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KONSERVATIVISMUS

GESCHICHTLICHER GEHALT UND UNTERGANG

CONSERVATISM

HISTORICAL CONTENT AND DECLINE

(DOWNFALL, DESTRUCTION, SINKING)

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STUTTGART 1986

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(AND GREEK) BY THE KRAZY MAN BARBARIAN IDIOM BARBARIAN IDIOT.

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

ΣΥΝΤΗΡΗΤΙΣΜΟΣ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΚΜΗ

ΜΕΤΑΦΡΑΣΙΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΚΩΝ : ΛΕΥΤΕΡΗΣ ΑΝΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΥ

CONSERVATISM

HISTORICAL CONTENT AND DECLINE

ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΑΚΕΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ

ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΟ 2015

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WERNER CONZE
IN MEMORIAM

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1. THE CONCEPT OF CONSERVATISM

1. Conservatism in the social-political and spiritual-intellectual spectrum of the New Time(s) (Modernity)

The fundamental, in principle putting into order / classification of conservatism as a social-political and ideological phenomenon in the overall / total spectrum of the New Times means / signifies two kinds of things: first, that it is not a historical or even anthropological constant, but a concrete historical phenomenon, that is, bound to / connected with a certain epoch and to / with a certain place, which fades (slips, wastes) away (withers, dwindles) with this epoch or even still before its (the said epoch's) end, and secondly, that it cannot be understood only in respect of enmity against/towards the French Revolution, but at best / better in its confrontation (debate, altercation, disputation, comparison) with certain specific, from a conservative point of view of course, revolutionary features (characteristics, traits, attributes) of the New Times in general. But even if there were agreement on (ruled, dominated over) the double thesis formulated so broadly (comprehensively), not much is gained (won) with that in terms of content as long as we do not apprehend sharply enough (with sufficient precision) for our setting of the question / problem formulation the decisive features of the epoch in which conservatism is moulded, shaped, formed, acts (operates, activates, is acted / plays out) and finally dissolves – and over and above that, as long as the question, problem of the ultimate, final origin(s) of conservative ideas in terms of social history and of the history of ideas is not satisfactorily solved. Because the ascertainment that certain ideological positions had only been condensed in confrontation with certain features (characteristics) of the New Times, which one retrospectively, later called / named “conservatism”, does not eo ipso mean that they (the said positions) came into being in this confrontation and through it (the confrontation) *ex nihilo* and necessarilyⁱ. The intensity of the struggle on (the) stage allowed (made) in actual fact the backdrop (scenery) pertaining to social history and the history of ideas to be forgotten, so that the from now on optical illusion became obvious (plausible) / suggested itself(,) that (the) (what is) conservative (element) – not merely as the consistently

rationalised and modernised social-political stance, but already as the elementarily structured totality of ideas – is the simple reversal (inversion) of the (what is) (ideologically or politically) revolutionary (element), that is/therefore, something recently (in the final analysis / in the end, a secondary) derivative. Precisely at/on/as regards this point we want to start in the following / what follows, in order to find the red / common thread for our explications, explanations, expositions, comments, remarks (the development of our thought). Nonetheless, it is to / must be said in advance that the in itself welcome and apparently already prevailing (predominant) tendency that conservatism first began not with enmity against the French Revolution, but already with the rejection of Enlightenment rationalism, by no means suffices in order to exhaust its (conservatism's) historical and ideological content: because on the one hand, the period in question is in reality much broader than (what) is usually assumed; on the other hand, through that, particularly in regard to this problemⁱⁱ, a fatal narrowing of the social-historical perspective takes place¹. Conversely, the attempts to trace the pre-

