

III. Social relation: the spectrum (Soziale Beziehung: Das Spektrum)

1. The approach of formal sociology (Der Ansatz der formalen Soziologie)

A. (The) Functionalistic background (backdrop) and ambivalences of formalism (Funktionalistischer Hintergrund und Ambivalenzen des Formalismus)

A(n intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)-historical) putting in order (ordering, being put in order, inclusion, incorporation, classification) of formal sociology (in the history of ideas) must first refer to the paradigm shift (change in paradigm; Paradigmenwechsel) which took place around the turn of the last century [i.e. the 19th century (into the 20th)], and in the place of the bourgeois synthetic-harmonising thought figure (schema)(,) put an analytical-combinatory [one, thought figure]; the substances (or essences) of the bourgeois thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) (world of thought(s)) (were) consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) dissolved (dispersed, disintegrated) into functions (und an die Stelle der bürgerlichen synthetisch-harmonisierenden Denkfigur eine analytisch-kombinatorische setzte; die Substanzen der bürgerlichen Gedankenwelt wurden somit in Funktionen aufgelöst)¹. Formal sociology (Die formale Soziologie) constituted (made up, formed) – (even, also) in accordance with the self-understanding of its originators (creators, perpetrators, bearers) (too, as well) – an aspect(,) and at the same time(,) a driving force (engine, motor) of this process (series of events, event). It

¹ In relation to this paradigm shift, see generally (in general) Kondylis, *Niedergang*; regarding the contribution of sociology in relation to that, see esp. p. 146ff..

[Formal sociology] directly connected (joined, linked, associated, bound, tied) its ambitions to found (establish, substantiate, justify, account for) *sociology* with a challenge (declaration of war) to (for, [directed at]) the philosophy of history and the substantialistic perception (view) of man (men, humans) contained or implied in it [the philosophy of history]. “History” and “man” (“Man”) were,(–) in the framework of the bourgeois philosophy of history, whose variation (modification, adaptation) was the Marxist [philosophy of history, one],(–) thought (conceived) (of) (reckoned, meant) together to the effect (so, such) that history’s (History’s) upward movement (was) accompanied (by) the perfection (improvement) of man (Man) as genus (i.e. species or race); the aptitudes (or predispositions) ((natural) tendencies; Anlagen) or the seeds (germs, embryos, shoots, sprouts, spores; Keime) in relation to (regarding) that were indeed supposed (meant) to belong to the original (initial) constitution of the genus (i.e. species or (human) race) (mankind), however they [the said aptitudes or seeds] could only be updated (made topical, refreshed; sich... aktualisieren) in the course of history’s (History’s) development (unfolding). As the unfolding space (room for unfolding) of human nature (Als Entfaltungsraum menschlicher Natur), history (History) was not, for its part, merely a quantitatively understood (period of) time (period) (Zeit), as well as (also) not a (period of) time whose qualities merely had to do with the density (denseness, compactness, thickness) and the peripeteiae (i.e. sudden and unexpected changes of fortune or reversals of circumstances) of the becoming (or events) (der Dichte und den Peripetien des Geschehens)(,) irrespective of its [this becoming’s] (or their [these events’]) content. It [History] was defined in terms of meaning and values (meaning(sense)-like (purposefully) and value-like (axiologically)), i.e. as progress (Progress, advancement, improvement) (Sie war sinnhaft und werthaft definiert, d.

h. als Fortschritt) in the [a] comprehensive (extensive, broad), real and ethical sense. The dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the substance (or essence) “history” (“History”) meant (signified) that time from now on (henceforth) lost (shed) the [its] ethical-qualitative dimension and the [its] unified (united, uniform, standard(ised)) sense (or meaning) in order to disintegrate ((be) decompose(d), fall apart, crumble, collapse) into (be pulled to) pieces (bits, parts)(,) which could be joined (fit(ted)) together differently on each and every respective occasion in accordance with (according to) the functional character of the becoming (or events). And the dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the substance (or essence) “man” (“Man”) meant (signified) the fragmentation (splintering or shattering) (splitting, dispersal; Zersplitterung) of those fixed (steady or stable) aptitudes (or predispositions) ((natural) tendencies), which in the course of history (History) were supposed (meant) to come to [their] full (complete) development (unfolding). In the perception of human things (i.e. affairs) (matters), (the) unified (united, uniform, standard(ised)) in its substance (or essence) history (History) is now displaced (driven out, dispelled) by (means of) (through) society comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed) as [a] functional ensemble (whole), while at the same time (in relation to which) man (Man) as [an] individual on each and every respective occasion differently shapes (forms, moulds), and also differently experiences, his own functional unity (unit, uniformity, entity) (seine eigene funktionale Einheit) in accordance with the functional requirements ((pre)requisites, demands, exigencies, desiderata) of the social ensemble.

Now formal sociology (has) neither first founded (established) *sociology* nor did [it] discover *society* as such; rather it [formal sociology] (has)

developed that concept (conceptual plan) of sociology and society which corresponded (was equivalent (analogous, in accordance) (conformed, accorded, correlated)) to (with) the analytical-combinatory thought figure (schema) and thereby (through (because of) that, in this way)(,) (it [formal sociology] (too, also, for its part))(,) [has] contributed to the aforementioned paradigm shift. In order to be able to obtain (gain, win) such a concept, it [formal sociology] had to put an end to the osmosis of history and sociology, as it [this (such an) osmosis] [which] existed in the framework of the philosophy of history, and likewise (as well, also) divide (split (cut) (up), separate) the real pendant (i.e. counterpart) to (vis-à-vis, of) this epistemological osmosis, namely the network (mesh, plexus; Geflecht) of history and society, into its components, in order to then define sociology and society anew in their separation from history (as tale, story or historiography) and history [as a science, as such, in general] (Historie und Geschichte) and to relate (refer, apply) [them, sociology and society] exclusively to each other. The co-existence with one another of the relatively independent (or autonomous) (self-sufficient, self-standing) stages (levels, phases, grades) of development (developmental stages) and of [an] overarching (general, comprehensive, overriding, overshadowing, superior, paramount, transcending, overlapping) progress (advancement, improvement) (Die Koexistenz von relativ selbständigen Entwicklungsstufen und übergreifendem Fortschritt miteinander) in the general schema of the philosophy of history reflected (mirrored) the noteworthy (remarkable, notable) and the, for historical sociology, (consequential, far-reaching, momentous, seminal, serious, important) fact (rich in (replete with) consequences) that here the concept (notion) of society (is) only part(ial)ly absorbed (assimilated) by (wrapped up in) (revolves around, fits in, merges with) the concept of history, although the former [society] – seen dynamically – remained

(stayed) subordinate(d) to the latter [history]. Yet (But, Nevertheless, However)(,) seen (looked at) statically, it [society] kept (retained, held on to) its independence as [a] functional and structured or inwardly (internally) hierarchised entirety (whole(ness), completeness, unity, totality) (als funktionelle und strukturierte bzw. innerlich hierarchisierte Ganzheit), and Comte's, but also Marx's attempt to distinguish (differentiate) (the) static and dynamic way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) from each other, and at the same time to connect (join, link, combine, associate, bind, tie) one with (to) the other, provided (supplied, furnished, yielded, delivered) the basis for the epistemological osmosis of (between) sociology and history. Precisely thanks to this relative autonomy (independence, self-sufficiency, self-reliance) of the concept of society(,) (could) [the] philosophy of history (was allowed to, might) raise (make) the claim of being not merely history, but also sociology. The (successive, consecutive) societies (following (coming after, succeeding) one another), which made up (provided, constituted, gave, produced) history's stages (levels, phases, grades) of development (developmental stages), could be transformed (converted) into sociological, historically saturated (satiated, replete, satisfied) ideal types and detached (removed, freed, cut loose) from the schema of progress (Progress schema) (konnten in soziologische, historisch gesättigte Idealtypen verwandelt und vom Fortschrittsschema losgelöst werden)². Whilst formal sociology separated (disconnected, detached, dis(as)sociated, segregated, severed, removed, parted) the concept of society from such contexts, in order to construct it [society] on the basis of ultimate (final, last) and ubiquitous constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents) (letzter und ubiquitärer

² Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 2B in this volume.

Bestandteile), it [formal sociology] increased (heightened, intensified, maximised) the demand (requirement, claim, call) for the overcoming (exceeding, getting over, surpassing, transcending) of the philosophy of history in favour [the direction] of (for, by turning (converting, transforming) [it, such a demand] into, to(wards), vis-à-vis) the demand for the supra(-)historical founding (establishment) of sociology. Only thus (in this way, so) could it [formal sociology], by the way (incidentally), acquire (gain, get (hold of), procure) its own terrain (i.e. territory) (ground, [space]), especially (particularly) as (since) [the] philosophy of history could just as well be disproved (proved wrong, refuted) with the means of historical sociology (mit den Mitteln historischer Soziologie). Both of the above-mentioned (aforementioned) demands [i.e. the overcoming of the philosophy of history, and, the suprahistorical founding of sociology] do not, therefore, necessarily interrelate (connect, join, attach, interweave) with (to) each other, and the a limine (at (from) the start, on (from) the threshold) elimination (or exclusion) of the historical approach from sociology did not at all allow the question to arise (come (spring, crop) up, emerge) [as to] whether (if) that which was supposed (meant) to be founded (established) supra(-)historically(,) was any longer or only in part able to be sociologyⁱ. The zeal (fervour, enthusiasm, keenness, eagerness) in (to) contrast(ing) (contradistinguish(ing), compar(e)(ing)) *forms (Formen)* to historical content(s) left (allowed, let), for their [the formal sociologists'] part, little time (remaining, over, to spare) for reflection on (over, about, regarding) the content-related(filled) (substantive) presuppositions of exactly these forms – yet (but, however, nevertheless) precisely this reflection would have shown (demonstrated, exhibited) that here a path (road) was taken (followed, entered on, pursued) which went beyond (past) (lead [us] out [of]) sociology in every theoretically and, in terms of research practice,

relevant sense. Typically (enough) (Significantly), formal sociology exercised (exerted) its influence not through the formation (development) of a coherent sociological school or tendency (or line (school) of thought) (direction, trend), which would have in connection with (the) programmatic work(s) [or projects] (deeds, tasks) (die programmatischen Werke) systematically investigated (or researched) (examined, explored, inquired into) social life, but through the mostly (for the most part) selective reception (adoption; Rezeption) of its insights (perceptions, views) on the part of unhistorical social psychology (unhistorischer Sozialpsychologie) or [the] just as unhistorical phenomenological analyses of the lifeworld. It [Formal sociology] interests us here because it thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion) the spectrum of the social relation – and because [the] weaknesses (shortcomings, failings) and [the] gaps (holes) of a purely form-related (i.e. formal) description (account, portrayal) of this spectrum is social-ontologically (sozialontologisch) revealing (instructive, informative).

Still (Even) in the second half of the 19th century(,) the bond (tie[s]) between sociology and the philosophy of history seemed to be so strong (solid, steady, sturdy, stable, firm, fixed) and self-evident ((perfectly) natural, obvious) that every demarcation (delimitation) had to proceed (move) via (or go through) formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) (renditions, making, conversions) into forms) (structuring(s) in terms of form, formal structuring(s)) (jede Abgrenzung über Formalisierungen gehen mußte). As far as I know, Lazarus (has) (was the) first (to) express(ed) (enunciate(d)) the idea (thought, notion, concept, perception; Gedanken) [that] society consists of several (a number of, various, multiple, quite a few) (side by side (juxtaposing, juxtaposed, (i.e.) adjacent) but also touching (coinciding with) one another ((i.e.) tangent) and intersecting(,))

narrower and broader(,) circles (cycles, circuits, spheres) ((standing) next to, but also brushing against (coming into contact with) and intersecting (with) (cutting through) one another) (mehreren nebeneinanderstehenden aber sich auch berührenden und durchscheidenden, engeren und breiteren Kreisen), so that it [society] represents (constitutes) “a(n) extremely (most, highly, greatly) manifold (multiple, in many ways) in itself intertwined (or convoluted) (entangled, intricate) relationship of connection (conjunction, combination, association, affiliation, linking, tying, binding) and separation (segregation, severance) („ein höchst vielfach in sich verschlungenes Verhältnis von Verbindung und Absonderung“)³. His [Lazarus’s] student (pupil), Dilthey, who (has, had) wanted to show (demonstrate, exhibit, display, express, point out, indicate) the essential (substantial, fundamental, important) relationship (affinity; Verwandtschaft) between sociology and the philosophy of history, suggested (proposed) as [a] realistic alternative (choice) to (vis-à-vis) their [sociology and the philosophy of history’s] “unsolvable (insoluble, insolvable)” problem (or task) (job, mission, duty, function), the dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the social whole into individual (separate, particular) interrelations (or contexts) (correlations, connections) (“members (i.e. parts, components or limbs) (elements, links)” or “systems”) (die Auflösung des sozialen Ganzen in Einzelzusammenhänge („Glieder“ oder „Systeme“), and compared the underlying “relations of dependence and affinity (relationship)” of every culture (die jeder Kultur zugrundeliegenden „Beziehungen von Abhängigkeit und Verwandtschaft“) with those between the “constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components, constituents)” or “functions of an

³ Lazarus-Steinthal, „Einleitende Gedanken“, p. 4. The context here is still “folk-psychological ((ethnologically) psychological ([in respect of] (the) people(s) (folk(s), masses, populace, nation(s)))” („völkerpsychologisch“).

organism” (den „Bestandteilen“ oder „Functionen eines Organismus“)⁴. The internal (inner) connection between [the] analytical, form-related (i.e. formal) and functional point of view (Die innere Verbindung zwischen analytischem, formalem und funktionalem Gesichtspunkt) (is) already emerging (looming) (emerges, looms (on the horizon), stands out) here, so that Vierkant could attribute (ascribe, impute) to Dilthey the “definition of society with the help of the concept of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) (Definition der Gesellschaft mit Hilfe des Begriffs der Wechselwirkung)”⁵. However, a hermeneutician (i.e. practitioner of hermeneutics) (der Hermeneutiker), who more or less needed (required) fixed (stable or settled) (steady, firm, solid) subjective bearers (carriers) of experiencing (going through life) and reliving (afterliving) (re-experiencing, after-experiencing) or understanding of objective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) (feste subjektive Träger des Erlebens und Nacherlebens bzw. Verstehens

⁴ *Einleitung in die Geisteswiss.*, GW, I, pp. 86ff., 111, 421 (regarding (in relation to) Simmel); V, p.61ff. (society as (aggregating, accumulating, accumulated) interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (being added (mounted, counted) up) (Gesellschaft als sich summierende Wechselwirkungen). The relationship between Dilthey and Simmel was concisely (succinctly, incisively, pithily, strikingly) characterised by Tenbruck, „Simmel“, p. 595ff.. Let us here recall (call to mind, recollect) (It is (here) to (should here) be reminded (remembered)) Spann’s objection to (against) Dilthey’s concept (notion) of society, which can (adversely) affect (hurt, strike [a blow to], hit, wound) the formal-sociological approach as a whole (der den formalsoziologischen Ansatz als ganzen treffen kann): Dilthey does not pose (ask) the [a] question according to (in accordance with) the specific (particular) character of the social (societal) (nach dem spezifischen Charakter des Gesellschaftlichen), but he confuses this [question] with the question according to (in accordance with) the interrelation (or connection) (correlation) of the subsystems (or part(ial) systems) (der Frage nach dem Zusammenhang der Teilsysteme („Zur soziol. Auseinandersetzung“, p. 220ff.). Cf. Ch. II, footnote 237, above.

⁵ *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 40. Amongst his main (chief) sources Vierkant counts (numbers, includes, takes into account), apart from (except for) Simmel, phenomenology, “which enables us to ascertain (establish, find out, detect, discover) comprehensive (or extensive) (broad) series of ultimate (final) a priori facts (of the matter) (data, findings)” („die uns umfassende Reihen letzter apriorischer Tatbestände festzustellen ermöglicht“) (loc. cit., III, p. 1ff.). L. v. Weise saw himself (with)in [as part of] Simmel and Vierkant’s intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) succession, *Soziologie*, pp. 128, 133; cf. the critical comments (remarks, observations) regarding (about) both [of them, Simmel and Vierkant] in *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 35, 41. A rebellion against (Resistance (Opposition) to) the «philosophie de l’histoire» [“philosophy of history”] was also the first version, represented by Tarde, of French «sociologie pure» [“pure sociology”]. “Imitation” constitutes primarily (first and foremost, in the first place, first of all, mainly, principally, chiefly, preeminently) [a] relation, and society should be defined as [a] system of relations, not for instance as [a] system of (the) law (justice, right; Rechts) or of (the) economy (*Lois*, XXII, p. 73).

von objektiven Sinnzusammenhängen), had to, despite (in spite of, notwithstanding) [the] turning away (renunciation, estrangement) from (of) the metaphysics of substance (or essence) and of Reason, resist (fight, struggle against, refuse) a consistent functionalisation, at whose end(ing) (finish, outcome, close, termination, expiry) (would be) (which would end up in) meaninglessness (pointlessness, senselessness, futility, uselessness, purposelessness) (would stand) (mußte sich trotz Abkehr von der Substanz- und Vernunftmetaphysik gegen eine konsequente Funktionalisierung sträuben, an deren Ende Sinnlosigkeit stehen würde). The young Simmel set (went) to work more radically, who already in his first sociological writing (i.e. treatise) (work, paper, document, publication) determined (or defined) the “direction (tendency, trend) of (the) modern intellectual(-spiritual) life (living) (life of the intellect(mind)(-spirit))” as follows, namely [as] “dissolving (or breaking up) (disintegrating) the (what is) fixed (stable, steady, solid, firm, settled), [the (what is)] [in, of] itself same (equal, identical, equivalent, (a)like) (what remains the same), [the (what is)] substantial, into function, force (energy, power, strength, vigour, might), movement” (die „Richtung des modernen Geisteslebens“ folgendermaßen bestimmte, nämlich „das Feste, sich selbst Gleiche, Substantielle, in Funktion, Kraft, Bewegung aufzulösen“)⁶. In the process, both the I-like or ego-ish (i.e. egocentric) “point of unity in us” (der ichhafte „Einheitspunkt in uns“), which is actually (really) merely “interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) and dynamic weaving (spinning) into one another (i.e. interweaving), interrelation (connection, correlation, context), balancing (evening out, equalisation) of a multitude (plurality, a great number)” („Wechselwirkung und dynamisches Ineinanderweben,

⁶ *Über soziale Differenzierung*, p. 130. Cf. *Philosophische Kultur*, p. 3ff..

Zusammenhang, Ausgleich einer Vielheit“), as well as society, which represents (or constitutes) (is) a “becoming (or events)”, a “function of the receiving (greeting or welcoming) (meeting) and (the) bringing about (or achieving) (causing, effecting) of fate (or destiny) and (the) shaping (moulding, forming, structuring, arrangement, designing, creation) of one on the part of (by) the other” („Funktion des Empfangens und Bewirkens von Schicksal und Gestaltung des einen von seiten des anderen“), are dissolved (or broken up)⁷. The functional way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) society (Die funktionelle Betrachtung der Gesellschaft) aims at putting (setting) aside (eliminating, removing, sidelining, doing away with, getting rid of) every notion (idea, perception, representation, image; Vorstellung) of a “mystical unity (whole)”, which exists “beyond (on the other side of) individuals”⁸. Indeed (Actually, In fact), Simmel remains consistent as [a] sociologist in this [his] anti-metaphysical and anti-substantialistic programme (antimetaphysischen und antisubstantialistischen Programm), even (in order) (to) pay(ing) the price of skipping (jumping, leaping, springing) over the question (problem) [as to] what then holds together (or coheres) the interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (was denn die Wechselwirkungen zusammenhalte), what makes (renders) them [interactions (or mutual influences)] [a] society⁹. He [Simmel] thereby (through (because of) that, in this way) avoided (evaded, obviated, steered clear of) at least the reverse mistake (error, fault), which our contemporary functionalists make (commit, perpetrate), by (while they) want(ing) to have both [these things] in one go (at the same time, at once): to dissolve (or break up) the (what is)

⁷ *Brücke*, pp. 91, 215.

⁸ *Über soziale Differenzierung*, p. 134ff..

⁹ See Ch. II, Sec. 3B, footnote 235, above.

social (das Soziale) into functions and simultaneously to safeguard (or preserve) (protect, keep) its [the social's] unity through (by means (way) of) the emphatic concept (notion) of the system and system rationality (the rationality of the system). Nonetheless (Nevertheless, All the same, However), Simmel shares with the latter [(systems theory) functionalists] (in) an error (mistake) of [a] methodical (i.e. methodological) character. The functionalistic thought [pattern] and interpretation pattern (model, specimen) (pattern of thought and of interpretation) (Das funktionalistische Denk- und Deutungsmuster), which supports (sustains, bears, carries) sociological theory, serves at the same time as [a] historical-sociological diagnosis of [the, our] time(s) (age, period, era) (als historisch-soziologische Zeitdiagnose), and indeed in the sense of (accordance with) (according to, for the purpose of) the self-description of the social present. Modern society, whose features (characteristics, traits, attributes) Simmel outlined (or described) (portrayed, depicted) absolutely (definitely, thoroughly, perfectly, completely) from the perspective of the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) [(in respect) of] “community-society”, is (stands, [exists]) under the influence (sign, cloak, aegis) of (is marked by) the pure functionality of the money economy and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) brings forth (gives rise to, produces, causes, creates) a relativistic-functionalistic way (manner, mode) of thinking (thought) (der reinen Funktionalität der Geldwirtschaft und bringt somit eine relativistisch-funktionalistische Denkweise hervor)¹⁰. The sociologist too (also, as well) is supposed (meant) to functionalistically apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) society and social life in general, that is, irrespective (regardless) of the

¹⁰ *Philosophie des Geldes*, esp. ch. VI; still (even) more concisely (succinctly, tersely, strikingly) in the [his] earlier (antecedent, prior, previous) article (essay, composition, paper) „Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (Money in modern culture)“.

diagnosis of [the, our] time(s) (age, period, era). However, how can such a time-conditioned(dependent, conditional, limited, qualified, based, bound, contingent) intellectual (thought, notional) attitude (stance, approach, outlook, view, orientation, positioning) (eine derart zeitbedingte gedankliche Einstellung) be legitimately declared (proclaimed, announced, pronounced, professed) (to be, as) the key for the understanding of every society in every period of time (or age) (era) (all times)? And why exactly (of all understandings (things)) does the functionalistic self-understanding of modern society coincide with the understanding of (the) supra(-)historical real facts (of the case) (or situations) (circumstances, state of affairs) (überhistorischen realen Sachverhaltes)? It does not cross Simmel's mind (occur to Simmel) (Simmel does not think (consider)) that functionality can be an ideological metaphysics in need of (requiring) explanation (eine erklärungsbedürftige ideologische Metaphysik) just as substantialism (Substanzialismus), for its part, was. He [Simmel] does not see that functionalistic sociology essentially (basically, in reality) represents (or constitutes) not [an] explanation, but rather [a] symptom of the “direction (tendency, trend) of (the) modern intellectual(-spiritual) life (living) (life of the intellect(mind)(-spirit))” described (delineated, depicted) by him himself, that (the) functionalistic way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation) did not, that is, for instance, gain the upper hand because people (humans, men) were suddenly transformed (converted, changed) from substances into functions, but because the social conditions (or circumstances) took a form in core areas (fields, sectors, domains, realms) (auf Kerngebieten) which in tone-setting (i.e.

leading) ((pre)dominant) ideologues (bei tonangebenden Ideologen)
found expression (were reflected) in functionalistic positions¹¹.

