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KONSERVATIVISMUS

GESCHICHTLICHER GEHALT UND UNTERGANG

CONSERVATISM

HISTORICAL CONTENT AND DECLINE
(DOWNFALL, DESTRUCTION, SINKING)

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ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

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ΣΥΝΤΗΡΗΤΙΣΜΟΣ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΟ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΚΜΗ

ΜΕΤΑΦΡΑΣΙΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΚΩΝ : ΛΕΥΤΕΡΗΣ ΑΝΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΥ

CONSERVATISM

HISTORICAL CONTENT AND DECLINE

ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΑΚΕΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ

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WERNER CONZE
IN MEMORIAM

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1. THE CONCEPT OF CONSERVATISM

1. Conservatism in the social-political and spiritual-intellectual spectrum of the New Time(s) (Modernity)

The fundamental, in principle putting into order / classification of conservatism as a social-political and ideological phenomenon in the overall / total spectrum of the New Times means / signifies two kinds of things: first, that it is not a historical or even anthropological constant, but a concrete historical phenomenon, that is, bound to / connected with a certain epoch and to / with a certain place, which fades (slips, wastes) away (withers, dwindles) with this epoch or even still before its (the said epoch's) end, and secondly, that it cannot be understood only in respect of enmity against/towards the French Revolution, but at best / better in its confrontation (debate, altercation, disputation, comparison) with certain specific, from a conservative point of view of course, revolutionary features (characteristics, traits, attributes) of the New Times in general. But even if there were agreement on (ruled, dominated over) the double thesis formulated so broadly (comprehensively), not much is gained (won) with that in terms of content as long as we do not apprehend sharply enough (with sufficient precision) for our setting of the question / problem formulation the decisive features of the epoch in which conservatism is moulded, shaped, formed, acts (operates, activates, is acted / plays out) and finally dissolves – and over and above that, as long as the question, problem of the ultimate, final origin(s) of conservative ideas in terms of social history and of the history of ideas is not satisfactorily solved. Because the ascertainment that certain ideological positions had only been condensed in confrontation with certain features (characteristics) of the New Times, which one retrospectively, later called / named “conservatism”, does not eo ipso mean that they (the said positions) came into being in this confrontation and through it (the confrontation) ex nihilo and necessarily¹. The intensity of the struggle on (the) stage allowed (made) in actual fact the backdrop (scenery) pertaining to social history and the history of

ideas to be forgotten, so that the from now on optical illusion became obvious (plausible) / suggested itself(,) that (the) (what is) conservative (element) – not merely as the consistently rationalised and modernised social-political stance, but already as the elementarily structured totality of ideas – is the simple reversal (inversion) of the (what is) (ideologically or politically) revolutionary (element), that is/therefore, something recently (in the final analysis / in the end, a secondary) derivative. Precisely at/on/as regards this point we want to start in the following / what follows, in order to find the red / common thread for our explications, explanations, expositions, comments, remarks (the development of our thought). Nonetheless, it is to / must be said in advance that the in itself welcome and apparently already prevailing (predominant) tendency that conservatism first began not with enmity against the French Revolution, but already with the rejection of Enlightenment rationalism, by no means suffices in order to exhaust its (conservatism's) historical and ideological content: because on the one hand, the period in question is in reality much broader than (what) is usually assumed; on the other hand, through that, particularly in regard to this problemⁱⁱ, a fatal narrowing of the social-historical perspective takes place¹. Conversely, the attempts to trace the pre-

¹ Already Kaufmann (Kons. Partei, 137) viewed / considered “the origins as regards the history of ideas of conservatism . . . in its opposition to / rivalry against the total world of ideas of rationalism”. For Mannheim, again, the cause of the appearance of conservatism as a conscious, “meaning-oriented current” was the fact “that the modern world” had become “dynamic” (Kons. Denken, 423) [[the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID is onto something here, even though he did not do the historically and socially thorough analysis of P.K.]]. That/This implies, of course, something more than a mere derivation, deduction of conservatism from the concrete event of 1789, although Mannheim in relation to that tended to absorb / integrate / incorporate (the) conservative thought content before the French Revolution in the blurry, fuzzy, unclear, indistinct, vague, hazy, ambiguous concept of “traditionalism” or “primordial / primeval conservatism” (cf. footnote 3, below). At the most consistent / With the greatest consistency, Valjavec endeavoured / tried to show, prove that conservatism is to be comprehended “originally not as the/a counteraction, reaction to the French Revolution . . . , but as the force against / contrary to the rational Enlightenment and – to a lesser / weaker / smaller degree / extent – against, contrary to the attacks of/by absolutism” (Entst. d. Kons., 141, cf. Entst. de. pol. Ström., 5). Now Valjavec does not only view / look at conservatism as a / the reaction against the Enlightenment, but also every reaction against the Enlightenment as conservatism (see e.g. Entst. d. pol. Ström., 255 ff.), so that finally (he loses sight of) the specifically conservative thought structure (moves/gets out sight). Furthermore, problem examination pertaining to social history and to the history of ideas of earlier centuries [[i.e. before the 18th century]] remains alien / foreign for/to him. The work by Greiffenhagen points to / presents the same weaknesses, which / who appropriates, adopts and continues, develops Valjavec's fundamental, basic thesis of conservatism as a reaction against / to the Enlightenment and its rationalism. Suggestions / Intimations / Allusions / Insinuations that there were conservative approaches already before the 18th century remain in regard to a quite, fairly amateurish – thus one must say – reference to Donne's (well-)known poem about the New Philosophy / “new philosophy” and its supposed, alleged destructive effect / influence (Dilemma, 41 f.): the central examination of the problem of sovereignty and its world-theoretical background, as well as the structure of the ideology of dominance of *societas civilis* (see ch. 2, sec. 1, below) are completely missed by Greiffenhagen just like all the above-mentioned researchers. His admittedly, confessedly, declaredly one-sided (and as such already rightly, just(ifiab)ly criticised by Gerstenberger, Konserv. i. d. Weim. Rep., 332) orientation pertaining to the history of ideas (Dilemma, 16) is not only at least deficient, patchy, full of gaps, lacking in so far as the development of new-times *political* theory is largely ignored here, but it also leads him, in relation to that, by the mere combination of quotations from such vastly different authors as/like e.g. Möser and Gehlen, to want to

revolutionary social-political entanglements / kinds of interweaving of conservatism did not go beyond / surpass / transcend elementary ascertainments, and furthermore, just like the aforementioned ascertainments, remained (arrested, trapped) (with)in / inside the horizon of the 18th century². In both cases it was thus that the early-new times / pre-new times

construct a conservative theory. Greiffenhagen knows that he, in the course of this, can attract the / an “accusation of historical recklessness / simplemindedness”; this, nevertheless, makes things even worse for him. In contrast, Ribhegge rightly, just(ifiab)ly argues that conservatism is not merely an ideological phenomenon, but “ a complex social process”. Moreover, he looks at it (i.e. conservatism), again rightly, just(ifiab)ly, as a process determined in terms of content and (temporally) demarcated, delimited (by time); a use of the concept beyond its historical boundaries/limits would make it unusable, useless (Konserv., 122, 123 f.). Ribhegge himself, however, makes this mistake when he talks of/about conservatism not only in relation to the counter-revolutionary movement after 1789 (with which he mistakenly associates the beginning of conservatism), but also in relation to the bourgeoisie after 1848 and even to the non-revolutionary-minded workers of modern mass society. Since he knows that this makes impossible the by him himself required, demanded “material definition” of conservatism (Konserv., 125), he resorts to a far-fetched use of cybernetic models and describes conservatism as a self-regulating (steering (control, management, regulation)) system (of steering), which is able to (capable of) adapt(ing) to the changes in history thanks to an increasingly better functioning feedback (reconnecting, reconnection, backcoupling) (Konserv., 126 f.). This perception must, however, lead to a hyper/supra-historical hypostatization of conservatism; furthermore, it is contradictory to place, set, posit at the beginning(s) of conservatism (the) resistance against the thesis of the feasibility, practicality, doability, constructability of society, as / like Ribhegge does, and then talk about conservatism in (the) modern mass society, which not least of all is characterised by the general imposition of that thesis [[of the constructability of society]]. Of all the noteworthy, significant, memorable investigations, studies of our problem only, as far as I know, that of Huntington questions / calls into question the binding, tying, connection of conservatism to/with a certain epoch [[THIS IS THE CLASSIC ZIO-ANGLO-JOO INABILITY OF THE SHALLOW “EMPIRICIST” ANGLO-SAXON TO SEE THINGS HISTORICALLY SINCE HE LIVES UNDER THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID TO LIVE AND BE RULED / LED BY THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN EVIL-DEVIL IN THE NOW]]. For him, conservatism is simply the (legitimation) ideology (of legitimation) of the each and every respective threatened social system, without consideration of/for place and time / time and place; with that / accordingly, the content of conservatism changes unceasingly, incessantly and the formation / development of a conservative tradition is impossible (Conservatism, esp. 455, 468 f.) [[THIS LEADS TO THE CURRENT ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ABOMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE POOFER-LEZZO-TRANZ-FREAK-HOMO-FAGGOT BEING CONSIDERED “CONSERVATIVE” IN LIGHT OF THE “REVOLUTIONARY” AND “EXTREME RADICAL” POSITION IN FAVOUR OF TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN ONLY !!!]]. Entirely irrespective of the fact that this perception possesses no heuristic / investigative / research value, worth, it can be refuted by (the) empirical evidence, proof (ascertainment), that from certain medieval authors until the final, last representatives of (the) conservatism in the 19th century, there exists a continuity of thought (intellectual) content(s) and structures, which must / has to be looked at / considered as a spiritual-intellectual tradition *stricto sensu*. Something similar has not existed in any other place and in/at any other time. Even Huntington hardly tries / endeavours to draw on, call into play, advance, quote examples of conservative ideology from antiquity or from the Orient, but he places, sets, posits the “first phase” of conservatism in the 16th century.

² The presentation / depiction of the conservative political theory of the 18th century is very superficial in Palmer (Zeitalter, 66 ff.), although the writer, author in invoking Valjavec, Égret and Lefebvre admits, concedes, recognises the worthwhile, valuable insight, perception that conservatism was not simply a reaction to the [[French]] Revolution, but a self-contained, self-reliant current of the 18th century, in relation, reference to which the Revolution itself had to be seen as a reaction (35). Epstein, who indeed evaluates, appraises some, many hitherto overlooked smaller writings, texts, yet in a conceptual-structural regard remains on many occasions, frequently behind what was already achieved / the achievements already in earlier research, loses himself in the boundless / every contour. Albeit he follows those authors who had striven after a historically useful definition of conservatism, and accordingly understood in it the answer to the challenge, provocation of the Enlightenment and of the [[French]] Revolution (Ursprünge, 17 ff.), yet through the setting up, establishment of three different ideal types of the conservative character (the defender (advocate, upholder)

component of latter “conservatively” named ideas, and consequently the whole, entire gamut, range, extent of the conservative phenomenon, could hardly be perceived, precisely because the, on each and every respective occasion, imagined, projected, envisaged image, picture of the New Times, whether in a regard pertaining to social history or to the history of ideas, was not full, complete, or else concise, succinct, full of content. The elaboration, processing, highlighting of the [[afore]]mentioned [[early-new-times]] component against the background of the stricto sensu relevant world-theoretical features, characteristics, traits, attributes of the New Time(s), Modernity constitutes a chief, primary, principal, main aim, objective, end of this investigation.

The historical bindedness, dependence of the conservative phenomenon is (f)actually conceded, admitted even by those who assert its anthropological taking root³. These

of the status quo, the reform conservative, the reactionary), he gets dangerously close, near to a quasi-psychological-anthropological way of looking at / consideration of the problem, whereby / in relation to which he, of course, cannot explain the historically proven, evidenced, verified and, incidentally, usual, common case in which one and the same person with regard to / (taking) in(to) consideration (account) (of) tactical and polemical necessities, that is, by simply following the paramount, topmost command of power, possesses, plays alternately or even / and or simultaneously all three roles.

