

Theory of War by Panagiotis Kondylis –

Summary Notes

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(translation of book, “God Willing”, *might* commence not before 2022/2023 to be completed not before ?2025/2026?... though by that time I might even decide to translate another of P.K.’s compelling books or the long Introduction to Machiavelli...)

Under no circumstances whatsoever are these Summary Notes to (Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης =) Panagiotis (Panajotis) Kondylis's *Theory of War* to be cited as representing Kondylis's position on any matter whatsoever. These Notes are the Translator's and were written to give English readers an idea of the contents of *Theorie des Krieges* = *Θεωρία τοῦ Πολέμου* = *Theory of War*, and for no other purpose!

The page references in these Summary Notes etc. are to the Greek 2nd edition by Kondylis of the book, *Θεωρία τοῦ Πολέμου*, 1998 (1st Greek edition = 1997), with only some consultation of P.K.’s German text when I deemed it to be absolutely necessary (If and when I do the translation into English I shall use the German text (published in 1988) as my primary source, whilst also consulting the Greek version).

[See, inter alia, Introduction to “The Philosopher and Power” (English translation by C.F.) pp. 28-29 re: social conflict and personal v. group wielding of power = relevant to conflict as a part of society which (at least potentially) gives rise to war, etc....]

Summary Notes to be Done sometime in the Future... (in bold red):

Prologue **DONE**

Prologue to the Greek Edition **DONE**

~~1) I. War and politics (with two digressions/excursus: II. ““Politicians” and “Soldiers””, and, III. “War of annihilation, total war, nuclear war”)~~ **DONE**

2) IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels (with a digression/excursus: V. “War and the Marxist-Leninist perception of history”)

3) VI. War and revolution: Lenin (with a digression/excursus: VII. “The Soviet military dogma”)

(The Chapters below are NOT in the German edition, but only in the Greek edition:)

~~4) VIII. Hot war after the Cold War~~ **DONE**

~~a) Classical theory of war and the “new military revolution”~~

~~b) The utopia of purely technological war~~

~~c) The multiformity of war and its political aetiology~~

5) IX. Addendum to the Greek edition: Geopolitical and strategic parameters of a Greco-Turkish war

WARNING:

Comments in [[...]] are the translator's/note-taker's and have ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with P.K. whatsoever SO readers can simply skip them or reject them BUT NOT associate them with P.K.

Some confusion might arise re: kinds and or forms of war:

The best way to think about it is:

“Barbarism” = pure/unmixed war {= the most basic ideal type = the united concept of war, which inheres in all wars}

“Culture” = real (forms of) war(s) with two basic kinds/forms = war of annihilation, and, restricted/limited war {= two ideal types as “sub-ideal types” compared to the most basic ideal type of pure/unmixed war} **but then on a case-by-case basis there is an enormous multiformity of war combining elements of up to all three ideal types above...**

Clausewitz in the earlier stages of his thought held Napoleonic War to be “absolute war”, but in his maturity separated pure/unmixed war, WHICH INHERES IN ALL WARS, from the two basic kinds (war of annihilation, and, restricted/limited war), and variant forms, of real war...

The basic contents, separated into chapters, of *Theory of War* are:

- 1) I. War and politics (with two digressions/excursus: II. ““Politicians” and “Soldiers/Military Personnel-Officers””, and, III. “War of annihilation, total war, nuclear war”)
- 2) IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels (with a digression/excursus: V. “War and the Marxist-Leninist perception of history”)
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NOTE: “Soldier(s)” = military officer, military personnel, servicemen, members of the armed forces, etc..

Prologue

p. 9 [of the Greek 2nd edition of Κονδύλης, Π. = Kondylis, P. *Θεωρία του Πολέμου = Theorie des Krieges = Theory of War*]

The war phenomenon exists within its historical multi-dimensionality.

It has barely been understood how Clausewitz founded his theory of war in anthropology and the philosophy of culture.

That founding of the theory of war by Clausewitz is a unique achievement, and deserves its place in the important political understandings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, covering the central concepts which illuminate war's texture in general whilst also being in harmony with strategic and tactical analyses.

The positive aspect of Marx and Engels's views on war are that they go into social-historical and sociological observation much more than Clausewitz, and they even go into the sociology of the army, whilst examining the theory of history.

Clausewitz did not only say essential things about the relationship between “soldiers” and “politicians”

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which have been widely misunderstood, but he gave us through the concept of “friction” the thread to understand over and beyond the usual confusion surrounding “war of annihilation”, “total war” and “nuclear war”.

Marx and Engels erred re power v. violence.

Clausewitz greatly influenced Soviet military dogma.

Mao Tse Tung etc. was left out because he did not offer anything original as theory of war (though he has importance re: tactics and strategy re: guerrilla warfare). The guerrilla wars of the 20th century cannot be deduced from Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, Lenin.

Theory to have any scientific value must relate to empirical reality, but empirical reality on its own can't produce deep understanding.

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Prologue to the Greek edition

Many people think that the fall of communism renders Marx and Engels's thought obsolete – that is not the case.

Weber said in 1919 that without Marx and Nietzsche later social scientists could never have achieved all that they achieved re: scientific understanding.

Marx = key re: forms and mechanisms of ideology.

Just like Montesquieu, Tocqueville or Pareto, Marx's thought = enormously valuable in the never-ending and always incomplete attempt to understand our human and social world. Just as Aristotle's thought remained valuable post-ancient slavery, so too does Marx's thought, post-Soviet communism.

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Many Marxist theoreticians of the 1960s-1980s were theoretically one-sided and spun fashionable ideas of little or no real value, and of course after Soviet communism, all of sudden started to follow other intellectual fashions!!!

They never read Marx as one would read Weber or Simmel, i.e. without focusing attention on personal and collective “liberation” etc.. **They went from Sovietism to Americanism... From “classless society” to “human rights”...**

If a “scholar” cares about personal career and self-projection, he won't be a social scientist worthy of the name.

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Marx and Engels got the relationship between the political and the economic wrong, and thus also made their errors re: war.

Re: the Eastern question (Ottoman Empire etc.), Marx and Engels were often right re: the primacy of politics over the economy.

But in terms of theoretical generalisations, they lost the political in the economic and drew all sorts of wrong conclusions.

But Marxist economism was inherited from liberal economism with polemical and ideological motives.

And economism continued and intensified even after the fall of Soviet communism!!! – in the “globalist” version...

Kondylis puts liberal in “” as “liberal” when talking about the “liberal” opponents of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

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The Chicago School of Economics [[about 1 in 3 of the 12 main players were Tribal Warriors, with a much higher ratio amongst the top 4 or so Economists!!! Surprise! Surprise!]] even went so far as to preach a whole range of inanities and absurdities on an economic basis re: family, friendship, religion, etc.. more vulgar than vulgar Marxism!!! [[This obviously has something to do with, or as preparation for, the broad ideology of “globalisation” which really got going in the 1990s]]

Today = mainly American-inspired capitalistic liberalism which examines war and peace.

In practice, however, there are “forces of rapid/quick intervention”, electronic equipment, and the militarisation of Space, incl. zeal to protect strategic nodes or points all over the planet, whilst theory is spun about increasing world-wide economic integration which will produce a united “globalist, global village” world without (a need for) war!!! [[which only a total RETARD or total POWER-HUNGRY MANIAC would ever believe]]

The Communist Manifesto stressed the significance of the formation of a world market, which would then bring about classless society, without military clashes and national differences!!!

Today's economistic and universalistic liberalism copies the same fundamental Communist Manifesto schema!!! – but without the ethical and humanistic demands of the Communist Manifesto.

Capitalistic liberalism = formal equality of opportunities (not equality of enjoyment) with endless social mobility, turning everything upside down, including the possessors of wealth. [[Hence, the much observed connection e.g. between NeoCons/largely or mostly Tribal Warriors and Trotskyism etc.]]

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Like original Marxism, capitalistic liberalism thinks wars will be abolished by the absorption of the political element by the economic.

The fact is that the political element very often is imposed on the economic, notwithstanding economistic dogma, and we can learn a lot about today's world situation and conjuncture by studying Marx and Engels...

Unlike today's American-based liberal utopia as ideology, at least Marx and Engels had a more solid foundation to their Utopia of requiring before the abolition of war, the abolition of classes and the solution to the problem of the distribution of goods.

But today's capitalistic liberal ideologues just want unlimited horizontal and vertical social mobility without solving the problem of the distribution of goods.

They think as utopists, that the globalisation of production, communications and trade will bring about the desired peaceful result!!!

They say NOTHING about the problem of distribution, when in fact globalisation is probably making the problem worse.

But the political element is tightly connected to the question of distribution SO THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE OF OVERCOMING POLITICS

when the distribution question remains unsolved and there are population explosions worldwide as well as ecological degradation.

There are huge dangers for our globalised world of intense anomic phenomena and wars on a grand scale.

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Lenin, also, is not to be discarded in theory, just as Marx should not be.

Clausewitz comprehended the relations between war and politics. Lenin, built on this basic understanding, in the context of the imperialist epoch and the world economic system, with wars eventuating from the cracks in this system.

The future unfortunately is going to prove this idea of Lenin as correct.

Lenin was right that the European colonial empires would be dissolved through a long series of national-liberation wars, and this is what set Asia free to (potentially) challenge the West.

Just look at the world map in 1914 compared to 1945 or to 1995 and one will understand that the changes c. 1989 were not necessarily the most dramatic and fundamental.

Without its communist revolution, China would not be today what it is and what it will be in the 21st century.

It's not a question of "socialism" and "capitalism".

It's a fundamental question of the Rise of New world Powers capable of displacing other Powers.

Understanding that means that the triumphalism c. 1989 does not denote something fundamental.

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Just as naive are those who believe in “freedom” against “totalitarianism” as those who once believed in “communism” and “classless society”.

The answers to historical problems are not to be found in constructed theories of “professional academics/thinkers” each one of whom thinks he is the Salt of the Earth!!!

The answers to theoretical problems are found in history.

In this book I provide the reader with systematic and conceptually clear cogitation, and thus, the Soviet military dogma, its formation and logic, is no less didactic in 1997 than in 1977 for the theory of war, nor even less didactic than the two world wars.

There is a more permanent interest from the perspective of history than from the perspective of journalism.

Genuine historical interest can begin to be developed with the exhausting of journalistic interest.

I. War and Politics: Clausewitz

(the edition of *Vom Kriege* (= *On War*) referred to is: by W. Hahlweg, Bonn 1980; when reference is made to other works by Clausewitz, I also give its title in abbreviated form – if there are only page numbers within parentheses then reference is being made to *Vom Kriege*)

[[...]] = my comments, and have nothing to do with P.K.'s text or Clausewitz's writings, so you can ignore them and place no weight on them... though *some* of my comments at least will definitely be helpful to *some* readers...

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1. Preliminary observation

Clausewitz belongs to no Side or Faction, not to “pacifists”, nor to “war-monger, bellicose sabre-rattlers”, neither to “liberals”, nor to “nationalists”, nor to “militarists”.

Clausewitz thought historically and was a strictly descriptive theoretician of war.

In his magnum opus, Clausewitz ascertains that wars occur and that they take different forms.

He did not advise or expect the abolition of wars, nor did he advise someone to wage war at the first opportunity.

Neither did he consider the hyper-intensification of forces or the as far as possible least effort to be desirable ends in themselves.

Clausewitz was used by the German General Staff after 1871 without people understanding what Clausewitz was really about.

Some German generals even insisted on the strategic primacy of attack/offence over defence (which was military orthodoxy in France as well) against Clausewitz's own position. – The French were hoping on discovering the “key” to German victory in 1871 and wanted a revanche.

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After WW1, when Germany was seen as “militaristic Prussia”, Clausewitz fell out of vogue and was even accused of being responsible for the carnage!!! incl. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller.

National-socialist propaganda in Metzsch and Hierl simply reinforced that wrong view of Clausewitz as war monger etc..

The first systematic liberal interpretation of Clausewitz re: the primacy of politics is equated with the command of moderation was put forward by German military officers and political opponents of National Socialism. Beck, Rothfels against Liddell Hart and other Anglo-Saxon writers.

[[Liberal is not what is understood in the USA and elsewhere today!!! Liberal means oligarchic bourgeois society and life stances of 19th century Europe (and at most up to WW1 and the Interwar period) – it has nothing to do with western mass democracy seen in toto, i.e. sociologically-historically, but as ideology and in polemics “liberal” the word is obviously still used, as P.K. uses it as ideology incl. non-liberal/mass-democratic content as occurs immediately below.]]

The liberal interpretation of Clausewitz really took off after WW2, with the victorious forces claiming Germany lost due to its increasing militarisation of politics and its aims. Ritter emphasised that Clausewitz had foreseen the military calamities for Germany... both Leftists of the victorious forces and former nationalists of the Right enforced such a view. The latter blamed Hitler

for not showing moderation, and that is why a Greater Germany could not be formed.

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Apart from victorious Anglo-Saxons and Frenchmen, even the Soviets saw Clausewitz in a positive light, with some reservations, as a “progressive”!!!

However, post-WW2 interpretations remained tied to the old ethical-normative way of looking at the problem of war, notwithstanding progress in philological research re: Clausewitz’s texts.

How can “rational” politics limit or eliminate war? is what researchers into Clausewitz asked themselves. How can political government control soldiers/generals and secure peace?

But what was central for Clausewitz was the anthropological, cultural and historical depth of the relationship between politics and war, not the ethical surface.

2. “Pure/unmixed” and “real” wars from the perspective of anthropology and the philosophy of culture

[[NOTE: πολιτισμὸς in Greek means both culture and civilisation, whilst German like English has Kultur = culture (but can also mean civilisation) and Zivilisation = civilisation (Zivilisation, as far as I can tell is not used by P.K. in the German text, or if it is used, it’s not prominent – if and when I translate the book, then we’ll find out!!!)... the point is that Clausewitz’s analysis of war makes a **sociological-historical**

distinction between raw/uncultivated/uncivilised peoples and cultured/civilised/educated etc. peoples, to illustrate the anthropological, not ethical, grounding of war, and is not concerned that STRICTLY SPEAKING in terms of **social ontology** so-called savage/wild/primitive/raw peoples have culture and are cultured too. That is an issue for P.K. in *The Political and Man*, and not here... Of course, in viewing so-called “primitive” peoples as “uncultured/savage” in the sociological-historical sense, Clausewitz is making a social-ontological/anthropological point of the phenomenon of war existing in all societies arising from societal conflict and the drives/urges/impulses “nature” of man etc., which in Kondylis’s social-ontological theoretical schema relates to the Friend-Foe spectrum of the social relation etc....]]

The first major mistake made of current dominant interpretations of Clausewitz is that Clausewitz at the beginning of his major work depicts war beyond reality as a kind of purely theoretical formulation or fictitious construct/ion (Rothfels, Kessel, Weil, Schmitt, Aron).

There is confusion re: violence and “abstract war-blind violence” and real war and rational, moderate political action.

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It is seen that in politics if there is moderate action by non-military politicians who are clear-headed and responsible, then violence, war can be avoided, since war has a political character.

We shall prove however, against such a view, that Clausewitz's concept of war does not refer to some abstract entity or ens rationis separate and apart from reality, but contains an intensified reality which is comprehended as an abstraction from the rest of reality.

The moderation of extreme, conceptually pure/unmixed/raw violence is due to factors completely different to political or military authority, but rather is due to anthropological and cultural constants, whose effect is independent re: the will and knowledge of governments and subjects. And that is why ethical-normative statements have no place.

Clausewitz formulates practical principles (politics as subjective acts and intentions) re: war of annihilation v. restricted/limited warfare, but not with ethical intent.

When Clausewitz **defines war as an “act of violence to force the opponent to carry out our will”** (*Vom Kriege*, p.191ff) he is taking into consideration **existential magnitudes such as violence, opponent, will/volition, forcing others,...** which are constants and found in all societies.

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There is always some kind of psychical operation in people re: war such as hate, enmity, rawness, the unloading/discharging of enmity, hate etc.. even when there is no “inimical feeling” but “inimical intent” when one does not know the enemy personally (Kondylis cites pp. 192, 410, 213, 991, 952, 659, 468).

Also, feelings of ambition, passion for dominance, every kind of enthusiasm, violence begetting revenge etc. are all human and animal aspects in all humans (p. 285ff.).

There is always the voice of raw, naked nature in war.

All war-like phenomena can be reduced to the direct and ultimate existential contrasting between two men fighting body to body, man to man (p. 269).

Of course, war between advanced cultures **can hide** such elemental aspects of war but cannot eliminate such aspects.

Even when political decisions etc. have to be made about when to go to war and battle etc., the “nerve” which “moves the higher will” is the raw man to man combat (p. 449).

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Once any battle is pulled apart, all that remains is the bare or naked meaning of the battle, i.e. an amorphous struggle (p. 374).

Clausewitz’s systematic starting point is therefore **the existential source and dimension of war**, which some of his contemporaries and theoreticians today avoid or downgrade as not being vitally important!!!

WITHOUT ENMITY, war is neither conceivable or possible. Once can subtract weaponry, organisation etc. from war BUT NOT ENMITY.

To be war, the enmity must be prepared for the use of extreme violence in the killing of another.

WITHOUT killing because of enmity, there can be no war.

Private murder due to private, personal enmity is not war.

[[It seems to me that War = violence involving killing others arising from the political not the plain personal/private-social BUT Kondylis does not say it in those terms... so I presume that gang violence is a kind of gang/criminal war of controlling turf/territory... though P.K. DOES NOT go into this... SEE p. 41 of these NOTES for Clausewitz’s definition of war re: large/great interests... + p.45 of these Notes = “Violence that is war must come from the social whole” so criminal gang violence CANNOT = civil war]]

For Clausewitz, the “philosophy” of war = the theoretical comprehension of war irrespective of war’s various forms.

There is no moderation when it comes to war as war (whether war of annihilation or restricted/limited war), **for Clausewitz, war = enmity and extreme violence culminating in the killing of the other by definition.**

It is not a matter of extent of violence, but its intensity, for the definition of war (i.e. it’s irrelevant if one of the enemy is killed or thousands).

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Without the extreme violence of killing another, there is no war.

Clausewitz emphasises the need to think of the whole along with the parts (p. 191).

The whole or the essence/substance exists in every part, i.e. in every historical form.

Clausewitz is not thinking of a fictitious construct(ion) or of an abstraction as an ens rationis.

So what does Clausewitz mean when he speaks of “abstraction”, “abstract” or “ideational” war? (pp. 196, 216, 199).

He uses such terms along with “simple”, “pure/unmixed”, “initial”, sense of war.

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His terminology does waver, but it seems he strove to find the differentiae specificae and pure/unmixed elements of the reality of war.

The definition of war is abstract not because something abstract is being referred to, but because one must understand war as to its specific features of enmity and extreme violence in all forms of war.

The abstraction shows the existential core of the war phenomenon just as in the case of an ideal-typical understanding of an “intensified reality” to remember Max Weber.

[[*I cannot but express how great Clausewitz’s mind must have been to pre-date Weberian sociology by about 100 years!!!*]]

The ideal type synopsis/summarises the authentic reality of war, it is the reality of various wars in their uniqueness and individuality.

SO the ideal type is not a fictitious construct/ion.

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Reality as a whole is comprehended only through the ideal-typical abstraction if it can be comprehended at all.

The enmity and extreme violence of war of course are never on-going, continuous and general/catholic/universal. Of course, peace has never been continuous and general/universal either. But our topic is war.

Why then is there a mix of different levels of human and historical-social reality?

Clausewitz saw that in the first phases of human history, in “**uncivilised/raw/uncultured/uncultivated peoples**” (P.K. German text p. 16 = rohen Völkern = raw/crude/brute/barbarous peoples), **the real waging of war and the concept of war** (as the continual and catholic/general exercising of extreme violence until the annihilation of the enemy), *were identical*.

Hitherto it has not been noticed in the literature on Clausewitz that for Clausewitz the contrast between the war of “uncivilised/raw” peoples and

that of “civilised/cultivated peoples” (P.K. German text pp. 16-17 = “rohen” and “gebildeten” Völkern = “raw/crude/brute” and “cultivated/educated/cultured/ learned/refined” peoples) (pp. 192ff., 209, 232, 422) is key to understanding that

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we are dealing with different human situations to which the ideal type of war refers because such an ideal type encompasses both these kinds of war (of enmity and extreme violence), i.e. whether we have man-to-man confrontation or wars between “uncivilised/raw/crude/brute” peoples or whether we have human situations where the whole of the existential manpower/force cannot be concentrated because of insurmountable objective obstacles in the case of “civilised/cultivated/educated” peoples.

In the circumstances of life of “civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated peoples”, there is, along with the mixing with other elements, a deconcentration of existential factors which are synopsised/summarised in the pure/unmixed concept of war.

And it is precisely this deconcentration which makes in retrospect indispensable the abstract-ideal-typical comprehension of the act of war.

We should not forget that the above-mentioned existential factors continue to constitute the “nerve” of war in the circumstances of culture/civilisation as well, because without such factors, war in general would be inconceivable.

The main feature of culture is that society is differentiated and becomes all the more complicated such that – under the influence of the many varying and constant subjective and objective factors which define and set the cultural whole continually in motion – **whatever constitutes war in its conceptual purity is thwarted/intercepted, channeled, broken up into pieces or in part covered**

(over) and disguised. The “dividing wall” which obstructs “total unloading/ discharging” rests on “the great number of things, forces and situations which war touches in the life of states” so that no kind of “intellect/mind/brain” can keep culture within the confines of pure/unmixed, war-like/military, will/ volition as in culture there is so much differentiation as to heterogeneous rational bearers, who cannot or do not want to do the same thing, that finally the “inertia of the mass as a whole” cannot be overcome/transcended (p. 953). That’s how “composed circumstances and forms of war between civilised/ cultured/cultivated/educated/learned peoples” are formed/shaped (*Feldzüge von 1799*). Of course, war’s simple nature as it is expressed

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in its definition, is not erased/effaced, nor does it paralyse, however from the time of the arrival/advent of culture it is covered by the “composed and variable texture of war” (p. 214).

What is the difference in the waging of war between the primitive/raw/ crude and developed/educated/cultivated phase of culture? (P.K.’s German text says beim rohen und beim gebildeten Zustand der Kultur = raw/crude/brute and cultivated/educated state of culture, p. 18).

For Clausewitz, **in the “simple circumstances of the life of savage/wild peoples” (German text by P.K. p. 18 = wilder Völker = wild/savage/fierce/ferocious peoples) state and armed forces are a unity, so that war is a one and only great battle, whereas “our wars” consist of many battles and this “fragmentation of the activity of so many individual/ isolated acts is due to the great multiformity of the circumstances, which give rise to war”. Here the political goal is not united because there a number or many wills/volitions, but even if it were, what is sought is attempted in a number of different acts (p. 422).**

For Clausewitz, it is crucial that there is for a “civilised/cultivated/educated people” *an objective weakness* in achieving “total mobilisation” (which was a term rather misused and abused in the 20th century) for the purpose of annihilating the enemy in one and only military act/act of war.

A duel as in the case of existences who hate each other can be repeated in magno between savage/wild peoples (wilden Völken p. 18 German text by P.K.) but not to the extent at which “our” peoples, states and armies function.

The command of a truly total and extreme military effort is for Clausewitz a “dream of logic” (p. 196) *since in developed cultures there is no monolithic cohesion* which is necessary so that a gigantic endless duel between two peoples-warriors can take place.

[[It seems to me that the extreme test of social cohesion is war, and whilst with highly advanced technology and professional armies a country/nation etc. is not necessarily “put to the extreme test”, the demographic-cultural make up of e.g. China today could, though not necessarily, give it some advantages over today’s Western “multi-cultural”, multi-racial, “diverse” countries...]]

Culture (p. 18 P.K. German text Kultur) when it advances not only multiplies forces, but also fragments them – if it is not based on weakness and if it does not produce weakness.

Any attempted total mobilisation in circumstances of more advanced culture would be for Clausewitz a “pointless spending of forces” (p. 196).

Clausewitz also says that if war is not born all of a sudden (p. 196ff.), but rather the inimical intentions of both sides appear already for some time,

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that is due to the organised society of peoples, whose members communicate either politically or otherwise with a code of understanding with one another, even if only symbolically, which precludes war as one strike/hit (p. 197ff.).

In such circumstances, the opponents are organised and ready, able to plan and act over the long run, and there is not just enmity and violence as an existential source of war which motivates people, but also other intellectual-spiritual factors, incl. weighing things up and foreseeing things.

This suggests the existence of a dichotomy between culture and man whose analysis will lead us to the focal point of Clausewitz's anthropology and cultural philosophy (German text by P.K. = Kulturphilosophie = philosophy of culture, p. 19).

In the transition from pure/unmixed to real war (German text by P.K. p. 19 vom reinen zum wirklichen Krieg = from pure to real war), politics as subjective effort for the moderation of violence by the government or other power, **politics plays no role.**

What is decisive is the contrasting of the two types of society, that is, "uncivilised/raw/crude/brute" and "civilised/cultivated/educated" (p. 19 German text by P.K. "rohen" v. "gebildeten") society

[[If one forgets today's ideological understanding of reality, Clausewitz's terminology points to reality: i.e. rural and proto-industrial based relatively stationary civilised/cultured society, v., nomadic/mobile uncivilised/raw and savage society (something which is making something of a comeback in today's "globalised" world of endless movement and "open borders" etc.,... cf. P.K.'s thoughts at the end of these Notes before the Addendum to the Greek edition)]]

[[It should be kept in mind that all human societies whether "savage/primitive/raw/wild" or "cultured/cultivated/educated/advanced/civilised", share certain attributes such as culture, rationality, understanding, intellect, meaning,... which relate to power/identity,

the political and the friend-foe spectrum, as well as the mechanism of the social relation, which Kondylis outlines in *The Political and Man*, and was obviously not the business of Clausewitz in his theory of war. Of course, strictly speaking, even wild/savage peoples obviously display culture and intellect and are “cultured” with an intellect in that sense, as well as having or sharing at an elemental/fundamental level at least in the political/politics/political communication etc. just like “civilised/cultured” peoples, but **NOT IN THE WAY** the so-called civilised peoples do with their Institutions and/or Political Factions/Parties and Greater Societal Complexities – at least in terms of quantity if not quality compared to more “primitive tribes”, where differentiation re: culture and the political is not so extensive and deep... SO for the purposes of Clausewitz’s theorisation of war, the *sociological* differentiation between “raw/crude” and “civilised/cultivated/ cultured” peoples stands, though it does not take into account the full notion of the *social-ontological* and anthropological commonalities of the

**two basic kinds of peoples Clausewitz deals with...
Kondylis DOES NOT comment about Clausewitz's
lack of knowledge of the social-ontological dimension,
simply because the subject matter of the book is War,
and Clausewitz, to put it mildly, displays
ABSOLUTELY BRILLIANT ANALYSES of the
human condition which I personally never cease to be
amazed by and in relation to which I stand in awe...
as obviously P.K. did too...**

**Furthermore, when Clausewitz refers to “human
nature” he is referring, inter alia, at least in part to
the social-ontological and anthropological, i.e. those
factors and forces and constants discernible in all
human societies and the humans that constitute such
societies such as “the passions”, the intellect, the
friend-foe spectrum of the social relation, etc....]]**

**Clausewitz says there can be politics only where there is a “social union” of
men/people.**

**The term “politics” in that Aristotelian sense means the entirety of the
social life of civilised/cultured/educated peoples (P.K. German text p. 19 =
Kulturvölkern), and war conducted politically is every war between such
peoples.**

The contrast between war of annihilation and restricted/limited war is important only inside the state of culture/civilisation where politics plays a part in the sense of subjective intentions and goals.

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN pure/unmixed and real war SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED with the contrast between war of annihilation and restricted/limited war!!!

What then induces the transition from pure/unmixed to real war, since the transition does not take place based on a subjective and philanthropic effort at achieving the moderation of violence?

Clausewitz's answer is anthropological: **man is made in such a way that he cannot remove himself from extreme violence, i.e. the killing of another, whereas at the same time man cannot live continually with extreme violence.**

[[Why are e.g. Kubrick, and many other artists, great? Because, apart from artistic-technical brilliance, “he got it” without being a “philosopher”. See e.g. *A Clockwork Orange...*]]

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“Philosophical logic cannot get over/surpass the dichotomy which takes root in man himself” (p. 990)

[[That's why the ethicists from e.g. Kant to Rawls and Habermas et al., ultimately GET IT WRONG...]]

Clausewitz was not however interested in the opposition between normative Reason and dark impulses/drives/urges as in the case of traditional ethical/moral philosophy BECAUSE Clausewitz saw that man is lead and driven and guided

by feelings/sentiments/emotions anyway, and not by strict logical consistency (pp. 252, 953).

For Clausewitz, there are two groups of feelings in his soul: “the pure/unmixed principle of enmity” and attendant ambition, lust for power, enthusiasm for this and that etc., which bring about competition and rivalry (pp. 286, 239).

