

## II. (The) Social science(s) and social ontology (Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialontologie)

# 1. [The] Stumbling and [the] flight of fancy of (the) philosophers in the realm (or area) (field, domain, sphere) of the social (social realm) (Stolpern und Höhenflug der Philosophen im Bereich des Sozialen)

The achievements (accomplishments, feats) of the ontologists of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century constituted (were) the popular (beloved, favourite, liked) target of Enlightenment mockery (ridicule, scorn, teasing): they [the said achievements of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century ontologists] smelt of scholasticism. Since then (that time) (Ever since)(,) philosophical ontologies became (have become) more and more (increasingly) half-hearted and ((more and) more, increasingly) rare(r) (scarce, uncommon, seldom), and they (have) enjoyed less and less attention (consideration, recognition, acceptance); in accordance with general (common, universal) [commonly held, mainstream] opinion (opining), natural (i.e. physical) science (die Naturwissenschaft) was henceforth alone (solely) competent (responsible, appropriate) (in regard) to (for) penetrate (penetrating) (find(ing) its way (go(ing)) into (fathom(ing)) the secrets (mysteries) of being (Is) (in die Geheimnisse des Seins einzudringen), to (for, in) account(ing) for the origin (beginnings, provenance, derivation) and constitution (composition or texture) of the world (Ursprung und Beschaffenheit der Welt). The (thereupon) (of necessity) (carried out, effected) turn of many philosophers (carried out, effected, [which] took place (occurred)) (of necessity) (immediately after that) from ontological to anthropological and social-ontological question formulations

(formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of  
 (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) could of course just as little leave its  
 mark on (shape, mould, stamp) modern social science, looked at  
 (considered, regarded) as a whole, as the earlier philosophical efforts  
 (endeavours) at the deciphering (or explaining) of being (Is) had shaped  
 (formed, moulded) the new-times (modern(-era)) world image (picture)  
 (Die daraufhin notgedrungen erfolgte Wendung vieler Philosophen von  
 ontologischen hin zu anthropologischen und sozialontologischen  
 Fragestellungen konnte freilich die moderne Sozialwissenschaft,  
 insgesamt betrachtet, ebensowenig prägen wie die früheren philosophischen  
 Anstrengungen zur Enträtselung des Seins das neuzeitliche Weltbild  
 gestalt hatten). The pioneering (or groundbreaking) (trailblazing;  
 bahnbrechenden) positions and insights came here almost (nearly)  
 without exception from fields (areas, sectors) outside of philosophy,  
 [something] which nevertheless as a rule did not hinder (prevent, stop,  
 obstruct) (on [in respect of] that) one-sidedly (unilaterally) [educated] or  
 half(-)educated philosophers, as well as commentators uneducated in  
 (terms of) (as regards) the history of ideas, from celebrating as [a]  
 specifically philosophical harvest (result(s), yield, fruits, return, proceeds)  
 ideas (or thoughts) which for other(s) [scientists, thinkers, philosophers] –  
 in many cases (frequently) in [with] different terminology and in other  
 contexts – were already [a] commonplace. On the whole (In general  
 (terms)), (the) new-times (modern(-era)) philosophy has not been (was  
 not) able to (could not) independently determine its own question  
 formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations,  
 examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes), because these  
 [question formulations] were directly or indirectly dictated first of all by  
 the formation of mathematical natural (i.e. physical) science in the 17<sup>th</sup>  
 century, [and] then (after that, after(wards)) [thereafter] by the rise of

anthropology and historical or social science in the Age of Enlightenment (Geschichts- bzw. Sozialwissenschaft im Zeitalter der Aufklärung); in the 19<sup>th</sup> and in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the dual (double, twin) predominance (supremacy) of these disciplines continued, while at the same time (in relation to which) the tensions (stresses, strains) in their relation(ship) (with (towards) each other) partly (turned, separated) [divided] (the) (philosophers) (against one another, into different camps) (e.g. scientific positivism vs. phenomenology and hermeneutics (szientistischer Positivismus vs. Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik)), [and] partly encouraged [them, philosophers] to appear as supreme (or chief) judges. This matter of concern (or aim) (objective, purpose, desire) [, i.e. to appear as supreme judges,] did (was) not however meet with success (come to pass, realised, destined to succeed) (achieved), in any case (at any rate, anyhow) no(ne) [success, achievement] was recognised as such outside of rather isolated philosophical circles<sup>1</sup>.

In view of (With regard to) our more special (particular, specific) knowledge (cognitive) (or research) interests (Im Hinblick auf unsere spezielleren Erkenntnisinteressen), this (these) state of affairs (facts (of the matter), circumstances) in the history of ideas can be schematised as follows: the philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) was shaped (formed, moulded) by (in (respect of), with) [a, the] dual (double, twin) endeavour (effort),(,; :) to deal (cope) with (manage) the (epistemological, knowledge-theoretical) aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) (pertaining to the theory of knowledge), which mathematical natural (i.e. physical) science – e.g. through (by means of, with) the distinction (difference, differentiation) between primary and secondary properties (or qualities) or through the postulate of

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<sup>1</sup> In relation to this complex (or set of issues) in the history of ideas see Kondylis, *Metaphysikkritik*, esp. pp. 149ff., 372ff..

strict causality in nature (durch die Unterscheidung zwischen primären und sekundären Eigenschaften oder durch das Postulat strenger Naturkausalität) – raised (threw up), and at the same time, to psychologically-anthropologically safeguard (protect) the ethical claim of normative Reason vis-à-vis the authority of faith (belief) (und zugleich den ethischen Anspruch normativer Vernunft gegenüber der Glaubensautorität). The steps towards (for) an overcoming of the philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) through the theoretical putting first of factors like the lifeworld, intersubjectivity or the strata (layers) of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) strata) [strata of depth] of existence as [the] terrain (territory, ground, soil, land) (der Lebenswelt, der Intersubjektivität oder der Tiefenschichten der Existenz als Boden) on which philosophy (also as philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy)) can only grow, took place (then) again (on the other hand, in turn) against the background (backdrop) and under the (atmospheric) pressure (of an atmosphere) of an already advanced historical and social science, which frequently (in many cases) unconsciously took up (absorbed, assimilated) or (meta-)developed basic (fundamental) Enlightenment approaches (tendencies, currents) (die aufklärerische Grundansätze vielfach unbewußt aufnahm bzw. weiterentwickelte) and, looked at (regarded, considered) in [regard to] [as to] their overall (total) effect, destroyed (ruined) philosophy's myth of life (or life myth) (den Lebensmythos der Philosophie), that is, the myth of the autonomy of the intellect(-spirit), namely, through (the) proof of its [the intellect(-spirit)'s] biological, geographical, economic, ideological etc. dependencies. Otherwise stated (said) (In other words, Put differently): from the moment (instance, time) (in, at) which the conviction [that] the products of the intellect(-spirit) in general are deducible (derivable, inferable) from non-intellectual constants or variables (Geistesprodukte überhaupt seien aus nicht

intellektuellen Konstanten oder Variablen ableitbar) was consolidated in the consciousness of the (socially and historically scientifically educated) broader public (audience) (educated in social and historical science) (des breiteren sozial- und geschichtswissenschaftlich gebildeten Publikums), at least one main (chief) school of thought (or tendency) (trend, direction) of philosophy (eine Hauptrichtung der Philosophie) had to follow suit (play along) and set out on a search of that ontic terrain (territory, ground, soil, land) (ontischen Boden) on which philosophy itself grows. This philosophical investigation (research, exploration) of [into] the roots of philosophy in being (Is) was often mixed (blended), as [it] was (to be) expected, with handed (passed) down (i.e. traditional) metaphysical or ontological thoughts (notions, ideas, perceptions) and concepts (mit überlieferten metaphysischen oder ontologischen Gedanken und Begriffen), which though, now in (on, from) the roundabout way of the illumination (elucidation) of the structures of existence (auf dem Unweg der Erhellung von Strukturen der Existenz), (were) turned (back (again), around) (were bent) towards the anthropological [sphere, field, domain, dimension, element] (ins Anthropologische umgebogen wurden), and consequently (thus, therefore) found [a] connection (made contact, were connected) with ongoing ((then) current) debates. The prospect (perspective) of a *social* ontology, however, emerged (could be seen to emerge) only when question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes), which despite all [the] philosophical mystification (bei aller philosophischen Mystifizierung) were in actual fact of [an] anthropological character, were connected with fundamental (basic) reflections (considerations or thoughts) (deliberations, observations) (grundsätzlichen Überlegungen) in respect of the lifeworld and intersubjectivity. The influence of the social (sciences) and (intellectual(-

spiritual) sciences) (of the humanities) (Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften) and of the New Times (Modern Era) in general made itself felt (became apparent (noticeable)) therefore exactly in [the fact] that the aforementioned search for the ontic original foundation (or first cause) lying beyond (on the other side of) the philosophical intellect flowed (lead), again despite all (the) philosophical mystification, in(to) social ontology.

This development was of course uneven (non-uniform, patchy, asymmetrical, irregular) and contradictory (inconsistent) (ungleichmäßig und widersprüchlich), and indeed not only because of (the) strong (intense, stark) memories (recollections, remembrances, reminiscences) of traditional metaphysics and ontology. Husserl's positive and negative entanglement (embroilment, involvement) in (with) the new-times (modern(-era)) theory of knowledge (epistemology) and philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) likewise had (has) an impeding (obstructive) effect (worked obstructively (hinderingly, hamperingly)); the [his] ontological intention, to tap into (or infer) (develop, open up, deduce, decipher, find) the foundations (depths, cause, reason; Grund) of philosophy and science, was here of course (indeed, in fact) unmistakable (obvious), on the other hand however, the ontic foundations (depths, cause, reason) were moved (transferred) into (laid in) the noetic [sphere] (i.e. mind or intellect) (wurde aber der ontische Grund ins Noetische hineinverlegt), and the thematisation (examination or making the subject of discussion) (die Thematisierung) of intersubjectivity and [the] lifeworld was undertaken not least ((first) of all, primarily) from the point of view (perspective, angle) of the question (problem, issue) of constitution (Konstitutionsfrage). Nonetheless, neither the anthropologisation or psychologisation of those foundations ([the]

growing weight of the bodily (physical, corporeal) and affective factor), nor the broadening (widening, expansion, extension) of this thematisation under [with regard to, in accordance with, subject to, in view of] the free use of historical leitmotifs, could be long in coming (delayed). In particular (Especially, Particularly)(,) the connection (fastening, tying) to (with) Dilthey – over Husserl’s head (without consulting Husserl) – meant a conscious (re)taking ((re)picking) up of the thread (again) of (the) methodically (i.e. methodologically) already refined historical science (science of history) (der methodisch schon raffinierten Geschichtswissenschaft), since Dilthey was Droysen’s immediate successor, as well as [meaning] an unconscious continuation of Enlightenment (social(-)(scientific) and historical-scientific) approaches (in social and historical science) (aufklärerischer sozial- und geschichtswissenschaftlicher Ansätze), since Dilthey, as one amongst very few [thinkers, philosophers], did not share (in) [a belief in] the legend (or myth) of the intellectualistic Enlightenment (der intellektualistischen Aufklärung)<sup>2</sup>. Dilthey’s methodological considerations (thoughts or reflections) (deliberations) and analyses as regards the history of ideas constituted a pioneering feat (Pionierleistung) in the philosophical search for the (social)ontic roots of philosophy, and as such had to shake up (necessarily shook up) the self-confidence (self-assurance) of the philosophers of the subject (das Selbstbewußtsein der Subjektphilosophen), especially the intellectualistically oriented (aligned) [ones, philosophers of the subject] (der intellektualistisch ausgerichteten). Simultaneously (At the same time, Concurrently) however, they [Dilthey’s methodological considerations and analyses regarding the history of ideas] were suitable for the [purpose of] instilling a new self-

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<sup>2</sup> See the treatise „Das 18. Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt“, *Ges. Schriften*, III, p. 209ff.. Cf. Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 421ff..



confidence in those philosophers who were prepared (ready, willing) for a rethink (to reorientate their thought) (die zum Umdenken bereit waren). Because the humiliation (or degradation) – if one may say so – of philosophy by the social and historical sciences (Denn die Erniedrigung – wenn man so sagen darf – der Philosophie durch die Sozial- und Geschichtswissenschaften) was compensated by (through) [an, the] intensified (exacerbated, aggravated) demarcation (delimitation, dissociation) against (from, vis-à-vis) (Abgrenzung gegen) the natural (i.e. physical) sciences, in relation to which many philosophers assigned themselves the task of taking on (assuming, accepting) the leadership in the revolt (rebellion, uprising, revolution) against the natural sciences (die Führung im Aufstand gegen die Naturwissenschaften), and thereby (thus, as a result) conferring (granting, giving, awarding) anew (upon, to) their field (subject, realm, domain; Fach) the old regal (kingly, royal) dignity under (in) more difficult (less favourable) conditions (circumstances). That is why the above-mentioned revolt soon obtained a world-theoretical (view, graphic, representative, illustrational) aspect going far beyond the methodological dimension (über die methodologische Dimension weit hinausgehenden weltanschaulichen Aspekt); the revolt therefore came (arrived) on the scene as [the, a] struggle against (the) “instrumental thought (thinking)”, the “thoughtlessness of technology (technique)” and modern civilisation in general (generally) (das „instrumentelle Denken“, „die Gedankenlosigkeit der Technik“ und die moderne Zivilisation überhaupt). Even in neo-Kantian circles, which otherwise thought much of their own methodological rigour (strictness, stringency), the clean separation of the nomological from the idiographic (die saubere Trennung des Nomologischen von Idiographischen) was often and gladly (or willingly) transformed (changed, converted) into a partisanship (taking sides, siding, positioning, espousal, advocacy) in

favour of (for) the latter [idiographic], and the thought (intellectual) categories (categories of thought; Denkkategorien) were (culturally-philosophically or culturally-historically) underpinned (supported, sustained) (in terms of the philosophy or history of culture) (wurden kulturphilosophisch oder -geschichtlich untermauert). The paradoxical overall result of such and similar tendencies was this: the more philosophy devoted itself to (espoused) an anti-intellectualistic stance (or positioning) (attitude, view), the more it admitted (confessed, owned up) (to) – often unintentionally (involuntarily) or while gnashing its teeth (grudgingly) – [that] it itself did not spring (arise) from (the, a) clear, unerring (or incorruptible) intellect, but from a frequently (in many cases) opaque (obscure) (anthropological and social) ontic terrain (territory, ground, soil, land). Quite a few (Many a, Some) [philosopher(s), thinker(s)] were (was) of course only all too willing to propagate this loudly. (The, A) Desire (An appetite) for provocation played, into the bargain (in the course of this), a role, also (as well as) the feeling (sense) [that] as [a] philosopher in the conventional (traditional) sense, one did not, anyway, have very much to lose.

So (Thus, In this way), a main (chief) school of thought (or tendency) (trend, direction) of philosophy (eine Hauptrichtung der Philosophie) in the 20<sup>th</sup> century reached (arrived at) (up to, as far as) the threshold of social ontology. But only up to (as far as) there. Because the ontological categories, which one adopted (borrowed, took) partly from the philosophical tradition, [and] partly (has) shaped (moulded) oneself, were – entirely (completely) apart from the question of their [the said ontological categories'] in principle (programmatic, fundamental) usefulness (usability) in the new context – applied not to the being (Is) of the social or to society in its social-ontologically decisive (determinative)

dimension, but rather to [the] individual existences and [the] relations between the[se] same [(those) individuals, them] (nicht auf das Sein des Sozialen bzw. auf die Gesellschaft in ihren sozialontologisch maßgeblichen Dimensionen, sondern vielmehr auf individuelle Existenzen und Beziehungen zwischen denselben). The ascertainment [that] the being(Is)-in-the-world and the being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) (das In-der-Welt-Sein und das Mitsein) constituted indispensable categorial (categorical) determinations (or definitions) of the subject (unabdingbare kategorielle Bestimmungen des Subjekts) did not therefore serve as [the, a] starting point for the exploration of (investigation (research) into) that world, to which exactly the being(Is)-in-the-world as being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) of (the) individual existences refers, but as [the] not further deepened foundation (or basis) of considerations (thoughts or reflections) (deliberations) on [the] character and possibilities of existence in its being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) with others [other existences] (sondern als nicht weiter vertiefte Grundlage von Überlegungen über Charakter und Möglichkeiten der Existenz in ihrem Mitsein mit anderen). It was indeed declared (or explained) (said, stated) – and in this declaration (or explanation) (statement) the deciding (decisive) step beyond (over) the philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) was beheld (seen) –, [that] being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) are for existence absolutely (really, actually, virtually) constitutive (geradezu konstitutiv), but in the course of this, exactly the constitution of existence (die Konstitution der Existenz), not that [the constitution] of the social and of society stood (was) at the centre of attention (interest), [in regard to] which [(and) the said constitution of the social and of society] rather had an (took) effect (worked) as [a] mere backdrop (setting, scenery). To conceptually apprehend (grasp, understand) the social-ontic (das Sozialontische) and to

consequently set up (or formulate) (put forward, establish, propose, advance) a social ontology (eine Sozialontologie aufzustellen), and, to emphasise (underline, stress) the social-ontic aspect (den sozialontischen Aspekt) or also the character of existence, are obviously (evidently) two [(completely) different] things. The pleasant (nice, substantial) result (outcome) of [the] philosophical efforts (endeavours) was, at any rate, the ontologisation (die Ontologisierung) of categories or concepts (notions), which from [the point of view of, in relation to] their content (Gehalt) actually (really, originally) belonged to anthropology. Kierkegaard had mapped (or traced) (worked) out how such a thing can be done when he described (outlined, sketched) [the] central existential situations of man (humans) as functions of his (their) ontic relation(ship) with a [something] higher or overarching (superior or general) [thing] (i.e. with something higher or overarching) (als er zentrale existentielle Lagen des Menschen als Funktionen seines ontischen Verhältnisses mit einem Höheren oder Übergreifenden), and not for instance as merely psychological given (actual) facts (Gegebenheiten)<sup>3</sup>. Now certainly during the projection of ontological structures inside existence, or during the apprehension (grasping, understanding) of existence with the help (on the basis) of ontological conceptuality, ample (abundant, liberal) use of phenomenological insights and analyses was made (bei der Erfassung der Existenz anhand ontologischer Begrifflichkeit reichlich Gebrauch von phänomenologischen Einsichten und Analysen gemacht); though (however) Kierkegaard's example remained definitive (authoritative, important, decisive) in another important respect, and indeed not so much because of a direct content-related(filled) (substantive) influence, but out [because] of much more general reasons, which have to do with the

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Buber, *Problem*, p. 92.

deepest power claim of philosophers, i.e. the claim to be creators  
 (founders or establishers) of meaning(,) and as a result (thus)(,) guides  
 (signposts) (Sinnstifter und somit Wegweiser). Kierkegaard's ontological  
 version of the existential (ontologische Fassung des Existentiellen) was  
 (stood), as is (well) known, characterised (marked, under the influence  
 (sign)) by (of) an ethical-normative, in his case, religious concern (worry,  
 anxiety), and exactly this concern (worry, anxiety) now (re)gained (got)  
 (again), especially vis-à-vis the relative normative colourlessness of the  
 original (initial) phenomenological approach, the upper hand, even if it  
 [the said (religious) concern] in some thinkers, by no means (not in the  
 least) in all, lost the religious hue. The question (problem, issue) of (in  
 relation to, about, regarding, in accordance with) the ontological  
 constitution (state, condition or texture) of existence (der ontologischen  
 Verfassung der Existenz) soon (suddenly, abruptly) turned (changed) into  
 the [a] question of "genuine (authentic, real, true)" existence („echten“  
 Existenz), and from (out of) the ascertainment of the constitutive  
 character of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), or, of the social  
 relation, for existence, ([there] was) a demand for [the] regulation of this  
 relation in accordance with the needs (requirements) of "genuine"  
 existence [arose, ensued, came about] – still further: it [the said  
 ascertainment and demand] was (were) a description (portrayal, account)  
 of the ontic-existential (des Ontisch-Existentiellen) and of the social-ontic  
 on the basis of perceptions (views, notions, representations;  
 Vorstellungen) of (regarding, on) "genuine" existence and [the]  
 "genuine" (interhuman, interpersonal) relation (between humans  
 (people)) (zwischenmenschliche Beziehung): the Ought turned (was  
 transformed (converted)) thereby (because of that, as a result), in  
 accordance with [a] tried and tested (proven, effective) model (pattern or  
 example), into an Is (Das Sollen verwandelte sich dadurch nach

bewährtem Muster in ein Sein). Only the analysis of the social-ontic and of the existential from the privileged or exclusive point of view of the relation between existences, or the relation between (“the”) (“)personal(”) existence on the one hand and (“the”) (“)impersonal(”) society on the other hand, could develop that dramaticality (dramaticness) which allowed (permitted) an effective raising (posing) of the question of meaning and of (the) Ought (Sinn- und Sollensfrage), irrespective of (no matter) whether the philosopher, in the process, more likely (rather) enthused about (dreamt of) longed-for ideal relations, or preferably (mainly, chiefly) lamented the wretchedness (misery) of present(-day) (current) relations.

No doubt (Certainly), the analysis of the – anyway (at any rate, in any event)(,) social – relation between individuals belongs, just like (as) certain aspects of anthropology, to social ontology’s research area (area of research), but only under (on, in accordance with) the logical condition that the social-ontic or society is not deduced (derived) from relations between individual existences, but conversely (vice versa, the other way around), these relations are understood (comprehended) or (conceptually) put in order (ordered, incorporated) (conceptually) only out of consideration for the social-ontic or (the) society as a whole. The analysis of the social relation between individuals can offer (provide, afford, present) one amongst several (a few) possible starting points in the direction of a social ontology,(;) it [the said social relation between individuals] constitutes neither its [social ontology’s] exclusive field (area, sector) nor its [social ontology’s] theoretical peak (summit) (Gewiß, die Analyse der – ohnehin sozialen – Beziehung zwischen Individuen gehört, ebenso wie bestimmte Aspekte der Anthropologie, zum Forschungsbereich der Sozialontologie, aber nur unter der logischen

Bedingung, daß nicht das Sozialontische oder die Gesellschaft aus Beziehungen zwischen individuellen Existenzen abgeleitet, sondern umgekehrt diese Beziehungen erst mit Rücksicht auf das Sozialontische oder die Gesellschaft als ganze begriffen bzw. begrifflich eingeordnet werden. Die Analyse der sozialen Beziehung zwischen Individuen kann einen unter einigen möglichen Ausgangspunkten in Richtung auf eine Sozialontologie bieten, sie bildet weder deren ausschließliches Gebiet noch deren theoretischen Gipfel)<sup>4</sup>. But the intellects(-spirits) of (the) philosophers did not separate (or diverge) (divide) on (in regard to, over) this social-ontologically crucial question (matter), which was touched upon by them only indirectly, namely, through the acknowledgement (recognition) of the constitutive significance (importance, meaning) of the being(Is)-in-the-world and the being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) for the being (Is) of existence. Rather, they separated (or diverged) (divided) in the attempts at analysing or at determining (defining) the relation between I and You or between I and society in (the) light of, on each and every respective occasion, different ethical-normative preferences (die Beziehung zwischen Ich und Du oder zwischen Ich und Gesellschaft im Lichte jeweils anderer ethisch-normativer Präferenzen). It should (must,

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<sup>4</sup> See our comments (remarks) following (below) on (in regard to) [the] spectrum and [the] mechanism of the social relation. Hence it is wrong (false) to describe (refer to, call) the relation of the I with (towards, in respect of) the You as “pre-social (or pre-societal)” (das Verhältnis des Ich zum Du als „vorgesellschaftlich“); such a relation is *stricto sensu* post-social (or post-societal) (nachgesellschaftlich), if one may say so, i.e. it always takes place (happens, occurs) inside of, or against the background of, an already constituted society, and in it [this society] all [the] central social-ontological factors have an (take) effect (work), as they intersect with (or cross) one another in the fact [of] “society”. Theunissen, who is responsible (to blame) for this wrong (false) description, states something which is [commits, makes] an oxymoron as well. Although he himself emphasises (underlines, stresses) “the limitations (narrowness) of the area (realm) of validity (or applicability) of the I-You-relation” („die Begrenztheit des Geltungsbereichs der Ich-Du-Beziehung“), and expresses the correct (right) conviction [that] neither from the transcendental nor from the dialogical approach (weder vom transzendentalen noch vom dialogischen Ansatz aus) [is there] any passable (feasible, practicable) way (path, road) [which] would lead to(wards) the constitution of the social, nevertheless, he calls his studies on (as regards) exactly both these approaches “Studies on (in relation to) the social ontology of the present” („Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart“), with the only justification [(being) that] Husserl had already used the term [“social ontology”] (*Der Andere*, pp. 7, 256 footnote 22, 492, 6).

ought to) be stressed (emphasised, underlined) that these preferences accompanied (cultural-critical) position(ing)s (stances) (pertaining to cultural critique (criticism)) (kulturkritischen Stellungnahmen) or articulated such [cultural critique] indirectly. There were important differences between (the) individual philosophers here too. But the (cultural-critical) stance (attitude, positioning) (pertaining to cultural critique) constituted just as great a common denominator as the ethical-normative [one, stance], because with it [the stance pertaining to cultural critique], the great intellectual(-spiritual) claim of this main school of thought (or tendency) (trend, direction) of philosophy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (der große geistige Anspruch dieser Hauptrichtung der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts) was connected, which, as [we have already] said (stated), wanted to lead the revolt (rebellion, uprising, revolution) against the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and (the) technically-instrumentally shaped (moulded, determined, formed, characterised) civilisation (technisch-instrumentell geprägte Zivilisation). The other [main school of thought (or tendency) of 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy], the scientific or positivistic main (chief) school of thought (or tendency) (trend, direction) (die szientistische oder positivistische Hauptrichtung) devoted (dedicated) itself, as is (well) known, to logical and mathematical problems, which directly or indirectly interrelated (connected) with the reshaping (restructuring, reorganisation, remodelling) of natural (i.e. physical) science around (circa) 1900.

In view (consideration) of (Considering) the differences in the ethical-normative preferences and in the weighing up (assessment; Gewichtung) of the critique (criticism) of culture (or cultural critique) (Kulturkritik), two main (chief) types of philosophical analysis of the social relation (zwei Haupttypen philosophischer Analyse der sozialen Beziehung) can



be picked out (discerned or distinguished) (identified). (The) (One) [of them (main type of philosophical analysis of the social relation)] is found in Heidegger, who of course rejects (repudiates) every “moralising” [intention] (and “cultural-philosophical” intention) (regarding the “philosophy of culture”)<sup>5</sup>, but at the same time [he] extensively (abundantly, substantially) makes use (avails himself) of the typical vocabulary of the then (at that time) aestheticising or moralising (cultural-critical) literature and journalism (pertaining to cultural critique (criticism)) (ästhetisierenden oder moralisierenden kulturkritischen Literatur und Publizistik)<sup>6</sup>. The ethical matter of concern went (followed) here of course (on) its own way (path), it differed, that is, from the ethics of the vulgus profanum, and, (so, thus) seen (in this way), it could and wanted to pass itself off even as unethical (i.e. non-ethical or having nothing to do with ethics) (unethisch). However, the determination (definition) of the modes (or ways) of being (Is) of being (t)here (or existence) as actuality (reality, trueness or genuineness) (authenticity) and unactuality (unreality, untrueness or ungenuineness) (inauthenticity) (die Bestimmung der Seinsweisen des Daseins als Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit) already points to (indicates, suggests) its [Heidegger’s ethical matter of concern’s] effect (or impact), in relation to which the latter [unactuality (unreality, untrueness or ungenuineness)] typically (enough) (characteristically) can be apparent (visible, noticeable, perceptible, evident, obvious) in human qualities (characteristics or properties) (an menschlichen Eigenschaften)(,) which flourish (thrive) principally (first and foremost) in modern civilisation: bustling activity

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<sup>5</sup> *Sein und Zeit*, p. 167.

<sup>6</sup> Even after the “turn”, Heidegger [had, has] never wanted to explain how the thesis [in respect] of (regarding) the moral indifference of “being (Is)” can be reconciled (consistent, compatible) with the loud complaints against (about) [the] “flight of the gods, destruction (ruin) of (the) earth, massification of humans (men, people), precedence (primacy or pre-eminence) (priority) of the mediocre (Flucht der Götter, Zerstörung der Erde, Vermassung des Menschen, Vorrang des Mittelmäßigen)” (*Einführung*, p. 34).

(busyness, hustle and bustle), animatedness (or liveliness) (Geschäftigkeit, Angeregtheit) etc.<sup>7</sup>. This fundamental (elementary, basic) determination (definition) or contradistinction (contrasting) has normative connotations, and neither did it constitute [a, the] constituent (integral) element (part) (component) of the earlier phenomenological ideas (or thoughts), nor does it arise (emanate, result) (is it derived) as [a, the] necessary finding (ascertainment, result) of phenomenological analysis. Yet from its [the said fundamental determination or contradistinction's] point of view, the analysis of (the) being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) or (the) being (t)here (or existence)(-)-with (Mitseins oder Mitdaseins) ensues (results, takes place, follows). Because its [being(-)-with or being (t)here (or existence)(-)-with's] horizon is the somebody (people or the They), which indeed represents (constitutes, is) an “existential [element (phenomenon, characteristic)]”(,) and “as [an] original phenomenon [belongs] to the positive constitution (state, condition or texture) of being (t)here (or existence)”, for which [the said being (t)here (or existence)] he or they [the somebody (people or the They)] even (in fact) provides (procures, gets) (or provide) “relieving of tension (or relief of strain)”, but (yet) on the other hand, brings about (causes, gives rise to) (or bring about) a splitting (dissociation, division) of the same [being (t)here (or existence)] into [an] “actual (real, true or genuine) self” and [a] “somebody (people or the They)-self”; “as somebody (people or the They)-self, each and every respective being (t)here (or existence) is scattered (or dispersed) (diffused) in the somebody (people or the They), and must first find itself”, it [the said being (t)here (or existence)] experiences (goes (lives) through) a decline (decay or fall)(,) which can be described (referred to) as [a] “sharper (or more precise) (stronger,

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<sup>7</sup> *Sein und Zeit*, p. 42ff..

clearer) determination (definition)” of its [the said being (t)here (or existence’s)] unactuality (unreality, untrueness or unguineness) (inauthenticity) (Denn dessen Horizont ist das Man, das zwar ein „Existenzial“ darstellt und „als ursprüngliches Phänomen zur positiven Verfassung des Daseins“ gehört, diesem sogar „Entlastung“ verschafft, doch andererseits eine Spaltung desselben in „eigentliches Selbst“ und „Man-selbst“ bewirkt; „als Man-selbst ist das jeweilige Dasein in das Man zerstreut und muß sich erst finden“, es erlebt ein Verfallen, das als „schärfere Bestimmung“ seiner Uneigentlichkeit bezeichnet werden kann)<sup>8</sup>. The one actuality (reality, trueness or genuineness) (authenticity), through which the existence (die Existenz) is made unassailable (incontestable; unanfechtbar) against the somebody (people or the They) is the resoluteness (resolve, determination, resolution) “as actual (real, true or genuine) (authentic) self-being(Is)” („als eigentliches Selbstsein“) and as living (vivid) embodiment (incarnation) of (the) opposition to (contrasting (conflict) with) the “irresoluteness (irresolution)” of the somebody (people or the They), and over and above that, to (with) his (or their) “ordinariness (or average(ness) [standard or level]) (mediocrity)”, to (with) his (or their) insensitivity (lack of sensitivity) “to all differences of level and of genuineness (or authenticity)” (zu seiner „Durchschnittlichkeit“, seiner Unempfindlichkeit „gegen alle Unterschiede des Niveaus und der Echtheit.“)<sup>9</sup>

All the same (However, After all, Nevertheless, Yet), the (cultural-critical and) ethical-normative tones (pertaining to cultural critique) [are] therefore remain [heard] loud and clear (distinct, unmistakable), and in the heat of battle between (the) actual (real, true or genuine) (authentic) and (the) unactual (unreal, untrue or unguine) (inauthentic)

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<sup>8</sup> Loc. cit., pp. 129, 175ff..

<sup>9</sup> Loc. cit., pp. 297, 298, 299, 127.

(Eigentlichem und Uneigentlichem), if not conceptually laying down (fixing, defining, setting, determining) the social-ontic, then at least explaining (illustrating) [the] spectrum and mechanism of the social relation between existences (Spektrum und Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung zwischen Existenzen) in greater detail (more precisely), (it) is missed (neglected). In particular, understanding (das Verstehen) in its crucial (key, pivotal, critical) function during (in) this relation is hardly thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion), but rather [(understanding) is thematised] in connection (interrelation) with the [an] “outline (or blueprint) (sketch, draft, plan, project)” as [one’s] own possibility of being (t)here (or existence) situated (located) (or found) (contained) in the world (in Zusammenhang mit dem „Entwurf“ als eigener Möglichkeit des in der Welt befindlichen Daseins)<sup>10</sup>. Under these circumstances, and during (in) the simultaneous in principle, but otherwise vague acknowledgement (recognition) of the being(Is)(-)-with-one-another as manner (or kind) of being (Is) of being (t)here (or existence) (des Miteinanderseins als Seinsart des Daseins), only the road (path, way) of the description of the (situational) states of mind of the individual existence (Befindlichkeiten der individuellen Existenz) in the guise of ontological categories remains open. The venture (undertaking) is in its content (Gehalt), i.e. apart from the conceptual empty words, anthropologically oriented, and Heidegger himself admits [that] his “fundamental ontology” constitutes a part, namely the “ontological foundation (or founding) (backing up)” of a “philosophical anthropology” („Fundamentalontologie“ bilde einen Teil, nämlich die „ontologische Fundierung“ einer „philosophischen Anthropologie“)<sup>11</sup>. The ontologically founded anthropology was supposed (meant) to realise, on a(n) extended

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<sup>10</sup> Loc. cit., p. 145ff.. Cf. in this volume, Ch. IV, Sec. 1C, below.

<sup>11</sup> Loc. cit., p. 17.

(broadened, widened, expanded, enlarged) and deepened basis, Husserl's program, to illuminate (or examine) (take a look at) the constitution of the pre-scientific world, that is, the non-scientific substratum of science (die Konstitution der vorwissenschaftlichen Welt, also das nicht wissenschaftliche Substrat der Wissenschaft). In place of the (subject(-philosophical) or consciousness philosophical) (conceptual) instruments (regarding the philosophy of the subject or of consciousness) (subject or consciousness philosophy) (subjekt- oder bewußtseinsphilosophischen Instrumentariums), which Husserl used in the course of this, Heidegger now wants to put (place, set) a more comprehensive (extensive) (broader) illumination of the manner (or kind) of being (Is) of being (t)here (or existence), to open up (disclose, deduce or decipher) (the) being (t)here (or existence)-like facticity and to found (or base) (establish, set up) the transcendental constitution of the world on exactly this facticity ("(situational) state of mind" etc.) (die daseinsmäßige Faktizität erschließen und die transzendente Weltkonstitution auf eben diese Faktizität („Befindlichkeit“ etc.) gründen). As we already indicated (hinted, intimated, mentioned briefly, suggested), and at the end (conclusion) of this section we want to explain in more detail (more precisely)(,) [that] this “overcoming” of the philosophy of the subject and of consciousness (subject and consciousness philosophy) was no pioneering (trailblazing, groundbreaking, epoch-making) achievement (accomplishment, feat), but the long-winded (overelaborate, ponderous, complicated) and delayed philosophical acknowledgement (recognition) of the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) facts (in the history of ideas)(,) which since the Enlightenment set the tone in the social (sciences) and (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) (the humanities) (sondern die umständliche und verspätete philosophische Anerkennung von geistesgeschichtlichen Tatsachen, die seit der Aufklärung in den Sozial-

und Geisteswissenschaften den Ton angaben). This explains too why the “overcoming” of Husserl did not constitute (represent) (was not) a direct answer to *his* [Husserl’s] problem, but in reality [was] a shift (displacement) in the examination (study) of (the) problem (problems). Husserl would not of course (in fact) dispute (deny, contest, challenge) that man is born into the (intersubjective) world(,) and *is* in the world (der Mensch in die (intersubjektive) Welt hineingeboren wird und in der Welt *ist*); this ascertainment does not in the least, however, answer the question about (regarding) the constitution of the consciousness as well as the constitution of the world and of the Other (other) in the consciousness (der Konstitution des Bewußtseins sowie der Konstitution der Welt und des Anderen im Bewußtsein). The question is – no matter (irrespective (regardless) of) whether Husserl has formulated (phrased) and solved it [the question] correctly – absolutely (quite, perfectly, thoroughly) legitimate, and requires (calls for, commands) that the [a] researcher takes the reverse(d) path of knowledge (knowledge path; Erkenntnisweg) than for instance [that (the path of knowledge) of] a social ontology, which, as it were (so to speak), from the outside and without consideration for (regardless of) the inner (internal) mechanisms of consciousness (Bewußtseinsmechanismen), must and is allowed to (may, should) make its fundamental (basic) statement (opinion, pronouncement, assertion, proposition) on (regarding, in respect of) the fact of society (das Faktum der Gesellschaft). Whoever, on the other hand (however), wants to get to the bottom of (fathom, find out) these mechanisms, does not [cannot] get around (away from) (the) insight [(into the fact) that] in the end (finally, ultimately) there is no other conceivable (imaginable, thinkable, possible; denkbaren) *cognitive* starting point than the perspective of an individual consciousness, in which also the other subjects must be constituted irrespective of their objective existence (availability or presence)

(Vorhandensein); because whoever does not want to accept this insight, does it for his part (in turn) also from the perspective of his own consciousness, for which the question of constitution is again posed, and so on and so forth. To confuse (mix up, mistake) the ontic pre-givenness (or pre-existence) (Die ontische Vorgegebenheit) of (the) being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), with (for) its [(the) being with's] constitution in the consciousness, and to interpret (explain) the cognitively unavoidable (inescapable, inevitable) putting first [in respect] of the analysis of the latter [being with's constitution in the consciousness] as denial of the former [ontic pre-givenness (or pre-existence) of (the) being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with)], i.e. to muddle (mix) up (confuse) *πρῶτον φύσει* and *πρῶτον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* (first in (or by) nature and first towards (amongst, unto or in regard to) us), is simply a logical error (mistake). Of course, only (all) too willing (ready, prepared) to perpetrate (commit) it [the said confusing, interpreting and logical error] were those for whom Husserl's phenomenology as intellectual(-spiritual) unfolding (or development) space (room for unfolding, field of activity) (*geistiger Entfaltungsraum*) was no longer sufficient (enough) (no longer sufficed), and they consciously or unconsciously conducted (carried on (out)) a shift (displacement) in (of) the question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme)<sup>12</sup>.

To those [, who found Husserl's phenomenology insufficient,] belong, apart from Heidegger, the dialogicians (*die Dialogiker*), who otherwise saw (considered, sensed) themselves as (felt like [they were]) his [Heidegger's] opponents. Before (we) turn(ing) (ourselves) to them, we

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<sup>12</sup> Terse (Succinct) statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) like that of Sartre: «On rencontre autrui, on ne le constitue pas» (One meets another, one does not constitute him) (*Être*, p. 295), show that we are indeed (actually, in fact) here dealing with a shift (displacement).

want to very briefly characterise, from [a] social-ontological point of view, two intellectual (thought) approaches (Denkansätze) which were (stood) close(r) to phenomenology. On the whole (In general (terms)), Sartre moves in the same thought (or intellectual) framework (framework (context) of thought) (Denkrahmen) as Heidegger, since also in him [his thought (work)] the real content of (the) ontological categories remains anthropological, and (the) being (Is) is understood (taken, grasped, interpreted, conceived) as existence (das Sein als Existenz), not for instance as society. With regard to the being (Is) of existence (das Sein der Existenz), the social relation is discussed too; on this point, however, in comparison to Heidegger, a concretisation worth mentioning takes place, which however (in the meantime) is accompanied by a misunderstanding. Heidegger had (has) little to say about [the] structure and spectrum of the apodictically imported (or established) (set up, introduced) constitutive being(Is)(-)-with-one-another of existences (apodiktisch eingeführten konstitutiven Miteinanderseins der Existenzen), and the (cultural-critical) intention (pertaining to cultural critique (criticism)) during the description (account, portrayal) of the somebody (people or the They) is served while this [somebody] (or these [people]) appears or appear in grey undifferentiability (i.e. as bearing a grey undifferentiated property (quality or nature)) (und der kulturkritischen Absicht bei der Schilderung des Man wird gedient, indem dieses in grauer Undifferenziertheit erscheint). Sartre now holds (regards, considers) the undifferentiability to be (as) cohesion (or unity) (Geschlossenheit), he reads into the somebody (people or the They) the constitution (composition or texture) of an «équipe» (“team”)<sup>13</sup> – in order to then destroy (or demolish)

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<sup>13</sup> *Être*, pp. 292ff., 478ff.. The social-ontologically crucial (key, pivotal, critical) (great) variety of form (or multiformity) of the social relation is only mentioned briefly (hinted at, intimated, indicated) in note form and selectively in Heidegger, and indeed on the one hand as “care (or welfare) helping out” („einspringende Fürsorge“), on the other hand as “distantiality” („Abständigkeit“) or worry (or



(ruin, wreck) (destruieren) (the) being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) and (the) We (Mitsein und Wir) by means of the thesis of the originality (i.e. initial or primary state) of the conflict situation (situation of conflict) (Ursprünglichkeit der Konfliktsituation). This allows (permits), on the other hand ((then) again), the setting (putting) up (or establishing) (erecting, erection, establishment) of an elementary spectrum of the social relation (die Aufstellung eines elementaren Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung), which extends (stretches) between the poles of masochism and sadism (welches sich zwischen den Polen des Masochismus und des Sadismus erstreckt)<sup>14</sup>, and apart from (except for) its narrowness takes effect (works, operates) rather impressionistically and literarily (has a rather impressionistic and literary effect); the fundamental (or basic) (elementary) mechanisms of the social relation are just as little brought up (raised, aired) as in Heidegger,(;) they [the said fundamental mechanisms of the social relation] (in fact) go (so) much (far) deeper (or further) than that which Sartre offers (affords, provides, gives) through (by means of) the analysis of the mutual (or reciprocal) objectification (objectivisation) of subjects (gegenseitigen Objektivierung der Subjekte).

In contrast to the Frenchman, who appears as destroyer (or demolisher) (ruiner, wrecker) (Destrukteur) of the somebody (people or the They), we could call Schütz the phenomenologist of the somebody (people or the They). The somebody (people or the They) here certainly stays (keeps, carries itself) free of (cultural-critical) connotations (pertaining to cultural

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concern) about (for, over) a difference or distance vis-à-vis the Others (gegen die Anderen), which appears (emerges, comes into view) as “balancing out” („Ausgleich“), “catching up (with or on)” („Aufholen“) and “holding (keeping) down (or oppressing)” („Niederhalten“) (loc. cit., pp. 122, 126). That is so inadequate (insufficient) and makes understandable (clear) (explains), by the way, [the fact] that Sartre could gain the wrong (false), but understandable impression [that] Heidegger’s “being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with)” orientates itself towards the idea (notion) of the [a] closed (or cohesive) group (der geschlossenen Gruppe)(,) and fails to appreciate (misjudges, mistakes) the «rapport originaire» (“original relation”) of (the) struggle (des Kampfes).

<sup>14</sup> Loc. cit., 3<sup>rd</sup> part, ch. 3.

critique), rather he or they constitutes or constitute, in Schütz's terminology, the "natural setting (or stance) (attitude, positioning, view)" („natürliche Einstellung“) or "view (notion, opinion, perception)" of (the) Everyman ("Anschauung" von Jedermann), which is shared with the Others (others) (mit den Anderen) inside of social everyday (daily) life, and notwithstanding (regardless (irrespective) of) all questions of constitution in Husserl's sense, contains or contain within itself (themselves) the existence of the You and of the around-(world) (i.e. environment) or with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) as self-evidence (naturalness) (die Existenz des Du und der Um- bzw. Mitwelt als Selbstverständlichkeit)<sup>15</sup>. It [The existence of the You and of the around-world (i.e. environment) or with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries)] is, nevertheless, reconstructed in [the, a] phenomenological manner (style, fashion) from the perspective of the individual consciousness,(:) the social (as such) does not (as such) come into consideration (is (not) as such considered (out of the question)). Also, the "structuring (arrangement)" of the social world into [an] around-(world) (i.e. environment), [a] with-(world) (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), [a] pre-(world) and [an] after-world (Auch die „Gliederung“ der sozialen Welt in Um-, Mit-, Vor- und Folgewelt) occurs (happens, takes place) "in accordance with the degrees (extent(s), size(s), grades) of intimacy (or familiarity)", in relation to which the yardstick (or gauge) is again the individual<sup>16</sup>. Since the social world is now structured in accordance with such criteria, the spectrum of the social relation as [a] factor of social differentiation, relations (circumstances, conditions) of supra-ordination (superordination) or subordination (Über- oder

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<sup>15</sup> *Aufbau*, p. 138.

<sup>16</sup> Loc. cit., p. 202ff..

Unterordnungsverhältnisse) etc. hardly play a role; the social world of the “natural setting (or stance) (attitude, positioning, view)” remains in this important respect fairly (quite, pretty) vague. The analysis of the mechanisms of the social relation, on the contrary, undergoes (experiences, receives) a noteworthy (notable, remarkable) deepening, which, [while, in] closely following Max Weber, revolves around the concept (notion) of social action and of understanding (um die Begriffe des sozialen Handelns und des Verstehens). Schütz explains understanding not merely as [an] organ of social-scientific knowledge, but likewise as [a] constitutive integral (constituent) element (part) (component) of social action, that is, of action of actors orientating themselves in their behaviour towards one another (als Organ sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, sondern ebenso als konstitutiven Bestandteil sozialen Handelns, also des Handelns von sich in ihrem Verhalten aneinander orientierenden Akteuren). In general, he endeavours (makes an effort, tries) to bring out (elaborate on) the common (shared, mutual, joint) presuppositions, but also the different orientations (alignments) of (the) social-scientific and “natural (i.e. physical)” conceptuality. Thus (So, In this way), he shows (or proves) that cognitive necessities, which in social science lead to the formulation (or putting forward) (establishing, making up) of ideal types (Aufstellung von Idealtypen), have in everyday (daily) life their pendant (i.e. counterpart) in the typifications (i.e. rendering into types) (Typisierungen) of the Other and of the around-(world) (i.e. environment) or with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one’s contemporaries)<sup>17</sup>.

Despite its fundamental social-theoretical shortcomings (defects) and holes (gaps, faults), the broadly (widely) grasped (understood)

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<sup>17</sup> Loc. cit., p. 252ff..

phenomenological school of thought (or tendency) (trend, direction) gave rise to (produced, created) not (quite) a few fertile (fruitful, productive) thoughts (notions or ideas) in [respect of] individual cases (matters) (as in (so, thus) e.g. Scheler's theory of understanding and of sympathy), which we want to appreciate (acknowledge, pay tribute to) at (in) each and every respective appropriate (suitable) point (place, [passage]) in (of) this work. We now (presently) come to the second main type of ethically-normatively (and culturally-critically) inspired (, and in terms of cultural critique,) analysis of the social relation [the first main type was Heidegger's], which we encounter principally (first and foremost) in the dialogicians, that is, in Buber and some (a number of) fellow travellers (followers or supporters). The critique (criticism) of culture (or cultural critique) is not found here in the form of the [an] attack (assault) against the somebody (people or the They), but instead in the indirect way (manner) [in] that the variety of form (multiformity) of the intersubjective relations is reduced to two fundamental (basic) patterns (or types) (Grundmuster), and then the "bad (wicked, evil)" of both [fundamental patterns (or types)] becomes like (grows similar to) the supposedly (allegedly) prevailing (or predominant) (prevalent), in natural(physical)-scientific-technical civilisation (naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Zivilisation), stance (attitude, positioning, view), or this [stance] is copied [by the "bad" fundamental pattern (or type)]. As (While, Since) in Buber's language, during the "bad (wicked, evil)" intersubjective relation, the Thou (You) is transformed (changed, converted) into an It or an object, technical-instrumental behaviour dominates (Indem sich in Bubers Sprache bei der „schlechten“ intersubjektiven Beziehung das Du in ein Es oder ein Objekt verwandelt, dominiert technisch-instrumentelles Verhaltens). The dialogicians' demand for [a, the] transition from (the) subject-object-(logic) to (the) I-Thou(You)-logic (der Subjekt-Objekt- zur

Ich-Du-Logik)<sup>18</sup> at the same time (simultaneously) has of course an eminently (exceptionally, extremely) ethical meaning (sense). But now it is a matter of an ethic(s) of reciprocity and of solidarity (eine Ethik der Reziprozität und der Solidarität) for the extraction (or gaining) (obtainment, acquirement, obtaining, acquisition) or confirmation of actuality (reality, trueness or genuineness) (authenticity) – not a matter of Heidegger’s elitist-individualistic actuality (reality, trueness or genuineness) (authenticity), which is (only rightly) made sure (or satisfied) (all the more) in its opposition to (countering of) the somebody (people or the They), nor a matter of Sartre’s responsibility in freedom, which wants just as much to be set (posited, contrasted) (break off) elitistly-individualistically (in an elitist-individualistic fashion (manner, way)) against (from, to) (the) bourgeois virtue or l’ esprit de sérieux (the spirit of seriousness (the serious))<sup>19</sup>. In (the) dialogical ethics, beside (next to) mystic(al) motives, strong (powerful, stark) memories (reminiscences, recollections) of Kant’s teaching (doctrine, theory) on ([in respect] of, regarding) the Other as object (subject matter) of respect (esteem, regard, consideration) and as end (goal) in itself (Kants Lehre ber den Anderen als Gegenstand von Achtung und als Selbstzweck) flow<sup>20</sup>.

Now, the dialogicians’ theoretical concern (worry) was not the conceptually underpinned (supported) putting in order (inclusion, incorporation, ordering) of the historically attested (vouched for, testified to) variety (diversity) of form (multiformity) of human relations, but such a preparation of the used concepts (notions) that the desired (wished-for) ethical-normative result could arise (result, follow, ensue)

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<sup>18</sup> See the references in Theunissen, *Der Andere*, p. 244ff..

<sup>19</sup> *Être*, p. 690ff..

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Löwith, *Individuum*, p. 139ff.. Cf. Ch. IV, Sec. ID below.

unconstrainedly (uninhibitedly, effortlessly) from it (that, them) [the said used concepts]. Their [The dialogicians'] solution to, or rather circumvention (bypassing, avoidance) of, the Husserlian question (problem, issue) of constitution, to which we adverted (pointed) with reference to Heidegger(,) and to which we shall return (come back) anew in the analysis of the mechanism of the social relation (der Analyse des Mechanismus sozialer Beziehung)<sup>21</sup>, belongs (pertains) to (is a part of) (the) [process (category) of] central conceptual manipulations (manipulations of the [a] concept). They [The dialogicians] thought (believed, reckoned) [that] they would avoid (elude, escape from, evade, get out of) the danger of (the, [a]) solipsism and at the same time would knock the bottom out of (undermine) the instrumental stance (or positioning) (view, attitude) in the (interhuman, interpersonal) relation (between humans (people)) (in der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehung), if they replaced the unilaterally (one-sidedly) constructing intentionality of the Ego with a bilateral (two-sided) intentionality, i.e. with the mutual (or reciprocal) constitution of the I and Thou (You) in an interrelation(ship) (exchange relation) (wenn sie die einseitig konstruierende Intentionalität des Ego durch eine zweiseitige Intentionalität, d. h. durch die gegenseitige Konstitution von Ich und Du in einem Wechselverhältnis ersetzen). In the process, they did (have) not only overlook(ed) that before I and Thou (You) can enter into an interrelation(ship) (exchange relation) with each other at all, the I must have constituted the Thou (You), and the Thou (You) (as I) [must have constituted] the I(;) the aforementioned relation(ship) as such (das genannte Verhältniss als solches) is meant (supposed) to (should) be conscious (aware), especially if (when) moral behaviour is expected of the subjects in question

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<sup>21</sup> See Ch. IV, Sec. ID below.

(concerned). Over and above that, they did (have) not register(ed) (express, make known, set down in writing) [that] the connection between the constitutive status of the interrelation(ship) (exchange relation) of I and Thou (You) with each other, and the putting (setting) aside (removal, elimination, abolition, sidelining) of instrumental stances (or positionings) (views, attitudes) in the ethical field (area, sector, domain) is (are) based (rest(s)) on a logical leap (leap in logic). Without the slightest doubt, the relation(ship) with (towards) the Thou (You) is constitutive for the I (even though not in the specific sense of the Husserlian question of constitution), on the other hand however, the constitutive character of this relation(ship) does not mean anything (said nothing) at all in regard to (about, on) its ethical or other (further) content. Man in fact (actually, really) becomes (the) I on (at) [the basis of] (with) (the) Thou (You), as Buber writes<sup>22</sup>, but this applies to (is valid for) the I of a criminal (crook) just as much as to (for) the I of a saint, and does not in the least prejudice what I shall become (am going to be), for an I, through (by means of) what [there is](,) for a Thou (You), [there is] (i.e. what I, I shall become, in relation to what Thou (You)) (und präjudiziert keineswegs, zu was für einem Ich ich durch was für ein Du werde). If (Were there) (there was) a necessary connection (existed) between the really (truly) constitutive character of the interrelation(ship) of I and Thou (You) and its ethical character, then (so, thus) there would only be moral humans (people, men) of the purest kind (pure water) in the world. However that is, as is (well) known, not the case. Because the mechanism of this interrelation(ship) does not at all change even during (the) extreme contrasting (conflict, opposition) of all (the social

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<sup>22</sup> *Ich und Du*, p. 37.

relation's) respective contents (each and every respective content) as between one another (of the social relation)<sup>23</sup>.

In short (a word), the I-Thou(You)-relation, as the dialogicians conceived it, represents (constitutes) an ideal model (or example) (ein ideales Vorbild) or an ideal borderline case, which is founded (based) on normative representations (or notions) (views, perceptions) [in respect] of the “true (real)” being (Is) of man or his actuality (reality, trueness or genuineness) (authenticity). “Only between genuine persons is there [a] genuine relation”, writes Buber, only [an] “essential” („wesenhaftes“) Thou (You) and [an] “essential” I result in (yield, produce) an “essential” We – the [what is] essential [element] nevertheless remains “rare”<sup>24</sup>. Not only because of its admitted (granted) actual (real, factual) rarity (rareness, scarcity), however, does the borderline case of the I-Thou(You)-relation appear (to be) (seem) social-ontologically quite (fairly) irrelevant. Moreover, it is theoretically constructed in such a way as if it were [being] (would be) shaped (formed, moulded) or happening (taking place) in a laboratory or greenhouse (hothouse). The more the I-Thou(You)-relation unfolds (develops) in accordance with the [a] normatively pre-given model (nach dem normativ vorgegebenen Modell), the more the real social world moves into (is lost) the background; general social relation(ship)s, in fact even the effects of the presence of third parties (persons) in the immediate environment, no longer reach it [the I-Thou(You)-relation]. As [the] means against (the) infiltrating (or penetrating) of (i.e. by) the instrumental intellect(-spirit), isolation is used,(;) (the) autarky (i.e. self-sufficiency) in (the) ideality culminates in the feeling (sense) [that] the I is “everything (all [things])” for the Thou

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<sup>23</sup> See Ch. IV, Secs. IB and D below.

<sup>24</sup> *Problem*, pp. 164, 115ff..



(You), the Thou (You) [“everything”] for the I<sup>25</sup>. The attempt at experiencing relations between real existences without mediation (or intervention) (intercession, interposition) (directly, immediately), i.e. without [the] mediation (or intervention) of the social world, or even only at conceiving (imagining or thinking of) [them, relations between real existences without mediation], must certainly end (up) in rapturous enthusiasm or in [a] shipwreck (i.e. complete failure or ruin) (Der Versuch, Beziehungen zwischen realen Existenzen unvermittelt, d. h. ohne Vermittlung der sozialen Welt zu erleben oder auch nur zu denken, muß allerdings bei der Schwärmerei oder beim Schiffbruch enden). The reason for that (it, this) does not lie so much in the external (outer, outward) pressure which imperfect (incomplete) social relation(ship)s (circumstances or conditions) (den unvollkommene soziale Verhältnisse) would have to (necessarily) exert on a perfect (complete) I-Thou(You)-relation (eine vollkommene Ich-Du-Beziehung), (in this case one could interpret (explain) the common resistance (opposition) or downfall (ruin, decline) of the partners even as proof of the perfection (completeness) of their relation), but far (much) deeper: I and Thou (You) meet in (the) reality always as more or less formed “characters (personalities)” or “persons” (herausgebildete „Charaktere“ oder „Personen“); they are, beyond the features (characteristics) of their biopsychic structure, conscious or unconscious bearers (carriers, vehicles) of all that which they have acquired (learnt, picked up, appropriated) or simply copped (i.e. incurred or suffered) through (the) positive or negative [kinds of] friction(s) (rubblings) in (or with) the environment (durch positive oder negative Reibungen an der Umwelt). These (This) central fact(s) (of the matter (case)) disintegrate(s) (dissolve(s)) when the specifically social-

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. the references (examples) in Theunissen, *Der Andere*, pp. 422ff., 450ff..

ontological question formulation (formulation of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of (a [the]) problem(s), central theme) does not appear (emerge) on the theoretical horizon, when, that is, the fact of society is not perceived (discerned) at all, let alone (never mind, much less) when [it (the fact of society) is] not made the starting point of the way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation). The dialogicians thematise (i.e. make a subject of discussion) the sociality of man (die Sozialität des Menschen) only to the extent this [sociality of man] seems to serve as proof of (for) the thesis [that] man is man's friend.

They [The dialogicians] were of course not the first who (have) made (committed) this noble logical mistake (error). Feuerbach, (in) whom they saw (beheld) [as] a precursor<sup>26</sup>, had (has) (likewise) used (made use of) human sociality as [an] argument (too)(,) in order to justify (or found) (give reasons (account) for, establish) the real possibility of an ethical reshaping (restructuring, reorganisation, remodelling) of human relation(ship)s (circumstances or conditions). Like the dialogicians, he [Feuerbach] worked (brought, carved) out (elaborated) the basic features (characteristics) of sociality, not in the framework of a general theory of society (social theory) (einer allgemeinen Gesellschaftstheorie), but on the basis of (based on) the relation of the individual (single person) with (towards) the individual (single person) (sondern an Hand der Beziehung des Einzelnen zum Einzelnen). The "unity" or the "community (fellowship, association)" of man with man, which makes up (constitutes) "man's essence (or nature) (being, substance)" ("the essence of man"), contains as [the, a] "natural standpoint" the differentiation (distinction) into [between] I and You, from which comes (emanates, stems,

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<sup>26</sup> See Ehrenberg's „Einleitung“; cf. Buber, *Problem*, esp. p. 61ff..

originates) the entire (complete, whole) orientation towards the world (world orientation) and [a, the] world theory (i.e. world view) (Die „Einheit“ oder die „Gemeinschaft“ des Menschen mit dem Menschen, die „das Wesen des Menschen“ ausmache, enthalte als „natürlichen Standpunkt“ die Unterscheidung in Ich und Du, der die ganze Weltorientierung und -anschauung entstamme). Because even the elementary concept (notion) of the object is mediated through that [concept] of the You as objective I (Denn selbst der elementare Begriff des Objekts sei vermittelt durch jenen des Du als gegenständlichem Ich), and indeed in (the way) that “my self-activity [has] its boundary (or limits) in another being’s activity – [where, and there] it finds resistance” („meine Selbsttätigkeit an der Tätigkeit eines anderen Wesens ihre Grenze - Widerstand findet“). Consciousness (awareness) and intellect (or mind) ((common) sense) (Verstand) come into being (arise, result, ensue) from the “interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect)” („Wechselwirkung“) of man with man,(;) through communication (or notification) (Mitteilung) and conversation, ideas come about – in short (a word): “the community (fellowship, association) of man with man is the first principle and criterion of truth”<sup>27</sup>. Here the foundations (or base) of thought and of the idea is sought in a stratum (layer) of the human *as* co-human (fellow-human or with-human) (Hier wird der Grund des Gedankens und der Idee in einer Schicht des Menschlichen *als* Mitmenschlichem gesucht), which precedes (lies in advance of) every intellectual(-spiritual) production; and at the same time, the primacy of this stratum (layer) is asserted in the sense that every other being (Is) acquires (reaches) ontological relevance only through its [the said stratum’s] mediation (or intervention). Extra-human reality is

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<sup>27</sup> Grundsätze, §§ 59, 56, 32, 41.

apprehended (grasped) from the perspectives which are opened (up) inside of the (relation(s)-rich) human reality (rich in relations) (innerhalb der beziehungsreichen menschlichen Realität), the being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with), as a result (hence), has (possesses, holds) a privileged status vis-à-vis the being(Is)-in-the-world, although (even though) being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) and being(Is)-in-the-world are equally original (equiprimordial; gleichursprünglich) for man (humans). Man, in other words, does not look at (consider, contemplate) his human world from the point of view of external (outer) nature, but the other way around (conversely): each and every respective constitution (composition or texture) or development of (interhuman, interpersonal) relations (between humans) determines (conditions) the consideration (contemplation, observation) of (or way of looking at) nature. The concept (notion) of being (Is) and of reality represents (constitutes) a function of the manner (way, mode, modus) of the human being(Is)(-)-with-one-another.

These thoughts (considerations, reflections, deliberations) of Feuerbach obviously (evidently, apparently) have a greater scope (range, significance, importance; Tragweite) than the later dialogical approach and incidentally (by the way) they [Feuerbach's thoughts] can also be utilised (made usable, taken advantage of) without their moralising veil (cover or wrapping). One [We] can follow (observe) their [Feuerbach's thoughts'] meta-development in a thinker like Dilthey<sup>28</sup>; but they had already previously fertilised (i.e. stimulated) the intellectual(-spiritual) beginnings of a(n) even (still) more ingenious [thinker] [greater genius]. The reminding (remembrance, recollection, memory) of him should here, apart from the factual (or objective) [aspect], serve the intention to outline (delineate, sketch out) (of outlining) more sharply (distinctly, clearly) the

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<sup>28</sup> As Löwith does it, *Individuum*, pp. 28-30, 43ff..

[already] [above-]mentioned (addressed, touched upon) prehistory of the entry of the social and of the historical sciences into 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy. Marx first of all leaves the philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy; Bewußtseinsphilosophie), on the basis of the same syllogistic [reasoning] (syllogism) as Feuerbach, behind. The materialistic turn from consciousness to being (Is) implies, man must, above all else (other things), be looked at (considered, regarded, contemplated) as [a] sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) being (Die materialistische Wendung von Bewußtsein zum Sein impliziert, der Mensch müsse vor allem anderen als sinnliches Wesen betrachtet werden). However, whoever takes sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses) (die Sinnlichkeit) seriously anthropologically, automatically breaks away (cuts oneself loose) from (frees oneself of) the individualism or solipsism of the philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy), since sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) man *as man* is bound (or tied), through innumerable (countless) tangible (or concrete) bonds (or ties) (beginning with biological reproduction), to other sensory (or sensorial) humans (men, people), that is, he is by definition (per definitionem) a social being (da der sinnliche Mensch *als Mensch* durch unzählige greifbare Bande (von der biologischen Reproduktion angefangen) an andere sinnliche Menschen gebunden, also definitionsgemäß ein soziales Wesen ist). That is why Marx praises Feuerbach's "true materialism", not merely the putting first of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses), but the fact that in this way (because of that, thus, thereby) "the social (or societal) relation(ship) of man with (towards) man [is made (turns into, becomes)] the basic (fundamental) principle of theory" (Daher lobt Marx an Feuerbachs „wahrem Materialismus“ nicht die bloße Voranstellung der Sinnlichkeit, sondern die Tatsache, daß dadurch „das gesellschaftliche Verhältnis des

Menschen zum Menschen zum Grundprinzip der Theorie“ gemacht werde)<sup>29</sup>. As nature and sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. senses), man constitutes the “first object” of man, however, exactly during the meeting (or encounter) with this object his “relation(ship) with (towards) himself” ceases (stops) being merely an “objective” [relation(ship)], it becomes a “real” [relation(ship)], and his own sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. senses) is now, through (the) other humans (men, people), “for himself”<sup>30</sup>; whereas the animal “behaves [in regard] (or relates) to nothing and (not) [does not behave (or relate)] at all (or in general)”, man behaves in regard (or relates) to himself in the relation(ship) with (towards) others [other humans (men, people)], that is, consciousness is “already from the beginning a social (or societal) product” (Als Natur und Sinnlichkeit bildet der Mensch den „ersten Gegenstand“ des Menschen, eben bei der Begegnung mit diesem Gegenstand hört aber sein „Verhältnis zu sich selbst“ auf, ein bloß „gegenständliches“ zu sein, es wird ein „wirkliches“, und die eigene Sinnlichkeit ist nun durch die anderen Menschen „für ihn selbst“; während das Tier „sich zu Nichts und überhaupt nicht“ verhält, verhält sich der Mensch im Verhältnis zu den anderen zu sich selbst, Bewußtsein ist also „von vornherein schon ein gesellschaftliches Produkt“)<sup>31</sup>.

Marx takes an important step beyond Feuerbach and in the direction of the founding (establishment) of a social ontology(,) by placing (putting, setting) (while (as) he places (puts, sets)) man and man’s relation with (towards) man in the framework of the social (or societal) whole, in order to understand it [man’s relation with man] from the point of view of society (Einen wichtigen Schritt über Feuerbach hinaus und in Richtung

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<sup>29</sup> „Ökon.-Phil. Manuskripte“, *MEW*, supplementary volume, part 1, p. 570.

<sup>30</sup> Loc. cit., pp. 544, 519. Cf. *Das Kapital*, I, *MEW*, 23, p. 67, footnote 18.

<sup>31</sup> *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, p. 27.

auf die Begründung einer Sozialontologie geht Marx, indem er den Menschen und die Beziehung des Menschen zum Menschen in den Rahmen des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen stellt, um sie von der Gesellschaft her zu verstehen). Precisely against the background ([a] backdrop) of the adequately understood (interpreted, conceived, taken for) fact of society (Gerade vor dem Hintergrund des adäquat aufgefaßten Faktums der Gesellschaft), he [Marx] nevertheless (however) shows that neither “society” may (is permitted (allowed) to, can, should) be fixed as [an] abstract concept (or abstraction) (Abstraktum) vis-à-vis the “individual”, nor [the] “individual” as [an] abstract concept (or abstraction) vis-à-vis “society”. The individual *is* the [a] social (or societal) being (Das Individuum *ist* das gesellschaftliche Wesen), even in his solitary (lonely, isolated) activities he draws (receives, obtains) his material (stuff, matter) (e.g. the language in which he thinks) from (the) overall (total, whole, entire) social (or societal) activity(,) and in this sense he represents (constitutes) “the ensemble of social (or societal) relation(ship)s (circumstances or conditions)” („das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse“). The mediation (or intervention) (intercession, interposition) of individual and society with [regard to] each other therefore takes place (occurs, happens) inside of a(n) incessant (unremitting, continual) social (or societal) activity (Die Vermittlung von Individuum und Gesellschaft miteinander findet also innerhalb einer unablässigen gesellschaftlichen Tätigkeit statt), and that is why the interrelation (correlation, connection) between [the] sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses) and sociality of man explained above can be understood (grasped, interpreted, regarded) (just, exactly) as (taken for) ((as) well as) [an] interrelation (correlation, connection) between

sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses) and practical activity (too)<sup>32</sup>. Now a second, no less important step follows (takes place, happens, occurs, ensues). The inseparable trinity of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses), sociality and activity, as it is found condensed in the fact of society, allows [us], to think consistently [in respect] of [through, about] the being(Is)-in-the-world(-) or [being(Is)-]in(-the)-nature of man, and the human being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), [all] together (jointly, altogether) (Die unzertrennliche Dreiheit von Sinnlichkeit, Sozialität und Tätigkeit, wie sie sich im Faktum der Gesellschaft kondensiert findet, gestattet es, das In-der-Welt- oder In-der-Natur-Sein des Menschen und das menschliche Mitsein konsequent zusammenzudenken). As [a] sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) being, man is nature, he lives in and from (of) nature, while (as) he (by) – since he lives socially exactly as [a] sensory (or sensorial) being – collectively organises (organising) the inevitable (unavoidable, inescapable) struggle against nature, that is, he fights it out (by fighting it out) with the means of the activity of the genus (i.e. mankind or the human species) or of society. This struggle, paraphrased (expressed differently) as labour (work), is of (has) constitutive significance (importance, meaning) both for (regarding) the fact of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) in general (generally), as well as for (regarding) its [the said being with's] each and every respective historical formation. In so far as (In that) man works on (treats or processes) the objective (concrete, representational) world as [a] being of the genus (or species) (i.e. human being), i.e. in the manner (way) (as) his specific constitution (composition or texture) vis-à-vis (the) other animals requires (demands) it, the object of his labour (work) constitutes (is) an “objectification (or reification) of the life of man’s genus (or species)”

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<sup>32</sup> „Ökon.-Phil. Manuskripte“, *MEW*, supplementary volume, part 1, p. 538; „Thesen über Feuerbach“, esp. 6 and 9, in: *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, pp. 584, 585.



(Als sinnliches Wesen ist der Mensch Natur, er lebt in und von der Natur, indem er – da er eben als sinnliches Wesen sozial lebt – den unausweichlichen Kampf gegen die Natur kollektiv organisiert, also mit den Mitteln der Tätigkeit der Gattung bzw. der Gesellschaft ausficht. Diesem Kampf, als Arbeit umschrieben, kommt sowohl für das Faktum des Mitseins überhaupt, als auch für seine jeweilige geschichtliche Ausgestaltung konstitutive Bedeutung zu. Insofern der Mensch die gegenständliche Welt als Gattungswesen, d. h. in der Art und Weise bearbeitet, wie seine spezifische Beschaffenheit gegenüber den anderen Tieren es erfordert, bildet der Gegenstand seiner Arbeit eine „Vergegenständlichung des Gattungslebens des Menschen“)<sup>33</sup>. Through (By means of) the struggle, in the struggle and as [a] struggle with nature, [the] human being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) exists and is concretised (Durch den Kampf, im Kampf und als Kampf mit der Natur existiert und konkretisiert sich menschliches Mitsein) – no matter how the struggle’s outcome (end, result) looks (seems, appears), whether, that is, man can prevail (assert (impose) himself, predominate) over (on) nature to a very small or very large extent: the division of labour remains the iron law of social existence and organisation (Arbeitsteilung bleibt das eherner Gesetz sozialer Existenz und Organisation). Nature itself is socially (or societally) mediated during (in) this process, and in this respect (as far as that goes (is concerned)) the way (manner, kind, sort) of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) determines (conditions) the more precise (detailed) circumstances of the being(Is)-in-the-world; of course there continues to always be an extra-social (or extra-societal), “external (outer, outward)” nature, whose laws (also) apply undiminished to (are valid undiminished for) (the) socially (or societally) mediated [nature, one] (as well); this

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<sup>33</sup> „Manuskripte“, loc. cit., p. 517.

ascertainment does not however have a social-ontological status, it interests [us] (is of interest) only to the extent [that, how] one wants to look at (consider, regard, contemplate) man “as distinguished (or apart) (differing, differentiated) from nature”<sup>34</sup>.

The depth and scope (range, implications) of this conceptual framework stands out (breaks away) [differentiates itself] advantageously (positively) e.g. against (from) Heidegger’s position, who indeed stresses (emphasises) that “the being(Is)-in-the-world of being (t)here (or existence) is essentially constituted through (by means of) the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with)”<sup>35</sup>, but in the course of this (at the same time, into the bargain) [he] starts (out) exactly from being (t)here (or existence) and remains at (in) this [being (t)here (or existence)], without making the social-ontologically crucial (key, pivotal, critical) interrelation (connection, correlation) between being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), irrespective (regardless, independent) of being (t)here (or existence), the [a] topic (subject, theme) [of interest, to be examined, under examination] (ohne den sozialontologisch neuralgischen Zusammenhang zwischen In-der-Welt-Sein und Mitsein unabhängig vom Dasein zum Thema zu machen). Certainly (No doubt), he connects the handiness (readiness-to-hand) of the tool (or equipment) (stuff, gear, things) (die Zuhandenheit des Zeugs) with the fact of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), but the connection (link, bond, interrelation, combination; die Verbindung) moves on the surface (superficially): the tool (or equipment) merely constitutes a “referral (reference) to possible bearers (carriers, vehicles)”, that is, to other subjects as users (or borrowers) or manufacturers (or makers)<sup>36</sup>, and it [the said tool] is by no

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<sup>34</sup> *Deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, vol. 3, p. 42. Cf. Schmidt, *Begriff der Natur*, esp. pp. 40ff., 66ff..

<sup>35</sup> *Seit und Zeit*, p. 120.

<sup>36</sup> Loc. cit., p. 117ff..

means in social (or societal) labour (work) [an] objectified (objectivised) being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) (objektiviertes Mitsein), let alone (never mind, much less) an indication of (clue (evidence) for) the particular historical constitution (composition or texture) of the social being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with). Even when (if, though) Heidegger talks (speaks) of the meeting (or encounter) with the Other (other) “during (in) labour (work)” (Auch wenn Heidegger von der Begegnung mit dem Anderen „bei der Arbeit“ redet), he is thinking not of the interweaving (interconnection) of individual activities with one another (die Verflechtung individueller Tätigkeiten miteinander) inside of (division of labour-related) social praxis (or practice) (pertaining to the division of labour) (der arbeitsteiligen sozialen Praxis), but rather of the sinking (or becoming immersed) in(to) the somebody (people or the They) (sondern vielmehr an das Versinken in das Man). The lack of density (denseness, compactness, thickness) of the being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with), if one may say so, is here the pendant (i.e. counterpart) of its [the being with’s] superficial relation with (towards) the being(Is)-in-the-world, which again (in turn) in its seclusion (separateness or isolation) from the being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) provides (offers, affords, presents) a new edition (or repeat performance) of the objective external (or outer) world, which in (the) classical philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy), a subject stood (was) opposite (faced) (opposite of which stood a subject in the classical philosophy of the subject). Marx breaks away (frees himself, cuts himself loose) from this [philosophy of the subject] much (far) more radically, because he does not approach (the) matter (thing(s)) (or [his] object) simply under the unconscious pressure of social and of historical science, but consciously as [a] social scientist and historian (als Sozialwissenschaftler und Historiker). The concept (notion) of labour (work), which mediates (or intervenes) (intercedes, interposes) between

being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) was (is, has been), as is (well) known, taken (inferred) from the strongly (highly) sociologically oriented (aligned) classical political economy, and each and every respective manner (way) of that mediation (or intervention) in turn (again) constitutes the criterion for the deciphering (or exploring) (inferring) of history, i.e. for its [history's] apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) as [a] succession (sequence) of social (societal) formations (formations of society) (d. h. für ihre Erfassung als Aufeinanderfolge von Gesellschaftsformationen). In this concise (succinct) sense, he [Marx] means (is saying) [that] history is “the true natural history of man”<sup>37</sup>. This thinking of social-ontology and history together (jointly), (in)(to) which the thinking (together) of (the) being(Is)-in-the-world and (the) being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) (together (jointly)) flows (leads) (Dieses Zusammendenken von Sozialontologie und Geschichte, in welches das Zussamendenken von In-der-Welt-Sein und Mitsein mündet), now allows [us] insight into that ontic stratum (layer) (ontische Schicht) in which the pre-understanding lying in advance of (or preceding) every theory lies (is) (in der das jeder Theorie vorausliegende Vorverständnis liegt), in which, that is, the constitutive terrain (territory, ground, soil, land) (terrain of [for] the constitution) (der Konstitutionsboden) of science, philosophy and intellectual(-spiritual) production in general is to be sought. The latter [science, philosophy and intellectual(-spiritual) production in general] – and in [relation to] this, the boundaries (or limits) of every merely anthropological way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) become apparent (noticeable) (make themselves felt) – cannot of course at all be deduced (derived)

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<sup>37</sup> „Manuskripte“, *MEW*, supplementary volume, part 1, p. 579. The critique (criticism) of Feuerbach is now (correspondingly) summarised (summed up) (accordingly) in the remark (comment, observation) [that] this [Feuerbach's] (is foreign (alien, strange)) history (is foreign), see *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, p. 43.

from the constant (situational) states of mind of being (t)here (or existence) (den konstanten Befindlichkeiten des Daseins), because then their [science, philosophy and intellectual(-spiritual) production in general's] content(s) would hardly change. The pre-scientific, pre-philosophical etc. (situational) state of mind is therefore not a being (t)here (or existence)-like, but a social-ontic [one, (situational) state of mind], which is however already permeated (pervaded, imbued, interspersed) with "ideas" (the Marxian inclusion (incorporation) of "ideology" in society's functional ensemble means this) (Die vorwissenschaftliche, vorphilosophische etc. Befindlichkeit ist also nicht eine daseinsmäßige, sondern eine sozialontische, die aber bereits mit „Ideen“ durchsetzt ist (dies meint die Marxsche Einbeziehung der „Ideologie“ in das funktionale Ensemble der Gesellschaft), otherwise it [the said (situational) state of mind] would hardly be in a position to (capable of) bring(ing) forth (produce, create, give rise to) ideas ex nihilo. And the orientation of (the) ontological analysis towards being (t)here (or existence) can neither make the specific (situational) states of mind, which find expression (or are reflected) in the production of ideas, nor the formation (development) and content of ideas (die sich in der Produktion von Ideen niederschlagen, noch Herausbildung und Inhalt von Ideen), clear (understandable); only the illumination of the social-ontic, and indeed in the dimension of the social relation and of the political, is capable of achieving (doing, accomplishing, managing) (able (in a position) to achieve) this (erst die Beleuchtung des Sozialontischen, und zwar in der Dimension der sozialen Beziehung und des Politischen, vermag dies zu leisten). Marx's teaching (or theory) (doctrine) [in respect] of ideology – a (first-rate(class)) social-scientific achievement (of the first (highest) rank (order)) – takes a very important step in this direction, while (as) it postulates (by postulating) [that] not only every

consideration (or contemplation) of (way of looking at) nature or, more generally, every theoretical consideration (or contemplation) of (way of looking at) the being(Is)-in-the-world, but also every theory of (on, regarding, about) the being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) represents (constitutes) a function of this same being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) or of the social relation in the broadest (widest) sense. The social-ontically determined (conditioned) (situational) state of mind lies (is) therefore in every case in advance of (or precedes) every ontology or social ontology. Inside of every ideology as talk of (about, regarding) (the) social and extra-social being (Is), elements can of course be made out (located, discerned, determined)(,) which, beyond each and every respective form of the social relation, can be connected (or combined) (put in conjunction) with anthropological constants; this, nevertheless (however), must not (does not necessarily (have to)) detract from (impair) the fundamental (or basic) orientation towards (alignment with) the social-ontic, if one takes (seriously) the thesis (seriously) [that] man is *as* man a being living in society (Marxens Ideologielehre – eine sozialwissenschaftliche Errungenschaft ersten Ranges – unternimmt einen sehr wichtigen Schritt in dieser Richtung, indem sie postuliert, nicht nur jede Naturbetrachtung oder, allgemeiner, jede theoretische Betrachtung über das In-der-Welt-Sein, sondern auch jede Theorie über das Mitsein stelle eine Funktion dieses selben Mitseins bzw. der sozialen Beziehung im weitesten Sinne dar. Die sozialontische bedingte Befindlichkeit liegt also auf jeden Fall jeder Ontologie oder Sozialontologie voraus. Innerhalb jeder Ideologie als Rede über das soziale und außersoziale Sein lassen sich freilich Elemente ausmachen, die über die jeweilige Form der sozialen Beziehung hinaus mit anthropologischen Konstanten in Verbindung gesetzt werden können; dies muß indes der grundsätzlichen Ausrichtung aufs Sozialontische keinen Abbruch tun, wenn man die

These ernst nimmt, der Mensch sei *als* Mensch ein in Gesellschaft lebendes Wesen).

In spite of (Despite) his valuable (worthy) contributions to(wards) social ontology, Marx does not have at his disposal (possess) a social-ontologically (properly) thought-out (thought-through, studied, reasoned) theory of the social relation (sozialontologisch durchdachte Theorie der sozialen Beziehung). The social relation appears (occurs) concretely in [to] him [Marx] [his thought] only as [a] historical magnitude, and then principally only in the form of the conflict between collective subjects (theory of class struggle (class-struggle theory)). Just as little does he develop a theory of the political which would essentially (or substantially) (considerably) go beyond the theory of class struggle, and in conjunction (connection) with the theory of the social relation, would work (carve) out (or elaborate) the social-ontic dimension of the political. Both shortcomings (defects, flaws, weaknesses) can be reduced (put down, traced back), by and large (in the main, on the whole) to the economistic limitation(s) (restriction) of his otherwise grandiose conception of (regarding, on) the interrelation (correlation, connection) between the being(Is)-in-the-world and the social being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with). This economistic limitation (restriction) does not mean though that Marx interprets (or comprehends) (understands, grasps, takes) the economic as such narrowly. Rather (the) economy is equated with the overall (total) process ((series of) events) of the production and reproduction of social life (dem Gesamtvorgang der Produktion und Reproduktion sozialen Lebens) so that “religion, family, state, law (or justice), morality (morals), economy, art etc.” are “particular modes (ways) of production (besondere Weisen der Produktion)”; a political economy which disregards the dominant (ruling or prevailing) social

relations, for instance private property, when (if) it [the said political economy] as [a] science puts forward (proposes, advances, formulates) laws, does not understand (comprehend, grasp, apprehend) its own laws<sup>38</sup>. Nonetheless, a dilemma emerges (is seen to be emerging) here. If the concept (notion) of the economy or of production is expanded (widened, extended, broadened) boundlessly (endlessly, on and on) and finally (eventually, in the end) is equated with the social, (then, so, thus) it loses the specific features (characteristics, traits), in relation to which one must ask why categories of economic origin (provenance, beginnings, derivation) should (be) (preferred, favoured) theoretically (be given priority). If, on the other hand, it [the concept of the economy or of production] is defined or used commensurately (in line) with (according to) its specificity, then (so, thus) the economic appears as a social sphere beside (next to) other(s) [social spheres], in relation to which the question of (in accordance with, regarding) the social-ontic priority of this or that [social sphere] amongst them [(all) (the) social spheres] is posed, and the ultimately infertile (unproductive) “base-superstructure”-(examination (study) of) (the) problem(s) must be gone into (reopened, discussed (again)). Marx did (has, had) not see the (this, that) dilemma or at least as [a] theoretician he (has, had) behaved as though it [the dilemma] did not exist. His economistic limitation (restriction) [in respect] of the interrelation (correlation, connection) between (the) being(Is)-in-the-world and (the) being(Is)(-)-with (i.e. being with) suggested [that] the latter [being with] could be founded (based) (take root) social-ontically on (or in) (in) the division of labour. But if economic activity represents (constitutes, is) no less than other forms of social activity a function of (interhuman, interpersonal) relations (between humans (people)) against

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<sup>38</sup> „Manuskripte“, loc. cit., pp. 537, 510; cf. *Grundrisse*, p. 26ff..



the background of the fact of society (Aber wenn Wirtschaften nicht weniger als andere Formen sozialer Tätigkeit eine Funktion von zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen vor dem Hintergrund des Faktums der Gesellschaft darstellt), then (so, thus) it [the said economic activity] must (also) be scrutinised (examined critically, got to the bottom of) with [a] social-ontological intent(ion(s)) (too, as well). Then (the) political economy might presumably be rewritten as (the) economy under the influence (sign) of the political.

Marx paid his tribute no less than other(s) [thinkers, philosophers] to ethical-normative thinking (thought): his alienation (estrangement) theorem (theorem of alienation) (Seine Entfremdungstheoreme) constitutes an apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of the anthropological question (problem) from the point of view of the contrast(ing) (conflict, opposition) between actuality (reality, trueness or genuineness) (authenticity) and unactuality (unreality, untrueness or ungenuineness) (inauthenticity). However, we do not want to say anything about this (waste (lose) [even] (a) word(s) on this). His [Marx's] work interests us as [a(n)] outstanding (pre-eminent, paramount) milestone (landmark) on the long (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) path (road, way) (in the history of ideas), at whose beginning (start, outset, commencement) (stood, was) the rehabilitation of human sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the human senses) through (by means of) new-times (modern(-era)) rationalism (den neuzeitlichen Rationalismus) in general, and the Enlightenment in particular, (stood, was). This rehabilitation made itself felt (worked, had its (took) effect) in two kinds of (different) respects (ways) (in a dual respect). The primacy of anthropology, which the Enlightenment fought for (won) against the primacy of theology, was concretised through a study of man in the entire (complete) fullness

(abundance, richness, wealth) of his sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) determinations (determinings, fixings, settings, purposes) (ein Studium des Menschen in der ganzen Fülle seiner sinnlichen Bestimmungen), of both (the) biological-bodily (corporeal, physical) as well as of (the) environmental (surroundings-related) [sensory determinations] (sowohl der biologisch-leiblichen als auch der umweltlichen) – and here again (though) not merely of (the) geographic-climatic, but also of (the) economic-social [sensory determinations] (der geographisch-klimatischen, sondern auch der ökonomisch-sozialen): because sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) man was ipso facto construed (taken for, (grasped, understood, interpreted) (as) man in society (Denn der sinnliche Mensch wurde ipso facto als Mensch in Gesellschaft aufgefaßt). On the other hand, the rehabilitation of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses) was translated (converted) into (brought about) the conviction (belief) [that] pure intellect does not make up (constitute) in the least man's essence (or nature) (being, substance) (the essence of man), not even the decisive (deciding) authority of the human intellect (mind) (-spirit) (purer Intellekt mache keineswegs das Wesen des Menschen, auch nicht die entscheidende Instanz menschlichen Geistes aus). On the basis of this conviction (belief), an existential concept (notion) of knowledge (ein existentieller Erkenntnisbegriff) is formed, which asserted (put forward, argued) the taking root (rootedness, rooting) of all knowledge and theory in a sensorily (or sensorially) (sensually, sensuously, materially) determined (conditioned) [existence], that is, in an existence found (situated, located) in constant interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) with the sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) environment and being shaped (moulded, formed) in it [such (a) sensory environment] (der die Verwurzelung aller Erkenntnis und Theorie in einer sinnlich

bedingen, also sich in ständiger Wechselwirkung mit der sinnlichen Umwelt befindenden und sich darin gestaltenden Existenz geltend machte). In it [the said existential concept of knowledge] thinking and wanting (or thought and volition) fuse (merge) with each other under the influence (sign) of wanting (or volition)(,) while at the same time (in relation to which, and indeed) the plastic (or malleable) historicity of sensorily (or sensorially) (sensually, sensuously, materially) deep-rooted (ingrained) existence drove out (or displaced) (ousted, dispelled, replaced, superseded) the rigid (or inflexible) (firm, unbending, unyielding) eternity of the intellect's truths (truths of the intellect) (In ihm verschmolzen Denken und Wollen im Zeichen des Wollens miteinander, wobei die plastische Historizität sinnlich, verwurzelter Existenz die starre Ewigkeit der Wahrheiten des Intellekts verdrängte)<sup>39</sup>. In Marx's concept of ideology, both aspects of the rehabilitation of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses) [the primacy of anthropology and the downgrading of pure intellect] flowed (in) (or infiltrated), because ideology is a thought (intellectual) product standing (being, [existing, found]) under existential commands (requirements, necessities) [(i.e. which answers to existential commands)], and the [an] ideologically thinking existence stands (is) [found](,) in turn ((then) again)(,) in the middle of a network (plexus, mesh) of sociologically-historically ascertainable (detectable, traceable) social relations (In Marx' Konzept von der Ideologie flossen beide Aspekte der Rehabilitation der Sinnlichkeit ein, denn Ideologie ist ein

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<sup>39</sup> In relation to both these complementary aspects of the rehabilitation of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses), see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, pp. 421ff., 309ff.. Cf. Heidegger's reference to the interrelation between representing (i.e. representational) and interest-taking (i.e. interest-based) acts (vorstellenden und interessenehmenden Akten) in order to emphasise (give prominence to, underline) the ontic priority of the (situational) state of mind as mood (um die ontische Priorität der Befindlichkeit als Stimmung herauszustellen) (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 139). It certainly testifies to [a] genuinely philosophical ignorance of the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) background[s] (of (in (respect of)) the history of ideas) when Heidegger attributes (ascribes, imputes) the "service (or contribution)" of this insight [regarding the ontic priority of the (situational) state of mind as mood] to the phenomenological school, or when he – with (after, following) Scheler – refers to Augustine and Pascal (love as presupposition of knowledge).

unter existentiellen Geboten stehendes Denkprodukt, und die ideologisch denkende Existenz steht wiederum mitten in einem Geflecht soziologisch-historisch ermittelbarer sozialer Beziehungen).

Philosophers, who (have, had) inherited, with (in) or without [their] knowledge, the anti-intellectualism of the Enlightenment, by and large (on the whole, all in all) left aside (to one side) the first aspect [(i.e. the primacy of anthropology vis-à-vis theology, and, the associated primacy of biological-bodily and environmental (geographic-climatic, economic-social) sensory determinations)], in order to elaborate (work (carve) out, process, form, investigate) the primacy of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses) and of wanting (or volition) as against (opposed to) (before, vis-à-vis, rather than) the intellect and thinking (or thought) in the field (area, sector, domain), and with the means, of anthropology. Thus (So, In this way), already Schopenhauer [had done this], who regarded (considered, saw) the will (i.e. volition) objectified (objectivised) in the body (den im Leib objektivierten Willen) as “the most immediate (direct) [aspect, thing, result] of consciousness” („das Unmittelbarste des Bewußtseins“); as such the will (i.e. volition) never completely (totally, fully) takes the form (shape) (or fits (goes) into the mould) of the [a] representation (Vorstellung)(,) in which the subject and object face (are facing) (or stand opposite) each other<sup>40</sup>. Likewise, in a sociological and historical vacuum, Nietzsche undertook (it) to develop an existential concept (notion) of knowledge on the basis of constant (situational) states of mind (for instance will to power (Wille zur Macht)), which lie in advance of (or precede) every scientific or philosophical activity of the intellect. Intellect and logic are for him instruments of the superordinate (superior, higher) (situational) state of mind of wanting (or volition), and

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<sup>40</sup> *Die Welt als Wille*, book 2 (2<sup>nd</sup> book), §§ 18-21.

grow out of a soil of desires (or longings) (appetites, lusts, yearnings) (Begierden-Erdreich) – in fact consciousness in general constitutes (represents, is) “not (the) leading (control, directing or management), but an organ of leading (control, directing or management)” („nicht die Leitung, sondern ein Organ der Leitung“); that is why knowledge and truth together with philosophers’ epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) stances (or positionings) (attitudes) (pertaining to the theory of knowledge) must be value-laden (loaded), “consequences of value-assessments (i.e. valuations or estimations of value) (appreciations)” (wertbeladen, „Konsequenzen von Wertschätzungen“)<sup>41</sup>.

As Nietzsche’s example reminds us, the in the meantime in part buried (submerged) existential concept (notion) of knowledge of the Enlightenment, amongst other things (inter alia), also came (arrived) on the scene anew in (on, from, through) the roundabout way of 19<sup>th</sup> century biological evolutionism. We do not have to here examine (investigate) more closely (in greater detail) how it [the existential concept of knowledge] was varied in the pragmatists, in Bergson or for instance in Freud; (in the latter two (both the latter thinkers), by the way (incidentally), the contradistinction (or dispute) (confrontation, altercation, clash) with biology (likewise) left (behind) deep traces (behind) (as well)). In all of them it is apparent (turns out, goes to show, appears, shown, seen) that the more or less successful attempt to make out (or locate) (determine, discern) pre-intellectual (situational) states of mind (vorintellektuelle Befindlichkeiten) of an existence deep-rooted (ingrained) in sensory (or sensorial) (sensual, sensuous, material) facticity, did (was) not at all suffice (sufficient) for the founding (establishment) of a social ontology. Marx’s approach was, concerning

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<sup>41</sup> *Werke*, III, pp. 892, 667, 547.

(regarding) this, irrespective of its [Marx's approach's] ascertained limits, more productive (fruitful, fertile, profitable), because he took the fact of society more seriously and (has, had) connected the anthropological factor with it [the fact of society] ab ovo. Social-ontologically relevant (pertinent) notions (ideas or thoughts) of philosophers were developed in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, at any rate, under the influence of the ascendant (rising) social-scientific disciplines, above all of sociology. Certainly not by chance (coincidentally, accidentally). Because sociology and social ontology were very often mixed (up) (blended) or even confused (muddled, mixed up) with each other to the detriment (harm, damage, disadvantage) of both. The task now is to (We must (have got to) now) bring about (on) (cause, induce) a conceptual clarification.

2. Social-scientific questions [in respect of] of method(s)  
(methodological questions (issues, problems)) from [a]  
social-ontological perspective  
(Sozialwissenschaftliche Methodenfragen in  
sozialontologischer Perspektive)

A. Two [kinds of] founding(s) (establishment(s), foundation(s))  
of sociology (Zwei Grundlegungen der Soziologie)

Let it be (It should be) said (Let us say it) right (straight) away  
(immediately, at once): the conceptual segregation (or separation)  
(severance, isolation, detachment, partition; Absonderung) of social  
ontology, sociology and historical science ([the] science of history) from  
one another can, on account (because) of the obvious (evident, manifest)  
commonalities (common ground, similarities) of their object (or subject  
matter) (topic), only be approximated, i.e. it [the said conceptual  
separation] concerns (has to do with, affects, pertains to, regards) the core  
(nucleus, nub, heart) and not the outer (external) boundaries (limits) of  
every one of these three disciplines (Die begriffliche Absonderung von  
Sozialontologie, Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft voneinander  
kann wegen der offensichtlichen Gemeinsamkeiten ihres Gegenstandes  
nur approximativ sein, d. h. sie betrifft den Kern und nicht die äußeren  
Grenzen jeder dieser drei Disziplinen). The conceptual exposure  
(exposing, uncovering, laying open (bare)) of this core does not therefore  
automatically effect (bring about, cause, give rise to, result in) the coming

into being (creation, genesis, emergence, origin) of three (fields which are) sharply delimited (demarcated) from one another (fields (areas, sectors, domains)), in which three different kinds (sorts, types) of specialist work. On the contrary. [The] Things (Matters) themselves have no idea of our concepts and conceptual distinctions (differentiations), and that is why every (deeper) analysis (going deeper) in regard to (of, about) that which humans living in society do and create must simultaneously move in, and at, all three fields or levels. [The] Analysis has (possesses) at its disposal (a) finer (set of) (conceptual) instruments (ein feineres Instrumentarium) when it does this in the knowledge of (the) specific (examination (study) of) (the) problem(s) of [at] every level, and (it) loses its way when it jumps (leaps) in a carefree manner (light-heartedly, without worry or responsibility) from one level to the other in the belief [that] it nevertheless remains constant(ly) (steady, steadily) at (one) only (one) (a single) [level] (e.g. at that [the level] of sociology) as the truly comprehensive [level]. Similar aberrations (or kinds of losing one's way) (defects, errors, fallacies, anomalies) perhaps do not do any major (great) damage to (the) major (great) researchers, whose genius (brilliance, ingenuity) and all-round (general) erudition (learning, education, culture) vouch for (guarantee) deeper insights into the interrelations (correlations, connections) between (contexts of) things (matters) (Sachzusammenhänge), as (is) [in line (accordance) with] their professed (declared, proclaimed, avowed) "methodology" (goes). However, here it is not a matter (question) of (we are not dealing with) an objective achievement (accomplishment), which cannot be guaranteed by a(ny) "methodology" [anyway], but of (with) the founding (establishment, foundation) of the sociological discipline (die Grundlegung der soziologischen Disziplin). According to my impression, the inner (internal) incoherence of classical sociological theories, as well as the old



fluctuations (vacillations, wavering, variations) between [the] formal (or form-related) and historical orientation (alignment) of sociological theory in general (zwischen formaler und historischer Ausrichtung soziologischer Theorie überhaupt), are put down (reduced, attributed) to the fact that social-ontological and sociological points of view (aspects) were unreflectedly (or unthinkingly) (uncritically; unreflektiert) lumped together (tarred with the same brush). In the process, they mutually (reciprocally) hindered (obstructed, impeded) each other in [respect of] their autonomous development (unfolding) or supplementation (supplementing, completion, replenishment) by other(s) [points of view] (partly anthropological, partly historical) or else one [some] [point(s) of view] overgrew (or grew profusely (rampant)) (proliferated) and (the) [an]other(s) [point(s) of view] fell by the wayside. It is theoretically worth following (pursuing) the converging and diverging (breaking (splitting) up, separating) (or going into one another or away from one another) (das In- und Auseinandergehen) of the aforementioned points of view (aspects) in Max Weber or Parsons in order to then observe in Durkheim how precisely (especially) a sharper (clearer, acuter) and more cohesive (or united) (unified, uniform, well-rounded) definition (determination of the concept (notion)) of sociology (eine schärfere und geschlossenere Begriffsbestimmung der Soziologie) goes hand in hand with (accompanies, is accompanied by) a factually (or an objectively) regrettable (unfortunate, lamentable, deplorable, woeful, sad) blunting (or dulling) (deadening) of the sense for that which is supposed (meant) to (should) lie (be) beyond its [sociology's] bound(arie)s (limits). A third kind (sort) of founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology, which wants (intends) to deal with (treat, handle) the forms of social life (die die Formen sozialen Lebens behandeln will), will occupy us during (in) the discussion of the social relation. Because such [a] sociology as a whole

constitutes (makes (up), provides) only (just) one (sole, single) aspect of the much broader social-ontological (examination (study) of) (the) problem(s)<sup>i</sup>.

