

III. Social relation: the spectrum (Soziale Beziehung: Das Spektrum)

1. The approach of formal sociology (Der Ansatz der formalen Soziologie)

A. (The) Functionalistic background (backdrop) and ambivalences of formalism (Funktionalistischer Hintergrund und Ambivalenzen des Formalismus)

A(n intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)-historical) putting in order (ordering, being put in order, inclusion, incorporation, classification) of formal sociology (in the history of ideas) must first refer to the paradigm shift (change in paradigm; Paradigmenwechsel) which took place around the turn of the last century [i.e. the 19th century (into the 20th)], and in the place of the bourgeois synthetic-harmonising thought figure (schema)(,) put an analytical-combinatory [one, thought figure]; the substances (or essences) of the bourgeois thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) (world of thought(s)) (were) consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) dissolved (dispersed, disintegrated) into functions (und an die Stelle der bürgerlichen synthetisch-harmonisierenden Denkfigur eine analytisch-kombinatorische setzte; die Substanzen der bürgerlichen Gedankenwelt wurden somit in Funktionen aufgelöst)¹. Formal sociology (Die formale Soziologie) constituted (made up, formed) – (even, also) in accordance with the self-understanding of its originators (creators, perpetrators, bearers) (too, as well) – an aspect(,) and at the same time(,)

¹ In relation to this paradigm shift, see generally (in general) Kondylis, *Niedergang*; regarding the contribution of sociology in relation to that, see esp. p. 146ff..

a driving force (engine, motor) of this process (series of events, event). It [Formal sociology] directly connected (joined, linked, associated, bound, tied) its ambitions to found (establish, substantiate, justify, account for) *sociology* with a challenge (declaration of war) to (for, [directed at]) the philosophy of history and the substantialistic perception (view) of man (men, humans) contained or implied in it [the philosophy of history]. “History” and “man” (“Man”) were,(–) in the framework of the bourgeois philosophy of history, whose variation (modification, adaptation) was the Marxist [philosophy of history, one],(–) thought (conceived) (of) (reckoned, meant) together to the effect (so, such) that history’s (History’s) upward movement (was) accompanied (by) the perfection (improvement) of man (Man) as genus (i.e. species or race); the aptitudes (or predispositions) ((natural) tendencies; Anlagen) or the seeds (germs, embryos, shoots, sprouts, spores; Keime) in relation to (regarding) that were indeed supposed (meant) to belong to the original (initial) constitution of the genus (i.e. species or (human) race) (mankind), however they [the said aptitudes or seeds] could only be updated (made topical, refreshed; sich... aktualisieren) in the course of history’s (History’s) development (unfolding). As the unfolding space (room for unfolding) of human nature (Als Entfaltungsraum menschlicher Natur), history (History) was not, for its part, merely a quantitatively understood (period of) time (period) (Zeit), as well as (also) not a (period of) time whose qualities merely had to do with the density (denseness, compactness, thickness) and the peripeteiae (i.e. sudden and unexpected changes of fortune or reversals of circumstances) of the becoming (or events) (der Dichte und den Peripetien des Geschehens)(,) irrespective of its [this becoming’s] (or their [these events’]) content. It [History] was defined in terms of meaning and values (meaning(sense)-like (purposefully) and value-like (axiologically)), i.e. as progress (Progress,

advancement, improvement) (Sie war sinnhaft und werthhaft definiert, d. h. als Fortschritt) in the [a] comprehensive (extensive, broad), real and ethical sense. The dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the substance (or essence) “history” (“History”) meant (signified) that time from now on (henceforth) lost (shed) the [its] ethical-qualitative dimension and the [its] unified (united, uniform, standard(ised)) sense (or meaning) in order to disintegrate ((be) decompose(d), fall apart, crumble, collapse) into (be pulled to) pieces (bits, parts)(,) which could be joined (fit(ted)) together differently on each and every respective occasion in accordance with (according to) the functional character of the becoming (or events). And the dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the substance (or essence) “man” (“Man”) meant (signified) the fragmentation (splintering or shattering) (splitting, dispersal; Zersplitterung) of those fixed (steady or stable) aptitudes (or predispositions) ((natural) tendencies), which in the course of history (History) were supposed (meant) to come to [their] full (complete) development (unfolding). In the perception of human things (i.e. affairs) (matters), (the) unified (united, uniform, standard(ised)) in its substance (or essence) history (History) is now displaced (driven out, dispelled) by (means of) (through) society comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed) as [a] functional ensemble (whole), while at the same time (in relation to which) man (Man) as [an] individual on each and every respective occasion differently shapes (forms, moulds), and also differently experiences, his own functional unity (unit, uniformity, entity) (seine eigene funktionale Einheit) in accordance with the functional requirements ((pre)requisites, demands, exigencies, desiderata) of the social ensemble.

Now formal sociology (has) neither first founded (established) *sociology* nor did [it] discover *society* as such; rather it [formal sociology] (has) developed that concept (conceptual plan) of sociology and society which corresponded (was equivalent (analogous, in accordance) (conformed, accorded, correlated)) to (with) the analytical-combinatory thought figure (schema) and thereby (through (because of) that, in this way)(,) (it [formal sociology] (too, also, for its part))(,) [has] contributed to the aforementioned paradigm shift. In order to be able to obtain (gain, win) such a concept, it [formal sociology] had to put an end to the osmosis of history and sociology, as it [this (such an) osmosis] [which] existed in the framework of the philosophy of history, and likewise (as well, also) divide (split (cut) (up), separate) the real pendant (i.e. counterpart) to (vis-à-vis, of) this epistemological osmosis, namely the network (mesh, plexus; Geflecht) of history and society, into its components, in order to then define sociology and society anew in their separation from history (as tale, story or historiography) and history [as a science, as such, in general] (Historie und Geschichte) and to relate (refer, apply) [them, sociology and society] exclusively to each other. The co-existence with one another of the relatively independent (or autonomous) (self-sufficient, self-standing) stages (levels, phases, grades) of development (developmental stages) and of [an] overarching (general, comprehensive, overriding, overshadowing, superior, paramount, transcending, overlapping) progress (advancement, improvement) (Die Koexistenz von relativ selbständigen Entwicklungsstufen und übergreifendem Fortschritt miteinander) in the general schema of the philosophy of history reflected (mirrored) the noteworthy (remarkable, notable) and the, for historical sociology, (consequential, far-reaching, momentous, seminal, serious, important) fact (rich in (replete with) consequences) that here the concept (notion) of society (is) only part(ial)ly absorbed (assimilated) by

(wrapped up in) (revolves around, fits in, merges with) the concept of history, although the former [society] – seen dynamically – remained (stayed) subordinate(d) to the latter [history]. Yet (But, Nevertheless, However)(,) seen (looked at) statically, it [society] kept (retained, held on to) its independence as [a] functional and structured or inwardly (internally) hierarchised entirety (whole(ness), completeness, unity, totality) (als funktionelle und strukturierte bzw. innerlich hierarchisierte Ganzheit), and Comte’s, but also Marx’s attempt to distinguish (differentiate) (the) static and dynamic way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) from each other, and at the same time to connect (join, link, combine, associate, bind, tie) one with (to) the other, provided (supplied, furnished, yielded, delivered) the basis for the epistemological osmosis of (between) sociology and history. Precisely thanks to this relative autonomy (independence, self-sufficiency, self-reliance) of the concept of society(,) (could) [the] philosophy of history (was allowed to, might) raise (make) the claim of being not merely history, but also sociology. The (successive, consecutive) societies (following (coming after, succeeding) one another), which made up (provided, constituted, gave, produced) history’s stages (levels, phases, grades) of development (developmental stages), could be transformed (converted) into sociological, historically saturated (satiated, replete, satisfied) ideal types and detached (removed, freed, cut loose) from the schema of progress (Progress schema) (konnten in soziologische, historisch gesättigte Idealtypen verwandelt und vom Fortschrittsschema losgelöst werden)². Whilst formal sociology separated (disconnected, detached, dis(as)sociated, segregated, severed, removed, parted) the concept of society from such contexts, in order to construct it [society] on

² Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 2B in this volume.

the basis of ultimate (final, last) and ubiquitous constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents) (letzter und ubiquitärer Bestandteile), it [formal sociology] increased (heightened, intensified, maximised) the demand (requirement, claim, call) for the overcoming (exceeding, getting over, surpassing, transcending) of the philosophy of history in favour [the direction] of (for, by turning (converting, transforming) [it, such a demand] into, to(wards), vis-à-vis) the demand for the supra(-)historical founding (establishment) of sociology. Only thus (in this way, so) could it [formal sociology], by the way (incidentally), acquire (gain, get (hold of), procure) its own terrain (i.e. territory) (ground, [space]), especially (particularly) as (since) [the] philosophy of history could just as well be disproved (proved wrong, refuted) with the means of historical sociology (mit den Mitteln historischer Soziologie). Both of the above-mentioned (aforementioned) demands [i.e. the overcoming of the philosophy of history, and, the suprahistorical founding of sociology] do not, therefore, necessarily interrelate (connect, join, attach, interweave) with (to) each other, and the a limine (at (from) the start, on (from) the threshold) elimination (or exclusion) of the historical approach from sociology did not at all allow the question to arise (come (spring, crop) up, emerge) [as to] whether (if) that which was supposed (meant) to be founded (established) supra(-)historically(,) was any longer or only in part able to be sociology¹. The zeal (fervour, enthusiasm, keenness, eagerness) in (to) contrast(ing) (contradistinguish(ing), compar(e)(ing)) *forms (Formen)* to historical content(s) left (allowed, let), for their [the formal sociologists'] part, little time (remaining, over, to spare) for reflection on (over, about, regarding) the content-related(filled) (substantive) presuppositions of exactly these forms – yet (but, however, nevertheless) precisely this reflection would have shown (demonstrated, exhibited) that here a path (road) was taken

(followed, entered on, pursued) which went beyond (past) (lead [us] out [of]) sociology in every theoretically and, in terms of research practice, relevant sense. Typically (enough) (Significantly), formal sociology exercised (exerted) its influence not through the formation (development) of a coherent sociological school or tendency (or line (school) of thought) (direction, trend), which would have in connection with (the) programmatic work(s) [or projects] (deeds, tasks) (die programmatischen Werke) systematically investigated (or researched) (examined, explored, inquired into) social life, but through the mostly (for the most part) selective reception (adoption; Rezeption) of its insights (perceptions, views) on the part of unhistorical social psychology (unhistorischer Sozialpsychologie) or [the] just as unhistorical phenomenological analyses of the lifeworld. It [Formal sociology] interests us here because it thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion) the spectrum of the social relation – and because [the] weaknesses (shortcomings, failings) and [the] gaps (holes) of a purely form-related (i.e. formal) description (account, portrayal) of this spectrum is social-ontologically (sozialontologisch) revealing (instructive, informative).

Still (Even) in the second half of the 19th century(,) the bond (tie[s]) between sociology and the philosophy of history seemed to be so strong (solid, steady, sturdy, stable, firm, fixed) and self-evident ((perfectly) natural, obvious) that every demarcation (delimitation) had to proceed (move) via (or go through) formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) (renditions, making, conversions) into forms) (structuring(s) in terms of form, formal structuring(s)) (jede Abgrenzung über Formalisierungen gehen mußte). As far as I know, Lazarus (has) (was the) first (to) express(ed) (enunciate(d)) the idea (thought, notion, concept, perception; Gedanken) [that] society consists of several (a number of, various, multiple, quite a

few) (side by side (juxtaposing, juxtaposed, (i.e.) adjacent) but also touching (coinciding with) one another ((i.e.) tangent) and intersecting(,)) narrower and broader(,) circles (cycles, circuits, spheres) ((standing) next to, but also brushing against (coming into contact with) and intersecting (with) (cutting through) one another) (mehreren nebeneinanderstehenden aber sich auch berührenden und durchscheidenden, engeren und breiteren Kreisen), so that it [society] represents (constitutes) “a(n) extremely (most, highly, greatly) manifold (multiple, in many ways) in itself intertwined (or convoluted) (entangled, intricate) relationship of connection (conjunction, combination, association, affiliation, linking, tying, binding) and separation (segregation, severance) („ein höchst vielfach in sich verschlungenes Verhältnis von Verbindung und Absonderung“)³. His [Lazarus’s] student (pupil), Dilthey, who (has, had) wanted to show (demonstrate, exhibit, display, express, point out, indicate) the essential (substantial, fundamental, important) relationship (affinity; Verwandtschaft) between sociology and the philosophy of history, suggested (proposed) as [a] realistic alternative (choice) to (vis-à-vis) their [sociology and the philosophy of history’s] “unsolvable (insoluble, insolvable)” problem (or task) (job, mission, duty, function), the dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of the social whole into individual (separate, particular) interrelations (or contexts) (correlations, connections) (“members (i.e. parts, components or limbs) (elements, links)” or “systems”) (die Auflösung des sozialen Ganzen in Einzelzusammenhänge („Glieder“ oder „Systeme“), and compared the underlying “relations of dependence and affinity (relationship)” of every culture (die jeder Kultur zugrundeliegenden „Beziehungen von

³ Lazarus-Steinthal, „Einleitende Gedanken“, p. 4. The context here is still “folk-psychological ((ethnologically) psychological ([in respect of] (the) people(s) (folk(s), masses, populace, nation(s)))” („völkerpsychologisch“).

Abhängigkeit und Verwandtschaft“) with those between the “constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components, constituents)” or “functions of an organism” (den „Bestandteilen“ oder „Functionen eines Organismus“)⁴. The internal (inner) connection between [the] analytical, form-related (i.e. formal) and functional point of view (Die innere Verbindung zwischen analytischem, formalem und funktionalem Gesichtspunkt) (is) already emerging (looming) (emerges, looms (on the horizon), stands out) here, so that Vierkandt could attribute (ascribe, impute) to Dilthey the “definition of society with the help of the concept of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) (Definition der Gesellschaft mit Hilfe des Begriffs der Wechselwirkung)”⁵. However, a hermeneutician (i.e. practitioner of hermeneutics) (der Hermeneutiker), who more or less needed (required) fixed (stable or settled) (steady, firm, solid) subjective bearers (carriers) of experiencing (going through life) and reliving (afterliving) (re-experiencing, after-experiencing) or

⁴ *Einleitung in die Geisteswiss.*, GW, I, pp. 86ff., 111, 421 (regarding (in relation to) Simmel); V, p.61ff. (society as (aggregating, accumulating, accumulated) interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (being added (mounted, counted) up) (Gesellschaft als sich summierende Wechselwirkungen). The relationship between Dilthey and Simmel was concisely (succinctly, incisively, pithily, strikingly) characterised by Tenbruck, „Simmel“, p. 595ff.. Let us here recall (call to mind, recollect) (It is (here) to (should here) be reminded (remembered)) Spann’s objection to (against) Dilthey’s concept (notion) of society, which can (adversely) affect (hurt, strike [a blow to], hit, wound) the formal-sociological approach as a whole (der den formalsoziologischen Ansatz als ganzen treffen kann): Dilthey does not pose (ask) the [a] question according to (in accordance with) the specific (particular) character of the social (societal) (nach dem spezifischen Charakter des Gesellschaftlichen), but he confuses this [question] with the question according to (in accordance with) the interrelation (or connection) (correlation) of the subsystems (or part(ial) systems) (der Frage nach dem Zusammenhang der Teilsysteme („Zur soziol. Auseinandersetzung“, p. 220ff.). Cf. Ch. II, footnote 237, above.

⁵ *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 40. Amongst his main (chief) sources Vierkandt counts (numbers, includes, takes into account), apart from (except for) Simmel, phenomenology, “which enables us to ascertain (establish, find out, detect, discover) comprehensive (or extensive) (broad) series of ultimate (final) a priori facts (of the matter) (data, findings)” („die uns umfassende Reihen letzter apriorischer Tatbestände festzustellen ermöglicht“) (loc. cit., III, p. 1ff.). L. v. Weise saw himself (with)in [as part of] Simmel and Vierkandt’s intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) succession, *Soziologie*, pp. 128, 133; cf. the critical comments (remarks, observations) regarding (about) both [of them, Simmel and Vierkandt] in *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 35, 41. A rebellion against (Resistance (Opposition) to) the «philosophie de l’histoire» [“philosophy of history”] was also the first version, represented by Tarde, of French «sociologie pure» [“pure sociology”]. “Imitation” constitutes primarily (first and foremost, in the first place, first of all, mainly, principally, chiefly, preeminently) [a] relation, and society should be defined as [a] system of relations, not for instance as [a] system of (the) law (justice, right; Rechts) or of (the) economy (*Lois*, XXII, p. 73).

understanding of objective meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations) (feste subjektive Träger des Erlebens und Nacherlebens bzw. Verstehens von objektiven Sinnzusammenhängen), had to, despite (in spite of, notwithstanding) [the] turning away (renunciation, estrangement) from (of) the metaphysics of substance (or essence) and of Reason, resist (fight, struggle against, refuse) a consistent functionalisation, at whose end(ing) (finish, outcome, close, termination, expiry) (would be) (which would end up in) meaninglessness (pointlessness, senselessness, futility, uselessness, purposelessness) (would stand) (mußte sich trotz Abkehr von der Substanz- und Vernunftmetaphysik gegen eine konsequente Funktionalisierung sträuben, an deren Ende Sinnlosigkeit stehen würde). The young Simmel set (went) to work more radically, who already in his first sociological writing (i.e. treatise) (work, paper, document, publication) determined (or defined) the “direction (tendency, trend) of (the) modern intellectual(-spiritual) life (living) (life of the intellect(mind)(-spirit))” as follows, namely [as] “dissolving (or breaking up) (disintegrating) the (what is) fixed (stable, steady, solid, firm, settled), [the (what is)] [in, of] itself same (equal, identical, equivalent, (a)like) (what remains the same), [the (what is)] substantial, into function, force (energy, power, strength, vigour, might), movement” (die „Richtung des modernen Geisteslebens“ folgendermaßen bestimmte, nämlich „das Feste, sich selbst Gleiche, Substantielle, in Funktion, Kraft, Bewegung aufzulösen“)⁶. In the process, both the I-like or ego-ish (i.e. egocentric) “point of unity in us” (der ichhafte „Einheitspunkt in uns“), which is actually (really) merely “interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) and dynamic weaving (spinning) into one another (i.e. interweaving), interrelation (connection, correlation,

⁶ *Über soziale Differenzierung*, p. 130. Cf. *Philosophische Kultur*, p. 3ff..

context), balancing (evening out, equalisation) of a multitude (plurality, a great number)” („Wechselwirkung und dynamisches Ineinanderweben, Zusammenhang, Ausgleich einer Vielheit“), as well as society, which represents (or constitutes) (is) a “becoming (or events)”, a “function of the receiving (greeting or welcoming) (meeting) and (the) bringing about (or achieving) (causing, effecting) of fate (or destiny) and (the) shaping (moulding, forming, structuring, arrangement, designing, creation) of one on the part of (by) the other” („Funktion des Empfangens und Bewirkens von Schicksal und Gestaltung des einen von seiten des anderen“), are dissolved (or broken up)⁷. The functional way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) society (Die funktionelle Betrachtung der Gesellschaft) aims at putting (setting) aside (eliminating, removing, sidelining, doing away with, getting rid of) every notion (idea, perception, representation, image; Vorstellung) of a “mystical unity (whole)”, which exists “beyond (on the other side of) individuals”⁸. Indeed (Actually, In fact), Simmel remains consistent as [a] sociologist in this [his] anti-metaphysical and anti-substantialistic programme (antimetaphysischen und antisubstantialistischen Programm), even (in order) (to) pay(ing) the price of skipping (jumping, leaping, springing) over the question (problem) [as to] what then holds together (or coheres) the interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (was denn die Wechselwirkungen zusammenhalte), what makes (renders) them [interactions (or mutual influences)] [a] society⁹. He [Simmel] thereby (through (because of) that, in this way) avoided (evaded, obviated, steered clear of) at least the reverse mistake (error, fault), which our contemporary functionalists make (commit,

⁷ *Brücke*, pp. 91, 215.

⁸ *Über soziale Differenzierung*, p. 134ff..

⁹ See Ch. II, Sec. 3B, footnote 235, above.

perpetrate), by (while they) want(ing) to have both [these things] in one go (at the same time, at once): to dissolve (or break up) the (what is) social (das Soziale) into functions and simultaneously to safeguard (or preserve) (protect, keep) its [the social's] unity through (by means (way) of) the emphatic concept (notion) of the system and system rationality (the rationality of the system). Nonetheless (Nevertheless, All the same, However), Simmel shares with the latter [(systems theory) functionalists] (in) an error (mistake) of [a] methodical (i.e. methodological) character. The functionalistic thought [pattern] and interpretation pattern (model, specimen) (pattern of thought and of interpretation) (Das funktionalistische Denk- und Deutungsmuster), which supports (sustains, bears, carries) sociological theory, serves at the same time as [a] historical-sociological diagnosis of [the, our] time(s) (age, period, era) (als historisch-soziologische Zeitdiagnose), and indeed in the sense of (accordance with) (according to, for the purpose of) the self-description of the social present. Modern society, whose features (characteristics, traits, attributes) Simmel outlined (or described) (portrayed, depicted) absolutely (definitely, thoroughly, perfectly, completely) from the perspective of the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) [(in respect) of] “community-society”, is (stands, [exists]) under the influence (sign, cloak, aegis) of (is marked by) the pure functionality of the money economy and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) brings forth (gives rise to, produces, causes, creates) a relativistic-functionalistic way (manner, mode) of thinking (thought) (der reinen Funktionalität der Geldwirtschaft und bringt somit eine relativistisch-funktionalistische Denkweise hervor)¹⁰. The sociologist too (also, as well) is supposed

¹⁰ *Philosophie des Geldes*, esp. ch. VI; still (even) more concisely (succinctly, tersely, strikingly) in the [his] earlier (antecedent, prior, previous) article (essay, composition, paper) „Das Geld in der modernen Kultur (Money in modern culture)“.

(meant) to functionalistically apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) society and social life in general, that is, irrespective (regardless) of the diagnosis of [the, our] time(s) (age, period, era). However, how can such a time-conditioned(dependent, conditional, limited, qualified, based, bound, contingent) intellectual (thought, notional) attitude (stance, approach, outlook, view, orientation, positioning) (eine derart zeitbedingte gedankliche Einstellung) be legitimately declared (proclaimed, announced, pronounced, professed) (to be, as) the key for the understanding of every society in every period of time (or age) (era) (all times)? And why exactly (of all understandings (things)) does the functionalistic self-understanding of modern society coincide with the understanding of (the) supra(-)historical real facts (of the case) (or situations) (circumstances, state of affairs) (überhistorischen realen Sachverhaltes)? It does not cross Simmel's mind (occur to Simmel) (Simmel does not think (consider)) that functionality can be an ideological metaphysics in need of (requiring) explanation (eine erklärungsbedürftige ideologische Metaphysik) just as substantialism (Substanzialismus), for its part, was. He [Simmel] does not see that functionalistic sociology essentially (basically, in reality) represents (or constitutes) not [an] explanation, but rather [a] symptom of the “direction (tendency, trend) of (the) modern intellectual(-spiritual) life (living) (life of the intellect(mind)(-spirit))” described (delineated, depicted) by him himself, that (the) functionalistic way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation) did not, that is, for instance, gain the upper hand because people (humans, men) were suddenly transformed (converted, changed) from substances into functions, but because the social conditions (or circumstances) took a form in core areas (fields, sectors, domains, realms) (auf Kerngebieten) which in tone-setting (i.e.

leading) ((pre)dominant) ideologues (bei tonangebenden Ideologen)
found expression (were reflected) in functionalistic positions¹¹.

A discussion of Simmel's so-called (life-philosophical) turn (regarding (in respect of) [towards] the philosophy of life) (Simmels sogenannter lebensphilosophischer Wende), which necessarily (had to) entail(ed) a certain rehabilitation of "substantial" magnitudes („substantieller“ Größen), e.g. of the experiencing and understanding I (Ego or Self) (des erlebenden und verstehenden Ich) or of (the) objective cultural meaning (sense) contexts (interrelations), is superfluous (unnecessary, not necessary) here. Because his [Simmel's] sociology was in essence (essentially, substantially, in the main) already mature(d) (ripe, fully developed, full-blown) before this turn¹²; although his sociological interests (continued to) remain(ed) (remaining) (wide-)awake ((on) alert) [i.e. active (alive)], the [his, Simmel's] basic (fundamental) sociological concept (das soziologische Grundkonzept) was not revised in the (life-philosophical) sense (spirit) (of) (accordance with) (the philosophy of life) (im lebensphilosophischen Sinne). Functionalism was connected with exactly this basic (fundamental) concept, and this was, next to (beside, alongside) the programmatic contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) with (to(wards), vis-à-vis) the philosophy of history, both recorded (registered, noted) by [Simmel's, his] contemporaries¹³, as well as loudly

¹¹ Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 2, above.

¹² Tenbruck, „Simmel“, esp. p. 592ff.

¹³ See e.g. (the way (manner)) [as to] (how) Jellinek summons (uses, highlights, projects, mobilises) function against substance (or essence)(,) in order to obtain (gain, win, get) the "social concept (notion) of the state" („sozialen Staatsbegriff“), *Staatslehre*, p. 174 ff.. For Troeltsch, formal sociology and [the] philosophy of history (a mixture (mixing, blend(ing)) of history and ethics, causality and finality (i.e. the doctrine of the efficacy of final causes, or, teleology) (eine Mischung aus Geschichte und Ethik, Kausalität und Finalität) represented (constituted) the two main (chief, principal) conflicting (contrasting, opposing) schools (lines) of thought (directions, tendencies, trends) in sociology („Zum Begriff“, p. 705ff.). Vierkandt starts from (takes) the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between (“historical-philosophical-encyclopaedic”) [“encyclopaedic sociology pertaining to the philosophy of history”] and “analysing(i.e. analytical)-formal” sociology („geschichtsphilosophisch-enzklopädischer“ und „analysierend-formaler“ Soziologie) (as his starting point) in his main (chief, principal, major) work (magnum opus; Hauptwerk) (*Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 1ff.).

proclaimed (declared, announced, promulgated) by Simmel's direct (immediate) successors. Vierkandt in fact recalled (called to mind, remembered, recollected) (reminded [us] of) the good example of natural science, which had "already everywhere (all over the place) carried out (through) (implemented)" the replacement of the category of the object (subject matter, topic, motif, theme) by that [the category] of the relation (das gute Beispiel der Naturwissenschaft, die die Ersetzung der Kategorie des Gegenstandes durch jene der Beziehung „bereits überall durchgeführt“ habe),(;) he [Vierkandt] set (put) the task (problem, job, mission, duty) to "relating (or relationalising)" thought (i.e. thinking which relates things between one another) („beziehendem“ Denken) of apprehending (grasping, understanding) functions, and by (while he [Vierkandt]), from [a] functionalistic point of view (perspective), objecting to (complaining about, querying, disputing, criticising) (objected to) the overestimation of the "unity (or uniformity) (consistency, standardisation) of the personality" („Einheitlichkeit der Persönlichkeit“) by (means (way) of) (through) the "popular way (manner, mode) of thinking (thought)" („populäre Denkweise“),(;) [Vierkandt (and) (also)] believed he was able to achieve (accomplish, perform, manage, do, effect) something about which cybernetic systems theory today boasts (brags, extols, prides itself). The distinction (differentiation, difference) "between the individual as place (or locus) (position; Ort) of the social becoming (or events) (des sozialen Geschehens) and the systems which make up (constitute) his (its) content", i.e. the ascertainment of the large (great) quantity (amount, mass, load, pile, heap; Menge) of various (varying, different, differing, distinct) stances (attitudes, positions), mentalities (mindsets, ways of thinking, opinions, views, (fundamental) attitudes, casts of mind) and purposes (or goals) (ends, objects) in the only conditionally (i.e. partly or

relatively) unified (uniform) (united) individual allows (permits) finally a bu(r)sting (breaking, forcing) open (blasting, blowing up) of the usual (customary, common) separations (divisions) between natural and historic(al), created and creating (creative), acting and watching (i.e. observing) (onlooking, looking on, spectating) man (verschiedener Haltungen, Gesinnungen und Zwecke im nur bedingt einheitlichen Individuum gestatte schließlich ein Sprengen der üblichen Trennungen zwischen natürlichem und historischem, geschaffenem und schaffendem, handelndem und zuschauendem Menschen)¹⁴. The dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) of substances (essences) into functions creates (produces), therefore, a unified (or uniform) (united) field in (on) which all the conceivable (imaginable, thinkable) transitions (crossings) and crossings (i.e. hybridisations) (intersections, junctions, crossbreedings, hybrids) (alle nur denkbaren Übergänge und Kreuzungen) are made possible (enabled). Space thus (as a result, consequently, therefore) displaces (drives out, ousts, dispels) time as the main (chief, principal, major) form of perception (awareness, cognition) of the social (Der Raum verdrängt somit die Zeit als Hauptwahrnehmungsform des Sozialen). As v. Wiese expressed (put, stated) it, “the primacy of the next to one another (i.e. being (existing, living) side by side, or co-existence) ahead of (vis-à-vis) the after one another (i.e. existing (being, living) after one another, or succession) [is]... an essential feature (characteristic, attribute, trait) of our teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of the relation” (ist „der Primat des Nebeneinander vor dem Nacheinander... ein wesentliches Merkmal unserer Beziehungslehre“), whereas it [the situation (case,

¹⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 40, 48ff..

instance), things] was (were) (had) (behaved, acted) the other way around ((the) reverse(d), contrariwise, conversely) in the philosophy of history¹⁵.

The bringing (working) out (analysis, processing, elaborating) of the functionalistic background (backdrop) of formal sociology can serve as a reminder (memento) (to remind [us]) (the recollection (remembering, reminding) (in memory (remembrance)) [of the fact] (in relation to (on, regarding) that) that quite a few (some, various, a number of) sociological schools (lines) of thought (tendencies, trends, directions) of the 1960s and 1970s (years), like quite a few [tendencies] of artistic avant-gardism (künstlerischen Avantgardismus) from the same time (period, age, era), took root [have their roots] in the paradigm shift around 1900; *mutatis mutandis*, the contradistinction (confrontation, altercation, clash, dispute, contrariety) between Durkheim and Simmel continued in [with] the contrast(ing) (opposition, conflict) between [the] closed and [the] open system. Yet (Nevertheless, However)(,) that [the said (aforementioned)] bringing out pursues (follows, tracks) here, first of all (primarily, in the first place), theoretical aims (targets, objectives). [The] functional and form-related (i.e. formal) approach in fact interrelate (connect, interweave) logically, because functions come to the fore (there) where substances have (been) dissolved (broken up) (disintegrated) into ultimate (final) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components,

¹⁵ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 30, 31, 49. Otherwise (Apart from that), v. Weise repeats (reiterates) the demand (claim, requirement) of “delimiting (demarcating, dissociating, separating, differentiating, distinguishing, marking (fencing) off) [the] concept (notion) of the relation from (against) the concepts of the object (subject matter, topic, motif, theme) and of (the) qualities (properties or characteristics) (der Eigenschaften)”,(;) he [v. Weise] regards (considers, views, looks at, contemplates) as [the, a, his] methodical (i.e. methodological) ideal the “(continued (carried on, pursued)) as far as possible (most extensive) quantification of the qualitative differences of the social becoming (or events)” („möglichst weitgeführte Quantifizierung der qualitativen Unterschiede des sozialen Geschehens“), and for his part recalls (calls to mind, recollects, remembers, reminds [us] of) the example of other sciences (loc. cit., pp. 3, 9, 7). The functionalistic spatialisation (turning into (making) space (room)) (Verräumlichung) of the way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation) is supposed (meant) to (should) also here show (point) the way (path, road) out of the alternatives “individual – society” or “whole – part” (loc. cit., p. 22ff.).

constituents), which then can be combined with one another in such a way (manner) that they constitute forms. The search for ultimate (final) elements was (stood, [existed]) expressly (explicitly) [stated] in [by] formal sociology's programme(,) and connected (joined, linked, combined, associated) this [search (for ultimate elements in formal sociology)], in this respect (regard) (on that score), with the aforementioned paradigm shift (Funktionaler und formaler Ansatz hängen ja logisch zusammen, denn Funktionen treten da in den Vordergrund, wo die Substanzen in letzte Bestandteile aufgelöst worden sind, die sich dann derart miteinander kombinieren lassen, daß sie Formen konstituieren. Die Suche nach letzten Elementen stand ausdrücklich auf dem Programm formaler Soziologie und verband diese auch in dieser Hinsicht mit dem genannten Paradigmenwechsel)¹⁶. Yet (All the same, Nevertheless, However)(,) precisely in this search, the fatal ambivalences of sociological formalism (die fatalen Ambivalenzen des soziologischen Formalismus) became noticeable (apparent) (made themselves felt, drew attention to themselves), and indeed at the same time regarding (on, in respect of) two crucial questions (matters, problems). On the one hand, when it was a question (matter) of (as it concerned) the total (complete, absolute) feasibility (practicability, practicality, workability, viability) of the separation between form and content (die restlose Durchführbarkeit der Trennung zwischen Form und Inhalt), on the other hand, when it was a question (matter) of (as it concerned) the determination (or definition) of "form". The possibility of a *formal* sociology (einer *formalen*

¹⁶ Formal sociology endeavours (attempts, makes the effort, strives, is eager) "to go back (be reduced (traced back) (return) to the ultimate (final) elements of social (societal) life" (Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 3); "our system is primarily a system of the next to one another (i.e. being (existing, living) side by side, or co-existence). We break down (or take apart) (dismantle, dissect) a complex into its simultaneous (concurrent) constituent (integral) elements (or parts) (components, constituents)" (v. Weise, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p.30). For [In (With) regard (relation) to] the search for ultimate elements in art, philosophy or linguistics at (of) the turn of the [twentieth] century [i.e. c. 1900] cf. Kondylis, *Niedergang*, pp. 97ff., 138ff., 152ff..

Soziologie) or of a sociology as pure (sheer, absolute) teaching (i.e. theory) (doctrine) of forms (morphology) (als purer Formenlehre) in general obviously (evidently, blatantly) depends on that feasibility. And Simmel could in this regard (connection) (regarding (concerning) this) show (or produce) (possess, have, exhibit, demonstrate) and promise so little that one may ask (question) with what scientific right was he convinced (assured, confident) in advance of the possibility of a formal sociology. As he [Simmel] himself wrote, “for [the] foreseeable future” no “even only approximate (almost, nearly, rough) dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up)” of the forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) “into simple elements” („auch nur annähernde Auflösung“ der Vergesellschaftungsformen „in einfache Elemente“) was to be hoped for, from (out of) which [it] followed that the already proposed (or formulated) (advanced, put forward, drawn (set) up, established, set out) forms would apply (be valid) “only to (for) a relatively small (slight, modest, minor, scant) circle (compass, radius, perimeter, ambit, area) of phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences; Erscheinungen)”; to that the admission (confession, acknowledgement) was added [that] even these forms do not remain (themselves) “absolutely the same (equal)” ([as, in respect of, with, to] themselves), but they varied according to (in accordance with) each and every respective content¹⁷. However, how would a(n) demanding (exacting) formal sociology be founded (established, substantiated, justified, accounted for) if (when) the forms were lacking (missing, absent) which would encompass (embrace, reach round, span, cover) social life (living) in its synchronic and diachronic entirety (or totality) (whole) (die das soziale Leben in seiner synchronischen und

¹⁷ *Soziologie*, pp. 10, 11.

diachronischen Gesamtheit umspannen würden)? And would the assertion (claim, statement, allegation, proposition) not be absurd [that] those wide (broad, extensive) social areas (fields, sectors, domains, realms) in which the separation (division, segregation, distinction) between form and content (Form und Inhalt) admittedly could not be carried out (implemented, put through, executed, accomplished, undertaken, enforced), would (be) completely (totally) closed to (shut themselves off from) sociological treatment (handling, processing, dealing, attention)? Simmel (and v. Weise too) sought to avoid (evade, dodge, sidestep, elude, get out of the way of) this absurdity through (by means of) a half-hearted compromise or a makeshift (compromise) solution (stopgap, temporary expedient; Verlegenheitslösung). He [Simmel] allowed (let, granted, afforded, provided) next to (beside) (the) pure sociology, a “general” [one, sociology] (Er ließ neben der reinen Soziologie eine „allgemeine“ gewähren)(,) (with)in (under) whose area of competence phenomena and construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (Phänomene und Gebilde) fell (came), which presupposed the existence (presence, hypostasis) of a society, whereas (while) (the) pure sociology was meant (supposed) to be (should have been) concerned (concern (occupy) itself, deal) with (the) forms of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) as [the] constituting (i.e. constitutive) forces of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) (mit den Wechselwirkungsformen als konstituierenden Kräften der Vergesellschaftung)¹⁸. Through (By means of) this reluctant

¹⁸ *Grundfragen*, ch. I. The same distinction (differentiation, difference) was in essence (essentially) made (or hit upon) (reached, found) in 1908 when Simmel wrote [that] conventional (customary, traditional) or non-pure (not pure) sociology would study those soci(et)al phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) “in which the (interacting (or mutually influencing) (interplaying)) forces (alternating (changing) [their] effect) are already crystallised out of their immediate bearers (carriers, vehicles)” (“bei denen die wechselwirkenden Kräfte schon aus ihrem unmittelbaren Träger auskristallisiert sind”), that is, represented (or constituted) objective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (*Soziologie*, p. 14). At that time (Back) (Then) (In those days)(,) Simmel only wanted to totally (completely) deny this study the name sociology or (leave it

((be)grudging, unwilling) split(ing) (division, schism) of sociology, the in(un)feasibility (impracticability, impracticality, unworkability, inviability; Undurchführbarkeit) of the pure or form-related (i.e. formal) programme was tacitly (implicitly, silently) admitted (confessed, granted), especially (particularly) as (since) the logical and epistemological relation(ship) between both branches of the discipline remained extremely (most, exceedingly, utterly) unclear (obscure, hazy, blurred) or entirely (completely, wholly, totally) external (outward, extrinsic). Content-related(filled) (substantive) sociology was perceived (regarded, seen, experienced, viewed) rather as (found (felt, considered) rather (to be), taken rather for) [a(n)] annoying (or burdensome) (bothersome, onerous, irksome, troublesome, tiresome, undesirable, vexing) compact (solid) appendage (attachment, addition), which awaited (hoped) for its dissolution (disintegration, break(ing) up) into forms (Die inhaltliche Soziologie wurde eher als lästiges kompaktes Anhängsel empfunden, das seiner Auflösung in Formen harrte). For its part, pure sociology was obviously (evidently, apparently) not dependent (reliant) (did not depend (rely)) on (the) content-related(filled) (substantive) [one, sociology], since it [pure sociology] wanted to directly have recourse (go

[this (such a) name] to) (let) the social sciences (have it (this (such a) name)) (but can the science of law replace the sociology of law (kann aber Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtssoziologie ersetzen)?), while he [Simmel] held (considered, regarded) pure sociology (to be) (as) “absolutely (quite, per se, as such) justified (entitled, eligible)” “in covering the concept (notion) of sociology fully (completely, totally, entirely) and alone (solely, on its own, by itself) (exclusively)” (loc. cit. pp. 19, 20). In 1917, he [Simmel] believed (thought, reckoned, opined), more reservedly (guardedly, cautiously) (with more restraint), [that] pure sociology is “in a... sense appearing (seeming, manifesting itself, turning (coming) out) to me actually (in actual fact, really) quite decisively(,) ‘sociological’”. L. v. Weise called (named), in contrast to Simmel, pure sociology, general, and assigned to (instructed, directed, engaged, commissioned) the “special (particular) sociologies” („speziellen Soziologien“) (with, in, to(wards)) the study of the areas (fields, sectors, domains, realms)(,) which are characterised (marked, identified) by content-related(filled) (substantive) ends (goals) being (which have been) set (or end (goal) setting) (durch inhaltliche Zwecksetzungen) (economy, law) (see e.g. „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 69). However, the diverging (differing, deviating) terminology does not change (alter) the factual (objective) agreement with Simmel [at all]. This [agreement] is underlined by v. Weise’s distinction (differentiation) between “processes of the first” and “processes of the second order”: those [the former] would not “logically” (!) presuppose the existence (presence, hypostasis, availability) of a social construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation)(;) these [the latter] would presuppose it [the existence of a social construct] („Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 75).

back) to (fall back upon, use, summon; zurückgreifen) (the) historical material (das historische Material) in order to unearth (bring (up) (to the surface (light))), uncover) therein (in there) hidden (concealed, veiled, latent, furtive) form-related (i.e. formal) structures (versteckte formale Strukturen). Now the path (way, road) from (the) historical material to the form was not only in practice inaccessible (unapproachable, impenetrable, impervious), as Simmel himself illustrated by way of an example¹⁹, but in principle (fundamentally, basically, de facto) indirect and mediated [subject to (determined by) intervention] (grundsätzlich indirekt und vermittelt). Because in view of (given) the uniqueness (singularity, singularness) of historical content(s), the [a] direct and exact correspondence (equivalence, counterpart, analogue, parallel) of [between] a pure sociological form with (to(wards), vis-à-vis) [and] a certain (particular) content would imply its [the (said) pure sociological form's] asymmetry to(wards) (vis-à-vis, with) other (different) content(s) and consequently (therefore, thus, as a result) the thwarting (frustration, foiling, upset(ting), prevention, circumvention) of a(n) comprehensive (extensive, broad) teaching (i.e. theory) (doctrine) of forms (morphology) (Denn angesichts der Einmaligkeit historischer Inhalte würde die direkte und exakte Entsprechung einer reinen soziologischen Form zu einem bestimmten Inhalt deren Asymmetrie zu anderen Inhalten und somit die Vereitelung einer umfassenden Formenlehre implizieren), which may (could) sensibly (meaningfully, reasonably, plausibly, rationally, logically) be proposed (or formulated) (advanced, put forward, drawn (set) up, established, set out) only (then) when every individual (or single) (separate(d), solitary, lone, isolated, odd) form structurally covers multiple (a number of, several, various, diverse) content(s) (wenn jede

¹⁹ *Soziologie*, p. 12.

einzelne Form mehrere Inhalte strukturell abdeckt). But also apart from (disregarding) that: if (the) pure sociological forms could (were able to) be applied to different (varying, varied, diverse, dissimilar) content(s) or if different content(s) could (were able to) be broken up (or dissolved) (disintegrate) into identical forms (in identische Formen auflösen), then (thus, so) a *sociological* determination (or definition) of the difference (distinction) between the content(s) would be impossible, and (in that case, then) (the) tolerance vis-à-vis content-related(filled) (substantive) sociology (der inhaltlichen Soziologie) would (also) be superfluous (redundant, unnecessary, useless, futile) (too); one could abolish it [such tolerance] straight (right) away (immediately, in a moment (minute), in a jiff(y)). Would (If) the forms (then) again (in turn, on the other hand), depending on (according to, in accordance with) the field (area, sector) of application (Anwendungsgebiet) and in accordance (line, compliance) with (according to) the difference of [between] the contents with [as regards, vis-à-vis] one another, (were to) vary (varied), they would therefore be determined (conditioned) in terms of content, then (thus, so, in this way) the theoretical desideratum (demand) of a general *sociological* teaching (i.e. theory) (doctrine) of forms would lose (shed, forfeit) its actual (real, true) sense (or meaning) and one could remain (rest) assured (confident, safe) (have no hesitation (fears)) in [regard to] (with) [respect to] [confident in (i.e. satisfied or content with)] historical-content-related(filled) (substantive) sociology. All the more (So much the more) as (considering) the contradistinction (confrontation, altercation, clash, dispute, contrariety) with [regard to] questions of formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) and typification (i.e. rendering into types) (classification under typifying forms) is immanent (inherent) in [respect of] this [historical-content-related sociology] (Um so mehr, als

dieser die Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen der Formalisierung und Typisierung immanent ist). Sociology *is* in fact (of course) by (of) itself formalisation and typification, and indeed exactly to the extent it vindicates (i.e. defends or claims (maintains, upholds)) its own territory (area, terrain) (eigenes Territorium vindiziert) vis-à-vis history. Certainly (Of course), pure sociology's search for ultimate (final) forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), in(to) which the historical content(s) would be able to (could) be absorbed (assimilated) (open, unfold, come undone), means (signifies) something other than (different to) the formalisation of these same contents by (means (way) of) (through) historically oriented (aligned, adjusted, aimed) sociology (Gewiß, die Suche der reinen Soziologie nach letzten Vergesellschaftungsformen, in denen die historischen Inhalte aufgehen könnten, bedeutet etwas anderes als die Formalisierung dieser selben Inhalte durch die historisch ausgerichtete Soziologie); here (are, exist), in other words, two different perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions; Auffassungen) of (about, regarding, on, over) the possible separation (division, segregation) between form and content (die mögliche Trennung zwischen Form und Inhalt) (are available (present)). But if "pure" and "general" (in Simmel's sense) or "special (particular)" (in v. Wiese's terminology) sociology, are supposed (meant) to (should) make up (constitute) branches of *the same* discipline, (then, so, thus) between both those perceptions (views) there must be a logical interrelation (connection, correlation). That, however, is not the case. An analysis of the family as form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)(,) free of (from) historical content(s)(,) would not provide (offer, give, grant, present) any backing (support) for a typology of historically attested forms of families (family forms) (Familienformen) – on the contrary: were this analysis at all doable (feasible, possible) (which

it is not necessarily), (then, so, thus) all forms of the family would have to be absorbed (assimilated) (open, unfold, come undone) in(to) a(n) single (sole, only) form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)(,) and historical sociology would remain out of work (i.e. without anything to do) (redundant, jobless, unemployed, workless, idle; arbeitslos) after this ultimate (final) reduction. Either this [historical sociology] must, therefore, cease to apply (be left out (lost, removed, omitted, discontinued, canceled, ceased, dropped), become unnecessary, disappear, vanish)(,) and pure sociology with the other social(-) [sciences] and (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) (the humanities) (Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften) be left [to stand] alone, or pure sociology must be assigned (attributed, ascribed, allocated) to (or classified within) (classed with) an extra-sociological epistemological field (area, sector, domain, realm) (oder die reine Soziologie muß einem außersozilogischen epistemologischen Gebiet zugeordnet werden), whereby (in relation to which) such questions would be answered by themselves.

The founders of formal sociology (have) hardly paid attention to the difference (distinction) between both these possible separations of form and content from each other. The failure to appreciate (misjudgement, underestimation) (of) the essentially form-related (i.e. formal) aspect of historical sociology had (took revenge (got its own back), avenged itself), nevertheless (however), (dire consequences) (or got its revenge) to the effect that pure sociology, believing in (under the impression of) its own monopoly over (regarding) the (what is) formal-related (i.e. formal) (das Formal), vindicated (i.e. defended or claimed (maintained, upheld)) many a form (quite a few (some) forms) for itself, which cannot be *stricto sensu* (in the (a) strict sense) classified(,) readily (without a second thought (any

(great) effort (problems), difficulty)) (directly, immediately, just like that)(,) as [an] “ultimate (final, last) constituent (integral) element (or part) (component, constituent)” of the social (and) or as [an] elementary and indispensable form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation). Above all, Simmel’s analyses in his main (chief, principal) sociological work suffer methodically (i.e. methodologically) under this ambiguity (equivocalness, ambiguousness), which of course is frequently ((in) many times (cases, ways)) concealed (hidden, covered up) by the [his] impressionistic mastery, by the [his] concise (succinct, to the point, pithy, striking) apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension, revealing, inclusion, recording, capturing; Erfassung) of concrete situations (circumstances) in their to((-)ing) and fro((-)ing) (back and forth, comings and goings), and not least of all by the mostly (for the most part, more often than not) convincing (persuasive, cogent), albeit (even though (if)) in principle (fundamentally) frowned-upon (disapproved-of, scorned), psychology. This all undoubtedly (doubtless(ly), undeniably, unquestionably) constitutes an important contribution to – “general” – sociology and explains, incidentally, the renewed interest in Simmel (exactly, precisely) at a time (of all times) in which one indeed wants to know little of “pure” sociology, but more about micro(-)situations (micro(-)circumstances), [micro](-)structures and [micro](-)interactions [microsituations, microstructures and micro-interactions] (Mikrolagen, -strukturen und -interaktionen). It is namely, the time (period, age, era) of the mass-democratic blurring of the boundary (border, frontier, limit) between [the] [what is] private [sphere] and [the] [what is] public [sphere] [between (the) private and (the) public] (die Zeit der massendemokratischen Verwischung der Grenze zwischen Privatem und Öffentlichem)(,) with the corresponding (analogous, commensurate) consequences for the sociological discipline. That

contribution is not however made (performed, achieved, accomplished, rendered) as [a] methodically (i.e. methodologically) strict keeping to (or honouring of) the form-related (i.e. formal) or pure programme. And this is by (far) (no means) (still) (not) (yet) all (everything). The ambiguity (equivocalness, ambiguousness), which results (emanates, derives, arises, is derived (created), comes) from the manifold (multiple) mixing (blending, mixture) of the “pure” and historically loaded (or charged) form with each other (der vielfachen Vermischung von reiner und historisch geladener Form miteinander), is paired (i.e. combined) with another and just as rich in consequences (consequential) [ambiguity], which concerns (affects) the determination (or definition) of the pure form itself. [The] Pure form can, on the one hand, mean (signify, denote, stand for) a fixed (steady or settled) (stable, firm, solid) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations (Reine Form kann zum einen eine feste Konstellation oder Kristallisation von Beziehungen bedeuten), which fulfils a constitutive function in every social construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation). On the other hand, [the, a] pure form can represent (or constitute) a form-related (i.e. formal) criterion (ein formales Kriterium), whose purity consists in its fundamental (in principle) applicability to every constellation or crystallisation of relations, regardless (irrespective) of whether this [constellation or crystallisation] is “pure” in the (formal-sociological) sense (of formal sociology) or not (dessen Reinheit in seiner grundsätzlichen Anwendbarkeit auf jede Konstellation oder Kristallisation von Beziehungen besteht, gleichgültig, ob diese „rein“ im formalsoziologischen Sinne ist oder nicht). The difference (distinction) is patently (obviously, clearly, apparently) serious (grave, momentous, massive, weighty, vital). Because the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion – broadcast (featured, presented, published, printed) conceptually (as a (in

regard to a) concept (notion, term), notionally, terminologically) as (i.e. called) “unification (agreement or union) (unity) and split(ing) (division or disunion) (rupture)” by Simmel, as “association and dissociation” or “nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance” („Einung und Entzweiung“ von Simmel, als „Assoziation und Dissoziation“ bzw. „Nähe und Distanz“) by L. v. Weise – was not at all in its validity (applicability, value, worth, influence, prestige, force; Geltung) influenced by the success of the attempt at proposing (or formulating) (advancing, putting forward, drawing (setting) up, establishing, setting out) pure forms in the former sense [of the pure form] and at encompassing (embracing, spanning, covering)(,) through (by (means (way)) of) their systematisation(,) the entire (whole, complete) realm (field, area, sector, domain) of the social (den ganzen Bereich des Sozialen zu umspannen). Expressed (Put, Stated, Said, Revealed) differently (otherwise): the application of the (above-)mentioned (aforementioned) social criterion to all existing (present, available) social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) or phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences; Erscheinungen), and the finding (searching, sounding) out (discovering) of ultimate (final, last) fixed (stable or settled) (steady, solid, firm) forms or relation crystals (crystalline or crystallised relations) (das Herausfinden von letzten festen Formen oder Beziehungskristallen), to which that criterion could be applied in every social construct(ion) (creation, shape, formation) or phenomenon (in jedem sozialen Gebilde oder Phänomen), are two completely (entirely) different (dissimilar, unlike, distinct, differing, various, miscellaneous, varying, variant) things. Nonetheless (Nevertheless, All the same), Simmel mixes and confuses both with each other when he speaks of the pure form, and he describes (outlines, portrays, depicts) constellations (correlations or conjunctures) like (as)

for instance that of “primus inter pares” [“first amongst equals”] (so, thus, in such a way) as if they were (stood) at the same logical level with the criterion of “unification (agreement or union) (unity) and split(ing) (division or disunion) (rupture)”, although they can merely (only, just) be illustrations of the same [criterion]. Still (Even) further (more) (Furthermore, Moreover, What’s more): on (under, with, in) the assumption [that] pure forms in the sense (with the meaning) of (in accordance with) constellations or crystallisations of relations would benefit, as it were (so to speak), the status of social law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) (der Status sozialer Gesetzmäßigkeit), he [Simmel] wants to search (look) for (seek) analogous law-bound (deterministic or law(rule)-based) [formations] or (law(-)like) formations (kinds of moulding) (mouldings, formats, arrangements, layouts) (similar to the law) [law-bound (deterministic or law-based) or law-like formations (kinds of moulding)] in social phenomena (will er nach analogen gesetzmäßigen oder gesetzesähnlichen Ausformungen bei sozialen Phänomenen suchen), which are not elementary fixed (stable or settled) (steady, solid, firm) forms, but rather mobile (movable, moving) incarnations of the (above-)mentioned (aforementioned) form-related (i.e. formal) criterion (bewegliche Inkarnationen des erwähnten formalen Kriteriums). So (Thus,) he believes (opines, thinks, means, says) that e.g. [he] [it] can (be) ascertain(ed) (determine(d), establish(ed), trace(d), detect(ed)) on a stable basis “how the various (miscellaneous, different, distinct, varying, differing) stadia (i.e. stages) of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] are lined up (arranged, formed in a line, strung together), (up) to (until) what extent (degree) a supra-ordination in a certain (particular) relation is compatible (agreeable, well-tolerated) with ((in regard) to) [a(n), the]

equal (same, like, identical) ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) (ordering, inclusion, incorporation, classification, accession) in other relations” („wie sich die verschiedenen Stadien der Über- und Unterordnung aneinanderreihen, bis zu welchem Maße eine Überordnung in einer bestimmten Beziehung mit Gleichordnung in anderen Beziehungen verträglich ist“) etc.²⁰. It is, nevertheless (however), futile (fruitless, useless, of no use) to answer (respond (reply) to) such questions once and for all by means (way) of (through) formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) appearing (seeming) in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner) (deterministically) (gesetzmäßig anmutende Formalisierung), that is, to want to achieve (do, manage, complete, perform, accomplish) something which lies (is) beyond (on the other side of) the ad hoc proposed (or formulated) (advanced, put forward, drawn (set) up, established, set out) ideal-typical formalisations of historical sociology (was jenseits der ad hoc aufgestellten idealtypischen Formalisierungen historischer Soziologie liegt). Supra(-)[ordination] [superordination], sub(-)[ordination] [subjugation], and equal (same, like, identical) ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) (ordering, inclusion, incorporation, classification, accession) [Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order)] are not related in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner) (deterministically), but causally, that is, in accordance with (corresponding (according) to) each and every respective historical and personal constellation (correlation or conjuncture) in relation to (between) one another (Über-,

²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 18.

Unter-, und Gleichordnung beziehen sich nicht gesetzmäßig, sondern
 kausal, also entsprechend der jeweiligen geschichtlichen und personellen
 Konstellation aufeinander), so that statements (opinions,
 pronouncements, assertions, propositions) about (regarding) them [supra-
 ordination, subordination and equal ordination] may (are, should) not (be)
 (allowed) (to) (be) assigned (ascribed) to (classified as, classed with) the
 realm (domain) of pure forms in the sense of (accordance with)
 (according to, for the purpose of) fixed (stable, firm or settled) (steady,
 solid) and ubiquitous crystallisations (so daß Aussagen über sie nicht dem
 Reich reiner Formen im Sinne fester und ubiquitärer Kristallisationen
 zugeordnet werden dürfen). They [Supra-ordination, subordination and
 equal ordination] can certainly (indeed, admittedly) be subsumed under
 the pure form in the sense of (accordance with) (according to, for the
 purpose of) the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of unification
 (agreement or union) (unity) and split(ting) (division or disunion)
 (rupture) or nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood)
 and distance – but (however) the application (use) of a ubiquitous
 criterion does not nearly (at all, by any means) (nowhere near, nothing
 like) found(s) (establish(es), justify, justifies, substantiate(s)) a(ny) law
 bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) (aber die
 Anwendung eines ubiquitären Kriteriums begründet noch lange keine
 Gesetzmäßigkeit). [The] ubiquity of the criterion and law bindedness
 (determinism or law-based necessity) as [the] necessary recurrence
 (return) (als notwendige Wiederkehr) of certain (particular) phenomena
 (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) or constellations
 (correlations or conjunctures)(,) to which the criterion is applicable
 (applies), must (have to, necessarily) definitely (at any rate, at all events,
 in every case) (instance) remain (stay) logically and factually

(objectively, really, in reality) (logisch und sachlich) separated from each other.

Our analysis is – most (highly, very) likely (probably) (in all probability) unreflectedly and unintentionally (involuntarily, inadvertently, unwillingly) – confirmed by v. Wiese’s theoretical decision to do (go) without (for(e)go, relinquish, renounce, abandon, refrain from) the Simmelian search for fixed (steady or stable) (settled, firm, solid) and elementary forms of the relation (relation(al) forms) underlying (forming the basis of, characterising) all social construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (die Simmelsche Suche nach festen und elementaren, allen sozialen Gebilden zugrundeliegenden Beziehungsformen)(,) and instead (of that (this)) to build (construct, erect, make) [a] pure sociology in principle on the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of association and dissociation or nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance. He [V. Wiese] expressly (explicitly, emphatically) identifies the concept (notion) of the pure form with the conceptual pair (pair of concepts; Begriffspaar) of nearness (proximity) and distance²¹, without though (however) seeing (realising, appreciating, accepting, recognising) that nearness (proximity) or distance cannot actually (in actual fact (in reality)) be a form ([an] at will (or arbitrarily) (randomly, as one likes) variable form without [a] fixed (solid or firm) (stable, steady, sturdy, settled) outline (contour) is in fact no form (beliebig variierbare Form ohne festen Umriß ist ja keine Form)), but is partly [a] given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance, condition; Gegebenheit) or force, under whose effect (impact, influence) forms come into being (arise, emerge,

²¹ Thus, e.g., when he writes “that the most general form of social events (incidents) must (has to, necessarily) consist(s) in approximations (i.e. approachings or coming (drawing) near(er) (bringing close(r) together)) and distancing (distance, removal), in back and forth (to(-ing) and fro(-ing)), in to(wards) one another and away from one another ([going] to and from one another)...” („daß die allgemeinste Form der sozialen Geschehnisse in Näherungen und Entfernungen, im Hin und Her, in Zueinander und Voneinander-weg bestehen muß...“), „Beziehungssoziologie“, p.67.

originate, result, ensue, are created (produced)), partly [an] analytical criterion which is applicable (usable) [in regard] to forms having come into being in such a manner (derart entstandene Formen). The identification of (the) form with nearness and distance or association and dissociation, as logically precarious as it may be (also) (is), implies, at any rate (all events) (in any case), the admission (confession) that the separation between form and content can be carried out (through) (undertaken, implemented, enforced, accomplished) only at a level at which the actual (or main) (real, true, original, principal) theme (i.e. topic) (subject, matter) is the spectrum of the social relation in general (auf der eigentliches Thema das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung im allgemeinen ist). If, on the other hand (however), form is comprehended (grasped, understood, conceived, interpreted) as (taken for) [a] fixed (stable, firm or settled) (steady, solid) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations, then (so, thus) the [an] analysis must be aligned (or oriented) (adjusted, lined up, organised, geared, directed) in terms of content and historically (die Analyse inhaltlich und historisch ausrichten); here, therefore, historical (“general”, as (expressed [by]) Simmel (expresses (states, articulates) [it]), or “special”, as expressed by v. Wiese) sociology does the talking (has the first say, shoots its mouth off), and the only (sole, lone) possible formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) remains the typification (i.e. rendering into types) (classification under typifying forms) of content(s). If, however, formal *sociology* is unrealisable and if the form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of the (social relation’s) spectrum (of the social relation) must be epistemologically established (settled, introduced) outside of the (sociology’s) area (realm, sector, field, sphere) (of sociology), (so, then, thus) this does not in the

least mean, on the other hand, that the (pure sociology's) original (initial) approach (of pure sociology) could bear (carry, support) the entire (complete, whole, full) load (burden, weight, encumbrance, onus) of a social ontology (einer Sozialontologie). The form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of the social relation's spectrum, as this is described (outlined, portrayed) on the basis (by virtue) of (due to) the criterion "nearness-distance" (and) or "association-dissociation", just (only) constitutes an aspect of social ontology, which only in connection ([an] interrelation) with the rest [of the aspects] has (or obtains) (gains, gets) *social-ontological* relevance. If (When) this connection (interrelation) becomes apparent (clear, evident, obvious), (so, then, thus) at the same time it is clear that the formalism of pure sociology must be criticised not only from [a, the] sociological, but no less from [a, the] social-ontological point of view, even though (if) (albeit) in a different sense on each and every respective occasion, as it [the different sense on each and every respective occasion] corresponds to (in accordance (compliance) with, according to) the difference of both epistemological levels in respect of (from, between) each other. Formal sociology could not be developed (elaborated, formed, organised, arranged) into the [a] social ontology basically (essentially, fundamentally, in reality) because the prevailing (decisive, determinative, weighty, influential, leading) functionalistic point of view refused to tolerate (accept) (forbade) a(n) going into (showing of interest in, taking on (acceptance) of, being involved (engaged) with) factors, which until today (up till now) are still regarded as "substances (essences)", e.g. anthropological factors. Yet (However, But, Nevertheless)(,) only the broadening (widening, extension, expansion, enlargement) of the social-ontological horizon in [the, an] anthropological [direction] – as well as political [direction] and cultural-philosophical [direction pertaining to the philosophy of culture]

(–) direction (anthropological – as well as political – direction pertaining to the philosophy of culture) (in the direction of anthropology – as well as of politics and of the philosophy of culture –) (in anthropologischer – sowie politischer und kulturphilosophischer – Richtung), allows (permits) (it) [one, us], beyond the apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension, recording, capture, registration) of the formal constitution (texture or composition) (nature) of the spectrum of the social relation (die Erfassung der formalen Beschaffenheit des Spektrums sozialer Beziehung), to explain (explicate, elucidate, expound) (the explaining of) its mechanism too, through (by means of) whose activity the (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) of historically attested social(-)[forms] and cultural forms comes about (takes place) (durch dessen Tätigkeit die Vielfalt der historisch bezeugten Sozial- und Kulturformen zustandekommt). The same social-ontological critique (criticism) can be directed at Weber in so far as (to the extent that) the foundation stone (cornerstone) of his sociology, namely the concept (notion) of social action (der Begriff vom sozialen Handeln), represents (or constitutes) a(n) (different (alternative)) description (formulation, expression) (or paraphrasing) (paraphrase) of the concept of the social relation (der sozialen Beziehung). Social action (and) or (and) the social relation here also represents (or constitutes) something which in itself lies (is) outside of (historical) sociology. It [Social action] is nevertheless not extended (widened, broadened, expanded, enlarged) to a social ontology because the necessity of certain (particular) basic (fundamental) features (characteristics, attributes, traits) of social action (and) or (and) [the] social relation – above all of meaning (or sense) (sense (i.e. meaning)) (des Sinnes) – is indeed ascertained (attested, established, observed, detected, discerned, determined, discovered, seen, noticed), but not made understandable (clear,

intelligible, comprehensible) against the [an] anthropological (and cultural-philosophical) background (backdrop) (pertaining to the philosophy of culture) (nicht aber vor anthropologischem und kulturphilosophischem Hintergrund). It is not a matter (question) (Our concern) here (is not) (of) whether Weber otherwise (apart from that) (has) supported perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions) which could (have) be(en) used as [the] building blocks (basic components (elements)) of a social ontology, but whether he [Weber] made *systematic* use of them [such (the said, these) perceptions (building blocks)] in connection ([an] interrelation) with the (his) teaching (or theory) (doctrine) of social action and (or) of the social relation. But that was not the case. And nevertheless (nonetheless, yet) it is [a situation (state of affairs) which is] factually (or objectively) so close (near) to touching upon the mechanism of the social relation (liegt es sachlich so nahe, den Mechanismus sozialer Beziehung zu streifen), when (if) there is talk of “interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect)” („Wechselwirkung“) or “social action”, that intimations (hints, allusions, suggestions, indications, insinuations) about (regarding) it (that) [the mechanism of the social relation] by (in) Simmel and Weber are not lacking, (which, who) point(ing) in the direction which then (after(wards) (that)) gained (attained, achieved) general (universal) fame (familiarity, prominence, notoriety) (became generally known) through (by means of) symbolic interactionism (durch den symbolischen Interaktionismus)²².

The feeling (or sense) [that] formal sociology would actually (really, in actual (as a matter of) fact) overstep (exceed, go beyond, transgress, transcend, pass, violate, infringe) the epistemologically justifiable (or

²² In relation to that, Ch. IV, esp. Sec. Ba.

acceptable) (tenable, reasonable, defensible) boundaries (limits, borders, frontiers) of the sociological discipline occasionally (now and then (again), from time to time) arose (sprung up, appeared) amongst (in) sociologists, however, it [this (such a, the said) feeling] would not be substantiated (justified, accounted for, explained, established, founded) in greater (more) detail because of the lack (absence) of a social-ontological perspective. That is why (Hence) one (has) complementarily (politely) ushered out (or got rid of) (saw, seen) formal sociology (off) rather than epistemologically incorporating (or classifying) (ordering, including) (putting) [it] (in order)²³. For our part, we may sum up (summarise) such an incorporation (or classification) (ordering, putting in order, inclusion, sorting, arrangement) as follows. Formal sociology posed questions, which sociology neither solves nor is obliged (has) to (must) solve, and it [formal sociology] did not solve these questions itself because it only half posed the[se] same [these, such] [questions]. In the final analysis (end) (Ultimately, Finally, Lastly), the road (path, way) to their social-ontological solution was blocked (obstructed, spoiled, spoilt, ruined) owing (due) to (on the basis (because) of) the functionalistic premises, which could behold (see, espy, spot, perceive) in the taking seriously of (society's) (the) *being (Is)* (of society)(,) only a lapsing (slipping) back (falling, declining) into “substantialism (essentialism)”. Thus (So, In this way)(,) formal sociology had to already from the beginning get entangled (tangled up, embroiled, ensnared, involved, entrapped) in the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of every methodological individualism,(;) otherwise (differently) stated (said) (in other words), its

²³ Franz Oppenheimer opined (thought, believed, said, reckoned) [that] it [formal sociology] is merely the “antechamber (anteroom, foyer, lobby, entrance hall) of the shrine (sanctum, sanctuary)”,(;) Freyer believed that it [formal sociology] “could definitely (absolutely, perfectly, thoroughly) be a necessary preliminary (opening, prior, preparatory, precursory) stage (phase) for a more demanding (or sophisticated) (exacting) sociology”, *Soziologie*, p. 63 (Oppenheimer is cited here too).

[formal sociology's] starting point (or approach) itself forced (compelled, made, pressured, obliged, coerced) it towards partisanship (taking sides, advocacy, espousal, positioning, siding) in favour of (for, with) methodological individualism. Because, if one wants to remain (stay) with (by, in) the pure form, (then, so, thus) one must construct the ultimate (final, last) forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) out of (from) individuals (die letzten Vergesellschaftungsformen aus Individuen konstruieren). A(n) investigation (inquiry (inquiring, researching) into, exploration, examination) of historically attested forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), even of the smallest scale (size, extent, magnitude, degree), cannot be carried out (made, done) without (with no) consideration for (regardless) (of) content(s); it cannot e.g. be seen (recognised, appreciated, accepted, realised, understood) what then a "pure" way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) "the" family as [the] minimal form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)(,) away (or apart) (aside) from (to one side (out of the way) of) every comparison of the many historically known (familiar, noted, famous, well-known) types of families (family (familial) types; Familientypen) with one another(,) could be meant. Constellations (or correlations) of individuals (Konstellationen von Individuen), starting (beginning) with the dyad (angefangen bei der Dyade), can, on the contrary, (really, already) be theoretically devised (outlined or sketched) (planned, designed, drafted, contrived, mapped out) (anyway), in relation to which (while at the same time) one could say (opine, think, believe, mean, reckon) [along] with Simmel [that] it would (come to) be (thought of) (occur [to us]) "only that examples are possible in relation to them [such constellations of individuals], but less [possible] (in relation to them [such constellations of individuals]) that they [such constellations of

individuals] (would [necessarily] be) (were) (are) real” (es käme „nur darauf an, daß Beispiele möglich, aber weniger darauf, daß sie wirklich“ seien)²⁴. Simmel (has, had), however (nevertheless), overlooked (missed) that he, in all his examples, (had, has) always tacitly (silently, implicitly) regarded at least one thing (matter, affair, object) as real: the becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) of individuals (das Vergesellschaftetsein der Individuen). He [Simmel] talks (speaks), without exception, of individuals, who *already* have at their disposal (possess) the mental equipment (equipping, provisions, furnishings, fittings, outfit) of members of organised societies, and when (if) he [Simmel] sets himself the aim (objective, target, goal, end, purpose) of evading (sidestepping, avoiding, dodging, eluding, getting out of the way of) the fact of society and of showing (demonstrating, exhibiting, presenting, displaying) “society, as it were (so to speak), in status nascens [in a state of being born or in a nascent state]”²⁵, (so, then, thus) he does not at all think (have the idea) of (consider) doing the same with individuals *as* individuals, that is, of making understandable (clear) (explaining) the coming into being (creation, emergence, genesis, origin, formation process) of society from (nascent, emerging, arising) individuals coming into being (being created (born)), i.e. not already socialised in the framework of a(n) existing ([already] present (available)) society (Er redet ausnahmslos von Individuen, die *schon* über die mentale Ausstattung von Mitgliedern organisierter Gesellschaften verfügen, und wenn er sich das Ziel setzt, dem Faktum der Gesellschaft auszuweichen und „die Gesellschaft gleichsam in status nascens“ zu zeigen, so kommt er überhaupt nicht auf den Gedanken, dasselbe mit Individuen *als* Individuen zu tun, also die Entstehung der Gesellschaft aus entstehenden,

²⁴ *Soziologie*, p. 33, footnote 1; cf. p. 144.

²⁵ Loc. cit., p. 15.

d. h. nicht bereits im Rahmen einer vorhandenen Gesellschaft vergesellschafteten Individuen begreiflich zu machen). Accordingly (Correspondingly), his [Simmel's] famous excursus (digression) "how is society possible?" („Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?“)²⁶ is based (rests) on a confusion (mistake): elements or phenomena, which are found (encountered) in every society, are passed off as elements or phenomena, whose effect (impact, influence) can give rise to (create, produce, bring into being, engender, generate) society, while at the same time (in relation to which) the presumed (accepted, adopted, assumed, supposed) genetic priority of these elements or phenomena vis-à-vis other [elements or phenomena] remains undiscussed and unproven (unproved, not proved, unverified); typically (enough), Simmel understands by that (thereunder), relations between individuals or between "the [an]" ["individual["] and ("the") ["society["]]. He (certainly, admittedly) knew (though), as mentioned, that historically working (labouring, making, doing, operating) "general" sociology (die historisch arbeitende „allgemeine“ Soziologie) cannot help (avoid) presupposing the fact of society (das Faktum der Gesellschaft vorauszusetzen), and at the same time he [Simmel] wanted to tie (knot) (i.e. link) (combine, associate, connect, affiliate, attach) the purity of formal sociology together with its [formal sociology's (own)] freeing (setting free, release, liberation, relief, rescue) from this presupposition [of the fact of society]. With (Among(st)) formalistic premises, this could also not be avoided (obviated, averted, evaded, eschewed). Since, however, even the encounter (meeting; Begegnung) between Robinson and Friday was marked (or shaped) (determined, formed, moulded, characterised, oriented) by the social pre(-)forming (shaping, moulding) [preforming] (die soziale Vorformung) of

²⁶ Loc. cit., p. 21ff..

both, since, that is, interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect; Wechselwirkung) can take place (happen, occur) only inside of (within) society or already socialised individuals (oder schon vergesellschafteten Individuen), when they [society or already socialised individuals] are supposed (meant) to (should) be [the] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of social science (Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaft), and not of (the) zoology of animals (beasts) living alone (lonely, solitarily) (solitary (lonely, isolated) animals) (und nicht der Zoologie einsam lebender Tiere), (then, so, thus) Simmel erred (was wrong (mistaken), strayed) when he related (applied, referred) his question on (about, regarding, over) the possibility of society to its [society's] genesis (Genese) and not to its [society's] cohesion (coherence; Zusammenhalt). The conviction (belief, certainty) of individualistic formal sociology [that] the cohesion of collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) is generally based (founded, established, set up) (generally bases (founds, establishes, sets up) [itself]) merely on (in) collective notions (or representations) (perceptions, views, ideas) (gründe bloß in kollektiven Vorstellungen) and ceases (stops, discontinues, finishes, breaks off) with these [collective notions (or representations)]²⁷, led, incidentally (by the way), to a paradoxical agreement with (the) [its, individualistic formal sociology's] opponent(,) [in] Durkheim.

²⁷ Thus, v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 9, 25ff.; cf. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 7.

B. The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance (Das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz)

The analysis of the previous section showed (established, proved, revealed) that the (formal-sociological) determination (or definition)(,) (in terms of formal sociology(,)) of the form (die formalsoziologische Bestimmung der Form) has two different meanings (significations, significances), which sociologically in a general sense are indeed both useful (helpful, beneficial), but not constitutive for the sociological discipline (aber nicht konstitutiv für die soziologische Disziplin sind). Now, the second of these meanings can, with (by [which]) (the) form (is) comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed, conceived, taken) as the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance (bei der Form als das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz aufgefaßt wird), find [have] [a] social-ontological use (application, utilisation, employment) [social-ontologically come in useful], although it [such (this) use] in itself(,) and without (with no) consideration (regard) for (regardless of) content(s) of any kind (sort, type)(,) is hardly (barely) able to (can scarcely) bear (carry, support) the epistemological load (or burden) (onus, weight, encumbrance) of a social ontology. When the founders of formal sociology inappropriately (inadequately, unacceptably) called (named) the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness and distance “form” („Form“), they (were) exclusively (solely, purely) thinking (thought, conceived) of (supposed, reckoned, believed in) its [the said formal criterion's] independence (autonomy, freedom) from sociological (and psychological) content(s); its possible direct or

indirect interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) with content(s) of another order did not (pre)occupy (absorb, engross, bother, keep) them (busy). As v. Wiese stressed (emphasised, underlined), the merely form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion was supposed (meant) to (should have been) distinguish (set, withdraw, take off, contrast) the specific realm (or field) (area, domain, sector) of a pure sociology (apart) from (with) that of all other social(-)[sciences] and [the (rest of the)] humanities (intellectual(-)spiritual) sciences) [the humanities] (sollte der bloß formale Charakter des Kriteriums das spezifische Gebiet reiner Soziologie gegen jenes aller anderen Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften abheben). Whereas (While) these [other social sciences and (the rest of the) humanities] would concern themselves (deal) with (work on, look into) (the) (political, religious, scientific etc.) goals (ends) (and) or (and) (goal(end)[-related]) content(s) (pertaining to goals (ends)) (Zwecken bzw. Zweckinhalten), for whose (the) sake (of which) humans (people, men) draw (come) near(er) [nearer] (near themselves (get close(r)) to (i.e. approach) one another(,) or distance themselves from one another (um derentwillen sich Menschen einander nähern oder voneinander distanzieren), pure sociology devotes (dedicates, applies) itself (attends) merely (just, only, simply) to the “direction (tendency, trend, movement)” and the “rhythm (cadence, pulse)” of this drawing (coming) near(er) [nearer] (i.e. approaching) (getting close(r)) or distancing, associating or dis(as)sociating movement (widme sich reine Soziologie bloß der „Richtung“ und dem „Rhythmus“ dieser annähernden oder distanzierenden, assozierenden oder dissoziierenden Bewegung).