¹ Already Kaufmann (Kons. Partei, 137) viewed / considered “the origins as regards the history of ideas of conservatism . . . in its opposition to / rivalry against the total world of ideas of rationalism”. For Mannheim, again, the cause of the appearance of conservatism as a conscious, “meaning-oriented current” was the fact “that the modern world” had become “dynamic” (Kons. Denken, 423) [[the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID is onto something here, even though he did not do the historically and socially thorough analysis of P.K.]]. That/This implies, of course, something more than a mere derivation, deduction of conservatism from the concrete event of 1789, although Mannheim in relation to that tended to absorb / integrate / incorporate (the) conservative thought content before the French Revolution in the blurry, fuzzy, unclear, indistinct, vague, hazy, ambiguous concept of “traditionalism” or “primordial / primeval conservatism” (cf. footnote 3, below). At the most consistent / With the greatest consistency, Valjavec endeavoured / tried to show, prove that conservatism is to be comprehended “originally not as the/a counteraction, reaction to the French Revolution . . ., but as the force against / contrary to the rational Enlightenment and – to a lesser / weaker / smaller degree / extent – against, contrary to the attacks of/by absolutism” (Entst. d. Kons., 141, cf. Entst. de. pol. Ström., 5). Now Valjavec does not only view / look at conservatism as a / the reaction against the Enlightenment, but also every reaction against the Enlightenment as conservatism (see e.g. Entst. d. pol. Ström., 255 ff.), so that finally (he loses sight of) the specifically conservative thought structure (moves/gets out sight). Furthermore, problem examination pertaining to social history and to the history of ideas of earlier centuries [[i.e. before the 18th century]] remains alien / foreign for/to him. The work by Greiffenhagen points to / presents the same weaknesses, which / who appropriates, adopts and continues, develops Valjavec's fundamental, basic thesis of conservatism as a reaction against / to the Enlightenment and its rationalism. Suggestions / Intimations / Allusions / Insinuations that there were conservative approaches already before the 18th century remain in regard to a quite, fairly amateurish – thus one must say – reference to Donne's (well-)known poem about the New Philosophy / “new philosophy” and its supposed, alleged destructive effect / influence (Dilemma, 41 f.): the central examination of the problem of sovereignty and its world-theoretical background, as well as the structure of the ideology of dominance of *societas civilis* (see ch. 2, sec. 1, below) are completely missed by Greiffenhagen just like all the above-mentioned researchers. His admittedly, confessedly, declaredly one-sided (and as such already rightly, just(ifiab)ly criticised by Gerstenberger, Konserv. i. d. Weim. Rep., 332) orientation pertaining to the history of ideas (Dilemma, 16) is not only at least deficient, patchy, full of gaps, lacking in so far as the development of new-times *political* theory is largely ignored here, but it also leads him, in relation to that, by the mere combination of quotations from such vastly different authors as/like e.g. Möser and Gehlen, to want to construct a conservative theory. Greiffenhagen knows that he, in the course of this, can attract the / an “accusation of historical recklessness / simplemindedness”; this, nevertheless, makes things even worse for him. In contrast, Ribhegge rightly, just(ifiab)ly argues that conservatism is not merely an ideological

revolutionary social-political entanglements / kinds of interweaving of conservatism did not go beyond / surpass / transcend elementary ascertainments, and furthermore, just like the aforementioned ascertainments, remained (arrested, trapped) (with)in / inside the horizon of the 18th century². In both cases it was thus that the early-new times / pre-new times

phenomenon, but “a complex social process”. Moreover, he looks at it (i.e. conservatism), again rightly, just(ifiab)ly, as a process determined in terms of content and (temporally) demarcated, delimited (by time); a use of the concept beyond its historical boundaries/limits would make it unusable, useless (Konserv., 122, 123 f.). Ribhegge himself, however, makes this mistake when he talks of/about conservatism not only in relation to the counter-revolutionary movement after 1789 (with which he mistakenly associates the beginning of conservatism), but also in relation to the bourgeoisie after 1848 and even to the non-revolutionary-minded workers of modern mass society. Since he knows that this makes impossible the by him himself required, demanded “material definition” of conservatism (Konserv., 125), he resorts to a far-fetched use of cybernetic models and describes conservatism as a self-regulating (steering (control, management, regulation)) system (of steering), which is able to (capable of) adapt(ing) to the changes in history thanks to an increasingly better functioning feedback (reconnecting, reconnection, backcoupling) (Konserv., 126 f.). This perception must, however, lead to a hyper/supra-historical hypostatisation of conservatism; furthermore, it is contradictory to place, set, posit at the beginning(s) of conservatism (the) resistance against the thesis of the feasibility, practicality, doability, constructability of society, as / like Ribhegge does, and then talk about conservatism in (the) modern mass society, which not least of all is characterised by the general imposition of that thesis [[of the constructability of society]]. Of all the noteworthy, significant, memorable investigations, studies of our problem only, as far as I know, that of Huntington questions / calls into question the binding, tying, connection of conservatism to/with a certain epoch [[THIS IS THE CLASSIC ZIO-ANGLO-JOO INABILITY OF THE SHALLOW “EMPIRICIST” ANGLO-SAXON TO SEE THINGS HISTORICALLY SINCE HE LIVES UNDER THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID TO LIVE AND BE RULED / LED BY THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN EVIL-DEVIL IN THE NOW]]. For him, conservatism is simply the (legitimation) ideology (of legitimation) of the each and every respective threatened social system, without consideration of/for place and time / time and place; with that / accordingly, the content of conservatism changes unceasingly, incessantly and the formation / development of a conservative tradition is impossible (Conservatism, esp. 455, 468 f.) [[THIS LEADS TO THE CURRENT ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ABOMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE POOFER-LEZZO-TRANZ-FREAK-HOMO-FAGGOT BEING CONSIDERED “CONSERVATIVE” IN LIGHT OF THE “REVOLUTIONARY” AND “EXTREME RADICAL” POSITION IN FAVOUR OF TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN ONLY !!!]]. Entirely irrespective of the fact that this perception possesses no heuristic / investigative / research value, worth, it can be refuted by (the) empirical evidence, proof (ascertainment), that from certain medieval authors until the final, last representatives of (the) conservatism in the 19th century, there exists a continuity of thought (intellectual) content(s) and structures, which must / has to be looked at / considered as a spiritual-intellectual tradition *stricto sensu*. Something similar has not existed in any other place and in/at any other time. Even Huntington hardly tries / endeavours to draw on, call into play, advance, quote examples of conservative ideology from antiquity or from the Orient, but he places, sets, posits the “first phase” of conservatism in the 16th century.

