



WAR AND POLITICS: CLAUSEWITZ'S POSITION*

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THE FATAL *FIRST FALSEHOOD* (*LIE, UNTRUTH*) of the predominant interpretation in respect of Clausewitz rests (is based) on the position that the concept of war, which is formulated (and expressed) at the beginning of his main work [*Vom Kriege = On War*], is something ideational and fictional or non-existent, an ideal type [[i.e. an ideal type as in ideal-like, perfect or pure type, and not as in a Weberian ideal type, cf. p. 9 below]] beyond reality, a purely theoretical perception/view or a fictitious (fantastical) construct(ion).¹ And because in this concept, inter alia, the

* The text is taken from the book *Theorie des Krieges. Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, Lenin*, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 11-32. [[translator's note: the text here corresponds with much, but not absolutely all (e.g. some of the (not insignificant explanatory passages in the) footnotes are omitted), of Ch. 1, Part 2 »„Reiner“ und „wirklicher“ Krieg in anthropologischer und kulturphilosophischer Sicht« (= “‘Pure’ and ‘real’ war from the anthropological point of view and from the point of view pertaining to the philosophy of culture”), and, the first 5 pages of the 21 pages of Ch. 1, Part 3 »Krieg und Politik oder Gewalt und Macht« (= “War and politics or violence and power”). I did not, by and large, consult the German text for this translation. That will be done, obviously, if I ever get around to translating the whole German book *Theorie des Krieges. Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, Lenin = Theory of War. Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, Lenin* in full.]]

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¹ In chronological order: H. Rothfels, *Carl von Clausewitz. Politik und Krieg*, Berlin 1920, p. 273; E. Kessel, »Zur Genesis der modernen Kriegslehre. Die Entstehungsgeschichte von Clausewitz' Buch *Vom Kriege*«, *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 3 (1953), pp. 405-423, esp. p. 410; G. Ritter, *Staatskunst und*

factor “violence” governs and rules (dominates), from the so-called abstract character of the concept of war, the abstract character of the same violence is deduced (inferred), and to the conceptual pair “abstract war-blind violence”, the conjugation, i.e. coupling, of real war and rational, that is, moderate political action, is contrasted. In other words: since unmoderated or unmitigated violence appears to be by definition the outflow, i.e. outcome (result, aftereffect, corollary) of the conceptual abstraction, for the whole field of reality, which really constitutes – according to Clausewitz – the field of politics, nothing remains but moderate action; and finally, this action is (co/inter)related with certain politicians (that is, non-military personnel/officers/soldiers/generals), perspicacious (perceptive) and responsible bearers, whose leadership position during the conducting and waging of war appears as a command drawn supposedly from the same theoretical ascertainment of the political character of war. Conversely, we shall prove below that Clausewitz’s concept regarding war does not refer to some abstract entity, to some *ens rationis*, but contains a reinforced reality,² which, precisely because it is reinforced, can be comprehended mentally and cognitively only by making an abstraction from the rest of reality; that the first and decisive moderation (mitigation) of extreme, conceptually pure or unmixed violence is due to factors entirely unrelated to the action and the intentions of any political and military dominating authority or power whatsoever, whilst being reduced, that is, to anthropological and cultural (civilisational) constants, whose effect remains independent of the will (volition) and the knowledge of governments and subjects; and that already for these reasons, ethical(moral)-normative statements or judgements do not have any place here: Clausewitz formulates and expresses practical principles (and

Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des »Militarismus« in Deutschland, 1, München 1954, p. 83; E. Weil, »Guerre et Politique selon Clausewitz«, *Revue Française de Science Politique* 5 (1955), pp. 291-314, esp. p. 298; R. Aron, *Penser la Guerre. Clausewitz*, I, Paris 1976, p. 121.

² (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): this is very close if not equivalent to Max Weber’s ideal type as reinforced or intensified reality highlighting the distinguishing features of a social phenomenon which can then be compared to both other (historical) social phenomena, and also to concrete reality, i.e. specific historical-social reality tied to time and place (the concrete situation).

again without ethical(moral)-normative intent) only just at a – in regard to theory – inferior level, where politics slips in (enters), in the sense of subjective acts and intentions, and wherever the contrast or opposition between war of annihilation and restricted (limited or confined) war, is analysed.

When Clausewitz defines war as an “act of violence, in order to force the opponent to execute or carry out our will (volition)” (I, 1 § 2 [[unless otherwise stated, all such references are to *Vom Kriege = On War*]]), he exclusively takes into account existential magnitudes (violence, opponent, will (volition), force (coercion, compulsion, constraint)), which are constant, and can be understood irrespective of very specific, concrete society, culture (civilisation) or politics, because, anyway, they (the said existential magnitudes) exist [[at least as potentiality]] in all of them (i.e. every concrete society, culture or politics). Whensoever Clausewitz also talks of war, he does not ever forget the elemental existential situation and elemental existential confrontation (conflict): the “element of rawness (cruelness)” (I, 1 § 3), the “hate/hatred” and the “enmity”, which “must be considered a blind impulse (drive, instinct)” (I, 1 § 28), the “unbridled element of enmity” (VIII, 6B), the “pure (unmixed) principle of enmity” (VIII, 2), the “authentic enmity” (VI, 8), the “discharging/unloading of enmity, of hate/hatred” (IV, 11), – these constitute the “authentic principle of war” (*Werke* X, p. 262). Even in more modern wars on a grand scale, which are not provoked or brought on by the personal hatred/hate of the individual against every foe, and in which, consequently, the “inimical feeling” is converted into “inimical intent”, “never is this psychical process (operation, activity, elaboration) absent (missing)”; violence (truculence, barbarism, viciousness), payback (retribution, reciprocation) and revenge beget one another, and the circle of their action is widened (broadened, extended or expanded) to the extent where they are connected with feelings like “ambition, passion or lust for power, dominance and authority, every kind of enthusiasm etc.”. All these are “human and or

animal/bestial – if we want to say it that way –, however, that’s how things stand”, Clausewitz adds dryly (curtly) (II, 2). As impersonal as the motives for wars may be, and as many metamorphoses (transformations) or idealisations the primordial (primal, primitive) feelings (emotions) of enmity can accept or accommodate, the voice of raw, naked nature is never muted (silenced) inside war. Struggle as direct and ultimate existential confrontation, as we see it when two people (men) fight body with body, i.e. man to man, or man against man (II, 1), constitutes the common source and the common denominator of all phenomena related to war; as Clausewitz says, “this and only this (i.e. struggle as direct and ultimate existential confrontation as exemplified by man-to-man combat) is the active principle inside that multifarious activity, which we call war in the wider (broadest) sense” (II, 1). It is true that on account of the complexity of a war between civilised/cultured³ peoples, its (war’s) inalienable (indefeasible) existential base or source is hidden and buried, we would say, and it no longer stands out, or strikes one, as obvious, with its presence being self-evident. And yet, its influence extends up to the longest intertwining(s) of the war (martial) phenomenon. Even (also) if the elemental desire of the warriors and fighters to fall (throw themselves) upon the foe and to extirpate (exterminate) him with their hands can no longer act like a pure/unmixed and autonomous factor inside the circumstances and conditions of contemporary complicated war, but rather must be connected with every kind of “political goals and terms and conditions”, passing, in this way, on to an “inferior fate” – nonetheless, it (the said elemental desire of ...) does not cease to constitute the “nerve”, which “moves the higher will/volition (IV, 8). The fact that now it constitutes “only” the nerve does not mean that it could be absent (missing) in

³ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): see the *Theory of War* – Summary Notes at www.panagiotiskondylis.com, for my – brief but hopefully insightful – discussion of what “(un)civilised/(un)cultured” meant in Clausewitz’s day and vis-à-vis Kondylisian theory overall, incl. e.g. “culture” as a social-ontological magnitude, as opposed to “culture” in Clausewitz’s sociological-historical sense (where, strictly speaking and at the level of “names” (words, terminology), the Prussian general is “wrong”, even though he is still making the most valid of points).

the case of war. This becomes most obvious in the central systematic use of the concept of battle (there) where Clausewitz expounds (the) matters of strategy and tactics (e.g. III, 1; VI, 30), by not omitting also again to comprehend the battle in regard to its existential core (nucleus), i.e. to denude (strip, undress) it from all its “modifications”, inside of which (“modifications”) it (the battle) appears according to, or depending on, all of its respective circumstances in regard to its commencement and development (evolution), and, thus, he (Clausewitz) reaches and comes to the ascertainment that after this “denuding”, “nothing but the naked concept of the battle remains leftover, that is to say, an amorphous struggle” (III, 8).

