II. Social sciences and social ontology

1. Stumbling and flight of fancy of philosophers in the realm of the social

The accomplishments of the ontologists of the 16th and 17th century constituted the favourite target of Enlightenment mockery: they smelt of scholasticism. Since then, philosophical ontologies became increasingly half-hearted and rarer, and they enjoyed less and less attention; in accordance with general opinion, natural (i.e. physical) science was henceforth solely competent in regard to penetrating the secrets of being (Is), to accounting for the origin and constitution (composition or texture) of the world. The turn of many philosophers, carried out thereupon of necessity, from ontological to anthropological and social-ontological question formulations could of course just as little leave its mark on modern social science, considered as a whole, as the earlier philosophical efforts at the deciphering (or explaining) of being (Is) had shaped the new-times world image. The pioneering (or groundbreaking) positions and insights came here almost without exception from fields outside of philosophy, which nevertheless as a rule did not hinder, in respect of that, one-sidedly educated or half-educated philosophers, as well as commentators uneducated in the history of ideas, from celebrating as a specifically philosophical harvest, ideas (or thoughts) which for others – in many cases with different terminology and in other contexts – were already a commonplace. On the whole, new-times philosophy could not independently determine its own question formulations, because these question formulations were directly or indirectly dictated, first of all, by the formation of mathematical natural (i.e. physical) science in the 17th

century, thereafter by the rise of anthropology and historical or social science in the Age of Enlightenment; in the 19th and in the 20th century the dual predominance of these disciplines continued, while at the same time the tensions in their relationship partly divided philosophers (e.g. scientistic positivism vs. phenomenology and hermeneutics), partly encouraged philosophers to appear as supreme (or chief) judges. This matter of concern (or aim), i.e. to appear as supreme judges, did not however meet with success, in any case, no success was recognised as such outside of rather isolated philosophical circles[1].

In view of our more special knowledge (or research) interests, this state of affairs in the history of ideas can be schematised as follows: the philosophy of the subject was shaped by the dual endeavour: to deal with the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) pertaining to the theory of knowledge, which mathematical natural (i.e. physical) science – e.g. by means of the distinction between primary and secondary properties (or qualities) or through the postulate of strict causality in nature – raised, and at the same time, to psychologically-anthropologically safeguard the ethical claim of normative Reason vis-à-vis the authority of faith. The steps towards an overcoming of the philosophy of the subject through the theoretical putting first of factors like the lifeworld, intersubjectivity or the strata of depth of existence as the terrain on which philosophy (also as philosophy of the subject) can only grow, took place then again against the background and under the atmospheric pressure of an already advanced historical and social science, which frequently unconsciously took up or (meta-)developed basic Enlightenment approaches and, looked at as to their overall effect, destroyed philosophy's myth of life (or life myth), that is, the myth of the

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[1] In relation to this complex (or set of issues) in the history of ideas see Kondylis, *Metaphysikkritik*, esp. pp. 149ff., 372ff..

autonomy of the intellect(-spirit), namely, through proof of the intellect(-spirit)'s biological, geographical, economic, ideological etc. dependencies. Otherwise said: from the moment which the conviction that the products of the intellect(-spirit) in general are deducible (or derivable) from non-intellectual constants or variables was consolidated in the consciousness of the broader public educated in social and historical science, at least one main school of thought (or tendency) of philosophy had to follow suit, and set out on a search of that ontic terrain on which philosophy itself grows. This philosophical investigation of the roots of philosophy in being (Is) was often mixed, as was to be expected, with handed down (i.e. traditional) metaphysical or ontological thoughts and concepts, which though, now in the roundabout way of the illumination of the structures of existence, turned back towards the anthropological, and consequently found a connection with ongoing debates. The perspective (or prospect) of a *social* ontology, however, emerged only when question formulations, which despite all the philosophical mystification were in actual fact of an anthropological character, were connected with fundamental reflections (considerations or thoughts) in respect of the lifeworld and intersubjectivity. The influence of the social sciences and of the humanities, and of the New Times in general, became apparent therefore exactly in the fact that the aforementioned search for the ontic original foundation (or first cause) lying beyond the philosophical intellect, flowed, again despite all the philosophical mystification, into social ontology.

This development was of course uneven and contradictory, and indeed not only because of the strong memories of traditional metaphysics and ontology. Husserl's positive and negative entanglement in the new-times theory of knowledge and philosophy of the subject likewise had an

impeding effect; his ontological intention, to tap into (or infer) the foundations (or cause) of philosophy and science, was here of course unmistakable, on the other hand however, the ontic foundations were moved into the noetic [sphere] (i.e. mind or intellect), and the thematisation (examination or making the subject of discussion) of intersubjectivity and the lifeworld was undertaken not least of all from the point of view of the question of constitution. Nonetheless, neither the anthropologisation or psychologisation of those foundations (the growing weight of the bodily and affective factor), nor the broadening of this thematisation in view of the free use of historical leitmotifs, could be long in coming. In particular, the fastening (or connection) to Dilthey – over Husserl's head – meant a conscious retaking up of the thread of methodically (i.e. methodologically) already refined historical science, since Dilthey was Droysen's immediate successor, as well as meaning an unconscious continuation of Enlightenment social-scientific and historical-scientific approaches, since Dilthey, as one amongst very few thinkers or philosophers, did not share a belief in the legend (or myth) of the intellectualistic Enlightenment[2]. Dilthey's methodological considerations (thoughts or reflections) and analyses as regards the history of ideas constituted a pioneering feat in the philosophical search for the (social)ontic roots of philosophy, and as such necessarily shook up the self-confidence of the philosophers of the subject, especially the intellectualistically oriented ones. Simultaneously however, Dilthey's methodological considerations and analyses regarding the history of ideas were suitable for the purpose of instilling a new self-confidence in those philosophers who were prepared for a rethink. Because the humiliation (or degradation) – if one may say so – of philosophy by the social and

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[2] See the treatise „Das 18. Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt", *Ges. Schriften*, III, p. 209ff.. Cf. Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 421ff..

historical sciences was compensated by an intensified demarcation from the natural (i.e. physical) sciences, in relation to which many philosophers assigned themselves the task of taking on the leadership in the revolt against the natural sciences, and thereby conferring anew upon their field (or realm) the old regal dignity under more difficult conditions. That is why the above-mentioned revolt soon obtained a world-theoretical aspect going far beyond the methodological dimension; the revolt therefore arrived on the scene as the struggle against "instrumental thought", the "thoughtlessness of technology (technique)" and modern civilisation in general. Even in neo-Kantian circles, which otherwise thought much of their own methodological rigour, the clean separation of the nomological from the idiographic was often and gladly (or willingly) transformed into a partisanship in favour of the latter, and the thought categories were underpinned in terms of the philosophy or history of culture. The paradoxical overall result of such and similar tendencies was this: the more philosophy devoted itself to an anti-intellectualistic stance (or positioning), the more it admitted – often unintentionally or while gnashing its teeth – that it itself did not spring from a clear, unerring (or incorruptible) intellect, but from a frequently opaque (anthropological and social) ontic terrain. Quite a few philosophers and thinkers were of course only all too willing to propagate this loudly. A desire for provocation played, into the bargain, a role, as well as the feeling that as a philosopher in the conventional sense, one did not, anyway, have very much to lose.

So, a main school of thought (or tendency) of philosophy in the 20th century reached up to the threshold of social ontology. But only up to there. Because the ontological categories, which one adopted partly from the philosophical tradition, and partly shaped oneself, were – entirely

apart from the question of the said ontological categories' in principle usefulness in the new context – applied not to the being (Is) of the social or to society in its social-ontologically decisive dimension, but rather to individual existences and the relations between these same individuals. The ascertainment that the being(Is)-in-the-world and the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) constituted indispensable categorial determinations (or definitions) of the subject did not therefore serve as the starting point for the exploration of that world, to which exactly the being(Is)-in-the-world as being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) of individual existences refers, but as the not further deepened foundation (or basis) of considerations (thoughts or reflections) on the character and possibilities of existence in its being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) with other existences. It was indeed declared (or explained) – and in this declaration (or explanation) the decisive step beyond the philosophy of the subject was beheld –, that being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) are for existence absolutely constitutive, but in the course of this, exactly the constitution of existence was at the centre of attention, not the constitution of the social and of society, which rather took effect as a mere backdrop. To conceptually apprehend the social-ontic and to consequently put forward (or formulate) a social ontology, and, to emphasise the social-ontic aspect or also the character of existence, are obviously two different things. The pleasant result of the philosophical efforts was, at any rate, the ontologisation of categories or concepts, which from the point of view of their content, actually belonged to anthropology. Kierkegaard had mapped (or traced) out how such a thing can be done when he described central existential situations of man as functions of his ontic relationship with something higher or overarching (superior or general), and not for instance as merely psychological given

facts[3]. Now certainly during the projection of ontological structures inside existence, or during the apprehension of existence with the help of ontological conceptuality, ample use of phenomenological insights and analyses was made; though Kierkegaard's example remained definitive in another important respect, and indeed not so much because of a direct content-related influence, but out of much more general reasons, which have to do with the deepest power claim of philosophers, i.e. the claim to be creators (founders or establishers) of meaning, and as a result, guides (or signposts). Kierkegaard's ontological version of the existential was, as is known, characterised by an ethical-normative, in his case, religious concern, and exactly this concern now regained, especially vis-à-vis the relative normative colourlessness of the original phenomenological approach, the upper hand, even if it, in some thinkers, by no means in all, lost the religious hue. The question of the ontological constitution (state, condition or texture) of existence soon turned into a question of "genuine" existence, and from the ascertainment of the constitutive character of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), or, of the social relation, for existence, a demand for the regulation of this relation in accordance with the needs of "genuine" existence arose – still further: the said ascertainment and demand were a description of the ontic-existential and of the social-ontic on the basis of perceptions of "genuine" existence and the "genuine" relation between humans: the Ought turned thereby, in accordance with a tried and tested model (pattern or example), into an Is. Only the analysis of the social-ontic and of the existential from the privileged or exclusive point of view of the relation between existences, or the relation between "personal" existence on the one hand and "impersonal" society on the other hand, could develop that dramaticality

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[3] Cf. Buber, *Problem*, p. 92.

which allowed an effective raising of the question of meaning and of Ought, irrespective of whether the philosopher, in the process, more likely enthused about longed-for ideal relations, or mainly lamented the wretchedness of present-day relations.

No doubt, the analysis of the – at any rate, social – relation between individuals belongs, just like certain aspects of anthropology, to social ontology's research area, but only under the logical condition that the social-ontic or society is not deduced from relations between individual existences, but conversely, these relations are understood, or put in order conceptually only out of consideration for the social-ontic or society as a whole. The analysis of the social relation between individuals can offer one amongst several possible starting points in the direction of a social ontology; the said social relation between individuals constitutes neither social ontology's exclusive field nor social ontology's theoretical peak[4]. But the philosophers' intellects(-spirits) did not separate (or diverge) on this social-ontologically crucial question, which was touched upon by them only indirectly, namely, through the acknowledgement of the constitutive significance of the being(Is)-in-the-world and the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) for the being (Is) of existence. Rather, they separated (or diverged) in the attempts at analysing or at determining the relation between I and You, or between I and society, in light of, on each and every respective occasion, different ethical-normative preferences. It

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[4] See our comments following on the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. Hence it is wrong to describe the relation of the I with the You as "pre-social (or pre-societal)"; such a relation is stricto sensu post-social (or post-societal), if one may say so, i.e. it always takes place inside of, or against the background of, an already constituted society, and in this society all the central social-ontological factors take effect, as they intersect with (or cross) one another in the fact of "society". Theunissen, who is responsible for this wrong description, states something which is an oxymoron as well. Although he himself emphasises "the limitations of the area of validity (or applicability) of the I-You-relation", and expresses the correct conviction that neither from the transcendental nor from the dialogical approach is there any feasible way which would lead to the constitution of the social, nevertheless, he calls his studies on exactly both these approaches "Studies on the social ontology of the present", with the only justification being that Husserl had already used the term "social ontology" (*Der Andere*, pp. 7, 256 footnote 22, 492, 6).

should be stressed that these preferences accompanied positionings pertaining to cultural critique or articulated such cultural critique indirectly. There were important differences between the individual philosophers here too. But the stance pertaining to cultural critique constituted just as great a common denominator as the ethical-normative stance, because with the stance pertaining to cultural critique, the great intellectual(-spiritual) claim of this main school of thought (or tendency) of philosophy of the 20th century was connected, which, as already stated, wanted to lead the revolt against the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and technically-instrumentally shaped civilisation. The other main school of thought (or tendency) of 20th century philosophy, the scientistic or positivistic main school of thought (or tendency), devoted itself, as is known, to logical and mathematical problems which directly or indirectly interrelated with the reshaping of natural (i.e. physical) science around 1900.

In view of the differences in the ethical-normative preferences and in the weighing up of the critique of culture (or cultural critique), two main types of philosophical analysis of the social relation can be picked out (discerned or distinguished). One is found in Heidegger, who of course rejects every "moralising" intention regarding the "philosophy of culture"[5], but at the same time he extensively makes use of the typical vocabulary of the, at that time, aestheticising or moralising literature and journalism pertaining to cultural critique[6]. The ethical matter of concern followed here of course its own path; it differed, that is, from the ethics of the vulgus profanum, and, seen in this way, it could and wanted to pass

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[5] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 167.
[6] Even after the "turn", Heidegger never wanted to explain how the thesis of the moral indifference of "being (Is)" can be reconciled with the loud complaints against the "flight of the gods, destruction of the earth, massification of humans, precedence (primacy or pre-eminence) of the mediocre" (*Einführung*, p. 34).

itself off even as unethical (i.e. non-ethical or having nothing to do with ethics). However, the determination of the modes (or ways) of being (Is) of being (t)here (or existence) as authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) and inauthenticity (ungenuineness, untrueness or unactuality) already points to Heidegger's ethical mater of concern's effect (or impact), in relation to which the latter inauthenticity (ungenuineness, untrueness or unactuality) typically enough can be apparent in human qualities (characteristics or properties) which flourish principally in modern civilisation: bustling activity, animatedness (or liveliness) etc.[7]. This fundamental determination or contradistinction has normative connotations, and neither did it constitute a constituent element of the earlier phenomenological ideas (or thoughts), nor does it arise as a necessary finding of phenomenological analysis. Yet from the said fundamental determination or contradistinction's point of view, the analysis of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) or the being (t)here (or existence)(-)with ensues. Because being(-)with or being (t)here (or existence)(-)with's horizon is the somebody (people or the They), which indeed represents an "existential [element]", and "as an original phenomenon belongs to the positive constitution (state, condition or texture) of being (t)here (or existence)", for which the somebody (people or the They) in fact provides (or provide) "relieving of tension (or relief of strain)", yet on the other hand, brings about (or bring about) a splitting of the same being (t)here (or existence) into an "authentic (genuine, true or actual) self" and a "somebody (people or the They)-self"; "as somebody (people or the They)-self, each and every respective being (t)here (or existence) is scattered (or dispersed) in the somebody (people or the They), and must first find itself", the said being (t)here (or

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[7] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 42ff..

existence) experiences a decline (decay or fall) which can be described as a "sharper (or more precise) determination" of the said being (t)here (or existence's) inauthenticity (ungenuineness, untrueness or unactuality)[8]. The one authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality), through which the existence is made unassailable against the somebody (people or the They) is the resoluteness "as authentic (genuine, true or actual) self-being(Is)" and as living embodiment of the opposition to the "irresoluteness (irresolution)" of the somebody (people or the They), and over and above that, to his (or their) "ordinariness (or averageness)", to his (or their) insensitivity "to all differences of level and of genuineness (or authenticity)."[9]

All the same, the ethical-normative tones pertaining to cultural critique therefore remain heard loud and clear, and in the heat of battle between the authentic (genuine, true or actual) and the inauthentic (ungenuine, untrue or notional), if not conceptually laying down (fixing or defining) the social-ontic, then at least explaining the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation between existences in greater detail, is missed. In particular, understanding in its crucial function during this relation is hardly thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion), but rather understanding is thematised in connection with an "outline (or blueprint)" as one's own possibility of being (t)here (or existence) situated (or found) in the world[10]. Under these circumstances, and during the simultaneous in principle, but otherwise vague acknowledgement of the being(Is)(-)with-one-another as manner (or kind) of being (Is) of being (t)here (or existence), only the path of the description of the (situational) states of mind of the individual existence in the guise of ontological categories

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[8] Loc. cit., pp. 129, 175ff..
[9] Loc. cit., pp. 297, 298, 299, 127.
[10] Loc. cit., p. 145ff.. Cf. in this volume, Ch. IV, Sec. 1C, below.

remains open. The venture is in its content, i.e. apart from the conceptual empty words, anthropologically oriented, and Heidegger himself admits that his "fundamental ontology" constitutes a part, namely the "ontological foundation (or founding)" of a "philosophical anthropology"[11]. The ontologically founded anthropology was supposed to realise, on an extended and deepened basis, Husserl's program, to illuminate (or examine) the constitution of the pre-scientific world, that is, the non-scientific substratum of science. In place of the (conceptual) instruments regarding the philosophy of the subject or of consciousness, which Husserl used in the course of this, Heidegger now wants to put a more comprehensive illumination of the manner (or kind) of being (Is) of being (t)here (or existence), to open up the being (t)here (or existence)-like facticity and to found (or base) the transcendental constitution of the world on exactly this facticity ("(situational) state of mind" etc.). As we already indicated, and at the end of this section we want to explain in more detail, this "overcoming" of the philosophy of the subject and of consciousness was no pioneering achievement, but the long-winded and delayed philosophical acknowledgement of the facts in the history of ideas, which since the Enlightenment set the tone in the social sciences and the humanities. This explains too why the "overcoming" of Husserl did not constitute a direct answer to *his* problem, but in reality was a shift in the examination of the problem. Husserl would not of course dispute that man is born into the (intersubjective) world, and *is* in the world; this ascertainment does not in the least, however, answer the question about the constitution of the consciousness, as well as the constitution of the world and of the Other in the consciousness. The question is – no matter whether Husserl has formulated and solved the question correctly –

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[11] Loc. cit., p. 17.

absolutely legitimate, and requires that a researcher takes the reverse path of knowledge than for instance the path of knowledge of a social ontology, which, as it were, from the outside and without consideration for the inner mechanisms of consciousness, must and is allowed to make its fundamental statement on the fact of society. Whoever, on the other hand, wants to get to the bottom of these mechanisms, cannot get around the insight that in the end there is no other conceivable *cognitive* starting point than the perspective of an individual consciousness, in which also the other subjects must be constituted irrespective of their objective existence (availability or presence); because whoever does not want to accept this insight, does it for his part also from the perspective of his own consciousness, for which the question of constitution is again posed, and so on and so forth. To confuse the ontic pre-givenness (or pre-existence) of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), with the being with's constitution in the consciousness, and to interpret the cognitively unavoidable putting first of the analysis of the being with's constitution in the consciousness as denial of the ontic pre-givenness (or pre-existence) of (the) being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), i.e. to muddle up πρῶτον φύσει and πρῶτον πρὸς ἡμᾶς (first in (or by) nature and first towards (amongst, unto or in regard to) us), is simply a logical error. Of course, all too willing to perpetrate the said confusing, interpreting and logical error were those for whom Husserl's phenomenology as intellectual(-spiritual) unfolding (or development) space was no longer sufficient, and they consciously or unconsciously conducted a shift in the question formulation[12].

To those who found Husserl's phenomenology insufficient, belong, apart from Heidegger, the dialogicians, who otherwise saw themselves as

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[12] Terse statements like that of Sartre: «On recontre autrui, on ne le constitue pas» (One meets another, one does not constitute him) (*Être*, p. 295), show that we are indeed here dealing with a shift.

Heidegger's opponents. Before turning to them, we want to very briefly characterise, from a social-ontological point of view, two thought (or intellectual) approaches which were closer to phenomenology. On the whole, Sartre moves in the same thought (or intellectual) framework as Heidegger, since also in his thought, the real content of the ontological categories remains anthropological, and the being (Is) is understood as existence, not for instance as society. With regard to the being (Is) of existence, the social relation is discussed too; on this point, however, in comparison to Heidegger, a concretisation worth mentioning takes place, which however is accompanied by a misunderstanding. Heidegger had little to say about the structure and spectrum of the apodictically imported (or established) constitutive being(Is)(-)with-one-another of existences, and the intention pertaining to cultural critique during the description of the somebody (people or the They) is served while this somebody (or these people (the They)) appears or appear in grey undifferentiality (i.e. as bearing a grey undifferentiated property (quality or nature)). Sartre now holds the undifferentiality to be cohesion (or unity), he reads into the somebody (people or the They) the constitution (composition or texture) of an «équipe» ("team")[13] – in order to then destroy (or demolish) being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) and We by means of the thesis of the originality (i.e. initial or primary state) of the conflict situation. This allows, on the other hand, the setting up (or establishing) of an elementary spectrum of the social relation, which extends between the poles of masochism and sadism[14], and apart from its narrowness, has a

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[13] *Être*, pp. 292ff., 478ff.. The social-ontologically crucial great variety of form (or multiformity) of the social relation is only mentioned briefly in note form and selectively in Heidegger, and indeed on the one hand as "care (or welfare) helping out", on the other hand as "distantiality" or worry (or concern) about a difference or distance vis-à-vis the Others, which appears as "balancing out", "catching up (with or on)" and "holding down (or oppressing)" (loc. cit., pp. 122, 126). That is so inadequate and makes understandable, by the way, the fact that Sartre could gain the wrong, but understandable impression that Heidegger's "being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with)" orientates itself towards the idea of the closed (or cohesive) group, and fails to appreciate the «rapport originaire» of the struggle.
[14] Loc. cit., part 3, ch. 3.

rather impressionistic and literary effect; the fundamental (or basic) mechanisms of the social relation are just as little brought up as in Heidegger; the said fundamental mechanisms of the social relation in fact go far deeper (or further) than that which Sartre offers by means of the analysis of the mutual (or reciprocal) objectification of subjects.

In contrast to the Frenchman, who appears as destroyer (or demolisher) of the somebody (people or the They), we could call Schütz the phenomenologist of the somebody (people or the They). The somebody (people or the They) here certainly stays free of connotations pertaining to cultural critique, rather the somebody (people or the They) constitutes or constitute, in Schütz's terminology, the "natural setting (or stance)" or "view" of the Everyman, which is shared with the Others inside of social everyday life, and notwithstanding all questions of constitution in Husserl's sense, contains or contain within itself (themselves) the existence of the You and of the around-world (i.e. environment) or with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) as self-evidence[15]. The existence of the You and of the around-world (i.e. environment) or with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is, nevertheless, reconstructed in a phenomenological manner from the perspective of the individual consciousness; the social does not as such come into consideration. Also, the "structuring" of the social world into an around-world (i.e. environment), a with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), a pre-world and an after-world occurs "in accordance with the degrees of intimacy (or familiarity)", in relation to which the yardstick (or gauge) is again the individual[16]. Since the social world is now structured in accordance with such criteria, the spectrum of the social relation as a factor of social

[15] *Aufbau*, p. 138.
[16] Loc. cit., p. 202ff..

differentiation, relations of superordination or subordination etc. hardly play a role; the social world of the "natural setting (or stance)" remains in this important respect fairly vague. The analysis of the mechanisms of the social relation, on the contrary, undergoes a noteworthy deepening, which, closely following Max Weber, revolves around the concept of social action and of understanding. Schütz explains understanding not merely as an organ of social-scientific knowledge, but likewise as a constitutive integral element of social action, that is, of action of actors orientating themselves in their behaviour towards one another. In general, he endeavours to bring out the common presuppositions, but also the different orientations of the social-scientific and "natural (i.e. physical)" conceptuality. Thus, he shows (or proves) that cognitive necessities, which in social science lead to the formulation (or putting forward) of ideal types, have in everyday life their pendant (i.e. counterpart) in the typifications (i.e. rendering into types) of the Other and of the around-world (i.e. environment) or with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries)[17].

Despite its fundamental social-theoretical shortcomings and holes (i.e. faults), the broadly grasped phenomenological school of thought (or tendency) gave rise to not a few fertile thoughts (notions or ideas) in individual cases (as in e.g. Scheler's theory of understanding and of sympathy), which we want to appreciate (or acknowledge) at each and every respective appropriate point in this work. We now come to the second main type of ethically-normatively, and in terms of cultural critique, inspired analysis of the social relation, which we encounter principally in the dialogicians, that is, in Buber and some fellow travellers (followers or supporters). The critique of culture (or cultural critique) is

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[17] Loc. cit., p. 252ff..

not found here in the form of an attack against the somebody (people or the They), but instead in the indirect way that the variety of form of the intersubjective relations is reduced to two fundamental patterns (or types), and then the "bad" fundamental pattern of both fundamental patterns (or types) becomes like the supposedly prevailing (or predominant), in natural(physical)-scientific-technical civilisation, stance, or this stance is copied by the "bad" fundamental pattern (or type). Since in Buber's language, during the "bad" intersubjective relation, the Thou (You) is transformed into an It or an object, technical-instrumental behaviour dominates. The dialogicians' demand for a transition from the subject-object-logic to the I-Thou(You)-logic[18] at the same time has of course an eminently ethical meaning. But now it is a matter of an ethic(s) of reciprocity and of solidarity for the extraction (or gaining) or confirmation of authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) – not a matter of Heidegger's elitist-individualistic authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality), which is only rightly made sure (or satisfied) in its opposition to the somebody (people or the They), nor a matter of Sartre's responsibility in freedom, which wants just as much to be set in an elitist-individualistic fashion against bourgeois virtue or l' esprit de sérieux (the spirit of seriousness (or of the serious))[19]. In dialogical ethics, beside mystical motives, strong memories of Kant's teaching on the Other as object of respect, and as end (goal) in itself, flow[20].

Now, the dialogicians' theoretical concern was not the conceptually underpinned putting in order of the historically attested variety of form of human relations, but such a preparation of the used concepts that the desired ethical-normative result could arise unconstrainedly from such

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[18] See the references in Theunissen, *Der Andere*, p. 244ff..
[19] *Être*, p. 690ff..
[20] Cf. Löwith, *Individuum*, p. 139ff.. Cf. Ch. IV, Sec. ID below.

used concepts. The dialogicians' solution to, or rather circumvention of, the Husserlian question of constitution, to which we adverted with reference to Heidegger, and to which we shall return anew in the analysis of the mechanism of the social relation[21], belongs to [the process of] central conceptual manipulations. The dialogicians thought that they would avoid the danger of solipsism, and at the same time would knock the bottom out of the instrumental stance (or positioning) in the relation between humans, if they replaced the unilaterally constructing intentionality of the Ego with a bilateral intentionality, i.e. with the mutual (or reciprocal) constitution of the I and Thou (You) in an interrelationship. In the process, they did not only overlook that before I and Thou (You) can enter into an interrelationship with each other at all, the I must have constituted the Thou (You), and the Thou (You) (as I) must have constituted the I; the aforementioned relationship as such is meant to be conscious, especially if moral behaviour is expected of the subjects in question. Over and above that, they did not register (or express) that the connection between the constitutive status of the interrelationship of I and Thou (You) with each other, and the putting aside of instrumental stances (or positionings) in the ethical field, are based on a leap in logic. Without the slightest doubt, the relationship with the Thou (You) is constitutive for the I (even though not in the specific sense of the Husserlian question of constitution), on the other hand however, the constitutive character of this relationship does not mean anything at all in regard to its ethical or other content. Man in fact becomes the I on the basis of (at or with) the Thou (You), as Buber writes[22], but this applies to the I of a criminal just as much as to the I of a saint, and does not in the least prejudge what I shall become, for an I,

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[21] See Ch. IV, Sec. ID below.
[22] *Ich und Du*, p. 37.

through what there is for a Thou (You) (i.e. what I, I shall become, in relation to what Thou (You)). If there was a necessary connection between the really constitutive character of the interrelationship of I and Thou (You) and its ethical character, then there would only be moral humans of the purest kind in the world. However that is, as is well known, not the case. Because the mechanism of this interrelationship does not at all change even during the extreme contrasting, as between one another, of all the social relation's respective contents[23].

In short, the I-Thou(You)-relation, as the dialogicians conceived it, represents an ideal model (or example) or an ideal borderline case, which is founded on normative representations (or notions) of the "true (real)" being (Is) of man or his authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality). "Only between genuine persons is there a genuine relation", writes Buber, only an "essential" Thou (You) and an "essential" I result in an "essential" We – the essential nevertheless remains "rare"[24]. Not only because of its admitted actual rarity, however, does the borderline case of the I-Thou(You)-relation appear to be social-ontologically quite irrelevant. Moreover, it is theoretically constructed in such a way as if it were shaped or happening in a laboratory or greenhouse. The more the I-Thou(You)-relation unfolds in accordance with the normatively pre-given model, the more the real social world moves into the background; general social reationships, in fact even the effects of the presence of third parties in the immediate environment, no longer reach the I-Thou(You)-relation. As means against infiltrating (or penetrating) by the instrumental intellect(-spirit), isolation is used; the autarky (i.e. self-sufficiency) in the ideality culminates in the feeling that the I is "everything" for the Thou

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[23] See Ch. IV, Secs. IB and D below.
[24] *Problem*, pp. 164, 115ff..

(You), the Thou (You) "everything" for the I[25]. The attempt at experiencing relations between real existences without mediation (or intervention), i.e. without the mediation (or intervention) of the social world, or even only at conceiving relations between real existences without mediation, must certainly end in rapturous enthusiasm or in a shipwreck (i.e. complete failure or ruin). The reason for that does not lie so much in the external pressure which imperfect social relationships (circumstances or conditions) would necessarily exert on a perfect I-Thou(You)-relation, (in this case one could interpret the common resistance or downfall of the partners even as proof of the perfection of their relation), but far deeper: I and Thou (You) meet in reality always as more or less formed "characters (personalities)" or "persons"; they are, beyond the features of their biopsychic structure, conscious or unconscious bearers of all that which they have acquired (or learnt) or simply copped (i.e. incurred or suffered) through positive or negative friction(s) in (or with) the environment. These central facts of the matter disintegrate when the specifically social-ontological question formulation does not appear on the theoretical horizon, when, that is, the fact of society is not perceived at all, let alone when the fact of society is not made the starting point of the way of looking at things. The dialogicians thematise (i.e. make a subject of discussion) the sociality of man only to the extent this sociality of man seems to serve as proof of the thesis that man is man's friend.

The dialogicians were of course not the first who made this noble logical mistake. Feuerbach, in whom they saw a precursor[26], had likewise used human sociality as an argument in order to justify (or found) the real possibility of an ethical reshaping of human relationships (circumstances

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[25] Cf. the references in Theunissen, *Der Andere*, pp. 422ff., 450ff..
[26] See Ehrenberg's „Einleitung"; cf. Buber, *Problem*, esp. p. 61ff..

or conditions). Like the dialogicians, Feuerbach worked out the basic features of sociality, not in the framework of a general theory of society, but on the basis of the relation of the individual with the individual. The "unity" or the "community" of man with man, which makes up "man's essence (or nature)", contains as a "natural standpoint" the differentiation between I and You, from which comes the entire orientation towards the world and world theory (i.e. world view). Because even the elementary concept of the object is mediated through the concept of the You as objective I, and indeed in the way that "my self-activity has its boundary (or limits) in another being's activity – where it finds resistance". Consciousness and intellect (or mind) come into being from the "interaction (or mutual influence)" of man with man; through communication (or notification) and conversation, ideas come about – in short: "the community of man with man is the first principle and criterion of truth"[27]. Here the foundations (or base) of thought and of the idea is sought in a stratum of the human *as* co-human (fellow-human or with-human), which precedes every intellectual(-spiritual) production; and at the same time, the primacy of this stratum is asserted in the sense that every other being (Is) acquires ontological relevance only through the said stratum's mediation (or intervention). Extra-human reality is apprehended from the perspectives which are opened up inside of the human reality rich in relations, the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), as a result, has a privileged status vis-à-vis the being(Is)-in-the-world, although being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) and being(Is)-in-the-world are equally original for man. Man, in other words, does not look at his human world from the point of view of external nature, but the other way around: each and every respective constitution (composition or texture) or

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[27] *Grundsätze*, §§ 59, 56, 32. 41.

development of relations between humans determines the consideration of (or way of looking at) nature. The concept of being (Is) and of reality constitutes a function of the manner of the human being(Is)(-)with-one-another.

These thoughts of Feuerbach obviously have a greater scope than the later dialogical approach, and incidentally they can also be utilised without their moralising veil (cover or wrapping). One can follow Feuerbach's thoughts' meta-development in a thinker like Dilthey[28]; but they had already previously fertilised (i.e. stimulated) the intellectual(-spritual) beginnings of an even more ingenious thinker. The reminding of him should here, apart from the factual (or objective) aspect, serve the intention of outlining more sharply the above-mentioned prehistory of the entry of the social and of the historical sciences into 20th century philosophy. Marx first of all leaves the philosophy of consciousness, on the basis of the same syllogistic reasoning as Feuerbach, behind. The materialistic turn from consciousness to being (Is) implies, man must, above all else, be looked at as a sensory (or sensorial) being. However, whoever takes sensoriality (i.e. the senses) seriously anthropologically, automatically breaks away from the individualism or solipsism of the philosophy of consciousness, since sensory (or sensorial) man *as man* is bound (or tied), through innumerable tangible (or concrete) bonds (or ties) (beginning with biological reproduction), to other sensory (or sensorial) humans, that is, he is by definition a social being. That is why Marx praises Feuerbach's "true materialism", not merely the putting first of sensoriality (i.e. the senses), but the fact that in this way "the social (or societal) relationship of man with man [is made] the basic principle of theory"[29]. As nature and sensoriality (i.e. senses), man constitutes the

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[28] As Löwith does it, *Individuum*, pp. 28-30, 43ff..
[29] „Ökon.-Phil. Manuskripte", *MEW*, supplementary volume, part 1, p. 570.

"first object" of man, however, exactly during the meeting (or encounter) with this object his "relationship with himself" ceases being merely an "objective" relationship, it becomes a "real" relationship, and his own sensoriality is (i.e. his own senses are) now, through other humans, "for himself"[30]; whereas the animal "behaves in regard (or relates) to nothing and does not behave (or relate) at all (or in general)", man behaves in regard (or relates) to himself in the relationship with other humans, that is, consciousness is "already from the beginning a social (or societal) product"[31].

Marx takes an important step beyond Feuerbach and in the direction of the founding of a social ontology by placing man and man's relation with man in the framework of the social (or societal) whole, in order to understand man's relation with man from the point of view of society. Precisely against the background of the adequately understood fact of society, Marx nevertheless shows that neither "society" may be fixed as an abstract concept (or abstraction) vis-à-vis the "individual", nor the "individual" as an abstract concept (or abstraction) vis-à-vis "society". The individual *is* a social (or societal) being, even in his solitary activities he draws his material (e.g. the language in which he thinks) from overall social (or societal) activity, and in this sense he represents "the ensemble of social (or societal) relationships (circumstances or conditions)". The mediation (or intervention) of individual and society with regard to each other therefore takes place inside of an incessant social (or societal) activity, and that is why the interrelation between the sensoriality (i.e. the senses), and sociality of man explained above, can be understood exactly as an interrelation between sensoriality (i.e. the senses) and practical

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[30] Loc. cit., pp. 544, 519. Cf. *Das Kapital*, I, MEW, 23, p. 67, footnote 18.
[31] *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, p. 27.

activity[32]. Now a second, no less important step follows. The inseparable trinity of sensoriality (i.e. the senses), sociality and activity, as it is found condensed in the fact of society, allows us, to think consistently in respect of man's being(Is)-in-the-world(-) or being(Is)-in-nature, and the human being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), all together. As a sensory (or sensorial) being, man is nature, he lives in and from nature, while he – since he lives socially exactly as a sensory (or sensorial) being – collectively organises the inevitable struggle against nature, that is, he fights it out with the means of the activity of the genus (i.e. mankind or the human species) or of society. This struggle, expressed differently as labour (work), has constitutive significance both regarding the fact of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) in general, as well as regarding the said being with's each and every respective historical formation. In so far as man works on (treats or processes) the objective world as a being of the genus (or species) (i.e. as a human being), i.e. in the manner his specific constitution (composition or texture) vis-à-vis other animals requires it, the object of his labour (work) constitutes an "objectification (or reification) of the life of man's genus (or species)"[33]. Through the struggle, in the struggle and as a struggle with nature, the human being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) exists and is concretised – no matter how the struggle's outcome looks, whether, that is, man can prevail over nature to a very small or very large extent: the division of labour remains the iron law of social existence and organisation. Nature itself is socially (or societally) mediated in this process, and in this respect, the way of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) determines the more precise circumstances of the being(Is)-in-the-world; of course there continues to

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[32] „Ökon.-Phil. Manuskripte", *MEW*, supplementary volume, part 1, p. 538; „Thesen über Feuerbach", esp. 6 and 9, in: *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, pp. 584, 585.
[33] „Manuskripte", loc. cit., p. 517.

always be an extra-social (or extra-societal), "external" nature, whose laws apply undiminished to socially (or societally) mediated nature as well; this ascertainment does not however have a social-ontological status, it is of interest only to the extent that one wants to look at man "as distinguished (or apart) from nature"[34].

The depth and scope of this conceptual framework stands out advantageously e.g. as against Heidegger's position, who indeed stresses that "the being(Is)-in-the-world of being (t)here (or existence) is essentially constituted through the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with)"[35], but in the course of this he starts exactly from being (t)here (or existence) and remains at this being (t)here (or existence), without making the social-ontologically crucial interrelation between being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), irrespective of being (t)here (or existence), the topic of interest. Certainly, he connects the handiness of the tool (or equipment) with the fact of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), but the connection moves on the surface (i.e. superficially): the tool (or equipment) merely constitutes a "referral (or reference) to possible bearers", that is, to other subjects as users (or borrowers) or manufacturers (or makers)[36], and the said tool is by no means in social (or societal) labour (work) an objectified being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), let alone an indication of the particular historical constitution (composition or texture) of the social being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with). Even when Heidegger talks of the meeting (or encounter) with the Other "during labour (work)", he is not thinking of the interweaving of individual activities with one another inside of social praxis (or practice) pertaining to the division of labour, but rather of the sinking (or becoming

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[34] *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, p. 42. Cf. Schmidt, *Begriff der Natur*, esp. pp. 40ff., 66ff..
[35] *Seit und Zeit*, p. 120.
[36] Loc. cit., p. 117ff..

immersed) in(to) the somebody (people or the They). The lack of density of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), if one may say so, is here the pendant (i.e. counterpart) of the being with's superficial relation with the being(Is)-in-the-world, which again, in its seclusion (separateness or isolation) from the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), provides a new edition (or repeat performance) of the objective external world, opposite of which in the classical philosophy of the subject, a subject stood. Marx breaks away from this philosophy of the subject much more radically, because he does not approach the matter (or object) simply under the unconscious pressure of social and of historical science, but consciously as a social scientist and historian. The concept of labour (work), which mediates (or intervenes) between being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) was, as is known, taken from the highly sociologically oriented classical political economy, and each and every respective manner of that mediation (or intervention) in turn constitutes the criterion for the deciphering (or exploring) of history, i.e. for history's apprehension as a succession of social (or societal) formations. In this concise sense, Marx means that history is "the true natural history of man"[37]. This thinking of social-ontology and history together, into which the thinking of the being(Is)-in-the-world and the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) together, flows, now allows us insight into that ontic stratum in which the pre-understanding lying in advance of (or preceding) every theory lies (or is), in which, that is, the terrain for the constitution of science, philosophy and intellectual(-spiritual) production in general is to be sought. Science, philosophy and intellectual(-spiritual) production in general – and in relation to this, the boundaries (or limits) of every merely

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[37] „Manuskripte", *MEW*, supplementary volume, part 1, p. 579. The critique of Feuerbach is now summarised accordingly in the remark that Feuerbach's history is foreign, see *Deutsche Ideologie*, *MEW*, vol. 3, p. 43.

anthropological way of looking at things become apparent – cannot of course at all be deduced from the constant (situational) states of mind of being (t)here (or existence), because then the content(s) of science, philosophy and intellectual(-spiritual) production in general would hardly change. The pre-scientific, pre-philosophical etc. (situational) state of mind is therefore not a being (t)here (or existence)-like, but a social-ontic (situational) state of mind, which is however already permeated with "ideas" (the Marxian inclusion of "ideology" in society's functional ensemble means this), otherwise the said (situational) state of mind would hardly be in a position to bring forth ideas ex nihilo. And the orientation of the ontological analysis towards being (t)here (or existence) can neither make the specific (situational) states of mind, which find expression (or are reflected) in the production of ideas, nor the formation and content of ideas, clear; only the illumination of the social-ontic, and indeed in the dimension of the social relation and of the political, is capable of achieving this. Marx's teaching (or theory) in respect of ideology – a social-scientific achievement of the highest order – takes a very important step in this direction, by postulating that not only every consideration (or contemplation) of nature or, more generally, every theoretical consideration (or contemplation) of the being(Is)-in-the-world, but also every theory of the being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with), constitutes a function of this same being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) or of the social relation in the broadest sense. The social-ontically determined (situational) state of mind lies therefore in every case in advance of (or precedes) every ontology or social ontology. Inside of every ideology as talk of social and extra-social being (Is), elements can of course be made out which, beyond each and every respective form of the social relation, can be connected (or combined) with anthropological constants; this, nevertheless, does not have to detract from the fundamental (or basic)

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orientation towards the social-ontic, if one takes the thesis seriously that man is *as* man a being living in society.

In spite of his valuable contributions to social ontology, Marx does not have at his disposal a social-ontologically properly thought-out theory of the social relation. The social relation appears concretely in Marx only as a historical magnitude, and then principally only in the form of the conflict between collective subjects (theory of class struggle). Just as little does he develop a theory of the political which would essentially (or substantially) go beyond the theory of class struggle, and in conjunction with the theory of the social relation, would work out (or elaborate) the social-ontic dimension of the political. Both shortcomings can be reduced, by and large to the economistic limitation of his otherwise grandiose conception of the interrelation between the being(Is)-in-the-world and the social being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with). This economistic limitation does not mean though that Marx interprets (or comprehends) the economic as such narrowly. Rather the economy is equated with the overall process of the production and reproduction of social life, so that "religion, family, state, law (or justice), morality, economy, art etc." are "particular modes of production"; a political economy which disregards the dominant (ruling or prevailing) social relations, for instance private property, when it, as a science, puts forward laws, does not understand its own laws[38]. Nonetheless, a dilemma emerges here. If the concept of the economy or of production is expanded boundlessly and finally is equated with the social, then it loses the specific features in relation to which one must ask why categories of economic origin should theoretically be given priority. If, on the other hand, the concept of the economy or of production is defined or used commensurately with its specificity, then

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[38] „Manuskripte", loc. cit., pp. 537, 510; cf. *Grundrisse*, p. 26ff..

the economic appears as a social sphere beside other social spheres, in relation to which the question of the social-ontic priority of this or that social sphere amongst all social spheres is posed, and the ultimately infertile "base-superstructure"-examination of problems must be reopened (i.e. re-examined). Marx did not see that dilemma, or at least as a theoretician he behaved as though the dilemma did not exist. His economistic limitation in respect of the interrelation between being(Is)-in-the-world and being(Is)(-)with (i.e. being with) suggested that the latter could be founded social-ontically on (or in) the division of labour. But if economic activity represents (or constitutes) no less than other forms of social activity a function of relations between humans against the background of the fact of society, the said economic activity must be scrutinised with a social-ontological intention too. Then political economy might presumably be rewritten as economy under the influence of the political.

Marx paid his tribute no less than other thinkers or philosophers to ethical-normative thought: his alienation theorem constitutes an apprehension of the anthropological question from the point of view of the contrast between authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) and inauthenticity (ungenuineness, untrueness or unactuality). However, we do not want to say anything about this. Marx's work interests us as an outstanding milestone on the long path in the history of ideas, at whose beginning stood the rehabilitation of human sensoriality (i.e. the human senses) through new-times rationalism in general, and the Enlightenment in particular. This rehabilitation made itself felt in two kinds of respects. The primacy of anthropology, which the Enlightenment fought for against the primacy of theology, was concretised through a study of man in the entire fullness of his sensory (or sensorial) determinations, of both the

biological-bodily as well as of environmental sensory determinations – and here again not merely of the geographic-climatic, but also of the economic-social sensory determinations: because sensory (or sensorial) man was ipso facto construed as man in society. On the other hand, the rehabilitation of sensoriality (i.e. the senses) was translated into the conviction that pure intellect does not make up in the least man's essence (or nature), not even the decisive authority of the human intellect(-spirit). On the basis of this conviction, an existential concept of knowledge is formed, which asserted the taking root of all knowledge and theory in a sensorily (or sensorially) determined existence, that is, in an existence found in constant interaction (or mutual influence) with the sensory (or sensorial) environment and being shaped in such a sensory environment. In the said existential concept of knowledge, thinking and wanting (or thought and volition) fuse with each other under the influence of wanting (or volition), while at the same time the plastic (i.e. malleable) historicity of sensorily (sensorially) deep-rooted existence drove out (or displaced) the rigid (i.e. inflexible) eternity of the intellect's truths[39]. In Marx's concept of ideology, both aspects of the rehabilitation of sensoriality (sensuality) (i.e. the senses), i.e. the primacy of anthropology and the downgrading of pure intellect, flowed (or infiltrated), because ideology is a thought product standing under existential commands (i.e. which answers to existential commands), and an ideologically thinking existence stands, in turn, in the middle of a network of sociologically-historically ascertainable social relations. Philosophers, who inherited,

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[39] In relation to both these complementary aspects of the rehabilitation of sensoriality (i.e. the senses), see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, pp. 421ff., 309ff.. Cf. Heidegger's reference to the interrelation between representing (i.e. representational) and interest-taking (i.e. interest-based) acts in order to emphasise the ontic priority of the (situational) state of mind as mood (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 139). It certainly testifies to a genuinely philosophical ignorance of the background[s] in respect of the history of ideas when Heidegger attributes the "service (or contribution)" of this insight regarding the ontic priority of the (situational) state of mind as mood, to the phenomenological school, or when he – with Scheler – refers to Augustine and Pascal (love as presupposition of knowledge).

with or without their knowledge, the anti-intellectualism of the Enlightenment, by and large left aside the first aspect (i.e. the primacy of anthropology vis-à-vis theology, and, the associated primacy of biological-bodily and environmental (geographic-climatic, economic-social) sensory determinations), in order to elaborate the primacy of sensoriality (i.e. the senses) and of wanting (or volition) as against the intellect and thinking (or thought) in the field, and with the means, of anthropology. Thus, already Schopenhauer had done this, who regarded the will (i.e. volition) objectified in the body as "the most immediate [aspect] of consciousness"; as such the will (i.e. volition) never completely takes the form (or fits into the mould) of a representation in which the subject and object face (or stand opposite) each other[40]. Likewise, in a sociological and historical vacuum, Nietzsche undertook to develop an existential concept of knowledge on the basis of constant (situational) states of mind (for instance will to power), which lie in advance of (or precede) every scientific or philosophical activity of the intellect. Intellect and logic are for him instruments of the superordinate (or superior) (situational) state of mind of wanting (or volition), and grow out of a soil of desires (or longings) – in fact consciousness in general constitutes "not leading (control, directing or management), but an organ of leading (control, directing or management)"; that is why knowledge and truth together with philosophers' stances (or positionings) pertaining to the theory of knowledge must be value-laden, "consequences of value-assessments (i.e. valuations or estimations of value)"[41].

