III. Social relation: the spectrum

1. The approach of formal sociology

A. The functionalistic background and ambivalences of formalism

A putting in order (or classification) of formal sociology in the history of ideas must first refer to the paradigm shift which took place around the turn of the last century [i.e. the 19th century into the 20th], and in the place of the bourgeois synthetic-harmonising thought figure, put an analytical-combinatory thought figure; the substances (or essences) of the bourgeois thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) were consequently dissolved into functions[1]. Formal sociology constituted – in accordance with the self-understanding of its originators too – an aspect, and at the same time, a driving force of this process. Formal sociology directly connected its ambitions to found *sociology* with a challenge to the philosophy of history and the substantialistic perception of man contained or implied in the philosophy of history. "History" and "man" were,– in the framework of the bourgeois philosophy of history, whose variation was the Marxist philosophy of history,– thought of together to the effect that history's upward movement was accompanied by the perfection of man as genus (i.e. species or race); the aptitudes (predispositions) or the seeds in relation to that were indeed supposed to belong to the original constitution of the genus (i.e. species or (human) race), however the said aptitudes or seeds could only be updated in the

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[1] In relation to this paradigm shift, see generally Kondylis, *Niedergang*; regarding the contribution of sociology in relation to that, see esp. p. 146ff..

course of history's development (or unfolding). As the unfolding space of human nature, history was not, for its part, merely a quantitatively understood period of time, as well as not a period of time whose qualities merely had to do with the density and the peripeteiae (i.e. sudden and unexpected changes of fortune or reversals of circumstances) of the becoming (or events), irrespective of this becoming's content. History was defined in terms of meaning and values, i.e. as progress in a comprehensive, real and ethical sense. The dissolution of the substance (or essence) "history" meant that time from now on lost its ethical-qualitative dimension and its unified sense (or meaning) in order to disintegrate into pieces, which could be joined together differently on each and every respective occasion in accordance with the functional character of the becoming (or events). And the dissolution of the substance (or essence) "man" meant the fragmentation of those fixed aptitudes, which in the course of history were supposed to come to full development. In the perception of human things (i.e. affairs), unified in its substance history, is now displaced by society comprehended as a functional ensemble (or whole), while at the same time man as an individual on each and every respective occasion differently shapes, and also differently experiences, his own functional unity in accordance with the functional requirements of the social ensemble.

Now formal sociology neither first founded *sociology* nor did it discover *society* as such; rather formal sociology developed that concept of sociology and society which corresponded to the analytical-combinatory thought figure and thereby, for its part, contributed to the aforementioned paradigm shift. In order to be able to obtain such a concept, formal sociology had to put an end to the osmosis of history and sociology, as this osmosis existed in the framework of the philosophy of history, and

likewise divide the real pendant (i.e. counterpart) to this epistemological osmosis, namely the network of history and society, into its components, in order to then define sociology and society anew in their separation from history (as tale, story or historiography) and history [as a science], and to relate sociology and society exclusively to each other. The co-existence with one another of the relatively independent (or autonomous) stages of development, and of an overarching progress in the general schema of the philosophy of history, reflected the noteworthy and the, for historical sociology, fact rich in consequences that here the concept of society is only partially absorbed by the concept of history, although the former – seen dynamically – remained subordinated to the latter. Yet seen statically, society kept its independence as a functional and structured or inwardly hierarchised entirety, and Comte's, but also Marx's attempt to distinguish the static and dynamic way of looking at things from each other, and at the same time to connect one with the other, provided the basis for the epistemological osmosis of sociology and history. Precisely thanks to this relative autonomy of the concept of society, the philosophy of history was allowed to raise (i.e. make) the claim of being not merely history, but also sociology. The societies following one another, which made up history's stages of development, could be transformed into sociological, historically saturated ideal types and detached from the schema of progress[2]. Whilst formal sociology separated the concept of society from such contexts, in order to construct society on the basis of ultimate and ubiquitous constituent elements (or parts), formal sociology increased the demand for the overcoming of the philosophy of history in favour of the demand for the supra-historical founding of sociology. Only in this way could formal sociology, incidentally, acquire its own terrain

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[2] Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 2B in this volume.

(i.e. territory), especially as the philosophy of history could just as well be disproved with the means of historical sociology. Both of the above-mentioned demands [i.e. the overcoming of the philosophy of history, and, the supra-historical founding of sociology] do not, therefore, necessarily interrelate with each other, and the a limine elimination (or exclusion) of the historical approach from sociology did not at all allow the question to arise as to whether that which was supposed to be founded supra-historically was any longer, or only in part, able to be sociology[i]. The zeal in contrasting *forms* to historical content(s) left, for the formal sociologists' part, little time for reflection on the content-related presuppositions of exactly these forms – yet precisely this reflection would have shown that here a path was taken which went beyond sociology in every theoretically and, in terms of research practice, relevant sense. Typically enough, formal sociology exercised its influence not through the formation of a coherent sociological school or tendency, which would have in connection with programmatic work(s) [or projects] systematically investigated social life, but through the mostly selective reception of its insights on the part of unhistorical social psychology or the just as unhistorical phenomenological analyses of the lifeworld. Formal sociology interests us here because it thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion) the spectrum of the social relation – and because the weaknesses and the gaps of a purely form-related (i.e. formal) description of this spectrum is social-ontologically revealing.

Still in the second half of the 19th century, the bond between sociology and the philosophy of history seemed to be so strong and self-evident that every demarcation had to proceed via formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms). As far as I know, Lazarus first expressed the idea that society consists of several side by side, i.e. adjacent, but also touching one

another i.e. tangent, and intersecting, narrower and broader, circles, so that society represents (or constitutes) "an extremely manifold in itself intertwined (or convoluted) relationship of connection and separation"[3]. Lazarus's student, Dilthey, who wanted to show the essential affinity (or relationship) between sociology and the philosophy of history, suggested as a realistic alternative to sociology and the philosophy of history's "unsolvable" problem, the dissolution of the social whole into individual interrelations (or contexts) ("members (i.e. parts, components or limbs)" or "systems"), and compared the underlying "relations of dependence and affinity (or relationship)" of every culture with those between the "constituent elements (parts)" or "functions of an organism"[4]. The internal connection between the analytical, form-related (i.e. formal) and functional point of view is already emerging here, so that Vierkandt could attribute to Dilthey the "definition of society with the help of the concept of interaction (or mutual influence)"[5]. However, a hermeneutician (i.e. practitioner of hermeneutics), who more or less needed fixed (steady or stable) subjective bearers of experiencing and reliving or understanding of objective meaning contexts, had to, despite the turning away from the metaphysics of substance (or essence) and of Reason, resist a consistent functionalisation, at whose end would be meaninglessness. The young

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[3] Lazarus-Steinthal, „Einleitende Gedanken", p. 4. The context here is still "folk-psychological".

[4] *Einleitung in die Geisteswiss.*, GW, I, pp. 86ff., 111, 421 (regarding Simmel); V, p. 61ff. (society as interactions (or mutual influences) being added up). The relationship between Dilthey and Simmel was succinctly characterised by Tenbruck, „Simmel", p. 595ff.. Let us here recall Spann's objection to Dilthey's concept of society, which can adversely affect the formal-sociological approach as a whole: Dilthey does not pose the question according to the specific character of the social, but he confuses this question with the question according to the interrelation (or connection) of the subsystems (or part systems) („Zur soziol. Auseinandersetzung", p. 220ff.). Cf. Ch. II, footnote 237, above.

[5] *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 40. Amongst his main sources Vierkandt counts, apart from Simmel, phenomenology, "which enables us to ascertain comprehensive (or extensive) series of ultimate a priori facts" (loc. cit., III, p. 1ff.). L. v. Weise saw himself as part of Simmel and Vierkandt's intellectual(-spiritual) succession, *Soziologie*, pp. 128, 133; cf. the critical comments regarding both Simmel and Vierkandt in *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 35, 41. A rebellion against the «philosophie de l'histoire» ["philosophy of history"] was also the first version, represented by Tarde, of French «sociologie pure» ["pure sociology"]. "Imitation" constitutes primarily a relation, and society should be defined as a system of relations, not for instance as a system of law or of the economy (*Lois*, XXII, p. 73).

Simmel set to work more radically, who already in his first sociological writing (i.e. treatise) determined (or defined) the "direction of modern intellectual(-spiritual) life" as follows, namely as "dissolving (or breaking up) the fixed, in itself same, substantial, into function, force, movement"[6]. In the process, both the I-like (or ego-ish (i.e. egocentric)) "point of unity in us", which is actually merely "interaction (or mutual influence) and dynamic weaving into one another (i.e. interweaving), interrelation, balancing of a multitude", as well as society, which represents (or constitutes) a "becoming (or events)", a "function of the receiving (greeting or welcoming) and the bringing about (or achieving) of fate (or destiny) and the shaping of one on the part of the other", are dissolved (or broken up)[7]. The functional way of looking at society aims at putting aside every notion of a "mystical unity", which exists "beyond individuals"[8]. Indeed, Simmel remains consistent as a sociologist in this anti-metaphysical and anti-substantialistic programme, even paying the price of skipping over the question as to what then holds together (or coheres) the interactions (or mutual influences), what makes them a society[9]. Simmel thereby at least avoided the reverse mistake, which our contemporary functionalists make by wanting to have both [these things] in one go (or at the same time): to dissolve (or break up) the social into functions and simultaneously to safeguard (or preserve) the social's unity through the emphatic concept of the system and system rationality. Nonetheless, Simmel shares with the systems theory functionalists an error of a methodical (i.e. methodological) character. The functionalistic thought pattern and interpretation pattern, which supports sociological theory, serves at the same time as a historical-sociological diagnosis of

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[6] *Über sociale Differenzierung*, p. 130. Cf. *Philosophische Kultur*, p. 3ff..
[7] *Brücke*, pp. 91, 215.
[8] *Über sociale Differenzierung*, p. 134ff..
[9] See Ch. II, Sec. 3B, footnote 235, above.

the age (i.e. our times), and indeed in the sense of the self-description of the social present. Modern society, whose features Simmel described definitely from the perspective of the contrast "community-society", is under the influence of the pure functionality of the money economy and consequently brings forth a relativistic-functionalistic way of thinking[10]. The sociologist too is supposed to functionalistically apprehend society and social life in general, that is, irrespective of the diagnosis of the age (i.e. our times). However, how can such a time-conditioned intellectual attitude be legitimately declared the key for the understanding of every society in every period of time? And why exactly, of all understandings, does the functionalistic self-understanding of modern society coincide with the understanding of supra-historical real facts (or situations)? It does not cross Simmel's mind that functionality can be an ideological metaphysics in need of explanation just as substantialism, for its part, was. Simmel does not see that functionalistic sociology essentially represents (or constitutes) not an explanation, but rather a symptom of the "direction of modern intellectual(-spiritual) life" described by him himself, that the functionalistic way of looking at things did not, that is, for instance, gain the upper hand because people were suddenly transformed from substances into functions, but because the social conditions (or circumstances) took a form in core areas, which in tone-setting (i.e. leading) ideologues found expression in functionalistic positions[11].

