

An Unfortunate Exchange ⁱ

(Polemics by way of five newspaper articles in *To Vima* (*Vema, Bema*) (*Tò Bḥμα* (= *The Step*)), Athens, Greece, between journalist Richardos Someritis and Panagiotis Kondylis, 23 November – 21st December, 1997)

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WAR GAMES

Richardos Someritis comments upon Kondylis's views regarding (a) potential Greco-Turkish armed (military) conflict ((extensive) armed (military) confrontation)

RICHARDOS SOMERITIS

The easy wordplay would be that we have acquired general Kondylis the younger. To this wordplay, the pre-publication, in “To Vima” of the 9th of November, leads us, in respect of a large excerpt (fragment) from the addendum to the Greek edition of a work of political philosophy by Panagiotis Kondylis,ⁱⁱ intellectual, and not a war-crazed army captain or lieutenant, regarding the theory of war, which was published in Germany in 1988. This addendum examines the various parameters of a supposed Greco-Turkish armed confrontation.

According to Clemenceau, the politician who led (steered) France to victory in 1918, war is a very serious matter to be entrusted to generals. What would Clemenceau have said about university professors? The answer is difficult, because Clemenceau never got to read Kondylis. At most, he might have read Clausewitz, the theoretician of war who shook everyone up so much with his glory, more than that of the studiers (students) of various schools of war, various intellectuals and University professors too. Some of them also consider it their duty to add to their curriculum vitae some ideas as to how you successfully kill your opponents. Fortunately, they do not experiment with these ideas, even in universities. Unfortunately, outside of the warmth of the university, these ideas can, however, influence all those who are already dominated by the feeling of corresponding itches. In short, Mr. Kondylis comes with his treatise to offer scientific and indeed (according to the rumours) progressive cover to all Helleno-psychical supposedly great writers (scribblers) of the East down our way.

In two words, Mr. Kondylis's position is the following: the distribution of space (compact geographical Turkey, fragmented Greece) gives Turkey an obvious strategic advantage. If Turkey strikes us first, it can break something away from us, something small or something significant, but, at any rate, relatively isolated and consequently defenceless, because we cannot defend everything. Thus, the Greek side must choose the points which are nodal (of central/crucial importance) for defence (the aim of every war is the destruction of the main bulk of the opposing forces), and simultaneously seek autonomous territorial gains. Which we have to take by confronting (dealing with) whatever cost (no matter what the cost is) in order to have something to exchange in subsequent (posterior) negotiations.

Of course, our country must cover with (a) satisfactory firepower the whole of Turkish territory so that its defence can be a deterrent. These things, however, do not suffice. The key to war is surprise. Thus, before (in view of) Turkey's more general advantageous position, the Greek side would not have serious chances of military victory if it did not find the strength and the decisiveness to inflict (bring about, manage, execute) the first (mass) strike, surprising the foe. That is, attack, and indeed a surprise attack. Yes and no, because, as Mr. Kondylis, whom they admire in Germany, explains to us, Turkey's geopolitical potential/capacity over the long run is being reinforced and increased, whereas Greece's is, long-term, shrinking; "consequently" the attacking side in... "the historical and the political sense, cannot be anyone else but Turkey". Thus, even if we invade Turkish lands/territory, ugh (humph), we draw breath: the others remain the bad (evil) people/side.

A book, and indeed at a university level, is not (a) (piece of) sugar candy (sweet) of the old good epoch (good ol' days), when various people, for a price, solved there, their problems by tasting their heavy-sweet Greek/Turkish coffee. And given the permanent Greco-Turkish crisis, it is certain that every word and every idea can lead to all that we would not want. It is also a fact that in our epoch (era, age), that which we write in Athens is read also in Ankara, and whilst our president considers that the Turkish people does not understand anything about culture (civilisation) (imagine if Mr. Demirelⁱⁱⁱ said something roughly similar about us...), however, Turkish generals must understand something about strategy. Question: will they wait for us to proceed to our massive military orders [[for military equipment, etc.]] and to the prevailing of Mr. Kondylis's ideas, for them to react?

This, however, is an argument of a particular conjuncture: with what logic and with what documentary evidence does Mr. Kondylis prejudge (preconceive, foresee) that the only thing that awaits us is war with Turkey, and that our duty

is how to lose it (such a war) with the greatest possible cost to our opponent, he underlines for us, who has all the strategic advantages?