² The presentation / depiction of the conservative political theory of the 18th century is very superficial in Palmer (Zeitalter, 66 ff.), although the writer, author in invoking Valjavec, Égret and Lefebvre admits, concedes, recognises the worthwhile, valuable insight, perception that conservatism was not simply a reaction to the [[French]] Revolution, but a self-contained, self-reliant current of the 18th century, in relation, reference to which the Revolution itself had to be seen as a reaction (35). Epstein, who indeed evaluates, appraises some, many hitherto overlooked smaller writings, texts, yet in a conceptual-structural regard remains on many occasions, frequently behind what was already achieved / the achievements already in earlier research, loses himself in the boundless / every contour. Albeit he follows those authors who had striven after a historically useful definition of conservatism, and accordingly understood in it the answer to the challenge, provocation of the Enlightenment and of the [[French]] Revolution (Ursprünge, 17 ff.), yet through the setting up, establishment of three different ideal types of the conservative character (the defender (advocate, upholder) of the status quo, the reform conservative, the reactionary), he gets dangerously close, near to a quasi-psychological-anthropological way of looking at / consideration of the problem, whereby / in relation to which he, of course, cannot explain the historically proven, evidenced, verified and, incidentally, usual, common case

component of latter “conservatively” named ideas, and consequently the whole, entire gamut, range, extent of the conservative phenomenon, could hardly be perceived, precisely because the, on each and every respective occasion, imagined, projected, envisaged image, picture of the New Times, whether in a regard pertaining to social history or to the history of ideas, was not full, complete, or else concise, succinct, full of content. The elaboration, processing, highlighting of the [[afore]]mentioned [[early-new-times]] component against the background of the stricto sensu relevant world-theoretical features, characteristics, traits, attributes of the New Time(s), Modernity constitutes a chief, primary, principal, main aim, objective, end of this investigation.

The historical bindedness, dependence of the conservative phenomenon is (f)actually conceded, admitted even by those who assert its anthropological taking root³. These

in which one and the same person with regard to / (taking) in(to) consideration (account) (of) tactical and polemical necessities, that is, by simply following the paramount, topmost command of power, possesses, plays alternately or even / and or simultaneously all three roles.

³ Thus, Cecile accepts a “natural conservatism”, but in the full sense looks at / considers the French Revolution as the triggering factor / catalyst of conservative theory and politics despite / notwithstanding the conservative approaches, elements in the times / epoch of the Reformation etc. (Conservatism, esp. 24 f., 39). In an anthropological rather than historical treatise, Romain represented, supported the perception, view that since / from the Renaissance and the Reformation, but above all since / from the 18th century, the European nations had been detached from the “general human pattern (model)” and entered, went down a fateful path, road; conservatism is the desire (longing, yearning) for lost naturalness and humanity (Über den Konserv., esp. 229, 237) [[THIS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY AND OR SOCIALISM AGAINST ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-M-C-M-MAMMON-ISATION-COMMODIFICATION-SATANISATION-MASSIFICATION-ATOMISATION-ALIENATION-EXPLOITATION-MOBILISATION-UPROOT/DEROOT-ETC.. AS WE CAN SEE BY WHAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THIS CRITIQUE OF CULTURE IS AXIOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE AND NOT PART OF SCIENTIFIC (DESCRIPTIVE OF ALL RELEVANT FACTS) OBSERVATION]]. Romain does not explain why then only certain men, humans, people with certain interests and convictions felt this desire (longing, yearning) and how it was possible that so many people wanted and could have so stubbornly denied, refused their own nature, essence, being, character. – Mannheim expressly resorts to Cecile’s category of natural conservatism in order to found, substantiate, underpin the distinction between merely “reactive” traditionalism and consciously “meaning-oriented” conservatism (Kons. Denken, 412 f.). Despite / Notwithstanding its highly problematic character (cf. Valjavec, Enst. d. Kons., 141), this distinction takes place, occurs with the right intent(ion) of apprehending conservatism not as a psychological, but as a historical category. It nevertheless must be asked why then traditionalism must be seen as the necessary preliminary (early) stage / pre-stage of conservatism, if Mannheim’s ascertainment is correct that there are/were conservatives who do/did not behave traditionalistically, as well as the reverse / other way around (Kons. Denken, 413). The distinction / differentiation between traditionalism and conservatism, which is usually attributed / ascribed to Mannheim, stems, originates, incidentally, from Rohden, in whom it fulfils apologetic functions: “the healthy man is by nature conservative . . . This kind of conservatism is naturally mute, dumb, silent”, even though it represents and constitutes “the primordial cell of theoretical conservatism”. “Tradition can become a conscious value only when in its existence it is threatened / something threatens its existence”, as this happened with rationalism and the [[French]] Revolution (Deutsch. u. franz. Konserv., 94, 96). [[OF COURSE, SINCE TRADITION CHANGES, WE CAN END UP IN TODAY’S ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ABSURDITY OF WORSHIPPING SINCE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ANTI-CHRIST, SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN, EVIL-DEVIL, GREAT SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF “TRADITION” WITH THEIR HOMOS, LEZZOZ, TRANZ-FREAKS, DRUGGEEZ, PORNOGRAPHERS, STERILE ABORT-FUCK SLUTS, TOTAL FILTH SHIT-SKATA-EXCREMENT-FREAK SHOW KOST AND MONKEY-APE ANOMY WORSHIPPERS, AS OPPOSED TO CHRISTIAN POSITIONS OF PRE-POST-MODERNISM, WHICH ARE NOW VIEWED AS RADICAL AND OR EVEN REVOLUTIONARY !!!]]