Weber (likewise, also) starts from (takes) the social relation in his founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology (as a starting point) (as well), since this is defined in essence (essentially, in the main) as synonymous with social action, which, as is (well) known, in accordance with Weber constitutes (represents) for sociology the constitutive state of affairs (facts of the matter) and its [sociology's] specific object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) (Weber geht ebenfalls bei seiner Grundlegung der Soziologie von der sozialen Beziehung aus, da diese im wesentlichen synonym mit dem sozialen Handeln definiert wird, welches bekanntlich nach Weber den für die Soziologie konstitutiven Tatbestand und ihren spezifischen Gegenstand darstellt). Both social action and [the] social relation equally mean (signify) the orientation of one's own behaviour to others' behaviour,(;) in the case of the social relation this orientation is merely mutual (or reciprocal) (Beides, soziales Handeln und soziale Beziehung, bedeuten gleichermaßen die Orientierung eigenen Verhaltens am Verhalten anderer, im Falle der sozialen Beziehung ist bloß diese Orientierung gegenseitig)<sup>42</sup>. Since the orientation in question must be connected with a meaning (or sense) on the part of (for) him (the person) [acting] or them (the people) acting, the no less constitutive occupation (engagement or (theoretical) activity) of sociology with (or in relation to) meaning (sense) and [the] understanding of meaning (sense) can, in the same characteristic manner (style, fashion), be made clear (or plausible) (explained) (Da die fragliche Orientierung seitens des oder der Handelnden mit Sinn verbunden sein muß, läßt sich im selben Duktus die

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<sup>42</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 1, 11, 12, 13.

nicht weniger konstitutive Beschäftigung der Soziologie mit Sinn und Verstehen von Sinn plausibel machen). Now it is often noted (noticed, observed, remarked) that Weber's substantial (or substantive) work (labour) as sociology pays little (scant, barely no) heed to (shows little (scant) consideration for) his programmatic founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology, and offers (provides) large-scale (grandly laid out (drawn up)) structural analyses of historically given collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations)(,) in relation to which "subjectively meant meaning (or sense)" and understanding related (relevant) to it (that) get short shrift (are paid scant attention (disregarded, passed over), do not get the attention they deserve) (und großangelegte strukturelle Analysen von geschichtlich gegebenen kollektiven Gebilden bietet, wobei „subjektiv gemeinter Sinn“ und darauf bezogenes Verstehen zu kurz kommen)<sup>43</sup>. The most obvious explanation for that, in so far as one [an explanation] was attempted at all, seemed to be [that] Weber's strong (intense) historical interests and his gift (talent, knack) for the grand (great, large) overall view (overview, survey) would drive (impel, carry) him, straight(away) (immediately, right) after (the) completion (execution, dealing with) of (the) [his] compulsory methodological duties, to(wards) the sketching (outlining, devising, designing, planning) of structural-functional panoramas (zum Entwerfen von strukturell-funktionalen Panoramen), while (during, amid, under) (the) neglect(ing) (of) the task (or duty) of incorporating (or building (inserting, working) in[to his research (work, panoramas)]) sufficient (adequate) mediations (or interventions) between both aspects [i.e. in regard to social action (or the social relation) and the historical aspect] of his own vision of sociology. Yet the question is exactly (that, [the question]) whether these

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<sup>43</sup> See e.g. Gerth-Mills, "Introduction", p. 57ff.; Levine, *Flight*, p. 102ff.; Fullbrook, "Weber's 'Interpretive Sociology'"; Bendix, *Weber*, p. 269ff..

aspects can be mediated as between (with) each other in principle, or, whether the [a] chasm (gulf, gap) here yawns not between two aspects of an in itself uniform (unified, standardised) sociological thinking (thought) in its particularity (or peculiarity (specific (special) feature)), but rather between two different levels of social knowledge (knowing) in its totality (entirety). [As] I think (believe, opine, mean)(,) [In my opinion] [that] this chasm (gulf, gap) is not able to (cannot) be bridged because the fact of the social relation in itself, and (out) (on account) of [from, based on] its constitution (composition or texture), refers to a kind (sort) of investigation (or research) (examination) which cannot be the specifically sociological, and (only) in (the) sociological praxis (practice) (alone, by itself) accessible(,) examination (study) of (the) problem (problems). Undoubtedly (Without (a) doubt), sociology must structurally and functionally examine (take a look at) (or illuminate (shed light on)) collective networks (or plexus(es)) of social relations (Zweifelsohne muß die Soziologie kollektive Geflechte sozialer Beziehungen strukturell und funktional beleuchten). These [collective networks of social relations] are, however, historically formed and variable (changeable, mutable, varying), whereas the social relation as orientation of the action of one side in [regard to] the action of each and every respective other [side] constitutes a constant(,) (and) ubiquitous (and,) (mechanism) (independent of (unattached to) historical etc. content(,)) (mechanism). It [The said (This) mechanism] distinguishes human affairs (matters or things) as a (on the) whole (e.g. their psychological dimension no less than the sociological [dimension]), and it could provide (or constitute) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make, produce) the specific characteristic (feature) of sociology only (then) if (when) sociology were the only (sole) discipline regarding (about) human affairs (matters or things) in general. That is why in [respect of] (during) the definition of sociology [the] social

relation may (should, must, ought, is) not (allowed to) be taken into account (considered) at all, and in the praxis (practice) of the sociologist, only after the marking, and inside, of the boundaries (limits) of his discipline – i.e. in this or that of its concrete forms (Diese sind aber geschichtlich geformt und veränderlich, während die soziale Beziehung als Orientierung des Handelns der einen Seite am Handeln der jeweils anderen einen konstanten, ubiquitären und vom geschichtlichen etc. Inhalt unabhängigen Mechanismus bildet. Er zeichnet die menschlichen Dinge insgesamt aus (z. B. ihre psychologische Dimension nicht weniger als die soziologische) und er könnte das spezifische Kennzeichen der Soziologie nur dann abgeben, wenn Soziologie die einzige Disziplin über die menschlichen Dinge überhaupt wäre. Bei der Definition der Soziologie darf soziale Beziehung daher gar nicht und in der Praxis des Soziologen erst nach der Markierung und innerhalb der Grenzen seiner Disziplin berücksichtigt werden – d. h. in dieser oder jener ihrer konkreten Formen).

If theory starts from (takes) social action or the social relation (as its (the, a) starting point), then (so, thus) the marking of those boundaries (limits) [of sociology] must (has to, necessarily) amount(s) (be (is) tantamount) to a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [transition to another genus (or species)].

Nonetheless, Weber does not in the least feel (so, thus) as if he, upon entry (when (while) entering) (into) the field (area, sector, domain, realm) of substantial (or substantive) sociological analyses, had (has, would have) made a logical leap (leap in logic). Because between the subjective meaning (or sense), with which the individuals (single persons) connect their action or their relation to(wards) [as regards (between)] one another, and the meaning (or sense) condensed (consolidated, solidified) in collective social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations), he

[Weber] inserts (or interposes) (interpolates, intercalates) several (some, a few) analytical tiers (or stages) (grades, levels) which in his eyes (opinion, view) enable (make) steps in (the) [a] continuity (possible) (Denn zwischen den subjektiven Sinn, mit dem die Einzelnen ihr Handeln bzw. ihre Beziehung zueinander verbinden, und den in kollektiven Sozialgebilden verdichteten Sinn schiebt er einige analytische Stufen ein, die in seinen Augen Schritte in der Kontinuität ermöglichen). But the first step has to do with a social relation, which is (stands) under the influence (sign) of the meaning-like (meaning-bearing) (meaningful or purposeful) orientation of actors towards (in relation to, as regards) one another,(;) the last (final) [step] brings social facts to light (displays (shows, exhibits, discloses) social facts), which take place (come to pass) or have taken place (come to pass) irrespective (regardless) of (notwithstanding) such orientation (Aber der erste Schritt hat mit einer sozialen Beziehung zu tun, die im Zeichen sinnhafter Orientierung der Akteure aneinander steht, der letzte fördert sozialen Tatsachen an den Tag, die sich ungeachtet solcher Orientierung vollziehen oder vollzogen haben). And only this last (final) step opens up (develops or discloses) [a] real (or an actual) *sociological* field (area, sector, domain, realm). The fact of society is presupposed by sociology, but the fact of the social relation cannot in itself result in (yield, produce, show, establish, prove) the fact of society, although this [fact of society] cannot be thought of (imagined, considered, conceptualised) without that [social relation] (Das Faktum der Gesellschaft wird von der Soziologie vorausgesetzt, aber das Faktum der sozialen Beziehung kann an sich das Faktum der Gesellschaft nicht ergeben, obwohl sich dieses ohne jenes nicht denken läßt)<sup>ii</sup>. Put differently (Otherwise said, In other words): Weber's definition of social action or of the social relation would retain (keep) its validity even (then) if (when) there were only two humans (men, people) in the world,(;) in

this case, however, the adjective “social” before (in front of) the noun “action” or “relation” would hardly (barely) be understandable (intelligible). Only against the background (a backdrop) of a society, as few in number [of people] as this [society] may be [no matter how many people in such a society], does the relation of two actors to(wards) (with, as between) each other become [a] *social* relation, and the concept (notion) “society” (would not come to anyone’s mind) on the basis of the mere representation (or idea) (notion, performance) of two individuals behaving (in relation) to(wards) each other (would come to no-one’s (nobody’s) (not come to anyone’s) mind). Weber himself admits (concedes, grants, confesses), albeit only indirectly, the necessity of a more detailed founding (or justification) (Begründung) of the “social” character of social action, when he, beyond the initial fundamental (basic, in principle) connection (bond) between social action and sociology, introduces an additional (extra, further) and important conceptual differentiation(,) in order to outline in greater detail sociology’s field of work. Then he speaks of action(,) which has the [as a] condition (requirement or prerequisite) [of] several (quite a few, a number of, multiple) persons living together, that is, the existence (presence) of a society. Historical science (The science of history) obviously deals with (is about), just like sociology, socially acting humans (people, men). How can therefore (the, [a]) preoccupation with (treatment (study) of) social action in general provide (or constitute) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make, produce) the *differentia specifica* (specific difference) of sociology (die *differentia specifica* der Soziologie)? It cannot [do it], Weber concedes (admits, acknowledges) tacitly (silently), and he (loudly) says (out loud (aloud)): whereas history investigates (examines, looks into, scrutinises) “important (significant) individual interrelations (or contexts)” of social action, sociology closely examines (has a good look

at, scrutinises, puts) the “actual regularities” (under the microscope)(,) which can be observed “inside of social action”, that is, as [a] category of action [they (the “actual regularities”)] stamp (mould or characterise) (shape, leave their mark on) only a part (or sector) of it [(social) action] (Während Geschichte „wichtige Einzelzusammenhänge“ sozialen Handelns untersucht, nimmt Soziologie die „tatsächlichen Regelmäßigkeiten“ unter die Lupe, die sich „innerhalb des sozialen Handelns“ beobachten lassen, also als Handelnskategorie nur einen Ausschnitt von ihm prägen)<sup>44</sup>. The [Something] equivalent (same, corresponding [to that]) applies (goes) understandably (with regard) to (for) the meaning (or sense) of action: “during (in, upon) (the) historical way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation)”, the meaning (or sense) “really meant by him (the person) acting” is (stands) at the centre of interest (attention), on the other hand (however), “during (in, upon) (the) mass sociological way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation)”, the “average and approximately” meant meaning (or sense) is at the centre of interest<sup>45</sup>. The construction of regularities and averages is therefore the actual (real) task (job) of sociology, and since such [regularities and averages, things, phenomena] do not happen (occur, appear, crop up) in (the) meaning (or sense) “really meant by him (the person) acting”, (so, then, thus) the perspective of the observer or of the sociologist gains (gets) the upper hand over that [(the) perspective] of him (the person) acting, and [as does] the category of the objective meaning (or sense) constructed by the former [observer or sociologist] (gains the upper hand) over the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) of the latter [him (the person) acting] (Entsprechendes gilt verständlicherweise im Hinblick auf den Sinn des Handelns: „bei

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<sup>44</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 14.

<sup>45</sup> Loc. cit., p. 4.



historischer Betrachtung“ stehe der „vom Handelnden real gemeinte“ Sinn, „bei soziologischer Massenbetrachtung“ hingegen der „durchschnittlich und annäherungsweise“ gemeinte Sinn im Mittelpunkt des Interesses. Die Konstruktion von Regelmäßigkeiten und Durchschnitten ist also die eigentliche Aufgabe der Soziologie, und da solche in dem „von Handelnden real gemeinten“ Sinn nicht vorkommen, so gewinnt die Perspektive des Beobachters bzw. des Soziologen über jene des Handelnden und die Kategorie des vom ersteren konstruierten objektiven Sinnes über den vom letzteren subjektiv gemeinten Sinn die Oberhand). A weighty (or very important) reason why the programmatic binding (bond, tie) of sociology to (with) the concept (notion) of social action on the path (road, way) towards (practised (or applied)) sociology (in practice, as practised) (praktizierten Soziologie) is dropped, is thus (consequently) the impossibility of deducing (deriving) from this concept (notion) [of social action], in its necessary reference to each and every respective concrete person acting, any averages or regularities (whatsoever). Social action and meaning (or sense) in relation to (regarding, in (with) regard (respect) to) the constructing observer (konstruierenden Beobachter), however, is (constitutes, represents) something else (different, another matter).

Schütz (has) described (called, referred to) Weber's undertaking as [an] epistemological paradox in solving [trying (wanting) to solve], through [the] making (manufacture) of objective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) (durch Herstellung objektiver Sinnzusammenhänge) on the part of the observer, the problem (question, task) of a science(,) which wants to in principle search for the meaning (or sense) [subjectively] meant by him (the person) acting. Whereas the early [younger] Weber gave precedence ([his] preference) to ideal types (Idealtypen) which were

based (rested) on historical guidelines (historischen Vorgaben), the late[r] [older] Weber as [a] sociologist constructed ideal types(,) which amounted (were tantamount) to statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions) on (about, regarding) “the action of a somebody (people or the They) proceeding in full anonymity”. As Schütz thinks (opines, means) [In Schütz’s opinion, According to Schütz], only the inclusion (incorporation) of meaning (or sense) in a subjective meaning (sense) context (interrelation) (erst die Einbeziehung von Sinn in einen subjektiven Sinnzusammenhang) fulfils the Weberian postulate (or imperative) of (demand (request) for) adequacy of meaning (or sense) (Sinnadäquanz); that is why (the) sociological ideal types must, or at least should (are supposed (meant) to), produce (or establish) (make, manufacture) an objective meaning (sense) context (interrelation) between (amongst) *subjective* meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations)<sup>46</sup>. In [respect of] the demand (request) for the tracing back (reduction or returning) of objective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) to subjective [meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations)] (or even the other way around: for the (meaning(sense)-adequate) construction(, adequate as to meaning (sense),) of objective [meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations)], lies (there is) a difficulty, however, which (escaped, eluded) both Weber as well as his kindly disposed (benevolent) critic (failed to notice, missed) – yet precisely it [this difficulty] makes the bidding farewell (saying goodbye, turning away) of Weberian sociology to (from) the principle (tenet, axiom) of subjectively meant meaning (or sense) in research practice (or praxis) unavoidable (inevitable). The dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the objective meaning (sense) context (interrelation) constructed by [an] observer into its [the

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<sup>46</sup> *Aufbau*, pp. 330ff., 343ff., 344ff.. Cf. the definitions of subjective and of objective meaning (sense) at p. 187ff..

objective meaning context's] subjective ideational components meant by them (the people) acting (in seine subjektiven, von den Handelnden gemeinten ideellen Komponenten) (or conversely (the other way around): the building (or construction) of the former [objective meaning context of the observer] through [the] putting together (compiling, arrangement) of the latter [subjective ideational components of them (the people) acting]) can only succeed (be successful) under two conditions: that at the same time (in the course of this) [an] average meaning (or sense) and average action ("action of a somebody (people or the They)", as Schütz calls it) be taken into consideration (account) (borne in mind) *and* that these averages are taken (or inferred) (gathered) from a meaning (or sense) and an action, whose manifestations (or expressions) (outer signs; Äußerungen) indeed (in fact, of course) vary in the multiformity (or variety of form) of individuals, but are essentially homogenous in accordance with (according to, [judging by]) their content and their direction; an average of a number of (several) different qualities cannot in fact be imagined (conceived, thought of, contemplated). On the other hand, if the subjective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations), which are condensed ((become) compressed) in an objective meaning (sense) construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation) (die sich in einem objektiven Sinngebilde verdichten), differ qualitatively from one another, then (so) the latter [objective meaning construct] cannot be reduced (put down) any more to [the fact of] subjectively meant meaning (or sense), since it [the objective meaning construct] does not agree (is not in agreement) with any of those [subjectively meant meanings (or senses)] contained in it. Here, the objective meaning (sense) context (interrelation) does not represent an average, but a resultant (eine Resultante), which does not coincide with any of the part-forces (partial forces) (putting) (assembling (or composing)) it [the objective meaning context] (together) (die mit

keiner der sie zusammensetzenden Teilkräfte zusammenfällt); in short (a word), the construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation) in question comes about (takes place) through the mechanism of the heterogony of ends (das betreffende Gebilde kommt durch den Mechanismus der Heterogonie der Zwecke zustande). Weber speaks briefly, in [a] different context on each (and every respective) occasion, of both cases mentioned just (right) now [i.e. an average meaning and average action, and, an objective meaning context as a resultant], without however thinking (worrying, wondering) about the methodological significance (or meaning) (importance) (die methodologische Bedeutung) of their difference. He [Weber] connects (associates, puts, places) social action's "regularities" (in connection (conjunction, contact)) with a "typically similarly (, in the same way (of the same kind),) meant meaning (or sense)", on the other hand he ascertains [that] "in the majority of cases" "historically or sociologically relevant action [is] affected (or influenced) by qualitatively heterogeneous motives"<sup>47</sup>. Both points of view are, again unreflectedly, fertilised (or made productive) in (the, [his]) substantial (or substantive) (fundamental) sociological analyses. When Weber e.g. brings (works, carves) out (elaborates) correlations between social classes or strata and types of religiosity<sup>48</sup>, (so, then) he does not obviously mean (think) [that] [in regard] to all those belonging to these classes or strata the corresponding (analogous) religiosity would be (is) cherished in their bosoms (or hearts), but he well (probably, no doubt) assumes (or accepts) (presumes) [that] the religiosity of the devout amongst them is by and large (in the main (general), on the whole), that is, on average, "similar (of the same kind, uniform)". During (In [respect of]) the description of long-term processes, which have found expression (been reflected

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<sup>47</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 14, 10.

<sup>48</sup> Loc. cit., p. 267ff..

(echoed)) (been expressed) in extensive (broad(er), large-scale) objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations), it is nevertheless hardly (not very) meaningful (or sensible) (of little meaning) to postulate such a thing (something like that). To(wards) the “rationalisation” in the West („Rationalisierung“ im Westen), of whose “ambiguity (multiple meanings (meaningfulness))” („Vieldeutigkeit“)<sup>49</sup> Weber knows, e.g. Calvinists have contributed just like atheistic Enlighteners (i.e. Enlightenment thinkers or philosophers), however neither (none) of both these schools (lines) of thought (or tendencies) (directions) would have seen in the other an allied force (ally) in the same historical process. Here, no average of the completely (entirely, totally) different subjectively meant meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) can be ascertained (established, determined, traced, found out)(,) in which those (the parties, individuals (or groups)) concerned could in part recognise themselves; only a resultant of part-forces (partial forces) having an effect (or being active) (acting, working, operating) against one another can be drawn up (sketched, outlined), and this is [a] matter for (of) the observer (the observer’s matter (affair, business)), who looks at (considers, regards, contemplates) these part-forces (partial forces) from the outside and after [their] (completed (concluded)) development (unfolding) ([has been] completed (brought to a close)).

Where the heterogony of ends creates (or causes) (makes) (the) social facts, there the last (final) epistemological step has (was) also (been) taken, away from subjectively meant meaning (or sense). Weber did not perceive (discern) it [that], because he thinks [that] at all tiers (or stages) (grades, levels) of ascent, from [the] concrete case of social action (up) to the architectural panorama of society, [he] can (is able to) use (employ,

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<sup>49</sup> Loc. cit., p. 15ff..

utilise, apply) [the] same methodological key: understanding of meaning (or sense) (Verstehen von Sinn). But the concepts (notions) “meaning (or sense)” and “understanding” are from the beginning (outset) conceived so that they really (absolutely, virtually) suggest the [a] leap (jump) from the standpoint of him (the person) acting to the standpoint of the observer, that is, the shift(ing) (moving, displacement) of [in] (the) question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme) from the subjective to the objective meaning (sense) context (interrelation). The rejection of “psychologism” („Psychologismus“) is made known (declared) (or manifests itself) in the definition of meaning (or sense) in [the fact] that, as subjectively meant meaning (or sense), [it (meaning (or sense))] does not merely apply to (is not valid as) “actual (real)” [meaning (or sense)], but also [to meaning (or sense)] apprehended (grasped, understood) “in a conceptually constructed pure type” („in einem begrifflich konstruierten reinen Typus“); understanding is correspondingly (accordingly) activated as interpreting (or interpretive) apprehension (graping, comprehension, understanding) (deutende Erfassung) of meaning (or sense) both in the former and in the latter case [of “actual” meaning, and, meaning apprehended in a pure type, respectively]<sup>50</sup>. The (of necessity (unavoidable, necessary)) transition from the “actual (real)” to the ideal-typical (vom „Tatsächlichen“ zum Idealtypischen) therefore by no means weakens (or reduces) (extenuates, tones down, mitigates) the potency of comprehending (understanding, knowing) interpretation (analysis, comment(ary)) (or interpretive explanation) (die Potenz der verstehenden Deutung), one can even say that it [the said transition] first (only [then]) brings it [comprehending

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<sup>50</sup> Loc. cit., pp. 1, 4.

interpretation] to [its, a state of] full development (or fruition) (unfolding) (develops it fully). And just as little is this same potency impaired (or reduced) (lessened, diminished, interfered with, restricted) through (by (means of)) the transition of sociological research to collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations)(,) which are (stand) under the influence (sign) of an objective meaning (sense) context (interrelation), regardless (irrespective, in spite) of (notwithstanding, despite) the subjective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) interwoven (beyond recognition) with one another in it [the said objective meaning context] [and are] (beyond recognition) ((up) to [the point of] unrecognisableness (indecipherability)). Typically enough, Weber emphasises (underlines, stresses) the particular advantages of the ideal-typical procedure (or method) precisely (there) where he makes his (above-)mentioned observation (ascertainment, statement, discovery) [that] historically or sociologically relevant action is mostly (most of the time, for the most part) influenced (or affected) by qualitatively heterogeneous motives, which could not (cannot) be reduced to a mere average<sup>51</sup>. This implies though that the use (or employment) of ideal-typically underpinned (supported, backed up, substantiated) understanding in sociological research must not at all depend on whether the starting point is an “individualistic” [one, starting point] or whether (it [the (such) use of ideal-typically underpinned understanding in sociological research]) takes as its basis (is based on) objective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) and collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations). “Meaning (or sense)” and “understanding” cannot in themselves determine the manner (or kind) (way, mode, sort) of founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology, when they [“meaning” and

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<sup>51</sup> Loc. cit., p.10.

“understanding”], at any rate (anyway, anyhow, nevertheless), want to leave every “psychologism” behind. They open up (or disclose) (develop, decipher) to (for) us, always in ideal-typical preparation, equally (in the same way) (both) [the, what is] individual-historical and [the, what is] collective-sociological [elements] (immer in idealtypischer Präparierung, gleichermaßen Individuell-Historisches und Kollektiv-Soziologisches), they do not, that is, clearly (or unambiguously) refer (concern), and not necessarily, (to) the specific object of sociology, and that is why [they] may not (are not permitted to) also give (provide, constitute, produce) (any) [the] criteria for the apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of the specific character of this [the sociological] discipline, irrespective of how indispensable they appear [to be] for the [a] sociologist’s work.

It can be assumed (presumed, supposed, suspected) why Weber had (has, did) not bore(d) (or delve(d)) deeper into this important point. In historism’s (or historicism’s) thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) (In der Gedankenwelt des Historismus), both individual (or separate) persons as well as collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) were regarded as individuals; the yardstick (or measure) (benchmark, criterion) for individuality (der Maßstab für Individualität) here was not (the) extent (size or scope) (range, area), but (the) historical uniqueness and unrepeatability (die geschichtliche Einmaligkeit und Unwiederholbarkeit). One knows [It is known] in what way (manner) Dilthey expanded (stretched, spread) the domain (competence or responsibility) of interpreting (interpretive) understanding in [respect of] the large (great) crystallisations of the objective intellect(-spirit) (die Zuständigkeit interpretierenden Verstehens auf die großen Kristallisationen des objektiven Geistes), without in the slightest (least)



having the feeling he turned his back on the individual<sup>52</sup>. From this perspective, the decisive (determinative) dividing line (line of separation) did not run between the two forms (shapes) of the individual [i.e. individual persons and collective constructs], but between the world of individual forms (shapes) in general, i.e. the historical world as a whole (on the whole, all in all), and (the) events (or becoming) of nature (natural events (or the natural becoming)) (und dem Naturgeschehen), which is beyond (or evades) (eludes, escapes) interpreting (interpretive) understanding. Since historical science (the science of history) (also) investigated (examined, researched into), ex officio (or by virtue of its office, i.e. standing, as a science), the field (area, sector, domain) of the objective intellect(-spirit) (too), that is, since it [historical science] had not been differentiated yet from sociology, and did not have to struggle (fight, battle, wrestle) against this latter [sociology] for its independence (or autonomy) (Unabhängigkeit), then (so, thus) the contradistinction (contrasting) of [between] historical and natural (i.e. physical) sciences (the sciences of history and of nature) (die Gegenüberstellung von Geschichts- und Naturwissenschaften) remained the only (lone) decisive (deciding) [one, contradistinction]. It [The said contradistinction] remained so, however, also for Weber, who continued to orientate himself towards it, although his particular (matter of) concern (purpose, intention, objective) was the determination (or definition) of sociology's specific object (subject (matter), topic, theme). Here, obviously, a new *differentia specifica* (specific difference) had to be introduced. That, which separated the (intellectual(-spiritual)) (humanities) and the natural sciences from one another, was not sufficient (enough) (did not suffice)(,)

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<sup>52</sup> „Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt“, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, esp. p. 208ff.. Cf. Droysen's remarks on psychological interpretation and [the] interpretation of (the) moral(ethical)(-customary(customs-related)) (= supra(hyper)-personal and social) powers (also pertaining to customs) (den Sittlichen (= überpersönlichen oder sozialen) Mächten), *Historik*, p. 173ff..

in order to found (establish, justify) the necessity of distinctions (differentiations) *inside* of the humanities (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences). As advocate (champion, defender, proponent) of (for) an independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) (self-standing) sociological discipline (Als Verfechter einer selbständigen soziologischen Disziplin), Weber broke away (freed himself, cut himself loose) from historism (or historicism), simultaneously however, he appropriated the methodological principles (maxims, axioms, tenets) of (the) idiographic science (die methodologischen Grundsätze der idiographischen Wissenschaft); he noticed (felt, realised) in fact that the contrast(ing) (or opposition) (conflict) between the idiographic and the nomological [science, discipline] (der Gegensatz zwischen Idiographischem und Nomologischem), *after* the founding (or justification) (establishment) (Begründung) of sociology, had slipped (crept) modified into the area (realm, sector) of the humanities (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) itself (“regularities”, “averages”), yet (but) he did not see the problems [in respect] of (the) founding (establishment, foundation) (die Grundlegungsprobleme) of the new discipline in this light, however [he] carried on (continued to) summon(ing) “meaning (or sense)” and “understanding” for [in regard to] (the) coping (coming to terms) with the task (or problem) (job, duty) [at hand]. He felt justified in relation to that because he, in any event (one way or another, anyway), wanted to conduct (pursue, do, carry on, be involved in, take part in) a *historically* oriented (aligned, adjusted) sociology. But a historically oriented sociology remains (nevertheless, all the same) [a] *sociology* (after all), and must be founded (established) (or justified) (accounted for, substantiated) *as* [a] sociology.

Not only does the historical orientation (alignment, adjustment) of his sociology, nonetheless, relieve (ease the burden of, reduce the strain on) Weber's methodological conscience. The methodological putting first of "meaning (or sense)" and "understanding" has moreover (besides) a particular (certain) polemical point, which though illustrates ((vividly, graphically) demonstrates, exemplifies) anew (afresh) how much in Weber's thought (thinking) the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between [the] humanities and [the] natural sciences dominated. The [polemical] point turns, namely, against attempts at looking at (considering, contemplating) and at systematising history in (on, from) the roundabout way of (through) sociology in (accordance with) the manner (way) of the natural (i.e. physical) sciences, i.e. to find (or trace) (locate, detect) in it [history] forms (kinds) of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) (Gesetzmäßigkeiten) comparable with (to) the forms (kinds) of law bindedness (determinisms, law(rule)-based necessities) of (in) nature (Naturgesetzmäßigkeiten), and to consequently foresee (predict) its [history's] future course. Comte, who wanted to find out (discover, ascertain, determine) the "natural laws of the history of mankind" (die „Naturgesetze der Geschichte der Menschheit“), and Marx, who spoke in the same spirit of the "natural laws of capitalistic production" (den „Naturgesetzen der Kapitalistischen Produktion“), constituted (were) the prime (classic) examples of this (historical-philosophical) sociology (pertaining to the philosophy of history) or sociological philosophy of history (diese geschichtsphilosophische Soziologie oder soziologische Geschichtsphilosophie)<sup>53</sup>. Sociology's (as) close(st) (tight, narrow) (as) possible methodological following [the example] (dependence) of the

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<sup>53</sup> From this point of view, Dilthey had already lumped sociology and the philosophy of history together, see „Einleitung in die Geisteswiss.“, *Ges. Schriften*, I, p. 86ff..

idiographic sciences is supposed (meant) to (should) now provide (give, offer, afford) the cure (remedy) for its [sociology's] (historical-philosophical) illness (sickness, disease, disorder) (in relation to [arising from] the philosophy of history). The emphasis, with which Weber expresses the principle (tenet, axiom) of methodological individualism (den Grundsatz des methodologischen Individualismus), necessitates (causes, determines, presupposes; bedingt) the same polemical consideration [used in rebutting Comte and Marx's philosophies of history (in combatting the philosophy of history)]; there are (actually, in reality) no collective social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (in actual fact), these are "merely (simply, only) sequences of events and interrelations of specific action of individual (single) humans (men)" („lediglich Abläufe und Zusammenhänge spezifischen Handelns einzelner Menschen“)<sup>54</sup>. This statement (opinion, pronouncement, assertion, proposition) is true – more precisely: it can be interpreted in such a way (manner) that it can be regarded as true –, its [the said statement's] relevance for the founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology must, nonetheless, be classified as slight (low, minor), and its use concerning (regarding) this [founding of sociology] is based (rests) on a confusion (mistaking, mixing up) of the epistemological level with (for) the level of reality. Naturally, societies exist, and the social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) in them [societies] [arise, come] only out of humans (men, people) and their action, however the question is whether this fact concerns (has to do with, affects) the definition of sociology as [a] discipline, especially as it [this fact] can be taken as the basis for the definition of practically (virtually, more or less) (or in practice) every (intellectual(-spiritual) science) (all the humanities)

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<sup>54</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 6.

(e.g.: literary studies (the science (study) of literature) is the discipline which deals with the action of humans (men) as authors etc.). The pointing out (indication, reminder) of a ubiquitous reality is (does) by no means sufficient (enough, suffice) for the founding (establishment) (or justification) of a particular discipline. Because the ubiquitous reality is only one [reality], yet (but, however) the disciplines are many, and the level of reality, at which every discipline has to (make a) start (or be developed (produced, attached, fixed, prepared)), is determined in accordance with epistemological criteria and not by invoking (appealing to) (with reference to) (or referring to) (“the”) (“reality”). Oddly (Strangely) enough, Weber, who otherwise knows like few others of the radical difference (distinction) between [a] conceptual construction and “reality”, and of the constitutive significance (meaning, importance) of the former for the picture (or image) [we have] of the latter, does not think in a consistent manner (consistently) of the primacy of the epistemological standpoint when it is a matter (question) of the founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology. He [Weber] does not hesitate (lose any time), in other words, *inside* of sociology(,) in view of (with regard to) [the] cognitive necessities of the ideal type, to give the ideal type precedence over (the) “reality”; however, he does not want to define [the] nature and [the] object (subject (matter), theme) of sociology itself through (by means of) [the, a] typifying process (procedure, method) (i.e. the process of rendering social facts (or phenomena) into types) (durch typisierendes Verfahren), but as far as (if) possible [(he) wants] to start (begin) with the individual (single person) as [a] meaning-bearing (meaning-like) (meaningful or purposeful) person acting (beim Einzelnen als sinnhaft Handelndem ansetzen). (Yet) Sociology (nonetheless) represents (or constitutes), as [a] whole or as [an] epistemological construct, an ideal type, and a specific reality corresponds to that (it)

[ideal type] (just) as (well as) to ideal types (too)(,) which are constructed by sociology and inside of sociology. This specific reality is called [a] “social fact”. Only the actual acknowledgement (or recognition) of its [the “social fact’s”] existence enables (puts) Weber, incidentally, (in a position) to formulate (or put forward) (draw up, establish, set up, construct, propose) historically saturated (full, thoroughly imbued (filled)) ideal types. Before we show how much his [Weber’s] research *praxis* (or *practice*) regarding (concerning) this approximates (approaches, comes close to) Durkheim’s *theory*, we want to briefly describe (outline) how the discrepancy between social-ontological motifs (subjects, themes, motives) and sociological analysis manifests (shows) itself in Parsons (Soziologie stellt dennoch als ganze bzw. als epistemologisches Konstrukt einen Idealtyp dar und ihm entspricht ebenso eine spezifische Wirklichkeit wie den Idealtypen auch, die von der Soziologie und innerhalb der Soziologie konstruiert werden. Diese spezifische Wirklichkeit heißt „soziale Tatsache“. Erst die faktische Anerkennung ihrer Existenz setzt übrigens Weber instand, historisch gesättigte Idealtypen aufzustellen. Ehe wir zeigen, wie sehr sich seine Forschungs*praxis* diesbezüglich der *Theorie* Durkheims annähert, wollen wir kurz schildern, wie sich die Diskrepanz zwischen sozialontologischen Motiven und soziologischer Analyse bei Parsons äußert).

Parsons makes clear (clarifies) that the theory of acting (i.e. action) (die Handlungstheorie) encompasses (encloses, contains) a much (far) broader field (area, domain) than that of sociology. It [Sociology] constitutes the common basis (or foundation) of all disciplines which deal (have to do) with social relations between humans (men, people) or with man (humans), and are divided into three parts: [the] theory of social systems, [the] theory of personality, [the] theory of culture. At the same time (Into

the bargain), sociology's cognitive responsibilities (or domain) do not extend (stretch), for one thing, (just) so (as) widely (far, broadly) as that of the theory of social systems, to which sociology is conceptually subordinated. It [Sociology] namely makes up (constitutes) only one aspect of this latter [(the) theory of social systems], since its examination (study) of themes (or topics) (subject matter) is supposed (meant) to be limited (restricted, confined) to the institutionalisation of models (or patterns) of value orientation (die Institutionalisierung von Wertorientierungsmustern). It [Sociology] cannot be founded (or justified) (established, substantiated) through the mere application of the categories of the theory of acting (i.e. action) to the social system because the person acting takes part (participates) in the social system as [a] bearer (carrier, vehicle) of a role and not as [a] total personality. That is why the [a] macroscopic analysis of the social system should (is supposed (meant) to) base itself (be based) on a unit(y) (whole, entity) of a higher order than the act, i.e. the unit(y) (whole, entity) "status-role" (eine Einheit höherer Ordnung als der Akt, d. h. die Einheit „Status-Rolle“)<sup>55</sup>. Precisely in order to be able to cross (pass, go beyond, step over, exceed) the threshold of sociology, Parsons therefore leaves the general theory of acting (i.e. action) behind. "Status" and "role" cannot in fact be categorially (i.e. in the form or in terms of categories) deduced (derived) from "action", i.e. they ["status" and "role"] are introduced (imported) as independent (autonomous) categories and displace (or drive out) (dispel, oust) the category [of] "action". From that, other sociologists have drawn the obvious conclusion, i.e. they have formulated (or put forward) structural-functional theories which pay no heed to (show no consideration for) the concept (notion) of acting (i.e. action), or

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<sup>55</sup> *Social System*, VIII-IX, pp. 545ff., 552, 25.

recommended to [that] [their] colleagues (to) continue (carry on) their work as if (though) there had never been theories of acting (i.e. action)<sup>56</sup>.

The uncoupling of the theory of acting (action) and of structural-functional theory from each other (was) accompanied (by) Parsons's turn from idealistic-voluntaristic to behaviouristic positions<sup>57</sup>. The behaviourism – enriched (expanded) by the expedient (purposeful, suitable, effective) treatment (or processing) (die zweckmäßige Bearbeitung) of Freudian concepts (notions) – was here put in (at, to) the service of normativism,(;) it (he) [the said behaviourism, Parsons] is therefore supposed (meant) to explain (or illustrate) the internalisation of the dominant (ruling, prevailing) system of values and of norms (values and norms system) (die Internalisierung des herrschenden Werte- und Normensystems) on the part of the individual in their quasi bindedness, while at the same time (in relation to which) the role mediates (or intervenes) (intercedes, interposes) between person and behavioural norm ((the) norm of behaviour) (wobei die Rolle zwischen Person und Verhaltensnorm vermittelt). The normativistic interpretation of the social system certainly dominated in Parsons's thinking (thought) even in the [his] "voluntaristic" phase(,) when he strove for (aimed at, aspired to) a direct founding (or justification) of sociology through (by means of) the theory of acting (i.e. action). The turning away from (renunciation of, break with) this, that is, from (of, with) voluntarism (Voluntarismus) and from (of, with) the imponderability (incalculability; Unberechenbarkeit) of (the) subjective meaning (or sense)<sup>58</sup>, appears as [to be] the best way for (towards) the safeguarding (protection) of the postulate of

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<sup>56</sup> Dahrendorf, „Struktur und Funktion“, p. 509ff..

<sup>57</sup> In relation to that: Scott, "Foundations", esp. p. 724ff.; cf. Vanberg, *Zwei Soziologien*, p. 184ff..

<sup>58</sup> That is the reason for (Thus,) his [Parsons's] highly (extremely) self-willed (or unconventional) interpretation of Weber in *The Structure of Social Action*, which ends up in (amounts to) a(n) (different (alternative)) description (paraphrasing, formulation, expression) of the category of subjective meaning (or sense) through (by means of) normative categories, see Zaret, "From Weber", esp. p. 1194ff..



normativism. All the same (Nonetheless, Yet): although normativism and the banishment of the theory of acting (i.e. action) from the realm of sociology are closely (tightly) interrelated (connected, linked) with each other in Parsons's intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) development, it would be an optical illusion to think (believe, opine) [that] [the] theory of acting (i.e. action) will be expelled from sociology with [on account of] logical necessity only (then) when sociology indulges in (or devotes itself to) normativism. The logical necessity [for the banishing of the theory of action from sociology<sup>iii</sup>] exists, as our remarks (observations, comments) on (regarding, about) Weber hopefully showed, regardless (irrespective) of sociology's each and every respective content, because it has to do with its [sociology's] founding (establishment, foundation) and not with its content, i.e. the content does not directly determine (condition), and not in every case, the epistemological necessities of the founding. Parsons's mistake (error) did not at all consist in that he founded (or justified) sociology, in practice, (virtually, basically) with no consideration for the theory of acting (i.e. action), but rather in the disposition (or arrangement) (ordering, proneness) of his sociology's content, which was devised (planned, sketched, outlined) with regard to (in view of) normative aims (goals)(,) and prevented (or hindered) a theoretical evaluation of action in its entire (complete) social-ontologically given spectrum (sondern vielmehr in der Disposition des Inhalts seiner Soziologie, die im Hinblick auf normative Ziele entworfen wurde und eine theoretische Auswertung des Handelns in seinem ganzen sozialontologisch gegebenen Spektrum verhinderte). The boundary (border) between [the] theory of acting (i.e. action) and sociology did not remain merely epistemological, it was real, while (as) action dwindled (shriveled (dried) (up)) to a great extent (largely) to the form (shape) of adaptation (or adjustment) to norms, and the social relation was

understood (grasped, comprehended, interpreted, conceived, construed) with corresponding selectivity. But the distinct (clear) epistemological drawing (setting) of boundaries (a boundary) (demarcation; Grenzziehung) between social ontology, sociology and history may (should, ought) (is) never (allowed to) entail the exclusion (ruling out, preclusion, expulsion) of content(s). Social reality is unified (or united) (uniform, standardised), and all its social-ontologically given possibilities remain constantly (continually) present (Die soziale Wirklichkeit ist einheitlich, und alle ihre sozialontologisch gegebenen Möglichkeiten bleiben ständig präsent) – the incursion (invasion or breaking in) (penetration) of the social-ontological in its entire (complete, whole) breadth into that which for reasons of cognitive purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) (usefulness) is assigned (or allotted) (allocated, apportioned) to sociology or history as their own field (area, sector), takes place (comes to pass) permanently in long or short waves, in this or that aspect (der Einbruch des Sozialontologischen in seiner ganzen Breite in das, was aus Gründen kognitiver Zweckmäßigkeit der Soziologie oder der Geschichte als eigenes Gebiet zugeteilt wird, vollzieht sich permanent in langen oder kurzen Wellen, in diesem oder jenem Aspekt). Parsons's tense (strained) relationship with (towards, vis-à-vis) the abrupt fluctuations in action and in history does not follow (ensue, result, arise) from the [an] epistemological decision to found (or justify) sociology epistemologically under (with, [through, by means of]) the actual (real, factual) circumvention (or by-passing) of the theory of acting (i.e. action), but it [the said tense relationship] comes into being (results, arises, ensues, is produced) from (by) the angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry) [that] his sociology's normative content could be swept away (aside) by the bursting (gushing or breaking) in of elementary social-ontic

forces (könnte durch das Hereinbrechen elementarer sozialontischer Kräfte hinweggefegt werden).

Parsons sought theoretical backing (support) for his normativism in Durkheim, but at the same time in Weber, who in this way was made out to be the Frenchman's kindred spirit (or intellectual(-spiritual) relative), at least in the [a], for Parsons, decisive (relevant) respect. In [regard to] such an interpretation, important differences had to of course be disregarded (ignored, paid no attention)<sup>59</sup>, while (whereas) (the) commonalities (common ground) truly (or really) existing in both great sociologists' approaches, which we shall emphasise (underline, stress) hereinafter, were not perceived (discerned, noticed, detected) at all. And there is something else [that] Parsons, like many other commentators too, completely missed (overlooked): that the normativistic orientation (alignment) or rather projection of Durkheim's sociology not in the least compellingly (inescapably, convincingly, conclusively, coercively, necessarily) results (arises, emanates) from the manner (way) of its founding (establishment, foundation). On the other hand, Durkheim's strategy for the founding of sociology as [a] discipline with [a] specific object (or subject matter) seems epistemologically quite (pretty, fairly, more or less) solid (sound, sturdy, strong, robust), in any case, it [Durkheim's said strategy] cannot be refuted (disproved) through (by (means of)) arguments which refer (relate) to the content(s) of Durkheim's substantial (or substantive) (fundamental) sociological analyses. Whoever e.g. rejects that strategy with reference to (on the basis of) the supposedly unhistorical character of Durkheim's content-related(filled) (substantive) investigations (examinations, research), without having clarified [answered] the question [made clear] beforehand

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<sup>59</sup> In relation to that: Pope-Cohen-Hazelrigg, "On the Divergence".

whether and in what sense both levels must interrelate (be connected), has himself made a logical leap (leap in logic). A sociologist's substantial (or substantive) (fundamental) achievement (accomplishment, performance) in [respect of] its quality anyhow depends on many factors, which only in rare [a few] cases (rarely) are due to a clear methodological consciousness (awareness).

If Weber floats (hovers) between the social-ontological motifs (themes, subjects, motives) of the theory of acting (i.e. action), the fundamental (basic) principles of methodological individualism and (the) historically saturated (full, thoroughly imbued (filled)) ideal types, then (so) Durkheim gains (obtains, acquires) clarity(.) (thereby, [and] in this way) [through (by) the fact that] he leaves (by leaving) (behind) truisms regarding facticity disputed (contested, challenged) by nobody (no-one), not even by him ("society consists of individuals and only of individuals, who orientate their action towards one another"), in order to ask the question: from which (what) level of abstraction does sociology begin (commence, start) as [an] autonomous science? What (Which) being (Is) is found (or finds itself) at this level – or rather: in what form (shape) does (the) being (Is) appear here (in) [and or] to (the) society (In welcher Gestalt erscheint hier das Sein (in) der Gesellschaft)? The answer is (reads): sociology begins (there) where we abstain from (or renounce) personal motives or goals (ends, purposes), since a lingering (staying, dwelling) at (on) these [personal motives and goals] does not allow (permit) an epistemologically unequivocal (unambiguous, explicit) distinction (differentiation) between psychology or historical science (the science of history) on the one hand, and sociology on the other hand. Weber drew a very similar dividing line (line of separation) when he commissioned (instructed, charged) sociology with the bringing (or

working) out of regularities or of averages of collectively meant meaning (or sense) (kollektiv gemeinten Sinnes), whereas (while) he declared (professed) the really meant meaning (or sense) (real gemeinten Sinn) by the individual person acting as (to be) the [a] matter (affair) of (for) the historian. Simultaneously, he took away (or withdrew) the sharpness (acuteness) from this dividing line (deprived the dividing line of sharpness), and indeed through the transfer(ence) of the originally (initially) idiographic methodology (or approach pertaining to method) of meaning-like (meaning-bearing) (meaningful or purposeful) understanding to collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (und zwar durch die Übertragung der ursprünglich idiographischen Methodik von sinnhaftem Verstehen auf kollektive Gebilde). Durkheim however (on the other hand) makes (produces, [has, gives, provides, uses, employs, puts to use]) here – and rightly [so] (justifiably) – a programmatic caesura (pause, interruption, break), because he ascertains (notices) an epistemological and ontological difference between both levels: the caesura keeps (holds) subjective motives or goals (ends, purposes) of individuals, and, “social facts”, apart (from one another, separated). The composition (texture or constitution) of these latter [“social facts”] will occupy (keep) us (busy) (with)in the framework of our confrontation (altercation, dispute, conflict) with (and discussion (examination) of) “methodological individualism”<sup>60</sup>. With regard to the (examination (study) of) (the) problem(s) of founding (establishment, foundation), (of interest,) first of all, (are) the considerations (thoughts) which led Durkheim to the acceptance (or assumption) (adoption, supposition) of social facts (interest [us]) – we mean (are thinking of) his sociological critique (criticism) of psychologism as well as his

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<sup>60</sup> See Section 2Cc, in this chapter.

ascertainment (realisation, observation; Feststellung) of (about, regarding) the effect (impact, influence) of the heterogony of ends or of that which one today is in the habit of calling [the] “unintended (unintentional) consequences of action” (die Wirkung der Heterogonie der Zwecke bzw. über das, was man heute „unbeabsichtigte Folgen des Handelns“ zu nennen pflegt). Yet before(hand) [looking into Durkheim’s founding of sociology], we must however clarify a misunderstanding which puts up (erects, builds) a high wall between Durkheim and Weber. Accordingly (Thus, Therefore, According to that [misunderstanding]), talk of (about, regarding) “social facts” is inspired by a way (manner) of thinking which wants to emulate (follow in the footsteps of) (the) (natural(physical)-scientific) positivity and exactitude (exactness) (in natural (i.e. physical) science), so that Durkheim, as Comte’s direct successor, is counted (ranked) amongst the sociological imitators of the natural(physical)-scientific (natural (i.e. physical) science’s) model (example; Vorbild), whereas (while) Weber seems to (be) stand(ing) (be (found)) on the other side (shore). Such an impression would be completely (entirely, absolutely, totally) wrong (false, incorrect). Durkheim describes (defined, sums up) the social fact as [a] “thing” („Ding“), not with the positive intention of bringing (approximating, reconciling) it [the social fact] closer (nearer, more) (into line) to (with) [nearer to (more into line or approximating it) with] things in the physical sense (im physikalischen Sinne), but with the negative aim (goal) of demarcating (delimiting, disassociating, distancing, differentiating) it against (from) all (everything) that is only accessible in (or amenable to) pure introspection (was nur purer Introspektion zugänglich ist); [a] fact in the sociological sense is therefore simply everything (all) which cannot be apprehended (grasped, understood) through (by means of) pure introspection. (As far as that goes (is concerned) (In this respect, From

that point of view), the ideal type of a subjectively meant meaning (or sense) constructed by an observer also constitutes a thing)<sup>61</sup>. As far as the material (stuff, substance, subject matter) of this thing (den Stoff dieses Dinges) is concerned, if one may say so, (so) it consists in nothing other than that which, according to Weber, makes up (constitutes) the object (subject (matter), topic, theme) of sociology: action. The social fact, opines (says, believes) Durkheim, is [the] «manière de faire», manner (or kind) (way) of action (Art des Handelns)<sup>62</sup>. Under these preconditions, only a gross (crude, coarse) representation (or notion) (view, idea, perception) of the ontic can obviously (evidently, apparently) take exception (offence) (in regard) to the term “thing” („Ding“). Because these things are ontically given every [single] time (always). Social facts are, in other words, not themselves an epistemological fiction, but those (basic) ontic given (actual) facts(,) which must be assumed (or accepted) (adopted), as soon as the epistemological fiction(,) which is called (means) “sociology”(,) has, through segregation (or separation) (severance) from (against, vis-à-vis) other fields (areas, sectors) of the social being (Is), seen the light of day (Unter diesen Voraussetzungen kann offenbar nur eine grobe Vorstellung vom Ontischen am Terminus „Ding“ Anstoß nehmen. Denn ontisch gegeben sind diese Dinge allemal. Die sozialen Tatsachen sind m. a. W. nicht selber eine epistemologische Fiktion, sondern jene ontischen Gegebenheiten, die angenommen werden müssen, sobald die epistemologische Fiktion, die „Soziologie“ heißt, durch Absonderung gegen andere Gebiete des sozialen Seins das Licht der Welt, erblickt hat).

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<sup>61</sup> *Règles*, p. 11.

<sup>62</sup> Loc. cit., p. 14, cf. p. 18: «les choses sociales ne se réalisent que par les hommes; elles sont un produit de l'activité humaine» [“social things are not realised (carried out, implemented) other than by men; they are a product of human activity”].

As one sees [can see], already the mere mention of the “social fact” leads (links) us (up) to (with) the problem of psychologism. In fact (Actually, Indeed), for Durkheim the rejection (disapproval) of introspection as [the] method of sociology and [the] acceptance (or assumption) (adoption, supposition) of social facts represent (constitute, are) both sides of the same coin. Because(,) if the object (or subject matter) (topic, theme) of sociology could not (was not able (allowed) to) be reduced to social facts, but to individual persons, then (so, thus) the very first (nearest) task (job, duty, assignment) would lie (be found) in (be to) scrutinising (having a good look at, examining, putting) (scrutinise) these atoms (or individual beings) (diese Atome) (under the microscope), penetrating (forcing one’s way into) (penetrate) their psyches (minds, mental states, psychological makeups, human souls, spirits) and, on the basis of the findings (results), (to) construct(ing) the social. On the other hand (Compared with this), Durkheim believes (thinks, opines, means, says) [that] sociology can in a specific way (manner) refrain (abstain) from psychological judgements with (in) a logical consistency which is not possible in [regard to] (for) other social sciences (Soziologie könne sich in spezifischer Art psychologischer Urteile in einer Folgerichtigkeit enthalten, die anderen Sozialwissenschaften nicht möglich ist). This is not supposed to (should not) mean that e.g. a political history in all its breadth could or should break up (or dissolve) (disintegrate) into an ensemble of (basic) psychical given (actual) facts,(;) the ascertainment (observation) is sufficient [that] it [the said political history] was very often virtually (almost) compelled (forced, impelled) to make assumptions (suppositions) about the psychical composition (texture or constitution) and the personal motivation of the actors; and who would seriously (in all seriousness) suggest (propose, recommend) (to) drive (cast) (driving) biography forever (for good) out (away) of (from) the realm (area, sector, field,



domain) of (the) scientific historiography (writing of history)? Durkheim sees (finds) himself, at any rate (in any case, anyway), (–) already through the lack of (deficient) reliability (dependability, trustworthiness) of the data [that] introspection and psychologising (Psychologisieren) in general are able (in a position) to (capable of) put(ting) (place) at one's (his) disposal (provide, offer, lend), (–) logically obliged to [accept (take) a (the)] package deal between [of] [the] rejection (disapproval) of psychologism and [the] founding (establishment, foundation) of the sociological discipline. He [Durkheim] repeats in several (multiple, various) contexts [that] we would hardly be in a position of recognising (detecting, spotting, identifying, making out) our (one's) own motivation, let alone (never mind, much less) others' motivation<sup>63</sup>. But also, for a(n) further (additional) reason, that package deal seems to be indispensable. Society is not based (or founded) on (does not take root in) psychical aptitudes (or predispositions), which in their development (or unfolding) bring forth (produce, give rise to, create, cause, present, spawn) the various aspects of social life for the satisfaction (satisfying, gratification) of man's just as many original needs, (;) it [society] does not constitute a projection of the [a] psyche or (the) psyches, but an epistemologically and ontologically autonomous result (outcome), which goes beyond (surpasses) the needs and the corresponding acts (or actions) of (the) individuals (single persons), and does not in the least have to conform with them [the said needs and act(ion)s of individuals]. Hence, society has a specific nature (Gesellschaft gründet nicht in psychischen Anlagen, die in ihrer Entfaltung die verschiedenen Aspekte des sozialen Lebens zur Befriedigung ebensovieler ursprünglicher Bedürfnisse des Menschen hervorbringen, sie bildet keine Projektion der Psyche oder der Psychen,

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<sup>63</sup> Loc. cit., XIV; *Suicide*, p. 144.

sondern ein epistemologisch und ontologisch autonomes Resultat, das über die Bedürfnisse und die entsprechenden Handlungen der Einzelnen hinausgeht und mit ihnen keineswegs konform sein muß. Gesellschaft hat daher eine spezifische Natur)<sup>64</sup>.

This point of view introduces (initiates, marks the beginning of) the second central consideration (thought) which underlies the epistemological decision in favour of the ontology of social facts. It is a matter, as was indicated (mentioned briefly, suggested, hinted at) above, of the heterogony of ends. Durkheim remarks (comments, observes, notices) that the psychologistic mistake (der psychologistische Irrtum) must entail a finalistic (finalistischen) [one, mistake]: if society is based (or founded) on (takes root in) individuals' psychical needs, then (so, thus) it [society] must also be (stand) (found) in (at) the service of their [the psychical needs'] ends (goals), and be able to be (correspondingly) guided (directed, steered) (accordingly). This pair of concepts (notions) (conceptual pair) of psychologism and finalism is turned upside down by [through the fact that] the destruction (Destruktion) of the former [psychologism] being (is) coupled (linked, associated, connected) with the thesis [that] society is ontologically something other than the individuals (single persons) putting it together (composing (assembling) it) (sie zusammensetzenden Einzelnen), and is not shaped (or formed) (moulded) as a result of the realisation of their [the said individuals'] ends (goals): between (active, working, effective) [the] cause (having an effect) and function, between intent and outcome (Zwischen wirkender Ursache und Funktion, zwischen Absicht und Ausgang), there is, anyway (in any case, at any rate, nevertheless), no necessary or (recti)linear (rectilineal) relation(ship)<sup>65</sup>. In praxeological terms, the same thought

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<sup>64</sup> *Règles*, p. 120ff..

<sup>65</sup> Loc. cit., pp. 89ff., 97ff..

(notion or idea) (concept, perception; *Gedanke*) is formulated in [so, such] that an act (action) (*eine Handlung*) cannot be defined on the basis of (based on) the actor's ends (goals), since through outwardly (externally) identical acts (actions) completely (entirely, totally) different ends (goals) could be attained (or achieved) (reached, arrived at)<sup>66</sup>. The shift(ing) (displacement, transfer) from the combatting (fighting) of psychologism to the combatting (fighting) of finalism obviously implies a conceptual distinction (differentiation) between action's motives and ends (goals), and this [distinction] can be used in order to sum up (summarise) both theses through (by (means of)) which Durkheim underpins (supports, backs up, substantiates) the acceptance (or assumption) (supposition, adoption) of social facts: motives cannot be recognised (or detected) (spotted, made out, identified), ends (goals) at the social level cannot, or not always, be attained (or achieved) (reached, arrived at) in the sense (or in accordance with the motives) of the actors.

Weber (has, had) likewise supported (represented, justified) both theses [that motives cannot be recognised, and that ends cannot always be attained in accordance with motives], the former directly, the latter at least indirectly, when he, namely, opined (said, thought, meant, believed) [that] historically or sociologically relevant action is(,) for the most part (most of the time, usually, mostly)(,) influenced (or affected) by qualitatively heterogeneous motives<sup>67</sup>. Although his [Weber's] terminology is unclear, i.e. although he does not in the [a(n)] in principle (fundamental, basic) praxeological sense distinguish (differentiate) between “motive” and “end (goal)”, and often used the former term [“motive”] in place of the latter [“end (goal)”], nevertheless (however) his demarcation (delimitation, dissociation) against (*vis-à-vis*, from)

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<sup>66</sup> *Suicide*, p. 4.

<sup>67</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 4, 10.

psychologism is based (rests) on the far-reaching (or extensive) (, for the most part (to a great extent),) equating (identification) of action's subjectively meant meaning (or sense) with (to) the ends (goals) which the actor's observable action pursues (follows). This way of looking at things agrees, on the one hand, with the ascertainment of the (frequent) indiscernibility (or unrecognisability) (Unerkennbarkeit) of motives, on the other hand, it enables (makes) the ideal-typical apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of subjectively meant meaning (or sense) (possible), and indeed through (by means of) (the) comparison of that course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) (Handlungsablauf), which (the) subjectively meant meaning (or sense) = end (goal) set in motion, with (to) yardsticks (benchmarks or criteria) which the observer set (e.g. "rationality" („Rationalität“)); as far as that goes (in this respect), the apprehension (grasping) of (the) subjectively meant meaning (or sense) becomes objective, i.e. it is no longer (more) [a(n), the] matter (thing, affair, business) of the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) or of (the) introspection. The ideal-typical objectification (objectivisation) (Die idealtypische Objektivierung) of (the) subjectively meant meaning (or sense) with [regard to] (during, at, in) the inclusion (incorporation) of the entire (complete, whole, total) course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action)(,) so that [the] discrepancies between action's ends (goals) and results (outcomes, consequences) or [the] consequences (results, effects) can be ascertained, and not least ((first) of all, primarily) the use (usage, utilisation) of the ideal-typical procedure (or method) (methodical procedure) for the apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of supra(hyper)-individual averages [in respect] of meaning (or sense) (die Verwendung des idealtypischen Verfahrens zur Erfassung überindividueller Sinnesdurchschnitte), lead (guide, conduct, drive) [us] now up to the threshold of the "social fact". Because they [the

ideal-typical objectification of the subjectively meant meaning while including the entire course of acting, and, the use of the ideal-typical procedure for the apprehension of supra-individual averages in respect of meaning] legitimise the putting in order (incorporation, inclusion) (die Einordnung) of the “actually (really)” meant, by the individual, meaning (or sense) in a much broader meaning (sense) context (interrelation), and indeed in a place of the same [much broader meaning context] (thereof), which [place] the individual concerned (in question) would not necessarily (unconditionally) recognise (or acknowledge) as that [(a) place] (be)fitting (due, suitable, proper) [for, to] him and striven for (after) (or pursued) (aimed at, sought after) by him. The context remains, in other words, independent of [the] motives and ends (goals) of them (the people) acting, although (even though) it contains (comprises, consists of) nothing other than their action. This essentially (basically) constitutes a(n) (different (alternative)) description (paraphrasing, formulation, expression) of the “social fact”, which arises (results, ensues) from (the) further (additional) thinking (thought(s)) (aus dem Weiterdenken) on (about, regarding) the two theses mentioned above. However (Nevertheless), Weber does not proceed (progress) to a conceptual fixing (or determining) (einer begrifflichen Festlegung) of the social fact as such, but investigates (examines, inquires into) various historically (pre-)given (pre-existing) social facts (sondern untersucht verschiedene geschichtlich vorgegebene soziale Tatsachen). The social fact as [a] concept (notion), whose definition founds (or justifies) sociology, and social facts as [the] field (area, sector, domain, realm) of activity of sociological research practice (or praxis) (und die sozialen Tatsachen als Betätigungsgebiet der soziologischen Forschungspraxis) though (certainly) lie (are (found)) at two different epistemological levels. But the intensity of the Weberian effort (endeavour) at [with regard to]

the latter [social facts as the field of activity of sociological research practice] can make clear (understandable) why he [Weber], without being aware of (realising) it, came so near (close) to the former [definition of the concept of the social fact founding sociology].

Conversely, Durkheim's proximity (nearness, closeness) to Weberian research practice (or praxis) seen in the resoluteness (determination, resolve) with which he [Durkheim] rejected (dismissed, repudiated) Simmel's formalism (er den Formalismus Simmels zurückweist), supported (stood up for, spoke out in favour of) the tight (close, narrow) content-related(filled) (substantive) binding (bond, tie, relationship, attachment) of sociology [in regard] to (with) the rest of the social sciences for the purpose of the illumination (elucidation) of objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (religion, law (or justice), morality, economy), and in general made investigating (examining, researching, inquiring into) [the] organisation, functioning and becoming of societies the primary task (job, duty) of the sociological discipline (und überhaupt der soziologischen Disziplin zur primären Aufgabe macht, Organisation, Funktionieren und Werden von Gesellschaften zu untersuchen)<sup>68</sup>. Obviously, investigations (examinations) of social content(s), which(,) amongst other things (inter alia)(,) have their [these social contents'] becoming as an (to(wards) an) object (or subject matter) (topic), must be historically oriented (aligned). The question, in the course of this, is (that) whether the sociologist's historical way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) includes (with it) subjectively meant meaning (or sense), that is, to what extent (in what way) is it [the sociologist's way of looking at things] dependent on the historical reconstruction of [the] action (acting) and thinking (thought) of concrete

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<sup>68</sup> Durkheim-Fauconnet, „Sociologie“, pp. 481 ff., 484, 485.

persons or collective(s) [formations, entities, groups] (also auf die historische Rekonstruktion von Handeln und Denken konkreter Personen oder Kollektive angewiesen ist). Durkheim answers the question in practice (a practical manner) by summoning (while he summons) averages of collectively meant meaning (or sense) or «représentations collectives» for the explanation of action (acting)<sup>69</sup>. Nonetheless, his relation(ship) with history does not nearly reach (attain) Weberian intensity, and for that there are two reasons: on the one hand, he confuses (mixes up) the level of founding (or justification) of sociology with the level of its [sociology's] research practice (or praxis), and he seems to think (believe, mean, say) [that] the sharp conceptual demarcation (delimitation, dissociation) between sociology and history at the former [level] must have analogous consequences at the latter [level], which however is not at all understood of (by) its own accord (itself) (i.e. it is not self-evident or obvious)<sup>70</sup>. On the other hand, he fears (is afraid, suspects) [that] every closer dealing (getting involved) with (showing an interest in) the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) of action inside of concrete situations would throw (toss, fling) someone back into the arms of psychologism – it [psychologism] in fact (indeed) does not know a(nother) manner (way, kind, sort) of understanding [other] than introspection. In addition (Besides, Moreover), here the confusion (mixing up) between [of] [the] level of founding (or justification) and research practice (or praxis) also takes (has an) effect (acts, works, operates, is effective). However, one should emphasise (underline, stress) very emphatically that the use of the concepts (notions) of “meaning (or sense)” and “understanding” *for the* founding (establishment, foundation)

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<sup>69</sup> See e.g. his thoughts (considerations, reflections) on (about, regarding) the relationship between [the] suicide rate and [a, the] confession (profession) of faith in [the] Protestant, Catholic and Jewish (religious) denomination (creed, religion), *Suicide*, p. 149ff..

<sup>70</sup> See [the] next Section (2B) in this chapter.

of sociology has an entirely (totally, completely, wholly) different epistemological status than the (selective) use of the methodology (or approach pertaining to method) of meaning (or sense) and understanding *inside of* sociology. The latter use in fact (actually, even) recommends (suggests) itself for the adequate apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of two phenomena, to (on) which Durkheim himself turned (directed, focused) his attention in important (significant) contexts. One of them is the heterogony of ends and was, as we know, brought (called) into play (mobilised, used, enlisted) in order to help with (carry its share in regard to) sociology's founding (establishment, foundation) through (by means of) the "social fact". The distance between [the] subjectively meant meaning (or sense) or end (goal) and [the] objective outcome of the course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) becomes evident (apparent, obvious, striking) only (then, [when]), and can only (then) become the object (or subject matter) of sociological investigation (examination, inquiry, research), when we know in what (wherein) the subjective meaning (or sense) or end (goal) consisted, so that the degree (extent) of its [the said subjective meaning or end's] divergence (deviation) from the attained (or achieved) (reached) result of action can be measured. Still (Even) further (more): not any (every) subjective meaning (or sense) or end (goal) (whatsoever) brings about (causes, gives rise to, effect(uate)s) any (every) objective outcome of the course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) (whatsoever). Between (the) both [of them, the subjective meaning or end and the objective outcome of the course of action] a causal interrelation (connection) (ein causaler Zusammenhang) exists, merely (only, [it is] just [that]) this [causal interrelation] has more or less slipped out of the control (on the part) of him (the person) or of them (the people) acting. Whoever wants to illuminate (or examine) (take a closer look at) the composition (texture or



constitution) of the outcome and the mechanisms of its [the said  
 outcome's] formation, which remained hidden (concealed) [in regard] to  
 (for) him (the person) or them (the people) acting, must (then) again (in  
 turn, on the other hand) go back (return, appeal) to the original (initial)  
 end(s) (goal(s)) set, as the original (initial) material (stuff), which passed  
 (went, came) through those mechanisms, and at the other end of the  
 course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action), as it were (so to speak,  
 somewhat), chemically transformed (changed, converted,  
 metamorphosed), has (was) [been] crystallised as [an] objective  
 construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation) (muß wiederum auf die  
 ursprüngliche Zwecksetzung als den ursprünglichen Stoff rekurreren, der  
 durch jene Mechanismen hindurchgegangen ist und sich am anderen  
 Ende des Handlungsablaufs, gleichsam chemisch verwandelt, als  
 objectives Gebilde kristallisiert hat). Such [an] explanation does not  
 merely have genetic relevance if (when) it is (we are) namely a matter of  
 (dealing with) completed (concluded) developments, in relation to which  
 the initial intentions have been broken (fractured) in the [a] whirlpool  
 (vortex, maelstrom) of evermore (always) new situations or (have) even  
 were (been) forgotten. It [The said explanation] is just as important  
 (significant) in [a] functional respect (regard) (terms) if supra(hyper)-  
 individual construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) are to be  
 researched (explored, studied, investigated), which seem to be held  
 together in abstracto by (means of) (through) the effect (or influence)  
 (impact) of an "invisible hand" („unsichtbaren Hand“). To these [supra-  
 individual constructs] belong social institutions or «pratiques  
 collectives», [in respect] of which Durkheim says they [the said social  
 institutions or «pratiques collectives»] would (be) (are) based (rest) on  
 collective representations (notions or views) (ideas, perceptions)(,)

inaccessible to introspection (kollektiven, der Introspektion

unzugänglichen Vorstellungen)<sup>71</sup>. Here, however, (there) (is) a second phenomenon (exists), whose concrete sociological apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) cannot manage (do) (get by) without (the) [a] historical recourse (reverting, reversion, going (falling) back) to (on) (the) subjectively meant meaning (or sense) and the ends (goals) of them (the people) acting. Because the group as [a] bearer (carrier, vehicle) of collective practices is never completely (absolutely, perfectly) homogenous, and the always existing discrepancies and tensions (stresses, strains) in its womb (bosom) ([coming] from within) bring about (cause, result in) two different things: the differentiation or even calling into question (questioning) of the dominant (ruling, prevailing) collective representation (notion or view) (idea, perception) in [a] sociologically relevant way (manner), and at the same time, the putting forward (formulation, drawing (making) up, establishing) of a binding interpretation of this same representation (notion or view) for the averting of the possible splitting of the social body (corpus) (sozialen Körpers). Both those who put forward (formulate) and impose (push (carry) through) the [a] binding interpretation, as well as those who passively or actively diverge (deviate) from it (that) [the binding interpretation], act on the basis of subjective ends (goals), and the effects (results, influence) of their action enter ((have some) influence (on)) the collective representation (notion or view) and (jointly) (co-)shape (mould, form) its [the collective representation's] character (together). If one overlooks (turns a blind eye to, ignores) these (this) historically ascertainable (detectable, traceable) facts (of the matter) (data, state of

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<sup>71</sup> *Règles*, XV. Weber likewise (also) thought (believed, said, opined, meant) [that] collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (would) exist(ed) as “representations (or notions) (ideas, perceptions)” („Vorstellungen“) “in the minds (heads) of real humans (men, people)”, and as such causally determine (or influence) (define, fix, condition, characterise) the course (or sequence) of their [humans'] action (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 7).

affairs), then (so, thus) one falls (lapses) into [or makes the mistake of] a functionalism (einem Funktionalismus), which Durkheim himself criticised in Comte and Spencer: one must, namely, comprehend (understand, grasp, perceive, interpret) (the) institutions across the board (or collectively) (without exception, comprehensively, wholesale) as [the] socially ensured (safeguarded, guaranteed) satisfaction (satisfying, gratification) of human nature's permanent basic (fundamental) needs (Man muß nämlich die Institutionen pauchsal als sozial gewährleistete Befriedigung von permanenten Grundbedürfnissen der menschlichen Natur auffassen). Nonetheless, [the] basic needs are also (quite (rather)) often (more than once and a while) a question (problem, issue, matter) of binding social interpretation, and this question (problem) is solved (answered) on each and every respective occasion, for shorter or longer periods, through this or that shaping (or formation) (forming, moulding, structuring) of the relations between humans. The leaving aside (ignoring, excluding; Ausklammerung) of the social relation's social-ontological dimension during (in) the sociological illumination (examination) of social facts consequently lends (gives or imparts to) (grants, confers on) these [social facts] a rigidity (or inflexibility)(,) which they [the said social facts] can never have in historical reality.

This rigidity (or inflexibility) does not however ensue (follow) merely from the wrong (mistaken, false, erroneous) squeezing (or forcing) (jamming) of research practice (or praxis) into [a] theoretical corset of the – to a great extent (largely) correct (right) – theory of founding (establishment, foundation). Likewise (Also, In the same way), it [this rigidity] comes (is brought) about through (by means of) the reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of the key concept (notion) of the social fact with [a] normativistic intent(ion) (which of course for its

part (in turn), precisely like (exactly as) in Parsons, leads anew to the leaving aside (ignoring, excluding) of social-ontologically given imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) (sozialontologisch gegebener Unwägbarkeiten) from (the) sociological analysis). Durkheim wants, for reasons which by no means logically emerge (arise, come) from his founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology, to put (place) his theoretical undertaking (venture) in (at) the service of an ethical-normative aim (goal, objective, target), which is supposed (meant) to be achieved (reached, attained) on the basis of social cohesion (or unity) (sozialer Geschlossenheit), [and] in fact [which] seems to be identical with the achieving (reaching, attaining) of social cohesion (or unity). Sociology should promote (foster, encourage, further, sponsor) «l'esprit de discipline»<sup>72</sup>, and accordingly the “social fact” is endowed (provided, furnished, supplied) with attributes from which the demand (requirement) for disciplining (Disziplinierung) and the necessity of disciplining can be deduced (inferred, derived). The concept (notion) of the social fact therefore turns out [being] mixed (or having two aspects) (ambivalent, conflicting). It does not only indicate a result of the interplay (synergy or having an effect together) (Zusammenwirkens) of a number of (several, quite a few) socially acting people, which can also come into being and exist irrespective (regardless, independent) of their knowing (i.e. knowledge) or will(ing) (wishing, desiring, intention, volition), but over and above that(,) [it indicates] something which, via (through) the power of collective representations (notions or views) (ideas, perceptions) exercises (exerts, wields) on every member of society [a] more or less noticeable (or perceptible) “compulsion (coercion or constraint)” (spürbaren „Zwang“). In [regard (relation) to] the first sense (meaning),

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<sup>72</sup> *Règles*, p. 123.

the concept of the social fact (directly) concerns, as we know, the founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology (directly). With regard to its meaning as compulsion (coercion or constraint), on the other hand, doubt(s) concerning this appear(s) to dawn (begin). Because here an empirical cohesion (or unity) of the social fact is postulated, which bears comparison with (is a match for, can be measured against) the logical coherence (cohesion or unity) of the epistemological construct, and only the assumption (supposition, acceptance) of such an empirical cohesion (or unity) can justify an in principle connection (relationship, combination) of the concept (notion) of the social fact with the concept (notion) of compulsion (coercion or constraint). But regardless (irrespective) of whether this connection is indeed (actually, in fact, really, truly) specific, whether, that is, the concept (notion) of compulsion (coercion or constraint) can be deduced (derived, inferred) only from the concept (notion) of the social fact or whether compulsion (coercion or constraint) just (rather, on the contrary) constitutes (is, represents) *a (one)* social fact next to (alongside, beside) other(s) [social facts], already the inner (internal) contradictoriness (inconsistency) or lack of clarity (uncertainty, obscurity, vagueness) of the collective representations (notions or views), for the reasons [in respect] of which there was talk above, does not always allow (permit) the exercising (exertion, wielding) of simultaneous (concurrent) or uniform (or even) (symmetrical, regular) compulsion (coercion or constraint) on the psyche of all humans (men, people) – if the word “compulsion (coercion or constraint)” is taken seriously, that is, [it] is supposed (meant) to (should) mean (signify) *necessity* of behaviour. If the element (or factor) (das Moment) of necessity is not unconditionally (necessarily, absolutely) given (taken for granted), then (so, thus) the concept (notion) of the social fact lacks, provided (that) (as long as) it [the said concept of the social fact] means

“compulsion (coercion or constraint)”, that cohesion (or unity)(,) [in respect] of which its [the concept of the social fact’s] use requires (demands) for sociology’s founding (establishment, foundation). Durkheim himself unintentionally admits how much both perceptions (or views) (conceptions, ideas, opinions; Auffassungen) differ over [in regard to] the character of the social fact when he, against the view (opinion) [that] historical development has aims (goals, objectives, targets)(,) which are known to (the) actors, amongst other things (inter alia), puts forward (or cites) the argument [that] (the) individuals would, even living under the same circumstances (conditions), choose (select) their ends (goals) and means in a self-willed (or headstrong) manner (with a mind of their own) and everyone «suivant son humeur» [“according to his mood (or temperament)”]<sup>73</sup>. This means (says): the social fact in the sense (terms) of (in accordance with) the heterogony of ends is compelling (coercive or constraining) (compulsive, cogent, exigent) exactly because the social fact in the sense (terms) of (in accordance with) compulsion (coercion or constraint) is not. Only the possibility of very different individual reactions to identical (basic) social given (actual) facts explains the divergence (deviation) of the results of collective action from all individual intentions. The “compulsion (coercion or constraint)”, which social facts exercise (exert, wield), consists in that (the) individuals must take certain (particular) factors into consideration (account) in [respect of] their action whether they like their [the said certain factors’] existence (or presence) (availability) or not, however, it does not in the least imply the necessity of socially conforming behaviour (sozial konformen Verhaltens) all (right) along (down) the line (at (in) every turn (stage, detail)), everywhere, ever since the beginning). Consideration [of certain

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<sup>73</sup> Loc. cit., p. 94.

factors] can flow (lead) (in)to adaptation (or adjustment), but just as much (in)to a diverging (divergent, deviating, deviant) stance (attitude) or even (in)to opposition (or rebellion). The reaction to that which, through the interplay (synergy or having an effect together) of a number of (several, quite a few) [people], is regarded as [a] social, formed fact, can hence (therefore) be put in order (ordered, incorporated) at (in) any (every) place (whatsoever) inside of the spectrum of the social relation, this spectrum, in other words, never shrivels (dries) up (or dwindles) [in]to the (an) ethically-normatively desired (desirable) place (Die Reaktion auf das, was als soziale, durch das Zusammenwirken Mehrerer herausgebildete Tatsache gilt, läßt sich daher in jeden beliebigen Platz innerhalb des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung einordnen, dieses Spektrum schrumpft m. a. W. nie auf den ethisch-normativ erwünschten Platz zusammen). And still (even) another consideration (thought) shows (demonstrates, exhibits, indicates) [us] the impossibility of drawing normative conclusions from the concept (notion) of the social fact in the sense (terms) of (accordance with) compulsion (coercion or constraint). So that (In order for) the social fact at the level of social praxis (practice) can (to be able to) compel (coerce or constrain) [people] towards (or within) the good (Damit die soziale Tatsache auf der Ebene der sozialen Praxis zum Guten zwingen kann), it must be (correspondingly) composed (or constituted) (made) (accordingly), that is, only a society can (educatively) have an effect (act, operate) (educatively, educationally) as [a] whole which is already well organised, i.e. well educated (brought up, trained); but then the [a] dogged additional (further) effort (endeavour, strain) is superfluous. At the level of sociological theory, it would then again only be meaningful (or sensible) to relate (put) the compulsive (coercive or constraining) character of social facts to ((in a relation) with) normatively meant effects (or influences) (results, consequences;

Wirkungen), if one wanted to deny (dispute) the quality (or property) of the social fact [in relation] to phenomena like anomie, dissent (disagreement) or conflict. Durkheim however (expressly, explicitly) did (expressis verbis) the opposite of that<sup>74</sup>. Thus (Consequently, Therefore), the sociologist (had, has) judged (passed judgment on) the reformer and the ethicist (moralist).

## B. Sociology and history (Soziologie und Geschichte)

We have already distinguished (differentiated) between [the] founding (establishment, foundation) and research practice (or praxis) of sociology, and now it is to (should, must, ought (to)) be discussed [we should discuss] what this distinction (differentiation) means (signifies) for the relation(ship) (die Beziehung) of sociology to(wards) (with) history. The distance between both disciplines must in principle turn out (to) (be) greater (larger) at the level of the founding than at the level of (the) research practice, i.e. of substantial (or substantive) analyses. The founding takes place (comes to pass, is carried out) through (by (means of)) the well-aimed (or purposeful) (targeted, deliberate, precise) isolation (insulation) of specific aspects, through (by (means of)) the conscious search for abstraction and unilaterality (one-sidedness) (Die Grundlegung vollzieht sich durch die gezielte Isolierung spezifischer Aspekte, durch die bewußte Suche nach Abstraktion und Einseitigkeit). What, however, at the epistemological level of founding is [a] necessity and advantage, is (to the) [one's] detriment[al] ([a] disadvantage) and [a(n)] obstacle (hindrance, impediment) at the level of research practice (praxis). The

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<sup>74</sup> Loc. cit., p. 64ff..



transfer(ence) of the dividing (separating, splitting) logic of founding (foundational logic) (der zerteilenden Grundlegungslogik) to research practice (praxis) inevitably (invariably) brings about (gives rise to, causes) the negation of the unified (or united) (uniform) character of (the) social reality in its constant (continual, continuous) becoming (die Negation des einheitlichen Charakters der sozialen Wirklichkeit in ihrem ständigen Werden). This [social reality] constitutes the common material (stuff, (subject) matter) of sociology and history, and it [(this) social reality] does not at all consist of elements(,) which from their ontic composition (texture or constitution) could (are able to, can) be divided (split) up into sociological and historical [elements] and separated from one another, as for instance wood and [from] iron; rather it [social reality] constitutes (or represents) (is) (just) one (a) sole (or unique) (only, single) ontic and temporal-spatial continuum (ein einziges ontisches und zeiträumliches Kontinuum), which is structured (organised) and broken (split) up (apart) according to (in accordance with) sociological, historical, anthropological etc. points of view. Yet (Even, Already)(,) (the) engrossment ((deep) absorption, deepening) in [respect of] one concrete case – irrespective of which discipline feels ex officio [by virtue of its office, i.e. standing] competent (responsible, relevant, appropriate) for it [that one concrete case] – can (lets (allows) [one] to) guess the existence (presence, availability) of this continuum, while at the same time (in relation to which) the continuum of the material (stuff, (subject) matter) requires (calls for, commands, demands, dictates) or compels (forces) the [a] many-sidedness (variedness, multilaterality; Vielseitigkeit) [in respect] of [in] the way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation). The many-sidedness is hence not merely a norm, (to) [with] which the observer should (is meant (supposed) to) keep (stick, follow, comply)(,) (al)though (even though) he

can omit (refrain (abstain) from, disregard) this [norm, it] too (as well), but [is] absolutely (really, actually) a necessity of [for] research practice (or praxis). An epistemological anatomy of any (whatever) sociological, historical etc. work would show (demonstrate) that this [(sociological, historical etc.) work] had (has) to (have) often overstep(ped) (go(ne) beyond, exceed(ed)) the bound(arie)s of the discipline concerned (in question), that is, [it] made (make) assumptions which are not to be had by (available [open] [to]) the discipline itself in accordance with its logic of founding (foundational logic). That (This) does not mean – as is (well) known and unfortunately – that all social (scientists) and (intellectual(-spiritual)) (scientists) ([all] those involved in the humanities) (alle Sozial- oder Geisteswissenschaftlicher), whether they know it and want to [it] or not, are eo ipso (by (or from) the thing itself, by that very act or quality, thereby, by the same token, of itself, on its own account) many-sided (multilateral) in the good sense; it however explains the frequent (common) confusion (puzzlement, perplexity, bewilderment) of the epistemological standpoints through (by means of, due (owing) to, because of) the pressure which the continuum of social and historical reality exercises on the representational (or ideational) world (world of representation (ideas, notions, perception), imagination) (Vorstellungswelt) of every (scientific) observer.

From this perspective(,) [it] becomes more understandable why Weber erred (was wrong (mistaken)) when he sought to safeguard (protect) the possibility of a historically oriented (aligned) research practice (praxis) through (by means of) a founding of sociology which left (let, allowed) its boundaries with (towards) the idiography of history ((to) be) fluid (changeable, porous) (die deren Grenzen zur Idiographie der Geschichte flüssig ließ). The result could only be the epistemological lack of clarity

(vagueness, uncertainty) of the founding, because the historical orientation (alignment) of (the) sociology is a(nother) [separate] matter (thing) (for itself) and does not relieve (rid, free, deliver, disburden) us of the task (or duty) (job) of determining (ascertaining, finding out, establishing) the «proprement sociologique» [“properly (or strictly) (really, truly) sociological] (Durkheim) through successive abstractions – just as its [the «proprement sociologique’s»] determination (or establishment) by no means eliminates (gets rid of, takes [away]) the fact (from the world)) that [changes the fact (that in this world)] social or historical reality constitutes (represents) one (a) sole (or unique) (only, single) ontic continuum and sociology (is, constitutes, represents) an epistemological fiction of [a] partial scope (extent, range, size). That is why Durkheim erred (was wrong (mistaken)) in the reverse sense, when he assumed (accepted) [that] his epistemologically stricter founding of sociology would as such (correspondingly) limit (restrict, constrict) its research practice (praxis) (accordingly), i.e. make the boundaries with (towards) history’s research practice fairly (quite, pretty) dense (thick). That does not though mean (signify) that he would refuse in advance to regard (consider, see, view, look at) all (every) historical material (stuff, (subject) matter) as possible material for the sociologist. He [Durkheim] himself could even (also, really) argue (reason) historically, (so, thus) e.g. when he, [in regard] to psychological interpretations of the development of history, countered (pointed out, said in reply) [that] [the] variety of form (multiformity) [of] and change [in] (of) (the) social phenomena could not be [simply] deduced (derived, inferred) from permanent psychical qualities (characteristics or properties) (just like that, without difficulty (any effort (problem(s)), anything else [happening] (further))

[without anything further]<sup>75</sup>. On the other hand, his research practice (praxis) amounts (comes ((boils) down)) to (ends up in) an unhistorical hypostatisation (unhistorische Hypostasierung) of each and every respective investigated (examined) «espèce sociale» [“social species (case, kind, sort)”], in so far (in as much) as he supposes (assumes) an unbridgeable opposition (or contrast(ing)) (conflict) between (the) sociological and (the) historical type[s] of relations. That is why he concentrated on the interdependence of two or more phenomena inside of (within) the same espèce sociale (static correlation) and neglected the succession (sequence) of (the) phenomena in the course of historical time (dynamic way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation)) ((statische Korrelation) und vernachlässigt die Aufeinanderfolge der Phänomene im Laufe der geschichtlichen Zeit (dynamische Betrachtung))<sup>76</sup>. Thus, [we (are)] faced with (stand opposite of) two types of causality: a functional-synchronic (funktional-synchronischer) [causality], in which the reason for (cause of) the cohesion of a whole is sought in the interdependence of the parts or of the partial social facts, and a genetic-diachronic [causality], in which the succession (sequence) of (the) social facts (or acts (actions)) in historical time is comprehended (grasped, understood, construed, taken for, perceived, interpreted) (as) [the, a] causal determination (fixing, definition) or (as) [the, a] causing of a social fact (or act (action)) by a (one) [social fact] preceding (going first, previous) ((in relation) to) it [the social fact caused] (Somit stehen sich zwei Kausalitätstypen gegenüber: ein funktional-synchronischer, bei dem der Grund für den Zusammenhalt eines Ganzen in der Interdependenz der Teile bzw. der partiellen sozialen Tatsachen gesucht wird, und ein genetisch-diachronischer, bei dem die

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<sup>75</sup> Loc. cit., p. 109.

<sup>76</sup> See Aron's good analysis, *Introduction*, p. 249ff..

Aufeinanderfolge der sozialen Tatsachen (oder Handlungen) in der geschichtlichen Zeit als kausale Bestimmung oder als Verursachung einer sozialen Tatsache (oder Handlung) durch eine ihr vorangehende aufgefaßt wird). The transfer(ence) of the logic of founding to (the) research practice (praxis) results (has [such] an effect) here (in) [the fact] that the achrony (Achronie) of the epistemological construct at the level of the *espèce sociale* is transformed (converted, changed) into functional synchrony (Synchronie). For that, however, there is no compelling (cogent, persuasive) methodical (i.e. methodological) reason (ground), even and precisely (especially, more than ever) not (then) (not even and precisely) when sociology is founded (based, established) on the concept (notion) of the social fact. Because in (the) diachrony (Diachronie) (the) social facts or (the) collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations), which come into being (arise, result, ensue, are created (produced)) out of (from) [the] innumerable (countless) combinations of individual acts (actions) as their [the innumerable combinations of individual act(ion)s'] resultant (die aus unzähligen Kombinationen individueller Handlungen als deren Resultante entstehen), diverge (deviate, differ) from these latter [innumerable combinations of individual act(ion)s] just (equally) as, or possibly still (even) more (strongly, intensely, greatly), than in synchrony. This [synchrony] can, in other words, in certain cases [in respect] of action(,) which (is) consciously (directed to(wards)) (or takes its cue from) (complies with, depends on, goes along with) individual ends (goals), be influenced (affected) more than diachrony. Regardless (Irrespective) of (Notwithstanding, Despite) that, [it] is (stands) certain (definite, sure) that in the course of diachrony(,) the weight of individual intentions and acts (actions) continuously (continually) decreases (declines, diminishes, grows less), and indeed both with regard to the dimension of the past,

which no human (person, man) has ever undone, as well as (in view (consideration) of) (considering, taking) the future (into consideration), which no human (person, man) can foresee (predict) in the long term, that is, [can] guide (steer, direct) [it, the future] consciously and in (the) knowledge of [(while) knowing] the outcome (end).

Durkheim's unwillingness (reluctance), [while] proceeding historically, to incorporate (include) diachrony in(to) his research practice (or praxis), is due (reduced, traced back) to a narrow perception (view) of the methodical (i.e. methodological) scope (or range) of (the) historical science (science of history), which for him represents (is, constitutes) the necessary pendant (i.e. counterpart) of his sharp delimitation (or definition) (seiner scharfen Umgrenzung) of sociology. History constitutes an extreme idiography, [a] description (portrayal, account) of a sequence of unique (or one-off(time)) (singular) events (occurrences, incidents) (Historie bildet eine extreme Idiographie, Schilderung einer Folge von einmaligen Ereignissen) or of «individualités hétérogènes» [“heterogeneous individualities (or particularities)”], between which there can be no comparison. The comparative (comparing) method (Die vergleichende Methode) is sociology's exclusive affair (matter, business, object, thing), and it [sociology] demands (calls for) the detachment (or breaking away) (disentanglement, dissociation, disengagement, removal) of the elements being compared (die Loslösung der zu vergleichenden Elemente) from each and every respective «série temporelle» [“temporal (i.e. time-related) (chronological) series”]<sup>77</sup>. Synchrony or achrony seems therefore to be a precondition (prerequisite) of sociological comparison, and indeed (actually, in fact (reality)) the comparison is first of all made (done, undertaken) amongst (or between) social facts, which belong to

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<sup>77</sup> *Règles*, pp. 76, 124ff..

more or less equally developed, that is, sociologically simultaneous (or contemporaneous) (concurrent) *espèces sociales*. The second time round (In a second attempt (go, approach) [at explaining matters]), however, the comparative method is called “genetic”, and it [the said comparative method] sets as the [its] aim (goal, objective, target) to follow (pursue, track) the becoming of a certain (particular) social fact (Institution) right through [the, its] various stages (levels, phases, grades) of development and in various *espèces sociales*. Durkheim holds (considers, regards) this (to be, as) the highest (biggest, greatest) achievement (accomplishment) (greatest feat) of sociological research and accordingly (puts (places, sets)) [sees] sociology in general (on a par with) [and] [is equated with] comparative (comparing) sociology ([become] as one) [or he sees them as one]<sup>78</sup>. It is certainly (surely, of course) difficult to see (appreciate, recognise, understand) how a(n) extensive (broad, comprehensive) application of the *méthode génétique* is compatible (consistent) (can be reconciled) with the leaving aside (exclusion, excluding, elimination, eliminating, ignoring) of the *série temporelle*. Yet Durkheim shrugs off (disregards, ignores, skips over, overcomes) the difficulty through (by means (force, way) of) two questionable (dubious) assumptions (suppositions). As selection criterion (*Auswahlkriterium*) of (the) social facts(,) which are supposed (meant) to be illuminated (or examined) genetically, their [these (the said) social facts’] weight inside of (within) the synchronically meant (intended, thought, imagined) functional whole (*ihr Gewicht innerhalb des synchronisch gedachten funktionalen Ganzen*) of the *espèce sociale* is of use (service, help), that is, it is a matter, in the course of this, principally (mainly, first and foremost) of institutions

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<sup>78</sup> Loc. cit., p. 137.

(Institutionen)<sup>79</sup>; and the *série temporelle* is understood in the narrowest possible sense, i.e. as [a, the] succession (sequence) of individual and unrepeatable events (occurrences, incidents). Durkheim connects (associates, interrelates, puts) this extreme idiographic version of the *série temporelle*, and the (historical method) supposedly (ostensibly, allegedly) belonging together (interrelated) with it (historical method) (und die damit angeblich zusammengehörende historische Methode), (in(to) [a] combination) with Comte's philosophy of history, and tries (attempts) to conclude (infer) the untenability (unsoundness; Unhaltbarkeit) of the historical method from the untenability (unsoundness) of a finalistic historiography (description (writing) of history) (einer finalistischen Geschichtsschreibung). The logical leap (leap in logic) is obvious and needs (requires) no (does not need (any)) further discussion. Durkheim's assessment of the historical method and his sharp demarcation (delimitation, dissociation) of sociology against (from, vis-à-vis) (the) historical science (science of history) stands [or] (and) falls, at any rate (in any event, anyway), by his narrow idiographic perception (view) of this [the] latter [historical science]. However, already (But anyway,) some (a few, several) considerations (thoughts, reflections, deliberations) about (over, on, regarding) [the] character and implications of *historical* comparisons can prove (show, verify, demonstrate, confirm) that not only the idea of an absolutely idiographic history is nonsense, but also that

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<sup>79</sup> It would hence be wrong (incorrect, false) to confuse Durkheim's evolutionistic perspective, which is based (founded) on his functionalism, with a *historical* way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation). In the [his] work on (about, regarding) the division of labour(,) a phenomenon is (stands) e.g. at the centre of interest (attention), whose functional meaning (significance, importance) is obvious (apparent, evident, manifest); for the explanation of its [the division of labour's] evolution(,) objective factors like population density (Book II, chap. II) are brought in(to play) (called on, enlisted, used), but not social facts as complexes of acts (or actions) (als Komplexe von Handlungen), whose composition (texture or constitution) and direction are not determined (conditioned, necessitated) by (dependent on) an(y) (individual [act(ion)]) of these acts (or actions). Long-term processes (or events), like for instance Western "rationalisation" can hardly, however, be apprehended (grasped, understood) without (the) going into (of) social facts in the latter sense [of social facts as complexes of act(ion)s] or by (means (force) of) (through) merely "objective" factors.



precisely the comparative (comparing) method – of historical or sociological provenance – makes (fluid or abolishes (cancels)) the boundaries between historical and sociological research practice (praxis) (fluid or abolishes) [them (the said boundaries)]. Durkheim thinks (believes) he may (can, is allowed (permitted) to) talk of (about) a specifically sociological comparative (comparing) method because he tends (, about it (that), in relation to that [sociological comparative method],) to comprehend (grasp, understand, interpret) the specifically sociological concept of the social fact one-sidedly (unilaterally, in a one-sided manner) in the sense of the [an] “institution” (capable of development, but functionally more or less stable). Comparisons of [on] a greater (larger) magnitude (dimension, extent, size, scale) can, however, be undertaken also between phenomena like, for instance, war or revolution, which only [through, by means of, with] (amongst, amid, under) [the] violation (rape, mutilation) of language can be called (described, referred to, characterised) (as) institutions and [yet], all the same (nevertheless, notwithstanding [that], anyhow), make up (constitute) genuine (authentic, real, true) social facts.