A discussion of Simmel's so-called turn regarding the philosophy of life, which necessarily entailed a certain rehabilitation of "substantial" magnitudes, e.g. of the experiencing and understanding I (Ego or Self) or

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[10] *Philosophie des Geldes*, esp. ch. VI; still more concisely in the earlier article „Das Geld in der modernen Kultur".
[11] Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 2, above.

of objective cultural meaning contexts, is superfluous here. Because Simmel's sociology was in essence already mature before this turn[12]; although his sociological interests continued to remain wide-awake [i.e. active], Simmel's basic sociological concept was not revised in the sense of the philosophy of life. Functionalism was connected with exactly this basic concept, and this was, next to the programmatic contrast with the philosophy of history, both recorded by Simmel's contemporaries[13], as well as loudly proclaimed by Simmel's direct successors. Vierkandt in fact called to mind the good example of natural science, which had "already everywhere carried out" the replacement of the category of the object by that of the relation; he set the task to "relating (or relationalising)" thought (i.e. thinking which relates things between one another) of apprehending functions, and by objecting, from a functionalistic point of view, to the overestimation of the "unity (or uniformity) of the personality" by the "popular way of thinking", and also believed he was able to achieve something about which cybernetic systems theory today boasts. The distinction "between the individual as place (or locus) of the social becoming (or events) and the systems which make up his content", i.e. the ascertainment of the large quantity of various stances, mentalities and purposes (or goals) in the only conditionally (i.e. partly or relatively) unified individual allows, finally, a bursting open of the usual separations between natural and historic, created and creating, acting and watching (i.e. observing) man[14]. The dissolution of substances into functions creates, therefore, a unified (or

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[12] Tenbruck, „Simmel", esp. p. 592ff..

[13] See e.g. the way Jellinek summons function against substance (or essence) in order to obtain the "social concept of the state", *Staatslehre*, p. 174ff.. For Troeltsch, formal sociology and the philosophy of history (a mixture of history and ethics, causality and finality (i.e. the doctrine of the efficacy of final causes, or, teleology)) represented the two main conflicting schools of thought in sociology („Zum Begriff", p. 705ff.). Vierkandt starts from the contrast between "encyclopaedic sociology pertaining to the philsophy of history" and "analysing(i.e. analytical)-formal" sociology in his main work (*Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 1ff.).

[14] Loc. cit., pp. 40, 48ff..

uniform) field in which all the conceivable transitions and crossings (i.e. hybridisations) are made possible. Space thus displaces time as the main form of perception of the social. As v. Wiese expressed it, "the primacy of the next to one another (i.e. being side by side, or co-existence) ahead of the after one another (i.e. existing after one another, or succession) [is]... an essential feature of our teaching (or theory) of the relation", whereas it was the other way around in the philosophy of history[15].

The bringing out (i.e. elaborating) of the functionalistic background of formal sociology can serve as a reminder that quite a few sociological schools of thought of the 1960s and 1970s, like quite a few tendencies of artistic avant-gardism from the same period, took root in the paradigm shift around 1900; mutatis mutandis, the contradistinction between Durkheim and Simmel continued in the contrast between the closed and the open system. Yet that bringing out pursues here, first of all, theoretical aims. The functional and form-related (i.e. formal) approach in fact interrelate logically, because functions come to the fore where substances have been dissolved into ultimate constituent elements (or parts), which then can be combined with one another in such a way that they constitute forms. The search for ultimate elements existed expressly in formal sociology's programme, and connected this search, in this regard, with the aforementioned paradigm shift[16]. Yet, precisely in this

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[15] *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 30, 31, 49. Apart from that, v. Weise repeats the demand of "delimiting the concept of the relation from the concepts of the object and of qualities (properties or characteristics)"; he regards as a methodical (i.e. methodological) ideal the "continued as far as possible quantification of the qualitative differences of the social becoming (or events)", and for his part recalls the example of other sciences (loc. cit., pp. 3, 9, 7). The functionalistic spatialisation of the way of looking at things is supposed to also here show the way out of the alternatives "individual – society" or "whole – part" (loc. cit., p. 22ff.).

[16] Formal sociology endeavours "to go back to the ultimate elements of social life" (Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 3); "our system is primarily a system of the next to one another (i.e. being side by side, or co-existence). We break down (or take apart) a complex into its simultaneous constituent elements (or parts)" (v. Weise, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 30). For the search for ultimate elements in art, philosophy or linguistics at the turn of the century [i.e. c. 1900] cf. Kondylis, *Niedergang*, pp. 97ff., 138ff., 152ff..

search, the fatal ambivalences of sociological formalism became apparent, and indeed at the same time regarding two crucial questions. On the one hand, when it was a question of the total feasibility of the separation between form and content, on the other hand, when it was a question of the determination (or definition) of "form". The possibility of a *formal* sociology, or of a sociology as pure teaching (i.e. theory) of forms in general, obviously depends on that feasibility. And Simmel could in this regard show and promise so little that one may ask with what scientific right was he convinced in advance of the possibility of a formal sociology. As Simmel himself wrote, "for the foreseeable future" no "even only approximate dissolution" of the forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) "into simple elements" was to be hoped for, from which it followed that the already proposed (or formulated) forms would apply "only to a relatively small compass of phenomena (or manifestations)"; to that the admission was added that even these forms do not remain themselves "absolutely the same", but they varied in accordance with each and every respective content[17]. However, how would a demanding formal sociology be founded if the forms were lacking which would encompass social life in its synchronic and diachronic entirety? And would the assertion not be absurd that those wide social areas in which the separation between form and content admittedly could not be carried out, would be completely closed to sociological treatment? Simmel (and v. Weise too) sought to avoid this absurdity by way of a half-hearted compromise or a makeshift solution. Simmel allowed next to pure sociology, a "general" sociology, within whose area of competence phenomena and constructs fell, which presupposed the existence of a society, whereas pure sociology was

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[17] *Soziologie*, pp. 10, 11.

supposed to be concerned with the forms of interaction (or mutual influence) as constituting (i.e. constitutive) forces of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)[18]. Through this reluctant splitting of sociology, the infeasibility of the pure or form-related (i.e. formal) programme was tacitly admitted, especially as the logical and epistemological relationship between both branches of the discipline remained extremely unclear or entirely external. Content-related sociology was perceived rather as an annoying (or burdensome) compact appendage, which awaited for its dissolution into forms. For its part, pure sociology was obviously not dependent on content-related sociology, since pure sociology wanted to directly have recourse to the historical material in order to unearth therein hidden form-related (i.e. formal) structures. Now the path from the historical material to the form was not only in practice inaccessible, as Simmel himself illustrated by way of an example[19], but in principle indirect and mediated (i.e. subject to intervention). Because in view of the uniqueness of historical content(s), the direct and exact correspondence of a pure sociological form with a certain content would imply the said pure sociological form's asymmetry vis-à-vis other content(s), and consequently the thwarting of a comprehensive teaching (i.e. theory) of forms, which may sensibly be

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[18] *Grundfragen*, ch. I. The same distinction was in essence made in 1908 when Simmel wrote that conventional or non-pure sociology would study those societal phenomena (or manifestations) "in which the interacting (or mutually influencing) forces are already crystallised out of their immediate bearers", that is, represented (or constituted) objective constructs (*Soziologie*, p. 14). Simmel only wanted to back then completely deny this study the name sociology, nor did he want to let the social sciences have such a name (but can the science of law replace the sociology of law?), while he held pure sociology to be "absolutely justified" "in covering the concept of sociology fully and alone" (loc. cit. pp. 19, 20). In 1917, Simmel believed, more reservedly that pure sociology is "in a... sense appearing to me actually quite decisively 'sociological'". L. v. Weise called, in contrast to Simmel, pure sociology, general, and assigned to the "special sociologies" the study of the areas, which are characterised by content-related ends (goals) being set (or end (goal) setting) (economy, law) (see e.g. „Beziehungssoziologie", p. 69). However, the diverging terminology does not change the factual agreement with Simmel at all. This agreement is underlined by v. Weise's distinction between "processes of the first" and "processes of the second order": the former would not "logically" (!) presuppose the existence of a social construct; the latter would presuppose it („Beziehungssoziologie", p. 75).
[19] *Soziologie*, p. 12.

proposed (or formulated) only when every individual (or single) form structurally covers multiple content(s). But also apart from that: if pure sociological forms could be applied to different content(s), or if different content(s) could be broken up (or dissolved) into identical forms, then a *sociological* determination (or definition) of the difference between the content(s) would be impossible, and in that case tolerance vis-à-vis content-related sociology would also be superfluous; one could abolish such tolerance straight away. If the forms then again, depending on the field of application and in accordance with the difference between the contents as regards one another, were to vary, they would therefore be determined in terms of content; thus, the theoretical desideratum of a general *sociological* teaching (i.e. theory) of forms would lose its actual sense (or meaning), and one could remain confident in (i.e. satisfied or content with) historical-content-related sociology. All the more as the contradistinction with regard to questions of formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms) and typification (i.e. rendering into types) is immanent (or inherent) in this historical-content-related sociology. Sociology *is* in fact of itself formalisation and typification, and indeed exactly to the extent it vindicates (i.e. defends or claims) its own territory vis-à-vis history. Certainly, pure sociology's search for ultimate forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), in which the historical content(s) would be able to be absorbed, means something other than the formalisation of these same contents by means of historically oriented sociology; here are, in other words, two different perceptions of the possible separation between form and content. But if "pure" and "general" (in Simmel's sense) or "special" (in v. Wiese's terminology) sociology, are supposed to make up branches of *the same* discipline, then there must be a logical interrelation between both those perceptions. That, however, is not the case. An analysis of the family as form of becoming

or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), free of historical content(s), would not provide any backing for a typology of historically attested forms of families – on the contrary: were this analysis at all doable (which it is not necessarily), then all forms of the family would have to be absorbed into a single form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), and historical sociology would remain out of work (i.e. without anything to do) after this ultimate reduction. Either this historical sociology must, therefore, cease to apply, and pure sociology with the other social sciences and the humanities be left alone, or pure sociology must be assigned to (or classified within) an extra-sociological epistemological field, whereby such questions would be answered by themselves.