As Nietzsche's example reminds us, the in the meantime in part buried existential concept of knowledge of the Enlightenment, amongst other

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[40] *Die Welt als Wille*, book 2, §§ 18-21.
[41] *Werke*, III, pp. 892, 667, 547.

things, also came on the scene anew in the roundabout way of 19th century biological evolutionism. We do not have to here examine in greater detail how the existential concept of knowledge was varied in the pragmatists, in Bergson or for instance in Freud; (in the latter two, by the way, the contradistinction (or dispute) with biology left behind deep traces as well). In all of them it is apparent that the more or less successful attempt to make out (or locate) pre-intellectual (situational) states of mind of an existence deep-rooted (ingrained) in sensory (or sensorial) facticity, did not at all suffice for the founding of a social ontology. Marx's approach was, concerning this, irrespective of Marx's approach's ascertained limits, more productive, because he took the fact of society more seriously and connected the anthropological factor with the fact of society ab ovo. Social-ontologically relevant notions (ideas or thoughts) of philosophers were developed in the 20th century, at any rate, under the influence of the ascendant social-scientific disciplines, above all of sociology. Certainly not by chance. Because sociology and social ontology were very often mixed or even confused with each other to the detriment of both. The task now is to bring about a conceptual clarification.

2. Social-scientific methodological questions from a social-ontological perspective

A. Two kinds of founding of sociology

Let it be said right away: the conceptual segregation (or separation) of social ontology, sociology and historical science from one another can, on account of the obvious commonalities of their object (or subject matter), only be approximated, i.e. the said conceptual segregation concerns the core and not the outer boundaries of every one of these three disciplines. The conceptual exposure of this core does not therefore automatically effect the coming into being of three fields sharply delimited from one another, in which three different kinds of specialist work. On the contrary. Things themselves have no idea of our concepts and conceptual distinctions, and that is why every analysis going deeper in regard to that which humans living in society do and create, must simultaneously move in, and at, all three fields or levels. Analysis has at its disposal a finer set of (conceptual) instruments when it does this in the knowledge of the specific examination of problems at every level, and it loses its way when it jumps in a carefree manner from one level to the other in the belief that it nevertheless constantly remains at a single level (e.g. at the level of sociology) as the truly comprehensive level. Similar aberrations (or kinds of losing one's way) perhaps do not do any great damage to the great researchers, whose genius and all-round erudition vouch for deeper insights into the interrelations between (or contexts of) things, in line with their professed "methodology". However, here we are not dealing with an objective achievement, which cannot be guaranteed by any

"methodology", but of the founding of the sociological discipline. According to my impression, the internal incoherence of classical sociological theories, as well as the old fluctuations between the formal (i.e. form-related) and historical orientation of sociological theory in general, are put down to the fact that social-ontological and sociological points of view were unreflectedly (or unthinkingly) lumped together. In the process, they mutually hindered each other in respect of their autonomous development or supplementation by other points of view (partly anthropological, partly historical), or else one overgrew (or grew profusely) and the other fell by the wayside. It is theoretically worth following the converging and diverging of the aforementioned points of view in Max Weber or Parsons, in order to then observe in Durkheim how precisely a sharper and more cohesive (or uniform) definition of sociology goes hand in hand with a factually regrettable blunting of the sense for that which is supposed to lie beyond sociology's boundaries. A third kind of founding of sociology, which wants to deal with the forms of social life, will occupy us during the discussion of the social relation. Because such a sociology as a whole constitutes just one aspect of the much broader social-ontological examination of problems[i].

Weber starts from the social relation in his founding of sociology as well, since this is defined in essence as synonymous with social action, which, as is known, constitutes for sociology, in accordance with Weber, the constitutive state of affairs and sociology's specific object (or subject matter). Both social action and social relation equally mean the orientation of one's own behaviour to others' behaviour; in the case of the social relation, this orientation is merely mutual (or reciprocal)[42]. Since the orientation in question must be connected with a meaning (or sense)

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[42] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 1, 11, 12, 13.

on the part of him or them acting, the no less constitutive occupation of sociology with meaning (or sense), and understanding of meaning (or sense), can, in the same characteristic manner, be made clear (or plausible). Now it is often noted that Weber's substantial (or substantive) work as sociology pays little heed to his programmatic founding of sociology, and offers large-scale structural analyses of historically given collective constructs, in relation to which "subjectively meant meaning (or sense)", and understanding related to it, get short shrift[43]. The most obvious explanation for that, in so far as an explanation was attempted at all, seemed to be that Weber's strong historical interests and his gift for the grand overall view would drive him, straight after the completion of compulsory methodological duties, to the sketching of structural-functional panoramas, while neglecting the task (or duty) of incorporating sufficient mediations (or interventions) between both aspects [i.e. in regard to social action (or the social relation) and the historical aspect] of his own vision of sociology. Yet the question is exactly whether these aspects can be mediated as between each other in principle, or, whether a chasm here yawns not between two aspects of an in itself unified (or uniform) sociological thought in its particularity, but rather between two different levels of social knowledge in its totality. As I believe, this chasm cannot be bridged because the fact of the social relation in itself, and on account of its constitution (composition or texture), refers to a kind of investigation which cannot be the specifically sociological, and only in sociological praxis accessible, examination of the problem. Undoubtedly, sociology must structurally and functionally illuminate (or examine) collective networks of social relations. These collective networks of social relations are, however, historically formed and

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[43] See e.g. Gerth-Mills, "Introduction", p. 57ff.; Levine, *Flight*, p. 102ff.; Fullbrook, "Weber's 'Interpretive Sociology'"; Bendix, *Weber*, p. 269ff..

variable, whereas the social relation as orientation of the action of one side, in regard to the action of each and every other respective side, constitutes a constant, ubiquitous mechanism independent of historical etc. content. This mechanism distinguishes human affairs (matters or things) as a whole (e.g. their psychological dimension no less than the sociological dimension), and it could provide (or constitute) the specific characteristic of sociology only if sociology were the sole discipline regarding human affairs (matters or things) in general. That is why in respect of the definition of sociology, the social relation may not be taken into account at all, and in the sociologist's praxis, only after the marking, and inside, of the boundaries of his discipline – i.e. in this or that of its concrete forms.

If theory starts from social action or the social relation, then the marking of those boundaries [of sociology] must amount to a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [transition to another genus (or species)]. Nonetheless, Weber does not in the least feel as if he, upon entry into the field of substantial (or substantive) sociological analyses, had made a logical leap. Because between the subjective meaning (or sense), with which the individuals connect their action or their relation towards one another, and the meaning (or sense) condensed in collective social constructs, Weber inserts (or interposes) several analytical tiers (or stages) which in his view make steps in a continuity possible. But the first step has to do with a social relation, which is under the influence of the meaning-like (meaningful or purposeful) orientation of actors towards one another; the last step brings social facts to light, which take place or have taken place irrespective of such orientation. And only this last step opens up (develops or discloses) an actual *sociological* field. The fact of society is presupposed by sociology, but the fact of the social relation cannot in

itself result in the fact of society, although this fact of society cannot be thought of without that social relation[ii]. Otherwise said: Weber's definition of social action or of the social relation would retain its validity even if there were only two humans in the world; in this case, however, the adjective "social" before the noun "action" or "relation" would hardly be understandable. Only against the background of a society, as few in number as this society may be, does the relation of two actors towards each other become a *social* relation, and the concept "society" would not come to anyone's mind on the basis of the mere representation (or idea) of two individuals behaving in relation to each other. Weber himself admits, albeit only indirectly, the necessity of a more detailed founding (or justification) of the "social" character of social action, when he, beyond the initial fundamental connection between social action and sociology, introduces an additional and important conceptual differentiation, in order to outline in greater detail sociology's field of work. Then he speaks of action which has a condition of several persons living together, that is, the existence of a society. Historical science obviously deals with, just like sociology, socially acting humans. How can therefore preoccupation with social action in general provide (or constitute) the differentia specifica of sociology? It cannot, Weber concedes tacitly, and he says out loud: whereas history investigates "important individual interrelations (or contexts)" of social action, sociology closely examines the "actual regularities" which can be observed "inside of social action", that is, as a category of action, the "actual regularities" stamp (mould or characterise) only a part (or sector) of (social) action[44]. The equivalent applies understandably to the meaning (or sense) of action: "during the historical way of looking at things", the

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[44] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 14.

meaning (or sense) "really meant by the person acting" is at the centre of interest, on the other hand, "during the mass sociological way of looking at things", the "average and approximately" meant meaning (or sense) is at the centre of interest[45]. The construction of regularities and averages is therefore the actual task of sociology, and since such regularities and averages do not happen in the sense (or with the meaning) "really meant by the person acting", the perspective of the observer or of the sociologist gains the upper hand over the perspective of him acting, as does the category of the objective meaning (or sense) constructed by the observer or sociologist over the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) of him acting. A very important reason why the programmatic binding of sociology to the concept of social action on the path towards practised (or applied) sociology is dropped, is thus the impossibility of deducing from this concept, in its necessary reference to each and every respective concrete person acting, any averages or regularities. Social action and meaning (or sense) in relation to the constructing observer, however, represents something else.

Schütz described Weber's undertaking as an epistemological paradox in solving, through the making of objective meaning contexts on the part of the observer, the problem of a science which wants to in principle search for the meaning (or sense) meant by the person acting. Whereas the younger Weber gave precedence to ideal types which were based on historical guidelines, the older Weber as a sociologist constructed ideal types which amounted to statements on "the action of a somebody (people or the They) proceeding in full anonymity". According to Schütz, only the inclusion of meaning (or sense) in a subjective meaning context fulfils the Weberian postulate (or imperative) of adequacy of meaning (or

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[45] Loc. cit., p. 4.

sense); that is why sociological ideal types must, or at least should, produce (or establish) an objective meaning context amongst *subjective* meaning contexts[46]. In respect of the demand for the tracing back (reduction or returning) of objective meaning contexts to subjective meaning contexts (or even the other way around: for the construction, adequate as to meaning, of objective meaning contexts), there is a difficulty, however, which escaped both Weber as well as his kindly disposed critic – yet precisely this difficulty makes the bidding farewell of Weberian sociology to the principle of subjectively meant meaning (or sense) in research practice (or praxis) unavoidable. The dissolution of the objective meaning context constructed by an observer into its subjective ideational components meant by the people acting (or conversely: the construction of the former through the putting together of the latter) can only succeed under two conditions: that at the same time, an average meaning (or sense) and average action ("action of a somebody (people or the They)", as Schütz calls it) be taken into consideration *and* that these averages are taken (or inferred) from a meaning (or sense) and an action, whose manifestations indeed vary in the multiformity of individuals, but are essentially homogenous in accordance with their content and their direction; an average of a number of different qualities cannot in fact be imagined. On the other hand, if the subjective meaning contexts, which are condensed in an objective meaning construct, differ qualitatively from one another, then the latter cannot be reduced any more to subjectively meant meaning (or sense), since the objective meaning construct does not agree with any of those subjectively meant meanings (or senses) contained in it. Here, the objective meaning context does not represent an average, but a resultant, which does not coincide with any of the part-

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[46] *Aufbau*, pp. 330ff., 343ff., 344ff.. Cf. the definitions of subjective and of objective meaning at p. 187ff..

forces putting it together; in a word, the construct in question comes about through the mechanism of the heterogony of ends. Weber speaks briefly, in a different context on each occasion, of both cases mentioned just now, without however thinking about the methodological significance (or meaning) of their difference. He connects social action's "regularities" with a "typically similarly meant meaning (or sense)", on the other hand he ascertains that "in the majority of cases" "historically or sociologically relevant action is affected (or influenced) by qualitatively heterogeneous motives"[47]. Both points of view are, again unreflectedly, fertilised (or made productive) in his substantial (or substantive) sociological analyses. When Weber e.g. brings out correlations between social classes or strata and types of religiosity[48], he does not obviously mean that in regard to all those belonging to these classes or strata, the corresponding religiosity would be cherished in their bosoms (or hearts), but he probably assumes (or accepts) that the religiosity of the devout amongst them is by and large, that is, on average, "similar (or of the same kind)". During the description of long-term processes, which have found expression in extensive objective constructs, it is nevertheless hardly meaningful (or sensible) to postulate something like that. To the "rationalisation" in the West, of whose "ambiguity"[49] Weber knows, e.g. Calvinists have contributed just like atheistic Enlighteners (i.e. Enlightenment thinkers or philosophers), however neither of both these schools of thought (or tendencies) would have seen in the other an allied force in the same historical process. Here, no average of the completely different subjectively meant meaning contexts can be ascertained in which those concerned could in part recognise themselves; only a

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[47] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 14, 10.
[48] Loc. cit., p. 267ff..
[49] Loc. cit., p. 15ff..

resultant of part-forces having an effect (or being active) against one another can be drawn up, and this is a matter for the observer, who looks at these part-forces from the outside and after their completed development.

Where the heterogony of ends creates social facts, there the last epistemological step away from subjectively meant meaning (or sense) has also been taken. Weber did not perceive it, because he thinks that at all tiers (or stages) of ascent, from the concrete case of social action, to the architectural panorama of society, he can use the same methodological key: understanding of meaning (or sense). But the concepts, "meaning (or sense)" and "understanding", are from the beginning conceived so that they really suggest a jump from the standpoint of the person acting to the standpoint of the observer, that is, the shifting of the question formulation from the subjective to the objective meaning context. The rejection of "psychologism" manifests itself in the definition of meaning (or sense) in the fact that, as subjectively meant meaning (or sense), meaning (or sense) does not merely apply to "actual" meaning (or sense), but also to meaning (or sense) apprehended "in a conceptually constructed pure type"; understanding is correspondingly activated as interpreting (or interpretive) apprehension of meaning (or sense) both in the former and in the latter case [of "actual" meaning, and, meaning apprehended in a pure type, respectively][50]. The (of necessity) transition from the "actual" to the ideal-typical therefore by no means weakens (or reduces) the potency of comprehending interpretation (or interpretive explanation), one can even say that the said transition first brings comprehending interpretation to a state of full development. And just as little is this same

[50] Loc. cit., pp. 1, 4.

potency impaired (or reduced) by the transition of sociological research to collective constructs, which are under the influence of an objective meaning context, regardless of the subjective meaning contexts interwoven beyond recognition with one another in the said objective meaning context. Typically enough, Weber emphasises the particular advantages of the ideal-typical procedure (or method) precisely where he makes his above-mentioned observation that historically or sociologically relevant action is mostly influenced (or affected) by qualitatively heterogeneous motives, which cannot be reduced to a mere average[51]. This implies though that the use (or employment) of ideal-typically underpinned understanding in sociological research must not at all depend on whether the starting point is an "individualistic" starting point, or whether it takes as its basis objective meaning contexts and collective constructs. "Meaning (or sense)" and "understanding" cannot in themselves determine the manner (or kind) of founding of sociology, when they, at any rate, want to leave every "psychologism" behind. They open up (or disclose) to us, always in ideal-typical preparation, both the individual-historical and the collective-sociological, they do not, that is, unambiguously refer, and not necessarily, to the specific object of sociology, and that is why they may not also provide criteria for the apprehension of the specific character of the sociological discipline, irrespective of how indispensable they appear to be for the sociologist's work.

It can be presumed why Weber did not delve deeper into this important point. In historicism's thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe), both individual persons as well as collective constructs were regarded as individuals; the yardstick for individuality here was not

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[51] Loc. cit., p.10.

extent (or size), but historical uniqueness and unrepeatability. One knows in what way Dilthey expanded the domain (competence or responsibility) of interpreting (interpretive) understanding in the great crystallisations of the objective intellect(-spirit), without in the slightest having the feeling he turned his back on the individual[52]. From this perspective, the decisive dividing line did not run between the two forms of the individual [i.e. individual persons and collective constructs], but between the world of individual forms in general, i.e. the historical world as a whole, and the events (or becoming) of nature, which is beyond (or eludes) interpreting understanding. Since historical science (also) investigated, ex officio (or by virtue of its office, i.e. standing, as a science), the field of the objective intellect(-spirit), that is, since historical science had not been differentiated yet from sociology, and did not have to struggle against sociology for its independence, thus the contradistinction between the sciences of history and of nature (i.e. historical science and natural sciences) remained the only decisive contradistinction. It remained so, however, also for Weber, who continued to orientate himself towards it, although his particular matter of concern was the determination (or definition) of sociology's specific object (or subject matter). Here, obviously, a new differentia specifica had to be introduced. That which separated the humanities and the natural sciences from one another did not suffice in order to found (or justify) the necessity of distinctions *inside* of the humanities. As advocate of an independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) sociological discipline, Weber cut himself loose from historicism, simultaneously however, he appropriated the methodological principles of the idiographic science; he noticed in fact that the contrast

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[52] „Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt", *Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, esp. p. 208ff.. Cf. Droysen's remarks on psychological interpretation and interpretation of moral(-customs-related) (= supra-personal and social) powers, *Historik*, p. 173ff..

(or opposition) between the idiographic and the nomological, *after* the founding (or justification) of sociology, had slipped modified into the realm of the humanities itself ("regularities", "averages"), but he did not see the problems in respect of the founding of the new discipline in this light, however he carried on summoning "meaning (or sense)" and "understanding" in regard to coping with the task (or problem) at hand. He felt justified in relation to that because he, in any event, wanted to conduct a *historically* oriented sociology. But a historically oriented sociology remains a *sociology* after all, and must be founded (or justified) *as* sociology.

Not only does the historical orientation of his sociology, nonetheless, relieve Weber's methodological conscience. The methodological putting first of "meaning (or sense)" and "understanding" has moreover a particular polemical point which, though, illustrates anew how much in Weber's thought the contrasting between the humanities and the natural (i.e. physical) sciences dominated. The polemical point turns, namely, against attempts at looking at, and at systematising, history in the roundabout way of sociology in the manner of the natural (i.e. physical) sciences, i.e. to find (or trace) in history forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) comparable to the forms of law bindedness in nature, and to consequently foresee history's future course. Comte, who wanted to discover the "natural laws of the history of mankind", and Marx, who spoke in the same spirit of the "natural laws of capitalistic production", constituted the prime examples of this sociology pertaining to the philosophy of history or sociological philosophy of history[53]. Sociology's closest possible methodological following of the idiographic sciences is supposed to now provide the cure for sociology's

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[53] From this point of view, Dilthey had already lumped sociology and the philosophy of history together, see „Einleitung in die Geisteswiss.", *Ges. Schriften*, I, p. 86ff..

illness in relation to the philosophy of history. The emphasis, with which Weber expresses the principle of methodological individualism, necessitates the same polemical consideration; there are actually no collective social constructs, these are "merely sequences of events and interrelations of specific action of individual humans"[54]. This statement is true – more precisely: it can be interpreted in such a way that it can be regarded as true –, its relevance for the founding of sociology must, nonetheless, be classified as slight, and its use regarding this [i.e. the founding of sociology] is based on a confusion of the epistemological level with the level of reality. Naturally, societies exist, and the social constructs in them arise only out of humans and their action, however the question is whether this fact concerns the definition of sociology as a discipline, especially as this fact can be taken as the basis for the definition of practically all the humanities (e.g.: literary studies is the discipline which deals with the action of humans as authors etc.). The pointing out of a ubiquitous reality is by no means sufficient for the founding (or justification) of a particular discipline. Because the ubiquitous reality is only one reality, but the disciplines are many, and the level of reality at which every discipline has to make a start (or be developed), is determined in accordance with epistemological criteria, and not by invoking "reality". Oddly enough, Weber, who otherwise knows, like few others, of the radical difference between conceptual construction and "reality", and of the constitutive significance of the former for the image (or picture) of the latter, does not think, in a consistent manner, of the primacy of the epistemological standpoint when it is a matter of the founding of sociology. He does not hesitate, in other words, *inside* of sociology, in view of the cognitive necessities of the

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[54] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 6.

ideal type, to give the ideal type precedence over "reality"; however, he does not want to define the nature and the object (or subject matter) of sociology itself through a typifying process (i.e. the process of rendering social facts (or phenomena) into types), but as far as possible, wants to start with the individual as a meaning-bearing (meaningful or purposeful) person acting. Sociology nonetheless represents (or constitutes), as a whole or as an epistemological construct, an ideal type, and a specific reality corresponds to it just as to ideal types too, which are constructed by sociology and inside of sociology. This specific reality is called a "social fact". Only the actual acknowledgement of the "social fact's" existence enables Weber, incidentally, to formulate historically saturated ideal types. Before we show how much Weber's research *praxis* (or *practice*) regarding this, approximates Durkheim's *theory*, we want to briefly describe how the discrepancy between social-ontological motifs and sociological analysis manifests itself in Parsons.

Parsons makes clear that the theory of action (acting) encompasses a much broader field than that of sociology. Sociology constitutes the common basis (or foundation) of all disciplines which deal with social relations between humans, or with man, and are divided into three parts: the theory of social systems, the theory of personality, the theory of culture. At the same time, sociology's cognitive responsibilities (or domain) do not extend, for one thing, as widely as that of the theory of social systems, to which sociology is conceptually subordinated. Sociology namely makes up only one aspect of the theory of social systems, since its examination of themes is supposed to be limited to the institutionalisation of models (or patterns) of value orientation. Sociology cannot be founded (or justified) through the mere application of the categories of the theory of action to the social system because the person

acting takes part in the social system as a bearer of a role and not as a total personality. That is why a macroscopic analysis of the social system should be based on a unit of a higher order than the act, i.e. the unit: "status-role"[55]. Precisely in order to be able to cross the threshold of sociology, Parsons therefore leaves the general theory of action behind. "Status" and "role" cannot in fact be categorially (i.e. in the form or in terms of categories) deduced from "action", i.e. they are introduced as independent categories and displace (or drive out) the category of "action". From that, other sociologists have drawn the obvious conclusion, i.e. they have put forward structural-functional theories which pay no heed to the concept of acting (i.e. action), or recommended to their colleagues to continue their work as if there had never been theories of action[56].

The uncoupling of the theory of action and of structural-functional theory from each other accompanied Parsons's turn from idealistic-voluntaristic to behaviouristic positions[57]. The behaviourism – enriched by the expedient treatment of Freudian concepts – was here put in the service of normativism; it is therefore meant to explain the internalisation of the dominant system of values and of norms on the part of the individual in their quasi bindedness, while at the same time the role mediates (or intervenes) between person and behavioural norm. The normativistic interpretation of the social system certainly dominated in Parsons's thought, even in his "voluntaristic" phase when he strove for a direct founding (or justification) of sociology by means of the theory of action. The turning away from this, that is, from voluntarism and from the

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[55] *Social System*, VIII-IX, pp. 545ff., 552, 25.
[56] Dahrendorf, „Struktur und Funktion", p. 509ff..
[57] In relation to that: Scott, "Foundations", esp. p. 724ff.; cf. Vanberg, *Zwei Soziologien*, p. 184ff..

imponderability of subjective meaning (or sense)[58], appears to be the best way for the safeguarding of the postulate of normativism. All the same: although normativism and the banishment of the theory of action from the realm of sociology are closely interrelated with each other in Parsons's intellectual(-spiritual) development, it would be an optical illusion to think that the theory of action will be expelled from sociology with logical necessity only when sociology indulges in normativism. The logical necessity [for the banishing of the theory of action from sociology[iii]] exists, as our remarks on Weber hopefully showed, regardless of sociology's each and every respective content, because it has to do with sociology's founding and not with its content, i.e. the content does not directly determine, and not in every case, the epistemological necessities of the founding. Parsons's mistake did not at all consist in that he founded (or justified) sociology, in practice, with no consideration for the theory of action, but rather in the disposition (or arrangement) of his sociology's content, which was devised with regard to normative aims, and prevented a theoretical evaluation of action in its entire social-ontologically given spectrum. The boundary between the theory of action and sociology did not remain merely epistemological, it was real, while action dwindled to a great extent to the form of adaptation (or adjustment) to norms, and the social relation was understood with corresponding selectivity. But the distinct epistemological drawing of boundaries between social ontology, sociology and history may never entail the exclusion of content(s). Social reality is uniform (or unified), and all its social-ontologically given possibilities remain constantly present – the incursion (invasion or breaking in) of the social-ontological

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[58] That is the reason for Parsons's highly self-willed (or unconventional) interpretation of Weber in *The Structure of Social Action*, which ends up in a different description of the category of subjective meaning (or sense) by means of normative categories, see Zaret, "From Weber", esp. p. 1194ff..

in its entire breadth into that which for reasons of cognitive purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) is assigned (or allotted) to sociology or history as their own field, takes place permanently in long or short waves, in this or that aspect. Parsons's tense relationship with the abrupt fluctuations in action and in history does not follow from an epistemological decision to found (or justify) sociology epistemologically through the actual circumvention of the theory of action, but the said tense relationship comes into being out of the angst (or fear) that his sociology's normative content could be swept away by the bursting (gushing or breaking) in of elementary social-ontic forces.

Parsons sought theoretical backing for his normativism in Durkheim, but at the same time in Weber, who, in this way, was made out to be the Frenchman's kindred spirit, at least in a, for Parsons, decisive respect. In regard to such an interpretation, important differences had to of course be disregarded[59], while the commonalities truly existing in both great sociologists' approaches, which we shall emphasise hereinafter, were not perceived at all. And there is something else Parsons, like many other commentators too, completely missed: that the normativistic orientation, or rather projection, of Durkheim's sociology does not in the least inescapably result from the manner of its founding. On the other hand, Durkheim's strategy for the founding of sociology as a discipline with a specific object (or subject matter) seems epistemologically quite solid (or sound), in any case, Durkheim's said strategy cannot be refuted by arguments which refer to the content(s) of Durkheim's substantial (or substantive) sociological analyses. Whoever e.g. rejects that strategy with reference to the supposedly unhistorical character of Durkheim's content-related investigations, without having clarified the question beforehand

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[59] In relation to that: Pope-Cohen-Hazelrigg, "On the Divergence".

whether, and in what sense, both levels must interrelate, has himself made a logical leap. A sociologist's substantial (or substantive) achievement in respect of its quality anyhow depends on many factors, which only in rare cases are due to a clear methodological consciousness.

If Weber floats between the social-ontological motifs of the theory of action, the fundamental principles of methodological individualism and historically saturated ideal types, then Durkheim gains clarity through leaving behind truisms regarding facticity disputed by nobody, not even by him ("society consists of individuals and only of individuals, who orientate their action towards one another"), in order to ask the question: from what level of abstraction does sociology begin as an autonomous science? What being (Is) is found (or finds itself) at this level – or rather: in what form does the being (Is) appear here (in) [and or] to society? The answer is: sociology begins where we abstain from personal motives or goals, since a lingering at these personal motives and goals does not allow an epistemologically unequivocal distinction between psychology or historical science on the one hand, and sociology on the other hand. Weber drew a very similar dividing line when he commissioned sociology with the bringing (or working) out of regularities or of averages of collectively meant meaning (or sense), while he declared the really meant meaning (or sense) by the individual person acting to be a matter for the historian. Simultaneously, he took away the sharpness from this dividing line, and indeed through the transference of the originally idiographic methodology (or approach pertaining to method) of meaning-like (meaningful or purposeful) understanding, to collective constructs. Durkheim however employs here – and rightly so – a programmatic caesura, because he ascertains an epistemological and ontological difference between both levels: the caesura keeps subjective motives or

goals of individuals, and, "social facts", from one another. The composition (texture or constitution) of these "social facts" will occupy us in the framework of our confrontation with (and discussion of) "methodological individualism"[60]. With regard to the examination of the problem of founding, of interest first of all are the considerations which led Durkheim to the acceptance (or assumption) of social facts – we mean his sociological critique of psychologism as well as his ascertainment of the effect of the heterogony of ends, or of that which one today is in the habit of calling "unintended consequences of action". Yet before looking into Durkheim's founding of sociology, we must however clarify a misunderstanding which erects a high wall between Durkheim and Weber. According to that misunderstanding, talk of "social facts" is inspired by a way of thinking which wants to emulate the positivity and exactitude in natural (i.e. physical) science, so that Durkheim, as Comte's direct successor, is counted amongst the sociological imitators of the natural(physical)-scientific model, whereas Weber seems to be standing on the other shore. Such an impression would be completely wrong. Durkheim describes the social fact as a "thing", not with the positive intention of bringing it closer to things in the physical sense, but with the negative aim of demarcating it against everything that is only accessible in (or amenable to) pure introspection; a fact in the sociological sense is therefore simply everything which cannot be apprehended through pure introspection. (As far as that goes, the ideal type of a subjectively meant meaning (or sense) constructed by an observer also constitutes a thing)[61]. As far as the material (stuff) of this thing is concerned, if one may say so, it consists in nothing other than that which, according to Weber, makes up the object (or subject matter) of sociology: action. The social fact,

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[60] See Section 2Cc, in this chapter.
[61] *Règles*, p. 11.

opines Durkheim, is the «manière de faire», manner (or kind) of action[62]. Under these preconditions, only a gross representation (or notion) of the ontic can obviously take exception to the term "thing". Because these things are ontically given every time. Social facts are, in other words, not themselves an epistemological fiction, but those (basic) ontic given facts which must be assumed (or accepted), as soon as the epistemological fiction which is called "sociology" has, through segregation (or separation) from other fields of the social being (Is), seen the light of day.

As one sees, already the mere mention of the "social fact" leads us to the problem of psychologism. In fact, for Durkheim the rejection of introspection as the method of sociology and the acceptance (or assumption) of social facts represent both sides of the same coin. Because if the object (or subject matter) of sociology could not be reduced to social facts, but to individual persons, then the very first task would lie in putting these atoms (or individual beings) under the microscope, penetrating their psyches and, on the basis of the findings, constructing the social. On the other hand, Durkheim believes that sociology can, in a specific way, refrain from psychological judgements with a logical consistency which is not possible in other social sciences. This is not supposed to mean that e.g. a political history in all its breadth could or should break up (or dissolve) into an ensemble of (basic) psychical given facts; the ascertainment is sufficient that the said political history was very often virtually compelled to make assumptions about the psychical composition (texture or constitution) and the personal motivation of the actors; and who would in all seriousness suggest driving biography forever out of the realm of scientific historiography? Durkheim sees

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[62] Loc. cit., p. 14, cf. p. 18: «des choses sociales ne se réalisent que par les hommes; elles sont un produit de l'activité humaine» ["social things are not realised (carried out) other than by men; they are a product of human activity"].

himself, at any rate – already through the lack of reliability of the data that introspection and psychologising in general are able to put at one's disposal – logically obliged to accept a package deal of the rejection of psychologism and the founding of the sociological discipline. He repeats in several contexts that we would hardly be in a position of recognising our own motivation, let alone others' motivation[63]. But also, for a further reason, that package deal seems to be indispensable. Society is not based (or founded) on psychical aptitudes (or predispositions), which in their development (or unfolding) bring forth the various aspects of social life for the satisfaction of man's just as many original needs; society does not constitute a projection of a psyche or psyches, but an epistemologically and ontologically autonomous result, which goes beyond the needs and the corresponding acts (or actions) of individuals, and does not in the least have to conform with the said needs and act(ion)s of individuals. Hence, society has a specific nature[64].

This point of view introduces the second central consideration which underlies the epistemological decision in favour of the ontology of social facts. It is a matter, as was indicated above, of the heterogony of ends. Durkheim remarks that the psychologistic mistake must entail a finalistic mistake: if society is based (or founded) on individuals' psychical needs, then society must also be in the service of the psychical needs' ends (goals), and be able to be steered accordingly. This pair of concepts of psychologism and finalism is turned upside down by the fact that the destruction of the former is coupled with the thesis that society is ontologically something other than the individuals putting it together, and is not shaped (or formed) as a result of the realisation of the said individuals' ends (goals): between cause having an effect and function,

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[63] Loc. cit., XIV; *Suicide*, p. 144.
[64] *Règles*, p. 120ff..

between intent and outcome, there is, in any case, no necessary or linear relation[65]. In praxeological terms, the same thought (notion or idea) is formulated in that an act(ion) cannot be defined on the basis of the actor's ends (goals), since through outwardly identical acts (actions) completely different ends (goals) could be attained (or achieved)[66]. The shift from the combatting of psychologism to the combatting of finalism obviously implies a conceptual distinction between action's motives and ends (goals), and this distinction can be used in order to sum up both theses by means of which Durkheim underpins the acceptance (or assumption) of social facts: motives cannot be recognised (or detected); ends (goals) at the social level cannot, or not always, be attained in the sense (or in accordance with the motives) of the actors.

Weber likewise supported both theses, the former directly, the latter at least indirectly, when he namely opined that historically or sociologically relevant action is, for the most part, influenced (or affected) by qualitatively heterogeneous motives[67]. Although Weber's terminology is unclear, i.e. although he does not, in an in principle praxeological sense, distinguish between "motive" and "end (goal)", and often used the former term in place of the latter, nevertheless his demarcation against psychologism is based on the extensive equating of action's subjectively meant meaning (or sense) with the ends (goals) which the actor's observable action pursues. This way of looking at things agrees, on the one hand, with the ascertainment of the (frequent) indiscernibility (or unrecognisability) of motives, on the other hand, it enables the ideal-typical apprehension of subjectively meant meaning (or sense), and indeed through the comparison of that course (or sequence) of acting (i.e.

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[65] Loc. cit., pp. 89ff., 97ff..
[66] *Suicide*, p. 4.
[67] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 4, 10.

action), which the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) = end (goal) set in motion, with yardsticks (benchmarks or criteria) which the observer set (e.g. "rationality"); in this respect, the apprehension of the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) becomes objective, i.e. it is no longer a matter of the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) or of introspection. The ideal-typical objectification of the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) while including the entire course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action), so that discrepancies between action's ends (goals) and results or consequences can be ascertained, and not least of all the use of the ideal-typical procedure (or method) for the apprehension of supra-individual averages in respect of meaning (or sense), lead now up to the threshold of the "social fact". Because they [the ideal-typical objectification of the subjectively meant meaning while including the entire course of acting, and, the use of the ideal-typical procedure for the apprehension of supra-individual averages in respect of meaning] legitimise the incorporation (or putting in order) of the "actually" meant, by the individual, meaning (or sense), in a much broader meaning context, and indeed in a place – of the same much broader meaning context – which the individual concerned would not necessarily recognise (or acknowledge) as a place befitting him and striven for (or pursued) by him. The context remains, in other words, independent of the motives and ends (goals) of the people acting, although it contains nothing other than their action. This essentially constitutes a different description (or paraphrasing) of the "social fact", which arises from further thought about the two theses mentioned above. However, Weber does not proceed to a conceptual fixing (or determining) of the social fact as such, but investigates various historically pre-given social facts. The social fact as a concept, whose definition founds (or justifies) sociology, and social facts as the field of activity of sociological research practice though lie at two different

epistemological levels. But the intensity of the Weberian effort with regard to the latter, can make clear why he, without being aware of it, came so close to the former.

Conversely, Durkheim's proximity to Weberian research practice seen in the resoluteness with which Durkheim rejected Simmel's formalism, supported the tight content-related binding of sociology to the rest of the social sciences, for the purpose of the illumination of objective constructs (religion, law (or justice), morality, economy), and in general made investigating the organisation, functioning and becoming of societies the primary task of the sociological discipline[68]. Obviously, investigations of social content(s), which, amongst other things, have these social contents' becoming as an object (or subject matter), must be historically oriented. The question, in the course of this, is whether the sociologist's historical way of looking at things includes subjectively meant meaning (or sense), that is, to what extent is the sociologist's way of looking at things dependent on the historical reconstruction of the action and thought (acting and thinking) of concrete persons or collectives. Durkheim answers the question in practice by summoning averages of collectively meant meaning (or sense) or «représenations collectives» for the explanation of action[69]. Nonetheless, his relationship with history does not nearly reach Weberian intensity, and for that there are two reasons: on the one hand, he confuses the level of founding (or justification) of sociology with the level of sociology's research practice, and he seems to think that the sharp conceptual demarcation between sociology and history at the former level must have analogous consequences at the latter level, which however is not at all understood of its own accord (i.e. it is

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[68] Durkheim-Fauconnet, „Sociologie", pp. 481 ff., 484, 485.
[69] See e.g. his thoughts on the relationship between the suicide rate and a confession of faith in the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish denomination, *Suicide*, p. 149ff..

not self-evident or obvious)[70]. On the other hand, he is afraid that every closer dealing with the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) of action inside of concrete situations would throw someone back into the arms of psychologism – psychologism in fact does not know a manner of understanding other than introspection. In addition, here the confusion between the level of founding (or justification) and research practice also takes effect. However, one should emphasise very emphatically that the use of the concepts of "meaning (or sense)" and "understanding" *for the founding* of sociology has an entirely different epistemological status than the (selective) use of the methodology (or approach pertaining to method) of meaning (or sense) and understanding *inside of* sociology. The latter use actually recommends itself for the adequate apprehension of two phenomena, to which Durkheim himself turned his attention in important contexts. One of them is the heterogony of ends and was, as we know, brought into play in order to help with sociology's founding by means of the "social fact". The distance between the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) or end (goal), and the objective outcome, of the course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) becomes evident only then, and can only become the object (or subject matter) of sociological investigation, when we know in what the subjective meaning (or sense) or end (goal) consisted, so that the degree of the said subjective meaning or end's divergence from the attained (or achieved) result of action can be measured. Still further: not any subjective meaning (or sense) or end (goal) brings about any objective outcome of the course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action). Between both of them, a causal interrelation exists, merely this causal interrelation has more or less slipped out of the control (on the part) of the person or of the people acting. Whoever wants to

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[70] See the next Section (2B) in this chapter.

illuminate the composition (texture or constitution) of the outcome and the mechanisms of the said outcome's formation, which remained hidden to him or them acting, must again go back to the original end(s) (goal(s)) set, as the original material which passed through those mechanisms – and at the other end of the course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) – as it were, chemically transformed, has crystallised as an objective construct. Such explanation does not merely have genetic relevance if it is namely a matter of completed developments, in relation to which the initial intentions have been broken in the whirlpool of evermore new situations, or have even been forgotten. The said explanation is just as important in a functional respect if supra-individual constructs, which seem to be held together in abstracto by the effect (or influence) of an "invisible hand", are to be researched. To these supra-individual constructs belong social institutions or «pratiques collectives», of which Durkheim says they are based on collective representations (notions or views) inaccessible to introspection[71]. Here, however, there is a second phenomenon, whose concrete sociological apprehension cannot manage without historical recourse to the subjectively meant meaning (or sense) and the ends (goals) of the people acting. Because the group as a bearer of collective practices is never completely homogenous, and the always existing discrepancies and tensions in its womb bring about two different things: the differentiation, or even calling into question, of the dominant collective representation (notion or view) in a sociologically relevant way, and at the same time, the putting forward of a binding interpretation of this same representation (notion or view) for the averting of the possible splitting of the social body. Both those who put forward and

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[71] *Règles*, XV. Weber likewise thought that collective constructs exist as "representations (or notions)" "in the minds of real humans", and as such causally determine (or influence) the course (or sequence) of humans' action (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 7).

impose a binding interpretation, as well as those who passively or actively diverge from it, act on the basis of subjective ends (goals), and the effects of their action enter (or influence) the collective representation (notion or view) and jointly shape the collective representation's character. If one overlooks these historically ascertainable facts of the matter, then one falls into [or makes the mistake of] a functionalism, which Durkheim himself criticised in Comte and Spencer: one must, namely, comprehend institutions across the board (or collectively) as the socially ensured satisfaction of human nature's permanent basic needs. Nonetheless, basic needs are also quite often a question of binding social interpretation, and this question is solved on each and every respective occasion, for shorter or longer periods, through this or that shaping (or formation) of the relations between humans. The leaving aside of the social relation's social-ontological dimension during the sociological illumination of social facts consequently lends (gives or imparts to) these social facts a rigidity (or inflexibility) which they can never have in historical reality.

This rigidity (or inflexibility) does not however ensue merely from the wrong squeezing (or forcing) of research practice (or praxis) into a theoretical corset of the – to a great extent correct – theory of founding. Likewise, this rigidity comes about through the reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of the key concept of the social fact with normativistic intent (which of course for its part, precisely as in Parsons, leads anew to the leaving aside of social-ontologically given imponderabilities from sociological analysis). Durkheim wants, for reasons which by no means logically emerge from his founding of sociology, to put his theoretical undertaking at the service of an ethical-normative aim, which is supposed to be achieved on the basis of social cohesion (or unity), and in fact

seems to be identical with the achieving of social cohesion (or unity). Sociology should promote «l'esprit de discipline»[72], and accordingly the "social fact" is endowed with attributes from which the demand for disciplining, and the necessity of disciplining, can be deduced. The concept of the social fact therefore turns out being mixed (or having two aspects). It does not only indicate a result of the interplay (synergy or having an effect together) of a number of socially acting people, which can also come into being and exist irrespective of their knowing (i.e. knowledge) or will(ing), but over and above that, it indicates something which, via the power of collective representations (notions or views), exercises on every member of society more or less noticeable (or perceptible) "compulsion (coercion or constraint)". In regard to the first sense, the concept of the social fact concerns, as we know, the founding of sociology directly. With regard to its meaning as compulsion (coercion or constraint), on the other hand, doubts concerning this appear to dawn. Because here an empirical cohesion (or unity) of the social fact is postulated, which bears comparison with the logical coherence (cohesion or unity) of the epistemological construct, and only the assumption of such an empirical cohesion (or unity) can justify an in principle connection of the concept of the social fact with the concept of compulsion (coercion or constraint). But regardless of whether this connection is indeed specific, whether, that is, the concept of compulsion (coercion or constraint) can be deduced only from the concept of the social fact, or whether compulsion (coercion or constraint) just constitutes *one* social fact next to other social facts, already the inner contradictoriness or lack of clarity of the collective representations (notions or views), for the reasons in respect of which there was talk

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[72] *Règles*, p. 123.

above, does not always allow the exercising of simultaneous or uniform compulsion (coercion or constraint) on the psyche of all humans – if the word "compulsion (coercion or constraint)" is taken seriously, that is, if it should mean *necessity* of behaviour. If the element (or factor) of necessity is not unconditionally given, then the concept of the social fact lacks, provided the said concept of the social fact means "compulsion (coercion or constraint)", that cohesion (or unity) in respect of which its use requires for sociology's founding. Durkheim himself unintentionally admits how much both perceptions (or views) in regard to the character of the social fact differ when he, against the view that historical development has aims which are known to the actors, amongst other things, puts forward (or cites) the argument that individuals would, even living under the same circumstances, choose their ends (goals) and means in a self-willed (or headstrong) manner and everyone «suivant son humeur» ["according to his mood (or temperament)"][73]. This means: the social fact in the sense of the heterogony of ends is compelling (coercive or constraining) exactly because the social fact in the sense of compulsion (coercion or constraint) is not. Only the possibility of very different individual reactions to identical (basic) social given facts explains the divergence of the results of collective action from all individual intentions. The "compulsion (coercion or constraint)", which social facts exercise, consists in that individuals must take certain factors into consideration in respect of their action whether they like the said certain factors' existence (or presence) or not, however, it does not in the least imply the necessity of socially conforming behaviour all along the line. Consideration [of certain factors] can flow into adaptation (or adjustment), but just as much into a diverging stance or even into

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[73] Loc. cit., p. 94.

opposition (or rebellion). The reaction to that which, through the interplay (synergy or having an effect together) of a number of people, is regarded as a social, formed fact, can hence be put in order (or incorporated) in any place inside of the spectrum of the social relation; this spectrum, in other words, never shrivels up (or dwindles) into an ethically-normatively desired place. And still another consideration shows the impossibility of drawing normative conclusions from the concept of the social fact in the sense of compulsion (coercion or constraint). So that the social fact at the level of social praxis can compel (coerce or constrain) [people] towards (or within) the good, it must be composed (or constituted) accordingly, that is, only a society, which is already well organised, i.e. well educated, can educatively have an effect as a whole; but then a dogged additional effort is superfluous. At the level of sociological theory, it would then again only be meaningful to relate the compulsive (coercive or constraining) character of social facts to normatively meant effects (or influences), if one wanted to deny the quality (or property) of the social fact to phenomena like anomie, dissent or conflict. Durkheim however expressis verbis did the opposite of that[74]. Thus, the sociologist passed judgment on the reformer and the ethicist.

B. Sociology and history

We have already distinguished between the founding and research practice (or praxis) of sociology, and now we should discuss what this distinction means for the relationship of sociology with history. The

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[74] Loc. cit., p. 64ff..

distance between both disciplines must in principle turn out greater at the level of the founding than at the level of research practice, i.e. of substantial (or substantive) analyses. The founding takes place by means of the well-aimed (or purposeful) isolation of specific aspects, by means of the conscious search for abstraction and one-sidedness (or unilaterality). What, however, at the epistemological level of founding is a necessity and advantage, is detrimental and an obstacle at the level of research practice. The transference of the dividing logic of founding to research practice inevitably brings about the negation of the unified (or united) character of social reality in its constant becoming. This social reality constitutes the common material of sociology and history, and it does not at all consist of elements, which from their ontic composition (texture or constitution) could be divided up into sociological and historical elements and separated from one another, as for instance wood from iron; rather social reality constitutes (or represents) one sole (or unique) ontic and temporal-spatial continuum, which is structured and broken up in accordance with sociological, historical, anthropological etc. points of view. Yet engrossment in one concrete case – irrespective of which discipline feels ex officio [by virtue of its office, i.e. standing] competent for that one concrete case – lets one guess the existence (or presence) of this continuum, while at the same time the continuum of the material requires or compels a many-sidedness (or multilaterality) in the way of looking at things. The many-sidedness is hence not merely a norm, to which the observer should keep, although he can omit this norm too, but is absolutely a necessity of research practice. An epistemological anatomy of any sociological, historical etc. work would show that this (sociological, historical etc.) work had to often overstep the boundaries of the discipline concerned, that is, it made assumptions which are not available to the discipline itself in accordance with its logic of founding.

That does not mean – as is known, and unfortunately – that all social scientists and all those scientists (i.e. scholars) involved in the humanities, whether they know it and want to or not, are eo ipso many-sided in the good sense; it however explains the frequent confusion of the epistemological standpoints due to the pressure which the continuum of social and historical reality exercises on the representational (or ideational) world of every (scientific) observer.

