

II. Communistic and liberalⁱ utopia

1. Marxism, communism and the history of the 20th century

The historical putting in order, i.e. classification of Marxism and of the communistic movement depends on how one judges the overall course of the planetary history of the 20th century. To say it differently: a satisfying result in this particular historical sector of research presupposes a concrete perception and notion of that which in this century was acted out in terms of universal history, and indeed both at the level of social, as well as at that level of (inter)national and political history (*or*: as well as at that of national and international political history). This ceases to sound like a banal methodical (i.e. methodological) command as soon as we visualise and contemplate how contestable such an undertaking can become already after the first steps, above all if, through that, the ideological self-legitimation of today's "West (Occident, Western world)" as the victor of the Cold War is called into question. This self-legitimation rests, in fact, on the acceptance of certain historical continuities, that is, on express or implicit periodisations of the historical course (or, course of history), and refers to historically growing social entities, whose substance, as is thought, was preserved and survives despite all the changes, alterations and variations in the accidental occurrences (happenings, events, incidents). The broadest of these constructed entities is the

“West” as the epitome (or idea(tiona)l synopsis) of ancient-classical, Christian and liberal traditions, i.e. as the crystallisation of an almost three-thousand-year historyⁱⁱ. If one, however, as a historian grasped, or attributed to, the concept of the “West” such a breadth, then in Marxist theory and communistic praxis (practice)ⁱⁱⁱ, as good as nothing is found which does not at least correspond with one aspect of the “West” – from historical eschatologies and various mixtures ([[made up]] out) of humanism and collectivism, up to the not very delicate dealings with, and handling of, dissenters, intellectual(-spiritual) prohibitions and mass murders (*or*: mass exterminations of humans); on the other hand, on the basis of this wide, broad concept of the “West”, it was never explained and clarified during the Cold War whether capitalistic and parliamentary Japan would be reckoned as belonging to the “community of Western peoples” rather (*or*: more so) than “communistically governed and ruled Eastern Europe”.

The historical picture becomes clearer if Marxism and communism are comprehended as the great adversaries of bourgeois liberalism as this was shaped and formed in the European New Times, above all after the French Revolution. From this perspective, it looks or seems as if (*or*: the impression arises or is born) that with and through the collapse of the communistic camp, the attack on bourgeois-liberal society had been finally and conclusively repulsed, and now in the process, this bourgeois-liberal society, enriched by a social(-welfare)-state dimension (*or*: the dimension of the social welfare state) and established and consolidated thanks to (by means of) general prosperity, will unfold world-wide (i.e. in and throughout all the world), and through its humanity will make the peoples felicitous in peace (*or*: with its humanity will grant peace and happiness to the peoples). Historical continuity stretches here from the age (epoch, era) of the Industrial Revolution, and it encompasses and includes in the first phase the putting aside, cleaning up and elimination (liquidation) of feudal-aristocratic remnants and leftovers, and in a second

phase, the defence against, and repulsion of, the revolutionary attack from the Left^{iv} through the organic integration of the lower [[social]] strata in an indeed reformed and more open, but still bourgeois-liberal society.

Were things so, Marxism and communism would have represented and constituted at most crises of adaptation, or even mere blemishes and slip-ups on the regal path of Western liberalism – and re-issues/new editions of “oriental despotism” in lands and countries, which at any rate, had no stake and decisive participation in the Western modern era. On the other hand, my thesis reads that the West in the course of the 20th century has gone through a far-reaching, deep, profound social and intellectual(-spiritual) change, in relation to which oligarchic and hierarchical bourgeois liberalism was replaced by mass-democratic relations; that this change was interwoven with a number of paths and roundabout ways along with a just as drastic re-shaping and metamorphosis of the planetary landscape, which reached an until then unimaginable degree of social and political density; and that Marxism and communism were originally and constantly (i.e. from the beginning and always) inherent and deeply rooted in this double-sided (as to bourgeois liberalism becoming mass democracy, and, the drastic re-shaping and densification of the planetary landscape), yet united process; Marxism and communism aided, supported and promoted this process, and did not depart the stage or abdicate before – stated in terms of Hegel – their “historical truth” came to light, saw the light of day and were realised objectively (i.e. irrespective of the subjective wishes and expectations of the “historical truth’s” proponents): in other words, they do not constitute a, in the meanwhile, tumour successfully surgically removed from history’s body, but an integral part of a phase of world history that has already come to its end, which now stands before its mainly planetary epoch.

Only the proper and informed, in-depth apprehension of the aforementioned double-sided process allows us to intellectually come to grips with and

understand the truly dramatic distinction between the basic questions and problems of 1900 and those of 2000. If around 1900, the at that time “social question”, which as a result of the oligarchical nature and texture of bourgeois liberalism was invariably placed within each and every respective national framework, dominated the social-political theatre or arena of struggle, thus it is characteristic for the epoch around 2000 that disputes, controversies and conflicts appear on the (attained, existing or coming into being and being created) basis of high collective consumption and high productivity, which intensify both the interweaving, as well as the competition, of national economies, whilst at the same time the whole process is acted out inside of demographic and ecological boundaries and limits becoming ever narrower. To the extent that the “social question” – though in an essentially different form – continues to be posed, it is connected now with *these* factors (of high collective consumption etc.), and its handling and management on each and every respective occasion does not require or demand any (*or*: is not done with the slogan in favour of the) dismantling (toppling or demolishing) of class(-like) hierarchies as the 19th century knew them, but – since the egalitarian performance (or achievement) principle, at least nominally, has been pushed through and imposed – requires or demands the partial rearrangement (and or changeover in respect) of a functional whole. The in principle replacement (substitution) of the class(-like) hierarchy by the functional hierarchy entails, of course, not under all circumstances, a defusing of social conflict. The opposite can be the case, since the horizon of expectation(s), which is formed parallelly with that replacement (substitution), is determined by (or stands under the aegis of) the mass-democratic hedonism of consumption (mass-democratic consumption hedonism), and correspondingly gives rise to and begets claims at the global level. In any case, the 5 billion of the non-Western and non-highly (*or*: non-advanced) industrialised world does not want to attain and achieve what the West possessed anno (i.e. in the year) 1900, but that which the West

seems to be enjoying en masse today. In the manner in which the horizon of expectation(s) is created and constituted, as well as its content, the interweaving of social and planetary points of view is reflected, which characterises and stamps the mass-democratic social formation developing in terms of the economy, in(to) large (great, major) spaces.