³ Thus, Cecile accepts a “natural conservatism”, but in the full sense looks at / considers the French Revolution as the triggering factor / catalyst of conservative theory and politics despite / notwithstanding the conservative approaches, elements in the times / epoch of the Reformation etc. (Conservatism, esp. 24 f., 39). In an anthropological rather than historical treatise, Romain represented, supported the perception, view that since / from the Renaissance and the Reformation, but above all since / from the 18th century, the European nations had been detached from the “general human pattern (model)” and entered, went down a fateful path, road; conservatism is the desire (longing, yearning) for lost naturalness and humanity (Über den Konserv., esp. 229, 237) [[THIS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY AND OR SOCIALISM AGAINST ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-M-C-M-MAMMON-ISATION-COMMODIFICATION-SATANISATION-MASSIFICATION-ATOMISATION-ALIENATION-EXPLOITATION-MOBILISATION-UPROOT/DEROOT-ETC.. AS WE CAN SEE BY WHAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THIS CRITIQUE OF CULTURE IS AXIOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE AND NOT PART OF SCIENTIFIC (DESCRIPTIVE OF ALL RELEVANT FACTS) OBSERVATION]]. Romain does not explain why then only certain men, humans, people with certain interests and convictions felt this desire (longing, yearning) and how it was possible that so many people wanted and could have so stubbornly denied, refused their own nature, essence, being, character. – Mannheim expressly resorts to Cecile’s category of natural conservatism in order to found, substantiate, underpin the distinction between merely “reactive” traditionalism and consciously “meaning-oriented” conservatism (Kons. Denken, 412 f.). Despite / Notwithstanding its highly problematic character (cf. Valjavec, Enst. d. Kons., 141), this distinction takes place, occurs with the right intent(ion) of apprehending conservatism not as a psychological, but as a historical category. It nevertheless must be asked why then traditionalism must be seen as the necessary preliminary (early) stage / pre-stage of conservatism, if Mannheim’s ascertainment is correct that there are/were conservatives who do/did not behave traditionalistically, as well as the reverse / other way around (Kons. Denken, 413). The distinction / differentiation between traditionalism and conservatism, which is usually attributed / ascribed to Mannheim, stems, originates, incidentally, from Rohden, in whom it fulfils apologetic functions: “the healthy man is by nature conservative . . . This kind of conservatism is naturally mute, dumb, silent”, even though it represents and constitutes “the primordial cell of theoretical conservatism”. “Tradition can become a conscious value only when in its existence it is threatened / something threatens its existence”, as this happened with rationalism and the [[French]] Revolution (Deutsch. u. franz. Konserv., 94, 96). [[OF COURSE, SINCE TRADITION CHANGES, WE CAN END UP IN TODAY’S ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ABSURDITY OF WORSHIPPING SINCE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ANTI-CHRIST, SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN, EVIL-DEVIL, GREAT SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF “TRADITION” WITH THEIR HOMOS, LEZZOZ, TRANZ-FREAKS, DRUGGEEZ, PORNOGRAPHERS, STERILE ABORT-FUCK SLUTS, TOTAL FILTH SHIT-SKATA-EXCREMENT-FREAK SHOW KOST AND MONKEY-APE

[[thinkers]], though, were not able (and, as far as I know, not once attempted) to offer a consistent interpretation of history on the basis of the supposed natural disposition of “man / humans” for the maintenance of the existing / what exists / the situation in existence. Despite the highly full of gaps (holes) / deficient / incomplete / defective presentation, depiction of the psychological-anthropological theory of conservatism, we want to here go briefly into (occupy ourselves with) it, because it is a matter of countering, opposing from the (very) beginning the effect (impact) of conservative ideology on the scientific analysis of conservatism. It is in actual fact noteworthy, remarkable, worthy of remark how central topoi / themes / commonplaces of conservative self-understanding and conservative self-(re)presentation gained entry in the conservatism-perception (/ were able to be incorporated / embodied in the perception of conservatism) of (even) non-conservatives (too). Thus, reflected / mirrored in the thesis presented by all sides almost axiomatically, that conservatism had come into being as a reaction against the French Revolution or already against the Enlightenment, albeit even indirectly and in a distorted / warped / contorted manner, is the conservative perception of the essence, character, nature of the conservative man, in accordance with which this (conservative man) never seeks or begins, starts, commences the first quarrel (dispute, controversy, argument), but on the contrary, is peace-loving and peaceful, peaceable par excellence, since he lives in agreement with the command of Nature or God (in respect) of pious, devout preservation; only the active violation, breach of this command on the part of others unleashes a drive to act / thirst for action in him (i.e. the conservative man)⁴. It is, nonetheless, not without something further, to be understood / it is not immediately clear why this – if we disregard (overlook) the (interrelated) value judgements (interconnected, associated with that) – should / ought to be a specific characteristic / differentia specifica of conservative behaviourⁱⁱⁱ. No man reacts inimically to the stimuli of the environment (his surroundings) as/so long as no obstacle, hindrance, impediment stands in the way of his self-preservation or his striving for power; even revolutionaries would be quite peaceful if one did not resist them and all their wishes, desires were fulfilled most politely / willingly. No pre-given psychical-anthropological (pre)disposition is at work here, but decisive remains the relative position, i.e. the concrete position in respect of power / power status of the respective subjects. Only from this perspective is it understandable why the victorious revolutionary overnight turns (transforms,

ANOMY WORSHIPPERS, AS OPPOSED TO CHRISTIAN POSITIONS OF PRE-POST-MODERNISM, WHICH ARE NOW VIEWED AS RADICAL AND OR EVEN REVOLUTIONARY !!!]

⁴ Cf. Rohden’s sentences, propositions cited in the previous, prior footnote.

converts himself) into a zealous, eager defender of / advocate for the existing (state of affairs) / what is in existence or why the defeated conservative or the conservative fearing defeat flirts, toys with violence or even applies, uses it (violence) openly. There exists no reason for the assumption that this reorientation of political behaviour costs conservative kinds of grouping (groups) more self-overcoming, willpower than this might be the case in regard to / with other social forces. The feudal right of resistance and “Tyrannicide”, rebelling, rioting politically and dictatorship are, as we shall see (below) / are still to see, historically proven, documented, verified, evidenced, certified and by no means untypical forms of conservative activism.

Conservatism and activism, therefore, do not constitute a(ny) unbridgeable opposition (contrast, antithesis) if / when one only pays attention to / respects / keeps one’s eye on (the) historical reality and does not – in relation to that – tend to take at face value the self-description, self-depiction, self-presentation of (the) conservatives designed, planned, sketched out, outlined subsequently, belatedly, additionally, at a later time for polemical goals, ends, purposes. The human type described by these conservatives, which/who supposedly, allegedly, ostensibly devoted / dedicated himself devoutly and quasi contemplatively to supra/hyper-individual tradition and the higher, superior forces of being / Is and correspondingly, accordingly moulds, shapes his concrete behaviour, hardly existed to a historically noteworthy, considerable extent/degree^{iv}. Long before (their) (the) threat (menace) (to them) by the [[French]] Revolution, significant, decisive, important members of the upper strata of estate-based (pre-revolutionary) society led a very active life, whose aim, end was not least of all the bettering, betterment, improvement of their own power position (position of power) by means of / through winning offices (positions of authority) and wealth. If these strata had not undertaken a(ny) revolution in the later radical and social sense of the word, then [this was the case] not because they were incapable psychically in relation to that (/ such a radical and social revolution), but simply because they could not and did not want to overthrow (topple) themselves. This banality means: the psychological-anthropological conservatism(-)theory (theory of conservatism) cannot be valid, right, correct when it does not furnish / provide evidence, proof that those who defend the status quo do so exclusively or primarily because it is psychically, psychologically impossible for them to behave in any way other than peacefully or humanely (in a manner friendly to [all] humans). Such a perception would, incidentally, by the way, imply the absurdity that the / those ruling, dominant [class/stratum/strata], who precisely resist revolutionary upheavals, radical

changes, would potentially be less able to cope with the harsh necessities of rule than the ruled or the insurgents. It nonetheless can be proven in terms of social history that e.g. at least most of those nobles who preached, sermonised against revolutionary Reason (in favour of) the peaceful love and preservation, cultivation of Tradition in the eternal womb, lap, bosom of God and of Nature, harboured, entertained, fostered, cherished a very living, lively, vital and an, in practice, unmistakable sense of their own superiority vis-à-vis, over those dependent on them, legitimising their rule. To the psychological-anthropological conservatism-interpretation / interpretation of conservatism, neither the drive, urge, impulse of conservation, protection, preservation^v, nor human behaviour marked, identified by overthrowing (government), subversion (the upsetting of things) in general, but the striving for/after, endeavour at preserving oneself or increasing (enhancing, building up, boosting, intensifying, maximising) one's own power might therefore in general be countered, counterposed; at times conservation, preservation, protection, at other times overthrowing (government), subversion (the upsetting of things) serves this topmost, uppermost, paramount end, goal, purpose. Furthermore, the assumption, acceptance, adoption of a conservative trait, attribute, characteristic, feature in man (humans) has no value, worth for the consideration of / way of looking at and the understanding of historical phenomena (appearances, occurrences). Here only such concepts are fruitful, fertile which imply / indicate a wholly / completely particular positioning / a very specific attitude and mode of conduct / behaviour in terms of content and concreteness / concretely, even if / when the agent meant is not called by name / expressly named. However, the psychological-anthropological concept of conservatism is applied today [[1986]] according to current, common, popular speech / language use both as regards communist(ic) leaders, who support / stand (speak) up (advocate) for / in favour of the pre-given primacy of heavy and arms / armaments industry inside of a strictly planned economy, as well as in relation to American politicians, who support / advocate in favour of the laissez-faire-principle / principle of laissez-faire against (the) local (home-grown, native, indigenous) "liberals". Thus, the door opens (widely) to/for confusion / confusion is provoked (begot, brought about)^{vi}.

The (appropriate) apprehension of the conservative phenomenon (which corresponds with its object) also demands, however, a putting / setting aside of another serious, grave and widespread misjudgement, error, which likewise was transported, transferred, transmitted from / out of the self-description, self-presentation of conservatives / the way conservatives described, presented themselves to scientific research. It is a matter of the perception that

conservatives would detest, abhor, loathe thought / intellectual constructions as such and would themselves only grapple with / have recourse to theory in contrast to / in their resistance to, against theorising opponents⁵. This perception fits in (with) the idealised image / picture of conservatives living with self-conviction / confidence according to their own natural disposition in tradition and not thinking and planning over and above / beyond that, however / yet having very little to do with (the) historical facts. Thus, they allow / let the false impression come into being that in pre-revolutionary *societas civilis* ideas and ideologies – as systematic thought / intellectual constructions as well as weapons – are alien, foreign, strange. However, that society could not do, perform, achieve, accomplish such a thing / did not have that luxury, already because dominance, rule in it, like every other dominance / rule, was at the latest since / from the time of high / advanced / developed cultures in need of legitimation, and over and above / beyond that / furthermore, because every conflict between groups of the ruling, dominating upper stratum sought and found a certain ideological justification, even when / if this did not burst, bust, blow (open), demolish, dynamite, go past / over the wider, broader ideological framework of the generally ruling, dominant fundamental, basic convictions in *societas civilis*. The theological, but also political thought (intellectual) systems (of thought) planned, sketched out, outlined in / during such conflicts and strivings after / for, efforts, endeavours at legitimation in the middle ages do not lag behind those thought / intellectual systems of analogous new-times constructions concerning, regarding, as regards intellectual sophistication, refinement, subtlety, nor as regards systematic all-sidedness and (a) general claim to validity. The world-theoretical core, nucleus, but also very many central ideas of the ideology of dominance, rule, dominant authority and legitimation of *societas civilis* have / had saved / salvaged / rescued themselves, passed in(side) / within conservative theory, which was presented / propounded / given as the answer to the Enlightenment and the [[French]] Revolution, and indeed not on the margins, fringes, but in the function(ing) of the ideational axes around which henceforth conservative thought revolved. The proof of this unbroken continuity, which we want to bring forth, adduce, render in this investigation, study, contains *eo ipso* the refutation, rebuttal of the thesis of the reactive, quasi reluctant character of conservative theory. There exists an essential difference between the perception, view that conservative theory was *created* in resistance, defence to / against the Enlightenment or to / against the [[French]] Revolution,

⁵ In the place / Instead of many conservatives who are of this view, opinion, see Schoeps, *Konserv. Erneuerung*, 22. Schoeps also shares in the anthropological (interpretation of) conservatism(-interpretation) and that is why he talks of the “human substance” etc. (20).

and the perception, view that during / in this defence, resistance, the conservatives of the 18th and of the 19th centuries served the long-established / long ago pre-given ideas / body of thought of *societas civilis* and *reformulated* the same (long-established ideas of *societas civilis*) in consideration of, considering / taking into account the polemical needs of the concrete situation at that time [[of the 18th and of the 19th centuries]]. If, however, this modernisation of conventional, traditional, handed-down thought / intellectual motives in the form of a reaction takes place against the ideological positions of a foe, thus the laying out / setting up, establishment, assembly, installation of / support for ideas pertaining to natural rights etc. of revolutionary rationalism constituted no less a reaction against the ideology of dominance, rule, dominant authority of *societas civilis*, in fact it was from the beginning a conscious and expedient, end-goal-rational, purposeful argumentative reversal of this latter (*societas civilis*), and in this sense much more deeply reactive in its character than the modernised version of conservatism: because *every* position comes into being as a counter / contrary position and not only or mainly, primarily, for the most part the conservative position, as its apologists want to make us believe, together with all those who do not make a clear and plain, perspicuous, sharp, articulate, lucid distinction.

On the other hand, the fact that the foes of *societas civilis* or else of the social dominance, rule of the nobility above all after the 17th century developed a particularly lively, busy, animated ideological activity, lay not in / was not due to their particular anthropological texture, composition, constitution, but in / to their concrete position, situation, in which the lack of significant social power had to be compensated by their own prevailing, predominance, imposition in the front of the spirit-intellect. The plentiful, abundant, ample production of conservative works, which did not take long to arrive / appear, proved that the theoretical (pre)disposition, nature, temperament of the conservatives was by no means less / slighter / weaker than that of their foes, since they (thoroughly) discussed (in detail) all the questions, problems, issues up for debate at that time, and in fact in the course of this / process, came into (acquired) insights / knowledge which proved to be a permanent, on-going gain, win, benefit for / (in respect) of the (emerging) (soci(et)al) science (of society) (just then coming into being)^{vii}. Their declared dislike, aversion for the abstractions of theoretical thought in general had/has nothing at all to do with the question, problem, issue of their (f)actual theoretical talent, endowment, gift, aptitude and their concrete handling, operation, implementation of the weapons provided by theory – a(n) dislike, aversion, which was purely polemically determined, i.e. it stemmed / sprung / originated from the aforementioned

particular role of theory in the arsenal of the foe. The struggle against (the) abstract theorising is in other words neither to be taken at (its) face / nominal value, nor to be looked at / considered as the expression of a fixed, psychologically-anthropologically anchored need of “conservative man”, but is to be apprehended in its concrete function(ing), i.e. in the function(ing) of a most highly / an exceptionally symbolic act, which makes enmity recognisable and seals it; had the revolutionaries appeared / come on the scene under the banner, flag of enmity towards (in respect of) theory, thus the conservatives would have had to defend Reason and theory⁶ – they defended, in any case, culture and the naturally grown / self-sown / spontaneous / natural character of society as often as / every time revolutionary ideology dressed itself / up in the garment, gown, garb, vestment, raiment, vesture, apparel of Rousseauism^{viii} etc.. The of necessity, necessary enmity towards / in respect of theory of conservatives had to – precisely because it was polemical and not literally meant – be convincingly articulated in regard to its public effect, impact and consequently it took (on) / adopted theoretical form; the idealised description of a “healthy” and “organic” society, which does not spring from any abstract theory and does not need such a theory, could in fact only be done, achieved, accomplished, performed theoretically, i.e. in terms of a theory.