Mr. Kondylis's theory really offers us, and this is literally bloodcurdling (creepy, chilling), the blackest (darkest) ideas: attack first, lose thousands of our children (youth) and national lands/territory, [[with]] Cyprus to suffer even more tragic consequences, and all of this, in order to have arguments in (a) future post-war negotiation(s). Why, however, not start from this negotiation (these negotiations) with the arguments and the forces we have, without the weight of a partial – at least – defeat? How are the minor (micro)problems of whatever (whichever) conservation/preservation of our forces, with arms and ammunition (munitions), obviously also with fuel(s) and spare parts, confronted (dealt with), when everything is in the hands of certain powers and, no matter how independent we want to be, we cannot acquire a military/war industry which covers our needs, nor can we manufacture spare parts, nor find fuel(s) too. And to say nothing of communications as well...

To say “come, Turk, let's speak honestly, if you wage war on us, you will not win/gain anything substantial, you will lose a lot, like us too, when naturally all of us will go to war” is something almost self-evident, and to a certain extent, takes place with a thousand contradictions and difficulties, with the main reaction being the internal/domestic war cries, here and across there [[over in Turkey]], of warmongers who have probably found their theoretician. To teach all that we have read with the signature of Kondylis is another discussion with arguments of an unbelievable lightness, extra-real [[i.e. not real]] and obviously dangerous. It is mainly that, in the continuation (following parts) of his work, Mr. Kondylis leaves few hopes for the country, its people, the economic, political, European future. He considers that even also with the solution of opportunistic desperation and hopelessness which he has as his preference (to strike first...), sacrifices and changes are demanded which do not appear/crop up

on the horizon: such desperation and hopelessness, such national neuropathy (disease of the nervous system). Let us hope, at any rate, that the good cogitator (thinker) will not find himself being an officer of the people's defence in a border region...

To VIMA, 23/11/1997, p.: B04

WAR AND "ADMIRABLE AND BRAVE (MASS, IMPULSIVE) RAIDS"

P. Kondylis responds to R. Someritis regarding potential
Greco-Turkish Armed (Military) Conflict (Extensive
Confrontation)

P. KONDYLIS | Sunday 30th November 1997

In the libelous (defamatory) writing/piece which R. Someritis dedicated to me ("To Vima", ~~28.11~~ [= 23.11]), he committed (made) two blunders (slips, faux pas), which even also in the rapidly Europeanising and always being a bumpkin (yokel, hick, backward-unsophisticated) Greece of ours, would have to be considered most gravely (heavily): he violated/transgressed the code of honour of decorous (decent, seemly) conversations, and he spoke ex cathedra about things which he does not have the slightest idea. I thank him, nevertheless, because he compensated me most richly in making even someone bitter (about life) laugh. Because/Since many readers enjoyed, as I learn, his achievements as to language style and register, I do not need to comment upon them. But I have

an obligation vis-à-vis our public [[readership]] to analyse in greater detail his blunders.

1 The code of honour in a discussion imposes that the arguments of every side be conveyed without falsifications (forgeries) and after every possible attempt is made, with all possible effort and exertion in regard to the comprehension of them, in the context in which they belong. R.S. rests/bases his polemic(s) on a detached and isolated pre-publication [[of the Greek edition of the book *Theory of War*]] (“To Vima”, 9.11), where the four strategic preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions) for a Greek victory in the case of Greco-Turkish war are summarised. This analysis does not say that Greece ought to wage war, but WHAT it is obliged to do IF war took place. Obviously, R.S. is not in a position to make such logical distinctions.^{iv} But on the very next day, my book “Theory of War” circulated [[was released]], and whoever is interesting in comprehending and not in swearing, could open it and read the context [[all of the related and surrounding text]]. Here, it is said with absolute clarity, that Greece does not gather/collect today the strategic prerequisites of a victory, and that a Greco-Turkish war would lead to a crushing Greek defeat (I use the word/phrase “crushing defeat”, on p. 410). I cite/quote, for the sake of the reader, the excerpt which immediately follows, text of/from the pre-publication:

“In regard to the above-mentioned four points, we synthesised the preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions) under (with regard to) which Greece could win a war against Turkey. Attention (Caution): we are not saying Greece is in a position to do it (i.e. win) or that she will do it; we are only saying that IF Greece does (succeeds in doing) it, Greece can do (succeed in doing) it under these preconditions and only [[under these preconditions]]. In (their) turn,