On the other hand, there is man’s “incomplete organisation” and his “inconsistency, lack of clarity and lack of daring as regards his spirit/intellect” along with his “imperfect/incomplete ability and judgement” and his “dislike for making huge efforts”, and the “natural phobia and indecisiveness of the human spirit/intellect” etc. (pp. 197, 988, 954, 408, 199, 408, 992, 469).

Two qualities in general obstruct the all-out and active unfolding of enmity and

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competitive disposition or the “inner need for struggle” (p. 269).

They are: the finite character of the spirit/intellect, and, fear.

From early on, Clausewitz knew that the art of war “is about living ethical/moral forces” (p. 208; also in *Feldzüge von 1799*), and in his maturity knew that **“theory must take the human element into account” (p. 208) and there was always a “political and human side to war” (p. 181).**

“The natural fear of common people for large, great undertaking” (*Strategie*, p. 53).

Clausewitz opposed Bülow’s “clean/pure strategy” with his own “general strategy” which could formulate principles which “are founded on equally

general circumstances, as e.g. the general character of man is founded on such general circumstances (“Bemerkungen”, p. 14ff..)

Clausewitz even observed that **feelings of “hate and revenge... were very badly or wrongly connected absolutely to religious fanaticism” when in fact in times of great danger they provide man with courage and energy to act** (Epistle to his fiancé 11.9.1807 and “Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8 and 1809” = *Politische Schriften*, pp. 21, 66, 75 + “Bekenntnisschrift” 1812 = *Schriften* p. 739).

[[Being the great observer of human affairs that Clausewitz was, he knew or sensed that “hate” and “love” etc. belong to all people, and we could add that today’s slogans of “Imagine a world without Hate” etc. = **PURE IDEOLOGICAL BULLSHIT** so certain groups can wield **grossly disproportionate** forms of Power which it “just happens” to be the case that they fail to point out etc. etc. etc.]]

Clausewitz was convinced that the majority of the populace “stood in between
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the extremes of human nature” (Rothfels, *Clausewitz*, Anhang, p. 224 re: 1807 text). Man between fear and courage (*Schriften*, p. 707).

Fear for Clausewitz “takes root in man himself”, which has an effect both in war and e.g. in a game of cards for “human nature remains the same, even in the most different circumstances”.

Hence, war as seen from historical experience is “in general terms so little passionately wild”. In such a context, Clausewitz gives a brief history of the waging of war from “raw/crude/uncivilised peoples” to the French Revolution (“Ueber das Fortschreiten”, pp. 233, 235, 236 ff.). Clausewitz wanted to “give lucidity and coherence to strategy” in that history of waging war (Epistle to Gneisenau 4.3.1817).

War CANNOT therefore be confined to its pure/unmixed meaning because it is waged out of enmity AND with fear.

[[Of course, fear (and e contrario enmity) are what feature in Thucydides re: the general origins/causes of war (see later P.K.’s discussion of the causes of and reasons for war... matters are not so clear-cut...)...]]

“Man seeks and creates the danger which he fears” = Clausewitz sees war as inseparable from human nature incl. from fear, human frailty and weakness, and enmity and passions etc. (p. 407, 465).

Clausewitz on this basis also sought to interpret the **pauses/breaks** in acts of war which he saw as related to “the natural fear and indecision of the human spirit/intellect” in the “imperfection” of the human intellect and judgement and
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only as the third factor the “superior power of defence” (pp. 408, 469).

The roots of the war phenomenon are in the whole of society and when Clausewitz understood the distinction between pure/unmixed war and real war, he included the notion of pauses/breaks in war within the wider societal context regarding anthropological perceptions (pp. 205/6).

It is not a coincidence that Clausewitz’s observation of the “dichotomy taking root in man himself” appears in the same chapter where for the first time he systematically presents the teaching of war as the continuation of political communication with the mixing of other means... the contradictory

elements in man find unity in the aforesaid teaching as such elements in part neutralise themselves (p. 990).

It is no coincidence that the “imperfections or incompleteness” of man = the “principle of moderation” of violence in the discussion on pure/unmixed v. real war (p. 197).

Clausewitz’s philosophy of culture: in culture (P.K. German text p. 23 = Kultur) (as objectification of divided human nature), there is a sufficient in practice balancing mechanism so that there can be peace, but there is also enough tension so that war cannot be excluded, but rather is being prepared for.

[[THIS IS UNBELIEVABLE STUFF. CLAUSEWITZ = TOTAL LEGEND...]]

This means that war and peace are mixed with each other in man and when there is peace, war is being prepared for, and when “cultured/civilised” peoples go to war, political goals and pauses/breaks in acts of war are always (potentially) present too.

The question is what “interests” hold sway on each and every respective occasion.

Thus, the state of culture/civilisation, the “social union” of man within which war and peace take place, is formed re: the two basic aspects of human nature and serves different human interests (p. 990).

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If there ever was a “social union” of people which had never experienced war, then we could say that it was based solely on feelings of fear and

weakness. It would be a pure/unmixed culture/civilisation as the exact opposite of pure/unmixed war.

But just as war as the representative of violence cannot be pure/unmixed in circumstances of culture (P.K. German text reine Kultur = pure culture p. 23), so too, culture as moderation of pure/unmixed war can bring about such moderation by it itself losing its pure/unmixed character as it gives birth to war from its own womb as culture (Kultur p. 23 German text).

The theoretical distinction between pure/unmixed culture, and, pure/unmixed war (reinen Kriegen = P.K. German text p. 23), does not apply to reality in which both co-exist and interweave with each other, **just as the dichotomy in man (the capacity for violence but also the inability to just be violent) does not prevent him from presenting himself as a united person or as a united people.**

One could *presume* that the “moderation” of pure/unmixed war and the transition to culture/civilisation (P.K. German text p. 24 = Kultur) is due to progress in ethics and humanitarianism which go with culture/more advanced civilisation.

Clausewitz would not have approved of such an interpretation of his thought.

For one, he does not believe that the formation of the “intellect” in “civilised/cultured” peoples is accompanied by the retreat of the “element of rawness”. [[How fucking brilliant is that...!!!]]

Hence the contrasting of barbarism and culture/civilisation, intellect and feelings/emotions, loses any moral/ethical connotation. SO THERE IS NO

POSSIBILITY OF ANY MORAL/ETHICAL PROGRESS!!!

[[THIS MEANS, *RETARDS*, THAT EVEN IF YOUR SOCIETY HAS MORE RIGHTS, BETTER MATERIAL STANDARDS OF LIVING, ETC. ETC. ETC., PEOPLE WILL STILL USE ETHICS/IDEOLOGY TO DOMINATE OTHERS, WHETHER PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND OR PHYSICALLY, BUT MOSTLY PSYCHOLOGICALLY-IDEOLOGICALLY... YOU CAN'T EVER GET AROUND POWER AND ITS FORMS, NOR THE FACT THAT E.G. A GROUP CAN PRETEND THEY ARE "EQUAL" WITH EVERYONE ELSE, WHEN ITS MEMBERS "JUST HAPPEN" TO **GROSSLY DISPROPOTIONATELY** FIND THEMSELVES IN POSITIONS OF SOME FORM(S) OF POWER... AND THEN THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY SO MANY PEOPLE ARE *DISGUSTED* BY THEM OR EVEN HATE THEM... WELL DONE, *RETARDS*...]]

Clausewitz writes that the primacy of emotions/feelings in barbarian peoples and the primacy of the intellect amongst civilised/cultured peoples "is not due to the same texture of barbarism and culture/civilisation, but to the concomitant circumstances, institutions etc." because "even the most civilised/cultured peoples can break out into passions of one against the other" (p. 193).

Clausewitz even noticed that Medieval War of "all against all" "stopped finally not because people gradually became less war-like" but due to the establishment of the absolute monarchy (*Politische Schriften*, p. 54).

[[This is very interesting: so, one can foresee Western mass democracy increasingly breaking down under the strain of "diversity" and "multi-

culturalism” so that a kind of dictatorship/authoritarian regime will be its only choice to maintain social order until it finally breaks down all together...]]

Progress in education has nothing to do with stopping the discovery of gunpowder or firearms in order to annihilate the opponent and... there are **all-powerful passions** which influence people in civilised peoples and amongst educated social classes too (pp. 194, 243).

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Culture (Kultur P.K. German text p. 24) does not mean the end of the existential source of war, but brings about the perfection of the art of war, the art of killing another. Precisely in epochs of “higher learning” did peoples stand famous for their art of war!!!.

All that the refinement of the intellect does is to replace the “war spirit” of the “savage” with the “war genius” of the “civilised” person (p. 232).

So, culture does not weaken the war inclinations of man, but for concrete, specific reasons does not allow for pure/unmixed war, and hence “intellect” which comes from “education” cannot have an ethical and humanitarian character, but just an instrumental character in rationally finding means to achieve a goal/end, irrespective of the ethics involved.

[[Oh my!!! Poor old (Tribal warrior) Horkheimer with his “objective rationality”
HAHAHAHA!!!]]

The intellect however does influence the course of events since “struggle is the counting of spiritual-intellectual and bodily forces through the latter” (p. 269).

For Clausewitz, “intellect” and “element of rawness” are not opposites, just like war and culture/civilisation are by no means mutually exclusive.

In fact, “violence is armed with the inventions of the arts/technology and science” (p. 192).

The intellect can moderate violence, but it does so not because of ethics per se residing in the intellect etc., but because it weighs up the means in relation to the ends. [[= ABSOLUTELY BRILLIANT]]

Pure/unmixed violence as in the case of “going in blind” and showing how brave you are as a “savage” can turn out to be totally counter-productive when situations are multifarious and multi-dimensional

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and require the combatant to weigh things up, calculate and make various unexpected moves to avoid defeat etc.

“The avoidance of an obstacle is a human instinct” (Gustav Adolfs *Feldzüge*, p. 77) and the intellect is the refinement of such an instinct in circumstances of culture/civilisation as it allows for a surveying of matters and for orientation re: what action to take.

For Clausewitz, the intellect has nothing to do with abolishing war, but makes action more effective by reining in uncontrolled violence. “If we

therefore see that civilised/cultured/cultivate/educated peoples do not kill captives and do not destroy cities and the countryside [[WHAT on earth DID the USA, Russia and

other Powers do in Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.!!!], *the reason is that the intellect is involved more in the waging of war and has taught them more drastic means for the exercising of violence, than the raw manifestations of the instinct*” (p. 226).

[[I note that in Clausewitz’s day the term Instinkt was used (p. 25 of P.K.’s German text) when nowadays “instinct” is used for (non-human) animals, and “drive/urge/impulse” for humans]]

There should not be any “blind attack/offence” because intellect now allows for “greater more drastic action” (p. 226), and “blind passion” is subordinated to the political goal of war, with the intellect now operating more so in the context of civilisation/culture but still with an instrumental goal/purpose/end in mind and thus defines how great the sacrifices will be (p. 217).

[[All these distinctions between “savage” peoples and “civilised/cultured” peoples, to the extent that they apply – and they do apply to some extent at a sociological level as I have previously explained, even if the terminology is not fully appropriate, have enormous implications for e.g. mean/average IQ differences and levels of impulse control between races and other groups in our societies, and of course these matters are TABOO in Western mass democracies. But science is not interested in serving TABOOS and those who (grossly disproportionately) WIELD forms of POWER through ideology etc.. Science describes and explains what IS – just as the GREAT CLAUSEWITZ DID and which P.K. shows he did...]]

All that the intellect can do is rein in the “element of rawness” inside of the “social union” of people as a kind of service and not in opposition to the “element of rawness”.

The reining in happens incl. through social and military institutions etc..

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Clausewitz views inventions (for the purpose) of war, arms, organisation, tactics, principles of using troops in battle, etc. as limits and restrictions on the “natural instinct”, though the psychological forces remain necessary and need to

have some margin to operate (“Leitfaden zur Bearbeitung der Taktik”, in Vom Kriege, p. 1108).

So enmity becomes more impersonal, more intellectual [[

wonder how and under what circumstances certain people can grossly disproportionately acquire positions of power etc!!!], if one will permit the phrase, and the same result arises from the perfection of weapons whereas the savage in man-to-man, body-to-body combat has weapons like the dagger/knife and war hatchet... whilst the weapons used to fight the foe from a distance are more so the “tools of the intellect; they leave the psychical forces and fighting instinct in nearly complete calm” (p. 1109).

War cannot be ever conceived of without “enmity”, “without the instinct of attack/offence and annihilation” (p. 1107), nor in circumstances of culture/civilisation can war be waged without the guidance and planning of the intellect. The intellect has as its motive force the will/volition to defeat outright the foe (without the nerve of will/volition, ideas just float in the soul/psyche, *Feldzüge von 1799*, p. 264).

At the highest military level, where the talented General displays a military genius, there is a “harmonic joining of forces (i.e. intellect and will)” as unity of courage and prudence/thoughtfulness which provides a genuine, well-aimed decisiveness (pp. 232, 236; + *Feldzüge von 1796* (conduct war not just with the mind/intellect, but as a whole man)).

“Cultured/cultivated/educated/civilised” peoples fight wars based on

- 1) hate and enmity, along with**
- 2) “free psychical activity” as an intermediate field, where enmity is mixed with courage, and finally**
- 3) the intellect.**

Clausewitz calls this the “idiosyncratic triad”, and attributes

element 1) (hate, enmity) more so to the people,

2) (intermediate enmity mixed with courage etc.) more to the General and his army,

and 3) (the intellect) more to the government (p. 213).

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All 3 elements above exist in all combatants but in different doses. This means that governments e.g. using the intellect alone cannot abolish wars etc. (p. 193).

[[SO, ALL THE STUPID FEMINISTS and other DO-GOODERS, who think women represent “peace” are in their usual STUPID IDEOLOGICAL FANTASY WORLD, away from reality...]]

The said triad cannot hierarchise the 3 elements or magnitudes, and is not a new definition of war, but counts the variables which act in all wars between “civilised” peoples [[Remember for Clausewitz’s sociological typology “savages” don’t use their intellect, at least not through institutions like “civilised/cultured/cultivated” peoples do]], and Clausewitz’s point in referring to these variables is not to show the essence of war, but to indicate the many forms of war (see Hepp who critiqued Aron, causing Aron to modify his initial position/theses. Aron’s mistake was to renew the misleading view of Ritter that Clausewitz’s thought was “idealistic” and “wholly soaked in the victorious belief in the power of Reason”).

With the formulation of the said triad, **Clausewitz then refers to war as the “true chameleon”**, and views the three elements of his formula like 3 poles of attraction (p. 213). All three elements operate in wars between civilised peoples and their internal relations are not a matter for norms, but for specific, concrete weighing up, which can vary a great deal from case to case.

3. War and politics or violence and power

From “instinct” v. “intellect” in relation to violence v. power.

Violence and power intersect in the same sense of war and politics in the context of the “social union” of peoples

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which is two-sided like human nature, since it is the objectification of human nature.

The “moderation” undertaken in the transition from pure/unmixed war to real wars has nothing to do with “humane or responsible” politics, but is due to a “politics” which = “social union” of people = political totality or political community.

“Politics” does not mean purposeful-expedient action, but means public-political communication of people within their “social union”, to a great extent in the Aristotelian sense, which was common in the beginning of the 19th century when the liberal and democratic concept of politics as “I do politics” had not yet been imposed.

Clausewitz is clear about the purely objective reasons for the “moderation” of pure/unmixed war, where the social situation both within and between states of civilised/cultivated/cultured/learned/educated peoples is very different to wild, savage peoples (p. 192).

However, the reduction in savagery etc. does not mean “civilised” peoples don’t engage in wars of annihilation. Nor do subjective intentions affect “friction”, to be discussed later.

We could say that the “moderation” of pure/unmixed war constitutes that friction which pure/unmixed war undergoes in the complicated “social union” of people.

Seen in this way, “politics” in the objective sense of public-political communication within political community, always has a moderating effect.

Interpreters such as Ritter are wrong in seeing “politics” as the beneficial and expedient activity of a non-military authority, and do not understand Clausewitz’s text at all. In their ethical/moralistic zeal

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they commit a logical leap and view the objective effect of the “social union” of people as the conscious achievement of a subject thinking normatively.

For us far more interesting than subjective political goals, is the intersection of anthropological observation, the philosophy of culture and the theory of war.

Just as we earlier explained Clausewitz’s perception of the unity of contrary tendencies within man and within culture, we can now outline the same unity in the relations between politics and war.

Generally, politics relates to war like man to violence. The former cannot renounce and go without the latter, nor can the former live continuously with the latter.

The “social union” of people cannot be in a state of perpetual, catholic/general violence, but its structure and functioning necessarily give birth to violence from time to time.

The necessity of peace between two wars is not due to ethical/moral, but to anthropological and cultural factors. That’s why there are **pauses/breaks**

during and within hostilities/battles/fighting **and there is also the politicisation of war as the subjection of war to the general law-like necessities which dominate in the social union of people as the objectification of human nature.**

Every conducting/waging of war in the complicated situation of civilisation/culture is of necessity politics in so far as it deviates from pure/unmixed war, by reining in blind violence and aggressive rabidity in order to take into consideration the multiformity of subjective and objective factors and act

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accordingly, i.e. by determining with cold logic the means which its ends demand.

The main issue is not if this is done “correctly” or with ethical/moral intent, but it is obligated to do it. To the extent that the political waging of war deviates from pure/unmixed war, the “inimical feeling” is covered by the “inimical intent”. even though the former (“inimical feeling”) continues to operate in the latter (pp. 193, 286).

The blind violence of pure war had as its only aim the subjugation of the enemy, which is a very abstract aim in a specific and complicated situation.

Calculating possibilities, i.e. the political waging of war means flexibility of behaviour and of the aim in accordance with the circumstances “taking into account the peculiarity of the states acting” (p. 201).

War of its nature is enmity and attempt to subjugate,

political waging of war = rational suspension, channeling and exploitation of essential elements of war within/into the framework of the calculation of

possibilities, and on the basis of knowledge of the complicated character of a peculiar network of relations on each and every respective occasion.

The political waging of war is war conducted in circumstances of culture.

War comes from “political communication”, making the general texture of war have an even deeper interweaving with politics.

Clausewitz writes that war “and indeed war between civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated peoples” comes “always [from] a political situation” and is induced “only by a political motive”, “only by the political communication of governments and peoples”; politics “gives rise or birth” to war (pp. 209, 990. 993).

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The “political goal” is not for Clausewitz the conscious choice of a subjective will/volition, but just the formal magnitude, which means that political communication must be expressed with subjective political goals and decisions in order to bring about war, but the content of the choice is still open at the said formal level. In the circumstances of culture/civilisation, there cannot be a decision to wage pure/unmixed war, but there can be a decision re: any kind of real war, from war of annihilation to simple armed ?observation? of the foe [[?not sure of the exact wording here?]] (p. 201).

Politics is no normative intellect, but an intellect which operates when it can't achieve its goals/ends without waging war. War is the continuation, the spawn/offspring of politics, and not something strange to politics, or an abrupt and inexplicable break from politics.

For Clausewitz war cannot ever be an entirely different situation compared to politics, for politics gives rise to

war, and war is not subject to laws different to politics (p. 990).

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Clausewitz focuses on the essential interrelation between political communication (as objectification of all facets of human nature) and war with its causes, in the light of the texture of political communication.

Clausewitz avoids every comparison between “good” politics and “bad” war, nor does he demand the former put a stop to the latter.

= War could not constitute the continuation of political communication if such political communication were not made to beget, necessarily, or at least be capable of begetting, war.

The essence of political communication continues to exist in war (p. 991), so the essence of political communication is not pure/unmixed peace, which cannot beget or give rise to war.

War is a part of politics, politics is not separate to war (p. 991).

War is a particular field in the broader field of politics, and war is thus a variation of the essential texture of politics, a certain form of political communication.

The peculiarity of war is in the “peculiarity of its means” (p. 210).

For Clausewitz, **war** **“is a clash of large/great interests which is solved bloodily, and only as to this [[shedding of blood]] does war differ from other clashes/conflicts”** (p. 303).

Both politics and war can be jointly classified under the concept “clash or conflict” and politics is “the womb, from which war develops” (p. 303).

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Shering is wrong to think that politics and war have only goals/ends in common whilst differing as to means, because both politics and war have in common a contradictory and multi-dimensional structure of conflict/clashes, regardless of the form of the conflict – Clausewitz compares conflict in legal give and take to war (p. 614).

It is wrong however to consider that all aspects of politics are war and that all aspects of war are politics. One must examine every specific, concrete situation to ascertain what aspect/s are paramount or ascendant at any given moment.

Clausewitz pragmatically saw the European balance/equilibrium of Great or Major Powers as an expedient correlation of forces, and did not connect such balance/equilibrium with the definition of war from the point of view of international law and reining in war.

[[ATTENTION: this means that there can be no such thing as the ludicrous “liberal world order” or “rules-based world order” etc., and any other such absurdities, because all correlations of forces in international politics are macro-historically temporary and are always related to distributions of forms of power (as are all human interactions for that matter, though within a state one can have more of a rules-based order over the long run, though never forever and ever and ever, because eventually a new social formation (perhaps even more relatively chaotic, though not necessarily) will eventuate, one way or another etc...]]

Clausewitz refers to the appealing influence of international law rather disparagingly, in that for him the mores of international law do not weaken

in essence the strength of force and violence [[in international relations]] (p. 192).

The differentia specifica of war for Clausewitz is in the exercising of violence, i.e. with the use of violent means.

It's not enough to say there is different intensity of conflict, it's violence that's the key.

Clausewitz regarded that the “primary duty of theory” is the “separation of heterogeneous things” (p. 272)

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without meaning that the ascertainment of heterogeneity excludes the existence of similarities and closeness etc..

For Clausewitz, there is no need whatsoever to look at international law to define war and peace because they are concepts which do not accept gradations, i.e. they are distinct (p. 988).

In peace, regardless of whether preparations are being made for war, hic et nunc no violence is being exercised.

Peace is NOT free from conflict and clashes but it does not contain the violence that characterises war as (armed) violence.

[[Needless to say, it is implied that we are not talking about personal violence or criminal violence, though “gang violence” could be seen as a kind of “gang/criminal war/violence” (p.45 of these Notes = “Violence that is war must come from the social

whole” so criminal gang violence CANNOT = civil war), but here the discussion is about countries as states and earlier about primitive tribes or “savages” in the case of “pure war”]]

Clausewitz, in thinking that war = the exercising of violence, held that war is started first of all by the side defending itself, since the attacking/offensive side would prefer to conquer something without fighting/going to war (p. 644) – something Carrias saw as sophistry, and Lenin as a witticism.

Clausewitz’s just mentioned position also implies that peace is definitely not without conflict – there are always forms of conflict in peacetime.

For Clausewitz, the [military] undertaking/venture for the purpose of occupation is planned outside of war, being in part executed before war, and the manufacture of weapons is peacetime activity, since the use of weapons happens in wartime (p. 269).

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War can only be a temporary, historically seen, continuation of politics because war cannot be a permanent state of affairs. Politics cannot be the continuation of war.

Endless and generalised violence cannot be a modus vivendi of a society.

For Clausewitz, one can classify both political communication and war under conflict/clashes.

Politics cannot be the continuation of war because war is not permanent and war is exercising violence, whereas politics isn't.

[[This raises the issue of whether all forms of internal/domestic political violence come under the category of “civil war” – it would seem so... SEE BELOW!!!]]

If the formal distinction Clausewitz makes of

war = exercising violence, and

peace = not exercising violence

is not accepted, then indirectly the difference between peace and war must be the absence of conflict, which is absurd as peace incl. conflict.

Raymond Aron [[as great as he was overall]] makes this mistake of not accepting that both peace and war come under conflict. Aron also errs re: Soviet war dogma and Sokolowski.

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The question remains: what is that which is not violence and indeed often bridles violence, but which can beget violence?

Conflict is a situation in which violence is possible, but not necessary.

The common cause of conflict in general and war is *striving for power*.

“Power” permeates political communication, and politics can therefore give rise to violence as war.

Only politics can beget war.

Every other [[kind of]] violence which is not sparked off by politics, but by the narrower personal communication between individuals = a personal duel, which barely shakes the organised social whole.

Violence that is war must come from the social whole.

The absolute form of war “floats endlessly in the background” for all wars (p. 992).

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whether it comes to the forefront or not.

Now, behind politics the image of violence floats, as well as that of war, since violence [[from the social whole and re: great interests]] = war, just as behind every restricted violence there hangs or floats the image of extreme violence.

There is for Clausewitz, a succession of calm and intensity in war itself until the decisive confrontation (p. 414).

Ethical-normative thought has always confused power and violence by equating striving for power with violence, by trying to convince itself and others that by renouncing violence it does not strive for power!!!!

[[On the other hand, you get EXTREMELY RETARDED FEMINISTS (IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF MASSIFIED AND ATOMISED HEDONISTIC MASS CONSUMPTION BASED ON THE UNRECOGNIZED OR FORGOTTEN (HISTORICAL) LABOUR OF MILLIONS AND MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF MEN AND WOMEN OF ALL RACES), WHO HAVE AN EXTREME LUST FOR POWER BY EQUATING VIOLENCE WITH “VERBAL VIOLENCE” TO SHOW HOW RETARDED THEY ARE (they don’t understand that the differentia specifica of violence is the physical targeting of another), AND HOW MUCH THEY WANT THEIR “SICK” NORMATIVE PROGRAMME BASED ON UNCONTROLLED LUST FOR POWER, TO CONTROL PEOPLE... and contribute to the potential autogenocide of the Western relatively white ethne/(sub-)races incl. through historically very low birth rates etc...]]

But precisely because politics is striving for power, it must often bridle or rein in violence and war to achieve its goals.

The end of barbarism and the start of culture/civilisation (see above) = the end of “pure/unmixed war” and blind aggressivity. Rather than inimical feeling, we have inimical intent, and the intellect controls the instincts, and channels the latter according to its goals.

The bridling/curbing/restraining of violence does not in the least constitute an achievement of peace-loving and philanthropic prudence.

The intellect, by rationally pursuing its goals, understands that in a complex society, the direct and unreflected striving for what is desired can, or as a rule, break(s) up or undermine(s) one’s own power.

So striving after power which is cautious, and blind violence which thirsts for immediate satisfaction,

become two different things for the intellect that understands...

[[THIS is exactly the starting point as to how a tiny, potentially much less powerful group, can exert GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE power over a much larger, potentially much more powerful group – i.e. by getting the larger group to agree to live in the way it does, or at least not see, as a whole, any need to resist, or change things... SEE NEXT PAGE!!!]]

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Striving after power sets limits on violence, knows when to expediently use violence, and can also introduce pauses/breaks during an act of war.

There is thus no contradiction between the origin of war from politics and the “moderation” of war by politics.

The distance between power and violence, between politics and physical superiority, grows with the increasing complexity of culture, and what was inconceivable amongst “uncivilised/uncultured savages” i.e. war between physically unequal groups becomes a reality in culture/civilisation when there can be armed conflict between two states of unequal power (p. 216).

The combinatory nature of power with its innumerable variations and ways out presents many more shades than the crude mechanics of violence, and next to the struggle between foes, it gives rise to the game between friends, which makes the weak able to make claims against the stronger.

[[This is another absolutely brilliant passage by P.K. – no wonder nowadays e.g. elite women, elite homosexuals and elite “chosen people” from within their primitive secret society or “mafia” etc. can achieve, have and wield GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of power in conditions of massification and atomisation and “advanced” civilisation... whilst also leading us ALL as peoples of the West straight (within another 50 or 100 or 200 or... years?) to self-annihilation incl. through their collective madness, short-sightedness, stupid Greed re: international affairs, etc....]]

To understand the relations between politics and war, one must clearly distinguish between striving for power and violence, whose textures are different even if they have common goals.

Power is the genuine more comprehensive, more visionary and more demanding product of the state of civilisation/culture compared to the state of barbarism, in

which power and violence basically coincided, and so politics excels, surpasses and outweighs war, in fact war must be conducted taking into account all of “political communication”.

Raymond Aron [[as great as he was]] makes the mistake of thinking that Clausewitz, in subjugating war to politics, wants to subordinate politics to peace and to the renunciation and abandonment of power, and that the strengthening of military power *in itself* is not a goal of politics.

The latter notion is, of course, correct, however one CANNOT derive the inherent peaceableness of politics from the statement “the strengthening of military power *in itself* is not a goal of politics” without incorrectly equating the goals of the army as organised violence with the goals of power of politics by confusing power with violence. [[In other words, war, which (eventually) emanates from politics, is characterised by violence, and there is nothing politics can do about that]].

Such confusion is unknown to Clausewitz.

Clausewitz knew that the goals of political power are realised in ways soldiers/generals/military personnel, specialists in violence, do not have in mind,

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who as specialists, are tied to a one-sided and inflexible way of looking at things.

If there was a general will to be removed or detached from power, then politics would be a very simple matter.

Peace is presented or presents as acceptable only when it accompanies at least the securing of one’s

own power, which in complex “political communication” is not achieved only through military force.