In general (Generally), historical comparisons fulfil two tasks (jobs, functions, purposes, missions): they [historical comparisons] close [fill], through [the] drawing on (use, enlisting) (of) analogies, gaps (holes) of [in] documentation (recorded evidence or records of proof) (Sie schließen durch Heranziehung von Analogien Lücken der Dokumentation), and they serve heuristic goals (ends, purposes)(,) while they tackle (treat, handle) (by tackling) or expand (extend, broaden, widen) (expanding), (–) with the help of problem awareness (consciousness of (the) problem(s)) (Problembewußtseins)(,) which was refined during [while] (the) going

deeply into (deepening (engrossment) in [respect of]) other cases<sup>80</sup>(,) (–) question formulations (or central themes) (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s))(,) which a particular case raises. Either way (One way or another, Whichever way one looks at it), comparison breaks (bursts, forces) (open) the boundaries (limits) of the consistently idiographic – and it [comparison] *must* be undertaken, unless one would like (wants, prefers) to reduce historiography to [a] chronicle (annals) (Chronik), and (to) deny the historian the right, contrary to (against) the entire (whole) tradition of his *métier* (i.e. occupation) (profession, trade), to research (or search for) causes (reasons) and interrelations (correlations, contexts, connections) (nach Ursachen und Zusammenhängen zu forschen)<sup>81</sup>. Research (or investigation) into ([The] exploration of) causes (reasons) (Erforschung von Ursachen) means (signifies)(,) first of all(,) that the relative weight of two differing (distinct, dissimilar, unlike, varying, varied, different, miscellaneous, various) historical data (data of history) (zwei verschiedenen Geschichtsdaten) are correlated or compared with each other in order to ascribe (attribute, grant, award) to one [historical datum] the status of (the, [a]) cause (reason), to the other [historical datum] that [the status] of (the, [a(n)]) effect (result) (um dem einen den Status der Ursache, dem anderen den der Wirkung zuzusprechen). Simultaneously (At the same time), all the historical factors (factors of history;

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<sup>80</sup> Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire*, p. 84ff..

<sup>81</sup> This tradition expressly starts (begins) with Herodotus, who wants to bring to light the cause of (reason for) (αἰτία) the war between the Asiatic East and the Greek West (I, Preamble (Prologue)), and it [the said tradition] experiences (discovers) its first great high point (summit) already in Thucydides's consciously multi-dimensional, and reaching (going) a long way back into the past, aetiology of the Peloponnesian War; for the determination (definition) of the specific character of this latter [the Peloponnesian War], Thucydides carries out (does, conducts, manages) a detailed (in depth, comprehensive) comparison with past wars, merging (blending, turning, passing) in many ways (cases) (frequently) into the "sociological" (I, 2-19). Polybius likewise (also) was fully aware of the interrelation (connection) of research into (of) causes and [the] comparative (comparing) procedure (or method) (den Zusammenhang Ursachenforschung und vergleichendem Verfahren) (see esp. I, pp. 12, 6; cf. I, pp. 4, 11).

Geschichtsfaktoren), which are (possible (a possibility, capable of happening (taking place)) (qualify) (as) possible candidates for the causative (causing, causal) function (die als mögliche Kandidaten für die verursachende Funktion in Frage kommen), must be compared, in order to determine (or ascertain) (find out, establish, discover) the correct [right] [one] amongst them. And finally, the task (job, mission) arises (is set (put)) to compare the effect (result) of a causal factor in (the) causal interrelation (connection, correlation, context) A (die Wirkung eines kausalen Faktors im Kausalzusammenhang A) with its effect (result) in (the) causal interrelation (connection, correlation, context) B, in order to be able to pass judgement (or form an opinion) (ein Urteil bilden) on its causal potency (power or potentiality) (capacity, force, efficacy, ability) (Kausalpotenz) in general (generally, at all). Comparisons between events (occurrences, incidents), epochs (eras, ages) or developments (are) regularly (serve) (of use), in relation to that, to (theoretically) isolate causal(ly) (effective (or acting) (working, active, operative, operating)) factors (having an effect) (theoretically), (the) comparison is hence regarded (considered, thought of, deemed) (as) successful (then) when through (by means of) it [comparison](,) a clear notion (idea, representation, perception, view) of the causal course (sequence (order) of events) of the phenomena concerned (in question) is achieved (brought about (off), reached) (comes about, materialises). This goal (end, purpose) is fulfilled regardless (irrespective) of whether the comparison ascertains (discerns, observes) differences or similarities<sup>82</sup>. It [Comparison, The said comparison] can [ascertain] either the one [difference(s)] or the other [similarity (similarities)], it can however also do both, i.e. bring (work, carve) out (or ascertain) (elaborate) far-reaching

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<sup>82</sup> In relation to that, see Somers-Skočpol, “The Uses of Comparative History”.

(extensive, broad) similarities in a decisive (deciding) difference(,) or far-reaching (extensive, broad) differences in a decisive (deciding) similarity. The idiographically understood individuality of (the) historical data (data of history) can in fact (actually, even) be stressed (emphasised, underlined) therefore through (by means of) comparisons. Yet on the other hand, even a comparison, which is [based (centred) on, due to, comes] [has] (out of, from) differences, presupposes a superordinate, perhaps only loose categorial (categorical) framework(,) inside of which the [(those) historical data] to be compared (comparative (comparing)) [data (things)] are (can be) combined (or come together) and consequently (can) become comparable (einen übergeordneten, vielleicht nur lockeren kategorialen Rahmen voraus, innerhalb dessen die zu Vergleichenden zusammenkommen und somit vergleichbar werden können). In this way (Thereby, Through that), (the) comparison ipso facto refers to the dual (double, twin) nature of every (single) historical datum (datum of history; Geschichtsdatums): behind the [its, the said historical datum's] conspicuous (obvious, evident) uniqueness (of the same [historical datum]) (hides, is) its latent generality (is hiding), which only [alone, solely] allows it to be looked upon (regarded) as (considered) [a] *historical* datum. Because (the) mere individuality does not turn (make) something (into) [a] historical datum, but its suitability (fitness, aptness) to be incorporated (included, put in order, ordered) in(to) contexts (or interrelations) having an effect (impact) (or contexts of influence) (Wirkungszusammenhänge), which are considered (regarded as) *historical* on the basis of independent epistemological decisions (determinations, judgements) (see in this Section below). That is why already the selection (choice) of historically relevant data presupposes implicit or explicit comparisons of the ontological character and of the epistemological status of the same [historically relevant data] with that

[ontological character (and epistemological status)] of other data. Already the understanding of the action of individuals in a concrete situation entails the implicit or explicit comparison with [the] action of other individuals in analogous situations (Schon das Verständnis des Handelns von Individuen in einer konkreten Situation zieht den impliziten oder expliziten Vergleich mit Handeln anderer Individuen in analogen Situationen nach sich) – and comparisons between situations can, for their part, be very easily expanded (broadened, widened) to comparisons between socially dominant (ruling, prevailing) conditions (relations or circumstances) (sozial herrschenden Verhältnissen), between historical processes or epochs (eras, ages). History is therefore from the beginning (outset) consciously or in (actual) fact (reality) ridden (interspersed) with (or permeated (afflicted, affected) by) comparisons and corresponding conceptualisations (Konzeptualisierungen); since it [history] is [a] reconstruction and as such must operate with concepts (or conceptual plans) (Konzepten), (then, so, thus) there can, already because of that, be no fundamental (basic, material) difference between comparative (comparing) history and descriptive sociology<sup>83</sup>.

It may appear (seem) [as, to be] [a] paradox(ical)(ly) that Durkheim, who had (has, was) not (been) particularly (especially) interested in the debate over the relation(ship) between [the] (intellectual(-spiritual)) (humanities) and [the] natural (i.e. physical) sciences (sciences of the intellect(-spirit) and of nature) (Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften), supported an extreme(ly) idiographic, in (the) research practice impracticable (unworkable) (undurchführbare), perception (view) of a historian's work. Responsible (To blame) for this error (mistake) was his [Durkheim's] concern (worry) over (regarding, about, on) the sharp delimitation (or

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<sup>83</sup> Aron, *Leçons*, p. 429. For [In regard to] the function of theory in (the) comparative (comparing) historical science (science of history), see generally (in general) Puhle, „Theorien“.

definition) of sociology. On the other hand Weber could, despite (in spite of, notwithstanding) his adherence (adhering, holding (on), sticking, clinging) to (perseverance (persistence) with) the in principle (or programmatic) (fundamental, basic) contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between both main (chief) kinds (sorts) of knowledge (knowing), evade (elude, avoid, get out of, escape from) the chimera of a pure idiographic historiography (description (writing) of history), exactly because his unspecific definition of sociology allowed (permitted) a nonchalant (unconcerned, carefree, cavalier) back and forth (to(-)ing and fro(-)ing) between sociology and history, i.e. a conception of sociology with regard to (in view of) its historical character, and a conception of history with regard to (in view of) its sociological processing (treatment, working, use, handling) (Hingegen konnte Weber trotz seines Festhaltens am grundsätzlichen Gegensatz zwischen den beiden Hauptarten des Wissens der Chimäre einer rein idiographischen Geschichtsschreibung eben deshalb entgehen, weil seine unspezifische Definition der Soziologie ein unbekümmertes Hin und Her zwischen Soziologie und Historie, d. h. eine Konzeption der Soziologie im Hinblick auf ihren historischen Charakter und eine Konzeption der Historie im Hinblick auf ihre soziologische Verarbeitung gestattete). Now (the) historical science (science of history), just as (like) sociology, is a science of the social action of man [humans, people], that is why sociology must be defined as the science of that social action which is condensed (compressed, thickened, solidified) in social facts – ergo (consequently, therefore, hence), the social fact constitutes the epistemological specific feature (characteristic) (differentia specifica) of sociology, irrespective (regardless) of how much weight (serious) (heavy) this specific feature carries (is) (weighs) in (the) research practice (or praxis) on each and every respective occasion, and how it is explained in (the) light of the historical data (data of history)

(Nun ist Geschichtswissenschaft ebenso wie Soziologie eine Wissenschaft vom sozialen Handeln des Menschen, Soziologie muß daher als die Wissenschaft von jenem sozialen Handeln her definiert werden, welches sich in sozialen Tatsachen verdichtet – ergo bildet die soziale Tatsache das epistemologische Spezifikum der Soziologie, gleichgültig, wie schwer dieses Spezifikum jeweils in der Forschungspraxis wiegt und wie es im Lichte der Geschichtsdaten erläutert wird). While (As) Weber does not precisely (exactly, accurately) distinguish (differentiate) between social action in the historical [sense](,) on the one hand, and in the sociological sense(,) on the other [hand], but, as it were, casually (incidentally, in passing) mentions (names, designates, describes) the real differences between sociology and history, he limps along at the epistemological level(;) however, he can proceed (go) so much the quicker in the field (area, sector) of research practice (or praxis)(,) since he actuates (sets in motion, puts into effect (motion), activates) the apparatus (equipment), attached to the concept (notion) of social action, [in respect] of meaning (or sense), understanding and [the] ideal type, both as [a] sociologist as well as [a] historian (Indem Weber zwischen sozialem Handeln im historischen und solchem im soziologischen Sinne nicht genau unterscheidet, sondern die realen Differenzen zwischen Soziologie und Historie gleichsam nebenbei nennt, hinkt er auf der epistemologischen Ebene, um so schneller kann er aber auf dem Gebiet der Forschungspraxis gehen, da er die am Begriff des sozialen Handelns angehängte Apparatur von Sinn, Verstehen und Idealtyp sowohl als Soziologe wie auch als Historiker betätigt). The ideal-typical preparation of understanding (Die idealtypische Präparierung des Verstehens) enables (makes) him [Weber] (capable, qualified), into the bargain (at the same time, in the course of this), to line up (compete) against [or oppose] (challenge) [resist] psychologism also

as [a] historian, and consequently dispense with (refrain (desist) from) (abandon) Durkheim's conviction [that], already because of its necessarily psychological orientation (alignment) (notwendig psychologischen Ausrichtung), history has an obligation to (extreme) idiography, otherwise it [history] does not possess (have), not merely vis-à-vis natural (i.e. physical) science, but also vis-à-vis sociology, a(ny) (its own) profile (of its own). The individual [element (or event (case))] (Das individuelle), Weber opines (thinks, says, believes), by no means constitutes as such an object of history, it [the individual [element (or event)]] becomes it [an object of history] either as [a] typical representative (exponent) of an abstract concept (notion), or as [a] member (component, element, part, section) (cause (reason) or effect (result)) of [in] a causal interrelation (connection, correlation, context), and then we look at (consider or contemplate) (observe) it only in its causally relevant manifestations (or expressions) (outer signs), not in its totality (bilde als solches keineswegs ein Objekt der Geschichte, es wird es entweder als typischer Repräsentant eines abstrakten Begriffes oder als Glied (Ursache oder Wirkung) eines Kausalzusammenhanges, und dann betrachten wir es nur in seinen kausal relevanten Äußerungen, nicht in seiner Totalität)<sup>84</sup>.

The first of both these conditions (prerequisites, requirements) for the inclusion (or acceptance) (admission, absorption, integration, incorporation, reception) of the individual [element (or event (case))] in(to) history(, [i.e. regarding (the individual element as) an object of history as a typical representative of an abstract concept],) implies that (between) the individuality of events (occurrences, incidents) or acts (or actions), and their suitability (fitness, aptness) to be assigned to classes

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<sup>84</sup> *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 232, 237ff.. Here Weber follows Eduard Meyer, *Zur Theorie*, p. 59.



(categories) (classified) and even to represent these classes (categories) (that is, to be able to be generalised), (a distinction must be made) (must be distinguished (differentiated)) (Die erstere dieser beiden Bedingungen für die Aufnahme des Individuellen in die Historie impliziert, daß zwischen der Individualität von Ereignissen oder Handlungen und ihrer Eignung, Klassen zugeordnet zu werden und sogar diese Klassen zu repräsentieren (sich also verallgemeinern zu lassen), unterschieden werden muß). The former (That) [individuality of events or acts] does not in the least preclude (exclude) the latter (this) [suitability to be generalised], and the historian should (ought to), on each and every respective occasion, in his estimation (opinion) (accordance with his [own] judgement) (at his discretion), deem (decide, judge, find) to what extent (in what way (respect), how far) the individual [characteristics (or features) (traits, attributes)] and the class characteristics (or features) intersect (or overlap) (inwiefern sich die individuellen und die Klassenmerkmale überschneiden). In principle (Fundamentally), he [a (the) historian] would, in the course of this, be ill-advised (giving bad advice) if he wanted, out of laziness (or convenience) (indolence, idleness) or ideology, to degrade (downgrade, demote) the individual case to the [a] reflection of a [the] general [case (or situation)] (wenn er aus Bequemlichkeit oder Ideologie den individuellen Fall zum Abglanz eines Allgemeinen degradieren wollte); the [a] cautious (careful, wary) and conditional (qualified) declaration (explanation) of an individual case as (the, [a]) typical [case, one] attests (testifies) (to) [that fact of] a(n) alert consciousness (keen awareness, [alertness]) [in respect] of (regarding, about) the epistemological-fictive(fictitious) character of types, classes and generalities (ein waches Bewußtsein über den epistemologisch-fiktiven Charakter von Typen, Klassen und Allgemeinheiten). Equally (In the same way, Likewise), [the] uniqueness (and unrepeatability), and

singularity [as to its kind or species], of the individual [case or element] (Einmaligkeit und Einzigartigkeit des Individuellen) must be distinguished (kept apart). An event (occurrence, incident) or a person in the absolute sense is unique (and unrepeatable), there is (or was) it [an event or a person] (it exists (or existed)), namely, only once (one time), on the other hand (by contrast, in comparison, however), [it (an event or a person) is] singular [as to its kind or species] only in the [a] relative [sense], i.e. in regard (relation) to (regarding) one or some (a few, several) aspects, but not to all: because there is nothing in this world which could not be subsumed under absolutely no genus or no species, and [there is nothing in this world] whose (its) constitution (composition or texture) or way (or mode) (manner) of acting (action) (conduct, behaviour) would have nothing to do with (the, [a(n)]) affiliation (or belonging) (attachment) to that (it) [subsumption, being subsumed] (Einmalig ist ein Ereignis oder eine Person im absoluten Sinne, es gibt (oder gab) sie nämlich nur einmal, einzigartig dagegen nur im relativen, d. h. in bezug auf einen oder einige Aspekte, nicht aber auf alle: Denn es gibt nichts in dieser Welt, das sich unter absolut kein Genus und keine Spezies subsumieren ließe und dessen Beschaffenheit oder Handlungsweise nichts mit der Zugehörigkeit dazu zu tun hätte).

Miltiades as [a] person and the Battle of Marathon are unique, that is, they (have) saw (seen) the light of day only one (single) time (once). But as [a] *historical* person Miltiades was an Athenian, general (or commander) (field marshal, strategist) etc., and he (had, has) acted *also* (or *absolutely*) (*really*) in line (strict conformity, accordance, keeping) with these not unique qualities (characteristics or properties); the Battle of Marathon has, for its part, next to (alongside, beside) its unrepeatable parameters (place, time, parties (those, persons) involved (or participants)), certain categorial (categorical) features (or characteristics),

whose mere knowledge permits (allows) [one, us] to form (construct, set (make) up, establish, constitute, mould) [the forming of], without going (entering) into details, a general notion (idea, representation, view, perception) of the event; no matter whether it [the (a) battle] is fought in Marathon, Cannae [during the Second Punic War in southeast Italy] or Stalingrad, (so, thus) [a, the] battle is a(, structured in [a] particular and recognisable (discernible, perceptible, visible) way (manner),) relation between men (humans, people) (structured in [a] particular and recognisable (discernible, perceptible, visible) way (manner)) (eine auf besondere und erkennbare Art strukturierte Beziehung zwischen Menschen), which differs (is distinguished, differentiated) from other (interhuman, interpersonal) relations (between humans (people))(,) and through (by means of) its existence (or presence) poses questions (political, anthropological etc.) going way (far) (by far, widely) beyond (surpassing, transcending) the concrete event (occurrence, incident). If we did not know at all what [a] battle meant, (so, then, thus) the event of 490 B.C. at Marathon would have a(n) entirely (completely, totally, wholly) different status (importance) in our history books.

The second of the conditions (prerequisites or requirements) mentioned above [(the individual element as) an object of history as a member (cause or effect) of [in] a causal interrelation] [for (in respect of) the inclusion (or acceptance) of the individual [element (or event (case))]] in history] refers, in turn (on the other hand, again), to our previous (prior, preceding) ascertainments (or observations) (findings) regarding (concerning) the logic of historical comparisons. The putting in order (or inclusion) (incorporation, ordering) of the individual [element (or event (case))]] as [a] member (component, element, part, section) in a causal interrelation (connection, correlation, context) presupposes a decision

(determination) over (on, in respect of) the character of the historical [element, sphere] and consequently over (on, in respect of) the yardsticks (or criteria) (benchmarks, measures, standards) (Die Einordnung des Individuellen als Glied in einen kausalen Zusammenhang setzt eine Entscheidung über den Charakter des Historischen und somit über die Maßstäbe voraus), on the basis of which the individual [element (or event (case))] is declared (proclaimed, announced, explained) [to be, as] historically relevant (pertinent). The putting in order (or inclusion) confers on (grants (gives) to, lends, awards) the individual [element (or event (case))] the status of the historical [element, sphere]. It [The said putting in order (or inclusion)] cannot, however, manage (effect) [that, it] (bring it off)(,) if each and every respective individual [element (or event (case))] is not apprehended (grasped, understood) from that particular aspect (point of view, angle)(,) which bridges the gap (builds bridges) with [regard to] the related (kindred) aspects of the rest of the individual magnitudes inside of (within) the overall (total) context (interrelation, correlation, connection) (thereby) produced (made, manufactured, established) (in this way, because of (through) it (that)). Because individualities as wholes (entireties, totalities) can never (be) fit into (or (be) adapted to) one another like two cogwheels (cogs, gears). The historically meant (intended or thought) (imagined) selection (choice) of [an, the] individuality (Die historisch gedachte Auswahl von Individualität) must, therefore, be supplemented (completed, replenished, added to) by a selection (choice) which is made (carried out, done) in(side) and at (the) individualities; the totality of the individual [element (or event (case))] (die Totalität des Individuellen), when it is generally (on the whole, actually) recognisable (discernible, perceptible, visible) and conceivable (imaginable, thinkable), falls (remains, drops) programmatically, or in (actual) fact (actually, factually, in reality), by the

wayside (left behind, out of the running). This should (had to, must, might) actually (really, by the way) be self-evident even at the level of the personal-individual [element (or case)] (der Ebene des Persönlich-Individuellen), if one does not want to be lost (lose oneself, disappear, vanish) in [a] psychologism. The historically expedient (or purposeful) (effective, suitable) dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) and selective treatment (handling) of (the) individual totality (Die historisch zweckmäßige Auflösung und selektive Behandlung der individuellen Totalität) takes place (happens, occurs, is effected) here through the leaving aside (ignoring, excluding) of the unfathomable (inscrutable) biopsychic structure of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) structure) [structure of depth] (unergründlichen biopsychischen Tiefenstruktur), in which drives (urges, impulses, instincts) or unconscious or half-conscious motivations stir (move) (in der sich Triebe und un- oder halbbewußte Motivationen regen), and [through] the concentration of (the) analytical attention on ends (goals), which manifest themselves (or find expression) (are reflected) in observable action (und die Konzentration der analytischen Aufmerksamkeit auf Zwecke, die sich im beobachtbaren Handeln niederschlagen)<sup>85</sup>. The historical objectification (objectivisation) (Die historische Objektivierung) of the personal-individual [element (or case)] through (by means of) isolating (insulating, isolative) abstraction or selection (durch isolierende Abstraktion bzw. Selektion) can of course find other means and ways, (all [of]) which nevertheless (however) (all) have to do with the same putting first of action's end(goal)-led(guided, conducted, directed, steered) (purposeful or expedient) external (outer, outward) course (order or sequence of events) (zweckgeleiteten äußeren Ablaufs des Handelns) (action in(side) [respect of] roles, action in

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<sup>85</sup> See, in relation to that, Lukacs's good observations (remarks, comments), *Historical Consciousness*, p. 160ff..

situations etc.). This must (need) not be pursued here further. The pointing out (indication, hinting, reference, reminder) of (at, to) another dimension of the problem of historical individuality, by contrast (on the other hand), appears [to be] absolutely necessary: [i.e. the pointing out] of the very (highly, greatly) different (variable, varying, varied) extent (scope, range), and the constant (perpetual, continual, continuous) need for (of) interpretation (interpretive need) (Interpretationsbedürfnis), of the concept (notion) [of] “individuality” itself, which in turn (on the other hand, again) testify to the (historical’s) quasi automatic and deep reaching (or extending) (inside)(,) of (the historical [element, dimension, sphere, realm, field]) (of, into) the sociological [dimension, sphere, realm, field, element] (die wiederum vom quasi automatischen und tiefen Hineinreichen des Historischen ins Soziologische). Singularity [as to its kind or species] and generality are not essential traits (features, characteristics) of facts, but modes of evaluation (assessment, appraisal) of facts (Wesenszüge von Fakten, sondern Modi der Bewertung von Fakten). How wide(ly) (broad(ly), far) the boundaries (limits) of the individual [element (or event)] are (set, put), and to what extent (in what way (respect)) individualities should (are supposed (meant) to) be looked at (viewed, seen, considered, regarded) (as) incomparable (unmatched, matchless) (in [a] certain respect (or relation)) or (as) typical (in [an] other respect (or relation)), depend on the (variable (changeable, varying)) direction of our historical interests<sup>86</sup>. Alexander [the Great] and Napoleon are historical individuals, just as, however, the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, the Reformation, capitalism or the Second World War are (it [historical individuals]) also (too, as well) in(, on each and every respective occasion,) another sense (on each and every respective

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<sup>86</sup> Gardiner, *Nature*, p. 40ff..

occasion); the concepts (notions) of the [an] entirety (wholeness, totality; Ganzheit) and of the [an] event (occurrence, incident) as unities (or units) (wholes, entities) of (the, [a]) historical analysis shift (move (out of place), become displaced) in terms of (as (in regard) to) content accordingly (entsprechend verschieben sich inhaltlich) (correspondingly) (a war can e.g. be interpreted in its totality (entirety; Gesamtheit) as [a(n)] individual (or a separate) (single) part (or member) (component, element, section) of a historical process (process of [in] history) (als einzelnes Glied eines Geschichtsprozesses), or as a series of preparations, manoeuvres, battles etc.). In view of (Given) this amorphousness (amorphousness, shapelessness, lack of form; Amorphie) of the concept (notion) of individuality (individuality concept), the effort (trouble, toil(ing), hassle, bother) appears (seems) [to be] futile (in vain, useless, fruitless) to want, by invoking (appealing to) (with reference to) it [that concept of individuality], to erect (put up, build) a wall between sociology and history in research practice (or praxis). Historism (or historicism) (Der Historismus), which set out (off) to smash (up) (wreck, shatter, demolish, destroy) abstract universalisms in the name of “living (lively, vivid) individuality”, had to soon apply this concept (or conceptual plan) (dieses Konzept) [as regards the concept of individuality erecting a wall between sociology and history] to (ever) more (and more) (increasingly) extensive (broad, comprehensive) construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (principally (first and foremost, mainly) to states), and in the end (finally, eventually) one spoke even of the “overall (total) individuality of mankind (humanity)”<sup>87</sup>. With (By, Because of) that (As a result), everything and nothing was said. The hypostatisation of any collective subjects [whatsoever] in the form of giant(-like) (gigantic,

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<sup>87</sup> Thus, Meinecke, *Entstehung*, pp. 626, 627.

colossal, enormous) or dwarf(-like) (dwarfish, diminutive, pigmy) (riesen- oder zwergenhaften) individuals leads epistemology and research practice (praxis) to a dead end, and it [the said hypostatisation] was only fertile (fruitful, productive) as [the, an] unintentional (unintended, involuntary, unwanted) preliminary stage (or tier) (grade, level) of that typification (i.e. rendering into types) (ungewollte Vorstufe jener Typisierungen) (of) which the historian as well as the sociologist must (make) use (avail themselves, employ). The [A] consistent adherence (adhering, holding (on), sticking, clinging) to (perseverance (persistence) with) a strict (rigorous, stringent) concept (notion) of individuality (individuality concept) is, in any case (anyway, at any rate (all events)), not possible in history. A(n) significant (important, major) historian, who declared his support for (professed, confessed to) a «nominalisme intégral» [“integral (full, whole, entire) nominalism”] assigned (classified, classed) history’s object (or subject matter) (topic, theme) all (right) along (down) the line (at (in) every turn (stage, detail)) to (as, with) the «catégorie du Singulier» [“category (class) of the singular (i.e. the unique (or exceptional))”],(;) he admitted (confessed, conceded) at the same time (simultaneously) [that] certain historical realities (would) have «un certain caractère général» [“a certain general character”] and [would] deserve (merit) the name [of] «complexes singuliers» [“singular complexes”]<sup>88</sup>. That (This) concession (acknowledgement) seems to (be to) me methodically (i.e. methodologically) more instructive (educational, informative) than the declaration of support [for integral nominalism].

This description (account) of history’s conscious or of necessity (unavoidable, ineluctable, necessary) praxis (or practice) may (ought,

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<sup>88</sup> Marrou, *Connaissance*, p. 169ff.. Marrou offers, incidentally (by the way), a (very readable) list of general concepts (very much worth reading), which the historian anyhow (anyway) must use (apply), loc. cit., p. 149ff..



should) by no means be taken for (understood (grasped, regarded) as) [a, the] methodical (i.e. methodological) norm or as [a(n), the] appeal (call) to (for) the historian [that] he should, in view of (given) the impossibility of a pure idiography, give up (abandon, renounce, relinquish, forsake) the concrete case (instance) (den konkreten Fall). As [a] historian he is always to be recognised (identified, discerned) in [by the fact] that he – principally (mainly) or *also* – devotes (applies, dedicated) himself to the concrete case. But both the determination (definition) of that which is the historically relevant, concrete case (instance), as well as the analytical penetration in(to)(side) this [concrete case], require (need) other parameters(,) which are not given in the concrete case (instance), but rather [they (these other parameters)] at first (only) constitute it. The use of “abstractions” does not, therefore, mean (signify) eo ipso a lapsing (slipping) into sociology(,) because abstraction does not serve (is not of use) merely, and not always, (in) specifically sociological generalisation, but also (in) the illumination (explanation, examination, investigation) of the concrete case (instance) – and it [abstraction] serves (is of use), moreover, (for, in) the genuinely (really, truly) historical intention of going beyond (surpassing) this [concrete case](,) and of formulating generalisations as soon as (when) it is a matter of the historical (epochal (or even universal(world)-historical)) status of the concrete case (instance) ((or even its status as regards world history)) ((epochalen oder gar universalhistorischen) Status des konkreten Falles). Whoever out of angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry) before (in the face of, vis-à-vis, over, [in regard to]) the risk (danger) of sociological infection disputes (contests, challenges, denies) the legitimacy of such question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes), has in actual fact (actually) thrown overboard many of the highest (supreme) achievements (feats,

accomplishments) of (the) classical and modern historiography (description (writing) of history). One does not assert (underline, contend) without a certain (some) justification (legitimacy, right, authority, entitlement) [that] the historian does (is) not deal (have to do) with (about) generally (or universally) in force (valid) causalities and law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) (allgemeingültigen Kausalitäten und Gesetzmäßigkeiten), but with ([is] about) particular, and related (referring) to concrete cases (instances), [law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities)],(;) he [the historian], that is, inquires (asks) about the causes (reasons) of (for) the First World War, not about the causes of war in general<sup>89</sup>. Yet even if we wanted to accept (assume) [that] the [a] historian could, in (during) his explanation of the causes of a certain war, abstain (refrain) from (renounce) general notions (ideas, perceptions, representations) [in respect] of (on, about, regarding) [the] essence (or nature) and [the] aetiology of war (Wesen und Ätiologie der Kriege), (then so, thus) (again) he cannot(, on the other hand, again, in turn), (but) help incorporating (including, putting in order, ordering) this particular (certain, specific) war as [a(n)] overall (total) process in(to) the [a] far (much) more general image (or picture) of an environment and a prehistory; the requirements (prerequisites, demands) of (the) concrete research into (of) causes are (will (must) not), otherwise, (not to) be (sufficiently) met (well enough) (satisfied)<sup>90</sup>. That [This] does not though mean that the historian, already after the clarification of (the) (existing) situation (or state) of the sources (sources situation, state of affairs, stratum) (source materials) (Quellenlage) and of the temporal classification of events (occurrences, incidents), must desert (abandon)

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<sup>89</sup> Schieder, „Unterschiede“.

<sup>90</sup> The recollection (reminder, reminding, remembrance) of Thucydides's "archeology" imposes (forces) itself [on us] here too (as well), see footnote 81 above.

his discipline's field (area, sector) and reach for (grab (get) (hold of), seize) (turn to) (the) sociological (conceptual) instruments in order to (at all, generally) be (at all) in a position (able) to articulate something [that is] meaningful (full of meaning). They say that (Apparently,) history itself, if (when) and in so far as it articulates [something] meaningful (full of meaning), puts forward (or formulates) (proposes, advances) generalisations, develops its own notions (ideas) on (of, about, regarding) short(-term) and long-term processes, on (of, about, regarding) driving (motive) forces (treibende Kräfte) and contexts (or interrelations) having an effect (impact) (or contexts of influence).

The, mostly (for the most part) amongst sociologists, common (current, going) impression is thus (therefore, accordingly) out of place (inappropriate, misguided), [that] history is (in relation to that) there [exists] in order to provide (supply, yield, furnish, deliver) (the) cleansed (cleaned, purified) material (stuff, (subject) matter), which sociology then explains causally from a higher vantage point. The historian has already *as* [a] historian explained the historical material (stuff, (subject) matter)<sup>91</sup>, he must do that (this, it), especially (particularly) as [the] explanation and constitution of the material cannot be separated from each other.

However, while he [the historian] does (by doing) that (this, it), he [the historian] must know that he is stepping (walking) into (entering) (setting foot in) fields (areas, sectors, domains, zones) which he must share with other disciplines, fields, in which the familiar (common) distributions of (divisions into) competence (competency or responsibility) (Kompetenzaufteilungen) – in [terms of] whose categories most practising scientists (or scholars) (academics, researchers), partly out of intellectual(-spiritual) sluggishness (lethargy, inertia), partly because (on

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<sup>91</sup> Cf. Dray, *Laws*, p. 109.

account) of (owing to) one-sided (unilateral, biased, partial) education (or culture) (cultivation, formation, development, fashioning, training) and guild mentality (wegen einseitiger Bildung und Zunftmentalität), think – can only lead [one] astray (into error) (mislead, deceive). The question is therefore not (that [question]) whether history as such can and must offer explanations, but rather (that [question]) whether sociological explanations of historical material (stuff, (subject) matter) belong to an essentially (or substantially) (fundamentally, considerably) different type or have a considerably (much) greater generalising range (scope). The answer to that [question] depends on the notions (ideas, perceptions) which one has about (on, regarding) the application of sociological concepts (notions) or “models” to [in respect of] historical material. And this application cannot obviously take place (occur, happen) sweepingly (or collectively) (as a whole, across the board, wholesale, without exception) and ubiquitously, but, according to each and every case and perspective of [in regard to] meaning (je nach Fall und Bedeutungsperspektive), it might (could) grosso modo assume (adopt) three forms (shapes): a) [the] simple use of concepts (or conceptual plans) in the formulation of meaningful (or sensible) historical explanations; b) [the] usage (or summoning) (use) of causal regularities for the explanation of historical processes and weighing up (assessment, consideration; Abwägung) of alternative hypotheses; c) [the] recourse (or reverting) (recursion, reversion, going back) to (falling back on) an already worked (carved, brought) out (processed) general theoretical model for the illumination of a(n) individual (separate, single, isolated) concrete case or a number of (several, various) [such cases] simultaneously ( a) einfacher Gebrauch von Konzepten bei der Formulierung von sinnvollen historischen Erklärungen; b) Aufgebot von kausalen Regelmäßigkeiten zur Erklärung von historischen Prozessen und

Abwägung von alternativen Hypothesen; c) Rückgriff auf ein schon herausgearbeitetes allgemeines theoretisches Modell zur Beleuchtung eines einzelnen konkreten Falles oder mehrerer gleichzeitig)<sup>92</sup>. Regarding the first case, one ought (must, [need]) not (to) say [lose, waste] a word. Even in the second [case, instance] an unbridgeable gap (gulf) does not have (ought, must) (not) (to) be opened (up) between [the] historical and sociological way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation). Because history (also) deals with (is about) long-term sequences (orders) of events (or processes) (langfristigen Abläufen), it [history] makes the general [element, event, case, sphere, dimension] and [the] impersonal [element, event, case, sphere, dimension], as well as the individual [element (case or event)] in the narrower (strict) sense, its object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) – and [it (history) does] this not only (then) when (if) it reconstructs overall economic or institutional developments, but also when(ever) (as soon as) it must (has to) sketch (i.e. outline) the pre-given framework(,) inside of which the [a] (, to be described,) more or less short historical episode to be described (or outlined) (portrayed, depicted) [unfolds and] is acted out ([or] happens (takes place)). Already (the) ancient historiography (description (writing) of history) knows synoptic retrospective(s) [accounts (looks, reviews, surveys)] of long, internally (inwardly) coherent developments as [an, the] introduction to the actual (real, true) narrative (narration, story, tale, account) (Schon die antike Geschichtsschreibung kennt zusammenfassende Retrospektiven von langen, innerlich kohärenten Entwicklungen als Einleitung in die eigentliche Erzählung). During (In) the historical reconstruction of processes of *longue durée* [long duration], the search for regularities makes its presence felt (announces its presence,

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<sup>92</sup> I am following Skocpol's classification, "Emerging Agendas", p. 362ff..

comes forward, becomes evident (manifest)) as [a(n), the] illustration (or exemplification) (demonstration; Veranschaulichung) of (the) temporal structure, of the internal (inner) rhythm of the processes, as [a, the] periodisation and as [a, the] mark(ing) (highlighting; Markierung) of [the] turning points. Already here the question is posed (put, raised) about (regarding, according [in relation] to, in accordance with) (the) causal interrelations (connections, correlations, contexts) (den kausalen Zusammenhängen), and it [the question about causal interrelations, such (a) question] comes totally (completely, entirely, wholly) to the fore(front) (is highlighted (put at the centre of attention, given priority)) as soon as (when(ever)), in(side) every retrospective [account (look, review, survey)] of a development, the entirely (completely, totally) natural aporia (i.e. doubt [, contradiction or paradox]) is pronounced (expressed, articulated, said): how would the outcome [have] turn[ed] out if this or that (had (did) not) happen(ed) (take(n) place, occur(ed)), if this or that factor (had) failed to materialise (did (had) not (to) take(n) place) or was (had (would have) been) activated? At (On) this question the paths of history and sociology cross (intersect) because the latter [sociology] also tests (checks or scrutinises) (examines, looks into) the validity (reliability, tenability, soundness) of its “regularities” (denn auch letztere prüft die Stichhaltigkeit ihrer „Regelmäßigkeiten“), while it (comparatively) investigates (examines, looks (inquires) into, scrutinises, researches) (by (comparatively) investigating) (comparatively) the varying and uniform (even, regular, symmetrical, steady, consistent, constant) effect (impact, result, influence, consequence) of isolatable factors in (during) different (variable, various, dissimilar) processes (die variierende und gleichmäßige Wirkung isolierbarer Faktoren bei unterschiedlichen Prozessen), or conducts (carries out, does, gets up to) (thought(s)) experiments ([in respect] of ideas (notions, concepts))

[thought experiments] on [in regard to] the relative weight of every individual (separate, single, isolated) factor in a(n) overall (total) context (or interrelation) (connection, correlation) (oder Gedankenexperimente über das relative Gewicht jedes einzelnen Faktors in einem Gesamtzusammenhang anstellt). Thus, we come to the third case (instance), i.e. the case of the application of theoretical models of sociology to historical phenomena. In so far (as much) as such models (lay) claim (to) (demand, call (ask) for) general (or universal) validity (universality) for themselves (Allgemeingültigkeit für sich) (and they must [do] it (that)), they take (assume, adopt) the following logical form: wars (revolutions, (industrialisation, institutionalisation) processes (of industrialisation, of institutionalisation) etc. etc.) take place (occur, happen) then and only then, when the constellation (correlation or conjuncture) (Konstellation) or hierarchy of cause (reason) X(, under the circumstances [of] Y,) comes into (takes) effect (under (the) Y circumstances). Such models have been (were) proposed (suggested), however they have, all together (of them) (to a man), proved (turned out) to be at times stimulating (inspiring, exciting, exhilarating), at other times vacuous (or meaningless) (vapid, inane) thought(s) (or intellectual (mind) games (bald anregende, bald nichtssagende Gedankenspiele), i.e. none [of them (those thought(s) (or intellectual) games)] have been able to explain the totality (entirety) of (the) relevant cases (instances), and indeed because (on account) of (due to) the in principle (fundamental) prospectlessness (lack of prospects) (or futility) (hopelessness) of the venture (undertaking) (see below). At any rate (In any case), the ascertainment of the inadequacy (insufficiency, deficiency) of (in) the model in an individual (separate, single, isolated) case suffices (is sufficient (enough)) in order to prompt (arrange for, cause, induce, give rise to, procure) the [a] prudent (wise, clever) return to [the] comparative

(comparing) analysis of developments and phenomena, in [which] history and sociology – ([while] presupposing (presuming, assuming)) the [if] [a] corresponding tact(fulness) (or sensitivity) (sensitiveness) ([being, is] presupposed (presumed, assumed) – must go hand in hand.

Now however not only the sociologist's models, but also quite a few (some, a number) of the historian's explanations, are too abstract and too general for the concrete case (instance). Sociology and history would not be (stand) so close (near) [to each other] if only the former [sociology] would give in (yield) to the temptation of ambitious and untenable (indefensible, intolerable) generalisation. [Put, Said, Thought] The other way around (Conversely, On the other hand): precisely the objective proximity (nearness, closeness) of the disciplines makes the historian very often prone (liable, susceptible) to shortcomings (weaknesses, defects, afflictions) which one usually (normally, customarily, conventionally) imputes to (blames on) (charges) the sociologist (with). Abstractive(Abstracting)-generalising approaches (tendencies, dispositions) and unhistorical-sociological tendencies (inclinations, propensities, predilections) do (are) not in the least coincide (correspond, identical) with each other under all circumstances – especially (precisely, just, exactly) [the] representatives (supporters, exponents) of our contemporary “microsociology” or “ethnomethodology”, who (do not) want to hear nothing (anything) of abstractions and generalisations, proceed (act, carry on, continue) as (so) unhistorically as hardly anyone else [does]. No internal (inner) barrier (limit(s), bounds) in his discipline keeps (stops, prevents, deters) the [a] historian from sketching (or devising) (outlining, designing, planning) bad abstractions and from defending (maintaining, [arguing in favour of, affirming, supporting]) imaginary (phantom, phantasmal, fanciful) causalities (eingebildete



Kausalitäten zu behaupten); and no immanent necessity of his field (area, subject; Faches) hinders (impedes, obstructs, blocks, stops) the sociologist in (from) penetrating (forcing his way (going) into) the sociologically enlightening (instructive, revealing, informative, illuminating) concrete case (instance),(;) for the sake of sociology(,) in (from) busying himself (working, being active) as (like) [a] historian and [even] familiarising himself with (getting to know (used to)) (working [reaching] up to) (the) [historical] sources (sich der Soziologie zuliebe als Historiker zu betätigen und bis in die Quelle hineinzuarbeiten). Finally, sociology treats (handles, deals with), even though (if) (albeit) with (in) [a] typifying(i.e. rendering into types)-generalising intent(ion) (in typisierend-generalisierender Absicht), not only collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (nations, states, churches etc.), but also events (occurrences, incidents) (wars, revolutions etc.), whereas (while) historiography (description (writing) of history) for its part quite often sets its reconstruction of events against the [a] background (backdrop) of a collective construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation) (“[the] history of England in the 16<sup>th</sup> century”). One could extend (or expand) (broaden, widen, enlarge) and deepen such parallels between historical and sociological research practice (or praxis), even point (allude, refer) to (indicate) considerable (substantial) commonalities (common ground, similarities),(,) which concern the composition (or putting together) (assembly, assembling) and the origin (provenance, derivation, beginnings, emanation) of the conceptuality used on (by) both sides. Yet (However) this is not our present (current) task (job, duty). For our question formulation (or problem examination), the following is of fundamental significance (importance, meaning). The insight, on which the concept (notion) of the social fact as [the] foundation stone (cornerstone) of sociology is based (rests), likewise (just as much)

constitutes (a) central experience (practical knowledge) of [for] the reflective (reflecting) historian. If the social fact is a network (plexus, mesh) or a resultant of acts (or actions), which exists and has an (takes) effect (works, acts) irrespective of the part-forces (partial forces), that is, the ends (goals) (purposes) and endeavours (efforts) of (the) actors, although (even though) it [the said social fact] is composed (put together, assembled) from (out of) these [acts (or actions) (and part-forces)] and only from (out of) these, then (thus, so) the historian, who sees (or grasps) (has a view of, surveys) (the) long-term developments, but also the intricate (or complicated) (involved) (inter)play (game) of forces in a particular situation, knows that subjectively meant meaning (or sense) constantly (continually) intersects with (crosses) subjectively meant meaning (or sense), or comes upon (bumps (runs) into, encounters, meets, stumbles on) an objectified (objectivised) meaning (or sense) in collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations), from (out of) which something comes into being (arises, results, ensues, is created (produced)) which is only accessible to him [the historian] as [an] observer; if history would coincide (coincided) with the simple summation (adding up) of the ends (goals) (purposes) and acts (or actions) of individuals (single persons), (then, so, thus) it [history] would be superfluous as [a] science (Ist soziale Tatsache ein Geflecht oder eine Resultante von Handlungen, die unabhängig von den Teilkräften, also den Zwecken und Bestrebungen der Akteure existiert und wirkt, obwohl sie sich aus diesen und nur aus diesen zusammensetzt, so weiß der Historiker, der längerfristige Entwicklungen, aber auch das verwickelte Spiel der Kräfte in einer besonderen Lage überblickt, da subjektiv gemeinter Sinn sich ständig mit subjektiv gemeinten Sinn kreuzt oder auf einen in kollektiven Gebilden objektivierten Sinn stößt, woraus etwas entsteht, was nur ihm als Beobachter zugänglich ist; fiele Historie mit der einfachen Summierung

der Zwecke und Handlungen der Einzelnen zusammen, so würde sie sich als Wissenschaft erübrigen). The colliding (or clashes) [of individual and or collective subjects with one another] (Das Aufeinanderstoßen) and the heterogony of ends have until now (hitherto), as ascertainments or presentiments (forebodings, premonitions; Ahnungen), made up (constituted), in various (different, miscellaneous) versions, the background (backdrop) and quintessence of historical wisdom (sagacity, sapience). The historian certainly (though) knows of this process's (the) dynamic character (of this series of events) (dynamischen Charakter dieses Vorgangs), of its unfolding (or development) in long sequences (or orders) of events (Abläufen). In this respect (As far as that goes (is concerned)), he [the historian] comprehends (understands, grasps) the composition (texture or constitution) of the social fact more comprehensively (extensively, broadly) than Durkheim, who, as [we have] said (mentioned, stated), (has) insisted upon (persisted in) its [the social fact's] static-institutional aspect (facet) (auf ihrem statisch-institutionellen Aspekt bestanden hat).

We have likewise (also) hinted at (indicated) another of Durkheim's flaws (faults, mistakes, errors). He (has) connected [the] historical method and [the] evolutionistic philosophy of history with each other logically, although the relation(ship) here is at (the) most (best) a pragmatic [relationship, one] (eine pragmatische): inside of (within) (historical-philosophical) intellectual (thought) efforts (pertaining to the philosophy of history) (geschichtsphilosophischer Denkbemühungen), discoveries and insights resulted (arose) which contributed to the formation of a historical way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) (of things (affairs, matters)), but, in the process, were (have been, became) detached (broke away, cut loose, peeled away) from

the original (initial) (historical-philosophical) framework (as regards (in respect of) the philosophy of history). Durkheim could [not] and of course did not want to admit (believe, accept) that modern sociology in some (a number of, many), not unimportant (insignificant) respects, owed possibly still (even) more to the philosophy of history than to (the) historical method. In order to comprehend (grasp, understand) this, one must first define what the philosophy of history since Herder and Hegel until (up to) Comte and Marx actually (really) wanted, and how its [the philosophy of history's] matter of concern (or purpose) (demand, request), under the influence of the ascendant (rising) social sciences, determined (conditioned) its structure. The postulate of a necessary advent (arrival; Ankunft) of an ethically-normatively desired (desirable, welcome) final (end) state (of affairs) (situation) (erwünschten Endzustandes) in the history of mankind (humankind, humanity) automatically gave rise to (called for, created, caused, provoked) two questions: how is (must, should) the historical period (of time) (time) preceding this final state of affairs (to) be comprehended (grasped, understood, interpreted, perceived)? On what paths (or in what ways) is the final state of affairs to be arrived at (or achieved) (reached, attained, accomplished)? The answers to them [those (these) questions] were found on the basis of the same automatic thought (intellectual) mechanism (mechanism of thought) (Denkautomatik): should the advent (arrival) of the final state of affairs be necessary, (then, so, thus) the historical past must be looked upon (regarded, seen) as [the] its [the final state of affairs'] preparation. So that it [the historical past], however, can function as preparation, a red (central) thread [of continuity] (i.e. central theme or leitmotif) (ein roter Faden) must run (go, pass) through it,(:) that is why its variety of form (multiformity) must, from this particular point of view, be put in order (ordered, sorted out, arranged) as a chain of meaningfully

(or rationally) (sensibly) successive (consecutive) links, or [even] better, as [an] ascending (rising) scale (or sequence of tiers or stages) (eine Kette von sinnvoll aufeinanderfolgenden Gliedern oder besser als aufsteigende Stufenfolge). On the one hand, the path (road) (up) to the final state of affairs is [a] development, on the other hand, the development is structured (arranged) in (or divided into) stages (tiers, levels, grades) (gliedert sich die Entwicklung in Stufen) – history as [a] whole consists, therefore, of stages of development *and* of the transitions (crossings) between them [such stages of development]. Here a static and a dynamic element emerges in (the) historiography (description (writing) of history). The philosophy of history did not have any great difficulty in accepting the independence (autonomy, self-sufficiency; Eigenständigkeit) or the historically understood individuality of every stage of development. Because at every [one of them, stage of development], it [the philosophy of history] simultaneously sensed (got wind of) the effect (impact, influence) of a mechanism, which drove (pushed, drifted, floated, carried on, went) [things, matters, affairs] beyond the [a] stage's each and every respective individual structure, however [it (the (this) mechanism (in question)))] was not external to it [the said stage's individual structure], but immanent (inherent, intrinsic, innate, internal), and at the same moment (time) was interwoven with (universal(world)-historical) forces (pertaining to world history (or the history of the universe)) (mit universalgeschichtlichen Kräften verwoben war). The historical factors accordingly had an (took) effect (worked, acted) in [a] dual (double, twin) respect (two respects): they constituted the stage [of development] and at the same time abolished (did away with, canceled, revoked, reversed, rescinded, neutralised, annulled) it [the said stage], while they brought about (on) (caused, induced) (by bringing (having brought) about) the transition to the next [stage, one], they [the said historical factors] were

condensed (solidified, compressed, thickened, consolidated) synchronically and they developed (or unfolded) diachronically, they brought (about, off) (achieved) stable (sturdy) mechanisms for the establishment (production or restoration) (making, manufacture, fabrication) of equilibria (zur Herstellung von Gleichgewichten), and likewise (also) stable mechanisms of change, (into existence). Such mechanisms cannot, however, be formed (or developed) if (when) the evidently (obviously, apparently) numerous historical factors come (arrive, appear) on the scene in a chaotic mess (or muddle) ((state of) confusion); they had to, that is, be classified and, above all, be hierarchised (arranged (put) in a hierarchy). This hierarchy indeed (certainly, in fact, of course) had (universal(world)-historical) [a] validity (in respect of universal (or world) history), but it simultaneously provided (supplied, made) the criteria (available) on the basis of which every stage (tier, level, grade) or every society could be looked at (regarded) as (considered) [a] coherent whole. Because the latter [coherent whole] contained in each and every respective historically specific form all [the] social and historical factors (technology (technique), economy, political and legal institutions, religion, science, art etc.), and the hierarchy amongst them [the(se) (said) social and historical factors] exactly took care of (looked after, saw to) its [each and every respective historically specific [societal] form's] functional cohesion (funktionalen Zusammenhalt), while shifts (displacements) inside of (within) the primary factor set in motion the mechanism of change (während Verschiebungen innerhalb des primären Faktors den Mechanismus des Wandels in Bewegung setzen).

From now on (Henceforth), the stages of development of the philosophy of history were transformed into sociological “concepts (notions) of

structure (or structural concepts) (Strukturbegriffe)”<sup>93</sup>, which related to (concerned) functionally self-supporting (or self-sustaining) social (societal) formations (formations of society) (selbst tragende Gesellschaftsformationen), and were used without (historical-philosophical) implications (pertaining to the philosophy of history); the large-scale Weberian ideal type is (stands) along the same (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) lines (as regards the history of ideas). Such concepts of structure (or structural concepts) should, nevertheless, apart from the social (societal) entirety (wholenesses, totalities; Ganzheiten), (also) sociologically apprehend (grasp) the construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (too)(,) from (out of) which those entiretys are composed (put together, assembled) and which, for their part, constitute entiretys on a smaller scale (of a smaller scope (extent, size, range)). Even if the sociologist, in the course of this, does not neglect (ignore) the diachronic-dynamic factor and does not overlook the possible (or potential) asymmetries between the entiretys (wholenesses, totalities) of the second order (i.e. the entiretys on a smaller scale), he must(,) nevertheless (after all)(,) pose (raise) the [a] question in accordance with their [the second order’s (these) entiretys’] functional interrelation (connection, context) (nach ihrem funktionalen Zusammenhang), no matter what importance (value) (status) he attaches to (gives) the same [question] inside of

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<sup>93</sup> The term stems (comes) from Freyer, who, by the way, starts (takes) expressis verbis (from) Hegel (as his (the, a) starting point). Freyer holds (considers) (regards as particularly fruitful (productive, fertile)) the Hegelian perception (view) [that] the (formation) principles (of formation) of societal (social) order are “developmental steps (steps in development) and structural elements, stages (tiers, levels, grades, phases) and strata (layers)” in one (, to be particularly fruitful) (Für besonders fruchtbar hält Freyer die Hegelsche Auffassung, die Bildungsprinzipien der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung seien „Entwicklungsschritte und Strukturelemente, Stufen und Schichten“ in einem). From that he concludes (infers, deduces) [that] the “pure basic (fundamental) structures” are contained (included) in each and every respective historical present as structural elements, while at the same time they succeeded (followed, came after) one another in real history (really-historically). Sociology’s task (job, duty) consists in the formulation of “maximally (the most) historically saturated (satiated, replete(d)) concepts of structure (or structural concepts)” („maximal historisch gesättigten Strukturbegriffen“) (Soziologie, pp. 217, 221ff., 227). What he was thinking of in the course of this, the reader knows through (by (means of), [from]) works (treatises, papers) like for instance v. Martin’s *Soziologie der Renaissance*.

(within) his overall way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation). In reality, no-one who thinks about society can evade (avoid) this question. Hence, it [the said (such a) question] was already broached (touched upon) in antiquity in [an] organicistic language (in organizistischer Sprache)<sup>94</sup>, and in the New Times (Modern Era) [it] was raised (thrown up) (still) before the formation (or development) (Herausbildung) of the philosophy of history (with)in the framework of the first approaches to (or attempts at) modern sociology<sup>95</sup>. The tight (close, narrow) interweaving (intertwining, interconnection, integration) between sociology and the philosophy of history in the 19<sup>th</sup> century indeed embedded the functional problem in the [a] perspective of development (developmental perspective), (but, however) at the same time (though, however)(,) for the (afore)mentioned reasons, it [the said tight interweaving] gave [an] important imput(es) to its [the said functional problem's] theoretical process of becoming independent (or theoretical autonomisation) (theoretischenVerselbständigung): as is (well) known, Marx treated (dealt with, handled) the capitalistic social (societal) formation (formation of society) both in terms of the history of development (developmentally-historically) as well as ideal-typically in relation to (in terms of) the concept of structure (structurally-conceptually-ideal-typically) (die kapitalistische Gesellschaftsformation sowohl entwicklungsgeschichtlich als auch strukturbegrifflich-idealypisch). If one leaves (Leaving) aside (to one side) (the) (historical-

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<sup>94</sup> Aristotle, *Politica*, 1302 b p.35ff.; cf. Menenius Agrippa's considerably older speech in Titus Livius, II, p.32.

<sup>95</sup> Thus (So), Montesquieu makes an effort (tries, goes to a lot of trouble, endeavours) to discover functional interrelations (connections) between the, for every society(,) indispensable(,) geographic, economic, institutional etc. factors. To the extent (degree) which the supposed causalities seem at the same time rigid (fixed, set, inflexible) and artificial, this is not due to the wish (desire) to prove (show, demonstrate) the necessity of the [a] Happy End in history (in fact the philosophy of history in the later (subsequent) sense was alien to Montesquieu), but [it was due] to sympathies in the field (area) of politics and to the predominance (supremacy, preponderance) of political philosophy in the [his] overall way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation). In relation to that, see Kondylis, *Montesquieu*, ch. II, sec. 4.



philosophical) eschatology (pertaining to the philosophy of history), (then, so, thus) a methodical (i.e. methodological) schema (remains) (is) (left) (over), which connects sociological and historical points of view with one another in a satisfactory (satisfying) way (manner). But [a, the] functional way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) as [an] indispensable aspect of sociological-historical analysis, and functionalism as [an] independent (or autonomous) theory(,) which postulates fixed (steady, firm, rigid) (hierarchical) relations between society's, defined a limine, functional components in general (on the whole, generally), are two very different (distinct, differing, various) things. The path (road, way) to the latter [functionalism as an independent theory] is cleared in (this [such a] way) (because of (due to) the fact) that the – for every sociology likewise (also) indispensable – discussion of the phenomena of change does not put (place) in the foreground (spotlight) (give priority (special emphasis) to, emphasise) social (societal) entires (wholenesses, totalities) and the breaks (or ruptures) between them [such entires] and inside (of) (within) them, but the evolution or the differentiation (process) of more or less institutionalised activities (sondern die Evolution bzw. die Ausdifferenzierung von mehr oder weniger institutionalisierten Tätigkeiten), which are supposed (meant) to (should) have [a] constitutive function in every society. The consideration (thought or idea) is (reads, goes): if phenomenon X exists diachronically, then (thus, so) it must have a permanent function too; however, a function can be permanent only inside of a permanent framework, that is, ultimately (finally, in the end) in the framework of [a] society as [a] functional system. A historically proceeding (acting) sociological analysis of social facts' functional aspects is by no means obliged to [accept] (places an obligation on) such assumptions (suppositions) (Zu solchen Annahmen ist eine historisch verfahrenende soziologische Analyse der

funktionalen Aspekte sozialer Tatsache keineswegs verpflichtet),(;) on the contrary: it [such an analysis] rejects them [such assumptions (functional aspects of social facts)]).

Functionalism, which indeed is consistent (compatible) with evolutionism, but not with the historical way of looking at things, did (was) not of course revel (exult) in its success (very successful) (celebrate its triumphs) thanks to its purely scientific advantages (merits), but as a result of a profound (deep) change (alteration, modification) in (of) the socially predominant (prevailing, prevalent) world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) paradigm (sondern infolge einer tiefgreifenden Änderung des sozial vorherrschenden weltanschaulichen Paradigmas). The bourgeois-liberal thought figure (or schema), which was oriented towards (geared to) the notion (idea) of (the) stage(-)wise (or gradual) (step by step, progressive, stepwise) progress in (the) historical time (Die bürgerlich-liberale Denkfigur, die sich an der Vorstellung des stufenweisen Fortschrittes in der geschichtlichen Zeit orientierte), was superseded (replaced, supplanted) in the mass-democratic era (age, epoch) (im massendemokratischen Zeitalter) by a thought figure (or schema) in which the [a] spatial perception of things (matters, affairs) predominates (is predominant, prevails) (in der die räumliche Wahrnehmung der Dinge überwiegt). The components of the social being (Is) (but also (the) periods (phases, segments, sections) of time) seem to be found next to one another on (in) a single (sole, only, solitary, lone) surface (area, expanse, face, space), no matter how they [the said (these, those) components] were hierarchised (arranged (put) in a hierarchy) or combined with one another, regardless (no matter, irrespective) too (of) how they potentially (or possibly) evolve through (the) differentiating (process) (Die Komponenten des sozialen Seins (aber

auch die Abschnitte der Zeit) scheinen sich nun auf einer einzigen Fläche nebeneinander zu befinden, gleichviel, wie sie hierarchisiert oder miteinander kombiniert wurden, gleichgültig auch, wie sie eventuell durch Ausdifferenzieren evolvieren)<sup>96</sup>. The predominance (prevailing, prevalence, imposition, carrying (pushing) through) of the spatial notion (or representation) (idea, view, perception) [in respect] of the social [sphere] put an end to the philosophy of history – at least in its classic(al) form, since (because) many an (some) eschatological element[s] survived from it [the philosophy of history] until (up to) today in [under, with] [an] evolutionistic shell (wrapping, cover, sheath, case, veil)<sup>97</sup>. Many sociologists, in the course of this, lapsed (fell) into Durkheim's error (made Durkheim's mistake) and thought (believed, opined) that(,) [along] with the philosophy of history of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, the historical method or way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) was done (dispensed, dealt, finished off) with (got out of the way) too. In relation to that, they [the said (many) sociologists] were not only encouraged by suggestions (ideas, stimulation(s), stimuli, encouragement, prompting(s)) from neighbouring (i.e. related) (adjacent, adjoining) fields (areas) (phenomenology, symbolic interactionism) or by the formal-sociological legacy (heritage, inheritance) (durch das formalsoziologische Erbe), which will (pre)occupy (employ) us (keep us busy) at the beginning (start) of the next Chapter, but also by the increasing (growing) crossing over (i.e. interweaving, intersecting or entanglement) (Verschränkung) of the sociological métier (i.e. profession) (job, trade) with social engineering in mass democracy,(;) which frequently (in many

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<sup>96</sup> Cf. the first Section of the previous Chapter. Generally in relation to this paradigm shift: Kondylis, *Niedergang*.

<sup>97</sup> See above, Ch. I, Sec. 3. In so far as (As far as that goes (In this respect), if) [the] philosophy of history in the 20<sup>th</sup> century openly appeared as such (Spengler, Toynbee), it had to spatialise itself, i.e. say goodbye to (or turn its back on (away from)) the idea of Progress in time and appropriate (acquire) the schema of movement in circles (or cycles) (i.e. the schema of circular (i.e. cyclical) movement).

cases) reduces sociology to the investigation of directly observable social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) (die Erforschung von direkt beobachtbaren sozialen Erscheinungen) (mobility, sex (i.e. gender) (or race) relation(ship)[s], demography, criminality etc.). (Against) Such sociological work (labour) there is nothing (in itself) to be said (is not to be objected to in itself), but its [such sociological work's] successes do not constitute [a] reason for the detachment (breaking away, dissociation) of sociology as [a] discipline from (the) historical science (science of history) and the historical consideration (contemplation) of (or way of looking at) social processes. [The] Constrictions (restrictions) of (limitations on) the theoretical horizon, as understandable as they may (also) be, for their part, as social phenomena, do not represent (or constitute) as such theoretical arguments. And it is indeed (really, truly, actually, in fact) a constriction (restriction) of (limitation on) the horizon, when (if) in what relation e.g. the specific character of today's (present-day) criminality in (the) Western countries is (stands) with the specific character of mass democracy as [a] historically arising (or coming into being) (ensuing, resulting, emerging) and historically determined (conditioned) social (societal) formation (formation of society) (als geschichtlich entstandener und geschichtlich bedingter Gesellschaftsformation), is misjudged (not appreciated, underestimated). Only historical analyses and comparisons would lend (confer, grant, give) (to) sociological investigations (or examinations) (inquiries) (soziologischen Untersuchungen) like those mentioned above [a] theoretical<sup>iv</sup> status – incidentally, they (such historical analyses and comparisons) are (lie, stand) close to (near) [(quite, directly, rather) relevant with regard to] the matter (thing) (in (at) hand), and it can be asserted with good reason (on solid (good, sound) grounds) (there are good reasons for claiming (asserting) (to claim)) [that] every sociologist,

even the historically unversed (inexperienced, unfamiliar) [one, sociologist], works(,) anyway (anyhow, in any case (event))(,) with historical concepts (or conceptual plans) at (in) the back of his mind<sup>98</sup>. The social present constitutes (just as much) the object (or subject matter) (topic) of (the) historical way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) (just) (as) society's past. But the unhistorical ideological self-understanding of mass democracy stands in the way of a historically founded (established, grounded, justified, substantiated) sociological analysis of (the) phenomena of mass-democratic existence (or being (t)here) (Aber das unhistorische ideologische Selbstverständnis der Massendemokratie steht einer historisch begründeten soziologischen Analyse von Phänomenen massendemokratischen Daseins in Wege). That is why such [an] analysis must, [when, if] consistently carried out (undertaken), amount to (end up in) a subversive relativisation (eine subversive Relativierung) of this self-understanding, which would for many scientists (or scholars), who think in its [this self-understanding's] (the) categories (of this same self-understanding), only be embarrassing. Nonetheless, as [we have] already remarked (commented, observed, noticed, noted)<sup>99</sup>, no ideology has ever been capable of (able to) monopolising (monopolise) the entire (whole, complete) intellectual(-spiritual) spectrum for itself. Historical sociology has, since Weber and Marc Bloch until (up to) Tilly, Eisenstadt and B. Moore, done notable (remarkable, formidable) work (a good job)<sup>100</sup>, although they also often succumbed to ideological temptations. Yet it is not a matter here – or not directly [a matter] – of those ideologems (i.e. kinds of sub-ideology) (jene

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<sup>98</sup> See in relation to that: Bonnell, "The Uses of Theory".

<sup>99</sup> See above, Ch. 1, Sec. 1.

<sup>100</sup> Skocpol (ed.) offers a panorama (i.e. overview) of this work, *Vision and Method*. In relation to the methodical (i.e. methodological) [aspect, dimension, element] cf. Stinchcombe, *Theoretical Methods*; Tilly, *As Sociology meets History* and *Big Structures*; Abrams, *Historical Sociology*.

Ideologeme) which characterise mass democracy's self-understanding(,) as [in when] this [mass democracy's self-understanding] (has) found expression (was (has been) reflected) for instance in systematic (i.e. systems-related) or economic social theories.

As [we (have)] said (stated), the philosophy of history constructed supposedly universally valid hierarchies of social and historical factors, in order to deduce (derive) from them that mechanism, whose mere self-acting (i.e. automatic) effect (impact, influence, consequence, result) (selbsttätige Wirkung) was supposed (meant) to (should (have)) bring about (on) (caused) (brought about) the desired (desirable, welcome) final (end) state (of affairs) (situation). One could expect that after the decline of the philosophy of history of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, (the) attempts to establish (set (put) up, erect) (or put forward (formulate)) similar hierarchies or even (only) (at least) complete inventories, would fail to materialise. This, however, has not occurred (happened, taken place) without exception, although now the old connection between such constructions and eschatology has broken off (been discontinued, stopped suddenly) or (in some (a number of, quite a few) evolutionists) has been maintained only in [an] indirect and weakened (toned down, lessened, attenuated, diminished, softened) form. The question (in respect) of (regarding, about) the realisability (i.e. feasibility) of the epistemological dream of an all-embracing (catholic, global, universal), universally valid and properly (rightly, correctly, appropriately) structured schema of (the) (socially effective (and acting) (active, working)) factors (having an effect socially), touches, in any case, directly (right, immediately) upon the problem of the relations between historical and sociological research (Die Frage nach der Realisierbarkeit des epistemologischen Traumes von einem allumfassenden, universal gültigen und sachgemäß gegliederten

Schema der sozial wirkenden Faktoren berührt sich jedenfalls unmittelbar mit dem Problem der Beziehungen zwischen historischer und soziologischer Forschung); that is why it was no accident (coincidence) that one of the most prominent attempts to realise the dream was undertaken in the course of the detachment (breaking away, disentanglement, dissociation, disengagement) from historical sociology, that is, in the [a] systematic-functionalistic context (im systemisch-funktionalistischen Kontext)<sup>101</sup>. Undoubtedly, the concepts or categories, which are listed in such schematisations or catalogisations (in solchen Schematisierungen oder Katalogisierungen), correspond with (to) some real social phenomena, provided though (however) these are regarded (understood) as (taken for), as it were, Platonic pure forms (irgendwelchen realen sozialen Phänomenen, vorausgesetzt allerdings, diese werden gleichsam als platonische reine Gestalten aufgefaßt). But the methodically (i.e. methodologically) crucial (key, weak) point (trouble area) (does) (is) not (lie) here. Already the establishing (or formulation) (setting up, putting forward) of such a categorial (categorical) schema drives (sweeps, carries, impels) sociological research in the [a] false direction, because (the) theoretical attention henceforth applies [turns] to(wards) the conceptual level, and the solution (solving) of (to) content-related(filled) (substantive) questions (problems), which of their essence (by their (very) nature) are historical or at least have a decisive (determinative, substantial, significant, definitive, deciding) historical component, is sought in the restructurings

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<sup>101</sup> Parsons's "Pattern Variables" is of course meant [here],(;) see the more mature (riper) version of the schema in the article (essay, paper) "Pattern Variables Revisited". Parsons (has, had) put forward (or imagined (envisaged)) in his first major (main) work the transition from Weber's historical sociology to (the, [a]) sociological theory of universal validity as follows: (the) ideal types are divided (split (cut) up) into their individual (or separate) elements, and then the analytically usable [elements] amongst these elements are detached (removed, broken) from historical reference and are used for the construction (building, setting up, erection, development, composition) of a comprehensive [set of] conceptual instruments (apparatus) of ubiquitous applicability (und zum Aufbau eines umfassenden begrifflichen Instrumentariums ubiquitärer Anwendbarkeit) (*Structure*, pp. 619, 626).

(reconstructions) or new (revised) versions of the conceptuality (denn die theoretische Aufmerksamkeit gilt fortan der begrifflichen Ebene und die Lösung der inhaltlichen Fragen, die vom Wesen her historisch sind oder wenigstens eine maßgebliche historische Komponente haben, wird in Umstrukturierungen oder Neufassungen der Begrifflichkeit gesucht). Yet even a hypothetically complete conceptuality, which a *limine* and in *abstracto* would name all possible factors in all conceivable (imaginable, thinkable) social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) and developments, could not indicate (or set) (give, determine) the specific weight or the particular mode of having an effect (or manner of influence) (*Wirkungsweise*) of every (single) (individual) one of these factors in every concrete situation. It [The hypothetically complete conceptuality] would have to separate (split up), detach, remove) the[se] same [factors] from one another, and (re)present [them] as [a] series (row, succession) of spheres of action or of “subsystems” existing side by side (next to (alongside, beside) one another) (und als Reihe von nebeneinander bestehender Sphären des Handelns oder von „Subsystemen“ vorstellen). The major (great), in fact the central problem in every concrete historical or sociological analysis is, nevertheless (however), the real *relation(ship)* between the factors, which in the categorial (categorical) schema appear (emerge) as polysemous (i.e. ambiguous) symbols or hieroglyphs – and this relation(ship) is shaped (formed, moulded) (for) ever (always) anew,(;) it [this relation(ship)] is, that is, historically produced (made, established, manufactured, fabricated), and it can in no way be anticipated in the [a] theoretical model and in (on) the roundabout way of non-binding conceptual alchemy (“interpretation”, “input”, “output” etc.) (Das große, ja das zentrale Problem bei jeder konkreten historischen oder soziologischen Analyse ist indes die reale *Beziehung* zwischen den Faktoren, die im



kategorialen Schema als vieldeutige Symbole oder Hieroglyphen in Erscheinung treten – und diese Beziehung gestaltet sich immer neu, sie wird also historisch hergestellt und sie kann in keiner Weise im theoretischen Modell und auf dem Umwege unverbindlicher begrifflicher Alchemie („Interpretation“, „Input“, „Output“ etc.) vorweggenommen werden)<sup>102</sup>. In reality, behind the rigidity (or inflexibility) (stiffness) of the sociological table of categories, hides a preliminary (precursory) decision (pre-decision) (eine Vorentscheidung) in favour of (for) certain content-related(filled) (substantive) theses and against other [content-related theses], i.e. the conceptual hierarchy should (is supposed (meant) to) support (prop up) epistemological or normative preferences. Nonetheless, the real effect (or influence) (impact, result, consequence) of (the) social factors must not, in their kind (sort) (manner (way) or nature) and range (scope) (in ihrer Art und Reichweite), at all correspond to (with) each and every respective place of these factors inside of the classification carried out (made), and only wrong (false) historical assessments (estimations) (historical misjudgements (miscalculations) (historische Fehleinschätzungen) can spring (arise, originate) from the assumption (supposition) [that] the taxonomically antecedent (preceding [factor, thing, element]) (das taxinomisch Vorangehende) is [ought to be] also, in every case, the more effective [factor] (Wirkungsvollere).

Our conclusion ([The] upshot, bottom line) must read (be): sociology is capable, just as little as the philosophy of history, of including *the* system and *the* development of society in a single (sole) categorial (categorical) schema, which would apprehend (grasp) (the) (permanently active (acting, effective, working, operating)) social factors (permanently having an effect) as well as their relations with one another, and at the same time

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<sup>102</sup> Cf. Hall's comments (remarks, observations), "The Problem of Epistemology", esp. p. 272.

(would) possess (have) universal-historical validity (i.e. as regards to world history) (das die permanent wirkenden sozialen Faktoren sowie ihre Beziehungen zueinander erfassen würde und zugleich universalhistorische Geltung besäße)<sup>103</sup>. Because the same factors do not (determinatively, decisively) have an (take) effect (are not (determinatively) active (work, operate) (determinatively) in every society and in every period (age); and the same factors have an effect, relate to (or interrelate with) (concern) one another and are hierarchised (arranged (put) in a hierarchy) differently in every concrete situation (in jeder konkreten Lage). In view of (Given) this incessant (unremitting) reshaping (remoulding, remodelling, restructuring, reorganisation), reassessment (reweighing or reprioritisation) and reordering (i.e. rearrangement) of (the) causal factors (Angesichts dieser unblässigen Umgestaltung, Umgewichtung und Umordnung der Kausalfaktoren), we may (can, should, are allowed to) safely say (confidently assert (claim, affirm)) [that] sociology is (will be) (re)written (anew, afresh) during (in) the analysis of every social phenomenon and every historical situation (bei der Analyse jedes sozialen Phänomens und jeder geschichtlichen Situation), it [sociology], that is, formulates (or puts forward) (sets up, establishes, proposes, advances), on each and every respective occasion, a specific categorial (categorical) table(,) which indeed (of course) through (by means of) comparisons explains (illustrates) and expands (extends,

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<sup>103</sup> This conclusion (or upshot) equally (in the same way) concerns (bears on, regards, affects) attempts which [that] put together (assemble, compose) [a] universally applicable table of categories from pairs of concepts (conceptual pairs), which already have historical content, as (like) for instance status-contract, community-society, culture-civilisation, estate-class (thus, Bendix-Berger, "Images of Society"). In relation to that, it is to be said (we must say along) with C. W. Mills [that] here it is a matter of concepts (notions) which are taken (gathered, borrowed) from (the) West(ern) European development and thoughts world (i.e. system of ideas or ideological universe) (Gedankenwelt), and whose use presupposes a certain notion (perception or representation) of (the) historical tendencies of development; the latter [historical tendencies of development] are not able (allowed) (cannot) however (to) be generalised,(;) they would, that is, apply only ever in regard (relation) to a concrete social (societal) formation (formation of society), not universally-historically (i.e. in regard to world history) (universalgeschichtlich) (*Kritik*, pp. 203, 199).

widens, broadens) [matters, things], but cannot be completely (totally) absorbed by (completely unfold [fit] in(to)) any other [categorical table]. Historical sociology does not need an all-embracing (or universal) (catholic, global) categorical (categorical) schema, and (the) unhistorical [sociology] cannot bring it [such an all-embracing or universal categorical schema] about, except (unless) as [a] thought(s) (or intellectual) (mind) game, which for its part has a heuristic value (worth) only (then) when comparative historical analyses precede or follow it [such a thought(s) (or intellectual) game]. And what applies to (is valid for) the all-embracing (or universal) schema, also applies to partial hierarchisations (hierarchical arrangements) of sociological categories or concepts (notions) (partielle Hierarchisierungen von soziologischen Kategorien oder Begriffen). Thus (So, In this way), the primacy of structure vis-à-vis individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act) (den Primat der Struktur gegenüber der individuellen Handlung), or of this [individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act)] over that [structure], was debated long and hard, and in the course of this (only, just, simply, merely) every conceivable (imaginable) solution (possible, on earth) was suggested (proposed). All were theoretical solutions in the worst sense of the word: combinations of purely ideational magnitudes at (or on) [a] purely conceptual level (or plane), without, in the process (into the bargain), seriously (in all seriousness) reflecting on the complex relation(ship) between [the] concurrent (simultaneous) indispensability and fictivity (i.e. fictiveness or fictitiousness) of conceptual constructs (Alle waren theoretische Lösungen im schlechtesten Sinn des Wortes: Kombinationen von rein ideellen Größen auf rein begrifflicher Ebene, ohne dabei im Ernst über die komplexe Beziehung zwischen gleichzeitiger Unentbehrlichkeit und Fiktivität von begrifflichen Konstrukten zu reflektieren). Individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act) and structure are in fact

borderline cases at the level of conceptuality, not independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) and isolable data at the level of that reality which makes up (constitutes) the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of sociological and historical research. And it is pointless (hopeless, futile) to rediscover the conceptual borderline cases in reality or to directly apply purely conceptual findings (ascertainments, results, data, facts) or combinations to analyses of what is real (reality) (real analyses), or even to exchange (or substitute) (interchange) these [analyses of what is real] with those [purely conceptual findings or combinations] [the latter with the former] (Und es ist aussichtslos, die begrifflichen Grenzfälle in der Realität wiederzuentdecken bzw. rein begriffliche Befunde oder Kombinationen auf Realanalysen direkt anzuwenden oder gar diese gegen jene auszutauschen). Only analyses of what is real (real analyses) [in respect] of concrete situations (Erst Realanalysen von konkreten Lagen) can give [us (an)] insight into (explanation of, information about) if (whether) and when structure precedes individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act) or vice versa, as well as above all what may be defined as individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act), and what as structure, on each and every respective occasion. The answer here [to all these questions (problems)] must vary from case to case. The chameleonic character of the matter (thing, issue, business) gives rise in theoreticians to (causes, creates, provokes) a never admitted (confessed) awkwardness (or embarrassment) (perplexity, predicament), which can be observed (noted, noticed) in statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) of the type “both – as well as”, or else in definitions of one concept with reference to the content which one normally (usually, conventionally) attributes (ascribes) to the other [concept]. Blau wants (to know (be sure (certain, aware) [that])) e.g. the concept (notion) of structure (is) [to (be)] related (refer(s),

concern(s), apply, applies) not to institutions and their integration, but to differentiated orders which individuals form (mould, shape, make up, constitute, establish, set up) through their interactions (Blau will z. B. den Strukturbegriff nicht auf die Institutionen und ihre Integration, sondern auf die differenzierten Ordnungen bezogen wissen, die die Individuen durch ihre Interaktionen bilden)<sup>104</sup>. A(n) adherent (supporter, follower) of methodological individualism (Ein Anhänger des methodologischen Individualismus) like Homans emphatically points out (points (alludes, refers) to) (stresses, emphasises, underlines) the individual exceptions in every structure (but (yet) talk of exceptions presupposes (rules existing) already (existing rules)!), and [he] puts (reduces) the formation of structures (down) to individual action, without however denying the possibility of the explanation of individual action through (by means of) the effect (impact, result) of [already formed] sociostructural factors (formed (shaped, moulded) once (first) [i.e. before the said individual action takes place]) (einmal geformter soziostruktureller Faktoren)<sup>105</sup>. And Giddens places great value on (attaches great importance to) the ascertainment (observation) [that] structures would not merely obstruct (impede, hamper, hold back, stem, slow down, check, stop, inhibit; hemmen) action, but at the same time enable action<sup>106</sup>. Every one of these propositions (suggestions, proposals) looks just as obvious (or plausible) (evident, reasonable, convincing) on paper as the other [propositions], and all [of them (these propositions)] remain, beyond (outside of) the conceptual level, equally non-binding.

The impossibility of working out (formulating, developing) a fixed (steady or stable) hierarchy of causal factors having an effect in the form

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<sup>104</sup> "Parameters", p. 615ff..

<sup>105</sup> "What do we mean", pp. 62, 64.

<sup>106</sup> *Constitution*, pp. 25ff., 169ff..

of a universally valid table of categories (Die Unmöglichkeit, eine feste Hierarchie kausaler Wirkungs-faktoren in Form einer universal geltenden Kategorientafel auszuarbeiten), decisively (significantly) affects (influences, impacts (impinges) (on)) the methodological field (area, sector, domain). Because there could be a(n) solely (singly, singularly, only) correct (right) and generally binding method only against the [a] background (backdrop) of such a table of categories; method would then be the flawless (perfect, impeccable) application of the [a] categorial (categorical) hierarchy to each and every respective analysis of what is real(ity) (real analysis) or the opening up of the real (i.e. what is real) (Erschließung des Realen) through (by means of) the [what is] (conceptually) already established (ready-made) (conceptually) (durch das begrifflich schon Feststehende). The enigmatic (equivocal, ambiguous) character of what is real (the real [thing, element, dimension, sphere]) indeed makes abstractions indispensable (necessary) for its [what is real's] apprehension (comprehension, grasping, understanding), however exactly these abstractions cannot be constructed based on (on the basis (with the help) of) fixed (steady or stable) and fixedly (steadily or stably) hierarchised ontological data, but in view of (with regard to, on the basis of) (the) subjective (research) goals (ends, purposes) (of research) (sondern im Hinblick auf subjektive Forschungszwecke), which can diverge (deviate, differ) considerably (substantially, significantly) from one another, or stand in the way of one another (mutually (reciprocally) stand (be) in one another's way). The methodical (i.e. methodological) approach (or methodological access) (der methodische Zugang) must vary accordingly – but it may not [do it] if a(n) comprehensive (extensive, broad) table of categories could name invariable [causal factors] or (invariably effective (acting, active, working, operative, operating)) causal factors (having an (invariable)

effect (invariably)) as obligatory points of orientation (orientation points). It is now (frequently) attempted (many times, in many cases) to compensate for the lack (absence) of this table of categories [in respect] of (the) social and historical being (Is) through (by means of) the summoning (usage, use) of ([an] appeal to) a(n) supposedly (ostensibly) generally binding method; it, by the way (incidentally), has often been so (thus, [the case]) in the (New Times') history of ideas (of the New Times (Modern Era)) that methodology overgrew (or grew profusely (rampant)) (proliferated) as soon as (when(ever)) ontology (that is to say (i.e., read): the opponent's (adversary's) ontology) was attacked (battled, combated, opposed) or avoided (steered clear of, shunned). The invocation of (appeal to) method serves in relation to that, to underpin (support, sustain, back up) content-related(filled) (substantive) preliminary (precursory) decisions (pre-decisions) with regard to the interpretation of the sociological or historical material (stuff, (subject) matter). Consequently (Thus, As a result, Therefore)(,) method becomes (turns into) the [a] theoretically prospective, and in (actual) fact (reality) retrospective, rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification) of one's own research praxis (or practice) (Methode wird somit zur theoretisch prospektiven und faktisch retrospektiven Rationalisierung der eigenen Forschungspraxis), which does (is) not though find itself (found) in any necessary relation(ship) with the productiveness (fertility) of this praxis (or practice). This [(putatively) necessary relationship with the productiveness of research practice occurs] so much the less when the propagation of a method under (in) (certain) circumstances, which favour the overgrowth (or profusion) (profuseness, excessive growth; Überwucherung) of methodological debates, has [a] partly symbolic, partly symptomatic character: it [the said propagation of a method] stands (vicariously) in [deputises] for (acts on behalf of) the now avoided open

world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) confessions of faith, and at the same time it indicates (shows) the position of those concerned (in question, [the] relevant (interested) parties [who propagate a method]) in the spectrum of the world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) parties (sides, groups, opponents, factions) competing with one another inside of (within) the [overall] scientific operation (enterprise or business) (Sie springt stellvertretend für die nun gemiedenen offenen weltanschaulichen Bekenntnisse ein und zeigt zugleich die Position des Betreffenden im Spektrum der innerhalb des wissenschaftlichen Betriebs miteinander konkurrierenden weltanschaulichen Parteien an). The controversy of the 1960s and 1970s between the adherents (supporters, followers) of a history without sociology and those of a sociology without history reflected e.g. partisanships (or taking sides) (positionings, espousals, advocacies, advocacy; Parteinahmen) for and against liberal individualism together with their [these partisanships'] political implications. The, in recent (the last few) decades, depoliticisation (Entpolitisierung) of history [which has] taken place (occurred, effected) in wide (broad, extensive) fields (or areas), the growing (increasing) interest in the everyday (daily) life of the humble (little, small, minor, modest) somebody (person, They, Them) (i.e. of the common man or the "little people") (am Alltag des kleinen Mannes), in mentalities and [the] experiential world (world of experience), in corporeality and sexuality, in outcasts and the [those who are] different (an Mentalitäten und Erlebnisswelt, an Körperlichkeit und Sexualität, an Ausgestoßenen und Andersartigen), constitutes (then) again (in turn, on the other hand) just as many back projections (i.e. projections into the past) (Rückprojektionen) of motifs (or motives) (von Motiven) and questions, which, after the discontinuation (cessation, ending, omission, cancelation; Wegfallen) of the old boundaries between the



private [sphere] and the public [sphere], and as a result of the world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) pluralism, are on the mass-democratic order of the day (or agenda). Certainly (No doubt, Of course), all that has brought with it [the] [various kinds of] expansion (or extensions) (widening(s), broadening(s)) of the sociological and historical horizon. But every expansion (or extension) (widening, broadening) of the horizon in one direction, is, as a rule, bought off by the constriction (or restriction) (limitation) of the horizon in the opposite direction. (The) Expansion (or extension) (widening, broadening) in each and every respective desired (wished-for) direction is, at any rate (in any case, anyhow, at all events), quite often passed off as [a] methodical (i.e. methodological) command (or requirement) (als methodisches Gebot). What is here called method, is essentially (basically, fundamentally) the [an] option (die Option) in favour of ([a] choice (selection) of) a certain (particular) object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme), behind which (is) a – for its part historically and sociologically to be investigated (researched, explored) – normative-world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) option (choice, selection) (stands). It is not to be expected (We ought not (to) expect) that this use (usage) of the notion (idea, thought) of method (Methodegedankens) for the purpose (or goal) (end) of declaring (proclaiming, announcing, explaining) one's own options (choices, selections) as generally binding, will stop in the future, unless one's own options are legitimised directly through (by (means of)) ontologies, not indirectly through (by (means of)) methodologies. One gains two things, after all (all the same, at least), through (by means of) this insight into the character and use (usage) of the notion (idea) of method. One spares oneself the mistake (error, fault) of expecting (hoping for) great (important, high) historical and sociological achievements (accomplishments, feats) from the application of the “right (correct)

method”, and (or) of putting (placing, setting) in second place the personal talent (aptitude, gift, endowment, genius; *Begabung*) and education (culture or cultivation) (formation, development, fashioning, training; *Bildung*) of the researcher; and one keeps [firmly] in mind (the [one’s] memory awake (alert)) [that] the impossibility of a lone (only one, one and only) binding method constitutes the reverse (flip, other) side of the impossibility of putting forward (or setting (drawing) up) (formulating, establishing, erecting, proposing, advancing) a fixed (steady or stable) hierarchy of the causal factors having an effect (working, acting, operating) in history and society.

### C. The instructive (educational, informative) mistakes (errors) of methodological individualism (*Die lehrreichen Irrtümer des methodologischen Individualismus*)

#### a. Methodological individualism as militant liberalism (*Methodologischer Individualismus als militanter Liberalismus*)

The – of course meant as reproach ([an] accusation) – ascertainment of methodological individualism [that] holistic and organicistic perceptions (views) of society (societal perceptions) were accompanied by anti-liberal political positions (*holistische und organistische Gesellschaftsauffassungen gingen mit antiliberalen politischen Positionen einher*), cannot, by and large (on the whole, in general), be disputed (contested). As the [a(n)] (intellectual(-spiritual)) retrospective [account,

look, review, survey] (of the history of ideas) shows (demonstrates, indicates), such perceptions (views) of society (societal perceptions) were formed (or developed) after the French Revolution as [a, the] theoretical answer to (the) from then (now) on (henceforth) consciously socially practised liberal individualism; holistic and organicistic ideas of Aristotelian-scholastic origin (provenance, beginnings, derivation) (aristotelisch-scholastischen Ursprungs) inspired (animated) Catholic social teaching[s] (doctrine, theory) too. Yet (But, However)(,) the radicality (radicalness) of the new profane holism and organicism (Doch die Radikalität des neuen profanen Holismus und Organizismus) differed markedly (noticeably) from the moderateness (moderation, temperance) of its precursors (forerunners, antecedents): the (noble, aristocratic) (Europe's) (European) world (of Europe) (of (the) nobles (nobility, aristocracy)) gathered (pulled (mustered, summoned) itself (themselves)) [its (their) forces] (together) now for the final (last) battle. The emphatic and at the same time typical elaboration (processing, working out) of the holistic teaching[s] (doctrine, theory) [in respect] of society (der holistischen Gesellschaftslehre) in Adam Müller was (had) also (been) ((very, [most])) consequential)(,) with regard to our question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme)(,) (rich in (many) consequences), because Müller, who wanted to strike (hit, beat, whack, bang) the liberal foe in his [the liberal foe's] (very) own (particular) (inherent) field (area, domain, territory), that of political economy, (has) applied his general theory of society to the analysis of fundamental (basic) phenomena [in respect] of (in) the economy<sup>107</sup>; Roscher, an intellectual(-spiritual) scion (offspring, sprout) of the historical school of

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<sup>107</sup> See, above all, his *Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes*.

law (or justice), (had, has,) despite (notwithstanding) reservations in [regard to] individual cases (matters) (or details), praised (extolled) Müller's merit (or contribution) (service) as [a] social theoretician<sup>108</sup> – and precisely in his polemics against the historical school of (national) economics (or political economy) (Nationalökonomie), Menger (had, has), during the renowned (famous, celebrated) “quarrel (dispute, argument, wrangle, controversy) over (about) methods” („Methodenstreites“), formulated methodological individualism as [a] theoretical programme. The “atomistic” („atomistische“) point of view, (opined, thought) the economist (meant, believed), should (was supposed (meant) to) henceforth (from now on) constitute the “exact direction of (or trend (tendency) in) research” in the social sciences, and contrary to (against) organicistic notions (representations, perceptions, views), follow the model of natural (i.e. physical) science, which through the dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of bodies into their ultimate (final) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents) (durch Auflösung der Körper in ihre letzten Bestandteile), explains their [these constituent elements'] origin (beginnings, provenance, derivation)<sup>109</sup>.

Menger did not find it necessary (find himself compelled) to [enter any] fundamental (basic) ethical or political quarrel (dispute, argument) with the representatives of the historical school of (national) economics (or political economy). For him, (the) individualistic consideration (contemplation, way of looking at things) of social and economic phenomena was essentially (fundamentally, basically, substantially, substantively) a methodological principle and a methodical (i.e.

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<sup>108</sup> *System*, I, § 12 footnote 2, cf. § 28 footnote 1.

<sup>109</sup> *Untersuchungen*, p. 153ff..

methodological) necessity. Schumpeter (had, has) emphasised (underlined, gave prominence to) a little later particularly (especially) vividly (graphically, clearly) this difference between methodology, and, politics or (and) ethics. From methodological individualism, he [Schumpeter] insisted, no conclusions (inferences) in favour of (the) political [individualism, one] can be drawn (derived, deduced). That is why a socialist can be guided (directed, led) just as (like) a liberal by the individualistic method; here the only (sole, lone, unique) yardstick (measure, criterion, benchmark) is [that, the yardstick] whether this starting point is, in [a] scientific respect (regard, terms), purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) (useful) (zweckmäßig), and leads (sufficiently) far (enough). Schumpeter saw a(n) substantial (fundamental, important, considerable, essential) disadvantage (drawback, shortcoming) of classical (national) economics (or political economy) vis-à-vis the newer [economics] precisely in [the fact] that [the] former mixed both meanings of individualism with each other, and was consequently transformed (converted, metamorphosed) into an apologia (apology; Apologie) of (for) liberalism. He [Schumpeter] reproached (accused) it [classical (national) economics] with (for, of) (still) something (else, more): the illusionary hope “of being able to apprehend (grasp) the mechanism (or machinery) (gears, gearbox, transmission; Getrieb) of social life from the standpoint of the economy”, out of which anti-liberal historical materialism (also) then came into being (arose, resulted, originated, emanated) (as well, too). Classical (national) economics (or political economy) and sociology should and must in fact differ (vary) in the evaluation (assessment) of the economic [sphere, element]. However Schumpeter also draws a methodical (i.e. methodological) dividing line (line of separation) of great significance (importance) between (national) economics (or political economy) in

general (that is, classical as well as [the] newer (more recent) [economics]) and sociology. Methodological individualism can, in his opinion, meet with (enjoy, find, have) fertile (fruitful) application only in the pure theory of (national) economics (or political economy) – “in organisation theory (doctrine) (teaching[s] of organisation[s]) e.g. and generally in sociology, one would probably (or surely) (possibly, well, arguably) not go far with individualism”<sup>110</sup>. Max Weber, on (in relation to, regarding) this point, (has) did not share (in) Schumpeter’s sharp (clear, distinct) outlook (view, insight) (or perspicacity) (den scharfen Blick Schumpeters). He [Weber] indeed heeded (followed, took to heart) the Austrian (national) economist’s distinction (differentiation) between methodological and political individualism, or between [the] “individualistic method” and “individualistic rating (i.e. evaluation)” („individualistischer Wertung“)<sup>111</sup>, nonetheless he [Weber] took (regarded, considered), without accounting for (explaining) (it, that, why), the uniform (regular, symmetrical, steady, consistent) application of the individualistic point of view to sociology and (national) economics, for granted (held) (to be (as) self-evident (obvious)).

The influential (important, powerful) revivers (renewers, restorers) and heralds (or preachers) of methodological individualism after the Second World War did (have, had) not hear (catch) (missed, ignored) not merely Schumpeter’s forceful (vivid, powerful, urgent) words, but did not once exercise Weber’s minimal caution. The Cold War promptly (swiftly) spread (spilled over), in all its acuteness (sharpness), (in)to the sphere of ideological confrontation[s] (altercation[s], contradistinction, clash[es], dispute[s]), and one found little (scant) time(,) and felt still less desire

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<sup>110</sup> *Wesen*, pp. 90ff., 51, 95.

<sup>111</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 9.