Through (By means (way) of) its formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to (matter of) form) (Formalität) understood in such a way, it [formal sociology] cannot (only) be demarcated (delimited, differentiated, marked (fenced) off) (only) from all other social(-)[sciences] and [the

(rest of the)] humanities (intellectual(-spiritual) sciences) [the humanities], but at the same time [it (formal sociology) can] encompass all [of the other social sciences and the (rest of the) humanities)], i.e. subject (subjugate or subordinate) them to its [formal sociology's] own specifically form-related (i.e. formal) criterion. Every relation, of whatever (associating or dis(as)sociating) kind (sort, type), develops (or unfolds) in a(n) realm (or field) (area, domain, sector) defined in terms of content and has, in this respect, a content. However, (the) content does not determine (condition) its [every relation's] form-related (i.e. formal) structure; its [every relation's] "direction (tendency, trend, movement)" and its "rhythm (cadence, pulse)" can be separated from it (that) [(the) content] not merely in [a] methodic (i.e. methodological) respect, but also in reality (really, actually, concretely, objectively); they [(every relation's) (the said) "direction" and "rhythm"] therefore largely (to a great extent, for the most part, extensively, widely, broadly) follow an ((their) own) inner (internal) logic (of their own), even though (although, notwithstanding that), on the other hand, the influence of the constitution (composition or texture) (nature, character) of a(n) area (realm, sector) defined in terms of content on the course of the relation is (should, ought) (can)not (to) be overlooked (der Einfluß der Beschaffenheit eines inhaltlich definierten Bereiches auf den Verlauf der Beziehung nicht zu übersehen ist)²⁸. According to (In accordance with) [the] perception (view) of (the) formal sociologists (Nach Auffassung der Formalsoziologen), the ascertainment (establishment, observation) of this influence remains [a(n), the] matter (affair, subject, object, issue, business, cause, thing; Sache) of (for) the individual (separate, lone, single, isolated) social sciences – for us, it constitutes a main (principal,

²⁸ v. Wiese, loc. cit., pp. 12, 13, 14; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), esp. p. 276ff..

chief, primary, head, foremost, leading) task (job, duty, mission, function) of sociology itself.

From (Of) the analysis of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, (the) knowledge (insight, cognition, recognition, realisation, discovery, ascertainment) should (might, could) therefore be retained (kept), first of all with (in) [a] social-ontological intent(ion) (purpose, aim, [frame of] mind), [that] [the] direction and rhythm of the social relation are in principle (basically, fundamentally), in [(as) regard(s) to] their formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to (matter of) form), independent of each and every respective area (or realm) (sector, domain, sphere) of social activity (Von der Analyse des formalen Kriteriums von Nähe und Distanz dürfte also zunächst in sozialontologischer Absicht die Erkenntnis behalten werden, Richtung und Rhythmus der sozialen Beziehung seien prinzipiell in ihrer Formalität vom jeweiligen Bereich der sozialen Tätigkeit unabhängig).

This can then be formulated or generalised(,) [((in) such (a way), so) that] the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the social relation is connected (joined, attached, linked) (or interrelates) (connects, depends) solely with (to, on) the fact that the subjects of this relation are humans (people, men) in society (Dies kann dahin formuliert bzw. verallgemeinert werden, die formale Struktur der sozialen Beziehung hänge einzig und allein mit der Tatsache zusammen, daß die Subjekte dieser Beziehung Menschen in Gesellschaft seien). Socially living or formed humans (people, men) represent (or constitute) the exclusive precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) for the general validity (force, currency, effect) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance (Sozial lebende bzw. geformte Menschen stellen die ausschließliche Voraussetzung für die allgemeine Gültigkeit des formalen Kriteriums von

Nähe und Distanz dar). This [formal criterion of nearness and distance] indeed (certainly, in fact, of course) never appears (shows itself, emerges, makes itself felt, occurs) in abstract purity, but always in connection (conjunction) with content(s) and goals (ends, purposes), yet precisely its [the formal criterion of nearness and distance's] (cap)ability (or capacity) (skill, competence) to (at) be(ing) connected with all possible content(s) and goals (Dieses tritt zwar nie in abstrakter Reinheit, sondern immer in Verbindung mit Inhalten und Zwecken in Erscheinung, doch gerade seine Fähigkeit, sich mit allen möglichen Inhalten und Zwecken zu verbinden), makes it [the formal criterion of nearness and distance] independent of (from) every individual (separate, lone, solitary, single, isolated) [(piece or kind of) content and goal] amongst them [(all) contents and goals]. (Something analogous is the case with) Socially living humans (people, men) (behave (act, are) analogous(ly)). They [Socially living humans] are always (situated or) located (found) in concrete situations (positions, locations, circumstances, conditions, states (of affairs)) (Sie befinden sich immer in konkreten Lagen), and in the course of this they [socially living humans] represent certain (particular) content(s) and goals (ends, purposes),(;) nevertheless (yet, however)(,) statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) about them [socially living humans] are possible, whose independence of (from) content(s) and goals (ends, purposes) consists exactly in their [such statements'] general applicability to content(s) and goal(s). If now the mere existence (presence, hypostasis, availability; Vorhandensein) of socially living humans or the fact of society vouches for (or guarantees) the validity (value, influence, prestige; Geltung) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, then (thus, so) that does not mean [that] the latter [the formal criterion of nearness and distance] could be put forward (or formulated) (proposed, set up (out), established,

advanced) on the basis of any (every) (arbitrary, random, at(-)will) way of looking at (consideration, contemplation, observation) (of) socially living humans (people, men) (whatsoever) (auf Grund beliebigen Betrachtung sozial lebender Menschen). The independence (autonomy, freedom) of the criterion [in respect] of (from) content(s) and goals (ends, purposes) requires (demands, commands, calls for, dictates, orders), first of all, an abstraction from the psychological factors, which drive (carry, push, impel, force) socially living humans (people, men) to those contents and goals. If one comprehends (grasps, understands, perceives, interprets, construes, conceives, takes) the expression (term, phrase) “psychological factors” in the widest (broadest) sense(,) and if one subsumes thereunder “thought acts (acts of thought)” as acts, as well as (just as (like)) “affects (i.e. emotions)” as acts, then (so, thus) the assumption (supposition, acceptance) seems (appears) legitimate [that] behind content(s) and goals (ends, purposes) are (stand), without exception, psychological factors (Die Unabhängigkeit des Kriteriums von Inhalten und Zwecken gebietet zunächst eine Abstraktion von den psychologischen Faktoren, die sozial lebende Menschen zu jenen Inhalten und Zwecken treiben. Faßt man den Ausdruck „psychologische Faktoren“ im weisten Sinne auf und subsumiert man darunter „Denkakte“ als Akte ebenso wie „Affekte“ als Akte, so erscheint die Annahme legitim, hinter Inhalten und Zwecken stünden ausnahmslos psychologische Faktoren). Under these circumstances, the autonomy (independence, self-sufficiency, self-reliance) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) (die Selbständigkeit des formalen Kriteriums von Distanz und Nähe) vis-à-vis the psychology of socially living humans (people, men) can be proved only by (means (way) of) (through) the ascertainment (observation, establishment, assessment, conclusion) [that] the same forms of distance

and nearness (proximity) (would) come about (take place) under the effect (impact, influence) of different (varying, diverse, varied, variable, dissimilar) psychologies ((and) (or) different forms of distance and nearness (proximity) (would) come about), and indeed under the effect (impact, influence) of similar (like) or identical psychological attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views; Einstellungen)²⁹. It is of course quite (very, well) possible [that] the separation (segregation, distinction) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion from (the) psychological factors [can] be (is) carried out (implemented, accomplished, enforced, executed, undertaken, conducted, put through) even (also) on (with, by (means of)) the assumption (supposition, acceptance) [that] the same psychical content(s) (dieselben psychischen Inhalte) would yield (or result in) (produce, amount (come) to) always the same forms of distance and nearness (proximity); however, in this case, that separation would be, if not less compelling (urgent, cogent, imperative, compulsive, conclusive, necessary), then(,) all the same (after all, really, actually, definitely, nevertheless, though, however)(,) less useful, both in [an] objective (or factual) as well as [(in) a] heuristic respect (regard). And one must take (consider) something else (into consideration). The non-psychological character of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance by no means (does not at all) mean(s) (signify, signifies) that this criterion cannot be applied to psychological phenomena, that is, [that] individual or collective psychology could not on the basis of the criterion “nearness-distance” be interpreted genetically and structurally. Completely (Entirely, Wholly, Totally) on the contrary. One must presently (currently, today) keep (hold, maintain, stick) [on] [to] the range (gamut, ambit, scope, compass, palette) of these logical

²⁹ See Sec. 2B in this chapter.

distinctions (differentiations) or possibilities, in order to clearly apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) the form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance. Compared with this (In contrast, On the other hand), the founders of formal sociology offer (provide, afford, present, show) fairly (pretty, quite, rather) wholesale (general, sweeping) and hence (therefore, thus) misleading (unclear, ambiguous) demarcations (delimitations) of the [what is] form-related (i.e. formal) against the [what is] psychological (und daher mißverständliche Abgrenzungen des Formalen gegen das Psychologische). Simmel kept (stuck) to (stood (remained, stayed (put)) by (at, with)) the [his] programmatic declaration (explanation, proclamation, pronouncement) [that] sociology disregards (refrains from) mental(-spiritual) processes (den seelischen Prozessen)(,) which would bring forth (produce, create, yield, spawn, present, give rise to) a social phenomenon, in order to explore (or research (inquire) (into)) (investigate, study, probe) the forms of the relation (relation(al) forms; Beziehungsformen) contained (included, embodied, incorporated) in this [social phenomenon]; in that (this) respect, it [sociology] proceeds (acts) [is] [in] the [a] same (similar) [way, manner] (equally, identically, alike) [as, to, with] (like) linguistics (Sprachwissenschaft)³⁰. In the same context, he [Simmel] opined (believed, thought, reckoned, meant, said, stated), however, that in sociology “the explanation of every individual (single, separate, solitary, lone, isolated, odd) fact [is] possible only in (on) [by] [a] psychological way (method) (path, road)”, and since in his individual (separate, single) analyses such explanations and exploration (investigation) of (or research (inquiry) into) forms (Formenerforschung) frequently (in many ways (cases)) went (go) into one another, thus (then,

³⁰ *Soziologie*, pp. 17-19.

so) he could not convince (persuade, satisfy) all his readers of the consistency (consequence, effect; Konsequenz) of his anti-psychological attitude (or stance) (positioning, approach, outlook, view, orientation)³¹. V. Weise shared this scepticism too, by seeing (beholding, spotting) (while he saw) in Simmel's perception (view) of (the) social relations as psychical interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (in Simmels Auffassung von den sozialen Beziehungen als psychischen Wechselwirkungen)(,) a source of misunderstandings³². We have already intimated (hinted, indicated, suggested) that here only a more precise (accurate, exact, specific, detailed, particular) and (or) broader apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension) of the psychical [dimension, sphere, element] (eine genauere bzw. breitere Erfassung des Psychischen) can help [us] (along, further), so that thereunder [under the psychical](,) situation-related(referring, concerning) (i.e. situational) thought (intellectual) acts (acts of thought (thinking)) (situationsbezogene Denkakte) are [could] (be) subsumed too; because in itself it should (must, ought to) be regarded (considered) as undisputed (indisputable) that social interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) without [a, the] psychical act of those taking part (participating) (the participants (participators)) in that [social interaction] (soziale Wechselwirkung ohne psychische Akte der daran Teilnehmenden) can come about (take place, materialise, be achieved) impossibly [as an impossibility] (i.e. is impossible) (unmöglich zustande kommen kann). For his part, v. Wiese sought (looked (searched) for) firm (solid, strong) guarantees against a lapsing (slipping, dropping, falling,

³¹ In relation to Weber's positioning (stance, opinion, statement, comment; Stellungnahme), see Levine's remarks (comments, observations), *Flight*, p. 102ff..

³² *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 41.

sliding, descending, wandering) into the [what is] psychological [realm, sphere, dimension] (ein Abgleiten ins Psychologische), by contrasting (while he contrasted (set, distinguished, separated)) the “processes ((series of) events, occurrences) of consciousness (awareness) in man ([a] person (human), humans, people)” („Bewußtseinsvorgänge im Menschen“) against (with, vis-à-vis) (apart) (from) human acts (or actions) (acting(s)) (menschliche Handlungen) as “facta (i.e. facts as doings or behaviour)” („Fakta“), and exclusively (solely) incorporated (included, absorbed, admitted, assimilated, accepted, accommodated, took in) the latter [“facta (i.e. facts as doings or behaviour)”] in the area of competence of sociology³³. However, this solution appears (seems) (to be) too simple. A strict (rigorous, rigid) orientation of the (formal-sociological) way of looking at act(ion)s as facts (as regards formal sociology) would end (up) in (with) an infertile (unfruitful, unproductive, barren, sterile, fruitless) behaviourism (Eine strikte Orientierung der formalsoziologischen Betrachtungsweise an Handlungen als Fakten würde bei einem unfruchtbaren Behaviorismus enden), in contrast, by the way (incidentally), to v. Wiese’s stated (declared, proclaimed, announced) intention of assigning (classifying, allocating) sociology, even (also) after its formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring), to [under] the “understanding (knowing, perceiving, seeing) (or interpretive (interpreting)) social sciences” („verstehenden Wissenschaften“). Because the external (outer, outward, exterior, outside) course (sequence (order) of events) of the act(ion)s (der äußere Ablauf von Handlungen) does not necessarily (unconditionally) allow (permit) the observer (onlooker, watcher; Beobachter) [to make (form)] a valid

³³ Loc. cit., I, p. 19; II, p. 11ff..

(cogent, sound, conclusive) judgement (opinion, decision) about (over, regarding) the associating or dis(as)sociating character of the same [act(ion)s], unless he knows about the meaning (or sense) (sense (i.e. meaning)) (Sinn) connected with them [those (such, these) act(ion)s], that is, [about] the corresponding (relevant, equivalent, analogous) processes ((series of) events, occurrences) of consciousness (awareness). [The] meaning (or sense) and the external (outer, outward) course of an acting (act or action) (äußerer Ablauf einer Handlung) can in fact (of course) contradict (be contrary (inconsistent) to (with)) each other, as the proverbial Judas kiss (kiss of Judas) or(,) conversely (contrariwise, vice versa, the other way around)(,) a life(-)saving amputation and countless (innumerable, numberless) other examples attest (testify, vouch, confirm, affirm, verify)³⁴. On the other hand, not even (the) [an] exclusive orientation towards the meaning (or sense) of the [an] act (action or acting) is capable of (able (in a position) to) giving (providing) (give) an(y) explanation (or information) about (of, regarding) (insight into) its [the said act(ion)'s] associating or dis(as)sociating character, if (when) [the] meaning (or sense) is reduced to the inner (internal, inward) wishes of those acting (who act) (acting subjects), that is, the psychical [dimension, sphere, element] [is reduced] to I(Ego)-related(referring, concerning) [I(Ego)-related] affects (i.e. emotions) under (with, amongst) [the] omission of (i.e. without) situation-related(referring, concerning) (i.e. situational) thought (intellectual) acts (acts of thought (thinking)). Only the concrete and all-round (full-scale, comprehensive, general, universal) analysis of the interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) makes [it](,) in every individual (single,

³⁴ «J'embrasse mon rival, mais c'est pour l'étouffer» [“I embrace my rival, but it is to stifle (i.e. choke or suffocate) (smother, suppress) him”], [is what] Racine lets his Nero say (*Britannicus*, IV, 3, v. 1314).

separate) case(,) clear whether nearness (proximity) or distance is gaining (gains) the upper hand here (wenn Sinn auf innere Wünsche des Handelnden, also das Psychische auf ichbezogene Affekte unter Auslassung situationsbezogener Denkakte reduziert wird. Nur die konkrete und allseitige Analyse der Wechselwirkung macht in jedem einzelnen Fall deutlich, ob hier Nähe oder Distanz die Oberhand gewinnt)³⁵.

In relation to that, a clarification of the concepts (notions) of “nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood)” and “distance” themselves is needed (required) though first of all. If nearness (proximity) and distance, social-ontologically understood, cannot necessarily (unconditionally) be discerned (recognised, identified, spotted, discovered, perceived) in the course (order, sequence) (of events) of [an] external (outer, outward) acting (or action) (act), then (so, thus) they [nearness and distance] are (should, may, can) even (still) less (to) be measured likewise (also, at the same time) by (in relation to, on, with) the external benchmark (yardstick, scale, measure, standard) of [a] spatial distance (spacing or gap) (interval, space, detachment) (so sind sie noch weniger am gleichfalls äußeren Maßstab des räumlichen Abstandes zu messen). Spatial-physical and social nearness (proximity) (and) (or) distance (Räumlich-physische und soziale Nähe bzw. Distanz) differ so much from each other that they can even be (stand) in a(n) inverse (reverse, contrary, opposite) relationship towards (with, vis-à-vis, in relation to) each other (im umgekehrten Verhältnis zueinander). The emotional (or dramatic) (emotive, histrionic, emotion-laden, passionate) embrace (hug, embracing) of (a) pair (couple) (of) (two) (lovers) and the struggle (fight) of (between) two foes (enemies) with bare hands both

³⁵ Sorokin, *Society*, p. 93.

attain (reach, achieve, accomplish, arrive at) a(n) [the] (outer)(ut)most
 (most extreme, ultimate) [point] (i.e. limit or maximum) (ein Äußerstes)
 in (of) physical nearness (proximity), however, the difference
 (distinction) in social nearness (proximity) could not be greater (larger,
 bigger). The distance (spacing or gap) (space, interval, detachment) (Der
 Abstand), which the concepts (notions, terms) “nearness (proximity)” and
 “distance (Distanz)” indicate is therefore in principle (fundamentally) an
 inside (i.e. internal) distance (spacing or gap) (ein Innenabstand), which
 can manifest (or express) (show) itself in friendly (amicable) or inimical
 (hostile, antagonistic) acts (der sich in freundlichen oder feindlichen
 Akten äußern kann), but not necessarily (does not have to). The mere
 possibility of (the) practical (handy, useful, functional, expedient)
 manifesting (or expressing) (showing) oneself (Die bloße Möglichkeit des
 praktischen Sichäußerns) suffices (is sufficient (enough)), nevertheless
 (however), (in order) to motivate behaviour (um Verhalten zu
 motivieren), [just] as (like) (the) mere (bare, naked, simple) conjecture
 (or presumption) (suspicion, hunch, supposition, speculation, expectation;
 Vermutung) about (regarding, on, over) alien (foreign, strange,
 unfamiliar, different, extraneous) (i.e. others’ (someone else’s))
 dispositions and intentions (purposes, aims) (fremde Dispositionen und
 Absichten)(,) brings into being (creates, gives rise to) one’s own
 analogous dispositions and intentions. How now does the entire (whole,
 total, complete) complex of dispositions, considerations (weighing(s) up,
 ponderings), intentions and possible or real acts (or actions) interrelate
 (connect, interweave) with the determination (or definition) of social
 nearness (proximity) and distance? The answer is obvious (or stands to
 reason) (suggests itself) if (when) one reformulates (rephrases, rewords)
 the question as follows: to what extent (in what respect (way)) does
 someone (anyone) confirm (acknowledge, validate, verify, affirm,

endorse, corroborate, bear out) or contest (dispute, deny, challenge) the sense (or feeling) of identity (Identitätsgefühl) (and) or the self-understanding of another,(;) to what extent (in what respect (way)) does someone (anyone) contribute to the increase (heightening, intensification, aggravation, improvement, enhancement) or decrease (reduction, lessening, erosion, debasement) in (of) the (understood in the [a] wide (broad) sense) feeling (or sense) of power (Machtgefühls) of another, regardless of (no matter) whether in foro interno (i.e. in the internal court; in private, privately; inwardly) or in foro externo (i.e. in the external court; in public, publicly; outwardly) (egal, ob in foro interno oder in foro externo)? The internal (inner) (inward) and/or external (outer) (outward) positioning (stance, opinion, statement, comment) of a subject vis-à-vis (in relation (regard) to, towards) the identity and power of another [subject] yields (produces, results in) their social nearness (proximity) to, or their social distance from, each (one an)other (Die innere und/oder äußere Stellungnahme eines Subjekts zur Identität und Macht eines anderen ergibt ihre soziale Nähe zu- oder ihre soziale Distanz voneinander). (Mind you, [It should be noted that] identity and power are confirmed or contested in accordance with (according to) what the subjects concerned define as one's, on each and every respective occasion, own and [an] alien (i.e. others' (someone else's, another's)) identity and power). This determination (or definition) of nearness (proximity) and distance refers to content(s), whose consideration, as [we have] already said [stated], transforms (converts, changes, transfigures) the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance from a postulate of "pure sociology" to the [a] component of a social ontology (das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz aus einem Postulat der „reinen Soziologie“ in die Komponente einer Sozialontologie verwandelt). The explication (explanation, clarification, elucidation,

illumination, exemplification, illustration) of the content(s) “identity” and “power” („Identität“ und „Macht“) remains reserved for (is to be left to) the third volume of this work. However, the [a(n)] indication of (reference to) that (it, such) [matter, topic, issue, (explication of) the content(s) “identity” and “power”] (thereupon) is objectively (factually) imperative (necessary, commanded, demanded) here.

If nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance do not represent (constitute) a physical-spatial, but a social (and) or internal (inner) (inward) relation(ship), then (so, thus) it is evident (elucidated, illuminated) (can be seen) from this (that) that the distance (spacing or gap) (space, interval, detachment) in the relation between two subjects cannot be measured with (on, by (means of), against) a single (sole) (one) objective yardstick (benchmark, measure, standard, scale) (Stellen Nähe und Distanz keine physisch-räumliche, sondern eine soziale bzw. innere Beziehung dar, so erhellt daraus, daß der Abstand in der Beziehung zwischen zwei Subjekten nicht mit einem einzigen objektiven Maßstab gemessen werden kann), as in [the case of] a spatial distance (wie bei einer räumlichen Distanz), but (however) in relation to that(,) (it takes) two yardsticks for the very frequent case (instance)(,) in which the attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views) of both subjects towards (vis-à-vis) each other are not absolutely symmetrical(,) (are required); there can therefore be two or more distances (spacings or gaps) between two subjects³⁶. For the just as frequent case (instance) again (in turn), in which the social relation consists in neither bilateral (mutual, reciprocal, on both sides) absolute nearness (proximity) or absolute distance, the concepts (notions) of “nearness (proximity)” and

³⁶ Pieper, „Grundbegriffe“, p. 173ff.; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 275ff.; v. Wiese (has, had) accepted the clarification of his commentators in [respect of] this formulation, „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 68.

“distance” must be relativised in a wider (broader) sense: they [“nearness” and “distance”] are not relative merely because of their dependence on subjective attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views), but likewise (also, as well, similarly) because every nearness (proximity) accompanies (is accompanied by, goes with) distance and every distance(,) [accompanies (is accompanied by, goes with)] nearness (proximity) (Sie sind nicht bloß wegen ihrer Abhängigkeit von subjektiven Einstellungen relativ, sondern ebenso deshalb, weil jede Nähe mit Distanz und jede Distanz mit Nähe einhergeht). Absolute[ly] [being] with(-)(,) [one another] (together, jointly) and absolute[ly] [being] apart (asunder, separate(d)) from(,) one another [Absolute with, and absolute apart from, one another,] are, seen (viewed, looked at, beheld) quantitatively, rather extreme and exceptional cases,(;) their social-ontological influence and status is, in the process (course of this) (into the bargain), unimportant (insignificant, inconsequential, immaterial, irrelevant) (Absolutes Mit- und absolutes Auseinander sind, quantitativ gesehen, eher Extrem- und Ausnahmefälle, ihr sozialontologischer Einfluß und Status ist dabei unwichtig)³⁷. Simmel, who somewhat incidentally (parenthetically, casually, in passing), but clearly(,) distinguished (differentiated) between [the] “spatial” and “psychological” meaning (significance) of nearness (proximity) and distance³⁸, stressed (emphasised) likewise (also, too, as well) “the unity of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (or distance) ((far) awayness; Entfernung), which contains (includes, embodies) any (i.e. every single) relationship between men (humans) (people) (die jegliches Verhältnis zwischen Menschen enthält)”. His [Simmel’s] attempt to comprehend (grasp, understand, perceive, interpret, construe,

³⁷ See in relation to that, Sec. 2A in this chapter.

³⁸ *Soziologie*, p. 539.

conceive, take) the form (or shape) (figure) of the stranger (alien or foreigner) as [a] “synthesis of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (distance or farness) (farawayness) (the remote (distant, far(away)) (Synthese von Nähe und Ferne)”, is based (rests) on a double (dual, twin) alternation of the spatial and of the “psychological” meaning (significance) of nearness (proximity) and distance. The distance in the relationship with (towards, vis-à-vis) [the, a] stranger (alien, foreigner) signifies (means) “that the (what is) near(by) (close) is remote (distant or faraway) (daß der Nahe fern ist)”, whose to be (or being) strange (i.e. strangeness, alienness or foreignness) (Fremdsein) consists, conversely (contrariwise), in [the fact] “that the (what is) remote (distant or faraway) (remoteness (distance or farness) (farawayness)) is near (close, proximate) (daß der Ferne nah ist)”: the termini (i.e. terms) (die Termini) “the (what is) near(by) (close)” and “near (close, proximate)” are here spatial, the termini “the (what is) remote (distant or faraway) (remoteness (distance or farness) (farawayness))” and “remote (distant or faraway)” are meant (reckoned, said) “psychologically”³⁹. Simmel (has, had)(,) furthermore (moreover, in addition, besides)(,) introduced a third parameter into the analysis of nearness (proximity) and distance: the extent (range, scope, area, size) and or the more general or more special (i.e. specific or particular) character of the common features (attributes, traits, characteristics) of two subjects⁴⁰.

The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance encompasses (spans, contains, comprises, includes) a (great) variety (diversity (of form) (multiformity) of social relations, which, for their part, can be grouped

³⁹ Loc. cit., p. 509.

⁴⁰ See in relation to that, Sec. 2B in this chapter.

(formed into groups) or typified (i.e. rendered into or classified under types) according to (in accordance with) form-related (i.e. formal) criteria (Das formale Kriterium von Nähe und Distanz umspannt eine Vielfalt von sozialen Beziehungen, die sich ihrerseits nach formalen Kriterien gruppieren oder typisieren lassen). Nonetheless (Nevertheless, Yet)(,) these groups or types (diese Gruppen oder Typen) neither exist separately from one another(,) nor can a field (domain, area) (sector, realm, territory, zone, sphere) of validity (or applicability) (ein Geltungsgebiet) of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance outside of these types and groups be thought (conceived) (of) (imagined, reckoned, contemplated); [the] latter [(said) types and groups] constitute mere (different ((or alternative)) descriptions (paraphrasing(s), formulations, expressions; Umschreibungen) of the [said, aforementioned] [this] criterion, and it is a question of (the question is, it is asked) which of these (different or alternative) descriptions is (stands) nearest (closest) in abstracto to the criterion. If one takes the criterion at its face (nominal) value, if one remains (stays) therefore strictly with (by, at, in, amongst) the spatial metaphor, in which it [the (said) criterion] is expressed, then (so, thus) one can imagine it [the (said) (this) criterion] under only one single form of the relation (relation(al) form): the physical distancing from someone (die physische Distanzierung von jemandem), towards whom one would have a negative [attitude (stance or positioning)], and the physical approaching (or drawing near to) someone (die physische Annäherung an jemandem), towards whom one would have a positive attitude (stance or positioning) (approach, outlook, view, orientation) (another's physical distance or nearness (proximity) could also be indifferent to the (he who is) indifferent vis-à-vis another, although in general the former [physical distance] rather than the latter [(physical) nearness] promotes (fosters, encourages, supports, stimulates) indifference (dem Gleichgültigen

gegenüber einem anderen könnte auch dessen physische Distanz oder Nähe gleichgültig sein, obwohl im allgemeinen eher die erstere als die letztere Gleichgültigkeit fördert)). Yet in accordance with all social experience and also in accordance with the inner (internal) logic of social cohesion (coherence), such real forms of the relation (relation(al) forms) represent (or constitute) neither always the greater (larger, major)(,) nor the decisive (deciding, crucial) part of social interactions (Doch nach aller sozialen Erfahrung und auch nach der inneren Logik des sozialen Zusammenhaltes stellen solche realen Beziehungsformen weder immer den größeren noch den ausschlaggebenden Teil sozialer Interaktionen dar). This part can only be apprehended (grasped, understood) by (means (way) of) (through) [a(n)] in principle (fundamental) separation (or divorce) (parting; Scheidung) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance from the spatial point of view (standpoint). There remain (are) then two other points of view (left over, remaining), from (or under) which nearness (proximity) and distance can be understood: that [point of view] of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] or subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination or subordination](,) and that of for (with) and against (Es bleiben dann zwei andere Gesichtspunkte übrig, unter denen Nähe und Distanz verstanden werden können: jener der Über- oder Unterordnung und jener des Für (Mit) und Gegen). Both these points of view imply both (equally) (internal (inner, inward)) nearness (proximity) or distance⁴¹, and they cover, in practice, all cases (instances) (even those, in which external (outer, outward) and internal (inner, inward) distance or nearness (proximity) either way go hand in hand (with) (accompany) [each other])(,) except (for) (apart from) indifferent [“]without one another (i.e.

⁴¹ Cf. v. Wiese, „Randbemerkungen“, p. 189ff..

absence)"])(,) and(,) being apart (or separate) from one another (außer dem gleichgültigen Ohne- und Auseinander). Nevertheless, they are not in the least identical (with each other). The type of relation (relation(al) type) “For (With) – Against (Versus)” (Der Beziehungstyp „Für (Mit) – Gegen“) does not set [up] (put, place, posit, erect) [set up (or posit)] a(ny) supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] in the social relationship (im sozialen Verhältnis) of the participants (those involved (taking part)) vis-à-vis (to(wards)) one another, since it [the said type of relation] can be represented just as well by equal(s) [participants, parties, sides] [equals (i.e. equal participants)]. On the other hand, supra-ordination and subordination can stand (i.e. be) both under the influence (sign) of (the) “For (With)”, as well as under the influence of (the) “Against (one another)”, in principle (fundamentally) [it, they, supra-ordination and subordination] [can] be [a] form of association or of dis(as)sociation (grundsätzlich Form der Assoziation oder der Dissoziation sein). In regard to (Regarding) the conceptual (notional) difference of both types of the relation (relation(al) types) (in respect of each other), there also arises therefore (thus, as a result, consequently) a difference of extent (scope, compass, range, area, scale, girth, circumference). If (When) the form of the relation (relation(al) form) “For (With) – Against”(,) in view of (given) the possible equality of the participants (those involved (taking part))(,) cannot be completely (totally, absolutely) reduced to the form of the relation of supra-ordination and subordination, whereas (while), conversely (vice versa, contrariwise, the other way around) supra-ordination and subordination must be (is necessarily) without exception a relation of (the) “For (With)” or “Against (one another)” („Für (Mit)“ oder „Gegen(einander)“), then (thus, so) from that results (arises, emanates) [the fact] that the form of the relation “For (With) – Against”

(formulated otherwise (differently): “association – dissociation”, “friendship (amity) – enmity (hostility)” („Freundschaft – Feindschaft“)) represents the concept (notion) of the genus (genre, type, kind) (generic term (name)), whose species (den Gattungsbegriff darstellt, dessen Spezies) is (the) supra-ordination and subordination. And since there is no other form of relation (relation(al) form) except for (apart from, besides, other than) the aforementioned [forms of relation] (those [forms of relation] mentioned) (the possible and usual (common, customary, normal) case (instance) of (the) indifferent without one another (i.e. absence)(,) and(,) being apart (or separate) from one another is social-ontologically irrelevant, i.e. (it takes) the effect (impact, influence) of other social-ontological factors (is required (needed))(,) in order (so as) to (so that it [the said case (of indifferent without one another and being apart from one another)]) gain(s) (attain(s), reach(es), achieve(s), acquire(s)) social weight (gravity), and as socially relevant relationlessness (i.e. socially relevant absence (or lack) of a relation) it [the said case (of indifferent without one another and being apart from one another)] presupposes relations (und als sozial relevante Beziehungslosigkeit setzt er Beziehungen voraus)), thus (then, so, in this way) from that [it] must be concluded (inferred, deduced) that association and dissociation(,) or(,) friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility)(,) as [the, a] form of (the) [a] relation(,) includes (contains) the entire (whole, complete, total, full) spectrum of the social relation (das ganze Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung). This is the ultimate (final) logical and factual (or objective) consequence (implication) from (out of) the use of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance for the setting (or drawing) up (establishing, establishment, putting forward, construction, building) of a morphology of the “interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects)” between humans

(people, men), as they [who were] [those, the adherents (representatives, advocates, supporters)] of “pure sociology” had in mind (imagined, thought, conceived) (zur Aufstellung einer Morphologie der „Wechselwirkungen“ zwischen Menschen, wie sie der „reinen Soziologie“ vorschwebte). (Besides,) it is(, incidentally, by the way,) a mistake (error, fault, defect, flaw, blemish, shortcoming)⁴² to hypostatise the relationship of Up and Down in a relation, that is, [to hypostatise] the general concept (notion) of the direction (tendency, trend, way) of the [a] relation (relation(al) direction)(,) as form of the [a] relation (relation(al) form), and then to comprehend (understand, grasp, perceive, interpret, construe, take) the relation “Above (Supra) – Under (Sub) (Below)” and the relation “For – Against” as the (following, next, subsequent, consequent) tiers (or stages) (grades, levels) (after (that, them)), which are characterised (marked, labelled) by (the, [a]) growing (increasing) tension (stress, strain) during (in) the transition from the first to the third [tier (or stage)] (das Verhältnis von Auf und Ab in einer Beziehung, also den abstrakten allgemein Begriff der Beziehungsrichtung, als Beziehungsform zu hypostasieren und dann die Beziehung „Über – Unter“ und die Beziehung „Für – Gegen“ als die darauffolgenden Stufen aufzufassen, die sich durch die wachsende Spannung beim Übergang von der ersten zur dritten kennzeichnen). Up and Down (or: To and Away-From (Fro)) (Auf und Ab (oder: Hin und Weg-Von)) do not conceptually (notionally) mark (label, accentuate, underline) a(ny) real form of (the, [a]) relation (relation(al) form), but declare (or indicate) (show, point out, state, cite, explain) the direction (tendency, trend, way) of the relation (relation(al) direction) in general (generally)(,) as [a] theoretical variable, which can find (be of) use (usage, utilisation, application) as (so) long as

⁴² Plenge made (committed) it [such a (this) mistake (error)], „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 279ff..

(there are) real circumstances (relation(ship)s or conditions) of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] (reale Über- und Unterordnungsverhältnisse) (exist, are (present, available, known)), [for as long] as [a, the] real For and Against is present (available) (exists). Supra-ordination and subordination in principle, (then) again (in turn), bear (carry) (with)in themselves [a] tension (stress, strain) not slighter (smaller, lower, less) than the form of (the) relation “For – Against”, however (but) the slighter or greater (larger) tension, which can be ascertained (detected, discovered, observed, discerned) on each and every respective occasion in them [the said supra-ordination and subordination, and, “For – Against”], is reduced (traced) (goes) (back) to the fact that “Above (Supra)” and “Under (Sub) (Below)”, anyhow (anyway), originally (initially) move inside (of) (within) the broader (wider, more extensive (comprehensive)) area (realm, sector, sphere, field, ambit) of “For” and “Against”. That is why it has no (does not make) (any) real meaning (sense) to call (name) social relations “mixed (blended, bastard, mongrel) relations” („Mischbeziehungen“), if thereby (with (because of) that (it)) [it] were (is) supposed to (should) be meant [that] in them [such (these, the said) “mixed relations”] (there would be) a mix(ing)(ture) (blend(ing) (combination, assortment) of in themselves different forms of (the) relation (relation(al) forms), also observable in [a] pure culture (or form) (i.e. unadulterated)(, would take place (occur, happen)) (in ihnen fände eine Mischung von an sich unterschiedlichen, auch in Reinkultur beobachtbaren Beziehungsformen statt).

2. (The) polarity (duality) in the spectrum of the social relation (social relation's spectrum) (Die Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung)

A. Anthropological parameters: the mortality of man [humans, people] (man's mortality) (Anthropologische Parameter: die Sterblichkeit des Menschen)

Formal sociology indeed put forward (or drew (set, put) up) (established, erected, constructed, stated, posed) the criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance, however, it (has) (did) not justify (justified) (account (give reasons) for, substantiate, support) why the form-related (i.e. formal) way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) social phenomena had to be oriented precisely (exactly, just) towards this criterion, why from (out of) functionalistic and formalistic (i.e. form-related) premises, this and no other guide (leitmotif, main (connecting) thread, introduction) could be derived (extracted, produced, obtained, gained, won, got) for sociological work (warum aus funktionalistischen und formalistischen Prämissen dieser und kein anderer Leitfaden für die soziologische Arbeit gewonnen werden konnte); the in(cap)ability (incapacity, incompetence) to account for that (this), made of course the boundaries (of) and holes (gaps, voids) of (in) those premises visible (noticeable, obvious, evident, clear). L. v. Wiese admitted (confessed, conceded, granted, allowed, recognised) the derivation of the criterion from (not) (non-)sociological factors or points of view, however, typically (enough) (characteristically, significantly)(,) he spoke only in passing (casually, parenthetically) and moreover

(additionally, in addition, furthermore, besides) inconsistently about (on, regarding) that. Once (One time), he opined (said, thought, believed, reckoned, meant) [that] the assumption (supposition, acceptance) of two antithetical fundamental (basic) relations is simply an “evident (obvious) proposition (theorem, sentence, clause)” („evidenter Satz“)⁴³. Yet evidences (i.e. pieces of evidence or evident propositions) (manifestness(es), obviousness(es); Evidenzen) stand out (attract attention, are conspicuous (remarkable, seen), get noticed, become clear) only from (in) a certain (particular) epistemological or factual (objective) (practical, material) perspective, and the perspectivistic character of an evidence (i.e. piece of evidence or evident proposition) (und der perspektivistische Charakter einer Evidenz) must then (above all) turn into (become) the [an] object of reflection(,) (above all, especially, particularly, in particular) when (if) the evidence concerned (in question) – as undisputed (uncontested, indisputable, unquestioned, incontestable) [as] it (is) in itself (is) – attains (gains, achieves, reaches) [a] new relevance (pertinence)(,) and for the first time undertakes (takes on, assumes, adopts, accepts) tasks (jobs, duties, functions, missions) [in respect] of founding (establishment, foundation) (foundation(al) tasks) (Grundlegungsaufgaben). In another context, v. Wiese argued [that] the antithesis of association and dis(as)sociation is “a necessity resulting (arising, ensuing, coming into existence (to light)) from (out of) the structure of our human mind (intellect or understanding) (sense, reason, intelligence) (unseres menschlichen Verstandes)”, since we could (can) only understand something through (by (means of)) “separation” or “division (dichotomy, bisection, bifurcation)” („Sonderung“ oder „Zweiteilung“)⁴⁴. Nevertheless (Yet, All the same, However)(,) from (out

⁴³ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 11.

⁴⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 178.

of) the general assumption (acceptance, supposition, hypothesis) [that] human thinking (thought) on the whole (overall, in general, generally) is based (rests) of necessity (necessarily) on antithetical conceptual pairs (pairs of concepts; Begriffspaaren) and must proceed (act) dichotomously, the suitability (fitness) of this or that concrete antithesis or dichotomy to constitute (provide, give, make, produce, grant, afford, create, carve out) the foundation stone (cornerstone) for the arrangement (order(ing), formation, layout, design, structure, structuring) of the (subject) matter (material, stuff, substance, topic) of a certain (particular) discipline, does not automatically arise (result, crop up, emanate); this suitability must be proved especially with regard to (in view of) the specific theoretical requirements (demands, prerequisites, desiderata) of the discipline. In the end (Eventually, Ultimately, Finally, After all), v. Wiese advocated (supported, justified, defended, maintained, represented, professed) the view (perception, opinion) [that] sociology took (would take (infer, gather, glean, draw, learn)) the [its] teaching (doctrine, theory) [in respect] of (about, regarding) “with(-)[man] and counter(against)[-]man (fellow man and anti-man) [with-man and counter-man (i.e. fellow man and anti-man)]” („Mit- und Gegenmenschen“) “from (out of) anthropology”⁴⁵. If one may (can, should) interpret this sweeping (general, wholesale) statement (opinion, pronouncement, assertion, proposition) in (the) light of v. Wiese’s sparse (sparing, scanty, meagre) anthropological utterances (expressions, remarks, comments, statements, observations), then (so, thus) one can presume (suspect, assume, expect) that he [v. Wiese] wanted to correlate (interrelate, combine, (inter)connect) (put into a combination (in touch)) the associating and dis(as)sociating social forces with those “elementary

⁴⁵ *Soziologie*, p. 11.

forces” in man (daß er die assoziierenden und dissoziierenden sozialen Kräfte mit jenen „elementaren Kräften“ im Menschen in Verbindung setzen wollte), which despite (in spite of, notwithstanding) all [the] variation(s) (modification(s)) of the “historical form of [a] manifestation (phenomenon or appearance) (apparition, occurrence)” („historischen Erscheinungsform“), despite all [the] weakening (attenuation, toning down, lessening, softening, reduction, mitigation, decrease, decreasing; Abschwächung) or strengthening (reinforcement, boosting, amplification, intensification, concentration, fortification, increase, increasing; Verstärkung) from time to time (now and then (again)), nevertheless exist (persist, endure) and take (or have an) effect (work, act, operate, are effective) permanently; these elementary forces determine (or give rise to) (cause, necessitate, condition) the “fundamental (basic) positioning (or stance) (attitude, view) of man towards (vis-à-vis, in relation to) man” („Grundeinstellungen von Mensch zu Mensch“) and, if one disregards (refrains from) (the) biological needs (wants, requirements, desires, necessities, wishes) (“hunger and thirst”) amongst them [humans, men, people], they [the said elementary forces] can likewise (also) be classified in accordance with (according to) the dichotomous schema: “love” on the one hand, “hate (hatred), lust (thirst) for (addiction to, obsession with) power (domination) (or domineeringness) (imperiousness, bossiness), envy (jealousy)” on the other (hand)⁴⁶. In this syllogistic reasoning (Syllogistik), the transition from anthropology to sociology ensues (results, follows, takes place, occurs, is effected (carried out)) through (by way (means) of) the (recti)linear projection (projecting; Projizierung) of

⁴⁶ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 121. (Even) Simmel (also) occasionally (now and then (again), sometimes) sees (beholds, spots) the dichotomy “association – dis(as)sociation” from the perspective of the dichotomy “(natural, normal, constitutional, inherited) opposition (rivalry, antagonism) (given (i.e. decreed) by nature)” („naturgegebene Gegnerschaft“) – “sympathy between humans (people, men)” (too, as well), see e.g. *Soziologie*, p. 196ff..

the fundamental (basic, elementary) dichotomy of an anthropology of drives (urges) (Triebanthropologie) onto the fundamental dichotomy of a formal sociology. Through (Because of) that (it) (Thus, Thereby, In this way), the programmatically frowned-upon (disapproved-of, scorned) binding (bond, attachment, tie, relationship) of forms to (with) content(s) is (nevertheless, however) restored (made, produced, fabricated, manufactured, established, done) (after all, anyway, all the same), albeit (even though (if)) (,) in the worst conceivable (possible, imaginable, thinkable) way. Because recourse (reversion, reverting) to (the) polarity in the spectrum of the anthropology of drives (urges) for the explanation of (the) polarity in the spectrum of the social relation stands or (and) falls on (by) the anthropology of drives (urges) itself, and moreover (in addition, furthermore) it [this (such) recourse] endangers (threatens, puts at risk, jeopardises, imperils) the (pursued) clear separation (striven for, aimed at, sought after) of the sociological from the psychological (die angestrebte klare Trennung des Soziologischen vom Psychologischen). Nonetheless (Nevertheless, All the same), the coupling of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) with anthropological content(s) remains in itself symptomatically and social-ontologically instructive (informative, revealing, illuminating).

It is obvious that the criterion of nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and distance can be (properly) formulated and used (utilised, employed) only in the form (shape or frame) (figure, guise) of a spectrum (nur in Gestalt eines Spektrums). There (really) is not (in fact, of course, indeed) [merely, only, just] (*the nearness (proximity)* (nearness (proximity)) and (*the distance* (distance)), because then history and society would consist of (only) two (single, sole, lone, only, unique) monotonous recurring (recurrent) and (reciprocally (mutually)

alternating) relations (reciprocally taking turns) (beständen Geschichte und Gesellschaft aus zwei einzigen monoton wiederkehrenden und sich gegenseitig ablösenden Beziehungen), but many forms and grades (degrees) of nearness (proximity) and distance are attested (to) (witnessed, vouched for) (sondern es sind sehr viele Formen und Grade von Nähe und Distanz bezeugt), which can be (simplistically (simplificatively) and approximatively) grouped into a number of (multiple, several, quite a few, various, diverse) classes (in a simplificative (or simplified) (simplifying, simplistic) and approximative (i.e. approximate) (approximated) way) (die sich vereinfachend und approximativ in mehrere Klassen gruppieren lassen). This grouping (group formation) or classification yields (i.e. results in or amounts (comes) to) (produces, makes)(,) then (in that case)(,) a spectrum if (when) one carries (makes, does) it [this (the said, such) grouping or classification] (out) with regard to two fixed (stable, steady, firm, settled, solid), symmetrically opposite (contrary, opposed, conflicting, inverse, inverted) out(er)most (extreme, furthest, ultimate) boundaries (borders, frontiers), one [boundary] of which must mark (label, [be]) patently (obviously, manifestly, evidently, clearly, apparently) (the) extreme nearness (proximity), the other [(boundary) of which](,) (must mark) (the) extreme distance (Diese Gruppierung oder Klassifizierung ergibt dann ein Spektrum, wenn man sie im Hinblick auf zwei feste, symmetrisch entgegengesetzte äußerste Grenzen vornimmt, deren eine offenbar die extreme Nähe, die andere die extreme Distanz markieren muß). Polarity as a result (consequently, therefore, thus) (constitutively) belongs (constitutively) to the spectrum of the social relation (Polarität gehört somit konstitutiv zum Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung). The (in it (that) [(the) spectrum] apprehended (grasped, understood)) forms and grades (degrees) of the social relation (Formen und Grade der sozialen

Beziehung) (apprehended in the (that) spectrum) are able to (can), because (on account) of (due to) their (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) and precisely (especially, just, right) in their (great) variety, be understood in context ([their] correlation [with one another]) only by means of (through) a clearly and objectively (or factually) justifiable (or foundable) (establishable, substantiatable, accounted for) demarcation (delimitation) of the entire (whole, complete) field,(;) a demarcation, which simultaneously (concurrently) (makes, places, puts) (provides) criteria (available, at one's disposal) for the arrangement (or order(ing)) (layout, formation, grouping, marshalling, setting out, disposing, disposition, disposal, design, pattern, scheme, structure) and definition of the content(s) of the spectrum (Die in ihm erfaßten Formen und Grade der sozialen Beziehung lassen sich wegen ihrer Vielfalt und gerade in ihrer Vielfalt erst durch eine klare und sachlich begründbare Abgrenzung des ganzen Feldes im Zusammenhang verstehen, ein Abgrenzung, die gleichzeitig Kriterien zur Anordnung und Definition der Inhalte des Spektrums zur Verfügung stellt). [The] Social relations, which lie (i.e. are (found, located) [take place]) between both poles of the spectrum, must be, therefore (accordingly, thus, according to that), comprehended (grasped, understood, construed, regarded, conceived, interpreted) as (taken for) successive (consecutive, serial, contiguous) attenuations (weakenings, reductions, lessenings, tonings down, softenings, easings off, mitigations, extenuations) of the extreme intensity of that pole(,) to which they [(the) (said) social relations] are [found] (stand) nearer (closer) (Die sozialen Beziehungen, die zwischen den beiden Polen des Spektrums liegen, müssen demnach als aufeinanderfolgende Abschwächungen der extremen Intensität jenes Pols aufgefaßt werden, dem sie näher stehen). How the continuity of the spectrum of the social relation (the social relation's

spectrum) can be determined (caused, necessitated, conditioned, called for) by its (the spectrum's) [own] polarity (Wie sich die Kontinuität des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung durch dessen Polarität bedingen läßt), will be explained (explicated, expounded, elucidated, commented on) later (afterwards)⁴⁷. In the face (view, light) of extreme intensity, with which the social relation at (on) both poles of the spectrum is loaded (or charged)(,) and in which an [the] (outer)(ut)most (most extreme, ultimate) [point] (i.e. extreme, limit or maximum) in human possibilities manifests (makes) itself (known), the coupling of these poles with anthropological factors or content(s) referring (with reference) to (on the basis of) [the] ultimate (final, last, end) and [the] most elementary [of] given (actual) facts (actualities, realities, circumstances) of human existence ensues (results, takes place, occurs, follows) (Angesichts der extremen Intensität, mit der die soziale Beziehung an beiden Polen des Spektrums geladen ist und in der sich ein Äußerstes an menschlichen Möglichkeiten kundtut, muß auch die Koppelung dieser Pole mit anthropologischen Faktoren bzw. Inhalten unter Hinweis auf letzte und elementarste Gegebenheiten menschlicher Existenz erfolgen), which exist and have an (take) effect (work, act, operate, are effective)(,) irrespective of whether one supports (justifies, represents) an anthropology of drives (urges) or [an anthropology] of Reason, a functionalistic or substantialistic (ob man eine Trieb- oder eine Vernunftanthropologie, eine funktionalistische oder substantialistische), an “optimistic” or a “pessimistic” perception (view, conception, opinion) of man (humans, people, men) (Menschenauffassung). Here the point (it) must (at stake), in other words, be about (a question of) (is) that upon (or to) (with) which man – every man – depends (or is attached (involved) (clings)) as [an] active being

⁴⁷ See Sec. 3A in this chapter.

(t)here (or existence) in the social world (als aktives Dasein in der sozialen Welt),(;) [the point must be] about [a question of] his (man's) existence as such and as [a] whole (um seine Existenz als solche und als ganze). Looked at (Regarded, Viewed, Seen, Considered, Beheld) in this way (so, thus), there is nothing more elementary and original (or primal) (primordial, initial) than the maintenance (keeping up, adherence to) or the interruption (break(ing), disruption, stoppage, disconnection) of (in) (the) vital functions, [such] as [in] (like) life (living) or death. And since man – every individual (separate, single, lone, solitary, isolated) man – does not necessarily (unconditionally) come into the world, but must invariably (inevitably, undoubtedly, inescapably) die (decease, pass away, perish), (thus, so, then) the deepest and [one and] only (sole, lone, unique) necessity of his existence lies (is (found, located)) (in) his mortality (So betrachtet gibt es nichts Elementareres und Ursprünglicheres als die Aufrechterhaltung oder die Unterbrechung der vitalen Funktionen, als Leben oder Tod. Und da der Mensch – jeder einzelne Mensch – nicht unbedingt in die Welt kommen, aber unweigerlich sterben muß, so liegt die tiefste und einzige Notwendigkeit seiner Existenz in seiner Sterblichkeit). The contingency (fortuitous (chance) nature) of life is won (acquired, got) day by day and year by year from the necessity of death, irrespective (regardless) of whether the individual may think about (of) it [death] or not; and the fact that life (living) [is] revocable (retractable, withdrawable, cancellable), but death (is) irrevocable (irreversible), grants (affords, gives, accords) the latter [death] a higher (superior) status *in life*, to the extent that [the] intensity and range (scope, consequences, significance) of social acts (or actions) must be judged (assessed, evaluated, gauged, measured) by their irrevocability (irreversibility), that is, by their nearness (proximity) to death (Die Kontingenz des Lebens wird der Notwendigkeit des Todes

Tag für Tag und Jahr für Jahr abgewonnen, unabhängig davon, ob der Einzelne daran denken mag oder nicht; und die Tatsache, da das Leben widerrufbar, der Tod aber unwiderruflich ist, gewährt letzterem in dem Maße einen höheren Status *im Leben*, wie Intensität und Tragweite von sozialen Handlungen von ihrer Unwiderrufbarkeit, also von ihrer Nähe zum Tod her beurteilt werden müssen). Life (Living) cannot become (turn into) the yardstick (or measure) (benchmark, standard, scale) of (for) death, because death does not know what life (living) means,(;) (however,) death(, however,) becomes (turns into) the yardstick (or measure) of life (living), because the living can (always) imagine (envisage, envision, visualise, picture) death (at any time (moment)) – death as one’s own and alien (foreign, strange) (i.e. another’s (someone else’s)) dying (death)(,) and death as one’s own and alien (i.e. another’s) killing (homicide) (den Tod als eigenes und fremdes Sterben und den Tod als eigene und fremde Tötung).

In which (what) sense now does (is) the mortality of man (die Sterblichkeit des Menschen) as [the] deepest and most necessary (imperative, requisite) dimension – which encloses (encompasses, surrounds, encircles, shuts in, locks up) the fact of life (living), since only [the, what is] living (alive, animate; Lebendes) can be mortal (sterblich) – interrelate(d) (connect(ed) (interwoven) (join(ed), attach(ed)) with (to) the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation? In all probability (likelihood), mortality and death would be social-ontologically irrelevant(,) if all humans (people, men) died (in) a (one) single (and only) (only one) way (manner), namely, a “natural death”(,) as a result of (owing (due) to, because (on account) of) organic dysfunction(s) or organic exhaustion (debility, fatigue, depletion, burnout, breaking point) without the help (mediation (intervention) or doing(s)) (assistance, effect,

deeds, to do) of other humans (people, men) and without the direct or indirect effect (impact, influence) of sociogenic factors (ohne das Zutun anderer Menschen und ohne die direkte oder indirekte Wirkung soziogener Faktoren). The same (equal, identical, like, similar) immanence, the same unimpressionability (or non-suggestibility) (state of not being easily influenced) and the same manner (way, mode) of dying (death) for all [people] (everyone) would make (from (out of)) (turn) it (that) [dying, death] (into) a socially neutral magnitude (Die gleiche Immanenz, die gleiche Unbeeinflussbarkeit und die gleiche Art des Sterbens für alle würde aus ihm eine sozial neutrale Größe machen), i.e. something (in relation) (to) (on, at, by) which (whereto) (no difference) could (would) (not) have (been) (able to) spark(ed) off (ignited, inflamed, kindled, lighted, provoked, aroused, incited) [eventuated, ensued, resulted] (no (any) difference). The possibility of bringing about (causing, effectuating, giving rise to, producing, inducing, achieving, resulting in) inequality (or dissimilarity) (diversity, difference, disparity, imparity; Ungleichheit) through (by means (way) of) human doing (i.e. deeds) (action(s), activity, activities, conduct, behaviour, movement(s); Tun) regarding (concerning) the imminence (Imminenz) and the manner (way, mode, fashion, kind, sort, type) of death brings (calls) the factor “mortality” into (social-ontological) play (in relation to (as regards) social ontology). Mortality does not constitute therefore [a] mere (bare, simple, naked) reality, whose occurrence (which) is reckoned (on) (or expected) (calculated, projected) (to occur) at a future (point in) time (moment, date), but it [mortality] opens (sets) up (reveals, discloses) for (to) the socially acting subject (dem sozial handelnden Subjekt) practical possibilities, of which it [the said (socially acting) subject] can make use in (at) certain (particular), often chosen (selected) (points in) time(s) (moments), both in relation (with (in) respect (regard)) to (of) other

subjects(,) as well as in relation to itself (himself); because everyone knows or finds (figures, works) (out) (discovers) what he [one] has to do in order to bring about (on) (realise, accomplish, cause, induce, procure, precipitate) one's own or [an] alien (foreign, strange) (i.e. another's (someone else's)) death, when (if) it [that, (one's own or another's) death] only (is) really (matters) (important). Consequently (Therefore, Thus, As a result), the (necessary) internal (inner, inward) (necessary) relation between the anthropological basic given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance) of being (to be) mortal and of the formation (development or emergence) of (the) polarity in the spectrum of the human social relation becomes obvious (apparent, evident, manifest, patent) (Somit wird die innere notwendige Beziehung zwischen der anthropologischen Grundgegebenheit des Sterblichseins und der Herausbildung der Polarität im Spektrum der menschlichen sozialen Beziehung offensichtlich). It would not cross any man's (human's, person's) (anyone's) mind to (No man (human, person) would [ever] think of) kill(ing) another [man, human, person], were (if) death amongst humans (men, people) (were, was) an unknown (unfamiliar, unidentified) phenomenon, that is, were (if) humans [in respect] of (from) [based on] their [own] constitution (composition, texture or nature) immortal (undying, deathless) (wären Menschen von ihrer Beschaffenheit her unsterblich); and someone would just as little want (to) or have to sacrifice his own life for another [human, person, man]. *These* extreme manifestations (demonstrations, displays, expressions, statements, exhibitions) of enmity (hostility) and friendship (amity) amongst humans (people, men) would simply fail to materialise (appear) (not take place (happen)),(;) both (the two) poles of the spectrum of the social relation would cease (to exist (apply)) (be discontinued (lost, left out, omitted, dropped, removed)) (become unnecessary)(,) and with their [the said

poles'] cessation (discontinuation, omission, abolition), the structure of the spectrum would (also) change from the ground up (scratch) (i.e. fundamentally or completely) (too, as well)) (*Diese* extremen Bekundungen von Feindschaft und Freundschaft unter Menschen würden einfach ausbleiben, die beiden Pole des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung würden wegfallen und mit ihrem Wegfall würde sich auch die Struktur des Spektrums von Grund auf ändern).

For the making (manufacture or establishment) (production, manufacturing, fabrication, completion, making, establishing, restoration) of the social-ontological interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) (Zur Herstellung des sozialontologischen Zusammenhanges) between the (anthropological) basic (anthropological) given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance) of being (to be) mortal and the polarity of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation), it however (nevertheless) does (is) not suffice (sufficient, enough) to leave (set) aside (exclude, eliminate, ignore, disregard) natural death as [a, the] neutral magnitude(,) in order to put (place) [the] manner (way, mode, fashion) (or kind (sort, type, style, species)) and likelihood (probability, plausability) of (the) violent (forcible) [death] (Art und Wahrscheinlichkeit des gewaltsamen) at the centre (focus) of attention (focal point, core). Over and above (Beyond) that (Furthermore), we must comprehend (understand, grasp) death not as [a] biological phenomenon, i.e. as [a] demise (i.e. deceasing or passing) (Ableben), which concerns (pertains to, affects, regards) a concrete individual organism and takes place (comes to pass, is performed (carried out)), as it were (so to speak), in a social vacuum, but as [a] socially meaning-like(bearing) (i.e. meaningful or purposeful) process (event, occurrence) (sondern als sozial sinnhaften Vorgang). In relation to (Regarding) that, violent (forcible) death offers

(provides, gives, grants, presents) considerably (substantially, significantly, much) (more) firm(er) (steady, steadier, stable(r), solid) clues (leads, indications, grounds) than (the) natural [death]. Because the meaningfulness (purposefulness or meaning-likeness) (Sinnhaftigkeit) of natural death can be asserted (claimed, maintained, contended, argued, alleged) merely on the basis of unprovable metaphysical or religious constructions,(;) during violent death, on the other hand (however), subjectively meant meaning (subjektiv gemeinter Sinn) can be objectively (or factually) ascertained (determined, traced, found out, discovered, established, detected, estimated). We can find out (learn, hear, experience) or (justifiably) suspect (presume, assume, guess, suppose, imagine) (in a well-founded manner) what (which) meaning (or sense) somebody who kills someone else or dies for someone else connects with his acting (i.e. action) (Wir können erfahren oder begründet vermuten, welchen Sinn derjenige mit seiner Handlung verbindet, der jemand anderen tötet oder für jemand anderen stirbt). Above all (Notably, In particular), the latter case constitutes a constant (permanent, perpetual, continuing, continuous, chronic) memento (i.e. reminder) (warning, admonition) (Memento) of the fact that with regard to (in view of) social-ontologically relevant death or with regard to (in view of) the anthropological and social-ontological notion (concept) of self-preservation (Begriff der Selbsterhaltung), the biological dimension is not necessarily (does not have to be) decisive (deciding, crucial, critical) (die biologische Dimension nicht entscheidend sein muß). At the human level, a transformation (conversion, change, metamorphosis, transmutation, transubstantiation; Verwandlung), through (by means (way) of) the mediation (agency) of the “intellect(mind)(-spirit)” and its symbolic mechanisms (durch die Vermittlung des „Geistes“ und seiner symbolischen Mechanismen), of the biological magnitude “self-

preservation” into [an] ideational magnitude takes place (occurs, happens, comes off), so that the (question of) self-preservation(-)[question(issue, problem, matter)] and the, understood in the broader (wider) sense, question of power (power question), are transubstantiated into a question of identity (identity question)⁴⁸, which at least at (on, in) one pole of the spectrum of the social relation can be (re)solved(,) even (in fact) at the expense (cost) of biological self-preservation (die Selbsterhaltungs- und die im weiteren Sinne verstandene Machtfrage in eine Identitätsfrage transubstantiiert wird, die mindestens am einen Pol des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung sogar auf Kosten der biologischen Selbsterhaltung gelöst werden kann). Whoever sacrifices his (one’s, their) [own] life for another (individual or collective) subject or for a “cause” („Sache“), to him (them)(,) self-preservation in the sense of the protection (or preservation) (safeguarding, conservation, maintenance; *Bewahrung*) of his (their, one’s) identity (however he defines (the) (this) same [it, such (this) identity])(,) is more important than self-preservation in the biological sense. Death is, however, not (socially mediated [subject to (determined by) intervention]) only via (through, by) the effect (impact, influence) of the “intellect(mind)(-spirit)” – and identity is an “intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)”(,) (need conceivable) (and) only in society with other[s] [humans, people](,) (socially mediated) (conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) need (necessity, requirement, want))(,) (–) (socially mediated) (Der Tod wird aber nicht nur über die Wirkung des „Geistes“ – und Identität ist ein „geistiges“ und nur in Gesellschaft mit anderen denkbare Bedürfnis – sozial vermittelt). The same mediation (intervention or agency) (intercession; *Vermittlung*) is accomplished (done, achieved, performed, managed, completed) via (through, by) the

⁴⁸ In relation to that in detail, (in) [see] the 3rd volume of this work. Basically (Fundamentally, In principle), [see] Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, esp. pp. 49ff., 80ff..

aims (targets, goals, ends, objectives, purposes; Ziele)(,) which are pursued (followed, tracked) at (on, in) both poles of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation). [The] aim of the killing (homicide) of a foe (enemy) just (as well) as (the) self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) for a friend is a change (alteration, modification) of (in) the hitherto (so far, until now) predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) social relation in [a] certain (particular) direction (Ziel der Tötung eines Feindes ebenso wie der Selbstaufopferung für einen Freund ist eine Änderung der bisher vorherrschenden sozialen Beziehung in bestimmter Richtung). – In the former case, due to the fact that (because) (by) the complete (whole, entire, full) and definit(iv)e (conclusive, decisive, ultimate, final) exclusion (elimination, expulsion, disqualification) of the foe (enemy) from the social relation leaves (leaving) its [the social relation's] shaping (forming, moulding, layout, arrangement, structuring, formation, composition; Gestaltung) to (its, one's, the) [i.e. (the (killing and surviving) actor(s) or subject(s) engaged in) the social relation's] [those who excluded the foe's] (own) discretion (pleasure) [devices] (up to it) [of those who excluded the foe] (– Im ersten Fall dadurch, daß der vollständige und endgültige Ausschluß des Feindes aus der sozialen Beziehung nun ihre Gestaltung eigenem Belieben überläßt),(;) in the latter [case](,) due to the fact that (because) (by) (the) self-sacrifice provides (gets (gains) for, procures) (providing) friends (with) possibilities of acting (action) or development (unfolding) (Handlungs- oder Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten),(;) [it, self-sacrifice] influences (by influencing) society by way (means) of (through) [the, a] “good example” etc.. Even when (if) one through (by) one's suicide (Selbstmord) wants to signal that one neither wants to reshape (remould, reorganise, rearrange, remodel, redesign, alter) nor preserve (keep, retain, conserve, protect,

safeguard), but simply leave (i.e. exit or abandon) (desert, forsake, quit) the social relation, in which one must (has to, necessarily) live(s), the [a] social reference continues to (carries on (with)) apply to (be valid for) (applying to) this concrete relation, only it is negative. (A positive reference to the social relation can of course also be included (contained, embodied, incorporated) in suicide, when (if) this, e.g. is meant as revenge (vengeance)). Consequently (As a result, Thus, Therefore), man's mortality ([the] mortality of man) and man's sociality (Sozialität ([the] sociality of man) go (i.e. flow) into each other and mark, from a social-ontological perspective, the polarity of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation).

We emphasise (underline, stress), to sum up (in summary, summarising, synoptically), that the mortality of man (man's mortality), especially (particularly) as (since) it is actualised (or made topical) (updated, brought up to date) in various (different, differing, distinct, varied, several, miscellaneous, dissimilar) kinds (sorts, types, forms, ways, manners, modes, fashions) of violent (forcible) death, anthropologically sustains (bears, carries, supports, takes the weight of) both the pole of extreme enmity (hostility) as well as that [(the) pole] of extreme friendship (amity) (die Sterblichkeit des Menschen, zumal wie sie sich in verschiedenen Arten des gewaltsamen Todes aktualisiert, anthropologisch sowohl den Pol der extremen Feindschaft als auch jenen der extremen Freundschaft trägt). And indeed (in fact (reality), really, truly): how can man *as man* (Mensch *als Mensch*) manifest (express, state, show, display, evince, declare, profess, testify to; bekunden) extreme enmity (hostility) other than by the fact that (because) (killing) (he kills) his foe (enemy)? And how can (some)one [man] *as man* (man *als Mensch*) prove extreme friendship other than by the fact that (because) (sacrificing) (he sacrifices)

his own life for the [his, a] friend? On the other side of (i.e. hereafter) (Beyond) death, man cannot act (operate), he must therefore do it on this side [of death] (i.e. in (during) (this) life (while alive)) (here) (Jenseits des Todes kann der Mensch nicht agieren, er muß es also diesseits tun); death as [an] act (der Tod als Akt), which can still be decided (determined, settled, resolved, judged, adjudicated) (about), however lies (is [found]) in this (From) Here (i.e. This World or Life) (in diesem Diesseits) and marks (pegs, stakes, works) out (demarcates, outlines, makes clear) the spectrum of the social relation in (accordance with) (to(wards)) both (the two) directions, that is, that space (area, expanse, sphere; Raum), inside of which socially living man must move. This fundamental (basic, elementary) social-ontological insight (has, had) everywhere (all over the place) and always constituted a commonplace(,) which was expressed (pronounced, said, enunciated, spoken, voiced) regardless (irrespective, independently) of what one otherwise held (thought, considered, maintained, contended, kept to) about [in respect] (of) the «situation humaine» [“human situation”] and in what respect (way) (to what extent) one wanted its [“the human situation’s”] change (alteration, modification), e.g. regardless of whether one heeded (followed, took to heart) heathen (pagan, infidel) values (heidnische Werte) or the religion of Love (love) [i.e. Christianity]. Heathens (or Pagans) (Gentiles) and Christians, just like many people before them, noticed what our contemporary ethologists brought (or worked (carved)) out (processed, elaborated, investigated, explored) scientifically, that, namely, the inhibition (or restraint) threshold (level) of the killing of animals (members) of the same species amongst (in) the rest of the (other) animals (beasts, brutes) (i.e. non-human animals) is placed (put, fixed, set, started, begun) higher than amongst (in [regard to (respect of)]) humans (people, men) (die Hemmschwelle der Tötung von Artgenossen

bei den übrigen Tieren höher angesetzt ist als beim Menschen)⁴⁹. Lions or snakes (serpents) have never conducted (waged) such battles (fights, struggles, conflicts) (fought) against each other like humans (people, men), wrote Augustine⁵⁰, and there (in relation to (respect of) that) he did not think differently than (to) for instance Horace⁵¹, Seneca⁵² or Juvenal⁵³. Human action has indeed (in fact (reality)) something “monstrous (or dreadful) (terrible, tremendous, terrific, incredible, enormous, vast, awful, colossal, formidable, gargantuan, gigantic, leviathan, portentous)” (Menschliche Aktion hat in der Tat etwas „Ungeheures“), as Canetti called (named) it,(:) “it [human action] presupposes that one has nothing against killing”⁵⁴. – However, just as

⁴⁹ Lorenz, *Das sog. Böse*, p. 226ff.; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Liebe*, p. 115ff.

⁵⁰ *De civitate dei*, XII, p. 23

⁵¹ *Epodon*, VII, vv. 11-12: neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus/umquam nisi in dispar feris [neither in wolves nor in lions did (was (there)) this habit ever (exist)/except [but] [only]] in dissimilar (different, unlike, differently matched) beasts (wild animals) (of a different species)].

⁵² *Epistulae*, XCV, 31: Non pudet homines... gaudere sanguine alterno et bella gerere..., cum inter se etiam mutis ac feris pax sit [Humans (People, Men) are not ashamed... to rejoice (take pleasure in, be glad) in others' (another's) (alternate, alternating) (the) blood (of others (another)) and to wage (conduct) wars... whilst even (amongst) mute (dumb, silent) beasts (wild animals) (as between one another) (are, live, exist, dwell) (amongst one another) (there is) also (and) (in) peace (peacefully)].

⁵³ *Saturae*, XV, vv. 159-164: sed iam serpentum maior concordia. parcat/cognatis maculis similis fera. quando leoni/fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo memore umquam expiravit aper maioris dentibus apri? Indica tigris rabida cum tigride pacem/perpetuam, saevis inter se convenit ursis [but (yet) already (nowadays, now at last, by now, currently) (there is more concord (harmony, accord, union, agreement) (amongst) (the) serpents (have more harmony (concord)). (The) [A] beast (wild animal) spares (is lenient to(wards) (with) (pardons)) [the life of] related (kindred, similar) [beasts] with similar (like) spots (specks). When did [a] stronger (braver) lion snatch (tear, pull, take) (the) life (away, by force) of (from) another lion? Where (In what place ((thick) forest) (in (living) memory, bring to mind, being mindful, tell, utter, recount) did a boar ever expire (die, breathe its last breath) from (by) [because of (owing to)] a boar with larger (bigger) teeth [tusks]? The fierce (savagely, furious, raving, rabid) Indian tigress (tiger) (lives (dwells) in, has, enjoys) perpetual (everlasting, lifelong) peace with (every other, another) tigress (tiger), savage (ferocious, fierce, violent, barbarous, cruel, furious) bears are suited (accost, convene, meet, assemble) (live harmoniously (peacefully)) (to, with) one another (together) (or English translation by G. G. Ramsay. London. New York. William Heinemann; G. P. Putnam's Son. 1918: “wild beasts are merciful/to beasts spotted like themselves. When did the/stronger lion ever take the life of the weaker? In/what wood did a boar ever breathe his last under/the tusks of a boar bigger than himself? The fierce/tigress of India dwells in perpetual peace with her/fellow; bears live in harmony with bears”)].

⁵⁴ FAZ of 18th August 1994. Canetti continues (carries (goes) on, proceeds): “... I get involved (involve myself) very much (widely) (at length, on and on) with people (humans, men), but always only so that I must not (do not have to) *kill* them. One may call (name) that, a priestly (hieratic, sacerdotal, clerical, pastoral, ecclesiastical, pontifical) stance (attitude, position, posture, manner, pose). I find it human. However, it is deceptive (deceitful, delusory, illusory, misleading, misguided, wrong, fallacious, specious, treacherous, vain) when (if) one expects it [such a stance] from other(s) [people, humans, men]”. Elsewhere (In another place), Canetti (has) emphasised (gave prominence to, underlined) very nicely (beautifully, well, finely) the interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) between the mortality

early (on) and generally as the (man's) particular (certain) lack of restraint (or inhibition) (inhibitionlessness, restraintlessness) (of man) in [respect of] (during) the killing of the same species (i.e. his fellow man), his [man's] frequently ((in) many times (cases, ways)) in relation to that [such (this) lack of restraint in killing his fellow man] symmetrical, and in the same open or even diffuse drive(s) (or urge(s)) structure (structure of drives (or urges)) [drive(s) (urge(s)) structure], anchored (embedded, embodied, enshrined, engrafted, secured, fastened, attached) (cap)ability (skill, competence) at (faculty (capacity) for) sacrificing himself for another [(hu)man, person] (others), was (got) noticed (seen, conspicuous) (stood out, attracted attention) (die besondere Hemmungslosigkeit des Menschen beim Töten von Artgenossen fiel seine vielfach dazu symmetrische und in der derselben offenen oder gar diffusen Triebstruktur verankerte Fähigkeit auf, sich für andere aufzuopfern). And in exactly this ability(,) the genuine (real, true, authentic, veritable, bona fide) (hall)mark (characteristic, sign, feature) and the most unmistakable (unerring, infallible, never-failing) (surest) attestation (testimony) of friendship (amity) was seen by all sides (everyone). "Nobody has greater love than that [(in respect of) which] [when] he lets go of (leaves) (of letting go of (leaving)) his [own] life for (in favour of) his friends", preached Jesus⁵⁵, and the Roman(,) Horace(,) counted (reckoned,

of man (man's mortality) and the permanent possibility of his [(man's) own] killing (homicide)(,) as well as the constant (continuous, continual, perpetual, incessant) institutional use (usage, application) of this possibility (see below): "How are there supposed to not be any murderers (killers, assassins, slayers)(,) as (so) long as it is *in accordance with* man to die (become deceased, pass away), as long as he [man] himself is not ashamed of that, as long as he has death *built (installed, incorporated, integrated) in(to)* his institutions, as if it [death] were their [man's (the said, these) institutions'] safest (or most stable) (most secure (certain, assured, reliable), surest, stablest, steadiest), best and most meaningful (rational, sensible, or useful) (reasonable, plausible, legitimate) foundation (fundament, base, footing, groundwork; Fundament)?" (*Die Fliegenpein*, p. 66). Canetti, though (mind you, certainly, admittedly), does not take into consideration (consider, contemplate, entertain) self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) as [a] social-ontologically relevant possibility of violent (forcible) death.

⁵⁵ Joh. 15, 13. μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῆ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ [no-one has a greater love than this, of (that) (in order for) someone placing (putting, laying (down), setting) (to place) his soul (life, breath, spirit) for the sake of (on behalf (in favour) of) his friends; or,

numbered, ranked) amongst the truly (really) happy (or lucky) (felicitous, fortunate, blessed) him who finds the courage (heart) to die for friends and fatherland ([the] (native, mother) country (land), motherland) (the collective friend)⁵⁶.

This, in practice (practical terms), unanimous (to a man, in unison, monophonic) acceptance of violent (forcible) death as [the] measure, with (by) which both extreme enmity (hostility) as well as extreme friendship (amity) are measured (gauged, compared, judged)(,) and thus (consequently, therefore, as a result) the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation is constituted, [has] found (its) expression (was [has been] reflected, [has] manifested itself) in the constitution of all (hitherto, previous, former) political collectives (until (up till) now, so far) (in der Verfassung aller bisherigen politischen Kollektive). All [(such) political collectives] have hitherto (until (up to) now, so far) asked (required, demanded, wanted) of (from) their members the sacrifice (offering, [sacrificing]) of [one's (their) own] life as [the, a] sign (signal, mark, indication, token) of loyalty, that is, friendship towards (vis-à-vis) the polity (commonwealth, community) (Freundschaft zum Gemeinwesen), and also all have hitherto allowed (permitted) their members to kill him (that one [person]) who the polity has declared (proclaimed, announced) to be (as) the collective enemy. The classic (perfect, prime) example for (of, in relation to) that (this) shows (i.e. is) (presents, offers, provides, affords, gives, grants), as is (well) known, war,(;) however,(,) the continuous (continual, perpetual, constant) maintenance of armed formations (or organisations) (associations), and even (also) for police

Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (*King James* translation)].