When Clausewitz makes the systematic starting point of his theory, the existential source –and at the same time, dimension– of war, he stresses something which in his eyes constitutes a commonplace (of course, a commonplace with weighty ((very) significant) consequences), only (and only) because some of his contemporary theoreticians (theorists) of war kept forgetting the elementary truth which is contained in this commonplace, [[exactly in]] the same [[way]] various present-day commentators on Clausewitz circumvent it (the said elementary truth) or downgrade/demote (degrade) it. The tracing (tracking (down)) of the above-mentioned existential magnitudes, if possible (if it can be done), in a situation of chemical purity simply means that without these (existential magnitudes), in a nutshell, without enmity, war is neither conceivable (imaginable, thinkable), nor possible. Everything else –organisation, being armed and getting equipped, etc.– can be subtracted (taken away, removed, deducted) from war as an existential confrontation, not however enmity too. To this is added, of course, also a second precondition (prerequisite, presupposition): enmity must get (build up) to such intensity that it does not become overwhelmed by cowardice and pusillanimity in the face of or before the use of extreme violence –and violence

reaches its extreme intensification (heightening) with the killing of the other (another); it cannot go any further. Without killing on account of enmity, war does not exist (although, it goes without saying, private murder on account of private enmity does not constitute war⁴). When, therefore, Clausewitz declares/ states that inside the “philosophy” of war (i.e. in the theoretical comprehension (grasping) of war, irrespective of its each and every respective form), the principle of “moderation (mitigation)” cannot penetrate without the carrying out of an absurdity (absurdness, paralogism) (I, 1 § 3), then simply he wants to express something self-evident, that is to say, wherever there is enmity and extreme violence climaxing in the killing of the other (another), there, there can be not talk of war. The lack or absence of “moderation/mitigation” in war, has no relation(ship) with the character of war, with the fact, that is to say, that the war is a war of annihilation and is not restricted (limited or confined); as long as *war* is taking place. Because violence reaches its zenith, even also in a (very) restricted war, during the moment when one and only one warrior or fighter kills a foe [[standing]] opposite or across from him. At this level of theory, the extent of the violence is not crucial and determinative, but rather of interest is only its (violence’s) intensity, as this climaxes in the killing of at least (or only also just) one individual. Whatever varies from war to war is not the degree of the intensity of the violence, which, anyhow, cannot go beyond the killing of the other (another), but rather its (violence’s) concentrated and incessant

⁴ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): Whilst no express definition of war is given **by P.K.** (unless I’m mistaken), various passages in *Theory of War* (more than) suggest that war is any deliberate, intended violence between a person or persons belonging to a group or groups in order to cause physical and other damage up to (and *necessarily* including) death to at least one person of the other, inimical side/group, with the intention that the other side/group (the foe/enemy) submits to the will of one’s own group, and that the forms of war are very many, from gang war, urban terrorism and civil war, to trench-warfare, guerrilla war, pre-emptive war, nuclear war, restricted war, war of annihilation, etc.. Wars – no matter whether the “excuse or pretence” of war is the Abduction of Helen, or the Rape of Women, or Offending one’s nation and or religion etc. – invariably have to do with geopolitical and or economic causes and reasons (control of territory as a matter of security and or hegemony, domination,... but also incl. for economic activity, and power (power relations, the correlation of forces, the balance of power, etc.) vis-à-vis other Powers) – no matter how complicated and intertwined (overlapping and indistinguishable) such causes/reasons can get. Of course, underlying the geopolitical and or economic causes of war, is man’s potential for violence and man’s various forms of non-violent conflict in society, since society (according to the historical evidence) has never simply ever been only just co-operation.

(uninterrupted) use, that is, the ability or the disposition of those waging war (warring, being belligerent) to not do anything else during (the duration of) the war apart from exercising violence. Obviously, two existences or small groups hating each other are in a position to do this, however the difficulties increase as the size of the army and of the war increases, as we shall explain immediately. From now, at any rate, we must retain (keep in mind) that moderation (mitigation) *in a state (situation) of war* is not the equivalent of stopping or coming to a standstill before the highest steps on the scale of violence, but with a more or less brief, more or less, non-continuous staying (as in standing and remaining) on them (the said steps). Without the extreme violence of the killing of the other (another), war does not exist. And just as this climax(ing) of violence exists also in moderated/mitigated or restricted (limited or confined) war, so too every real war, irrespective of its intensity, encircles the concept of war, that is to say, it (every real war) is not separated from this concept (of war as violence and killing) with (i.e. by means of) [[or as in the case of]] that chasm which separates something simply ideational from something real.

So, the definition of war is not the opposite of its (war's) reality, but rather [[the definition of war is]] only the conceptual isolation and condensation of the existential factors, which provoke or bring it (war) about, and at the same time, constitute its core (nucleus). Clausewitz himself prefaces his definition by declaring (stating) that he desires to start "casting a glance towards (having a look at) the essence of the whole thing", that is, to directly penetrate (permeate, infiltrate) an area deeper than the accidental occurrences (happenings, incidents, events, accidents) of the historical reality of wars, and adds that here you must, "more than anywhere else, together with the part, always at the same time think about and contemplate the whole too" (I, 1 § 1); this obviously means that the whole (or the essence) exists inside/within every part (i.e. in every historical form of its appearance), and is inseparable from this. Clausewitz does not at all

here have in mind a fictitious construct or an abstraction in the sense of the simple ens rationis. What can he, therefore, mean, when he talks of an “abstraction” and of an “abstract” or “ideational” war (I, 1 § 6)? First of all, we must of course remind ourselves that he (Clausewitz) does not use those terms exclusively or in accordance with his preference, but parallelly with other terms, equivalent (terms), like the “simple”, “pure or unmixed” or “initial” concept of war (I, 1 § 6; I, 2). Already, therefore, inside his groping and vacillating (fluctuating) terminology, the intention to synopsis within the concept of war, certain distinguishing, distinctive, ultimate and pure or unmixed elements of the reality of war, appears (emerges, pops (crops) up, looms on the horizon). However, these elements can be comprehended (grasped) in their pure situation only when their separation is realised, that is, their abstraction, from other elements, which are equally real and are mixed necessarily with the first/former elements inside the womb/bosom of (within) a multi-sided reality. In other words, the definition of war is abstract because it is formed inside a process (operation, elaboration, activity) of segregation (separation), an abstractive process, and not because he (Clausewitz) himself refers to something abstract, except if we want to assume that every real thing becomes abstract(ed) if we segregate or separate it from the rest of reality; but then equally (just as) abstract(ed) as also the pure or unmixed concept of war, would also be a conceptual comprehension of social-political reality, which would ignore war as a real magnitude inside history. To say/put it differently: abstraction inside the concept of war is constituted by or consists in the fact that during the methodologically self-evident search for the distinctive/distinguishing features (differentia specifica) of war, initially the factors are left outside which obstruct or hamper (impede) the perpetuation and the omnipresence of enmity and of extreme violence, i.e. of the distinctive and distinguishing features of war (precisely since war too, for its part, does not allow the unobstructed and continual predominance/prevaling of the above-mentioned factors inside

social-political life) – and not by or in the fact that enmity and the related and subsequent extreme violence simply constitute fictitious constructs. If they were such (fictitious constructs), then we would not need *real* obstacles (impediments) in order to bridle them and keep them in check. So, their abstract character inside the framework of the definition of war does not concern their ontological texture (composition or nature), but rather the possibility of their incontinent (intemperate) influence (or their influence which cannot be held back) inside complex/complicated social constructs: because the abstraction took place precisely in relation to all the factors preventing such an influence. Since, through abstraction, the – in terms of distinctiveness and distinguishing nature – (inter/cor)related with war, real factors are discovered, and since abstraction brings out, discloses and displays the existential core (nucleus) of the war phenomenon, before our eyes, not a fictitious construct, but an ideal-typical conception is formed of a “reinforced reality”, to recall M. Weber. The *ideal type* [[as in a Weberian ideal type and not as in a kind of “perfect or pure” type/ens rationis beyond reality referred to on p. 1 above and elsewhere]], truly synopsis the authentic reality of war, whilst whatever is usually called the “reality of war” is nothing other than the reality of various wars in their singularity or uniqueness. If we become conscious of this once and for all, and we do not fall into the traps of language, then we shall not regard the ideal type as a fictitious construct, and the scattered aspects or facets of war as “the” reality; we shall understand, in other words, that “reality” can be comprehended only with ideal-typical abstraction –if and since or when (provided that) it is possible to be comprehended (grasped).