(appetite, pleasure, drive)(,) for (towards) fine distinctions  
 (differentiations). The endeavour (effort), from the liberal-Western point  
 of view, at lumping (tarring) threatening (menacing, looming)  
 communism with (the) just defeated (vanquished, conquered) fascism or  
 national socialism together (with the same brush) as regards [their]  
 holism, lent (gave, conferred, granted) the gospel (bible) of  
 methodological individualism additional (further, extra) ideological élan  
 (i.e. vigour or zest) (brio, liveliness, verve), and looked after (provided  
 for, took care of, saw to, ensured) its [methodological individualism's  
 gospel's] rapid (quick, swift) dissemination (spreading, circulation).  
 Hayek and Popper attained (gained, achieved) their fame (renown, glory)  
 as evangelists of the pressurised (pressured, hassled, pestered, plagued,  
 harassed) West's liberal values,(;) their factual (objective, material,  
 practical) contribution to social science is marginal, and the informed  
 reader will (waste their time, all for nothing,) search their [Hayek and  
 Popper's] writings for major (great, grand) original ideas (in vain). Much  
 (Far) more productive (fertile) than their own accomplishment[s]  
 (achievement, performance) is the analysis of their intellectual (thought)  
 errors (mistakes) (or flaws in (their) reasoning) (ihrer Denkfehler), which,  
 in view of (given) the[ir] applied (implemented, used) strategy, were  
 inevitable (unavoidable). Because Hayek and Popper basically  
 (essentially) reverse (turn around (upside down), invert) only content(s)  
 and signs (i.e. symbolism) (Inhalte und Vorzeichen): they contrast  
 (contradistinguish, set) methodological individualism as [the] ideational  
 safeguarding (protection, consolidation) of the freedom of the individual  
 to (against) holism as [the] intellectual(-spiritual) father of  
 "totalitarianism". They accept (admit, tolerate) therefore the in principle  
 (fundamental) connection (interrelation, link) between [the]  
 methodological [sphere, dimension, element, point of view] and [the]

political-ethical [sphere, dimension, element, point of view], both for the foe (enemy) as well as for themselves, and throw overboard (jettison) this strict distinguishing between methodological and political individualism – without further explanations and with no (without) consideration for the contrary (conflicting, opposite) opinion of the true (real) originators (creators, authors, bearers) of methodological individualism. Their syllogistic reasoning reads (is, goes): since institutions and [the] state have to serve the free individual, so (then, thus) it must be shown that individuals created them [institutions and (the) state], and also that social science should (ought to) start from (take) individuals and their acts (or actions) (as its starting point). The three propositions (sentences, clauses) contained therein [in that (this syllogistic reasoning)] do not interrelate (connect, correlate) logically, as we shall (still) [are yet to] see, either at all (in general), or only in pairs, and in this case only (then) when (if) they are interpreted narrowly, that is, [they are] no longer suitable (good, appropriate) for the purposes (or goals) (ends) of founding (establishment, foundation) (zu Grundlegungszwecken). All three [propositions] together – and taken at face value – cause insurmountable (insuperable) difficulties. Hayek and Popper nevertheless assume (accept, adopt, presume) their [the said three propositions'] interrelation (connection, correlation) and moreover construct the holistic position combatted by them as [the] simple reversal (inversion) of this interrelation (connection, correlation): if one starts, in (during) the analysis of social phenomena, not from individuals and their acts (or actions), (then, so, thus) one must deny their [individuals and their acts'] role as sole creators of institutions and history, and eventually (finally, in the end) make them [such individuals and their acts] the slaves of institutions, which crop up (occur, act, arise, appear) in the name of history or [in the name of] any other supra-individual hypostasis



(überindividuellen Hypostase). The picture (or image) of holism remains here (most) highly (extremely) undifferentiated and at the same time selective, i.e. it is cobbled (or knocked) together (made, built) without consideration for (regardless of) the variety (diversity) of form (multiformity) and nuances of non-individualistic social theories, and through (by (means of)) [the] accumulation (amassing) of the most different intellectual(-spiritual) materials. It is a pure (neat, straight, unmixed) and for the most part (mostly, largely) fictive (fictitious) image (picture) of the foe (enemy) (foe image) (fiktives Feindbild)(,) which is supposed (meant) to (should) justify the absolute acuteness (sharpness, severity) of the following alternative: either one presses (pushes) for methodological individualism or either one is at best (at (the) most) a (gushing, enthusing, enthusiastic, effusive) metaphysician (going into raptures)(,) and normally (usually) a pioneer (trailblaser, precursor, forerunner) [in respect] of civil war, unfreedom (lack of freedom) (bondage or servitude) and theocracy (ein Wegbereiter von Bürgerkrieg, Unfreiheit und Theokratie)<sup>112</sup>.

Ambivalences in one's own position, even regarding (concerning) its political aspect, though (certainly), correspond to (with) the (foe's image's) undifferentiability (i.e. undifferentiated property (quality or nature)) (of the image (picture) of the foe (enemy) (foe image)). Hayek speaks out in fact not (declares himself) in favour of (supports) individualism absolutely (as such, per se), but in favour of the "genuine (real, authentic)" [one, individualism], which does not want to break (away) (free (rid, detach) itself, be detached) from tradition, convention,

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<sup>112</sup> A(n) particularly (especially) coarse (crude, gross) and rhetorical version of this argumentative strategy is found in v. Mises, *Human Action*, pp. 41ff., 145ff.. In relation to (On, Regarding) Hayek's and Popper's lacking (deficient, wanting) readiness (willingness, preparedness, disposition) for differentiation, cf. the apt (or well-aimed) (telling, striking) comments (remarks, observations) in Mandelbaum, "Laws", p. 213ff..

family etc.<sup>113</sup>. It is a matter here of the (well-)known (familiar) theses of the “neoliberalism” connected principally (first and foremost, mainly) with Röpke’s name, which in reality constituted the [an] attempt at a return to classical liberalism [while] demarcating (dissociating, distancing) itself (dissociated, delimited) from democratic and “Jacobinical” tendencies. In this thought schema, liberal individualism (Der liberale Individualismus) is approved (of) (sanctioned, countenanced, welcomed) unreservedly (without reservations, unconditionally) against “totalitarian” collectivism („totalitären“ Kollektivismus) as well as against the drastic (far-reaching, radical) interventions (interference, encroachment(s)) of the (Western) state in [regard to] [the] economy and private property; it [liberal individualism], however (on the other hand), is peered (looked) at (viewed, regarded, eyed) very suspiciously as soon as it is transformed (converted, changed) into a planning rationalism (in einen planenden Rationalismus) in alliance with militarism and eudaemonism (Eudämonismus), and creates a (welfare-state) mass democracy (pertaining to the (a) welfare state) (wohlfahrtsstaatliche Massendemokratie); such a rationalism, as much as it may be active (work, operate) in the name of the protection and affluence (or prosperity) of the individual, introduces (establishes, sets up, instals) collectivism through the back door<sup>114</sup>. Boundaries (or limits) should be set [in regard] to the feasibility of the social world due to (because (by means (way)) of, through) (i.e. which results from) the individual – after all, precisely (the) declared collectivists, e.g. (the) Marxists, assert (claim, maintain, argue) [that] they can plan the life of society in toto. However, boundaries (or limits) must, during (in) the

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<sup>113</sup> *Individualismus*, p. 36ff..

<sup>114</sup> See Hayek’s critique (criticism) of “rationalistic Continental liberalism” and of “English utilitarian liberalism”, *Verfassung*, esp. pp. 485, 488, 492, 493 footnote 15.

application (use, employment) of methodological individualism to (in) social science, correspond to (with) the boundaries (or limits) of the feasibility of the social world due to (i.e. which results from) individuals, and we shall see where Hayek himself wanted to draw them [boundaries (or [set] limits)] out of concern (or anxiety) (worry, apprehension) for (in regard to, regarding) the eudaemonistic and utilitarian outgrowths (or excesses) (excrecence(s), deformities) of individualism.

Röpke and Hayek's "neoliberal" thought schema suffered from (had, was burdened by) a fundamental contradiction. It [The said "neoliberal" thought schema] saw (approved of) economic liberalism (Wirtschaftsliberalismus) (positively) and rejected its consequences (results, (after)effects), it defended (the) liberal premises and combatted (fought, counteracted) the mass-democratic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) (die massendemokratische Uminterpretation) and meta-development (or further development) (und Weiterentwicklung) of the same [liberal premises]. However (But) society's atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals), eudaemonistic calculus (i.e. calculation) and [the] dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of traditions and substantial (fundamental or material) bonds (ties) into value pluralism represent (constitute, are) the necessary consequences of economic liberalism on [a] highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) basis (Aber Atomisierung der Gesellschaft, eudämonistisches Kalkül und Auflösung von Traditionen und substantiellen Bindungen im Wertpluralismus stellen die notwendigen Konsequenzen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus auf hochtechnisierter Basis dar)<sup>115</sup>. [The] advent (emergence, appearance) and [the] dissemination

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<sup>115</sup> In detail (depth) ([For] details, Extensively, Thoroughly, Elaborately) with regard to (regarding) neoliberalism see Kondylis, *Konservativismus*, esp. p. 32ff..

(spreading, diffusion) of these consequences in the social life of Western mass democracies during the last [few] (recent) decades (ironically) manifested themselves (found expression, were reflected) (in an ironic way (manner)) also in [the fact] that eudaemonism and utilitarianism celebrated their entry (in)(to) the field (area, sector, domain) of methodological individualism itself, and for the most part (largely) conquered it [the said field]. This took place (occurred) in the form of a substitution of the individual's situational rationality by the utilitarian (or utility) maximiser's behaviouristically meant (intended, thought) rationality (Dies erfolgte in Form einer Substitution der situationellen Rationalität des Individuums durch die behavioristisch gedachte Rationalität des utilitaristischen Maximizers), and therefore (thus, as a result, consequently) as [an] open turn towards psychologism, notwithstanding (regardless (irrespective) of, despite) its [psychologism's] condemnation (denunciation, denouncement) by Hayek and Popper who, on (regarding, in relation to) this question (problem, matter, issue), remained on Weberian ground. Hayek (has, had) regarded (took, understood, conceived, grasped) (taken) "understanding" and "meaning (or sense)" as (for) [kinds (forms) of] proof ([pieces of] evidence) for (of) the autonomy of the "intellectual(-spiritual)" against (vis-à-vis, (as) compared (to, with), as opposed to) its [the "intellectual(-spiritual)'s"] "physical explanations" („physikalische Eklärungen“), and (accordingly, correspondingly) made (methodological) use (took advantage) of [them, "understanding" and "meaning (or sense)"] (methodologically)<sup>116</sup>; Popper beheld (saw), for his part, in the assumption (acceptance) of situational logic both the path (way, road) to the avoidance of psychologism as well as the real (true, actual) method of

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<sup>116</sup> *Missbrauch*, p. 58ff..

economic analysis<sup>117</sup>. It is not however to [cannot however] be (readily, immediately) seen (appreciated) (without a second thought) for which (what) logical [reasons] and (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) reasons (pertaining to the history of ideas), the economic analysis of liberal inspiration should (is supposed (meant) to) exclude (preclude) every form of psychological reductionism; it [the economic analysis of liberal inspiration], at any rate (in any case)(,) was (has, had) since early on (been) connected with the psychological construct of homo oeconomicus maximising utility (profit or use) (nutzenmaximierenden), and in this respect (as far as that goes (is concerned)), those may today feel [they are] in the right who exactly in the name of methodological individualism make an effort (try (hard), go to a lot of trouble) around [in relation to (achieving)] the [an] approach (approximation, convergence, reconciliation) between behaviouristic and economic points of view<sup>118</sup>. As a result of (Because of, Owing to) such efforts (endeavours), the camp of methodological individualism split into two schools (lines) of thought (tendencies) quarreling (arguing) with each other<sup>119</sup>, and the quarrel (or dispute) (squabble, argument) cannot (thereby, thus) be settled (mediated) by one simultaneously declaring (proclaiming, announcing) agreement with (approval of) all perceptions (views). Thus (So, In this way)(,) Coleman wants to decide in favour of methodological individualism not merely as [an] economist and sociologist, but also because he professes [a, his] belief in (declares [his] support for) that ethical tradition(,) which holds (considers, regards) man (to be, as) a free and responsible (or accountable) (answerable) being (verantwortliches Wesen). At the same

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<sup>117</sup> *Open Society*, II, p. 97.

<sup>118</sup> See our remarks (comments, observations) on (about, regarding) Homans, Ch. I, Sec. 5.

<sup>119</sup> In relation to that, Vanberg, *Die zwei Soziologien*. The author stands up for (upholds, supports, reinforces, makes a case (campaigns) for) Homans's individualistic and reductionistic-psychological position against Hayek's and Popper's individualistic, but anti-reductionistic theses.

time he [Coleman] (expressly, explicitly) follows (supports, endorses, concurs with, takes) Weber('s) (side) (expressly), while he [Coleman] takes (by taking) his starting point from the concept (notion) of purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) acting (i.e. action) (von Begriff der zweckmäßigen Handlung). On the other hand however, he [Coleman] does not accept (allow, tolerate) this [concept of purposeful (end-oriented or expedient) acting] in all its aspects, but it [the said concept] is programmatically confined (or restricted) (limited) to that kind (sort, way, manner) of purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) action (Art von zweckmäßigem Handeln), which aims at utility (profit or use) maximisation (die auf Nutzenmaximierung abzielt)<sup>120</sup>. Through (By means (way) of, [With]) two leaps, Coleman therefore manages (makes) the transition from the [an] ethical (solemn) declaration (protestation; Beteuerung) to economistic-behaviouristic praxeology and anthropology. With that (it) (What is more, Besides, In the course of this, At the same time) – as (like) in Hayek and Popper too – why and how the ethical (solemn) declaration on the part of the observer should (is supposed (meant) to) interrelate (connect) with the striving for (after) (efforts at) utility (profit or use) maximisation on the part of the (observed) individuals ([being] observed), remains obscure (opaque, vague, dark, unclear). The in principle (fundamental) use (or roping in) of individualism for the [a] good cause (object, thing, affair, matter, case, issue) (Die grundsätzliche Einspannung des Individualismus für die gute Sache) at the level of methodical (i.e. methodological) declarations (or explanations) does not, in other words, in the least vouch for (guarantee) the ethically desired (desirable, welcome) character or even (only) (for) the socially desired (desirable, welcome) results of that action(,) which is

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<sup>120</sup> *Foundations*, p. 16ff..

supposed (meant) to (should) be illuminated (examined) with the help (on the basis) of (based on) the principles of methodological individualism. However, not only method and cause (object) (Methode und Sache), observer and actor(,) are confused with each other (mixed (muddled) (up), mistaken) (with each other) here. The inclination (tendency, propensity, disposition, leaning, proclivity, bent; Hang) towards the ethicisation of methodological individualism ignores, just like (as) the ethically motivated inclination towards holism and collectivism, the simple truth that from neither of both positions must result (arise, ensue) that which they would like to [respectively] prove (demonstrate). Because neither can the holistically meant (intended, thought, imagined) ontological independence (autonomy) and indestructibility (robustness, resilience) of society (die holistisch gedachte ontologische Unabhängigkeit und Unverwüstlichkeit der Gesellschaft), or its primacy vis-à-vis the individual, effect (cause, bring about, give rise to, result in, achieve, induce) the gleichschaltung (i.e. forcing into line or enforced conformity and standardisation) (die Gleichschaltung) of *all* individuals through (by means of) normative conformity, nor is any autonomy of individuals (whatsoever) capable of (able to) ruin(ing) (or destroy(ing)) *society* as [a] primeval (or original) (unspoilt) collective [entity, group, body] (als urtümliches Kollektiv), and [capable of (able to)] bring(ing) about (off) (achieve (achieving), accomplish(ing), manage (managing), pull(ing) off) another life except for (the) collective life *in* society.

b. The unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, involuntary) consequences (results, effects) of action (Die unbeabsichtigten Folgen des Handelns)

If one takes methodological individualism's ethical claim (demand, requirement, right; Anspruch) completely (entirely, totally) seriously,

then one must be surprised (amazed) over (about, [in regard to]) [the fact] that it [methodological individualism] wants to realise (put into effect, actualise, achieve) its anti-collectivistic programme (sein antikollektivistisches Programm) not merely through (by means of) the analysis of (the) action and of the mutual (or reciprocal) relations of [between] individuals in certain (particular) situations, but at the same time through (by means of) the analysis of the unintended consequences of this action and these relations<sup>121</sup>. Because in the network (or plexus) (mesh) of unintended consequences, precisely the elements are lost, which are supposed (meant) to (should) characterise (mark) individual (personal) action (i.e. the action of individuals) (die individuellen Handeln): on the one hand, freedom or responsibility (or accountability) (answerability) (Verantwortung), on the other hand, end (goal) rationality (purposeful (expedient) rationality, expediency) (Zweckrationalität). No ethics of responsibility (or accountability) (answerability) has [a(n)] (continued) existence (duration; Bestand) if the consequences of action cannot be weighed (up) in advance; and (the) end (goal) rationality does (is) not look(ing) much better, regardless of (no matter) whether the already chosen (selected) means lead to something other than the desired (or wished-for) (hoped-for, wanted) end (goal) (gewünschten Zweck), or whether the already attained (achieved, reached, accomplished) end (goal) (der schon erreichte Zweck) creates (has, sets, posits, composes) side effects in the world, which turn (make) its [the (this) end (goal's)] attainment (achievement, attaining, achieving) (into) a Pyrrhic victory. What value does freedom have during (in) action, when the consequences of action are (or go) beyond (elude or defy) (escape) the freedom and responsibility (or accountability) (answerability) of the individual, when

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<sup>121</sup> Popper, *Open Society*, II, p. 323ff..



the [what is] most personal [thing, element, aspect] in (during) action (das Persönlichste im Handeln), i.e. intention and meaning (or sense) (Absicht und Sinn), is condemned (doomed, sentenced) to being absorbed (assimilated) by the anonymity of the [what is] unintended [element, sphere] (zum Aufgehen in der Anonymität des Unbeabsichtigten verurteilt ist)? [The] unfreedom (lack of freedom) (bondage or servitude) and [the] insignificance (or meaninglessness) of the individual (single person) (Unfreiheit und Bedeutungslosigkeit des Einzelnen) in society and history, which the liberal representatives (supporters, advocates) of methodological individualism did not like in [regard to] holism and collectivism, are now caused (brought about) by a factor, to which they [methodological individualism's said liberal representatives] themselves attached (apportioned, ascribed) [a] great and important effect (impact or influence), i.e. by the heterogony of ends (Heterogonie der Zwecke). However one may look at it: methodological individualism's ethical claim (demand) and objective (factual) soundness (validity) could only be rendered (made) plausible (then) if (when) a necessary (recti)linear (rectilineal) relation(ship) could be established (produced, made, manufactured) between individual ends (goals) in action and action's social outcome (end(ing)), if the outcome had (would have) been moulded (shaped or marked) (formed, determined, characterised) by the conscious participation of individuals in its [the said outcome's] formation (development). A sentence like: "society is an outcome of human action, i.e. of a conscious aiming at the attaining of ends"<sup>122</sup> would have to then be taken at face value, and not be watered down (diluted) by (means of) (through) explanations and addenda (additions,

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<sup>122</sup> v. Mises, *Human Action*, p. 145.

supplements)(,) which rob (deprive, divest) it of its specifically individualistic content.

The [A(n)] pointing out (reminder, indication) of the unintended consequences of action serves (is of use to), first of all, the methodological individualists as [an] argument against psychologism. Those consequences bring about the institutional construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) and order in society, which then provide (or constitute) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make, produce) the object (or subject matter) of social science (the science of society) (Gesellschaftswissenschaft); if there were no consequences, (then, so, thus) social science would be superfluous (unnecessary),(;) psychology alone would suffice (be sufficient (enough))<sup>123</sup>. But the shift(ing) of the question formulation (formulation of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of (a [the]) problem(s), central theme) to the level of objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) and of supra-individual orders is not at all necessary for the overcoming of psychologism, i.e. the way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) does not have to relate to something which does not constitute (or represent) a person(,) and as such does not have (at its disposal) (possess) an individual psyche and motivation, so that it [the said way of looking at things] itself cannot (is not able to) proceed (act) psychologically. Because the overcoming of psychologism takes place (comes to pass) not at the level of the object (i.e. thing) (of the subject) observed (des beobachteten Gegenstandes (Subjektes)), but at the level of the observer, who – at any rate (anyway) [(while) (being), is](,) incapable of (unable to) penetrating (forcing one's way (breaking) into,) (penetrate) the labyrinth of alien (i.e. other) (foreign, strange) psyches, and with

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<sup>123</sup> Hayek, *Missbrauch*, p. 50; Popper, *Poverty*, p. 158.

ultimate (absolute, maximum) certainty, of working out (or deciphering) motivations – from the beginning ideal-typically constructs (construes, devises) (for) ends (goals) and [the] course of action (even of (the) individual [action, kind]), and measures (or judges) [them, things] [in relation] against (to) objective standards (or with objective yardsticks (benchmarks, criteria)) (e.g. end (goal) rationality (purposeful (expedient) rationality, expediency)). Weber, who by no means wanted to wait for the transition (passing, crossing, passage) of sociological research to the “averages” of collective action, (has, had) followed (pursued, embarked (entered) on) this path (road), in order to consider (think) (of) [that] psychologism [as] [has (had) been] overcome; the reconstruction of “situational logic” was enough for him. Also, from the [a] reverse(d) perspective, [it] is shown (proved, seen) (turns out) how poorly (deficiently, insufficiently, badly) (with what great difficulty) the rejection of psychologism can (is able to) be founded (established, justified, substantiated) by the pointing out (indication) of (to) the unintended consequences of action. The notion (idea, perception; Vorstellung) of these consequences can predominate (prevail), namely, in historical or sociological thinking (thought), also (then) when with regard to individual action, first and foremost (principally) the effect (impact, influence) of psychological factors is underlined (underscored, emphasised). The material (stuff, (subject) matter), on which reason (Reason) (die Vernunft) or the idea (Idea) (die Idee) in history (History) (in der Geschichte) works, in order to create one’s own works (deeds, products; Werke) via the mechanism of the heterogony of ends, is of [a] psychical kind (or nature) (sort) (ist psychischer Art),(;) Hegel e.g. opines (thinks, believes, says) [that] it [the said material] is “drives (or urges) (impulses, instincts), passions, inclinations (tendencies, propensities, proclivities), needs” („Triebe, Leidenschaften, Neigungen,

Bedürfnisse“). The interpretation of action is here of course also not limited to (or exhausted in) the psychological [sphere, element, dimension]; however, Hegel is not able to leave psychologism behind by ideal-typically preparing courses (or sequences) of acting (i.e. action) (Handlungsabläufe) and searching (looking) for situation-bound(tied, connected) ends (goals) (situationsgebundenen Zwecken) rather than questioning motives, but by (while) searching in acting (i.e. action) for that which goes (leads) beyond the personal intentions and the horizon of the person (him) acting; only in this sense does he refuse to approve (of) (sanction, endorse) that “psychological way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation)”, which would like to see in the acts (or actions) of great men (in Handlungen großer Männer) merely the expression (sign) of petty personal mania (obsession, addiction)<sup>124</sup>. He, that is, leaves aside (excludes) psychology only at the level of the (already occurred) unintended consequences of action ([which have] already occurred (happened, taken place)),(;) he accepts it [psychology], however, precisely in the area (realm, sector) which methodological individualism claims (demands, requires) par excellence for itself, i.e. in the area of individual action. In [respect of] (From) both [afore]mentioned perspectives it is therefore clear (plain, obvious) that the rejection of psychologism and the acceptance (assumption) of the unintended consequences of action are not necessarily interrelated (connected) with each other in any way. And we already know that that rejection must not follow (ensue, result) (does not necessarily follow) even from the principle of methodological individualism itself.

The deeper reason for the recourse (Rekurs) of the methodological individualists to the unintended consequences of action lies, however

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<sup>124</sup> *Phil. d. Geschichte*, pp. 65ff., 77.

(nevertheless), not in the theoretical attempt at (a) demarcation (delimitation, dissociation) against psychologism. The recourse is politically and ideologically motivated, i.e. it [this recourse] is supposed (meant) to (should) serve the [a] “neoliberal” matter of concern (purpose, intention, aim, objective, desire, wish, longing; Anliegen), and it accordingly has two distinct (differing, different), but coordinated polemical points. (The) One [of them, point] turns away (back) (repudiates, rejects) the endeavour (effort) at revolutionary reason (Reason) (voluntaristically) reshaping (remoulding, rearranging, altering) the social world [in a voluntaristic manner (way)] (die soziale Welt voluntaristisch umzugestalten). Hayek says it [that] point-blank (straight out, frankly): the assumption (supposition) [that] institutions would come into being (or be created) (arise, result, ensue, be produced, emerge) and function as unintended consequences of action, i.e. “without a planning and guiding (steering, directing, governing) intellect(-spirit)”, “is directed against rationalistic pseudo-individualism, which in practice (praxis) also leads to collectivism”; from (out of) the “theories of conscious construction” the conclusion would “necessarily” ensue (arise, crop up) that [the] social becoming should be (stand) “under ((with)in) the control (authority) of individual reason (Reason) (in der Gewalt der individuellen Vernunft)”, (something) which leads “straight to socialism”<sup>125</sup>. This angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry) before [in regard (light) of] the voluntarism of revolutionary reason (Reason) does not even stop before [in view of] the logical coherence (cohesion) of methodological individualism. The fundamental (basic) principle (axiom)(,) [that] the supra-individual construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (institutions, states, nations) (would) – and indeed “always”! – come about (take place)

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<sup>125</sup> *Individualismus*, pp. 16, 21; cf. *Missbrauch*, pp. 116, 120ff..

through (by means of) individuals' decisions and acts (or actions)<sup>126</sup>, may (is not allowed) thus (not) (to) apply to society as a whole; this [society] (would) exist(s) before all individuals<sup>127</sup>,(;) contract theory constitutes, therefore, a further monstrous invention (or product) (monstrosity, excrescence, abnormity) of “bad (evil, wicked)” individualism, which wants to deduce (derive) all [things] (everything) and every [thing] (everything) (all and sundry) from the wanting (or volition) of individual reason (Reason)<sup>128</sup>. Here obviously a serious (momentous, massive, grave) concession to holism is [being] made, yet the rage (fury, frenzy, wrath) against the inimical position remains so strong that it [the said rage] suppresses (oppresses, stifles) (the) reflection on the logical coherence of one's own [position]<sup>129</sup>. The same inner (internal) contradictoriness (or inconsistency) becomes apparent (clear, evident, obvious) (makes itself felt) when Popper puts forward (advances, brings to bear) the unintended consequences of action in order to refute (disprove, prove) the “conspiracy theory of society” (wrong), which makes society's fate (destiny, lot) dependent on the intentions and the whims (or moods) (Launen) of powerful (mighty) individuals and groups. It does not, in the process, occur to him [Popper] that such a theory is compatible (consistent) with the individualistic point of view rather than with the [a] belief in historical law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities); he [Popper] simply declares [that](,) from it [the “conspiracy theory of society”, such a theory](,) “historicism”

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<sup>126</sup> Popper, *Open Society*, II, p. 98, cf. p. 324.

<sup>127</sup> Loc. cit., p. 92ff..

<sup>128</sup> Hayek, *Individualism*, p. 21.

<sup>129</sup> Already the fact that Hayek calls at times Burke, at other times Locke, sometimes (at times) Mandeville, as [a] witness in (for) his case reveals (shows) the motley (colourful, multicoloured) heterogeneity of his thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe). The fighter (combatant) against (of) “Jacobinism” [Hayek] had to, of course, be near to (i.e. close to the positions of) Burke and contract theory's opponents; the economic liberal (der Wirtschaftsliberale) [Hayek], on the other hand, forms an alliance (allies himself, joins forces) with Locke and Mandeville – (of) *whose* contract theory, however, he [the (this same) economic liberal, Hayek] does not note (take notice (of), observe, keep (bear) in mind, pay attention).

(„Historizismus“) came into being (arose, emerged, originated) – (something) (though) which (certainly) does not hinder (prevent, stop, impede, block, obstruct) him in another place from praising a protagonist of this same “historicism”, namely Marx, for [the fact] (considering) that he [Marx] had (did) not look(ed) at (consider(ed), regard(ed), contemplate(d)) history and society from the point of view of “conspiracy theory”<sup>130</sup>.

The other polemical point [in respect] of the acceptance (assumption) of the unintended consequences of action in the context of methodological individualism turns against economic liberalism’s opponents, or the proponents (advocates, supporters) of state (government) intervention(s) (staatlicher Eingriffe) in [the] economy and society. The consideration (thought, deliberation, reflection) here is (goes, reads) as follows: society is shaped (formed, moulded) through (by (means, way) of) the free play of innumerable (countless) forces and through the effect (impact, influence) of the unintended consequences of action, hence it is beyond (evades, eludes, escapes) voluntaristic guidance (control, steering, direction); on the other hand, [the] state is [the, a] conscious product of human reason (menschlicher Vernunft) and represents (constitutes) only a small part of society’s total (overall) forces, that is why its [the state’s] task (mission, duty, job) cannot lie in directing (conducting, leading) society as a whole at will (and as it [one] likes) (any way it [one] wants, as it [one] likes)<sup>131</sup>. The effect (impact, influence) of the unintended consequences of action, that is, the invisible hand, lets (allows) (gives rise to) a “spontaneous order” (arise, emerge, appear) (come (spring) up), and

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<sup>130</sup> *Open Society*, II, p. 94ff.; *Conjectures*, p. 125, footnote. In this context [one should] refer to an analysis of Elster’s, who shows very vividly (clearly, graphically) to what extent Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s historiography is (stands) under the influence of (influenced by) “conspiracy theory” (*Sour Grapes*, p. 101ff.).

<sup>131</sup> Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 35.

renders (makes) interventions (Interventionen) superfluous<sup>132</sup>. But if society and the state are contrasted with each other in *this* way, then the general and frequently presented (put forward, expressed) thesis can no longer apply [that] *all* social institutions (would) come into being (or are created (produced)) (arise, result, ensue, emerge) as [the] unintended consequences of action of individuals. If the state came into being just as (like) all other institutions [came into being] (too), (then, thus, so) it remains a puzzle (enigma, riddle) how (so, come) (why) it [the state] can be transformed (converted, changed) from a product of the unintended [element, sphere] into an instrument of [an] (evil) intent(ion) (wieso er sich aus einem Produkt des Unbeabsichtigten in ein Instrument der (bösen) Absicht verwandeln kann). Nevertheless (All the same), when (if) it [the state] does that (this), (then) one must conclude from these empirical facts (of the matter (case)) (data) (aus diesem empirischen Tatbestand) that the independence (autonomy) of individual intentions indeed often belongs to the everyday (daily) life, but not to the essence (or nature) of institutions (aber nicht zum Wesen von Institutionen). The same question is posed with regard to the relation(ship) between individual action and [the] unintended consequences of action in general: if individual acts (or actions) are, anyway, destined (meant, intended) (in relation to that) to be absorbed by (come undone in) the [a] network (plexus, mesh) of unintended consequences, how (so, come) (why) can (then) some acts (or actions) become autonomous vis-à-vis this network to such an extent (degree) and with such success that they can in fact (even) voluntaristically squeeze (or force) society into the corset of collectivism? Is it not sensible (reasonable or legitimate) (rational, plausible, wise, practical, meaningful) (sinnvoller) in view of this to

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<sup>132</sup> Hayek, *Law*, I, p. 5ff.; III, p. 154ff..



deduce (derive) collectivism not from “holism”, but rather from the hard individualistic core (nucleus) of methodological individualism itself, or to drop (abandon, desert, renounce, ditch, dismiss, discard, discontinue) the obligatory pairing of this core with the unintended consequences of action?

It is evident (obvious) that the methodological individualists in principle connect the unintended consequences of action with agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing; wohltuenden) consequences, i.e. with the formation of “beneficial (or useful)” („nützlichen“) institutions and generally with “[what is, something, the] higher” („Höherem“) than that “which a(n) individual (single) mind (or intellect) (Einzelverstand) could plan or foresee”<sup>133</sup>. The historically frequently attested (witnessed, affirmed [as true]) case in which the heterogony of ends brings forth (produces, spawns, gives rise to) not unintended and agreeable (i.e. acceptable) or beneficial (i.e. useful), but unwanted (or unintentional) (unintended, involuntary) and at the same time fateful (disastrous or fatal) consequences for individuals and entire (whole, complete, total) collectives (nicht unbeabsichtige und genehme oder nützliche, sondern ungewollte und zugleich verhängnisvolle Folgen für Individuen und ganze Kollektive), is hardly made the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of social-theoretical reflection. This central hole (gap or flaw) (fault, deficiency, discrepancy, lacuna; Lücke) is by-passed (circumvented, avoided, got around) through (by means of) a functionalistic interpretation of the invisible hand’s mechanism and works (or workings), which from the beginning (start) plays down (downplays, trivialises, minimises) the eventuality of bad (evil, sinister, vicious, nasty, wicked; böser) (i.e. unpleasant) surprises. Thus

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<sup>133</sup> Hayek, *Missbrauch*, p. 116; *Individualismus*, p. 21.

(According(ly) (to that)), a “group selection” takes place within (inside of) the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution [of the 1960s and 1970s] (Kulturrevolution) and institutions are imposed (pushed through) “*because* the groups who practised them were more successful”<sup>134</sup>. There (Here) is (exists) a dual (double, twin) conceptual sleight of hand (legerdemain, trick) (available) (here). On the one hand, the (collectively acting (effective, working, operating)) unintended consequences of action (collectively having an effect) are connected (or combined) (coupled, joined) with a function, and indeed [a] successful [function, one], although (even though, notwithstanding that), as [we have (already)] said, this connection (or combination) (interrelation, linking, association, bond; Verbindung) is not at all necessary; on the other hand, (there is a(n) abrupt (sudden) transition) from the level of individual action and utility (profit, benefit or use) (gain, advantage; Nutzen) [Hayek suddenly (abruptly) passes (moves) on (proceeds)] to that [(the) level] of collective [action]. Should (If) methodological individualism apply (applies) in principle, (then, thus, so) it must be accepted (or assumed) that collectively beneficial (or useful) institutions commence (begin) (take as their starting point) (in) [with] the action of individuals. This however, as is (well) known, does (must) not always (have to) (necessarily) benefit (or be (is) of use to) the collective [entity, formation, group, body] (dem Kollektiv nützen), that is, the special (particular) conditions (circumstances) on each and every respective occasion must be ascertained (established, determined, found out, detected)(,) under which individual action leads to (flows into) socially beneficial (or useful) institutions; the invisible hand’s effect (impact) of course (indeed) in general (generally) inserts (fits) individual action into collective [action],

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<sup>134</sup> Hayek, *Law*, III, p. 202; I, p. 18 (my italicisation (spacing, punctuation)).

but it cannot in the least vouch for (guarantee) the agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing) consequences of this insertion (fitting in) – only (on paper) a teleological functionalism (ein teleologischer Funktionalismus) can vouch for that. The quick (rapid), albeit (however, even though) tacit (or silent) abandonment (relinquishment, giving up, quitting) of the individualistic starting point in favour of teleology, as well as the just as quick (rapid) and tacit (or silent) transition from individual action and utility (profit, benefit or use) (gain, advantage) to collective [action and benefit] let, incidentally (by the way), another important aspect go by the board (get ruined or lost, end, stop existing). It is not explained what utility (profit, benefit or use) (gain, advantage) the individual (single person) (thereof, in relation to that) has when (if) he equates (identifies) his own utility (profit, benefit or use) (gain, advantage) with the utility (profit, benefit or use) of the collective. The individualistic standpoint requires (demands, wants, asks) in fact [that] the usefulness (or utility) (die Nützlichkeit) of institutions be made evident (clear, apparent, obvious, visible, noticeable) not abstractly for society as such (exactly this would be “holism” and “collectivism”), but out of consideration for (with regard (in reference) to) individual (single) humans (men). But what are things like [is the situation (happening, occurring), happens] (in relation to that) if (when) these individuals (single persons) e.g. decide in favour of (or choose (select, go for)) the role of the “free rider”?<sup>135</sup>

These intellectual (thought) holes (gaps, faults) and logical weaknesses are accompanied partly by a lack of (lacking, deficient, inadequate) differentiations (mangelnden Differenzierungen) in [respect of] the matter (thing, issue, case, subject, business) [at hand, under discussion] (in der

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<sup>135</sup> See Vanberg’s comments (explanations, remarks), “Spontaneous Market Order”, esp. pp. 82ff., 88.

Sache), partly by ambivalent or inadequate (insufficient) perceptions (or representations) (views, notions) of the developmental mechanism (mechanism of development) (Enfaltungsmechanismus) of (the) unintended consequences. A consideration (contemplation, way of looking), which wants to think of institutions and [the] unintended consequences of action jointly (together), would have to first of all concede (admit, acknowledge, allow) that in very many cases institutions were founded by concrete actors and with regard to the achieving (achievement, attaining, attainment, reaching) of concrete effects (i.e. results or consequences) (und im Hinblick auf das Erzielen konkreter Wirkungen). Unintended consequences then come into play not in relation (regard) to (the) coming into being (emergence, genesis, origin, creation), but only in relation (regard) to (the) (long-term) effects (i.e. results or consequences). It (historically and action-theoretically) makes (does make) a(n) essential (substantial, substantive, material, fundamental, considerable) difference(,) (historically and with regard to the theory of acting (i.e. action)) (Es macht historisch und handlungstheoretisch einen wesentlichen Unterschied)(,) whether action misses its original (initial) aims (goals, objectives, targets; Ziele) and instead attains (achieves, reaches) its other [aims], or whether precisely the attainment (achievement) of the set aims (goals, objectives, targets) sets in motion the mechanism of the heterogony of ends. And no less important is the distinction (differentiation) between the unintended, and, the unforeseen (unexpected; unvorhergesehenen) or unforeseeable (unpredictable) (unvorhersehbaren), consequences of action. Because such consequences can (well) be both something which one indeed did not intend (aim at (for), plan), but already knew as [a] phenomenon beforehand (previously), as well as something which one neither intended nor knew. The latter case should actually (really) make up the hard core

(or solid basis) (den harten Kern) of a(n) comprehensive (extensive, broad) theory on (about, regarding) the heterogony of ends. However, our methodological individualists hardly seem to be in a position to provide (supply) examples of (for) the unintended coming into being (emergence, genesis, origin, creation) of the until then unpresented (or unimagined) (unenvisaged) or unpresentable (or unimaginable) (unenvisagable) (von bis dahin Unvorgestelltem oder Unvorstellbarem), although *every* institution would have to represent (or constitute) such an example, if it were indeed (actually, in reality, really) the unintended product of individual acts (or actions) *as* individual acts (or actions): because no individual can imagine (figure out) what (which) consequences his action will bring forth (produce, occasion) at the level of the collective [entity, formation, group, body]. As soon as (When) the methodological individualists are about (get ready) to (on the point of) explain(ing) (elucidate, illuminate) the heterogony of ends' mechanism – and this happens (occurs, takes place) only now and then (occasionally) and in passing (incidentally, parenthetically) –, they do not reveal (show, indicate, suggest) [a] consciousness of (this) its [heterogony of ends'] complexity. Menger, who contrary to organicistic interpretations of institutional construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) as [being] “[the, a(n)] result (outcome, consequence) of social-teleological causings” (als „Ergebnis socialteleologischer Verursachungen“)(,) saw (in) social institutions (as) “the unintended resultant of countless (innumerable, endless, numberless) endeavours (efforts) pursuing individual interests”<sup>136</sup>, (had, has) wanted, from this point of view, to illuminate the coming into being (emergence, genesis, origin, creation) of money and [the] state<sup>137</sup>. His [Menger's] historical data and presumptions

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<sup>136</sup> *Untersuchungen*, p. 182.

<sup>137</sup> Loc. cit., p. 172ff..

(or conjectures) (assumptions, guesses, suspicions, suppositions; Vermutungen) are not of interest here. But an attentive (i.e. careful) reading shows that he [Menger], at all points at which he retraces or reconstructs acts (or actions) which were supposed (meant) to have led to the state or to money, points (alludes, refers) to (the) intentions and endeavours (efforts)(,) regarding (concerning) this (in this connection)(,) of the actors concerned (in question), who under the pressure of certain needs *wanted* to create (make, produce) something like [the] state and money; they [the said actors] did not therefore search for (seek) something entirely (completely, totally, wholly) different (other), and their each and every respective search did not also have different or even opposing (conflicting) aims (goals), so that one might describe (call) with good reason the objective result of the many and scattered (dispersed, diffuse) individual efforts (as) [a] “resultant”. The element of the [what is] *unintended* [element, sphere] consequently falls by the wayside (drops out of the race, is out of the running). Hayek’s description (account) of the same mechanism in [respect of, relation (regard) to] the process in which a path (trail, track) (ein Pfad) comes into being (is created (produced), arises, results, ensues) leaves a similar impression. An individual (single person) finds [a(n)] easier (more convenient (comfortable)) access (entrance, admittance) to a (place of) destination, and other[s] [individuals] follow his tracks (trail) (track (trail) him), because they can fathom (comprehend, understand) his behaviour (Verhalten) in this situation<sup>138</sup>. The coming into being of the path, nevertheless, may be characterised (called, described) (as) [an] unintended consequence of acts (i.e. actions) (als unbeabsichtigte Folge von Handlungen) if one, with (because of) that (as a result, thereby),

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<sup>138</sup> *Missbrauch*, p. 51ff..

meant [that] no individual (single person) wanted (since he (anyhow) could not (anyway)), through (by (means of)) his one-off (single, unique) walking (going; Gehen) through the [a(n)] area (region, vicinity, countryside, neighbourhood; Gegend), to create (make, produce) a path. However another point of view is decisive (determinative) here. The path came into being out of (from) the accumulation (aggregation, amassing; Anhäufung) of end(goal)-rational (purposeful-rational) acts (i.e. actions) (von zweckrationalen Handlungen), which all had one single aim (goal, objective, target): to cover the same distance (i.e. go down the same route (path, course)). The actors possibly (perhaps) were not known amongst (as between) themselves (did not know one another), but this is of secondary importance (unimportant, incidental, irrelevant, trivial, a minor matter): the commonality (common ground, [similarity]; die Gemeinsamkeit) of [every actor's] intention was [a] given (i.e. assumed (as a premise)) (granted (acknowledged) (as a supposition)). But the great (major) question remains (that) what (which) may socially come into being (arise, emerge, result) (then) when intentions hardly or only occasionally (now and then, from time to time) and partially agree with one another.

The piquant (i.e. appealingly provocative or savoury) (racy, spicy, risqué) point lies now in [the fact] that Hayek and Popper quite (rather, pretty) unsuspectingly (cluelessly) pass by (go past) an important (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) fact (in the history of ideas): I mean the pre-eminent (paramount, superlative, outstanding) status (or value) (importance, position) of the theory on [regarding, about] the unintended consequences of action precisely (of all things) within (inside (of)) the thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) of the “historicism” so passionately (fervently) combatted (fought) by them [Hayek and Popper].

Not only (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) incompetence (pertaining to the history of ideas), [but] also a political-ideological reason, bear (the) responsibility (are to blame (at fault, responsible)) for this transgression. “Historicism” meant for them – depending on (according to) the polemical need[s] of the moment – at times collectivistic or holistic “fatalism”, at other times the hubris of individual reason (Reason), which wants to shape (form, mould) everything (all [things]) in accordance with its arbitrariness (or capriciousness) and hence cannot feel any respect (reverence) for impersonal and anonymous social processes ((series of) events)<sup>139</sup>. The unintended consequences of action were asserted (underlined, defended) against this latter meaning of “historicism”; if, on the other hand, (the case is put for) rational social engineering (is supported (backed up)) against “historicistic” fatalism, (then, so, thus) “historicism” is blamed for the theory of the heterogony of ends<sup>140</sup>. Nevertheless (All the same), it can be effortlessly (unconstrainedly, uninhibitedly, easily) proved (shown) that this theory in the thinking (thought) of our methodological individualists on the whole (in general (terms)) fulfils the same functions as in the “historicistic” philosophers of history or “holistic” sociologists. First of all, it neutralises the anthropological question, i.e. it makes the desired (desirable, welcome) outcome of becoming independent of whether man is “good” or “evil (bad, wicked)”. It was hinted at (intimated, suggested, indicated) above how Hegel imagines (envisages) the channeling (canalisation) of ethically reprehensible (abominable) motives by (means (way) of) (through) the cunning (ruse, trick) of Reason and in accordance with (for the purpose[s] (in the sense) of) the eschatology of History (history) (im Sinn der Geschichtseschatologie). Hayek of course does not want to know

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<sup>139</sup> Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 18; *Missbrauch*, p. 104ff..

<sup>140</sup> Popper, *Poverty*, pp. 47, 49.



anything of the latter [Hegel's eschatology of History], however the invisible hand is summoned by him [Hayek] amongst other things (inter alia) with the aim (goal, objective, target) of playing the effects (or consequences) (results) of human self-seekingness (i.e. selfishness or egotism) (Selbstsucht) or malice (wickedness, nastiness, evilness) (Bosheit) against one another, and consequently of guiding (or driving) (steering, turning) [them, the said effects] in a socially constructive direction lying beyond anthropological factors<sup>141</sup>. Besides, the other great commonality (common ground, [similarity]) between methodological individualism and the philosophy of history consists in [the fact] that both sides want to take in (note, register, understand) the unintended consequences of action in principle only from the point of view (angle) of agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing) effects (or consequences) (results)<sup>142</sup>. Certainly (No doubt), Mandeville and Adam Smith had done (did) precisely the same, and this encouraged (emboldened) perhaps the methodological individualists to(wards) (the) accept(ance) (assumption, supposition) [that] they had (would have) adopted (accepted, taken on, undertaken) the concept [of the agreeable or beneficial effects of the unintended consequences of action] from (the) political economy (das Konzept von der politischen Ökonomie) and not for instance from the philosophy of history. However, this [philosophy of history] had developed it [the said concept] earlier, (and if one takes into consideration (account) (bears in mind) its [the said concept's] theological prehistory, in fact (even) much earlier<sup>143</sup>), and moreover (in addition, besides)(,) [the philosophy of history] did not in principle dispute (contest, challenge,

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<sup>141</sup> *Individualismus*, p. 22ff.

<sup>142</sup> In relation to the concept of the heterogony of ends in the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment from Vico to Herder via Turgot see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, pp. 433ff., 441ff., 462ff., 467ff., 631.

<sup>143</sup> Löwith, *Weltgeschichte*, p. 97ff.. and passim.

deny) the point in [regard to] which the methodological individualists believed (thought) they must (had (ought) to, necessarily) see (saw, have seen, behold, spot) the great difference of their perception (view) from [with regard (compared) to] the “historicistic” [perception (view)]: that humans (men, people) themselves, guided (lead, directed, conducted, steered) by their own individual motives or interests and by their individual faculty (or power) of judgement (discernment) (Urteilkraft), make their own history<sup>144</sup>. The same full recognition (acknowledgement, acceptance) of individuals as ultimate (final, last) really acting units (unities or entities) (als letzte real handelnde Einheiten)(,) during (in [relation to], with) [a] simultaneous (concurrent) concentration of theoretical interest on the objectified (objectivised) unintended consequences of action(,) is found in a sociology which, from the perspective of methodological individualism, might be regarded (considered, thought of) as “holistic”. Durkheim has no difficulty in explaining that society consists of individuals and only of individuals – and what is no longer individual, what, therefore, is social in the [a]

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<sup>144</sup> (In accordance with) Vico (described (outlined)) a few (some, several) examples [were, have been] (described (outlined)) [as (in regard) to] how restricted (or limited) individual settings of an aim (goal) (target) (i.e. ends, objectives or purposes) (die begrenzten individuellen Zielsetzungen) (fini ristretti) are transformed (converted, changed) into means for the attainment (reaching, achievement) of more extensive (or comprehensive) (broad) aims (goals, objectives, ends, targets) (mezzi per servire a fini piu ampi),(;) he adds [that] this process is (should, ought) not (to) be interpreted as blind external (outer) fate, because humans (men, people) do what they do with understanding (or intelligence) (the intellect) and through choice (selection, election) (con intelligenza und [e?] con elezione), see *Principi di Scienza Nuova* (Conchiusione), *Opere Fil.*, p. 700ff.. Marx thinks (says or writes) in his altercation (confrontation, dispute) with Proudhon: «M. Proudhon l'économiste a très bien compris que les hommes font le drap, la toile, les étoffes de soie, dans les rapports déterminés de production. Mais ce qu'il n'a pas compris, c'est que ces rapports sociaux déterminés sont aussi bien produits par les hommes que la toile, le lin etc.» [“Mr. Proudhon the economist has understood very well that men (people, humans) make (the) sheet[s], (the) cloth, silk fabrics, in the fixed (determined or specific) relations of production. But what he has not understood is that these fixed (determined or specific) social relations are produced as well by men (people, humans) as [are] cloth, linen etc.” (*Misère*, part 2, ch. 1, observation (remark or comment) 2, p. 414; Germ. trans. (German translation) *MEW*, vol. 4, p. 130). And Engels writes on 21/(-)22. 9. 1890 to J. Bloch: “we make our history ourselves, but first under very determined (fixed, specific) prerequisites (or preconditions) (presuppositions) and conditions... Secondly, however, history is made thus (in this [such a] way, so), that the end result always (constantly) comes (emerges) from the conflict of many individual (single) wills (volitions) (Einzelwillen)... every(one) [individual will] contributes to the resultant and is(,) in this respect (as far as that goes (is concerned))(,) included in it [the said resultant]” (*MEW*, vol. 39).

specific sense [of being social], results (arises, emanates, derives) exactly from the crossing (intersection) of innumerable (countless) individual activities with one another<sup>145</sup>. Similarly to (Like) the methodological individualists, Durkheim puts (places, [makes]) the agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing) effects (or consequences) (results) of collective action at the centre (focus) of attention (focal point), by observing (while [as] he observes) the heterogony of ends quite (fairly, rather) one-sidedly during (in) the formation (or development) of functionally indispensable (necessary) institutions, [but] not during (in) the production (creation; Hervorbringung) of anomic phenomena (manifestations, appearances, occurrences) or catastrophes.

[This] (So) much should (hitherto) have become clear so far (up to now): the acceptance (assumption, supposition) of the unintended consequences of action is compatible (consistent) with the principle of methodological individualism ([only] with difficulty), although (even though, notwithstanding) it [the said acceptance of the unintended consequences of action] went hand in hand with this [principle] in the thought schema of the classical representatives of the latter [methodological individualism]. Under the subliminal (underlying) pressure of logical inconsistency, that acceptance (assumption, supposition) [of the unintended consequences of action] fell, in the later versions of methodological individualism, partly into disuse, [and] partly it was openly dropped (abandoned, forgotten). The (afore)mentioned entry (arrival, onset, advent) of behaviourism and of economism in[on](to) the field (area, domain, sector) of the original (initial) theory was expressed, amongst other things (inter alia), in the abandonment (giving up,

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<sup>145</sup> *Règles*, XVI («la société ne contient rien en dehors des individus» [“society does not contain anything apart from (outside of, other than) individuals”]).

relinquishment) of sociological models of acting (i.e. action) (soziologischen Handlungsmodellen) in favour of behavioural models (of behaviour) of the economy (Verhaltensmodellen der Ökonomie); intentions and ends (goals) of action were replaced by utility (profit, benefit or use) and cost (Nutzen und Kosten), and the “new” national economy and the individual maximising utility (profit or use) took the place of (replaced, stood in for, superseded) (the) classical political economy (Political Economy) and the invisible hand (und an die Stelle der klassischen Politischen Ökonomie und der unsichtbaren Hand trat die „neue“ Nationalökonomie und das nutzenmaximierende Individuum)<sup>146</sup>. Adherents (Supporters, Followers) of “rational choice theory” radicalised, for their part, methodological individualism so much (such) that they could believe (think, say, mean, opine) [that they] no longer needed (required) the ultimate (final) safeguarding (protection, securing) of the individual’s rational choice by (means of) the invisible hand; as a result, rational choice can approach (come nearer to) a voluntarism, which contrary (in opposition) to (against) Hayek’s premises and wishes (desires)(,) sometimes leads to the [a] demand [that] a stronger (more powerful (forceful)) state should now take on (undertake, accept, assume, adopt) the functions of the invisible hand<sup>147</sup>. Finally (In the end, Ultimately, After all), the investigations (studies, research) into (examinations of) the logic of collective action and the “prisoner’s

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<sup>146</sup> Typical of this tendency (trend): Wippler, „Nicht-intendierte soziale Folgen“, esp. pp. 175, 177. But also irrespective of economistic propensities (inclinations, tendencies), the manner is instructive (or informative) (revealing) [as to] how a(n) avowed (professed, declared) Popperian like Agassi, contrary to (against) his teacher, wants to lessen (reduce, diminish, decrease) the meaning (significance, importance) of the unintended consequences of action for the coming into being (genesis, emergence, creation) of institutions („Method. Individualism“, p. 261).

<sup>147</sup> Thus, e.g. Hechter, “Polanyi’s Social Theory”, p. 182ff.. The decisive (crucial, deciding) line (school) of thought (tendency, direction) in the liberal-economistic camp is able of course to continue (carry on) to be (being) inspired by Hayek’s vision of a “spontaneous order”, and draws up (sketches, outlines) theories on (about, regarding) the minimal state as [an] “efficient institution that allows agents to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes by assuring them of the sanctity of their property” (thus, e.g. Schotter, *Economic Theory*, esp. ch. 2, [the quotation] here [in this footnote]: p. 51).

dilemma” brought to light the inner (internal) tensions in the concept of the unintended consequences of action as well as the unpleasant (invidious, unsavoury) dark reverse side (back, rear) of the agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing) invisible hand, i.e. that self-interested (selfish, self-seeking) individual rationality which at times breaks free from (parts ways with, is beyond) (evades, shirks, dodges, eludes) collective efforts (endeavours), at other times, opposes (resists, combats) them [the said collective efforts]<sup>148</sup>. In view (consideration) of (Considering) this, social theory cannot assign to (instruct, charge) the unintended consequences of action (with) partly teleological-functional, partly ethically-normatively conceived tasks (duties). This concept (or conceptual plan) can indeed find good theoretical use, but not that [use] which methodological individualists dreamed up (imagined, thought (up, of, out, through), came up with, worked out).

c. The social-theoretical consequences of the unintended consequences of action (Die sozialtheoretischen Folgen der unbeabsichtigten Folgen des Handelns)

Let it (It should) be repeated: in (during) [regard to] the explanation of the mechanism of the unintended consequences of action, the methodological individualists made a double (dual, twin) mistake, i.e. they (have) expected from this mechanism in principle only agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing) effects (or consequences) (results), and (have) overlooked (missed) the logical conflict (opposition, contrast(ing)) between its [the said (this) mechanism’s] existence and the individualistic starting point of their [the methodological individualists’] social theory.

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<sup>148</sup> Hardin, *Collective Action*, pp. 6ff., 25ff.. Cf. footnote 135 above.

Durkheim thought just as one-sidedly (unilaterally) in relation (with respect) to (regarding) the first point [i.e. the agreeable effects], however [it, the fact] was clear [to him] that the ascertainment of the coming into being (creation, genesis, emergence, origin) of supra-individual construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) through (by (means of)) the crossing (or intersection) of innumerable (countless) individual acts (or actions) with one another, had to find expression (manifest (show) itself, be reflected) in the concept (notion) of the social fact, and in a non-individualistic founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology. The one-sidedness (unilaterality) of the expectations with regard to the character of those construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) lent (granted, gave) of course his [Durkheim's] perception (view) of the heterogony of ends a garish (loud, dazzling, flashy, stark) static-institutional, functional and unhistorical colour(ing) (slant, tinge, bias, tone, hue). On the other hand, the detachment (breaking away, disentanglement, dissociation, disengagement, removal) of the heterogony of ends from (the) ethical-normative desiderata (demands), with which it [the heterogony of ends] was interwoven already inside the philosophy of history, must (has to) considerably (substantially) expand (widen, broaden, extend) and dynamicise the concept of the social fact, [i.e., and, in fact, that is,] comprehensively (extensively) *historicise* it, so that it points to (indicates) not only more or less fixed (steady or stable) (settled, solid, firm) objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations), but likewise (also, as well) to more or less fluid (flowing, liquid; flüssige) or even dangerous (risky, grave, unsafe) historical situations. Yet the fundamental (basic) insight keeps on persisting (existing, enduring, continuing, surviving) (remains) irrespective of that. The – incidentally acknowledged (recognised, accepted, established) as a fact by all sides – heterogony of ends, would not be possible if there were

no specific(ally) social facts, that is, if society were nothing other than the merely quantitatively conceived sum of individuals and their acts (or actions) thought of (meant, intended, or imagined) as separate (isolated, detached, distinct) units (unities or entities) (wenn es keine spezifisch sozialen Tatsachen gäbe, wenn also Gesellschaft nichts anderes als die bloß quantitativ konzipierte Summe der als gesonderte Einheiten gedachten Individuen und deren Handlungen wäre)<sup>v</sup>. Here the social-theoretical consequences of the unintended consequences of action start (begin). And the way of looking at (consideration, contemplation) (of) social processes ((series of) events) from this standpoint can just as well as any (every) other [way of looking at social processes] invoke (appeal (refer) to) everyday (daily) and generally human (panhuman, general(-)human, common human, universal) experiences. The methodological individualist can certainly (of course) refer to the undisputed (uncontested, indisputable) existing consciousness of every actor [that] he [the said actor] finds himself in a situation and must adapt (prepare) himself end(goal)-rationally (purposefully-rationally) in relation to that [situation] (sich darauf zweckrational einstellen). However, does not this same actor very often have that certain (particular, specific) or vague feeling (sense) that his acts (or actions) are diverted (redirected, rerouted) or thwarted (frustrated, foiled, crossed out) by alien (i.e. other) (strange) [acts, ones],(;) that out of [for, due to, because of] not nearly explainable (explicable) reasons, that is, [out of, for] [reasons] beyond those referable (relatable) to separate (single, solitary, lone, individual) individuals, boundaries (or limits) are set to his ends (goals) and consequently (therefore, as a result) (also) to his end (goal) rationality (purposeful (expedient) rationality, expediency) (too, as well)?

As is (well) known, the thesis [that] society is something other than the quantitatively comprehended (understood, perceived, interpreted, grasped, conceived) sum of its constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents) often bumps (runs, leads) into (comes upon) the objection (argument) [that] with that (thereby, as a result, because of that) hypostatisations would be (are) undertaken (done, made) and metaphysical entities would be (are) put (placed, set, given birth to) in the world (damit würden Hypostasierungen unternommen und metaphysische Entitäten in die Welt gesetzt). Our aim (goal, objective) is not, in any case (at any rate), to support (back up, promote, bolster, encourage, sustain) such undertakings (ventures), if (in case, should) they [the said hypostatisations and metaphysical entities] (are supposed to) have ever (been supposed to) existed in this form, but on the contrary to show (indicate, demonstrate, prove) that one – against (contrary (in opposition) to) the downright (really, absolutely) extortionate (blackmailing; erpresserischen) dilemmas of the methodological individualists – does not have to approve (of) (sanction) them [these undertakings] at all, in order to be able to reject (decline, refuse, disapprove of) the individualistic (fundamental) principle. The individualistic critique (criticism) of holism is based (rests), as [we (have)] remarked (mentioned) above, on a confused image (or picture) of the foe (enemy) (foe image; Feindbild); however in addition (moreover, furthermore), it [the individualistic critique of holism] lets itself be (is) guided (directed, steered, governed) by certain implicit (implied) notions (ideas, perceptions, representations; Vorstellungen) which are behind the rejection (disapproval) of the “holistic” axiom [that] the whole is something more than its parts, or [that] society, sociologically understood, is not completely absorbed by (taken up with or exhausted in) the mere sum of the individuals comprising it (composing or putting (making) it together (up)). The a)



static, b) quantitative and c) sensualistic (i.e. in terms of philosophical sensualism) (sensualistische) character of these notions (ideas, perceptions, representations) results in (amounts to, yields, reveals) a naive social ontology incompatible (irreconcilable) with sociological and historical research practice (praxis) (eine naive, mit der soziologischen und historischen Forschungspraxis unvereinbare Sozialontologie), and it [the said character] becomes (is, will be) best (most) visible (apparent, noticeable, obvious, evident, clear) if (when) we turn the tables [reverse the situation], and ask (question) under which (what) conditions (circumstances) (on what terms) does the whole indeed (really, in reality, actually) represent (or constitute) not more than its parts. In a strict sense (then), this can e.g. be the case when (if) it is a matter of (we are dealing with) a pure *res extensa*, [i.e.] a matter of (with) a geometric figure, which can be cut up (or dissected) (broken down) into equal parts and (, through any combination of these parts,) be put together (composed) anew (again) into its original (initial) form (or shape) (by any combination of these parts (whatsoever)). The relation(ship) between the parts bearing (or supporting) (carrying) the whole here remains unchangeable (or unchanging) (immutable, unwavering, steadfast, constant; unwandelbar) and static, because the parts themselves are unchangeable and static. But precisely the specific qualities (i.e. characteristics) (properties, traits, attributes, features; Eigenschaften) of those [parts] which the methodological individualists regard as (hold to be, consider) the irreducible parts of society, represent (or constitute) (make up) the precise (exact) opposite of the [what is] static-unchangeable (or unchanging) [element, dimension] (Statisch-Unwandelbaren). [The] giving of meanings (or significations) and [the] ends (or goal) set (end (goal) setting) (Sinngebungen und Zwecksetzungen), [the] assessment (judgement, evaluation) of the

situation and interpersonal relations (Beurteilungen der Situation und interpersonelle Beziehungen), in short all [things] (everything) which are (is) supposed (meant) to (should) distinguish (mark, be a feature of) [the] essence (or nature) and doing (i.e. acts) (actions, conduct, activities, behaviour) (Wesen und Tun) of actors in the context of methodological individualism, are found (find themselves) in [a state of] constant (continuous, perpetual) change (alteration; Wandel) or can at (the) [very] least change (alter; ändern) (at) any time (moment). This process (or series of events) (development; Vorgang) takes place again (in turn) in time,(;) the effect (impact, consequence, influence, result) of the time factor therefore constitutes in itself the reason why the whole, put forward (or imagined) ((re)presented) as [a] stable sum, may (should, is) not (allowed to) be equated with the totality (entirety) of its changeable (or changing) (mutable, wavering; wandelbaren) parts. Put another way (differently) (In other words): at a hypothetical moment, in which time would freeze, the whole would also exist as the simple sum of its parts, yet an essential (a fundamental) feature (characteristic) of society consists exactly in that it [society] never freezes at that moment. The dynamic behaviour (behaving) of the parts constantly (continually) circumvents (avoids, dodges, gets around) the additive (i.e. cumulative) relationship (additive Verhältnis) between the parts and the whole; it [the said dynamic behaviour of the parts] drives (pushes, propels) [the parts, things, the situation] towards always (forever, constantly, all the time) new combinations and new creations, which first of all are contained (included) in the whole as internal (inner) possibilities of mobile parts, and already because of that (therefore) go beyond (exceed, surpass, transcend) their [the mobile parts'] additively (i.e. cumulatively) comprehensible (apprehensible, graspable) reality. Formulated (Expressed, Put) paradoxically [as a paradox]: precisely the constant

(continual, continuous) change in (or changing of) the parts and the production (or creation) (manufacturing) of new parts make (turn) the whole (into) something more than its parts<sup>149</sup>.

If now this more [“more”, More] (dieses Mehr) arises (or springs) from the dynamic behaviour of the parts in time, then (so, thus) it cannot be meant (thought of) as [a] detachable (severable or separable) quantitative addition (addendum, supplement) which constitutes a necessary supplement (supplementation, addition) of [to] the rest of the (other, remaining) parts for [the purpose of] the completion of a visible and tangible whole(,) which is given in the absolute synchrony of its parts. Yet the individualistic critics of “holism” suppose (insinuate, assume) precisely this when they in actual fact reproach (or accuse) this [“holism”] [that] it [the said “holism”] basically (essentially) comprehends (grasps, understands, interprets) society in such a way that even after the removal (expulsion, exclusion, distancing) of all individuals or of all parts something from it [society] or from the whole would have to be left over<sup>150</sup>. Whoever raises such an accusation (or makes such a reproach), can obviously (apparently, evidently) himself only quantitatively imagine (envisage, (re)present, put forward) ontic magnitudes (dimensions, extents, sizes, capacities) (ontische Größen).

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<sup>149</sup> Lewin gives preference (priority, precedence) to [prefers] the formulation [that] the whole is different (dissimilar) to (unlike) the sum of its parts (*Field Theory*, p. 146). The improvement (correction) is apt (or well-aimed) (telling, striking) in so far (in as much) as it brings (puts, highlights) the qualitative aspect of the relation between [the] whole and [the] parts, contrary to (compared with, as opposed to, against) the quantitatively meant (intended, thought, imagined) individualistic objections (see next paragraph), (to the fore, at the centre of attention).

<sup>150</sup> Thus (So) Sander argues ex negativo e.g., when he counters (objects (says (argues) in reply) to) “holism” [by saying (arguing)] that “between a collective entity (group, body) (Kollektivum) and its members, a relationship does not exist at all (in general, anyway), because exactly the collective entity is not a new member next to (beside, alongside) many members, but [is] merely (only, just, simply) all the many members, and every taking away (removal) and contrariety (or contrasting) (opposition, conflict) of one member destroys (ruins, wrecks, demolishes) the original (initial) collective entity” („Spanns ‘Überwindung’“, p. 65). This can only be true in the [a] quantitative sense. If it held water (Were it valid (true)) qualitatively, then (thus, so) after an individual’s death or birth, society as [a] whole would be reshaped (or formed anew) (remoulded, re-formed, newly shaped).

Perhaps (Maybe, Possibly) an intellectus archetypus (archetypal intellect) would be in a position to at once have a view of (or take in) (overlook, grasp, see, supervise) the internal (inner) and external (outer) movements of the parts in (the, [terms (respect) of]) diachrony, and apprehend (grasp, understand) in quantitative relations (in quantitativen Relationen) that which appears to our finite (limited) intellectual capacity (or ability at thought) (unserem endlichen Denkvermögen) as [the, a] qualitative surplus (excess, overflow) (als qualitativer Überschuß) of the whole vis-à-vis the sum of its parts. The [This] matter (thing, subject, case, affair) becomes understandable to us only if we qualitatively distinguish (differentiate) between various (different, varying, differing, distinct, dissimilar) ontological levels, and do not interpret the material identity of the same [(the said, these) ontological levels] as [an, the(ir)] ontological identity. Naturally (Of course), society materially consists of a sum of individuals and of nothing else, but the equality (identity, identical nature, uniformity, sameness, similarity; die Gleichheit) of the material extent (or scope) (range, size, scale) (des materiellen Umfangs) of both these levels [i.e. the level of society, and, the level of individuals] with each other does not in the least permit (allow) [us] to readily (, without a second thought (difficulty, anything else),) reduce the former [i.e. society] to the latter [i.e. the sum of individuals] – just as little as the material identity of mental acts with certain physical processes ((series of) events, occurrences) proves (demonstrates) the reducibility of logic or psychology to physics (genausowenig wie die materielle Identität der mentalen Akte mit bestimmten physischen Vorgängen die Reduzierbarkeit von Logik oder Psychologie auf Physik beweist)<sup>151</sup>[vi]. In order to be able to apprehend (grasp) the qualitative difference in the

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<sup>151</sup> Mellor, “Reduction”, pp. 54, 53.

material-quantitative identity, we must certainly (indeed) free ourselves from (of) the metaphysical belief [that] there is *one* being (Is) and its strata (layers) are homogenous. Yet thinkers, who otherwise disapprove of (reject) (have a(n) unfavourable (negative) view of) metaphysical monism (metaphysischen Monismus), especially (particularly) of (the) materialistic [monism, kind, sort], piquantly turn (metamorphose, transform themselves) into social-theoretical monists, in order to be able to defend (stand up for, justify) their ethically-normatively meant individualism. And with this atomistic monism, which does not tolerate (endure, suffer) any independent (self-sufficient, self-standing, autonomous) ontology of the social next to (beside, alongside) it, the demand (request, requirement) for a(n) absolutely (really, virtually) sensualistic (i.e. in terms of philosophical sensualism) way (manner, mode) of knowledge (cognition) (or cognitive approach (mode)) (einer geradezu sensualistischen Erkenntnisweise), which wants to exclude (preclude, bar, disqualify) from the concept (notion) of social being (Is) all (everything) which is not visible (perceptible, noticeable) and tangible (concrete, corporeal) (die aus dem Begriff des sozialen Seins alles ausschließen will, was nicht sicht- und greifbar ist), is connected (connects, combines).

Indeed (In fact (reality)): methodological individualism's programme [that] the being (Is) of society is to [can, should, ought (to)] be totally (completely, entirely) apprehended (grasped, understood) by a complete as possible inventorying (or itemisation) (stocktaking; Inventarisierung) of all observable individual acts (or actions), reminds [us, one] of (recalls, calls to mind) the never fulfilled ambition of the neo-positivists to build (base, construct, set up, erect, mount, assemble) on empirically safeguarded (protected, secured, ensured) protocol statements (i.e.

statements, minutes or records (of evidence) verified by experience) (empirisch abgesicherten Protokollsätzen), a world image (picture) without gaps (ein lückenloses Weltbild) (a complete (unbroken, full, perfect, watertight) world image). And as “metaphysical” abstractions were supposed (meant) to foremost fall victim to (be the first victim of) this ambition, so now the implementation (carrying out) of the individualistic programme is supposed (meant) to (should), not least ((first) of all, primarily), eliminate the concept (notion) of the social fact, in which the ontological autonomy of the social is in fact (reality) (indeed) condensed par excellence. With that, this concept [of the social fact] actually (really, as a matter of (in actual) fact) comes into being (results, arises, ensues, is produced (created)) from (out of) (the) consistent further (additional) thinking about (of) the rejection (refusal, denial, renunciation) of psychologism, which (is well-known ((most) familiar) to) (the) methodological individualists (knew of, recognised, acknowledged) too. But with one important difference. At the level of the individual actor, the leaving aside (excluding, eliminating) of (the) psychical factors does not take place (is not carried out, come to pass) by the actor himself, but by the scientific observer (sondern durch den wissenschaftlichen Beobachter), who can only speculate (conjecture) about (on) motivations, and in their [these motivations’] vagueness and sterility (fruitlessness or infertility) (barrenness; Unfruchtbarkeit) prefers the ideal-typical reconstruction of [the] ends (or goal) set (end (goal) setting) and end(goal)-rational (purposeful-rational) acts (or actions). At the level of the social fact, on the other hand, the actor himself knows, or is able to (can) know, that he is confronted with something which prompts (causes) or forces (makes, coerces) him to set boundaries (or limits) in regard to his wishes (desires), that is, to objectify (objectivise) his behaviour, as it were (so to speak), leaving aside (excluding, while

eliminating) his own motivation. As is (well) known, he [the said actor] does not always succeed [in] [achieve] this or only partially (partly),(;) however, the process interests us here not from this, the inner (internal) psychological angle (or standpoint) (point of view, aspect, side) of subjective effort (endeavour) or weakness, but in accordance with its outer (or external) aspect, which refers to the confrontation with the [a] social fact as such(,) irrespective of its [the confrontation's] outcome. For [Regarding] the outcome, the social fact is not as such unconditionally (necessarily, absolutely) decisive (crucial, deciding), and just as little can it [the social fact] make personal temperaments and reactions understandable (clear [to us, the observer]). (Besides,) It [The social fact] by no means (, incidentally, by the way,) takes up (lays claim to) the entire (whole) psyche, and one could even (in fact) say that the actor's consideration for social facts very often contributes to the deepening of the chasm (gulf) between the public and the private aspects of his experiencing (i.e. perception or feelings) (sense, view, mind) (seines Empfindens) and behaviour (behaving), in relation to which (while at the same time) these aspects constantly (continually) interact and fight (or struggle) (battle) for precedence (wobei diese Aspekte ständig interagieren und um den Vortritt kämpfen). Those are general human (panhuman) experiences, which stretch (range) from the heroic conflict between duty and inclination (or propensity) (tendency, proclivity) (up) to (until) the manoeuvrability of a "free-rider". The feeling (sense) [that] one does not behave as [a] member of a group or as [a] bearer of a social role, even at the price of hypocrisy, unconditionally (necessarily) in the same manner as a private person (i.e. individual) towards oneself (i.e. in one's own space) (no matter where the boundary between private and public behaviour runs (goes, stretches, passes) on each and every respective occasion), is as old as society itself, and it implies the actual

(real, factual) acknowledgement (recognition, appreciation) of the existence of social facts lying beyond (on the other side of) individual pleasure (discretion or choice) (Beliebens) and individual logic. A (consistently applied) methodological individualism (applied consistently) can hardly account for these age-old (ancient, immemorial, primeval, primordial) general human (or panhuman) experiences. It [The said consistently applied methodological individualism] must interpret them [these panhuman experiences] as splits (divisions, splittings) or conflicts inside of the private [sphere, realm] or between private persons (i.e. individuals), not as processes (or series of events) in the field of tension (area of conflict) between [the] private [sphere] and [the] public [sphere] (nicht als Vorgänge im Spannungsfeld zwischen Privaten und Öffentlichem). Because it is true that not only the [a] confrontation with social facts, but already the [a(n)] encounter (i.e. meeting) (die Begegnung) with another individual can prompt (cause) or force (make, coerce) ([upon) one (us)] towards) the restriction (limitation, reduction, moderation) of one's own wishes (desires) and (towards) the differentiation between the inner (internal) and outer (external) aspect of behaviour. The [This] same differentiation, however, in [respect of] social facts, is distinguished (marked, characterised) by (due to) the fact that (because) it [the said differentiation] takes place (occurs, happens) out of consideration for supra-individual factors, irrespective of how tightly (narrowly, closely) interwoven these latter [supra-individual factors] are with concrete individuals. It is [a matter (question) of] two (entirely) different things if one does not attack someone [else] because one fears (is afraid of) his [that person's] physical strength, or because one (is, has) thinks (thinking, thought) of (about) [considers] the legally provided for (intended, planned, designated, selected, chosen) punishment (penalty) or of (about) the "scandal" [which will (might) ensue].



If we registered (recorded, noted) in protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence)) the individual behaviour (behaving) of actors who take part (participate) (or are involved) in a social fact, then (so, thus) our records (or notes) should (ought, might) (not) make little (scant) (much) sense. [The fact] That someone enters (walks (goes, steps) into, sets foot in) a building, writes something on a piece of paper, gives this [piece of paper, it] to someone who is sitting at [behind] a counter (desk, (ticket) window), and from him [that someone sitting at a counter] receives in response (reply) one or several pieces of paper, does not mean (prove) in itself anything for (to) the proverbial visitor from Mars, and can even (in fact) provoke (his, [this visitor's (Martian's)]) laughter (stimulate his laughing muscle; seine Lachmuskeln reizen), unless he [the said Martian] knows what bank, money, saving etc. mean on earth, and he [the Martian] has moreover (in addition) a(n) rough (approximate) idea (notion) about (of) the overall organisation of [the] economy and society. Something similar (like that) applies with regard to religious worship (or cults), military parades, parliamentary sittings (sittings of parliament) etc.. The question about (regarding, in accordance with) the meaning (sense) of the process (or event) (occurrence) is not answered by (the) knowledge (knowing) of (about, regarding) the subjective meaning (sense) which the individual (single or separate) (isolated) actor connects with his participation (involvement) in the process (or event) (I do not learn (find out, hear about, discover, experience) what a bank is if I know that customer (client, patron) Jones (Smith) (Kunde Müller) withdraws money (in order) to buy a bicycle); with (in relation to, on top of) that (into the bargain, besides, in addition), a knowledge is required that lies beyond the motivations and ends (or goal) set (end (goal) settings) of all individual (single or separate) actors – including those [motivations and ends (or goal) set] of the first founder of the first bank in the world.

Because also in this case, (to) which a methodological individualist would presumably (probably, likely) invoke (appeal, refer, cite), no necessary interrelation (connection, correlation) exists between the actor's motives and ends (goals, purposes) (e.g. his wish (desire) for (of) enrichment), and the organisational form which he chose (selected) in order to fulfil (satisfy) them [those motives and ends]. [The fact] That he did not have to necessarily wage (conduct) a (predatory) war (of plunder (robbery)) (Raubkrieg) in order to acquire riches, but could just as well [have] do(ne) banking transactions, is based (rests) on historical-structural preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions); he did (has) not of course himself bring (place, put) the money economy (and with it a new notion (idea, perception, representation) of wealth (or riches)) in(to) the world in order to then be able to found a bank, just as little as someone founds a bank in order to (so that) then be allowed to (he may) withdraw his money.

Social facts (are), in short, at home (reside in) and come from an ontological zone which lies outside of actors' individual acts (as well as of motivations and ends (or the goal) set) registerable (recordable, notable) in protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence)), although it [the ontological zone in question] at any time (moment) (always) remains materially identical with (to) these acts (or actions) (Soziale Tatsachen sind kurzum in einer ontologischen Zone beheimatet, die außerhalb der in Protokollsätzen registrierbaren individuellen Handlungen (sowie der Motivationen und Zwecksetzungen) der Akteure liegt, obwohl sie mit diesen Handlungen jederzeit materiell identisch bleibt). Inside (of, Within) this zone, individual behaviour can be made understandable (clear) only by (while) taking into consideration supra-individual factors, i.e. such [supra-individual factors](,) which

indeed gain (obtain, attain) and retain (keep, maintain) [their] shape (or form) through (by means of) the activity of individuals, but cannot be (arbitrarily and a nihilo) created or uncreated (i.e. abolished or extinguished) (done away with) (as one likes and out of nothing (ex nihilo)) by any single [individual] amongst them [all (the) individuals] (Innerhalb dieser Zone kann individuelles Verhalten nur unter Berücksichtigung überindividueller Faktoren begreiflich gemacht werden, d. h. solcher, die zwar durch die Tätigkeit von Individuen Gestalt gewinnen und behalten, sich aber durch kein einziges unter ihnen beliebig und a nihilo schaffen oder abschaffen lassen). This again (in turn) implies that the relations between the actors – always inside this same zone – cannot at all depend, or not primarily(,) or not totally (completely, entirely, wholly), on the purely subjective sympathies or antipathies of the sides (or parties) concerned (in question). (My friend, who is a teller (cashier) in a bank and, in a difficult situation, wants to help me, lends me his own money, not the bank's money; and if he does this [i.e. lends me the bank's money] illegally, he knows what (which) consequences the predominating (predominance, prevailing, preponderance) of his subjective feelings can have for him.) This already mentioned, generally conscious (even though not generally or always respected), and for life in society, constitutive distinction (difference) between social and personal, outer (or external) and inner (or internal) behaviour (behaving) constitutes, together with the necessity of the consideration of (for) supra-individual factors in [regard to] (during) the explanation of individuals' social behaviour, proof (evidence) for (of, [regarding]) [the fact] that statements (or propositions) (opinions, pronouncements, assertions) about (on, regarding) social facts cannot be reduced to statements (or

propositions) about (on, regarding) individuals' action<sup>152</sup>. Such an ascertainment (observation) does not in any way entail a hypostatisation of the social, i.e. a search for sources of social facts which lie (are) beyond (on the other side of) individuals' action. [What is] meant is that supra-individual elements must flow into this action because the actor is born in an already, one way or another (either way), organised society, and his social acts (or actions) make up (constitute) positive or negative positionings (stances) for the organisation of this society. Recourse to individual action as [the] ultimate (final) (explanatory) authority (of explanation) (als letzte Erklärungsinstanz) would only be legitimate if society had demonstrably come into being (arisen, resulted, ensued, emerged, been created (produced)) from (out of) the agreement (understanding) of previously (beforehand) isolated individuals (aus der Übereinkunft vorher isolierter Individuen)(,) and would again (time) and again (over and over, repeatedly, perennially) come into being anew. The logical necessity of this conclusion is unintentionally (involuntarily) reflected (mirrored) in the thought(s) (or intellectual) (mind) games of the methodological individualists of the second and third generation, who more or less oscillate (swing) skilfully (cleverly, deftly, ably) between fact and fiction (or poetry and truth) (fantasy and truth, truth and fantasy), and into (onto) their (contract-theoretical) constructs (pertaining to contract theory) project via the origin (beginnings, provenance, derivation, emanation) of [the] state and society that which would represent (constitute) the ideal mode (way) of function(ing) (den idealen Funktionsmodus) of a society organised according to (in accordance with) the normative implications of methodological individualism; the idealised individual, who inside of (within) this latter [society organised

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<sup>152</sup> Mandelbaum, "Societal facts", esp. pp. 308, 309. Cf. Nisbet, *Social Bond*, pp. 48, 49.

according to the normative implications of methodological individualism] is supposed (meant) to (should) act freely, can therefore (thus, consequently) appear (arise, crop up, show himself, occur) before every society and as [the] (society's) founder (of society)<sup>153</sup>. Hayek and Popper did not want, as [we have (already)] said, to go so far, and they (have) watered down (diluted) their methodological individualism by means of (through) the dual (double, twin) assumption (acceptance, supposition, adoption) of society's originality (i.e. initial or primary state) (die doppelte Annahme von der Ursprünglichkeit der Gesellschaft) and the unintended consequences of action. However, *tertium non datur* (i.e. no third [possibility] is given [there is no third alternative]): either one must take the aforementioned assumptions seriously, i.e. translate them into the language of social facts and finally bid farewell (say goodbye) to methodological individualism, or keep (stick, stand, abide, remain) consistently to (by, with, at) this [methodological individualism] and bring contract theories into the world, without caring (worrying) in the slightest (least) about their reference to historical and social realities.

The whole (entirety) (Das Ganze) is therefore in this (the, a) sense something more than its parts (Das Ganze ist also in dem Sinn etwas mehr als seine Teile)(,) [such] that it includes (or consists of) (contains, embraces, comprises) not merely individuals as, in any case (anyway, anyhow), [the] only (sole) conceivable (thinkable, imaginable, possible) actors, but over and above that, social facts. To these [social facts] belong again (in turn), apart from the institutional construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations), which function more or less ponderably (calculably), the imponderable (incalculable) effects (results, influences,

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<sup>153</sup> See e.g. Nozick, *Anarchy*. Cf. already the revaluation of "contractualism" by the Popperian Agassi, "Method. Individualism", p. 264ff..

consequences) of the heterogony of ends, the (often) unforeseeable (or unpredictable) outcomes of collective action. Accordingly (According to that, Thus), the whole of society consists of a (one) single (sole, only) material (stuff or substance) (Das Ganze der Gesellschaft besteht demnach aus einem einzigen Stoff) (individuals and their acts (or actions)) and of at least two distinct (different) ontological levels. From the sensualistic (i.e. in terms of philosophical sensualism) perspective of methodological individualism, there is of course only this material (or stuff); supra-individual social facts are merely theoretical constructs,(;) only individuals are real and concrete<sup>154</sup>. Thereby (With that, As a result), social theory seems to be (standing) on solid (firm) ground (on terra firma), namely, to be acquiring (gaining, obtaining, getting, winning) a directly observable object (subject (matter), topic, motif, theme; Gegenstand). A more precise deliberation (consideration, thought, reflection) teaches (instructs, informs) us, however, a [something, to know] better [deliberation, thought, thing] [a better deliberation (i.e. to know better)]. Only as [a] biological being can, namely, an individual be directly observed, while the attempt at deciphering (deducing) him as [a] thinking and acting person presents us with enigmas (riddles, puzzles, mysteries, conundrums) not smaller (slighter) than the investigation (examination) of supra-individual construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations). Both have their external (outer) and internal (inner) sides, and during (at) [in respect (the case) of (relation (regard)) to] both we must orientate ourselves first of all towards (the) actual (real) behaviour (behaving), in order to substantiate (justify, found, establish; begründen) conjectures (speculation, suspicions) over (regarding, about, on) motivations, should (if) this (was (were, is) supposed (meant) to) at all

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<sup>154</sup> Popper, *Poverty*, p. 135ff..

appear [to be] scientifically meaningful (reasonable, legitimate, rational, plausible, practical). For the establishment (production or restoration) (making, manufacture, fabrication; Herstellung) of a causal relation between an act (or action) and a psychical disposition (einer psychischen Disposition), our thinking (thought; Denken) does not proceed (act) categorially (categorically, in terms of categories) essentially differently than in (the) research (or investigation) into (of) external (outer) causalities. The more familiar (intimate) is not eo ipso more understandable. And the supra-individual does not become automatically more familiar and more understandable if (when) we break it down (dissect or dismantle it) (cut it up, analyse (decompose) it) into individuals (Und das Überindividuelle wird nicht automatisch vertrauter und verstehbarer, wenn wir es in Individuen zerlegen). Wherein (In what) does a church differ from an army if about (regarding, in relation to) both it can merely (just, only, simply) be said [that] they (would) consist of individuals?<sup>155</sup>

Already the logic of (the) delimitation (demarcation, dissociation) against (from) psychologism hints at [the fact] that the individual [element or person] as such is not necessarily more understandable and (more) explainable than the supra-individual [construct] (Individuelles als solches nicht unbedingt versteh- und erklärbarer als Überindividuelles ist). Were, namely, the individual (das Individuum) psychologically (more easily) accessible (approachable), (so, then, thus) an individualistic way of looking at (consideration (contemplation) of) social phenomena would have to, without [any] further hesitation (reflection, consideration, reservation) (giving it a second thought), start (begin) from (at) (the, [an]) individual psychology, and be able to get by (make do, manage) with the

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<sup>155</sup> Ginsberg, *Essays*, p. 63; Warriner, "Groups", pp. 552, 553.

conceptual means of psychology. Yet not even the behaviouristic-reductionistic wing of methodological individualism can achieve (do, manage, accomplish, perform) (is capable of achieving) this. This [behaviouristic-reductionistic wing of methodological individualism] also asserts (defends, underlines) [the existence (validity) of] in fact (indeed) (the) panhuman (or generally human) psychical dispositions in order to explain social life<sup>156</sup>, that is, it does not reconstruct it [social life] on the basis of the specifically individual psychology of different and unmistakable (i.e. distinctive) persons. Other methodological individualists declare (or explain) (proclaim) in turn ((then) again) [that] social phenomena ought (would have) to indeed be deduced from dispositions, representations (or notions) (perceptions, ideas) and relations of individuals (Dispositionen, Vorstellungen und Beziehungen), however(,) in the course of this (at the same time, into the bargain)(,) [the] individuals would be permitted to (could, should) remain “anonymous” and be looked at (considered, regarded) as bearers (carriers, vehicles) of “typical” dispositions, representations (or notions) etc.<sup>157</sup>. Such [kinds of] dispositions, however, crop up (appear, occur, happen) only at the super-individual level of social facts, which methodological individualism does not want to accept, and, incidentally, (they [i.e. “typical” dispositions]) differ from dispositions in the [a(n)] real (actual,

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<sup>156</sup> Homans, *Nature*, p. 35ff..

<sup>157</sup> Watkins, “Historical Explanation”, p. 106. Watkins wants, though, to supplement (add to, complete) this kind (sort, type) of explanation, which he calls “explanation in principle”, with an “explanation in detail”, which goes into (deals with) the particular personality structure (structure of personality) of actors (“Ideal Types”, esp. pp. 34, 35, 42ff.). In the process, he subsumes both types of explanation under the concept (notion) [of] “historical explanation” and consequently (thus, therefore) blurs (covers up (over), smears) the salient (crucial) point. Historical explanation is, namely, only “explanation in detail”, on the other hand, (however) “explanation in principle” is sociological, and it implies the acceptance (or assumption) (supposition) of social facts. The (fundamental) individualistic (fundamental) principle is therefore only applicable to the former [(first) type of explanation, “explanation in detail”], from (out of) which results (arises) [the fact] that methodological individualism has little to offer outside of the boundaries (or limits) of idiographic history. He is able to (can) enter (into) the field (area, domain, sector) of sociology, which interests [us] here, only illegitimately, i.e. through (by means (way) of) reference to “typical” and “anonymous” dispositions.



true, literal) psychological sense. Because these [dispositions in the psychological sense] are in themselves subjective and quite often variable (or changeable) (mutable, varying, shifting); moreover, they can, even if they in themselves remain (stay) stable, in [a] sociological respect, be channeled (canalised, conveyed) very differently, whereas “typical” or “anonymous” dispositions point (allude) to (indicate) a collective ethos, which can support (bear, carry, sustain) objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) or at least characterise (mark, identify) group behaviour (the behaviour of groups) (Gruppenverhalten); their difference from (to) (the) merely psychological dispositions is already seen (shown) (already appears (shows itself)) in [the fact] that we encounter them in people (humans, men) who are in no way characterologically (charakterologisch) similar (alike)<sup>158</sup>. (According to that (Thus), in(side) [within] psychology’s competence (or domain) (responsibility, authority, jurisdiction; Kompetenz) fall) Dispositions, which are typical (characteristic) of (specific (particular) to) (inherent in) persons as persons regardless of (notwithstanding) their affiliation (membership, sense of belonging, incorporation, accession) with (to, in) a sociologically definable group (e.g. [the] “introverted [people] (introverts)” and [the] “extroverted [people] (extroverts)”, [the] melancholy [people] and [the] cheerful (happy, glad) [people] [with cheerful dispositions]), (accordingly come under the competence (or domain) of psychology); dispositions in the sociocultural sense have in principle (basically) nothing to do with group affiliation (membership) ((the sense of) belonging to groups) (Gruppenzugehörigkeit) (again: in the sociocultural, not the psychological sense), and they are not shaped (formed, moulded) as [the] summation of related (cognate, kindred)

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<sup>158</sup> S. Lukes, “Methodological Individualism”, p. 122ff.; L. Goldstein, “Inadequacy” pp. 802, 813; “Two Theses”, esp. p. 9.

psychical aptitudes (or predispositions) (verwandten psychischen Anlagen) in multiple (several, various) individuals, but they exclusively presuppose a certain aspect of behaviour which is (stands, found) precisely at the centre of sociological interest (e.g. [the] Christian way of thinking (attitude or views) (mentality, mindset, cast of mind) (christliche Gesinnung), [the, a] capitalistic ethos).

Just as (like) already (the) recourse to the unintended consequences of action, so too (the) [a] sudden (abrupt) transition from (the) individual-psychological to (the) anonymous and typical sociocultural dispositions, ends up in (amounts (comes (down)) to) the admission (confession) that methodological individualism's programme cannot be realised (achieved, put into effect) (materialise), unless one waters (dilutes) it (down) in such a way that one is not capable of (cannot, able to) discover(ing) (spot(ing), detect, find, ascertain, discern) a(ny) difference from (to) "holism" (any more)<sup>159</sup>. Now the methodological individualists do not deduce (derive) from the thesis [that] collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (Kollektivgebilde) are abstractions and solely (only) individuals are real, merely a certain (particular) ontology, but also a methodological demand (requirement, claim). [The] aim (goal, objective, target) of research is supposed (meant) to (should) be to reduce supra-individual construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (überindividuelle Gebilde) ("theoretical constructs" („theoretische Konstrukte“)) to ("real") individuals and their acts (or actions). Consequently (Therefore, Thus, As a result), a relation(ship) between ontology and method of explanation (explanatory method;

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<sup>159</sup> Thus, e.g. Danto, by counting (while he) for some obscure (inexplicable, incomprehensible) reason(s) (reckons, estimates) the ontological assumption (or acceptance) (supposition) of social facts ("social individuals"), apart from (in addition (next) to, alongside, besides) that [(the) ontological assumption] of individual actors, amongst methodological individualism's conceptual components; *Analytical Philosophy*, p. 267.

Erklärungsmethode) is postulated, which neither was proven (shown, demonstrated) nor can be proven. Because from (out of) the ontological thesis [that] social facts or constructs (Gebilde) are the work of individuals and not autonomous hypostases, the methodical (i.e. methodological) necessity or the theoretical possibility of their explanation on the basis of the individualistic (fundamental) principle does not at all follow (ensue, result, arise)<sup>160</sup>. The assumption (or acceptance) (supposition) of such a necessity or possibility already presupposes what it [the said ontological thesis] is supposed (meant) to (should) prove (show), that, namely, there is no ontological inter-level (i.e. intermediate (between) level) (ontologische Zwischenebene) and no tertium (i.e. third [thing (dimension, element)]) (Tertium) between collective hypostases and individuals, that is, it [the said ontological thesis] eliminates (shuts out, excludes) a limine the ontological level of social facts and reduces social being (Is) to its (sole (unique or own) (single, only)) material (or stuff) (matter, substance) (auf seinen (einzigen) Stoff), namely (to) (the) individuals and their acts (or actions). However, it is not a matter here merely of the concept (notion) of social being (Is), its extent (scope, range, size, scale; Umfang) and its components; (likewise, in the same way, exactly so (thus)) it is a matter of methodical (i.e. methodological) questions (as well). Without (a) doubt, it is methodically (i.e. methodologically) more productive (fertile, fruitful), especially for historical research goals (purposes, ends), to smell (i.e. sense) behind collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) (Kollektivbegriffen)(,) networks (webs) of individuals and acts (or actions), not for instance hypostases. This fundamental (basic) positioning (or stance) (attitude, view), nevertheless (all the

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<sup>160</sup> Goldstein, "Two Theses", esp. p. 3; Miller, "Methodological Individualism", pp. 402ff., 413; Brodbeck, "Methodological Individualisms", p. 20.

same), does not automatically put (enable) us (in a position) to define all collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) on the basis (or with the help) of individual concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) (Individualbegriffen), and indeed already not because the boundaries between both (the two) concepts of genus are fluid (und zwar schon deshalb nicht, weil die Grenzen zwischen beiden Begriffsgattungen flüssig sind). For the definition of collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective), individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) are very often not suitable, but other collective concepts [are suitable], and the solely (only, exclusively), in practice (in practical terms), interesting question is (that) [question] whether our collective concepts are defined clearly enough and are used (employed) purposefully (expediently, usefully, suitably). More in the research practice (praxis) of sociology, but to a great extent (largely, for the most part) also of history, is not sensibly (reasonably, plausibly, meaningfully) to be required (demanded, asked of), especially if one considers (takes into consideration) that not even in the natural (i.e. physical) sciences can the meaning (significance, importance) of collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) always be conveyed (represented, reflected, given an account of) by (means of) (through) individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual). At any rate (In any case), statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) about (regarding) social phenomena cannot manage (do) (get by) without [the] use of collective concepts, and this necessity at the level of description (representation, portrayal; Darstellung) reflects (mirrors) the social-ontological fact that

collective action represents (or constitutes) (is) something more or something other than the mere sum of its individual components<sup>161</sup>.

If the ontological autonomy (or independence) of social facts (die ontologische Selbständigkeit der sozialen Tatsachen) is correctly (rightly, properly) comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted) and taken seriously, (so, then, must) one does not have to (must (ought) not) be (is not necessarily) a friend of paradoxicalness (the [a] paradox) in order to be allowed (able) to assert (claim, maintain, argue) [that] precisely a hypothetical success of the reduction of all collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) to individual concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) would make what is supposed (meant) to (should) be explained vanish into thin air, and consequently (therefore, thus) render (make) the aimed at (i.e. intended) explanation itself invalid (untenable); because only the destruction of society would enable the theoretical isolation of the actor. The endeavour [regarding, in respect of] (effort at) the realisation (fulfilment, achievement) of the individualistic programme does not spring (arise) from the logical necessities of social theory, but from a dogmatics (i.e. dogmatism) whose world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) background(s) (backdrops) (Hintergründe) has (have) (was, were) already (been) discussed. And the absence so far (up till (to) now) of this realisation (fulfilment, achievement) [of the individualistic programme] is (does) not (lie in) merely (due to, because of) technical difficulties, which come into being (arise, emerge, ensue, result) out of (from) the complexity of the matter (thing, affair), and which could be remedied (rectified, removed, got rid of, repaired) with [the passing of] (in) time and the progress of research, as methodological individualists

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<sup>161</sup> Nagel, *Structure*, esp. p. 537ff., 542ff..

want to make [us] believe. Rather, it [the said absence] is due to (because of, lies in) the ontological impossibility, with no consideration for (regardless of) qualitative differences, of forcing (pressing) the extent (or scope) (range, size, scale, area, girth; Umfang) of the social in(to) the extent (or scope) of the added or multiplied individual [person (element)], or of converting (transforming) the quantitative equality of both levels into qualitative identity (sameness, oneness) (in qualitative Identität). Several (Some) researchers have convincingly (persuasively, compellingly, conclusively) shown that a complete reduction of sociological collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) to individual concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) cannot be brought off (effected, managed) at all, namely in such a way that the individual concepts exclusively contain terms which strictly refer (relate, apply) to (concern) individuals and individual dispositions<sup>162</sup>. But no representative (supporter, advocate) of the individualistic other (opposite) side (i.e. opposition) (opposing party) has hitherto (until now) proven the opposite. Instead of proving, before disbelieving eyes, the realisability (or feasibility) of the [individualistic methodological] programme by means of (through) sociological and historical examples, one keeps (sticks, remains) quite (fairly, pretty,

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<sup>162</sup> See e.g. Gellner, "Explanations in History", esp. p. 161ff. In other words: the dissolution (breaking up, disintegration, resolution) of the collective into individuals and their acts (or actions) is not managed without the use of institutional or sociocultural concepts (notions). Instead of: "The German Reich (empire) declared war on France", one can of course (certainly, surely) write "Wilhelm (William) II declared war on France". However, this declaration of war would have had no practical consequences were Wilhelm not Kaiser (emperor), that is, were (if) he (did) not (stand) (at) the head (apex, peak, top) of a correspondingly organised polity. Or the other way around: acts (or actions) are often hardly understandable if they are not defined by (means (way) of) (through) a collective concept (notion) (i.e. concept pertaining to the collective). What a capitalist does, I know in general; but without the use (utilisation; Verwendung) of this concept [of the capitalist (capitalism)], it is (does) (I do) not immediately clear (make sense) (to me) (see, understand) what it is supposed [to mean] (should [be]) when Mr. Miller (Müller, Jones, Smith) buys a plot of land (property), on which he builds (constructs, erects) a building and lets (allows) in that [building] machines to be installed, employs workers for the (to) operation (handling) of (operate) the machines etc. (it should be noted (remarked, said) that this description (account) for its part contains a number of (several, quite a few) collective concepts: plot of land, building, machines, workers, which need (require) individualisation (Individualisierung)).

rather) non-bindingly to (at) general methodical (i.e. methodological) considerations (thoughts, reflections, deliberations) on (about, regarding, over) the manner of a possible transformation of collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) into individual concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual), and moreover (in addition) one leaves [oneself] (many) a way (some ways) out (keeps (holds) many a (some) back door[s] (loophole) open): the use (utilisation) of collective concepts is [would be] legitimate if these [collective concepts] described (indicated, referred to, marked) relations between individuals (what, however, could they otherwise describe?); and that transformation is [would] not [be] in fact necessary at all, provided that (as long as) the collective concept appears to be definable more precisely or better than the individual concepts corresponding to it [the said collective concept]<sup>163</sup>. [Just] As through (by means of) the acceptance (or assumption) (supposition) of “typical” dispositions or unintended consequences of action, (so, thus) methodological individualism loses (sheds) through (by means of) such concessions (acknowledgements, allowances) [to (of) the collective concept] its specific content, it unnecessarily (needlessly) complicates (the) [its] theoretical (conceptual) instruments, without contributing to the matter (affair, thing, object, issue, case) [something] illuminating. Why should we, however, be unhappy as (so) long as (while) [the] social is not reduced to [the] individual [person (element)], when (if) the [said, this] reduction does not ensure (guarantee, safeguard) additional (further, extra) clarity (lucidity), and when (if) no-one has accomplished (achieved) it [the said (such a) reduction] so far (until now)<sup>164</sup>? Why by

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<sup>163</sup> Opp, *Individualistische Sozialwissenschaft*, ch. VI, esp. pp. 127, 145ff..

