

III. Social relation: the spectrum

1. The approach of formal sociology

A. The functionalistic background and ambivalences of formalism

A putting in order (or classification) of formal sociology in the history of ideas must first refer to the paradigm shift which took place around the turn of the last century [i.e. the 19th century into the 20th], and in the place of the bourgeois synthetic-harmonising thought figure, put an analytical-combinatory thought figure; the substances (or essences) of the bourgeois thoughts world (system of ideas or ideological universe) were consequently dissolved into functions¹. Formal sociology constituted – in accordance with the self-understanding of its originators too – an aspect, and at the same time, a driving force of this process. Formal sociology directly connected its ambitions to found *sociology* with a challenge to the philosophy of history and the substantialistic perception of man contained or implied in the philosophy of history. “History” and “man” were, – in the framework of the bourgeois philosophy of history, whose variation was the Marxist philosophy of history, – thought of together to the effect that history’s upward movement was accompanied by the perfection of man as genus (i.e. species or race); the aptitudes (predispositions) or the seeds in relation to that were indeed supposed to belong to the original constitution of the genus (i.e. species or (human) race), however the said aptitudes or seeds could only be updated in the

¹ In relation to this paradigm shift, see generally Kondylis, *Niedergang*; regarding the contribution of sociology in relation to that, see esp. p. 146ff..

course of history's development (or unfolding). As the unfolding space of human nature, history was not, for its part, merely a quantitatively understood period of time, as well as not a period of time whose qualities merely had to do with the density and the peripeteiae (i.e. sudden and unexpected changes of fortune or reversals of circumstances) of the becoming (or events), irrespective of this becoming's content. History was defined in terms of meaning and values, i.e. as progress in a comprehensive, real and ethical sense. The dissolution of the substance (or essence) "history" meant that time from now on lost its ethical-qualitative dimension and its unified sense (or meaning) in order to disintegrate into pieces, which could be joined together differently on each and every respective occasion in accordance with the functional character of the becoming (or events). And the dissolution of the substance (or essence) "man" meant the fragmentation of those fixed aptitudes, which in the course of history were supposed to come to full development. In the perception of human things (i.e. affairs), unified in its substance history, is now displaced by society comprehended as a functional ensemble (or whole), while at the same time man as an individual on each and every respective occasion differently shapes, and also differently experiences, his own functional unity in accordance with the functional requirements of the social ensemble.

Now formal sociology neither first founded *sociology* nor did it discover *society* as such; rather formal sociology developed that concept of sociology and society which corresponded to the analytical-combinatory thought figure and thereby, for its part, contributed to the aforementioned paradigm shift. In order to be able to obtain such a concept, formal sociology had to put an end to the osmosis of history and sociology, as this osmosis existed in the framework of the philosophy of history, and

likewise divide the real pendant (i.e. counterpart) to this epistemological osmosis, namely the network of history and society, into its components, in order to then define sociology and society anew in their separation from history (as tale, story or historiography) and history [as a science], and to relate sociology and society exclusively to each other. The co-existence with one another of the relatively independent (or autonomous) stages of development, and of an overarching progress in the general schema of the philosophy of history, reflected the noteworthy and the, for historical sociology, fact rich in consequences that here the concept of society is only partially absorbed by the concept of history, although the former – seen dynamically – remained subordinated to the latter. Yet seen statically, society kept its independence as a functional and structured or inwardly hierarchised entirety, and Comte's, but also Marx's attempt to distinguish the static and dynamic way of looking at things from each other, and at the same time to connect one with the other, provided the basis for the epistemological osmosis of sociology and history. Precisely thanks to this relative autonomy of the concept of society, the philosophy of history was allowed to raise (i.e. make) the claim of being not merely history, but also sociology. The societies following one another, which made up history's stages of development, could be transformed into sociological, historically saturated ideal types and detached from the schema of progress². Whilst formal sociology separated the concept of society from such contexts, in order to construct society on the basis of ultimate and ubiquitous constituent elements (or parts), formal sociology increased the demand for the overcoming of the philosophy of history in favour of the demand for the supra-historical founding of sociology. Only in this way could formal sociology, incidentally, acquire its own terrain

² Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 2B in this volume.

(i.e. territory), especially as the philosophy of history could just as well be disproved with the means of historical sociology. Both of the above-mentioned demands [i.e. the overcoming of the philosophy of history, and, the supra-historical founding of sociology] do not, therefore, necessarily interrelate with each other, and the a limine elimination (or exclusion) of the historical approach from sociology did not at all allow the question to arise as to whether that which was supposed to be founded supra-historically was any longer, or only in part, able to be sociology¹. The zeal in contrasting *forms* to historical content(s) left, for the formal sociologists' part, little time for reflection on the content-related presuppositions of exactly these forms – yet precisely this reflection would have shown that here a path was taken which went beyond sociology in every theoretically and, in terms of research practice, relevant sense. Typically enough, formal sociology exercised its influence not through the formation of a coherent sociological school or tendency, which would have in connection with programmatic work(s) [or projects] systematically investigated social life, but through the mostly selective reception of its insights on the part of unhistorical social psychology or the just as unhistorical phenomenological analyses of the lifeworld. Formal sociology interests us here because it thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion) the spectrum of the social relation – and because the weaknesses and the gaps of a purely form-related (i.e. formal) description of this spectrum is social-ontologically revealing.

Still in the second half of the 19th century, the bond between sociology and the philosophy of history seemed to be so strong and self-evident that every demarcation had to proceed via formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms). As far as I know, Lazarus first expressed the idea that society consists of several side by side, i.e. adjacent, but also touching one

another i.e. tangent, and intersecting, narrower and broader, circles, so that society represents (or constitutes) “an extremely manifold in itself intertwined (or convoluted) relationship of connection and separation”³. Lazarus’s student, Dilthey, who wanted to show the essential affinity (or relationship) between sociology and the philosophy of history, suggested as a realistic alternative to sociology and the philosophy of history’s “unsolvable” problem, the dissolution of the social whole into individual interrelations (or contexts) (“members (i.e. parts, components or limbs)” or “systems”), and compared the underlying “relations of dependence and affinity (or relationship)” of every culture with those between the “constituent elements (parts)” or “functions of an organism”⁴. The internal connection between the analytical, form-related (i.e. formal) and functional point of view is already emerging here, so that Vierkandt could attribute to Dilthey the “definition of society with the help of the concept of interaction (or mutual influence)”⁵. However, a hermeneutician (i.e. practitioner of hermeneutics), who more or less needed fixed (steady or stable) subjective bearers of experiencing and reliving or understanding of objective meaning contexts, had to, despite the turning away from the metaphysics of substance (or essence) and of Reason, resist a consistent functionalisation, at whose end would be meaninglessness. The young

³ Lazarus-Steinthal, „Einleitende Gedanken“, p. 4. The context here is still “folk-psychological”.

⁴ *Einleitung in die Geisteswiss.*, GW, I, pp. 86ff., 111, 421 (regarding Simmel); V, p. 61ff. (society as interactions (or mutual influences) being added up). The relationship between Dilthey and Simmel was succinctly characterised by Tenbruck, „Simmel“, p. 595ff. Let us here recall Spann’s objection to Dilthey’s concept of society, which can adversely affect the formal-sociological approach as a whole: Dilthey does not pose the question according to the specific character of the social, but he confuses this question with the question according to the interrelation (or connection) of the subsystems (or part systems) („Zur soziol. Auseinandersetzung“, p. 220ff.). Cf. Ch. II, footnote 237, above.

⁵ *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 40. Amongst his main sources Vierkandt counts, apart from Simmel, phenomenology, “which enables us to ascertain comprehensive (or extensive) series of ultimate a priori facts” (loc. cit., III, p. 1ff.). L. v. Weise saw himself as part of Simmel and Vierkandt’s intellectual(-spiritual) succession, *Soziologie*, pp. 128, 133; cf. the critical comments regarding both Simmel and Vierkandt in *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 35, 41. A rebellion against the «philosophie de l’histoire» [“philosophy of history”] was also the first version, represented by Tarde, of French «sociologie pure» [“pure sociology”]. “Imitation” constitutes primarily a relation, and society should be defined as a system of relations, not for instance as a system of law or of the economy (*Lois*, XXII, p. 73).

Simmel set to work more radically, who already in his first sociological writing (i.e. treatise) determined (or defined) the “direction of modern intellectual(-spiritual) life” as follows, namely as “dissolving (or breaking up) the fixed, in itself same, substantial, into function, force, movement”⁶. In the process, both the I-like (or ego-ish (i.e. egocentric)) “point of unity in us”, which is actually merely “interaction (or mutual influence) and dynamic weaving into one another (i.e. interweaving), interrelation, balancing of a multitude”, as well as society, which represents (or constitutes) a “becoming (or events)”, a “function of the receiving (greeting or welcoming) and the bringing about (or achieving) of fate (or destiny) and the shaping of one on the part of the other”, are dissolved (or broken up)⁷. The functional way of looking at society aims at putting aside every notion of a “mystical unity”, which exists “beyond individuals”⁸. Indeed, Simmel remains consistent as a sociologist in this anti-metaphysical and anti-substantialistic programme, even paying the price of skipping over the question as to what then holds together (or coheres) the interactions (or mutual influences), what makes them a society⁹. Simmel thereby at least avoided the reverse mistake, which our contemporary functionalists make by wanting to have both [these things] in one go (or at the same time): to dissolve (or break up) the social into functions and simultaneously to safeguard (or preserve) the social’s unity through the emphatic concept of the system and system rationality. Nonetheless, Simmel shares with the systems theory functionalists an error of a methodical (i.e. methodological) character. The functionalistic thought pattern and interpretation pattern, which supports sociological theory, serves at the same time as a historical-sociological diagnosis of

⁶ *Über soziale Differenzierung*, p. 130. Cf. *Philosophische Kultur*, p. 3ff..

⁷ *Brücke*, pp. 91, 215.

⁸ *Über soziale Differenzierung*, p. 134ff..

⁹ See Ch. II, Sec. 3B, footnote 235, above.

the age (i.e. our times), and indeed in the sense of the self-description of the social present. Modern society, whose features Simmel described definitely from the perspective of the contrast “community-society”, is under the influence of the pure functionality of the money economy and consequently brings forth a relativistic-functionalistic way of thinking¹⁰. The sociologist too is supposed to functionalistically apprehend society and social life in general, that is, irrespective of the diagnosis of the age (i.e. our times). However, how can such a time-conditioned intellectual attitude be legitimately declared the key for the understanding of every society in every period of time? And why exactly, of all understandings, does the functionalistic self-understanding of modern society coincide with the understanding of supra-historical real facts (or situations)? It does not cross Simmel’s mind that functionality can be an ideological metaphysics in need of explanation just as substantialism, for its part, was. Simmel does not see that functionalistic sociology essentially represents (or constitutes) not an explanation, but rather a symptom of the “direction of modern intellectual(-spiritual) life” described by him himself, that the functionalistic way of looking at things did not, that is, for instance, gain the upper hand because people were suddenly transformed from substances into functions, but because the social conditions (or circumstances) took a form in core areas, which in tone-setting (i.e. leading) ideologues found expression in functionalistic positions¹¹.

A discussion of Simmel’s so-called turn regarding the philosophy of life, which necessarily entailed a certain rehabilitation of “substantial” magnitudes, e.g. of the experiencing and understanding I (Ego or Self) or

¹⁰ *Philosophie des Geldes*, esp. ch. VI; still more concisely in the earlier article „Das Geld in der modernen Kultur“.

¹¹ Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 2, above.

of objective cultural meaning contexts, is superfluous here. Because Simmel's sociology was in essence already mature before this turn¹²; although his sociological interests continued to remain wide-awake [i.e. active], Simmel's basic sociological concept was not revised in the sense of the philosophy of life. Functionalism was connected with exactly this basic concept, and this was, next to the programmatic contrast with the philosophy of history, both recorded by Simmel's contemporaries¹³, as well as loudly proclaimed by Simmel's direct successors. Vierkandt in fact called to mind the good example of natural science, which had "already everywhere carried out" the replacement of the category of the object by that of the relation; he set the task to "relating (or relationalising)" thought (i.e. thinking which relates things between one another) of apprehending functions, and by objecting, from a functionalistic point of view, to the overestimation of the "unity (or uniformity) of the personality" by the "popular way of thinking", and also believed he was able to achieve something about which cybernetic systems theory today boasts. The distinction "between the individual as place (or locus) of the social becoming (or events) and the systems which make up his content", i.e. the ascertainment of the large quantity of various stances, mentalities and purposes (or goals) in the only conditionally (i.e. partly or relatively) unified individual allows, finally, a bursting open of the usual separations between natural and historic, created and creating, acting and watching (i.e. observing) man¹⁴. The dissolution of substances into functions creates, therefore, a unified (or

¹² Tenbruck, „Simmel“, esp. p. 592ff..

¹³ See e.g. the way Jellinek summons function against substance (or essence) in order to obtain the "social concept of the state", *Staatslehre*, p. 174ff.. For Troeltsch, formal sociology and the philosophy of history (a mixture of history and ethics, causality and finality (i.e. the doctrine of the efficacy of final causes, or, teleology)) represented the two main conflicting schools of thought in sociology („Zum Begriff“, p. 705ff.). Vierkandt starts from the contrast between "encyclopaedic sociology pertaining to the philosophy of history" and "analysing(i.e. analytical)-formal" sociology in his main work (*Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 1ff.).

¹⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 40, 48ff..

uniform) field in which all the conceivable transitions and crossings (i.e. hybridisations) are made possible. Space thus displaces time as the main form of perception of the social. As v. Wiese expressed it, “the primacy of the next to one another (i.e. being side by side, or co-existence) ahead of the after one another (i.e. existing after one another, or succession) [is]... an essential feature of our teaching (or theory) of the relation”, whereas it was the other way around in the philosophy of history¹⁵.

The bringing out (i.e. elaborating) of the functionalistic background of formal sociology can serve as a reminder that quite a few sociological schools of thought of the 1960s and 1970s, like quite a few tendencies of artistic avant-gardism from the same period, took root in the paradigm shift around 1900; *mutatis mutandis*, the contradistinction between Durkheim and Simmel continued in the contrast between the closed and the open system. Yet that bringing out pursues here, first of all, theoretical aims. The functional and form-related (i.e. formal) approach in fact interrelate logically, because functions come to the fore where substances have been dissolved into ultimate constituent elements (or parts), which then can be combined with one another in such a way that they constitute forms. The search for ultimate elements existed expressly in formal sociology’s programme, and connected this search, in this regard, with the aforementioned paradigm shift¹⁶. Yet, precisely in this

¹⁵ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 30, 31, 49. Apart from that, v. Weise repeats the demand of “delimiting the concept of the relation from the concepts of the object and of qualities (properties or characteristics)”; he regards as a methodical (i.e. methodological) ideal the “continued as far as possible quantification of the qualitative differences of the social becoming (or events)”, and for his part recalls the example of other sciences (*loc. cit.*, pp. 3, 9, 7). The functionalistic spatialisation of the way of looking at things is supposed to also here show the way out of the alternatives “individual – society” or “whole – part” (*loc. cit.*, p. 22ff.).

¹⁶ Formal sociology endeavours “to go back to the ultimate elements of social life” (Vierkant, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 3); “our system is primarily a system of the next to one another (i.e. being side by side, or co-existence). We break down (or take apart) a complex into its simultaneous constituent elements (or parts)” (v. Weise, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 30). For the search for ultimate elements in art, philosophy or linguistics at the turn of the century [i.e. c. 1900] cf. Kondylis, *Niedergang*, pp. 97ff., 138ff., 152ff..

search, the fatal ambivalences of sociological formalism became apparent, and indeed at the same time regarding two crucial questions. On the one hand, when it was a question of the total feasibility of the separation between form and content, on the other hand, when it was a question of the determination (or definition) of “form”. The possibility of a *formal* sociology, or of a sociology as pure teaching (i.e. theory) of forms in general, obviously depends on that feasibility. And Simmel could in this regard show and promise so little that one may ask with what scientific right was he convinced in advance of the possibility of a formal sociology. As Simmel himself wrote, “for the foreseeable future” no “even only approximate dissolution” of the forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) “into simple elements” was to be hoped for, from which it followed that the already proposed (or formulated) forms would apply “only to a relatively small compass of phenomena (or manifestations)”; to that the admission was added that even these forms do not remain themselves “absolutely the same”, but they varied in accordance with each and every respective content¹⁷. However, how would a demanding formal sociology be founded if the forms were lacking which would encompass social life in its synchronic and diachronic entirety? And would the assertion not be absurd that those wide social areas in which the separation between form and content admittedly could not be carried out, would be completely closed to sociological treatment? Simmel (and v. Weise too) sought to avoid this absurdity by way of a half-hearted compromise or a makeshift solution. Simmel allowed next to pure sociology, a “general” sociology, within whose area of competence phenomena and constructs fell, which presupposed the existence of a society, whereas pure sociology was

¹⁷ *Soziologie*, pp. 10, 11.

supposed to be concerned with the forms of interaction (or mutual influence) as constituting (i.e. constitutive) forces of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation)¹⁸. Through this reluctant splitting of sociology, the infeasibility of the pure or form-related (i.e. formal) programme was tacitly admitted, especially as the logical and epistemological relationship between both branches of the discipline remained extremely unclear or entirely external. Content-related sociology was perceived rather as an annoying (or burdensome) compact appendage, which awaited for its dissolution into forms. For its part, pure sociology was obviously not dependent on content-related sociology, since pure sociology wanted to directly have recourse to the historical material in order to unearth therein hidden form-related (i.e. formal) structures. Now the path from the historical material to the form was not only in practice inaccessible, as Simmel himself illustrated by way of an example¹⁹, but in principle indirect and mediated (i.e. subject to intervention). Because in view of the uniqueness of historical content(s), the direct and exact correspondence of a pure sociological form with a certain content would imply the said pure sociological form's asymmetry vis-à-vis other content(s), and consequently the thwarting of a comprehensive teaching (i.e. theory) of forms, which may sensibly be

¹⁸ *Grundfragen*, ch. I. The same distinction was in essence made in 1908 when Simmel wrote that conventional or non-pure sociology would study those societal phenomena (or manifestations) “in which the interacting (or mutually influencing) forces are already crystallised out of their immediate bearers”, that is, represented (or constituted) objective constructs (*Soziologie*, p. 14). Simmel only wanted to back then completely deny this study the name sociology, nor did he want to let the social sciences have such a name (but can the science of law replace the sociology of law?), while he held pure sociology to be “absolutely justified” “in covering the concept of sociology fully and alone” (loc. cit. pp. 19, 20). In 1917, Simmel believed, more reservedly that pure sociology is “in a... sense appearing to me actually quite decisively ‘sociological’”. L. v. Weise called, in contrast to Simmel, pure sociology, general, and assigned to the “special sociologies” the study of the areas, which are characterised by content-related ends (goals) being set (or end (goal) setting) (economy, law) (see e.g. „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 69). However, the diverging terminology does not change the factual agreement with Simmel at all. This agreement is underlined by v. Weise's distinction between “processes of the first” and “processes of the second order”: the former would not “logically” (!) presuppose the existence of a social construct; the latter would presuppose it („Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 75).

¹⁹ *Soziologie*, p. 12.

proposed (or formulated) only when every individual (or single) form structurally covers multiple content(s). But also apart from that: if pure sociological forms could be applied to different content(s), or if different content(s) could be broken up (or dissolved) into identical forms, then a *sociological* determination (or definition) of the difference between the content(s) would be impossible, and in that case tolerance vis-à-vis content-related sociology would also be superfluous; one could abolish such tolerance straight away. If the forms then again, depending on the field of application and in accordance with the difference between the contents as regards one another, were to vary, they would therefore be determined in terms of content; thus, the theoretical desideratum of a general *sociological* teaching (i.e. theory) of forms would lose its actual sense (or meaning), and one could remain confident in (i.e. satisfied or content with) historical-content-related sociology. All the more as the contradistinction with regard to questions of formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms) and typification (i.e. rendering into types) is immanent (or inherent) in this historical-content-related sociology. Sociology *is* in fact of itself formalisation and typification, and indeed exactly to the extent it vindicates (i.e. defends or claims) its own territory vis-à-vis history. Certainly, pure sociology's search for ultimate forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), in which the historical content(s) would be able to be absorbed, means something other than the formalisation of these same contents by means of historically oriented sociology; here are, in other words, two different perceptions of the possible separation between form and content. But if "pure" and "general" (in Simmel's sense) or "special" (in v. Wiese's terminology) sociology, are supposed to make up branches of *the same* discipline, then there must be a logical interrelation between both those perceptions. That, however, is not the case. An analysis of the family as form of becoming

or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), free of historical content(s), would not provide any backing for a typology of historically attested forms of families – on the contrary: were this analysis at all doable (which it is not necessarily), then all forms of the family would have to be absorbed into a single form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), and historical sociology would remain out of work (i.e. without anything to do) after this ultimate reduction. Either this historical sociology must, therefore, cease to apply, and pure sociology with the other social sciences and the humanities be left alone, or pure sociology must be assigned to (or classified within) an extra-sociological epistemological field, whereby such questions would be answered by themselves.

The founders of formal sociology hardly paid attention to the difference between both these possible separations of form and content from each other. The failure to appreciate the essentially form-related (i.e. formal) aspect of historical sociology had, nevertheless, dire consequences (or got its revenge) to the effect that pure sociology, believing in its own monopoly over the formal-related (i.e. formal), vindicated (i.e. defended or claimed) many a form for itself, which cannot be *stricto sensu* classified readily as an “ultimate constituent element (or part)” of the social, or as an elementary and indispensable form of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation). Above all, Simmel’s analyses in his main sociological work suffer methodically (i.e. methodologically) under this ambiguity, which of course is frequently concealed by the impressionistic mastery, by the concise apprehension of concrete situations in their to-ing and fro-ing, and not least of all by the mostly convincing, albeit in principle frowned-upon, psychology. This all undoubtedly constitutes an important contribution to – “general” – sociology and explains, incidentally, the renewed interest in Simmel at a time, of all times, in

which one indeed wants to know little of “pure” sociology, but more about microsituations, microstructures and micro-interactions. It is namely, the time of the mass-democratic blurring of the boundary between (the) private and (the) public, with the corresponding consequences for the sociological discipline. That contribution is not however made as a methodically (i.e. methodologically) strict keeping to the form-related (i.e. formal) or pure programme. And this is by far not yet all. The ambiguity, which results from the manifold mixing of the “pure” and historically loaded form with each other, is paired (i.e. combined) with another, and just as rich in consequences, ambiguity, which concerns the determination (or definition) of the pure form itself. The pure form can, on the one hand, mean a fixed (steady or settled) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations, which fulfils a constitutive function in every social construct. On the other hand, a pure form can represent (or constitute) a form-related (i.e. formal) criterion, whose purity consists in its in principle applicability to every constellation or crystallisation of relations, regardless of whether this constellation or crystallisation is “pure” in the sense of formal sociology or not. The difference is patently momentous. Because the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion – broadcast conceptually as (i.e. called) “unification (agreement or union) and splitting (division or disunion)” by Simmel, as “association and dissociation” or “nearness (proximity) and distance” by L. v. Weise – was not at all in its validity influenced by the success of the attempt at proposing (or formulating) pure forms in the former sense, and at encompassing, through their systematisation, the entire realm of the social. Expressed otherwise: the application of the above-mentioned social criterion to all existing social constructs or phenomena (manifestations), and the finding out of ultimate fixed (stable or settled) forms or relation crystals (crystalline or

crystallised relations), to which that criterion could be applied in every social construct or phenomenon, are two completely different things. Nonetheless, Simmel mixes and confuses both with each other when he speaks of the pure form, and he describes constellations (correlations or conjunctures) like for instance that of “*primus inter pares*” [“first amongst equals”], thus, as if they were at the same logical level with the criterion of “unification (agreement or union) and splitting (division or disunion)”, although they can merely be illustrations of the same criterion. Furthermore: on the assumption that pure forms in the sense of constellations or crystallisations of relations would befit, as it were, the status of social law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), Simmel wants to search for analogous law-bound (deterministic or law-based) or law-like formations (kinds of moulding) in social phenomena, which are not elementary fixed (stable or settled) forms, but rather mobile incarnations of the aforementioned form-related (i.e. formal) criterion. In this way, he believes that e.g. he can ascertain on a stable basis “how the various stadia (i.e. stages) of supra-ordination and subordination are lined up, to what extent a supra-ordination in a certain relation is compatible with an equal ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) in other relations” etc.²⁰. It is, nevertheless, futile to answer such questions once and for all by means of formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms) appearing in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner), that is, to want to achieve something which lies beyond the ad hoc proposed (or formulated) ideal-typical formalisations of historical sociology. Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination (i.e. putting in order or, being put in the same order) are not related in terms of law bindedness (determinism

²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 18.

or law-based necessity) (or in a law-bound manner), but causally, that is, in accordance with each and every respective historical and personal constellation (correlation or conjuncture) between one another, so that statements about supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination may not be assigned to the realm of pure forms in the sense of fixed (stable, firm or settled) and ubiquitous crystallisations. Supra-ordination, subordination and equal ordination can certainly be subsumed under the pure form in the sense of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of unification (agreement or union) and splitting (division or disunion) or nearness (proximity) and distance – but the application of a ubiquitous criterion does not nearly found any law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity). The ubiquity of the criterion and law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) as the necessary recurrence of certain phenomena (or manifestations) or constellations (correlations or conjunctures), to which the criterion is applicable, must definitely remain logically and factually separated from each other.

Our analysis is – most likely unreflectedly and unintentionally – confirmed by v. Wiese's theoretical decision to do without the Simmelian search for fixed (steady or stable) and elementary forms of the relation underlying all social constructs, and instead of that, to build a pure sociology in principle on the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of association and dissociation or nearness (proximity) and distance. V. Wiese expressly identifies the concept of the pure form with the conceptual pair of nearness (proximity) and distance²¹, without though seeing that nearness (proximity) or distance cannot actually be a form (an at will (or arbitrarily) variable form without a fixed (solid or firm) outline

²¹ Thus, e.g., when he writes “that the most general form of social events must consist in approximations (i.e. approachings or coming near) and distancing, in to-ing and fro-ing, in towards one another and away from one another...”, „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 67.

is in fact no form), but is partly a given (actual) fact or force, under whose effect forms come into being, partly an analytical criterion which is applicable to forms having come into being in such a manner. The identification of the form with nearness and distance or association and dissociation, as logically precarious as it may be, implies, at any rate, the admission that the separation between form and content can be carried out only at a level at which the actual (or main) theme is the spectrum of the social relation in general. If, on the other hand, form is comprehended as a fixed (stable, firm or settled) constellation (correlation or conjuncture) or crystallisation of relations, then the analysis must be aligned (or oriented) in terms of content and historically; here, therefore, historical (“general”, as expressed by Simmel, or “special”, as expressed by v. Wiese) sociology does the talking, and the only possible formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms) remains the typification (i.e. rendering into types) of content(s). If, however, formal *sociology* is unrealisable, and if the form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) of the spectrum of the social relation must be epistemologically established outside of the area of sociology, then this does not in the least mean, on the other hand, that the original approach of pure sociology could bear the entire load of a social ontology. The form-related (i.e. formal) teaching (or theory) of the social relation’s spectrum, as this is described on the basis of the criterion “nearness-distance” and “association-dissociation”, just constitutes an aspect of social ontology, which only in connection with the rest of the aspects has (or obtains) *social-ontological* relevance. If this connection becomes apparent, then at the same time it is clear that the formalism of pure sociology must be criticised not only from a sociological, but no less from a social-ontological point of view, albeit in a different sense on each and every respective occasion, as the different sense on each and every respective occasion corresponds to the difference

of both epistemological levels in respect of each other. Formal sociology could not be developed into a social ontology basically because the prevailing functionalistic point of view refused to accept a going into factors, which until today are still regarded as “substances (or essences)”, e.g. anthropological factors. Yet only the widening of the social-ontological horizon in an anthropological – as well as a political direction and direction pertaining to the philosophy of culture – allows one, beyond the apprehension of the formal constitution (texture or composition) of the spectrum of the social relation, to explain its mechanism too, through whose activity the great variety of historically attested social and cultural forms comes about. The same social-ontological critique can be directed at Weber in so far as the foundation stone of his sociology, namely the concept of social action, represents an alternative description (or paraphrasing) of the concept of the social relation. Social action or the social relation here also represents something which in itself lies outside of (historical) sociology. Social action is nevertheless not extended to a social ontology because the necessity of certain basic features of social action or the social relation – above all of meaning (or sense) – is indeed ascertained, but not made understandable against an anthropological background pertaining to the philosophy of culture. It is not a matter here of whether Weber otherwise supported perceptions which could have been used as building blocks of a social ontology, but whether he made *systematic* use of them in connection with the teaching (or theory) of social action or of the social relation. But that was not the case. And nevertheless it is factually so close to touching upon the mechanism of the social relation, when there is talk of “interaction (or mutual influence) or “social action”, that intimations about the mechanism of the social relation by Simmel and Weber are not lacking, which point in the

direction which then gained general fame by way of symbolic interactionism²².

The feeling that formal sociology would in actual fact overstep the epistemologically justifiable boundaries of the sociological discipline occasionally arose amongst sociologists, however, this feeling would not be substantiated in greater detail because of the lack of a social-ontological perspective. That is why one complementarily ushered out (or got rid of) formal sociology rather than epistemologically incorporating (or classifying) it²³. For our part, we may sum up such an incorporation (or classification) as follows. Formal sociology posed questions, which sociology neither solves nor is obliged to solve, and formal sociology did not solve these questions itself because it only half posed these same questions. In the final analysis, the road to their social-ontological solution was blocked owing to the functionalistic premises, which could behold in the taking seriously of the *being (Is)* of society, only a lapsing back into “substantialism”. Thus, formal sociology had to already from the beginning get entangled in the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of every methodological individualism; otherwise stated, formal sociology’s starting point (or approach) itself forced it towards partisanship in favour of methodological individualism. Because, if one wants to remain with the pure form, then one must construct the ultimate forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) out of individuals. An investigation of historically attested forms of becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), even of the smallest scale, cannot be carried out without consideration for content(s); it cannot e.g. be seen what then a “pure” way of looking at “the” family as the minimal form of

²² In relation to that, Ch. IV, esp. Sec. Ba.

²³ Franz Oppenheimer opined that formal sociology is merely the “antechamber of the shrine”; Freyer believed that it “could definitely be a necessary preliminary stage for a more demanding (or sophisticated) sociology”, *Soziologie*, p. 63 (Oppenheimer is cited here too).

becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation), away (i.e. apart) from every comparison of the many historically known types of families with one another, could be meant. Constellations (or correlations) of individuals, starting with the dyad, can, on the contrary, be theoretically devised (outlined or sketched) anyway, in relation to which one could say along with Simmel that it would occur to us “only that examples are possible in relation to such constellations of individuals, but less possible that such constellations of individuals would be real”²⁴. Simmel, however, overlooked that he, in all his examples, always tacitly regarded at least one thing as real: the becoming or being socialised (i.e. socialisation) of individuals. He talks, without exception, of individuals, who *already* have at their disposal the mental equipment of members of organised societies, and when he sets himself the aim of evading the fact of society and of showing “society, as it were, in status nascens [in a state of being born or in a nascent state]”²⁵, then he does not at all think of doing the same with individuals *as* individuals, that is, of making understandable the coming into being of society from individuals coming into being, i.e. not already socialised in the framework of an existing society. Accordingly, Simmel’s famous excursus “how is society possible?”²⁶ is based on a confusion: elements or phenomena, which are found in every society, are passed off as elements or phenomena, whose effect can give rise to society, while at the same time the presumed genetic priority of these elements or phenomena vis-à-vis other elements or phenomena remains undiscussed and unproven; typically enough, Simmel understands by that, relations between individuals or between “the” individual and “society”. He certainly knew though, as mentioned,

²⁴ *Soziologie*, p. 33, footnote 1; cf. p. 144.

²⁵ Loc. cit., p. 15.

²⁶ Loc. cit., p. 21ff..

that historically working “general” sociology cannot help presupposing the fact of society, and at the same time he wanted to tie (i.e. link) the purity of formal sociology together with formal sociology’s freeing from this presupposition of the fact of society. With formalistic premises, this could also not be avoided. Since, however, even the encounter between Robinson and Friday was marked (or shaped) by the social preforming of both, since, that is, interaction (or mutual influence) can take place only inside of society or already socialised individuals, when society or already socialised individuals are supposed to be the object (or subject matter) of social science, and not of the zoology of animals living alone, then Simmel erred when he related his question on the possibility of society to society’s genesis and not to society’s cohesion. The conviction of individualistic formal sociology that the cohesion of collective constructs is generally based merely on collective notions (or representations) and ceases with these collective notions (or representations)²⁷, led, incidentally, to a paradoxical agreement with individualistic formal sociology’s opponent, Durkheim.