[[thinkers]], though, were not able (and, as far as I know, not once attempted) to offer a consistent interpretation of history on the basis of the supposed natural disposition of “man / humans” for the maintenance of the existing / what exists / the situation in existence. Despite the highly full of gaps (holes) / deficient / incomplete / defective presentation, depiction of the psychological-anthropological theory of conservatism, we want to here go briefly into (occupy ourselves with) it, because it is a matter of countering, opposing from the (very) beginning the effect (impact) of conservative ideology on the scientific analysis of conservatism. It is in actual fact noteworthy, remarkable, worthy of remark how central topoi / themes / commonplaces of conservative self-understanding and conservative self-(re)presentation gained entry in the conservatism-perception (/ were able to be incorporated / embodied in the perception of conservatism) of (even) non-conservatives (too). Thus, reflected / mirrored in the thesis presented by all sides almost axiomatically, that conservatism had come into being as a reaction against the French Revolution or already against the Enlightenment, albeit even indirectly and in a distorted / warped / contorted manner, is the conservative perception of the essence, character, nature of the conservative man, in accordance with which this (conservative man) never seeks or begins, starts, commences the first quarrel (dispute, controversy, argument), but on the contrary, is peace-loving and peaceful, peaceable par excellence, since he lives in agreement with the command of Nature or God (in respect) of pious, devout preservation; only the active violation, breach of this command on the part of others unleashes a drive to act / thirst for action in him (i.e. the conservative man)⁴. It is, nonetheless, not without something further, to be understood / it is not immediately clear why this – if we disregard (overlook) the (interrelated) value judgements (interconnected, associated with that) – should / ought to be a specific characteristic / *differentia specifica* of conservative behaviourⁱⁱⁱ. No man reacts inimically to the stimuli of the environment (his surroundings) as/so long as no obstacle, hindrance, impediment stands in the way of his self-preservation or his striving for power; even revolutionaries would be quite peaceful if one did not resist them and all their wishes, desires were fulfilled most politely / willingly. No pre-given psychical-anthropological (pre)disposition is at work here, but decisive remains the relative position, i.e. the concrete position in respect of power / power status of the respective subjects. Only from this perspective is it understandable why the victorious revolutionary overnight turns (transforms, converts himself) into a zealous, eager defender of / advocate for the existing (state of affairs)

⁴ Cf. Rohden's sentences, propositions cited in the previous, prior footnote.

/ what is in existence or why the defeated conservative or the conservative fearing defeat flirts, toys with violence or even applies, uses it (violence) openly. There exists no reason for the assumption that this reorientation of political behaviour costs conservative kinds of grouping (groups) more self-overcoming, willpower than this might be the case in regard to / with other social forces. The feudal right of resistance and “Tyrannicide”, rebelling, rioting politically and dictatorship are, as we shall see (below) / are still to see, historically proven, documented, verified, evidenced, certified and by no means untypical forms of conservative activism.

