

Political typology in the West under the gaze of Panagiotis Kondylis

[Subject to further revision and correction]

The main sides of the Western political scene today (starting roughly from the Interwar period) belong to Western mass democracy as the historical fusion of both:

a) “centre” (initially “left-wing” or later “right-wing”) oligarchic capitalistic (and imperialistic, vulgar-racialistic) liberalism (mainly of the 19th century),

b) and (the idea of) “(far (extreme)) left-wing”

(social-)“democracy” or socialism,

with a common ideological and at least partially in practice generalised application of the principle of equality and the faster or slower breaking up of relatively macro-historical Tradition,*¹...

and with the “extremes” of this same mass democracy being represented by:

a) the non-(general-)electable dictatorship of (neo-) national socialism or fascism (with aggressive racism, chauvinism and nationalism(-imperialism)),

b) and the non-(general-)electable dictatorship of (neo-) communism (with at times internationalistic rhetoric and practice, but oftentimes, particularly as regards regimes with state-political power, nationalistic or ethno(racial)-centric, ethno-patriotic ideology and practice).

Previously, from the French Revolution (and the Industrial Revolution) until the First World War (and until the 1960s/1970s roughly as regards the anti-colonial struggle),

a) the Right and far (extreme) Right were made up of royalists, defenders of feudal privileges and the ownership of (large) inherited real estate, “god-given” order and (relatively) fixed hierarchy, comparatively quite or very limited capitalism,...*²

b) whereas oligarchic liberal capitalists (of *both* free trade *and* of protectionism, as the case may be, along with mainly British and French imperialism) were then at the political Centre, having set forth from the “Left” (“Rights of Man”), even though the “Right” started to take positions once “centrist” from the end of the 19th century when the movement in favour of already defunct feudalism, or at least the remnants of feudal privileges, no longer had social and political weight (that is, the once known as “liberal” started to be called “conservative”)...

c) with the (centre-) Left up to the far (extreme) Left being made up of former liberals in favour of the general vote (i.e. universal suffrage), various democrats, socialists (even also with not a few references to Christ), communists, who generally had ethno(racial)-centric and relatively conservative views about the relations between the sexes, races – (except for the ultra-leftist tendencies) – , initially supporting e.g. British capitalism and imperialism as the modernising representative of Progress against “retrograde” Russian imperialism, whereas generally from approximately 1917 and thereafter they were in favour of national liberation from (mainly British and French) colonialists, and a few years later they also supported the “socialist family” of socialism in one country, the Soviet (Russian) Empire, etc....

Nowadays, Western mass democracy is characterised, – if one has the volition to use the terminology “left-wing, centrist, right-wing”, scientifically without benefit, after the end of the Cold War, when the differences between Left and Right were reduced (as to sociological content overall) sharply, since all sides mainly advocate a version of Western mass democracy and not e.g. really existing socialism, liberal capitalism or (pre-fascistic, pre-national-socialistic) dictatorial

“conservatism”(nationalism), which are already historically finished social constructions*³,— by:

a) “left-wing” western mass democratic forces in favour of more statism and more “diversifying” multi-racialism, multi-culturalism, libertarian rights-based individualism in particular as to “abnormalities” of previous epochs or even of just a few decades ago, but oftentimes with less economic globalisation (and are disparagingly called “left-wing populists”), whilst simultaneously advocating, along with a significant part of multinational or simply large capital, in favour of open borders (i.e. including those whom the socialist/ communist Left once called strikebreakers or “scabs”), libertarian individualism, etc.!

b) more (“socialist and social-democratic”) or less (“neoliberal”) statist (“centrist”) Western mass democrats in favour of more globalisation and the public promotion of erstwhile “abnormalities” and libertarian “rights”, who are called “intelligent”, “rational”, “democratic”, “human rights advocates”, just as in the case of the “left-wing” mass-democratic warriors against “xenophobia, islamophobia, homophobia”, and other very merry things,

and

c) “right-wing” Western mass-democrats in favour of less globalisation (and/or another form of a more nation-state-based E.U., or no E.U.