(Western) mass democracy gradually (i.e. step by step, by degrees, in small increments) emerged and came, albeit relatively quickly, from the womb of (or bosom of or from within) bourgeois liberalism. And yet the caesura (break or turning point) is more important than the continuity, because the just mentioned problems on the horizon of [[the year]] 2000 revolve around or abut (attach/append to) social phenomena which exactly as the result of the said caesura now dominate. The latter caesura can of course be fully apprehended in its character, extent and scope only through ideal-typical extrapolation, and it remains in this case, as in others too, an elementary methodical (i.e. methodological) command to give preference and priority to the qualitative way of looking at events (things that happen) over quantitative consideration. Even if the elements of bourgeois liberalism as well as those of bourgeois civilisation and culture (*or*: of bourgeois intellectual(-spiritual) and material-technical culture/civilisation), continued to quantitatively predominate, this would have had little meaning for a dynamic understanding of things, if in the meantime social phenomena of another type had established themselves as the locomotives of development. Between the 13th and the 17th century, the way and mode of living and the mentality of most people in Europe by no means changed radically, i.e., *societas civilis* retained its fundamental hierarchies, and theology ruled and dominated the ideological terrain in an always undiminished and unabated fashion – and nevertheless, we distinguish with regard to exactly this period of time between “Middle Ages” and “New Times (Modern Era)”, whilst we, and rightly so, focus our attention on what is qualitatively new, knowing very well that it (i.e.

the qualitatively new) quantitatively continues to be inferior or continues to lag behind. Historically and sociologically interesting is the novel (the new) and what is decisive (promising) for the future, regardless of whether it temporarily or even for a long time appears to be a simple appendage (appurtenance, accessory) or variation of the old (what is old).

Assuming our contemporary Western mass democracy were in actual fact nothing other, and not more than, a further formation (i.e. transformation or restructuring) and continuation or meta-development/evolution of bourgeois liberalism, then the issue would have to still be clarified as to whether factors of further formation, transformation and meta-development/evolution have come into play, which thereafter took over the role of the social motor/engine (i.e. driving force) in a qualitative relation (*or*: from a qualitative point of view). Personally, I believe, nonetheless, that I can show that the transition from the bourgeois liberalism of the 19th century to modern mass democracies was much more evident for all to see.¹ Thus, around 1900 a thorough, sweeping paradigm shift at the level of intellectual(-spiritual) production took place (from the natural-scientific world image, across philosophy and sociology, up to literature and the visual arts), which almost simultaneously unhinged and blew to smithereens all forms of bourgeois culture as they had been formed since the Renaissance. From within (*or*: In and out of) this comprehensive, multi-dimensional polemic, a thought figure (*or*: schema of thought) came into being, which through and by giving absolute priority and precedence in respect of the functional point of view vis-à-vis the substantialistic or substance/essence-based point of view, the atomisation of all entireties and totalities (*or*: the breaking up and fragmenting of all totalities and wholes into atoms, individual parts or

¹ Panajotis Kondylis, *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform. Die liberale Moderne und die massendemokratische Postmoderne*, Weinheim 1991 (= *The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form. The liberal modern era and the mass-democratic postmodern era* (to be translated into English by 2025 or 2030? – “God Willing”)). P.K., *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992 (= *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*). P.K., „Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln“ (= “Utopia and historical action”), in: *Politische Lageanalyse, Festschrift für H. J. Arndt zum 70. Geburtstag*, Bruchsal 1993, pp. 163-175.

individuals), and the arbitrary (random, at will, of one's own volition) combinability (or, any kind of combinability whatsoever) of everything with everything, corresponded with the picture, image and the reality of an extremely mobile mass society, in which goods, social positions and values are constantly exchanged. This ideational and social paradigm shift has hitherto in its complete significance, implications and reality (yet it does not simply point beyond bourgeois liberalism, but beyond the European New Times as a whole) hardly become known (i.e. is hardly a part of people's consciousness and awareness) (*or*: This "change in example" in the area of ideas and at the level of social life never became until today known in all of its extent and radicality (since it signifies not only the end of European liberalism, but also the conclusion (closing and expiration) of the European New Times)), because the educated (and cultured, cultivated) portions of the population still draw on many elements of bourgeois culture, and frequently perceive the anti-bourgeois only against the backdrop of the bourgeois (*or*: and often perceive from bourgeois culture's perspective whatever does not belong to bourgeois culture)^v. Since (Because) one has the impression that the programme directors of private, commercial television and the patrons of discotheques know better in what kind of society they live than many sociologists and historians – to say nothing of classical philologists. This would certainly not be the first time in history in which something similar happened. Educated (and other) pagans (heathens) (*or*: Most of the educated and non-educated idolaters) had still in the 3rd or 4th century after Christ hardly noticed and registered the paradigm shift already having taken place for a long time, and continued to talk about the liveliness, vitality and the ability at renewal of their faith, roughly as many today rave on about an "unfinished project of the modern (era, age) (i.e. modernity or the New Times)".

Since the anti-communistic struggle of the West was conducted not least of all in the name of liberalism, thus the optical illusion was established, strengthened

and consolidated that the collapse of outdated communism was tantamount to a victory of evergreen liberalism. In the course of this, it is a matter of a vague and normatively coloured or charged concept of liberalism, which did not constitute an unequivocal social, but rather an ideological indication. Only the, in the propaganda battle, often added explication may be regarded as a social indication that Western liberalism does not mean class privileges, but the in principle and fundamental openness of society (*or*: but open society), equal chances and opportunities, and affluence (prosperity), but also social protection (shelter) for all (everyone). This implicit repudiation and denial of the original bourgeois class content(s) of liberalism (from the restrictions on voting up to the rejection of the welfare state) signaled in itself both the turn towards mass democracy as well as – since it was thought of, and imagined as, an answer to the communistic critique of capitalism – the influence which the threat of a red revolution had exerted on that turn towards mass democracy^{vi}. However, having an effect at least just as much as this threat was the gradual penetrating and permeating of the collective consciousness or collective unconscious mind and subconscious with the ideal of material equality, which from the beginning was summoned by all currents of socialistic thought, but most emphatically by the Marxists against the bourgeois-liberal insistence on merely formal-legal equality as the guarantee of freedom. Typically enough, people, factions and parties, who otherwise had not much or nothing at all in mind in respect of sympathising with communism as it was practised in Russia, became the mouthpiece, megaphone and trumpet of this ideal, in whatever different packaging (presentation, form, layout) and intensity on each and every respective occasion: social democrats of vague Marxist inspiration, who wanted against the communistic inimical and hated brother to prove they were better because they were “realistic” and “liberal” friends of the people; Christians, who now continued charitable traditions zealously and connected them with the social (welfare) state approaches, since they, after the decline, decomposition