<sup>164</sup> Foldes, “Note”, p. 333ff..

the way (for that matter, in actual fact, actually) – if (when) dogmatic reasons do not command (call for, demand) it?

The indispensability of collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) both in (the) natural (i.e. physical) [sciences] as well as in (the) social sciences points to (indicates, suggests) the dubiousness of the attempt to differentiate (distinguish) between both these kinds (sorts) of science on the basis of the contrast(ing) (conflict, opposition) of [between] [the] resolute and [the] compositive (methodical) procedure (auf Grund des Gegensatzes von resolutivem und kompositivem Verfahren), namely to think (believe, say) [that] [the] natural (i.e. physical) sciences would start at (with, [from]) (the) complex (natural (i.e. physical)) phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) (of nature) (bei den komplexen Naturerscheinungen ansetzen) and work [their way] backwards in order to bring to light (into the open) their [complex natural phenomena's] ultimate (final) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents), (,;) however (on the other hand) [whereas] [the] social sciences (would) start from (take as a (their) starting point) (the) elements, i.e. (the) individual views (opinions) and stances (or positionings) (attitudes)(,) in order to inductively construct entireties (wholenesses, totalities)<sup>165</sup>. During (With, In [regard to]) such a contradistinction (contrasting), a question of the purposefulness (expediency or usefulness) (end (goal) orientation) [in respect] of research practice (praxis), which from case to case is posed (put) differently, is talked up (presented, acclaimed, promoted, puffed (hyped) up) to [be, seem, as] (towards) [a] methodical (i.e. methodological) question of principle (i.e. fundamental (basic, key) question (issue)) with ontological implications. Were it (If it were (lay))

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<sup>165</sup> Thus, Hayek, *Missbrauch*, p. 48ff..



in the nature of the social sciences to be obliged (have, need) to take animated atoms (i.e. animate or living individuals) (beseelte Atome) as the[ir] starting point, then (so, thus) the matter (affair, thing, issue, case, subject, object) would have taken care (been dealt with (handled, done, seen to)) of itself (a) long (time) ago and despite the obstinate (stubborn) arguments (or protests) (backchat, objections) of the dissenters (those of a different opinion (who think otherwise (differently))), dissidents). But on this side (i.e. in this world or life) [in respect] of every presumption (or conjecture) (assumption, guess, suspicion, supposition) about (regarding, on, over) the ultimate (final) elements)(,) stands (is) [a] social-scientific and panhuman (or generally human) (general(-)human, common human, universal) experience of a fact, whose ascertainment (realisation, observation) does not need (require, demand) any presumptions (or conjectures) or thought experiments: the fact of society (Aber diesseits jeder Vermutung über letzte Elemente steht sozialwissenschaftliche und allgemeinmenschliche Erfahrung vor einem Faktum, dessen Feststellung keiner Vermutungen oder Gedankenexperimente bedarf: dem Faktum der Gesellschaft). (The) Methodological individualists must (have to) struggle (fight, battle) so doggedly (determinedly, obstinately) for (in favour of) their positions because this fact [of society] at every turn (every step of the way) stands in the[ir] way (of [in relation to] them themselves), and withdraws (takes away, extracts) self-evidence (naturalness; Selbstverständlichkeit) from the individualistic (fundamental) principle (deprives the individualistic principle of self-evidence). In reality they [methodological individualists] presuppose it [the fact of society] just like their opponents (rivals). Because they (are) nolentes volentes (i.e. whether they like it or not (are unwilling or willing)) (willingly or unwillingly) from (at) the outset (beginning) aware (realise) that the ultimate (final) elements, (from) which they supposedly

start (take as the[ir] (a) starting point, set forth), are [the] ultimate (final) elements of something, namely, [the] ultimate (final) elements of a society and of nothing else. They [Methodological individualists] know, therefore, from the beginning, the direction and the conclusion (end(ing)), and accordingly orientate their undertaking (enterprise) when they are able (let (allow) themselves) (to) put together (compose) the ultimate (final) individual elements of social-scientifically (meaningful (or rational)) (plausible, sensible, reasonable, legitimate) entireties (wholenesses, totalities) (which are full of (replete with) meaning) (sozialwissenschaftlich sinnvoller Ganzheiten). There [They] are [It is a matter of] two very different (distinct, dissimilar, differing) things, [(a)] to construct the social whole from individuals with one eye on the [an] already existing society, and, [(b)] to be left alone with the ultimate (final) elements, without [having, bearing] any representation (or notion) (idea, perception) of a whole in (on) [one's] mind (head), in order to blindly reach (attain, get (come) to), as it were (so to speak), the construction of a social whole through (by means of) the mere automatic mechanism (or effect) (influence) (Automatik) of combinations. Most (Very) probably (likely) (In all probability), methodological individualism would, in the latter case (instance), outline (or sketch) (devise, design, plan) a picture (or an image) of society which would exhibit (show) only chance (or accidental) (incidental, coincidental) similarities to (with) that [picture of society] familiar to us – otherwise the movement of history and society would be in principle foreseeable (predictable), and individualistic polemics against “holism” would no longer “have (get) a grip” [(or be effective (persuasive))] precisely on [in regard to] this important point. What, therefore, methodological individualism proclaims (exclaims, calls out) as the synthesis of a whole on the basis of ultimate (final) elements turns out (proves, reveals itself)

to be [an] analysis with the idea of the whole in (at) the back of its mind. An analysis, which unfolds (develops) in constant (continuous) counterpoint towards [in relation (respect) to (of), vis-à-vis] synthesis and is supposed (meant) (ought) to (should) unfold (develop) constantly (continuously, permanently, forever, perpetually) in the course of research praxis (i.e. practice), does not constitute, on the other hand, a task (job, mission, assignment, duty) which one can or may deal (cope, come to grips) with (manage, handle) only in the capacity (with the attribute (characteristic)) of the methodological individualist. As we had to note (comment, say, mark) against Durkheim, [the] concrete composition (texture or constitution) of (the) social facts (konkrete Beschaffenheit der sozialen Tatsachen), as well as [the] mechanism and outcome (or result) (upshot, end(ing)) (Ausgang) of the heterogony of ends, can only be very insufficiently (inadequately) comprehended (grasped, understood) without going deeply (or immersion) (deepening; Vertiefung) into actors' subjectively meant meaning (or sense)<sup>166</sup>. One could in social science indeed (actually, in fact (reality)) describe as the [an] ideal explanation that (during, [in the course of]) which would simultaneously illuminate (or examine) (take a look at) (the) actors' intentions and the mechanism of the non-realisation (non-fulfilment(achievement, attainment) (Nichtverwirklichung) of these intentions<sup>167</sup>. [We] (Two things) should (must) (cannot) (are not allowed), nevertheless (however), (not) lose sight of two things (be lost sight of): that we indeed (actually, in fact) here have to do (are dealing) with one sole (unique, single) (i.e. one only) material (or stuff) (matter, substance), but with two distinct (or varying) (different) (research) levels (of research) *and* that the sequence (or order) of these levels cannot

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<sup>166</sup> See Sec. 2A in this chapter.

<sup>167</sup> Thus, Aron, *Leçons*, p. 324.

necessarily be reversed (turned around (upside down), inverted). The outcome of collective action becomes more understandable (intelligible, comprehensible) (clearer) through (by means of) contrast in consideration (view) of (considering) the original (or initial) intentions, but whoever knows only the intentions and the situation at the beginning (start, outset, commencement) of the becoming (or events) (nur die Absichten und die Lage am Anfang des Geschehens), (is) (can) hardly (able to) (capable of) prognosticate (predict, forecast, foretell) (prognosticating) the outcome on the basis of this knowledge – incidentally, the actors themselves would have been able to (could) do this, and history would then be foreseeable as structure and event (incident, occurrence; Ereignis). As [the] retrospective prophet which he is, the historian argues *ex post facto* (after the fact, subsequently, retroactively), that is, he sees actors' intentions in (the) light of a(n) actual (real, factual) outcome, which could not be known to the actors themselves. The methodological individualist errs (is wrong (mistaken)) in the belief [that] as [a] sociologist he would (be able to) [could] proceed otherwise (differently). He likewise looks at (considers, contemplates) things *ex post facto* – only this fact is here the social-scientific fact *par excellence*, namely, the fact of society.

As soon as the question of the use of collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) is posed, in the methodological individualists' thoughts world (i.e. system of ideas or ideological universe), the not unusual (in it [the methodological individualists' thoughts world]) conflict between (the) dogmatic intent(ion) and the necessities of research practice (praxis) breaks out (erupts, explodes). On the one hand, one must admit (confess, concede) that generalisations, precisely for the explanation of individual (separate, single, isolated) facts, are unavoidable (inevitable), that abstraction is inherent in every

thought, on the other hand, one [as a methodological individualist] would like it if concepts like society, nation or capitalism would (completely, totally) disappear (vanish) (entirely) from social science. The passable (i.e. practicable) middle course is sought in the consideration (contemplation) (of) ((way of) looking at) entireties (wholenesses, totalities) as fictions (in der Betrachtung der Ganzheiten als Fiktionen), which are, as it were (so to speak), made (thought, dreamt) up (fabricated, concocted, invented) according to (in line (accordance) with) variable (changeable, mutable, varying) research goals (ends, purposes), and behind which (are) only individuals (stand, [exist])<sup>168</sup>. Weber, to whom this concept (or conceptual plan) is attributed (ascribed, imputed), (has) nevertheless (however) called (named) ideal-typical fictions “intensified (heightened, increased, enhanced, improved) *reality*” („gesteigerte *Wirklichkeit*“), and this is supposed (meant) to (should) mean that, [in regard] to the constructive arbitrariness (der konstruktiven Beleibigkeit), boundaries (or limits) are set (put)(, which are [set]) because of the composition (texture or constitution) of the object (or subject matter) (die an der Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes liegen). A fiction does not come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge) (is not created (produced)) ex nihilo (out of nothing) in the [an] ideal type, i.e. the fiction [in an (the) ideal type] is not caused (produced, brought about, created, generated, engendered, manufactured) by (means of) (through) the accumulation (amassing) of fictive (fictitious) elements, but by (means of) (through) the refining (cleaning, purification; Reinigung) of real elements [in respect] of those aspects which are regarded (considered) in the chosen (selected) research perspective (as) accidental (coincidental, fortuitous, chance) and dispensable (non-essential, unnecessary). After the fixing (establishing,

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<sup>168</sup> Hayek, *Missbrauch*, pp. 90, 92, 69ff., 94ff..

determining, determination; Festlegung) of the research perspective, the construction of the ideal-typical fiction is subject to empirical examination (testing or scrutiny) (investigation, assessment, trial, proof(ing)) (empirischer Prüfung),(:) not all (any, random, arbitrary) fictions (whatsoever) have, therefore, the same empirical (knowledge, cognitive) value (regarding knowledge) (Erkenntniswert), and they cannot be exchanged (interchanged, replaced, substituted), so (as) long as the research perspective does not expressly change (vary). The individualistic emphasis (stress) on the fictivity (i.e. fictiveness or fictitiousness) of ideal-typical constructs and of generalisations generally (in general) remains correct (right) in principle, only in so far as it does not want to suggest [that] the ideal of social science is its own reduction to idiographic history through (by means (way) of) the reconstruction of individual acts (or actions) in concrete situations. However, it aims precisely at this.

Not by chance, therefore, the intellectual(-spiritual) genealogy of modern social science refers to the “holistic” philosophy of history rather than to (the) individualistic contract theory, to Vico and Herder rather than to Hobbes or Locke. The individualistic tradition of social-theoretical thinking (thought) has, in other words, for the formation (or development) of modern social science, contributed markedly (noticeably, distinctly, perceptibly) less than the “holistic” [tradition, one],(:) (something) which says (states, declares, testifies) nothing at all of course (naturally) in favour of “holistically” embellished (or disguised) (garnished, trimmed) normativisms. Methodological individualists praise Tocqueville’s achievement (accomplishment, feat, performance) in a work like *L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution* in order to substantiate (verify, back up, prove, produce (give) evidence for) the advantages (merits) of (the)

individualistic way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) in the social-historical field (area, sector, domain)<sup>169</sup>. It is, however, at least rash to conclude (infer, deduce) from Tocqueville's – anyhow (at any rate, anyway) ambivalent – political liberalism(,) his individualistic orientation in [regard to] social-scientific methodology (or approach pertaining to method) (in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Methodik). And it is frankly (absolutely, really) paradoxical for methodological individualism to vindicate a(n) (large-scale, extensive, great) analysis (on a large scale) at (in) whose centre (heart, focal point) are (stand) consciously very long-term institutional trends which by no means correspond to the actors' self-understanding. In comparison with (to) that, one could in fact (even) gain the impression [that] another classical sociological historiography (description (writing) of history), namely Marx's *The 18<sup>th</sup> Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, proceeds “more individualistically” – perhaps (maybe, possibly) of necessity, since the (time) period (of time) treated (handled) is much smaller. However, this example already teaches that a(n) proper (appropriate) weighing up (assessment) of individual action does not in the least depend on [a] confession (declaration) of faith in methodological individualism, whereas one can learn from Tocqueville that the orientation of research towards the long waves of collective action and towards the heterogony of ends' effects (or consequences) (results) does not at all have to arise (spring) from “holistic” biases (prejudices). As [we have] already noted (remarked, observed, mentioned), methodical (i.e. methodological) “rules” in such works play a considerably (substantially, significantly) smaller role than in conventional (plain, “good”, “well-behaved”) dissertations ((doctoral) thesis) or habilitation writings (i.e. treatises (or

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<sup>169</sup> Thus, Boudon, “Individualistic Tradition”, p. 49ff..

postdoctoral theses) (papers) pertaining to the institutional recognition of a scholar as having the highest academic qualifications) (Habilitationsschriften)<sup>170</sup>. Methodological individualists need (require), in any case, for the confirmation of their (fundamental) principles, entirely (totally, wholly, completely) different (other) scientific achievements (accomplishments, feats) than the mere proclamation (announcement), or the mere theoretical processing (treatment), of these (fundamental) principles. One would, furthermore (moreover, besides, anyway), be curious (inquisitive) to find out (learn, discover) what they *as* methodological individualists have to say about (regarding) [the] present and future of contemporary mass [society] and world society (Massen- und Weltgesellschaft). [That] [It] (is obvious) [that] the task (job, mission, duty) of a construction of the social from individuals in a world population of six billion humans (people, men) has become considerably (a great deal, substantially, sizably) more complex(, is obvious (evident, apparent)). And correspondingly (or in parallel with that) (parallely, commensurately, accordingly, at the same time, simultaneously), the feeling (sense) is reinforced (strengthened, amplified, intensified, heightened, increased, boosted) far and wide (as far as the eye can see) [that] the heterogony of ends, in the meanwhile (meantime), takes (has an) (is taking (having an)) effect (works, acts, operates) (working, acting) with the relentlessness (inexorability, pitilessness, mercilessness, implacableness, unrelenting nature) of fate (or destiny).

It would be unfair (unjust) to deny (refuse) methodological individualism any scientific value. However, its greatest merit (or service) is unintended (involuntary, unintentional, unwanted), and it lies (is) precisely (there)

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<sup>170</sup> See Sec. 2B in this chapter.



where Hayek and Popper would have not preferred [rather it not], since they [Hayek and Popper], regarding (concerning) this (in this regard (connection)), were less distant [not so far] from the social-ethical concerns (worries, cares, anxieties) of a “holist” like for instance Durkheim, than they [would have] wanted to admit. The – correct (right) – reminder (recollection, memory) [of the fact] that every society and every institution consists of individuals and only of individuals, amounts (is tantamount (equivalent)) directly or indirectly to a reminder of the precarious and fragile (delicate) character of every collective [entity, formation, group, body] and every objective construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation). Their [Every society and every institution’s] stability depends in fact on the most mobile and the most unstable [(of all) things (elements, features)]: (the) individuals and the relations between individuals. Without collective concepts (notions) (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective), the brittleness (or fragility) (crumbliness; Brüchigkeit) of the collective becomes still (even) more conspicuous (palpable, obvious, striking, evident), and the centripetal (centralising, unifying) forces, which it [the collective] unleashes (triggers, provokes, starts) for [the purpose of] compensation, are [the] reverse (flip, other) side and function of this brittleness (or fragility). (The) institutional orders (or regulations) (rules) appear now as the infinitely varying mixings (i.e. mixtures) (blendings, combinations) (out) of (from) (more) fixed (steady or stable) elements and (out) of (from) their individual manipulation. And the unintended consequences of action, which are supposed (meant) to (should) serve (be of use for) methodological individualists in (during) the creation (establishment) of fixed (steady or stable) elements, appear, for their part, as (to be) the great manipulators of (the) manipulating (manipulative) individuals (Die institutionellen Ordnungen erscheinen nun als unendlich variierende Mischungen aus

feste(re)n Elementen und aus deren individueller Manipulation. Und die unbeabsichtigten Folgen des Handelns, die bei den methodologischen Individualisten der Schaffung fester Elemente dienen sollten, erscheinen ihrerseits als die großen Manipulierer der manipulierenden Individuen).

#### d. Laws and causalities (Gesetze und Kausalitäten)

The conclusion (result(s), finding(s), outcome, consequence(s); Ergebnis) of the previous section was (read): the truism (commonplace; Binsenweisheit) [that] society consists of individuals and their acts (or actions) and only these, does not in the least entail methodological individualism's two fundamental (basic) assumptions (positions, theses, suppositions) because neither can the statements (or propositions) (opinions, pronouncements, assertions) about (on, regarding) social facts be reduced to statements (or propositions) about individuals, neither do individuals and their act(ion)s constitute the only ontological level inside of the social, unless one imagines (envisages, envisions, visualises, pictures) social being (Is) as perceptible (discernible, noticeable, observable) material (or stuff) (matter, substance) (wahrnehmbaren Stoff). We now turn to the third individualistic fundamental assumption, which says (means, states) [that] the inclusion (incorporation) of social facts in the concept (notion) of the social being (Is) must (has to, necessarily) lead(s) (flow(s)) (in)to the "holistic" or "historicistic" belief (faith) in (historical forms (kinds) of) law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) (in (of) history) and teleologically conceived (developmental, evolutionary) laws (of development (evolution)) of [in] history [historical forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) and teleologically conceived laws of development of history] (Glauben an Geschichtsgesetzmäßigkeiten und an teleologisch

konzipierte Entwicklungsgesetze der Geschichte)<sup>171</sup>. The false (wrong, incorrect) package (i.e. combination or union) (Das falsche Junktim) and the false (wrong, incorrect) alternative, standing behind it [that package, combination or union], were formulated with particular ((e)special) polemical emphasis, since this time it was a matter of the foe (enemy) par excellence, that is, of the Marxian perception (view) of history, whereby (in accordance with (according to) which) the law-bound (deterministic, law(rule)-based) (developmental) stages (tiers, grades, levels, degrees) (of development) [stages of development] in history (die gesetzmäßige Stufenentwicklung in der Geschichte) necessarily (unconditionally) lead to the building (or establishment) (erection, founding, construction) of a communistic society. Now already in the 19<sup>th</sup> century such a way of looking at (consideration (contemplation) of) the course of history was interpreted as [an] attempt to transfer, in a positivistic spirit, natural (i.e. physical) scientific thought patterns to the apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) of human affairs (or things) (matters); proponents (advocates, supporters) and opponents (adversaries, rivals, foes) of the [such a(n)] undertaking (venture) equally supported this interpretation<sup>172</sup>; and (the) methodological individualists continued this line of thought (further spun this leitmotif (thread))<sup>173</sup>. Under these circumstances(,) one would expect (anticipate), as [a] reaction (response) to (against) such (kinds of) philosophies of history, a sharp (acute) contradistinction (contrasting) between (of) (the) natural (i.e. physical) [sciences] and (the) (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) (humanities), and therein indeed (in fact (reality), actually) Hayek's fundamental argumentative strategy consisted too, who distinguished (differentiated,

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<sup>171</sup> See e.g. Watkins, "Historical Explanation", p. 106ff..

<sup>172</sup> See footnote 53 above.

<sup>173</sup> S. I. Berlin, *Four Essays*, pp. 43, 56 and passim. Berlin also stressed (emphasised) of course the metaphysical and eschatological component of the philosophies of history.

made a distinction) between the two (both) (scientific) genera (genuses, kinds, types, species) (of science) (den beiden Wissenschaftsgattungen), both [in respect] of (subject) matter (the (subject) matter of the social sciences is (are) [consists of] freely acting and understandable (intelligible) subjects) as well as [in respect] of, as [we have (already)] said (remarked, mentioned, commented, noticed, noted, observed), (the) method<sup>174</sup>.

Popper [thinks, holds, contends (thought, held, contended)] otherwise (differently). This [person] [He, Popper] agrees with (approves of) the ontological separation (or segregation) (cutting off, severance, disassociation) of both (scientific) fields (areas, domains, sectors) (of science), at the same time however, he (could) imagine(s) (had (has) in mind, was thinking of) their methodical (i.e. methodological) unification, (and) to which he dedicates (dedicated) his own powers (strength(s), faculties, forces) as [an] epistemologist. In [regard to] (On) this important point, he chimes in (i.e. agrees) with the neo-positivistic programme which, as it seemed, for its part pursued (followed) the “Enlightenment” aim (goal, objective, target) of unhinging (disrupting, unsettling, revolutionising) the idealistic and reactionary German (intellectual(-spiritual)-scientific) tradition in the humanities (geisteswissenschaftliche Tradition). On the other hand, he does not want to either share (in) neo-positivism’s implicit monistic ontology, or approve of inductivism as [a] means for (towards) the realisation of that programme. The ambivalence of his position and his impact (or influence) (effect, result, consequence) lies in [the fact] that he sought to attain (reach, achieve, accomplish) the neo-positivistic desideratum (demand) of a methodologically unified (or uniform) (united, standardised) science (das neopositivistische

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<sup>174</sup> *Missbrauch*, ch. I-III. See footnote 165 above.

Desideratum methodisch einheitlicher Wissenschaft) through (by (means (way) of)) conceptual (notional) means, which amounted (came (boiled) down) to (ended up in) a rehabilitation of the activity of the scientific subject, that is, to (in) a revaluation of the subjective factor (subsequent to (following, after) the older conventionalism), as well as of theory vis-à-vis (sensory (or material) (sensorial, sensual, sensuous, perceptible)) experience ((sinnlichen) Empirie). When shortly (briefly) thereafter (afterwards) – in [respect of] Popper's succession and against him – the epistemological subject was replaced (superseded) by a historical-sociological [subject] as originator (creator, author, bearer) of theories, the path (road, way) towards the historicisation of the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and towards the relativisation of their truth claim (ihres Wahrheitsanspruches) opened, while the growing (increasing) resistance against the neo-positivistic and analytical approaches in the field (area, domain, sector) of the theory of acting (i.e. action) (Handlungstheorie) led to the revival (resuscitation) of the old separation (division) between [the] meaning-like-purposeful (or meaning-bearing-expedient) (meaningful-end(goal)-oriented(useful)) [element, dimension, factor] and [the] causal [element, dimension, factor] (zwischen Sinnhaft-Zweckmäßigem und Kausalem), between understanding and explaining (explanation). This development – flanked (or accompanied) by the direct cultivation (maintenance, nurturing, caring) of (for) the humanities' (intellectual(-spiritual)-scientific) tradition on the part of hermeneutics – turned against that which Popper had in common (jointly, communally, collectively, together) with neo-positivism, and it [the said development] radicalised the aspects which separated him from it [neo-positivism] (it [neo-positivism] from him). Popper (has, had) projected his own ambivalence onto the image (or picture) of his great foe (enemy): with (under, by) "historicism" he understands (comprehends, sees), at times,

views (or perceptions) which identify (i.e. equate) (the) natural (i.e. physical) [sciences] and (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) (the) humanities with each other, at other times, historicism's humanities-oriented(related) (intellectual(-spiritual)-scientific) direction, which actually (really, virtually, precisely) lived from its [historicism's] separation [from the natural sciences]. No doubt (Certainly, Of course): (the) [said] identification (i.e. equating) (Die Identifizierung) is rejected by Popper regarding the question of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (Gesetzmäßigkeitsfrage), (the) separation [is rejected by Popper] regarding method. Nonetheless, he [Popper] does not himself make the (a) distinction (differentiate (distinguish) [between the natural sciences and humanities vis-à-vis historicism]) so (as) neatly (cleanly, clearly) as we do (make) it for him here, and furthermore (in addition), the essential aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) remains unanswered: how is the identity (i.e. sameness) (oneness) of the (explanatory) model (or pattern) (example) (of explanation) (Identität des Erklärungsmusters) (this turns against "historicism's" second version) possible [in view of] (during, among, near, with) (the) grave (serious, significant) ontological differences (their acceptance (assumption, supposition) turns against the [historicism's] first version [of historicism])? Identity (i.e. sameness) or, at any rate, far-reaching (extensive) approximation (convergence, approaching) can be asserted (defended, underlined, put into force) only with regard to the process of theory formation (shaping, forming, creation, development, setting up, construction) (Theoriebildung), i.e. one can with good reason(s) claim (maintain, contend, argue, assert) [that] the [a] researcher proceeds in the same manner (way) both in the (natural-[scientific] as well as intellectual(-spiritual)-scientific) realm (area, domain, field, sector) (of the natural (i.e. physical) sciences as well as of the humanities), while he

(by) indeed (in fact, of course) may (liking (wanting) to) pay lip service to induction, but in fact (actually) devises (or sketches) (plans, outlines, designs) theories or hypotheses(,) which are only in retrospect (hindsight) (afterwards) confirmed or rationalised through (by means of) empirical findings (results, evidence)<sup>175</sup>. However Popper does not keep (stick, adhere, hold, remain) to (with, at) the formal (i.e. form-related) level of theory formation. He transfers the identity (i.e. sameness) to the content of (the) explanatory (expository, explaining) theories or [of] (the) explanations (auf den Inhalt der erklärenden Theorien bzw. der Erklärungen) and defines, moreover, causal explanation in general as explanation by means of (through) law[s] (kausale Erklärung überhaupt als Erklärung durch Gesetz)<sup>176</sup>. Consequently (Thus, Therefore), he overshoots the mark, because he must now expound (explain, illustrate, explicate; erläutern) what it means to explain society and history by means of (through) law[s] without resorting to (or lapsing into) (falling (slipping) into) “historicism” and “holism”. The explication (explanation, illustration, exposition; Die Erläuterung) looks [sounds, reads, appears, seems] unsatisfactor(il)y: the laws of the social sciences are considered (held to be, regarded, thought of) either (as) banal (or trivial) (commonplace, trite, ordinary, shallow) or (as) merely probabilistic, with the unacknowledged (undeclared, unconfessed, unadmitted) result (consequence, outcome, effect)(,) [being] that the desideratum (demand) of methodical (i.e. methodological) unification (standardisation) is partly watered down (diluted) and partly abandoned (betrayed, surrendered). Popper’s solution is, as we shall (immediately) see (right away), wrong

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<sup>175</sup> I have discussed elsewhere (in another place [text, article]) („Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung“ [“Science, Power and Decision”]) the mechanisms of power and decision, which determine (condition, cause, necessitate) theory formation uniformly (in a unified (uniform) manner) in all fields (areas, sectors). Popper of course knows nothing of their [these (the said) mechanisms’] effect (impact, influence); what is *their* effect, appears in his eyes as praxis (i.e. practice) or [the, a] norm of science.

<sup>176</sup> See e.g. *Poverty*, p. 146: “causality means, fundamentally, determination by law”.

(mistaken, false) in accordance with [as regards, in terms of] both sides [of the matter (scientific endeavour)] (aspects): neither can causal explanation be defined sweepingly (generally, extensively, wholesale, indiscriminately) as explanation by means of (through) law[s], nor are social and historical causalities banal (or trivial), as is contended (asserted, claimed, maintained, argued) out of [due (owing) to, because of] angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry) before [in view (the face) of] “fatalistic determinism”. The following, after all (anyhow, all the same), remains characteristic (typical, indicative). Despite all [the] half-measures and ambivalences, Popper’s endeavour (effort) at unification (standardisation) brought on (set (triggered, sparked, touched) off, caused, aroused) [a feeling of] unease (uneasiness, discontent, discomfort) to (for) other methodological individualists(,) who found Hayek’s dualistic position more consistent<sup>177</sup>.

There would be nothing to (for) [a] debate, if Popper had confined (restricted, limited) himself to the refutation (disproving, disproof, rebuttal, falsification; Widerlegung) of “historicism” in the sense of a teleologically understood law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) [in respect] of the overall (total) historical course ((sequence, order) of events); we have, for our part, ascertained (established, determined, discovered, observed, noticed, seen) the continuing effect (impact, influence) (Fortwirkung) of such “historicistic” thinking (thought) on [in regard to] contemporary functionalistic evolutionism, as well as the incapability (or incapacity) (inability) of sociology to put forward (or establish) (propose, advance, set up, lay down, erect, formulate) a(n) unshakable (unalterable, firm, absolute) hierarchy of (permanently working (acting, operating, effective)) causal factors

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<sup>177</sup> Thus, e.g. I. Berlin, *Four Essays*, (foot)note 49.



(permanently having an effect) (eine unverrückbare Hierarchie permanent wirkender kausaler Faktoren aufzustellen)<sup>178</sup>. However Popper connects (joins, links, combines, associates, binds, ties) – and the connection is by no means logically compelling (cogent, conclusive, necessary, inescapable) – his refutation of “historicism”, or the first of both aforementioned versions thereof [of “historicism”] [i.e. the identity (i.e. sameness) of natural (i.e. physical) sciences and the humanities], with a positive (explanatory) model (or pattern) (example) (of explanation)(,) whose transfer(ence) to society and history in the framework of methodological monism gives rise to (causes, creates, induces, invokes, provokes) instructive (educational, informative) mistakes (errors). Some (Several, A few) conceptual clarifications are, nevertheless (however), as [an] introduction to this (examination (study) of the) problem (problem under examination) and as (orientational, orientative) help (assistance, aid) (as to (in respect of) orientation) (i.e. guidance) (Orientierungshilfe), necessary during its [this examination of the problem’s] processing (or handling) (unwinding, conclusion, completion; Abwicklung). First of all, [it] must be emphasised (stressed, recorded, held, captured) against Popper’s wholesale (sweeping, general, extensive, indiscriminate) judgements and demonisations that, no matter what (whatever) one thinks (holds in respect) of laws in history, not everyone, who accepts (assumes, adopts, presumes) such [laws in history], may eo ipso be called (described, referred to) (as) [a] “holist” or “historicist”. Laws, which concern (pertain to, regard, affect) the overall (total) course (sequence) (of events) [of], or the direction and the purpose (goal or end) [of], (of) history, are something other than laws(,) which inside (of) (within) this course (sequence) (of events) [of history] take (have an) effect (work, act,

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<sup>178</sup> See (above) Ch. 1, Sec. 3, and, Sec. 2B in this Chapter(, above).

operate) without teleological implications. Amongst these latter [laws inside the course of history without teleological implications], one must then again distinguish (differentiate) those which are supposed (meant) to (should) apply universally, from other(s) [laws] which include (or record) (register, capture, apprehend, grasp) a stable relation between two particular (special) aspects or components of society<sup>179</sup>. In the rush (intoxication) [Under the influence] of the struggle (battle, fight) against “holism” and the philosophy of history, Hayek and Popper missed (overlooked, [did not (failed to) notice]) that for instance (the) “laws” in the Marxian construction cannot be put down (reduced) all together (of them) and (not) entirely (completely, wholly, totally) to the philosophy of history, but also at least in part represent (constitute) empirically checkable (verifiable or testable) statements (or propositions) (pronouncements, assertions, opinions) on (regarding, about) the way (mode) of functioning of social formations and the causal interrelation (connection, correlation, context) of social factors (empirisch überprüfbare Aussagen über die Funktionsweise von Gesellschaftsformationen und den kausalen Zusammenhang sozialer Faktoren darstellen), which can have [a(n)] (continued) existence [continue to exist] irrespective (regardless independent) of the teleological background (backdrop). The [A] differentiation (distinction) of the concept (notion) of law should, in any case (anyway, at all events, at any rate), precede a condemnation (denunciation, denouncement) of “determinism” („Determinismus“) in accordance with (according to) a triple [three-pronged] criterion: level of validity (force, effect, influence, application), range (scope) of validity, stringency of validity (Ebene der Geltung, Reichweite der Geltung, Stringenz der Geltung).

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<sup>179</sup> Mandelbaum, “Societal laws”, passim.

Already the attempt at such a differentiation (distinction) of the concept (notion) of law, however, results in (yields, produces, makes, reveals, shows, establishes) a(n) in principle (fundamental, principal) distinction (difference, differentiation) between law and causality, since only that causality, whose range (scope) is unlimited (boundless) and whose stringency [is] absolute, may be regarded as (considered) [a] law *stricto sensu* (Schon der Versuch einer solchen Differenzierung des Gesetzesbegriffes ergibt aber eine prinzipielle Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Kausalität, da als Gesetz *stricto sensu* nur jene Kausalität gelten darf, deren Reichweite unbegrenzt und deren Stringenz absolut ist). Law is causality, not every causality constitutes, however (though), a law. Of causality or cause and effect (Ursache und Wirkung) way may talk (speak) with regard to individual (separate, single, isolated) facts or events (occurrences, incidents), of laws on the other hand, [we may talk] in (with) regard (respect) to (of) (regarding) [those (such) facts or events] necessarily being repeated (or repeating themselves) in [a] typical form (i.e. while conforming to a type) (sich in typischer Form notwendig wiederholende). [A] law correlates a type of event (incident, occurrence) with another type of event, not merely an event with another event; there are therefore no laws which concern (have to do with, regard, pertain to, affect) a(n) sole (single, unique, only, solitary, lone, just one) atypical event (die ein einziges atypisches Ereignis betreffen), even though (although, notwithstanding that) this [event] must come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, be created (produced)) as a result (because) of (due to) the effect (impact, consequence, influence, result) of a certain (particular) cause or causality. However, the mere causal effect of an event (Aber die bloße kausale Wirkung eines Ereignisses) on another [event] does not mean that the form, under which the causal effect took place, is transferable to other causal effects, that is, [that it (the said form

(of a causal effect))) is generalisable; and [a] law is exactly a universally in force (effect) (prevailing, applicable, operative, current) form of effect (or effectual form) of causality (und Gesetz ist eben eine universell geltende Wirkungsform von Kausalität). A broad (wide) spectrum (ein breites Spektrum) extends (stretches) between the [a] law *stricto sensu* and the causality of a(n) case (instance), and the task (job, duty, mission) of sociological and historical research during its search for causal interrelations (connections, correlations, contexts) consists in determining (fixing, defining) the place of the phenomenon (coming) in(to) question inside of (within) this spectrum. The [An] investigation (or tracing) of (inquiry (making inquiries) about) the causality, to which a phenomenon is subject, occurs (happens, takes place) with regard to the entire (whole, complete) spectrum (das ganze Spektrum),(:) it [the said investigation] implies direct or indirect comparisons of (causal(ity)) types (of causality) (Kausalitätstypen) with one another, and it is obvious that the rash identification (i.e. equating) of causal explanation with (the) explanation by means (way) of (through) [a] law[s] can only detract from (interfere with, damage, impair, impede, spoil, restrict) (the) necessary flexibility during (the) research into causes (Ursachenforschung). Instead of searching for laws in order to then, on this basis [i.e. the basis of laws], investigate (or trace) causalities, it appears [to be] much more fertile (productive, fruitful) to pose (the) concrete questions: to what extent (or in what way) does a type of causality between two successive historical events differ from that [(the) type of causality] between two sociological interrelations (correlations, contexts)? Does the cause of a certain (particular) type of phenomenon, e.g. a revolution, always remain the same(,) or does it change (vary) under the influence of other factors and [under] which [factors] on each and every respective occasion? Does the same cause have an (take) effect (act, work, operate) always in the same

way (manner)? How far is the [a] cause (distanced, removed) from the [an] effect, and what comes (in) between (them),(;) how is, on each and every respective occasion, the network (plexus, mesh) of necessary and sufficient reasons shaped (formed, moulded)?

The renunciation (or rejection) (refusal, cancelation) of teleologically conceived (historical forms (kinds) of) law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) (in (of) history) must, therefore, entail a renunciation (or rejection) of causality just as little as the taking seriously of causality calls for (commands, requires, demands) the acceptance (assumption, adoption) of laws of [a] (natural(physical)-scientific rather than historical-philosophical) type ([found] in the natural (i.e. physical) sciences rather than in the philosophy of history). The conviction [that] nomological knowing (knowledge) of [a, the] (natural(physical)-scientific) type ([found] in the natural (i.e. physical) sciences) is hardly suitable (any (not much) good) for the investigation of (research into) sociological and historical causality does not imply epistemologically the (any) glorification (praising) of chance (or coincidence) (Zufalls) in the name of human freedom (see below). Not even the acceptance (acknowledgement) of (confession of faith in) pure idiography must (necessarily, has (ought) to) amount(s) to (end(s) up in) a devaluation (debasement, disparagement, belittlement) of (the) causal way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation); the progressive (advancing, progressing, gradual, onward) causal analysis of the concrete case shows (displays, indicates, demonstrates) of course that as a result (because) of (due to) the complexity of causal interrelations (connections, correlations, contexts) and consequently (thus) of the constant (continuous, continual) overlapping (spreading or encroaching) (infringing) (Übergreifen) of one level of causality (causal level) into another [level of causality], pure

idiography is just as great a nonsense (mischief, nuisance, horseplay, devilment) as pure nomology (die pure Nomologie). That is why it is advisable (recommended) to not, in the interests of the in itself necessary sharp separation (i.e. distinction) (division, segregation) between law and causality, bring the causal way of looking at things into the vicinity of (close (near) to) idiography, and [it is advisable] to place little value on (think little of) the investigation of regularities, no matter how rich the yield (return, fruits, results) may be from case to case (Daher empfiehlt es sich nicht, im Interesse der an sich nötigen scharfen Trennung zwischen Gesetz und Kausalität die kausale Betrachtung in die Nähe zur Idiographie zu bringen und die Erforschung von Regelmäßigkeiten geringzuschätzen, egal, wie reich der Ertrag von Fall zu Fall sein mag)<sup>180</sup>. It is also advisable to not identify (i.e. equate) the distinction (difference) between law and causality in every respect with that [distinction] between nature and history or society, to want to find (discover, come across) causality by means of (through) law[s] only in nature and lawless causality (i.e. causality not by means of law[s]) (gesetzlose Kausalität) only in history or society. Because apart from the fact that the latter [causality not by means of law] is conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) in nature too, statistical-probabilistic regularities (statistisch-probabilistische Regelmäßigkeiten) can be found (located) at both ontological levels [i.e. of (historical) human action, and, of nature]. In this way (Because of that), the in principle difference existing between them [both ontological levels] is not disputed (denied, contested, challenged), but [the said in principle difference, it] must be sought where it is to (can, should) be found: in the fact that one end of the spectrum of causalities, i.e. law *stricto sensu*, can (should, is to) occur (appear, crop up, arise)

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<sup>180</sup> This is noted (marked, said) against Dray's idiographic preferences, *Laws*, p. 104ff..

only in nature, not in history and society; all other [things] are (everything else is), at least heuristically, a possibility (to be considered) for both ontological realms (areas, fields, sectors, domains; Bereiche), even though the [a] researcher can estimate (appreciate, reckon, assess, guess, forecast) in advance how frequently one or the other type of causality (causal type) appears (happens, occurs, crops up) in each of them (every one of them [both ontological realms]). Law, on the one hand, and causality [in respect] of one case, on the other hand, remain thus (consequently, therefore) indispensable (essential) as methodological and ontological (points of) orientation (points) – but only as such.

So much (far [it]) is now clear: the in principle openness (uncertain outcome) of historical-social developments (Die prinzipielle Offenheit geschichtlich-sozialer Entwicklungen) does not mean [that] the effect (impact, influence) of causality slackens (decreases, diminishes, subsides, abates, wears (eases) off, lets up, wanes fades; lasse...nach) now and then (from time to time, once in a while) or for [a] longer period (of time), but only [that] the constant (continual, continuous) crossing (or intersection) of several (a number of, quite a few) causalities with one another stands in the way of the (recti)linear (rectilineal) development (unfolding) of one [causality] amongst them(,) and forces (compels, enforces) unforeseeable (unpredictable) turns (i.e. changes) (turning points, twists). This [constant crossing of several causalities etc.], not intermittent causality (or causality breaking off or being interrupted (suspended), continuous causality) (aussetzende Kausalität), makes laws impossible(,) which would include (register, capture, grasp, record) the whole (entire) course of history or even only aspects (facets) of the same [course of history]; because law is nothing other than the absolutely certain imposition (pushing (carrying) through, assertion, predominance, prevailing, enforcement,

implementation) and unfolding (development) of a(n) sole (single, only, unique, solitary, lone) causal chain (denn Gesetz ist nichts anderes als die absolut sichere Durchsetzung und Entfaltung einer einzigen Kausalkette). Only a clear separation (division) between law and causality is, therefore (consequently), capable of (able to) (can) making (make) understandable (clear) why laws cannot be taken into consideration (considered) in Popper's "historicistic" sense. The separation does not take place (happen, occur) so that historical laws are substituted by historical coincidences (accidents, happenstances, fortuities, chances, [chance cases (instances, events, happenings, facts)]; Zufälle), but while chance (or coincidence) is assigned (allocated) to (or classified as) a causality(,) which is not law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), i.e. is not a one-dimensional and absolutely irrefutable (incontrovertible, irrevocable) causality (sondern indem der Zufall einer Kausalität zugeordnet wird, die keine Gesetzmäßigkeit, d. h. keine eindimensionale und absolut unumstößliche Kausalität ist). That is why chance (or coincidence) can be described (referred to) as (called) the invasion (breaking in) of a, for us, irrelevant causality, into a, for us, relevant [one, causality]; it is a question of standpoint, from which the crossing (or intersection) of causalities with one another becomes (is) perceived, and (so) seen [in this way] it [chance (or coincidence)] can even dominate, although all (everything) which exists in the world is determined (conditioned) causally<sup>181</sup>. There will always, therefore, be coincidences (accidents, happenstances, fortuities, chances, [chance cases (instances, events, happenings, facts)]) from the human perspective, of necessity

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<sup>181</sup> Meyer, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 23, 27. Weber follows (i.e. agrees (goes along) with) him ("causal concept of chance (or coincidence)"), *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 219ff.. Carr, who does not accept the difference (distinction) between chance (or coincidence) and causality even terminologically, argues similarly (*What is History?*, pp. 98ff., 107); for him, there are only "rational" and "accidental causes", that is, such [causes] which have an (take) effect (act, work, operate) in a number of (several, quite a few) cases, and hence can lead to generalisations, and such [causes](,) which only have an effect in a single (sole, solitary, lone) case and are of importance (significance) only for the analysis of this case.



concentrated on the [what is] relevant [element, dimension] (Zufälle wird es also in der menschlichen, notgedrungen auf Relevantes zentrierten Perspektive immer geben), since our knowledge (even (the) natural-scientific (knowledge) [pertaining to natural (i.e. physical) science] (auch das naturwissenschaftliche)) at best (most) can encompass (include, contain) individual (separate, single, isolated) causalities or [forms (kinds) of] law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) in the present, not their crossings (or intersections) with one another and not their crossings (or intersections) between all their effects (consequences, results, influences) in the future.

For methodological individualists, who comprehend (grasp, understand, interpret) the struggle (fight, battle) against “historicism” as [a] pleading (advocacy, defence) for (in favour of) the freedom of man (humans, people) and his [man’s] historical work (i.e. activities) (Wirken), the temptation prompts (suggests, advises) [(to) them] to extend (expand, stretch, enlarge) the rejection (disapproval) of the philosophy of history’s teleological determinism to every causal determinism. Berlin e.g., who knows the difference between both “determinisms”<sup>182</sup>, nevertheless talks (speaks) (so) as if there were a necessary interrelation (connection, correlation) between them [both “determinisms”], since for him (both) teleological law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) in history and (biopsychic) causality (equally, in the same way) eliminate (the) freedom of (the) will (or free will) (die Willensfreiheit) and the responsibility (or accountability) (answerability) of the person. This position, which was promoted to a liberal article of faith and commonplace (banality), leads to paradoxes. The philosophy of history (has) supported (defended, advocated, justified, represented) teleological

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<sup>182</sup> In the following [passage] [what follows], I [shall (be)] refer[ring] to *Four Essays*, p. 41ff..

determinism in order to safeguard (protect, secure) the meaning (sense) and purpose (goal or end) of human history with ultimate (final) arguments (um Sinn und Zweck menschlicher Geschichte mit letzten Argumenten abzusichern)(,) and to make [such meaning and purpose of human history (and ultimate arguments)] binding for [on] all individuals, no matter how they may behave as individuals; and the opponents (adversaries) of the philosophy of history reject (refuse, repudiate, repel, turn away) this determinism in order to protect (save, preserve, keep) the meaning and purpose (goal or end) of [the] free individual life from [in relation to] the blind power (might) of historical fate (or destiny). Yet why can the meaning and purpose of individual life be assumed (accepted, adopted, supposed, presumed) with certainty, but not the meaning and purpose of history as a whole? If life is supposed (meant) to (should) in general have [a] meaning and purpose, why may (can, should, must) (are) these [meaning and purpose] (allowed (permitted) to) become apparent (noticeable, evident, clear, manifest, perceptible) (make themselves felt) only at [the] individual [level], not at the level of history and of the genus (i.e. mankind or the human species)? And is it not considerably (much, a great deal, substantially) more difficult to grant (or confer on) (give, award, bestow) (to) individual life meaning and purpose if (when) history as a whole does not have any [meaning and purpose]? One can in fact deny (gainsay) (the) teleological determinism in (of) history (den teleologischen Geschichts determinismus) exactly *because* one is not capable of discerning (recognising, discovering, spotting) any meaning and purpose in human life at all, and indeed on the basis of the assumption (acceptance) of a strict determination of all individuals by their collective and personal biopsychic fate (or destiny). The [An] (optimistic) teleological determinism in (of) history can be shaken (rocked) by a biopsychic determinism, which stands [finds itself, has]

(under) pessimistic signs (i.e. symbolism) (auspices)<sup>183</sup>,(;) for (about) [in relation to] that (into the bargain, in addition), belief in (the) freedom of (the) will (or free will), from whose point of view both determinisms and ultimately (in the end, finally, after all) all types of causality are lumped together (tarred with the same brush), is not therefore by any means required. The equating (identification) of law and causality leaves “freedom” as [the] sole (only, single, unique, solitary, lone) (remaining) counter concept, and does not permit (allow) the refutation (disproving) of (the) teleological determinism in (of) history by the notion (thought, idea, concept, perception; Gedanken) of causality itself.

Beyond (Over and above, Apart from) that, the philosophical affirmation (approval) or rejection (disapproval) of (the) freedom of (the) will (or free will) is absolutely (completely, totally) irrelevant for sociological and historical research praxis (or practice). With that (Thereby, As a result,) it is not merely meant that the causal concept (notion) of chance (or coincidence) explained (explicated, expounded, elucidated) above makes a deduction (derivation, inference) of (the) freedom of (the) will (or free will) and [freedom] of acting (i.e. action) from the prevailing (ruling) of chance (or coincidence) in history redundant (unnecessary, superfluous, irrelevant) (eine Ableitung der Willens- und Handlungsfreiheit aus dem Walten des Zufalls in der Geschichte gegenstandslos macht). Rather, we

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<sup>183</sup> Anthropological pessimists have, at any rate (in any case), often attempted it, thus e.g. Cioran, *Histoire et Utopie*. For their part, the champions (or advocates) (proponents, defenders, supporters) of (the) freedom of (the) will (or free will) should explain [to] what [objections] then does (has) (the) [a] free will (der freie Wille) (object(ed)) against a law-bound (deterministic or law(rule)-based) course of history if (when) this heads (makes, is heading) for (aims (drives) at) ethically good aims (goals, targets, objectives, destinations), as most philosophies of history assure (reassure, promise, affirm) [us] in miscellaneous (different, differing, various) variations. A contrast(ing) (conflict, opposition) between free will and such aims (goals) of history can only be postulated with the help of the (in itself contradictory) theological assumption (supposition) [that] the [a] decision in favour of (for) (choice of) evil is a(n) inseparable ((entirely, totally) indispensable, integral) part of human freedom. But exactly in order to deprive (take all power(s) away from) (the) freedom [in favour of] (towards the) evil (of power), the philosophies of history (die Geschichtsphilosophien) (have) invented the determinism [in respect] of (the) [what is] good [as opposed to evil].

are thinking about something methodically (i.e. methodologically) fundamental (basic). Historical-sociological research must, namely, of its cognitive character, (make a) stop before that threshold(,) on the other side of (beyond) which the question [in respect] of (in accordance with) (the) freedom of (the) will (or free will) is posed. For sociological research in the narrower (strict) sense, which deals (is concerned (concerns itself), looks) in principle with (into) anonymous averages of social behaviour and with (into) resultants of numerous (a large number of) converging (or going into one another) individual act(ion)s (Für die soziologische Forschung im engeren Sinn, die sich prinzipiell mit anonymen Durchschnitten sozialen Verhaltens und mit Resultanten von zahlreichen ineinandergehenden individuellen Handlungen befaßt), this is clear anyhow (anyway). But the historical reconstruction of individual action (acting) too, must come to a standstill (stop, halt) outside of the (holy) sanctum (shrine)(,) in(side) which the mystery of freedom and necessity is acted out (happens, takes place). What may here seem (appear) (as) [to be] [the] free choice and correspondingly [the] free acting (i.e. action) of the historical actor, constitutes in reality a projection of the alternatives of acting (i.e. action), as the historian perceives (sees) them [these alternatives] in [regard to] the situation in question (concerned) (in der betreffenden Lage), in [regard to] the actor's representational (or ideational) world (world of representation (ideas, notions, perception), imagination; die Vorstellungswelt), as well as a connection (or combination) (interrelation, link(ing), association, bond), made (or manufactured) (produced, established, fabricated, restored) by the historian (vom Historiker hergestellte), of the actor's outer (external) mode (way) of acting (i.e. action) (conduct; Handlungsweise) with the inner (internal) act of choice (Akt der Wahl) between the supposedly (ostensibly) existing alternatives. Put differently (another way, otherwise)

(In other words): as much as the historian also wants to put (place, set) the [an] actor at (in) the centre (focal point, heart) of his description (or account) (portrayal, representation), in actual fact (reality) he starts from the situation in which the actor (supposedly) finds himself (is found) (faktisch geht er von der Lage aus, in der sich der Akteur (angeblich) befindet),(;) he [the historian] forms a(n) judgement (opinion) on (about, regarding) the possibilities of acting (i.e. action) in this situation, and he comprehends (grasps, understands, interprets) the action of the actor as [a] function of the choice between these possibilities. In so far (as much) as the historian accepts (assumes, adopts), therefore, the freedom of choice, he comprehends it, in actual fact, as [a] correlate of what he considers (regards, holds to be, thinks of) (as) the openness (uncertain outcome) of a situation, or (rather, else) (alternatively) he translates that which he considers (holds to be, regards, thinks of) (as) the openness (uncertain outcome) of the situation into [as] the actor's freedom of acting (i.e. action). In any event, his [the historian's] starting point is of necessity an external (outer) and observable [one, starting point], i.e. a (notion (idea, representation, perception) of the) situation and an acting (i.e. action) of the actor (in accordance with his [the historian's] opinion connected with it [that situation]). The historian can go further (on(ward), forward, beyond) only in the direction of (towards) himself, i.e. he can reflect upon his own work and even analyse the optical illusion which brings (leads, causes) him, in relation to that, to classify the actor's action as free action, because it [the actor's action] arrives (comes) on the scene (appears) as [a] choice between alternatives. However, he [the historian] cannot go further in the direction of (towards) the actor, that is, he, under no circumstances, can take (adopt, assume) as [the, a(n)] actual (real) starting point of his description (or account) the processes (or (series of) events) (occurrences, developments) in the actor's (conscious and

unconscious) psyche, and assert (claim, maintain) the freedom of his [the actor's] choice in the knowledge [while knowing] of these processes (or (series of) events), [but, and] not with regard to the (assumed (adopted, accepted)) openness (uncertain outcome) of the situation. All this also applies to (is valid for) the actor himself, in so far as he is confirmed (proved true) (confirms (proves, acknowledges) himself) as [a] historian and wants to account for his acts (or actions). The historian, or the actor as a historian of himself, thus can and must comprehend (understand, grasp, perceive, interpret) and (re)present (show, depict, portray, describe) the actor's action as [a, the] choice between alternatives, yet (however) whether this choice was free or not, escapes (eludes, defies, is beyond) his [the historian or actor as historian of himself's] knowledge and competence; if he is convinced of the contrary (opposite), then he is persevering (adhering) (perseveres, persists) merely in (to) the optical illusion outlined (described) above. This becomes more understandable if we think of the case (instance) [in which] the actor acts more or less "unfree (not free)" („unfrei“, e.g. under the influence of a(n) (coercive (forcible, coerced, forced)) idea (notion, representation, perception) (of coercion (compulsion or necessity)) (Zwangsvorstellung), and nevertheless can choose amongst a number of (several, various, multiple, quite a few) possibilities: one is driven by pathological hate to(wards) murder (homicide), and in the course of this (at the same time), one chooses in [a state of] cool (chilly, cold) end (goal) (purposeful, expedient) rationality (or expediency) (in kühler Zweckrationalität) (the) [a(n)] suitable (right, appropriate, fit) procedure (or course of action) and the most effective means. The historian can ascertain (determine, establish, find out, discover) the motive and judge (assess) the end (goal) (purposeful, expedient) rationality (expediency) of the action, he can(not) and must (not) say nothing (anything) about whether the actor was

“determined” or not by his motive or his biopsychic composition (texture or constitution) to(wards) (vis-à-vis) [commit] (the) murder. Freedom with regard to (in view of, regarding) [the fact] *that* an act (eine Handlung) is undertaken or omitted (neglected), is something different than freedom in relation to (regarding) the *how* (*How*) of the act. The wilful (deliberate, voluntary; willentliche) character of an act is something other than the existence of causes for this act. And the existence of causes for the act is something different than the subsumability (Subsumierbarkeit) of these causes under the necessity of a (biopsychic) law. Consequently, we [have] come back (return[ed]) to the fundamental (basic, elementary) distinction between law and causality.

The sociologist and the historian can, therefore, rightly (properly) little [hardly, barely] start with the assumption that history is made by “free human wills and free choices”. After such an – ethically rather than scientifically motivated – confession of faith (creed), they [the sociologist and the historian] would have to anyhow (anyway) proceed (go (pass, move) over (on)) to research practice (praxis), and then they would again stand (be, [find themselves]) before the same question, before which Herodotus and Thucydides in their (at that) time (in those days) had stood (were, [found themselves])<sup>184</sup>: what was the cause of the individual acts (or actions) and of the collective course (order or sequence) of events (i.e. development) (und der kollektiven Abläufe), why are they so (thus) and did not turn out otherwise (differently)? Indeed (Actually, In fact (reality)): the historical material and the historical narrative (narration, story, tale, account) *must* be organised around the axis of this question should history really (actually, after (at) all, in general) differ (be distinguished) from [a] chronicle (annals). Because the criterion for [the]

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<sup>184</sup> See footnote 81 above.

selection (choice) and putting in order (inclusion, incorporation, ordering) (or classification) of the facts can be sought and found only in a judgement (estimation, adjudication) of their relative weight (gravity) inside of the overall (total) causal context (or interrelation) (des kausalen Gesamtzusammenhanges). This weight is measured against (compared to) their [the said facts'] consequences, and the consequences of the facts awaken (stir up, arouse) for their part (the) historical interest for [in] the causal preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions) of these same facts, so that gradually (step by step, bit by bit) a structured (organised), gapless (complete, total, full, unbroken, watertight) historical narrative, i.e. a historical continuum (ein historisches Kontinuum)(,) is formed (developed)<sup>185</sup>. The question about (regarding, in accordance with, of) the subjective meaning (or sense), which (the) actors (have) connect(ed) with their act(ion)s, is posed only as a result of the ascertainment of the status (or importance) (value) of those act(ion)s inside of the historical continuum. In view of this function of the notion (idea, thought, concept) of causality for the constitution of the historical narrative, it appears [to be] (seems) unfounded (groundless, absurd, bizarre) to see, from [a] literary or hermeneutic perspective, the historical text's cement in the narrative itself, in the dynamic(s) of its own unfolding (development) and in its immanent (inherent) structural law<sup>186</sup>. A weighing up (assessment) of act(ion)s and facts, which by [of, in accordance with] its [very] essence (nature, texture, character, being; Wesen) must be thought of in (accordance with, terms of) causal categories(,) and carries (bears, yields, supports) the narrative *as history*, always underlies (is at the root of) the undoubtedly existing own (independent or autonomous) life (Eigenleben)

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<sup>185</sup> Cf. Carr, *What is History?*, p. 103; Lukacs, *Hist. Consciousness*, p. 128ff.; Mandelbaum, *Anatomy*, p. 76.

<sup>186</sup> Thus, e.g. L. White, *Metahistory*, also Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*.



of the narrative as literary form. The purely literary aspect itself, as informative (instructive, revealing, illuminating) as it may (also) be in other respects, lies (is) outside of the interests and of the competencies (domains, responsibilities; Zuständigkeiten) of history as science. The identification (i.e. equating) of history and narration (or narrative) cannot, in any case (at all events (any rate)), name (call, give away, reveal) the specific difference between history and chronicle (die spezifische Differenz zwischen Historie und Chronik).

The causal nexus, which gives (provides, delivers) the structure of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) structure) [structure of depth] (Tiefenstruktur) of [the] historical narration (narrative), can though (certainly, indeed, however) be conceived (designed, planned, drafted) and articulated in a unified (closed) manner or loosely, systematically or in passing (casually, incidentally). But even when (deeper, more profound) causal analyses (going deeper [into matters]) (tiefergehende kausale Analysen) and the corresponding abstract terms are lacking (absent, missing) or even banished (ostracised, outlawed, excommunicated, banned, expelled, excluded), nevertheless expressions and words emerging (arising, surfacing, appearing, coming (cropping, turning) up) time (again) and again (repeatedly) (as for instance “under these conditions (circumstances)”, “unavoidably (inevitably)”, “influence”, “motive”, “lead [to]”, “bring about (cause, give rise to, result in)” and other[s] [expressions and words]), reveal what is being acted out (happening, taking place) in the thought (notional or intellectual) (imaginary) background (im gedanklichen Hintergrund). In the course of this, the implicit or pronounced (express(ed), marked, distinct, definite, explicit) causal explanations (Kausalerklärungen) are based a) on the assumption (or acceptance) (supposition, adoption) of regularities

(when(ever) (if) x, then one may (should, must) expect (be prepared for, reckon with, take into account, estimate) y), b) on presumptions (suppositions or conjectures) (assumptions) (Vermutungen) and ascertainments (observations, realisations) about (on, regarding, over) the motives and reasons for acting (i.e. action) or c) on assessments of the influence of a(n) earlier (previous) event (occurrence, incident) on the coming (bringing) about (genesis) (das Zustandekommen) of a later (subsequent) [event]<sup>187</sup>. (Moreover,) At least at (in) the back of the historian's mind(,) (is) the category of the objective possibility (is (moreover) found (located)), which with the help (on the basis) of (based on, starting from) the hypothesis about ([in respect] of, regarding, on) the absence (non-appearance, non-materialisation, non-realisation, eclipse) of an event or factor, allows (permits) [the] conclusions about ([in respect] of, regarding) its [the event or factor's] causal relevance<sup>188</sup>. The question: "what (would happen ((there) be),) if (not)..." does not constitute an escapade of [a] historical phantasy, but a legitimate thought experiment for the (indirect) verification of a causal hypothesis,(;) it [the said question] (stands) (is) just as epistemologically (to reason) (obvious, reasonable, plausible, logical) as [it does (is)] psychologically. It [This question] illuminates (elucidates) from a wider (broader) point of view (angle, perspective, viewpoint) the difference (distinction) between history and chronicle, and already its [the said question's] formulation implies both a programmatic connecting (linking, combining, connection, combination, association, bond, interrelation; Verbindung) of [between] history and causal explanation (with each other) as well as the assumption (or acceptance) of the openness (uncertain outcome) of the becoming (or events) – in short (a nutshell), it implies a simultaneous (concurrent)

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<sup>187</sup> Gardiner, *Nature*, p. 67ff..

<sup>188</sup> Weber, *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 266ff..

affirmation (approval) of causality and [a] rejection (disapproval, refusal, denial) of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity). The application (use, employment, usage, bringing to bear) of the category of the objective possibility constitutes (represents) an isolating (insulating, isolative) thought (intellectual, mental) operation (eine isolierende Denkoperation); through it [this application of the category of the objective possibility or thought operation], namely, the causal weight (gravity) of an event or factor through (by means of) [the] isolation of the same [event or factor] from the rest of [the events or factors] is calculated (estimated, assessed, worked (figured) out, reckoned, taken into account, computed). Successive isolations for the determination (or investigation) (establishment, ascertainment, tracing; Ermittlung) of causalities result in (amount (come) to, yield, produce, make), for their part, the central structuring principle of [the] historical narration (narrative) (das zentrale strukturierende Prinzip historischer Erzählung). With their [the successive isolations'] help (aid, assistance), the researcher's standpoint gains (acquires, obtains, wins, gets, procures) validity (prestige or recognition) (value, influence, worth, importance, respect, acceptance; Geltung), in whose judgement (estimation, discretion) it matters (is important, means [a lot]) to centre the causal analysis on (around) a certain (particular) factor or on the relation(ship) between two or a number of (several, many, multiple) factors; [the] object (subject matter, topic, motif, theme), extent (range, scope, size, scale), materials and structuring of the narrative (narration) will then turn out (end up, [transpire, come about, take place]) accordingly (correspondingly). The clause "ceteris paribus" ["with other things (or conditions) [remaining] the same", or, "(all) (other) things being equal (or held constant)"], in which (the) isolating thought operations find expression (manifest themselves, are reflected), keeps (brings, calls) (once) again (more) in (to) mind [reminds us] that the

ascertainment of a cause does not have to (necessarily) point (allude) to (indicate, suggest) law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity). Because the effect (impact, influence, result, consequence) of the cause depends on the attendant (surrounding) circumstances (Begleitumstände), on the “ceteris”. This effect can be unequivocally (unambiguously) determined (found out, made (up), constituted) only inside of (within) an intellectually (, in terms of thought(s and ideas),) prepared closed system; however, the clear causal lines become (go) blurred (or cloudy) (dull, muddy) as soon as (when) one turns (devotes oneself) to the darkest (unplumbed) depths (or abysses) (chasms, precipices; Abgründen) of motivation or to the complex variety (diversity) of form (multiformity) of the environment<sup>189</sup>. Nonetheless, it does not lead (take, guide, carry, escort, go) [us] in(to) research practice (praxis) much further if, in [respect of] the laudable (commendable, praiseworthy) intention (purpose, aim) of avoiding (evading, eschewing, steering clear of, shunning) dogmatisms, the affirmation (protestation, (solemn) declaration, assertion) [that] all [things] (everything) interrelate(s) (connect(s), is interwoven) somehow with all [things] (everything) and [that] all [things] (everything) are (is) mutually (reciprocally) determined (conditioned), takes the place of concrete questions over (about, regarding, on) each and every respective relevance of causal factors. Because, as true as this may be in abstracto, it does not though (however) necessarily (unconditionally) explain the individual (separate, single, isolated) case (instance) in (during) which one sole (only, unique, single) cause or one unique (or one-off(time)) (singular) constellation (i.e. correlation) of causes can be the deciding (decisive, crucial) factor (Denn, so wahr dies in abstracto sein mag, erklärt es jedoch nicht unbedingt den

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<sup>189</sup> Cf. Marrou’s remarks (comments, observations), *Connaissance*, p. 178ff..

einzelnen Fall, bei dem eine einzige Ursache oder eine einmalige Konstellation von Ursachen den Ausschlag geben kann). The acceptance (or assumption) of a multi-causality (Multikausalität) with regard to (in view of, in connection with) the totality (entirety) of phenomena constitutes, indeed (actually, in fact (reality)), a good antidote against (to) dogmatism. Yet (But, However,) the totality of phenomena is not the usual (customary, normal) object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of research practice (praxis); in it [research practice](,) the task (or problem) (job, duty, question, mission) of the determination (or investigation) (establishment, ascertainment, tracing) and hierarchisation of causalities in (during) every concrete case or context (or interrelation) (connection, correlation) (is) hence (set, posed, put) (arises) always anew.

Berlin's doubts (thoughts, reflections, objections) [regarding, about, on] (against, to) Popper's epistemological monism were, as [already] mentioned [above], not dispelled by the common confession (i.e. declaration) of faith in (acceptance (acknowledgement) of) methodological individualism. Both [opposing] tendencies (lines (schools) of thought, directions) [regarding (for and against) epistemological monism] inside of the latter [methodological individualism] however erred (were wrong (mistaken)) for the same reasons, albeit in the reverse (contrary) sense. Berlin made, in the interest of the protection (preservation, safeguarding, conservation) of freedom from [in respect of, before] all forms (shapes) of determinism, in practice (practical terms) no distinction (difference) between law and causality, and comprehended (grasped, understood, construed, perceived, interpreted) the (ontological) distinction (difference) between nature and society as one [a distinction] between determinism (in every form) and freedom. Popper brought, on the contrary, law and causality, in the

interests of the (epistemological) convergence (reconciliation, approach) between [of] nature and society, together. His [Popper's] thesis [that] causal explanation is explanation by means of (through) law[s], underlies (is at the root of) the construction of a nomological (explanatory) model (of explanation) of universal validity (der Konstruktion eines nomologischen Erklärungsmodells universeller Geltung), for which the name "Covering Law Model" was established in the [related, associated, relevant] discussion (debate) [that ensued]. According to that (Accordingly), the causal explanation of an event consists of two groups of statements (or propositions) (opinions, pronouncements, assertions): one of them contains the (initial, starting, commencing) conditions (at the start, in the beginning) [initial (i.e. starting) conditions] (Ausgangsbedingungen), which determine the event, i.e. the circumstances under which it [the (said) event (in question)] takes place; the other formulates the general law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity)(,) which prevails in those initial (or starting) conditions, and via the effect (impact, influence) of these latter [initial conditions] causes (induces, brings about, gives rise to, creates, generates) the coming (bringing) about (genesis) of the event. [The] [relevant] Law[s] and initial (i.e. starting) conditions *must (have to)*, taken (all) together (all in all, all things considered), result in (yield or produce) (amount to) the event, that is, the event can be deduced from those [factors, that law and those initial conditions] not only in the form of a finding (or ascertainment) (result, datum, fact), but already in the form of a prognosis (forecast, prediction; Prognose)<sup>190</sup>. The claim (demand, requirement) of this model to (for)

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<sup>190</sup> *Open Society*, II, p. 262. The model was (repeatedly) expounded (explained, explicated) and defended by Hempel (many (several) times); see his synopsis (summary) in "The Function", p. 459ff.. In nuce (i.e. in a nutshell), the model is already found in Weber, who wants to found (establish, base) historical explanation in the joint (or combined) effect (impact, influence) (synergy) (Zusammenwirkung) of "ontological knowing (knowledge)" (knowledge about the concrete situation) and "nomological knowledge" (knowledge of certain (particular) (experiential (i.e. empirical)) rules ([in respect] of experience) (Erfahrungsregeln) about (on, regarding, over) the manner (way) in which

universal validity (is) obviously (evidently, apparently) based (rests) on the assumption [that] the formal (i.e. form-related) identity of its [this model's] logical structure, at all possible levels of its application, is in itself sufficient (adequate, enough) in order to make the ontological difference between these levels epistemologically irrelevant; consequently (therefore, thus), the ubiquitous unity of the formal(form-related)-epistemological [aspect, element, dimension, sphere] (die ubiquitäre Einheit des Formal-Epistemologischen) conceals (covers up (over), masks, obscures) like a miraculous veil (wie ein Wunderschleier) the difference in [regard to] the ontological [aspect, element, dimension, sphere] (die Differenz im Ontologischen)(,) and simply spirits it [this difference in the ontological (aspect, element)] away. This seems (strikes one as) paradoxical if (when) one simultaneously is of the firm belief [that] society and history constituted(,) in contrast to nature(,) which knows no personality and no will, the unfolding space (room for unfolding, field of activity; Entfaltungsraum) of human freedom and dignity. So (Thus,) Berlin's fears (misgivings, apprehensions) were therefore not unfounded (unwarranted, baseless, groundless, unsubstantiated). Indeed (In fact (reality), Actually), the peculiarity of the ontological level, upon which human things (i.e. affairs) (matters) stand (are), offered such (so) (a) strong (a) resistance to (against) the model of unity (uniformity) (unitary model) (Einheitsmodell) that this [model of unity of the ontological levels] had to be watered down (diluted) to [the point of] irrelevance. Before we [Prior to us] see(ing) how it (that) came

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humans (people, men) are in the habit of (accustomed to) reacting); in the course of this (into the bargain), every constituent (integral) element (part) (component) of the [a] situation or of the initial conditions should (is supposed to) be able to be fitted (inserted, added) (in)to a(n) (experiential) rule ([in respect] of experience) (*Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 276ff.). Weber of course was (did) not think(ing) of a(n) (explanatory) model (of explanation), which would bridge the gap between [the] natural (i.e. physical) [sciences] and (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) (the humanities); he nonetheless suggested (proposed) something structurally similar precisely with regard to the field (area, sector) for which the Covering Law Model is (the) least suitable [i.e. the field of the humanities].

about (happened), we want to recall (recollect, call to mind) its [the said model's] fundamental (basic) weaknesses.

Let us (We shall) begin once more (again) with the distinction (difference) between law and causality. Causal explanation by means of (through) law[s] would only (then) be problemless (i.e. problem-free) (unproblematic, without problems) if (when) [a] law[s] by definition (per definitionem) contained (comprised, included) and implied all causal factors which determine (condition) a phenomenon. But that is not so [the case]. So that the phenomenon can be subsumed under the [a] law, (it takes) a causality or cause independent of the law concerned (in question) (is required (needed)). A subsumption of the phenomenon under the [a] law (not) mediated by any (no) particular causality or cause would only (then) be a possibility (considered) if (when) the law exclusively applied to (was valid for) that phenomenon. Yet a law must, should it be (allowed to be) called a law (at (after) all, anyway (anyhow)), apply to (be valid for) a number of (several) phenomena which belong to a certain type, that is, it [a law] does not apply to individual (single, separate, isolated) phenomena, but to one type of phenomenon, and it cannot include (capture or cover) (register, record; erfassen) the attendant (surrounding) circumstances(,) under which these phenomena come forward (or occur) (happen, appear, present themselves); every phenomenon has, by the way (incidentally), several (multiple, many, various) aspects, and it is subsumed under the [a] law not as [a] whole, but only in accordance with the aspect receptive (susceptible) to it (that) [(the) law] on each and every respective occasion. Since the phenomenon, apart from (except for, besides) (the) typical [aspects](,) also has specific aspects (außer den typischen auch spezifische Aspekte hat), since it is thus (hence) not absorbed (assimilated) in toto by (does not thus go into) (the) [a] law[s]



(in toto), which can only concern (affect, pertain to, regard) (in [respect of] its [the law's] spirit (or sense)) [the, what is] typical (das nur (in seinem Sinne) Typisches betreffen kann), since its [the phenomenon's] subsumption thereunder [under the law] is partial and consequently must take place (occur, happen) under specific conditions, so (then, thus) must it [the said subsumption] be mediated also by a causality independent of the law[s]. Certainly (No doubt, Of course), during a motor's (or an engine's) breakdown (failure), a natural (i.e. physical) law is at work, but the breakdown is due e.g. directly to the mechanic's negligence (carelessness), which does not in itself have anything to do with the law; certainly (no doubt, of course), one falls from the [a] tree by virtue (means) of the law of gravitation (gravity), but one [simultaneously] falls because one slips<sup>191</sup>. Especially with regard to social and historical phenomena, which are borne (carried) by human subjects (die durch menschliche Subjekte getragen werden), it can never turn (work) out (succeed, be successful) [that] the same relation is (be) established (made, produced, manufactured, restored) between these subjective bearers and the laws which are supposed (meant) to (should) determine (condition) their acts (or actions), as (like) [in respect (the case) of] that [(the) relation] of one class with (towards, vis-à-vis) its elements<sup>192</sup>. That, which here as law, e.g. the psychological law of a stable disposition, would have to explain the mode (way) of acting (action) in a concrete case, cannot constitute (or provide) (produce, make) [a] sufficient condition for (the) explanation, because it is by no means certain that the actor, without exception, will follow his disposition and not that which for instance commands (demands, requires, calls for) consideration for external (outer) factors and constraints (or compulsions) (coercion(s)). The

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<sup>191</sup> Mandelbaum, "Problem", esp. pp.55-57.

<sup>192</sup> Danto, *Analytical Philosophy*, p. 230ff..

assumed (adopted, accepted, supposed, presumed) dispositional law (Das angenommene dispositionelle Gesetz) is prevented (hindered) here in its effect (impact, influence, result, consequence) by the intervening (or interposing) (interfering, stepping in; das Dazwischentreten) of this particular causality, whose determination (or investigation) (establishment, ascertainment, tracing) requires (needs, necessitates) a likewise particular (i.e. specific) (special) investigation (examination, inquiry), just as in other cases the effect (or impact) of laws is enabled (made possible) by the intervening (or interposing) of another particular (i.e. specific) causality. [A, The] disposition *can*, regardless (irrespective) of external (outer) factors and constraints (or compulsions) (coercion(s)), and even “against every reason (i.e. good (or common) sense) (Vernunft)”, lead to an acting (act or action) (einer Handlung führen). That, however, happens (occurs, takes place) in concrete cases, not always and everywhere (all over (the place)); that is why [a, the] disposition is [the] cause of this or that act (or action) (Handlung), not [the] law of action (Gesetz des Handelns) in general.

The Covering Law Model therefore disregards (ignores, shrugs off, overrides, rides roughshod over, defies) the sufficient conditions of act(ion)s and historical phenomena. And it does not itself constitute a necessary condition [in respect] of [for] explanation (explanatory condition; Erklärungsbedingung), because [the] aim (goal, objective, target) of historical explanation is not (the) proof [that] a certain person, under the determining (i.e. determinative) influence of a certain disposition, would always act in the same way (manner), but it [the aim of historical explanation] is the understanding of [to understand] his [the said person’s] acting (act or action) from the perspective of the subjective

meaning (or sense) connected with it [that acting]<sup>193</sup>, which in turn ((then) again) is inseparable from the logic of the situation, no matter (irrespective of) whether situation and disposition stand (are [found]) vis-à-vis (to(wards)) each other in [a] positive or negative relation(ship) (Situation und Disposition in positiver oder in negativer Beziehung zueinander stehen). Over and above (Beyond) that, the (sociological) classification (assignment, allocation, relation; Zuordnung) of a phenomenon (with)in a class of phenomena does not in the least mean [there is] carte blanche (an open invitation (excuse)) to treat (handle, deal with) the phenomenon concerned as [a(n)] instance (case) of the application of a law, and indeed (in fact, namely) (also) (then) not (even) (when, if) regularities could be ascertained (noticed, observed, discovered, found out) here. A phenomenon may e.g. be called “war” or “revolution”, yet only a bad (poor) sociology or history would draw from that the conclusion [that] it [the said phenomenon] may (should, ought to) be explained just like every other phenomenon of [with] the same name or [that] for all phenomena of [with] the same name, the same explanation and law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) applies (is valid)<sup>194</sup>. Here the essential difference (distinction) between [the] natural-scientific [pertaining to natural (i.e. physical) science] and sociological-historical way (manner, mode) of explanation appears (emerges, makes itself felt, shows itself). In [regard to] (During) the former [way of explanation, case] one can suppose (assume) [that] phenomena of one and [the] same class are put down (due, reduced) to the effect (impact, influence) of the same constant (or invariable) (steady; gleichbleibenden) causality, i.e. the same law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity); in [regard to] (during) the latter [way of

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<sup>193</sup> Dray, “Historical Explanation”, p. 109.

<sup>194</sup> Dray, *Laws*, p. 46ff..

explanation, case], the – always only (very) loose (slack) – common bond  
 (or interrelation) (togetherness, linkage, interdependence;  
 Zusammengehörigkeit) of phenomena inside of (within) the same class  
 does not (offer any) guarantee (for) the ubiquitous effect (impact,  
 influence) of causal factors; the investigation (or exploration) of (research  
 into) the same [causal factors] must start in every case anew,(;) a  
 deductive method (or procedure) (ein deductives Verfahren) does not  
 come into question (is not a possibility) here, at most (best) a comparative  
 (comparing) [method (is the only possibility)]. Against [In relation to]  
 that, the possible (potential) ascertainment of regularities by sociology  
 would also not change (alter) much [i.e. many things (the situation)].  
 Because it can never be certain in advance that the phenomenon  
 concerned belongs to the rule and does not constitute the exception to it  
 [the said rule]. Sociological regularities do not absolve (release, excuse,  
 deliver) [us] from the duty (obligation, responsibility, onus) of (historical)  
 (causal) research into (of) (historical) causes (historischen  
 Ursachenforschung) in every concrete case. (Both) Sociology and history  
 thus (equally) (both) go against (oppose, resist, reject) the Covering Law  
 Model, notwithstanding (regardless of) their each and every respective  
 dealing[s] (contact, handling, association, relation) with regularities.

The illusion (deception, delusion; Die Täuschung) [that] the unity of  
 epistemology can cover over (up) (or conceal) (obscure, drown out)  
 ontological differences opened up (ripped, tore (open, up)) a(n) further  
 (additional) fatal hole (gap) in Popper and Hempel's (explanatory) model  
 (of explanation). It was overlooked that laws and causalities possess  
 (have) sufficient (explanatory) strength (power or force) (of explanation)  
 (Erklärungskraft) only (then) when (if) they are specific for [(with regard)  
 to] each and every (respective) ontological level (in question, concerned).

Otherwise, they [laws and causalities] can name at best (most), for the occurrence (incidence, existence; Vorkommen) of a phenomenon, many a (some) necessary condition[s] which are not necessarily relevant for the explanation undertaken, since they [these laws and causalities] have [a] specific character only at another ontological level. Thus (So), social-historical action cannot annul (cancel, override) physical laws, and in this respect the latter [physical laws] constitute its [social-historical action's] necessary condition; it would, however, be absurd to hold (consider, regard) the pointing out (indication, hinting, reference, allusion, reminder) of (at, to) such laws (to be) (as) a sufficient explanation of that action. Nevertheless (However), Popper commits precisely this absurdity, when he, in [the] application of the Covering Law Model, draws on (quotes from, resorts (has recourse) to, engages) the physical law of combustion (burning) in order to explain Giordano Bruno's death on (in) the pyre (or at the stake)<sup>195</sup>. The in itself correct (right) ascertainment (realisation, observation) [that] Bruno by virtue of the same natural law was burnt as the wood of the pyre, on (in) which he stood, leaves however, furthermore (on top of that), the decisive (crucial, critical, deciding) question open: what then was the difference (distinction) between Bruno and the wood? From the perspective of Popper's explanation there was apparently (evidently, obviously) none (no) [difference]. Beyond this perspective, a second [question], in this context no(t) less decisive(,) (question) likewise (also) remains: why did (was) Bruno of all people (stand) and not any[one else] (other [person]) [the] just as (similarly) combustible (burnable, flammable) [as the wood or other persons (people, humans, men)], on (in) the pyre (or at the stake)? Assuming (Supposing) here a nomological explanation were (was) at all

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<sup>195</sup> *Poverty*, p. 145.

(generally) appropriate (or called for) (in place, suitable, apt), then (so, thus) it [the said nomological explanation] would at least have to take into account (consideration) (consider, bear in mind, allow for) the (ontologically pre-given (pre-existing, already given) (ontologisch vorgegeben)) difference (or distinction) of the combustible (burnable, flammable) material (stuff, matter, substance) and to adapt (or fit) (align, adjust, suit, bring) (the) explanatory (expository, explaining, explicating) law to ((into line) with) the constitution (composition or texture) of the ontological level of interest (und das erklärende Gesetz der Beschaffenheit der interessierenden ontologischen Ebene anpassen), i.e. to formulate it as [a] historical law and in the course of this (at the same time, into the bargain) use terms (Termini)(,) which only have meaning ([a] sense) in [a] historical context. But (However,) already the attempt to put forward (or establish) (set up, formulate, propose, advance) such a law (for instance in the form: “heretics must be burnt (combusted)”), shows (exhibits, demonstrates) that here (the) talk of law is incorrect (or improper) [has been (is being) misused]. The consciously (or deliberately) (intentionally) carried out (executed) change (changing, alternation) in (of) the ontological level consequently (therefore) (automatically) calls (questions) the epistemological recipe (prescription, cure or remedy) (das epistemologische Rezept) (into question) (automatically). This makes understandable Popper’s reluctance (aversion, disgust, loathing) to take into account (consideration) the change occurring (ensuing, arising, resulting, setting (kicking) in) all the same (after all, anyway, nevertheless), that is, to distinguish (differentiate) between Bruno and the wood. A logically legitimate working out (elaboration, drawing up) of the [a] nomological (explanatory) model (of explanation) would have to construct a hierarchy of laws whose tiers (grades, levels, stages; Stufen) would correspond with

(to) the ontological scale (range, gamut, spectrum; Skala) of the phenomena [which ought] to be explained; thus (so, then, in this way) the mixing (blending, mixture) or confusion (mixing up, mistaking) of physical, sociological, historical and psychological-anthropological laws with one another would be avoided. Yet (However,) this clever (intelligent, smart, wise) procedure (or method) (process; Verfahren) would end in self-refutation (disproving, disproof, rebuttal). Because nomological explanations in society and history are only possible under the assumption that there are social and historical laws(,) which are distinguished (distinguish themselves, stand (are singled) out) by (due to) [the] same stringency as natural laws (or many of (amongst) them [such laws]). Popper, however, took the field (crusaded or campaigned) precisely against this “historicistic” assumption (supposition).

If one, under these circumstances, regardless (nevertheless, nonetheless, all the same, still), sticks (clings, adheres, keeps) to the Covering Law Model, then only the path (or road) (way) to tautology remains (stays) open. The law, which is supposed (meant) to (should) explain the concrete case (instance), essentially (basically) represents (constitutes) then a formalised description (account, portrayal) (i.e. a description rendered into forms) (eine formalisierte Schilderung) of this same case (instance), i.e. the historical analysis, which was tailored (geared) to (tailor-made, designed) (for) the [that] case, is recast (or remoulded) (repoured) in(to) abstract theoretical terms (wird in abstrakte theoretische Termini umgegossen),(;) in this form [it (the law) is] detached (severed, cut (torn) off, removed, separated) from the case (instance) and then applied anew to the case (instance). One can nomologically explain Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon only if (when) one formulates the nomological law as follows: whenever (every time) someone, who as [a]

person is identical to Caesar, finds himself in the same situation, [then] (he) [will] do(es) exactly the same [thing] as (that) [Caesar] did at that time (then). The nomological explanation consequently puts forward (or formulates) (proposes, advances, establishes) its law *ex post facto*, i.e. in (the) light of the actor's already taken (made) and executed (carried out, implemented) decision to act thus (so, in that way). Had (Were) the decision (turned out) otherwise (different(ly)), (then, so, thus) one would have to put forward (or formulate) another law. The relation(ship) between the phenomenon to be explained and the explanatory (expository, explaining, explicating) law is hence not clear (unambiguous, obvious) and not binding<sup>196</sup>. The scientific observer does not ascertain (determine, find out, establish) here the law(,) which is supposed (meant) to (should) underpin (back (shore) up, substantiate, corroborate, support) the explanation, and indeed in the form of a prognosis, but in reality the actor determines which law has to apply (be valid) during the explanation. However, it [the situation, matters, things] would have to be [the] reverse(d) (opposite, the other way around) were (if) the Covering Law Model (were) to be in the position (capable) of keeping the promise of the prognosis of events (occurrences, incidents). Not without reason (for nothing) (It is no coincidence that)(,) this promise therefore remained vague, although it had to be put forward (or formulated) (proposed, advanced, established) with emphasis (emphatically, vigorously), since it constitutes the touchstone of nomological explanation in the framework of a universally applicable epistemology<sup>197</sup>. That is why (Because of that,) Popper declared (proclaimed, professed) *nolens volens* (i.e. (whether) (not) willing (or)

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<sup>196</sup> Aron, *Leçons*, pp. 171ff., 187.

<sup>197</sup> Hempel in fact rejected (repudiated) Hayek's moderate position, according to which prognoses were supposed (meant) to (should) refer to types of phenomena, not to individual events (occurrences, incidents) ("Reasons", p. 97). Cf. footnote 177 above.



(un)willing (not) [willing or unwilling]) his agreement with the thesis of “historicism” [that] a prognosis on the basis of laws is possible in social science just as in physics<sup>198</sup>. He certainly did not try anywhere to formulate checkable (i.e. verifiable) prognoses or to elucidate (explain, illustrate) the reasons for the standing up (defending, espousing) or not (non-)standing up for (defending, espousing) (espousal (or advocacy), or, non-espousal (or non-advocacy); Eintreten bzw. Nichteintreten) [in favour] (of) prognoses in the past. According to (In line with) his ideological options (i.e. choices) he concentrates on the mere conceptual (notional) distinction between two types of prognoses: that of the “historicistic” “prophecy”, which wants to apprehend (grasp) the overall (total, whole) course of history (die den Gesamtlauf der Geschichte erfassen will), and that of the “technological” prognosis as [the] basis of “social engineering”<sup>199</sup>. Yet while he praises (extols) (by praising) the latter [type] as [a] contribution to the shaping (moulding) of a meaningful (sensible) life inside of an open society, he forgets what he wrote elsewhere about (on, regarding) the in principle (fundamentally, basically) agreeable (or beneficial) (pleasant, soothing) effects (results, consequences) of the unintended consequences of action. If these effects (are) by and large (on the whole, in general (the main)) suffice (sufficient, enough) for the formation (or development) of institutions and for the regulation of social life in accordance (compliance) with the pointer (or sign) (Fingerzeig) of the liberal invisible hand, to what [avail] [what is the point] then [of] “social engineering”? Scientific prognoses on the basis of laws, and action on the basis of scientific prognoses, would then only be a pressing (or urgent) (compelling) desideratum (demand) if it

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<sup>198</sup> *Poverty*, p. 36, cf. p. 12. At p. 13ff. he ascribes (attributes, puts down), though, to “historicists” the perception (view) [that] prognoses are either very difficult or impossible!

<sup>199</sup> Loc. cit., p. 43.

applied (was true (valid, in force)) (i.e. if it was the case), for the purposes (in the sense) of (in accordance with) the philosophy of history, (to cause (manage or establish) (create, make)) [that] the [a] transition (crossing, passage, passing) from the realm (kingdom, domain) of blind necessity to the realm of knowing (wissenden) freedom [would be caused (or managed)]. Whoever takes the unintended consequences of action as [a] historical factor seriously, must at any rate (all events, in any case), seriously (earnestly) ask themselves (wonder) about [the] possibility, limits (or bound(arie)s) and function of prognoses.

The inability (incapability, incapacity) to keep the promise of the [a] prognosis does (is) not, though (however), lie (found) in the tautological character of explanation by means of (through) a law. It [This (Such) inability] lies (is found) just as much in the necessity, under the pressure of (the) ontological [forms of] resistance[s] (opposition[s], “resistors”; Widerstände) in the area (realm, sector) of society and history, to (considerably) water down (dilute) that law, which was supposed (meant) to (should) have enabled (made) the prognosis (possible)(, considerably (substantially, significantly)). Through (By means (way) of) the double (dual, twin) concession straight from the horse’s mouth (on good authority, from an authoritative (dependable, reliable) source), that a probabilistic-statistical and inductively proceeding way (manner, mode) of explanation can [could] be placed side by side with a nomological(ly)-deductive [way of explanation], and that nomological explanation would often have the status (value or importance) of mere “explanatory sketches”<sup>200</sup>, the Covering Law Model’s original (initial) ambitions were lowered [fell, diminished, reduced] to [the point of] abandonment (surrender) (sold out, betrayed). One, that is, returned in practice to the

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<sup>200</sup> Hempel, “Reasons”, p.90ff..

old (ancient) wisdom [that] in society regularities are able to (can) be indeed observed, however these [regularities] do not allow (permit) any certain (safe, secure, sure) prognosis for [about, regarding] the [a] concrete case. This applies (is valid) again (in turn) irrespective of whether the regularity covers (includes, captures; *erfaßt*) 60% or 90% of cases, and also [irrespective] of whether one can rely (count, depend) on it [the (said) regularity] for practical purposes (ends or goals). The young doctor (general practitioner), who opens his practice in the [a] village, proceeds with considerable (some, reasonable) certainty (sureness) from the assumption that he does not have to wait long for clientele (i.e. patients) (customers); but he cannot at all know in advance whether Smith and Jones (Miller and Meyer) will count (number) [be] (towards) [amongst] his patients, even if (when) the [a] plague [will] afflict[s] (descend[s] on, strike[s], ravage[s]) the villagers. The causality of the particular (specific) case always retains (keeps, preserves, conserves) its autonomy (or independence) vis-à-vis regularity, even if this [regularity] comes very close to (or borders on) [a] law. What [a] prognosis can, and what it can never, achieve (do, perform, accomplish, manage), we infer (take, gather) from this ascertainment (observation). It [This ascertainment] may of course not be interpreted to the effect (stage, point) that (where) a (statistical) prognosis is possible only during (in) [regard to] regularities, not in the individual (separate, single, isolated) case (instance). It [The said ascertainment] means (says) that [a] prognosis at the level of the regularity is something other (different) than (to, from) the prognosis at that [(the) level] of the individual case, and that one type of prognosis cannot be deduced from the other [type of prognosis]. Prognosis in (during) an individual case means knowledge of a particular (specific) causality and its [this causality's] direction. This knowledge owes so little to the knowledge of regularities that it even stems (comes,

originates, emanates) from the mistrust (distrust) [in respect] of (against, vis-à-vis) them [such regularities]. It [The said knowledge] implies, that is for its part, the [a] clear separation (division) between (statistical) law and causality as well as the assumption (acceptance) of this latter [causality] (because without causality the prognosis would be [a] prophecy), and indeed as [an] independent (autonomous) category, notwithstanding (in spite (irrespective, regardless) of, despite) every law and every regularity<sup>201</sup>.

As [we have] said, Popper hardly thought (or worried) about the logical tension between (the) “technological” prognosis resting (based) on [a] law[s] and the social function of the unintended consequences of action. Just as little did he reflect upon the incompatibility (or inconsistency) (die Unvereinbarkeit) between the Covering Law Model and another favourite motif (theme, subject) (Lieblingsmotiv) of his social philosophy, namely, situational logic (der situationellen Logik), which is supposed (meant) to (should) guide (steer, direct, conduct) the [an] actor during (in) action. [The] determination of action through (by (means of)) the logic of the situation (durch die Logik der Situation) means that both on the side (or part) of the actor as well as on the side (or part) of the situation all (everything) is in principle open: the situation constantly (continuously) changes (that is why (hence) it has *its* logic, it is no crystallisation of logic) and the actor must be ready to follow the changing situation, not his own fixed (steady, stable, rigid, firm, settled) prejudices (preconceptions) or affects (i.e. emotions). The logic of the situation puts the logic of the disposition out of action, and the ability of the actor to follow the logic of the situation and not himself, provides (supplies,

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<sup>201</sup> As Veyne (has) formulated it aptly: «La causalité n'est pas une légalité imparfaite, c'est un système autonome» [“Causality is not an imperfect legality, it is an autonomous system”] (*Comment on écrit l'histoire*, p. 115ff.).

delivers) (the) proof (evidence) of his rationality. Now Hempel (has), in the framework of the defence of the nomological (explanatory) model (of explanation) against Dray's argumentation (incidentally, rightly<sup>vii</sup>, from [a, the] nomological point of view), believed (thought, opined) [that] propositions (theorems, clauses, sentences) about rational motives can be subsumed under propositions about dispositions so that (the) explanation through (by means (way) of) rational motives is, after all (still, all the same, nevertheless), nomological<sup>202</sup>. Why dispositional laws are hardly in a position to explain concrete act(ion)s always and everywhere, why, that is, dispositions can indeed be causes, but not laws, was already expounded (elucidated, explained, explicated) in this section<sup>203</sup>. The incompatibility (or inconsistency) of Popper's situational logic with the assumption of dispositional laws and with the Covering Law Model in general (on the whole), which (is) now a matter (of interest) for (to) [concerns] us, appears (comes up, shows itself) indirectly, but eloquently in the willingness (readiness, eagerness) with which the anti-Popperian, that is, behaviouristic wing of methodological individualism (has, had) took up the nomological (explanatory) model (of explanation). Homans adopted (made, appropriated) it [the nomological explanatory model] (his own) in order to epistemologically underpin (back (shore) up, support, sustain) the, asserted (claimed, contended) by him, precedence (or primacy) (priority; Vorrang) of psychology vis-à-vis the rest of the social sciences<sup>204</sup>. (Behaviouristic) psychology should (is supposed (meant) to) formulate the laws from which (the) social and historical phenomena can then be deduced. Causality is absorbed (assimilated, taken up) by (goes into, [is embodied in]) (the) law[s],(;) there is no mediating (or

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<sup>202</sup> "Reasons", p. 100ff..

<sup>203</sup> Cf., in relation to that, Nagel, *Structure*, p. 555.