From this perspective, it becomes more understandable why Weber erred when he sought to safeguard the possibility of a historically oriented research practice through a founding of sociology which left its boundaries with the idiography of history fluid. The result could only be the epistemological lack of clarity of the founding, because the historical orientation of sociology is a matter for itself, and does not relieve us of the task (or duty) of determining the «proprement sociologique» ["properly (or strictly) sociological] (Durkheim) through successive abstractions – just as its determination (or establishment) by no means eliminates the fact that social or historical reality constitutes one sole (or unique) ontic continuum, and sociology is an epistemological fiction of partial scope. That is why Durkheim erred in the reverse sense, when he assumed that his epistemologically stricter founding of sociology would as such limit sociology's research practice accordingly, i.e. make the boundaries with history's research practice fairly dense. That does not though mean that he would refuse in advance to regard all historical material as possible material for the sociologist. Durkheim himself could even argue historically, thus e.g. when he, in regard to psychological interpretations of the development of history, countered that the variety of form of, and change in, social phenomena could not be deduced simply

from permanent psychical qualities (characteristics or properties)[75]. On the other hand, his research practice amounts to an unhistorical hypostatisation of each and every respective «espèce sociale» ["social species"] investigated, in so far as he supposes an unbridgeable opposition (or contrast) between the sociological and the historical type of relations. That is why he concentrated on the interdependence of two or more phenomena inside of the same espèce sociale (static correlation) and neglected the succession of phenomena in the course of historical time (dynamic way of looking at things)[76]. Thus, we are faced with two types of causality: a functional-synchronic causality, in which the reason for the cohesion of a whole is sought in the interdependence of the parts or of the partial social facts, and a genetic-diachronic causality, in which the succession of social facts (or acts) in historical time is comprehended as a causal determination, or as a causing of a social fact (or act) by a social fact preceding it. The transference of the logic of founding to research practice results here in the fact that the achrony of the epistemological construct at the level of the espèce sociale is transformed into functional synchrony. For that, however, there is no compelling methodical (i.e. methodological) reason, not even and precisely when sociology is founded on the concept of the social fact. Because in diachrony, social facts or collective constructs, which come into being from innumerable combinations of individual acts (or actions) as the said innumerable combinations of individual act(ion)s' resultant, diverge from these innumerable combinations of individual act(ion)s just as, or possibly still more greatly, than in synchrony. In other words, this synchrony can, in certain cases regarding action which is consciously directed towards (or takes its cue from) individual ends (goals), be

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[75] Loc. cit., p. 109.
[76] See Aron's good analysis, *Introduction*, p. 249ff..

influenced more than diachrony. Regardless of that, it is certain that in the course of diachrony the weight of individual intentions and acts (actions) continuously decreases, and indeed both with regard to the dimension of the past, which no human has ever undone, as well as in view of the future, which no human can foresee in the long term, that is, guide consciously and in the knowledge of the outcome.

Durkheim's unwillingness, while proceeding historically, to incorporate diachrony into his research practice (or praxis), is due to a narrow perception of the methodical (i.e. methodological) scope (or range) of historical science, which for him represents the necessary pendant (i.e. counterpart) of his sharp delimitation of sociology. History constitutes an extreme idiography, a description of a sequence of unique events or of «individualités hétérogènes» ["heterogeneous individualities (or particularities)"], between which there can be no comparison. The comparative method is sociology's exclusive affair, and sociology demands the detachment of the elements being compared from each and every respective «série temporelle» ["temporal (i.e. time-related) series"][77]. Synchrony or achrony seems therefore to be a precondition of sociological comparison, and indeed the comparison is first of all made amongst social facts, which belong to more or less equally developed, that is, sociologically contemporaneous espèces sociales. In a second attempt [at explaining matters], however, the comparative method is called "genetic", and this comparative method sets as its aim to follow the becoming of a certain social fact (Institution) right through this certain social fact's various stages of development and in various espèces sociales. Durkheim considers this the highest achievement of sociological research, and accordingly places sociology in general on a par with

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[77] *Règles*, pp. 76, 124ff..

comparative sociology[78]. It is certainly difficult to see how a broad application of the méthode génétique is compatible with the leaving aside of the série temporelle. Yet Durkheim shrugs off the difficulty by way of two questionable assumptions. As selection criterion of the social facts which are supposed to be illuminated (or examined) genetically, these social facts' weight inside of the synchronically meant functional whole of the espèce sociale is of use, that is, it is a matter, in the course of this, principally of institutions[79]; and the série temporelle is understood in the narrowest possible sense, i.e. as a succession of individual and unrepeatable events. Durkheim associates this extreme idiographic version of the série temporelle, and the supposedly interrelated (with it) historical method, with Comte's philosophy of history, and tries to infer the untenability of the historical method from the untenability of a finalistic historiography. The logical leap is obvious and needs no further discussion. Durkheim's assessment of the historical method, and his sharp demarcation of sociology against historical science, stands or falls, at any rate, by his narrow idiographic perception of historical science. However, already some considerations about the character and implications of *historical* comparisons can prove that not only the idea of an absolutely idiographic history is nonsense, but also that precisely the comparative method – of historical or sociological provenance – makes fluid or abolishes the boundaries between historical and sociological research practice. Durkheim thinks he may talk of a specifically

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[78] Loc. cit., p. 137.

[79] It would hence be wrong to confuse Durkheim's evolutionistic perspective, which is based on his functionalism, with a *historical* way of looking at things. In his work regarding the division of labour, a phenomenon is e.g. at the centre of interest whose functional significance is obvious; for the explanation of the division of labour's evolution, objective factors like population density (Book II, chap. II) are brought into play, but not social facts as complexes of acts (or actions), whose composition (texture or constitution) and direction are not determined by an individual act(ion) of these acts (or actions). Long-term processes (or events), like for instance Western "rationalisation" can hardly, however, be apprehended without going into social facts in the sense of social facts as complexes of act(ion)s, or by means of merely "objective" factors.

sociological comparative method because he tends, in relation to that sociological comparative method, to comprehend the specifically sociological concept of the social fact one-sidedly, in the sense of an "institution" (capable of development, but functionally more or less stable). Comparisons of a greater magnitude can, however, be undertaken also between phenomena like, for instance, war or revolution, which only through the violation of language can be called institutions, and all the same, make up genuine social facts.

In general, historical comparisons fulfil two tasks: they fill (or close), through drawing on analogies, gaps in documentation (recorded evidence or records of proof), and they serve heuristic goals by tackling or expanding – with the help of problem awareness which was refined while going deeply into other cases[80] – question formulations (or central themes) which a particular case raises. Either way, comparison breaks open the boundaries of the consistently idiographic – and comparison *must* be undertaken, unless one would like to reduce historiography to a chronicle, and deny the historian the right, contrary to the entire tradition of his métier (i.e. occupation or profession), to research (or search for) causes and interrelations[81]. Research (or investigation) into causes means, first of all, that the relative weight of two differing historical data are correlated or compared with each other in order to ascribe to one historical datum the status of a cause, to the other, the status of an effect. Simultaneously, all the historical factors, which qualify as possible candidates for the causative function, must be compared, in order to

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[80] Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire*, p. 84ff..

[81] This tradition expressly starts with Herodotus, who wants to bring to light the cause (αἰτίη) of the war between the Asiatic East and the Greek West (I, Preamble), and the said tradition experiences its first great high point already in Thucydides's consciously multi-dimensional, and reaching a long way back into the past, aetiology of the Peloponnesian War; for the determination of the specific character of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides carries out a detailed comparison with past wars, merging in many cases into the "sociological" (I, 2-19). Polybius likewise was fully aware of the interrelation of research into causes and comparative procedure (or method) (see esp. I, pp. 12, 6; cf. I, pp. 4, 11).

determine (or ascertain) the correct one amongst them. And finally, the task is set to compare the effect of a causal factor in causal interrelation A with its effect in causal interrelation B, in order to be able to pass judgement on (or form an opinion of) its causal potency (power or potentiality) in general. Comparisons between events, epochs or developments regularly serve, in relation to that, to theoretically isolate causal factors having an effect; comparison is hence regarded as successful when, through comparison, a clear notion of the causal course of the phenomena concerned is achieved. This goal is fulfilled regardless of whether the comparison ascertains differences or similarities[82]. Comparison can ascertain either differences or similarities, it can however also do both, i.e. bring out (or ascertain) far-reaching similarities in a decisive difference, or far-reaching differences in a decisive similarity. The idiographically understood individuality of historical data can in fact be stressed therefore by way of comparisons. Yet on the other hand, even a comparison, which comes from differences, presupposes a superordinate, perhaps only loose categorial framework, inside of which the historical data to be compared can be combined (or come together) and consequently become comparable. In this way, comparison ipso facto refers to the dual nature of every historical datum: behind the conspicuous uniqueness of the same historical datum hides its latent generality, which only allows it to be looked upon as a *historical* datum. Because mere individuality does not turn something into a historical datum, but its suitability to be incorporated into contexts (or interrelations) having an effect (or in contexts of influence), which are considered *historical* on the basis of independent epistemological decisions (see below in this Section). That is why already the selection of

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[82] In relation to that, see Somers-Skocpol, "The Uses of Comparative History".

historically relevant data presupposes implicit or explicit comparisons of the ontological character and of the epistemological status of the same historically relevant data with that ontological character (and epistemological status) of other data. Already the understanding of the action of individuals in a concrete situation entails the implicit or explicit comparison with the action of other individuals in analogous situations – and comparisons between situations can, for their part, be very easily expanded to comparisons between socially dominant conditions (relations or circumstances), between historical processes or epochs. History is therefore from the beginning consciously, or in actual fact, ridden with (or permeated by) comparisons and corresponding conceptualisations; since history is a reconstruction, and as such must operate with concepts (or conceptual plans), then there can, already because of that, be no fundamental difference between comparative history and descriptive sociology[83].

It may appear to be paradoxical that Durkheim, who was not particularly interested in the debate over the relationship between the humanities and the natural (i.e. physical) sciences, supported an extremely idiographic, in research practice impracticable, perception of a historian's work. Durkheim's concern about the sharp delimitation (or definition) of sociology was responsible for this error. On the other hand, Weber could, despite his adherence to the in principle (or programmatic) contrast between both main kinds of knowledge, evade the chimera of a pure idiographic historiography, exactly because his unspecific definition of sociology allowed a nonchalant back and forth between sociology and history, i.e. a conception of sociology with regard to its historical character, and a conception of history with regard to its sociological

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[83] Aron, *Leçons*, p. 429. For the function of theory in comparative historical science, see generally Puhle, „Theorien".

processing. Now historical science, just like sociology, is a science of the social action of man, that is why sociology must be defined as the science of that social action which is condensed in social facts – ergo, the social fact constitutes the epistemological specific feature of sociology, irrespective of how much weight this specific feature carries in research practice (or praxis) on each and every respective occasion, and regardless of how it is explained in light of the historical data. While Weber does not precisely differentiate between social action in the historical sense on the one hand, and in the sociological sense on the other hand, but, as it were, casually mentions the real differences between sociology and history, he limps along at the epistemological level; however, he can proceed so much the quicker in the field of research practice, since he actuates the apparatus, attached to the concept of social action, in respect of meaning (or sense), understanding and the ideal type; both as a sociologist as well as a historian. The ideal-typical preparation of understanding enables Weber, into the bargain, to line up against [or oppose] psychologism also as a historian, and consequently dispense with Durkheim's conviction that, already because of its necessarily psychological orientation, history has an obligation to (extreme) idiography, otherwise history does not possess, not merely vis-à-vis natural (i.e. physical) science, but also vis-à-vis sociology, its own profile. The individual [element (event or case)], Weber opines, by no means constitutes as such an object of history, the individual [element (or event)] becomes an object of history either as a typical representative of an abstract concept, or as a member (cause or effect) in a causal interrelation, and then we look at it only in its causally relevant manifestations (or expressions), not in its totality[84].

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[84] *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 232, 237ff.. Here Weber follows Eduard Meyer, *Zur Theorie*, p. 59.

The first of both these conditions for the inclusion (or acceptance) of the individual [element (or event)] in history [i.e. regarding the individual element as an object of history as a typical representative of an abstract concept], implies that between the individuality of events or acts (actions), and their suitability to be assigned to classes, and even to represent these classes (that is, to be able to be generalised), a distinction must be made. The individuality of events or acts does not in the least preclude the suitability to be generalised, and the historian should in his estimation, on each and every respective occasion, deem to what extent the individual and the class characteristics (or features) intersect (or overlap). In principle, he would, in the course of this, be ill-advised if he wanted, out of laziness (or convenience) or ideology, to downgrade the individual case to a reflection of a general case (or situation); a cautious and conditional declaration of an individual case as typical attests to an alert consciousness in respect of the epistemological-fictive character of types, classes and generalities. Likewise, the uniqueness (and unrepeatability), and singularity [as to its kind or species], of the individual [case or element] must be distinguished. An event or a person in the absolute sense is unique (and unrepeatable), there is (or there was) an event or person, namely, only once; on the other hand, it is singular [as to its kind or species] only in a relative sense, i.e. in regard to one or some aspects, but not to all: because there is nothing in this world which could not be subsumed under absolutely no genus or no species, and whose constitution (composition or texture) or way (or mode) of acting would have nothing to do with an affiliation (or belonging) to that subsumption. Miltiades as a person and the Battle of Marathon are unique, that is, they saw the light of day only one time. But as a *historical* person Miltiades was an Athenian, general (or commander) etc., and he acted *also* (or *absolutely*) in line with these not unique qualities

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(characteristics or properties); the Battle of Marathon has, for its part, alongside its unrepeatable parameters (place, time, parties involved (or participants)), certain categorial features (or characteristics), whose mere knowledge permits the forming of, without going into details, a general notion of the event; no matter whether it is fought in Marathon, Cannae [during the Second Punic War in southeast Italy] or Stalingrad, a battle is thus a relation between men structured in a particular and recognisable way, which differs from other relations between humans, and through its existence (or presence) poses questions (political, anthropological etc.) going far beyond the concrete event. If we did not know at all what a battle meant, then the event of 490 B.C. at Marathon would have an entirely different status in our history books.

The second of the conditions (prerequisites or requirements) mentioned above [the individual element as an object of history as a member (cause or effect) in a causal interrelation] refers, in turn, to our previous observations regarding the logic of historical comparisons. The putting in order (or inclusion) of the individual [element (event or case)] as a member in a causal interrelation presupposes a decision over the character of the historical [element] and consequently over the yardsticks (or criteria), on the basis of which the individual [element (or event)] is declared historically relevant. The putting in order (or inclusion) confers on the individual [element (or event)] the status of the historical. The said putting in order (or inclusion) cannot, however, manage that if each and every respective individual [element (or event)] is not apprehended from that particular aspect which bridges the gap with the related aspects of the rest of the individual magnitudes inside of the overall context thereby produced. Because individualities as wholes can never fit into one another like two cogwheels. The historically meant (intended or thought)

selection of an individuality must, therefore, be supplemented by a selection which is made inside and at the individualities; the totality of the individual [element (or event)], when it is generally recognisable and conceivable, falls programmatically, or in actual fact, by the wayside. This should actually be self-evident even at the level of the personal-individual [element (or case)], if one does not want to be lost in a psychologism. The historically expedient (or purposeful) dissolution and selective treatment of the individual totality takes place here through the leaving aside of the unfathomable biopsychic structure of depth, in which drives (urges) or unconscious or half-conscious motivations stir, and through the concentration of analytical attention on ends (goals), which manifest themselves (or find expression) in observable action[85]. The historical objectification of the personal-individual [element (or case)] through isolating abstraction or selection can of course find other means and ways, all of which nevertheless have to do with the same putting first of action's end(goal)-led (purposeful or expedient) external course (or sequence of events) (action in roles, action in situations etc.). This need not be pursued here further. The pointing out of another dimension of the problem of historical individuality, by contrast, appears absolutely necessary: i.e. the pointing out of the highly variable extent, and the constant need for interpretation, of the concept of "individuality" itself, which in turn testify to the quasi automatic and deep reaching (or extending) of the historical into the sociological. Singularity [as to its kind or species] and generality are not essential traits of facts, but modes of evaluation of facts. How broadly the boundaries of the individual [element (or event)] are set, and to what extent individualities should be looked at as incomparable (in a certain respect (or relation)) or as typical

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[85] See, in relation to that, Lukacs's good observations, *Historical Consciousness*, p. 160ff..

(in another respect (or relation)), depend on the (variable) direction of our historical interests[86]. Alexander the Great and Napoleon are historical individuals, just as, however, the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, the Reformation, capitalism or the Second World War are also historical individuals [i.e. historical individual entities] in, on each and every respective occasion, another sense; the concepts of the entirety and of the event as unities (or units) of historical analysis shift in terms of content accordingly (a war can e.g. be interpreted in its totality as an individual (or a separate) part (or member) of a historical process, or as a series of preparations, manoeuvres, battles etc.). In view of this amorphy (or amorphousness) of the concept of individuality, the effort appears to be futile to want, by invoking that concept of individuality, to erect a wall between sociology and history in research practice. Historicism, which set out to smash abstract universalisms in the name of "living individuality", had to soon apply this concept (or conceptual plan) [as regards erecting a wall between sociology and history] to increasingly extensive constructs (first and foremost to states), and in the end one spoke even of the "overall individuality of mankind"[87]. By that, everything and nothing was said. The hypostatisation of any collective subjects whatsoever in the form of giant or dwarf-like individuals [i.e. individual entities] leads epistemology and research practice to a dead end, and the said hypostatisation was only fertile as the unintended preliminary stage (or tier) of that typification (i.e. rendering into types) of which the historian as well as the sociologist must avail themselves. A consistent adherence to a strict concept of individuality is, in any case, not possible in history. A significant historian, who declared his support for a «nominalisme intégral» ["integral nominalism"] assigned history's

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[86] Gardiner, *Nature*, p. 40ff..
[87] Thus, Meinecke, *Entstehung*, pp. 626, 627.

object (or subject matter) all along the line to the «catégorie du Singulier» ["category of the singular (i.e. the unique (or exceptional))"]; he admitted at the same time that certain historical realities would have «un certain caractère général» ["a certain general character"] and deserve the name «complexes singuliers» ["singular complexes"][88]. That concession seems to me methodically (i.e. methodologically) more instructive than the declaration of support.

This description of history's conscious or unavoidable praxis (or practice) may by no means be taken for the methodical (i.e. methodological) norm or as an appeal to the historian that he should, in view of the impossibility of a pure idiography, abandon the concrete case. *As* a historian he is always to be recognised in that he – principally or *also* – devotes himself to the concrete case. But both the determination of that which is the historically relevant, concrete case, as well as the analytical penetration inside this concrete case, require other parameters which are not given in the concrete case, but rather at first constitute it. The use of "abstractions" does not, therefore, mean eo ipso a lapsing into sociology, because abstraction does not serve merely, and not always, specifically sociological generalisation, but also the illumination of the concrete case – and abstraction serves, moreover, the genuinely historical intention of going beyond this concrete case, and of formulating generalisations as soon as it is a matter of the historical (epochal) status of the concrete case (or even a matter of the concrete case's status as regards world history). Whoever out of angst (or fear) before the risk of sociological infection disputes the legitimacy of such question formulations (or central themes), has in actual fact thrown overboard many of the highest achievements of classical and modern historiography. One does not assert without a

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[88] Marrou, *Connaissance*, p. 169ff.. Marrou offers, incidentally, a list of general concepts very much worth reading, which the historian anyhow must use, loc. cit., p. 149ff..

certain justification that the historian does not deal with generally (or universally) in force causalities and forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities), but with particular, and related to concrete cases, forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities); he, that is, inquires about the causes of the First World War, not about the causes of war in general[89]. Yet even if we wanted to accept that the historian could, in his explanation of the causes of a certain war, abstain from general notions regarding the essence (or nature) and aetiology of war, he cannot, on the other hand, help incorporating this particular war as an overall process into the much more general image (or picture) of an environment and a prehistory; the requirements of concrete research into causes will not, otherwise, be sufficiently met[90]. That does not mean though that the historian, already after the clarification of the state of the sources and of the temporal classification of events, must desert his discipline's field and reach for sociological (conceptual) instruments in order to generally be in a position to articulate something meaningful. They say that history itself, if and in so far as it articulates something meaningful, puts forward (or formulates) generalisations, develops its own notions about short-term and long-term processes, about driving (or motive) forces, and contexts (or interrelations) having an effect (or contexts of influence).

The, mostly amongst sociologists, common impression is thus out of place, that history, in relation to that, exists in order to provide the cleansed material which sociology then explains causally from a higher vantage point. The historian has already *as* a historian explained the historical material[91], he must do that, especially as the explanation and

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[89] Schieder, „Unterschiede".
[90] The recollection of Thucydides's "archeology" imposes itself on us here too, see footnote 81 above.
[91] Cf. Dray, *Laws*, p. 109.

constitution of the material cannot be separated from each other. However, while the historian does that, he must know that he is entering fields which he must share with other disciplines, fields, in which the familiar distributions (or divisions) of competence (competency or responsibility) – in terms of whose categories most practising scientists (i.e. scholars), partly out of intellectual(-spiritual) sluggishness, partly because of one-sided education (or culture) and guild mentality, think – can only lead one astray. The question is therefore not whether history as such can and must offer explanations, but rather whether sociological explanations of historical material belong to an essentially (or substantially) different type, or a have a considerably greater generalising range. The answer to that depends on the notions which one has about the application of sociological concepts or "models" to historical material. And this application cannot obviously take place sweepingly and ubiquitously, but, according to each and every case and perspective in regard to meaning, it might grosso modo assume three forms: a) the simple use of concepts (or conceptual plans) in the formulation of meaningful (or sensible) historical explanations; b) usage (or summoning) of causal regularities for the explanation of historical processes and weighing up of alternative hypotheses; c) recourse (or reverting) to an already worked out general theoretical model for the illumination of an individual concrete case or a number of such cases simultaneously[92]. Regarding the first case, one need not say a word. Even in the second case, an unbridgeable gap does not have to be opened between the historical and sociological way of looking at things. Because history (also) deals with long-term sequences of events (or processes), history makes the general and the impersonal, as well as the individual [element

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[92] I am following Skocpol's classification, "Emerging Agendas", p. 362ff..

(case or event)] in the narrower sense, its object (or subject matter) – and it does this not only when it reconstructs overall economic or institutional developments, but also whenever it has to sketch (i.e. outline) the pre-given framework inside of which the more or less short historical episode to be described (or outlined) is acted out. Already ancient historiography knows synoptic retrospective accounts of long, internally coherent developments as an introduction to the actual narrative. During the historical reconstruction of processes of longue durée [long duration], the search for regularities makes its presence felt as an illustration (or exemplification) of the temporal structure, of the internal rhythm of the processes, as periodisation and as the marking of turning points. Already here the question is posed about the causal interrelations, and such a question comes totally to the fore as soon as, in every retrospective account of a development, the entirely natural aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) is pronounced: how would have the outcome turned out if this or that had not happened, if this or that factor had failed to materialise or had been activated? At this question the paths of history and sociology cross because the latter also tests (checks or scrutinises) the validity of its "regularities", while it investigates comparatively the varying and uniform effect of isolatable factors during different processes, or conducts thought experiments in regard to the relative weight of every individual factor in an overall context (or interrelation). Thus, we come to the third case, i.e. the case of the application of theoretical models of sociology to historical phenomena. In so far as such models lay claim to general (or universal) validity for themselves (and they must do that), they take the following logical form: wars (revolutions, processes of industrialisation, of institutionalisation etc. etc.) take place then and only then, when the constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or hierarchy of cause (reason) X, comes into effect under Y

circumstances. Such models have been proposed, however they have, all together, proved to be at times stimulating, at other times vacuous (or meaningless) thought (or intellectual) games, i.e. none have been able to explain the totality of the relevant cases, and indeed because of the in principle lack of prospects (or futility) of the venture (see below). At any rate, the ascertainment of the inadequacy of the model in an individual case suffices in order to prompt a prudent return to the comparative analysis of developments and phenomena, in which history and sociology – while presupposing a corresponding tactfulness (or sensitivity) – must go hand in hand.

Now however not only the sociologist's models, but also quite a few of the historian's explanations, are too abstract and too general for the concrete case. Sociology and history would not be so close to each other if only the former would give in to the temptation of ambitious and untenable generalisation. Put the other way around: precisely the objective proximity of the disciplines makes the historian very often prone to shortcomings which one usually imputes to the sociologist. Abstractive-generalising approaches and unhistorical-sociological tendencies do not in the least coincide with each other under all circumstances – especially the representatives of our contemporary "microsociology" or "ethnomethodology", who do not want to hear anything of abstractions and generalisations, proceed as unhistorically as hardly anyone else. No internal barrier in his discipline keeps the historian from sketching (or devising) bad abstractions and from defending imaginary causalities; and no immanent necessity of his field hinders the sociologist in penetrating the sociologically enlightening concrete case, in busying himself, for the sake of sociology, as a historian and familiarising himself with [historical] sources. Finally, sociology

treats, even though with typifying(i.e. rendering into types)-generalising intent, not only collective constructs (nations, states, churches etc.), but also events (wars, revolutions etc.), whereas historiography for its part quite often sets its reconstruction of events against a background of a collective construct ("the history of England in the 16th century"). One could extend and deepen such parallels between historical and sociological research practice, even point to substantial commonalities which concern the composition (or putting together) and the origin of the conceptuality used on both sides. Yet this is not our present task. For our question formulation (or problem examination), the following is of fundamental significance. The insight, on which the concept of the social fact as the foundation stone of sociology is based, likewise constitutes a central experience of the reflective historian. If the social fact is a network or a resultant of acts (or actions), which exists and has an effect irrespective of the part-forces, that is, the ends (goals) and endeavours of actors, although the said social fact is composed from these acts (or actions, and part-forces) and only from these, then the historian, who sees (or grasps) long-term developments, but also the intricate interplay of forces in a particular situation, knows that subjectively meant meaning (or sense) constantly intersects with subjectively meant meaning (or sense), or comes upon an objectified meaning (or sense) in collective constructs, from which something comes into being which is only accessible to the historian as an observer; if history coincided with the simple summation of the ends (goals) and acts (or actions) of individuals, then history would be superfluous as a science. The colliding (or clashes) [of individual and or collective subjects with one another] and the heterogony of ends have hitherto, as ascertainments or presentiments, made up, in various versions, the background and quintessence of historical wisdom. The historian certainly knows of this process's

dynamic character, of its unfolding (or development) in long sequences (or orders) of events. In this respect, the historian comprehends the composition (texture or constitution) of the social fact more comprehensively than Durkheim, who, as we have said, insisted upon the social fact's static-institutional aspect.

We have likewise hinted at another of Durkheim's flaws. He connected the historical method and the evolutionistic philosophy of history with each other logically, although the relationship here is at best a pragmatic one: inside of intellectual efforts pertaining to the philosophy of history, discoveries and insights resulted which contributed to the formation of a historical consideration of things, but, in the process, were detached from the original framework as regards the philosophy of history. Durkheim could not, and of course did not want to, admit that modern sociology in some, not unimportant respects, owed possibly still more to the philosophy of history than to historical method. In order to comprehend this, one must first define what the philosophy of history since Herder and Hegel up to Comte and Marx actually wanted, and how its matter of concern (or purpose), under the influence of the ascendant social sciences, determined its structure. The postulate of a necessary advent of an ethically-normatively desired final state of affairs in the history of mankind automatically gave rise to two questions: how is the historical period preceding this final state of affairs to be understood? On what paths (or in what ways) is the final state of affairs to be arrived at (or achieved)? The answers to these questions were found on the basis of the same automatic thought mechanism: should the advent of the final state of affairs be necessary, then the historical past must be looked upon as the final state of affairs' preparation. So that the historical past, however, can function as preparation, a red thread of continuity (i.e. central theme or

leitmotif) must run through it; that is why its variety of form must, from this particular point of view, be put in order as a chain of meaningfully (or rationally) successive links, or better, as an ascending scale (or sequence of tiers or stages). On the one hand, the path to the final state of affairs is a development, on the other hand, the development is structured in (or divided into) stages – history as a whole consists, therefore, of stages of development *and* of the transitions between such stages of development. Here a static and a dynamic element emerges in historiography. The philosophy of history did not have any great difficulty in accepting the independence or the historically understood individuality of every stage of development. Because at every stage of development, the philosophy of history simultaneously sensed the effect of a mechanism, which drove [things] beyond the stage's each and every respective individual structure, however this mechanism was not external to the said stage's individual structure, but immanent, and at the same moment was interwoven with forces pertaining to world history (or the history of the universe). The historical factors accordingly took effect in two respects: they constituted the stage of development and at the same time abolished the said stage, while they brought about the transition to the next stage, the said historical factors were condensed synchronically and they developed (or unfolded) diachronically, they brought stable mechanisms for the establishment (production or restoration) of equilibria, and likewise stable mechanisms of change, into existence. Such mechanisms cannot, however, be formed (or developed) if the evidently numerous historical factors come on the scene in a chaotic mess (or muddle); they had to, that is, be classified and, above all, be hierarchised. This hierarchy indeed had validity in respect of universal (or world) history, but it simultaneously provided the criteria on the basis of which every stage or every society could be looked at as a coherent

whole. Because the coherent whole contained, in each and every respective historically specific form, all the social and historical factors (technology (technique), economy, political and legal institutions, religion, science, art etc.), and the hierarchy amongst these social and historical factors exactly took care of each and every respective historically specific form's functional cohesion, while shifts inside of the primary factor set in motion the mechanism of change.

From now on, the stages of development of the philosophy of history were transformed into sociological "concepts of structure (or structural concepts)"[93], which related to functionally self-supporting (or self-sustaining) social formations, and were used without implications pertaining to the philosophy of history; the large-scale Weberian ideal type is along the same lines as regards the history of ideas. Such concepts of structure (or structural concepts) should nevertheless, apart from the social entireties, also sociologically apprehend the constructs from which those entireties are composed and which, for their part, constitute entireties on a smaller scale. Even if the sociologist, in the course of this, does not neglect the diachronic-dynamic factor, and does not overlook the possible (or potential) asymmetries between the entireties of the second order (i.e. the entireties on a smaller scale), he must nevertheless pose a question in accordance with these entireties' functional interrelation, no matter what importance he attaches to the same question inside of his overall way of looking at things. In reality, no-one who thinks about

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[93] The term stems from Freyer, who, by the way, takes expressis verbis Hegel as his starting point. Freyer regards as particularly fruitful the Hegelian view that the principles of formation of societal order are "developmental steps and structural elements, stages and strata" in one. From that he concludes that the "pure basic structures" are contained in each and every respective historical present as structural elements, while at the same time they succeeded one another in real history. Sociology's task consists in the formulation of "maximally historically saturated concepts of structure (or structural concepts)" (*Soziologie*, pp. 217, 221ff., 227). What he was thinking of in the course of this, the reader knows by means of treatises like for instance v. Martin's *Soziologie der Renaissance*.

society can evade this question. Hence, such a question was already broached in antiquity in an organicistic language[94], and in the New Times was raised before the formation (or development) of the philosophy of history in the framework of the first approaches to (or attempts at) modern sociology[95]. The tight interweaving between sociology and the philosophy of history in the 19th century indeed embedded the functional problem in the perspective of development, at the same time though, for the aforementioned reasons, the said tight interweaving gave important imputeses to the functional problem's theoretical process of becoming independent (or theoretical autonomisation): as is known, Marx treated the capitalistic social formation both in terms of the history of development, as well as ideal-typically in terms of the concept of structure. If one leaves aside eschatology pertaining to the philosophy of history, then a methodical (i.e. methodological) schema is left over, which connects sociological and historical points of view with one another in a satisfactory way. But the functional way of looking at things as an indispensable aspect of sociological-historical analysis, and functionalism as an independent (or autonomous) theory, which postulates fixed (hierarchical) relations between society's, defined a limine, functional components in general, are two very different things. The path to functionalism as an independent theory is cleared in that the – for every sociology also indispensable – discussion of the phenomena of change does not put in the foreground (or spotlight) social entireties and the breaks (or ruptures) between such entireties and inside them, but the

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[94] Aristotle, *Politica*, 1302 b p.35ff.; cf. Menenius Agrippa's considerably older speech in Titus Livius, II, p.32.

[95] Thus, Montesquieu makes an effort to discover functional interrelations between the, for every society, indispensable geographic, economic, institutional etc. factors. To the extent which the supposed causalities seem at the same time rigid and artificial, this is not due to the wish to prove the necessity of a Happy End in history (in fact the philosophy of history in the later sense was alien to Montesquieu), but it was due to sympathies in the field of politics and to the predominance of political philosophy in his overall way of looking at things. In relation to that, see Kondylis, *Montesquieu*, ch. II, sec. 4.

evolution or the differentiation (process) of more or less institutionalised activities, which are supposed to have a constitutive function in every society. The consideration (thought or idea) is: if phenomenon X exists diachronically, then it must have a permanent function too; however, a function can be permanent only inside a permanent framework, that is, ultimately in the framework of a society as a functional system. A historically proceeding sociological analysis of social facts' functional aspects is by no means obliged to accept such assumptions; on the contrary: it rejects them.

Functionalism, which indeed is consistent with evolutionism, but not with the historical way of looking at things, did not of course celebrate its triumphs thanks to its purely scientific advantages (or merits), but as a result of a profound change in the socially predominant world-theoretical paradigm. The bourgeois-liberal thought figure (or schema), which was oriented towards the notion of stagewise (i.e. gradual or stage by stage) progress in historical time, was superseded in the mass-democratic era by a thought figure (or schema) in which the spatial perception of things predominates. The components of the social being (Is) (but also the periods of time) seem to be found next to one another on a single surface, no matter how the said components were hierarchised or combined with one another, regardless too of how they potentially (or possibly) evolve through the differentiating process[96]. The predominance of the spatial notion (or representation) of the social put an end to the philosophy of history – at least in its classical form, because many an eschatological element survived from the philosophy of history until today in an evolutionistic shell[97]. Many sociologists, in the course of this, lapsed into

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[96] Cf. the first Section of the previous Chapter. Generally in relation to this paradigm shift: Kondylis, *Niedergang*.

[97] See above, Ch. I, Sec. 3. In so far as the philosophy of history in the 20th century openly appeared as such (Spengler, Toynbee), it had to spatialise itself, i.e. say goodbye to (or turn its back on) the idea of

Durkheim's error and thought that, along with the philosophy of history of the 18th and 19th century, the historical method or way of looking at things was done with too. In relation to that, they were not only encouraged by suggestions from neighbouring (i.e. related) fields (phenomenology, symbolic interactionism) or by the formal-sociological legacy, which will occupy us at the beginning of the next Chapter, but also by the increasing crossing over (i.e. interweaving, intersecting or entanglement) of the sociological métier (i.e. profession) with social engineering in mass democracy, which frequently reduces sociology to the investigation of directly observable social phenomena (or manifestations) (mobility, sex (i.e. gender) (or race) relations, demography, criminality etc.). Against such sociological work there is nothing in itself to be said, but such sociological work's successes do not constitute a reason for the detachment of sociology as a discipline from historical science and the historical consideration of social processes. Constrictions of the theoretical horizon, as understandable as they may be, for their part, as social phenomena, do not represent (or constitute) as such theoretical arguments. And it is indeed a constriction of the horizon, when in what relation e.g. the specific character of today's criminality in Western countries is with the specific character of mass democracy as a historically arising (or coming into being) and historically determined social formation, is misjudged. Only historical analyses and comparisons would lend to sociological investigations (or examinations) like those mentioned above a theoretical[iv] status – incidentally, such historical analyses and comparisons are close to the matter in hand, and it can be asserted with good reason that every sociologist, even the historically unversed sociologist, works, in any event, with historical concepts (or

Progress in time and appropriate the schema of movement in circles (or cycles) (i.e. the schema of circular (i.e. cyclical) movement).

conceptual plans) at the back of his mind[98]. The social present constitutes just as much the object (or subject matter) of the historical way of looking at things as society's past. But the unhistorical ideological self-understanding of mass democracy stands in the way of a historically founded sociological analysis of phenomena of mass-democratic existence (or being (t)here). That is why such an analysis must, when consistently carried out, amount to a subversive relativisation of this self-understanding, which would for many scientists (i.e. scholars), who think in the categories of this same self-understanding, only be embarrassing. Nonetheless, as we have already remarked[99], no ideology has ever been capable of monopolising the entire intellectual(-spiritual) spectrum for itself. Historical sociology has, since Weber and Marc Bloch up to Tilly, Eisenstadt and B. Moore, done notable work[100], although they also often succumbed to ideological temptations. Yet it is not a matter here – or not directly a matter – of those ideologems (i.e. kinds of sub-ideology) which characterise mass democracy's self-understanding as in when this mass-democratic self-understanding found expression for instance in systematic (i.e. systems-related) or economistic social theories.

As we have said, the philosophy of history constructed supposedly universally valid hierarchies of social and historical factors, in order to deduce from them that mechanism, whose mere self-acting (i.e. automatic) effect was supposed to bring about the desired final state of affairs. One could expect that after the decline of the philosophy of history of the 19th century, attempts to establish (or put forward) similar hierarchies or even complete inventories, would fail to materialise. This,

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[98] See in relation to that: Bonnell, "The Uses of Theory".

[99] See above, Ch. 1, Sec. 1.

[100] Skocpol (ed.) offers a panorama (i.e. overview) of this work, *Vision and Method*. In relation to the methodical (i.e. methodological) aspect, cf. Stinchcombe, *Theoretical Methods*; Tilly, *As Sociology meets History* and *Big Structures*; Abrams, *Historical Sociology*.

however, has not occurred without exception, although now the old connection between such constructions and eschatology has broken off, or (in a number of evolutionists) has been maintained only in an indirect and toned-down form. The question of the realisability (i.e. feasibility) of the epistemological dream of an all-embracing, universally valid and properly structured schema of factors having an effect socially, touches, in any case, directly upon the problem of the relations between historical and sociological research; that is why it was no accident that one of the most prominent attempts to realise the dream was undertaken in the course of the detachment from historical sociology, that is, in a systematic-functionalistic context[101]. Undoubtedly, the concepts or categories, which are listed in such schematisations or catalogisations, correspond with some real social phenomena, provided though these are taken for, as it were, Platonic pure forms. But the methically (i.e. methodologically) crucial point does not lie here. Already the establishing (or formulation) of such a categorial schema drives sociological research in a false direction, because theoretical attention henceforth turns towards the conceptual level, and the solution to content-related questions, which of their essence are historical, or at least have a decisive historical component, is sought in the restructurings or new versions of the conceptuality. Yet even a hypothetically complete conceptuality, which a limine and in abstracto would name all possible factors in all conceivable social phenomena (or manifestations) and developments, could not indicate (or set) the specific weight, or the particular mode of having an effect (or manner of influence), of every single one of these factors in

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[101] Parsons's "Pattern Variables" is of course meant here; see the more mature version of the schema in the article "Pattern Variables Revisited". Parsons put forward (or imagined), in his first major work, the transition from Weber's historical sociology to a sociological theory of universal validity as follows: ideal types are divided into their individual (or separate) elements, and then the analytically usable elements amongst these elements are detached from historical reference and are used for the construction of a comprehensive set of conceptual instruments of ubiquitous applicability (*Structure*, pp. 619, 626).

every concrete situation. The hypothetically complete conceptuality would have to separate these same factors from one another, and present them as a series of spheres of action or of "subsystems" existing side by side. The major, in fact the central problem in every concrete historical or sociological analysis is, nevertheless, the real *relation(ship)* between the factors, which in the categorial schema appear as polysemous (i.e. ambiguous) symbols or hieroglyphs – and this relation(ship) is shaped forever anew; this relation(ship) is, that is, historically produced, and it can in no way be anticipated in a theoretical model and in the roundabout way of non-binding conceptual alchemy ("interpretation", "input", "output" etc.)[102]. In reality, behind the rigidity (or inflexibility) of the sociological table of categories, hides a preliminary decision in favour of certain content-related theses and against other content-related theses, i.e. the conceptual hierarchy should support epistemological or normative preferences. Nonetheless, the real effect (or influence) of social factors must not, in their kind (manner or nature) and range, at all correspond to each and every respective place of these factors inside of the classification carried out, and only wrong historical assessments can spring from the assumption that the taxonomically antecedent [factor] is (or ought to be) also, in every case, the more effective [factor].

Our conclusion must read: sociology is capable, just as little as the philosophy of history, of including *the* system and *the* development of society in a single categorial schema which would apprehend the social factors permanently having an effect, as well as their relations with one another, and at the same time would possess universal-historical validity (i.e. as regards to world history)[103]. Because the same factors do not have

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[102] Cf. Hall's observations, "The Problem of Epistemology", esp. p. 272.
[103] This conclusion equally concerns attempts which put together a universally applicable table of categories from pairs of concepts, which already have historical content, as for instance status-contract,

an effect determinatively in every society and in every period; and the same factors have an effect, relate to (or interrelate with) one another and are hierarchised differently in every concrete situation. Given this incessant reshaping, reassessment (reweighing or reprioritisation) and reordering (i.e. rearrangement) of causal factors, we may safely say that sociology is rewritten during the analysis of every social phenomenon and every historical situation; sociology, that is, formulates (or puts forward), on each and every respective occasion, a specific categorial table which indeed by way of comparisons explains and expands matters, but cannot be totally absorbed by any other categorial table. Historical sociology does not need an all-embracing (or universal) categorial schema, and unhistorical sociology cannot bring such an all-embracing or universal categorial schema about, except as a thought (or intellectual) game, which for its part has a heuristic value only when comparative historical analyses precede or follow such a thought (or intellectual) game. And what applies to the all-embracing (or universal) schema, also applies to partial hierarchisations of sociological categories or concepts. Thus, the primacy of structure vis-à-vis individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act), or of this individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act) over that structure, was debated long and hard, and in the course of this every conceivable solution on earth was suggested. All were theoretical solutions in the worst sense of the word: combinations of purely ideational magnitudes at (or on) a purely conceptual level (or plane), without, in the process, seriously reflecting on the complex relationship between the concurrent indispensability and fictivity (i.e.

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community-society, culture-civilisation, estate-class (thus, Bendix-Berger, "Images of Society"). In relation to that, we must say along with C. W. Mills that here it is a matter of concepts which are taken from the West European development and thoughts world (i.e. system of ideas or ideological universe), and whose use presupposes a certain notion (perception or representation) of the historical tendencies of development; these historical tendencies of development are not able however to be generalised; they would, that is, apply only ever in regard to a concrete social formation, not universally-historically (i.e. in regard to world history) (*Kritik*, pp. 203, 199).

fictiveness or fictitiousness) of conceptual constructs. Individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act) and structure are in fact borderline cases at the level of conceptuality, not independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) and isolatable data at the level of that reality which makes up the object (or subject matter) of sociological and historical research. And it is pointless to rediscover the conceptual borderline cases in reality, or to directly apply purely conceptual findings or combinations to analyses of what is real, or even to exchange (or substitute) these analyses of what is real with those purely conceptual findings or combinations. Only analyses of what is real in respect of concrete situations can give us an insight into if and when structure precedes individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act) or vice versa, as well as above all what may be defined as individual acting (i.e. action, or the individual act), and what as structure, on each and every respective occasion. The answer here must vary from case to case. The chameleonic character of the matter gives rise in theoreticians to a never admitted awkwardness, which can be observed in statements of the type "both – as well as", or else in definitions of one concept with reference to the content which one normally attributes to the other concept. Blau wants to be sure that e.g. the concept of structure is related not to institutions and their integration, but to differentiated orders which individuals form through their interactions[104]. An adherent of methodological individualism like Homans emphatically points out the individual exceptions in every structure (yet talk of exceptions presupposes rules already existing!), and he puts the formation of structures down to individual action, without however denying the possibility of the explanation of individual action by means of the effect of sociostructual factors formed first [i.e. before the said individual action

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[104] "Parameters", p. 615ff..

takes place][105]. And Giddens places great value on the ascertainment that structures would not merely obstruct action, but at the same time enable action[106]. Every one of these propositions looks just as obvious (or plausible) on paper as the other, and all remain, beyond the conceptual level, equally non-binding.

The impossibility of working out a fixed (steady or stable) hierarchy of causal factors having an effect in the form of a universally valid table of categories, decisively affects the methodological field. Because there could be a solely correct and generally binding method only against the background of such a table of categories; method would then be the flawless application of a categorial hierarchy to each and every respective analysis of what is real, or the opening up of the real (i.e. what is real) through what is conceptually already established. The enigmatic character of the real (i.e. what is real) indeed makes abstractions indispensable for the real's apprehension, however exactly these abstractions cannot be constructed on the basis of fixed (steady or stable) and fixedly (steadily or stably) hierarchised ontological data, but in view of subjective research goals, which can diverge considerably from one another, or stand in the way of one another. The methodical (i.e. methodological) approach (or methodological access) must vary accordingly – but it may not if a comprehensive table of categories could name invariable causal factors, or causal factors having an effect invariably, as obligatory points of orientation. It is now attempted in many cases to compensate for the lack of this table of categories in respect of social and historical being (Is) through the summoning of a supposedly generally binding method; it, by the way, has often been so in the New Times' history of ideas that

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[105] "What do we mean", pp. 62, 64.
[106] *Constitution*, pp. 25ff., 169ff..

methodology overgrew (or grew profusely) whenever ontology (that is to say (i.e., read): the opponent's ontology) was attacked or avoided. The invocation of method serves, in relation to that, to underpin content-related preliminary decisions with regard to the interpretation of the sociological or historical material. Consequently, method becomes the theoretically prospective, and in actual fact retrospective, rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification) of one's own research praxis (or practice), which does not though find itself in any necessary relation with the productiveness of this practice. This putatively necessary relationship with the productiveness of research practice occurs so much the less when the propagation of a method under certain circumstances, which favour the overgrowth (or profusion) of methodological debates, has a partly symbolic, partly symptomatic character: the said propagation of a method stands (vicariously) in for the now avoided open world-theoretical confessions of faith, and at the same time it indicates the position of those concerned in the spectrum of the world-theoretical parties competing with one another within the [overall] scientific operation (enterprise or business). The controversy of the 1960s and 1970s between the adherents of a history without sociology, and those of a sociology without history, reflected e.g. partisanships (or taking sides) for and against liberal individualism together with these partisanships' political implications. The, in recent decades, depoliticisation of history which has taken place in broad fields (or areas), the growing interest in the everyday life of the humble somebody (i.e. of the common man or the "little people"), in mentalities and the experiential world, in corporeality and sexuality, in outcasts and those who are different, constitutes in turn, just as many back projections (i.e. projections into the past) of motifs (or motives) and questions – which, after the discontinuation of the old boundaries between the private [sphere] and the public [sphere], and as a

result of the world-theoretical pluralism – are on the mass-democratic order of the day. Certainly, all that has brought with it expansion (or extensions) of the sociological and historical horizon. But every expansion of the horizon in one direction, is, as a rule, bought off by the constriction (or restriction) of the horizon in the opposite direction. Expansion in each and every respective desired direction is, at any rate, quite often passed off as a methodical (i.e. methodological) command (or requirement). What is here called method, is essentially an option in favour of a certain object (or subject matter), behind which a – for its part historically and sociologically to be investigated – normative-world-theoretical option stands. We ought not expect that this use of the notion of method for the purpose (or goal) of declaring one's own options as generally binding, will stop in the future, unless one's own options are legitimised directly by ontologies, not indirectly by methodologies. One gains two things, after all, by means of this insight into the character and use of the notion of method. One spares oneself the mistake of expecting great historical and sociological achievements from the application of the "right method", and of putting in second place the personal talent and education (culture or cultivation) of the researcher; and one keeps firmly in mind that the impossibility of a lone binding method constitutes the reverse side of the impossibility of putting forward (or setting up) a fixed (steady or stable) hierarchy of the causal factors having an effect in history and society.