A discussion of Simmel's so-called (life-philosophical) turn (regarding (in respect of) [towards] the philosophy of life) (Simmels sogenannter lebensphilosophischer Wende), which necessarily (had to) entail(ed) a certain rehabilitation of "substantial" magnitudes („substantieller“ Größen), e.g. of the experiencing and understanding I (Ego or Self) (des erlebenden und verstehenden Ich) or of (the) objective cultural meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations), is superfluous (unnecessary, not necessary) here. Because his [Simmel's] sociology was in essence (essentially, substantially, in the main) already mature(d) (ripe, fully developed, full-blown) before this turn¹²; although his sociological interests (continued to) remain(ed) (remaining) (wide-)awake ((on) alert) [i.e. active (alive)], the [his, Simmel's] basic (fundamental) sociological concept (das soziologische Grundkonzept) was not revised in the (life-philosophical) sense (spirit) (of) (accordance with) (the philosophy of life) (im lebensphilosophischen Sinne). Functionalism was connected with exactly this basic (fundamental) concept, and this was, next to (beside, alongside) the programmatic contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) with (to(wards), vis-à-vis) the philosophy of history, both recorded (registered, noted) by [Simmel's, his] contemporaries¹³, as well as loudly

¹¹ Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 2, above.

¹² Tenbruck, „Simmel“, esp. p. 592ff..

¹³ See e.g. (the way (manner)) [as to] (how) Jellinek summons (uses, highlights, projects, mobilises) function against substance (or essence)(,) in order to obtain (gain, win, get) the "social concept (notion) of the state" („sozialen Staatsbegriff“), *Staatslehre*, p. 174 ff.. For Troeltsch, formal sociology and [the] philosophy of history (a mixture (mixing, blend(ing)) of history and ethics, causality and finality (i.e. the doctrine of the efficacy of final causes, or, teleology) (eine Mischung aus Geschichte und Ethik, Kausalität und Finalität) represented (constituted) the two main (chief, principal) conflicting (contrasting, opposing) schools (lines) of thought (directions, tendencies, trends) in sociology („Zum Begriff“, p. 705ff.). Vierkandt starts from (takes) the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between ("historical-philosophical-encyclopaedic") ["encyclopaedic sociology pertaining to the philosophy of history"] and "analysing(i.e. analytical)-formal" sociology („geschichtsphilosophisch-enzklopädischer“ und „analysierend-formaler“ Soziologie) (as his starting point) in his main (chief, principal, major) work (magnum opus; Hauptwerk) (*Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 1ff.).

proclaimed (declared, announced, promulgated) by Simmel's direct (immediate) successors. Vierkandt in fact recalled (called to mind, remembered, recollected) (reminded [us] of) the good example of natural science, which had "already everywhere (all over the place) carried out (through) (implemented)" the replacement of the category of the object (subject matter, topic, motif, theme) by that [the category] of the relation (das gute Beispiel der Naturwissenschaft, die die Ersetzung der Kategorie des Gegenstandes durch jene der Beziehung „bereits überall durchgeführt“ habe),(;) he [Vierkandt] set (put) the task (problem, job, mission, duty) to "relating (or relationalising)" thought (i.e. thinking which relates things between one another) („beziehendem“ Denken) of apprehending (grasping, understanding) functions, and by (while he [Vierkandt]), from [a] functionalistic point of view (perspective), objecting to (complaining about, querying, disputing, criticising) (objected to) the overestimation of the "unity (or uniformity) (consistency, standardisation) of the personality" („Einheitlichkeit der Persönlichkeit“) by (means (way) of) (through) the "popular way (manner, mode) of thinking (thought)" („populäre Denkweise“),(;) [Vierkandt (and) (also)] believed he was able to achieve (accomplish, perform, manage, do, effect) something about which cybernetic systems theory today boasts (brags, extols, prides itself). The distinction (differentiation, difference) "between the individual as place (or locus) (position; Ort) of the social becoming (or events) (des sozialen Geschehens) and the systems which make up (constitute) his (its) content", i.e. the ascertainment of the large (great) quantity (amount, mass, load, pile, heap; Menge) of various (varying, different, differing, distinct) stances (attitudes, positions), mentalities (mindsets, ways of thinking, opinions, views, (fundamental) attitudes, casts of mind) and purposes (or goals) (ends, objects) in the only conditionally (i.e. partly or

relatively) unified (uniform) (united) individual allows (permits) finally a bursting (breaking, forcing) open (blasting, blowing up) of the usual (customary, common) separations (divisions) between natural and historic(al), created and creating (creative), acting and watching (i.e. observing) (onlooking, looking on, spectating) man (verschiedener Haltungen, Gesinnungen und Zwecke im nur bedingt einheitlichen Individuum gestatte schließlich ein Sprengen der üblichen Trennungen zwischen natürlichem und historischem, geschaffenen und schaffendem, handelndem und zuschauendem Menschen)¹⁴. The dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of substances (essences) into functions creates (produces), therefore, a unified (or uniform) (united) field in (on) which all the conceivable (imaginable, thinkable) transitions (crossings) and crossings (i.e. hybridisations) (intersections, junctions, crossbreedings, hybrids) (alle nur denkbaren Übergänge und Kreuzungen) are made possible (enabled). Space thus (as a result, consequently, therefore) displaces (drives out, ousts, dispels) time as the main (chief, principal, major) form of perception (awareness, cognition) of the social (Der Raum verdrängt somit die Zeit als Hauptwahrnehmungsform des Sozialen). As v. Wiese expressed (put, stated) it, “the primacy of the next to one another (i.e. being (existing, living) side by side, or co-existence) ahead of (vis-à-vis) the after one another (i.e. existing (being, living) after one another, or succession) [is]... an essential feature (characteristic, attribute, trait) of our teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of the relation” (ist „der Primat des Nebeneinander vor dem Nacheinander... ein wesentliches Merkmal unserer Beziehungslehre“), whereas it [the situation (case,

¹⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 40, 48ff..

instance), things] was (were) (had) (behaved, acted) the other way around ((the) reverse(d), contrariwise, conversely) in the philosophy of history¹⁵.

The bringing (working) out (analysis, processing, elaborating) of the functionalistic background (backdrop) of formal sociology can serve as a reminder (memento) (to remind [us]) (the recollection (remembering, reminding) (in memory (remembrance)) [of the fact] (in relation to (on, regarding) that) that quite a few (some, various, a number of) sociological schools (lines) of thought (tendencies, trends, directions) of the 1960s and 1970s (years), like quite a few [tendencies] of artistic avant-gardism (künstlerischen Avantgardismus) from the same time (period, age, era), took root [have their roots] in the paradigm shift around 1900; *mutatis mutandis*, the contradistinction (confrontation, altercation, clash, dispute, contrariety) between Durkheim and Simmel continued in [with] the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between [the] closed and [the] open system. Yet (Nevertheless, However)(,) that [the said (aforementioned)] bringing out pursues (follows, tracks) here, first of all (primarily, in the first place), theoretical aims (targets, objectives). [The] functional and form-related (i.e. formal) approach in fact interrelate (connect, interweave) logically, because functions come to the fore (there) where substances have (been) dissolved (broken up) (disintegrated) into ultimate (final) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components,

¹⁵ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 30, 31, 49. Otherwise (Apart from that), v. Weise repeats (reiterates) the demand (claim, requirement) of “delimiting (demarkating, dissociating, separating, differentiating, distinguishing, marking (fencing) off) [the] concept (notion) of the relation from (against) the concepts of the object (subject matter, topic, motif, theme) and of (the) qualities (properties or characteristics) (der Eigenschaften)”,(;) he [v. Weise] regards (considers, views, looks at, contemplates) as [the, a, his] methodical (i.e. methodological) ideal the “(continued (carried on, pursued)) as far as possible (most extensive) quantification of the qualitative differences of the social becoming (or events)” („möglichst weitgeführte Quantifizierung der qualitativen Unterschiede des sozialen Geschehens“), and for his part recalls (calls to mind, recollects, remembers, reminds [us] of) the example of other sciences (loc. cit., pp. 3, 9, 7). The functionalistic spatialisation (turning into (making) space (room)) (Verräumlichung) of the way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation) is supposed (meant) to (should) also here show (point) the way (path, road) out of the alternatives “individual – society” or “whole – part” (loc. cit., p. 22ff.).

constituents), which then can be combined with one another in such a way (manner) that they constitute forms. The search for ultimate (final) elements was (stood, [existed]) expressly (explicitly) [stated] in [by] formal sociology's programme(,) and connected (joined, linked, combined, associated) this [search (for ultimate elements in formal sociology)], in this respect (regard) (on that score), with the aforementioned paradigm shift (Funktionaler und formaler Ansatz hängen ja logisch zusammen, denn Funktionen treten da in den Vordergrund, wo die Substanzen in letzte Bestandteile aufgelöst worden sind, die sich dann derart miteinander kombinieren lassen, daß sie Formen konstituieren. Die Suche nach letzten Elementen stand ausdrücklich auf dem Programm formaler Soziologie und verband diese auch in dieser Hinsicht mit dem genannten Paradigmenwechsel)¹⁶. Yet (All the same, Nevertheless, However)(,) precisely in this search, the fatal ambivalences of sociological formalism (die fatalen Ambivalenzen des soziologischen Formalismus) became noticeable (apparent) (made themselves felt, drew attention to themselves), and indeed at the same time regarding (on, in respect of) two crucial questions (matters, problems). On the one hand, when it was a question (matter) of (as it concerned) the total (complete, absolute) feasibility (practicability, practicality, workability, viability) of the separation between form and content (die restlose Durchführbarkeit der Trennung zwischen Form und Inhalt), on the other hand, when it was a question (matter) of (as it concerned) the determination (or definition) of "form". The possibility of a *formal* sociology (einer *formalen*

¹⁶ Formal sociology endeavours (attempts, makes the effort, strives, is eager) "to go back (be reduced (traced back) (return) to the ultimate (final) elements of social (societal) life" (Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 3); "our system is primarily a system of the next to one another (i.e. being (existing, living) side by side, or co-existence). We break down (or take apart) (dismantle, dissect) a complex into its simultaneous (concurrent) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents)" (v. Weise, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p.30). For [In (With) regard (relation) to] the search for ultimate elements in art, philosophy or linguistics at (of) the turn of the [twentieth] century [i.e. c. 1900] cf. Kondylis, *Niedergang*, pp. 97ff., 138ff., 152ff..

Soziologie) or of a sociology as pure (sheer, absolute) teaching (i.e. theory) (doctrine) of forms (morphology) (als purer Formenlehre) in general obviously (evidently, blatantly) depends on that feasibility. And Simmel could in this regard (connection) (regarding (concerning) this) show (or produce) (possess, have, exhibit, demonstrate) and promise so little that one may ask (question) with what scientific right was he convinced (assured, confident) in advance of the possibility of a formal sociology. As he [Simmel] himself wrote, “for [the] foreseeable future” no “even only approximate (almost, nearly, rough) dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up)” of the forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) “into simple elements” („auch nur annähernde Auflösung“ der Vergesellschaftungsformen „in einfache Elemente“) was to be hoped for, from (out of) which [it] followed that the already proposed (or formulated) (advanced, put forward, drawn (set) up, established, set out) forms would apply (be valid) “only to (for) a relatively small (slight, modest, minor, scant) circle (compass, radius, perimeter, ambit, area) of phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences; Erscheinungen)”; to that the admission (confession, acknowledgement) was added [that] even these forms do not remain (themselves) “absolutely the same (equal)” ([as, in respect of, with, to] themselves), but they varied according to (in accordance with) each and every respective content¹⁷. However, how would a(n) demanding (exacting) formal sociology be founded (established, substantiated, justified, accounted for) if (when) the forms were lacking (missing, absent) which would encompass (embrace, reach round, span, cover) social life (living) in its synchronic and diachronic entirety (or totality) (whole) (die das soziale Leben in seiner synchronischen und

¹⁷ *Soziologie*, pp. 10, 11.

diachronischen Gesamtheit umspannen würden)? And would the assertion (claim, statement, allegation, proposition) not be absurd [that] those wide (broad, extensive) social areas (fields, sectors, domains, realms) in which the separation (division, segregation, distinction) between form and content (Form und Inhalt) admittedly could not be carried out (implemented, put through, executed, accomplished, undertaken, enforced), would (be) completely (totally) closed to (shut themselves off from) sociological treatment (handling, processing, dealing, attention)? Simmel (and v. Weise too) sought to avoid (evade, dodge, sidestep, elude, get out of the way of) this absurdity through (by means of) a half-hearted compromise or a makeshift (compromise) solution (stopgap, temporary expedient; Verlegenheitslösung). He [Simmel] allowed (let, granted, afforded, provided) next to (beside) (the) pure sociology, a “general” [one, sociology] (Er ließ neben der reinen Soziologie eine „allgemeine“ gewähren)(,) (with)in (under) whose area of competence phenomena and construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (Phänomene und Gebilde) fell (came), which presupposed the existence (presence, hypostasis) of a society, whereas (while) (the) pure sociology was meant (supposed) to be (should have been) concerned (concern (occupy) itself, deal) with (the) forms of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) as [the] constituting (i.e. constitutive) forces of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) (mit den Wechselwirkungsformen als konstituierenden Kräften der Vergesellschaftung)¹⁸. Through (By means of) this reluctant

¹⁸ *Grundfragen*, ch. I. The same distinction (differentiation, difference) was in essence (essentially) made (or hit upon) (reached, found) in 1908 when Simmel wrote [that] conventional (customary, traditional) or non-pure (not pure) sociology would study those soci(et)al phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) “in which the (interacting (or mutually influencing) (interplaying)) forces (alternating (changing) [their] effect) are already crystallised out of their immediate bearers (carriers, vehicles)” (“bei denen die wechselwirkenden Kräfte schon aus ihrem unmittelbaren Träger auskristallisiert sind”), that is, represented (or constituted) objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (*Soziologie*, p. 14). At that time (Back) (Then) (In those days)(,) Simmel only wanted to totally (completely) deny this study the name sociology or (leave it

((be)grudging, unwilling) split(ing) (division, schism) of sociology, the in(un)feasibility (impracticability, impracticality, unworkability, inviability; Undurchführbarkeit) of the pure or form-related (i.e. formal) programme was tacitly (implicitly, silently) admitted (confessed, granted), especially (particularly) as (since) the logical and epistemological relation(ship) between both branches of the discipline remained extremely (most, exceedingly, utterly) unclear (obscure, hazy, blurred) or entirely (completely, wholly, totally) external (outward, extrinsic). Content-related(filled) (substantive) sociology was perceived (regarded, seen, experienced, viewed) rather as (found (felt, considered) rather (to be), taken rather for) [a(n)] annoying (or burdensome) (bothersome, onerous, irksome, troublesome, tiresome, undesirable, vexing) compact (solid) appendage (attachment, addition), which awaited (hoped) for its dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) into forms (Die inhaltliche Soziologie wurde eher als lästiges kompaktes Anhängsel empfunden, das seiner Auflösung in Formen harrte). For its part, pure sociology was obviously (evidently, apparently) not dependent (reliant) (did not depend (rely)) on (the) content-related(filled) (substantive) [one, sociology], since it [pure sociology] wanted to directly have recourse (go

[this (such a) name] to) (let) the social sciences (have it (this (such a) name)) (but can the science of law replace the sociology of law (kann aber Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtssoziologie ersetzen)?), while he [Simmel] held (considered, regarded) pure sociology (to be) (as) “absolutely (quite, per se, as such) justified (entitled, eligible)” “in covering the concept (notion) of sociology fully (completely, totally, entirely) and alone (solely, on its own, by itself) (exclusively)” (loc. cit. pp. 19, 20). In 1917, he [Simmel] believed (thought, reckoned, opined), more reservedly (guardedly, cautiously) (with more restraint), [that] pure sociology is “in a... sense appearing (seeming, manifesting itself, turning (coming) out) to me actually (in actual fact, really) quite decisively(.) ‘sociological’”. L. v. Weise called (named), in contrast to Simmel, pure sociology, general, and assigned to (instructed, directed, engaged, commissioned) the “special (particular) sociologies” („speziellen Soziologien“) (with, in, to(wards)) the study of the areas (fields, sectors, domains, realms)(,) which are characterised (marked, identified) by content-related(filled) (substantive) ends (goals) being (which have been) set (or end (goal) setting) (durch inhaltliche Zwecksetzungen) (economy, law) (see e.g. „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 69). However, the diverging (differing, deviating) terminology does not change (alter) the factual (objective) agreement with Simmel [at all]. This [agreement] is underlined by v. Weise’s distinction (differentiation) between “processes of the first” and “processes of the second order”: those [the former] would not “logically” (!) presuppose the existence (presence, hypostasis, availability) of a social construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation),(;) these [the latter] would presuppose it [the existence of a social construct] („Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 75).

back) to (fall back upon, use, summon; zurückgreifen) (the) historical material (das historische Material) in order to unearth (bring (up) (to the surface (light)), uncover) therein (in there) hidden (concealed, veiled, latent, furtive) form-related (i.e. formal) structures (versteckte formale Strukturen). Now the path (way, road) from (the) historical material to the form was not only in practice inaccessible (unapproachable, impenetrable, impervious), as Simmel himself illustrated by way of an example¹⁹, but in principle (fundamentally, basically, de facto) indirect and mediated [subject to (determined by) intervention] (grundsätzlich indirekt und vermittelt). Because in view of (given) the uniqueness (singularity, singularness) of historical content(s), the [a] direct and exact correspondence (equivalence, counterpart, analogue, parallel) of [between] a pure sociological form with (to(wards), vis-à-vis) [and] a certain (particular) content would imply its [the (said) pure sociological form's] asymmetry to(wards) (vis-à-vis, with) other (different) content(s) and consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) the thwarting (frustration, foiling, upset(ing), prevention, circumvention) of a(n) comprehensive (extensive, broad) teaching (i.e. theory) (doctrine) of forms (morphology) (Denn angesichts der Einmaligkeit historischer Inhalte würde die direkte und exakte Entsprechung einer reinen soziologischen Form zu einem bestimmten Inhalt deren Asymmetrie zu anderen Inhalten und somit die Vereitelung einer umfassenden Formenlehre implizieren), which may (could) sensibly (meaningfully, reasonably, plausibly, rationally, logically) be proposed (or formulated) (advanced, put forward, drawn (set) up, established, set out) only (then) when every individual (or single) (separate(d), solitary, lone, isolated, odd) form structurally covers multiple (a number of, several, various, diverse) content(s) (wenn jede

¹⁹ *Soziologie*, p. 12.

einzelne Form mehrere Inhalte strukturell abdeckt). But also apart from (disregarding) that: if (the) pure sociological forms could (were able to) be applied to different (varying, varied, diverse, dissimilar) content(s) or if different content(s) could (were able to) be broken up (or dissolved) (disintegrate) into identical forms (in identische Formen auflösen), then (thus, so) a *sociological* determination (or definition) of the difference (distinction) between the content(s) would be impossible, and (in that case, then) (the) tolerance vis-à-vis content-related(filled) (substantive) sociology (der inhaltlichen Soziologie) would (also) be superfluous (redundant, unnecessary, useless, futile) (too); one could abolish it [such tolerance] straight (right) away (immediately, in a moment (minute), in a jiff(y)). Would (If) the forms (then) again (in turn, on the other hand), depending on (according to, in accordance with) the field (area, sector) of application (Anwendungsgebiet) and in accordance (line, compliance) with (according to) the difference of [between] the contents with [as regards, vis-à-vis] one another, (were to) vary (varied), they would therefore be determined (conditioned) in terms of content, then (thus, so, in this way) the theoretical desideratum (demand) of a general *sociological* teaching (i.e. theory) (doctrine) of forms would lose (shed, forfeit) its actual (real, true) sense (or meaning) and one could remain (rest) assured (confident, safe) (have no hesitation (fears)) in [regard to] (with) [respect to] [confident in (i.e. satisfied or content with)] historical-content-related(filled) (substantive) sociology. All the more (So much the more) as (considering) the contradistinction (confrontation, altercation, clash, dispute, contrariety) with [regard to] questions of formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) and typification (i.e. rendering into types) (classification under typifying forms) is immanent (inherent) in [respect of] this [historical-content-related sociology] (Um so mehr, als

dieser die Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen der Formalisierung und Typisierung immanent ist). Sociology *is* in fact (of course) by (of) itself formalisation and typification, and indeed exactly to the extent it vindicates (i.e. defends or claims (maintains, upholds)) its own territory (area, terrain) (eigenes Territorium vindiziert) vis-à-vis history. Certainly (Of course), pure sociology's search for ultimate (final) forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), in(to) which the historical content(s) would be able to (could) be absorbed (assimilated) (open, unfold, come undone), means (signifies) something other than (different to) the formalisation of these same contents by (means (way) of) (through) historically oriented (aligned, adjusted, aimed) sociology (Gewiß, die Suche der reinen Soziologie nach letzten Vergesellschaftungsformen, in denen die historischen Inhalte aufgehen könnten, bedeutet etwas anderes als die Formalisierung dieser selben Inhalte durch die historisch ausgerichtete Soziologie); here (are, exist), in other words, two different perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions; Auffassungen) of (about, regarding, on, over) the possible separation (division, segregation) between form and content (die mögliche Trennung zwischen Form und Inhalt) (are available (present)). But if "pure" and "general" (in Simmel's sense) or "special (particular)" (in v. Wiese's terminology) sociology, are supposed (meant) to (should) make up (constitute) branches of *the same* discipline, (then, so, thus) between both those perceptions (views) there must be a logical interrelation (connection, correlation). That, however, is not the case. An analysis of the family as form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)(,) free of historical content(s)(,) would not provide (offer, give, grant, present) any backing (support) for a typology of historically attested forms of families (family forms) (Familienformen) – on the contrary: were this analysis at all doable (feasible, possible) (which it is

not necessarily), (then, so, thus) all forms of the family would have to be absorbed (assimilated) (open, unfold, come undone) in(to) a(n) single (sole, only) form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)(,) and historical sociology would remain out of work (i.e. without anything to do) (redundant, jobless, unemployed, workless, idle; arbeitslos) after this ultimate (final) reduction. Either this [historical sociology] must, therefore, cease to apply (be left out (lost, removed, omitted, discontinued, canceled, ceased, dropped), become unnecessary, disappear, vanish)(,) and pure sociology with the other social(-) [sciences] and (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) (the humanities) (Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften) be left [to stand] alone, or pure sociology must be assigned (attributed, ascribed, allocated) to (or classified within) (classed with) an extra-sociological epistemological field (area, sector, domain, realm) (oder die reine Soziologie muß einem außersozilogischen epistemologischen Gebiet zugeordnet werden), whereby (in relation to which) such questions would be answered by themselves.