and dissolution of theological metaphysics, saw in “social activity (actuation, action)” the great chance and opportunity for the maintenance of their religion’s influence; and not least “social liberals”, who undertook a reinterpretation of classical liberalism, by going beyond formal equality and deducing from the old individualistic principle(s) now a right of the individual to social protection and shelter (refuge) by way, and on the part, of the state. The strengthening, consolidation and dissemination of such perceptions went with the building and creation of the social (welfare) state and with the gradual displacement and replacement of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class, or class socially setting the tone, by in principle open economic and political elites of a changing composition. It would be a mistake to think that this all was going on and came about automatically as the result of the second and third industrial revolution, of increased productivity, and the mass production accordingly made possible, although these preconditions were objectively indispensable^{vii}. Yet also social-economic processes are formed, shaped and moulded through what the people want participating in such processes, through how they perceive their social world and their own activity in it. If we look at and survey history in its entirety, the modern conviction that it is neither willed by God (divinely ordained), nor natural, that some have, whilst others have little or nothing, has become and constitutes one of the greatest upheavals (subversions, reversals) in the “realm of ideas” – and its consequences will perhaps be unforeseeable if such a conviction is militantly projected and represented by 5, 8 or 10 billion people (humans). Our contemporary “neoliberals” are kidding themselves in their assumption that extensive, far-reaching privatisation of the economy could bring about and effect a corresponding privatisation of expectations, a making do with what one has got (self-contentedness) as a result of insight into individual incapacity and into economic logic (*or*: on account of the ascertainment that certain people lack the personal credentials and capabilities in order to enrich themselves, and on account of conforming with economic

logic). Irrespective of the essential and substantial contribution of the state to the flourishing of the private economy in the West (*or*: in(side) Western countries), this private economy draws its legitimation from the certainty (or feeling) that *it* is the best means for the achieving of general prosperity, affluence and of a surplus which allows considerable, noteworthy redistributions and the blunting, diminution (reduction, dismantling) of the crassest material inequalities. Should such a private economy not have been able to fulfil any longer such mass-democratic expectations, then it and the “system” would be plunged into a crisis of legitimation (*or*: it would throw (plunge) itself together with the “system” into a crisis of legitimisation). So, the performance (efficiency, output, yield) of the private economy does not constitute – in other words – a private issue, but a public and highly political matter of concern – and it became that under the pressure of the anti-liberal demand for the material interpretation of the equality principle.

The broad, comprehensive way of looking at the social aspect therefore makes it clear which fallacies follow from the tendency to place little value on, or to disregard, the historical impact and influence of Marxism and communism, and indeed owing to a failure to appreciate the qualitative features and elements of the turn towards mass democracy. But the sober observer can draw the same teaching from the analysis of a second aspect, namely, of the planetary aspect.² The Enlightenment philosophy of history, especially in its Hegelian version, had unified world history due to the fact that it prescribed world history one single ethical-normative aim (goal, objective), towards which unified world history had to necessarily be directed^{viii}. Marx of course held fast to this normative-eschatological unification of world history, but far more important was the fact that he explained the united character of planetary events and the planetary becoming on the basis of social and economic factors, and drew political

² P. Kondylis, *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992 [= *Planetary politics after the Cold War*].

conclusions from such factors. He comprehended, like hardly anyone else before him, that capitalistic industry had brought about a deep caesura (break or turning point) in the course of history by having created a world network into which, with milder or harder methods, the said historical caesura forced all nations. The industrial bourgeoisie brought about in this sense a world revolution; that is why for its part it could now only be overthrown by a world revolution. And this new and conclusive world revolution – the proletarian – was supposed to realise, i.e. bring to fruition, a united social blueprint on, i.e. regarding or over, the whole earth. The planetary and the social dimension[[s]] were therefore thought about and understood together and in a unified manner, and in their unity, they connected with the real forces of historical development. The struggles of the nations with one another, as well as the struggles inside of the nations, took on now, through their being conducted and fought out on only one world stage, a new meaning; they became in part [[factors and phenomena]] for the setting and triggering off, in part for the condensing and consolidation of, universal tendencies. And the direction seemed to be singular and irreversible: continually narrower, tighter interweaving and continually more united methods of behaving and acting in terms of economics ((extra-)household stewardship and management) after the end of the agrarian-patriarchal pre-history of mankind.

If we want to apprehend the *historical* range (and consequences) of this concept(ual plan) (conception), then we must look at and judge it from the side, i.e. angle or point of view, of the driving forces carved/brought/worked out by such a concept(ual plan) (conception), and the socio-economic magnitudes correlated within it – not from its utopian-eschatological side. Liberal “realists” celebrate easy triumphs by emphatically highlighting and underlining the failure of the attempt at realising all-out the original utopian plan³. But can one dispute

³ P. Kondylis, „Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln“, *Festschrift für H. J. Arndt zum 70. Geburtstag*, Bruchsal 1993 [= “Utopia and historical action”].

the enormous historical effect of Christianity because neither the eschatological promise and pledge was kept or verified, nor did the command of love considerably influence social praxis (practice)^{ix}? Further still: can one doubt that its, i.e. the original utopian plan's real historical impact and influence was possible precisely through the invoking of the unrealisable and even supra-historical or unhistorical and extra-historical ideas or magnitudes? Such paradoxes and enigmas are solved only when one breaks with the habit having roots in the moral needs of taking normative ideas at (their) face value, and of judging them in accordance with their realisation or realisability, instead of tracking down, and uncovering, their functions and changes ((trans)mutations) corresponding to, and commensurate with, the social peripeteias of their bearers. A further rationalistic prejudice likewise hinders insight into the historical impact and influence of utopian plans. Namely, a schema for historical action (= a historical action plan) is taken as the starting point in which the ends (goals) and means are coordinated and remain in this, its symmetry, controllable at all times, so that between subjective intentions and the objective outcome of events and facts (becoming), no chasm pops or opens up. Obviously, however, according to this schema, action can only be directed (*or*: conform with this schema) which stretches over a relatively short period of time, and is borne by relatively few actors (*or*: and is processed by relatively few in number bearers). But the utopia of the planetary classless society had an almost one-and-a-half-century-long effect as a historical force and power, under considerably different circumstances and through the acts, actions and deeds (energies) of millions and millions of human existences, who connected it (i.e. this utopia of the planetary classless society) with different concrete content(s) on each and every respective occasion – that is, it had an effect under conditions, under which the long waves of historical action devour, gobble up the short waves of historical action, and the heterogony of ends submerges and destroys the symmetry of means and ends, plans and realisations. Consequently,

striving after the absolute utopian aim (objective, goal, end) splits up, ramifies (i.e. branches out) and is distributed, dispersed into riverbeds deviating and diverging from one another, whereby it is put into, or placed in (at), the service of relative [[= not absolute]] social-political endeavours. In so far as these latter endeavours are able to be distanced from the original absolute objective(s) (from the settings of the original aim), their character, nevertheless, is not left to chance and coincidence. Because every utopian plan contains, apart from the uncompromising dream of the overcoming of all conflict(s) and suffering(s), a critique of the existing state of affairs, and indeed in those sides, i.e. aspects or facets of it, which *par excellence* become perceived as a hindrance and obstacle on the road to utopia^x. If private property e.g. is considered such a hindrance and obstacle, then not only is the final utopian state of affairs (situation) accordingly imagined and adumbrated, but just as much is the realpolitik (realistic politics) shaped which appears and is exercised in its name. The abolition of private ownership by the state and the possession of the state by the heralds of utopia can therefore *ipso facto* be made out to be the in principle realisation of this latter utopia. But also in countries in which such a thing does not happen, “progressive” real-political endeavours are concentrated on the dismantling of the privileges of the possessors of these privileges^{xi}, on the creation of collective forms of ownership, or at least on the as far as possible tight binding and connection of pleasure to performance (efficiency).