C. The instructive errors of methodological individualism

a. Methodological individualism as militant liberalism

Methodological individualism's – of course meant as reproach – ascertainment that holistic and organicistic perceptions of society were accompanied by anti-liberal political positions, cannot, by and large, be disputed. As a retrospective account of the history of ideas shows, such perceptions of society were formed (or developed) after the French Revolution as a theoretical answer to the from then on consciously socially practised liberal individualism; holistic and organicistic ideas of Aristotelian-scholastic origin inspired Catholic social teaching (or doctrine) too. Yet the radicality of the new profane holism and organicism differed markedly from the moderateness of its precursors: Europe's world of nobles gathered itself together now for the final battle. The emphatic and at the same time typical elaboration of the holistic teachings (or theory) in respect of society in Adam Müller was also most consequential with regard to our question formulation, because Müller, who wanted to strike the liberal foe in the liberal foe's own field, that of political economy, applied his general theory of society to the analysis of fundamental phenomena of the economy[107]; Roscher, an intellectual(-spiritual) scion of the historical school of law (or justice), despite reservations in regard to individual matters (or details), praised Müller's merit (or contribution) as a social theoretician[108] – and precisely in his polemics against the historical school of (national) economics (or political economy), Menger, during the renowned "quarrel over methods", formulated methodological individualism as a theoretical

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[107] See, above all, his *Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes*.
[108] *System*, I, § 12 footnote 2, cf. § 28 footnote 1.

programme. The "atomistic" point of view, opined the economist, should henceforth constitute the "exact direction of (or trend in) research" in the social sciences, and contrary to organicistic notions, follow the model of natural (i.e. physical) science, which through the dissolution of bodies into their ultimate constituent elements (or parts), explains these constituent elements' origin[109].

Menger did not find it necessary to enter any fundamental ethical or political quarrel with the representatives of the historical school of (national) economics (or political economy). For him, the individualistic consideration of social and economic phenomena was essentially a methodological principle and a methodical (i.e. methodological) necessity. Schumpeter emphasised a little later particularly vividly this difference between methodology, and, politics or ethics. From methodological individualism, Schumpeter insisted, no conclusions in favour of political individualism can be drawn. That is why a socialist can be guided just like a liberal by the individualistic method; here the only yardstick is whether this starting point is, in a scientific respect, purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient), and leads far enough. Schumpeter saw a substantial disadvantage of classical (national) economics (or political economy) vis-à-vis the newer economics precisely in that the former mixed both meanings of individualism with each other, and was consequently transformed into an apologia for liberalism. Schumpeter reproached classical (national) economics with something else: the illusionary hope "of being able to apprehend the mechanism (or machinery) of social life from the standpoint of the economy", out of which anti-liberal historical materialism then came into being too. Classical (national) economics (or political economy) and

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[109] *Untersuchungen*, p. 153ff..

sociology should and must in fact differ in the evaluation of the economic. However Schumpeter also draws a methodical (i.e. methodological) dividing line of great significance between (national) economics (or political economy) in general (that is, classical as well as the newer economics) and sociology. Methodological individualism can, in his opinion, meet with (or enjoy) fertile application only in the pure theory of (national) economics (or political economy) – "in organisation theory e.g. and generally in sociology, one would probably (or surely) not go far with individualism"[110]. Max Weber, on this point, did not share Schumpeter's sharp outlook (or perspicacity). Weber indeed heeded the Austrian (national) economist's distinction between methodological and political individualism, or between the "individualistic method" and "individualistic rating (i.e. evaluation)"[111], nonetheless Weber took, without accounting for it, the uniform application of the individualistic point of view to sociology and (national) economics, to be self-evident.

The influential revivers and heralds (or preachers) of methodological individualism after the Second World War did not hear not merely Schumpeter's forceful words, but did not once exercise Weber's minimal caution. The Cold War promptly spread, in all its acuteness, to the sphere of ideological confrontation, and one found little time, and felt still less desire, for fine distinctions. The endeavour, from the liberal-Western point of view, at lumping threatening communism with the just defeated fascism or national socialism together as regards holism, lent the gospel of methodological individualism additional ideological élan (i.e. vigour or zest), and saw to methodological individualism's gospel's rapid dissemination. Hayek and Popper attained their fame as evangelists of the

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[110] *Wesen*, pp. 90ff., 51, 95.
[111] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 9.

pressurised West's liberal values; their factual (i.e. objective) contribution to social science is marginal, and the informed reader will search their writings for major original ideas in vain. Much more productive than Hayek and Popper's own accomplishment is the analysis of their intellectual errors (or flaws in reasoning), which, in view of the strategy applied, were inevitable. Because Hayek and Popper basically reverse only content(s) and signs (i.e. symbolism): they contrast methodological individualism, as the ideational safeguarding of the freedom of the individual, to holism, as the intellectual(-spiritual) father of "totalitarianism". They accept therefore the in principle connection between the methodological and the political-ethical, both for the foe as well as for themselves, and throw overboard this strict distinguishing between methodological and political individualism – without further explanations and with no consideration for the contrary opinion of the true originators of methodological individualism. Their syllogistic reasoning reads: since institutions and the state have to serve the free individual, thus it must be shown that individuals created institutions and the state, and also that social science should take individuals and their acts (or actions) as its starting point. The three propositions contained in that syllogistic reasoning do not interrelate logically, as we shall see, either at all, or only in pairs, and in this case only if they are interpreted narrowly, that is, they are no longer suitable for the purposes (or goals) of founding. All three propositions together – and taken at face value – cause insurmountable difficulties. Hayek and Popper nevertheless assume the said three propositions' interrelation and moreover construct the holistic position combatted by them as the simple reversal of this interrelation: if one starts, during the analysis of social phenomena, not from individuals and their acts (or actions), then one must deny individuals and their acts' role as sole creators of institutions and history,

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and eventually make such individuals and their acts the slaves of institutions, which crop up in the name of history or in the name of any other supra-individual hypostasis. The picture (or image) of holism remains here highly undifferentiated and at the same time selective, i.e. it is cobbled (or knocked) together without consideration for the variety of form and nuances of non-individualistic social theories, and by means of the accumulation of the most different intellectual(-spiritual) materials. It is a pure and for the most part fictive image of the foe, which is supposed to justify the absolute acuteness of the following alternative: either one presses for methodological individualism, or either one is at best a gushing metaphysician, and normally a pioneer in respect of civil war, unfreedom (bondage or servitude) and theocracy[112].

Ambivalences in one's own position, even regarding its political aspect, though, correspond to the foe's image's undifferentiality (i.e. undifferentiated property (quality or nature)). Hayek speaks out in fact not in favour of individualism absolutely, but in favour of "genuine" individualism, which does not want to break from tradition, convention, family etc.[113]. It is a matter here of the familiar theses of the "neoliberalism" connected principally with Röpke's name, which in reality constituted an attempt at a return to classical liberalism while demarcating itself from democratic and "Jacobinical" tendencies. In this thought schema, liberal individualism is approved of unreservedly against "totalitarian" collectivism, as well as against the drastic interventions of the (Western) state in the economy and private property; liberal individualism, however, is peered at very suspiciously as soon as it is

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[112] A particularly coarse and rhetorical version of this argumentative strategy is found in v. Mises, *Human Action*, pp. 41ff., 145ff.. In relation to Hayek's and Popper's lacking readiness for differentiation, cf. the apt (or well-aimed) comments in Mandelbaum, "Laws", p. 213ff..
[113] *Individualismus*, p. 36ff..

transformed into a planning rationalism in alliance with militarism and eudaemonism, and creates a welfare-state mass democracy; such a rationalism, as much as it may be active in the name of the protection and affluence (or prosperity) of the individual, introduces collectivism through the back door[114]. Boundaries (or limits) should be set in regard to the feasibility of the social world due to the individual (i.e. of the social world which results from the individual) – after all, precisely the declared collectivists, e.g. Marxists, assert that they can plan the life of society in toto. However, boundaries (or limits) must, during the application of methodological individualism to social science, correspond to the boundaries (or limits) of the feasibility of the social world due to (i.e. which results from) individuals, and we shall see where Hayek himself wanted to draw such boundaries out of concern for (or anxiety over) the eudaemonistic and utilitarian outgrowths (or excesses) of individualism.

Röpke and Hayek's "neoliberal" thought schema suffered from a fundamental contradiction. It saw economic liberalism positively and rejected its consequences, it defended liberal premises and combatted the mass-democratic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) and meta-development (or further development) of the same liberal premises. However society's atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals), eudaemonistic calculus (i.e. calculation) and the disintegration of traditions and substantial (fundamental or material) bonds into value pluralism, represent the necessary consequences of economic liberalism on a highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) basis[115]. The advent and the dissemination of these consequences in the social life of Western mass democracies during

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[114] See Hayek's critique of "rationalistic Continental liberalism" and of "English utilitarian liberalism", *Verfassung*, esp. pp. 485, 488, 492, 493 footnote 15.
[115] For details with regard to neoliberalism, see Kondylis, *Konservativismus*, esp. p. 32ff..

recent decades manifested themselves ironically also in the fact that eudaemonism and utilitarianism celebrated their entry into the field of methodological individualism itself, and for the most part conquered the said field. This took place in the form of a substitution of the individual's situational rationality by the utilitarian (or utility) maximiser's behaviouristically meant rationality, and therefore as an open turn towards psychologism, notwithstanding psychologism's condemnation by Hayek and Popper who, on this question, remained on Weberian ground. Hayek regarded "understanding" and "meaning (or sense)" as proof of the autonomy of the "intellectual(-spiritual)" against the "intellectual(-spiritual)'s" "physical explanations", and correspondingly made use of "understanding" and "meaning (or sense)" methodologically[116]; Popper beheld, for his part, in the assumption of situational logic, both the path to the avoidance of psychologism as well as the real method of economic analysis[117]. It cannot however be readily appreciated for which logical reasons and reasons pertaining to the history of ideas, the economic analysis of liberal inspiration should exclude every form of psychological reductionism; the economic analysis of liberal inspiration, at any rate, was since early on connected with the psychological construct of homo oeconomicus maximising utility (profit or use), and in this respect, those who exactly in the name of methodological individualism make an effort in relation to an approach between behaviouristic and economistic points of view, may today feel they are in the right[118]. As a result of such efforts, the camp of methodological individualism split into two schools of thought quarreling with each other[119], and the quarrel (or dispute) cannot

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[116] *Missbrauch*, p. 58ff..
[117] *Open Society*, II, p. 97.
[118] See our remarks on Homans, Ch. I, Sec. 5.
[119] In relation to that, Vanberg, *Die zwei Soziologien*. The author stands up for Homans's individualistic and reductionistic-psychological position against Hayek's and Popper's individualistic, but anti-reductionistic theses.

thereby be settled by someone simultaneously declaring agreement with all perceptions. Thus, Coleman wants to decide in favour of methodological individualism not merely as an economist and sociologist, but also because he professes a belief in that ethical tradition which holds man to be a free and responsible (or accountable) being. At the same time Coleman expressly follows Weber, by taking his starting point from the concept of purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) acting (i.e. action). On the other hand however, Coleman does not accept this concept of purposeful (end-oriented or expedient) acting in all its aspects, but the said concept is programmatically confined (or restricted) to that kind of purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) action which aims at utility (profit or use) maximisation[120]. By way of two leaps, Coleman therefore manages the transition from an ethical (solemn) declaration to economistic-behaviouristic praxeology and anthropology. With that – as in Hayek and Popper too – why and how the ethical (solemn) declaration on the part of the observer should interrelate with the striving for utility (profit or use) maximisation on the part of the observed individuals, remains obscure. The in principle use (or roping in) of individualism for a good cause at the level of methodical (i.e. methodological) declarations (or explanations) does not, in other words, in the least vouch for the ethically desired character or even the socially desired results of that action, which is supposed to be illuminated with the help of the principles of methodological individualism. However, not only method and cause, observer and actor, are confused with each other here. The inclination towards the ethicisation of methodological individualism ignores, just like the ethically motivated inclination towards holism and collectivism, the simple truth that from neither of

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[120] *Foundations*, p. 16ff..

both positions must result that which they would like to prove. Because neither can the holistically meant ontological independence and indestructibility of society, or its primacy vis-à-vis the individual, effect the gleichschaltung (i.e. forcing into line or enforced conformity and standardisation) *of all* individuals by means of normative conformity; nor is any autonomy of individuals whatsoever capable of ruining (or destroying) *society* as a primeval (or original) collective, and capable of bringing about another life except for the collective life *in* society.

b. The unintended consequences of action

If one takes methodological individualism's ethical claim entirely seriously, then one must be surprised about the fact that methodological individualism wants to realise its anti-collectivistic programme not merely by means of the analysis of the action and of the mutual (or reciprocal) relations between individuals in certain situations, but at the same time by means of the analysis of the unintended consequences of this action and these relations[121]. Because in the network (or plexus) of unintended consequences, precisely the elements are lost, which are supposed to characterise individual action (i.e. the action of individuals): on the one hand, freedom or responsibility (accountability), on the other hand, end (goal) rationality. No ethics of responsibility (or accountability) has a (continued) existence if the consequences of action cannot be weighed in advance; and end (goal) rationality does not look much better, regardless of whether the already chosen means lead to something other than the desired end (goal), or whether the already attained end (goal) creates side effects in the world which turn its attainment into a Pyrrhic

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[121] Popper, *Open Society*, II, p. 323ff..

victory. What value does freedom have during (or in) action, when the consequences of action go beyond (elude or defy) the freedom and responsibility (accountability) of the individual, when the most personal in action, i.e. intention and meaning (or sense), is condemned to being absorbed by the anonymity of the unintended? The unfreedom (bondage or servitude) and the insignificance (or meaninglessness) of the individual in society and history, which the liberal representatives of methodological individualism did not like in holism and collectivism, are now caused by a factor to which methodological individualism's said liberal representatives themselves attached a great and important effect (impact or influence), i.e. by the heterogony of ends. However one may look at it: methodological individualism's ethical claim and objective soundness could only be made plausible if a necessary linear relation could be established between individual ends (goals) in action and action's social outcome, if the outcome had been moulded (shaped or marked) by the conscious participation of individuals in its formation. A sentence like: "society is an outcome of human action, i.e. of a conscious aiming at the attaining of ends"[122] would have to then be taken at face value, and not be watered down by explanations and addenda which rob it of its specifically individualistic content.

The pointing out of the unintended consequences of action serves, first of all, the methodological individualists as an argument against psychologism. Those consequences bring about the institutional constructs and order in society, which then provide (or constitute) the object (or subject matter) of social science; if there were no consequences, then social science would be superfluous; psychology

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[122] v. Mises, *Human Action*, p. 145.

alone would suffice[123]. But the shifting of the question formulation (or central theme) to the level of objective constructs and of supra-individual orders is not at all necessary for the overcoming of psychologism, i.e. the way of looking at things does not have to relate to something which does not constitute (or represent) a person and as such does not have at its disposal an individual psyche and motivation, so that the said way of looking at things itself is not able to proceed psychologistically. Because the overcoming of psychologism takes place not at the level of the object (subject) observed, but at the level of the observer, who – at any rate, incapable of penetrating the labyrinth of alien (i.e. other) psyches, and with ultimate (i.e. absolute) certainty, of working out (or deciphering) motivations – from the beginning ideal-typically constructs ends (goals) and the course of action (even of individual action), and measures (or judges) them against objective standards (e.g. end (goal) rationality). Weber, who by no means wanted to wait for the transition of sociological research to the "averages" of collective action, followed this path, in order to consider that psychologism had been overcome; the reconstruction of "situational logic" was enough for him. Also, from the reverse perspective, it is shown how deficiently the rejection of psychologism can be founded by the pointing out of the unintended consequences of action. The notion of these consequences can predominate, namely, in historical or sociological thinking, also when with regard to individual action, first and foremost the effect of psychological factors is underlined. The material on which Reason or the Idea in History works in order to create one's own works (deeds or products) via the mechanism of the heterogony of ends, is of a psychichal kind (or nature); Hegel e.g. opines that the said material is "drives (or

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[123] Hayek, *Missbrauch*, p. 50; Popper, *Poverty*, p. 158.

urges), passions, inclinations, needs". The interpretation of action is here of course also not limited to (or exhausted in) the psychological; however, Hegel is not able to leave psychologism behind by ideal-typically preparing courses (or sequences) of acting (i.e. action) and searching for situation-bound ends (goals) rather than questioning motives, but by searching in acting (i.e. action) for that which goes beyond the personal intentions and the horizon of the person acting; only in this sense does he refuse to approve of that "psychological way of looking at things", which would like to see in the acts (or actions) of great men merely the expression of petty personal mania[124]. He, that is, leaves aside psychology only at the level of the unintended consequences of action which have already occurred; he accepts psychology, however, precisely in the area which methodological individualism claims par excellence for itself, i.e. in the area of individual action. From both aforementioned perspectives it is therefore clear that the rejection of psychologism and the acceptance of the unintended consequences of action are not in any way necessarily interrelated with each other. And we already know that that rejection does not necessarily follow even from the principle of methodological individualism itself.

The deeper reason for the recourse of the methodological individualists to the unintended consequences of action lies, however, not in the theoretical attempt at demarcation against psychologism. The recourse is politically and ideologically motivated, i.e. it is supposed to serve a "neoliberal" matter of concern, and it accordingly has two distinct, but coordinated polemical points. One point repudiates the endeavour at revolutionary Reason voluntaristically reshaping the social world. Hayek says it straight-out: the assumption that institutions would come into

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[124] *Phil. d. Geschichte*, pp. 65ff., 77.

being (or be created) and function as unintended consequences of action, i.e. "without a planning and guiding intellect(-spirit)", "is directed against rationalistic pseudo-individualism, which in practice also leads to collectivism"; from the "theories of conscious construction" the conclusion would "necessarily" ensue that social becoming should be "under the control of individual reason", which leads "straight to socialism"[125]. This angst (or fear) before the voluntarism of revolutionary Reason does not even stop in view of the logical coherence of methodological individualism. The fundamental principle that the supra-individual constructs (institutions, states, nations) – and indeed "always"! – come about through individuals' decisions and acts (or actions)[126], is not allowed to thus apply to society as a whole; society exists before all individuals[127]; contract theory constitutes, therefore, a further monstrous invention (or product) of "bad" individualism, which wants to deduce all things and everything from the wanting (or volition) of individual reason[128]. Here obviously a serious concession to holism is being made, yet the rage against the inimical position remains so strong that it suppresses reflection on the logical coherence of one's own position[129]. The same inner contradictoriness (or inconsistency) becomes apparent when Popper puts forward the unintended consequences of action in order to refute the "conspiracy theory of society", which makes society's fate dependent on the intentions and the whims (or moods) of powerful individuals and groups. It does not, in the process, occur to Popper that such a theory is compatible with the individualistic point of view rather

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[125] *Individualismus*, pp. 16, 21; cf. *Missbrauch*, pp. 116, 120ff..
[126] Popper, *Open Society*, II, p. 98, cf. p. 324.
[127] Loc. cit., p. 92ff..
[128] Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 21.
[129] Already the fact that Hayek calls at times Burke, at other times Locke, sometimes Mandeville, as a witness for his case reveals the motley heterogeneity of his thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe). The fighter of "Jacobinism" had to, of course, be close to the positions of Burke and contract theory's opponents; the economic liberal, on the other hand, forms an alliance with Locke and Mandeville – of *whose* contract theory, however, he does not take notice.

than with a belief in historical forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities); he simply declares that from the "conspiracy theory of society", "historicism" came into being – which certainly does not prevent him in another place from praising a protagonist of this same "historicism", namely Marx, for the fact that Marx had not looked at history and society from the point of view of "conspiracy theory"[130].

The other polemical point in respect of the acceptance of the unintended consequences of action in the context of methodological individualism turns against economic liberalism's opponents, or the proponents of state intervention(s) in the economy and society. The consideration here is as follows: society is shaped through the free play of innumerable forces and through the effect of the unintended consequences of action, hence it is beyond voluntaristic guidance; on the other hand, the state is the conscious product of human reason and represents only a small part of society's overall forces, that is why the state's task (mission or duty) cannot lie in directing society as a whole at will (i.e. as it likes)[131]. The effect of the unintended consequences of action, that is, the invisible hand, lets a "spontaneous order" arise and makes interventions superfluous[132]. But if society and the state are contrasted with each other in *this* way, then the general and frequently presented thesis can no longer apply that *all* social institutions would come into being (or are created) as the unintended consequences of action of individuals. If the state came into being just like all other institutions too, then it remains a puzzle how the state can be transformed from a product of the unintended into an instrument of (evil) intent. Nevertheless, when the state does that, one

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[130] *Open Society*, II, p. 94ff.; *Conjectures*, p. 125, footnote. In this context one should refer to an analysis of Elster's, who shows very vividly to what extent Foucault's and Bourdieu's historiography stands under the influence of "conspiracy theory" (*Sour Grapes*, p. 101ff.).
[131] Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 35.
[132] Hayek, *Law*, I, p. 5ff.; III, p. 154ff..

must conclude from these empirical facts of the matter that the independence of individual intentions indeed often belongs to the everyday life, but not to the essence (or nature), of institutions. The same question is posed with regard to the relationship between individual action and the unintended consequences of action in general: if individual acts (or actions) are, anyway, destined, in relation to that, to be absorbed by a network of unintended consequences, how can some acts (or actions) become autonomous vis-à-vis this network to such an extent and with such success that they can in fact voluntaristically squeeze (or force) society into the corset of collectivism? Is it not sensible (reasonable or legitimate) in view of this to deduce collectivism not from "holism", but rather from the hard individualistic core of methodological individualism itself, or to drop (i.e. abandon) the obligatory pairing of this core with the unintended consequences of action?

It is evident that the methodological individualists in principle connect the unintended consequences of action with agreeable (or beneficial) consequences, i.e. with the formation of "beneficial (or useful)" institutions, and generally with "something higher" than that "which an individual mind (or intellect) could plan or foresee"[133]. The historically frequently attested case in which the heterogony of ends brings forth not unintended and agreeable (i.e. acceptable) or beneficial (i.e. useful), but unwanted (or unintentional), and at the same time fateful (disastrous or fatal), consequences for individuals and entire collectives, is hardly made the object (or subject matter) of social-theoretical reflection. This central hole (gap or flaw) is by-passed by means of a functionalistic interpretation of the invisible hand's mechanism and works (or workings), which from the beginning plays down the eventuality of bad

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[133] Hayek, *Missbrauch*, p. 116; *Individualismus*, p. 21.

(i.e. unpleasant) surprises. Thus, a "group selection" takes place within the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution [of the 1960s and 1970s] and institutions are imposed "*because* the groups who practised them were more successful"[134]. There is a double conceptual sleight of hand here. On the one hand, the unintended consequences of action (collectively having an effect) are connected (or combined) with a function, and indeed a successful function, although, as we have said, this connection (or combination) is not at all necessary; on the other hand, there is an abrupt transition from the level of individual action and utility (profit, benefit or use) to that of collective action. Should methodological individualism apply in principle, then it must be accepted (or assumed) that collectively beneficial (or useful) institutions commence in the action of individuals. This however, as is known, does not always necessarily benefit (or is of use to) the collective, that is, the special conditions on each and every respective occasion must be ascertained under which individual action leads to socially beneficial (or useful) institutions; the invisible hand's effect of course in general inserts individual action into collective action, but it cannot in the least vouch for the agreeable (or beneficial) consequences of this insertion – only a teleological functionalism can (on paper) vouch for that. The quick, albeit tacit (or silent) abandonment of the individualistic starting point in favour of teleology, as well as the just as quick and tacit (or silent) transition from individual action and utility (profit, benefit or use) to collective action and benefit, let incidentally, another important aspect go by the board. It is not explained what utility (profit, benefit or use) the individual, in relation to that, has when he equates his own utility (profit, benefit or use) with the utility (profit, benefit or use) of the collective. The

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[134] Hayek, *Law*, III, p. 202; I, p. 18 (my italicisation).

individualistic standpoint requires in fact that the usefulness (or utility) of institutions be made evident not abstractly for society as such (exactly this would be "holism" and "collectivism"), but out of consideration for individual humans. But what happens if these individuals e.g. decide in favour of (or choose) the role of the "free rider"?[135]

These intellectual holes and logical weaknesses are accompanied partly by a lack of differentiations in respect of the matter at hand, partly by ambivalent or inadequate perceptions (or representations) of the developmental mechanism of unintended consequences. A consideration, which wants to think of institutions and the unintended consequences of action jointly, would have to first of all concede that in very many cases institutions were founded by concrete actors and with regard to the achieving of concrete effects (i.e. results or consequences). Unintended consequences then come into play not in relation to coming into being, but only in relation to (long-term) effects (i.e. results or consequences). It does make a substantial difference, historically and with regard to the theory of acting (i.e. action), whether action misses its original aims (objectives, targets or goals) and instead attains its other aims, or whether precisely the attainment of the set aims sets in motion the mechanism of the heterogony of ends. And no less important is the distinction between the unintended, and, the unforeseen or unforeseeable, consequences of action. Because such consequences can be both something which one indeed did not intend, but already knew as a phenomenon beforehand, as well as something which one neither intended nor knew. The latter case should actually make up the hard core (or solid basis) of a comprehensive theory on the heterogony of ends. However, our methodological individualists hardly seem to be in a position to provide examples of the

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[135] See Vanberg's comments, "Spontaneous Market Order", esp. pp. 82ff., 88.

unintended coming into being of the until then unpresented (or unimagined) or unpresentable (or unimaginable), although *every* institution would have to represent (or constitute) such an example if it were indeed the unintended product of individual acts (or actions) *as* individual acts (or actions): because no individual can imagine what consequences his action will bring forth at the level of the collective. When the methodological individualists are about to explain the heterogony of ends' mechanism – and this happens only now and then and in passing –, they do not reveal a consciousness of this heterogony of ends' complexity. Menger, who contrary to organicistic interpretations of institutional constructs as "[the] result of social-teleological causings" saw social institutions as "the unintended resultant of countless endeavours pursuing individual interests"[136], wanted, from this point of view, to illuminate the coming into being of money and the state[137]. His historical data and presumptions (or conjectures) are not of interest here. But an attentive (i.e. careful) reading shows that Menger, at all points at which he retraces or reconstructs acts (or actions) which were supposed to have led to the state or to money, points to the intentions and endeavours, in this connection, of the actors concerned, who under the pressure of certain needs *wanted* to create something like the state and money; the said actors did not therefore search for something completely different, and their each and every respective search did not also have different or even opposing aims, so that one might describe with good reason the objective result of the many and scattered individual efforts as a "resultant". The element of the *un*intended consequently falls by the wayside. Hayek's account of the same mechanism, in respect of the process in which a path comes into being, leaves a similar impression. An

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[136] *Untersuchungen*, p. 182.
[137] Loc. cit., p. 172ff..

individual finds easier access to a (place of) destination, and other individuals follow his tracks, because they can fathom his behaviour in this situation[138]. The coming into being of the path, nevertheless, may be characterised an unintended consequence of acts (i.e. actions) if one, thereby, meant that no individual wanted (since he could not anyway), by means of his one-off walking through an area, to create a path. However another point of view is decisive here. The path came into being from the accumulation of end(goal)-rational (or purposeful-rational) act(ion)s, which all had one single aim: to cover the same distance (i.e. go down the same route). The actors possibly were not known amongst themselves (i.e. they did not know one another), but this is of secondary importance: the commonality of intention was given (i.e. assumed (as a premise)). But the great question remains what may socially come into being when intentions hardly or only occasionally and partially agree with one another.

The piquant (i.e. appealingly provocative or savoury) point lies now in the fact that Hayek and Popper quite unsuspectingly pass by an important fact in the history of ideas: I mean the pre-eminent status (or value) of the theory on the unintended consequences of action precisely within the thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) of the "historicism" so passionately combatted by Hayek and Popper. Not only incompetence pertaining to the history of ideas, but also a political-ideological reason, bear responsibility for this transgression. "Historicism" meant for them – depending on the polemical need of the moment – at times collectivistic or holistic "fatalism", at other times the hubris of individual reason which wants to shape everything in accordance with its arbitrariness (or capriciousness), and hence cannot

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[138] *Missbrauch*, p. 51ff..

feel any respect for impersonal and anonymous social processes[139]. The unintended consequences of action were asserted against this latter meaning of "historicism"; if, on the other hand, rational social engineering is supported against "historicistic" fatalism, then "historicism" is blamed for the theory of the heterogony of ends[140]. Nevertheless, it can be effortlessly proved that this theory in the thought of our methodological individualists on the whole fulfils the same functions as in the "historicistic" philosophers of history or "holistic" sociologists. First of all, it neutralises the anthropological question, i.e. it makes the desired outcome of becoming independent of whether man is "good" or "evil". It was hinted at above how Hegel imagines the channeling of ethically reprehensible motives by way of the cunning of Reason and in accordance with the eschatology of History. Hayek of course does not want to know anything of Hegel's eschatology of History, however the invisible hand is summoned by Hayek, amongst other things, with the aim of playing the effects (or consequences) of human self-seekingness (i.e. selfishness or egotism) or malice against one another, and consequently of guiding (or driving) the said effects in a socially constructive direction lying beyond anthropological factors[141]. Besides, the other great commonality between methodological individualism and the philosophy of history consists in the fact that both sides want to take in (note or understand) the unintended consequences of action in principle only from the point of view of agreeable (or beneficial) effects (or consequences)[142]. Certainly, Mandeville and Adam Smith had done precisely the same, and this encouraged perhaps the methodological

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[139] Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 18; *Missbrauch*, p. 104ff..

[140] Popper, *Poverty*, pp. 47, 49.

[141] *Individualismus*, p. 22ff.

[142] In relation to the concept of the heterogony of ends in the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment from Vico to Herder via Turgot see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, pp. 433ff., 441ff., 462ff., 467ff., 631.

individualists to accept that they had adopted the concept [of the agreeable or beneficial effects of the unintended consequences of action] from the political economy, and not for instance from the philosophy of history. However, this philosophy of history had developed the said concept earlier, (and if one takes into consideration its theological prehistory, in fact much earlier[143]), and moreover, the philosophy of history did not in principle dispute the point in regard to which the methodological individualists believed they necessarily saw the great difference of their perception compared to the "historicistic" perception: that humans themselves, guided by their own individual motives or interests and by their individual faculty (or power) of judgement, make their own history[144]. The same full recognition of individuals as ultimate really acting units (unities or entities), in relation to a simultaneous concentration of theoretical interest on the objectified unintended consequences of action, is found in a sociology which, from the perspective of methodological individualism, might be regarded as "holistic". Durkheim has no difficulty in explaining that society consists of individuals and only of individuals – and what is no longer individual, what, therefore, is social in the specific sense [of being social], results

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[143] Löwith, *Weltgeschichte*, p. 97ff.. and passim.

[144] Vico described a few examples as to how restricted (or limited) individual settings of an aim (or a goal) (i.e. ends, objectives or purposes) (fini ristretti) are transformed into means for the attainment of more extensive (or comprehensive) aims (mezzi per servire a fini piu ampi); he adds that this process should not be interpreted as blind external fate, because humans do what they do with understanding (or intelligence) and through choice (con intelligenzia und con elezione), see *Principi di Scienza Nuova* (Conchiusione), *Opere Fil*., p. 700ff.. Marx says in his altercation with Proudhon: «M. Proudhon l'économiste a très bien compris que les hommes font le drap, la toile, les étoffes de soie, dans les rapports déterminés de production. Mais ce qú'il n'a pas compris, c'est que ces rapports sociaux déterminés sont aussi bien produits par les hommes que la toile, le lin etc.» ["Mr. Proudhon the economist has understood very well that men make the sheet, the cloth, silk fabrics, in the fixed (determined or specific) relations of production. But what he has not understood is that these fixed (determined or specific) social relations are produced as well by men as are cloth, linen etc." (*Misère*, part 2, ch. 1, observation 2, p. 414; Germ. trans. *MEW*, vol. 4, p. 130). And Engels writes on 21/22. 9. 1890 to J. Bloch: "we make our history ourselves, but first under very determined prerequisites (or preconditions) and conditions... Secondly, however, history is made thus, that the end result always comes from the conflict of many individual wills... every individual will contributes to the resultant and is, in this respect, included in the resultant" (*MEW*, vol. 39).

exactly from the crossing (or intersection) of innumerable individual activities with one another[145]. Similarly to the methodological individualists, Durkheim puts the agreeable (or beneficial) effects (or consequences) of collective action at the centre of attention by observing the heterogony of ends quite one-sidedly during the formation (or development) of functionally indispensable institutions, but not during the production of anomic phenomena or catastrophes.

This much should have become clear so far: the acceptance of the unintended consequences of action is compatible (or consistent) with the principle of methodological individualism only with difficulty, even though the said acceptance of the unintended consequences of action went hand in hand with this principle in the thought schema of the classical representatives of methodological individualism. Under the subliminal pressure of logical inconsistency, that acceptance fell, in the later versions of methodological individualism, partly into disuse; partly it was openly dropped. The aforementioned entry of behaviourism and of economism into the field of the original theory was expressed, amongst other things, in the abandonment of sociological models of acting (i.e. action) in favour of behavioural models of the economy; intentions and ends (goals) of action were replaced by utility (profit, benefit or use) and cost, and the "new" national economy and the individual maximising utility (profit or use) took the place of classical political economy and the invisible hand[146]. Adherents of "rational choice theory" radicalised, for their part, methodological individualism so much that they could believe

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[145] *Règles*, XVI («la société ne contient rien en dehors des individus» ["society does not contain anything apart from individuals"]).

[146] Typical of this tendency: Wippler, „Nicht-intendierte soziale Folgen", esp. pp. 175, 177. But also irrespective of economistic propensities, the manner is instructive (or informative) as to how an avowed Popperian like Agassi, against his teacher, wants to lessen the significance of the unintended consequences of action for the coming into being of institutions („Method. Individualism", p. 261).

that they no longer needed the ultimate safeguarding of the individual's rational choice by the invisible hand; as a result, rational choice can approach a voluntarism, which contrary to Hayek's premises and wishes, sometimes leads to the demand that a stronger state should now take on the functions of the invisible hand[147]. Finally, the investigations (or studies) into the logic of collective action and the "prisoner's dilemma" brought to light the inner tensions in the concept of the unintended consequences of action, as well as the unpleasant dark reverse side of the agreeable (or beneficial) invisible hand, i.e. that self-interested individual rationality which at times breaks free from collective efforts, at other times, opposes them[148]. In view of this, social theory cannot assign to the unintended consequences of action partly teleological-functional, partly ethically-normatively conceived tasks (or duties). This concept (or conceptual plan) can indeed find good theoretical use, but not that which methodological individualists dreamed up.

c. The social-theoretical consequences of the unintended consequences of action

Let it be repeated: in regard to the explanation of the mechanism of the unintended consequences of action, the methodological individualists made a double mistake, i.e. they expected from this mechanism in principle only agreeable effects (or beneficial consequences), and overlooked the logical conflict between its existence and the individualistic starting point of their social theory. Durkheim thought just

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[147] Thus, e.g. Hechter, "Polanyi's Social Theory", p. 182ff.. The decisive line of thought in the liberal-economistic camp is able of course to carry on being inspired by Hayek's vision of a "spontaneous order", and draws up theories on the minimal state as an "efficient institution that allows agents to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes by assuring them of the sanctity of their property" (thus, e.g. Schotter, *Economic Theory*, esp. ch. 2, the quotation here in this footnote: p. 51).
[148] Hardin, *Collective Action*, pp. 6ff., 25ff.. Cf. footnote 135 above.

as one-sidedly in relation to the first point [i.e. the agreeable effects],
however it was clear to him that the ascertainment of the coming into
being of supra-individual constructs through the crossing (or intersection)
of innumerable individual acts (or actions) with one another, had to find
expression in the concept of the social fact, and in a non-individualistic
founding of sociology. The one-sidedness of the expectations with regard
to the character of those constructs lent of course Durkheim's perception
of the heterogony of ends a garish static-institutional, functional and
unhistorical colour. On the other hand, the detachment of the heterogony
of ends from ethical-normative desiderata, with which the heterogony of
ends was interwoven already inside the philosophy of history, must
considerably expand and dynamicise the concept of the social fact, that is,
comprehensively *historicise* it, so that it points to not only more or less
fixed (steady or stable) objective constructs, but likewise to more or less
fluid or even dangerous historical situations. Yet the fundamental insight
keeps on persisting irrespective of that. The – incidentally acknowledged
as a fact by all sides – heterogony of ends, would not be possible if there
were no specifically social facts, that is, if society were nothing other than
the merely quantitatively conceived sum of individuals and their acts (or
actions) thought of (meant, intended, or imagined) as separate units
(unities or entities)[v]. Here the social-theoretical consequences of the
unintended consequences of action begin. And the way of looking at
social processes from this standpoint can, just as well as any other
consideration of social processes, invoke everyday and generally human
(or panhuman) experiences. The methodological individualist can
certainly refer to the undisputed existing consciousness of every actor that
the said actor finds himself in a situation and must adapt himself
end(goal)-rationally (or purposefully-rationally) in relation to that
situation. However, does not this same actor very often have that certain

or vague feeling that his act(ion)s are diverted or thwarted by alien (i.e. other) acts; that for not nearly explainable reasons, that is, for reasons beyond those referable to separate individuals, boundaries (or limits) are set to his ends (goals) and consequently to his end (goal) rationality as well?

As is known, the thesis that society is something other than the quantitatively comprehended sum of its constituent elements (or parts) often runs into the objection that, as a result, hypostatisations would be undertaken and metaphysical entities would be put in the world. Our aim is not, in any case, to support such undertakings, should the said hypostatisations and metaphysical entities have ever been supposed to exist in this form, but on the contrary to show that one – contrary to the downright extortionate dilemmas of the methodological individualists – does not have to approve of these undertakings at all in order to be able to reject the (fundamental) individualistic principle. The individualistic critique of holism is based, as remarked above, on a confused image (or picture) of the foe; however in addition, the individualistic critique of holism lets itself be guided by certain implicit notions which are behind the rejection of the "holistic" axiom that the whole is something more than its parts, or that society, sociologically understood, is not completely absorbed by (taken up with or exhausted in) the mere sum of the individuals comprising it (composing or putting it together). The a) static, b) quantitative and c) sensualistic (i.e. in terms of philosophical sensualism) character of these notions results in a naive social ontology incompatible with sociological and historical research practice, and this character becomes most apparent if we turn the tables, and ask under what conditions does the whole indeed represent (or constitute) not more than its parts. In a strict sense, this can e.g. be the case when it is a matter

of a pure res extensa, a matter of a geometric figure, which can be cut up (or dissected) into equal parts and be put together anew into its original form (or shape) by any combination of these parts. The relationship between the parts bearing (or supporting) the whole here remains unchangeable (or unchanging) and static, because the parts themselves are unchangeable and static. But precisely the specific qualities (i.e. characteristics) of those parts which the methodological individualists regard as the irreducible parts of society, represent (or constitute) the precise opposite of what is static-unchangeable (or unchanging). The giving of meanings (or significations) and the ends (or goal) set, the assessment of the situation and interpersonal relations, in short everything which is supposed to distinguish actors' essence (or nature) and doing (i.e. acts) in the context of methodological individualism, find themselves in a state of constant change, or can at least change at any moment. This process (or series of events) takes place again in time; the effect of the time factor therefore constitutes in itself the reason why the whole, put forward (or imagined) as a stable sum, may not be equated with the totality of its changeable (or changing) parts. Put differently: at a hypothetical moment, in which time would freeze, the whole would also exist as the simple sum of its parts, yet an essential feature of society consists exactly in that society never freezes at that moment. The dynamic behaviour of the parts constantly circumvents the additive (i.e. cumulative) relationship between the parts and the whole; such dynamic behaviour of the parts drives [the parts, things, the situation] towards forever new combinations and new creations, which first of all are contained in the whole as internal possibilities of mobile parts, and already because of that go beyond the mobile parts' additively (i.e. cumulatively) comprehensible reality. Formulated as a paradox: precisely

the constant change in (or changing of) the parts, and the production (or creation) of new parts, make the whole something more than its parts[149].

If now this "more" arises from the dynamic behaviour of the parts in time, then it cannot be thought of as a detachable (severable or separable) quantitative addition, which constitutes a necessary supplement to the rest of the parts, for the purpose of the completion of a visible and tangible whole, which is given in the absolute synchrony of its parts. Yet the individualistic critics of "holism" suppose precisely this when they in actual fact reproach (or accuse) this "holism" that it basically comprehends society in such a way that, even after the removal of all individuals or of all parts, something from society or from the whole would have to be left over[150]. Whoever raises such an accusation (or makes such a reproach), can obviously himself only quantitatively imagine ontic magnitudes. Perhaps an intellectus archetypus would be in a position to at once have a view of (or take in) the internal and external movements of the parts in diachrony, and apprehend in quantitative relations that which appears to our finite intellectual capacity (or ability at thought) as the qualitative surplus of the whole vis-à-vis the sum of its parts. This matter becomes understandable to us only if we qualitatively distinguish between various ontological levels, and do not interpret the material identity of the ontological levels as their ontological identity. Naturally, society materially consists of a sum of individuals and of nothing else, but the equality of the material extent (or scope) of both

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[149] Lewin prefers the formulation that the whole is different to the sum of its parts (*Field Theory*, p. 146). The improvement is apt (or well-aimed) in so far as it brings the qualitative aspect of the relation between the whole and the parts, contrary to the quantitatively meant individualistic objections (see next paragraph), to the fore.

[150] Thus Sander argues ex negativo e.g., when he counters "holism" by saying that "between a collective entity and its members, a relationship does not exist at all, because exactly the collective entity is not a new member next to many members, but merely all the many members, and every taking away and contrariety (or contrasting) of one member destroys the original collective entity" („Spanns 'Überwindung'", p. 65). This can only be true in a quantitative sense. If it held water qualitatively, then after an individual's death or birth, society as a whole would be reshaped (or formed anew).

these levels [i.e. the level of society, and, the level of individuals] with each other, does not in the least permit us to readily reduce the former [i.e. society] to the latter [i.e. the sum of individuals] – just as little as the material identity of mental acts with certain physical processes proves the reducibility of logic or psychology to physics[151][vi]. In order to be able to apprehend the qualitative difference in the material-quantitative identity, we must certainly free ourselves from the metaphysical belief that there is *one* being (Is) and its strata are homogenous. Yet thinkers, who otherwise disapprove of metaphysical monism, especially of the materialistic kind, piquantly turn into social-theoretical monists, in order to be able to defend their ethically-normatively meant individualism. And with this atomistic monism, which does not tolerate any independent ontology of the social next to it, the demand for an absolutely sensualistic (i.e. in terms of philosophical sensualism) way of knowledge (or cognitive approach), which wants to exclude from the concept of social being (Is) everything which is not visible and tangible, is connected.

Indeed: methodological individualism's programme that the being (Is) of society is to be totally apprehended by a complete as possible inventorying (or itemisation) of all observable individual act(ion)s, calls to mind the never fulfilled ambition of the neo-positivists to build on empirically safeguarded protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence) verified by experience), a world image without gaps. And as "metaphysical" abstractions were supposed to foremost fall victim to this ambition, so now the implementation of the individualistic programme is supposed to, not least of all, eliminate the concept of the social fact, in which the ontological autonomy of the social is indeed condensed par excellence. With that, this concept of the social fact

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[151] Mellor, "Reduction", pp. 54, 53.

actually comes into being from the consistent further thinking about the rejection of psychologism, which is well-known to methodological individualists too. But with one important difference. At the level of the individual actor, the leaving aside of psychical factors is not carried out by the actor himself, but by the scientific observer, who can only speculate about motivations, and in these motivations' vagueness and sterility (fruitlessness or infertility) prefers the ideal-typical reconstruction of the ends (or goal) set and end(goal)-rational (or purposeful-rational) act(ion)s. At the level of the social fact, on the other hand, the actor himself knows, or is able to know, that he is confronted with something which prompts or forces him to set boundaries (or limits) in regard to his wishes, that is, to objectify his behaviour, as it were, while leaving aside his own motivation. As is well known, he does not always succeed in this, or only partially succeeds; however, the process interests us here not from this, the inner (or internal) psychological angle (or standpoint) of subjective effort or weakness, but in accordance with its outer (or external) aspect, which refers to the confrontation with the social fact as such, irrespective of the confrontation's outcome. For the outcome, the social fact is not as such unconditionally decisive, and just as little can the social fact make personal temperaments and reactions understandable. Besides, the social fact by no means takes up (or lays claim to) the entire psyche, and one could even say that the actor's consideration for social facts very often contributes to the deepening of the chasm between the public and the private aspects of his experiencing (i.e. perception or feelings) and behaviour, in relation to which these aspects constantly interact and fight (or struggle) for precedence. Those are general human (or panhuman) experiences, which stretch from the heroic conflict between duty and inclination (or propensity) to the manoeuvrability of a "free-rider". The sense (or feeling) that one does not

behave as a member of a group or as a bearer of a social role, even at the price of hypocrisy, necessarily in the same manner as a private person (i.e. individual) towards oneself (i.e. in one's own space) (no matter where the boundary between private and public behaviour runs on each and every respective occasion), is as old as society itself, and it implies the actual acknowledgement of the existence of social facts lying beyond individual pleasure (discretion or choice) and individual logic. A consistently applied methodological individualism can hardly account for these age-old general human (or panhuman) experiences. It must interpret these panhuman experiences as splits or conflicts inside of the private [sphere] or between private persons (i.e. individuals), not as processes (or series of events) in the field of tension between private and public. Because it is true that not only the confrontation with social facts, but already an encounter (i.e. meeting) with another individual can prompt or force the restriction of one's own wishes and the differentiation between the inner and outer aspect of behaviour. The same differentiation, however, in respect of social facts, is distinguished by the fact that it takes place out of consideration for supra-individual factors, irrespective of how tightly interwoven these supra-individual factors are with concrete individuals. It is a matter of two entirely different things if one does not attack someone else because one fears that person's physical strength, or because one is thinking of the legally provided for punishment, or of the "scandal" which might ensue.