The founders of formal sociology (have) hardly paid attention to the difference (distinction) between both these possible separations of form and content from each other. The failure to appreciate (misjudgement, underestimation) (of) the essentially form-related (i.e. formal) aspect of historical sociology had (took revenge (got its own back), avenged itself), nevertheless (however), (dire consequences) (or got its revenge) to the effect that pure sociology, believing in (under the impression of) its own monopoly over (regarding) the (what is) formal-related (i.e. formal) (das Formal), vindicated (i.e. defended or claimed (maintained, upheld)) many a form (quite a few (some) forms) for itself, which cannot be stricto sensu (in the (a) strict sense) classified(,) readily (without a second thought (any

(great) effort (problems), difficulty)) (directly, immediately, just like that)(,) as [an] “ultimate (final, last) constituent (integral) element (or part) (component, constituent)” of the social (and) or as [an] elementary and indispensable form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation). Above all, Simmel’s analyses in his main (chief, principal) sociological work suffer methodically (i.e. methodologically) under this ambiguity (equivocalness, ambiguousness), which of course is frequently ((in) many times (cases, ways)) concealed (hidden, covered up) by the [his] impressionistic mastery, by the [his] concise (succinct, to the point, pithy, striking) apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension, revealing, inclusion, recording, capturing; Erfassung) of concrete situations (circumstances) in their to((-)ing) and fro((-)ing) (back and forth, comings and goings), and not least of all by the mostly (for the most part, more often than not) convincing (persuasive, cogent), albeit (even though (if)) in principle (fundamentally) frowned-upon (disapproved-of, scorned), psychology. This all undoubtedly (doubtless(ly), undeniably, unquestionably) constitutes an important contribution to – “general” – sociology and explains, incidentally, the renewed interest in Simmel (exactly, precisely) at a time (of all times) in which one indeed wants to know little of “pure” sociology, but more about micro(-)situations (micro(-)circumstances), [micro](-)structures and [micro](-)interactions [microsituations, microstructures and micro-interactions] (Mikrolagen, -strukturen und -interaktionen). It is namely, the time (period, age, era) of the mass-democratic blurring of the boundary (border, frontier, limit) between [the] [what is] private [sphere] and [the] [what is] public [sphere] [between (the) private and (the) public] (die Zeit der massendemokratischen Verwischung der Grenze zwischen Privatem und Öffentlichem)(,) with the corresponding (analogous, commensurate) consequences for the sociological discipline. That

contribution is not however made (performed, achieved, accomplished, rendered) as [a] methodically (i.e. methodologically) strict keeping to (or honouring of) the form-related (i.e. formal) or pure programme. And this is by (far) (no means) (still) (not) (yet) all (everything). The ambiguity (equivocalness, ambiguousness), which results (emanates, derives, arises, is derived (created), comes) from the manifold (multiple) mixing (blending, mixture) of the “pure” and historically loaded (or charged) form with each other (der vielfachen Vermischung von reiner und historisch geladener Form miteinander), is paired (i.e. combined) with another and just as rich in consequences (consequential) [ambiguity], which concerns (affects) the determination (or definition) of the pure form itself. [The] Pure form can, on the one hand, mean (signify, denote, stand for) a fixed (steady or settled) (stable, firm, solid) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations (Reine Form kann zum einen eine feste Konstellation oder Kristallisation von Beziehungen bedeuten), which fulfils a constitutive function in every social construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation). On the other hand, [the, a] pure form can represent (or constitute) a form-related (i.e. formal) criterion (ein formales Kriterium), whose purity consists in its fundamental (in principle) applicability to every constellation or crystallisation of relations, regardless (irrespective) of whether this [constellation or crystallisation] is “pure” in the (formal-sociological) sense (of formal sociology) or not (dessen Reinheit in seiner grundsätzlichen Anwendbarkeit auf jede Konstellation oder Kristallisation von Beziehungen besteht, gleichgültig, ob diese „rein“ im formalsoziologischen Sinne ist oder nicht). The difference (distinction) is patently (obviously, clearly, apparently) serious (grave, momentous, massive, weighty, vital). Because the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion – broadcast (featured, presented, published, printed) conceptually (as a (in

regard to a) concept (notion, term), notionally, terminologically) as (i.e. called) “unification (agreement or union) (unity) and split(ing) (division or disunion) (rupture)” by Simmel, as “association and dissociation” or “nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance” („Einung und Entzweiung“ von Simmel, als „Assoziation und Dissoziation“ bzw. „Nähe und Distanz“) by L. v. Weise – was not at all in its validity (applicability, value, worth, influence, prestige, force; Geltung) influenced by the success of the attempt at proposing (or formulating) (advancing, putting forward, drawing (setting) up, establishing, setting out) pure forms in the former sense [of the pure form] and at encompassing (embracing, spanning, covering)(,) through (by (means (way)) of) their systematisation(,) the entire (whole, complete) realm (field, area, sector, domain) of the social (den ganzen Bereich des Sozialen zu umspannen). Expressed (Put, Stated, Said, Revealed) differently (otherwise): the application of the (above-)mentioned (aforementioned) social criterion to all existing (present, available) social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) or phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences; Erscheinungen), and the finding (searching, sounding) out (discovering) of ultimate (final, last) fixed (stable or settled) (steady, solid, firm) forms or relation crystals (crystalline or crystallised relations) (das Herausfinden von letzten festen Formen oder Beziehungskristallen), to which that criterion could be applied in every social construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation) or phenomenon (in jedem sozialen Gebilde oder Phänomen), are two completely (entirely) different (dissimilar, unlike, distinct, differing, various, miscellaneous, varying, variant) things. Nonetheless (Nevertheless, All the same), Simmel mixes and confuses both with each other when he speaks of the pure form, and he describes (outlines, portrays, depicts) constellations (correlations or conjunctures) like (as)

for instance that of “primus inter pares” [“first amongst equals”] (so, thus, in such a way) as if they were (stood) at the same logical level with the criterion of “unification (agreement or union) (unity) and split(ing) (division or disunion) (rupture)”, although they can merely (only, just) be illustrations of the same [criterion]. Still (Even) further (more) (Furthermore, Moreover, What’s more): on (under, with, in) the assumption [that] pure forms in the sense (with the meaning) of (in accordance with) constellations or crystallisations of relations would benefit, as it were (so to speak), the status of social law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) (der Status sozialer Gesetzmäßigkeit), he [Simmel] wants to search (look) for (seek) analogous law-bound (deterministic or law(rule)-based) [formations] or (law(-)like) formations (kinds of moulding) (mouldings, formats, arrangements, layouts) (similar to the law) [law-bound (deterministic or law-based) or law-like formations (kinds of moulding)] in social phenomena (will er nach analogen gesetzmäßigen oder gesetzesähnlichen Ausformungen bei sozialen Phänomenen suchen), which are not elementary fixed (stable or settled) (steady, solid, firm) forms, but rather mobile (movable, moving) incarnations of the (above-)mentioned (aforementioned) form-related (i.e. formal) criterion (bewegliche Inkarnationen des erwähnten formalen Kriteriums). So (Thus,) he believes (opines, thinks, means, says) that e.g. [he] [it] can (be) ascertain(ed) (determine(d), establish(ed), trace(d), detect(ed)) on a stable basis “how the various (miscellaneous, different, distinct, varying, differing) stadia (i.e. stages) of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] are lined up (arranged, formed in a line, strung together), (up) to (until) what extent (degree) a supra-ordination in a certain (particular) relation is compatible (agreeable, well-tolerated) with ((in regard) to) [a(n), the]

equal (same, like, identical) ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) (ordering, inclusion, incorporation, classification, accession) in other relations” („wie sich die verschiedenen Stadien der Über- und Unterordnung aneinanderreihen, bis zu welchem Maße eine Überordnung in einer bestimmten Beziehung mit Gleichordnung in anderen Beziehungen verträglich ist“) etc.²⁰. It is, nevertheless (however), futile (fruitless, useless, of no use) to answer (respond (reply) to) such questions once and for all by means (way) of (through) formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) appearing (seeming) in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner) (deterministically) (gesetzmäßig anmutende Formalisierung), that is, to want to achieve (do, manage, complete, perform, accomplish) something which lies (is) beyond (on the other side of) the ad hoc proposed (or formulated) (advanced, put forward, drawn (set) up, established, set out) ideal-typical formalisations of historical sociology (was jenseits der ad hoc aufgestellten idealtypischen Formalisierungen historischer Soziologie liegt). Supra(-)[ordination] [superordination], sub(-)[ordination] [subjugation], and equal (same, like, identical) ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) (ordering, inclusion, incorporation, classification, accession) [Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order)] are not related in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner) (deterministically), but causally, that is, in accordance with (corresponding (according) to) each and every respective historical and personal constellation (correlation or conjuncture) in relation to (between) one another (Über-,

²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 18.

Unter-, und Gleichordnung beziehen sich nicht gesetzmäßig, sondern kausal, also entsprechend der jeweiligen geschichtlichen und personellen Konstellation aufeinander), so that statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) about (regarding) them [supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination] may (are, should) not (be) (allowed) (to) (be) assigned (ascribed) to (classified as, classed with) the realm (domain) of pure forms in the sense of (accordance with) (according to, for the purpose of) fixed (stable, firm or settled) (steady, solid) and ubiquitous crystallisations (so daß Aussagen über sie nicht dem Reich reiner Formen im Sinne fester und ubiquitärer Kristallisationen zugeordnet werden dürfen). They [Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination] can certainly (indeed, admittedly) be subsumed under the pure form in the sense of (accordance with) (according to, for the purpose of) the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of unification (agreement or union) (unity) and split(ing) (division or disunion) (rupture) or nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance – but (however) the application (use) of a ubiquitous criterion does not nearly (at all, by any means) (nowhere near, nothing like) found(s) (establish(es), justify, justifies, substantiate(s)) a(ny) law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) (aber die Anwendung eines ubiquitären Kriteriums begründet noch lange keine Gesetzmäßigkeit). [The] ubiquity of the criterion and law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) as [the] necessary recurrence (return) (als notwendige Wiederkehr) of certain (particular) phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) or constellations (correlations or conjunctures)(,) to which the criterion is applicable (applies), must (have to, necessarily) definitely (at any rate, at all events, in every case) (instance) remain (stay) logically and factually

(objectively, really, in reality) (logisch und sachlich) separated from each other.

Our analysis is – most (highly, very) likely (probably) (in all probability) unreflectedly and unintentionally (involuntarily, inadvertently, unwillingly) – confirmed by v. Wiese’s theoretical decision to do (go) without (for(e)go, relinquish, renounce, abandon, refrain from) the Simmelian search for fixed (steady or stable) (settled, firm, solid) and elementary forms of the relation (relation(al) forms) underlying (forming the basis of, characterising) all social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (die Simmelsche Suche nach festen und elementaren, allen sozialen Gebilden zugrundeliegenden Beziehungsformen)(,) and instead (of that (this)) to build (construct, erect, make) [a] pure sociology in principle on the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of association and dissociation or nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance. He [V. Wiese] expressly (explicitly, emphatically) identifies the concept (notion) of the pure form with the conceptual pair (pair of concepts; Begriffspaar) of nearness (proximity) and distance²¹, without though (however) seeing (realising, appreciating, accepting, recognising) that nearness (proximity) or distance cannot actually (in actual fact (in reality)) be a form ([an] at will (or arbitrarily) (randomly, as one likes) variable form without [a] fixed (solid or firm) (stable, steady, sturdy, settled) outline (contour) is in fact no form (beliebig variierbare Form ohne festen Umriß ist ja keine Form)), but is partly [a] given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance, condition; Gegebenheit) or force, under whose effect (impact, influence) forms come into being (arise, emerge,

²¹ Thus, e.g., when he writes “that the most general form of social events (incidents) must (has to, necessarily) consist(s) in approximations (i.e. approachings or coming near (bringing close together)) and distancing (distance, removal), in back and forth (to(-ing) and fro(-ing)), in to(wards) one another and away from one another ([going] to and from one another)...” („daß die allgemeinste Form der sozialen Geschehnisse in Näherungen und Entfernungen, im Hin und Her, in Zueinander und Voneinander-weg bestehen muß...“), „Beziehungssoziologie“, p.67.

originate, result, ensue, are created (produced)), partly [an] analytical criterion which is applicable (usable) [in regard] to forms having come into being in such a manner (derart entstandene Formen). The identification of (the) form with nearness and distance or association and dissociation, as logically precarious as it may be (also) (is), implies, at any rate (all events) (in any case), the admission (confession) that the separation between form and content can be carried out (through) (undertaken, implemented, enforced, accomplished) only at a level at which the actual (or main) (real, true, original, principal) theme (i.e. topic) (subject, matter) is the spectrum of the social relation in general (auf der eigentliches Thema das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung im allgemeinen ist). If, on the other hand (however), form is comprehended (grasped, understood, conceived, interpreted) as (taken for) [a] fixed (stable, firm or settled) (steady, solid) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations, then (so, thus) the [an] analysis must be aligned (or oriented) (adjusted, lined up, organised, geared, directed) in terms of content and historically (die Analyse inhaltlich und historisch ausrichten); here, therefore, historical (“general”, as (expressed [by]) Simmel (expresses (states, articulates) [it]), or “special”, as expressed by v. Wiese) sociology does the talking (has the first say, shoots its mouth off), and the only (sole, lone) possible formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) remains the typification (i.e. rendering into types) (classification under typifying forms) of content(s). If, however, formal *sociology* is unrealisable and if the form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of the (social relation’s) spectrum (of the social relation) must be epistemologically established (settled, introduced) outside of the (sociology’s) area (realm, sector, field, sphere) (of sociology), (so, then, thus) this does not in the

least mean, on the other hand, that the (pure sociology's) original (initial) approach (of pure sociology) could bear (carry, support) the entire (complete, whole, full) load (burden, weight, encumbrance, onus) of a social ontology (einer Sozialontologie). The form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of the social relation's spectrum, as this is described (outlined, portrayed) on the basis (by virtue) of (due to) the criterion "nearness-distance" (and) or "association-dissociation", just (only) constitutes an aspect of social ontology, which only in connection ([an] interrelation) with the rest [of the aspects] has (or obtains) (gains, gets) *social-ontological* relevance. If (When) this connection (interrelation) becomes apparent (clear, evident, obvious), (so, then, thus) at the same time it is clear that the formalism of pure sociology must be criticised not only from [a, the] sociological, but no less from [a, the] social-ontological point of view, even though (if) (albeit) in a different sense on each and every respective occasion, as it [the different sense on each and every respective occasion] corresponds to (in accordance (compliance) with, according to) the difference of both epistemological levels in respect of (from, between) each other. Formal sociology could not be developed (elaborated, formed, organised, arranged) into the [a] social ontology basically (essentially, fundamentally, in reality) because the prevailing (decisive, determinative, weighty, influential, leading) functionalistic point of view refused to tolerate (accept) (forbade) a(n) going into (showing of interest in, taking on (acceptance) of, being involved (engaged) with) factors, which until today (up till now) are still regarded as "substances (essences)", e.g. anthropological factors. Yet (However, But, Nevertheless)(,) only the broadening (widening, extension, expansion, enlargement) of the social-ontological horizon in [the, an] anthropological [direction] – as well as political [direction] and cultural-philosophical [direction pertaining to the philosophy of culture]

(–) direction (anthropological – as well as political – direction pertaining to the philosophy of culture) (in the direction of anthropology – as well as of politics and of the philosophy of culture –) (in anthropologischer – sowie politischer und kulturphilosophischer – Richtung), allows (permits) (it) [one, us], beyond the apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension, recording, capture, registration) of the formal constitution (texture or composition) (nature) of the spectrum of the social relation (die Erfassung der formalen Beschaffenheit des Spektrums sozialer Beziehung), to explain (explicate, elucidate, expound) (the explaining of) its mechanism too, through (by means of) whose activity the (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) of historically attested social(-)[forms] and cultural forms comes about (takes place) (durch dessen Tätigkeit die Vielfalt der historisch bezeugten Sozial- und Kulturformen zustandekommt). The same social-ontological critique (criticism) can be directed at Weber in so far as (to the extent that) the foundation stone (cornerstone) of his sociology, namely the concept (notion) of social action (der Begriff vom sozialen Handeln), represents (or constitutes) a(n) (different (alternative)) description (formulation, expression) (or paraphrasing) (paraphrase) of the concept of the social relation (der sozialen Beziehung). Social action (and) or (and) the social relation here also represents (or constitutes) something which in itself lies (is) outside of (historical) sociology. It [Social action] is nevertheless not extended (widened, broadened, expanded, enlarged) to a social ontology because the necessity of certain (particular) basic (fundamental) features (characteristics, attributes, traits) of social action (and) or (and) [the] social relation – above all of meaning (or sense) (sense (i.e. meaning)) (des Sinnes) – is indeed ascertained (attested, established, observed, detected, discerned, determined, discovered, seen, noticed), but not made understandable (clear,

intelligible, comprehensible) against the [an] anthropological (and cultural-philosophical) background (backdrop) (pertaining to the philosophy of culture) (nicht aber vor anthropologischem und kulturphilosophischem Hintergrund). It is not a matter (question) (Our concern) here (is not) (of) whether Weber otherwise (apart from that) (has) supported perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions) which could (have) be(en) used as [the] building blocks (basic components (elements)) of a social ontology, but whether he [Weber] made *systematic* use of them [such (the said, these) perceptions (building blocks)] in connection ([an] interrelation) with the (his) teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of social action and (or) of the social relation. But that was not the case. And nevertheless (nonetheless, yet) it is [a situation (state of affairs) which is] factually (or objectively) so close (near) to touching upon the mechanism of the social relation (liegt es sachlich so nahe, den Mechanismus sozialer Beziehung zu streifen), when (if) there is talk of “interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect)” („Wechselwirkung“) or “social action”, that intimations (hints, allusions, suggestions, indications, insinuations) about (regarding) it (that) [the mechanism of the social relation] by (in) Simmel and Weber are not lacking, (which, who) point(ing) in the direction which then (after(wards) (that)) gained (attained, achieved) general (universal) fame (familiarity, prominence, notoriety) (became generally known) through (by means of) symbolic interactionism (durch den symbolischen Interaktionismus)²².

The feeling (or sense) [that] formal sociology would actually (really, in actual (as a matter of) fact) overstep (exceed, go beyond, transgress, transcend, pass, violate, infringe) the epistemologically justifiable (or

²² In relation to that, Ch. IV, esp. Sec. Ba.

acceptable) (tenable, reasonable, defensible) boundaries (limits, borders, frontiers) of the sociological discipline occasionally (now and then (again), from time to time) arose (sprung up, appeared) amongst (in) sociologists, however, it [this (such a, the said) feeling] would not be substantiated (justified, accounted for, explained, established, founded) in greater (more) detail because of the lack (absence) of a social-ontological perspective. That is why (Hence) one (has) complementarily (politely) ushered out (or got rid of) (saw, seen) formal sociology (off) rather than epistemologically incorporating (or classifying) (ordering, including) (putting) [it] (in order)²³. For our part, we may sum up (summarise) such an incorporation (or classification) (ordering, putting in order, inclusion, sorting, arrangement) as follows. Formal sociology posed questions, which sociology neither solves nor is obliged (has) to (must) solve, and it [formal sociology] did not solve these questions itself because it only half posed the[se] same [these, such] [questions]. In the final analysis (end) (Ultimately, Finally, Lastly), the road (path, way) to their social-ontological solution was blocked (obstructed, spoiled, spoilt, ruined) owing (due) to (on the basis (because) of) the functionalistic premises, which could behold (see, espy, spot, perceive) in the taking seriously of (society's) (the) *being (Is)* (of society)(,) only a lapsing (slipping) back (falling, declining) into “substantialism (essentialism)”. Thus (So, In this way)(,) formal sociology had to already from the beginning get entangled (tangled up, embroiled, ensnared, involved, entrapped) in the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of every methodological individualism,(;) otherwise (differently) stated (said) (in other words), its

²³ Franz Oppenheimer opined (thought, believed, said, reckoned) [that] it [formal sociology] is merely the “antechamber (anteroom, foyer, lobby, entrance hall) of the shrine (sanctum, sanctuary)”,(;) Freyer believed that it [formal sociology] “could definitely (absolutely, perfectly, thoroughly) be a necessary preliminary (opening, prior, preparatory, precursory) stage (phase) for a more demanding (or sophisticated) (exacting) sociology”, *Soziologie*, p. 63 (Oppenheimer is cited here too).

[formal sociology's] starting point (or approach) itself forced (compelled, made, pressured, obliged, coerced) it towards partisanship (taking sides, advocacy, espousal, positioning, siding) in favour of (for, with) methodological individualism. Because, if one wants to remain (stay) with (by, in) the pure form, (then, so, thus) one must construct the ultimate (final, last) forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) out of (from) individuals (die letzten Vergesellschaftungsformen aus Individuen konstruieren). A(n) investigation (inquiry (inquiring, researching) into, exploration, examination) of historically attested forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), even of the smallest scale (size, extent, magnitude, degree), cannot be carried out (made, done) without (with no) consideration for (regardless) (of) content(s); it cannot e.g. be seen (recognised, appreciated, accepted, realised, understood) what then a "pure" way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) "the" family as [the] minimal form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)(,) away (or apart) (aside) from (to one side (out of the way) of) every comparison of the many historically known (familiar, noted, famous, well-known) types of families (family (familial) types; Familientypen) with one another(,) could be meant. Constellations (or correlations) of individuals (Konstellationen von Individuen), starting (beginning) with the dyad (angefangen bei der Dyade), can, on the contrary, (really, already) be theoretically devised (outlined or sketched) (planned, designed, drafted, contrived, mapped out) (anyway), in relation to which (while at the same time) one could say (opine, think, believe, mean, reckon) [along] with Simmel [that] it would (come to) be (thought of) (occur [to us]) "only that examples are possible in relation to them [such constellations of individuals], but less [possible] (in relation to them [such constellations of individuals]) that they [such constellations of

individuals] (would [necessarily] be) (were) (are) real” (es käme „nur darauf an, daß Beispiele möglich, aber weniger darauf, daß sie wirklich“ seien)²⁴. Simmel (has, had), however (nevertheless), overlooked (missed) that he, in all his examples, (had, has) always tacitly (silently, implicitly) regarded at least one thing (matter, affair, object) as real: the becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) of individuals (das Vergesellschaftetsein der Individuen). He [Simmel] talks (speaks), without exception, of individuals, who *already* have at their disposal (possess) the mental equipment (equipping, provisions, furnishings, fittings, outfit) of members of organised societies, and when (if) he [Simmel] sets himself the aim (objective, target, goal, end, purpose) of evading (sidestepping, avoiding, dodging, eluding, getting out of the way of) the fact of society and of showing (demonstrating, exhibiting, presenting, displaying) “society, as it were (so to speak), in status nascens [in a state of being born or in a nascent state]”²⁵, (so, then, thus) he does not at all think (have the idea) of (consider) doing the same with individuals *as* individuals, that is, of making understandable (clear) (explaining) the coming into being (creation, emergence, genesis, origin, formation process) of society from (nascent, emerging, arising) individuals coming into being (being created (born)), i.e. not already socialised in the framework of a(n) existing ([already] present (available)) society (Er redet ausnahmslos von Individuen, die *schon* über die mentale Ausstattung von Mitgliedern organisierter Gesellschaften verfügen, und wenn er sich das Ziel setzt, dem Faktum der Gesellschaft auszuweichen und „die Gesellschaft gleichsam in status nascens“ zu zeigen, so kommt er überhaupt nicht auf den Gedanken, dasselbe mit Individuen *als* Individuen zu tun, also die Entstehung der Gesellschaft aus entstehenden,

²⁴ *Soziologie*, p. 33, footnote 1; cf. p. 144.

²⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 15.

d. h. nicht bereits im Rahmen einer vorhandenen Gesellschaft vergesellschafteten Individuen begreiflich zu machen). Accordingly (Correspondingly), his [Simmel's] famous excursus (digression) "how is society possible?" („Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?“)²⁶ is based (rests) on a confusion (mistake): elements or phenomena, which are found (encountered) in every society, are passed off as elements or phenomena, whose effect (impact, influence) can give rise to (create, produce, bring into being, engender, generate) society, while at the same time (in relation to which) the presumed (accepted, adopted, assumed, supposed) genetic priority of these elements or phenomena vis-à-vis other [elements or phenomena] remains undiscussed and unproven (unproved, not proved, unverified); typically (enough), Simmel understands by that (thereunder), relations between individuals or between "the [an]" ["individual["] and ("the") ["society["]]. He (certainly, admittedly) knew (though), as mentioned, that historically working (labouring, making, doing, operating) "general" sociology (die historisch arbeitende „allgemeine“ Soziologie) cannot help (avoid) presupposing the fact of society (das Faktum der Gesellschaft vorauszusetzen), and at the same time he [Simmel] wanted to tie (knot) (i.e. link) (combine, associate, connect, affiliate, attach) the purity of formal sociology together with its [formal sociology's (own)] freeing (setting free, release, liberation, relief, rescue) from this presupposition [of the fact of society]. With (Among(st)) formalistic premises, this could also not be avoided (obviated, averted, evaded, eschewed). Since, however, even the encounter (meeting; Begegnung) between Robinson and Friday was marked (or shaped) (determined, formed, moulded, characterised, oriented) by the social pre(-)forming (shaping, moulding) [preforming] (die soziale Vorformung) of

²⁶ Loc. cit., p. 21ff.

both, since, that is, interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect; Wechselwirkung) can take place (happen, occur) only inside of (within) society or already socialised individuals (oder schon vergesellschafteten Individuen), when they [society or already socialised individuals] are supposed (meant) to (should) be [the] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of social science (Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaft), and not of (the) zoology of animals (beasts) living alone (lonely, solitarily) (solitary (lonely, isolated) animals) (und nicht der Zoologie einsam lebender Tiere), (then, so, thus) Simmel erred (was wrong (mistaken), strayed) when he related (applied, referred) his question on (about, regarding, over) the possibility of society to its [society's] genesis (Genese) and not to its [society's] cohesion (coherence; Zusammenhalt). The conviction (belief, certainty) of individualistic formal sociology [that] the cohesion of collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) is generally based (founded, established, set up) (generally bases (founds, establishes, sets up) [itself]) merely on (in) collective notions (or representations) (perceptions, views, ideas) (gründe bloß in kollektiven Vorstellungen) and ceases (stops, discontinues, finishes, breaks off) with these [collective notions (or representations)]²⁷, led, incidentally (by the way), to a paradoxical agreement with (the) [its, individualistic formal sociology's] opponent(,) [in] Durkheim.

²⁷ Thus, v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 9, 25ff.; cf. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 7.

B. The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance (Das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz)

The analysis of the previous section showed (established, proved, revealed) that the (formal-sociological) determination (or definition)(,) (in terms of formal sociology(,)) of the form (die formalsoziologische Bestimmung der Form) has two different meanings (significations, significances), which sociologically in a general sense are indeed both useful (helpful, beneficial), but not constitutive for the sociological discipline (aber nicht konstitutiv für die soziologische Disziplin sind). Now, the second of these meanings can, with (by [which]) (the) form (is) comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed, conceived, taken) as the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) (bei der Form als das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz aufgefaßt wird), find [have] [a] social-ontological use (application, utilisation, employment) [social-ontologically come in useful], although it [such (this) use] in itself(,) and without (with no) consideration (regard) for (regardless of) content(s) of any kind (sort, type)(,) is hardly (barely) able to (can scarcely) bear (carry, support) the epistemological load (or burden) (onus, weight, encumbrance) of a social ontology. When the founders of formal sociology inappropriately (inadequately, unacceptably) called (named) the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness and distance “form” („Form“), they (were) exclusively (solely, purely) thinking (thought, conceived) of (supposed, reckoned, believed in) its [the said formal criterion's] independence (autonomy, freedom) from sociological (and psychological) content(s); its possible direct or

indirect interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) with content(s) of another order did not (pre)occupy (absorb, engross, bother, keep) them (busy). As v. Wiese stressed (emphasised, underlined), the merely form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion was supposed (meant) to (should have been) distinguish (set, withdraw, take off, contrast) the specific realm (or field) (area, domain, sector) of a pure sociology (apart) from (with) that of all other social(-)[sciences] and [the (rest of the)] humanities (intellectual(-)spiritual) sciences) [the humanities] (sollte der bloß formale Charakter des Kriteriums das spezifische Gebiet reiner Soziologie gegen jenes aller anderen Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften abheben). Whereas (While) these [other social sciences and (the rest of the) humanities] would concern themselves (deal) with (work on, look into) (the) (political, religious, scientific etc.) goals (ends) (and) or (and) (goal(end)[-related]) content(s) (pertaining to goals (ends)) (Zwecken bzw. Zweckinhalten), for whose (the) sake (of which) humans (people, men) draw (come) near(er) [nearer] (near themselves (get close(r)) to (i.e. approach) one another(,) or distance themselves from one another (um derentwillen sich Menschen einander nähern oder voneinander distanzieren), pure sociology devotes (dedicates, applies) itself (attends) merely (just, only, simply) to the “direction (tendency, trend, movement)” and the “rhythm (cadence, pulse)” of this drawing (coming) near(er) [nearer] (i.e. approaching) (getting close(r)) or distancing, associating or dis(as)sociating movement (widme sich reine Soziologie bloß der „Richtung“ und dem „Rhythmus“ dieser annähernden oder distanzierenden, assoziierenden oder dissoziierenden Bewegung).

Through (By means (way) of) its formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to (matter of) form) (Formalität) understood in such a way, it [formal sociology] cannot (only) be demarcated (delimited, differentiated, marked (fenced) off) (only) from all other social(-)[sciences] and [the

(rest of the)] humanities (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) [the humanities], but at the same time [it (formal sociology) can] encompass all [of the other social sciences and the (rest of the) humanities)], i.e. subject (subjugate or subordinate) them to its [formal sociology's] own specifically form-related (i.e. formal) criterion. Every relation, of whatever (associating or dis(as)sociating) kind (sort, type), develops (or unfolds) in a(n) realm (or field) (area, domain, sector) defined in terms of content and has, in this respect, a content. However, (the) content does not determine (condition) its [every relation's] form-related (i.e. formal) structure; its [every relation's] "direction (tendency, trend, movement)" and its "rhythm (cadence, pulse)" can be separated from it (that) [(the) content] not merely in [a] methodic (i.e. methodological) respect, but also in reality (really, actually, concretely, objectively); they [(every relation's) (the said) "direction" and "rhythm"] therefore largely (to a great extent, for the most part, extensively, widely, broadly) follow an ((their) own) inner (internal) logic (of their own), even though (although, notwithstanding that), on the other hand, the influence of the constitution (composition or texture) (nature, character) of a(n) area (realm, sector) defined in terms of content on the course of the relation is (should, ought) (can)not (to) be overlooked (der Einfluß der Beschaffenheit eines inhaltlich definierten Bereiches auf den Verlauf der Beziehung nicht zu übersehen ist)²⁸. According to (In accordance with) [the] perception (view) of (the) formal sociologists (Nach Auffassung der Formalsoziologen), the ascertainment (establishment, observation) of this influence remains [a(n), the] matter (affair, subject, object, issue, business, cause, thing; Sache) of (for) the individual (separate, lone, single, isolated) social sciences – for us, it constitutes a main (principal,

²⁸ v. Wiese, loc. cit., pp. 12, 13, 14; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), esp. p. 276ff..

chief, primary, head, foremost, leading) task (job, duty, mission, function) of sociology itself.

From (Of) the analysis of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, (the) knowledge (insight, cognition, recognition, realisation, discovery, ascertainment) should (might, could) therefore be retained (kept), first of all with (in) [a] social-ontological intent(ion) (purpose, aim, [frame of] mind), [that] [the] direction and rhythm of the social relation are in principle (basically, fundamentally), in [(as) regard(s) to] their formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to (matter of) form), independent of each and every respective area (or realm) (sector, domain, sphere) of social activity (Von der Analyse des formalen Kriteriums von Nähe und Distanz dürfte also zunächst in sozialontologischer Absicht die Erkenntnis behalten werden, Richtung und Rhythmus der sozialen Beziehung seien prinzipiell in ihrer Formalität vom jeweiligen Bereich der sozialen Tätigkeit unabhängig).

This can then be formulated or generalised(,) [(in) such (a way), so] that the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the social relation is connected (joined, attached, linked) (or interrelates) (connects, depends) solely with (to, on) the fact that the subjects of this relation are humans (people, men) in society (Dies kann dahin formuliert bzw. verallgemeinert werden, die formale Struktur der sozialen Beziehung hänge einzig und allein mit der Tatsache zusammen, daß die Subjekte dieser Beziehung Menschen in Gesellschaft seien). Socially living or formed humans (people, men) represent (or constitute) the exclusive precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) for the general validity (force, currency, effect) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance (Sozial lebende bzw. geformte Menschen stellen die ausschließliche Voraussetzung für die allgemeine Gültigkeit des formalen Kriteriums von

Nähe und Distanz dar). This [formal criterion of nearness and distance] indeed (certainly, in fact, of course) never appears (shows itself, emerges, makes itself felt, occurs) in abstract purity, but always in connection (conjunction) with content(s) and goals (ends, purposes), yet precisely its [the formal criterion of nearness and distance's] (cap)ability (or capacity) (skill, competence) to (at) be(ing) connected with all possible content(s) and goals (Dieses tritt zwar nie in abstrakter Reinheit, sondern immer in Verbindung mit Inhalten und Zwecken in Erscheinung, doch gerade seine Fähigkeit, sich mit allen möglichen Inhalten und Zwecken zu verbinden), makes it [the formal criterion of nearness and distance] independent of (from) every individual (separate, lone, solitary, single, isolated) [(piece or kind of) content and goal] amongst them [(all) contents and goals]. (Something analogous is the case with) Socially living humans (people, men) (behave (act, are) analogous(ly)). They [Socially living humans] are always (situated or) located (found) in concrete situations (positions, locations, circumstances, conditions, states (of affairs)) (Sie befinden sich immer in konkreten Lagen), and in the course of this they [socially living humans] represent certain (particular) content(s) and goals (ends, purposes),(;) nevertheless (yet, however)(,) statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) about them [socially living humans] are possible, whose independence of (from) content(s) and goals (ends, purposes) consists exactly in their [such statements'] general applicability to content(s) and goal(s). If now the mere existence (presence, hypostasis, availability; Vorhandensein) of socially living humans or the fact of society vouches for (or guarantees) the validity (value, influence, prestige; Geltung) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, then (thus, so) that does not mean [that] the latter [the formal criterion of nearness and distance] could be put forward (or formulated) (proposed, set up (out), established,

advanced) on the basis of any (every) (arbitrary, random, at(-)will) way of looking at (consideration, contemplation, observation) (of) socially living humans (people, men) (whatsoever) (auf Grund beliebigen Betrachtung sozial lebender Menschen). The independence (autonomy, freedom) of the criterion [in respect] of (from) content(s) and goals (ends, purposes) requires (demands, commands, calls for, dictates, orders), first of all, an abstraction from the psychological factors, which drive (carry, push, impel, force) socially living humans (people, men) to those contents and goals. If one comprehends (grasps, understands, perceives, interprets, construes, conceives, takes) the expression (term, phrase) “psychological factors” in the widest (broadest) sense(,) and if one subsumes thereunder “thought acts (acts of thought)” as acts, as well as (just as (like)) “affects (i.e. emotions)” as acts, then (so, thus) the assumption (supposition, acceptance) seems (appears) legitimate [that] behind content(s) and goals (ends, purposes) are (stand), without exception, psychological factors (Die Unabhängigkeit des Kriteriums von Inhalten und Zwecken gebietet zunächst eine Abstraktion von den psychologischen Faktoren, die sozial lebende Menschen zu jenen Inhalten und Zwecken treiben. Faßt man den Ausdruck „psychologische Faktoren“ im weisten Sinne auf und subsumiert man darunter „Denkakte“ als Akte ebenso wie „Affekte“ als Akte, so erscheint die Annahme legitim, hinter Inhalten und Zwecken stünden ausnahmslos psychologische Faktoren). Under these circumstances, the autonomy (independence, self-sufficiency, self-reliance) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) (die Selbständigkeit des formalen Kriteriums von Distanz und Nähe) vis-à-vis the psychology of socially living humans (people, men) can be proved only by (means (way) of) (through) the ascertainment (observation, establishment, assessment, conclusion) [that] the same forms of distance

and nearness (proximity) (would) come about (take place) under the effect (impact, influence) of different (varying, diverse, varied, variable, dissimilar) psychologies ((and) (or) different forms of distance and nearness (proximity) (would) come about), and indeed under the effect (impact, influence) of similar (like) or identical psychological attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views; Einstellungen)²⁹. It is of course quite (very, well) possible [that] the separation (segregation, distinction) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion from (the) psychological factors [can] be (is) carried out (implemented, accomplished, enforced, executed, undertaken, conducted, put through) even (also) on (with, by (means of)) the assumption (supposition, acceptance) [that] the same psychical content(s) (dieselben psychischen Inhalte) would yield (or result in) (produce, amount (come) to) always the same forms of distance and nearness (proximity); however, in this case, that separation would be, if not less compelling (urgent, cogent, imperative, compulsive, conclusive, necessary), then(,) all the same (after all, really, actually, definitely, nevertheless, though, however)(,) less useful, both in [an] objective (or factual) as well as [(in) a] heuristic respect (regard). And one must take (consider) something else (into consideration). The non-psychological character of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance by no means (does not at all) mean(s) (signify, signifies) that this criterion cannot be applied to psychological phenomena, that is, [that] individual or collective psychology could not on the basis of the criterion “nearness-distance” be interpreted genetically and structurally. Completely (Entirely, Wholly, Totally) on the contrary. One must presently (currently, today) keep (hold, maintain, stick) [on] [to] the range (gamut, ambit, scope, compass, palette) of these logical

²⁹ See Sec. 2B in this chapter.

distinctions (differentiations) or possibilities, in order to clearly apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) the form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance. Compared with this (In contrast, On the other hand), the founders of formal sociology offer (provide, afford, present, show) fairly (pretty, quite, rather) wholesale (general, sweeping) and hence (therefore, thus) misleading (unclear, ambiguous) demarcations (delimitations) of the [what is] form-related (i.e. formal) against the [what is] psychological (und daher mißverständliche Abgrenzungen des Formalen gegen das Psychologische). Simmel kept (stuck) to (stood (remained, stayed (put)) by (at, with)) the [his] programmatic declaration (explanation, proclamation, pronouncement) [that] sociology disregards (refrains from) mental(-spiritual) processes (den seelischen Prozessen)(,) which would bring forth (produce, create, yield, spawn, present, give rise to) a social phenomenon, in order to explore (or research (inquire) (into)) (investigate, study, probe) the forms of the relation (relation(al) forms; Beziehungsformen) contained (included, embodied, incorporated) in this [social phenomenon]; in that (this) respect, it [sociology] proceeds (acts) [is] [in] the [a] same (similar) [way, manner] (equally, identically, alike) [as, to, with] (like) linguistics (Sprachwissenschaft)³⁰. In the same context, he [Simmel] opined (believed, thought, reckoned, meant, said, stated), however, that in sociology “the explanation of every individual (single, separate, solitary, lone, isolated, odd) fact [is] possible only in (on) [by] [a] psychological way (method) (path, road)”, and since in his individual (separate, single) analyses such explanations and exploration (investigation) of (or research (inquiry) into) forms (Formenerforschung) frequently (in many ways (cases)) went (go) into one another, thus (then,

³⁰ *Soziologie*, pp. 17-19.

so) he could not convince (persuade, satisfy) all his readers of the consistency (consequence, effect; Konsequenz) of his anti-psychological attitude (or stance) (positioning, approach, outlook, view, orientation)³¹. V. Weise shared this scepticism too, by seeing (beholding, spotting) (while he saw) in Simmel's perception (view) of (the) social relations as psychical interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (in Simmels Auffassung von den sozialen Beziehungen als psychischen Wechselwirkungen)(,) a source of misunderstandings³². We have already intimated (hinted, indicated, suggested) that here only a more precise (accurate, exact, specific, detailed, particular) and (or) broader apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) of the psychical [dimension, sphere, element] (eine genauere bzw. breitere Erfassung des Psychischen) can help [us] (along, further), so that thereunder [under the psychical](,) situation-related(referring, concerning) (i.e. situational) thought (intellectual) acts (acts of thought (thinking)) (situationsbezogene Denkakte) are [could] (be) subsumed too; because in itself it should (must, ought to) be regarded (considered) as undisputed (indisputable) that social interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) without [a, the] psychical act of those taking part (participating) (the participants (participators)) in that [social interaction] (soziale Wechselwirkung ohne psychische Akte der daran Teilnehmenden) can come about (take place, materialise, be achieved) impossibly [as an impossibility] (i.e. is impossible) (unmöglich zustande kommen kann). For his part, v. Wiese sought (looked (searched) for) firm (solid, strong) guarantees against a lapsing (slipping, dropping, falling,

³¹ In relation to Weber's positioning (stance, opinion, statement, comment; Stellungnahme), see Levine's remarks (comments, observations), *Flight*, p. 102ff..

³² *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 41.

sliding, descending, wandering) into the [what is] psychological [realm, sphere, dimension] (ein Abgleiten ins Psychologische), by contrasting (while he contrasted (set, distinguished, separated)) the “processes ((series of) events, occurrences) of consciousness (awareness) in man ([a] person (human), humans, people)” („Bewußtseinsvorgänge im Menschen“) against (with, vis-à-vis) (apart) (from) human acts (or actions) (acting(s)) (menschliche Handlungen) as “facta (i.e. facts as doings or behaviour)” („Fakta“), and exclusively (solely) incorporated (included, absorbed, admitted, assimilated, accepted, accommodated, took in) the latter [“facta (i.e. facts as doings or behaviour)”] in the area of competence of sociology³³. However, this solution appears (seems) (to be) too simple. A strict (rigorous, rigid) orientation of the (formal-sociological) way of looking at act(ion)s as facts (as regards formal sociology) would end (up) in (with) an infertile (unfruitful, unproductive, barren, sterile, fruitless) behaviourism (Eine strikte Orientierung der formalsoziologischen Betrachtungsweise an Handlungen als Fakten würde bei einem unfruchtbaren Behaviorismus enden), in contrast, by the way (incidentally), to v. Wiese’s stated (declared, proclaimed, announced) intention of assigning (classifying, allocating) sociology, even (also) after its formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring), to [under] the “understanding (knowing, perceiving, seeing) (or interpretive (interpreting)) social sciences” („verstehenden Wissenschaften“). Because the external (outer, outward, exterior, outside) course (sequence (order) of events) of the act(ion)s (der äußere Ablauf von Handlungen) does not necessarily (unconditionally) allow (permit) the observer (onlooker, watcher; Beobachter) [to make (form)] a valid

³³ Loc. cit., I, p. 19; II, p. 11ff..

(cogent, sound, conclusive) judgement (opinion, decision) about (over, regarding) the associating or dis(as)sociating character of the same [act(ion)s], unless he knows about the meaning (or sense) (sense (i.e. meaning)) (Sinn) connected with them [those (such, these) act(ion)s], that is, [about] the corresponding (relevant, equivalent, analogous) processes ((series of) events, occurrences) of consciousness (awareness). [The] meaning (or sense) and the external (outer, outward) course of an acting (act or action) (äußerer Ablauf einer Handlung) can in fact (of course) contradict (be contrary (inconsistent) to (with)) each other, as the proverbial Judas kiss (kiss of Judas) or(,) conversely (contrariwise, vice versa, the other way around)(,) a life(-)saving amputation and countless (innumerable, numberless) other examples attest (testify, vouch, confirm, affirm, verify)³⁴. On the other hand, not even (the) [an] exclusive orientation towards the meaning (or sense) of the [an] act (action or acting) is capable of (able (in a position) to) giving (providing) (give) an(y) explanation (or information) about (of, regarding) (insight into) its [the said act(ion)'s] associating or dis(as)sociating character, if (when) [the] meaning (or sense) is reduced to the inner (internal, inward) wishes of those acting (who act) (acting subjects), that is, the psychical [dimension, sphere, element] [is reduced] to I(Ego)-related(referring, concerning) [I(Ego)-related] affects (i.e. emotions) under (with, amongst) [the] omission of (i.e. without) situation-related(referring, concerning) (i.e. situational) thought (intellectual) acts (acts of thought (thinking)). Only the concrete and all-round (full-scale, comprehensive, general, universal) analysis of the interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) makes [it](,) in every individual (single,

³⁴ «J'embrasse mon rival, mais c'est pour l'étouffer» [“I embrace my rival, but it is to stifle (i.e. choke or suffocate) (smother, suppress) him”], [is what] Racine lets his Nero say (*Britannicus*, IV, 3, v. 1314).

separate) case(,) clear whether nearness (proximity) or distance is gaining (gains) the upper hand here (wenn Sinn auf innere Wünsche des Handelnden, also das Psychische auf ichbezogene Affekte unter Auslassung situationsbezogener Denkakte reduziert wird. Nur die konkrete und allseitige Analyse der Wechselwirkung macht in jedem einzelnen Fall deutlich, ob hier Nähe oder Distanz die Oberhand gewinnt)³⁵.

In relation to that, a clarification of the concepts (notions) of “nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood)” and “distance” themselves is needed (required) though first of all. If nearness (proximity) and distance, social-ontologically understood, cannot necessarily (unconditionally) be discerned (recognised, identified, spotted, discovered, perceived) in the course (order, sequence) (of events) of [an] external (outer, outward) acting (or action) (act), then (so, thus) they [nearness and distance] are (should, may, can) even (still) less (to) be measured likewise (also, at the same time) by (in relation to, on, with) the external benchmark (yardstick, scale, measure, standard) of [a] spatial distance (spacing or gap) (interval, space, detachment) (so sind sie noch weniger am gleichfalls äußeren Maßstab des räumlichen Abstandes zu messen). Spatial-physical and social nearness (proximity) (and) (or) distance (Räumlich-physische und soziale Nähe bzw. Distanz) differ so much from each other that they can even be (stand) in a(n) inverse (reverse, contrary, opposite) relationship towards (with, vis-à-vis, in relation to) each other (im umgekehrten Verhältnis zueinander). The emotional (or dramatic) (emotive, histrionic, emotion-laden, passionate) embrace (hug, embracing) of (a) pair (couple) (of) (two) (lovers) and the struggle (fight) of (between) two foes (enemies) with bare hands both

³⁵ Sorokin, *Society*, p. 93.

attain (reach, achieve, accomplish, arrive at) a(n) [the] (outer)(ut)most (most extreme, ultimate) [point] (i.e. limit or maximum) (ein Äußerstes) in (of) physical nearness (proximity), however, the difference (distinction) in social nearness (proximity) could not be greater (larger, bigger). The distance (spacing or gap) (space, interval, detachment) (Der Abstand), which the concepts (notions, terms) “nearness (proximity)” and “distance (Distanz)” indicate is therefore in principle (fundamentally) an inside (i.e. internal) distance (spacing or gap) (ein Innenabstand), which can manifest (or express) (show) itself in friendly (amicable) or inimical (hostile, antagonistic) acts (der sich in freundlichen oder feindlichen Akten äußern kann), but not necessarily (does not have to). The mere possibility of (the) practical (handy, useful, functional, expedient) manifesting (or expressing) (showing) oneself (Die bloße Möglichkeit des praktischen Sichäußerns) suffices (is sufficient (enough)), nevertheless (however), (in order) to motivate behaviour (um Verhalten zu motivieren), [just] as (like) (the) mere (bare, naked, simple) conjecture (or presumption) (suspicion, hunch, supposition, speculation, expectation; Vermutung) about (regarding, on, over) alien (foreign, strange, unfamiliar, different, extraneous) (i.e. others’ (someone else’s)) dispositions and intentions (purposes, aims) (fremde Dispositionen und Absichten)(,) brings into being (creates, gives rise to) one’s own analogous dispositions and intentions. How now does the entire (whole, total, complete) complex of dispositions, considerations (weighing(s) up, ponderings), intentions and possible or real acts (or actions) interrelate (connect, interweave) with the determination (or definition) of social nearness (proximity) and distance? The answer is obvious (or stands to reason) (suggests itself) if (when) one reformulates (rephrases, rewords) the question as follows: to what extent (in what respect (way)) does someone (anyone) confirm (acknowledge, validate, verify, affirm,

endorse, corroborate, bear out) or contest (dispute, deny, challenge) the sense (or feeling) of identity (Identitätsgefühl) (and) or the self-understanding of another,(;) to what extent (in what respect (way)) does someone (anyone) contribute to the increase (heightening, intensification, aggravation, improvement, enhancement) or decrease (reduction, lessening, erosion, debasement) in (of) the (understood in the [a] wide (broad) sense) feeling (or sense) of power (Machtgefühls) of another, regardless of (no matter) whether in foro interno (i.e. in the internal court; in private, privately; inwardly) or in foro externo (i.e. in the external court; in public, publicly; outwardly) (egal, ob in foro interno oder in foro externo)? The internal (inner) (inward) and/or external (outer) (outward) positioning (stance, opinion, statement, comment) of a subject vis-à-vis (in relation (regard) to, towards) the identity and power of another [subject] yields (produces, results in) their social nearness (proximity) to, or their social distance from, each (one an)other (Die innere und/oder äußere Stellungnahme eines Subjekts zur Identität und Macht eines anderen ergibt ihre soziale Nähe zu- oder ihre soziale Distanz voneinander). (Mind you, [It should be noted that] identity and power are confirmed or contested in accordance with (according to) what the subjects concerned define as one's, on each and every respective occasion, own and [an] alien (i.e. others' (someone else's, another's)) identity and power). This determination (or definition) of nearness (proximity) and distance refers to content(s), whose consideration, as [we have] already said [stated], transforms (converts, changes, transfigures) the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance from a postulate of "pure sociology" to the [a] component of a social ontology (das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz aus einem Postulat der „reinen Soziologie“ in die Komponente einer Sozialontologie verwandelt). The explication (explanation, clarification, elucidation,

illumination, exemplification, illustration) of the content(s) “identity” and “power” („Identität“ und „Macht“) remains reserved for (is to be left to) the third volume of this work. However, the [a(n)] indication of (reference to) that (it, such) [matter, topic, issue, (explication of) the content(s) “identity” and “power”] (thereupon) is objectively (factually) imperative (necessary, commanded, demanded) here.

If nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance do not represent (constitute) a physical-spatial, but a social (and) or internal (inner) (inward) relation(ship), then (so, thus) it is evident (elucidated, illuminated) (can be seen) from this (that) that the distance (spacing or gap) (space, interval, detachment) in the relation between two subjects cannot be measured with (on, by (means of), against) a single (sole) (one) objective yardstick (benchmark, measure, standard, scale) (Stellen Nähe und Distanz keine physisch-räumliche, sondern eine soziale bzw. innere Beziehung dar, so erhellt daraus, daß der Abstand in der Beziehung zwischen zwei Subjekten nicht mit einem einzigen objektiven Maßstab gemessen werden kann), as in [the case of] a spatial distance (wie bei einer räumlichen Distanz), but (however) in relation to that(,) (it takes) two yardsticks for the very frequent case (instance)(,) in which the attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views) of both subjects towards (vis-à-vis) each other are not absolutely symmetrical(,) (are required); there can therefore be two or more distances (spacings or gaps) between two subjects³⁶. For the just as frequent case (instance) again (in turn), in which the social relation consists in neither bilateral (mutual, reciprocal, on both sides) absolute nearness (proximity) or absolute distance, the concepts (notions) of “nearness (proximity)” and

³⁶ Pieper, „Grundbegriffe“, p. 173ff.; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 275ff.; v. Wiese (has, had) accepted the clarification of his commentators in [respect of] this formulation, „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 68.

“distance” must be relativised in a wider (broader) sense: they [“nearness” and “distance”] are not relative merely because of their dependence on subjective attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views), but likewise (also, as well, similarly) because every nearness (proximity) accompanies (is accompanied by, goes with) distance and every distance(,) [accompanies (is accompanied by, goes with)] nearness (proximity) (Sie sind nicht bloß wegen ihrer Abhängigkeit von subjektiven Einstellungen relativ, sondern ebenso deshalb, weil jede Nähe mit Distanz und jede Distanz mit Nähe einhergeht). Absolute[ly] [being] with(-)(,) [one another] (together, jointly) and absolute[ly] [being] apart (asunder, separate(d)) from(,) one another [Absolute with, and absolute apart from, one another,] are, seen (viewed, looked at, beheld) quantitatively, rather extreme and exceptional cases,(;) their social-ontological influence and status is, in the process (course of this) (into the bargain), unimportant (insignificant, inconsequential, immaterial, irrelevant) (Absolutes Mit- und absolutes Auseinander sind, quantitativ gesehen, eher Extrem- und Ausnahmefälle, ihr sozialontologischer Einfluß und Status ist dabei unwichtig)³⁷. Simmel, who somewhat incidentally (parenthetically, casually, in passing), but clearly(,) distinguished (differentiated) between [the] “spatial” and “psychological” meaning (significance) of nearness (proximity) and distance³⁸, stressed (emphasised) likewise (also, too, as well) “the unity of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (or distance) ((far) awayness; Entfernung), which contains (includes, embodies) any (i.e. every single) relationship between men (humans) (people) (die jegliches Verhältnis zwischen Menschen enthält)”. His [Simmel’s] attempt to comprehend (grasp, understand, perceive, interpret, construe,

³⁷ See in relation to that, Sec. 2A in this chapter.

³⁸ *Soziologie*, p. 539.

conceive, take) the form (or shape) (figure) of the stranger (alien or foreigner) as [a] “synthesis of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (distance or farness) (farawayness) (the remote (distant, far(away)) (Synthese von Nähe und Ferne)”, is based (rests) on a double (dual, twin) alternation of the spatial and of the “psychological” meaning (significance) of nearness (proximity) and distance. The distance in the relationship with (towards, vis-à-vis) [the, a] stranger (alien, foreigner) signifies (means) “that the (what is) near(by) (close) is remote (distant or faraway) (daß der Nahe fern ist)”, whose to be (or being) strange (i.e. strangeness, alienness or foreignness) (Fremdsein) consists, conversely (contrariwise), in [the fact] “that the (what is) remote (distant or faraway) (remoteness (distance or farness) (farawayness)) is near (close, proximate) (daß der Ferne nah ist)”: the termini (i.e. terms) (die Termini) “the (what is) near(by) (close)” and “near (close, proximate)” are here spatial, the termini “the (what is) remote (distant or faraway) (remoteness (distance or farness) (farawayness))” and “remote (distant or faraway)” are meant (reckoned, said) “psychologically”³⁹. Simmel (has, had)(,) furthermore (moreover, in addition, besides)(,) introduced a third parameter into the analysis of nearness (proximity) and distance: the extent (range, scope, area, size) and or the more general or more special (i.e. specific or particular) character of the common features (attributes, traits, characteristics) of two subjects⁴⁰.

The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance encompasses (spans, contains, comprises, includes) a (great) variety (diversity (of form) (multiformity) of social relations, which, for their part, can be grouped

³⁹ Loc. cit., p. 509.

⁴⁰ See in relation to that, Sec. 2B in this chapter.

(formed into groups) or typified (i.e. rendered into or classified under types) according to (in accordance with) form-related (i.e. formal) criteria (Das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz umspannt eine Vielfalt von sozialen Beziehungen, die sich ihrerseits nach formalen Kriterien gruppieren oder typisieren lassen). Nonetheless (Nevertheless, Yet)(,) these groups or types (diese Gruppen oder Typen) neither exist separately from one another(,) nor can a field (domain, area) (sector, realm, territory, zone, sphere) of validity (or applicability) (ein Geltungsgebiet) of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance outside of these types and groups be thought (conceived) (of) (imagined, reckoned, contemplated); [the] latter [(said) types and groups] constitute mere (different ((or alternative)) descriptions (paraphrasing(s), formulations, expressions; Umschreibungen) of the [said, aforementioned] [this] criterion, and it is a question of (the question is, it is asked) which of these (different or alternative) descriptions is (stands) nearest (closest) in abstracto to the criterion. If one takes the criterion at its face (nominal) value, if one remains (stays) therefore strictly with (by, at, in, amongst) the spatial metaphor, in which it [the (said) criterion] is expressed, then (so, thus) one can imagine it [the (said) (this) criterion] under only one single form of the relation (relation(al) form): the physical distancing from someone (die physische Distanzierung von jemandem), towards whom one would have a negative [attitude (stance or positioning)], and the physical approaching (or drawing near to) someone (die physische Annäherung an jemandem), towards whom one would have a positive attitude (stance or positioning) (approach, outlook, view, orientation) (another's physical distance or nearness (proximity) could also be indifferent to the (he who is) indifferent vis-à-vis another, although in general the former [physical distance] rather than the latter [(physical) nearness] promotes (fosters, encourages, supports, stimulates) indifference (dem Gleichgültigen

gegenüber einem anderen könnte auch dessen physische Distanz oder Nähe gleichgültig sein, obwohl im allgemeinen eher die erstere als die letztere Gleichgültigkeit fördert)). Yet in accordance with all social experience and also in accordance with the inner (internal) logic of social cohesion (coherence), such real forms of the relation (relation(al) forms) represent (or constitute) neither always the greater (larger, major)(,) nor the decisive (deciding, crucial) part of social interactions (Doch nach aller sozialen Erfahrung und auch nach der inneren Logik des sozialen Zusammenhaltes stellen solche realen Beziehungsformen weder immer den größeren noch den ausschlaggebenden Teil sozialer Interaktionen dar). This part can only be apprehended (grasped, understood) by (means (way) of) (through) [a(n)] in principle (fundamental) separation (or divorce) (parting; Scheidung) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance from the spatial point of view (standpoint). There remain (are) then two other points of view (left over, remaining), from (or under) which nearness (proximity) and distance can be understood: that [point of view] of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] or subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination or subordination](,) and that of for (with) and against (Es bleiben dann zwei andere Gesichtspunkte übrig, unter denen Nähe und Distanz verstanden werden können: jener der Über- oder Unterordnung und jener des Für (Mit) und Gegen). Both these points of view imply both (equally) (internal (inner, inward)) nearness (proximity) or distance⁴¹, and they cover, in practice, all cases (instances) (even those, in which external (outer, outward) and internal (inner, inward) distance or nearness (proximity) either way go hand in hand (with) (accompany) [each other])(,) except (for) (apart from) indifferent [“]without one another (i.e.

⁴¹ Cf. v. Wiese, „Randbemerkungen“, p. 189ff..

absence)"])(,) and(,) being apart (or separate) from one another (außer dem gleichgültigen Ohne- und Auseinander). Nevertheless, they are not in the least identical (with each other). The type of relation (relation(al) type) “For (With) – Against (Versus)” (Der Beziehungstyp „Für (Mit) – Gegen“) does not set [up] (put, place, posit, erect) [set up (or posit)] a(ny) supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] in the social relationship (im sozialen Verhältnis) of the participants (those involved (taking part)) vis-à-vis (to(wards)) one another, since it [the said type of relation] can be represented just as well by equal(s) [participants, parties, sides] [equals (i.e. equal participants)]. On the other hand, supra-ordination and subordination can stand (i.e. be) both under the influence (sign) of (the) “For (With)”, as well as under the influence of (the) “Against (one another)”, in principle (fundamentally) [it, they, supra-ordination and subordination] [can] be [a] form of association or of dis(as)sociation (grundsätzlich Form der Assoziation oder der Dissoziation sein). In regard to (Regarding) the conceptual (notional) difference of both types of the relation (relation(al) types) (in respect of each other), there also arises therefore (thus, as a result, consequently) a difference of extent (scope, compass, range, area, scale, girth, circumference). If (When) the form of the relation (relation(al) form) “For (With) – Against”(,) in view of (given) the possible equality of the participants (those involved (taking part))(,) cannot be completely (totally, absolutely) reduced to the form of the relation of supra-ordination and subordination, whereas (while), conversely (vice versa, contrariwise, the other way around) supra-ordination and subordination must be (is necessarily) without exception a relation of (the) “For (With)” or “Against (one another)” („Für (Mit)“ oder „Gegen(einander)“), then (thus, so) from that results (arises, emanates) [the fact] that the form of the relation “For (With) – Against”

(formulated otherwise (differently): “association – dissociation”, “friendship (amity) – enmity (hostility)” („Freundschaft – Feindschaft“)) represents the concept (notion) of the genus (genre, type, kind) (generic term (name)), whose species (den Gattungsbegriff darstellt, dessen Spezies) is (the) supra-ordination and subordination. And since there is no other form of relation (relation(al) form) except for (apart from, besides, other than) the aforementioned [forms of relation] (those [forms of relation] mentioned) (the possible and usual (common, customary, normal) case (instance) of (the) indifferent without one another (i.e. absence)(,) and(,) being apart (or separate) from one another is social-ontologically irrelevant, i.e. (it takes) the effect (impact, influence) of other social-ontological factors (is required (needed))(,) in order (so as) to (so that it [the said case (of indifferent without one another and being apart from one another)]) gain(s) (attain(s), reach(es), achieve(s), acquire(s)) social weight (gravity), and as socially relevant relationlessness (i.e. socially relevant absence (or lack) of a relation) it [the said case (of indifferent without one another and being apart from one another)] presupposes relations (und als sozial relevante Beziehungslosigkeit setzt er Beziehungen voraus)), thus (then, so, in this way) from that [it] must be concluded (inferred, deduced) that association and dissociation(,) or(,) friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility)(,) as [the, a] form of (the) [a] relation(,) includes (contains) the entire (whole, complete, total, full) spectrum of the social relation (das ganze Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung). This is the ultimate (final) logical and factual (or objective) consequence (implication) from (out of) the use of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance for the setting (or drawing) up (establishing, establishment, putting forward, construction, building) of a morphology of the “interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects)” between humans

(people, men), as they [who were] [those, the adherents (representatives, advocates, supporters)] of “pure sociology” had in mind (imagined, thought, conceived) (zur Aufstellung einer Morphologie der „Wechselwirkungen“ zwischen Menschen, wie sie der „reinen Soziologie“ vorschwebte). (Besides,) it is(, incidentally, by the way,) a mistake (error, fault, defect, flaw, blemish, shortcoming)⁴² to hypostatise the relationship of Up and Down in a relation, that is, [to hypostatise] the general concept (notion) of the direction (tendency, trend, way) of the [a] relation (relation(al) direction)(,) as form of the [a] relation (relation(al) form), and then to comprehend (understand, grasp, perceive, interpret, construe, take) the relation “Above (Supra) – Under (Sub) (Below)” and the relation “For – Against” as the (following, next, subsequent, consequent) tiers (or stages) (grades, levels) (after (that, them)), which are characterised (marked, labeled) by (the, [a]) growing (increasing) tension (stress, strain) during (in) the transition from the first to the third [tier (or stage)] (das Verhältnis von Auf und Ab in einer Beziehung, also den abstrakten allgemein Begriff der Beziehungsrichtung, als Beziehungsform zu hypostasieren und dann die Beziehung „Über – Unter“ und die Beziehung „Für – Gegen“ als die darauffolgenden Stufen aufzufassen, die sich durch die wachsende Spannung beim Übergang von der ersten zur dritten kennzeichnen). Up and Down (or: To and Away-From (Fro)) (Auf und Ab (oder: Hin und Weg-Von)) do not conceptually (notionally) mark (label, accentuate, underline) a(ny) real form of (the, [a]) relation (relation(al) form), but declare (or indicate) (show, point out, state, cite, explain) the direction (tendency, trend, way) of the relation (relation(al) direction) in general (generally)(,) as [a] theoretical variable, which can find (be of) use (usage, utilisation, application) as (so) long as

⁴² Plenge made (committed) it [such a (this) mistake (error)], „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 279ff..

(there are) real circumstances (relation(ship)s or conditions) of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] (reale Über- und Unterordnungsverhältnisse) (exist, are (present, available, known)), [for as long] as [a, the] real For and Against is present (available) (exists). Supra-ordination and subordination in principle, (then) again (in turn), bear (carry) (with)in themselves [a] tension (stress, strain) not slighter (smaller, lower, less) than the form of (the) relation “For – Against”, however (but) the slighter or greater (larger) tension, which can be ascertained (detected, discovered, observed, discerned) on each and every respective occasion in them [the said supra-ordination and subordination, and, “For – Against”], is reduced (traced) (goes) (back) to the fact that “Above (Supra)” and “Under (Sub) (Below)”, anyhow (anyway), originally (initially) move inside (of) (within) the broader (wider, more extensive (comprehensive)) area (realm, sector, sphere, field, ambit) of “For” and “Against”. That is why it has no (does not make) (any) real meaning (sense) to call (name) social relations “mixed (blended, bastard, mongrel) relations” („Mischbeziehungen“), if thereby (with (because of) that (it)) [it] were (is) supposed to (should) be meant [that] in them [such (these, the said) “mixed relations”] (there would be) a mix(ing)(ture) (blend(ing) (combination, assortment) of in themselves different forms of (the) relation (relation(al) forms), also observable in [a] pure culture (or form) (i.e. unadulterated)(, would take place (occur, happen)) (in ihnen fände eine Mischung von an sich unterschiedlichen, auch in Reinkultur beobachtbaren Beziehungsformen statt).

2. (The) polarity (duality) in the spectrum of the social relation (social relation's spectrum) (Die Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung)

A. Anthropological parameters: the mortality of man [humans, people] (man's mortality) (Anthropologische Parameter: die Sterblichkeit des Menschen)

Formal sociology indeed put forward (or drew (set, put) up) (established, erected, constructed, stated, posed) the criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance, however, it (has) (did) not justify (justified) (account (give reasons) for, substantiate, support) why the form-related (i.e. formal) way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) social phenomena had to be oriented precisely (exactly, just) towards this criterion, why from (out of) functionalistic and formalistic (i.e. form-related) premises, this and no other guide (leitmotiv, main (connecting) thread, introduction) could be derived (extracted, produced, obtained, gained, won, got) for sociological work (warum aus funktionalistischen und formalistischen Prämissen dieser und kein anderer Leitfaden für die soziologische Arbeit gewonnen werden konnte); the in(cap)ability (incapacity, incompetence) to account for that (this), made of course the boundaries (of) and holes (gaps, voids) of (in) those premises visible (noticeable, obvious, evident, clear). L. v. Wiese admitted (confessed, conceded, granted, allowed, recognised) the derivation of the criterion from (not) (non-)sociological factors or points of view, however, typically (enough) (characteristically, significantly)(,) he spoke only in passing (casually, parenthetically) and moreover (additionally, in addition, furthermore, besides) inconsistently about (on,

regarding) that. Once (One time), he opined (said, thought, believed, reckoned, meant) [that] the assumption (supposition, acceptance) of two antithetical fundamental (basic) relations is simply an “evident (obvious) proposition (theorem, sentence, clause)” („evidenter Satz“)⁴³. Yet evidences (i.e. pieces of evidence or evident propositions) (manifestness(es), obviousness(es); Evidenzen) stand out (attract attention, are conspicuous (remarkable, seen), get noticed, become clear) only from (in) a certain (particular) epistemological or factual (objective) (practical, material) perspective, and the perspectivistic character of an evidence (i.e. piece of evidence or evident proposition) (und der perspektivistische Charakter einer Evidenz) must then (above all) turn into (become) the [an] object of reflection(,) (above all, especially, particularly, in particular) when (if) the evidence concerned (in question) – as undisputed (uncontested, indisputable, unquestioned, incontestable) [as] it (is) in itself (is) – attains (gains, achieves, reaches) [a] new relevance (pertinence)(,) and for the first time undertakes (takes on, assumes, adopts, accepts) tasks (jobs, duties, functions, missions) [in respect] of founding (establishment, foundation) (foundation(al) tasks) (Grundlegungsaufgaben). In another context, v. Wiese argued [that] the antithesis of association and dis(as)sociation is “a necessity resulting (arising, ensuing, coming into existence (to light)) from (out of) the structure of our human mind (intellect or understanding) (sense, reason, intelligence) (unseres menschlichen Verstandes)”, since we could (can) only understand something through (by (means of)) “separation” or “division (dichotomy, bisection, bifurcation)” („Sonderung“ oder „Zweiteilung“)⁴⁴. Nevertheless (Yet, All the same, However)(,) from (out of) the general assumption (acceptance, supposition, hypothesis) [that]

⁴³ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 11.

⁴⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 178.

human thinking (thought) on the whole (overall, in general, generally) is based (rests) of necessity (necessarily) on antithetical conceptual pairs (pairs of concepts; Begriffspaaren) and must proceed (act) dichotomously, the suitability (fitness) of this or that concrete antithesis or dichotomy to constitute (provide, give, make, produce, grant, afford, create, carve out) the foundation stone (cornerstone) for the arrangement (order(ing), formation, layout, design, structure, structuring) of the (subject) matter (material, stuff, substance, topic) of a certain (particular) discipline, does not automatically arise (result, crop up, emanate); this suitability must be proved especially with regard to (in view of) the specific theoretical requirements (demands, prerequisites, desiderata) of the discipline. In the end (Eventually, Ultimately, Finally, After all), v. Wiese advocated (supported, justified, defended, maintained, represented, professed) the view (perception, opinion) [that] sociology took (would take (infer, gather, glean, draw, learn)) the [its] teaching (doctrine, theory) [in respect] of (about, regarding) “with(-)[man] and counter(against)[-]man (fellow man and anti-man) [with-man and counter-man (i.e. fellow man and anti-man)]” („Mit- und Gegenmenschen“) “from (out of) anthropology”⁴⁵. If one may (can, should) interpret this sweeping (general, wholesale) statement (opinion, pronouncement, assertion, proposition) in (the) light of v. Wiese’s sparse (sparing, scanty, meagre) anthropological utterances (expressions, remarks, comments, statements, observations), then (so, thus) one can presume (suspect, assume, expect) that he [v. Wiese] wanted to correlate (interrelate, combine, (inter)connect) (put into a combination (in touch)) the associating and dis(as)sociating social forces with those “elementary forces” in man (daß er die assoziierenden und dissoziierenden sozialen

⁴⁵ *Soziologie*, p. 11.

Kräfte mit jenen „elementaren Kräften“ im Menschen in Verbindung setzen wollte), which despite (in spite of, notwithstanding) all [the] variation(s) (modification(s)) of the “historical form of [a] manifestation (phenomenon or appearance) (apparition, occurrence)” („historischen Erscheinungsform“), despite all [the] weakening (attenuation, toning down, lessening, softening, reduction, mitigation, decrease, decreasing; Abschwächung) or strengthening (reinforcement, boosting, amplification, intensification, concentration, fortification, increase, increasing; Verstärkung) from time to time (now and then (again)), nevertheless exist (persist, endure) and take (or have an) effect (work, act, operate, are effective) permanently; these elementary forces determine (or give rise to) (cause, necessitate, condition) the “fundamental (basic) positioning (or stance) (attitude, view) of man towards (vis-à-vis, in relation to) man” („Grundeinstellungen von Mensch zu Mensch“) and, if one disregards (refrains from) (the) biological needs (wants, requirements, desires, necessities, wishes) (“hunger and thirst”) amongst them [humans, men, people], they [the said elementary forces] can likewise (also) be classified in accordance with (according to) the dichotomous schema: “love” on the one hand, “hate (hatred), lust (thirst) for (addiction to, obsession with) power (domination) (or domineeringness) (imperiousness, bossiness), envy (jealousy)” on the other (hand)⁴⁶. In this syllogistic reasoning (Syllogistik), the transition from anthropology to sociology ensues (results, follows, takes place, occurs, is effected (carried out)) through (by way (means) of) the (recti)linear projection (projecting; Projizierung) of the fundamental (basic, elementary) dichotomy of an anthropology of

⁴⁶ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 121. (Even) Simmel (also) occasionally (now and then (again), sometimes) sees (beholds, spots) the dichotomy “association – dis(as)sociation” from the perspective of the dichotomy “(natural, normal, constitutional, inherited) opposition (rivalry, antagonism) (given (i.e. decreed) by nature)” („naturgegebene Gegnerschaft“) – “sympathy between humans (people, men)” (too, as well), see e.g. *Soziologie*, p. 196ff..

drives (urges) (Triebanthropologie) onto the fundamental dichotomy of a formal sociology. Through (Because of) that (it) (Thus, Thereby, In this way), the programmatically frowned-upon (disapproved-of, scorned) binding (bond, attachment, tie, relationship) of forms to (with) content(s) is (nevertheless, however) restored (made, produced, fabricated, manufactured, established, done) (after all, anyway, all the same), albeit (even though (if)) (,) in the worst conceivable (possible, imaginable, thinkable) way. Because recourse (reversion, reverting) to (the) polarity in the spectrum of the anthropology of drives (urges) for the explanation of (the) polarity in the spectrum of the social relation stands or (and) falls on (by) the anthropology of drives (urges) itself, and moreover (in addition, furthermore) it [this (such) recourse] endangers (threatens, puts at risk, jeopardises, imperils) the (pursued) clear separation (striven for, aimed at, sought after) of the sociological from the psychological (die angestrebte klare Trennung des Soziologischen vom Psychologischen). Nonetheless (Nevertheless, All the same), the coupling of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) with anthropological content(s) remains in itself symptomatically and social-ontologically instructive (informative, revealing, illuminating).