<sup>204</sup> "The Relevance of Psychology", pp. 313ff., 319.

intervening) causality (vermittelnde Kausalität) between [the, a] law and [the] individual (separate, single, isolated) case (instance), that is, there cannot even be [a] causally determined (conditioned) exception to the [a] law. This gap ((loop)hole, void) stands logically and really (in reality, actually, tangibly) in the way of the transition from (the, [a]) law to (the, [a]) concrete case. Homans cannot make (render) [it] clear (or plausible) (explain) why (the) universal psychological laws (stimulus-reaction or reward-punishment) have been connected (associated, combined, linked, joined), in various (distinct, different, dissimilar) places and at various (distinct, different, dissimilar) times, with completely (entirely, wholly, totally) different, in fact very often absolutely (really) opposing (opposite, conflicting), content(s). Regarding (Concerning, In) this (regard), he [Homans] of course refers to historical research, but the question (it) is exactly (a question of) whether this reference can be legitimised on the basis of the nomological presuppositions (preconditions, prerequisites) of the theory. Because that which is [needs to be] interpolated (inserted, added) here as causality between [the, a] psychological law and [the, a] historical concrete case, and amongst other things (inter alia) determines (conditions) the difference in (of) the value content(s) (Wertinhalte) – i.e. a social relation and the primeval (original or primordial) social dimension in general (d. h. eine soziale Beziehung und die urtümliche soziale Dimension überhaupt) –, is a limine pushed (put) aside (to one side) through (by (means of)) the necessary binding (bond, tie, joining, connection, dependence) of behaviourism to (with, on) methodological individualism. About that, what(ever) is necessary (the wherewithal) has already been said<sup>205</sup>.

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<sup>205</sup> Ch. I, Sec. 5.

e. Microstructures and macrostructures (Mikrostrukturen und Makrostrukturen)

Hayek and Popper's methodological individualism dared not, as we know, approach (come close to, reach) the theoretical reconstruction of society as such [starting] from [the point of view of] individuals and their act(ion)s; the[ir] embarrassment (or predicament) in [regard to] the matter (affair, subject, thing, case) (was) hid(den) behind rhetorical-political attacks (invectives, sallies) against the revolutionary hubris of contract theory. The question (problem) about (as to, over, in accordance with) the relation(ship) between micro- [microstructures] and macrostructures was posed only indirectly in (during) the attempt to explain (account for, illustrate, explicate) the coming into being (creation, genesis, emergence, origin, ensuing, resulting, emerging) of institutions through (by (means (way) of)) the mechanism of (the) (individuals') unintended consequences of action (of individuals). It [The said (This) question] gained (obtained, acquired) considerable (substantial, significant, serious, major) importance (or significance) (meaning) when methodological individualism blazed a trail via other paths and in modified forms. The revolt (rebellion, uprising, insurrection, revolution) against Parsons directly or indirectly renewed (the) argumentation against "holism", only (but, just) this time the latter [this (such) argumentation against "holism"] turned not against the philosophy of history, but against the "system". The rehabilitation (restoration) of the individual as [an] actor took place (occurred, happened) in the framework of the turning away from (break with, renunciation of) Parsons partly through (by means of) the development (or formation) of the behaviouristic variant of methodological individualism<sup>206</sup>, partly through (by means of) a(n)

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<sup>206</sup> See Homans's programmatic article (essay, paper) "Bringing Men Back In".

unprecedented (unequalled, unparalleled, matchless, unheard of, without parallel) flourishing (blossoming) of “microsociology”, during (in [regard to]) which the approaches (attempts) of symbolic interactionism and the phenomenology of the lifeworld (die Ansätze des symbolischen Interaktionismus und der Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt) were mixed (blended) with findings (results) of psychological investigations (studies, analyses, research) of (into) “small group dynamics” („Kleingruppendynamik“). The (That) mixture (jumble) (has) wanted to be[come] theoretically autonomised (autonomous) under the name of “ethnomethodology”, yet (nonetheless, nevertheless) it [the said mixture] could not entirely (completely, wholly, totally, quite) assimilate its older components. All the same (After all, Anyhow, At least)(,) in [respect of, relation (regard) to] (During, With) ethnomethodology, which in the 1960s and 1970s in the course of (connection with) (thanks to) the mass-democratic (and cultural-revolutionary) privatisation of the public [sphere] (pertaining to the [Western] cultural revolution) was [became] the [a] fashionable trend, a characteristic feature of the overall (total) anti-holistic and anti-systemic school (line) of thought (tendency, direction) particularly (especially) came to light (the surface) (was revealed): we mean (are thinking of) the tendency towards unwatered-down (i.e. undiluted or unadulterated) (pure, unmixed) empiricism, so to speak (as it were), as [the] radical(ly)(-)phenomenological realisation of the neo-positivistic programme of the building (or construction) of a science on the basis of protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence))<sup>207</sup>. Under these presuppositions (preconditions, premises), one could not go very far theoretically (in terms of theory) – at any rate (in

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<sup>207</sup> Cf. Collins, *Conflict Sociology*, p. 7ff., as well as our remarks (comments, observations) on (about, regarding) the empirical characteristic (trait, feature) of (the) methodological individualism in Hayek and Popper, under c in this Section.



any case) not so far that (the) [“]Parsonians[”] (Parsons’s supporters) would (could) (have) be(en) impressed by the (now proposed) solutions (now [being] proposed (suggested, put forward)) of (to) the micro-macro-problem; according to the(ir) opinion [of those promoting a(n) (more or less) undiluted empiricism], microstructures would be in good hands in the womb (bosom) of (from within) flexible macrostructures, or (it) [the matter] would basically (essentially) be done [taken care of] [end] with the ascertainment of the “interpenetration” of both spheres<sup>208</sup>. The massive turn towards microsociology did (was) not fail to have an effect (work) (a failure), so that even macro-sociologically geared (minded, thinking, oriented) researchers felt obliged (or called upon) (impelled, duty-bound) to take it [microsociology] into account theoretically<sup>209</sup>. Various (Different, Distinct, Differing, Miscellaneous) combinations resulted (came, arose) from (out of) the encounter (meeting) of both schools (lines) of thought (tendencies, directions)<sup>210</sup>.

So (Thus, In this way,) the micro-sociological reaction against Parsons was not articulated only as declared (avowed, professed) partisanship (siding, espousal) in favour of (for, with, of) methodological individualism, but also as [the, an] attempt to reach (attain, get to, acquire), with the means of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, a “methodological situationalism”, which already before the [its] start (or launch, i.e. application) (beginning) would have left strict individualistic approaches behind. To Parsons [it] was counterposed (objected, pointed out) that social order does not come about (take place) through (by means of) [the] internalisation of supra-

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<sup>208</sup> Alexander, “Action”; Münch, “Interpenetration”.

<sup>209</sup> Symptomatic of that[,] [is] Collins, “Microfoundations”; Turner, *Theory*, esp. p. 211.

<sup>210</sup> Classifications and synopses (summaries) of the same [such] [combinations of both schools of thought] are found in Münch-Smelser, “Relating”, as well as Ritzer, “Micro-Macro-Linkage”.

individual values and norms, but is the result (outcome, consequence) constantly (continually) being reproduced of communicative interaction in concrete situations (sondern das sich ständig reproduzierende Ergebnis kommunikativer Interaktion in konkreten Situationen sei); consequently the problem of social order was (has been) shifted (moved, displaced) from the macro- [macrolevel] to the microlevel (von der Makro- auf die Mikroebene), and the substitution of the individual act or actor and of (the) subjective meaning (or sense) by networks of acting (or action) and socially constructed meaning (or sense) (durch Handlungsnetzwerke und sozial konstruierten Sinn) took care (saw to, ensured) that the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between person and structure as well as act(ion) and structure will [would] be [is] (theoretically) overcome (sorge dafür, daß der Gegensatz zwischen Person und Struktur sowie Handlung und Struktur (theoretisch) überwunden werde)<sup>211</sup>. Beginning (Starting) at [from] this synthetic starting point, one could believe (think, opine, say) [that] through (by means of) ethnomethodology, micro- [micro-sociological] and macro-sociological tasks (problems, questions) were (are) to be dealt (or coped) with (managed, handled, got over) in one [methodological process] (i.e. together or combined with each other)<sup>212</sup>,(;) (the) progress from (the) micro- [microstructures] to (the) macrostructures would, that is, basically (essentially, fundamentally) imply only a quantitative extension (expansion, widening) of the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) to be observed, but not [the, a] methodical (i.e. methodological) reorientation en route (on the way) [from microstructures to macrostructures]. Indeed (Actually, In fact (reality)), concrete suggestions (proposals) about (regarding) how the transition from (the) micro- [microstructure] to (the) macrostructure is to

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<sup>211</sup> Knorr-Cetina, "Introduction", esp. pp. 7, 8ff., 16ff..

<sup>212</sup> Thus, e.g. Hilbert, "Ethnomethodology", esp. pp. 795, 804.

be brought off (managed, effected, contrived, arranged, accomplished) were on the whole (in general (terms)) quantitatively meant (intended, thought, imagined), namely as [the, a] reproduction being constantly (continually, continuously) extended (expanded, widened, broadened, enlarged) of a fundamental (or basic) (elementary) microunit (microunity) (als sich ständig erweiternde Reproduktion einer grundlegenden Mikroeinheit), inside of which the binding (i.e. cohesive) principle of social life (das zusammenhaltende Prinzip sozialen Lebens) is developed (cultivated or formed) (shaped) and discernible (recognisable, perceptible). Thus (So, In this way), Emerson wanted to bridge the gap (forge links) between [the] dyad (Dyade) and [the] social macrostructure through (by means (way) of) (only) two concepts (notions) (alone): that of the “corporate group”, i.e. a collective(, collective) (actor) made up of two or more persons (collective actor) (einen kollektiven, aus zwei oder mehr Personen zusammengesetzten kollektiven Akteur), and that of the “network”, i.e. a sum of interacting actors which could consist partly of individuals, partly of groups (eine Summe von interagierenden Akteuren, die teils aus Individuen, teils aus Gruppen bestehen könnte); coalitions etc. would mediate (or intervene) (intercede, interpose) between [the] “corporate group” and [the] “network”. Groups, networks and networks of networks would be connected (combined, bound, tied, linked, associated, joined, interwoven, interconnected, interrelated) with one another through (by means of) exchange relation(ship)s (Austauschbeziehungen), which, for their part, would be interrelated (interconnected, interwoven, joined, attached) with (to) one another in the positive and negative sense that exchange in a certain (particular) relation(ship) would be dependent (depend) on the exchange or non-exchange (Nichtaustausch) in another certain relation(ship); in every network, [the] key function would befit (be for (due to), fall to) that one

point (place, position) on which the exchange process in its totality (entirety) would most depend (in jedem Netzwerk käme derjenigen Stelle Schlüsselfunktion zu, von der der Austauschvorgang in seiner Gesamtheit am meisten abhänge)<sup>213</sup>. Such concepts or sketches ((rough) outlines) seemed to be (very) promising to those who, on the one hand, could not be content with Weber's unmediated (or abrupt) (sudden, unexpected) transition (unvermitteltem Übergang) from the definition of social action to the investigation (exploration, research) of (into) macrostructures, on the other hand, they [the said concepts or sketches] found Homans's individualistic-psychological approach unsatisfactory because of (owing to) the lack of insight into interaction's own (self-activating, self-sufficient, independent, internal) dynamics (die Eigendynamik der Interaktion)<sup>214</sup>. After the primacy of interaction vis-à-vis the individual act and actor appeared [to be] safeguarded (secured, protected, ensured), the impression came into being (arose, emerged, resulted) as though (if) the mere elongation (or extension) of the interaction chains (chains of interaction) (die bloße Verlängerung der Interaktionsketten) – these “marketplaces for cultural and emotional resources” – would suffice (be sufficient (enough)) for the theoretical construction of macrostructures from structurally homogenous units (unities or entities)<sup>215</sup>.

The critique (criticism) of (in regard to) this sociological programme can commence (start, begin) with the general remark (comment, observation) that the replacement of the norm system (Normsystems) by [with] interaction (durch die Interaktion) very little [does not] promote(s) (foster(s), encourage(s), further(s)) (the) understanding of (the) social

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<sup>213</sup> “Social Exchange Theory”, esp. pp. 46-53; cf. “Exchange Theory” (Part II), p. 70ff.. Cf. Boissevain's network-model, *Friends of Friends*, chap. 2.

<sup>214</sup> Thus, e.g. B. J. Turner, “Future Directions”, esp. pp. 224, 229ff.; *Theory*, p. 121ff..

<sup>215</sup> See e.g. Collins, “Microfoundations”, pp. 998ff., 1002ff..

order [much]. Because disorder (Unordnung) is also interaction,(;) it  
 [disorder] comes into being (results, arises, ensues, is produced (created))  
 out of (from) interactions and spreads via (through) interactions. That is  
 why order is not identical with (to) interaction in general and as such, but  
 it [order] is shaped (or formed) (moulded) on the basis of particular  
 (special, specific) forms of interaction (or interaction forms) (besonderen  
 Interaktionsformen) whose specific features (characteristics, traits)  
 (spezifische Merkmale) must (have to) be ascertained (established,  
 determined, investigated) through (by (means (way) of) investigations of  
 a special kind (sort); reference to the generic term (or concept)  
 (Oberbegriff) “interaction” („Interaktion“) does not mean anything here.  
 What now concerns [As far as] the transition from micro-  
 [microstructures] to macrostructures [is concerned], (thus, so) the  
 substitution of individual acts or actors by the microunit(y) of interacting  
 individuals (die Mikroeinheit der interagierenden Individuen) does not  
 essentially (fundamentally) contribute to the solution of this particular  
 (especial, specific) problem. Because the microunit(y) constitutes just as  
 much a theoretical fiction as the isolated individual and his (its) action,  
 and it [the microunit] can serve (be of use for) the theoretical construction  
 of macrounits (macrounities; Makroeinheiten) exactly because it is [a]  
 fiction, that is, [an,] as one likes (at will), homogenisable and usable  
 building block (weil sie Fiktion, also beliebig homogenisierbarer und  
 verwendbarer Baustein ist). Empirically there are in fact several (various,  
 multiple, a number of, quite a few) forms of microunit(ie)s in a society,  
 and it is certain that every reconstruction of society on the basis of a(n)  
 sole (single, unique, only, solitary, lone) [microunit, one] amongst the  
 empirically existing microunit(ie)s must soon (shortly) (begin to) falter  
 (or stall) (come to a standstill, breakdown)(,) since none amongst (of)  
 them [(all) the microunits] can include all indispensable components of

the social as well as the specific manner (way) of their cohesion with (or bond between) one another (die spezifische Art und Weise ihres Zusammenhaltes miteinander). The distance between [the] micro-sociological and [the] individualistic fiction (continues to) decrease(s) (diminish(es)) (further) if (when) one(,) to be fair (in fairness, justly, rightfully)(,) takes into consideration (account) (considers, bears in mind) that the individualists imagine (envisage) the transition to the macrostructure likewise as [a(n)] interaction process (process of interaction; Interaktionsprozeß), which can be included in rules about (regarding, in respect of) the manner (way) [as to] how [in which] the action of an individual has an (takes) effect (acts, works, operates) on other(s) [individuals]<sup>216</sup>. And this same distance (is) ultimately (in the end) (becomes) insignificant (slight, minor, negligible) when (if) methodological individualists, just like microsociologists, (make) use (of) formal (i.e. form-related) models (formaler Modelle) in order to, undisturbed (uninterrupted, unhindered, untroubled) by rough (or bumpy) (jolty, clumsy, unpleasant, turbulent) facticity, make the aforementioned transition smooth at least on paper. For economistically inclined (minded, adjusted, focused, set, prepared) individualists, it stands to reason (is plausible, reasonable, sensible) to regard (consider, hold) the neo-classical theory of the perfect market exchange system (as) (to be) the best theoretical mediation (or intervention) (intercession, interposition) between [the, a] micro- [microsystem] and [the, a] macrosystem, although (even though) [it] is admitted (confessed) that this model is suitable “only for an idealized social system”<sup>217</sup>. It should be mentioned in passing that here “exchange” stands (is) at the centre of attention just as in the

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<sup>216</sup> See e.g. Coleman, *Foundations*, p. 19.

<sup>217</sup> Coleman, “Microfoundations”, p. 171.

“interactional” or “situationalistic” model (im „interaktionellen“ oder „situationalistischen“ Modell).

The common characteristic (feature, trait) of the attempt until (up to) now to bring (or work) (carve) out (elaborate) the transition from micro- [microstructures] to macrostructures is, therefore, stark (or intense) (severe, strong, deep, heavy) formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) (structuring in terms of form) (die starke Formalisierung). It is not shown (exhibited, displayed, demonstrated) through (by means of) historical-genetic analysis how a real society came into being (arose, resulted, ensued, originated, is created (produced)) out of (from) the expansion (widening, extension or enlargement) (broadening) of microunit(ie)s or out of (from) the elongation (or extension) of [the] interaction chains (chains of interaction) (wie eine reale Gesellschaft aus der Erweiterung von Mikroeinheiten bzw. aus der Verlängerung von Interaktionsketten entstanden ist), but conceptual (notional) entities are lined up (strung together) until (the) formal (i.e. form-related) microstructures flow into (or lead to) the likewise formal (i.e. form-related) macrostructure. The thereby (in this way, through (because of) that, by this means) gained (obtained, won) macrostructure (certainly, admittedly) does not (though) even coincide at the formal level with society as [a] whole. One reaches (attains, acquires, gets to) at (the) most (up to) a network not described (outlined) (more precisely) historically-sociologically (in more (greater) detail), or [up] to any just as vaguely sketched (outlined, drafted) “institution” or “formal organisation”<sup>218</sup>. The final (last, ultimate) and most difficult steps of the reconstruction are not taken (done). But also (even) apart from this external (outer) deficiency (flaw, fault, defect), which perhaps would be remedied (redressed, rectified) by (means of)

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<sup>218</sup> Thus, e.g. Coleman, *Foundations*, p. 20ff..

(through) additional improvisational arts (i.e. artful devises, strategems and tricks of improvisation) (Improvisationskünste), the endeavour (effort) at formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) (structuring in terms of form) as such presupposes certain wrong (false, incorrect, erroneous) content-related(filled) (substantive) assumptions. If (the) formal (i.e. form-related) construction wants to find [have] ubiquitous or at least broad historical and sociological application (be applied ubiquitously or at least broadly [both] historically and sociologically), then it must postulate two (different (kinds of)) things: that basically (essentially) only a(n) single (sole, only, unique, solitary, lone) form of transition from (the) micro- [microstructure] to (the) macrostructure is conceivable (imaginable, thinkable)(,) and that the transition as such is necessary. Neither the one nor the other is true (right, correct, the case) (applies). The form of the transition depends in fact (actually, really) on each and every respective composition (texture or constitution) of that which is defined [as] the starting point, as well as that which is defined as the end point of the same [transition] (thereof). Different (Varying, Varied) perceptions (views) of (about, on, regarding) that composition (texture or constitution) and integration of different social phenomena are, however, behind the external (outer) uniformity of (the) formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) (structuring in terms of form) (Hinter der äußeren Gleichförmigkeit der Formalisierung). The concepts (notions) used (utilised, employed) obtain (preserve, maintain, conserve), depending on (according to) [the] context, a(n) essentially (fundamentally, considerably) different meaning (significance, signification, importance) (the actor can be [an] individual or [a] collective [entity, group, body, formation], (the) structure can refer to (indicate, describe, identify, name) micro- [microunit(ie)s] or macrounit(ie)s, (the) microunit(ie)s can, for their part, make up (constitute) psychological coefficients, individuals or



elementary interactions (elementare Interaktionen) not described (outlined, portrayed, depicted) in greater (more) detail (more precisely), (the) macrounit(ie)s [can make up (constitute)] institutions or population groups)(,) and moreover the construction of the transition in terms of details (particular cases) is prejudged by the in advance established (ready-made, settled, fixed) sympathies for micro- [microconsideration, microcontemplation] or macroconsideration (macrocontemplation) (i.e. the micro or macro way of looking at things)<sup>219</sup>. The necessity of the transition cannot again (in turn) be proved (substantiated, demonstrated) by the ascertainment [that] microunit(ie)s (would) exist inside of (within) macrounit(ie)s, because this line of argument (or proof) already presupposes that the latter [macrounits] came into being (arose, resulted, ensued, originated, were created (produced)) through (by means of) the expansion (widening, extension or enlargement) (broadening) or the elongation (or extension) of those [microunits]. There are, however, microunits (e.g. personal bonds (or ties)), which do not flow (lead) into any macrounit and do (are) not have to (necessarily) underlie ((be) at the root of) such [a macrounit], although they [microunits] can have (continued) existence and meaning only inside of macrounits. And there are macrounits, which as a result (because) of (owing to) their reduction to microunits, must (have to, necessarily) lose their relevance for the interpretation of social life. Even the in itself correct (right) ascertainment (observation) [that] in micro- [microunits] and macrounits frequently (in many cases) the same forms of interaction (or interaction forms) (Interaktionsformen), psychical forces (powers) or patterns (models) of behaviour (behavioural patterns; Verhaltensmuster) are at work (operate), does not immediately (directly, without a second thought,) establish (or

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<sup>219</sup> See Ritzer's remarks (comments, observations), "Micro-Macro-Linkage", esp. pp. 354, 355, 363.

found) (justify, substantiate) the necessity of the transition from the former [microunits] to the latter [macrounits]. Because it is definitely (quite, perfectly, absolutely, completely) possible that it is a matter (question) (we are) here of (dealing with) anthropological or social-ontological dimensions (anthropologische bzw. sozialontologische Dimensionen), which exist and have an (take) effect (work, act, operate) irrespective (regardless) of how one may judge (assess, rate, evaluate) the logical (and developmental-historical) priority (and priority pertaining to the history of development) of micro- [microunit(ie)s] and macrounit(ie)s (die logische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Priorität von Mikro- und Makroeinheiten).

Under these circumstances one may not, without further differentiation, hold (support) the opinion [that] micro- [microstructural] and macrostructural theories were not able to (could not) be indeed reduced in principle to one another, yet they were (behaved, acted) complementar(ily) to one another and had to be developed (in) (a) parallel (manner) [to one another] (parallelly), because one [group of theorists] would postulate that which (the) others [another group of theorists] would regard as (consider, hold to be) problematic<sup>220</sup>. Undoubtedly, it is in abstracto more advantageous (beneficial, favourable) to separate micro- [microtheories] and macrotheories from one another, than to pave the way for (initiate, arrange) a quantitatively-additively conceived reduction of macro- [macrostructures] to microstructures. Nevertheless, a clear separation between (them) both (of them) [microstructures and macrostructures] – should it [such a clear separation] be at all possible – can take place (happen, occur) only at the level of sociological abstraction and must disregard (ignore) the just

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<sup>220</sup> Thus, e.g. Blau, “Contrasting”, p. 82ff.; “Microprocess”, p. 96ff..

mentioned anthropological or social-ontological given (actual) facts (or actualities), whose aura (or fluid element) saturates (soaks, imbues, suffuses, steeps) all corners (or edges) (points), surfaces (or areas) (spaces), and strata (layers) of social life (kann nur auf der Ebene soziologischer Abstraktion stattfinden und muß sich über die soeben erwähnten anthropologischen bzw. sozialontologischen Gegebenheiten hinwegsetzen, deren Fluidum alle Ecken, Flächen und Schichten des sozialen Lebens durchtränkt). On the other hand, the meaning (sense) of the complementarity of micro- [microconsideration] and macroconsideration (the micro and macro way of looking at things) (in relation) to(wards) (with, vis-à-vis) each other must be clarified (cleared up). Complementarity is [the] relation(ship) between [magnitudes] separated from one another or separable magnitudes; however, micro- [microstructures] and macrostructures overlap (turn or merge into) one another in every respect and at any time (every moment in time) (anytime), they are defined with (in) regard to (regarding) one another, and constitute, by their (very) nature (or of their essence), a continuum, whose micro- [microparts] and macroparts can be separated (or segregated) (isolated) from one another only through (by means of) conventional[ly] drawn, in accordance with heuristic criteria, and constantly (continually) shifting boundaries (or boundaries put forward as an excuse [for a particular theoretical stance regarding microstructures and macrostructures]) (Mikro- und Makrostrukturen gehen aber in jeder Hinsicht und zu jeder Zeit ineinander über, sie definieren sich in bezug aufeinander und bilden von ihrem Wesen her ein Kontinuum, dessen Mikro- und Makroteile sich nur durch konventionelle, nach heuristischen Kriterien gezogene und sich ständig verschiebende Grenzen voneinander absondern lassen); exactly because of that in fact the quantitatively-additively construction of macrounits from microunits can never succeed

(be successful, turn out well, work). Complementarity of the ways of looking at things on the horizon of a continuum can therefore merely mean (signify) that the observer registers (records or notes) (takes in, notices) the constant (continual, continuous) shift(ing) (displacement, moving; *Verschiebung*) of the boundaries between micro- [microunits] and macrounits according to (in line with) the leading (central, dominant, governing) knowledge (cognitive) interest(,) and defers (postpones, puts aside) [the] abstract questions [in respect] of priority(,) in order to turn (direct) his attention to the intersection (or crossing) (junction, hybrid; *Kreuzung*) and the interplay (synergy or having an effect together) of concrete factors with one another, which may (can) be assigned completely (entirely, wholly) or in part, at times to the micro- [microlevel], at other times to the macrolevel. Into the bargain (In the course of this (process), At the same time)(,) it is a matter first of all of the tracking down (unearthing, uncovering) of (macro-socially active (acting, effective, working, operating)) mental and institutional forces (macro-socially having an effect) in the smaller interaction circle (or cycle) (circle (or cycle) of interaction) of nameable (or specifiable) individuals (*Dabei geht es zunächst um das Aufspüren makrosozial wirkender mentaler und institutioneller Kräfte im kleineren Interaktionskreis nennbarer Individuen*). Only knowledge of (about) these forces or long-term trends often allows (permits) a historical and sociological inclusion (or classification) (incorporation, being put in order; *Einordnung*) of actions and interactions at the microlevel. (The Background knowledge of (about) the phenomenon “capitalism” puts (places, moves) e.g. a Calvinist family’s life and work (living and working (activity, activities)) in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in a historically and sociologically interesting perspective; to proceed (act, deal) the other way around(,) and to want to draw conclusions on later social developments

from (out of) protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence) verified by experience) about (regarding, on, over) this life and work, would (here) (hardly) (not) be (very) ([only] slightly) productive (fertile, fruitful) (here) ([only] a little). That does not of course mean that the chasm (gulf, gap) between micro- [microstructure] and macrostructure can (is able to) be overcome every time (without any problem, once and for all) without leaving (deserting) the terrain (territory, area) (das Terrain) of the former [microstructure] – by (while) for instance showing merely [it] (is merely shown) how institutional and similar supra-individual factors force (find) their way (penetrate, break) from the outside, as it were (so to speak), (into) interactions between individuals and (co-)shape (or (co-)mould) ((co-)form) them [such interactions between individuals] (together, jointly, mutually)<sup>221</sup>. Because there are macrodimensions (Makrodimensionen) which do not fit into (in with) any microstructure, so that the picture (or image) of a society cannot in the least be put together (drawn (made) up, compiled, arranged) from (out of) the addition of those macrostructural elements which are contained (included) in microstructures. Beyond (Over and above) that, the presence of macrodimensions in microstructures can vary very sharply (strongly, greatly, profusely, severely, intensely, starkly) in [respect of] [as to] extent (range, scope) and intensity. And finally (lastly), an undogmatic, that is [a] historical-sociological analysis free from (of) the compulsions (constraints or coercion(s)) of formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) (structuring in terms of form), must consider (take, bear) the reverse phenomenon (into consideration (account), in mind) too, namely, the effect (impact, influence) of microstructural processes on macroprocesses (die Wirkung von mikrostrukturellen

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<sup>221</sup> Cicourel apparently (evidently, obviously) thinks (means, believes) this, “Notes”.

Prozessen auf Makroprozesse). This effect is (should) not (to) be understood in [such a way, so far as, to the point, as meaning] that macroprocesses would (is) always and necessarily (unconditionally) (be) set in motion by (through) the accumulation of corresponding microprocesses. [Just] as the static macroimage (or macropicture) (Makrobild) cannot (is not able to) be obtained (got, reached, attained, won) from the mere addition of microunit(ie)s, so too social change in magno (i.e. on a large scale) is not absorbed (assimilated) by [taken up with] the mere sum of shifts (displacements) and changes (alterations) in parvo (i.e. on a small scale) (in miniature (little))<sup>222</sup>; and [just] as quite a few (a number of, several, multiple) forms of (the) transition from micro- [microstructures] to macrostructures are conceivable (imaginable, thinkable, possible), so too numerous mechanisms and forms (or shapes) of change can be ascertained(,) which are [can] hardly to be reduced to (brought under) one sole (only, unique, single) formula ((set) phrase, wording). The possibility of a(n) (considerable, not inconsiderable, appreciable) influence (worth mentioning) of microprocesses on macroprocesses exists when (if) [the] position and status (value or importance) of a microstructure inside of (within) a macrostructure allows (permits) such influence. An interactive microsituation (Mikrosituation) in a Cabinet [Meeting] (cabinet, group of ministers in the executive arm of government), which deliberates on (about) war and peace, obviously (evidently, apparently) has a(n) entirely (completely, wholly) different historical and sociological weight (gravity) than a private family row – although (even though) both microprocesses can proceed (take a course, run) according to (in accordance with) the same psychological [dynamics] and group dynamics. The difference

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<sup>222</sup> In relation to that, Nisbet, *Social Change*, esp. p. 288.

(distinction) between them [the two aforesaid microsituations (Cabinet meeting and the family row)] cannot be grasped (understood, apprehended) either through (by means of) the contradistinction (contrasting) of micro- [microstructures] and macrostructures, or through (by means of) a theory of the transition from those [microstructures, the former] to these [macrostructures, the latter]. A multi-dimensional way of looking at things (observation, contemplation) is necessary, which moreover (in addition, besides,) oscillates (swings) continuously (constantly) between (the) dimensions and purposefully (expediently or in an end(goal)-oriented manner) redefines them [the various dimensions].

The result (outcome, consequence, upshot) of our casuistry (i.e. case by case (case-based) analysis or reasoning) (Kasuistik) should (might, may, must, could) encourage (embolden) further (additional) historical-sociological casuistry (i.e. case by case analysis or reasoning), and deter (scare, put) [us] (off) from abstract sociological construction work (i.e. constructions) (abstrakter soziologischer Konstruktionsarbeit) in this field (area, sector, domain). Not only is an(y) empirically defensible (tenable, justifiable) formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) (structuring in terms of form) of the transition from micro- [microstructures] to macrostructures not possible, but not even a compelling formal (i.e. form-related) definition of their difference from (to) [vis-à-vis, as between] each other can be thought up (imagined) (is inconceivable). Such a definition (for instance: microstructures are put together (assembled, composed) out of (from) interacting individuals, macrostructures out of (from) groups related to one another (Mikrostrukturen sind aus interagierenden Individuen, Makrostrukturen aus aufeinander bezogene Gruppen zusammengesetzt),(:) the latter are distinguished by the

existence (presence) of values, norms and institutions<sup>223</sup>) would have to already in its first application to a historically-sociologically relevant case be more or less relativised, and through (by means of) its relativisation be in (actual) fact (reality) taken back (withdrawn, canceled, retracted). Every theoretical insistence on this point, which would go beyond (surpass) partial conjectures (suppositions, presumptions, guesses, hunches, guesswork) with regard to certain categories of concrete cases, must (has (ought) to) be lost in verbal [construct(ion)s, combinations, formations] and (or) in (the) tinkering (messing, fiddling) around with ([in respect] of) concepts (notions) and fictions (muß sich im Verbalen bzw. im Zusammenbasteln von Begriffen und Fiktionen verlieren). The deeper reason for the hopelessness of such theoretical experiments lies (is found) in the lacking (missing, absent) (lack of) social-ontological reflexion (reflection) (der fehlenden sozialontologischen Reflexion), that is, reflexion on (about, regarding, over) the being (Is) of society as that irreducible magnitude, which enables (makes) the appearance (or occurrence) of (fluid (flowing)) micro- [microstructures] and macrostructures in general (possible) (also Reflexion über das Sein der Gesellschaft als jener irreduzierbaren Größe, die das Auftreten von (flüssigen) Mikro- und Makrostrukturen überhaupt ermöglicht). Micro- [Microstructures] and macrostructures can be observed only against the background ((a) backdrop) of a society, and the incessant (unceasing, ceaseless) shimmering (iridescence) of their [microstructures and macrostructures'] outlines (or contours), their unremitting (continual, incessant) going (merging) into one another (or interlacing) (entwining)(,) represent (constitute) [the] effects (or consequences) of this background (backdrop). Even those who concern (occupy) themselves (deal) with

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<sup>223</sup> Thus, Blau, *Exchange*, p. 24ff..



(take interest in) the drawing (making, setting) up (putting forward, establishing, establishment, formulation) of classifications and the formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) (structuring in terms of form) of transitions, implicitly presuppose the existence (presence) of a society in the multitude (large (huge, vast) number, plurality, multiplicity; Vielzahl) of its aspects. Because society as such does not constitute [the] (any) express (explicit) object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of their attempts at reconstruction; these [attempts at reconstruction] (make a) stop (halt) at (institutional etc.) macrostructures, which are found already inside of (within) constituted societies. Such macrostructures [i.e. macrostructures as institutions etc., and, macrostructures constituting society] to be reconstructed from microstructures are two seemingly (apparently) related, but actually (really, as a matter of fact) very different undertakings (ventures). Not only because [the] latter [i.e. reconstructing already constituted society from macrostructures (and microstructures)] has even fewer prospects (less chance) of success than the former [i.e. reconstructing macrostructures such as institutions from microstructures], but above all because one refers to the problem area of sociology, the other to that of social ontology (Mikro- und Makrostrukturen lassen sich erst vor dem Hintergrund einer Gesellschaft beobachten, und das unaufhörliche Schillern ihrer Umrisse, ihr unablässiges Ineinandergehen stellen Wirkungen dieses Hintergrundes dar. Auch diejenigen, die sich mit der Aufstellung von Klassifizierungen und der Formalisierung von Übergängen befassen, setzen implizit das Vorhandensein einer Gesellschaft in der Vielzahl ihrer Aspekte voraus. Denn die Gesellschaft bildet als solche keinen ausdrücklichen Gegenstand ihrer Rekonstruktionsversuche; diese machen bei (institutionellen etc.) Makrostrukturen halt, die sich bereits innerhalb konstituierter Gesellschaften befinden. Solche Makrostrukturen aus Mikrostrukturen

zu rekonstruieren sind zwei scheinbar verwandte, aber eigentlich sehr unterschiedliche Unternehmungen. Nicht nur deswegen, weil letztere noch weniger Aussichten auf Erfolg als erstere hat, sondern vor allem deshalb, weil die eine auf das Problemgebiet der Soziologie, die andere auf jenes der Sozialontologie verweist).

### 3. Social ontology as theoretical dimension of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) dimension) [dimension of depth] (Sozialontologie als theoretische Tiefendimension)

A. The specific point of view (perspective, optic(s), eye, lens, prism, [way of] look[ing]) of social ontology (Die spezifische Optik der Sozialontologie)

The analyses of the preceding (previous) sections pursued (followed, tracked, trailed, aimed at), with hopefully [a] good result[s] (outcome, yield, consequences), a double (dual, twin) aim (goal, objective, target): to liquefy (i.e. to make liquid or fluid) the factual (objective) boundaries (limits) between the phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) of social life, that is, between the corresponding objects (or subject matter(s)) (topics, motifs, themes) of sociology and history, and simultaneously to grasp (apprehend, understand) more sharply (clearly,

carefully, closely) the epistemological boundaries between sociology and history(,) as they are shaped (or moulded) (formed, characterised) in the logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic) of each one of both these disciplines (die sachlichen Grenzen zwischen den Erscheinungen des sozialen Lebens, also zwischen den entsprechenden Gegenständen von Soziologie und Historie zu verflüssigen und gleichzeitig die epistemologischen Grenzen zwischen Soziologie und Historie, wie sie sich in der Grundlegungslogik jeder dieser beiden Disziplinen ausprägen, schärfer zu fassen); in the unremitting (incessant, continual) tension (stress, strain; Spannung) between research praxis (or practice) and logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic) (to) which was referred (alluded) (to) (pointed out, indicated) several (multiple) times (repeatedly)(,) and whose social-ontological background (backdrop) must yet (still) occupy (busy, employ, absorb) us, the objective need (requirement, necessity, wish, desire) (das objektive Bedürfnis) for [the] liquefaction (i.e. making liquid or fluid) (Verflüssigung) of the factual (objective), and for [the] clarification (elucidation) of (the), epistemological bound(arie)s (limits, frontiers) between the social sciences, merely manifests itself(,) (quite) often (a lot) unreflectedly (or unthinkingly) (uncritically) and confusedly. The founding (foundation, establishment) of a discipline, like every methodological consideration (thought, reflection, deliberation) (too), has content-related(filled) (substantive) aspects and implications,(;) it [such founding of a discipline] (is) of necessity accompanied (accompanies, goes hand in hand) (by, with) delimitations (demarcations, dissociations, separations, fencings off; Abgrenzungen), since it presupposes the admission (confession) that the discipline concerned (in question) cannot deal (concern itself) with all phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances,

occurrences) of an ontic field (area, sector, domain) (mit allen  
 Erscheinungen eines ontischen Gebiets), but inside of (within) this field a  
 narrower (smaller, tighter) area (field, sector, domain, realm) (einen  
 engeren Bereich) must be picked (chosen), which is then regarded as its  
 [the said discipline's] actual (real, true) area. Now relativisations[, for  
 their part,] of those delimitations are epistemologically explained and  
 justified(, for its part,) by research practice. The factual (objective)  
 osmosis (Die sachliche Osmose) of history and sociology with each other  
 is (continues to be), for example (instance), (further) supported (propped  
 up) and expounded (explained, illustrated, explicated) (in) more (greater)  
 detail (precisely) by more precise (preciser) thoughts (considerations,  
 reflections, deliberations) on (about, over, regarding) law and causality. If  
 in the area (or domain) (field, sector) of sociology, strict laws, and in that  
 of history, mere causalities, prevailed (were at work, [applied]), or in the  
 former [area], causalities, and in the latter [area], blind coincidences (or  
 chance) (fortuities, accidents; Zufälle), then only a bad, not the [a] good  
 praxis (i.e. [research] practice) could liquefy (i.e. to make liquid or fluid)  
 the boundaries between both [of them, sociology and history, areas]. The  
 proof (evidence) [that] sociology can just as little as history put forward  
 (or formulate) (propose, advance, set (draw) up, establish) laws in [the]  
 form of a fixed (steady or stable) (rigid, firm, settled, solid) and  
 ubiquitous hierarchy of causal factors, [just] as (well as) the  
 ascertainment (realisation, observation) [that] sociological and historical  
 regularities do not mean (say, prove) anything binding and conclusive  
 (definitive or final) (Verbindliches und Endgültiges) about (regarding)  
 any concrete case (whatsoever), jointly (together, collectively) refer to an  
 open and plastic field(,) in which the epistemological settings of a  
 boundary (bounds) (demarcation, drawing of a borderline) seem (appear  
 (to be), strike one as) cognitively unavoidable (inevitable, indispensable,

imperative, (absolutely) essential (necessary)) and ontically fictive (fictitious) (ein offenes und plastisches Feld, auf dem die epistemologischen Grenzziehungen kognitiv unumgänglich und ontisch fiktiv anmuten). The disciplines pile up like artefacts in (on) this field, which they can only part(ial)ly cover. Were the field to be (stand) under the influence (sign) of strict law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), then (so, thus) already through (by means of) the knowledge of the same [(said) law bindedness], (the) cognitive would coincide with the ontological order inside of (within) the disciplines concerned (in question), while at the same time (in relation to which) these [disciplines] would cover the entire (whole, complete) field in their lining up [alongside one another]. The openness (uncertain outcome) and plasticity of causalities (Die Offenheit und Plastizität), their resisting (refusing, kicking up a fuss over) against (to) be(ing) able to be classified and hierarchised (arranged (put) in a hierarchy) in the form (shape) of fixed (steady or stable) (firm) laws, constitutes, conversely (on the other hand), a function of the openness and the plasticity of that field.

Our comments (remarks, exposition, explanation) on (about, regarding, of) the founding or delimitation of research practice or [the] osmosis of the social sciences, on laws and causalities(,) flow, according to that (therefore, accordingly), into (lead to) the question (problem) of (regarding, about) the composition (texture or constitution) of the social field (in die Frage nach der Beschaffenheit des sozialen Feldes). What constitutes social being (Is) (Was konstituiert soziales Sein) so (such) that fixedly (steadily or stably) (firmly) hierarchised causalities, that is, laws, fail to materialise (appear) in its [(the) social being (Is's)] field, that the theoretical barriers (embankments, dams) between the disciplines, as they were raised (pulled up, erected) through (by means of) their logic of

founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic), move (step, shrink) back (retreat, withdraw, recoil) or even collapse (break down) under the pressure of the aura (or fluid element) of this causally determined (conditioned), but lawless facticity (i.e. facticity not governed, restrained or controlled by any law) (unter dem Druck des Fluidums dieser kausal bedingten, aber gesetzlosen Faktizität)? Which (What) factors or forces develop (or unfold) and intersect (cross) (with) one another in (on) the social-ontic field (auf dem sozialontischen Feld) so (such) that here in principle (basically) a number of (quite a few, multiple, several) outcomes (results, upshots) as well as projections of the becoming (or events) (Projektionen des Geschehens) appear [to be] conceivable (imaginable, thinkable) and possible, [so] that, in other words, openness and plasticity constitutively belong to (are amongst (necessary for), go with) this field? Such factors and forces, in so far as (in as much as (that)) they were in the past called key concepts (notions) of ontologies, served (were of use), in relation to that, to (put in) order (classify, arrange) the (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality; die Vielfalt) of phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) in accordance with (according to) the yardsticks (benchmarks or criteria) (measures, standards) set by them [such (the said) ontologies (themselves)], that is, to manufacture (or produce) (make, establish, build) gradations (grades, degrees, stages, levels; Abstufungen) and hierarchies amongst these phenomena (or manifestations), irrespective (regardless) of whether taxonomic or emanatistic logic (taxonomische oder emanatistische Logik) was at work here. In this respect (As far as that is concerned (goes)), ontology has always been drawn up (composed, written (out)) metaphysically<sup>224</sup>.

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<sup>224</sup> Heidegger's teaching[s] (theory, doctrine) of being (Is) (i.e. ontology) (Seinslehre) (is), in spite of [the] verbal rebellion against (opposition (resistance) to) "metaphysics" (or rather a caricature of it

Social ontologies or social-ontologically laid out (drawn (set) up, calculated, structured, designed, invested) sociologies lapsed (fell, declined) into the logic of emanation ([an] emanation logic), by (while they) assuming (or accepting) (assumed) biological, geographic, psychological, economic etc. “ultimate (final, last) authorities (tiers (grades, levels, stages) (of jurisdiction) ((power, commanding, ruling, governing) authorities (centres) (of power)))” („letzte Instanzen“) and accordingly shaped (formed, moulded) their (explanatory) models (of explanation). For us, the question is posed differently (otherwise). Because that(,) which at the level of theoretical (re)presentation (or description) must be called (referred to, described, characterised) (as) social-ontological dimension of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) dimension) [dimension of depth], i.e. (the) social-ontic being (Is), is by far (far and away) more fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent), more mobile and more multiform (variform, diversiform, multifarious) than all [things] (everything) which the individual (or separate) (single, isolated) social sciences can apprehend (grasp, understand) with the help (on the basis) of their [such social sciences’] conceptual (notional) instruments, which are determined (fixed, established, laid down, stipulated) by their each and every respective logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic) (Sozialontologien oder sozialontologisch angelegte Soziologien verfielen der Emanationslogik, indem sie biologische, geographische,

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[“metaphysics”]), copied from (copies) the emanatism (dem Emanatismus) of (the) late Schelling [(i.e. the older (mature) Schelling)] (in relation to that, Kondylis, *Metaphysikkritik*, p. 389ff.). His [Heidegger’s] early ontology of being (t)here (or existence) (Seine frühe Ontologie des Daseins) eluded (escaped, avoided, evaded) emanatism only because here [in (t)his (Heidegger’s) early ontology of being (t)here (or existence)] the [there was only] talk (was only) of a (one) single (sole, only) being (Seienden) in itself regarded (looked at, considered) and only selectively connected with biopsychic, social-political etc. facticity; it is very questionable (much to be asked) [as to] how Heidegger would have theoretically accommodated (managed, located) being (t)here (or existence), had he tackled (approached) the construction of a *social* ontology. Why the ontology of being (t)here (or existence) does not represent (constitute) a social ontology, we explained in Section 1 of this Chapter.

psychologische, ökonomische etc. „letzte Instanzen“ annahmen und dementsprechend ihre Erklärungsmodelle gestalteten. Für uns stellt sich die Frage anders. Denn das, was auf der Ebene der theoretischen Darstellung als sozialontologische Tiefendimension bezeichnet werden muß, d. h. das sozialontische Sein, ist bei weitem flüssiger, mobiler und vielgestaltiger als alles, was die einzelnen Sozialwissenschaften an Hand ihres begrifflichen Instrumentariums erfassen können, welches durch ihre jeweilige Grundlegungslogik festgelegt wird). That is why social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) are not the more fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent) or diluted (thinned (watered) (down), rarefied, weakened) emanations of a fixed (settled or solid) (steady, stable, rigid, firm) substratum, but rather temporary (provisional) and precarious (insecure, dicey) crystallisations on a social-ontic field, which looks (seems) like moving sand(,) and can be outlined (delineated) only in view of ([while] considering, subject to) several (a number of, multiple) (outspread) factors or forces (spread out) in the form of a spectrum. By (With, Under) social being (Is) we do not understand a stable magnitude, which guides (or directs) (steers, channels, governs, controls, manages) and hierarchises (arranges (puts) in a hierarchy) the (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) of phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) from the inside, but those factors or forces(,) which keep (hold) (moving) the life (living, existence) of the humans (people, men) living in society (in motion, [a state of] movement)(,) and give (provide, supply) every causality only a relative and transitory (passing, temporary, transient) predominance (i.e. superior potency or power (strength, potency, force, might)) (superiority) vis-à-vis other [causalities]. Formulated paradoxically: *Social being (Is) as object (or subject matter) (topic, theme, motif) of social ontology consists of those forces or*



*factors(,) which do not allow (any) solidification (or becoming fixed (firmer)) (hardening, stiffening, consolidation, reinforcement, strengthening, stabilisation) of social being (Is)(,) and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) (any) causally or emanatistically (i.e. in an emanatistic manner) hierarchised (arranged (put) in a hierarchy) apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) of it [social being (Is)]* (Soziale Erscheinungen sind daher nicht die flüssigeren oder verdünnten Emanationen eines festeren und reineren Substrats, sondern vielmehr vorläufige und prekäre Kristallisationen auf einem sozialontischen Feld, welches wie beweglicher Sand aussieht und sich nur unter Berücksichtigung mehrerer, in Form eines Spektrums ausgebreiteter Faktoren oder Kräfte umreißen läßt. Unter sozialem Sein verstehen wir nicht eine stabile Größe, die die Vielfalt der Erscheinungen von innen her lenkt und hierarchisiert, sondern jene Faktoren oder Kräfte, die das Leben der in Gesellschaft lebenden Menschen in Bewegung halten und jeder Kausalität eine nur relative und vorübergehende Übermacht gegenüber anderen bescheiden. Paradox formuliert: *Das soziale Sein als Gegenstand der Sozialontologie besteht aus jenen Kräften oder Faktoren, die keine Verfestigung des Sozialen Seins und somit keine kausal oder emanatistisch hierarchisierte Erfassung von ihm gestatten*). The social-ontic forces or factors do (are) not in fact (indeed, of course) (have an, take) effect(ive) (act, work, operate) as segregated (or separated) from one another and compact levers, but they [the(se) (such) social-ontic forces or factors] constitute a spectrum, whose aspects indeed originally (initially) belong (go) together, but, in terms of content, more or less diverge (deviate, differ) from one another(,) and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) are constantly (continually, continuously) found in a state (condition, situation) of tension (stress, strain), even of opposition (or conflict) (contrast(ing)) to(wards) (with) one another. We may (are

allowed to, should), nonetheless, legitimately talk of social ontology because the aforementioned (named) forces or factors have (or display (reveal, exhibit, develop, unfurl, unfold, spread (open) (out))) [a] ubiquitous and simultaneous effect and because their effect (impact, influence) makes up (or constitutes) *society* – as “order” and as “disorder”(-) [-]. All [things] (Everything) with (of) which the social sciences deal (are [concerned] about, concerned) take(s) place (happen(s), occur(s)) against the background (backdrop) of a society, that is, against the background of the effect (impact, influence) of those forces or factors; all [things] (everything) constitute(s) (form(s), make(s) up), as [we have] said, a temporary (provisional) and precarious (insecure, dicey) crystallisation on the fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent) and open social-ontic field (Die sozialontischen Kräfte oder Faktoren wirken ja nicht als voneinander abgesonderte und kompakte Hebel, sondern sie bilden ein Spektrum, dessen Aspekte zwar ursprünglich zusammengehören, inhaltlich aber mehr oder weniger voneinander abweichen und sich somit ständig in einem Zustand der Spannung, ja des Gegensatzes zueinander befinden. Von Sozialontologie dürfen wir dennoch legitimerweise deshalb reden, weil die genannten Kräfte oder Faktoren ubiquitäre und gleichzeitige Wirkung entfalten und weil ihre Wirkung *Gesellschaft* – als „Ordnung“ und als „Unordnung“(-) [-] ausmacht. Alles, wovon die Sozialwissenschaften handeln, findet vor dem Hintergrund einer Gesellschaft, also vor dem Hintergrund der Wirkung jener Kräfte oder Faktoren statt; alles bildet, wie gesagt, eine vorläufige und prekäre Kristallisation auf dem flüssigen und offenen sozialontischen Feld).

The social-ontic meaning (or sense) of the clear epistemological distinction (differentiation, difference) between law and causality can

therefore be grasped (understood, comprehended) as follows: the lawlessness (i.e. absence of law) [in respect] of (in) causality, during (with, in) [while there is] (the) complete (full, perfect, watertight) validity of the causality principle (principle of causality), in the area (or field) (sector, domain, realm) of the social sciences, originally (initially) and essentially (or fundamentally) (basically, substantially) interrelates (connects) with the fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent) and Proteus-like (i.e. protean) character of the social-ontic [element, dimension], which should (ought to) constitute (or provide) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make) the specific object (or subject matter) (topic, theme) of social ontology – (said) otherwise (differently) (said, stated) (in other words): it [social ontology] interrelates (connects), if one may say so, with the suitability of the social-ontic material (matter, stuff, substance) to be cast (moulded or poured) always (forever) into new patterns (models, specimens, samples) and in the course of this (at the same time) to be subjected (subjugated, subordinated) to always (forever) new causalities. The task (job, assignment, duty, mission, function) of social ontology does not, according to that (accordingly, therefore, thus), consist in reducing (the) [what is] fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent) [element, dimension, phenomena] and [the, what is] varied (diverse or manifold) (multifarious) [element, dimension, phenomena] to fundamental (basic) patterns (or types) and fundamental (elementary, basic) genetic factors; the point is (what is sought is) to make clear ([us] aware of, evince, [bring to our attention, bear in mind]) the spectrum of (the) forces or factors, which in nothing other than this – irreducible and inexhaustible – (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) is made discernible (recognisable, visible, perceptible) and can consist. *Social ontology does not offer (provide, afford, grant, give) a(n)(y) supreme (up(per)most, topmost, paramount,*

*highest, ultimate, chief, main, overriding) or exclusive (sole) content-related(filled) (substantive) or normative criterion for the consideration (contemplation, observation) of (looking at, reflection on) human society and history, only that analysis of the foundations (bases, fundamentals, basics), from (out of) which [it, that analysis of the foundations, social ontology] comes (or emerges) (is created, develops), because the putting forward (or formulation) (establishing) of such a criterion is impossible.*

It [Social ontology] does not formulate (any) regularities or causalities – let alone (much less, never mind) laws –, it has nothing to report (say, tell, inform [us]) about what humans (people, men) must do in this or that situation(,) or how their collective action must (ought to) proceed (go, run). In no case does it [social ontology] want, therefore, to fulfil the ambitions of a Covering Law Model (Der sozialontische Sinn der klaren epistemologischen Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Kausalität läßt sich also folgendermaßen fassen: Die Gesetzlosigkeit der Kausalität bei lückenloser Geltung des Kausalitätsprinzips auf dem Gebiet der Sozialwissenschaften hängt ursprünglich und wesentlich mit dem flüssigen und proteushaften Charakter des Sozialontischen zusammen, welches den spezifischen Gegenstand der Sozialontologie abgeben soll – anders gesagt: Sie hängt, wenn man so sagen darf, mit der Eignung des sozialontischen Stoffes zusammen, sich in immer neue Muster zu gießen und sich dabei immer neuen Kausalitäten zu unterwerfen. Die Aufgabe der Sozialontologie besteht demnach nicht darin, das Flüssige und Vielfältige auf Grundmuster und grundlegende genetische Faktoren zu reduzieren; ihr geht es darum, das Spektrum der Kräfte oder Faktoren vor Augen zu führen, das sich nicht anders als in dieser – irreduzierbaren und unerschöpflichen – Vielfalt erkennbar machen und bestehen kann.

*Sozialontologie bietet kein oberstes oder ausschließliches inhaltliches oder normatives Kriterium zur Betrachtung menschlicher Gesellschaft*

*und Geschichte, sie liefert nur jene Grundlagenanalyse, aus der hervorgeht, warum die Aufstellung eines solchen Kriteriums unmöglich ist.* Sie formuliert keine Regelmäßigkeiten oder Kausalitäten – geschweige denn Gesetze –, sie hat nichts darüber zu berichten, was Menschen in dieser oder jener Lage tun müssen oder wie ihr kollektives Handeln verlaufen wird. In keinem Fall will sie also die Ambitionen eines Covering Law Model erfüllen). It [Social ontology] tries (attempts) to outline the framework inside of (within) which collective or individual, at any rate (in any case), social action moves (Sie versucht, den Rahmen zu umreißen, innerhalb dessen sich kollektives oder individuelles, jedenfalls soziales Handeln bewegt), without being able to state (say, declare, express) anything (something) (whatsoever) about (regarding) the possible direction and possible outcome (result; Ausgang) of the [this] same [collective or individual social action]; all directions and all outcomes remain from one to the other corner (edge, angle) of the framework in principle open (grundsätzlich offen), nothing can be excluded (precluded, out of the question, impossible) in advance. That is why the aforementioned framework does not constitute the (different or alternative) description (or formulation) (paraphrasing, expression) of an all-embracing (catholic, universal) law or a regularity, but the ideal (abstract, theoretical or conceptual) (notional, intellectual) formalised (i.e. rendered into forms) sum of the descriptions (accounts, portrayals) of all social acts (or actions) (die Umschreibung eines allumfassenden Gesetzes oder einer Regelmäßigkeit, sondern die ideale formalisierte Summe der Schilderungen aller sozialen Handlungen). (E.g.) the spectrum of the social relation [for instance] (Das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung z. B.), to which we want to devote the next chapter, could only be comprehended (or regarded) (understood, construed, conceived, perceived, interpreted, grasped) as (taken for) law or regularity(,) if its

description (depiction, portrayal, account, characterisation, specification) would contain (include) compelling (cogent, persuasive, conclusive, necessary) data (facts) or indications (signs, evidence)(,) which might (may) (would) [have] enable(d) (mak(d)e possible, allow(ed)) knowledge about which aspect of this spectrum, under which circumstances, is activated(,) and puts (overshadows) the rest [of the aspects (of the said spectrum)] (in the shade) (wenn seine Beschreibung zwingende Daten oder Indizien enthalten würde, die das Wissen darum ermöglichen dürften, welcher Aspekt dieses Spektrums unter welchen Umständen aktiviert wird und die übrigen in den Schatten stellt). There can be no talk about that. Social ontology says what ([there] is, exists) in general (is), it [social ontology] does not declare (or explain) (announce, proclaim) what occurs (happens, sets in, takes place) or what must occur as a rule or in the individual (separate, single, isolated) case. Such [an] explanation (or declaration) is the [a] matter (or affair) (thing, business, job, subject, object, cause, case, issue), rather the permanent desideratum (demand), of [for] the social sciences, which accordingly (correspondingly) ascertain (establish, determine, find out, trace) causalities or search (look) for regularities (Sozialontologie sagt, was im allgemeinen ist, sie erklärt nicht, was in der Regel oder im einzelnen Fall eintritt oder eintreten muß. Solche Erklärung ist die Sache, vielmehr das permanente Desideratum der Sozialwissenschaften, die dementsprechend Kausalitäten ermitteln oder nach Regelmäßigkeiten suchen). If they [the social sciences] (really) have great difficulty (a hard time, (many) problems) with that [of it], (then, so, thus) the social-ontological background (backdrop) or impact (or element) (hint) – whatever one wants to call it – of becoming (or events) is not least ((first) of all, primarily) to blame (at fault, responsible) for (in relation (regard) to) that, i.e. the constant (continuous, continual) presence of all social-ontologically relevant factors or forces in the whole

(entire, complete, full) gamut (range, panoply, palette) of their [these social-ontologically relevant forces or factors'] (developmental) possibilities (scope) (for (of) development (unfolding)) [possibilities for development] (Wenn sie damit ihre liebe Not haben, so ist nicht zuletzt der sozialontologische Hintergrund oder Einschlag – wie auch immer man ihn nennen will – des Geschehens daran schuld, d.h. die ständige Präsenz aller sozialontologisch relevanten Faktoren oder Kräfte in der ganzen Palette ihrer Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten).

Now social scientists explain ex post facto recurring (recurrent) phenomena or individual (separate, single, isolated) events (occurrences, incidents), and in this respect (that) (as far as that is concerned) they look at (or consider) (contemplate, observe, view) a completed (finished, finalised, concluded), a no longer open, becoming (or series (chain, course) of events), which made a more or less one-sided use (usage, application) of the original (initial) potential of (the) causalities (ein abgeschlossenes, ein nicht mehr offenes Geschehen, das vom ursprünglichen Potential der Kausalitäten einen mehr oder weniger einseitigen Gebrauch gemacht hat). But (also) social-scientific prognoses (too) move in the framework of a causally justifiable (foundable) smaller number of suspected (assumed or presumed) (supposed) possibilities, in relation to which some (a few, several) are excluded (precluded) in advance (beforehand) (Aber auch sozialwissenschaftliche Prognosen bewegen sich im Rahmen einer kausal begründbaren kleineren Anzahl von vermuteten Möglichkeiten, wobei einiges im voraus ausgeschlossen wird) – for instance the return of humanity to (the) ancient society of slave holders (slave-holding society) within (inside (of)) the next two decades. Things (It, The situation (case)) are (is) entirely (completely) otherwise (different) with (in) [regard to] social ontology. Here the

possibilities existing (in existence, extant, available) in the social-ontic field are at any time (always) present in their entirety (totality) and ready for action (actionable, [can readily act or be readily activated]) (Hier sind die im sozialontischen Feld vorhandenen Möglichkeiten jederzeit in ihrer Gesamtheit präsent und aktionsbereit). Said (Stated, Put) more precisely: in the social-ontic field there are actually (really) no past realities and not future possibilities (Im sozialontischen Feld gibt es eigentlich keine vergangenen Wirklichkeiten und keine künftigen Möglichkeiten). The entire (whole, complete) spectrum is always (constantly, continually; stets) represented by various (different, varying, varied, miscellaneous, dissimilar) actors, in relation to which many an aspect of it [the said (this) spectrum] is represented here and now (and in relation to them [these aspects] the rest [of the aspects] appear as mere possibilities), while (whereas) many an other [aspect] comes into effect there etc.. However, there has never been a moment in human history known to us without [the fact] (that) the spectrum would have been (was, being) represented in its entirety (totality) at least summatively (i.e. as a summation) (Aber es hat keinen Augenblick in der uns bekannten menschlichen Geschichte gegeben, ohne daß das Spektrum in seiner Gesamtheit wenigstens summativ vertreten worden wäre). The ubiquitous presence of the social-ontic factors or forces makes clear (understandable, comprehensible) why these [ubiquitous social-ontic factors or forces] are out of the question as (not considered) causes of special phenomena or events (occurrences, incidents): were they [the ubiquitous social-ontic factors or forces] this [thing, causes of special phenomena or events], then (so, thus) noticeable (perceptible, marked, distinct) boundaries (or limits) would have to be set (placed, put) [in regard] to (on) the (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) of the social world (Die ubiquitäre Anwesenheit der sozialontischen Faktoren oder Kräfte macht



verständlich, warum diese nicht als Ursachen von speziellen Phänomenen oder Ereignissen in Betracht kommen: Wären sie dies, so müßten der Vielfalt der sozialen Welt spürbare Grenzen gesetzt werden). If they may (are allowed, can, should) at all (to) be seen (looked at (upon), regarded) as causal determinations (regulations, rules, provisions) (als kausale Bestimmungen), then [this may be done] just (merely, only, simply) in a negative sense: the boundaries (or limits) of their [the ubiquitous social-ontic factors or forces'] (developmental) possibilities (scope) (for (of) development (unfolding)) [possibilities for development] mark (underline, highlight, accentuate) the possible boundaries (or limits) of every becoming (or series (chain, course) of events) and, in this respect, they force (coerce, compel, constrain) this [becoming] into a framework – the framework of the social-human – (und insofern zwingen sie dieses in einen Rahmen – den Rahmen des Sozial-Menschlichen – hinein)(,) and remind [us, one] of (call to mind, recall) the necessity to (by, on) which all [that is] (everything) social-human is subject (liable, governed) (succumbs, depends). Social ontology investigates (examines, looks (inquires) into, scrutinises) and describes therefore the necessary, not the sufficient conditions of behaviour and action of socially living humans; researching (inquiring) into (exploring, ascertaining, investigating, studying) the latter [(said) sufficient conditions (of behaviour and action of socially living humans)] is the task (job, assignment, duty, mission, function) of the social sciences, which track (trace, trail) causal interrelations (connections, correlations, contexts) (Sozialontologie untersucht und beschreibt also die notwendigen, nicht die zureichenden Bedingungen von Verhalten und Handeln sozial lebender Menschen; letztere zu erforschen, ist die Aufgabe der Sozialwissenschaften, die kausalen Zusammenhängen nachspüren).

So (Thus, In this way,) the position (status, standing) of social ontology vis-à-vis the social sciences is by and large (on the whole, in the main) double (dual, twin). The recourse (reversion, reverting, resorting) of sociology or of history to assumptions of [a] social-ontological character widens (broadens, extends, expands) and deepens of course the understanding (comprehension) of the material (matter, stuff, substance) handled (treated, dealt with) by them (sociology or history), because scientific understanding functions by (of) its [very] nature as [the] putting in order (or inclusion) (incorporation, classification, ordering) of a situation (or facts (of the (a) case)) in(to) a factual (objective or relevant) (practical, functional, material, substantial) or thought (i.e. intellectual) framework (Der Rückgriff der Soziologie oder der Historie auf Annahmen sozialontologischen Charakters erweitert und vertieft freilich das Verständnis der von ihnen behandelten Stoffe, denn wissenschaftliches Verständnis funktioniert von seiner Natur her als Einordnung eines Sachverhalts in einen sachlichen oder gedanklichen Rahmen) – and the broader (wider) this framework, the more comprehensive (extensive) (broader) the understanding. Historians and sociologists, who very often seek (try) to prop (shore) up (support) their individual (or separate) explanations (declarations, statements, pronouncements) (Einzelerklärungen) by means of (through) general experiential (i.e. empirical) rules (rules [in respect] of experience; Erfahrungsregeln) about (regarding, on) the way (manner, mode) (how) [in which] humans (people, men) meet (encounter) and behave towards one another, or by means of (through) general statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) on (about, regarding, over) the nature of social living together (or co-existence), of politics and of man ((the) human[s], [people]) (die Natur des sozialen Zusammenlebens, der Politik und des Menschen), move(,) mostly (for the most part, usually,

most of the time) unknowingly (unawares, unwittingly) and  
 unsystematically in the social-ontological field (area or domain) (sector)  
 (bewegen sich meistens unwissentlich und unsystematisch auf  
 sozialontologischem Gebiet). Consequently (Therefore, As a result),  
 research practice (or praxis), in [a state of] need (hardship, distress,  
 necessity) of (for, [in regard to]) explanation (in Erklärungsnot), takes  
 refuge in (resorts to) statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions,  
 propositions) (in [regard, relation]) to which it [research practice] is not  
 at all entitled (allowed, authorised) through (by means (way) of) [based  
 on] the logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding  
 (foundational) logic), i.e. through (by means of, [on]) the epistemological  
 delimitation (or demarcation) of the discipline concerned. Certainly  
 (However, Though, Admittedly, Indeed)(,) similar statements never  
 constitute specific and sufficient explanations, since, as [we have] said,  
 social-ontological statements (pronouncements, assertions, propositions,  
 opinions) can in principle not offer such [(specific and sufficient)  
 explanations]. Historians and sociologists, but also social ontologists  
 (Sozialontologen), who confuse (such(like)) statements (of that sort  
 (kind)) with (for) explanations, and for instance put (reduce, attribute,  
 trace) this or that (that or this) war down (back) to “human nature”, as if  
 humans, following the voice of their nature(,) only wage (conduct) wars  
 in their history(,) and would not have done anything else, have lost sight  
 of (touch with) [the] task (job, duty, function) and logic of social-  
 scientific explanation. Social ontology does not explain any particular  
 phenomenon or event (occurrence, incident), it must however make  
 (render) clear (plausible) why A and simultaneously its opposite (reverse)  
 (or, that which is commonly regarded as such) are just as conceivable  
 (imaginable, thinkable, possible), why, that is, social-ontologically seen,  
 the chances (odds, prospects) of war and peace are just as great, although

from the social-scientific point of view, these same chances must be (are necessarily) distributed (shared out, allocated), according to (depending on) time and place (place and time), unequally. Social ontology is not there to (for) [does not have the task (job, purpose) of] [the] teach(ing) (tell) the individual (or separate) (single, isolated) social sciences [about] methods and ways (manners, modes) of explanation; it [social ontology] makes its presence felt (noticeable, perceptible, tangible) because (due to the fact that) it muddles up (jumbles; durcheinanderbringt) the commands (requirements) of the logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic) from the outside(,) by (while it) forcing (compelling, coercing, obliging, constraining) (forces) or enticing (tempting, luring, seducing) (entices) research practice (in addition (relation to that), into the bargain) to found (or base) (establish, set up) its explanations (declarations, statements, pronouncements) on (in) (actual) fact (reality) on social-ontological statements (pronouncements, assertions, propositions, opinions). That (quite) often (repeatedly) happens (takes place, occurs) unconsciously, but not by chance (without reason, for nothing, from nowhere). The concealed (covered up, hidden, undercover) or open incursion (invasion or breaking-in) (penetration; Einbruch) of social ontology into the terrain (territory, area) of the social sciences is made possible (enabled, facilitated), in fact (indeed) promoted (fostered, encouraged, sponsored, stimulated), by the unity (uniformity; Einheitlichkeit), openness (uncertain outcome) and the flexibility of the social-ontic field. The material (or subject matter) (stuff, substance) of social ontology hardly in fact differs from that of the social sciences, the boundaries are not here of an ontic, but [are of a] cognitive-epistemological kind (sort), and it is the incursion of the ontic [element, sphere, dimension] into the cognitive-epistemological [element, sphere, dimension] (der Einbruch des Ontischen in das Kognitiv-

Epistemologische)(,) which jumbles (or muddles up) the boundaries – without however being able to abolish (do away with, get rid of, remove, undo, uncreate) them [the said boundaries]: because (there is no and there will never be [a(ny)]) (the) intellectus archetypus (archetypal intellect), which could disregard (overlook, ignore) the finiteness (finite nature; die Endlichkeit) of the human intellect and without [the] help (aid, assistance) of cognitive-epistemological boundaries (limits) and fictions at once (all of a sudden, suddenly) overlook [look over] (i.e. have a view of) (take in, grasp) the entire (whole, complete) social-ontic field(,) [does not exist and will never exist]. From the longing (yearning, hankering, nostalgia) for (after) the [an] intellectus archetypus – objectively formulated: from the incessant (unremitting, unabating, continual, ceaseless) pressure of the unified (or united) (uniform) social-ontic field on the boundaries between the disciplines (dem unablässigen Druck des einheitlichen sozialontischen Feldes auf die Grenzen zwischen den Disziplinen) – springs (arises), in the final analysis (end) (ultimately), the unease (uneasiness, uneasy feeling, discomfort, malaise, discontent, disquiet; Unbehagen) of broadly (widely) educated and far-seeing (far-sighted) social scientists vis-à-vis (the) epistemological and cognitive necessities or fictions, as differently as one may express this unease. As [the] conceptual (notional) apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of the unified (or united) (uniform), open and flexible social-ontic field – and in this respect (as far as that is concerned (goes)) for its part as scientific fiction too – social ontology partly puts (places, sets, connects, correlates, interrelates) the social sciences and the social-ontic field in connection (combination, conjunction, association, contact) with, partly in contrast (or opposition) (conflict, contrasts) to (with) one another (Als begriffliche Erfassung des einheitlichen, offenen und flexiblen sozialontischen Feldes – und insofern ihrerseits auch als

wissenschaftliche Fiktion – setzt Sozialontologie die Sozialwissenschaften und das sozialontische Feld teils in Verbindung mit-, teils in Gegensatz zueinander), (;) it [social ontology] indeed reminds [us, one] (calls to mind, recalls, recollects) (of) the ontic commonality (common ground, [similarity]) of the material (or subject matter) (stuff, substance) of all social sciences (die ontische Gemeinsamkeit des Stoffes aller Sozialwissenschaften), at the same time however it [social ontology] acquires (obtains, gains, gets) exactly thereby (through that (it), thus, in this way) a deeper insight (knowledge, understanding, appreciation) into (of) [the] necessity and character of their [the social sciences'] boundaries (limits) or their founding (establishment, foundation), [so, such] that (since) it [social ontology] wants to in principle leave (lay, set) aside (ignore, disregard, eliminate) the social-ontic common denominator from [vis-à-vis, in respect of] social-scientific question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes), keep it [the said social-ontic common denominator] for itself(,) and then (afterwards) use (employ, apply, utilise) it [the social-ontic common denominator] as [a] battering ram in order to (make a) breach (break through, violate, hole) (in) those boundaries (daß sie den sozialontischen gemeinsamen Nenner aus sozialwissenschaftlichen Fragestellungen prinzipiell ausklammern, ihn für sich behalten und ihn dann als Sturmbock einsetzen will, um in jene Grenzen Breschen zu schlagen).

The epistemological boundaries (limits, borders, frontiers, borderlines) between the social sciences, which are fixed (established or determined) by their founding, are not of the same kind (sort, type) as those [boundaries] between social ontology and the social sciences; sociology

and history differ (are distinguished (differentiated)) (by) [because of] their thematic area (or field) (sector, domain, realm; Gebiet) and their methods from each other differently [in a different way (manner), other] than both together (jointly) from social ontology. Every social science in principle, i.e. in accordance with (according to) its [respective] founding, deals with (treats, handles) certain phenomena rather than other [phenomena], without(,) though (however)(,) being in a position (able, capable), with the help (on the basis) of (based on) its own [respective] criteria, to (of) properly (rightly, correctly) assess(ing) (evaluate, rate) each and every respective weight of those phenomena in(side) (on) the social-ontic field. Misled (Misguided, Led astray, Deceived) by the fact that the social-ontic material (or subject matter) (stuff, substance) is (just) one (a(n)) (single, sole, single, unique, solitary, only) and inseparable (indivisible) [material], it [every social science] tends (has a tendency, is prone) in fact to(wards) equate (identify) its own thematic area (or field) either with the entire (whole, complete) social-ontic field or to look at (consider, contemplate) it [its own thematic area] as (its) [the entire social-ontic field's] [the] objectively privileged core (or crucial (central) part (element)) (nucleus, centrepiece, main item; Kernstück) (of it). However, the specific weight of the phenomena, (with) which every social science deals (treats, handles), constantly (continually, continuously) changes (alters) in(side) the social-ontic field(,) and with it [that specific weight (of the phenomena)] the position (status) of the social science concerned (in question) shifts (moves, becomes displaced) vis-à-vis the social-ontological problem area, although its [the social science concerned's] position (status) vis-à-vis the rest of the social sciences remains the same; because the logic of founding of a social science must (does) not (have to, necessarily) change (alter)(,) as soon as (once, when) the specific weight of the thematic area (or field) of this

same social science increases or decreases (goes up or down) in(side) (of) the social-ontic field – otherwise the disciplines would quickly (rapidly, swiftly) cease to (stop) exist(ing) as disciplines. Since all factors or forces of the social-ontic field are simultaneously (concurrently) present as aspects of a spectrum and every one of them [these factors or forces] at any time (moment) can come to the fore(front) (be highlighted (put at the centre of attention)), (so, thus, in this way) the determinative (or weighty) (decisive, defining, prevailing, leading, substantial, relevant, important; maßgeblichen) phenomena and causalities alternate (take turns), and at times a historical event (occurrence, incident), at other times a sociological structure, one time a psychological given (actual) fact, another time an institution or a role, is the decisive factor (decides the issue, tips the balance) (und bald gibt ein historisches Ereignis, bald eine soziologische Struktur, einmal eine psychologische Gegebenheit, ein anderes Mal eine Institution oder eine Rolle den Ausschlag). From [a] social-ontological point of view, this steady (continuous, constant) and often surprising (unexpected or sudden) change (alternation, fluctuation) (dieser stetige und oft überraschende Wechsel) does not cause any theoretical difficulties, but no doubt (indeed, surely, definitely, probably) [does cause theoretical difficulties] from the point of view of the individual (or separate) (single, isolated) social sciences, whose objective (factual) priorities interrelate (connect, correlate) with their logic of founding and cannot be turned upside down without [the] betrayal (or abandonment) (sellout, surrender, relinquishment) of (abandoning, betraying) their each and every respective epistemological identity (that is to say (i.e., read): of one's own power claim in the realm (area, field, sector, domain) of knowledge (des eigenen Machtanspruchs im Bereich des Wissens)). Confusion (Bewilderment, Perplexity) and – manifesting (expressing) itself in sterile methodological diatribes – quarrelsomeness



(pugnacity, belligerence; Streitsucht) grow (increase, expand) here as a rule not only because [the] place and importance (value or status) of all phenomena in(side) the social-ontic field constantly (continuously, continually) change, but also because every phenomenon can be looked at (considered, contemplated) both social-scientifically as well as social-ontologically, and indeed from several (a number of, quite a few, multiple) perspectives. Because social ontology differs from the social sciences also due to the fact that (because) it changes its standpoint in accordance with (according to) the prevailing (predominant, prevalent) ontic aspect on each and every respective occasion. The social-ontic field is indeed unified (or united) (uniform), but not one-dimensional, and social ontology must accordingly turn out multi-dimensionally [i.e. end up or be found to be multi-dimensional], as we shall (are) (yet) (to) see [later, below] in this section.

If (it is) so (thus) (that is the case), then the social sciences cannot be classified on the basis (with the help) of (based on, starting from) the criterion of their increasing or decreasing (growing or waning) proximity (nearness, closeness) to social ontology. One may not therefore assert (claim, maintain, contend, insist) [that] sociology is (stands) nearer (closer) to social ontology than for instance history, because it [sociology] makes general statements (pronouncements, assertions) about entire (whole) classes of social phenomena, whereas history concerns itself (deals with) with special (i.e. specific) (particular) phenomena and can hardly make (come to, reach) generalisations. Such a distinction between sociology and history, whose validity (or tenability) (soundness, reliability) may (here) remain (here) an open question (to be seen), could serve (be of use for, help, aid) the determination (or definition) (fixing, determining) of each and every respective proximity of these disciplines

to social ontology only under the assumption [that] social-ontological statements (pronouncements, assertions, propositions, opinions) are still more general than (the) sociological [statements], that is, social ontology is [the] supreme (highest, ultimate, paramount, uppermost, topmost, premier) [science], because [it is a] strictly nomological science (Sozialontologie sei also oberste, weil streng nomologische Wissenschaft). No doubt (Certainly, Of course), the generality of social-ontological statements is absolute, because these concern the entire (whole, complete, total) social being (Is) (das ganze soziale Sein), and outside of (the, this) (same) [social being (Is)] there is nothing socially (und außerhalb desselben gibt es sozial nichts), (;) it [social ontology](,) however(,) refers (applies) to (concerns) the framework and the factors or forces of the social-ontic becoming (or events) (des sozialontischen Geschehens), without touching upon the question of its [the social-ontic becoming's] each and every respective presumable (supposed, putative, suspected, presumptive, probable, likely) outcome (end(ing), result, upshot). Yet (Nevertheless, All the same)(,) the regularities, of which sociology speaks or of which it searches (looks) for (seeks), aim at ascertaining (finding out, establishing, determining, discovering, noticing, observing) the relative frequency (commonness, incidence) and therefore (hence) probability (likelihood) of an outcome in comparison with (to) that [the probability] of another [outcome]. (Recti)Linear (Rectilineal) intensifications (heightenings or increases) of the same thought (intellectual) content(s) from discipline to discipline are not to be found here (Geradlinige Steigerungen derselben Denkinhalte von Disziplin zu Disziplin sind hier nicht zu finden). If we take the multi-dimensionality of social ontology seriously, (then, so, thus) we may (are allowed to, can, should), with regard to (in view of) its [social ontology's] content-related(filled) (substantive) analogies [in relation] to(wards) (with) the

social sciences, at most venture the assertion (claim, allegation, proposition) (dare to say) [that] some of its dimensions come to the fore(front) (step into the foreground) in historical, some in sociological or political, some finally in anthropological studies, while at the same time (in relation to which) the boundaries [between these disciplines] remain extremely (exceedingly) flowing (i.e. fluid) (fluent) (äußerst fließend). Thus (So, In this way)(,) the theoretical lingering (or dwelling) on [the] spectrum and mechanism of the social relation, on the internal (inner) dynamic(s) of the political or of (identity) (the) (formation) (shaping, building, development) (of identity) [identity formation](,) and power(,) can offer the historian some [kind (point) of] orientation (or guidance) (information) and a certain refinement (improvement) of the faculty (or power) of judgement (discernment)(,) in so far (as much) as this [historian, man] seeks to shed light on (illuminate, examine, take a look at) acts (or actions) on the basis of a general notion (idea, perception, view, representation) of (about, on) humans and human behaviour, which he has in (at) the back of his mind, [while] sometimes [he] in fact (even) programmatically supporting (defending, backing, justifying, representing) (supports) [it, this general notion] (So kann das theoretische Verweilen bei Spektrum und Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung, bei der inneren Dynamik des Politischen oder der Identitätsbildung und der Macht dem Historiker manche Orientierung und eine gewisse Verfeinerung der Urteilskraft anbieten, insofern dieser Handlungen auf Grund einer allgemeinen Vorstellung über Menschen und menschliches Verhalten zu beleuchten sucht, die er im Hinterkopf hat, manchmal sogar programmatisch vertritt). We have already expounded (explained, explicated, illustrated) why such orientation or social-ontological schooling (training, education, instruction; Schulung) cannot advance (push forward, venture, press on as far as) (up, on) (to) the sufficient

reasons of the phenomenon to be explained. However, the great assistance (help, aid) of social ontology to(wards) (for) history is of a fundamental (basic) kind (sort) and lies (is [found]) elsewhere (somewhere else): in the knowledge of (about) the openness and flexibility of the social-ontic field, which does not bestow (grant, give, allocate) (upon) sociological hypostatisations and dehistoricisations a long life (Aber die große Hilfeleistung der Sozialontologie für die Historie ist grundsätzlicher Art und liegt anderswo: im Wissen um die Offenheit und Flexibilität des sozialontischen Feldes, welche soziologischen Hypostasierungen und Enthistorisierungen kein langes Leben zuteil werden lassen). In this important sense, social ontology is a true ally of the historical way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation) against a superficial (shallow) sociology (oberflächlich Soziologismus). The conceptual (notional) axes of social ontology are laid out (drawn up, calculated, designed) so that the transition from them to(wards) the historical way of looking at (contemplation (consideration) of) human things (i.e. affairs) can take place (occur, ensue) unconstrainedly (uninhibitedly, effortlessly) and without the mediation of sociological pseudo-generalisations (Pseudoverallgemeinerungen). The ascertainments of the openness and plasticity of the social-ontic field, of the fragmentation and the alternation (change, fluctuation; Wechsel) of causalities, of the at any time (moment) imminent swing (or shift) of the pendulum towards the opposite side really (absolutely, virtually) invite (ask for) the historical way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation). Furthermore (Even more, More still): social ontology shares the profoundly (deeply) subversive character of the historical way of looking at things (consideration)(,) by (while it) demonstrating (showing, pointing out) (demonstrates) the fragility (frailty) and internal (inner) contradictoriness (inconsistency) of

everything (all) that is (stands) in (on) the social-ontic field, not least (of all) every sociologically apprehensible (graspable, understandable, comprehensible) social order. Because the forces or factors, which in their entire (whole, complete) spectrum have an (take) effect (act, work, operate, are effective) permanently in that field and make up (constitute) the conceptual (notional) axes of social ontology, are the same [forces or factors] which – as necessary, not sufficient conditions – create and at the same time destroy (ruin, wreck) everything (all) that constitute(s) (or provide(s)) (produce(s), make(s), give(s), create(s); abgibt) the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of history and of sociology.

The latter remark (comment, observation) offers (provides, affords, gives, grants, presents) us (with) a good guide (main (connecting) thread (theme) or leitmotif) (Leitfaden) in order to go (penetrate, force one's way) deeper into the relations (relationship(s)) between social ontology and sociology. If social facts as crystallisations of social action (which for its part does not have to be [the] action of [a] collective[s] [groups, entities, bodies, formations], but can just as much be the resultant of the action of a number of (several, multiple) individuals) represent (or constitute) the object (or subject matter) of sociology in accordance with its logic of founding (founding (foundational) logic)(,) and regardless (irrespective) of research practice's necessities, then (so, thus, in this way) the composition (texture or constitution) of the central object (or subject matter) of social ontology, namely the composition (texture or constitution) of the fact of society, makes clear (understandable, comprehensible) why the sometimes (once, suddenly) crystallised social facts are (do) not destined for (given, have) eternal life (eternity, immortality) (Stellen soziale Tatsachen als Kristallisierungen sozialen Handelns (welches seinerseits nicht Handeln von Kollektiven sein muß,

sondern ebenso die Resultante des Handelns mehrerer Individuen sein kann) den Gegenstand der Soziologie entsprechend ihrer Grundlegungslogik und unabhängig von den Notwendigkeiten der Forschungspraxis dar, so macht die Beschaffenheit des zentralen Gegenstandes der Sozialontologie, nämlich die Beschaffenheit des Faktums der Gesellschaft, verständlich, warum den einmal kristallisierten sozialen Tatsachen kein ewiges Leben beschieden ist). Every crystallisation of social action occupies (fills) only a part or aspect of the social-ontologically ascertained (established, traced, determined, found out, investigated, noticed, observed) overall (total, whole, complete, entire) spectrum of the fact “society”, and the rest of the (remaining) parts or aspects weigh on it [society] until sooner or later it [society] gives in (yields, relents, succumbs) to their [the rest of the parts or aspects’] pressure (Jede Kristallisierung sozialen Handelns besetzt nur einen Teil oder Aspekt des sozialontologisch ermittelten Gesamtspektrums des Faktums „Gesellschaft“, und die übrigen Teile oder Aspekte lasten auf ihr, bis sie früher oder später ihrem Druck nachgibt). The fact of society entails (brings with it (in its wake)) the existence of social facts, and it [society] can only actually (in reality, really) exist in the form (shape, figure, guise; Gestalt) of social facts. However, it [the fact of society] itself is not merely more comprehensive (extensive) (broader), but also more fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent) and more open than every individual (separate, single, isolated) social fact, so that it [the fact of society] brings forth (creates, produces, gives rise to, spawns) from its womb (bosom, within) and material (stuff, substance, subject matter) those social facts(,) which gnaw away at (to pieces) or destroy (ruin, demolish, spoil, wreck) the already crystallised social facts (Das Faktum der Gesellschaft zieht die Existenz von sozialen Tatsachen nach sich, und es kann eigentlich nur in Gestalt von sozialen Tatsachen

bestehen. Aber es ist selbst nicht bloß umfassender, sondern auch flüssiger und offener als jede einzelne soziale Tatsache, so daß es aus seinem Schoß und Stoff jene sozialen Tatsachen hervorbringt, die die bereits kirstallisierten sozialen Tatsachen zernagen oder zerstören). It should (is to) be emphatically repeated: [just] as during (in) the formation (development), so too during (in) the dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of social facts, social-ontological points of view can bring to light (the surface) (unearth, reveal, uncover) only necessary, never sufficient reasons and conditions (Es sei nachdrücklich wiederholt: Wie bei der Herausbildung, so auch bei der Auflösung von sozialen Tatsachen können sozialontologische Gesichtspunkte nur notwendige, nie zureichende Gründe und Bedingungen zutage fördern). Social ontology cannot replace (take the place of) the social sciences, however (as, no matter how) much (as) both fields (areas) of knowledge (knowledge areas; Wissensgebiete) in their research praxis (or practice) may (like, want, are able), must and are allowed to (should) go into (penetrate, merge with, enter) each other. No leap leads from social-ontological statements (pronouncements, assertions, propositions, opinions), that is, from statements about (regarding, on) the social-ontic field in its entirety (totality) and about the fact of society, to fully justified (substantiated, well-founded, accounted for) explanations (declarations, statements, pronouncements) of social facts. Sociology always remains – and indeed preferably – directly or indirectly bound (tied, attached, connected) to (with) historically loaded (charged) contents, which substantially (or essentially) (considerably, fundamentally, substantively) differ from one another (the sociology of the formation (or development) of literary taste for instance, and that [the sociology] of “industrial relations” have at most (best) general methodical (i.e. methodological) aspects in common), and are constantly (continuously) thematically (thematisch) expanded (extended, widened,

broadened, enlarged) in order to take into account (consideration) new social facts. Social ontology, on the other hand (however), illuminates (or takes a look at) (clarifies, examines) the way (manner) [as to] (how) [in which] the factors or forces of the social-ontic field have an (take) effect (act, work, operate, are effective) in(side) (the) social facts, that is, the way (manner) [as to] (how) [in which] social facts interrelate (connect, [are interrelated (connected)]) with the fact of society. What(ever) goes beyond (surpasses, oversteps) that, is not within (beyond) (or evades) (eludes, breaks free from, shirks, escapes) its [social ontology's] competence. If social facts were (came) completely (totally, wholly, entirely) absorbed (assimilated) by (wrapped (undone) in, taken up with) the (permanently active (acting, effective, working, operating)) social-ontic factors or forces (permanently having an effect), then (so, thus) social ontology and sociology, already from ([because] of, [based on]) their logic of founding (founding (foundational) logic), would have to coincide with each other, and in social reality the same factors or forces would have to always bring about (or generate) (cause, produce, make, give rise to, engender, manufacture) the same social facts. This is, however, impossible already because (the) social-ontic factors or forces can be connected (or combined) with the most different (dissimilar, diverse, varying, variable, varied) [of] historical and social content(s), and indeed in the most different [of] ways (manners): because they [the said social-ontic factors or forces] do not develop (or unfold) of themselves, as [we have (already)] said (stated, mentioned), univocally (univok) or one-dimensionally, but they originally (initially) constitute a spectrum, whose parts or aspects can even be (stand) in content-related(filled) (substantive) opposition (or conflict) (contrast, antithesis, contradistinction; Gegensatz) with (towards) one another. Thus (In this way, So)(,) social ontology proves that no sociological concept (notion,



term) *stricto sensu* can be applicable to all societies without exception, whereby (by (means of) which) it [social ontology] further (additionally) emphasises (underlines, stresses) the historical character of sociological research (So stellt Sozialontologie unter Beweis, daß kein soziologischer Begriff *stricto sensu* auf alle Gesellschaften ohne Ausnahme anwendbar sein kann, wodurch sie den historischen Charakter soziologischer Forschung zusätzlich heraushebt).

These differences (distinctions) are (certainly) expressed (though, however) in both disciplines' different logic of founding (founding (foundational) logic). On the other hand, the ubiquitous effect (impact, influence) of the social-ontic factors or forces make (render) overlappings (or intersections) (Überschneidungen) in research practice inevitable (unavoidable, indispensable, imperative, (absolutely) essential), which are more consequential (rich in consequences, momentous, serious, far-reaching) than [the] corresponding overlappings (or intersections) between social ontology and history. Sociology of course (does in fact) deal(s) (concerns itself, is concerned) with (looks into) *social* phenomena and (or) facts, and the investigation (examination) of its objects (or subject matter(s)) (topics, motifs, themes) easily slips (slides, glides) into the question of what then would (is) the *social* (is) generally (in general) and what *societas* (is) generally (in general) (be) (Soziologie befaßt sich ja mit *sozialen* Phänomenen bzw. Tatsachen, und die Untersuchung ihrer Gegenstände gleitet leicht in die Frage über, was denn *das Soziale* überhaupt und was *Societas* überhaupt seien). Now sociological thought (thinking) has, since its beginnings (origin(s)), often sought the solution to (of) its problem in various (differing, different, varied, varying) economic, biological, psychological etc. reductionisms (Reduktionismen) by circumventing (bypassing, getting around) strictly sociological

categories<sup>225</sup>. The theoretical danger (threat, risk, hazard) of a social-ontological reductionism appears on the horizon when sociologists want to deduce (derive, infer) answers to sociological questions from general statements (or propositions) (pronouncements, assertions, opinions) about (on, regarding, over) the essence (nature, substance) of the social and of society (das Wesen des Sozialen und der Gesellschaft) and from the teachings (doctrines, theories) [in respect] of forms (morphologies; Formenlehren) about (on, regarding) the social relations of humans (people, men). Thereby (In this way, Because of (Through) that, That is why)(,) the turn towards the unhistorical [element, dimension, way of looking at things] (die Wendung zum Unhistorischen) or the unbridgeable gap between [the] necessary and sufficient conditions of social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences; Erscheinungen) is pre(-)programmed, yet precisely the unhistorical and ultimately (in the end (final analysis)) unsociological character of such foundings (establishments, justifications) of sociology (doch gerade der unhistorische und letztlich unsoziologische Charakter solcher Begründungen der Soziologie) leads to insights into the effect (impact, influence) of [the] permanent factors or forces of the social-ontic field. What(, in the course of this (process) (into the bargain),) emerges (appears, comes out [of it] (to light)), is though (however, mind you, certainly) neither fish nor fowl. It cannot be sociology already because of the lacking (missing, absent, wanting, deficient) mediation (or intervention) (intercession, interposition) between [the] fundamental (basic, elementary) conceptuality and historical (and) or social facts,(;) on the other hand, it is not social ontology because of its unsystematic and partial character. Such [“]hermaphrodites[”] (i.e. (sub)disciplines with a

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<sup>225</sup> Cf. Brittan, *Meanings*, p. 1ff., esp. p. 6.

hermaphroditic character) are for instance formal sociology or symbolic interactionism (Solche Zwitterwesen sind etwa die formale Soziologie oder der symbolische Interaktionismus), in so far (as much) as this [symbolic interactionism, the latter] was put in (at) the service of sociological (more accurately (precisely, exactly): micro-sociological) research. As we want to show (demonstrate) in the next two chapters, formal-sociological and interactionistic ideas (thoughts) can at most (best) be used as [a] building block in the description of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation; this mechanism and that spectrum are, however, understandable only against the background (backdrop) of other assumptions (suppositions, presumptions, acceptances), and only this entire (whole, total) thought(s) complex (complex of thoughts (ideas)) in its logical and objective (factual) coherence can provide (or constitute) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make, produce) the scaffolding (i.e. framework) of a social ontology (läßt sich formalsoziologisches und interaktionistisches Gedankengut höchstens als Baustein bei der Schilderung des Spektrums and des Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung verwenden; dieser Mechanismus und jenes Spektrum sind aber erst vor dem Hintergrund anderer Annahmen verständlich, and nur dieser ganze Gedankenkomplex kann in seiner logischen und sachlichen Kohärenz das Gerüst einer Sozialontologie abgeben). Things are (It (The situation) is) no(t) different (otherwise) (the same) as regards Weber's founding (establishment) of sociology, since the concept (notion) of social action, as he defines it, offers (provides, gives, grants) an (alternative or indirect) description (formulation, paraphrasing, expression) (Umschreibung) of the social relation, from (out of) which the transition to the real (genuine, authentic, true, actual) – historical(ly)-content-related(filled)(substantive) examination (study) of themes (or topics) (subject matter) [in respect] of

sociology (der historisch-inhaltlichen Thematik der Soziologie) is to be made (achieved, managed, pulled off, established, created) just as little as from Simmel's formalities (i.e. form-related lines of thought) (von Simmels Formalien). Luckily (Fortunately, Happily), neither Weber the ingenious (brilliant, inspired) researcher nor Simmel the subtle (or sensitive) analyst followed their own sociological logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic); had they remained consistent in [regard to] it [their respective sociological logic of founding], then they would have had to have devised (outlined, sketched, designed, planned) a social ontology. The splitting (division, fission; Spaltung) and the tension (stress, strain) in the theoretical corpus (body) of sociology owing (due) to (as a result (because) of) the forced (compelled, (con)strained) being next to (beside) one another (side by side) (i.e. co-existence) (gezwungenen Nebeneinanderseins) of epistemologically heterogeneous elements have not been abolished (done away with, canceled, annulled, terminated, supplanted, displaced, superseded, set (put, pushed) aside, voided, reversed) until today (sind bis heute nicht aufgehoben),(;) they [such splitting and tension in the theoretical corpus of sociology] have in fact (even) deepened by means of (through) the getting out of hand (becoming rife (rampant) or uncontrolled spread) (Überhandnehmen) of the phenomenology of the lifeworld and of symbolic interactionism in recent (the last few) decades. What in many places is complained about (deplored, lamented, bewailed, mourned) as [an, the] inability to bring (put) together [the] two main (principal, chief, primary) strands of sociological thought (thinking), in reality constitutes an insurmountable (insuperable, invincible) theoretical awkwardness (or perplexity) (predicament, embarrassment) vis-à-vis a badly (poorly) formulated and thus (therefore, hence) insoluble (un(in)solvable) problem. One cannot proceed (go (move) forward) here

rhapsodically, as if one was dealing with (it were a matter of) sticking together anew the *disjecta membra* (i.e. scattered fragments) of one (a) single (sole, solitary, lone, unique) discipline after an arbitrary (random, voluntary) separation of their [the said *disjecta membra*'s] original (initial) unity; it is a matter of the coordination (coordinating) and the co-operation (collaboration) of two different disciplines, and these can be achieved (attained, reached) only on the basis of their previous clear epistemological separation from each other – the ontic unity (uniformity) of the material (or subject matter) (stuff, substance) (*die ontische Einheitlichkeit des Stoffes*) already provides (looks, takes care, sees, ensures), beyond each respective logic of founding (founding (foundational) logic), for (after, of, to) the necessary content-related(filled) (substantive) interweaving (intertwining, interconnection) of the bilateral (or mutual) research practice (on both sides) [of both disciplines (i.e. social ontology and sociology)].