If we registered in protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence)) the individual behaviour of actors who take part in a social fact, then our records (or notes) should make little sense. That someone enters a building, writes something on a piece of paper, gives this piece of paper to someone who is sitting at a counter, and from him receives in

response one or several pieces of paper, does not mean in itself anything to the proverbial visitor from Mars, and can even provoke this Martian visitor's laughter, unless the said Martian knows what bank, money, saving etc. mean on earth, and the Martian has moreover a rough idea about the overall organisation of the economy and society. Something similar applies with regard to religious worship (or cults), military parades, parliamentary sittings etc.. The question about the meaning of the process (or event) is not answered by knowledge of the subjective meaning which the individual (single or separate) actor connects with his participation in the process (or event) (I do not learn what a bank is if I know that customer Jones withdraws money to buy a bicycle); in addition, a knowledge is required that lies beyond the motivations and ends (or goal) set of all individual (single or separate) actors – including those motivations and ends (or goal) set of the first founder of the first bank in the world. Because also in this case, which a methodological individualist would presumably invoke, no necessary interrelation exists between the actor's motives and ends (goals or purposes) (e.g. his wish for enrichment), and the organisational form which he chose in order to fulfil those motives and ends. The fact that he did not have to necessarily wage a war of plunder in order to acquire riches, but could just as well do banking transactions, is based on historical-structural preconditions; he did not of course himself bring the money economy (and with it a new notion of wealth (or riches)) into the world in order to then be able to found a bank, just as little as someone founds a bank in order to then be allowed to withdraw his money.

Social facts are, in short, at home (or reside in), and come from, an ontological zone which lies outside of actors' individual acts (as well as outside of motivations and ends (or the goal) set) registerable in protocol

statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence)), although the ontological zone in question at any time remains materially identical with these act(ion)s. Inside this zone, individual behaviour can be made understandable only by taking into consideration supra-individual factors, i.e. such supra-individual factors which indeed gain and retain their shape (or form) by means of the activity of individuals, but cannot be arbitrarily and a nihilo created or uncreated (i.e. abolished or extinguished) by any single individual amongst all individuals. This in turn implies that the relations between the actors – always inside this same zone – cannot at all depend, or not primarily or not totally, on the purely subjective sympathies or antipathies of the sides (or parties) concerned. (My friend, who is a teller in a bank and, in a difficult situation, wants to help me, lends me his own money, not the bank's money; and if he does this [i.e. lends me the bank's money] illegally, he knows what consequences the prevailing of his subjective feelings can have for him.) This already mentioned, generally conscious (even though not generally or always respected), and for life in society, constitutive distinction between social and personal, outer (or external) and inner (or internal) behaviour constitutes, together with the necessity of the consideration of supra-individual factors in regard to the explanation of individuals' social behaviour, proof of the fact that statements (or propositions) about social facts cannot be reduced to statements (or propositions) about individuals' action[152]. Such an ascertainment does not in any way entail a hypostatisation of the social, i.e. a search for sources of social facts which lie beyond individuals' action. What is meant is that supra-individual elements must flow into this action because the actor is born in an already, one way or another, organised society, and his social act(ion)s

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[152] Mandelbaum, "Societal facts", esp. pp. 308, 309. Cf. Nisbet, *Social Bond*, pp. 48, 49.

make up positive or negative positionings for the organisation of this society. Recourse to individual action as the ultimate explanatory authority would only be legitimate if society had demonstrably come into being out of the agreement of previously isolated individuals, and would again and again come into being anew. The logical necessity of this conclusion is unintentionally reflected in the thought(s) (or intellectual) games of the methodological individualists of the second and third generation, who more or less oscillate skilfully between fact and fiction (or poetry and truth), and onto their constructs pertaining to contract theory project, via the origin of the state and society, that which would represent the ideal mode of functioning of a society organised according to the normative implications of methodological individualism; the idealised individual, who, inside of this society organised according to the normative implications of methodological individualism, is supposed to act freely, can therefore appear before every society and as society's founder[153]. Hayek and Popper did not want, as we have said, to go so far, and they watered down their methodological individualism by means of the double assumption of society's originality (i.e. initial or primary state) and the unintended consequences of action. However, tertium non datur (i.e. no third [possibility] is given (or there is no third alternative)): either one must take the aforementioned assumptions seriously, i.e. translate them into the language of social facts and finally bid farewell to methodological individualism, or keep consistently to this methodological individualism and bring contract theories into the world, without caring in the slightest about their reference to historical and social realities.

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[153] See e.g. Nozick, *Anarchy*. Cf. already the revaluation of "contractualism" by the Popperian Agassi, "Method. Individualism", p. 264ff..

The whole is thus in this sense something more than its parts, such that it includes (or consists of) not merely individuals as, in any case, the only conceivable actors, but over and above that, social facts. To these social facts belong again, apart from the institutional constructs which function more or less ponderably, the imponderable effects of the heterogony of ends, the (often) unforeseeable (or unpredictable) outcomes of collective action. Accordingly, the whole of society consists of a single material (stuff or substance) (individuals and their acts (or actions)) and of at least two distinct ontological levels. From the sensualistic (i.e. in terms of philosophical sensualism) perspective of methodological individualism, there is of course only this material (or stuff); supra-individual social facts are merely theoretical constructs; only individuals are real and concrete[154]. Thereby, social theory seems to be on solid ground, namely, to be acquiring a directly observable object. A more precise deliberation teaches us, however, a better deliberation (i.e. to know better). Only as a biological being, namely, can an individual be directly observed, while the attempt at deciphering him as a thinking and acting person presents us with enigmas not slighter than the investigation of supra-individual constructs. Both have their external and internal sides, and in respect of both we must orientate ourselves first of all towards the actual behaviour, in order to substantiate conjectures over motivations, should this at all appear to be scientifically meaningful. For the establishment (production or restoration) of a causal relation between an act(ion) and a psychical disposition, our thinking does not proceed categorially (i.e. in terms of categories) essentially differently than in research into external causalities. The more familiar is not eo ipso more understandable. And the supra-individual does not become automatically more familiar and

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[154] Popper, *Poverty*, p. 135ff..

more understandable if we break it down (dissect or dismantle it) into individuals. Wherein does a church differ from an army if about both it can merely be said that they consist of individuals?[155]

Already the logic of delimitation against psychologism hints at the fact that the individual [person or element] as such is not necessarily more understandable and more explainable than the supra-individual [construct]. Were, namely, the individual psychologically (more easily) accessible, then an individualistic way of looking at social phenomena would have to, without further hesitation, start from individual psychology, and be able to make do with the conceptual means of psychology. Yet not even the behaviouristic-reductionistic wing of methodological individualism can achieve this. This behaviouristic-reductionistic wing of methodological individualism also asserts in fact panhuman (or generally human) psychical dispositions in order to explain social life[156], that is, it does not reconstruct social life on the basis of the specifically individual psychology of different and unmistakable (i.e. distinctive) persons. Other methodological individualists declare (or explain) in turn that social phenomena ought to indeed be deduced from dispositions, representations (or notions) and relations of individuals, however in the course of this, the individuals would be permitted to remain "anonymous" and be looked at as bearers of "typical" dispositions, representations (or notions) etc.[157]. Such dispositions,

[155] Ginsberg, *Essays*, p. 63; Warriner, "Groups", pp. 552, 553.

[156] Homans, *Nature*, p. 35ff..

[157] Watkins, "Historical Explanation", p. 106. Watkins wants, though, to supplement this kind of explanation, which he calls "explanation in principle", with an "explanation in detail", which goes into the particular personality structure of actors ("Ideal Types", esp. pp. 34, 35, 42ff.). In the process, he subsumes both types of explanation under the concept of "historical explanation" and consequently blurs the salient point. Historical explanation is, namely, only "explanation in detail", on the other hand, "explanation in principle" is sociological, and it implies the acceptance (or assumption) of social facts. The (fundamental) individualistic principle is therefore only applicable to the former, from which results the fact that methodological individualism has little to offer outside of the boundaries (or limits) of idiographic history. He is able to enter the field of sociology, which interests us here, only illegitimately, i.e. by way of reference to "typical" and "anonymous" dispositions.

however, crop up only at the super-individual level of social facts, which methodological individualism does not want to accept, and, incidentally, they [i.e. "typical" dispositions] differ from dispositions in the actual psychological sense. Because these are in themselves subjective and quite often variable (or changeable); moreover, they can, even if they in themselves remain stable, be channeled very differently in a sociological respect, whereas "typical" or "anonymous" dispositions point to a collective ethos, which can support objective constructs or at least characterise group behaviour; their difference from merely psychological dispositions is already seen in the fact that we encounter them in people who are in no way characterologically similar[158]. Dispositions, which are typical of persons as persons regardless of their affiliation with a sociologically definable group (e.g. "introverted" and "extroverted" [people], melancholy and cheerful [people]), accordingly come under the competence (or domain) of psychology; dispositions in the sociocultural sense have in principle nothing to do with group affiliation (again: in the sociocultural, not the psychological sense), and they are not shaped as the summation of related psychical aptitudes (or predispositions) in multiple individuals, but they exclusively presuppose a certain aspect of behaviour which is precisely at the centre of sociological interest (e.g. the Christian way of thinking (attitude or views), the capitalistic ethos).

Just as, already, recourse to the unintended consequences of action, so too a sudden transition from the individual-psychological to the anonymous and typical sociocultural dispositions, ends up in the admission that methodological individualism's programme cannot be realised, unless one waters it down in such a way that one is not able to spot any

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[158] S. Lukes, "Methodological Individualism", p. 122ff.; L. Goldstein, "Inadequacy" pp. 802, 813; "Two Theses", esp. p. 9.

difference from "holism" any more[159]. Now the methodological individualists do not deduce from the thesis that collective constructs are abstractions and solely individuals are real, merely a certain ontology, but also a methodological demand. The aim of research should be to reduce supra-individual constructs ("theoretical constructs") to ("real") individuals and their acts (or actions). Consequently, a relationship between ontology and method of explanation is postulated, which was neither proven nor can be proven. Because from the ontological thesis that social facts or constructs are the work of individuals and not autonomous hypostases, the methodical (i.e. methodological) necessity or the theoretical possibility of their explanation on the basis of the individualistic principle does not at all follow[160]. The assumption (or acceptance) of such a necessity or possibility already presupposes what the said ontological thesis is supposed to prove, that, namely, there is no ontological inter-level (i.e. intermediate level) and no tertium (i.e. third thing) between collective hypostases and individuals, that is, the said ontological thesis eliminates a limine the ontological level of social facts and reduces social being (Is) to its (sole (unique or own)) material (or stuff), namely to individuals and their act(ion)s. However, it is not a matter here merely of the concept of social being (Is), its extent and its components; likewise, it is a matter of methodical (i.e. methodological) questions. Without doubt, it is methodically (i.e. methodologically) more productive, especially for historical research goals, to smell (i.e. sense) behind collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective), networks of individuals and act(ion)s, not for instance hypostases. This

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[159] Thus, e.g. Danto, by counting for some obscure reasons the ontological assumption (or acceptance) of social facts ("social individuals"), apart from the ontological assumption of individual actors, amongst methodological individualism's conceptual components; *Analytical Philosophy*, p. 267.
[160] Goldstein, "Two Theses", esp. p. 3; Miller, "Methodological Individualism", pp. 402ff., 413; Brodbeck, "Methodological Individualisms", p. 20.

fundamental positioning (or stance), nevertheless, does not automatically put us in a position to define all collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) on the basis (or with the help) of individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual), and indeed already not because the boundaries between both concepts of genus are fluid. For the definition of collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective), individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) are very often not suitable, but other collective concepts are suitable, and the solely, in practice, interesting question is whether our collective concepts are defined clearly enough and are used purposefully. More in the research practice of sociology, but to a great extent also of history, is not sensibly to be required, especially if one considers that not even in the natural (i.e. physical) sciences can the significance of collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) always be conveyed by individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual). At any rate, statements about social phenomena cannot manage without the use of collective concepts, and this necessity at the level of description reflects the social-ontological fact that collective action represents (or constitutes) something more or something other than the mere sum of its individual components[161].

If the ontological autonomy (or independence) of social facts is correctly comprehended and taken seriously, one does not have to be a friend of paradoxicalness in order to be allowed to assert that precisely a hypothetical success of the reduction of all collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) to individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) would make what is supposed to be explained vanish into thin air, and therefore render the aimed at (i.e.

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[161] Nagel, *Structure*, esp. p. 537ff., 542ff..

intended) explanation itself invalid; because only the destruction of society would enable the theoretical isolation of the actor. The endeavour regarding the realisation of the individualistic programme does not spring from the logical necessities of social theory, but from a dogmatics (i.e. dogmatism) whose world-theoretical background has already been discussed. And the absence so far of this realisation of the individualistic programme is not merely due to technical difficulties, which come into being from the complexity of the matter, and which could be remedied with time and the progress of research, as methodological individualists want to make us believe. Rather, the said absence is due to the ontological impossibility, with no consideration for qualitative differences, of forcing the extent (or scope) of the social into the extent (or scope) of the added or multiplied individual [person (or element)], or of converting the quantitative equality of both levels into qualitative identity. Several researchers have convincingly shown that a complete reduction of sociological collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) to individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual) cannot be brought off at all, namely in such a way that the individual concepts exclusively contain terms which strictly refer to individuals and individual dispositions[162]. But no representative of the individualistic other side (i.e. opposition) has hitherto proven the opposite. Instead of proving, before disbelieving eyes, the realisability (or

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[162] See e.g. Gellner, "Explanations in History", esp. p. 161ff.. In other words: the dissolution of the collective into individuals and their act(ion)s is not managed without the use of institutional or sociocultural concepts. Instead of: "The German Reich declared war on France", one can of course write "Wilhelm II declared war on France". However, this declaration of war would have had no practical consequences were Wilhelm not Kaiser, that is, were he not at the head of a correspondingly organised polity. Or the other way around: act(ion)s are often hardly understandable if they are not defined by means of a collective concept (i.e. concept pertaining to the collective). What a capitalist does, I know in general; but without the use of this concept of the capitalist or capitalism, it is not immediately clear to me what it is supposed to mean when Mr. Miller buys a plot of land (property), on which he builds a building and lets in that building machines to be installed, employs workers for the operation of the machines etc. (it should be noted that this description for its part contains a number of collective concepts: plot of land, building, machines, workers, which need individualisation).

feasibility) of the programme by means of sociological and historical examples, one keeps quite non-bindingly to general methodical (i.e. methodological) considerations about the manner of a possible transformation of collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) into individual concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the individual), and moreover one leaves many a way out: the use of collective concepts is legitimate if these described relations between individuals (what, however, could they otherwise describe?); and that transformation is not in fact necessary at all, provided that the collective concept appears to be definable more precisely or better than the individual concepts corresponding to it[163]. Just as through the acceptance (or assumption) of "typical" dispositions or unintended consequences of action, thus methodological individualism loses through such concessions its specific content, it unnecessarily complicates the theoretical (conceptual) instruments, without contributing to the matter something illuminating. Why should we, however, be unhappy as long as the social is not reduced to the individual [person (or element)], when the reduction does not ensure further clarity, and when no-one has accomplished such a reduction so far[164]? Why by the way – if dogmatic reasons do not call for it?

The indispensability of collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective), both in natural (i.e. physical) as well as in social sciences, points to the dubiousness of the attempt to differentiate between both these kinds of science on the basis of the contrasting of resolutive and compositive (methodical) procedure, namely to think that the natural (i.e. physical) sciences would start with complex phenomena (or

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[163] Opp, *Individualistische Sozialwissenschaft*, ch. VI, esp. pp. 127, 145ff..
[164] Foldes, "Note", p. 333ff..

manifestations) of nature and work their way backwards in order to bring to light complex natural phenomena's ultimate constituent elements (or parts), whereas on the other hand, the social sciences would start from elements, i.e. individual views and stances (or positionings), in order to inductively construct entireties[165]. In regard to such a contradistinction, a question of the purposefulness (expediency or usefulness) of research practice, which from case to case is posed differently, is talked up as a methodical (i.e. methodological) question of principle (i.e. fundamental question) with ontological implications. Were it in the nature of the social sciences to be obliged to take animated atoms (i.e. animate or living individuals) as their starting point, then the matter would have taken care of itself long ago, and despite the obstinate arguments (or protests) of the dissenters. But on this side (i.e. in this world or life) of every presumption (or conjecture) about the ultimate elements, stands a social-scientific and panhuman (or generally human) experience of a fact, whose ascertainment does not need any presumptions (or conjectures) or thought experiments: the fact of society. Methodological individualists have to struggle so doggedly for their positions because this fact – of society – at every turn stands in their way, and takes away self-evidence from the (fundamental) individualistic principle. In reality methodological individualists presuppose the fact of society just like their opponents. Because they are nolentes volentes (i.e. whether they like it or not) from the outset aware that the ultimate elements, from which they supposedly start, are the ultimate elements of something, namely, the ultimate elements of a society and of nothing else. Methodological individualists know, therefore, from the beginning, the direction and the end (or conclusion), and accordingly orientate their undertaking when they let

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[165] Thus, Hayek, *Missbrauch*, p. 48ff..

themselves put together the ultimate individual elements of social-scientifically meaningful (or rational) entireties. It is a matter of two very different things, to construct the social whole from individuals with one eye on the already existing society, and, to be left alone with the ultimate elements, without any representation (or notion) of a whole in mind, in order to blindly reach, as it were, the construction of a social whole through the mere automatic mechanism (or effect) of combinations. Most probably, methodological individualism would, in the latter case, outline a picture (or an image) of society which would exhibit only chance (or accidental) similarities to that picture of society familiar to us – otherwise the movement of history and society would be in principle foreseeable, and individualistic polemics against "holism" would no longer have a grip (i.e. be effective or persuasive) precisely on this important point. What, therefore, methodological individualism proclaims as the synthesis of a whole on the basis of ultimate elements turns out to be an analysis with the idea of the whole at the back of its mind. An analysis, which unfolds in constant counterpoint vis-à-vis synthesis and is supposed to unfold constantly in the course of research praxis (i.e. practice), does not constitute, on the other hand, a task which one can or may deal with only in the capacity of the methodological individualist. As we had to note against Durkheim, the concrete composition (texture or constitution) of social facts, as well as the mechanism and outcome (or result) of the heterogony of ends, can only be very inadequately comprehended without going deeply (or without immersion) into actors' subjectively meant meaning (or sense)[166]. One could in social science indeed describe as the ideal explanation that which would simultaneously illuminate (or examine) actors' intentions and the mechanism of the non-realisation of

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[166] See Sec. 2A in this chapter.

these intentions[167]. Two things, nevertheless, should not be lost sight of: that we are actually here dealing with one sole (i.e. one only) material (or stuff), but with two distinct (or varying) research levels *and* that the sequence (or order) of these levels cannot necessarily be reversed. The outcome of collective action becomes more understandable by means of contrast in view of the original (or initial) intentions, but whoever knows only the intentions and the situation at the beginning of the becoming (or events), is hardly capable of prognosticating the outcome on the basis of this knowledge – incidentally, the actors themselves would have been able to do this, and history would then be foreseeable as structure and event. As the retrospective prophet which he is, the historian argues ex post facto, that is, he sees actors' intentions in the light of an actual outcome, which could not be known to the actors themselves. The methodological individualist errs in the belief that as a sociologist he would (be able to) proceed otherwise. He likewise looks at things ex post facto – only this fact is here the social-scientific fact par excellence, namely, the fact of society.

As soon as the question of the use of collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective) is posed, in the methodological individualists' thoughts world (i.e. system of ideas or ideological universe), the not unusual conflict between dogmatic intent and the necessities of research practice breaks out. On the one hand, one must admit that generalisations, precisely for the explanation of individual facts, are unavoidable, that abstraction is inherent in every thought; on the other hand, one would like it if concepts like society, nation or capitalism would completely disappear from social science. The passable (i.e. practicable) middle course is sought in the consideration of entireties as

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[167] Thus, Aron, *Leçons*, p. 324.

fictions, which are, as it were, made up according to variable research goals, and behind which are only individuals[168]. Weber, to whom this concept (or conceptual plan) is attributed, nevertheless called ideal-typical fictions "intensified *reality*", and this is supposed to mean that, to the constructive arbitrariness, boundaries (or limits) are set because of the composition (texture or constitution) of the object (or subject matter). A fiction does not come into being ex nihilo in the ideal type, i.e. the fiction in an ideal type is not caused by the accumulation of fictive elements, but by the refining (cleaning or purification) of real elements of those aspects which are regarded in the chosen research perspective as accidental and dispensable. After the fixing of the research perspective, the construction of the ideal-typical fiction is subject to empirical examination (testing or scrutiny); not all fictions have, therefore, the same empirical knowledge value, and they cannot be exchanged, as long as the research perspective does not expressly change. The individualistic emphasis on the fictivity (i.e. fictiveness or fictitiousness) of ideal-typical constructs and of generalisations generally remains correct in principle, only in so far as it does not want to suggest that the ideal of social science is its own reduction to idiographic history through the reconstruction of individual acts (or actions) in concrete situations. However, it aims precisely at this.

Not by chance, therefore, the intellectual(-spiritual) genealogy of modern social science refers to the "holistic" philosophy of history rather than to individualistic contract theory, to Vico and Herder rather than to Hobbes or Locke. The individualistic tradition of social-theoretical thought has, in other words, for the formation (or development) of modern social science, contributed markedly less than the "holistic" tradition; which says nothing at all of course in favour of "holistically" embellished (or

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[168] Hayek, *Missbrauch*, pp. 90, 92, 69ff., 94ff..

disguised) normativisms. Methodological individualists praise Tocqueville's achievement in a work like *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* in order to substantiate the advantages (or merits) of the individualistic way of looking at things in the social-historical field[169]. It is, however, at least rash to conclude from Tocqueville's – anyhow ambivalent – political liberalism, his individualistic orientation in regard to social-scientific methodology (or approach pertaining to method). And it is frankly paradoxical for methodological individualism to vindicate an analysis on a large scale at whose centre are consciously very long-term institutional trends which by no means correspond to the actors' self-understanding. In comparison to that, one could in fact gain the impression that another classical sociological historiography, namely Marx's *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, proceeds "more individualistically" – perhaps of necessity, since the period treated is much smaller. However, this example already teaches that a proper weighing up of individual action does not in the least depend on a confession of faith in methodological individualism, whereas one can learn from Tocqueville that the orientation of research towards the long waves of collective action and towards the heterogony of ends' effects (or consequences) does not at all have to arise from "holistic" biasses. As already noted, methodical (i.e. methodological) "rules" in such works play a considerably smaller role than in conventional dissertations or habilitation writings (i.e. treatises (or postdoctoral theses) pertaining to the institutional recognition of a scholar as having the highest academic qualifications (in Germany etc.))[170]. Methodological individualists need, in any case, for the confirmation of their (fundamental) principles, entirely different scientific achievements than the mere proclamation, or

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[169] Thus, Boudon, "Individualistic Tradition", p. 49ff..
[170] See Sec. 2B in this chapter.

the mere theoretical processing (or treatment), of these (fundamental) principles. One would, furthermore, be curious to find out what they *as* methodological individualists have to say about the present and future of contemporary mass society and world society. It is obvious that the task of a construction of the social from individuals in a world population of six billion people has become considerably more complex. And in parallel with that, the feeling is reinforced far and wide that the heterogony of ends, in the meanwhile, is taking effect with the relentlessness of fate (or destiny).

It would be unfair to deny methodological individualism any scientific value. However, its greatest merit (or service) is unintended, and it lies precisely where Hayek and Popper would have not preferred, since they, regarding this, were less distant from the social-ethical concerns of a "holist" like for instance Durkheim, than they wanted to admit. The – correct – reminder that every society and every institution consists of individuals and only of individuals, amounts directly or indirectly to a reminder of the precarious and fragile character of every collective and every objective construct. Every society and every institution's stability depends in fact on the most mobile and the most unstable of all things: individuals and the relations between individuals. Without collective concepts (i.e. concepts pertaining to the collective), the brittleness (or fragility) of the collective becomes still more conspicuous, and the centripetal forces, which the collective unleashes for the purpose of compensation, are the reverse side and function of this brittleness (or fragility). Institutional orders (or regulations) appear now as the infinitely varying mixings (i.e. mixtures) of (more) fixed (steady or stable) elements and of their individual manipulation. And the unintended consequences of action, which are supposed to serve methodological

individualists in the creation of fixed (steady or stable) elements, appear, for their part, as the great manipulators of manipulating (i.e. manipulative) individuals.

d. Laws and causalities

The conclusion of the previous section was: the truism that society consists of individuals and their acts (or actions) and only these, does not in the least entail methodological individualism's two fundamental assumptions, because neither can the statements (or propositions) about social facts be reduced to statements (or propositions) about individuals, neither do individuals and their act(ion)s constitute the only ontological level inside of the social, unless one imagines social being (Is) as perceptible material (or stuff). We now turn to the third individualistic fundamental assumption, which says that the inclusion of social facts in the concept of the social being (Is) must lead to the "holistic" or "historicistic" belief in historical forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) and teleologically conceived laws of development of history[171]. The false package (i.e. combination) and the false alternative, standing behind that package (combination), were formulated with particular polemical emphasis, since this time it was a matter of the foe par excellence, that is, of the Marxian perception of history, whereby the law-bound stages of development in history necessarily lead to the building (or establishment) of a communistic society. Now already in the 19th century such a way of looking at the course of history was interpreted as an attempt to transfer, in a positivistic spirit, natural (i.e. physical) scientific thought patterns to the

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[171] See e.g. Watkins, "Historical Explanation", p. 106ff..

apprehension of human affairs; proponents and opponents of such an undertaking equally supported this interpretation[172]; and methodological individualists continued this line of thought[173]. Under these circumstances, one would expect, as a reaction to such kinds of philosophies of history, a sharp contradistinction between the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and the humanities, and therein indeed the fundamental argumentative strategy of Hayek, who distinguished between the two scientific genera (i.e. kinds or types) both in respect of subject matter (the subject matter of the social sciences consists of freely acting and understandable subjects) as well as in respect of, as already remarked, method, also consisted[174].

Popper holds otherwise. He agrees with the ontological separation (or segregation) of both scientific fields, at the same time however, he has in mind their methodical (i.e. methodological) unification, to which he dedicates his own powers as an epistemologist. On this important point, he chimes in (i.e. agrees) with the neo-positivistic programme which, as it seemed, for its part pursued the "Enlightenment" aim of unhinging the idealistic and reactionary German tradition in the humanities. On the other hand, he does not want to either share neo-positivism's implicit monistic ontology, or approve of inductivism as a means for the realisation of that programme. The ambivalence of his position and his impact (or influence) lies in that he sought to attain the neo-positivistic desideratum of a methodologically unified science through conceptual means, which amounted to a rehabilitation of the activity of the scientific subject, that is, to a revaluation of the subjective factor (after the older

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[172] See footnote 53 above.
[173] S. I. Berlin, *Four Essays*, pp. 43, 56 and passim. Berlin also stressed of course the metaphysical and eschatological component of the philosophies of history.
[174] *Missbrauch*, ch. I-III. See footnote 165 above.

conventionalism), as well as of theory vis-à-vis (sensory (or material)) experience. When shortly thereafter – in respect of Popper's succession and against him – the epistemological subject was replaced by a historical-sociological subject as originator of theories, the path towards the historicisation of the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and towards the relativisation of their truth claim opened, while the growing resistance against the neo-positivistic and analytical approaches in the field of the theory of acting (i.e. action) led to the revival of the old separation between the meaning-like-purposeful (or meaning-bearing-expedient) [element] and the causal [element], between understanding and explaining. This development – flanked (or accompanied) by the direct cultivation of the humanities' tradition on the part of hermeneutics – turned against that which Popper had in common with neo-positivism, and it radicalised the aspects which separated neo-positivism from him. Popper projected his own ambivalence onto the image (or picture) of his great foe: with "historicism" he understands, at times, views (or perceptions) which identify (i.e. equate) the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and the humanities with each other, at other times, historicism's humanities-oriented direction, which actually lived from historicism's separation from the natural sciences. No doubt: the said identification (i.e. equating) is rejected by Popper regarding the question of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), separation is rejected by Popper regarding method. Nonetheless, Popper does not himself make the distinction between the natural sciences and humanities vis-à-vis historicism as neatly as we make it for him here, and furthermore, the essential aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) remains unanswered: how is the identity (i.e. sameness) of the explanatory model (or pattern) (this turns against "historicism's" second version) possible in view of the grave ontological differences (their acceptance turns against

historicism's first version)? Identity (i.e. sameness) or, at any rate, far-reaching approximation (or extensive convergence) can be asserted only with regard to the process of theory formation, i.e. one can with good reason claim that the researcher proceeds in the same manner both in the realm of the natural (i.e. physical) sciences as well as of the humanities, while he indeed may pay lip service to induction, but in fact devises (or sketches) theories or hypotheses which are only in retrospect confirmed or rationalised through empirical findings[175]. However Popper does not keep to the formal (i.e. form-related) level of theory formation. He transfers the identity (i.e. sameness) to the content of the explanatory theories or of the explanations, and defines, moreover, causal explanation in general as explanation by means of law[176]. Consequently, he overshoots the mark, because he must now expound what it means to explain society and history by way of law without resorting to (or lapsing into) "historicism" and "holism". The explication reads unsatisfactorily: the laws of the social sciences are considered either banal (or trivial) or merely probabilistic, with the unacknowledged result being that the desideratum of methodical (i.e. methodological) unification is partly watered down and partly abandoned. Popper's solution is, as we shall see right away, wrong in accordance with both sides of the matter: neither can causal explanation be defined sweepingly as explanation by means of law, nor are social and historical causalities banal (or trivial), as is contended out of angst (or fear) before "fatalistic determinism". The following, after all, remains characteristic. Despite all the half-measures and ambivalences, Popper's endeavour at unification brought on unease

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[175] I have discussed elsewhere („Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung" ["Science, Power and Decision"]) the mechanisms of power and decision, which determine theory formation uniformly in all fields. Popper of course knows nothing of these mechanisms' effect; what is *their* effect, appears in his eyes as praxis (i.e. practice) or the norm of science.

[176] See e.g. *Poverty*, p. 146: "causality means, fundamentally, determination by law".

for other methodological individualists, who found Hayek's dualistic position more consistent[177].

There would be nothing to debate, if Popper had confined himself to the refutation of "historicism" in the sense of a teleologically understood law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) in respect of the overall historical course (sequence or order) of events; we have, for our part, ascertained the continuing effect of such "historicistic" thought on contemporary functionalistic evolutionism, as well as the incapability (or incapacity) of sociology to put forward (or establish) an unshakable hierarchy of causal factors permanently having an effect[178]. However Popper connects – and the connection is by no means logically compelling – his refutation of "historicism", or the first of both aforementioned versions of "historicism" [i.e. the identity (i.e. sameness) of natural (i.e. physical) sciences and the humanities], with a positive explanatory model (or pattern), whose transference to society and history in the framework of methodological monism gives rise to instructive mistakes. Some conceptual clarifications are, nevertheless, as an introduction to this examination of the problem and as orientational help (i.e. guidance), necessary during this examination of the problem's processing (or handling). First of all, it must be emphasised against Popper's wholesale judgements and demonisations that, no matter what one thinks of laws in history, not everyone who accepts such laws in history, may eo ipso be called a "holist" or "historicist". Laws which concern the overall course, or the direction and the purpose (goal or end), of history, are something other than laws, which inside this course of history take effect without teleological implications. Amongst these latter

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[177] Thus, e.g. I. Berlin, *Four Essays*, note 49.
[178] See Ch. 1, Sec. 3, and, Sec. 2B in this Chapter, above.

laws, one must then again distinguish those which are supposed to apply universally, from other laws, which include (or record) a stable relation between two particular aspects or components of society[179]. In the rush of the struggle against "holism" and the philosophy of history, Hayek and Popper missed that for instance "laws" in the Marxian construction cannot be put down all together and entirely to the philosophy of history, but also at least in part represent empirically checkable (verifiable or testable) statements (or propositions) on the way of functioning of social formations and the causal interrelation of social factors, which can have a (continued) existence irrespective of the teleological background. The differentiation of the concept of law should, in any case, precede a condemnation of "determinism" in accordance with a triple criterion: level of validity, range of validity, stringency of validity.

Already the attempt at such a differentiation of the concept of law, however, results in an in principle distinction between law and causality, since only that causality, whose range is unlimited and whose stringency is absolute, may be regarded as a law stricto sensu. Law is causality, not every causality constitutes, however, a law. Of causality or cause and effect, way may talk with regard to individual facts or events, of laws on the other hand, we may talk in regard to those facts or events necessarily being repeated (or repeating themselves) in typical form (i.e. while conforming to a type). A law correlates a type of event with another type of event, not merely an event with another event; there are therefore no laws which concern a sole atypical event, even though this event must come into being as a result of the effect of a certain cause or causality. However, the mere causal effect of an event on another event does not mean that the form, under which the causal effect took place, is

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[179] Mandelbaum, "Societal laws", passim.

transferable to other causal effects, that is, that the said form is generalisable; and a law is exactly a universally in force form of effect (or effectual form) of causality. A broad spectrum extends between a law stricto sensu and the causality of a case, and the task of sociological and historical research during its search for causal interrelations consists in determining the place of the phenomenon coming into question inside of this spectrum. The investigation (or tracing) of the causality, to which a phenomenon is subject, occurs with regard to the entire spectrum; the said investigation implies direct or indirect comparisons of types of causality with one another, and it is obvious that the rash identification (i.e. equating) of causal explanation with explanation by means of law can only detract from the necessary flexibility during research into causes. Instead of searching for laws in order to then, on this basis [i.e. the basis of laws], investigate (or trace) causalities, it appears to be much more fertile to pose concrete questions: to what extent (or in what way) does a type of causality between two successive historical events differ from that between two sociological interrelations? Does the cause of a certain type of phenomenon, e.g. a revolution, always remain the same, or does it change under the influence of other factors, and under which factors on each and every respective occasion? Does the same cause have an effect always in the same way? How far is the cause from the effect, and what comes in between them; how is, on each and every respective occasion, the network of necessary and sufficient reasons shaped?

The renunciation (or rejection) of teleologically conceived historical forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) must, therefore, entail a renunciation (or rejection) of causality just as little as the taking seriously of causality calls for the acceptance of laws of a type found in the natural (i.e. physical) sciences rather than in the philosophy

of history. The conviction that nomological knowledge of the natural-scientific type is hardly suitable for the investigation of sociological and historical causality does not imply epistemologically any glorification of chance (or coincidence) in the name of human freedom (see below). Not even the acceptance of pure idiography must amount to a devaluation of the causal way of looking at things; the progressive causal analysis of the concrete case shows of course that as a result of the complexity of causal interrelations, and consequently of the constant overlapping (spreading or encroaching) of one level of causality into another level of causality, pure idiography is just as great a nonsense as pure nomology. That is why it is not advisable to, in the interests of the in itself necessary sharp separation (i.e. distinction) between law and causality, bring the causal way of looking at things into the vicinity of idiography, and [it is advisable] to place little value on the investigation of regularities, no matter how rich the yield may be from case to case[180]. It is also advisable to not identify (i.e. equate) the distinction between law and causality in every respect with that between nature and history or society, to want to find causality by means of law only in nature and lawless causality (i.e. causality not by means of law) only in history or society. Because apart from the fact that the latter is conceivable in nature too, statistical-probabilistic regularities can be found at both ontological levels [i.e. of (historical) human action, and, of nature]. In this way, the in principle difference existing between both ontological levels is not disputed, but must be sought where it is to be found: in the fact that one end of the spectrum of causalities, i.e. law stricto sensu, can occur only in nature, not in history and society; everything else is, at least heuristically, a possibility for both ontological realms, even though a researcher can estimate in advance how frequently

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[180] This is noted against Dray's idiographic preferences, *Laws*, p. 104ff..

one or the other type of causality appears in each of the ontological realms. Law, on the one hand, and causality in respect of one case, on the other hand, remain thus indispensable as methodological and ontological points of orientation – but only as such.

So much is now clear: the in principle openness of historical-social developments does not mean that the effect of causality slackens (diminishes or subsides) from time to time or for a longer period of time, but only that the constant crossing (or intersection) of several causalities with one another stands in the way of the linear development of one causality amongst the other causalities, and forces unforeseeable turns (i.e. changes). This [constant crossing of several causalities etc.], not intermittent causality (i.e. causality breaking off or being interrupted), makes laws, which would include the whole course of history or even only aspects of the same course of history, impossible; because law is nothing other than the absolutely certain imposition and unfolding of a sole causal chain. Only a clear separation between law and causality is, therefore, capable of making understandable why laws cannot be taken into consideration in Popper's "historicistic" sense. The separation does not take place so that historical laws are substituted by historical coincidences, but while chance (or coincidence) is assigned to (or classified as) a causality, which is not law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), i.e. is not a one-dimensional and absolutely irrefutable causality. That is why chance (or coincidence) can be described as the invasion of a, for us, irrelevant causality, into a, for us, relevant causality; it is a question of standpoint, from which the crossing (or intersection) of causalities with one another is perceived, and seen in this way, chance (or coincidence) can even dominate, although

everything which exists in the world is determined causally[181]. There will always, therefore, be coincidences from the human perspective, of necessity concentrated on what is relevant, since our knowledge (even natural-scientific knowledge) at best can encompass individual causalities or forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) in the present, not their crossings (or intersections) with one another and not their crossings (or intersections) between all their effects in the future.

For methodological individualists, who comprehend the struggle against "historicism" as a pleading (or advocacy) for the freedom of man and his historical work (i.e. activities), the temptation prompts them to extend the rejection of the philosophy of history's teleological determinism to every causal determinism. Berlin e.g., who knows the difference between both "determinisms"[182], nevertheless talks as if there were a necessary interrelation between both "determinisms", since for him teleological law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) in history, and (biopsychic) causality, equally eliminate freedom of will (or free will) and the responsibility (or accountability) of the person. This position, which was promoted to a liberal article of faith and commonplace, leads to paradoxes. The philosophy of history supported teleological determinism in order to safeguard the meaning and purpose (goal or end) of human history with ultimate arguments, and to make such meaning and purpose of human history (and ultimate arguments) binding for all individuals, no matter how they may behave as individuals; and the opponents of the philosophy of history reject this determinism in order to

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[181] Meyer, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 23, 27. Weber follows (i.e. agrees with) him ("causal concept of chance (or coincidence)"), *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 219ff.. Carr, who does not accept the distinction between chance (or coincidence) and causality even terminologically, argues similarly (*What is History?*, pp. 98ff., 107); for him, there are only "rational" and "accidental causes", that is, such causes which have an effect in a number of cases, and hence can lead to generalisations, and such causes, which only have an effect in a single case and are of importance only for the analysis of this case.
[182] In the following passage, I shall be referring to *Four Essays*, p. 41ff..

protect the meaning and purpose (goal or end) of free individual life from the blind power of historical fate (or destiny). Yet why can the meaning and purpose of individual life be assumed with certainty, but not the meaning and purpose of history as a whole? If life is supposed to in general have meaning and purpose, why may these [i.e. meaning and purpose] become apparent only at the individual level, not at the level of history and of the genus (i.e. mankind or the human species)? And is it not considerably more difficult to grant individual life meaning and purpose when history as a whole does not have any meaning and purpose? One can in fact deny teleological determinism in history exactly *because* one is not capable of discerning any meaning and purpose in human life at all, and indeed on the basis of the assumption of a strict determination of all individuals by their collective and personal biopsychic fate (or destiny). An (optimistic) teleological determinism in history can be shaken by a biopsychic determinism, which stands under pessimistic signs (i.e. symbolism)[183]; in relation to that, belief in freedom of will (or free will), from whose point of view both determinisms and ultimately all types of causality are lumped together, is not therefore by any means required. The equating of law and causality leaves "freedom" as the sole counter concept, and does not permit the refutation of teleological determinism in history by the notion of causality itself.

Beyond that, the philosophical affirmation or rejection of freedom of will (or free will) is absolutely irrelevant for sociological and historical research practice. As a result, it is not merely meant that the causal

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[183] Anthropological pessimists have, at any rate, often attempted it, thus e.g. Cioran, *Histoire et Utopie*. For their part, the champions (or advocates) of freedom of will (or free will) should explain to what then does the free will object against a law-bound (deterministic or law(rule)-based) course of history if this heads for ethically good aims, as most philosophies of history assure us in miscellaneous variations. A contrast between free will and such aims of history can only be postulated with the help of the (in itself contradictory) theological assumption that the decision in favour of evil is an inseparable part of human freedom. But exactly in order to take all power away from freedom in favour of evil, the philosophies of history invented the determinism of the good.

concept of chance (or coincidence) explained above makes redundant a derivation of freedom of will (or free will) and freedom of acting (i.e. action) from the prevailing of chance (or coincidence) in history. Rather, we are thinking about something methodically (i.e. methodologically) fundamental. Historical-sociological research must, namely, of its cognitive character, stop before that threshold, on the other side of which the question of freedom of will (or free will) is posed. For sociological research in the narrower sense, which deals in principle with anonymous averages of social behaviour and with resultants of numerous converging (or going into one another) individual act(ion)s, this is clear anyhow. But the historical reconstruction of individual action too, must come to a standstill outside of the holy shrine, in which the mystery of freedom and necessity is acted out. What may here seem to be free choice and correspondingly the free acting (i.e. action) of the historical actor, constitutes in reality a projection of the alternatives of acting (i.e. action), as the historian perceives them in regard to the situation in question, in regard to the actor's representational (or ideational) world, as well as a connection (or combination) made (or manufactured) by the historian, of the actor's outer mode of acting (i.e. action) with the inner act of choice between the supposedly existing alternatives. In other words: as much as the historian also wants to put the actor at the centre of his description (or account), in actual fact he starts from the situation in which the actor (supposedly) finds himself; the historian forms a judgement on the possibilities of acting (i.e. action) in this situation, and he comprehends the action of the actor as a function of the choice between these possibilities. In so far as the historian accepts, therefore, the freedom of choice, he comprehends it in actual fact as a correlate of what he considers the openness of a situation, or he translates that which he considers the openness of the situation as the actor's freedom of acting

(i.e. action). In any event, the historian's starting point is of necessity an external and observable starting point, i.e. a (notion of the) situation and an acting (i.e. action) of the actor (in accordance with the historian's opinion connected with that situation). The historian can go further only in the direction towards himself, i.e. he can reflect upon his own work and even analyse the optical illusion which brings him, in relation to that, to classify the actor's action as free action, because the actor's action arrives on the scene as a choice between alternatives. However, the historian cannot go further in the direction towards the actor, that is, he, under no circumstances, can take as the actual starting point of his description (or account) the processes (or (series of) events) in the actor's (conscious and unconscious) psyche, and assert the freedom of the actor's choice in the knowledge of these processes (or (series of) events), not with regard to the (assumed) openness of the situation. All this also applies to the actor himself, in so far as he confirms (proves or acknowledges) himself as a historian and wants to account for his acts (or actions). The historian, or the actor as a historian of himself, thus can and must comprehend and (re)present the actor's action as the choice between alternatives, yet whether this choice was free or not, escapes his knowledge and competence; if he is convinced of the contrary, then he is merely persevering in the optical illusion outlined above. This becomes more understandable if we think of the case in which the actor acts more or less "unfree (not free)", e.g. under the influence of an idea of coercion (compulsion or necessity), and nevertheless can choose amongst a number of possibilities: one is driven by pathological hate to murder, and in the course of this, one chooses in a state of cool end (goal) rationality (or expediency) the suitable procedure (or course of action) and the most effective means. The historian can ascertain the motive and judge the end (goal) rationality of the action, he cannot and must not say anything about

whether the actor was "determined" or not by his motive or his biopsychic composition (texture or constitution) to commit the murder. Freedom with regard to the fact *that* an act is undertaken or omitted, is something different than freedom in relation to the *how* of the act. The wilful character of an act is something other than the existence of causes for this act. And the existence of causes for the act is something different than the subsumability of these causes under the necessity of a (biopsychic) law. Consequently, we have come back to the fundamental distinction between law and causality.

The sociologist and the historian can, therefore, rightly hardly start with the assumption that history is made by "free human wills and free choices". After such an – ethically rather than scientifically motivated – confession of faith, the sociologist and the historian would have to anyhow proceed to research practice, and then they would again stand before the same question, before which Herodotus and Thucydides in their time had stood[184]: what was the cause of the individual acts (or actions) and of the collective course (order or sequence) of events (i.e. development), why are they so, and did not turn out otherwise? Indeed: the historical material and the historical narrative *must* be organised around the axis of this question should history really differ from a chronicle. Because the criterion for the selection and putting in order (or classification) of the facts can be sought and found only in a judgement of their relative weight inside of the overall causal context (or interrelation). This weight is measured against the said facts' consequences, and the consequences of the facts awaken, for their part, historical interest in the causal preconditions of these same facts, so that gradually a structured,

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[184] See footnote 81 above.

gapless historical narrative, i.e. a historical continuum, is formed[185]. The question about the subjective meaning (or sense), which actors connected with their act(ion)s, is posed only as a result of the ascertainment of the status (or importance) of those act(ion)s inside of the historical continuum. In view of this function of the notion of causality for the constitution of the historical narrative, it appears to be unfounded to see, from a literary or hermeneutic perspective, the historical text's cement in the narrative itself, in the dynamic(s) of its own unfolding and in its immanent structural law[186]. A weighing up of act(ion)s and facts, which of its very essence must be thought of in causal categories, and carries the narrative *as history*, always underlies the undoubtedly existing own (independent or autonomous) life of the narrative as literary form. The purely literary aspect itself, as informative as it may also be in other respects, lies outside of the interests and of the competencies of history as science. The identification (i.e. equating) of history and narration (or narrative) cannot, in any case, name the specific difference between history and chronicle.