Clausewitz of course was not concerned with finding the road from violence to moderate philanthropic politics, but was concerned with comprehending and assessing the function of violence *politically*, based on higher views/aspirations of power.

Clausewitz of course directly dealt with political communication and the Napoleonic Wars, but such wars were in the context of “civilised/cultured/cultivated” peoples, not in that of “pure/unmixed” war between “barbarous peoples”.

Clausewitz saw that Napoleon’s mode of waging war was not blameworthy itself, but the result of the seemingly new “political communication” born of the French Revolution (p. 997).

[[One is tempted to say that the Spykman/Brzezinski and “(Zio-)NeoCon” and “Left/Human Rights” forms of political communication, to the extent they overlap (and of course they don’t fully overlap), arise from the process of defeating the Soviet Union/the Russian Empire and then proceeding to “globalisation”, which we all know in the sense of American/Grossly Disproportionate (in part at least) “Chosen People”/ZIO Hegemony and Influence is BOUND TO FAIL, probably miserably sooner (within a few decades and with the destruction of all of the West?), or later e.g. in the 22nd century... though, of course, one can never know for sure... By the way, because ZBiggie the Polak had a brain, in his final article in *The American Interest*, he shows clearly that he was more than capable of thinking along realistic/scientific/non-ideological lines... <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignment/>]]

The political character of war is crystal-clear for Clausewitz since “the political situation distances itself from the pure/unmixed opposition

between foes, and war itself has more periods of relative peace than usual”
(*Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig*).

In wars between “civilised/cultured/cultivated peoples”, there are factors other than blind violence, so that’s why there can be restricted/limited wars which are not “pure/unmixed” war, ***and not because of any kind of “humanism”***.

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However, as violence increases, an optical illusion eventuates, and war of annihilation is confused with pure/unmixed war, and it even took Clausewitz a lot of time to rid himself of such an optical illusion (see sub-chapter 4 below).

Clausewitz gets things right in terms of our interpretation when he states that restricted/limited war “appears to be” more political than other forms of war (p. 211), and elsewhere he says that the two forms of war, restricted/limited war and war of annihilation, are both political (p. 211).

For Clausewitz, some wars = equating of politics and enmity and violence and annihilation (Epistle to v. Roeder 22.12.1827), whereas later he rejects outright the equating of “political” war with restricted/limited war, because in certain conjunctures political “calculation” must include the option of wars of annihilation, incl. in regard to his stance in 1812 (p. 212 and “Bekennnisschrift”).

The above does not mean Clausewitz was in favour of wars of annihilation, but that he was not a moronic ethicist/moralist re: the so-called humanitarian obligations of politics.

Clausewitz NOT WITHOUT IRONY left it too “philosophers” to decide whether war in general or

new forms of war “benefit or not mankind generally” (p. 800), and would have said the same about politics too!!!

Clausewitz was convinced that politics is the struggle for power

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and it is a total waste of time to contemplate something invariable and anthropologically a GIVEN!!!

“What does every side want? To dominate its opponent”, he calmly ascertains (“Aufzeichnungen aus 1807/8” = *Pol. Schriften*, p. 55).

Clausewitz explicitly states he cannot blame any nation for wanting to free itself or to conquer other nations, incl. France kicking the boot into us (i.e. the Prussians/Germans)!!! (“Aufzeichnungen aus dem Jahre 1803” = *Pol. Schriften*, p. 2 + *Geist und Tat*, p. 11).

Clausewitz clearly saw the fundamental distinction between politics and ethics (*Aufzeichnungen aus dem Jahre 1803” = Pol. Schriften*, p. 3).

CUT the BULLSHIT, i.e. **“in politics ... pure heart and knightly virtue are permitted to only someone who has conquered such a right through ACTION”** (*Gustav Adolphs Felzüge*).

Of course, Clausewitz NEVER supported the violent choice when violence was avoidable,

and being suspicious or sceptical of the practical possibilities of international law,

he also NEVER declared any belief or faith in political subjects and dialogue/consensus.

Clausewitz prophetically foresaw the Liberation of Germany from Napoleonic Rule, and the Unification of Germany via the SWORD, when one of Germany's states subjugates the other states ("Umtriebe" (1819-1823?) and also in "Bekanntnisschrift").

Just before he died Clausewitz wrote against "philosophers" who thought they could rid the world of conflict/opposition etc....

"such a thing would be very anti-philosophical, because all of the natural and intellectual/spiritual world is kept in balance/equilibrium by its conflicts/oppositions".

Even if "liberalism" defeated "despotism" and annihilated the latter, there would never be any "idyllic peace" established, nor would the rivalry between interests and passions fall silent. We cannot

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find contrasts/conflicts of peoples in axioms and principles, but only in the entirety of their material and spiritual/intellectual relations – **and here we must ask history** ("Die Verhältnisse Europas seit der Teilung Polens" = *Pol. Schriften*, p. 226).

[[SO, RETARDS!!! Even if you got your “beautiful One World Global Village” (with (next to) no relatively white Christians) and with elite “Chosen People” in GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE Seats of forms of Power, you STILL won’t be able to rest indefinitely!!! DISGUSTING REVOLTING (subjective assessment) RETARDS and DUMB FUCKS (objective assessment) – Absolutely Sickening Animals that you are (very subjective, emotional, non-scientific assessment)!!! – NEVER FORGET, even “civilised/ultra-sophisticated/ultra-cosmopolitan people” share in some or most of the basic traits to some degree of “primitive, savage peoples”... (and by the way FUCKING STUPID RETARDS, no-one, not Clausewitz, not P.K., not me, not anyone engaged in science is supporting National Socialism or White Nationalism/Identitarianism or Communism/Marxism/Leninism/Maoism or any other Political Programme – FUCKING DUMB FUCKS...)]]

In one passage (p. 993), Clausewitz writes that politics “unites and balances inside itself” everything which serves “humanity”.

Ritter and Paret interpreted that phrase as meaning that politics is not just power struggle.

Kondylis holds that an analysis of the context of the said phrase means that the Ritter and Paret interpretation was at least rushed.

To begin with, Clausewitz was referring to internal/domestic administration/governance and not to international relations. Politics in terms of internal administration/governance of a state happens against other foreign states. If a state does not stand on its own feet it cannot possibly guarantee the rights and well-being or prosperity of its own citizens.

“Humanity” does not dictate the state’s behaviour, but humanity itself is protected by the state via rights and freedoms.

Clausewitz however does not concern himself with what those rights and freedoms should be, and does not refer to ethics/morality and natural law.

Clausewitz writes: “there is no ethical/moral authority or dominance outside of the concept of the state and of law” (p. 192), and by that he means that peace and ethics/morality and “humanity” are established and protected ONLY by the state and its power, and the bindedness of the

state's laws. So, you can't have "humanity as humanitarianism" without the self-preservation of the state.

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For Clausewitz internal politics must be seen from the point of view of the necessities of external politics.

But re: external politics, which for Clausewitz is the pre-eminent grand politics, a "barbarous state of affairs or situation" holds sway, natural law and the law of power, as was known in Europe since at least the time of Bodin and Hobbes. [[All this reminds us of H. Morgenthau, H. Bull, K. Waltz, et al.,...]]

Weil makes the mistake of thinking that Clausewitz connected the mode of waging war with the polity and that internal politics has primacy.

The primacy of external politics/foreign policy rests on the fact that irrespective of the polity and internal politics, the co-existence and rivalry between states has its own logic and the struggle between states is ongoing, perpetual.

So internal politics/policy ought to be formed on the basis of the needs of external politics/foreign policy, so that the state can maximise its powers, AND NOT based on ethical/moral principles (no matter how respectable in themselves), or on the basis of the interests of one group against state power.

[[WHAT THE FUCK DOES THAT MEAN??? OH MY GOD!!! HAHAHAHA!!!]]

Early on, **Clausewitz recognised that “there is no more important political goal/end than the independence of the state and the nation** (“Ueber die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens gegen Frankreich”, Nov. 1807 – March 1808).

And as Clausewitz’s thought matured he saw that political community or the polity as a whole is based on the idea of defence against an external

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foe/enemy (Epistle to Gneisenau 9.9.1824).

Of course, the Marxist literature e.g. Engelberg, classified Clausewitz politically between monarchical reaction and liberal progressivism.

Clausewitz expressly wrote that the Prussian state **should not “support its army and war with a few tonnes of gold in the treasury, but with the whole of the power/strength of the nation”** (Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe” (1824/5), *Polit. Schriften*, p. 217).

[[WHAT THE FUCK DOES THAT MEAN??? OH MY GOD!!! HAHAAAAHA!!!]]

Clausewitz personally was worried about internal political reform, and whilst he did not share in the class prejudices of the aristocracy, stood back from criticising the aristocracy as they were crucial for the Prussian Army (Rothfels). [[= political pragmatism on the part of the great Prussian general!!!]]

Nor was Clausewitz impressed by the “demagogues” (“Umtriebe”, *Polit. Schriften*, esp. p. 166ff.).

Clausewitz saw that the problem with anarchy was the paralysis of the state to act and the decomposition of its united will. **“A large country with European**

culture can be conquered only with the help of internal division”, *Der russische Feldzug*).

[[WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR YOUR “BEAUTIFUL” “DIVERSITY” and “MULTI-CULTURALISM”??? OH MY GOD!!! **YOU ARE GOING DOWN!!!** IT’S JUST A MATTER OF TIME (50 years, 150 years,... whenever, whatever...)... (I and my tribe are already down and out, so obviously I am not claiming any victory, nor am I gloating – human existence is TRAGIC, ultimately for everyone... CRETIN!!! And by the way, monoculturalism and or relative homogeneity has never ever been a guarantee for the avoidance of the most brutal of Civil Wars... the point is, NO SOCIAL FORMATION PER SE is immune from the tragedy of human existence... it is simply a matter of TIME... depending on circumstances, correlations of forces, etc., etc., etc.,....)]]

For Clausewitz, the united will/volition of the state must overlook weaknesses and “private interests” of those governing (p. 993).

Clausewitz views the question of peoples’ war [[this must be a reference to both the American and French Revolutions???, but also to Spain!!!]] not as something to be rejected just because it is a “revolutionary means” but

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he views the matter pragmatically, i.e. whether the peoples’ war is expedient as a “competitive means for struggle”. Clausewitz sees the civil guard/militia as an adjunct of, or assistance to, the regular army rather than as an autonomous force (pp. 799ff., 803). Clausewitz studied the popular uprisings in Spain or *Bandeau* (*Schriften*, pp. 604-611 and *Übersicht des Krieges in der Vendée*) and hoped in 1812 for the then government to remain in power and give the insurrection the “right direction” (“Bekennnisschrift”).

Clausewitz was not in favour of universal conscription/compulsory military service because in the then current circumstances it would have caused such an internal commotion that it would have been a negative.

For Clausewitz, politics and war are two different degrees of intensity inside a totality, and not two

heterogeneous magnitudes [[with war being characterised by violence]].

War is a “part” of political communication, not vice versa. Political communication necessarily produces war, but such war can therefore not be pure/unmixed war, which is decided in one battle whilst mobilising all available forces.

The unity of politics and war *within the state of war* determines

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Clausewitz’s structure of his study of war in the narrowest sense re: strategy and tactics, even though political communication with its conflicts, in terms of genesis, comes first.

Clausewitz’s philosophy of culture = in “the simple circumstances of life of wild/savage peoples” the whole of war was just “one and only battle/fight”, whereas today it’s a matter of a whole series of battles because of the great variety of situations in “culture/civilisation” (p. 422 + p. 224).

Strategy arises only where there are many battles. One battle = war only requires tactics (p. 270 + “Bekanntnisschrift” of 1812: **the art of war in civilised peoples requires means (tactics) and strategy (goals/ends)**)).

For small wars, some kind of skill might be enough, whereas in great wars there is a need for “scientific and, put through a sieve, views” (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg” (1810/1811)).

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And strategy ends up identifying with the art of governing and politics (p. 347).

Mutatis mutandis, the transition from pure/unmixed to real war = transition from tactics to strategy.

But even in battles in the “civilised world” the battle is not like in the primitive/pure war situation, it becomes modified (p. 449).

Yet the element of pure/unmixed war of concentrating the absolutely necessary in every war existential magnitudes (p. 230) is also present.

“As multi-faceted as war is, as much as war has distanced itself from the barbaric unloading of hate and enmity in the struggle man to man, body to body, no matter what else gets involved that is not struggle as such, the concept of war always means that all that takes place in war, necessarily starts from struggle” (p. 222).

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The next battle is the reason armed forces are needed, if there were no next battle then war would be something beyond reality (which of course it isn't) (*Strategie*, p. 62 + “Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg” and Epistle to Gneisenau 17.6.1811).

“Army” means “armed men” and the idea of struggle is fundamental (p. 222).

In war, armed men confront each other ready to die on a mutual basis, otherwise there is no war or theory of war. Raymond Aron refuses to confront this simple fact, believing and or hoping in other ways to achieve the goals/ends set. Aron made the mistaking of wishful thinking in trying to make war disappear. Aron engages, to this end, in logical and linguistic acrobatics and Aron misinterprets Clausewitz re: “means” because Clausewitz only meant military means and the annihilation of armed forces, conquering, occupation of regions or invading such areas, and other military undertakings, the acceptance of inimical strikes... and not non-military, non-war “means” or “paths” (p. 221).

Strategy must be determined based on its means and not on the basis of its goals because that means, the battle, cannot be eliminated with eliminating the concept of war, whereas the goals/ends are various, many, inexhaustible (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg” – the battle/fight is the only means of strategy (p. 293) + p. 847 = the significance of a battle is the soul of strategy).

SO, the complexity of political communication does not abolish the hard core of war, even though this core in real war is understood as a battle, whereas in the “strict” or “pure/unmixed” concept of war it = the concentration of all existential magnitudes.

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War as a part of political communication means that strategy when it is concretised and specified must choose between defence and attack/offence.

In pure/unmixed war there is no strategy, but just the blind clash or conflict of opponents in which perhaps *the motives* of those clashing distinguish between defence and attack/offence, but otherwise their struggle remains the same (p. 204).

Defence and attack/offence as forms of the waging of war show only by way of their existence that the transition from pure to real war has already taken place, that political communication is in historical stage of “culture/civilisation”, that the multi-branched game of power has overshadowed simple violence and that clashes and conflicts can occur between very unequal opponents. Now opens before us the broad field of combinations of defensive and offensive/attacking war (Rothfels rightly saw that Clausewitz discussed the concepts of defence and attack/offence in trying to answer how wars can happen between factions of very unequal power – and we are not here talking ethically in favour of defence). Clausewitz wanted to

encourage the Prussian movement against Napoleon with his theory of defence as the most powerful form of struggle (Bekennnisschrift of 1812).

There is no such thing as absolutely passive defence, and defence must equally be struggle like attack/offence. There is also an explanation of pauses/breaks in the course of waging war, which are viewed as the consequence of the superiority of defence re: attack/offence, and consequently the advantage of the weaker at the beginning of hostilities (pp. 647, 649 (defence is not simply passive); 205 (superiority of defence and pauses/breaks inside war)) = in the early

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theorems of Clausewitz's study of war (*Strategie*, p. 55 etc. (3 other sources)).

Now we shall describe how the early Clausewitz fits into his more mature ruminations to create one synthesis of thought on war.

4. The path/road to synthesis

General comments re: contradictions in thought, commentators, maturity in Clausewitz and synthesis.

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Clausewitz's intellectual-spiritual development/evolution was rightly called "a process of distinguishing" (Kessel, who nonetheless also misses the mark re: some matters).

Clausewitz came to a new comprehension late in his life which overturned certain things he once accepted and until he could offer us a solid and broad conceptual construction and tie various parts of his thinking together.

Early on, Clausewitz opposed the so-called geometric waging of war.

The battle prioritised re: strategy means a theory of war as struggle (irrespective of whether we mean real or pure/unmixed war).

Initially, Clausewitz underlined ethical factors, but at least that let him have some kind of anthropological notion re: the actions and reactions of the human psyche.

His teaching re: friction also turned against the geometric perception that the waging of war can be planned down to every detail, and Clausewitz connected friction with his anthropology so that friction was finally understood as the necessary aftereffect/follow-up of innate human weakness(es).

From the chasm between tactics and strategy, Clausewitz started thinking about the determinative factors of strategy, i.e. about the “political goal” of war, from 1804, when Clausewitz makes a distinction between the goal of *war* and the goal *inside* war and points out that **the political goal can “be double”, either the annihilation of the foe/enemy or forcing the foe to accept**

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certain terms of peace (*Strategie*, p. 51. In his early text re: the campaigns of Gustav Adolph, Clausewitz calls war the “organ of political plans” (Werke, IX, p. 26; cf. p. 101 for the internal relation between war ventures and the “political goals” of Gustav Adolph).

If Clausewitz had just stuck to the opposition “strategy-tactics”, he would have just dealt with the aims and acts of acting subjects, and that would not have been converted into a general theory of “political communication” in which the war phenomenon would be based on anthropology and the philosophy of culture/civilisation.

But even that was not enough for the final synthesis. The mature Clausewitz had to combine “political communication” with an analysis of the historical forms of war starting with the Napoleonic Wars.

He managed to leave behind old terminology, and started to combine historical facts of war with anthropology and the philosophy of culture and a new conceptual framework/context, with the new concepts in part being modified, in part generalised and in part displaced.

Historical research and historicisation allowed Clausewitz to have a relativistic orientation, incl. detaching his thinking from the accepted until then Napoleonic rules/norms of conducting/waging war, and simultaneously from every rule/norm.

For as long as Clausewitz was impressed by the great victories of Napoleon and the Napoleonic waging of war

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he was convinced that such waging of war would be definitive into the future.

In 1812, he wrote of the present-day “war of all against all” and that “war only with difficulty changes its character, nor should we hope for a return of the old bloody, yet often boring chess, which was played with real soldiers”. Perhaps in the future things will change, but “in our epoch ... every war is considered a national matter and is waged in that spirit” (“Bekenntnisschrift”, Schriften, p. 750; cf. p. 751).

But by 1817 Clausewitz has lost his certainty about the immediate future.

His historical research had progressed, and his scepticism increased and he opined that based on history no-one can prove that “... today the decisive and speedy waging of war will necessarily remain a law of war” – just as the opposite can be proven; **only the future will show if governments and peoples**

will be more reserved in waging war and if wars will be formed accordingly, just as whether diplomacy “will bridle and rein in the quick god of war, especially after a generation, when the experiences of the most recent wars have been lost” (“Ueber das Fortschreiten” pp. 238, 239).

The previous phrase suggests that a return to peoples’ war and the war of annihilation is quite possible, though not at all certain (+ see p. 413).

Clausewitz changes tone, though, when he foresees as more likely, undertakings of observation [[?not sure of correct terminology in English?]] (p. 813), and that wars without a clear-cut outcome will be a “large part” of wars, if not an absolute majority of wars (p. 834), or that earlier circumstance of waging

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war will reappear to a great extent (p. 856), or that it is impossible that wars in the future will have such a large-scale character that they will completely close the broad margins which opened up for them (p. 973).

We are not concerned here with Clausewitz’s vacillations on the future of war, but with the fact that he increasingly relativises the Napoleonic waging of war, as one amongst many forms of war.

Clausewitz, by going into history, did not prophesy/prophesise the future, but more so explained all of the past, by classifying conceptually all forms of war under one denominator.

Clausewitz now began to see Napoleonic war as the most extreme intensification of the war effort in historical context, i.e. that such war was not the only form of war, and thus he had to formulate a new concept of war which would encompass both Napoleonic war in all its intensity, as well as the restricted/limited wars of the pre-Napoleonic epoch/era. **But to do that**

logically, he had to discover similarities between types of war which he considered until then as *toto coelo* opposites.

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If one discovered similarities between Napoleonic and restricted/limited wars, then neither of those types of war could exclusively represent the concept of war in general. In other words, the dilation/expansion between the Napoleonic waging of war, and the general concept of war, was necessary so that both Napoleonic and restricted/limited war could come under **one concept of war, which is formal-general, and at the same time absolutely specific/concrete, enclosing all the variety of historically known forms of war.**

Clausewitz's decisive moment in changing his thinking comes when he clearly distinguishes between "pure/unmixed" and Napoleonic war, with the former synopsising/summarising certain constants from which all the kinds of real war are deduced, by thinking deeply about anthropology and the philosophy of culture.

The basic materials/building blocks as the concepts of tactics, strategy and political goals, fundamental anthropological perceptions, the theory of friction(s) and pauses/breaks in war, the teaching of the two kinds of war [[pure war and real (forms of) war]] etc. already existed

BUT ONLY

when the concept of pure/unmixed war was separated from *all* the individual real forms of war, because it included all of them, and only when the concept of pure war obtained an autonomous ontological and epistemological hypostasis,

ONLY THEN

was a deeper interpretation and a theoretical, more demanding combination of the above materials possible. It's not just talk of war anymore, but also anthropology and culture on a solid conceptual basis, taking in all individual facets of war and its problems.

Of course, all of that does not mean that Clausewitz stopped being a theoretician of war and became a “philosopher” [[When you read that and know P.K.'s mind, that is ABSOLUTELY HILARIOUS, HAHAAHAHA!!!]],

it's just that Clausewitz reached the point of generalisations which enlighten the study of war in the light of the “political communication” between people.

We could say that in Clausewitz's youth a “Napoleonic normative perception of war” holds sway, and that is found in the older

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sections of his main work, esp. books 3, 4, 5.

By equating the general concept of war with the Napoleonic waging of war, and by endeavouring to deduce the ideal waging of war from the general concept of war, Clausewitz held that

“the art of war is the most advantageous possible use of the available armed forces, so what is possible to be undertaken with those forces, should in reality be undertaken” (*Strategie*, p. 53).

[[Very interesting re: nuclear weapons – see P.K.'s discussion below, and of course every quote by Clausewitz must be seen in the context of all his stances and overall development in his thought as he approached maturity... as can be seen in the discussion which follows...]]

In 1817, Clausewitz still saw (Napoleonic) campaigns in real wars as rapid united acts, and in the case of Napoleon's campaigns, they were the military consequence of the French Revolution, which had replaced "the rights of the natural element" ("Ueber das Fortschreiten", pp. 234 ff., 237). There is an equating of the "natural element", which is contained absolutely in the concept of war, and its tangible unfolding in real Napoleonic wars (= an equating of the concept of war with reality), and hence there is also an equating of the Napoleonic campaign in revolutionary war with "that absolute degree of energy/activity, which we viewed as the natural law of the element" (p. 407 + p. 408). "In more recent wars, i.e. in the campaigns we have been observing for the last 25 years, the war/military element acted in all its energy" (p. 566). This meant that pauses/breaks in war disappeared so that there could be "unstoppable/relentless violence" (p. 548). Clausewitz saw in the core of Napoleonic war the concept of war as the "unloading/discharging of enmity, of hate"

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with the whole of activity being unified in "one bloody struggle" and "concentrated in one and only point of space and time" (pp. 468, 469).

Also: "the great decision in a great battle" was the guiding principle Clausewitz derived from such a line of thought (p. 470).

At the time Clausewitz was equating the concept of war with the Napoleonic waging of war, he was expressing and formulating opinions which were contradictory.

He knew of wars in which the pauses/breaks in war/hostilities were longer than the actual fighting. Initially, he attributed such a phenomenon to anthropological reasons such as "fear and the indecision of the human spirit/intellect", "imperfection of human judgement" (p. 408).

Why should there be such long pauses/temporary cessations of war/hostilities in prerevolutionary wars between monarchs and not in all wars, regardless?

And by asking himself that question, Clausewitz saw that there actually were pauses/breaks in all wars, though to varying degrees.

He started to think about the intensity of wars and the length of pauses/temporary cessations/breaks (pp. 414, 415).

A decisive battle can decide the outcome of a campaign but only very rarely the outcome of a whole

p. 70

war (p. 470).

Clausewitz started thinking that the FACTS, the DATA re: wars were such that his position about the certain waging of a war (i.e. Napoleonic) cannot possibly allow for a theoretical characterisation of all wars.

“The more war ... becomes something ambiguous, evasive, so much the more does its theory lose the necessary stable points and supports for its considerations, the necessities become all the fewer, the coincidences all the more [[common]]” (p. 410).

Historical observation got Clausewitz to think very deeply about the concept of war and how now the concept of war qua war must be separated from the Napoleonic waging of war, and that there must be a unification of all kinds/forms of war, from the war of annihilation to armed observation under the aegis of the concept of “pure/unmixed war”.

His reasoning can be seen in the 8th book of *Vom Kriege*. A teaching of war must regard not ideational, but real situations (p. 973; cf. p. 813). Either

1) we stick to trying to relate war in general to Napoleonic war, or

2) we orientate ourselves towards the multiformity of historical phenomena.

“Now we must make a decision”...

[[= THE ROAD TO GREATNESS!!!]]

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If we go down the path of the first choice, then what are we to say about all the wars after Alexander and several Roman campaigns until Napoleon?

And during the next decade what happens if a war takes place like those before Napoleon?

Our present theory is totally defenceless re: such realities.

We must leave space for the various kinds/forms of war... the human mind is fraught with inconsistency, ambiguity, lack of daring... (p. 954).

= As much as the equating of the concept of war with Napoleonic war is attractive in order to come to a theoretical generalisation,

such thinking is superficial and misleading because it neglects

HISTORY/HISTORICAL FACTS, both as to the past but also as to the future.

In order to be fair to historical reality, we must admit that anthropological constants which bring about pauses/temporary cessations/breaks in and of war don't just occur in prerevolutionary wars, but in all the human subjects when they develop war action – otherwise they wouldn't be constants.

So Napoleonic war is subject, albeit to a different degree, to the same laws as every other war

[[Kondylis in *The Political and Man* would not have used the term “laws” (since stricto sensu laws can apply to nature not to humans/human history/social reality

(where constants, generalisations, regularities, causalities, causation, correlations etc. can apply...), but Clausewitz did use the term “law”, and in Clausewitz’s era “law” here can be taken to mean “constant”... Likewise, “human nature” is not a phrase/term/concept in *The Political and Man*, neither in *Power and Decision*... (though P.K. had used the term “human nature” in the 1970s when his thought had not fully matured... – it’s not a big problem in any event...), though if reference is being made to the drive of self-preservation, maintenance and expansion of power, the friend-foe spectrum, the sex drive, the existence of values, (paying lip-service to) values and the realisation of power claims, etc., etc., etc., essentially we are talking about aspects of “human nature”...]]

and can be classified under one concept of war, which can be deduced abstractly, not exclusively from

p. 72

Napoleonic war, but from all real wars.

Clausewitz begins to modify his position re: Napoleonic war, by writing that from Bonaparte and thereafter, war “to a great extent approached its true nature” (p. 972 + cf. 997ff.: war “went through significant changes which brought it closer to its absolute form”).

Clausewitz dropped the term “absolute” war (p. 959).

His revised Part I does not contain the opposition “absolute-real war” (Title of Ch. VIII, p. 2).

Now, the general concept of war is referred to with the adjectives “pure/unmixed”, “clean”, “strict” or “initial”.

The fundamental discovery of the 8th book that no real war can coincide with the concept of war, is repeated *ipsis verbis* in the 1st Book worked on anew, where it is stated that real wars could “greatly approach” or “approach” the abstract concept of war (pp. 214 + 211).

Extremely important:

As we already know, **the transition from pure/unmixed and real war is made necessary by only the existence of “civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated/learned society” or “political communication”, which HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO**

with the good intentions of political professionals and their success in eliminating the war of annihilation from political communication.

Whilst the distance between pure war and war of annihilation is smaller than that between impure and restricted/limited war, the said distance or gap exists

p. 73

even if active subjects want to abolish such a distance (i.e. lump war of annihilation in with pure war so it can't take place in “advanced” societies of “political communication”).

THE current dominant position that the (allegedly) ideational and abstract character of pure/unmixed war converts the war of annihilation into a fictional construct(ion) too is totally misleading.

Two different levels of theory are mixed here, and that is tantamount of course to the complete failure to appreciate and understand the founding of this theory on a certain anthropology and philosophy of culture

(Raymond Aron [[as great as he was]] contradicts himself by, on the one hand, acknowledging in the 8th Book the distinction between absolute and real war, and that theory is unified on the basis that all real wars have a political character, even wars of annihilation; on the other hand, he does not understand the details of the transition from absolute war in the 8th Book to pure/unmixed war in the 1st Book – he completely misses the anthropological and cultural side of things. And Aron thinks that only politics as subjective activity of non-

military authority/government remains as a factor for the moderation of pure war. Aron lumps war of annihilation together with pure war as fictitious construct(ion)s and he does not distinguish between absolute (pure) and real war, nor does he acknowledge the political character of *all* [[? did Kondylis mean to include "real" here ? – the answer is "NO" because the German text does not have such a word real/wirklich]] wars. This however means for Aron that (subjective) politics in this sense can ALWAYS exercise a moderating influence. Aron accuses Clausewitz of seeing the war of annihilation as political war, with political communication being objective, SO THAT politics in the subjective sense for Aron must always exert a moderating influence. Aron is unable to theoretically render war of annihilation understandable. Hepp pointed this out, but doesn't have the analytical skills of Aron on other matters (Aron never denied in principle the political character of the war of annihilation), and Hepp's reasoning is simplistic, even though he comes to the right conclusion that the war of annihilation is really possible. But Hepp does not understand the distance between pure and absolute war as war of annihilation. This is inexcusable, as the pure concept of war is included in all real wars, and not only in the war of annihilation (a mistake which Clausewitz had also made before the maturation of his thinking re: historical consideration etc., when he equated the concept of absolute war with Napoleonic war).

p. 74

Hepp does not see Clausewitz's development in thinking, and that in Clausewitz's maturity, Clausewitz separated the concept of pure war from the idea of Napoleonic war by referring to anthropology and culture in a methodologically admirable manner.