Conservatism and activism, therefore, do not constitute a(ny) unbridgeable opposition (contrast, antithesis) if / when one only pays attention to / respects / keeps one’s eye on (the) historical reality and does not – in relation to that – tend to take at face value the self-description, self-depiction, self-presentation of (the) conservatives designed, planned, sketched out, outlined subsequently, belatedly, additionally, at a later time for polemical goals, ends, purposes. The human type described by these conservatives, which/who supposedly, allegedly, ostensibly devoted / dedicated himself devoutly and quasi contemplatively to supra/hyper-individual tradition and the higher, superior forces of being / Is and correspondingly, accordingly moulds, shapes his concrete behaviour, hardly existed to a historically noteworthy, considerable extent/degree^{iv}. Long before (their) (the) threat (menace) (to them) by the [[French]] Revolution, significant, decisive, important members of the upper strata of estate-based (pre-revolutionary) society led a very active life, whose aim, end was not least of all the bettering, betterment, improvement of their own power position (position of power) by means of / through winning offices (positions of authority) and wealth. If these strata had not undertaken a(ny) revolution in the later radical and social sense of the word, then [this was the case] not because they were incapable psychically in relation to that (/ such a radical and social revolution), but simply because they could not and did not want to overthrow (topple) themselves. This banality means: the psychological-anthropological conservatism(-)theory (theory of conservatism) cannot be valid, right, correct when it does not furnish / provide evidence, proof that those who defend the status quo do so exclusively or primarily because it is psychically, psychologically impossible for them to behave in any way other than peacefully or humanely (in a manner friendly to [all] humans). Such a perception would, incidentally, by the way, imply the absurdity that the / those ruling, dominant [class/stratum/strata], who precisely resist revolutionary upheavals, radical changes, would potentially be less able to cope with the harsh necessities of rule than the

ruled or the insurgents. It nonetheless can be proven in terms of social history that e.g. at least most of those nobles who preached, sermonised against revolutionary Reason (in favour of) the peaceful love and preservation, cultivation of Tradition in the eternal womb, lap, bosom of God and of Nature, harboured, entertained, fostered, cherished a very living, lively, vital and an, in practice, unmistakable sense of their own superiority vis-à-vis, over those dependent on them, legitimising their rule. To the psychological-anthropological conservatism-interpretation / interpretation of conservatism, neither the drive, urge, impulse of conservation, protection, preservation^v, nor human behaviour marked, identified by overthrowing (government), subversion (the upsetting of things) in general, but the striving for/after, endeavour at preserving oneself or increasing (enhancing, building up, boosting, intensifying, maximising) one's own power might therefore in general be countered, counterposed; at times conservation, preservation, protection, at other times overthrowing (government), subversion (the upsetting of things) serves this topmost, uppermost, paramount end, goal, purpose. Furthermore, the assumption, acceptance, adoption of a conservative trait, attribute, characteristic, feature in man (humans) has no value, worth for the consideration of / way of looking at and the understanding of historical phenomena (appearances, occurrences). Here only such concepts are fruitful, fertile which imply / indicate a wholly / completely particular positioning / a very specific attitude and mode of conduct / behaviour in terms of content and concreteness / concretely, even if / when the agent meant is not called by name / expressly named. However, the psychological-anthropological concept of conservatism is applied today [[1986]] according to current, common, popular speech / language use both as regards communist(ic) leaders, who support / stand (speak) up (advocate) for / in favour of the pre-given primacy of heavy and arms / armaments industry inside of a strictly planned economy, as well as in relation to American politicians, who support / advocate in favour of the laissez-faire-principle / principle of laissez-faire against (the) local (home-grown, native, indigenous) "liberals". Thus, the door opens (widely) to/for confusion / confusion is provoked (begot, brought about)^{vi}.

The (appropriate) apprehension of the conservative phenomenon (which corresponds with its object) also demands, however, a putting / setting aside of another serious, grave and widespread misjudgement, error, which likewise was transported, transferred, transmitted from / out of the self-description, self-presentation of conservatives / the way conservatives described, presented themselves to scientific research. It is a matter of the perception that conservatives would detest, abhor, loathe thought / intellectual constructions as such and