This unity (uniformity) does not extend (stretch, cover, span) (itself) only (in(side), across) (apply to) synchrony, but likewise (also, as well) (in(side), across, to) diachrony. The social-ontic does not consist of younger and older strata (layers), [but] rather of equally original (initial) (or equiprimordial) aspects (*gleichursprünglichen Aspekten*); and [the] task (job, duty, assignment, function, mission) of social ontology is (this, it)(,) to work (bring, bear, carve) out (ascertain or investigate) (process, elaborate, investigate, explore; *herauszuarbeiten*) the (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality), the necessary interrelation (or correlation) (connection) and the just as necessary equal originality (or equiprimordiality) (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*) of these aspects. In this sense, the archaic is always young here, at any rate younger and fresher than phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances,

occurrences) which come (arrive) on the scene with the claim (demand) of establishing their own newness (or novelty) (innovation; Neuheit) as historical eternity. Precisely the equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of the social-ontic's aspects (Gerade die Gleichursprünglichkeit der Aspekte des Sozialontischen) in their simultaneous (concurrent) complementarity and contrast (opposition or conflict) (Gegensätzlichkeit) ensures (guarantees, safeguards) incidentally (by the way) – as [a] necessary condition – the openness and the endless (or infinite) (unendliche) productivity of history. What may appear on the social-ontic field as change is merely the at times ([happening] occasional(ly), from time to time, now and then) rearrangement (rearranging, changing around, switching over, transposition, changeover, shift, about turn (face), change; Umstellung) of those equally original (initial) (or equiprimordial) (and simultaneously (concurrently), if also not uniformly,) (acting, operating, effective) aspects (having an (taking) effect) (simultaneously, if not (also) uniformly (too)) (Was auf dem sozialontischen Feld as Wandel erscheinen mag, ist bloß die zeitweise Umstellung jener gleichursprünglichen und gleichzeitig, wenn auch nicht gleichmäßig wirkenden Aspekte). (The) Change (alteration) in (of) historical and sociological phenomena is, in contrast (on the other hand), qualitative, it [such change] takes place (comes to pass) in different time periods (courses of time; Zeitläuften), and consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) it brings about (effect, causes, occasions, induces) a more or less intense (severe or stark) (strong, considerable, powerful, deep) qualitative differentiation of time, which seems to disintegrate (decompose, fall apart (into ruin), collapse, crumble, decay) into larger or smaller heterogeneous fragments. Every historical or sociological phenomenon (or manifestation) (appearance, occurrence) lives in (i.e. occupies) (inhabits) or produces, as one [would say (have it)] (wants), its own time fragment

(fragment of time; Zeitfragment), in order to (so that it [every historical or sociological phenomenon]) struggle(s) (fight(s)) ([while] struggling) in vain (vainly, futilely) for its prolongation (elongation, lengthening, extension) – or shortening (cutting short, curtailment). Even if it [every historical or sociological phenomenon] – prepared as [a] sociological ideal type (and) in accordance with (corresponding to) the subjective meaning (or sense) connected with it (als soziologischer Idealtyp präpariert und entsprechend dem mit ihr verbundenen subjektiven Sinn) – (out)lasts (survives) centuries or millennia (“Christendom (Christianity)”, “New Times (Modern Era)”), it has, nevertheless (all the same, however), its irreplaceable (un(in)exchangeable, non-interchangeable; unaustauschbaren) place inside of the overall (total) becoming (or events) (Gesamtgeschehens), its unique (or one-off(time)) (singular) time period (span, frame, space) (period of time; Zeitraum), in(to) which no other phenomenon (or manifestation) fits; thus (so, in this way) it looks (appears, seems), at least in the [a] retrospective representation (portrayal, description, account), as if history which, thanks to the dynamic(s) of the social-ontic field bearing (carrying, supporting, sustaining) it [history], is in principle open, all the same (nevertheless, after all) (would) consist(s), in (terms of) detail(s) (or in particular cases), of closed (self-contained, concluded, completed, finished-off) units (unities or entities) and different (varied, varying, variable, various) qualities [in respect] of time (Zeitqualitäten). In social ontology (the) [it (the situation, things) look(s) (is, are)] reverse(d) (opposite) (occurs). The real openness of the social-ontic field appears (is seen, shows itself, becomes apparent) in the interweaving (intertwining, interconnection) of the social-ontic factors or forces with the individual (or separate) (single, isolated) temporally (chronologically) determined (conditioned) historical phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences), in relation to which the

internal (inner) tensions (stresses, strains) and contrasts (or conflicts) (opposites) in the spectrum of those factors or forces take care of (provide (cater) for, look after) their [the said factors or forces'] suitability (fitness) to spread (gain ground) inside of the most different, in terms of content, absolutely (really) opposed (contrary, conflicting, contrasted) phenomena (or manifestations). However, at the level of the description (representation) and of the conceptual (notional) apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of these same factors and forces, time stands, as it were (so to speak), still. Social ontology deals with the slowest time flow (flow of time)(,) which human affairs (or things) (matters) know (Sozialontologie handelt vom langsamsten Zeitfluß, den die menschlichen Dinge kennen). The spectrum of the social-ontic factors and forces remains(,) (stable) since the attested (witnessed) beginnings (origin(s)) of the history of mankind (humankind, humanity) (Menschheitsgeschichte)(,) (stable), no matter (irrespective of) how its individual (or separate) (single, isolated) aspects may have been rearranged (redisposed, realigned, reclassified) (changed their arrangements (plans)) according to (depending on) time and place; no rearrangement (redisposition, realignment, reclassification) can, in any case (at any rate, at all events, anyway), conclusively (definitively, once and for all, for good, finally) drive out (or displace) (dispel, repel, oust, remove, sideline, put (set) aside, replace, supersede, repress, repulse) (endgültig verdrängen) or exclude (preclude, ostracise) previous (or earlier) (antecedent, former, past) or conceivable (imaginable, thinkable, possible) rearrangements, that is, monopolise the spectrum for itself.

The diachronic stability of the spectrum, which takes root in (or is based (founded) on) (springs (originates, emanates) from) the synchrony and equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of its aspects, is no mere



theoretical postulate and no mere heuristic fiction, which still awaits  
 (waits (hopes) for) its empirical confirmation (corroboration, upholding).  
 It [The said diachronic stability of the spectrum], on the contrary,  
 constitutes an age-old (ancient, immemorial, primeval, primordial)  
 knowledge or notion (perception or representation) (idea) which has been  
 (was) articulated more or less vaguely in all cultures(,) and can be  
 reconstructed already through (by (means of)) (the) reading [matter,  
 material] (of) the oldest texts which we know (Die diachronische  
 Stabilität des Spektrums, die in der Synchronie und  
 Gleichursprünglichkeit seiner Aspekte gründet, ist kein bloßes  
 theoretisches Postulat und keine bloße heuristische Fiktion, die noch  
 immer der empirischen Bestätigung harrt. Sie bildet im Gegenteil eine  
 uralte Erkenntnis oder Vorstellung, die mehr oder weniger vage in allen  
 Kulturen artikuliert wurde und sich bereits durch die Lektüre der ältesten  
 Texte, die wir kennen, rekonstruieren läßt). It [The diachronic stability of  
 the spectrum] always aimed at providing the answer to the elementary  
 question (problem) or at explaining (accounting for) the elementary  
 feeling (sense) [of] how it (then) (is) (thereby, with that) [possible, can  
 be] that [the, what is, something] constantly (continually, continuously)  
 new [things] (Neues) happen(s) (occur(s), take(s) place) in a world which  
 after all (yet, all the same, nevertheless, really) is so old and somehow  
 seems familiar. Those oldest texts in fact speak a(n) directly  
 (immediately) understandable (intelligible, comprehensible) language –  
 for the most part (mostly, more often than not) considerably  
 (substantially, significantly, much) more understandable than modern  
 sociological jargon – and talk of human (the) social behaviour (of  
 humans) and of human motivations, which we can (readily) comprehend  
 (understand, fathom) (without a second thought (any difficulty)) (und  
 reden von menschlichem Sozialverhalten und menschlichen

Motivationen, die wir ohne weiteres nachvollziehen können). What, in the course of this (at the same time, into the bargain), we cannot grasp (comprehend, understand, apprehend) without [a] scientific pre-education (or educational background) (pretraining, previous training) is that which otherwise (apart from that) makes up (constitutes) the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of historical and sociological research (investigation, inquiry): customs (or manners) (morals, practices) and institutions, world theories (i.e. world views) and rituals. This distinction (differentiation, difference) is in [a] twofold (double) respect of great significance (importance). First, it [the (said) distinction] refers to a stratum (layer) of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) stratum; Tiefenschicht) [stratum of depth] of social life, which (the) socially living (hu)man knows from immediate (direct, instantaneous) experience, because it [this stratum of depth of social life] consists (is made up, put together) of (from) factors or forces to whose composition (texture or constitution) and whose spectrum every actor must orientate his action, no matter in which society he may be found (find himself). This stratum of depth coincides with what we call the social-ontic field, and its essence (or nature) (being, substance) can be fathomed (discovered, found out, got to the bottom of, determined, penetrated, probed) without us knowing (having known) anything about (regarding) (the) temporally(chronologically)-historically determined (conditioned) religious, national, political etc. ideas(,) with which (the) actors connect (join, link, tie, bind combine) their action's subjectively meant meaning (or sense), indeed [with which actors] have to (must) connect in every (cultural) state (of affairs) (or situation (condition)) [in respect] (of culture) [state (or situation) of culture] (Kulturzustand)(,) in order to be able to support (justify, back, defend, represent) it [the said subjectively meant meaning] socially. Social ontology therefore is no history of ideas

or analysis of ideology (ideological analysis) (Ideengeschichte oder Ideologiekritik), as history and sociology must (also) be (it [a history of ideas or analysis of ideology]). It [Social ontology] elucidates (illuminates, enlightens, sheds light on, clears up, clarifies) the terrain (territory or ground) (soil, land; Boden) on which ideas grow and makes clear (plausible) (explains) why on this terrain, the terrain of [an] elementary or complex culture, the social-ontic factors or forces in their necessary bond (tie, binding, bonding, relationship; Bindung) with (to) concrete humans (people, men) can only develop (unfold) via ideas (über Ideen sich entfalten können). The necessity of the ideational mediation (or intervention) (intercession, interposition) [in respect] of [in] all the [that is] (everything) social is a social-ontic fact and must be explained social-ontologically; but ideas as particular (certain, specific) content(s) do not possess social-ontic necessity, and in this sense one can in principle assert (maintain, claim, contend): there are no ideas, there are living humans (people, men) in society and culture, whose social-ontically determined (conditioned) and explainable action must be connected with what one commonly (generally) calls ideas (Die Notwendigkeit der ideellen Vermittlung von allem Sozialen ist ein sozialontisches Faktum und muß sozialontologisch erklärt werden; aber die Ideen als bestimmte Inhalte besitzen keine sozialontische Notwendigkeit, und in diesem Sinne kann man grundsätzlich behaupten: Es gibt keine Ideen, es gibt in Gesellschaft und Kultur lebende Menschen, die ihr sozialontisch bedingtes und erklärbares Handeln mit dem verbinden müssen, was man gemeinhin Ideen nennt).

Thus (Therefore, Consequently, As a result, So)(,) we (have) come to [arrived at] the second implication of the distinction (difference, differentiation) mentioned above between the levels of understanding.

This time it is a matter of the much-discussed alternative (option; Alternative) “cultural relativism vs. universal understanding” („kultureller Relativismus vs. universelles Verstehen“)<sup>226</sup>. Cultural relativism is based (founded) on (takes root in, springs (originates, emanates) from) the perception [that] the criteria for the understanding of a society are (would be) put (placed) at [one’s] disposal (offered, provided, lent) by this society itself, [that] (that is why, and so, as a result) understanding (therefore) (would) come(s) about (materialise(s), is (be) achieved (reached, brought off), take(s) place) only (then) when one is (would be) able to understand (fathom or re-enact in one’s mind) a society’s self-understanding in all its detail(s) and ramifications (branching (out)) in(side) social life; but (in relation to that) no member of a(n) foreign (alien) society would be in a position (to) (capable) (of) [do(ing) that]. Here a(n) coming undone (or absorption) (assimilation; Aufgehen) of social action in the ((very) same) subjective sense connected with it is postulated, and no distance is perceived (discerned) between the becoming (or events) in (on) the social-ontic field and the ideationally articulated self-understanding of actors. As soon as this distance comes into view (becomes visible), the conclusion is obvious (follows, suggests itself) (it is reasonable to conclude (stands to reason)) that understanding and observing actors find themselves (are found (located)) in (on) the same social-ontic, if (even though, although, albeit) not necessarily [the same] historical or sociological field, and that that aspect of their action, which lies on that side or this side of (beyond or close (near) to) their each and every respective self-understanding, must (has to) be common to (for) them on the basis of the social-ontic field’s compelling (cogent, persuasive, conclusive, necessary) given (actual)

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<sup>226</sup> In detail (depth) ([For] details, Extensively, Thoroughly, Elaborately) in relation to that(,)(:) Ch. 5, Sec. 2.

facts, as much as their [the said observing actors'] [(various) kinds of] self-understanding(s) (ihre Selbstverständnisse) may (also) differ from one another. This opens (up) (inaugurates, institutes) a secure (reliable, safe, certain, assured, stable, firm) perspective for mutual (reciprocal) understanding on [a] social-ontic basis, as a common (familiar, prevalent) example can illustrate (exemplify): two foes (enemies), who cannot and do not want to “understand” each other culturally etc. at all, understand each other, nevertheless, very well and without talking (speaking) to each other on a battlefield(,) by (while) one [of them (the said foes)] directing (orientating, adjusting, pointing, fixing) (directs) his action in accordance with what the other is doing (does) or will presumably (or likely) (probably) do. In this way (So, Thus)(,) (the) social-ontological way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) makes (demonstrates, shows, evinces) the bounds (or limits) (barriers; Schrancken) of cultural relativism, and at the same time [the] possibilities and meaning (or sense) of universal understanding(, visible (noticeable, apparent, clear)); because understanding as the fundamental mechanism of the social relation lies (is) likewise (also) originally (initially), and regardless (irrespective) of its each and every respective cultural formation (development, elaboration, arrangement, configuration), in(side) (on) the social-ontic field (So macht die sozialontologische Betrachtung die Schranken des kulturellen Relativismus und zugleich Möglichkeiten und Sinn universellen Verstehens sichtbar; denn Verstehen als der fundamentale Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung liegt ebenfalls ursprünglich und ungeachtet seiner jeweiligen kulturellen Ausgestaltung auf dem sozialontischen Feld).

Social ontology is (the) [a] talk (speech) of (about) this social-ontic field, it [social ontology] constitutes its [the social-ontic field's] conceptual

(notional) reconstruction. In this respect (As far as that goes (is concerned)), it [social ontology] unfolds (or develops) as [a] scientific fiction at the level of description (representation, portrayal) (descriptive level), not unlike (differently to, other(wise) than [in]) history or sociology. That is why it shares (in) the same fate (destiny, lot) of all scientific fictions: it fails (to function) (breaks down, malfunctions) and is pushed (put, placed) aside when it cannot “save” the phenomena in the Platonic sense (Sozialontologie ist die Rede von diesem sozialontischen Feld, sie bildet dessen begriffliche Rekonstruktion. Insofern entfaltet sie sich als wissenschaftliche Fiktion auf einer Darstellungsebene, nicht anders als Historie oder Soziologie. Sie teilt daher das Schicksal aller wissenschaftlichen Fiktionen: Sie versagt und wird beiseitegeschoben, wenn sie die Phänomene nicht im platonische Sinne „retten“ kann). In order to be able to save the phenomena, a discipline must, though (certainly, admittedly, mind you, however), clarify (clear (up)) first through (by means of) its logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic) which phenomena fall [come, are] under [within] its competence (authority) so that it[s competence] can be measured justly (fairly) in [respect of, relation to] its [the said discipline’s] own claim[s]. After [the] fixing (or determining) of the conceptual (notional) and content-related(filled) (substantive) framework through (by means of) the logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic), this [framework] may be proved as [being] in need of improvement (betterment, amelioration) or even as largely (to a great (large) extent (degree), for the most part, extensively) unsuitable (unfit). In both cases, reflection (thought, thinking, contemplation; das Nachdenken) on (about) the historical experience (practical (empirical) knowledge) of social life (die historische Erfahrung des sozialen Lebens) must answer the question [as to] whether the

undertaking (venture; das Unterfangen) of a social ontology, all the same (nevertheless), is worthwhile and should (ought to) be continued in another form (shape). No epistemological profundity (profound (deep(er)) meaning) and no methodological art(s) of improvisation (improvisational art(s) (skill(s))) can, at any rate (in any case), disregard (ignore, shrug off, jump (leap) over, override) the banal (trivial, commonplace, trite, mundane) but compelling (cogent, persuasive, conclusive, necessary) criterion of empirical conclusiveness (or validity) (soundness, reliability, tenability), unless [it does so] in [its] imagination (fantasy, illusion, conceit). Social ontology is an empirical discipline like every other [empirical discipline] too (as well, also), and no philosophical posture (or pose) (attitude) can release (excuse, deliver) it [social ontology] from the prosaic duties (obligations) which arise (come into being, result, ensue) from it (that) (therefrom) (Kein epistemologischer Tiefsinn und keine methodologischen Improvisationskünste können sich jedenfalls über das banale, aber zwingende Kriterium empirischer Stichhaltigkeit hinwegsetzen, es sei denn in der Einbildung. Sozialontologie ist eine empirische Disziplin wie jede andere auch, und keine philosophie Attitüde kann sie von den prosaischen Pflichten entbinden, die daraus entstehen). Nonetheless, it [social ontology] is not positivistically inclined (adjusted, positioned, focused, set) and indeed in neither of both the basic (fundamental) meanings of the word in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It [Social ontology] does not therefore arrive at (reach, get to, achieve, accomplish) its generalisations through (by means of) induction on the basis of sensorily(or sensorially)(sensually, sensuously, materially)-experimentally ascertainable (detectable) facts (auf der Basis von sinnlich-experimentell feststellbaren Fakten); and it does not want to imitate the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and proceed (act) nomologically. The laws of positivistic social science try (attempt) to

anticipate, via the assumption (supposition, acceptance, presumption, hypothesis) of fixed (steady or stable) (rigid, firm) hierarchies of causal factors, outcomes of becoming (or events) in terms of content. Social ontology does not deal with such content(s), but with that framework, inside of which [the] (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) of content(s) and [the] openness of outcomes (inevitably, invariably, undoubtedly) appear (or occur) (crop up, arise) (without fail). And the factors or forces, which are (stand) at (in) its [social ontology's] conceptual (notional) centre (or focus of attention) (focal point, heart), do not have an (take) effect (act, work, operate, are not effective), as we must (have to) repeat in conclusion, compactly in one sole (only, unique, single) direction, but they [the said factors or forces] spread (stretch) out (extend, expand, unfold) in the shape (or form) of a spectrum(,) whose aspects in part (partly) are (stand) in fact (even) in content-related(filled) (substantive) opposition (or conflict) ([a state of] contrast(ing)) with one another (Die Gesetze positivistischer Sozialwissenschaft versuchten über die Annahme fester Hierarchien von Kausalfaktoren Ausgänge des Geschehens inhaltlich vorwegzunehmen. Sozialontologie handelt nicht von solchen Inhalten, sondern von jenem Rahmen, innerhalb dessen Vielfalt der Inhalte und Offenheit der Ausgänge unweigerlich auftreten. Und die Faktoren oder Kräfte, die in ihrem begrifflichen Mittelpunkt stehen, wirken, wie wir abschließend wiederholen müssen, nicht kompakt in eine einzige Richtung, sondern sie breiten sich in Gestalt eines Spektrums aus, dessen Aspekte z. T. sogar im inhaltlichen Gegensatz zueinander stehen).



## B. The being (Is) of society as object (or subject matter) (topic) of social ontology (Das Sein der Gesellschaft als Gegenstand der Sozialontologie)

Social ontology is the ontology of the [what is] social [sphere, dimension, element]. The social is that which specifically characterises (marks, labels, identifies, brands, describes) the being (Is) of society, that is, society as [a] social-ontologically specific concept (notion) and [the] social coincide. The being (Is) of society, looked at (considered, contemplated, regarded, viewed, looked upon, beheld, observed) as [a] primeval (or primordial) fact, (accordingly, thus) constitutes(, according to that, therefore,) the natural starting point of social ontology, just as (like) the being (Is) of the world per se (as such) likewise (also) as [a] primeval fact, has been the intellectual (thought) *conditio sine qua non* (i.e. (absolutely) essential (indispensable, “without which [thing] not”) condition (term, stipulation)) of philosophical ontology (Sozialontologie ist die Ontologie des Sozialen. Das Soziale ist das, was das Sein der Gesellschaft spezifisch kennzeichnet, Gesellschaft als sozialontologisch spezifischer Begriff und Soziales fallen also zusammen. Das Sein der Gesellschaft, als Urfaktum betrachtet, bildet demnach den natürlichen Ausgangspunkt der Sozialontologie, genauso wie das Sein der Welt schlechthin, ebenfalls als Urfaktum, die gendankliche *conditio sine qua non* der philosophischen Ontologie gewesen ist). If now social ontology has society (in the [its, society’s] specific sense) for (as) the [its, social ontology’s] object (or subject matter) (in the [its] specific sense (meaning) [of society as society]), then (so, thus) evidently (obviously, apparently, it (would) seem(s)) it [social ontology] does not concern itself (deal) with (look into, take interest in) all [things] (everything) which

(that) is found in society and may (even, perhaps, really) represent (constitute) (even, perhaps, really) the material precondition (or prerequisite) (presupposition) of the being (Is) of the social (Hat nun Sozialontologie Gesellschaft im spezifischen Sinn zum Gegenstand, so befaßt sie sich offenbar nicht mit allem, was sich in der Gesellschaft befinden und gar die materielle Voraussetzung des Seins des Sozialen darstellen mag). Not all [things] (everything) in society and not all [things] (everything) which society conditionally or unconditionally (up to a point (partly, under certain circumstances) or absolutely (at all costs, indispensably), necessarily or unnecessarily) needs for existence (to exist) is society in the relevant(,) for social ontology(,) sense. That does not mean [that] human things (or affairs) (matters) would be (are) divided already externally into those (such [things]) which relate (or refer) to the social, and those (such [things]) which do not do this [relate to the social]. Rather the dividing (partitive) line (line of division (separation); Teilungslinie) runs crossways (crosswise, diagonally, across) through all [things] (everything) which lives and weaves (i.e. moves) (spins) in society, that is, somehow (or other) interrelates (connects) with [the] doing (i.e. acts) (actions, conduct, activities, behaviour, to do) and being (Is) (to be) of socially living humans – it [the dividing line] goes, above all, crossways (crosswise, diagonally, across) through man himself. [Just] as [the] economy, institutions or (intellectual(mental)-spiritual) products (of the intellect(-spirit) (or mind)) [products of the intellect(-spirit) (or mind)] have their social-ontologically instructive (informative, illuminating, revealing, telling) and their only historically-sociologically derivable (inferable, deducible, developable, findable) sides (aspects), so too a social-ontologically relevant anthropology must leave wide (broad, large, extensive) areas (sectors or realms) (fields, domains) [in respect] of the study of man (humans) to other disciplines, beginning (starting) with

biology (Wie Wirtschaft, Institutionen oder Geistesprodukte ihre sozialontologisch aufschlußreichen und ihre nur historisch-soziologisch erschließbaren Seiten haben, so muß auch eine sozialontologisch relevante Anthropologie weite Bereiche des Stadiums des Menschen anderen Disziplinen überlassen, angefangen bei der Biologie). That is why the anthropological [sphere, dimension, field, element] just (exactly) as (like) the political [sphere, dimension, field, element] appear (differently) from (in) the perspective of social ontology (differently, otherwise) than from (in) that [the perspective] of general anthropology or of common (usual, familiar) political science (Politikwissenschaft), in relation to which (while at the same time) the[ir] [said] [these perspectives', the anthropological and the political's] separation (division, segregation, partition) [in question] (does not) concern(s not) (pertain (refer) to, affect, regard) (the) subject areas (fields, sectors, matters) (Sachgebiete), but (changing (alternating, changeable, variable, varying)) aspects.

The determination (or definition) (fixing, determining, classification, identification) of the being (Is) of society as [the] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of social ontology implies something else (more) (Die Bestimmung des Seins der Gesellschaft als Gegenstand der Sozialontologie impliziert noch etwas). If the question formulation (formulation of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of (a [the]) problem(s), central theme) wants to be social-*ontological*, (then, so, thus) it [such question formulation] must advance (push (forge) ahead) to (get as far as, reach) a theoretical point from (out of) which it [this question formulation] may (is allowed to, can) mean (or say) (think, believe): thus (so, in this way) was (is) society originally (initially) (society was originally) composed (drawn up) (in this way), and no

element of its [society's] theoretical reconstruction is superfluous (unnecessary) or can be reduced to a(n) even (still) deeper and more original (initial) dimension – provided (on condition, presupposing, assuming) of course [that] one remains during this consideration (thought, deliberation, reflection) at (on) the same epistemological level and with (during, in) the same logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic), without for instance attempting (trying), for [the purpose of] the underpinning (supporting, backing up) of the most general, that is, ontological claim (demand), to categorially (categorically) think of (imagine, reflect upon) the foundations of social ontology together (jointly) with those [the foundations] of biology (So ist Gesellschaft ursprünglich verfaßt, und kein Element ihrer theoretischen Rekonstruktion erübrigt sich oder läßt sich auf eine noch tiefere und ursprünglichere Dimension reduzieren – vorausgesetzt freilich, man bleibt während dieser Überlegung auf derselben epistemologischen Ebene und bei derselben Grundlegungslogik, ohne etwa zu versuchen, zur Untermauerung des allgemeinsten, also ontologischen Anspruchs die Fundamente der Sozialontologie mit jenen der Biologie kategorial zusammenzudenken). Cybernetic system(s) theory, which raises (makes) universal claims, and wants to at once (first of all, for a start) embrace (contain, enclose, include) all strata (layers) of social and non-social being (Is) (alle Schichten des sozialen und nichtsozialen Seins), cannot provide (or constitute) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make, produce) a *social* ontology because it [cybernetic systems theory] cannot by means of (through) its specifically own categorial (categorical) apparatus (equipment) ascertain (establish, determine, find out, trace) the necessary (pre)conditions (requirements) of historical and sociological phenomena which a social ontology must name, but smuggles [them, these necessary (pre)conditions] into its theoretical corpus (body) through (by means of)

selective loans (borrowings) from the biological etc. sciences. A sociology cannot (then) again (on the other hand, in turn) support (bear, carry, sustain) them [the said necessary (pre)conditions] because it [(a) sociology] cannot through (by means of) this same apparatus (equipment) explain (any) historical content(s), that is, it is not in a position (able) to (cannot) apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) even the sufficient conditions of historical and sociological phenomena; such content(s) is (are) brought into play (used, called on, enlisted, drawn on) at (the) most (best) selectively and amateurishly for the explanation of already (well-)established (or fixed) (settled, definite) (system(s)-theoretical) principles (pertaining to system(s) theory). The situation (case) (It, Things) is (are) analogous [with regard] to functionalistic system(s) theory, which was initiated by ethnologists subsequent to (following, after) Durkheim, [and] in many ways (or cases) was interwoven (entangled, crossed over, connected) with pre(-)cybernetic forms of system(s) theory, and likewise (also) belongs to the sociologies social-ontologically laid out (drawn (set) up, calculated, structured, designed, invested) in an unreflected (unthinking or uncritical) manner (unreflectedly (unthinkingly or uncritically)) (den unreflektierterweise sozialontologisch angelegten Soziologien). Here a system of needs or striving for (after) their [these needs'] satisfaction (satisfying) underlies (is at the root of (the basis for)) the being (Is) of society, in relation to which (while at the same time) (the) individual (separate, single, isolated) aspects of (the) social order or (the) individual institutions are connected (combined, associated) (put into [a(n)] combination (association, connection)) with biological and anthropological constants, i.e. [with] exactly these fundamental (basic or elementary) needs (wants, requirements, necessities, wishes, desires) (grundlegenden Bedürfnissen). This position of course does (is) not satisfy (fulfil) (sufficient (enough) for) concrete sociological and

historical (explanatory) claims ([in respect] of explanation), moreover (in addition, furthermore, besides) it is more than doubtful (dubious, questionable) whether it (the said position) withstands social-ontological examination (scrutiny, investigation, checking, testing) by (while it) wanting (wants) to deduce (derive, infer) the being (Is) of society from another order, namely, the biological-anthropological order of needs. Society does not in fact (indeed) exist *so that* the needs established (settled, fixed, ready-made, set) in advance of its members are satisfied through (by (means of)) [the] division of labour and institutional measures (or precautions) (provisions). Things (Matters, The situation) are (is) the other way around ([the] reverse(d)): *because* the human genus (i.e. race) (or mankind) (humankind) lives since primeval (primordial) times (time immemorial) (for aeons) in society, certain institutions were formed (or developed), and continue to be formed (or developed), for the socially regulated satisfaction of needs. The satisfaction of needs takes place (occurs, happens, is carried out) in view of (with regard to) the fact that one (humans, people) [they, needs] live(s) [are lived, experienced] in society. Further (More) still (Furthermore, Even (Still) more (further)): other needs beyond the biological-animal – and the manner of the satisfaction of exactly these [needs] – would not have arisen (emerged, come (sprung) up, appeared [on the scene]) at all without the fact of society and without the propulsive (forward(s)-driving(propelling, pushing), propulsory, aggravating) dynamic(s) of life in society. Naturally, an elementary stratum (layer) of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) stratum) [stratum of depth] of human needs has nothing to do with social-ontologically relevant factors; that, however, which is as [a] need social-ontologically irrelevant is also not specifically human. Specifically human needs are satisfied from (there) [the point] where [or the moment] social-ontologically relevant factors come into play (Die

Gesellschaft existiert ja nicht, *damit* die im voraus feststehenden Bedürfnisse ihrer Mitglieder durch Arbeitsteilung und institutionelle Vorkehrungen befriedigt werden. Die Dinge liegen umgekehrt: *Weil* das Menschengeschlecht seit Urzeiten in Gesellschaft lebt, bildeten und bilden sich weiterhin bestimmte Institutionen zur sozial regulierten Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen heraus. Die Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse erfolgt im Hinblick auf das Faktum, daß in Gesellschaft gelebt wird. Mehr noch: Andere Bedürfnisse jenseits der biologisch-animalischen – und die Art und Weise der Befriedigung eben dieser – wären ohne das Faktum der Gesellschaft und ohne die vorwärtstreibende Dynamik des Lebens in Gesellschaft überhaupt nicht aufgekommen. Natürlich hat eine elementare Tiefenschicht von menschlichen Bedürfnissen nichts mit sozialontologisch relevanten Faktoren zu tun; das aber, was als Bedürfnis sozialontologisch irrelevant ist, ist auch nicht spezifisch menschlich. Spezifisch menschliche Bedürfnisse werden von da an befriedigt, wo sozialontologisch relevante Faktoren ins Spiel kommen).

The determination (or definition) (fixing, determining, classification, identification) of the being (Is) of society as [the] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of social ontology means, thirdly, that the factors or forces, which thematically compose (put together, assemble) social ontology, do not exist in connection ([an] interrelation, association) with or against the background (backdrop) of a society, but are (the) society or make up (constitute) the social-ontologically specific concept (notion) of society (die Faktoren oder Kräfte, die die Sozialontologie thematisch zusammensetzen, nicht im Zusammenhang mit oder vor dem Hintergrund einer Gesellschaft bestehen, sondern die Gesellschaft sind bzw. den sozialontologisch spezifischen Gesellschaftsbegriff ausmachen). They [The said factors or forces] have not gradually (by degrees, bit by

bit) given rise to (created, let) society as [an] in principle independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) (self-standing) social-ontic magnitude by their doing (i.e. acting) together (or joining forces) (teaming up, joint action; *Zusammentun*), (;) [but] rather they were separated as analytical categories from each other only at the cognitive level of social ontology (vielmehr trennten sie sich als analytische Kategorien voneinander erst auf der kognitiven Ebene der Sozialontologie). In order to have [a] specifically social-ontological meaning (sense) (Um spezifisch sozialontologischen Sinn zu haben), they [these forces or factors] must (have to) be able(,) (taken) together [jointly, collectively](,) to give an account of (or describe) (render, translate, reproduce, give back, restore, return) the being (Is) of society, that is, the elementary ascertainment (observation, assessment, realisation) of the being (Is) of society must (has to) be able, at the level of [a] social-ontological description (portrayal, account, (re)presentation), to be transcribed (rewritten, adapted, transferred) as [an] ascertainment of the equal indispensability and not least (of all) of the equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of the social-ontic factors or forces (als Feststellung von der gleichen Unentbehrlichkeit und nicht zuletzt der Gleichursprünglichkeit der sozialontischen Faktoren oder Kräfte umgeschrieben werden können). One can be certain (sure, confident) that [the] *being (Is)* has been (was) apprehended (grasped, understood) if (when) beyond this apprehension (grasping, understanding) nothing can be meant (intended, thought, imagined) ((to) think(ing) of nothing(ness) is of course a(n) completely (entirely) different matter (affair, concern, issue), which one may confidently (safely, easily) leave to those who have (the) being and (the) time in relation to that (das Nichts zu denken ist freilich eine ganz andere Angelegenheit, die man getrost jenen überlassen darf, die das Sein und die Zeit dazu haben))<sup>viii</sup>. From (In) a social-ontological perspective(,) this



means (says) that the being (Is) of society is (has been) apprehended (grasped, understood, comprehended) conceptually (then) when, outside (of) (beyond) (apart from) (the) analytically pin-pointed (or localized) (located; lokalisierten) social-ontic factors or forces, nothing can be thought [of, about] (imagined, believed, conceived, supposed, reckoned, speculated, considered)(,) which according to (in accordance with) the knowledge of (previous, hitherto) social processes (or series of events) (occurrences) (until now), (would) (be) (social-ontically) (crucial, significant, weighty) (count, matter (a lot)) (social-ontically).

Consequently (Therefore, As a result), the analytical separation (segregation, isolation, severance) of those factors or forces from one another amounts (is tantamount) to, as it were (so to speak), an evaluation (assessment, appraisal) of their each and every respective social-ontic relevance,(;) it [the said analytical separation] is carried out (through) (undertaken, implemented) as [a] thought(s) experiment in order to find (seek) out what could possibly (potentially, perhaps, maybe) be social-ontically dispensable (unnecessary, expendable). They [The said social-ontic factors or forces] must all be logically indispensable (essential) (i.e. genetically equally original (or equiprimordial)) – and their already emphasised (underlined, highlighted, stressed, noted) disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) (bereits hervorgehobene Disposition) in the shape (or form) of a spectrum (in Gestalt eines Spektrums), which through internal (inner) tension (stress, strain) (durch innere Spannung), in fact [(through) the] contradictoriness (inconsistency; Widersprüchlichkeit) of its [the spectrum's] aspects, appears [to be] just (exactly) as indispensable (essential). This disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) is to be thought of together (jointly) with the fact of society just (in the same way) as (like) the social-ontic factors or forces in their conceptual separation (segregation, isolation, severance) from one

another (as well, too); only with regard to (in view of) them [these social-ontic forces or factors] (and) or to (of) the constant (continuous, continual) redispositions (i.e. rearrangements or redisposals) (die ständigen Umdispositionen) inside of the aforementioned spectrum(,) is the historical and sociological horizon opened up (i.e. revealed) (disclosed, deduced, inferred, deciphered), – and social ontology should (is supposed (meant) to) at all times (any time (moment)) (always) ensure (guarantee) the free transition (passage) to (the) historical and sociological way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation), [and] on each and every respective occasion build (construct, erect, make) conceptual bridges in view (light) of (given) this transition (passage).

Such an important (significant) bridge is the determination (or definition) of social “order” or “disorder” in (the) light of the ascertainment (observation, assessment, realisation) of the disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) of the social-ontic factors or forces in the form (shape) of a spectrum rich in (replete with, full of, with ample (abundant)) tension (stress, strain) (Eine solch wichtige Brücke ist die Bestimmung von sozialer „Ordnung“ bzw. „Unordnung“ im Lichte der Feststellung von der Disposition der sozialontischen Faktoren oder Kräfte in Gestalt eines spannungsreichen Spektrums). If the fact of society is certain (sure) and unalterable (irrevocable, immutable, irreversible), then (so, thus) no disorder can be imagined (envisaged) as [the] literal dissolution (disintegration, breaking up, breakdown, decay) of society in the social-ontological sense of the word (Ist das Faktum der Gesellschaft gewiß und unabänderlich, so läßt sich kein Unordnung als buchstäbliche Auflösung der Gesellschaft im sozialontologischen Sinne des Wortes vorstellen). “Disorder” constitutes a, on each and every respective occasion, differently proceeding (running, moving (going) (forward), carrying on,

advancing) and defined becoming (or series (chain, course) of events) as being (Is),(:) it [“disorder”] is ontically laid out (or inherent) (drawn (set) up, calculated, factored, structured, designed, invested) in(to) the disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) of the spectrum of the social-ontic factors or forces („Unordnung“ bildet ein jeweils anders verlaufendes und definiertes Geschehen innerhalb der Gesellschaft als Sein, sie ist ontisch in der Disposition des Spektrums der sozialontischen Faktoren oder Kräfte angelegt). The same applies to (is valid for) “order”. That is why the historian or the sociologist, who puts (takes a close look at, examines) real societies (under the microscope) (closely), must know that these [real societies] can, already for (on) social-ontological reasons (grounds), live (exist, subsist) neither entirely (completely) in “order” nor entirely (completely) in “disorder”; his task (job, duty, mission) is to find out (ascertain, establish, determine, detect trace) the sufficient reasons for which the social-ontological spectrum has (was) shifted (moved, displaced), in this or that time fragment (fragment of time), towards the side of “order” or towards that [the side] of “disorder”. The constellation (correlation or conjuncture) of (the) concrete (economic, institutional, ideological etc.) factors, which support (bear, carry, sustain) the “order” of a certain (particular) society remains unique (or one-off(time)) (singular) and contingent (Die Konstellation der konkreten (wirtschaftlichen, institutionellen, ideologischen etc.) Faktoren, die die „Ordnung“ einer bestimmten Gesellschaft tragen, bleibt einmalig und kontingent),(:) it [the said (this) constellation] may, that is, under no circumstances (on no account, in no way) – especially (particularly) under the influence of subjective ideals and wishes (desires) (zumal unter dem Einfluß subjektiver Ideale und Wünsche) – be projected onto a fixed (steady or stable) hierarchy of order-creating factors (i.e. factors which bring about or establish (cause, make) order) (ordnungsstiftenden

Faktoren) and be passed off ((re)presented, appear) as [the] conclusive (or definitive) (final, ultimate, decisive) decipherment (decoding, deciphering; Entschlüsselung) of the secret of (“the”) (“social order”). Here sociology, (incidentally) in vain(, by the way), presumes (or usurps) (takes upon (claims for) itself, assumes) social-ontological powers (or authority)(,) by (while it) surrounding (encircling, enclosing) (surrounds) something, which is (in terms of content and) contingently determined (conditioned) [as well as determined in terms of content], with the aura of necessity. Between “order” in the social-ontological [sense] and “order” in the historical-sociological sense, a sharp conceptual dividing line (line of separation) is, in any case (at any rate, anyhow), to (must, should) be drawn. The former has no particular content, it is not bound (tied, connected) to any hierarchy of factors, but (it) refers (relates, applies) to (concerns) the presupposed fact of society(,) which no “disorder” could [ever] destroy (wreck, demolish, ruin) and whose discontinuation (cessation, omission, cancelation) would also withdraw from (deprive) talk of “disorder” (of) every meaning (sense). The latter [historical-sociological sense], on the other hand (however), is characterised (marked, distinguished) by its binding (or connection) (bond, tie, connection, joining, dependence; Bindung) to (with, on) content(s) and hierarchies of factors, and its relation(ship) with (towards) the former [social-ontological sense] consists in [the fact] that it [the historical-sociological sense] comes to grips (terms) (copes, deals), well or badly, with (manages, overcomes) the questions (or tasks), which the irrefutable (incontrovertible, irrevocable) fact of (the) social living together (i.e. co-existence) poses (or sets), in a concrete situation (daß sie die Aufgaben, die das unumstößliche Faktum des sozialen Zusammenlebens stellt, in einer konkreten Lage recht oder schlecht bewältigt). The assertion (claim, contention, proposition) [that] (only, solely) this or that particular

(certain) coming to terms (coping) with the said (aforementioned) questions (or tasks) (alone, on its own) guarantees the (continued) existence (duration) of society in general, has [a] legitimising character and conceals (disguises, covers (up), masks, veils) a power claim: the champions (advocates, proponents, defenders, supporters) of a certain (particular) social order normally (usually, ordinarily) describe (call, characterise) the [this] same [social order] (as) the solely (only) conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) or at least (as) the best possible (optimum) realisation of social order in general. However, order in the social-ontological sense, i.e. the fact of society, is never endangered (at risk, in danger, imperiled) because (since, for) it encompasses (includes, involves, comprises, embraces) both that which is called “order” from a historical-sociological point of view, as well as that which from the same [historical-sociological] point of view is called “disorder”. A civil war belongs, just like [a] harmonious (peaceable, peaceful) peace, to (the) *social* situations, that is to those [situations] which, irrespective of their sufficient reasons, are acted out (happen, take place) necessarily inside of (within) the social-ontic field or spectrum. In so far as (In as much as, Seeing (In) that) sociological notions (perceptions, views, representations, ideas) [in respect] of order are based (rest) on fixed (steady or stable) (rigid, firm) hierarchisations (hierarchical arrangements) of factors, and every disruption (convulsion, vibration, jarring) of (or blow (shock) to) – at least total disruption – of the same [order] is equated (identified) (equates, identifies) with disorder, they [the said sociological notions of order] directly or indirectly lump (tar) order, “normality” and peace together (with the same brush) (Die Behauptung, allein diese oder jene bestimmte Bewältigung besagter Aufgaben garantiere den Bestand der Gesellschaft überhaupt, hat legitimierenden Charakter und verhüllt einen Machtanspruch: Die

Verfechter einer bestimmten sozialen Ordnung bezeichnen normalerweise dieselbe als die allein denkbare oder wenigstens als die bestmögliche Realisierung sozialer Ordnung überhaupt. Aber die Ordnung im sozialontologischen Sinne, d. h. das Faktum der Gesellschaft, ist nie gefährdet, denn es umfaßt sowohl das, was aus historisch-soziologischer Sicht „Ordnung“, als auch das, was aus derselben Sicht „Unordnung“ heißt. Ein Bürgerkrieg gehört ebenso wie einträchtiger Friede zu den *sozialen* Situationen, zu jenen also, die sich, unabhängig von ihren zureichenden Gründen, notwendig innerhalb des sozialontischen Feldes oder Spektrums abspielen. Insofern soziologische Ordnungsvorstellungen auf festen Hierarchisierungen von Faktoren beruhen und jede Erschütterung – zumindest die totale Erschütterung – derselben der Unordnung gleichsetzen, werfen sie direkt oder indirekt Ordnung, „Normalität“ und Frieden in denselben Topf)<sup>227</sup>. For social ontology, on the other hand (however), all [things] (everything) is normal which belong(s) to the being (Is) of society, i.e. take(s) place (happen(s), occur(s)) inside of (within) society and are (is) done by socially living humans (people, men) (Für die Sozialontologie ist hingegen alles normal, was zum Sein der Gesellschaft gehört, d. h. innerhalb von Gesellschaft stattfindet und durch sozial lebende Menschen getan wird). The [A] clear distinction (differentiation) between [the] social-ontological and historical-sociological level makes, moreover, understandable

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<sup>227</sup> That applies to (is valid for) sociologies with [a] social-ontological element (hint, hue, aspect, tinge, tone; Einschlag), as (like) for instance (the) Parsonian [sociology], but also to (for) conflict sociologies (Konfliktsoziologien), which want to perceive (discern, observe, take in) conflict selectively-positively and within limits (see below Ch. III, Sec. 4). Presupposing (Assuming) the far-reaching (extensive, for the most part) subsumption of conflict under the generic term (or concept) of order, a (long-distance, long-time) fellow traveller (or companion) (ein Weggenosse) of Parsons can write some (several, a few) sentences (propositions) which, if taken at face value, must (have to, necessarily) mean the [a] death blow (coup de grace) to (against) system(s) theory – and the confirmation (corroboration, upholding) of our dual (double, twin) social-ontological perspective: “The structures of integration and unintegratedness existing simultaneously in intricate patterns are by no means entirely stable. Integration is an intermittent phenomenon[on]. It is never more than partial. It is not constant or continuous. It is frequently shifting from one part of the society to others.” (Shils, *Center*, p. 81).

(comprehensible, intelligible) why talk of the “dissolution (or disintegration)” (break(ing) up, breakdown, decay; „Auflösung“) of society as a result of (owing to) “disorder” is just as social-ontologically nonsensical as its [the said (such) talk’s] positive pendant (i.e. counterpart), namely the attempt at constructing society from (out of) ultimate building (construction) units (unities or blocks) (entities) (letzten Baueinheiten). Sociologists often use (make use of) expressions (phrases) like for instance “societies cease to exist”, when (if) they merely mean (with that (it, them, [those expressions]), thereby) [that] a certain (particular) political collective [entity, formation, group, body] was (has) (been) destroyed (ruined) (went (gone) to pieces) through (by means of) conquest (capture), civil war etc.<sup>228</sup>. Social-ontologically significant, however, is not the replacement of a (thus (so) drawn up (or constituted) (composed)) collective (drawn up (or constituted) in this [such a] way) (die Ablösung eines so verfaßten Kollektivs) by (with) a new and differently (otherwise) drawn up (or constituted) [collective, one], but the certainty [that] society again will have to (necessarily) take (over) (step into, stand in for, supersede) (the place) of society.

The existence (or presence) of “disorder” in society is often ascribed (attributed, imputed) to “unsocial (i.e. anti-social)” („unsozialen“) tendencies (inclinations, propensities, proclivities) or, at any rate (all events) (in any case), to [the] “anti-social” behaviour of individuals or groups. [Just] like “order”, so too the “social” as a rule has a normative connotation (eine normative Konnotation), that is, it does not point (allude, refer) to (indicate, suggest) the naked (bare) fact of human living together (i.e. co-existence) in society (die nackte Tatsache menschlichen Zusammenlebens in Gesellschaft), but preferably (by (in terms of)

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<sup>228</sup> See e.g. Shils, loc. cit., p. 52ff..

preference, preferentially, chiefly, mainly) to properties (i.e. qualities or characteristics) (traits, attributes, features; *Eigenschaften*), which could contribute to the better coordination or harmonisation of this living together. Man's sociality (*Die Sozialität des Menschen*) is equated with what p(a)edagogically minded (disposed, oriented) sociologists call his [man's] socialisation (*Sozialisierung*) or (the) capacity (for) (or (cap)ability (at)) [in relation to] that (it) [(such) socialisation], and accordingly (correspondingly) society is comprehended (grasped, understood, construed, perceived, interpreted) in the stronger or in the weaker sense depending on how successfully it [society] conducts (carries (presses) on (with), is involved (takes part) in, pursues, operates) the socialisation of its members. The intentions (purposes, aims) of this language (linguistic) usage (parlance; *Sprachgebrauchs*) are edifying (uplifting, elevating; *erbaulich*), (:) the consequence (result, effect) of it (that) [such (that) language usage] means (is called) conceptual confusion (bewilderment, perplexity). In fact (Actually), adaptation (or conformity (conformation)) (adjustment) and rebellion (insurrection, revolt, uprising, revolution) (*Anpassung und Aufstand*), [a] good deed[s] and crime(,) are equally social and only conceivable (imaginable, thinkable, possible) in society. The social-ontological primacy of the being (Is) of society does not have the slightest (least) to do with any restriction (limitation) or pre(-)programming of individual action. One cannot therefore either, by invoking (appealing (referring)) (with reference) (to) supra-individual social being (Is), achieve (attain, get, reach) desired (wished(hoped)-for, welcome, desirable) channelings (canalisations) of individual acts (or actions) (*Der sozialontologische Primat des Seins der Gesellschaft hat nicht das geringste mit irgendeiner Einschränkung oder Vorprogrammierung individuellen Handelns zu tun. Man kann also weder unter Berufung auf überindividuelles soziales Sein erwünschte*



Kanalisierungen individueller Handlungen erzielen)(,) [just] as [for instance] Durkheim tried (attempted) it unsuccessfully (ineffectively, fruitlessly, ineffectually) with his faits sociaux [social facts], nor, with reference to the openness (uncertain outcome) of individual action, (call into) question (challenge) the fact of society or want to reconstruct [it, the fact of society] from (out of) individual act(ion)s. All that is only flagrant (logical) leaps (in logic)(,) which are motivated by normativisms of [a] different hue[s] (complexion[s], colour[s], shade[s]) (die durch Normativismen unterschiedlicher Couleur motiviert werden).

Linguistically, these [logical] leaps [in logic] find expression (are reflected (echoed, articulated)) not only in the (afore)mentioned confusion (mix(ing)-up, mistaking) of “social” with “socialised” (in der erwähnten Verwechslung von „sozial“ mit „sozialisiert“), but also in the erroneous (mistaken, wrong) identification of “social” with “collective” (von „sozial“ mit „kollektiv“), whose reverse (flip, other) side is the likewise (also) erroneous contradistinction (contrasting) of [between] “social” and “individual” (von „sozial“ und „individuell“). [The] latter [contradistinction between “social” and “individual”] wants to suggest a dichotomous picture (or image) as if an individual (ein Individuum) could stand (be) on one [bank], and a society on another bank (shore) of the same river. However, in so far (as much) as (that) we are talking of (about) one and the same society, this [society] cannot be conceived (imagined, thought of (about)) without the totality (entirety, aggregate) of its individuals, otherwise it would be the whole which would be (found, situated, located) outside of one part of (it) itself. The individual does not exist together (co-exist) *with* society, but *in* society, i.e. in a permanent positive and negative, open and secret, direct and indirect confrontation (altercation, clash, contrariety, contradistinction) with humans (people, men)(,) who belong to the same or, at any rate (in any case), a collective

[entity, formation, group, body], as well as with that which constitutes [the] institutional and cultural product of the action of other humans (people, men) (Das Individuum existiert nicht *mit* der Gesellschaft zusammen, sondern *in* Gesellschaft, d. h. in einer permanenten positiven und negativen, offenen und geheimen, direkten und indirekten Auseinandersetzung mit Menschen, die demselben oder jedenfalls einem Kollektiv angehören, sowie mit dem, was institutionelles und kulturelles Produkt des Handelns anderer Menschen bildet). His [The individual's] external (outer) and internal (inner) activity (Aktivität) always has a social reference and aspect, which one (then) only undervalues (underrates) and misjudges (mistakes, fails to appreciate, underestimates) when one – again through (by means (way) of) [a] (logical) leap (in logic) – confuses (mixes up, mistakes) the [what is] individual [element, dimension] (das Individuelle) with (for) the [what is] personal [element, dimension] (mit dem Persönlichen) in the narrower (strict) sense of the word, i.e. with that which makes up (constitutes) the more or less unique (singular) character of a person (einmaligen Charakter einer Person). All humans (people, men) are equally and in the same sense individuals, however they are persons in a, on each and every respective occasion, different (other) way (manner), which is not social-ontologically apprehensible (graspable, understandable, comprehensible) and does not necessarily interrelate (connect) with the social-ontological question of the relation between individual and collective [entity, formation, group, body] or society. Because it cannot be proved (shown, demonstrated, established) that this certain (particular) mould(ing) (or shaping) (type) of the [what is] personal [element, dimension] must exclusively (solely) entail (bring with it, involve) that certain (particular) internal (inner) and external (outer) activity of the individual regardless (irrespective) of time, place and situation. The [What is] personal [element, dimension] as [the,

a(n)] opponent (antagonist, competitor) of the [what is] individual [element, dimension] or [the, what is] social [element, dimension] is of (counts, matters, carries, has) even (still) less (slighter, smaller) (consequence, weight) if (when) we consider (bear in mind, take into account (consideration), think about) the extent to which “personal” feelings (sentiments, emotions), opinions and modes of behaviour (behaviours, behavioural modes) are premoulded (preformed or preshaped), in fact (indeed) modeled social(ly)-collectively – an extent(,) which only the all-too-human egocentrism and (validity(or prestige)-addicted(craving)) complacency (smugness) (addicted to (craving) validity (recognition and prestige) (importance, respect, value) [complacency addicted to gaining validity (recognition and prestige)] (that is, (then again) ultimately (in the end, eventually, finally) (then) (again) (in turn) the socially determined (conditioned) need (requirement, necessity, want) for identity) strives (endeavours, seeks, aims, is out) to make smaller (reduce, decrease, diminish, lessen, minimise) (Alle Menschen sind gleichermaßen und im selben Sinne Individuen, Personen sind sie aber in einer jeweils anderen Art und Weise, die sozialontologisch nicht erfaßbar ist und mit der sozialontologischen Frage der Beziehung zwischen Individuum und Kollektiv bzw. Gesellschaft nicht notwendig zusammenhängt. Denn es läßt sich nicht erweisen, daß diese bestimmte Prägung des Persönlichen ausschließlich jene bestimmte innere und äußere Tätigkeit des Individuums unabhängig von Zeit, Ort und Lage nach sich ziehen muß. Das Persönliche fällt als Gegenspieler des Individuellen bzw. Sozialen noch weniger ins Gewicht, wenn wir das Ausmaß bedenken, in dem „persönliche“ Gefühle, Meinungen und Verhaltensweisen sozialkollektiv vorgeprägt, ja modelliert sind – ein Ausmaß, das nur allzumenschliche Egozentrik und geltungssüchtige Selbstgefälligkeit (also schließlich wiederum das sozial bedingte

Bedürfnis nach Identität) zu verkleinern trachtet). The following, at any rate (in any case), is to be stressed (emphasised, noted, accepted, recorded, kept hold of, held onto): [the, what is] social [element, dimension] and [the, what is] individual [element, dimension] are not counter concepts, the social therefore does (is) not at all coincide (correspond, tally) (identical) with the [what is] collective [element, dimension], but [the] individual and [the] collective constitute manifestations (external appearances, forms of appearance) of the social against the background (backdrop) of the fact of society (sondern Individuelles und Kollektives bilden Erscheinungsformen des Sozialen vor dem Hintergrund des Faktums der Gesellschaft); an individual's action (the action of an individual) cannot be collective, however (yet) it [an individual's action] must, just (exactly) like collective action, be social (das Handeln eines Individuums kann nicht kollektiv, es muß aber ebenso wie kollektives Handeln sozial sein). There is a personal character and style, however there is no purely personal action in any social-ontologically relevant sense (Einen persönlichen Charakter und Stil gibt es, es gibt aber kein in irgendeinem sozialontologisch relevanten Sinn rein persönliches Handeln). Even he (the one) who seeks salvation (or redemption) (relief, deliverance; Erlösung) in the desert (wilderness, wasteland), indeed acts individually, but not personally in the sense of an action(,) which would not in itself have anything at all determined (conditioned) socially (das gar nichts sozial Bedingtes an sich hätte); because salvation (or redemption) is a concept (conceptual plan) and a need (requirement, necessity, want)(,) which can come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, be created) only in human societies.

These fundamental (basic, elementary) conceptual clarifications are supposed (meant) to (should) mark (peg, stake, work) out (demarcate,

delimit, make clear; abstecken) social ontology's field (area, sector, domain, realm) (das Gebiet der Sozialontologie) as the field of that which can be conceived (imagined, thought of) only as [a(n)] aspect (facet) or [a(n)] constituent (integral) element (or part) (component, constituent) (Aspekt oder Bestandteil) of the fact of society. [The] individual and [the] individual action of socially living humans (people, men) belong to that (it, [the fact of society]) (Individuum und individuelles Handeln sozial lebender Menschen gehören dazu). If one did not want to accept the primeval (or primordial) fact of society (das Urfaktum der Gesellschaft) and attempted (tried) a (theoretical) construction of the same [society] on the basis (with the help) of the principle of methodological individualism, then (so, thus) the sole (only, unique, single) possible ontological underpinning (supporting, backing up) of the social sciences would be an anthropology cut off from social-ontological points of view (criteria) – actually (in reality (in actual fact)) a contradictio in se [contradiction in itself]. The being (Is) of society could be reduced to individuals only (then) if (when) these [individuals] did not originally (initially) have at their disposal properties (i.e. qualities or characteristics) (traits, attributes, features)(,) which only socially living individuals can possess (have). However, there is no excuse for (it is not possible (our concern), cannot be allowed (true, tolerated), does not matter) (to) want(ing) to have both [things] simultaneously (concurrently): both individuals as independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) (self-standing) ontic building (construction) units (unities or blocks) (entities) of society, as well as individuals with (a(n)) [cultural] equipment (outfit, accoutrement(s), provisions, endowment) which can be acquired only in an already existing (given, available) society (sowohl Individuen als selbständige ontische Baueinheiten der Gesellschaft als auch Individuen mit einer Ausstattung, die sie sich nur in einer bereits vorhandenen Gesellschaft

erwerben können). Only individuals equipped (endowed, provided) in such a manner would at all be, in an individualistic construction of society, in a position to (capable of) act(ing) so that *society* [would] come(s) into being (arise(s), emerge(s), result(s), ensue(s), is (be) created) from (out of) their combined action. The thesis [that] individual activity can be conceived (imagined, thought of (about)) only against the background (backdrop) of society, is supposed (meant) to (should) mean that no individual can derive (deduce, infer) everything (all) which (that) happens (takes place, occurs) from his own action *and* that his own action is dependent on (depends (relies) on) the action of other humans (people, men). Society cannot therefore be reconstructed as the sum of ontically independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) (self-standing) units (unities or entities). Its [Society's] being (Is) is a whole (Whole), but not such that exists invisibly next to (beside, alongside) its visible constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents) (Gesellschaft kann somit nicht als Summe ontisch selbständiger Einheiten rekonstruiert werden. Ihr Sein ist ein Ganzes, aber kein solches, das neben seinen sichtbaren Bestandteilen unsichtbar existiert). Its [Society's] ontic independence (autonomy or self-sufficiency) is rather to be seen (told, gauged, anticipated) in (from) the lack of independence (lack of autonomy or lack of self-sufficiency) (Unselbstständigkeit) of every one of its individual (separate, single, isolated) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents) vis-à-vis the rest of the constituent elements (or parts). That (This, It) obviously (manifestly, evidently, apparently) applies (is obviously valid) irrespective (regardless) of how one defines these constituent elements, and if ([irrespective] of whether) one, for instance, wants to leave behind the theoretical bottlenecks (i.e. the hindrances to theoretical progress) of methodological individualism(,) with the help (aid, assistance) of variations of interactionism. Because

micro- [microstructural] and macrostructural interactions (mikro- und makrostrukturelle Interaktionen) are acted out (happen, take place)(,) just like individual activity(,) against the background of society. Hence (Because of that), they [microstructural and macrostructural interactions(, just like individual activity,)] are subject to formal (i.e. form-related) and qualitative restrictions (limitations), and no chemically pure apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of them can be considered (a possibility (consideration)), so that already because of that(,) [it] can be disputed (contested, challenged, denied) [that] they are suitable as building blocks for the construction of society (als Bausteine zur Konstruktion der Gesellschaft)<sup>229</sup>. The same must be said about (regarding) [the] attempts at [the] reconstruction of individual (separate, single, isolated) social phenomena from (out of) [the] interactions of [a] limited (restricted, confined) scope (range, compass, extent, size). Social power (might) and domination (dominance or rule) (Soziale Macht und Herrschaft) cannot e.g. be sufficiently (adequately, satisfactorily) studied at the level of a commune (i.e. local authority district) (community, municipality, council; Kommune), which is inserted (fitted) into a state and is unburdened by (relieved (discharged) of, released from) (the) sovereign functions (und von den souveränen Funktionen entlastet ist) which support (bear, carry, sustain) their [these sovereign functions'] own administrative (bureaucratic) apparatus (mechanism(s), machinery) (Verwaltungsapparat). Just as little may contracts (agreements, treaties), which the contracting parties have already concluded (entered into) as [the] members of a society and [the] nationals (or citizens) (natives, (family) members, relatives) of a certain (particular) state, be taken as the yardstick (benchmark, measure, criterion) in order to judge (or gauge)

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<sup>229</sup> Cf. Sec. 2Ce in this Chapter.

(assess, evaluate, rate) the social-constitutive viability (soundness) of the contract as [an] institution (um die sozialkonstitutive Tragfähigkeit des Vertrages als Institution zu beurteilen). In the next Section we want to point (out) (allude, refer) (to) (indicate) the consequences of these ascertainments (observations) for the social-ontological evaluation (assessment, appraisal) of the political (die sozialontologische Bewertung des Politischen hinweisen).

Our conclusion: whoever is about to (on the point of, gets ready to) explain(ing) (expound, declare) the *possibility* of society (and social order), cannot essentially (basically, in reality, fundamentally) do anything other than have recourse to (fall back upon) those magnitudes which exist and have an (take) effect (act, work, operate, are effective) in the *reality* of society, while at the same time (in relation to which) this reality is in actual fact presupposed (assumed, presumed, taken for granted). Some (Quite a few) sociologists know and say it, other(s) [sociologists] act (behave) as if they would [do not] know it, others (then) (again) (on the other hand, in turn) devise (sketch, plan, outline, design) (the) heuristically infertile (unproductive) [“]hermaphrodites[”] (i.e. social theories with a hermaphroditic [social-ontological and sociological] character) (andere wiederum entwerfen die heuristisch unfruchtbaren Zwitterwesen), which we (have) called (named) social-ontologically laid out (drawn up or invested) (calculated, designed, based, positioned, inherent, imbued) sociologies (sozialontologisch angelegte Soziologien). The[se] latter [social-ontologically invested sociologies] vindicate for sociology the dignity of the crown (i.e. they want sociology to be seen as the paramount social science) and, at the same time, the function of the foundation and of the synopsis of all [the] social sciences, instead of seeing (beholding) (in) it [sociology] [as] a social science next



to (alongside, beside) the rest [of them (the social sciences)]. Geiger came closer to the point when he opined (said, thought, reckoned, meant) [that] questions like “what is the essence (or nature) of society?” or “how is society possible?” constituted “pre-sociological preliminary questions” („vor-soziologische Präliminarfragen“), and sociology deals (concerns itself) with social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) and processes (or events) as “findings (results, ascertainments)” („Befunden“), not with (their) “substratum” („Substrat“) (of these (such) (social phenomena and processes as findings))<sup>230</sup>. And Pareto, who defined sociology first of all as [the] synthesis of the social sciences, which wants to research (investigate, explore, study) human society in general, himself found this definition “imperfetissima” [“most imperfect (defective, flawed, faulty)”] and called (asked) for (demanded, requested, invited) the concrete analysis “of the relations between (the) social facts (der Beziehungen zwischen den sozialen Fakten)”<sup>231</sup>; thereby (in this way, through (with) that), he [Pareto] in reality (actually, really, in actual fact) outlined Weber’s research practice, in which the question (problem, issue) [in respect] of (in accordance with) [the] being (Is) and [the] coherence (Sein und Kohärenz) of society was posed rather (more likely) indirectly, i.e. in (on) the roundabout way of the correlation of important (significant) aspects (facets) (e.g. economy and religion) of this same society<sup>232</sup>. Also, other definitions of sociology and its tasks (duties, duty, jobs, mission) betray (i.e. divulge or reveal) (give away, tell, blab out) that here – reasonably (sensibly, plausibly, meaningfully) –

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<sup>230</sup> “Gesellschaft”, pp. 209, 210. Indicative (Typical, Characteristic) of the vacillations (oscillations) and confusion of most sociologists in (on) [respect of] [regarding, about] this question (problem) is the fact [that] (the same) Geiger (himself) elsewhere (somewhere else) expressly (explicitly, emphatically) follows Simmel and wants to commission (engage, instruct, charge, entrust) sociology with (in) the study of the constants of social life or those aspects (facets) of social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences)(,) which should (are supposed (meant) to) refer to the “mode of existence (or being (t)here) of the social” („Daseinsmodus des Sozialen“) (*Arbeiten*, p. 47ff.).

<sup>231</sup> *Trattato*, §§ 1-2.

<sup>232</sup> Cf. Bendix’s remarks (comments, observations), *Weber*, p. 277.

phenomena are thought of (about) (conceived (of), imagined), which occur (happen, appear, crop up, are found) against the background of the tacitly (silently, implicitly) presupposed fact of society<sup>233</sup>. Durkheim's epistemological decision to expressly (explicitly) confine (limit, restrict) the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of sociology to social facts (den Gegenstand der Soziologie ausdrücklich auf die sozialen Tatsachen zu beschränken) may (should, is allowed to) be regarded (considered, looked at (upon), viewed) as (taken for) their [such (these) other definitions of sociology and its tasks'] prototype (archetype). This decision can, from our point of view, be interpreted as [the, a] clear separation between social ontology and sociology, and even as [the] founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology with regard to (in view of) the presupposed, but not further discussed fact of society; because social facts are interactions, and sociologically relevant interactions take place, as we know, only against the background of society – (otherwise) said (stated) (differently) (in other words): where(ver) the fact of society does not guarantee the (continued) existence of the social, (there) no *social* facts can even be formed (Denn soziale Tatsachen sind Interaktionen, und soziologisch relevante Interaktionen finden, wie wir wissen, erst vor dem Hintergrund von Gesellschaft statt – anders gesagt: Wo nicht das Faktum der Gesellschaft für den Bestand des Sozialen bürgt, da können sich auch keine *sozialen* Tatsachen herausbilden). But this clear concept (conceptual plan) becomes invalid (untenable) (or abates (wanes)) as soon as (when) one attempts (tries) to apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) society itself as [a] social fact like every other [social fact] (too), and to theoretically get a grasp (grip) [of (on) it

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<sup>233</sup> Cf. Nisbet's ambivalent enumeration (list) of sociology's study areas (fields (areas) of study): "the patterns of social interac[ti]on, the social aggregates, the systems of authority, the social roles, statuses, and norms which form the social bond" (*Social Bond*, p. 18).

(society as a social fact like every other social fact)] with the usual sociological means. In [regard to] (During, With) the exposition of his founding (establishment, foundation) of sociology, Durkheim (pr) offered, in place (lieu) (instead) of a definition of society, the ideal-typical enumeration (list[ing]) of its successive historical forms (shapes)<sup>234</sup>. When he [Durkheim] in [his] late(r) [more mature] work[s] (im Spätwerk), driven (propelled) by growing (increasing) concern (worry, care, anxiety) about (for, regarding) the moral integration of society, succumbed (gave in, yielded) to (the [a]) social-ontological temptation and sought (looked for) the deepest roots of social cohesion, he [Durkheim] could [not] as a sociologist (properly) say (very, quite, fairly, rather) little [much]; that is why he [Durkheim] [personally] resorted to (took (his) refuge in) the mysticism of the “collective representations (notions, views or ideas) (perceptions)” welding (or knitting) together the social whole (er nahm daher zur Mystik der das soziale Ganze zusammenschweißenden „kollektiven Vorstellungen“ seine Zuflucht), and in the process (he [Durkheim]) (even, in fact) contradicted (came into conflict (became (was) inconsistent) with) (even) his earlier evolutionism, since according to (in accordance with) his own perception (view), [the] essence (or nature) and effect (impact, result, influence, consequence) of collective representations (notions, views or ideas) (perceptions) in the [a] primitive tribe (clan) and in (the, [a]) complex modern society hardly differ from one another (und dabei geriet er sogar mit seinem früheren Evolutionismus in Widerspruch, da sich nach seiner eigenen Auffassung Wesen und Wirkung kollektiver Vorstellungen im primitiven Stamm und in der komplexen modernen Gesellschaft kaum voneinander unterscheiden).

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<sup>234</sup> *Règles*, p. 81ff..

Formal sociology's representatives (supporters, exponents) likewise moved unconsciously and erratically on social-ontological ground (terrain). The definitions of society, which they suggested (proposed, propounded, put forward) as veiled (disguised, hidden, concealed) social ontologists, were (stood) under the influence (sign) of their main (chief, principal) (matter of) concern (aim, objective), i.e. to take an inventory (stock) of (or to itemise) and to formalise (i.e. render into forms) (structure in terms of form) (zu inventarisieren und zu formalisieren) the relations between socially living individuals. The fundamental (basic, elementary) fact that interactions do not bring (put, place) society in(to) the world, but are acted out (or happen) (take place) against the background of society, took revenge (got its revenge (own back)), in the process, on the tautological character of this definition (Die grundlegende Tatsache, daß Interaktionen keine Gesellschaft in die Welt setzen, sondern sich vor dem Hintergrund der Gesellschaft abspielen, rächte sich dabei am tautologischen Charakter dieser Definition). For Simmel, society was the complex (combination, cluster) of socialised individuals or the sum of those forms of the relation (relational forms) (der Komplex vergesellschafteter Individuen bzw. die Summe jener Beziehungsformen)(,) which make that complex from (out of) (the) individuals<sup>235</sup>. And Vierkandt varied this to the effect (point) (in [such a way], by saying) that society is a group of humans (people, men) [existing] as [the, a] bearer(s) [the bearer] of interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) between (amongst) its individual members (Gesellschaft sei eine Gruppe von Menschen als Träger von Wechselwirkungen zwischen ihren einzelnen

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<sup>235</sup> *Soziologie*, p. 8.

Mitgliedern)<sup>236</sup>. The tautology here concerns (affects, pertains to, involves) not merely the formulation (wording, phrasing) (society and [the] being (to be) socialised (Gesellschaft und Vergesellschaftetsein) of individuals, or society and [the] group, stand for the same thing and are also used synonymously), but [concerns] the underlying thought (or notion) (idea, perception, concept) itself. Interaction (mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) or [the] relation is in fact (indeed, of course) not what as [the, a] differentia specifica (specific difference) belongs (goes, [is added]) to [with] the genus “society”(,) in order to define it [society], but it [interaction (mutual influence) or [the] relation] offers (presents, gives, provides, affords, grants) merely an (alternative or indirect) description (paraphrasing, expression) of the same [genus (of) “society”] (Wechselwirkung oder Beziehung ist ja nichts, was als differentia specifica zum Genus „Gesellschaft“ hinzukommt, um es zu definieren, sondern sie bietet bloß eine Umschreibung desselben); “society” contains (includes, comprises, embodies), in other words, as [a] concept (notion) eo ipso interaction in itself („Gesellschaft“ enthält m. a. W. als Begriff eo ipso die Interaktion in sich); interaction (Interaktion) is not something which from the outside slips (goes, finds its way) into (penetrates) a heap (pile, stack, load, mass) of immobile (motionless, immovable) and unrelated (unconnected) bodies in order to make (a society) from (out of) that (a society) [heap of immobile and unrelated bodies]<sup>237</sup>. The specific difference (Die spezifische Differenz)(,) which conceptually characterises (marks, labels, identifies) society, cannot therefore be interaction (Interaktion) in itself

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<sup>236</sup> *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 28. The interactional definition of society returns (comes back, [reappears]) again (time) and again in [the work of] various (different, several) authors, see e.g. McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 5 (society is “the web of social relationships”), or Lundberg et al., *Sociology*, p. 583 (society as “patterned system of interaction”).

<sup>237</sup> See Landshut’s apt (well-aimed, telling, striking, incisive) comments (remarks, observations), *Kritik*, p. 16. Cf. Ch. III, footnotes 4, 25, 26 below.

and in general, although (even though) interaction constitutively belongs to society. This can, incidentally (by the way), be inferred (concluded, deduced, gathered) already from the simple thought (consideration, ascertainment, observation) that two individual (separate, single, isolated), absolutely (completely, perfectly) and always (all along) isolated people (humans, men) can indeed interact with each other (miteinander interagieren), but (yet, nevertheless) not constitute (form) a society. To interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) as such, (still) something (else, more) must obviously be added (Zur Wechselwirkung als solcher muß offenbar noch etwas hinzukommen)(,) so that [one (we) may meaningfully (or sensibly) (reasonably, plausibly) speak] (of) society (may (is allowed to, can) be (meaningfully (or sensibly)) spoken of (talked about)). Vierkandt indirectly admitted (conceded, owned up (confessed) to) this, when he(,) apart from interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect; Wechselwirkung), smuggled (in) another, (from [in relation to] it (that) [interaction (or mutual influence), society]) completely (entirely, quite) different criterion, into the definition of society: its (their [humans' (peoples')], interaction (or mutual influence's)) [society or interaction's] joining together (union or amalgamation) (merger, combining) (deren Zusammenschluß), no matter what ensures (guarantees) it [this joining together (union or amalgamation) (of interaction (or mutual influence) (society or interaction))]<sup>238</sup>.

Now the necessary reverse (other, flip) side of the joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining) of individuals for the formation (shaping, fashioning) of a society is its [(this) society's]

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<sup>238</sup> *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 30ff..

delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) to(wards) (from) the outside (outwards, outwardly), i.e. vis-à-vis other societies (Nun ist die notwendige Kehrseite des Zusammenschlusses von Individuen zur Bildung einer Gesellschaft ihre Abgrenzung nach außen, d. h. gegenüber anderen Gesellschaften). And if interaction (Interaktion) in itself and in general cannot provide (or constitute) (give, deliver, hand over, emit, make, produce) the specific feature (characteristic) (differentia specifica) (das Spezifikum) of society, then (so, thus) we must (have to) seek (search (look) for) the latter [specific feature of society] in that which coordinates a number of (several, various, multiple) individual (or separate) (single, isolated) interactions in a certain direct or indirect manner (way), [and (which)] assigns (gives, allocates) (to) them [these individual (or separate) interactions] a(n) unfolding space (room for unfolding) and at the same time boundaries (or limits). This factor or this element must of course, like everything else (all other [factors or elements]) in society too, arrive (come) on the scene (appear, turn up) as interaction, however (but, yet) the features (characteristics, traits, attributes) of this interaction might (or are allowed to) (may, should, could, can) be unique (or one-off(time)) (singular) and in a(n) entirely (completely) particular (special, specific) sense social, so that exactly these features and not the mere fact of the being of interaction, irrespective of further (additional, other) differentiations, make (turn) this particular interaction (into) society's specific characteristic (or feature) (differentia specifica) (Dieser Faktor oder dieses Element muß freilich, wie alles andere in der Gesellschaft auch, als Interaktion auf den Plan treten, die Merkmale dieser Interaktion dürften aber einmalig und in einem ganz besonderen Sinne sozial sein, so daß eben diese Merkmale und nicht die bloße Tatsache des Interaktionsseins unabhängig von weiteren Differenzierungen diese

besondere Interaktion zum Spezifikum von Gesellschaft macht). Before we draw (the) ultimate (final) social-ontological conclusions from this consideration (thought, deliberation, reflection), we must remark (comment, observe) that the joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining) of interaction to(wards) the inside (inwards, inwardly) and its [interaction's] delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) to(wards) the outside (outwards, outwardly) (der Zusammenschluß der Interaktion nach innen und ihre Abgrenzung nach außen) conceptually implies something else: the in principle autarky (i.e. self-sufficiency) (die grundsätzliche Autarkie) of that which more or less joined together (or united) (amalgamated, merged, combined; zusammengeschlossen) extends (spans) inside of its own more or less clearly defined (outlined) boundaries (or limits). Self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky), i.e. the ability at (or capacity for) long[-term] survival (surviving) [for a long time] on the basis of one's own material and intellectual(mental)-spiritual resources, was in actual fact (reality) (indeed) proclaimed (declared, announced) (as) the main (chief, principal) criterion for the definition of society, however much (no matter how much), in the course of this, the aspect of interaction continued to be taken into consideration (account) (considered, borne in mind) by quite a few (some, many a) sociologist(s), first (and foremost) (of (above) all) (primarily, chiefly)(,) Parsons (Von manchen Soziologen, allen voran Parsons, wurde in der Tat die Selbstgenügsamkeit, d. h. die Fähigkeit zum langen Überleben auf der Basis eigener materieller und geistiger Ressourcen, zum Hauptkriterium für die Definition der Gesellschaft erklärt, so sehr auch der Aspekt der Interaktion dabei weiterhin berücksichtigt wurde)<sup>239</sup>. From the point of view of the

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<sup>239</sup> Parsons, *Social Systems*, p. 19, as well as "Outline", p. 44; cf. Levy, *Structure*, p. 113.



sociologist, it may (might) stand to reason (be reasonable (obvious)) to put (reduce, attribute) [the] joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining), delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) of society (down) to fixed (steady or stable) (settled, solid, firm) social facts (Zusammenschluß, Abgrenzung und Selbstgenügsamkeit der Gesellschaft auf feste soziale Tatsache zurückzuführen), i.e. to illogically (inconsistently; unlogischerweise) explain society through (by means of) something which can only come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, be created (produced)) in it [society]. Institutions in their crossing over (i.e. interweaving, intersecting or entanglement) with one another and their interdependence, also in their function in fixing (determining or setting) (laying down) [the] role and status of individuals in accordance with (the sense (for the purpose(s)) of, as defined by) the social whole (die Institutionen in ihrer Verschränkung miteinander und ihrer Interdependenz, auch in ihrer Funktion, Rolle und Status der Individuen im Sinne des sozialen Ganzen festzusetzen), often appear as such social facts<sup>240</sup>. Yet (Nevertheless, But, However) social ontology must penetrate (go, find (force) its way (get) in) deeper. No doubt (Certainly), institutions take care of (or ensure) (provide for, look after, see to, care about, guarantee) [the] joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining), delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) of society, however (but) through (by (means (way) of)) which (what) immanence (durch welche Immanenz) is society determined (conditioned) in such a way (to such an extent) that it [society], existing (surviving, continuing) historically under the influence (sign) of these

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<sup>240</sup> See e.g. Mandelbaum, *Anatomy*, p. 11; Giddens, *Constitution*, p. 164.

determinations (conditionings, fixings, settings, purposes; Bestimmungen), must (has to) therefore bring forth (produce, give rise to, create, cause, present, spawn) institutions from (out of) its womb (bosom) (within)? And why must institutions sooner or later change and alter, although the need of society for joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining), delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) remains stable? This (obvious (or plausible) (reasonable)) question(, which suggests itself,) refers to the social-ontic field and the spectrum of the social-ontic factors or forces, whose internal (inner) tensions (stresses, strains) in the end (eventually, finally, ultimately, after all) wear (grind) down (gnaw) (make) all social facts (brittle). The question is not answered if (when) one shifts (moves, transfers) the (integrative) main (chief, principal) (integrative) function of the rather apparatus-like (or machine-like) (mechanically, mechanistically) understood institutions to the more (likely) (rather) ideologically understood normative order (wenn man die integrative Hauptfunktion von den eher apparathaft verstandenen Institutionen auf die eher ideologisch verstandene normative Ordnung verlagert). Parsons, who did this and at the same time granted (allowed, conceded to) the integrative function in society (der integrativen Funktion in der Gesellschaft) the highest status (value or importance) (significance) (greatest weight) vis-à-vis all other [functions (in society)], could (certainly) not (though, admittedly) draw a clear dividing line (line of separation) between norms and institutions (zwischen Normen und Institutionen), (;) on the contrary, he [Parsons] ascertained (determined, established, found out) the interweaving (intertwining, interconnection) of moral and legal norms as well as the necessity of (the) institutional support of (for) the [a] norms system (i.e. system of norms) (die

Verflechtung von moralischen und legalen Normen sowie die Notwendigkeit der institutionellen Abstützung des Normensystems), for instance by (means of) (through) the [a] judicature (judiciary, jurisdiction; die Gerichtsbarkeit). He even (in fact) went a step further. Although (Even though, Notwithstanding that) he connected (linked, associated) (the) political organisation (die politische Organisation) in principle with the function of “goal attain[er]ment” and not with the integrative [function], he stressed (emphasised) its [political organisation’s] contribution to the maintenance of the normative order and consequently (therefore, as a result) [to the maintenance] of the structure of the overall (total) collective [entity, formation, group, body] (der Struktur des Gesamtkollektivs), and he even (in fact) let (allowed) the boundaries (or limits) of society coincide with those [the boundaries] of its [(this same) society’s] political organisation<sup>241</sup>. Politics (Policy) (Politik) was of course understood by him [Parsons] primarily institutionally, i.e. [as being (coming)] of [conducted, carried out, exercised] (by, from) the state and its administrative praxis (or practice) (praxis of administration) (vom Staat und seiner Verwaltungspraxis), yet (nevertheless, however, but) precisely this narrow understanding (comprehension, appreciation, insight) (dieses enge Verständnis), precisely Parsons’s in principle (or programmatic) (fundamental, basic; grundsätzliche) separation (division) between politics and integrative function, makes (renders) his sociological assessment (evaluation, judgement) of the political factor noteworthy (remarkable). It [The said (in principle) separation (between politics and integrative function)] is, so to speak (as it were), an unintended (unintentional, unwanted, involuntary, inadvertent) admission (confession, acknowledgement) of the actual (real, true) ubiquity of the

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<sup>241</sup> “Outline”, p. 46. Cf. Ch. I, footnote 176.

political in(side) the network (plexus, mesh) of the social being (Is) (der tatsächlichen Ubiquität des Politischen im Geflecht des sozialen Seins), an objective repercussion (consequence or effect) of this ubiquity on a(n) essentially (basically) unpolitical sociology (eine objektive Auswirkung dieser Ubiquität auf eine im Grunde unpolitische Soziologie). Access (Admittance, Admission, Entrance) to that level of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) level) [level of depth](,) (up)on (in) which (the) processes (or series of events) (occurrences) are acted out (or happen) (take place), whose (temporary (passing, transient, transitory)) crystallisations then (afterwards, after that) appear from the perspective of the sociologist as [the] joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining), delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) of society through (by means of) [the] mediation (or intervention) (intercession, interposition) of the historically-sociologically sufficient conditions, is found here (Hier findet sich der Zugang zu jener Tiefenebene, auf der sich die Vorgänge abspielen, deren (vorübergehende) Kristalliesierungen durch Vermittlung der historisch-soziologisch zureichenden Bedingungen dann in der Perspektive des Soziologen als Zusammenschluß, Abgrenzung und Selbstgenügsamkeit der Gesellschaft erscheinen). In which (what) relation the social-ontic dimension of the political with the rest [of the dimensions] is (stands) (In welcher Beziehung die sozialontische Dimension des Politischen mit den übrigen steht), will be provisionally (tentatively, temporarily, for the time being) expounded (explicated, explained, elucidated) in the next section. This relation constitutes the real (actual, true) central (essential, main, core) point (crux, core) of social ontology as teaching (theory, doctrine) of the being (Is) of society (Diese Beziehung bildet den eigentlichen Kernpunkt der Sozialontologie als Lehre vom Sein der Gesellschaft).

The social-ontological bringing (or working) out (analysis, processing) of that level of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) level) [level of depth] (Die sozialontologische Herausarbeitung) must entail (bring with it (in its wake, about), involve, result in, have as a consequence) a revision of sociological representations (or notions) (views, perceptions, ideas) about (regarding, on, over) [the] joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining), delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) of society. These [representations (or notions)] are (excessively, exceedingly, extremely) influenced ((all) too much) by new-times (modern(-era)) [models] and nation-state or cultural models (patterns, examples) (models pertaining to the nation-state or culture), which haunt (or are at (in) the back of (have a hold on)) people's minds in [regard to] (during) all ethnological digressions (or deviations) and excursuses (Diese sind allzusehr durch neuzeitliche nationalstaatliche oder kulturelle Muster beeinflusst, die bei allen ethnologischen Abschweifungen und Exkursen im Hinterkopf spuken). [The] delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) of society do not necessarily have to do with territorial boundaries (or limits) or with an absolutely definable quantum (quantity) of resources (Quantum von Ressourcen) – on the contrary: those boundaries and these resources (and) or the claims (demands, requirements) (there(up)on) [in relation to them (such boundaries and resources)] are constantly (continually, continuously) defined anew depending on (according to) the outcome of (the) processes (or sequences (orders) of events) (courses)(,) which indeed (of course, in fact) are apprehensible (graspable, understandable, comprehensible) historically-sociologically, but whose necessary (pre)conditions (prerequisites, requirements) take root [have their roots (origin)] in the social-ontic field.

Also, the significance (meaning, importance) of normative and cultural or institutional components for social cohesion must be judged (evaluated, assessed, appraised) differently (otherwise) in (the) light of the becoming (or events) in (on) the social-ontic field than from the perspective of sociology, which very often (frequently) succumbs (yields, gives in) to the temptation of projecting normative-cultural and institutional content(s), which is (are) decisive (deciding, crucial) only in certain (particular) situations, into (inside) the social-ontological [field, area, domain, sector, sphere, dimension](,) instead of dwelling (lingering) on the[se] [this] same [normative-cultural and institutional content(s)] [them] without social-ontological ambitions (Auch die Bedeutung von normativen und kulturellen oder institutionellen Komponenten für den sozialen Zusammenhalt muß im Lichte des Geschehens auf dem sozialontischen Feld anders bewertet werden als in der Perspektive der Soziologie, die sehr oft der Versuchung erliegt, normativ-kulturelle und institutionelle Inhalte, die nur in bestimmten Lagen ausschlaggebend sind, ins Sozialontologische zu projizieren, anstatt bei denselben ohne sozialontologische Ambitionen zu verweilen). [Just] Like (As) the social-ontic field in comparison with (to) (the) historical and sociological crystallisations, so too the social-ontological concept (notion) of society must be more fluid (flowing, changeable, porous, liquid, fluent) and more open than every sociological [concept of society] (Wie das sozialontische Feld im Vergleich zu den historischen und soziologischen Kristallisationen, so muß auch der sozialontologische Gesellschaftsbegriff flüssiger und offener als jeder soziologische sein). It [The social-ontological concept of society] is not dependent on the sociological determination (or definition) of [the] joining together (or union) (amalgamation, merger, combining), delimitation (demarcation, separation, fencing off, entrenchment, dissociation) and self-sufficiency

(contentedness, autarky) of society. Even in a hypothetical world society without state (national) borders (frontiers, boundaries, limits) and without political (state[-based]) government (administration, rule) (Selbst in einer hypothetischen Weltgesellschaft ohne Staatsgrenzen und ohne politische Regierung), in which the criterion of delimitation (demarcation, separation) is (would have to be) automatically omitted (dropped, cancelled, inapplicable) (not apply) and that [(the) criterion] of self-sufficiency (contentedness, autarky) would necessarily (have to) lose (shed, forfeit) its specific, i.e. comparative (comparing) meaning (or sense), since (as, because, inasmuch as) mankind (humankind, humanity), for (due to the) lack (want) of productive neighbours, nolens volens (i.e. (whether) (not) willing (or) (un)willing (not) [willing or unwilling]) would have to be content (or satisfied) (make do) with (settle for) itself –, even here the political would, in its interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) with the rest of the aspects of the social-ontic, have the same weight as in earlier social (societal) formations (formations of society) too and as in the primitive horde, which likewise (also) knew no (did not know any) state borders and no (any) political government. Talk of the being (Is) of society would be empty (or hollow) (vacuous, unfounded) if the social-ontological concept of society could not be extended (stretched, expanded, elongated) theoretically and empirically so far (widely, broadly, extensively) (selbst hier würde das Politische in seiner Wechselwirkung mit den übrigen Aspekten des Sozialontischen dasselbe Gewicht haben wie bei früheren Gesellschaftsformationen auch und wie bei der primitiven Horde, die ebenfalls keine Staatsgrenzen und keine politische Regierung kannte. Die Rede vom Sein der Gesellschaft wäre leer, ließe sich der sozialontologische Gesellschaftsbegriff theoretisch und empirisch nicht so weit ausdehnen).

### C. The three ontic aspects of the social and the theoretical triptych of social ontology (Die drei ontischen Aspekte des Sozialen und das theoretische Triptychon der Sozialontologie)

We (have) hopefully succeeded (managed) in making (to make) the following clear: were the being (Is) of society univocal and one-dimensional (univok und eindimensional), then (so, thus) social ontology would culminate theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) in a formally (i.e. in terms of form) all-embracing(encompassing) (catholic, universal, global) and, in terms of content, absolutely empty (vacuous, hollow, void, blank) concept (notion) of this being (Is), not unlike (otherwise than, differently to) scholastic-Aristotelian ontology (of) [which has become (is (like))] [a(n)] unhappy (bad, unfortunate, ill-fated, ill-starred, miserable, sorrowful) memory (remembrance) (so würde Sozialontologie theoretisch in einem formal allumfassenden und inhaltlich absolut leeren Begriff von diesem Sein gipfeln, nicht anders als die scholastisch-aristotelische Ontologie unseligen Angedenkens). On the other hand, its [social ontology's] character as [an] ontology is certain (settled, definite, fixed, known) on condition (provided) that the aspects or dimensions of (the) social being (Is) are equally original (initial) (or equiprimordial) (gleichursprünglich) and can be meant (intended or thought (conceived) of) (imagined) only with regard (respect) (in) (relation, reference) to one another; meant (or thought of) together (jointly, collectively) (zusammengedacht), they [the said aspects or dimensions of the social being (Is)] must (then) again (in turn, on the other hand) encompass (span, cover, embrace) the concept (notion) of (the) social being (Is) (to) such (so, in such a way) (an extent) that for its [(the) social being's] specific determination (or definition) (fixing, determining, classification,



identification) nothing else (more) must (has to) be brought (called) in (to play) (used, enlisted, called (drawn) on), no matter what society may otherwise need (require) for its (continued) existence (duration). The multi-dimensionality of the social-ontic (Die Multidimensionalität des Sozialontischen), which should (is supposed (meant) to) find expression (be reflected, manifest (show) itself) in the theoretical structuring (structure, arrangement) of social ontology (in der theoretischen Gliederung der Sozialontologie), is (must), for its part, (to) be understood in [a] dual (double, twin) sense: as the being next to one another (or co-existence) (existing (living) side by side) of (involved (participating), but analytically distinguishable) factors or forces (taking (playing a) part (involved), but analytically distinguishable,) in the social-ontic field, and as [the] disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) of the same [(social-ontic) factors or forces] in the form (shape) of a spectrum rich in (i.e. replete with) (full of, with ample (abundant)) tension (stress, strain) (als das Nebeneinander mitwirkender, aber analytisch unterscheidbarer Faktoren oder Kräfte auf dem sozialontischen Feld und als Disposition derselben in Gestalt eines spannungsreichen Spektrums). There are three factors or forces which have the [an] immanent (inherent, intrinsic) property (or quality) (characteristic, trait, attribute, feature) to dispose (i.e. arrange) themselves in such a way (thus, so, to such an extent) and to relate (refer) to one another originally (initially) (i.e. from the beginning or primordially (primally)): the social relation, the political and man (Es gibt drei Faktoren oder Kräfte, die die immanente Eigenschaft haben, sich derart zu disponieren und sich ursprünglich aufeinander zu beziehen: die soziale Beziehung, das Politische und der Mensch). Why and how these three ontic aspects of the social must be meant (or thought of) together (jointly, collectively), social ontology as [a] whole actually (in actual fact (reality), really) deals (is concerned (involved)) with (is about) that

(Warum und wie diese drei ontischen Aspekte des Sozialen zusammengedacht werden müssen, davon handelt eigentlich die Sozialontologie als ganze). For the [a] first orientation, the following can be said in the manner (by way) of theses (theses-like; thesenhaft).[:] All [things] (Everything), which happen(s) (take(s) place, occur(s)) in a society and can be equipped (or endowed) (provided, supplied, administered) with the predicate of the social, happens via visible or invisible (interhuman, interpersonal) relations (between humans (people)), and comes into being (results, arises, ensues, is produced (created)) through (by means of) the dynamic(s) of these relations (Alles, was in einer Gesellschaft geschieht und mit dem Prädikat des Sozialen versehen werden kann, geschieht über sichtbare oder unsichtbare zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen und entsteht durch die Dynamik dieser Beziehungen). In this sense, the social relation is co-extensive with the being (Is) of society and belongs constitutively to (its) [the being of society's] concept (notions) (of it) (In diesem Sinn ist die soziale Beziehung koextensiv mit dem Sein der Gesellschaft und gehört konstitutiv zu dessen Begriff). Its [The social relation's] spectrum and mechanism can, however, fully (completely, wholly) unfold (or develop) only (just) in society or against the background of a society – irrespective of its smaller or larger extent (size, scale, scope, range), its simple or complex structure –; only under [in accordance with] the precondition (prerequisite, presupposition, assumption, premise) (on the basis) of this topical (current, relevant, up-to-date) or potential[ly] full (complete, whole) unfolding (or development) does it [the social relation] deserve the predicate *social* relation (Ihr Spektrum und ihr Mechanismus können sich aber erst in Gesellschaft oder vor dem Hintergrund einer Gesellschaft – ungeachtet ihres kleineren oder größeren Umfangs, ihrer einfachen oder komplexen Struktur – voll entfalten; nur unter der Voraussetzung dieser

aktuellen oder potentiellen vollen Entfaltung verdient sie das Prädikat *soziale* Beziehung). Society now differs from the relations between separately looked at (considered, regarded, contemplated, viewed) humans (men, people), as well as from the mere sum of such relations, due to the fact that (because) (by) (it [society]) puts (places, provides) an open field for interactions at [humans', society's] disposal [by providing an open field for interactions], which do not have to have a(ny) direct individual reference (regard), but aim at the creation of an in principle binding framework for all other interactions (Gesellschaft unterscheidet sich nun von Beziehungen zwischen separat betrachteten Menschen sowie von der bloßen Summe solcher Beziehungen dadurch, daß sie ein offenes Feld für Interaktionen zur Verfügung stellt, die keinen direkten individuellen Bezug haben müssen, sondern auf die Schaffung eines grundsätzlich verbindlichen Rahmen für alle anderen Interaktionen abzielen). Such interactions (Solche Interaktionen) do not differ (are not distinguished (differentiated)) as to (in accordance (relation) with (to)) either their spectrum or their mechanism from the rest of the social relations, but surely (certainly, of course) as to their range (or scope) (reach; Reichweite), which lends (gives, imparts, bestows, confers, awards) (to, upon) them a(n) entirely (completely, wholly, totally) particular (or separate) (special, specific, peculiar) quality: it is the quality of the political as the [an] interactional element, which should (is supposed (meant) to) (e)specially (specifically) refer (relate, apply) to (concern) society as [a] whole, and indeed as [a] whole to be ordered and to be held together ((to be) (cohered) or to cohere) (i.e. to attain (have, acquire, obtain, achieve) order and cohesion), and subordinate (the) its own individual (separate, single, isolated) or [individual] alien (foreign or other) (strange) interactions to this supreme (topmost, uppermost, highest, paramount, ultimate) point of view (Sie ist die Qualität des Politischen als

des interaktionellen Elements, das sich speziell auf die Gesellschaft als Ganzes, und zwar als zu ordnendes und zusammenzuhaltendes Ganzes beziehen soll und die einzelnen eigenen oder fremden Interaktionen diesem obersten Gesichtspunkt unterordnet). The political constitutes (forms), so to speak (as it were), the interaction of all interactions (Das Politische bildet sozusagen die Interaktion aller Interaktionen).

Where(ver) society is in principle [a] binding correlation (interrelation, connection or context) of interactions, (there,) the political is (there) too (as well, also) (Wo Gesellschaft grundsätzlich verbindlicher Zusammenhang von Interaktionen ist, da ist das Politische auch).

