

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

MARX

AND

GREEK ANTIQUITY

Two studies

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Contained in this small volume (tome), enriched with references and notes, is the text of a speech which was given (took place) on 3rd February 1984 at the Ἑταιρεία Σπουδῶν Νεοελληνικοῦ Πολιτισμοῦ καὶ Γενικῆς Παιδείας τῆς Σχολῆς Μωραΐτη (= Society (Corporation, Company, Firm) for Studies of Modern Greek Culture (Modern Greek Cultural Studies) and General Paideia (Education) of the Moraitis School) [[This note on the page before the (table of) contents only appears in the Greek edition, and NOT in the German edition – translator’s note]].

[[The Translation of the Greek text commences on p. 68 below]]

[[ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE GERMAN TEXT (Study One of the German-language book is not included in the Greek-language booklet at all and includes far greater detail about Hegel, The Young Hegelians, Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Fichte, Stirner, Marx himself, et al., etc., and, Study Two of the German Text is largely the same as the whole of the Greek text – though there are some differences which are not (entirely or at all) insignificant, and hence I have translated both the German-language and Greek-language book(let)s separately.)**]]**

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I.

MARX'S DISSERTATION AND THE STARTING POINT OF HIS INTELLECTUAL(-SPIRITUAL) DEVELOPMENT

Seventeen years after the writing (drafting) of his dissertation, Marx declared that the interests which had driven him to the study of (the) later Greek philosophy, were not principally “philosophical” – obviously in the merely academic or doxographical sense of the word¹. Today the view (perception) is already a commonplace, Marx's first writings (early work, juvenilia) had the underlying ambition of posing and solving questions and problems, which were (stood) at the centre of the debates at that time, and from their satisfactory (satisfying) theoretical treatment (or: from coping satisfactorily – in terms of theory – with them), certain practical, that is, social-political effects (results), were expected. This generally arrived-at or encountered ascertainment does not always unite the intellects(-spirits) of the interpreters, but often separates (divides, divorces) them; because it is asked exactly which problems (issues), and in which [[order of]] priority, stimulated (excited, animated) Marx's thought, and under which – converging or antagonistic – influences did (were) his apprehension and formulations take place (ensue, effected). Both the description (portrayal) of the way (path, road) to Marx's mature perceptions (views), as well as the determination (ascertainment) of the content of these latter (perceptions/views), depend in fact sometimes (occasionally) on the manner in which Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) starting point is reconstructed. Seen in this way, this reconstruction becomes just as little an academic question

(problem) as the handling (treatment) of his dissertation's topic (theme, subject) was (it, i.e. an academic question) for Marx.

Before we turn to the current (topical, relevant) question formulations (central themes) and debates, which Marx's thought itself kept under its spell in the most learned occupations (activities, pursuits) [[translator's note: "learned occupations" = P.K. irony at its best!]], we need to clarify the reasons which brought or led Marx, in relation to that, to look at a past epoch of the history of philosophy consciously and primarily from the point of view of [[his]] present-day/contemporary theoretical concerns (cares). Now the festive (ceremonious, solemn) primacy of the present arises from the belief that the present – and indeed *this* present – makes up a high point or culmination of overall historical development, since it is pregnant with a coup (overthrowing, revolution, subversion) which channels (guides, directs) human history into a new riverbed, and for the first time becomes shaped (moulded, formed) in accordance with the highest and absolute moral-humanistic values. An apocalyptic and eschatological mood (temper, humour, spirit) predominates in left-wing young-Hegelian circles,² to which Marx at the time of the writing of his dissertation belongs. If, therefore, the present is the decisive turning point of/in history in general, if it constitutes the threshold to ultimate, final things, and lifts (raises) the curtain on (of) revelation (Revelation), thus historical studies can also only then be of interest if they are pursued (conducted, carried on) from the point of view of such a present, and as attempts at the solution of the questions posed by the present. The explication of the absolute primacy of the present does still not suffice, however, for our goals (purposes). It must, over and above that, be made understandable and clear why then Marx chooses not any (random) section whatsoever as he so pleases, but an entirely particular section from the (philosophical) past in order to project onto the past, the present, and the present's examination of problems/the problem. Here too, reverting or recourse to the specific self-confidence and self-