The founders of formal sociology hardly paid attention to the difference between both these possible separations of form and content from each other. The failure to appreciate the essentially form-related (i.e. formal) aspect of historical sociology had, nevertheless, dire consequences (or got its revenge) to the effect that pure sociology, believing in its own monopoly over the formal-related (i.e. formal), vindicated (i.e. defended or claimed) many a form for itself, which cannot be stricto sensu classified readily as an "ultimate constituent element (or part)" of the social, or as an elementary and indispensable form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation). Above all, Simmel's analyses in his main sociological work suffer methodically (i.e. methodologically) under this ambiguity, which of course is frequently concealed by the impressionistic mastery, by the concise apprehension of concrete situations in their to-ing and fro-ing, and not least of all by the mostly convincing, albeit in principle frowned-upon, psychology. This all undoubtedly constitutes an important contribution to – "general" – sociology and explains, incidentally, the renewed interest in Simmel at a time, of all times, in

which one indeed wants to know little of "pure" sociology, but more about microsituations, microstructures and micro-interactions. It is namely, the time of the mass-democratic blurring of the boundary between (the) private and (the) public, with the corresponding consequences for the sociological discipline. That contribution is not however made as a methodically (i.e. methodologically) strict keeping to the form-related (i.e. formal) or pure programme. And this is by far not yet all. The ambiguity, which results from the manifold mixing of the "pure" and historically loaded form with each other, is paired (i.e. combined) with another, and just as rich in consequences, ambiguity, which concerns the determination (or definition) of the pure form itself. The pure form can, on the one hand, mean a fixed (steady or settled) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations, which fulfils a constitutive function in every social construct. On the other hand, a pure form can represent (or constitute) a form-related (i.e. formal) criterion, whose purity consists in its in principle applicability to every constellation or crystallisation of relations, regardless of whether this constellation or crystallisation is "pure" in the sense of formal sociology or not. The difference is patently momentous. Because the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion – broadcast conceptually as (i.e. called) "unification (agreement or union) and splitting (division or disunion)" by Simmel, as "association and dissociation" or "nearness (proximity) and distance" by L. v. Weise – was not at all in its validity influenced by the success of the attempt at proposing (or formulating) pure forms in the former sense, and at encompassing, through their systematisation, the entire realm of the social. Expressed otherwise: the application of the above-mentioned social criterion to all existing social constructs or phenomena (manifestations), and the finding out of ultimate fixed (stable or settled) forms or relation crystals (crystalline or

crystallised relations), to which that criterion could be applied in every social construct or phenomenon, are two completely different things. Nonetheless, Simmel mixes and confuses both with each other when he speaks of the pure form, and he describes constellations (correlations or conjunctures) like for instance that of "primus inter pares" ["first amongst equals"], thus, as if they were at the same logical level with the criterion of "unification (agreement or union) and splitting (division or disunion)", although they can merely be illustrations of the same criterion. Furthermore: on the assumption that pure forms in the sense of constellations or crystallisations of relations would befit, as it were, the status of social law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), Simmel wants to search for analogous law-bound (deterministic or law-based) or law-like formations (kinds of moulding) in social phenomena, which are not elementary fixed (stable or settled) forms, but rather mobile incarnations of the aforementioned form-related (i.e. formal) criterion. In this way, he believes that e.g. he can ascertain on a stable basis "how the various stadia (i.e. stages) of supra-ordination and subordination are lined up, to what extent a supra-ordination in a certain relation is compatible with an equal ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) in other relations" etc.[20]. It is, nevertheless, futile to answer such questions once and for all by means of formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms) appearing in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner), that is, to want to achieve something which lies beyond the ad hoc proposed (or formulated) ideal-typical formalisations of historical sociology. Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) are not related in terms of law bindedness (determinism

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[20] Loc. cit., p. 18.

or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner), but causally, that is, in accordance with each and every respective historical and personal constellation (correlation or conjuncture) between one another, so that statements about supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination may not be assigned to the realm of pure forms in the sense of fixed (stable, firm or settled) and ubiquitous crystallisations. Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination can certainly be subsumed under the pure form in the sense of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of unification (agreement or union) and splitting (division or disunion) or nearness (proximity) and distance – but the application of a ubiquitous criterion does not nearly found any law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity). The ubiquity of the criterion and law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) as the necessary recurrence of certain phenomena (or manifestations) or constellations (correlations or conjunctures), to which the criterion is applicable, must definitely remain logically and factually separated from each other.

Our analysis is – most likely unreflectedly and unintentionally – confirmed by v. Wiese's theoretical decision to do without the Simmelian search for fixed (steady or stable) and elementary forms of the relation underlying all social constructs, and instead of that, to build a pure sociology in principle on the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of association and dissociation or nearness (proximity) and distance. V. Wiese expressly identifies the concept of the pure form with the conceptual pair of nearness (proximity) and distance[21], without though seeing that nearness (proximity) or distance cannot actually be a form (an at will (or arbitrarily) variable form without a fixed (solid or firm) outline

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[21] Thus, e.g., when he writes "that the most general form of social events must consist in approximations (i.e. approachings or coming near) and distancing, in to-ing and fro-ing, in towards one another and away from one another...", „Beziehungssoziologie", p. 67.

is in fact no form), but is partly a given (actual) fact or force, under whose effect forms come into being, partly an analytical criterion which is applicable to forms having come into being in such a manner. The identification of the form with nearness and distance or association and dissociation, as logically precarious as it may be, implies, at any rate, the admission that the separation between form and content can be carried out only at a level at which the actual (or main) theme is the spectrum of the social relation in general. If, on the other hand, form is comprehended as a fixed (stable, firm or settled) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations, then the analysis must be aligned (or oriented) in terms of content and historically; here, therefore, historical ("general", as expressed by Simmel, or "special", as expressed by v. Wiese) sociology does the talking, and the only possible formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms) remains the typification (i.e. rendering into types) of content(s). If, however, formal *sociology* is unrealisable, and if the form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) of the spectrum of the social relation must be epistemologically established outside of the area of sociology, then this does not in the least mean, on the other hand, that the original approach of pure sociology could bear the entire load of a social ontology. The form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) of the social relation's spectrum, as this is described on the basis of the criterion "nearness-distance" and "association-dissociation", just constitutes an aspect of social ontology, which only in connection with the rest of the aspects has (or obtains) *social-ontological* relevance. If this connection becomes apparent, then at the same time it is clear that the formalism of pure sociology must be criticised not only from a sociological, but no less from a social-ontological point of view, albeit in a different sense on each and every respective occasion, as the different sense on each and every respective occasion corresponds to the difference

of both epistemological levels in respect of each other. Formal sociology could not be developed into a social ontology basically because the prevailing functionalistic point of view refused to accept a going into factors, which until today are still regarded as "substances (or essences)", e.g. anthropological factors. Yet only the widening of the social-ontological horizon in an anthropological – as well as a political direction and direction pertaining to the philosophy of culture – allows one, beyond the apprehension of the formal constitution (texture or composition) of the spectrum of the social relation, to explain its mechanism too, through whose activity the great variety of historically attested social and cultural forms comes about. The same social-ontological critique can be directed at Weber in so far as the foundation stone of his sociology, namely the concept of social action, represents an alternative description (or paraphrasing) of the concept of the social relation. Social action or the social relation here also represents something which in itself lies outside of (historical) sociology. Social action is nevertheless not extended to a social ontology because the necessity of certain basic features of social action or the social relation – above all of meaning (or sense) – is indeed ascertained, but not made understandable against an anthropological background pertaining to the philosophy of culture. It is not a matter here of whether Weber otherwise supported perceptions which could have been used as building blocks of a social ontology, but whether he made *systematic* use of them in connection with the teaching (or theory) of social action or of the social relation. But that was not the case. And nevertheless it is factually so close to touching upon the mechanism of the social relation, when there is talk of "interaction (or mutual influence) or "social action", that intimations about the mechanism of the social relation by Simmel and Weber are not lacking, which point in the

direction which then gained general fame by way of symbolic interactionism[22].