would themselves only grapple with / have recourse to theory in contrast to / in their resistance to, against theorising opponents⁵. This perception fits in (with) the idealised image / picture of conservatives living with self-conviction / confidence according to their own natural disposition in tradition and not thinking and planning over and above / beyond that, however / yet having very little to do with (the) historical facts. Thus, they allow / let the false impression come into being that in pre-revolutionary *societas civilis* ideas and ideologies – as systematic thought / intellectual constructions as well as weapons – are alien, foreign, strange. However, that society could not do, perform, achieve, accomplish such a thing / did not have that luxury, already because dominance, rule in it, like every other dominance / rule, was at the latest since / from the time of high / advanced / developed cultures in need of legitimation, and over and above / beyond that / furthermore, because every conflict between groups of the ruling, dominating upper stratum sought and found a certain ideological justification, even when / if this did not burst, bust, blow (open), demolish, dynamite, go past / over the wider, broader ideological framework of the generally ruling, dominant fundamental, basic convictions in *societas civilis*. The theological, but also political thought (intellectual) systems (of thought) planned, sketched out, outlined in / during such conflicts and strivings after / for, efforts, endeavours at legitimation in the middle ages do not lag behind those thought / intellectual systems of analogous new-times constructions concerning, regarding, as regards intellectual sophistication, refinement, subtlety, nor as regards systematic all-sidedness and (a) general claim to validity. The world-theoretical core, nucleus, but also very many central ideas of the ideology of dominance, rule, dominant authority and legitimation of *societas civilis* have / had saved / salvaged / rescued themselves, passed in(side) / within conservative theory, which was presented / propounded / given as the answer to the Enlightenment and the [[French]] Revolution, and indeed not on the margins, fringes, but in the function(ing) of the ideational axes around which henceforth conservative thought revolved. The proof of this unbroken continuity, which we want to bring forth, adduce, render in this investigation, study, contains *eo ipso* the refutation, rebuttal of the thesis of the reactive, quasi reluctant character of conservative theory. There exists an essential difference between the perception, view that conservative theory was *created* in resistance, defence to / against the Enlightenment or to / against the [[French]] Revolution, and the perception, view that during / in this defence, resistance, the conservatives of the 18th

⁵ In the place / Instead of many conservatives who are of this view, opinion, see Schoeps, *Konserv. Erneuerung*, 22. Schoeps also shares in the anthropological (interpretation of) conservatism(-interpretation) and that is why he talks of the “human substance” etc. (20).

and of the 19th centuries served the long-established / long ago pre-given ideas / body of thought of *societas civilis* and *reformulated* the same (long-established ideas of *societas civilis*) in consideration of, considering / taking into account the polemical needs of the concrete situation at that time [[of the 18th and of the 19th centuries]]. If, however, this modernisation of conventional, traditional, handed-down thought / intellectual motives in the form of a reaction takes place against the ideological positions of a foe, thus the laying out / setting up, establishment, assembly, installation of / support for ideas pertaining to natural rights etc. of revolutionary rationalism constituted no less a reaction against the ideology of dominance, rule, dominant authority of *societas civilis*, in fact it was from the beginning a conscious and expedient, end-goal-rational, purposeful argumentative reversal of this latter (*societas civilis*), and in this sense much more deeply reactive in its character than the modernised version of conservatism: because *every* position comes into being as a counter / contrary position and not only or mainly, primarily, for the most part the conservative position, as its apologists want to make us believe, together with all those who do not make a clear and plain, perspicuous, sharp, articulate, lucid distinction.

On the other hand, the fact that the foes of *societas civilis* or else of the social dominance, rule of the nobility above all after the 17th century developed a particularly lively, busy, animated ideological activity, lay not in / was not due to their particular anthropological texture, composition, constitution, but in / to their concrete position, situation, in which the lack of significant social power had to be compensated by their own prevailing, predominance, imposition in the front of the spirit-intellect. The plentiful, abundant, ample production of conservative works, which did not take long to arrive / appear, proved that the theoretical (pre)disposition, nature, temperament of the conservatives was by no means less / slighter / weaker than that of their foes, since they (thoroughly) discussed (in detail) all the questions, problems, issues up for debate at that time, and in fact in the course of this / process, came into (acquired) insights / knowledge which proved to be a permanent, on-going gain, win, benefit for / (in respect) of the (emerging) (soci(et)al) science (of society) (just then coming into being)^{vii}. Their declared dislike, aversion for the abstractions of theoretical thought in general had/has nothing at all to do with the question, problem, issue of their (f)actual theoretical talent, endowment, gift, aptitude and their concrete handling, operation, implementation of the weapons provided by theory – a(n) dislike, aversion, which was purely polemically determined, i.e. it stemmed / sprung / originated from the aforementioned particular role of theory in the arsenal of the foe. The struggle against (the) abstract theorising

is in other words neither to be taken at (its) face / nominal value, nor to be looked at / considered as the expression of a fixed, psychologically-anthropologically anchored need of “conservative man”, but is to be apprehended in its concrete function(ing), i.e. in the function(ing) of a most highly / an exceptionally symbolic act, which makes enmity recognisable and seals it; had the revolutionaries appeared / come on the scene under the banner, flag of enmity towards (in respect of) theory, thus the conservatives would have had to defend Reason and theory⁶ – they defended, in any case, culture and the naturally grown / self-sown / spontaneous / natural character of society as often as / every time revolutionary ideology dressed itself / up in the garment, gown, garb, vestment, raiment, vesture, apparel of Rousseauism^{viii} etc.. The of necessity, necessary enmity towards / in respect of theory of conservatives had to – precisely because it was polemical and not literally meant – be convincingly articulated in regard to its public effect, impact and consequently it took (on) / adopted theoretical form; the idealised description of a “healthy” and “organic” society, which does not spring from any abstract theory and does not need such a theory, could in fact only be done, achieved, accomplished, performed theoretically, i.e. in terms of a theory.