It is obvious that the criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance can be (properly) formulated and used (utilised, employed) only in the form (shape or frame) (figure, guise) of a spectrum (nur in Gestalt eines Spektrums). There (really) is not (in fact, of course, indeed) [merely, only, just] (*the nearness (proximity)*) (nearness (proximity)) and (*the distance*) (distance), because then history and society would consist of (only) two (single, sole, lone, only, unique) monotonous recurring (recurrent) and (reciprocally (mutually) alternating) relations (reciprocally taking turns) (beständen Geschichte

und Gesellschaft aus zwei einzigen monoton wiederkehrenden und sich gegenseitig ablösenden Beziehungen), but many forms and grades of nearness (proximity) and distance are attested (to) (witnessed, vouched for) (sondern es sind sehr viele Formen und Grade von Nähe und Distanz bezeugt), which can be (simplistically (simplificatively) and approximatively) grouped into a number of (multiple, several, quite a few, various, diverse) classes (in a simplificative (or simplified) (simplifying, simplistic) and approximative (i.e. approximate) (approximated) way) (die sich vereinfachend und approximativ in mehrere Klassen gruppieren lassen). This grouping (group formation) or classification yields (i.e. results in or amounts (comes) to) (produces, makes)(,) then (in that case)(,) a spectrum if (when) one carries (makes, does) it [this (the said, such) grouping or classification] (out) with regard to two fixed (stable, steady, firm, settled, solid), symmetrically opposite (contrary, opposed, conflicting, inverse, inverted) out(er)most (extreme, furthest, ultimate) boundaries (borders, frontiers), one [boundary] of which must mark (label, [be]) patently (obviously, manifestly, evidently, clearly, apparently) (the) extreme nearness (proximity), the other [(boundary) of which](,) (must mark) (the) extreme distance (Diese Gruppierung oder Klassifizierung ergibt dann ein Spektrum, wenn man sie im Hinblick auf zwei feste, symmetrisch entgegengesetzte äußerste Grenzen vornimmt, deren eine offenbar die extreme Nähe, die andere die extreme Distanz markieren muß). Polarity as a result (consequently, therefore, thus) (constitutively) belongs (constitutively) to the spectrum of the social relation (Polarität gehört somit konstitutiv zum Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung). The (in it (that) [(the) spectrum] apprehended (grasped, understood)) forms and grades of the social relation (apprehended in the (that) spectrum) are able to (can), because (on account) of (due to) their (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality)

(of form) (multiformity) and precisely (especially, just, right) in their (great) variety, be understood in context ([their] correlation [with one another]) only by means of (through) a clearly and objectively (or factually) justifiable (or foundable) (establishable, substantiatable, accounted for) demarcation (delimitation) of the entire (whole, complete) field,(;) a demarcation, which simultaneously (concurrently) (makes, places, puts) (provides) criteria (available, at one's disposal) for the arrangement (or order(ing)) (layout, formation, grouping, marshalling, setting out, disposing, disposition, disposal, design, pattern, scheme, structure) and definition of the content(s) of the spectrum (Die in ihm erfaßten Formen und Grade der sozialen Beziehung lassen sich wegen ihrer Vielfalt und gerade in ihrer Vielfalt erst durch eine klare und sachlich begründbare Abgrenzung des ganzen Feldes im Zusammenhang verstehen, ein Abgrenzung, die gleichzeitig Kriterien zur Anordnung und Definition der Inhalte des Spektrums zur Verfügung stellt). [The] Social relations, which lie (i.e. are (found, located) [take place]) between both poles of the spectrum, must be, therefore (accordingly, thus, according to that), comprehended (grasped, understood, construed, regarded, conceived, interpreted) as (taken for) successive (consecutive, serial, contiguous) attenuations (weakenings, reductions, lessenings, tonings down, softenings, easings off, mitigations, extenuations) of the extreme intensity of that pole(,) to which they [(the) (said) social relations] are [found] (stand) nearer (closer) (Die sozialen Beziehungen, die zwischen den beiden Polen des Spektrums liegen, müssen demnach als aufeinanderfolgende Abschwächungen der extremen Intensität jenes Pols aufgefaßt werden, dem sie näher stehen). How the continuity of the spectrum of the social relation (the social relation's spectrum) can be determined (caused, necessitated, conditioned, called for) by its (the spectrum's) [own] polarity (Wie sich die Kontinuität des Spektrums der

sozialen Beziehung durch dessen Polarität bedingen läßt), will be explained (explicated, expounded, elucidated, commented on) later (afterwards)⁴⁷. In the face (view, light) of extreme intensity, with which the social relation at (on) both poles of the spectrum is loaded (or charged)(,) and in which an [the] (outer)(ut)most (most extreme, ultimate) [point] (i.e. extreme, limit or maximum) in human possibilities manifests (makes) itself (known), the coupling of these poles with anthropological factors or content(s) referring (with reference) to (on the basis of) [the] ultimate (final, last, end) and [the] most elementary [of] given (actual) facts (actualities, realities, circumstances) of human existence ensues (results, takes place, occurs, follows) (Angesichts der extremen Intensität, mit der die soziale Beziehung an beiden Polen des Spektrums geladen ist und in der sich ein Äußerstes an menschlichen Möglichkeiten kundtut, muß auch die Koppelung dieser Pole mit anthropologischen Faktoren bzw. Inhalten unter Hinweis auf letzte und elementarste Gegebenheiten menschlicher Existenz erfolgen), which exist and have an (take) effect (work, act, operate, are effective)(,) irrespective of whether one supports (justifies, represents) an anthropology of drives (urges) or [an anthropology] of Reason, a functionalistic or substantialistic (ob man eine Trieb- oder eine Vernunftanthropologie, eine funktionalistische oder substantialistische), an “optimistic” or a “pessimistic” perception (view, conception, opinion) of man (humans, people, men) (Menschenauffassung). Here the point (it) must (at stake), in other words, be about (a question of) (is) that upon (or to) (with) which man – every man – depends (or is attached (involved) (clings)) as [an] active being (t)here (or existence) in the social world (als aktives Dasein in der sozialen Welt),(;) [the point must be] about [a question of] his (man’s)

⁴⁷ See Sec. 3A in this chapter.

existence as such and as [a] whole (um seine Existenz als solche und als ganze). Looked at (Regarded, Viewed, Seen, Considered, Beheld) in this way (so, thus), there is nothing more elementary and original (or primal) (primordial, initial) than the maintenance (keeping up, adherence to) or the interruption (break(ing), disruption, stoppage, disconnection) of (in) (the) vital functions, [such] as [in] (like) life (living) or death. And since man – every individual (separate, single, lone, solitary, isolated) man – does not necessarily (unconditionally) come into the world, but must invariably (inevitably, undoubtedly, inescapably) die (decease, pass away, perish), (thus, so, then) the deepest and [one and] only (sole, lone, unique) necessity of his existence lies (is (found, located)) (in) his mortality (So betrachtet gibt es nichts Elementareres und Ursprünglicheres als die Aufrechterhaltung oder die Unterbrechung der vitalen Funktionen, als Leben oder Tod. Und da der Mensch – jeder einzelne Mensch – nicht unbedingt in die Welt kommen, aber unweigerlich sterben muß, so liegt die tiefste und einzige Notwendigkeit seiner Existenz in seiner Sterblichkeit). The contingency (fortuitous (chance) nature) of life is won (acquired, got) day by day and year by year from the necessity of death, irrespective (regardless) of whether the individual may think about (of) it [death] or not; and the fact that life (living) [is] revocable (retractable, withdrawable, cancellable), but death (is) irrevocable (irreversible), grants (affords, gives, accords) the latter [death] a higher (superior) status *in life*, to the extent that [the] intensity and range (scope, consequences, significance) of social acts (or actions) must be judged (assessed, evaluated, gauged, measured) by their irrevocability (irreversibility), that is, by their nearness (proximity) to death (Die Kontingenz des Lebens wird der Notwendigkeit des Todes Tag für Tag und Jahr für Jahr abgewonnen, unabhängig davon, ob der Einzelne daran denken mag oder nicht; und die Tatsache, da das Leben

widerrufbar, der Tod aber unwiderruflich ist, gewährt letzterem in dem Maße einen höheren Status *im Leben*, wie Intensität und Tragweite von sozialen Handlungen von ihrer Unwiderrufbarkeit, also von ihrer Nähe zum Tod her beurteilt werden müssen). Life (Living) cannot become (turn into) the yardstick (or measure) (benchmark, standard, scale) of (for) death, because death does not know what life (living) means,(;) (however,) death(, however,) becomes (turns into) the yardstick (or measure) of life (living), because the living can (always) imagine (envisage, envision, visualise, picture) death (at any time (moment)) – death as one’s own and alien (foreign, strange) (i.e. another’s (someone else’s)) dying (death)(,) and death as one’s own and alien (i.e. another’s) killing (homicide) (den Tod als eigenes und fremdes Sterben und den Tod als eigene und fremde Tötung).

In which (what) sense now does (is) the mortality of man (die Sterblichkeit des Menschen) as [the] deepest and most necessary (imperative, requisite) dimension – which encloses (encompasses, surrounds, encircles, shuts in, locks up) the fact of life (living), since only [the, what is] living (alive, animate; Lebendes) can be mortal (sterblich) – interrelate(d) (connect(ed) (interwoven) (join(ed), attach(ed)) with (to) the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation? In all probability (likelihood), mortality and death would be social-ontologically irrelevant(,) if all humans (people, men) died (in) a (one) single (and only) (only one) way (manner), namely, a “natural death”(,) as a result of (owing (due) to, because (on account) of) organic dysfunction(s) or organic exhaustion (debility, fatigue, depletion, burnout, breaking point) without the help (mediation (intervention) or doing(s)) (assistance, effect, deeds, to do) of other humans (people, men) and without the direct or indirect effect (impact, influence) of sociogenic factors (ohne das Zutun

anderer Menschen und ohne die direkte oder indirekte Wirkung
 soziogener Faktoren). The same (equal, identical, like, similar)
 immanence, the same unimpressionability (or non-suggestibility) (state of
 not being easily influenced) and the same manner (way, mode) of dying
 (death) for all [people] (everyone) would make (from (out of)) (turn) it
 (that) [dying, death] (into) a socially neutral magnitude (Die gleiche
 Immanenz, die gleiche Unbeeinflußbarkeit und die gleiche Art des
 Sterbens für alle würde aus ihm eine sozial neutrale Größe machen), i.e.
 something (in relation) (to) (on, at, by) which (whereto) (no difference)
 could (would) (not) have (been) (able to) spark(ed) off (ignited, inflamed,
 kindled, lighted, provoked, aroused, incited) [eventuated, ensued,
 resulted] (no (any) difference). The possibility of bringing about (causing,
 effect(uat)ing, giving rise to, producing, inducing, achieving, resulting in)
 inequality (or dissimilarity) (diversity, difference, disparity, imparity;
 Ungleichheit) through (by means (way) of) human doing (i.e. deeds)
 (action(s), activity, activities, conduct, behaviour, movement(s); Tun)
 regarding (concerning) the imminence (Imminenz) and the manner (way,
 mode, fashion, kind, sort, type) of death brings (calls) the factor
 “mortality” into (social-ontological) play (in relation to (as regards) social
 ontology). Mortality does not constitute therefore [a] mere (bare, simple,
 naked) reality, whose occurrence (which) is reckoned (on) (or expected)
 (calculated, projected) (to occur) at a future (point in) time (moment,
 date), but it [mortality] opens (sets) up (reveals, discloses) for (to) the
 socially acting subject (dem sozial handelnden Subjekt) practical
 possibilities, of which it [the said (socially acting) subject] can make use
 in (at) certain (particular), often chosen (selected) (points in) time(s)
 (moments), both in relation (with (in) respect (regard)) to (of) other
 subjects(.) as well as in relation to itself (himself); because everyone
 knows or finds (figures, works) (out) (discovers) what he [one] has to do

in order to bring about (on) (realise, accomplish, cause, induce, procure, precipitate) one's own or [an] alien (foreign, strange) (i.e. another's (someone else's)) death, when (if) it [that, (one's own or another's) death] only (is) really (matters) (important). Consequently (Therefore, Thus, As a result), the (necessary) internal (inner, inward) (necessary) relation between the anthropological basic given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance) of being (to be) mortal and of the formation (development or emergence) of (the) polarity in the spectrum of the human social relation becomes obvious (apparent, evident, manifest, patent) (Somit wird die innere notwendige Beziehung zwischen der anthropologischen Grundgegebenheit des Sterblichseins und der Herausbildung der Polarität im Spektrum der menschlichen sozialen Beziehung offensichtlich). It would not cross any man's (human's, person's) (anyone's) mind to (No man (human, person) would [ever] think of) kill(ing) another [man, human, person], were (if) death amongst humans (men, people) (were, was) an unknown (unfamiliar, unidentified) phenomenon, that is, were (if) humans [in respect] of (from) [based on] their [own] constitution (composition, texture or nature) immortal (undying, deathless) (wären Menschen von ihrer Beschaffenheit her unsterblich); and someone would just as little want (to) or have to sacrifice his own life for another [human, person, man]. *These* extreme manifestations (demonstrations, displays, expressions, statements, exhibitions) of enmity (hostility) and friendship (amity) amongst humans (people, men) would simply fail to materialise (appear) (not take place (happen)),(;) both (the two) poles of the spectrum of the social relation would cease (to exist (apply)) (be discontinued (lost, left out, omitted, dropped, removed)) (become unnecessary)(,) and with their [the said poles'] cessation (discontinuation, omission, abolition), the structure of the spectrum would (also) change from the ground up (scratch) (i.e.

fundamentally or completely) (too, as well)) (*Diese* extremen Bekundungen von Feindschaft und Freundschaft unter Menschen würden einfach ausbleiben, die beiden Pole des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung würden wegfallen und mit ihrem Wegfall würde sich auch die Struktur des Spektrums von Grund auf ändern).

For the making (manufacture or establishment) (production, manufacturing, fabrication, completion, making, establishing, restoration) of the social-ontological interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) (Zur Herstellung des sozialontologischen Zusammenhanges) between the (anthropological) basic (anthropological) given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance) of being (to be) mortal and the polarity of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation), it however (nevertheless) does (is) not suffice (sufficient, enough) to leave (set) aside (exclude, eliminate, ignore, disregard) natural death as [a, the] neutral magnitude(,) in order to put (place) [the] manner (way, mode, fashion) (or kind (sort, type, style, species)) and likelihood (probability, plausability) of (the) violent (forcible) [death] (Art und Wahrscheinlichkeit des gewaltsamen) at the centre (focus) of attention (focal point, core). Over and above (Beyond) that (Furthermore), we must comprehend (understand, grasp) death not as [a] biological phenomenon, i.e. as [a] demise (i.e. deceasing or passing) (Ableben), which concerns (pertains to, affects, regards) a concrete individual organism and takes place (comes to pass, is performed (carried out)), as it were (so to speak), in a social vacuum, but as [a] socially meaning-like(bearing) (i.e. meaningful or purposeful) process (event, occurrence) (sondern als sozial sinnhaften Vorgang). In relation to (Regarding) that, violent (forcible) death offers (provides, gives, grants, presents) considerably (substantially, significantly, much) (more) firm(er) (steady, steadier, stable(r), solid)

clues (leads, indications, grounds) than (the) natural [death]. Because the meaningfulness (purposefulness or meaning-likeness) (Sinnhaftigkeit) of natural death can be asserted (claimed, maintained, contended, argued, alleged) merely on the basis of unprovable metaphysical or religious constructions,(;) during violent death, on the other hand (however), subjectively meant meaning (subjektiv gemeinter Sinn) can be objectively (or factually) ascertained (determined, traced, found out, discovered, established, detected, estimated). We can find out (learn, hear, experience) or (justifiably) suspect (presume, assume, guess, suppose, imagine) (in a well-founded manner) what (which) meaning (or sense) somebody who kills someone else or dies for someone else connects with his acting (i.e. action) (Wir können erfahren oder begründet vermuten, welchen Sinn derjenige mit seiner Handlung verbindet, der jemand anderen tötet oder für jemand anderen stirbt). Above all (Notably, In particular), the latter case constitutes a constant (permanent, perpetual, continuing, continuous, chronic) memento (i.e. reminder) (warning, admonition) (Memento) of the fact that with regard to (in view of) social-ontologically relevant death or with regard to (in view of) the anthropological and social-ontological notion (concept) of self-preservation (Begriff der Selbsterhaltung), the biological dimension is not necessarily (does not have to be) decisive (deciding, crucial, critical) (die biologische Dimension nicht entscheidend sein muß). At the human level, a transformation (conversion, change, metamorphosis, transmutation, transubstantiation; Verwandlung), through (by means (way) of) the mediation (agency) of the “intellect(mind)(-spirit)” and its symbolic mechanisms (durch die Vermittlung des „Geistes“ und seiner symbolischen Mechanismen), of the biological magnitude “self-preservation” into [an] ideational magnitude takes place (occurs, happens, comes off), so that the (question of) self-preservation(-)[question(issue,

problem, matter)] and the, understood in the broader (wider) sense, question of power (power question), are transubstantiated into a question of identity (identity question)⁴⁸, which at least at (on, in) one pole of the spectrum of the social relation can be (re)solved(,) even (in fact) at the expense (cost) of biological self-preservation (die Selbsterhaltungs- und die im weiteren Sinne verstandene Machtfrage in eine Identitätsfrage transubstantiiert wird, die mindestens am einen Pol des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung sogar auf Kosten der biologischen Selbsterhaltung gelöst werden kann). Whoever sacrifices his (one's, their) [own] life for another (individual or collective) subject or for a "cause" („Sache“), to him (them)(,) self-preservation in the sense of the protection (or preservation) (safeguarding, conservation, maintenance; *Bewahrung*) of his (their, one's) identity (however he defines (the) (this) same [it, such (this) identity])(,) is more important than self-preservation in the biological sense. Death is, however, not (socially mediated [subject to (determined by) intervention]) only via (through, by) the effect (impact, influence) of the "intellect(mind)(-spirit)" – and identity is an "intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)"(,) (need conceivable) (and) only in society with other[s] [humans, people](,) (socially mediated) (conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) need (necessity, requirement, want))(,) (–) (socially mediated) (Der Tod wird aber nicht nur über die Wirkung des „Geistes“ – und Identität ist ein „geistiges“ und nur in Gesellschaft mit anderen denkbare Bedürfnis – sozial vermittelt). The same mediation (intervention or agency) (intercession; *Vermittlung*) is accomplished (done, achieved, performed, managed, completed) via (through, by) the aims (targets, goals, ends, objectives, purposes; *Ziele*)(,) which are pursued (followed, tracked) at (on, in) both poles of the social relation's

⁴⁸ In relation to that in detail, (in) [see] the 3rd volume of this work. Basically (Fundamentally, In principle), [see] Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, esp. pp. 49ff., 80ff..

spectrum (spectrum of the social relation). [The] aim of the killing (homicide) of a foe (enemy) just (as well) as (the) self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) for a friend is a change (alteration, modification) of (in) the hitherto (so far, until now) predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) social relation in [a] certain (particular) direction (Ziel der Tötung eines Feindes ebenso wie der Selbstaufopferung für einen Freund ist eine Änderung der bisher vorherrschenden sozialen Beziehung in bestimmter Richtung). – In the former case, due to the fact that (because) (by) the complete (whole, entire, full) and definit(iv)e (conclusive, decisive, ultimate, final) exclusion (elimination, expulsion, disqualification) of the foe (enemy) from the social relation leaves (leaving) its [the social relation's] shaping (forming, moulding, layout, arrangement, structuring, formation, composition; Gestaltung) to (its, one's, the) [i.e. (the (killing and surviving) actor(s) or subject(s) engaged in) the social relation's] [those who excluded the foe's] (own) discretion (pleasure) [devices] (up to it) [of those who excluded the foe] (– Im ersteren Fall dadurch, daß der vollständige und endgültige Ausschluß des Feindes aus der sozialen Beziehung nun ihre Gestaltung eigenem Belieben überläßt),(;) in the latter [case](,) due to the fact that (because) (by) (the) self-sacrifice provides (gets (gains) for, procures) (providing) friends (with) possibilities of acting (action) or development (unfolding) (Handlungs- oder Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten),(;) [it, self-sacrifice] influences (by influencing) society by way (means) of (through) [the, a] “good example” etc.. Even when (if) one through (by) one's suicide (Selbstmord) wants to signal that one neither wants to reshape (remould, reorganise, rearrange, remodel, redesign, alter) nor preserve (keep, retain, conserve, protect, safeguard), but simply leave (i.e. exit or abandon) (desert, forsake, quit) the social relation, in which one must (has to, necessarily) live(s), the [a]

social reference continues to (carries on (with)) apply to (be valid for) (applying to) this concrete relation, only it is negative. (A positive reference to the social relation can of course also be included (contained, embodied, incorporated) in suicide, when (if) this, e.g. is meant as revenge (vengeance)). Consequently (As a result, Thus, Therefore), man's mortality ([the] mortality of man) and man's sociality (Sozialität) ([the] sociality of man) go (i.e. flow) into each other and mark, from a social-ontological perspective, the polarity of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation).

