

## V. The political and (the) geopolitical backgrounds (subjects)

### 1. The Right, the Left and Germany<sup>i</sup>

The tone of political-intellectual debate in Germany is always touchy and irritated, and this [[occurs]] not without reason. It is in fact a matter of the orientation of a country, which has a key position in Europe and could play a not insignificant role in planetary politics. In an irritated tone, however, are expressed not only common cares and concerns, but opposed world-theoretical, personal and other preferences. Whilst official German politics tries hard in a nebulous rhetoric to reduce “healthy” patriotism, European unification and the universalism of the market and of values to a common denominator, both opposite poles (counter-poles) of the present-day debate stand out or distinguish themselves through their more one-sided “national” or “universalistic” preferences. Consequently, they remain negatively dependent on each other; they share not the solution, but for the most part the dilemma. It is a question of whether the dilemma is real or whether history has already disregarded or overcome and ridden roughshod over it<sup>ii</sup>.

The suspicion that the latter is the case is borne out by the preferred self-description on each and every respective occasion. One [[side]] wants to still be the “Left”, although simultaneously it claims for itself “genuine liberalism”, while at the same time inadvertently indicating only its adaptation to, and

conformation with, Western mass-democratic reality. The other [[side]] demarcates and delimits itself against that by clinging to the spectre (phantom, ghost) of a “conservatism”, which has long been dead and which cannot rise again (be resurrected) by means of any “conservative revolution”. After all, the invocation of, or appeal to, the revolutionary and pioneering or trailblazing, creates opportunities and possibilities for loose alliances with forces, which indeed are understood not as “conservative”, but probably as “national” or “anti-Western” forces. The ambivalence generates on both sides mistrust or derision (mockery, ridicule), at any rate, it essentially contributes to the strengthening, amplification and reinforcement of uneasiness and confusion. But these (uneasiness and confusion) stem in reality neither from the in the meanwhile subjugation carried out of the “Left” to the “Western” logic of the free market, nor from the conspiracy of the incorrigible “Right” with nationally minded social democrats or liberals<sup>iii</sup>. They, i.e. the uneasiness and confusion, stem therefore not from effects, but from causes – from that which still was thought in the political categories of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although these can no longer have any real social reference and bearers<sup>iv</sup>.

### The West is no more

Western political conceptuality did not all of a sudden become – through the national factor’s gaining of the upper hand and becoming rife, or through the machinations, scheming and the arts of disguise of the nationalists<sup>v</sup> –, obsolete. It, i.e. Western political conceptuality, was a constituent element or part of the thoughts world or universe of ideas of the European New Times<sup>vi</sup>, and with the European New Times, the said Western political conceptuality perished during the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nonetheless, I want to here use for the sake of understanding, the terms “nationalistic Right” and “cosmopolitan Left” – which

of course show or signal that the political dividing lines have now been drawn with regard to the overall planetary constellation rather than in accordance with the positioning of the parties towards the “social question”<sup>vii</sup>.

The end of the Cold War did not only bring to light the antiquatedness of the political vocabulary, but also sooner or later brought on and brought about the end of the West. The “West” was the anti-communistic camp (otherwise Japan and South Korea were not “Western”). Those (above all the cosmopolitan “Left”), who believe in a cohesion of the West on the basis of the mere commonality of values, are politically and historically naive<sup>viii</sup>. The commonality of values causes in itself no commonality of interests – in fact the opposite can be the case – and has never prevented bloody conflicts between Christian or liberal peoples, just as little as it, i.e. the commonality of values between e.g. Christian or liberal peoples, has put off or deterred alliances with unbelievers or tyrants.