The feeling that formal sociology would in actual fact overstep the epistemologically justifiable boundaries of the sociological discipline occasionally arose amongst sociologists, however, this feeling would not be substantiated in greater detail because of the lack of a social-ontological perspective. That is why one complimentarily ushered out (or got rid of) formal sociology rather than epistemologically incorporating (or classifying) it[23]. For our part, we may sum up such an incorporation (or classification) as follows. Formal sociology posed questions, which sociology neither solves nor is obliged to solve, and formal sociology did not solve these questions itself because it only half posed these same questions. In the final analysis, the road to their social-ontological solution was blocked owing to the functionalistic premises, which could behold in the taking seriously of the *being (Is)* of society, only a lapsing back into "substantialism". Thus, formal sociology had to already from the beginning get entangled in the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of every methodological individualism; otherwise stated, formal sociology's starting point (or approach) itself forced it towards partisanship in favour of methodological individualism. Because, if one wants to remain with the pure form, then one must construct the ultimate forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) out of individuals. An investigation of historically attested forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), even of the smallest scale, cannot be carried out without consideration for content(s); it cannot e.g. be seen what then a "pure" way of looking at "the" family as the minimal form of

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[22] In relation to that, Ch. IV, esp. Sec. Ba.
[23] Franz Oppenheimer opined that formal sociology is merely the "antechamber of the shrine"; Freyer believed that it "could definitely be a necessary preliminary stage for a more demanding (or sophisticated) sociology", *Soziologie*, p. 63 (Oppenheimer is cited here too).

becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), away (i.e. apart) from every comparison of the many historically known types of families with one another, could be meant. Constellations (or correlations) of individuals, starting with the dyad, can, on the contrary, be theoretically devised (outlined or sketched) anyway, in relation to which one could say along with Simmel that it would occur to us "only that examples are possible in relation to such constellations of individuals, but less possible that such constellations of individuals would be real"[24]. Simmel, however, overlooked that he, in all his examples, always tacitly regarded at least one thing as real: the becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) of individuals. He talks, without exception, of individuals, who *already* have at their disposal the mental equipment of members of organised societies, and when he sets himself the aim of evading the fact of society and of showing "society, as it were, in status nascens [in a state of being born or in a nascent state]"[25], then he does not at all think of doing the same with individuals *as* individuals, that is, of making understandable the coming into being of society from individuals coming into being, i.e. not already socialised in the framework of an existing society. Accordingly, Simmel's famous excursus "how is society possible?"[26] is based on a confusion: elements or phenomena, which are found in every society, are passed off as elements or phenomena, whose effect can give rise to society, while at the same time the presumed genetic priority of these elements or phenomena vis-à-vis other elements or phenomena remains undiscussed and unproven; typically enough, Simmel understands by that, relations between individuals or between "the" individual and "society". He certainly knew though, as mentioned,

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[24] *Soziologie*, p. 33, footnote 1; cf. p. 144.
[25] Loc. cit., p. 15.
[26] Loc. cit., p. 21ff..

that historically working "general" sociology cannot help presupposing the fact of society, and at the same time he wanted to tie (i.e. link) the purity of formal sociology together with formal sociology's freeing from this presupposition of the fact of society. With formalistic premises, this could also not be avoided. Since, however, even the encounter between Robinson and Friday was marked (or shaped) by the social preforming of both, since, that is, interaction (or mutual influence) can take place only inside of society or already socialised individuals, when society or already socialised individuals are supposed to be the object (or subject matter) of social science, and not of the zoology of animals living alone, then Simmel erred when he related his question on the possibility of society to society's genesis and not to society's cohesion. The conviction of individualistic formal sociology that the cohesion of collective constructs is generally based merely on collective notions (or representations) and ceases with these collective notions (or representations)[27], led, incidentally, to a paradoxical agreement with individualistic formal sociology's opponent, Durkheim.

B. The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance

The analysis of the previous section showed that the formal-sociological determination (or definition) of the form has two different meanings, which sociologically, in a general sense, are indeed both useful, but not constitutive for the sociological discipline. Now, the second of these

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[27] Thus, v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 9, 25ff.; cf. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 7.

meanings can, with the form comprehended as the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, find social-ontological use, although such use in itself, and without consideration for content(s) of any kind, is hardly able to bear the epistemological load of a social ontology. When the founders of formal sociology inappropriately called the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness and distance "form", they were solely thinking of its independence from sociological (and psychological) content(s); its possible direct or indirect interrelation with content(s) of another order did not occupy them. As v. Wiese stressed, the merely form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion was supposed to distinguish the specific field of a pure sociology from that of all other social sciences and the humanities. Whereas these other social sciences and the humanities would concern themselves with the (political, religious, scientific etc.) goals or goal-related content(s), for whose sake humans draw nearer to (i.e. approach) one another, or distance themselves from one another, pure sociology devotes itself merely to the "direction" and the "rhythm" of this drawing nearer (i.e. approaching) or distancing, associating or dissociating movement. Through its formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to form) understood in such a way, formal sociology cannot only be demarcated from all other social sciences and the humanities, but at the same time it can encompass all of the other social sciences and the humanities, i.e. subject (or subordinate) them to its own specifically form-related (i.e. formal) criterion. Every relation, of whatever (associating or dissociating) kind, develops (or unfolds) in a field defined in terms of content and has, in this respect, a content. However, the content does not determine every relation's form-related (i.e. formal) structure; every relation's "direction" and its "rhythm" can be separated from content not merely in a methodic (i.e. methodological) respect, but also in reality; the said "direction" and

"rhythm" therefore largely follow an inner logic of their own, even though, on the other hand, the influence of the constitution (composition or texture) of an area, defined in terms of content, on the course of the relation is not to be overlooked[28]. According to the perception of the formal sociologists, the ascertainment of this influence remains a matter for the individual social sciences – for us, it constitutes a main task of sociology itself.

From the analysis of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, knowledge should therefore be retained, first of all with social-ontological intent, that the direction and rhythm of the social relation are in principle, in regard to their formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to form), independent of each and every respective area of social activity. This can then be formulated or generalised such that the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the social relation is connected solely with the fact that the subjects of this relation are humans in society. Socially living or formed humans constitute the exclusive precondition for the general validity of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance. This formal criterion of nearness and distance indeed never appears in abstract purity, but always in connection with content(s) and goals, yet precisely its (cap)ability at being connected with all possible content(s) and goals, makes it independent of every individual [piece or kind of] content and goal amongst all contents and goals. Socially living humans behave analogously. Socially living humans are always (situated or) located in concrete situations, and in the course of this they represent certain content(s) and goals; nevertheless, statements about socially living humans are possible, whose independence of content(s) and goals

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[28] v. Wiese, loc. cit., pp. 12, 13, 14; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau" (I), esp. p. 276ff..

consists exactly in such statements' general applicability to content(s) and goal(s). If now the mere existence of socially living humans or the fact of society vouches for the validity of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, then that does not mean that the said formal criterion of nearness and distance could be put forward (or formulated) on the basis of any way of looking at socially living humans whatsoever. The independence of the criterion in respect of content(s) and goals requires, first of all, an abstraction from the psychological factors which drive socially living humans to those contents and goals. If one comprehends the expression "psychological factors" in the widest sense, and if one subsumes thereunder "thought acts" as acts, as well as "affects (i.e. emotions)" as acts, then the assumption seems legitimate that behind content(s) and goals are, without exception, psychological factors. Under these circumstances, the autonomy of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) vis-à-vis the psychology of socially living humans can be proved only by means of the ascertainment that the same forms of distance and nearness (proximity) would come about under the effect of different psychologies or different forms of distance and nearness, and indeed under the effect of similar or identical psychological attitudes (stances or positionings)[29]. It is of course quite possible that the separation of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion from psychological factors be carried out even on the assumption that the same psychical content(s) would yield (or result in) always the same forms of distance and nearness (proximity); however, in this case, that separation would be, if not less compelling, then, all the same, less useful, both in an objective (factual) as well as heuristic respect. And one must take something else into consideration. The non-psychological character

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[29] See Sec. 2B in this Chapter.

of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance does not at all mean that this criterion cannot be applied to psychological phenomena, that is, that individual or collective psychology could not on the basis of the criterion "nearness-distance" be interpreted genetically and structurally. Entirely on the contrary.

One must presently maintain the range of these logical distinctions or possibilities, in order to clearly apprehend the form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance. In contrast, the founders of formal sociology offer fairly wholesale and hence misleading demarcations of the form-related (i.e. formal) against the psychological. Simmel kept to the programmatic declaration that sociology disregards mental(-spiritual) processes, which would bring forth a social phenomenon, in order to explore the forms of the relation contained in this social phenomenon; in that respect, sociology proceeds like linguistics[30]. In the same context, Simmel opined, however, that in sociology "the explanation of every individual fact [is] possible only in a psychological way", and since in his individual analyses such explanations and exploration of forms frequently went into (encountered or mixed with) one another, thus he could not convince all his readers of the consistency of his anti-psychological attitude (stance or positioning)[31]. V. Weise shared this scepticism too, by seeing in Simmel's perception of social relations as psychical interactions (or mutual influences), a source of misunderstandings[32]. We have already intimated that here only a more precise and broader apprehension of the psychical can help further, so that thereunder (i.e. under the psychical), situation-related (i.e. situational) thought acts are subsumed too; because in itself it should be

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[30] *Soziologie*, pp. 17-19.
[31] In relation to Weber's positioning, see Levine's remarks, *Flight*, p. 102ff..
[32] *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 41.

regarded as undisputed that social interaction (or mutual influence), without a psychical act of those taking part in that social interaction, can come about impossibly (i.e. is impossible). For his part, v. Wiese sought firm guarantees against a lapsing into the psychological, by contrasting the "processes of consciousness in man" with human acts (or actions) as "facta (i.e. facts as doings or behaviour)", and solely incorporated the latter in the area of competence of sociology[33]. However, this solution appears to be too simple. A strict orientation of the formal-sociological way of looking at act(ion)s as facts would end up in an infertile behaviourism, in contrast, by the way, to v. Wiese's stated intention of assigning sociology, even after its formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms), to the "understanding (or interpretive) social sciences". Because the external course of the act(ion)s does not necessarily allow the observer to make a valid judgement about the associating or dissociating character of the same act(ion)s, unless he knows about the meaning (or sense) connected with them, that is, the corresponding processes of consciousness. The meaning (sense) and the external course of an acting (act or action) can in fact contradict each other, as the proverbial Judas kiss or, conversely, a life-saving amputation and countless other examples attest[34]. On the other hand, not even exclusive orientation towards the meaning (sense) of the act (action or acting) is capable of giving an explanation (or information) about the said act(ion)'s associating or dissociating character, when the meaning (sense) is reduced to the inner wishes of those acting, that is, the psychical is reduced to I(Ego)-related affects (i.e. emotions) under the omission of (i.e. without) situation-related (i.e. situational) thought acts. Only the

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[33] Loc. cit., I, p. 19; II, p. 11ff..

[34] Racine lets his Nero say «J'embrasse mon rival, mais c'est pour l'étouffer» ["I embrace my rival, but it is to stifle (i.e. choke or suffocate) him"] (*Britannicus*, IV, 3, v. 1314).

concrete and all-round analysis of the interaction (or mutual influence) makes in every individual case clear whether nearness (proximity) or distance is gaining the upper hand here[35].