This ambivalence (which came to light / emerged in the holding / keeping to / conformity with rational arguing / argumentation in / during the simultaneous rejection of rationalism and the denial, renunciation of the predominance of the ratio in man / humans⁷) can only (then) be seen as contradictory or condemned, disapproved, judged negatively if one overlooks the polemical sense, meaning of the confrontation, dispute, debate, discussion, altercation, takes the explanations, statements, declarations, proclamations of the participants at (their) face / nominal value and moreover forgets that the/that/this phenomenon has its counterparts, equivalents in the history of ideas (e.g. (the) theological rational arguing, argumentation as regards the proof of / to prove the limits, boundaries of (the) human capacity, faculty for (capability at) knowledge and the necessity of the Revelation – or the refined syllogism / syllogistic thinking of the Enlightenment philosophy of feeling / sentiment / affection / emotion, sensation or the latter philosophy of life against the intellect and for / in favour of the elementary force of (the) existentially pulsating feeling / sentiment / affection / emotion,

⁶ These explanations / references actually / in actual fact become understandable only (with)in the framework / context of a general theory about / regarding the polemical character and the corresponding symbolic functions of the “spirit(-intellect)”, see in relation to that, Kondylis, Macht und Entscheidung, Ch. III.

⁷ Rohden makes this ascertainment in regard to the French traditionalists around 1800 (Deutsch. u. franz. Konserv., 128). Greiffenhagen generalises it and put it at the centre (of attention) / focal point of his thoughts, considerations, meditations, cogitations as regards the dilemma of conservatism.

sensation etc. etc.), and that is why it (i.e. the said ambivalence) lies in / is due to not a specific enmity towards / as to, or poverty, scantiness, meagreness, wretchedness, sparseness (in respect) of, theory, but rather in / to the complicated dialectic of the unconscious relations between “rationalism” and “irrationalism”⁸. No less superficial is the perception that the supposedly inborn, innate, inherent, congenital enmity towards theory of conservatism is reflected / finds expression / manifests itself automatically in its -(from the point of view of conservative self-understanding / the way conservatives understand themselves, of course nothing to complain about)- incapacity, in(cap)ability at developing a systematic and united theory. One cannot, however, deny, dispute the systematic character of conservative theory, when with that what is meant is (howsoever it must be meant) that it starts, proceeds from certain general premises shared by all conservatives, from which the statements, opinions, comments, positionings on individual, in-part theoretical questions, problems, issues are derived, deduced or to which these latter (theoretical questions, problems) are (able to be) reduced, traced back.

Still other topoi / commonplaces / motifs / formulae of conservative self-understanding / the way conservatives understand, understood themselves crept, slipped into (the) scientific discussion(,) not without harmful, detrimental effects, influences, and indeed such with which conservatives themselves connected certain advantages of their own positioning (stance). That is why it is necessary to examine closely (put under the microscope, magnifying glass) some central keywords of the conservative vocabulary, in order to highlight their – decisive – polemical aspect and consequently become aware / clear (in respect) of their historical determinedness, conditionality, dependence. With the coquettish, dandy enmity towards / as regards theory of the conservatives asserting, claiming i.e. basically intellectual superiority for themselves, interrelates / interconnects their declared preference for the “empirically given” and “concrete”⁹. Completely, Totally disregarding / overlooking in relation to that that partisanship for / in favour of “empiricism”, for its part, does not represent and constitute an(y) empirical judgement^{ix}, (there are) serious (epistemological) doubts, reservations, misgivings (pertaining to the theory of knowledge) (are registered, announced) against the conservative prefixing / putting in front (first) of the “concrete” in its contradistinction with

⁸ Regarding / About this most highly / exceptionally important point, see the work cited in footnote 6 [[above]] as well as Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, esp. p. 36 ff.

⁹ In the place / Instead of many others, Schoeps, *Kons. Erneuerung*, 22; Wilson, *Anatomy*, 341 f.. The topos / commonplace / formula / motif is regarded as Burke’s great legacy, bequest, but it was established, set up, laid out much earlier and used with polemical intent, see Ch. II, Sec. 4d, below.

the “abstract”. First of all, it must be pointed out / indicated in relation to that that the contradistinction between the abstract and the concrete itself represents and constitutes an abstraction. Every apprehension of the concrete and every definition of that (concrete thing), which is supposed to be concrete, always takes place / occurs inside of a general perception of reality or (inside) of a world-theoretical positioning / stance, which first provides the criteria on the basis of which something is regarded as abstract or as concrete – and the perception of reality, again, does not ever arise out of the mere summation of concrete details or individual forms of the concrete, but precisely through / by means of abstraction from the latter (concrete), although it must often seek in the “concrete” its positive or negative confirmation and illustration, demonstration, exemplification, representational explanation. Precisely in this search is the “concrete” defined or even invented, devised, fabricated, and in this sense the/a world-theoretical abstraction does not constitute the lifting, abolition, cancellation, nullification of the concrete, but exactly, accurately, directly its presupposition, precondition, prerequisite¹⁰; all the same, in any case, the abstract and the concrete become so intertwined / are mixed with each other to the point of unrecognisability (with regard to each other) / with the end result, effect that they are unrecognisable. If it is so / things are thus, then the critical question, problem is / means: who decides what must be held / considered to be abstract and what concrete? The decision regarding that, especially in (regard to) politics / political matters, is, nonetheless, a function of needs pertaining to / in respect of power and not for instance a / the overall perception of “reality” lying on the other side / beyond every perspective. This is not least of all confirmed by what was made out / presented by the conservatives on each and every respective occasion to be / as concrete and demonstrably constituted nothing other than a constituent part of a construct aimed at the legitimation and the defence of certain interests. When / If partisanship for / in favour of the concrete sounds in general captivating, irresistible, tempting, convincing, thus the necessarily subsequent, consequent content-related determination of the concrete (brings) more or less clearly reveals (to light) the deeper wishes and aims, ends of each and every respective “foe of every abstraction”.

¹⁰ The (f)actual, objective subjection, subjugation, subordination of the “concrete” to the general perception of reality is / finds – perhaps not completely, wholly, totally unwillingly – expressed / expression in Marxist-Leninist terminology, according to which that way of looking at things is regarded as concrete which does not isolate things, but apprehends them in their mutual, reciprocal relation and their totality or else from the standpoint of the totality. [[THIS IS THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF SUCH THOUGHT, BUT NOT ITS ESCHATOLOGICAL CLASS-WAR NORMATIVISM LEADING TO A COMMUNIST UTOPIA WHICH IS ALWAYS COMING, BUT NEVER ARRIVES.]]

The conservative basic, fundamental principle that “healthy” politics should start from existing real relations and adapt itself to the same (existing real relations) as far as possible is basically, essentially just as / equally / likewise empty (in a logical regard) and polemical (functionally seen) as (the) (variously intertwined with that) advocacy for empiricism and the concrete (entangled, interlocked with that in diverse ways). Because every politics – (the) revolutionary (politics) no less than (the) conservative (politics) – must precisely, accurately, exactly know the (pre)given circumstances, relations and orient itself to(wards) this knowledge if it wants to be successful. In this elementary sense, political realism does not constitute any conservative monopoly (otherwise conservatives would not have lost any great political battle), but belong to the self-evident qualities, properties, characteristics of the politically endowed, talented individual or collective of every / any direction, tendency, just as illusionists, (day)dreamers and daredevils, go-getters, reckless types are (to be) found in all parties. When, therefore, conservatives posit, establish, set/draw up, put forward, lay down the aforementioned principle, they do not mean it at (its) face value, but in reality they tacitly, silently load it with certain normative implications and in this roundabout way, detour they attempt from the (political) command of the realistic weighing up, assessment of existing conditions, relations and practical possibilities to derive, deduce the (moral) command of respect before / in view of / for (pre-)given reality and consequently to ascribe, attribute the advantage, merit of sober realism exclusively to a certain politics, namely, their own. The decisive question *in* politics is, however, not whether real relations, circumstances should / ought to be considered / taken into account or not (every politics taken seriously actually begins with this consideration), but : to which end/goal are they (real relations, circumstances) to be considered / taken into account. Conservatives make the logical mistake (which, nevertheless, can ideologically be of advantage / advantageous) of confusing their own (re)presentations, perceptions, notions of the end/goal, purposes, objectives with realism in general. To the extent there is a conservative realism or else a realism in the service of the conservative cause, matter, affair, case, thing, it is not a product of a natural conservative predisposition, nature, tendency, temperament, bent, as conservatives like to portray, present it / make it out to be, but rather a negative impact, effect, influence of (an) external, outer compulsion, coercion, constraint. The / A wise adaptation to (the) (new) relations, circumstances, for which conservatives on some occasions / sometimes are / act so proud, follows, ensues, in other words, as a rule under the pressure of a foe, who at least partially succeeded precisely for that reason (that) the conservatives were forced, pushed, squeezed,

herded into a defensive or else / and good-natured stance, attitude because these conservatives initially, at the beginning, originally lacked that wisdom of realistic adaptation, adjustment, with regard to which they (could, would) later, belatedly boast(ed), brag(ed) / in retrospect, ex post facto are proud – if they survive(d). A just as unwanted as common, usual result of revolutions consists, incidentally, by the way, in the fact that (some or many) conservatives discover their fondness, liking, sympathy, heart, soul, courage for “true” progress and feel, sense, perceive the need to take into account the “new situation” and / or else to remember, recall, recollect, remind themselves of the dynamic organic growth, development, expansion (and not merely, simply the static organic constitution) of society and history.^x

The aforementioned examples illustrate, clarify, explain, elucidate that behind the conservative topoi / commonplaces are / stand not self-evident and irrefutable truths, but questions, problems of interpretation, which of their essence, nature, texture are (in accordance with) questions, problems of power. This applies no less / equally to those conservative basic, fundamental concepts which seem to draw, obtain, receive, without further / (any) other mediation, their content from history itself. To these belongs “tradition”. Now, however, “tradition” as a concept would be automatically obvious, plausible, convincing, lucid, valid (of course, at the price of being colourless and ideologically without value, valueless, worthless) only if it would (could) encompass everything historically (pre-) given, predetermined without exception or choice. But in history nothing happens, comes about without being accompanied or followed by its opposite – neither obedience without uprising, revolt, rebellion, insurrection, riot, insurgency, resistance, nor continuity without the / a radical break, rupture, nor orthodoxy and (the, a) blessing without heresy and the, a curse / cursing. All of this is historically testified / attested to, witnessed, proven, and exactly because history as a whole encloses, encompasses within itself all conceivable, thinkable, imaginable manifestations, antinomies and possibilities of the human, traditions can be constructed not otherwise / in no manner other than (only) selectively, whereby / in relation to which the selection belongs to the competencies, skills, capabilities, authority of the (current or sometimes also of the prospective) ruler / dominator, sovereign, monarch^{11 + xi}. That / This is the reason why “tradition” must not necessarily signify, mean what conservatives want to understand under / by that (term); even quite straightforward, rectilinear, lineal and gapless,

¹¹ Very instructive, informative, educational in this regard is the volume edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger *The Invention of Tradition*.

seamless “revolutionary” or “democratic” traditions are put, pieced, cobbled together, assembled in no time / instantly when this appears to be expedient to a decisive, influential group in society. Similarly it can be shown that the specifically conservative “tradition” represents and constitutes a construct, completely, entirely, wholly irrespective of whether the given facts / data it draws upon (has recourse to) are historically attested to, witnessed, proven and real, genuine, actual, authentic or not: because if the ideal case is presupposed, (the / what is (a)) forgery, fake, falsification, counterfeit, phony lies here already in the unavoidable, inevitable generalisation and absolutisation of partial aspects / part-aspects of (the) historical becoming, events.