The *politically* relevant question is: which binding West is meant on each and every respective occasion, and what can binding West mean for Germany, if the West were supposed to split, and Germany for example would have to choose between engagement in, and commitment to, a large (great) European space, and, friendship with the United States; or the other way around, if European unification took place under conditions which the majority of the German people (folk) would turn down and reject? (Because the Hour of Truth for Europe will strike (or ring) when one no longer must distribute affluence and prosperity, but burdens and debts, liabilities). In both cases, which no historically thinking person can exclude in advance, the confession of faith in Western values would help politically only slightly<sup>ix</sup>. Germans will, therefore, spare or save both disappointments as well as panic reactions if and when they duly, in a timely manner and soberly reconcile themselves with the thought that the unity of the West and consequently the sweepingly and categorically

binding West sprang from a unique situation, which must not be regarded as an eternal historical yardstick or benchmark, even if its prolongation and extension appears as temporarily desirable and possible.

Although the German cosmopolitan “Left”, as from now in an alliance with multi-national concerns, stands up for the overcoming of nationalisms, it nevertheless remains fixed, i.e. focused on its own national past. It scoops (draws or creates) those values from the contrasting with, and opposition to, this past, into whose logic it wants to force the historical future. No less fixed or focused on this same past appears to be the nationalistic “Right”. It does not merely endeavour, try and strive to get a revision of the image of history (historical picture) sanctioned by the victors. That is scientifically thoroughly, absolutely and perfectly legitimate, and personally I believe – although I am no “right-winger” – that the construction of the “German special way (path or German Sonderweg)” is untenable. Over and above that, this Right moves back and puts itself – not expressly, but with recognisable longing and yearning – to and in those positions and situations, which it wants to illuminate historically anew, in order to take from there a new run-up (approach path or start).

That politically cannot lead very far. Because the world was until 1945 characterised by Europe’s unambiguous and unequivocal preponderance and predominance, whereas in the present constellation, the demographic, geopolitical, economic and military weight of our continent is constantly decreasing, lessening, diminishing. The degree of density attained of planetary politics turns the consideration of the planetary dimension into a political task of prime importance: relations with the European nations must be seen and shaped from the perspective of this dimension. Europe’s survival is not so self-evident as one would like to think, and it is not least of all a *German* question and problem. One may as a German “right-winger” not particularly like Frenchmen or Englishmen, however, the Chinese (Chinamen) can be liked even less.

But precisely under (in view of) the neglect of the planetary dimension, the thinking of the nationalistic “right-wingers”, who tend towards navel-gazing, suffers. Because of that, the Right’s thinking remains politically less fertile and less productive. The strategic question reads: will the most important European nations, through consensus or through reciprocal or one-sided concessions, constitute a political unit (entity, unity) capable of acting, which can exist within world competition and world rivalry, or, will the actual hegemony of one nation over the other nations prove to be for this purpose necessarily – something in itself more desirable than what the joint (common) decline of all the European nations would be? In the former case, the nationalistic “Right” will rethink its positioning and stance towards Frenchmen and Englishmen, in the latter case however, it must rethink the resentments of the vanquished against the Americans. Because as long as the Americans are the single genuinely planetary Power, their backing and support for the achieving of such a hegemony is indispensable, just as their interventions in the past could prevent this same hegemony [[of the Germans over other Europeans]] twice.

A third development seems to me, though, to be more likely: that for the foreseeable future the national tug of war in Europe under the motto “whoever can, save yourself” will continue, and older combinatory games (games of combination and ensemble) [[i.e. various (changing) manifestations of teamwork between nations]] – to the satisfaction of nationalistic “Right” – will be revived anew<sup>x</sup>. The world-historical relevance, as well as the intensity of such games, would be nonetheless far less than previously. The provincial deeper meaning (profundity or melancholy, pensiveness) of the nationalistic “Right” would then be the mere other or reverse side of the cosmopolitan superficiality of the “Left”. Both would not be able to pose and to answer the decisive political question: which is today, under European circumstances, the planetary political unit (entity, unity) capable of surviving? This question is

posed irrespective of how one evaluates the future and the necessity of the nation-state.

