, or certain German terms which are best translated by more than one English word, or e.g. German adverbs which may or may not be included in English. All footnotes are the translator's and have nothing to do with Kondylis himself.

The texts used for this translation:

Kondylis, P. *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992.

Κονδύλης, Π. *Πλανητική πολιτική μετά τον ψυχρό πόλεμο*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1992.