Institutional orders come into being and follow one another in history like traditions too, as well, and hence the concept of order in itself can serve just as little / cannot be of use for the justification of conservatism(, just) as the concept of tradition as such (cannot be of use for the justification of conservatism). For the conservatives, who perceive (suggest) themselves as the true guardians, keepers, custodians of the institutional order essential, indispensable for social life, it was / had become a bitter irony that their successful foes were able to sooner or later bring about / into being, set up, achieve a new, more or less well-functioning institutional order. This was, of course, never recognised, acknowledged by the conservatives as the “genuine, true, real, actual, authentic” and “natural” order by interpreting its (f)actual existence away, i.e. as not being what it claimed it was,(;) even the enemies of conservatism would, in fact, by founding, establishing (or wanting, attempting to found, establish) a fixed institutional order, would in actual fact, factually, effectively make (adopt, appropriate) the conservative standpoint (their own) on this crucial, central question, problem, issue¹². From / Out of the historically attested, witnessed, proven (cap)ability, capacity of non-conservatives to bring to life / launch / found, establish, institute institutional orders, one, however, can draw the contrary, opposite conclusion, that namely there can be life / people can live even without conservatism and (the) conservative(s). All / Everything that (the) conservative(s) is in the habit of / accustomed to connecting to/with the concept of order, flourishes, thrives, prospers also or even principally, primarily, chiefly in their / his absence, because even their / his foe, exactly by struggling, fighting for the consolidation of his own rule, dominance, cares (provides) for / takes care of / concerns himself with the protection, preservation, conservation, keeping, perpetuation of the law, hierarchy (inequality) and (legally, juristically

¹² See e.g. Merkatz, *Kons. Funktion*, 72. Regarding / About order as the conservative basic, fundamental value, see e.g. Kaltenbrunner, *Der schwierige Konserv.*, 36.

or factually, objectively secured, safeguarded) property – though, certainly, admittedly, mind you under (an)other, different sign(s), symbolism and with varied, different content. Precisely this must appear, seem to the conservatives (to be) unbelievable: that to, upon another, and indeed their own foe, the role falls, goes, passes, to create and maintain, uphold, perpetuate, sustain the essential, vital, as they themselves claim, order, and indeed after, once the conservatives themselves are (have been) put, set aside, sidelined, and possibly annihilated, obliterated, destroyed, crushed, exterminated, killed off. It is not therefore a matter of order in itself and in general as the conservatives like to assume and assert, but (it is a matter) of the concrete question, problem of interpretation and of power: who embodies order, who dictates its rules and who is its guardian, keeper, custodian? The just as logically suspect as ideologically essential, indispensable identification of a certain order with order in itself makes itself noticeable even when the (re)presentation, notion, perception of order stretches way beyond the social-political in order to take on, adopt, assume anthropological or even cosmic dimensions. The declared (theoretical) enmity (as to, in respect of theory) of conservatives has hardly been able to prevent, discourage, deter the conservatives from indulging (themselves), delighting, revelling in [[highly theoretical]] constructions about, regarding, on the eternal law of the world, the eternal order of the world etc. as well as the determination, definition of man deriving, being deduced from / out of that. However, precisely because behind these constructions in reality (there are) questions, problems of interpretation (stand), the conservatives' foes have not failed, neglected, missed to, for their part, take up concepts like for instance “eternal order / Order” and to fill out/in/up, complete the same (concepts) with the normative content(s) acceptable, agreeable to them. Consequently, (both) conservatives and revolutionaries confess their faith in natural law / the law of nature (Nature)^{xii}, even though they connect it with fundamentally different notions, (re)presentations, perceptions, and this common confession of faith presents for both similar, albeit reverse(d) theoretical difficulties: just as the conservatives have never been able to satisfactorily explain how the revolutionaries were able to unhinge root and branch / thoroughly, fundamentally change a whole, complete, entire “natural” or even “divine” order and consequently, hence prove themselves [[as revolutionaries]] to be stronger than this latter “natural” or even “divine” order, so too the (supporters, followers of) revolutionary natural law (theorists (ideologues, rhetoricians)) have hitherto not given any convincing answer to the question, problem as to how then the command(ment)s of nature / Nature can be injured, hurt, upset, aggrieved, transgressed, violated so persistently, lastingly / in such a sustained,

permanent / an ongoing manner by (means of) / through suppression, repression, oppression, violence or estrangement, alienation.

The until now / hitherto things (we have) said does not aim at / have as its object, goal/end a / the “refutation / confutation / rebuttal” of conservatism from the point of view of an ideology competing with it, especially since in accordance with our perception, view it (conservatism) has been (long) dead (since long ago)^{xiii}. However, without a complete, total, full reduction of (the) conservative topoi / commonplaces to their polemical content and to their polemical function, the path, way to(wards) the *historical* apprehension of the conservative phenomenon cannot be unblocked, made / set free, liberated, released. Conservatism is (demonstrated) / becomes, in other words, only then as a historical phenomenon (occurrence, appearance) bound, tied to place and time, (visible,) when the magnitudes, which in its self-understanding / the way it understands itself appear, crop (pop) up as ontological or anthropological categories, are apprehended and (re)presented, depicted, described in their concrete (power-political) function (pertaining to politics pertaining to (relations of) power). As scientists, scholars we must learn to speak, talk of conservatism as a more or less coherent unity in the history of politics and of the intellect-spirit / ideas characterised by specific features, exactly, precisely as we do (it) today with regard to the “Reformation” or the “Enlightenment”. In the strict historical sense, it (conservatism) can, therefore, be defined as the ideological and social-political current, whose aim, end, objective was the maintenance, perpetuation, upholding, keeping up of *societas civilis*^{xiv} and the position of dominance (dominant authority, rule) / dominant position of its upper strata^{xv}. What in particular concerns the ideological aspect, thus conservatism draws, takes, derives, obtains, receives, gets its basic, fundamental stock, reserve, fund, hoard, backlog, continuance, content of its theories from the theological and social-political (set, world of) ideas (intellectual material) of *societas civilis*, and hence chronologically, in terms of time, temporally precedes / goes ahead of / goes before new-times and indeed Enlightenment rationalism^{xvi}, even though, although the confrontation, altercation, debate, dispute, argument, clash with this latter (Enlightenment rationalism) makes up, constitutes a(n) important, significant – and hitherto, until now, so far the best known, if not the only well-known – stage in its development, unfolding. Social-politically, conservatism means, signifies again the resistance of (the upper strata, layers of) *societas civilis* to / against its dissolution, which first of all appeared, arrived on the historical scene in the form of the new-times separation of state and society in order to be (made) complete(d), round(ed) off later through / by means of

the ousting, displacement, driving out, replacing of the primacy of the agricultural, agrarian economy by the primacy of industry. The conclusion, completion of this long-lasting, lengthy and complicated process also means, signifies the end of conservatism; the historical content of conservatism exhausts (spends) itself / runs out / is depleted (worn out), in other words, in the world-theoretically, social-philosophically or anthropologically underpinned, supported, backed up, founded positionings vis-à-vis / with regard to this process(,) as well as in the concrete social-political activity of the ruling, dominant upper strata of *societas civilis* with regard to the same (aforesaid process). Outside of this social-historical framework and framework pertaining to the history of ideas, there can be talk of conservatism only metaphorically or with (a) polemical or else apologetic intent(ion). Next to / Beside liberalism and (the) (radical or social) democracy^{xvii}, conservatism belongs to the great slogans, catchwords, catchphrases, keywords and movements of the long period of time which is / was characterised by the above-mentioned process. Whereas, however, conservatism, in practice / as a matter of practice / in practical terms, was at its end when the separation of state and society (i.e. of the modern centralised and united administered, managed state and quickly, rapidly industrialising society dominated, ruled by the bourgeoisie) prevailed, was imposed / pushed through across the board, comprehensively, universally, liberalism and democracy^{xviii} were nearing their end or they were becoming as political concepts meaningless, senseless as soon as the separation of state and society was lifted, abolished, cancelled anew – not, however, because of an already imminent, approaching, beginning return to *societas civilis*^{xix}, but on account of the victory of the state (i.e. those social groups which saw, viewed, espied in the state their most important instrument, organ of power or the protector of their own interests^{xx}) over society (ruled, dominated by the bourgeoisie^{xxi}). The inflationary and most highly / exceptionally confused use(, which in our time(s) is made up of all three of the aforementioned terms /) (of all three aforementioned terms in our time(s))(.), so that they often pass / cross over into one another and lose their conciseness, succinctness, pithiness, is an unmistak(e)able, unambiguous, unequivocal sign for the partly approaching and partly already (having) occurred end of the epoch(;) from / out of whose social-political and intellectual(-spiritual) life they (i.e. liberalism, conservatism and (radical, social) democracy) have in part or completely drawn their content^{xxii}.

We (have) already explained, explicated why conservative thought may not / cannot be interpreted as the / a mere reaction to / against the French Revolution or to / against

Enlightenment rationalism. When (the) conservatives turned / were turning against the Enlightenment, [[they did]] so / thus, because they were more or less (in the) clear (know) about what they were supposed to counter(pose) to the Enlightenment; and they were (in the) clear (know) because they could, in terms of theory, lean, rely on the traditional, albeit modernised, world-theoretical (and social-philosophical) (set, sphere, realm, world of) ideas (intellectual material) (also pertaining to the philosophy of society) of *societas civilis*. However, it was not only that anti-Enlightenment conservatism had its pre-history, but the Enlightenment itself did not constitute a new beginning too, as well; rather it was a phase in the development, unfolding, evolution of the at that time already mature, ripe(ned) new-times rationalism, which in the 18th century merely brought certain originally, initially established, inherent, innate, laid out (in it (i.e. new-times rationalism)) tendencies to their full development (fruition)¹³. The ascertainment that the confrontations, clashes, quarrels, disputes of the 18th century had (had) their pre-history does not mean, signify that enough has been done in this matter / we have explained this matter, issue, thing enough, adequately, sufficiently if we allow the history of conservatism to begin with the reaction against, to the first great generation of the typical representatives of new-times rationalism – the generation of Galilei, Descartes and Hobbes^{xxiii}. Such a (procedural, methodical) method, process, procedure would ignore, disregard, set aside the (social-historical and social-theoretical) side of the problem (pertaining to the history (of) and (the) theory of society), something which would be in the present case not only a method(ological) mistake, error, defect, fault, flaw, but a regular temptation, enticement, seduction (wandering, rambling) [[to commit / into error]]. Because the precisely of prime importance / priority / prioritised consideration of the (social-historical and social-theoretical) aspect (pertaining to the history and theory of society) permits, allows here proper (kinds of) dating / chronologisations, thanks to the fact that conservatism was originally, initially articulated not only with regard to cosmological or ontological problem examinations, settings of the question, but precisely in (relation to) the field, area of social-political thought and action with the direct participation of those directly affected by / concerned with certain social developments. Said more concretely, specifically / To be more specific : the totality (set, sphere, realm, world of) of ideas (intellectual material) of *societas civilis* came for the first time in conscious structural conflict with (the) (developing) new-times thought (being formed, developed / under formation, development)

¹³ This thesis is founded, justified, established, explained in detail / extensively / thoroughly / comprehensively by Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, esp. 42 ff., 170 ff..

when the traditional-medieval perception of right, law, justice and the modern teaching, doctrine, theory of sovereignty, which gradually took shape, form during the 16th century, collided, clashed. Accordingly, Through that, a movement was set in motion, which had to (begin to) affect, spread to more and more / increasingly more realms, areas of social-political and intellectual-spiritual life since both the perception of law, justice, right of *societas civilis* as well as (the) modern theory, teaching, doctrine of sovereignty did not concern (any) marginalia (peripheral and (relatively) unimportant, insignificant matters), but were connected with general, all-round, comprehensive, universal world-theoretical choices, selections, options, even if this was not (completely, entirely) conscious (in people's / the relevant actors' awareness, consciousness) from the beginning, start. The proof of this connection, which we want to adduce, produce, furnish, provide, give below, as follows, will permit, allow us to do full justice to the scope, extent, range, scale of the problem as it pertains to the history of ideas without neglecting (or)(,) let alone ignoring (/ or even not having to take note of) its social-political dimension, in fact (its) origins, provenance, background, extraction, stock. Only in the light of the aforementioned proof, evidence does it, though, become comprehensible in which specific sense conservatism (had, has) resisted, opposed, defied, withstood, faced (antagonistically), disobeyed new-times rationalism.

