

PANAJOTIS KONDYLLIS

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KONSERVATIVISMUS

GESCHICHTLICHER GEHALT UND UNTERGANG

CONSERVATISM

HISTORICAL CONTENT AND DECLINE

(DOWNFALL, DESTRUCTION, SINKING)

KLETT-COTTA

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ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

ΣΥΝΤΗΡΗΤΙΣΜΟΣ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΚΜΗ

ΜΕΤΑΦΡΑΣΗ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΚΩΝ : ΛΕΥΤΕΡΗΣ ΑΝΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΥ

CONSERVATISM

HISTORICAL CONTENT AND DECLINE

ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΑΚΕΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ

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WERNER CONZE
IN MEMORIAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. The concept of conservatism	5
1. Conservatism in the social-political and spiritual-intellectual spectrum of the New Times	5

1. THE CONCEPT OF CONSERVATISM

1. Conservatism in the social-political and spiritual-intellectual spectrum of the New Time(s) (Modernity)

The fundamental, in principle putting into order / classification of conservatism as a social-political and ideological phenomenon in the overall / total spectrum of the New Times means / signifies two kinds of things: first, that it is not a historical or even anthropological constant, but a concrete historical phenomenon, that is, bound to / connected with a certain epoch and to / with a certain place, which fades (slips, wastes) away (withers, dwindles) with this epoch or even still before its (the said epoch's) end, and secondly, that it cannot be understood only in respect of enmity against/towards the French Revolution, but at best / better in its confrontation (debate, altercation, disputation, comparison) with certain specific, from a conservative point of view of course, revolutionary features (characteristics, traits, attributes) of the New Times in general. But even if there were agreement on (ruled, dominated over) the double thesis formulated so broadly (comprehensively), not much is gained (won) with that in terms of content as long as we do not apprehend sharply enough (with sufficient precision) for our setting of the question / problem formulation the decisive features of the epoch in which conservatism is moulded, shaped, formed, acts (operates, activates, is acted / plays out) and finally dissolves – and over and above that, as long as the question, problem of the ultimate, final origin(s) of conservative ideas in terms of social history and of the history of ideas is not satisfactorily solved. Because the ascertainment that certain ideological positions had only been condensed in confrontation with certain features (characteristics) of the New Times, which one retrospectively, later called / named “conservatism”, does not eo ipso mean that they (the said positions) came into being in this confrontation and through it (the confrontation) ex nihilo and necessarilyⁱ. The intensity of the struggle on (the) stage allowed (made) in actual fact the backdrop (scenery) pertaining to social history and the history of ideas to be forgotten, so that the from now on optical illusion became obvious (plausible) / suggested itself(,) that (the) (what is) conservative (element) – not merely as the consistently

rationalised and modernised social-political stance, but already as the elementarily structured totality of ideas – is the simple reversal (inversion) of the (what is) (ideologically or politically) revolutionary (element), that is/therefore, something recently (in the final analysis / in the end, a secondary) derivative. Precisely at/on/as regards this point we want to start in the following / what follows, in order to find the red / common thread for our explications, explanations, expositions, comments, remarks (the development of our thought). Nonetheless, it is to / must be said in advance that the in itself welcome and apparently already prevailing (predominant) tendency that conservatism first began not with enmity against the French Revolution, but already with the rejection of Enlightenment rationalism, by no means suffices in order to exhaust its (conservatism's) historical and ideological content: because on the one hand, the period in question is in reality much broader than (what) is usually assumed; on the other hand, through that, particularly in regard to this problemⁱⁱ, a fatal narrowing of the social-historical perspective takes place¹. Conversely, the attempts to trace the pre-