The essential theoretical problem, therefore, is not for us to contrast or contradistinguish “reality” to/with a conceptual fictitious construct, but to name the real factors, which, of course, neither efface (obliterate or eliminate), nor soften (soothe, relieve) enmity and extreme violence, yet [[still]] do not let them become continual and catholic (universal and general). The issue/matter, that is

to say, is that the reasons be explained which render necessary the mix(ing)/mixture of different levels of the same human and historical-social reality; let it be observed here that, if our starting point is something ideational, i.e. the concept of war, we did not choose it because it has within it less reality, but rather most simply because the matter is war; if the topic (matter, theme) is peace, for instance, then the author, since he would follow the same method, would start with the ideational essence, i.e. from the concept of peace, in order to explain thereafter why until today peace in the world did not stand (= exist), i.e. was not ever continuous and catholic (i.e. universal and general). Precisely the real content of the “abstract” or the “pure/unmixed” concept of war comes to us graphically and vividly to our memory when Clausewitz names this same concept also “initial”, meaning that in the first phases of human history, in “uncivilised⁵ peoples”, the real conduct(ing) and waging of war, and the concept of war (continual and catholic/universal/general exercising of extreme violence up to the annihilation of the foe) were identical (equivalent). The fundamental – and until now unobserved– role which the (standardised-typified(i.e. rendered into types)) contrast and opposition between the war of “uncivilised and uncultured” (peoples) and that (war) of “civilised and cultured” peoples plays in Clausewitz’s syllogistic reasoning (I, 1 § § 3, 23; I, 3; IV, 3), leaves no doubt as to the fact that the transition from abstract pure or unmixed war, to real wars, ought not be understood as the transition from the area/realm of the ideational and of the fictitious construct, to the area/realm of the real, but rather as the historically-culturally(/pertaining to civilisation) determined transition from human situations, where the absolute concentration of the whole of the existential and remaining potential on enmity and on extreme violence (as e.g. in the fight of two foes body with body (i.e. man to man) or in a war between “uncivilised/uncultured peoples”) is possible, towards human situations, where

⁵ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): see footnote 3 above.

such a concentration bumps into or collides with insurmountable objective obstacles.

In the circumstances and conditions of the life of “civilised peoples”, the de(-)condensation or de(-)concentration of existential factors [[violence, killing, hatred, enmity, etc.]], which are synopsised inside the pure or unmixed concept/sense of war is, therefore, carried out, along with the admixture of other elements; and precisely this decondensation or deconcentration makes the abstract(ed)–ideal-typical comprehension of the war act(ion) now retrospectively necessary. We should not of course forget that the above-mentioned factors continue also inside the circumstances of civilisation to constitute the “nerve” of war, since without those (factors), wars in general would be inconceivable (unthinkable, unimaginable). However, henceforward, their (the said factors’) influence is subject to radical changes, and accordingly the physiognomy (countenance, appearance) of war is changed and transformed – not, of course, because its essence, as its definition expresses it, is thoroughly transfigured or metamorphosed, but because this essence it has, can no longer manifest itself uninterruptedly in the whole field and in all the sides (aspects) of armed confrontations. The main feature of civilisation (culture) is that society is differentiated and becomes all the more complicated (complex), such that – under the influence of the incessantly appearing, counterbalancing or balancing (with a contrary propensity or with the same propensity), fluctuating (wavering) or stable, subjective or objective factors, which constitute, move and define continually anew the civilisational/culture totality– whatever constitutes war in its conceptual purity is intercepted (halted), channelled, fragmented (broken into pieces), or in part covered and disguised (masked). The “partition (dividing, separating, segregative) wall”, which obstructs the “complete unloading or discharge”, rests or is based henceforth “on the great number of things, forces and situations which war touches inside the life of states”. Even if some “nous

(mind, intellect)”, i.e. a person, a group or a dominant authority, had the ability and the will/volition to keep its pure/unmixed will (volition) uninfluenced by all these obstacles, and again, differentiated – and the cause of differentiations – civilisation/culture has begotten inside the state, a multitude of other, heterogeneous rational bearers, which cannot, or do not want to, do the same thing, so that finally the “inertia of the mass in its totality” (VIII, 2), is not overcome or transcended. In this way, the “composite conditions and forms of war between civilised (cultured) peoples” are formed and shaped; thus, “such a composite activity as is war between civilised peoples” (*Werke*, V. p. 221) is formed; of course, the simple nature of war, as it is expressed in its definition, neither is eliminated and effaced, nor does it become paralysed, but is covered over/up (overlaid) by the, from now on, “composite and variable or mutable texture (composition) of war” (I, 2).

In what does the waging/conduct of war differ in regard to the primitive and the developed phase of civilisation (culture)? Whereas inside the “simple circumstances (conditions) of life of savage/wild peoples” the state and the armed force(s) constitute a unity, and consequently war constitutes one and only one great battle, “our wars” are comprised of a number of battles, and this “fragmentation of activity into so many isolated act(ion)s is due to the great variety of form (multiformity) of the circumstances, which beget for us war”; here, neither the political goal or purpose is unified/united (obviously because inside the state many wills/volitions exist simultaneously), however, even if it (the political goal/purpose) were (unified), again the act(ion) which is undertaken towards its (this political aim’s) achievement would have to be apportioned (allocated, shared, meted out) into several act(ion)s (IV, 3). Decisive in Clausewitz’s eyes is, therefore, the objectively given inability of a “civilised (cultured) people” to realise in the literalness (literal sense) of the term whatever in our century [[i.e. the 20th century]] was called, somewhat abusively,

“total mobilisation”, with the goal (purpose) of the annihilation of the foe in one and only one war (martial/military) act(ion); the duel between existences hating each other can of course be repeated in magno between wild/savage peoples, not, however, also to that extent which the size of “our” peoples, states and armies has made in the meantime necessary. Clausewitz characterises the order (i.e. command, mandate or behest) for a truly total and extreme war (martial, military) effort as a “dream of logic” (I, 1 § 6), and means with this the impossibility of its realisation inside a civilisation (culture) which no longer possesses that primitive monolithic cohesion which must be presupposed in order for the gigantic ceaseless duel or single combat of two peoples-warriors/fighters to take place. Because civilisation (culture) not only multiplies the forces, but also fragments them (cuts or breaks them up into little pieces) –if it is not anchored in inability (debility or weakness) and does not produce inability (debility or weakness) (see below); so the possible result of the undertaking of a total mobilisation in the sense above would be, under the given historical and social circumstances, a “pointless spending (or wasting) of forces” (I, 1 § 6). And the other reasons also, which, according to Clausewitz, cause or engender (occasion) the divergence of real war from its pure or unmixed sense, are deduced (derived) from the indirect or direct influence of civilisation (culture). If war is not generated (born) suddenly (I, 1 § 7), but rather the inimical intentions of (also) both (the two) sides have already appeared since some time ago, this is due to the existence of a more or less organised society of peoples, whose members communicate, politically or otherwise between themselves, having developed a code of mutual understanding, even if only symbolic; and if war does not consist anymore of one and only one strike (blow) (I, 1 § 8), the reason is that now opponents fight between themselves (who are) more or less organised and prepared, able to plan and to act over the long run. Inside this incessant weighing up (pondering, consideration) and foresight (anticipation), as civilisation (culture) demands it

and presupposes it, intellectual(-spiritual) forces, however, function, which cannot be drawn directly from the existential core (nucleus) of war, that is, enmity and violence. This again suggests the existence of a dichotomy (schism, division, split, bifurcation, disunity) inside civilisation (culture) and man, whose analysis will drive (lead) us to the focal point of Clausewitz's anthropology and cultural (civilisational) philosophy.