B. The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance

The analysis of the previous section showed that the formal-sociological determination (or definition) of the form has two different meanings, which sociologically, in a general sense, are indeed both useful, but not constitutive for the sociological discipline. Now, the second of these

²⁷ Thus, v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 9, 25ff.; cf. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 7.

meanings can, with the form comprehended as the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, find social-ontological use, although such use in itself, and without consideration for content(s) of any kind, is hardly able to bear the epistemological load of a social ontology. When the founders of formal sociology inappropriately called the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness and distance “form”, they were solely thinking of its independence from sociological (and psychological) content(s); its possible direct or indirect interrelation with content(s) of another order did not occupy them. As v. Wiese stressed, the merely form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion was supposed to distinguish the specific field of a pure sociology from that of all other social sciences and the humanities. Whereas these other social sciences and the humanities would concern themselves with the (political, religious, scientific etc.) goals or goal-related content(s), for whose sake humans draw nearer to (i.e. approach) one another, or distance themselves from one another, pure sociology devotes itself merely to the “direction” and the “rhythm” of this drawing nearer (i.e. approaching) or distancing, associating or dissociating movement. Through its formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to form) understood in such a way, formal sociology cannot only be demarcated from all other social sciences and the humanities, but at the same time it can encompass all of the other social sciences and the humanities, i.e. subject (or subordinate) them to its own specifically form-related (i.e. formal) criterion. Every relation, of whatever (associating or dissociating) kind, develops (or unfolds) in a field defined in terms of content and has, in this respect, a content. However, the content does not determine every relation’s form-related (i.e. formal) structure; every relation’s “direction” and its “rhythm” can be separated from content not merely in a methodic (i.e. methodological) respect, but also in reality; the said “direction” and

“rhythm” therefore largely follow an inner logic of their own, even though, on the other hand, the influence of the constitution (composition or texture) of an area, defined in terms of content, on the course of the relation is not to be overlooked²⁸. According to the perception of the formal sociologists, the ascertainment of this influence remains a matter for the individual social sciences – for us, it constitutes a main task of sociology itself.

From the analysis of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, knowledge should therefore be retained, first of all with social-ontological intent, that the direction and rhythm of the social relation are in principle, in regard to their formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to form), independent of each and every respective area of social activity. This can then be formulated or generalised such that the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the social relation is connected solely with the fact that the subjects of this relation are humans in society. Socially living or formed humans constitute the exclusive precondition for the general validity of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance. This formal criterion of nearness and distance indeed never appears in abstract purity, but always in connection with content(s) and goals, yet precisely its (cap)ability at being connected with all possible content(s) and goals, makes it independent of every individual [piece or kind of] content and goal amongst all contents and goals. Socially living humans behave analogously. Socially living humans are always (situated or) located in concrete situations, and in the course of this they represent certain content(s) and goals; nevertheless, statements about socially living humans are possible, whose independence of content(s) and goals

²⁸ v. Wiese, loc. cit., pp. 12, 13, 14; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), esp. p. 276ff..

consists exactly in such statements' general applicability to content(s) and goal(s). If now the mere existence of socially living humans or the fact of society vouches for the validity of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, then that does not mean that the said formal criterion of nearness and distance could be put forward (or formulated) on the basis of any way of looking at socially living humans whatsoever. The independence of the criterion in respect of content(s) and goals requires, first of all, an abstraction from the psychological factors which drive socially living humans to those contents and goals. If one comprehends the expression "psychological factors" in the widest sense, and if one subsumes thereunder "thought acts" as acts, as well as "affects (i.e. emotions)" as acts, then the assumption seems legitimate that behind content(s) and goals are, without exception, psychological factors. Under these circumstances, the autonomy of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) vis-à-vis the psychology of socially living humans can be proved only by means of the ascertainment that the same forms of distance and nearness (proximity) would come about under the effect of different psychologies or different forms of distance and nearness, and indeed under the effect of similar or identical psychological attitudes (stances or positionings)²⁹. It is of course quite possible that the separation of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion from psychological factors be carried out even on the assumption that the same psychical content(s) would yield (or result in) always the same forms of distance and nearness (proximity); however, in this case, that separation would be, if not less compelling, then, all the same, less useful, both in an objective (factual) as well as heuristic respect. And one must take something else into consideration. The non-psychological character

²⁹ See Sec. 2B in this Chapter.

of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance does not at all mean that this criterion cannot be applied to psychological phenomena, that is, that individual or collective psychology could not on the basis of the criterion “nearness-distance” be interpreted genetically and structurally. Entirely on the contrary.

One must presently maintain the range of these logical distinctions or possibilities, in order to clearly apprehend the form-related (i.e. formal) character of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance. In contrast, the founders of formal sociology offer fairly wholesale and hence misleading demarcations of the form-related (i.e. formal) against the psychological. Simmel kept to the programmatic declaration that sociology disregards mental(-spiritual) processes, which would bring forth a social phenomenon, in order to explore the forms of the relation contained in this social phenomenon; in that respect, sociology proceeds like linguistics³⁰. In the same context, Simmel opined, however, that in sociology “the explanation of every individual fact [is] possible only in a psychological way”, and since in his individual analyses such explanations and exploration of forms frequently went into (encountered or mixed with) one another, thus he could not convince all his readers of the consistency of his anti-psychological attitude (stance or positioning)³¹. V. Weise shared this scepticism too, by seeing in Simmel’s perception of social relations as psychical interactions (or mutual influences), a source of misunderstandings³². We have already intimated that here only a more precise and broader apprehension of the psychical can help further, so that thereunder (i.e. under the psychical), situation-related (i.e. situational) thought acts are subsumed too; because in itself it should be

³⁰ *Soziologie*, pp. 17-19.

³¹ In relation to Weber’s positioning, see Levine’s remarks, *Flight*, p. 102ff..

³² *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 41.

regarded as undisputed that social interaction (or mutual influence), without a psychological act of those taking part in that social interaction, can come about impossibly (i.e. is impossible). For his part, v. Wiese sought firm guarantees against a lapsing into the psychological, by contrasting the “processes of consciousness in man” with human acts (or actions) as “facta (i.e. facts as doings or behaviour)”, and solely incorporated the latter in the area of competence of sociology³³. However, this solution appears to be too simple. A strict orientation of the formal-sociological way of looking at act(ion)s as facts would end up in an infertile behaviourism, in contrast, by the way, to v. Wiese’s stated intention of assigning sociology, even after its formalisation (i.e. rendering into forms), to the “understanding (or interpretive) social sciences”. Because the external course of the act(ion)s does not necessarily allow the observer to make a valid judgement about the associating or dissociating character of the same act(ion)s, unless he knows about the meaning (or sense) connected with them, that is, the corresponding processes of consciousness. The meaning (sense) and the external course of an acting (act or action) can in fact contradict each other, as the proverbial Judas kiss or, conversely, a life-saving amputation and countless other examples attest³⁴. On the other hand, not even exclusive orientation towards the meaning (sense) of the act (action or acting) is capable of giving an explanation (or information) about the said act(ion)’s associating or dissociating character, when the meaning (sense) is reduced to the inner wishes of those acting, that is, the psychological is reduced to I(Ego)-related affects (i.e. emotions) under the omission of (i.e. without) situation-related (i.e. situational) thought acts. Only the

³³ Loc. cit., I, p. 19; II, p. 11ff..

³⁴ Racine lets his Nero say «J’embrasse mon rival, mais c’est pour l’étouffer» [“I embrace my rival, but it is to stifle (i.e. choke or suffocate) him”] (*Britannicus*, IV, 3, v. 1314).

concrete and all-round analysis of the interaction (or mutual influence) makes in every individual case clear whether nearness (proximity) or distance is gaining the upper hand here³⁵.

In relation to that, a clarification of the concepts of “nearness (proximity)” and “distance” themselves is needed though, first of all. If nearness (proximity) and distance, social-ontologically understood, cannot necessarily be discerned in the course of external acting (or action), then nearness and distance are even less to be measured likewise with the external benchmark of spatial distance. Spatial-physical and social nearness (proximity) or distance differ so much from each other that they can even be in an inverse relationship vis-à-vis each other. The emotional embrace of a pair of lovers and the struggle between two foes with bare hands both attain an outermost (i.e. limit or maximum) in physical nearness (proximity), however, the difference in social nearness (proximity) could not be greater. The distance (spacing or gap), which the concepts “nearness (proximity)” and “distance” indicate is therefore in principle an inside (i.e. internal) distance (spacing or gap), which can manifest (or express) itself in friendly or inimical acts, but not necessarily. The mere possibility of practical manifesting (or expressing) oneself suffices, nevertheless, in order to motivate behaviour, just as mere conjecture about alien (i.e. others’) dispositions and intentions, brings into being one’s own analogous dispositions and intentions. How now does the entire complex of dispositions, considerations, intentions and possible or real act(ion)s interrelate with the determination of social nearness (proximity) and distance? The answer is obvious if one reformulates the question as follows: to what extent does someone confirm or contest the sense (or feeling) of identity and the self-

³⁵ Sorokin, *Society*, p. 93.

understanding of another; to what extent does someone contribute to the increase or decrease in the (understood in the wide sense) feeling (or sense) of power of another, regardless of whether in foro interno (i.e. in the internal court; in private, privately; inwardly) or in foro externo (i.e. in the external court; in public, publicly; outwardly)? The internal and/or external positioning of a subject vis-à-vis the identity and power of another subject yields their social nearness (proximity) to, or their social distance from, each another. (Mind you, identity and power are confirmed or contested in accordance with what the subjects concerned define as one's, on each and every respective occasion, own and alien (i.e. another's or others') identity and power). This determination (or definition) of nearness (proximity) and distance refers to content(s), whose consideration, as already stated, transforms the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance from a postulate of "pure sociology" to a component of a social ontology. The explication of the content(s) "identity" and "power" remains reserved for the third volume of this work. However, an indication of that is objectively imperative here.

If nearness (proximity) and distance do not represent a physical-spatial, but a social and or internal relation, then it is evident from this that the distance (spacing or gap) in the relation between two subjects cannot be measured with a single objective yardstick, as in the case of a spatial distance, but in relation to that, two yardsticks for the very frequent case in which the attitudes (stances or positionings) of both subjects towards each other are not absolutely symmetrical, are required; there can therefore be two or more distances (spacings or gaps) between two

subjects³⁶. For the just as frequent case again, in which the social relation consists in neither bilateral absolute nearness (proximity) or absolute distance, the concepts of “nearness (proximity)” and “distance” must be relativised in a wider sense: “nearness” and “distance” are not relative merely because of their dependence on subjective attitudes (stances or positionings), but likewise because every nearness accompanies distance and every distance accompanies nearness. Absolute with, and absolute apart from, one another, are, seen quantitatively, rather extreme and exceptional cases; their social-ontological influence and status is, in the process, unimportant³⁷. Simmel, who somewhat parenthetically, but clearly, distinguished between the “spatial” and “psychological” meaning of nearness (proximity) and distance³⁸, stressed likewise “the unity of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (or distance), which contains any (i.e. every single) relationship between men”. Simmel’s attempt to comprehend the form of the stranger (alien or foreigner) as a “synthesis of nearness (proximity) and remoteness (distance or farness)”, is based on a double alternation of the spatial and of the “psychological” meaning of nearness (proximity) and distance. The distance in the relationship with the stranger signifies “that the near is remote (distant or faraway)”, whose to be (or being) strange (i.e. strangeness, alienness or foreignness) consists, conversely, in “that the remote (distant or faraway) is near”: the termini (i.e. terms) “the near” and “near” are here spatial, the termini “the remote (distant or faraway)” and “remote (distant or faraway)” are meant “psychologically”³⁹. Simmel, furthermore, introduced a third parameter into the analysis of nearness (proximity) and distance: the extent and the

³⁶ Pieper, „Grundbegriffe“, p. 173ff.; Plenge, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 275ff.; v. Wiese accepted the clarification of his commentators in respect of this formulation, „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 68.

³⁷ See in relation to that, Sec. 2A in this Chapter.

³⁸ *Soziologie*, p. 539.

³⁹ Loc. cit., p. 509.

more general or more special (i.e. specific or particular) character of the common features of two subjects⁴⁰.

The form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance encompasses a great variety of social relations, which, for their part, can be grouped or typified (i.e. rendered into or classified under types) according to form-related (i.e. formal) criteria. Nonetheless, these groups or types neither exist separately from one another, nor can a field of validity (or applicability) of the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance outside of these types and groups be thought of; the said types and groups constitute mere (different or alternative) descriptions of the aforementioned criterion, and it is a question of which of these (different or alternative) descriptions is nearest in abstracto to the criterion. If one takes the criterion at its face value, if one remains therefore strictly with the spatial metaphor, in which the criterion is expressed, then one can imagine this criterion under only one single form of the relation: the physical distancing from someone, towards whom one would have a negative attitude (stance or positioning), and the physical approaching (or drawing near to) someone, towards whom one would have a positive attitude (stance or positioning) (another's physical distance or nearness (proximity) could also be indifferent to he who is indifferent vis-à-vis another, although in general the former [physical distance] rather than the latter [(physical) nearness] promotes indifference). Yet in accordance with all social experience and also in accordance with the inner logic of social cohesion, such real forms of the relation represent (or constitute) neither always the greater, nor the decisive part of social interactions. This part can only be apprehended by means of an in principle separation (or divorce) of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness

⁴⁰ See in relation to that, Sec. 2B in this Chapter.

(proximity) and distance from the spatial point of view. There remain then two other points of view, from which nearness (proximity) and distance can be understood: that of supra-ordination or subordination, and that of for (with) and against. Both these points of view equally imply (internal) nearness or distance⁴¹, and they cover, in practice, all cases (even those, in which external and internal distance or nearness (proximity), either way, go hand in hand), except for indifferent [“]without one another (i.e. absence)[”], and, being apart (or separate) from one another. Nevertheless, they are not in the least identical with each other. The type of relation “For (With) – Against” does not set up (or posit) any supra-ordination and subordination in the social relationship of the participants vis-à-vis one another, since the said type of relation can be represented just as well by equals (i.e. equal participants). On the other hand, supra-ordination and subordination can be both under the influence of “For (With)”, as well as under the influence of “Against (one another)”, in principle supra-ordination and subordination can be a form of association or of dissociation. Regarding the conceptual difference of both types of the relation in respect of each other, there also arises therefore a difference of extent. If the form of the relation “For (With) – Against”, in view of the possible equality of the participants, cannot be completely reduced to the form of the relation of supra-ordination and subordination, whereas, conversely supra-ordination and subordination must be without exception a relation of “For (With)” or “Against (one another)”, then from that results that the form of the relation “For (With) – Against” (formulated otherwise: “association – dissociation”, “friendship – enmity”) represents the concept of the genus, whose species is supra-ordination and subordination. And since there is

⁴¹ Cf. v. Wiese, „Randbemerkungen“, p. 189ff..

no other form of relation except for the aforementioned forms of relation (the possible and usual case of indifferent [“]without one another (i.e. absence)[”], and, being apart (or separate) from one another, is social-ontologically irrelevant, i.e. the effect of other social-ontological factors is required in order to attain social weight; and as socially relevant relationlessness (i.e. socially relevant absence (or lack) of a relation), the said case of indifferent [“]without one another[”] and being apart from one another presupposes relations), thus from that it must be concluded that association and dissociation, or, friendship and enmity, as the form of the relation, includes the entire spectrum of the social relation. This is the ultimate logical and factual (objective) consequence from the use of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance for the setting (or drawing) up of a morphology of the “interactions (or mutual influences)” between humans, as the adherents of “pure sociology” had in mind. Besides, it is a mistake⁴² to hypostatise the relationship of Up and Down in a relation, that is, to hypostatise the general concept of the direction of the relation as the form of the relation, and then to comprehend the relation “Above (Supra) – Under (Sub)” and the relation “For – Against” as the following (i.e. next or subsequent) tiers (or stages), which are characterised by growing tension during the transition from the first to the third tier (or stage). Up and Down (or: To and Away-From) do not conceptually mark any real form of the relation, but declare (or indicate) the direction of the relation in general, as a theoretical variable, which can find use as long as real circumstances (relation(ship)s or conditions) of supra-ordination and subordination exist, for as long as a real For and Against is present. Supra-ordination and subordination in principle, then again, bear in themselves a tension

⁴² Plenge made such a mistake, „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 279ff..

not slighter than the form of the relation “For – Against”, however the slighter or greater tension, which can be ascertained on each and every respective occasion in the said supra-ordination and subordination, and, “For – Against”, is reduced to the fact that “Above (Supra)” and “Under (Sub)”, anyhow, originally move inside of the broader area of “For” and “Against”. That is why it has no real meaning to call social relations “mixed relations”, if thereby it were supposed to be meant that in such “mixed relations” a mixing of in themselves different forms of the relation, also observable in a pure culture (or form) (i.e. unadulterated), would take place.

2. The polarity in the spectrum of the social relation

A. Anthropological parameters: the mortality of man

Formal sociology indeed put forward the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, however, it did not justify why the form-related (i.e. formal) way of looking at social phenomena had to be oriented precisely towards this criterion, why from functionalistic and formalistic (i.e. form-related) premises, this and no other guide could be derived for sociological work; the inability to account for that, made of course the boundaries of, and holes (or gaps) in those premises visible. L. v. Wiese admitted the derivation of the criterion from non-sociological factors or points of view, however, typically enough, he spoke only in passing and moreover inconsistently about that. Once, he opined that the assumption of two antithetical fundamental (or basic) relations is simply an “evident

proposition”⁴³. Yet evidences (i.e. pieces of evidence or evident propositions) stand out only from a certain epistemological or factual perspective, and the perspectivistic character of an evidence (i.e. piece of evidence or evident proposition) must then above all become an object of reflection when the evidence concerned – as undisputed as it is in itself – attains a new relevance, and for the first time undertakes tasks in respect of founding. In another context, v. Wiese argued that the antithesis of association and dissociation is “a necessity resulting from the structure of our human mind (intellect or understanding)”, since we could only understand something through “separation” or “division”⁴⁴. Nevertheless, from the general assumption that human thought on the whole is based of necessity on antithetical conceptual pairs and must proceed dichotomously, the suitability of this or that concrete antithesis or dichotomy to constitute the foundation stone for the arrangement of the (subject) matter of a certain discipline, does not automatically arise; this suitability must be proved especially with regard to the specific theoretical requirements of the discipline. Eventually, v. Wiese advocated the view that sociology would take its teaching of “with-man and counter-man (i.e. fellow man and anti-man)” “from anthropology”⁴⁵. If one may interpret this sweeping statement in the light of v. Wiese’s sparse anthropological remarks (or statements), then one can presume that he wanted to correlate the associating and dissociating social forces with those “elementary forces” in man, which despite all the variation of the “historical form of a manifestation (phenomenon or appearance)”, despite all weakening or strengthening from time to time, nevertheless exist and have an effect permanently; these elementary forces determine (or give

⁴³ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 11.

⁴⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 178.

⁴⁵ *Soziologie*, p. 11.

rise to) the “fundamental positioning (or stance) of man towards man” and, if one disregards biological needs (“hunger and thirst”) amongst humans, the said elementary forces can likewise be classified in accordance with the dichotomous schema: “love” on the one hand, “hate, lust for power (or domineeringness), envy” on the other hand⁴⁶. In this syllogistic reasoning, the transition from anthropology to sociology ensues through the linear projection of the fundamental dichotomy of an anthropology of drives (urges or impulses) onto the fundamental dichotomy of a formal sociology. Because of that, the programmatically frowned-upon binding of forms to content(s) is nevertheless restored (or done), albeit in the worst possible way. Because recourse to the polarity in the spectrum of the anthropology of drives (urges) for the explanation of polarity in the spectrum of the social relation stands or falls on the anthropology of drives (urges) itself, and moreover such recourse endangers the clear separation pursued of the sociological from the psychological. Nonetheless, the coupling of the form-related (i.e. formal) criterion of distance and nearness (proximity) with anthropological content(s) remains in itself symptomatically and social-ontologically instructive.

It is obvious that the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance can be properly formulated and used only in the form (shape or frame) of a spectrum. There is not in fact [just] *nearness (proximity)* and *distance*, because then history and society would consist of two single monotonous recurring and reciprocally alternating relations, but many forms and grades of nearness (proximity) and distance are attested, which can be simplificatively and approximatively grouped into a number of classes.

⁴⁶ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 121. Simmel occasionally sees the dichotomy “association – dissociation” from the perspective of the dichotomy “opposition given by nature” – “sympathy between humans” too, see e.g. *Soziologie*, p. 196ff..

This grouping or classification yields (i.e. results in or amounts to), then, a spectrum if one carries this grouping or classification out with regard to two fixed, symmetrically opposite outermost boundaries, one of which must mark patently extreme nearness (proximity), the other, extreme distance. Polarity, as a result, constitutively belongs to the spectrum of the social relation. The forms and grades of the social relation apprehended in that spectrum are able to be, because of their great variety and precisely in their great variety, understood in context only by means of a clearly and objectively (factually) justifiable (foundable) demarcation of the entire field; a demarcation, which simultaneously makes criteria available for the arrangement (or ordering) and definition of the content(s) of the spectrum. Social relations, which lie (i.e. take place) between both poles of the spectrum, must therefore be comprehended as successive attenuations of the extreme intensity of that pole to which they are nearer. How the continuity of the spectrum of the social relation can be determined by its own polarity, will be explained later⁴⁷. In the face of extreme intensity, with which the social relation at both poles of the spectrum is loaded (or charged), and in which an outermost [point] (i.e. extreme, limit or maximum) in human possibilities manifests itself, the coupling of these poles with anthropological factors or content(s) referring to the ultimate and most elementary given facts of human existence ensues, which exist and have an effect irrespective of whether one supports an anthropology of drives (urges) or an anthropology of Reason, a functionalistic or substantialistic, an “optimistic” or a “pessimistic” perception of man. Here it must, in other words, be a question of that upon (or to) which man – every man – depends (or is attached) as an active being (t)here (or existence) in the social world; a

⁴⁷ See Sec. 3A in this chapter.

question of man's existence as such and as a whole. Looked at in this way, there is nothing more elementary and original (or primal) than the maintenance or the interruption of the vital functions, such as in life or death. And since man – every individual man – does not necessarily come into the world, but must invariably die, thus the deepest and sole necessity of his existence lies in his mortality. The contingency of life is won day by day and year by year from the necessity of death, regardless of whether the individual may think about death or not; and the fact that life is revocable, but death irrevocable, grants the latter a higher status *in life*, to the extent that the intensity and range of social acts (or actions) must be judged by their irrevocability, that is, by their nearness (proximity) to death. Life cannot become the yardstick (or measure) of death, because death does not know what life means; however, death becomes the yardstick (or measure) of life, because the living can imagine death at any moment – death as one's own and alien (i.e. another's) dying, and death as one's own and alien (i.e. another's) killing.

In which sense now does the mortality of man as the deepest and most necessary dimension – which encompasses the fact of life, since only the living can be mortal – interrelate with the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation? In all probability, mortality and death would be social-ontologically irrelevant if all humans died in a single way, namely, a “natural death” as a result of organic dysfunctions or organic exhaustion without the help (mediation or doing(s)) of other humans, and without the direct or indirect effect of sociogenic factors. The same immanence, the same unimpressionability (or non-suggestibility) and the same manner of dying for all people, would make dying a socially neutral magnitude, i.e. something which could not have sparked off any difference. The possibility of bringing about inequality through human doing (i.e. deeds)

regarding the imminence and the manner of death brings the factor “mortality” into social-ontological play. Mortality does not constitute therefore mere reality, whose occurrence is reckoned on (or expected) at a future point in time, but mortality opens up for the socially acting subject practical possibilities, of which the said socially acting subject can make use in certain, often chosen points in time, both in relation to other subjects, as well as in relation to itself; because everyone knows or finds out what one has to do in order to bring about one’s own or alien (i.e. another’s) death, when one’s own or another’s death only really matters. Consequently, the necessary internal relation between the anthropological basic given fact of being mortal, and of the formation (development or emergence) of the polarity in the spectrum of the human social relation, becomes obvious. It would not cross any man’s mind to kill another, were death amongst humans an unknown phenomenon, that is, were humans in respect of their constitution (composition, texture or nature) immortal; and someone would just as little want to, or have to, sacrifice his own life for another. *These* extreme manifestations of enmity and friendship amongst humans would simply fail to materialise; both poles of the spectrum of the social relation would cease to exist, and with their cessation, the structure of the spectrum would change from the ground up (i.e. fundamentally or completely) too.

For the making (or establishment) of the social-ontological interrelation between the basic anthropological given fact of being mortal and the polarity of the social relation’s spectrum, it however does not suffice to leave aside natural death as a neutral magnitude in order to put the manner (or kind) and likelihood of violent (or forcible) death at the centre of attention. Over and above that, we must comprehend death not as a biological phenomenon, i.e. as demise (deceasing or passing), which

concerns a concrete individual organism and takes place, as it were, in a social vacuum, but as a socially meaning-like (i.e. meaningful or purposeful) process. In relation to that, violent death offers considerably firmer clues than natural death. Because the meaningfulness (purposefulness or meaning-likeness) of natural death can be asserted merely on the basis of unprovable metaphysical or religious constructions; during violent death, on the other hand, subjectively meant meaning can be objectively (or factually) ascertained. We can find out or suspect in a well-founded manner what meaning (or sense) somebody who kills someone else or dies for someone else connects with his acting (i.e. action). Above all, the latter case constitutes a constant memento (i.e. reminder) of the fact that, with regard to social-ontologically relevant death or with regard to the anthropological and social-ontological notion of self-preservation, the biological dimension is not necessarily decisive. At the human level, a transformation, through the mediation (or agency) of the “intellect(-spirit)” and its symbolic mechanisms, of the biological magnitude “self-preservation” into an ideational magnitude takes place, so that the question of self-preservation and the, understood in the wider sense, question of power, are transubstantiated into a question of identity⁴⁸, which at least at one pole of the spectrum of the social relation can be solved even at the cost of biological self-preservation. Whoever sacrifices his life for another (individual or collective) subject or for a “cause”, to him, self-preservation in the sense of the protection (or preservation) of his identity (however he defines this same identity), is more important than self-preservation in the biological sense. Death, however, is not socially mediated only via the effect of the “intellect(-spirit)” – and identity is an “intellectual(-spiritual)”, and only in society

⁴⁸ In relation to that in detail, see the 3rd volume of this work. Basically, see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, esp. pp. 49ff., 80ff..

with other humans, conceivable need. The same mediation (intervention or agency) is accomplished via the aims which are pursued at both poles of the social relation's spectrum. The aim of the killing of a foe, just as self-sacrifice for a friend, is a change in the hitherto predominant social relation in a certain direction. – In the former case, due to the fact that the complete and definitive exclusion of the foe from the social relation leaves the social relation's shaping to the own discretion of those who excluded the foe; in the latter case, due to the fact that self-sacrifice provides friends with possibilities of acting (action) or development (unfolding) by influencing society by way of a "good example" etc.. Even when one through one's suicide wants to signal that one neither wants to reshape nor preserve, but simply leave (i.e. exit or abandon) the social relation in which one must live, a social reference continues to apply to this concrete relation, only it is negative. (A positive reference to the social relation can of course also be embodied in suicide, when this, e.g. is meant as revenge). Consequently, man's mortality and man's sociality go (i.e. flow) into each other and mark, from a social-ontological perspective, the polarity of the social relation's spectrum.

We emphasise, to sum up, that the mortality of man, especially as it is actualised (or made topical) in various kinds of violent death, anthropologically sustains both the pole of extreme enmity as well as that of extreme friendship. And indeed: how can man *as man* manifest extreme enmity other than by killing his foe? And how can one *as man* prove extreme friendship other than by sacrificing his own life for his friend? On the other side of (i.e. hereafter) death, man cannot act, he must therefore do it on this side of death (i.e. in this life); death as an act, which can still be decided about, however lies in this (From) Here (i.e. This World or Life) and marks out the spectrum of the social relation in

both directions, that is, that space, inside of which socially living man must move. This fundamental social-ontological insight has everywhere and always constituted a commonplace which was expressed regardless of what one otherwise held about the «situation humaine» [“human situation”] and in what respect one wanted “the human situation’s” change, e.g. regardless of whether one heeded heathen values or the religion of Love [i.e. Christianity]. Heathens (Pagans) and Christians, just like many people before them, noticed what our contemporary ethologists brought (or worked) out scientifically, that, namely, the inhibition (or restraint) threshold of the killing of animals of the same species amongst the rest of the animals (i.e. non-human animals) is placed higher than amongst humans⁴⁹. Lions or snakes have never conducted such battles against each other like humans, wrote Augustine⁵⁰, and there he did not think differently than for instance Horace⁵¹, Seneca⁵² or Juvenal⁵³. Human action has indeed something “monstrous (or dreadful)”, as Canetti called it; “human action presupposes that one has nothing against killing”⁵⁴. – However, just as early on and generally as man’s particular

⁴⁹ Lorenz, *Das sog. Böse*, p. 226ff.; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Liebe*, p. 115ff..

⁵⁰ *De civitate dei*, XII, p. 23

⁵¹ *Epodon*, VII, vv. 11-12: neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus/umquam nisi in dispar feris [neither in wolves nor in lions did this habit ever exist/except only in dissimilar beasts].

⁵² *Epistulae*, XCV, 31: Non pudet homines... gaudere sanguine alterno et bella gerere..., cum inter se etiam mutis ac feris pax sit [Humans are not ashamed... to rejoice in others’ blood and to wage wars... whilst even mute beasts as between one another also live in peace].

⁵³ *Saturae*, XV, vv. 159-164: sed iam serpentum maior concordia. parcit/cognatis maculis similis fera. quando leoni/fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo memore umquam expiravit aper maioris dentibus apri? Indica tigris rabida cum tigride pacem/perpetuam, saevis inter se convenit ursis [but already nowadays, there is more concord amongst the serpents. The beast spares [the life of] related beasts with similar spots. When did a stronger lion snatch life away from another lion? Where in living memory did a boar ever expire (i.e. die) from a boar with larger teeth? The fierce Indian tigress lives in perpetual peace with another tigress, savage bears are suited to (or live harmoniously with) one another (or English translation by G. G. Ramsay. London. New York. William Heinemann; G. P. Putnam's Son. 1918: “wild beasts are merciful/to beasts spotted like themselves. When did the/stronger lion ever take the life of the weaker? In/what wood did a boar ever breathe his last under/the tusks of a boar bigger than himself? The fierce/tigress of India dwells in perpetual peace with her/fellow; bears live in harmony with bears”)].

⁵⁴ FAZ of 18th August 1994. Canetti continues: “ ... I get involved very much with people, but always only so that I do not have to *kill* them. One may call that, a priestly stance. I find it human. However, it is deceptive if one expects such a stance from other people”. Elsewhere, Canetti emphasised very nicely the interrelation between man’s mortality and the permanent possibility of man’s killing, as well

lack of restraint (or inhibition) in respect of the killing of the same species (i.e. his fellow man), man's frequently, in relation to such lack of restraint in killing his fellow man, symmetrical, and in the same open or even diffuse drive(s) (urge(s)) structure, anchored capability at sacrificing himself for another human, was noticed. And in exactly this ability, the genuine hallmark and the most unmistakable attestation of friendship was seen by all sides. "Nobody has greater love than that in respect of which he lets go of his own life for his friends", preached Jesus⁵⁵, and the Roman, Horace, counted amongst the truly happy (or lucky) him who finds the courage to die for friends and fatherland (the collective friend)⁵⁶.

This, in practice, unanimous acceptance of violent death as the measure by which both extreme enmity as well as extreme friendship are measured, and thus the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation is constituted, has found its expression in the constitution of all political collectives until now. All political collectives have hitherto asked of their members the sacrifice of their own life as the sign of loyalty, that is, friendship towards the polity, and also all have hitherto allowed their members to kill him who the polity has declared to be the collective enemy. The classic example for that shows (i.e. is), as is well known, war, however, the continuous maintenance of armed formations (or organisations), and even for police goals (ends or purposes), indicates that here we are dealing with a constitutive constant in the life of the political

as the constant institutional use of this possibility (see below): "How are there supposed to not be any murderers as long as it is *in accordance with* man to die, as long as he himself is not ashamed of that, as long as he has death *built into* his institutions, as if death were man's institutions' safest (or most stable), best and most meaningful (rational, sensible, or useful) foundation?" (*Die Fliegenpein*, p. 66). Canetti, though, does not take into consideration self-sacrifice as a social-ontologically relevant possibility of violent death.

⁵⁵ Joh. 15, 13. μείζονα ταύτης ἀγάπην οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῆ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ [no-one has a greater love than this, of someone placing his soul (i.e. life) for the sake of his friends; or, Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (*King James* translation)].

⁵⁶ *Carminum* IV, 9, vv. 51-52: non ille pro caris amicis/aut patria timidus perire [he who is not afraid to die for dear friends or else his country].

collective. Whoever, on behalf (or on the orders) of the polity, bears a weapon, must constantly thereby reckon that he with that weapon could kill someone; he must, however, also reckon on his own killing on the part of another, because he is armed exactly because his job is regarded as life-threatening (or highly dangerous). It would, nonetheless, be a huge mistake to connect the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation exclusively or principally with the public realm (domain or sphere) and to want to deduce from the said polarity the specific character of the political⁵⁷. This polarity in the spectrum of the social relation is present in all forms and at all levels of the social relation, namely, in private and personal relations, as well as in the same intensity as in public and impersonal relations – something which, incidentally, is recognised by society itself, which cheers as a paragon of virtue the (boy-)scout who dies while rescuing a drowning child, while it (i.e. society) simultaneously acquits him who killed someone in legitimate self-defence.