In relation to that, a clarification of the concepts of "nearness (proximity)" and "distance" themselves is needed though, first of all. If nearness (proximity) and distance, social-ontologically understood, cannot necessarily be discerned in the course of external acting (or action), then nearness and distance are even less to be measured likewise with the external benchmark of spatial distance. Spatial-physical and social nearness (proximity) or distance differ so much from each other that they can even be in an inverse relationship vis-à-vis each other. The emotional embrace of a pair of lovers and the struggle between two foes with bare hands both attain an outermost (i.e. limit or maximum) in physical nearness (proximity), however, the difference in social nearness (proximity) could not be greater. The distance (spacing or gap), which the concepts "nearness (proximity)" and "distance" indicate is therefore in principle an inside (i.e. internal) distance (spacing or gap), which can manifest (or express) itself in friendly or inimical acts, but not necessarily. The mere possibility of practical manifesting (or expressing) oneself suffices, nevertheless, in order to motivate behaviour, just as mere conjecture about alien (i.e. others') dispositions and intentions, brings into being one's own analogous dispositions and intentions. How now does the entire complex of dispositions, considerations, intentions and possible or real act(ion)s interrelate with the determination of social nearness (proximity) and distance? The answer is obvious if one reformulates the question as follows: to what extent does someone confirm or contest the sense (or feeling) of identity and the self-

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[35] Sorokin, *Society*, p. 93.

understanding of another; to what extent does someone contribute to the increase or decrease in the (understood in the wide sense) feeling (or sense) of power of another, regardless of whether in foro interno (i.e. in the internal court; in private, privately; inwardly) or in foro externo (i.e. in the external court; in public, publicly; outwardly)? The internal and/or external positioning of a subject vis-à-vis the identity and power of another subject yields their social nearness (proximity) to, or their social distance from, each another. (Mind you, identity and power are confirmed or contested in accordance with what the subjects concerned define as one's, on each and every respective occasion, own and alien (i.e. another's or others') identity and power). This determination (or definition) of nearness (proximity) and distance refers to content(s), whose consideration, as already stated, transforms the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance from a postulate of "pure sociology" to a component of a social ontology. The explication of the content(s) "identity" and "power" remains reserved for the third volume of this work. However, an indication of that is objectively imperative here.

If nearness (proximity) and distance do not represent a physical-spatial, but a social and or internal relation, then it is evident from this that the distance (spacing or gap) in the relation between two subjects cannot be measured with a single objective yardstick, as in the case of a spatial distance, but in relation to that, two yardsticks for the very frequent case in which the attitudes (stances or positionings) of both subjects towards each other are not absolutely symmetrical, are required; there can therefore be two or more distances (spacings or gaps) between two

subjects[36]. For the just as frequent case again, in which the social relation consists in neither bilateral absolute nearness (proximity) or absolute distance, the concepts of "nearness (proximity)" and "distance" must be relativised in a wider sense: "nearness" and "distance" are not relative merely because of their dependence on subjective attitudes (stances or positionings), but likewise because every nearness accompanies distance and every distance accompanies nearness. Absolute with, and absolute apart from, one another, are, seen quantitatively, rather extreme and exceptional cases; their social-ontological influence and status is, in the process, unimportant[37]. Simmel, who somewhat parenthetically, but clearly, distinguished between the "spatial" and "psychological" meaning of nearness (proximity) and distance[38], stressed likewise "the unity of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (or distance), which contains any (i.e. every single) relationship between men". Simmel's attempt to comprehend the form of the stranger (alien or foreigner) as a "synthesis of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (distance or farness)", is based on a double alternation of the spatial and of the "psychological" meaning of nearness (proximity) and distance. The distance in the relationship with the stranger signifies "that the near is remote (distant or faraway)", whose to be (or being) strange (i.e. strangeness, alienness or foreignness) consists, conversely, in "that the remote (distant or faraway) is near": the termini (i.e. terms) "the near" and "near" are here spatial, the termini "the remote (distant or faraway)" and "remote (distant or faraway)" are meant "psychologically"[39]. Simmel, furthermore, introduced a third parameter into the analysis of nearness (proximity) and distance: the extent and the

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[36] Pieper, „Grundbegriffe", p. 173ff.; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau" (I), p. 275ff.; v. Wiese accepted the clarification of his commentators in respect of this formulation, „Beziehungssoziologie", p. 68.
[37] See in relation to that, Sec. 2A in this Chapter.
[38] *Soziologie*, p. 539.
[39] Loc. cit., p. 509.

more general or more special (i.e. specific or particular) character of the common features of two subjects[40].

The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance encompasses a great variety of social relations, which, for their part, can be grouped or typified (i.e. rendered into or classified under types) according to form-related (i.e. formal) criteria. Nonetheless, these groups or types neither exist separately from one another, nor can a field of validity (or applicability) of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance outside of these types and groups be thought of; the said types and groups constitute mere (different or alternative) descriptions of the aforementioned criterion, and it is a question of which of these (different or alternative) descriptions is nearest in abstracto to the criterion. If one takes the criterion at its face value, if one remains therefore strictly with the spatial metaphor, in which the criterion is expressed, then one can imagine this criterion under only one single form of the relation: the physical distancing from someone, towards whom one would have a negative attitude (stance or positioning), and the physical approaching (or drawing near to) someone, towards whom one would have a positive attitude (stance or positioning) (another's physical distance or nearness (proximity) could also be indifferent to he who is indifferent vis-à-vis another, although in general the former [physical distance] rather than the latter [(physical) nearness] promotes indifference). Yet in accordance with all social experience and also in accordance with the inner logic of social cohesion, such real forms of the relation represent (or constitute) neither always the greater, nor the decisive part of social interactions. This part can only be apprehended by means of an in principle separation (or divorce) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness

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[40] See in relation to that, Sec. 2B in this Chapter.

(proximity) and distance from the spatial point of view. There remain then two other points of view, from which nearness (proximity) and distance can be understood: that of supra-ordination or subordination, and that of for (with) and against. Both these points of view equally imply (internal) nearness or distance[41], and they cover, in practice, all cases (even those, in which external and internal distance or nearness (proximity), either way, go hand in hand), except for indifferent ["]without one another (i.e. absence)["], and, being apart (or separate) from one another. Nevertheless, they are not in the least identical with each other. The type of relation "For (With) – Against" does not set up (or posit) any supra-ordination and subordination in the social relationship of the participants vis-à-vis one another, since the said type of relation can be represented just as well by equals (i.e. equal participants). On the other hand, supra-ordination and subordination can be both under the influence of "For (With)", as well as under the influence of "Against (one another)", in principle supra-ordination and subordination can be a form of association or of dissociation. Regarding the conceptual difference of both types of the relation in respect of each other, there also arises therefore a difference of extent. If the form of the relation "For (With) – Against", in view of the possible equality of the participants, cannot be completely reduced to the form of the relation of supra-ordination and subordination, whereas, conversely supra-ordination and subordination must be without exception a relation of "For (With)" or "Against (one another)", then from that results that the form of the relation "For (With) – Against" (formulated otherwise: "association – dissociation", "friendship – enmity") represents the concept of the genus, whose species is supra-ordination and subordination. And since there is

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[41] Cf. v. Wiese, „Randbemerkungen", p. 189ff..

no other form of relation except for the aforementioned forms of relation (the possible and usual case of indifferent ["]without one another (i.e. absence)["], and, being apart (or separate) from one another, is social-ontologically irrelevant, i.e. the effect of other social-ontological factors is required in order to attain social weight; and as socially relevant relationlessness (i.e. socially relevant absence (or lack) of a relation), the said case of indifferent ["]without one another["] and being apart from one another presupposes relations), thus from that it must be concluded that association and dissociation, or, friendship and enmity, as the form of the relation, includes the entire spectrum of the social relation. This is the ultimate logical and factual (objective) consequence from the use of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance for the setting (or drawing) up of a morphology of the "interactions (or mutual influences)" between humans, as the adherents of "pure sociology" had in mind. Besides, it is a mistake[42] to hypostatise the relationship of Up and Down in a relation, that is, to hypostatise the general concept of the direction of the relation as the form of the relation, and then to comprehend the relation "Above (Supra) – Under (Sub)" and the relation "For – Against" as the following (i.e. next or subsequent) tiers (or stages), which are characterised by growing tension during the transition from the first to the third tier (or stage). Up and Down (or: To and Away-From) do not conceptually mark any real form of the relation, but declare (or indicate) the direction of the relation in general, as a theoretical variable, which can find use as long as real circumstances (relation(ship)s or conditions) of supra-ordination and subordination exist, for as long as a real For and Against is present. Supra-ordination and subordination in principle, then again, bear in themselves a tension

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[42] Plenge made such a mistake, „Zum Ausbau" (I), p. 279ff..

not slighter than the form of the relation "For – Against", however the slighter or greater tension, which can be ascertained on each and every respective occasion in the said supra-ordination and subordination, and, "For – Against", is reduced to the fact that "Above (Supra)" and "Under (Sub)", anyhow, originally move inside of the broader area of "For" and "Against". That is why it has no real meaning to call social relations "mixed relations", if thereby it were supposed to be meant that in such "mixed relations" a mixing of in themselves different forms of the relation, also observable in a pure culture (or form) (i.e. unadulterated), would take place.