If / When the constitutive meaning (significance) of the negation (rejection, refusal, cancellation, turndown) of the modern teaching, doctrine, theory (of) and praxis (practice) of sovereignty for conservatism is recognised (acknowledged), thus must its history naturally start, begin with this negation (rejection) and the same (conservatism) be put, placed, posited at the centre of attention together with all its implications. The struggle, fight against absolutism^{xxiv} and the struggle, fight against the liberal and the (from the conservative point of view with the similar in nature / of the same, equal essence) democratic^{xxv} revolution constitute the two great phases of this history, which, nevertheless, notwithstanding / in spite of all that, remains at all times / always united, uniform and coherent, because the arguments presented and the aims, ends, objectives pursued, striven after in both phases were essentially identical. Of course, this continuity was not coincidental, accidental, (by, a) chance (event, occurrence). Because even, still decades before Tocqueville, (the) conservatives had become conscious / aware of the inner interrelation, interconnection, correlation between absolutism and revolution, and still, even long before the formidable, mighty, tremendous, huge, powerful, enormous, immense, massive appearance of the latter (revolution) at the end of the 18th century, ((the) conservatives) had accused the former (absolutism) that it would dissolve

societas civilis, i.e. set, put aside, eliminate the traditional perception of law, right, justice, separating from each other / one another state and society, as well as morality, morals, ethics (religion) and politics(,) or the (what is) private (sphere) and the (what is) public (sphere), displacing, pushing away, driving out, dispelling, ousting, replacing the collective (the oikos, household) and the forms of dominance, dominant authority and of life connected with that (collective, household) in favour of the individual as the ultimate, final social unit(y) and through that, accordingly, in the place of (replacing) tradition, Tradition putting, placing, positing (with) historically rootless Reason etc. etc.^{xxvi}. Now, however, absolutism undertook the dissolution of societas civilis exactly in its property, quality, characteristic, capacity as the first historical representative of the modern theory (of) and praxis (practice) of sovereignty (as much as it had to stop halfway in both regards, respects due to / of its own social character), and the same applies also in regard to (the) revolution, and indeed not only in its democratic^{xxvii}, but also in its liberal variant: because even (if) liberalism in its striving, endeavour, effort to stand up to absolutist claims(,) (it) (liberalism) had to / could not but announce, declare, express natural law(-related) and political considerations, reservations, doubts, misgiving, objections, demurs against the radical version of the new-times teaching, doctrine, theory (of) and praxis, practice of sovereignty, thus it (liberalism), on the other hand, itself fully thrived, flourished, prospered only on the terrain, territory of modern statehood, that is on account of and thanks to the dissolution of societas civilis. The continuity of conservative argumentation, which revolves around the aforementioned questions, problems and their world-theoretical implications or else presuppositions, and in the course of this – let it be repeated once again / as we must repeat – is formed, shaped not as a mere reaction, but rather adapts, adjusts the conventional, traditional ideas of societas civilis to new polemical needs, corresponds partly in parallel and partly consecutively to the continuity in the effect, impact, influence of the forces destroying / corrosive / poisonous / subversive (in respect) (of) societas civilis; conservative thought does not owe, therefore, its own continuity simply to the need to defend, put up a fight against, resist the continual, continuous activity of the successive, consecutive foes of societas civilis, even if (they are) often fighting, struggling against one another, but rather to the provenance, origins, background, extraction, stock of conservative basic, fundamental ideas from / out of a very long intellectual-spiritual and social-political tradition. It can be proven that both this provenance / these origins as well as the fact that conservative thought, from the 16th century, when it namely first / for the first time consciously turned against the modern teaching, doctrine, theory and praxis, practice of sovereignty, until / up to its dissolution in / during the

course of the 19th century, revolves around certain themes, topics and repeats the same leitmotifs in innumerable, countless variations. Without doubt / Undoubtedly, conservative thought experienced, underwent, lived through around / circa 1800 an enrichment, whose important aspects remain the critique of culture / cultural critique^{xxviii} and the teaching, doctrine, theory of dictatorship – the former (critique of culture) namely as an / the answer, response to the incipient industrial revolution and the intellectually rich-in-influence / (very) influential political economy, the latter (doctrine, theory, teaching of dictatorship) as the attempt to defend, fend / ward / hold / beat off, repel, avert, parry, repulse the [[French]] Revolution precisely with the help of the means of power of the in principle rejected (turned down, declined, refused) modern state. Even the (what is) content-related new (element, dimension) / new content hardly modifies, however, this conventional, traditional ideological construct, rather it is placed in order / classified, integrated, incorporated, included in it (the said traditional, conventional ideological construct) in the form of an additional argument and a further confirmation, affirmation, acknowledgement, verification, validation, endorsement, attestation, recognition, authentication, corroboration, reassurance, upholding, indorsement. There is evidence, proof for the fact that some conservatives around, circa 1800 were clear about / had cognizance, were aware of the origins, provenance, origination, descent, emanation of their own ideas from old sources(,) and that very many [[of them]] knew of the long history of the dissolution of *societas civilis* and the correspondingly long pre-history of their party^{xxix}. Modern researchers, nonetheless, reach, attain, achieve, obtain, end up in similar insights, conclusions, understandings only seldom and inadequately, poorly, insufficiently, deficiently, defectively, imperfectly, unsatisfactorily, if at all, because they are not (sufficiently, adequately) familiar (enough) with the body, corpus, set of ideas (intellectual / thoughts world) of *societas civilis*, so that they, behind the conservative explanations, analyses regarding, (in respect) of, on the natural, organic, spontaneous, self-sown (vigorous, prolific) growth of society e.g., which in the 18th and 19th century were in opposition (contrary) to / countered liberal individualism, can hardly recognise the intricate (entangled, involved, complicated, convoluted) lines of argumentation of scholastic (soci(et)al and contract) theory (pertaining to / as regards society and the contract / contracts). The diversity, dissimilarity, variety, difference of language and of terminology – despite all the identity, sameness of (the) thought structure (structure of thought) – constitutes in actual fact that element (moment) [with] which (the) earlier conservatism profoundly, deep down, in depth distinguishes / differentiates itself from (the) anti-Enlightenment and anti-revolutionary (anti-French Revolution) conservatism. The latter (anti-Enlightenment and anti-revolutionary

(anti-French Revolution) conservatism) seems in a linguistic/language-formal/form-related regard much more modern, for which reason it also is recognised, acknowledged as such, without difficulty / easily by those who command, control, dominate, master, possess no other language than that of (the) modern politics and social / societal theory coming into being after the 18th century. Because (the) conservatives of the time(s), period, era, age, epoch around and after 1800 under the pressure of the Enlightenment, whose conscious or unconscious pupils, students they (the conservatives) have (had) often been (were), and taking into account / with (in) consideration of the journalistic, publicist(ic) effect, impact, influence of its (the Enlightenment's) words and writings, turned away from / turned their backs on, averted, warded off the traditional, for the most part, scholastically stamped, moulded, shaped, embossed vocabulary and conceptual arsenal of *societas civilis*, in order to from then on / henceforth, thereafter make use of / use the new, secular and essentially more direct language of their foes. This opposition, contrast between form and content constitutes in / during later conservatism, in actual fact, a sign, signal of the decadence and an omen of / for the upcoming, approaching, imminent conclusive, definitive decline of *societas civilis*, even though it came into being in the course of an attempt at modernisation. Beyond this opposition, contrast (between form and content), research, nevertheless, must keep in mind / an eye on, hold before its eyes the perseverance, persistence, insistence, tenacity, steadfastness of the thought structures (structures of thought)(,) in order to be able to follow, track, pursue conservative thought in (during) its real duration, length of time, period (of time), term, continuance and unfolding, evolution, development in historical time.

If we want to consistently avoid, evade, obviate, avert, eschew an analysis merely pertaining to the history of ideas, that is an *ab ovo*^{xxx} misleading analysis of conservatism(,) and put, place, posit the social-political aspect at the centre of attention, thus it is not enough, sufficient, in relation to that, to deduce, derive the general world-theoretical positions of conservatism from its (social-theoretical) positions (pertaining to the theory of society) (something which basically again would mean, signify a coming to a standstill in the history of ideas), but the historical fate, destiny, lot must be always, continuously, at all times present [[in our minds, thoughts]] of that upper stratum, which during the whole historical duration, period (of time), term was / had (has) been the natural bearer, carrier, vehicle of the conservative world view and social theory. The history of conservatism coincides extensively, to a great extent with the history of the nobility, aristocracy, something which obviously means, signifies that the end of the nobility, aristocracy as the traditional (in the Weberian

sense) ruling, dominant stratum had to / necessarily entail(ed) the end of socially relevant and conceptually concise, succinct, incisive, terse conservatism too, as well. The two great phases in the history of conservatism, (in respect) of which just now (this moment) there was talk, coincide with the two great episodes in the new-times history of the nobility : we mean the partly successive, consecutive and partly simultaneous, concurrent struggles against both / the two factors which finally brought (dethroned, deposed, overthrew, displaced) it (the nobility, aristocracy) (down), namely against the modern state on the one hand, and modern industry, on the other (hand). The nobility (aristocracy) (we shall / if we remain temporarily, provisionally, for the time being, tentatively with this abstraction / let us stick with this abstraction for now) rationalised these (its) existential struggles, fights (it had) through / by means of thought (intellectual) constructions, which took into account, consideration (kept in mind) both long-term as well as short-term polemical-ideological needs(,) and in which, hence, the world-theoretical and the confessional (what pertains to world views and confessions of faith) was mixed with the tactical and the expedient in various, different proportions on each and every respective occasion. This is a point of great significance, importance for the concrete apprehension of the character and of the history of conservatism. The ambivalences and the ambiguities, which make their presence felt / become noticeable at every turn / every step of the way, can only be understood in regard to the concrete situation of the nobility (aristocracy) according to time and place. In general it ought to / should be noted that the nobility (aristocracy), despite all its in principle rejection, disapproval of absolutism and of the modern state, reconciled itself, nevertheless, with these to the extent that it believed itself to be capable of harnessing / using / roping in these (i.e. absolutism and the modern state) for its own purposes, goals, ends or else against foes from below / under them: this belief, conviction was often reinforced by the fact that in the young, new, emergent state apparatus, which had only partially detached, broken, freed itself from (the) in essence, essentially continuing to exist, surviving, lingering *societas civilis*, it (the said nobility) possessed the most important, significant posts, positions, offices, jobs. But also with / in (regard to) activities (in respect) of the economy / economic activity, which were (was) bound (had) to (necessarily) undermine(d) *societas civilis* in the long run / over time, the nobility (aristocracy) gave in / surrendered (i.e. took part in / indulged) – at least inside of certain, from country to country and from time to time, various, different bound(arie)s, limits –, in so far as this / these seemed to be of service, useful, helpful, conducive, expedient to its / their (the nobility's) immediate, direct interests. The inescapable, unavoidable, inevitable ambivalence of the relation of the nobility towards / with the modern state and towards / with

the modern economy has in conservative thought, especially in its later phase, left behind deep traces, tracks, marks so that there can hardly be talk of a satisfactory reconstruction of conservatism without consideration of / for these social-historical factors; the in-breeding, agreement, concord of the conservative thought figure with itself provides, delivers, incidentally, eo ipso the proof, evidence of its concrete historicity, through / by which (whereby) anthropological etc. constructions [[of conservatism^{xxxix}]] have the ground cut from under them / their foundation(s) undermined.

That / This is for the most part the social-historical framework (and framework) (also) pertaining to the history of ideas, inside of which this this investigation, research moves / will move. A short, brief method(ological) consideration, thought must still / is yet to be advanced, put forward, proffered, which concerns the utility, benefit and bound(arie)s, limits, borders, confines of the (methodical) procedure of the history of concepts (/ the method of conceptual history). It is (well-)known that the concept of conservatism in our familiar sense first appeared, arose, cropped / popped up and was disseminated, became widespread in the first, early decades of the 19th century¹⁴, whereas / whilst in our description, depiction, (re)presentation, the conservative thought figure is centuries older and precisely at the time / in the times of the appearance of the concept describing it, it had begun to dissolve. If things are factually / in actual fact so / thus, then there exists between the genetic and structural analysis resting / based on findings pertaining to social history and the history of ideas and the (methodical) procedure / method (of proceeding) oriented exclusively towards conceptual history / the history of the concept(,) a(n) opposition, clash, contrast. The latter must in actual fact remain (stuck) on (at) the surface when it disregards, overlooks, ignores the aforementioned genetic and structural analysis or else understands itself as the / a general replacement / substitute for this (genetic and structural analysis) and in the course of this / process lets the (actual) thing [[i.e. of conservatism even if it has not yet been called “conservatism”]] come into being with the concept (/ equates the genesis of the thing with the appearance of its concept). Because it is not only possible that a mere word becomes / turns into a historically loaded, charged concept when / if it is connected with a social or intellectual structure simultaneously coming into being [[with the word in question]], but also that such a structure existing for a long time only later is (becomes) summarised / summed up in a concept. In the former case, of course, the conceptual-historical / history of the concept and the genetic-structural / genesis and the structure go together / accompany each other, in

¹⁴ For the history of the concept / conceptual history in general, see Vierhaus, *Konservativ-Konservatismus*.

the latter case, no(t) / they do not. The concept can, therefore, not only be an indicator of a new development, but just as well / much a concluding, conclusive, in conclusion, final summa summarum or even a(n) epitaph, gravestone (memorial) inscription of an already (in essence) expired, out-of-date, lapsed process¹⁵. If the history of a concept does not take this into account and makes (it) in every case and at any cost (that) the ascertainment of the beginning, start of a historical development dependent on the registering, recording, writing, taking down of a new concept, then it isolates itself from the real becoming, course of events in its continuity and turns into language / linguistic idealism or into a linguistics (in respect) of history. In the case of conservatism, a one-sided (conceptual-historical) orientation (as regards the history of the concept) leads in a double sense into error / into a double entendre: because here the thing (as the concrete effect, impact, influence of certain historical bearers, carriers, vehicles, supporters as well as the thought (intellectual) structure) not only exists long avant la lettre / before the word came into being, but the concept also persists and even thrives long after the thing originally – albeit / even if belatedly – associated with it has lapsed / fallen into ruin / decayed, perished, come to an end, declined, foundered, sunk, been destroyed, vanished. This will be shown in/by the following analysis of today's use of the concept of conservatism.