The bringing out (or elaborating) of the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation has something to do with the definition of the political, just as little as with a value judgement about man. Such a judgement is, incidentally, in this context logically impossible, because the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation requires the same capability of the human genus (or species) at (or capacity for) “altruistic” and “egoistical”, friendly and inimical acts. From these acts, to which all historical and social experience attests, we must therefore start, and at the same time this question can serve as a guiding thread: what can mortal man do all in all to mortal man? The only empirically valid answer to that is the following: man can do acts (or actions) which other humans consider to

⁵⁷ See Ch. II, footnote 242, above.

be pleasant and/or useful or unpleasant and/or harmful. It cannot be ascertained whether these act(ion)s are “good” or “bad (evil)” in an absolute, that is, extra-human sense, and it also cannot be said whether the man who carried them out, is “good” or “bad (evil)”. Because “good” and “bad (evil)” appear, as concepts and as modes of acting (action) marked by “good” and “bad (evil)”, only inside of the human situation, and “good” and “bad (evil)” cannot constitute any yardsticks by which the human situation as a whole, and from the outside, can be judged. But also for another reason: because man is not necessarily “bad (evil)” when he kills, and not necessarily “good” when he loves or even dies for someone else. Anthropological parameters may therefore not be drawn on for the apprehension of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity as open or concealed value judgements, but only in the form of the ascertainment of the mortality of man as objective anthropological given fact, which can motivate (or account for) very different expectations, attitudes (positionings) and modes of behaviour. The anthropological given fact is not therefore a psychological magnitude, but an incontrovertible fact, in which socially mediated psychological effects are ignited. The analysis of the next section will name additional reasons as to why the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation cannot in principle be reduced to psychological factors.

Thus, the social-ontological relevance of human mortality is seen in the unremitting direct or indirect presence of violent death in social life, and indeed both at the inimical as well as at the friendly pole of the social relation’s spectrum. On the other hand, the introverted reflection of the individual regarding the fact of one’s own natural mortality is not able to develop a social-ontological dynamic(s) – unless social authorities (or jurisdictional tiers [such as courts]) use perceptions of the meaning

(sense) and consequences of the natural mortality of the individual in order to guide his life in a certain practical direction. Nothing shows more clearly how little Heidegger thought social-ontologically, and how much he thought in terms of cultural critique, as his treatment of death exclusively from the point of view of the existential possibilities of the individual being (t)here (or existence), i.e. the individual being (t)here (or existence's) "authentic (genuine, true or actual) ability at being whole". At the centre of attention here is also the contradistinction of the inauthentic somebody (people or the They), who does or do not let "courage vis-à-vis angst (or fear) before death arise", who gets or get out of the way of death and transforms or transform the "being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death" into "constant flight before it (i.e. death)", and, of the authentic (genuine, true or actual) being (t)here (or existence), which positions itself in angst (or fear) before death and finds therein its "excellent (outstanding or pre-eminent) ability at being"⁵⁸. Death, accordingly, is not of interest as a multiform real phenomenon (or manifestation) amongst socially living humans, but as a trigger (i.e. cause) of that angst (or fear) and that expecting, which are supposed to give "evidence" of the authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) of existence. Violent death remains completely out of (i.e. beyond) consideration, and in fact the "bringing about of one's own demise (i.e. death)", obviously by suicide, is disapproved of, because through one's

⁵⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 254, 259. Since being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death is founded (or takes root) in concern (worry, care or looking after), and death becomes understandable only against the background of the character of concern as the fundamental constitution (or state) of being (t)here (or existence) (loc. cit., pp. 259, 249ff.), thus the dogged dispelling (or driving out) of death on the part of the somebody (people or the They) obviously constitutes a pendant (i.e. counterpart) or a consequence of its (or their) (i.e. somebody's, people's, or the They's) transformation of concern into "mere desires (or wishes)" (loc. cit., p. 195). Heidegger's reference to *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* calls to mind, by the way, the at that time common source pertaining to cultural critique of Heidegger's inspiration. The unexpected oncoming of death crosses out (or thwarts) in Tolstoy's novella the small dreams of happiness of the Philistine, who until then had lived in the abysses of the existence dedicated to death (i.e. doomed to die). The of "mere desires (or wishes)" driven, money-grubbing etc. bourgeois can take the place of the Philistine.

own real death, being (t)here (or existence) would no longer exist “for (vis-à-vis or towards) death”, and “therewith [it (i.e. the said being (t)here (or existence))] would remove precisely the ground from under itself” for the probation (i.e. proving) of its own authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)!⁵⁹ It is an open question (or Let us not examine) as to what extent loudly propagated existential probation (i.e. proving (of one’s self)) through angst (or fear) before death is an intellectual construction or even a self-mirroring (self-reflection, narcissism or mirage) of intellectuals in certain situations pertaining to the history of ideas, to what extent it is at all possible to base a socially living existence on direct and personal, that is, socially unmediated angst (or fear) before death: in fact, very little can be thought and said about one’s own death unless one connects this death, one way or another, with things which are either in life or on the other side of (i.e. beyond) this same life. Social-ontologically, in any case, such thoughts and propositions appear to be irrelevant, and indeed in accordance with Heidegger’s own presuppositions. Because if the somebody (people or the They) is a social-ontological, that is, unalterable category, and if the somebody (people of the They’s) effect is so determining (or decisive) on the whole of social life as Heidegger describes it, then social ontology must take as its starting point the reality of a social life which dispels death; the life of the “authentic (genuine, true or actual)” in the shadow of angst (or fear) before death is not the decisive factor social-ontologically, and one might only hope for the social prevailing of “authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality)”, if the somebody (people or the They) did not represent (or constitute) a social-ontological category, but merely a historical transitory manifestation (phenomenon or occurrence).

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 266ff., 261.

That mortality and death are totally dispelled from the life of the somebody (people or the They), constitutes, incidentally, a serious pragmatic mistake which Heidegger makes, because his élan as regards cultural critique pushes him, in relation to that, to contemplate death only as a motive (or an occasion) for exercises in intellectual(-spiritual) refinement. Already the institutionalisation of the possibility of violent death in all societies until now (through custom[s] and tradition (practice or usage) or through forms of organisation) proves that the social omnipresence (of the possibility) of death can accompany perfectly well the dispelling of angst (or fear) before (natural) death in the life of the individual. The somebody (people or the They) apparently perceives more clearly than its critics what has social-ontological weight, and accordingly it makes as its own central “concern (worry, care or looking after)” not angst (or fear) before (natural) death, but interaction with other members of society. There are indeed no indications of the fact that a man could make out of his dominating angst (or fear) before death a stable and exclusive yardstick for the regulation (i.e. arrangement) of his relations with fellow humans. However, we have many instances (or pieces of evidence) of the shaping of the relation with death on the basis of the existing or desired relation with fellow humans. We already explained in which sense the killing of foes, self-sacrifice for a friend and even suicide represent (or constitute) interventions in the social relation. Studies of the history of mentality substantiate in other respects the thesis of the priority of the social relation vis-à-vis the personal relation with (one’s own) death⁶⁰. Even the Christian perception (or notion), which perhaps as the first to confront (i.e. bring) the individual as individual (face to face) with his own death, and consequently wanted to make out of life a μελέτη

⁶⁰ See e.g. Vovelle’s excellent work, *La Mort en Occident*.

θανάτου [study of death], was permeated (or interspersed) with social references, although these references for the most part were shifted (transferred or moved) to the (From or Over) There (i.e. That (Next) World or Life; the Hereafter or Beyond) and accordingly disguised. The studium mortis [study of death] basically constituted a continuous account regarding the doing (i.e. deeds or actions) in life, an account which the individual owed in the best case to God alone, in the worst and the most usual case to God's governors (deputies or representatives) on earth. It is impossible to sever this account, which had to deeply influence the experiencing of (or going through) one's own mortality, from ideas about social duties in the widest sense of the word (the touchstone of inner purification was in fact love, and whose object (or subject matter) is other people), irrespective of whether these ideas always agreed with those of God's governors (deputies or representatives) or directly invoked God. Heidegger praises the insights of Christian theology in the "being for (vis-à-vis or towards) death" as the highest ability at being, however he does not take notice of all these interrelations. If he did this, then it would be difficult for him to use Christian content(s) in an in principle non-religious framework. Precisely here a logical paradox in Heidegger's undertaking becomes apparent: he declares culturally determined experiences and views (perceptions or beliefs) constants of fundamental ontology. But why should e.g. "guilt" belong to the constitution of a being (t)here (or existence), which is simply "thrown (tossed, flung or dropped), and is cut off from every ethically loaded (or charged) transcendence? Radicalised theology and anti-bourgeois cultural critique often entered into an alliance in our century [i.e. the 20th century]. Nevertheless, this alliance could never be free of tensions and contradictions.

Hobbes saw social-ontologically deeper than Heidegger, when he left to theologians the abstractly or sublimatedly imagined relationship of the individual with his own natural death, and made angst (or fear) before violent death the crucial (pivotal or central) point of his social theory. However, by neglecting, in terms of theory, the objective given fact of human mortality, which allows a number of active and passive positionings (stances or attitudes) towards one's own and alien (i.e. another's) death, in favour of just one subjective feeling vis-à-vis just one kind of death, weak spots and gaps (or holes) necessarily came to light in the construction of the Leviathan. Hobbes treats violent death in principle from the point of view of the anxious (or fearful) possible victim (prey, casualty or sacrifice), not from the point of view of the apparently less anxious (or fearful) culprit (or doer) in the same concrete situation, and moreover he looks at the struggle (battle or fight) which entails violent death as a struggle between foes who struggle (battle or fight) only for themselves, not (also) for (personal or political) friends and – no matter out of what motivation and under what pressure – in the process thereby reckon that they can die for these friends. The political collective may come into being with the aim of exorcising angst (or fear) from violent death, as Hobbes believes; the paradox of the political collective's existence lies, nonetheless, in the fact that the collective, before violent death, can effectively and permanently protect itself only if its members are prepared (or ready) to die, if need be, a violent death, on the inner (internal) or the outer (external) front. Before this paradox, Hobbes's logical consistency fails, which does not want to deviate a little bit from the theoretical criterion of angst (or fear) before violent death, and accordingly allows the deserter his right: whoever before the foe takes flight from one's own political collective, acts merely "dishonourably",

not “unjustly”⁶¹. With Hobbes’ premises, it is of course easier to justify the deserter’s stance (or attitude) than to explain the life-threatening (or highly dangerous) deployment (action or commitment) of the great mass for the cause of friends or of one’s own political collective. Naturalistic anthropology does not allow complete insight into the symbolic-ideological mechanisms which at the human level transform the biologically understood drive (urge, impulse or instinct) of self-preservation into an ideational need for identity, and even let that drive (or urge) of self-preservation retreat before this ideational need for identity. Hobbes follows (or tracks) these mechanisms only in accordance with the “egoistical” side, that is, only in so far as the biological drive (or urge) of self-preservation is ideationally reflected (finds expression or manifests itself) in “vanity”, “thirst (or lust) for fame (glory)” or “thirst (lust) for rule (or domineering); the “altruistic” metamorphoses of the same drive (or urge) of self-preservation remain outside of the possibilities of explanation of Hobbes’s anthropological schema.

Moreover, the one-sided way of looking at violent death from the point of view of its possible victims (prey or casualties) is not completely consistent with the process of founding of the Leviathan. If the political collective is founded by means of contract, then angst (or fear) before violent death takes (or has an) effect as the angst (or fear) of every individual before all other individuals; if, on the other hand, the founding of the political collective is due to conquest, then the angst (or fear) in respect of death (or mortal agony) of every individual before the conqueror is the deciding factor. In both cases, says Hobbes, it is a matter of the same feeling (sense) of angst (fear or anxiety); that is why the same duties vis-à-vis the sovereign arise from such a feeling (or sense) of angst

⁶¹ *Leviathan*, XXI, (15th paragraph) = *English Works*, III.

(or fear)⁶². The important difference lies, nevertheless, in each and every respective process of founding. In the first case, all individuals are in principal exposed to the same threat to life (or mortal danger); in the latter case, the conqueror could gain a considerable advantage due to the fact that he (at first) relieved himself (or got rid of) the danger (threat or risk), not through his own passive submission (subjection or subjugation) to a sovereign, but actively through the subjugation (subjection or submission) of other individuals. Angst (or fear) before death does not obviously reach (in respect of all individuals) such a degree that it paralyses readiness to take a great risk if advantages are thought of, which the individual concerned holds to be necessarily worth striving for (i.e. desirable). Angst (or fear) before violent death would, incidentally, not at all be so widespread if the readiness to attack were not just as widespread, even while endangering (or putting under threat) one's own life. Every attack involves (or conceals) imponderabilities and bad (or terrible) surprises in itself, and yet experience teaches that attacks are not only undertaken when they are regarded as riskless. Hobbes indeed accepts an anthropological disposition which counteracts angst (or fear) before violent death: the "desire of Power after Power". With that, however, not everything can have been said yet, since this insatiable desire (or lust) for power in itself is not always capable of overcoming angst (or fear) in respect of death (or mortal agony), as much as it may press for that. Where this overcoming (temporarily) succeeds, an additional force distinguished from desire (or lust) for power intervenes as a direct contrast to angst (or fear). It is a boldness (daring or an audacity), which draws (or feeds) on the certainty that the other individual is mortal and consequently vulnerable. The certainty of the

⁶² *Leviathan*, XX (1st and 2nd paragraph) = *English Works*, III

mortality of the other individual lets one (temporarily) forget one's own mortality, in any case, no longer take one's own mortality entirely seriously. The culprit (or doer) feels, at least for a short time (or temporarily) less mortal than the victim (prey or casualty). The said culprit's founding of the state hence takes other paths than those paths of those individuals who first of all appear and argue as possible victims (or casualties). Killing and violent dying open up, not only here, different perspectives. All possible perspectives are, however, opened up against the background of the objective given fact of human mortality. Social ontology must start from that objective given fact of human mortality so that social ontology can apprehend all these possible perspectives.

B. The neutrality of the psychological and ethical factor

In the previous sub-section it was explained why any reference of the anthropological to the polarity of the spectrum of the social relation must not be made via this or that version of the anthropology of drives (urges), but with regard to the objective fact of human mortality. For the underpinning and extension of this thesis, proof should now be furnished that that polarity acts in principle neutrally towards subjective, whether psychological or ethical, factors. No necessary and ubiquitous interrelation can be ascertained between the friendly or the inimical pole of the social relation, and certain stable feelings, motivations, dispositions or ethical stances (attitudes or positionings). Said more precisely: no necessary correspondence between the *kind* of subjective stance (attitude or positioning) or of the psychical act, and, the friendly or inimical *kind* of the social act, can be ascertained, even though social acts without

subjective stances (attitudes or positionings) and psychological acts are inconceivable. These fundamental facts of the case are not sufficiently apprehended by the in itself correct indication that both association and solidarity, as well as dissociation and antagonism, could equally be motivated by means of emotional factors (love or hate), by means of interests or end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) considerations, for objective (or factual) reasons, or by means of ethical-normative positions⁶³. Here, the possibility of a dichotomous classification continues to remain, in which emotions, interests and objective (factual) or normative reasons of content A would end up, in accordance with their essence and always, in friendly acts, however, emotions, interests and objective (factual) or normative reasons of content B would end up, in accordance with their essence and always, in inimical acts. Yet the real situation is more complex. This becomes more understandable if we distinguish between the general *type* of motivation and the, on each and every respective occasion, special psychological *content(s)*: love and hate belong e.g. to the same, namely, the affective type of motivation, however, in terms of content, they are different from each other. Now the same type of motivation is found not only at both poles of the spectrum of the social relation, but also different psychological contents (notwithstanding the type of motivation) interweave with the same form of the social relation, just as related or identical psychological contents (notwithstanding the type of motivation) can be activated at different points of the social relation's spectrum. For the designation of the relationship between the social and psychological act, we use neutral ("interweave with one another") rather than causal expressions, in order to bring to mind that the impeccable proof of causalities in this field is an

⁶³ Thus, v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 186, and Sorokin, *Society*, p. 97ff.. Both authors rightly point out that in practice these motivations would be and are mixed with one another.

extremely tricky matter. The constant mixing of types of motivation and content(s) of motivation with one another can indeed be confirmed as a fact through case analyses (i.e. on a case-by-case basis), however the ascertainment of a genetic and causal sequence between them runs on many occasions into insurmountable difficulties; if one can deal with such difficulties at all, then they are dealt with through the patient going into the concrete case, never through preconceived opinions about the inner hierarchy of the forces having an effect in the human psyche. Because no-one can empirically verify that the affective type of motivation always causes (necessitates or determines) the end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) or the normative type of motivation – or the other way around. Just as little can fixed (stable or settled) causalities between corresponding psychological content(s) be made (i.e. found) out. As soon as e.g. the question is posed, “does A love B because B is his friend, or is B, A’s friend because A loves him?”, the vicious circle is hardly to be circumvented, especially if one takes into consideration that, in the sense of psychological housekeeping, it appears to be more economical to love one’s own friends in various forms, and that in view of that, as well as in view of the just as economically functioning unconscious or semi-conscious mechanisms of rationalisation, the genetic beginning of the chain of motivation is, in practical terms, lost in the unexplored (unresearched or unfathomable). The necessity of distinguishing type of motivation or psychological content, and, the form of the social relation, is, besides, underlined by the asymmetry which is often prevalent between the psychological disposition and the external acts (or actions) of actors. Thus, one cannot know in advance even whether friendly gestures will be reciprocated with friendship, and inimical gestures with enmity, because demonstrative (or ostentatious) friendship can awaken mistrust and mobilise inimically oriented counter-strategies if

the intentions of the other person are doubted, whereas inimical acts can be overlooked or twisted if unconditional (i.e. absolute) (affectively or end(goal)-rationally (i.e. purposefully or expediently) motivated) interest in the friendship with someone exists. This same asymmetry appears in another shape (form) when for instance psychological dissociation and social association go hand in hand (e.g. personal contempt for a business partner or a political friend), or conversely, psychological association and social dissociation accompany each other (respect and admiration for one's foe). The possibility of such ambivalent relations makes again the drawing of a clear dividing line between the intensity of the psychological disposition or motivation, and the intensity of the social relation, essential. The intensity of the relation, that is, the degree of the inner psychological claims (demands or preoccupation) of those involved in the relation in question is independent of whether the social relation approaches the friendly or the inimical pole of the spectrum; the social relation, hence, can in both cases run through the same curve, so that on the basis of the mere criterion of intensity, the friendly or inimical quality of the relation cannot be inferred. That is, incidentally, the reason why friendship or enmity in themselves, therefore, first of all under the abstraction of [i.e. without taking concretely into account] the intensity and of the extensity of the relation, constitute the ultimate and sole decisive yardstick (benchmark or measure) for the construction of the spectrum of the social relation⁶⁴.

⁶⁴ Regarding this point cf. Stok, „Nähe und Ferne“, p. 245ff.. For the definition of the concept “extensity of the relation” and “intensity of the relation”, p. 237ff.. Stok connects “approaching (drawing nearer or approximation)” with “promotion (support or encouragement)”, “conflict” with “harm (damage or hurt) of (to) another”. In Section 1B of this chapter it was suggested why a definition of nearness (proximity) and distance (or of friendship and enmity), which disregards the question of identity and sets apart (i.e. underlines) (external) usefulness (benefit) and damage, is always one-sided and often false. We shall come back to that in this section. It is worth mentioning, at any rate, how little the older and newer literature have made the effort [to achieve] a comprehensive and deeper definition of friendship and enmity.

The methodical (i.e. methodological) meaning of these ascertainties and differentiations is the following. The investigation of the types of motivation and psychological content(s), (in regard to which situation-related (i.e. situational) thought acts can be reckoned too), becomes a topical (relevant or actual) task only in the analysis of the concrete case. Precisely the tremendous variety of the said types of motivation and psychological contents' manifestations, the richness (i.e. abundance) of their combinations and the unforeseeability (or unpredictability) of their effects, make these types and content(s) social-ontologically neutral and commit these types and contents into the historian or the psychologist's hands (i.e. area of expertise). Admittedly, the social-ontologically understood neutrality of the psychological and ethical-normative factor does not in the least signify that acting humans would not be able to be motivated by such factors; such neutrality means that there is no unambiguous, causal and permanently recurring interrelation between such motivation and the shaping (forming or structuring) of the spectrum of the social relation. Insight into the content-related great variety and changeability (or variability) of the motivation of the actors in the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the spectrum of the social relation always staying the same – far from dissolving living human forces into formalities (i.e. formal, not regarding content, qualities) – poses, beyond every psychologism, the anthropological question on the sole fertile basis, and indeed in the following form: how is the essence (substance, nature, being or creature) constituted (composed), in which varied and changeable psychological given (actual) facts accompany the same friendly and/or inimical act(ion)s – as well as the other way around? The aforementioned asymmetries between the psychological level of the actors and the form-related (i.e. formal) level of the spectrum of their relations with one another, shows that there can be no talk of a linear

correspondence of the (real) polarity of this spectrum with the (frequently assumed) polarity of the drive(s) (urge(s)) structure. The usual connection of love with friendship, and hate (hatred) with enmity, is not social-ontologically or anthropologically decisive, in fact it is misleading. Love and hate can indeed often interrelate with friendship or enmity in the same direct manner as motives and act(ion)s, which otherwise is in the habit of being done in the animal kingdom. The likewise numerous cases in which neither that interrelation is direct or necessary, nor does the psychical and practical high or low point coincide in a social relation, nevertheless remain informative (enlightening). And something else distinguishes friendship and enmity at the human social-ontological level in contrast to the rest of the animal kingdom; friendship and enmity's independence as relations from substantial, i.e. conspecific (belonging to the same species, characteristic or true to type) invariable factors.

Whereas the proverbial disposition of the wolf vis-à-vis the lamb points to the insurmountable barriers in the relations between animal species, within the human genus (i.e. race) there is no substantial (essential or fundamental) "species equality (equivalence or sameness)", which would dispose humans to eternal friendship, and no "species strangeness (or alienness)" which would dispose humans to eternal enmity. Friendship and enmity are, as forms of the relation, structurally stable; friends and foes constantly alternate in role allocation (or the occupation of roles). In the dynamic movement of the social relation, all substantial (fundamental) properties (qualities or characteristics) are liquefied (i.e. made liquid or fluid) or step back (i.e. withdraw or retreat) – at least with regard to the determination of friend and foe. A certain individual or collective subject may in some respects be regarded as a substance, however this substance can be deemed active and passive both at the friendly as well as at the inimical pole of the spectrum of the social

relation; *in this regard* it is therefore to be looked at according to functional criteria. The old Indian author, who wanted to settle the question as to whether friendship towards someone is innate or acquired, knew that already, and into the bargain carefully distinguished the permanent species-determined enmity between carnivorous and herbivorous animals from that enmity between humans: humans on each and every respective occasion (would) have their reasons, and with the reasons they also change their friendly or inimical positioning (attitude or stance) towards the same person⁶⁵.

It might seem as if the stressed by us fundamental interrelation of friendship and enmity, along with the question of identity, smuggled the psychological dimension into the explanation of the polarity of the spectrum of the social relation. It is not so. Identity does not constitute a psychological variable, but an anthropological constant, that is, a ubiquitous human attribute with direct social-ontological implications. Identity can be connected with the most different feelings and thoughts; however, exactly because of that, identity does not depend on any particular feeling or thought act, that is, on any special psychological content; it stands or falls by the subject concerned as bearer of often varying, contradictory and reciprocally alternating feelings and thoughts. Identity does not exist without feelings and thoughts, however it cannot be abolished by a feeling or a thought act in the same sense as a feeling abolishes another feeling, or a thought act abolishes another thought act. On the contrary: identity can force (squeeze) special psychical content(s) into its logic, that is, modify or replace such content(s), proceed (or act)

⁶⁵ *Pantschatantra*, II § 30-32 = II, p.162ff.: “For one reason does one enter into friendship, and enmity takes place for one reason too; that is why whoever has a brain (understanding or any sense) must also one moment be a friend, the next a foe, with regard to someone.” Cf. II, § 121 (122) = II, p. 189: “No-one is anyone’s friend without measure (i.e. unlimitedly), or anyone’s foe; by means of a hostile stance towards a friend, he proves to be a foe.”

against instinctive preferences, or in general supplement or even overcome the pleasure principle through the principle of reality or of power. The manner in which the subject behaves (or acts) in concrete situations turns out to be (or takes shape as) the resultant of the manner in which the subject deals with, on a strategic and tactical basis, its problem of identity, and the problem of extra-subjective given (actual) facts; the latter determine (or presuppose) behaviour, and consequently diminish the weight of psychological factors only to the extent that they are recognised and acknowledged by the identity as such, while at the same time, the identity, for its part, has at its disposal its own, independent of the situation, means and ways in order to bring psychical factors and content(s) under control. That is why it would be very one-sided to summon against psychologism exclusively the logic of the situation, and to overlook that the acting (act or action) in a situation is mediated by an interpretation of the situation, which in turn remains at any time (i.e. always) interwoven with the process of the formation, the purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) restructuring and the self-assertion of the identity⁶⁶. When one wants to conceptually separate what is objectively (or factually) inseparable, then one must in fact allow the constant “identity” the theoretical precedence before the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation. Because only from the perspective of self-preservation comprehended as identity, that is, beyond biological connotations, can the constellation (correlation or conjuncture) be described in which friendship and enmity come into being and alternate; such self-preservation behaves (or acts) in itself indifferently vis-à-vis the

⁶⁶ A symbolic interactionist like Blumer indeed connects the interpretation process with the “self-indication” of the self, however, he is very far off from comprehending that “self-indication” as an intricate (or far-reaching) need for identity and power with its own possibilities, and means, of disciplining vis-à-vis feelings, inclinations and similar psychical factors; as a result, the situation-related (i.e. situational) interaction must rather one-sidedly carry the main theoretical load (i.e. bear the main theoretical burden) in the anti-psychologistic context (see *Symbolic Interactionism*, esp. pp. 79, 83ff., 111ff.).

option (or choice) of friendship or enmity, that is, the option (or choice) is subordinated to self-preservation. If one held, on the other hand, friendship or enmity to be original, then the criteria are missing in order to make the option (or choice) of friendship or enmity understandable. There are two different things meant by the process of the formation and assertion of identity inevitably entailing the distinction between friend and foe, and assuming that this distinction is at the beginning of that process. However, as we have already said: those are conceptual clarifications and hierarchisations rather than clearly provable causalities. With the complexity and the tight interdependence of the factors having an effect, the following general ascertainment is merely permitted here: where the question of self-preservation – and this anthropologically and social-ontologically means: the question of identity – is posed, there the question of power is posed too, and consequently the distinction between friend and foe, and the option (or choice) regarding this distinction, become unavoidable. That is why the thesis seems plausible that the spectrum of the social relation becomes (or is) occupied and shaped by concrete subjects in accordance with which way, to what extent, and with what intensity these subjects pose the question of identity in relation to themselves and to other subjects. Between both poles of the spectrum, indeed for long stretches (or to a large extent), namely, in very many social relations, the question of identity is not posed directly and openly – not for instance because the question of identity does not exist, but because it can, against the background of already solidified (consolidated or stabilised) private or public power relations (or circumstances of power), be left aside, in fact even must be left aside. If the question of identity is to be posed explicitly and uncompromisingly, the social relation must be driven to one of both poles of the spectrum: (extreme) enmity is the absolute negation of the identity of the Other up to its

intellectual(-spiritual) and physical annihilation, (extreme) friendship is the absolute affirmation of the identity of the Other up to intellectual(-spiritual) and physical self-sacrifice. In total enmity, the identity wants total recognition for itself; in total friendship, total recognition is given to another [identity (person and or group)]. Yet in both cases, and regardless of reverse(d) (or contrary) signs (i.e. symbolism), the question of identity as a question of recognition, i.e. as a question of power, remains all along the line decisive. Regarding the question of identity's weight, the observers of human things (i.e. affairs), incidentally, were clear since ancient times. Friendship, according to Aristotle, is based, on the one hand, on the common option (or choice) with regard to friends and foes; on the other hand, on the readiness (or willingness) of both sides to recognise and to confirm each and every respective Other, precisely in regard to the activities in relation to which the said Other would like to most of all distinguish himself or itself⁶⁷. And Cicero praised Scipio's efforts (or troubles) in treating himself as an equal in friendship with the inferior person, since Scipio knew how annoying friendship becomes for him who sees himself always and everywhere surpassed, or believes he is despised, by his friend⁶⁸.

The basic misunderstanding that friendship and enmity amongst socially living humans (would) spring straight from feelings or impulsive (drive(urge)-like) inclinations like love and hate (hatred), is apparently indispensable in terms of the economy (i.e. careful management or sparing use) of thought, and therefore continues to flourish, notwithstanding the rejection of the anthropology of drives (urges). The said fundamental misunderstanding is accompanied by a series of other,

⁶⁷ *Rhetorik*, 1381a 8-9, 15-17; 1381b 10-14.

⁶⁸ *Laelius de amicitia*, 20, 69 – 21, 72. The more recent social-psychological literature about motivation in friendship (and enmity) will be evaluated in the 3rd volume of this work during the detailed discussion of the problem of identity.

in terms of the economy (i.e. careful management or sparing use) of thought (and socially) expedient (or convenient) errors, which must still be discussed in this section. The not smallest amongst them establishes (manufactures or restores) between friendship and enmity on the one hand, and sociality and successful socialisation or unsociality and deficient socialisation on the other hand, a more or less close connection. It was explained elsewhere why sociality and socialisation are not normative concepts, that is, why they cannot prejudge the “good” or “bad” social behaviour of the individual⁶⁹. From the social nature of man, it can only be concluded (inferred) that specifically human friendly or inimical acts must take place in society, that society neither comes into being out of nothing through friendship, nor goes to pieces through enmity, but simply constitutes the field inside of which friendship and enmity are acted out (unfold or take place). Ginsberg enunciated a great truth when he opined that it is not sociality in itself, which can in fact also be observed in many other animals even in complex forms, which distinguishes man in a specific way, but rather his ability (faculty, capacity or powers) to press (brace himself) against (i.e. oppose or resist) the will of the generality (i.e. the (whole) commonalty (community) or general public)⁷⁰. That then again does not necessarily mean that the foe of society, i.e. of dominant norms, or the foe of other humans, is badly or deficiently socialised. Two complementary considerations prove it. Altruistic behaviour must absolutely seek conflict and enmity, when he for whom altruistic behaviour is meant, is threatened by humans; that is why it has meaning and (continued) existence only in a world in which enmity can be so extreme that for the protection of the friend (in respect of the individual or of the collective) under certain circumstances, the

⁶⁹ See Ch. II, Sec. 3B, above.

⁷⁰ *Sociology*, p. 120.

acceptance of extreme dangers (or risks), that is, self-sacrifice appears to be necessary. On the other hand, the cultivation (or fostering) of sociality is no indication of a friendly cast of mind (mindset, mentality) or intention. The e.g. dependence of the vain person on the praise of other people, for whom otherwise they are indifferent, or simply angst (fear) before loneliness, even with the complete maintenance of (or keeping to) socially sanctioned manners, can motivate the closest contact with the world, which in the disappointment (or frustration) of expectations easily turns into aggressivity and enmity⁷¹.

The latter example implies that the search for, or the existence of, nearness (proximity) and intimacy (i.e. familiarity) between social actors is just as neutral vis-à-vis friendship and enmity as the sociality and socialisation of man. Given the great variety of phenomena, which the social-ontological concept of friendship encompasses, one cannot say that personal nearness (proximity) and intimacy (i.e. familiarity) belong to it without exception and by definition. Personal nearness and intimacy indeed characterise several important forms of friendship, but – and this is important here – they constitute only a concomitant of friendship under certain circumstances, not a guarantee of their longer duration or greater steadiness (i.e. stability) in comparison to friendly relations, which for instance are based on (self-)interest and personal distance. Under other

⁷¹ Two of Chamfort's sentences elegantly conceptualise these aspects of human sociality and socialisation: «Les misérables motifs qui font que l'on recherche un homme ou qu'on le considère, sont transparents et ne peuvent tromper qu'on sot, ni flatter qu'un homme ridiculement vain» [“the miserable motives which make one search for a man or take him into consideration, are transparent, and can neither deceive but a fool, nor flatter someone but the ridiculously vain man”]. And: «La faiblesse de caractère ou le défaut d'idées, en un mot tout ce qui peut nous empêcher de vivre avec nous-mêmes, sont les choses qui préservent beaucoup de gens de la misanthropie» [“weakness of character or the lack of ideas, in a word, all those things that can prevent us from living with ourselves [alone], are the things which preserve (i.e. protect) many people from misanthropy”] (*Maximes*, pp. 235, 111). The sociologist thinks just like that: “... the self-satisfied (smug or complacent) [person]... flees from loneliness, because he draws strength and comfort only from the reflection of the I (Ego) in the acclaim (or applause) and the admiration of others” (v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 64; here the author turns against the frequent confusion of “separation (or isolation)” and “egoism”).

circumstances, the opposite of that can be the case. Personal nearness (proximity) and intimacy do not only make, because of constant being with one another (or co-existence), friction(s) and conflict(s) more probable; above all, they intensify the subject's participation in the relation, claims or sensitivities correspondingly increase, and the feeling of being betrayed arises more easily and more vehemently. One does not have to search far and wide for examples of the coming into being of bitter enmity from [situations of] previously being close to one another: families have their internal vendettas, religions above all persecute their heretics, political movements never forgive their renegades, and peoples know of nasty civil wars⁷². These observations are not at all supposed to mean that personal nearness (proximity) and intimacy must give rise to sharp conflict(s), but only that a conflict, which comes into being from personal nearness and intimacy, can be possibly much sharper than other conflict(s). All possibilities of the social relation are, both in regard to familiarity as well as in regard to strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity), open: this is, in short, the meaning of the thesis that friendship and enmity are neutral towards such factors. Far from determining friendship and enmity, intimacy and familiarity have to be able to be determined by friendship and enmity. Because in the course of enmity, strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity) comes from the old familiarity, whereas earlier strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity) gives way to a growing interest in the constitution (composition or nature), that is, in the mode of acting and the possibilities of the foe.