This ambivalence (which came to light / emerged in the holding / keeping to / conformity with rational arguing / argumentation in / during the simultaneous rejection of rationalism and the denial, renunciation of the predominance of the ratio in man / humans⁷) can only (then) be seen as contradictory or condemned, disapproved, judged negatively if one overlooks the polemical sense, meaning of the confrontation, dispute, debate, discussion, altercation, takes the explanations, statements, declarations, proclamations of the participants at (their) face / nominal value and moreover forgets that the/that/this phenomenon has its counterparts, equivalents in the history of ideas (e.g. (the) theological rational arguing, argumentation as regards the proof of / to prove the limits, boundaries of (the) human capacity, faculty for (capability at) knowledge and the necessity of the Revelation – or the refined syllogism / syllogistic thinking of the Enlightenment philosophy of feeling / sentiment / affection / emotion, sensation or the latter philosophy of life against the intellect and for / in favour of the elementary force of (the) existentially pulsating feeling / sentiment / affection / emotion, sensation etc. etc.), and that is why it (i.e. the said ambivalence) lies in / is due to not a

⁶ These explanations / references actually / in actual fact become understandable only (with) in the framework / context of a general theory about / regarding the polemical character and the corresponding symbolic functions of the “spirit(-intellect)”, see in relation to that, Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, Ch. III.

⁷ Rohden makes this ascertainment in regard to the French traditionalists around 1800 (*Deutsch. u. franz. Konserv.*, 128). Greiffenhagen generalises it and put it at the centre (of attention) / focal point of his thoughts, considerations, meditations, cogitations as regards the dilemma of conservatism.

specific enmity towards / as to, or poverty, scantiness, meagreness, wretchedness, sparseness (in respect) of, theory, but rather in / to the complicated dialectic of the unconscious relations between “rationalism” and “irrationalism”⁸. No less superficial is the perception that the supposedly inborn, innate, inherent, congenital enmity towards theory of conservatism is reflected / finds expression / manifests itself automatically in its -(from the point of view of conservative self-understanding / the way conservatives understand themselves, of course nothing to complain about)- incapacity, in(cap)ability at developing a systematic and united theory. One cannot, however, deny, dispute the systematic character of conservative theory, when with that what is meant is (howsoever it must be meant) that it starts, proceeds from certain general premises shared by all conservatives, from which the statements, opinions, comments, positionings on individual, in-part theoretical questions, problems, issues are derived, deduced or to which these latter (theoretical questions, problems) are (able to be) reduced, traced back.

Still other topoi / commonplaces / motifs / formulae of conservative self-understanding / the way conservatives understand, understood themselves crept, slipped into (the) scientific discussion(,) not without harmful, detrimental effects, influences, and indeed such with which conservatives themselves connected certain advantages of their own positioning (stance). That is why it is necessary to examine closely (put under the microscope, magnifying glass) some central keywords of the conservative vocabulary, in order to highlight their – decisive – polemical aspect and consequently become aware / clear (in respect) of their historical determinedness, conditionality, dependence. With the coquettish, dandy enmity towards / as regards theory of the conservatives asserting, claiming i.e. basically intellectual superiority for themselves, interrelates / interconnects their declared preference for the “empirically given” and “concrete”⁹. Completely, Totally disregarding / overlooking in relation to that that partisanship for / in favour of “empiricism”, for its part, does not represent and constitute an(y) empirical judgement^{ix}, (there are) serious (epistemological) doubts, reservations, misgivings (pertaining to the theory of knowledge) (are registered, announced) against the conservative prefixing / putting in front (first) of the “concrete” in its contradistinction with the “abstract”. First of all, it must be pointed out / indicated in relation to that that the

⁸ Regarding / About this most highly / exceptionally important point, see the work cited in footnote 6 [[above]] as well as Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, esp. p. 36 ff..