*however, these preconditions (presuppositions, prerequisites) presuppose other things, that is, a certain military potential/capacity, certain firepower and a certain structuring of the armed forces. The keeping to (conforming with) the rule of the concentration of forces has no value, when your forces are paltry; and the first strike also does not result in (yield, produce) great gains, when you carry it out with a hunting rifle; that is also why, besides, the underlining of the strategic significance of the first strike does not at all contain some indirect encouragement for someone to start a war out of being brave, valiant and admirable and just because one feels like it; it means only that, IF a combatant has at his disposal enough means for a crucial/decisive first strike, he must use them, since he wants to win a war, given modern and ultra-modern technological circumstances. Since, then, the strategic preconditions of victory are not (to be) at all possibly gathered (collected, concentrated) if the requisite military potential/capacity does not exist, the question is posed as to which situation is the Greek side found today... To these questions, the answer today is clear: Greece does not possess sufficient means of deterrence, if we define deterrence, as we are obliged to define it, as the ability to carry out a decisive/ crucial first strike and to paralyse for a long period of time, the foe” (“**Theory of War**”, pp. 398-399 [[Greek edition]]).*^v

2 Already this citation/quoted passage [[extract from my book]] shoots down (i.e. debunks) the reproach that I am encouraging (egging on, inciting) a war against Turkey: how could I, incidentally, do that, when I myself foresee that with (regard to) today’s correlation of forces, Greece will be crushed? R.S. drew this reproach [[against me]] from my conversation about the decisive significance of the first strike. And precisely as regards this point, his gross ignorance in respect of matters of strategy becomes crystal clear, which unfortunately is accompanied by his inability to understand whatever he reads.

Let me remind [[readers]] that the problem of the first strike is found (finds itself) at the (epi)centre of every strategic discussion from the epoch/era of the invention of ballistic missiles, in particular, however, from 1967, when the Israelis, precisely thanks to a masterful first strike, won the Six-Day War. This discussion is not conducted by university loafers (idlers, do-nothings, bums) as the journalistic [[and]] very-busy-in-regard-to-many-matters R.S. imagines, but in the centres of taking essential and substantial political-military decisions. Perhaps, R.S. has just now heard about there being talk of such things, and that is why he became startled and alarmed (frightened). Let him, however, be certain that this matter has de facto (as a matter of reality) absolute priority for the strategic plans (designs) both of the Turkish, as well as of the Greek, General Staff. It is of course sensible that this cannot be publicly declared by any leadership.

As it is elucidated in the citation (quote) above, the first strike has no relationship with admirable and brave (mass, impulsive) raids. It is a matter which is posed, unfortunately, by the nature of modern weapons systems. The force (strength), the precision and the speed of fire have increased to such an extent that the commencing phase of the war in contrast to its innocent epoch: “Messrs Englishmen (you may) fire first”, has obtained decisive (crucial, determinative) significance (meaning), as by now a first-year student (freshman) at a military (war) college knows. Because the first (mass) strike in the first hours of a technicised (high-technology) war aspires to render useless, inter alia, (the [[opponent’s]]) information and communications centres, without which the cohesive strategic use of the most recent weapons systems is impossible. Whoever suffers in the commencing (beginning, starting, initial) phase such losses, does not have serious possibilities of recovery and rebounding. R.S. tells us that if the Turks attack us first, then, and only then, “we shall wage war”. I inform him that a few hours after the, most powerful today, Turkish firepower

brings about a mass first strike against the Greek armed forces, there will be no one and nothing to fight/wage war. Thus, the factor which R.S. thinks will frighten the Turks will also automatically be eclipsed/eliminated: that a war will cost them great (large, major) losses too. Because the central goal of the decisive first strike is precisely the minimisation(s) of one's losses. Precisely he who wants to avoid great losses has recourse to the first strike. And if you wait to accept it (a first strike), it is preferable, in order to also save yourself extra (surplus) expenses, to send from now, your military officers and soldiers [[back]] to their homes.

3 Does all of that mean that the Greek side must carry out a mass first strike without a *casus belli* [[= Latin = a cause of war = an act or event which provokes or is used to justify war]] existing? Anything but [[that]]. Today it cannot do that, anyway, because it does not have the means. But let us assume/suppose that it did have (such means). In this case, it would be obliged to execute a mass first strike only if it had convincing (compelling) reasons to believe that a mass first strike of the foe is immanent. Because, of course, not every hot episode is the catalyst for/of a generalised war, and the generalisation of a local hot episode is nonsensical if you are weak, just as Greece will always, anyway, be vis-à-vis Turkey. Whether a general war is immanent, or not, is a matter for the weighing up of the concrete situation, and this weighing up demands the highest sensitivity and (fine) judgement (discernment or objectivity). Besides, that is why the task/job of the responsible leadership in crucial times is so difficult; so much more difficult than inexpensive journalistic rhetoric.