2.   The polarity in the spectrum of the social relation

A.   Anthropological parameters: the mortality of man

Formal sociology indeed put forward the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, however, it did not justify why the form-related (i.e. formal) way of looking at social phenomena had to be oriented precisely towards this criterion, why from functionalistic and formalistic (i.e. form-related) premises, this and no other guide could be derived for sociological work; the inability to account for that, made of course the boundaries of, and holes (or gaps) in those premises visible. L. v. Wiese admitted the derivation of the criterion from non-sociological factors or points of view, however, typically enough, he spoke only in passing and moreover inconsistently about that. Once, he opined that the assumption of two antithetical fundamental (or basic) relations is simply an "evident

proposition"[43]. Yet evidences (i.e. pieces of evidence or evident propositions) stand out only from a certain epistemological or factual perspective, and the perspectivistic character of an evidence (i.e. piece of evidence or evident proposition) must then above all become an object of reflection when the evidence concerned – as undisputed as it is in itself – attains a new relevance, and for the first time undertakes tasks in respect of founding. In another context, v. Wiese argued that the antithesis of association and dissociation is "a necessity resulting from the structure of our human mind (intellect or understanding)", since we could only understand something through "separation" or "division"[44]. Nevertheless, from the general assumption that human thought on the whole is based of necessity on antithetical conceptual pairs and must proceed dichotomously, the suitability of this or that concrete antithesis or dichotomy to constitute the foundation stone for the arrangement of the (subject) matter of a certain discipline, does not automatically arise; this suitability must be proved especially with regard to the specific theoretical requirements of the discipline. Eventually, v. Wiese advocated the view that sociology would take its teaching of "with-man and counter-man (i.e. fellow man and anti-man)" "from anthropology"[45]. If one may interpret this sweeping statement in the light of v. Wiese's sparse anthropological remarks (or statements), then one can presume that he wanted to correlate the associating and dissociating social forces with those "elementary forces" in man, which despite all the variation of the "historical form of a manifestation (phenomenon or appearance)", despite all weakening or strengthening from time to time, nevertheless exist and have an effect permanently; these elementary forces determine (or give

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[43] *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 11.
[44] Loc. cit., p. 178.
[45] *Soziologie*, p. 11.

rise to) the "fundamental positioning (or stance) of man towards man" and, if one disregards biological needs ("hunger and thirst") amongst humans, the said elementary forces can likewise be classified in accordance with the dichotomous schema: "love" on the one hand, "hate, lust for power (or domineeringness), envy" on the other hand[46]. In this syllogistic reasoning, the transition from anthropology to sociology ensues through the linear projection of the fundamental dichotomy of an anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) onto the fundamental dichotomy of a formal sociology. Because of that, the programmatically frowned-upon binding of forms to content(s) is nevertheless restored (or done), albeit in the worst possible way. Because recourse to the polarity in the spectrum of the anthropology of drives (urges) for the explanation of polarity in the spectrum of the social relation stands or falls on the anthropology of drives (urges) itself, and moreover such recourse endangers the clear separation pursued of the sociological from the psychological. Nonetheless, the coupling of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) with anthropological content(s) remains in itself symptomatically and social-ontologically instructive.

It is obvious that the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance can be properly formulated and used only in the form (shape or frame) of a spectrum. There is not in fact [just] *nearness* (*proximity*) and *distance*, because then history and society would consist of two single monotonous recurring and reciprocally alternating relations, but many forms and grades of nearness (proximity) and distance are attested, which can be simplificatively and approximatively grouped into a number of classes.

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[46] *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 121. Simmel occasionally sees the dichotomy "association – dissociation" from the perspective of the dichotomy "opposition given by nature" – "sympathy between humans" too, see e.g. *Soziologie*, p. 196ff..

This grouping or classification yields (i.e. results in or amounts to), then, a spectrum if one carries this grouping or classification out with regard to two fixed, symmetrically opposite outermost boundaries, one of which must mark patently extreme nearness (proximity), the other, extreme distance. Polarity, as a result, constitutively belongs to the spectrum of the social relation. The forms and grades of the social relation apprehended in that spectrum are able to be, because of their great variety and precisely in their great variety, understood in context only by means of a clearly and objectively (factually) justifiable (foundable) demarcation of the entire field; a demarcation, which simultaneously makes criteria available for the arrangement (or ordering) and definition of the content(s) of the spectrum. Social relations, which lie (i.e. take place) between both poles of the spectrum, must therefore be comprehended as successive attenuations of the extreme intensity of that pole to which they are nearer. How the continuity of the spectrum of the social relation can be determined by its own polarity, will be explained later[47]. In the face of extreme intensity, with which the social relation at both poles of the spectrum is loaded (or charged), and in which an outermost [point] (i.e. extreme, limit or maximum) in human possibilities manifests itself, the coupling of these poles with anthropological factors or content(s) referring to the ultimate and most elementary given facts of human existence ensues, which exist and have an effect irrespective of whether one supports an anthropology of drives (urges) or an anthropology of Reason, a functionalistic or substantialistic, an "optimistic" or a "pessimistic" perception of man. Here it must, in other words, be a question of that upon (or to) which man – every man – depends (or is attached) as an active being (t)here (or existence) in the social world; a

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[47] See Sec. 3A in this chapter.

question of man's existence as such and as a whole. Looked at in this way, there is nothing more elementary and original (or primal) than the maintenance or the interruption of the vital functions, such as in life or death. And since man – every individual man – does not necessarily come into the world, but must invariably die, thus the deepest and sole necessity of his existence lies in his mortality. The contingency of life is won day by day and year by year from the necessity of death, regardless of whether the individual may think about death or not; and the fact that life is revocable, but death irrevocable, grants the latter a higher status *in life*, to the extent that the intensity and range of social acts (or actions) must be judged by their irrevocability, that is, by their nearness (proximity) to death. Life cannot become the yardstick (or measure) of death, because death does not know what life means; however, death becomes the yardstick (or measure) of life, because the living can imagine death at any moment – death as one's own and alien (i.e. another's) dying, and death as one's own and alien (i.e. another's) killing.

In which sense now does the mortality of man as the deepest and most necessary dimension – which encompasses the fact of life, since only the living can be mortal – interrelate with the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation? In all probability, mortality and death would be social-ontologically irrelevant if all humans died in a single way, namely, a "natural death" as a result of organic dysfunctions or organic exhaustion without the help (mediation or doing(s)) of other humans, and without the direct or indirect effect of sociogenic factors. The same immanence, the same unimpressionability (or non-suggestibility) and the same manner of dying for all people, would make dying a socially neutral magnitude, i.e. something which could not have sparked off any difference. The possibility of bringing about inequality through human doing (i.e. deeds)

regarding the imminence and the manner of death brings the factor "mortality" into social-ontological play. Mortality does not constitute therefore mere reality, whose occurrence is reckoned on (or expected) at a future point in time, but mortality opens up for the socially acting subject practical possibilities, of which the said socially acting subject can make use in certain, often chosen points in time, both in relation to other subjects, as well as in relation to itself; because everyone knows or finds out what one has to do in order to bring about one's own or alien (i.e. another's) death, when one's own or another's death only really matters. Consequently, the necessary internal relation between the anthropological basic given fact of being mortal, and of the formation (development or emergence) of the polarity in the spectrum of the human social relation, becomes obvious. It would not cross any man's mind to kill another, were death amongst humans an unknown phenomenon, that is, were humans in respect of their constitution (composition, texture or nature) immortal; and someone would just as little want to, or have to, sacrifice his own life for another. *These* extreme manifestations of enmity and friendship amongst humans would simply fail to materialise; both poles of the spectrum of the social relation would cease to exist, and with their cessation, the structure of the spectrum would change from the ground up (i.e. fundamentally or completely) too.

For the making (or establishment) of the social-ontological interrelation between the basic anthropological given fact of being mortal and the polarity of the social relation's spectrum, it however does not suffice to leave aside natural death as a neutral magnitude in order to put the manner (or kind) and likelihood of violent (or forcible) death at the centre of attention. Over and above that, we must comprehend death not as a biological phenomenon, i.e. as demise (deceasing or passing), which

concerns a concrete individual organism and takes place, as it were, in a social vacuum, but as a socially meaning-like (i.e. meaningful or purposeful) process. In relation to that, violent death offers considerably firmer clues than natural death. Because the meaningfulness (purposefulness or meaning-likeness) of natural death can be asserted merely on the basis of unprovable metaphysical or religious constructions; during violent death, on the other hand, subjectively meant meaning can be objectively (or factually) ascertained. We can find out or suspect in a well-founded manner what meaning (or sense) somebody who kills someone else or dies for someone else connects with his acting (i.e. action). Above all, the latter case constitutes a constant memento (i.e. reminder) of the fact that, with regard to social-ontologically relevant death or with regard to the anthropological and social-ontological notion of self-preservation, the biological dimension is not necessarily decisive. At the human level, a transformation, through the mediation (or agency) of the "intellect(-spirit)" and its symbolic mechanisms, of the biological magnitude "self-preservation" into an ideational magnitude takes place, so that the question of self-preservation and the, understood in the wider sense, question of power, are transubstantiated into a question of identity[48], which at least at one pole of the spectrum of the social relation can be solved even at the cost of biological self-preservation. Whoever sacrifices his life for another (individual or collective) subject or for a "cause", to him, self-preservation in the sense of the protection (or preservation) of his identity (however he defines this same identity), is more important than self-preservation in the biological sense. Death, however, is not socially mediated only via the effect of the "intellect(-spirit)" – and identity is an "intellectual(-spiritual)", and only in society

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[48] In relation to that in detail, see the 3rd volume of this work. Basically, see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, esp. pp. 49ff., 80ff..

with other humans, conceivable need. The same mediation (intervention or agency) is accomplished via the aims which are pursued at both poles of the social relation's spectrum. The aim of the killing of a foe, just as self-sacrifice for a friend, is a change in the hitherto predominant social relation in a certain direction. – In the former case, due to the fact that the complete and definitive exclusion of the foe from the social relation leaves the social relation's shaping to the own discretion of those who excluded the foe; in the latter case, due to the fact that self-sacrifice provides friends with possibilities of acting (action) or development (unfolding) by influencing society by way of a "good example" etc.. Even when one through one's suicide wants to signal that one neither wants to reshape nor preserve, but simply leave (i.e. exit or abandon) the social relation in which one must live, a social reference continues to apply to this concrete relation, only it is negative. (A positive reference to the social relation can of course also be embodied in suicide, when this, e.g. is meant as revenge). Consequently, man's mortality and man's sociality go (i.e. flow) into each other and mark, from a social-ontological perspective, the polarity of the social relation's spectrum.