¹ Already Kaufmann (Kons. Partei, 137) viewed / considered “the origins as regards the history of ideas of conservatism . . . in its opposition to / rivalry against the total world of ideas of rationalism”. For Mannheim, again, the cause of the appearance of conservatism as a conscious, “meaning-oriented current” was the fact “that the modern world” had become “dynamic” (Kons. Denken, 423) [[the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID is onto something here, even though he did not do the historically and socially thorough analysis of P.K.]]. That/This implies, of course, something more than a mere derivation, deduction of conservatism from the concrete event of 1789, although Mannheim in relation to that tended to absorb / integrate / incorporate (the) conservative thought content before the French Revolution in the blurry, fuzzy, unclear, indistinct, vague, hazy, ambiguous concept of “traditionalism” or “primordial / primeval conservatism” (cf. footnote 3, below). At the most consistent / With the greatest consistency, Valjavec endeavoured / tried to show, prove that conservatism is to be comprehended “originally not as the/a counteraction, reaction to the French Revolution . . ., but as the force against / contrary to the rational Enlightenment and – to a lesser / weaker / smaller degree / extent – against, contrary to the attacks of/by absolutism” (Entst. d. Kons., 141, cf. Entst. de. pol. Ström., 5). Now Valjavec does not only view / look at conservatism as a / the reaction against the Enlightenment, but also every reaction against the Enlightenment as conservatism (see e.g. Entst. d. pol. Ström., 255 ff.), so that finally (he loses sight of) the specifically conservative thought structure (moves/gets out sight). Furthermore, problem examination pertaining to social history and to the history of ideas of earlier centuries [[i.e. before the 18th century]] remains alien / foreign for/to him. The work by Greiffenhagen points to / presents the same weaknesses, which / who appropriates, adopts and continues, develops Valjavec's fundamental, basic thesis of conservatism as a reaction against / to the Enlightenment and its rationalism. Suggestions / Intimations / Allusions / Insinuations that there were conservative approaches already before the 18th century remain in regard to a quite, fairly amateurish – thus one must say – reference to Donne's (well-)known poem about the New Philosophy / “new philosophy” and its supposed, alleged destructive effect / influence (Dilemma, 41 f.): the central examination of the problem of sovereignty and its world-theoretical background, as well as the structure of the ideology of dominance of *societas civilis* (see ch. 2, sec. 1, below) are completely missed by Greiffenhagen just like all the above-mentioned researchers. His admittedly, confessedly, declaredly one-sided (and as such already rightly, just(ifiab)ly criticised by Gerstenberger, Konserv. i. d. Weim. Rep., 332) orientation pertaining to the history of ideas (Dilemma, 16) is not only at least deficient, patchy, full of gaps, lacking in so far as the development of new-times *political* theory is largely ignored here, but it also leads him, in relation to that, by the mere combination of quotations from such vastly different authors as/like e.g. Möser and Gehlen, to want to construct a conservative theory. Greiffenhagen knows that he, in the course of this, can attract the / an “accusation of historical recklessness / simplemindedness”; this, nevertheless, makes things even worse for him. In contrast, Ribhegge rightly, just(ifiab)ly argues that conservatism is not merely an ideological

revolutionary social-political entanglements / kinds of interweaving of conservatism did not go beyond / surpass / transcend elementary ascertainments, and furthermore, just like the aforementioned ascertainments, remained (arrested, trapped) (with)in / inside the horizon of the 18th century². In both cases it was thus that the early-new times / pre-new times