Let us keep in mind (retain, hold onto), first of all, the more significant finding of our previous discussion. During the transition from pure or unmixed to real war, politics as the subjective attempt and effort at the moderation (mitigation) of violence on the part of the government or of another dominant authority, plays no role; decisive here is exclusively the confrontation of two types of society, "uncivilised (uncultured)" and "civilised" society, whereas talk of politics is permitted only when by this we mean whatever Clausewitz calls the "social union" of men (humans, people). "Politics" in this, the (Aristotelian) sense, means the whole of the social life of civilised peoples,⁶ and war conducted politically is *every* war between such peoples. So, at this level of theory, the contrast and opposition between war of annihilation and restricted (limited, confined) war, which obtains significance only *inside* the situation of civilisation, and in relation to which politics, in the sense of subjective intentions and goals (purposes), could play some role, does not yet constitute an object of discussion. Since we, therefore, (shall) avoid the equally usual/ common, as well as fatal, mistake of confusing the contrast and opposition between pure or unmixed, and real war, with the contrast/opposition between the war of annihilation and restricted war, we ought to now pose the question of

⁶ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): hence, Aristotelian "politics" is roughly equivalent to P.K.'s "the political", which would – unlike in Clausewitz's case – cover "primitive peoples" as well (unless I am missing something and or P.K. had something else in mind for volumes two and three of *The Political and Man*, which of course were never written). Clausewitz, however, did not produce a comprehensive social ontology (and of course no-one can reasonably have ever expected one from him), yet his genius is evidenced by his ability to discern what anthropological and social-ontological factors and forces play their role in all forms of war – and how sociologically and historically "primitive societies" differ from more "civilised" societies as regards the manifestation in them of the war phenomenon, i.e. the social fact of war.

what causes (provokes, begets, brings about (on)) the transition from pure or unmixed to real war, if the reason for the transition is not found in some subjective and philanthropic effort or attempt at the moderation (mitigation) of violence. Clausewitz's answer to this question is anthropological and has, i.e. is as follows: man is made in such a way that he cannot relinquish or forego (desist from) extreme violence, i.e. the killing of the other (another), simultaneously, however, he cannot live permanently with it (violence). Clausewitz's framework of orientation for anthropological thoughts and ascertainments remains, thus, that "dichotomy (schism, division, split, bifurcation, disunity) which takes root in man himself, and for that reason, philosophical logic cannot surpass (get past) it" (VIII, 6B). However, here, it is not a matter of the contrast or opposition between normative Reason (Logos) and dark drives (urges, impulses, instincts), which was always found at the (epi)centre of traditional moral (ethical) philosophy. Such a contrast/opposition does not interest Clausewitz already because, according to his perception, man is always guided (led, directed) by, and acts with a lack of control because of, feelings (emotions, sentiments). "The more/most powerful prompting or motivation for action, man accepts it (i.e. Man accepts the more powerful prompting to act), always from feelings (emotions, sentiments)" (I, 3), being accustomed to, "both the great, as well as the, small things, to act much more in accordance with isolated dominating/ruling/hegemonic representations and emotional or sentimental proclivities (propensities), rather than with strict logical progression or sequence" (VIII, 2). So, the insurmountable dichotomy (schism, division, split, bifurcation, disunity) inside man can come only from the existence of two opposed (groups) of feelings or emotions (sentiments) inside his soul. And in actual fact: on the one hand, man is the "bearer of the unmixed or pure principle of enmity" (VII, 2), and furthermore, in his breast/bosom/chest also many other feelings (sentiments) boil, capable of exciting (stirring, triggering, arousing, setting alight) his competitive

disposition, like ambition, love or lust for power and dominance (authority), enthusiasm for this or that etc. (II, 2); on the other hand, however, “his incomplete and imperfect organisation” (I, 1 § 7) becomes glaringly conspicuous and evident in “his physical restrictions (limitations) and inabilities or weaknesses” (VIII, 6A), in “all the inconsistency, vagueness and timidity (diffidence) of the human spirit(-intellect)” (VIII, 2), in “his incomplete (imperfect) understanding and judgement” (III, 16), just as also in “his aversion (distaste, abhorrence) vis-à-vis inordinate toiling and labours” (I, 1, § 8), in the “natural phobia or fearfulness and indecisiveness of the human spirit(-intellect)”, in “his fear of danger and of responsibility” (III, 16), and in the “inability or weakness”, which occupies and takes over the “of his nature, scared-stiff (frightened or terrified) man” (VIII, 6B) in regard to “every great decision” (IV, 11). Two human properties, qualities or characteristics impede, therefore, in general terms, the thoroughgoing, all-out and active unfolding of enmity and of the related competitive disposition, of the “internal need for struggle” (II, 1): the finite character of the spirit(-intellect), and, fear.

In the late (mature) phase of his intellectual development (evolution), Clausewitz became conscious (aware) also from a systematic viewpoint, of the fundamental significance of the anthropological factor for the theory of war. “Theory ought to take into (its) consideration the human element too”, he wrote then (I, 1 § 22), and he repeated this programmatic demand in the last note which he left (behind to us) in connection with his main work (p. 181: “the political and human side/aspect of war”). But already at the outset of his intellectual(-spiritual) career, he was frequently compelled to use anthropological arguments, because, as is known, he also defended then, just as he did repeatedly later too, the perception or view that the art of war (martial, military skill) “has to do with living ethical (moral) forces” (I, 1 § 22; *Werke*,

VI, p. 274): the bearer of these forces is, however, man, and for this reason, the problem of his texture (composition, nature) comes to the fore(front).

Thus, a still young Clausewitz justifies and gives reasons for his abhorrence (abomination, odium) against “waiting for time to bring you (the) favourable conjunctures”, with the argument that “the natural phobia or fearfulness of usual or common men/people (humans) in regard to great undertakings or ventures” finds here a pretence or pretext for inaction (inactivity, idleness)” (*Strategie*, p. 53). And against Bülow’s “pure strategy”, Clausewitz proposes (puts forward) the term “general strategy” because, as he believes, it (“general strategy”) can formulate principles which “are founded on equally general circumstances, as e.g. is the general character of man” (»Bemerkungen«, 14/5). But in the years of the Prussian debacle, when he sought, in the manner and as much as he could, ways to mobilise souls against the foe, he frequently reflected (cogitated) upon (contemplated, pondered) the dichotomy (schism, bifurcation, division, split, disunity) of/in human nature, (upon), i.e., the “sluggish (languid, indolent) animal”, which it (human nature) hides in it (the said “sluggish animal”), and which accepts “pusillanimously and cowardly” for them (i.e. others) to put on it (the “sluggish animal”) (dress it with, make it wear) chains, and, at the same time (upon) the feelings (emotions, sentiments) of “hate/hatred and of revenge..., which very badly (i.e. wrongly and inaccurately) one connects exclusively with religious fanaticism”, and which in the hours of great danger and of calamity (woe) and of despair (desperation, hopelessness) lift man above his “usual life”, giving him courage and energy and vigour (*Politische Schriften*, pp. 21, 66, 75; *Schriften*, p. 739). Nevertheless, he remained convinced that the great multitude “stands in the middle between the extremes of human nature” (»Bemerkungen und Einfälle«, p. 224), and that, in any case, the nous (mind, intellect) does not decide (things), but man’s affect (as the totality of psychical phenomena which are related with emotion and its impulses) (decides (things)):

“the one concern of affect (as the totality of psychological phenomena which are related with emotion and its impulses), is courage, the other (concern), however, is fear” (*Schriften*, p. 707). Finally, Clausewitz expressly referred to anthropological factors when he attempted or undertook for the first time to systematically expound his views. Here “fear before a final, definitive decision” or a “strike (blow) of fate or destiny” appears as a natural feeling (sentiment, emotion), i.e. “having taken root in man himself”, which acts equally in war as in a card game (game of cards): “because precisely as it concerns the innermost features of the heart and of the spirit(-intellect)... human nature remains the same, even also inside different circumstances”. This fear constitutes an “almost always more or less active cause of the weakening of the physical power of this element”, that is, of war, and makes understandable historical experience that war “in general terms, is so little manic, wild and belligerent”. Subsequently, by consciously and systematically giving priority to this central anthropological ascertainment (“on the basis of these findings, let us now ask history”), Clausewitz briefly explains the development (evolution) of the conduct/waging of war from “uncivilised peoples” up to the French Revolution (»Ueber das Fortschreiten« esp, pp. 233, 237, 236).