In all these cases whose internal interrelation cannot escape or remain hidden to the attentive observer, it is seen how the utopian plan via its social-critical dimension becomes the instrument of concrete politics, that is, of power politics, which brings forth shifts and displacements in social stratification and not least of all in the positions of power of the elites. With the degree of density which planetary politics reached in the epoch (era, age) of European imperialism, the strong power-political impact had to take a world-political

dimension (*or*: the strong presence or power politics (the politics of power) within the utopian construct(ion), had to take planetary dimensions), whilst utopia became the banner of a great nation which strove for the position of a great and world Power, and beyond that, world domination. We are here dealing with a point of decisive meaning for the understanding of the history of the 20th century and of the place of communism in it. To the two fundamental aspects of this history mentioned above (until now), namely, the planetary and the social, a third is added: the national – and indeed not as the weakening or as the disconnection of both of the first two as regards each other, but rather in order to further condense their network (mesh or grid) and to bind and tie their additive impact and influence to concrete bearers. That means: the history of the 20th century since 1917 was characterised by the appearance of great nations which want to impose (push through) a certain schema of social organisation (*or*: a social blueprint) at the world level, and heightens, intensifies the degree of density of planetary politics precisely through the tight connection of the social and the planetary with each other. Nations, which on account of their potential are capable of playing such a role, become bearers of universal values and of schemata of social organisation (*or*: of social blueprints) with claims of universal application, because they otherwise would not have the chance and opportunity to dominate or govern the planetary scene – and with the, in the meanwhile, attained density of the world network (mesh or grid), more modest aims and goals do not provide any absolute security and safety. Bearers of universal or world-historical ideas are therefore certain nations, not the whole world. Nonetheless, the difference between this new and more intensive phase of planetary politics and the epoch of European imperialism cannot be overlooked, for it is patently obvious. The imperialistic Powers indeed had certain ideas about the shaping and formation, or the partitioning and division, of the globe, and in fact talked of their self-imposed (self-appointed) civilizing mission; yet at the same time they assumed as self-evident the clear dividing

lines between “European” and “Asian” or “Negro” with regard to social needs and social or political possibilities. The thought and perception that the same plan of social organisation (*or*: social blueprint) can and should by and large find planetary application, rises and comes into sight peremptorily on the world horizon the moment at which two large, great nations step onto (appear on or enter) the world-historical stage: communistic Russia and the capitalistic United States. Both represent, pursue and promote – as nations wanting (*or*: with the ambition) to be great and world Powers – the programmatic connection of the social and the planetary (standpoint or aspect) with each other, albeit with opposing and opposed signs and symbolism. Which signs and symbolism would prevail and predominate depended on the outcome of the conflict between the great (large) nations, not for instance on the immanent “features of the system” looked at *in abstracto*. The planetary plan of social organisation (*or*: the planetary social blueprint) of the communists failed, shipwrecked, in other words, not because of its moral or economic inferiority, but because Russia’s national power ran into the superior national power of the United States. (One could say the same with regard to the reaching of national-socialistic Germany for world power). If capitalistic “logic (or Reason)” had been incarnated world-historically in Belgium and in Switzerland, and the planned economy’s “absurdity (or Unreason)” in Russia and China, then the preferences of world history would have been completely different than what turned out in 1989. This insight and ascertainment are of the utmost historical and methodical (i.e. methodological) importance: it shows how deeply political and social history go (flow) into each other, i.e. intertwine and interlock with each other.

The same thought can be formulated in reverse: the world-historical potency of communism, that is, the capacity and ability to champion a plan of social organisation (social blueprint) on a planetary scale, would have been equal to nil if it had to be condensed within Albania’s borders. However, communism

seized and conquered Russia and China – and *this* gave it momentum and seriousness; the planetary, the social and the national (standpoint or aspect) could and had to (*or*: could and, were in fact obliged to) now come and act together. In actual fact, the national endeavours and efforts of Russia (or of the erstwhile Soviet Union) at achieving world power were tightly connected with processes which changed the world map, and had as a consequence an unprecedented thickening and condensing of planetary politics. One is today easily inclined to forget the powerful influence that the October Revolution exerted on the colonised peoples of Asia and Africa. The October Revolution's contribution to the collapse of the colonial system existed not only in respect of political and military support, which it offered to the anti-colonial movements and to the corresponding elites, but it stretched to the ideologically and psychologically crucial field of the legitimation of the philosophy of history. The proletarian peoples were supposed to, at a planetary level through their struggle against the colonial masters and rulers (i.e. colonisers), accompany or even anticipate the revolution of the proletarians in the developed capitalistic countries. The Stalinistic five-stage schema of historical development allowed and provided for (*or*: The Stalinist schema regarding historical evolution considered obligatory on a universal scale the crossing of five stages^{xii} and hence foresaw) the social convergence of all nations shortly before (*or*: at the threshold of) the completion (and consummation) of history, so that now historical praxis (practice) could refute and prove wrong the humiliating racist teachings. In any event, the former colonial masters and rulers (colonisers) were on the point of and under the pressure of the geopolitical competition of the Soviet Union – whether they liked it or not –, discovering the equal dignity and the equal rights of all men (i.e. humans). The coming into being of numerous subjects with equal rights under international law out of the process of decolonisation (*or*: through the process of the collapse of the colonial system) widened the world-political room to move of the Soviet Union (*or*: the leeway

or scope of the Soviet Union in the arena of world politics), and actually (topically) or potentially turned every corner of the planet into a place to fight over. Thus, the Cold War signified a high point in the form-related (i.e. formal-morphological) formation and completion of modern planetary politics, by strongly and vigorously driving forward, and keeping in mind as well as making clear every day, the tight interdependence of all regions of the world and of all aspects of world politics.