We emphasise, to sum up, that the mortality of man, especially as it is actualised (or made topical) in various kinds of violent death, anthropologically sustains both the pole of extreme enmity as well as that of extreme friendship. And indeed: how can man *as man* manifest extreme enmity other than by killing his foe? And how can one *as man* prove extreme friendship other than by sacrificing his own life for his friend? On the other side of (i.e. hereafter) death, man cannot act, he must therefore do it on this side of death (i.e. in this life); death as an act, which can still be decided about, however lies in this (From) Here (i.e. This World or Life) and marks out the spectrum of the social relation in

both directions, that is, that space, inside of which socially living man must move. This fundamental social-ontological insight has everywhere and always constituted a commonplace which was expressed regardless of what one otherwise held about the «situation humaine» ["human situation"] and in what respect one wanted "the human situation's" change, e.g. regardless of whether one heeded heathen values or the religion of Love [i.e. Christianity]. Heathens (Pagans) and Christians, just like many people before them, noticed what our contemporary ethologists brought (or worked) out scientifically, that, namely, the inhibition (or restraint) threshold of the killing of animals of the same species amongst the rest of the animals (i.e. non-human animals) is placed higher than amongst humans[49]. Lions or snakes have never conducted such battles against each other like humans, wrote Augustine[50], and there he did not think differently than for instance Horace[51], Seneca[52] or Juvenal[53]. Human action has indeed something "monstrous (or dreadful)", as Canetti called it; "human action presupposes that one has nothing against killing"[54]. – However, just as early on and generally as man's particular

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[49] Lorenz, *Das sog. Böse*, p. 226ff..; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Liebe*, p. 115ff..

[50] *De civitate dei*, XII, p. 23

[51] *Epodon*, VII, vv. 11-12: neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus/umquam nisi in dispar feris [neither in wolves nor in lions did this habit ever exist/except only in dissimilar beasts].

[52] *Epistulae*, XCV, 31: Non pudet homines... gaudere sanguine alterno et bella gerere..., cum inter se etiam mutis ac feris pax sit [Humans are not ashamed... to rejoice in others' blood and to wage wars... whilst even mute beasts as between one another also live in peace].

[53] *Saturae*, XV, vv. 159-164: sed iam serpentum maior concordia. parcit/cognatis maculis similis fera. quando leoni/fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo memore umquam expiravit aper maioris dentibus apri? Indica tigris rabida cum tigride pacem/perpetuam, saevis inter se convenit ursis [but already nowadays, there is more concord amongst the serpents. The beast spares [the life of] related beasts with similar spots. When did a stronger lion snatch life away from another lion? Where in living memory did a boar ever expire (i.e. die) from a boar with larger teeth? The fierce Indian tigress lives in perpetual peace with another tigress, savage bears are suited to (or live harmoniously with) one another (or English translation by G. G. Ramsay. London. New York. William Heinemann; G. P. Putnam's Son. 1918: "wild beasts are merciful/to beasts spotted like themselves. When did the/stronger lion ever take the life of the weaker? In/what wood did a boar ever breathe his last under/the tusks of a boar bigger than himself? The fierce/tigress of India dwells in perpetual peace with her/fellow; bears live in harmony with bears")].

[54] FAZ of 18th August 1994. Canetti continues: " ... I get involved very much with people, but always only so that I do not have to *kill* them. One may call that, a priestly stance. I find it human. However, it is deceptive if one expects such a stance from other people". Elsewhere, Canetti emphasised very nicely the interrelation between man's mortality and the permanent possibility of man's killing, as well

lack of restraint (or inhibition) in respect of the killing of the same species (i.e. his fellow man), man's frequently, in relation to such lack of restraint in killing his fellow man, symmetrical, and in the same open or even diffuse drive(s) (urge(s)) structure, anchored capability at sacrificing himself for another human, was noticed. And in exactly this ability, the genuine hallmark and the most unmistakable attestation of friendship was seen by all sides. "Nobody has greater love than that in respect of which he lets go of his own life for his friends", preached Jesus[55], and the Roman, Horace, counted amongst the truly happy (or lucky) him who finds the courage to die for friends and fatherland (the collective friend)[56].

This, in practice, unanimous acceptance of violent death as the measure by which both extreme enmity as well as extreme friendship are measured, and thus the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation is constituted, has found its expression in the constitution of all political collectives until now. All political collectives have hitherto asked of their members the sacrifice of their own life as the sign of loyalty, that is, friendship towards the polity, and also all have hitherto allowed their members to kill him who the polity has declared to be the collective enemy. The classic example for that shows (i.e. is), as is well known, war, however, the continuous maintenance of armed formations (or organisations), and even for police goals (ends or purposes), indicates that here we are dealing with a constitutive constant in the life of the political

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as the constant institutional use of this possibility (see below): "How are there supposed to not be any murderers as long as it is *in accordance with* man to die, as long as he himself is not ashamed of that, as long as he has death *built into* his institutions, as if death were man's institutions' safest (or most stable), best and most meaningful (rational, sensible, or useful) foundation?" (*Die Fliegenpein*, p. 66). Canetti, though, does not take into consideration self-sacrifice as a social-ontologically relevant possibility of violent death.

[55] Joh. 15, 13. μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδείς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ [no-one has a greater love than this, of someone placing his soul (i.e. life) for the sake of his friends; or, Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (*King James* translation)].

[56] *Carminum* IV, 9, vv. 51-52: non ille pro caris amicis/aut patria timidus perire [he who is not afraid to die for dear friends or else his country].

collective. Whoever, on behalf (or on the orders) of the polity, bears a weapon, must constantly thereby reckon that he with that weapon could kill someone; he must, however, also reckon on his own killing on the part of another, because he is armed exactly because his job is regarded as life-threatening (or highly dangerous). It would, nonetheless, be a huge mistake to connect the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation exclusively or principally with the public realm (domain or sphere) and to want to deduce from the said polarity the specific character of the political[57]. This polarity in the spectrum of the social relation is present in all forms and at all levels of the social relation, namely, in private and personal relations, as well as in the same intensity as in public and impersonal relations – something which, incidentally, is recognised by society itself, which cheers as a paragon of virtue the (boy-)scout who dies while rescuing a drowning child, while it (i.e. society) simultaneously acquits him who killed someone in legitimate self-defence.

The bringing out (or elaborating) of the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation has something to do with the definition of the political, just as little as with a value judgement about man. Such a judgement is, incidentally, in this context logically impossible, because the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation requires the same capability of the human genus (or species) at (or capacity for) "altruistic" and "egoistical", friendly and inimical acts. From these acts, to which all historical and social experience attests, we must therefore start, and at the same time this question can serve as a guiding thread: what can mortal man do all in all to mortal man? The only empirically valid answer to that is the following: man can do acts (or actions) which other humans consider to

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[57] See Ch. II, footnote 242, above.

be pleasant and/or useful or unpleasant and/or harmful. It cannot be ascertained whether these act(ion)s are "good" or "bad (evil)" in an absolute, that is, extra-human sense, and it also cannot be said whether the man who carried them out, is "good" or "bad (evil)". Because "good" and "bad (evil)" appear, as concepts and as modes of acting (action) marked by "good" and "bad (evil)", only inside of the human situation, and "good" and "bad (evil)" cannot constitute any yardsticks by which the human situation as a whole, and from the outside, can be judged. But also for another reason: because man is not necessarily "bad (evil)" when he kills, and not necessarily "good" when he loves or even dies for someone else. Anthropological parameters may therefore not be drawn on for the apprehension of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity as open or concealed value judgements, but only in the form of the ascertainment of the mortality of man as objective anthropological given fact, which can motivate (or account for) very different expectations, attitudes (positionings) and modes of bevaviour. The anthropological given fact is not therefore a psychological magnitude, but an incontrovertible fact, in which socially mediated psychological effects are ignited. The analysis of the next section will name additional reasons as to why the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation cannot in principle be reduced to psychological factors.

Thus, the social-ontological relevance of human mortality is seen in the unremitting direct or indirect presence of violent death in social life, and indeed both at the inimical as well as at the friendly pole of the social relation's spectrum. On the other hand, the introverted reflection of the individual regarding the fact of one's own natural mortality is not able to develop a social-ontological dynamic(s) – unless social authorities (or jurisdictional tiers [such as courts]) use perceptions of the meaning

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(sense) and consequences of the natural mortality of the individual in order to guide his life in a certain practical direction. Nothing shows more clearly how little Heidegger thought social-ontologically, and how much he thought in terms of cultural critique, as his treatment of death exclusively from the point of view of the existential possibilities of the individual being (t)here (or existence), i.e. the individual being (t)here (or existence's) "authentic (genuine, true or actual) ability at being whole". At the centre of attention here is also the contradistinction of the inauthentic somebody (people or the They), who does or do not let "courage vis-à-vis angst (or fear) before death arise", who gets or get out of the way of death and transforms or transform the "being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death" into "constant flight before it (i.e. death)", and, of the authentic (genuine, true or actual) being (t)here (or existence), which positions itself in angst (or fear) before death and finds therein its "excellent (outstanding or pre-eminent) ability at being"[58]. Death, accordingly, is not of interest as a multiform real phenomenon (or manifestation) amongst socially living humans, but as a trigger (i.e. cause) of that angst (or fear) and that expecting, which are supposed to give "evidence" of the authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) of existence. Violent death remains completely out of (i.e. beyond) consideration, and in fact the "bringing about of one's own demise (i.e. death)", obviously by suicide, is disapproved of, because through one's

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[58] *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 254, 259. Since being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death is founded (or takes root) in concern (worry, care or looking after), and death becomes understandable only against the background of the character of concern as the fundamental constitution (or state) of being (t)here (or existence) (loc. cit., pp. 259, 249ff..), thus the dogged dispelling (or driving out) of death on the part of the somebody (people or the They) obviously constitutes a pendant (i.e. counterpart) or a consequence of its (or their) (i.e. somebody's, people's, or the They's) transformation of concern into "mere desires (or wishes)" (loc. cit., p. 195). Heidegger's reference to *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* calls to mind, by the way, the at that time common source pertaining to cultural critique of Heidegger's inspiration. The unexpected oncoming of death crosses out (or thwarts) in Tolstoy's novella the small dreams of happiness of the Philistine, who until then had lived in the abysses of the existence dedicated to death (i.e. doomed to die). The of "mere desires (or wishes)" driven, money-grubbing etc. bourgeois can take the place of the Philistine.

own real death, being (t)here (or existence) would no longer exist "for (vis-à-vis or towards) death", and "therewith [it (i.e. the said being (t)here (or existence))] would remove precisely the ground from under itself" for the probation (i.e. proving) of its own authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)![59] It is an open question (or Let us not examine) as to what extent loudly propagated existential probation (i.e. proving (of one's self)) through angst (or fear) before death is an intellectual construction or even a self-mirroring (self-reflection, narcissism or mirage) of intellectuals in certain situations pertaining to the history of ideas, to what extent it is at all possible to base a socially living existence on direct and personal, that is, socially unmediated angst (or fear) before death: in fact, very little can be thought and said about one's own death unless one connects this death, one way or another, with things which are either in life or on the other side of (i.e. beyond) this same life. Social-ontologically, in any case, such thoughts and propositions appear to be irrelevant, and indeed in accordance with Heidegger's own presuppositions. Because if the somebody (people or the They) is a social-ontological, that is, unalterable category, and if the somebody (people of the They's) effect is so determining (or decisive) on the whole of social life as Heidegger describes it, then social ontology must take as its starting point the reality of a social life which dispels death; the life of the "authentic (genuine, true or actual)" in the shadow of angst (or fear) before death is not the decisive factor social-ontologically, and one might only hope for the social prevailing of "authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)", if the somebody (people or the They) did not represent (or constitute) a social-ontological category, but merely a historical transitory manifestation (phenomenon or occurrence).