In light of this anthropology, which groups the multiformity (great variety of form) of the human factor around the two poles of the dichotomy (schism, bifurcation, division, split, disunity) we pointed out ((1) the “sluggish animal”, which can be pusillanimous and cowardly, feeling fear, and, (2) the feelings of “hate/hatred and revenge” leading to enmity (and violence, killing)), the dual hypostasis and nature of war is explained: war cannot be closed in its unmixed or pure sense because it is not conducted or waged only out of enmity, but also with fear. Clausewitz synopsis this contradictory situation in well-aimed ascertainments: “the wilder and more savage the nature of war is, nevertheless human weaknesses (and inabilities) enchain it or tie it down, and no-one will

wonder at or puzzle over the contradiction which manifests itself here, that is to say, that man seeks and creates the danger (risk) which, nevertheless, he fears (III, 16). Or: “in its totality, war presupposes human weakness (and inability), and turns precisely against it (human weakness)” (IV, 10). In this way, Clausewitz wanted to interpret, (with)in the narrower framework/context of the theory of war, the “stagnation (stagnancy) of the hostilities (between foes)”, the cause of which he located in the “physical phobia or fearfulness and indecisiveness of the human spirit(-intellect)”, in the “imperfection or incompleteness” of the human intellect (mind) and judgement, and only thirdly (as a third reason) in the “superior power (strength/might) of defence” (III, 16). When, however, he located the roots of the war (martial, military) phenomenon inside the whole of society, and theoretically understood the distinction between unmixed/pure and real war, then he embodied such an interpretation of stagnation in hostilities (between foes) in this wider/broader framework (I, 1 § § 17-18), which he again supported (propped up) on the same anthropological perceptions (views). It is not at all coincidental that the clue (hint, implication) regarding the “dichotomy (schism, bifurcation, division, split, disunity) which takes root inside the same man” appears precisely in that chapter where for the first time, the teaching about war is presented systematically as the continuity of political communication with the mixing (blending) (in) (mixture) of other means –indeed, Clausewitz characterises this teaching as the “unity, which jointly constitute it, connected, these contradictory elements (i.e. the unity which these connected, contradictory elements jointly constitute) [sc. (= scilicet (Latin) = it is permitted to know = namely) the elements which constitute the dichotomy or schism (bifurcation, division, split, disunity) inside man], since in part they are reciprocally neutralised (eradicated, eliminated)” (VIII, 6B). And, also, it is not coincidental or accidental that (there) where Clausewitz discusses the distinction between unmixed/pure and real war he underlines precisely the “imperfections” of man as the “principle of moderation (mitigation)” of

violence (I, 1 § 7). Now, however, it is not a matter anymore of the character of the stagnation of the hostilities (between foes), but of the character of war itself inside the life of a “civilised (cultured)” people, whereupon an, in part, express, and, in part, unsaid, philosophy of civilisation (culture) is formed. According to this, inside of civilisation (culture) (as the objectification of a dichotomous or split (schismatic, bifurcated, divided, disunited) human nature), both an, in practice, adequate equilibrium of counterbalancing tendencies of man so that peace is maintained, as well as enough intensity so that war is not excluded, but rather is prepared for, exist. This mixture of war and peace, which in a state of peace takes on (assumes) the form of war preparation (or activity in view of the possibility of armed confrontation), in wars between “civilised (cultured)” peoples, appears as the impregnation (saturation or soaking) of the conduct/waging of war with political goals, and as stagnation inside the hostilities (between foes) themselves. The matter (issue) is which “interests” dominate every time. Because the situation of civilisation (culture), the “social union” of men (humans, people), inside of which war and peace are acted out, is formed with the collaboration or co-action (joint action, acting or working together) also of both (the two) basic views of human nature [[fear etc. vs. hatred/enmity etc.]]; consequently, it (the “social union” of men) simultaneously serves different human interests. If a “social union” of men (people, humans) existed, which had never known (or become acquainted/familiar with) war, then we could have contended that this (“social union”) is anchored exclusively in the feelings (emotions, sentiments) of fear and weakness (inability) (whatever name they had). This (“social union”) would have constituted, of course, a pure or unmixed civilisation (culture), as it were, the opposite of pure/unmixed war. Just like, however, war, as the representative of violence inside civilisation (culture), so too civilisation (culture), as the moderation (mitigation) of pure/unmixed war, can engender (beget, provoke, bring on (about)) this moderation (mitigation) only by losing, itself (i.e. civilisation), its unmixed/pure character,

as it gives rise to (begets) and conducts (wages) war inside its womb (bosom) (within itself). Pure/unmixed civilisation (culture) and pure/unmixed war can be contrasted at the conceptual level, just as aggressive and attacking hate/hatred, and, fear before danger or risk, are contrasted; however, the theoretical validity (reliability, tenability, soundness) of their distinction does not in the least bother (hinder, hamper) their real interweaving, the same also as [[in the fact that]] the ascertainment of the dichotomy (schism, bifurcation, division, split, disunity) inside man does not at all bother him from presenting himself as a united person or a united people.⁷

One could understand that the “moderation (mitigation)” of pure/unmixed war during the transition towards culture (civilisation), and consequently towards real wars, is due to the advances (progress) of ethics (morals, morality) and of humanism (inter/cor)related to the character of culture (civilisation) itself. Clausewitz, at any rate, would not approve of such an interpretation of his thought, and indeed already because he does not believe that the formation of the “intellect (mind)” in “cultured/civilised” peoples goes (proceeds) together with the retreat (subsidence) of the “element of rawness (cruelness)”; thus, the contrasting of barbarity and culture (civilisation), of intellect and of (the) affect (as the totality of psychical phenomena which are related to emotion and its impulses), loses every ethical (moral) (emotive) suggestiveness, whereupon the real possibility of ethical (moral) progress is not discussed at all. The priority or precedence of the affect (as the totality of psychical phenomena which are

⁷ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): as we’ve said throughout www.panagiotiskondylis.com, empirical reality is what it is – and it is very complex and varied – whereas human understanding is also what it is – i.e. it cannot grasp the totality of known or knowable empirical reality without abstractions, separations, segregations, categorisations, comparisons, etc.. And because “getting to” such knowledge in depth is indeed a very difficult process requiring years of training and self-discipline, including the empirically and logically sound “synthesis” of those abstractions, separations and categorisations in order to “shed light on real, empirical totalities” etc., that is one of the major reasons why it is far easier for people, including “professors” and “intellectuals” and “doctors” and “masters” to lapse into (up to – especially in the Anglo-Franco-sphere (but not only) – absolutely moronic, cretinous, mentally retarded, stupid, idiotic “cultured, sophisticated, cosmopolitan, erudite and urbane” FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO/USA-LOBOTOMISED, etc.) – and of course many other kinds of – ideologisations.

related to emotion and its impulses) in barbarian peoples, and of the intellect (mind) in civilised (cultured) peoples, writes Clausewitz, “is not due to the texture (composition or nature) itself of barbarity and of culture (civilisation), but to the concomitant (ancillary, adjunct) circumstances and conditions, constructs as forms of institutionalisation etc.”, because “even the most cultured and civilised peoples too can break out with/in passion, one against the other (another)”; inventions like gunpowder and firearms show that “the tendency or trend of annihilation of the opponent also in praxis (practice) was by no means impeded (held up or obstructed), nor did it change course or path (road) along with progress in education (paideia)” (I, 1 § 3). Culture (civilisation) does not, therefore, mean the depletion or draining of the existential source of war, but, conversely, brings about the perfection of the art of war, the art of killing the other (another); since “the (a) more or less war(-like) (martial, military) propensity and development (evolution)”, is not at all absent (or missing) from “cultured (civilised) peoples”, the refinement of the intellect (mind) contributes to the substitution of the “war/martial spirit(-intellect)” with “war/martial genius (brilliance of mind/intellect)”, which makes possible great achievements in war; incidentally, in “epochs of higher education (paideia)”, did all the peoples who were renowned (famous) for their martial/war art, i.e. art of war, act (I, 3).