2. “Conservatism” as a contemporary political keyword / catchword / slogan

Our perception (view) that conservatism is nothing other than a solidly, firmly outlined, delineated, exactly / precisely identifiable and long ago concluded, completed social historical phenomenon (occurrence, appearance) also pertaining to the history of ideas in / during the transition from *societas civilis* to the dualism of (the) state and society can / is able to find (a) confirmation, verification in the proof, evidence, fact that those who today call themselves or allow, let, permit themselves to be called “conservative” (would) have only the

¹⁵ We recall, recollect, remind ourselves of the telling, well-aimed, if also not generally valid / of general validity saying by Bruno Bauer: “Historical categories usually, customarily become only the slogan, keyword, catchword, catchphrase of a party when the thing, matter, case, cause, issue, which they describe, has long gone / ago lapsed / fallen into ruin / decayed, perished, come to an end, declined, foundered, sunk”. *Der christliche Staat und unsere Zeit* (1841) = *Feldzüge*, 7.

slightest, least in common with those who originally, initially bore, carried, supported this name, and have filled (the) old conservative commonplaces, in so far as these are still used, with essentially new content. Hardly does a (present-day) “conservative” (of today) seek to undo / reverse the fundamental separation of state and society (precisely the opposite is the case), hardly does a conservative call into question / doubt equality before the law or “human rights” (anything but that) and hardly would it occur to him that the boundaries, limits between the private and the public or legality and morality – fixed, determined only / first in the struggle against *societas civilis* – ought to be abolished, cancelled, lifted; also, the relations between the individual and the collective or questions, problems, issues like for instance the freedom of spiritual-intellectual creation / creating are as a rule comprehended by today’s “conservatives” completely, fully, entirely differently than their supposed, alleged ancestors, antecedents, precursors, forerunners, forebears, predecessors. If that / this / things is / are so / thus, then scientific research does not stand in actual fact before the task, job, mission of explaining the continuation, survival, lingering, continuing to exist and continuity of conservatism as a concrete historical phenomenon (occurrence, appearance); rather it must make comprehensible, understandable why the concept of conservatism is used today at all, i.e. which / what polemical and ideological needs push, thrust, urge us towards / for its use. It is to be remarked, observed, commented upon in advance that the use of the concept of conservatism on the part of contemporary^{xxxii} social-political directions, tendencies, schools of thought, which have very little to do with conservatism as a historical phenomenon, occurrence, appearance, or even stand at its antipodes / are the exact opposite (of conservatism as a historical phenomenon), additionally obfuscate, obscure, darken, dim, eclipse, black out, suppress the essence, nature, character of this latter (conservatism as a historical phenomenon)^{xxxiii}. In conservatism as a historical phenomenon, namely, (much) later positions and wishes, desires are projected, which in reality interrelate, interconnect not with it / conservatism itself, but with the (also, likewise much later) use of the concept of conservatism. The fact that / That today’s “conservatives”, who fight, struggle primarily against revolutionary “totalitarianism”, make out of / convert the counter-revolutionaries of the time(s), era around 1800 (into) the representatives of their own perception of freedom and sometimes, on occasion even (into) blasé, airy, indifferent and sceptical late-liberals, lays, puts, places, posits without doubt / undoubtedly considerable, substantial hindrances, obstacles in the way of an apprehension of the concrete historicity, historicity of the conservative phenomenon^{xxxiv}.

Let us get straight to the point / go therefore immediately in medias res (into the middle of things). Disregarding / Overlooking / Ignoring some historically and politically hardly remarkable, noteworthy fossils (out) of / from (the) past (times), “conservatives” are today called those liberals^{xxxv} who reject under (the) conditions, circumstances of (the) industrial mass society, to on each and every respective occasion different extent, degree and tempo, rhythm, the (effective, in effect, executive) lapsing, sliding (of / by a wing) of liberalism into positions of social democracy^{xxxvi}. This lapsing, sliding began to become evident, apparent, obvious during the final, last decades of the 19th century – precisely because of this, incidentally, as we shall see, basic / fundamental motifs of contemporary “conservative” thought stem, emanate, arise, come from that time / those times – and have since that time put to the (a hard, tough, severe, stiff) test the inner / internal life of a number of liberal parties^{xxxvii}. A satisfactory description, depiction, (re)presentation of this process would require, call for, demand a substantial recapitulation of the whole, entire history of liberalism from the point of view of a central aspect. Here we must be content / make do with an indication of / allusion (pointing) to a crucial, vital point. The ideological (and often political too) fusion, merging, amalgamation of a wing of liberalism with social democracy occurred, took place not as an open break with (the) liberal tradition / Tradition, but on the roundabout way of a re-interpretation / different interpretation of the liberal basic / fundamental concept^{xxxviii}. Thus, the individual is fixed, kept, maintained as / determined to be the guiding basic, fundamental value; but whereas old liberalism espoused primarily the inviolability of the rights and of the property of the individual, whereby it (old liberalism), tacitly / silently or not, kept an eye on the (already possessing [[what is necessary]]) individual (who already possessed [[what was deemed to be necessary / all that an individual needed]]), socially oriented liberalism, rather, directed its attention to the underprivileged and interpreted the worthiness, valuableness or else dignity of the individual in that/the regard / is such a way that society is (would be) obligated / obliged, duty-bound / has (have) a duty to not let him (or her or it) (the individual) suffer. Freedom as a formal, form-related right, in other words, is no longer looked at as the / a(n) sufficient, adequate social underpinning, back-up, support, reinforcement, prop of the individual, although / even though it is always, constantly, continually regarded as indispensable, essential and in fact is continuously defended at least nominally against every / any form of collectivism. The formal / form-related right is supposed to, however, now be secured, safeguarded, protected materially, and precisely this builds the decisive bridge towards social democracy, especially since the latter(,) also / even in its Marxist version(,) appeared from the beginning with the claim not to set / put aside the

formal rights propagated by liberalism, but wanting them (the said formal rights) filled with material content. And since again as a / the guarantee of the material rights of the individual in (as a matter of) practice only the modern bureaucratic social(-)(state), administrative(-) (state) and welfare state is an option, so / thus, social liberalism reaches – if we may thus, so call it for the sake of (mutual) understanding – precisely on the basis of liberal-individualistic premises, the (point of) demand(ing) of more state or more egalitarian mass democracy, whereby / in relation to which the common places of the liberal tradition / Tradition or else slogans, keywords, catchwords, catchphrases from / (coming) out of the heroic time(s), era of liberalism of the 19th century, which, in any case, have a “progressive” ring, sound, are (re-) interpreted according to these (re)presentations, notions, ideas, perceptions [[of the material rights of the individual as “social liberalism”]]. Here, of course, the paths, roads, ways of the social liberals are separated from those of the old liberals, who see, espy, behold in material rights the end of formal rights (as well as the end of the (social status) differences (in social position / status) covered or favoured, encouraged, furthered, aided and abetted, facilitated by this formality), and who, at least in part, in the welfare state and in mass society, (are) neither politically completely find their way / completely reconciled with the welfare state and with mass society, nor do they want to or can they accept the unstoppable, inevitable dissolution taking place here of the traditional, conventional, at their own discretion (in their judgement) self-conscious bourgeois life form / way of life. Under these circumstances, conditions, two important, significant points of contact arise between the old liberals of our time^{xxxix} and the counter-revolutionary conservatives of the 19th century – whereby / in relation to which, of course, whose / their (i.e. the counter-revolutionary conservatives’) teachings, doctrines, theories are taken only at (their) face value and are torn away, loosened, dislodged from their concrete historical reference. Firstly, (we are reminded of) the warnings of the conservatives of that time (are recalled), that consistent liberalism would have / had to give birth from / out of its own womb to egalitarian and tyrannical democracy,(;) [that is to say,] liberalism and democracy are originally closely related; and secondly, (there is a connection to) the originally, initially conservative critique of culture / cultural criticism (is attached, connected), which inside of the colourful, multi-coloured pandemonium of democratic mass society likewise sounds prophetic^{xl}.

Now the impression would be false, wrong that this rather, quite, somewhat free recollection, remembrance of truly conservative thought (intellectual) motifs by / on the part of old liberals proves the unbroken and linear, lineal continuation, survival of conservatism

during the 19th and 20th century. Because for the contemporary use of language, the social-historical *continuity* or *continuity* pertaining to the history of ideas of actual, real historical conservatism is not responsible, liable, accountable, but rather the *change in / changing or splitting (cleavage, fission)* of (*split in*) liberalism (is responsible); only this change created that atmosphere which made possible, enabled, facilitated a new appraisal, evaluation of certain conservative ideas, henceforth detached from the(ir) historical context, interrelation(s). It can be proved, proven that today's usual, common critique, criticism of egalitarian mass society and the social or else welfare state (social-(state) or else welfare-state) does not stem, emanate, come from conservatives *stricto sensu*^{xli}, who, incidentally, did not know (of) these phenomena, but were sketched out, outlined, planned, delineated by old liberals so that contemporary "conservatives"^{xlii}, who come on the scene / appear / crop (pop) up in the name of this critique, criticism and renew this same critique, criticism, in reality have (are having) recourse to – irrespective of whether knowingly, deliberately, intentionally / they know it or not – (a) genuinely liberal ideas (set of ideas / thoughts (intellectual) world). In order to (first of all) disregard, overlook, ignore (once) the obligatory reference to Tocqueville: very instructive, informative would be in this regard / respect a study of the writings appearing, published in the last third of the 19th century by / of the Victorian critics of liberalism bearing, carrying, supporting democratic^{xliii} features (characteristics, attributes, traits), and indeed by J. Stephen, Lord Acton, H. Maine and W. Lecky. These writing came into being e.g. as the direct answer to the at that time theoretical attempt (trial, experiment, effort) to widen, broaden, like for instance by Green and Bradlaugh, following in the footsteps of J. S. Mill, liberalism as the optimistic active politics of unrestricted, unlimited progress (Progress) around the idea of the welfare state, (to) which would in principle permit, allow (be permissible) interventions in all spheres of society for the protection ((safe)guarding, sheltering) and well-being (welfare) of all individuals. The aforementioned authors resisted / fought this / that by comparing this radical social liberalism, which nevertheless continued to appear / arrive (come) on the scene in the name of the individual, with Jacobinism, which wants to force society into abstract patterns, schemata, models, whereupon tyranny would have to / necessarily follow(ed)¹⁶. The express, highly symbolic

¹⁶ Regarding this motif in Acton and Maine see Brinton, *Pol. Thought*, 205, 275 ff.. Synoptical / Summary (re)presentations, depictions, descriptions of the political thought of the representatives of this direction, tendency, school of thought are offered, apart from Brinton, who concentrates above all on Acton and Maine (198 ff., 266 ff.), by Barker, *Pol. Thought*, esp. 145 ff. (regarding Maine and Stephen) and Lippincott, *Vict. Critics*, 144 ff. (regarding Stephen, Maine and Lecky). Similar perceptions are at the basis / foundation of the social-political thought of Lord Salisbury, as we shall see in Ch. IV, Sec. 1 d.

demarcation, delimitation, differentiation against / from Jacobinism (allowed / let) indeed (reveals, discloses, brings out) (the) commonalities with counter-revolutionary conservatism (to become visible), although here every reference to conservative theorists / theoreticians is missing (lacking),(;) but / however, on the other hand, it (the said demarcation from Jacobinism) implies that neither liberalism in toto is (to be) condemned, nor is the ancien régime (to be) romantically glorified. Above all, in regard to two points of radical social liberalism does this old liberalism take offence: in regard to its extreme individualism, which by invoking the absolute value (worth) of every / any individual and the resulting (coming into being, emanating) (from that) obligation to provide social protection in practice amounts / is tantamount to the rootlessness of the individual, and in regard to its extreme utilitarian(ist)(ic) thought / thinking, which can be guided, conducted, led exclusively by (an) economic and administrative-technical calculus, calculation(s). The rootless individual and (the) utilitarian calculus / calculation(s) constitute again (the) two sides of the same coin, since both manage without / lack / are deprived of (the / a) fixed, firm, solid binding, tying, ties, bonds, connection to (pre-)given values, so that vulgar eudaemonism and psychically and culturally disastrous, catastrophic, fatal, ominous, fateful, ill-fated, portentous self-serving, selfish end / goal, purposeful, expedient, instrumental rationality remain / are left over as the sole, lone force, power holding together / cohering, binding – or rather dissolving – (the/a) society. Both reflection, contemplation, concentration (up)on higher, superior spiritual-intellectual values stabilising hierarchies through / by means of authority, especially Christian values, as well as a reinforcement, strengthening of supra/hyper-individual social (not state(-related)) constructs, beginning / starting with the family, are (re)commended, advised here against the egalitarian welfare state and the with it (the egalitarian welfare state) connected cultural and spiritual-intellectual degeneracy / degeneration, as well as against the extreme atomisation of society in various, differing forms.