We emphasise (underline, stress), to sum up (in summary, summarising, synoptically), that the mortality of man (man's mortality), especially (particularly) as (since) it is actualised (or made topical) (updated, brought up to date) in various (different, differing, distinct, varied, several, miscellaneous, dissimilar) kinds (sorts, types, forms, ways, manners, modes, fashions) of violent (forcible) death, anthropologically sustains (bears, carries, supports, takes the weight of) both the pole of extreme enmity (hostility) as well as that [(the) pole] of extreme friendship (amity) (die Sterblichkeit des Menschen, zumal wie sie sich in verschiedenen Arten des gewaltsamen Todes aktualisiert, anthropologisch sowohl den Pol der extremen Feindschaft als auch jenen der extremen Freundschaft trägt). And indeed (in fact (reality), really, truly): how can man *as man* (Mensch *als Mensch*) manifest (express, state, show, display, evince, declare, profess, testify to; bekunden) extreme enmity (hostility) other than by the fact that (because) (killing) (he kills) his foe (enemy)? And how can (some)one [man] *as man* (man *als Mensch*) prove extreme friendship other than by the fact that (because) (sacrificing) (he sacrifices) his own life for the [his, a] friend? On the other side of (i.e. hereafter) (Beyond) death, man cannot act (operate), he must therefore do it on this

side [of death] (i.e. in (during) (this) life (while alive)) (here) (Jenseits des Todes kann der Mensch nicht agieren, er muß es also diesseits tun); death as [an] act (der Tod als Akt), which can still be decided (determined, settled, resolved, judged, adjudicated) (about), however lies (is [found]) in this (From) Here (i.e. This World or Life) (in diesem Diesseits) and marks (pegs, stakes, works) out (demarcates, outlines, makes clear) the spectrum of the social relation in (accordance with) (to(wards)) both (the two) directions, that is, that space (area, expanse, sphere; Raum), inside of which socially living man must move. This fundamental (basic, elementary) social-ontological insight (has, had) everywhere (all over the place) and always constituted a commonplace(,) which was expressed (pronounced, said, enunciated, spoken, voiced) regardless (irrespective, independently) of what one otherwise held (thought, considered, maintained, contended, kept to) about [in respect] (of) the «situation humaine» [“human situation”] and in what respect (way) (to what extent) one wanted its [“the human situation’s”] change (alteration, modification), e.g. regardless of whether one heeded (followed, took to heart) heathen (pagan, infidel) values (heidnische Werte) or the religion of Love (love) [i.e. Christianity]. Heathens (or Pagans) (Gentiles) and Christians, just like many people before them, noticed what our contemporary ethologists brought (or worked (carved)) out (processed, elaborated, investigated, explored) scientifically, that, namely, the inhibition (or restraint) threshold (level) of the killing of animals (members) of the same species amongst (in) the rest of the (other) animals (beasts, brutes) (i.e. non-human animals) is placed (put, fixed, set, started, begun) higher than amongst (in [regard to (respect of)]) humans (people, men) (die Hemmschwelle der Tötung von Artgenossen

bei den übrigen Tieren höher angesetzt ist als beim Menschen)⁴⁹. Lions or snakes (serpents) have never conducted (waged) such battles (fights, struggles, conflicts) (fought) against each other like humans (people, men), wrote Augustine⁵⁰, and there (in relation to (respect of) that) he did not think differently than (to) for instance Horace⁵¹, Seneca⁵² or Juvenal⁵³. Human action has indeed (in fact (reality)) something “monstrous (or dreadful) (terrible, tremendous, terrific, incredible, enormous, vast, awful, colossal, formidable, gargantuan, gigantic, leviathan, portentous)” (Menschliche Aktion hat in der Tat etwas „Ungeheures“), as Canetti called (named) it,(:) “it [human action] presupposes that one has nothing against killing”⁵⁴. – However, just as

⁴⁹ Lorenz, *Das sog. Böse*, p. 226ff.; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Liebe*, p. 115ff.

⁵⁰ *De civitate dei*, XII, p. 23

⁵¹ *Epodon*, VII, vv. 11-12: neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus/umquam nisi in dispar feris [neither in wolves nor in lions did (was (there)) this habit ever (exist)/except [but] [only]] in dissimilar (different, unlike, differently matched) beasts (wild animals) (of a different species)].

⁵² *Epistulae*, XCV, 31: Non pudet homines... gaudere sanguine alterno et bella gerere..., cum inter se etiam mutis ac feris pax sit [Humans (People, Men) are not ashamed... to rejoice (take pleasure in, be glad) in others' (another's) (alternate, alternating) (the) blood (of others (another)) and to wage (conduct) wars... whilst even (amongst) mute (dumb, silent) beasts (wild animals) (as between one another) (are, live, exist, dwell) (amongst one another) (there is) also (and) (in) peace (peacefully)].

⁵³ *Saturae*, XV, vv. 159-164: sed iam serpentum maior concordia. parcat/cognatis maculis similis fera. quando leoni/fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo memore umquam expiravit aper maioris dentibus apri? Indica tigris rabida cum tigride pacem/perpetuam, saevis inter se convenit ursis [but (yet) already (nowadays, now at last, by now, currently) (there is more concord (harmony, accord, union, agreement) (amongst) (the) serpents (have more harmony (concord)). (The) [A] beast (wild animal) spares (is lenient to(wards) (with) (pardons)) [the life of] related (kindred, similar) [beasts] with similar (like) spots (specks). When did [a] stronger (braver) lion snatch (tear, pull, take) (the) life (away, by force) of (from) another lion? Where (In what place ((thick) forest) (in (living) memory, bring to mind, being mindful, tell, utter, recount) did a boar ever expire (die, breathe its last breath) from (by) [because of (owing to)] a boar with larger (bigger) teeth [tusks]? The fierce (savagely, furious, raving, rabid) Indian tigress (tiger) (lives (dwells) in, has, enjoys) perpetual (everlasting, lifelong) peace with (every other, another) tigress (tiger), savage (ferocious, fierce, violent, barbarous, cruel, furious) bears are suited (accost, convene, meet, assemble) (live harmoniously (peacefully)) (to, with) one another (together) (or English translation by G. G. Ramsay. London. New York. William Heinemann; G. P. Putnam's Son. 1918: “wild beasts are merciful/to beasts spotted like themselves. When did the/stronger lion ever take the life of the weaker? In/what wood did a boar ever breathe his last under/the tusks of a boar bigger than himself? The fierce/tigress of India dwells in perpetual peace with her/fellow; bears live in harmony with bears”)].

⁵⁴ FAZ of 18th August 1994. Canetti continues (carries (goes) on, proceeds): “... I get involved (involve myself) very much (widely) (at length, on and on) with people (humans, men), but always only so that I must not (do not have to) *kill* them. One may call (name) that, a priestly (hieratic, sacerdotal, clerical, pastoral, ecclesiastical, pontifical) stance (attitude, position, posture, manner, pose). I find it human. However, it is deceptive (deceitful, delusory, illusory, misleading, misguided, wrong, fallacious, specious, treacherous, vain) when (if) one expects it [such a stance] from other(s) [people, humans, men]”. Elsewhere (In another place), Canetti (has) emphasised (gave prominence to, underlined) very nicely (beautifully, well, finely) the interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) between the mortality

early (on) and generally as the (man's) particular (certain) lack of restraint (or inhibition) (inhibitionlessness, restraintlessness) (of man) in [respect of] (during) the killing of the same species (i.e. his fellow man), his [man's] frequently ((in) many times (cases, ways)) in relation to that [such (this) lack of restraint in killing his fellow man] symmetrical, and in the same open or even diffuse drive(s) (or urge(s)) structure (structure of drives (or urges)) [drive(s) (urge(s)) structure], anchored (embedded, embodied, enshrined, engrafted, secured, fastened, attached) (cap)ability (skill, competence) at (faculty (capacity) for) sacrificing himself for another [(hu)man, person] (others), was (got) noticed (seen, conspicuous) (stood out, attracted attention) (die besondere Hemmungslosigkeit des Menschen beim Töten von Artgenossen fiel seine vielfach dazu symmetrische und in der derselben offenen oder gar diffusen Triebstruktur verankerte Fähigkeit auf, sich für andere aufzuopfern). And in exactly this ability(,) the genuine (real, true, authentic, veritable, bona fide) (hall)mark (characteristic, sign, feature) and the most unmistakable (unerring, infallible, never-failing) (surest) attestation (testimony) of friendship (amity) was seen by all sides (everyone). "Nobody has greater love than that [(in respect of) which] [when] he lets go of (leaves) (of letting go of (leaving)) his [own] life for (in favour of) his friends", preached Jesus⁵⁵, and the Roman(,) Horace(,) counted (reckoned,

of man (man's mortality) and the permanent possibility of his [(man's) own] killing (homicide)(,) as well as the constant (continuous, continual, perpetual, incessant) institutional use (usage, application) of this possibility (see below): "How are there supposed to not be any murderers (killers, assassins, slayers)(,) as (so) long as it is *in accordance with* man to die (become deceased, pass away), as long as he [man] himself is not ashamed of that, as long as he has death *built (installed, incorporated, integrated) in(to)* his institutions, as if it [death] were their [man's (the said, these) institutions'] safest (or most stable) (most secure (certain, assured, reliable), surest, stablest, steadiest), best and most meaningful (rational, sensible, or useful) (reasonable, plausible, legitimate) foundation (fundament, base, footing, groundwork; Fundament)?" (*Die Fliegenpein*, p. 66). Canetti, though (mind you, certainly, admittedly), does not take into consideration (consider, contemplate, entertain) self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) as [a] social-ontologically relevant possibility of violent (forcible) death.

⁵⁵ Joh. 15, 13. μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῆ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ [no-one has a greater love than this, of (that) (in order for) someone placing (putting, laying (down), setting) (to place) his soul (life, breath, spirit) for the sake of (on behalf (in favour) of) his friends; or,

numbered, ranked) amongst the truly (really) happy (or lucky) (felicitous, fortunate, blessed) him who finds the courage (heart) to die for friends and fatherland ([the] (native, mother) country (land), motherland) (the collective friend)⁵⁶.

This, in practice (practical terms), unanimous (to a man, in unison, monophonic) acceptance of violent (forcible) death as [the] measure, with (by) which both extreme enmity (hostility) as well as extreme friendship (amity) are measured (gauged, compared, judged)(,) and thus (consequently, therefore, as a result) the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation is constituted, [has] found (its) expression (was [has been] reflected, [has] manifested itself) in the constitution of all (hitherto, previous, former) political collectives (until (up till) now, so far) (in der Verfassung aller bisherigen politischen Kollektive). All [(such) political collectives] have hitherto (until (up to) now, so far) asked (required, demanded, wanted) of (from) their members the sacrifice (offering, [sacrificing]) of [one's (their) own] life as [the, a] sign (signal, mark, indication, token) of loyalty, that is, friendship towards (vis-à-vis) the polity (commonwealth, community) (Freundschaft zum Gemeinwesen), and also all have hitherto allowed (permitted) their members to kill him (that one [person]) who the polity has declared (proclaimed, announced) to be (as) the collective enemy. The classic (perfect, prime) example for (of, in relation to) that (this) shows (i.e. is) (presents, offers, provides, affords, gives, grants), as is (well) known, war,(;) however,(,) the continuous (continual, perpetual, constant) maintenance of armed formations (or organisations) (associations), and even (also) for police

Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (*King James* translation)].

⁵⁶ *Carminum* IV, 9, vv. 51-52: non ille pro caris amicis/aut patria timidus perire [he (that [man, person], such and such) who is not afraid (full of fear, faint-hearted, cowardly) to die (perish) for [his] dear ((be)loved, valued) friends (and) or (else) [his] country].

goals (ends or purposes), indicate(s) that here we are dealing with (it is a matter of) a constitutive constant (eine konstitutive Konstante) in the life of the political collective. Whoever, on behalf (or on the orders (instructions)) of the [a] polity, bears (carries) a weapon, must constantly thereby (therewith, because of (with) that (it)) reckon (estimate, count, calculate, work out) that he with that [weapon] could kill someone; he must, however, also reckon (count) (on) (estimate, expect) his own killing (homicide) on the part of another, because (since) he is armed exactly because his job (function, purpose, task, work, mission) is regarded (considered) (as, to be) life-threatening (or (highly, extremely) dangerous (to, for [his]) (life)). It would, nonetheless (nevertheless), be a(n) huge (enormous, colossal, grave) mistake (error, fault, defect) to connect (combine, put in a combination) the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation exclusively or principally (first and foremost, mainly) with the public realm (domain or sphere) (area) and to want to deduce (derive, infer) (from it [the said (this) polarity in the spectrum of the social relation]) the (political's) specific character (of the political) (from it [the said (this) polarity in the spectrum of the social relation]) (Es wäre dennoch ein gewaltiger Fehler, die Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung ausschließlich oder vornehmlich mit dem öffentlichen Bereich in Verbindung zu setzen und aus ihr den spezifischen Charakter des Politischen ableiten zu wollen)⁵⁷. It [This polarity in the spectrum of the social relation] is present (existing, current) (exists) in all forms (Formen) and at all levels of the social relation, namely, in private and personal relations(,) as well as in the same (equal) intensity as in public and impersonal [relations] (nämlich in den privaten und persönlichen Beziehungen ebenso und in gleicher Intensität wie in den öffentlichen

⁵⁷ See Ch. II, footnote 242, above.

und unpersönlichen) – something (which, what), incidentally (by the way), (is) recognised (acknowledged, accepted, known) by society itself, which (gives three) cheers (applauds, acclaims) as [for being] [a] paragon (model, example) of virtue (goodness, morality) (to) the (boy-)scout (pathfinder)(,) who dies while (in, during the) rescuing (saving) a drowning child (kid), while it [society] simultaneously acquits (exonerates, absolves, finds) the [that] one [person, (hu)man] (him) (not guilty) who killed someone in legitimate self-defence.

The bringing (working) out (or elaborating) (analysis, processing; Herausarbeitung) of the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation has something (just as little) to do with the definition of the political, (just as little) as with a value judgement about (regarding, on, over) man (humans, people) (einem Werturteil über den Menschen). Such a judgement is, incidentally (by the way), in this context logically impossible, because the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation (the social relation's spectrum) requires (or demands) (calls for, necessitates) equal (the same) (cap)ability (skill, competence) of the human genus (or species) ((hu)mankind) at (or capacity for) “altruistic” and “ego(t)istical (selfish)”, friendly (amicable) and inimical (hostile) acts (gleiche Fähigkeit der menschlichen Gattung zu „altruistischen“ und „egoistischen“, freundlichen und feindlichen Akten). ([We] must therefore start) from (take) these acts, [to] which all historical and social experience attests, ([we] must therefore start) (as a (the, our) starting point), and at the same time (into the bargain, in the course of this) the [following, this] question can serve (be of use) as [a] guiding (main) (connecting) thread (guide, leitmotif; Leitfaden): what can mortal man do all in all (overall, on the whole, in general) to (for) mortal man? The only (sole, lone, unique) empirically valid (cogent, conclusive) answer

(response) to (for) that (it) [question] is the following: man (humans, people) can do act(ion)s(,) which other humans (men, people) hold (consider, regard) (to be) (as) pleasant (agreeable, pleasing, enjoyable, congenial, welcome) and/or useful (beneficial, helpful) or (as) unpleasant (disagreeable, displeasing, uncongenial, unwelcome, awkward, embarrassing) and/or harmful (detrimental, damaging). It cannot (is not able to) be ascertained whether these act(ion)s are “good” or “bad (evil) (nasty, wicked)” in an absolute, that is, extra-human sense, and it also cannot be said whether the man, who (has) carried (did, performed) them (out), is “good” or “bad (evil)”. Because [what is, the] “good” and “bad (evil)” appear (emerge, arise, surface, crop up), as concepts (notions) and as modes (ways, manners) of acting (action) marked (indicated, denoted, described, called) by them [“good” and “bad (evil)”], only inside of the human situation, and they [“good” and “bad (evil)”] cannot constitute (provide, grant, afford, produce, make, create, emit) any yardsticks (benchmarks, measures, standards, scales) by which the human situation as [a] whole and from the outside can be judged (assessed, evaluated, gauged) (Der Mensch kann Handlungen tun, die andere Menschen für angenehm und/oder nützlich oder für unangenehm und/oder schädlich halten. Es läßt sich nicht feststellen, ob diese Handlungen „gut“ oder „böse“ in einem absoluten, also außermenschlichen Sinne sind, und es läßt sich auch nicht sagen, ob der Mensch, der sie verrichtet hat, „gut“ oder „böse“ ist. Denn „Gutes“ und „Böses“ tauchen, als Begriffe und als damit bezeichnete Handlungsweisen, nur innerhalb der menschlichen Situation auf, und sie können keine Maßstäbe abgeben, an denen die menschliche Situation als ganze und von außen beurteilt werden kann).

But also for another reason: because man is not necessarily (unconditionally) “bad (evil)”(,) when (if) he kills, and not necessarily “good”(,) when (if) he loves or even dies for someone [else]. (The)

Anthropological parameters may therefore not be drawn (called) on (used, enlisted, mobilised, considered, consulted) for the apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity as open or concealed (hidden, masked) value judgements, but only in the form of the ascertainment (establishment, observation, conclusion, identification) of the mortality of man as objective anthropological given (actual) fact, which can motivate (or account (give reasons) for) (be behind, justify) very different expectations, attitudes (or positionings) (stances) and modes (ways, manners) of behaviour (behavioural modes). The anthropological given (actual) fact is not therefore a psychological magnitude, but an incontrovertible (irrefutable) fact, in which socially mediated (arbitrated, conveyed, imparted, interposed, interceded) psychological effects (impacts, influences) are ignited (sparked off, (en)kindled, aroused, incited, provoked, inflamed, triggered) (Aber auch aus einem anderen Grund: Weil der Mensch nicht unbedingt „böse“ ist, wenn er tötet, und nicht unbedingt „gut“, wenn er liebt oder gar für jemanden stirbt. Die anthropologischen Parameter dürfen also zur Erfassung des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung in seiner Polarität nicht als offene oder verdeckte Werturteile herangezogen werden, sondern nur in Form der Feststellung von der Sterblichkeit des Menschen als objektiver anthropologischer Gegebenheit, die sehr unterschiedliche Erwartungen, Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen motivieren kann. Die anthropologische Gegebenheit ist also keine psychologische Größe, sondern ein unumstößliches Faktum, an dem sich sozial vermittelte psychologische Wirkungen entzünden). The analysis of the next section will name additional (further, extra) reasons (grounds) [as to] why the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation cannot in principle be reduced (put down, traced back, ascribed) to psychological factors.

Thus (In this way, So)(,) the social-ontological relevance of human mortality is seen (shown) (appears, shows itself) in the unremitting (incessant, unceasing, ceaseless, unrelenting) direct or indirect presence of violent (forcible) death in social life (living) (im sozialen Leben), and indeed both at (in [regard to], during) the inimical (hostile) as well as at the friendly (amicable) pole of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation). On the other hand (However), the introverted reflection of the individual on (about, regarding, over) the fact of one's own natural mortality is not able to (cannot, may not) develop (unfold) a(ny) social-ontological dynamic(s) – unless social authorities (or (jurisdictional) tiers (grades, levels, stages) (of (with) jurisdiction) [such as courts]) [authorities (or jurisdictional tiers [such as courts])] (soziale Instanzen) use (make use of, utilise, employ, apply) perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions) [in respect] of (about, on, regarding) [the] meaning (sense) and consequences of the natural mortality of the individual(,) in order to guide (direct, steer, drive, lead) his (one's, [such (every) individual's]) life (living) in a certain (particular) practical direction. Nothing shows more clearly (distinctly, noticeably) (makes it clearer (us more aware)) how little Heidegger thought social-ontologically and how much (he thought) in terms of cultural critique (criticism) (the critique (criticism) of culture) (cultural-critically) (kulturkritisch)(,) as his treatment (handling) of death exclusively (solely) from the point of view of the existential possibilities of the individual (single, lone, solitary, separate) being (t)here (or existence) (des einzelnen Daseins), i.e. [the individual being (t)here (or existence's)] (his, one's, its) “authentic (genuine, true or actual) (real, original) ability (skill) at being (to be) whole (complete, entire)” („eigentlichen Ganzseinkönnens“). At the centre of attention (The focal point (heart of the matter)) here is (stands) also the contradistinction (contrasting) of the

inauthentic (fake, spurious, ungenueine, false, bogus, adulterated, untrue, fallacious, notional, non-existent, unreal, imaginary, unoriginal, latest, derivative) somebody (people or the They) (uneigentlichen Man), who does or do not let (be) (leave, allow) “courage (bravery, daring, heart, spirit, nerve, guts) vis-à-vis (towards, for) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death arise (emerge, appear, crop up)”, [who] gets or get out of the way of (evades or evade, dodges or dodge, sidesteps or sidestep, avoids or avoid) death and transforms or transform (converts or ..., changes, transmutes, transfigures, transubstantiates) the “being (to be) for (vis-à-vis or towards) death” into “constant flight (escape) before him (it) (i.e. death)” (und das „Sein zum Tode“ in „ständige Flucht vor ihm“ verwandele), and, of the authentic (genuine, true or actual) (real, original) being (t)here (or existence), which positions (sets, puts, places) itself (stands) in angst (or fear) before death and finds therein [in that angst (situation, position)] its “excellent (outstanding or (pre-)eminent) (exquisite, superior, magnificent, standout, distinguished, first-class) ability (skill) at being (to be) [of (its) being]” (und des eigentlichen Daseins, welches sich der Angst vor dem Tode stelle und darin sein „ausgezeichnetes Seinkönnen“ finde)⁵⁸. (According to that,) Death(,

⁵⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 254, 259. Since being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death is founded (based) (or takes root) (springs, originates, emanates, sets itself up, establishes itself) in (from, on) concern (worry, care or looking after) (taking care of, trouble; Sorge)(,) and death is (becomes) understandable (intelligible, comprehensible, understood) only against the background (backdrop) of the character of concern as [the] fundamental (basic) constitution (or state) of being (t)here (or existence) (als Grundverfassung des Daseins) (loc. cit., pp. 259, 249ff.), thus (so, in this way) the dogged (determined, obstinate) dispelling (or driving out) (ousting, displacement, repression, suppression) of death on the part of the somebody (people or the They) obviously (patently) constitutes a pendant (i.e. counterpart) or a consequence of its (or their) (i.e. somebody’s, people’s, or the They’s) transformation of concern into “mere (naked, bare, simple) desires (or wishes) (wants)” („bloßes[?n?] Wünschen“) (loc. cit., p. 195). Heidegger’s reference to *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* (incidentally) calls to mind(, by the way,) the at that time common (current) (cultural-critical) source(s) (pertaining to cultural critique (criticism) (the critique of culture)) of his [Heidegger’s] inspiration. The unexpected (unforeseen, unanticipated) (on)coming of death crosses out (or thwarts) (foils, frustrates, deletes) in Tolstoy’s novella the (Philistine’s) small (little, modest, humble, miniature) dreams of happiness (luck, bliss, felicity, fortune) (of the Philistine), who until then (hitherto) had lived (through, past, by) (in) the abyss(es) (chasm(s), precipice(s), gulf(s)) of (the) existence dedicated (consecrated, ordained) to death (i.e. doomed to die). (In (the) place of the Philistine) (The) [A](,) of “mere desires (or wishes)” driven (propelled, impelled, forced, thrust(ed),

therefore, accordingly, thus,) is not of interest as [a] multiform (variform, diversiform, multifarious) real phenomenon (or manifestation) (appearance, occurrence) amongst (between, under) socially living humans (men, people), but as [a] trigger (i.e. cause) of that angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) and that expecting (expectation; Erwartens), which are supposed to give (provide) “evidence (testimony, attestation)” of (“bear witness” to) the authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) (reality, originality) of existence (welche von der Eigentlichkeit der Existenz „Zeugnis“ geben sollen). Violent (forcible) death remains completely (absolutely, totally) out of (beyond) consideration (disregarded, not taken into account), and (it) in fact (even) the “bringing about (causing, inducing, forcing, precipitating, leading) of (to) [one’s (own)] demise (deceasing, passing) (i.e. death)”, obviously (apparently, evidently) by suicide, is disapproved (of) (und es wird sogar die „Herbeiführung des Ablebens“, offenbar durch Selbstmord, mißbilligt), because through (by means (way) of) one’s own real death(,) (the) being (t)here (or existence) would no longer exist “for (vis-à-vis or towards) death”(,) and “therewith (with that, thereby, as a result) [it ((the said) being (t)here (or existence))] would remove (withdraw, extract) precisely the ground (soil, land, base) from under itself” for [in regard to] the probation (i.e. proving) (demonstration, verification, proof, corroboration, substantiation, attestation; Bewährung) of its [own] authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)!⁵⁹ It is an open question (remains to be seen) (Let us not examine) (as) (to) what extent (how far, in what way) (the) loudly (noisily) propagated existential probation (i.e. proving (of one’s self)) (Bewährung) through (by means of) angst (or fear) (anxiety,

pushed), money-grubbing (avaricious, greedy (for money), obsessed with money, money-grabbing, mercenary) etc.(,) bourgeois(,) can take the place of the Philistine (go).