If Marxism and the communistic movement had an effect in the industrial Western countries and lands above all because of the fact that they spread the material interpretation of the liberal idea (notion, thought) of equality, and by soaking, saturating the social atmosphere of capitalism by the growing enmity towards the type of the “capitalist”, then they in the economically underdeveloped nations, in which they seized power, reinforced in a different way the planetary tendency of development (*or*: otherwise helped the planetary evolutionary tendency to [[achieve]] a breakthrough) towards mass democracy. Here the existing pre-capitalistic or half-capitalistic patriarchalistic social structures were smashed to pieces with violence, atomisation (the fragmentation and splintering of society into individuals) and at the same time the massification of individuals, were promoted not only through the dissolution and disintegration of the extended family and the incorporation (putting into order) of individuals into mass organisations of a vocational/professional/occupational and political kind, but also through policing (spying) and terror(ism). The character of authority as dominance was also changed fundamentally, in relation to which the heightening of its intensity and its strict, intransigent exercising accompanied a detachment from the sociological type of class domination and from the setting-up and establishment of a pure (unmixed) ruling and dominating elite. Namely, anyone in principle could reach, attain and acquire or occupy a superior or dominant position (and in actual fact nearly all

the members of the bureaucratic nomenklatura started in practice “from the absolute bottom” (*or*: started their career from the lower rungs of each and every respective hierarchy)), on the sole condition that he possessed and mastered the art of survival in a dictatorship and was in the position to optimally exploit the available pathways to ascension (primarily the mechanisms of the party)^{xiii}. That can be called democratic in the sense that the person concerned had indeed at his disposal intellectual(-spiritual) and political capabilities, aptitudes, talents (qualifications, credentials), but did not have to fulfil and satisfy any social prerequisites (preconditions). There was no juristically i.e. legally safeguarded and inherited private property on a socially significant scale, and the in part sizeable and considerable differences in standard of living between “equal” and “more equal” animals (to remember Orwell) were mainly founded in, and arose from, the privileged access of the nomenklatura to the enjoyment of and pleasure in consumer goods, immovables (real property, real estate) and services.

The dictatorship of the party was exercised in the name of utopia, that is, with the declared aim of the realisation of the utopian plan of social organisation (= the utopian social blueprint). It was legitimised with the argument that political action in view of (*or*: which has as its aim) the establishment of utopia, but under conditions and circumstances under which this establishment *hic et nunc* is impossible, demands the taking of extraordinary measures. The domination of the party was made therefore not least crystal-clear in its responsibility and jurisdiction (powers, competence, scope) to bindingly define when conditions for the realisation of utopia were to be seen as ripe, and over and above that, when to postpone the realisation of utopia in the name of precisely this same realisation. It is obvious that the aforementioned argument was ideological, i.e., it gave the party the possibility of doing something other than that which it ought to have done on the basis of the narrow, strict interpretation of the same

argument in the sense of the utopian objective or setting of the utopian aim. Under “something other/something else” the acts and actions are of course meant which were everything other than utopian, namely, they were dictated by calculus, i.e. weighing up and calculation in terms of power politics, and served partly the strengthening and consolidation of new social hierarchies, partly the pushing through, i.e. the pursuit and achievement of national aims and goals. Hence, the critics of utopia commit a serious logical and historical error when they want to deduce the violent character of communistic domination straight from the striving after the establishment of utopia; this amounts to or entails a confusion between utopian or utopistic ideology and the legitimation of communistic domination, and, this communistic domination’s reality as determined by power politics. Violence, however, always arrives on the scene (there) where the distance between the present, existing and the striven after or pursued state of affairs (situation of things) appears to be so great that only by way of the cutting of the Gordian knot can the said distance be bridged; in other words, not merely utopian projects and undertakings beget violence, i.e. such which aim at the establishment and achievement of a perfect society, but all large-scale, grandiose ventures and undertakings which stand before considerable real obstacles and countervailing forces, and that is why such non-utopian but nonetheless grandiose and large-scale undertakings can be, or possibly are, unrealisable from the very beginning. The historical proof for that does not have to be sought for a long time: political action in the name of utopia has put no new kind of, exclusively its own and without a second thought, as such, knowable forms of violence in the world, that is, it did not beget any form of violence which would not have been exercised and applied in the pursuit of religious, national, social, racist etc. aims and goals. The great collective acts of violence of this [[the 20th]] century, i.e. both world wars, had nothing to do with utopian endeavours, although they coincided with the planetary unfolding of the communistic movement. And the other way around: it can be proven that the

most excruciating and harrowing paroxysms of communistic violence can be traced back, and are due, to reasons of realpolitik (realistic politics). Violent collectivisation and forced industrialisation in the Soviet Union were set in motion in the justified expectation of a great war, in which that internationally isolated giant land or big country would have to taste and suffer once again the bitter fate (lot) of 1853, 1904^{xiv} and 1917/18 – and perhaps even worse –, had it sat and waited for the long, calm, tranquil development of the economy and society. Only the five-year plans put the Soviet Union in the position of setting and lining up on time a modern technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) army of an industrial power, and of winning the arms race and the war against Germany. Because of that, the course (flow) of world history in the 20th century was literally changed. This, – one may not want to see and admit out of anti-communistic pathos –, however, the taboo of this ascertainment is (*or*: the conversion of this ascertainment into a taboo constitutes) ideology and propaganda, not historical science. The Stalinist Soviet Union, not liberal France or parliamentary England, defeated national socialism. And the preconditions for the successful military intervention of the United States in Western Europe were created in Stalingrad.

Whereas now the “right-wing” critics of utopia tried hard to prove that the original/initial Marxism and Soviet communism belonged together in the same sense as utopia and violence (*or*: interweave with each other in the same sense as utopia with violence), on the “left-wing” side of the ideological spectrum, many and influential intellectuals were preparing to provide evidence of the opposite. According to them, Marx’s work contains an indestructible, indissoluble humanistic core, and a perception of the essence of man which cannot be absorbed and exhausted in “mechanistic” schemata regarding the evolution of history (historical development), and should be released from its being embraced (taken or collected) by economistic Soviet Marxism-Leninism