One does not need to maim Clausewitz the theoretician to show, contra Aron, that war of annihilation is possible).

SO the concept of “pure/unmixed” war = anthropological reasons for the pauses/breaks in all real wars, albeit to different degrees.

As a fairly young man Clausewitz, still in his “geometric strategy” phase, observed that rarely in history does a general succeed in his strategic calculations to their full extent (*Gustav Adolphs Feldzüge*).

Clausewitz was scathing of those who completely forget the friction(s) of the whole machine in war and the difficulties obstructing the precise execution of systematic instructions – in war, execution is more difficult than in any other case re: theory (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg”).

Initially, “friction” was understood in the narrow war sense of the distance between plan and execution, with the negative influence of certain unforeseeable factors, related to one’s own or the opposing army. Clausewitz though fairly quickly started to attribute friction to anthropological constants incl. the [[Thucydidean-like]] feeling of fear incl. amongst the populace (p. 1081).

p. 75

Apart from the superiority of defence re: attack/offence, ignorance of the state of the opponent, and fear of the big decision, are referred to in making the real waging of war diverge from war’s concept as “rapid, unrelenting activity, unrelenting [[in its]] course towards the aim, i.e. hard, bloody, quickly done, decisive struggle” (“Über das Fortschreiten”, p. 234). In that way, friction is associated closely with pauses/breaks inside war, even though friction does not necessarily mean pauses/breaks.

Friction always presupposes a distance between plan(s) and execution, which is not necessarily the case in regard to pauses/breaks, which can be planned and voluntary. In contemplating friction, Clausewitz comes close to thoughts of

“pure” war, and, of “political” war e.g. when the act of war cannot be concentrated in one and only act (p. 1001).

If the absolute concentration/densification of the act of war is idealtypically expressed in the concept of pure war, there can be no friction and pauses/breaks, since there is all-out confrontation with no time or space or ability to pause, or manoeuvres due to weakness etc..

Here there is only enmity.

But in every real war, time and space are widened and extended and expanded significantly, and we cannot talk of an act of war as if it were a duel as in the case of pure war (p. 950).

Not only are there now those anthropological qualities which lead to friction and pauses/breaks, but they interweave with an important aspect of “political communication”.

Political communication comes into the conduct/waging of war via friction and pauses/breaks.

There is friction and (human) inertia when

p. 76.

we go from pure to political war (p. 209ff.).

By broadening the notion of friction, Clausewitz connects it with human nature and with the complicated texture of the “social situation” or “political communication”.

Now, the theorising of war and cultural magnitudes are being merged with each other and war is interwoven with politics (Kessel talks about Clausewitz and friction, but doesn't get the anthropological and cultural parameters, nor the difference between absolute and pure war, nor the sense under which pure war =

abstraction. Schering errs too, by implying that purposeful/expedient rational action can be connected with real, political war in order to bring about the “moderation” of real war in comparison to pure/unmixed war, which simply isn’t the case).

Only the first chapter of the first book was considered complete by Clausewitz (p. 181), incl. re: his definitive findings on the fixed/stable/firm/constant/steady texture and the historical forms of war, as well as the transition from pure to real war.

The 8th Book has an experimental character (p. 180, note of 10.7.1827) re: Napoleonic waging of war etc..

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The 8th Book contains the incorrect perception that war = Napoleonic “absolute” war, but this incorrect perception is not used thereafter.

Kessel was right in relation to Rosinski and Schering that Clausewitz didn’t work on Book 8 any further.

After 1827, Clausewitz studied the history of war more than working on *Vom Kriege* (Epistles to Gröben 1829, 1830 published by Kessel).

Book 8 however does support Ch. 1, Book 1.

Rosinski is wrong to think that politics, as having primacy, was discovered and articulated in Ch. 1, Book 1. Clausewitz nowhere says that Ch. 1, Book 1 cancels out other sections of his work.

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The primacy of politics was stressed already in the note of 1827. Kondylis also refers to Schering, Rosinski and R. Aron again re: interpretation problems regarding Clausewitz concluding that the war of annihilation is equally real

[[i.e. just as real as other forms of war]], and is political war, as all other kinds/forms of war are, and which all are subject to the objective influence of “friction”.

All wars are phenomena of political communication which interweave with all facets of human nature, which is objectified in political communication.

If one interprets the primacy of politics as the priority/primacy of allegedly, by definition, a moderating government of politicians vis-a-vis, by definition, warmongering soldiers/military officers/generals, then one cannot understand how all wars are phenomena of political communication re: human nature.

[[Obviously, Clausewitz is NOT concerned with “to war, or not to war”? There will always be war, one way or another, sooner or later, but every case is up to the politicians in power, peoples, correlations of forces, and many other factors – anthropological, objectively (and subjectively) political,... etc....]]

5. The historical way of looking at things and praxeology

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Clausewitz was aware that historical examples in themselves don't prove anything (p. 339),

but are [[in toto]] the source and permanent point of reference of an autonomous way of looking at things/consideration/contemplation/observation with certain theoretical and praxeological consequences.

It is through historical consideration/observation that Clausewitz could break with the Napoleonic normative comprehension of the war phenomenon.

Of course, the ultimate logical consequences of his historical way of looking at things came to him only towards the end of his life, Clausewitz nevertheless had always a leaning towards seeing things historically.

As a historian, Clausewitz researched no less than 130 campaigns (Linnebach; cf. Schering).

Clausewitz had invoked the Napoleonic model, and historical consideration, against the geometric art of war (with its claim to formulate generally applicable rules/norms of war whilst ignoring the human element), but only later did he relativise Napoleonic wars via historical analysis.

Ethical factors had been proffered against geometric war (see Nohn re: those in Clausewitz's intellectual circle), which led to the examination of the political character of war.

Of course, historical contemplation and the multiformity of war implied or brought about a relativistic and anti-intellectualistic positioning, which was articulated in the teachings re: war as art/skill, and as the “tact of judgement” as the only reliable compass of acting/action.

Delbrück refers to Clausewitz's “historical sense/feeling” during the latter's Napoleonic model period, which was in contrast to Clausewitz's “law” as the annihilation of inimical armed forces, and following that, as the battle as the only decisive element of war, which he deduced abstractly from the Napoleonic waging of war “like Lessing deduced the laws of poetry from Homer”.

Clausewitz however was not fooled by the defunct ways of conducting war

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esp. because they falsified the geometric ideals of his theoretical opponents at that time.

Clausewitz never hesitated to defend Gustav Adolph as a military officer against all those who sought in the 30 Years' War, the art of war, because Gustav placed importance on ethical factors, even though he was not "daring in attacks on the battlefield", preferring rather, various manoeuvres (*Gustav Adolphs Feldzüge*).

Clausewitz in a fragment from his uncollected writings cited by Rothfels clearly expresses his view that according to time and place, the people, mores, political situations and the general "spirit of nations", there were different kinds/forms of war, and Clausewitz was therefore against one-sided theorisations of war.

He looked into the "real reasons" for the different character of the 30 Years' War and the monarchical "geometric" wars thereafter.

He even looked into wars of the Middle Ages, personal honour etc. (in Rothfels).

He knows that one cannot bring back the past with a magic wand, and that one cannot fully ever stand in the shoes of peoples and cultures of the past and their ways of thinking (whoever dreams of resurrecting ancient polities which they don't understand, and after 2-3000 years no-one will understand, does not have Clausewitz's sympathy ("Umtriebe").

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Clausewitz even goes into a reliable, but not original, synopsis/summary of the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of the bourgeoisie (loc. cit.) without believing in any kind of Progress etc..

"Everything in this world is subject to change" (loc. cit.), and he does not as a man's man seek support in the other life.

Clausewitz could even see that the most brilliant works of civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated society, no matter how many centuries they survive and influence things, “enclose in themselves the principle or start [[need check German text]] of their own destruction ... and no work can last forever, even that which would be subverted but not overturned by the same principles which initially gave it strength and grandeur” (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8).

[[HOW BRILLIANT WAS CLAUSEWITZ’S MIND!!! AMAZING STUFF!!!]]

Without theoretically weighty religious belief, and with an observation of human affairs from the point of view of power = the concomitants of Clausewitz’s historical-relativistic positioning.

Clausewitz asks himself “is perhaps the nature of war determined by the nature of situations, and which are these situations and what are the conditions/terms?” (*Geist und Tat*).

From such a question Clausewitz includes war in the great totality of “political communication”

and in the 8th Book Clausewitz gives us his famous quote about the relationship between war and politics for the first time, having first described the historical forms of war and having underlined that

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every epoch conducted war “in their way, differently, with other means and another goal”, and every epoch has its own wars, restrictive conditions, its own inertia and one-sidedness (pp. 962, 973).

With such historical relativism, Clausewitz was able to state that war is the continuation of political communication and understand that all wars were of the same kind (i.e. from the point of view of the continuation of political communication) (p. 992).

The unification of wars at the level of theory on the basis of friction presupposes the ascertainment that the various wars take root historically in certain political situations. Thus, we can understand *why* friction exists.

And pure/unmixed war [[concept]] comes about to show what a war is without friction(s) and pauses/temporary cessations/breaks, whereas friction takes place only in wars arising from the social life of “civilised/cultured/learned/ educated” peoples.

So, we have

- 1) historical relativism as to the many kinds/forms of war,
- 2) the theoretical unification of the historical multiformity of war through the ascertainment of the decisive role of “political communication”, and
- 3) the formulation of the pure concept of war.

Only the ascertainment that war is an organ of politics makes understandable “how much wars differ

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necessarily according to the texture of their motives and of the situations from which they arise (p. 212).

Praxeologically, for Clausewitz, norms do not apply, history is not a magistra vitae of normative teachings.

One must exercise judgement, but no formulae are given, no principles, rules/norms or methods (p. 858).

Clausewitz' theory is descriptive based on a normatively silent and relativised history.

Any actor must rely on his own “tact of judgement”, not on any advice coming from Clausewitz.

Initially, such a stance turned against the geometric conducting or waging of war, though Clausewitz still stuck [[at that time]] to his Napoleonic normative perception that “war must be conducted to the highest degree of necessary or possible effort” or “one should not concentrate all his forces in time and place, but gradually turn all one’s activity as far as possible to one and only point” (*Strategie*, pp. 51, 48).

The geometric school wanted to reduce all that happens in war to ponderable magnitudes in order to found fixed rules/norms of behaviour. **Clausewitz however stressed the imponderable element**

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and hence theory is “perhaps totally impossible” as regards practice in a battle where it’s up to the commanding officer to make decisions etc.

(*Strategie*, p. 80).

“War manuals always arrived very late, and in all epochs constituted a dead search” (*Strategie*, p. 72). = there are no rules/instructions for all battlefields...

The art of war can command a general or other officer on the battlefield to do little (“Ueber das Fortschreiten”).

Clausewitz asked himself in his maturity what is the meaning and what are the limits of his theoretical work. He drew the only consistent conclusion: **“the opposition/contrast between theory and praxis/practice can be bridged only if theory is perceived as observation and not as teaching”** (pp. 290, 292).

[[HOW GREAT WAS THE PRUSSIAN!!! WOE UNTO THE ETHICISING-MORALISING RETARD “WHO KNOWS EVERYTHING” AND IS CONSTANTLY PROVEN WRONG TIME AND TIME AGAIN BY (LONG-TERM) HISTORICAL REALITY...]]

Only a renunciation of norms would make theory able to comprehend praxis/practice. [[= GENIUS]]

Only the tact of judgement helps man at the time of action (see below), **and hence no stable theory can be constituted on the basis of such tact.**

Clausewitz was both a theoretician of war, and a warrior/soldier [[that is, he had real life experience to the extreme, whereas the RETARDS = (most or nearly all) Professional Academics, “who know “everything””, all they can do is regurgitate moralising-ethicising GARBAGE as Sacks of Letical/Verbal Shit, Day in, Day Out... whilst “noticing everything”, but they “just happen” not to notice...!!!]], and only through time and effort could he separate the two.

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Clausewitz’s BRILLIANT mind led him to make three key distinctions:

1) **separation of theoretical and practical goals.** **Science differs “from poetry and from real life because it contains its goal inside itself”;** **[[!!!!!!!!!!!!!!GENIUS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]**

“whoever steps on the ground/earth of science should have absolutely no goal/ end. Otherwise we have an opinion formed in advance – something completely foreign to science” (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8),

[[WHAT CAN SOMEONE SAY ABOUT CLAUSEWITZ? HE WAS A **SOLDIER** AND **HIS MIND WAS METHODOLOGICALLY FAR MORE ADVANCED AND IN TUNE WITH SCIENCE THAN THE VAST MAJORITY IF NOT ALL OF THE PROFESSORS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES POST WW2!!! Unbelievable Stuff!!!]]**

2) **separation of evaluations and causal explanations**, and Clausewitz would even write: “we do not say this to praise or to blame... but only to find reasons of events inside the situation of things and only for that reason” (*Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien*).

3) **separation of ethical from historical-political consideration**, e.g. re: Poland and its division, and that one shouldn't see it from an ethical, but from a historical-political point of view (“Die Verhältnisse Europas seit der Teilung Poles”).

The basically imponderable/incalculable character of human action is not due to only its emotional motives and related vacillations (man is not simply a machine executing his duties in his practical action (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*)).

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The field of possible events, the sequence of consequences which an act begets, is endless, and the final result of such contemplation remains incomprehensible for the human intellect (“Über die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens”).

There are thoughts about the act being carried out in twilight which obscures things, and, war as a form of a human act as “the field of coincidence”, “the field of uncertainty; $\frac{3}{4}$ of what we base our acts on in war are hidden in the clouds of smaller or larger uncertainty”, there is no “positive teaching” re: action/the act, **just as the abstract formulation of laws of the art of war is**

pointless since the situations direct/affect/determine things etc. (pp. 289, 234, 233, 289 and other sources).

“In the political world, there is no certainty, rather one must be satisfied with a more or less high degree of probability/possibility” (*Der Feldzug von 1813*).

Two different people view “truth” differently re: their political or ethical contemplations (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8”).

There’s an advantage to knowing about the relativity of knowledge and perspectives [[obviously the

great Prussian general overlooked that Scientific knowledge is not relative, but we get his point...]] **so that one**

can ponder various possibilities and give oneself a chance of success, rather than being stuck in one’s own alleged “certainties” listening to only one’s own desires and “constituting easy prey for one’s enemies” (loc. cit.)

In war, the act should orientate itself re: the “mean possibility” and there is no need for the “concept of law” (p. 306).

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It’s not a question of “absolute truth” but the judgement of the practical person.

Each case is peculiar. Every situation is multifarious with different limits.

So, all that is demanded is a “tact of judgement”, which hits or misses the mark according to how switched on every military commander is, incl. an

ability to sort out what is important and what isn't, etc.. We are talking about a sense/feeling, a knack, as a judgement at a higher level (pp. 315, 283, 221, 962, 251, 182, 401, 961, 245, 257 and other pages as well as other texts).

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And with this “spiritual/intellectual instinct” re: tact of judgement, the activity of the intellect abandons “the field of strict science, logic and mathematics, and becomes ... art/skill” (pp. 298, 961).

Clausewitz knew that strategy does not concern itself “simply with the magnitudes which can accept mathematical calculation”, that it must step inside “the realm/territory of art/skill” and that strategic plans demand “great tact of judgement of the spirit/mind/intellect” (“Bemerkungen”, p. 19, *Strategie*, p. 60) **(The tact and exercising of judgement, Clausewitz wrote a few years later, constitute the “soul of action”, not only in war, but in “every art and occupation of human life”** (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg”) + pp. 39 (for the figure of the ingenious military commander in the philosophy of the 18th century and similar motifs in the thought of Barenhorst, who stressed the role of ethical factors and coincidence, see Höhn)).

In the light of such a relativistic historical way of looking at things, we can now come to understand Clausewitz's analyses on the two sets of problems which constitute the two most important praxeological fields within the general theory of war:

1) the teaching re: ends/goals and means;

2) the teaching re: the two kinds of war [[pure war and real (forms of) war]]

(and vice versa: Raymond Aron [[as great as he was, and despite his tremendous knowledge of historical sociology etc.]] did not see that historical consideration and praxeology are interwoven, but thought that the solving of theoretical matters determines the

content of praxeology. Schering knew well before R. Aron though that we should not expect any “advice” or “recipes” from Clausewitz).

Both aforesaid teachings interweave with each other and should be understood together with the theoretical axiom of the political texture of war, we shall now have a look at problems re: the act/action and the duties of the “tact of judgement” initially re: politics broadly understood, and then more specifically.

As we know, the primacy of politics is related to “political communication” in toto i.e. to the “social body” as a politically constituted whole. (It is not a question per se of politics being about non-soldiers, non-military officers).

The objective sense of politics is therefore in absolute ascendancy or is absolutely pre-eminent/supreme re: the subjective sense of politics, and correspondingly there is a transition from pure/unmixed to real war.

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If Clausewitz had just stuck to using politics in its objective sense and only in its objective sense, then obviously there would have been no praxeological matters.

The subjective sense of politics = the purposeful/expedient acts/undertakings of non-military bearers and authorities (the double meaning of politics in Clausewitz was covered long ago by Korfes, Kessel, R. Aron) = the way politics is talked about nowadays; however, since long ago the Aristotelian notion of politics, which was still alive c. 1800, has died = this is the reason for so many misunderstandings of Clausewitz (not being able to separate the (objective) notion of politics as social organisation as in Aristotle, and (subjective) politics today of politicians [[running around for “special interest groups” [[e.g. Corporations, Big Money Bankers/Financiers (who grossly disproportionately “just happen” to incl. “chosen people” et al.), “Humanitarian” N.G.O.s funded and directed by, in GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE numbers, “circumstantial chosen people” because it “just happens to be that way” and of course “it’s good for the rest of us”... etc. and all of “the people” etc., etc., etc....]]]

It's a question of the positive or negative relationship of subjective politics with the objective facts/data of political communication, and not a matter of any supremacy or dominating autonomy of subjective politics.

Clausewitz does not deny room for action of subjective politics, but he sets such politics some limits. For Clausewitz, ONLY objective politics (e.g. of state v. state) can be treated scientifically, so he does not go into subjective politics (p. 993) [[This is exactly what all very good to excellent analysts of International Affairs, inter alia, do...]].

What is important is not the “ethical” or “unethical” positionings, but the objective course of political communication.

On the other hand, the complexity and heterogeneity of such communication is always kept in mind, incl. the combinatory nature of its constituent parts from different points of view on each and every respective occasion, and the multiformity of the psychological sources of human action.

Indifference to subjective motives does not mean indifference to subjective politics in the sense of purposeful/expedient acts of subjects, which want to develop action on the basis of objective data/facts of a certain political communication, taking the objective facts into account as precisely as possible.

Only in that way do concepts such as “will/volition”, “end/goal” or “choice of means” obtain concrete historical reference and concrete historical content.

[[The above is basically *THE* Primer of what politics is... CONTEMPLATE IT, THINK ABOUT IT – AND if you want to engage in Science CUT THE FUCKING IDEOLOGICAL BULLSHIT, RETARDS!!! And it continues below...]]

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As we have already said, Clausewitz on the basis of general historical ascertainties about the character of war and also re: anthropology and

the philosophy of culture, ascertained that war is the continuation of political communication, and not on the various actions and reactions, machinations, successes and mistakes of various leaders and generals etc. who “shaped/ formed” politics in the subjective sense of the term.

Clausewitz’s ascertainment of the political nature of war,

because he saw that objective politics is political communication, which – in contrast to the broadly vague, unforeseeable and non-classifiable original ideas and acts of subjective politics –

does not resist, of its nature, scientific comprehension.

In Book 8 of *Vom Kriege*, the “character” of a war and “its general outline” must be defined/determined based on “political magnitudes and the political conditions” (p. 959). **The ends/goals and means of him involved in war conform of course “with the absolutely personal features of his situation”, but bear within them “the character of the epoch and of the general circumstances/ conditions”** (p. 974). And from p. 962ff. **Clausewitz provides readers with a long historical excursus/digression into the dependence of the nature of war on the social situation of various peoples.**

Even though Clausewitz did not in the least underestimate Napoleon’s personality as a driving force for the Napoleonic waging of war, Clausewitz never even considered attributing the new way of conducting wars to the peculiarity of the ingenious Corsican = Napoleon. **What was crucial was the basic transformation of political communication after 1789**, because even though Napoleon perfected revolutionary war, he did not create such war out of nothing.

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It was the “change in politics” which mobilised “other means, other forces” which gave rise to the Napoleonic art of war (p. 998) + “new social situations and circumstances” for the new phenomena in the area of the art of war (p. 856; cf. p. 479). “The general circumstances from which a war arises” determine the “character” of war (p. 659).

Clausewitz writes of the “influence of the general and superordinate circumstances/conditions” on people involved in war, and that “whoever regards this influence as something coincidental, has not at all comprehended the authentic life of war and is not entitled to express judgements on the forces which unfold in a war” (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*).

[[DO YOU UNDERSTAND, CRETINS, THAT CLAUSEWITZ IS GIVING YOU A NON-NORMATIVE, VALUE-FREE WEBERIAN LESSON IN SOCIOLOGY 101, a hundred years before Weber????!! MORONS!!!]]

The context/framework of an act exists independent of the will/volition of those acting, and the texture of the said

framework determines the behaviour of the actors, no matter

whether there is wider or narrower space for action re: subjective politics.

Political communication is necessarily multi-dimensional and contradictory but allows the setting of different goals and the development of different moves.

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On this side of/Εντεῖθεν [[but not per se]] pure/unmixed war, i.e. in the reality of war at one extreme, there is the war of annihilation, and at the other extreme there is armed observation, it is up to the judgement of those concerned to ascertain the limits of their undertakings (p. 199).

And it's not just about goals set, but also the available means which are a part of the objective facts/data of political communication (p. 573 incl. re: supplying the army).

Another limit on subjective politics is of course the two sides wanting to "impose its law" on the other (p. 194).

Key is to understand the primacy of objective politics and the room to act re: subjective politics. Clausewitz studied Friedrich the Great's campaigns and emphasised the need to understand the circumstances at the time of the war being studied.

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Friedrich, in his failed attempt to crush Austria, had many problems re: supplying his troops and tremendous expenses for every armed soldier, which made it very difficult to make up for great losses in men. Thereafter, based on those objective realities, Friedrich took a "moderate" course which brought him the permanent occupation of Silesia (*Feldzugspläne Friedrichs* etc.).

It was the general character of the conduct of war and the state of the enemy which determined to a great extent the subjective politics of Friedrich, but the latter would not have borne any results if it didn't *weigh up the situation correctly* and do what needed to be done on a case by case basis.

[[THIS IS AT THE CRUX OF ALL POLITICAL MOVES/ACTIONS – FROM LOCAL POLITICS TO GEOPOLITICS – TO WEIGH UP THE SITUATION AND MAKE THE RIGHT MOVES TO BRING ABOUT MORE OR LESS THE REALISTICALLY DESIRED RESULT. This is why, at different levels of analysis and with variable but nonetheless usually at least realistic positions factually grounded, e.g. Paul Craig Roberts, Pat Buchanan, John Mearsheimer, K. Waltz, Paul Kennedy, Morgenthau, G. Kennan, Robert Merry, Lyle Goldstein, Michael Lind, A.

Lieven, et al. in the Anglo-American context, have taken positions many in the U.S. leadership don't want to know about even though they have constantly made, obviously not always, many sensible, level-headed and valid points... And I repeat, carefully study ZBIG's final words/thoughts in *The American Interest*...

<https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignment/> in conjunction with P.K.'s *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*... and below...]]

So, the “tact of judgement” is obliged to decide how it will orientate itself on the basis of the objective facts/data of political communication.

The primacy of the latter (political communication), and the room to move of the former (tact of judgement), as understood as a unity (P.K. has another go at one of his “teachers”, whom he really respected and admired, as we all do, R. Aron, and refers to Hepp on the concept and primacy of objective politics in Clausewitz).

Regarding **ends and means** and the two kinds/forms of war re: tact of judgement there are no specific rules/norms for

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the individual case.

Clausewitz in his younger days proffered a somewhat rectilinear and simplistic perception of the relationship between ends and means, which he modified with a more flexible, elastic perception when his historical consideration matured.

Clausewitz opposed Bülow's stance that great results are best produced with small means. Clausewitz focused on available forces and their correct use to achieve the goals set. Such means/available forces are as far as possible independent of coincidences (“Bemerkungen”, pp. 13, 12; *Strategie*, p. 63).

Clausewitz got himself into a bit of logical trouble, i.e. he in part contradicted himself, because on the one hand, he rightly highlighted

coincidences and vacillating ethical factors against the rigid and abstract geometrical strategy, but on the other hand, wanted to obliterate the role of coincidences/accidents through precise calculation and the correlation of means and ends.

As far as Napoleon was concerned, his great ends/goals could only be achieved with great means.

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Such great means were connected with the central role of the battle against the preference of geometric strategy for manoeuvres. Clausewitz' thought however vacillated between ethical factors and "passionate courage" as an "instinct of a powerful nature" which sometimes contains the "highest wisdom" ("Über die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens" + Epistle to his fiancé 20.9.1806).

He also talks of war as a game and repeats that the "highest daring can constitute the highest wisdom" (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*).

For as long as Clausewitz concentrated on the Napoleonic way or thinking of the Napoleonic general/military officer, he had a narrower view of means and ends uninfluenced by historical and sociological problems.

Such a stance retreats as he begins to see the political character of war so that praxeology and the choice of ends and means was seen from

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a different angle.

After the ascertainment of the ontological interrelation between "absolute"-Napoleonic war and the rest of the real wars, and also after the ascertainment of the notion of "pure/unmixed war", the matter of the means and the ends/goals could be examined only when taking into account the complexity of "civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated society" and

“political communication” which was wrapped in a network of actions and mutual actions/interplay.

Wars waged between civilised societies are characterised by the fact that “the number of possible relations increases, and consequently their combinations, the multiformity of the arrangements/settlements/setting of accounts/reckonings/... multiplies, and with the hierarchical gradation of the ends/goals, the first means is distanced from the ultimate end/goal” (p. 224).

[[Clausewitz in his absolute brilliance, is basically pre-dating the notion of the Heterogony of Ends!!!!]]

For Clausewitz, what’s needed to judge a war, the purpose/end/goal and its means, is an overall/general overview of the circumstances/conditions as well as the “individual features of the moment”. Such judgement can’t be objective because it is determined by “the intellectual/spiritual and psychical qualities of the hegemon, politicians and army officers” (pp. 962; cf. 974).

The military aim of a war is “equally variable ..., as much as its political goal/aim is and its particular circumstances” (p. 214). There is no clear-cut and fixed relation between political goal/end and military goal/end, which we shall see in the discussion between the two kinds/forms of war.

Clausewitz = the ends/goals of tactics = the means of strategy = strategy uses tactics to achieves its ends/goals (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen

Krieg”). At the top of the pyramid of considerations is the political goal/end.

But owing to the “great multiformity of circumstances” in culture/civilisation, the political goal/end cannot be “totally simple”, and even if it were, its dependence on a “multitude of circumstances and concerns” does not allow its realisation with “one and only one great act(ion)”, but

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demands more acts each of which has its own goal/end and is thus connected to the totality. (p. 422ff.).

Being a means or an end/goal is not a fixed predicate, but a variable and interchangeable function with the exception of the highest political goal/aim, which can never be converted into a means.

Every other means can be converted into an end/goal and vice versa.

“Nowhere else do end/goal and means mutually influence/interact with each other as much as in war” + The initial political motive in the said interaction can be overshadowed or overruled by the course of the mutual influence/interaction of all the motives etc. during the war (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*). This is very important re: praxeology in general.

The problem of the two kinds/forms of war interrelated narrowly with the broadening of the possible relations between end/goal and means in the sense that the theory of war must answer the question if the kind

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of war can be foreseen on the basis of ends/goals of war or on the basis of the means used.

Is the correlation between end/goal and means analogous/proportional and rectilinear or not? In a war in which the end/goal is the subjugation of the foe, do more means need to be used than in a war with moderate intent?