phenomenon, but “ a complex social process”. Moreover, he looks at it (i.e. conservatism), again rightly, just(ifiab)ly, as a process determined in terms of content and (temporally) demarcated, delimited (by time); a use of the concept beyond its historical boundaries/limits would make it unusable, useless (Konserv., 122, 123 f.). Ribhegge himself, however, makes this mistake when he talks of/about conservatism not only in relation to the counter-revolutionary movement after 1789 (with which he mistakenly associates the beginning of conservatism), but also in relation to the bourgeoisie after 1848 and even to the non-revolutionary-minded workers of modern mass society. Since he knows that this makes impossible the by him himself required, demanded “material definition” of conservatism (Konserv., 125), he resorts to a far-fetched use of cybernetic models and describes conservatism as a self-regulating (steering (control, management, regulation)) system (of steering), which is able to (capable of) adapt(ing) to the changes in history thanks to an increasingly better functioning feedback (reconnecting, reconnection, backcoupling) (Konserv., 126 f.). This perception must, however, lead to a hyper/supra-historical hypostatisation of conservatism; furthermore, it is contradictory to place, set, posit at the beginning(s) of conservatism (the) resistance against the thesis of the feasibility, practicality, doability, constructability of society, as / like Ribhegge does, and then talk about conservatism in (the) modern mass society, which not least of all is characterised by the general imposition of that thesis [[of the constructability of society]]. Of all the noteworthy, significant, memorable investigations, studies of our problem only, as far as I know, that of Huntington questions / calls into question the binding, tying, connection of conservatism to/with a certain epoch [[THIS IS THE CLASSIC ZIO-ANGLO-JOO INABILITY OF THE SHALLOW “EMPIRICIST” ANGLO-SAXON TO SEE THINGS HISTORICALLY SINCE HE LIVES UNDER THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID TO LIVE AND BE RULED / LED BY THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN EVIL-DEVIL IN THE NOW]]. For him, conservatism is simply the (legitimation) ideology (of legitimation) of the each and every respective threatened social system, without consideration of/for place and time / time and place; with that / accordingly, the content of conservatism changes unceasingly, incessantly and the formation / development of a conservative tradition is impossible (Conservatism, esp. 455, 468 f.) [[THIS LEADS TO THE CURRENT ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ABOMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE POOFER-LEZZO-TRANZ-FREAK-HOMO-FAGGOT BEING CONSIDERED “CONSERVATIVE” IN LIGHT OF THE “REVOLUTIONARY” AND “EXTREME RADICAL” POSITION IN FAVOUR OF TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN ONLY !!!]]. Entirely irrespective of the fact that this perception possesses no heuristic / investigative / research value, worth, it can be refuted by (the) empirical evidence, proof (ascertainment), that from certain medieval authors until the final, last representatives of (the) conservatism in the 19th century, there exists a continuity of thought (intellectual) content(s) and structures, which must / has to be looked at / considered as a spiritual-intellectual tradition *stricto sensu*. Something similar has not existed in any other place and in/at any other time. Even Huntington hardly tries / endeavours to draw on, call into play, advance, quote examples of conservative ideology from antiquity or from the Orient, but he places, sets, posits the “first phase” of conservatism in the 16th century.

² The presentation / depiction of the conservative political theory of the 18th century is very superficial in Palmer (Zeitalter, 66 ff.), although the writer, author in invoking Valjavec, Égret and Lefebvre admits, concedes, recognises the worthwhile, valuable insight, perception that conservatism was not simply a reaction to the [[French]] Revolution, but a self-contained, self-reliant current of the 18th century, in relation, reference to which the Revolution itself had to be seen as a reaction (35). Epstein, who indeed evaluates, appraises some, many hitherto overlooked smaller writings, texts, yet in a conceptual-structural regard remains on many occasions, frequently behind what was already achieved / the achievements already in earlier research, loses himself in the boundless / every contour. Albeit he follows those authors who had striven after a historically useful definition of conservatism, and accordingly understood in it the answer to the challenge, provocation of the Enlightenment and of the [[French]] Revolution (Ursprünge, 17 ff.), yet through the setting up, establishment of three different ideal types of the conservative character (the defender (advocate, upholder) of the status quo, the reform conservative, the reactionary), he gets dangerously close, near to a quasi-psychological-anthropological way of looking at / consideration of the problem, whereby / in relation to which he, of course, cannot explain the historically proven, evidenced, verified and, incidentally, usual, common case

component of latter “conservatively” named ideas, and consequently the whole, entire gamut, range, extent of the conservative phenomenon, could hardly be perceived, precisely because the, on each and every respective occasion, imagined, projected, envisaged image, picture of the New Times, whether in a regard pertaining to social history or to the history of ideas, was not full, complete, or else concise, succinct, full of content. The elaboration, processing, highlighting of the [[afore]]mentioned [[early-new-times]] component against the background of the stricto sensu relevant world-theoretical features, characteristics, traits, attributes of the New Time(s), Modernity constitutes a chief, primary, principal, main aim, objective, end of this investigation.

The historical bindedness, dependence of the conservative phenomenon is (f)actually conceded, admitted even by those who assert its anthropological taking root³. These

in which one and the same person with regard to / (taking) in(to) consideration (account) (of) tactical and polemical necessities, that is, by simply following the paramount, topmost command of power, possesses, plays alternately or even / and or simultaneously all three roles.