⁵⁶ *Carminum* IV, 9, vv. 51-52: non ille pro caris amicis/aut patria timidus perire [he (that [man, person], such and such) who is not afraid (full of fear, faint-hearted, cowardly) to die (perish) for [his] dear ((be)loved, valued) friends (and) or (else) [his] country].

goals (ends or purposes), indicate(s) that here we are dealing with (it is a matter of) a constitutive constant (eine konstitutive Konstante) in the life of the political collective. Whoever, on behalf (or on the orders (instructions)) of the [a] polity, bears (carries) a weapon, must constantly thereby (therewith, because of (with) that (it)) reckon (estimate, count, calculate, work out) that he with that [weapon] could kill someone; he must, however, also reckon (count) (on) (estimate, expect) his own killing (homicide) on the part of another, because (since) he is armed exactly because his job (function, purpose, task, work, mission) is regarded (considered) (as, to be) life-threatening (or (highly, extremely) dangerous (to, for [his]) (life)). It would, nonetheless (nevertheless), be a(n) huge (enormous, colossal, grave) mistake (error, fault, defect) to connect (combine, put in a combination) the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation exclusively or principally (first and foremost, mainly) with the public realm (domain or sphere) (area) and to want to deduce (derive, infer) (from it [the said (this) polarity in the spectrum of the social relation]) the (political's) specific character (of the political) (from it [the said (this) polarity in the spectrum of the social relation]) (Es wäre dennoch ein gewaltiger Fehler, die Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung ausschließlich oder vornehmlich mit dem öffentlichen Bereich in Verbindung zu setzen und aus ihr den spezifischen Charakter des Politischen ableiten zu wollen)⁵⁷. It [This polarity in the spectrum of the social relation] is present (existing, current) (exists) in all forms (Formen) and at all levels of the social relation, namely, in private and personal relations(,) as well as in the same (equal) intensity as in public and impersonal [relations] (nämlich in den privaten und persönlichen Beziehungen ebenso und in gleicher Intensität wie in den öffentlichen

⁵⁷ See Ch. II, footnote 242, above.

und unpersönlichen) – something (which, what), incidentally (by the way), (is) recognised (acknowledged, accepted, known) by society itself, which (gives three) cheers (applauds, acclaims) as [for being] [a] paragon (model, example) of virtue (goodness, morality) (to) the (boy-)scout (pathfinder) (die den Pfadfinder als Tugendmuster hochleben läßt)(,) who dies while (in, during the) rescuing (saving) a drowning child (kid), while it [society] simultaneously acquits (exonerates, absolves, finds) the [that] one [person, (hu)man] (him) (not guilty) who killed someone in legitimate self-defence.

The bringing (working) out (or elaborating) (analysis, processing; Herausarbeitung) of the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation has something (just as little) to do with the definition of the political, (just as little) as with a value judgement about (regarding, on, over) man (humans, people) (einem Werturteil über den Menschen). Such a judgement is, incidentally (by the way), in this context logically impossible, because the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation (the social relation's spectrum) requires (or demands) (calls for, necessitates) equal (the same) (cap)ability (skill, competence) of the human genus (or species) ((hu)mankind) at (or capacity for) “altruistic” and “ego(t)istical (selfish)”, friendly (amicable) and inimical (hostile) acts (gleiche Fähigkeit der menschlichen Gattung zu „altruistischen“ und „egoistischen“, freundlichen und feindlichen Akten). ([We] must therefore start) from (take) these acts, [to] which all historical and social experience attests, ([we] must therefore start) (as a (the, our) starting point), and at the same time (into the bargain, in the course of this) the [following, this] question can serve (be of use) as [a] guiding (main) (connecting) thread (guide, leitmotif; Leitfaden): what can mortal man do all in all (overall, on the whole, in general) to (for) mortal man? The only

(sole, lone, unique) empirically valid (cogent, conclusive) answer (response) to (for) that (it) [question] is the following: man (humans, people) can do act(ion)s(,) which other humans (men, people) hold (consider, regard) (to be) (as) pleasant (agreeable, pleasing, enjoyable, congenial, welcome) and/or useful (beneficial, helpful) or (as) unpleasant (disagreeable, displeasing, uncongenial, unwelcome, awkward, embarrassing) and/or harmful (detrimental, damaging). It cannot (is not able to) be ascertained whether these act(ion)s are “good” or “bad (evil) (nasty, wicked)” in an absolute, that is, extra-human sense, and it also cannot be said whether the man, who (has) carried (did, performed) them (out), is “good” or “bad (evil)”. Because [what is, the] “good” and “bad (evil)” appear (emerge, arise, surface, crop up), as concepts (notions) and as modes (ways, manners) of acting (action) marked (indicated, denoted, described, called) by them [“good” and “bad (evil)”], only inside of the human situation, and they [“good” and “bad (evil)”] cannot constitute (provide, grant, afford, produce, make, create, emit) any yardsticks (benchmarks, measures, standards, scales) by which the human situation as [a] whole and from the outside can be judged (assessed, evaluated, gauged) (Der Mensch kann Handlungen tun, die andere Menschen für angenehm und/oder nützlich oder für unangenehm und/oder schädlich halten. Es läßt sich nicht feststellen, ob diese Handlungen „gut“ oder „böse“ in einem absoluten, also außermenschlichen Sinne sind, und es läßt sich auch nicht sagen, ob der Mensch, der sie verrichtet hat, „gut“ oder „böse“ ist. Denn „Gutes“ und „Böses“ tauchen, als Begriffe und als damit bezeichnete Handlungsweisen, nur innerhalb der menschlichen Situation auf, und sie können keine Maßstäbe abgeben, an denen die menschliche Situation als ganze und von außen beurteilt werden kann).

But also for another reason: because man is not necessarily (unconditionally) “bad (evil)”(,) when (if) he kills, and not necessarily

“good”(,) when (if) he loves or even dies for someone [else]. (The) Anthropological parameters may therefore not be drawn (called) on (used, enlisted, mobilised, considered, consulted) for the apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding) of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity as open or concealed (hidden, masked) value judgements, but only in the form of the ascertainment (establishment, observation, conclusion, identification) of the mortality of man as objective anthropological given (actual) fact, which can motivate (or account (give reasons) for) (be behind, justify) very different expectations, attitudes (or positionings) (stances) and modes (ways, manners) of behaviour (behavioural modes). The anthropological given (actual) fact is not therefore a psychological magnitude, but an incontrovertible (irrefutable) fact, in which socially mediated (arbitrated, conveyed, imparted, interposed, interceded) psychological effects (impacts, influences) are ignited (sparked off, (en)kindled, aroused, incited, provoked, inflamed, triggered) (Aber auch aus einem anderen Grund: Weil der Mensch nicht unbedingt „böse“ ist, wenn er tötet, und nicht unbedingt „gut“, wenn er liebt oder gar für jemanden stirbt. Die anthropologischen Parameter dürfen also zur Erfassung des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung in seiner Polarität nicht als offene oder verdeckte Werturteile herangezogen werden, sondern nur in Form der Feststellung von der Sterblichkeit des Menschen als objektiver anthropologischer Gegebenheit, die sehr unterschiedliche Erwartungen, Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen motivieren kann. Die anthropologische Gegebenheit ist also keine psychologische Größe, sondern ein unumstößliches Faktum, an dem sich sozial vermittelte psychologische Wirkungen entzünden). The analysis of the next section will name additional (further, extra) reasons (grounds) [as to] why the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation

cannot in principle be reduced (put down, traced back, ascribed) to psychological factors.

Thus (In this way, So)(,) the social-ontological relevance of human mortality is seen (shown) (appears, shows itself) in the unremitting (incessant, unceasing, ceaseless, unrelenting) direct or indirect presence of violent (forcible) death in social life (living) (im sozialen Leben), and indeed both at (in [regard to], during) the inimical (hostile) as well as at the friendly (amicable) pole of the social relation's spectrum (spectrum of the social relation). On the other hand (However), the introverted reflection of the individual on (about, regarding, over) the fact of one's own natural mortality is not able to (cannot, may not) develop (unfold) a(ny) social-ontological dynamic(s) – unless social authorities (or (jurisdictional) tiers (grades, levels, stages) (of (with) jurisdiction) [such as courts]) [authorities (or jurisdictional tiers [such as courts])] (soziale Instanzen) use (make use of, utilise, employ, apply) perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions) [in respect] of (about, on, regarding) [the] meaning (sense) and consequences of the natural mortality of the individual(,) in order to guide (direct, steer, drive, lead) his (one's, [such (every) individual's]) life (living) in a certain (particular) practical direction. Nothing shows more clearly (distinctly, noticeably) (makes it clearer (us more aware)) how little Heidegger thought social-ontologically and how much (he thought) in terms of cultural critique (criticism) (the critique (criticism) of culture) (cultural-critically) (kulturkritisch)(,) as his treatment (handling) of death exclusively (solely) from the point of view of the existential possibilities of the individual (single, lone, solitary, separate) being (t)here (or existence) (des einzelnen Daseins), i.e. [the individual being (t)here (or existence's)] (his, one's, its) “authentic (genuine, true or actual) (real, original) ability (skill) at

being (to be) whole (complete, entire)” („eigentlichen Ganzseinkönnens“). At the centre of attention (The focal point (heart of the matter)) here is (stands) also the contradistinction (contrasting) of the inauthentic (fake, spurious, ungenueine, false, bogus, adulterated, untrue, fallacious, notional, non-existent, unreal, imaginary, unoriginal, latest, derivative) somebody (people or the They) (uneigentlichen Man), who does or do not let (be) (leave, allow) “courage (bravery, daring, heart, spirit, nerve, guts) vis-à-vis (towards, for) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death arise (emerge, appear, crop up)”, [who] gets or get out of the way of (evades or evade, dodges or dodge, sidesteps or sidestep, avoids or avoid) death and transforms or transform (converts or ..., changes, transmutes, transfigures, transubstantiates) the “being (to be) for (vis-à-vis or towards) death” into “constant flight (escape) before him (it) (i.e. death)” (und das „Sein zum Tode“ in „ständige Flucht vor ihm“ verwandele), and, of the authentic (genuine, true or actual) (real, original) being (t)here (or existence), which positions (sets, puts, places) itself (stands) in angst (or fear) before death and finds therein [in that angst (situation, position)] its “excellent (outstanding or (pre-)eminent) (exquisite, superior, magnificent, standout, distinguished, first-class) ability (skill) at being (to be) [of (its) being]” (und des eigentlichen Daseins, welches sich der Angst vor dem Tode stelle und darin sein „ausgezeichnetes Seinkönnen“ finde)⁵⁸. (According to that,) Death(,

⁵⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 254, 259. Since being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death is founded (based) (or takes root) (springs, originates, emanates, sets itself up, establishes itself) in (from, on) concern (worry, care or looking after) (taking care of, trouble; Sorge)(,) and death is (becomes) understandable (intelligible, comprehensible, understood) only against the background (backdrop) of the character of concern as [the] fundamental (basic) constitution (or state) of being (t)here (or existence) (als Grundverfassung des Daseins) (loc. cit., pp. 259, 249ff.), thus (so, in this way) the dogged (determined, obstinate) dispelling (or driving out) (ousting, displacement, repression, suppression) of death on the part of the somebody (people or the They) obviously (patently) constitutes a pendant (i.e. counterpart) or a consequence of its (or their) (i.e. somebody’s, people’s, or the They’s) transformation of concern into “mere (naked, bare, simple) desires (or wishes) (wants)” („bloßes[?n?] Wünschen“) (loc. cit., p. 195). Heidegger’s reference to *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* (incidentally) calls to mind(, by the way,) the at that time common (current) (cultural-critical) source(s) (pertaining to cultural critique (criticism) (the critique of culture)) of his [Heidegger’s] inspiration. The unexpected (unforeseen, unanticipated) (on)coming of

therefore, accordingly, thus,) is not of interest as [a] multiform (variform, diversiform, multifarious) real phenomenon (or manifestation) (appearance, occurrence) amongst (between, under) socially living humans (men, people), but as [a] trigger (i.e. cause) of that angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) and that expecting (expectation; Erwartens), which are supposed to give (provide) “evidence (testimony, attestation)” of (“bear witness” to) the authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) (reality, originality) of existence (welche von der Eigentlichkeit der Existenz „Zeugnis“ geben sollen). Violent (forcible) death remains completely (absolutely, totally) out of (beyond) consideration (disregarded, not taken into account), and (it) in fact (even) the “bringing about (causing, inducing, forcing, precipitating, leading) of (to) [one’s (own)] demise (deceasing, passing) (i.e. death)”, obviously (apparently, evidently) by suicide, is disapproved (of) (und es wird sogar die „Herbeiführung des Ablebens“, offenbar durch Selbstmord, mißbilligt), because through (by means (way) of) one’s own real death(,) (the) being (t)here (or existence) would no longer exist “for (vis-à-vis or towards) death”(,) and “therewith (with that, thereby, as a result) [it ((the said) being (t)here (or existence))] would remove (withdraw, extract) precisely the ground (soil, land, base) from under itself” for [in regard to] the probation (i.e. proving) (demonstration, verification, proof, corroboration, substantiation, attestation; Bewährung) of its [own] authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)!⁵⁹ It is an open question (remains to be seen) (Let us not examine) (as) (to) what extent (how far, in what way)

death crosses out (or thwarts) (foils, frustrates, deletes) in Tolstoy’s novella the (Philistine’s) small (little, modest, humble, miniature) dreams of happiness (luck, bliss, felicity, fortune) (of the Philistine), who until then (hitherto) had lived (through, past, by) (in) the abyss(es) (chasm(s), precipice(s), gulf(s)) of (the) existence dedicated (consecrated, ordained) to death (i.e. doomed to die). (In (the) place of the Philistine) (The) [A](,) of “mere desires (or wishes)” driven (propelled, impelled, forced, thrust(ed), pushed), money-grubbing (avaricious, greedy (for money), obsessed with money, money-grabbing, mercenary) etc.(,) bourgeois(,) can take the place of the Philistine (go).

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 266ff., 261.

(the) loudly (noisily) propagated existential probation (i.e. proving (of one's self)) (Bewährung) through (by means of) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death is [an] intellectual construction or even [a] self-mirroring (self-reflection, narcissism or (a) mirage) (Selbstbespiegelung) of intellectuals in certain (intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)-historical) situations (pertaining to the history of ideas) (in bestimmten geistesgeschichtlichen Situationen), to what extent it is at all (generally) possible (to base (found, establish, set up, form)) [for] a socially living existence [to be based (founded, established)] on (the) direct and personal, that is, socially unmediated angst (or fear) before death (sozial unvermittelte Angst vor dem Tod): about (with regard to, regarding) one's own death(,) in fact (indeed, of course) very little can (is able to) be thought and said, unless one connects (combines, associates, links, joins, binds, ties) this death(,) one way or another (whichever way you look at it, anyway, either way)(,) with things(,) which are (lie) either in life (living) or on the other side of (i.e. beyond) the [that, this] same [life]. Social-ontologically [speaking], in any case (at any rate (all events)), such thoughts (notions, perceptions, ideas, concepts) and propositions (statements, declarations, opinions, pronouncements, assertions, sayings) appear [to be] (seem) irrelevant, and indeed in accordance with Heidegger's own presuppositions. Because if the somebody (people or the They) (das Man) is [a] social-ontological, that is, unalterable (immutable, irreversible, irrevocable) category(,) and if its [the somebody (people of the They's)] effect (impact, influence) is so determining (or decisive) (determinative) on the whole of (entire, total) social life (living) as Heidegger describes (portrays, depicts, outlines) it, then (thus, so) social ontology must take as a (the) [its] starting point (start from) the reality of a social life(,) which dispels (drives out, ousts, displaces, supersedes, represses) death; the life (living) of (the) "authentic

(genuine, true or actual) (real, original)” [humans, people, individuals, men] [the life of the “authentic (genuine, true or actual)”] (das Leben der „Eigentlichen“) in the shadow of angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death is (does) not the decisive (deciding) factor (decisive) (decide the issue) social-ontologically, and one might (could, should) only (then, afterwards, at that time, in that case) hope for the social prevailing (predominance, imposition, prevalence, carrying (pushing) through, victory; Durchsetzung) of “authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)”, if (when) the somebody (people or the They) did not represent (or constitute) a social-ontological category, but merely (only, simply, barely) a historical transitory (transient, passing, temporary, short) manifestation (phenomenon or occurrence) (apparition, appearance, symptom, sign, figure, presence, phantom, vision) (eine geschichtliche vorübergehende Erscheinung).

That mortality and death are totally dispelled (driven out, ousted, displaced) from the life (living) of the somebody (people or the They)(,) constitutes, incidentally (by the way), a serious (grave) pragmatic mistake (error, fault, defect, flaw, blemish) which Heidegger makes(,) because his (cultural-critical) e(é)lan (vigour, pep, verve, dash, spirit, buoyancy, energy, enthusiasm) (as regards cultural critique) pushes (urges, presses, pressur(is)es) him, in relation to that, to contemplate (consider) death only as [a] motive (reason, cause, grounds) (or an occasion) for exercises (or practice) in intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) refinement. Already the institutionalisation of the possibility of violent (forcible) death in all (hitherto, previous, former) societies (until (up till) now) (through (by means of) custom[s] (convention, practice, fashion) and tradition (practice or usage) (custom, use, convention, fashion) or through forms of organisation (organisational forms)) (durch Sitte und Brauch oder durch

Organisation[en]sformen) proves that the social omnipresence (ubiquity) (of the possibility) of death can accompany (be accompanied) perfectly (very) well (by) the dispelling (driving out, ousting, displacement, suppression, repression, superseding) of (the) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before (the) (natural) death in the life of the individual (die soziale Allgegenwart (der Möglichkeit) des Todes sehr wohl mit der Verdrängung der Angst vor dem (natürlichen) Tod im Leben des Einzelnen einhergehen kann). The somebody (people or the They) apparently (obviously) perceives (feels, sees, regards) more clearly (noticeably, distinctly) than its critics what has social-ontological weight (gravity), and accordingly (it) makes (turns into) [(as) its] own central “concern (worry, care or looking after) (taking care of, trouble)” not angst (or fear) before (natural) death, but (the) interaction (die Interaktion) with other members of society. There are (is) indeed (in fact) no indications (signs, clues, (circumstantial) evidence) (for) [(of, in relation to) the fact] that a man could make out of (from) his dominating angst (or fear) before death a stable and exclusive (sole) yardstick (benchmark, measure, gauge, standard) for the regulation (arrangement, settlement, settling, resolution, control) of his relations with (towards, vis-à-vis) fellow humans (men) (with-humans, co-humans) (den Mitmenschen). However, we have many instances (pieces of) (plenty of) (much) (evidence, proof, records, examples) of (for, regarding, about, in relation to) the shaping (moulding, forming, formation, structuring, arrangement, organisation, designing) of the relation with (towards, vis-à-vis) death on the basis of the existing or desired (desirable, welcome) relation with (towards, vis-à-vis) fellow humans. We [have] already explained (expounded, professed, stated, declared, announced, proclaimed) in which (what) sense the killing (homicide) of foes (enemies), self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) for [a] friend and even suicide represent (or constitute)

interventions (interference(s), encroachment(s), intrusion(s)) in (upon) the social relation. Studies (Investigations, Examinations, Enquiries, Inquiries, Analyses, Research) of (in(to)) historical (the history of) mentality [mentalities, ways of thinking] (Mentality-historical (mental history) studies) [Studies of the history of mentality] (Mentalitätsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen) substantiate (corroborate, confirm, bear out) in other respects the thesis of the priority of the social relation vis-à-vis the personal relation with (towards, for) (one's own) death⁶⁰. Even (Also) the Christian perception (or notion) (idea, view, conception, representation, presentation, vision; Vorstellung), which perhaps [w]as [is] the first to confront (i.e. bring) the individual as individual (face to face) with his own death(,) and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) wanted to make (out) of (from) life a μελέτη θανάτου [study of death (death study)], was permeated (or interspersed) (laced, saturated, ridden, honeycombed) with social references, although (even though) these [references] for the most (in large) part (largely, mostly, to a great extent) [were] shifted (transferred or moved) ([were] translocated (dislocated, externalised)) to the (From or Over) There (i.e. That (Next) World or Life; the Hereafter or Beyond) (ins Jenseits verlagert) and accordingly (correspondingly, commensurately) disguised (covered (dressed) (up), masked). The studium mortis [study of death] basically (fundamentally, essentially, at bottom) constituted (was) a continuous (continual, constant, permanent) account (explanation) regarding (about, for, of, on) the doing(s) (i.e. deeds or actions) (activities, conduct, behaviour, to do) in life ([while] living) (das Tun im Leben), an account(,) which the individual owed in the best case (instance) to God alone, in the worst and the most usual (common,

⁶⁰ See e.g. Vovelle's excellent (masterly, superb, exquisite, first-rate, great) work, *La Mort en Occident*.

customary, conventional, normal, standard, accustomed) (commonest) [case] to (his) [God's, His] governors (deputies or representatives) (lieutenants, vice(-)regents, pro-consuls, satraps, vicars, surrogates; Statthaltern) (of his) on earth. It is impossible to sever (untie, disengage, remove, separate, disentangle, detach, break off, loosen, release) this account, which had to deeply influence the experiencing of (or going through) (living to see) one's own mortality, from ideas about (regarding, on) social duties (obligations) in the widest (broadest) sense of the word (the touchstone (test, criterion) of (for) inner (internal, inward) purification (purging, clarification, reformation; Läuterung) was in fact (indeed, of course) love, (and) whose [love's, its] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) is (are) (the) other[s] [people, humans, men]), irrespective (regardless) of (no matter) whether these ideas always agreed with those [ideas] of God's governors (deputies or representatives) or directly invoked (appealed (referred) to) God. Heidegger praises (extols, speaks very highly of) the insights of Christian theology in the "being (to be) for (vis-à-vis or towards) death" as [the, a(n)] highest (supreme, maximum, superlative, utmost) ability (skill) at being (to be) (ins „Sein zum Tode“ als höchstes Seinkönnen), however he does not take (takes no) notice (note) of (ignores) all these interrelations ((inter)connections). If he did this, then (thus, so) it would be (go (come) down) difficult (hard) for him to use (utilise, apply) Christian content(s) in a(n) in principle (fundamentally) non-religious (not religious) framework (context, setting). Precisely here a logical paradox in his [Heidegger's] undertaking (venture) becomes apparent (noticeable) (makes itself felt, draws attention to itself): he declares (explains, announces, professes, expounds) culturally determined (conditioned) experiences (adventures, events, episodes) and views (perceptions or beliefs) (opinions, approaches, points of view, ideas, notions,

conceptions, convictions, outlooks) (kulturell bedingte Erlebnisse und Anschauungen) (as, to be) fundamental(ly)(-)ontological constants (of fundamental ontology) [constants of fundamental ontology] (fundamentalontologischen Konstanten). But (However)(,) why should e.g. “guilt (sin, wrong, crime, trespass(es), blame, fault, liability)” („Schuld“) belong to the constitution of a being (t)here (or existence), which is simply “thrown (tossed, flung or dropped) (slung, pitched, lobbed)” („geworfen“)(,) and is cut off (isolated) from every ethically loaded (or charged) transcendence (und von jeder ethisch geladenen Transzendenz abgeschnitten ist)? Radicalised theology and [the] anti-bourgeois cultural critique (criticism) (critique of culture) (Radikalisierte Theologie und antibürgerliche Kulturkritik) (have) often entered into an alliance in our century [i.e. the 20th century]. Nevertheless (However), this [alliance] could never be free of (from) tensions (stresses, strains) and contradictions (objections, disagreements).

Hobbes (has, had) saw (seen) social-ontologically deeper than Heidegger, when he [(i.e.) Hobbes] left (entrusted, ceded, handed over) to (for) (the) theologians the abstractly or sublimatedly imagined (represented, visualised, portrayed, envisioned, meant) relationship (das abstrakt oder sublimiert vorgestellte Verhältnis) of the individual with his own natural death(,) and made (turned) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before violent (forcible) death (into) the crucial (pivotal or central) (key, focal) point (issue) (hub, linchpin, fulcrum) of (in) his social theory.

However(,) (But) by (in the meantime, while) (he [Hobbes]), in terms of theory, neglecting (ignoring) (neglected, ignored) the objective given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance) of human mortality, which allows (permits, admits, approves, authorises, licenses) a number of (several, quite a few, multiple) active and passive positionings (stances or

attitudes) (Einstellungen) towards (vis-à-vis) one's own and alien (i.e. another's) death, in favour of (just, only) one (and only) subjective feeling vis-à-vis (just, only) one (and only) kind (sort, type, manner, way, mode) of death, weak spots (points) and gaps (or holes) had to come (necessarily) (came) (to light (the surface)) (be (were necessarily) revealed (unearthed)) (become (became) visible) in the construction of (the) Leviathan [*Leviathan*]. He [Hobbes] treats (handles or deals with) violent (forcible) death in principle (fundamentally, basically) from the point of view of the anxious (or fearful) (afraid, apprehensive, scared, terrified, timid, uneasy, worried, nervous, skittish) possible (potential) victim (prey, casualty or sacrifice) (offering, oblation) (ängstlichen möglichen Opfers), not from that [(the) point of view] of the apparently (patently, obviously, evidently, manifestly, plainly) less anxious (or fearful) culprit (or doer) (perpetrator, offender, wrongdoer, evildoer) in the same concrete situation (nicht aus jener des in derselben konkreten Lage offenbar weniger ängstlichen Täters), and moreover (in addition, furthermore, besides, also, as well, anyway) he looks at (sees, regards, considers, views, contemplates, observes, beholds, esteems) the struggle (battle or fight) (combat, contest; den Kampf)(,) which entails (involves, brings with it (about, in its wake), causes) violent (forcible) death(,) as [the, a] struggle between foes (enemies)(,) who struggle (battle or fight) (combat, contend, contest, wrestle) only for themselves, not (also) for (personal or political) friends and – (no matter, regardless) out of (from) whichever (what) motivation and under whichever (what) pressure – in the process (course of this) (into the bargain) thereby (with (because of) that) reckon (estimate, expect, calculate) that they can die (perish, pass away) for these friends. The political collective [entity, group, polity, body] (Das politische Kollektiv) may (might, can) come into being (arise, result, ensue, emerge, originate, stem, be created (produced, born,

formed)) with the aim (objective, goal, end, target) of exorcising (banishing, averting, warding off, casting out, excommunicating) angst (or fear) from violent (forcible) death, as Hobbes believes; the paradox of its [the political collective's] existence (existing, persistence, endurance, insistence; Bestehens) lies (is) (found), nonetheless (nevertheless)(,) in [the fact] that the collective(,) (before violent (forcible) death)(,) can effectively (effectually) and permanently protect ((safe)guard, shield, secure) [itself, its members] (from (against) violent death) only (then) when (if) its members are prepared (or ready) (willing, disposed) to die(,) if need be (necessary)(,) (the [a]) violent death(,) on (at, in) the inner (internal) (inward) or the outer (external) (outward) front. Before this paradox, Hobbes's logical consistency (soundness) fails (breaks down, malfunctions), which does not want to deviate (diverge, differ, depart, vary, digress, stray, swerve, wander, err) (just, not even) a (little, tiny) bit (little) (slightly) from the theoretical criterion of angst (or fear) before violent (forcible) death(,) and accordingly (correspondingly, therefore, thus) allows (lets, leaves) the [a] deserter [have] his right: whoever before the [a] foe (enemy) takes flight (flees, runs away, makes one's escape) from one's own political collective [entity, group, polity, body], acts (behaves) merely "dishonourably", not "unjustly"⁶¹. With Hobbes' premises, it is of course easier to justify (excuse, defend, support, exculpate, explain) the deserter's stance (or attitude) (demeanour, posture, bearing) than to explain (account for) the life-threatening (or highly (extremely) dangerous) (critical, vital, very serious) deployment (action or commitment) (employment, operation, use, effort, hard work, exertion, mission; Einsatz) of the great mass for the cause (case, matter, business, object, affair, thing; die Sache) of friends or of one's own

⁶¹ *Leviathan*, XXI, (15th paragraph (paragraph 15)) = *English Works*, III.

political collective. Naturalistic anthropology does not allow (permit, grant, tolerate, admit, suffer, agree (consent) to) (the) [a(n)] complete (full, entire, perfect) insight into (knowledge (understanding, perception) of) the symbolic-ideological mechanisms(,) which at the human level transform (convert, transmute, change, transfigure, transubstantiate) the biologically understood drive (urge, impulse or instinct) (inclination, impulsion, desire, need) of (for) self-preservation into an ideational need (requirement, want, desire, necessity, wish, demand) for (of) identity(,) and even (in fact) let (allow, leave) that [drive (or urge) of self-preservation] [to] retreat (step (move, fall, shrink, stand, draw) back, recoil, back (shy) away, withdraw, subside, recede) before [from] this [ideational need for identity] (Die naturalistische Anthropologie gestattet keine vollständige Einsicht in die symbolisch-ideologischen Mechanismen, die auf menschlicher Ebene den biologisch verstandenen Selbsterhaltungstrieb in ein ideelles Identitätsbedürfnis verwandeln und jenen vor diesem sogar zurückweichen lassen). Hobbes follows (or tracks) (pursues) these mechanisms only in accordance with (according to) [from] the “egoistical (egotistical, selfish)” side (facet) [of things] [point of view], that is, only in so far as (as much as, that) the biological drive (or urge) of self-preservation (is) ideationally reflected (finds expression, manifests (shows) itself) in “vanity (conceit)”, “[thirst (or lust) (desire, mania, obsession, addiction) for] fame (or glory)” or “(thirst (or lust)) for rule (or domineering(ness)) (ruling [over others], dominating, power, command, control)” („Eitelkeit“, „Ruhm-“ oder „Herrschaft“); the “altruistic” metamorphoses of the [this] same [drive (or urge) of self-preservation] remain outside of the (explanatory, explanative, illustrative, expository) possibilities (of explanation) of his [Hobbes’s] anthropological schema (scheme, plan, system, pattern).

Moreover (In addition, Furthermore, Besides), the one-sided (unilateral) way of looking at (consideration (contemplation, observation) of) violent (forcible) death from the point of view of its possible victims (prey, casualties or sacrifices) (offerings, oblations) is (does) not completely (entirely, wholly, totally) consistent (compatible) (go) with the process of founding (foundation, establishment, formation, setting up, institution, incorporation) (founding (foundation(al), establishment, formation, setting up) process (series of events)) of the Leviathan (Gründungsvorgang des Leviathan). If the political collective [entity, group, polity, body] is founded (established, formed, instituted, set up, constituted, incorporated) through (by means (way) of) contract (agreement, treaty, pact, convention, covenant) (durch Vertrag), then (so, thus) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before violent (forcible) death takes (or has an) effect (acts, works, is effective, operates) as [the] angst (or fear) of every individual before all other[s] [individuals]; if, on the other hand, the founding of the political collective is due (traced back, reduced) to (stems from) conquest (capture, taking), then (so, thus) the angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) [in respect (the face)] of death (or mortal agony (fear)) (die Todesangst) of every individual before the conqueror is the deciding (decisive) factor (decides the issue). In both cases (instances), says Hobbes, it is a matter of (we are dealing with) the same feeling (or sense) of angst (fear) (or anxiety) (frightened feeling) (Angstgefühl),(:) that is why (as a result) the same duties (obligations, responsibilities) vis-à-vis the sovereign [power] arise (result, come) from it (that (such [a]) [feeling (or sense) of angst (fear)])⁶². The important (significant) difference (or distinction) lies, nevertheless (however), in each and every respective process of founding. In the first case, all

⁶² *Leviathan*, XX (1st and 2nd paragraph (paragraph 1. and 2.)) = *English Works*, III

individuals are in principal exposed to (at the mercy of) the same (equal, identical, equivalent, like) threat ((extreme) danger) to (for) life (or mortal danger) (risk of death) (Lebensgefahr),(;) in the latter [case], the conqueror could gain (obtain, earn, get, acquire) a(n) considerable (important, serious, material, substantial, significant, large) advantage due to (through) the fact that (because) he ((at) first (of all), initially, to start with) relieved (rid) himself (or got rid (disposed) of) (removed) (the) danger ([the, a] threat (hazard) or risk) not through (by means of) his own passive submission (subjection or subjugation) to (under) a sovereign, but actively through the subjugation (subjection or submission) of other[s] [individuals]. Angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before death does not obviously reach (attain, gain, obtain, achieve, acquire) (in [respect of] all individuals) such a(n) extent (degree, scale, magnitude, size, proportion) that it [angst (or fear)] paralyses (cripples, halts, brings to a standstill, holds up) (the) readiness (willingness, preparedness) to take (undergo, be exposed to, accept) a great (high, serious) risk (gamble) if (when) advantages (benefits, gains) are thought of (imagined, had in mind, expected)(,) which the individual (person) concerned (in question) (interested (relevant) party (subject)) holds (regards, considers, views) to be (as) necessarily (unconditionally) worth striving for (after) (aspiring to) (i.e. desirable (worthwhile)). Angst (or fear) before violent (forcible) death would, incidentally (by the way), not at all (really, quite) be so widespread (common, diffuse, endemic)(,) if (the) readiness (willingness, preparedness) to attack were not just as (likewise, also) widespread(,) even [while, if] endangering (risking) ([or) putting (placing)]) (under, in) (danger, threat)) [even while endangering (or putting under threat)] one's own life. Every attack (assault, aggression, onslaught, strike, offence, raid) involves (or conceals) (hides, holds, contains, salvages, saves, rescues) imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) and bad (or

terrible) (awful, wicked, evil, nasty, unpleasant, ugly) surprises in itself (Jeder Angriff birgt Unwägbarkeiten und schlimme Überraschungen in sich), and yet (nevertheless, nonetheless, all the same, anyhow) experience (empirical (practical) knowledge) teaches that attacks are not only undertaken (done, attempted, carried out) (then) when (if) they are regarded as (considered [to be]) riskless (risk-free, free of risk, unhazardous, safe). Hobbes indeed (actually, in fact (reality), really, truly) accepts (assumes, adopts, presumes, supposes, embraces) an anthropological disposition, which counteracts (combats, fights) angst (or fear) before violent (forcible) death: the “desire of Power after Power”. With (Because of) that (As a result, Thereby, Therefore), however, not everything can (yet, still, even, just) be (have been) (has (yet) been) said (yet) [can have been said yet], since this insatiable (unquenchable, inexhaustible) desire (or lust) (craving, coveting, want(ing), longing) for (of, after) power in itself is not always capable (in the position) of overcoming (getting over, surmounting, conquering) (does not always have the capacity to overcome) (the) angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) [in respect (the face)] of death (or mortal agony (fear)) (da dieses unstillbare Machtbegehren an sich nicht immer die Todesangst zu überwinden vermag), as much as it may press (push, urge, shove, pressure, pressurise) (presses) for (towards, after, on) that (there(up)on). Where this overcoming (getting over, surmounting, conquest, will power; Überwindung) (temporarily (provisionally, for the time being, for the present, in the interim, tentatively; vorläufig)) succeeds (is successful), an additional (extra, further, supplementary, ancillary, accessory) force (power, strength, energy, vigour, might) (easily) distinguished (differentiated) from desire (or lust) (craving, coveting, want(ing), longing) for (of, after) power intervenes (joins (steps) in, switches (turns) itself on, is engaged (connected, started, interpolated), operates) as [a,

the] direct contrast(ing) (opposition, antithesis, conflict) to (with, vis-à-vis, towards) angst (or fear) (schaltet sich eine zusätzliche, von Machtbegehren unterschiedene Kraft als direkter Gegensatz zur Angst ein). It is a(n) boldness (daring or (an) audacity) (temerity, hardihood, intrepidity; Kühnheit), which draws (or feeds (lives)) on (off) the certainty (certitude) that the other [individual, human, person, man] is mortal and consequently (therefore, as a result, thus) vulnerable. The certainty of the mortality of the other [individual, human, person, man] (other's (other [individual's]) mortality) lets (allows, leaves) one forget (to leave behind) one's own mortality (temporarily), [and, or] in any case (at all events (any rate), anyway, anyhow, at least)(,) no longer take [it, one's own mortality] entirely (completely, totally, wholly) seriously (earnestly). The culprit (or doer) (perpetrator, offender, wrongdoer, evildoer) feels, at least for a short time (the time being) (or temporarily) (vorübergehend) less mortal than the victim (or casualty) (prey, sacrifice, offering, oblation). (That is why) His [The said culprit's] founding (establishment, foundation, formation) of the [a] state (Seine Staatsgründung) (hence, therefore) takes (follows, pursues, enters on) other paths (roads, ways) than those [paths] of them (those [individuals]) who first of all (for a start) appear (arise, occur, behave, act) and argue (reason) as possible victims (or casualties) (prey, sacrifices). Killing and violent (forcible) dying (death) (Töten und Sterben) open (set, start) (up) (off) (inaugurate, reveal, disclose), not only here, different (varying, varied, diverse, variable) perspectives. All possible perspectives are, however, opened up against the background (backdrop) of the objective given (actual) fact (actuality, reality, circumstance, condition) of human mortality. Social ontology must start from that (there) [objective given fact of human mortality] so that it [social ontology] can (is able to)

apprehend (grasp, understand, comprehend) all [of them (the(se) (said) possible perspectives)].

B. The neutrality of the psychological and ethical factor (Die Neutralität des psychologischen und ethischen Faktors)

In the previous [sub-]section(,) it was explained (declared, illustrated, clarified, professed) why (the, [a, any]) reference of the anthropological [element, sphere, dimension, realm, domain] to the polarity of the spectrum of the social relation must (has to) not be (is not necessarily) produced (manufactured, restored or done) (made, fabricated, established) via (through, by) this or that version of the anthropology of drives (urges) (impulses, instincts), but with regard to (in view of) the objective fact of human mortality (Im vorigen Abschnitt wurde erklärt, warum der Bezug des Anthropologischen zur Polarität des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung nicht über diese oder jene Fassung der Triebanthropologie, sondern im Hinblick auf das objektive Faktum menschlicher Sterblichkeit hergestellt werden muß). For the underpinning (backing up, substantiation, corroboration, support(ing), reinforcement) and widening (broadening, expansion, extension, enlargement) of this thesis, proof (evidence) should now be furnished (produced, yielded, provided) [that] that polarity acts (or is) (behaves, conducts itself) in principle (fundamentally) neutral(ly) towards (vis-à-vis, in relation (with regard) to, regarding) subjective, whether psychological(,) or ethical(,) factors. Between the friendly (amicable) or the inimical (hostile, antagonistic) pole of the social relation(,) and(,) certain (particular) stable feelings (emotions, sentiments, impressions, senses), motivations, dispositions or

ethical positionings (stances or attitudes) (approaches, outlooks, views), no necessary and ubiquitous interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) can be ascertained (determined, established, detected, traced, discerned) (Zur Untermauerung und Erweiterung dieser These soll nun der Nachweis erbracht werden, jene Polarität verhalte sich zu subjektiven, sei es psychologischen, sei es ethischen Faktoren grundsätzlich neutral. Zwischen dem freundlichen oder dem feindlichen Pol der sozialen Beziehung und bestimmten stabilen Gefühlen, Motivationen, Dispositionen oder ethischen Einstellungen kann kein notwendiger und ubiquitärer Zusammenhang ermittelt werden). Said (Stated, Expressed, Uttered, Spoken) more precisely: no necessary correspondence between the *kind* (sort, type, species, manner, way, mode, fashion, nature) of (the) subjective positioning (stance or attitude) or of the psychological act, and, the friendly (amicable) or inimical (hostile) *kind* (sort, type, species) of the social act can be ascertained (detected, discovered, found out, established, discerned, observed), even though (although) social acts without subjective positionings (stances or attitudes) and psychological acts are inconceivable (unthinkable, unimaginable) (Genauer gesagt: Es läßt sich keine notwendige Entsprechung zwischen der *Art* der subjektiven Einstellung bzw. des psychischen Aktes und der freundlichen oder feindlichen *Art* des sozialen Aktes feststellen, obwohl soziale Akte ohne subjektive Einstellungen und psychische Akte undenkbar sind). These (This) fundamental facts (of the case) (state of affairs, situation, circumstance(s)) (Dieser fundamentale Sachverhalt) are (is) not sufficiently apprehended (grasped, understood, comprehended) by the in itself correct (right, proper, accurate, exact) indication (reference, clue, pointer, hint, tip, piece of advice, remark, suggestion, allusion) [that] both association and solidarity(,) as well as dissociation and antagonism(,) could equally be motivated by (means (way) of) (through) emotional

factors (love or hate), by means of interests or end(goal)-rational (purposeful(expedient)-rational) [end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient)] considerations, by means of (for, on) objective (or factual) reasons (grounds) or by means of ethical-normative positions (sowohl Assoziation und Solidarität wie auch Dissoziation und Antagonismus könnten gleichermaßen durch emotionale Faktoren (Liebe oder Haß), durch Interessen oder zweckrationale Erwägungen, durch sachliche Gründe oder durch ethisch-normative Positionen motiviert werden)⁶³. Here, the possibility of a dichotomous classification continues to (carries on) remain(ing), in which emotions, interests and objective (factual) or normative reasons (grounds) of content A would end up (come (boil) down to) in accordance with their essence (substance, nature, texture) and always (in) friendly (amicable) [acts], however, (emotions, interests and objective (factual) or normative reasons (grounds)) of content B (would end up (come (boil) down to)) in accordance with their essence and always (in) inimical (hostile) acts. Yet (However, After all, Nevertheless, Actually, Really, Surely, Of course)(,) the real situation is more complex. This becomes more understandable (intelligible, comprehensible) (clearer) if (when) we distinguish (differentiate) between the general *type* of motivation (motivational *type*) (*Typ* der Motivation) and the, on each and every respective occasion, special (particular) psychical *content(s)* (und den jeweiligen speziellen psychischen *Inhalten*): love and hate belong e.g. to the same, namely, the affective type of motivation (affektiven Motivationstyp), however,(,) in terms of content, they are different (distinct, unlike, dissimilar) from each other. Now the same type of motivation is found not only at (on, in) both poles of the spectrum of

⁶³ Thus (So, Hence), v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 186, and Sorokin, *Society*, p. 97ff.. Both authors rightly point out (stress, emphasise) [that] in praxis (i.e. practice) these motivations would be (are) mixed (blended, mingled) with one another.

the social relation, but also different (diverse, varying, varied, dissimilar, variant) psychological contents (notwithstanding (regardless (irrespective) of) the type of motivation) interweave (become interwoven) with the same form of the social relation(,) just as (like) related or identical psychological contents (notwithstanding the type of motivation) can be activated at different points (positions, places, locations, spots; Stellen) of the spectrum of the social relation (social relation's spectrum). For the designation (appellation, name, naming, description, expression, marking, indication, term) of the relationship between [the, a] social and [the, a] psychological act, we (preferably, more likely (easily, readily), sooner) (make) use (of) neutral ("interweave [with one another] (become interwoven)") (rather) than causal expressions (phrases, terms, words), in order to call (bring) to mind (recall, remember) that the impeccable (perfect, flawless, indisputable, incontestable, definite) proof (proving) of causalities in this field (area, sector, domain, realm, territory, dominion) is a(n) extremely (exceedingly, utterly, most, supremely) tricky (delicate, awkward) matter (affair, business, concern, case) (daß der einwandfreie Nachweis von Kausalitäten auf diesem Gebiet eine äußerst heikle Angelegenheit ist). The constant (continual, continuous, perpetual, permanent, incessant, steady) mixing (blending, mixture, mingling) of [the] types of motivation (motivational types) and content(s) of motivation (motivational content(s)) with one another can indeed be confirmed (corroborated, borne out, upheld, validated) as [a] fact through (by (means (way) of)) case analyses (i.e. analyses of cases or on a case-by-case basis) (Fallanalysen), however the ascertainment (ascertaining, establishment, detection, investigation, determination, tracing) of a genetic and causal sequence (order, result or effect) (succession, series, consequence) (einer genetischen und kausalen Folge) between them runs (comes, stumbles) on (in) many occasions (cases) (frequently, many

times) into (across) (encounters) insurmountable (insuperable) difficulties (problems, challenges, hitches); if one can manage (deal (cope) with, overcome, get over, handle) them [such difficulties] at all, then [they are managed] through (by (means of)) [the, a] patient going (entering) into (showing an interest in, giving of (one's time and) attention to) the concrete case,(;) [and] never through preconceived (prejudiced) opinions (notions, views, ideas, judgements) about (on, regarding, over) the inner (internal, inward) hierarchy of the forces having an (taking) effect (acting, working, operating) in the human psyche (die innere Hierarchie der in der menschlichen Psyche wirkenden Kräfte). Because no-one can empirically verify (back up, document, substantiate, prove) that the affective type of motivation always causes (necessitates or determines) (conditions) the end(goal)-rational (purposeful(expedient)-rational) [end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient)] or the normative [type of motivation] – or the other way around (vice versa, conversely). Just as little can fixed (stable or settled) (steady, solid, firm) causalities between (the) corresponding psychological contents be made (found) out (or made up) (determined, identified, located, constituted). As soon as (When, Once) e.g. the question is posed, “does A love B because B is his [A's] friend, or is B(,) (A's) (the) friend (of A) because A loves him [B]?”(,) the [a] vicious circle is [can] hardly (barely) (to) be got around (circumvented, evaded, avoided, bypassed), especially (particularly) when (if) one takes into consideration (considers, reflects, (be)thinks) that, in the sense of (the) [a] psychological housekeeping (or budget) (balance, household), it appears (seems) [to be] more economical to love one's own friends in various (different, distinct, differing, varied, several, dissimilar, sundry) forms, and that in view of (given) that, as well as in view of the just as economically functioning un(-) [unconscious] or semi(half)-conscious mechanisms of rationalisation (explanation, justification) (rationalisation

mechanisms) (un- oder halbbewußten Rationalisierungsmechanismen), the genetic beginning (start, outset, commencement, origin, inception, onset) of the chain (line, string, series, succession) of motivation (motivation(al) chain; Motivationskette) (is), in practice (practical terms), lost (loses itself) in the [what is] unexplored (unresearched or unfathomable) (unascertained, unexplainable) (im Unerforschlichen). The necessity of distinguishing (keeping (telling) apart) [the] type of motivation or [the] psychical content(,) and(,) [the] form of the social relation, is besides (in addition, moreover, anyway) underlined by the asymmetry(,) which (is) often prevalent (predominant) (prevails, holds sway, rules, (pre)dominates) between [the] psychical disposition (proneness, susceptibility) and [the] external (outer, outward) acts (or actions) of (the) actors (die oft zwischen psychischer Disposition und äußeren Handlungen der Akteure herrscht). Thus (So, In this way, Hence), one cannot know in advance (beforehand) even whether friendly (amicable) gestures will be reciprocated (repaid, payed back, answered, replied) by (means of) (through, with) friendship (amity)(,) and inimical (hostile, antagonistic) [gestures] with enmity (hostility), because demonstrative (or ostentatious) (exaggerated, unmistakable, studied, marked, showy, flamboyant, pointed) friendship can awaken (arouse, prompt, call forth) mistrust (distrust, suspicion) and mobilise inimically oriented (aligned, adjusted, aimed) counter(-)strategies (feindlich ausgerichtete Gegenstrategien)(,) when (if) the intentions (purposes, aims, designs) of the other [person, individual, human] are doubted, whereas (while) inimical (hostile) acts can be overlooked (missed, ignored, neglected) or twisted (warped, bent out of shape, contorted, spoiled, dispersed, distorted, altered)(,) when (if) unconditional (i.e. absolute) (affectively (emotionally) or end(goal)-rationally (i.e. purposefully or expediently) motivated) interest[s] in (the) friendship with someone

exist(s) (wenn unbedingtes (affektiv oder zweckrational motiviertes) Interesse an der Freundschaft mit jemandem besteht). This same asymmetry appears (shows itself, is in evidence (noticeable)) in another shape (or form) (figure) when (if) for instance psychological dis(as)sociation and social association (psychische Dissoziation und soziale Assoziation) go hand in hand (accompany (are accompanied) [(by) each other]) (e.g. personal contempt (disdain, scorn) for the [a] business partner (associate) or the [a] political friend)(,) or conversely (the other way around, contrariwise, vice versa)(,) psychological association and social dis(as)sociation [accompany each other] (respect (esteem, regard, deference, consideration) and admiration for the [a(n), one's] foe (enemy)) [go hand in hand]. The possibility of such ambivalent relations makes (then) again (in turn, on the other hand) essential (necessary, required, requisite) the drawing of a clear dividing line (line of separation) between the intensity of the psychological disposition or motivation and the intensity of the social relation (zwischen der Intensität der psychischen Disposition oder Motivation und der Intensität der sozialen Beziehung). The intensity of the relation (relational intensity) (Die Beziehungsintensität), that is, the degree (grade, extent, size) of the inner (internal, inward) psychological claims (demands or preoccupation) (utilisation, engrossment) of those involved (the participants) in the relation in question (der Grad der inneren psychischen Inanspruchnahme der an der fraglichen Beziehung Beteiligten) is independent of whether the social relation approaches (comes closer to, approximates) the friendly or the inimical pole of the spectrum,(;) it [the social relation], therefore, can in both cases run (go, pass, flow, rush) through the same curve(,) so that on the basis (account) (because, for reasons) of the mere criterion of (the) intensity, the friendly or inimical quality of the relation cannot be inferred (concluded, deduced, derived). That is, incidentally

(by the way), the reason why friendship or enmity in themselves, therefore (namely, that is), first of all under [the] abstraction of the intensity and of the extensity of the relation (relational intensity and extensity), constitute (provide, grant, afford, produce, make, create, emit) the ultimate and sole (only, lone, unique) decisive (deciding, crucial, critical, determinative) yardstick (benchmark or measure) (scale, standard) for the construction of the spectrum of the social relation (the social relation's spectrum) (Das ist übrigens der Grund, warum Freundschaft oder Feindschaft an sich, also zunächst unter Abstraktion von der Beziehungsintensität und -extensität, die letzten und einzig entscheidenden Maßstäbe zur Konstruktion des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung abgeben)⁶⁴.

The methodical (i.e. methodological) meaning (sense, signification) of these ascertainments (observations, conclusions, findings) and differentiations is (the) following (as follows).(:) (T(t)he) investigation (exploration, research, inquiry, enquiry) of (into) [the] types of motivation (motivational types) and psychical contents, (in (relation (regard) to, respect of) (regarding) which situation-related(referring, concerning) (i.e. situational) thought (intellectual) acts (acts of thought (thinking)) can (also) be reckoned (estimated, counted (on), expected,

⁶⁴ Regarding (In relation to, For) this point cf. Stok, „Nähe und Ferne“, p. 245ff.. For the definition of the concept “extensity of the relation (relational extensity)” and “intensity of the relation (relational intensity)”, p. 237ff.. Stok connects (combines, links, affiliates, puts) “approaching (drawing (coming) nearer or approximation)” with “promotion (support or encouragement) (fostering, furtherance, advancement, sponsorship, patronage, stimulation)”, “conflict” with “harm (damage or hurt) of (i.e. to) the other (another) [person, individual, human]” („Näherung“ mit „Förderung“, „Konflikt“ mit „Schädigung des anderen“) (into [a] combination). In Section 1B of this chapter [it] was suggested (indicated, implied, hinted, alluded to (as to)) why a definition of nearness (proximity) and distance (or of friendship and enmity)], which disregards the question of identity (identity problem) and sets apart (or underlines) (makes noticeable) (external (outer, outward)) use(fulness) (or benefit) (advantage, gain, profit, utility; Nutzen) and damage (harm, detriment, injury, loss, disadvantage, fault, defect; Schaden), is always one-sided and often false. We shall come back (return) to that in this section. It is worth mentioning (remarkable, noticeable, the case), at any rate (in any case, anyhow, anyway), how little [the] older and newer literature have made the effort (bothered, tried, endeavoured) [to achieve, regarding] a(n) comprehensive (extensive, broad, wide, general, universal) and deeper (profounder, more far-reaching) definition of friendship and enmity.

calculated, computed) (too)), becomes the [a] topical (relevant or actual) (current, latest, up-to-date) task (mission, duty, job, function, purpose) only in the analysis of the concrete case (instance) (Der methodische Sinn dieser Feststellungen und Differenzierungen ist folgender. Die Erforschung von Motivationstypen und psychischen Inhalten, (zu denen auch situationsbezogene Denkakte gerechnet werden können), wird erst bei der Analyse von konkreten Fällen zur aktuellen Aufgabe). Precisely the (great, tremendous) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) of their [the said types of motivation and psychical contents'] manifestations (external appearances, forms of manifestation (appearance)), the richness (wealth, abundance) of their combinations and the unforeseeability (or unpredictability) of their effects (impact(s), influence(s)) make (render) these types and content(s) social-ontologically neutral and hand them [these types and contents] over (commit (place, put) them) (in)(to) the historian or the psychologist('s hands (i.e. area of expertise (competence), jurisdiction) (Gerade die Vielfalt ihrer Erscheinungsformen, der Reichtum ihrer Kombinationen und die Unvorhersehbarkeit ihrer Wirkungen machen jene Typen und Inhalte sozialontologisch neutral und überantworten sie dem Historiker bzw. dem Psychologen). (Though, Certainly, Admittedly,) the social-ontologically understood neutrality of the psychological and ethical-normative factor does not(, mind you,) in the least signify (mean) [that] (the) acting humans (people, men) would not be able to be motivated by such factors; it [such (the said) neutrality (of the psychological and ethical-normative factor)] means (says, states) [that] there is no unambiguous (clear, obvious, explicit), causal and permanently recurring (recurrent) interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) between such motivation and the shaping (forming or structuring) (formation, design, layout, arrangement, moulding) of the spectrum of the social relation (sie

besagt, zwischen solcher Motivation und der Gestaltung des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung gebe es keinen eindeutigen, kausalen und permanent wiederkehrenden Zusammenhang). (The) Insight into (Understanding (Knowledge, Sense, Perception) of) the content-related(filled) (substantive) (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) and changeability (or variability) of the motivation of the actors in (during, with, while) the (spectrum of the social relation's) (constant, steady, invariable, uniform) form-related (i.e. formal) structure (of the spectrum of the social relation) ([always] remaining (staying, remains, stays) the same) – far from dissolving (breaking up, disintegrating, dispersing) (the) living (vital) human forces into formalities (i.e. formal, not regarding content, qualities (entities, conditions, dimensions, starting points, methods, acts, procedures); as pertaining to forms, not content) (Die Einsicht in die inhaltliche Vielfalt und Veränderlichkeit der Motivation der Akteure bei gleichbleibender formaler Struktur des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung – weit davon entfernt, die lebendigen menschlichen Kräfte in Formalien aufzulösen) – poses(,) beyond every psychologism (Psychologismus)(,) the anthropological question on the only (sole, single, lone, unique) fertile (fruitful, productive, fecund) basis, and indeed in the following form: how is the essence (substance, nature, being or creature) (entity, thing, character, person(ality)) constituted (composed or made) (procured, conditioned, moulded, created)(,) in which varied (diverse, manifold, multifarious) and changeable (or variable) (varying, mutable) psychical given (actual) facts (actualities) accompany (are accompanied by) the same friendly (amicable) and/or inimical (hostile, antagonistic) acts (or actions) – as well as the other way around (vice versa, conversely) (Wie ist das Wesen beschaffen, bei dem vielfältige und veränderliche psychische Gegebenheiten mit den gleichen freundlichen und/oder

feindlichen Handlungen eiergehen – sowie umgekehrt)? The (afore)mentioned asymmetries between the psychological level of (the) actors and the form-related (i.e. formal) level of the spectrum of their (such actors’) relations with (towards, vis-à-vis) one another, shows (reveals, indicates) that there can be no talk of a (recti)linear (direct, straight) correspondence (equivalence, analogy, parallelism, correlation; Entsprechung) of the (real) polarity of this latter [spectrum] with (towards, vis-à-vis) the (frequently (many times, in many cases (ways)) assumed (supposed, adopted, accepted)) polarity of the drive(s) (or urge(s)) structure (structure of drives (or urges)) [drive(s) (urge(s)) structure] (Polarität der Triebstruktur). The usual (customary, normal, conventional, standard) connection (conjunction, combination, association) of love with friendship and hate with enmity is not social-ontologically or anthropologically decisive (deciding, crucial), in fact [it is] misleading (deceptive, delusive, delusory). Love and hate can indeed often interrelate (be connected (linked), connect, cohere, hang together) with friendship or enmity in the same direct manner (way, mode) as (like) motives and act(ion)s (acting(s))[,] [which] otherwise [(it) is] in the habit of being done (accustomed to be done) [(usually) happens] in the animal kingdom. The likewise (just as, also, similarly) numerous cases in which neither that interrelation ((inter)connection) is direct or necessary, (n)or does [the fact that] [the] psychological and practical high(-)[point] or low(deep)(-)point [high or low point] (psychischer und praktischer Höhe- bzw. Tiefpunkt) [do not] coincide in a social relation, nevertheless (nonetheless, however, all the same) remain informative (or enlightening) (instructive, illuminating, revealing). And something else distinguishes (singles) friendship and enmity (out) at the human social-ontological level in contrast to the rest of the animal kingdom; their [friendship and enmity’s] independence as relations from substantial (fundamental,

essential, basic, material), i.e. conspecific (belonging to the same species, characteristic or true to type) invariable (unchangeable, unchanging, unvariable) factors (ihre Unabhängigkeit als Beziehungen von substantiellen, d. h. arteigenen unvariablen Faktoren). Whereas (While) the proverbial disposition of the wolf vis-à-vis the lamb points to (indicates, suggests) the insurmountable barriers in the relations between animal species, inside of (within) the human genus (i.e. race) there is no substantial (essential or fundamental) (basic, material) “species (kind, sort, type) equality (equivalence or sameness) (identity, parity, similarity, uniformity, homogeneity) (equality of the species)” („Artgleichheit“), which would dispose [humans, people, men, one] to eternal friendship, and no “species strangeness (or alienness) (unfamiliarity, foreignness) (strangeness of the species)” („Artfremdheit“) which [would dispose [humans, people, men, one]] to eternal enmity. Friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) are as forms of the relation (relational forms) structurally stable,(;) friends and foes (enemies) constantly (continually, continuously) alternate (take turns, interchange) in (the) role allocation (or the occupation (allocation, assigning, allocating, filling, appointment) of roles) (Freundschaft und Feindschaft sind als Beziehungsformen strukturell stabil, Freunde und Feinde wechseln sich ständig in der Rollenbesetzung ab). In the dynamic movement of the social relation, all substantial (or fundamental) (essential, basic, material) properties (qualities or characteristics) (substantiellen Eigenschaften) are liquefied (i.e. made liquid or fluid) (verflüssigen sich) or step (stand) back (down) (i.e. withdraw or retreat) (resign, recede, subside, yield) – at least with regard to (in view of) the determination of friend and foe. A certain (particular) individual or collective subject may in some (one, [a] certain) respect(s) (way(s)) be regarded as [a] substance (Substanz), however it [the said (this) substance] can be deemed (found [to be]) active and

passive both at the friendly as well as at the inimical pole of the spectrum of the social relation,(;) (therefore) *in this regard (connection) (regarding (concerning) this)* it is (therefore) to be looked at (considered, contemplated, observed, examined, inspected, studied) in accordance with (according to) functional criteria. The old Indian author, who wanted to settle (clarify, clear up, solve) the question [as to] whether friendship towards (vis-à-vis, with) someone is innate (inborn, congenital, inbred, inherent, inbuilt, hereditary) or acquired (appropriated, learned, developed, picked up) (angeboren oder angeeignet), knew that already, and into the bargain (in the course of this, with it (that)), carefully (painstakingly, thoroughly, meticulously, studiously) distinguished (differentiated, made a distinction) the permanent species(kind, sort, type, breed, variety)-determined(conditioned) (artbedingte) enmity between carnivorous and herbivorous animals (fleisch- und pflanzenfressenden Tieren) from that [enmity] between humans (men, people): humans on each and every respective occasion (would) have (had) their reasons, and with the[se] reasons they [humans] also change(d) (alternated, switched) their friendly or inimical positioning (attitude or stance) (approach, outlook, view, orientation) towards (vis-à-vis) the same person⁶⁵.

It could (might) seem (look (very much) (appear)) as if (that) the stressed (emphasised, accentuated) by us fundamental (basic) interrelation (connection, correlation) of friendship and enmity(,) [along] with the question (problem) of identity(,) smuggled the psychological dimension into the explanation (elucidation, illustration, declaration) of the polarity

⁶⁵ *Pantschatantra*, II § 30-32 = II, p.162ff.: “For (Out of, From) one reason does one enter into (form) [a] friendship, and enmity [is entered into (formed), occurs, happens, takes place] for one reason too; that is why (therefore) whoever has a brain (understanding or [any] sense) (reason) must also one moment (sometimes) be [a] friend, the next (another time, sometimes) [a] foe with [regard to] (some)one.” Cf. II, § 121 (122) = II, p. 189: “No-one (Not anyone) is anyone’s friend without measure (i.e. unlimitedly (limitlessly, immeasurably, absolutely, infinitely))(,) or [anyone’s, a] foe (enemy); by means of (through, with) a hostile (malevolent, unfriendly, antagonistic; feindsel’ge) stance (attitude, position) towards the [a] friend, he proves (turns out) to be [a] foe.”

of the spectrum of the social relation. That (It) is not so [the case]. Identity does not constitute a psychological variable, but an anthropological constant, that is, a ubiquitous human attribute with direct social-ontological implications (Identität bildet keine psychologische Variable, sondern eine anthropologische Konstante, also ein ubiquitäres menschliches Attribut mit direkten sozialontologischen Implikationen). It [Identity] can be connected (joined, linked, combined, tied, bound) with (to) the most different feelings (emotions, impressions, sentiments, sensations, senses) and thoughts (ideas, concepts, notions) (Gefühlen und Gedanken),(;) however, exactly because of that (this)(for that very reason, hence, therefore)(,) it [identity] does (is) not depend(ent) on any particular (special) feeling or thought act (act of thought; Denkakt), that is, on any special psychological content; it [identity] stand or falls (depends, relies) by (on) the subject concerned (in question) as bearer (carrier, vehicle) of (the) often varying, contradictory and (mutually (or reciprocally) alternating (rotating)) feelings and thoughts (reciprocally taking turns (relieving one another)) (mit dem betreffenden Subjekt als Träger von oft variierenden, widersprüchlichen und sich gegenseitig ablösenden Gefühlen und Gedanken). It [Identity] does not exist without feelings and thoughts, however (yet, but) it cannot be abolished (canceled, revoked, dissolved, withdrawn, rescinded, quashed, abrogated, terminated, repealed, annulled, superseded, called off, closed, raised, lifted) by a feeling or a thought act in the same sense as a feeling abolishes (cancels, supersedes) another feeling(,) or a thought act(,) [abolishes] another thought act. On the contrary: it [identity] can force (squeeze, cram, jam, sandwich) special psychical content(s) into its logic, that is, modify or replace [such content(s)], [it (identity) can] proceed (or act) (take action, advance, go forward, happen) against instinctive (instinctual, intuitive, natural) preferences (predilections, likings,

proclivities)(,) or in general (generally) supplement (complete, complement, add to, replenish, restore) or even overcome (get over, conquer, surmount) the pleasure(desire, craving, lust, sexual)(-)[principle] through (by means (way) of, with) the [principle of] reality(-)[principle] or the power principle (principle of power) [the pleasure principle through the principle of reality or of power] (gegen instinktive Vorlieben vorgehen oder überhaupt das Lust- durch das Wirklichkeits- bzw. Machtprinzip ergänzen oder sogar überwinden). The manner (way, mode) in (with) which (how) the subject behaves (or acts) (is) in concrete situations (Die Art und Weise, wie sich das Subjekt in konkreten Situationen verhält)(,) (turns out to be (or takes shape (develops) as)) the resultant of the manner in which (how) it [the (said) (this) subject] deals (copes) with (manages)(,) on [a] strategic and [a] tactical basis(,) its problem of identity (identity problem; Identitätsproblem), and [the problem] of (the) extra-subjective given (actual) facts (actualities, realities, circumstances, conditions) (und der außersubjektiven Gegebenheiten); the latter determine (or presuppose) (condition, necessitate) behaviour (conduct, reaction, compartment) (letztere bedingen das Verhalten)(,) and consequently (therefore, as a result) diminish (reduce, lessen, decrease, lower) the weight (gravity) of [the] psychological factors only to the extent that they are recognised (discerned or seen) (spotted, discovered, perceived, traced, known, realised, understood, identified) and acknowledged (recognised, appreciated, accepted, allowed) (erkannt und anerkannt werden) by (the) identity as such, while at the same time(,) (in relation to which) (the) identity(,) for its part(,) has at its disposal its own, independent of the situation, means and ways (paths, roads, methods)(,) (in order) to bring (get) psychical factors and content(s) under control. That is why it would be very one-sided to summon (use, mobilise, muster, put forth, pit)

against psychologism exclusively (solely, strictly) the logic of the situation (die Logik der Situation)(,) and to overlook (miss) that the acting (act or action) (die Handlung) in a situation is mediated [subject to intervention] by an interpretation of the situation (durch eine Interpretation der Situation vermittelt wird), which in turn ((then) again, on the other hand) remains (stays) at any time (moment) (all times) (i.e. always) interwoven with the process ((series of) event(s)) of the formation (development), (of) the purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) (useful, effective, suitable) restructuring and (of) the self-assertion (self-assertiveness) of (the) identity (welche wiederum jederzeit mit dem Vorgang der Herausbildung, der zweckmäßigen Umstrukturierung und der Selbstbehauptung der Identität verflochten bleibt)⁶⁶. When (If) one wants to conceptually (notionally, abstractly) separate (divide, split up, detach, sever, dissociate, segregate, disjoin) what is objectively (or factually) (materially, in practice) inseparable (indivisible), then (thus, so) one must in fact allow (let, leave to) the constant “identity” [have] (the) theoretical precedence (priority, right of way, primacy) before [with respect to, as regards] the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation. Because only from the perspective of (the) self-preservation comprehended (grasped, understood, interpreted, perceived, construed) as identity, that is, beyond (on the other side of) biological connotations, can the constellation (correlation or conjuncture)

⁶⁶ A symbolic interactionist (Ein symbolischer Interaktionist) like Blumer indeed connects the interpretation process (process of interpretation) with the “self-indication” of the self, however, he is very far away (off) (remote, distant) from comprehending (understanding, grasping, interpreting, conceptualising) that “self-indication” as [a(n)] intricate (or far-reaching) (complex, extensive) need for ([in respect] of) identity and (for) power with its own possibilities (of)(,) and (its own) means(,) of disciplining vis-à-vis feelings (emotions, impressions, sentiments, sensations, senses), inclinations (tendencies, propensities or predilections) (proclivities, dispositions) and similar (like) psychological factors (als weitverzweigtes Identitäts- und Machtbedürfnis mit eigenen Disziplinierungsmöglichkeiten und -mitteln gegenüber Gefühlen, Neigungen und ähnlichen psychischen Faktoren); as a result (thus, therefore, consequently), the situation-related(referring, concerning) (i.e. situational) interaction (die situationsbezogene Interaktion) must rather one-sidedly (unilaterally) carry the main theoretical load (i.e. bear the main theoretical burden) in the [an, his] anti-psychologistic context (see *Symbolic Interactionism*, esp. pp. 79, 83ff., 111ff.).

be described (delineated, depicted) in which friendship and enmity come into being (arise, emerge, originate, result, ensue, are created (produced)) and alternate (takes turns, interchange, rotate); such self-preservation behaves (or acts) (is) in itself indifferent(ly) (neutral(ly), inert(ly), inactive(ly)) vis-à-vis the option (or choice) (selection) of friendship or enmity, that is, the option (or choice) is subordinated (subordinates itself) to self-preservation. If one held (regarded, considered), on the other hand, friendship or enmity to be (as) original (initial, primordial, primal, primary), then (thus, so) the criteria are lacking (missing, absent) (in order) to make the option (or choice) of friendship or enmity understandable (intelligible, clear) (Wenn man begrifflich trennen will, was sachlich untrennbar ist, so muß man sogar der Konstante „Identität“ den theoretischen Vortritt vor der Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung lassen. Denn nur in der Perspektive der als Identität, also jenseits biologischer Konnotationen aufgefaßten Selbsterhaltung können die Konstellation beschrieben werden, in denen Freundschaft und Feindschaft entstehen und sich abwechseln; solche Selbsterhaltung verhält sich an sich indifferent gegenüber der Option für die Freundschaft oder die Feindschaft, die Option ordnet sich also der Selbsterhaltung unter. Hält man hingegen die Freundschaft oder die Feindschaft für ursprünglich, so fehlen die Kriterien, um die Option für die Freundschaft oder die Feindschaft verständlich zu machen). (There are) Two different (dissimilar, unlike) things [which] (are) (to be) meant (said, opined, thought, believed) by the process of the formation (forming, shaping, fashioning, setting up, development, creation, establishment, building, education, culture) (of) and assertion (claim, contention, maintenance, allegation, statement) of identity (identity formation and assertion) inevitably (unavoidably, inescapably, necessarily) entailing the distinction (differentiation) between friend and foe (enemy), and

assuming (accepting, adopting, supposing, presuming) [that] this distinction is (stands) at the beginning (start, outset, origin, inception) of that process (der Vorgang der Identitätsbildung und -behauptung ziehe zwangsläufig die Unterscheidung zwischen Freund und Feind nach sich, und anzunehmen, diese Unterscheidung stehe am Anfang jenes Vorgangs). However, as [(we have) already] said: those (more likely) are conceptual (notional) clarifications and hierarchisations (rather) than clearly (distinctly, plainly, lucidly) provable (demonstrable, verifiable, detectable, evident, traceable) causalities (Das sind eher begriffliche Klärungen und Hierarchisierungen als klar nachweisbare Kausalitäten). With (During, In) the complexity and the tight (close, narrow) interdependence of the (acting, working, operating) factors (having an (taking) effect, being effective), the following general ascertainment (observation, conclusion) is merely (only) permitted (allowed, tolerated) here: where(ver) the question (problem) of self-preservation (self-preservation question) – and this anthropologically and social-ontologically means: the question (problem) of identity (identity question) – is posed, there the question (problem) of power (power question) is posed too, and consequently the distinction (differentiation) between friend and foe (enemy) and the (corresponding, related, relevant) option (or choice) (regarding (concerning) this [distinction], in this regard (connection)) become (are) unavoidable (inevitable, indispensable, (absolutely) essential, imperative) (Wo sich die Selbsterhaltungsfrage – und dies heißt anthropologisch und sozialontologisch: die Identitätsfrage – stellt, da stellt sich auch die Machtfrage und somit wird die Unterscheidung zwischen Freund und Feind und die diesbezügliche Option unumgänglich). That is why (Hence, Therefore,) the thesis seems (appears) (to be) plausible [that] the spectrum of the social relation becomes (or is) (will be) occupied and shaped (formed, moulded,

structured, arranged, configured, fashioned) by concrete subjects according to (in accordance with) (in) which way (manner, fashion), to (in) which (what) extent (degree, scale), and with which (what) intensity these subjects pose the question of identity in relation to themselves and to other [subjects]. Between both (the) poles of the spectrum(,) indeed for long stretches (or to a large extent), namely, in (during) very many social relations, the question of identity is not posed directly and openly (overtly, frankly, candidly) – not for instance because it [the question of identity] does not exist, but because it can(,) against the background (backdrop) of already solidified (consolidated or stabilised) (strengthened, hardened, reinforced, cemented, secure(d)) private or public power relations (or circumstances (conditions) of power) (schon verfestigter privater oder öffentlicher Machtverhältnisse)(,) be left (set, put) aside (disregarded, ignored, excluded, factored out), in fact even must [be left aside]. If it [the question of identity] is to (should) be posed explicitly and uncompromisingly (without compromise), the social relation must be driven (pushed, impelled, forced, propelled, thrust) to one of both poles of the spectrum: (extreme) enmity is the absolute negation of the identity of the Other (other [person (human, man) or group (collective)]) up to (until) its (his (or their)) intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) and physical annihilation (destruction, obliteration, extinction, extermination), (extreme) friendship is the absolute affirmation of the identity of the Other (other [person (human, man) or group (collective)]) up to (until) its (his (or their)) intellectual(mental)(-spiritual) and physical self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) (Die (extreme) Feindschaft ist die absolute Negation der Identität des Anderen bis zu seiner geistigen und physischen Vernichtung, (extreme) Freundschaft ist die absolute Affirmation der Identität des Anderen bis zur geistigen und physischen Selbstaufopferung). In total enmity(,) (the) identity wants

total recognition (acknowledgement, appreciation, acceptance, approval) for itself; in total friendship(,) total recognition (acknowledgement) is given (granted, provided) to another [person (human, man) or group (collective)]. But (Yet, However)(,) in both cases, and regardless (irrespective, in spite) of (despite, notwithstanding) (the) reverse(d) (converse, contrary) signs (i.e. symbolism), the question (problem) of identity as [a] question of recognition, i.e. [(as a) question] of power, remains (stays) all (the way) along ((right) down) the line (across the board) [all along the line] decisive (deciding, substantial) (In der totalen Feindschaft will die Identität die totale Anerkennung für sich; in der totalen Freundschaft wird einem anderen die totale Anerkennung gegeben. Aber in beiden Fällen, und ungeachtet der umgekehrten Vorzeichen, bleibt die Identitätsfrage als Anerkennungs-, d. h. Machtfrage auf der ganzen Linie maßgeblich). About (Regarding, Concerning, With regard (reference) to) its [the question of identity's] weight (gravity), the observers of human things (i.e. affairs) (matters, objects, items, issues) (die Beobachter der menschlichen Dinge), incidentally (by the way), were (have been) clear since (from) [the] ancient (old) times (age(s), period). Friendship (Amity), according to Aristotle, is based, on the one hand, on the common (joint, mutual) option (or choice) (selection; Option) with regard to friends and foes (enemies),(;) on the other hand, on the readiness (or willingness) (preparedness, disposition) of both sides to recognise (acknowledge, accept, appreciate) and to confirm (corroborate, back up, bear out, validate, verify, affirm, acknowledge, certify, endorse, authenticate) each and every respective Other (den jeweils Anderen)(,) precisely in [regard to] the activities (functions, tasks, jobs) in [relation to] which he [the said

Other] would like to most of all (best) distinguish himself (show off)⁶⁷. And Cicero praised (commended, spoke very highly of, extolled, lauded) Scipio's efforts (or troubles) (difficulties) in equating (treating) himself (as an equal) in friendship with the [someone] inferior [of] (lower) [status] [person], since he [Scipio] knew how annoying (troublesome, tiresome, irksome, onerous, bothersome, irritating, burdensome, inconvenient, undesirable, vexing, vexatious, worrisome, disagreeable) friendship becomes (is) for him who sees himself always and everywhere surpassed (excelled)(,) or believes he is despised(,) by the [his] friend⁶⁸.

The fundamental (basic, elementary) misunderstanding (misconception, misapprehension) [that] friendship and enmity amongst socially living humans (men, people) (would) spring (arise, come, originate) straight from feelings (emotions, sentiments, impressions, senses) or impulsive (drive(urge)-like, instinctive, impulse-driven, compulsive, libidinous) inclinations (propensities or tendencies) (proclivities, predilections) (Gefühlen oder triebhaften Neigungen) like (as [with]) love and hate, is apparently (obviously, evidently, manifestly, clearly, patently, blatantly) indispensable (essential) in terms of (for, as regards) the economy (i.e. careful management or sparing use) of thought (denkökonomisch unentbehrlich)(,) and therefore (because of (for) that, hence) continues to (keeps (carries) on) flourish(ing)(,) despite (notwithstanding, in spite of) [the] rejection (refusal, denial, turning down, canceling) of the anthropology of drives (urges). It [The said fundamental misunderstanding] is accompanied by (accompanies) a series (number) of other, in terms of (as regards) the economy (i.e. careful management or sparing use) of thought(,) (and socially) expedient (purposeful, functional

⁶⁷ *Rhetorik*, 1381a 8-9, 15-17; 1381b 10-14.