If the correlation between end/goal and means is not analogous/proportional and rectilinear (e.g. there can be restricted/limited war with massive means not restricted as means etc.), what determines the kind of war if not the precisely calculated correlation of goal/end and means determined by domination in political communication?

Already the simple enumeration of the four possible relations between ends/goals and means shows that only in the first two is there an analogous/proportional correlation:

- 1) when a great goal/end accompanies the use of great means,
- 2) when a small/little goal/end accompanies the use of restricted means.

The first case was prominent in the Napoleonic waging of war and was the focus of attention for Clausewitz (see *Die Feldzüge Friedrichs*).

Clausewitz wants to find a direct/rational proportionality between end/goal and means, and this actually helped him in his taxonomy/classification of phenomena within his theory of war in the light of historical-relativistic contemplation.

Clausewitz observed that really intense efforts can arise where they were not initially planned, but even if something like that happens, it won't last long "because the existence of such intense efforts produces a corresponding grand plan" (*Vom Kriege*, p. 211). And since it won't last long, can't be sustained etc., then *during the course of the war*, even if such a lack of proportionality between means and ends occurred, end/goal and means balance each other out.

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In the second case of small goal/end and restricted/small means, the smaller the political end/goal, the smaller are our efforts/means mobilised (p. 200).

Clausewitz, however, thought long and hard about the two cases where there was disproportionality between ends/goals and means (“Neuer Standpunkt der Theorie des Krieges” in *Geist und Tat*, p. 309).

So:

3) either great means are mobilised for the achievement of a restricted goal/end (e.g. the military subjugation of the enemy without subjugating the enemy politically or when a small motive begets results beyond their nature (p. 201))

or

4) a great goal/end is sought/striven after, with restricted/limited means (Clausewitz showed little interest in this possibility as it was something Bülow believed in, and Clausewitz never took him or his thought seriously, because when there is a balance/balancing of forces of the two sides, the side in defence

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would never want to lose everything without first mobilising everything to make the other side put in a similar effort, and, if the offensive/attacking side was much stronger, that side would succeed, but it's doubtful you could call that success, the realisation of a great goal/end, because the size of the goal/end is measured on the basis of the extent of the possibilities of that which sets the end/goal).

In 1827, Clausewitz continues to write about the two kinds/forms of war exclusively in relation to the end/goal (either the subjugation of the foe/enemy, or a few conquests along/around the frontiers/borders) (p. 179). Elsewhere he writes that despite the political character of war, the political goal/end ought to

be adapted to the “nature of the means”, and that such political character exerts its influence “only as much as the texture of the explosive forces which it encompasses” (p. 210).

Clausewitz stressed the central significance of the means for war, but comprehended their autonomous/independent dynamic(s) only when he became conscious of the political nature of war on a broad historical basis.

This is paradoxical only superficially, or only from the point of view of the “liberal” interpretation of his thought.

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The breaking away from the Napoleonic normative perception, and the prevailing of the historical way of looking at things, place the primacy of politics on a broad basis, and sharpen the mind to look at other possibilities of the combining of means and goals/ends, rather than just great means/great ends.

So, the putting forward of the primacy of an objective politics came about as a need to not get bogged down in endless casuistry (case-by-case analysis) by focusing only on the goal/end and not on the means as well.

Clausewitz sometimes understood the means as *the totality* of the available military dynamic(s) = as the whole of the forces/powers/strengths of a nation incl. ethical factors,

and recognised the role of subjective political factors as having to conform with the autonomous dynamic(s) of the means. “War and its form arise from the ideas, feelings and circumstances dominating at that time” (p. 954).

This relativisation of the significance of the subjective goals/ends for the selection of the kind of war

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was ascertained in the thought that the impact/effect of the political goal/end depends on the texture of the political communication, and for that reason, the same political goal/end can “bring about at different points in time entirely different effects/impacts in different peoples, or even in the people itself”.

If the political goal/end is the initial motive of war, and as such ought to define the military aim and the use of means, the motive for war is really “the relation with the two states faced off against each other” (p. 200). So vital = the political community as bearer of the military dynamic(s) in its totality.

[[ABSOLUTELY STUNNINGLY BRILLIANT!!!]]

Example of Friedrich (p. 413).

There are never as such e.g. “healthy” and “humanitarian” goals/ends for a restricted/limited war to be necessarily chosen over a war of annihilation: what counts is that a war of annihilation has never been the norm in history because of objective reasons: “these general circumstances made war a vague/unclear/ambiguous thing, where authentic enmity was obliged to do various manoeuvres through conflicting factors, so that in the end all that was left was a very weak, sick element” (p. 659. Kessel interpreted Clausewitz as giving precedence to the subjective factor,

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even though earlier on Kessel was correct that the two kinds/forms of war in their interrelation with objective politics and the polity must be separated from the “simple influence of the political end/goal on war”, since indeed the end/goal of subjugation of the foe existed in the restricted/limited wars of the 18th century. If one is going to say that the distinction between the two kinds of war is connected to the free, subjective choice of goals/ends, then one could not say with any substance as to historical content, and with any theoretical significance, that war is the continuation of politics (in particular against the writings of R. Aron on the matter). **Clausewitz by 1827 saw the contradictions, and limited the range of the subjective factor.** Kessel knew that the mature Clausewitz had “particularly restricted the element of subjective volition” and went on to do an admirable analysis of the objective preconditions for the two kinds/forms of war (“Die doppelte Art”).

[[One could say that it seems, though it might not and definitely NOT necessarily turn out that way, that China is “correctly” waiting for objective political conditions to mature, and that the “Neo-Con”/”Left/Humanitarian” tendency in the USA’s leadership, with a greater emphasis on the “subjective” side of things, and not correctly weighing up the political communication and politics/society objectively, could possibly hasten USA and the West’s losses – now the PROOF can only come through the unfolding of Reality and neither I, nor P.K. are or were ever Pythia... BUT EVEN IF time is gained in this Historical Conjunction, other things will *really* happen, and not “just happen”, in the more distant future, which always put EVERYONE in their place... and of course we know that things only ever *really* happen, and the “just happen” is *really* saying “let’s pretend not to notice and have *them* not noticing, so we can continue wielding GROSSLY DISPOROPORTIONATE forms of Power...]]

Of course, specific people and not the general circumstances *decide* when, where and what kind of war will be waged. But such a decision depends on a link in the chain of circumstances/conditions, and **is based on the “tact of**

judgement”, whose main criterion is the correct reading of the circumstances.

General circumstances are more than capable of determining the individual decisions of generals/military officers (*Feldzug von 1796*), **but the political leadership decides what kind of war it will wage in accordance with each and every respective occasion and not based on preliminary preferences re: restricted/limited war v. war of annihilation.**

The “peculiarity of the case”, “the tact of judgement” = will decide whether to prefer to choose anything from the annihilation of the enemy armed forces, to the passive waiting of the strikes of the enemy (p. 221 + 212).

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For Clausewitz, **it is not an ethical matter** re: e.g. calling blameworthy or barbarous the choice of war of annihilation over restricted/limited war (p. 410).

France (compared to Austria) has great goals/ends and great means so that in this case moderation would be like not acting at all (“Bekennnisschrift”).

[[So e.g. in terms of USA v. Iraq (Hussein) – battlefield “victory” = guaranteed and sensible... though the wider geopolitical repercussions is the question... incl. as to the wisdom of the campaign and what eventuated re: Iran (which apparently increased its relative regional forms of power), as well as the mass displacement, maiming, killing of civilians etc.,... and the waves of invasion/humanitarian incursion into Europe, ISIS etc., etc., etc.,...]]

War does not, in any case, constitute something “philanthropic” (p. 586).

Clausewitz felt that the Allies could have beaten and made France smaller in 1814 but they feared making France stronger so... (“Die Verhältnisse Europas...”).

If one leans to moderation and restricted/limited war when it is not called for, then there is a weakness/sickness of the motives for action, whereas “politics”

does have an inclination towards the “dishonourable prudence” of restricted/limited war (p. 989 + p. 216 + 212).

Clausewitz never ever was concerned with being “nice or a do-gooder” because
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for Clausewitz it’s not a question of being a “war-mongering soldier/general/military officer”. **Clausewitz thought descriptively. He sought not to plug an ethical gap, but to plug a gap in the historical way of looking at things.**

The distance between pure/unmixed war and war of annihilation intensified the notion of friction in all the kinds/forms of war, it unified the war phenomenon in all its historical forms, and rendered as equivalent kinds of real war, war of annihilation and restricted/limited war.

Since war was not just war of annihilation, then restricted/limited war was war too, and this meant a need to take into account the multiformity of these two kinds = forms of war and re: means and ends etc.

The ideal-typical treatment of the two kinds/forms of wars = there is no reason to prefer one kind over the other.

The rational, as to the decision re: ends/goals set, rests always on the “tact of judgement” as the judgement of him/the side *acting*.

Reality as reality does not know of ideal types, so ideal types cannot give any practical normative advice or orientation.

Clausewitz had a consciousness of the theoretical advantages of ideal-typical procedure.

Since theory can “never include inside itself the authentic individual case”, it must “rest on categories of phenomena” (p. 288).

Our perceptions constitute “clarity, certainty and strength” when we make the object of our observations “full”, “extreme” opposites – without forgetting we are dealing with helpful construct(ion)s and that “the

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concrete/specific situation of war is found for the most part in the middle, and is governed by the extreme only to the extent it approaches the extreme” (p. 859).

With the two kinds/forms of war as ideal types, there is also the knowledge that in reality as reality in concrete circumstances/situations there will be all sorts of situations in which the elements of the war of annihilation and of restricted/ limited war could and will be mixed with each other absolutely.

In Clausewitz’s historically oriented mind, it seems that the concrete multiformity prevailed over ideal-typical classification.

The term “two kinds” appears only once in the notes of 1827, though in the complete chapter of the main work, there is reference to “one kind” and “the other kind”.

The vast, historical multiformity of war with all kinds of gradations (p. 212; cf. Hintze).

It would be scholastic to put all the sorts of ends/goals and means into categories (pp. 211ff., 216).

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There are no criteria which can be linearly applied to multifarious reality via a complex theory (In a note of 1803 (*Polit. Schriften*, p. 3) we read: “there are two kinds of coalitions in politics; without delay, the destruction or the subjugation of the foe, and, the intent to weaken, to break up etc. the state, against which the coalition turns, and the state, with which the coalition takes

place”. In *Strategie* (p.51) in 1804 Clausewitz writes that war can be of two kinds:

- 1) annihilation of foe/enemy and the dissolution of the state
- 2) the imposition of certain terms in a peace treaty.

In both cases the destruction of the enemy armed forces is sought).

[[One can definitely see though the source of Clausewitz's two basic/fundamental kinds of war (for both barbarism and culture) as pure war and real (forms of) war potentially emerging in his stance of 1804...]]

In this early phase of Clausewitz's thought, the Prussian, as great as his mind was, could not and did not conceptually comprehend historical multiformity...

RE: “tact of judgement”, the two ideal types [[of real war = war of annihilation, and, restricted/limited war]], as well as the synopsis within them infinite individual cases [[= various forms of war]], all belong to the united concept of war as the concept of pure/unmixed war.

No matter how much a real war diverges from the concept of war “it is found under this strict concept as its highest law” (p. 230. P.K. cannot understand how Kessel thinks Clausewitz thought there was only one kind of war, which does not belong to the absolute concept of war, not even to its modification (“Genesis”, p. 414). Kessel against Liddell Hart wanted the war of annihilation as proximate with the pure concept in the sphere of fictitious construct(ion)s. Clausewitz did not in the 8th Book do what Kessel thinks,

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for Clausewitz called the first kind of war as the subjugation of the enemy a “fundamental idea”, and the second kind of war as “its modification” (pp. 957ff., cf. p. 975). **What Clausewitz did in daring fashion in the 8th Book is that he took Napoleonic war which he used to call “absolute”, and said it is**

not and cannot be pure/unmixed war. And Kessel does not get that.

Clausewitz wrote that pure war inheres in all wars, and thus Napoleonic war is not pure war, whereas Kessel said that pure war does not exist in the second kind of war which is separate from the Napoleonic war of annihilation.

Clausewitz NEVER said that extreme goals/ends are not allowed to be striven after, but he said that the extreme intensity of forces in the sense of pure war cannot be achieved – but it is permitted, and it can be achieved in the sense of war of annihilation “when the nature of the circumstances commands a war of the first kind” (p. 212).

The law that the outcome of war is determined by the weapons applies to both kinds of war and all possible variations [[= other forms of war]], even when there is no real battle (p. 225).

All wars are by means of weapons, but there is a “multiformity of application of the means [of weapons]” (p. 225).

The basic forms of armed struggle, defence and attack/offence, belong in all kinds/forms of war, but a variety of strategies and tactics are possible.

Strategic attack/offence is not precluded when the political end/goal is limited/restricted (p. 984), and even when we seek something negative [[= ?expect to lose?]], our military aim can still be the annihilation of

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inimical armed forces (p. 228).

One cannot though subjugate the enemy when one choses strategic defence on a permanent basis.

[[Whereas a pathetic, parasitic Protectorate with a pathetic, parasitic Elite (and people) = Greece... doesn't even have permanent strategic defence... only permanent

strategic appeasement and conceding territory... as well as sucking Imperialist Overlord (USA and or German) ???k...]]

Delbrück believes that great ends/goals can be achieved only with manoeuvres under certain conditions, whereas Clausewitz is unclear. Perhaps the strategy of attrition/wearing down/corrosion [[which is a means]] could be used to subjugate a foe, though Clausewitz doesn't either confirm or deny such a possibility expressly.

Rothfels, Schering, Hintze, Kessel; the four of them against Delbrück say:

the strategy of subjugation and the strategy of attrition [[i.e. a means]] do not coincide with the two basic kinds/forms of war because they constitute kinds of strategy and not kinds of war.

Delbrück's other opponents, Hobohm and Szczepanski, thought that they could explain a kind of war based only on aims/ends.

Creuzinger correctly explained the disproportionality between goal/end and mode of waging war.

Leaning one-sidedly either towards the concept of end/goal, or the concept of means = insufficient, which Clausewitz at least sensed.

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No matter what is put down on paper, in the hour of ACTION, THE ACT, the end/goal and the means are shaped in the struggle of the active subjects whereby the supreme law is the maintenance/preservation and intensification of one's own power, i.e. maintenance/preservation through intensification.

So much takes place as to perception, actions and reactions etc. *in the heat of battle* and each side "imposes its law on the other" (p. 194).

Ready made plans = subjective logic,

BUT the objective logic = armed struggle,

and the former retreats re: the latter.

And the actual armed struggle can culminate in extreme forms.

The continual intensification of preparation is bothered by the “counter-balance of the internal situation”, so a “middle path/road” needs to be found (p. 960).

There is **great pressure** in the heat of the battle. *Even if one side want to use limited/restricted means, it must be prepared to go further, always in fear of what the enemy might do...*

Subjective politics depends on objective politics, as the former cannot set goals/ends willy-nilly, i.e. regardless of the (supposed) ends/goals of the foe, nor can it not use the most effective means.

Whoever does not make the greatest possible effort runs the risk of his opponent doing so (*Feldzugspläne Friedrichs*); precisely because of that, “the simultaneous use of all the forces is found deep in the nature of strategy” (Feldzug von 1796).

Only rarely can someone get by with only manoeuvres when the foe seeks the decisive battle; the

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strategic manoeuvre presupposes a balance of forces and situations whereby the decisive outcome is avoided simply because neither of the two sides seeks such a decisive outcome (p. 183).

If one side wishes and strives to go to extremes, then it imposes its law on the other side, i.e. it negatively determines the means and ends/goals of the other side. Deciding to “go down the path of the great armed decision” most likely will succeed if the other side does not want to follow.

One can seek victory by limited/restricted means, *but should not be caught out* e.g. you go to engage in sword-fighting and the enemy turns up with heavy sabres (p. 229).

We must always follow the foe, what he is doing. And our behaviour is determined on the basis of his behaviour.

This does not mean a lack of originality, but a vitally necessary vigilance.

Because everyone is what his foe forces him to be – provided that one is in a position to leave the historical and social nought/zero/nothing and appear as the foe of someone.

The ultimate wisdom of praxeology is that there cannot exist any other praxeology, and any other teaching about means and ends, apart from that dictated to us by our foe on each and every respective occasion.

6. Method and philosophy

Clausewitz's methods and methodology have a permanent value just as his positions on question of content.

Clausewitz combined simplicity with common sense and flexibility, and his overall method lacks in nothing compared to the best of the 20th century [[read: Max Weber, Simmel, von Wiese, Durkheim re: social facts (only), and ??]] without becoming lost in supposedly profound scholasticisms.

Clausewitz benefitted from the fact that in his times the sector of ideas did not suffer a methodological hypertrophy; and that kind of human who in all seriousness [[!!!]] dealt exclusively with

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methods and nothing else, was not in existence. **The fact that Clausewitz did not have any relation to philosophy as a specific branch, probably benefitted his thought.**

Clausewitz's intellectual(-spiritual) achievement constitutes in itself a clear verification of the age-old supposition that philosophical education in the narrowest sense does not in the least constitute a *conditio sine qua non* of *thought* with high demands

[[!!! P.K. can't help himself!!! HAHAAHAHA!!!]].

In his younger days, Clausewitz combatted the geometric method particularly because of its wish to enclose by force the vacillating, interchanging and polymorphous object (i.e. war) into a strict system, in order to impose universal and invariable laws to a material which of its nature was resistant to that.

Clausewitz stressed the “peculiarity” and the “extremely individual features” of each and every specific case, as well as the plasticity or vacillations of ethical factors.

In his maturity he combined such observations with a grand-scale historical way of looking at things and praxeology.

“In war so many insignificant, trivial instances appear, which also determine the act/action, such that for someone to try to include all of that duly in the abstract sentences of theory, he/that someone would seem like a great scholastic/pedantic/finicky person and would become commonplace to the point of disgust” (*Strategie*, p. 71). [[Even Clausewitz felt disgust!...]]

Re: **war**, we should not take logical types as seriously as in philosophy and mathematics;

rather, we ought to find the general in “most cases” (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg”) ... as opposed to those who invent theories and hasten to attribute to this or that axiom the predicate of the generality, showing that they don’t understand what the essence of a theory is (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*).

From such one-sided generalisations there result abstract, albeit “lustrous”, systems, which in the end lose contact with reality.

[[CLAUSEWITZ IN HIS SHEER BRILLIANCE IS DESCRIBING WHAT HAPPENS IN ALL IDEOLOGICAL THEORIES AND THAT WOULD INCL. ALL OF TODAY’S RIDICULOUS “THEORISATIONS” OF “DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, OTHERNESS, SUPREMACY, OPPRESSION ETC.”, WHICH HAVE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS MAKING SPECIFIC POWER CLAIMS OF CONTROL AND DOMINATION BEHIND THEM, AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING OR NEXT TO NOTHING OR NOT (THAT) MUCH (AT BEST) TO DO WITH SCIENCE]]

Clausewitz wants theory to relate to the phenomena of the world as the world is, what is understood must be united and merged with the existent; and

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according to the texture of the object, either the theoretical or the historical aspect will take precedence (“Charakteristik Scharnhorsts”).

How though do we avoid short-sighted infertile empiricism as well as empty theorisation?

Clausewitz is convinced that it is not enough to look at an isolated fact = the surface of things, not the depth of reality.

Every isolated fact needs to be illuminated from a higher vantage point with its inclusion in broader interrelations in order to find out what of essence is inside it.

“The nature of things” or the “internal interrelation” of things (pp.335, 339, 340) is emphasised, and he points out cases “*where the deep hidden interrelation of things is not embodied in visible phenomena*” (p. 330; cf. p. 640: “the general circumstances which dominate in the depths-depths”).

Also, the individual case in itself is not conducive to theoretical processing nor direct and full inclusion in theory. So, theory must be oriented to the “categories of phenomena” (p. 288).

And theory must be “the separation of non-homogenous things” (p. 271), and hence there must be reference to differentia specifica.

Which means that reality is fragmented into various poles, around which gather the formal and characteristic qualities/properties on each and every respective occasion.

It is of value to focus on those poles where the “extreme opposites” are visible or “the extreme form of every process”, and indeed in the knowledge of the fact that most concrete/specific cases

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are not acted out at those poles, but move somewhere between them (p. 859).

[[THIS IS NOT THAT FAR FROM SIMMEL AND KONDYLIS RE: THE SPECTRUM OF THE SOCIAL RELATION!!!]]

Focus on the extremes is not to ignore the vast majority of phenomena = quantity,

but to focus on the qualitative differences which the extremes show us.

The intellectually intensified reality of theory has more internal truth than the reality of direct experience; if the latter wants to become theory, it needs to be intensified, to be concentrated, to be purified.

[[This (above and below) = the basis for the ideal type]]

Theory can comprehend the nature and the internal interrelation of things only through abstractions and fictitious construct(ion)s, and it does that always having a consciousness of the difference between the logical level, i.e. the level of cohesive intellectual comprehension, and the level where real cases are acted out.

P.K. gives us two examples by Clausewitz from *Die Feldzüge von 1799* where Clausewitz acknowledges the gap between reality and the theoretical comprehension or way of looking at such reality.

The content of theory is not just about the logically faultless putting in a chain of autonomous fictitious constructs and abstractions, **but rather arises from the ceaseless comparison of such construct(ion)s and abstractions with specific cases and situations in their individuality.** That way, both the theoretical and real dimensions are continually present in their necessary connection and divergence.

Progress in theory happens not when we just distance ourselves from the individual and unrepeatable, but rather with the refinement of general concepts, which makes smaller such general concepts' distance from the individual case, giving them the possibility of

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undergoing the test of comparison with experience.

In practice, all this boils down to the skill of the analyst/observer/scientist in selecting the material, covering all the relevant points in question, and presenting the material in a way which stands the test of reality/experience.

“The abstraction succeeds absolutely as to its purpose/goal, when by doing/making the abstraction nothing is lost in respect of all that belongs to the thing [[= phenomenon being observed]]” (*Strategie*, p. 82).

The intellectual skill and maturity needed to set out an adequate theory is the highest imaginable in order to be able to be logical and accurately observe human affairs. As in praxis/practise, so too in theory the “tact of judgement” is decisive.

Key is what happens in concreto with theory, not the plain abstract formulation.

One only needs to think of Clausewitz’s “pure/unmixed war” to see how great he was. Clausewitz formed his method separate to/apart from classical German philosophy, in the light of the political and historical world. Herein is his essential difference from every philosophical, i.e. ontological or epistemological undertaking.

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For Clausewitz, there is no philosophy as mater scientiarum. For Clausewitz, philosophical investigations seem to have an “unfortunate mania for abstractions”, and the Germans need to free themselves of such abstractions in order to learn from the French “to think clearly and specifically on the matters of the state and society” (“Umtriebe”).

Clausewitz felt he was only able to be really interested in historical and political matters/themes/topics (Epistle to his fiancé, 3.10.1807), and he was not at all interested in “*unmanly mysticisms*” etc. (Epistle to his fiancé, 17.8.1808).

[[HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!]]

Philosophy for Clausewitz is not content, but form. It's the abstraction in theory that can be useful. Philosophy and experience are fused in theory just as conceptuality, logic and ideal-typical construct(ion) are fused with material reality (p. 184). Philosophy is not the whole body/corpus of theory but only its conceptual aspect. Empirical data/facts = another aspect. *The continuous comparison of theory with experience depends more on the "tact of judgement" than on learned logical-philosophical rules/norms.*

The little Clausewitz absorbed from the philosophy of his era (especially through the Kantianism of Kiesewetter) more than likely helped him through the formal principles of structuring and as a means of intellectual-spiritual disciplining (Rothfels; cf. Linnebach).

Yet no similarities can be ascertained betwixt Clausewitz's analyses

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and the texts of known German philosophers of his epoch (Cf. Schering. Creuzinger's amateurish, baseless attempt to convert Clausewitz into a Hegelian was exposed by and in Bleich).

There were various attempts to pigeon-hole Clausewitz according to ideological preferences e.g. as a part of "German humanism" in the liberal interpretation of Clausewitz, whereas the Marxist-Leninists wanted Clausewitz proximate to Hegel and the "progressive" thought of the times.

If we want to classify Clausewitz in the history of ideas, then he does not belong to a certain German intellectual-spiritual tendency, but rather is in the tradition of

European pragmatic political thought, whose starting point and high point, peak, pinnacle in the New Times is Machiavelli.

Clausewitz wrote: “no book in the world is so necessary for a politician than Machiavelli”, and when he characterises Machiavelli’s opponents with disdain he calls them “a kind of humanistic little teachers” and “humanitarian ethicists”, and had studied Machiavelli already in his youth (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8” + Strategie, pp. 41, 42). Clausewitz shared in Machiavelli’s anthropological presuppositions, the related perception of politics as power politics, and a purely earthly of this world contemplation of human affairs, as well as the historical-political feeling of the peculiarity of every specific case, of the continuous transformations and displacements of every political conjuncture. **[[= ABSOLUTELY BRILLIANT]]**

For Clausewitz, the second “top thinker” of politics was Montesequieu (*Pol. Schriften*, p. 4) [[A pretty fucking good choice, I’d say!!!]]. *In Montesquieu, Clausewitz saw the historical world unfold in its infinite material, political and intellectual-spiritual-ethical multiformity, and by observing that GRAND PANORAMA, Clausewitz could refine his own contemplation of things.* It is doubtful though as to whether Clausewitz was taught anything by

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the way Montesquieu develops his conceptuality in order to intellectually subjugate historical multiformity, even though there are some similarities (Cf. R. Aron).

Clausewitz's method matured longer after reading Montesquieu, and reflected on Montesquieu as lacking in system, strict coherence,... in the presentation of his material, whereas Clausewitz wanted to analyse and systematise (p. 175). General Clausewitz was interested in the historical-sociological causal aspect of Baron Montesquieu's thought, and not those aspects under the influence of natural law. The clash/contrast of/between causal and normative consideration as we see in Montesquieu (Kondylis, *Aufklärung*), is totally missing from Clausewitz's consistent historical and descriptive positioning.

Clausewitz's proximity to the historical and sociological Montesquieu simultaneously shows his proximity to the Enlightenment as a whole. The Enlightenment first disclosed and opened up for investigation the historical universe in its multiformity and its multi-layered nature as well as its determination by material and social factors (Kondylis, loc. cit.).

Clausewitz adopts some essential commonplaces of the anthropology of the Enlightenment: he sees man in his tangible corporeality and explains e.g. the differences in psycho-somatic constitution with the particular texture of the neurological system, that "amphibian", which ties matter and spirit to each other (p. 241). *Clausewitz also, based on such an anthropological perception, attributes to feeling the most important role as motive force, and belongs to the anti-intellectualistic mainstream of the Enlightenment when he combats abstract systems, and vis-a-vis the logical activity of the intellect, he gives priority to the "tact of judgement", to that peculiar refined instinct* (see Kondylis, loc. cit.).

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So, from the point of view of Clausewitz's relationship with the Enlightenment, it is clear how little he owes to "philosophy", and indeed to then current German philosophy.

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II. Excursus/Digression A: "Politicians" and "Soldiers/Military Officers"

The dominant liberal interpretation of Clausewitz confuses the issue of the relations(hip) between politics and war, with the issue of the relations between politicians and soldiers, and contends that from the theoretical subjugation of war to politics, automatically one deduces the practical command of the subjugation of military principles to policies/politics, *which supposedly adopt a moderate stance*, either by obstructing, hindering war or keeping policy within "logical" limits/confines.

Clausewitz by no means ever agreed that behind every war are warmongering soldiers/generals.

Clausewitz's theory of the unity of politics and war came out of general historical musings, and was never put forward for the purpose of theoretically justifying the primacy of political government vis-a-vis military command (as liberal interpreters of Clausewitz do).

In any event in Clausewitz's day, Napoleon was both military Chief and political Chief, and most of the political and military leaderships were **from the same social classes** which gave some internal homogeneity between "politicians" and "soldiers/military officers".

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Clausewitz does not support political governmental primacy over the military because of the former's popular "legitimacy" as liberals did, but because war is a part and continuation of political communication. Clausewitz is not concerned with the technical difference between politician and soldier but with the difference between the political and military perspective (pp. 994, 993).

Since the political perspective comprehends all of the political communication as a whole, it must be imposed and decided what the character of the war will be in order to set out the war plan and determine the "guiding lines" of its conduct.

Clausewitz though is fully aware of the fluctuating complexity of reality, and highlights the very frequent political inadequacy of government e.g. when politics diverges from its destination (pp. 995, 993).

So, of course a soldier/general might support a more "political" position than a politician etc. and in any event, generals are aware of the political perspective as they are public men (p. 250).

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And the most important politicians must be familiar with military matters so that the aims of war and the political goals are "adapted to the texture of the means" (p. 210; cf. Gembruch's well-aimed observations).