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[59] Loc. cit., pp. 266ff., 261.

That mortality and death are totally dispelled from the life of the somebody (people or the They), constitutes, incidentally, a serious pragmatic mistake which Heidegger makes, because his élan as regards cultural critique pushes him, in relation to that, to contemplate death only as a motive (or an occasion) for exercises in intellectual(-spiritual) refinement. Already the institutionalisation of the possibility of violent death in all societies until now (through custom[s] and tradition (practice or usage) or through forms of organisation) proves that the social omnipresence (of the possibility) of death can accompany perfectly well the dispelling of angst (or fear) before (natural) death in the life of the individual. The somebody (people or the They) apparently perceives more clearly than its critics what has social-ontological weight, and accordingly it makes as its own central "concern (worry, care or looking after)" not angst (or fear) before (natural) death, but interaction with other members of society. There are indeed no indications of the fact that a man could make out of his dominating angst (or fear) before death a stable and exclusive yardstick for the regulation (i.e. arrangement) of his relations with fellow humans. However, we have many instances (or pieces of evidence) of the shaping of the relation with death on the basis of the existing or desired relation with fellow humans. We already explained in which sense the killing of foes, self-sacrifice for a friend and even suicide represent (or constitute) interventions in the social relation. Studies of the history of mentality substantiate in other respects the thesis of the priority of the social relation vis-à-vis the personal relation with (one's own) death[60]. Even the Christian perception (or notion), which perhaps as the first to confront (i.e. bring) the individual as individual (face to face) with his own death, and consequently wanted to make out of life a μελέτη

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[60] See e.g. Vovelle's excellent work, *La Mort en Occident*.

θανάτου [study of death], was permeated (or interspersed) with social references, although these references for the most part were shifted (transferred or moved) to the (From or Over) There (i.e. That (Next) World or Life; the Hereafter or Beyond) and accordingly disguised. The studium mortis [study of death] basically constituted a continuous account regarding the doing (i.e. deeds or actions) in life, an account which the individual owed in the best case to God alone, in the worst and the most usual case to God's governors (deputies or representatives) on earth. It is impossible to sever this account, which had to deeply influence the experiencing of (or going through) one's own mortality, from ideas about social duties in the widest sense of the word (the touchstone of inner purification was in fact love, and whose object (or subject matter) is other people), irrespective of whether these ideas always agreed with those of God's governors (deputies or representatives) or directly invoked God. Heidegger praises the insights of Christian theology in the "being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death" as the highest ability at being, however he does not take notice of all these interrelations. If he did this, then it would be difficult for him to use Christian content(s) in an in principle non-religious framework. Precisely here a logical paradox in Heidegger's undertaking becomes apparent: he declares culturally determined experiences and views (perceptions or beliefs) constants of fundamental ontology. But why should e.g. "guilt" belong to the constitution of a being (t)here (or existence), which is simply "thrown (tossed, flung or dropped), and is cut off from every ethically loaded (or charged) transcendence? Radicalised theology and anti-bourgeois cultural critique often entered into an alliance in our century [i.e. the 20th century]. Nevertheless, this alliance could never be free of tensions and contradictions.

Hobbes saw social-ontologically deeper than Heidegger, when he left to theologians the abstractly or sublimatedly imagined relationship of the individual with his own natural death, and made angst (or fear) before violent death the crucial (pivotal or central) point of his social theory. However, by neglecting, in terms of theory, the objective given fact of human mortality, which allows a number of active and passive positionings (stances or attitudes) towards one's own and alien (i.e. another's) death, in favour of just one subjective feeling vis-à-vis just one kind of death, weak spots and gaps (or holes) necessarily came to light in the construction of the Leviathan. Hobbes treats violent death in principle from the point of view of the anxious (or fearful) possible victim (prey, casualty or sacrifice), not from the point of view of the apparently less anxious (or fearful) culprit (or doer) in the same concrete situation, and moreover he looks at the struggle (battle or fight) which entails violent death as a struggle between foes who struggle (battle or fight) only for themselves, not (also) for (personal or political) friends and – no matter out of what motivation and under what pressure – in the process thereby reckon that they can die for these friends. The political collective may come into being with the aim of exorcising angst (or fear) from violent death, as Hobbes believes; the paradox of the political collective's existence lies, nonetheless, in the fact that the collective, before violent death, can effectively and permanently protect itself only if its members are prepared (or ready) to die, if need be, a violent death, on the inner (internal) or the outer (external) front. Before this paradox, Hobbes's logical consistency fails, which does not want to deviate a little bit from the theoretical criterion of angst (or fear) before violent death, and accordingly allows the deserter his right: whoever before the foe takes flight from one's own political collective, acts merely "dishonourably",

not "unjustly"[61]. With Hobbes' premises, it is of course easier to justify the deserter's stance (or attitude) than to explain the life-threatening (or highly dangerous) deployment (action or commitment) of the great mass for the cause of friends or of one's own political collective. Naturalistic anthropology does not allow complete insight into the symbolic-ideological mechanisms which at the human level transform the biologically understood drive (urge, impulse or instinct) of self-preservation into an ideational need for identity, and even let that drive (or urge) of self-preservation retreat before this ideational need for identity. Hobbes follows (or tracks) these mechanisms only in accordance with the "egoistical" side, that is, only in so far as the biological drive (or urge) of self-preservation is ideationally reflected (finds expression or manifests itself) in "vanity", "thirst (or lust) for fame (glory)" or "thirst (lust) for rule (or domineering); the "altruistic" metamorphoses of the same drive (or urge) of self-preservation remain outside of the possibilities of explanation of Hobbes's anthropological schema.

Moreover, the one-sided way of looking at violent death from the point of view of its possible victims (prey or casualties) is not completely consistent with the process of founding of the Leviathan. If the political collective is founded by means of contract, then angst (or fear) before violent death takes (or has an) effect as the angst (or fear) of every individual before all other individuals; if, on the other hand, the founding of the political collective is due to conquest, then the angst (or fear) in respect of death (or mortal agony) of every individual before the conqueror is the deciding factor. In both cases, says Hobbes, it is a matter of the same feeling (sense) of angst (fear or anxiety); that is why the same duties vis-à-vis the sovereign arise from such a feeling (or sense) of angst

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[61] *Leviathan*, XXI, (15th paragraph) = *English Works*, III.

(or fear)[62]. The important difference lies, nevertheless, in each and every respective process of founding. In the first case, all individuals are in principal exposed to the same threat to life (or mortal danger); in the latter case, the conqueror could gain a considerable advantage due to the fact that he (at first) relieved himself (or got rid of) the danger (threat or risk), not through his own passive submission (subjection or subjugation) to a sovereign, but actively through the subjugation (subjection or submission) of other individuals. Angst (or fear) before death does not obviously reach (in respect of all individuals) such a degree that it paralyses readiness to take a great risk if advantages are thought of, which the individual concerned holds to be necessarily worth striving for (i.e. desirable). Angst (or fear) before violent death would, incidentally, not at all be so widespread if the readiness to attack were not just as widespread, even while endangering (or putting under threat) one's own life. Every attack involves (or conceals) imponderabilities and bad (or terrible) surprises in itself, and yet experience teaches that attacks are not only undertaken when they are regarded as riskless. Hobbes indeed accepts an anthropological disposition which counteracts angst (or fear) before violent death: the "desire of Power after Power". With that, however, not everything can have been said yet, since this insatiable desire (or lust) for power in itself is not always capable of overcoming angst (or fear) in respect of death (or mortal agony), as much as it may press for that. Where this overcoming (temporarily) succeeds, an additional force distinguished from desire (or lust) for power intervenes as a direct contrast to angst (or fear). It is a boldness (daring or an audacity), which draws (or feeds) on the certainty that the other individual is mortal and consequently vulnerable. The certainty of the

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[62] *Leviathan*, XX (1st and 2nd paragraph) = *English Works*, III

mortality of the other individual lets one (temporarily) forget one's own mortality, in any case, no longer take one's own mortality entirely seriously. The culprit (or doer) feels, at least for a short time (or temporarily) less mortal than the victim (prey or casualty). The said culprit's founding of the state hence takes other paths than those paths of those individuals who first of all appear and argue as possible victims (or casualties). Killing and violent dying open up, not only here, different perspectives. All possible perspectives are, however, opened up against the background of the objective given fact of human mortality. Social ontology must start from that objective given fact of human mortality so that social ontology can apprehend all these possible perspectives.

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[i] Kondylis is suggesting to the reader that Simmel and v. Wiese did not even consider the possibility of the social-ontological aspect or discipline in respect of general or macro social science, whose two main disciplines in recent centuries consist of history and sociology, even though the two German sociologists inadvertently implied the existence of a social-ontological aspect or discipline (i.e. social ontology) in part (see below) [translator's endnote].