### Beyond the critique of culture (cultural criticism)

The anti-Americanism of the nationalistic “Right” stems indeed politically from the resentment of the vanquished, but it takes root in the history of ideas in the far older anti-capitalistic critique of culture, which also had inspired the “Left” until recently. The “Right and right-wingers” do not want to admit that that which is called “Americanisation”, is no import or no octroi [= (formerly, in some European countries, esp. France) a tax, tariff or duty levied on certain goods brought into a town or city]], but the normal way of living (mode of life) of modern mass democracy, whether one likes it or not. It is no coincidence that “the Right” does not push, drive and propel its analysis so far and wide.

Because just as little as the “conservative revolutionaries” of the twenties, i.e. 1920s, do they dare to connect their critique of culture with a critique of that which lies at the root of the much-lamented, much-bewailed evil of (post)modern culture, that is, with a critique of the “free market” and the logic of the market<sup>xi</sup>. The entirely inner contradiction of today’s “conservatism” is here within reach, becoming palpable, which is exceeded and surpassed only by the reverse(d) contradiction in the thought of the cosmopolitan “Left”. This “Left” has indeed adapted itself to the existing, i.e. to that which exists – stamped, shaped and moulded by the logic of the market; on the other hand, however, the “Left” wants to reserve the monopoly of the critique of culture for itself and becomes nervous when others fill the vacuum, which its own cushy arrangement has left behind. Plagued by a guilty conscience or remorse, the “Left” represses the well-known to it fact of old, that the critique of culture and the critique of civilisation today, for very many real reasons, meet with

approval, and not merely because a pair of “right-wing” aesthetes wants this to be this way.

Our conclusion reads: planetary history is open, its forthcoming peripeteiae [[= sudden changes in a course/courses of events and or circumstances]] and combinations can be apprehended neither through projections of the present into the future, nor through ethical-universalistic or through conservative-nationalistic stereotypes. Just as the current political conceptuality stems from the thoughts world or universe of ideas of the coming to an end and perishing, or already at its end or already perished, European New Times. The “tact of judgement”, of which the great Clausewitz spoke<sup>xii</sup>, is not to be, i.e. cannot be replaced, by a confession of faith and by a proud militancy. It is a pity and shame that regarding these questions, in this country[[, Germany]], most intellectuals, who necessarily cart and drag along their needs as to raising their profile in every debate, express themselves without having expertise and an overall view at their disposal. Political thinkers of calibre and stature are not in sight. And the otherwise prosperous Homunculus politicus [[= little politician]] is busy and preoccupied otherwise and elsewhere<sup>xiii</sup>.

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## ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and **have nothing whatsoever to do with P.K.. Readers can and in fact probably must simply ignore them and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in the mirror and say “Oh my God, I’m really ugly, and retarded”.** I do

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*it every day, and it's the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.*

<sup>i</sup> This is the second extended piece of German text by P.K. I've translated without the assistance of a Greek version. Exciting times for me!

<sup>ii</sup> This to me clearly indicates that we are dealing with a Western mass democracy in the era of Planetary Politics and most of, if not all of, the so-called "far-right" parties in Germany and Europe which enter parliament in general are simply "right-wingish" manifestations of the same Western mainstream mass-democratic social formation, and only some of them are at most much more *potentially* than actually anti-parliamentary, para-military "fascistic" types of parties. After all, until the end of the Cold War virtually the whole of the political spectrum in parliament in the West was in favour of more or less very tightly policed and guarded borders and fairly tightly controlled immigration programmes – or at least could not do anything effective about such programmes then in force.

<sup>iii</sup> My understanding is that since 1994 the German social democrats or liberals, but especially the former, have become far less "nationally minded" and more or less fully in tune with the Zio-Globalist Agenda of Hate and Satan. It remains to be seen in which direction the "winds" will take things in coming decades.

<sup>iv</sup> According to the Kondylisian historical ideal-typical schema of: from *societas civilis* to liberalism and then to mass democracy, the 19<sup>th</sup> century belongs to the heyday of liberalism in which the "Left" meant (social) democracy (up to communism), and the "Right" conservatism in the sense of trying to maintain as many feudal privileges and features of *societas civilis* as possible.