However, the political can set its sights on ((take) aim for (at)) this function or this power claim because all [that is, things] (everything) social(,) which happen(s) (take(s) place, occur(s)) in society(,) must happen via (through) interactions (Das Politische kann aber diese Funktion bzw. diesen Machtanspruch deshalb anvisieren, weil alles Soziale, das in der Gesellschaft geschieht, über Interaktionen geschehen muß); the political is accordingly (correspondingly) shaped (formed, moulded, constituted) in its spectrum and its mechanism as [an] interaction(,) in order to guide (or direct) (steer, drive) interactions (entsprechend gestaltet sich das Politische in seinem Spektrum und seinem Mechanismus als Interaktion, um Interaktionen zu lenken). It [The political] is not co-extensive with society in the same sense as the sum of interactions, but in the sense that its [the political's] range (or scope) (reach) touches (borders on, affects, concerns, comes into contact with, has an effect on) society's bound(arie)s (limits, borders, frontiers), in fact marks these boundaries on each and every respective occasion, regardless (irrespective, in spite) of (notwithstanding, despite) how extensive (comprehensive, broad, wide) the interaction is, on (in) which it [the political], on each and every respective occasion, (is) directly

founded (established, based) (takes root) and from which it [the political] starts (out) (emanates, originates, comes) (takes as a (the) starting point) (Mit der Gesellschaft ist es nicht in demselben Sinne koextensiv wie die Summe der Interaktionen, sondern in dem Sinne, daß seine Reichweite die Grenzen der Gesellschaft berührt, ja diese Grenzen jeweils markiert, ungeachtet dessen, wie umfangreich die Interaktion ist, in der es jeweils direkt gründet und von der es ausgeht). The anthropological [element, dimension, sphere], finally (in the end), comes into play social-ontically in a triple (threefold) respect (regard, sense) (Das Anthropologische kommt schließlich in dreifacher Hinsicht sozialontisch ins Spiel). For one thing (Firstly, For a start, On the one hand), [the] spectrum and mechanism of the social relation can be described (outlined, portrayed) in anthropological categories; indeed, both [the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation] interrelate ((are) connect(ed)) primarily with the social in this relation, yet the social concerns (affects, pertains to) here humans and not for instance ants or bees, so that (the) anthropological specification appears (seems) (to be) indispensable (essential), especially (particularly) as (since) the mechanism of the social relation (less [so,] its [the social relation's] spectrum) accompanies (goes with) (cap)abilities (or skills) (faculties) and qualities (characteristics or properties) (traits, attributes, features) (Fähigkeiten und Eigenschaften)(,) which we rightly are in the habit of regarding (considering, looking at, contemplating) as human par excellence. On the other hand, (the) recourse (reverting, recursion, reversion, going back) to the anthropological dimension becomes unavoidable (inevitable, (absolutely) essential, imperative) when (if) the question arises (comes (springs) up, emerges) [as to] what (then) drives humans (people, men) beyond (over, across, via, away from, out of) all other interactions to that special (particular) interaction (zu jener speziellen Interaktion), which we call

(name) the political (das Politische). And thirdly, one does not get around anthropological considerations (thoughts, deliberations, reflections) as soon as (when) the phenomenon of culture (civilisation, cultivation) (das Phänomen der Kultur) appears (turns (crops, comes) up, arises, emerges, surfaces, looms) on the social-ontological horizon – and it [culture] must appear: because man's nature (the nature of man) is, as is (well) known, culture (und es muß auftauchen: Denn des Menschen Natur ist bekanntlich Kultur); [the] being (Is) of culture and [the] being (Is) of human society represent (or constitute), in practical terms (practice), interchangeable (exchangeable, replaceable) concepts. Social ontology and social-ontologically oriented anthropology do not, though (however, certainly, admittedly, mind you), deal with cultural content(s) and with the sufficient conditions of this or that culture, but with the necessary conditions of culture as human nature (Sein der Kultur und Sein menschlicher Gesellschaft stellen praktisch austauschbare Begriffe dar. Sozialontologie und sozialontologisch orientierte Anthropologie handeln allerdings nicht von kulturellen Inhalten und von den zureichenden Bedingungen dieser oder jener Kultur, sondern von den notwendigen Bedingungen der Kultur als menschlicher Natur).

Let us [now] turn to every single (individual) one of these three ontic aspects of the social. Our brief (short, quick) explications (explanations, exemplifications, illustrations, clarifications) here apply (are) mainly (principally, chiefly) to (meant for (aimed at)) the political and the anthropological complex of questions (problems) and should (are supposed (meant) to) convey (impart, provide, give) (to) the reader a preparatory (preliminary, precursory, preparing) insight into the overall (total) concept (or conceptual plan) of the [this] work. Our preliminaries (i.e. preliminary remarks, comments or observations) in relation to the

aspect of the social relation can be framed (expressed, grasped, apprehended, interpreted, composed, understood) even (still) more briefly, since (as, because) the remaining chapters of the (present, current, extant) (this) volume (at hand) are devoted (dedicated) to its [the social relation's] spectrum and its mechanism. The putting first (Das Voranstellen) of the analysis of the social relation does not mean (signify, stand for, symbolise, denote, imply), though (however, certainly), a(ny) hierarchical gradation (grading; Abstufung) of the social-ontic aspect,(:) it also does not mean that [one, we] should (is (are) supposed (meant) to) proceed (progress, march on, continue, advance) from the particular to the general via inductionis (i.e. by means (or the method) (way, (the) manner) of induction) (vom Besonderen zum Allgemeinen via inductionis fortgeschritten werden soll). The equal originality (or equiprimordiality) and the mutual (reciprocal) being dependent (i.e. dependence) of the [(all) three] (social-ontic's) aspects (of the social-ontic) prohibit (forbid, proscribe, ban) such implications (Die Gleichursprünglichkeit und das gegenseitige Angewiesensein der Aspekte des Sozialontischen verbieten solche Implikationen). Our (re)presentation (portrayal, depiction, description, account; Darstellung) could have just as well started (begun) with the anthropological or with the political, in order to, from there, build (construct, erect, make) conceptual bridges (in relation) to(wards) the(, on each and every respective occasion,) [two] (all) other [two] (respective) social-ontic aspects. The being (Is) of the social is a field without [a] centre and without [a] periphery,(:) rather, every point in it [the (said) (this) (being of the social) (as a) (field)] can become [the, a] centre or periphery depending on the standpoint or situation (position or location). (Accordingly,) The[ir] [Every point( in the said being of the social as a field)'s] (re)presentation (portrayal, depiction, description, account) can (accordingly, correspondingly) move freely, on condition

(provided) that it (the said presentation) never loses sight of the constant connecting (connective, connection, combination, conjunctive) lines (lines [in respect] of connection (combination, conjunction, association, relationship)) between the social-ontic aspects (Das Sein des Sozialen ist ein Feld ohne Zentrum und ohne Peripherie, vielmehr kann jeder Punkt in ihm Zentrum oder Peripherie je nach Standpunkt oder Lage werden. Entsprechend frei kann sich die Darstellung bewegen, unter der Bedingung, daß sie die konstanten Verbindungslinien zwischen den sozialontischen Aspekten nie aus den Augen verliert). The separate and equivalent (i.e. even-handed) handling (or treatment) of the social relation, (with)in(to) (under) whose field (or area) (sector, domain, realm) collective just as (as well as) individual interactions fall (come), indicates, in any case (at any rate), in (by) itself (per se) that the determination (or definition) (fixing, determining, classification, identification) of the being (Is) of society as [the] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of social ontology does not point (allude) to (at) (indicate, suggest) any veiled (disguised, hidden, concealed, cloaked, covered) pre-decision (precursory (before, preliminary) decision) (verhüllte Vorentscheidung) in favour of “holism” („Holismus“) – whereas the thesis [that] individual interactions (would) only through (by means of) the fact of society become (or turn into) (lead to) *social* relations, blocks (obstructs) the option (choice, selection) [in favour] of methodological individualism. Generally (In general, On the whole), we should guard against (protect ourselves from, take care to not) carry(ing) methodical (i.e. methodological) quarrels (disputes, squabbles) over (across) into social ontology’s field (area, sector, domain, realm), which have marked (characterised) the tense co-existence (living together) of history and sociology for (since) approximately (about, roughly) 150 years [ago]. What appears as [the] immanent (inherent, intrinsic, innate) “holism” of



sociology(,) is in reality – disregarding (apart from, excepting) normatively inspired hypostatisations – the command (order, requirement, necessity) of its [sociology’s] logic of founding (establishment, foundation) (founding (foundational) logic)(,) putting (placing) (focus(s)ing on) supra-individual construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) or social facts (at the centre of attention (interest)); and the – of necessity (unavoidable, ineluctable, necessary) very watered down (diluted) – “individualism” of history is (does) not based (rest), for its part, on an(y) ontic autonomy (or independence) (self-sufficiency) of the individual [element, factor or person] [(human) being, actor, dimension, sphere] (ontischen Selbständigkeit des Individuellen), but on the specific commands (orders, requirements) of [the] historical logic of founding (i.e. the logic of founding pertaining to (the) historical science) (sondern auf spezifischen Geboten historischer Grundlegungslogik). As we know, social ontology touches (borders, comes into contact, affects, concerns) at times (more) (on) (with) sociology (more), at other times (more) (on) (with) history (more), on each and every (respective) occasion in a different respect (regard) (Wie wir wissen, berührt sich Sozialontologie bald mehr mit der Soziologie, bald mehr mit der Historie in jeweils anderer Hinsicht). With regard to the social relation, sociology investigates (examines, looks (inquires) into, scrutinises) its [the social relation’s] (transitory (passing, temporary, transient)) historical crystallisations ((vorübergehende) geschichtliche Kristallisationen), whether these [historical crystallisations] take (assume, adopt) institutional forms (institutionelle Formen annehmen) or arrive (come) on the scene (turn up) as collective movements and processes under the influence (sign) of the heterogony of ends (als kollektive Bewegungen und Prozesse im Zeichen der Heterogonie der Zwecke auf den Plan treten). Social ontology must, on the other hand first of all, outline

(delineate) the spectrum of the social relation(,) inside of which those crystallisations crop up (appear, occur, happen) (are found), and name the (anthropological) reasons [as to] why this spectrum extends (stretches, spans) between the extremes of friendship and enmity (Sozialontologie muß hingegen zunächst das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung umreißen, innerhalb dessen jene Kristallisationen vorkommen, und die (anthropologischen) Gründe nennen, warum sich dieses Spektrum zwischen den Extremen von Freundschaft und Feindschaft erstreckt). The permanent movement in(side) this spectrum and the likewise (also) permanent changing (change, alternation, rotation; Wechsel) of each and every respective predominant (prevailing, prevalent; vorherrschenden) aspect in it [the said spectrum] takes away (withdraws, cuts), as it were, from individual and collective social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) the firm (solid) ground [from] under the[ir] [such (individual and collective) social phenomena's] feet, and prevents (or hinders) (blocks, stops, circumvents) a nomological explanation (declaration) of the becoming (or events) in this field (area, sector, domain, realm) (und verhindern eine nomologische Erklärung des Geschehens auf diesem Gebiet). However (But, Yet)(,) not only because the same subjects are able to (can) occupy (fill; besetzen) completely (entirely, wholly) different places (spaces; Plätze) inside of the social relation's spectrum; [but] (just) as (well) (also, likewise, similarly, in the same way) for the reason because [that] the social relation's mechanism (der Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung) always remains the same irrespective of which aspect or which end of its [the social relation's] spectrum is affected (of concern); that is why a nomologically meant (intended, thought, imagined) binding (or connection) (bond, tie, bonding, joining, dependence, relationship) (eine nomologisch gedachte Bindung) of aspect A of the spectrum to form B of the mechanism of the

social relation is out of the question (not considered (a consideration)). Social action, understanding, rationality and language (speech) are equally subject to this mechanism (Diesem Mechanismus unterliegen gleichermaßen soziales Handeln, Verstehen, Rationalität und Sprache),(; because of that (that is why, therefore)(,) its [the (social relation's) mechanism's] illumination (examination or investigation) (elucidation, clarification, explanation) opens up (makes accessible, develops) a wide (broad, extensive, great) [range of] question formulation[s] (or central theme[s]) (formulation[s] of the [a] question, problem examination[s], examination[s] of (a [the]) problem(s)), whose unified (or uniform) (united) apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) can be successful (managed, [achieved]) (succeed, work) only with the help (on the basis) of a thus (so, in such a way) laid out (or drawn up) (invested, calculated, designed, based, positioned, structured) social ontology (seine Beleuchtung erschließt deshalb eine weite Fragestellung, deren einheitliche Erfassung nur an Hand einer so angelegten Sozialontologie gelingen kann).

The bringing (or working) out (analysis, processing; Die Herausarbeitung) of the second social-ontic aspect, i.e. of the political, and the(,) because of (through) that (it) (in this way, thereby)(,) possibility opening up (presenting itself) of determining (or defining) (fixing, classifying, identifying) society as [a] political collective, reinforces (confirms, strengthens, encourages, makes) the impression (stronger) [that] social ontology can (could)(,) without difficulty (easily)(,) disregard (ignore, jump (ride roughshod) over, shrug off, [get around]) the dilemma [of] “holism or individualism”. It [Social ontology] does not investigate (examine, look (inquire) into, scrutinise) the political factor (den politischen Faktor) for instance like sociology, i.e. not in the

ideal-typically prepared form (shape) of historically determined  
 (conditioned), and on each and every respective occasion, differently  
 legitimised supra-individual political orders,(;) [and] also not from the  
 point of view of the interrelation (connection, correlation) of these orders  
 with the uni- [unisegmental] or polysegmental, simpler or more complex  
 character of the corresponding societies (d. h. nicht in der idealtypisch  
 präparierten Gestalt von geschichtlich bedingten und jeweils anders  
 legitimierten überindividuellen politischen Ordnungen, auch nicht aus der  
 Sicht des Zusammenhanges dieser Ordnungen mit dem uni- oder  
 polysegmentären, einfacheren oder komplexeren Charakter der  
 entsprechenden Gesellschaften). It [Social ontology] defines the political  
 with regard (in reference) to (in view (on the basis) of) the being (Is) of  
 society, that is, the definition must apply to (be valid for) all political  
 orders in all societies,(;) it [the said definition] must be able to state (or  
 indicate) (declare, cite, give, explain, specify) the necessary  
 (pre)conditions (prerequisites, requirements) of their [all political orders(  
 in all societies)'] formation (development) and at the same time of their  
 dissolution (or disintegration) (break(ing) up, breakdown, decay).  
 Because the spectrum of the political coincides (is congruent (identical),  
 corresponds, tallies) with the spectrum of the social relation,(;) in other  
 words, it [the spectrum of the political] constitutes a marked (pegged,  
 staked) out (or delimited) (demarcated)(,) by both extremes of friendship  
 and enmity(,) field rich in (i.e. replete with) (full of, with ample  
 (abundant)) tension (stress, strain) (Denn das Spektrum des Politischen  
 deckt sich mit dem Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung, es bildet m. a. W.  
 ein spannungsreiches, durch die beiden Extreme der Freundschaft und der  
 Feindschaft abgestecktes Feld). The identity (i.e. sameness) (oneness) of  
 the spectrum (and of the mechanism) of course does not at all mean  
 (signify) (the) identity (i.e. sameness) of (the) extent (size or range)

(scale, scope, area; Umfanges): not all social relations are political, although the political can only be [a] social relation; the identity (i.e. sameness) of political and non-political social relations regarding (with regard to, concerning) the spectrum (and the mechanism) explains (accounts for, declares), at any rate (all events) (in any case, anyway), the(, at any time, (always) existing (current, prevailing, established),) possibility of politicisation(, existing at any time (always),) of the(,) at the moment (for the time being, momentarily, presently, currently)(,) non-political (not political) (Nicht alle sozialen Beziehungen sind politisch, obwohl das Politische nur soziale Beziehung sein kann; die Identität von politischen und nicht politischen sozialen Beziehungen hinsichtlich des Spektrums (und des Mechanismus) erklärt jedenfalls die jederzeit bestehende Politisierungsmöglichkeit des momentan nicht Politischen)<sup>242</sup>.

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<sup>242</sup> If the spectrum of the political is co-extensive with the spectrum of the social relation, i.e. both [the political's spectrum and the social relation's spectrum] extend between the extremes of friendship and enmity, then (thus, so) from that results (arises, emanates) [the fact] that the distinction (difference, differentiation) between friend and foe (enemy) does not *specifically* belong to the political, and hence (therefore, thus, that is why) [it] cannot also define its [the political's] concept (notion), although friendship and enmity are after all (in general, generally, on the whole, altogether, actually, anyway) to be avoided (or thought of (about) (imagined) as not there) ((entirely, totally) indispensable (inseparable, integral)) (wegzudenken sind) for the political(,) just as (little as) for the social relation. The logical error (mistake, flaw, fault) of C. Schmitt, who (has) wanted to define the political – certainly (although, mind you, admittedly) in ignorance of its social-ontological dimension – on the basis (with the help) of (based on) the “friend-foe” criterion (an Hand des „Freund-Feind“ Kriteriums), consists in the confusion (mixing up, mistaking) of the social relation in general with the political. No doubt (Certainly), the political is [a] social relation(,) and as such it encompasses (spans, covers) the entire (complete, whole, total) spectrum of the social relation in general, including both its extreme (out(er)most, furthest) boundaries (limits), however, not all social relations are political, although they show (or contain) (manifest, display) the same spectrum as the political too; the specific difference of the more extensive (comprehensive, broad, wide) genus (or species) (kind, sort, type) does not coincide with that [the specific difference] of the less extensive genera (genus(es)), ergo (therefore, consequently, hence, as a result (consequence)), the specific difference of the political is (should, ought, must) not (to) be sought (looked for, found) in the marking of the political spectrum by the extremes of friendship and of enmity (die spezifische Differenz der umfangreicheren Gattung fällt nicht mit jener der weniger umfangreichen zusammen, ergo ist die spezifische Differenz des Politischen nicht in der Markierung des politischen Spektrums durch die Extreme der Freundschaft und der Feindschaft zu suchen). In (With) simpler words: the [a] horse is indeed (actually, really, in reality, truly) a four-legged creature (being; Wesen), but if one defines it [a horse] on the basis of this real property (i.e. quality or characteristic) (trait, attribute, feature), then one blurs (covers over (up), smears) its difference with a dog. – Obviously (Evidently, Apparently), this refutation (disproving, rebuttal) of the Schmittian definition differs fundamentally (considerably, substantially) from the usual (customary) moralistic critiques (criticisms, reviews), which do not take exception (offence) to the (by them [these critiques], incidentally, hardly (barely, scarcely) noticed (noted)) logical shortcomings (deficiencies, defects, faults, flaws, imperfections, weaknesses), but simply postulate [that] the element of enmity should and can be excluded from the political and politics (aus dem Politischen und der

The political is that particular (special, exceptional, peculiar) social relation(,) which makes (renders) the social(,) as [a, the] whole to be ordered and to be held together ((cohered) or to cohere) (i.e. to attain (have, acquire, obtain, achieve) order and cohesion)(,) the [an, its] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) (Das Politische ist jene besondere soziale Beziehung, die sich das Soziale als zu ordnendes und zusammenzuhaltendes Ganzes zum Gegenstand macht). It [The political] belongs therefore to society in a(n) still (even) more special (specific, particular) sense than interaction in general (on the whole) (Es gehört also zur Gesellschaft in einem noch spezielleren Sinne als Interaktion überhaupt). Because in society all [things] (everything) is (are) interaction (Interaktion), however not all [things] (everything) is (are) political, and exactly (precisely, of all things)(,) that which of its extent (size or range) (scale, scope, area) does not coincide with the whole (all) [of] (entire, complete, total) society, makes (at least potentially) the whole (all) [of] (entire, complete, total) society the [a, its] object (or subject matter). It [The political] goes beyond (exceeds, climbs over, transcends) the possible range (or scope) (reach) of every individual interaction (Es übersteigt die mögliche Reichweite jeder individuellen Interaktion), and that is why (because of that) it must invoke (appeal (refer) to, call upon) supra-individual principles (überindividuelle Prinzipien), principles,

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Politik). One can reply (retort in regard) to the [this] postulate [in, with] two (different) [ways, arguments (things)]: a) if the definition of the political on the basis of the *double* (*dual*, *twin*) “friend-foe” criterion is rejected, then (so, thus) the exclusion of enmity from the definition, to be consistent (logically), also entails the exclusion of friendship; b) the existence (presence, availability) of enmity (or friendship) in the political and the definition of the political on the basis of the criterion of enmity (and friendship) are two entirely (completely) different things (matters). That is why [he](,) who hopes for (expects) a “humanisation” of the political and of politics (eine „Humanisierung“ des Politischen und der Politik) from the loud (noisy) rejection (refusal, denial, renunciation) of the Schmittian definition(,) deceives himself (is wrong (mistaken)); political enmity did not come into the world through (by means (way) of) Schmitt’s definition(,) and it [political enmity] will not disappear (vanish) from the world through (by means (way) of) the refutation (disproving, rebuttal) of the [this] same [definition]. – This important question had to be briefly touched upon here; it [the said important question] will be treated (dealt with, handled) in detail (extensively) in the second volume of this work. Cf. Ch. III, Sec. 3A in this volume.

which in the end (ultimately, when all is said and done, at the end of the day, after all) concern (affect) the shaping (moulding, forming, formation) of the social order (die Gestaltung der sozialen Ordnung). Two hypothetical humans (people, men) all along (always, from time immemorial) cut off (isolated) from every (group) (living) (life (of groups)) [group life] (Zwei von jedem Gruppenleben seit jeher abgeschnittene hypothetische Menschen), would never get (have, come up with) the idea of shaping (moulding, forming) their relations with (towards, vis-à-vis) each other on the basis of such [supra-individual] principles, however (on the other hand)(,) two socially living humans (people, men) refer (point out) each other very often to (the) [what is] generally applicable (valid) in order to regulate (the)[ir] [what is, something] private [sphere, matters (affairs), between them] (zwei sozial lebende Menschen verweisen einander hingegen sehr oft auf allgemein Geltendes, um Privates zu regeln). The political deals (is concerned, has,) exactly directly or indirectly(,) (with) (the) [what is] generally applicable (valid) (towards (vis-à-vis, [as]) the [its] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme)) (Das Politische hat eben direkt oder indirekt allgemein Geltendes zum Gegenstand), and accordingly (therefore, thus, according to that) represents (describes, shows, depicts, portrays, constitutes) the social in the most comprehensive (extensive) (broadest) sense of the word. Statements (propositions or pronouncements) (assertions, opinions) and acts (or actions) here refer (apply, relate) essentially (, in accordance with (of) their essence (nature, texture),) to (concern) the social whole,(;) the part-questions(problems, issues) (i.e. secondary, separate (individual), restricted or minor questions) (partial questions, sub-questions) are subordinated to the most general social points of view (die Teilfragen werden den allgemeinsten sozialen Gesichtspunkten untergeordnet). Materially (Substantively, Physically, Corporeally; Materiell), the

political certainly (though) is based (founded, takes root) on (in) (emanates (springs, originates) from) individuals and their act(ion)s, however, its [the political's] social uniqueness (singularity; Einmaligkeit) consists in that [the] individual (Individuelles) [element, dimension, sphere, person, human] here, as (however) much as it may be perceived (felt, experienced, seen) as (found to be) [the] individual or even [the] personal (so sehr es sich auch als Individuelles oder gar Persönliches empfinden mag), raises (makes) the (conceivably, imaginably, possibly) most general social claim ((conceivably) possible) (den denkbar allgemeinsten sozialen Anspruch erhebt).

The (in itself amorphous) social-ontological and the, on each and every respective occasion, historically concretised dimension of the political phenomenon are in reality (actually, really) inseparable from each other, but conceptually and theoretically [(they) are] two (different) things (Die (an sich amorphe) sozialontologische und die jeweils geschichtlich konkretisierte Dimension des politischen Phänomens sind real voneinander unzertrennlich, begrifflich und theoretisch aber zweierlei). We want to refer to (call, describe, label, identify, name) the former (with the expression (term)) [as] “the political”,(;) [for] the latter we shall reserve (retain) the name “politics”, in relation to which it must be noted (said) that under “politics”(,) (also) currents (trends, tendencies) and movements are to (should, ought to) be subsumed (too)(,) which do (are) without (lack) (state or non-state) institutional crystallisation (Die erstere wollen wir mit dem Ausdruck „das Politische“ bezeichnen, der letzteren behalten wir den Namen „Politik“ vor, wobei angemerkt werden muß, daß unter „Politik“ auch Strömungen und Bewegungen zu subsumieren sind, die der (staatlichen oder nichtstaatlichen) institutionellen Kristallisation entbehren). The institutionally anchored (fixed, secured,



fastened, attached, embodied, engrafted) or (temporarily (provisionally, tentatively, for the time being)) unbound (untied, unattached, independent) politics constitutes the each and every respective historical concretisation of the political, without being able to ever exhaust (deplete, wear out) its [the political's] potentiality (Die institutionell verankerte oder (vorläufig) ungebundene Politik bildet die jeweilige geschichtliche Konkretisierung des Politischen, ohne dessen Potentialitäten je erschöpfen zu können). This concretisation has to fulfil (have fulfilled, carry through (comply) with (out), achieve, satisfy, perform, discharge) the tasks (jobs, duties, functions) set (put, posed, placed, posited) by the social-ontological character of the political, i.e. to concretely determine (define, fix, condition, characterise, specify, ascertain) in each and every respective concrete situation (in der jeweiligen konkreten Lage konkret zu bestimmen) how (the) social cohesion and (the) social order should (are supposed (meant) to) look like (wie der soziale Zusammenhalt und die soziale Ordnung aussehen sollen). *That*, however, there must be a cohesion ((inter)connection, interrelation, context or correlation) (einen Zusammenhang) and an order (und eine Ordnung), does not depend on the free decision of each and every respective politics, but (it) belongs originally (initially) to the constitution of the social (sondern es gehört ursprünglich zur Konstitution des Sozialen). That is why (There can therefore be) no politics (can have (continued) existence (duration)) (Es kann daher keine Politik Bestand haben) if (when) it [politics] does not (to some extent (degree) (somewhat, rather, fairly)) satisfy (fulfil) the social-ontologically determined (conditioned) requirements (or demands) (standards, requisites; Anforderungen) of the political(,) and if it does not raise (make) and fulfil (satisfy) its own power claims (die eigenen Machtansprüche) in the name of those requirements (or demands). We shall come back (refer, return) to that [later] (To that (Thereupon) we

shall (still) come back). If one is not aware (does not take notice) of (perceive, see, discern, notice, observe) the taking root (rootedness, rooting) of every politics in the social-ontologically understood political, then (thus, so, in this way) one tends, in relation to that, to comprehend (grasp, understand, interpret, perceive, view, see) politics (rather, more) quantitatively, namely, as [a] sub(-system) (or part(ial)(-system)) [a part(-system) (i.e. as a part(,) or (as a) subsystem)] of society (als Teil(-System) der Gesellschaft) beside (next to, alongside) other [part(s)(-systems) of society], and moreover (in addition, additionally, furthermore, besides) to equate (identify) it [politics] with the state or (the) government<sup>243</sup>. This mistake (fault, error, flaw, defect) would in [of] itself be only half(-)fatal if did not necessarily (have to) entail a bigger (greater) [one, mistake]: to imagine (conceive of) a society without the political (and) or politics in order to then (next, afterwards, in that case,) ask (question) what (then) has brought to life (into being) and maintains (preserves, keeps, conserves) in life (alive) this un- [unpolitical] or pre-political society (diese un- oder vorpolitische Gesellschaft). From (Out of) a fictive (fictitious) question, of course only fictions as answers (responses, replies) are to be got (obtained, received), thus (hence, so) e.g. the old and new (young) contract theories or [the](,) as of late(,) (recently, lately, newly) quantitative extensions (expansions, enlargements, broadening(s), widening(s), enhancements) of the interactionistic approach (so z. B. die alten und jungen Vertragstheorien oder neuerdings quantitative Erweiterungen des interaktionistischen Ansatzes)<sup>244</sup>. (Mind you,) [We should keep in mind (not forget) that] behind the in itself empty and merely pompous (or self-important) (pretentious, conceited, bombastic, rhetorical) question “how does (is)

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<sup>243</sup> See Ch. I, Sec. 6, above.

<sup>244</sup> See Sec. 2Ce in this chapter.

society come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, created, produced)?” or “how is society and social order possible?” (are, hide) normative-political preferences and power claims (are hiding),(:) i.e. in [respect of, relation to] the constitution of society, on each and every respective occasion, what one with regard to (in view of) present (current) theoretical-practical goals (ends, purposes) would like to emphasise (underline, give prominence) as decisive (determinative, definitive, defining, substantial, significant, weighty, prevailing, leading, deciding, relevant, important) is projected to the frontmost (foremost) position (place). So (Thus, In this way,) in recent (the last few) decades, under the direct or indirect influence of contractualistic liberalism, within (inside of) which its [contractualistic liberalism’s] individualism and economic aversion to (dislike of) the state and politics merge (fuse, blend) with each other (unter dem direkten oder indirekten Einfluß des kontraktualistischen Liberalismus, innerhalb dessen Individualismus und ökonomistische Abneigung gegen Staat und Politik miteinander verschmelzen)<sup>245</sup>, the tendency has spread (been disseminated) to comprehend (grasp, understand, interpret) social norms and institutions on the whole (all in all, in general) as quantitative extensions (expansions, enlargements, broadening(s), widening(s), enhancements) of crystallisations, which supposedly (ostensibly, allegedly) (first) saw the light of day in the interaction (Interaktion) between [of] individuals. What(ever) has gained (obtained, got) validity in the narrow circle (cycle, circuit, sphere) of personal interaction (im engen Kreis personeller Interaktion), becomes (turns into), according to (in accordance with) this logic, the “social norm when and to the extent that it is shared with other people”<sup>246</sup>. Nevertheless (However), the norms coming into being

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<sup>245</sup> Typically, Nozick, *Anarchy*. Cf. footnote 153 above.

<sup>246</sup> Thus, Elster, *Cement*, p. 105.

(arising, ensuing, resulting, emerging) in (the) “face-to-face relations” differ from (the) social [norms] not merely quantitatively, i.e. through (by means (way) of) the extent (scope, scale, range, area, size) of [their] validity (application, prestige, importance, influence) (durch den Geltungsumfang), but through a qualitative element(,) which again refers to the social-ontological dimension of the political, that is, relates (applies, refers) to (concerns) the question of (the) social cohesion and (the) social order (die Frage des sozialen Zusammenhalts und der sozialen Ordnung). The arbitrariness (randomness) of the interpretation of norms (Die Beliebigkeit der Normeninterpretation) at the level of personal interaction, which can here bring about (cause, induce, occasion, effect, give rise to) the dissolution (disintegration, cancellation, break(ing) up) of a relation without further (additional, other) consequences, gives way (yields, retreats, backs away) at the social level to (from) the – stricter (more stringent) or more flexible – bindedness (Verbindlichkeit) of the interpretation of norms, since society can neither be dissolved (broken up) (disintegrate) arbitrarily (as one likes, randomly, at will) nor founded arbitrarily (da Gesellschaft weder beliebig aufgelöst noch beliebig gegründet werden kann). This bindedness remains (i.e. persists), despite (in spite (irrespective, regardless) of, notwithstanding) (the) [a(ny)] content-related(filled) (substantive) change in (of) norms (ungeachtet des inhaltlichen Normenwandels), and it explains why inside of (within) a society individuals endure (put up with, withstand, bear, tolerate) unequal circumstances (conditions, relation(ship)s) (ungleiche Verhältnisse aushalten)(,) which they would never bear (stand, endure, tolerate) within (inside) [the context] (of) a personal interaction. A merely quantitative extension (expansion, enlargement, broadening, widening, enhancement) of acknowledged (recognised or accepted) (known, established) norms through (by means (way) of) their (recti)linear (rectilineal) and full

(complete, entire) transfer(ence) from the personal to the social level would have as the [a] precondition (presupposition) (prerequisite) or the [a] consequence a society of absolute(ly) equal(s) [people, humans, men] (eine Gesellschaft der absolut Gleichen). However, social theoreticians (theorists), who imagine the aforementioned process in this manner (way), think precisely under [in accordance with, in terms of] the premise of mass-democratic egalitarianism, while at the same time (in relation to which) (they) (simultaneously) raise (elevate, lift) this premise to the [a] genetic principle.

(The) Individual (or separate) (single, isolated) interactions (Die einzelnen Interaktionen) therefore come (are) under (subject to), more or less, one way or another ((in) this way or otherwise (differently)) (anyway, anyhow, in any case, at all events), the social-ontological necessity of the cohesion and of the order of the social (societal) whole (der sozialontologischen Notwendigkeit des Zusammenhalts und der Ordnung des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen). In the course of this (the process) (At the same time, Into the bargain, With that (it)), it is social-ontologically indifferent (unimportant) [as to] whether each and every respective interaction follows (goes by (along with), complies with, takes its cue from, is modeled after (on)) the historical form (shape)(,) which that cohesion and that order have at the [any] given moment (time), or whether its [the said each and every interaction's] reference to that [historical form] is negative, i.e. whether it [each and every respective interaction] conducts (wages) a small or large (great, major) war against the established modes of behaviour (behaviours, behavioural modes (ways, manners)) and norms, whether (be that) with individual aims (goals, objectives, targets) or in the name of a new formation (shaping or structuring) (forming, moulding) of cohesion and of order (Dabei ist es

sozialontologisch gleichgültig, ob sich die jeweilige Interaktion nach der geschichtlichen Gestalt richtet, die jener Zusammenhalt und jene Ordnung im gegebenen Augenblick haben, oder ob ihre Bezugnahme darauf negativ ist, d. h. ob sie gegen die etablierten Verhaltensweisen und Normen einen kleinen oder großen Krieg führt, sei es mit individuellen Zielen, sei es im Namen einer neuen Gestaltung des Zusammenhalts und der Ordnung). In every (any) case (instance) here the political is of concern (affected) as [a] social-ontological magnitude (Auf jeden Fall ist hier das Politische als sozialontologische Größe betroffen). Because the always latent political comes (arrives) on the scene (appears) (there) where a social action or interaction (eine soziale Aktion bzw. Interaktion) is able to (can) be seen (i.e. looked at) (viewed) from the point of view of social cohesion and of social order. This point of view lies (is [found]) ahead (or in advance (front)) of (before) (i.e. precedes) every concrete politics (Dieser Gesichtspunkt liegt jeder konkreten Politik voraus). The political is therefore equally original (initial) with society as such and is (stands, is found) at the same logical level with its [society's] concept (notion) (Das Politische ist also mit der Gesellschaft als solcher gleich ursprünglich und steht in ihrem Begriff auf derselben logischen Ebene). Its [The political's] relation(ship) with (towards, vis-à-vis) society should (may, ought, is) not (allowed to) be comprehended (or construed) (grasped, understood, taken for, perceived, interpreted) instrumentally, i.e. it is not so [the case] that activities or institutions develop (unfold) under the effect (i.e. influence or impact) and from the point of view of the political, *so that* society can exist, but *because* society exists. This [society, Society] is not ordered and held together ((cohered) or does not cohere) (i.e. [it] does not attain (have, acquire, obtain, achieve) order and cohesion), as it were (so to speak), from the outside, but it [society] exists as originally (initially) political; the political is exactly its [society's]

cohesion and its social-ontologically understood order in (very) different (varying, variable, varied, diverse, dissimilar) forms (shapes), and it [the political] lacks (is without) a particular (special, specific) and permanent content exactly because all [things] (everything), which on each and every respective occasion amongst (in [relation (regard) to] (the) leading (decisive (deciding) or relevant (significant, substantial, influential)) actors give(s) (create(s)) the impression [that (the)] (society's) cohesion and order (of society) would be affected [(detrimentally)] by it (that) [the political], can become (turn into) its content (Diese wird nicht durch das Politische gleichsam von außen zusammengehalten und geordnet, sondern sie besteht als ursprünglich politische; das Politische ist eben ihr Zusammenhalt und ihre sozialontologisch verstandene Ordnung in (sehr) unterschiedlichen Gestalten, und es entbehrt eines besonderen und permanenten Inhalts eben deshalb, weil alles zu seinem Inhalt werden kann, was jeweils bei maßgeblichen Akteuren den Eindruck erweckt, Zusammenhalt und Ordnung der Gesellschaft wären davon in Mitleidenschaft gezogen). Incidentally (By the way), from (out of) the social-ontological status of the political the fact is explained that inside of (within) (the) historically given societies(,) politics was (has been) differentiated (or has differentiated itself) as [the] first "subsystem (or part(ial) system)" (Aus dem sozialontologischen Status des Politischen erklärt sich übrigens die Tatsache, daß sich innerhalb der geschichtlich gegebenen Gesellschaften die Politik als erstes „Teilsystem“ ausdifferenziert hat). From (At) the moment in (from, at) which the differentiation of primeval (primordial or original) societies (die Differenzierung der Urgesellschaften) starts (begins) and consequently [the] (society's) cohesion and order (of society) became particularly (especially) noticeable (perceptible, tangible) as a (towards (vis-à-vis, in relation to) the) problem, subjects arrived (came) on the scene (appeared),

which (who) legitimised their own activity and existence by invoking (appealing (referring)) (with reference) (to) the character and the needs of society as [a] whole to be ordered and to be held together (((to be) cohered) or to cohere) (i.e. to attain (have, acquire, obtain, achieve) order and cohesion). Politics is the political from the subjective perspective of a subjective bearer (carrier, vehicle),(:) politics can therefore (as a result, thus, consequently) simultaneously (concurrently) have a number of (several, quite a few, various, multiple) bearers, whereas (while) the political in itself is interwoven (intertwined, interconnected) originally (i.e. from the outset or from its and society's origin), and constantly (or continuously) remains interwoven, with the whole of (entire) society (treten Subjekte auf den Plan, die die eigene Tätigkeit und Existenz unter Berufung auf den Charakter und die Bedürfnisse der Gesellschaft als zusammenzuhaltendem und zu ordnendem Ganzen legitimieren. Politik ist das Politische in der subjektiven Perspektive eines subjektiven Trägers, Politik kann somit gleichzeitig mehrere Träger haben, während das Politische an sich mit der ganzen Gesellschaft ursprünglich verflochten ist und ständig verflochten bleibt).

In (the) light of this perception (view) of the social-ontological nature (or character) (Wesensart) of the political, society can be defined as follows: society is a certain (particular) interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) of individuals which attains (achieves, accomplishes, reaches, arrives at) such an expanse (or extent) (expansion, extension, elongation, stretching, scope, range) and density (thickness) that in it [society] the question (problem, issue) of (the) cohesion and of (the) order in the form of a specifically political question as to (of, in accordance with, regarding) the common good (public (or general) interest (welfare)) is posed, in relation to which (while at the



same time) the thereby (through that, in this way, by this means) outlined field of tension (stress, strain) (area of conflict) of the political is set in motion as soon as it is a matter of bindingly defining the common good, that is, the political, by invoking (appealing (referring)) (with reference) (to) its [the (common good and the) political's] specific point of view to be put (placed) in (or at) the service of a concrete politics (in contrast (as opposed) to (unlike) another [politics]) (Gesellschaft ist eine bestimmte Wechselwirkung von Individuen, die eine solche Ausdehnung und Dichte erreicht, daß sich in ihr die Frage des Zusammenhalts und der Ordnung in Form der spezifisch politischen Frage nach dem Gemeinwohl stellt, wobei das dadurch umrissene Spannungsfeld des Politischen in Bewegung gerät, sobald es darum geht, das Gemeinwohl verbindlich zu definieren, also das Politische unter Berufung auf dessen spezifische Gesichtspunkte in den Dienst einer konkreten Politik (im Gegensatz zu anderen) zu stellen). This definition has far-reaching (or wide-ranging) (extensive, broad) content-related(filled) (substantive) and methodical (i.e. methodological) consequences. The inclusion of the social-ontologically understood political in the concept (notion) of society implies, namely, that society by no means must be (re)presented (or imagined) (put forward) in mystifying, holistic or organicistic categories if (in the event (case), should) one see(s) the question "how is society or social order possible?" as an indeed polemically-normatively usable (exploitable), but social-theoretically useless (pointless) fiction (Diese Definition hat weitreichende inhaltliche und methodische Folgen. Die Einbeziehung des sozialontologisch verstandenen Politischen in den Begriff der Gesellschaft impliziert nämlich, daß die Gesellschaft keineswegs in mystifizierenden, holistischen oder organizistischen Kategorien vorgestellt werden muß, falls man in der Frage „wie ist Gesellschaft bzw. soziale Ordnung möglich?“ eine zwar polemisch-

normativ verwertbare, aber sozialtheoretisch unnütze Fiktion erblickt).

The bringing together and thinking together (jointly) of the social and the political opens up (inaugurates, institutes), in other words, a perspective in which the socially constitutive, that is, binding (cohering or cohesive) and ordering forces (i.e. forces which (seek to) attain cohesion and order) in the action of concrete actors, become tangible (palpable, concrete, obvious), without one, in the process (course of this) (at the same time, into the bargain), having to put the case for (support, back up) a methodological individualism or without having to buy off (obtain (secure) through bribery (a bribe)) demarcation (delimitation, dissociation, separation, fencing off) against (from, vis-à-vis) holism and organicism through (by means of) the acceptance (or assumption) (adoption, supposition, presumption) of a just as (likewise, similarly) polemically-normatively laden (or charged) individualism (Das Zusammenführen und -denken von Sozialem und Politischem eröffnet m. a. W. eine Perspektive, in der die sozial konstitutiven, also zusammenhaltenden und ordnenden Kräfte am Handeln konkreter Akteure greifbar werden, ohne daß man dabei einem methodologischen Individualismus das Wort reden müßte bzw. ohne die Abgrenzung gegen den Holismus und Organizismus durch die Annahme eines ebenso polemisch-normativ aufgeladenen Individualismus erkaufen zu müssen).

To the extent that the in itself amorphous and free-weaving (i.e. free, independent, unattached or autonomous) (free-spinning) political is through (by means (way) of) subjective bearers objectively particularised, therefore (as a result, consequently, thus) concretised(,) and becomes (turns into) politics of a certain direction (tendency or line (school) of thought) (trend), a particular type of action develops (unfolds) which, like every other action too, is borne (carried) by individuals, however simultaneously is undertaken with regard to (or in view of) society as a

whole(,) and by invoking (appealing (referring)) (with reference) (to) the good, namely the common good (or public (general) interest (welfare)) (In dem Maße, wie das an sich amorphe und freischwebende Politische durch subjektive Träger objektiv partikularisiert, somit konkretisiert und zur Politik bestimmter Richtung wird, entwickelt sich ein besonderer Typ von Handeln, der, wie jedes andere Handeln auch, von Einzelnen getragen, gleichzeitig aber im Hinblick auf die Gesellschaft als ganze und unter Berufung auf ihr Wohl, nämlich das Gemeinwohl, unternommen wird). The representatives (or exponents) (supporters, advocates, agents; Die Vertreter) of either this or that (one or the other) politics see, that is (therefore), the common good (public (or general) interest) from their subjective point of view and interpret it [the common good] in accordance with (the sense (for the purposes) of, according to [the spirit of]) their own power claims and goals (ends) (purposes) [in respect] of dominance (or domination) (rule, ruling over others) (im Sinne ihrer eigenen Machtansprüche und Herrschaftszwecke); – and anyone in any political system can in principle become [a] representative (or exponent) of either this or that politics (even if (when) (not) [it is not permissible to (for)] everyone (is (not) allowed (may (not) [(to) be such a representative [of any kind of politics], (to) do this (that, so)])) in every political regime), so that the political field of tension (stress, strain) (area of conflict) is also in this respect co-extensive with society. If (Were) the concept (notion) of the common good itself (is) not brought into play by (the) (in itself incapable of articulation and of acting) society in toto (von der (an sich artikulations- und handlungsunfähigen) Gesellschaft in toto), but by concrete subjects, then (so, thus) the interpretation of this concept must still be particularistic (sectional, factional) (so muß die Interpretation dieses Begriffs noch partikularistischer sein), no matter (irrespective of) whether it [this (such an) interpretation] is shared by

most, by many or by few (of society's) members (of society). The particularism and hence (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) of possible interpretations makes the struggle for (over, regarding, about) the bindedness of one amongst (of) them [such possible interpretations] unavoidable (inevitable). The common good (public (or general) interest) can therefore be striven for (after) (pursued, aimed at, sought) and realised always only in a binding interpretation, regardless of how the bindedness of the interpretation is arrived at (reached, attained, achieved, accomplished) and how long it [such a(n) (binding) interpretation (of the common good)] lasts (Der Partikularismus und daher die Vielfalt der möglichen Interpretationen macht den Kampf um die Verbindlichkeit einer unter ihnen unumgänglich. Das Gemeinwohl läßt sich also immer nur in einer verbindlichen Interpretation anstreben und verwirklichen, unabhängig davon, wie die Verbindlichkeit der Interpretation erreicht wird und wie lange sie dauert). The political "subsystem (or part(ial) system)" („Teilsystem“) is marked (i.e. characterised) (identified, distinguished) exactly by the fact that in it [the political "subsystem"] the claim for (in accordance with, according to, on, to, regarding) [the] binding interpretation of the common good must be raised (made); the rest of the "subsystems (or part systems)" do not raise (make) this claim by (of) themselves, and to the extent that they (do) raise it [such a claim] (to the extent e.g. that an economic organisation makes itself out to be *the* form of organisation (organisational form) of the whole of (entire) society (eine wirtschaftliche Organisation als *die* Organisationsform der ganzen Gesellschaft)), they [the rest of the "subsystems"] automatically enter, in the form of this or that (one or another) politics, the field of tension (stress, strain) (area of conflict) of the political, i.e. they touch upon the constitutive question (problem, issue) of (the) social cohesion and of (the) social order (betreten sie, in Form dieser oder jener Politik, automatisch

das Spannungsfeld des Politischen, d. h. sie schneiden die konstitutive Frage des sozialen Zusammenhalts und der sozialen Ordnung an).

The reverse (flip, other) side of the particularistic interpretation of the common good (or public (general) interest) is the obligatory character of the invocation (invoking) of (appeal(ing) (reference) to) it [the common good] itself (Die Kehrseite der partikularistischen Interpretation des Gemeinwohls ist der obligatorische Charakter der Berufung auf dasselbe). This invocation must of course be [an] ideological case (i.e. cover or wrapping) (shell, veil, sheath) and masking (dressing up or disguise), yet it does not in the least solely revolve around (or is not in the least totally absorbed (assimilated) by (taken up with, totally wrapped up in)) the ideological function (Diese Berufung muß freilich ideologische Hülle und Maskierung sein, doch geht sie keineswegs in der ideologischen Funktion auf). It [This invocation] implies an objective obligation (duty, commitment, responsibility), which results (emanates, derives, arises) from the necessary, and (be it) (although, albeit, even if) sometimes only superficial (shallow, cursory, facile, frivolous), taking root (rootedness, rooting) of every politics in the terrain (territory, ground, soil, land) of the social-ontologically understood political (der notwendigen, und sei es manchmal nur oberflächlichen Verwurzelung jeder Politik im Boden des sozialontologisch verstandenen Politischen). No politics, that is, no particularistic and at the same time – at least in accordance with (according to) the [its] claim – binding interpretation of the common good can last (continue or hold out) if (when) it does not, after a fashion (somehow or other, to a certain extent), ensure (guarantee) society's cohesion and order – which of course does not have to necessarily (unconditionally) mean the present (current) form of this cohesion and this order. The inevitable (unavoidable, inescapable)

binding of particularistic politics with the specific points of view (or aspects) (angles, factors, points) of the political (that is, the general points of view (or aspects) of cohesion and of order) simultaneously provides (procures, gets, gives, earns, gains, wins) (for) politics, especially (particularly) (the) (government(al)) politics (of government) (or policy) [the politics of government (or government policy)], [with] a bonus (an advantage or a benefit), i.e. politics has in principle the fact of society on its side, which through (by means of) an optical illusion of continuation (continuity) and stability seems to adhere to (follow, espouse) the present (current) political constitution (state [of affairs], polity). This ambiguity (ambiguousness, equivocation, equivocalness) and this tension (stress, strain) between the particularism of politics, which wants to be binding, and the particularisable generality (or universality) (commonality) of the political has characterised (marked) all societies until (up to (till)) now (so far), from the primeval (or primordial) (primitive) horde to modern mass democracy (Die unvermeidliche Verbindung der partikularistischen Politik mit den spezifischen Gesichtspunkten des Politischen (also den allgemeinen Gesichtspunkten des Zusammenhalts und der Ordnung) verschafft gleichzeitig der Politik, zumal der Regierungspolitik, einen Bonus, d. h. die Politik hat grundsätzlich das Faktum der Gesellschaft auf ihrer Seite, welches durch eine optische Täuschung von Fortdauer und Stabilität der gegenwärtigen politischen Verfassung anzuhängen scheint. Diese Zweideutigkeit und diese Spannung zwischen dem Partikularismus der Politik, der verbindlich sein will und der partikularisierbaren Allgemeinheit des Politischen hat alle bisherigen Gesellschaften gekennzeichnet, von der Urhorde bis zur modernen Massendemokratie). The (previously given) definition (given beforehand) of society can now be varied as follows: society is a collective [entity, formation, group, body] of humans (people, men), every one of whom can raise (make) the

[a] claim to bindingly define the common good (public (or general) interest)(,) so that the social-ontologically necessary rules of living together (i.e. co-existence) make up (constitute) the object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of a(n) incessant (unremitting, unrelenting, continual) (defining and interpret(at)ive) activity ([in respect] of definition and of interpretation), and consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) represent (or constitute) both [the] bearer(s) of social cohesion and of social order as well as [the] vehicle(s) for the attainment (achievement) of particularistic ends (goals) (purposes) (Gesellschaft ist ein Kollektiv von Menschen, deren jeder den Anspruch erheben kann, das Gemeinwohl verbindlich zu definieren, so daß die sozialontologisch notwendigen Regeln des Zusammenlebens den Gegenstand einer unablässigen Definitions- und Interpretationstätigkeit ausmachen und somit sowohl Träger des sozialen Zusammenhalts und der sozialen Ordnung als auch Vehikel zur Erreichung partikularistischer Zwecke darstellen).

If these theses hold true (are correct (right, true, accurate, the case, valid), apply), then no solution to (of) the problem of order can be valid (sound, conclusive, cogent), which is based (rests) on the identification (i.e. equating) of the institutional order (auf der Identifizierung der institutionellen Ordnung) with a conscience collective [collective conscience] in Durkheim's sense<sup>247</sup>. Because the conscience collective has just as little a (continued) existence (duration) as the notion (idea, representation, perception, view) of the common good (public (or general) interest (welfare)) without particularistic interpretations; its [the conscience collective's] collective character and its generality (universality, commonality) lie – just like the notion of the common good – merely in the fact that all interested sides (parties) simultaneously

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<sup>247</sup> Thus, Parsons, "Utilitarianism", p. 233.

invoke (appeal (refer) to) it [the conscience collective], i.e. its supposed (presumed, assumed, putative, alleged) ideals and commands (orders, requirements, necessities, rules, precepts), and make out their own interpretation of the same [conscience collective] to be generally in force ((universally) valid) and binding. From the fact that this invocation takes place (happens, occurs, ensues, follows, results, is carried out (effected)) under the (latent) pressure of the specific points of view (or aspects) (angles, factors, points) of the political and is consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) social-ontologically necessary, the objectivity of the conscience collective as [the, a] mainstay (or foundation) (basic pillar, cornerstone) of social order (die Objektivität der conscience collective als Grundsäule sozialer Ordnung) cannot at all be inferred (deduced): cohesion and order are already given with the concept (notion) of society (Zusammenhalt und Ordnung sind schon mit dem Begriff der Gesellschaft gegeben), and only the equating (identification; Gleichsetzung) of order in general, i.e. of order in its social-ontological dimension, with a stable institutional order lets the question of (in accordance with) the social order as such come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, be created) separately; because order in the former sense [i.e. order in general (or in its social-ontological dimension)] is compatible (consistent, conformable) and in (actual) fact (reality) (actually) interwoven (intertwined, interconnected) (vereinbar und faktisch verflochten) with (to) all kinds (sorts) of “disorders”, whereas (while) the latter [sense (of a stable institutional order)] is a merely historical phenomenon (ein bloß geschichtliches Phänomen ist), i.e. certain (particular) historical (pre)conditions (prerequisites, requirements) allow (permit), for shorter or longer (time) periods (of time), the stability of a certain (particular) institutional order – with [the collapse (or perishing) of] [when] this [certain institutional order] [collapses (or



perishes)], however, as its supporters (followers, adherents) as a rule assert (claim, maintain, contend, argue, allege), society does not collapse (or perish) (suffer destruction (or) ruin), go to pieces) too<sup>248</sup>. A definition of society as [the, a(n)] connection (affiliation, association, combination) of humans (people, men) by means of (through) common (shared, joint, mutual) goals (ends, purposes) (eine Definition der Gesellschaft als Verbindung der Menschen durch gemeinsame Zwecke) runs into analogous difficulties (problems)<sup>249</sup>. It [The said definition] makes out of goals(,) supra-individual hypostases similar to the conscience collective or the common good, and moreover it suggests [gives, creates] (the impression) [that] individuals have (had) concluded a lasting (permanent, enduring) contract with one another (Sie macht aus den Zwecken überindividuelle Hypostasen ähnlich der conscience collective oder dem Gemeinwohl, und zudem suggeriert sie den Eindruck, Individuen hätten miteinander einen dauerhaften Vertrag geschlossen). The crucial (key, pivotal, critical) point is not, in any case, the connection (affiliation, association, combination) [of humans through common goals], but the binding interpretation of the goals (ends, purposes) (die verbindliche Interpretation der Zwecke), since the connection can only take place (happen, occur) under the influence (sign) of the bindedness of the interpretation (Verbindlichkeit der Interpretation), which must though (certainly) invoke (refer to) the commonality (commonness, common ground, similarity, likeness, resemblance) of the goals (die Gemeinsamkeit der Zwecke) – but *not* for instance because there is the same [commonality of (the) goals] in fact (reality) (actually, really) and in terms of (as to) content (es dieselbe tatsächlich und inhaltlich gibt). Finally, our thesis of (regarding, about) the social-ontological dimension

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<sup>248</sup> See our comments (remarks, explanations, analyses) in relation to that in the previous section.

<sup>249</sup> Ihering, *Zweck*, I, p. 83ff.; II, p. 175ff..

of the political makes a just as familiar (common) as superficial (shallow, facile, frivolous) dualism, superfluous (redundant, unnecessary). The (constructed) contrast(ing) (conflict, opposition, antithesis) between a merely “symbiotic” society, in which every individual has his own meanings (and goals (ends, purposes)) on (in) (his) mind (head) which he wants to impose (force) (up)on other(s) (people, humans, men), and a society of consensus (consent, agreement) (und einer Gesellschaft des Konsenses), in which signs (indications, marks, signals, symbols) and meanings (or goals) are understood in common (or jointly) (together, collectively) and accordingly support (bear, carry, sustain) common (joint) action (in der Zeichen und Bedeutungen (oder Zwecke) gemeinsam verstanden werden und dementsprechend gemeinsames Handeln tragen)<sup>250</sup>, is meant. (There has never been) (N)either the one (n)or the other type of society (societal type; Gesellschaftstyp) (has ever been [existed]). What actually (really) happens (occurs, takes place) (and it happens not because of historical accidents (chance(s), coincidences), but on the basis (by virtue) of social-ontological given (actual) facts (or actualities)), is something else: meanings or concepts (notions) and ideas (notions or representations) (perceptions, conceptions, images) (or goals (ends, purposes)), which in principle and at (their) face (nominal) value are accepted by, in practice (practical terms), all of a society’s members (e.g. the common good (or public (general) interest (welfare))), become (turn into) the [a] battlefield of struggle (fighting) over (about, around, for, regarding) their binding interpretation, exactly because they [such meanings or concepts and ideas] are accepted in common (jointly, collectively)<sup>251</sup> – as the specific point of view (or aspect) of the political

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<sup>250</sup> Thus, Warriner, *Emergence*, p. 92ff..

<sup>251</sup> Why precisely the commonality of (the) premises and of (the) conceptual structure(.) (in [regard to]) (which) (is) (the) (thought of) (on) both sides (think, is thought (meant, imagined, conceived)), can aggravate (intensify, heighten, increase, exacerbate) (the) competition and (the) struggle, I have

commands (orders, requires, calls for, demands, instructs) (Was tatsächlich geschieht (und es geschieht nicht wegen geschichtlicher Zufälle, sondern aufgrund sozialontologischer Gegebenheiten), ist etwas anderes: Bedeutungen bzw. Begriffe und Vorstellungen (oder Zwecke), die grundsätzlich und in ihrem Nominalwert von praktisch allen Mitgliedern einer Gesellschaft akzeptiert werden (z. B. das Gemeinwohl), werden eben deswegen zum Schlachtfeld des Kampfes um ihre verbindliche Interpretation, weil sie gemeinsam akzeptiert werden – wie der spezifische Gesichtspunkt des Politischen es gebietet).

The third ontic aspect of the social is the anthropological [aspect]. It was mentioned that a social-ontologically oriented anthropology does not represent (constitute) anthropology per se (as such, absolutely, generally)(,) and that it must leave wide (broad) areas (fields, sectors) of the study of man to (the) general anthropology and to the disciplines working together (co-operating, collaborating) with this [general anthropology]. Its [A social-ontologically oriented anthropology's] own primary task (job, mission, assignment, duty) lies in making understandable (comprehensible, intelligible) (the manner (way) [in which]) (how) human nature interrelates (connects) with (the rest of) the [other two] ontic aspects of the social and in general with the openness and plasticity of the social-ontic field. It [A social-ontologically meant anthropology] deals (is) not with (about) content(s), but with (about) boundaries (limits) and forms (Ihre eigene primäre Aufgabe liegt darin, die Art und Weise verständlich zu machen, wie die menschliche Natur mit den übrigen ontischen Aspekten des Sozialen und überhaupt mit der Offenheit und der Plastizität des sozialontischen Feldes zusammenhängt).

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generally discussed (in detail) elsewhere (in another place) (Warum gerade die Gemeinsamkeit der Prämissen und der begrifflichen Struktur, in der beiderseits gedacht wird, die Konkurrenz und den Kampf verschärfen kann, habe ich an anderer Stelle allgemein erörtert), see *Macht und Entscheidung* [Power and Decision], esp. p. 67ff..

Sie handelt nicht von Inhalten, sondern von Grenzen und Formen). As we want to show (demonstrate) in the next chapter, the boundaries (limits; Grenzen) or the extremes (i.e. extremities, limits, ends or opposites) (Extreme), inside of which the spectrum of the social relation extends (stretches, spans), are marked by anthropological given (actual) facts (or actualities), and indeed, on the one hand by (the) inseparable ((entirely, totally) indispensable (integral), not to be (“)thought away(”) (i.e. disregarded)) sociality (durch die nicht wegzudenkende Sozialität), on the other hand, by (the) likewise (also, at the same time) inseparable mortality – and that means not least (of all): [the] possibility of (the) killing (homicide) [dying] [being killed] (Tötungsmöglichkeit) – of man. The social-ontological investigation (or study) (examination, analysis) of culture as [the, a] constitutive component of human nature also refers (points) to anthropologically determined (conditioned) and apprehensible (graspable, comprehensible, understandable, ascertainable) boundaries (limits) ((Auf anthropologisch bedingte und erfaßbare Grenzen verweist auch die sozialontologische Untersuchung der Kultur als konstitutiver Komponente menschlicher Natur) (see below). During research into (or the investigation (exploration) of) the social relation the question is invariably (without fail, inevitably, undoubtedly) posed: to what extent and in which way (manner, fashion) is that which is acted out (or happens) (takes place) connected with the quality (characteristic or property) (trait, attribute, feature) of the actors being (to be) [as, who are] humans (Inwiefern und auf welche Weise verbindet sich das, was sich hier abspielt, mit der Eigenschaft der Akteure, Menschen zu sein)? The mechanism of the social relation, just as its [the social relation’s] spectrum, concerns (is of concern to (affected by)) this question. Because the various (different, dissimilar) places (or points) (positions, spots) inside of (within) the spectrum are not permanently occupied (taken,

filled) by the same human individuals, who by virtue (on the strength) of their particular individual constitution (composition or texture, nature or character) are able (can) and want to exclusively (solely) identify with this and no other place (or point) (Denn die verschiedenen Stellen innerhalb des Spektrums werden nicht permanent von denselben menschlichen Individuen besetzt, die sich kraft ihrer besonderen individuellen Beschaffenheit ausschließlich mit dieser und keiner anderen Stelle identifizieren können und wollen). On the contrary: the same humans (people, men) (are) constantly (continuously, continually) move (moving) inside of (within) the spectrum of the social relation and (are) alternately (by turns, turn and turn about) occupy (fill, take) (occupying) various (different) places (or points) in it [the (said) spectrum of the social relation], while they are driven ((by) being driven) by the dynamic(s) of the mechanism of the aforementioned ((above-)mentioned) relation (Im Gegenteil: Dieselben Menschen bewegen sich ständig innerhalb des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung und besetzen abwechselnd verschiedene Stellen in ihm, indem sie von der Dynamik des Mechanismus der genannten Beziehung getrieben werden). During this movement and in closest contact with this mechanism, all [things] (everything), in which we, with good reason, recognise [as] specifically human (worin wir mit gutem Grund spezifisch Menschliches wiedererkennen), is (are) shaped (moulded or formed) and refined. (It (i.e. the said movement in the social relation's spectrum driven by the dynamics of the social relation's mechanism) forms (shapes, moulds, fashions, makes up, constitutes, establishes, sets up, constructs) and satisfies (at least partially and temporarily (provisionally, for the time being, tentatively)) the need for meaning-like (meaning-bearing, meaningful or purposeful) identity, which under (in) the conditions (circumstances, prerequisites) of culture fuses (merges or blends) with the

elementary drive (urge, impulse, instinct) of (for) self-preservation or even takes (steps into) its [the elementary drive of self-preservation's] place (self-sacrifice as [the, a] command (order, precept, requirement, necessity, rule) of identity) (is formed and satisfied (at least partially and temporarily)) (Es bildet und befriedigt sich (wenigstens partiell und vorläufig) das Bedürfnis nach sinnhafter Identität, das unter den Bedingungen der Kultur mit dem elementaren Selbsterhaltungstrieb verschmilzt oder sogar an seine Stelle tritt (Selbstaufopferung als Identitätsgebot); (it forms and satisfies (at least partially and temporarily)) the(,) ((being) (based) (established, grounded, founded) (founding, establishing, grounding)) in the need for identity ((being) based)(,) need for power(,) in an inestimable (incalculable) (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) of gradations (gradings), nuances (shades) and external (outer) manifestations(, based in the need for identity)(, is formed and satisfied (at least partially and temporarily)) (es bildet und befriedigt sich (wenigstens partiell und vorläufig) das im Bedürfnis nach Identität gründende Bedürfnis nach Macht in einer unübersehbaren Vielfalt von Abstufungen, Nuancen und äußeren Manifestationen); (it develops and expands (spreads)) [an] "intellect(mind)(-spirit)" on the basis of understanding, rationality and language (speech), which constitute the social relation's mechanism, as well as against the background (backdrop) of the formation of meaning-like (meaning-bearing, meaningful or purposeful) identity and of specific forms of striving for (after) power (power striving) (is developed and branches (spreads) out (expands)) (es entfaltet und verzweigt sich „Geist“ auf der Grundlage von Verstehen, Rationalität und Sprache, die den Mechanismus sozialer Beziehung konstituieren, sowie vor dem Hintergrund sinnhafter Identitätsbildung und spezifischer Formen des Machtstrebens); finally, identity, power and intellect(-spirit) – in [with]

certain shapings (or expressions) (mouldings, markednesses, characteristics) and intensities – seek (search (look) for) and find their channelings (canalisations) in the stream (or river) beds of the political, which is crystallised in this or that concrete politics, that is, [which] wants and has to bindingly define [the] cohesion and order of society (schließlich suchen und finden Identität, Macht und Geist – in bestimmten Ausprägungen und Intensitäten – ihre Kanalisierung ins Strombett des Politischen, das sich in dieser oder jener konkreten Politik kristallisieren, also Zusammenhalt und Ordnung der Gesellschaft verbindlich definieren will und muß)<sup>252</sup>. Consequently, the anthropological, the political and the social relation go into (i.e. interweave or intertwine with) one another, and in this [aspect, dimension, element] ((of) their) unity (unit, entity) (of theirs) (they) represent (constitute) the being (Is) of society as [the] (social ontology's) object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) (of social ontology) (Das Anthropologische, das Politische und die soziale Beziehung gehen somit ineinander, und in dieser ihrer Einheit stellen sie das Sein der Gesellschaft als Gegenstand der Sozialontologie dar).

We (have) already used the expression (phrase, term) [the] “nature of man (human nature)”. It [This expression, The “nature of man”] is equally burdened (loaded, charged) by (with) the anthropology of Reason and the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) (instincts) (reason and drive (urge, impulse, instinct) anthropology), of course for (on) opposing (conflicting, contrary, contrasting) reasons (grounds) (Wir verwendeten bereits den Ausdruck „Natur des Menschen“. Er ist gleichermaßen durch die Vernunft- und die Triebanthropologie belastet, freilich aus

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<sup>252</sup> A concise (terse, brief) basic (fundamental, elementary) orientation about (regarding, on, over) the concepts (or terms) (notions) “identity”, “power” and “intellect(mind)(-spirit)” is found in Kondylis, loc. cit..

entgegengesetzten Gründen). The anthropology of Reason was little (not much, [only] slightly) interested in the actual (real) interweavings (intertwinings, interconnections, integrations) of the anthropological factor with (the) social and historical becoming (Die Vernunftanthropologie war wenig an den tatsächlichen Verflechtungen des anthropologischen Faktors mit dem sozialen und geschichtlichen Werden interessiert), rather it [the anthropology of Reason] endeavoured (tried (hard), made an effort, went to a lot of trouble) [to achieve (get, attain, obtain)] (sought, strove for) the formulation of a concept (notion) of autonomy, on the basis (with the help) of which the direction of this becoming could be diverted (redirected) in the [a] normatively desired (desirable) direction. Wanting to deduce (derive, infer) (the) human history until (up to) now from the essence (nature, being, substance) and the commands (requirements, necessities, orders) of normative R(r)eason, would in fact, at any rate (in any case, anyway), (have) be(en) a(n) thankless (ungrateful, unthankful) – and humourless – venture (undertaking). On the other hand (However), the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) (drive anthropology) believed it could (would be able to) make (achieve, perform, accomplish, do) a deduction (derivation) of the historical from (out of) the human (eine Ableitung des Geschichtlichen aus Menschlichem), by reducing (putting down, tracing back) (while it reduced(s), attributed(s)) that which is commonly (generally) perceived (felt) as (to be) (taken for) [the] irrationality (Irrationalität) of human history, to the incurable irrationality of the life of the drive (urge or impulse) (i.e. impulsive (impetuous, instinctual) life) (die unheilbare Irrationalität des Trieblebens). In the course of this (process), it [the anthropology of drives] typically proceeds (acts) (proceeded) as follows: the psychical or biopsychic was divided (split) (up) into separate drives (urges or impulses)(,) and every one of these



drives was declared (announced, proclaimed, explained) to be (as) the motor (i.e. engine or driving force) or the source of a certain (particular) kind (sort, way) or group of social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) and institutions, through (by (means of)) whose summation society was then constructed as [a] whole (Dabei ist sie typischerweise wie folgt verfahren: Das Psychische bzw. Biopsychische wurde in separate Triebe eingeteilt und jeder dieser Triebe zum Motor oder zur Quelle einer bestimmten Art oder Gruppe von sozialen Erscheinungen und Institutionen erklärt, durch deren Summierung dann die Gesellschaft als ganze konstruiert wurde)<sup>253[ix]</sup>. A social ontology, which wants to save (rescue, salvage) (the) historical and social phenomena (or manifestations), that is, keep the door(s) open for history and sociology, can begin (start) just as little with this anthropology of drives as with the anthropology of Reason. It [Such a social ontology] cannot devise (design or sketch) (plan, outline) the image (picture) of social being (Is) on the basis of a(n), in terms of content, established (ready-made, settled, fixed, set) image (picture, view) of man (human image, image of Man (humans, men, people)), but it should (ought to, must), conversely (contrariwise, on the contrary), bring its image of man into line (agreement) with the elementary fact of the openness and of the plasticity of the social-ontic field. The social-ontologically oriented anthropologist should, in other words, as wrong (amiss, upside down) as this may (also) appear to be, not take “man”, but the immeasurable (immense, vast) (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) of historical and social phenomena as his starting point, and reach (get (come) to, attain) his image of man as the end point of his investigation (examination, inquiry, study, analysis), after

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<sup>253</sup> The most important (significant) versions of the anthropology of Reason and the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) will occupy (engage, keep) us (busy) in the 3<sup>rd</sup> (third) volume of this work.

answering (he has answered (responded (replied) to)) the question: how must man (humans, people) be constituted (or composed) as [a] being (or creature) of the genus (or species) (i.e. human being) so that his being (Is) is consistent (compatible) (goes) with, obviously (evidently, apparently) unconstrainedly (uninhibitedly, without compulsion, freely), this (immeasurable, great) variety (of form) (Eine Sozialontologie, die die geschichtlichen und sozialen Erscheinungen retten, also die Türen zur Historie und Soziologie offenhalten will, kann mit dieser Trieb- ebensowenig wie mit der Vernunftanthropologie etwas anfangen. Sie kann nicht auf der Basis eines inhaltlich feststehenden Menschenbildes ihr Bild vom sozialen Sein entwerfen, sondern sie soll umgekehrt ihr Menschenbild in Übereinstimmung mit dem elementaren Faktum der Offenheit und der Plastizität des sozialontischen Feldes bringen. Der sozialontologisch orientierte Anthropologe soll m. a. W., so verkehrt dies auch erscheinen mag, nicht „den Menschen“, sondern die unermessliche Vielfalt der geschichtlichen und sozialen Phänomene zu seinem Ausgangspunkt nehmen und zu seinem Menschenbild als dem Endpunkt seiner Untersuchung gelangen, nachdem er die Frage beantwortet hat: Wie muß der Mensch als Gattungswesen beschaffen sein, damit sich sein Sein, offenbar zwanglos, mit dieser Vielfalt verträgt)? Before such a question, the premises of every anthropology of Reason or anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) fail (break down, give out, fail to function, malfunction). Reason and drives (urges or impulses) (instincts) as separate(d) (isolated, segregated) parts of the soul (i.e. psyche) (mental (emotional) state, state of mind, spirit, heart) (Seelenteile) or [(as) the (a)] capacity (capacities) (power(s), faculty (faculties), property (properties), means; Vermögen) with, on each and every respective occasion, its (their) own objects as fixed points (or points of reference), must dissolve (disintegrate, disperse, disappear, break up, be broken up)(,) in order to

make room (or way) for a(n) unlimited (in(de)finite, boundless) and unlimitable (illimitable), plastic and at the same time unified (united or uniform) (standardised) biopsychic energy, which is capable of the most astonishing (amazing, astounding, remarkable) transformations (changes, metamorphoses, transmutations), gradations (gradings) and fixings (i.e. settings) (specifications, fixations), that is, [it, such biopsychic energy] coincides with the openness and flexibility of the social-ontic field in its entirety (totality) – to say absolutely nothing of (not to mention (at all)) its purely personal formations (developments, elaborations, arrangements, configurations), which lie (are) beyond (on the other side of) social-ontological apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) (eine unbegrenzte und unbegrenzbare, plastische und zugleich einheitliche biopsychische Energie, die der erstaunlichsten Verwandlungen, Abstufungen und Fixierungen fähig ist, sich also mit der Offenheit und Flexibilität des sozialontischen Feldes in seiner Gesamtheit deckt – von ihren rein persönlichen Ausgestaltungen ganz zu schweigen, die jenseits sozialontologischer Erfassung liegen). (The) (Bidding) farewell (Saying goodbye) to (Parting (Turning away) from) [a(n)] thoughtless (rash, impulsive, unadvised) anthropological substantialism (Der Abschied vom unbesonnenen anthropologischen Substanzialismus) may (should) not (is not allowed to), though (certainly, mind you, admittedly), be bought (off) (obtained, secured, purchased, redeemed) with a thoughtless lapsing (declining) into pure functionalism (mit einem unbesonnenen Verfallen in den puren Funktionalismus), which indeed somehow functionally (inter)connects (combines, joins, links) all [things] (everything) with all [things] (everything), but cannot report (tell, relate, say) much about (regarding, of) the specific quality of the level (up)on which functions develop (unfold) on each and every respective occasion, and about the specific boundaries (or limits) or constraints (compulsions) (coercions,

necessities; Zwängen) of this level (here: of the human [level]). In the anthropological field (area or domain) (sector, realm), like in other(s) [fields] too, functionalism represents (constitutes) that abstract quantitative metaphysics, which has replaced the concrete qualitative metaphysics of substantialism (Auf anthropologischem Gebiet, wie auf anderen auch, stellt Funktionalismus jene abstrakte quantitative Metaphysik dar, die die konkrete qualitative Metaphysik des Substanzialismus abgelöst hat). Social-ontologically oriented anthropology does (must, ought) not (have to) decide between both [functionalism and substantialism] (the two), the [an] alternative [choice] [a choice between the two options] is not compelling (necessary). The best advice (guide, adviser, counselor) is also here, as banal as this may sound, the in the widest (broadest) sense historically learned (educated or cultured) (cultivated, refined, well-read, well-informed) and historically tested (proved, scrutinised, looked into, examined, verified) judgement (das im weitesten Sinne historisch gebildete and historisch geprüfte Urteil) [that] “humani nihil alienum” [“nothing (of (a)) human [thing(s)] is alien (foreign, strange)”]<sup>254</sup>. Man becomes (turns into), for us, [a] familiar being (creature, entity) not in [regard to] his stable substance, but in his endless (infinite) metamorphoses (Der Mensch wird uns nicht in seiner stabilen Substanz, sondern in seinen unendlichen Metamorphosen zum vertrauten Wesen). Only (then) when one has said with Montaigne [that] one can imagine a thousand contrasting (opposing, conflicting, different, opposed, antithetical, contrary) ways (manners) of life (sich tausend gegensätzliche Lebensweisen vorstellen)<sup>255</sup>, may (should) (is) one also (allowed to)(,) with the same self-evidence (naturalness) as

<sup>254</sup> “Humani nihil a me alienum puto” [“I consider (reckon, believe, think, suppose, estimate) nothing human, alien (foreign, strange) to me”], Terentius, *Heautontimorumenos*, 1, 1, 25.

<sup>255</sup> «Crois et conçois mille contraires façons de vie» [“I believe and conceive one thousand contrary fashions (i.e. ways (manners, modes)) of life”], *Essais*, I, 1, ch. XXXVII = I, 259.

Democritus(,) opine (believe, say, think, mean): man is that which we all know<sup>256</sup>.

From the double (dual, twin) perspective of the openness or plasticity (malleability) and of the boundaries (limits) or constraints (compulsions) (coercions, necessities) of the [what is] human [element, dimension, sphere], the relation(ship) between nature and culture must be examined (or illuminated) social-ontologically. The in itself correct (right) perception (view) [that] the nature of man (i.e. human nature) is culture, cannot mean, as one often likes to assume (suppose, presume), that man can free (remove, detach, cut) himself (loose) (break away) from the determinations (conditionings, fixings, determinings, settings, purposes, definitions, classifications) of nature (natural determinations), and be formed (shaped, moulded) as one sees fit (at one's own discretion (will)), or that his existence on earth can be freely planned in accordance with exclusively cultural yardsticks (or criteria) (benchmarks, measures, standards) (In den doppelten Perspektive der Offenheit oder Plastizität und der Grenzen oder Zwänge des Menschlichen muß sozialontologisch die Beziehung zwischen Natur und Kultur beleuchtet werden. Die an sich richtige Auffassung, des Menschen Natur sei die Kultur, kann nicht heißen, wie man oft zu unterstellen beliebt, daß sich der Mensch von den Naturbestimmungen loslösen und sich nach Gutdünken bilden oder seine Existenz auf Erden nach ausschließlich kulturellen Maßstäben frei planen kann). Such assumptions (suppositions, presumptions, acceptances) and expectations tacitly (implicitly, silently) feed (draw, live) on (off) an untenable contradistinction (contrasting) between the blind necessity of the determinations of nature and of freedom in culture (Solche Annahmen

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<sup>256</sup> «ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴδμεν» [“man is what everybody (all people) know(s)”], Diels-Kranz, 68 [55], fragment 165 = II, 178.

oder Erwartungen zehren stillschweigend von einer unhaltbaren Gegenüberstellung zwischen der blinden Notwendigkeit der Naturbestimmungen und der Freiheit in der Kultur), while at the same time (in relation to which) freedom again (in turn) is erroneously (mistakenly) confused with the actual (real) openness and plasticity (malleability) of culture or is deduced (derived, inferred) from this [openness and plasticity of culture]. However, those are two entirely (completely, quite) different (dissimilar) things. The openness and plasticity (malleability) of culture, which is seen (shows itself) in the parallel existence or in the succession of several (a number of, multiple) cultures, does not exist beyond (on the other side of) the causal determinations (fixings, definitions, determinings) in nature and history, and it would be simply absurd to interpret them [the said openness and plasticity of culture] as [the] overcoming of the same [(said) causal determinations in nature and history] (Die Offenheit und Plastizität der Kultur, die sich an der parallelen Existenz oder an der Aufeinanderfolge mehrerer Kulturen zeigt, besteht nicht jenseits der Kausalbestimmungen in Natur und Geschichte, und es wäre einfach absurd, sie als Überwindung derselben zu deuten). No less absurd would it be to want to ethically-normatively comprehend (understand, grasp, perceive, interpret) the freedom allegedly (supposedly) gifted (given (granted) as a present, bestowed) to man by culture. Because all [things] (everything) which one usually (normally, conventionally) refers to (mentions, apostrophises) as “inhuman(e)” and as [the] effect (impact, result, consequence, influence) of “blind” or “animal (bestial) (brutish, brutal, brute) nature”, was (has been) accomplished (achieved, performed, carried out) in history until (up to) now inside of (within) culture (innerhalb der Kultur) and with the means of culture (cultural means) (und mit den Mitteln der Kultur); concentration camps are e.g. [the] pure work(s) (deed, act) of culture

(reines Werk der Kultur), i.e. something for which there is absolutely no example in nature. Culture can only be a normatively loaded (or charged) (laden) concept (notion, term) in the language of ethics, not in that of social ontology (Kultur kann nur in der Sprache der Ethik ein normativ geladener Begriff sein, nicht in jener der Sozialontologie). It [Culture] might (could) have logically and objectively (factually) been interpreted (explained, displayed, laid out) only (then) as [a] (piece of) evidence (proof, instance) for (of) man's ethical and ontic freedom if (when) (already) his coming into being (genesis, emergence, origin, creation, formation process, production; Entstehung) was (already) due (traced, reduced) (went) (back) to (stemmed from) a free decision (resolution) (einen freien Entschluß) of man, that is, if man at (in) the beginning (start) of his history stood like (the same as, similar to) [a] mythical Hercules before a crossroads (crossing, intersection, fork in the road), and after mature (ripe) deliberation (consideration, thought, reflection)(,) had left aside (to one side) other possibilities in order to take (enter (embark) (up)on) the path of culture. However, he [man] did not have (had no) other possibilities apart from (except for) that of the downfall (i.e. extinction) (decline, destruction, ruin, doom) of the species (außer der des Untergangs der Spezies). The proposition (sentence, theorem, clause) [that] the nature of man (man's nature, human nature) is culture, actually (really) means (says) that man, under the pressure of (his) nature(,) had to become (turn into) the [a] being (creature) of culture (cultural being)(,) and that the voice of (his) nature is therefore to continue to be heard in all its tones (notes, shades, sounds) and nuances (shades, tinges) in culture; he [man] is just as little free to selectively treat (or deal with) (handle, attend to) culture as he was in primeval times free to stand still (stay, be left behind) in (a) nature before culture, or as he is now(adays) free to undo (unmake, call off, cancel, reverse, rescind, annul, go back on)

culture (Der Satz, des Menschen Natur sei die Kultur, besagt eigentlich, daß der Mensch unter dem Druck der (seiner) Natur zum Kulturwesen werden mußte und daß die Stimme der (seiner) Natur daher in allen ihren Tönen und Nuancen in der Kultur weiter zu hören ist; die Kultur selektiv zu behandeln steht ihm ebensowenig frei wie es ihm vor Urzeiten freistand, bei einer Natur vor der Kultur stehenzubleiben, oder wie es ihm jetzt freisteht, die Kultur rückgängig zu machen). (According to that,) The culture of man is (therefore) just as much nature as his [man's] nature is culture (Die Kultur des Menschen ist demnach ebenso Natur wie seine Natur Kultur ist). And this fact must, social-ontologically, be meant (or thought of) together (jointly, collectively) with the fact of society, which is equally old and original (initial) as man (humans, people) and culture, in (actual) fact (actually, really) [it (the fact of society)] illustrates (shows, demonstrates, exemplifies) nothing other (different, else) than the inseparability of man and culture (Und dieses Faktum muß sozialontologisch mit dem Faktum der Gesellschaft zusammengedacht werden, das gleich alt und ursprünglich wie der Mensch und die Kultur ist, ja eigentlich nichts anderes als die Unzertrennlichkeit von Mensch und Kultur veranschaulicht). Via (Through) the social relation and via (through) the political [there is mediation] [the relation(ship)] between man and culture [mediation takes place] [is mediated] (Man and culture are mediated via the social relation and via the political) [[That which (What) is (The nexus (relationship))] between man and culture is mediated via the social relation and via the political],(;) [and] thereby (through (because of) that, in this way) man develops (unfolds) as [a] being (creature) of culture (cultural being) and puts (enables) himself (in a position) to not only historicise his own, but also external (outer) nature. The becoming (or series (chain, course) of events) in external nature indeed does not change (alter, vary) in its law bindedness (determinism or



law-based necessity), but its [the becoming in external nature's] effects (or consequences) (impacts, influences) on [with regard to] the human collective [entity, group, body] depend from now (this time) on (henceforth) on the culture of the [this] same [human collective] (Über die soziale Beziehung und über das Politische wird zwischen Mensch und Kultur vermittelt, der Mensch entfaltet sich dadurch als Kulturwesen und setzt sich instand, nicht nur die eigene, sondern auch die äußere Natur zu historisieren. Das Geschehen in der äußeren Natur ändert sich zwar in seiner Gesetzmäßigkeit nicht, seine Wirkungen auf das menschliche Kollektiv hängen aber fortan von der Kultur desselben ab). Still further (Moreover (Furthermore, Further still): the structure of (the) social cohesion and of (the) social conditions (or circumstances) is not least (of all) determined (conditioned) by each and every respective outcome (result, end(ing), upshot) of the struggle of the human genus (i.e. race) (species) (genus of man (men), (hu)mankind) against external nature (Mehr noch: Die Struktur des sozialen Zusammenhalts und der sozialen Verhältnisse wird nicht zuletzt durch den jeweiligen Ausgang des Kampfes der Menschengattung gegen die äußere Natur bedingt). This great truth, which we owe to (have) Marx (to thank for), was (has) never (been) so topical (current, timely, up to date, relevant) as today, when (where) the (at least potential) overcoming (exceeding, getting over) of the age-old (very old, [going] very far back, since long ago, ancient) shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods (wo die (wenigstens potentielle) Überwindung der unvordenklichen Güterknappheit) through (by means (way) of) rapid ((very) fast) technical (i.e. technological) progress [advances, improvements] set in motion historically unprecedented (unheard of, unequal(l)ed, unparalleled, without parallel, matchless, peerless, outrageous) changes (or transformations) of a planetary extent (scale, magnitude, size, dimension, vastness, degree) (durch den rasanten

technischen Fortschritt geschichtlich beispiellose Wandlungen planetarischen Ausmaßes in Gang setzte). However, precisely these changes (and transformations) allow [us, one], on the other hand, to recognise (discern, see, know, identify) with growing (increasing) clarity (clearness, distinctness) the embedding of culture in nature (die Einbettung der Kultur in der Natur erkennen).

[Just] as (like) the social-ontological analysis of the social relation and of the political, so too social-ontologically oriented anthropology names (mentions) only [the] necessary, not the sufficient conditions of concrete human acts (or actions) (Wie die sozialontologische Analyse der sozialen Beziehung und des Politischen, so nennt auch sozialontologisch orientierte Anthropologie nur notwendige, nicht die zureichenden Bedingungen konkreter menschlicher Handlungen). It [Social-ontologically oriented anthropology] names possibilities(,) which it has inventoried (or itemised) (taken (an) inventory (stock) (of), listed, catalogued, recorded) through (by means of) (the) investigation (exploration, research(ing), ascertaining) of historical and sociological of realities. In no case may (can, is) it (allowed) deduce prognoses about (regarding) cultural content(s) or historical-sociological facts from general (even apt (appropriate, well-targeted(judged, chosen), striking, pointed)) statements (propositions, pronouncements, assertions, opinions) about (on, regarding) man's nature (the nature of man) (Sie nennt Möglichkeiten, die sie durch die historische und soziologische Erforschung von Wirklichkeiten inventarisiert hat. In keinem Fall darf sie aus allgemeinen (auch treffenden) Aussagen über die Natur des Menschen Prognosen über kulturelle Inhalte oder historisch-soziologische Fakten deduzieren). The possibility of such deductions would imply that one could run (or pass) (go, rush) through the anthropological sector (or

area) (realm, field, domain) before one had (would have) entered (stepped (walked) into (onto), set foot on) the sector (area or realm) of those contents and facts. However, the anthropological factor exists not *before* every society, but *in (inside)* every society; *this* [fact, reality, truth] makes up (constitutes) its [the anthropological factor's] ubiquity (Der anthropologische Faktor existiert aber nicht *vor* jeder Gesellschaft, sondern *in* jeder Gesellschaft; *dies* macht seine Ubiquität aus).

Furthermore (Moreover, Besides, In addition), anthropologically founded (established, justified, substantiated, proven, valid) prognoses (or explanations (declarations, statements)) of content(s) or facts would have to, sooner or later, accept (adopt, assume, take on, embrace) separate and even opposed (or conflicting) (opposing, contrasting, opposite) drives (urges or impulses) (instincts) as causes of the same [prognoses (or explanations) of content(s) or facts] (thereof) (separate und sogar entgegengesetzte Triebe als Ursachen derselben), since content(s) and facts likewise differ from one another and often (re)act (behave) contrarily (contrastingly, conflictingly, antithetically) towards (vis-à-vis, in relation to) one another. The ethical-normative classification of these drives (urges or impulses) would, finally, be unavoidable (inevitable) in order to be able to account for the contrary ((totally, completely) opposed (opposite), opposing, antithetical) extremes (i.e. extremities, limits, ends or opposites) of the social relation (die konträren Extreme der sozialen Beziehung); one would have to also say: the “good (guten)” or “social (sozialen)” impulses (Impulse) drive (push, propel, impel, force) man to(wards) friendship (amity) and concord (harmony, peace, unity) (Freundschaft und Eintracht), the “bad (wicked and evil) (bösen)” or “asocial (anti(-)social; asozialen)” to(wards) enmity (hostility) and war (Feindschaft und Krieg). This – common (familiar, prevalent) – anthropological explanation of the historically witnessed (or attested (to))

(vouched for, corroborated, confirmed) spectrum of the social relation (anthropologische Erklärung des geschichtlich bezeugten Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung) stands on exceedingly (extremely, most, very) shaky ground (weak feet). Neither does man wage (conduct) war because he is bad (wicked or evil), nor – and this (that) must perhaps be said still (even) more emphatically (forcibly, insistently, explicitly, firmly) – does he enter into (form, contract, conclude, make) friendships and does he live in society as a result (because) of (due to) his natural goodness (kind(li)ness, benevolence, generosity, quality) (infolge seiner natürlichen Güte). Thucydides's reference to man's nature always staying the same (the constant (steady, unvarying, invariable, stable) nature of man) for the explanation of (in order to explain) the atrocities (acts of cruelty, cruelties, barbarities, savagery, savageries) (Thukydides' Verweis auf die gleichbleibende Natur des Menschen zur Erklärung der Grausamkeiten) in (of) the Peloponnesian War(,) anthropologically and social-ontologically results in (i.e. has) (yields, amounts (comes) to, reveals) meaning only (then) when (if) with that [reference] ([what is] meant is [that]) the openness and plasticity of human nature (der menschlichen Natur) is so (to such an extent, in such a way) unlimited (in(de)finite, boundless) and unlimitable (illimitable) that the attempt to reduce it [the said openness and plasticity of human nature] to its "good" half is from the beginning (outset, start) doomed to fail(ure)(, is meant); the great historian then continues (proceeds, goes on) also (too, as well) in this sense (spirit) (with this in mind)(,) and (inter)relates (connects, establishes a connection (link) between) the vicissitudes (ups and downs, transformations, changes, transitions) of events (occurrences, incidents) (die Wechselfälle der Ereignisse), i.e. the transition from peace to war and vice versa (back again, the other way around, conversely, inversely, the reverse), with, on each and every respective occasion, different

(other) manifestations (external appearances, forms of appearance; Erscheinungsformen) of human nature (der menschlichen Natur)<sup>257</sup>. The same reservations (provisos, qualifications, caveats) apply (are valid) vis-à-vis anthropologically founded (established, justified, substantiated, proven, valid) explanations of human behaviour (menschlichen Verhaltens) like, for instance, those which we often encounter (meet) in French moral(istic) (ethical) philosophy (or literature) (in der französischen Moralistik). La Rochefoucauld may be absolutely right when he sees (beholds, perceives) in personal interest (im persönlichen Interesse), which he(,) incidentally (by the way)(,) by no means comprehends (understands, grasps, perceives, interprets) merely (only) materially (das er übrigens keineswegs bloß materiell auffaßt), the motive of all possible virtues (goodness, morality, grace(s)) and vices (badness, immorality) (das Motiv aller möglichen Tugenden und Laster)<sup>258</sup>. However, the uniformity of the motive makes the task (job, duty, assignment, mission) of explaining the qualitative differences in the (great) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity) (multiplicity, plurality) of (the) actual act(ion)s only all the more pressing (urgent, imperative, compelling). And the task can no longer be dealt (coped) with (managed) inside of (within) anthropology, however much the validity (soundness or conclusiveness) (reliability, tenability, tenableness) of (the) anthropological guidelines (directions, instructions, directives) may, into the bargain (at the same time, in the course of this (process)), be helpful (useful). In comparison with (Compared to) the common (familiar, prevalent) versions of general and empirical anthropology, the [a] social-ontologically oriented [one, anthropology] has (possesses, holds), in this

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<sup>257</sup> III, 82, 2.

<sup>258</sup> *Maximes*, Nr. 253 (éd. 1678): «L'intérêt met en œuvre toutes sortes de vertus et de vices» ["Interest implements (or actuates (mobilises, drives, impels, applies)) all sorts of virtues and vices"].

regard (regarding (concerning) this), a(n) considerable (significant, important, substantial) advantage: it [the (a) social-ontologically oriented anthropology] ab ovo (from the very beginning) thinks of (about) (the) anthropological coefficients together with the other social-ontic aspects, i.e. together with the social relation and the political (Aber die Gleichförmigkeit des Motivs macht die Aufgabe, die qualitativen Unterschiede in der Vielfalt der tatsächlichen Handlungen zu erklären, nur um so dringender. Und die Aufgabe läßt sich nicht mehr innerhalb der Anthropologie bewältigen, so sehr auch die Stichhaltigkeit der anthropologischen Richtlinien dabei hilfreich sein mag. Im Vergleich zu den geläufigen Versionen der allgemeinen und der empirischen Anthropologie besitzt die sozialontologisch orientierte diesbezüglich einen erheblichen Vorzug: Sie denkt ab ovo die anthropologischen Koeffizienten mit den anderen sozialontischen Aspekten, d. h. mit der sozialen Beziehung und dem Politischen zusammen). Consequently, the theoretical triptych of social ontology analytically reaches (comes (gets) to) the threshold of historical, sociological and also (even) psychological explanation(,) and gives this [(kind of) (historical, sociological and psychological) explanation] valuable (worthy, worthwhile) hints (or tips)(,) without wanting to curtail (restrict, cut back, trim, pare down, prune) their [these kinds of explanations'] competencies (authority, responsibilities) (Das theoretische Triptychon der Sozialontologie gelangt somit analytisch bis zur Schwelle der historischen, soziologischen und auch psychologischen Erklärung und gibt dieser wertvolle Winke, ohne ihre Kompetenzen beschneiden zu wollen). Indeed (In fact (reality), Actually): the best general theory is that which, on the basis of its own conceptual premises, gives (or leaves) (the) precedence (priority, right of way) in [respect of (relation to)] [regarding] empirical research to the individual (or separate) (single, isolated) [explanations, disciplines, areas,

fields]. The criterion [in respect] of (for) falsification (falsification criterion) for our own general theory results (arises, emanates, is derived), e contrario (i.e. (as an argument) from a contrary position), from (out of) this fundamental principle (In der Tat: Die beste allgemeine Theorie ist jene, die auf Grund ihrer eigenen begrifflichen Prämissen empirischer Forschung im einzelnen den Vortritt überläßt. Aus diesem Grundsatz ergibt sich e contrario das Falsifikationskriterium für unsere eigene allgemeine Theorie). This [Our own general theory] cannot, as it were (so to speak), be refuted (proved wrong, confuted, rebutted, disproved, falsified) from the outside by another general theory, but only with reference (by referring) to (by citing) (on the basis of) historically witnessed (or attested (to)) human relations and situations, which burst (break, force) open (blast, blow up) the conceptual framework worked out (formulated, prepared, elaborated, conceived, developed, drawn up, composed) here (Diese läßt sich nicht gleichsam von außen durch eine andere allgemeine Theorie widerlegen, sondern nur unter Hinweis auf historisch bezeugte menschliche Beziehungen und Lagen, die den hier ausgearbeiteten begrifflichen Rahmen sprengen).

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<sup>i</sup> See Ch. III, Sec. 1 and passim, as well as Ch. IV, with particular reference to Simmel [translator's endnote].

<sup>ii</sup> The translator shall assist the reader by adding that society as a whole is what is given or presupposed before any analysis of anything human can be undertaken, i.e. the social relation cannot exist before and separate or apart from society, but is a necessary and undetachable constituent part or element of society [translator's endnote].

<sup>iii</sup> Since action per se is a social-ontological magnitude and cannot be part of what distinguishes sociology as a distinct discipline – to the extent of course any discipline is distinct from other disciplines [translator's endnote].

<sup>iv</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between theory, and, subjects' decisions and power, necessarily in polemics with other theories; and the need for scientific theory to be able to explain phenomena which prima facie contradict it, see Kondylis, P. *Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung* (Science, Power and Decision: [www.panagiotiskondylis.com](http://www.panagiotiskondylis.com)) [translator's endnote].

<sup>v</sup> Kondylis means social facts are, to state the obvious, social, i.e. they are part of the overall network of relations that make up society, whereas the "separate units" he mentions are not viewed other than as the sum of isolated individuals and their acts, without any reference to their overall omnipresent social interconnectedness [translator's endnote].

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<sup>vi</sup> The human mind exists in the material human head consisting of the brain, its neurons etc., but human thought has the capacity to create its own thoughts world without referring to matter [translator's endnote].

<sup>vii</sup> Dray generally takes a pro-idiographic and anti-nomological stance, while not being fond of sociological regularities and while emphasising the importance of every actor's subjective meaning in historical exposition [translator's endnote].

<sup>viii</sup> Probably a rather disparaging allusion to the "great philosopher" Heidegger. Cf. P. Kondylis, "Heidegger's Being and Time: A Collection of Pretentious and Vague Platitudes" (In: TELOS, TelosScope, November 23, 2015 (originally published in the Greek newspaper *To Vima* (*To Βήμα*) on December 21, 1997, trans. Raymond Petridis)) – available online: <http://www.telospress.com/heideggers-being-and-time-a-collection-of-pretentious-and-vague-platitudes/> [translator's endnote].

<sup>ix</sup> Representative thinkers in regard to the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) are: A. Gehlen, S. Freud, M. Scheler, H. Plessner (with L. Klages, Alfred Seidel, W. Bagehot, Pareto, Nietzsche as "background figures"; Machiavelli and Hobbes as classical points of reference). Classical instances of the anthropology of Reason are: Descartes, Rousseau, Kant and his followers, Hegel. My sincere thanks to Dr. R. Petridis for his expertise [translator's endnote].