As I stress in my book, the possibility of bringing about or managing a first strike is not a means of attack, but (for the weaker Greece), a means of deterrence. To use a simile: the first strike is not but the attempt to strike in the

air a hand which is about to knife/stab you (truly: if someone lunged at R.S. with a knife, would he react before or after receiving/suffering the knife attack? Perchance he would wait to receive/suffer it first, fearing that people would call him a warmonger? But how would he know that, having received/suffered the knife attack, he would thereafter have enough strength at his disposal to defend himself?) The foe is deterred only when he knows that you have this possibility [[of deterring him]], whereas if he knows that you do not have it (this said possibility of deterring him), as Turkey knows for quite a while in relation to us, he increases his pressure not simply in the military, but also in the diplomatic field. No-one is so silly (foolish, daft, nonsensical) so as to prefer war over peace. But many silly people exist who deny seeing the narrowest nexus or connection between diplomatic settlement (arrangement of matters/affairs) and military deterrence. Our desires (wishes) do not determine the nature of the latter (military deterrence), but the nature of modern weapons systems, which are obedient towards the logic of the first strike [[do]].

4 This last phrase [[re: the logic of the first strike]] constitutes a commonplace for anyone who has even elementary familiarisation with modern strategy. In a country where one is forced to explain commonplaces, the level of discussions (debates) and of problematisations is obviously very low. Greece urgently needs a major and sober discussion (debate) about problems of strategy. Its (Such a discussion's) absence is an additional indication of our dry and rigid intellectual(-spiritual) provincialism and of our inability at disciplined logical thought, which we think we surpass (transcend) by chewing on hollow words (Italian: parole), either nationalistic or pacifistic and universal. The breadth and the depth of corresponding discussions (debates) in England, in France, in Italy (and let's leave the USA out) ought to act as an example for us. And that would

constitute an essential contribution both to “Europeanisation” as well as to our free and dignified survival.

P.S. Of all the insults and opprobrium which R.S. directs towards me (“general Kondylis the younger”, “theoretician of warmongers”, “professor”) I definitely do not deserve the worst perhaps of all: I am not a professor.^{vi}

REGARDING WAR AND KONDYLIS

Richardos Someritis counter-responds (retorts, rebuts) regarding the logic of the “first strike” in a potential armed (military) conflict (extensive confrontation) with Turkey

RICH. SOMERITIS | Sunday 7th December 1997

I am naturally obliged to refer again to Mr. Kondylis, so much is his response to the criticism which I exercised, and which he characterises as a “libelous (defamatory) writing/piece” whilst he himself slanders himself, on some points (in certain places) revealing, and on other points (in other places) imprecise.

I have read, and he knows [[it]], all of the “addendum” of his book.^{vii} I refer to this expressly in my publication (i.e. previous article). What “code of honour” allows him to confirm the opposite? As I do not know of it (such “code of honour”), could he give me the relevant (related) bibliographical information (documents)?

Regarding ethos (morals): he considers that I “affronted” him. He turns against, however, as a whole, by swearing at her, “rapidly Europeanising and always being a bumpkin (yokel, hick, backward-unsophisticated) Greece”, for whose future he suffers so much in Germany. For what is poor, desolate Greece to be “blamed (as being responsible)/at fault” for my “mistake”? What “code of honour” permits this/that?

As regards the essence [[of matters]]: the excerpt/fragment which was published in the “Vima” is that which he himself chose through his publisher. He refers to his basic choice, which he supports with such passion also in his answer: war is inevitable because Turkey is expansionary; our geopolitical position is bad, consequently we must attack first. Subsequently, and as I noted; he considers that even (also) with the solution of opportunistic desperation and hopelessness which he has obviously as his preference (to strike first...), sacrifices and changes are demanded which do not appear [[as capable of being made]] on the horizon: such desperation (hopelessness), such neuropathy. Since in contrast to me he knows reading (i.e. he knows how to read), that (desperation and neuropathy), he must have read [[somewhere]]. He imputes (attributes) to me, consequently, a non-existent falsification (false representation, forgery) of his opinions. Shall/Should I suspect some egocentrism or lack of honesty and rectitude [[on his part]]?