³ Thus, Cecile accepts a “natural conservatism”, but in the full sense looks at / considers the French Revolution as the triggering factor / catalyst of conservative theory and politics despite / notwithstanding the conservative approaches, elements in the times / epoch of the Reformation etc. (Conservatism, esp. 24 f., 39). In an anthropological rather than historical treatise, Romain represented, supported the perception, view that since / from the Renaissance and the Reformation, but above all since / from the 18th century, the European nations had been detached from the “general human pattern (model)” and entered, went down a fateful path, road; conservatism is the desire (longing, yearning) for lost naturalness and humanity (Über den Konserv., esp. 229, 237) [[THIS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY AND OR SOCIALISM AGAINST ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-M-C-M-MAMMON-ISATION-COMMODIFICATION-SATANISATION-MASSIFICATION-ATOMISATION-ALIENATION-EXPLOITATION-MOBILISATION-UPROOT/DEROOF-ETC.. AS WE CAN SEE BY WHAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THIS CRITIQUE OF CULTURE IS AXIOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE AND NOT PART OF SCIENTIFIC (DESCRIPTIVE OF ALL RELEVANT FACTS) OBSERVATION]]. Romain does not explain why then only certain men, humans, people with certain interests and convictions felt this desire (longing, yearning) and how it was possible that so many people wanted and could have so stubbornly denied, refused their own nature, essence, being, character. – Mannheim expressly resorts to Cecile’s category of natural conservatism in order to found, substantiate, underpin the distinction between merely “reactive” traditionalism and consciously “meaning-oriented” conservatism (Kons. Denken, 412 f.). Despite / Notwithstanding its highly problematic character (cf. Valjavec, Enst. d. Kons., 141), this distinction takes place, occurs with the right intent(ion) of apprehending conservatism not as a psychological, but as a historical category. It nevertheless must be asked why then traditionalism must be seen as the necessary preliminary (early) stage / pre-stage of conservatism, if Mannheim’s ascertainment is correct that there are/were conservatives who do/did not behave traditionalistically, as well as the reverse / other way around (Kons. Denken, 413). The distinction / differentiation between traditionalism and conservatism, which is usually attributed / ascribed to Mannheim, stems, originates, incidentally, from Rohden, in whom it fulfils apologetic functions: “the healthy man is by nature conservative . . . This kind of conservatism is naturally mute, dumb, silent”, even though it represents and constitutes “the primordial cell of theoretical conservatism”. “Tradition can become a conscious value only when in its existence it is threatened / something threatens its existence”, as this happened with rationalism and the [[French]] Revolution (Deutsch. u. franz. Konserv., 94, 96). [[OF COURSE, SINCE TRADITION CHANGES, WE CAN END UP IN TODAY’S ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ABSURDITY OF WORSHIPPING SINCE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ANTI-CHRIST, SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN, EVIL-DEVIL, GREAT SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF “TRADITION” WITH THEIR HOMOS, LEZZOZ, TRANZ-FREAKS, DRUGGEEZ, PORNOGRAPHERS, STERILE ABORT-FUCK SLUTS, TOTAL FILTH SHIT-SKATA-EXCREMENT-FREAK SHOW KOST AND MONKEY-APE ANOMY WORSHIPPERS, AS OPPOSED TO CHRISTIAN POSITIONS OF PRE-POST-MODERNISM, WHICH ARE NOW VIEWED AS RADICAL AND OR EVEN REVOLUTIONARY !!!]]

[[thinkers]], though, were not able (and, as far as I know, not once attempted) to offer a consistent interpretation of history on the basis of the supposed natural disposition of “man / humans” for the maintenance of the existing / what exists / the situation in existence.

**THE FOOTNOTES ARE BY P.K. (UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE [[]]), WHEREAS THE ENDNOTES KONSTITIOOT
KRAYZEE MAN SHIT**

ⁱ Obviously, many of these positions had existed for up to centuries, if not longer, before they were, so to speak, baptised as “conservative”.

ⁱⁱ Of conservatism and its time-frame.