consciousness of the radical Hegelians must give insight into those who see themselves not as pioneers, but also as successors, not only as harbingers (heralds), but also as epigones: because according to their own self-understanding, they stand under the cheerful (merry, serene) sun of the historical future, but simultaneously also in Hegel's heavy (difficult) shadow. The eschatological expectation drives them towards a determined (resolute, resolved) deed (act); on the other hand, however, they feel the perplexity and awkwardness (embarrassment) of the theoretician, who stands opposite and faces an all-round and definitive, as it seems, philosophical construction, and does not know what he now has to do; because a further development is no longer possible, unless in the sense that one carves (divides) up and dismembers that construction in order to then re-shape/mould or self-sufficiently work on and process individual parts or aspects of it. The epigonic consciousness, which also left behind strong traces in Marx's dissertation,³ causes (brings about, effect(uate)s) [[the fact]] that the Young Hegelians discover their elective affinity with the representatives of later Greek philosophy, who equally stood before the difficult task of developing their own philosophies in accordance with the great systematic thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, and reached – through paving (clearing) their personal way (path) throughout the ruins or rubble (wreckage, debris) of the preceding syntheses –, theories like the theories which are characteristic (typical, representative) of times of world-historical upheaval (radical change, revolution).

A second reason which explains the interest of the Young Hegelians in post-Aristotelian and especially Epicurean philosophy, is that (reason that) this latter (Epicurean philosophy) offers or provides them with a(n) suitable (appropriate, apt) starting point, and at the same time, the desired historical cover for the commencement (initiation, taking up) of their struggle against theology and religion.⁴ We shall go into that in more detail below. First of all, we want to deal

with the third reason for the lingering of the Young Hegelians on this section (segment, portion, phase) of the history of ideas, which will lead us also to the central (main, core) point of the crucial problem of their relation(ship) with Hegel. Hegel, as is known, called the detachment (breaking away) from the objective examination of the problem of substance, and the turn(ing) towards the subjective realm (area, sector), that is, towards the element or factor (moment) of abstract self-consciousness (self-awareness, self-confidence, self-assurance), a typical feature of epigonic philosophy.⁵ Precisely “self-consciousness (self-awareness, self-confidence)” constituted, however, the central philosophical solution of (for) those Young Hegelians, with whom Marx at that time was most closely connected (associated); in the concept of self-consciousness, their (the Young Hegelians’) emancipatory desideratum and pathos (emotiveness, emotionalism) was condensed; self-consciousness meant for them the uncompromising demand of the individual for self-realisation and independence (autonomy), for the full going through and experiencing of freedom in the overcoming and even annihilation of all external compulsions and constraints – and at the same time for a Promethean activity towards the re-creation (creation anew) of the world. For Marx personally, it was thus, that in the concept of “self-consciousness” that explosive spiritual(-intellectual) impulse (drive, urge, yearning, thirst; Drang) was crystallised (and at the same time objectified and disciplined), which still before his encounter with (young-)Hegelian philosophy, had made an appearance (appeared) in his poems (poetry) as romantic yearning (longing, hankering) for the infinite (unending, endless) or as swaying (fluctuations, vacillations, wavering) between irreconcilable contrasts (oppositions, opposites).⁶ Inside of the – at that time – intellectual(-spiritual) world of Marx, the Promethean element is particularly emphatically articulated as the self-evident world-creative(/inventive/fertile/productive) and world-improving(/corrective/bettering) positioning of every

genuine (authentic, real, true), i.e. autonomous philosophical effort (exertion, endeavour).⁷

It can be comprehended without difficulty (easily) why a main philosophical source for the radical Young Hegelians consisted in furnishing proof (proving) that the absolute Spirit, i.e. the highest ontological principle of Hegel's system, is basically identical with what they (the Young Hegelians) called "self-consciousness". If there is in actual fact a(n) affinity (relationship, kinship) – and a unity – of the essence/substance between the absolute Spirit and the individual spirits or the spirit of individuals, then the human spirit cannot be a degenerate and incurably finite form (shape) of the divine (godly) spirit, but it must be this divine spirit itself. The Hegelian principle of the identity (identicalness) of substance and subject was similarly interpreted too: if the substance of Hegelian metaphysics, that is, the absolute Spirit, is identical with the subject, thus the said substance necessarily actually (in reality, really) coincides with the self-consciousness which the subject par excellence, i.e. the living, vital and pulsating human subject, represents and constitutes. Hegel keeps (holds, retains), therefore, only seemingly (ostensibly, apparently) the absolute (Absolute) and the I (Ego) apart from each other by subjecting this (I/Ego) to that (absolute/Absolute); in reality, the absolute (Absolute) is absorbed by (goes into) the I (Ego). God and man (Man) become (are identified (equated)) with each other, and this identification (identifying, equating) means, for its part, that man (Man) is the only existing God.⁸ That is why Hegel must be classed/classified as an atheist if one understands the concept of God in its traditional sense; his theology basically constitutes an anthropology, and if we want to carry on calling it a theology, then at least clarity must hold sway (i.e. it must be made clear) that we are dealing with a new God, whose existence and power are really (actually) opposed to the existence and power of the old godhead (deity).