⁶⁸ *Laelius de amicitia*, 20, 69 – 21, 72. The more recent (newer) socio(social-)psychological literature about (on, regarding) motivation in friendship (and enmity) will be evaluated (analysed, interpreted) in the 3rd volume of this work during (in [respect of]) the (detailed) discussion of the problem of identity.

or convenient) (effective, suitable) errors (mistakes) (zweckmäßigen Irrtümern), which must (have to) yet (still) be discussed in this section. The not smallest (slightest) amongst them [these errors] establishes (manufactures or restores) (fabricates, produces, makes, creates) between friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) on the one hand(,) and sociality and (or) successful (effective, very good, felicitous) socialisation or unsociality and (or) deficient (defective, faulty, imperfect, poor, inadequate, insufficient, unsatisfactory, lacking, wanting) socialisation on the other hand(,) a more or less close (tight, narrow) connection (combination, conjunction, link(ing), coupling, association, affiliation, union, relationship) (stellt zwischen Freundschaft und Feindschaft einerseits und Sozialität bzw. gelungener Sozialisierung oder Unsozialität bzw. mangelhafter Sozialisierung andererseits eine mehr oder weniger enge Verbindung her). It was explained (expounded, explicated, elucidated) in another place why sociality and socialisation are not normative concepts (notions), that is, [why] [they] cannot prejudge the “good” or “bad (evil, wicked; schlechte)” social behaviour (conduct) (soziale Verhalten) of the individual⁶⁹. From (Out of) the social nature of man (humans, people) (Aus der sozialen Natur des Menschen)(,) [it] can only be concluded (or inferred) (derived) that specifically human friendly (amicable) or inimical (hostile, antagonistic) acts must take place (happen, occur) in society, that society neither comes into being (arises, emerges, originates, results, ensues, is created (produced)) out of (from) nothing through (by means of) friendship (amity), nor goes to pieces (is ruined (destroyed, wrecked), perishes, founders) through (by means of) enmity (hostility), but simply constitutes (provides, grants, affords, produces, makes, creates, emits) the field inside of which friendship and

⁶⁹ See Ch. II, Sec. 3B, above.

enmity are acted out (unfold or happen) (take place). Ginsberg (has, had) enunciated (said, voiced, pronounced, articulated, expressed, uttered, stated) a great truth when he opined (said, thought, meant) [that (it is)] not sociality in itself, which can in fact (also) be observed (noticed, watched) in many other animals even in complex forms (too, as well), [which] distinguishes (marks, singles out, is a feature of) man (humans, people) in a specific way (manner, fashion), but rather his ability (faculty, capacity or powers) (assets) (Vermögen) to press (or brace himself) against (i.e. oppose or resist) the will (volition, determination, intention) of the generality (i.e. the (whole) commonalty (community) or general public) (sich gegen den Willen der Allgemeinheit zu stemmen)⁷⁰. That (This) (then) again (in turn, on the other hand) does not necessarily (have to) (must not) mean [that] the foe (enemy) of society, i.e. of dominant (prevailing, ruling) norms (der herrschenden Normen), or the foe of other humans (people, men)(,) is badly (poorly) or deficiently (defectively or inadequately) (insufficiently, imperfectly, poorly, unsatisfactorily) socialised (schlecht oder mangelhaft sozialisiert). Two complementary considerations (thoughts, reflections, deliberations) prove (demonstrate, establish, verify) it. Altruistic behaviour (conduct) must absolutely (actually, really) seek (look for) conflict and enmity, when (if) he for (to) whom it [altruistic behaviour] is meant (applies) is threatened (endangered) by humans (people, men, man); that is why it [(such, this) altruistic behaviour] has meaning (sense) and (continued) existence (continuance, duration) (Sinn und Bestand) only in a world in which enmity can be so extreme that for the protection (safeguarding, conservation, preservation, sheltering, safety) of the friend ([in respect] of the individual or of the collective [group, entity]) (des Einzelnen oder des

⁷⁰ *Sociology*, p. 120.

Kollektivs) under (in) [certain] circumstances (possibly, perhaps, if need be) the acceptance of extreme dangers (or risks) (hazards, threats; Gefahren), that is, self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) appears (seems) (to be) necessary. On the other hand, the cultivation (or fostering) (maintenance, upkeep, keeping, nurture, nursing, care) of sociality is no indication (or sign) ((piece of) (circumstantial) evidence) of [a] friendly cast of mind (mindset or mentality) (way of thinking, conviction, view, attitude) or intent(ion) (purpose, aim) (die Pflege der Sozialität kein Indiz freundlicher Gesinnung oder Absicht sein). The e.g. dependence (reliance) of the [he who is] vain (conceited, stuck-up) [person] on (or need for) (the) praise (commendation, approval) of other[s] [people], for (to) whom otherwise [are] indifferent (people (humans, persons, men))(,) or simply angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry, trepidation) before loneliness (solitude, solitariness, isolation, seclusion, emptiness, desolation)(,) even under (with, amongst) [the] complete (total, full) safeguarding (or maintenance) (protection, preservation, keeping) of socially sanctioned manners ((public) behaviour (in public), etiquette), can motivate (be (the) motivation for) the closest (tightest, narrowest) contact with the world, which in (during, with) the disappointment (or frustration) (letdown, disillusionment, disenchantment) of expectations easily turns (passes, blends, merges) into aggressivity (aggressiveness, aggression, belligerence) and enmity (hostility) (Zum engsten Kontakt mit der sozialen Welt, sogar unter völliger Wahrung der sozial sanktionierten Umgangsformen, können z.B. die Angewiesenheit des Eitlen auf das Lob anderer, ihm ansonsten indifferenter Menschen oder einfach die Angst vor der Einsamkeit

motivieren, die bei Enttäuschung der Erwartungen leicht in Aggressivität und Feindschaft übergehen)⁷¹.

The latter (last) example implies that the search (quest, pursuit, looking) for (of)(,) or the existence (or presence) (availability; Vorhandensein) of(,) nearness (proximity) (closeness, vicinity, neighbourhood) and intimacy (i.e. familiarity) (closeness; Intimität) between social actors acts (behaves, is) just as (likewise, equally, similarly) neutral(ly) for (towards, vis-à-vis, regarding, in relation to) [is just as neutral vis-à-vis] friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) as (like) [the] sociality and socialisation of man (wie Sozialität und Sozialisierung des Menschen) [are neutral vis-à-vis friendship and enmity]. In view of (Given) the great (large) variety (diversity) (of form) (multiformity, multiplicity) (number) of phenomena, which the social-ontological concept (notion) of friendship (amity) encompasses (comprises, includes, contains, embraces, covers), one cannot say that personal nearness (proximity) and intimacy (i.e. familiarity) belong to it [(the social-ontological concept of) friendship]

⁷¹ Two of Chamfort's sentences (clauses, propositions, theorems, tenets, principles; Sätze) (sentences by Chamfort) elegantly (stylishly, neatly, gracefully, sleekly, polishedly, refinedly) bring (take, carry, give) (conceptualise) these aspects of human sociality and socialisation (menschlicher Sozialität und Sozialisierung) (to the concept (notion)): «Les misérables motifs qui font que l'on recherche un homme ou qu'on le considère, sont transparents et ne peuvent tromper qu'on sot, ni flatter qu'un homme ridiculement vain» [“the miserable (wretched, pitiable, paltry, measly, unhappy, mean, squalid, sordid, stingy) motives which make one search (look) for (pursue, seek) a (hu)man (someone) or (make) (one) take (him, someone) into consideration (consider, regard, looks at) (him, someone), are transparent (clear)(,) and can neither deceive but a(n) fool (idiot, moron, simpleton), nor flatter someone but the ((hu)man) [him (someone) (who is)] ridiculously (absurdly) vain ((hu)man)”]. And: «La faiblesse de caractère ou le défaut d'idées, en un mot tout ce qui peut nous empêcher de vivre avec nous-mêmes, sont les choses qui préservent beaucoup de gens de la misanthropie» [“weakness (feebleness, frailness, frailty, infirmity, impairment, lameness) of character or the lack (shortage) of ideas, in a (one) word(,) all those things that can prevent (preclude, stop, hinder, impede, deter, forbid, prohibit) us from living with ourselves [alone], are the things which preserve (guard, protect) (a great) many people (folk) from misanthropy”] (*Maximes*, pp. 235, 111). The sociologist thinks (thought) just like [that] (exactly the same, similarly, likewise): “... the self-satisfied (smug or complacent) [person, (hu)man] (der Selbstgefällige)... flees (runs away, escapes) from loneliness (solitude, solitariness, isolation, seclusion, emptiness, desolation), because he draws (obtains, receives, gets, takes) strength (energy, vigour, power, force) and comfort (contentment, ease, relish, pleasure) (Kraft und Behagen bezieht) only from (out of) the reflection (mirroring, mirage) of the I (Ego) (der Spiegelung des Ich) in the acclaim (or applause) (acclamation, clapping, approval, cheers, cheering) and the admiration (by) (means) (of) (through) others” (v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 64; here the author turns against the frequent confusion (mistake, mistaking, mix(-)up, mixing up) of “separation (or isolation)” („Absonderung“) and “ego(t)ism” („Egoismus“)).

without exception and by definition (per definitionem). These [Personal nearness and intimacy] indeed characterise (mark, label, identify, brand, describe, portray, signpost) several (some, a few) important forms of friendship, but – and that (this) is important here – they constitute only a concomitant (corollary, outcome, ancillary, appurtenance, adjunct, accessory; Begleiterscheinung) of friendship under (in) certain circumstances (conditions), not a guarantee of (for) their longer duration or greater (larger) steadiness (i.e. stability) (firmness, strength, steadfastness) in comparison to (with) friendly (amicable) relations (freundschaftlichen Beziehungen), which for instance are based (rest) on (self-)interest (Interesse) and personal distance. Under (In) other circumstances, the opposite (reverse, contrary, converse) of that (it) can be the case. Personal nearness (proximity) and intimacy do not make (render) merely (just, only, simply) because (on account, by reason) of (due to) constant (continual, continuous, perpetual) [being] with one another (or co-existence) (bloß wegen des ständigen Miteinanders) friction(s) and conflict(s) more probable (likely), (,;) above all, they intensify the (subject's) participation (of the subject) in the relation, (correspondingly, accordingly,) (the) claims (demands, entitlements) or (the) sensitivities (correspondingly) increase (rise, go up), and the feeling (sense) of being betrayed arises (appears (on the scene)) more easily (readily) and more vehemently (emphatically, intensely, violently, fiercely, passionately, furiously). One does not have to search (look, seek) (for a) long (time) [far and wide] for examples of the coming into being (emergence, creation, genesis) of bitter (nasty) enmity from previously (earlier, formerly, before(hand), antecedent, once) [being] close with (to) one another: families have their internal vendettas, religions above all (especially, particularly, in particular, notably) persecute their heretics, political movements never forgive (pardon, excuse) their renegades(,) and

peoples know (of) (are (become) acquainted with) nasty (terrible, bad, evil, wicked) civil wars⁷². These observations (ascertainments; Feststellungen) are (should) not at all (supposed to) mean that personal nearness (proximity) and intimacy must (necessarily, have to) give(s) rise to (cause(s), create(s), induce(s), provoke(s), arouse(s)) sharp (acute) conflict(s), but only that a conflict, which comes into being (arises, emerges, originates, results, ensues, is created (produced)) from it (that, them) [personal nearness and intimacy, close being with one another], can be possibly much (far) sharper (acuter) than other conflict(s). All possibilities of the social relation are (open)(,) both in [regard to] (during) familiarity (intimacy, closeness, nearness; Vertrautheit) as well as in [regard to] (during) strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity) (foreignness; Fremdheit)(,) (open): this is, in short, the meaning of the thesis [that] friendship and enmity would act (behave, be) neutral(ly) towards (vis-à-vis, with (in) regard (relation) to, regarding) such factors. Far from determining (conditioning, being the presupposition of) friendship and enmity, intimacy and familiarity have to be able (allowed, left) to be determined (conditioned, presupposed) by these [friendship and enmity]. Because in the course of enmity, strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity) (be)comes from (out of) the old familiarity, whereas (whilst) earlier (previous, antecedent) strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity) gives way to [a(n)] growing (increasing) interest for (in) the constitution (composition or nature) (texture), that is, for (in) the mode (way) of acting (action) and the possibilities of the foe (enemy) (während frühere Fremdheit wachsendem Interesse für die Beschaffenheit, also für die Handlungsweise und die Möglichkeiten des Feindes weicht).

⁷² Simmel (has, had) highlighted (emphasised, underlined, brought out) this point very nicely (finely, beautifully), *Soziologie*, esp. p. 205ff.; cf. the commentary on Simmel by Coser, *Theorie*, pp. 71ff., 78ff..

We remarked elsewhere (in another place) that friendship and enmity are just as (likewise, also, equally) indifferent to(wards) (vis-à-vis, with regard to) relations (conditions or circumstances) of equality and of supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] or subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination] (Gleichheits- und Über- bzw. Unterordnungsverhältnissen)⁷³. The one-sided (unilateral) consideration of one amongst a number of (several, multiple) possibilities led (guided, conducted, shepherded) Bacon here to the conviction (belief) [that] friendship is (was) to be expected (anticipated, awaited) in a community (association, society, fellowship, collective, consortium, group, commonality) of fate (destiny, lot, doom) (i.e. people with a common destiny) (Schicksalsgemeinschaft) of “superior and inferior” [people, humans, men, actors] rather than among(st) (between) equals⁷⁴. With (Because of) that (Therefore, Thereby, Therewith), he [Bacon] continued (resumed, kept (followed) up, perpetuated, carried forward) also in this field (area, sector) his polemic(s) against the ancient-Aristotelian tradition, which had declared (announced, proclaimed, explained, expounded) the equality of partners (associates, companions), at least in [regard to] virtue (goodness, morality; Tugend) and pure (genuine, sincere or honourable) cast of mind (mindset or mentality) as the presupposition (precondition, prerequisite) of genuine (real, true, authentic, natural, veritable, sincere, proper) friendship. Following (In connection with) pre-Socratic (cosmological) perceptions (views or conceptions) (opinions, ideas, notions), according (in relation) to which (whereupon, whereby) Same (Equal or Like) (same (equal or like)) (similar, equivalent, alike, identical, uniform) is harmonised with Same

⁷³ See Sec. 1B in this chapter.

⁷⁴ *Essays*, XLVIII (“Of Followers and Friends”).

(Equal or Like) (wonach Gleiches mit Gleichem harmoniere)⁷⁵, Plato took (based) as the [his] basis(,) (during (in)) his investigation (examination, probe, probing, enquiry, inquiry, exploration, researching, research) of (into) friendship (amity)(,) (on) the criterion of sameness (equality or likeness) (similarity, equivalence, alikeness, identicalness (identical nature, identity), uniformity, parity) or unsameness (inequality or unlikeness) (unsimilarity, inequivalence, unalikeness, unidenticalness (non-identity), non-uniformity (ununiformity), non-parity (unparity)) (das Kriterium der Gleichheit bzw. Ungleichheit)(,) and concluded [that] “true (veritable, real, genuine)” friendship is possible only amongst (between) equals (i.e. people who are the same or alike), [that] only the good (i.e. good people (humans)) can, nevertheless (however), be equal (the same or alike) amongst (as between) one another, since the bad (i.e. bad (evil, wicked, malign, nasty, malevolent) people), driven (propelled) by (a) thousand(s of) contradictory (conflicting, paradoxical, inconsistent, incompatible) desires (appetites, lusts, longings, yearnings), are not even (so much as, once) equal to (with, vis-à-vis) (the same as or like) themselves („wahre“ Freundschaft sei nur unter Gleichen möglich, gleich untereinander könnten indes nur die Guten sein, da die Bösen, durch tausend widersprüchliche Begierden getrieben, nicht einmal sich selbst gleich seien); amongst (under) these [people who are bad, circumstances, conditions](,) friendship therefore would (be) (is) out of the question (not (be) possible (a possibility)),(;) (then) again (on the other had)(,) amongst (between) unequals (i.e. those who are not the same or alike) (Ungleichen), who are dependent (reliant) (depend, rely) upon one another for the remedying (repair(ing) or removal) of one’s own (each and every) respective deficiency (fault, defect, shortcoming, want), only a

⁷⁵ Thus (So, In this way), e.g. Empedocles (in Theophrastus), in Diels-Kranz, I, p. 303.

[friendship] based (resting) on considerations (contemplations) of usefulness (utility or expedience) (use, profitableness, helpfulness, advantage, handiness) and [which is] hence (therefore, thus) unstable (unsteady, inconstant, erratic, fickle, variable, changeable) (nur eine auf Nützlichkeits erwägungen beruhende und daher unbeständige) [is possible]⁷⁶. Aristotle in principle approved of (answered in the affirmative (yes) to, saw, accepted) all three limbs (sections, parts, terms) of this line (or train) of thought (reasoning, thought process; Gedankenganges) (positively, as positive): “true (veritable, real, genuine)” or “perfect (complete or absolute)” friendship, as he expressed (enunciated, verbalised, stated, said) (himself) [it], can flourish (thrive, prosper, grow, survive) in [regard to] virtue (goodness) only amongst (between) equals (i.e. people who are the same or alike),(;) (the) unstable (unsteady, inconstant, erratic, fickle, variable, changeable) bad (evil, wicked) [people] are, anyway (anyhow, in any case, at any rate), incapable of (for) friendship, and utility (benefit, profit, or advantage) (use; Nutzen) is the deciding (decisive) factor in (with) [regard to, the case of] unequal (dissimilar or un(a)like) (different, disparate, uneven, mismatched, ill-matched) or opposed (conflicting, contrary, opposing) characters (personalities) (bei ungleichen und entgegengesetzten Charakteren)⁷⁷. The inclusion (incorporation) of the friendship (amity) of usefulness (utility or expedience) (use, profitableness, helpfulness, advantage, handiness) (Nützlichkeitsfreundschaft) in the genus (genre, type, kind) (generic term (name)) “friendship”, as begrudging[ly] (reluctant[ly], unwilling[ly]) [done] as it may seem (appear), took the fact into account that a strong (powerful, intense) current (flow, trend, tendency) of Greek thought (thinking) had baldly (bluntly, plainly,

⁷⁶ The pertinent (relevant, appropriate) passages (loci, references): *Lysis*, 214b – 215e; *Nomoi*, 837ab.

⁷⁷ See above all (especially) *Nikomachische Ethik [= Nicomachean Ethics]*, 1156b 7, 1159b 7–15.

openly, pointedly, outspokenly, forthrightly) elevated (raised, lifted, assessed, registered, recorded, expressed, voiced) self-interest (vested interest, selfish interests; *Eigeninteresse*) to (as) the *raison d'être* (reason for being, mainspring, purpose) of friendship (amity)⁷⁸. Between the utilitarian and the ethical concept (conceptual plan) of friendship (*Zwischen dem utilitaristischen und dem ethischen Freundschaftskonzept*)(,) mediating (or intermediary) (intervening, interceding, intermediate) perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions) announced their presence (made their presence felt, came forward, were expressed) (*meldeten sich vermittelnde Auffassungen*) with [a] different and often changing (varying, alternating, changeable, variable, shifting) weighting (evaluating, evaluation) (*wechselnder Gewichtung*) of the conceptual (notional, terminological) components⁷⁹(,) so that the definitive (relevant, decisive, deciding, leading, substantial, significant) inventory (list)(,) since then (from that (this) time forward)(,) of the conceivable (imaginable, thinkable, possible) basic (or fundamental) positions in this field (area, sector, domain, realm, territory) (was) soon (in front of us, there, available, known, present, published) (existed) [became apparent] in outline (outlined).

⁷⁸ Thus (Hence, So, In this way), the Sophists, but e.g. Democritus too, who summoned (mobilised, highlighted, projected) the concept (notion) of (self-)interest in order to loosen (dissolve, undo, untie, disengage, sever, ease, release, remove, separate, disentangle, break off, cancel) the primeval (original, natural, unspoilt, elemental, primitive, archaic, rooted in the soil) bond (binding, tie, commitment, relationship) of friendship (amity) with (to) [an] affinity (or relationship), and put (placed) in the place of sameness (equality, likeness, resemblance or similarity) (equivalence, alikeness, identicalness (identical nature, identity), uniformity, parity) (*Gleichheit*) (*ὁμοιότης*)(,) (the) same (equal or like) cast of mind (mindset or mentality) (way of thinking, conviction, view, attitude) [or concord (i.e. like or similar thinking)] (*die gleiche Gesinnung*) (*ὁμοοφροσύνη*), which obviously (apparently, evidently, manifestly) (also) concerns the content of (mutual, bilateral) (self-)interest (on both sides) (see. Fr. 107 and 186, in Diels-Kranz, II, pp. 164, 183). The argument(ation) (reasoning) of ancient rhetoric is marked (ruled, governed, conditioned) (found) (stands) (under the sign (influence)) in many ways (cases) (many times, frequently) by (of) the utilitarian Common Sense (common sense) of everyday (daily) life (routine) (humans (people, men) need one another etc.), see(,) in relation to that(,) Fraisee, *Philia*, p. 107ff..

⁷⁹ In relation to (Regarding) that, Dirlmeier, *ΦΙΛΟΣ*, esp. pp. 29ff., 42ff..

For (Regarding, In respect of (relation to)) the dissemination (spreading) of the mediating (or intermediary) (intervening, interceding, intermediate) perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions), one can first (of all) remark (comment, observe, notice, note, mark) that they correspond to (with) a collective and individual need determined (conditioned) by the ambivalent nature (essence, substance or texture) (being) of human culture (sie einem kollektiven und individuellen, durch das ambivalente Wesen menschlicher Kultur bedingten Bedürfnis entspricht), fusing (merging, blending, amalgamating, uniting, melting together) “utilitarian” or “ego(t)istical” points of view with “ethical” and “altruistic” [points of view] up to [the point of] unrecognisableness (indecipherability) (i.e. beyond recognition) (bis zur Unkenntlichkeit), with the consequence (result, outcome, upshot, effect) that the available room to move (leeway, latitude, scope, unfolding space) of (for) action (der verfügbare Spielraum des Handelns) in (towards) all directions is extended (expanded, widened, broadened)(,) and moreover (in addition, furthermore) movement (motion) thereafter (thereupon, in relation (regarding, with regard) to (on) that) becomes more flexible; a determination (i.e. definition) (fixing, designation) of friendship on the basis of “reciprocity (or mutuality)” or of “reciprocal (mutual) assistance (help, aid)” („gegenseitigen Hilfeleistung“) offers (provides, gives, grants, presents) e.g. a useful (practicable, viable, handy) – and elegant – way out of the dilemma between the, in practice, not precisely very (much) (ever) promising expectation [that] friendship is to be attained (reached, achieved, accomplished, arrived at) through virtue (goodness, morality; Tugend), and the socially compromising open confession of faith (affirmation) in (of) (the) ego(t)istical calculation of interests (Interessenkalkül) as the sole (only) reason (ground, basis) for seeking

(looking (searching) for) friends⁸⁰. However, not only is the logic of the mediating (or intermediary) (intervening, interceding, intermediate) positions (vermittelnden Positionen) social-ontologically interesting. The ethical founding (establishment, justification, substantiation) of friendship(,) as well as the criterion of equality (sameness or likeness) (equality or sameness criterion) (Gleichheitskriterium), from the beginning (start, outset) ran (bumped) into (encountered, met with, came across) no(t) less (slighter, fewer) instructive (educational, informative) difficulties (troubles). Thus (Hence, In this way, So)(,) it was (did) not entirely (completely, wholly) clear (obvious) (stand to reason, make sense) why (to (for) what [purpose, end]) someone, who has reached (attained, achieved, arrived at, accomplished) perfection (or completeness) (absoluteness; Vollkommenheit) through (by means (way) of) virtue, needs friends at all; according to (in accordance with) [the] ancient perception (view)(,) self-sufficiency (or contentedness) (modesty, an undemanding nature, frugality; Selbstgenügsamkeit) (autarchy) (Autarkie) indeed makes up (constitutes, forms, shapes, moulds, establishes, fashions) a constitutive feature (characteristic, attribute, trait) of genuine (real, true, authentic) perfection (or completeness)⁸¹. However, above all (especially) the exponents (representatives, advocates, supporters) of the ideal of friendship (amity) (friendship ideal) (Freundschaftsideals) had to vouch (assert) (stand by [the fact]) that it (i.e. the aforesaid perfection based on virtue) is a matter (issue, thing,

⁸⁰ (Also preferring this elegant way out, is) the otherwise unmistakably (or ostentatiously) (pointedly, demonstratively, markedly, exaggeratedly) illusionless (with no (free from) illusions) author of the *Pantschatantra* (II, § 35 = II, p. 164) (also prefers (favours, gives priority (preference) to) this elegant way out): “Amongst men (humans, people)(,) assistance (help, aid) (Hilfeleistung)(,)(;) in [respect of, regard to] game (i.e. wild animals hunted for food or sport) (deer, venison; Wild) and birds(,) instinct (der Instinct),(;) in [respect of, regard to] boys (and or morons (fools, simpletons, the witless)) (bei Thoren), as (the) good (men, people, humans) teach, fear (dread, fearfulness) and gain (profit, winnings, benefit, income)(,)(;) is the reason for (of) friendship (amity).”

⁸¹ Plato (has, had) himself, in an aporetic manner (way) (i.e. in a state of perplexity, puzzlement or doubt) (in aporetischer Weise), pointed out (drew attention to) this difficulty (brought this difficulty to our notice), *Lysis*, 215a; for the same difficulty in Aristotle(,) see Adkins, “Friendship”, p. 43ff.

affair, subject, cause, case) of (for) (the) few (people)⁸², that therefore its practical social relevance and hence (as a result) also its meaning (significance) for the theoretical understanding (appreciation) of the construction (structure, composition, building, setting up) of a society (is) hardly (barely) of any consequence (crucial) (counts, matters). The criterion of equality (sameness or likeness) (equality or sameness criterion) was, therefore, formulated with regard to (in view of) ethical, not social-ontological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) and aims (targets, objectives, goals, ends, purposes), especially since equality (sameness or likeness) was comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed, conceived, taken) one-dimensionally and one-sidedly (unilaterally), i.e. [it (equality)] was confined (restricted, limited) to (only) one (a) (sole, single, lone) property (quality or characteristic) of a single (unique) kind (sort, type) of man. The being virtue-like (i.e. virtuous) (moral) of the virtue-like (i.e. those who are virtuous (moral)) (The virtuousness of (the) virtuous [people]) [The being virtue-like (i.e. virtuous) of virtuous people] (Das Tugendhaftsein der Tugendhaften) of course remains itself the same, even if it is distributed (spread, apportioned, shared, divided up, handed out) among(st) (to) a number of (several, multiple, quite a few, various, diverse) individual bearers (carriers), however (then, in that case) these bearers do (are) not come into consideration (considered, a possibility) (out of the question) in [regard to, respect of] their individuality lying (being) on (their) this side of (their) being virtue-like (i.e. virtuous)(,) and the proof (evidence, verification, validation) of their equality (sameness or likeness) amongst (as between) one another takes place (occurs,

⁸² See e.g. Cicero, *Laelius de amicitia*, pp. 6, 22.

happens), as it were (so to speak), over their head(s) (i.e. without consulting them). When (As, Once) the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition of the ethically underpinned (substantiated, supported, corroborated) ideal of friendship, despite (in spite of, notwithstanding) [the] attempts at (of) [its] revival (resuscitation, resurrection) in the early New Times (Modern Era)⁸³(,) finally (in the end, eventually, after all, ultimately, lastly) perished (died out, ended, declined, sank) in (went under) the fire of the merciless (or relentless) (pitiless, unforgiving) psychology of the “moralistes” [“Moralists”], the question (problem) (also) regarding (in accordance with, in respect of, with regard to, about, concerning) equality (sameness or likeness) as [the] presupposition (precondition, prerequisite) of friendship had to be (also) posed (put, set) considerably (substantially, vastly) differently (too). A late, but concise (succinct, to the point, striking, telling, incisive) summary (synopsis) of this turn is found in Rivarol, who makes perfect (complete, absolute, total) friendship (amity) conditional (dependent) upon the existence (availability, presence) of “ideal circumstances (conditions, relations)” („idealer Verhältnisse“)(,) and in the course of this (into the bargain, with that, at the same time) emphatically (strongly, firmly) stresses (emphasises) that he wants to point to (emphasise, distinguish, differentiate, set apart, contrast, underline) [the] “circumstances” („Verhältnisse“) (relations [relations]) and not [the] “similarities (resemblances, likenesses, similitudes, affinities)” („Ähnlichkeiten“) (resemblances [resemblances, likenesses, similarities, similitudes]); [the, people who are] envious (jealous), desiring (addicted to) fame (praise) (or thirsting for glory) and impatient (Neidische, Ruhmsüchtige und Ungeduldige) indeed (in fact, of course) also resemble(d) (are, were) (similar to (like), take (took) after) one

⁸³ In the philosophy of the Renaissance (Renaissance philosophy), but also in Montaigne e.g., *Essais*, I, p. 28 («De l'amitié» [“Of [On] Friendship”]).

another (alike),(;) exactly because of that (on this account, hence, that is why) they could (can)(not)(,) however(,) enter into friendship (make friends) with one another. Rivarol(,) moreover(,) points out (refers to, indicates) the changing (variable, alternating) meaning (significance) of character for friendship in accordance (line) (commensurate, corresponding, according) with (to) (the) situation(s) (Situationen)⁸⁴.

The introduction of the variables “situation” and “circumstances (conditions or relations)” is no less pioneering (path(-)breaking, revolutionary, pointing of the way) than the relativisation of the criterion of “equality (sameness or likeness)” (and) or “similarity (resemblance, likeness)” through (by means (way) of) its application (use) also (with regard) to (the) [those who are] “bad (evil) (nasty, wicked) [ones, people]” (die „Bösen“), which(,) nevertheless (all the same)(,) appeared (seemed) invalid (illegitimate, impermissible, inadmissible, undue, improper, excessive, illegal) to Plato and Aristotle. One gains (wins, obtains) therefore the starting point (point of departure) of (for) fertile (fruitful, productive) thoughts (considerations, deliberations, reflections) in (with) [regard to (a)] social-ontological purpose (aim, intent(ion), view) only when (if) one disregards (ignores, leaves out of consideration, pays no attention to) ethical points of view (standpoints, angles, aspects, considerations). Inside of (Within) the total [conceptually a priori and independent of sensory experience, according to Kant] entirety (or totality) (universality) (der totalen Allheit) of the [those who are] not (non-)virtue-like (i.e. virtuous) and not (non-)perfect (complete, absolute), that is, of the [those who are] “unsteady (erratic, changeable, fickle, inconstant, unstable, unsettled, volatile, impermanent, uncertain, fitful)” („Unbeständige“), the equality (equalities or samenesses)

⁸⁴ *Sur l'amitié*, p. 312.

(likenesses) or similarities (resemblances, likenesses) amongst (between) humans (men, people) must likewise (also) be unsteady and relative; precisely in this (their) unsteadiness and relativity (of theirs) [of the said equalities (or samenesses) or similarities], which(,) by the way (incidentally)(,) allows (admits, authorises, approves, permits) their interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect; Wechselwirkung) with “circumstances (conditions or relations)” and “situations”, they [the said equality (equalities or samenesses) or similarities] can possibly (potentially, perhaps) constitute (provide, grant, afford, produce, make, create, emit) a factor [in respect] of (for) [the] friendly or inimical shaping (moulding, forming, structuring, arrangement, designing, creation, composition, layout; Gestaltung) of human relations. In view of (Given) the unique (singular) personality of every human (man, person), equality (sameness) or similarity can apply (extend) to (concern) only an aspect or at (the) most (best) (to) some (a few, several) traits (attributes, characteristics) of character (character traits). That is why it (they) [equality (sameness) or similarity] must be ascertained (investigated, traced, estimated, established, detected, determined, found out, discovered, identified) via particularising and specifying questions (i.e. questions which particularise and specify what is being ascertained), which concern (affect) its (their) [equality or similarity’s] class (category; Klasse) (sex (or “gender”) (Geschlecht), vocation (calling, occupation, profession; Beruf), social situation (position, circumstances; Lage), education (learning, erudition, culture, formation, shaping, development; Bildung), values (Werte), etc.), its (their) extent (degree, magnitude, scale, dimensions; Ausmaß) and its (their) meaning (significance, importance) for the actors [in question]⁸⁵.

⁸⁵ Cf. Kon, *Freundschaft*, p. 93.

However, because of (through) that (thereby, in this way, as a result)(,) the problem (or task) (exercise) by far is still not solved. Because the inventorying (or itemisation) (stocktaking; Inventarisierung) of more or less strong (robust, stark, profound, broad) similarities (resemblances, likenesses, similitudes, affinities) essentially (basically, fundamentally) remains (stays) a static undertaking (enterprise)(,) which hardly does justice to (lives up to, fulfils) the dynamics and multi-dimensionality of a friendly (amicable) (or inimical (hostile, antagonistic)) relation. Similarities (resemblances, likenesses, similitudes, affinities) or dissimilarities (unlikenesses, dissimilitudes, unaffinities, differences) (Ähnlichkeiten oder Unähnlichkeiten) may (can, might, are capable)(,) in the very first phases (stages) of a relation(,) call forth (cause, give rise to, provoke, create, elicit, arouse, induce) favourable (advantageous, propitious, auspicious, opportune, convenient) or unfavourable (disadvantageous, unpropitious, inauspicious, inopportune, inconvenient) impressions and dispositions, nonetheless (however, nevertheless, all the same)(,) in the course of the deepening (heightening) and extension (or expansion) (broadening, widening, enlargement) of the relation they [the said similarities or dissimilarities] lose their independent (self-sufficient, self-supporting) influence, i.e. they maintain (keep, retain) their influence only in so far (as much) as ((to the extent) that) they suit (match, go with, fit) (are suitable for) the logic and dynamic(s)(,) which the relation has developed (unfolded) in the meantime (meanwhile). [Just] as it is simply (plainly, completely) false (wrong, incorrect, untrue, bogus) to deduce (derive, infer) solidarity from similarity and alienation (or estrangement) from difference (Solidarität aus Ähnlichkeit und Entfremdung aus Difference abzuleiten)⁸⁶, so [too] it is at least one-sided to deny (gainsay,

⁸⁶ Thus (So, In this way), e.g. Torrance, *Estrangement*, esp. p. 119ff.. Tönnies and Durkheim's attempt to describe two different kinds (sorts, types) of solidarity, one of which is based (rests) on similarity,

negate) the effect (impact, influence) of similarity and dissimilarity in a relation (die Wirkung von Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit in einer Beziehung) only because the role of conditions (circumstances or relations) of dependency (dependency conditions (circumstances or relations)) (Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse) is regarded as (considered (to be)) the lone (only, sole) decisive (deciding, crucial, critical) [role, one]⁸⁷. The process (event, occurrence), in (during) which that effect (impact, influence) [of similarity and dissimilarity in a relation] can fade (slip, die, waste) (away) (dwindle, wane, drop off, recede, retreat, disappear, vanish, diminish, shrink, evanesce, atrophy, fail), encompasses (includes, contains, comprises, consists of, embraces, covers)(,) apart (aside) from (except for) the formation (or development) of dependencies – and regardless (irrespective) of whether similarities come into being (arise, emerge, originate, result, ensue, are created (produced)) or not – a series of other factors, which must (have to) be considered (taken into consideration (account), borne in mind) separately, as much as (no matter how much) they [this series of other factors] go (or fit) into (find a place in, enter, are adopted (taken up) by) [the] conditions (circumstances or relations) of dependency (dependency conditions (circumstances or relations)) or even (in fact) cause (give rise to, occasion, bring about (on), provoke, spark, generate) such [conditions of dependency]. In addition to (Apart from, Besides) the kind (sort, type, way, manner) of interaction (Neben der Art von Interaktion), the self-understanding of the subject, his (its) understanding of the other (Other) [person, of others (people)] as well as his expectations of the other (Other) [person, of others (people)]

the other however on difference, fails (founders, breaks down)(,) for its part(,) in [respect of, regard to] the fact that both kinds of solidarity in reality are characterised (marked, labelled, identified) by a functioning combination (eine funktionierende Kombination) of similarities and differences(,) and that the social actors' perceptions (views or notions) (representations, ideas) on (about, regarding, over) similarity and difference by no means coincide with those of the aforementioned theoreticians (theorists); see Sorokin, *Society*, pp. 133, 143ff..

⁸⁷ Thus, Lewin, *Lösung*, p. 128, cf. p. 114ff..

in relation to (regarding) himself (as far as his self is concerned)(,) come into (are a) consideration (possibility) (are considered) here⁸⁸.

The broadly (widely, extensively) apprehended (grasped, understood, taken, framed, expressed, set) question (problem, issue) of identity (identity question) (die weit gefaßte Identitätsfrage) is therefore posed (put, set) anew, and only (the) insight into (understanding (knowledge) of) the plastic (malleable) essence (or nature) (being, substance, character) and behaviour (conduct) of identity inside of (within) social interaction (und erst die Einsicht in das plastische Wesen und Verhalten der Identität innerhalb der sozialen Interaktion) allows (lets) the fundamental (in principle) meaninglessness (senselessness, futility, pointlessness, purposelessness, uselessness) of the attempt at understanding friendship and enmity [starting] from (out of) the similarity or dissimilarity of (the) actors to be discerned (recognised, identified, perceived, spotted, realised, understood, known). It [Such an attempt] is based (founded) on the notion (perception, idea, concept(ion), representation) [that] these actors would be (are) bearers (carriers, vehicles) of more or less objectively existing (present, existent, available) and ascertainable (detectable, establishable, discoverable, discernible) similarities and dissimilarities, which likewise (also) entail objective effects (impacts, influences) and consequently map (trace, work) out (prescribe or specify) their [the more or less objectively existing and ascertainable similarities and dissimilarities entailing these effects'] course [in respect] of the relation. But even if this holds true (is correct (the case, true, accurate, confirmed), applies), it is only of secondary (subordinate, subsidiary, minor, lesser) importance (significance, meaning). The approaching one another (or drawing near) of two subjects

⁸⁸ Murstein, "Critique", p. 14..

does (is) not in the least take root (set itself up, establish (found) itself) (based, founded) in (on) the (bilateral, mutual, reciprocal) comparison (by (on) both sides) of two ready (or mature) (finished, qualified) and definitive (conclusive, final) characters (character sketches, personalities) (fertiger und endgültiger Charakterbilder) with each other for the finding (searching, seeking, sounding, sifting, picking) out (discovering, tracing, determining) of similarities and dissimilarities, which (are) (should) then (supposed, meant) to direct (guide, steer, lead) practical behaviour (conduct). Rather, identity adapts (adjusts) itself to every new relation anew and dynamically, i.e. it [identity] binds (ties, unites, connects, links) its decision to appear (show itself to be) unyielding (or inflexible) (intransigent, uncompromising, intransigent, unrelenting, unbending, unaccommodating, adamant, immovable, unflinching, hardline) or flexible, to emphasise (give prominence to, underline, bring out) commonalities (common ground) or differences (Gemeinsamkeiten oder Differenzen), to (with) the evaluation (judgement, assessment) of existing (present, available) possibilities [in (order)] (to) find(ing) (meet with, encounter, receive, locate, hit upon, discover) partial or full recognition (acknowledgement, appreciation, acceptance, approval) (partielle oder volle Anerkennung), that is, to [in] be[ing] able to partially or fully (completely) push (carry) through (i.e. achieve or succeed in) its material or ideational aims (or goals) (targets, ends, objectives, purposes), without or against resistance (opposition); in the course of this (process) (at the same time, into the bargain)(,) it [identity] can – it does not have to [do] (it) – define its aims (or goals) and its essence (or nature) (being, substance, character) anew, if (when) it expects (hopes for) from this rearrangement (reordering, rearranging, changing around, switch(-)over, changeover, adjustment; Umstellung) greater recognition, and even if only at the lower (inferior) tier (or level) (grade, stage, phase) of a

relationship of dependency (und sei es nur auf der niedrigeren Stufe eines Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses). The spectrum of options (or choices) (selections) (Das Spektrum der Optionen), of aggressive or defensive attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views) (der aggressiven oder defensiven Einstellungen)(,) is broad (wide, massive, large), and there is no rule here, which (would) is (be) valid (in force) (apply to) and (be, is) binding (compulsory, obligatory) for all identities. Against the background (backdrop) of this option (or choice)(,) the question (problem, issue) of similarity or dissimilarity (Ähnlichkeit oder Unähnlichkeit) is decided (determined, adjudicated) with regard to (regarding, concerning) the Other (other [identity, person, human, man, subject]) (hinsichtlich des Anderen) – and it [this question] is decided without (with no) consideration for (regardless of) any inventory put forward (up) (proposed, advanced, formulated, drawn (set) up, made (up), laid down, installed, arranged, erected, deployed, constituted) in advance (beforehand) (ohne Rücksicht auf irgendein im voraus aufgestelltes Inventar). Similarity and dissimilarity, commonality (common ground) and difference (Gemeinsamkeit und Differenz)(,) do not exist abstractly (in the abstract) and isolatedly (in an isolated manner), and they are also not looked at (considered, contemplated, observed, viewed, examined, inspected) abstractly and isolatedly, but always in relation (or with reference) to an Other (i.e. another person, other persons or group) (in bezug auf einen Anderen), i.e. in accordance with (according (corresponding) to) the friendly (amicable) or inimical (hostile, antagonistic) turn(,) which the relation takes vis-à-vis (towards, regarding, in relation to) him (them or it). If both sides share the feeling (sense) that they must consolidate (strengthen, cement, solidify, stabilise, secure) their friendship by means of (through, with) reference to the similarities of their essence (or nature) (being, substance, character), then

(so, thus, in this way) they will emphasise (give prominence to, underline) or exaggerate (overstate, overdo) [the] actually (really) existing (present, available) [similarities] and(,) if need be (necessary) (in case of need)(,) invent (devise, fabricate, make up, concoct) or create (make, establish) [similarities] not existing; conversely (contrariwise, vice versa, the other way around)(,) foes (enemies) will withhold (hide or hush up) (conceal, keep as a secret) or deny (gainsay, disaffirm, negate, renounce, forswear) actually existing similarities between them(,) and will bring about (on) (create, provoke) differences. Friendship can (is able to, may) tend, in relation to (regarding) that, to(wards) ignore (ignoring) (disregard(ing)) or overlook(ing) (miss(ing), neglect(ing)) dissimilarities,(;) on the other hand, objective similarities are for it [friendship] (constitutively) [of] so [such] little important [importance] (constitutively)(,) that the only (sole, lone, single) common denominator of a friendship, even of a [friendship] (tried and) (well-)tested (proven, established, put to the test, effective) in practice, can be (the) enmity against a third [party (person, side, thing, entity, group)] (die Feindschaft gegen einen Dritten). In general, similarities and commonalities (common ground) are asserted (formulated as demands, in force, underlined, defended) (dominate) on (by) both sides only (then) when (if) every individual side expects (anticipates, awaits) from them a confirmation (affirmation, acknowledgement, validation, corroboration, endorsement, recognition, verification) of one's own identity (eine Bestätigung der eigenen Identität erwartet); [the] one-sided (unilateral) stress(ing) (emphasis, accentuation) of (on) similarities and commonalities serves aggressive or defensive goals (ends) (purposes; Zwecken) (i.e. either the superior [side, party, individual or group] (der Überlegene) legitimises (justifies) thereby (in this way, by this means, through (because of) that) his (its, their) right to put (set) aside (i.e. abolish) (remove, sideline, do

away with, eliminate, get rid of) the independence (autonomy, freedom, self-sufficiency; Unabhängigkeit) or difference of the inferior [side, party, individual or group] (bzw. Differenz des Unterlegen), or(,) the inferior [side, party, individual or group] thereby (through (because of) that) reminds the superior of his (its) duties (obligations, responsibilities)(,) when he (it) behaves (acts) “like (as) a stranger (alien or foreigner)” to this [inferior (side, party, individual or group)]. The element (part, component, unit, cell) (Das Element), in (on) which similarity is supposed (meant) to (should) take root (set itself up, establish (found) itself) (be) (based, founded) on each and every respective occasion, is (then) again assessed (estimated, evaluated, judged, rated) in principle bearing in mind (mindful of) its [similarity’s] great (large) or small effect(s) (impact(s), influence(s); Wirkungen) on the question (problem) of recognition (acknowledgement, appreciation, acceptance, approval) (recognition question; Anerkennungsfrage); A shares with B central and, on both sides (mutually) found to be (felt (seen) as) important, ethical and world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) convictions ((firm) beliefs),(;) nevertheless, he [A] cannot be his [B’s] friend(,) since he knows that B regards (considers, holds) him (as, to be) a(n) ridiculous (laughable, absurd, comical, trivial) person. (The) frequent pointing out (indication) of (reference (allusion) to) objectively existing similarities between foes as [the, a] justification (rationale, substantiation, founding, establishment) for (of) the recommendation to them to bury the hatchet [and become friends] overlooks (misses, goes past, passes by) therefore the reasons for (of) enmity(,) and unintentionally (involuntarily, inadvertently, unwillingly) proves (demonstrates, establishes) that friendship and enmity hardly (barely, scarcely) depend on such things (that sort of thing). A minimum of similarities and commonalities between foes (enemies) appears to be (seems), incidentally (by the way),

indispensable (essential, necessary), since the totally alien (strange or foreign) is simply unimaginable (inconceivable, unheard-of, unthinkable) and hence (therefore) uninteresting (of no interest, irrelevant, unattractive, uninspiring); that is why the [a] mixture (mix(ing), blending, combination, assortment) of similarity and difference (or discrepancy) (Ähnlichkeit und Differenz) characterises (marks) enmity no less than other social relations⁸⁹. Against the (a) background (backdrop) of [the, a] (widest-ranging, utmost) commonality(, as far as possible, to the greatest possible extent,) of qualities, one (a) single (lone, solitary) difference (or variance) (distinction, differential, variation) (Unterschied) can, by the way, when (if) (enmity) (it) has come (about) (occurred, happened, taken place) (to enmity) anyhow (anyway, at any rate), (stand out, attract attention, be seen, get noticed) (be noticeable (noticed, conspicuous)) and disturbing (perturbing, disruptive, interrupting) (get (be) in the way, spoil (the effect), disturb, interrupt, bother, obstruct) even more than [is] otherwise usual, so that it [the said difference] attracts the entire (complete, whole, total, full) attention of the [sides] (those) concerned (sides (parties, people, individuals or groups) in question) and correspondingly (commensurately) blows (swells, billows, bellies, puffs) up (out) (i.e. becomes magnified or exaggerated)⁹⁰. If recognition in the desired (desirable, welcome, wished-for) form is lacking (missing) (absent) or is lost (dropped, eclipsed, inapplicable) (does not apply, vanishes), then (so, thus) (the) great (large) similarities contribute to the heightening (aggravation or intensification) (strengthening, sharpening, tightening) of (increase in) conflict (familial (family) [conflict (of

⁸⁹ According to (In accordance with) a(n) observation (comment, remark) by Cooley, *Human Nature*, p. 267ff..

⁹⁰ Cf. Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 205ff., 511ff..

families)] and civil war) (zur Verschärfung des Konflikts ... (Familien- und Bürgerkrieg)).

In another place (locus) (Elsewhere)(,) we (have) explained (went into, tackled, grappled (dealt) with, set out) [the fact] that(,) and why(,) the ideational aspect of the enmity of two subjects vis-à-vis (against) each other necessarily (must, has to) make(s) up (constitute(s)) an ensemble (i.e. whole) of (jointly, commonly, mutually, collectively) divided (in common) (i.e. shared) thought (intellectual) structures (structures of thought) and opposed (contrary or conflicting) (opposing, contrasting, antithetical, different) content(s) (der ideelle Aspekt der Feindschaft zweier Subjekte gegeneinander ein Ensemble von gemeinsam geteilten Denkstrukturen und gegensätzlichen Inhalten ausmachen muß)⁹¹. In the field (area, sector, domain, realm) of action(,) common aims (or goals) (targets, ends, objectives, purposes; Ziele) guarantee (vouch for, assure) friendship just as little as similarity of character (personality) traits (characteristics) or form-related (i.e. formal) commonalities in the way (manner, mode) of thinking (thought); they of course do not constitute any sufficient (adequate) ground (i.e. reason) for friendship (Auf dem Gebiet des Handelns bürgen gemeinsame Ziele ebensowenig für Freundschaft wie die Ähnlichkeit von Charakterzügen oder formale Gemeinsamkeiten in der Denkweise; sie bilden freilich auch keinen zureichenden Grund für Feindschaft). Common (i.e. mutual) (joint, collective) hate (hatred) for a subject or [an] object can bring (call, form, create, originate, start) friendship (into being, to life), and conversely (vice versa, the other way around), common (i.e. mutual) love for a subject or [an] object can generate (spawn, beget, engender, produce, cause, bring about, give rise to, manufacture, breed, make) enmity

⁹¹ Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, pp. 67ff., 71ff..

between two sides(,) when (if) each of them wants to have the beloved (much-loved, dear) subject or object exclusively for itself. Not otherwise (No different) is the case (it ordered (summoned)) (are things) regarding (concerning, with regard to) common (mutual, joint) practical aims (or goals) (targets, ends, objectives, purposes) (um die gemeinsame praktischen Ziele). Commonality (Common ground, Mutuality; Gemeinsamkeit) brings about (or establishes) (causes, founds, provides, donates, endows) friendship here when (if) the aim (or goal) (das Ziel) is supposed (meant) to (should) be imposed (pushed (carried) through or asserted) (prevail) against a third [party, side, individual or group] or demanded from a third [party]; it [commonality] very likely (probably) sows enmity when (if) the attaining (achieving, reaching, achievement, accomplishing, arriving at) of the [a] common (mutual, joint) aim (or goal) by the one side makes its [this aim's] attaining by the other [side] either impossible or else worthless (valueless). That is why friendship does (is) not result (derive, arise, emanate) (created) from (out of) the commonality (mutuality) of the setting of the (an) aim (or goal) (aim (or goal) setting) (objective, target; Zielsetzung) in itself, but from (out of) the agreement (understanding, arrangement, settlement; Übereinkunft) over (about, regarding, with regard to) which rank(ing) (position, place, standing, class, grade, tier) each (or every) side occupies (takes (up), has, earns) in (during) the pursuance (pursuit, tracking) of the common aim (or goal)(,) and what (which) advantages will be drawn (pulled) from (out of) its [the common aim's] realisation (implementation). If no agreement is reached (achieved, attained) in this regard, then (so, thus) exactly as a result (because) of (owing (due) to) the commonality of the aim (goal)(,) conflict will necessarily (must, has to) be heightened (increased or intensified) (aggravated, sharpened, strengthened)(,) and indeed for the (very) same reason for which the butcher does not become (fall out with)

the (foe (enemy) of) the fruiterer (fruit seller) opposite (across) [on the other side] (from him) [(of) the street], but (becomes) the [foe of the] butcher next door (aus demselben Grunde, aus dem der Metzger nicht mit dem Obsthändler gegenüber, sondern mit Metzger nebenan verfeindet ist)⁹². Friendship (Amity) and co-operation (Freundschaft und Kooperation) can of course also be built (made, constructed, erected) upon the commonality of (the) aims (goals),(;) however(,) this precisely proves (demonstrates, establishes, verifies, validates) that [what] matters [is] (it (all) depends) not (on) that commonality in itself, but (on) the kind (sort, type, way, manner, mode, fashion, style, nature) of social relation(,) which functions as [a] parameter in relation (regard) (with respect (regard)) to the element of the common (mutual, joint) aim (goal). Depending on whether the (both sides') common aim (goal) (of both sides) is attained (achieved, accomplished, reached, arrived at) without [the] going against (i.e. opposition, resistance or rejection) (aversion, reluctance; Widerstreben) of (the) one [side](,) or(,) by (the) one side at the expense (cost) of the other [side], different positions in the spectrum of the social relation are occupied (taken, filled). Provided(, into the bargain (in the process, at the same time),) that (As long as) it is a matter of (we are dealing with) enmity, in the course of its [(this) enmity's] unfolding (development) a change (transformation, transfiguration, changing) of (in) character appears (seems) (to be) possible. Conflict,

⁹² Hesiod already knew that: "The potter is the potter's foe and the bricklayer, the bricklayer's/The beggar is jealous (envious) of the beggar and the songster (singer, vocalist, bard, minstrel, poet) of the songster" (*Werke und Tage*, V. vv. 25-26; my (i.e. Kondylis's) translation [from Greek into German]) [cf. "And potter is angry with potter and craftsman with craftsman and beggar is jealous of beggar and minstrel of minstrel" (translated by Evelyn-White, Hugh G. (Hugh Gerard), 1884-1924); or, "Potter is potter's enemy, and craftsman is craftsman's rival; tramp is jealous of tramp, and singer of singer" (unknown translator)]. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorik*, 1388a. In a private letter to Michels, Max Weber formulated (phrased, worded, couched) the same thought (idea, concept, reflection, sentiment) as follows: "the greatest clash (conflict) of interests can go hand in hand with the complete (full, entire, total, absolute) identity (i.e. identicalness) of the forms of life (life forms) on both sides" („Der größte Interessengegensatz kann mit völliger Identität der beiderseitigen Lebensformen Hand in Hand gehen“) (cited (cit., qtd., quoted) [in, from] Michels, *Soziologie*, p. 324).

which came into being (arose, emerged, originated, resulted, ensued, was created (produced)) from (out of) the clash (conflict) of interests(,) despite (in spite of, during, in) in principle [the] same ratings (i.e. evaluations) (Wertungen), is then transformed (converted, transmuted, transubstantiated, transfigured) through (by means of) purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) (useful, effective, suitable, functional, convenient) rationalisations (zweckmäßige Rationalisierungen) into a genuine (real, true, authentic, veritable, bona fide) or artificial (synthetic, man-made, factious, simulated, fake), at any rate (in any case, anyhow, anyway) in practice, (motivating) value conflict (i.e. conflict of values) [pertaining to motivation] (in einen echten oder künstlichen, jedenfalls praktisch motivierenden Wertkonflikt)⁹³.

In the most direct – not necessarily (unconditionally) in the most probable (likely) – [way, manner](,) enmity comes into being (arises, emerges)(,) when (if) the value scale (i.e. scale of values) (Wertskala) approved of (seen positively, affirmed, accepted) by both sides jointly (together, in common, collectively) encourages [by virtue] of its content an in principle agonal (i.e. agonistic, conflictual or combative) (martial, war(-)like, bellicose, belligerent, contentious, polemical) attitude to life (agonale Lebenseinstellung), e.g. (the) martial (i.e. war((-)like)) [(i.e. war(-like))] (belligerent, bellicose) virtues (die kriegerischen Tugenden) are put (placed, set) completely on (at the) top (above) (are considered superior) [of (to) all other virtues]. In this case (instance)(,) the actors do not have to outwit (outsmart, outflank, outmanoeuvre, circumvent, trick) through rationalisations the dominant (dominating or ruling) (prevailing, prevalent) social ethic(s) (die Akteure nicht die herrschende soziale Ethik durch Rationalisierungen überlisten)(,) in order to legitimise and to

⁹³ Cf., in relation to that, McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 67.

practise enmity (hostility). Ethics and enmity can unconstrainedly (uninhibitedly, freely, casually, informally) accompany each other and seamlessly (smoothly, perfectly) pass (blend or turn) into (merge with) each other. Where a martial (i.e. war((-)like)) [(i.e. war(-like))] (belligerent, bellicose) ethic(s) (eine kriegerische Ethik) does not ensure (or take care of) (provide for, look after, worry about) that, other ethical views (perceptions, notions, ideas, approaches, opinions, conceptions, contemplations) (ethische Anschauungen) undertake (take on, adopt, accept, assume) the task (job, duty, function, purpose) of this mediation (intervention or agency) (intercession; Vermittlung) – even such [ethical views], which in principle disapprove of every enmity (hostility). The assumption (acceptance, adoption, supposition, approval) [that, of (the fact that)] friendship is connected (bound, tied, linked, joined) essentially (basically, fundamentally) with (to) a superior [moral attitude (stance, positioning)], [and] on the other hand (however)(,) enmity essentially with (to) an inferior moral attitude (positioning) (stance, approach, outlook, view, orientation) (moralischen Einstellung) or even quality (Qualität)(,) belongs, at any rate (in any case (event), anyway, anyhow, at all events), to the same group of often purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) (useful, effective, suitable, functional, convenient) misunderstandings like (as [in]) the in principle (fundamental) coupling (linking, association) of love or similarity with friendship and hate (hatred) or difference with enmity. Rightly (Justifiably, Justly)(,) a classical social-psychological typology of the kinds (sorts, types) of enmity (enmity types) (eine klassische sozialpsychologische Typologie der Feindschaftsarten) names, alongside (next to, beside) the elementary-animal (elementar-animalischen) [kind] and that (the) [kind] coming into being (arising, emerging) in the course of social interaction via the mechanisms of sympathy and imagination, as [the, a] third [kind (sort,

type)](,) (the) “rational or ethical” enmity (im Laufe der sozialen Interaktion über die Mechanismen von Sympathie und Imagination entstehenden als dritte die „rationale oder ethische“ Feindschaft), which shares the rest of the (i.e. the other) features (attributes, characteristics, traits) with the latter [kind (i.e. the kind coming into being in the course of social interaction via...)], but moreover (in addition, additionally) invokes (appeals (refers) to, calls on) justice (justness, equity, fairness) and conscience (Gerechtigkeit und Gewissen)⁹⁴. This invocation (appeal) can(,) in its (own) way(,) and on its own paths (ways, roads, routes, pathways), lead (guide (conduct, direct, drive) [us]) to the same absolute heightening (intensification, aggravation, sharpening, strengthening) of (increase in) inimical (hostile) opposition (or contrasting) (conflict, antithesis) like other forms of enmity as well (too). Because the summoning (mobilisation, usage, use, contingent, array, posse) of (appeal to) supra-[personal] or impersonal values (Denn das Aufgebot von über- bzw. unpersönlichen Werten), if (when) it does not serve (is not used) merely as [a, the] means of negotiation (negotiation (negotiatory, negotiating) means; Verhandlungsmittel) (“my price (cost, fee, charge) is high, because I must betray my values”), indicates that no reconciliation (conciliation, peace, appeasement, pacification) can come into question at [the, a] personal level, whereas (while) the readiness (or willingness) (preparedness) to die(,) if need be (necessary) (in case of need)(,) (not) for (not) [non-]personal interests is existent (present, available, existing) (exists). (The) [A] Good conscience, which (the) [an] ethically motivated altruistic commitment (effort or hard work) (use, action, operation, employment, deployment, mission; Einsatz) provides (supplies, furnishes, gets, obtains, gains, procures, makes possible), lowers (brings down,

⁹⁴ Cooley, *Human Nature*, p. 271.

lessens, decreases, cuts, reduces, sinks) the inhibition threshold (level) (senkt die Hemmschwelle) of extreme enmity, and the fact(,) ([which] has (having) the same effect,) that exactly to the extent (degree) that the [an] actor believes (thinks) [he is, in, of, about] thrusting (shoving, pushing, setting, moving) aside his [own] personal interests, he is assessing (assesses) the [his] foe (enemy) equally (likewise, also) as [the] impersonal representative of ethically and humanly reprehensible (abominable, condemnable, reprobate, vicious) principles or powers (forces)(,) and correspondingly impersonally, yet (but) all the more doggedly (determinedly, obstinately, grimly, steadfastly)(,) combats (battles) [him, the (said) foe (in question)](,) ([and that said fact] has the same effect (Effekt)). This kind (sort, type) of extreme enmity, whose reverse (other, flip) (side) is (the) likewise (also) extreme altruistic commitment (or effort) (use, action, operation, employment, hard work, deployment, mission) in favour of (for) values and friends, was of course (indeed) not legitimised by all philosophers and founders of (a) religion, but indeed (certainly, definitely, probably, very well) by all (hitherto, previous, former) political collectives (until today) in [the] form of the differentiation (distinction, difference) between private and public foe (enemy) (wurde zwar nicht von allen Philosophen und Religionsstiftern, wohl aber von allen bisherigen politischen Kollektiven in Form der Unterscheidung zwischen privatem und öffentlichem Feind legitimiert). Accordingly (According to that), mere subjective hate (hatred) does not define the foe of the political collective, but consideration of (regard for) the law (right) [defines (such a) (the political collective's) foe]⁹⁵; in the domain (realm, field area, sector) of manners, morals and customs (Sittlichkeit) the foe may (is allowed to), in Hegel's words, be only a foe

⁹⁵ Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, XVI.

of the folk (i.e. people) (masses, nation, hoi polloi, populace) (Volk), hate is “in(un)differentiated, free of (from) all personality” („indifferentiiert, von aller Persönlichkeit frei“) and “death goes into (enters) the General ([what is] general), because it comes out of (from) the General ([what is] general)” („der Tod geht ins Allgemeine hinein, weil er aus dem Allgemeinen kommt“)⁹⁶. It must be added that (the) privilege of declaring (proclaiming, announcing, professing, expounding) [an] enmity with full (complete, whole, total) ethical-political backing (support; Rückendeckung) is claimed (taken advantage of (up), enlisted) for themselves not only by already constituted polities (commonwealths, communities) through their established representatives (schon verfaßte Gemeinwesen durch ihre etablierten Vertreter), but also by groups, which have the opportunity (chance, prospect(s)) or simply the ambition to advance to the position (post) one day of (be promoted one day to) the established representatives of the polity (commonwealth) (e.g. [the] parties (or opponents) of (in) a civil war (civil war parties (factions))), or they appoint (employ, engage, hire, retain, commission, instruct, charge) themselves (entirely) on their own authority (without any authorization [from someone else or from some kind of (other) authority], high-handedly, of their own accord) (oder sich eigenmächtig beauftragen), to speak (talk) in the name of [the, a] greater collective [entity, polity], even [in the name] of the whole of (hu)mankind (humanity). In general (Generally), collective mobilisation and collective cohesion seem to need (require) “ethically” and “rationally” motivated enmity against disturbers of the peace (troublemakers (disruptive of the peace)) and renegades (apostates, defectors, deserters, seceders, turncoats) (Überhaupt scheinen kollektive Mobilisierung und kollektiver Zusammenhalt der „ethisch“

⁹⁶ *System der Sittlichkeit*, in: *Schriften zur Politik*, pp. 470, 471.

und „rational“ motivierten Feindschaft gegen Friedensstörer und Abtrünnige zu bedürfen): Aristotle already distinguished (differentiated) very perspicaciously (or astutely) (sagaciously, discriminatingly, subtly, penetratingly, perceptively, sharply, lucidly, incisively, shrewdly) between the irate (angry, furious, wrathful) enmity against certain (particular) persons and that enmity without anger (wrath, fury, rage), which applied to whole (entire, complete) genera (i.e. types) (kinds, sorts, classes, categories, species, genres) of socially harmful (damaging, detrimental, injurious, malign) individuals (e.g. thieves (burglars, pilferers, muggers, plunderers))⁹⁷.

There is not only an ethical-rational justification (and [conceptual] founding) (substantiation, establishment) of enmity (eine ethisch-rationale Begründung der Feindschaft), but also an enmity as ethical-rational praxis (i.e. practice). In (At) all times (ages, epochs, eras) and in all places(,) enmity was very often evaluated (assessed, judged, appraised measured) as an attitude (stance or positioning) (approach, outlook, view, orientation), which, far from necessarily (having to) entail(ing) the (down(-))fall (crash) (or lapse (lapsing)) [(down-)fall (or lapse)] of [the] reason ((good) sense) and [the] soul (psyche, (state of) mind, mental (emotional) state, heart) of man into blind passion (emotion, ardour, fervour, zeal) and ethical or practical irrationality (den Absturz von Vernunft und Seele des Menschen in die blinde Leidenschaft und die ethische oder praktische Irrationalität), could serve (be of use) for the formation (development or education) (cultivation, shaping, moulding, learning, erudition, culture; Bildung) of his [man's] personality and as touchstone of (for) this formation (development or education). For antiquity(,) it was understood of itself e.g. that an ethical man is not

⁹⁷ *Rhetorik*, 1382a 3-7.

someone(,) who has no foes (enemies), but someone(,) who appears (shows himself, comes out, turns up, is seen) (proves to be) “noble (magnanimous, aristocratic) and just (fair, righteous, equitable) and truthful (veracious, honest, true)” as foe vis-à-vis ([in regard] to) foe (sondern jemand, der sich als Feind dem Feind gegenüber „edel und gerecht und wahrhaftig“) zeigt⁹⁸. This applied (was valid) as [a] maxim just as much (equally) to (for) private as to (for) public enmities, nonetheless(,) the latter [public enmities] seemed, especially in (at) times of war, to be more suitable (appropriate, fit, apt, right) to promote (support, further, foster, encourage, nurse, improve, stimulate, sponsor, increase, aid) (in promoting) those practical virtues(,) which were in demand (asked for, requested, desirable) in (at) times of peace⁹⁹. A precursor (forerunner, predecessor) of modern sociology thought similarly (likewise), who not only was not capable of (could not) discern(ing) (see(ing), detect(ing), spot(ing), discover(ing), identify(ing), making out, recognising) any contradiction (inconsistency, opposition, objection, dissent) between enmity and the “most amiable qualities of our nature”, but above all(,) looked upon (regarded, considered, saw in) (the) collective enmity free of (from) personal malicious (despicable, spiteful) behaviour or vile deeds (acts) (vileness, malice, spite, despicableness, baseness, villainy) (Niederträchtigkeiten) as the birthplace of “passions of another sort”, i.e. “generosity” and “courage”¹⁰⁰. The ascertainment hit upon (made, reached) by modern social scientists [that] the dichotomy of friendship and enmity does not coincide with that of the intellectual

⁹⁸ Plutarch, Πῶς ἄν τις ἀπ’ ἐχθρῶν ὠφελοῖτο (de capienda ex inimicis utilitate) [how to profit (benefit, gain) from (by (reason of), on account of) one’s foes (enemies) (or, how (some)one benefited (benefits) from foes)], 91D.

⁹⁹ Aristotle, *Nikom. Ethik*, 1177b 6-7: “Practical virtues are activated (set up, started off) (get going (moving)) in political or martial (i.e. war((-)like)) [(i.e. war(-like))] (belligerent, bellicose) activities” („Die praktischen Tugenden aktivieren sich in den politischen oder den kriegerischen Tätigkeiten“) (my [i.e. Kondylis’s] translation). Cf. Platon, *Protagoras*, 322b (the art of war(fare) as part of politics (Kriegskunst als Teil der Politik)).

¹⁰⁰ Ferguson, *Essay*, I. 4, pp. 23ff., 24ff..

[sphere, dimension, element] and the emotional [sphere, dimension, element] (Die von modernen Sozialwissenschaftlern getroffene Feststellung, die Dichotomie von Freundschaft und Feindschaft falle nicht mit jener von Intellektuellem und Emotionalem zusammen)¹⁰¹, in actual (as a matter of) fact (actually, really) constitutes an age-old (ancient) knowledge (cognizance, cognition, understanding), which was formulated (phrased, worded, couched, expressed) in pragmatic(al) language (speech, discourse, talk) as [a(n)] request (call, invitation, demand, order, exhortation, challenge, appeal, call) for [a] more thorough (exhaustive, complete, profound, in-depth, painstaking, searching, methodical) self-knowledge (knowledge of self) and [a] greater willingness (readiness, preparedness) to learn in the face (view) of (given) [the, a(n)] inimical (hostile, antagonistic) challenge[s] (provocation[s], act[s] of defiance) (angesichts feindlicher Herausforderung). Plutarch by no means stood (was) alone (by himself) with [in] his conviction ((firm) belief) [that] foes (enemies) recognise (see, discern, detect, spot, identify, perceive, acknowledge) more clearly (lucidly) (clearer, with greater clarity) than friends our weaknesses (failings, frailties, deficiencies, shortcomings, weak points),(:) that is why they are more suited (suitable) (fitter) (better qualified) to urge (urging) (or drive (driving)) (propel, push) us (on) to vigilance (watchfulness, wakefulness, guardedness, alertness) and self-improvement (self-betterment)¹⁰². (In relation) to (Regarding, Vis-à-vis) the social-

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Thurnwald, „Probleme der Fremdheit“, p. 29.

¹⁰² Πῶς ἄν τις ... [How to/How (some)one ...], 87 B-D, 90 A. La Rochefoucauld was more emphatic: the foe judges us more correctly (rightly, properly, accurately) than we ourselves («nos ennemis approchent plus de la vérité dans les jugements qu'ils font de nous que nous n'approchons nous mêmes» [“our foes approach (are closer to) (the) truth in the judgements they make of us (more) than us [who] do not (we) approach (are [in the judgements we make, in respect] of) [it, truth] ourselves”), *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 458. On (Regarding, In relation to) the foe as [an] incentive (spur or motivation) (goad, prod, inducement, stimulation, stimulant; Ansporn)(,) see Halifax, “Miscellaneous Thoughts” (*Works*, p. 244): “Nothing could more contribute to make a man wise than to have always an enemy in his view.” More vividly (graphically, pictorially, visually, picturesquely) Saint-Exupéry: «Il te faut l'ennemi pour danser.» [“You need an enemy (foe) to dance.”] (*Citadelle*, p. 196ff.).

ontologically interesting commonplaces one can also count (number, rank, reckon) the just as widespread (widely held (read, disseminated)) pragmatic(al) (fundamental (basic)) principle that one should (is supposed (meant) to) (let (allow) oneself (to)) learn from (be instructed (taught, informed, enlightened, advised) by) the (one's) foe (enemy)¹⁰³. The same cool (cold, unemotional, emotionless, distant, dry, businesslike, calculating) end (goal) rationality (purposeful (expedient) rationality) (Dieselbe kühle Zweckrationalität), which knows how to draw (obtain) [a] benefit[s] (utility, profit or advantage) (use, usefulness, gain, avail; Nutzen) from the observation of the foe (enemy), is however needed (also) in practical dealings with him [the said (this) foe] (too). First(ly) (of all)(,) in [regard to] the choice (selection) of (the) friends and (the) foes on the basis of a realistic assessment (judgement, evaluation, rating) of their qualities (or characteristics) (properties, features, attributes, traits, capacities) and (cap)abilities (skills, faculties, competencies, aptitudes, capacities) (Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten): because it is often the same qualities (or characteristics) and (cap)abilities(,) which characterise (mark, denote, identify, label, describe, portray) the terrible (or frightful) (awful, dreadful, appalling, horrible, terrifying, fearful, horrendous) foe (enemy) and the precious (valuable) friend (die den schrecklichen Feind und den kostbaren Freund), even though (although, notwithstanding that) they are used (utilised, employed, applied) in opposite (opposed, opposing or conflicting) (contrasting, contrary, contradictory, inverse, reverse) directions (tendencies, schools (lines) of thought, trends, ways) as to aim (objective, target, goal, end, purpose) (obwohl sie mit

¹⁰³ Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, I, 15; Ovid: “fas est et ab hoste doceri” [“it is right (proper, permitted) (right it is) to be taught (learn,) even by (from) the (a(n)) enemy (foe)”] (*Metamorph.* 4, 428); Schiller: “The [My] (If the [my]) friend shows me what I can [do or know], the [my] foe (enemy) teaches me what I should [do or know]” („Zeigt mir den Freund, was ich kann, lehrt mich der Feind, was ich soll“) (*Epigramme*, „Freund und Feind“ (“Friend and Foe”)) Schiller, NA Bd. 1, p. 288.

entgegengesetzter Zielrichtung verwendet werden)¹⁰⁴. And then in [respect of] (during, with) (the) overcoming (surmounting, getting over) (of) (or coping (dealing, coming to terms) with) the foe in battle (combat, fighting, struggle), in which every gaining of the upper hand (predominance) over blind hate (hatred) and (over) recklessness (or daredevil(t)ry) (boldness, daring, bravado; Draufgängertums) at the expense (cost) of the sober (unemotional, clearheaded, dispassionate) judgement (evaluation, assessment) of the situation and (of) the forces of the other side (opposition, opponent, opposing party; Gegenseite)(,) can only provide (procure, obtain, get, supply, furnish) advantages (benefits)¹⁰⁵.

These comments (or observations) (remarks) do not imply an(y) idealisation of enmity (hostility) or every enmity. They [Such (The(se)) comments] only call to mind that ethics and rationality very often make up (constitute) an aspect of the relation between foes, just as in many other cases unrestrained (uninhibited, unimpeded, unhindered, unchecked) affectivity (affection, emotion(ality), feeling, sentiment(ality), affectuality) (ungehemmte Affektivität) can lead to inimical (hostile, antagonistic) action. But the situation (case) (things) is

¹⁰⁴ Thucydides (VI, 92, 5 [= «εἰ πολέμιός γε ὢν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἄν φίλος ὢν ἰκανῶς ὠφελοίην»]) puts the following “quoted (cited) by everyone word[s] (saying, expression, quotation)” into Alcibiades’s mouth: “if I(,) as [a(n)] foe (enemy)(,) have inflicted (caused, done) (upon, to) you great damage (harm, loss, injury, detriment), then (so, thus) I could (amply) benefit (be of great use to) you (abundantly, plentifully, copiously, richly, lavishly, bountifully) as a friend” („wenn ich als Feind euch sehr großen Schaden zugefügt habe, so könnte ich euch als Freund reichlich nützen“) (my [i.e. Kondylis’s] translation).

¹⁰⁵ Clausewitz (has) in exactly this sense described (portrayed, depicted) the substitution of the “inimical (hostile, antagonistic) feeling (sense, sentiment, sensation, impression, emotion)” („feindlichen Gefühls“) with (by) the end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) “inimical intention (purpose)” (zweckrationale „feindliche Absicht“) in war, see(,) in relation to (regarding) that(,) my comments (remarks, exposition) in *Theorie des Krieges (Theory of War)*, esp. pp. 29ff., 36ff.. The author of the *Pantschatantra* (has) also saw (seen) [things] correctly (rightly, properly, accurately) here: “whoever (he who)(,) not knowing (being acquainted with, realising) his own strength (power, force), nor that (the) [strength] of the foe, rushes (hurries, hastens) (in a) hot-headed(ly) (quick-tempered) (manner) (rashly, heatedly, passionately) into battle (combat), (he) goes under” (I, § 266 = I, 66).

no(t) different (otherwise) as regards (regarding) friendship (amity), which can just as much be (stand, find itself) under the influence (sign, cloak, aegis) of (i.e. influenced by) ethics and rationality as [the] affect(ively)(emotion(ally)-laden(load(ed), charged) blindness (or delusion) vis-à-vis situations and characters (affektgeladener Verblendung gegenüber Lagen und Charakteren). From (Out of) that we can only conclude (deduce, infer, derive) the neutrality of ethical and psychological factors (die Neutralität der ethischen und psychologischen Faktoren) with regard to (in view of) friendship and enmity, since all these factors can accompany (go together with)(,) in variable (varying) (changeable, mutable, shifting) mix(es)(ings)(tures) (blend(s)(ings) (assortments, combinations) and combinations (veränderlichen Mischungen und Kombinationen)(,) both inimical as well as friendly attitudes (stances or positionings) (approaches, outlooks, views). If a more or less precise (exact, accurate, true) correlation of feelings (senses, sentiments, impressions, emotions), drives (urges or impulses) (instincts), character (personal(ity)) traits (features) (characteristics) (eine mehr oder weniger genaue Korrelation von Gefühlen, Trieben, Charakterzügen) etc. with friendship and enmity could be reached (or managed) (attained, achieved) (succeed, be successful), then (so, thus, in this way) these [friendship and enmity] could be foreseen (anticipated, envisaged) and (be) reckoned (calculated, estimated, computed) in [regard to] their sequence (or course (order)) of events (i.e. course) (development, evolution, procedure; Ablauf). That(,) however(,) will never be made (done) (i.e. be feasible) [possible, attainable, obtainable] [happen], since (because) the social relation is never absorbed (assimilated, taken up) by (or never comes undone (gets wrapped (up) in)) that which the participants (those involved (participating)) in it [the said social relation]

feel or what they are as persons¹⁰⁶. [Just] like the one (him, someone), who stands (is) across (from) (opposite, face to face with) (faces) precisely (from) an attacking (assailing, assaulting, invasive, offensive) foe and must defend (stand up for, protect) himself (put up a fight, resist, beat off the foe) as best (much as) he can (far as it is possible)(,) the foe's motives(,) at least for the time being (present) (provisionally, tentatively, temporarily, in the interim, at the moment)(,) are indifferent¹⁰⁷, so too the social-ontological description (account, depiction, portrayal) of the spectrum of the social relation on [a] much broader (wider, more extensive) basis must disregard (refrain from [investigating, dealing with]) psychological and ethical questions (matters, issues) [in respect] of motivation – however with that (therefore, thereby, therewith, because of that)(,) [it, the said social-ontological description of the spectrum of the social relation on a very broad basis] also rejects (denies, strikes a blow against) the hope of making (rendering) the movements of actors inside of (within) this spectrum foreseeable (or predictable) and ponderable (calculable)(,) for instance(,) in the interest[s] of (the) permanent regulation (control, settlement) of conflict [conflict resolution] (so muß auch die sozialontologische Schilderung des Spektrums sozialer Beziehung auf viel breiterer Basis von psychologischen und ethischen Motivationsfragen absehen – damit aber der Hoffnung eine Absage erteilen, die Bewegungen der Akteure innerhalb dieses Spektrums etwa im Interesse permanenten Konfliktregelung vorhersehbar und berechenbar zu machen). Whoever (He who)(,) in relation to (regarding) that(,) collects (gathers, piles up, picks) recipes (or prescriptions) (cures,

¹⁰⁶ Watzlawick, *Kommunikation*, p. 145.