We remarked elsewhere that friendship and enmity are just as indifferent towards relations (conditions or circumstances) of equality and of supra-

⁷² Simmel highlighted this point very nicely, *Soziologie*, esp. p. 205ff.; cf. the commentary on Simmel by Coser, *Theorie*, pp. 71ff., 78ff..

ordination or subordination⁷³. The one-sided consideration of one amongst a number of possibilities led Bacon here to the conviction that friendship is to be expected in a community of fate (i.e. people with a common destiny) of “superior and inferior” people rather than amongst equals⁷⁴. With that, Bacon continued also in this field his polemic against the ancient-Aristotelian tradition, which had declared the equality of partners, at least in virtue and pure (sincere or honourable) cast of mind as the presupposition of genuine friendship. Following pre-Socratic (cosmological) perceptions, according to which Same (Equal or Like) is harmonised with Same (Equal or Like)⁷⁵, Plato took as the basis in his investigation of friendship, the criterion of sameness (equality or likeness) or unsameness (inequality or unlikeness), and concluded that “true” friendship is possible only amongst equals (i.e. people who are the same or alike), that only the good (i.e. good people) can, nevertheless, be equal (the same or alike) as between one another, since the bad (i.e. bad or evil people), driven by a thousand contradictory desires, are not even equal to (the same as or like) themselves; amongst these people who are bad, friendship therefore would be out of the question; again, amongst unequals (i.e. those who are not the same or alike), who are dependent upon one another for the remedying of one’s own each and every respective deficiency, only a friendship based on considerations of usefulness (utility or expedience), and which is hence unstable, is possible⁷⁶. Aristotle in principle approved of all three limbs of this line of thought: “true” or “perfect (complete or absolute)” friendship, as he expressed it, can flourish in regard to virtue only amongst equals (i.e. people who are the same or alike); unstable bad people are, anyway,

⁷³ See Sec. 1B in this chapter.

⁷⁴ *Essays*, XLVIII (“Of Followers and Friends”).

⁷⁵ Thus, e.g. Empedocles (in Theophrastus), in Diels-Kranz, I, p. 303.

⁷⁶ The pertinent passages: *Lysis*, 214b – 215e; *Nomoi*, 837ab.

incapable of friendship, and utility (benefit, profit, or advantage) is the deciding factor in regard to unequal (dissimilar or un(a)like) or opposed characters⁷⁷. The inclusion of the friendship of usefulness (utility or expedience) in the genus “friendship”, as begrudging as it may seem, took the fact into account that a strong current of Greek thought had baldly elevated self-interest to the *raison d'être* of friendship⁷⁸. Between the utilitarian and the ethical concept(ual plan) of friendship, mediating (i.e. intermediary) perceptions made their presence felt with a different and often changing weighting of the conceptual components⁷⁹, so that the definitive inventory since then of the basic positions in this field soon became apparent in outline.

For the dissemination of the mediating (i.e. intermediary) perceptions, one can first of all remark that they correspond to a collective and individual need determined by the ambivalent nature (essence, substance or texture) of human culture, fusing “utilitarian” or “egoistical” points of view with “ethical” and “altruistic” points of view up to the point of unrecognisableness (i.e. beyond recognition), with the consequence that the available room to move of action in all directions is extended, and moreover, movement thereafter becomes more flexible; a determination (i.e. definition) of friendship on the basis of “reciprocity (mutuality)” or of “reciprocal (mutual) assistance” offers e.g. a useful – and elegant – way out of the dilemma between the, in practice, not precisely very promising expectation that friendship is to be attained through virtue, and

⁷⁷ See above all *Nikomachische Ethik* [= *Nicomachean Ethics*], 1156b 7, 1159b 7–15.

⁷⁸ Thus, the Sophists, but e.g. Democritus too, who summoned the concept of (self-)interest in order to loosen the primeval bond of friendship with affinity (or relationship), and put in the place of sameness (equality, likeness, resemblance or similarity) (ὁμοιότης), the same (equal or like) cast of mind (mindset or mentality) [concord (i.e. like or similar thinking)] (ὁμοοφροσύνη), which obviously (also) concerns the content of (self-)interest on both sides (see. Fr. 107 and 186, in Diels-Kranz, II, pp. 164, 183). The argumentation of ancient rhetoric is marked (or influenced) in many ways by the utilitarian Common Sense of everyday life (humans need one another etc.), see in relation to that, Fraisse, *Philia*, p. 107ff..

⁷⁹ In relation to that, Dirlmeier, ΦΙΛΟΣ, esp. pp. 29ff., 42ff..

the socially compromising open confession of faith in the egoistical calculation of interests as the sole reason for seeking friends⁸⁰. However, not only is the logic of the mediating (intermediary) positions social-ontologically interesting. The ethical founding of friendship, as well as the criterion of equality (sameness or likeness), from the beginning ran into no less instructive difficulties. Thus, it was not entirely clear why someone, who has reached perfection (or completeness) through virtue, needs friends at all; according to the ancient perception, self-sufficiency (or contentedness) [autarchy] indeed makes up a constitutive feature of genuine perfection (or completeness)⁸¹. However, above all the exponents of the ideal of friendship had to vouch that it (i.e. the aforesaid perfection based on virtue) is a matter of the few⁸², that therefore its practical social relevance and hence also its meaning for the theoretical understanding of the construction of a society, is barely of any consequence. The criterion of equality (sameness or likeness) was, therefore, formulated with regard to ethical, not social-ontological question formulations (or central themes) and aims, especially since equality (sameness or likeness) was comprehended one-dimensionally and one-sidedly, i.e. it was confined to one single property (quality or characteristic) of a single kind of man. The being virtue-like (i.e. virtuous) of virtuous people of course remains itself the same, even if it is distributed amongst a number of individual bearers, however these bearers do not come into consideration in regard to their individuality lying on their this side of being virtue-like (i.e. virtuous), and the proof of their equality (sameness or likeness) amongst one another takes place, as it were, over their head(s) (i.e. without consulting

⁸⁰ Also preferring this elegant way out, is the otherwise unmistakably (or ostentatiously) illusionless author of the *Pantschatantra* (II, § 35 = II, p. 164): “Amongst men, assistance; in respect of game (i.e. wild animals hunted for food or sport) and birds, instinct; in respect of boys (and or morons), as good men teach, fear and gain (or profit); is the reason for friendship.”

⁸¹ Plato himself, in an aporetic manner (i.e. in a state of perplexity, puzzlement or doubt), pointed out this difficulty, *Lysis*, 215a; for the same difficulty in Aristotle, see Adkins, “Friendship”, p. 43ff.

⁸² See e.g. Cicero, *Laelius de amicitia*, pp. 6, 22.

them). When the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition of the ethically underpinned ideal of friendship, despite attempts at its revival in the early New Times⁸³, finally perished in the fire of the merciless psychology of the “moralistes” [“Moralists”], the question regarding equality (sameness or likeness) as the presupposition of friendship had to be posed considerably differently too. A late, but concise summary of this turn is found in Rivarol, who makes perfect friendship conditional upon the existence of “ideal circumstances”, and in the course of this emphatically stresses that he wants to point to the “circumstances” (relations [relations]) and not the “similarities” (ressemblances [resemblances, likenesses, similarities, similitudes]); the envious, desiring fame (or thirsting for glory) and impatient indeed also resemble one another, however, exactly because of that they could not enter into friendship with one another. Rivarol, moreover, points out the changing significance of character for friendship in accordance with the situation(s)⁸⁴.

The introduction of the variables “situation” and “circumstances” is no less pioneering than the relativisation of the criterion of “equality (sameness or likeness)” or “similarity” by way of its application also to “bad (evil) people”, which, nevertheless, seemed invalid to Plato and Aristotle. One therefore gains the starting point for fertile thoughts in regard to a social-ontological purpose only when one disregards ethical points of view. Inside of the total [conceptually a priori and independent of sensory experience, according to Kant] entirety (or totality) of the not virtue-like (i.e. virtuous) and not perfect, that is, of the “unsteady”, the equality (equalities or samenesses) or similarities amongst humans must likewise be unsteady and relative; precisely in this unsteadiness and

⁸³ In the philosophy of the Renaissance, but also in Montaigne e.g., *Essais*, I, p. 28 («De l'amitié» [“Of Friendship”]).

⁸⁴ *Sur l'amitié*, p. 312.

relativity of theirs, which, by the way, allows their interaction (or mutual influence) with “circumstances (conditions or relations)” and “situations”, the said equality (equalities or samenesses) or similarities can potentially constitute a factor in respect of the friendly or inimical shaping of human relations. In view of the unique personality of every human, equality (sameness) or similarity can apply to only an aspect of, or at most to some, character traits. That is why equality (sameness) or similarity must be ascertained via particularising and specifying questions (i.e. questions which particularise and specify what is being ascertained), which concern equality or similarity’s class (sex (or “gender”), vocation, social situation, education, values, etc.), extent and meaning for the actors [in question]⁸⁵. However, because of that, the problem is still not solved by far. Because the inventorying (or itemisation) of more or less strong similarities essentially remains a static undertaking, which hardly does justice to the dynamics and multi-dimensionality of a friendly (or inimical) relation. Similarities or dissimilarities may, in the very first phases of a relation, call forth favourable or unfavourable impressions and dispositions, nonetheless, in the course of the deepening and extension (expansion) of the relation the said similarities or dissimilarities lose their independent influence, i.e. they maintain their influence only in so far as they suit the logic and dynamics, which the relation has developed in the meantime. Just as it is simply false to deduce solidarity from similarity, and alienation (estrangement) from difference⁸⁶, so too it is at least one-sided to deny the effect of similarity and dissimilarity in a relation only because the role of conditions (circumstances or relations) of dependency is

⁸⁵ Cf. Kon, *Freundschaft*, p. 93.

⁸⁶ Thus, e.g. Torrance, *Estrangement*, esp. p. 119ff.. Tönnies and Durkheim’s attempt to describe two different kinds of solidarity, one of which is based on similarity, the other however on difference, fails, for its part, in respect of the fact that both kinds of solidarity in reality are characterised by a functioning combination of similarities and differences, and that the social actors’ perceptions (views or notions) on similarity and difference by no means coincide with those of the aforementioned theoreticians; see Sorokin, *Society*, pp. 133, 143ff..

regarded as the lone decisive role⁸⁷. The process, in which that effect of similarity and dissimilarity in a relation can fade away, encompasses, apart from the formation (or development) of dependencies – and regardless of whether similarities come into being or not – a series of other factors, which must be considered separately, no matter how much they go (i.e. fit) into the conditions (circumstances or relations) of dependency or even cause such conditions of dependency. Apart from the kind of interaction, the self-understanding of the subject, its (his) understanding of the other [person or other people], as well as its (his) expectations of the other [person or other people] in relation to himself, come into consideration here⁸⁸.

The broadly apprehended question of identity is therefore posed anew, and only insight into the plastic essence (or nature) and behaviour of identity inside of social interaction allows the fundamental meaninglessness of the attempt at understanding friendship and enmity [starting] from the similarity or dissimilarity of the actors to be discerned. Such an attempt is based on the notion that these actors would be bearers of more or less objectively existing and ascertainable similarities and dissimilarities, which also entail objective effects and consequently map out (prescribe or specify) their course in respect of the relation. But even if this holds true, it is only of secondary importance. The approaching one another (or drawing near) of two subjects does not in the least take root in the comparison on both sides of two ready (or mature) and definitive characters with each other, for the finding out of similarities and dissimilarities, which are then supposed to direct practical behaviour. Rather, identity adapts itself to every new relation anew and dynamically, i.e. identity binds its decision to appear unyielding (inflexible) or flexible,

⁸⁷ Thus, Lewin, *Lösung*, p. 128, cf. p. 114ff..

⁸⁸ Murstein, "Critique", p. 14..

to emphasise commonalities or differences, to the evaluation of existing possibilities in finding partial or full recognition, that is, to being able to partially or fully push through (i.e. achieve or succeed in) its material or ideational aims (or goals), without or against resistance; in the course of this, identity can – it does not have to – define its aims (goals) and its essence (or nature) anew, if it expects from this rearrangement greater recognition, and even if only at the lower tier (or level) of a relationship of dependency. The spectrum of options (or choices) of aggressive or defensive attitudes (stances or positionings) is broad, and there is no rule here which would be valid and binding for all identities. Against the background of this option (or choice), the question of similarity or dissimilarity is decided with regard to the Other – and this question is decided without consideration for any inventory put forward in advance. Similarity and dissimilarity, commonality and difference, do not exist abstractly and isolatedly, and they are also not looked at abstractly and isolatedly, but always in relation (or with reference) to an Other [= another person, other persons or group(s) – identity, identities], i.e. in accordance with the friendly or inimical turn which the relation takes vis-à-vis him (them or it). If both sides share the feeling that they must consolidate their friendship by means of reference to the similarities of their essence (or nature), then they will emphasise or exaggerate the actually existing similarities and, if need be, invent or create similarities not existing; conversely, foes will withhold (hide or hush up) or deny actually existing similarities between them, and will bring about differences. Friendship can tend, in relation to that, towards ignoring dissimilarities; on the other hand, objective similarities are for friendship of such little importance constitutively, that the only common denominator of a friendship, even of a friendship tested in practice, can be enmity against a third party. In general, similarities and commonalities

are asserted on both sides only when every individual side expects from them a confirmation of one's own identity; the one-sided stressing of similarities and commonalities serves aggressive or defensive goals (ends) (i.e. either the superior [side] legitimises thereby its right to put aside (i.e. abolish) the independence or difference of the inferior [side], or, the inferior [side] thereby reminds the superior of its duties, when it behaves "like a stranger (alien or foreigner)" to this inferior side). The element, in which similarity is supposed to take root on each and every respective occasion, is then again assessed in principle bearing in mind similarity's great or small effect(s) on the question of recognition; A shares with B central and, found on both sides to be important, ethical and world-theoretical convictions; nevertheless, he [A] cannot be B's friend, since he knows that B regards him as a ridiculous person. The frequent pointing out of objectively existing similarities between foes as the justification for the recommendation to them to bury the hatchet [and become friends] overlooks therefore the reasons for enmity, and unintentionally proves that friendship and enmity hardly depend on such things. A minimum of similarities and commonalities between foes appears to be, incidentally, indispensable, since the totally alien (strange or foreign) is simply unimaginable and hence uninteresting; that is why a mixture of similarity and difference (or discrepancy) characterises enmity no less than other social relations⁸⁹. Against the background of the widest-ranging commonality of qualities, one single difference (or variance) can, by the way, when it has come to enmity anyhow, stand out and disturb even more than is otherwise usual, so that the said difference attracts the entire attention of the sides concerned and correspondingly blows up (or swells out, i.e. becomes magnified or exaggerated)⁹⁰. If

⁸⁹ According to an observation by Cooley, *Human Nature*, p. 267ff..

⁹⁰ Cf. Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 205ff., 511ff..

recognition in the desired form is lacking or is lost, then great similarities contribute to the heightening (aggravation or intensification) of conflict (family conflict and civil war).

In another place we explained that, and why, the ideational aspect of the enmity of two subjects vis-à-vis each other necessarily makes up an ensemble (i.e. whole) of divided in common (i.e. shared) thought structures and opposed (contrary or conflicting) content(s)⁹¹. In the field of action, common aims (or goals) guarantee friendship just as little as similarity of character traits or form-related (i.e. formal) commonalities in the way of thinking; they of course do not constitute any sufficient reason for friendship. Common (i.e. mutual) hatred for a subject or object can bring friendship into being, and conversely, common (i.e. mutual) love for a subject or object can generate enmity between two sides when each of them wants to have the beloved subject or object exclusively for itself. No different is the case regarding common practical aims (or goals). Commonality brings about (or establishes) friendship here when the aim (or goal) is supposed to be imposed against a third party or demanded from a third party; commonality very likely sows enmity when the attaining of the common aim (goal) by the one side makes this aim's attaining by the other side either impossible or else worthless. That is why friendship does not result from the commonality of the setting of the aim (goal) in itself, but from the agreement over which rank each (or every) side occupies in the pursuance of the common aim (goal), and what advantages will be drawn from the common aim's realisation. If no agreement is reached in this regard, then exactly as a result of the commonality of the aim, conflict will necessarily be heightened (increased or intensified), and indeed for the very same reason for which

⁹¹ Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, pp. 67ff., 71ff..

the butcher does not become the foe of the fruiterer across from him, but the foe of the butcher next door⁹². Friendship and co-operation can of course also be built upon the commonality of aims (goals), however, this precisely proves that what matters is not that commonality in itself, but the kind of social relation which functions as a parameter in relation to the element of the common aim (goal). Depending on whether both sides' common aim (goal) is attained without the going against (i.e. opposition, resistance or rejection) of one [side], or, by one side at the expense of the other side, different positions in the spectrum of the social relation are occupied. Provided at the same time that it is a matter of enmity, in the course of this enmity's unfolding a change in character appears to be possible. Conflict, which came into being from the clash of interests, despite in principle the same ratings (i.e. evaluations), is then transformed through purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) rationalisations into a genuine or artificial, at any rate in practice, motivating value conflict (i.e. conflict of values)⁹³.

In the most direct – not necessarily in the most probable – way, enmity comes into being when the value scale (i.e. scale of values) approved of by both sides jointly encourages, by virtue of its content, an in principle agonal (i.e. agonistic, conflictual or combative) attitude to life, e.g. martial (i.e. war(-like)) virtues are put completely on top of all other virtues. In this case, the actors do not have to outwit through rationalisations the dominant (dominating or ruling) social ethics in order

⁹² Hesiod already knew that: “The potter is the potter's foe and the bricklayer, the bricklayer's/The beggar is jealous of the beggar and the songster of the songster” (*Werke und Tage*, V. vv. 25-26; my (i.e. Kondylis's) translation) [cf. “And potter is angry with potter and craftsman with craftsman and beggar is jealous of beggar and minstrel of minstrel” (translated by Evelyn-White, Hugh G. (Hugh Gerard), 1884-1924); or, “Potter is potter's enemy, and craftsman is craftsman's rival; tramp is jealous of tramp, and singer of singer” (unknown translator)]. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorik*, 1388a. In a private letter to Michels, Max Weber formulated the same thought as follows: “the greatest clash of interests can go hand in hand with the complete identity (i.e. identicalness) of the forms of life (life forms) on both sides” (cited in Michels, *Soziologie*, p. 324).

⁹³ Cf., in relation to that, McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 67.

to legitimise and to practise enmity. Ethics and enmity can unconstrainedly accompany each other and seamlessly pass (blend or turn) into each other. Where a martial (i.e. war(-like)) ethic(s) does not ensure that, other ethical views undertake the task of this mediation (intervention or agency) – even such ethical views, which in principle disapprove of every enmity. The assumption that friendship is connected essentially to a superior moral attitude (stance or positioning), and on the other hand, enmity essentially to an inferior moral attitude or even quality, belongs, at any rate, to the same group of often purposeful (end(goal)-oriented or expedient) misunderstandings like the in principle coupling of love or similarity with friendship, and hate (hatred) or difference with enmity. Rightly, a classical social-psychological typology of the kinds of enmity names, alongside the elementary-animal kind and that coming into being in the course of social interaction via the mechanisms of sympathy and imagination, as third kind, “rational or ethical” enmity, which shares the rest of the (i.e. the other) features with the latter kind (i.e. the kind coming into being in the course of social interaction via...), but moreover invokes justice and conscience⁹⁴. This invocation can, in its own way, and on its own paths, lead to the same absolute heightening of inimical opposition (or contrasting) like other forms of enmity too. Because the summoning of supra-personal or impersonal values, if it does not serve merely as a means of negotiation (“my price is high, because I must betray my values”), indicates that no reconciliation can come into question at the personal level, whereas the readiness (or willingness) to die, if need be, not for personal interests is existent. A good conscience, which an ethically motivated altruistic commitment (effort or hard work) provides, lowers the inhibition

⁹⁴ Cooley, *Human Nature*, p. 271.

threshold of extreme enmity, and the fact that exactly to the extent that the actor believes in thrusting aside his personal interests, he is assessing the foe equally as the impersonal representative of ethically and humanly reprehensible principles or powers (forces), and correspondingly impersonally, yet all the more doggedly, combats the foe in question, has the same effect. This kind of extreme enmity, whose reverse side is the likewise extreme altruistic commitment (or effort) in favour of values and friends, was of course not legitimised by all philosophers and founders of religion, but indeed by all political collectives until today in the form of the differentiation between private and public foe. Accordingly, mere subjective hatred does not define the foe of the political collective, but consideration of the law⁹⁵; in the domain of manners, morals and customs, the foe may, in Hegel's words, be only a foe of the folk (i.e. people), hatred is "indifferentiated, free of all personality" and "death goes into the General, because it comes out of the General"⁹⁶. It must be added that the privilege of declaring an enmity, with full ethical-political backing, is claimed for themselves not only by already constituted polities through their established representatives, but also by groups, which have the opportunity or simply the ambition to advance to the position one day of the established representatives of the polity (e.g. parties (or opponents) in a civil war), or they appoint themselves entirely on their own authority, to speak in the name of the greater collective, even in the name of the whole of mankind. In general, collective mobilisation and collective cohesion seem to need "ethically" and "rationally" motivated enmity against disturbers of the peace and renegades: Aristotle already distinguished very perspicaciously (or astutely) between the irate enmity against certain persons and that enmity

⁹⁵ Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, XVI.

⁹⁶ *System der Sittlichkeit*, in: *Schriften zur Politik*, pp. 470, 471.

without anger, which applied to whole genera (i.e. types) of socially harmful individuals (e.g. thieves)⁹⁷.

There is not only an ethical-rational justification (and ethical-rational [conceptual] founding) of enmity, but also an enmity as ethical-rational praxis (i.e. practice). In all times and in all places, enmity was very often evaluated as an attitude (stance or positioning), which, far from necessarily entailing the (down-)fall (or lapse) of the reason and the soul of man into blind passion and ethical or practical irrationality, could serve for the formation (development or education) of man's personality and as touchstone of this formation (development or education). For antiquity, it was understood of itself e.g. that an ethical man is not someone who has no foes, but someone who appears "noble and just and truthful" as foe vis-à-vis foe⁹⁸. This applied as a maxim just as much to private as to public enmities, nonetheless, the latter seemed, especially in times of war, to be more suitable in promoting those practical virtues, which were in demand in times of peace⁹⁹. A precursor of modern sociology thought similarly, who not only was not capable of discerning any contradiction between enmity and the "most amiable qualities of our nature", but above all, looked upon collective enmity free of personal malicious behaviour or vile deeds as the birthplace of "passions of another sort", i.e. "generosity" and "courage"¹⁰⁰. The ascertainment hit upon by modern social scientists that the dichotomy of friendship and enmity does not coincide with that of the intellectual and the emotional [spheres]¹⁰¹, in actual fact constitutes an age-old knowledge, which was formulated in pragmatistical language as

⁹⁷ *Rhetorik*, 1382a 3-7.

⁹⁸ Plutarch, *Πῶς ἄν τις ἀπ' ἐχθρῶν ὠφελοῖτο* (de capienda ex inimicis utilitate) [how to profit (benefit) from one's foes (or, how one benefited from foes)], 91D.

⁹⁹ Aristotle, *Nikom. Ethik*, 1177b 6-7: "Practical virtues are activated in political or martial (i.e. war(-like)) activities" (my [i.e. Kondylis's] translation). Cf. Platon, *Protagoras*, 322b (the art of war(fare) as part of politics).

¹⁰⁰ Ferguson, *Essay*, I. 4, pp. 23ff., 24ff..

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Thurnwald, „Probleme der Fremdheit“, p. 29.

a request for a more thorough self-knowledge and a greater willingness to learn in the face of an inimical challenge (provocation or act of defiance). Plutarch by no means was alone in his conviction that foes recognise more clearly than friends our weaknesses; that is why they are more suited to urging (or driving) us on to vigilance and self-improvement¹⁰². In relation to the social-ontologically interesting commonplaces one can also count the just as widespread pragmatical fundamental principle that one should let oneself learn from one's foe¹⁰³. The same cool end (goal) (purposeful or expedient) rationality, which knows how to draw benefit[s] (utility, profit or advantage) from the observation of the foe, is however needed in practical dealings with this foe too. First, in the choice of friends and foes on the basis of a realistic assessment of their qualities (or characteristics) and (cap)abilities: because it is often the same qualities (or characteristics) and (cap)abilities which characterise the terrible (or frightful) foe and the precious friend, even though they are used in opposite (opposed or conflicting) directions as to aim¹⁰⁴. And then in overcoming (or coping with) the foe in battle, in which every gaining of the upper hand over blind hate (hatred) and recklessness (or daredevilry) [displayed] at the expense of the sober judgement of the situation and of the forces of the other side, can only provide advantages¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰² Πῶς ἄν τις ... [How to/How (some)one ...], 87 B-D, 90 A. La Rochefoucauld was more emphatic: the foe judges us more correctly than we ourselves («nos ennemis approchent plus de la vérité dans les jugements qu'ils font de nous que nous n'approchons nous mêmes» [“our foes approach the truth in the judgements they make of us more than us who do not approach truth ourselves”]), *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 458. Regarding the foe as an incentive (spur or motivation), see Halifax, “Miscellaneous Thoughts” (*Works*, p. 244): “Nothing could more contribute to make a man wise than to have always an enemy in his view.” More vividly Saint-Exupéry: «Il te faut l'ennemi pour danser.» [“You need an enemy to dance.”] (*Citadelle*, p. 196ff.).

¹⁰³ Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, I, 15; Ovid: “fas est et ab hoste doceri” [“right it is to be taught even by the enemy”] (*Metamorph.* 4, 428); Schiller: “The friend shows me what I can, the foe teaches me what I should” (*Epigramme*, „Freund und Feind“) Schiller, NA Bd. 1, p. 288.

¹⁰⁴ Thucydides (VI, 92, 5 [= «εἰ πολέμιός γε ὦν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἂν φίλος ὦν ἰκανῶς ὠφελοίην»]) puts the following “quoted by everyone words” into Alcibiades's mouth: “if I, as foe, have inflicted upon you great damage, then I could benefit you as a friend” (my [i.e. Kondylis's] translation).

¹⁰⁵ Clausewitz in exactly this sense described the substitution of the “inimical feeling” with the end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) “inimical intention” in war; see in relation to that, my

These comments do not imply an idealisation of enmity or every enmity. They only call to mind that ethics and rationality very often make up an aspect of the relation between foes, just as in many other cases unrestrained affectivity can lead to inimical action. But the situation is no different as regards friendship, which can just as much be under the influence of ethics and rationality as affect-laden blindness (or delusion) vis-à-vis situations and characters. From that, we can only conclude the neutrality of ethical and psychological factors with regard to friendship and enmity, since all these factors can accompany, in variable mixings (mixtures or blends) and combinations, both inimical as well as friendly attitudes (stances or positionings). If a more or less precise correlation of feelings, drives (urges or impulses), character traits etc. with friendship and enmity could be reached (or managed), then friendship and enmity could be foreseen and reckoned in regard to their sequence (or course). That, however, will never be done (i.e. be feasible), since the social relation is never absorbed by (or never comes undone in) that which the participants in the said social relation feel, or what they are as persons¹⁰⁶. Just like the one who stands across from precisely an attacking foe and must defend himself as best he can, the foe's motives, at least for the time being, are indifferent¹⁰⁷, so too the social-ontological description of the spectrum of the social relation on a much broader basis must disregard psychological and ethical questions in respect of motivation – however with that, the said social-ontological description of the spectrum of the social relation on a very broad basis also rejects the hope of making the movements of actors inside of (within) this spectrum foreseeable

comments in *Theorie des Krieges (Theory of War)*, esp. pp. 29ff., 36ff.. The author of the *Pantschatantra* also saw [things] correctly here: “whoever, not knowing his own strength, nor that [strength] of the foe, rushes hot-headedly into battle, goes under” (I, § 266 = I, 66).

¹⁰⁶ Watzlawick, *Kommunikation*, p. 145.

¹⁰⁷ “Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat? [“Deceit, or valour, who seeks them in regard to the foe?”], or, “Who will ask of a foe whether he was defeated (or succeeded) by strategy or valour?”], Virgil, *Aeneis* (= *Aeneid*), II, v. 390.

(predictable) and ponderable, for instance, in the interest[s] of the permanent regulation of conflict. Whoever in relation to that collects recipes (prescriptions) and promises (or hopes for) such progress from the reshaping of certain variables in regard to circumstances (and conditions) or characters, is wrong. Here, as everywhere in the social, there are only causalities, on the basis of which one can explain the already having become (i.e. events or happenings which have come to pass), not laws by means of whose handling one can predetermine all future cases.

3. The continuity in the spectrum of the social relation

A. The meaning and the aetiology of continuity

The polarity in the spectrum of the social relation does not exist merely at the social-ontological level of description as the contradistinction of two ideal types or even archetypes, which indeed facilitate understanding and render good orientation services, yet ultimately lack tangible reality. On the contrary, this polarity is real in the full sense of the word; it is crystallised, namely, in acts (or actions), which are for all humans without exception, recognisable as extreme expressions (or manifestations) of friendship or enmity. In this respect, the said polarity does not belong to those «structures oppositionnelles» [“oppositional structures”], which are frequently regarded as the original and permanent forms within which human thought must move¹⁰⁸, and towards whose main (or connecting)

¹⁰⁸ See e.g. Blanche, *Structures intellectuelles*, esp. p. 15ff..

thread (or theme) this polarity is, incidentally, already oriented at the earliest (i.e. youngest) age¹⁰⁹. The polarity in the social relation's spectrum belongs just as little to the "binary oppositions", which are supposed to assist linguists in the classification of language (i.e. linguistic) features¹¹⁰, or to the antithetical pairs of concepts and or of principles, which in their abstract clarity or evidence (i.e. evident nature or obviousness), above all however in their symbol-bearing (i.e. highly symbolic) nature, have already constituted the basis of cosmological, religious etc. schematisations¹¹¹. Polarities or binary constructs like Male – Female, Holy – Profane, Vowel – Consonant, divide the entirety of the phenomena (or manifestations) coming into question into two groups or classes, so that the sum total of the existing quantities is absorbed by (or fits into) two qualities for those who know the moderations (i.e. restraints), of themselves, or mediations (interventions or agencies) between one another, more likely as forms of degeneracy. On the other hand, the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation means two accurately determinable (or definable) phenomena, which quantitatively both inside the total extent (scope or range) of the spectrum, as well as with regard to their statistical frequency, certainly are not in themselves a small minority. Admittedly, one can also talk of friendship and enmity in a loose sense in order to, with that, comprehensively describe both halves of the spectrum of the social relation. However, the polarity really comes into play only where man's mortality is actualised in the killing of the Other or in self-sacrifice.

This widespread loose talk of friendship and enmity, which can refer to very different, extremely turbulent or quite harmless phenomena (or

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. Wallon, *Les origines*, I, pp. 41, 67.

¹¹⁰ Jacobson-Halle, *Fundamentals*, p. 29ff..

¹¹¹ Lloyd, *Polarity*, esp. pp. 66, 80 (on the function of these polarities in the construction of ancient cosmologies, see esp. pp. 15ff., 94ff.); cf. R. Needham (ed.), *Right and Left*.

manifestations), constitutes an excellent indication of the fact that the consciousness of socially living humans imagines (or (re)presents) the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation in the closest interrelation with its polarity. And rightly so. As we have said, it would be fundamentally wrong to divide the human world in the same polarising sense into friends and foes, just as one would could divide it for instance into male and female beings (or creatures). On the other hand, the social relations, which lie between both poles of the spectrum, do not act (or behave) in the least towards those social relations which characterise both the poles, as one could presume on the basis of the quantitative proportion (i.e. ratio) between them. The former (i.e. social relations between the spectrum's poles) are not, already because of their overwhelming quantity, autonomous in their structure and unfolding (or development), but the social-ontological quality of the latter [poles] more or less penetrate their (i.e. the social relations between and not at the spectrum's poles') quality. In this respect, without the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation, there can be no continuity. However, the polarity cannot, for its part, in itself constitute any spectrum; i.e. a social life, which would exclusively revolve around both poles of the spectrum of the social relation, is not merely incompatible with the experience(s) of the human race until today, but, as we want to explain later in this section, absolutely inconceivable. The spectrum of the social relation must, accordingly, be comprehended as a continuum of polarity and continuity, as the language (speech or linguistic) usage itself suggests, since the spectrum of the social relation (as a continuum of polarity and continuity) under "friendship" and "enmity", which in themselves point to a polarity, subsumes extremely varied social relations, which through their arrangement (order or formation) and their conceptual and objective (factual) transition into one another, create a gapless (seamless or

complete) continuity¹¹². But the dominant (or prevailing) language usage likewise hits upon the right thing (i.e. hits the nail on the head) when it names the objective reasons from which the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation must be apprehended with regard to its polarity. For the internal differentiation of the concepts of “friendship” and “enmity”, so that they can stretch over each side’s own half of the spectrum and cover both halves of the spectrum together in their entirety, the dominant language usage makes use of, namely, criteria which appear in pure culture (i.e. in an unadulterated or pure form) only at both poles of the spectrum. Everyone knows and says that friendship is judged according to primarily the presumed degree of its unselfishness, and correspondingly is experienced or used (or implemented) in dealing(s) (contact or relations) with others; that would be incomprehensible if the borderline case of self-sacrifice for one’s friend did not have a hold on (or haunt) one’s mind, – no matter what one regards as self-sacrifice’s practical relevance on each and every respective occasion. And everyone knows and says it too, that the course and character of enmity to a decisive extent are dependent on how, in the process, one deals with violence, i.e. the possibility of killing; with reference to the latter, that is, to whether someone is someone’s “death (i.e. mortal) foe” or not, whether someone “wishes him death” or not, enmities are commonly classified as harmless or serious, transient or insurmountable. Even pacifists, who want to exclude the use of force (violence) from competition (rivalry) amongst humans or else substitute this use of force (violence) all along the line with a sportsmanlike-playful contest, likewise argue with the

¹¹² Linguistically, it is therefore exactly the same for the terms “friendship” and “enmity” as with “love” and “hate (hatred)”, in relation to which Voltaire remarked quite rightly: «On est obligé de désigner sous le nom général d'amour et de haine mille amours et mille haines toutes différentes.» [“One is obliged to designate under the general name of love and hatred (hate), a thousand totally different loves and a thousand totally different hatreds.”] (*Dictionnaire philosophique*, art. «Langues», in: *Oeuvres Complètes*, XIX, p. 564).

borderline case of violent killing in mind; this violent killing remains the obligatory point of reference, regardless of whether the annihilation of the foe or the eradication of evil and hate (hatred) is called for.