He ascribes to me gross ignorance regarding matters of strategy. In essence, he baptises as ignorance the self-evident condemnation by every civilised person of the principle of pre-emptive (preventive) attacking war. He marvels at Israel of 1967. He refers to the examination of problems which the matter of ballistic missiles in Europe provoked, which was, however, integrated or anchored in the strategy of a thermo-nuclear war and the diplomacy of its (such war's) deterrence. Why does he not refer to the Hitlerian strategy of 1939? I do not know (it/why). I ascertain, however, that he refers to our defence expenditure(s). He regards also the new programme roughly like/as “nothing”. He demands the subjection (subjugation) of the whole/totality of the economic and social life of the country to the multi-sided organisation of defence – attack. He regards all his compatriots as “naive”.^{viii} He attributes everything to “consumeristic parasitism”; of others, naturally. All of his thought leads to Greece being converted into a paradise for weapons traders (traders in weapons), who normally (regularly) would have to bless him. And all of these things, on the basis of the dogma, as if also the Franco/Germen precedent amongst many other cases (situations) does not exist, that Turkey is irreparably (irretrievably, irredeemably) expansionary, that Turks, are Turks, and will remain Turks, that everyone (all other countries and international organisations) support Turkey, and no-one, us. As a consequence, our only hope, is “a powerful nationalistic and expansionary Russia (which) would constitute a drastic dam in regard to Turkish ambitions in the Balkans”. That is to say, the Russia which Zhirinovsky^{ix} dreams about. Has Mr. Kondylis ever heard what pan-Slavism means for us? And what would a Zhirinovsky regime mean for Russians?

I shall omit a lot from his “scientific” delirium (raving(s), tirade) (amongst other things (inter alia), all that regarding medium-term and long-term demographic and economic developments),^x and I shall note only the following: “In actual fact, he writes (pp. 410-411), today’s dilemma is objectively frightening (horrific) and psychologically unbearable: peace means for Greece satellite-ification (being turned into a satellite of another country or other countries) (editor’s/writer’s (i.e. R.S.’s) note: thus, he decided it!), and war means crushing defeat (also, thus, he decided it!). The transcending of this dilemma, the overturning of today’s geopolitical and strategic correlations, demands, more or less, the carrying out (execution) of a Herculean Labour/Task, for which Greek society, as it is, does not possess the balls. The mediocrities, the lower still mediocrities and the counter-lower-level mediocrities which co-constitute the Greek political and para-political world, do not have the stature to set and solve the historical problems of such an extent and such depth; perhaps they will collapse even also in the case where they will find themselves before the great/huge decision to conduct/wage a war”.

All of this, Mr. Kondylis, considers scientific, non-“journalistic” (oh my dear, the bad word [[“journalism”]])... and non-libelous. Shall we believe that he could also suggest a “satirical” show/broadcast on (for) television?

Finally, I would like to remind our omniscient and nationally fretting (worried) author, who already has elicited (extracted) the praises of Mr. Stelios Papathemelis^{xi} (and sorry to the professors for referring to him (P.K.) as their colleague, albeit for him to hate them so much, they must have once hurt (wounded) him...), that in 1974 the grand plan of the Junta of Ioannidis was, in conjunction (combination) with the coup in Cyprus and the Turkish landing, to attack Thrace and reach Constantinople. The results are known [[to all]].

P. Kondylis counter-responds (retorts, rebuts) to R. Someritis regarding the strategic necessity of the/a first strike in a potential Greco-Turkish armed (military) conflict (extensive confrontation)

P. KONDYLLIS | Sunday 14th December 1997

Engagement with the R. Someritis's writings would not be worth the effort if these did not put forth (capture, reflect) in a typical way, an intellectual(-spiritual) confusion diffuse today in our land/place/country, especially in circles of “progressive” intellectuals, and a corresponding tendency of flight/fleeing before unrelenting realities. If beautiful talk cannot erase these realities, much less can R.S.'s foul and abusive language (scurrility). If I counter-respond (retort, rebut), I do it solely with the hope that my observations will assist (aid, help) not him himself, but thinking/thoughtful readers.