¹⁰⁷ “Dolus, an virtue, quis in hoste requirat? [“Deceit (Trickery, Fraud, Guile, Cunning, Stratagem), or valour (virtue, bravery, manliness, manhood, heroism, merit, strength, prowess, mettle, morality), who seeks (looks for, searches, asks, inquires, requires, demands, needs, desires, wants) [them] (in) [regard to] the foe (enemy)?”, or, “Who asks (will ask of a foe) whether (the foe) (he) was defeated (or succeeded) by strategy or valour?”], Vergil (Virgil), *Aeneis (Aeneid)*, II, v. 390.

remedies) and promises (pledges) (or hopes for) such progress (advances) from the reshaping (restructuring, reorganisation, remodelling) of certain (particular) variables in [regard to] circumstances (conditions) or characters, is wrong (mistaken) (deceiving (misleading, fooling) himself) (errs). Here, as everywhere (all over (the place)) in the social, there are only causalities, on the basis (with the help) of which one can explain [the] already having become (becoming) (i.e. events or happenings which have come to pass), [there are] no(t) laws(,) by means (way) of (through) whose handling (operation, implementation, use) one can predetermine (determine in advance, preordain, foreordain, predestine) all future cases (instances) (Wer dazu Rezepte sammelt und sich von der Umgestaltung bestimmter Variablen in den Umständen oder den Charakteren solche Fortschritte verspricht, täuscht sich. Hier, wie überall im Sozialen, gibt es nur Kausalitäten, an Hand derer man schon Geschehenes erklären, nicht Gesetze, durch deren Handhabung man alle künftigen Fälle vorherbestimmen kann).

3. (The) continuity in the spectrum of the social relation (social relation's spectrum) (Die Kontinuität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung)

A. [The] Meaning (Sense, Signification) and (the) aetiology of (the) continuity (Sinn und Ätiologie der Koninuität)

The polarity in the spectrum of the social relation does not exist merely (simply) at the (level of) (the) social-ontological (level of) description ((re)presentation, portrayal, account) as [the, a] contradistinction (contrast(ing), comparison) of [between] two ideal- [ideal types] or even archetypes, which indeed make (facilitate) understanding (comprehension, appreciation) (easier) and render (provide, give, afford, perform, achieve, manage, accomplish) good (orientation) services (of orientation) (serve orientation well), yet ultimately (in the end, finally) lack (do (are) without, spare, miss) tangible (concrete, solid) reality. On the contrary, it [the (said) (this) polarity (in the spectrum of the social relation)] is real in the full sense of the word; it is crystallised, namely, in acts (or actions) (actings), which are(,) for all humans (people, men) (everyone) without exception(,) recognisable (discernible, identifiable, observable, noticeable, perceivable, visible) as extreme expressions (or manifestations) (signs, demonstrations) of friendship or enmity (Die Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung existiert nicht bloß auf der sozialontologischen Darstellungsebene als Gegenüberstellung zweier Ideal- oder gar Archetypen, die das Verständnis zwar erleichtern und gute Orientierungsdienste leisten, doch letztlich der handfesten Realität entbehren. Im Gegenteil, sie ist real im vollen Sinne des Wortes; sie

kristallisiert sich nämlich in Handlungen, die für alle Menschen ohne Ausnahme als extreme Äußerungen von Freundschaft oder Feindschaft erkennbar sind). In this respect (As far as that is concerned)(,) it [the said polarity] does not belong to those «structures oppositionnelles» [“oppositional structures”], which are frequently (in many cases (ways)) regarded as the original (initial, primary, pristine, unspoilt) and permanent forms(,) inside of (within) which human thought (thinking) must move¹⁰⁸(,) and to(wards) whose guide (main (connecting) thread (theme), leitmotif, introduction, primer, basic course) it [the (this) polarity] is, incidentally (by the way), already (oriented) at (from, in) the earliest (i.e. youngest) age (oriented)¹⁰⁹. It [The polarity (in the social relation’s spectrum)] belongs just as little to the “binary oppositions” („binären Oppositionen“), which are supposed (meant) to (should) assist (aid, help) linguists in (for, towards) the classification of language (i.e. linguistic) (speech) features (characteristics)¹¹⁰, or to the antithetical pairs of concepts (notions) and (or) (of) principles (concept(ual) and principle pairs), which in their abstract clarity (clearness, lucidity) or evidence (i.e. evident nature or obviousness) (Klarheit oder Evidenz), above all (especially) however in their symbol-bearing (i.e. highly (heavily) symbolic) nature (deep symbolism) (in ihrer Symbolträchtigkeit), had (have) already constituted (provided, granted, afforded, produced, made, created, emitted) the basis (foundation) of (for) cosmological, religious etc. schematisations¹¹¹. Polarities or binary constructs like (such as) Male (Masculine, Manly, Mannish, Macho) – Female (Feminine, Womanly, Womanish), Holy (Sacred, Saintly, Hallowed, Blessed) – Profane

¹⁰⁸ See e.g. Blanche, *Structures intellectuelles*, esp. p. 15ff..

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. Wallon, *Les origines*, I, pp. 41, 67.

¹¹⁰ Jacobson-Halle, *Fundamentals*, p. 29ff..

¹¹¹ Lloyd, *Polarity*, esp. pp. 66, 80 (on (regarding, in relation to, over) the function of these polarities in the construction (building, erection, assembly, development) of ancient cosmologies(,) see esp. pp. 15ff., 94ff.); cf. R. Needham (ed.), *Right and Left*.

(Secular, Unhallowed, Mundane), Vowel (Vocal) – Consonant(,) divide (up) (share (out)) the entirety (totality, aggregate) of the (possible, eligible) phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) ((coming) in(to) question, worth considering, being a possibility) into two groups or classes(,) so that the sum(mation) (total) (aggregate) of the existing (available, present) quantities is absorbed (assimilated, taken up) by (totally wrapped up in) (or fits into) two qualities(,) for (with [regard to]) those who know the moderations (i.e. restraints) (mitigations, modifications)(,) of themselves(,) or mediations (interventions or agencies) (intercessions, interpositions) between one another(,) more likely (rather) as forms of degeneracy (degeneration) (Polaritäten oder binäre Konstrukte wie Männlich – Weiblich, Heiliges – Profanes, Vokal – Konsonant teilen die Gesamtheit der in Frage kommenden Erscheinungen in zwei Gruppen oder Klassen, so daß die Summe der vorhandenen Quantitäten in zwei Qualitäten bei denen aufgeht, die Mäßigungen von sich oder Vermittlungen zwischen einander eher als Entartungsformen kennen). On the other hand, the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation means [that there are] two accurately (precisely, exactly, strictly, absolutely, specifically) determinable (definable, assignable, quantifiable) phenomena, which quantitatively both inside (of) (within) the total (entire, whole, overall, aggregate, cumulative, gross) extent (scope or range) (compass, span, circumference, perimeter) of the spectrum(,) as well as with regard to (in view of) their statistical frequency (commonness, incidence, prevalence)(,) certainly (definitely) are not in themselves a small minority. Admittedly (Mind you), one can (also) talk (speak) of (about) friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) in a loose sense (too)(,) in order to, with that, comprehensively (extensively, fully, broadly, sweepingly) describe (denote, refer to, indicate, mark, label) both halves of the spectrum of the social relation (social relation's

spectrum). However, the polarity really comes into play (there) only where the mortality of man (man's mortality) is actualised in the killing (homicide) of the Other (another person, other people) or in self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself).

This widespread (widely held) loose (relaxed, casual) talk (speech) of (about, regarding) friendship and enmity, which can refer to very different (dissimilar, varying, diverse), extremely (exceedingly, supremely, intensely, awfully) turbulent (tempestuous, tumultuous, stormy, frenzied, passionate, rough, blustery, violent) or quite (rather, pretty, fairly) harmless (innocuous, innocent, inoffensive, unoffending) phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences), constitutes an excellent (outstanding) indication (sign) of (for, regarding) the fact that (the) consciousness (awareness) of socially (societally) living humans (people, men) imagines ((re)presents, shows, introduces) the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation in the [a] closest (tightest, narrowest, strictest) [possible] interrelation (connection, correlation) with (its) polarity (of it [the spectrum of the social relation]). And (this is) right(ly) so) (correct, justified). As [we have] said (mentioned, stated), it would be fundamentally (utterly, absolutely, completely) wrong (false, incorrect) to divide the human world in the same polarising sense into friends and foes, [just] as (like) one would could divide it for instance into male (masculine) and female (feminine) beings (or creatures) (natures, essences, entities, characters). On the other hand, the social relations(,) which lie (are (found)) between both (the) poles of the spectrum, do not act (or behave) in the least towards those [social relations](,) which characterise (mark, label, identify, denote) both the poles(,) as one could presume (suspect, expect, assume, suppose, imagine, guess, think) on the basis of the quantitative proportion (i.e. ratio) (analogy) between them.

The former [social relations between the spectrum's poles] are not, already because (on account, by reason) of (due (owing) to) their overwhelming (sweeping, phenomenal, awesome, breathtaking) quantity, autonomous in their structure and unfolding (or development), but the social-ontological quality of the latter [poles as the (polarity and) extremes of the social relation] more or less [to a greater or a lesser extent] penetrate(s) (pierce(s)) (or find(s) (force(s)) its (their) way (get(s), intrude(s), break(s), become(s) established) in(to)) their quality. In this respect (As far as that is concerned (goes)), (there can be no continuity) without the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation(, there can be no continuity) (Insofern kann es ohne die Polarität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung keine Kontinuität geben). However (But)(,) (the) polarity cannot, for its part, in itself constitute a(ny) [the] spectrum,(;) i.e. a social life(,) which would exclusively (solely, purely, only) revolve (rotate, spin, twist, turn) around both poles of the spectrum of the social relation, is not merely (only, simply) incompatible (inconsistent, irreconcilable, dissonant, incongruous, at variance) with (the) (hitherto, past, previous) experiences (practical (empirical) knowledge(s)) of the human race ((hu)mankind) (until today, up till now), but, as we (still) want (intend, wish, desire) to (shall) explain (explicate, expound, elucidate) (later) in this section, absolutely (quite, plainly, per se) inconceivable (unimaginable, unthinkable, unthought-of, incredible). The spectrum of the social relation must(,) accordingly (according to that, therefore, thus)(,) be comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed, conceived, taken) as a continuum of polarity and continuity (als ein Kontinuum von Polarität und Kontinuität), as the language (speech or linguistic) usage itself suggests, since it [the spectrum of the social relation as a continuum of polarity and continuity] under (amongst) "friendship" and "enmity", which in themselves point to (indicate, show)

a polarity, subsumes extremely (exceedingly, the most) varied (diverse, multifarious, manifold) social relations (äußerst vielfältige soziale Beziehungen subsumiert), which through (by means (way) of) their arrangement (order or formation) (set(get)(-)up, grouping, layout, structure, pattern, scheme, disposition, disposal; Anordnung) and their conceptual (notional) and objective (factual) (material, substantial, relevant, practical) transition (passage, crossing) to(wards) (into) one another(,) create (establish, make, achieve, accomplish, cause) a gapless (seamless or complete) (full, unbroken, watertight, perfect) continuity (eine lückenlose Kontinuität schaffen)¹¹². (But, Yet) The dominant (or prevailing) (dominating, ruling, prevalent) language (linguistic) usage(, however,) likewise (also, equally) hits upon (finds, meets, reaches, strikes) [says] the right thing [hits the bull's eye (mark, target, nail on the head)] when it names the objective (factual) reasons (die sachlichen Gründe) from (out of) which the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation must be apprehended (grasped, understood, comprehended, captured, recorded, registered, taken in) with regard to (in view of) its polarity. For the internal (inner) differentiation (distinction) of the concepts (notions) of “friendship” and “enmity”, so that they can stretch (extend) over (cover) (the) each [side's] (own) half of the spectrum and (be able to) cover both [halves] of the spectrum together in their entirety (totality, whole(ness), completeness), it [(the) dominant language (usage)] uses (makes use of)(,) namely(,) criteria(,) which appear (show themselves, emerge) in pure culture (i.e. in an unadulterated or pure form)

¹¹² Linguistically (In terms of language (speech), Verbally)(,) it [the situation, things] is [are] therefore exactly the same (similar) for (regarding) the terms “friendship” and “enmity” as with [regards] [vis-à-vis] “love” and “hate (hatred)”, in relation to which Voltaire remarked (noticed, observed, commented) quite (very) rightly (correctly): «On est obligé de désigner sous le nom général d'amour et de haine mille amours et mille haines toutes différentes.» [“One is obliged to designate under the general name of love and hatred (hate)(,) a (one) thousand [totally different] loves and a (one) thousand [totally different] hatreds [that (which) are] (all (totally, altogether, entirely, completely) different).”] (*Dictionnaire philosophique*, art. [article, entry, headword and related text] «Langues», in: *Oeuvres Complètes*, XIX, p. 564).

only at both poles of the spectrum (die in Reinkultur erst auf den beiden Polen des Spektrums in Erscheinung treten). Everyone knows and says that friendship is judged (rated, assessed, evaluated, gauged) according to (in accordance with) primarily (first (of all, and foremost), in the first place, pre-eminently, mainly, principally, chiefly) the presumed (supposed, assumed, suspected, expected, imagined) degree (grade, extent, size) of its unselfishness (selflessness, altruism)(,) and correspondingly is experienced (lived, gone through) or used (dealt with) (or implemented) (handled, used, managed, operated, practised) in dealing(s) (contact or relations) [with other(s) people]; that (this) would be incomprehensible (unintelligible) if (were) the borderline case of self-sacrifice for (in favour of) the [one's, a] friend did not have a hold on (or haunt) the [people's, one's] (not in the back of the [one's]) mind, – what(so)ever (no matter what) one holds (regards, considers, believes) [in respect] of [as, to be] its [self-sacrifice's] practical relevance on each and every respective occasion. And everyone knows and says it too, that [the] course (order (sequence) of events) and character [in respect] of enmity(,) to (in) [a] decisive (crucial, critical, deciding) extent (degree, measure)(,) are dependent on how(,) in the process (course of this) (at the same time, into the bargain)(,) ([one] deals with (treats, handles, uses)) violence (force; Gewalt), i.e. the possibility of killing [another, others] (homicide) (are dealt with (used)); with reference to the latter [case, how one deals with violence and the possibility of killing (another)], that is, to whether (if) someone is (or is not) someone's "death (i.e. mortal (deadly, bitter, implacable)) foe (enemy)" („Todfeind“) (or not), (whether (if) someone) "wishes [upon] him [another] [his] death" or not, enmities are commonly (generally) classified (classed) as (put into the category (class) of) harmless (innocuous, innocent, inoffensive) or serious (grave, sever, earnest, in earnest), transient (temporary, transitory, passing) or

insurmountable (invincible, insuperable, overwhelming). Even pacifists, who want to exclude (bar, preclude) the use (application, exercising, exercise, exertion) of force (violence) (Gewaltanwendung) from (the) competition (or rivalry) (Konkurrenz) amongst (between) humans (men, people) (and) or (else) substitute this [such] [(use of force and) violence] [it] all along (right) (down) the line (totally, completely) with (by, through) [a] sportsmanlike(sporting, sporty, athletic)-playful(playing, acting) contest (competition, emulation; Wettbewerb), likewise (also) argue (reason) with the borderline case of violent (forcible) killing (homicide) in mind; this [violent killing] remains the obligatory reference point (point of reference), no matter (regardless (irrespective) of) whether the annihilation (extermination, obliteration, destruction) of the foe or the eradication (wiping out) (extirpation, extermination) of (the) [what is] evil (bad) and (of) hate (hatred) is called (appealed) for (upon, to) (invoked, petitioned).

The objective (factual, material, relevant, practical, substantial) social-ontological insight [that] precisely the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation can be best apprehended (grasped) from (in) the perspective of the polarity of friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) (Die sachliche sozialontologische Einsicht, in der Perspektive der Polarität von Freundschaft und Feindschaft lasse sich gerade die Kontinuität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung am besten erfassen)(,) exhibits (shows, boasts, has, possesses, features) therefore (, that is,) the added (additional, further, extra, ancillary) advantage (merit) of belonging to the most familiar (or prevalent) (common) commonplaces (platitudes) of the social consciousness (awareness) of humans (people, men) or of the practical social knowledge of all times (ages, eras, epochs, periods) and lands (countries, states, territories, places, nations) (des

praktischen Sozialwissen aller Zeiten und Länder). (Scientifically, Academically) looked at (considered, contemplated, observed) (in a scholarly manner (way)) (From a scientific point of view) (Wissenschaftlich betrachtet), it [the said insight] offers (provides, affords, presents) the most comprehensive (extensive, complete, thorough, sweeping, encompassing) (fullest)(,) and at the same time(,) most flexible (pliable, pliant, adaptable, supple, variable), (in fact, indeed, yes) (actually, really, in actual fact, as a matter of fact, for that matter, in reality) the only conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) framework (context) of putting [things] in order (or of classification (categorisation)) (being put in order, inclusion, ordering, sorting, arrangement, filing) (classification framework) (Einordnungsrahmen) of all historically attested (witnessed) social relations between humans (men, people), which moreover has [with such classification framework moreover having] two incomparable methodical (i.e. methodological) advantages. One of them [such (these) (methodological) advantages] [(The) one (such advantage)] was hinted at (indicated, implied, suggested, insinuated, alluded to) in the previous [sub-]section(,) and consists in the possibility of carrying out (making, doing, constituting, forming, composing) the building (construction, setting up, structure, composition) of the spectrum of the social relation regardless (irrespective) of (notwithstanding, despite, in spite of) the motivation[s] or the anthropologically understood quality of the actors. If (this is) transferred (transmitted, assigned, passed on, conveyed) to the field (or domain) (area, sector, realm) of sociology and (of) history(,) (this) [it] means [that] the social and historical causal factors (Kausalfaktoren)(,) which the researcher on each and every respective occasion would like to (might) summon (mobilise) in order to explain the behaviour of the (possible) collective or individual subjects ((coming) in(to) question, worth considering, [under discussion

(examination, consideration)]), could equally (likewise) remain (or be) (stay) disregarded (ignored, not paid attention to (taken into consideration (account))), left out of consideration). The description (portrayal, account) of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity retains (keeps)(,) in other words(,) its validity (force) irrespective of whether at the apex (top, peak, vertex, tip, head, point, spike, spire) of each and every respective assumed (adopted, accepted) hierarchy of the factors causally having an (taking) effect (acting, working, operating) (being effective) in society and history are (stand [as]) “economic” or “(spiritual-)intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)” or “biological” causes (found) (Die Schilderung des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung in seiner Polarität und Kontinuität behält m. a. W. ihre Gültigkeit unabhängig davon, ob an der Spitze der jeweils angenommenen Hierarchie der in Gesellschaft und Geschichte kausal wirkenden Faktoren „ökonomische“ oder „geistige“ oder „biologische“ Ursachen stehen). It remains [the] task (or duty) (job, mission, assignment, function) of research (investigation, exploration, enquiry, inquiry) into (of, on) the concrete case (instance) (Aufgabe der Erforschung des konkreten Falles) to ascertain (find out, discover, determine, establish, investigate, look into), apart from (next to, beside(s), in addition to, along with) the motivation[s] of the actors, [the] effect (impact or influence) and hierarchy of such factors (Wirkung und Hierarchie solcher Faktoren). The other great advantage (merit) of the option (i.e. choice) (selection) in favour of (for, of) the arrangement (order or formation) (set(get)(-)up, grouping, layout, structure, pattern, scheme, disposition, disposal) of (the) social relations (die Anordnung der sozialen Beziehungen) around (i.e. between) (about, at, on) the axes of friendship and enmity (um die Achsen von Freundschaft und Feindschaft) lies in [the fact] that(,) in this way (thereby, through (because of) that, by this means)(,) the concept (notion) of society is concretised a limine

[from the beginning]. Society is, according to that (accordingly, thus, therefore), not the abstract sum(mation) (total) (aggregate) of social relations otherwise not (further) defined ([any] further, in greater (more) detail [precisely]), but it is co-extensive with the spectrum of the social relation in its equally original (initial) (or equiprimordial) polarity and continuity, in its constant (continuous, continual, permanent, perpetual, incessant, regular, persistent, chronic) changing (or alternation) (change, switching, rotation, transition, exchange) of the predominant (prevalent, prevailing) aspect in it [this (the said) spectrum (of the social relation)](,) and not and not least (last(ly), finally) (of all) in the incessant (continual, unceasing, unremitting, unrelenting) interchange (interchanging, exchange, replacement, substitution, swapping) of (the) (actors') places (positions, spaces, room(s), seats, sites) (of (the) actors) in it [this spectrum] (Gesellschaft ist demnach nicht die abstrakte Summe von ansonsten nicht näher definierten sozialen Beziehungen, sondern sie ist koextensiv mit dem Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung in seiner gleichursprünglichen Polarität und Kontinuität, im ständigen Wechsel des in ihm vorherrschenden Aspekts und nicht zuletzt im unablässigen Austausch der Plätze der Akteure in ihm). The co-extensity of (the) society with the spectrum of the social relation defined in this (such a) way (manner) (thus)(,) explains (declares, confirms, announces, illustrates, avows) the in principle (fundamental, basic, cardinal) openness (open nature (character)) of the historical movement (motion) of society (Die Koextensität der Gesellschaft mit dem derart definierten Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung erklärt die grundsätzliche Offenheit der geschichtlichen Bewegung der Gesellschaft). All attempts (efforts, experiments) or wishes (desires, wants) [with regard] to (at) channel(1)(ing) (steer(ing), guide, guiding, direct(ing), drive, driving) this movement (in)to certain (particular) paths (ways, directions, trajectories,

courses, lanes, tracks, routes), must (necessarily, have to) hence end up in (amount to) the attempt or the wish to pare (whittle) down (trim, prune, clip, crop, lop, cut) (i.e. curtail (restrict)) (beschneiden) the spectrum of the social relation to(wards) (in accordance with) this or that side(,) and with the lifting (i.e. abolition) (cancellation, breaking (calling) off, annulment, raising, repeal, quashing, reversal, revocation, removal, rescinding, dissolving, obviating; Aufhebung) of its [the (said) spectrum's] polarity as well as its continuity, to make (or establish) (create, manage, achieve, accomplish, pull off) [get] [that] [it (the spectrum)] [is] out of (from) the world (i.e. to make the spectrum vanish (disappear) from the world) at least by (in) [one] half (the scientifically (academically, scholarly) legitimate speculation (conjecture, guess(work), hypothesis, presumption, supposition, suspicion) over (about, regarding, on) the possible future social-historical shaping (forming, formation, moulding) of the spectrum is (stands) of course (naturally) another story (a completely different matter, on another page)). This can never succeed (be successful (managed)) because friendship and enmity occupy (fill, reserve) places (positions, loci) demonstrably separate(d) from one another only in the *social-ontological description (portrayal, account)* of the spectrum of the social relation. However, their [friendship and enmity's] bearers (carriers, vehicles), which are what matters (is important) in concreto [i.e. in a concrete sense; concretely; in the concrete or specific situation], have no (do not have a(ny)) fixed (stable or settled) (steady, firm, solid) social-historical place (position, locus; Ort),(;) [and] that is why they [friendship and enmity's bearers] cannot (are not able to) be unambiguously (unequivocally, clearly) pinpointed (located, localised) in (the) *social-historical reality*(,) in order (then) (so) that (then) [they] be fixed (established, settled, pinned down, set) in (tied to) their place (room, seat, square, site, position, locus; Platz)(,) or (be) distanced (or

removed) (become estranged) from it [their place](,) as wished (desired, wanted, required, planned) (according to one's wishes (desires) (plan), as one wants (wanted, wishes, desires)).

[The] latter remarks (and observations) (comments) allow one to already guess (divine) the reasons for (from, out of) which the social-ontological reconstruction of the spectrum of the social relation suggested (proposed, recommended, propounded, presented) here, despite its methodical (i.e. methodological) and objective (factual) (material, substantial, relevant, practical) advantages (merits) is not approved (of) (sanctioned, endorsed, welcomed, countenanced) by most [people, scholars, academics, social "scientists"]. One reads(,) in a nonsensical (absurd) manner (way) (nonsensically, absurdly)(,) the formula (or wording) (set phrase) "friend-foe-relation" (die Formel „Freund-Feind-Beziehung“) so (in such a way), as if it only contains (includes, embodies, features) the word "foe" – and the moral matter of concern (demand, desire, wish, longing, request, care, intention, purpose, end, goal, aim, objective) consists exactly in that the spectrum of the social relation (is (ought) to) (should, must) be shortened (i.e. curtailed or cut (back)) (reduced, truncated, abridged, reduced, pruned, cropped, clipped, pruned, cancelled; zu kürzen) around (or at) (about) [as regards] the [enmity's] pole or even (at, around, about) [with regard to] the [whole] half of enmity (enmity's half). But (However, Yet)(,) the cleansing (or purging) of the terminology and (of) the conceptuality for the purpose of (with a view to) [the] driving (edging) out (ousting, displacement, replacement, suppression) or influencing of realities is [a] pure conjuring trick (or wizardry) (conjunction, magic, sorcery, witchcraft, witchery, sleight-of-hand, hocus(-)pocus) (pure Zauberei) and pure animism. It does not change (alter) in the slightest the fact that since (from) time immemorial (the beginning (the dawn) of

time)(,) every day and (at) every hour [of (the) day (and night)]
 somewhere (someplace) in the world and out [because] of (from) a great
 variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) of motives(,) humans (people,
 men) die (perish, decease) by (means (way) of) (through, from) the hand
 of humans (human hands) (Menschen durch Menschenhand sterben)(,) and still (even) more humans (people, men) must reckon (count) (on,
 with) (expect) this possibility as perpetrators (culprits, offenders, actors,
 doers (i.e. killers), suspects) and as victims (sacrifice(s)). It is a matter
 (We are dealing) here of (with) a banality, not of (with) a surprising
 (unexpected) (sudden, astonishing) discovery or even a diabolic(al)
 (devilish, fiendish, evil, demonic, satanic) invention – not of (with) a
 thesis, which first must be proved (demonstrated, established, verified),
 but of (with) an incontrovertible (irrefutable, irrevocable, incontestable,
 axiomatic) fact, from which [we, it] must [be the] start[ing point] (nicht
 um eine These, die erst bewiesen, sondern um ein unumstößliches
 Faktum, von dem ausgegangen werden muß). Whoever (Anyone who)
 reacts to the ascertainment of this banality(,) like (such as) Pavlov’s
 conditioned dog (hound) by (whilst he) (wildly, savagely, ferociously,
 ferally) barking (baying) (barks) (wildly) at (upon) hearing the word
 “enmity”, (renders) (does, extends, bestows) no(t) (render) good service
 to (serve) the knowledge of (about, regarding) human things (i.e. affairs
 (matters, issues)) (well) (Wer auf die Feststellung dieser Banalität wie
 Pawlows konditionierter Hund reagiert, indem er beim Hören des Wortes
 „Feindschaft“ wild um sich bellt, erweist dem Wissen um die
 menschlichen Dinge keinen guten Dienst). Because the shortening
 (curtailment, reduction or cutting (down, short, back)) (narrowing,
 truncation, abridgement, cutback, excision, ending; Verkürzen) of the
 spectrum of the social relation around (about) (or at) the pole or around
 (or at) the half “enmity” would at the same (that) moment (instant, time)

[in the blink of an eye] rob (deprive) the pole or half “friendship” of every concrete *social* meaning (sense, signification) (Denn das Verkürzen des Spektrums der sozialen Beziehung um den Pol oder um die Hälfte „Feindschaft“ würde im selben Augenblick den Pol oder die Hälfte „Freundschaft“ jedes konkreten *sozialen* Sinnes berauben); “friendship” (*as* friendship) would simply(,) *as* friendship(,) have no specific character in a social world(,) in which enmity would be unknown (unfamiliar, unidentified, nameless) and even inconceivable (unthinkable, unimaginable, unthought-of). Friendship can thus (consequently, therefore) be safeguarded (made safe, protected, secured) social-ontologically only from the perspective of the polarity and the continuity of the spectrum of the social relation. The formula (or wording) (set phrase) “friend-foe-relation”, far from containing (including, embodying) only the concept (notion) “foe”(,) or (far) from pushing (putting) aside (rejecting, displacing, dislodging, removing) through (by means (way) of) the concept “foe”(,) the concept “friend”, highlights (emphasises, underlines, stresses, accentuates) the unity (unit, uniformity, whole, integrity, entity) of the social [dimension, sphere, realm, entity] (die Einheit des Sozialen) and consequently the (totally (entirely)) indispensable (and inseparable) (not-to-be-thought(imagined)-away) role of friendship inside of (within) this unity. Precisely from (out of) the proper (appropriate, objectively correct (precise, accurate, exact)) aetiology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation (follows, results, arises, does) the meaninglessness (or absurdity) of a way of looking at (consideration (contemplation) of) social life as [a] “war of all (everyone) against all (everyone)” (follow) (Gerade aus einer sachgerechten Ätiologie der Kontinuität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung ergibt sich die Sinnlosigkeit einer Betrachtung sozialen Lebens als „Krieg aller gegen alle“). On (About, Regarding) that, we

(still, yet) have quite a bit (something (a few things) [further], a fair amount) (more, still) to say [later] in this section.

Before we turn to that aetiology, three structural features (characteristics, attributes) (strukturelle Merkmale) must be discussed, whose common (joint) existence (presence, availability) in friendship and enmity constitutes (provides, grants, affords, produces, makes, creates, emits) the fundamental (basic, elementary, underlying) precondition (prerequisite) for the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation. As [the] first [structural feature](,) [we shall name, let] the reciprocal (mutual or bilateral) symmetry of its [the said continuity's] internal (inner, inward) structure (composition, make(-)up, (re)construction, building, erection, setting up) (is (will) (be) named) (Als erstes sei die wechselseitige Symmetrie ihres inneren Aufbaus genannt). As [we have] said, the terms "friendship" and "enmity" contain (include, embody), when they do not describe (refer to, characterise, indicate, denote, name, identify) just (merely, only) (the) one pole, but (the) one half of the spectrum, a(n) quasi (virtually, almost, more or less) inexhaustible (unfailing) wealth (richness, abundance, plenty) of nuances (shades, tinges) and gradations (gradings, grades, shades, shadings, levels, stages) (einen quasi unerschöpflichen Reichtum von Nuancen und Abstufungen). One can structure (arrange, (sub)divide, organise, classify) it [this wealth of nuances and gradations] differently on each and every respective occasion, depending on whether one takes (bases oneself on) psychological, institutional or other criteria (as one's basis). But whatever the structuring (structure, arrangement, organisation, (sub)division; Gliederung) may be, the scale (range, gamut, spectrum) of the friendships (always, constantly, continually, invariably, every time, evermore) is (behaves, acts) (always) symmetrical(ly) with (towards, as regards, vis-à-

vis) the scale of enmities (verhält sich die Skala der Freundschaften stets symmetrisch zur Skala der Feindschaften), i.e. every grade (tier or stage) (level, phase, step, degree) on (in) the former [scale] corresponds to (with) a more or less clearly recognisable (discernable, identifiable, noticeable) grade (tier or stage) on the latter [scale] (as well as the other way around (vice versa, conversely)). An indifference point (i.e. point of indifference) (Ein Indifferenzpunkt) between both scales crops up (appears, occurs, exists, happens, is found, comes forward) in the shape (form) of mutual (reciprocal) indifference (apathy, unconcern or detachment) (kommt in Gestalt der gegenseitigen Gleichgültigkeit vor), however, its presence in the spectrum of the social relation has only structural, not real value (worth) (ihre Anwesenheit im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung hat aber nur strukturellen, nicht realen Wert). Indifference (as apathy, unconcern or detachment) is social-ontologically irrelevant (Gleichgültigkeit ist sozialontologisch irrelevant), since no society can be based (established, set up, founded) on (in) it [(such) indifference],(;) moreover,(,) it can only take place where the social framework is otherwise ready (available, on standby, standing by) through (by means of) already existing (available) friendships and enmities. The social relations around (about) the centre of the spectrum, in [relation (regard) to] (during) which the symmetry rests (is based) on the loose (relaxed, slack, lax)(,) on both sides(,) character of the nearness (proximity) and (of the) distance (bei denen die Symmetrie auf den beiderseits lockeren Charakter der Nähe und der Distanz beruht) are (should, ought (to)) not be confused with indifference (apathy, unconcern, detachment) (Gleichgültigkeit). Such symmetry exists for instance between impersonally regulated co-operation and impersonally regulated competition (rivalry), between one-off(time(-only)) (singular, unique, non-recurring) mutual assistance amongst people (persons) unknown to

(who do not know) each other (strangers)(,) and coincidental (accidental, chance, incidental, random) friction without consequences, between non-binding adaptation (adjustment) and harmless opposition. One is supposed (meant) to (should) think (say, mean, believe, opine) [that] the greater nearness (proximity) of these relations to(wards) [as between] one another in the spectrum of the social relation(,) as this appears at the level of description (or (re)presentation) (depiction, portrayal, account) (description (descriptive) level) (auf der Darstellungsebene), means (signifies, denotes) quicker and easier transition possibilities (possibilities of transition (passage, passing, crossing)) (bedeute schnellere und leichtere Übergangsmöglichkeiten) from (the) one [relation] to the other [another relation]. The sudden (abrupt) change (or transition) from the pole of unconditional (absolute) friendship to that of absolute enmity (Das Umschlagen vom Pol der unbedingten Freundschaft in jenen der absoluten Feindschaft) can in reality be (occur, happen, take place) as fast as lightning (blitzschnell erfolgen), like (as [with]) every other [sudden change (or transition)] too (as well, also). In general (Generally)(,) the symmetry of [between] two relations towards (vis-à-vis, as between) each other in the spectrum of the social relation or on (in) both scales of friendship and of enmity does not in the least mean [that] (the) detachment (breaking away, disengagement, dissociation, disentanglement, removal, secession) from (the) one [relation] would have to entail (the) accession (joining, adhesion) to (with) the symmetrically opposite (opposed, opposing, contrasting, contrary, conflicting, inverse, reverse) [one, relation]. [Just] as the sudden change (or transition) from the pole of friendship does not require (necessitate, demand) (the) going (passing, running) through all of the intermediate (in between) stages (stop(over)s or stations) in the spectrum of social relation (nicht das Durchlaufen aller Zwischenstationen im Spektrum der sozialen

Beziehung erfordert), so (too) can [one] go (pass) from any (every) position to any (every) [other] position of this spectrum with(out) (no) consideration for (regard to, regardless of, taking into account) structural symmetries (too) (so kann auch von jeder Position zu jeder Position dieses Spektrum ohne Rücksicht auf strukturelle Symmetrien übergangen werden).

(Until now(,)) we have (hitherto) spoken (talked) of (about) (the) symmetries in [regard to] intensity (Intensität). [The] Symmetries in (the) extensity (Extensität) constitute the second common (joint) structural feature (characteristic, attribute) (feature [in respect] of structure; Strukturmerkmal) of friendship and enmity. In both [friendship and enmity](,) (can) the extensity of the relation (can) make up (constitute) a small, easily interchangeable (exchangeable, replaceable) part of the personal and social interests of the actors(,) or else this [extensity of the relation] (totally, completely, entirely, wholly) engrosses (preoccupies) [them, (the) actors] (totally), representing (constituting) their life('s) content and their life('s) purpose (destiny, determination, designation) (content and purpose in life) (ihren Lebensinhalt und ihre Lebensbestimmung). It is (well, generally) known [that] the thus (so) understood¹¹³ extensity of a friendly or inimical social relation has nothing to do with any objectively existing hierarchy of values and (of) tastes (likes, likings) (whatsoever); what for (some)one is the future of (hu)mankind (i.e. Humanity), can be for another (someone else) the (neighbourhood) bakerwoman (female baker) ((from) next door); and whereas someone, who at the level of values puts (first) (prefers, favours, promotes) (hu)mankind (i.e. Humanity) and its felicitous (happy, lucky, fortunate) future (first), in practice (praxis) lives for his bank account,

¹¹³ See footnote 64 above; cf. Sorokin, *Society*, p. 96.

someone else can kill or die (perish, pass away) for the (neighbourhood) bakerwoman ((from) next door) (was dem einen die Zukunft der Menschheit ist, kann dem anderen die Bäckerin von nebenan sein, und während jemand, der auf der Ebene der Werte die Menschheit und ihre glückliche Zukunft voranstellt, in der Praxis seinem Bankkonto lebt, kann jemand anderes für die Bäckerin von nebenan töten oder sterben). The extensity of the social relation concerning (regarding, as to) subjective mutuality (or reciprocity) is just as little symmetrical with regard to value[s] and goal[s] (end[s]) (Ebensowenig wie im Hinblick auf Wert und Zweck ist die Extensität der sozialen Beziehung hinsichtlich der subjektiven Gegenseitigkeit symmetrisch): the same relation, whether friendly or inimical, can have a very different (varied, variable, diverse, dissimilar) extensity, that is, a very different personal and social value (worth) for each of both partners of (in) the relation (relation(al) partners) (Beziehungspartner). The symmetry in the extensity of the social relation (exclusively) concerns (regards, pertains to, affects), therefore, (exclusively, solely) the commonalities (common ground) in the form-related (i.e. formal) structure (in der formalen Struktur) of friendship and enmity(,) and means (says) that both on the side of the former [friendship] as well as on that [(the) side] of the latter [enmity](,) [we can come across (encounter, find)] the whole (entire, complete, total) conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) scale of the grades (or degrees) of extensity (extensional grades (degrees)) (is to (can, should) be found) (die ganze denkbare Skala der Extensitätsgrade anzutreffen ist). Every grade (or degree) of extensity on the scale of enmities corresponds to (with) such [a grade (or degree) of extensity] on the scale of friendships(,) as well as the other way around (vice versa, conversely), so that form-relatedly (i.e. formally) and really closed (shut, united, unified, uniform, well-rounded, finished, serried, self-contained) parallel

sequences (or orders) (series, rows, successions) result (arise, ensue) (so daß sich formal und real geschlossene parallele Reihenfolgen ergeben). Nonetheless (Nevertheless) these are, as they are apprehended (grasped, understood, comprehended, registered, recorded, captured) at the level of description ((re)presentation) (portrayal, account) (description (descriptive) level), not at all binding for the practical behaviour (conduct) of subjects (für das praktische Verhalten der Subjekte). Friendships and enmities can equally (likewise) pass (move) (on) (go, proceed) from every grade (degree) of extensity (over) to every other [grade (degree) of extensity]. In this important respect(,) [the] intensity and extensity of the social relation behave (act, are) identical(ly), and through (by means of) their really (absolutely, virtually, almost) chameleonic (cap)ability (capacity, faculty) at (for) transformation, through their often lightning(-fast(quick)) mutations(,) they characterise (mark, label, identify) the epistemological status (position) of social ontology (und durch ihre geradezu chamäleonische Transformationsfähigkeit, durch ihre oft blitzartigen Mutationen kennzeichnen sie den epistemologischen Status der Sozialontologie)¹¹⁴.

The third major (great, large) structural commonality (common ground) (strukturelle Gemeinsamkeit) between friendship and enmity consists in [the fact] that the varied (and diverse) (manifold) social relations summarised (summed up, condensed, compressed, united, combined, integrated, encompassed, embodied) in these terms can unfold (or develop (be developed)) both in the private as well as the public realm (sphere, domain, area, sector), both at the level of individuals as well as at that [(the) level] of the collective – and indeed without having to change (alter, modify) their [the said varied (and diverse) social relations’] form-

¹¹⁴ See Ch. II, Sec. 3A above.

related (i.e. formal) structure and the logic of their unfolding (or development) (sich die in diesen Termini zusammengefaßten vielfältigen sozialen Beziehungen sowohl im privaten wie auch im öffentlichen Bereich, sowohl auf der Ebene der Individuen als auch auf der der Kollektive entfalten können – und zwar ohne ihre formale Struktur und die Logik ihrer Entfaltung ändern zu müssen). The individual (separate) areas (realms or sectors) (fields, domains, spheres) of the social (Die einzelnen Bereiche des Sozialen) differ (distinguish (differentiate) themselves) therefore from one another not through (by means (way) of [the] structural peculiarities (anomalies, special features, unusual qualities, distinctivenesses, oddities, abnormalities) (strukturelle Besonderheiten) of friendship and enmity in every one of them [these (such, the said) areas (realms or sectors)], but through their [friendship and enmity's] each and every respective content or object (subject matter) (topic, theme) (sondern durch deren jeweiligen Inhalt oder Gegenstand). The form-related (i.e. formal) description (account, depiction, portrayal, (re)presentation, evocation, delineation) (Die formale Schilderung) of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity applies (is valid) therefore equally to (for) all these areas (realms or sectors), and just (exactly) as the ascertainments (conclusions, observations, findings, realisations, discoveries) made (hit upon, met with, encountered, arrived at) just now (this moment) on (regarding, in relation to, as regards, about) the symmetries in [the] intensity and [the] extensity of friendship and enmity(,) as well as on the possibility of [the, an] asymmetrical mutation of every social relation (die Möglichkeit asymmetrischer Mutation jeder sozialen Beziehung)(,) apply (are valid). The (thus (so) achieved) unification (standardisation) of the way of looking at (contemplation (consideration) of) the social (achieved (accomplished, attained, reached) in this way) (Die derart erreichte Vereinheitlichung der Betrachtung des

Sozialen) leaves – in any case (at any rate, anyway, anyhow)(,) at the social-ontological level and regardless of sociological ascertainments (conclusions, observations, findings) – the contrast(ing) (contradistinction, opposition, conflict, antithesis) between micro- [microstructures] and macrostructures, micro- [microscopic] and macroscopic analysis(,) behind (itself). A genetic reconstruction of the fact of society through (by means of) micro(-)analytically underpinned (backed up, substantiated, corroborated) induction (Eine genetische Rekonstruktion des Faktums der Gesellschaft durch mikroanalytisch untermauerte Induktion), can never succeed anyhow (anyway)¹¹⁵, and the founders of formal sociology (have, had) wrong(ful)ly (unjustly, unjustifiably, unfairly) wanted to give (create) the impression [that] a necessary interrelation (connection, correlation) exists between the possibility of such a form-related (i.e. formal) reconstruction and the ascertainment of the form-related (i.e. formal) equality of the forms of the relation (relational forms) in all areas (realms or sectors) of the social¹¹⁶ (und die Begründer der formalen Soziologie haben zu Unrecht den Eindruck erwecken wollen, zwischen der Möglichkeit einer solchen Rekonstruktion und der Feststellung von der formalen Gleichheit der Beziehungsformen in allen Bereichen des Sozialen bestehe ein notwendiger Zusammenhang). But (However,) this ascertainment implies only that the social relations of [between] individuals or of [between] collectives amongst themselves or with (towards) one another (Aber diese Feststellung impliziert nur, daß sich die sozialen Beziehungen von Individuen oder von Kollektiven unter sich oder zueinander) can be apprehended (grasped, understood) by means of (through) the same morphology(,) and be subject to the same form-relatedly (i.e. formally)

¹¹⁵ See Ch. II, Sec. 2Ce above.

¹¹⁶ Thus, e.g. Simmel, *Brücke*; v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 212. Cf. footnote 18 and Ch. II, Sec. 3B.

analysable, symmetrical or asymmetrical changes (or transformations) in ([regard] (as) to) their extensity and intensity (durch dieselbe Morphologie erfassen lassen und denselben formal analysierbaren, symmetrischen oder asymmetrischen Wandlungen in ihrer Extensität und Intensität unterliegen)¹¹⁷. A particular (special, specific, peculiar) methodical (i.e. methodological) advantage of the (so-called, thus (so) meant (said, stated)) unification (standardisation) of the social (meant in this way) lies in the fact that the unfolding (or development) of the social relation, as it [this (the (said)) social relation] is concretised in the shaping (formation or education) (forming, development, culture, creation, establishment, setting up) of the individuals, groups and parties allying (associating, combining) (conjoining, interconnecting) or competing (in rivalry) with one another (wie sie sich in der Bildung von miteinander konkurrierenden oder sich verbündenden Individuen, Gruppen und Parteien konkretisiert), can be followed (pursued, tracked, traced, trailed) in a number of (quite a few, several, many a, multiple, various, diverse) field(s) (area(s), sector(s), domain(s), realm(s)) simultaneously. Art and philosophy, [the] economy and politics, religion and science are constituted (set up, established), split (up) (chopped, decomposed, divided, cracked, splintered, cleaved), and changed (or transformed) (altered) on the basis of the same association(-) and dis(ass)ociation dynamic(s) (dynamic(s) of association and dissociation) (Kunst und Philosophie, Wirtschaft und Politik, Religion und Wissenschaft konstituieren, spalten, wandeln sich auf Grund derselben Assoziations- und Dissoziationsdynamik). Neither hypostases-like and autonomous ideas nor substantially (i.e. in terms of substances) (pre-

¹¹⁷ For (Regarding, About) that(,) there are concrete reasons (grounds)(,) which have to do with the internal (inner, inward) structure (or building) (construction) of collective construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations)(,) and [they (these concrete reasons)] will (pre)occupy (concern, engross, keep, engage, absorb) us (busy) in the 2nd volume of this work.

)given (already given, pre-existing, prefabricated) [pre-given] peoples
 (folks, nations) and races nor collective souls (psyches) and spirits
 (intellects, minds) determine (condition) in all these seemingly
 (apparently, ostensibly) heterogeneous fields (areas, sectors, domains,
 realms) the predominant (predominating, prevalent, prevailing)
 constellations (or correlations) (conjunctures) and the outcomes of
 becoming (or events), but constantly (continuously, continually,
 perpetually, permanently) changing (varying, alternating, changeable,
 variable, shifting) and constantly ((for)ever) alternating (rotatory,
 rotative, interchangeable, interchanging) (themselves) concrete relations
 and groupings (group formations) of concrete humans (people, men),
 which on each and every respective occasion (want to) bindingly define
 what has to be regarded as (considered) [an, the] ideational hypostasis or
 [a, the] supra-personal, in fact (indeed) supra-historical collective [entity,
 body, identity] (Weder hypostasenartige und autonome Ideen noch
 substantiell vorgegebene Völker und Rassen noch kollektive Seelen und
 Geister bestimmen auf all diesen scheinbar heterogenen Gebieten die
 vorherrschenden Konstellationen und die Ausgänge des Geschehens,
 sondern ständig wechselnde und sich ständig abwechselnde konkrete
 Beziehungen und Gruppierungen von konkreten Menschen, die jeweils
 verbindlich definieren (wollen), was als ideelle Hypostase oder
 überpersönliches, ja überhistorisches Kollektiv zu gelten hat). The (A)
 parallel analysis of the history of ideas, of social and political history
 (idea-, social- and political history)(,) bearing in mind ([whilst being]
 mindful of) the polarity and continuity in the spectrum of the social
 relation(,) offers (gives, grants, provides, renders unto us (one)) a unique
 (singular, one-off, one-of-a-kind) key for the synthetical (i.e.
 synthesising) understanding of social phenomena (Die parallele Analyse
 von Ideen-, Sozial- und politischer Geschichte eingedenk der Polarität

und Kontinuität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung gibt einem einmaligen Schlüssel zum synthetischen Verständnis sozialer Phänomene in die Hand)¹¹⁸.

The structural symmetries and commonalities (common ground) between friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) will (pre)occupy (concern, engross, keep, engage, absorb) us (busy) once more (again) in the phenomenological description of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation¹¹⁹. Their [The said structural symmetries and commonalities'] constitutive function(ing) for this continuity should (ought to, must, could) already be [taken (seen) as, considered] certain (definite, settled, fixed, known), in any case (anyway, anyhow). But why must there be continuity at all? Why can it [continuity] not keep (stick) to (or remain (stay) in (with) [a state of]) polarity, why, that is, is social life (living), which would consist exclusively (solely, purely, only) in extreme friendship, extreme enmity and the mutual (reciprocal) alternation ((inter)change, rotation, switching, variety) (gegenseitigen Abwechslung) of both [poles](,) not just historically unknown (unfamiliar, unheard-of), but absolutely (quite, plainly, patently) inconceivable (unimaginable, unthinkable, unthought-of, incredible)? At first glance(,) it might seem (appear, look (very much)) ((one could have) the impression (could be had))(,) as if [that] nothing would stand in the way of at least the founding (foundation, establishment, formation, setting up, institution, incorporation; Gründung) of society on (at, in) the pole of extreme friendship. However, this is not the case (things are not so (like this, thus)). Because extreme friendship is, as we [already] know, not simply more or less calculating (computing, estimating) mutuality (or

¹¹⁸ Cf. Mannheim, „Die Bedeutung“; Kondylis, „Wissenschaft“.

¹¹⁹ See Sec. 3C in this chapter.

reciprocity), but unconditional (unquestioning, unqualified) altruism and self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) (berechnende Gegenseitigkeit, sondern bedingungsloser Altruismus und Selbstaufopferung). If all individuals (every individual) elevated (raised, lifted, promoted, exalted) this undiluted altruism to (as) the guideline (guiding rule, standard) of (for) one's own behaviour (conduct), (then, thus, so) this ethically laudable (praiseworthy, commendable) decision would have highly (extremely, the most, superlatively, supremely, exceptionally, greatly) paradoxical consequences. If everyone rated (over)(estimated) the well-being (welfare, going well) of the Other (higher, more) than [compared to] the (one's, his) own [well-being], then his (one's) behaviour (conduct) would have to be directed by (in accordance with, according to) the (Other's) wishes (desires, wants) (of the Other), which would bring into being (create, form) a vicious circle: everyone would harbour (cherish, foster, entertain, have), namely, merely (just, only, simply) the wish to do that which (what) the Other wished,(;) no side would define, in terms of content, its own wishes(,) and that is why (therefore, hence, thus) none of them [the sides] would pursue any aims (targets, objectives, goals, ends, purposes) (whatsoever) too, since they [all sides] would (a)wait (for) the definition(,) by the other [side](,) of the aims to be pursued (und daher würde auch keine von ihnen irgendwelche Ziele verfolgen, da sie auf die Definition der zu verfolgenden Ziele durch die andere warten würde); (in the) meanwhile (meantime)(,) social life would flag (i.e. weaken) (slacken, languish, tire, go lame, be paralysed) – for the same reason [that] two men (people, humans) would never (take a) step over (beyond, past) a threshold if (they) both absolutely (necessarily, unconditionally) insisted on allowing (letting, leaving to, giving) the other(,) on each and every respective

occasion(,) [have] right of way (or precedence) (priority)¹²⁰. This (thought(s)) experiment ([in respect] of ideas (notions, concepts)) [thought experiment] (Gedankenexperiment) retains (keeps, maintains) its validity (force) irrespective of what one may accept (adopt, assume, presume, take on) as (to be) [the, a] motive for altruistic behaviour (conduct), whether one, that is, (would) even (also) want(s) to put down (reduce, attribute) this behaviour to [deeper] egoistic motivating (or driving) forces (mainsprings) (egoistische Triebfedern) or not. Altruistic behaviour is, notwithstanding (regardless (irrespective, in spite) of, despite) its likely (probably, presumed, supposed, presumptive) motivation[s](,) (just as much) a fact (just, exactly) as (like) the (its) exact (precise, direct, straight) opposite – and the question (problem) of the motivating (or driving) force would be most probably even less relevant here, if ethical question formulations (or central themes) (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s); Fragestellungen) and concerns (cares, worries, troubles) were consistently left (set, put) aside (ignored, disregarded, eliminated, excluded, precluded)¹²¹.

Just as little at (on) the pole of pure general (universal) friendship can a society of mortal humans (people, men) be founded (established, based, formed, instituted, set up, constituted, incorporated) at the pole of undiluted (unadulterated, unmixed, unblended, absolute, perfect) general enmity (Ebensowenig wie auf den Pol reiner allgemeiner Freundschaft läßt sich eine Gesellschaft von sterblichen Menschen auf den Pol unverwässerter allgemeiner Feindschaft gründen). The proverbial war of all against all simply constitutes a practical impossibility, i.e. no state (of

¹²⁰ See Sawyer's apt (well-aimed, telling, striking) remarks (comments, observations), "The Altruism Scale", esp. p. 409.

¹²¹ (More) (thoroughly) in relation to that (in (greater) detail)(,) in the 3rd Volume of this work.

affairs) (situation, condition(s)) is (are) conceivable (imaginable) in which such a war(,) together (along) with (including) all its implications(,) literally takes place(,) and lasts (goes on, has a duration) (for) more than a few moments (seconds, instants). Even if we wanted to accept (assume, presume, adopt) [the] absolutely inimical dispositions (susceptibilities, proneness(es), arrangements, plans) of all humans (people, men) against all humans, it is(,) from the [a] generally inimical (hostile, antagonistic) disposition to generally inimical – and indeed violent (forcible) – behaviour (conduct)(,) a very long way (path, road, route, journey), on which are (found) (stand), in practice, insurmountable (insuperable, invincible, unconquerable) obstacles (barriers, obstructions, impediments). The set phrase (or formula) (wording) [of “war of all against all”] is therefore either metaphoric(al) (figurative) or meaningless (senseless, pointless, purposeless, futile, useless). More precisely (accurately, exactly): it [the said set phrase] had no real, but only a polemical meaning (sense, signification), when it was summoned (highlighted, projected, used) in the early New Times (Modern Era), in order to unhinge (dislocate, disrupt, disturb) the Aristotelian-Scholastic teaching (doctrine or theory) (lesson) of the originality (i.e. initial, primary or unspoilt state) (primordially, naturalness, primitiveness) of society (der Ursprünglichkeit der Gesellschaft)(,) and in a second step to prop (shore, back) up (support, underpin, uphold, reinforce) contract theory of this or that couleur (i.e. shade and colour, complexion or hue) (die Vertragstheorie dieser oder jener Couleur zu stützen). What one can [say] contrary to (against, contra, [in contrast (opposition) to]) Hobbes, if one wants to take him at face value, is the following: society was not *founded (established, formed, instituted, set up, constituted, incorporated)*(,) so that the war of all against all comes (could come) to an end; society *exists, because* the war of all against all is, in practice,

impossible. Hobbes's opponents (adversaries, rivals, antagonists, objectors) (The opponents of Hobbes), who set [with] the fiction of the basically (essentially, fundamentally) peaceful (peaceable, pacific, placid, gentle, docile) and anxious (or fearful) (afraid, timorous, scared, timid, apprehensive) man (im Grunde friedfertigen und ängstlichen Menschen) against (opposed, countered) his [Hobbes's] construction of the state of nature (or natural state) (Naturzustand), had to assume (presume, accept, suppose, adopt) that war came into the world only with the founding (foundation, establishment, formation, setting up, institution, incorporation) of society¹²²; with (because of) that (thereby, therewith, for this reason, as a result)(,) in part (partly) against the ethical intent(ion) (purpose, aim, object(ive)) and conviction ((firm) belief) of these authors (writers), (the) insight (understanding, realisation) into the profound (deep, intimate) interweaving (intertwining, interlacing, integration, entanglement, interconnection, combining) of war and society with one another (die innige Verflechtung von Krieg und Gesellschaft miteinander) was gained (won, obtained, extracted), that is, war was brought (carried) from the state of nature (or natural state) into society, however, the error (mistake, fallacy) [in respect] of the founding of society remained. That insight had, at any rate, an important(,) even if hardly noticed (recorded, registered, noted) implication, namely the [fact] that a war (of (the)) (between humans (people, men) living) societally (i.e. socially) in [the] same collective or in distinct (differing, different, varied, unlike, dissimilar, miscellaneous, various, varying) collectives (living humans) (in demselben Kollektiv oder in verschiedenen Kollektiven lebenden

¹²² See above all (especially) Rousseau, *Oeuvres Complètes* [*Oeuvres Complètes*], III, pp. 601-616 «Que l'état de guerre naît de l'état social » [“that the state (condition, situation) of war is born (arises, springs, dawns) of (from) the social state (condition, situation)”]; similarly(,) Montesquieu in the zeal (fervour, ardour, keenness, enthusiasm, eagerness) of the [his] polemic(s) against Hobbes, *Esprit des Lois*, I, 2-3.

Menschen) cannot be a war of all against all,(;) that here, that is (therefore), (the) enmity amongst (between) (the) one [group of people (individuals, humans)] must (has (would have) to) be accompanied by (go (hand in hand) with, accompany) friendship amongst (between) (the) (an)other [group (of people)] (daß hier also die Feindschaft unter den einen mit Freundschaft unter den anderen einhergehen müsse); on the other hand, it is obvious (apparent, evident) that the [a] hypothetical war of one (an) individual against all other[s] [individuals, people, humans] cannot in the least be described as [a] war of all against all. War, i.e. (the) bloody (sanguinary, gory) conflict as [the, an] expression (manifestation) of extreme enmity is therefore neither the continuation (resumption) nor the remnant (leftover[s], relic, remains, holdover, hangover, remainder, residual, residue, residuum) of a pre-social war of all against all (Der Krieg, d. h. der blutige Konflikt als Äußerung extremer Feindschaft ist also weder die Fortsetzung noch das Überbleibsel eines vorsozialen Krieges aller gegen alle), and it does not turn against the fact of society and of friendship; it [war] is itself a fact of society(,) just like friendship.

Hardly (Barely) anyone until today (hitherto) has understood so deeply (profoundly) why war cannot be the [a] sole (only, lone, unique, single) and permanent fact(,) like (as) Clausewitz [did], whose comments (remarks, references, statements, explanation(s), exposition(s)) in this regard (regarding (concerning) this, in this connection) represent (or constitute) a(n) (first-class, first-rate) (cultural-philosophical and) anthropological achievement (accomplishment, performance, output, work, effort) (pertaining to the philosophy of culture) (of the first rank(ing) (tier, class, grade, order) (highest order) (dessen diesbezügliche Ausführungen eine kulturphilosophische und anthropologische Leistung ersten Ranges darstellen). The great theoretician (theorist) does not

comprehend (understand, grasp, perceive, interpret, construe, take) war(fare) either metaphorically (figuratively) or psychologically (weder metaphorisch noch psychologisch): extreme enmity, no matter what [the] motivation, manifests (shows, expresses) itself here as an act of violence (force, power, control, mightiness, strength) for the purpose of the throwing (putting) down (to the ground) (i.e. defeat, suppressing, quelling or crushing) of the foe (äußert sich hier in einem Akt der Gewalt zwecks Niederwerfung des Feindes). This act of violence must of course culminate (climax) in the killing (homicide) of other men (or humans in general) (people), otherwise there can be no talk of war *stricto sensu*. However(,) that which must characterise (mark, label, identify, designate, denote) war by definition, that is, of [its, war's] essence (nature, substance, texture, being, character) (Aber das, was den Krieg definitionsgemäß, also vom Wesen her kennzeichnen muß), cannot make up (constitute) the entire (whole, complete, total) reality of relations of man to(wards) (with, vis-à-vis, in relation to) man (men, humans, people) (human-to-human relations) [of man towards man (i.e. between humans)] (die ganze Wirklichkeit der Beziehungen von Mensch zu Mensch). Because an absolute concentration of the entire (whole) existing (available, present) existential and material potential (capacity or capabilities) on enmity and the most extreme (utmost) violence (Denn eine absolute Konzentration des ganzen vorhandenen existentiellen und materiellen Potentials auf die Feindschaft und die äußerste Gewalt), as can be observed (noticed, watched, eyed, seen) in the wrestling (or struggling) (grappling) of two foes with [their] bare hands or in the short battles (fights, struggles, combats, tussles, contests, engagements, matches, campaigns) between a few in number of primitive tribes (wie sich dies beim Ringen zweier Feinde mit bloßen Händen oder bei kurzen Kämpfen zwischen an Zahl geringen primitiven Stämmen beobachten

läßt), is under (in) the conditions of “societal (social) association (or union) (formation, federation, unit, bond)” („gesellschaftlichen Verbandes“), as Clausewitz expresses (puts, states, articulates, verbalises, phrases, enunciates) [it], simply impossible. The conditions of life (living) in society consequently (therefore, thus) force (coerce, compel, make) [humans, people, men, us] (in)to(wards) (necessitate, impel, impose, inflict) an inhibition (checking or hindering) (inhibiting, stemming, hampering, restraining, obstructing, hindrance, obstruction), diversion (detour, rerouting, bypassing), fragmentation or partially (partly, in part) covering (up) (or concealing) (hiding, obscuring) and disguising (disguise, dressing up, covering) of that which constitutes war(fare) as [an] act of violence (force) in its conceptual (notional) purity. And not only inside of (within) society does “the great (large) number of things, forces, circumstances (relation(ship)s, conditions)” prevent (hinder, foil, block, impede, obstruct) the “total unloading (or discharging) (dumping, releasing)” of the existing (available) potential (capacity or capabilities) for (of) violence; the same happens (takes place, occurs) in (the) war itself, in so far (as much) as (to the extent that) this is a political act, that is, an act of humans (men, people) who live in the [a] political association (or union)(,) and therefore subordinate their martial (i.e. war((-)like)) [(i.e. war(-like))] (belligerent, bellicose) activity (doings, task(s), job(s), function(s)) as well as the exercising (exercise, wielding, practising, practice, executing, execution, exerting, exertion) of violence to political ends (goals)(,) and accordingly interpose (interject, insert, put (push, fit, slot) (in), interpolate, intercalate) pauses or “friction(s)” into the course (sequence, process) of (the) war itself) (Die Bedingungen des Lebens in Gesellschaft zwingen folglich zu einer Hemmung, Umleitung, Fragmentierung oder teilweisen Verdeckung und Verkleidung dessen, was den Krieg als Akt der Gewalt in seiner

begrifflichen Reinheit konstituiert. Und nicht nur innerhalb der Gesellschaft verhindert „die große Zahl von Dingen, Kräften, Verhältnissen“ das „totale Entladen“ des vorhandenen Gewaltpotentials; dasselbe geschieht im Krieg selbst, insofern dieser ein politischer Akt, also ein Akt von Menschen ist, die im politischen Verband leben und daher ihre kriegerische Tätigkeit sowie die Gewaltausübung überhaupt politischen Zwecken unterordnen und dementsprechend Pausen oder „Friktionen“ in den Kriegsablauf selbst hineinschieben). „Politics” means (signifies) in this context (especially in a(n) age (period, era, epoch) (at a time)(,) in which the traditional Aristotelian terminology was still alive (living, vivid, vibrant) (i.e. in use))(,) as much (far) as the whole of (total, entire, overall, aggregate) social life, the “societal association (or union)”, and *that is why (for that reason, because of this (that), on this account, therefore)* every war between socially living humans (men, people) is a political and politically waged (conducted, led, guided, run, managed, operated, controlled, directed) war („Politik“ bedeutet in diesem Zusammenhang (zumal in einer Zeit, in der die traditionelle aristotelische Terminologie noch lebendig war) soviel wie das gesamte Sozialleben, den „gesellschaftlichen Verband“, und *deshalb* ist jeder Krieg zwischen sozial lebenden Menschen ein politischer und politisch geführter Krieg). The entirety (totality, sum, aggregate) of (i.e. all) (the) (previous) commentators (until today)(,) who from Clausewitz’s fundamental (basic) principle (axiom, postulate) [in respect] of the political character of war(,) (have) want(ed) to deduce(d) (infer(red), derive(d)) a sectoral (departmental, area-specific) primacy of the civil(ian) [civil] [sector] vis-à-vis the military [sector](,) and a(n) call for (appeal to) the moderation (restraint, mitigation, modification) of war against the endeavours (efforts, attempts, aspirations) of the uncouth (rough, crude, unpolished,

unrefined, raw) men (persons) in uniform, (have) simply (did) not understand (understood) at all (about) what (the talk in) Clausewitz is (was) (talking about) (meant) (Die Gesamtheit der bisherigen Kommentatoren, die aus Clausewitz' Grundsatz vom politischen Charakter des Krieges einen ressortmäßigen Primat des Zivilen gegenüber dem Militär und einen Aufruf zur Mäßigung des Krieges gegen die Bestrebungen rauhbeiniger Uniformträger haben ableiten wollen, haben einfach nicht verstanden, wovon bei Clausewitz überhaupt die Rede ist). (It was a matter to (for) him) [Clausewitz] of (was dealing with) the explanation of the fact that not only in "limited (restricted, confined)", but even in "absolute (total)" war, which, incidentally, is no less "political" than the former (i.e. "absolute" war is not less "political" than "limited" war), the exercising (exercise, wielding, practising, practice, executing, execution, exerting, exertion) of violence cannot be massed (or concentrated) and uninterrupted (or unbroken) (continuous, continual incessant) (nicht nur beim „begrenzten“, sondern sogar beim „absoluten“ Krieg, die übrigens nicht weniger „politisch“ als der erstere ist, Gewaltausübung nicht geballt und ununterbrochen sein kann). The explanation offered (proffered, tendered, volunteered, proposed, suggested) connects (joins, links, combines, binds, ties, associates, affiliates, couples)(,) at (in [the]) last (final, ultimate) social-ontological instance (analysis)(,) the philosophy of culture (cultural philosophy) and anthropology with each other(,) and reads (goes, is) [that] socially (societally) living man or the "societal association (or union)" of humans (men, people) is constituted (made or composed) (procured, obtained) in (to) such a way (an extent) that [he and (or)] it cannot do without (forego, renounce or abstain from) (relinquish, give up) the most extreme (utmost, supreme) violence, that is killing, but (yet, however) simultaneously [it (i.e. socially living man or the "societal association (or union)" of

humans)] cannot live permanently (constantly, perpetually) with it (that) [(such, this) (most) extreme violence (i.e. killing)] (Die angebotene Erklärung verbindet in letzter sozialontologischer Instanz Kulturphilosophie und Anthropologie miteinander und lautet, der gesellschaftlich lebende Mensch oder der „gesellschaftliche Verband“ der Menschen sei derart beschaffen, daß er auf die äußerste Gewalt, also das Töten, nicht verzichten, gleichzeitig aber nicht permanent damit leben könne)¹²³.

The aetiology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation can, however, also in another respect(,) be connected (combined) (put into (a) combination (touch), get in contact) with anthropological (and cultural-philosophical) considerations (reflections, deliberations, thoughts) (pertaining to the philosophy of culture), and indeed regarding (about, in relation to, over) the question (problem) of identity (identity question) in its interweaving (intertwining, interlacing, integration, entanglement, interconnection, combining) with the question (problem) of value(s) (value question) (Die Ätiologie der Kontinuität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung läßt sich aber auch in anderer Hinsicht mit anthropologischen und kulturphilosophischen Überlegungen in Verbindung setzen, und zwar über die Identitätsfrage in deren Verflechtung mit der Wertfrage). As [we have] already remarked (observed, noticed, commented), identity is a constitutive feature (characteristic, attribute, trait) and at the same time a(n) fundamental (elementary, basic, underlying) need of *socially* living humans (people, men) (ist Identität konstitutives Merkmal und zugleich grundlegendes Bedürfnis *sozial* lebender Menschen). And since even the most elementary society contains (includes, embodies) a “great (large)

¹²³ For details (particulars) and evidence (references, supporting documents) see Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, esp. p. 16ff.; for the dual (double, twin) concept (notion) of politics in Clausewitz cf. p. 74ff..

number of things, forces, circumstances (relation(ship)s, conditions)”, (so, then, thus) identity is shaped (formed, moulded, fashioned, configured, structured) and asserted (or maintained) (claimed, affirmed, contended, alleged) as a series (number, chain, line) of positionings (stances, opinions, statements, comments, declarations) towards (as regards, in relation to, vis-à-vis) multiple (several, a number of, quite a few, various, diverse) persons and situations, customs (conventions, practices, fashions), institutions and values (so gestaltet und behauptet sich Identität als eine Reihe von Stellungnahmen zu mehreren Personen und Situationen, Sitten, Institutionen und Werten). These positionings can be stable or variable (changeable, mutable, shifting, varying, alterable, fluid, unsettled; veränderlich), partly stable, partly variable, and (accordingly, correspondingly, commensurately, proportionately) identity persists (perseveres, insists) or shifts (moves, relocates, is (becomes) displaced, switches [position]) (accordingly) (und entsprechend beharrt oder verschiebt sich die Identität). It [Identity] cannot, in any case, be conceived (imagined) (or thought [of, about]) without the incessant (unremitting, unrelenting, unceasing, ceaseless) activity of the taking of [a] position[s] (position taking), which must turn out (be) (is necessarily) positive(ly) *and* at the same time negative(ly), friendl(ily) *and* at the same time inimical(ly) (Sie läßt sich jedenfalls ohne die unablässige Tätigkeit des Stellungnehmens nicht denken, die positiv *und* zugleich negativ, freundlich *und* zugleich feindlich ausfallen muß). In their huge (vast, large, great) number (or multitude) (multiplicity, abundance, wealth; Vielzahl)(,) these positionings constitute a spectrum or continuum (Kontinuum), which ipso facto is transformed (converted, transmuted, transfigured) (transforms itself, changes, turns) into a spectrum or continuum of friendships and enmities (das sich ipso facto in ein Spektrum oder Kontinuum von Freundschaften und Feindschaften

verwandelt). Friendships and enmities move without interruption (break,
 stoppage, disconnection, disruption, discontinuance, recess, [a] gap) and
 merge (and turn) (blend, pass, go (over)) into one another(,) in
 accordance with (according (corresponding) to) the movement (motion)
 of the identity constantly taking a position in relation (regard) to
 (regarding, towards, vis-à-vis) something. No identity can adhere (stick,
 persevere, persist) for a(n) lifetime (whole (entire) (all of its) life) to (in
 [respect of]) (or remain at) the one and same pole of the spectrum of the
 social relation,(;) it can therefore neither permanently kill nor
 permanently sacrifice itself. That is why it [(an(y)) identity] must reflect
 (mirror) the continuum of the objectively existing (present, available)
 possibilities of the social relation to (in) a greater (larger) or lesser
 (smaller) extent (degree, scope, range, compass) in the continuum of its
 own positionings (stances, opinions, statements, comments, declarations)
 (Freundschaften und Feindschaften bewegen sich ohne Unterbrechung
 und gehen ineinander über, entsprechend der Bewegung der ständig
 Stellung zu etwas nehmenden Identität. Keine Identität kann ein ganzes
 Leben lang bei einem und demselben Pol des Spektrums der sozialen
 Beziehung verharren, sie kann also weder permanent töten noch sich
 permanent aufopfern. Sie muß daher das Kontinuum der objektiv
 vorhandenen Möglichkeiten der sozialen Beziehung in größerem oder
 kleinerem Umfang in Kontinuum der eigenen Stellungnahmen
 widerspiegeln). In the course of this (At the same time, Into the
 bargain)(,) friendships and enmities must be more or less differentiated –
 moreover(,) they must be connected (joined, united, associated, linked,
 bound, tied) with (to) all [things] (everything) which may (might) ever
 constitute (provide, grant, afford, produce, make, create, emit) the object
 (subject (matter), topic, theme) of the (identity's) positionings (of the
 identity). Friend and foe (enemy) are thus (hence, therefore) not

necessarily persons, but (just) as (well) (much) values and social practices or attitudes (stances, approaches, outlooks, views), especially as under the circumstances (or conditions) of culture it is normal (and seems (appears to be) advisable (wise, recommendable, expedient)) to connect friendship and enmity towards (regarding, vis-à-vis) persons with friendship and enmity towards (regarding, vis-à-vis) values (Freund und Feind sind daher nicht unbedingt Personen, sondern ebensogut Werte und soziale Praktiken oder Einstellungen, zumal es unter den Umständen der Kultur normal ist (und ratsam erscheint) Freundschaft und Feindschaft zu Personen mit Freundschaft und Feindschaft zu Werten zu verbinden).

(Up)on (By taking a) closer inspection (examination, look) (looking in greater (more) detail (carefully))(,) (the) [a] positioning towards (regarding, vis-à-vis) values of course proves (turns out) to of necessity (unavoidably, necessarily, perforce) be [a] hidden (disguised, concealed) positioning towards persons or it becomes (turns into) such a [positioning] (Beim näheren Hinsehen erweist sich freilich auch die Stellungnahme zu Werten notgedrungen als verkappte Stellungnahme zu Personen bzw. sie wird zu einer solchen), even though this is very often not (completely (entirely, wholly, totally)) conscious (i.e. realised). The possibility of carrying out (executing, performing, effecting) a positioning (i.e. of taking a position) towards (regarding, vis-à-vis, in relation to) humans (people, men) via or as [a] positioning towards values, considerably (substantially, sizeably) extends (expands, widens, broadens, enlarges)(,) at any rate(,) the circle of the positionings of the identity, and the more extensive (wider, broader) this circle is, the more often does it intersect (or overlap) ((partially) coincide) with the corresponding circles of other identities. This sets in motion anew (afresh, again) the mechanisms(,) which the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation maintains (and perpetuates) (keeps going, upholds, adheres

to, sustains, preserves). Because, like (as [with]) all social (and cultural) goods (of culture) too, the unfolding (development) space (room to move or field of activity) for (of) the possible positionings of the identity is scarce (tight, narrow). Not only the positioning in itself, but also the – actually (really, in actual (as a matter of) fact) implied in it (therein) – positioning towards alien (i.e. other) (foreign, different, strange) positionings(,) brings the spectrum of the social relation to [its] full (complete, whole) unfolding (or development) (Dies setzt von neuem die Mechanismen in Bewegung, die die Kontinuität im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung aufrechterhalten. Denn, wie alle sozialen und Kulturgüter auch, ist der Entfaltungsraum für die möglichen Stellungnahmen der Identität knapp. Nicht nur die Stellungnahme an sich, sondern auch die – eigentlich darin implizierte – Stellungnahme zu fremden Stellungnahmen bringt das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung zur vollen Entfaltung).

B. “Normality (Normalcy)” and “exception” („Normalität“ und „Ausnahme“)

Social theoreticians (theorists) and [social] (-)philosophers, who for ethical-normative reasons(,) want to shorten (curtail or cut (back)) (abridge, truncate, reduce, prune, crop, clip, cancel) the spectrum of the social relation around (about) (or at) the (enmity’s) pole or around (about) (or at) the [enmity’s] half (of enmity) [of the spectrum], can(not), as explicated (explained, elucidated, illustrated, expounded, commented on) in the previous [sub-]section, as a result (because) of (due to) the lifting (i.e. abolition) (cancellation, breaking (calling) off, annulment, raising, repeal, quashing, reversal, revocation, removal, rescinding, dissolving,

obviation; Aufhebung) of the polarity, (no longer) account for the continuity in the spectrum any longer (more). In connection (interrelation, association) (Connected) with (to) this, they fall (lapse) into epistemological and pragmatic(al) error(s) (mistakes). They [(The) (said) social theoreticians and social philosophers] follow the (already represented (and supported) (defended, advocated, justified) in antiquity and frequently (in many cases (ways)) renewed (reiterated, renovated, restored) in the New Times (Modern Era) (modern times)) perception (view, conception, opinion) (already represented in antiquity and frequently renewed in the New Times [that] there can be science only via (the) [a] rule or (the) [a] law, not via (the) [a] exception. That('s) (is) right (true)(,) if with it (that) (therefore [what]) is meant that (the) exceptions are not able (allowed) to (cannot) be classified and foreseen (predicted, forecast, anticipated) through (by means (way) of) their subsumption under an invariable causality. This point of view would, however (though), count (matter (a lot), be crucial (important)) if social ontology were (was) a science(,) which would aim (get) at and (lay) claim (to) (or demand) (require, call for, use, make use of) the formulation of strict [kinds of] law bindedness(es) (determinism(s) or law(rule)-based necessities), and on the basis of the same [(kinds of) law bindedness(es)](,) determine (fix, specify, define, ascertain, identify, ordain) in advance the outcome of every concrete becoming (or group, cluster, series of events) (happening). But (However) we know that it [social ontology] cannot go about [doing, trying to do, pursuing, pursue] (be about, deal with) (make) that (it) (point)(,) and that she (it) [social ontology] in fact (even)(,) in a certain (some) respect(s) (ways)(,) stands (is) nearer (closer) to history than sociology (Sie folgen der schon im Altertum vertretenen und in der Neuzeit vielfach erneuerten Auffassung, Wissenschaft könne es nur über die Regel oder das Gesetz, nicht über die

Ausnahme geben. Das stimmt, wenn damit gemeint ist, daß sich Ausnahmen nicht durch ihre Subsumtion unter eine invariable [?invariabel?] Kausalität klassifizieren und vorhersehen lassen. Dieser Gesichtspunkt fiele jedoch nur dann ins Gewicht, wenn Sozialontologie eine Wissenschaft wäre, die auf die Formulierung von strengen Gesetzmäßigkeiten abzielte und beanspruchte, auf Grund derselben den Ausgang jeden konkreten Geschehens im voraus zu bestimmen. Aber wir wissen, daß es ihr darum nicht gehen kann und daß sie sogar in gewisser Hinsicht der Historie näher steht als der Soziologie)¹²⁴. Its [Social ontology's] task (job, mission, duty, function, purpose, assignment), accordingly (therefore, according to that), does not consist in(,) epistemologically and in reality (really, actually, concretely)(,) domesticating the exception, but rather in defining its social-ontological status(,) and assessing (estimating, evaluating, measuring, anticipating, foreseeing) its social-historical weight (gravity, gravitas), and indeed on the path (way, road) to(wards) [as a means of] insight (understanding) into (of) its meaning (significance) for the constitution of (the) norm and (of) normality, in its multiform (motley, mixed, diverse) interweaving (intertwining) with (the) norm[s] and normality. No knowledge (knowing) about (regarding, of) human things (or affairs) (matters, issues) can be of great empirical value, if [it] (does not bear (keep, have) in mind) the forces and factors (are not borne (kept) in mind)(,) which can break (blast or bu(r)st) (force) (open) (blow up, explode, dynamite) every norm[s] and normality, in fact (indeed) (on a) daily (basis) (every (single) day) break [them, norms and normality] open. The epistemological impregnability (or invincibility) (unconquerability, unbeatability) of the exception would only (then) entitle (authorise, enable) [us] (to) its

¹²⁴ See Ch. II, Sec. 3A in this volume. Cf. footnote 114 above.

neglect(ing) (disregard(ing), ignoring) if (when) one wanted to (naively) identify (in a naive manner) the level of epistemology with that of (the [level] of) reality (Ihre Aufgabe besteht demnach nicht darin, die Ausnahme epistemologisch und real zu domestizieren, sondern vielmehr darin, ihren sozialontologischen Status zu definieren und ihr sozial-historisches Gewicht abzuschätzen, und zwar auf dem Wege der Einsicht in ihre Bedeutung für die Konstitution der Norm und der Normalität, in ihre mehrgestaltige Verflechtung mit der Norm und der Normalität. Kein Wissen um die menschlichen Dinge kann von großem empirischem Wert sein, wenn es sich nicht permanent die Kräfte und Faktoren vor Augen hält, die jede Norm und Normalität sprengen können, ja tagtäglich sprengen. Die epistemologische Unbezwingbarkeit der Ausnahme würde zu deren Vernachlässigung nur dann berechtigen, wenn man naiverweise die Ebene der Epistemologie mit jener der Wirklichkeit identifizieren wollte).