The objective social-ontological insight that precisely the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation can be best apprehended from the perspective of the polarity of friendship and enmity, exhibits therefore the added advantage of belonging to the most familiar (or prevalent) commonplaces of the social consciousness of humans or of the practical social knowledge of all times and lands. Scientifically looked at, the said insight offers the most comprehensive, and at the same time, most flexible, in actual fact the only conceivable framework of putting things in order (or of classification) of all historically attested social relations between humans, which moreover has two incomparable methodical (i.e. methodological) advantages. One of these methodological advantages was hinted at in the previous section, and consists in the possibility of carrying out the building (construction, setting up or composition) of the spectrum of the social relation, regardless of the motivation[s] or the anthropologically understood quality of the actors. If transferred to the domain of sociology and of history, this means that the social and historical causal factors which the researcher on each and every respective occasion would like to summon in order to explain the behaviour of the collective or individual subjects in question, could equally remain (or be) disregarded. The description of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity retains, in other words, its validity irrespective of whether at the apex of each and every respective assumed hierarchy of the factors causally having an effect in society and history are “economic” or “spiritual(-intellectual)” or “biological” causes. It remains the task (or duty) of research into the concrete case to

ascertain, apart from the motivation[s] of the actors, the effect (impact or influence) and hierarchy of such factors. The other great advantage of the option (i.e. choice) in favour of the arrangement (order or formation) of social relations around (i.e. between) the axes of friendship and enmity lies in the fact that, in this way, the concept of society is concretised a limine [from the beginning]. Society is, according to that, not the abstract sum of social relations otherwise not defined in greater detail, but it is co-extensive with the spectrum of the social relation in its equally original (equiprimordial) polarity and continuity, in its constant changing (or alternation) of the predominant aspect in the said spectrum, and not least of all in the incessant interchange of the actors' places in the spectrum. The co-extensity of society with the spectrum of the social relation defined in this way, explains the in principle openness of the historical movement of society. All attempts or wishes with regard to channelling this movement into certain paths must hence end up in the attempt or the wish to pare down (i.e. curtail) the spectrum of the social relation to this or that side, and with the lifting (i.e. abolition) of the said spectrum's polarity as well as its continuity, to make (establish or create) the spectrum out of the world (i.e. to make the spectrum vanish from the world) at least by one half (scientifically legitimate speculation over the possible future social-historical shaping of the spectrum is of course another story). This can never succeed because friendship and enmity occupy places demonstrably separate from one another only in the *social-ontological description* of the spectrum of the social relation. However, friendship and enmity's bearers, (who and) which are what matters in concreto [i.e. in a concrete sense; concretely; in the concrete or specific situation], have no fixed (stable or settled) social-historical place; that is why friendship and enmity's bearers cannot be unambiguously pinpointed

in *social-historical reality*, in order then that they be fixed in their place, or be distanced (or removed) from their place, as wished or desired.

The latter remarks allow one to already guess the reasons for which the social-ontological reconstruction of the spectrum of the social relation suggested here, despite its methodical (i.e. methodological) and objective advantages, is not approved of by most [people, scholars, academics, social “scientists” et al.]. One reads in a nonsensical manner the formula (or wording) “friend-foe-relation” in such a way, as if it only contains the word “foe” – and the moral matter of concern consists exactly in that the spectrum of the social relation be shortened (i.e. curtailed or cut) around (or at) enmity’s pole or even around (or at) enmity’s half. But the cleansing (or purging) of the terminology and of the conceptuality for the purpose of the driving out or influencing of realities is a pure conjuring trick (wizardry) and pure animism. It does not change in the slightest the fact that since time immemorial, every day and every hour somewhere in the world, and because of a great variety of motives, humans die by the hand of humans, and still more humans must reckon with this possibility as perpetrators and as victims. It is a matter here of a banality, not of a surprising (unexpected) discovery or even a diabolical invention – not of a thesis, which first must be proved, but of an incontrovertible fact, from which we must start. Whoever reacts to the ascertainment of this banality like Pavlov’s conditioned dog by barking wildly upon hearing the word “enmity”, does not render good service to the knowledge of human affairs. Because the shortening (curtailment, reduction or cutting) of the spectrum of the social relation around (or at) the pole or around (or at) the half “enmity” would at the same moment rob the pole or half “friendship” of every concrete *social* meaning; “friendship” would simply, *as* friendship, have no specific character in a social world in which enmity

would be unknown and even inconceivable. Friendship can thus be safeguarded social-ontologically only from the perspective of the polarity and the continuity of the spectrum of the social relation. The formula (or wording) “friend-foe-relation”, far from containing only the concept “foe”, or far from pushing aside by means of the concept “foe”, the concept “friend”, highlights the unity of the social, and consequently the entirely indispensable (and inseparable) role of friendship within this unity. Precisely from the proper (i.e. objectively and factually correct) aetiology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation, does the meaninglessness (or absurdity) of a way of looking at social life as a “war of all against all” follow. On that, we still have quite a bit to say later in this section.

Before we turn to that aetiology, three structural features must be discussed, whose joint existence in friendship and enmity constitutes the fundamental precondition for the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation. As the first structural feature, we shall name the reciprocal (mutual or bilateral) symmetry of the said continuity’s internal structure. Like we have said, the terms “friendship” and “enmity” contain, when they do not refer to just one pole, but one half of the spectrum, a quasi inexhaustible wealth of nuances and gradations. One can structure this wealth of nuances and gradations differently on each and every respective occasion, depending on whether one takes psychological, institutional or other criteria as one’s basis. But whatever the structuring may be, the scale of the friendships always is symmetrical with the scale of enmities, i.e. every grade (tier or stage) on the former scale corresponds to a more or less clearly recognisable grade (tier or stage) on the latter scale (as well as the other way around). An indifference point (i.e. point of indifference) between both scales appears in the shape (form) of mutual indifference

(apathy, unconcern or detachment), however, its presence in the spectrum of the social relation has only structural, not real value. Indifference (as apathy, unconcern or detachment) is social-ontologically irrelevant, since no society can be based (or founded) on it; moreover, it can only take place where the social framework is otherwise ready (or available) through already existing friendships and enmities. The social relations around the centre of the spectrum, in regard to which the symmetry rests on the loose, on both sides, character of the nearness (proximity) and of the distance, are not to be confused with indifference. Such symmetry exists for instance between impersonally regulated co-operation and impersonally regulated competition (rivalry), between one-off mutual assistance amongst people unknown to each other, and coincidental (accidental, chance, or random) friction without consequences, between non-binding adaptation and harmless opposition. One is supposed to think that the greater nearness (proximity) of these relations to one another in the spectrum of the social relation, as this appears at the level of description (or (re)presentation), means quicker and easier transition possibilities from one to the other. The sudden change (or transition) from the pole of unconditional friendship to that of absolute enmity can in reality be as fast as lightning, like every other sudden change (or transition) too. In general, the symmetry of two relations vis-à-vis each other in the spectrum of the social relation, or on both scales of friendship and of enmity, does not in the least mean that detachment from one relation would have to entail accession to the symmetrically opposite relation. Just as the sudden change (or transition) from the pole of friendship does not require going through all of the intermediate stages (stop(over)s or stations) in the spectrum of social relation, so too can one go from any position to any other position of this spectrum without consideration for structural symmetries.

Until now, we have talked about symmetries in regard to intensity. Symmetries in extensity constitute the second common structural feature of friendship and enmity. In both friendship and enmity, the extensity of the relation can make up a small, easily interchangeable part of the personal and social interests of actors, or else this extensity of the relation totally engrosses the actors, representing their life content and life purpose (i.e. content and purpose in life). It is known that the thus understood¹¹³ extensity of a friendly or inimical social relation has nothing to do with any objectively existing hierarchy of values and of tastes; what for someone is the future of mankind (i.e. Humanity), can be for someone else the bakerwoman from next door; and whereas someone, who at the level of values puts mankind (i.e. Humanity) and its felicitous future first, in practice lives for his bank account, someone else can kill or die for the bakerwoman from next door. The extensity of the social relation concerning subjective mutuality (or reciprocity) is just as little symmetrical with regard to values and goals (ends): the same relation, whether friendly or inimical, can have a very different extensity, that is, a very different personal and social value for each of both partners of the relation. The symmetry in the extensity of the social relation exclusively concerns, therefore, the commonalities in the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of friendship and enmity, and means that both on the side of friendship as well as on that of enmity, the whole conceivable scale of the grades (or degrees) of extensity is to be found. Every grade (or degree) of extensity on the scale of enmities corresponds to such a grade (or degree) of extensity on the scale of friendships, as well as the other way around, so that form-relatedly (i.e. formally) and really closed parallel sequences (or orders) result. Nonetheless these are, as they are apprehended at the

¹¹³ See footnote 64 above; cf. Sorokin, *Society*, p. 96.

level of description ((re)presentation), not at all binding for the practical behaviour of subjects. Friendships and enmities can equally pass from every grade (degree) of extensity to every other grade (degree) of extensity. In this important respect, the intensity and extensity of the social relation behave identically, and through their really chameleonic ability at (and capacity for) transformation, through their often lightning-fast mutations, they characterise the epistemological status of social ontology¹¹⁴.

The third major structural commonality between friendship and enmity consists in the fact that the varied and diverse social relations summarised in these terms can unfold (or develop) both in the private as well as the public realm, both at the level of individuals as well as at the level of the collective – and indeed without having to change the said varied (and diverse) social relations' form-related (i.e. formal) structure and the logic of their unfolding (or development). The individual areas (realms or sectors) of the social differ therefore from one another not by way of the structural peculiarities of friendship and enmity in every one of these areas (realms or sectors), but through friendship and enmity's each and every respective content or object (subject matter). The form-related (i.e. formal) description of the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity applies therefore equally to all these areas (realms or sectors), and exactly as the ascertainments made just now on the symmetries in the intensity and the extensity of friendship and enmity, as well as on the possibility of the asymmetrical mutation of every social relation, apply to all areas (realms of sectors) of the social. The unification of the way of looking at the social achieved in this way leaves – in any case, at the social-ontological level and regardless of sociological

¹¹⁴ See Ch. II, Sec. 3A above.

ascertainments (conclusions, observations or findings) – the contrast between microstructures and macrostructures, microscopic and macroscopic analysis, behind. A genetic reconstruction of the fact of society by means of micro-analytically underpinned induction, can never succeed anyhow¹¹⁵, and the founders of formal sociology wrongly and unjustifiably wanted to give the impression that a necessary interrelation exists between the possibility of such a form-related (i.e. formal) reconstruction and the ascertainment of the form-related (i.e. formal) equality of the forms of the relation in all areas (realms or sectors) of the social¹¹⁶. However, this ascertainment implies only that the social relations of individuals or of collectives amongst themselves or with one another can be apprehended by means of the same morphology, and be subject to the same form-relatedly (i.e. formally) analysable, symmetrical or asymmetrical changes (or transformations) in regard to their extensity and intensity¹¹⁷. A particular methodical (i.e. methodological) advantage of the thus meant unification of the social lies in the fact that the unfolding (or development) of the social relation, as it is concretised in the shaping (formation or education) of the individuals, groups and parties allying (associating, combining) or competing with one another, can be followed in a number of fields simultaneously. Art and philosophy, the economy and politics, religion and science are constituted, split, and changed (or transformed) on the basis of the same dynamic(s) of association and dissociation. Neither hypostases-like and autonomous ideas nor substantially (i.e. in terms of substances) pre-given peoples and races, nor collective souls and spirits(-intellects), determine in all these seemingly heterogeneous fields the predominant

¹¹⁵ See Ch. II, Sec. 2Ce above.

¹¹⁶ Thus, e.g. Simmel, *Brücke*; v. Wiese, *Allg. Soziologie*, I, p. 212. Cf. footnote 18 and Ch. II, Sec. 3B.

¹¹⁷ About that, there are concrete reasons which have to do with the internal structure (or building) of collective constructs, and these concrete reasons will occupy us in the 2nd volume of this work.

constellations (or correlations) and the outcomes of becoming (or events), but constantly changing and constantly alternating concrete relations and groupings (group formations) of concrete humans, which on each and every respective occasion (want to) bindingly define what has to be regarded as an ideational hypostasis or a supra-personal, in fact supra-historical collective. A parallel analysis of the history of ideas, of social and political history, bearing in mind the polarity and continuity in the spectrum of the social relation, offers a unique key for the synthetical (i.e. synthesising) understanding of social phenomena¹¹⁸.

The structural symmetries and commonalities between friendship and enmity will occupy us once more in the phenomenological description of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation¹¹⁹. The said structural symmetries and commonalities' constitutive functioning for this continuity should already be taken as certain, in any case. But why must there be continuity at all? Why can continuity not keep to (or remain in a state of) polarity, why, that is, is social life, which would consist exclusively in extreme friendship, extreme enmity and the mutual alternation of both poles, not just historically unknown, but absolutely inconceivable? At first glance it might seem as if nothing would stand in the way of at least the founding of society on (at) the pole of extreme friendship. However, this is not the case. Because extreme friendship is, as we know, not simply more or less calculating mutuality (reciprocity), but unconditional altruism and self-sacrifice. If all individuals elevated this undiluted altruism to the guideline of one's own behaviour, then this ethically laudable decision would have highly paradoxical consequences. If everyone rated the well-being of the Other higher than one's own well-

¹¹⁸ Cf. Mannheim, „Die Bedeutung“; Kondylis, „Wissenschaft“.

¹¹⁹ See Sec. 3C in this chapter.

being, one's behaviour would have to be directed by the Other's wishes, which would bring into being a vicious circle: everyone would harbour, namely, merely the wish to do that which the Other wished; no side would define, in terms of content, its own wishes, and that is why none of the sides would pursue any aims too, since they would await the definition by the other side of the aims to be pursued; meanwhile, social life would flag (i.e. weaken) – for the same reason that two men would never step over a threshold if both absolutely insisted on allowing the other, on each and every respective occasion, right of way (or precedence)¹²⁰. This thought experiment retains its validity irrespective of what one may accept as motive for altruistic behaviour, whether one, that is, also even wants to put down this behaviour to egoistic motivating (or driving) forces or not. Altruistic behaviour is, notwithstanding its likely motivation[s], a fact just as its exact opposite – and the question of the motivating (or driving) force would be most probably even less relevant here, if ethical question formulations (or central themes) and concerns were consistently left aside¹²¹.

Just as little at the pole of pure general friendship can a society of mortal humans be founded at the pole of undiluted general enmity. The proverbial war of all against all simply constitutes a practical impossibility, i.e. no state (of affairs) is conceivable in which such a war, together with all its implications, literally takes place, and lasts for more than a few moments. Even if we wanted to accept the absolutely inimical dispositions of all humans against all humans, it is, from a generally inimical disposition to generally inimical – and indeed violent – behaviour, a very long way, on which are, in practice, insurmountable

¹²⁰ See Sawyer's apt remarks, "The Altruism Scale", esp. p. 409.

¹²¹ More thoroughly in relation to that, in the 3rd Volume of this work.

obstacles. The set phrase (or formula) of “war of all against all” is therefore either metaphorical or meaningless. More precisely: the said set phrase had no real, but only a polemical meaning, when it was summoned in the early New Times, in order to unhinge the Aristotelian-Scholastic teaching of the originality (i.e. initial, primary or unspoilt state) of society, and in a second step to prop up contract theory of this or that couleur (i.e. shade and colour, complexion or hue). What one can say contrary to Hobbes, if one wants to take him at face value, is the following: society was not *founded*, so that the war of all against all could come to an end; society *exists*, because the war of all against all is, in practice, impossible. Hobbes’s opponents, who set the fiction of the basically peaceful and anxious (fearful) man against Hobbes’s construction of the state of nature (or natural state), had to assume that war came into the world only with the founding of society¹²²; with that, in part against the ethical intent and conviction of these authors, insight into the profound interweaving of war and society with one another was gained, that is, war was brought from the state of nature (natural state) into society, however, the error in respect of the founding of society remained. That insight had, at any rate, an important, even if hardly noticed implication, namely the fact that a war between humans living societally (i.e. socially) in the same collective or in distinct collectives cannot be a war of all against all; that therefore here, enmity amongst one group of people must be accompanied by friendship amongst another group of people; on the other hand, it is obvious that the hypothetical war of one individual against all others cannot in the least be described as a war of all against all. War, i.e. bloody conflict as the expression of

¹²² See above all Rousseau, *Oeuvres Complètes*, III, pp. 601-616 «Que l’état de guerre naît de l’état social » [“that the state of war is born of the social state”]; similarly, Montesquieu in the zeal of his polemic against Hobbes, *Esprit des Lois*, I, 2-3.

extreme enmity, is thus neither the continuation nor the remnant of a pre-social war of all against all, and it does not turn against the fact of society and of friendship; war is itself a fact of society, just like friendship.

Hardly anyone until today has understood so deeply why war cannot be a sole and permanent fact like Clausewitz, whose comments in this regard represent (or constitute) an anthropological achievement, pertaining to the philosophy of culture, of the first rank. The great theoretician does not comprehend war(fare) either metaphorically or psychologically: extreme enmity, no matter what the motivation, manifests itself here as an act of violence for the purpose of the throwing down to the ground (i.e. defeat, suppressing, quelling or crushing) of the foe. This act of violence must of course culminate in the killing of other men (humans), otherwise there can be no talk of war *stricto sensu*. However, that which must characterise war by definition, that is, of its (i.e. war's) essence, cannot make up the entire reality of relations of man towards man (i.e. between humans). Because an absolute concentration of the entire available existential and material potential (capacity or capabilities) on enmity and the most extreme violence, as can be observed in the wrestling (or struggling) of two foes with their bare hands, or in the short battles between a few in number of primitive tribes, is under the conditions of "societal association (or union)", as Clausewitz expresses it, simply impossible. The conditions of life in society consequently force humans into an inhibition (checking or hindering), diversion, fragmentation or partially covering (or concealing) and disguising of that which constitutes war as an act of violence in its conceptual purity. And not only inside of society does "the large number of things, forces, circumstances" prevent the "total unloading (or discharging)" of the existing potential (capacity or capabilities) for violence; the same happens in war itself, in so far as

this is a political act, that is, an act of humans who live in a political association (or union), and therefore subordinate their martial (i.e. war(-like)) activity, as well as the exercising of violence, to political ends (goals), and accordingly interpose pauses or “friction(s)” into the course of war itself. “Politics” means in this context (especially in an age in which the traditional Aristotelian terminology was still alive (i.e. in use)), as much as the whole of social life, the “societal association (or union)”, and *that is why* every war between socially living humans is a political and politically waged war. The entirety of (i.e. all) commentators until today, who from Clausewitz’s fundamental principle in respect of the political character of war, have wanted to deduce a sectoral primacy of the civil vis-à-vis the military, and a call for the moderation of war against the endeavours of the uncouth men in uniform, have simply not understood at all what Clausewitz was talking about. Clausewitz was dealing with the explanation of the fact that not only in “limited”, but even in “absolute” war, which, incidentally, is no less “political” than the former (i.e. “absolute” war is not less “political” than “limited” war), the exercising of violence cannot be massed (or concentrated) and uninterrupted (or unbroken). The explanation offered connects, at last social-ontological instance, the philosophy of culture and anthropology with each other, and reads that socially living man or the “societal association (or union)” of humans is constituted (made or composed) in such a way that he or it cannot do without (forego, renounce or abstain from) the most extreme violence, that is killing, but simultaneously cannot live permanently with such most extreme violence (i.e. killing)¹²³.

¹²³ For details and evidence see Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, esp. p. 16ff.; for the dual concept of politics in Clausewitz cf. p. 74ff..

The aetiology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation can, however, also in another respect, be connected with anthropological considerations pertaining to the philosophy of culture, and indeed regarding the question of identity in its interweaving with the question of values. As we have already remarked, identity is a constitutive feature and at the same time a fundamental need of *socially* living humans. And since even the most elementary society contains a “large number of things, forces, circumstances”, thus identity is shaped and asserted (or maintained) as a series of positionings towards multiple persons and situations, customs, institutions and values. These positionings can be stable or variable, partly stable, partly variable, and identity persists or shifts accordingly. Identity cannot, in any case, be thought of (or conceived) without the incessant activity of position taking (i.e. the taking of a position), which necessarily turns out positively *and* at the same time negatively, *friendly and* at the same time *inimically*. In their huge number, these positionings constitute a spectrum or continuum, which ipso facto is transformed into a spectrum or continuum of friendships and enmities. Friendships and enmities move without interruption and merge (and turn) into one another, in accordance with the movement of the identity constantly taking a position in relation to something. No identity can adhere for a lifetime to (or remain at) the one and same pole of the spectrum of the social relation; it can therefore neither permanently kill nor permanently sacrifice itself. That is why an identity must reflect the continuum of the objectively existing possibilities of the social relation to a greater or lesser extent in the continuum of its own positionings. In the course of this, friendships and enmities must be more or less differentiated – moreover, they must be connected with everything which might ever constitute the object (subject matter) of the identity’s positionings. Friend and foe are thus not necessarily persons, but just as

much values and social practices or attitudes, especially as under the circumstances (or conditions) of culture it is normal (and seems advisable) to connect friendship and enmity towards persons with friendship and enmity towards values. Upon closer inspection, a positioning towards values of course proves to of necessity be a hidden positioning towards persons, or it becomes (turns into) such a positioning, even though this is very often not (completely) conscious (i.e. realised). The possibility of carrying out a positioning (i.e. of taking a position) towards humans via or as a positioning towards values, considerably extends, at any rate, the circle of the positionings of the identity, and the more extensive this circle is, the more often does it intersect (or overlap) with the corresponding circles of other identities. This sets in motion anew the mechanisms, which the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation maintains (and perpetuates). Because, like all social and cultural goods too, the unfolding (development) space (room to move or field of activity) for the possible positionings of the identity is scarce. Not only the positioning in itself, but also the – actually implied therein – positioning towards alien (i.e. other) positionings, brings the spectrum of the social relation to its full unfolding (or development).

B. “Normality” and “exception”

Social theoreticians and social philosophers, who for ethical-normative reasons want to shorten (curtail or cut (back)) the spectrum of the social relation around (or at) the enmity’s pole or around (or at) the enmity’s half [of the spectrum], cannot, as explicated in the previous section, as a result of the lifting (i.e. abolition) of the polarity, account for the

continuity in the spectrum any longer. In connection with this, they fall into epistemological and pragmatical errors. They follow the perception already represented in antiquity and frequently renewed in the New Times, that there can be science only via rule or law, not via exception. That is true, if with it, therefore, is meant that exceptions are not able to be classified and foreseen through their subsumption under an invariable causality. This point of view would, though, count if social ontology were a science which would aim at and lay claim to (or demand) the formulation of strict kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities), and on the basis of the same kinds of law bindedness, determine in advance the outcome of every concrete becoming (cluster or series of events). But we know that social ontology cannot go about that, and that social ontology in fact, in a certain respect, is nearer to history than sociology¹²⁴. Social ontology's task, accordingly, does not consist in, epistemologically and in reality, domesticating the exception, but rather in defining its social-ontological status, and assessing its social-historical weight, and indeed on the path towards insight into the exception's meaning for the constitution of norm[s] and normality, in its multiform interweaving with norm[s] and normality. No knowledge about human affairs can be of great empirical value, if the forces and factors are not borne in mind, which can break (blast or burst) open every norm and normality, in fact on a daily basis break norms and normality open. The epistemological impregnability (or invincibility) of the exception would only then entitle us to its neglect if one wanted to naively identify the level of epistemology with that of reality.

Durkheim's suggestion to regard the usual as the normal, however the exception as the pathological, does not essentially appear to be smarter or

¹²⁴ See Ch. II, Sec. 3A in this volume. Cf. footnote 114 above.

more fertile. Here speaks someone, who declaredly puts social science at the service of morality, and does not want to tolerate any ethical neutrality on this question, although he, on the other hand, has to admit the content-related changeability of the normal according to the predominant «espèce sociale» [“social species”]¹²⁵. But that is not the sole obstacle to the consistent implementation (or carrying out) of the ethical approach. The option (or choice) of the quantitative criterion for the definition of the normal and of the pathological or exceptional cannot found (or justify) the option (choice) of the friendly or the inimical pole in the spectrum of the social relation. Because extreme friendship, i.e. the sacrifice of one’s own life for others, is statistically by no means more frequent than extreme enmity, i.e. the killing of a human by a human; one would even venture the presumption that killing and self-sacrifice more likely balance each other out in times of war, whereas in “normal” times of peace, daily killings quantitatively outweigh self-sacrifice by far. Finally, Durkheim himself violates the binding of the normal to the ethical or “healthy”, as he expresses it, when he counts crime amongst the normal phenomena (or manifestations) in social life. At the same time, he himself takes, through that, the quantitative criterion for the definition of the normal back, since obviously criminal acts are not the majority in any society. Instructively, Durkheim establishes (manufactures or restores) an indirect relation(ship) between crime and normality: crime belongs to normality because the collective defence against it keeps the feelings of solidarity of those belonging to society (i.e. society’s members) alive. The shift of the standpoint is drastic, although Durkheim barely notices it. Crime and non-conforming behaviour, that is, exception and normality do not constitute a dichotomy anymore, both of whose limbs can exist

¹²⁵ *Règles*, pp. 55ff., 74, 47ff., 57.

independent of each other. By declaring the quantitatively defined exception, i.e. crime, a normal phenomenon (or manifestation), the said quantitatively defined exception, i.e. crime, is transformed into a condition of actual normality – an indeed negative, but nevertheless necessary condition. Because, otherwise, one could simply demand this quantitatively defined exception's putting aside, and disregard it in the analysis of the social. As a condition of normality, the exception provides, moreover, an insight into the composition of normality and into the essence of the forces, which hold the normality together: social solidarity is asserted (or asserts itself) in the defence (protection) against abnormal and non-standard (deviant or norm-adverse) behaviour. That the exception displays (or reveals) the essence of normality, and that only its thorough analysis permits the apprehension of the general-normal, was not only pronounced by Kierkegaard in a partly metaphysical, partly existentialistic context¹²⁶. Similar statements are found in epistemologists, who turned their interest towards biological phenomena¹²⁷, as well as in sociologists, who thought about the problem of order and disorder¹²⁸. The comments of the first chapter regarding the dominant basic tenor in the social theory of recent decades explains why such statements of sociologists have rarity value (i.e. are rare or scarce), and for the most part are made without a deeper understanding of their systematic implications.

The quantitative apprehension of the exception, as Durkheim represents (or supports) it exemplarily, even though inconsistently, more often than not underlies the pragmatically false assessments in respect of their own

¹²⁶ *Die Wiederholung*, p. 93.

¹²⁷ Canguilhem, *Le normal*, pp. 4, 75, 86ff..

¹²⁸ See e.g. Garfinkel, "Trust", p. 187: "The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of... disorganized interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained."

social-ontological status. Durkheim himself threw out his own quantitative criterion when he highlighted the permanent effect of a smaller quantity on a by far greater quantity. This effect cannot be explained by the proportional relationship of the quantities with one another; that is why this effect constitutes an independent qualitative element (or factor), which in fact stands that relationship on its head (i.e. turns the said relationship upside down). No differently do both poles of the spectrum of the social relation behave towards the social relation's spectrum's entirety or towards its continuity; their (i.e. the poles') qualitative presence in the spectrum towers above (or surpasses) their quantitative strength, and indeed so much that the thesis appears to be plausible that the by far greater quantity complies with (orientates itself towards or is modelled on), in decisive respects, the by far smaller quantity. That which is regarded as normal activity in social life, takes place, not least of all in view of the presumed requirements of action, in exceptional situations (situations of exception); the collective and the individual go by (i.e. are or act in accordance or deal with) their normal activities, by simultaneously safeguarding themselves as far as possible and consciously from interruptions or even destruction (breakdowns) in respect of their normal activities through the occurrence of exceptional situations. In this way, normal social practice (praxis) already lifts (i.e. abolishes) the supposed dichotomy between normality and exception; the exception becomes a fixed (steady or stable) constituent element (part) of normality, whilst normality is handled bearing in mind the possible occurrence of exceptional situations. The exception does not, therefore, have to occur in actual fact so that it can unfold (or develop) its effect; its ideational presence in normality in the shape (or form) of precaution already brings this effect to its full development (i.e. brings this effect about), on each and every respective occasion, in different variants and to

a different extent. This should be clear to anyone who does not convert the all-too-human pious wish for eternal normality into social theory and social philosophy, and hence to some degree retains the ability of looking at elementary social phenomena (or manifestations) with naive eyes. That no human collective, not even the “most liberal”, e.g. has renounced (or done without) the threat and exercising of violence, can be interpreted only as preparation for the exceptional situation in the state of normality, or as the effect of the exception on the norm in the normal state (of affairs). No collective lives in permanent war, and in all collectives those defined, one way or another, as criminals represent a, quantitatively seen, very small minority. However, the precautions against the threat from the outside and against crime do not constitute (or represent), for their part, any exceptional situation, although they concern exceptional situations; they constitute an in themselves (well-)balanced (dormant) stable component of the collective, in fact they seep through (i.e. permeate) the collective’s whole organisation. The police and (law) courts are not made anew (or recreated) in regard to every new burglary.

A proper theoretical reconstruction of social life impossibly, therefore, comes about (i.e. does not come about), if one does not detach oneself from the quantitative point of view of normality, in order to get onto (or track (down)) the qualitatively understood effects of the exception. The exception is at any time the living present (or presence), both objectively, i.e. in the forces which make every social order vulnerable, as well as subjectively, i.e. in the meaning which the actors connect with their action. At both levels there are, though, reasons to either play down this permanent presence (or present) of the exception in normality or even to deny it. To the usual logic of the legitimation of every social order belongs its direct or indirect identification with a normality founded (i.e.

established or based) on stable or even eternal values, whereas in regard to individual actors, the need for relief (i.e. the relieving of the tension of existence) very often drives out the thought of the exception and its dangers. Praxis (i.e. practice) never completely adapts, however, to either the logic or the ideology of legitimation, nor to the need for relief (i.e. the relieving of the tension of existence). Whichever place a collective or individual actor in the spectrum of the social relation occupies (or takes) at present, he acts mindful of that which is happening at the poles of this same spectrum, that is, with the whole spectrum in mind¹²⁹. The scientific observer should do exactly this too. Analysing normality in respect of the guide (main connecting thread, theme or leitmotif) of the exception, and overcoming the dichotomy of normality and exception through the bringing out (elaboration or investigating) of the integration of the exception in normality, appears, incidentally, to be both in synchrony as well as diachrony, essential. Historical change is e.g. not a question of quantity and of normality; historical change's prevailing does not in the least depend on whether it has captured (or taken in) the quantitatively preponderant part of society. The social locomotives, which carry historical change, constitute for a longer period of time the qualitative exception inside of quantitatively decisive normality – and yet the historian is not wrong in examining the, for instance, 14th or 15th century from the point of view of the “New Times”, “capitalism” etc., although the “pre-new-times”, “pre-capitalistic” etc. circumstances (relations or conditions) in those days and for a long time later still quantitatively outweighed “new-times”, “capitalistic” circumstances (relations or conditions) by far. Every concrete social formation consists of several strata; some such strata in fact continue to have roots in the archaic (i.e.

¹²⁹ In relation to this, more in Ch. IV, Sec. 1B of this volume.

antiquity), but their definition as a whole must take place in view of the qualitatively predominant elements pointing the way (ahead or to the future), and be justified accordingly¹³⁰. The sociological worship (or adoration) of normality becomes, given such objective (or factual) and epistemological necessities, meaningless. All the more so when the historical exception means not merely a pause between two phases of the same structural normality, but, in a revolutionary way, brings into being a new normality, that is, the said historical exception defines the meaning of normality anew.