whatsoever, etc.) and less multi-culturalism, even though oftentimes whilst showing tolerance both towards historical “abnormalities” (homosexuality, for instance) and towards erstwhile anathemas for (far(extreme)-)Right-wingers (e.g. Jews), who for polemical reasons are erroneously called “far (extreme) Right-wingers”, “nationalists”, “ethno-populists (nationalist populists)”, etc., whereas in essence they are to a great extent like the mainstream “centrist” Western mass-democratic current during the Cold War of overt protectionism, ethnocentric consciousness, the stricter protection of nation-state borders, relatively limited, mild or moderate racism (racial segregation), the in the main generalised exclusion from public life of Mohammedans and foreigners of other (non-white) races or (non-Christian) religions in general, etc.*4...

A “far (extreme) right-winger” today, in order to actually be far (extreme) “right-wing”, must advocate at least*5:

a) non-electable (of the general vote or universal suffrage) dictatorship,

and

b) an aggressive mass-imposed segregational racism and chauvinism and/or aggressive nationalism(-imperialism) (not mere national patriotism), which programmatically aim at doing mass concrete damage and or persecuting on a mass scale the Other, howsoever it may be

defined, and not just restricting it by means of a defensive disposition of championing one's own (inherited and constructed) Identity.

The French "New Right", just like the "New Left" – both phenomena of Western mass democracy –, touches upon or is found largely or on occasion in the relatively "extreme" political space, but oftentimes *and or* in the more "normal broader centrist" political space of the main current of Western mass democracy (especially when it is expressed in part at least in political parties which gain not negligible electoral results, and or co-govern, and or as "metapolitics" seeking wide resonance), as the case may be, whereas similarly the American "alt-right" shows both tendencies in the "right-wing" margins of the "alt-lite" of "civic nationalism"*⁶, up to the relatively sophisticated and "well-read" ideologues of relatively isolationist, ethnonationalist identitarian Heideggerian/Spenglerian/Schmittian/et al., homosexual-tolerant (e.g. counter-currents.com (Greg Johnson)), or relatively "geopolitically realist land-based (not sea-based, globalising) white (!) imperialist (pan-Europeanist and russophile)", homosexual-rejectionist (e.g. altright.com (Richard Spencer)), "white nationalism or white identitarianism" in favour of the segregation of the races and with clear-cut anti-zionist ("anti-semitic") and often, but not necessarily always, at

least in part “white-supremacist” positions, up to the unabashed and (very) vulgar neo-Nazis.

The equating of the protection of borders of a country and of the legal handling and restriction and/or exclusion of illegal migrants (invaders and potentially or actually colonists, criminals, terrorists) and/or “refugees”/refugees, or the equating of opposition to legal (mass) immigration and/or opposition to the European Union in toto or as it is presently*⁷, with “extremism”, can only constitute in itself “far (extreme) right-wing” politics for people of ethics and (polemical) politics, and not of (absolutely consistent) science, and/or for the mentally retarded (in fact, for people of the Lobotomy, just like most journalists, professors, mass media personalities and other public speakers – of course, if in the future the levels of anomy in Western mass democracies reach points which shake the foundations of Western mass democracy itself (and more authoritarianism is not sufficiently effective, or if mass islamification and/or mass “junglification”, or the transition to another kind of new social formation, do not hold sway, for instance), it cannot be excluded, *but neither is it necessary, nor even likely*, that dynamic racialistic(ethno)(religious)-based “far (extreme) right-wing” movements with governmental power arise, with programmes of mass deportations of racially and religiously heterogeneous peoples, and of

“rewrite(ethno)ification”, in a violent struggle in respect of the resetting of social cohesion and social order, even though, in such an instance, the results which might come about would include those not expected for the so-called “white far (extreme) right wingers” (or simply “ethno(national)-patriots” who do not want potentially (auto)(white)(ethno)Genocide), in particular if one considers that the relatively white populations will not only be much less than 80% or 90%, for instance, of the total population, but perhaps already a minority, as well as if one takes into account the reactions of those relatively white and other residents opposed to the “white far (extreme) right wingers” or “ethno(national)-patriots”^{*8}).