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 266ff., 261.

worry, trepidation) before death is [an] intellectual construction or even [a] self-mirroring (self-reflection, narcissism or (a) mirage) (Selbstbespiegelung) of intellectuals in certain (intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)-historical) situations (pertaining to the history of ideas) (in bestimmten geistesgeschichtlichen Situationen), to what extent it is at all (generally) possible (to base (found, establish, set up, form)) [for] a socially living existence [to be based (founded, established)] on (the) direct and personal, that is, socially unmediated angst (or fear) before death (sozial unvermittelte Angst vor dem Tod): about (with regard to, regarding) one's own death(,) in fact (indeed, of course) very little can (is able to) be thought and said, unless one connects (combines, associates, links, joins, binds, ties) this death(,) one way or another (whichever way you look at it, anyway, either way)(,) with things(,) which are (lie) either in life (living) or on the other side of (i.e. beyond) the [that, this] same [life]. Social-ontologically [speaking], in any case (at any rate (all events)), such thoughts (notions, perceptions, ideas, concepts) and propositions (statements, declarations, opinions, pronouncements, assertions, sayings) appear [to be] (seem) irrelevant, and indeed in accordance with Heidegger's own presuppositions. Because if the somebody (people or the They) (das Man) is [a] social-ontological, that is, unalterable (immutable, irreversible, irrevocable) category(,) and if its [the somebody (people of the They's)] effect (impact, influence) is so determining (or decisive) (determinative) on the whole of (entire, total) social life (living) as Heidegger describes (portrays, depicts, outlines) it, then (thus, so) social ontology must take as a (the) [its] starting point (start from) the reality of a social life(,) which dispels (drives out, ousts, displaces, supersedes, represses) death; the life (living) of (the) "authentic (genuine, true or actual) (real, original)" [humans, people, individuals, men] [the life of the "authentic (genuine, true or actual)"] (das Leben der

„Eigentlichen“) in the shadow of angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death is (does) not the decisive (deciding) factor (decisive) (decide the issue) social-ontologically, and one might (could, should) only (then, afterwards, at that time, in that case) hope for the social prevailing (predominance, imposition, prevalence, carrying (pushing) through, victory; Durchsetzung) of “authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)”, if (when) the somebody (people or the They) did not represent (or constitute) a social-ontological category, but merely (only, simply, barely) a historical transitory (transient, passing, temporary, short) manifestation (phenomenon or occurrence) (apparition, appearance, symptom, sign, figure, presence, phantom, vision) (eine geschichtliche vorübergehende Erscheinung).

That mortality and death are totally dispelled (driven out, ousted, displaced) from the life (living) of the somebody (people or the They)(,) constitutes, incidentally (by the way), a serious (grave) pragmatic mistake (error, fault, defect, flaw, blemish) which Heidegger makes(,) because his (cultural-critical) e(é)lan (vigour, pep, verve, dash, spirit, buoyancy, energy, enthusiasm) (as regards cultural critique) pushes (urges, presses, pressur(is)es) him, in relation to that, to contemplate (consider) death only as [a] motive (reason, cause, grounds) (or an occasion) for exercises (or practice) in intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) refinement. Already the institutionalisation of the possibility of violent (forcible) death in all (hitherto, previous, former) societies (until (up till) now) (through (by means of) custom[s] (convention, practice, fashion) and tradition (practice or usage) (custom, use, convention, fashion) or through forms of organisation (organisational forms)) (durch Sitte und Brauch oder durch Organisation[≠]sformen) proves that the social omnipresence (ubiquity) (of the possibility) of death can accompany (be accompanied) perfectly

(very) well (by) the dispelling (driving out, ousting, displacement, suppression, repression, superseding) of (the) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before (the) (natural) death in the life of the individual (die soziale Allgegenwart (der Möglichkeit) des Todes sehr wohl mit der Verdrängung der Angst vor dem (natürlichen) Tod im Leben des Einzelnen einhergehen kann). The somebody (people or the They) apparently (obviously) perceives (feels, sees, regards) more clearly (noticeably, distinctly) than its critics what has social-ontological weight (gravity), and accordingly (it) makes (turns into) [(as) its] own central “concern (worry, care or looking after) (taking care of, trouble)” not angst (or fear) before (natural) death, but (the) interaction (die Interaktion) with other members of society. There are (is) indeed (in fact) no indications (signs, clues, (circumstantial) evidence) (for) [(of, in relation to) the fact] that a man could make out of (from) his dominating angst (or fear) before death a stable and exclusive (sole) yardstick (benchmark, measure, gauge, standard) for the regulation (arrangement, settlement, settling, resolution, control) of his relations with (towards, vis-à-vis) fellow humans (men) (with-humans, co-humans) (den Mitmenschen). However, we have many instances (pieces of) (plenty of) (much) (evidence, proof, records, examples) of (for, regarding, about, in relation to) the shaping (moulding, forming, formation, structuring, arrangement, organisation, designing) of the relation with (towards, vis-à-vis) death on the basis of the existing or desired (desirable, welcome) relation with (towards, vis-à-vis) fellow humans. We [have] already explained (expounded, professed, stated, declared, announced, proclaimed) in which (what) sense the killing (homicide) of foes (enemies), self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) for [a] friend and even suicide represent (or constitute) interventions (interference(s), encroachment(s), intrusion(s)) in (upon) the social relation. Studies (Investigations, Examinations, Enquiries,

Inquiries, Analyses, Research) of (in(to)) historical (the history of) mentality [mentalities, ways of thinking] (Mentality-historical (mental history) studies) [Studies of the history of mentality] (Mentalitätsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen) substantiate (corroborate, confirm, bear out) in other respects the thesis of the priority of the social relation vis-à-vis the personal relation with (towards, for) (one's own) death⁶⁰. Even (Also) the Christian perception (or notion) (idea, view, conception, representation, presentation, vision; Vorstellung), which perhaps [w]as [is] the first to confront (i.e. bring) the individual as individual (face to face) with his own death(,) and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) wanted to make (out) of (from) life a μελέτη θανάτου [study of death (death study)], was permeated (or interspersed) (laced, saturated, ridden, honeycombed) with social references, although (even though) these [references] for the most (in large) part (largely, mostly, to a great extent) [were] shifted (transferred or moved) ([were] translocated (dislocated, externalised)) to the (From or Over) There (i.e. That (Next) World or Life; the Hereafter or Beyond) (ins Jenseits verlagert) and accordingly (correspondingly, commensurately) disguised (covered (dressed) (up), masked). The studium mortis [study of death] basically (fundamentally, essentially, at bottom) constituted (was) a continuous (continual, constant, permanent) account (explanation) regarding (about, for, of, on) the doing(s) (i.e. deeds or actions) (activities, conduct, behaviour, to do) in life ([while] living) (das Tun im Leben), an account(,) which the individual owed in the best case (instance) to God alone, in the worst and the most usual (common, customary, conventional, normal, standard, accustomed) (commonest) [case] to (his) [God's, His] governors (deputies or representatives)

⁶⁰ See e.g. Vovelle's excellent (masterly, superb, exquisite, first-rate, great) work, *La Mort en Occident*.

(lieutenants, vice(-)regents, pro-consuls, satraps, vicars, surrogates; Statthaltern) (of his) on earth. It is impossible to sever (untie, disengage, remove, separate, disentangle, detach, break off, loosen, release) this account, which had to deeply influence the experiencing of (or going through) (living to see) one's own mortality, from ideas about (regarding, on) social duties (obligations) in the widest (broadest) sense of the word (the touchstone (test, criterion) of (for) inner (internal, inward) purification (purging, clarification, reformation; Läuterung) was in fact (indeed, of course) love, (and) whose [love's, its] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) is (are) (the) other[s] [people, humans, men]), irrespective (regardless) of (no matter) whether these ideas always agreed with those [ideas] of God's governors (deputies or representatives) or directly invoked (appealed (referred) to) God. Heidegger praises (extols, speaks very highly of) the insights of Christian theology in the "being (to be) for (vis-à-vis or towards) death" as [the, a(n)] highest (supreme, maximum, superlative, utmost) ability (skill) at being (to be) (ins „Sein zum Tode“ als höchstes Seinkönnen), however he does not take (takes no) notice (note) of (ignores) all these interrelations ((inter)connections). If he did this, then (thus, so) it would be (go (come) down) difficult (hard) for him to use (utilise, apply) Christian content(s) in a(n) in principle (fundamentally) non-religious (not religious) framework (context, setting). Precisely here a logical paradox in his [Heidegger's] undertaking (venture) becomes apparent (noticeable) (makes itself felt, draws attention to itself): he declares (explains, announces, professes, expounds) culturally determined (conditioned) experiences (adventures, events, episodes) and views (perceptions or beliefs) (opinions, approaches, points of view, ideas, notions, conceptions, convictions, outlooks) (kulturell bedingte Erlebnisse und Anschauungen) (as, to be) fundamental(ly)(-)ontological constants (of

fundamental ontology) [constants of fundamental ontology] (fundamentalontologischen Konstanten). But (However)(,) why should e.g. “guilt (sin, wrong, crime, trespass(es), blame, fault, liability)” („Schuld“) belong to the constitution of a being (t)here (or existence), which is simply “thrown (tossed, flung or dropped) (slung, pitched, lobbed)” („geworfen“)(,) and is cut off (isolated) from every ethically loaded (or charged) transcendence (und von jeder ethisch geladenen Transzendenz abgeschnitten ist)? Radicalised theology and [the] anti-bourgeois cultural critique (criticism) (critique of culture) (Radikalisierte Theologie und antibürgerliche Kulturkritik) (have) often entered into an alliance in our century [i.e. the 20th century]. Nevertheless (However), this [alliance] could never be free of (from) tensions (stresses, strains) and contradictions (objections, disagreements).

Hobbes (has, had) saw (seen) social-ontologically deeper than Heidegger, when he [(i.e.) Hobbes] left (entrusted, ceded, handed over) to (for) (the) theologians the abstractly or sublimatedly imagined (represented, visualised, portrayed, envisioned, meant) relationship (das abstrakt oder sublimiert vorgestellte Verhältnis) of the individual with his own natural death(,) and made (turned) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before violent (forcible) death (into) the crucial (pivotal or central) (key, focal) point (issue) (hub, linchpin, fulcrum) of (in) his social theory.

However(,) (But) by (in the meantime, while) (he [Hobbes]), in terms of theory, neglecting (ignoring) (neglected, ignored) the objective given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance) of human mortality, which allows (permits, admits, approves, authorises, licenses) a number of (several, quite a few, multiple) active and passive positionings (stances or attitudes) (Einstellungen) towards (vis-à-vis) one’s own and alien (i.e. another’s) death, in favour of (just, only) one (and only) subjective

feeling vis-à-vis (just, only) one (and only) kind (sort, type, manner, way, mode) of death, weak spots (points) and gaps (or holes) had to come (necessarily) (came) (to light (the surface)) (be (were necessarily) revealed (unearthed)) (become (became) visible) in the construction of (the) Leviathan [*Leviathan*]. He [Hobbes] treats (handles or deals with) violent (forcible) death in principle (fundamentally, basically) from the point of view of the anxious (or fearful) (afraid, apprehensive, scared, terrified, timid, uneasy, worried, nervous, skittish) possible (potential) victim (prey, casualty or sacrifice) (offering, oblation) (ängstlichen möglichen Opfers), not from that [(the) point of view] of the apparently (patently, obviously, evidently, manifestly, plainly) less anxious (or fearful) culprit (or doer) (perpetrator, offender, wrongdoer, evildoer) in the same concrete situation (nicht aus jener des in derselben konkreten Lage offenbar weniger ängstlichen Täters), and moreover (in addition, furthermore, besides, also, as well, anyway) he looks at (sees, regards, considers, views, contemplates, observes, beholds, esteems) the struggle (battle or fight) (combat, contest; den Kampf)(,) which entails (involves, brings with it (about, in its wake), causes) violent (forcible) death(,) as [the, a] struggle between foes (enemies)(,) who struggle (battle or fight) (combat, contend, contest, wrestle) only for themselves, not (also) for (personal or political) friends and – (no matter, regardless) out of (from) whichever (what) motivation and under whichever (what) pressure – in the process (course of this) (into the bargain) thereby (with (because of) that) reckon (estimate, expect, calculate) that they can die (perish, pass away) for these friends. The political collective [entity, group, polity, body] (Das politische Kollektiv) may (might, can) come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, originate, stem, be created (produced, born, formed)) with the aim (objective, goal, end, target) of exorcising (banishing, averting, warding off, casting out, excommunicating) angst

(or fear) from violent (forcible) death, as Hobbes believes; the paradox of its [the political collective's] existence (existing, persistence, endurance, insistence; Bestehens) lies (is) (found), nonetheless (nevertheless)(,) in [the fact] that the collective(,) (before violent (forcible) death)(,) can effectively (effectually) and permanently protect ((safe)guard, shield, secure) [itself, its members] (from (against) violent death) only (then) when (if) its members are prepared (or ready) (willing, disposed) to die(,) if need be (necessary)(,) (the [a]) violent death(,) on (at, in) the inner (internal) (inward) or the outer (external) (outward) front. Before this paradox, Hobbes's logical consistency (soundness) fails (breaks down, malfunctions), which does not want to deviate (diverge, differ, depart, vary, digress, stray, swerve, wander, err) (just, not even) a (little, tiny) bit (little) (slightly) from the theoretical criterion of angst (or fear) before violent (forcible) death(,) and accordingly (correspondingly, therefore, thus) allows (lets, leaves) the [a] deserter [have] his right: whoever before the [a] foe (enemy) takes flight (flees, runs away, makes one's escape) from one's own political collective [entity, group, polity, body], acts (behaves) merely "dishonourably", not "unjustly"⁶¹. With Hobbes' premises, it is of course easier to justify (excuse, defend, support, exculpate, explain) the deserter's stance (or attitude) (demeanour, posture, bearing) than to explain (account for) the life-threatening (or highly (extremely) dangerous) (critical, vital, very serious) deployment (action or commitment) (employment, operation, use, effort, hard work, exertion, mission; Einsatz) of the great mass for the cause (case, matter, business, object, affair, thing; die Sache) of friends or of one's own political collective. Naturalistic anthropology does not allow (permit, grant, tolerate, admit, suffer, agree (consent) to) (the) [a(n)] complete

⁶¹ *Leviathan*, XXI, (15th paragraph (paragraph 15)) = *English Works*, III.

(full, entire, perfect) insight into (knowledge (understanding, perception) of) the symbolic-ideological mechanisms(,) which at the human level transform (convert, transmute, change, transfigure, transubstantiate) the biologically understood drive (urge, impulse or instinct) (inclination, impulsion, desire, need) of (for) self-preservation into an ideational need (requirement, want, desire, necessity, wish, demand) for (of) identity(,) and even (in fact) let (allow, leave) that [drive (or urge) of self-preservation] [to] retreat (step (move, fall, shrink, stand, draw) back, recoil, back (shy) away, withdraw, subside, recede) before [from] this [ideational need for identity] (Die naturalistische Anthropologie gestattet keine vollständige Einsicht in die symbolisch-ideologischen Mechanismen, die auf menschlicher Ebene den biologisch verstandenen Selbsterhaltungstrieb in ein ideelles Identitätsbedürfnis verwandeln und jenen vor diesem sogar zurückweichen lassen). Hobbes follows (or tracks) (pursues) these mechanisms only in accordance with (according to) [from] the “egoistical (egotistical, selfish)” side (facet) [of things] [point of view], that is, only in so far as (as much as, that) the biological drive (or urge) of self-preservation (is) ideationally reflected (finds expression, manifests (shows) itself) in “vanity (conceit)”, “[thirst (or lust) (desire, mania, obsession, addiction) for] fame (or glory)” or “(thirst (or lust)) for rule (or domineering(ness)) (ruling [over others], dominating, power, command, control)” („Eitelkeit“, „Ruhm-“ oder „Herrschaft“); the “altruistic” metamorphoses of the [this] same [drive (or urge) of self-preservation] remain outside of the (explanatory, explanative, illustrative, expository) possibilities (of explanation) of his [Hobbes’s] anthropological schema (scheme, plan, system, pattern).

Moreover (In addition, Furthermore, Besides), the one-sided (unilateral) way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) violent

(forcible) death from the point of view of its possible victims (prey, casualties or sacrifices) (offerings, oblations) is (does) not completely (entirely, wholly, totally) consistent (compatible) (go) with the process of founding (foundation, establishment, formation, setting up, institution, incorporation) (founding (foundation(al), establishment, formation, setting up) process (series of events)) of the Leviathan (Gründungsvorgang des Leviathan). If the political collective [entity, group, polity, body] is founded (established, formed, instituted, incorporated) through (by means (way) of) contract (agreement, treaty, pact, convention, covenant) (durch Vertrag), then (so, thus) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before violent (forcible) death takes (or has an) effect (acts, works, is effective, operates) as [the] angst (or fear) of every individual before all other[s] [individuals]; if, on the other hand, the founding of the political collective is due (traced back, reduced) to (stems from) conquest (capture, taking), then (so, thus) the angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) [in respect (the face)] of death (or mortal agony (fear)) (die Todesangst) of every individual before the conqueror is the deciding (decisive) factor (decides the issue). In both cases (instances), says Hobbes, it is a matter of (we are dealing with) the same feeling (or sense) of angst (fear) (or anxiety) (frightened feeling) (Angstgefühl),(:) that is why (as a result) the same duties (obligations, responsibilities) vis-à-vis the sovereign [power] arise (result, come) from it (that (such [a]) [feeling (or sense) of angst (fear)])⁶². The important (significant) difference (or distinction) lies, nevertheless (however), in each and every respective process of founding. In the first case, all individuals are in principal exposed to (at the mercy of) the same (equal, identical, equivalent, like) threat ((extreme) danger) to (for) life (or

⁶² *Leviathan*, XX (1st and 2nd paragraph (paragraph 1. and 2.)) = *English Works*, III

mortal danger) (risk of death) (Lebensgefahr),(;) in the latter [case], the conqueror could gain (obtain, earn, get, acquire) a(n) considerable (important, serious, material, substantial, significant, large) advantage due to (through) the fact that (because) he ((at) first (of all), initially, to start with) relieved (rid) himself (or got rid (disposed) of) (removed) (the) danger ([the, a] threat (hazard) or risk) not through (by means of) his own passive submission (subjection or subjugation) to (under) a sovereign, but actively through the subjugation (subjection or submission) of other[s] [individuals]. Angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death does not obviously reach (attain, gain, obtain, achieve, acquire) (in [respect of] all individuals) such a(n) extent (degree, scale, magnitude, size, proportion) that it [angst (or fear)] paralyses (cripples, halts, brings to a standstill, holds up) (the) readiness (willingness, preparedness) to take (undergo, be exposed to, accept) a great (high, serious) risk (gamble) if (when) advantages (benefits, gains) are thought of (imagined, had in mind, expected)(,) which the individual (person) concerned (in question) (interested (relevant) party (subject)) holds (regards, considers, views) to be (as) necessarily (unconditionally) worth striving for (after) (aspiring to) (i.e. desirable (worthwhile)). Angst (or fear) before violent (forcible) death would, incidentally (by the way), not at all (really, quite) be so widespread (common, diffuse, endemic)(,) if (the) readiness (willingness, preparedness) to attack were not just as (likewise, also) widespread(,) even [while, if] endangering (risking) ([or) putting (placing)]) (under, in) (danger, threat)) [even while endangering (or putting under threat)] one's own life. Every attack (assault, aggression, onslaught, strike, offence, raid) involves (or conceals) (hides, holds, contains, salvages, saves, rescues) imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) and bad (or terrible) (awful, wicked, evil, nasty, unpleasant, ugly) surprises in itself (Jeder Angriff birgt Unwägbarkeiten und schlimme Überraschungen in

sich), and yet (nevertheless, nonetheless, all the same, anyhow) experience (empirical (practical) knowledge) teaches that attacks are not only undertaken (done, attempted, carried out) (then) when (if) they are regarded as (considered [to be]) riskless (risk-free, free of risk, un Hazardous, safe). Hobbes indeed (actually, in fact (reality), really, truly) accepts (assumes, adopts, presumes, supposes, embraces) an anthropological disposition, which counteracts (combats, fights) angst (or fear) before violent (forcible) death: the “desire of Power after Power”. With (Because of) that (As a result, Thereby, Therefore), however, not everything can (yet, still, even, just) be (have been) (has (yet) been) said (yet) [can have been said yet], since this insatiable (unquenchable, inexhaustible) desire (or lust) (craving, coveting, want(ing), longing) for (of, after) power in itself is not always capable (in the position) of overcoming (getting over, surmounting, conquering) (does not always have the capacity to overcome) (the) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) [in respect (the face)] of death (or mortal agony (fear)) (da dieses unstillbare Machtbegehren an sich nicht immer die Todesangst zu überwinden vermag), as much as it may press (push, urge, shove, pressure, pressurise) (presses) for (towards, after, on) that (there(up)on). Where this overcoming (getting over, surmounting, conquest, will power; Überwindung) (temporarily (provisionally, for the time being, for the present, in the interim, tentatively; vorläufig)) succeeds (is successful), an additional (extra, further, supplementary, ancillary, accessory) force (power, strength, energy, vigour, might) (easily) distinguished (differentiated) from desire (or lust) (craving, coveting, want(ing), longing) for (of, after) power intervenes (joins (steps) in, switches (turns) itself on, is engaged (connected, started, interpolated), operates) as [a, the] direct contrast(ing) (opposition, antithesis, conflict) to (with, vis-à-vis, towards) angst (or fear) (schaltet sich eine zusätzliche, von

Machtbegehren unterschiedene Kraft als direkter Gegensatz zur Angst ein). It is a(n) boldness (daring or (an) audacity) (temerity, hardihood, intrepidity; Kühnheit), which draws (or feeds (lives)) on (off) the certainty (certitude) that the other [individual, human, person, man] is mortal and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) vulnerable. The certainty of the mortality of the other [individual, human, person, man] (other's (other [individual's]) mortality) lets (allows, leaves) one forget (to leave behind) one's own mortality (temporarily), [and, or] in any case (at all events (any rate), anyway, anyhow, at least)(,) no longer take [it, one's own mortality] entirely (completely, totally, wholly) seriously (earnestly). The culprit (or doer) (perpetrator, offender, wrongdoer, evildoer) feels, at least for a short time (the time being) (or temporarily) (vorübergehend) less mortal than the victim (or casualty) (prey, sacrifice, offering, oblation). (That is why) His [The said culprit's] founding (establishment, foundation, formation) of the [a] state (Seine Staatsgründung) (hence, therefore) takes (follows, pursues, enters on) other paths (roads, ways) than those [paths] of them (those [individuals]) who first of all (for a start) appear (arise, occur, behave, act) and argue (reason) as possible victims (or casualties) (prey, sacrifices). Killing and violent (forcible) dying (death) (Töten und Sterben) open (set, start) (up) (off) (inaugurate, reveal, disclose), not only here, different (varying, varied, diverse, variable) perspectives. All possible perspectives are, however, opened up against the background (backdrop) of the objective given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance, condition) of human mortality. Social ontology must start from that (there) [objective given fact of human mortality] so that it [social ontology] can (is able to) apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) all [of them (the(se) (said) possible perspectives)].

ⁱ Kondylis is suggesting to the reader that Simmel and v. Wiese did not even consider the possibility of the social-ontological aspect or discipline in respect of general or macro social science, whose two main disciplines in recent centuries consist of history and sociology, even though the two German sociologists inadvertently implied the existence of a social-ontological aspect or discipline (i.e. social ontology) in part (see below) [translator's endnote].