Durkheim's suggestion (recommendation, proposal), to regard (hold, consider) the usual (customary, common, standard) as (to be) the normal, [and] on the other hand (however)(,) the exception as the [something, what is] pathological (das Übliche für das Normale, die Ausnahme hingegen für das Pathologische zu halten), does not essentially (fundamentally, substantially, entirely, considerably) appear (to be) (seem) smarter (cleverer, brighter, more intelligent) or more fertile (fruitful, productive). Here speaks someone, who puts (places) (the) declaredly (avowedly, openly) social science at (in) the service of morality(,) and does not want to tolerate any ethical neutrality on (in [regard to]) this question (problem, issue, matter), although (even though) he, on the other hand, has to admit (confess, concede, accept, recognise) the content-related(filled) (substantive) changeability (mutability,

shiftability) of the [what is] normal according to the predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) «espèce sociale» [“social species (kind, sort, type, nature, case, instance)”] (Hier spricht jemand, der erklärtermaßen Sozialwissenschaft in den Dienst der Moralität stellen und keine ethische Neutralität in dieser Frage tolerieren will, obwohl er andererseits die inhaltliche Wandelbarkeit des Normalen je nach der vorherrschenden «espèce sociale» zugeben muß)¹²⁵. However (But)(,) that is not the sole (only, only) obstacle (impediment, barrier, obstruction, hindrance, handicap) to the consistent implementation (carrying out (through)) of the ethical approach. The option (or choice) (selection) of (for, in favour of) the quantitative criterion for the definition of the normal and of the pathological or exceptional (Die Option für das quantitative Kriterium zur Definition des Normalen und des Pathologischen oder Exzeptionellen) cannot found (or justify) (establish, substantiate, account for) the option (or choice) (selection) of (for, in favour of) the friendly or the inimical pole in the spectrum of the social relation. Because extreme friendship, i.e. [the] sacrifice (sacrificing) of one’s own life for other[s] [people, humans], is statistically by no means more frequent than extreme enmity, i.e. [the] killing (homicide) of a human (man, person) by a human; one would even venture (dare [to make]) the presumption (speculation, guess, supposition, assumption) (speculate, presume, guess) [that] killing and self-sacrifice more likely (rather) balance each other (out) (are more or less equal) in times of war (wartime), whereas in “normal” times of peace (peacetime)(,) daily (everyday, quotidian) killings quantitatively (greatly) outweigh [self-sacrifice(s)] (by far). Finally, Durkheim himself violates (contravenes, infringes, offends against, disowns, repudiates) the binding (bond, tie,

¹²⁵ *Règles*, pp. 55ff., 74, 47ff., 57.

relationship, attachment, linkage, connection) of the [what is] normal to (with) the ethical or “healthy (sound) (wholesome, fit, robust, salubrious, salutary, strong)” (die Bindung des Normalen an das Ethische oder „Gesunde“), as he expresses (himself) (puts, says, phrases, enunciates, states, articulates, verbalises) [it], when he [Durkheim] counts (reckons, numbers) crime amongst the normal phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) in social life (living) (wenn er das Verbrechen zu den normalen Erscheinungen im sozialen Leben zählt). At the same time(,) he [Durkheim] himself takes (retracts, recants, revokes, cancels, withdraws, reverses, recalls)(,) through (because of) that (thereby, in this way)(,) the quantitative criterion for the definition of the [what is] normal (das quantitative Kriterium zur Definition des Normalen) (back), since obviously (clearly, plainly, evidently) criminal acts (actions) are not the majority (plurality) in any society. Instructively (In an informative (instructive, revealing, interesting, enlightening) manner), [It is instructive that] he [Durkheim] establishes (manufactures or restores) (produces, makes, fabricates, completes) an indirect relation(ship) (connection, correlation; Beziehung) between crime and normality (Aufschlußreicherweise stellt er zwischen Verbrechen und Normalität eine indirekte Beziehung her): crime belongs to normality(,) because (the) collective defence (protection) against it [crime] keeps (preserves, maintains, conserves, sustains) the (solidarity) feelings (sense, sentiments, emotions, impressions) (of solidarity) of those belonging to society (i.e. society’s members) alive (in life, [as] living) (weil die kollektive Abwehr dagegen die solidarischen Gefühle der Gesellschaftsangehörigen am Leben erhalte). The shift(ing) (displacement, moving, postponement, adjournment) of the standpoint is drastic (Die Verschiebung des Standpunktes ist drastisch), although Durkheim (barely, hardly, little) (takes) notice(s) (of) it ([only] a little).

Crime and non-conforming behaviour (conduct) (nonkonformes Verhalten), that is, exception and normality do not constitute a dichotomy anymore (any longer), both of whose limbs (parts, sections, segments, members; Glieder) can exist independent of each other. Whilst (By declaring (proclaiming, announcing)) the quantitatively defined exception, i.e. (the) crime (is declared (acknowledged))(,) (as) a normal phenomenon (or manifestation), it [(the (said) quantitatively defined exception, i.e.) crime,] is transformed (converted, changed, transmuted, transfigured) into a condition of actual (real, true) normality – a(n indeed) negative (indeed), but nevertheless (a) necessary [one, condition]. Because, otherwise, one could simply demand (require, call for) its [this (the said) quantitatively defined exception's (crime's, condition's)] putting (setting) aside (elimination, removal, sidelining, doing away with, abolition, destruction; Beseitigung)(,) and disregard (ignore, pay not attention to) it in (during) the analysis of the social. As [a] condition of normality(,) the exception provides (imparts, gives, gets, conveys, procures, interposes)(,) moreover (furthermore, besides, in any case, anyway)(,) an insight (look, glimpse) into the composition (constitution, texture or nature) of normality and into the essence (substance, nature, character, being) of the forces(,) which hold (keep, stick, bind, cohere) the normality (together) (das Wesen der Kräfte, die die Normalität zusammenhalten): social solidarity is asserted (claimed, affirmed, maintained, contended) (or asserts itself) in the defence (or protection) against abnormal (aberrant) and non-standard (deviant or norm-adverse) behaviour (conduct) (Soziale Solidarität behauptet sich in der Abwehr gegen anormales und normwidriges Verhalten). [The fact] That the exception displays (shows, exhibits, reveals, discloses) the essence (substance, nature, character, being) of normality(,) and that only its thorough (painstaking, in-depth, rigorous, profound, exhaustive, outright,

careful, complete, searching, methodical, systematic) analysis permits (allows) the apprehension (grasping, understanding, comprehension, revealing, inclusion, recording, capturing) of the [what is] general-normal (ihre gründliche Analyse die Erfassung des Allgemein-Normalen), was not only pronounced (expressed, enunciated, voiced, said) by Kierkegaard in a(n) partly (in part) metaphysical, partly (in part) existentialistic context (interrelation, connection, correlation)¹²⁶. Similar (Like) statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions, propositions) are found in epistemologists, who turned [their interest (attention, minds, endeavours)] towards biological phenomena¹²⁷, as well as in sociologists, who thought (wondered, worried, had, made, did) (thoughts, ideas, concepts, notions) about (regarding) the problem of order and disorder¹²⁸. The comments (remarks, statements, exposition, reference) of the first chapter regarding (on, in relation to, about) the (basic, fundamental) dominant (ruling, prevailing) (basic) tenor (drift, essence, substance, gist) in the social theory of recent (the last few) decades explains why such statements of sociologists have rarity value (i.e. are rare or scarce)(,) and for the most part (mostly, in the main) are made without [a] deeper understanding of their systematic implications.

The quantitative apprehension (grasping, comprehension, understanding, recording, registering, capture) of the exception, as Durkheim represents (or supports (defends, advocated, pleads for, justifies)) it exemplarily (in an exemplary manner (fashion), i.e. as a model) (or paradigmatically (illustratively, typically)), even though (if) inconsistently, more often than not (for the most part, mostly, in the main, usually) underlies (forms the

¹²⁶ *Die Wiederholung*, p. 93.

¹²⁷ Canguilhem, *Le normal*, pp. 4, 75, 86ff..

¹²⁸ See e.g. Garfinkel, "Trust", p. 187: "The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of... disorganized interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained."

basis (is at the root) of) the pragmatically false (wrong, incorrect, untrue) assessments (judgements, estimations, evaluations) [in respect] of their social-ontological status. Durkheim himself threw out (dropped, rejected, discarded, got rid of) the [his] own quantitative criterion when he highlighted (emphasised, stressed, underlined) the permanent effect (impact, influence) (permanente Wirkung) of the [a] smaller quantity on the [a] by far (much) greater (larger) [quantity]. This effect cannot be explained by (from, out of) the proportional relationship of the quantities with (towards) one another,(;) that is why it [this (the said) effect] constitutes an independent (original, own-standing, standing on its own) qualitative element (or factor) (moment; Moment), which in fact (even) turns (stands) that relationship upside down (on its head). No(t) different(ly) (otherwise) do (are) both poles of the spectrum of the social relation behave (act) towards (vis-à-vis, in relation to) its [the (social relation's) spectrum's] entirety (totality) or towards its continuity; their qualitative presence in the spectrum towers above (or surpasses) (transcends, outdoes, outstrips, outshines, excels, surmounts, goes beyond, outclasses) their quantitative strength (potency, force, intensity, power, severity, fortitude) (überragt ihre quantitative Stärke), and indeed (of course) so much (to such an extent) that the thesis appears to be (seems) plausible that the by far (much) greater quantity complies (goes along) with (orientates itself towards or is modelled (depends) on (after)) (takes its cue from, follows the example of, suits, fits)(,) in [a] decisive (crucial, critical, deciding) respect(s) (regard(s), ways)(,) the by far (much) smaller [quantity]. That(,) which is regarded as normal activity in social life (living) (normale Tätigkeit im sozialen Leben), takes place (occurs, happens)(,) not least (of all) in (with) view (regard) of (to) the presumed (assumed, supposed, suspected) requirements (desiderata, demands, requisites) of action(,) in exceptional (unusual, special)

situations (situations of exception)(;) [the] collective and [the] individual (erfolgt nicht zuletzt im Hinblick auf die vermuteten Erfordernisse des Handelns in Ausnahmesituationen, Kollektiv und Individuum) go by (are (act) in accordance (deal) with, follow, conform to (with)) their normal activities, by simultaneously safeguarding (protecting, securing) (whilst they simultaneously safeguard) themselves as far as (if, where) possible and consciously from interruptions (disruptions) (breaks, disconnections, gaps, discontinuance(s), adjournment(s), recesses) or even [the] destruction(s) (breakdown(s)) (collapses, ruining(s)) [in respect] of their normal activities through (by means of) the occurrence (occurring, happening, taking place, setting (kicking) in, arising, starting) of exceptional (unusual, special) situations (situations of exception) (Unterbrechungen oder gar Zerrüttungen ihrer normalen Tätigkeiten durch das Eintreten von Ausnahmesituationen). In this way (manner) (By this means)(,) (the) normal social practice (praxis) already lifts (i.e. abolishes) (cancels, breaks (calls) off, annuls, terminates, supplants, displaces, reverses, revokes, removes, rescinds, dissolves, obviates; hebt ... auf) the supposed (assumed, presumed, accepted, adopted) dichotomy between normality and exception; the exception becomes (turns into) the [a] fixed (steady or stable) (firm, solid, settled) constituent (integral) element (or part) (component, constituent) of normality, by (whilst) normality being (is) handled (managed, used, operated, dealt with, applied) [whilst (being)] bearing in mind (mindful of) the possible occurrence of exceptional situations (die Ausnahme wird zum festen Bestandteil der Normalität, indem Normalität eingedenk des möglichen Eintretens von Ausnahmesituationen gehandhabt wird). The exception does not (must), therefore, have to (not) (actually, really, factually) occur (happen, take place, arise) (in (actual) fact)(,) so that it can unfold (or develop) its effect (impact, influence); its ideational presence in normality

in the shape (or form) of precaution (provision(s), providence; Vorsorge) already brings this effect to [its (full)] development (i.e. brings this effect about)((,) on each and every respective occasion(,)) in other (different, alternate) variants (varieties, versions, mutants) and to [a] different (varying) extent (magnitude, degrees). This should (must, ought to) be clear (obvious) (make sense) to anyone who does not convert (transform, transfigure, transmute, transubstantiate, change) the all-too-human pious wish for eternal (everlasting, perpetual, immortal, unending, timeless) normality into social theory and [social] (-)philosophy(,) and hence (therefore) to some degree (extent) (somewhat) (has) retains (preserves, conserves, keeps, protects, saves, keeps safe, safeguards) (retained, preserved, conserved,...) the [a(n), his] (cap)ability to (of, at) look(ing) at (consider(ing), contemplate, regard, observe) elementary social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) with naive eyes (elementare soziale Erscheinungen mit naiven Augen betrachten). [The fact] That no human collective [entity, group, formation, body, identity], not even the “most liberal”, e.g. has renounced (or done without) (relinquished, foregone, waived, foresworn, abstained (refrained) from, disclaimed) the threat and exercising (exercise, practice, exertion, execution) of violence, can be interpreted only as preparation for the exceptional (unusual, special) situation (situation of exception) in the state (of affairs) of normality or as [the] effect (impact, influence) of the exception on the norm in the normal state (of affairs) (Daß kein menschliches Kollektiv, auch das „liberalste“ nicht, z. B. auf die Androhung und Ausübung von Gewalt verzichtet hat, kann nur als Vorbereitung auf die Ausnahmesituation im Zustand der Normalität bzw. als Wirkung der Ausnahme auf die Norm im normalen Zustand gedeutet werden). No collective lives in permanent war, and in all collectives those (the [people]) (defined)(,) one way or another (either way, whichever way

you look at it),(,) (defined) as criminals represent (constitute) a(,) quantitatively seen(,) very small minority. However(,) the precautions against the threat [coming] from the outside and against (the) crime do not constitute (or represent)(,) for their part(,) any exceptional situation, although they concern exceptional situations; they constitute (are) a(n in themselves) (well-)balanced (in themselves dormant (idle, stationary, quiescent, abeyant, resting), self-contained) stable component of the collective, in fact they seep (get) through (i.e. permeate) (pervade, (inter)penetrate, impregnate, pierce, reach, transfuse) its [the (said) collective's] whole (entire) organisation. [The] Police (forces) (Constabularies) and (law) courts (tribunals) are not (newly) made (afresh, anew) (or recreated) in [regard to] (during, at [the time of]) every new burglary (housebreaking, break(-)in, raid).

A proper theoretical reconstruction of social life (living) impossibly [is impossible to](,) therefore(,) come(s) about (materialise(s)) [is impossible] (to be brought about (achieved, managed)) if one does not detach (cut oneself loose, free, loosen) oneself (break away, peel off) from the quantitative point of view of normality, in order to get (be) onto (or track (down)) (become aware of, uncover, detect, trace, apprehend, comprehend) the qualitatively understood effects (impact(s), influence(s)) of the exception. The exception is (at) any time (moment) (always) [the, a] living (alive, vital) present (or presence) (today, now), both objectively, i.e. in the forces (powers, energies, vigours)(,) which make (render) every social order vulnerable, as well as subjectively, i.e. in the meaning (sense, signification) which the actors connect (associate, link, (con)join, bind, tie, affiliate, couple combine) with (to) their action. At both levels there are, though (certainly, admittedly, mind you, however), reasons to either play down (downplay, minimise, trivialise) this

permanent presence (or present) of the exception in normality or even to deny (reject) [it (such (permanent) presence)]. To the usual (customary, common, normal, standard) logic of the legitimation of every social order belongs its [this (usual) logic's] direct or indirect identification with a normality founded (i.e. established or based) (formed, instituted, set up, constituted, incorporated) on (in) stable or even eternal (everlasting, perpetual) values, whereas (whilst) in [regard to, the case of] individual actors(,) the need (necessity, requirement) for relief (i.e. the relieving of the tension of existence) very often drives (edges) out (dispels, displaces, ousts, supersedes, supplants, replaces, dislodges, represses) (the) [very] thought (thinking) of the exception and its dangers (risks, hazards, perils, jeopardy, threat(s)). Praxis (i.e. practice) never completely adapts (adjusts, conforms, aligns (itself)) (fits, matches), however, (to, with) either the logic or the ideology of legitimation(,) nor to the need for relief (i.e. the relieving of the tension of existence) (Zur üblichen Logik der Legitimation jeder sozialen Ordnung gehört ihre direkte oder indirekte Identifizierung mit einer in stabilen oder gar ewigen Werten gründenden Normalität, während bei den individuellen Akteuren das Bedürfnis nach Entlastung das Denken an die Ausnahme und ihre Gefahren sehr oft verdrängt. Die Praxis paßt sich aber nie weder der Logik bzw. der Ideologie der Legitimation noch dem Bedürfnis nach Entlastung ganz an). Whichever (Whatever) place a collective or individual actor in the spectrum of the social relation occupies (or takes) at present (the moment) (presently, currently, nowadays, these days, today), he acts mindful of (bearing in mind) that which happens (is happening) at the poles of this same spectrum, that is, with the whole (entire) spectrum in mind¹²⁹. The scientific observer (der wissenschaftliche Beobachter)

¹²⁹ In relation to (Regarding) this, more in Ch. IV, Sec. 1B of this volume.

should do exactly (precisely, strictly) this too. Analysing normality in (at, on) [respect of] the (guide (main connecting thread (theme) or leitmotif)) (of) the exception [as] (guide (main connecting thread or leitmotif)) (Die Normalität am Leitfaden der Ausnahme zu analysieren)(,) and overcoming (surmounting, getting over, overbearing, overpowering) the dichotomy of normality and exception through the bringing (carving or working) out (elaboration or investigating) (processing, forming, shaping, moulding, exploring) of the integration of the exception in normality, appears (seems), incidentally, (to be) (both) in (both) synchrony as (well as) (and) diachrony (sowohl in der Synchronie wie der Diachronie)(,) essential (required, necessary, requisite). Historical change is e.g. not a question (problem, issue) of quantity and of normality, its [historical change's] prevailing (predominance, imposition, prevalence, carrying (pushing) through, victory, enforcement, imposition, infliction, achievement) does not in the least depend on whether it has captured (or taken in) (seized, caught, recorded, registered, apprehended, grasped, comprehended) the quantitatively preponderant (predominant, prevalent, overriding, greater) part (majority) of society. The social locomotives (Die sozialen Lokomotiven), which carry (bear, sustain, support) it [historical change], constitute for a long (longer (greater) [period of]) time (duration(s)) the qualitative exception inside of (within) quantitatively decisive (definitive, significant, relevant, deciding, leading, substantial) normality – and yet (nonetheless, nevertheless) the historian is (does, lies) not (lie) wrong (mistaken, incorrect, in error, false, erroneous) in examining (to examine) (looking into, scrutinising, researching, investigating, probing, inspecting, analysing) the(,) for instance(,) 14th or 15th century from the point of view of the “New Times (Modern Era)”, (of) “capitalism” etc., although the “pre-new-times(modern era)”, “pre-capitalistic” etc. circumstances (relations or

conditions) (situation) (die „vorneuzeitlichen“, „vorkapitalistischen“ etc. Verhältnisse) in those days (then, at (in) that (those) time(s)) and for a long time later (were) still (quantitatively) (were) (greatly, (much) more) predominant (prevailed) (quantitatively) (outweighed) [other (“new-times”, “capitalistic”) circumstances] (by far). Every concrete social (societal) formation (formation of society; Gesellschaftsformation) consists of several (a number of, quite a few, multiple, many a) strata (stratum, layer(s), levels, coatings, ranks; Schichten), some (quite a few) of them [such strata] in fact (even) continue to (carry on) have (having) roots (be rooted) in the archaic (i.e. antiquity (the ancient world (times))), but their definition as a whole must take place (and be accordingly (correspondingly) justified (substantiated, founded, established, accounted for)) in view of (with regard to) the qualitatively predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) (directive) elements (pointing the way (ahead or to the future)), (and be justified accordingly) (aber ihre Definition als ganze muß im Hinblick auf die qualitativ vorherrschenden richtungsweisenden Elemente erfolgen und dementsprechend begründet werden)¹³⁰. The sociological worship (or adoration) (idolatry, devotion) of normality becomes(,) given (in view of) such objective (or factual) (real, material, relevant, substantive) and epistemological necessities(,) meaningless (senseless, pointless, purposeless, useless, futile). All the more so(,) when (if) the historical exception means (signifies) not merely (just, only) a pause (intermission, break, recess, rest, interval, hiatus, respite) between two phases of the same structural normality, but(,) in a revolutionary way (manner)(,) brings into being a new normality, that is, [it (the said historical exception)] (newly) (re)defines the meaning (sense) of normality (anew, afresh).

¹³⁰ On (Regarding, About) that(,) more in the 3rd volume of this work.

A sober (dispassionate, unemotional, level-headed, matter-of-fact, austere, prosaic, bland) social-ontological evaluation (appraisal) of (the) exception stands not only in the way of the zeal(otry) (fervour, ardour, keenness, eagerness) of the ethicists of various hues (complexions, i.e. stripes), who want to eradicate (weed (wipe, comb, sort) out, eliminate, uproot, obliterate) the inimical pole or the inimical half in the spectrum of the social relation, because they dream of a(n) eternally (everlastingly, forever, perpetually, immortally, unendingly) undisturbed (uninterrupted, peaceful, imperturbable) normality; norm, normality and normativism belong together in fact both juristically (juridically or legally) as well as ethically (Einer nüchternen sozialontologischen Bewertung der Ausnahme steht nicht nur der Eifer der Ethiker verschiedener Couleur in Wege, die den feindlichen Pol oder die feindliche Hälfte im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung ausmerzen wollen, weil sie von der ewig ungestörten Normalität träumen; Norm, Normalität und Normativismus gehören ja sowohl juristisch als auch ethisch zusammen). The glorification (extolment, praising, apotheosis, adulation, celebration) of the exception on the part of magniloquent (grandiloquent, verbally formidable (enthralling, powerful)) existentialists, who make out of normality an aesthetically (and ultimately (in the end) also ethically, even though (albeit) in another sense than [that of] the normativists (Normativisten)) unbearable (intolerable, unendurable, excruciating, insufferable) banality, in order to then contrast (contradistinguish, compare) this [normality] with (to) the authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) (reality, originality) of the determined (resolute, unfaltering, unflinching, unbending, resolved) to [go to] extremes (in the extreme) existence in borderline situations (die Eigentlichkeit der zum Äußersten entschlossenen Existenz in Grenzsituationen), has (is, acts, works, operates) (a) no less misleading(ly) (deceptive, delusory, false, delusive,

fallacious) (effect). Both sides essentially (basically, fundamentally) pay homage (tribute) (subscribe) to (indulge in) (follow, worship, embrace), of course with reverse(d) (opposite, inverse, contrary, converse) signs (i.e. symbolism) (the other way around), the dichotomous perception (view, conception, opinion) regarding (of, on, about) the relationship between normality and exception, which however (though) cannot be brought into line (harmonised or reconciled) with the (entirely, totally) indispensable (inseparable, integral, necessary) (not to be thought [= thrown] away (i.e. disregarded)) common bond (togetherness, interrelation, relationship, linkage, interdependence) (mit der nicht wegzudenkenden Zusammengehörigkeit) of (between) polarity and continuity in the spectrum of the social relation. Said the other way around (Put differently): polarity and continuity interweave (intertwine, interlace) with each other in the spectrum of the social relation in the same sense and [to (on) the same] extent (degree, scale) as exception and normality in [the] organisation and [the] movement (motion) of the whole of (total, entire, aggregate, overall) social life (living). Normalities (frequently) stem (come, originate, date, hail) from (in) (go back to)(, in many cases (ways),) from exceptions and breaks (or ruptures) (breakages, fractures, cracks, splits; Brüchen), and they (are) always based (founded) (rest) on measures (or precautions) for exceptional (unusual, special) situations (situations of exception) (Vorkehrungen für die Ausnahmesituationen). Exceptions want(,) for their part(,) to found (or justify) (establish, substantiate, account for) normalities, i.e. make (render, turn) the principles connected with the self-understanding of their originators (creators, bearers, authors) and advocates (champions or proponents) (defenders, supporters) (into) the guiding principle (guideline, rule) (or at any rate (into) the ideal) of social (or individual) action (Ausnahmen wollen ihrerseits Normalitäten begründen, d. h. die

mit dem Selbstverständnis ihrer Urheber oder Verfechter verbundenen Prinzipien zur Richtschnur (oder jedenfalls zum Ideal) sozialen (oder individuellen) Handelns machen); because not even they can imagine that social life could be based (rest) on a never-ending (never being suspended (interrupted, abandoned, adjourned) (stopping, breaking off), incessant, unceasing) sequence of exceptional situations (auf einer nie aussetzenden Folge von Ausnahmesituationen). Thus (So, In this way)(,) the exception is, or it must become (it), much more banal (trite, commonplace, trivial, mundane, run-of-the-mill) and everyday (i.e. commonplace) (daily, ordinary, humdrum) than those who see (behold, spot, espy, catch sight of) in it the unfolding (development) space (room to move or field of activity) of authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) (reality, originality) (Entfaltungsraum der Eigentlichkeit), want to believe; and precisely because of its banal and everyday (i.e. commonplace) components ([a] friendly (kindly, pleasant, affable, cordial, gentle) smiling armed policeman on (during) [his] evening patrol (shift))(,) normality permeates (penetrates, imbues, pervades, gets (seeps) through) it [the exception] much deeper than the scribes (i.e. writers) of idylls (pastoral scenes (poems)) (would) like (to) (take pleasure in) perceive (perceiving) (be aware of, notice, detect, discern) in the field (area, domain) of social theory. The mistakes (errors, faults, defects, flaws) on both sides and the short circuits (i.e. rash, logically inconsistent, thinking (actions)) (moments of madness; Kurzschlüsse) call to mind (recall, are reminiscent (remind) [us, one]) of(,) by the way in [a] symmetrical way (manner)(,) the mistakes and short circuits (i.e. rash, logically inconsistent, thinking) of the friends and the foes of decisionism (i.e. the arbitrariness of (subjective) decisions) (Dezisionismus) – as expected, since the former [friends] did (have) not keep (kept) secret (quiet) (conceal(ed), hide, hidden, cover(ed) up, suppress(ed)) (about) their

preference (predilection, fondness, partiality, proclivity, (special) liking) for the exception, whereas the latter take (took) up the cudgels (go (in)to bat) for (come (came) in on the side of) the normality party (side, faction) (die Normalität Partei). Regarding (On, About, In relation to) this social-ontologically (highly) explosive (charged, volatile) (shattering) question (problem)(,) we have already said the the [what is] necessary [things] in another place¹³¹.

C. [The] Phenomenology of continuity. A sketch (outline, delineation, plan, adumbration, design, draft) (Phänomenologie der Kontinuität. Eine Skizze)

In the systematising expositions (presentations, explanations, analyses, exposés, statements; Dalegungen) of (the) formal sociology (formalen Soziologie) with [a] claim[s] to peremptoriness (finality, conclusiveness, irrevocability, decisiveness, unassailability) (Endgültigkeitsanspruch), it was plausible (sensible, reasonable, familiar, to be expected, likely, credible, probable) to undertake (attempt, do, make) classifications of the forms of the social relation (Klassifizierungen der Formen der sozialen Beziehung) in accordance with the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, that is, to place (put, position) every one of these forms somewhere (anywhere, someplace) between extreme nearness (proximity) and extreme distance according to (commensurate with) the predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) aspect in it [(the (every) form of) the social relation] and its [every form of the social relation's] intensity. Thus (So, In this way)(,) v. Wiese (has) worked out

¹³¹ Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, esp. p. 7ff.; Kondylis, „Jurisprudenz“, p. 355ff..

(prepared, formulated) a table, which from “approaching (or drawing near to) (Annäherung)” reaches “conflict (Konflikt)” via “adaptation (adjustment, acculturation, conformity, conformation, alignment; Anpassung)”, “becoming alike (or bringing into line) (growing closer together, adaptation, adjustment, assimilation, conformation, mimicry, standardisation; Angleichung)”, “unification (uniting or combining) (association, union, amalgamation, consolidation, integration; Vereinigung)”, “competition (rivalry; Konkurrenz)” and “opposition (Opposition)”¹³². Such tables serve general goals (ends, purposes, intent(ion)s, aims, objects) of orientation (goal orientation) (Orientierungszwecken) and in this respect they are useful (beneficial, helpful), on the other hand, they can in practice be refined, enriched or modified ad infinitum, whereby (by (in relation to) which) one could get tangled up (entangled, embroiled, implicated, involved) in an infertile (unfruitful, unproductive, barren, sterile, fruitless) casuistry. Instead of this(,) we want to found (i.e. conceptually establish or base) (form, institute, set up, constitute, incorporate) the phenomenology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation on (in) the discussion (in detail) of the structural factors, which it [the social relation] determines (conditions, necessitates, causes, presupposes). In the course of this, it is primarily (chiefly, principally, mainly, first and foremost, pre-eminently) a matter of the absolute necessity of the multiform (variform, diversiform, multifarious) co-existence or mixing (blending, mixture) of friendship and enmity with each other, from (out of) which again (in turn) the absolute necessity of a constant (continuous) movement between both poles of the spectrum follows (results, arises, ensues). Seen (Viewed)

¹³² *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 51-53; „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 74ff.. Regarding (About, On, In relation to) similar (like) attempts (efforts) at classification, in part, in (respect of) the direct succession (i.e. successors) of formal sociology, be (get) informed by (see) the next [sub-]section.

from the angle (or aspect) (point of view) (in terms) of the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the spectrum, that co-existence or mixing constitutes a function of the fact that every friendship (enmity) contains (includes, embodies) in itself as much enmity (friendship) as corresponds (equates) to (with) the distance (spacing or gap) (space, interval, detachment), which separates it in the spectrum of the social relation from the pole of extreme friendship (enmity) (Dabei geht es in erster Linie um die absolute Notwendigkeit der vielgestaltigen Koexistenz oder Vermischung von Freundschaft und Feindschaft miteinander, woraus sich wiederum die absolute Notwendigkeit einer ständigen Bewegung zwischen den beiden Polen des Spektrums ergibt. Unter dem Aspekt der formalen Struktur des Spektrums betrachtet, bildet jene Koexistenz oder Vermischung eine Funktion der Tatsache, daß jede Freundschaft (Feindschaft) soviel Feindschaft (Freundschaft) in sich enthält, wie es dem Abstand entspricht, der sie im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung vom Pol der extremen Freundschaft (Feindschaft) trennt); friendship (enmity) achieves (accomplishes, reaches, attains, gets) indeed very often its extreme or pure form precisely (there) where enmity (friendship) is manifested (manifests itself) in the most extreme or [(in) the] most pure [form, manner, way, mode, fashion],(;) this(,) though (however),(,) does not lift (i.e. abolish) (cancel, break (call) off, annul, terminate, supplant, displace, reverse, revoke, remove, withdraw, rescind, dissolve, obviate, close, abrogate, supersede) the necessary co-existence of both forms of the relation; self-sacrifice (self-sacrificing, sacrificing oneself) appears (or happens) (occurs, crops up, is found, comes forward, seems) most frequently amongst all social phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences),(,) (precisely, exactly, just) in war (of all social phenomena) (Selbstaufopferung kommt unter allen sozialen Erscheinungen ausgerechnet im Krieg am häufigsten vor).

This form-related (formal) way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation) grants (gives, bestows) [(upon) us] fundamental (basic, elementary) insights into the elementary mechanics of the combination games (games (plays, performances, sets) of combination) of (between) friendship (amity) and enmity (hostility) (Diese formale Betrachtung gewährt grundlegende Einblicke in die elementare Mechanik der Kombinationsspiele von Freundschaft und Feindschaft); the concrete analysis of the same [combination games of friendship and enmity](,) (of) case (instance) by (to) case (instance) (i.e. on a case-by-case [basis])(,) must of course be reserved for the historian and the sociologist (die konkrete Analyse derselben von Fall zu Fall muß freilich dem Historiker und dem Soziologen vorbehalten werden). Because (the) form-related (i.e. formal) way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation), that is, detached (removed, freed, cut loose (off, away), absconded, excised, severed, elided, amputated) from the actors on each and every respective occasion, to which social ontology is condemned (sentenced) because (on account, by reason, for the sake) of (due to) its claim to (of, on) generalisation (generality) (generalisation (generalising) claim) (Denn die formale, also von den jeweiligen Akteuren losgelöste Betrachtung, zu der die Sozialontologie wegen ihres Verallgemeinerungsanspruchs verurteilt ist), cannot explain, but merely (simply) registers (records, captures, notes, keeps a record of, writes down, enters, chronicles) the fact that the same actors occupy (fill, reserve) other (or different) (alternat(iv)e, variant, new) places (positions, loci) (andere Plätze ... besetzen) in the spectrum of the social relation on each and every respective occasion; whereas (whilst) the sequence (order) of these places (positions) remains stable at (on) the level of the form-related (i.e. formal) apprehension (grasping, understanding, capture, recording, registering, registration) (formalen Erfassung) of the spectrum, the actors move incessantly

(unceasingly, constantly, perpetually, unremittingly, unendingly, continually, without stopping) back and forth(, to and fro, hither and thither) (there and back, here and there) in the continuum(,) which manufactures (makes, produces or creates) (fabricates, restores, establishes) these places. Neither can “friendship” be allo(ca)t(t)ed (or assigned) ((ap)portioned, attached, given, attributed, ascribed, imputed, conferred) to (upon) “good” actors, nor enmity to “bad (evil) (nasty, wicked)” [actors, ones], that is, the corresponding places in the spectrum do not have any existentially and essentially (i.e. of their own essence) (intrinsically, in essence) pre-programmed occupiers (owners or holders) (occupants, proprietors, bearers); for their part(,) they [these places] do not represent (or constitute) small boxes (caskets, cases, squares) existing in advance ((from) beforehand)(,) which wait for the suitable (appropriate, qualified, eligible, apt, fit) actors(,) (in order) to be filled (fill [them]), but their directory (index or table) (list, register; Verzeichnis) constitutes the abstractive (abstracting) summary (summing, abstract, synopsis, precis) of historically attested (to) (witnessed, vouched for) social relations between humans (people, men). The distance (spacing or gap) (interval, space, detachment) between the form-related (i.e. formal) apprehension of the spectrum and the real level of social action (und der realen Ebene des sozialen Handelns) can be, incidentally (by the way), recognised (known, discerned, understood, acknowledged) already in [the fact] that the actor can move from this to that (any, every, whichever) place of the spectrum (at will (or arbitrarily)) (randomly, as one (he) likes) (whatsoever), i.e. from this to that other (different) kind (sort, type, way, manner, mode, style, fashion, nature, species) of friendship or enmity, without having to take into (show) account (consideration) (pay heed) (for, to) (bear in mind) the systematic sequence (order) of the social relations at the form-related (i.e. formal)

level of description (or (re)presentation) (depiction, portrayal, account) (description (descriptive) level) (formalen Darstellungsebene) of their spectrum. For the – theoretical – bridging (getting through, reconciliation, stopgap) of that distance (spacing or gap), that is, for the overcoming (surmounting, conquest, defeat) of the pure formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to form) of the spectrum in the direction (line, course, way, movement, trend, tendency) of (towards) the reality of action, (it takes) the bringing (working) out (or elaborating) (elaboration, analysis, processing) of the mechanism of the social relation (is necessary (required)) (Zur – theoretischen – Überbrückung jenes Abstandes, also zur Überwindung der puren Formalität des Spektrums in Richtung auf die Realität des Handelns bedarf es der Herausarbeitung des Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung), which shall occupy (keep) us (busy) in the next chapter, as well as the introduction of the dimension of time (time dimension; Zeitdimension) in [respect of, regard to] the analysis of this same relation. If the form-relatedly (i.e. formally) apprehended (grasped, understood, comprehended) spectrum of the social relation is timeless (ageless, dateless; zeitlos) in the sense that all places (positions, loci) in it, despite (notwithstanding, in spite of) [the] constant (continual, continuous, perpetual) movement (motion) of the individual (separate, lone, solitary, single, isolated) actors from place to place, always (forever) remain present and occupied (filled, reserved), (then, so, thus) on the other hand(,) the (afore)(above-)mentioned movement takes place (comes to pass, happens) (is effected (carried out, performed, executed)) in time. The dimension of time (time dimension) is real time for the carrying out (execution, performance, enforcement, implementation, completion, fulfilment, consummation) of the actors' movement inside of the spectrum (Die Zeitdimension ist reale Zeit zum Vollzug der Bewegung der Akteure innerhalb des Spektrums), but above all it is

(thought, reckoned, supposed, conceived, assumed, meant, imaginary) time thought about (and imagined) (gedachte Zeit), in which in the imagination (perception, conception, vision) of the actors several (a number of, multiple, various) possible movements take place (or are carried out (performed, executed)) (happen), that is, several possible social relations (are preventively (precautionarily, prophylactically) (and)(,) in terms of planning(,)) anticipated (as a preventive (measure) and planned measure (in terms of planning)) (vorbeugend und planend vorweggenommen werden). As time thought about (and imagined), the dimension of time consequently (therefore) dynamises (makes (more) dynamic, potentiates; dynamisiert) the social relation between real actors and contributes essentially (substantially, considerably, fundamentally, materially) to the effacing (blurring) (smudging, covering over (up), smearing) and muddling (messing, tangling) up of the boundaries and the logic of form-related (i.e. formal) classification in praxis (i.e. practice).

The actors – irrespective of whether they are active in the field (area, sector, domain, realm) of high theory or in that of low(-)brow (philistine, anti-intellectual, plebeian, boorish, uncultured; banausischer) praxis (practice) – often make the effort (endeavour, go out of their way (to the trouble), try, attempt) to prove [that] the spectrum of the social relation is (stands) “actually (in actual (as a matter of) fact (reality))” under the influence (sign, aegis, cloak) of friendship or of enmity. When (the) one side is convinced of the natural peacefulness (peaceableness, pacificity, placidity, gentleness, docileness; Friedfertigkeit) and goodness (kind(li)ness, benevolence, charity, good nature) of man (people, humans), then (so, thus) the other [side] must for polemical reasons emphasise (underline, give prominence to) his [man’s] innate (inborn, congenital, hereditary; angeborene) aggressivity (aggressiveness,

aggression; Aggressivität) and delight (or pleasure) in (appetite, desire or lust for) destruction (devastation, annihilation, ruination, ruining, wrecking, ravaging) (destructiveness; Zerstörungslust), as well as the other way around (contrariwise, vice versa). The self-legitimation (legitimising, legitimation) (or self-justification) of a polity (community, commonwealth) (Die Selbstlegitimierung eines Gemeinwesens), in which the collective drive (urge, impulse or instinct) (inclination, impulsion, desire, need) of (for) self-preservation is articulated (in der sich der kollektive Selbsterhaltungstrieb artikuliert), normally (usually, ordinarily, customarily, conventionally, traditionally, under normal circumstances) puts sociality and (or) friendship first together (along) with the corresponding duties (responsibilities, obligations)(,) and puts (attributes, reduces) enmity (down) to the essence (nature, character or being) (substance, texture; Wesen) and machinations (intrigues, wheeling(s) and dealing(s), scheming, chicanery; Machenschaften) of other[s] [people, humans, men], from which the conclusion follows [that] enmity must (necessarily, has to) disappear(s) (vanish(es)) with that essence (nature, character or being) and those machinations from (out of) the world; however, the opposite (other) (counter-)side thinks just (exactly) the same way, and exactly because the primacy (priority) of friendship recognised (known, accepted, established) in principle (fundamentally) on both sides cannot be realised (carried out, implemented, produced) in one framework encompassing (containing, enclosing, comprising, embracing, embodying, encircling) both sides. From [a] social-ontological point of view, no polemical [reason] or (legitimising) reason [in respect] (of legitimation) (polemischer oder Legitimationsgrund) of course exists(,) in order to give (the) priority (or preference) (precedence, advantage, merit, privilege) to friendship or enmity in the spectrum of the social relation. This would in

fact (indeed, of course) (call into) question (query, challenge) the social-*ontological* status of the spectrum itself, because one of its both poles or one [of its both] halves would have to thereby (through (because of) that, in this way, by this means) descend (climb down, walk) into (to)(wards) contingency (i.e. become unnecessary) (zur Kontingenz herabsteigen). Social ontology should (is meant (supposed) to) rather (on the contrary) take the necessary togetherness (or common bond) (interrelation, relationship) of (between) friendship and enmity in the spectrum of the social relation seriously (in earnest)(,) and make (render) the main (chief, principal) forms (shapes, moulds, figures, frames) of this togetherness (or common bond) the basis of a phenomenology of the continuity in this same spectrum (und die Hauptgestalten dieser Zusammengehörigkeit zur Basis einer Phänomenologie der Kontinuität in diesem selben Spektrum machen). The typical (characteristic) mistake (error, fault, flaw, defect, failing), which should be avoided (evaded, obviated, averted) here, manifests (shows, expresses) itself often in assumptions (suppositions, hypotheses, presumptions, acceptances) of the type [that] social relations on which society is founded (or based) (established, set up, formed, instituted, incorporated) are contrary (opposed, conflicting, contrasting) to (with) those which for instance two armies (standing) opposite (or facing) each other inimically embody (incarnate, personify) (soziale Beziehungen, worin Gesellschaft gründe, seien denen entgegengesetzt, die etwa zwei feindlich gegenüberstehende Armeen verkörpern)¹³³. The mistake is obvious: it is merely thought of (what (it) is merely (just, only) thought of [is]) what is between the armies, not that which is going on (happening, taking place, occurring) within (inside (of)) the armies, in which the inner coherence (coherency) (Kohärenz) normally must

¹³³ Thus (So, In this way)(,) McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 6.

increase (grow, expand, pick up, intensify) exactly to the extent that enmity grows (waxes, expands, heightens, increases) and as [to the extent that] the hour of (the) armed confrontation (altercation, conflict, clash, dispute) draws near(er) (approaches, comes (gets) closer). Far from proving (demonstrating, establishing) (Very far (distant, remote) from that which is to be proven is) the diametrical contrast(ing) (or opposition) of (between, in [regard to]) associating and dis(as)sociating forces (powers) vis-à-vis (with regard to, towards) one another, this example rather graphically (vividly, clearly, concretely, lucidly) illustrates (makes [us] aware of) the fact (clear) that friendship and enmity represent (and constitute) two sides of the same medal(lion) (i.e. coin); and precisely enmities, in which there is, as Herodotus let Xerxes say, “no middle path (or course) (way, road, route, ground)”¹³⁴, not only mobilise friendship, but they absolutely (virtually, actually, really, frankly, almost, exactly) presuppose it. This (is) only noticed (noticeable) (stands out, makes an impression)(,) though (mind you, admittedly, certainly)(,) when (if) one considers (takes) the overall (or total) (whole) complex in a concrete situation (circumstance[s], condition[s], state (of affairs), positions, locations) (into account)(,) and in the course of this (the process) (at the same time, into the bargain) observes how every new branching out (or ramification) of the social relation brings to light new respects (i.e. aspects) (directions, points, premises, regards, senses, ways, terms), towards which friendship and enmity must be directed(,) so that the foe (enemy) in one respect (from one aspect) becomes the friend in another [respect] (from another aspect) etc. (wenn man den Gesamtkomplex in einer konkreten Lage berücksichtigt und dabei beobachtet, wie jede neue

¹³⁴ VII, 11, 3: «τὸ γὰρ μέσον οὐδὲν τῆς ἔχθρης ἐστίν» [= “the middle ground of enmity is nothing”; or: “there is no middle course for our enmity” (in Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*).

Verästelung der sozialen Beziehung neue Hinsichten an den Tag bringt, nach denen sich Freundschaft und Feindschaft richten müssen, so daß der Feind in einer Hinsicht der Freund in einer anderen wird etc.). Here(,) the Arabian (Arab(ic)) proverb (saying, adage)(,) in its condensed wisdom (sagacity, sapience, profoundness, sageness)(,) speaks volumes (says a lot) (bonds, ties, tethers, braids, unities, knots): “I against my brother; I and my brother against our cousin; I, my brothers and my cousins against the neighbouring village; all of us (we all) [including (the) neighbouring village(s)] against the alien (stranger or foreigner) (Other)”. The factors of social interaction therefore normally (usually, ordinarily, customarily, conventionally, traditionally, under normal circumstances) develop (or unfold) a dual (binary) effect (impact, influence) (Die Faktoren sozialer Interaktion entfalten also normalerweise eine duale Wirkung), i.e. they contribute in (from), on each and every respective occasion, [a] different respect (aspect) to(wards) association as well as to(wards) dis(as)sociation (Assoziation als auch zur Dissoziation); association in this respect (from this aspect) entails dissociation in (from) that [respect, aspect],(;) more intens(iv)e (strong, acute, powerful) coherence (or unity) (cohesion, interrelation, correlation) of a group is accompanied by (accompanies, goes hand in hand with) [a] sharper (acuter, stronger, more severe) demarcation (delimitation) against other groups (intensivere Geschlossenheit einer Gruppe geht mit schärferer Abgrenzung gegen andere Gruppen einher) etc.¹³⁵.

The necessary co-existence and the symmetrical increasing (heightening, intensification) of (increase (rise) in) the intensity of friendship and enmity (die symmetrische Intensitätssteigerung von Freundschaft und Feindschaft)(,) are explained quite (rightly, pretty,

¹³⁵ Jameson, “Principles”, p. 11.

fairly, really) (well) (nicely, finely, efficiently) on the basis (with the help) of (based on) the internal (inner, inward) logic of the grouping (or group formation) of (the) individuals in public life (living) (Gruppierung von Individuen im öffentlichen Leben). Here the [a] (challenge) (to) fight (or struggle) (battle, combat) (announcement, call) (or declaration of war) against one party eo ipso brings about (on) (causes, induces) the formation (development) of another [party], that is, of an alliance (= union, association, league, confederation or band) of friends (Hier muß die Kampfansage gegen eine Partei eo ipso die Herausbildung einer anderen, also eines Bundes von Freunden herbeiführen). Because whoever issues a challenge (to fight, struggle) (or a declaration of war)(,) and in the process pursues (follows, tracks, trails, chases) public aims (targets, objectives, goals, ends, purposes) – political in the current (present-day) sense or intellectual(mental)(-spiritual), i.e. such [intellectual(-spiritual) aims](,) which foresee (have an (their) eye on) a certain (particular) (re-)shaping(forming, moulding, structuring, arrangement, organisation, design, creation) of modes (ways) of thought (thinking) and behaviour (behaving) (thought (intellectual) and behavioural modes (ways, manners) (eine bestimmte (Um-)Gestaltung von Denk- und Verhaltensweisen)) –, (he, that [person]) sooner or later lands (ends up, arrives) in the madhouse (nuthouse, lunatic asylum, loony bin) if he alone goes (moves, pulls (draws) [himself]) into battle (combat, struggle) (or takes on the fight by himself) against the whole (entire) world, that is, finds no friends, whom he can harness (i.e. rope in) for (fit into) those aims; through (by means of, with) the small or large (great) number of his friends he will be taken seriously socially and politically¹³⁶.

¹³⁶ Montesquieu remarks (observes, comments, notices) very nicely (well, finely) regarding (in relation to, on) the Roman polity (commonwealth, community): «La constitution de l'État était telle que chacun était porté à se faire des amis... Un homme n'était puissant dans le sénat et dans le peuple que par ses amis...» [= “The constitution of the state was such that everyone was inclined (made or driven) to make

So that he can rally (assemble, gather) friends around (himself) (and) or so that other[s] [people, humans, men] have compelling (good, sound, weighty, cogent, convincing) reasons to rally around him as friends, he must have foes (enemies), which of course must not be said directly: one can talk simply of (about) “aims (objectives, targets, goals, ends, purposes)” or “ideals”, however(,) people (humans, men) inevitably (without fail, inescapably) stand in the way of the realisation of the same ([such] “aims” or “ideals”), so that the impersonal declaration (proclamation) of the aims and of the ideals is tantamount (equivalent, equal) (amounts) to (matches) a personal (challenge) (to) fight (or struggle) (battle, combat) (announcement, call) (or declaration of war)(,) and is also perceived (felt, seen) as such by the people concerned; if (there was no(t)) (the) concrete counter-party (i.e. opposing party or other side) (opposition; *Gegenpartei*) (did not exist), then (so, thus) that declaration would obviously (patently, manifestly) be superfluous (redundant, spare, unnecessary) and would not cause a stir (or sensation).

friends ... A man was (not) powerful in the senate and amongst (in) the people but (only) through (by means (way) of) his friends...” (*Pensées*, Nr. 1253 (604) = *Oeuvres*, II, p. 333ff.; on (regarding) this function of *amicitia* [friendship] cf. Gelzer, *Nobilität*, p. 44ff., 83ff., as well as Rouland, *Pouvoir politique*; on analogous phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) in Greece see Sartori, *Le eterie*, as well as Gehrke, „Zwischen Freundschaft und Programm“). Montesquieu compares (likens) (the) (idealised) Roman circumstances (relations or conditions) with (to) the isolation (insulation) of individuals from one another in a despotism (despotic regime), however(,) at the same time (into the bargain, in the course of this (process))(,) his political preferences cloud (muddy, dull, tarnish, spoil, dampen, obfuscate, mist, blur) (his) sociological gaze (view, look, sight, glimpse) ([belonging] to him). Because the despot is no less than for instance the politician or the demagogue dependent (reliant) on friends, and Sophocles rightly (just(ifiab)ly, advisedly) let (allowed) his Oedipus accuse (reproach, blame) Creon of (for) acting foolishly (naively, moronically)(,) when he [Creon](,) without an armed crowd (populace, multitude, mass, people, mob) and without friends behind him (ἄνευ τε πλήθους καὶ φίλων) [= without [a, the] multitude (mass, crowd, throng, people, populace, mob) and friends] wanted to become Tyrant (tyrant) (*Oedipus Rex*, vv. 540-542). The categorial independence (or autonomy) of the alliance (union, association, league, (con)federation, band) of friends was(,) as is (well-)known(,) worked (brought, carved) out (or elaborated) (processed, investigated, explored) by Schmalenbach („Der Bund“); primitive “secret societies” („geheime Gesellschaften“) can be subsumed thereunder (under there (it) [(such categorial independence) of the alliance of friends]) just as (like) modern Parties, cf. Ludz (ed.), *Geheime Gesellschaften*. Needless to say (Naturally, Of course), (by no means) (must) friendship (does not at all (in the least) necessarily (have to)) imply in this social-ontological context intimacy (familiarity) or equality ((and/or) sameness) amongst friends. Cf. the excellent (superb, masterly, first-rate, choice, exquisite) work by Altoff, *Verwandte, Freunde und Getreue*, esp. the 3rd chapter and the “Conclusion (Closing, End(ing))”.

The assertion (claim, contention, statement, proposition, thesis, allegation) is not therefore paradoxical that without foes (enemies) one does not have any followers (adherents or supporters) (fans, devotees, disciples, partisans, enthusiasts)¹³⁷. Here it is merely a matter of a special case (instance) (exception; Sonderfall) of the most usual (common) social-ontological principle of grouping (or group formation) (grouping principle), in which(,) incidentally (by the way)(,) the necessary common bond (or togetherness) (interrelation, relationship, linkage, interdependence) of (between) friendship and enmity immediately catches the (one's) eye (strikes (hits) one immediately (in the eye), sticks out a mile); friendship is constituted as [a] joining together (combining or union) (combination, amalgamation, merger, federation, consolidation; Zusammenschluß) of actors against a common (joint, mutual, collective) foe, regardless of whether for defensive or offensive goals (ends or purposes). As the Arabian (Arab(ic)) proverb cited (quoted) [above] already indicates, knowledge of this most elementary amongst all principles of grouping (or group formation) constitutes [a] universal [estate, i.e. reserve (fund, property, possession, item), of] ideas (or thoughts) (universelles Gedankengut), from (out of) which practical lessons (teachings, doctrines, theories, morals) both (also, even, really, actually) everywhere (all over the place) and at all tiers (stages or levels) (grades, gradations) of cultural development (the development of culture) (auf allen Stufen der Kulturentwicklung) were drawn (too, as well)¹³⁸.

¹³⁷ “The man who has no enemies has no following”, Piatt, *Memories*, Preface.

¹³⁸ Thus (So, In this way)(,) a proverb (saying) of tropical Africa warns (alerts, cautions) (the) allies against a common (joint, mutual) foe (enemy) of (about, against) being disunited (not united, in disagreement, divided) amongst themselves, see Claridge, *Wild Bush Tribes*, p. 255. And Plutarch cites (quotes) a leader of the [a] victorious (triumphant, winning, successful, conquering) (civil war) party (side, faction) (in (of) a civil war) in (on [the island of]) Chios, who should have (was supposed (meant) to have) urged (admonished, exhorted, reminded) [his combatants (troops, warriors)] to (of) not send(ing) all [their] foes into exile, otherwise the victors (winners, champions) would be threatened with (in danger (at risk) of) division (disunion, splitting, separation, being split up) [amongst themselves] (*Πῶς ἄν τις ...*, 91F – 92A; cf. Scipio Nasica's dictum (pronouncement, statement, assertion, maxim, saying, declaration) in 88A).

Very many sociologists saw in commonly (i.e. (con)jointly) (mutually, conjunctly, collectively) shared enmity “one of the most powerful (potent, forceful) (mightiest, strongest) means”(,) to bring about (on) (cause, induce, force, precipitate) cohesion (coherence)¹³⁹, other[s] [sociologists, (social) theorists], older and newer, went one step further and opined (said, thought, believed) [that] only the [a] common foe holds (keeps, sticks, hangs) collectives together (nur der gemeinsame Feind halte Kollektive zusammen)¹⁴⁰. Here we do not have to decide which view (opinion, notion, idea, judgement) under which (what) conditions (circumstances, terms) is (holds) accurate (or applies) (correct, true, right, the case, valid) (follows). It may be regarded as (considered) certain (secure, assured, reliable, steady, safe) that friendship (then) can come into being and continue (last, remain, survive, persist, come through) when friends have both common (joint, mutual) friends as well as common foes (enemies)¹⁴¹. Nonetheless, many an (quite a few, a number of, some, much) experience[s] (empirical (practical) knowledge) speaks for (in favour of) Adam Smith’s remark (or observation) (comment) [that] we would indeed stand (i.e. tolerate) (endure, bear) that our friends would not share all their friends with us, but not that they (would) make (are, be) friends with (have befriended) our foes¹⁴². On (In [regard to], With, Through) this detour (or roundabout way), as on (with) other[s] [detours and roundabout ways] too, the criterion of enmity is decisive (crucial, determinative, deciding, relevant, substantial) for friendship, which points (alludes) (indicates) anew (afresh) (to) their ([friendship (enmity) and enmity’s (friendship’s)]) togetherness (or common bond) (interrelation,

¹³⁹ Thus (So, Hence, In this way)(,) e.g. Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 108, 139.

¹⁴⁰ Thus (So, Hence, In this way)(,) e.g. Ferguson, *Essay*, I, 4 = S. [= p.] 25: “It is vain to expect that we can give to the multitude of people a sense of union among themselves, without admitting hostility to those who oppose them.” Easier to remember (More memorable (catchy))(,) Lasswell: “people do not unite, but unite against specific collective groups” (*World Politics*, p. 239).

¹⁴¹ Aristotle, *Rhetorik*, 1381a 7-9, 13-17.

¹⁴² *Theory*, I, 1, 2.

relationship) in every social complex (Auf diesem Umweg, wie auf anderen auch, wird das Kriterium der Feindschaft für die Freundschaft maßgeblich, was von neuem auf ihre Zusammengehörigkeit in jedem sozialen Komplex hindeutet).

As we know, the terms “friendship” and “enmity” have (got) (possess, own, keep, hold, get, obtain) another sense (i.e. meaning), depending on whether they are used in connection (interrelation, association) with the polarity or the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation. In the former case (instance) [i.e. of the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation](,) the meaning (sense) is determined (conditioned) by the direct reference (relation, connection; Bezug) to (with) the fact of human mortality(,) and is because of (for) that (this) (hence, therefore, consequently, on this account) clear (or unambiguous (with one meaning (or interpretation))) (unequivocal, clear, obvious, indisputable, definite, unmistakable, explicit, manifest, plain, unique; eindeutig). In the latter [case (i.e. that of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation)](,) that reference (relation, connection) is indirect (mediate, consequential) and potential (prospective) (mittelbar und potentiell), and since (as, because) there are several (a number of, many, multiple, quite a few) grades (or degrees) of mediacy (or indirectness) and potentiality (und da es mehrere Grade von Mittelbarkeit und Potentialität gibt), we can speak of (talk about) friendship and enmity only polysemously (i.e. ambiguously) (in terms of many (multiple) meanings; vieldeutig). Clarity (or unambiguity (having one meaning (or interpretation))) (perspicuity, explicitness, definiteness, clearness; Eindeutigkeit) is attained (reached, achieved, accomplished, arrived (got (to)) at) here theoretically (in terms of theory) through (by means (way) of) the classification of the friendships and the enmities in the spectrum of the social relation, in

relation to which (whereby, while at the same time) every class obtains (gets, receives, is given (awarded), keeps, maintains, preserves, conserves) its own name more or less sanctioned through (by (means of)) (the) language (speech or linguistic) usage (use of language) (Sprachgebrauch). In spite of (Despite) polysemy (i.e. ambiguity or many (multiple) meanings) (multiple meaningfulness; Vieldeutigkeit)(,) the retention (keeping, upholding, preservation, maintenance, maintaining, continuation, perpetuation) of (to) “friendship” and “enmity” as axes of social-ontological terminology is recommended (advised, suggested, commended, endorsed)(,) though (however)(,) because no other [terms] so (as) familiar (well-known, intimate, trusted) are found (encountered) (turn up) in [regard (relation, respect) to (of)] the feel(ing) for (sense of) language (speech) (denn es finden sich keine anderen dem Sprachgefühl so vertrauten Termini)(,) in order to talk of (about) the spectrum of the social relation as [a] whole in an economical (i.e. sparing (sparse)) way (manner, fashion, mode)(,) without(,) in the process (course of this) (at the same time, into the bargain)(,) (closing one’s mind to) the possibility of (the) specification (itemisation, specifying, itemising, particularisation; Spezifizierung) (being barred (obstructed, blocked, shut out, excluded)) as soon as (when) this appears (seems) (to be) necessary. An orient(at)ing (guiding, directing, directive, aligning; orientierende) phenomenology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation needs (demands, requires) of course (the) elementary and concise (succinct, incisive, terse, to the point, pithy, striking) conceptual caesurae (caesuras, pauses, breaks, interruptions, intermissions, suspensions) (elementaren und prägnanten begrifflichen Zäsuren). With regard to (In view of) enmity (hostility)(,) in principle in all languages – objectively (i.e. factually) correctly (rightly, properly, accurately, exactly) – (there is a distinction made) between its [enmity’s] extreme forms(,) in [regard to] which it is a

matter of (we are dealing with) the killing (homicide) of the foe (enemy), and that of the much more nuanced ((very) rich(er) in nuances) palette (range, spectrum, ambit, compass, panoply) of relations (there is a differentiation (telling (setting) apart)) (is differentiated (distinguished, told (set) apart)) (,) which one substantiates (backs up, produces (gives) evidence for, proves, verifies, covers) with the collective (or generic) concepts (names or terms (nouns)) (notions) (Sammelbegriffen) “rivalry (antagonism or opposition)”, “opposition”, “competition (or rivalry)” („Gegnerschaft“, „Opposition“, „Konkurrenz“) etc.¹⁴³. These [concepts] are used often, but not always, synonymously, (;) they can, that is, depending on the context (Kontext) (,) indicate (point to, display, show, (re)present) a very different intensity and extensity, (;) the direction (,) at (in, to, for) which they (are) aim(ing) (meant), is however clear. Both the scientific observer (der wissenschaftliche Beobachter) as well as the actor (der Akteur) must pose the question to themselves [as to] whether the conflict, (to) which they face (stand face to face, are up against, confront) (,) is a relative or an absolute [conflict, one], whether, that is, the commonalities of both sides surpass (go beyond, outstrip, exceed, excel, beat, outdo, outmatch, transcend) their differences or not; whether it is a total or limited (restricted, confined) [conflict], whether it extends (applies) to (or concerns) (stretches across) therefore the entire (whole, complete) objective and existential situation (Situation) or to a part of the interactions (Interaktionen) inside (of) (within) this situation; finally

¹⁴³ Regarding (About, On) these concepts (notions) and their gradation (grading, grade, shade, shading, level, stage, degree, step(ping), rank, graduation; Abstufung) in the most significant (important, prominent, crucial, vital) modern European languages (,) see the synoptic (summary) table in Morani, “Il ‘Nemico’”, p. 60; regarding (in respect of) the scale (range, gamut, spectrum, chart) “hostis [foe, enemy, antagonist, stranger, foreigner, alien] – inimicus [enemy, foe, antagonist, inimical, hostile, unfriendly, hurtful, injurious, harmful] – competitor [rival, competitor] – adversarius [adversary, opponent, enemy, foe, antagonist, opposed, contrary, hostile, noxious, turned towards]” in Latin (,) p. 42ff.. It is to (should, ought to) be added here that a conscious (deliberate, intentional, aware) theoretical working (or bringing) out (elaborating, elaboration, analysis, processing) of the elementary distinction (difference, differentiation) between (the) both (two) forms of enmity is already found in Hesiod, *Werke und Tage*, V, vv. 11ff..

(lastly, in the end, after all), whether it [(the said) conflict] is a direct or indirect [conflict, one], whether, that is, every side can attain (achieve, reach) its (their) aim only via the direct throwing (putting) down (to the ground) (i.e. defeat, suppressing, quelling or crushing) of the other [side] (e.g. conquest (capture) through (by (means (way) of) military victory) or whether(,) the other way around (contrariwise, vice versa, contrarily)(,) the attainment (reaching, achievement) of its [a side's] aim effect(uate)s (causes, brings about, gives rise to, results in, occasions, induces, produces, procures) a giving up (i.e. surrendering) (submitting, discontinuing, dropping out, conceding (defeat), throwing in the towel) of the other (opposite, opposing) side (e.g. domination (control or monopolisation) (command, mastery; Beherrschung) of the market by means of (through) higher sales and(,) through (because of) that (it) (thereby, thus)(,) elimination of (the) competitors (rivals) (competition))¹⁴⁴.

In general(,) the deciding (i.e. decisive) criterion in the classification of enmities seems to be (this,) whether both sides recognise (acknowledge, appreciate, approve, honour, accept) superordinate (superior or higher) norms (standards) and rules (regulations, norms, principle, precepts, laws, canons, policies) (übergeordnete Normen und Regeln)(,) which they want to keep (stick) to (i.e. comply with) (follow) even to (at) their own detriment (or disadvantage) (drawback, shortcoming, handicap), or whether they(,) only via the outcome of their conflict(,) want to ascertain (find out, establish, determine, look into, trace) who has to define (the)

¹⁴⁴ The pair of concepts (conceptual pair) “relative – absolute” and “total – restricted” are found (located) in Axelrod, *Conflict of interest*, p. 87ff.; on (regarding) the distinction (difference, differentiation) between “direct” and “indirect conflict” see McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 64. (We encounter) Similar (Like) concepts and distinctions (differences, differentiations)(,) (though, mind you, however)(,) (are) (certainly, admittedly, indeed) (encountered) (meet us) in many authors, and indeed already in the older sociologists, see e.g. Giddings, *Prinzipien*, p. 92, who speaks (talks) of (about) “primary” (conquest (capture)) and “secondary” (contest (or competition) (rivalry; Wettstreit)) conflicts.

binding norms and rules (die verbindlichen Normen und Regeln); in the former case (instance)(,) (it (that case), [the situation]) [what, all that] (remains (stays, is left)) (at) [is] the [a] peaceful (peaceable, unwarlike) contest (or competition) (rivalry; Wettstreit) (of varying (and diverse) (different, varied, variable) intensity) (with)in(side) the framework of commonly (jointly, mutually, collectively) accepted norms and rules (is final (settled)),(;) in the latter [case](,) it is a matter of all or nothing, and the outcome of the conflict can be fatal (deadly, lethal, mortal; tödlich) for (the) one or the other side. As cogent (or evident) (convincing, plausible, obvious, reasonable, clear, plain, probable) [as] this criterion appears (to be) at first glance (sight, glimpse, appearance), it requires (needs) essential explications (or clarifications) (explanations, elucidations, illustrations) and also (as well as) modifications (wesentlicher Erläuterungen und auch Modifizierungen). On the one hand, we must remind those(,) who lean (tend, bend) towards juristic (legal and juridical) or ethical hypostatisations, of the banality (platitude, triviality, commonplace; Banalität) that norms and rules can (lay) claim (to) (demand, ask for) a superordinate (superior or higher) status for themselves only as (so) long as their interpretation is regarded as (considered) self-evident (natural, obvious, of (par for the) course; selbstverständlich). If this is contested (disputed or denied) (challenged) by one side, (then, so, thus) the question (problem) of the monopoly of (on) interpretation arises (emerges, crops (pops, bobs) up, surfaces, appears), which(,) as is known(,) is a question (problem) of power (Wird dies von einer Seite bestritten, so taucht die Frage des Interpretationsmonopols auf, die bekanntlich eine Machtfrage ist). (The Conflict does not take shape (turn out, develop, is not shaped (moulded, formed, fashioned, developed)), therefore, as peaceful competition (or rivalry) because the following (observance, obeying) of (compliance

(complying) with) rules and norms prohibits (forbids, proscribes, bans, outlaws) the use (or application) of force (i.e. violence), but norms and rules follow (observe, obey, comply with) the existing (present, current, standing, prevailing) correlation (or constellation) of forces(,) or(,) under the historically pre-given (structural framework) conditions (circumstances)(,) ([as, in terms of] structural framework)(,) of [as regards] action(,) the question (problem) of the interpretation of the predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) norms and rules is not posed (put, set) at all(,) or only in [a] technical respect (Der Konflikt gestaltet sich also nicht deshalb, als friedliche Konkurrenz, weil die Befolgung von Regeln und Normen die Gewaltanwendung verbietet, sondern Normen und Regeln werden deshalb befolgt, weil sich in der bestehenden Kräftekonstellation bzw. unter den historisch vorgegebenen strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen des Handelns die Frage der Interpretation der vorherrschenden Normen und Regeln überhaupt nicht oder nur in technischer Hinsicht stellt). As [already] noted (remarked, noticed, observed, commented)¹⁴⁵, foes can, in fact must have(,) despite (in, with) [regard to] (during) all the content-related(filled) (substantive) contrast(ing) (and opposition) (antithesis, contradistinction, conflict) (inhaltlichen Gegensatz) of their positions (interpretations) [as] to(wards) (vis-à-vis) one another, certain (particular) thought (intellectual) structures (structures of thought) or concepts (notions) in common ([all] together, (con)jointly, mutually, collectively) (können, ja müssen Feinde bei allem inhaltlichen Gegensatz ihrer Positionen (Interpretationen) zueinander bestimmte Denkstrukturen oder Begriffe gemeinsam haben): that is the battlefield (battleground) (das Schlachtfeld), which they in fact (nevertheless) share with one another (anyhow, anyway). That is why

¹⁴⁵ See footnote 91 above.

norms and rules accepted on both sides(,) in principle do not constitute a(ny) compelling (cogent, necessary) reason for [the, a] peaceful resolution (settlement, holding, conducting) of conflict(s) (zur friedlichen Austragung von Konflikten), (not) even (then) when (if) they [norms and rules accepted on both sides] (do not) command (dictate, call for, demand, order, instruct, impose, inflict) non(-)violence ([a(n)] lack (absence) of violence) taken at face (nominal) value (im Nominalwert genommen Gewaltlosigkeit gebieten). Because the [a] common (joint, mutual) confession of faith in peace leads to war(,) when (if) the perceptions (or views) (conceptions, opinions, ideas, notions) on (about, regarding) the conditions (or circumstances) of peace substantially differ (or diverge) (deviate, vary) from one another¹⁴⁶. On the other hand, a reflection on (over, about, regarding) the relation(ship) between goals (ends) (purposes) and means in [regard (relation) to] action leads to the conclusion (finding(s), result(s), outcome) that (the) conflict does not have to be of its goals “total” or “absolute” (Andererseits führt eine Reflexion über die Beziehung zwischen Zwecken und Mitteln im Handeln zum Ergebnis, daß der Konflikt nicht von den Zwecken her „total“ oder „absolut“ sein muß)(,) so that those involved (the participants) grasp (i.e. reach for, turn or resort to) (seize, take hold of, snatch, catch, clutch, grab) the most extreme means of enmity, i.e. (for or to) violence with fatal (deadly or lethal) (mortal) intent. The perspective varies, therefore, depending on whether one describes (calls, refers to, indicates, marks) the goals (ends) or the means as (with) “total” and “absolute” (and) or (else) “limited (restricted, confined; begrenzt)” and “relative (relativ)”. Total and absolute goals (ends) can be accompanied

¹⁴⁶ “Non ergo ut sit pax ꝥ[n]olunt [nolunt] sed ut sit quam volunt” [= “They do not (are) therefore want (wish, loathe) that there be no peace, but they want that peace be as they want it to be”, or: “Therefore they do not desire that there shall be no peace, but only that the peace shall be such as they choose” (Loeb Classical Library online)], Augustine, *De civitate die*, XIX, 12.

by (accompany, go (hand in hand) with) total and absolute means,(;) limited and relative goals (ends) by (with) limited and relative means. They do not(,) however(,) have to [do] (it, that) [way] (But that is not necessarily so). Because total and absolute goals (ends) can also, either out of (from) one's own sluggishness (inertia) (lethargy, laziness, inertness, inactivity, inaction, listlessness, drowsiness, dullness, indolence, languor, slackness, sloth, lassitude, torpor, torpidity, stagnancy, sullenness, phlegm, shiftlessness; Trägheit) or because (on account, by reason) of (owing (due) to) [the] weakness (debility, frailty, feebleness, deficiency, failing, slackness, brittleness, faintness, softness, lightness, slightness, dullness, impotence; Schwäche) of the foe, be pursued (followed, tracked, trailed, chased, tailed, persecuted) or attained (reached, achieved, accomplished, arrived at) through limited and relative means, above all (especially) however – and this case (instance) appears (seems) (to be) particularly ((e)pecially, peculiarly) significant (important, crucial, vital) for our formulation of the question (or central theme) (problem examination, examination of (a [the]) problem(s)) – total and absolute means can be used (or employed) (deployed, brought into play (action), installed)(,) in order to attain (achieve, reach) limited and relative goals (ends)¹⁴⁷. The means develop (evolve, unfold) their own dynamic(s) and logic, which can determine (necessitate or cause) (call for, condition, presuppose; bedingen) another form and intensity of competition (rivalry) or enmity (hostility) than [what] one would have expected (anticipated, awaited) on the basis of the originally (initially) limited (restricted, confined) object (subject (matter), topic, theme) of (the) conflict (ursprünglich begrenzten Gegenstandes des Konflikts). The heightening (increase or intensification) (aggravation, rise, build-up, step-

¹⁴⁷ C.f. Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges* [Theory of War], p. 82ff..

up, exacerbation) of (in) (the) competition (or rivalry) (Die Steigerung der Konkurrenz) to(wards) [the point of] extreme enmity appears (seems) to the actor (then) as [an] economical process (or series of events) (developments, occurrences), destined(, into the bargain (with that (it)))(,) to drastically cut short (down) (shorten, reduce, narrow) a long process of [the] mutual (reciprocal) wear and tear (erosion, abrasion, attrition, wearing down (away)) of the forces (powers) in the framework of a conflict of lesser (slighter, minor, inferior) (i.e. low) intensity (als ökonomischer Vorgang, dazu bestimmt, einen langen Prozeß gegenseitiger Abnutzung der Kräfte im Rahmen eines Konflikts geringer Intensität drastisch zu verkürzen). (As is) Self-evident(ly) (Of course, Naturally)(,) that heightening [of competition (to the point of extreme enmity)] takes place [in] parallel to (with) the intensification (aggravation, heightening, increase, tightening (up), sharpening) of the struggle (fight or battle) (combat) around (over) the monopoly of (on) interpretation [in respect] of the norms and rules, under whose influence (sign, cloak, aegis, governance, rule, conditioning) competition (or rivalry) is supposed (meant) to (should) stand (be) [found].

If the phenomenology of enmity must(,) first (of all) (to start with)(,) take into consideration (observe, notice, pay attention to, heed, follow, comply with) the difference between violent (forcible) and non(-)violent (violentless, bloodless) conflict (gewaltsamen und gewaltlosem Konflikt) as well as the structural reasons(,) which determine (or cause) (condition, necessitate) the transition from (the) one to the other kind (sort, type, manner, mode, way, style, species, category) of conflict (Konfliktart), but also the friendly-co-operative aspects of non(-)violent (bloodless) conflicts (aber auch die freundlich-kooperativen Aspekte gewaltloser Konflikte), (then, thus, so) the phenomenology of friendship must start

(set) from (out, forth) (take as its starting point) its (friendship's) negative reference (relation, connection) [in relation] to(wards) enmity.

Friendship(,) in its various (varying, differing, distinct, different, dissimilar, diverse, disparate) personal and impersonal forms (shapes or guises) (figures; Gestalten) is looked upon (considered, regarded) in principle as (to be) a (desirable, worthwhile and to protected (and preserved)) good (property, possession, domain, estate, belonging) (worth striving after (for) (aspiring to, aiming for, coveting)) (and to be protected (and preserved) (kept, saved, retained, conserved)) (als erstrebenwertes und zu bewahrendes Gut)(,) against the [a] background (backdrop) of existing (present, current, standing, established) and possible enmity. It [Friendship] (does not) constitute(s) in itself and in abstracto (no, a(ny)) value (worth; Wert)(,) if (when) the individual or collective consequences (results, (after)effects) of its dissolution (breaking up, disintegration) are not current (i.e. existing) (present, existent, (kept) in mind (the consciousness(es) (awareness, recollection, memory))) for (of) those [the people] concerned (in question). The self-praise(commendation, approval) [in respect] of friendship (gladly, willingly) refers (relates, applies) (with pleasure) to (concerns) the evil (illness, malady, malignancy; Übel) of [the, a] past enmity between today's friends or to the present(-day) (current, existing, prevailing) disadvantages (downsides, drawbacks, handicaps, shortcoming, demerits, disabilities), which arise (grow, accrue, result, develop) (out of (from) them [such disadvantages]) for third parties(,) [so, such] that (out of (from) which) they [the said third parties] [who] cannot [enter] or(, in relation to (regarding) that,) are not (cap)able (competent) of (to) enter(ing) into (open(ing) up, deriving, developing, making (having, revealing) [a]) friendship. When Cicero wanted "to gauge (assess, judge, appreciate, realise, understand, conceive, infer, estimate, fathom)"(,) "how much

good is (i.e. belongs) to friendship”, he posed, that is, with good reason(s) the question: “which (what) house (building, home, abode, place) is so firmly (securely or solidly) (sturdily, stably, steadily, fixedly) founded (or established) (set up, constituted, formed, based), which community (or municipality) (local authority, parish, rural commune, congregation; Gemeinde) is so strong (powerful, well-built, able)(,) that they could not be destroyed (ruined, demolished, spoiled, shattered, wrecked, vandalised) by (means of) (through) hate (hatred, odium) and by (means of) (through) discord ([a] rift[s], row[s], quarrel[s], argument[s])?”¹⁴⁸. In the consciousness (awareness) of socially living humans (people, men) (is)(,) despite constant (continuous, perpetual) entreaties (or incantations) (conjurations, adjurations, invocations, evocations, oaths) of the opposite (contrary, reverse, inverse)(,) the certainty (is) anchored (grounded, embedded, tied (laid) down, engrafted, fixed, tied) that friendship and peace(fulness, time) (tranquility, quietude, harmony; Frieden) do not last forever (eternally, everlastingly, perpetually), that they are fragile (frail, delicate, brittle; zerbrechlich) and always to be fought for (and won) (achieved, struggled over) anew (afresh); even the existence (availability, presence) of peace cannot strengthen (consolidate, solidify, cement, stabilise, secure, harden, stiffen, build (up)) trust (confidence, faith, reliance) in peace beyond (over (and above)) every doubt¹⁴⁹, and those entreaties (or incantations) sound (so) much (the) more dramatic (emotional or pathetic) (lofty, pompous, bombastic, grandiose; pathetischer) or even intolerant, the deeper (more profoundly) doubt gnaws (away) (nibbles, festers, corrodes) (at) (eats into) the irrefutability

¹⁴⁸ *Laelius de amicitia*, 7 (23).