Science is actually hard work (in this instance, the ascertainment of the specific differences of each and every respective social fact of the “left-wing-centrist-right-wing” phenomenon in politics and the political), and as a consequence, is found absolutely consistently in the thought of the few, if not the extremely few. One of those extremely few was the singular and unsurpassable observer of human affairs, Panagiotis

Kondylis.

^{*1} “Mass democracy” is an ideal type which is used sociologically-historically to compare mass democracy with previous large-scale social formations like “oligarchic liberal capitalism” and “feudalism”. (Western) mass democracy is characterised by advanced massification (mass organisations, unions, political parties, etc.) and atomisation (incl. relatively low birth rates and broken families), urbanisation, secularisation, advanced technicisation, the performance principle and an extremely complex division of labour, mass (hedonistic) consumption and (access to) “taken for granted” water, energy, mass production; historically relatively developed social mobility and (not

only ideologically) equality, with ideational-ideological-psychological (and in practice) emphasis on space rather than time, a (mass-democratic) analytical-combinatory thought figure rather than the (bourgeois) synthetic-harmonising thought figure, universal suffrage, a highly interventionist state with a related bureaucracy (which interrelates or co-operates closely with large corporations and the mass media of “managers/C.E.O.s”), the effacement of the separation of the private from the public sphere, usually by dominant “politically correct” ideologies of “feminism”, “anti-racism”, “multi-culturalism”, “diversity”, “anti-homophobia”, “(minority) victims, and guilty (white male) victimisers”, “tolerance”, opposition to “hate”, non-eurocentric exoticism (Other worship) and dissolution of bourgeois anthropocentrism, at times ideologically “eliminating” Nature (biology) in Culture, featuring (the illusion of) Novelty, Kitsch, Fashion, an emphasis on Youth(fulness), Change, Pluralism, the loosening of traditional morals and attitudes as to sex(uality), (depictions of) violence,...; the dissolution of traditional substances (and “grand narratives”) into variable functions, but with a persistence of “metaphysics” (and “grand narratives”) in ideological beliefs and constructs centred on concepts like “equality”, “tolerance”, “human rights”,... normatively driven “deconstruction” (which conveniently does not “deconstruct” itself just as Marx conveniently did not apply his notion of “false consciousness” and “ideology” to his own normative (eschatological) ideology), etc. etc. etc.. Mass democracy also exists in non-Western versions, which are not treated here. Democracy as such refers to a polity (and socio-economic context where citizens (normally) do not work in order to take part in politics – “politics”, in Aristotelian terms, includes the whole of social life) in which the citizens govern on a daily or regular basis through elections, the drawing of lots, participation, responsibilities, recallability, etc., and historically belongs to the pre-industrial Greek world, which was relatively and comparatively – from the point of view of the large scale – racially and/or ethnologically-religiously homogenous, from the 6th/5th centuries B.C., with its eastern-Roman remnants existing until the 19th century. The polity in the main manifestation of Western mass democracy is based on some version of general-electable (constitutional or common-law) party-dominated parliamentarianism (presidential, presidentially overseen or prime-ministerial) with a social welfare state and rule of law, some kind of separation of powers, and is tightly intertwined with the mass media, various lobby groups, etc.. It has absolutely nothing to do with democracy, i.e. the rule of the demos, as a *polity* (plus society) (it is understood that sensu stricto “polity” cannot be totally excised from “polis” as society, but for the purposes of conceptual clarity a distinction is made here between “democracy” as polity and “mass democracy” as overall sociological phenomenon). Furthermore, Western historiography from e.g. Montesquieu and Edward Gibbon, to Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel and the American political scientist Samuel Huntington have completely misunderstood, or not understood at all, Byzantium, which was the actual conveyer of (some, not insignificant) civilisational continuity from ancient Greece and Rome until (roughly the last two centuries of) its downfall, whereupon anthropocentrism was recast within the Western-European context, starting mainly with Italy (and Greco-Roman-Christian civilisation in the Hellenocentric world was overshadowed to a great extent by the Ottoman Conquest and Occupation, inclusive of a partial large-scale Genocide of Hellenes (Rom) and Hellenism)

(see Contogeorgis, even though Contogeorgis's philosophy of History is entirely baseless; Speros Vryonis Jr., et al.).