in order to serve as the theoretical basis of a social critique of a new type, and of a corresponding renewal, of the socialistic movement. In view of their ethical prejudice, biases and their rootedness (roots) in the Western European cultural milieu^{xv}, these intellectuals^{xvi} of course could hardly ever realise and understand the national and planetary necessities which guided the political action of the Soviet Union and of China; that is why they vacillated constantly between the naivety of the fellow-traveller, who overlooks a lot, beautifies, i.e. puts things into a favourable light, or simply swallows, and, the indignation and outrage of someone disappointed and let down, who then resorts to and latches onto downright daemonology as a method of explanation. All the same, they had the impression that the Soviet Union and China were, so to speak, obliged to realise the political programme of Western intellectuals already because they made use of the red flag and the rhetoric belonging to it (i.e. the red flag and the associated ideology). As intellectuals, whose power claim must consist in translating and applying certain (of their own) ideas and values fully, directly and bindingly (in)to social praxis, they could not and did not want to see that ideas and values in general have an effect on a larger scale only, that is, by being worked on (edited, processed, treated, handled) by (*or*: by, that is, becoming objects of processing on the part of) interested interpreters. By the way, not otherwise did the humanistic re-interpretation of original Marxism fare (*or*: Besides, that was the fate of the “humanitarian” re-interpretation of initial Marxism)^{xvii}. The “alienation (and estrangement)” theorems achieved in the cultural-revolutionary 1960s and 1970s broad popularity (*or*: The theorems of “alienation” became most (or exceedingly) popular in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of the, in those days, “cultural revolution”), because they were understood in the light of a keyword or catchword (slogan), which in view of the hedonistic fundamental orientation of mass producing and mass consuming, anti-authoritarian and permissive mass democracy came to be a key function (*or*: which acquired a key-function on account of the hedonistic basic

orientation of mass democracy as social formation dominated by mass production, mass consumption and ethical (moral) tolerance and permissiveness): what is meant (what we mean) of course is the absolutely electrifying keyword/catchword of individual “self-realisation”.

The mass-democratic re-interpretation or meta-interpretation of Marxian humanism, which suited and went well with the above-mentioned material interpretation of the right to equality, was for one reason indispensable, which *prima facie* may strike someone as strange, or is perhaps paradoxical. Marx’s ideal of man (humans) or Marx’s ideal man stemmed from the bourgeois educational ideal as to its basic features, in which the classicistic perceptions and representations of harmony mixed with the anthropological utopia of *homo universalis*; the classless society, in which everyone would be able to develop unrestrained(ly) and uninhibited(ly), would abound, teem with great/major and small/minor Shakespeares and Goethes rather than with tone-setting (trend-setting) pop-stars, tourists living it up and living life to the full, and jet-set professors and intellectuals. The deep cultural rootedness and debt of Marxism in and to the bourgeois educational ideal and generally in and to bourgeois literary and artistic forms is seen during the 20th century in its fundamental rejection of the literary-artistic avant-garde and the modern (i.e. modernism), despite the sporadic and unfortunate, ill-fated or unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation. In the West, this rejection was frequently felt to be a sign (indication) of philistine or petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness and provincialism, however, this impression could only come into being because the West itself had, through the paradigm shift around 1900, turned its back on bourgeois culture. The Marxists could therefore now invoke the great realist traditions of bourgeois art, which socialistic realism was supposed to continue, in order to interpret the modernistic and avant-gardistic severance from and abandonment of such bourgeois realist traditions as the ideological expression

of the now progressive, i.e. ongoing and advancing bourgeois decadence; since they deemed or considered themselves to be the only historically conceivable, thinkable inheritor and heir of bourgeois society, they were hardly capable of the insight that after the bourgeois age (epoch, era), in the West, nevertheless, something other than communism was possible, something whose ideological projection constituted exactly the *anti-bourgeois* modern and avant-garde (or: the *anti-bourgeois* currents of modernism and the avant-garde). The Marxists, as the last to hold the flag of bourgeois traditions and thought figures (schemata of thought) high, did so also in the sector of the theory of history, where they insisted on the hypostatisation of History and the notion or perception of stage-wise (gradual, graduated) progress. All-round Man and the progressing History were, however, precisely the entities of the substances through which the bourgeois-liberal world theory (i.e. world view) drove out and displaced the theological world view. When the mass-democratic culture of the 20th century dissolved these substances into interchangeable and freely combinable functions, the bourgeois thoughts (intellectual) world (or world of ideas) was fatally struck. The collapse of Marxism anthropologically oriented in terms of the philosophy of history consequently sealed, stamped and confirmed the end of bourgeois culture. This must of course, from the perspective of ideologically determined interpretations and periodisations of the history of the 20th century appear to be the greatest of all paradoxes (or: as the paradox of paradoxes).

In short, for it to be able to exert its historical influence and impact, Marxism had to be ideologised, i.e. converted into ideology – irrespective of whether under the influence/aegis, or taking the form, of “dialectical and historical materialism”, or anthropologically postulated –, in order to be able to have an effect historically. In this sense, Marxism is entirely absorbed by, or is totally fused with, the communistic or the “left-wing” political movements of the East and of the West, i.e. it has no existence outside of each and every ideological

expression of those movements, and it does not exist in any chemically pure form. Vis-à-vis the great scientist, which Marx was *inter alia* too, it would, nonetheless, be unjust, and for social science itself, a significant loss, if one did not add that certain basic or central ideas of his possess a lasting, permanent value, and are in themselves immune to ideological usage – in fact, on the contrary, they can serve as the key to unearth and expose the artifices (deceptions, clever tricks) of ideological thought. Never, do I believe, were certain basic positions of the Marxian way of looking at history so true and so topical as in the planetary history precisely starting now, and indeed the views that the level and character of the relation between natural being or creature, man, and, the rest of nature, have a decisive effect and impact on the constitution, composition and texture of the forms of socialisation (*or*: on the mode of the constitution and of the structuring or arranging of human society); that human relations, which are crystallised in these forms of socialisation (*or*: in social structuring/arranging), are apprehended and strengthened, consolidated or modified on the part of actors through ideologies, that is, they are reflected and echoed in(side) a “false consciousness”, which satisfies normative and at the same time polemical needs; that the discrepancy between false consciousness and real processes do not bring historical becoming to a standstill, but really drives historical becoming forward (propels historical becoming or pushes it along), and that the heterogony of ends represents or constitutes the natural mechanism for the unwinding or development of processes of «*longue durée*». Undogmatically interpreted, these theses apply regardless of sociological preferences as to the priority of this or that material and ideational factors, and they can be connected or linked in a fertile manner to methodical (i.e. methodological), anthropological and social-theoretical approaches, which more or less differ from the corresponding Marxian approaches. Precisely this, however, demonstrates that Marx’s scientific work, even if one wants to apprehend it as a mere inventory of basic questions or

fundamental problems, belongs to the fixed stock of modern social science. No modern thinker has so deeply, profoundly and so vividly, graphically shown like Marx that history, economy, politics, philosophy and anthropology are basically taken as one single thing and one single discipline (*or*: basically constitute only one science) – irrespective of under which signs or symbolism Marx himself wanted to effect the great unification of all of the aforesaid sub-disciplines. If the mass of the contended and unperceptive “specialists”, who populate and flood the mass-democratic scene of knowledge, can no longer stand at the height of this achievement, and either mock and deride this same achievement, or can emulate it (or mimic/imitate/ape it) only through anemic constructs cobbled together (or made) from second or third-hand materials, then this is not the fault of that great thinker^{xviii}.