If culture (civilisation) does not enfeeble or debilitate (weaken) the war or martial proclivities of man, even though, for objective reasons, he does not permit pure or unmixed war any longer, then, the “intellect/mind”, – whose development characterises the situation of “paideia or education”, cannot have an ethical (moral) and humanitarian character, but rather simply instrumental (character) –, signifies the rational discovery of the means for the achievement of a goal (purpose, end), irrespective of its ethical (moral) quality (character, nature). The intellect or mind is, therefore, called upon now to serve those psychological forces (powers), which, before it (the intellect) itself is refined yet,

determine the course of (the) facts, although the intellect's influence changes and transforms this latter (course of facts). "Struggle is the measurement of spiritual(-intellectual) and bodily (corporeal) forces by means of the latter (bodily) forces" (II, 1); consequently, the fact that struggle can be conducted only with tangible means, does not mean that the spirit(-intellect) is alien (foreign) towards/vis-à-vis the struggle or abhors (disdains, loathes) it. For Clausewitz, the "intellect/ mind" and the "element of rawness (cruelness)" by no means constitute a contrast or opposition, just as war and culture (civilisation) do not constitute a contrast/opposition; incidentally, Clausewitz stresses that "the use of physical violence to its full extent does not in the least exclude (preclude) the collaboration or co-action (joint action, acting or working together) of the intellect/mind", "violence is armed with the inventions of the arts and of the sciences" (I, 1 § § 3, 2). This collaboration or joint action (working together) of violence and intellect does not bring about the transition from pure or unmixed war, to the war of the cultured/civilised (people(s)), in the sense that the intellect, as an ethical(moral)-humanitarian principle, endeavours (tries hard) everywhere and always to bridle (rein in, curb, control, subdue) and or to cast out (expel or eliminate) violence. It is true, of course, that the intellect (mind) moderates and mitigates violence, however, it does it because it better weighs up (ponders, considers) the means in relation to the ends, thus being in a position to ascertain that victory in war, as this is conducted inside the circumstances (conditions) of culture/civilisation, can be achieved only if all the subjective and objective factors of this now so (i.e. very) complicated (complex) "social union" of men (people, humans) are taken into consideration (account) and made (good) use of, utilised or exploited. Pure or unmixed violence could be imposed inside pure/unmixed war, however, the blind blows (hits, beating, knocks, strikes) and plain manly (virile, macho, masculine) bravery (gallantry, valiance, valour, heroics, courage) are proved (prove) to be, most of time (in most cases), pernicious or disastrous (baneful) when one has to do with

situations where the great variety of form (multiformity), and or (the) multi-dimensionality, render weighing up (pondering, consideration), calculation and manoeuvring (dodging), indispensable elements of the act/praxis or action. “The avoidance of an obstacle is for man, [[his]] instinct” (*Werke*, IX, p. 77), and an extreme refinement of this instinct, inside the circumstances (conditions) of culture (civilisation), is the intellect, as it gives the vitally necessary orientation, and allows the surveying (overview) of things. The intellect/mind itself neither can, nor wants, to condemn to inaction the rest of the psychological forces because, let us say, they appear to it (the intellect) to be dangerous – the abolition of wars does not constitute for the intellect, as Clausewitz defines it, a declared or feasible goal (end); however, it (the intellect) can and wants to channel them (wars) such that they serve as means, its (the intellect’s) ends/goals, and only to make its action more effective, does it (the intellect/mind) bridle and rein in (curb, control, subdue) uncontrolled (unchecked) violence: “if we, therefore, see that cultured and civilised peoples do not kill captives, and do not destroy cities (towns) and the countryside, the reason is that the intellect slips or enters more into the conduct and waging of war, and has taught them (the said cultured and civilised peoples) about more drastic (efficacious, potent) means towards/as regards the exercising of violence, than those raw (cruel) manifestations of the instinct” (I, 1 § 3). The “blind onrush (i.e. advance or attack)” with the purpose (goal or end) (being) the annihilation of the foe, is condemned precisely from the point of view of the superior criterion of the “greater activity (potency)” (I, 2). And the submission of “blind passion” to the political end (goal or purpose) of war does not mean anything other than the imposition of the same criterion (of the “greater activity and potency”) and of the same instrumental mode (way or manner) of thought; because this superiority of the political goal (end or purpose) entails an action (activeness, energetic movement) of the intellect, which determines the size or magnitude of the sacrifices in accordance with the value of the goal (end or purpose) (I, 2).

So, the better service, which the intellect/mind can offer to the “element of rawness (cruelness)” inside the “social union” of men (people, humans), is to bridle it (the “element of rawness/cruelness”) in accordance with the logic of its (the intellect’s) ends (goals and purposes). We repeat; we are dealing with (it is a matter of) a service, not a contrast/opposition to it (the “element of rawness and cruelty”). The bridling (reigning in, curbing, controlling, subduing) [[directed]] towards the achievement of “greater activity/potency” is realised not only directly, i.e. with express prohibitions, social disciplining and military training and education, but also indirectly, when the forces of enmity are put in order, incorporated or classified in collective forms of organisation, so that they can no longer move and act as they want –when they are obliged to subordinate their feelings (emotions, sentiments) to the control and the guidance of existing social and military institutions: “all the inventions of art(fulness) (craft, workmanship, skill), arms, organisation, used or executed (exercised) tactics, principles for the use of troops in battle, constitute limits and restrictions on the natural instinct, since through these, the instinct is sought to be driven by side roads to the more expedient use (usage) of its forces” –although the psychological forces remain indispensable (necessary) and “a certain margin, scope or space” must be left to them (*Leitfaden*, § 45).

Thus, enmity becomes more impersonal, more cerebral – if the phrase (putting it this way) may be permitted – and the perfection (completion) of arms also has the same result: whereas in the “barbarian struggle body to body, i.e. man to man”, the dagger (stiletto) and the war hatchet (ax) are still used, arms, “with which the foe (enemy) is fought from a distance, constitute more (so) (more like) the instruments or tools of the intellect/mind; they leave in almost full calmness, psychological forces and the competitive instinct in itself” (*Leitfaden*, § § 46-47). Despite all that, we cannot conceive of war without “enmity”, without the “instinct of attack (aggression) and of annihilation” (*Leitfaden*, § § 30-31),

precisely also as in the circumstances (conditions) of culture (civilisation), the conduct (waging) of war is not possible without the guidance and the planning of the intellect/mind. In the framework of the inevitable collaboration (joint action or working together) of the soul's two basic forces, the intellect accepts its motive or driving force from the will/volition in regard to the total beating of, and complete victory over, the foe ("thus is human nature: when the nerve of volition (will) is missing (lacking or absent), the intellectual-mental representations float in vain inside the soul", *Werke*, VI, p. 264), whereas enmity survives in part more or less unadulterated and changes/is transformed into "collective hate", or lights up again inside the struggle itself, and in part is idealised by taking the form of feelings (emotions, sentiments) like, for instance, the yearning (longing, craving) for glory (*Leitfaden*, § § 35-37). At the highest military level, (there) where war (martial, military) genius (intellectual brilliance) is represented by the gifted and, endowed with talent, (chief/ commanding) general (chief warrior, field marshal), the above-mentioned collaboration (co-action, joint action, acting/working together) appears as the "harmonic coalescence (union, fusion) of forces", as the indivisible unity of courage and prudence (thoughtfulness, sobriety, sagemess), from which, also, only genuine, well-aimed decisiveness emerges (I, 3).

We can now survey the whole spectrum of the spiritual(-intellectual) and psychical forces, which unfold inside war between "cultured (civilised) peoples": [[1]] hate/hatred and enmity, [[2]] thereafter the middle field of "free psychical activity" where our known idealised metamorphoses of enmity are mixed with properties (qualities, characteristics) like courage, and [[3]] finally the intellect (mind). Clausewitz names this entirety (totality, whole) a "peculiar (quirky, eccentric) triad", and attributes its first element "more to the people", the second element "more to the commander in chief (generalissimo, field marshal) and his army", and the third element "more to the government" (I, 1 §

28). He does not, therefore, identify, i.e. fully equate, any of the three above-mentioned spiritual(-intellectual) and psychical forces with their main bearer, and this means, of course, that the three elements also exist, in each and every respective different dosage, inside the three subjects of the conduct/waging of war too. Consequently, he does not try to overcharge or overload the intellect (mind) (the government) with the job/task of the bridling or the casting out (expulsion or elimination) of the rest of the two psychical forces (subjects) – incidentally, he knows how mistaken it would be “to attribute war between cultured (civilised) people(s) simply and only to an intellectual action or activeness of governments” (I, 1 § 3). The triadic formula does not contain any judgement as to the “correct” hierarchisation of magnitudes which it encompasses, and consequently does not constitute a new definition of war next to all those we already know (of) (are familiar with); rather, it enumerates the variables, which act in every war between “cultured (civilised) peoples”, and the basic intention is to explain on the basis of these variables not the essence of war, but rather the vast (enormous) variety of its (war’s) real and possible forms.