*² Before the French Revolution, conservatism focused on the maintenance of (premodern) "god-given" strictly hierarchised feudalism as opposed to the absolutist centralist modernist state of the then "modern(ist)s", "enlighteners" or "progressives", or even against the "tyrannical" king or monarch. "Conservatism", "liberalism", and "(social-)democracy or socialism", were social(-ideological) facts or phenomena which step-by-step were divested of concrete distinct social(-ideological) content so as to end up scientifically ineffective and redundant conceptually, yet remained in use as polemical terms from the second half and particularly towards the end of the 19th century or at the latest from World War One, and of course later. Interestingly, much of the left-wing (social)democratic criticism of capitalism in the 19th century had its intellectual origins in (far (extreme)) ("right-wing") anti-capitalistic conservatism, most famously in ideas such as "alienation", whilst the Centre *and* the Left of the 19th and early 20th century generally saw liberal imperialism as "enlightening" and benefiting peoples not yet existing within Modernity and Progress.

*³ Stricto sensu, the triptych "conservatism-liberalism-(social) democracy (socialism)" (from the 16th, 17th or the 18th century), or, "Right-Centre-Left" (from the period after the French Revolution), as we have mentioned, existed in its first two phases until the end of the 19th century or the First World War at the latest (in the first phase mainly as a diptych since the pole "democracy or socialism" was oftentimes non-existent), and afterwards in its third phase in name only when really existing "conservatism-liberalism-(social)democracy" did not exist at all, but rather Western mass democracy existed – the remnants of capitalistic oligarchic liberalism survived, albeit faintly, until the Second World War roughly – with, until the end of the Cold War, the "far (extreme) Right" being represented by fascism and national-socialism, with its undoubted origins in *both* left-wing socialism *and* oligarchic liberal nationalistic and highly racialistic and (extremely) (vulgar-)racist imperialism, and the "centre-Right or the Centre or the centre-Left" by the U.S.A. and Western Europe as mainstream Western mass democracy, and the "far(extreme)-Left" by the Soviet Union and Maoist China. If one, however, considers the socio-economic and cultural changes in the West from the 1960s, one understands that, scientifically, already from then the signs "Right-Left" were already long ago finished, and that politics had already passed on to a purely mass-democratic phase with no relationship whatsoever to initial conservatism and liberalism as social facts or phenomena. The fact that most people continue in polemics with signs and slogans is completely natural, and indeed things could not be otherwise. Science demands completely different conceptual tools and a general education, disposition, etc. compared to the various ideologues and propagandists, or simply idiots, of universities, political parties, the mass media, etc.. Furthermore, from at least the Second World War, there does not exist any "liberal world order" but a mass-democratic (globalising) planetary order or situation in which the U.S.A. generally have, albeit not catholically, the first place, being restricted by the (regional) might (= power) of other Powers, that is, by the correlation of forces (balance of power) on each and every respective occasion, with a

circumstantial and selective functioning of international “rules and laws” (the examples of contradictory positionings by any Power acting in its (perceived) interests are too many to mention, however, one could mention in passing the U.S.A’s support of that paragon of “human rights”, Saudi Arabia, as opposed to Iran, or, tolerance or even encouragement of Ukrainian, Polish, Georgian,... and Balkan nationalisms when Russia is the main target, notwithstanding the whole “one world, globalising” ideology of “anti-(far-right-)nationalism”). Also, we shall not expand here upon the almost ludicrous use today and of recent decades of terms such as “liberal” and “(neo)conservative” in the U.S.A.. On the other hand, the possible biologisation rather than continuing sustained economisation of the political, in circumstances of increased global anomie nationally and transnationally, whilst the developing effect of “human rights” and “right-to-consume” universalism increasingly clashes with concrete national, ethnic and other identity interests, in view of a possible world-wide relative scarcity of goods, relatively damaged environment and uncontrolled mass migration, portends not just the possible “thirdworldification” of hitherto “first-world (developed)” societies, but also the end of (Western) mass democracy as a social formation.