A sober social-ontological evaluation of the exception stands not only in the way of the zeal of the ethicists of various hues (complexions, i.e. stripes), who want to eradicate the inimical pole or the inimical half in the spectrum of the social relation, because they dream of an eternally undisturbed normality; norm, normality and normativism belong together in fact both juristically (juridically or legally) as well as ethically. The glorification of the exception on the part of magniloquent existentialists, who make out of normality an aesthetically (and ultimately also ethically, even though in another sense than that of the normativists) unbearable banality, in order to then contrast this normality with the authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality) of the determined to go to extremes existence in borderline situations, has a no less misleading effect. Both sides essentially pay homage to, of course with reverse(d) signs (i.e. symbolism), the dichotomous perception regarding the relationship between normality and exception, which however cannot be brought into line (harmonised or reconciled) with the entirely indispensable common bond between polarity and continuity in the spectrum of the social relation. Said the other way around: polarity and continuity interweave

¹³⁰ Regarding that, more in the 3rd volume of this work.

with each other in the spectrum of the social relation in the same sense and to the same extent as exception and normality in the organisation and the movement of the whole of social life. Normalities frequently stem from exceptions and breaks (or ruptures), and they are always based on measures (or precautions) for exceptional situations. Exceptions want, for their part, to found (or justify) normalities, i.e. make the principles connected with the self-understanding of their originators and advocates (champions or proponents) into the guiding principle (or, at any rate, the ideal) of social (or individual) action; because not even they can imagine that social life could be based on a never-ending sequence of exceptional situations. Thus, the exception is, or it must become, much more banal and everyday (i.e. commonplace) than those who see in it the unfolding space (room to move or field of activity) of authenticity (genuineness, trueness or actuality), want to believe; and precisely because of its banal and everyday (i.e. commonplace) components (a friendly smiling armed policeman on his evening patrol), normality permeates the exception much deeper than the scribes (i.e. writers) of idylls like to perceive in the field of social theory. The mistakes on both sides and the short circuits (i.e. rash, logically inconsistent, thinking) call to mind, by the way in a symmetrical manner, the mistakes and short circuits (i.e. rash, logically inconsistent, thinking) of the friends and the foes of decisionism (i.e. the arbitrariness of (subjective) decisions) – as expected, since the former [friends] did not keep secret their preference for the exception, whereas the latter take up the cudgels for the normality party. Regarding this social-ontologically explosive question, we have already said what is necessary in another place¹³¹.

¹³¹ Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, esp. p. 7ff.; Kondylis, „Jurisprudenz“, p. 355ff..

C. The phenomenology of continuity. A sketch

In the systematising expositions of formal sociology with a claim to peremptoriness (i.e. finality and unassailability), it was plausible to undertake classifications of the forms of the social relation in accordance with the criterion of nearness (proximity) and distance, that is, to place every one of these forms somewhere between extreme nearness (proximity) and extreme distance according to the predominant aspect in every form of the social relation and its intensity. Thus, v. Wiese worked out a table, which from “approaching (or drawing near to)” reaches “conflict” via “adaptation”, “becoming alike (or bringing into line)”, “unification (uniting or combining)”, “competition” and “opposition”¹³². Such tables serve general goals of orientation and in this respect they are useful, on the other hand, they can in practice be refined, enriched or modified ad infinitum, whereby one could get tangled up in an infertile casuistry. Instead of this, we want to found (i.e. conceptually establish or base) the phenomenology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation in the in detail discussion of the structural factors, which the social relation determines. In the course of this, it is primarily a matter of the absolute necessity of the multiform co-existence or mixing of friendship and enmity with each other, from which again the absolute necessity of a constant movement between both poles of the spectrum results. Seen from the angle of the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of the spectrum, that co-existence or mixing constitutes a function of the fact that every friendship (enmity) contains in itself as much enmity (friendship) as corresponds to the distance which separates it in the

¹³² *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 51-53; „Beziehungssoziologie“, p. 74ff.. Regarding similar attempts at classification, in part, with regard to the direct succession (i.e. successors) of formal sociology, be informed by the next section.

spectrum of the social relation from the pole of extreme friendship (enmity); friendship (enmity) achieves indeed very often its extreme or pure form precisely where enmity (friendship) is manifested in the most extreme or most pure form or manner; this, though, does not lift (i.e. abolish) the necessary co-existence of both forms of the relation; self-sacrifice appears (happens) most frequently amongst all social phenomena (or manifestations), precisely in war.

This form-related (formal) way of looking at things grants fundamental insights into the elementary mechanics of the combination games between friendship and enmity; the concrete analysis of these same combination games of friendship and enmity, case by case, must of course be reserved for the historian and the sociologist. Because the form-related (i.e. formal) way of looking at things, that is, detached from the actors on each and every respective occasion, to which social ontology is condemned because of its claim to generalisation, cannot explain, but merely registers the fact that the same actors occupy other (i.e. different) places in the spectrum of the social relation on each and every respective occasion; whereas the sequence of these places remains stable at the level of the form-related (i.e. formal) apprehension of the spectrum, the actors move incessantly back and forth, to and fro, hither and thither, in the continuum, which produces these places. Neither can “friendship” be allocated to “good” actors, nor enmity to “bad (evil)” actors, that is, the corresponding places in the spectrum do not have any existentially and essentially (i.e. of their own essence) pre-programmed occupiers; for their part, these places do not represent small boxes existing in advance, which wait for the suitable actors to be filled, but their directory (index or table) constitutes the abstractive summary of historically attested social relations between humans. The distance (spacing or gap) between the

form-related (i.e. formal) apprehension of the spectrum and the real level of social action can be, incidentally, recognised already in that the actor can move from this to that place of the spectrum at will (arbitrarily), i.e. from this to that other kind of friendship or enmity, without having to take into account the systematic sequence of the social relations at the form-related (i.e. formal) level of description (or representation) of their spectrum. For the – theoretical – bridging of that distance, that is, for the overcoming of the pure formality (i.e. form-relatedness or relation to form) of the spectrum in the direction of the reality of action, the bringing out (or elaborating) of the mechanism of the social relation is necessary, which shall occupy us in the next chapter, as well as the introduction of the dimension of time in respect of the analysis of this same relation. If the form-relatedly (i.e. formally) apprehended spectrum of the social relation is timeless in the sense that all places in it, despite the constant movement of the individual actors from place to place, always remain present and occupied, then on the other hand, the aforementioned movement takes place in time. The dimension of time is real time for the carrying out of the actors' movement inside of the spectrum, but above all it is time thought about (and imagined), in which in the imagination of the actors several possible movements take place, that is, several possible social relations are preventively and, in terms of planning, anticipated. As time thought about (and imagined), the dimension of time consequently dynamises the social relation between real actors and contributes essentially to the effacing (blurring) and muddling up of the boundaries and the logic of form-related (i.e. formal) classification in praxis (i.e. practice).

The actors – irrespective of whether they are active in the field of high theory or in that of low-brow praxis – often make the effort to prove that

the spectrum of the social relation is “actually” under the influence (or aegis) of friendship or of enmity. When one side is convinced of the natural peacefulness and goodness of man, then the other side must for polemical reasons emphasise man’s innate aggressivity and delight (pleasure) in destruction, as well as the other way around. The self-legitimation (or self-justification) of a polity, in which the collective drive (urge, impulse or instinct) of self-preservation is articulated, normally puts sociality and friendship together first, along with the corresponding duties, and attributes enmity to the essence (nature, character or being) and machinations of others, from which the conclusion follows that enmity must disappear with that essence and those machinations from the world; however, the opposite side thinks just the same way, and exactly because the primacy of friendship recognised in principle on both sides cannot be realised in one framework encompassing both sides. From a social-ontological point of view, no polemical reason, or reason of legitimation, of course exists in order to give priority (preference) to friendship or enmity in the spectrum of the social relation. This would in fact call into question the *social-ontological* status of the spectrum itself, because one of both of its poles or one of its halves would have to thereby descend into contingency (i.e. become unnecessary). Social ontology should rather take the necessary togetherness (or common bond) between friendship and enmity in the spectrum of the social relation seriously, and make the main forms of this togetherness (or common bond) the basis of a phenomenology of the continuity in this same spectrum. The typical mistake, which should be avoided here, manifests itself often in assumptions of the type that social relations on which society is founded (or based) are contrary to those

which for instance two armies facing each other inimically embody¹³³. The mistake is obvious: what is merely thought of is what is between the armies, not that which is going on inside the armies, in which the inner coherence normally must increase exactly to the extent that enmity grows and as the hour of armed confrontation draws nearer. Far from proving the diametrical contrast of associating and dissociating forces vis-à-vis one another, this example rather graphically illustrates the fact that friendship and enmity represent two sides of the same coin; and precisely enmities, in which there is, as Herodotus let Xerxes say, “no middle path”¹³⁴, not only mobilise friendship, but they actually presuppose it. This is only noticed though, when one considers the overall complex in a concrete situation, and in the course of this observes how every new branching out (or ramification) of the social relation brings to light new aspects, towards which friendship and enmity must be directed, so that the foe in one respect becomes the friend in another respect etc.. Here the Arabian proverb in its condensed wisdom speaks volumes: “I against my brother; I and my brother against our cousin; I, my brothers and my cousins against the neighbouring village; all of us against the alien (stranger or foreigner)”. The factors of social interaction therefore normally develop (or unfold) a dual effect, i.e. they contribute in, on each and every respective occasion, a different respect to association as well as to dissociation; association in this respect entails dissociation in that respect; more intensive coherence (or unity) of a group is accompanied by a sharper demarcation against other groups etc.¹³⁵.

¹³³ Thus, McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 6.

¹³⁴ VII, 11, 3: «τὸ γὰρ μέσον οὐδὲν τῆς ἐχθρῆς ἐστίν» [= “the middle ground of enmity is nothing”; or: “there is no middle course for our enmity” (in Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*).

¹³⁵ Jameson, “Principles”, p. 11.

The necessary co-existence and the symmetrical increasing of the intensity of friendship and enmity, are explained quite well on the basis of the inner logic of the grouping (or group formation) of individuals in public life. Here the challenge to fight (or declaration of war) against one party eo ipso brings about the formation of another party, that is, of an alliance (= union, association, league, confederation or band) of friends. Because whoever issues a challenge to fight (or a declaration of war), and in the process pursues public aims – political in the current sense or intellectual(-spiritual), i.e. such aims which foresee a certain (re-)shaping of modes of thought and behaviour –, sooner or later ends up in the madhouse if he goes into battle alone (or takes on the fight by himself) against the whole world, that is, finds no friends, whom he can harness (rope in) for those aims; through the small or large number of his friends, he will be taken seriously socially and politically¹³⁶. So that he can rally friends around himself or so that others have compelling reasons to rally around him as friends, he must have foes, which of course must not be said directly: one can talk simply of “aims” or “ideals”, however, people inevitably stand in the way of the realisation of the same “aims” or “ideals”, so that the impersonal declaration of the aims and of the ideals is

¹³⁶ Montesquieu remarks very nicely regarding the Roman polity: «La constitution de l'État était telle que chacun était porté à se faire des amis... Un homme n'était puissant dans le sénat et dans le peuple que par ses amis...» [= “The constitution of the state was such that everyone was inclined (made or driven) to make friends ... A man was not powerful in the senate and amongst the people but through his friends...”] (*Pensées*, Nr. 1253 (604) = *Oeuvres*, II, p. 333ff.; on this function of amicitia [friendship] cf. Gelzer, *Nobilität*, p. 44ff., 83ff., as well as Rouland, *Pouvoir politique*; on analogous phenomena (or manifestations) in Greece see Sartori, *Le eterie*, as well as Gehrke, „Zwischen Freundschaft und Programm“). Montesquieu compares (idealised) Roman circumstances (relations or conditions) with the isolation of individuals from one another in a despotism, however at the same time, his political preferences cloud his sociological gaze. Because the despot is no less than for instance the politician or the demagogue dependent on friends, and Sophocles rightly let his Oedipus accuse Creon of acting foolishly when Creon, without an armed crowd and without friends behind him (ἀνευ τε πλήθους και φίλων) [= without the multitude and friends] wanted to become Tyrant (*Oedipus Rex*, vv. 540-542). The categorial independence of the alliance of friends was, as is known, worked out (or elaborated) by Schmalenbach („Der Bund“); primitive “secret societies” can be subsumed thereunder just as modern Parties, cf. Ludz (ed.), *Geheime Gesellschaften*. Needless to say, friendship does not at all necessarily imply in this social-ontological context intimacy or equality (and/or sameness) amongst friends. Cf. the excellent work by Altoff, *Verwandte, Freunde und Getreue*, esp. the 3rd chapter and the “Conclusion”.

tantamount to a personal challenge to fight (or declaration of war), and is also perceived as such by the people concerned; if the concrete counterparty (i.e. opposing party or other side) did not exist, then that declaration would obviously be superfluous and would not cause a stir (or sensation). The assertion is not therefore paradoxical that without foes one does not have any followers (adherents or supporters)¹³⁷. Here it is merely a matter of a special case of the most usual social-ontological principle of grouping (or group formation), in which, incidentally, the necessary common bond (or togetherness) between friendship and enmity immediately catches the eye; friendship is constituted as a joining together (combining or union) of actors against a common foe, regardless of whether for defensive or offensive goals (ends or purposes). As the Arabian proverb cited above already indicates, knowledge of this most elementary amongst all principles of grouping (or group formation) constitutes a universal estate, i.e. reserve, of ideas (or thoughts), from which practical lessons everywhere and at all tiers (stages or levels) of cultural development were drawn as well¹³⁸. Very many sociologists saw in commonly (i.e. conjointly) shared enmity “one of the most powerful means” to bring about cohesion¹³⁹, others, older and newer, went one step further and opined that only a common foe holds collectives together¹⁴⁰. Here we do not have to decide which view under which conditions is accurate (or applies). It may be regarded as certain that friendship can come into being and continue when friends have both common friends as

¹³⁷ “The man who has no enemies has no following”, Piatt, *Memories*, Preface.

¹³⁸ Thus, a proverb of tropical Africa warns allies, against a common foe, of being disunited amongst themselves, see Claridge, *Wild Bush Tribes*, p. 255. And Plutarch cites a leader of the victorious party in a civil war in Chios, who should have urged his combatants to not send all their foes into exile, otherwise the victors would be threatened with division (*Πῶς ἄν τις* ..., 91F – 92A; cf. Scipio Nasica’s dictum in 88A).

¹³⁹ Thus, e.g. Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 108, 139.

¹⁴⁰ Thus, e.g. Ferguson, *Essay*, I, 4 = S. [= p.] 25: “It is vain to expect that we can give to the multitude of people a sense of union among themselves, without admitting hostility to those who oppose them.” Easier to remember, Lasswell: “people do not unite, but unite against specific collective groups” (*World Politics*, p. 239).

well as common foes¹⁴¹. Nonetheless, many an experience (empirical (practical) knowledge) speaks for Adam Smith's observation that we would indeed stand (i.e. tolerate) that our friends would not share all their friends with us, but not that they would make friends with our foes¹⁴². On this roundabout way, as on other roundabout ways too, the criterion of enmity is decisive for friendship, which points anew to friendship and enmity's togetherness (or common bond) in every social complex.

As we know, the terms "friendship" and "enmity" have another meaning, depending on whether they are used in connection with the polarity or the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation. In the former case i.e. of the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation, the meaning is determined by the direct reference to the fact of human mortality, and is because of that absolutely clear. In the latter case i.e. that of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation, that reference is indirect and potential, and since there are several grades (or degrees) of mediacy (or indirectness) and potentiality, we can speak of friendship and enmity only polysemously (i.e. ambiguously). Clarity (or unambiguity) is attained here theoretically through the classification of the friendships and the enmities in the spectrum of the social relation, in relation to which every class obtains its own name more or less sanctioned through language (speech or linguistic) usage. In spite of polysemy (i.e. ambiguity or multiple meanings), the retention of "friendship" and "enmity" as axes of social-ontological terminology is recommended though, because no other terms as familiar are found in regard to the feel for (sense of) language in order to talk about the spectrum of the social relation as a whole in an economical (i.e. sparing) way, without in the process closing

¹⁴¹ Aristotle, *Rhetorik*, 1381a 7-9, 13-17.

¹⁴² *Theory*, I, 1, 2.

one's mind to the possibility of specification as soon as this appears to be necessary. An orientating phenomenology of the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation needs of course elementary and concise conceptual caesurae. With regard to enmity, in principle in all languages – objectively (i.e. factually) correctly – a distinction is made between enmity's extreme forms in which it is a matter of the killing of the foe, and that of the much richer in nuances palette of relations, which one substantiates with the collective (or generic) concepts (names or terms) “rivalry (antagonism)”, “opposition”, “competition” etc.¹⁴³. These concepts are used often, but not always, synonymously, they can, that is, depending on the context, indicate a very different intensity and extensity; the direction at which they aim, is however clear. Both the scientific observer as well as the actor must pose the question to themselves as to whether the conflict which they face, is a relative or an absolute conflict, whether, that is, the commonalities of both sides surpass their differences or not; whether it is a total or limited conflict, whether it extends to therefore the entire objective and existential situation, or to a part of the interactions within this situation; finally, whether the said conflict is a direct or indirect conflict, whether, that is, every side can attain its aim only via the direct throwing down to the ground (i.e. defeat, suppressing, quelling or crushing) of the other side (e.g. conquest through military victory) or whether, the other way around, the attainment of a side's aim effects a giving up (i.e. surrendering) of the

¹⁴³ Regarding these concepts and their gradation in the most significant modern European languages, see the synoptic table in Morani, “Il ‘Nemico’”, p. 60; regarding the scale “hostis [foe, enemy, antagonist, stranger, foreigner, alien] – inimicus [enemy, foe, antagonist, inimical, hostile, unfriendly, hurtful, injurious, harmful] – competitor [rival, competitor] – adversarius [adversary, opponent, enemy, foe, antagonist, opposed, contrary, hostile, noxious, turned towards]” in Latin, p. 42ff.. It is to be added here that a conscious theoretical working (or bringing) out of the elementary distinction between both forms of enmity is already found in Hesiod, *Werke und Tage*, V, vv. 11ff..

other side (e.g. domination (control or monopolisation)) of the market by means of higher sales and, through that, elimination of competitors)¹⁴⁴.

In general, the decisive criterion in the classification of enmities seems to be this, whether both sides recognise superordinate (superior or higher) norms and rules, which they want to comply with even to their own detriment, or whether they, only via the outcome of their conflict, want to ascertain who has to define the binding norms and rules; in the former case, what remains is the peaceful contest (or competition) (of varying intensity) in the framework of commonly accepted norms and rules; in the latter case, it is a matter of all or nothing, and the outcome of the conflict can be fatal for one or the other side. As cogent as this criterion appears to be at first glance, it requires essential explications and also modifications. On the one hand, we must remind those who lean towards juristic (legal and juridical) or ethical hypostatisations, of the banality that norms and rules can claim a superordinate (superior or higher) status for themselves only as long as their interpretation is regarded as self-evident. If this is contested by one side, then the question of the monopoly of interpretation arises, which, as is known, is a question of power. Conflict does not take shape, therefore, as peaceful competition (rivalry) because the following of (i.e. compliance with) rules and norms prohibits the use of force (violence), but norms and rules follow the existing correlation (constellation) of forces, or, under the historically pre-given conditions, as structural framework, of action, the question of the interpretation of the predominant norms and rules is not posed at all, or only in a technical respect. As observed¹⁴⁵, foes can, in fact must have, despite all the

¹⁴⁴ The pair of concepts “relative – absolute” and “total – restricted” are found in Axelrod, *Conflict of interest*, p. 87ff.; on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect conflict” see McIver-Page, *Society*, p. 64. We encounter similar concepts and distinctions, mind you, in many authors, and indeed already in the older sociologists, see e.g. Giddings, *Prinzipien*, p. 92, who talks of “primary” (conquest) and “secondary” (contest (competition)) conflicts.

¹⁴⁵ See footnote 91 above.

content-related contrasting and opposition of their positions (interpretations) vis-à-vis one another, certain thought structures or concepts in common: that is the battlefield which they in fact share with one another anyhow. That is why norms and rules accepted on both sides in principle do not constitute a compelling reason for the peaceful resolution of conflict(s), not even when they command non-violence taken at face value. Because the common confession of faith in peace leads to war when perceptions regarding the conditions (or circumstances) of peace substantially diverge from one another¹⁴⁶. On the other hand, reflection over the relation(ship) between goals (i.e. ends) and means in action leads to the conclusion that conflict does not have to be of its ends “total” or “absolute” so that those involved grasp (i.e. reach for, turn or resort to) the most extreme means of enmity, i.e. for or to violence with lethal intent. The perspective varies, therefore, depending on whether one describes the ends or the means as “total” and “absolute” or else “limited” and “relative”. Total and absolute ends can be accompanied by total and absolute means; limited and relative goals (ends) by limited and relative means. But that is not necessarily so. Because total and absolute ends can also, either out of one’s own sluggishness (inertia) or because of weakness of the foe, be pursued or attained through limited and relative means, above all however – and this case appears to be particularly significant for our formulation of the question (or central theme) – total and absolute means can be used in order to attain limited and relative goals (ends)¹⁴⁷. The means develop their own dynamic(s) and logic, which can determine (necessitate or

¹⁴⁶ “Non ergo ut sit pax nolunt sed ut sit quam volunt” [= “They do not therefore want that there be no peace, but they want that peace be as they want it to be”, or: “Therefore they do not desire that there shall be no peace, but only that the peace shall be such as they choose” (Loeb Classical Library online)], Augustine, *De civitate die*, XIX, 12.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges* [= Theory of War], p. 82ff..

cause) another form and intensity of competition or enmity than what one would have expected on the basis of the originally limited object of conflict. The heightening of competition (or rivalry) to the point of extreme enmity appears to the actor then as an economical process destined, into the bargain, to drastically cut short a long process of mutual wear and tear of the forces in the framework of a conflict of lesser intensity. Self-evidently, that heightening of competition to the point of extreme enmity takes place in parallel with the intensification of the struggle (fight or battle) over the monopoly of interpretation in respect of the norms and rules, under whose influence competition (rivalry) is supposed to be.

If the phenomenology of enmity must, first of all, take into consideration the difference between violent and non-violent conflict as well as the structural reasons which determine (or cause) the transition from one to the other kind of conflict, but also the friendly–co-operative aspects of non-violent conflicts, then the phenomenology of friendship must start from friendship’s negative reference to enmity. Friendship, in its various personal and impersonal forms (shapes or guises) is looked upon in principle as a good worth striving after and to be protected against the background of existing and possible enmity. Friendship does not constitute in itself and in abstracto a value, if the individual or collective consequences of its dissolution are not current (i.e. existing) for those concerned. The self-praise of friendship gladly refers to the evil of past enmity between today’s friends, or to the present-day disadvantages which arise for third parties, from which the said third parties cannot enter or, in relation to that, are not capable of entering into friendship. When Cicero wanted “to gauge” “how much good is (i.e. belongs) to friendship”, he posed, that is, with good reason the question: “which

house is so solidly founded, which community (municipality) is so strong, that they could not be destroyed by hatred and by discord?”¹⁴⁸. In the consciousness of socially living humans, despite constant entreaties (or incantations) of the opposite, the certainty is anchored (i.e. exists) that friendship and peace do not last forever, that they are fragile and always to be fought for (and won) anew; even the existence of peace cannot strengthen trust in peace beyond every doubt¹⁴⁹, and those entreaties (or incantations) sound much more dramatic (emotional or pathetic) or even intolerant, the deeper doubt gnaws away at the irrefutability (or incontrovertibility) of friendship and of peace. The consciousness of socially living humans keeps, therefore, at all times, an eye on the entirety of the spectrum of the social relation, and the expectations or acts of the actors are oriented towards the great variety and interchangeability of possibilities, which become apparent in this overall picture¹⁵⁰. Friendship and peace are as components of this overall picture structured in such a way that they contain in themselves the possibility of the sudden change into their opposite – and indeed: enmity would have no social-ontological place if friendship were not of its ontic character fragile, as well as the other way around.

The fragility of friendship is not due merely to the pressure which the other half of the spectrum of the social relation exerts, but is due to friendship’s own structural presuppositions (preconditions or prerequisites) in its connection with the question of identity. Two aspects make up the deciding factor here. On the one hand, enmity dwells (or is inherent) in friendship in the sense that friendship objectively entails the (partially and in fact first of all gladly accepted) loss of independence,

¹⁴⁸ *Laelius de amicitia*, 7 (23).

¹⁴⁹ “Pax tam interdum est, pacis fiducia nunquam [There is such peace now and then, that one should trust in peace never]”, Ovid, *Tristia*, II, v. 71. Cf. Augustine, *De civitate dei*, XIX, 5.

¹⁵⁰ More about that in Ch. IV, Sec. 1A of this volume.

that is, duties and considerations [i.e. care, respect for others], whilst at the same time the objective loss must at least be made good (or made up for) to a certain extent by subjective advantages or feelings. If the making good of (or making up for) the loss of independence is considered to be inadequate, then an element of dissociation creeps (worms its way) into association, which easily steps over the threshold (i.e. enters into the realm) of enmity. Strictly speaking, the element of dissociation is present in the form of watchfulness on both sides as to whether that making good of (or making up for) turns out, on the whole, satisfactory: in every love, mutual fidelity (faithfulness or loyalty) is unremittingly controlled (i.e. checked or supervised), as in every partnership, the observance of the agreed terms. The withdrawal (or revocation) of friendship on the part of a friend must potentially be tantamount to a declaration of enmity, and enmity becomes active when the other person or side cannot balance out (i.e. offset or equalise) that withdrawal (revocation) with new friendships, when, that is, his (or its) dependence continues to exist, this time, negatively. These consequences of the withdrawal (or revocation) of friendship brings us to the second aspect of the structural presuppositions (preconditions or prerequisites) for the latency of enmity in friendship. Of course, it is not a matter here of an already closed (i.e. entered into) and then brought to its end friendship, but of an offer of friendship made and rejected. The refusal of friendship vis-à-vis someone who sets great store by (attaches great importance to or especially values) this closing of (i.e. entering into) friendship, must be interpreted as a sign of enmity, at any rate, gives rise to enmity which becomes active depending on whether the side rejected holds the closing of (i.e. entering into) friendship to be vital or not. The refusal of friendship and the withdrawal (revocation) of friendship are blows which strike identity; their merely imagined possibility takes effect, therefore, as (latent) enmity in friendship. Not

without reason, the thousands-of-years duration of the saying has remained in use that humans loved one another thus, as if they would hate one another in the future, and or they treated their friends as if one day these friends would necessarily become foes¹⁵¹.

For the establishment of the social-ontological place (or locus) of friendship, we must first put aside the prejudice that society would always encourage friendship amongst its members, and puts this friendship above all other goals and values. In principle, no friendship in the womb (bosom) of a collective is allowed to offend against (breach, violate or transgress) these norms and rules. There is a socially sanctioned enmity against friendships which are guilty of (or made responsible for) such an offence (breach, violation or transgression). Friendship between criminals or conspirators for the promotion of corresponding goals becomes in fact legally more difficult (laws against the aiding and abetting of offenders, the rewarding of informers, a witness protection programme (more specifically = regulation guaranteeing a state witness from a terrorist background (e.g. 1970s “Left-Wing” or present-day “Islamic fundamentalist” terrorism) immunity from prosecution or a lenient sentence) (Kronzeugenregelung) etc.). The unconditional loyalty towards personal or sectarian friendship without consideration for generally recognised duties is, in every case (i.e. definitely), socially suspicious or unacceptable, however much such loyalty sometimes calls to mind (awakens) “human” understanding; because, as Cicero remarked, if one wanted to fulfil one’s friend’s every wish, then this would not be mere friendship, but a conspiracy (plot)¹⁵². The distinction between active and

¹⁵¹ Bias [of Priene] in Diogenes Laertius, I, 87, cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorik*, 1389b 24 and 1395a 27; Rivarol, *Sur l’amitié*, p. 314: «l’odieuse maxime de vivre avec son ami, comme s’il devait un jour être notre ennemi [= the odious maxim of living with one’s friend, as if he’d have to one day become our enemy]»).

¹⁵² *De officiis*, III, 43-45; cf. *Laelius de amicitia*, 12 (40-43).

neutral friendship contributes as well to the nuancing of the social-ontological status of friendship, if one may say so. If indifference (as apathy, unconcern or detachment), in the full sense of the word, has at most social rarity value and no social-ontological relevance, then frequently happening neutral friendship, as it were, constitutes a buffer zone between active friendship and active enmity. Two sides give to each other, by means of words or other signs (symbols), to understand that they want to refrain from interference in the matters of concern (or affairs) of the other side on each and every respective occasion, since both regard the existing distribution of social living space as satisfactory or simply as, for the time being, unalterable. The mutual assurance that each will go (i.e. stay) out of the way of the other and will remain “friends” in the sense of non-enmity, is sometimes in fact sealed through already established rituals, or through the non-binding cordiality of jokes (or witticisms), which are exactly supposed to indicate that the sides concerned do not have the intention of dealing in earnest – for good or ill – with each other¹⁵³.

If the social-ontological common bond (or togetherness) of friendship and enmity comes to light on the side of enmity in that friendship is entered into against an already existing common foe, then the social-ontological common bond of friendship and enmity becomes, on the side of friendship, apparent in the fact that such an entering into friendship can give rise to enmity on that side which is ipso facto excluded from entering into friendship, especially when this side excluded from entering into friendship was earlier in a relationship of friendship towards one of both of the new partners. Friendship creates (i.e. causes or establishes)

¹⁵³ Radcliff-Brown, *Structure*, pp. 90ff., 106ff.. Regarding the relationship in respect of accommodation, cf. Couch, “Elementary Forms”, p. 124ff..

delimitation against third parties even when friendship is not thought of (or meant) as delimitation, and indeed already because the specifically friendly must be lost to (i.e. as regards) friendship as soon as any human may reckon (count or rely) on what friends *as* friends give each other¹⁵⁴. Incidentally, a delimitation comes into being not merely due to the fact that friends want to ostentatiously separate from certain namable (i.e. specifiable or identifiable) persons. A negative reference to third parties can also be indirect or totally vague when friendship is defined either as a refuge from precisely predominant (prevailing) or impending objective social circumstances (conditions or relations) (which can of course be personalised) or else as a locus (place), which removed from the daily hustle and bustle, allows the lingering on the finer things, and consequently can draw out (or develop) the particular human quality of friends. The thus thought of (conceived or meant) exclusivity can take several forms, whose highest, at least in the eyes of philosophers, was mentioned above: it is a matter of the friendship between the accomplished (i.e. completed, consummate or perfect people) in terms of manners, morals, customs and intellect(-spirit), in which, as Cicero said, the borderless community of the human genus (i.e. race) contracts (= shrinks) into the small circle or the “rare genus (or species)” of two or of a few persons¹⁵⁵. If we disregard the ethical content of this ideal of friendship, then the double delimitation is exhibited, which also characterises many less demanding friendships: that which is directed against outsiders (or outliers), and that which exists between friends. Because the friends here are in principle supposed to be independent and contented individuals, and in that independence and contentedness, the

¹⁵⁴ „Mein Freund muß kein Freund der ganzen Welt sein“ [= “My friend ought not be a friend of the whole world”], Lessing, *Der Freigeist*, I, p. 1.

¹⁵⁵ *Laelius*, 5 (20), 21 (79); cf. Sec. 2B in this chapter.

sovereign freedom of their relation(ship) should exactly be founded (and based) – this same independence, which in the end in fact can mean independence from the friend himself, and consequently the most painlessly possible separation from him, is praised, however, occasionally (and in different ways), even when it concerns non-ethical or material factors¹⁵⁶. Friendship therefore comes about in this case because it is based on the independence of the friends (from one another), however, for exactly this reason friendship bears inside itself the element (factor or moment) of separation and the possibility of dissociation, especially since, as is well-known, independent people put up with far less than dependent people. With that, though, only one form amongst multiple forms in the phenomenology of friendship has been addressed. Yet the double delimitation as a social-ontological concomitant of friendship is in fact extremely rich in variations too.