THUS, unless there is some kind of "imperfection in the comprehension of things", it is self-evident that the military command/principle must be subjugated to the political command/principle in the sense of understanding the whole mechanics and dynamics of political communication.

Such a perception is not in line with today's liberal [[as ideology]] perceptions, and if we wanted to compare it to the 20th century, it is more in line with the Soviet rather than the Western model.

Clausewitz has no objections to the uniting of political and military leadership “in one person”, in fact he views such unity as more conducive to efficiency so that the politics can be in tune with the means of war etc.. In any event, at the very least, the Commander in Chief/Supreme General should sit on the Council of Ministers of the government (p. 669).

Whatever the structure, the key is if political and military perspectives can see eye to eye and be co-ordinated (see e.g. Oncken “Politics”; cf. Szczepanski, *Politik*).

A clash of perspectives can exist within the same person when the military commander is the political commander.

And a clear separation between politicians and soldiers guarantees nothing of itself as to co-ordination.

Sometimes political persons

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can weigh up military matters better than military officers and vice versa.

Neither the recipes of the “rule of law state”, or the dictates of a dictator, can be substitutes for the “tact of judgement”.

In the 19th century, the increasing professionalisation and specialisation of soldiers (Huntington), and the rise and imposition of the liberal perception of popular rule and the rule of law state for the first time created the problems between politicians and soldiers/military officers we know today. *The greater*

reliance on technology etc. made the gap in knowledge of military matters between soldiers and politicians greater than ever before, incl. because of the gradual abolition of the social domination of the aristocracy, which used to provide much of the military and civilian-political leadership. Also, there was a fragmentation of politics into factions and parties, so the military elite felt that they were in existence above and beyond petty party politics. However, P.K. knows of no case in 19th century European history where the military leadership doubted the right of the government of the day to declare and end war or to determine the extent of war preparations.

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Generals/Soldiers did claim a right to determine the means for the achievement of victory in war due to their specialist knowledge.

They were not though coup plotters. So, the difference between political and military perspectives does not coincide with the distinction between politicians and soldiers/generals/military officers.

The clashes between Bismarck and Moltke at the time of the Franco-Prussian war are indicative. In 1871, for Moltke, strategy might be used for political ends/goals, but the military means to achieve the political goals set was the business of the soldiers/generals.

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Moltke called for independence of action for the army for reasons of technical expediency, and not with any serious intent to co-determine long-term political decisions.

Von der Goltz, referring to Clausewitz, had a similar view. **The reasons for war are political. Good politics is necessary. War serves politics best when the enemy is fully vanquished** (Moltke, Scherff).

Likewise, v. Seeckt. A general has full responsibility to exterminate the enemy in accordance with the order received from politicians.

Sczcepanski distinguishes between management of war, management of the armed forces, and management of military units.

C. 1900, Moltke's basic position was fully accepted by military authors who gave an even greater role to the political leadership, and hence diverged from Moltke: e.g. Verdy du Vernois opposed Clausewitz's view on "full independence" of strategy from politics

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as to the conduct of the military undertakings. Of course, political goals often cannot be achieved without military might.

V. Caemmerer agrees with v. Verdy that politics had to influence the course of military ventures.

Blume went for a sophisticated intermediate position and in opposition to v. Caemmerer agreed with Moltke about military tactics during the siege of Paris, but was against full operational independence.

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In agreement with Blume re: the co-ordination of military and political leaderships and the circumstantial autonomy for the military during military campaigns, was v. Freytag-Loringhoven, agreeing with Clausewitz that what was damaging was not the influence of politics, but **bad politics**.

Likewise, Bernhardi, who wrote about the political character of war. When the political situation changes, then politics can set new duties for the waging of war and the Head General/Marshal/Chief of the General Staff cannot decide what is possible in war. Yet politics must take the military factors seriously into consideration and not get involved in the actual conduct of military operations.

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Moltke = correct tactics during the Paris siege.

A number of military writers understood that what counted is what happened in concrete circumstances and not the various positionings as recipes on paper (Binder von Krieglstein incl. re: characters of both political and military personnel. But, of course, the system of war in place is most crucial of all – a good understanding between politicians and soldiers/generals means nothing if...).

In the context of the ideology of the victors of WW2, the view was promulgated that at least after 1870/71 German generals/soldiers had broken away from the spirit of Clausewitz and doubted the primacy of politics, leading to the final catastrophe (Marwedel, who cites texts out of context). Things are NOT so simple. The theoretical confession of faith in the absolute primacy of politics guarantees nothing (in terms of military victory), e.g. Hitler.

Clausewitz spoke of the influence of the political leadership on “basic points” of military activity and believed that one did not define patrols in accordance with

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political motives (pp. 996, 992).

Obviously, there is more autonomy re: tactics, but tactics are always connected to strategy which is connected to politics.

The drawing of boundaries between the competencies of soldiers/generals and politicians is essentially a matter of interpretation and it will always remain thus.

After the brilliant and much admired by friends and foes alike accomplishments of the Prussian military leadership in the wars of 1866 and 1870/71, a self-

conviction was created and reflected in the rich Prussian military literature of 1870 to 1914. Even the French General Iung refers expressly to the teachings of the “Prussians” and the relations between politics and war, saying that politics ought to define the goals/ends of war and thereafter their achievement is to be left to the soldiers/generals.

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Iung was of the view that politics only is involved in choosing the goal, and thereafter politics only functions indirectly via influence, otherwise tactics are the domain of military personnel.

Colonel Colin just before WW1 in a very widely read book (*Transformations*) = once a war begins, it's very important the (Commanding) General/Field Marshal have complete freedom to wage war as he sees fit.

Foch as a war specialist felt like a stranger re: politics. See J. King re: when French military officers temporarily took over state power and in peace negotiations.

In Great Britain, the army had a big say on British world politics (McDermott).

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Engels wrote in the *New York Daily Tribune* of the particular role of the military factor against “politics” (2.2.1854). Diplomacy can't do much without stuffing things up once military operations are underway.

Both Churchill and Stalin knew of military matters in quite a bit of depth (Possony re: Stalin).

Wallach admits that Hitler until 1941 correctly applied Clausewitz's principles but did not listen to his generals as things turned sour for Germany.

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There is no causal interrelation between the weakness of the political leadership vis-a-vis soldiers/generals, and the extreme intensity of war.

What in the 20th century was called “total war” did not arise from the sudden strengthening of military personnel as opposed to the political leadership, even though some events of WW1 could give that misleading impression. Yet only after the war had become “total” did the generals get stronger. Before 1914, the military plans were for a short war.

In WW2, there were no Foch or Ludendorff, and the political leaderships were in full command. **In the national-socialistic literature, Schmitthener condemns the attempts of military personnel to become autonomous vis-a-vis politics (just like an “anti-militaristic liberal”!!!)** and attacks Blume and Bernhardt on operational autonomy.

Foertsch went further and saw politics as determining even military operations, and not just deciding the start and finish of war, or the goals and the finding of means. Foertsch even criticises Ludendorff, supporting Bismarck against Moltke (Ludendorff misunderstands Clausewitz because the latter focused more on foreign policy than internal politics

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because the first concern was the survival of the people, and **Clausewitz understood history primarily as the fighting between peoples**. Clausewitz however did look into the interrelation between foreign politics/policy and domestic/internal politics/policy esp. re: the wars of revolutionary France. Ludendorff also confuses restricted and non-restricted/limited war and total war. **Total war preparations were something that liberal governments did too, so there is no necessary correlation between total war and totalitarian governments**. Ludendorff made the common mistake made today that

Clausewitz held that politics = moderation. And we know that that is definitely not the case.

Peace cannot be supported by stupid arguments not based on (historical) reality.

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III. Excursus/Digression B: War of Annihilation, Total War, Atomic/Nuclear War

The key to Clausewitz and the subjugation of the military leadership to politics is understanding the notion of the primacy of the political perspective vis-a-vis the military perspective (which both politicians and soldiers/generals can have), and not the formal hierarchisation of authority and responsibilities in a liberal polity.

Clausewitz's notion of friction referring to anthropology and the philosophy of culture, included everything between the notion of "pure/unmixed war" and all the possible forms of real war.

The most intense form of war for Clausewitz could never be like "pure war".
However, in the 20th century forms of "total war" and atomic war came about which were much more harmful than the real wars of Clausewitz's day. What does this mean for Clausewitz's theory and for friction?

There are many legends and misunderstandings surrounding the deduction of total and atomic war from war of annihilation, which drew a straight line from Moltke to Schlieffen and Hitler.

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We shall look at the historical character of the two world wars and the conceptual texture of atomic war.

In Clausewitz, the term “annihilation” exclusively refers to (inimical) armed forces, and of course does not mean their physical annihilation, but rather bringing them to a state in which they cannot continue armed struggle (p. 215).

Annihilation also referred to the morale of the armed forces, not just their physical situation (p. 226).

Various references to “annihilation” in Clausewitz (pp. 391, 392, 508, 510, 517, 228, 423, 225; cf. p. 949).

The fact that the main aim of acts of war is annihilation of armed forces which is done mainly in battle = the central significance of the battle in war (p. 467).

Though, the goal of the battle and the annihilation of enemy armed forces constitute a simple means in relation to the ultimate war goal/end (p. 221, 223, 225).

Not all wars are wars of annihilation only because in every war the goal of a/the battle is the annihilation of the enemy armed forces.

The war of annihilation is of course at the antipodes of armed observation and one must have the intention re: the former to subjugate the enemy (pp. 201, 200).

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Subjugation as a goal/end of a war of annihilation consists in the neutralisation of enemy armed forces, the conquering of the enemy country, and indeed the enemy capital city incl. the dissolution of state power and of political organisations, and the ending of enemy will/volition, so that the foe/enemy cannot continue resistance (pp. 214ff., 977).

Many have observed that Clausewitz does not talk of the destruction of animals and goods based on “total mobilisation”, which later was called “total war” (Linnebach, Boehm-Tettelbach).

Moltke had focused on destroying enemy forces and not gaining (a piece of) (any) land, nor on the extensive destruction of enemy human and economic forces. Moltke had in mind the relatively harmless example of 1870/71 re: economy, railways, food supplies, even prestige. **Moltke was of the view that the need for speediness comes about from the fact that a modern developed economy is so complicated and sensitive that it cannot withstand a long interruption or an expensive war. Clausewitz referred to the importance of speed of war re: supplies** (p. 586).

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Von der Goltz saw that the notion of annihilation was different in his day than in the Napoleonic age.

Von der Goltz did not differ much from Clausewitz on annihilation and re: economic war his positions were basically the same as Moltke.

The key to “annihilation” is to bring the foe to such a state that he himself feels he is unable to continue in war.

If need be, i.e. if there is still resistance, the capital must be occupied as well as ports, warehouses, the most important transportation arteries, forts, factories producing armaments. Economic war therefore comes last if the foe is still trying to battle on and still maintains hopes of...

“We do not defeat the enemy by totally destroying his physical existence, but by annihilating his hope to win” (von der Goltz).

This perception = key for wars of 1866 and 1870/71 whereby a strategy of annihilation was used for limited/restricted political goals/ends.

Delbrück went so far as to say that the final political goal/aim of war determines
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directly, strategy. For the Prussian soldiers/generals there was no economic war at that time, and the army waged war without depending on the military mobilisation of the whole country (Ludendorff).

On the lead up to WW1, Schlieffen's military planning had as its major concern to avoid a protracted war. [[Not a very successfully carried out plan!!!]] He wanted a quick victory via war of annihilation. His view was that because of the millions of people involved, prolonged wars could not be sustained incl. re: the economy. Also, since 1870/71, Germany had lost the numerical advantage re: France – another reason for a quick, decisive campaign.

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Front to front war would be prolonged and then what happened in the Russo-Japanese war would repeat itself – two mass armies with modern firearms/guns/cannons facing each other with no decisive victory.

What happened in September 1914 proved Schlieffen 100% correct on this point. And there was also the fear of intervention of other Powers, so a quick outcome was even more desirable.

Schlieffen's critics focused on his underrating of the ethical factor and overrating of grand plans of a great circular movement (Bernhardi; Schlichtung; Mette).

Of course, the facts showed that high level of morale of themselves mean nothing. Reference to Craig.

P.K. = if Germany had won quickly then very likely the fatal for Germany intervention of the Americans would not have taken place.

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Moltke had already stressed the need for the precise assessment of the general situation before deciding on a strategy of annihilation (the political situation determines whether one seeks the annihilation of the opponent, or one treads on a more secure path of a series of less decisive victories).

It is sheer conceptual confusion to say that Schlieffen's plan was not "political" or was "purely military" because it was set out/drawn up exclusively by military personnel and because it violated Belgium's neutrality. Schlieffen provided his plans in good time to the political leadership so that it could approve or reject the plans.

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The fact is that before 1914 the German General Staff had not displayed aggressiveness re: war even in times of crisis. There is no reason whatsoever to exclude the possibility that even if in Germany there was less "military spirit" (which is a dubious accusation on the facts), a political government without a trace of "militarism" would not have opted for a rapid victory in a rapid war of annihilation.

In that case, the violation of Belgium's neutrality would show that liberal governments are not necessarily less prone than "military-based" governments to violations of international law.

[[One only needs to think of the fate of international law under USA tutelage... HahahahaHa... international law a la carte... etc. That's not to say that having another World Super Power would make things any "better"!!! In fact, the likely outcome of a sudden shift in the world correlation of forces is a lot of trouble, to say the least...]]

E.g. the transgression of Norwegian neutrality at the beginning of WW2 **by liberal governments** of the West, which had the German invasion as a consequence (Liddell Hart).

There were inherent reasons for Germany to act the way she did incl. that if she did not violate Belgium's neutrality and take advantage of that, there was no guarantee that France would have respected the neutrality, or that Great Britain would have depended on the said violation as to its participation for war. There was a numerical disadvantage on the German side as well, which placed serious obstacles in the way of a strategy of immediately breaking of the enemy's Front. So, a liberal German government could just as easily for practical reasons followed the same course.

Only very naive people without historical evidence connect the non-military to the ethical and the humanitarian.

[[ONLY A RETARD WOULD THINK THAT E.G. IRAN, NORTH KOREA ETC. "SHOULD NOT" HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF ETHICS. THE ONLY FACTOR AT PLAY IS POWER AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES, AND ALL THE FAIRY STORIES ABOUT "HUMAN RIGHTS" AND "DEMOCRACY" ARE FOR THE RETARDED AND THOSE IN CONTROL (FOR NOW – and theoretically, that NOW could last for decades, or even centuries,... but somehow it doesn't seem like it's going to be centuries at the rate the WEST is SPINNING TOTALLY OUT OF CONTROL and EATING ITSELF FROM THE INSIDE...)...]]

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Cheap ex post facto wisdom is the wisdom of the victor.

Especially in liberal France, but all over Europe, the military leadership had full widespread support for military build-up. See von der Goltz already before 1900.

Schlichting was of the view that the new firearms/guns/cannons would favour defence only in the first phase, but in the second phase they would provide the annihilation force in attack/offence.

The perfection of arms favours attack/offence more than defence =

Hoppenstedt, which the European observers of the Russo-Japanese war thought (Howard).

Whilst Bernhardi agreed with Clausewitz that defence is a more powerful form of struggle vis-a-vis attack/offence, the modern firearms/cannons etc. aided attack/ offence.

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Blume wrote about defence being made stronger by the new weapons technology, but attack/offence was given possibilities too, incl. re: ethical factors.

V. Caemmerer was in a minority in advising for moderation, following Clausewitz.

The military literature c. 1900 in France shows much more enthusiasm for attack/offence than in Germany. The French quoted many Germans, and one could say that French military thinking at that time was simply a radicalisation of German thinking.

Even the left-wing in France talked of revanche for 1870/71.

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But e.g. based on a genuine peoples' army etc. without reference to German militarism (Jaurés).

Jaurés attacked French admirers of Clausewitz like Gilbert, and saw Napoleon as the burier of revolutionary war, and that the Prussians just copied Napoleon.

Foch frequently cites Moltke, Willisen, Clausewitz and von der Goltz to call modern at that time warfare "struggles between peoples" incl. mobilising all the intellectual-spiritual and material forces of a country at war.

Foch was not an original thinker on war. Nearly everyone in France c. 1890 agreed upon war of annihilation and the appropriation of the "Prussians".

General Derrécagaix in a much-read manual invoking von der Goltz with full self-conviction wrote: “Attack/offence is the only possible

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choice of a general if he wants to win”.

For Derrécagaix, a quick and intense war based on decisive attack/offence was absolutely necessary. However, Germany did have the advantage in Lorraine.

Bonnal and the school of “counterattack”, which was opposed by the supporters of pure/unmixed attack/offence... up to Joffre as Head of the General Staff and the war plan of 1913.

Foch too supported “pure attack/offence”, and emphasised the decisive attack/offence.

Following Foch,

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Grandmaison rejected the school of counterattack, which became popular just before WW1.

By focusing on defensive “guarantees” in counterattack there would be a fragmentation of forces and a paralysis of the offensive/attacking spirit and the taking of the initiative. Defence = lower morale.

Attack/offence = strengthening the self-conviction of the troops and their mobility, incl. the advantage of surprise.

Grandmaison is simply reiterating the “Prussian” stance that only in attack/offence can one fully make use of the decisive ethical factor.

He laughs off accusations of Germanophilia, and says that he is radicalising German ideas to defeat the Germans.

For Grandmaison, Germans are not capable of moving into pure attack/offence mode because their spirit/intellect is too methodical and they take too long on the battlefield etc..

Colin found no preference in Clausewitz for defence over attack/offence, and saw attack/offence as the natural mode of action in war.

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In Great Britain, nearly everyone was in favour of the offensive/attacking character/basic stance and quick ending of a future war (Gooch, Howard) (with the exception referred to by General Bonnal in respect of the **lieutenant-colonel of the artillery(/firearms/cannons) Mayer**, who in 1902 under the pseudonym of *Manceau* wrote about the situation of not being able to successfully break through the enemy's front and then getting bogged down with the two sides opposing each other at some point such as the sea, a mountain, at the borders of a neutral state [[= VERY, VERY INTERESTING STUFF!!!]])

Schlieffen's basic conviction, following Moltke, that prolonged war was impossible for economic reasons, was widely held in all of Europe incl. Freytag-Loringhoven in Germany.

[[WE ALL KNOW THOUGH WHAT REALLY EVENTUATED – PROLONGED WAR AND a phase in THE PRIMARY FORMATION of the corporate/managerial state and Western mass democracy, and in which in certain countries, particularly after WW2, a certain group GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY came to positions of power and influence...]]

Von der Goltz saw that governments would have to pressure armies to not pause in war for economic reasons, and due to mass armies etc.. Bernhardt did not see economic "catastrophe" from a long war, but a long war would weaken the economy.

Burchardt on the shorter duration of war, spoke of about a year.

French (the author) in Great Britain felt that economic catastrophe would shorten or even prevent a war.

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Schlieffen in almost 15 years never asked for an increase in military personnel for the German army (Ritter: Ludendorff hides the truth, but then makes an indirect admission in 1922 that no-one knew of how long the war would have lasted etc.).

In 1914, German resupplying depended on imports, so that the outcome of war had to be quick (*Der Weltkrieg* + Dix).

France had mobilised about 90% of its soldiers whereas Germany remained at around 50% on the eve of WW1 (Schmitt + Miksche (on state of armaments/ equipment of the two main sides = Germany by no means was in the better position)).

Buat saw that Germany counted on a quick victory, but were not better prepared overall for war.

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Buat opined that if Germany had another 600,000 troops, which it could have had, it would have been able to circle off the left Franco-English wing up to the coast of the North Sea and the Channel Straits, and Great Britain would have been under direct threat as to naval bases etc.!!!

SO, the inadequate preparations for war contributed, somewhat paradoxically, to the prolongation of war, with both lack of arms and lack of supplies at telling points in the war (Wieland, Feldman).

The military situation had no way out when the war economy got under way (French, Woodward, Fontaine, Hardach).

The war of annihilation did not take place, and precisely the belief it was inevitable obstructed adequate preparation.

For the purposes of our way of looking at the problem, **WW1 can be separated into**

a quick first phase of unrealised war of annihilation,

and,

a second phase, which was much longer, in which the battles used up military material and featured an until then unknown and unforeseen intensification of the war economy on the home front.

It is interesting that something similar applies to WW2, esp. by looking at the efforts of national-socialistic Germany.

In the first phase of WW2, the war of annihilation on the part of Germany met with success (unlike in WW1) under the notion of “Blitzkrieg”, and this first phase lasted much longer than in WW1,

as well as

in relation to the second phase of “total war”.

Both world wars show that the German side was economically unprepared for “total war” (WW1 after the battle of Marni, and WW2 after the German Army got bogged down before Moscow).

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and precisely because of the belief in a quick victory in a war of annihilation.

[[One view of voices in the “dissident media” in the West is that if China, Russia, Iran and perhaps also Turkey, pulling Germany along as well, don’t even very loosely come together, then current GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO-led USA could lead everyone straight to HELL (in an attempt to strike before China becomes too powerful etc.)... On the other hand, things are not so simple and clear cut, and usually so many Powers do not just “come together”, and scientifically speaking, no-

one is inherently evil or good, though undoubtedly some appear inherently evil and disgusting to others with their monkey circus/ugliness/sick/vomit civilisation etc... *purely as a matter of taste*... which, however, is perfectly normal and acceptable to many hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people... “fair enough”... I think I need a Time Machine, and if not that, then the Time to say Good-bye is fast approaching!!! – And no-one here is supporting any kind of National Socialism/Communism, Retards. All that is Desired is Peace and Proportionality, the Golden Mean, but of course such is not the Destiny of Man and Mankind... In the beginning, the APE, in the End, the APE again...]]

Germany, in any event, was probably not in a position to win even with the best of preparation as the forces against it were far greater and e.g. Great Britain had a greater degree of war mobilisation (Carroll).

The National Socialists in attempting to learn the lessons of WW1, comprehended the essential difference between war of annihilation and “total” war. This was understood in East Germany rather than by the Allies as Ethicising Victors. The East Germans saw that the National Socialists were right about the initial phase of the war and about the significance of the air force, tanks, armoured vehicles and submarines (*Das Moderne Militärwesen*, which saw that whilst Germany got off to a flying start with its Blitzkrieg/war of annihilation, that alone could not decide the outcome of the war, which of course was the case).

Blitzkrieg was just Hitler updating war of annihilation with modern

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weapons technology etc..

Of course, Hitler’s traumatic experiences from World War One influenced his strategic thought greatly, so that avoiding a repeat of “total” war (or at least of war which was considered as such) became a strategic priority.

As was later observed, “total” war existed as Hitler’s Nemesis, and not as his initial plan (Carroll, who also writes “the inflexible insistence of England, Russia’s refusal to seek peace, and the intervention of the USA, forced Hitler

into conducting the kind of war that he had sworn he would never wage”. Cf. Milward: “Hitler was simply one of the many strategic planners who sought an alternative to the multiple deaths and obviously pointless battles of the artillery and foot soldiers from 1915 to 1918”).

[[NOW, this is very, very interesting, because it shows that Hitler’s subjective political and military campaign decisions did not come out of nowhere, or as the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONALLY owned and controlled in the USA mass media would tell you “from EVIL” (HAHAHAHAHA), but arose from his interactions in concrete situations with the decisions of those opposed to him. THAT IS HOW social science works – Concrete Situations and Human-Social Interactions AND CUT THE FUCKING BULLSHIT ABOUT “GOOD” and “EVIL” – that is legitimate for the purposes of PROPAGANDA and CONTROL, incl. GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE CONTROL, but it is not SCIENCE...]]

Erfurth, who wanted to return to Schlieffen’s position, argued that military technology and the concentration of power was such that quick victory was possible. Guderian, likewise, esp. re tanks/armoured vehicles as well as aeroplanes (cf. Eimannsberger). Whereas those who were sceptical about the new weapons believed in a lengthy war (Foertsch, the national socialist).

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National-socialistic Germany DID NOT get into full mobilisation of the economy for war mode because it felt the Blitzkrieg would hand it victory quickly, and only in 1942 did the war economy come into being (Klein).

From 1933-1938, military expenditure in the German economy was less than 40% of state expenditure and about 10% of GDP. This increased greatly in 1938/39, though Germany was producing about the same number of planes as Great Britain and less tanks on a monthly basis. (See Klein, Carroll who stresses that **the German economy before 1938 was not a war economy.** Cf. Milward).

Only after the failure of the Blitzkrieg into Russia in 1942 did German armament policy follow in the footsteps of Western Powers, but Hitler was

particularly reluctant (Milward). There were from 1939 problems with raw materials and production

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and e.g. less ammunition was produced in order to produce more armoured vehicles/tanks.

The view was outside of Germany that national-socialistic Germany was copying “Prussian militarism” re: economy, statism etc. (Szczoł).

Some wanted to draw the correct “economic lessons” from WW1 (Hellmer, Korfes) so that Germany would not go unprepared into war ever again.

Quite often we have suggestions of Germany copying the tried and tested examples of Great Britain and the USA, whilst also stressing that the efforts of the state in the sector of the war economy has “limits”.

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So, a balance needs to be found between the necessary “organised war economy” and “peacetime economy” (Rothe).

State intervention in property is inevitable in times of war, but a “prudent government” should proceed carefully and cautiously, sparingly, only as much as necessary (Fischer).

Hellmer on the transition from peacetime preparing for the war economy to the wartime economy. + Korfes.

Hierl referring to France and USA, in agreement with Seeckt, emphasised that the peacetime economy can't be fully ready re: arms, as arms technology changes rapidly, expenditure is massive,... so one needs to be ready for mass production in the hour of need. But there is rejection of the idea of a professional army.

General Ludendorff is a classic example of the ambiguity and inconsistency of economic preparation for war.

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Ludendorff continues that there are no general principles re: the economy for all countries, but every country should cater to both the people and the army, though he found planned economies to be abominable. “The centralisation of the economy [in WW1], the work of the Jew Walter Rathenau, detracted from everyone creativity and correspondingly acted in slowing down [the economy]”

[[Kondylis makes absolutely no comment about whether Ludendorff was right about Rathenau, and rightly so – it’s obviously not the point]].

The national-socialistic propaganda was geared towards the economy tying into the coming war, but the reality was different from the ideology. Reference to Billman and Blau.

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E. Jünger held that the defeat of 1918 came about because of the lack of truly total mobilisation. Jünger, the man of letters, did not go into details as to how the total mobilisation should have been achieved, and concentrated more on the aesthetic and existential category. The general stance of a Jünger or Ludendorff was like Foch re: WW1 “the extreme utilisation of inspired by flaming passions human masses, which should absorb all the activities of society and adopt totally to its needs the material parts of the system”. Cf. Ludendorf “the texture of total war literally seeks all the strength of the people”.

[[Thus, if the USA had a united home front re: the war in Vietnam, and if it then engaged in even more barbarous warfare (carpet bombings etc.), it could have “won” the war and tortured the Vietnamese people even more so (who in the South got tortured by the Northern forces anyway)... On the other hand, to be fair, the USA as a Power was in a Cold War with another Power and succeeded towards the end of the war in Vietnam to approach another Power, which it wanted to ensure was never close

to the Power which was the main Foe at the time. So, one could say that Nixon/Kissinger displayed rather successful/effective pragmatism and realism from the point of view of the USA...]]

The finding of the previous analysis is that the transition to “total war” in the First and the Second World War did not take place on account of the effort to apply the strategy of annihilation in a or b form, but rather because the strategy of annihilation could not be applied with consistency until the end; it is a historical and logical mistake to deduce “total war” from the war of annihilation (Such a deduction was carried out by Wallach. In his passion against the militarism in Schlieffen up to Hitler via Ludendorff, he does not see that even he acknowledged that in 1914 a new era in war had commenced, or that Falkenhayn strove after only restricted/limited ends/goals and did economise forces, and that Hitler in the Russian campaign diverged from the strategy of annihilation against the opinion of his generals).

From the moment the war is transformed into an essentially ceaseless battle of consuming war materials, in which the non-conscripted population participated in part directly (e.g. guerrillas), and in part indirectly (work on the home front), the one and only great and decisive battle with the goal of annihilating enemy forces forever becomes impossible. Such a battle can only take place when “total war”, long war, is not possible. Because “total” mobilisation

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before the war and during war brings about material and human forces, which cannot be annihilated in one and only battle or even in a few battles.

Both in WW1 and WW2 the most significant sides in the war had at their disposal forces able to survive a war of annihilation as they were industrial (potentially) equalised/equalising societies.

SO, the transition from war of annihilation to “total” war constitutes a clear case where – thinking of Clausewitz – objective politics overruled subjective politics. **Confirmed in a dramatic way was the notion that enemies “impose their law on one another”, because sooner or later every side had to be totally mobilised for fear of not being able to effectively fight the foe.**

Thus, the weakness of subjective politics and the subjugation of the logic of the goal/end to the logic of the means is due to the objective qualities and the dynamics of the situation itself, and NOT to war-mongering generals etc..