<sup>v</sup> Reference is obviously being made to the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>vi</sup> Mr P.K., I have a question. Do you mean before the French Revolution, and if yes, how long before? From the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the modern absolutist state came into being and the first stirrings of "conservatism"? I think, in fact I'm sure, that's what you're saying. Cf. *Konservativismus*, though unless I'm mistaken, the Left/Ride divide, i.e. with the actual words "Left" vs. "Right", is a product of the French Revolution and where the bums went on seats in parliament.

<sup>vii</sup> This is another clear-cut, brilliant insight by P.K.. Since all main sides of the Western political spectrum are more or less accepting of the Western mass-democratic agenda of multi-culturalism, Zio-lobotomy or Zio-worship, "anti-racism", femino-faggotism, all kinds of "degeneracy" and "abnormality", etc., etc., etc., what really is at stake is how quickly Western societies will Zio-lobotomise themselves totally out of existence through mass invasions, low birth rates, etc., etc., etc.. And concern for "the social question", i.e. workers' rights etc., has almost totally been forgotten since most people can participate at some level in hedonistic consumerism, "I shop, I consume (plastic) garbage, therefore I am".

<sup>viii</sup> It would be fair to say that by about 2005-2010 most of the mainstream "Right" P.K. refers to had moved to the positions of the mainstream "cosmopolitan" Left. And hence the appearance of the fledgling "far Right" and or "identitarian ("alt- or white nationalist") Right" with its various colours, shades, hues and differences in pragmatism (Zio-acceptance) vs. "authenticity" (Zio-repulsion), etc.. In any event, at this stage it would appear that they have next to no chance of ever coming to power and causing fundamental change, though, one never knows what the Future brings! (My gut feeling is that they'll just remain fringe book and social clubs at best, though my gut could be wrong...).

<sup>ix</sup> Never forget, P.K. always writes with a vista stretching right into and through the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

<sup>x</sup> It seems to me that e.g. (attempted) BREXIT and Salvini and Co. are examples how P.K.'s method of analysis is able to encompass concrete phenomena when they arise even more than 20 years after the article was written, when in 1994 most, if not all, were "waxing lyrical" about this or that thought manifestation of Deep Zio-Lobotomy, i.e. Utopian Zio-Insanity in the Zio-NeoPsychoCon/DemTard-USA era – even though thinkers like Huntington had the good sense to say things people did not want to hear, notwithstanding his weaknesses highlighted by P.K. in the previous article.



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<sup>xi</sup> P.K. is basically saying that so-called “right-wing” theorists might express their cultural and aesthetic rejection of Western mass democracy, but have no overall social, incl. economic, basis to ground their political power claims so that people can live in a society with strong roots in *societas civilis*, i.e. rural, God-fearing, strictly hierarchical and mostly static society up to the 18<sup>th</sup> or late 19<sup>th</sup> century at the very latest. The mass-democratic “futurist” attempts of the “Right” were tried, failed and have vanished into history like Soviet communism. Today one can see that the vast majority of people in – let alone the elites of (!) – Western mass democracies – regardless of race – are not interested in non-consumeristic, extra- or non-“free”-market life based on Tradition and Countryside, let alone a new version of managed-“free”-market Fascism or National Socialism.

<sup>xii</sup> “Spake”! Not “spoke”! It’s Clausewitz... going back in Time, always relevant, always constant are his insights into human affairs and human nature. Both (inter)relations and biology. Neither can be separated in reality, but obviously can and must be separated conceptually. The question is for what purpose?

<sup>xiii</sup> Unsurpassable P.K.! The 21<sup>st</sup> century requires and will require politicians of all-time greatness, wisdom and vision – neither Zio-lobotomised Imbeciles, nor narrow-minded, hyper-nationalistic-racialistic Dingbats. And it seems that on the Western side of things, Germany is totally lacking in such leadership; and Trump may not be able to do much to steer the ship in the right direction or even avert total catastrophe, notwithstanding all the rhetoric. You wanted Zio-lobotomy; we shall all see (if we’re alive) the Results.