Not by chance (coincidentally), therefore, the development of the triadic formula commences (begins, starts) with the renowned and famous characterisation of war as the “true chameleon”, and equally logical is that Clausewitz sets for his theory, the duty to remain pendulous or floating between the three elements of the formula, as if these constituted three poles of attraction (I, 1 § 28): because the three (elements of the said formula) participate equally in war between cultured/civilised people(s), and the determination of their internal relations is not a matter of (for) normative principles, but of (for) concrete and specific (kinds of) weighing(s) up (considerations, pondering(s)), which can also vary very much from case to case.

WE SHALL NOW SHOW that the antithetic (conflicting, contradictory, opposed) unity of “instinct”, and, intellect (mind) capable of rationally choosing the better or best means towards (as regards, for the purpose of) the realisation of its ends (goals or purposes), is found to be in a systematic relation(ship) with (towards or as regards) the antithetic-conflicting/contradictory unity of violence and power;⁸ also, that violence and power are divided and intersect in (accordance with) the same sense as war and politics in the framework of the “social union” of men (humans, people), which is, for its part, in the same way united, and in the same way of a dual nature or hypostasis (existence), as (like) human nature (is) too, since it (the “social union” of men) does not constitute but its (human nature’s) objectification. Before, however, we go about coming to grips with the analysis of this finely intertwined or (multi-)branched, but purely (cleanly) structured plexus, mesh (grid or network) of thoughts, we must emphatically remind ourselves that the first and decisive “moderation (mitigation)”, which war is stricken/affected by (or is exposed to) during the transition from pure/unmixed war to real wars,⁹ does not have the slightest relation(ship) with the goals (ends, purposes) and activities of some “humanitarian” or “responsible” politics, but rather is due to a “politics” which means the same as the “social union” of men (humans, people), the political totality or the political community; in other words, the concept “politics” does not have the sense or meaning of (the) deliberate (intentional, expedient, purposeful) act(ion) (acting), but rather expresses the public-political

⁸ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): A clear indication that power is not just physical, which is discussed later in *Theory of War* (not here) (see the *Theory of War* – Summary Notes), and at other points in P.K.’s oeuvre.

⁹ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): a reminder that whilst “the pure or unmixed” is also real as having existed in “primitive” tribes and with its core elements existing in “advanced” or “civilised/cultured” societies, it is distinguished from “real” (which probably would have helped readers by being called “existing/extant” rather than “real”) in the sense that societies – even in Clausewitz’s day, were seen to have “moved on” (at least in part) from their primitive or primordial states, notwithstanding any remnants of “primitive” tribes in Africa and America (of which Clausewitz may (?) or may not (?) have been aware). The German „wirklich“ can be translated as “real, true or actual”, whereas, the Greek «πραγματικός» can be translated as “real, actual or factual”.

communication of people (men, humans) in the framework of their “social union”, whilst maintaining in this way for the most part its Aristotelian meaning, as, incidentally, was most frequent at the beginning of the 19th century, when the liberal and democratic concept or sense of politics (= “I (am) do(ing) politics”) had not yet been imposed (enforced, necessitated). Clausewitz leaves no doubt as to the purely objective reasons for the “moderation (mitigation)” of pure/unmixed war: “if the wars of cultured (civilised) peoples are less wild (savage) and destructive than those of the uncultured (uncivilised) peoples, this is due to the social situation, both within/inside and between the states” (I, 1 § 3). This reduction of/in (the) savagery (wildness), i.e. this deviation from pure or unmixed war does not mean of course at all that “civilised/cultured” peoples do not conduct or wage wars of annihilation between themselves, since also such wars are found on this side of the limits (confines) of pure/unmixed war. This proves, in addition, that the “moderation (or mitigation)” of pure/unmixed war correlates or interrelates with subjective intentions equally as little as the general phenomenon of “friction” (Friktion), whose analysis significantly influenced, and in part, inspired Clausewitz when he described the transition from pure/unmixed to real war. We could say that the “moderation (mitigation)” of pure or unmixed war simply constitutes that friction, which pure/unmixed war is necessarily stricken/affected by (or is exposed to) inside the complicated (complex) “social union” of men (humans, people). If we see things this way, then “politics”, in the objective sense of public-political communication in the framework of a political community, always influences and acts upon (has an effect) [[upon things]] mitigatingly, i.e. with a moderating effect –however, all those interpreters of Clausewitz, by saying “politics”, mean the beneficial deliberate (intentional, expedient, purposeful) activity of a non-military dominant authority, and consider it everywhere and always as the element of moderation (mitigation), do not understand in the least about what there is talk of in Clausewitz’s text; in their

ethical (moral) zeal, they commit a logical leap, i.e. leap in logic, and comprehend (perceive) the objective influence of the “social union” of men/humans (people) as the conscious achievement of a subject thinking normatively.

Instead of orientating ourselves towards the misleading thread of subjective political ends (goals and purposes), it seems to us far more fertile to seek the core (nucleus) of our examination of the problem (problem examination) at the point where (the) anthropological consideration (way of looking at things), the philosophy of culture, and the theory of war, intersect with one another. The “contrasting or opposed (conflicting/conflicted) elements” which comprise the unity of politics and war, constitute for Clausewitz a “dichotomy (schism, bifurcation, division, split, disunity) having taken root inside man himself” –and the theory of the unity of war and politics is born precisely as the answer to the question how the two aspects of human nature, and at the same time of the “social union” of men (humans, people), can be jointly understood (VIII, 6B). Previously, we described how Clausewitz perceives and understands (comprehends, apprehends) the unity of the counterbalancing tendencies inside man and inside culture (civilisation); on this basis, we can now delineate the same unity in the sector of the relations between politics¹⁰ and war. In general terms, politics (inter)relates with war, like man with violence: it (politics) and he (man) cannot relinquish, forego, or desist from, them (war and violence), but also it and he cannot live continuously with them. Analogous is the texture (composition or nature) of the “social union” of men (humans, people): it (the “social union” of men) cannot be maintained inside a situation of perpetual and catholic (i.e. general or universal) violence, however at the same time, its

¹⁰ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): a reminder, “politics” here is meant in the broad (Aristotelian) sense of the Kondylisian “the political” (including e.g. ideological influence or “brainwashing or FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA-LOBOTOMISATION” etc.) or the Clausewitzian “social union/politics” and “political communication”, and not in the narrower sense of participating in party(-related) politics in regard to the distribution of power within government.

structure and its function(ing) necessarily beget violence from time to time. The necessity of peace between two wars is not due to ethical (moral), but to anthropological and cultural factors. And the same reasons, which in the final analysis, make impossible the perpetuation of the situation of war, bring about stagnation *inside* (*within*) hostilities (between foes), and consequently the politicisation of war, i.e. its (war's) subjugation to general determinisms (kinds of law bindedness or law-based necessities),¹¹ which dominate inside the social union of men (people, humans) as the objectification of human nature. The "general circumstances (conditions), from which war is born/engendered/begotten", "have made most wars something abstract and vague containing postponement, where enmity in itself was obliged to manoeuvre (meander) from inside so many relations clashing with one another, so that nothing remained from it but a very feeble (weakly, sickly) element" (VI, 8). Every conduct (waging) of war inside the complicated situation of culture (civilisation) is, therefore, necessarily politics, since it is obliged to deviate or diverge from pure and unmixed war to the extent where it more or less bridles or reins in (curbs, controls) blind violence and attacking-aggressive rabidity in order to take into account/consideration the great variety of form (multiformity) of subjective and objective factors, and to act accordingly, i.e. in determining with cold logic the means which its ends demand. The main problem here is not if it does this "correctly" or with ethical (moral) intention, but that it is *forced* (*compelled*) to do it. To the extent where the political conduct (waging) of war diverges or deviates from pure or unmixed war, the "inimical feeling (sentiment, emotion)" is covered up/over by the "inimical intention", even though, as we know, the former ("inimical feeling") continues to act in the latter ("inimical intention") (I,

¹¹ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): whilst "laws", "determinisms" etc. are not terms or concepts supported by tangible, hard empirical evidence in relation to human affairs (see *The Political and Man*), they were in use well into the 20th century, and obviously in Clausewitz's day too, and in this instance we are referring to at least a constant of war not being able to be continuous in circumstances of "advanced" societies (unlike in "primitive" societies, where presumably two tribes could fight to the point where one of them becomes totally wiped out, exterminated, obliterated, annihilated).