1 R.S. (“To Vima”, 7.12) insists on the falsification (forgery) of my views and on the violation of the code of honour of decorous (decent, seemly) discussions (debates) when, notwithstanding my analytical elucidations (“To Vima”, 30.11), and without slipping/entering into them, he continues to identify (equate) the strategic necessity of the first strike with the encouragement of an aggressive war. I repeat: he who is defending himself when a casus belli already exists

inflicts (brings about, manages, executes) a first strike, and [[does so]] when already the attack of the inimical side is immediately imminent. And I repeat, also, the question which, like so many other questions too, R.S. has left unanswered: if someone set upon him with a knife, would he react before or after receiving the knife attack/stabbing/cut? Since R.S. does not have the slightest clue/idea about strategic matters (he is so clueless as to characterise the missiles which NATO developed in Europe in 1984 as “ballistic”!!!), he has recourse to the counterbalancing of his ignorance with defamatory innuendo(es), comparing the strategy of the first strike with Hitler’s wars. Hitler, however, did not defend himself with a first strike against forces which threatened Germany, but he himself waged aggressive war. Greece is not playing Hitler’s role, if the parallels are permitted here, but Turkey. Is perchance Mr. Tsochatzopoulos,^{xii} who correctly pointed this out, a warmonger according to R.S.?

2 For the second time, R.S. falsifies (falsely misrepresents, forges) my views when he says that I consider war between Greece and Turkey as inevitable. Anything but [[that]]. My analyses suggest what the Greek side would have to do IF war took place, not in the least do they (my analyses) contend that war WILL take place. Every General Staff, and the Greek [[one, General Staff]] too, has in its drawers, war plans. Does this mean that it considers war to be desirable or inevitable? According to my estimation, the more/most probable development in the foreseeable future is not war, but the further geopolitical shrinkage (shrinking) of Greece, and its gradual conversion (transformation) into a geopolitical satellite of Turkey (with the help/assistance (aid) of the USA and of “Europe”).^{xiii} This prediction of mine is justified in detail in my book “Theory of War”.

3 For the third time, R.S. forges my views by saying that I consider war unavoidable because “the Turks remain Turks”. In the text, which R.S. asserts he (has) read, it is stressed repeatedly that the battle between Greece and Turkey has no relationship (nothing to do) with racial and cultural (civilisational) factors as the Greek “nationalists” talking hot air contend, but is due exclusively (solely) to the continual widening of the difference between the geopolitical potential/capacity of the two countries. Expressly and often, I castigate (criticise) all those who base their political argumentation on the thesis/position that Turkey is “Ottoman”, “barbarian” etc.. Nationalistic sympathies and antipathies are so foreign to me that I do not hesitate to clearly say that the roles of the attacking/offensive side, and of the defensive/defending side, would be reversed if the more powerful and continually becoming more powerful (and reinforced) [[country]] was not Turkey, but Greece (“Theory of War”, p. 398).

4 R.S. attributes to me that I defend the programmes of (re)armaments (defence contracts) and consequently weapons traders etc.. He himself, however, declared (“To Vima”, 23.11) that, if the Turks attack, then “all of us will fight/wage war”. I ask him: with what weapons does he purport to [[that we]] wage war? With insufficient and antiquated weapons? Whoever stands against the modernisation of the armed forces essentially is asking for their abolition. Because whether an army has insufficient armaments or a country is disarmed, in practice it means/signifies the same thing. Since R.S. cannot understand all/ everything (that) I write, he should have read at least everything Mr. Ploritis^{xiv} wrote most manifestly in an adjacent column regarding the matter of armaments (“To Vima”, 7.12). From all that I know, Mr. Ploritis is neither a chauvinist nor an arms trader. He, however, most patently, is to a great extent much more lucid than R.S..