In order to apprehend the implications of this young-Hegelian ontology, it is still to be said (it still should be said) that the concept of man (Man) in the said ontology, by no means refers to coincidental (chance, accidental) or transitory (temporary) crystallisations of the human, but to the historically relevant essence-like (intrinsic, essential) manifestations of human doing (deeds, acts). Man is, in other words, the active subject which creates history, he is the God of the historical universe, he cannot, nevertheless, exist without this universe or outside of this same universe; God and History, Man and History are identical; History is God's lone possible unfolding space (room for unfolding) – and exactly because of that, only Man can be God. The starting point, but also the development of Marx's thought can only be comprehended highly inadequately if the effect (impact) of this young-Hegelian reinterpretation of Hegelian ontology or theology is disregarded (ignored, not paid attention to). No lack (want, deficiency, shortage) of testimonies and evidence prevails which documents the appropriation (acquisition, learning) of the reinterpretation outlined (described) [[above]] on the part of the young Marx. Not only is the concept of self-consciousness at the centre of attention of the comments (remarks, versions) of his dissertation, but Marx could apparently still be particularly impressed – at that time – in respect of his first acquaintance with Hegel's philosophy of the idea of identity (identicalness, equivalence) of God and History, which amounted to the deification (apotheosis) of Man.⁹ In the preparatory/preliminary work for his dissertation, again sympathies for Hegel's monistic fusion (blending, amalgamation) of transcendence and immanence become clear,¹⁰ which underpin (back up) the aforementioned identity (identicalness) of the absolute and of the human Spirit. Since Marx at that time considered Hegel to be an atheist in the sense explicated above, then he also did not see any contradiction between his own Hegelianism and his vehement (fierce, intense, passionate, vigorous, severe) polemic(s) against religion.¹¹

The young-Hegelian reinterpretation of Hegel's ontology had, of course, its theoretical price. In order to work, carve and bring out the identity (identicalness, equivalence) of absolute Spirit and self-consciousness together with their above-mentioned implications, important aspects of Hegel's thought, namely, had to be secluded (made discreet, concealed) or (indirectly) called into question. The absolute Spirit in fact encompassed in its ontological omnipresence (ubiquity) both the human, as well as the extra-human, i.e. natural reality, and moreover all forms (shapes) of the subjective and of the objective spirit. The young-Hegelian squeezing (forcing, jamming, cramming) (in) of the absolute Spirit into the wardrobe(s) (cupboard(s), locker(s)), i.e. confines, of self-consciousness, and indeed of a tangible human self-consciousness, and not for instance of a transcendental etc. self-consciousness, implied not only a separation of the (human) spirit from nature (Nature), since this nature could obviously no longer be deduced (derived) from that spirit,¹² but also a dichotomy (rift, conflict) between subjective and objective spirit, that is, a contrast (opposition) between the (philosophising) individual self-consciousness and the existing social-political formations (kinds of moulding) of the spirit. For Hegel, it was unthinkable that philosophical self-consciousness could come into conflict with the social-political world, when it (i.e. such philosophical self-consciousness) only in actual fact is elevated (raised, lifted) to the speculative exhibition (display, show) of the absolute Spirit, and exactly in the light of the development and of the perfection (completion, consummation) of this Spirit in the totality of its manifestations, would the inner/internal logic (and this also meant: the reality and the truth) of the social-political world, (have) be(en) comprehended. Conflicts occurring between philosophical self-consciousness and the social-political world (with)in the framework of the self-development of the absolute Spirit are always put down (reduced, due) to the still imperfect and incomplete formation or moulding of both. As a result of this, there can be no perfect(ed) (complete(d) or consummate) philosophy, and also no perfect(ed)/

complete(d)/consummate philosophical self-consciousness, as long as the social-political world, or the self-development of the absolute Spirit, has not yet been perfected and completed (consummated); this should, conversely, mean that the formation and the existence/presence (availability) of an absolute and insurmountable systematic philosophical totality ipso facto proves that the social-political world has reached the highest possible point of its development: because philosophy as the conceptual apprehension and condensation (compression, thickening) of the world, in which it (philosophy) was formed and developed, can, for its part, achieve (attain, reach) its own perfection (completion, consummation), that is, complete systematic totality, only as the apprehension and the condensation of an all-round (universally, generally) perfect(ed)/complete(d)/accomplished world.