¹⁴⁹ “Pax tam interdum est, pacis fiducia nunquam [There is (such) peace (to such a(n) extent (degree)) now and then (sometimes, at times),(;) [that one (you) should] (never, at no time, certainly not) trust (confidence, faith, assurance, reliance, security) in peace (never)]”, Ovid, *Tristia*, II, v. 71. C.f. Augustine, *De civitate dei*, XIX, 5.

(or incontrovertibility) (incontestability, irrevocability) of (the) friendship and of (the) peace. The consciousness of socially living humans (men, people) (always) (keeps, retains)(,) therefore(, at all times (any time, any moment), always)(,) (an eye on, sight of) (bears (has) in mind) the entirety (or totality) of the spectrum of the social relation (in view)(,) and the expectations or acts of the actors are oriented (orientate themselves) towards the great variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) and interchangeability (exchangeability, replaceability) of (the) possibilities, which become (are) apparent (or emerge) (emerging, loom(ing), on the horizon, stand out) in this overall (whole, entire, general, total) picture (image)¹⁵⁰. Friendship and peace are as components of this overall picture structured in such a way (manner, fashion, mode) that they contain (include, embody) in themselves the possibility of the sudden (abrupt) change (or transition) into their opposite (contrary, reverse, inverse) – and indeed (as a matter of (in) fact, actually, really, truly): enmity would have no social-ontological place if friendship were not of its ontic character (von ihrem ontischen Charakter) fragile (frail, delicate, brittle), as well as the other way around (contrariwise, vice versa).

The fragility (frailty, frailness, brittleness, delicateness; Zerbrechlichkeit) of friendship is (does) not (lie) (due) merely (just, only) under (at, (with)in, to) the pressure(,) which the other half of the spectrum of the social relation exerts (exercises, carries out, practises, performs), but [is due] to (the reason for this [such fragility of friendship] is) its [friendship's] own structural presuppositions (preconditions or prerequisites) in its connection (interrelation, association) with the question (problem, matter, issue) of identity (sondern an ihren eigenen

¹⁵⁰ More about that (this) in Ch. IV, Sec. 1A of this volume.

strukturellen Voraussetzungen in deren Zusammenhang mit der Identitätsfrage). Two aspects decide the issue (or make up the deciding factor) (clinch matters, tip the balance) here. On the one hand(,) enmity dwells (lives, stays, resides) (is inherent) in (inhabits) friendship in the sense that friendship objectively entails the (part(ial)ly and in fact first of all gladly (willingly, readily, with pleasure) accepted (conceded)) loss of independence (freedom, self-sufficiency, autarky) (Verlust von Unabhängigkeit), that is, duties (obligations, responsibilities) and considerations [i.e. care, respect for others] (Pflichten und Rücksichten)(,) while at the same time (in relation to which) the objective loss must at least be made good (or made up (atoned) for) (recompensed, rectified, compensated (for), put right, corrected, redressed) to a certain (some) extent (degree) by the subjective advantages (benefits, gains, profits, pros; Vorteile) or feelings (sentiments, emotions, impressions, sensations, perceptions, senses; Empfindungen). If the making good (atoning, rectification) of (or making up (amends) (compensation, recompense) for) the loss of independence is considered (thought, judged, deemed, regarded) (as, to be) inadequate (insufficient, deficient), (then, so, thus) the [an] element of dis(as)sociation creeps (sneaks, slips, steals) (worms its way) in(to) association(,) which easily steps over (oversteps, crosses, goes beyond, transcends, exceeds, transgress) the threshold (i.e. enters into the realm) of enmity. Strictly speaking (Actually, (Taken) More precisely, For precision' (accuracy's) sake)(,) the element of dissociation is present in the form of (bilateral, reciprocal, mutual) watchfulness (or vigilance) (alertness, wakefulness, guardedness) (on both sides) as to (regarding, about) whether that making good of (or making up for) turns out (is), on the whole (in general (terms)), satisfactory (satisfying, gratifying, acceptable, adequate): in every love(,) mutual (reciprocal) fidelity (faithfulness or loyalty) (allegiance, devotion, trueness) is

unremittingly (incessantly, ceaselessly, continually, unceasingly)
 controlled (i.e. checked or supervised), [as] in every partnership(,) the
 observance (following) of (keeping to) the agreed terms (conditions)
 (Genau genommen ist das Dissoziationselement in Form der
 beiderseitigen Wachsamkeit darüber präsent, ob jene Wiedergutmachung
 im großen ganzen befriedigend ausfällt: In jeder Liebe wird die
 gegenseitige Treue, in jeder Partnerschaft die Einhaltung der vereinbarten
 Bedingungen unablässig kontrolliert). The withdrawal (or revocation)
 (removing) of friendship (Der Entzug der Freundschaft) on the part of a
 friend must potentially be tantamount (equivalent) (amount) to (equal,
 match) a declaration (proclamation, pronouncement, statement) of enmity
 (Feindschaftserklärung), and enmity becomes active(,) when (if) the other
 [person or side] cannot balance (out) (i.e. offset) (equalise, compensate,
 even out, reconcile, make good) that withdrawal (or revocation) with (by
 (means (way) of)) new friendships, when (if), that is, his (or its)
 dependence (dependency, reliance, subordination, subjection) continues
 to (carries on) exist(ing)(,) this time(,) negatively. These consequences of
 the withdrawal (or revocation) of friendship (Freundschaftsentzugs)
 brings us to the second aspect of the structural presuppositions
 (preconditions or prerequisites) for the latency of enmity in friendship. Of
 course(,) it is not a matter (we are not dealing) here of (with) an already
 closed (united, unified, finished, cohesive, uniform, concluded) (i.e.
 entered into) [friendship] and then (thereafter, after that, after(wards), in
 that case) (ended, finished, completed, terminated, concluded)
 (friendship) (brought to the (its) end) (eine schon geschlossene und dann
 beendete Freundschaft), but of (with) a(n) offer (proposal, proposition,
 invitation, bid, tender) of friendship made and rejected (refused, declined,
 turned down) (sondern um ein gemachtes und abgelehntes
 Freundschaftsangebot). The refusal (denial) of friendship

(Freundschaftsverweigerung) vis-à-vis someone who sets great store by (attaches great importance to or especially (particularly) values (appreciates)) (this) [the] closing (conclusion) of (i.e. entering into) (this) friendship (Freundschaftsschließung), must be interpreted (read) as [a] sign (symbol, mark, indication, omen, token) of enmity, in any case (at any rate), [at least] give(s) rise to (provoke, occasion, cause, generate, produce, create) enmity, which becomes active (is activated) depending on whether the (rejected, refused, declined, turned down) side (rejected, refused, declined, turned down) holds (regards, considers) the closing of (i.e. entering into) friendship to be (as) vital or not. The refusal of friendship and the withdrawal (or revocation) (removing) of friendship are blows (punches, hits, strikes, beat(ing)s, strokes, kicks, slaps, knocks)(,) which strike (hit) identity (sind Schläge, die die Identität treffen),(;) their merely imagined ((re)presented, featured) possibility has an (takes) effect (works, operates, is effective)(,) therefore(,) as (latent) enmity in friendship. Not without reason (for nothing), the thousands-of-years(millennia[1])-length(long) [duration] of the saying (motto, maxim, adage, quote, aphorism, sentence) has remained in use (usage) [that, by which] humans (people, men) loved one another (so, thus, hence) as if they would hate one another in the future(,) and or they treated (dealt (went about things (their business), conducted themselves) with [regard to]) their friends as if one day these [friends] [they] would necessarily (have to) become (be turned into) foes (enemies) (die Menschen liebten sich so, als ob sie sich künftig hassen würden bzw. sie gingen mit ihren Freunden so um, als ob diese eines Tages zu Feinden werden müßten)¹⁵¹.

¹⁵¹ Bias [of Priene] in (according to) Diogenes Laertius, I, 87, cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorik*, 1389b 24 and 1395a 27; Rivarol, *Sur l'amitié*, p. 314: «l'odieuse maxime de vivre avec son ami, comme s'il devait un jour être notre ennemi [= the odious (detestable, heinous, abhorrent) maxim (rule) of (to) living (live) with your (one's) friend, as if he'd have (ought) to (he'll) one day become our enemy (foe)]»).

For the (In order to) establish(ing)(ment) (investigation, ascertaining, ascertainment, determination) (of) the social-ontological place (or locus) (scene, spot, location, situs, site, position; Ortes) of friendship(,) we must first (of all) put (set) aside (eliminate, remove, get rid of, abolish, do away with, sideline) the prejudice (bias, preconception) [that] society would always encourage (fortify, hearten, embolden) friendship amongst its members(,) and places (puts, sets) this [friendship] above all other goals (ends or purposes) (objects) and values. In principle(,) no friendship in the womb (bosom) of ((from) within) a collective (im Schoße eines Kollektivs) may (can, is allowed to) offend against (breach, violate or transgress) these norms and rules. There is a socially sanctioned enmity against friendships(,) which are (made) guilty (blameworthy, responsible) of ((or made responsible) for) such [an] offence (breach, violation or transgression). Friendship between criminals (delinquents) or conspirators (plotters) for the promotion (patronage, sponsorship, stimulation) of corresponding (analogous) goals (ends or purposes) becomes in fact legally more difficult (harder) (laws against the aiding and abetting of offenders, [the] reward(ing) of informers (informants), [a] witness protection programme (more specifically = regulation guaranteeing a state witness from a terrorist background (e.g. 1970s “Left-Wing” or present-day “Islamic fundamentalist” terrorism) immunity from prosecution or a lenient sentence) (Kronzeugenregelung) etc.). The unconditional loyalty towards (in relation to, vis-à-vis) personal or sectarian friendship without (with no) consideration (regard) for (to) (regardless) (of) (the) generally recognised (acknowledged, accepted, established, standard) duties (obligations, responsibilities) is(,) in every case (i.e. definitely) (at any rate, at all events, anyway)(,) socially suspicious (suspect, dubious, doubtful) or unacceptable, however (no matter how) much it [such (this, the said) loyalty] sometimes calls to

mind (or awakens) (evokes, rouses) “human” understanding; because, as Cicero remarked (commented, observed, noticed), if one wanted to fulfil one’s friend’s every wish (desire), (then, so, thus) this would not be mere friendship, but [a] conspiracy (plot)¹⁵². The distinction between active and neutral friendship contributes as well (also, too, likewise) to the nuancing (refining, shading; Nuancierung) of the social-ontological status of friendship, if one may say so. If indifference (as apathy, unconcern or detachment) (Gleichgültigkeit)(,) in the full (complete) sense of the word(,) has at (the) most (best) social rarity (scarceness) value and no social-ontological relevance (Relevanz), (then, so, thus) (the) frequently ((in) many times (cases, ways)) happening (occurring, existing, coming forward (to the (fore)(front), found, seeming) neutral friendship (die vielfach vorkommende neutrale Freundschaft)(,) as it were (so to speak)(,) constitutes a buffer zone between active friendship and active enmity (eine Pufferzone zwischen aktiver Freundschaft und aktiver Feindschaft). Two sides give (indicate, signify, denote, imply) to each other by means of (through) words or other signs (symbols) (marks, indications, characters, references; Zeichen) to understand that they want to refrain (or abstain) from interference (intervention, intrusion) in the (matters of) concern(s) (or affairs) (issues, interests) of the other [side] on each and every respective occasion, since both regard (consider) the existing (present) distribution (allocation, dispersion, spread) of social living space (lebensraum or habitat) (sozialen Lebensraumes) (as) (to be) satisfactory (satisfying, gratifying, good, adequate, acceptable) or simply (as) (to be) for the time being (at present (the moment), currently) unalterable (inalterable, immutable, irrevocable, irreversible, unchangeable). The mutual (reciprocal) assurance (guarantee, promise)

¹⁵² *De officiis*, III, 43-45; cf. *Laelius de amicitia*, 12 (40-43).

[that] each will go (move, proceed) (i.e. stay) out of the way of the other(,) and will remain “friends” in the sense of non-enmity (not enmity [being foes]), is sometimes in fact sealed through already fixed (steady or established) rituals(,) or through the non-binding cordiality (heartiness, warmth, sincerity, geniality, joviality) of jokes (or wit(ticisms)) (humour, joking, kidding), which are exactly supposed (meant) to indicate (show, display, point to [the fact], announce, report) that the sides (parties, those) concerned (in question) do not have the intent(ion) (purpose) of dealing (occupying (busying, engrossing) themselves) in earnest (seriously) – for good or ill ([for] bad (evil)) – with each other¹⁵³.

If the social-ontological common bond (or togetherness) (interrelation, relationship, linkage, interdependence) of friendship and enmity comes to light (the surface) (appears, surfaces, is discovered, turns up, emerges) [in respect] of (on, from) the side of enmity in [so much as] that friendship is entered into (closed, concluded) against an already existing common foe, then (thus, so) it [the social-ontological common bond of friendship and enmity] becomes(,) [in respect] of (on, from) the side of friendship(,) apparent (evident, noticeable, (all too) clear, obvious, manifest) (makes itself felt) in the fact that such an entering into (closure (conclusion) of) friendship (Freundschaftsschluß) can give rise to (cause, provoke, generate, induce, occasion, create, produce) enmity on [in respect of] that side(,) which is ipso facto excluded (precluded, left out, disqualified, foreclosed, eliminated) from it [(entering into) friendship], especially when this [side (excluded from entering into friendship)] was (stood) earlier (previously) in the [a] relationship of friendship towards (regarding, in (with) regard to (respect of), vis-à-vis) one of both of the

¹⁵³ Radcliff-Brown, *Structure*, pp. 90ff., 106ff.. In relation to (For, Regarding) the (accommodation) relationship ([in respect] of accommodation) (Akkomodationsverhältnis)(,) cf. Couch, “Elementary Forms”, p. 124ff..

new partners (im Freundschaftsverhältnis zum einen der beiden neuen Partner stand). Friendship (also) creates (i.e. establishes) (makes, achieves, accomplishes, causes, pulls (brings) off, imposes) (then) delimitation (demarcation, dissociation, separation, differentiation, distinguishing, marking (fencing) off; Abgrenzung) against third parties(,) (even) when (if) she (it, [friendship]) is not thought of (or meant) (conceived, imagined) as delimitation, and indeed already because the specifically friendly (amicable) (das spezifisch Freundschaftliche) must (has to) be (get) lost (go astray, be mislaid) [with regard] to friendship(,) as soon as (when(ever)) any (every) human (being) (person, man) (what(who)soever, possible) may (should, can) reckon (count or rely) on (expect, estimate, calculate, work out) what friends *as* friends give (grant, offer, pass) to each other¹⁵⁴. Incidentally (By the way)(,) a delimitation comes into being not merely due to the fact that (because) friends want to ostentatiously (exaggeratedly, demonstratively, markedly) separate (segregate) from (against, vis-à-vis) certain (particular) namable (i.e. specifiable or identifiable) persons. The [A] negative reference (relation, connection) to third parties can also be indirect or totally (wholly, completely, entirely) vague(,) when (if) friendship is defined either as [the, a] refuge (shelter, safe retreat, stronghold) from (against, vis-à-vis) precisely predominant (or prevailing) (predominating, prevalent) or impending (imminent, threatening, menacing) objective social circumstances (conditions or relations) (als Hort gegen gerade vorherrschende oder drohende objektive soziale Verhältnisse) (which can of course be personalised) or else as [a] locus (or place) (position, location, scene, spot, situs, site)(,) which removed (withdrawn, broken off) from the daily (everyday) hustle and bustle (hurly-burly)(,) allows

¹⁵⁴ „Mein Freund muß kein Freund der ganzen Welt sein“ [= “My friend must (ought, does) not (have to) be [a, the] friend of the entire (total, complete, whole of the) world”], Lessing, *Der Freigeist*, I, p. 1.

(permits) (the) lingering (dwelling, staying) on the finer things(,) and consequently (as a result) can draw (bring) out (or develop) ((help) realize) the particular (specific, special, exceptional, separate) human quality of friends. The thus (so, hence) thought of (conceived or meant) (imagined) exclusivity can take several (a number of) forms, whose highest, at least in the eyes of (the) philosophers, was mentioned (referred to) above: it is a matter of (we are dealing with) the friendship between the (morally (ethically) and intellectually(mentally)(-spiritually)) accomplished (i.e. completed, consummate or perfect(ed) people) (in terms of manners, morals, customs and intellect(-spirit)) (zwischen den sittlich und geistig Vollendeten), in which [friendship], as Cicero said, the borderless (bound(ary-)-less, limitless, unbounded) community of the human genus (i.e. race) contracts (shrinks, is narrowed (constricted)) into the small circle or the “rare (scarce, uncommon, unusual, infrequent) genus (or species)” of two or of a few persons (die grenzenlose Gemeinschaft des Menschengeschlechts sich auf den kleinen Kreis bzw. die „seltene Gattung“ von zwei oder von wenigen Personen zusammenzieht)¹⁵⁵. If we disregard (ignore, overlook, pay no attention (heed) to, refrain from) the ethical content of this ideal of friendship (Sieht man vom ethischen Gehalt dieses Freundschaftsideals ab), then (so, thus) the [a] double (dual, twin) delimitation is exhibited (shown)(,) which also characterises many less demanding (exacting, hard-to-please, particular, highbrow, discriminating, sophisticated, ambitious) friendships: that, which is directed against outsiders (or outliers) (those standing (who are) outside [of (a, the) friendship]) (gegen Außenstehende), and that, which exists between friends. Because (the) friends here are in principle (fundamentally) supposed (meant) to

¹⁵⁵ *Laelius*, 5 (20), 21 (79); cf. Sec. 2B in this chapter.

(should) be independent (self-sufficient, autarkic, autonomous) and contented (self-sufficient) individuals (modest and satisfied with their lot) (unabhängige und selbstgenügsame Individuen), and therein [in that (independence and contentedness)](,) the sovereign freedom of their relation(ship) (die souveräne Freiheit ihrer Beziehung) should exactly be founded (and based) (established, set up, instituted, formed, constituted, incorporated) – this same independence (self-sufficiency), which in the end (finally, ultimately, eventually, after all) in fact can mean (signify) (the) independence from the [one’s, a] (same) friend himself(,) and consequently (therefore, as a result) the most painlessly possible separation from him [this (the) friend (in question)](,) is praised (or extolled)(,) however(,) occasionally (several times, on several occasions, repeatedly, in different ways)(,) even (then) when (if) it concerns non-ethical (not ethical) or material factors (nichtethische bze. materielle Faktoren)¹⁵⁶. Friendship therefore comes about (takes place) in this case (instance)(,) because it [friendship] is based (rests) on the independence of the friends (from one another), however(,) for exactly this reason it [friendship] carries (bears) in(side) itself the element (factor or moment) (motive) of separation (segregation, severance, isolation, detachment, parting, seclusion, secretion) (separation element; Absonderungsmoment) and the possibility of dis(as)sociation, especially since (as), as is well-known, [the] independent [people] put up with (tolerate) far (much) less

¹⁵⁶ This(,) [takes place, happens, occurs] in very different cultural circles (groups, areas, environments) (cultures) and in (at) various periods (ages, times, epochs, eras). Rivarol holds (regards, considers) friendship (to be) (as) [the] free «mariage d’âmes [= marriage (matrimoy) of souls (lifeblood)]» possible only between humans (people, men) «assez égaux en âge, en fortune, en mérite, pour être indépendants l’un de l’autre [= fairly (quite, rather, pretty) equal (even) in age, fortune (or wealth) (luck, assets, estate), merit (worth, virtue, value), in order to [so that they can] be independent from one another]» (*Sur l’amitié*, p. 308ff.). The author of the *Pantschatantra* opines (believes, thinks, reckons, says, means): “only where both are equal (the same, identical, equivalent, similar) in (as to) wealth (riches, affluence, prosperity) and both equal (i.e. the same) in descent (lineage or race)(,) is marriage (married life), friendship then (there) proper (or befitting)” (I, § 313 = I, 78)). Herskovits relates (renders, translates, interprets) a proverb (saying) of the tribe (clan) Kru in English as follows: “Do not rely on the pot of your friend to feed you” (“Kru Proverbs”, p. 283).

than [the] dependent [people]. With that (Thereby, Therewith)(,) though (mind you)(,) only a (one) form (or shape) (figure, frame, guise; Gestalt) amongst multiple (several, a number of, quite a few) [forms] in the phenomenology of friendship has been addressed (spoken about, touched upon). However (But, Yet)(,) the double (dual, twin) delimitation as [a] social-ontological concomitant (corollary, outcome, ancillary, appurtenance, adjunct, accessory) of friendship(,) is in fact (indeed, of course) extremely (exceedingly, most, supremely, exceptionally) rich in (the) variation(s) [rich in variations] (variationsreich) too.

The forms (shapes) of friendship(,) which compose (put together, assemble, compound, comprise) its phenomenology, do not at all represent (or constitute) (successive, consecutive, contiguous) stages (tiers, levels, grades, gradations) (following one another) in a historical development (or evolution) (stellen keineswegs aufeinanderfolgende Stufen einer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dar)(,) during (in) which one form (shape) of friendship (had) completely replaced a(n) previous (earlier) [form (of friendship)](,) or at least had pushed (pressed, shoved, pressured, packed, driven) [it, the previous form of friendship] into social insignificance. Attempts have not (been) lacked (lacking, absent, missing)(,) to relate (in relating) types of friendship with types of society (Typen von Freundschaft und Typen von Gesellschaft) directly with one another(,) and(,) in the course of this (into the bargain)(,) (to, in) explain(ing) the changing (change) of (in) the former by means of the influence (Einfluß) of (the) social development in the direction of modern atomised society (moderne atomisierte Gesellschaft)¹⁵⁷. This influence

¹⁵⁷ Thus, Y. Cohen connects (combines, puts) four types of friendship (Typen von Freundschaft) (inalienable, close, casual, expedient) with four types of society (maximally solidary community, solidary-fissile community, nonnucleated society, individual social structure) (into [a] combination). Interestingly (It's interesting that)(,) he works (or brings) out (elaborates, processes, analyses) four types of enmity as counterparts (equivalents, pendants) of (for, vis-à-vis) the above-mentioned types of friendship, see "Patterns", esp. p. 352ff.

must indeed (actually, in fact (reality), really, truly) be taken into account (consideration) (considered) in a historical and sociological analysis(,) which is supposed (meant) to (should) create clarity regarding (about) (i.e. make clear) (clarify) the relative social weight (gravity) of this or that type of friendship (Typs von Freundschaft) in this or that social formation (formation of society). But we do not know (of) any social formation in which not all social-ontologically relevant types of friendship (Typen von Freundschaft) in this or that form, with this or that social weight(,) appeared (cropped up, occurred, happened, took place, came forward) (were found). [A] Society, which would have reduced all forms of friendship (as well as all forms of enmity) to a single or lone (solitary, single) decisive (definitive, crucial) [form, one], would suffer (put up with, endure) (under) not to be endured (withstood, sustained, sat through, tolerated) (i.e. unbearable) dysfunctionality (würde unter nicht auszuhaltender Dysfunktionalität leiden), and indeed regardless of the degree (extent, size, rank) of its complexity. The subsumption of friendship as [a] social relation from (under) the point of view of “complexity” („Komplexität“) shows (reveals to) (lets, allows) [us](,) by the way(,) (to recognise (see, know, realise, understand, discern, perceive))(,) how many (much) modern sociological investigations (research, examinations, inquiries) of (into) friendship are attached (stuck) to the misleading (deceptive, delusory, delusive) template (cliché or stereotype) (set pattern) (der irreführenden Schablone) [of] “community vs. society” („Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft“)¹⁵⁸. Accordingly, they construct a type of friendship (friendship type; Typ von Freundschaft)(,) which was supposed (meant) to have dominated (prevailed or held sway) (ruled, was prevalent, reigned) in (the) “pre-

¹⁵⁸ See in relation to that Ch. I, Sec. 4, in this volume.

modern” society in the immediate vicinity of (or in the nearest (closest, most proximate) nearness (closeness, proximity) to) familial (i.e. family or kinship) relation(ship)s (in nächster Nähe zu verwandtschaftlichen Beziehungen)(,)(;) and in (during, with) which the relation(ship) of friends towards (vis-à-vis, with) one another was ostensibly (supposedly, allegedly, professedly) subject (subjugated) to the grip (clutches, access) of fixed (steady or established) social rules and binding rituals,(;) and then [they] contrast it [the(ir) (said) (this) type of friendship] to (with) the friendship in atomised mass societies (angeblich dem Zugriff fester sozialer Regeln und verbindlicher Rituale unterworfen war, und kontrastieren ihn dann mit der Freundschaft in den atomisierten Massengesellschaften), which in principle (fundamentally) has [a] private character, [(and, since, as) it (this friendship in atomised mass societies)] itself determines (conditions, necessitates, causes) its rules and rituals,(,) and consequently (accordingly) is more fragile (frail, delicate, brittle) or even more imponderable (incalculable; with (more) unforeseen consequences, unpredictable; unberechenbar)¹⁵⁹. However,(,) the already incessant (unceasing, unending, never-ending, ceaseless, constant, perpetual, continual) complaints (lamentations) about (regarding, over) the transience (transitoriness, impermanence, brevity, briefness, fugacity, temporariness, short-lived nature) and instability (unsettledness, fickleness, changeableness, impermanence, inconsistency, inconstancy, mutability, uncertainty, variability) of friendship from all times and [in] all lands (countries) should make (arouse) us (our) suspicious (suspicion) (perplex, puzzle) [us] vis-à-vis (regarding, in respect of, against) such generous (or bounteous) (lavish, liberal, unsparing, ungrudging) contrasts. Personal friendships as private relation(ship)s have existed in

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. Paine, “In Search of Friendship”.

all societies and, irrespective of their socially sanctioned rituals, they (have) always (had) (like (as with) erotic relation(ship)s too) (had) their private code (ihren privaten Kode), which concerned the arrangement (regulation or settlement; Regelung) of questions (matters) of identity and power, no matter (regardless of) whether these codes, looked at (contemplated, considered, observed) from the outside, were and are much more uniform (regular, constant, steady, unchanging, monotonous; gleichförmig)(,) than the partners in friendship or love want(ed) to believe, who normally (usually) overestimate (or overrate) the original aspect of their relation(ship). And the other way around (contrariwise, vice versa): in modern atomised mass societies (In den modernen atomisierten Massengesellschaften)(,) there are not only private friendships, but likewise (also, similarly) socially sanctioned and ritualised (sondern ebenso sozial sanktionierte und ritualisierte) [friendships], which for instance are dealt with under the rubric (category, class, heading) [of] (categorised under) “co-operation”, “reciprocity (mutuality)”(,) and similarly. For reasons(,) which have to do with the new importance (status or value) of the private [sphere, realm, domain] (dem neuen Stellenwert des Privaten) in these societies, the concept (notion) of friendship increasingly (progressively) obtained (got, gained, developed, received) private content, but the shifts in the vocabulary do not here mean (say, [tell us], make) much in relation to (vis-à-vis) this issue (matter, case, affair, thing, subject, point) (difference) (have great importance). Incidentally, in language (speech or linguistic) usage (use of language)(,) expressions continue to live (on) (i.e. exist (survive)) (subsist, exist, are alive) unabated (undiminished), which concern purely public friendships (“friendship” between peoples (folk(s)) or states), and this continues an age-old (ancient, vintage) universal tradition(,) which also (even) belongs to the intellectual(-spiritual) stock (supplies,

inventory, continued existence; Bestand) of the European New Times (Modern Era)¹⁶⁰.

In (With) [regard to] (During) the example of the ancient concept (notion) of friendship(,) [it] can be (easily, nicely, efficiently, well) illustrated (depicted, exemplified, demonstrated) ([very] well) how the social-ontological forms of friendship interweave (intertwine, interlace) with one another, and also, how strongly (greatly, intensely, heavily, profusely, starkly) their common bond (togetherness, interrelation, relationship, linkage, interdependence) was felt (or perceived) (seen); in fact their [the said social-ontological forms of friendship's] subsumption under (to) one and the same term (Terminus) testifies (bears witness) to (vouches for, certifies, witnesses) exactly this. Examples from other times (periods, ages, eras, epochs) or [other] cultural circles (cultures) (Kulturkreisen) (would), with few terminological variations, bring (brought) to light (out into the open) (reveal) the same factual (or objective) (material, relevant, practical) interrelations (correlations, (inter)connections, contexts), nonetheless (nevertheless)(,) the ancient example pushes (forces) (i.e. imposes) itself [onto us] (mounts up) because it has been researched (studied, explored, investigated, looked into, examined) well(,) and moreover(,) already contains (includes, incorporates) the necessary theorisation (with)in(side) itself. The concept (notion) of friendship here encompasses (embraces, encloses, envelopes,

¹⁶⁰ Thus (So)(,) Bodin speaks of “friendship” both with regard to (the) external politics (i.e. foreign affairs (policy)) (a weak (feeble) republic is «delaissée des amis, assiégée des ennemis [= abandoned (forsaken, deserted, neglected) by friends, besieged by enemies]»,(:) on the other hand, a strong [one, republic] [is] «reverée des amis, redoutée des ennemis [= revered (respected) by friends, dreaded (feared) by enemies]», as well as [with regard to] internal (i.e. domestic) politics (affairs, policy): «la vraie marque d'amitié [= the true (real, actual, right) mark (sign, token) of friendship]» is for him (Bodin) «le droit gouvernement selon les loix de nature [= the right(eous) government in accordance with the laws of nature]» (*République*, I, 1 = p. 4). C.f. Michelet's dictum (pronouncement, saying, maxim): «La patrie, c'est bien la grande amitié qui contient toutes les autres [= The fatherland (homeland, motherland, native land) is indeed (of course, very well) the great friendship (amity, fellowship) which contains (holds, checks, restrains) all the other(s) (friendships)]».

consists of, comprises, embodies, contains) the whole (entire, complete) field (area, sector, realm, domain) and network (mesh, plexus) of (the) social relations, which bring humans(,) in [an] (with) associating (associative, associatory) intent(ion)(,) together, (on) whatever principle and motive [the (said)] association is based (on) (rests). [A] Blood relationship[s] (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) and elective affinity [affinities] (i.e. (a) relationship[s] of choice), private intimacy and socially institutionalised co-operation, [a] community [communities] of faith (or belief) (i.e. a religious community [communities]) and utilitarian reciprocity (mutuality) – all fall under the rubric (category, class, heading) [of] “friendship” (Bluts- und Wahlverwand[t]schaft, private Intimität und sozial institutionalisierte Kooperation, Glaubensgemeinschaft und utilitaristische Gegenseitigkeit – alles fällt unter die Rubrik „Freundschaft“). No Greek was surprised (amazed, astonished, wondered) by (at) the self-evidence (naturalness)(,) with which Xenophon for instance(,) in a characteristic (typical) place (i.e. passage)(,) in one breadth(,) enumerated (listed, itemised, named, counted out) familial (i.e. family or kinship) relation(ship)s (verwandtschaftliche Beziehungen) ((of) parents and (of) children, (of) brothers and sisters (i.e. siblings) etc.), and associations held (stuck, kept, hung) together (cohering) through (by (means, way) [as a matter] of, [in]) statute (νόμος) or personal option (i.e. choice) (selection), as forms (Formen) of friendship, without(,) in the process(,) failing (neglecting, missing) [in] [to] (the) point(ing) out (indication, reference, allusion, pointer, hint, clue, piece of advice, suggestion, instruction, remark) [(in respect) of (with regard) (to) the fact] [that] the organised polities (commonwealths, communities; Gemeinwesen), that is, (the) poleis [= city-states of ancient Greece] (die Poleis), knew of the significance (importance, meaning) of all these bonds (or ties) of friendship (Freundschaftsbande) for knowing

about (being informed (in the picture (know)) (notification) about) social life (living) (das Sozialleben Bescheid)¹⁶¹. Homo[-] [Homosexual] and heterosexual erotic relation(ship)s likewise belonged to the possible forms (Gestalten) of friendship, even though the [then] current (or common) (popular, staple) vocabulary clearly distinguished (differentiated) (made a clear distinction) between erotic and other relation(ship)s of friendship (Freundschaftsbeziehungen)¹⁶².

Nevertheless(,) this mixing (up) (interweaving; Vermengung) of philia [= friendship as love, affection, fondness and favouritism] and eros [= (carnal) love as mainly sexual yearning or desire] (Philia und Eros) with each other does not constitute a lat(t)er (posterior) and abusive (i.e. improper) (incorrect) conceptual (notional) expansion of the former [i.e. philia],(;) rather it [the said mixing of philia and eros] refers to the closest (tightest, narrowest) connection (or bond) (link(ing), combination, association, union, binding, joining together) between one's own (i.e. the familiar to the self) and the alien (the foreign or strange) (die engste Verbindung zwischen dem Eigenen und dem Fremden), which makes out of (turns) every friendship (into),(,) either way (anyway),(,) a question (problem, matter, issue) of identity. The enthralling (exciting, fascinating, gripping, full of suspense, suspenseful, thrilling, dramatic) (conceptual and intellectual(-spiritual)) history (of the concept and of the intellect(mind)(-spirit)) (Die spannende Begriffs- und Geistesgeschichte) of (the) thus (so) understood friendship has overt (evident, clear, manifest, obvious, blatant) social-ontological implications and (makes a) start(s) (begins) very early [in recorded history]; it is worth(while)

¹⁶¹ Hieron, Ch. III.

¹⁶² Dirlmeier, *ΦΙΛΟΣ*, p. 59ff..

(briefly) recalling (calling, remembering, recollecting) it (to mind)
(briefly).

First(,) the dual (double, twin) Homeric meaning of the adjective φίλος [= φίλος = someone, something loved; a friend; someone, something pleasant, familiar], whose nominalisation (Substantivierung) (has) provided (or produced) (granted, afforded, constituted, made, created, emitted) the Greek word for “friendship (amity)”, appears (seems) (to be) fundamental (basic). It [Φίλος] means both (the) [what is] one’s own (i.e. the familiar to the self) (das Eigene) as well as that which is dear (kind, nice or pleasant) (beloved, endearing, sweet, welcome) and trusted (homely or familiar) to (or for) someone (das, was einem lieb und traut ist). The combination of both meanings should (is supposed (meant) to) denote (indicate, mark, label, describe; bezeichnen) the character and the extent (or scope) (range, compass, extent, scale, area, size, magnitude) of that which is necessary for self-preservation (Selbsterhaltung) in the widely (broadly, extensively) comprehended (understood, apprehended, grasped, framed) social sense of the word(,) and lie (i.e. are) on this side of the boundary (border, limit, frontier)(,) which separates (divides, segregates) the friendly (amicable) world, that is (the) friendly subjects and objects(,) from the inimical (hostile, antagonistic) world (also die freundlichen Subjekte und Objekte von der feindlichen Welt). One’s own (i.e. the familiar to the self) and at the same time trusted (homely or familiar) and dear (kind, nice or pleasant) are to and for man his tools (instruments, implements, utensils; Werkzeuge) and weapons (arms, weaponry; Waffen), (the) [entirety (all) (of)] his (entire, whole (of his), total, overall, gross) belongings (possessions, goods, assets; Habe)(,) and not least (of all) the persons, whom he can trust – family, servants (slaves, serfs, farmhands, stableboys), relatives (relations), guests (visitors) and

hetairoi [= ἑταῖροι = partners, comrades, fellows of various kinds (work, business, war, etc.), but (usually) not in regard to sexual intimacy], i.e. socii [= Latin = companions, associates, fellows, partners, allies, confederates] (Familie, Knechte, Verwandte, Gäste und Hetairoi, d. h. socii). All that together constitutes the conditions (requirements or circumstances) (terms; Bedingungen) of (for) self-preservation, which can hardly (barely, scarcely) be pulled off (achieved, gained, obtained, won) in friendless solitude (isolation, solitariness, seclusion, loneliness) (in der freundlosen Einsamkeit). The relation(ship) towards (with, vis-à-vis) the [such] persons [referred to (named) above], who are counted amongst the conditions (requirements or circumstances) of (for) self-preservation, is not necessarily (unconditionally) affectively (affectually, emotionally) loaded (or charged) or altruistically motivated in our sense [today]; of weight (i.e. gravitas or importance) is the act (Akt) of co-operation and the certainty (certitude, assurance, sureness) that one can (always) rely on the help of the other [person] (at any time (moment))(,) even after decades of not seeing (meeting) each other (having a reunion)¹⁶³. Friendship in this sense exists first of all between relatives¹⁶⁴, so that kinship (relations, [familial] affinity, relationship; Verwandtschaft), irrespective of the personal sympathies and antipathies of the relatives towards one another, becomes (turns into) a system of relation(ship)s (System von Beziehungen) characterised (marked,

¹⁶³ Adkins, "Friendship", pp. 33, 36; cf. Fraisse, *Philia*, p. 37ff., who against Adkins wants to emphasise (underline, stress) more emphatically (strongly, intensely) (much more) the affective (i.e. emotional) (affectual, sentimental) aspect of Homeric friendship – not unjustly (wrong(ful))ly, without justification), I think (say), if (when) one thinks of (about) the reasons for the frequent strife (discord or quarrels) (disputes, feuds) between Homeric friends.

¹⁶⁴ Which is why (For which reason, Wherefore, Whence, And so) the term for "friend" frequently (on many occasions, in many cases) means (signifies) relatives,(;) [and] by the way(,) also in (the) Old German(ic) (as well, too) (e.g. *Der Nibelunge Noth*, 492, 3, Lachmann: friund die nâhen = die nächsten Verwandten [= near (i.e. close) friend = the nearest (closest) relatives])(,) and even (still) in Luther's (translation of the) Bible(-translation) (e.g. *Luk* [= *Luke*]. 1, 61).

labelled) by concrete duties (responsibilities, obligations) and rights¹⁶⁵. [The fact] That (the) blood relationship[s] (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) was [were] connected (bound, tied, linked, combined, affiliated, united)(,) evidently (obviously, apparently, manifestly) since (from) [the] earliest [of] (ancient) times (periods, ages, epochs, eras)(,) to (with) [the] normification (i.e. normative standardisation) of behaviour, had far-reaching (extensive) consequences (Daß die Blutsverwandtschaft offenbar seit frühesten Zeiten sich mit Normierungen des Verhaltens verband, hatte weitreichende Folgen). The normative component (Die normative Komponente) frequently came to the fore (became the focus of attention or was given special emphasis), and first of all(,) it [the said (this) normative component] blurred the sharp boundary (border, limit, frontier) between the blood relatives (or relations) and the hetairos [= ἑταῖρος = partner, comrade, fellow of various kinds (work, business, war, etc.), but (usually) not in regard to sexual intimacy] (socius [= Latin = companion, associate, fellow, partner, ally, confederate]) (zwischen den Blutsverwandten und dem Hetairos (socius)), whether this [hetairos] was a brother(comrade)-in-arms, a guest (visitor, patron, customer) or an ally (ein Waffenbruder, ein Gast oder ein Verbündeter); to the extent that (in so far as) friendship as hospitality (guest friendship; Gastfreundschaft) or as [an] alliance (confederation, coalition, league; Bündnis) was practised, it (she) [such friendship as hospitality or as an alliance] was subject (subjugated) (submitted) (also, even) to a code of behaviour (or conduct) and of honour (unterwarf sie sich auch einem Verhaltens und Ehrekodex)

¹⁶⁵ With [regard to] an ethnologist like (as [is]) Fortes(,) one could say [that] altruism in (the) [a] (kinship) relation(s)(hip)[s] (of kinship ([familial] affinity)) [kinship relation(ship)] (in der Verwandtschaftsbeziehung) is not affective (emotional), but “prescriptive”: kinship understood as [a] moral, but also political-juristic(legal and juridical) relation(ship), demands (dictates or commands) (imposes) friendship, and friendship means “consensus in accepting the value of mutual support” (*Kinship*, pp. 237, 232, 110).

(too)¹⁶⁶. Thereupon (Whereupon, After that, Consequently, As a result, With regard to that (this))(,) the concept (notion) of kinship (relations, [familial] affinity, relationship), which continues to determine (condition) the basic (fundamental) understanding of the net(work) (web or mesh) of the social relation (des Netzes der sozialen Beziehung), is extended (expanded, widened, broadened) such that it is also applied (there) where (there is) no blood relationship (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) (exists, is known (present, available)). Friendship is of course (indeed) frequently (in many cases (ways), on many occasions) articulated in [regard to, respect of] the terminology of (kinship) relation(ship)s (of kinship ([familial] affinity)) [kinship relation(ship)s] (Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen), however these [kinship relation(ship)s] are only verbally comprehensive (complete, sweeping, thorough, extensive, broad, full, wholesale, blanket); friendly relation(ship)s, which one enters (goes) into (undertakes, takes up, gets involved with, contracts) for (purposeful and expedient or personal) reasons (of purposefulness (end (goal) orientation and expediency) (usefulness) or [for] personal [reasons]) (die man aus Zweckmäßigkeit- oder persönlichen Gründen eingeht), are in (as a matter of) fact (reality) (indeed, actually)(,) far (much) more expansive (i.e. extensive or far-reaching) (widespread, sweeping, vast, lengthy, prolonged). Ethnologists have shown that in all “pre-modern” cultural circles (cultures)(,) friendly relation(ship)s were very often dressed (up) (clothed, couched) in the forms of a fake(d) (fabricated) (bogus, made-up, fictitious, invented) common ((con)joint, mutual, collective) descent (lineage, ancestry, origin, derivation, extraction, genealogy, birth, parentage) (einer

¹⁶⁶ That is why Dirlmeier’s stark (strong, intense, profound) contrast between kinship and hetaireia [= *ἑταιρεία* = partnership, comradeship, fellowship, companionship, association, brotherhood, political club] (ΦΙΛΟΣ, pp. 8ff., 22ff.) must be relativised considerably; cf. Fraisse, *Philia*, pp. 40ff., 44.

fingierten gemeinsamen Abstammung), so that the stranger (alien or foreigner) (der Fremde) only ceases (stops) (to) be(ing) regarded as [a] (potential (prospective)) foe (enemy) (then) when (if) he is addressed as [a] relative (relation)¹⁶⁷. The best (most) known (popular) of such pseudo-kinships (relation(ship)s, [familial] affinities) (Scheinverwandtschaften), which is (was) supposed (meant) to (should) (have) cement(ed) (solidify, solidified, reinforce(d)) friendship through (by means of) its incorporation (integration) into the circle of the(,) according to [the] general feeling (perception, sense, opinion, consciousness, experience, instinct)(,) strongest (most powerful (intense, profound), greatest, heaviest) and most in(dis)soluble relation(ship) amongst humans (people, men), has been (is, was)(,) since (from) time immemorial (ancient (primeval) times)(,) blood brotherhood. However(,) ritualised personal relation(ship)s like (as) for instance that (those) between “compadres” [e.g. groom and best man] („compadres“) or godparents and godchildren belong to the same category too, which for their part show (exhibit, feature, display) still (even) looser variations (e.g. inside of patriarchally structured (built (set) up, assembled, put together, constructed, based) criminal organisations). Although these relation(ship)s differ (are distinguished) from (the) purely contractual [ones, relation(ship)s] (den rein kontraktuellen) through (by means of) the choice (selection) of the (one’s) friend on the basis of personal qualities (or characteristics) (attributes, traits) and preferences (predilections, proclivities), by no means is the end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient)-instrumental element (das zweckrational-instrumentelle Element) lacking (missing, absent), which (inter)mixes (blends) the [what is] rich in (the) variation(s) with the [what is] emotional-[in]solidarity (das sich variationsreich mit

¹⁶⁷ Thurnwald, *Die Gemeinde*, esp. pp. 180ff., 159ff.; „Freundschaft“, esp. p. 119ff..

dem emotional-solidarischen vermischt); the boundaries between [the] “irrational” sense (feeling) of belonging (affiliation, membership) and [the] “rational” calculable need (requirement, necessity, want, desire) for backing (i.e. support) and safeguarding (or protection) are, anyhow (anyway), fluid (flowing, running, liquid, moving, fluent) (die Grenzen zwischen „irrationalem“ Zugehörigkeitsgefühl und „rational“ kalkulierbarem Bedürfnis nach Rückhalt und Absicherung sind ohnehin fließend). Precisely the ineluctable (i.e. inevitable) (unavoidable, inescapable, necessary) mixing (blending, mixture) of these elements or aspects (Gerade die unausweichliche Vermischung dieser Elemente oder Aspekte) of such friendships with one another as well as the particular (special, peculiar) nearness (proximity) of (the) friends to(wards) (vis-à-vis) one another, which constantly puts to the test (tests) (the) mutual (reciprocal) loyalty(,) at whatever level (stage or gradation) (tier, grade, phase; Stufe), generates (produces, engenders, causes, manufactures, breeds, spawns, begets) tensions (stresses, strains) and conflict(s) (erzeugen Spannungen und Konflikte), especially as (since) in the name of the (principle of) solidarity (principle) (im Namen des Solidaritätsprinzips)(,) often one-sided (i.e. unilateral) utilitarian claims (demands) are raised (i.e. made)¹⁶⁸. In general (Generally)(,) the (pseudo)familial (i.e. family or kinship) element (or impact; Einschlag) of friendship in itself does not in the least vouch for (guarantee) the moderation (attenuation or toning down) (Abmilderung) of such claims or (for) the dismantling (decomposition, breakdown, reduction, cutback; Abbau) of rigid (firm, stiff, hard(ened), harsh, severe, solid, tough, relentless) hierarchical relations (circumstances or conditions) (harter hierarchischer Verhältnisse). Patriarchalism (Der Patriarchalismus) has(,)

¹⁶⁸ See the good analysis of such relation(ship)s in Eisenstadt, “Ritualised Personal Relations”, esp. pp. 90ff., 91ff., 93.

as is known(,) become [a] political system in various (different, distinct, dissimilar, differing, varying), even democratic forms, and coercion (compulsion or force) (pressure, constraint, restraint, inhibition, obligation, necessitation, duress; Zwang) can be legitimised most easily (the easiest) through the supposed (ostensible, reputed, alleged) concern (worry, care) for (regarding, about) the welfare (good, well-being, wellness, fate, prosperity) of the (fake(d) or fictitious (bogus, fabricated, made-up, invented)) relative (relation)¹⁶⁹.

Let us return, however, to our ancient example. What has been (hitherto) said (so (thus) far, until (up to) now) shows (reveals, suggests, indicates, allows [us] to recognise (know)) that even friendships, which are (stand) under the influence (sign, cloak, aegis) of archaic values, contain (include, feature, comprise, embrace) a number of (several, multiple, may, quite a few) permanent aspects. Their [These permanent aspects'] conceptual (notional) separation (segregation, severance) from one another marks (labels), that is, not the (point in) time (moment) of their [every permanent aspect's (conceptual separation's)] coming into being (emergence, creation, genesis, formation), but it [such coming into being] takes place at a time (or in an age (era, period, epoch)), which for whatever reasons(,) develops the corresponding abstractions and in their [these abstractions'] light apprehends (grasps, understands, records, registers, captures) what until then indeed existed and consciously had an (took) effect (worked, acted, operated, was effective), but was not reflected upon at this level of abstraction. A more accurate (precise, exact, specific, particular) (closer) analysis of the social thoughts world (ideological universe or system of ideas) of Homeric men (humans)

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Sorokin's comments (remarks, observations) about (regarding, on) "familistic" and "contractual solidarity", *Society*, esp. pp. 103, 107.

(people, and women) can prove (demonstrate, show, establish) that they very well had a notion (or representation) (idea, concept(ion), perception, image, picture, vision) of the social-ontologically fundamental forms (shapes) of friendship (eine Vorstellung von den sozialontologisch fundamentalen Gestalten der Freundschaft), i.e. they could very well distinguish (differentiate), on the one hand between the elementary substantial bonds (or ties) of friendship (elementaren substantiellen Freundschaftsbanden) (family, community (fellowship, association, communion, confraternity, society, co-operation; Gemeinschaft)) and (the) more or less transient (temporary, transitory, passing, momentary) utilitarian co-operation (vorübergehenden utilitaristischen Kooperation),(;) on the other hand,(,) between the private and public character of such bonds (ties) or end(goal)[-oriented] (i.e. purposeful or expedient) friendships (friendships of the end (goal) (purpose or expediency) (Zweckfreundschaften). In (the) early or late classical period (time[s], age, era, epoch)(,) however,(,) this experience is (becomes) (more) starkly (i.e. greatly) (strongly, intensely) differentiated,(,) and is conceptually (notionally) fixed in (the) reflection. We (have) already indicated (hinted at, conveyed, suggested, implied, intimated, insinuated, alluded to) under which (what) (intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)-historical) influences (pertaining to the history of ideas) the criterion of usefulness (utility or expedience) (Nützlichkeitskriterium) was emphasised (given prominence, underlined)¹⁷⁰. This turned of course against the value scale (i.e. scale of values) (Wertskala) of the old (genera [in respect] of) nobility (noble lineage or aristocracy) (der alten Adelsgeschlechter) – that is, against an ideology, not against a reality, [in relation (regard, respect)] to (of) which [whose] (the) considerations of usefulness (utility or

¹⁷⁰ See footnote 78 in this chapter.

expedience), even (also) in friendship, would be (were) alien (foreign or strange). The conceptual (notional) gain (win, benefit, profit, return, yield) was(,) at any rate (in any case)(,) clear, because thereby (through (because of) that, in this way, by this means, as a result, thus) the two most important degrees (grades, extents, sizes, magnitudes) of intensity [in respect] of friendship (Intensitätsgrade der Freundschaft) (binding (i.e. affiliation or [a] bond) (linking, association, conjunction, coupling) for better or for worse (i.e. come what may), [and] if need be (necessary) (when needed) self-sacrifice,(;) and [an] end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) relationship of co-operation, [which is] if need [can] be dissoluble [dissolved] (Verbindung auf Gedeih und Verderb, notfalls Selbstaufopferung, und zweckrationales Kooperationsverhältnis, notfalls auflösbar))(,) were in principle kept (told) apart (distinguished). Epicurus, who had a soft spot (lot of time) for (cared about) both perceptions (views), i.e. friendship could take root in utility (gain, advantage or benefit) (use, profit)(,) and simultaneously (concurrently) regarded (considered, held) the torment (anguish, agony or pain) (torture; Qual) of the (one's) friend as more painful (distressing, stinging, aching) than one's own [torment]¹⁷¹, [whilst] indeed (of course) (he) left (exposed) (leaving, exposing) himself open to some (quite a bit (a degree) of, many a) logical weakness(es) (nakedness), for (regarding, in regard to) which however(,) he summarised (summed up) the (examination (study) of) (the) problem(s), and did the same (once) (more) (again) e contrario (i.e. from the contrary point of view), when he wanted to make out of (from) friendship a secluded (or remote) (faraway, out-of-the-way, isolated, solitary) private sanctuary (refuge or retreat) against the storms (tempests, gales, assaults, attacks, turbulence) of public life. Because

¹⁷¹ See e.g. the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, Nr. 23 and 56-57 (Krauz, pp. 84 and 92).

friendship had in the meantime (meanwhile) (a) [already] (long (time) ago) become (turned into) a social and political concept (notion), and this [happened] in the [a] dual (double, twin) sense: on the one hand as [the] union (combination, bringing together, consolidation, integration, merger, amalgamation) of persons of [a] common (joint, mutual, collective) cast of mind (mindset or mentality) (way of thinking, conviction, view, attitude) and [common] interests for (in) the pursuit (pursuance, tracking) of political goals (ends or purposes)¹⁷²,(;) on the other hand(,) as [the] designation (or description) (appellation, expression, indication, marking, signification, naming) of the bond[s] (tie[s]) (Band)(,) which hold(s) (keep(s)) society together in general, as well as (as) [regards] [with regard to] the (pre)conditions (prerequisites, requirements) of partial or general social cohesion (coherence) (die Bedingungen partiellen oder generellen sozialen Zusammenhaltes). With remarkable (noteworthy, notable, noticeable, conspicuous, striking) swiftness (rapidity, quickness, speed(iness), promptness)(,) the classical term for friendship (φιλία [= love, affection as friendship]) as [a] neological replacement (substitute) for the archaic φιλότης [= love, friendship as hospitality]) was extended (expanded, stretched) to ([the] conclusion (entering into) of) (inter(-)state, intergovernmental, international) peace treaties (agreements) and alliances (between states) (auf zwischenstaatliche Friedenschlüsse und Bündnisse)¹⁷³. However(,) above all it [(the classical term for) friendship] was used purposefully (in accordance with certain aims (goals), in a well-aimed (deliberate, targeted, concentrated, studied) manner) in connection (conjunction, combination) (combined) with concepts (notions) like ([such] as) order and justice (justness, fairness, equity, legitimacy,

¹⁷² Even those [political goals] of the nobility (noble lineage or aristocracy); on (regarding, about) Theognis and his perception (view) of political friendship see Fraisse, *Philia*, p. 50ff.. Cf. footnote 136 in this chapter.

¹⁷³ See e.g. Herodotus IV, 152; VII, 130, 151, 152.

righteousness) (Ordnung und Gerechtigkeit)(,) in order to make (the) co-operative social relations, which constitute(d) life in the framework of organised society(,) recognisable (or distinct) (clear, known)¹⁷⁴.

On the basis of this long pre-history(,) Aristotle (has, had) built (set) up (erected, assembled, founded, arranged, constructed, synthesised) his grand (great, grandiose, tremendous, awesome, excellent, brilliant, wonderful, majestic, magnificent, splendid, terrific, admirable, sublime, pompous) phenomenology of friendship, which after a good twenty-three centuries retains (keeps) its theoretical validity – which(,) certainly (though, admittedly, mind you, indeed)(,) says something about the constancy (Konstanz) of social-ontological magnitudes. The great thinker did not let (allow) himself at all(,) in the drawing (setting) up (formulation, wording, putting forward, arrangement, constructing, assembly, specification) of this phenomenology(,) (to) be put off (disconcerted) by his own ideal of friendship, i.e. the perfect (complete, consummate) friendship of the [those who are] (intellectually(mentally)(-spiritually) and(,) in terms of manners, morals and customs(,) (ethically, morally)) perfect(ed) (or accomplished) [people, humans, men] (in terms of [both] the spirit(-intellect) (intellect(-spirit))(,) and(,) manners, morals and customs) (die vollkommene Freundschaft der geistig and sittlich Vollendeten); in so far as (as much as, that) (to the extent that) the normative notion (idea, perception, (re)presentation, concept(ion), image, picture, vision) is regarded as realisable (feasible, viable, practicable), it avowedly (declaredly, professedly, openly) constitutes a peripheral (secondary, marginal, side) phenomenon (matter, effect), and it is not carried (brought) into (i.e. included in) (the) social-ontological

¹⁷⁴ Concisely (To the point, Incisively, Pithily)(,) (in) Plato, *Politeia*, 351d; *Gorgias*, 508a; *Protagoras*, 322c.

stocktaking (inventory, itemisation, reappraisal; Bestandsaufnahme), but rather serves (is of use (used)) as [a] background (film, foil, transparency; Folie) on which the features (characteristics, attributes, traits) of social reality come to the fore (out, forward, prominence) (become evident, emerge, protrude, stand out, bulge) more sharply (clearly, crisply, accurately, focussed, perspicaciously). [The fact] That Aristotle retains (keeps) his normativism for (to) himself (and the likes of him (his equals ((own) kind))), is the one methodical (i.e. methodological) advantage (merit, asset) of his analysis. The other [(methodological) advantage] might (should, could) be conceptually difficult for those who want to make out of (from) the contrast(ing) (opposition, antithesis, conflict) between “community” and “society” not merely (just, simply) two starkly (strongly, intensely, greatly, powerfully, severely) stylised epochs of (in) the development (or evolution) of history (historical development), but virtually (almost, really, absolutely) a social-ontological caesura (pause, break, interruption, intermission, suspension). Because Aristotle simultaneously and equally (in the same way, to the same degree (extent), likewise) accepts (grants, allows, admits to, recognises) “community-based(related)” and “societal (social)” („gemeinschaftliche“ und „gesellschaftliche“) forms of friendship, and he in fact gains (obtains) his own comprehensive (extensive, broad, sweeping) position through (by means of) (the) demarcation (delimitation, dissociation, differentiation, separation) against the pure concept of society, that is, against the sophistic perception (or view) [that] society was (had (has) been, is) founded (established, set up, instituted, formed, constituted, incorporated) by way (means) of (through) contract between individuals(,) and serves (is of use) of its [very] essence (nature or being) (substance, texture, character)(,) (for) the exchange (traffic) (or the circulation (communication, intercourse) of exchange) and the utility (benefit, profit

or advantage) (use(fulness)) or the protection ((safe)guarding, shielding, conservation, conserving) (dem Tauschverkehr und dem Nutzen bzw. dem Schutz) of its members¹⁷⁵. His (Aristotle's) turning away (estrangement) from (or break with) (renunciation of) (social) normativism is (then) again (in turn) (on the other hand) borne out (confirmed, corroborated, substantiated, supported, hardened, solidified) through (by (means of)) the [his] critique (criticism) of the Platonic state, which exactly because of its egalitarianism (Egalitarismus) destroys (ruins) socially viable (strong or durable) (load-bearing, sound, acceptable) friendship (capable of taking a load) (sozial tragfähige Freundschaft)¹⁷⁶. The upshot (result, bottom line, conclusion; Fazit) of this double (dual, twin) polemic(s) reads (is, states, rings): friendship in the sense of social cohesion (coherence) (sozialen Zusammenhaltes) exists in a (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) of particular (special, specific, exceptional) forms of friendship, which draw (or feed (live)) on (and live off) very different motivations; and in these forms of friendship(,) egalitarian as well (just) as hierarchical relations between those involved (the participants) (egalitäre ebenso wie hierarchische Beziehungen zwischen den Beteiligten) can be reflected (or can manifest (show) themselves) (precipitate, find expression). From (Out of) this way of looking at things (consideration, contemplation, observation), (a) [set of] flexible conceptual (notional) instruments (and means of thought) results (is derived, arises, emanates), which is capable of (can, is able (has a capacity) to) apprehend(ing) (grasp(ing), understand(ing)) the social collective in its concreteness (ein flexibles begrifflichen Instrumentarium, das soziale Kollektive in ihrer Konkretheit zu erfassen vermag), no matter

¹⁷⁵ See the polemic(s) against Lycophron in *Politik*, 1280b.

¹⁷⁶ Loc. cit., 1262b.

how the dosage (dose, measuring out; Dosierung) of the “community-based(related)” and “societal (social)”, of the egalitarian and hierarchical elements(,) in every one of them turns out [to be] (are like).

Friendship in society, i.e. in its [friendship’s] sole (only, lone, single, unique) conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) coming into being (emergence, creation, genesis, origin, formation (process))(-)and(-)unfolding (development) space (room for coming into being and unfolding) (in ihrem einzig denkbaren Entstehungs- und Entfaltungsraum), is based (rests) by and large (on the whole, in the main, in general) on two principles: [the] blood relationship[s] (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) and agreeing (i.e. agreement) (understanding, arrangement, settlement, accord, covenant, accommodation) (Blutsverwandtschaft und Übereinkommen), in relation to which each of both these kinds (sorts, types, ways, manners, fashions, styles, species, forms) of friendship takes (adopts, accepts, assumes, embraces) several (a number of, multiple, many a, quite a few) form(s)¹⁷⁷. Friendship out of (from) blood relationship[s] (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) lets (allows) [us](,) through one of its forms and indeed that of friendship between parents and children, (to) recognise (know, see, realise, understand, discern, identify, detect, spot, make out) that friendship in general can exist just as between equals (i.e. people who are the same or alike) (zwischen Gleichen) as (well as) between unequals (i.e. those who are not the same or alike) (Ungleichen), so that nothing prohibits (forbids, bans, proscribes, outlaws, debars) [us] from (also) calling (naming) the relation(ship) between master (lord, ruler, commander, arbiter) and him

¹⁷⁷ *Nikom. Ethik*, 1161b 11 – 15. (So to speak)(,) As (it were)(,) as an appendage (attachment, addition, extension, pendant, tag) of kinship ([familial] affinity)(,) (even, still) the friendship of *hetairoi* [= *ἑταῖροι* = partners, comrades, fellows of various kinds (work, business, war, etc.), but (usually) not in regard to sexual intimacy] is (even, still, also) mentioned (even, still) here (Gleichsam als Anhängsel der Verwandtschaft wird hier noch die Freundschaft der *Hetairoi* erwähnt).

who obeys (is obeying) (i.e. the servant or the subservient) (die Beziehung zwischen Gebieter und Gehorchendem)(,) (friendship)(,) in the wider (broader, more extensive) political-social sense(,) (friendship) (too)¹⁷⁸ – (certainly, admittedly, mind you) if (when) it [such a (this) relation(ship)] is not inimical (hostile, antagonistic) (though). The same kind (sort, type, manner) of friendship, when (if) it is in evidence (appears, emerges, makes itself felt) as friendship between [a] married couple (spouses), indicates that motivations are distributed right across (all over, straight through) the most different kinds (sorts, types) of friendship; because husband and wife are (become) united ((inter)connected, related, conjoined, associated) with each other not only through the procreation (fathering, generation, begetting, progeniture) drive (urge or impulse) (instinct) (drive of procreation) (Zeugungstrieb), but also through utility (benefit, profit, or advantage) (use(fulness)) and the division of labour¹⁷⁹. It is no(t) wonder (surprising) [then] when (if) agreeing (i.e. agreement) based (resting) on friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) (use (utility) friendship) quantitatively preponderates (predominates, is predominant, prevails) in society by far (wenn die auf Übereinkommen beruhende Nutzfrendtschaft in der Gesellschaft quantitativ bei weitem überwiegt): humans (people, men) struggle (fight or battle) constantly (continuously) over money, honour (reputation, glory, kudos) and pleasure (desire, (sexual) appetite, craving, lust) (Geld, Ehre und Lust)¹⁸⁰. Pleasure and utility (Lust und Nutzen) naturally represent (constitute) two varying (or different) (differing) things, and Aristotle accordingly distinguishes (differentiates) the friendships from one another coming into being (emerging, arising) from

¹⁷⁸ Loc. cit., 1158b 11-14.

¹⁷⁹ Loc. cit., 1162a 24-25.

¹⁸⁰ Loc. cit., 1168b 15-19.

them, however(,) no(t) less important appears (seems) (to be) his [Aristotle's] (sub)division of friendship for use into a strict (harsh, hard, rigid, austere) statutes (i.e. rules-based or legal) friendship (friendship of statutes (i.e. rules or law)) (eine strenge Satzungsfreundschaft) (νομική), in which performance (work, payment) and service in return (counter(-)performance) (i.e. a quid pro quo) (or supply and consideration) (Leistung und Gegenleistung) are precisely (exactly, closely, accurately) stipulated (laid down, established, determined, set, arranged, fixed, settled, agreed, prescribed, defined), and(,) a loose (relaxed, slack) friendship [in respect] of cast of mind (mindset or mentality) (eine lockere Gesinnungsfreundschaft) (ἡθική), in which the performance (supply or "pro quo") is honoured (remunerated or rewarded) (paid (for)) asymmetrically and irregularly (unevenly, erratically, in an irregular (unregulated) manner) by the services in return (consideration or "quid") (bei der Leistungen nur asymmetrisch und unregelmäßig durch Gegenleistungen honoriert werden)¹⁸¹. The (re)presentation (or notion) (idea, concept(ion), perception, image, picture, vision) of utility changes (alters, varies) (is) constantly (continuously, continually, perpetually) (changing) [along] with [regard to] [changes to] humans and situations (ändert sich nun ständig mit den Menschen und Situationen), and consequently (as a result)(,) friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) must be subject (liable) (succumb) to (be governed by) vacillations (or fluctuations) (variations, oscillations, swaying(s), rocking(s), ups and downs) and crises (Schwankungen und Krisen)¹⁸², in fact(,) its [friendship for use's] termination (revocation, breakup, breaking up, annulment, dissolution, cancellation) is, so to speak, already in its entering into (formation) [from the beginning](,) co-calculated (i.e.

¹⁸¹ Loc. cit., 1162b 23.

¹⁸² Loc. cit., 1162b 5-6. Cf.(,) in relation to that(,) Cicero, *Laelius*, 9 (32).

included in the calculation) (wird ... miteinkalkuliert); exactly that which here makes (causes, creates, brings about, gives, grants) friendship, (also) brings about (on) (causes, leads to, precipitates, procures, induces) its end (too) (eben das, was hier Freundschaft stiftet, führt auch ihr Ende herbei). The socially decisive (deciding, relevant, significant, definitive, authoritative, competent) friendship types (types of friendship; Freundschaftstypen) (even the political friendship keeping (sticking, hanging, cohering, binding) the polity (commonwealth, community) (together) is in fact a friendship for use) (auch die das Gemeinwesen zusammenhaltende politische Freundschaft ist ja eine Nutzfrenschaft¹⁸³) are (stand) not therefore in a(ny) necessary relation(ship) with (towards, vis-à-vis) ethical factors and motives (stehen also in keiner notwendigen Beziehung zu ethischen Faktoren und Motiven).

The Aristotelian phenomenology of friendship emphasises (shows, displays, parades, projects) two further (more) social-ontologically central points of view. On the one hand [it] is ascertained (determined, established, found out, discovered, noticed, observed, detected, realised) that all kinds (sorts, types) of friendship show (exhibit, feature, display) greater (larger) or lesser (slighter, smaller) intensity (Intensität)¹⁸⁴. On the other hand, a(n) interrelation ((inter)connection, correlation) between the predominant (predominating, prevailing, prevalent) kind (sort, type, manner, way, fashion, style) or intensity of friendship(,) and(,) the internal (inner, inward) structure of the polity, i.e. of the political collective is made (established, manufactured or restored) (produced, fabricated) (Zum anderen wird ein Zusammenhang zwischen der vorherrschenden Art bzw. Intensität der Freundschaft und der inneren

¹⁸³ Loc. cit., 1160a 11-12.

¹⁸⁴ Loc. cit., 1159b 34-35 (τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἧττον [= for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly friendships (Engl.tr. adapted by L. Dysinger, O.S.B. from that of by W. D. Ross. Greek:, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1894 rpr.1962). Cit. Bekker])).

Struktur des Gemeinwesens, d. h. des politischen Kollektivs hergestellt). This [political collective] is based (rests) on an, on each and every respective occasion, particular (special, specific, peculiar) shaping (moulding, forming, structuring, arrangement, designing, creation) of the (legal) relationships (or circumstances) ([in respect] of (pertaining to) (the) law (and justice)) (besonderen Gestaltung der Rechtsverhältnisse),(; however (but)(,) [the] law (and justice) and friendship, in practical terms (practice), coincide¹⁸⁵: they concern the same humans (people, men) and have the same extent (or scope) (degree, range, compass, scale, span, spread; Umfang)¹⁸⁶. That is why that which Aristotle calls (names) political friendship, i.e. the friendship articulated in terms of (the) law and justice keeping the polity together, reaches (attains, achieves) its high point (there) where concord (or harmony) (peace, unity; Eintracht), that is, the agreement (understanding, arrangement, settlement; Übereinkunft) of all sides regarding (over, about, in relation to) the interests to be pursued (followed)(,) as well as regarding the manner (way, mode) of their [these (the agreed) interests'] practical implementation (realisation)(,) dominates (rules, holds sway, prevails, presides)¹⁸⁷. [Just] As (Like) every friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) or friendship between [the] (morally (ethically) and intellectually(mentally) (-spiritually)) accomplished (i.e. completed, consummate or perfect(ed) people) (in terms of manners, morals, customs and intellect(-spirit)), [so] (too) law (and justice) and constitutional law are subject to more or less great (strong, heavy, intense, substantial, profound, powerful, stark) vacillations (or fluctuations) (variations, oscillations, swaying(s), rocking(s), ups and downs) (too), which not seldom (rarely, infrequently,

¹⁸⁵ Loc. cit., 1155a 22-28, 1159b 25-28.

¹⁸⁶ Loc. cit., 1160a 7-8.

¹⁸⁷ Loc. cit., 1167b 36-37, 1167a 26-28.

uncommonly, unusually) flow into (i.e. lead to) [= στᾶσις (στάσις) = rising, revolt, sedition, party-strife, discord, quarrel; party, faction; standing, stationariness, condition, station, position] (Stasis), (in)to turmoil (or rebellion) (commotion, revolt, uprising, sedition, upheaval, uproar, tumult; Aufruhr) and civil war (Bürgerkrieg), at any rate (least, all events) (in any case, anyway) show (let) concord (or harmony) (peace, unity; Eintracht) (appear) in the literal sense as [an] ideal borderline case. [The] concrete causes and more precise (or detailed) (nearer, closer, further) circumstances of these vacillations (or fluctuations) and endangering(s) (jeopardising(s), risking(s)) of (or (dangers,) threats or risks [in regard] to) political friendship to be investigated (explored, examined, studies, probed, looked into, scrutinised, surveyed, researched), are(,) though (mind you, admittedly, certainly)(,) the [a] matter (business or thing) (issue, object, case, cause, job) of (for) history and sociology (Konkrete Ursachen und nähere Umstände dieser Schwankungen und Gefährdungen der politischen Freundschaft zu untersuchen, ist allerdings Sache der Historie und der Soziologie), and it (they) [this (such a) matter] has (have)(,) as is known(,) also (even) occupied (absorbed, engrossed, employed, concerned) the historian and sociologist Aristotle. This insight into the asymmetrical relationship between degrees (grades, extents, sizes, magnitudes) of intensity and kinds of friendship inside of the spectrum of the social relation is social-ontologically important. That means: the construction of this spectrum as [a] succession (series) of degrees (grades) of intensity (als Aufeinanderfolge von Intensitätsgraden) does not coincide with its construction as [an, the] inventory of the kinds of friendship. The intensity achieves all its degrees (grades) in every single kind of friendship, in the private as in the public [kind of friendship], in the statutory as in the emotionally [determined] and

((s)electively(choice))familiially determined (conditioned) [kind of friendship] ([also determined] in terms of (selection (choice))family(kinship)) (in der statutarischen wie in der emotional und (wahl)verwandtschaftlich bedingten); because of this (hence)(,) one can construct the spectrum of the social relation as [a] succession of these degrees (grades) (als Aufeinanderfolge dieser Grade), without having to take into consideration (account) the typology of the kinds of friendship. This typology(,) for its part(,) cannot be apprehended as a gradually (i.e. by (in terms of) degrees or grades) structured (or jointed) (organised, sectionalised, membered, differentiated, varied, hierarchical, planned) sequence (or order) (Diese Typologie ... als graduell gegliederte Reihenfolge); the types or the kinds intersect (cross, traverse) (with) one another depending on the criterion of classification.

4. Excursus (Digression, Divagation): the spectrum of the social relation in the spectrum of social theory and of social science (Exkurs: Das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung im Spektrum der Sozialtheorie und der Sozialwissenschaft)

The (fundamental) social-ontological (fundamental) principle (axiom, postulate, proposition) [that] friendship and enmity in their many forms (shapes) spanned (covered, encompassed, embraced) the whole (entire, complete, total) spectrum of the social relation (Der sozialontologische Grundsatz, Freundschaft und Feindschaft in ihren vielen Gestalten umspannten das ganze Spektrum der sozialen Beziehungen), was, as we

know, not put forward (formulated, proposed, drawn up, set out, established) first by formal sociology(,) and also not claimed by it [formal sociology] as its own discovery (finding)¹⁸⁸. In reality(,) it [this (the) (said) fundamental social-ontological principle] constitutes since (from) time immemorial (the beginning (the dawn) of (ancient, primeval) time(s)) in all cultural circles (cultures) a [matter (kind, piece) of] self-evidence (naturalness) [something self-evident], which indeed first of all was expressed (pronounced, said, enunciated, spoken) not in the form of a theoretical insight, but rather as [an] elementary rule of orientation in life (living) (als elementare Regel der Orientierung im Leben). (In order) To remain (stay) with (at) the Greeks: “probably (surely, possibly, perhaps) the oldest saying (motto, maxim, adage, aphorism, quote) which the Greeks (had, have) formulated about (regarding) the relation(ship) of man to(wards) (with [regard to]) man(,) is the (piece of) advice (recommendation, suggestion) to love (the [one’s]) friend[s] and to hate (the [one’s]) foe[s]”¹⁸⁹. This requirement (necessity, command(ment), law, bid(ding), precept) for (of) wisdom and prudence (cleverness, intelligence, good sense, soundness, shrewdness) (command(ment), law, bid(ding), precept) (Klugheitsgebot) was typically (enough) (characteristically)(,) regardless of other (further) world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) and political sympathies (weltanschaulichen und politischen Sympathien), heeded(;) it is [found] (stands) for example (instance) with the same lack of hesitance in thinking (promptness, readiness, unscrupulousness, unthinkingness; Bedenkenlosigkeit) in Plato¹⁹⁰ and in Thucydides¹⁹¹; moreover (in

¹⁸⁸ See Sec. 2A in this chapter.

¹⁸⁹ Dirlmeier, *ΦΙΛΟΣ*, 27; with many (much) references ((pieces of) evidence, instances, examples, documents, records, proof).

¹⁹⁰ See e.g. *Politeia*, 332d, 375c.

¹⁹¹ See e.g. I, 41,3; I, 43,3. With the stereotypical obligation (duty, commitment) “to have the same friends and foes”(,) alliances are sealed, e.g. I, 44, 1; III, 70, 6; III, 75, 1; VII, 33, 6 etc..

addition, additionally)(,) (the) patriotic consciousness (awareness) of the citizen (townsman, burgher, bourgeois) of the ancient polis [= city-state] is summed up (summarised, encapsulated) (with)in(side) it [the above-mentioned piece of advice (saying, requirement for wisdom and prudence)], for whom the concept (notion) “fatherland” and the duty to help the [one’s] friend and to harm (damage, injure, impair) the [one’s] foe are synonymous¹⁹². The Christian request (or exhortation) (call, invitation, appeal, demand, incitement; Aufforderung) to love the [one’s] foe (enemy)(,) meant (signified, denoted) a change (alteration, modification, shift, transformation) in the ethical positioning (stance or attitude), but not [a change] in the ascertainment [that] the social world could be (was, is) divided into friends and foes. On the contrary, it [such an exhortation] presupposed this ascertainment, in relation to which (whilst at the same time) the necessity of enmity in statu isto [= in that state (condition, standing) of ours (Latin)] could be explained by the Fall of Man (or Original Sin) (Sündenfall)¹⁹³. It should be added (appended) that in the ancient as well as in the Christian (general) thought (intellectual) framework (framework of thought; Denkrahen)(,) friendship and enmity were derived (deduced, inferred) from an anthropology of drives (urges) (impulses, instincts; Triebanthropologie), no matter how one interpreted [the] origin (provenance, background) and composition (texture, nature or constitution) of the drives (urges) (Herkunft und Beschaffenheit der Triebe) on each and every respective occasion. It stayed that way even after the establishment (establishing) of the primacy of anthropology in the European New Times (Modern Era) (Dabei blieb es auch nach der Etablierung des Primats der Anthropologie

¹⁹² According to a fine (good, nice, lovely, beautiful) observation (comment, remark) by L. Strauss, *On Tyranny*, p. 138.