The forms of friendship which compose its phenomenology, do not at all constitute successive stages in a historical development (or evolution), during which one form of friendship completely replaced a previous form of friendship, or at least had pushed the previous form of friendship into social insignificance. Attempts have not been lacking in relating types of friendship with types of society directly with one another, and, in the course of this, in explaining the changing of the former by means of the influence of social development in the direction of modern atomised

¹⁵⁶ This takes place in very different cultural circles and in various periods. Rivarol regards friendship, as the free «mariage d'âmes [= marriage of souls]», possible only between humans «assez égaux en âge, en fortune, en mérite, pour être indépendants l'un de l'autre [= fairly equal in age, fortune (wealth), merit, in order to be independent from one another]» (*Sur l'amitié*, p. 308ff.). The author of the *Pantschatantra* opines: “only where both are equal (the same) in wealth and both equal (the same) in descent (lineage or race), is marriage, friendship, there, proper (or befitting)” (I, § 313 = I, 78)). Herskovits relates a proverb of the tribe Kru in English as follows: “Do not rely on the pot of your friend to feed you” (“Kru Proverbs”, p. 283).

society¹⁵⁷. This influence must indeed be taken into account in a historical and sociological analysis which should make clear the relative social weight of this or that type of friendship in this or that social formation. But we do not know of any social formation in which not all social-ontologically relevant types of friendship in this or that form, with this or that social weight, appeared. A society, which would have reduced all forms of friendship (as well as all forms of enmity) to a single or lone decisive form, would suffer not-to-be-endured (i.e. unbearable) dysfunctionality, and indeed regardless of the degree of its complexity. The subsumption of friendship as a social relation from the point of view of “complexity” lets us, by the way, know how many modern sociological investigations into friendship are attached to the misleading template (cliché or stereotype) of “community vs. society”¹⁵⁸. Accordingly, they construct a type of friendship which was supposed to have dominated and prevailed in “pre-modern” society in the immediate vicinity of familial (i.e. family or kinship) relation(ship)s, and in which the relationship of friends towards one another was ostensibly subject to the grip of fixed (steady or established) social rules and binding rituals, and then contrast this type of friendship to the friendship in atomised mass societies, which in principle has a private character, it itself determines its rules and rituals and consequently is more fragile or even more imponderable¹⁵⁹. However, the already incessant complaints about the transience and instability of friendship from all times and all lands should make us suspicious vis-à-vis such generous (bounteous) contrasts. Personal friendships as private relation(ship)s have existed in all societies

¹⁵⁷ Thus, Y. Cohen connects four types of friendship (inalienable, close, casual, expedient) with four types of society (maximally solidary community, solidary-fissile community, nonnucleated society, individual social structure). Interestingly, he works (or brings) out four types of enmity as counterparts of the above-mentioned types of friendship, see “Patterns”, esp. p. 352ff..

¹⁵⁸ See in relation to that Ch. I, Sec. 4, in this volume.

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. Paine, “In Search of Friendship”.

and, irrespective of their socially sanctioned rituals, they have always (like erotic relation(ship)s too) had their private code, which concerned the regulation of questions of identity and power, no matter whether these codes, looked at from the outside, were and are much more uniform than the partners in friendship or love want to believe, who normally overestimate (overrate) the original aspect of their relationship. And the other way around: in modern atomised mass societies, there are not only private friendships, but likewise socially sanctioned and ritualized friendships, which for instance are dealt with under the rubric of “co-operation”, “reciprocity (mutuality)”, and similarly. For reasons which have to do with the new importance (status or value) of the private [sphere or realm] in these societies, the concept of friendship increasingly obtained private content, but the shifts in the vocabulary do not here mean much in relation to this issue. Incidentally, in language usage, expressions continue to live (i.e. exist) unabated, which concern purely public friendships (“friendship” between peoples or states), and this continues an age-old universal tradition which also belongs to the intellectual(-spiritual) stock of the European New Times¹⁶⁰.

In the example of the ancient concept of friendship, it can be illustrated very well how the social-ontological forms of friendship interweave with one another, and also, how strongly their common bond was felt (or perceived); in fact, the said social-ontological forms of friendship’s subsumption under one and the same term testifies to exactly this.

Examples from other times or cultural circles would, with few

¹⁶⁰ Thus, Bodin speaks of “friendship” both with regard to external politics (i.e. foreign affairs) (a weak republic is «delaissée des amis, assiégée des ennemis [= abandoned by friends, besieged by enemies]»; on the other hand, a strong republic is «reverée des amis, redoutée des ennemis [= revered (respected) by friends, dreaded by enemies]), as well as with regard to internal (i.e. domestic) politics: «la vraye marque d'amitié [= the true mark of friendship]» is for him «le droit gouvernement selon les loix de nature [= the right government in accordance with the laws of nature]» (*République*, I, 1 = p. 4). Cf. Michelet's dictum: «La patrie, c'est bien la grande amitié qui contient toutes les autres [= The fatherland is indeed the great friendship which contains all the other friendships]».

terminological variations, bring to light the same factual (objective) interrelations, nonetheless, the ancient example pushes (i.e. imposes) itself onto us because it has been researched well, and moreover, already contains the necessary theorisation within itself. The concept of friendship here encompasses the whole field and network of social relations, which bring humans, with associating intent, together, whatever principle and motive the said association is based on. A blood relationship (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) and elective affinity (i.e. a relationship of choice), private intimacy and socially institutionalised co-operation, a community of faith (belief) (i.e. a religious community) and utilitarian reciprocity – all fall under the rubric of “friendship”. No Greek was surprised by the self-evidence with which Xenophon for instance, in a characteristic passage, in one breadth, enumerated familial (i.e. family or kinship) relation(ship)s (of parents and children, of brothers and sisters (i.e. siblings) etc.), and associations held together by statute (νόμος) or personal option (i.e. choice), as forms of friendship, without, in the process, failing in pointing out that the organised polities, that is, the poleis [= city-states of ancient Greece], knew of the significance of all these bonds (or ties) of friendship for (being in the know about) social life¹⁶¹. Homosexual and heterosexual erotic relation(ship)s likewise belonged to the possible forms of friendship, even though the then current (or common) vocabulary clearly distinguished between erotic and other relation(ship)s of friendship¹⁶². Nevertheless, this mixing of philia [= friendship as love, affection, fondness and favouritism] and eros [= (carnal) love as mainly sexual yearning or desire] with each other does not constitute a later and abusive (i.e. improper) conceptual expansion of the former [i.e. philia]; rather the said mixing of philia and eros refers to

¹⁶¹ Hieron, Ch. III.

¹⁶² Dirlmeier, *ΦΙΛΟΣ*, p. 59ff..

the closest connection (or bond) between one's own (i.e. the familiar to the self) and the alien (the foreign or strange), which makes out of every friendship, either way, a question of identity (i.e. turns every friendship into a question of identity). The enthralling history of the concept and of the intellect(-spirit) of thus understood friendship has overt social-ontological implications and begins very early in recorded history; it is worth recalling it briefly.

First, the dual Homeric meaning of the adjective φίλος [= φίλος = someone, something loved; a friend; someone, something pleasant, familiar], whose nominalisation provided the Greek word for “friendship”, appears to be fundamental. It [Φίλος] means both one's own (i.e. the familiar to the self) as well as that which is dear (kind, nice or pleasant) and trusted (homely or familiar) to (or for) someone. The combination of both meanings is supposed to denote the character and the extent (or scope) of that which is necessary for self-preservation in the widely comprehended social sense of the word, and lie on this side of the boundary which separates the friendly world, that is friendly subjects and objects, from the inimical world. One's own (i.e. the familiar to the self) and at the same time trusted (homely or familiar) and dear (kind, nice or pleasant) are to and for man his tools and weapons, his entire belongings, and not least of all the persons whom he can trust – family, servants (slaves), relatives, guests and hetairoi [= ἑταῖροι = partners, comrades, fellows of various kinds (work, business, war, etc.), but (usually) not in regard to sexual intimacy], i.e. socii [= Latin = companions, associates, fellows, partners, allies, confederates]. All that together constitutes the conditions (requirements or circumstances) of self-preservation, which can hardly be pulled off in friendless solitude. The relation(ship) with such persons, who are counted amongst the conditions (requirements or

circumstances) of self-preservation, is not necessarily affectively loaded (charged) or altruistically motivated in our sense; of weight (i.e. gravitas or importance) is the act of co-operation and the certainty that one can rely on the help of the other person at any time, even after decades of not seeing each other¹⁶³. Friendship in this sense exists first of all between relatives¹⁶⁴, so that kinship, irrespective of the personal sympathies and antipathies of the relatives towards one another, becomes a system of relation(ship)s characterised by concrete duties and rights¹⁶⁵. The fact that the blood relationship (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) was connected, evidently since earliest times, to the normification (i.e. normative standardisation) of behaviour, had far-reaching consequences. The normative component frequently came to the fore (i.e. became the focus of attention or was given special emphasis), and first of all, this normative component blurred the sharp boundary between the blood relatives (or relations) and the *hetairos* [= ἑταῖρος = partner, comrade, fellow of various kinds (work, business, war, etc.), but (usually) not in regard to sexual intimacy] (*socius* [= Latin = companion, associate, fellow, partner, ally, confederate]), whether this *hetairos* was a brother(comrade)-in-arms, a guest or an ally; to the extent that friendship as hospitality or as an alliance was practised, it was subject also to a code of behaviour (or conduct) and of honour¹⁶⁶. Thereupon, the concept of kinship, which

¹⁶³ Adkins, "Friendship", pp. 33, 36; cf. Fraisse, *Philia*, p. 37ff., who against Adkins wants to emphasise more emphatically the affective (i.e. emotional) aspect of Homeric friendship – not unjustly, I think, if one thinks about the reasons for the frequent strife (discord, quarrels) between Homeric friends.

¹⁶⁴ Which is why the term for "friend" frequently means relatives; by the way, in the Old Germanic too (e.g. *Der Nibelunge Noth*, 492, 3, Lachmann: *freund die nâhen = die nächsten Verwandten* [= near (i.e. close) friend = the nearest relatives]), and even in Luther's Bible translation (e.g. *Luk* [= *Luke*]. 1, 61).

¹⁶⁵ With regard to an ethnologist like Fortes, one could say that altruism in a kinship relation(ship) is not affective (emotional), but "prescriptive": kinship understood as a moral, but also political-juristic(legal and juridical) relation(ship), demands (dictates or commands) friendship, and friendship means "consensus in accepting the value of mutual support" (*Kinship*, pp. 237, 232, 110).

¹⁶⁶ That is why Dirlmeier's stark contrast between kinship and *hetaireia* [= ἑταιρεία = partnership, comradeship, fellowship, companionship, association, brotherhood, political club] (*ΦΙΛΟΣ*, pp. 8ff., 22ff.) must be relativised considerably; cf. Fraisse, *Philia*, pp. 40ff., 44.

continues to determine the basic understanding of the network (web, mesh) of the social relation, is extended such that it is also applied where no blood relationship (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) is present. Friendship is of course frequently articulated in the terminology of kinship relation(ship)s, however these are only verbally comprehensive; friendly relation(ship)s, which one enters into for reasons of purposefulness (end (goal) orientation and expediency) or for personal reasons, are in fact far more extensive. Ethnologists have shown that in all “pre-modern” cultural circles, friendly relation(ship)s were very often dressed up in the forms of a fake (fabricated) common descent, so that the stranger (alien or foreigner) only ceases being regarded as a (potential) foe when he is addressed as a relative¹⁶⁷. The best known of such pseudo-kinships, which was supposed to have cemented friendship through its incorporation into the circle of the, according to the general feeling (perception), strongest and most insoluble relation(ship) amongst humans, has been, since time immemorial, blood brotherhood. However, ritualised personal relation(ship)s as for instance that between “compadres” [e.g. groom and best man] or godparents and godchildren belong to the same category too, which for their part exhibit still looser variations (e.g. inside of patriarchally structured criminal organisations). Although these relation(ship)s differ from the purely contractual ones by means of the choice of one’s friend on the basis of personal qualities (or characteristics) and preferences, by no means is the end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient)-instrumental element missing, which mixes the what is rich in variations with what is emotional-in solidarity; the boundaries between the “irrational” sense of belonging and the “rational” calculable need for backing (i.e. support) and safeguarding (or protection)

¹⁶⁷ Thurnwald, *Die Gemeinde*, esp. pp. 180ff., 159ff.; „Freundschaft“, esp. p. 119ff..

are, anyhow, fluid. Precisely the ineluctable (i.e. inevitable) mixing of these elements or aspects of such friendships with one another as well as the particular nearness (proximity) of friends to one another, which constantly puts to the test mutual loyalty, at whatever level (stage or gradation), generates tensions and conflict(s), especially since in the name of the principle of solidarity, often one-sided (unilateral) utilitarian claims are raised¹⁶⁸. In general, the (pseudo)familial (i.e. family or kinship) element (or impact) of friendship in itself does not in the least vouch for the moderation (attenuation or toning down) of such claims or for the dismantling of rigid hierarchical relations (circumstances or conditions). Patriarchalism has, as is known, become a political system in various, even democratic, forms, and coercion (compulsion or force) can be legitimised most easily through the supposed concern for the welfare of the (fake or fictitious) relative¹⁶⁹.

Let us return, however, to our ancient example. What has been said so far shows that even friendships, which are under the influence of archaic values, contain a number of permanent aspects. These permanent aspects' conceptual separation from one another marks, that is, not the point in time of their coming into being, but such coming into being takes place at a time (or in an age), which for whatever reasons, develops the corresponding abstractions and in these abstractions' light apprehends what until then indeed existed and consciously had an effect, but was not reflected upon at this level of abstraction. A more accurate analysis of the social thoughts world (ideological universe or system of ideas) of Homeric men (and women) can prove that they very well had a notion of the social-ontologically fundamental forms of friendship, i.e. they could

¹⁶⁸ See the good analysis of such relation(ship)s in Eisenstadt, "Ritualised Personal Relations", esp. pp. 90ff., 91ff., 93.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Sorokin's comments about "familistic" and "contractual solidarity", *Society*, esp. pp. 103, 107.

very well distinguish, on the one hand between the elementary substantial bonds (or ties) of friendship (family, community) and more or less transient utilitarian co-operation; on the other hand, between the private and public character of such bonds or end(goal)-oriented (i.e. purposeful or expedient) friendships. In the early or late classical period, however, this experience becomes starkly differentiated, and is conceptually fixed in reflection. We have already indicated under which influences pertaining to the history of ideas the criterion of usefulness (utility or expedience) was emphasised¹⁷⁰. This turned of course against the value scale (i.e. scale of values) of the old nobility (noble lineage or aristocracy) – that is, against an ideology, not against a reality, in relation to which considerations of usefulness (utility or expedience), even in friendship, would be alien (foreign or strange). The conceptual gain was, at any rate, clear, because thereby the two most important degrees of intensity of friendship (binding (i.e. affiliation or a bond) for better or for worse (i.e. come what may), if need be self-sacrifice; and, an end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) relationship of co-operation, if need be dissoluble), were in principle distinguished. Epicurus, who had a soft spot for both perceptions, i.e. friendship could take root in utility (gain, advantage or benefit), and simultaneously regarded the torment (anguish, agony or pain) of one's friend as more painful than one's own torment¹⁷¹, indeed left himself open to some logical weaknesses, in regard to which however he summarised the examination of the problem, and did the same once again e contrario (i.e. from the contrary point of view), when he wanted to make out of friendship a secluded (or remote) private sanctuary (refuge or retreat) against the storms of public life. Because friendship had in the meantime long ago become a social and political

¹⁷⁰ See footnote 78 in this chapter.

¹⁷¹ See e.g. the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, Nr. 23 and 56-57 (Krauz, pp. 84 and 92).

concept, and this happened in a dual sense: on the one hand, as the union of persons of a common cast of mind (mindset or mentality) and common interests in the pursuit of political goals¹⁷²; on the other hand, as the designation (description) of the bond which holds society together in general as well as the conditions (prerequisites) of partial or general social cohesion. With remarkable swiftness, the classical term for friendship (φιλία [= love, affection as friendship] as a neological replacement for the archaic φιλότης [= love, friendship as hospitality]) was extended to peace treaties and alliances between states¹⁷³. However, above all the classical term for friendship was used purposefully in connection with concepts like order and justice, in order to make the co-operative social relations, which constituted life in the framework of organised society, recognisable (distinct)¹⁷⁴.

On the basis of this long pre-history, Aristotle built up his grand phenomenology of friendship, which after a good twenty-three centuries retains its theoretical validity – which certainly says something about the constancy of social-ontological magnitudes. The great thinker did not let himself at all, in the drawing up of this phenomenology, be put off by his own ideal of friendship, i.e. the perfect friendship of the perfect (or accomplished) in terms of both the spirit(-intellect), and, manners, morals and customs; in so far as the normative notion is regarded as realisable, it avowedly constitutes a peripheral phenomenon, and it is not carried into (i.e. included in) social-ontological stocktaking, but rather serves as a background on which the features of social reality come to the fore more sharply. That Aristotle retains his normativism for himself (and the likes of him), is the one methodical (i.e. methodological) advantage of his

¹⁷² Even those political goals of the nobility; on Theognis and his perception of political friendship see Fraisse, *Philia*, p. 50ff.. Cf. footnote 136 in this chapter.

¹⁷³ See e.g. Herodotus IV, 152; VII, 130, 151, 152.

¹⁷⁴ Concisely, Plato, *Politeia*, 351d; *Gorgias*, 508a; *Protagoras*, 322c.

analysis. The other methodological advantage might be conceptually difficult for those who want to make out of the contrast between “community” and “society” not merely two strongly stylised epochs in the development (or evolution) of history, but virtually a social-ontological caesura. Because Aristotle simultaneously and equally accepts “community-based” and “societal” forms of friendship, and he in fact gains his own comprehensive position through demarcation against the pure concept of society, that is, against the sophistic perception (or view) that society was founded by way of contract between individuals, and serves of its essence (nature or being), the (circulation of) exchange and the utility (benefit, profit or advantage) or the protection of its members¹⁷⁵. Aristotle’s turning away from (or break with) (social) normativism is again borne out through his critique of the Platonic state, which exactly because of its egalitarianism destroys socially viable (strong or durable) friendship¹⁷⁶. The upshot of this double polemic reads: friendship in the sense of social cohesion exists in a great variety of particular forms of friendship, which draw on (and live off) very different motivations; and in these forms of friendship, egalitarian as well as hierarchical relations between those involved can be reflected (or can manifest themselves). From this way of looking at things, a set of flexible conceptual instruments (and means of thought) results, which is capable of apprehending the social collective in its concreteness, no matter how the dosage of the “community-based” and “societal (social)”, of the egalitarian and hierarchical, elements in every one of them turns out to be.

¹⁷⁵ See the polemic against Lycophron in *Politik*, 1280b.

¹⁷⁶ Loc. cit., 1262b.

Friendship in society is, i.e. in friendship's sole conceivable coming into being-and-unfolding space, based by and large on two principles: the blood relationship (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) and agreeing (i.e. agreement), in relation to which each of both these kinds of friendship takes several forms¹⁷⁷. Friendship from blood relationships (i.e. consanguinity or kinship) lets us, through one of its forms and indeed that of friendship between parents and children, recognise that friendship in general can exist just as between equals (i.e. people who are the same or alike) as between unequals (i.e. those who are not the same or alike), so that nothing prohibits us from calling the relation(ship) between master and him who obeys (i.e. the servant or the subservient), friendship, in the wider political-social sense, too¹⁷⁸ – certainly if such a relation(ship) is not inimical. The same kind of friendship, when it is in evidence as friendship between a married couple, indicates that motivations are distributed right across the most different kinds of friendship; because husband and wife are united with each other not only through the procreation drive (urge or impulse), but also through utility (benefit, profit, or advantage) and the division of labour¹⁷⁹. It is no wonder when agreeing (i.e. agreement) based on friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) quantitatively preponderates in society by far: humans struggle (fight or battle) constantly over money, honour (reputation) and pleasure (desire, lust)¹⁸⁰. Pleasure and utility naturally represent two varying (or different) things, and Aristotle accordingly distinguishes the friendships from one another coming into being from them, however, no less important appears to be Aristotle's division of

¹⁷⁷ *Nikom. Ethik*, 1161b 11 – 15. An appendage, as it were, of kinship, the friendship of *hetairoi* [= *ἑταῖροι* = partners, comrades, fellows of various kinds (work, business, war, etc.), but (usually) not in regard to sexual intimacy] is also mentioned here.

¹⁷⁸ *Loc. cit.*, 1158b 11-14.

¹⁷⁹ *Loc. cit.*, 1162a 24-25.

¹⁸⁰ *Loc. cit.*, 1168b 15-19.

friendship for use into a strict statutes (i.e. rules-based or legal) friendship (νομική), in which performance and service in return (i.e. a quid pro quo) (or supply and consideration) are precisely stipulated, and, a loose friendship of cast of mind (mindset or mentality) (ἠθική), in which the performance (supply or “pro quo”) is honoured (remunerated or rewarded) asymmetrically and irregularly by the services in return (consideration or “quid”)¹⁸¹. The representation (or notion) of utility changes constantly along with humans and situations, and consequently friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) must be subject to vacillations (or fluctuations) and crises¹⁸², in fact friendship for use’s termination is, so to speak, already in its entering into (i.e. from the beginning), co-calculated (i.e. included in the calculation); exactly that which here makes friendship, also brings about its end. The socially decisive friendship types (even the political friendship keeping the polity together is in fact a friendship for use¹⁸³) are not therefore in any necessary relation(ship) with ethical factors and motives.

The Aristotelian phenomenology of friendship emphasises two further social-ontologically central points of view. On the one hand it is ascertained that all kinds of friendship show greater or lesser intensity¹⁸⁴. On the other hand, an interrelation between the predominant kind or intensity of friendship, and, the internal structure of the polity, i.e. of the political collective is made (established, manufactured or restored). This political collective is based on an, on each and every respective occasion, particular shaping of the relationships (or circumstances) pertaining to the law (and justice); however, the law (and justice) and friendship, in

¹⁸¹ Loc. cit., 1162b 23.

¹⁸² Loc. cit., 1162b 5-6. Cf., in relation to that, Cicero, *Laelius*, 9 (32).

¹⁸³ Loc. cit., 1160a 11-12.

¹⁸⁴ Loc. cit., 1159b 34-35 (τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἥττον [= for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly friendships (Engl.tr. adapted by L. Dyingier, O.S.B. from that of by W. D. Ross. Greek:, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1894 rpr.1962). Cit. Bekker])).

practical terms, coincide¹⁸⁵: they concern the same humans and have the same extent (or scope)¹⁸⁶. That is why that which Aristotle calls political friendship, i.e. the friendship articulated in terms of law and justice keeping the polity together, reaches its high point where concord (or harmony), that is, the agreement of all sides regarding the interests to be pursued, as well as regarding the manner of these agreed interests' practical implementation, dominates¹⁸⁷. Just as every friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) or friendship between the accomplished (i.e. completed, consummate or perfect people) in terms of manners, morals, customs and intellect(-spirit), so too law (and justice) and constitutional law are subject to more or less great vacillations (or fluctuations), which not seldom flow into (i.e. lead to) stasis [= στᾶσις (στάσις) = rising, revolt, sedition, party-strife, discord, quarrel; party, faction; standing, stationariness, condition, station, position], (in)to turmoil (or rebellion) and civil war, at any rate show concord (or harmony) in the literal sense as an ideal borderline case. The concrete causes and more precise (or detailed) circumstances of these vacillations (or fluctuations) and endangering of (or threats or risks to) political friendship to be investigated, are, though, the matter (business or thing) of history and sociology, and this matter has, as is known, also occupied the historian and sociologist Aristotle. This insight into the asymmetrical relationship between degrees of intensity and kinds of friendship inside of the spectrum of the social relation is social-ontologically important. That means: the construction of this spectrum as a succession of degrees of intensity does not coincide with its construction as an inventory of the kinds of friendship. The intensity achieves all its degrees in every single

¹⁸⁵ Loc. cit., 1155a 22-28, 1159b 25-28.

¹⁸⁶ Loc. cit., 1160a 7-8.

¹⁸⁷ Loc. cit., 1167b 36-37, 1167a 26-28.

kind of friendship, in the private as in the public kind of friendship, in the statutory as in the emotionally determined and (electively (i.e. as regards choice))familiarily determined kind of friendship; because of this, one can construct the spectrum of the social relation as a succession of these degrees (grades), without having to take into consideration the typology of the kinds of friendship. This typology, for its part, cannot be apprehended as a gradually (i.e. in terms of degrees or grades) structured (or jointed) sequence (or order); the types or the kinds intersect with one another depending on the criterion of classification.

4. Excursus: the spectrum of the social relation in the spectrum of social theory and of social science

The fundamental social-ontological principle that friendship and enmity in their many forms spanned the entire spectrum of the social relation, was, as we know, not put forward first by formal sociology, and also not claimed by formal sociology as its own discovery¹⁸⁸. In reality, this fundamental social-ontological principle constitutes since time immemorial in all cultural circles a matter of self-evidence, which indeed first of all was expressed not in the form of a theoretical insight, but rather as an elementary rule of orientation in life. To remain with the Greeks: “probably the oldest saying which the Greeks formulated about the relationship of man towards man, is the piece of advice to love one’s friend and to hate one’s foe”¹⁸⁹. This requirement for wisdom and prudence was typically enough, regardless of other world-theoretical and

¹⁸⁸ See Sec. 2A in this chapter.

¹⁸⁹ Dirlmeier, *ΦΙΛΟΣ*, 27; with many references.

political sympathies, heeded; it is found for example with the same lack of hesitance in thinking in Plato¹⁹⁰ and in Thucydides¹⁹¹; moreover, the patriotic consciousness of the citizen of the ancient polis [= city-state] is summed up in the above-mentioned piece of advice, for whom the concept “fatherland” and the duty to help one’s friend and to harm one’s foe are synonymous¹⁹². The Christian exhortation to love one’s foe meant a change in the ethical positioning (stance or attitude), but not in the ascertainment that the social world could be divided into friends and foes. On the contrary, such an exhortation presupposed this ascertainment, whilst at the same time the necessity of enmity in statu isto [= in that state of ours] could be explained by the Fall of Man (or Original Sin)¹⁹³. It should be added that in the ancient as well as in the Christian thought framework, friendship and enmity were derived from an anthropology of drives (urges), no matter how one interpreted the origin and composition (texture, nature or constitution) of the drives (urges) on each and every respective occasion. It stayed that way even after the establishment of the primacy of anthropology in the European New Times. Ferguson spoke of the “mixed dispositions to friendship or enmity” of man, that is why Ferguson saw friendship and enmity at work “in the most pacific situation” too, and connected both halves, of which, according to his perception, social life consists, i.e. the “state of war” and “state of amity”, with the corresponding unalterable aptitudes (or predispositions) in man¹⁹⁴.

One would have to write a whole treatise in order to explain that already since the 18th century, but above all in the 19th and 20th century,

¹⁹⁰ See e.g. *Politeia*, 332d, 375c.

¹⁹¹ See e.g. I, 41,3; I, 43,3. With the stereotypical obligation “to have the same friends and foes”, alliances are sealed, e.g. I, 44, 1; III, 70, 6; III, 75, 1; VII, 33, 6 etc..

¹⁹² According to a fine observation by L. Strauss, *On Tyranny*, p. 138.

¹⁹³ See e.g. Augustine, *De civ. dei*, the entire 19th book (cf. footnotes 146, 149 above).

¹⁹⁴ *Essay*, I, 1, 3, 4 = pp. 3, 16, 20.

many social theoreticians bade farewell to the thousands-of-years-old self-evidence (or naturalness) of social-ontologically placing friendship and enmity next to each other on an equal basis in the spectrum of the social relation. Nonetheless, an indication of a particularly important reason for that should not be lacking here. We mean the extremely intricate effect of the eschatological philosophy of history, whose avowed aim consisted in fact exactly in cutting (or shortening) the spectrum of the social relation around (or at) the half or at least around (or at) the pole of enmity, that is, of holding out the prospect of social relations (circumstances and conditions) which would exclude bloody conflict(s). As long as the Kingdom of God was not of this world, one might have held, as a Christian, without contradiction, onto the dream of harmony at the end of time, and concurrently onto the conviction and belief that on this earth the lot of sinful man is (in the best case) friendship and (in any case) enmity. However, the shifting of the dream from Heaven to Earth made the exclusion of enmity from the realm of social-ontological constants absolutely essential. The exclusion resulted through the promise of classless society in Marxist messianism, through the certainty that trade will take the place of war in half-hearted (or diffident) liberal chiliasm, as well as through other, politically less effective ideologems (i.e. kinds of sub-ideology), which nevertheless drew the force of their magnetism (aura or charisma) from the more effective ideologies, even when they more or less deviate from these. Personalisms belong to such ideologems, which aimed for a friendly unio mystica [= mystical union] between the members of a society and through that unio mystica, the overcoming of conventional (i.e. traditional) evils, or else seemingly ideologically colourless systems theories, whose view of things a limine leapt over deep inimical splits in the social body, and whose actual

reversion to the philosophy of history, we have already ascertained¹⁹⁵. Hereinafter we shall see how representatives of such currents sought to define the social relation to the programmatic exclusion of enmity, even though an overall view shows that its success has been only partial. Enmity continues to appear in very many social-theoretical and social-psychological reconstructions of the spectrum of the social relation as a pole of this spectrum of the social relation, and one would create (i.e. have) an entirely false picture pertaining to the history of ideas, if one here took as a yardstick that which one since several decades ago gets to be offered in Germany in unsurpassable ethical and political correctness. We shall start once again with formal sociology, which of its premises had to pose this question of what enmity actually means social-ontologically, and whose impact penetrated much deeper than the influence of “closed” and “open” systems theories let us suppose.

Tönnies’ approach as is known initiated, so to speak, formal sociology in so far as, namely, community and society were comprehended as the ultimate conceivable forms of social living together (i.e. co-existence); on the other hand, Tönnies remained doubly captive of (attached to) the philosophy of history: community and society appear as necessary stages of a development (or evolution) of history *and* at the end of the same historical development, a restoration of community is supposed to emerge on a higher (i.e. superior) (anti-capitalistic) basis¹⁹⁶. The dichotomy (or rift) is reflected in the importance (status or value) of enmity inside of the sociological system. For Tönnies, it is certain that a comprehensive description of human relations cannot pass by (i.e. overlook) enmity, even extreme enmity. The “reciprocal effects” in which those relations

¹⁹⁵ See Ch. I, Sec. 3 in this volume.

¹⁹⁶ See Ch. I, Sec. 4 in this volume.

consist tend “towards the preservation or... towards the destruction of the other will or body”, they are “affirmative (i.e. positive) or denying (i.e. negative)”¹⁹⁷; every animal being (creature) lives, by the way, within the polarity of “acceptance and exclusion (expulsion), attack and defence, approximation (i.e. approaching) and flight”, which is expressed “physically and mentally” as “pleasure and pain, desire and disgust, hope and fear”, “neutrally and logically” as “affirmation and denial”¹⁹⁸.

Tönnies knew though that friendship and enmity have to appear in both fundamental types of social living together (or co-existence) (i.e. community and society), but that is not supposed to mean for him that social living together was founded equally on friendship and enmity. In the apprehension of the social as such, friendship has by definition precedence; that is why Tönnies wants to make the theme in his main work exclusively the “relations (circumstances or conditions) of mutual affirmation”¹⁹⁹. Later, he tried to partially found (or justify), partially ease (i.e. moderate) the one-sidedness of this decision by way of an epistemological distinction. Accordingly, “all interrelations of humans in space and time, irrespective of whether ... they affirm or deny one another” are the object (or subject matter) of “general sociology”. “Special” sociology, whose first part is “pure”, does not, on the other hand, investigate the friendly and inimical or the positive and negative “mental(-spiritual) relationship between humans”, but only “the social

¹⁹⁷ *Gemeinschaft*, p. 3.

¹⁹⁸ Loc. cit., p. 86. The explanation of friendship and enmity takes place therefore ultimately on a psychology of drives (urges) basis, cf. p. 17ff.: enmity emerges from either the “tearing or loosening of natural and existing ties (bonds)” or else from “strangeness (alienness or unfamiliarity), lack of understanding, mistrust”. “Both instances are instinctive, but the former is essentially wrath (or anger), hate, displeasure (or unwillingness), the latter is essentially fear, abhorrence (or disgust), aversion (or distaste); the former, acute; the latter, chronic.”

¹⁹⁹ Loc. cit., p. 3.

relationship”, which is supposed to come into being “out of a positive mental(-spiritual) relationship”²⁰⁰.

In Simmel, the terms “general” and “pure” sociology have, as mentioned²⁰¹, a completely different meaning than in Tönnies. If one takes the equal thematisation of friendship and enmity as the benchmark, then Simmel’s “pure” sociology is in fact at the antipodes of Tönniesian “pure” sociology, or it corresponds, in terms of content, with Tönnies’s “general” sociology. Because Simmel wants to research in “pure” sociology the forms of socialisation; however, all “interactions (or mutual influences) amongst humans” without exception belong to the forms of socialisation, that is, even enmity and struggle (fighting), and indeed as “one of the most lively” of interactions (or mutual influences) amongst humans²⁰². The unity of the social results from the addition of association and dissociation, not from a subtraction in which the dissociative element is neatly separated from the associative element and, as it were, would be surgically removed from the social body. The unity of the social is, in other words, something conceptually and ontologically different than the social unity in this or that concrete society. The struggle (fighting) is “an against one another (i.e. conflict or antagonism), which belongs, with the for one another (i.e. harmony, agreement or co-operation), under a higher concept”. It may in its most extreme forms “rise (or build up) to the driving out of all moments (fact(or)s or elements) of unity”, but even then, i.e. even as open war, struggle (fighting) is to be comprehended as a “borderline case of socialisation”²⁰³. How deeply struggle and war, that is, enmity, is interwoven into the social network (or mesh), becomes evident from the thought that the transition from war to peace in principle

²⁰⁰ „Einteilung“, pp. 430, 434ff.; cf. already in „Das Wesen“, p. 351.

²⁰¹ See footnote 18 in this chapter.

²⁰² *Soziologie*, pp. 186, 187ff..