Very similar or even identical perceptions determine (the) social-political thought / thinking of (the) so-called “neo-liberalism” appearing / arriving (coming) onto the scene programmatically during the Second World War or else shortly before(hand), whose more or less typical representatives or adherents, supporters, followers, adherents for the most part / (as regards the) vast majority are those who today call themselves “conservative(s)”. Since it (the said social-political thought of so-called “neo-liberalism”) was, in terms of theory, not least of all formed, shaped, moulded under the impression of the economic crisis of 1929, thus / so “neo-liberalism” had to – in contrast, (contra)distinction to / with (unlike) its

conscious or unconscious old-liberal antecedents, ancestors, precursors – give (e)special, particular consideration to (economic) questions, problems, issues (of the economy) and propose, suggest, put forward, propound a series, row, range of measures, actions to mitigate / for the mitigation, alleviation, easing, moderation of (economic(-related), business, cyclical) fluctuations, cycles (of the (overall social-economic) conjuncture) (the decentralisation of industry, the widening, broadening, extension, expanding, expansion of individual self-sufficiency, self-catering, the strengthening, reinforcement of the agricultural, rural, rustic, agrarian share, proportion of the national economy^{xliv}). Otherwise / Apart from that, the polemical chief, main aims, ends, objectives remain for the most part the same: it is, on the one hand, massification and on the other hand, cultural and moral “decline (decay, dilapidation, abasement, decadence, disintegration, downfall, degeneracy)”¹⁷. Massification appears, of course, as the concomitant, accompaniment, side effect of egalitarianism and of the bureaucratic welfare state, which partly drove forward, pushed along, advanced, impelled, partly incarnated, embodied, personified the development, unfolding towards / of egalitarian mass democracy. At the root of the “decline, decadence, degeneracy” the narrowly rationalistic, i.e. merely / simply end/goal-rational, expedient, purposeful and utilitarian spirit (intellect, mind) is again supposed to be found. Its outgrowths, excrescences, protuberances are scientism, positivism and technicism, which of / by their (very) essence, nature, character disregard / do not respect moral values, after they had previously / beforehand corroded, subverted, decomposed, broken them up and undermined them with / through their permanent critique / criticism; rationalism, in other words, dissolves, breaks up values by holding all values to be / regarding all values as being of the same value / equivalent / equal according to time and place, that is to say, equally good for certain social functions, and reaches scepticism precisely in / during the attempt to extend, expand, stretch, enlarge, dilate the principle of liberal tolerance to all values. Between this liberal rationalism and the detachment / breaking away of the members of mass society from Tradition and fixed, firm, stable, especially religious perceptions, notions, ideas of values (value perceptions), (there) exists therefore an inner / internal interrelation / interconnection; the tangible result, outcome is economism and the general turn towards the vulgar eudaemonism of consumption¹⁸. Rational scientism, in

¹⁷ Regarding the following, see, above all, Röpke, *Gesellschaftskrisis*, 15 ff., 23 ff., 85 ff., as well as *Civitas humana*, 112 ff., 133 ff., 241 ff.. Röpke's analyses pertaining to the history of ideas are often superficial, shallow, frivolous, trivial and amateurish, dilettantish.

¹⁸ Contemporary “conservatives” often turn against the “constant artificial generation, creating, production, manufacturing, provoking of new (consumer) desires / wishes ((in respect) of / for consumption)”, especially whose “artificially caused, arisen, evoked, created, stimulated uniformity” impairs, interferes with, reduces,

short, is calculating, designing, pondering and spiritually-intellectually (mentally) rootless, that is, in principle egalitarian and revolutionary, it constitutes the practical (pragmatic, action-oriented, immediate-use-focused way of thinking and acting) and utilitarian ideology of mass society; the rejection of egalitarian mass society and of the bureaucratic welfare state must, therefore, accompany / be accompanied by / go (hand in hand) with the refusal, renunciation, cancellation, denial of rationalism (thus / so) understood (in this way)¹⁹. And if (in the place of) a state(-related/like) bureaucracy (should be replaced by) a decentralised society (is supposed to be put, placed, posited), in which individuals are bound, tied freely and organically to clear / concise collective(s) (collective bodies, organisations) and in which talent, endowment and performance, achievement, accomplishment create natural and healthy gradations between individuals, thus against (the antidote for) dry, arid, stale, barren rationalism(.) (is) recourse to spiritual and moral values (should / must / ought to provide, ensure, take care of a / the remedy, redress, cure, rectification [[for people's problems]])^{xlv}.

harms, detracts from, disturbs, distorts, restricts the free development, unfolding of the individual. Thus, e.g. Schwarzkopf, *Was ist heute kons.?*, 48. All the important points of the "conservative" programme, which Schwarzkopf sets / lays out, puts forward, establishes, posits (legitimate authority, freedom, the limitation, restriction, confining of the welfare state) coincide, by the way / incidentally, with the demands, requests of neoliberalism.

¹⁹ This interrelation was, by the way, seen, recognised, accepted, observed and underlined, emphasised early (on); apart from the above-mentioned Victorian(s) (thinkers), it appears around 1900 in a central position in Mallock's writings. Kirk, *Cons. Mind*, 345 ff. informs us of that/this.

**THE FOOTNOTES ARE BY P.K. (UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE [[]]), WHEREAS THE
ENDNOTES KONSTITOOT KRAYZEE MAN SHIT**

ⁱ Obviously, many of these positions had existed for up to centuries, if not longer, before they were, so to speak, baptised as “conservative”.

ⁱⁱ Of conservatism and its time-frame.

ⁱⁱⁱ Obviously, all sides can react to another side acting against them and or perceived to be acting against them, and not just “conservatives”, whatever that may mean on each and every respective occasion.

^{iv} All societies are made up of groups and individuals, regardless of whether Tradition and Custom dominates, or for instance FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LOBOTOMISATION-PAVLOV’S DOG-STIMULUS-REACTION-CREATION OF “NEEDS”-HEDONISMUS-KONSUM-TOORIZMOOS-EXOTIZMOOS-SELF-RACISM-SELF-ETHNIC CLEANSING AND SELF-GENOCIDE BRAIN WASHING.

^v Der Trieb zur Bewahrung. In *Power and Decision / Macht und Entscheidung* (1984), self-preservation is referred to numerous times (das Gebot der Selbsterhaltung (S. 11), Anspruch auf Selbsterhaltung (S. 12), Modus von Selbsterhaltung (S. 13), Selbsterhaltung (S. 14), die Selbsterhaltung (S. 21), Bedürfnisse der Selbsterhaltung (S. 26), Selbsterhaltungstrieb und -kampf (S. 26)), before we arrive at the classic formulation of the drive, urge, impulse of self-preservation only : dem Selbsterhaltungstrieb (S. 26).

^{vi} Just what the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID ordered: a communist, who is a revolutionary, becomes a “conservative”, a liberal, who was a revolutionary against “feudalism”, is now also a “conservative” degenerate proponent of the welfare state and the “great society” status quo, whilst the advocates of laissez-faire want a “radical return” to a place no-one can any longer return to etc. etc. etc.. If everyone is confused and arguing with one another, no-one will even think about uniting against the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID.

^{vii} Two of the most prominent precursors of modern sociology are : Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), whilst thinkers such as David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) are also important reference points.

^{viii} I.e. against Rousseau’s idiotic and highly ideological notions of man as a naturally good individual in the state of nature before entering into society and becoming wicked etc..

^{ix} Since it’s an abstraction / abstract thought, i.e. it is not smelt, tasted, heard, seen, touched anywhere by the senses “communicating directly to da brain”, apart from being totally a thought / intellectual construction of man.

^x Hence the absolutely ludicrous and ridiculous situation in our times in “the West” under the ruling ANTI-CHRIST GREAT SATAN EVIL-DEVIL SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN MAMMON-LUCIFER ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID of “conservatives” and “neo-conservatives” not only worshipping JOOZ, KIKES, YIDZ and their TOTAL EXCREMENT, TOTAL FILTH, TOTAL FAECES, TOTAL GARBAGE, TOTAL RUBBISH ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-“KOST”, but as “Christian Democrats” and God only knows what else, supporting and encouraging SIN, adultery, “love is love” casual sex fucking and the marriage of the HOMO-POOFTA-TRANZ-LEZZO-FAGGOT, as well as drug-taking, porn, self-racism, self-ethnic cleansing, self-genocide etc. etc. etc..

^{xi} This, of course, does not preclude the (at least partial) continuation of some religious and other traditions, customs, mores, ways for up to many centuries or longer, especially with regard to the indigenous peasantry of a (wider) locus / region.

^{xii} Obviously, P.K. is referring to circa 1800 (1750-1850) here.

^{xiii} Conservatism as a political movement with at least some substantive reference to the conserving of Christian patriarchy, if not “feudal” pre-industrial relations (which was over as a matter of practice by the end of the 18th century, and as to the conserving of “feudal privileges” by the mid-nineteenth century / 1848), was essentially dead by circa 1890 (as expounded in this book by P.K.), whilst liberalism as the practice (not just ideology) of oligarchic, patriarchal bourgeois society (but with strong (albeit marginal-minority) tendencies towards Decadence (Dandyism, Hedonism etc.)) was effectively dead by circa 1900, i.e. up to the First ZIO-World War, as ZIO-mass democracy took over with the increasing mass-universal mechanisation-technicisation of the whole of society by the Second ZIO-World War with an extremely refined division of labour, heightened social mobility and massified atomisation up to and including the ZIO-cultural revolution of the ZIO-1960s and ZIO-1970s with tolerance for erstwhile abominations such as “out of the closet” homosexuality, homoz, lezzoz, tranz-freaks, drugs, porn, self-racism, self-ethnic cleansing, self-genocide, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-KOST-worship, monkey / other-worship, BOING-BOING-BOING-worship, etc. all in a generalised massified climate of

HEDONISMUS and KONSUM with societal KONSENS based on “everybody, everybody, absolutely everybody, yeah” partaking of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-CAVE-SATANISM, albeit to varying degrees. The fact that today a “liberal” is in favour of the ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANIC ABOMINATION of the marriage of the homosexual, which the “Christian” Pope blesses !!!, and that a “(neo-)conservative” does the same, as well as advocating for more “free market” orientation, even though in practice he generally does not significantly reduce the welfare state at all, proves of itself that the liberal and the conservative of the early to mid-nineteenth century are long gone and dead. For scientific observation, however, concepts cannot change their meaning like LIZZARDZ, JOOZ, KIKES AND YIDZ change their skin, so to speak, because in that case, today someone in favour of traditional Christian marriage would be a “revolutionary”, whereas the supporters of the abomination of the marriage of the Poofter or Lezzo is a “conservative” – as you can see, we’ve entered ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-“CONFUSE THE SHIT OUT OF EVERYONE” AND SPREAD CHAOS MAKE EVERYTHING UPSIDE DOWN AND FUZZY territory, exactly as the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID and its many ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES programmatically seek to do in order for the ruling JOO, KIKE AND YID to remain in power and control (KONTROL). For “the West”, it’s now OVER. DEAD. PLANET ZOG ANTI-CHRIST. SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN. EVIL DEVIL. GREAT SATAN. LUCIFER. MAMMON. SULPHUR. ZIO.

^{xiv} Alive and “kicking” until the 18th century, essentially dead by 1848-circa 1890, and last “still peaking” as “late feudalism” before the (16th /) 17th century, if not much earlier, e.g. before the 15th century (incl. as a continuation of late antiquity).

^{xv} P.K. will now go on to outline the separation of the state from society as a key component of bourgeois rule (PARTLY ZIO-ED, BUT NOT YET FULLY ZIO-ED AND JOO-JACKED) which was accompanied by industrialisation in the 19th century, which will then move onto the involvement of the state in society in the mass democracy of the 20th (and 21st centuries) (under total and absolute ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-MAMMON-MONEY-LUCIFER-EVIL-DEVIL-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN-ANTI-CHRIST-“LEFT/RIGHT” power and control (KONTROL) across economy, state and culture), with *societas civilis* representing a mostly agricultural, pre-industrial state of affairs without any kind of universal (within a specific territory) state reaching into up to all spheres of life, as well as without substantive massification-atomisation and any kind of heightened / generalised social mobility and any kind of a refined division of labour, and with the Church and Christianity still dominating culture, with up to not insignificant input in the economic and state-related spheres too.

^{xvi} If the New Times refers to the 16th and 17th centuries, and the Enlightenment to the 18th century, then *societas civilis* as “late feudalism” was generally still relatively “strong” in the 15th century and beforehand.

^{xvii} Massification had commenced in the first half of the 19th century, even from the second half of the 18th century, but it had not reached the point yet of mass mechanisation / electrification / technicisation and so talk of “(radical / social) democracy” in the 19th century in terms of a polity pertaining to the rule of the people as a *demos* was not yet fully without reference to actual extant social-political conditions at that time, nor was such talk yet fully ideologised as occurred when universal suffrage actually came into being from circa 1900, which coincided with the processes of the MASS-ANTI-CHRIST-MONEY-MAMMON-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-IFICATION of the “West” reaching their peak, including not just the economy, but also the state and even culture by the ZIO-1960s and ZIO-1970s. It’s now OVER. DEAD. PLANET ZOG. ZIO. “The West” will “have its day” just as “every dog does” in its ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST-JOO-DAS-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-MAMMON-LUCIFER-MADNESS against the most powerful and best organised parts of the non/extra-“West”, and the odds of anyone getting to 2100 AD do not at all look good, even though nobody today can know what will “exist” in 2100.

^{xviii} See endnote xvii immediately above.

^{xix} Which was impossible. There is no going back in time, notwithstanding that up to many elements from the (distant) past continue (albeit changed) into the present and future.

^{xx} This is where the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LIZZARD-ENTRY-IST literally “comes in”, i.e. into all departments of the state, bureaucracy and administration affecting and infecting inter alia everything from Tax and Education to Business Administration and Entertainment (displacing and or co-opting anything remaining from the Christian nobility and or bourgeoisie, and in the USA from pre/non-JOO Christian / Secular America), and everything in between – there are no economic-money-related, state-bureaucratic-administrative or cultural-ideological (significant) crystallisations of power not under direct or indirect ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-power and control (KONTROL), i.e. ultimately the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID deep state in favour of the ANTI-CHRIST ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN EVIL-DEVIL MAMMON-LUCIFER GREAT SATAN controls (KONTROL) everything and everyone. The issue by the end of ZIO-WW2 was not “the West” as such anymore, this “West” had been totally ZIO-fucked up and JOO-DAS-fucked over, the issue now was whether the Chinese, the Rooskeez and others outside of “the West” could do anything for themselves.

^{xxi} Which was already grossly disproportionately and vastly asymmetrically ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST infiltrated, even in the name of Jesus, but more often than not secular, agnostic etc. ...