¹⁹³ See e.g. Augustine, *De civ. dei*, the entire (complete, whole) 19th book (cf. footnotes 146, 149 above).

in der europäischen Neuzeit). Ferguson spoke (of) (man) [of, as having] [the] “mixed dispositions to friendship or enmity” (of man),(;) that is why he [Ferguson] saw friendship and enmity (also) (at work) “in the most pacific situation” (at work) (too)(,) and connected (linked, combined, united, tied, bound) both halves, from ((out) of) which(,) according to his perception (view)(,) social life consists, i.e. [the, a] “state of war” and “state of amity”, with the corresponding unalterable (irrevocable, immutable, irreversible) aptitudes (or predispositions) in man (unabänderlichen Anlagen in Menschen)¹⁹⁴.

One would have to write a(n) whole (entire, complete) treatise in order to explain [that] already since (from) the 18th century, but above all in the 19th and 20th [century], many social theoreticians (theorists) bade farewell (said goodbye) to the thousands-of-years-old self-evidence (or naturalness) (Selbstverständlichkeit) of social-ontologically (equally) putting (placing, setting) (juxtaposing, comparing) friendship and enmity (next (with) to each other) (with equal rights, on an equal basis) in the spectrum of the social relation [as (being) social-ontologically having equal rights (equivalent)]. Nonetheless (However), [we should not omit (here)] a(n) indication (reference, pointer, allusion) of a particularly important reason for that (should (may) not be lacking ((go) missing)) (here). We mean the extremely (exceedingly, exceptionally, awfully) intricate (complex, multifarious) effect (impact, influence) of the eschatological philosophy of history (eschatologischen Geschichtsphilosophie), whose avowed (declared, professed, proclaimed) aim (objective, target, goal, end, purpose) consisted in fact exactly (there)in (of) cutting (back) (or shortening) (reducing, slashing, abridging, condensing) the spectrum of the social relation around (about)

¹⁹⁴ *Essay*, I, 1, 3, 4 = pp. 3, 16, 20.

(or at) the half or at least around (about) (or at) the pole of enmity, that is, of holding out (presenting) the prospect of (making possible) (promising) social relations (circumstances and conditions)(,) which would exclude (preclude, rule (leave, lock) out) bloody conflict(s). As long as the Kingdom (Realm, Empire, Domain) of God was not of this world, one might (could, should) have held (kept hold, clung, grasped)(,) as [a] Christian(,) without [any] contradiction (objections), onto (of, tight, firmly) the dream of harmony at the end of time(,) and at the same time onto the conviction (and belief) [that] on this earth the lot (fate, destiny) of sinful man is (would be) (in the best case, at best (most), ideally) friendship and (in any (other) case (event), at any rate (all events), definitely) enmity. However(,) the shifting (movement, transfer(ral)(rence)) of the dream from Heaven to Earth (heaven (the sky) to earth) made (rendered) the exclusion of enmity from the realm (area, domain, field, sector) of social-ontological constants absolutely essential (necessary, required, requisite). The exclusion resulted (effected, took place, occurred, ensued) through the promise of classless society in Marxist messianism, through the certainty (certitude) [that] trade ((and) commerce, business) will take the place of (replace, supersede, relieve) war, in half-hearted (or diffident) (bashful, timid, shy, hesitant, sheepish, coy, apologetical) liberal chiliasm as well as through other, politically less effective (efficacious, effectual, potent) ideologems (i.e. kinds of sub-ideology) (Ideologeme), which nevertheless drew (got, received, obtained) the force (strength, power, energy, vigour, might) of their (personal) magnetism (aura or charisma) (radiation) (Ausstrahlungskraft) from the more effective [ideologies (or ideologems)], even when (if) they more or less deviate (diverge, differ, vary, stray, wander) from these [(more effective) ideologies]. Personalisms belong to them [such ideologems], which (took) aim(ed) for (at) (set one's sights on) a friendly

unio mystica [= mystical union] between the members of the [a] society and through (because of) that [unio mystica](,) (thereby) the overcoming (exceeding, getting over, surpassing, transcending, surmounting, conquest, defeat) of conventional (i.e. traditional) (handed down) evils (ills, maladies) (die Überwindung herkömmlicher Übel), or else seemingly (apparently, ostensibly) ideologically colourless system[s] theories [systems theories] (scheinbar ideologisch farblose Systemtheorien), whose view of things (point of view; Sichtweise) a limine leapt (jumped, sprang, vaulted, skipped) (over) (cleared) deep (profound) inimical split(ing)s (fissions, divisions, schisms) (decomposition) in the social body (tiefe feindliche Spaltungen am sozialen Körper)(,) and whose actual (real, factual) reversion (relapse, repetition, recourse) (in)to (of) the philosophy of history(,) we (have) already ascertained (determined, established, found out, observed, detected, discovered)¹⁹⁵. Hereinafter (Below) we shall see how representatives (exponents, advocates, supporters, agents) of such currents (trends, movements) sought to define the social relation (to the) programmatic(ally) exclusion of (excluding) enmity, even though the [an] overall view (perspective) (overview, survey, synopsis) shows that its success has (had) been (was) only partial. Enmity continues to appear (crop up, be found, happen, occur) in very many social-theoretical and [social]-psychological reconstructions of the spectrum of the social relation as a [one of] (its) pole[s] (of this spectrum (of the social relation)), and one would make (create, produce, cause) (i.e. have) (form, visualise, see, take) an entirely (totally, completely, wholly) false (wrong, incorrect) (intellectual(mental)(-spiritual)-historical) picture (image, impression, photo) (pertaining to the history of ideas)(,) if one here took

¹⁹⁵ See Ch. I, Sec. 3 in this volume.

as the (one's) [a] yardstick (benchmark, measure, standard, gauge) that which one since several decades [ago] gets to be (has been, is, was) offered (served, presented, suggested) in Germany in unsurpassable (unbeatable, matchless) ethical and political correctness (in *unübertrefflicher ethischer und politischer Korrektheit*). We shall start (begin) once again (more) with (in [regard to]) formal sociology, which [in respect] of (from) its premises(,) had to pose this question [of what enmity actually means social-ontologically,] and whose effect (impact, influence) penetrated (forced its way) much deeper than the influence of “closed (self-contained, united, cohesive, unified)” and “open” systems theories let (allowed) [us] (to) suppose (presume, assume).

Tönnies' approach, as is known, initiated (introduced, inaugurated)(,) so to speak (to a certain extent, in a way, as it were), formal sociology(,) in so far (as much) as ((to the extent) that)(,) namely(,) community and society were comprehended (understood, grasped) as the ultimate (final, last, end) conceivable (imaginable, thinkable, possible) forms of social living together (i.e. co-existence) (cohabitation),(;) on the other hand, he [Tönnies] remained doubly captive of (or attached to) (rooted in) the [a] philosophy of history: community and society appear as [the] necessary stages (tiers, levels, grades, gradations) of a development (evolution) of history (historical development) (als notwendige Stufen einer *Geschichtsentwicklung*) *and* at (in) the end of the same [(this) historical development](,) a restoration (re-establishment, rebuilding, renewal, restitution, recovery, reinstatement) of (the) community is supposed (meant) to (should) emerge (loom) on a higher (superior) (anti(-)capitalist(ic)) basis (soll sich eine Wiederherstellung der Gemeinschaft auf höherer (antikapitalistischer) Basis abzeichnen)¹⁹⁶. The dichotomy (or

¹⁹⁶ See Ch. I, Sec. 4 in this volume.

rift) (conflict, discrepancy, gulf, crack, dilemma; Zwiespalt) is reflected (manifested) (manifests (shows) itself) (finds expression) in the importance (status or value) of enmity inside of the sociological system. For Tönnies(,) [it is] certain (definite, known) that a comprehensive (extensive, complete, full, sweeping) description (portrayal, account, (re)presentation) of human relations cannot pass by (i.e. overlook (disregard)) (go (move) past) enmity, even (the) extreme [enmity, kind]. The “reciprocal (mutual) effects (impact(s), influence(s))” („gegenseitigen Wirkungen“) in which those relations consist tend “towards the preservation (maintenance, conservation) or... towards the destruction (ruination, ruining, vandalising) of the other will or body (flesh)” („zur Erhaltung oder... zur Zerstörung des anderen Willens oder Leibes“), they are “affirmative (i.e. positive) or denying (i.e. negative) (opposing)” („bejahende oder verneinende“) ¹⁹⁷; every animal (brutish) being (or creature) (essence, substance, nature) (jedes animalische Wesen) lives, by the way (incidentally), (with)in(side) the polarity of “acceptance (adoption, assumption, approval, acquisition) and exclusion (ejection or expulsion) (banishment, repulsion), attack (assault, aggression, raid, strike) and defence (protection), approximation (i.e. approaching (getting near(er) (close(r)), convergence)) and flight (escape, getaway)” („Annahme und Ausstoßung, Angriff und Abwehr, Nahung und Flucht“), which is expressed (enunciated, phrased, verbalised) “physically (bodily) and mentally” („physisch und mental“) as “pleasure (or lust) (joy, delight, desire, appetite) and pain (ache, aching, grief, hurt, distress, soreness), desire (longing or craving) and disgust (loathing, revulsion), hope and fear (dread, fearfulness)” („Lust und Schmerz, Verlangen und Ekel, Hoffnung und Furcht“), “neutrally and logically”

¹⁹⁷ *Gemeinschaft*, p. 3.

(„neutral und logisch“) as “affirmation (approval) and denial (negation, disputing)” („Bejahung und Verneinung“)¹⁹⁸. Tönnies knew though(,) that friendship and enmity have to appear (crop up, happen, occur) in both basic (fundamental, elementary) types of social living together (i.e. co-existence) (cohabitation) (in beiden Grundtypen sozialen Zusammenlebens) [i.e. community and society], but that is not supposed (meant) to mean for him that social living together was founded (established, based, formed, set up, constituted) equally on (in) friendship and enmity. In the apprehension (grasping, understanding, recording, capture, registering) of the social as such(,) friendship has precedence (priority) by definition,(;) that is why (for that reason, because of that, on this account, hence) Tönnies wants to make the [its, his] theme (topic, subject (matter)) in his main (principal, chief) work exclusively (solely) the “relations (circumstances or conditions) of mutual (reciprocal) affirmation (approval)” („Verhältnisse gegenseitiger Bejahung“)¹⁹⁹. (He) Later(,) (he) (has) tried to partially found (or justify) (establish, substantiate, account (give reasons) for), [and] partially ease (i.e. moderate) (mitigate, alleviate, relieve, soothe) the one-sidedness (partiality, bias) of this decision through (by (means (way) of)) an epistemological distinction. According(ly) (to that), “all interrelations

¹⁹⁸ Loc. cit., p. 86. The explanation of friendship and enmity takes place (results, occurs, ensues, follows, is effected) therefore ultimately on [a] psychology of (the) drive(s) (urge(s)) (impulse(s), instinct(s)) (drive(urge)-psychological) [psychology of drives (urges)] basis (auf triebpsychologischer Basis), cf. p. 17ff.: enmity emerges (comes, arises, results, develops) from (out of) either [the] “tearing (to pieces, up, apart) (breaking) or loosening (slackening, relaxation, easing) of natural and existing (present, available) ties (or bonds)” („Zerreiung oder Lockerung natrlicher und vorhandener Bande“) or else from “strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity) (foreignness), lack of understanding (appreciation) (incomprehension), mistrust(ing) (distrust, suspiciousness)” („Fremdheit, Unverstndnis, Mitrauen“). “Both [instances, cases] are instinctive (instinctual), but that [the former (first instance)] is essentially wrath (or anger) (rage, fury, spleen), hate (hatred), displeasure (irritation, indignation, resentment) (or unwillingness), this [the latter (second instance)] [is] essentially fear (dread, fearfulness), abhorrence (or disgust) (revulsion, repugnance, repulsion, loathing, detestation), aversion (or distaste) (loathing, disgust, reluctance); that [the former,] acute,(;) this [the latter,] chronic.” („Beide sind instinktiv, aber jene ist wesentlich Zorn, Ha, Unwille, diese wesentlich Furcht, Abscheu, Widerwille; jene akut, diese chronisch.“)

¹⁹⁹ Loc. cit., p. 3.

(connections, correlations) of humans (people, men) in space and time, irrespective of whether ... they affirm or deny (negate, dispute) one another” („alle Zusammenhänge der Menschen in Raum und Zeit, unabhängig davon, ob ... sie einander bejahen oder verneinen“) are [the] object (or subject matter) (topic, motif, theme) of “general sociology” („allgemeinen Soziologie“). “Special (particular, specific)” („spezielle“) sociology, whose first part is “pure (unadulterated, clean, virgin)” („reine“), does not investigate (research, examine, look (inquire) into, scrutinise, study, inspect)(,) on the other hand(,) the friendly and inimical or the positive and negative “mental(-spiritual) relation(ship) between humans (people, men)” („seelische Verhältnis zwischen Menschen“), but only “the social relation(ship)” („das soziale Verhältnis“), which is supposed (meant) to (should) come into being (arise, emerge, originate, result, ensue, be created (produced)) “out of a positive mental(-spiritual) relation(ship)” („aus einem positiven seelischen Verhältnis“)200.

In Simmel(,) the terms “general” („allgemeine“) and “pure” („reine“) sociology (Soziologie) have, as [already] mentioned²⁰¹, a(n) completely (entirely, wholly, totally) different meaning than in Tönnies. If one takes the equal [equally weigh(t)ed (entitled, legitimate)] thematisation of friendship and enmity as the [a] yardstick (measure, benchmark), then (so, thus) Simmel’s “pure” sociology is in fact [found] (stands) at the antipodes of (the) Tönniesian (Tönniesian) [“pure” sociology](,) or it corresponds (tallies, coincides) (is identical), in terms of content, with Tönnies’s “general” sociology. Because Simmel wants to research (investigate, examine, look (inquire) into, scrutinise) in(to) “pure” sociology the forms of socialisation (die Formen der

²⁰⁰ „Einteilung“, pp. 430, 434ff.; cf. already [in] „Das Wesen“, p. 351.

²⁰¹ See footnote 18 in this chapter.

Vergesellschaftung)(,)(;) however(,) all “interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) amongst humans (people, men)” („alle Wechselwirkungen unter Menschen“) without exception belong to them [the forms of socialisation], that is, even (also) enmity and (the) struggle (fight(ing), battle, combat), and indeed as “one of the most lively (vivid, animated)” [of interactions (or mutual influences) amongst humans]²⁰². The unity of the social results (ensues, arises, crops up) from the addition (summation) of association and dissociation, not from a subtraction(,) in which the dissociative element (part, component, factor, unit, cell) is neatly (cleanly, clearly, very thoroughly, carefully) separated from the associative [element] and(,) as it were(,) (would (have) be(en), is) surgically removed from (operated out of) the social body (Der Einheit des Sozialen ergibt sich aus der Addition von Assoziation und Dissoziation, nicht aus einer Subtraktion, bei der das dissoziative Element vom assoziativen sauber getrennt und gleichsam aus dem sozialen Körper herausoperiert worden wäre). The unity of the social is(,) in other words(,) something conceptually (notionally) and ontologically different (dissimilar, varied, diverse) than (to, from) the social unity in this or that concrete society (Die Einheit des Sozialen ist m. a. W. etwas begrifflich und ontologisch Unterschiedliches als die soziale Einheit in dieser oder jener konkreten Gesellschaft). The struggle (fight(ing), battle, combat) is “an against one another (i.e. conflict or antagonism), which belongs(,) with the [a] for one another (i.e. harmony, agreement or co-operation)(,) under a higher concept”. It may in its most extreme forms “rise (or build up) (increase, intensify, grow, improve) to the driving out (ousting, displacement, replacing, superseding, dispelling, suppression) of all moments (fact(or)s or elements) (instances) of unity”,

²⁰² *Soziologie*, pp. 186, 187ff..

but even then, i.e. even as open war, it [struggle] is to be comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted, construed, taken) as [a] “borderline case of socialisation” (Der Kampf ist „ein Gegeneinander, das mit dem Füreinander unter einen höheren Begriff gehört“. Er mag sich in seinen äußersten Formen „bis zur Verdrängung aller Einheitsmomente steigern“, selbst dann aber, d. h. selbst als offener Krieg, ist er als „Grenzfall der Vergesellschaftung“ aufzufassen)²⁰³. How deeply (profoundly) [the] struggle (fight(ing), combat, battle) and war, that is, enmity(,) is interwoven into the social network (or mesh) (plexus) (ins soziale Geflecht eingewoben ist), becomes (is) evident (illuminated) from the thought (consideration, reflection, deliberation) that the transition from war to peace in principle can be (is) more difficult to (be) explain(ed) than the other way around. Because the “the situations inside of peace(,) from which (the) open struggle (fighting or battle (combat)) emerges (comes), are themselves already struggle (fighting or battle) in [a] diffuse (scattered, vague, foggy, hazy, unclear), imperceptible or latent form” („die Situationen innerhalb des Friedens, aus denen der offene Kampf hervorgeht, sind selbst schon Kampf in diffuser, unmerklicher oder latenter Form“), however peace “does not crystallise (is not started (put into position), prepared, made, produced, developed) as well (likewise) immediately (right away, instantaneously, directly) in(side) the dispute (quarrel, wrangle, squabble)” („setzt sich nicht ebenso unmittelbar an den Streit an“), but it needs (requires) a “particular (special, separate, peculiar, exceptional) undertaking (or act(ion)) (carrying out, doing)” („besonderen Vornahme“), which can be (the) [a] victory (win, triumph), compromise, or (re)conciliation (appeasement)²⁰⁴. The “collectivising effect (impact, influence)” („kollektivierende

²⁰³ Loc. cit., p. 193, and „Zur Methodik“, p. 233.

²⁰⁴ *Soziologie*, p. 246ff..

Wirkung“ of the struggle (fight(ing) or battle), to which Simmel devotes (dedicates) impressive pages²⁰⁵, bears witness (attests, testifies) to (vouches for)(,) from a wider (broader) (point of) view(point) (i.e. perspective)(,) the original (initial, primordial) togetherness (belonging together or common bond) (interrelation, relationship, linkage, interdependence) of enmity and sociality (die ursprüngliche Zusammengehörigkeit von Feindschaft und Sozialität). Friendship belongs, of course, likewise (as well, similarly, just as [much]) to sociality, yet it is not identical with this [sociality], and that is why commentators err (are wrong (mistaken)), who disguise (dress up, mask) their own pious (religious, devout, god-fearing) wish (desire, request, want) to (absolutely) equate (identify, treat) sociality with friendship (as equivalent) (absolutely, per se, as such) as a question to Simmel [as to] how then this [Simmel, man, he] wants to deduce (derive, infer) sociality from (out of) the general concept (notion) of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) when (if) struggle (fighting or battling) and friendship are interactions (or mutual influences) too²⁰⁶.

Simmel’s implicit turning away (estrangement) from (renunciation of, break with) Tönnies on (in [regard to]) this crucial (key, pivotal, critical) point becomes in v. Wiese explicit. The narrowing (constriction, contraction) of the concept (notion) of the social to “so-called positive, uninimical (i.e. non-inimical (not inimical)) relations” („sogennante positive, unfeindliche Beziehungen“), he [v. Wiese] writes, corresponds with (to) (the) “ethical” („ethischen“) language (linguistic, speech) use (or usage), however(,) is “not to be (re)commended (advised, counselled,

²⁰⁵ Loc. cit., p. 239ff..

²⁰⁶ Thus, e.g. Becker, *Simmel*, p. 31ff..

suggested, endorsed) in sociology” („in der Soziologie nicht zu empfehlen“), which should develop its own criteria beyond ethics, aesthetics, etc.. If sociology turns its attention exclusively to “positive” social relations, (then, so, thus) from those [“positive” social relations] not merely (just, only) an incomplete, but an absolutely (really, actually) false (wrong, untrue, incorrect, artificial, erroneous, counterfeit, bogus) picture (image) comes into being (arises, emerges, is created (produced)): “because the now and then (again) (i.e. interchange between “positive” and “negative” social relations) in (the) praxis (i.e. (in) practice) interlocks (meshes or interconnects) so much and constitutes such a dense (thick, compact, tight) network (or mesh) (plexus) that one wrongly (incorrectly, falsely) explains every community if one derives (infers, deduces) [it, every community] only from solidarity (attachment, closeness, fellowship or strong mutual bonds) („denn das Ab und An greift in der Praxis so sehr ineinander und bildet ein so dichtes Geflecht, daß man jede Gemeinschaft falsch erklärt, wenn man sie nur aus Verbundenheit ableitet“)²⁰⁷. Other representatives of formal sociology likewise directly or indirectly appropriated (made their own) this criticism (critique) of Tönnies²⁰⁸. But M. Weber here unmistakably

²⁰⁷ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 37, 181, 15ff.; *System*, p. 54ff.. For Tönnies’s social-ethical inspiration cf. König, „Begriffe“, p. 373.

²⁰⁸ See Vierkandt’s table of social relations, which as to (regards) (by, in relation (regard) to) [one] half consists of “relations (circumstances or conditions) of struggle (fighting or battle (battling)) and power” („Kampf-“ und „Machtverhältnissen“), *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 237. Vierkandt writes though that a “will to struggle (fight or battle) (fighting will (spirit))” („Kampfwille“), which is directed “unrestrictedly towards bodily (i.e. physical) extermination (annihilation, obliteration, destruction)” („uneingeschränkt auf die leibliche Vernichtung“), would, unlike (differently to) other forms of struggle (fighting or battle) (Kampfformen), exclude society (loc. cit., p. 108ff.). With that, he apparently (obviously, patently, manifestly) does not mean society in general and as such, but only (the) society between those struggling (fighting or battling) one another in such a manner (way) [(in respect) of bodily (i.e. physical) extermination]; the reasons(,) for [because] ((out) of) which [the] struggle (fight or battle) [in respect] of (over, regarding, as to, for) life and death can only be temporary (passing, transient) and only [a] partial state (of affairs) (situation, condition) inside (of) (within) a society were mentioned above (Sec. 3A in this chapter). Regarding (On, About, Over) the (anthropology of drives (urges)) background (pertaining to the anthropology of drives (urges)) of Vierkandt’s teaching (or theory) (doctrine) [in respect (regard)] of (to) [regarding, about, on] the social relation (Über den triebanthropologischen Hintergrund der Lehre Vierkandts von der sozialen Beziehung), see „Die Beziehung“, p. 221ff.. “[The] drive (urge) (impulse, instinct, inclination) of help (assistance, aid) and

(unequivocally, unambiguously) also took the side of (sided with) the critics(,) by accepting (whilst he accepted) first of all Simmel’s double (dual, twin) definition of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) as friendship and enmity(,) in order to of course then expand (extend, stretch) the concept (notion) of interaction (or mutual influence) to the concept of social action (den Begriff der Wechselwirkung zum Begriff des sozialen Handelns auszuweiten). That decisive part of social action(,) which is called “social relation” („soziale Beziehung“) and is characterised (marked, labelled) by the reciprocal (mutual) orientation of the behaviour of the actors towards one another (und durch die gegenseitige Orientierung des Verhaltens der Akteure aneinander gekennzeichnet ist), can(,) according to Weber(,) have the “most different (differing, distinct, varied, diverse) content of all” („allerverschiedensten Inhalt“), that is “enmity” as well (just) as “friendship”. The concept (notion) of the social relation (and of the social in general) “says ([has] said) nothing about: whether [the] ‘solidarity’ of those acting exists or (precisely) the (its) (precise, exact) opposite (contrary, reverse, converse, inverse)” („besagt nichts darüber: ob ‘Solidarität’ der Handelnden besteht oder das gerade Gegenteil“) ²⁰⁹. The (competitive) relationship ([in respect] of (pertaining to) struggle (fighting or battle)) (Das Kampfverhältnis) accordingly constitutes [a] social relation in the full sense of the word, and indeed in its entire (whole, complete, full, total) spectrum from irregular (disorderly or

of struggle (fighting or battle)”, mixed depending on the “circumstances (relations or conditions)” on each and every respective occasion” („Hilfs- und Kampftrieb“, gemischt je nach den jeweiligen „Verhältnissen“). Plenge(,) in (v. Wiese’s) direct succession ([in respect] of [(with regard) to] v. Wiese)(,) distanced himself expressly from Tönnies, see „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 281. His [Plenge’s] objection [that] Tönnies would have had to(,) [along] with the “counter-circumstances(relations or conditions)”, in terms of [factual and logical] consistency (factually and logically [consistently], to be consistent), also excluded the circumstances (relations or conditions) of supra-ordination (superordination) and subordination from his sociology, does (is) not(,) however (nevertheless)(,) hit the mark (true (correct, accurate)): the latter [circumstances of supra-ordination and subordination] can be founded (or based) (established) on friendship too (see Section 1B in this chapter).

²⁰⁹ *Wirtschaft*, p. 13.

erratic) (random) and regular (regulated) (or orderly (well-ordered)) bloody struggle (fighting or battle) (combat) up to peaceful competition (or rivalry) bound (tied) to an order (vom regellosen und geregelten blutigen Kampf bis zum an eine Ordnung gebundenen friedlichen Konkurrenzkampf)²¹⁰. (The) social living together (i.e. co-existence) (cohabitation) cannot, whether as “community” or as “society”, be regarded (considered) as the chemically pure opposite of struggle (fighting or battle) and enmity, because in it [social living together] “rape (or violation[s] (mutilation)) of every kind (sort, type, manner, mode)” („Vergewaltigung jeder Art“) constantly take(s) place; the(,) on each and every respective occasion(,) compromises reached (achieved, attained, made, accomplished, arrived at) shut out (i.e. exclude) (avoid, get rid of, turn (shut, switch) off, deactivate, eliminate) “only a part of the object of (the) struggle (fighting or battle) or of the means of (the) struggle (fighting or battle)” („nur einen Teil des Kampfgegenstandes oder der Kampfmittel“), however(,) the clash (contrast(ing) or conflict) of interests (der Interessengegensatz) remains, and according to its sharpness (or acuteness) (severity, harshness)(,) the struggle (fighting or battle) is shaped (moulded, formed) “very differently (distinctly, varyingly, differingly, dissimilarly), depending on (in accordance with, according to) the means (violent or ‘peaceful’) and the ruthlessness (inconsiderateness, lack of consideration, thoughtlessness) of their application” („sehr verschieden, je nach den Mitteln (gewaltsamen oder ‘friedlichen’) und der Rücksichtslosigkeit ihrer Anwendung“)²¹¹. Peace does not mean conflictlessness (i.e. a lack or absence of conflict) (Konfliktlosigkeit), but merely (just, only, simply) [the] use (utilisation, employment) of means, “which do not consist in actual physical [acts of]

²¹⁰ Loc. cit., p. 20.

²¹¹ Loc. cit., p. 22.

violence [states of being violent]” („welche nicht in aktueller physischer Gewaltsamkeit bestehen“)²¹². Consequently(,) Weber comes to the same conclusion(,) which Clausewitz had already drawn on the basis of similar considerations (thoughts, deliberations, reflections) on (regarding, about, over) the texture (composition, constitution or nature) of (the) social living together (i.e. co-existence) (die Beschaffenheit sozialen Zusammenlebens). Peace and war, the general opined (thought, said, believed), do not necessarily differ from each other with regard to goals (ends) (purposes; Zwecke), but specifically with regard to the means used (utilised, employed, made use of, applied) (die verwendeten Mittel). The application of violence (force; Gewalt) constitutes the specific feature (characteristic) (differentia specifica; Spezifikum) of war exactly because peace is no(t a(ny)) conflict-free state (of affairs) (condition) (Frieden kein konfliktfreier Zustand ist); if it [peace] were this [conflict-free state of affairs], (then, thus, so) war and conflict would be synonymous (equivalent), and the equating (identification) of peace with conflictlessness (i.e. an absence or lack of conflict) (Konfliktlosigkeit) would(,) for its part(,) make the coming into being (emergence, creation, genesis, origin, formation (process)) of war incomprehensible (inconceivable, unknowable): because out of (from) what would wars come into being in general if not out of (from) conflicts in the state of peace (Denn woraus würden Kriege überhaupt entstehen, wenn nicht aus Konflikten im Friedenszustand)?²¹³.

Formal sociology (has, had) always exercised (exerted) its direct or indirect influence (there) where one (has, had) tried to achieve (gain, win, accomplish, succeed in) (went to (put) a lot of trouble (effort) (into)

²¹² Loc. cit., p. 20.

²¹³ In relation to that, Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges* [= *Theory of War*], esp. pp. 32, 33ff., 35.

(tried, endeavoured) to draw(ing) up) a systematic drawing up (working(-)out, elaboration, formulation, completion) of the spectrum of the social relation; in actual fact (indeed, actually, in reality)(,) older formulations of the polar principle of association and dissociation (ältere Formulierungen des polaren Prinzips von Assoziation und Dissoziation) appear to be (seem) quite (fairly, rather, pretty) primitive in comparison to its [formal sociology's] achievements (performance(s), accomplishments, efforts, services)²¹⁴. Some (Quite a few) phenomenologists of the lifeworld praised (extolled, lauded, commended) its [formal sociology's] services (contributions, merits) [in regard] to the investigation (examination, exploration, research, inquiry) of (into) the “situation of contact (contact situation)” („Kontaktsituation“) in the dual (double, twin, duplicate, duplex) form (shape) of “towards one another and away (apart) from one another” („Zueinander und Auseinander“)²¹⁵, in order to then of course rather (quite, fairly, pretty) one-sidedly devote themselves to the “towards one another” as (lifeworld) anonymity (in (pertaining to) the lifeworld (worldliness of life (living)) (lebensweltlicher Anonymität). There were (have been)(,) however(,) renowned (famous) sociologists, who drew the right (correct) conclusion from formal sociology, that just as great importance (significance, meaning) must be attached to the “away (apart) from one another”. Gurvitch expressly adopted (accepted, assumed, took on, undertook) v. Wiese's trisection (i.e. division into three parts) of the social relation and spoke of «relations de rapprochement, d'éloignement et mixtes» [= “relations of rapprochement (reconciliation, linking), remoteness (estrangement, alienation, distance) and mixed (joint) [relations]”], in relation to which he examined (inquired (researched) into, investigated) it

²¹⁴ See e.g. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 17, 34.

²¹⁵ Schütz, *Aufbau*, p. 246ff..

[such (the said) trisection] from the point of view of “passivity (passiveness) – activity”(,) and opined (thought, said, believed) [that] in association the passive [element (factor or motive)] would more likely [predominate], in dissociation the active element (factor or motive) (moment) (would) more likely predominate(s) (prevail(s), be (is) prevalent); against Durkheim’s interpretation of the contractual relationship as consensus he [Gurvitch] asserted (underlined, defended, expressed) (then) again (in turn, on the other hand) its [the contractual relationship’s] mixed character as simultaneous (concurrent) approaching (or drawing near) and distancing (distance, removal): the former consists in the reciprocity (mutuality) of the obligation (commitment, pledge, duty, responsibility), the latter(,) in the difference (distinction) in (of, between) the expectations, which connects every side with the fulfilment of (the) obligations²¹⁶. Sorokin likewise agreed with (consented (assented) to) (applauded) v. Wiese on the issue [at hand],(;) he only modified (adapted) the terminology and defined the three basic types of the social relation on the basis of the dual (double, twin) criterion of the aspirations connected with (to) representations (or notions) (ideas, concept(ion)s, perceptions, images, views, pictures, visions) of meaning (sense) and value (worth)(,) and(,) of (the) external (outer, outward) act(ion)s. In (“[in] solidarity”) relations (“of solidarity”) (Bei „solidarischen“ Beziehungen)(,) [the] aspirations and act(ion)s (Aspirationen und Handlungen) of both sides coincide(,)(;) in “antagonistic” [relations](,) they [aspirations and act(ion)s] are opposed,(;) in “mixed” [relations](,) aspirations are (stand) in accord (harmony, agreement) (compatible) with(-)(,) and act(ion)s contrary (in opposition (contradiction)) (inconsistent) to (with)(,) one another(,) or the

²¹⁶ Gurvitch, *Vocation*, I, p. 187ff..

other way around (contrariwise, vice versa)²¹⁷. Other sociological classifications of the social relations(,) which refer to (invoke) v. Wiese(,) attempted (tried) a combination of the points of view of association and dissociation with supra(-)[ordination] [superordination] and subordination (subjugation) [supra-ordination and subordination]²¹⁸. In the direct succession to (of) formal sociology (i.e. amongst formal sociology's directs successors)(,) [it] remained(,) at any rate (in any event)(,) clear that even "unmitigated hostility" is to be comprehended (understood, taken) as [a] *social* relation²¹⁹.

All in all nonetheless(,) formal sociology did not make (manage, achieve, accomplish, create, impose (force) itself) (the [a] big breakthrough) vis-à-vis (on) (professional, academic, expert, specialist, vocational) sociologists (of the field (discipline) of sociology). That had (was bound (meant)) to be (happen, come about) so (thus), and indeed not merely because of the rise of functionalism and of system (systems) theory. Its [Formal sociology's] actual (real) matter of concern (purpose, intention, request, desire, wish, longing, aim, objective) was a social-ontological [one, matter of concern], with which sociology *as* sociology, i.e. as science(,) which in the separation from historical content(s) sooner or later dries up (out) (withers, shrivels), [it] cannot do (begin, start) much, although it urgently (desperately, definitely) needs social-ontological help (assistance, aid) [in respect] of orientation. The elementary (fundamental, basic) principles of formal sociology however struck a chord (or caught on) (went down well, got a good response, met with approval, found favour (approval)) outside of the guild [of

²¹⁷ *Society*, p. 93.

²¹⁸ See footnote 209.

²¹⁹ McIver-Page, *Sociology*, p. 25ff.. (The) Social relations were here(,) though(,) seen as the outflow (discharge, leaking, leakage, effluent) (i.e. result (aftereffect)) of psychological attitudes (stances, positionings)(;) see the table on p. 28.

sociologists], certainly with (at) [whilst bearing] the cost ([whilst paying] the price) of flattening (or levelling) out (superficiality) and of vulgarisation. Sociometrics (i.e. sociometry) began (started) e.g. programmatically from the assumption [that] in all relations between individuals and groups forces (would) appear(,) which had to be seen as attraction and repulsion (Anziehung und Abstoßung)²²⁰; the network (mesh, plexus) of the organisation of groups can accordingly (therefore) be described (outlined, depicted, portrayed) as [the] “labyrinth of love and of hate (hatred)” („Labyrinth der Liebe und des Hasses“)²²¹. This “corroboration (reinforcement or endorsement) (supporting, confirmation)” of his [v. Wiese’s] basic (fundamental) thoughts (ideas) could not, however, deter (discourage, prevent, stop) v. Wiese from finding fault with (decrying) the psychological orientation in sociometrics (i.e. sociometry), which put aside (moved) (back, last) (deferred, postponed) that which (is) occurs (occurring) (happens, happening) *between* humans (people, men) for the sake of what is going on (goes on) (*with*)*in*(*side*) them [humans, people, men]; a(n) neglecting (ignoring) of the factors “act(ing) (or action)” and “situation” („Handlung“ und „Situation“) is the regrettable (unfortunate, deplorable, woeful, sad, sorry) consequence (result, effect)²²². Nonetheless(,) acting (or [the] act(ion)) (as “behavior”) and situation soon came (moved) into the field of vision (i.e. became the focus of attention) of the more demanding (or sophisticated) (exacting, fastidious, discriminating, advanced) social psychologists, so (thus) e.g. of Bales, who(,) by the way(,) pointed to v. Wiese as [his] inspirer [inspiration]²²³. The result (outcome, upshot, consequence) of his [Bales’s] being influenced by formal sociology was the drawing up of a

²²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 6. Cf. footnote 133 above.

²²¹ Moreno, *Grundlagen*, pp. 3, 138.

²²² „Soziometrik“, pp. 23ff., 30ff..

²²³ *Interaction*, pp. 43, 198.

table of twelve forms of interaction (Interaktionsformen), which for their part were divided (split) (up) into three main (chief, principal) groups: positive, neutral and negative. At one end of the spectrum stand (are) solidarity, dismantling (i.e. reduction) (breaking down, decomposition) of tension (stress, strain) and agreement (accord, consensus) (Solidarität, Abbau der Spannung und Übereinstimmung), at the other end(,) difference (of) (or variety (in)) (in) opinion, tension, antagonism (Meinungsverschiedenheit, Spannung, Antagonismus)²²⁴. The American's [Bales's] remark (comment, observation) directly calls to mind (recalls, reminds [us] of) v. Wiese(,) [that] all these classes of the social relation (would) constitute a whole and had (have) to (must) (necessarily) be (were, are) comprehended (understood, grasped) in their unity; if (would) some [of the classes] amongst them (would) be (were) left out (let go) or not understood, (so, then, thus) the other[s] [classes] could not be correctly (rightly, properly) defined any longer (more)²²⁵. Here(,) though (mind you)(,) we are exclusively dealing with (it is exclusively a matter of) classes(,) which make up the spectrum of the social relation, that is, [which] show (display, signal, indicate) the degree (or grade) (extent, size) of dissociation and of association. Other subdivisions of the social relation do not concern its (the social relation's) spectrum and the intensities occurring (coming forward, happening, existing, found) in this [spectrum] (und die in diesem vorkommenden Intensitäten), nonetheless(,) they are likewise named in pairs in one breath with the criterion of association and dissociation(,) in order to outline (delineate, sketch out) the social relation as completely (fully, entirely) as possible.

²²⁴ Loc. cit., see the table at p. 59 and its explication p. 177ff.. Bales (has) reproduced this arrangement (classification or structuring) (organisation, pattern, ordering, segmentation, outline) in a number of (several, multiple) publications and (s)lightly (mildly, easily) varied [it], see "Categories", esp. p. 258; *Personality*, chap. 6; also Bales-Gerbrands, "Interaction Recorder", p. 462ff..

²²⁵ *Interaction*, p. 63.

According to Triandis(,) apart from “association and dissociation”, “superordination [= supra-ordination] and subordination”, “intimacy and formality”, “overt and covert behaviour” must be brought into play as the parameters for this purpose (end or goal); he (also) names them “genotypes” („Genotypen“) of universal validity (force) (too), towards which the analytical findings (results) would behave (be) (are) like culturally varying “phenotypes”²²⁶. Another social-psychological attempt at working and bringing out (or elaborating) (processing, analysing) the parameters of the social relation, as was perceived (noticed, determined) by the actors, likewise named four antithetical pairs of concepts: “cooperative-friendly vs. competitive-hostile”, “equal vs. unequal”, “intense vs. superficial”, “emotional-informal vs. task-oriented and formal”; the authors rightly (justifiably, justly) add that the whole of (entire, complete, total) [the] social-psychological research (investigation) relies (depends, is dependent) on these or similar categories, irrespective of whether friendship and enmity are rechristened (renamed) in [a] “positive” and “negative” relation(ship), equality (sameness, similarity) and inequality (disparity, dissimilarity)(,)(;) (in [respect of] (i.e. as)) autonomy and dominance (domination, ruling (over others), rule)²²⁷. This conceptuality has spread (been disseminated (promulgated, diffused)) in fact (indeed, actually, truly) inside of (within) psychological [research] and (behavioural) research (into behaviour) (to) such (an extent) that one even (in fact) in a sociometric journal (periodical, magazine, review)(,) structured (or arranged) (classified, organised, subdivided) (the) (animal) social behaviour (of animals) according to the way animals “attract or repulse each other”²²⁸. Finally, in this context(,) (mention must be made

²²⁶ “Some Universals”, p. 8; “Analysis”, p. 270.

²²⁷ Wish-Deutsch-Kaplan, “Perceived Dimensions”, p. 419.

²²⁸ Scott, “Group Formation”, p. 51. Cf. Shibutani’s division of “social transactions” into “sustaining” (co-operation of every kind (sort)) and “agonistic” (“conflict from family quarrels to total wars”). “All

[of] the indeed heterogeneous, but noticeable (perceptible, marked, distinct, tangible) influence of (the) psychoanalytical (anthropology of drives (urges)) dualism (pertaining to the anthropology of drives (urges)) (must be mentioned), which likewise (also) is divided into centrifugal and [centri](-)petal forces having an (taking) effect (acting, working, operating, being effective) amongst actors, that is, are represented in the form (or shape) of a spectrum(,) which stretches (extends, expands) between both poles of the [drive (impulse or instinct) of] eros and of the (death) drive (impulse or instinct) (of death) (den beiden Polen den Eros- und des Todestriebes)²²⁹.

The more or less sociometrically and experimentally oriented (aligned) social psychology (soziometrisch und experimentell ausgerichtetete Sozialpsychologie) could, despite [the, its] manifold (multiple) fastening (or attachment) (connection, tying) (on)to formal sociology(,) bring very little to light about (regarding, on) (the) real social dynamic(s), especially about the borderline cases of extreme friendship and of extreme enmity. The experimenting with test (experimental) persons (subjects) in laboratories or class rooms cannot overcome (get over, surmount, conquer) the conventional setting(s) (or drawing(s)) of a boundary (demarcations) and distributions of roles,(;) it has a certain indicative value (worth), however (but) it must remain harmless (innocuous or innocent) and often naive. Friendship and enmity indeed constitute (provide, give, make, produce, grant, afford, create, carve out, emit) even (also) in such [an] ambience (atmosphere, air) both extreme forms of the social relation, however (nevertheless) (the) words here have a different weight (gravitas, gravity) than in historical and social praxis (practice).

these processes are found in all societies” and, although they are analytically distinguishable, nevertheless “in real life they blend, overlap, and co-exist even in the same transaction” (*Social Processes*, pp. 5, 25-28).

²²⁹ See e.g. Kardiner, *Individual*, p. 63.

Exactly because of this (their) harmlessness (innocuousness or innocence) (of theirs)(,) the findings and the concepts (notions) of social psychology do not essentially (fundamentally) get in the way of (interfere with, disturb, interrupt) the endeavour (effort(s)) of several (a number of, multiple, many a, quite a few) side(s) to shape (or mould) (form, fashion, arrange, structure, configure) the spectrum of the social relation(,) at least on paper(,) according to human wishes (desires). This endeavour came (arrived) on the scene principally (mainly, chiefly, primarily, above all, first and foremost) in two variations: as the by definition identification of the concept (notion) of the social relation with the concept of friendship(,) and as [the] acute (sharp, strong, strict) distinction (differentiation) of peaceful conflict acting or operating positively (i.e. having a positive effect) from harmful (detrimental, injurious, noxious) bloody [conflict]. We [have] already hinted at (intimated, indicated, suggested) the eschatological (and historical-philosophical) backgrounds of such theses (pertaining to the philosophy of history), and that is why it cannot be any wonder (surprising, wondered) when (if) [that] we find them again both in mystically inspired thinkers (with (of a) mystical tendencies (leanings, bent)) as well as in enlightened (progressive) liberals (believing (having faith) in progress (Progress)). Thus (So), for Buber “relation”(,) in the [its] actual (real, literal, true, original, proper) sense(,) is “mutuality (reciprocity)”, and indeed mutuality amongst equals, between whom ((there) is, stands) “no goal (end or purpose), no greed(iness) (avarice, avidity) and no anticipation” (is found); end (goal, purposeful or expedient) rationality (Zweckrationalität) and independence are eo ipso regarded as withdrawal (Aufhebung), as [the] “de(-)realisation” („Entwirklichung“) of the relation²³⁰. (How) Buber (does not say how he)

²³⁰ *Ich und Du*, pp. 14, 18ff., 100.

will call (name) (the) real friendly and inimical relations(,) which do not fulfil these (ideal) (pre)conditions (of the ideal)(, he says not (does not say)). Here the nomenclature can obviously only get by on (manage with [respect to]) the value-laden(charged) distinction (differentiation) between [the] “authentic (genuine, true or actual)” (real, original) and [the] “inauthentic (ungenuine, untrue or notional)” (fake, spurious, false, bogus, adulterated, fallacious, non-existent, unreal, imaginary, unoriginal, latest, derivative) relation (der wertgeladenen Unterscheidung zwischen „eigentlicher“ und „uneigentlicher“ Beziehung), which is however social-scientifically empty (vacuous, hollow, blank, vacant)(,) since it lumps (tars) the (great) variety (diversity, multiplicity, plurality) (of form) (multiformity) of “inauthentic (ungenuine, untrue or notional)” relations together (with the same brush): from the point of view of the “authentic (genuine, true or actual)” relation(,) the difference between friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) (use (utility) friendship) (Nutzfreundschaft) and enmity appears (seems) (to be) structurally subordinate (secondary, ancillary). A liberal like v. Mises, who must evaluate (assess, judge, appraise) (the) friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) much more positively than Buber and hardly says a word (talks) about (regarding, on) ideal relations (relations [in respect] of the ideal) (Idealbeziehungen), shares(,) all the same (at any rate, anyhow, though, after all)(,) with this [man, thinker, Buber] [in] the ethical-normative definition of the social relation. He [V. Mises] in fact turns explicitly against v. Wiese and looks at (considers, regards, views, contemplates, esteems, beholds, sees) it as [a(n)] error (mistake, fallacy, aberration)(,) “to define the term ‘social relationships’ in such a way as to include actions which aim to other people’s annihilation and at the frustration of their actions”. Not every relation between humans, he explains (declares), is a social relation, but only that which supports

(sustains, carries, bears) society as [a] co-operative undertaking (venture, enterprise), in which every participant sees (beholds, perceives) in the success of his partner the means for the attainment (reaching, achievement, accomplishment) of one's own goals (ends or purposes)²³¹. Where(,) that is(,) (the) society or the social and co-operative cohesion are regarded (considered (to be)) as synonymous, (there) [the] social relation and friendship, [of (any)] whatever (whichever) [regardless of] [the] couleur (i.e. shade and colour, complexion or hue) and motivation (whatsoever), must also be equated. That is why the way of looking at (consideration (contemplation) of) society as [a] functional system lets (allows) such a definition of the social relation appear to be (seem) absolutely (really) compelling, and Radcliff-Brown e.g. does (did) not hesitate (hang back, waver) from talking (synonymously (, in terms of synonyms,) and alternately) about [the] "social relation" and "social solidarity" (synonymously (, in terms of synonyms,) and alternately). A social relation for him is present (there, available) (exists) only (then) when (if) the interests of two or more actors are co-ordinated, either through (by means of) convergence or through (by means of) [the] (de)limiting (limitation, narrowing down, enclosing) of divergence²³².

[The] rise and dissemination (spread(ing)) of (the) functionalistic system[s] theory reinforced (strengthened) in many sociologists the inclination (tendency, propensity) to deny (dispute), expressly (explicitly) or tacitly (implicitly, silently), to enmity(,) the status of the social relation. The experience(s) with [respect to] (of) two world wars and mass exterminations (holocausts) of [an] enormous (vast, tremendous, dreadful) magnitude (scale, degree, extent, size, volume, depth,

²³¹ *Human Action*, pp. 169, 168.

²³² *Structure and Function*, p. 199.

proportions) muddied (clouded, dulled, obfuscated, dimmed, tarnished, spoilt, blurred) [but, only] little (slightly) the joyful (happy, pleased, glad, mirthful, joyous) theory formation (creation, learning) (development of theory), which in the West proceeded (went forward, occurred, happened) against the background (backdrop) of growing (increasing) affluence (prosperity) and [the] mass-democratic loosening (slackening, easing, relaxation) of conventional (or traditional) (customary) hierarchies. (Still) More typical (characteristic, indicative) (yet) than ([in respect] of) the unwillingness (displeasure, anger) of the system (systems) theoreticians of the first generation to thoroughly (extensively, profoundly) go into (show an interest in, deal with) the phenomenon of enmity, has been (was, is) the attempt of some (several) of their opponents to rehabilitate conflict sociologically, however(,) [whilst] at the same time emphasising (underlining, bringing out) its (system-)preserving(maintaining) and [system](-)renewing function ([in respect] of the system); consequently (therefore, as a result)(,) the “left[-wing]” opponents of the Parson(s)ian notions (ideas, (re)presentations, perceptions, concept(ion)s, images, pictures, visions) of equilibrium (or balance) contributed atmospherically to the reformulation of systems theory under the influence (sign, cloak, aegis) of (marked by) cybernetics, i.e. to the putting forward (establishing, establishment, setting (drawing) up, formulation) of the theory of the “open system”²³³. Because conflict basically continued to be seen from the perspective of the “system”, which can be either “rigid (stiff, motionless, inflexible, fixed, inelastic, fossilised)” and “totalitarian” or “flexible” and “open”; in the first case(,) conflicts could, in fact must entail irreparable split(ing)s (divisions, fissures, or schisms) (cleavages), in the latter [case](,) conflict would be(,) for a society which

²³³ See Ch. I, Sec. 2 in this volume.

has (at its disposal) (possesses) “valve institutions (i.e. institutions which act like a vent or outlet)” for its [conflict’s] channeling (canalisation) (die über „Ventilinstitutionen“ zu seiner Kanalisierung verfüge), “functional” and fertile (fruitful, productive, fecund) as [a, the] means of (for) adaptation (adjustment) to new situations. Social equilibrium becomes therefore endangered (threatened, put at risk (in danger), imperil(1)ed) not through conflict in itself, but through the rigidity (stiffness, inflexibility, fixedness, numbness, paralysis, glassiness) of the system. The subdivision of the conflicts likewise takes place (occurs, ensues, results) on the basis of the general character of the “system”. In the “rigid” system(,) conflicts are expected to be “fake (inauthentic, spurious, bogus, phony, artificial, sham, false, counterfeit, imitation; unechte)”, in the “flexible” [system](,) “genuine (authentic, real, bona fide, unfeigned, true, veritable, natural, original; echte)”, i.e. such(,) in which there are functional alternatives regarding the means(,) and permanence (or duration) regarding the aims (i.e. ends); “fake” conflicts(,) on the other hand(,) serve(d) merely for the psychical unloading (or discharge) of tension (stress, strain) (psychischen Spannungsentladung) and change(d) (alter(ed), modify, modified, vary, varied) their aims (i.e. ends) according to the needs of this latter [unloading (or discharge) of tension], not however their means, since the unloading (or discharge) of tension would be sought exactly in the application (use, usage, exercise, exertion) of the means²³⁴. A “certain

²³⁴ Coser, *Theorie*, pp. 93, 151ff., 184, 55ff.. It is incomprehensible (unintelligible) to me how Coser can assign “fake” conflicts in principle to “rigid” systems, when he(,) on the other hand(,) admits that wars without personal enmity can be waged, that is, not out of (from) the need for [the] unloading (or discharge) of tension (loc. cit., p. 68ff.). The decision to break open (blow (break) up or bu(r)st) (dynamite) a “system” through war or civil war(,) because it appears (to be) (seems) “rigid” and without a way out (i.e. hopeless or a dead end) with regard to its own aims (i.e. ends), can spring (arise) from thoroughly (absolutely, perfectly, quite, completely) rational considerations,(;) that is why the insisting (insistence, persistence, perseverance) on (with) the application (use, usage, exercise, exertion) of certain (particular), i.e. violent (forcible) means must (is, does) not (have to) be (necessarily, definitely) founded (or based) (established, set up, instituted, formed, constituted) on (in) [a] psychical need for the unloading (or discharge) of tension. When Coser talks about (of) [a] “functional alternative [choice]” in means, he is patently (obviously, apparently) not thinking of the alternative [choice] [between] “peaceful – violent” means, but of the possibility of choice between

measure (degree, extent, amount) (in) [respect] (of) conflict” promotes (encourages, furthers, facilitates, assists, sponsors) (the) group formation (formation of groups) and the continued existence of the collective, if (when) the conflict does not touch ((up)on) the foundations (fundamentals, bases, root positions) of this collective(,) and if it accordingly does not escalate (deteriorate, worsen) into one (a) sole (lone, single, unique) contrast(ing) (opposition or conflict) (antithesis, contradistinction), but is spread out (and distributed) (allocated) into several (a number of, multiple) smaller conflicts²³⁵.

Dahrendorf (has, had) criticised Coser’s conflict theory (theory of conflict) as “the final word of functionalism on the (examination (study) of the) problem of social conflicts”. The accusation (reproach) was objectively correct (right), but subjectively greatly (grossly, severely, heavily, profusely) exaggerated (overdone, excessive, inflated, unreasonable). Because Dahrendorf himself moved through and through (thoroughly, absolutely, completely, definitely, fully) (with)in Coser’s thought (intellectual) framework, i.e. he did (has, had) not offer(ed) (provide(d), supply, supplied) a(ny) complete (full, entire) phenomenology of enmity, but tried to apprehend (grasp) conflicts in principle from (in respect of) their “positive” side (aspect, facet). In relation (regard) to that(,) little changes(,) even the fact that he [Dahrendorf] put in the place of (the) “system”(, “change”) as supra-concept(notion) (i.e. generic (major) term) (Oberbegriff) (“change”). [The] task (job, mission, duty, function, purpose, assignment), meaning

various (different, differing, miscellaneous, sundry) peaceful means in a western parliamentary democracy (sondern an die Wahlmöglichkeit zwischen verschiedenen friedlichen Mitteln in einer westlichen parlamentarischen Demokratie). In general(,) he cannot make (render) plausible (i.e. clear) any compelling (necessary, compulsive) correlations (interrelations, connections, relationships) between the choice of goals (i.e. ends) and means on the one hand(,) and “genuine” and “fake” conflicts(,) on the other hand.

²³⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 33, 86, 90.

and consequence of social conflicts (would) accordingly consist in “maintaining (perpetuating) and promoting (encouraging, furthering, boosting, facilitating) (the) change (changing) of (in) global societies and their parts”. In order to facilitate (make easier, ease) the necessary and desired (wanted, desirable, welcome) change and “to give” it [such change] the form “of gradual (bit-by-bit, step-by-step) development”, conflicts should (were (are) supposed (meant) (would have) to) be “recognised (acknowledged, accepted) and regulated (controlled, organised, settled, regular)”; “the contradictions of the norms and interests dealt (coped) with (managed) and preserved (maintained, obtained, received, got, kept) at the same time in the rules of the game make up (i.e. constitute) the real chance (or opportunity) of that historical epoch(,) which one should strive (aim, desire, covet, seek, aspire) (after, for, to) as ‘eternal (everlasting, perpetual) peace’” and is supposed (meant) to be put in the place of a conflict-free utopia – “then conflict signifies (means, denotes, stands for, implies, connotes) the great hope of a dignified (worthy) and rational coping (coming to terms, handling, dealing, managing, getting over) (with, of) life (living) in society”²³⁶. Dahrendorf indeed (of course) spoke of revolution, yet preferably on (in) the fringe(s) (margin(s), edge, periphery, outskirts) (or in passing),(;) however(,) [he spoke (did not speak)] of war, and indeed precisely as [a, the] vehicle of rapid (fast, meteoric) change, (not) at all. The co-existence of friendship and enmity in their extreme intensity on both sides – when(,) namely(,) two groups of friends inimically stand against (or face) each other in revolution or war – is hardly (barely) discussed,(;) instead of that, their [these groups’] entanglement (or interweaving) (crossing over [vis-à-vis each other])(,) enabled (made possible, facilitated) by

²³⁶ „Die Funktionen“, pp. 272, 276.

moderation (attenuation, toning down, cushioning, softening, lightening) on both sides(,) inside of the same social group or society(,) is (stands) at the centre of interest (attention). That is of course a stark (i.e. great or severe) (substantial, profound, intense, tremendous) narrowing (contraction, stricture) of the theoretical horizon, which suppresses the important (significant, big) problem(,) in [relation to] [regarding] which (what) intensity under which (what) circumstances does conflict promote (encourage, boost, foster, further, facilitate, stimulate) change – or even (also, else) inhibits (hinders, hampers, obstructs, stops, checks, restrains, limits, slows down, stems, stunts, frustrates, chokes) [it, change]. Without (a) (No) doubt (Undoubtedly)(,) the forms of conflict (conflict forms; Konfliktformen), on which Coser and Dahrendorf by (according to) preference (mainly, chiefly, preferably) concentrate, are historically real and theoretically not to be thought [= thrown] away (i.e. disregarded) aspects in the spectrum of the social relation; however(,) their essence (substance, texture or nature) (character) can be ascertained (determined, detected, established, estimated) only by the determination of their significance (status or value) (importance) in the entire (whole, total, complete, overall) spectrum. One can also formulate this ascertainment in (such, to the effect) [regard to the fact] that Dahrendorf uses the concepts of conflict and change (Konflikt und Wandel) only purely formally, he remains (stays, persists), that is, at (with) the structural-functional model(,) because he postulates conflict as [a] component of the social structure(,) and he does not put (reduce) it [conflict] (down) to the concreteness of the circumstances (relations or conditions) of dominance (domination, rule, ruling (over others)) and of the relations between humans (people, men); he has in mind an “institutionalised liberalism” with many open possibilities, which indeed (of course) knows of conflict(s) in the sense of friction(s) inside of a very mobile “progressive”

society, but [knows] not of radical structural ruptures (break(age)s, fissures, cracks, splits)²³⁷.

The greatly (grandly) heralded (presaged, publicised, advertised, announced) dispute (quarrel or wrangle) (controversy, argument, discord, disagreement, battle, strife) between systems [theoreticians] and conflict theoreticians ended up (terminated) therefore in (a) [some] familial (family) shadow boxing (bluff, eyewash, make believe) between “liberals”, whose “left” wing preferred to talk about (of) “conflict”,(;) the [whose] “right” [wing](,) on the other hand(,) (preferred) [(to talk) about (of)] “consensus”. The systems theoreticians could(,) in the course of this (in the process, at the same time, into the bargain)(,) [being] of [having (with) (a)] clear (quiet, calm, tranquil, serene, peaceful, untroubled) conscience and not wrong(ful)ly (unjustly)(,) declare that their theoretical schema could be (nicely, safely, efficiently, beneficially) reconciled (consistent, compatible) ([very] well) with the double (dual, twin) function of conflict as system preservation and system renewal; conflict(,) on the basis of generally accepted norms and rules of the game(,) is(,) in contrast (opposition) (contrary) to revolution(,) a factor of integration (i.e. an integrating factor)²³⁸. In the more concrete language (speech, tongue, lingo) of political apologetics it was meant (or said) then (at that time) [that] “a stable democracy” needs both conflicts or split(ing)s (divisions, schisms) for the attainment of dominant (or ruling) positions(,) as well as [a] basic (fundamental) consensus as [the] background against ((up)on) which conflicts and splits take place²³⁹. This meeting (encounter) of conflict theory and systems theory in the middle of the road (path, journey, way) (i.e. midway or halfway) now had a dual (double, twin)

²³⁷ Weingart, “Beyond Parsons?”, esp. pp. 155, 159, 160ff.; in [a] similar sense J. Turner “From Utopia to Where?”, esp. p. 242ff., cf. “Marx and Simmel Revisited”, esp. pp. 619ff., 625ff.

²³⁸ See e.g. Shils, *Center and Periphery*, p. 82.

²³⁹ See e.g. Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 21.

consequence. On the one hand, the theoretical reduction (shortening or curtailment (cutting (back) (down, short))) of the spectrum of the social relation was pushed (carried) through (i.e. imposed) (forced) to a great extent (extensively, broadly, far-reachingly), i.e. the inimical pole of the same (spectrum) was moved (got) out of sight (view) or it was consciously driven out (dispelled, ousted, repressed). Even some Weberians, who made the accusation against Durkheim and Parsons of having unduly (improperly, invalidly, inadmissibly) cut down (or restricted) (moderated, reduced, limited) the area (sector, realm) of sociology to the study of the forms of consummate (or perfect) (complete, ideal, unmitigated; vollkommener) co-operation, in a carefree way (free from care (worry), carelessly) shrugged off (or ignored) (overrode, defied, rode roughshod over) the concept (notion) of the social relation in its entire (complete, whole, total, full) breadth(,) and saw (espied, perceived, beheld) the object (or subject matter) (topic, theme) of sociology in (the) investigation (exploration, study) of (inquiry (research) into) the “social interaction” („sozialen Interaktion“), that is, (of (into)) the cases (instances)(,) which (would) lie (lay) “somewhere between perfect co-operation and total conflict”²⁴⁰. Who was supposed to look (inquire) into (investigate, scrutinise, examine, explore, study, go over, pick through) the phenomena of perfect co-operation or (of) extreme enmity(,) as well as those [phenomena] of total conflict or (of) total enmity, was(,) in the course of this (process), at the same time(,) not said. On the other hand, the “system” came under pressure to be opened, that is, to be transformed (converted) into an “open system”(,) taking into account (including, inclusive of) conflict. Friendship against the [a] backdrop of enmity was now out of the question (no longer a matter for

²⁴⁰ Thus (So, Hence, In this way)(,) Rex, *Grundprobleme*, p. 81.

consideration (to be taken into account))(,) [and] all (so much) the more was conflict against the background of (the, [a]) basic consensus rewritten as (i.e. synonymous with) [the] “system”(,) highlighted (emphasised, stressed, accentuated). Let us remind ourselves (recollect, recall, call to mind) in this context first of all that for Parsons the one-sided (unilateral) determination (i.e. definition) of the social relation as friendship was [a] political preference and at the same time [a] theoretical necessity. The leap (jump) from interaction to (the) system (von der Interaktion zum System) could not succeed (be successful) if the concept (notion) of interaction would (were to) contain (include, embody, encompass) on equal terms (with equal rights, equally) extreme enmity. The “positive” definition of interaction flows (leads)(,) on the other hand(,) directly (in)to that social unity (cohesion or interrelation)(,) which only deserves to be in use (taken, occupied, engaged) (i.e. known) with the name “system”. Remarkably (It is remarkable (noteworthy))(,) Parsons’s critics (the critics of Parsons), who made an effort (struggled (fought), went to the trouble) for (towards, vis-à-vis, regarding) the “opening” of the system through (by means (way) of) [the] rehabilitation of conflict, took as the(ir) starting point the same positive definition of the social relation. Conflict was of course (indeed) taken into consideration, but (tacitly or even expressly) excluding (with (under, via) [the] tacit (implicit, silent) or even express (explicit) exclusion of) its degeneration (getting out of control, going too far) into (in relation to, towards) bloody enmity, it [conflict] was(,) in other words(,) accepted (accommodated, admitted to) in principle (in the “system”) only in so far as (to the extent that) it was acted out (unfolded or took place) (in the “system”) against the backdrop of a basic (fundamental) consensus, in so far therefore as it was in advance definite (certain, established, settled) that the outcome of its peaceful course (sequence (order) of events)

would be accepted by all sides. Blau, who apparently (obviously, patently, manifestly) knows of the whole breadth of the spectrum of the social relation – he in fact believes (thinks, opines) [that] power’s “ultimate source, of course, is physical coercion” –, wants,) nonetheless(,) to investigate (explore) only such social relations(,) which are based (rest) on “processes of social attraction”, and to top it all (on top of everything, into the bargain)(,) such [social relations](,) “into which men enter of their own free will rather than... either those into which they are born or those imposed on them by forces beyond their control”²⁴¹. Conflict here is programmatically discussed in [regard to] its peaceful forms in the framework of the Western constitutional state (im Rahmen des westlichen Verfassungsstaates), i.e. in accordance with the model of parliamentary opposition (nach dem Modell der parlamentarischen Opposition)²⁴². Accordingly(,) its [the Western constitutional state’s] system-renewing(reviving, restoring, rehabilitating, renascent, regenerative) strength (force or power) is highlighted (emphasised, stressed, accentuated, brought out) in (with) good (joyful, joyous) spirits (cheer, courage, heart) (cheerfully)²⁴³.

Despite all the criticism of Parsons(,) it [things, the situation] therefore basically stayed (remained) with (i.e. kept (stuck) to) his [Parsons’s] pioneering (pathbreaking, revolutionary) “positive” determination (i.e. definition) of interaction (Interaktion). Because the “open” system also continued to (carried on) be(ing) [a] *system*; [a] system without the attribute of unity (and self-contained cohesion) (coherence) (Geschlossenheit) already linguistically lacks (is (does) without)

²⁴¹ *Exchange*, pp. 22, 21, 20.

²⁴² Loc. cit., Z.7. The passage reads: “The analysis of opposition is largely conceived within the framework of democratic values... and neglects to consider corresponding conflicts in fundamentally different political climates”.

²⁴³ Loc. cit., chap. IX and XI, esp. p. 301ff..

meaning, and theoretically only that [positive] definition can care (provide) for (about) (look after, see to) (or ensure) unity (and self-contained cohesion). That is why (Because of that, Hence, On this account)(,) the advocates (champions, proponents, promoters) of the “open” system had to a limine forget or dispel (drive out (away), displace) two things: that there are namely various (different, many) kinds of social-historically determined (conditioned, necessitated, caused) openness (uncertain outcomes, open characters, openesses) (sozialgeschichtlich bedingte Offenheiten), which can ruin (or destroy) the openness of every social system, and that the consideration (regard, attention) of (to) conflict excluding its possible bloody worsening (or intensification) (pointing) results in (produces, makes, yields, amounts (comes) to) an entirely (totally, completely, wholly) different picture (image) of it than the discussion of this or that form of conflict mindful of (bearing (which bears) in mind) the entire (whole, complete, total) spectrum of the social relation; as we know, the spectrum of the social relation as [a] whole and as [a] palette (range, spectrum, ambit, compass, panoply) of imminent possibilities (als Palette von immanenten Möglichkeiten) permeates (imbues, saturates or soaks) (suffuses, seeps through (into), infuses, penetrates, pervades, impregnates) every single (individual) social relation; incidentally (by the way)(,) this (also, even) remains (stays) more or less in the consciousness (awareness) of (i.e. known to) (the) actors at any time (moment) (all times) (always). They [The said advocates of the “open” system] have moreover (furthermore) left out of consideration (ignored, disregarded, paid no attention (heed) to) an irrefutable (incontrovertible) epistemological (fundamental, basic) principle: that every scientific theory should first explain those phenomena which contradict it. A systems theory should (is supposed (meant) to) primarily (mainly, chiefly, first and foremost, principally, in

the first place, first of all) be a theory of the unsystemic (non(-)systemic) [dimension, element, sphere] (eine Theorie des Unsystematischen), [and] a (normative) communication theory (theory of communication) [should] first [be] a theory of war (war theory; Kriegstheorie) – and that does not constitute a(ny) paradox. If one did (would) not (have) know(n) the political preferences of the theoreticians of the “open” system, then one would have to (must) be surprised why they covered up (or clouded) such serious (weighty) shortcomings (faults, flaws, deficiencies) with a disproportionately strong (stark, intense, great, severe, substantial, profound, powerful) self-consciousness(,) and in particular they celebrated (reveled in) the (limited or qualified (determined, conditioned, relative, conditional; bedingte)) rehabilitation (Rehabilitierung) of conflict as [a(n)] important (significant) theoretical renewal (renovation, revival, repair, restoration, renaissance, regeneration, resuscitation, rehabilitation; Erneuerung). They (One) even went on [so far as] to assert (claim, allege, declare, state) [that] the advantage (merit) of the theory of self-referential systems (der Theorie selbstreferentieller Systeme) consisted in that they elevated (i.e. reduced or put down) the difference between dissent and consensus to the [a] “guiding (or directive) (directing, leading) difference” („Leitdifferenz“) – and this “by no means is understood of itself (i.e. self-evident)”!²⁴⁴ Social-theoretical thought (thinking) must actually (in reality (fact), indeed, really, truly) (have) be(en) stunted (or atrophied) (wasted away, deteriorated) [for a] long time (while) under the effect (impact or influence) of open and disguised (dressed (covered) up) normativisms, in order to pass off (or display) (emit) as [a] novelty something which since time immemorial (primeval times) has been a truism (stock phrase, axiom, trite saying;

²⁴⁴ Thus, Luhmann, „Autopoiesis“, p. 377.

Binsenwahrheit) in the perception of human affairs (things, matters).
 However,(,) (it) (is, does) (also) (not) (just) (suffice (enough) to (just,
 only) talk) (about) (have anything (has nothing) to do with) the [a]
 wholesale (or blanket) (across-the-board, global, general, comprehensive,
 sweeping, extensive) confession of faith in the social reality of “dissent
 (disagreement)” („Dissenses“) (is also not enough). What (Which) is its
 [“dissent’s”] phenomenology and what (which) forms (shapes) of it [such
 “dissent”] (call into) question the “system”(,) and with it (that) [(the, this)
 (calling into question (questioning) of the) “system”](,) systems theory?
 Systems theory may indeed have – very wisely (for good reason,
 prudently, carefully)! – given up (abandoned) “defining systems by
 (means (way) [in terms] of, through) very high [levels of] (great) or even
 complete (full, perfect) interdependence”²⁴⁵, but thereby (because of
 (through) that) it has (is) not (been) relieved (exempted, disposed, got rid)
 of the duty (responsibility, obligation, onus) of making [us, people] clear
 (aware) (bringing to mind) the unity (and self-contained cohesion) of the
 components which continue to justify (vindicate) talk of (the) [a]
 “system”, and that means amongst other things too, of going into the kind
 (sort, type, manner) of conflicts(,) which can destroy this minimally
 required (requisite, essential, necessary) unity (and self-contained
 cohesion). The in principle (fundamental) incompatibility
 (irreconcilability, inconsistency; Unvereinbarkeit) between conflict in *all*
 its forms and system *as* system is unintentionally (unwillingly, without
 meaning to) made known (announced, declared, proclaimed) in the thesis
 [that] conflicts are indeed in themselves social systems, but such(,) which
 could not accept (adopt, assume) [for themselves] the status of
 subsystems (or part(ial) systems) (Teilsystemen),(;) [yet] however [they]

²⁴⁵ Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 533.

exist parasitically, and indeed not in the sense of symbiosis with the system; (rather) the parasites here would (rather) attempt (try) to absorb the system²⁴⁶. The definition of conflict as [a] social system²⁴⁷(,) and its compatibility (consistency, congruity) with the system of society(,) are therefore two entirely (totally, completely) different things. Systems theory exchanges (interchanges, swaps, substitutes, replaces) sub rosa (i.e. clandestinely or on the sly) (secretly, covertly, by stealth, under cover) these entirely different (differing, varying, unlike, miscellaneous) things and levels, and the [this] sleight of hand (legerdemain, conjuring trick, trickery, deception) is carried out (or takes place) (comes to pass, effected, executed, performed, fulfilled) under the broad mantel of the magic(al) word “system”. If it [systems theory](,) therefore (that is)(,) thinks (believes, means, opines) [that] extreme conflict does not refute (rebut, confute, disprove) it [systems theory] as [a] theory because conflict can (also) be (theoretically) apprehended (grasped, understood, comprehended, recorded, registered, captured) (theoretically, in terms of theory,) as [a] system (too), then it [systems theory] overlooks (fails to see, misses) that it is a matter in the former case of real incompatibility (irreconcilability, inconsistency) between conflict and system, [and] in the latter [case](,) of the theoretical description (account, portrayal) of a real phenomenon in the language of systems theory. When conflict is described as an “autopoietic (i.e. a self-making(producing, doing, effecting, creating) system” („autopoietisches System“), then its [conflict’s] most extreme intensification (or escalation) (increase, increasing, heightening, aggravation, rise) can (also) be thematised (i.e.

²⁴⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 531, 533.

²⁴⁷ Cf. K. Deutsch, *Staat*, p. 172: if (there is) a relation like that of [between] a wolf towards (vis-à-vis, with) [and] a sheep (exists, is present), “then we are talking about (speaking of) a system of conflict (conflict(ual) system; Konfliktsystem). The groups(,) which are chained to one another in this conflict are parts of a system... They belong together, but not in the [a] positive sense.”

made a subject of discussion) (too); but this same most extreme intensification (escalation) must be left aside (excluded) if (when) there is supposed (meant) to be talk of society in general as [a] *system*.

[Just] As (Like) in other contexts²⁴⁸, so too in the rehabilitation of conflict(,) the theory of the “open” system did not offer (give, grant, present, show) any new [kinds of] knowledge (or findings), however it translated into the language of its abstractions ascertainment (conclusions, observations), in fact (indeed) commonplaces (platitudes, banalities) of classical political and social theory. Machiavelli (has, had) e.g. forcefully (powerfully, strongly) depicted (imagined, visualised, painted) the positive repercussions (effects, impact(s), consequences, outcomes, results, implications) of conflicts on the ability at (or capacity for) adaptation (or adjustment) and renewal of a polity, and he meant (said, opined, believed) in fact [that] Rome has the conflict between patricians and plebeians to thank for its freedom and imperial might(iness) (or power) (strength, force, potency)²⁴⁹. Tocqueville (has, had) likewise comprehended (the) American democracy or (the) democratic society in its atomisation and mobility as [an] “open system”, in which (the) stability is achieved (attained, accomplished, reached) always anew via friction(s) and conflicts (Tocqueville hat ebenfalls die amerikanische Demokratie bzw. die demokratische Gesellschaft in ihrer Atomisierung und Mobilität als „offenes System“ aufgefaßt, in dem Stabilität immer von neuem über Friktionen und Konflikte erreicht wird)²⁵⁰. Both Machiavelli as well as Tocqueville here have in mind

²⁴⁸ See Ch. I, Sec. 2 in this volume.

²⁴⁹ *Discorsi*, I, 4: “Che la disunione della Plebe e Senato romano fece libera e potente questa republica.” [= “That the disunion (discord, disunity) of the Plebeians (Plebs) and the Roman Senate made this Republic free (liberated) and powerful (mighty, potent).”]

²⁵⁰ This guiding (or central) (directive, directing, leading) idea (or theme) (is) occasionally finds expression (expressed) even (also) directly, see e.g. *De la Démocratie*, vol. 2, part II, ch. 7: “if one singles (picks) out (cites, seizes upon) a particular moment in the existence of a people (folk), then it is easily proven that (the) political associations (organisations, guilds, clubs or unions) (Vereine) can

conflicts like those of [about, regarding] which (the) systems theoreticians talk, i.e. conflicts of the type “more-or-less” („Mehr-oder-Weniger“), which do not break (force) open (blow (break) up or bu(r)st) (explode, blast, dynamite) the “system”, but really (absolutely, virtually, frankly) presuppose [it]. However(,) there are also conflicts of the type “either-or” („Entweder-Oder“) – and it is not in the least accepted fact (settled, agreed, absolute, certain) that (the) “complex societies” would be immune against the latter [“either-or” type of conflicts], as the theoreticians of the “open system” indirectly suggest, by deducing (deriving, inferring) (whilst they deduce) sociological categories from the decades of Western affluence (prosperity) after the Second World War²⁵¹. The everlasting (perennial, perpetual, eternal, timeless) presence of conflict in every society, irrespective of its [(each and every) society’s] complexity, is not due to (because of) [the fact] that – as functionalistic teleology asserts – the “system” moves (is drawn) to(wards) (in the direction of) better adaptation (adjustment) to the environment and to(wards) expansion (extension, enlargement, widening, broadening), but simply [is due to the fact that] everywhere (there) where people live together (co-exist, cohabit), the spectrum of the social relation in its entire (complete, full, whole, total) breadth is existent (exists) and in effect (i.e. effective or operative). Not only do friendship and peaceful conflict belong to it [the said (this) spectrum (of the social relation)]; violently fought out (dealt with, carried on, delivered) enmity can just as little be separated (segregated, isolated, dissociated, detached) from it [this spectrum]. The next chapter will name a decisive (deciding, crucial)

cause (make) the state unrest (disturbance, trouble or worry) (worry) and paralyse (cripple, maim, hamstring) trade, industry and business; if one however takes the life of a people (folk) in its entirety (wholeness, completeness, totality), then [it] is very easy to show (demonstrate, set out, explain) that the freedom of (the) political association[s] (or political freedom of association) favours the welfare (well-being) and even the peace and quiet of citizens.” ([German] transl. by H. Zbinden).

²⁵¹ See the good observations (comments, remarks) by Hirschman, „Wieviel Gemeinsinn...“, esp. p. 302ff.

reason for which all attempts to expel (eject, banish, exile) most extreme enmity from the spectrum of the social relation (lacks [a]) social-ontological(ly) (lacks) [a] basis (foundation): the *mechanism* of the social relation is namely in all places (or positions) (i.e. at all points (spots)) (an allen Stellen) of the spectrum of the social relation, that is, both in (extreme) friendship as well as in (extreme) enmity, one and the same.

ⁱ Kondylis is suggesting to the reader that Simmel and v. Wiese did not even consider the possibility of the social-ontological aspect or discipline in respect of general or macro social science, whose two main disciplines in recent centuries consist of history and sociology, even though the two German sociologists inadvertently implied the existence of a social-ontological aspect or discipline (i.e. social ontology) in part (see below) [translator's endnote].