But precisely if one assesses Marx’s scientific feat and value in this way, one must know that the logic of the scholar’s study, and, the logic of social evolution, social development and of social struggles are two different kinds of things. The key for the understanding of this latter logic of social evolution and social struggles cannot be the self-understanding of the actors^{xix} – this self-understanding constitutes only one of the factors having an effect. The self-understanding of the defeated and vanquished, namely, of the communistic movement, which historically appeared in the name of the realisation of utopia, cannot explain amongst other things why utopia could not nevertheless be realised. And the self-understanding of the victorious West can neither make the historical influence of the communistic foe on the moulding and shaping of today’s West clear (nor interpret the said historical influence of communism as the West’s foe), nor account for or shed light on the perspectives, i.e. prospects of this world, which by no means are deduced from the mere summation of the features and advantages of the West minus the evils of communism. Regardless of what today is fashion and conformism, and also regardless of how many

scientists succumb and are subordinated, and how much, to fashion and conformism: Marxism and communism cannot be judged historically as if the ideology of the Western camp were the precise expression of the sole faithful interpreter of historical movement. Should this in actual fact be the case, then this correspondence of Is and consciousness would be a historical novum (novelty), that is, the West would have realised (made reality) what the Marxist mythological dialectic expected of the proletariat: that the proletariat's own self-understanding coincides with the knowledge of the objective course of history, and the proletariat is constituted as the self-understanding of this latter objective course of history. Of course, the victor always feels the right to the assumption or belief that his victory is tangible proof of the coincidence of his self-understanding with history's meaning. The West would, indeed, like to present its victory simply as the victory of freedom (FREEDOM) writ large (*or*: Freedom with a capital F), however, at the same time it is about something much more concrete: it must accomplish and finish, under its aegis and with its signs, i.e. symbolism, the interweaving of planetary and social (*or*: it must see the interweaving of the planetary and the social element through), which the history of the 20th century has set as order of the day – it must, therefore, push (carry) through and impose its own social plan (*or*: plan of social organisation) on a planetary scale. The discrepancy between its self-understanding and the objective course of history will manifest itself in the contradictions and the conflicts which this undertaking will display (*or*: will beget/give birth to). In itself, that interweaving of the planetary and the social element, which through the driving force of the motors and engines of mass producing and mass consuming mass democracy reaches its greatest density, proves that the New Times have come to their end, since they were a specifically European phenomenon – and with it, bourgeois-liberal culture is also at an end, which put its stamp (seal) on (*or*: which stamped) the epoch from the Renaissance to the 20th century. Despite the propagandistic sweet nothings, honeyed words and

beautiful-sounding eloquence, and ideological self-deception, the West is today flooding the rest of the world not with this bourgeois-liberal culture, but with mass-democratic technicism and economism, on the one hand, and with the hedonistic mass culture of Kitsch, on the other hand^{xx}. Even if we want to disregard the grave, serious reasons which threaten the social plan of the West (*or*: the Western plan of social organisation) exactly in its growing planetarisation – ecological and demographic factors, the world-wide spreading and dissemination of anomie, the sharpening of the struggles of distribution both amongst the great, large nations as well as inside of the Western nations exactly because of the intensifying (*or*: more intense) competition and rivalry from the outside; the dissolving, abolishment or annulment of the conjunction or coupling (political package deal) of the free (market) economy and parliament – , the possibility is not to be dismissed out of hand that the economic and political principles which the West today champions, could be turned against it. Free trade will appear in a different light when the first exporting country (exporter) will no longer be called the United States or Germany, but China^{xxi}; and freedom of movement will trigger historical and barbaric reactions should or when hundreds of millions set off to cross, and or, actually cross the borders of the industrial^{xxii} countries. Whereas the victory of the principles of the West in the bourgeois-liberal and imperialistic epoch meant *eo ipso* the victory of the West, the victory of the principles of today's mass-democratic West can bring about at a planetary level the decline or collapse (destruction, breakup, downfall, ruin) of the West (Occident). That can proceed or happen slowly, but it can also happen quickly. The most rapid disintegration (decomposition) of the communistic imperium (empire) does not merely show that communism was a giant with clay feet (feet of clay), as dominant opinion in the West says (*or*: as the public opinion of the West believes). The teaching is much more general and means: states and regimes, no matter of what name (*or*: no matter what they

are called), are of their nature fragile construct(ion)s or assemblies and can be broken up in a flash.

ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and *have nothing whatsoever to do with P.K.. Readers can and in fact **probably must** simply ignore them and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in the mirror and say "Oh my God, I'm really ugly, and retarded". I do it every day, and it's the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.*

ⁱ Throughout the site www.panagiotiskondylis.com, I have explained a number of times that "liberal" and "liberalism" stricto sensu and scientifically refer to the ideal type of the basic social formation between *societas civilis* (feudalism) and mass democracy (incorporating social democracy). Liberalism's heyday was in the 19th century, it was Western European, oligarchic, capitalistic, formal-legalistic, imperialistic, highly crudely racist against Africans, Asians, Native Americans, Aborigines et al., in ways different to today's dominant anti-white racism whose logical, if not always avowed programmatical, endpoint is the genocide of historically white peoples and nations. "Liberal" in this volume can also refer to "liberal utopia" as an ideological programme of world "free markets" and "individual rights" so that (Zio-)America can try to dominate the world in imperialistic-like fashion, incl. through regime change, regime control, cultural and propaganda projection through the Other-worshipping and "degeneracy and fem(in)o-faggot"-worshipping GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ???ish and or ???nist owned and or controlled mass media and mass entertainment centred in, but not limited to, the USA. "Liberalism" in the sense of its common use in today's mainstream discourse is totally misleading, and what is really meant is Western mass-democratic ideology with GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ???ish and or ???nist input. P.K. quite rightly never referred to ???s and ???nism in the context of mass democracy, because apart from living and working in Germany, he left the particulars and the who is who of individuals and groups to specific sociological-historical study which is undertaken to widely varying degrees of success, quality and accuracy within sites like Prof. Kevin MacDonald's <http://www.theoccidentobserver.net/> or Ron Unz's <http://www.unz.com/>. Obviously, P.K. had absolutely nothing to do with such sites and probably would have considered them as being of very poor levels of analysis and scholarship overall, but not necessarily with regard to everything contained therein. Also, obviously, we cannot expect any seriousness and self-reflection from "The Academy" which at elite level in the West is staffed GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY (owing, inter alia, to primitive secret society(-like) networking,

nepotism, collusion, etc.) by ???ish and or ???nist “Academics and Professors”, who, again, obviously, defend their own. Hence, the scientific understanding of the concept of “liberalism” is very different to today’s ideological use of this concept. Something similar happens with the concept of “conservatism”, which I have explained elsewhere within my site.