This kind of objectively given “political communication” and “social situation” applied to all industrial nations of the first half of the 20th century, and **the theory of “total war” was NOT put forward first by representatives of “Prussian militarism”, but in France during WW1 by A. Séché 1915 and G. Blanchoy 1916**, summarised by Carroll. + Leon Daudet 1918.

And in the Second World War, the logic of the available means = the logic of the destructive possibilities, which provided the objective politics guiding the action

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of the political governments of the West, which set as their strategic goal the complete annihilation of the foe and oriented themselves more with military than with political motives (see Armstrong’s excellent work incl. why democracies are suited to the ideology and the psychological intent of total war. + also see J.F.C. Fuller).

Going from war of annihilation to “total” war means that in principle the aim now is not the destruction simply of the foe’s armed forces, but the destruction of all of the material and ethical/moral forces of the enemy nation.

[[So, when a Super Power or great Power seeks “regime change” in another country, it is trying to achieve something fundamental without necessarily waging war, i.e. to change the direction or content of the “material and ethical/moral forces of the enemy nation”, i.e. get a change in subjective politics/political communication and at least an adjustment in the objective political communication/politics of that nation, by using and expending local forces/people rather than its own military personnel (which can cause its own domestic political problems), such that that nation comes within the Imperial Orbit or Bloc of the great Power in question... with its “disgusting monkey circus values destroying traditional collective identities”, for instance,... otherwise known as “(individualistic) human rights”... etc., etc., etc.,...]]

There are traces of the notion of “total” war **before 1914** in e.g. Delbrück writing about the strategy of wear and tear/attrition rather than subjugating the foe, with two poles, the battle and the manoeuvre, incl. economic damage through destruction, imposition of taxes, impeding trade, and re: naval powers, blockades. **Fifteen**

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years before WW1, Delbrück in relation to wear and tear/attrition as above held that there could be a prolonged war.

He believed that economic damage could intensify war. Paralysing economic life could make the opponent surrender.

Delbrück never discussed it himself, but the third possibility existed of combining war of attrition/wear and tear of the “manoeuvre” with the idea and goal of the subjugation of the enemy. Others observed that as soon as “manoeuvres” commenced, war tended to intensify and included the most

terrible things that humans were capable of doing (Hobohm; cf. Schering). And Delbrück more or less agreed e.g. re: Falkenhayn and the battle of Verdun.

There were of course in the pre-Industrial age many instances when armed forces destroyed civilian forces of the economy etc.

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BUT there was not the degree of mobilisation of the whole economy for the war effort.

During war, the home front was not obliged to systematically work for the war front in the pre-industrial era.

Also, there was no expectation of significant replacement of weaponry during the war – you used what you had and often that was it.

Loss of arms often meant loss of the soldier.

In the industrial age, things change as weapons and ammunition are made en masse to be supplied... to mass armies. There is not the same kind of personal attachment of the fighter to his weapon as in the past.

Hence, in “total” war, the home front works for the war front and much of the economy is geared towards this purpose. Soldiers now use more weapons than in the past, which along with the ammunition, require continual replacement, renewal and improvement. The large-scale industry which makes the weapons also makes the means for the destruction of the weapons.

If weapons are quickly destroyed, the home front can now quickly replace them.

Only an industrial society can provide for mass armies, mass supplies of weapons etc.

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and that is how the “home front” is connected to the “war front”.

The countries which approached the most total mobilisation were Great Britain and Germany in the period 1942-1944. In Great Britain armaments were about 63% of GDP and in Germany around 60% of GDP (Carroll).

SO, the question is, *is such a war pure/unmixed war in Clausewitz’s sense or is it still political war as the continuation and expression of a certain form of political communication?*

THERE was no one and only ceaseless and non-decreasing intense act of violence in the so-called “total wars”

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in which the combatants were involved in one and only clash into which all their forces went.

The hostilities had longer or briefer “pauses/breaks” or “friction” so the “total wars” were NOT simple manifestations of hate and passion.

Thus, according to Clausewitz’s criteria, the two “total” world wars were not pure/unmixed, but real wars.

If there was a lack of “moderation”, the reason is that the combatants adopted certain absolute political goals/ends, and not because they lacked a political character.

They approached, like Napoleonic wars, the form of pure war, leaving behind the classical war of annihilation, and reducing significantly the pauses/breaks.

Today’s possible major wars between great industrial nations theoretically should be “total”, but there has been a novel development of a technical nature.

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Today, the relationship between the “home front” replenishing the “war front” can be put out of action by destroying the home front to the point that it can’t operate.

HENCE, an atomic war carried out consistently could not be a “total war”.

Things are so if we are clear re: our definitions of terms.

In “total” war, there is “total” mobilisation and any destruction could be made up for within a reasonable amount of time.

In an atomic war, one could deprive the opponent of any possibility of mobilising anything.

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All this depends on the direct, ceaseless and full use of atomic weapons, giving the other side no chance.

There would be no pause/break, no friction between the various hostilities and acts of war.

From this point of view, Clausewitz could consider an atomic war to be pure war.

But technically it’s still not pure/unmixed war in Clausewitz’s sense because not all the means to wage war go into the war in total hate etc., i.e. the atomic weapons are used, but not more conventional weapons etc..

Also, in the case where the atomic weapons were not continually and effectively used, there are possibilities of “friction” as in the collapse of information systems.

Perhaps Clausewitz's dictum that war is the field of coincidence applies to a large extent to possible atomic war. Atomic war would not probably just be

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a war of buttons, which cold monsters push etc.. *One cannot exclude the possibility of the retreat of one side after the first exchange of atomic strikes or the abandoning of the struggle by both sides, if the first round indicated all that could be achieved is a macabre draw.*

Also possible is mutual exhaustion if both sides hit the atomic centres of the foe.

And there could be various combinations of atomic and conventional warfare that we could imagine, which have already been planned (see Excursus D).

CONSEQUENTLY, the fundamental conceptuality propounded by Clausewitz in distinguishing between pure/unmixed and real war, together with the criteria which found it, was not surpassed by the experiences of "total" war or the possibility of atomic war.

[[THAT IS CLAUSEWITZ'S GREATNESS IN A NUTSHELL. I BOW IN REVERENCE...]]

Clausewitz is still highly relevant as a theoretician for another reason: that one side imposes its law on the other side. We saw in the "total" wars of the world wars how objective politics held sway over subjective politics.

It's not a question of moderate politicians overruling war-mongering soldiers/generals and misinterpreting Clausewitz.

What applies is that it CANNOT be proved that atomic war could never arise from political communication and that nuclear powers would only ever engage in conventional warfare.

Anyone who says that atomic war is not possible is DUMB and understands politics in the subjective sense of moderation and not in its objective sense.

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We saw atomic war in action in 1945.

It was a continuation of politics in the objective sense because the country dropping atomic bombs had the general ability to construct atomic weapons etc..

That atomic weapons constitute a means of politics, is proved by their deterrent force/power.

The restricted/limited wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were not the outcome of a certain psycho-spiritual/intellectual positioning or prudence and sobriety but of objective social-political factors – from the mainly aristocratic composition of the officer corps, to the relative unloading of the European Front due to colonial expansion.

Whoever formulates hinc et nunc the demand for restricted/limited war, has to first ask what form of (world) political communication makes it possible; of slightest use here is the nostalgic reminiscing of the (idealised) ius publicum europaeum.

[[Kondylis is inter alia implying that Europe's days of imperial pre-eminence are well and truly OVER, and that another era is approaching... with other Powers outside of European culture etc.,... even though European culture of itself obviously does not guarantee any kind of inherent peaceful, less warlike inter-state relations, though it did give rise to certain "humanitarian" laws of war, rules of engagement, etc.,...]]

Summary Notes to be Done sometime in the Future... (in bold red):

Prologue **DONE**

Prologue to the Greek Edition **DONE**

1) ~~I. War and politics (with two digressions/excursus: II. ““Politicians” and “Soldiers””, and, III. “War of annihilation, total war, nuclear war”)~~ **DONE**

2) IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels (with a digression/excursus: V. “War and the Marxist-Leninist perception of history”)

3) VI. War and revolution: Lenin (with a digression/excursus: VII. “The Soviet military dogma”)

(The Chapters below are NOT in the German edition, but only in the Greek edition:)

4) ~~VIII. Hot war after the Cold War~~ **DONE**

a) ~~Classical theory of war and the “new military revolution”~~

b) ~~The utopia of purely technological war~~

c) ~~The multiformity of war and its political aetiology~~

5) IX. Addendum to the Greek edition: Geopolitical and strategic parameters of a Greco-Turkish war

VIII. Hot war after the Cold War

1. The classical theory of war and the “new military revolution”

The ideological charging of the Cold War and the connecting of political clashes with panhuman concerns, also brought the interweaving of strategic discussions at a higher level with the classical theory of war.

There was a huge increase of interest in Clausewitz in the 1960s and 1970s.

Lautan held that the planet was heading towards Balkanisation with frequent, low intensity and amorphous military clashes... and Crevelde that Clausewitz's analyses and teachings have become irrelevant.

Before we explain why such positions are wrong, we'll see why they might appear to be sensible, especially in a transitional epoch.

There was a more or less homogeneous construction of European strategic thought with 5 or 6 major Powers in a tense or strained balance in the 19th century, with the generally accepted source for strategy being the Napoleonic art of war

and these Powers waged war against one another on the basis of certain diplomatic and military rules/norms, and programmatically kept the boundaries between the state of war and state of peace clear, and between the army at war and the unarmed civilian population.

There were campaign rules/norms (rules of engagement) incl. in relation to the infantry and artillery. This system came to an end in 1914 with the first “total war”. Yet again a united strategic perception/view emerged starting

in England with J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart, which planted roots in Germany by way of Guderian.

It's axis was the transcending of **war of array**/line-up/deployment/moving into position (**battle array**) [[?not sure of the exact terminology?]] by a **war of movement**, which could make greatest use of new weapons such as tanks, armoured vehicles, aeroplanes.

The Cold War though made the field of high strategy the whole planet and not just Europe.

And the weapons were of planetary radiuses/ranges: nuclear warheads on intercontinental missiles. There was discussion of surprising the enemy with these weapons use (e.g. Kahn).

In the West, because of a deficiency in conventional equipment, there was a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, whereas the Soviets developed their Dogma based on conventional weapons advantages and nuclear weapons.

Yet mutatis mutandis both sides thought along the same lines, even though in the periphery of the two main camps there were various wars and guerrilla wars which did not at all have the strategic logic of the two great camps.

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Three great phases of strategic thought in the 19th and 20th century.

First two phases with a common and broad political-military field of action involving more than one great Power with common rules of the game, no matter how destructive = Europe Ruling the World.

Third phase = the whole planet, with two Superpowers competing against each other.

After 1989, things are not so clear, as planetary politics are more dense/thick than ever before (see Kondylis, *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*), but **the various Powers are not at the same level, with all sorts of differences in geopolitical, economic and military dynamism, and with different strategic possibilities.**

I [[=Kondylis in 1997]] find the expression of a multipolar world coming about straight after the bipolar Cold War imprecise and misleading, esp. as regards the European present and foreseeable future.

Multi-polar suits the European system until 1914 with relatively more or less equivalent major Powers.

But today [[1997]] “Europe”, which Europe? British? French? German? and Japan, are not planetary poles equivalent to the USA; the former powers’ diplomatic and military dependence on the latter [[Super Power]] did not at all end with the Cold War, and will continue to exist through NATO.

Russia, China or India are quite lower down the scale than the USA which is the world Hegemon, world firefighter or world gendarme or countryside/rural policeman according to the image/picture one choses **[[obviously China’s (relative) position in 21 years to 2018 is moving UP!]]**.

The USA is the only country for the time being [[1997]] which wraps with its military net the whole world and has the ability to strike with

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its arms every corner of the globe or conduct war at any point in the world.

The USA is unique based on unique facts [[which won’t last forever; cf. Mearsheimer and of course P. Kennedy]] and can’t be the model for other Powers.

The ground/basis for the formation of a similar high strategy will arise if and when Powers like China for instance approach today’s level of the USA

and project analogous hegemonic claims, when planetary politics become multi-polar in essence.

Until then, the USA remains the great laboratory of the new, fourth phase of strategic theory,

and esp. after the Gulf War there is an orgy of strategic planning with the express aim of securing American global reach – the ability of the USA to intervene militarily anywhere and to protect their global hegemony from any decisive doubts (see e.g. Colson).

Whatever happens with strategic thought, it is not at all true that the classical theory of war will become useless.

Because the theory of war and strategy move at different logical levels, the former develops a conceptuality to which all strategies, no matter how different, are subjected, even in the most amorphous wars the distinction between strategic (general or long-term) and direct tactical aims remains whole/integral/undivided.

Clausewitz's immortal achievement was precisely that he logically dilated/enlarged/opened up the theory of war from[[, i.e. compared with and in relation to]] the concept and the content of strategy.

Decisive for Clausewitz's thought was the disconnecting of the concept of war from the Napoleonic waging of war, with which initially he had equated the general concept of war, and thus created a theoretical framework for the inclusion of all forms of war, irrespective of strategic direction and

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quality. We have already seen that Clausewitz's fundamental conceptuality applies absolutely even in the case of an atomic war to its extremes.

The same applies to an amorphous war, or to the “new military revolution” of exceptionally technicised war depending on, as to its waging, to large extent, services of contemporary informatics/Information Technology.

[[Tribal Warrior]] Toffler = 3rd wave of the Revolution of Informatics/I.T. (after the Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions),

confirms the classical theory of war that war everywhere and forever is the continuation of politics – politics meant as the whole of the social communication of people in the necessary intertwining of its various sectors.

As the continuation of politics, war is a phenomenon of its essence historical and mutable, its historicity inevitably intersects with the historicity of technique/technology.

But this intersection does not ever mean the simple reduction of war to technique/technology esp. if we examine the facts/data of the “new military revolution” in the light of the crucial concepts of classical theory: “friction”, “coincidence” and the “chameleon” texture of the war phenomenon.

Clausewitz’s conceptuality is for the past, the now and the future (i.e. the only possibility of seeing into the future is through Clausewitz’s conceptuality).

The term “military revolution” was first used in the Soviet discussion of the 1960s, when technological progress

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in the sector of atomic weapons made an issue of whether the role and specific weight of conventional weapons changed.

Today in the West, the term “military revolution” is used re: the consequences of the mass use of electronic means and informatics/I.T., both in the structuring of the Armed Forces and in the character of the weapons systems, as well as in the conduct of war ventures (such a use of the term though was in place at the end of the 1970s in the Soviet Union e.g. Commanding General/Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Orgakov spoke of a “new military revolution” in expressing his concern that the technological pre-eminence of the West gave them the possibility of neutralising great masses of armoured vehicles/tanks and motorised/motor-driven equipment through electronically remote-controlled weapons, destroying the Soviet advantage in having more tanks etc.. Orgakov realised that the “military revolution” [[in the 1960s Soviet sense]] belonged to the past, and the Soviet Union had to adapt to electronics and related non-nuclear weapons systems (Petersen-Trulock).

But the term “new military revolution” meant in the West the greatest change ever in the kind of war re: the whole history of the war phenomenon.

However, the “new military revolution” does not cancel the classical theory of war and it begins even in the pre-electronic age in the Interwar Period with practical application in WW2, from Ardennes and North Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

The central idea behind it was avoiding strategic dead ends and the pointless bloodletting of 1914-1918 through a fast

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war of movement and (circular) manoeuvres, whereby the armoured fighting vehicles/tanks and motorised/motor-driven units would take the lead in breaking through enemy lines without having the old problems of being re-supplied.

From quantitative consideration to qualitative, i.e. from “mass” to “flexibility” and “nimbleness, rapid movement”, and the breaking up of the old unified battlefield into many and dispersed battlefields.

The risk and danger of confusion is now expected to be taken care of by communications (wireless communications, telephones) = invisible cohesive web of operationally autonomous units unfolding in wide spaces.

There is also the organic co-ordination of the action of the infantry, of the armoured fighting vehicles or motor-driven forces and of the Air Force.

The infantry loses its traditional primacy and is no longer a mass infantry, and now becomes mobile to “get inside” the spaces opened up by tanks etc., whereas the Air Force has in its sights enemy armoured fighting vehicles, the enemy’s heavy artillery, which can stop the forward movement of one’s own armoured vehicle forces with barriers of fire, and the network of inimical communications and lines of re-supplying.

The autonomy of tanks etc. depends on the co-ordination of a mass of such units through thick/dense communications (Liddell Hart emphasises that in 1940 the French had more heavy tanks than the Germans, but the latter had modern organisation, having totally broken with the notion that the armoured fighting vehicles are simply a helpful weapon for the infantry. On the other hand, the Germans got the surprise of their lives when they ascertained that on the Eastern Front, the Soviet T-34s were quicker, more durable, even though their construction was simpler without a satisfactory system of communications).

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Already before the Second World War, the supporters of the new strategy, incl. then Colonel de Gaulle [[Love that man! Great Common Sense ethno-patriot. Whoever has Malraux as a Minister of Culture must be a total fucking LEGEND!!!]] (Bond-Alexander), called for the replacement of mass armies by small and professional units/armies like those

today who draw the ultimate conclusions flowing from the “new military revolution”.

Also new weapons, technological developments,... all contributed...

However, mass armies continued, and non-motor-driven sectors continued to play a decisive role in WW2 battles, as WW2 in general evolved into something which the new strategy wanted to avoid: i.e. evolving into “total war”.

Of course, WW2 differed from WW1 because it did not become a war of positions, it started and finished as a war of movement. Yet wars very different from a strategic point of view, can be or become “total” wars.

“Total” war, as we know, is the way of conducting/waging war between nations which were in a mature phase of the Second Industrial Revolution.

There was an abolition of the previous distinction between peaceful “home front” and the warring “war front”, and now the mobile “home front” could continually supply the “war front” with gigantic quantities of war material, being exhausted very quickly in battles which precisely demanded the consumption of such quantities.

That such “total” war dragged on for a long time is because no warring party had the means to strike from the beginning and decisively the inimical/enemy “home front” as the source of the ceaseless re-supplying of the “war front”.

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Nuclear weapons, of course, rendered “total war” impossible in practice. Because now the “home front” could be quickly put out of action, and because the decisive production of nuclear weapons was undergone in the period of Peace, so that there is no need for “total” mobilisation as in the case of the

continual production during wartime of armoured fighting vehicles, aeroplanes and ammunition.

With less social labour, a greater firepower was secured. Because of this nature of nuclear weapons, the West could succeed in the Cold War against the Soviets, who had greater quantities of conventional weapons, i.e. the sector requiring more social labour.

From the late 1970s, in the zone between conventional and nuclear weapons, the appearance began all the more frequently of weapons and weapons systems of great precision and great firepower, which at least as between military targets can achieve results equally drastic as in the case of nuclear weapons, whilst at the same time imposing/requiring significant readjustments to the structure of the armed forces.

Especially the remote-controlled/teleguided missile systems of every size, range and kind, together with the use of new electronic methods of collecting and disseminating information, constitute the technological trunk of the in part done/completed, in part being planned, and in part expected, “new military revolution”.

Today we have an extreme form, in the context of the whole history of war, of what we could

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call “avoidance of bodily contact with the foe”.

Such contact was direct for as long as armed struggles were carried out with sharp and pointed weapons, e.g. axes, swords, spears.

It becomes laxer with projectile weapons, from the slingshot to the bow and arrow, to the gun and the cannon, but even then at least optic i.e. eye contact is necessary.

The qualitative change occurs when eye contact is no longer necessary. Already, in 1918 the German tele-cannons/firearms/guns had a range of 120 kms. In our times [[= mid 1990s]], the American submarine “Trident II” can target half the planet with 192 missiles with a margin of error re: the target of 10 metres.

= continual improvement in Greater Distance and Greater precision in Strikes.

The “revolution in precision” went with the so-called “revolution in energy”. Non-nuclear priming/charging [[=?correct word? unsure?]] adapted to all sorts of missiles can replace nuclear warheads. What once was the target of nuclear weapons, can now be struck by precision weapons, and since the precision weapons are centred on one point, leaving the periphery untouched, doubts and indecision about their use lessens.

So, the firepower used can come from sources outside of the combat zone/field of military undertakings in the narrower sense.

The classical battlefield was characterised by the concentration of available forces in one place and with the purpose of a confrontation whereby the firepower played its part, however the technique/skill/art and the correct choice of the manoeuvre was more important.

The hitherto unheard-of increase of the strength and precision of the firepower changes this relation, destroying the outlines of the battlefield.

The confrontation at the level of manoeuvres is replaced by one duel of artillery/ordnance [[?not sure of exact expression?]] (Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare”).

The term “artillery” here incl. all the kinds of weapons of all the available ranges, from ballistic missiles to “smart” bombs and

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“smart” mines. This of course affects how infantry is used = downsizing and becoming more mobile.

Fewer soldiers must now use advanced technology and achieve more. Futurists of war have already planned for an absolutely autonomous soldier, incl. use of mobile microtechnology with access to central information systems, and the ability to strike at will within its surroundings, which it has analysed first.

In Napoleon’s time, a division of 15-20,000 men occupied 3 square miles, today [[c. 1997]] a square with a side of 25 miles can be covered with that many men, and after another 20 years [[= 2017]] a side of 100 miles [[Someone who knows can send me an email and I can add a note!!!]].

The united battle array is fragmented in several clashes in all the depth of space with or without the aid of armoured fighting vehicles/tanks, manoeuvring or falling with parachutes. There is also the erasure of the classical “line for the Front/Frontline”, the use of aeroplanes becomes very important, which opens up fronts in the enemy’s “Home Front”, and informs [[Base]] of to what extent penetration into space can go. Of course, air power is not enough for everything, and often all Arms/Branches of the Military must play a part or change parts/roles etc..

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One of the ambitions of the “new military revolution” is to erase the traditional boundaries between the three Arms/Branches of the Military with the help of modern informatics/I.T. and electronic communications systems and increased firepower.

Land targets can be hit by ships, land supports air (e.g. with land-air missiles), whereas the assistance of land operations by air has been going on for decades.

The marine and parachuter/parachutist symbolise the trend beyond the traditional demarcations between the three Arms/Branches of the Military. Likewise, re: helicopters incl. as flying armoured vehicles.

SO, today's perceptions of operationally using all the depth of space and whilst co-ordinating air, land and sea forces = a meta-development of strategic plans of the Interwar Period and WW2.

Of course, there have been great increases in range, firepower, collecting (often from very far away) and disseminating information. A dense communication network is absolutely necessary.

American Admiral William Owens called “system of systems”, the full covering of a square with a side of 200 miles incl. the recording of signs/signals acoustically and optically, as well as thermically/thermally.

Obviously, technical infrastructure is needed in place in order to make

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decentralisation possible. This brings to our attention certain weak points in the “new military revolution”, as we shall later see.

With all the technology etc. it is less likely or impossible for there to be the old “war-mongering” general, because now the emphasis is on professionalism and on specialisation in violence, just as there is specialisation in tax matters.

This is particularly the case in information gathering and logistics. Something like Western society having a larger “service” industry than in the past, with a drop in numbers of old style soldiers like there has been a drop in workers in “production”.

All this adds to showing that war remains the continuation of [[primarily objective]] politics [[e.g. women in front-line combat, transsexuals, etc. in the Army etc. because of subjective politics/ideology based on objective political conditions.]]

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There is a tendency for the hierarchies in the army like in society to get smaller/ shorter in the middle so that the pinnacle approaches the base, and now with the appearance of webs of teams etc..

De-centralisation will stop, like in the past, whether a dictatorship, oligarchy or constitutional parliamentary democracy, before the top of the pyramid, i.e. **the upper echelons of the political-military regime make the telling decisions re: general strategy and war plans etc. [[will always exist, regardless of polity]]**.

It doesn't matter whether the regime is parliamentary or Caesarian, the top of the hierarchy decides re: crucial war matters.

Of course, there are more general political criteria taken into consideration as well as military capacity etc..

The logic of weapons systems is such that defensive intent at the political level might in some instances only be achieved by an offensive/attacking strategy militarily.

Of course, the problem of the First/Preventive Strike is as old as the history of war.

But the existence of precision weapons makes the question of the First Preventative Strike pressing, existential.

This was understood from the time of the construction of the first intercontinental atomic missiles.

Whoever has them, is at a great advantage and the side on defence without them is more or less stuffed.

The attacker will strike at the enemy's information centres and

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communication systems, and without those system no advanced technology weapons will be able to be used.

The more advanced the weapons technology, the more vulnerable one becomes, as we shall later see – for as long as one is on the defensive.

[[No wonder there's so much media attention re: Russian S-400, S-500 etc. as counteracting offensive Strike Power...]]

It is no surprise e.g. that Handel would maintain that with advanced weapons technology of the “new military revolution”, Clausewitz’s position that the strongest form of war is defence has been put out of date.

But we have seen Clausewitz’s position on this matter never had the most supporters either in WW1 (See Excursus B and add Miller, v. Evera) or WW2, though in **the Interwar period, Liddell Hart thought of a defensive strategy based on tanks/armoured fighting vehicles.**

Due to the nature of modern weapons systems, defence in essence means attack/offence and vice versa, so the boundaries between war and peace are effaced and the distinction between defensive and offensive wars, which never was binding in International Law, becomes academic and philological.

2. The utopia of a pure/unmixed technological war

Already from [[Francis]] Bacon’s Atlantis there was technocratic and utopian thought in that Nature had to be subjugated to technique/technology;

the Marxist classless society would provide to people the development of the productive forces, which would efface forever the shortage of goods,

and today's Western Promises in essence say that the united world market will do what the communistic regimes did not do: on the basis of continual technological progress, secure the general prosperity by tying together at the same time nations and races in one

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panhuman community (see my article: "Blühende Geistesgeschäfte" [[to be translated into English in 2018 or 2019 from the book *The Political in the 20th century*]] [[*HOW FUCKING RETARDED OR SIMPLY OVER THE TOP GREEDY AND DELUSIONAL ARE THESE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE SUCH TOTAL BULLSHIT????!! There must be some kind of Evolutionary Missing Link, particularly amongst a certain group of Tribal Warriors!!!*]])

In its peace-loving version, utopian-like thought intersects today with the fetishism re: technique/technology through the expectation of the technicisation of war, generalised universally, so that war can be a series of calculations on an electronic board, *whereby the inferior, seeing that his defeat is night, abandons the confrontation without suffering defeat with practical confirmation*, which an experienced chess player does for instance from about the middle of the game of chess.

Or, there will be clean surgical wars because of technology, with few human losses since the foe will be quickly and effectively disarmed.

All this RUBBISH in thought presupposes that the "good", and not the "evil", will have the most advanced weapons and = *wet dreams in today's western euphoria [[1990s]]*.

There is no such thing as a technologically perfect war, without “friction”, i.e. without no divergence between the strategic plan or vision and the reality of war.

For Clausewitz, “friction” would only be excluded in a “pure/unmixed” war, where all the animate and inanimate forces of the foes would be used in one and only concentrated act of war without pauses.

Since that is impossible in a war between complex societies, “friction” is the indispensable aftereffect

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of every real war – and the concept of “pure/unmixed” war helps us understand the texture of real war, it pushes us e contrario towards the phenomenology and aetiology of “friction”.

The one and only wipeout of the foe = strategic ideal, but reality is multifarious, with many forms of war and various causes/reasons.

The historical circumstances are of course many and varied, imponderable and unforeseeable, as are the forms of war.

The causes of/reasons for war:

- 1) anthropologically given
- 2) socio-political
- 3) coincidental/chance (whereby “coincidence” means the obstructional or helpful intersection of a chain of causes and results/effects, whose existence we

ignore or see as indifferent vis-a-vis that causal chain we want to put together with our acts).

These three causes of friction have acted in many different ways in all historical wars until today, and there is not the slightest reason to believe they will stop acting in a war technicised in the sense of the “new military revolution”.

These three causes appear in all wars.

So, we need to view them re: highly technicised war.

There are four points:

- 1) the inevitable existence of gaps in information**
- 2) the need for the analysis and use of information during and leading up to war**
- 3) the elimination of advanced technology by advanced technology**
- 4) the elimination of advanced technology by more or less inferior technology.**

When technology becomes a Religion, it is inevitable it will be viewed like a God, and all sorts of Wet Dreams will abound. For we know that satellite technology does not cover and clearly see everything.

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There are even meteorological issues.

The use of satellites also presupposes domination of air space, and the Americans may not always have it so easy, for instance, as in the case of Bosnia.

There's also a gap in time from collecting data from satellites and their use in aiming weapons (Gulf War – up to two weeks) [[not sure what all this means in terms of today's technology]].

Also, no recognizance/recognition system could locate the Somali resistance leader whilst Mogadishu was under American occupation in 1992, neither in Iraq in 1991, which was already paralysed military, could the hidden bases for the launching of missiles be found, nor could the fairly primitive Scud missiles be tracked 100% all of the time. Then there are human errors etc. as well (Postol).