5 As a(n) cogent (unshakeable, incontrovertible) argument regarding the “nationalistic” character of my positions, R.S. mentions that Mr. Papathemelis approved of them. I have the feeling that Mr. Papathemelis’s praise would not be so unreserved if he entered into (dealt with) all/everything I write about the capital (major) mistakes of the “nationalists” in the handling of the Macedonian matter/question. If he read that (i.e. regarding the Macedonian question) and, despite his disagreement with me, he praises my book, I am obliged to recognise, in regard to him, intellectual(-spiritual) superiority, and the gallantry or knightliness which R.S. lacks, of course. And if R.S. asks me to draw my conclusions from the fact that Mr. Papathemelis praises me, on my part, I ask him to draw his own conclusions from the way in which the Athenian press commented upon the confrontation Someritis – Kondylis. I cite/quote in chronological order: “The high quality of the book is not of course offered for silly jokes and tacky ironical comments on the part of those who (it’s their right) can disagree with the spirit with which P. Kondylis approaches his theme (subject matter, topic). The book can be dealt with in that way only by those who are trapped within dogmatic views, or by those who talk in an unlearned manner, of necessity, by not having the possibility of developing essential arguments vis-à-vis a serious work, the weight of which transcends/surpasses them by a lot” (“I Kathimerini”, 27.11). “Flea against elephant, of course, but given that publishing morals and manners impose an answer, Mr. R. Someritis will probably be able to add to his curriculum vitae that he had the fortune of drawing (having chanced upon) Panagiotis Kondylis’s attention” (“To Paron”, 30.11). “Panagiotis Kondylis, insightful (crucial, well-timed) and scathing, removes the padding (ideological shell) and fulminates. Hey, sometime the time comes and the face of all of our public speakers/talkers is really depicted, without make-up and borrowed fame” (“Eleftherotypia”, 1.12).

This mirthless topic (theme) closes here. I hope now a more fertile discussion (debate) will open (take place). If the search for a sober national strategy is drowned in paroxysms of nationalistic or pacifistic hysteria, then definitely the future of our land (place, country) does not presage (portend, foreshadow) a good omen.

Rich. Someritis responds for the third (and final) time to P. Kondylis in relation to a potential Greco-Turkish armed (military) conflict (extensive confrontation)

WHAT WILL WE SACRIFICE AT THE ALTER OF THE WAR MACHINE?

RICH. SOMERITIS | Sunday 21ST December 1997

I am ethically obliged for the third and ultimate time to refer to Mr. Kondylis. I start with a reminder. According to him (whom someone characterised as “sober”!!) “today’s dilemma (of the/our country) is objectively and psychologically unbearable: peace (with Turkey) means for Greece being turned into a satellite, and war means a crushing defeat”. Why? Essentially, because he decided it thus. In an absolute manner, regarding peace. With a less absolute manner, regarding war: the subjugation of everything to military expenditure(s) by means of the economy which would serve it (such subjugation), and

consequently, the abolition of “consumeristic eudaemonism” would permit, perhaps, salvation. Geopolitically, Turkey is superior from every point of view. What remains for us is preparation for the possibility of the “first strike” and for the “gains” which it will bring about (yield), knowing that we must then sacrifice significant lands/territory (islands and potentially Cyprus) in order to secure, however, territorial quae pro quibus (quid pro quibus or quid pro quos) in Turkey, and whilst destroying to a significant degree the central bulk of the foe’s war machine. However, our abjection and bloody mess (being in the pits collectively) is such (of our people and leadership) that according to Mr. Kondylis, “we find ourselves in the collective search for our historical euthanasia”.

Whoever does not share these “responsible”, “scientific” and “serious” views, is, according to Mr. Kondylis, illiterate and naive. Anyhow, as he noted, Greece comports herself as a bumpkin (yokel, hick, backward-unsophisticated) country generally. The suspicion that responsibility means to write things which if you had power/dominant (governmental) authority, you could promote [[in practice]], does not seem to touch him. Obviously, this self-evident rule is not included in the “codes” which he fabricates and refers to when he has no other argument, between a swear word and an expression of arrogant egotism. Who, however, would vote for Kondylis, if he sought (governmental) power/dominant authority in order to promote his proposals, knowing that, with the temptation of a bet which can be lost, they (Kondylis’s proposals) (would) lead to sorrows and mourning, destruction(s) and lost fatherlands detached from today’s national geographic main body/trunk [[of our nation]]?

When the admirable scientist tries to explain the inexplicable regarding a first strike, which is not an attack but defence,^{xv} he uses, in order to convince us, examples from the underworld which he seems to know, but which personally I have not been given (had) the chance [[for them]] to (pre)occupy me: if someone set upon me with a knife, what would I do; would I not strike first? He adds all that/those things regarding “casus belli”, obviously... auto/self-determined, or everything regarding “imminent attack” (according to journalistic (pieces of) information?), whereupon you get to strike first in time and there! – your first strike is not attack, but defence. A reminder, because obviously Mr. “specialist” does not remember it: the (this) stunt/trick was played/done by Hitler too.