⁹ In the place / Instead of many others, Schoeps, *Kons. Erneuerung*, 22; Wilson, *Anatomy*, 341 f.. The topos / commonplace / formula / motif is regarded as Burke’s great legacy, bequest, but it was established, set up, laid out much earlier and used with polemical intent, see Ch. II, Sec. 4d, below.

contradistinction between the abstract and the concrete itself represents and constitutes an abstraction. Every apprehension of the concrete and every definition of that (concrete thing), which is supposed to be concrete, always takes place / occurs inside of a general perception of reality or (inside) of a world-theoretical positioning / stance, which first provides the criteria on the basis of which something is regarded as abstract or as concrete – and the perception of reality, again, does not ever arise out of the mere summation of concrete details or individual forms of the concrete, but precisely through / by means of abstraction from the latter (concrete), although it must often seek in the “concrete” its positive or negative confirmation and illustration, demonstration, exemplification, representational explanation. Precisely in this search is the “concrete” defined or even invented, devised, fabricated, and in this sense the/a world-theoretical abstraction does not constitute the lifting, abolition, cancellation, nullification of the concrete, but exactly, accurately, directly its presupposition, precondition, prerequisite¹⁰; all the same, in any case, the abstract and the concrete become so intertwined / are mixed with each other to the point of unrecognisability (with regard to each other) / with the end result, effect that they are unrecognisable. If it is so / things are thus, then the critical question, problem is / means: who decides what must be held / considered to be abstract and what concrete? The decision regarding that, especially in (regard to) politics / political matters, is, nonetheless, a function of needs pertaining to / in respect of power and not for instance a / the overall perception of “reality” lying on the other side / beyond every perspective. This is not least of all confirmed by what was made out / presented by the conservatives on each and every respective occasion to be / as concrete and demonstrably constituted nothing other than a constituent part of a construct aimed at the legitimization and the defence of certain interests. When / If partisanship for / in favour of the concrete sounds in general captivating, irresistible, tempting, convincing, thus the necessarily subsequent, consequent content-related determination of the concrete (brings) more or less clearly reveals (to light) the deeper wishes and aims, ends of each and every respective “foe of every abstraction”.

¹⁰ The (f)actual, objective subjection, subjugation, subordination of the “concrete” to the general perception of reality is / finds – perhaps not completely, wholly, totally unwillingly – expressed / expression in Marxist-Leninist terminology, according to which that way of looking at things is regarded as concrete which does not isolate things, but apprehends them in their mutual, reciprocal relation and their totality or else from the standpoint of the totality. [[THIS IS THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF SUCH THOUGHT, BUT NOT ITS ESCHATOLOGICAL CLASS-WAR NORMATIVISM LEADING TO A COMMUNIST UTOPIA WHICH IS ALWAYS COMING, BUT NEVER ARRIVES.]]

**THE FOOTNOTES ARE BY P.K. (UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE [[]]), WHEREAS THE
ENDNOTES KONSTITOOT KRAYZEE MAN SHIT**

ⁱ Obviously, many of these positions had existed for up to centuries, if not longer, before they were, so to speak, baptised as “conservative”.

ⁱⁱ Of conservatism and its time-frame.

ⁱⁱⁱ Obviously, all sides can react to another side acting against them and or perceived to be acting against them, and not just “conservatives”, whatever that may mean on each and every respective occasion.

^{iv} All societies are made up of groups and individuals, regardless of whether Tradition and Custom dominates, or for instance FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LOBOTO MISATION-PAVLOV’S DOG-STIMULUS-REACTION-CREATION OF “NEEDS”-HEDONISMUS-KONSUM-TOORIZMOOS-EXOTIZMOOS-SELF-RACISM-SELF-ETHNIC CLEANSING AND SELF-GENOCIDE BRAIN WASHING.

^v Der Trieb zur Bewahrung. In *Power and Decision / Macht und Entscheidung* (1984), self-preservation is referred to numerous times (das Gebot der Selbsterhaltung (S. 11), Anspruch auf Selbsterhaltung (S. 12), Modus von Selbsterhaltung (S. 13), Selbsterhaltung (S. 14), die Selbsterhaltung (S. 21), Bedürfnisse der Selbsterhaltung (S. 26), Selbsterhaltungstrieb und -kampf (S. 26)), before we arrive at the classic formulation of the drive, urge, impulse of self-preservation only : dem Selbsterhaltungstrieb (S. 26).

^{vi} Just what the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID ordered: a communist, who is a revolutionary, becomes a “conservative”, a liberal, who was a revolutionary against “feudalism”, is now also a “conservative” degenerate proponent of the welfare state and the “great society” status quo, whilst the advocates of laissez-faire want a “radical return” to a place no-one can any longer return to etc. etc. etc.. If everyone is confused and arguing with one another, no-one will even think about uniting against the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID.

^{vii} Two of the most prominent precursors of modern sociology are : Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), whilst thinkers such as David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) are also important reference points.

^{viii} I.e. against Rousseau’s idiotic and highly ideological notions of man as a naturally good individual in the state of nature before entering into society and becoming wicked etc..

^{ix} Since it’s an abstraction / abstract thought, i.e. it is not smelt, tasted, heard, seen, touched anywhere by the senses “communicating directly to da brain”, apart from being totally a thought / intellectual construction of man.