In regard to 2) above, as we have said, the path from the information material to commands to weapons systems is at times longer

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than what many think.

There's also another problem. *Information of itself does not give a criterion of orientation in the plethora of information, especially when time presses etc..*

Nor does information/I.T. from satellites etc. tell us about the morale or intentions of the enemy, the quality and conditions of his weapons.

In such cases, there needs to be checking of information from other sources etc..

And, of course, there is the production of misleading information by the enemy, which could have all sorts of repercussions. **In all such cases of weighing up and judging the quality of the information, Clausewitz's "tact of judgement" still fully applies.**

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There are also a whole range of other problems with collecting information in various situations, some of which are referred to by P.K..

In relation to 3): where the “new military revolution” in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia was applied, the gap between advanced technology and the enemy was massive and decisive. An omnipotent Goliath executed in cold blood a David stuck to the ground. *One should not rush to universalistic conclusions.* **In the future, other foes might be much better equipped, incl. technologically,** and then the matter is not one of technology, **but of politics.**

Kondylis refers to Munro and electromagnetic energy etc..

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P.K. refers to the fact that most information can be intercepted by the other side, the enemy, in any event.

The technological advantages the USA has today [[1997]] won't necessarily be at all around tomorrow.

And even if one is in command in space, one cannot at all guarantee that one is not vulnerable to weapons on earth.

So, we come to 4) and note that never in any era has more advanced weaponry made older weapons totally useless.

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Neither arrows, nor guns and cannons, nor nuclear weapons have ever been able to replace the simple knife, and in e.g. commando attacks/offens(iv)es etc. the knife is much more useful than nuclear weapons.

There are therefore many reasons to see that there will never be a utopia of pure technological warfare, esp. if older weapons can destroy the information, communications etc. of the typical weapons of the “new military revolution”.

One and only nuclear explosion... can render a lot of advanced technology useless... and even older than nuclear weapons or other weapons which can paralyse or blind the foe can also cause a lot of strife for the bearer of advanced technology... See Géré and Mathey.

And even today, technological microsystems (cruise missiles) can relatively easily strike military

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megasystems like aircraft carriers. *There are also other options to attack such as vehicles firing high technology weapons, or the relatively cheap conversion of older weapons into “smart” weapons, etc., etc., etc..*

None of the above means that the latest, post-nuclear technology and the “new military revolution” will not bring about significant and potentially drastic changes to the conduct of future wars.

Yet the concepts of the classical theory of war remain completely in force and relevant, i.e. war will continue to be characterised by the phenomenon of “friction”. and will remain “the field of coincidence”; and in terms of practice. war will always be “chameleon” as it cannot fit into any pure/clean schema of technology and utopia, and will move at many levels. incl. “primitive” and “super-modern” elements. *Neither are two combatants the same, nor the historical circumstances absolutely the same.*

In abstracto, it seems there is no need for mass armies, and all that is needed is well equipped and well trained “Rambos” with the latest technology and information and air cover etc..

Yet such professional armies cannot have numbers below a certain level, which is not that low, so they will remain fairly large armies of more or less hundreds of thousands

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if they want to be ready to fight effectively.

The occupation of enemy land etc. will always require a large number of soldiers.

For even the complete domination of the skies does not necessarily mean victory in the sense of the complete inability of the foe to put up resistance.

In Bosnia, after air dominance, there had to be soldiers on the ground incl. motor-powered to secure victory/peace.

In Iraq, infantry was used on a mass scale, despite the advanced technology, and most of the 3000 aeroplanes bombing Iraq were of 1960s and 1970s technology, and with 1950s technology bombs.

And the military undertakings ended in fairly traditional fashion with a circular manoeuvre and the pitiless slaughter of trapped Iraqi troops on the ground and from the air (there were more than 100,000 victims of the slaughter which were not covered by the usually very loud-mouthed, babbling Western television networks, and it would seem by the TV coverage that no more than 200 died during the Gulf War).

And never forget: behind every machine and technology/technique no matter how refined there is a person. And the functioning of advanced technology requires a whole lot of infrastructure...

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War, like the economy, politics, religion and art is of its essence a relation of people.

From an anthropological point of view, the purpose of high/advanced technology is to form a human relation whereby the foe is kept as far away as possible and is neutralised before he bridges the distance.

Because if he makes it across, then the knife might be the most useful weapon.

And technology will NEVER be able to exclude political and psychological factors and influences.

The overall correlation of forces incl. the “ethical magnitudes or magnitudes of morale” as well, of which Clausewitz spoke in rejecting the geometric perception of war. The same arguments fully apply today against the utopia of pure/unmixed technological war.

3. The multiformity of war and its political aetiology

In this context re: war, “political” [[as/qua social]] does not mean in opposition to “economic” or “ideological” causes/reasons, but that **war is the continuation of politics as the general character of political subjects**, whether they are states, or movements and teams, whether within a nation or internationally.

The general character of a political subject constitutes a resultant of many factors (economic, national, historical, ideological, political in the narrower sense etc.).

Now, the necessary correlation between the multiformity of wars and the multifarious character of political subjects does not mean wars are waged because the character of political subjects differs

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and that wars will cease once political subjects become homogenous !!!!

That is a **patently ABSURD** argument, because if all political subjects were homogenous as imperialistic and anti-democratic there is no reason to believe there would be no wars, just as if they were democracies of a western kind [[and we all know that “democracies”/parliamentary regimes wage war too]] (see my article: “Ein so schlimmes Spiel” [[to be translated into English in 2018 or 2019, “God Willing”]]; cf. Gowa and Faber-Gowa).

Just as there are many forms of political subjects, there are many forms of war,

and there are also many causes of/reasons for the outbreak of war, varying from epoch to epoch and case to case,

so that there is no way to work out any laws for the cause(s) of wars in general as fixed chains of causes and results of causes.

Even if one could produce a table of the causes of all the world’s wars, they would be hierarchised, interrelated and would act differently in every case.

Wars don't have one clear-cut, unmistakable cause, nor can they be "cured" as in the case of treating an illness.

The liberal [[ideologically]] politicians and economists, who, despite the continual factual falsifications of the last three centuries, continue to purport that trade will replace war, and as a result make a tremendous logical and historical mistake. [[How fucking Retarded are these people, who

think they are so sophisticated?!!!]]

ONLY he who supports an economic determinism, i.e. who attributes wars to economic competition only, will logically believe that economic co-operation would abolish wars.

On this crucial point, as well as on others, economic liberalism is just another form of vulgar Marxism with reversed signs/symbolism.

After 1989 and the armed conflict in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, many said that the threat of a nuclear holocaust was succeeded by the reality of many smaller national wars and that the two kinds/forms of war cannot co-exist.

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Nothing could be further from the truth. After 1945, there were 146 wars with more than 30 million dead. Between about three quarters and four fifths of those dead were civilian non-combatants.

Europe enjoyed the peace of nuclear terror, whilst in Asia, Africa and Latin America there were anti-colonial wars and wars of national liberation, as well as civil wars, racial and national wars (e.g. between China and India, India and Pakistan, Israel and Arabs).

There were a whole range of wars, from wars where the combatants were at roughly the same technological etc. levels (e.g. Iran and Iraq) or where the differences were huge (e.g. USA and Vietnam).

The planetary phase of human history commenced when the colonial expansion of Europe brought nations which were slowly entering the industrial era against pre-industrial nations.

In the 19th century and first half of the 20th century, whilst in Europe the major Powers had mass armies and the latest weapons and military means, outside of Europe, these same Powers conducted campaigns and wars of another form.

In today's planetary conjuncture, there are no notable/distinguished major or regional Powers which have not to a or b degree stepped over the threshold of the second, but also the third industrial revolution.

The divergence though between them is still significant, which affects their military possibilities and strategic plans.

Any search for one and only strategic model for the 21st century, or at least for the next few decades = pointless, in vain. The Gulf War and other wars of recent times cannot be a source for general and binding strategic teachings.

All that one can do is observe the technical possibilities of newly designed and in practice until today untried weapons systems.

As the continuation of politics, the war of the future will take

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various forms in expressing the (inimical) relations of various political subjects.

Today's [[1997]] planetary conjuncture is not defined/determined by the equilibrium of three, four or five more or less equal/equivalent (ἰσοσθενεῖς = covalent) poles, i.e. major spaces around an equal number of major Powers, but the characteristic and in practice decisive feature is the undoubted supremacy of one and only one great Power, which does not limit itself to its own major space, but finds itself or intervenes or would like to intervene at every point on the globe.

The hegemony of this Power, i.e. of the USA, is directly exercised in the most developed regions of the world, in Europe and in Japan, where no political-military decision of substance is taken without the approval of the USA, and where also significant economic matters, e.g. international trade, is regulated under its pressure and dictates.

In this hierarchy in the upper levels are Powers which in the future would like to compete with the USA (Eurasian Russia, China, perhaps India), and upcoming regional Powers also exist (Turkey, Iran, Brazil), and in the lower rungs are nation-states or states with fluid internal composition and a correspondingly fluid political and military activity (especially on the African continent).

For as long as Europe dominated the world through their colonial empires, the contrasts, clashes and conflicts between the great European Powers constituted the axis around which the rest of the planet would group itself in accordance with the friend-foe relation.

The clash of the two protagonists of the Cold War was also such an axis, or a criterion for the grouping of friends and foes on a planetary scale.

If with the end of the Cold War something changed, it is that an axis with a similar function has been eclipsed (this is what is probably meant by those who talk rather stupidly of a multi-polar world today), whereby the world regime of international relations appears to be “anarchical” [[Obviously, a reference to the great Australian, Hedley Bull]].

It would cease being anarchical if we assumed the world would (once again) become bipolar or (really) multi-polar, if i.e. hegemonic Powers safeguarded peace within their corresponding major spaces, with the most likely result, of course, of the military and other clashes *between* those Powers being much more acute.

For as long the planetary field is not arranged thus, the one and

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only really planetary Power, the USA will, at least potentially, be omnipresent UNLESS internal factors paralyse it [[THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING POINT AS TO E.G. “DIVERSITY” and what such “diversity” might mean for Internal Political Cohesion and thus the ability to Act as a major interventionist Power...]].

The USA's first concern will be to constitute regional alliances which it will control and direct, either directly or by overseeing its proxies solving local and regional problems.

Behind e.g. the countries of ASEAN vis-a-vis the expansionist views of China, will be as ultimate guarantor, the diplomatic and military power of the planetary hegemonic Power, which if it wants to maintain this place/position as planetary hegemonic Power, will have to intervene as ultimate adjudicator in every major clash.

In this sense, it can be said that the planetarily crucial, or at any rate significant, wars of the immediate future will be American wars.

And since their extent, intensity and texture will vary, the hegemonic Power will be obliged to correspondingly escalate its military reactions or initiatives, giving its armed forces their duly elastic structuring.

Current [[mid 1990s]] American executive plans aim at the possibility of the simultaneous conducting of two wars of the magnitude of the 1991 Gulf War, as well as one further smaller deterrent intervention (Colson).

Such aims require the permanent support of fixed strategic forces placed at key points in continents and on oceans,

they require air superiority and the free movement of aircraft carriers and fleets,

and the ultimate safety valves/switches: ballistic nuclear weapons.

No rising Power will be able to doubt today's [[1997]] planetary hegemony of the USA, if it does not compete against it at all those levels – without of course that meaning that the USA won't or can't

meet with potential defeats in secondary theatres for as long as they hold their world hegemonic role

[[SO the question is can China (with Russia?) by about 2030 to 2050 be in a position to be more than a regional Hegemon? Kondylis of course, and rightly so, does not engage in any specific/concrete speculation as to who, when, how and what challenge will arise for the USA...]].

The doubting of the planetary hegemon does not necessarily mean that a new hegemon defeats head-on and replaces the old hegemon;

it could mean, more restrictedly, that the rising regional Power gradually constitutes around it a major space and forbids the planetary hegemonic Power from intervening in any way whatsoever in that space.

Something like that might be possible in the near(ish) future

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China in relation to South-East and central Asia

[[Kondylis does not give a time frame, and his “nearish” could mean say within 50 years from 1997]].

The greater spectrum of cases a Power is in a position to face, the more it increases its specific weight in planetary politics. The narrower the spectrum, the more shrinks its significance to regional and local limits/boundaries.

That a hegemonic, but also an up and coming planetary Power, is obliged to have at its disposal the full scale/gambit of military capacity/force/potency/

power, from ballistic missiles to the forces of rapid development/unfolding (rapid development forces) [[?not sure of the technical term?]], it does not mean that in every war, in accordance with its specific/concrete texture, it would mobilise one only grade/gradation of this scale; **even in restricted clashes the use of nuclear weapons can become inevitable.**

The multiformity, the “chameleon” nature of the war phenomenon does not refer only to the totality of wars, but also to the inside(s)/internal space of every war separately.

If we formulate the hypothesis that a military conflict/clash breaks out between two great planetary Powers which equally possess the very latest in technology of the “new military revolution” and the corresponding structure in the sector of informatics/I.T., we can imagine in principle that war would be waged essentially at that level e.g. in space and in/on the ocean with the use of automated air means and ships on the surface of the sea and submarines.

What would happen if both the combatants already in the initial phases of the conflict were able to neutralise on both sides the satellites and other recognizance systems (of recognition) and communications systems, such that the clash would come to a dead end?

There are two possibilities:

either they would step back/retreat/become conciliatory in a situation of terror of nuclear balancing/equilibrium, so that even if they did not immediately use the nuclear weapons, at any rate, again they would have recourse to them as ultima ratio – or they would get involved in a necessarily long, drawn-out conventional war until the end or mutual destruction/exhausting; the threat of using nuclear weapons could even be used and could have an effect after the (relative) exhausting of the one side in such a conventional war.

**Whatever the case may be, the “chameleonic” metamorphosis/
transformation of any kind of war, even the technologically most advanced,
from its initial strategic conception is inherent and very possible.**

Wars between great Powers with highly advanced military technology remain of course essentially impossible for as long as today's

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planetary hegemony of the USA lasts

[[which of course means e contrario that such hegemony one day will end, and of course P.K. does NOT give any time frame, though *PPatCW* and/or, if I'm not mistaken, one of P.K.'s articles in *The Political in the 20th century* implies during the course of the 21st century if China remains a centralised state]];

as we have pointed out, this hegemony is exercised in one sense more directly precisely in economically more developed regions of the world, i.e. in Europe and Japan.

Of far greater practical interest for the foreseeable future are two other cases:

the clashes/conflicts of the planetary Superpower on the one hand, with small and, on the other hand, with middle and major Powers, especially in connection and interrelation with two burning issues: **the issue of terrorism and that of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.**

The general criterion for the distinction between small and middle or major Powers is, obviously, the geopolitical, demographic and economic capacity/potency/dynamics/power/force on each and every respective occasion.

More specifically and on a narrower basis, we shall look at the matter of competition and future wars between Powers re: the possession or not of ballistic missiles (with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads).

The ability of a Power to strike any point on the planet is crucial when planetary politics has become so dense/thick as in our days;

because one essential part of a unified globe is the ability of a number of Powers to strike with military means everyone or many [[countries]].

In regard to the relationship of middle and major Powers with the planetarily hegemonic Power, schematically speaking, the dispersal/proliferation of ballistic missiles, and in particular nuclear weapons, appears to be central, whereas the small Powers do not seem to be able to strike the hegemonic Power on its own home turf with means, re: what is available today, other than terrorism.

A great planetary Power does not have any reason to have recourse to terroristic acts or to minor acts of sabotage/damaging infrastructure, property etc..

Whoever can bomb, (almost) without being hampered, military targets and entire regions, does not need the restricted means of terrorism in order to do damage or to overawe/intimidate the civilian population.

But the weak or just less powerful, i.e. not only small but also at times even middle Powers, will need the means of terrorism etc..

A general goal of every combatant is for the clash/conflict/battle to be conducted on that field where he himself has the advantage or at least is not behind or below the other side(s).

SO necessarily less technologically advanced countries are going to try and draw more technologically advanced countries into wars at their own less technologically advanced level/more “primitive” forms of war.

High/Advanced technology, giving the possibility of annihilation of the foe/enemy from a greater distance and in that way lessening (significantly) the losses of this advanced technology's possessor, provides Western governments in particular the political advantage **that public opinion is placated to a degree which as a rule is not willing to make sacrifices in faraway countries/lands and for purposes foreign to its own concerns and cares.**

[[**WHAT THE FUCK DOES THAT MEAN? HAHHAHAHA!!!**]]

Contrarily, the side which is technologically subordinate seeks the lessening of the distance, if possible, so that battle can be face to face, hand to hand, man to man, which will allow bringing about greater casualties of the foe and make things difficult from a political point of view.

So, we come back to the earlier ascertainment that latest technology weapons. no matter how advanced, never render old weapons totally useless, even the oldest of weapons. *The suitability of a weapon is determined by the situation, and the advantage is gained for him who puts the foe in a situation where his weapons are more suitable than the enemy's weapons.*

In the event of armed conflict/clash between a world hegemonic Power and one up and coming middle or major Power, the crucial question is: can the latter, even if it had no prospects of prevailing in an all-out struggle against the former, nonetheless bring about so many casualties and losses such that that will have a deterrent effect?

And since the most painful casualties would occur obviously on the home turf of the world hegemonic Power amongst civilians, the question is concretised as follows: ***can a middle or major Power strike with ballistic missiles and nuclear and other warheads the world hegemonic Power at its very own base?***

The course of planetary politics will be substantially influenced by the answer which the future will give to this question.

[[All this means that if China remains a centralised state with its population more or less under control, the USA is going to have to concede more and more territory in Asia, and perhaps even further afield, as the century moves on, unless of course the USA gains an extreme advantage in technology and or strikes first decisively to cripple China – which of course we can't know for sure... one way or another... all that matters, is what Reality is...]]

As to how dramatic would a change be at this level, the head of the Indian General Staff alluded, when asked about the Gulf War. His answer: **“do not ever wage war against the USA if you don't have atomic weapons”** (in Delmas).

So, the key for an up and coming middle or major Power to be able to compete militarily-politically is to possess atomic weapons and ballistic missiles of the required range, even though other Powers have an overall economic and military capacity/potency much greater.

The advantage of possessing atomic weapons and ballistic missiles of the required range is that it's much easier and cheaper than having conventional armed forces with

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modern technology and education/training in all grades/gradations. Also, atomic weapons etc. can be used without mobilising the entirety of the armed forces as well as their deterrent effect even after a defeat, whereas conventional weapons are not in the position to bring about significant casualties to a foe even after defeat (Posen).

How true and bloody bleeding obvious all that is, we can see from how the USA reacts to attempts to obtain atomic weapons (and long-range ballistic missiles) by non-friendly countries.

Such reactions are the result of power claims without a stable logical or ethical basis, since it is neither logical or ethical to deny to others the right which you self-evidently reserve for yourself.

According to the universalism of “human rights”, which the USA proclaims along with their European hangers-on, all people have the same rights, because all people have as of birth the same dignity and all equally take part in Reason (rationality).

[[ABSOLUTELY FUCKING HILARIOUS STUFF!!!]]

Starting from that universal principle, one cannot argue that the Western Powers or Israel have the right to possess nuclear weapons, because they are by definition in a position to use them “rationally”, whereas Iraq and Iran are denied such a right because it is from the very beginning certain they won’t make “rational” use of such weapons.

Of course, no nuclear Power with planetary or just regional ambitions has ever suggested there be a universal/catholic renunciation and abandonment of nuclear weapons.

Because renunciation or abandonment by today's atomic Powers of their advantage would entail the risk/danger of becoming later captive to atomic blackmail by Powers with much smaller military and economic capacity/powers/potency. One cannot expect any complete nuclear disarmament ever.

However, the potential for the proliferation of nuclear or roughly equivalent/covalent weapons is very probable, because it arises from the very character of world politics and technological developments.

As to political developments, we must stress that today's world [[1997]] is not multi-polar, that is, grouped around basically equivalent/covalent poles, but climaxes in a pyramid whose highest gradation is occupied by one hegemonic Power, whereas other higher positions are occupied by up and coming major Powers with widening ambitions.

All these Powers, but especially the hegemonic Power, seek regional allies, wanting to use them, case by case or as the case may be or comes about, as conduits/ducts/channels of influence or as surrogates/regional governors-representatives with policing responsibilities.

They equip them accordingly, and give them on occasion the opportunity to construct, over the medium term at least, atomic weapons. They certainly make them participate in advanced weapons technology.

Regional Powers even have the opportunity from the free market of obtaining many kinds of weapons, up to nuclear weapons, which any middle of the road industrial country is now in the position to construct (Reiss).

See Garrity re: prestige etc. of having nuclear weapons.

Thanks to the Third Industrial Revolution and the progressive merging of military and civilian technology, the obtaining of nuclear weapons and other high/advanced military technicisation more generally is made all the easier. See Samuels.

And countries at lower levels of development without the ability to obtain nuclear weapons can still do damage to the planetary hegemon e.g. via chemical and biological priming/charging which under

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certain conditions can bring about as many casualties as nuclear weapons (Fetter; cf. Carus).

Thus, the problem shifts from the possession of nuclear weapons to the possession of long-range ballistic missiles.

The USA foresees that apart from China, no Power will be able to strike the USA with ballistic missiles until about 2010 (Lewi Hua-Di re: China's ballistic missile programmes) [[don't know if it turned out that way or not]].

But today, already 35 non-NATO countries have ballistic missiles of a shorter range, and 18 can arm them with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads (67 non-NATO countries have cruise missiles, mostly short-range. Argentina sunk two British war ships with French cruise missiles in the Falklands wars

[[this is obviously P.K.'s humour in referring to ancient European enemies in an Age when Europe is not even a Shadow of its Old Self, and will never ever be so again!!!]]

So, the development of anti-missile technology is crucial, esp. for the USA [[and we know that Russia seems to be doing a fairly good job of such technology of late – at least that is what media reports seem to indicate, though I personally can't really know or be sure...]].

There are a whole lot of technical issues with such defence systems incl. trying to neutralise missiles fired at you early on in their trajectory etc., or when they have warheads which break off etc..

Very likely so-called “surgical” wars, will only be able to take place when the “surgeon” is overwhelming more powerful. Otherwise, “surgical strikes” won’t be that simple or effective.

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Powers invoking “humanitarian” and “peacemaking” purposes for military interventions, could incur the wrath of terroristic acts coming from smaller Powers as the answer of the poor to the military might of the rich.

Any general definition of terrorism is on shaky conceptual ground, not only because of the plethora of forms and sources of terror, but because it is difficult to avoid anathema as a foe, or beautification as a friend.

Terrorism today is not possible as the attempted murders of individual/isolated persons, as was the case in the 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th century in Russia,

but also in the rest of Europe, and as it happened in part in the 1970s and 1980s in Germany and Italy.

All these cases were of small groups internally against the regime.

But if terrorist actions are directed by an external centre, and seek to do harm to a foreign Power, use can be made of highly technicised societies which at first glance are infinitely complicated, intertwined and fragmented, whereas in reality their functioning depends on relatively few energy and information centres.

That is why such societies as a whole are more vulnerable than any society of the past.

An official/officer of the American Forces Information Service [[I think that is what P.K. means, though I could be wrong]], recently said that with 1 billion dollars and 20 able hackers he could paralyse the USA (in Laqueur).

So potentially terrorists could bring a modern society to its knees.

Crucial nodes are not only

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electronic systems of every kind, but the large energy stations or the water reservoirs, which easily can be contaminated with viruses.

There's also the potential use of chemical and biological means, and with 30 kilos of anthrax, 30,000 people can be killed.

P.K. in 1997 refers to small countries who want to engage in terrorism in developed countries having a lack of information [[though that c. 2018 seems to have changed with the mass Mohammedan etc. influx into the West]], **and it is noted how easily, well-fed, relatively comfortable societies addicted to prosperity and security can be thrown into hysterics over any attacks etc..**

Again, P.K. says that imported terror won't be able to find a broad circle of sympathisers in the country to be attacked [[though that seems to have changed with the mass Mohammedan/African/Arab/Asian "elite and lobotomised/cretin-assisted invasions" or "humanitarian refugee influxes" into Europe]].

Guerrilla war is defined as the armed calling into question of a regime in power, whereas terrorism, as flashy as it is, is not in a position to seek regime change.

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The guerilla war, though, has lost its ground/basis for development because today's advanced societies are concentrated in cities etc., and this is more and more the case even in Asia and Latin America.

We have gone beyond the historical phase of national liberation and anti-colonial struggle.

The only hope for guerrilla war is if there is a pan-national movement against a foreign Power, or where there is no resistance because the internal regime has collapsed, but it can never prevail against an organised and unbroken, cohesive tactical army.

Because of worldwide urbanisation, there are possibilities of movements floating between terrorism and guerrilla warfare if they find support by broad sections of the populace (e.g. Algeria in the 1950s and today).

Mao's perception of guerrilla war has possibly died, but Lenin's lives on.

There are all sorts of clashes, conflicts, wars which can take place between middle or major Powers, and, middle or major Powers,

between middle or major, and, small Powers,

between small, and, small Powers.

The outcome of such armed conflicts will correlate with technological superiority or inferiority of one or the other side (see e.g. Klare).

but not only with technology.

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There are also factors of culture and the general ability of the masses to fight, their courage, heart etc. = traditional considerations.

There are many possibilities for amorphous wars, prolonged and wasteful in inanimate and animate material, if I may say so, as in the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s.

It's not just chaotic conflicts as in Afghanistan that the 21st century is faced with.

There are also possibilities of armed conflicts in circumstances of generalised anomie

[[of course we could add that the absolutely STUPID AND IRRESPONSIBLE SHORT-SIGHTED ELITE OF THE WEST SUCKING ?????? MON?EY C??? has brought the POTENTIAL FOR ANOMIE RIGHT INTO THE WEST WITH THE INVASIONS/WELCOMING OF HORDES OF INCOMPATIBLE MOHAMMEDANS, ARABS, ASIATICS AND AFRICANS ETC.]].

P.K. gives the example of whole regions of Colombia or in Russian cities, whereby there is something much worse than armed states waging war, which well-fed people living in cushy suburbs don't understand, and that is ANOMIE with all sorts of war-mad actors.

IN a world characterised by great inequalities in wealth, ecological crises and mass movements of populations, the vast proliferation of light weapons carried and used by one or two people, might

perhaps in the future be as significant as the proliferation of high/advanced military technology.

300 companies in 50 countries make light weapons today, and with them there could be massacres of people by the hundreds

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of thousands as occurred recently in Rawanda.

“Globalisation” will not be one-sided, as the greedy and selfish or naive supporters of it believe; it will not just be about monetary and investment projects or “human rights”, but it will be extended equally to *anomie*, to organised and unorganised crime, to the revenge of everyone against everyone

[[Remember the Zbigie article I referred to earlier and combine that with radical Mohammedans and Populist/Far-Right-Wingers et al. – GOOD LUCK WITH ALL OF THAT, RETARDS!!!]]

whereby the struggle between states and nations will be succeeded, at least in part, by the struggle of man against man.

Then the concept of “total war” will change as well.

It will not mean as in WW1 and WW2, the direct or indirect conscription and mobilisation of all the able population, either at the war front or at the home front for the production of weapons and war supplies, without, however, there definitely being an abolition of the distinction between combatants and civilians.

Exactly the opposite will be meant: since the weapons are produced relatively cheaply and quickly, and since the firepower increases continuously at all weaponry levels, there is no need to conscript masses for their production and proliferation. *But at the same time the legal monopoly of armed violence is lost, the boundaries between combatants and civilians are erased, between war and criminal act, between war and peace.* **And**

when the boundaries

**between war and peace are
lost, peace does not absorb
war: war gulps peace down,
and becomes “total” in the
most nightmarish sense of
the term.**

[[All I can say is that the knife, gun and acid attacks, mass, daily crime in London, Sweden, Paris, Belgium, Germany,... of late... and Mexico, Central and South America etc. (for decades now)... **DOES NOT BODE WELL**... P.K. is obviously referring to all of the 21st century and in 2018 we have not even entered the 3rd decade YET. **NOT LOOKING GOOD. NO GOOD. NO NOT GOOD.**]]

Summary Notes to be Done sometime in the Future... (in bold red):

Prologue **DONE**

Prologue to the Greek Edition **DONE**

1) ~~I. War and politics (with two digressions/excursus: II. ““Politicians” and “Soldiers””, and, III. “War of annihilation, total war, nuclear war”)~~ **DONE**

2) IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels (with a digression/excursus: V. “War and the Marxist-Leninist perception of history”)

3) VI. War and revolution: Lenin (with a digression/excursus: VII. “The Soviet military dogma”)

(The Chapters below are NOT in the German edition, but only in the Greek edition:)

4) ~~VIII. Hot war after the Cold War~~ **DONE**

a) ~~Classical theory of war and the “new military revolution”~~

b) ~~The utopia of purely technological war~~

c) ~~The multiformity of war and its political aetiology~~

5) IX. Addendum to the Greek edition: Geopolitical and strategic parameters of a Greco-Turkish war