2. He contends (and one – two believed him, reading the unhinged and thereafter overturned quote (apposition, juxtaposition) from/of the text which he included in his first response) that “I falsify (falsely represent, forge) his views” when I say that he considers Greco-Turkish war as inevitable. I anthologise the response from his (vegetable) garden: “the attacking/offensive side in the historical and the political sense cannot be anyone other than Turkey” (p. 398); “In our contemporaneous Turkey there is not the slightest serious indication that sectors of the people/population disapprove in any manner whatsoever the foreign policy/external politics of their governments, and particularly in the Aegean and in Cyprus” (p. 406); “in today’s Turkey unbridled elemental forces act, which push internal contradictions towards expansion” (p. 386); “today’s (editor’s/writer’s (i.e. R.S.’s) note: Greek) nationalists who believe the opposition: Turkey (–) Greece, is unbridgeable, find themselves closer to reality...” (p. 404). Is that enough?

3. Every reader can ascertain the following: that, wrongly/badly perhaps, I did not use, not once, in regard to Mr. Kondylis, the word “nationalist”; that in relation to defence expenditure(s)/spending, I noted that he also considers the new armament (defence) programme insufficient, and not that there does not have to be modernisation of the armed forces; that he took care to not refer to the names of those who praised him in certain newspapers (is he ashamed? And how does he react now to the newer negative – regarding him – publications (things published about him), inter alia, of “Augi” and of “Eleftherotypia”?); that he does not respond to any of the (my) basic arguments; that my texts, as aggressive as his are too, do not include swear words, in complete contrast to his [[texts]] (but since he knows of those who pull knives on people, [[there’s]] nothing strange [[in regard to his use of swear words]]...); and mainly, that this man, for reasons which concern him, tries with passion to convince [[others]] that he did not write all that he wrote, but, simultaneously, that all that he wrote is correct.

Conclusion: I understand why he finds himself outside of the University. Thus, end of story...^{xvi}

BY THE TRANSLATOR, WHO IS INSANE, AS
WELL AS BEING A LITERARY-SATIRICAL
PERSONA BORN MORE THAN 1000 YEARS AGO
= **ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K..**

^x A good indication of why I’ve called these five articles “an unfortunate exchange”. Why would P.K., who in my estimation is the ABSOLUTE PEAK in the history of the social sciences and “philosophy”, ever enter into an “exchange” with a journalist who does not have the decency to even think before he writes absolute garbage? The only possible explanation is the publication in Greece of *Theory of War*, and the need (of the publisher? of P.K.?) to produce sales, etc..

^{xi} “Stelios Papathemelis (Greek: Στέλιος Παπαθεμελής) (born January, 1938 in Thessaloniki) is a Greek politician and lawyer. He studied law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stelios_Papathemelis) I’d say that overall he is a good, well-intentioned ethno-patriot, and it’s a pity Greece has so few people like him.

^{xii} Greek Minister of National Defence at the time of these articles, “Apostolos Tsochatzopoulos, commonly known by the diminutive form Akis (Greek: Άκης Τσοχατζόπουλος; born 31 July 1939, Thessaloniki), is a Greek former politician who served as a minister in several Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) cabinets between 1981 and 2004.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akis_Tsochatzopoulos)

^{xiii} **THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND IS HAPPENING!!!**

^{xiv} “Marios Ploritis (19 January 1919-29 December 2006) was a journalist, critic, translator, writer and theatre director.” (<https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/111745632/marios-ploritis>)

^{xv} Readers are encouraged to study very carefully both Clausewitz and Lenin – both jointly and severally – as regards the matter of “defence” and “attack”, including in relation to the objective state of politics etc.. See *Theory of War* – Summary Notes at www.panagiotiskondylis.com .

^{xvi} On a number of occasions, or in a number of places, I have mentioned at www.panagiotiskondylis.com that one actually needs to spend about 10 to 20 years reading and re-reading all of P.K.’s texts to – in effect – de-lobotomise oneself and be able to appreciate truly scientific description (non-normative, saved by empirical reality, absolutely logically consistent). Obviously, R.S. knows next to nothing, apart from arguing, and that is why I would never waste any more time than what personally entertains me in dealing with your average ideologue and or moron. One aspect, which people don’t get, is that absolutely consistent science, is nihilistic in the sense that it seeks absolutely nothing. So P.K.’s works, in toto, can just be brushed aside and forgotten, or burnt, or given to goats to eat. It makes no difference, anyway. The great human collectivities which will shape the future state(s) of affairs can only act on the basis of norms, ideology and myths (abilities and what is feasible, realisable, practicable). There is no other way with regard to human behaviour in general.