1, §3; II, 2). Thus, the “political goal/end/purpose” of war comes to the fore(front), and with it, the political consideration of the necessities of war, i.e. “a calculus or calculation of possibilities taken from certain persons and situations” (I, 1, § 12). The blind violence of pure or unmixed war had as its singular or unique aim, the subjugation of the foe –an aim, which, if it is formulated thus generally and inflexibly, necessarily seems very abstract inside a concrete and complicated situation. The calculus (calculation) of possibilities, i.e. the political conduct (or waging) of war, means flexibility of behaviour and of (the) aim in accordance with circumstances and conditions on each and every respective occasion, it means that “the peculiarity (oddity) of active states is taken into account/consideration” (I, 1 § 12). War is of its nature, enmity and the effort or attempt at subjugation; the political conduct/waging of war is, however, rational postponement or suspension (deferment), channelling and exploitation of the essential elements of war (with)in the framework of a calculus of possibilities and on the basis of the knowledge of the complicated character of a peculiar (odd) plexus (mesh, grid or network) of relations on each and every respective occasion; in a nutshell, the political conduct or waging of war is war conducted or waged inside the circumstances and conditions of culture (civilisation).

However, politics and war do not constitute unity only in the sense that every conduct (waging) of war between cultured (civilised) peoples has a necessarily political character. Their interweaving is shown (revealed, disclosed, unveiled) in a dimension which is still deeper when we analyse the genetic texture (composition or nature) of war, when i.e. we ascertain that it (war) descends and comes from “political communication”. Clausewitz frequently stresses that war, “and indeed the war of cultured (civilised) peoples”, starts, is motivated and caused “always by a political situation”, and is brought on (engendered, provoked) “only by a political motive” (I, 1 § 23), “only by the political

communication of governments and of peoples”; politics “begets, gives birth/ rise to war” (VIII, 6B). These statements do not mean, as it is thought many times, that war, being exclusively a matter of a (non-military) political dominant authority, is obliged to be waged or conducted in accordance with its – of its very nature – moderate will/volition. We know that the transition from pure or unmixed to real war has of course to do with the influence of “political communication” generally, not with the expedient, purposeful and deliberate activity of a political volition (will), which plays a smaller or greater role only at the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) inferior level of the choice between the possible forms of real war on each and every respective occasion. When Clausewitz speaks here of the “political goal/end/purpose” of war, or characterises war “political energy”, he still moves at that level of theory which is found on the other side of, i.e. beyond, the choice between war of annihilation and restricted (limited, confined) war; in other words, the “political purpose (goal or end)” is mentioned in principle not as the product of the conscious choice of a subjective will (volition), but rather only as a typical (i.e. as to types) magnitude, something which means that political communication is obliged to be expressed in [[terms of]] subjective political goals (ends or purposes) and decisions in order to bring on or beget (provoke) war, [[and]] that, however, the content of the choice still remains open. Inside the circumstances and conditions of culture (civilisation), politics cannot of course – having been crystallised in a political goal (end or purpose) – decide upon the conduct or waging of pure or unmixed war, however, it can decide on all the possible forms of real war, “from the war of annihilation up to simple armed recognition, i.e. armed reconnaissance [[translator’s note: in the *Theory of War* – Summary Notes I rendered «ἐνοπλη ἀναγνώριση»; in German = „bewaffneten Beobachtung“ as “armed observation”, when it seems that the correct technical term in English (unless I’m mistaken again) is actually “armed reconnaissance”.]] (I, 1 § 11). So, politics is not the normative intellect or mind which, beyond the inevitable divergence or deviation from pure or unmixed

war, wants to cast out (expel or eliminate) a lineage the more violent forms of real war; it (politics) is an intellect (mind) which can guide war *because* and *only when* it begets (gives birth, engenders) it (war), in other words, it (politics) is in a position to subordinate war to its goals (purposes, ends) only because these goals (ends, purposes) of politics cannot be realised without the conduct and waging of war. Politics is the continuation, i.e. the product and the spawn (child, result, creation, offspring) of politics, not the sudden and unexplained interruption or break of/in political communication and something alien (foreign) towards (as to) the texture (composition or nature) of politics: because in this case, this genesis (birth) and conduct or waging of war would remain incomprehensible.

From this perspective, it appears, of course, plausible that the renowned (famous) formulation (expression) that war constitutes the continuation (continuance) of political communication with the mixing/admixture of other means, comes immediately after the ascertainment, that war is born, engendered or begotten precisely from this political communication, whilst at the same time, the opinion is repelled (repulsed) of all those who accept an essential difference between politics and war, and believe that with war, an entirely different situation is founded (established) subject to different laws (VIII, 6B). These phrases are usually interpreted in the sense that Clausewitz wanted allegedly to say that the political (non-military) leadership is obliged to remain immobile at the helm (tiller or (steering) wheel) of the state, also after the eruption of war. However, this matter interests our theoretician (theorist) only marginally, if it interests him at all. His attention is centred on the essential nexus (correlation or interrelation, connection) between political communication and war, i.e. between the texture (composition and nature) of the former (political communication), as the objectification of all the views and facets of human nature, and of the genetic causes of the latter (war) in light of

the texture (composition or nature) of the former (political communication). In particular, he avoids every contradistinction between “good” politics and “bad/evil” war, nor does he rush to demand the bridling (reining in or curbing (controlling)) of the (what is) bad/evil with the (what is) good, but rather, conversely, insists on the fact of a continuation due to homogeneity. We repeat: war would not constitute the continuation (continuance) of political communication, if this here (political communication) were not made in such a way that it would necessarily beget or give rise/birth to, or at least could beget, war. If war “does not have its own logic” (VIII, 6B), then obviously the logic of politics and the logic of war coincide. And if political communication “in its essence continues to exist” inside war, then the essence of political communication is not unmixed or pure peace, i.e. peace as the situation which embodies in chemical purity the opposite of war, and consequently cannot beget war. In other words, politics is not the opposite concept as to, or vis-à-vis, war in the way that, from a purely conceptual point of view, “political” and “military principles”, or, war and peace, constitute opposite magnitudes. War is a “part” of the whole, i.e. of politics (VIII, 6B), it is, i.e. as much a particular field inside its wider (broader) field, as well and as much as it is a version or variant of its essential texture (composition or nature), that is to say, a certain form of political communication. However, the particularity (oddity) of war is understood only if we see it (this particularity of war) under (through) the prism of its (war’s) essential relationship (kinship, affinity) with politics, and consists simply in the “peculiarity or oddity of its (war’s) means” (I, 1 § 24). When Clausewitz writes about war: “it is a conflict or clash of great interests which is resolved bloodily, and only as to this does it differ from other conflicts (clashes)” (II, 3), then he leaves no doubt (there can be no doubt) the he regards war as one only conflict (clash) out of many conflicts and clashes, which, of course, are not resolved bloodily, nonetheless, they equally characterise political communication. Politics and war can be jointly subordinated to the broader

concept of “conflict or clash”, and this explains their essential relationship (affinity, kinship), which in (its) turn, makes understandable the position that politics is “the womb (bosom), inside which war develops” (II, 3). The renowned (famous) formulation (expression) regarding the continuation of politics and war suggests that the two (both) differ only as to (the) means, however, this does not mean that their community, i.e. common ground, commonality (area of accord and agreement) is limited (restricted, confined) to goals (purposes or ends); on the contrary, this community as common ground or area of accord/agreement extends to all their contradictory and multi-dimensional structure, which lives off (on) “conflict (a clash/clashes)” and continually produces “conflict (a clash/clashes)”, irrespective in which form.¹²

¹² (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): cf. *The Political and Man* Ch. III pp. 523-524 and 574-575 (re: Clausewitz, in particular), and, pp. 543-546 and 574-590 (re: “conflict”, in general) of the English translation at www.panagiotiskondylis.com .

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