*⁴ Of great interest is how “islamophilia” in the West, or at least islamo-tolerance, officially became the governing position *and* on the basis of anti-Soviet, anti-Russian and other geopolitical expediciencies, regardless of effectiveness. This matter, however, lies beyond the confines of this study.

*⁵ If a Party “hides its real actually far(extreme)-right intentions”, and it “appears” so, at most it is potentially “far(extreme)-right”, and actually far(extreme)-right-wing, when it expressly manifests with announcements or acts and actions its “real” identity. The same, *mutatis mutandis*, obviously applies to other sides and positions in the political spectrum.

*⁶ As one would expect, there are many versions of fundamental ideological positionings in each and every broader political realm, e.g. Herman Hoppe advocates positions inspired also by von Mises and M. Rothbard in favour of “free trade” and individual rights, individual property ownership, etc., whilst not ignoring, however, the “need” for borders and strictly controlled migration, nation states, a “natural” (mainly or in part) anti-multicultural segregation of races and or nations, traditional roles of the sexes, the inequality amongst people, family and community as opposed to the interventionist social welfare state, scientific research and not “political correctness”, the more effective policing of criminals and transgressors, a relatively limited imperialism of the U.S.A., and so on and so forth, promoting his own ideological dreams, which not only at least in part differ substantially from those of other contemporary “Right-wingers”, but have already by and large been undermined by demographic and cultural-political reality itself (Hans Hoppe: *Libertarianism, The Alt-Right And AntiFa—A Libertarian Strategy For Social Change*, VDare, October 20, 2017, 10:38 pm, <http://www.vdare.com/articles/hans-hoppe-libertarianism-the-alt-right-and-antifa-a-libertarian-strategy-for-social-change>). Another “far(extreme)-right” approach, without being racial-centric, is the “culturalism” of John K. Press, for instance (see <http://www.culturism.us/>, and, <https://alternativeright.blog/2017/10/31/a-quick-guide-to-the-quick-guide-to-culturist-policy/>).

*⁷ Even a generally most insightful analyst, Georgios Stylianos Prevelakis (= Georges Prévélakis, Professor of Geopolitics, Sorbonne, Paris I), who fully

possesses understanding of the great flow of world history, confuses the “far (extreme) right” with mere euroscepticism or the outright rejection of the E.U. (see e.g. Prevelakis Georgios, “European reformative retrogressions”, *The Daily* (= *Kathimerini*), Politics (= ΠΡΕΒΕΛΑΚΗΣ ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ, «Ευρωπαϊκές μεταρρυθμιστικές παλινδρομήσεις», *Καθημερινή*, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ), 21:28, 1-10-2017, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/928826/opinion/epikairohta/politikh/eyrwpaikes-metarry8mistikes-palindromhseis>).