The causal nexus, which gives the structure of depth of the historical narration (or narrative) can, though, be conceived and articulated in a unified manner or loosely, systematically or in passing. But even when deeper causal analyses and the corresponding abstract terms are lacking or even banished, nevertheless expressions and words emerging time and again (as for instance "under these conditions", "unavoidably", "influence", "motive", "lead to", "bring about" and other expressions and words), reveal what is being acted out in the thought (notional or intellectual) background. In the course of this, the implicit or pronounced

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[185] Cf. Carr, *What is History?*, p. 103; Lukacs, *Hist. Consciousness*, p. 128ff.; Mandelbaum, *Anatomy*, p. 76.
[186] Thus, e.g. L. White, *Metahistory*, also Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*.

causal explanations are based a) on the assumption (or acceptance) of regularities (whenever x, then one may expect y), b) on presumptions (suppositions or conjectures) and ascertainments about the motives and reasons for acting (i.e. action) or c) on assessments of the influence of an earlier event on the coming about of a later event[187]. Moreover, at least at the back of the historian's mind is the category of the objective possibility, which with the help of the hypothesis about the absence of an event or factor, allows conclusions about the event or factor's causal relevance[188]. The question: "what would happen (or, would there be), if (not)...?" does not constitute an escapade of a historical phantasy, but a legitimate thought experiment for the (indirect) verification of a causal hypothesis; the said question stands just as epistemologically to reason as it does psychologically. This question illuminates from a wider point of view the difference between history and chronicle, and already the said question's formulation implies both a programmatic connecting of history and causal explanation with each other, as well as the assumption (or acceptance) of the openness of the becoming (or events) – in short, it implies a simultaneous affirmation of causality and a rejection of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity). The application of the category of the objective possibility constitutes an isolating thought operation; through it, namely, the causal weight of an event or factor, through the isolation of the same event or factor from the rest of the events or factors, is calculated. Successive isolations for the determination (or investigation) of causalities result in, for their part, the central structuring principle of historical narration. With the successive isolations' help, the researcher's standpoint gains validity (prestige or recognition), in whose judgement it matters to centre the causal analysis

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[187] Gardiner, *Nature*, p. 67ff..
[188] Weber, *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 266ff..

on a certain factor or on the relation(ship) between two or a number of factors; the object (or subject matter), extent, materials and structuring of the narrative will then turn out accordingly. The clause "ceteris paribus" ["with other things (or conditions) remaining the same", or, "all things being equal (or held constant)"], in which the isolating thought operations find expression, brings once again to mind that the ascertainment of a cause does not have to point to law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity). Because the effect of the cause depends on the attendant circumstances, on the "ceteris". This effect can be unequivocally determined only inside of an intellectually, in terms of thoughts and ideas, prepared closed system; however, the clear causal lines become blurred as soon as one turns to the darkest depths (or abysses) of motivation or to the complex variety of form of the environment[189]. Nonetheless, it does not lead us into research practice much further if, in respect of the laudable intention of avoiding dogmatisms, the affirmation that everything interrelates somehow with everything and that everything is mutually determined, takes the place of concrete questions over each and every respective relevance of causal factors. Because, as true as this may be in abstracto, it does not though necessarily explain the individual case in which one sole cause or one unique constellation (i.e. correlation) of causes can be the deciding factor. The acceptance (or assumption) of a multi-causality with regard to the totality of phenomena constitutes, indeed, a good antidote against dogmatism. Yet the totality of phenomena is not the usual object (or subject matter) of research practice; in research practice, the task (or problem) of the determination (or investigation) and hierarchisation of causalities in every concrete case or context (or interrelation) is hence always set anew.

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[189] Cf. Marrou's remarks, *Connaissance*, p. 178ff..

Berlin's doubts about Popper's epistemological monism were, as mentioned above, not dispelled by the common confession (i.e. declaration) of faith in methodological individualism. Both schools of thought inside of methodological individualism were however wrong for the same reasons, albeit in the reverse sense. Berlin made, in the interest of the protection of freedom from all forms of determinism, in practice no distinction between law and causality, and comprehended the (ontological) distinction between nature and society as one between determinism (in every form) and freedom. Popper brought, on the contrary, law and causality, in the interests of the (epistemological) convergence between nature and society, together. Popper's thesis that causal explanation is explanation by means of law, underlies the construction of a nomological explanatory model of universal validity, for which the name "Covering Law Model" was established in the related discussion. According to that, the causal explanation of an event consists of two groups of statements (or propositions): one of them contains the initial (i.e. starting) conditions, which determine the event, i.e. the circumstances under which the event takes place; the other formulates the general law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) which prevails in those initial (or starting) conditions, and via the effect of these initial conditions induces the coming about of the event. Law and initial conditions *must*, taken together, result in (yield or produce) the event, that is, the event can be deduced from those factors (i.e. law and initial conditions) not only in the form of a finding (or ascertainment), but already in the form of a prognosis[190]. The claim of this model to universal

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[190] *Open Society*, II, p. 262. The model was expounded and defended by Hempel many times; see his synopsis in "The Function", p. 459ff.. In nuce (i.e. in a nutshell), the model is already found in Weber, who wants to found historical explanation in the joint (or combined) effect of "ontological knowledge" (knowledge about the concrete situation) and "nomological knowledge" (knowledge of certain experiential rules about the manner in which humans are in the habit of reacting); in the course of this, every constituent element of a situation or of the initial conditions should be able to be fitted into an experiential rule (*Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 276ff.). Weber of course was not thinking of an explanatory

validity is apparently based on the assumption that the formal (i.e. form-related) identity of this model's logical structure, at all possible levels of its application, is in itself sufficient in order to make the ontological difference between these levels epistemologically irrelevant; consequently, the ubiquitous unity of the formal(form-related)-epistemological conceals like a miraculous veil the difference in regard to the ontological, and simply spirits this difference in the ontological away. This strikes one as paradoxical when one simultaneously is of the firm belief that society and history constituted, in contrast to nature, which knows no personality and no will, the unfolding space of human freedom and dignity. So Berlin's fears were therefore not unfounded. Indeed, the peculiarity of the ontological level, upon which human things (i.e. affairs) stand, offered such strong resistance to the model of unity (or unitary model) that this model of unity of the ontological levels had to be watered down to the point of irrelevance. Before we see how that happened, we want to recall the said model's fundamental weaknesses.

We shall begin once more with the distinction between law and causality. Causal explanation by means of law would only be problemless (i.e. problem-free) if a law by definition contained and implied all causal factors which determine a phenomenon. But that is not the case. So that the phenomenon can be subsumed under a law, a causality or cause independent of the law concerned is required. A subsumption of the phenomenon under a law not mediated by any particular causality or cause would only be a possibility if the law exclusively applied to that phenomenon. Yet a law must, should it be called a law after all, apply to a number of phenomena which belong to a certain type, that is, a law does

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model, which would bridge the gap between the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and the humanities; he nonetheless suggested something structurally similar precisely with regard to the field for which the Covering Law Model is least suitable [i.e. the field of the humanities].

not apply to individual phenomena, but to one type of phenomenon, and it cannot include (capture or cover) the attendant circumstances, under which these phenomena come forward (or occur); every phenomenon has, by the way, several aspects, and it is subsumed under a law not as a whole, but only in accordance with the aspect receptive to that law on each and every respective occasion. Since the phenomenon, apart from the typical aspects, also has specific aspects, since it is thus not absorbed in toto by a law, which can only concern (in respect of the law's spirit (or sense)) what is typical, since the phenomenon's subsumption under a law is partial and consequently must take place under specific conditions, the said subsumption must thus be mediated also by a causality independent of the law in question. Certainly, during a motor's (or an engine's) breakdown, a natural (i.e. physical) law is at work, but the breakdown is due e.g. directly to the mechanic's negligence, which does not in itself have anything to do with the [natural] law [in question]; certainly, one falls from a tree by virtue of the law of gravitation, but one falls because one slips[191]. Especially with regard to social and historical phenomena, which are borne by human subjects, it can never turn out that the same relation is established between these subjective bearers and the laws which are supposed to determine their acts (or actions), as in the case of the relation of one class with its elements[192]. That, which here as law, e.g. the psychological law of a stable disposition, would have to explain the mode of acting (or action) in a concrete case, cannot constitute (or provide) a sufficient condition for the said explanation, because it is by no means certain that the actor, without exception, will follow his disposition and not that which for instance commands consideration for external factors and constraints (or compulsions). The assumed

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[191] Mandelbaum, "Problem", esp. pp.55-57.
[192] Danto, *Analytical Philosophy*, p. 230ff..

dispositional law is prevented here in its effect by the intervening (or interposing) of this particular causality, whose determination (or investigation) requires a likewise particular (i.e. specific) investigation, just as in other cases the effect (or impact) of laws is made possible by the intervening (or interposing) of another particular (i.e. specific) causality. A disposition *can*, regardless of external factors and constraints (or compulsions), and even "against every reason (i.e. good (or common) sense)", lead to an act(ing) (or action). That, however, happens in concrete cases, not always and everywhere; that is why a disposition is the cause of this or that act (or action), not the law of action in general.

The Covering Law Model therefore disregards the sufficient conditions of act(ion)s and historical phenomena. And it does not itself constitute a necessary condition for explanation, because the aim of historical explanation is not proof that a certain person, under the determining (i.e. determinative) influence of a certain disposition, would always act in the same way, but the understanding of the said person's acting (act or action) from the perspective of the subjective meaning (or sense) connected with that acting (or act(ion))[193], which in turn is inseparable from the logic of the situation, no matter whether situation and disposition are, vis-à-vis each other, in a positive or negative relation(ship). Over and above that, the (sociological) classification of a phenomenon within a class of phenomena does not in the least mean there is carte blanche to treat the phenomenon concerned as an instance of the application of a law, and indeed not even when regularities could be ascertained here. A phenomenon may e.g. be called "war" or "revolution", yet only a bad sociology or history would draw from that the conclusion that the said phenomenon may be explained just like every

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[193] Dray, "Historical Explanation", p. 109.

other phenomenon with the same name, or that for all phenomena with the same name, the same explanation and law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) applies[194]. Here the essential difference between the natural-scientific and sociological-historical way of explanation appears. During the former way of explanation, one can suppose that phenomena of one and the same class are put down to the effect of the same constant (or invariable) causality, i.e. the same law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity); during the latter way of explanation, the – always only (very) loose – common bond (or interrelation) of phenomena inside of the same class does not offer any guarantee for the ubiquitous effect of causal factors; the investigation (or exploration) of the same causal factors must start in every case anew; a deductive method (or procedure) does not come into question here, at most a comparative method is the only possibility. In relation to that, the possible ascertainment of regularities by sociology would also not change much [i.e. the situation]. Because it can never be certain in advance that the phenomenon concerned belongs to the rule and does not constitute the exception to the rule. Sociological regularities do not absolve us from the duty of research into historical causes in every concrete case. Sociology and history thus both go against the Covering Law Model, notwithstanding their each and every respective dealing with regularities.

The illusion that the unity of epistemology can cover over (or conceal) ontological differences opened up a further fatal hole in Popper and Hempel's explanatory model. It was overlooked that laws and causalities possess sufficient explanatory strength (power or force) only when they are specific to each and every ontological level in question. Otherwise, laws and causalities can name at best, for the occurrence of a

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[194] Dray, *Laws*, p. 46ff..

phenomenon, many a necessary condition which are not necessarily relevant for the explanation undertaken, since these laws and causalities have a specific character only at another ontological level. Thus, social-historical action cannot annul physical laws, and in this respect the latter physical laws constitute social-historical action's necessary condition; it would, however, be absurd to hold the pointing out of such laws as a sufficient explanation of that action. Nevertheless, Popper commits precisely this absurdity, when he, in the application of the Covering Law Model, draws on the physical law of combustion in order to explain Giordano Bruno's death on the pyre (or at the stake)[195]. The in itself correct ascertainment that Bruno by virtue of the same natural law was burnt as the wood of the pyre, on which he stood, leaves however, furthermore, the decisive question open: what then was the difference between Bruno and the wood? From the perspective of Popper's explanation there was apparently none. Beyond this perspective, a second question, in this context no less decisive, likewise remains: why did Bruno of all people stand, and not any other person just as combustible, on the pyre (or at the stake)? Assuming here a nomological explanation were at all appropriate (or called for), then the said nomological explanation would at least have to take into account the (ontologically pre-given) difference of the combustible material and to adapt (or fit) the explanatory law to the constitution (composition or texture) of the ontological level of interest, i.e. to formulate it as a historical law, and in the course of this, use terms which only have meaning in a historical context. However, already the attempt to put forward (or establish) such a law (for instance in the form: "heretics must be burnt"), shows that here talk of law is incorrect. The consciously carried out change in the

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[195] *Poverty*, p. 145.

ontological level consequently automatically calls the epistemological recipe into question. This makes understandable Popper's reluctance to take into account the change occurring, after all, that is, to distinguish between Bruno and the wood. A logically legitimate working out of the nomological explanatory model would have to construct a hierarchy of laws whose tiers would correspond with the ontological scale of the phenomena which ought to be explained; thus the mixing or confusion of physical, sociological, historical and psychological-anthropological laws with one another would be avoided. Yet this clever procedure (or method) would end in self-refutation. Because nomological explanations in society and history are only possible under the assumption that there are social and historical laws which are distinguished by the same stringency as natural laws (or many of them). Popper, however, took the field (crusaded or campaigned) precisely against this "historicistic" assumption.

If one, under these circumstances, regardless, sticks to the Covering Law Model, then only the path (or road) to tautology remains open. The law, which is supposed to explain the concrete case, essentially represents then a formalised description (i.e. a description rendered into forms) of this same case, i.e. the historical analysis, which was tailored to that case, is recast (or remoulded) in abstract theoretical terms; in this form the law is detached from the case and then applied anew to the case. One can nomologically explain Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon only if one formulates the nomological law as follows: whenever someone, who as a person is identical to Caesar, finds himself in the same situation, then he will do exactly the same as Caesar did at that time. The nomological explanation consequently puts forward (or formulates) its law ex post facto, i.e. in light of the actor's already taken and executed decision to act in that way. Had the decision turned out otherwise, then one would have

to put forward (or formulate) another law. The relation(ship) between the phenomenon to be explained and the explanatory law is hence not clear and not binding[196]. The scientific observer does not ascertain here the law which is supposed to underpin the explanation, and indeed in the form of a prognosis, but in reality the actor determines which law has to apply during the explanation. However, the situation would have to be reversed were the Covering Law Model to be in the position of keeping the promise of the prognosis of events. Not without reason, this promise therefore remained vague, although it had to be put forward (or formulated) with emphasis, since it constitutes the touchstone of nomological explanation in the framework of a universally applicable epistemology[197]. That is why Popper declared nolens volens (i.e. willing or unwilling) his agreement with the thesis of "historicism", that a prognosis on the basis of laws is possible in social science just as in physics[198]. He certainly did not try anywhere to formulate checkable (i.e. verifiable) prognoses or to elucidate the reasons for the standing up or not standing up for (i.e. espousal or non-espousal of) prognoses in the past. In line with his ideological options (i.e. choices) he concentrates on the mere conceptual distinction between two types of prognoses: that of the "historicistic" "prophecy", which wants to apprehend the overall course of history, and that of the "technological" prognosis as the basis of "social engineering"[199]. Yet while he praises the latter type as a contribution to the shaping of a meaningful life inside of an open society, he forgets what he wrote elsewhere about the in principle agreeable (or beneficial) effects of the unintended consequences of action. If these

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[196] Aron, *Leçons*, pp. 171ff., 187.
[197] Hempel in fact rejected Hayek's moderate position, according to which prognoses were supposed to refer to types of phenomena, not to individual events ("Reasons", p. 97). Cf. footnote 177 above.
[198] *Poverty*, p. 36, cf. p. 12. At p. 13ff. he ascribes, though, to "historicists" the perception that prognoses are either very difficult or impossible!
[199] Loc. cit., p. 43.

effects by and large suffice for the formation (or development) of institutions and for the regulation of social life in accordance with the pointer (or sign) of the liberal invisible hand, to what avail then, "social engineering"? Scientific prognoses on the basis of laws, and action on the basis of scientific prognoses, would then only be a pressing desideratum if it applied (i.e. if it was the case) that, for the purposes of the philosophy of history, the transition from the realm of blind necessity to the realm of knowing freedom would be caused (established or managed). Whoever takes the unintended consequences of action as a historical factor seriously, must at any rate, seriously ask themselves about the possibility, limits (or boundaries) and function of prognoses.

The inability to keep the promise of the prognosis does not, though, lie in the tautological character of explanation by means of a law. Such inability lies just as much in the necessity, under the pressure of ontological forms of resistance in the area of society and history, to considerably water down that law, which was supposed to have made the prognosis possible. By means of the dual concession straight from the horse's mouth, that a probabilistic-statistical and inductively proceeding way of explanation can be placed side by side with a nomological-deductive way of explanation, and that nomological explanation would often have the status (value or importance) of mere "explanatory sketches"[200], the Covering Law Model's original ambitions diminished to the point of abandonment. One, that is, returned in practice to the old wisdom that in society regularities can be indeed observed, however these regularities do not allow any certain prognosis about the concrete case. This applies again irrespective of whether the regularity covers 60% or 90% of cases, and also irrespective of whether one can rely on the said regularity for

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[200] Hempel, "Reasons", p.90ff..

practical purposes (ends or goals). The young doctor, who opens his practice in a village, proceeds with considerable certainty from the assumption that he does not have to wait long for clientele (i.e. patients); but he cannot at all know in advance whether Smith and Jones will number amongst his patients, even if the plague afflicts the villagers. The causality of the particular case always retains its autonomy (or independence) vis-à-vis regularity, even if this regularity comes very close to (or borders on) a law. What a prognosis can, and what it can never, achieve, we infer from this ascertainment. This ascertainment may of course not be interpreted to the effect that a (statistical) prognosis is possible only in regard to regularities, not in the individual case. The said ascertainment means that a prognosis at the level of the regularity is something other than the prognosis at the level of the individual case, and that one type of prognosis cannot be deduced from the other type of prognosis. Prognosis in an individual case means knowledge of a particular causality and this causality's direction. This knowledge owes so little to the knowledge of regularities that it even stems from the mistrust of such regularities. The said knowledge implies, that is, for its part, the clear separation between (statistical) law and causality as well as the assumption of this causality (because without causality the prognosis would be a prophecy), and indeed as an independent category, notwithstanding every law and every regularity[201].

As we have said, Popper hardly thought (or worried) about the logical tension between "technological" prognosis based on a law and the social function of the unintended consequences of action. Just as little did he reflect upon the incompatibility (or inconsistency) between the Covering

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[201] As Veyne formulated it aptly: «La causalité n'est pas une légalité imparfaite, c'est un système autonome» ["Causality is not an imperfect legality, it is an autonomous system"] (*Comment on écrit l' histoire*, p. 115ff.).

Law Model and another favourite motif of his social philosophy, namely, situational logic, which is supposed to guide the actor during action. The determination of action by the logic of the situation means that both on the side (i.e. part) of the actor, as well as on the side (i.e. part) of the situation, everything is in principle open: the situation constantly changes (that is why it has *its* logic, it is no crystallisation *of* logic) and the actor must be ready to follow the changing situation, not his own fixed prejudices or affects (i.e. emotions). The logic of the situation puts the logic of the disposition out of action, and the ability of the actor to follow the logic of the situation and not himself, provides the proof of his rationality. Now Hempel, in the framework of the defence of the nomological explanatory model against Dray's argumentation (incidentally, rightly[vii], from a nomological point of view), believed that propositions about rational motives can be subsumed under propositions about dispositions so that explanation by means of rational motives is, after all, nomological[202]. Why dispositional laws are hardly in a position to explain concrete act(ion)s always and everywhere, why, that is, dispositions can indeed be causes, but not laws, was already expounded in this section[203]. The incompatibility (or inconsistency) of Popper's situational logic with the assumption of dispositional laws and with the Covering Law Model in general, which now concerns us, appears indirectly, but eloquently in the willingness with which the anti-Popperian, that is, behaviouristic wing of methodological individualism took up the nomological explanatory model. Homans adopted the nomological explanatory model in order to epistemologically underpin the, asserted by him, precedence (or primacy) of psychology vis-à-vis the

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[202] "Reasons", p. 100ff..
[203] Cf., in relation to that, Nagel, *Structure*, p. 555.

rest of the social sciences[204]. (Behaviouristic) psychology should formulate the laws from which social and historical phenomena can then be deduced. Causality is absorbed by law; there is no mediating (or intervening) causality between law and the individual case, that is, there cannot even be a causally determined exception to law. This gap stands logically and in reality in the way of the transition from law to concrete case. Homans cannot make it clear (or plausible) why universal psychological laws (stimulus-reaction or reward-punishment) have been connected, in various places and at various times, with completely different, in fact very often absolutely opposing, content(s). Regarding this, Homans of course refers to historical research, but the question is exactly whether this reference can be legitimised on the basis of the nomological presuppositions of the theory. Because that which is [or needs to be] interpolated here as causality between psychological law and historical concrete case, and amongst other things determines the difference in the value content(s) – i.e. a social relation and the primeval (original or primordial) social dimension in general –, is a limine pushed aside through the necessary binding of behaviourism to methodological individualism. About that, what is necessary has already been said[205].

e. Microstructures and macrostructures

Hayek and Popper's methodological individualism dared not, as we know, approach the theoretical reconstruction of society as such [starting] from individuals and their act(ion)s; Hayek and Popper's embarrassment (or predicament) in regard to the matter hid behind rhetorical-political attacks against the revolutionary hubris of contract theory. The question

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[204] "The Relevance of Psychology", pp. 313ff., 319.
[205] Ch. I, Sec. 5.

about the relationship between microstructures and macrostructures was posed only indirectly in the attempt to explain the coming into being of institutions by means of the mechanism of the unintended consequences of action of individuals. This question gained considerable significance when methodological individualism blazed a trail via other paths and in modified forms. The revolt against Parsons directly or indirectly renewed argumentation against "holism", only this time such argumentation against "holism" turned not against the philosophy of history, but against the "system". The rehabilitation of the individual as an actor took place in the framework of the turning away from Parsons, partly through the development (or formation) of the behaviouristic variant of methodological individualism[206], partly through an unprecedented flourishing of "microsociology", in which the approaches of symbolic interactionism and the phenomenology of the lifeworld were mixed with findings of psychological investigations of "small group dynamics". That mixture wanted to be theoretically autonomised under the name of "ethnomethodology", yet it could not entirely assimilate its older components. All the same, in ethnomethodology, which in the 1960s and 1970s became a fashionable trend in the course of the mass-democratic and [Western] cultural-revolutionary privatisation of the public [sphere], a characteristic feature of the overall anti-holistic and anti-systemic school of thought particularly came to light: we mean the tendency towards unwatered-down (i.e. undiluted or unadulterated) empiricism, so to speak, as the radical-phenomenological realisation of the neo-positivistic programme of the building (or construction) of a science on the basis of protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of

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[206] See Homans's programmatic article "Bringing Men Back In".

evidence)[207]. Under these presuppositions, one could not go very far theoretically – at any rate not so far that Parsons's supporters would have been impressed by the now proposed solutions to the micro-macro-problem; according to the opinion of those promoting a more or less undiluted empiricism, microstructures would be in good hands in the womb of flexible macrostructures, or the matter would essentially be taken care of with the ascertainment of the "interpenetration" of both spheres[208]. The massive turn towards microsociology did not fail to have an effect, so that even macro-sociologically geared researchers felt obliged (or called upon) to take microsociology into account theoretically[209]. Various combinations resulted from the encounter of both schools of thought[210].

So the micro-sociological reaction against Parsons was not articulated only as declared partisanship in favour of methodological individualism, but also as the attempt to reach, with the means of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, a "methodological situationalism", which already before its start (or launch, i.e. application) would have left strict individualistic approaches behind. To Parsons it was counterposed that social order does not come about through the internalisation of supra-individual values and norms, but is the result constantly being reproduced of communicative interaction in concrete situations; consequently the problem of social order was shifted from the macrolevel to the microlevel, and the substitution of the individual act or actor, and of subjective meaning (or sense), by networks of acting (or action) and

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[207] Cf. Collins, *Conflict Sociology*, p. 7ff., as well as our remarks on the empirical characteristic of methodological individualism in Hayek and Popper, under c in this Section.

[208] Alexander, "Action"; Münch, "Interpenetration".

[209] Symptomatic of that is Collins, "Microfoundations"; Turner, *Theory*, esp. p. 211.

[210] Classifications and synopses of such combinations of both schools of thought are found in Münch-Smelser, "Relating", as well as Ritzer, "Micro-Macro-Linkage".

socially constructed meaning (or sense), took care that the opposition (contrasting or conflict) between person and structure as well as act(ion) and structure would be (theoretically) overcome[211]. Beginning at this synthetic starting point, one could believe that through ethnomethodology, micro-sociological and macro-sociological tasks were to be dealt with in one [methodological process] (i.e. together or combined with each other)[212]; progress from microstructures to macrostructures would, that is, basically imply only a quantitative extension of the object (or subject matter) to be observed, but not methodical (i.e. methodological) reorientation en route from microstructures to macrostructures. Indeed, concrete suggestions about how the transition from microstructure to macrostructure is to be brought off were on the whole quantitatively meant, namely as reproduction being constantly extended of a fundamental (or basic) microunit, inside of which the binding (i.e. cohesive) principle of social life is developed (cultivated or formed) and discernible. Thus, Emerson wanted to bridge the gap between dyad and social macrostructure through two concepts alone: that of the "corporate group", i.e. a collective, collective actor made up of two or more persons, and that of the "network", i.e. a sum of interacting actors which could consist partly of individuals, partly of groups; coalitions etc. would mediate (or intervene) between "corporate group" and "network". Groups, networks and networks of networks would be connected with one another through exchange relations, which, for their part, would be interrelated with one another in the positive and negative sense that exchange in a certain relation would be dependent on the exchange or non-exchange in another certain relation; in every network, the key function would befit that one point on which the

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[211] Knorr-Cetina, "Introduction", esp. pp. 7, 8ff., 16ff..
[212] Thus, e.g. Hilbert, "Ethnomethodology", esp. pp. 795, 804.

exchange process in its totality would most depend[213]. Such concepts or sketches seemed to be very promising to those who, on the one hand, could not be content with Weber's unmediated (or abrupt) transition from the definition of social action to the investigation of macrostructures, on the other hand, the said concepts or sketches found Homans's individualistic-psychological approach unsatisfactory owing to the lack of insight into interaction's own dynamics[214]. After the primacy of interaction vis-à-vis the individual act and actor appeared to be safeguarded, the impression came into being as though the mere elongation (or extension) of the interaction chains – these "marketplaces for cultural and emotional resources" – would suffice for the theoretical construction of macrostructures from structurally homogenous units (unities or entities)[215].

The critique of this sociological programme can commence with the general observation that the replacement of the norm system by interaction very little promotes understanding of the social order. Because disorder is also interaction; disorder comes into being out of interactions and spreads via interactions. That is why order is not identical with interaction in general and as such, but order is shaped (or formed) on the basis of particular forms of interaction whose specific features must be ascertained through investigations of a special kind; reference to the generic term (or concept) "interaction" does not mean anything here. As far as the transition from microstructures to macrostructures is concerned, the substitution of individual acts or actors by the microunit of interacting individuals does not fundamentally contribute to the solution of this

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[213] "Social Exchange Theory", esp. pp. 46-53; cf. "Exchange Theory" (Part II), p. 70ff.. Cf. Boissevain's network-model, *Friends of Friends*, chap. 2.
[214] Thus, e.g. B. J. Turner, "Future Directions", esp. pp. 224, 229ff.; *Theory*, p. 121ff..
[215] See e.g. Collins, "Microfoundations", pp. 998ff., 1002ff..

particular problem. Because the microunit constitutes just as much a theoretical fiction as the isolated individual and his action, and the microunit can serve the theoretical construction of macrounits exactly because it is a fiction, that is a, as one likes, homogenisable and usable building block. Empirically there are in fact several forms of microunits in a society, and it is certain that every reconstruction of society on the basis of a sole microunit amongst the empirically existing microunits must soon begin to falter (or stall), since none amongst them can include all indispensable components of the social as well as the specific manner of their cohesion with (or bond between) one another. The distance between the micro-sociological and individualistic fiction continues to decrease if one, in fairness, takes into consideration that the individualists imagine the transition to the macrostructure likewise as an interaction process, which can be included in rules about the manner as to how the action of an individual has an effect on other individuals[216]. And this same distance ultimately becomes insignificant when methodological individualists, just like microsociologists, use formal (i.e. form-related) models in order to, undisturbed by rough (or bumpy) facticity, make the aforementioned transition smooth at least on paper. For economistically inclined individualists, it stands to reason to regard the neo-classical theory of the perfect market exchange system as the best theoretical mediation (or intervention) between microsystem and macrosystem, although it is admitted that this model is suitable "only for an idealized social system"[217]. It should be mentioned in passing that here "exchange" is at the centre of attention just as in the "interactional" or "situationalistic" model.

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[216] See e.g. Coleman, *Foundations*, p. 19.
[217] Coleman, "Microfoundations", p. 171.

The common characteristic of the attempt up to now to bring (or work) out the transition from microstructures to macrostructures is, therefore, stark (or intense) formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms). It is not shown through historical-genetic analysis how a real society came into being out of the expansion of microunits or out of the elongation (or extension) of interaction chains, but conceptual entities are lined up until the formal (i.e. form-related) microstructures flow into the likewise formal (i.e. form-related) macrostructure. The thereby gained macrostructure does not, though, even coincide at the formal level with society as a whole. One reaches at most up to a network not described historically-sociologically in greater detail, or up to any just as vaguely sketched "institution" or "formal organisation"[218]. The final and most difficult steps of the reconstruction are not taken. But also apart from this external deficiency, which perhaps would be remedied by means of additional improvisational arts (i.e. artful devises, strategems and tricks of improvisation), the endeavour at formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) as such presupposes certain wrong content-related assumptions. If the formal (i.e. form-related) construction wants to have ubiquitous or at least broad historical and sociological application, then it must postulate two different things: that basically only a single form of transition from microstructure to macrostructure is conceivable, and that the transition as such is necessary. Neither the one nor the other is true. The form of the transition depends in fact on each and every respective constitution (composition or texture) of that which is defined as the starting point, as well as that which is defined as the end point, of the same transition. Different perceptions of that constitution (composition or texture) and integration of different social phenomena are, however, behind the

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[218] Thus, e.g. Coleman, *Foundations*, p. 20ff..

external uniformity of formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms). The concepts used obtain, depending on the context, an essentially different meaning (the actor can be an individual or a collective; structure can refer to microunits or macrounits; microunits can, for their part, make up psychological coefficients, individuals or elementary interactions not described in greater detail; macrounits can make up institutions or population groups), and moreover the construction of the transition in terms of details is prejudged by the in advance established sympathies for microconsideration or macroconsideration (i.e. the micro or macro way of looking at things)[219]. The necessity of the transition cannot again be proved by the ascertainment that microunits exist inside of macrounits, because this line of argument (or proof) already presupposes that the macrounits came into being through the expansion (widening, extension or enlargement) or the elongation (or extension) of those microunits. There are, however, microunits (e.g. personal bonds (or ties)), which do not flow into any macrounit and do not necessarily underlie such a macrounit, although microunits can have (continued) existence and meaning only inside of macrounits. And there are macrounits, which as a result of their reduction to microunits, necessarily lose their relevance for the interpretation of social life. Even the in itself correct ascertainment that in microunits and macrounits frequently the same forms of interaction, psychical forces or behavioural patterns are at work, does not immediately establish the necessity of the transition from microunits to macrounits. Because it is definitely possible that it is a matter here of anthropological or social-ontological dimensions, which exist and have an effect irrespective of how one may judge the logical priority, and

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[219] See Ritzer's comments, "Micro-Macro-Linkage", esp. pp. 354, 355, 363.

priority pertaining to the history of development, of microunits and macrounits.

Under these circumstances one may not, without further differentiation, hold the opinion that micro-structural and macro-structural theories could not indeed be reduced in principle to one another, yet they were complementary to one another and had to be developed parallelly, because one group of theorists would postulate that which another group of theorists would consider problematic[220]. Undoubtedly, it is in abstracto more advantageous to separate microtheories and macrotheories from one another, than to pave the way for a quantitatively-additively conceived reduction of macrostructures to microstructures. Nevertheless, a clear separation between both – should such a clear separation be at all possible – can take place only at the level of sociological abstraction and must disregard the just mentioned anthropological or social-ontological given facts (or actualities), whose aura (or fluid element) saturates all corners (or edges), surfaces (or areas), and strata of social life. On the other hand, the meaning of the complementarity of the micro and macro way of looking at things vis-à-vis each other must be clarified. Complementarity is the relation(ship) between magnitudes separated from one another or separable magnitudes; however, microstructures and macrostructures overlap (turn or merge into) one another in every respect and at any time, they are defined with regard to one another, and constitute, by their very nature (or of their essence), a continuum, whose microparts and macroparts can be separated (or segregated) from one another only by means of conventionally drawn, in accordance with heuristic criteria, and constantly shifting boundaries; exactly because of that, in fact, the quantitatively-additively construction of macrounits from microunits can

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[220] Thus, e.g. Blau, "Contrasting", p. 82ff.; "Microprocess", p. 96ff..

never succeed. Complementarity of the ways of looking at things on the horizon of a continuum can therefore merely mean that the observer registers (records or notes) the constant shifting of the boundaries between microunits and macrounits in line with the leading knowledge interest, and defers abstract questions in respect of priority in order to turn his attention to the intersection and interplay (synergy or having an effect together) of concrete factors with one another, which may be assigned completely or in part, at times to the mircrolevel, at other times to the macrolevel. Into the bargain, it is a matter, first of all, of the tracking down of mental and institutional forces macro-socially having an effect in the smaller interaction circle (or cycle) of nameable individuals. Only knowledge of these forces or long-term trends often allows a historical and sociological inclusion (or classification) of actions and interactions at the microlevel. Background knowledge of the phenomenon "capitalism" puts e.g. a Calvinist family's life and work in the 17th century in a historically and sociologically interesting perspective; to proceed the other way around, and to want to draw conclusions on later social developments from protocol statements (i.e. statements, minutes or records (of evidence) verified by experience) about this life and work, would here hardly be productive. That does not of course mean that the chasm between microstructure and macrostructure can be overcome every time without leaving the terrain of the former – by for instance showing merely how institutional and similar supra-individual factors force their way from the outside, so to speak, into interactions between individuals and co-shape (or co-mould) such interactions between individuals[221]. Because there are macrodimensions which do not fit into any microstructure, so that the picture (or image) of a society cannot in the

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[221] Cicourel apparently thinks this, "Notes".

least be put together from the addition of those macrostructural elements which are contained in microstructures. Over and above that, the presence of macrodimensions in microstructures can vary very sharply in respect of extent and intensity. And finally, an undogmatic, that is a historical-sociological analysis free from the compulsions (constraints or coercion) of formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms), must consider the reverse phenomenon too, namely, the effect of microstructural processes on macroprocesses. This effect is not to be understood in such a way that macroprocesses would always and necessarily be set in motion by the accumulation of corresponding microprocesses. Just as the static macroimage (or macropicture) cannot be obtained from the mere addition of microunits, so too social change in magno (i.e. on a large scale) is not absorbed by the mere sum of shifts and changes in parvo (i.e. on a small scale)[222]; and just as quite a few forms of the transition from microstructures to macrostructures are conceivable, so too numerous mechanisms and forms (or shapes) of change can be ascertained, which are hardly to be reduced to one sole formula. The possibility of an influence worth mentioning of microprocesses on macroprocesses exists when the position and status (value or importance) of a microstructure inside of a macrostructure allows such influence. An interactive microsituation in a Cabinet [Meeting], which deliberates on war and peace, obviously has an entirely different historical and sociological weight than a private family row – although both microprocesses can proceed in accordance with the same psychological and group dynamics. The difference between them cannot be grasped either through the contradistinction of microstructures and macrostructures, or through a theory of the transition from the former to the latter. A multi-dimensional

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[222] In relation to that, Nisbet, *Social Change*, esp. p. 288.

way of looking at things is necessary, which moreover oscillates continuously between the dimensions and purposefully (expediently or in an end(goal)-oriented manner) redefines the various dimensions.

The result of our casuistry (i.e. case by case analysis or reasoning) should encourage further historical-sociological casuistry (i.e. case by case analysis or reasoning), and deter us from abstract sociological construction work (i.e. constructions) in this field. Not only is an empirically defensible formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) of the transition from microstructures to macrostructures not possible, but not even a compelling formal (i.e. form-related) definition of their difference to each other can be thought up. Such a definition (for instance: microstructures are put together from interacting individuals, macrostructures from groups related to one another; the latter are distinguished by the existence of values, norms and institutions[223]) would have to already in its first application to a historically-sociologically relevant case be more or less relativised, and through its relativisation be in actual fact taken back. Every theoretical insistence on this point, which would go beyond partial conjectures with regard to certain categories of concrete cases, must be lost in verbal [constructs] and or in the tinkering around with concepts and fictions. The deeper reason for the hopelessness of such theoretical experiments lies in the lack of social-ontological reflexion, that is, reflexion on the being (Is) of society as that irreducible magnitude, which enables the appearance (or occurrence) of (fluid) microstructures and macrostructures in general. Microstructures and macrostructures can be observed only against the background of a society, and the incessant shimmering of microstructures and macrostructures' outlines (or contours), their unremitting going into one

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[223] Thus, Blau, *Exchange*, p. 24ff..

another (or interlacing), represent the effects (or consequences) of this background. Even those who concern themselves with the drawing up of classifications and the formalisation (i.e. rendition into forms) of transitions, implicitly presuppose the existence of a society in the multitude of its aspects. Because society as such does not constitute the express object (or subject matter) of their attempts at reconstruction; these attempts at reconstruction stop at (institutional etc.) macrostructures, which are found already inside of constituted societies. Such macrostructures [i.e. macrostructures as institutions etc., and, macrostructures constituting society] to be reconstructed from microstructures are two seemingly related, but actually very different undertakings. Not only because the latter [i.e. reconstructing already constituted society from macrostructures (and microstructures)] has even fewer prospects of success than the former [i.e. reconstructing macrostructures such as institutions from microstructures], but above all because one refers to the problem area of sociology, the other to that of social ontology.

3. Social ontology as theoretical dimension of depth

A. The specific point of view of social ontology

The analyses of the preceding sections pursued, with hopefully good results, a double aim: to liquefy (i.e. to make liquid or fluid) the factual

boundaries between the phenomena (or manifestations) of social life, that is, between the corresponding objects (or subject matter) of sociology and history, and simultaneously to grasp more sharply the epistemological boundaries between sociology and history as they are shaped (or moulded) in the logic of founding of each one of both these disciplines; in the unremitting tension between research praxis (or practice) and logic of founding which was referred to several times, and whose social-ontological background must yet occupy us, the objective need for the liquefaction (i.e. making liquid or fluid) of the factual, and for the clarification of the, epistemological boundaries between the social sciences, merely manifests itself, quite often unreflectedly (or unthinkingly) and confusedly. The founding of a discipline, like every methodological consideration too, has content-related aspects and implications; such founding of a discipline is of necessity accompanied by delimitations, since it presupposes the admission that the discipline concerned cannot deal with all phenomena (or manifestations) of an ontic field, but inside of this field a narrower area must be picked, which is then regarded as the said discipline's actual area. Now relativisations of those delimitations are epistemologically explained and justified, for their (its) part, by research practice. The factual osmosis of history and sociology with each other is, for example, further supported and expounded in greater detail by more precise thoughts on law and causality. If in the area of sociology, strict laws, and in that of history, mere causalities, prevailed, or in the former, causalities, and in the latter, blind coincidences (or chance), then only a bad, not a good praxis (i.e. [research] practice) could liquefy (i.e. to make liquid or fluid) the boundaries between both areas. The proof that sociology can just as little as history put forward (or formulate) laws in the form of a fixed (steady or stable) and ubiquitous hierarchy of causal factors, as well as the

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ascertainment that sociological and historical regularities do not mean anything binding and conclusive about any concrete case whatsoever, jointly refer to an open and plastic field in which the epistemological settings of a boundary seem cognitively unavoidable and ontically fictive. The disciplines pile up like artefacts in this field, which they can only partially cover. Were the field to be under the influence of strict law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), then already through the knowledge of the same law bindedness, the cognitive would coincide with the ontological order inside of the disciplines concerned, while at the same time these disciplines would cover the entire field in their lining up alongside one another. The openness and plasticity of causalities, their resisting against being able to be classified and hierarchised in the form of fixed (steady or stable) laws, constitutes, conversely, a function of the openness and the plasticity of that field.

Our comments on the founding or delimitation of research practice or the osmosis of the social sciences, on laws and causalities, flow according to that, into the question of the composition (texture or constitution) of the social field. What constitutes social being (Is) so that fixedly (steadily or stably) hierarchised causalities, that is, laws, fail to materialise in the social being's (Is's) field, that the theoretical barriers between the disciplines, as they were raised through their logic of founding, move back or even collapse under the pressure of the aura (or fluid element) of this causally determined, but lawless facticity (i.e. facticity not governed, restrained or controlled by any law)? Which factors or forces develop (or unfold) and intersect with one another in the social-ontic field so that here in principle a number of outcomes as well as projections of the becoming (or events) appear to be conceivable and possible, so that, in other words, openness and plasticity constitutively belong to this field? Such factors

and forces, in so far as they were in the past called key concepts of ontologies, served, in relation to that, to put in order the great variety of form of phenomena (or manifestations) in accordance with the yardsticks (benchmarks or criteria) set by such ontologies, that is, to manufacture (or produce) gradations and hierarchies amongst these phenomena (or manifestations), irrespective of whether taxonomic or emanatistic logic was at work here. In this respect, ontology has always been drawn up metaphysically[224]. Social ontologies or social-ontologically drawn up sociologies lapsed into the logic of emanation, by assuming biological, geographic, psychological, economic etc. "ultimate authorities" and accordingly shaped their explanatory models. For us, the question is posed differently. Because that which at the level of theoretical representation (or description) must be called social-ontological dimension of depth, i.e. social-ontic being (Is), is by far more fluid, more mobile and more multiform than everything which the individual (or separate) social sciences can apprehend with the help of their conceptual instruments, which are determined by their each and every respective logic of founding. That is why social phenomena (or manifestations) are not the more fluid or diluted emanations of a fixed (settled or solid) substratum, but rather temporary and precarious crystallisations on a social-ontic field, which looks like moving sand, and can be outlined only in view of several factors or forces spread out in the form of a spectrum. By social being (Is) we do not understand a stable magnitude, which guides (or directs) and hierarchises the great variety of form of

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[224] Heidegger's teachings of being (Is) (i.e. ontology) is, in spite of the verbal rebellion against "metaphysics" (or rather a caricature of "metaphysics"), copied from the emanatism of late Schelling (in relation to that, Kondylis, *Metaphysikkritik*, p. 389ff.). Heidegger's early ontology of being (t)here (or existence; Daseins) eluded emanatism only because in this early ontology of being (t)here, the talk was of only a single being (Seienden) regarded in itself and only selectively connected with biopsychic, social-political etc. facticity; it is very questionable as to how Heidegger would have theoretically accommodated being (t)here (or existence), had he tackled the construction of a *social* ontology. Why the ontology of being (t)here (or existence) does not represent a social ontology, we explained in Section 1 of this Chapter.

phenomena (or manifestations) from the inside, but those factors or forces which keep the life of the humans living in society in motion, and give every causality only a relative and transitory predominance (i.e. superior potency or power) vis-à-vis other causalities. Formulated paradoxically: *Social being (Is) as object (or subject matter) of social ontology consists of those forces or factors which do not allow any solidification (or becoming fixed) of social being (Is), and consequently any causally or emanatistically (i.e. in an emanatistic manner) hierarchised apprehension of social being (Is).* The social-ontic forces or factors do not in fact have an effect as segregated (or separated) from one another and compact levers, but the social-ontic forces or factors constitute a spectrum, whose aspects indeed originally belong together, but, in terms of content, more or less diverge from one another, and consequently are constantly found in a state of tension, even of opposition (or conflict) towards one another. We may, nonetheless, legitimately talk of social ontology because the aforementioned forces or factors have (or display) a ubiquitous and simultaneous effect and because their effect makes up (or constitutes) *society* – as "order" and as "disorder" –. Everything with which the social sciences deal takes place against the background of a society, that is, against the background of the effect of those forces or factors; everything constitutes, as we have said, a temporary and precarious crystallisation on the fluid and open social-ontic field.

The social-ontic meaning of the clear epistemological distinction between law and causality can therefore be grasped as follows: the lawlessness (i.e. absence of law) of causality, while there is complete validity of the causality principle, in the field of the social sciences, originally and fundamentally interrelates with the fluid and Proteus-like (i.e. protean) character of the social-ontic, which should be the specific object (or

subject matter) of social ontology – said otherwise: social ontology interrelates, if one may say so, with the suitability of the social-ontic material to be cast (moulded or poured) always into new patterns, and in the course of this, to be subjected to always new causalities. The task of social ontology does not, according to that, consist in reducing the fluid and the varied (diverse or manifold) to fundamental patterns (or types) and fundamental genetic factors; the point is to make clear the spectrum of the forces or factors, which in nothing other than this – irreducible and inexhaustible – great variety of form is made discernible and can consist. *Social ontology does not offer a supreme or exclusive content-related or normative criterion for the consideration of human society and history, only that analysis of the foundations from which it comes (or emerges), because the putting forward (or formulation) of such a criterion is impossible.* Social ontology does not formulate regularities or causalities – let alone laws –, it has nothing to report about what humans must do in this or that situation, or how their collective action must proceed. In no case does social ontology want, therefore, to fulfil the ambitions of a Covering Law Model. Social ontology tries to outline the framework inside of which collective or individual, at any rate, social action moves, without being able to state anything whatsoever about the possible direction and possible outcome of the same collective or individual social action; all directions and all outcomes remain from one to the other corner of the framework in principle open, nothing can be excluded in advance. That is why the aforementioned framework does not constitute the (different or alternative) description (or formulation) of an all-embracing law or a regularity, but the ideal (abstract, theoretical or conceptual) formalised (i.e. rendered into forms) sum of the descriptions of all social acts (or actions). E.g. the spectrum of the social relation, to which we want to devote the next chapter, could only be comprehended

(or regarded) as law or regularity if its description would contain compelling data or indications which might enable knowledge about which aspect of this spectrum, under which circumstances, is activated, and puts the rest of the aspects of the said spectrum in the shade. There can be no talk about that. Social ontology says what there is in general, it does not declare (or explain) what occurs or what must occur as a rule or in the individual case. Such an explanation (or declaration) is a matter, rather the permanent desideratum, for the social sciences, which accordingly ascertain causalities or search for regularities. If the social sciences have great difficulty with that, then the social-ontological background or impact (or element) – whatever one wants to call it – of becoming (or events) is not least of all to blame for that, i.e. the constant presence of all social-ontologically relevant factors or forces in the whole gamut of their possibilities for development.