ⁱⁱ P.K., as always, writes from the point of view of Europe, and it would never have occurred to him to use the USA-centred highly ideologically loaded, representative of the Zionist-Protestant/Evangelical alliance, “Judeo-Christian”. On the other hand, for the purposes of this article, it is not a major issue, in any event.

ⁱⁱⁱ Until the end of the Cold War, it was common to refer to the Soviet Block and Eastern Europe, and not only to China, Vietnam, etc., as the “East” compared to the “West”, which in turn somehow also, at least sort of, included Japan and South Korea!

^{iv} Obviously “the Left” here is meant in accordance with its 19th century and 20th century (until c. 1945/1968/1991) meaning of social democracy, socialism and communism, and not in today’s Western mass-democratic sense, which is hardly distinguishable from the Western mass-democratic “Right”.

^v This is another “unbelievable insight” by P.K., which not only has cultural and demographic implications, but political as well. The present article was published in 1994 and P.K. died in 1998, and at around that time and for about another 10 years it never occurred to me how rapidly the West was “spinning out of control” (I then thought that all would be sort of “good” until c. 2050 when I would die, barring premature death!), so that c. 2015 we have reached a stage where “intellectuals”, incl. those who GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY belong to a particular group, are openly calling for white genocide based on “white privilege” etc. when members of the same particular group GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY occupy positions of relative power and influence. It appears that – notwithstanding that a few people have “woken up” – matters have proceeded to a point where hardly anything inherited from the West will be salvageable within a few more decades simply because there won’t be enough Western people (taught how) to connect with the cultural achievements of the West, though a kind of “intermediate period” before total collapse, lasting for a number of decades or longer, is still a possibility, if not probability.

^{vi} Of course, it “just happens” that both the Bolshevik and the Menshevik leaderships, which grosso modo symbolise and or refer to both the creation of the Soviet Union and the social-democratic, i.e. Western mass-democratic response to communism, GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY contained – just like international bankers and financiers and the avante-garde of the 1960s and 1970s cultural revolution, etc. – people of a particular group. Historical causation of course is a far more complicated matter, and involves decades and centuries-long processes of social and intellectual(-spiritual) change, and in Western Europe that means (nominally) Christian Europeans taking the lead from the 13th century until the 19th century, without the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE degree of involvement of members of the aforesaid (tiny minority, but very effectively networking) group until the mid to late 19th and 20th century, when *they* (at elite level) really “got cracking” with incredibly high levels of efficacy and achievement as to forms of power, influence, and control.

^{vii} There is your “clue” as to how macro-historical chains of causation can take place over two or three or more centuries and then converge and fit in with “parasitical-like”, “primitive secret society-like” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystallisations of forms of power within a particular group, whose members at the level of elites seize the opportunities presented to them, including by using their clear advantage in the banking and finance sectors, etc..

^{viii} I have opted for the clear meaning of the Greek text, because the German text reads in a manner which can be confusing: “The Enlightenment philosophy of history, especially in its Hegelian version, had unified world history by prescribing to it a single normative aim/goal, which it (the Enlightenment philosophy of history) had to steer against or counteract as a whole.” This obviously means, when you analyse the phrase, that there was a Hegelian dialectic in progress through which world history ends up – like it or not – at the said single normative aim/goal.

^{ix} I.e. the command of Love did absolutely nothing to alter the human propensity for conflict, violence, war, etc..

^x E.g. today, and for the last 30 or so years, we have had the (originally Trotsky/Parvus-inspired) Zio-Neocon-Nutters and totally Lobotomised “Missing Link” Fanatics, fantasising about eternal Zio world domination via the USA but always for the purpose of Israel – in the name of “democracy” and “human rights”, etc., and not only will they not get anywhere near to realising their utopian(-like) fantasies ever, they will contribute greatly

to destroying the West once and for all, including through gradual, but nonetheless on-going and progressing race and or ethnos replacement and (potential) white genocide. And not withstanding all that, they are “amazed” and “astonished” that some “tribalist-nationalist-NAZI” people, who are mostly just normal ethno/racial-patriots recognisable throughout much of European and Asian history, are pushing back, even though it would appear that it is far too late already.

^{xi} It goes without saying that here P.K. is talking about the Cold War period, and that since the collapse of communism, “progressives” have been highly selective – to say the least – about which and whose “privileges” they seek to “dismantle”.

^{xii} From primitive communism to slavery to feudalism to capitalism to (socialism/)communism (whether European, or Asiatic, or African civilisation).

^{xiii} P.K. very wisely leaves matters of who’s who to historians and does not get involved in the specifics and minutiae of history (and one should not forget that he is talking here of China and other countries, just as much as of Russia). At the end of the day, science as scientific observation explains what is, and does not have any kind of programme in focusing *normatively* in on group dynamics and inter-group relations etc.. And, of course, ideal-typical sociological-historical macro-level analysis, of its own nature, leaves the details to specialist historians and researchers.

^{xiv} The Greek text incorrectly states (presumably as a typographical error or misreading of P.K.’s handwriting), “1914”, whereas the Russo-Japanese War took place in 1904-1905.

^{xv} I have to admit that I smiled upon re-reading this... HAHHAHAHA!!!

^{xvi} See endnote immediately above – by no means are we talking only about Sartre!

^{xvii} This passage indicates that what has become known as “cultural Marxism” is not really Marxism at all, but a reflection of (aspects of) Western mass-democratic ideology and praxis.

^{xviii} P.K. very rarely calls anyone a “great thinker”, and off the top of my head he has only ever called Aristotle and Marx “great thinkers”, though he has also highly praised with enthusiasm Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Clausewitz, Weber, Aron, and very few others.

^{xix} Presumably a reference to one of Max Weber’s not exactly “perfect” points.

^{xx} As explained in my comments on “The multi-dimensional Enlightenment”, various clowns who parade as “professors” at elite universities, and more often than not seem to belong to a particular group, do not have the slightest idea of what they are talking about with regard to either the “Enlightenment” or the notion of “liberal”, and really just seek to justify their own and their own group’s GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE possession of forms of power.

^{xxi} This was written in 1994!

^{xxii} This could be partly ironical, because we all know that the West is not compared to up to the 1980s very industrial anymore! Otherwise, once largely industrialised, but now largely service economies, must be meant, though Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Italy, have kept their main industries, whilst Spain sort of industrialised post-Franco, if I’m not mistaken. As to the “hundreds of millions”, P.K. definitely had his own sense of humour!