*⁸ Here the characterisation “Lobotomy” is used as a non-scientific term denoting humour. It is worth noting, in addition, that utopian thought characterises all the dominant ideological-political currents today. From the defenders of totally advanced globalised, universalistic, multicultural, multiracial and extremely technicised “liberal democracy” (and the “liberal world order” of individual, indeed “human”, rights of (relatively) open borders), which crushes “populism”, “nationalism”, and every “intolerance”, that is, which denies the historically actually existing development of (racial, ethnic, national, religious,...) cultural collective and, within these, individual identities, up to the other side of the same coin, namely, the communistic classless world society – always without borders – of a plethora of goods for all, and of the elimination of every kind of injustice, oppression, disease and malady... up to the return to white race-based states of “high(er) trust” and “organic” evolution without the politically and culturally out-group Other. All such utopian plans, all these fantasies, not only will (almost certainly) always remain unrealised, but if they clash on a front which is demographically, ecologically and culturally-politically unfavourable, will contribute to the realisation of that which every Utopia would see in nightmares as Dystopia... [A possible “best case scenario” for the 21st century at a planetary level is outlined or implied e.g. in: Lind Michael, “Blocpolitik”, June 18, 2017, *The National Interest*, July-August 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/blocpolitik-21208?page=show>, and in the related with that article: Lieven Anatol, “Don't Fear the New Nationalism”, June 25, 2017, *The National Interest*, July-August 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-fear-the-new-nationalism-21307?page=show>. Similar themes are covered in Hefaistos Panagiotis, *World theory of Nations. Constitution and maintenance of states, of Europe and of the world*, Poioteta, Athens, 2009 (= Ἡφαιστος Παναγιώτης, *Κοσμοθεωρία τῶν Ἐθνῶν. Συγκρότησις καὶ συγκράτησις τῶν κρατῶν, τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τοῦ κόσμου*, Ἐκδ. Ποιότητα, Ἀθήναι, 2009). The possibility of war between great Powers in the 21st century is treated wholly skillfully in: Mearsheimer John J., “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, *The National Interest*, October 25, 2014 (Editor’s Note: The following is the new concluding chapter of Dr. John J. Mearsheimer’s book *The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics*. A new, updated edition was released on April 7 and is available via Amazon.), <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=show>. Paul Kennedy seems to be far more pessimistic and more in line with Kondylis’s overall position than M. Lind; e.g. Kennedy refers to 1) “wear and tear” of the U.S. navy and the military in general; 2) “fiscal amnesia” (macro-historically fiscal deficit spending year after year after year does not bode well...); and 3) the state of the world environment as being in the long run the single greatest threat to the world (in agreement with Obama), which has four great Powers (U.S.A., China, Russia, India) and (rising) significant Powers like Iran and Indonesia, which will not want to be pushed around, leading to “not a very happy” future (“U.S. Foreign Policy in the Trump Era”, Watch our conference in Washington, DC. By TAC STAFF, *The American Conservative*, November 3, 2017

<http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/live-u-s-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-era/>). Kondylis himself suggested that the significant geopolitical events and developments of the 21st century, inter alia, to a great extent will depend on whether China remains a centralised united state, and whether Russia is pushed into the arms of China by primarily the U.S.A.'s stance, but also Europe's [the E.U.'s stance] (if she remains functionally and materially united; otherwise Europe will become largely geopolitically comparatively irrelevant). Furthermore, whilst nations can definitely survive and develop without a state and/or within an Empire, as history proves and as Kondylis highlighted more than once, it is not, on the other hand, absolutely certain, nor is it absolutely excluded, that a nation or ethnos can survive in the historical long run without a relatively homogenous racial(-ethnological) and/or religious base, on the basis of e.g. "I shop, therefore I am", "We are all the same", "We should all love one another", etc.. In any event, Kondylis believed that the events of the 21st century would not only be the most tragic in history, but also fatal for the ideology of "liberalism" as (internationalistic) Utopia (and Western mass democracy also (?)), just as the 20th century killed off (Soviet) (internationalistic) communism.]

Kondylis's books forming the basis for this article are:

- 1) Conservatism (*Konservativismus*) (1986);
- 2) The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form. The liberal modern era and the mass-democratic postmodern era (*Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform. Die liberale Moderne und die massendemokratische Postmoderne*) (1991);

3) Planetary Politics after the Cold War (*Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*) (1992);

4) The Political and Man (*Das Politische und der Mensch*) (1999);

5) The Political in the 20th century. From Utopias to Globalisation (*Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert. Von den Utopien zur Globalisierung*) (2001).

C.F. maintains and updates the site: www.panagiotiskondylis.com