Now social scientists explain ex post facto recurring phenomena or individual events, and in this respect they look at (or consider) a completed, a no longer open, becoming (or series of events), which made a more or less one-sided use of the original potential of causalities. But social-scientific prognoses too move in the framework of a causally justifiable smaller number of suspected (assumed or presumed) possibilities, in relation to which some are excluded in advance – for instance the return of humanity to ancient slave-holding society within the next two decades. Things are entirely different with social ontology. Here the possibilities existing in the social-ontic field are at any time present in their entirety and ready for action [i.e. can readily act or be readily activated]. Stated more precisely: in the social-ontic field there are actually no past realities and not future possibilities. The entire spectrum is always (or constantly) represented by various actors, in relation to

which many an aspect of this spectrum is represented here and now (and in relation to these aspects the rest of the aspects appear as mere possibilities), while many an other aspect comes into effect there etc.. However, there has never been a moment in human history known to us without the spectrum being represented in its entirety at least summatively (i.e. as a summation). The ubiquitous presence of the social-ontic factors or forces makes clear why these ubiquitous social-ontic factors or forces are not considered causes of special phenomena or events: were the ubiquitous social-ontic factors or forces, causes of special phenomena or events, then noticeable boundaries (or limits) would have to be set to the great variety of form of the social world. If these ubiquitous social-ontic factors or forces may at all be seen as causal determinations, then this may be done just in a negative sense: the boundaries (or limits) of their possibilities for development mark the possible boundaries (or limits) of every becoming (or series of events) and, in this respect, they force this becoming into a framework – the framework of the social-human –, and remind us of the necessity to which everything social-human is subject. Social ontology investigates and describes therefore the necessary, not the sufficient conditions of behaviour and action of socially living humans; researching the sufficient conditions of behaviour and action of socially living humans is the task of the social sciences, which track causal interrelations.

Thus, the position of social ontology vis-à-vis the social sciences is by and large double. The recourse of sociology or of history to assumptions of a social-ontological character widens and deepens of course the understanding of the material handled by sociology or history, because scientific understanding functions by its very nature as the putting in order (or inclusion) of a situation (or facts (of the case)) into a factual

(objective or relevant) or thought (i.e. intellectual) framework – and the broader this framework, the more comprehensive the understanding. Historians and sociologists, who very often seek to prop up their individual explanations by means of general experiential (i.e. empirical) rules about the way in which humans meet and behave towards one another, or by means of general statements on the nature of social living together (or co-existence), of politics and of man, move mostly unknowingly and unsystematically in the social-ontological field (area or domain). Consequently, research practice, in need of explanation, takes refuge in statements to which it is not at all entitled by means of the logic of founding, i.e. by means of the epistemological delimitation (or demarcation) of the discipline concerned. Certainly similar statements never constitute specific and sufficient explanations, since, as we have said, social-ontological statements can in principle not offer such specific and sufficient explanations. Historians and sociologists, but also social ontologists, who confuse suchlike statements with explanations, and for instance put this or that war down to "human nature", as if humans, following the voice of their nature, only wage wars in their history, and would not have done anything else, have lost sight of the task and logic of social-scientific explanation. Social ontology does not explain any particular phenomenon or event, it must however make clear why A and simultaneously its opposite (or, that which is commonly regarded as such) are just as conceivable, why, that is, social-ontologically seen, the chances of war and peace are just as great, although from the social-scientific point of view, these same chances must be distributed, according to time and place, unequally. Social ontology is not there to teach the individual social sciences about methods and ways of explanation; social ontology makes its presence felt because it jumbles (or muddles up) the commands of the logic of founding from the outside

by forcing or enticing research practice, into the bargain, to found (or base) its explanations on actual fact on social-ontological statements. That quite often happens unconsciously, but not without reason (or not by chance). The concealed or open incursion (invasion or breaking-in) of social ontology into the terrain of the social sciences is made possible, in fact promoted, by the unity, openness and the flexibility of the social-ontic field. The material (or subject matter) of social ontology hardly in fact differs from that of the social sciences, the boundaries are not here of an ontic, but are of a cognitive-epistemological kind, and it is the incursion of the ontic into the cognitive-epistemological which jumbles (or muddles up) the boundaries – without however being able to abolish these boundaries: because there is no and there will never be an intellectus archetypus (archetypal intellect), which could disregard the finiteness of the human intellect and without the help of cognitive-epistemological boundaries and fictions at once overlook (i.e. have a view of) the entire social-ontic field. From the longing for the intellectus archetypus – objectively formulated: from the incessant pressure of the unified (or united) social-ontic field on the boundaries between the disciplines – springs, in the final analysis, the unease of broadly educated and far-seeing social scientists vis-à-vis epistemological and cognitive necessities or fictions, as differently as one may express this unease. As the conceptual apprehension of the unified (or united), open and flexible social-ontic field – and in this respect for its part as scientific fiction too – social ontology partly puts the social sciences and the social-ontic field in connection with, partly in contrast (or opposition) to one another; social ontology indeed reminds us of the ontic commonality of the material (or subject matter) of all social sciences, at the same time however social ontology acquires exactly thereby a deeper insight into the necessity and character of the social sciences' boundaries or their founding, since social

ontology wants to in principle leave aside the social-ontic common denominator from social-scientific question formulations, keep the said social-ontic common denominator for itself, and then use the social-ontic common denominator as a battering ram in order to make a breach in those boundaries.

The epistemological boundaries between the social sciences, which are fixed by their founding, are not of the same kind as those between social ontology and the social sciences; sociology and history differ from each other because of their thematic area (or field) and their methods differently than both together from social ontology. Every social science in principle, i.e. in accordance with its founding, deals with certain phenomena rather than other phenomena, without though being in a position, with the help of its own criteria, to properly assess each and every respective weight of those phenomena in the social-ontic field. Misled by the fact that the social-ontic material (or subject matter) is just one and inseparable, every social science tends in fact to equate its own thematic area either with the entire social-ontic field or to look at its own thematic area as the entire social-ontic field's objectively privileged core. However, the specific weight of the phenomena, with which every social science deals, constantly changes in the social-ontic field, and with that specific weight, the position of the social science concerned shifts vis-à-vis the social-ontological problem area, although the position of the social science concerned vis-à-vis the rest of the social sciences remains the same; because the logic of founding of a social science does not have to change as soon as the specific weight of the thematic area of this same social science increases or decreases in the social-ontic field – otherwise the disciplines would quickly cease to exist as disciplines. Since all factors or forces of the social-ontic field are simultaneously present as

aspects of a spectrum and every one of these factors or forces at any time can come to the forefront, thus the determinative phenomena and causalities alternate, and at times a historical event, at other times a sociological structure, one time a psychological given fact, another time an institution or a role, is the decisive factor. From a social-ontological point of view, this steady and often surprising (unexpected or sudden) change does not cause any theoretical difficulties, but no doubt does cause theoretical difficulties from the point of view of the individual social sciences, whose objective priorities interrelate with their logic of founding and cannot be turned upside down without betrayal (or abandonment) of their each and every respective epistemological identity (that is to say: of one's own power claim in the realm of knowledge). Confusion and – manifesting itself in sterile methodological diatribes – quarrelsomeness grow here as a rule not only because the place and importance (or status) of all phenomena in the social-ontic field constantly change, but also because every phenomenon can be looked at both social-scientifically as well as social-ontologically, and indeed from several perspectives. Because social ontology differs from the social sciences also due to the fact that it changes its standpoint in accordance with the prevailing ontic aspect on each and every respective occasion. The social-ontic field is indeed unified (or united), but not one-dimensional, and social ontology must accordingly turn out multi-dimensionally [i.e. end up or be found to be multi-dimensional], as we shall see later in this section.

If so, then the social sciences cannot be classified on the basis of the criterion of their increasing or decreasing proximity to social ontology. One may not therefore assert that sociology is nearer to social ontology than for instance history, because sociology makes general statements

about entire classes of social phenomena, whereas history concerns itself with special (i.e. specific) phenomena and can hardly make generalisations. Such a distinction between sociology and history, whose validity may here remain an open question, could serve the determination of each and every respective proximity of these disciplines to social ontology only under the assumption that social-ontological statements are still more general than sociological statements, that is, social ontology is the supreme science, because it is a strictly nomological science. No doubt, the generality of social-ontological statements is absolute, because these concern the entire social being (Is), and outside of this same social being (Is) there is nothing socially; social ontology however refers to the framework and the factors or forces of the social-ontic becoming (or events), without touching upon the question of the social-ontic becoming's each and every respective presumable outcome. Yet the regularities of which sociology speaks or of which it searches for, aim at ascertaining the relative frequency and therefore probability of an outcome in comparison with the probability of another outcome. Linear intensifications (heightenings or increases) of the same thought (intellectual) content(s) from discipline to discipline are not to be found here. If we take the multi-dimensionality of social ontology seriously, then we may, in view of social ontology's content-related analogies in relation to the social sciences, at most venture the assertion that some of its dimensions come to the forefront in historical, some in sociological or political, some finally in anthropological studies, while at the same time the boundaries between these disciplines remain extremely flowing (i.e. fluid). Thus, the theoretical lingering (or dwelling) on the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation, on the internal dynamics of the political or of identity formation and power, can offer the historian some kind of orientation (or guidance) and a certain refinement of the faculty (or

power) of judgement, in so far as this historian seeks to shed light on acts (or actions) on the basis of a general notion of humans and human behaviour, which he has at the back of his mind, while sometimes in fact programmatically supporting this general notion. We have already expounded why such orientation or social-ontological schooling cannot advance up to the sufficient reasons of the phenomenon to be explained. However, the great assistance of social ontology towards history is of a fundamental kind and lies elsewhere: in the knowledge of the openness and flexibility of the social-ontic field, which does not bestow upon sociological hypostatisations and dehistoricisations a long life. In this important sense, social ontology is a true ally of the historical way of looking at things against a superficial sociologism. The conceptual axes of social ontology are laid out so that the transition from them to the historical way of looking at human things (i.e. affairs) can take place unconstrainedly and without the mediation of sociological pseudo-generalisations. The ascertainments of the openness and plasticity of the social-ontic field, of the fragmentation and the alternation of causalities, of the, at any time, imminent swing (or shift) of the pendulum towards the opposite side, really invite the historical way of looking at things. Furthermore: social ontology shares the profoundly subversive character of the historical way of looking at things by demonstrating the fragility and internal contradictoriness of everything that is in the social-ontic field, not least of all every sociologically apprehensible social order. Because the forces or factors, which in their entire spectrum have an effect permanently in that field and make up the conceptual axes of social ontology, are the same forces or factors which – as necessary, not sufficient conditions – create and at the same time destroy everything that constitutes (or provides) the object (or subject matter) of history and of sociology.

The latter remark offers us a good guide (main connecting thread or leitmotif) in order to go deeper into the relations between social ontology and sociology. If social facts as crystallisations of social action (which for its part does not have to be the action of collectives (i.e. collective entities or groups), but can just as much be the resultant of the action of a number of individuals) constitute the object (or subject matter) of sociology in accordance with its logic of founding, and regardless of research practice's necessities, then the composition (texture or constitution) of the central object (or subject matter) of social ontology, namely the composition (texture or constitution) of the fact of society, makes clear why the sometimes crystallised social facts are not destined for eternal life. Every crystallisation of social action occupies only a part or aspect of the social-ontologically ascertained overall spectrum of the fact "society", and the rest of the parts or aspects weigh on society until sooner or later society gives in to the rest of the parts or aspects' pressure. The fact of society entails the existence of social facts, and society can only actually exist in the form of social facts. However, the fact of society itself is not merely more comprehensive, but also more fluid and more open than every individual social fact, so that the fact of society brings forth from its womb and material those social facts which gnaw away at or destroy the already crystallised social facts. It should be emphatically repeated: just as during the formation, so too during the dissolution of social facts, social-ontological points of view can bring to light only necessary, never sufficient reasons and conditions. Social ontology cannot replace the social sciences, however much both fields of knowledge in their research practice may, must and are allowed to go into each other. No leap leads from social-ontological statements, that is, from statements about the social-ontic field in its entirety and about the fact of society, to fully justified explanations of social facts. Sociology always remains – and

indeed preferably – directly or indirectly bound to historically loaded contents, which essentially differ from one another (the sociology of the formation of literary taste for instance, and the sociology of "industrial relations" have at most general methical (i.e. methodological) aspects in common), and are constantly thematically expanded in order to take into account new social facts. Social ontology, on the other hand, illuminates (or takes a look at) the way the factors or forces of the social-ontic field have an effect in social facts, that is, the way social facts interrelate with the fact of society. Whatever goes beyond that, is not within (or evades) social ontology's competence. If social facts were completely absorbed by the social-ontic factors or forces permanently having an effect, then social ontology and sociology, already from their logic of founding, would have to coincide with each other, and in social reality the same factors or forces would have to always bring about (or generate) the same social facts. This is, however, impossible already because social-ontic factors or forces can be connected (or combined) with the most different historical and social content(s), and indeed in the most different of ways: because the said social-ontic factors or forces do not develop (or unfold) of themselves, as we have said, univocally or one-dimensionally, but they originally constitute a spectrum, whose parts or aspects can even be in content-related opposition (or conflict) with one another. Thus, social ontology proves that no sociological concept stricto sensu can be applicable to all societies without exception, whereby social ontology further emphasises the historical character of sociological research.

These differences are certainly expressed in both disciplines' different logic of founding. On the other hand, the ubiquitous effect of the social-ontic factors or forces make overlappings (or intersections) in research

practice inevitable, which are more consequential than the corresponding overlappings (or intersections) between social ontology and history. Sociology of course deals with *social* phenomena and facts, and the investigation of its objects (or subject matter) easily slips into the question of what the *social* is generally and what *societas* is generally. Now sociological thought has, since its beginnings, often sought the solution to its problem in various economic, biological, psychological etc. reductionisms by circumventing strictly sociological categories[225]. The theoretical danger of a social-ontological reductionism appears on the horizon when sociologists want to deduce answers to sociological questions from general statements (or propositions) about the essence (or nature) of the social and of society and from the teachings of forms about the social relations of humans. Because of that, the turn towards the unhistorical, or the unbridgeable gap between the necessary and sufficient conditions of social phenomena (or manifestations), is pre-programmed, yet precisely the unhistorical and ultimately unsociological character of such foundings of sociology leads to insights into the effect of the permanent factors or forces of the social-ontic field. What in the course of this emerges, is though neither fish nor fowl. It cannot be sociology already because of the lacking mediation (or intervention) between fundamental conceptuality and historical and or social facts; on the other hand, it is not social ontology because of its unsystematic and partial character. Such hermaphrodites (i.e. disciplines with a hermaphroditic character) are for instance formal sociology or symbolic interactionism, in so far as this symbolic interactionism was put in the service of sociological (more accurately: micro-sociological) research. As we want to show in the next two chapters, formal-sociological and interactionistic

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[225] Cf. Brittan, *Meanings*, p. 1ff., esp. p. 6.

ideas can at most be used as a building block in the description of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation; this mechanism and that spectrum are, however, understandable only against the background of other assumptions, and only this entire thoughts complex (or complex of ideas) in its logical and objective coherence can provide (or constitute) the scaffolding (i.e. framework) of a social ontology. It is not otherwise as regards Weber's founding of sociology, since the concept of social action, as he defines it, offers an (alternative or indirect) description of the social relation, from which the transition to the real – historical-content-related examination of themes (or topics) of sociology, is to be made just as little as from Simmel's formalities (i.e. form-related lines of thought). Luckily, neither Weber the ingenious researcher, nor Simmel the subtle analyst, followed their own sociological logic of founding; had they remained consistent in regard to their respective sociological logic of founding, then they would have had to have devised a social ontology. The splitting and the tension in the theoretical corpus of sociology owing to the forced being next to one another (i.e. co-existence) of epistemologically heterogeneous elements have not been abolished until today; such splitting and tension in the theoretical corpus of sociology have in fact deepened through the getting out of hand (becoming rife or uncontrolled spread) of the phenomenology of the lifeworld and of symbolic interactionism in recent decades. What in many places is complained about as the inability to bring together the two main strands of sociological thought, in reality constitutes an insurmountable theoretical awkwardness (or perplexity) vis-à-vis a badly formulated and thus insoluble problem. One cannot proceed here rhapsodically, as if it were a matter of sticking together anew the disjecta membra (i.e. scattered fragments) of a single discipline after an arbitrary separation of the said disjecta membra's original unity; it is a matter of the coordination

and the co-operation of two different disciplines, and these can be achieved only on the basis of the two different disciplines' previous clear epistemological separation from each other – the ontic unity of the material (or subject matter) already provides, beyond each respective logic of founding, for the necessary content-related interweaving of the bilateral (or mutual) research practice of both disciplines (i.e. social ontology and sociology).

This unity does not extend only in synchrony, but likewise in diachrony. The social-ontic does not consist of younger and older strata, but rather of equally original (or equiprimordial) aspects; and the task of social ontology is to work out (ascertain or investigate) the great variety of form, the necessary interrelation (or correlation) and the just as necessary equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of these aspects. In this sense, the archaic is always young here, at any rate younger and fresher than phenomena (or manifestations) which come on the scene with the claim of establishing their own newness (or novelty) as historical eternity. Precisely the equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of the social-ontic's aspects in their simultaneous complementarity and contrast (opposition or conflict) ensures incidentally – as a necessary condition – the openness and the endless (or infinite) productivity of history. What may appear on the social-ontic field as change is merely the at times rearrangement of those equally original (or equiprimordial) aspects having an effect simultaneously, if not uniformly too. Change in historical and sociological phenomena is, in contrast, qualitative; such change takes place in different time periods, and consequently it brings about a more or less intense (severe or stark) qualitative differentiation of time, which seems to disintegrate into larger or smaller heterogeneous fragments. Every historical or sociological phenomenon (or manifestation) lives in

(i.e. occupies) or produces, as one would say, its own time fragment, in order to struggle in vain for its prolongation – or shortening. Even if every historical or sociological phenomenon – prepared as a sociological ideal type and in accordance with the subjective meaning (or sense) connected with it – lasts centuries or millennia ("Christendom", "New Times"), it has, nevertheless, its irreplaceable place inside of the overall becoming (or events), its unique (or one-off) time period, in which no other phenomenon (or manifestation) fits; thus it looks, at least in a retrospective representation, as if history which thanks to the dynamics of the social-ontic field bearing it is in principle open, all the same consists, in terms of detail (or in particular cases), of closed units (unities or entities) and different qualities of time. In social ontology things look reversed. The real openness of the social-ontic field appears in the interweaving of the social-ontic factors or forces with the individual (or separate) temporally determined historical phenomena (or manifestations), in relation to which the internal tensions and contrasts (or conflicts) in the spectrum of those factors or forces provide for the said factors or forces' suitability to spread inside of the most different, in terms of content, absolutely opposed phenomena (or manifestations). However, at the level of the description and of the conceptual apprehension of these same factors and forces, time stands, as it were, still. Social ontology deals with the slowest time flow which human affairs (or things) know. The spectrum of the social-ontic factors and forces remains stable since the attested beginnings of the history of mankind, no matter how its individual (or separate) aspects may have been rearranged according to time and place; no rearrangement can, in any case, conclusively drive out (or displace) or exclude earlier or conceivable rearrangements, that is, monopolise the spectrum for itself.

The diachronic stability of the spectrum, which takes root in (or is based on) the synchrony and equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of its aspects, is no mere theoretical postulate and no mere heuristic fiction, which still awaits its empirical confirmation. It, on the contrary, constitutes an age-old knowledge or notion which has been articulated more or less vaguely in all cultures, and can be reconstructed already by the reading of the oldest texts which we know. This diachronic stability of the spectrum always aimed at providing the answer to the elementary question or at explaining the elementary feeling of how it is possible that what is constantly new happens in a world which after all is so old and somehow seems familiar. Those oldest texts in fact speak a directly understandable language – for the most part considerably more understandable than modern sociological jargon – and talk of human social behaviour and of human motivations, which we can comprehend without a second thought. What, in the course of this, we cannot grasp without a scientific pre-education (or educational background) is that which otherwise makes up the object (or subject matter) of historical and sociological research: customs (or manners) and institutions, world theories (i.e. world views) and rituals. This distinction is in a twofold respect of great significance. First, it refers to a stratum of depth of social life, which socially living man knows from immediate experience, because this stratum of depth of social life consists of factors or forces to whose composition (texture or constitution) and whose spectrum every actor must orientate his action, no matter in which society he may be found. This stratum of depth coincides with what we call the social-ontic field, and its essence (or nature) can be fathomed without us knowing anything about temporally-historically determined religious, national, political etc. ideas, with which actors connect their action's subjectively meant meaning (or sense), indeed with which actors have to connect in

every state (or situation) of culture in order to be able to support the said subjectively meant meaning socially. Social ontology therefore is no history of ideas or analysis of ideology, as history and sociology must (also) be. Social ontology elucidates the terrain (territory or ground) on which ideas grow and makes clear why on this terrain, the terrain of an elementary or complex culture, the social-ontic factors or forces in their necessary bond with concrete humans can only develop via ideas. The necessity of the ideational mediation (or intervention) of everything social is a social-ontic fact and must be explained social-ontologically; but ideas as particular content(s) do not possess social-ontic necessity, and in this sense one can in principle assert: there are no ideas, there are humans living in society and culture, whose social-ontically determined and explainable action must be connected with what one commonly calls ideas.

Thus we have come to the second implication of the distinction mentioned above between the levels of understanding. This time it is a matter of the much-discussed alternative "cultural relativism vs. universal understanding"[226]. Cultural relativism is based on the perception that the criteria for the understanding of a society are put at one's disposal by this society itself, that understanding therefore comes about only when one is able to understand (fathom or re-enact in one's mind) a society's self-understanding in all its details and ramifications in social life; but no member of a foreign society would be in a position to do that. Here a coming undone (or absorption) of social action in the very same subjective sense connected with it is postulated, and no distance is perceived between the becoming (or events) in the social-ontic field and the ideationally articulated self-understanding of actors. As soon as this

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[226] In detail in relation to that: Ch. 5, Sec. 2.

distance comes into view, the conclusion follows that understanding and observing actors find themselves in the same social-ontic, if not necessarily the same historical or sociological field, and that that aspect of their action, which lies on that side or this side of their each and every respective self-understanding, must be common to them on the basis of the social-ontic field's compelling given facts, as much as their various kinds of self-understanding may also differ from one another. This opens up a secure perspective for mutual understanding on a social-ontic basis, as a common example can illustrate: two foes, who cannot and do not want to "understand" each other culturally etc. at all, understand each other, nevertheless, very well and without talking to each other on a battlefield, by one of them directing his action in accordance with what the other is doing or will presumably (or likely) do. In this way, the social-ontological way of looking at things makes the bounds (or limits) of cultural relativism, and at the same time the possibilities and meaning (or sense) of universal understanding, visible; because understanding as the fundamental mechanism of the social relation lies likewise originally, and regardless of its each and every respective cultural formation, in the social-ontic field.

Social ontology is talk of this social-ontic field, social ontology constitutes the social-ontic field's conceptual reconstruction. In this respect, social ontology unfolds (or develops) as a scientific fiction at the level of description, not unlike history or sociology. That is why it shares the same fate of all scientific fictions: it fails and is pushed aside when it cannot "save" the phenomena in the Platonic sense. In order to be able to save the phenomena, a discipline must, though, clarify first through its logic of founding which phenomena fall under its competence so that its competence can be measured justly in respect of the said discipline's own

claim. After the fixing (or determining) of the conceptual and content-related framework through the logic of founding, this framework may be proved as being in need of improvement or even as largely unsuitable. In both cases, reflection on the historical experience of social life must answer the question as to whether the undertaking of a social ontology, all the same, is worthwhile and should be continued in another form. No epistemological profundity and no methodological art(s) of improvisation can, at any rate, disregard the banal but compelling criterion of empirical conclusiveness (or validity), unless it does so in its imagination. Social ontology is an empirical discipline like every other empirical discipline too, and no philosophical posture (or pose) can release it from the prosaic duties which arise from that. Nonetheless, social ontology is not positivistically inclined and indeed in neither of both the basic meanings of the word in the 19th century. Social ontology does not therefore arrive at its generalisations through induction on the basis of sensorily(or sensorially)-experimentally ascertainable facts; and it does not want to imitate the natural (i.e. physical) sciences and proceed nomologically. The laws of positivistic social science try to anticipate, via the assumption of fixed (steady or stable) hierarchies of causal factors, outcomes of becoming (or events) in terms of content. Social ontology does not deal with such content(s), but with that framework, inside of which the great variety of form of content(s) and the openness of outcomes appear (or occur) without fail. And the factors or forces, which are at social ontology's conceptual centre (or focus of attention), do not have an effect, as we must repeat in conclusion, compactly in one sole direction, but the said factors or forces spread out in the shape (or form) of a spectrum, whose aspects in part are in fact in content-related opposition (or conflict) with one another.

B. The being (Is) of society as object (or subject matter) of social ontology

Social ontology is the ontology of the social. The social is that which specifically characterises the being (Is) of society, that is, society as a social-ontologically specific concept and the social coincide. The being (Is) of society, looked at as a primeval (i.e. primordial) fact, accordingly constitutes the natural starting point of social ontology, just as the being (Is) of the world per se, likewise as a primeval fact, has been the intellectual conditio sine qua non (i.e. absolutely essential condition) of philosophical ontology. If now social ontology has society in the specific sense as social ontology's object (or subject matter), then evidently social ontology does not concern itself with everything which is found in society and may represent even the material precondition of the being (Is) of the social. Not everything in society and not everything which society conditionally or unconditionally needs for existence, is society in the relevant, for social ontology, sense. That does not mean that human things (or affairs) are divided already externally into those which relate to the social, and those which do not relate to the social. Rather the dividing line runs crossways through everything which lives and weaves (i.e. moves) in society, that is, somehow or other interrelates with the doing (i.e. acts) and being (Is) of socially living humans – the dividing line goes, above all, crossways through man himself. Just as the economy, institutions or products of the intellect(-spirit) (or mind) have their social-ontologically instructive and their only historically-sociologically derivable sides, so too a social-ontologically relevant anthropology must leave wide areas in respect of the study of man to other disciplines, beginning with biology. That is why the anthropological, just as the

political, appear differently from the perspective of social ontology than from the perspective of general anthropology or of common political science, while at the same time the separation of these perspectives does not concern the subject areas, but (changing) aspects.

The determination of the being (Is) of society as object (or subject matter) of social ontology implies something else. If the question formulation (or central theme) wants to be social-*ontological*, then such question formulation must advance to a theoretical point from which it may mean: thus was society originally composed, and no element of society's theoretical reconstruction is superfluous or can be reduced to an even deeper and more original dimension – provided of course that one remains during this consideration at the same epistemological level and with the same logic of founding, without for instance attempting, for the purpose of the underpinning of the most general, that is, ontological claim, to categorially think of the foundations of social ontology together with those of biology. Cybernetic systems theory, which raises universal claims, and wants to at once embrace all strata of social and non-social being (Is), cannot provide (or constitute) a *social* ontology because cybernetic systems theory cannot by means of its specifically own categorial apparatus ascertain the necessary (pre)conditions of historical and sociological phenomena which a social ontology must name, but smuggles these necessary (pre)conditions into its theoretical corpus through selective loans from the biological etc. sciences. A sociology cannot again support the said necessary (pre)conditions because it cannot by means of this same apparatus explain historical content(s), that is, it is not in a position to apprehend even the sufficient conditions of historical and sociological phenomena; such content is brought into play at most selectively and amateurishly for the explanation of already well-

established principles pertaining to systems theory. The situation is analogous to functionalistic systems theory, which was initiated by ethnologists subsequent to Durkheim, and in many ways was interwoven with pre-cybernetic forms of systems theory, and likewise belongs to the sociologies social-ontologically laid out in an unreflected (unthinking or uncritical) manner. Here a system of needs or striving for these needs' satisfaction underlies the being (Is) of society, in relation to which individual aspects of the social order or individual institutions are connected with biological and anthropological constants, i.e. with exactly these fundamental needs. This position of course does not satisfy concrete sociological and historical claims in respect of explanation, moreover it is more than doubtful whether the said position withstands social-ontological examination by wanting to deduce the being (Is) of society from another order, namely, the biological-anthropological order of needs. Society does not in fact exist *so that* the needs, established in advance, of its members are satisfied by the division of labour and institutional measures. Things are the other way around: *because* the human genus (i.e. race) (or mankind) lives since primeval times in society, certain institutions were formed (or developed), and continue to be formed (or developed), for the socially regulated satisfaction of needs. The satisfaction of needs takes place in view of the fact that humans live in society. Still further: other needs beyond the biological-animal – and the manner of the satisfaction of exactly these needs – would not have arisen at all without the fact of society and without the propulsive dynamic(s) of life in society. Naturally, an elementary stratum of depth of human needs has nothing to do with social-ontologically relevant factors; that, however, which is as a need social-ontologically irrelevant is also not specifically human. Specifically human needs are satisfied from the point where social-ontologically relevant factors come into play.

The determination of the being (Is) of society as object (or subject matter) of social ontology means, thirdly, that the factors or forces which thematically compose social ontology, do not exist in connection with or against the background of a society, but are the society or make up the social-ontologically specific concept of society. The said factors or forces have not gradually given rise to society as an in principle independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) social-ontic magnitude by their doing (i.e. acting) together; rather they were separated as analytical categories from each other only at the cognitive level of social ontology. In order to have a specifically social-ontological meaning, these forces or factors must be able, taken together, to give an account of the being (Is) of society, that is, the elementary ascertainment of the being (Is) of society must be able, at the level of social-ontological description, to be transcribed as an ascertainment of the equal indispensability, and not least of all, of the equal originality (or equiprimordiality) of the social-ontic factors or forces. One can be certain that *being* (*Is*) has been apprehended, when beyond this apprehension nothing can be meant (to think of nothingness is of course a completely different matter, which one may confidently leave to those who have the being and the time in relation to that)[viii]. From a social-ontological perspective, this means that the being (Is) of society has been apprehended conceptually when, outside the analytically pin-pointed social-ontic factors or forces, nothing can be thought of, which in accordance with the knowledge of social processes (or series of events) until now, would count social-ontically. Consequently, the analytical separation of those factors or forces from one another amounts to, as it were, an evaluation of their each and every respective social-ontic relevance; the said analytical separation is carried out as a thought experiment in order to find out what could possibly be social-ontically dispensable. The said social-ontic factors or forces must all be logically

indispensable (i.e. genetically equally original (or equiprimordial)) – and their already emphasised disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) in the shape (or form) of a spectrum, which through internal tension, in fact through the contradictoriness the spectrum's aspects, appears just as indispensable. This disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) is to be thought of together with the fact of society just like the social-ontic factors or forces in their conceptual separation from one another; only with regard to these social-ontic forces or factors or to the constant redispositions (i.e. rearrangements or redisposals) inside of the aforementioned spectrum, is the historical and sociological horizon opened up (i.e. revealed), – and social ontology should at all times ensure the free transition to the historical and sociological way of looking at things, and on each and every respective occasion build conceptual bridges in view of this transition.

Such an important bridge is the determination (or definition) of social "order" or "disorder" in light of the ascertainment of the disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) of the social-ontic factors or forces in the form of a spectrum rich in (i.e. replete with) tension. If the fact of society is certain and unalterable, then no disorder can be imagined as the literal dissolution (or disintegration) of society in the social-ontological sense of the word. "Disorder" constitutes a, on each and every respective occasion, differently proceeding and defined becoming (or series of events) as being (Is); it is ontically laid out (or inherent) in the disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) of the spectrum of the social-ontic factors or forces. The same applies to "order". That is why the historian or the sociologist, who puts real societies under the microscope, must know that these real societies can, already for social-ontological reasons, live (or exist) neither entirely in "order" nor entirely in "disorder"; his task is to

find out the sufficient reasons for which the social-ontological spectrum has shifted, in this or that time fragment, towards the side of "order" or towards that of "disorder". The constellation (i.e. correlation) of the concrete (economic, institutional, ideological etc.) factors, which support the "order" of a certain society remains unique and contingent; the said constellation may, that is, under no circumstances – especially under the influence of subjective ideals and wishes – be projected onto a fixed (steady or stable) hierarchy of order-creating factors (i.e. factors which bring about or establish order) and be passed off as the conclusive decipherment of the secret of "the" social order. Here sociology, in vain by the way, presumes (or usurps) social-ontological powers by surrounding something which is contingently determined, as well as determined in terms of content, with the aura of necessity. Between "order" in the social-ontological sense and "order" in the historical-sociological sense, a sharp conceptual dividing line is, in any case, to be drawn. The former has no particular content, it is not bound to any hierarchy of factors, but refers to the presupposed fact of society which no "disorder" could destroy and whose discontinuation would also withdraw every meaning from talk of "disorder". The latter, on the other hand, is characterised by its binding to content(s) and hierarchies of factors, and its relationship with the social-ontological sense consists in that it comes to grips, well or badly, with the questions (or tasks), which the irrefutable fact of social living together (i.e. co-existence) poses (or sets), in a concrete situation. The assertion that this or that particular coming to terms with the aforementioned questions (or tasks) alone guarantees the (continued) existence of society in general, has a legitimising character and conceals a power claim: the champions of a certain social order normally describe the same social order as the solely conceivable or at least the best possible realisation of social order in

general. However, order in the social-ontological sense, i.e. the fact of society, is never endangered because it encompasses both that which is called "order" from a historical-sociological point of view, as well as that which from the same historical-sociological point of view is called "disorder". A civil war belongs, just like harmonious peace, to *social* situations, that is, to those situations which, irrespective of their sufficient reasons, are acted out necessarily inside of the social-ontic field or spectrum. In so far as sociological notions of order are based on fixed (steady or stable) hierarchisations of factors, and every disruption – at least total disruption – of the same order is equated with disorder, the said sociological notions of order directly or indirectly lump order, "normality" and peace together[227]. For social ontology, on the other hand, everything is normal which belongs to the being (Is) of society, i.e. takes place inside of society and is done by socially living humans. A clear distinction between the social-ontological and historical-sociological level makes, moreover, understandable why talk of the "dissolution (or disintegration)" of society as a result of "disorder" is just as social-ontologically nonsensical as such talk's positive pendant (i.e. counterpart), namely the attempt at constructing society from ultimate building units (unities or blocks). Sociologists often use expressions like for instance "societies cease to exist", when they merely mean thereby that a certain political collective was destroyed through conquest, civil war etc.[228]. Social-ontologically significant, however, is not the

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[227] That applies to sociologies with a social-ontological element, as for instance Parsonian sociology, but also to conflict sociologies, which want to perceive conflict selectively-positively and within limits (see below Ch. III, Sec. 4). Presupposing the far-reaching subsumption of conflict under the generic term (or concept) of order, a fellow traveller of Parsons can write some sentences which, if taken at face value, must mean a death blow to systems theory – and the confirmation of our dual social-ontological perspective: "The structures of integration and unintegratedness existing simultaneously in intricate patterns are by no means entirely stable. Integration is an intermittent phenomenon. It is never more than partial. It is not constant or continuous. It is frequently shifting from one part of the society to others." (Shils, *Center*, p. 81).

[228] See e.g. Shils, loc. cit., p. 52ff..

replacement of a collective drawn up (or constituted) thus by a new and differently drawn up (or constituted) collective, but the certainty that society again will have to take the place of society.

The existence of "disorder" in society is often ascribed to "unsocial (i.e. anti-social)" tendencies or, at any rate, to "anti-social" behaviour of individuals or groups. Just like "order", so too the "social" as a rule has a normative connotation, that is, it does not point to the naked fact of human living together (i.e. co-existence) in society, but preferably to properties (i.e. qualities or characteristics), which could contribute to the better coordination or harmonisation of this living together. Man's sociality is equated with what paedagogically minded sociologists call man's socialisation or capacity for such socialisation, and accordingly society is comprehended in the stronger or in the weaker sense depending on how successfully society conducts the socialisation of its members. The intentions of this language usage are edifying; the consequence of such language usage means conceptual confusion. In fact, adaptation (or conformity) and rebellion, good deeds and crime, are equally social and only conceivable in society. The social-ontological primacy of the being (Is) of society does not have the slightest to do with any restriction or pre-programming of individual action. One cannot therefore either, by invoking supra-individual social being (Is), achieve desired channelings of individual acts (or actions) as Durkheim tried it unsuccessfully with his faits sociaux [social facts], nor, with reference to the openness of individual action, call into question the fact of society or want to reconstruct the fact of society from individual act(ion)s. All that is only flagrant leaps in logic which are motivated by normativisms of a different hue. Linguistically, these logical leaps find expression not only in the aforementioned confusion of "social" with "socialised", but also in the

erroneous identification of "social" with "collective", whose reverse side is the likewise erroneous contradistinction of "social" and "individual". The latter wants to suggest a dichotomous picture as if an individual could stand on one bank, and a society on another bank of the same river. However, in so far as we are talking about one and the same society, this society cannot be conceived without the totality of its individuals, otherwise it would be the whole which would be found outside of one part of itself. The individual does not exist together *with* society, but *in* society, i.e. in a permanent positive and negative, open and secret, direct and indirect confrontation with humans who belong to the same or, at any rate, a collective, as well as with that which constitutes the institutional and cultural product of the action of other humans. The individual's external and internal activity always has a social reference and aspect, which one only undervalues and misjudges when one – again by way of a logical leap – confuses the individual with the personal in the narrower sense of the word, i.e. with that which makes up the more or less unique character of a person. All humans are equally and in the same sense individuals, however they are persons in a, on each and every respective occasion, different way, which is not social-ontologically apprehensible and does not necessarily interrelate with the social-ontological question of the relation between individual and collective or society. Because it cannot be proved that this certain mould (or shaping) of the personal must exclusively entail that certain internal and external activity of the individual regardless of time, place and situation. The personal as opponent of the individual or the social counts even less if we consider the extent to which "personal" feelings, opinions and modes of behaviour are premoulded (preformed or preshaped), in fact modeled socially-collectively – an extent which only the all-too-human egocentrism and complacency addicted to gaining validity (recognition and prestige) (that

is, ultimately again the socially determined need for identity) strives to make smaller. The following, in any case, is to be stressed: the social and the individual are not counter concepts, the social therefore does not at all coincide with the collective, but the individual and the collective constitute manifestations of the social against the background of the fact of society; an individual's action cannot be collective, however it must, just like collective action, be social. There is a personal character and style, however there is no purely personal action in any social-ontologically relevant sense. Even he who seeks salvation (or redemption) in the desert, indeed acts individually, but not personally in the sense of an action which would not in itself have anything at all determined socially; because salvation (or redemption) is a concept and a need which can come into being only in human societies.

These fundamental conceptual clarifications are supposed to mark out social ontology's field (or area) as the field of that which can be conceived only as an aspect or a constituent element (or part) of the fact of society. The individual, and the individual action of socially living humans, belong to the fact of society. If one did not want to accept the primeval (i.e. primordial) fact of society and attempted a (theoretical) construction of the same society on the basis of the principle of methodological individualism, then the sole possible ontological underpinning of the social sciences would be an anthropology cut off from social-ontological points of view – actually a contradictio in se [contradiction in itself]. The being (Is) of society could be reduced to individuals only if these individuals did not originally have at their disposal properties (i.e. qualities or characteristics) which only socially living individuals can possess. However, there is no excuse for wanting to have both simultaneously: both individuals as independent (autonomous

or self-sufficient) ontic building units (unities or blocks) of society, as well as individuals with a [cultural] equipment which can be acquired only in an already existing society. Only individuals equipped in such a manner would at all be, in an individualistic construction of society, capable of acting so that *society* comes into being from their combined action. The thesis that individual activity can be conceived only against the background of society, is supposed to mean that no individual can derive everything which happens from his own action *and* that his own action is dependent on the action of other humans. Society cannot therefore be reconstructed as the sum of ontically independent (autonomous or self-sufficient) units (unities or entities). Society's being (Is) is a whole, but not such that exists invisibly next to its visible constituent elements (or parts). Society's ontic independence (autonomy or self-sufficiency) is rather to be seen in the lack of independence (lack of autonomy or lack of self-sufficiency) of every one of its individual constituent elements (or parts) vis-à-vis the rest of the constituent elements (or parts). That obviously applies irrespective of how one defines these constituent elements, and if one, for instance, wants to leave behind the theoretical bottlenecks (i.e. the hindrances to theoretical progress) of methodological individualism, with the help of variations of interactionism. Because microstructural and macrostructural interactions are acted out, just like individual activity, against the background of society. Hence, microstructural and macrostructural interactions are subject to formal (i.e. form-related) and qualitative restrictions, and no chemically pure apprehension of them can be considered, so that already because of that, it can be disputed that they are suitable as building blocks for the construction of society[229]. The same must be said about attempts at

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[229] Cf. Sec. 2Ce in this Chapter.

the reconstruction of individual social phenomena from interactions of a limited scope. Social power and domination (dominance or rule) cannot e.g. be sufficiently studied at the level of a commune (i.e. local authority district, municipality, council or community), which is inserted into a state and is unburdened by sovereign functions which bear their own administrative apparatus. Just as little may contracts, which the contracting parties have already concluded as members of a society and nationals (or citizens) of a certain state, be taken as the yardstick in order to judge (or gauge) the social-constitutive viability of the contract as an institution. In the next Section we want to point out the consequences of these ascertainments for the social-ontological evaluation of the political.

Our conclusion: whoever is about to explain the *possibility* of society (and social order), cannot essentially do anything other than have recourse to those magnitudes which exist and have an effect in the *reality* of society, while at the same time this reality is in actual fact presupposed. Some sociologists know and say it, others act as if they would know it, others then again devise heuristically infertile "hermaphrodites" (i.e. social theories with a hermaphroditic [social-ontological and sociological] character), which we have called social-ontologically laid out (drawn up or invested) sociologies. The latter vindicate for sociology the dignity of the crown (i.e. they want sociology to be seen as the paramount social science) and, at the same time, the function of the foundation and of the synopsis of all social sciences, instead of seeing in sociology a social science alongside the rest of the social sciences. Geiger came closer to the point when he opined that questions like "what is the essence (or nature) of society?" or "how is society possible?" constituted "pre-sociological preliminary questions", and sociology deals with social phenomena (or manifestations) and

processes (or events) as "findings", not with their "substratum"[230]. And Pareto, who defined sociology first of all as the synthesis of the social sciences, which wants to research human society in general, himself found this definition "imperfetissima" ["most imperfect"] and called for the concrete analysis "of the relations between social facts"[231]; thereby, Pareto in reality outlined Weber's research practice, in which the question in respect of the being (Is) and the coherence of society was posed rather indirectly, i.e. in the roundabout way of the correlation of important aspects (e.g. economy and religion) of this same society[232]. Also, other definitions of sociology and its tasks betray that here – reasonably – phenomena are thought about which occur against the background of the tacitly presupposed fact of society[233]. Durkheim's epistemological decision to expressly confine the object (or subject matter) of sociology to social facts may be regarded as such other definitions of sociology and its tasks' prototype. This decision can, from our point of view, be interpreted as the clear separation between social ontology and sociology, and even as the founding of sociology with regard to the presupposed, but not further discussed, fact of society; because social facts are interactions, and sociologically relevant interactions take place, as we know, only against the background of society – otherwise said: where the fact of society does not guarantee the (continued) existence of the social, no *social* facts can even be formed. But this clear concept becomes invalid (or abates) as soon as one attempts to apprehend society itself as a social

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[230] "Gesellschaft", pp. 209, 210. Indicative of the vacillations and confusion of most sociologists in respect of this question is the fact that the same Geiger elsewhere expressly follows Simmel and wants to commission sociology with the study of the constants of social life or those aspects of social phenomena (or manifestations) which are supposed to refer to the "mode of existence (or being (t)here) of the social" (*Arbeiten*, p. 47ff.).

[231] *Trattato*, §§ 1-2.

[232] Cf. Bendix's remarks, *Weber*, p. 277.

[233] Cf. Nisbet's ambivalent enumeration of sociology's study areas: "the patterns of social interaction, the social aggregates, the systems of authority, the social roles, statuses, and norms which form the social bond" (*Social Bond*, p. 18).

fact like every other social fact too, and to theoretically get a grasp of society as a social fact, like every other social fact, with the usual sociological means. In the exposition of his founding of sociology, Durkheim proffered, in place of a definition of society, the ideal-typical enumeration of its successive historical forms[234]. When Durkheim in his later work, driven by growing concern about the moral integration of society, succumbed to social-ontological temptation and sought the deepest roots of social cohesion, he could as a sociologist say fairly little; that is why Durkheim took refuge in the mysticism of the "collective representations (notions, views or ideas)" welding (or knitting) together the social whole, and in the process even contradicted his earlier evolutionism, since according to his own perception, the essence (or nature) and effect of collective representations in the primitive tribe and in complex modern society hardly differ from one another.

Formal sociology's representatives likewise moved unconsciously and erratically on social-ontological ground. The definitions of society, which they suggested as veiled social ontologists, stood under the influence of their main matter of concern, i.e. to take an inventory of (or to itemise) and to formalise (i.e. render into forms) the relations between socially living individuals. The fundamental fact that interactions do not bring society into the world, but are acted out (or happen) against the background of society, took revenge, in the process, on the tautological character of this definition. For Simmel, society was the complex of socialised individuals, or the sum of those forms of the relation which make that complex from individuals[235]. And Vierkandt varied this by saying that society is a group of humans as the bearer of interactions (or

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[234] *Règles*, p. 81ff..
[235] *Soziologie*, p. 8.

mutual influences) between its individual members[236]. The tautology here concerns not merely the formulation (society and the being socialised of individuals, or society and the group, stand for the same thing and are also used synonymously), but the underlying thought (or notion) itself. Interaction (mutual influence) or the relation is in fact not what as differentia specifica belongs to the genus "society" in order to define society, but interaction (mutual influence) or the relation offers merely an (alternative or indirect) description of the same genus "society"; in other words, "society" contains as a concept eo ipso interaction in itself; interaction is not something which from the outside slips into a heap of immobile and unrelated bodies in order to make from that a society[237]. The specific difference, which conceptually characterises society, cannot therefore be interaction in itself and in general, although interaction constitutively belongs to society. This can, incidentally, be inferred already from the simple thought that two individual, absolutely and always isolated people can indeed interact with each other, but not constitute a society. To interaction (or mutual influence) as such, something else must obviously be added, so that one may sensibly speak of society. Vierkandt indirectly admitted this, when he, apart from interaction (or mutual influence), smuggled another completely different criterion into the definition of society: interaction (or mutual influence's) [society's] joining together (union or amalgamation), no matter what ensures this joining together (union or amalgamation)[238].