^{xxii} As far as a layman can tell, the technology is already “there” / available to robotise etc. humans completely, i.e. to mechanise-technicise human existence (incl. the implanting of chips and other forms of control (KONTROL) etc.) to such an extent that humans move into a new era / epoch of another novum whereby the political terminology originating in the 19th century (liberalism, conservatism, (social / radical) democracy) falls completely out of use, but we’re not “there” quite yet because the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SCUMBAG SATANISTS and all their ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOUGE SCUMBAG-SATANISTS of “the West” haven’t got over the Russia / China “hurdle” ... which will either mean the end of everyone, or China, Russia and BRICS+ gaining the upper hand and with “the West” becoming subservient and or relatively peripheral.

^{xxiii} 1564-1642, 1596-1650 and 1588-1679, respectively.

^{xxiv} Monarchical (and less often other forms of) absolutism of the sixteenth and seventeenth to eighteenth (and nineteenth) centuries did much to strengthen (nation-state) liberalism (along with parliamentarism, as the case may be), which in turn meant the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LIZZARD-ENTRY-IST-RAT-RODENT-CRIMINAL-CONSPIRATORIAL-RAT-TUNNEL-PARASITE-ANTI-CHRIST-EVIL-DEVIL-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-LUCIFER-MAMMON-SATANIST too.

^{xxv} Meant in relation to the social whole (as it formed under the influence of the Industrial Revolution novum of circa 1800, and later the mass-democratic novum of circa 1900), i.e. with nothing (not superficial and not ideological) to do with ancient Greece.

^{xxvi} Of course, the individual referred to here (unless he was a Dandy or other kind of Degenerate) still tended to engage in the creation of a nuclear family in a very limited and diminished kind of household, though, now more often than not without the/an extended family, servants et al., and it was only with the “full explosion” of mass democracy from circa 1900 that the societal basis was laid for (especially after ZIO-WW2) mass easily-automatically obtained divorces, as well as mass licentiousness, permissiveness, love is love casual sex fucking, abort-fuck-slut sterility and childlessness, homoz, lezzoz, tranz-freaks, porn, drugz, self-racism, self-ethnic cleansing, self-genocide, other-ape-monkey-total filth shit skata excrement faeces vomit KOST worship, “I’ll sleep in after partying hard on Saturday night, watch TV or go on an excursion, camping or go to work (working for “the Man”) instead of going to Church” etc. etc. etc..

^{xxvii} Meant in relation to the social whole (as it formed under the influence of the Industrial Revolution novum of circa 1800, and later the mass-democratic novum of circa 1900), i.e. with nothing (not superficial and not ideological) to do with ancient Greece.

^{xxviii} Leading, on the surface paradoxically, to socialistic and or Marxian concepts such as “alienation”, “exploitation”, “solidarity”, “repression” etc. coming to the fore, not infrequently mixed with “primitive” societies or “primitive” Christianity and their (supposedly) communistic-like textures, compositions, structures.

^{xxix} Obviously, here, P.K. means the really true Christian “feudal privileges” conservatives in general of circa 1800, and not e.g. the Conservative Party of ZIO-GB (founded in 1834 from the Tory Party founded in 1679) in the 19th century, which in effect was a Liberal Party, and then in the 20th century just another ZIO-mass-democratic (eventually) “homo marriage” and the rest ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOUGE-ANTI-CHRIST party.

^{xxx} “From the egg” i.e. from the beginning, start, one’s genesis, the very start.

^{xxxi} I.e. a conservative is any man / human who supports retaining the status quo against any change, which today would mean the absolutely ludicrous and ridiculous position : those in favour of the abomination of the marriage of the homo-poofta-faggot under ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-PLANET ZOG are “conservatives” and those in favour of Traditional Christian Marriage are “revolutionaries” !!!

^{xxxii} Always keep in mind that “contemporary” in ZIO-1986 was all about Thatcher-Reagan ZIO-COLD WAR “conservatism” as anti-“totalitarian” anti-communism in favour of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-“free markets” (with no homo-poofta-faggot-etc marriage and “I am what I feel” etc. abominations yet), whereas today the ruling JOOZ, KIKES AND YIDZ, who were only at the preliminary stage in ZIO-1986 as regards their “full social-cultural programme”, have a full ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-LUCIFER-MAMMON-SULPHUR programme of HOMOZ, LEZZOZ, TRANZ-FREAKS, CHILDLESS ABORT-FUCK-SLUT-STERILITY, DRUGS, PORN, SELF-RACISM, SELF-ETHNIC CLEANSING AND THE COMPLETE GENOCIDING OUT OF EXISTENCE OF PISS-WEAK AND RETARDED TRIBES LIKE KRAZY MAN’S TRIBE. In fact, in da Gippa’s day,



anti-abortion movements and Traditional Family organisations etc. were still relatively strong.

^{xxxiii} This is fully in line with the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-GREAT SATAN-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-LUCIFER-MAMMON-SULPHUR programme of de-Christianising “Western” society, to have it run on a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST basis under a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-PLANET ZOG seeking to “rool da world” for the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-“master race” of JOOZ, KIKES and YIDZ.

^{xxxiv} Just what the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-OBFUSCATOR ordered.

^{xxxv} Ideologically “liberals”, because the centuries-long age, epoch, era of the liberal was over by circa 1900 / ZIO-WW1.

^{xxxvi} Again, ideologically, because in practice the so-called (social) welfare state started to become a reality in parts of “the West” in the first half of the twentieth century (even from the 19th century), and definitely had reached “the point of no return” after ZIO-WW2, and no “conservative” – no matter how “conservative” – could do the slightest thing about it (apart from tork and “tweaking it” a bit “here and there”).

^{xxxvii} Thus, circa ZIO-1900 and the novum of mass democracy (UNDER ZIO IN “THE WEST”), and especially under the pressure of 1917 and “world communism”, “liberals” became in effect “social democrats” / “socialists” / “pinkos”, whilst “conservatives” became “liberals”, who, nevertheless, did absolutely nothing in practice to abolish the (social) welfare state or to stop by circa 2000 such erstwhile (even up to circa 1970-1980-1990 for the still “silent majority”) unthinkable abominations of the marriage of the HOMO-POOFTA-FAGGOT, always under ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-PLANET ZOG-ANTI-CHRIST, calling themselves in recent decades “NEO-KON” ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZIO-KON-JOO-BERZ.

^{xxxviii} In other words, it was ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-JOO-JACKED to be associated with degenerate HEDONISMUS KONSUM TOORIZMOOS EXOTIZMOOS SELF-RACIST SELF-ETHNIC-CLEANSING SELF-GENOCIDAL CHILDLESS STERILE ABORT-FUCK-SLUT HOMO-POOFTA-TRANZ-LEZZO-FAGGOT DRUGS PORN ETC. individualism under ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-PLANET ZOG-rule, FROM ZIO-JOO-ES-HEY TO VASSAL ZIO-JOO-ROPA-CHANNEL AND DA ZIO-SATAN STATE AND ZIO-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY-ZOROS!

^{xxxix} See endnote xxxii, above. “The old liberals of our time” in ZIO-1986 are the Reagan / Thatcher “conservatives” who centred their rhetoric on anti-“totalitarian” anti-communism in favour of “free markets” under the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE. Note that “the old folks at home”, to whom P.K. does not refer, were the last generation to remain in their ancestral tribal homeland villages in “the West” (Europe and America) up until about the ZIO-1950s at the very latest, with a real-deal and not superficial connection to Christian Tradition and Patriarchy and the Ancestors-Descendants of the same Genos nexus as a world view and dominant value “system”.

^{xi} Don’t forget that circa 1800 the novum of industrial revolution massification was still in its first stages, so that a pre-(post-)modern understanding, without massification and industrialisation, of democracy was still possible, and such an understanding per definitionem is much closer to the ancient world than anything which came after. Repeat : the Founding Fathers and the Jacobins et al. were much closer from the point of view of the social-political-cultural whole to real-deal democracy than what came into being circa 1900 with universal suffrage under the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID(-LIZZARD-ENTRY-IST) of mass M-C-M industrial capitalism-imperialism becoming mass democratic and fully ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-EVIL-DEVIL-LUCIFER-MAMMON-SATANIC from circa 1900 and the novum of mass democracy. Hence, the notion of “egalitarian and tyrannical” democracy, which in the ancient world essentially meant the undermining of the hereditary aristocracy / nobility and or Great Clans of the Genos, has application right up to circa 1800 and the French Revolution, though there was no “liberalism” in ancient / pre-modern Greco-Roman democracy, with liberalism closely related to the rise of M-C-M capitalism-imperialism from Christian late feudalism / *societas civilis*, which increasingly, albeit in a gradual, slow and or disjointed manner at first, got JOO-JACKED and ZIO-ED from the 13th – 15th century and thereafter in Western / Northern Europe, as the Greco-Roman world fell into a state of coma and death. Now, as a matter of practice, the Thatcherite-Reaganite “conservatives” of the 1970s and 1980s, notwithstanding any theorists “of their circles” who moved on the periphery of “theory”, had little to do with substantively undermining the mass-democratic egalitarian ideology and the welfare state, notwithstanding anti-social democratic / anti-socialist and anti-communist rhetoric, even though they were at least tolerant, up to quite supportive, of Gordon Gekko “greed is good” ZIO-capitalism-imperialism and not “fully on board” the full ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-HOMO-LEZZO-TRANZ-FREAK-SHOW-DRUGS-PORN-SELF-RACISM-MONKEY-ZIO-JOO-DAS-KOST-WORSHIP programme of the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITES. And as to the “critique of culture” regarding concepts such as “alienation, estrangement, solidarity, community, oppression, exploitation” etc., which started on a Christian conservative basis circa 1800 and increasingly were co-opted by the (Old) Left in the nineteenth century and 20th century up until the cultural revolution of the ZIO-1960s and ZIO-1970s when the TOTALLY ZIO-JOO-JACKED New Left took over “the ideological-cultural space” in “the West” under ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-PLANET ZOG, as mentioned above, replacing socialist-communist

economic and social organisation with massified-atomised-individualist “self-realisation/actualisation” i.e. any kind of degeneracy, licentiousness, abnormality and perversion is “anything goes” and “live and let live” “kosher”, all the Reaganites or Thatcherites could do was give lip service support to traditional nuclear families whilst emphasising anti-communism, without doing anything of substance to stop not only the “FDR NEW DEAL” (social) welfare state, but also the steamroller of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-HOMO-LEZZO-TRANZ-EMPHYLO-STERILE-CHILDLESS-ABORT-FUCK-SLUT-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-MONKEY-APE-KOST-FREAK SHOW WORSHIP WITH MORE AND MORE AND MORE DRUGS AND PORN AND SELF-RACISM, SELF-ETHNIC CLEANSING AND SELF-GENOCIDE UNDER ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-PLANET ZOG, AND WITH NOT ONLY THE ZIO-ZOROS!-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIC-CIRCUS-MONKEY AND ITS **TOTAL FILTH** OF THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SHIT-SKATA-EXCREMENT-FAECES-MONKEY-PITHICUS-RUBBISH-GARBAGE-CRAP-FREAK SHOW KOST BEING “SPECIAL”, BUT THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATAN STATE TOO.

^{xii} I.e. circa 1800.

^{xiii} I.e. circa ZIO-1986, going back to at least circa ZIO-WW2 / the ZIO-1950-1960s, if not further back (when things are more “mixed up” in the transitional phase between the death of genuine conservatism and of (old) liberalism (by the late 19th century) and the full fruition of mass democracy (first half of the 20th century)).

^{xiii} See all endnotes above regarding (mass-)democracy / (mass-)democratic. Note that the emphasis here in the 19th and first half of the 20th century is given to mass democracy as social or radical democracy, i.e. in relation to “the social question” of living conditions, wages, public health etc. for the working masses, and not in relation to degenerate, licentious, perverted, abnormal “self-realisation/actualisation” (HOMOZ, LEZZOZ, TRANZ-FREAKS, STERILE-CHILDLESS ABORT FUCK-SLUTS, DRUGZ, PORN, SELF-RACISM ETC.) as became the case on a mass scale during the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. So e.g. “the great libertarian” Lord Acton (1834-1902; ZIO-JOO-KEE-PEE-DEE-A : “best known for his observation on the dangers of concentrated authority. In an 1887 letter to an Anglican bishop, he famously wrote, 'Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely', underscoring his belief that unchecked power poses the greatest threat to human freedom. His works consistently emphasised the importance of limiting governmental and institutional power in favour of individual rights and personal liberty”) was, or rather could retrospectively be interpreted as being, concerned about the centralising state as a (potential) social welfare state limiting “free enterprise” and “private initiative”, which indeed did give powerful rhetorical tropes to the battle against communism right until the end of the ZIO-COLD WAR, but in practice did nothing substantial against the reality of “free enterprise” and “private initiative” in “the West” coming under up to total ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-CONTROL (KONTROL) in the economy, the state and culture / ideology-propaganda.

^{xiv} How much have things changed in about a hundred years !

^{xiv} This is utopianism with no hope of ever coming to pass. “Western” society was ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-PLANET ZOG-JOO-JACKED BY THE MIDDLE OF THE ZIO-20TH CENTURY TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE, NO FUTURE EVEN THEN, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ALL THE NON-STOP BLAH-BLAH-BLAH ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-OBFUSCATION ENSURED THAT “THE SHOW HAD TO GO ON” ... AND IT DID ... AND HERE WE ARE TODAY IN ZIO-2026, PERHAPS NOT THAT FAR FROM THE END OF EVERYONE.