²⁰³ Loc. cit., p. 193, and „Zur Methodik“, p. 233.

can be more difficult to explain than the other way around. Because the “the situations inside of peace, from which open struggle (fighting or battle) emerges, are themselves already struggle (fighting or battle) in a diffuse, imperceptible or latent form”, however peace “does not crystallise likewise immediately in the dispute”, but it needs a “particular undertaking (or act(ion))”, which can be a victory, compromise, or (re)conciliation²⁰⁴. The “collectivising effect” of the struggle (fighting or battle), to which Simmel devotes impressive pages²⁰⁵, bears witness to, from a wider viewpoint (i.e. perspective), the original togetherness (belonging together or common bond) of enmity and sociality. Friendship belongs, of course, likewise to sociality, yet it is not identical with this sociality, and that is why commentators err, who disguise their own pious wish to equate sociality with friendship absolutely as a question to Simmel as to how then Simmel wants to deduce sociality from the general concept of interaction (or mutual influence) when struggle (fighting or battling) and friendship are interactions (or mutual influences) too²⁰⁶.

Simmel’s implicit turning away from Tönnies on this crucial point becomes in v. Wiese explicit. The narrowing of the concept of the social to “so-called positive, uninimical (i.e. non-inimical) relations”, v. Wiese writes, corresponds with “ethical” language usage, however, is “not to be recommended in sociology”, which should develop its own criteria beyond ethics, aesthetics, etc.. If sociology turns its attention exclusively to “positive” social relations, then from those “positive” social relations not merely an incomplete, but an absolutely false picture comes into being: “because the now and again (or off and on) (i.e. interchange

²⁰⁴ *Soziologie*, p. 246ff..

²⁰⁵ Loc. cit., p. 239ff..

²⁰⁶ Thus, e.g. Becker, *Simmel*, p. 31ff..

between “positive” and “negative” social relations) in practice interlocks (meshes or interconnects) so much and constitutes such a dense network (mesh) that one wrongly explains every community if one derives every community only from solidarity (attachment, closeness, fellowship or strong mutual bonds)²⁰⁷. Other representatives of formal sociology likewise directly or indirectly appropriated this criticism of Tönnies²⁰⁸. But M. Weber here unmistakably also took the side of the critics by accepting first of all Simmel’s dual definition of interaction (or mutual influence) as friendship and enmity, in order to of course then expand the concept of interaction (or mutual influence) to the concept of social action. That decisive part of social action, which is called “social relation” and is characterised by the reciprocal (mutual) orientation of the behaviour of the actors towards one another, can, according to Weber, have the “most different content of all”, that is “enmity” as well as “friendship”. The concept of the social relation (and of the social in general) “says nothing about: whether the ‘solidarity’ of those acting exists or the precise opposite”²⁰⁹. The relationship pertaining to struggle (fighting or battle) accordingly constitutes a social relation in the full

²⁰⁷ *Allg. Soziologie*, I, pp. 37, 181, 15ff.; *System*, p. 54ff.. For Tönnies’s social-ethical inspiration cf. König, „Begriffe“, p. 373.

²⁰⁸ See Vierkandt’s table of social relations, which as to one half consists of “relations (circumstances or conditions) of struggle (fighting or battle) and power”, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 237. Vierkandt writes though that a “will to struggle (fight or battle)”, which is directed “unrestrictedly towards bodily (i.e. physical) extermination”, would, unlike other forms of struggle (fighting or battle), exclude society (loc. cit., p. 108ff.). With that, he apparently does not mean society in general and as such, but only society between those struggling (fighting or battling) one another in such a manner of bodily (i.e. physical) extermination; the reasons for which the struggle (fight or battle) of life and death can only be temporary and only a partial state of affairs inside a society were mentioned above (Sec. 3A in this chapter). Regarding the background pertaining to the anthropology of drives (urges) of Vierkandt’s teaching (or theory) of the social relation, see „Die Beziehung“, p. 221ff.. “The drive (urge) of help and of struggle (fighting or battle)”, mixed depending on the “circumstances (relations or conditions)” on each and every respective occasion”. Plenge, in direct succession to v. Wiese, distanced himself expressly from Tönnies, see „Zum Ausbau“ (I), p. 281. Plenge’s objection that Tönnies would have had to, along with the “counter-circumstances (relations or conditions)”, in terms of consistency, also excluded the circumstances (relations or conditions) of supra-ordination and subordination from his sociology, does not, however, hit the mark: circumstances of supra-ordination and subordination can be founded (or based) on friendship too (see Section 1B in this chapter).

²⁰⁹ *Wirtschaft*, p. 13.

sense of the word, and indeed in its entire spectrum, from irregular (disorderly or erratic) and regular (or orderly) bloody struggle (fighting or battle) up to peaceful competition (or rivalry) bound to an order²¹⁰. Social living together (i.e. co-existence) cannot, whether as “community” or as “society”, be regarded as the chemically pure opposite of struggle (fighting or battle) and enmity, because in social living together “rape (or violation[s]) of every kind” constantly take(s) place; the, on each and every respective occasion, compromises reached shut out (i.e. exclude) “only a part of the object of struggle (fighting or battle) or of the means of struggle (fighting or battle)”, however, the clash of interests remains, and according to its sharpness (acuteness), the struggle (fighting or battle) is shaped “very differently, depending on the means (violent or ‘peaceful’) and the ruthlessness of their application”²¹¹. Peace does not mean conflictlessness (i.e. a lack or absence of conflict), but merely the use of means, “which do not consist in actual physical violence (or states of being violent)”²¹². Consequently, Weber comes to the same conclusion which Clausewitz had already drawn on the basis of similar considerations on the texture (composition, constitution or nature) of social living together (i.e. co-existence). Peace and war, the General opined, do not necessarily differ from each other with regard to goals (ends), but specifically with regard to the means used. The application of violence constitutes the specific feature of war exactly because peace is no conflict-free state of affairs; if peace were this conflict-free state of affairs, then war and conflict would be synonymous, and the equating of peace with conflictlessness (i.e. an absence or lack of conflict) would, for its part, make the coming into being of war incomprehensible: because

²¹⁰ Loc. cit., p. 20.

²¹¹ Loc. cit., p. 22.

²¹² Loc. cit., p. 20.

out of what would wars come into being in general if not out of conflicts in the state of peace?²¹³.

Formal sociology always exercised its direct or indirect influence where one tried to achieve a systematic drawing up of the spectrum of the social relation; in actual fact, older formulations of the polar principle of association and dissociation appear to be quite primitive in comparison to formal sociology's accomplishments²¹⁴. Some phenomenologists of the lifeworld praised formal sociology's services (i.e. contributions) to the investigation of the "situation of contact" in the dual form of "towards one another and away from one another"²¹⁵, in order to then of course rather one-sidedly devote themselves to the "towards one another" as anonymity in the lifeworld. There were, however, renowned sociologists, who drew the right conclusion from formal sociology, that just as great significance must be attached to the "away from one another". Gurvitch expressly adopted v. Wiese's trisection (i.e. division into three parts) of the social relation and spoke of «relations de rapprochement, d'éloignement et mixtes» [= "relations of rapprochement, remoteness and mixed relations"], in regard to which he examined the said trisection from the point of view of "passivity – activity", and opined that in association, the passive element (factor or motive) would more likely predominate, in dissociation the active element (factor or motive) would more likely predominate; against Durkheim's interpretation of the contractual relationship as consensus, Gurvitch asserted in turn the contractual relationship's mixed character as simultaneous approaching (or drawing near) and distancing: the former consists in the reciprocity (mutuality) of the obligation, the latter, in the difference in the expectations, which

²¹³ In relation to that, Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges* [= *Theory of War*], esp. pp. 32, 33ff., 35.

²¹⁴ See e.g. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 17, 34.

²¹⁵ Schütz, *Aufbau*, p. 246ff..

connects every side with the fulfilment of obligations²¹⁶. Sorokin likewise agreed with v. Wiese on the issue at hand; he only modified the terminology and defined the three basic types of the social relation on the basis of the dual criterion of the aspirations connected with representations (or notions) of meaning and value, and, of external act(ion)s. In relations “of solidarity”, the aspirations and act(ion)s of both sides coincide; in “antagonistic” relations, aspirations and act(ion)s are opposed; in “mixed” relations, aspirations are in accord (i.e. harmony or agreement) with, and act(ion)s contrary to, one another, or the other way around²¹⁷. Other sociological classifications of the social relations which refer to v. Wiese attempted a combination of the points of view of association and dissociation with supra-ordination and subordination²¹⁸. In the direct succession to formal sociology (i.e. amongst formal sociology’s direct successors), it remained at any rate clear that even “unmitigated hostility” is to be comprehended as a *social* relation²¹⁹.

All in all nonetheless, formal sociology did not make a big breakthrough vis-à-vis professional sociologists. That was bound to be so, and indeed not merely because of the rise of functionalism and of systems theory. Formal sociology’s actual matter of concern was a social-ontological one, with which sociology *as* sociology, i.e. as science – which in the separation from historical content(s) sooner or later dries up – cannot do much, although it urgently needs social-ontological help in respect of orientation. The elementary principles of formal sociology however struck a chord (or caught on) outside of the guild of sociologists, certainly whilst paying the price of flattening (or levelling) out and of

²¹⁶ Gurvitch, *Vocation*, I, p. 187ff..

²¹⁷ *Society*, p. 93.

²¹⁸ See footnote 209.

²¹⁹ McIver-Page, *Sociology*, p. 25ff.. Social relations were here, though, seen as the outflow (i.e. result) of psychological attitudes; see the table on p. 28.

vulgarisation. Sociometrics (i.e. sociometry) began e.g. programmatically from the assumption that in all relations between individuals and groups forces appear which had to be seen as attraction and repulsion²²⁰; the network of the organisation of groups can accordingly be described as the “labyrinth of love and of hate”²²¹. This “corroboration (reinforcement or endorsement)” of v. Wiese’s fundamental thoughts could not, however, deter v. Wiese from finding fault with the psychological orientation in sociometrics (i.e. sociometry), which put aside that which occurs *between* humans for the sake of what is going on *in* them; a neglecting of the factors “acting (or act(ion))” and “situation” is the regrettable consequence²²². Nonetheless, acting (or act(ion)) (as “behavior”) and situation soon came into the field of vision (i.e. became the focus of attention) of the more demanding (or sophisticated) social psychologists, thus e.g. of Bales, who, by the way, pointed to v. Wiese as his inspirer²²³. The result of Bales’s being influenced by formal sociology was the drawing up of a table of twelve forms of interaction, which for their part were divided into three main groups: positive, neutral and negative. At one end of the spectrum are solidarity, dismantling (i.e. reduction) of tension and agreement, at the other end, difference of (or variety in) opinion, tension, antagonism²²⁴. The American’s remark directly calls to mind v. Wiese that all these classes of the social relation would constitute a whole and had to be comprehended in their unity; if some of the classes amongst them would be left out or not understood, then the other classes could not be correctly defined any longer²²⁵. Here, though, we are

²²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 6. Cf. footnote 133 above.

²²¹ Moreno, *Grundlagen*, pp. 3, 138.

²²² „Soziometrik“, pp. 23ff., 30ff..

²²³ *Interaction*, pp. 43, 198.

²²⁴ Loc. cit., see the table at p. 59 and its explication p. 177ff.. Bales reproduced this arrangement (classification or structuring) in a number of publications and (s)lightly varied it, see “Categories”, esp. p. 258; *Personality*, chap. 6; also Bales-Gerbrands, “Interaction Recorder”, p. 462ff..

²²⁵ *Interaction*, p. 63.

exclusively dealing with classes, which make up the spectrum of the social relation, that is, which show the degree of dissociation and of association. Other subdivisions of the social relation do not concern the social relation's spectrum and the intensities occurring in this spectrum, nonetheless, they are likewise named in pairs in one breath with the criterion of association and dissociation, in order to outline the social relation as completely as possible. According to Triandis, apart from "association and dissociation", "superordination [= supra-ordination] and subordination", "intimacy and formality", "overt and covert behaviour" must be brought into play as the parameters for this purpose; he also names them "genotypes" of universal validity, towards which analytical findings would be (or behave) like culturally varying "phenotypes"²²⁶. Another social-psychological attempt at working and bringing out the parameters of the social relation, as was perceived by actors, likewise named four antithetical pairs of concepts: "cooperative-friendly vs. competitive-hostile", "equal vs. unequal", "intense vs. superficial", "emotional-informal vs. task-oriented and formal"; the authors rightly add that the whole of social-psychological research relies on these or similar categories, irrespective of whether friendship and enmity are rechristened in a "positive" and "negative" relation(ship); equality and inequality as autonomy and dominance²²⁷. This conceptuality has spread in fact inside of psychological and behavioural research such that one even in a sociometric journal structured (or arranged) animal social behaviour according to the way animals "attract or repulse each other"²²⁸. Finally, in this context, mention must be made of the indeed

²²⁶ "Some Universals", p. 8; "Analysis", p. 270.

²²⁷ Wish-Deutsch-Kaplan, "Perceived Dimensions", p. 419.

²²⁸ Scott, "Group Formation", p. 51. Cf. Shibutani's division of "social transactions" into "sustaining" (co-operation of every kind) and "agonistic" ("conflict from family quarrels to total wars"). "All these processes are found in all societies" and, although they are analytically distinguishable, nevertheless "in real life they blend, overlap, and co-exist even in the same transaction" (*Social Processes*, pp. 5, 25-28).

heterogeneous, but noticeable influence of psychoanalytical dualism pertaining to the anthropology of drives (urges), which likewise is divided into centrifugal and centripetal forces having an effect amongst actors, that is, are represented in the form (or shape) of a spectrum, which stretches between both poles of the drive (impulse or instinct) of eros and of the drive (impulse or instinct) of death²²⁹.

The more or less sociometrically and experimentally oriented social psychology could, despite the manifold fastening (or attachment) to formal sociology, bring very little to light about real social dynamics, especially about the borderline cases of extreme friendship and of extreme enmity. The experimenting with test persons in laboratories or class rooms cannot overcome the conventional setting(s) (or drawing(s)) of a boundary and distributions of roles; it has a certain indicative value, however it must remain harmless (innocuous or innocent) and often naive. Friendship and enmity indeed constitute even in such an ambience both extreme forms of the social relation, however words here have a different weight than in historical and social praxis (practice). Exactly because of this harmlessness (innocuousness or innocence) of theirs, the findings and the concepts of social psychology do not essentially get in the way of the endeavour of several sides to shape (or mould) the spectrum of the social relation, at least on paper, according to human wishes. This endeavour came on the scene principally in two variations: as the by definition identification of the concept of the social relation with the concept of friendship, and as the acute differentiation of peaceful conflict acting or operating positively (i.e. having a positive effect) from harmful bloody conflict. We already hinted at the eschatological backgrounds of such theses pertaining to the philosophy of history, and

²²⁹ See e.g. Kardiner, *Individual*, p. 63.

that is why it cannot be any wonder when we find them again both in mystically inspired thinkers as well as in enlightened liberals believing in Progress. Thus, for Buber, “relation” in its actual sense is “mutuality (reciprocity)”, and indeed mutuality amongst equals, between whom there is “no goal (end or purpose), no greed and no anticipation”; end (goal, purposeful or expedient) rationality and independence are eo ipso regarded as withdrawal, as the “de-realisation” of the relation²³⁰. Buber does not say how he will call the real friendly and inimical relations which do not fulfil these (pre)conditions of the ideal. Here the nomenclature can obviously only get by on the value-laden distinction between the “authentic (genuine, true or actual)” and the “inauthentic (ungenuine, untrue or notional)” relation, which is however social-scientifically vacuous, since it lumps the great variety of “inauthentic (ungenuine, untrue or notional)” relations together: from the point of view of the “authentic (genuine, true or actual)” relation, the difference between friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) and enmity appears to be structurally subordinate. A liberal like v. Mises, who must evaluate friendship for use (utility, benefit, profit or advantage) much more positively than Buber, and hardly says a word about ideal relations, shares, at any rate, with Buber the ethical-normative definition of the social relation. V. Mises in fact turns explicitly against v. Wiese and looks at it as an error “to define the term ‘social relationships’ in such a way as to include actions which aim to other people’s annihilation and at the frustration of their actions”. Not every relation between humans, he explains, is a social relation, but only that which supports society as a co-operative undertaking, in which every participant sees in the success of his partner the means for the attainment of one’s own goals (ends or

²³⁰ *Ich und Du*, pp. 14, 18ff., 100.

purposes)²³¹. Where, that is, the society or the social and co-operative cohesion are regarded as synonymous, the social relation and friendship, whatever the *couleur* (i.e. shade and colour, complexion or hue) and motivation, must also be equated. That is why the way of looking at society as a functional system lets such a definition of the social relation seem absolutely compelling, and Radcliff-Brown e.g. does not hesitate from talking about the “social relation” and “social solidarity” synonymously and alternately. A social relation for him is present only when the interests of two or more actors are co-ordinated, either through convergence or through the (de)limiting of divergence²³².

The rise and dissemination of functionalistic systems theory reinforced in many sociologists the inclination to deny, expressly or tacitly, to enmity, the status of the social relation. The experiences with respect to two world wars and mass exterminations of an enormous scale muddied but little the joyful theory formation, which in the West proceeded against the background of growing affluence and the mass-democratic loosening of conventional (or traditional) hierarchies. Still more typical than the unwillingness of the systems theoreticians of the first generation to thoroughly go into the phenomenon of enmity, has been the attempt of some of their opponents to rehabilitate conflict sociologically, however, whilst at the same time emphasising its system-preserving and system-renewing function; consequently, the “left-wing” opponents of the Parsonian notions of equilibrium (or balance) contributed atmospherically to the reformulation of systems theory under the influence of cybernetics, i.e. to the putting forward of the theory of the “open system”²³³. Because conflict basically continued to be seen from the perspective of the

²³¹ *Human Action*, pp. 169, 168.

²³² *Structure and Function*, p. 199.

²³³ See Ch. I, Sec. 2 in this volume.

“system”, which can be either “rigid” and “totalitarian” or “flexible” and “open”; in the first case, conflicts could, in fact must entail irreparable splits (divisions, fissures, or schisms); in the latter case, conflict would be, for a society which has at its disposal “valve institutions (i.e. institutions which act like a vent or outlet)” for conflict’s channeling, “functional” and fertile as a means of adaptation to new situations. Social equilibrium becomes therefore endangered not through conflict in itself, but through the rigidity of the system. The subdivision of the conflicts likewise takes place on the basis of the general character of the “system”. In the “rigid” system, conflicts are expected to be “fake”, in the “flexible” system, “genuine”, i.e. such in which there are functional alternatives regarding the means, and permanence (or duration) regarding the aims (i.e. ends); “fake” conflicts, on the other hand, served merely for the psychological unloading (or discharge) of tension and changed their aims (ends) according to the needs of this latter unloading (or discharge) of tension, not however their means, since the unloading (or discharge) of tension would be sought exactly in the application of the means²³⁴. A “certain measure in conflict” promotes group formation and the continued existence of the collective, if the conflict does not touch upon the foundations of this collective, and if it accordingly does not escalate into

²³⁴ Coser, *Theorie*, pp. 93, 151ff., 184, 55ff.. It is incomprehensible to me how Coser can assign “fake” conflicts in principle to “rigid” systems, when he, on the other hand, admits that wars without personal enmity can be waged, that is, not out of the need for the unloading (or discharge) of tension (loc. cit., p. 68ff.). The decision to break open (blow up or bu(r)st) a “system” through war or civil war, because it appears to be “rigid” and without a way out (i.e. hopeless or a dead end) with regard to its own aims (ends), can spring from thoroughly rational considerations; that is why the insisting on the application of certain, i.e. violent means is not necessarily founded (or based) on a psychological need for the unloading (or discharge) of tension. When Coser talks about a “functional alternative” in means, he is patently not thinking of the alternative between “peaceful – violent” means, but of the possibility of choice between various peaceful means in a western parliamentary democracy. In general, he cannot make plausible (i.e. clear) any compelling correlations between the choice of goals (i.e. ends) and means on the one hand, and “genuine” and “fake” conflicts, on the other hand.

one sole contrasting (opposition or conflict), but is spread out and distributed into several smaller conflicts²³⁵.

Dahrendorf criticised Coser's conflict theory as "the final word of functionalism on the examination of the problem of social conflicts". The accusation was objectively correct, but subjectively grossly exaggerated. Because Dahrendorf himself moved thoroughly within Coser's thought framework, i.e. he did not offer a complete phenomenology of enmity, but tried to apprehend conflicts in principle from their "positive" side (i.e. facet). In relation to that, little changes, even the fact that Dahrendorf put in the place of "system", "change" as supra-concept (i.e. generic term). The task, meaning and consequence of social conflicts would accordingly consist in "maintaining and promoting the changing of global societies and their parts". In order to facilitate the necessary and desired change and "to give" such change the form "of gradual development", conflicts should be "recognised and regulated"; "the contradictions of the norms and interests dealt with and preserved at the same time in the rules of the game constitute the real chance (i.e. opportunity) of that historical epoch, which one should strive after as 'eternal peace'" and is supposed to be put in the place of a conflict-free utopia – "then conflict signifies the great hope of a dignified and rational coping with life in society"²³⁶.

Dahrendorf indeed spoke of revolution, yet preferably on the fringes (or in passing); however, he did not speak of war, and indeed precisely as a vehicle of rapid change, at all. The co-existence of friendship and enmity in their extreme intensity on both sides – when, namely, two groups of friends inimically stand against (or face) each other in revolution or war – is barely discussed; instead of that, these groups' entanglement (or

²³⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 33, 86, 90.

²³⁶ „Die Funktionen“, pp. 272, 276.

interweaving), enabled by moderation on both sides, inside of the same social group or society, is at the centre of interest. That is of course a tremendous narrowing of the theoretical horizon, which suppresses the important problem in regard to what intensity under what circumstances does conflict promote change – or even inhibits change. Without doubt, the forms of conflict, on which Coser and Dahrendorf concentrate by preference, are historically real and theoretically not to be thought [= thrown] away (i.e. disregarded) aspects in the spectrum of the social relation; however, their essence (substance, texture, nature or character) can be ascertained only by the determination of their significance (status or value) in the entire spectrum. One can also formulate this ascertainment in regard to the fact that Dahrendorf uses the concepts of conflict and change only purely formally, he persists, that is, with the structural-functional model because he postulates conflict as a component of the social structure, and he does not put conflict down to the concreteness of the circumstances (relations or conditions) of dominance and of the relations between humans; he has in mind an “institutionalised liberalism” with many open possibilities, which of course knows of conflict(s) in the sense of friction(s) inside of a very mobile “progressive” society, but knows not of radical structural ruptures²³⁷.

The greatly heralded dispute between systems theoreticians and conflict theoreticians ended up therefore in familial shadow boxing between “liberals”, whose “left” wing preferred to talk about “conflict”; the “right” wing, on the other hand, preferred to talk about “consensus”. The systems theoreticians could, in the course of this, with clear conscience and not wrongfully, declare that their theoretical schema could be nicely

²³⁷ Weingart, “Beyond Parsons?”, esp. pp. 155, 159, 160ff.; in a similar sense J. Turner “From Utopia to Where?”, esp. p. 242ff., cf. “Marx and Simmel Revisited”, esp. pp. 619ff., 625ff.

reconciled with the dual function of conflict as system preservation and system renewal; conflict, on the basis of generally accepted norms and rules of the game, is, in contrast to revolution, a factor of integration (i.e. an integrating factor)²³⁸. In the more concrete language of political apologetics, it was said then that “a stable democracy” needs both conflicts or splits for the attainment of dominant (ruling) positions, as well as a basic consensus as the background against which conflicts and splits take place²³⁹. This meeting of conflict theory and systems theory in the middle of the road (i.e. midway or halfway) now had a dual consequence. On the one hand, the theoretical reduction (shortening) of the spectrum of the social relation was pushed through (i.e. imposed) to a great extent, i.e. the inimical pole of the same spectrum was moved out of sight or it was consciously driven out. Even some Weberians, who made the accusation against Durkheim and Parsons of having unduly cut down (or restricted) the area of sociology to the study of the forms of consummate (or perfect) co-operation, shrugged off (or ignored) in a carefree way the concept of the social relation in its entire breadth, and saw the object (or subject matter) of sociology in the investigation of the “social interaction”, that is, the cases which would lie “somewhere between perfect co-operation and total conflict”²⁴⁰. Who was supposed to look into the phenomena of perfect co-operation or of extreme enmity, as well as those phenomena of total conflict or of total enmity, was in the process, not said. On the other hand, the “system” came under pressure to be opened, that is, to be transformed into an “open system”, taking into account conflict. Friendship against a backdrop of enmity was now out of the question, and all the more was conflict against the background of a

²³⁸ See e.g. Shils, *Center and Periphery*, p. 82.

²³⁹ See e.g. Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 21.

²⁴⁰ Thus, Rex, *Grundprobleme*, p. 81.

basic consensus rewritten as (i.e. synonymous with) the “system”, highlighted. Let us remind ourselves in this context first of all that for Parsons the one-sided determination (i.e. definition) of the social relation as friendship was a political preference, and at the same time a theoretical necessity. The leap from interaction to system could not succeed if the concept of interaction were to contain, on equal terms, extreme enmity. The “positive” definition of interaction flows, on the other hand, directly into that social unity (cohesion or interrelation) which only deserves to be in use (i.e. known) with the name “system”. Remarkably, Parsons’s critics, who made an effort in favour of the “opening” of the system through the rehabilitation of conflict, took as the starting point the same positive definition of the social relation. Conflict was of course taken into consideration, but with the tacit or even express exclusion of its degeneration into bloody enmity; conflict was, in other words, accepted in principle in the “system” only in so far as it was acted out (unfolded or took place) against the backdrop of a basic consensus, in so far therefore as it was in advance definite that the outcome of its peaceful course would be accepted by all sides. Blau, who apparently knows of the whole breadth of the spectrum of the social relation – he in fact believes that power’s “ultimate source, of course, is physical coercion” –, wants, nonetheless, to investigate only such social relations, which are based on “processes of social attraction”, and to top it all, such social relations “into which men enter of their own free will rather than... either those into which they are born or those imposed on them by forces beyond their control”²⁴¹. Conflict here is programmatically discussed in regard to its peaceful forms in the framework of the Western constitutional state, i.e.

²⁴¹ *Exchange*, pp. 22, 21, 20.

in accordance with the model of parliamentary opposition²⁴².

Accordingly, the Western constitutional state's system-renewing strength is highlighted in good spirits²⁴³.

Despite all the criticism of Parsons, things therefore basically stayed with (i.e. kept to) Parsons's pioneering "positive" determination (i.e. definition) of interaction. Because the "open" system also continued to be a *system*; a system without the attribute of unity (and self-contained cohesion) already linguistically lacks meaning, and theoretically only that positive definition can take care of (or ensure) unity (and self-contained cohesion). That is why the advocates of the "open" system had to a limine forget or dispel two things: that there are namely various kinds of social-historically determined openness, which can ruin (or destroy) the openness of every social system, and that the consideration of conflict excluding its possible bloody worsening (or intensification) results in an entirely different picture of conflict than the discussion of this or that form of conflict mindful of the entire spectrum of the social relation; as we know, the spectrum of the social relation as a whole and as a palette (i.e. range) of imminent possibilities permeates (imbues and saturates) every single social relation; incidentally, this remains more or less in the consciousness of (i.e. known to) actors at any time. The said advocates of the "open" system have moreover disregarded an irrefutable epistemological fundamental principle: that every scientific theory should first explain those phenomena which contradict it. A systems theory should primarily be a theory of the unsystemic (i.e. non-systemic), and a (normative) communication theory should first be a theory of war – and that does not constitute a paradox. If one did not know the political

²⁴² Loc. cit., Z.7. The passage reads: "The analysis of opposition is largely conceived within the framework of democratic values... and neglects to consider corresponding conflicts in fundamentally different political climates".

²⁴³ Loc. cit., chap. IX and XI, esp. p. 301ff..

preferences of the theoreticians of the “open” system, then one would have to be surprised why they covered up and clouded such serious shortcomings with a disproportionately strong self-consciousness, and in particular they celebrated the (limited or qualified) rehabilitation of conflict as an important and significant theoretical renewal. They even went on to assert that the advantage of the theory of self-referential systems consisted in that they elevated the difference between dissent and consensus to the “guiding (or directive) difference” – and this “by no means is understood of itself (i.e. is self-evident)”!²⁴⁴ Social-theoretical thought must actually have been stunted (or atrophied) for a long time under the effect of open and disguised normativisms, in order to pass off as a novelty something which since time immemorial has been a truism in the perception of human affairs. However, the wholesale (or blanket) confession of faith in the social reality of “dissent” is also not enough. What is “dissent’s” phenomenology and what forms of such “dissent” question the “system”, and with that, systems theory? Systems theory may indeed have – very wisely! – given up “defining systems by way of very high levels of or even complete interdependence”²⁴⁵, but because of that, it has not been relieved of the duty of making clear the unity (and self-contained cohesion) of the components which continue to justify talk of the “system”, and that means amongst other things too, of going into the kind of conflicts which can destroy this minimally required unity (and self-contained cohesion). The in principle incompatibility between conflict in *all* its forms and system *as* system is unintentionally made known in the thesis that conflicts are indeed in themselves social systems, but such which could not accept [for themselves] the status of subsystems (or part systems); however conflicts exist parasitically, and indeed not in

²⁴⁴ Thus, Luhmann, „Autopoiesis“, p. 377.

²⁴⁵ Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 533.

the sense of symbiosis with the system; the parasites here would rather attempt to absorb the system²⁴⁶. The definition of conflict as a social system²⁴⁷, and its compatibility with the system of society, are therefore two entirely different things. Systems theory exchanges sub rosa (i.e. clandestinely or on the sly) these entirely different things and levels, and the sleight of hand is carried out under the broad mantle of the magical word “system”. If systems theory therefore thinks that extreme conflict does not refute it as theory because conflict can be apprehended, in terms of theory, as a system too, then systems theory overlooks that it is a matter in the former case of real incompatibility between conflict and system, and in the latter case, of the theoretical description of a real phenomenon in the language of systems theory. When conflict is described as an “autopoietic (i.e. a self-making) system”, then conflict’s most extreme intensification (or escalation) can be thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion) too; but this same most extreme intensification (escalation) must be left aside if there is supposed to be talk of society in general as a *system*.

Just as in other contexts²⁴⁸, so too in the rehabilitation of conflict, the theory of the “open” system did not offer any new kinds of knowledge (or findings), however it translated into the language of its abstractions, ascertainments, in fact commonplaces of classical political and social theory. Machiavelli e.g. forcefully depicted the positive repercussions of conflicts on the ability at adaptation (or adjustment) and renewal of a polity, and he meant in fact that Rome has the conflict between patricians

²⁴⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 531, 533.

²⁴⁷ Cf. K. Deutsch, *Staat*, p. 172: if there is a relation like that of a wolf towards a sheep, “then we are talking about a system of conflict. The groups which are chained to one another in this conflict are parts of a system... They belong together, but not in the positive sense.”

²⁴⁸ See Ch. I, Sec. 2 in this volume.

and plebeians to thank for its freedom and imperial might²⁴⁹. Tocqueville likewise comprehended American democracy or democratic society in its atomisation and mobility as an “open system”, in which stability is achieved always anew via friction(s) and conflicts²⁵⁰. Both Machiavelli as well as Tocqueville here have in mind conflicts like those of which systems theoreticians talk, i.e. conflicts of the type “more-or-less”, which do not break open (blow up or burst (bust)) the “system”, but really presuppose it. However, there are also conflicts of the type “either-or” – and it is not in the least accepted fact that “complex societies” would be immune against the latter “either-or” type of conflicts, as the theoreticians of the “open system” indirectly suggest, by deducing sociological categories from the decades of Western affluence after the Second World War²⁵¹. The everlasting presence of conflict in every society, irrespective of its each and every society’s complexity, is not due to the fact that – as functionalistic teleology asserts – the “system” moves towards better adaptation to the environment and towards expansion, but simply is due to the fact that everywhere where people live together, the spectrum of the social relation in its entire breadth is existent and in effect (i.e. effective or operative). Not only do friendship and peaceful conflict belong to this spectrum; violently fought out enmity can just as little be separated from this spectrum. The next chapter will name a decisive reason for which all attempts to expel most extreme enmity from the spectrum of the social relation lacks a basis social-ontologically: the

²⁴⁹ *Discorsi*, I, 4: “Che la disunione della Plebe e Senato romano fece libera e potente questa repubblica.” [= “That the disunion of the Plebeians and the Roman Senate made this Republic free and powerful.”]

²⁵⁰ This guiding (or central) idea (theme) occasionally finds expression even directly, see e.g. *De la Démocratie*, vol. 2, part II, ch. 7: “if one singles out a particular moment in the existence of a people, then it is easily proven that political associations (organisations, guilds, clubs or unions) can cause the state unrest (disturbance, trouble or worry) and paralyse trade, industry and business; if one however takes the life of a people in its entirety, then it is very easy to show that the freedom of political association (or political freedom of association) favours the welfare and even the peace and quiet of citizens.” ([German] transl. by H. Zbinden).

²⁵¹ See the good observations by Hirschman, „Wieviel Gemeinsinn...“, esp. p. 302ff.

mechanism of the social relation is namely in all places (or positions) (i.e. at all points) of the spectrum of the social relation, that is, both in (extreme) friendship as well as in (extreme) enmity, one and the same.

ⁱ Kondylis is suggesting to the reader that Simmel and v. Wiese did not even consider the possibility of the social-ontological aspect or discipline in respect of general or macro social science, whose two main disciplines in recent centuries consist of history and sociology, even though the two German sociologists inadvertently implied the existence of a social-ontological aspect or discipline (i.e. social ontology) in part (see below) [translator's endnote].