Now the necessary reverse side of the joining together (or union) of individuals for the formation of a society, is society's delimitation

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[236] *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 28. The interactional definition of society returns again and again in various authors, see e.g. McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 5 (society is "the web of social relationships"), or Lundberg et al., *Sociology*, p. 583 (society as "patterned system of interaction").
[237] See Landshut's apt comments, *Kritik*, p. 16. Cf. Ch. III, footnotes 4, 25, 26 below.
[238] *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 30ff..

towards the outside, i.e. vis-à-vis other societies. And if interaction in itself and in general cannot provide (or constitute) the specific characteristic of society, then we must seek the latter in that which coordinates a number of individual (or separate) interactions in a certain direct or indirect manner, and assigns to these individual (or separate) interactions an unfolding space, and at the same time, boundaries (or limits). This factor or this element must of course, like everything else in society too, arrive on the scene as interaction, however the features of this interaction might be unique, and in an entirely particular sense, social, so that exactly these features and not the mere fact of the being of interaction, irrespective of further differentiations, make this particular interaction society's specific characteristic. Before we draw the ultimate social-ontological conclusions from this consideration, we must remark that the joining together (union or amalgamation) of interaction towards the inside, and interaction's delimitation towards the outside, conceptually implies something else: the in principle autarky (i.e. self-sufficiency) of that which more or less joined together (or united) extends inside of its own more or less clearly defined boundaries (or limits). Self-sufficiency, i.e. the ability at (or capacity for) surviving for a long time on the basis of one's own material and intellectual-spiritual resources, was in actual fact proclaimed the main criterion for the definition of society, however much, in the course of this, the aspect of interaction continued to be taken into consideration by quite a few sociologists, first and foremost, Parsons[239]. From the point of view of the sociologist, it may stand to reason to put the joining together (union or amalgamation), delimitation and self-sufficiency of society down to fixed (steady or stable) social facts, i.e. to illogically explain society by means of something which can

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[239] Parsons, *Social Systems*, p. 19, as well as "Outline", p. 44; cf. Levy, *Structure*, p. 113.

only come into being in society. Institutions in their crossing over (i.e. interweaving, intersecting or entanglement) with one another and their interdependence, also in their function in fixing (determining or setting) the role and status of individuals in accordance with (or for the purpose of) the social whole, often appear as such social facts[240]. Yet social ontology must penetrate deeper. No doubt, institutions take care of (or ensure) the joining together (union or amalgamation), delimitation and self-sufficiency of society, however through which immanence is society determined in such a way that society, existing historically under the influence of these determinations, must therefore bring forth institutions from its womb? And why must institutions sooner or later change and alter, although the need of society for joining together, delimitation and self-sufficiency remains stable? This obvious question refers to the social-ontic field and the spectrum of the social-ontic factors or forces, whose internal tensions in the end wear down all social facts. The question is not answered if one shifts the main integrative function of the rather apparatus-like (or machine-like) understood institutions to the rather ideologically understood normative order. Parsons, who did this, and at the same time granted the integrative function in society the highest status (value or importance) vis-à-vis all other functions, could not though draw a clear dividing line between norms and institutions; on the contrary, he ascertained the interweaving of moral and legal norms as well as the necessity of the institutional support of the norms system (i.e. system of norms), for instance by the judicature. He even went a step further. Although he connected political organisation in principle with the function of "goal attainment" and not with the integrative function, he stressed political organisation's contribution to the maintenance of the

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[240] See e.g. Mandelbaum, *Anatomy*, p. 11; Giddens, *Constitution*, p. 164.

normative order and consequently to the maintenance of the structure of the overall collective, and he even let the boundaries (or limits) of society coincide with those of society's political organisation[241]. Politics was of course understood by Parsons primarily institutionally, i.e. of the state and its administrative praxis (or practice), yet precisely this narrow understanding, precisely Parsons's in principle (or programmatic) separation between politics and integrative function, makes his sociological assessment of the political factor noteworthy. The said in principle separation between politics and integrative function is, so to speak, an unintended admission of the actual ubiquity of the political inside the network of the social being (Is), an objective repercussion of this ubiquity on an essentially unpolitical sociology. Access to that level of depth, upon which processes (or series of events) are acted out (or happen), whose (temporary) crystallisations then appear from the perspective of the sociologist as the joining together, delimitation and self-sufficiency of society through the mediation (or intervention) of the historically-sociologically sufficient conditions, is found here. In which relation the social-ontic dimension of the political with the rest of the dimensions is, will be provisionally expounded in the next section. This relation constitutes the real central point of social ontology as teaching (or theory) of the being (Is) of society.

The social-ontological bringing (or working) out of that level of depth must entail a revision of sociological representations (or notions) about the joining together (union or amalgamation), delimitation and self-sufficiency of society. These representations (or notions) are influenced all too much by new-times and nation-state or cultural models, which haunt (or are at the back of) people's minds in all ethnological digressions

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[241] "Outline", p. 46. Cf. Ch. I, footnote 176.

and excursuses. The delimitation and self-sufficiency of society do not necessarily have to do with territorial boundaries (or limits) or with an absolutely definable quantum of resources – on the contrary: those boundaries and these resources or the claims thereupon are constantly defined anew depending on the outcome of processes (or sequences of events), which indeed are apprehensible historically-sociologically, but whose necessary (pre)conditions take root in the social-ontic field. Also, the significance of normative and cultural or institutional components for social cohesion must be judged differently in light of the becoming (or events) in the social-ontic field than from the perspective of sociology, which very often succumbs to the temptation of projecting normative-cultural and institutional contents, which are decisive only in certain situations, into the social-ontological, instead of lingering on the same normative-cultural and institutional contents without social-ontological ambitions. Just like the social-ontic field in comparison with historical and sociological crystallisations, so too the social-ontological concept of society must be more fluid and more open than every sociological concept of society. The social-ontological concept of society is not dependent on the sociological determination (or definition) of the joining together, delimitation and self-sufficiency of society. Even in a hypothetical world society without state borders and without political government, in which the criterion of delimitation is automatically omitted and that of self-sufficiency would lose its specific, i.e. comparative meaning, since mankind, for lack of productive neighbours, nolens volens (i.e. willing or unwilling) would have to be content with itself –, even here the political would, in its interaction (or mutual influence) with the rest of the aspects of the social-ontic, have the same weight as in earlier social formations too, and as in the primitive horde, which likewise knew no state borders and no political government. Talk

of the being (Is) of society would be empty (or hollow) if the social-ontological concept of society could not be extended theoretically and empirically so widely.

C. The three ontic aspects of the social and the theoretical triptych of social ontology

We have hopefully succeeded in making the following clear: were the being (Is) of society univocal and one-dimensional, then social ontology would, in terms of theory, culminate in a formally (i.e. in terms of form) all-embracing and, in terms of content, absolutely empty concept of this being (Is), not unlike scholastic-Aristotelian ontology, which has become an unhappy memory. On the other hand, social ontology's character as an ontology is certain on condition that the aspects or dimensions of the social being (Is) are equally original (or equiprimordial), and can be meant only with regard to one another; meant together, the said aspects or dimensions of the social being (Is) must again encompass the concept of social being (Is) such that, for the social being's specific determination (or definition), nothing else must be brought into play, no matter what society may otherwise need for its (continued) existence. The multi-dimensionality of the social-ontic, which should find expression in the theoretical structuring of social ontology, is, for its part, to be understood in a dual sense: as the being next to one another (or co-existence) of factors or forces taking part, but analytically distinguishable, in the social-ontic field, and as the disposition (i.e. arrangement or disposal) of the same social-ontic factors or forces in the form of a spectrum rich in

(i.e. replete with) tension. There are three factors or forces which have an immanent property (or quality) to dispose (i.e. arrange) themselves in such a way, and to relate to one another originally (i.e. from the beginning or primordially): the social relation, the political and man. Social ontology as a whole actually deals with why and how these three ontic aspects of the social must be meant (or thought of) together. For a first orientation, the following can be said in the manner of theses. Everything which happens in a society and can be equipped (or endowed) with the predicate of the social, happens via visible or invisible relations between humans, and comes into being through the dynamic(s) of these relations. In this sense, the social relation is co-extensive with the being (Is) of society and constitutively belongs to the being of society's concept. The social relation's spectrum and mechanism can, however, fully unfold (or develop) just in society or against the background of a society – irrespective of its smaller or larger extent, its simple or complex structure –; only under the precondition of this topical or potential full unfolding (or development) does the social relation deserve the predicate *social* relation. Society now differs from the relations between separately looked at humans, as well as from the mere sum of such relations, by providing an open field for interactions, which do not have to have a direct individual reference, but aim at the creation of an in principle binding framework for all other interactions. Such interactions do not differ as to either their spectrum or their mechanism from the rest of the social relations, but certainly as to their range (or scope), which lends them an entirely particular (or separate) quality: it is the quality of the political as the interactional element, which should especially refer to society as a whole, and indeed as a whole to be ordered and to be held together (to be cohered or to cohere) (i.e. to attain order and cohesion), and subordinate its own individual or individual alien (foreign or other)

interactions to this supreme point of view. The political constitutes, as it were, the interaction of all interactions. Where society is in principle a binding correlation (interrelation, connection or context) of interactions, the political is there too. However, the political can set its sights on this function or this power claim because everything social that happens in society must happen via interactions; the political is accordingly shaped in its spectrum and its mechanism as an interaction in order to guide (or direct) interactions. The political is not co-extensive with society in the same sense as the sum of interactions, but in the sense that the political's range (or scope) touches society's boundaries, in fact marks these boundaries on each and every respective occasion, regardless of how extensive the interaction is on which the political, on each and every respective occasion, is directly founded (or based), and from which the political starts. The anthropological, finally, comes into play social-ontically in a triple respect. For one thing, the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation can be described in anthropological categories; indeed, both interrelate primarily with the social in this relation, yet the social here concerns humans and not for instance ants or bees, so that anthropological specification appears to be indispensable, especially as the mechanism of the social relation (less so, the social relation's spectrum) accompanies capabilities (or skills) and qualities (characteristics or properties) which we rightly are in the habit of regarding as human par excellence. On the other hand, recourse to the anthropological dimension becomes unavoidable when the question arises as to what drives humans beyond all other interactions to that special interaction, which we call the political. And thirdly, one does not get around anthropological considerations as soon as the phenomenon of culture emerges on the social-ontological horizon – and culture must emerge: because man's nature is, as is known, culture; the being (Is) of

culture and the being (Is) of human society represent (or constitute), in practical terms, interchangeable concepts. Social ontology and social-ontologically oriented anthropology do not, though, deal with cultural content(s) and with the sufficient conditions of this or that culture, but with the necessary conditions of culture as human nature.

Let us turn to every single one of these three ontic aspects of the social. Our brief explications here apply mainly to the political and the anthropological complex of questions and should convey to the reader a preparatory insight into the overall conceptual plan of this work. Our preliminaries (i.e. preliminary remarks, comments or observations) in relation to the aspect of the social relation can be framed even more briefly, since the remaining chapters of the volume at hand are devoted to the social relation's spectrum and its mechanism. The putting first of the analysis of the social relation does not mean, though, a hierarchical gradation of the social-ontic aspect; it also does not mean that one should proceed from the particular to the general via inductionis (i.e. by means (or the method) of induction). The equal originality (or equiprimordiality) and the mutual being dependent (i.e. dependence) of the social-ontic's aspects prohibit such implications. Our presentation could have just as well started with the anthropological or with the political, in order to, from there, build conceptual bridges in relation to the other two respective social-ontic aspects. The being (Is) of the social is a field without a centre and without a periphery; rather, every point in this field can become the centre or periphery depending on the standpoint or situation (position or location). Accordingly, the presentation can move freely, on condition that the said presentation never loses sight of the constant connecting lines between the social-ontic aspects. The separate and equivalent (i.e. even-handed) handling of the social relation, within

whose field (or area) collective just as individual interactions fall, indicates, at any rate, in itself that the determination (or definition) of the being (Is) of society as the object (or subject matter) of social ontology does not point to any veiled pre-decision in favour of "holism" – whereas the thesis that individual interactions would only through the fact of society become *social* relations, blocks the option of methodological individualism. Generally, we should guard against carrying methodical (i.e. methodological) quarrels, which have marked the tense co-existence of history and sociology since approximately 150 years ago, over into social ontology's field. What appears as the immanent "holism" of sociology, is in reality – disregarding normatively inspired hypostatisations – the command of sociology's logic of founding putting supra-individual constructs or social facts at the centre of attention; and the – of necessity very watered down – "individualism" of history is not based, for its part, on an ontic autonomy (or independence) of the individual [element, factor or person], but on the specific commands of the historical logic of founding (i.e. the logic of founding pertaining to historical science). As we know, social ontology touches at times more on sociology, at other times more on history, on each and every occasion in a different respect. With regard to the social relation, sociology investigates its (transitory) historical crystallisations, whether these take institutional forms or come on the scene as collective movements and processes under the influence of the heterogony of ends. Social ontology must, on the other hand, first of all, outline the spectrum of the social relation, inside of which those crystallisations crop up, and name the (anthropological) reasons why this spectrum extends between the extremes of friendship and enmity. The permanent movement in this spectrum and the likewise permanent changing of each and every respective predominant aspect in the said spectrum takes away, as it were, from individual and collective

social phenomena (or manifestations), the firm ground from under such phenomena's feet, and hinders a nomological explanation of the becoming (or events) in this field. However, not only because the same subjects are able to occupy completely different places inside of the social relation's spectrum; but likewise for the reason because the social relation's mechanism always remains the same irrespective of which aspect or which end of the social relation's spectrum is affected; that is why a nomologically meant binding (or connection) of aspect A of the spectrum to form B of the mechanism of the social relation is out of the question. Social action, understanding, rationality and language are equally subject to this mechanism; because of that, the social relation's mechanism's illumination (or examination) opens up a broad question formulation (or central theme), whose unified (or uniform) apprehension can be successful only with the help of a thus laid out (or drawn up) social ontology.

The bringing (or working) out of the second social-ontic aspect, i.e. of the political, and the, through that, possibility opening up of defining society as a political collective, reinforces the impression that social ontology can, without difficulty, disregard the dilemma "holism or individualism". Social ontology does not investigate the political factor for instance like sociology, i.e. not in the ideal-typically prepared form of historically determined, and on each and every respective occasion, differently legitimised supra-individual political orders; and also not from the point of view of the interrelation of these orders with the unisegmental or polysegmental, simpler or more complex character of the corresponding societies. Social ontology defines the political with regard to the being (Is) of society, that is, the definition must apply to all political orders in all societies; the said definition must be able to state (or indicate) the

necessary (pre)conditions of all political orders' formation and at the same time of their dissolution (or disintegration). Because the spectrum of the political coincides with the spectrum of the social relation; in other words, the spectrum of the political constitutes a marked out (or delimited), by both extremes of friendship and enmity, field rich in (i.e. replete with) tension. The identity (i.e. sameness) of the spectrum (and of the mechanism) of course does not at all mean identity (i.e. sameness) of extent (size or range): not all social relations are political, although the political can only be a social relation; the identity (i.e. sameness) of political and non-political social relations regarding the spectrum (and the mechanism) explains, in any case, the, at any time, possibility of politicisation of the, for the time being, non-political[242]. The political is that particular social relation which makes the social, as a whole to be ordered and to be held together (to be cohered or to cohere) (i.e. to attain order and cohesion), its object (or subject matter). The political therefore

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[242] If the spectrum of the political is co-extensive with the spectrum of the social relation, i.e. both extend between the extremes of friendship and enmity, then from that results the fact that the distinction between friend and foe does not *specifically* belong to the political, and hence cannot also define the political's concept (or notion), although friendship and enmity are after all to be avoided (or thought of as not there) for the political, just as little as for the social relation. The logical error of C. Schmitt, who wanted to define the political – certainly in ignorance of its social-ontological dimension – on the basis of the "friend-foe" criterion, consists in the confusion of the social relation in general with the political. No doubt, the political is a social relation, and as such it encompasses the entire spectrum of the social relation in general, including both its extreme boundaries (or limits), however, not all social relations are political, although they show (or contain) the same spectrum as the political too; the specific difference of the more extensive genus (or species) does not coincide with the specific difference of the less extensive genera, ergo, the specific difference of the political is not to be sought in the marking of the political spectrum by the extremes of friendship and of enmity. In simpler words: the horse is indeed a four-legged creature, but if one defines a horse on the basis of this real property (i.e. quality or characteristic), then one blurs its difference with a dog. – Obviously, this refutation of the Schmittian definition differs fundamentally from the usual moralistic critiques, which do not take exception to the (by these moralistic critiques, incidentally, hardly noticed) logical shortcomings, but simply postulate that the element of enmity should and can be excluded from the political and politics. One can reply to this postulate in two different ways: a) if the definition of the political on the basis of the *double* "friend-foe" criterion is rejected, then the exclusion of enmity from the definition, to be logically consistent, also entails the exclusion of friendship; b) the existence of enmity (or friendship) in the political and the definition of the political on the basis of the criterion of enmity (and friendship) are two entirely different things. That is why he who hopes for a "humanisation" of the political and of politics from the loud rejection of the Schmittian definition, deceives himself; political enmity did not come into the world by way of Schmitt's definition, and political enmity will not disappear from the world by way of the refutation of this same definition. – This important question had to be briefly touched upon here; it will be treated in detail in the second volume of this work. Cf. Ch. III, Sec. 3A in this volume.

belongs to society in a still more special sense than interaction in general. Because in society everything is interaction, however not everything is political, and exactly that which of its extent (size or range) does not coincide with the whole of society, makes (at least potentially) the whole of society its object (or subject matter). The political goes beyond the possible range (or scope) of every individual interaction, and that is why it must invoke supra-individual principles, principles, which in the end concern the shaping of the social order. Two hypothetical humans all along cut off from every group life, would never come up with the idea of shaping their relations with each other on the basis of such principles, however, two socially living humans refer each other very often to what is generally applicable in order to regulate what is private between them. The political deals exactly directly or indirectly with the generally applicable as its object (or subject matter), and accordingly represents the social in the most comprehensive sense of the word. Statements (propositions or pronouncements) and acts (or actions) here refer essentially to the social whole, the part-questions (i.e. secondary, separate, restricted or minor questions) (or sub-questions) are subordinated to the most general social points of view. Materially, the political certainly is based on individuals and their act(ion)s, however, the political's social uniqueness consists in that the individual [element] here, as much as it may be perceived as the individual [element] or even the personal [element], raises the conceivably most general social claim.

The (in itself amorphous) social-ontological and the, on each and every respective occasion, historically concretised dimension of the political phenomenon are in reality inseparable from each other, but conceptually and theoretically are two different things. We want to refer to the former with the expression "the political"; for the latter we shall reserve the

name "politics", in relation to which it must be noted that under "politics" currents and movements are to be subsumed too, which do without (state or non-state) institutional crystallisation. The institutionally anchored or (temporarily) unbound (unattached) politics constitutes the each and every respective historical concretisation of the political, without being able to ever exhaust the political's potentiality. This concretisation has to fulfil the tasks set by the social-ontological character of the political, i.e. to concretely determine in each and every respective concrete situation how social cohesion and social order should look like. *That*, however, there must be a cohesion ((inter)connection, interrelation, context or correlation) and an order, does not depend on the free decision of each and every respective politics, but belongs originally to the constitution of the social. That is why no politics can have continued existence if it does not (to some extent) satisfy the social-ontologically determined requirements of the political, and if it does not raise and fulfil its own power claims in the name of those requirements. We shall come back to that later. If one is not aware of the taking root of every politics in the social-ontologically understood political, then one tends, in relation to that, to comprehend politics rather quantitatively, namely, as a part(-system) (i.e. as a part, or as a subsystem) of society beside other part(s)(-systems) of society, and moreover to equate politics with the state or government[243]. This mistake would in itself be only half-fatal if did not necessarily entail a bigger mistake: to imagine a society without the political and or politics in order to next ask what then has brought to life and maintains alive unpolitical or pre-political society. From a fictive question, of course only fictions as answers are to be got, thus e.g. the old and new contract theories or the, as of late, quantitative extensions of the

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[243] See Ch. I, Sec. 6, above.

interactionistic approach[244]. We should keep in mind that behind the in itself empty and merely pompous (or self-important) question "how does society come into being?" or "how is society and social order possible?", normative-political preferences and power claims are hiding; i.e. in respect of the constitution of society, on each and every respective occasion, what one, with regard to present theoretical-practical goals, would like to emphasise as decisive, is projected to the foremost position. Thus, in recent decades, under the direct or indirect influence of contractualistic liberalism, within which its individualism and economistic aversion to the state and politics merge with each other[245], the tendency has spread to comprehend social norms and institutions on the whole as quantitative extensions of crystallisations, which supposedly saw the light of day in the interaction between individuals. Whatever has gained validity in the narrow circle of personal interaction, becomes, according to this logic, the "social norm when and to the extent that it is shared with other people"[246]. Nevertheless, the norms coming into being in "face-to-face relations" differ from social norms not merely quantitatively, i.e. through the extent of their validity, but through a qualitative element, which again refers to the social-ontological dimension of the political, that is, relates to the question of social cohesion and social order. The arbitrariness of the interpretation of norms at the level of personal interaction, which can here bring about the dissolution of a relation without further consequences, gives way at the social level to the – stricter or more flexible – bindedness of the interpretation of norms, since society can neither be dissolved arbitrarily nor founded arbitrarily. This bindedness remains (i.e. persists), despite

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[244] See Sec. 2Ce in this chapter.
[245] Typically, Nozick, *Anarchy*. Cf. footnote 153 above.
[246] Thus, Elster, *Cement*, p. 105.

content-related change in norms, and it explains why inside of a society individuals endure unequal circumstances, which they would never bear within a personal interaction. A merely quantitative extension of acknowledged norms through linear and full transference from the personal to the social level would have as a precondition or a consequence a society of absolute equals. However, social theoreticians, who imagine the aforementioned process in this manner, think precisely under the premise of mass-democratic egalitarianism, while at the same time raise this premise to a genetic principle.

Individual (or separate) interactions therefore come under more or less, one way or another, the social-ontological necessity of the cohesion and of the order of the social whole. With that, it is social-ontologically indifferent whether each and every respective interaction follows (or is modeled after) the historical form which that cohesion and that order have at any given moment, or whether each and every interaction's reference to that historical form is negative, i.e. whether each and every respective interaction conducts a small or large war against the established modes of behaviour and norms, be that with individual aims or in the name of a new formation (shaping or structuring) of cohesion and of order. In every case here the political is of concern as a social-ontological magnitude. Because the always latent political comes on the scene where a social action or interaction is able to be looked at from the point of view of social cohesion and of social order. This point of view precedes every concrete politics. The political is therefore equally original with society as such and is at the same logical level with society's concept. The political's realtion(ship) with society should not be comprehended instrumentally, i.e. it is not the case that activities or institutions develop under the effect and from the point of view of the

political, *so that* society can exist, but *because* society exists. Society is not ordered and held together (i.e. it does not attain order and cohesion), as it were, from the outside, but society exists as originally political; the political is exactly society's cohesion and its social-ontologically understood order in (very) different forms, and the political lacks a particular and permanent content exactly because everything, which on each and every respective occasion amongst the leading (decisive or relevant) actors gives the impression that the cohesion and order of society would be affected (detrimentally) by the political, can become its content. Incidentally, from the social-ontological status of the political, the fact is explained that inside of historically given societies, politics was differentiated (or has differentiated itself) as the first "subsystem (or part system)". From the moment in which the differentiation of primeval (primordial or original) societies starts, and consequently society's cohesion and order became particularly noticeable as a problem, subjects arrived on the scene which legitimised their own activity and existence by invoking the character and the needs of society as a whole to be ordered and to be held together (to be cohered or to cohere) (i.e. to attain order and cohesion). Politics is the political from the subjective perspective of a subjective bearer; politics can therefore simultaneously have a number of bearers, whereas the political in itself is interwoven originally (i.e. from the outset or from its and society's origin), and constantly remains interwoven, with the whole of society.

In light of this perception of the social-ontological nature (or character) of the political, society can be defined as follows: society is a certain interaction (or mutual influence) of individuals which attains such an expanse (or extent) and density that in society the question of cohesion and of order in the form of a specifically political question as to the

common good (public (or general) interest) is posed, while at the same time the thereby outlined field of tension of the political is set in motion as soon as it is a matter of bindingly defining the common good, that is, the political, by invoking its specific point of view to be put at the service of a concrete politics (in contrast to another politics). This definition has far-reaching content-related and methodical (i.e. methodological) consequences. The inclusion of the social-ontologically understood political in the concept of society implies, namely, that society by no means must be (re)presented (or imagined) in mystifying, holistic or organicistic categories in the event one sees the question "how is society or social order possible?" as an indeed polemically-normatively usable, but social-theoretically useless fiction. The bringing together and thinking together of the social and the political opens up, in other words, a perspective in which the socially constitutive, that is, binding (cohering or cohesive) and ordering forces (i.e. forces which (seek to) attain cohesion and order) in the action of concrete actors, become tangible, without one, in the process, having to put the case for a methodological individualism or without having to buy off demarcation against holism and organicism through the acceptance (or assumption) of a just as polemically-normatively laden (or charged) individualism. To the extent that the in itself amorphous and free-weaving (i.e. free, independent, unattached or autonomous) political is, through subjective bearers, objectively particularised, therefore concretised, and becomes politics of a certain direction (tendency or line of thought), a particular type of action develops which, like every other action too, is borne by individuals, however, is simultaneously undertaken with regard to society as a whole, and by invoking the good, namely the common good (or public (general) interest). The representatives (or exponents) of either this or that politics see, that is, the common good (public (or general) interest) from their

subjective point of view, and interpret the common good in accordance with their own power claims and goals in respect of dominance (or domination); – and anyone in any political system can in principle become a representative (or exponent) of either this or that politics (even if everyone is not allowed to do this in every political regime), so that the political field of tension is also in this respect co-extensive with society. Were the concept of the common good itself not brought into play by the (in itself incapable of articulation and of acting) society in toto, but by concrete subjects, then the interpretation of this concept must still be particularistic, no matter whether such an interpretation is shared by most, by many or by few of society's members. The particularism and hence (great) variety of possible interpretations makes the struggle over the bindedness of one amongst such possible interpretations unavoidable. The common good (public (or general) interest) can therefore be striven for and realised always only in a binding interpretation, regardless of how the bindedness of the interpretation is arrived at and how long it lasts. The political "subsystem (or part system)" is marked (i.e. characterised) exactly by the fact that in it the claim to the binding interpretation of the common good must be raised; the rest of the "subsystems (or part systems)" do not raise this claim by themselves, and to the extent that they do raise such a claim (to the extent e.g. that an economic organisation makes itself out to be *the* form of organisation of the whole of society), they automatically enter, in the form of this or that politics, the field of tension of the political, i.e. they touch upon the constitutive question of social cohesion and of social order.

The reverse side of the particularistic interpretation of the common good (or public (general) interest) is the obligatory character of the invocation of the common good itself. This invocation must of course be an

ideological shell (i.e. cover or wrapping) and masking (dressing up or disguise), yet such an invocation does not in the least solely revolve around the ideological function. This invocation implies an objective obligation, which results from the necessary, and be it sometimes only superficial, taking root of every politics in the terrain of the social-ontologically understood political. No politics, that is, no particularistic and at the same time – at least in accordance with its claim – binding interpretation of the common good can last (continue or hold out) if it does not, after a fashion, ensure society's cohesion and order – which of course does not have to necessarily mean the present form of this cohesion and this order. The inevitable binding of particularistic politics with the specific points of view (or aspects) of the political (that is, the general points of view (or aspects) of cohesion and of order) simultaneously provides politics, especially the politics of government (or government policy), a bonus (an advantage or a benefit), i.e. politics has in principle the fact of society on its side, which by means of an optical illusion of continuation and stability seems to adhere to the present political constitution. This ambiguity and this tension between the particularism of politics, which wants to be binding, and the particularisable generality (or universality) of the political has characterised all societies until now, from the primeval (or primordial) horde to modern mass democracy. The definition given beforehand of society can now be varied as follows: society is a collective of humans, every one of whom can raise a claim to bindingly define the common good (public (or general) interest) so that the social-ontologically necessary rules of living together (i.e. co-existence) make up the object (or subject matter) of an incessant activity of definition and of interpretation, and consequently represent (or constitute) both the bearers

of social cohesion and of social order as well as the vehicles for the attainment of particularistic ends (goals).

If these theses hold true, then no solution to the problem of order can be valid, which is based on the identification (i.e. equating) of the institutional order with a conscience collective in Durkheim's sense[247]. Because the conscience collective has just as little a (continued) existence as the notion of the common good (public (or general) interest) without particularistic interpretations; the conscience collective's collective character and its generality lie – just like the notion of the common good – merely in the fact that all interested sides simultaneously invoke the conscience collective, i.e. its supposed ideals and commands, and make out their own interpretation of the same conscience collective to be generally in force and binding. The objectivity of the conscience collective as the mainstay (or foundation) of social order cannot at all be inferred from the fact that this invocation takes place under the (latent) pressure of the specific points of view (or aspects) of the political and is consequently social-ontologically necessary: cohesion and order are already given with the concept of society, and only the equating of order in general, i.e. of order in its social-ontological dimension, with a stable institutional order lets the question of the social order as such come into being separately; because order in the former sense [i.e. order in general (or in its social-ontological dimension)] is compatible and in actual fact interwoven with all kinds of "disorders", whereas the latter sense (of a stable institutional order) is a merely historical phenomenon, i.e. certain historical (pre)conditions allow, for shorter or longer periods of time, the stability of a certain institutional order – with the collapse (or perishing) of this certain institutional order, however, as its supporters as a rule

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[247] Thus, Parsons, "Utilitarism", p. 233.

assert, society does not collapse (or perish) too[248]. A definition of society as a connection of humans by means of common goals runs into analogous difficulties[249]. The said definition makes out of goals supra-individual hypostases similar to the conscience collective or the common good, and moreover it suggests that individuals have concluded a lasting contract with one another. The crucial point is not, in any case, the connection of humans through common goals, but the binding interpretation of the goals, since the connection can only take place under the influence of the bindedness of the interpretation, which must though invoke the commonality of the goals – but *not* for instance because there is the same commonality of goals in fact and in terms of content. Finally, our thesis of the social-ontological dimension of the political makes a just as familiar as superficial dualism, superfluous. The (constructed) contrast between a merely "symbiotic" society, in which every individual has his own meanings (and goals) in mind which he wants to impose upon others, and a society of consensus, in which signs and meanings (or goals) are understood in common (or jointly), and accordingly support joint action[250], is meant. There has never been either the one or the other type of society. What really happens (and it happens not because of historical accidents, but on the basis of social-ontological given facts (or actualities)), is something else: meanings or concepts and ideas (or goals), which in principle and at face value are accepted by, in practice, all of a society's members (e.g. the common good (or public (general) interest)), become the battlefield of struggle over their binding interpretation, exactly because such meanings or concepts and ideas are accepted in

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[248] See our comments in relation to that in the previous section.
[249] Ihering, *Zweck*, I, p. 83ff.; II, p. 175ff..
[250] Thus, Warriner, *Emergence*, p. 92ff..

common[251] – as the specific point of view (or aspect) of the political commands (requires or calls for).

The third ontic aspect of the social is the anthropological aspect. It was mentioned that a social-ontologically oriented anthropology does not represent anthropology per se, and that it must leave wide areas of the study of man to general anthropology and to the disciplines working together with this general anthropology. A social-ontologically oriented anthropology's own primary task lies in making understandable the manner human nature interrelates with the other two ontic aspects of the social, and in general with the openness and plasticity of the social-ontic field. A social-ontologically meant anthropology deals not with content(s), but with boundaries and forms. As we want to show in the next chapter, the boundaries or the extremes (i.e. extremities, limits, ends or opposites), inside of which the spectrum of the social relation extends, are marked by anthropological given facts (or actualities), and indeed, on the one hand by inseparable (i.e. entirely indispensable) sociality, on the other hand, by likewise inseparable mortality – and that means not least of all: the possibility of the killing – of man. The social-ontological investigation (or study) of culture as the constitutive component of human nature also refers to anthropologically determined and apprehensible boundaries (see below). During research into the social relation, the question is invariably posed: to what extent and in which way is that which is acted out (or happens) connected with the quality (characteristic or property) of the actors who are humans? The mechanism of the social relation, just as the social relation's spectrum, concerns this question. Because the various places (or points) inside of the spectrum are not

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[251] Why precisely the commonality of premises and of conceptual structure, thought of on both sides, can aggravate competition and struggle, I have generally discussed in detail elsewhere, see *Macht und Entscheidung* [*Power and Decision*], esp. p. 67ff..

permanently occupied by the same human individuals, who by virtue of their particular individual constitution (composition or texture, nature or character) are able and want to exclusively identify with this and no other place (or point). On the contrary: the same humans constantly move inside of the spectrum of the social relation and alternately occupy various places (or points) in the said spectrum of the social relation, while they are driven by the dynamic(s) of the mechanism of the aforementioned relation. During this movement and in closest contact with this mechanism, everything, in which we, with good reason, recognise as specifically human, is shaped (moulded or formed) and refined. It (i.e. the said movement in the social relation's spectrum driven by the dynamics of the social relation's mechanism) forms and satisfies (at least partially and temporarily) the need for meaning-like (meaning-bearing, meaningful or purposeful) identity, which under the conditions of culture fuses (merges or blends) with the elementary drive of self-preservation or even takes the elementary drive of self-preservation's place (self-sacrifice as a command of identity); it forms and satisfies (at least partially and temporarily) the, being based in the need for identity, need for power, in an inestimable variety of gradations, nuances and external manifestations; it develops and expands an "intellect(-spirit)" on the basis of understanding, rationality and language, which constitute the social relation's mechanism, as well as against the background of the formation of meaning-like (meaning-bearing, meaningful or purposeful) identity and of specific forms of striving for power; finally, identity, power and intellect(-spirit) – in certain shapings (or expressions) and intensities – seek and find their channelings in the stream (or river) beds of the political, which is crystallised in this or that concrete politics, that is, which wants and has to bindingly define the cohesion and order of

society[252]. Consequently, the anthropological, the political and the social relation go into (i.e. interweave or intertwine with) one another, and in this unity of theirs represent the being (Is) of society as social ontology's object (or subject matter).

We have already used the expression "nature of man". This expression is equally burdened by the anthropology of Reason and the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses), of course for opposing reasons. The anthropology of Reason was little interested in the actual interweavings of the anthropological factor with the social and historical becoming, rather the anthropology of Reason endeavoured to achieve the formulation of a concept of autonomy, on the basis of which the direction of this becoming could be diverted in the normatively desired direction. Wanting to deduce human history until now from the essence and the commands of normative Reason, would in fact, at any rate, have been a thankless – and humourless – venture. On the other hand, the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) believed it could make a deduction of the historical from the human, by reducing that which is commonly perceived as the irrationality of human history, to the incurable irrationality of the life of the drive (urge or impulse) (i.e. impulsive life). In the course of this, the anthropology of drives typically proceeded as follows: the psychical or biopsychic was divided into separate drives (urges or impulses), and every one of these drives was declared to be the motor (i.e. engine or driving force) or the source of a certain kind or group of social phenomena (or manifestations) and institutions, through whose summation society was then constructed as a

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[252] A concise basic orientation regarding the concepts (or terms) "identity", "power" and "intellect(-spirit)" is found in Kondylis, loc. cit..

whole[253][ix]. A social ontology, which wants to save the historical and social phenomena (or manifestations), that is, keep the door open for history and sociology, can begin just as little with this anthropology of drives as with the anthropology of Reason. Such a social ontology cannot devise the image of social being (Is) on the basis of an, in terms of content, established image of man, but it should, conversely, bring its image of man into line with the elementary fact of the openness and of the plasticity of the social-ontic field. The social-ontologically oriented anthropologist should, in other words, as wrong as this may appear to be, not take "man", but the immeasurable variety (of form) of historical and social phenomena as his starting point, and reach his image of man as the end point of his investigation, after answering the question: how must man be constituted (composed) as a being (creature) of the genus (species) (i.e. human being) so that his being (Is) is consistent with, obviously unconstrainedly, this immeasurable variety (of form)? Before such a question, the premises of every anthropology of Reason or anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) fail. Reason and drives (urges or impulses) as separate(d) parts of the soul (i.e. psyche) or as the capacities with, on each and every respective occasion, their own objects as fixed points (or points of reference), must dissolve, in order to make room for an unlimited and unlimitable, plastic and at the same time unified (united or uniform) biopsychic energy, which is capable of the most astonishing transformations, gradations and fixings (i.e. settings), that is, such biopsychic energy coincides with the openness and flexibility of the social-ontic field in its entirety – to say absolutely nothing of its purely personal formations, which lie beyond social-ontological apprehension. The bidding farewell to a thoughtless anthropological

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253 The most important versions of the anthropology of Reason and the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) will occupy us in the 3rd volume of this work.

substantialism may not, though, be bought off with a thoughtless lapsing into pure functionalism, which indeed somehow functionally connects everything with everything, but cannot report much about the specific quality of the level upon which functions develop on each and every respective occasion, and about the specific boundaries (or limits) or constraints of this level (here: of the human level). In the anthropological field, like in other fields too, functionalism represents that abstract quantitative metaphysics, which has replaced the concrete qualitative metaphysics of substantialism. Social-ontologically oriented anthropology does not have to decide between both functionalism and substantialism, a choice between the two options is not compelling. The best advice is also here, as banal as this may sound, the, in the widest sense, historically learned (educated or cultured) and historically tested judgement that "humani nihil alienum [nothing of human things is alien]"[254]. Man becomes, for us, a familiar being not in regard to his stable substance, but in his endless metamorphoses. Only when one has said with Montaigne that one can imagine a thousand contrasting ways of life[255], may one also, with the same self-evidence as Democritus, opine: man is that which we all know[256].

From the double perspective of the openness or plasticity and of the boundaries (limits) or constraints (compulsions) of the human, the relation(ship) between nature and culture must be examined (or illuminated) social-ontologically. The in itself correct perception that the nature of man (i.e. human nature) is culture, cannot mean, as one often

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[254] "Humani nihil a me alienum puto [I consider nothing human, alien to me]", Terentius, *Heautontimorumenos*, 1, 1, 25.
[255] «Crois et conçois mille contraires façons de vie» ["I believe and conceive one thousand contrary fashions (i.e. ways) of life"], *Essais*, I, 1, ch. XXXVII = I, 259.
[256] «ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὅ πάντες ἴδμεν» ["man is what everybody knows"], Diels-Kranz, 68 [55], fragment 165 = II, 178.

likes to assume, that man can free himself from the determinations of nature, and be formed as one sees fit, or that his existence on earth can be freely planned in accordance with exclusively cultural yardsticks (or criteria). Such assumptions and expectations tacitly feed on an untenable contradistinction between the blind necessity of the determinations of nature and of freedom in culture, while at the same time freedom again is erroneously confused with the actual openness and plasticity of culture or is deduced from this openness and plasticity of culture. However, those are two entirely different things. The openness and plasticity of culture, which is seen in the parallel existence or in the succession of several cultures, does not exist beyond the causal determinations in nature and history, and it would be simply absurd to interpret the said openness and plasticity of culture as the overcoming of the same causal determinations in nature and history. No less absurd would it be to want to ethically-normatively comprehend the freedom allegedly gifted to man by culture. Because everything which one usually refers to as "inhuman" and as the effect of "blind" or "animal (bestial) nature", has been accomplished in history until now inside of culture and with the means of culture; concentration camps are e.g. the pure work of culture, i.e. something for which there is absolutely no example in nature. Culture can only be a normatively loaded (or charged) concept in the language of ethics, not in that of social ontology. Culture might have logically and objectively been interpreted only then as evidence for man's ethical and ontic freedom if his coming into being was already due to a free decision of man, that is, if man at the beginning of his history stood like a mythical Hercules before a crossroads, and after mature deliberation, had left aside other possibilities in order to take the path of culture. However, man did not have other possibilities apart from that of the downfall (i.e. extinction) of the species. The proposition that man's nature is culture, actually means

that man, under the pressure of (his) nature, had to become a being of culture, and that the voice of (his) nature is therefore to continue to be heard in all its tones and nuances in culture; man is just as little free to selectively treat (or deal with) culture as he was in primeval times free to stand still in a nature before culture, or as he is nowadays free to undo culture. The culture of man is therefore just as much nature as his nature is culture. And this fact must, social-ontologically, be meant (or thought of) together with the fact of society, which is equally old and original as man and culture, actually, the fact of society illustrates nothing other than the inseparability of man and culture. Man and culture are mediated via the social relation and via the political (i.e. that which is between man and culture is mediated via the social relation and via the political; thereby, man develops as a being of culture and puts himself in a position to not only historicise his own, but also external nature. The becoming (or series of events) in external nature indeed does not change in its law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), but the becoming in external nature's effects (or consequences) with regard to the human collective depend henceforth on the culture of this same human collective. Still further: the structure of social cohesion and of social conditions (or circumstances) is not least of all determined by each and every respective outcome of the struggle of the human genus (i.e. race) against external nature. This great truth, which we owe to Marx, has never been so topical as today, when the (at least potential) overcoming of the age-old shortage of goods by means of rapid technical (i.e. technological) progress set in motion historically unprecedented changes (or transformations) of a planetary extent. However, precisely these changes (and transformations) allow us, on the other hand, to recognise with increasing clarity the embedding of culture in nature.

Just like the social-ontological analysis of the social relation and of the political, so too social-ontologically oriented anthropology names only the necessary, not the sufficient conditions of concrete human acts (or actions). Social-ontologically oriented anthropology names possibilities, which it has inventoried (or itemised) through the investigation of historical and sociological of realities. In no case may it deduce prognoses about cultural content(s) or historical-sociological facts from general (even apt) statements about the nature of man. The possibility of such deductions would imply that one could run (or pass) through the anthropological sector before one had entered the sector (area or realm) of those contents and facts. However, the anthropological factor exists not *before* every society, but *in* every society; *this* makes up the anthropological factor's ubiquity. Furthermore, anthropologically founded prognoses (or explanations) of content(s) or facts would have to, sooner or later, accept separate and even opposed drives (urges or impulses) as causes of the same prognoses (or explanations) of content(s) or facts, since content(s) and facts likewise differ from one another and often (re)act contrarily towards one another. The ethical-normative classification of these drives (urges or impulses) would, finally, be unavoidable in order to be able to account for the contrary extremes (i.e. extremities, limits, ends or opposites) of the social relation; one would have to also say: the "good" or "social" impulses drive man towards friendship and concord, the "bad (wicked and evil)" or "asocial" towards enmity and war. This – common – anthropological explanation of the historically witnessed (or attested) spectrum of the social relation stands on exceedingly shaky ground. Neither does man wage war because he is bad (wicked or evil), nor – and this must perhaps be said even more emphatically – does he enter into friendships and does he live in society as a result of his natural goodness. Thucydides's reference to the nature

of man always staying the same for the explanation of the atrocities in the Peloponnesian War, anthropologically and social-ontologically results in (i.e. has) meaning only when, with that reference, what is meant is that the openness and plasticity of human nature is so unlimited and unlimitable that the attempt to reduce the said openness and plasticity of human nature to its "good" half is from the beginning doomed to failure; the great historian then continues also in this sense, and interrelates the vicissitudes of events, i.e. the transition from peace to war and vice versa, with, on each and every respective occasion, different manifestations of human nature[257]. The same reservations apply vis-à-vis anthropologically founded explanations of human behaviour like, for instance, those which we often encounter in French moral philosophy (or literature). La Rochefoucauld may be absolutely right when he sees in personal interest, which he, incidentally, by no means comprehends merely materially, the motive of all possible virtues and vices[258]. However, the uniformity of the motive makes the task of explaining the qualitative differences in the great variety of actual act(ion)s only all the more pressing. And the task can no longer be dealt with inside of anthropology, however much the validity (soundness or conclusiveness) of anthropological guidelines may, into the bargain, be helpful. In comparison with the common versions of general and empirical anthropology, the social-ontologically oriented one has, in this regard, a considerable advantage: it ab ovo thinks of the anthropological coefficients together with the other social-ontic aspects, i.e. together with the social relation and the political. Consequently, the theoretical triptych of social ontology analytically reaches the threshold of historical, sociological and also psychological explanation, and gives

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[257] III, 82, 2.

[258] *Maximes*, Nr. 253 (éd. 1678): «L'intérêt met en œuvre toutes sortes de vertus et de vices» ["Interest implements (or actuates) all sorts of virtues and vices"].

this (historical, sociological and psychological) explanation valuable hints, without wanting to curtail these kinds of explanations' competencies. Indeed: the best general theory is that which, on the basis of its own conceptual premises, gives precedence in respect of empirical research to the individual (or separate) disciplines. The criterion of falsification for our own general theory results, e contrario, from this fundamental principle. Our own general theory cannot, as it were, be refuted from the outside by another general theory, but only with reference to historically witnessed (or attested) human relations and situations, which burst open the conceptual framework worked out here.

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[i] See Ch. III, Sec. 1 and passim, as well as Ch. IV, with particular reference to Simmel [translator's endnote].

[ii] The translator shall assist the reader by adding that society as a whole is what is given or presupposed before any analysis of anything human can be undertaken, i.e. the social relation cannot exist before and separate or apart from society, but is a necessary and undetachable constituent part or element of society.

[iii] Since action per se is a social-ontological magnitude and cannot be part of what distinguishes sociology as a distinct discipline – to the extent of course any discipline is distinct from other disciplines [translator's comment].

[iv] For a discussion of the relationship between theory, and, subjects' decisions and power, necessarily in polemics with other theories; and the need for scientific theory to be able to explain phenomena which prima facie contradict it, see Kondylis, P. *Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung* (Science, Power and Decision: www.panagiotiskondylis.com) [translator's endnote].

[v] Kondylis means social facts are, to state the obvious, social, i.e. they are part of the overall nextwork of relations that make up society, whereas the "separate units" he mentions are not viewed other than as the sum of isolated individuals and their acts, without any reference to their overall omnipresent social interconnectedness [translator's endnote].

[vi] The human mind exists in the material human head consisting of the brain, its neurons etc., but human thought has the capacity to create its own thoughts world without referring to matter [translator's endnote].

[vii] Dray generally takes a pro-idiographic and anti-nomological stance, while not being fond of sociological regularities and while emphasising the importance of every actor's subjective meaning in historical exposition.

[viii] Probably a rather disparaging allusion to the "great philosopher" Heidegger. Cf. P. Kondylis, "Heidegger's Being and Time: A Collection of Pretentious and Vague Platitudes" (In: TELOS, TelosScope, November 23, 2015 (originally published in the Greek newspaper *To Vima* (*Το Βήμα*) on December 21, 1997, trans. Raymond Petridis)) – available online: http://www.telospress.com/heideggers-being-and-time-a-collection-of-pretentious-and-vague-platitudes./ [translator's endnote].

[ix] Representative thinkers in regard to the anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) are: A. Gehlen, S. Freud, M. Scheler, H. Plessner (with L. Klages, Alfred Seidel, W. Bagehot, Pareto, Nietzsche as "background figures"; Machiavelli and Hobbes as classical points of reference). Classical instances of the anthropology of Reason are: Descartes, Rousseau, Kant and his followers, Hegel. My sincere thanks to Dr. R. Petridis for his expertise [translator's endnote].