This positioning of/by Hegel is obviously in (a) contradiction with that which for the Young Hegelians was an elementary experience, and at the same time an elementary belief: resistance or opposition (rebellion) of an individual philosophical self-consciousness, which finds itself in possession of a conceptual totality, to (against) a world, which stands opposite and faces – dismembered (in fragments) and deficiently – a perfect and completed (perfected) philosophy. In accordance with Hegel's yardstick(s) (benchmark(s), measure(s), standard(s)), this resistance or opposition (rebellion) meant the abandonment (relinquishment, surrender) of the absolute Spirit as the absolute Content of an absolute Philosophy, and a return to subjective self-consciousness, that is, to the mere being-for-itself of the spirit, and consequently to a lower (more base, minor) tier (level, stage, phase, grade) of development. The lowering and belittlement of the absolute Spirit, if one may say so, was, nonetheless, for the Young Hegelians unavoidable, since *their* existential and philosophical concern (care) was not reconciliation with social-political reality, looked at in (regard to) its rational essence (substance, nature, being), but the

irreconcilable, unforgiving (unremitting) critique and criticism of the contradictions and of the deficiencies of exactly this reality. That which separates them (the Young Hegelians) at the end of the day from Hegel, and begets the direct or indirect theoretical deviations from him, is an essentially different positioning (attitude) towards the surroundings and the environment. As a result of this positioning (attitude), they are not frightened (afraid) of returning to that which Hegel called the state of affairs of the “infelicitous and unfortunate consciousness (awareness)”, through which they conceded/gave priority (precedence) to the struggling (and suffering) individual self-consciousness (self-confidence), and at least tacitly turned their backs on the objective-systematic philosophical totality, which does not live from criticism (critique), but from the (re)conciliation, the mediation (intercession) and the abolition (nullification) of opposites (contrasts). This pre-eminence (priority, precedence) of the subjective element or factor (motive, moment) explains, as already indicated, the rediscovery of later Greek philosophy on the part of the Young Hegelians, which indeed starts from Hegel’s judgement regarding its (i.e. the said subjective element’s) subjective character; however, on the other hand, by no means does it (the said rediscovery of later Greek philosophy) take on (assume) the disparaging tone with which Hegel himself accompanied his judgement. And they not only discover again (rediscover) the Epicureans, the Stoics and the Sceptics, but they also continue, and bring back to life (revive again), a chapter of the – at that time – still young history of classical German philosophy, which according to Hegel seemed to have been overtaken (outstripped, overhauled, surpassed) forever: we mean here Fichte’s activist subjectivism and the, with that, interrelating conflict between Is (Being) and Ought – a conflict which corresponds with the antagonism between social-political reality and self-consciousness (self-confidence) as the proponent (advocate, champion) of philosophical deontology.¹³

The relation(ship) of the Young Hegelians with (towards) Hegel is therefore two-sided (bilateral, double-sided) and ambiguous (has two meanings or interpretations): on the one hand, they interpret him [[roughly]] about (i.e. for instance) in order for his own atheism or his own deification of man to be rationalised philosophically by his own conceptuality; on the other hand however, they brush aside (dismiss, discard) Hegel's theory of (re)conciliation with reality in (regard to) its rational substance, and raise (make) a claim (in regard) to the realisation (fulfilment, fruition) of philosophy.¹⁴ Were this (re)conciliation for Hegel a natural result (outcome, upshot) of complete systematic philosophical totality as the sole (lone) possible conceptual condensation (thickening) of a rationally constituted and composed world, then the completeness of the philosophical system in the eyes of his radical disciples (students, followers) made the imperfections and incompleteness(es) of reality all the more striking and noticeable (conspicuous). Philosophy and reality consequently are separated from each other, in relation to which philosophy, as perfected/completed and perfect/complete (consummate), turns into and becomes the yardstick (benchmark) by (against) which reality should be measured; philosophy becomes demand and weapon, ideal and critique/criticism. Philosophy must be realised, and the first step for its realisation is none other than its conflict with the social-political surroundings (environment). Marx now also directs his attention to this conflict whilst the thought (idea or concept) of the systematically organised philosophical whole moves into the background. The category of the contradiction accordingly puts the category of totality in the shade. The precedence (primacy, priority) of the contradiction means, however, for its part, the primacy of (the) deed (act) vis-à-vis theory, since, as said, (re)conciliation with the social-political world, that is, the basically speculative positioning in regard to it, went hand in hand with and accompanied the abolition (annulment) of the contradictions or contrasts (oppositions) (with)in the framework of philosophical totality. The deed (act) is

the way in which the active subject of self-consciousness (self-confidence) makes its own existence clearly and effectively known by binding (tying) its own fate and destiny not to (re)conciliation and totality, but to the rejection of imperfect (incomplete) reality, and to contradiction. Totality is from now on felt to be and is seen as a barrier, whilst simultaneously the fertility (productivity) of contradictions is ascertained, whose heightening and aggravation are supposed to bring about a(n) acceleration (speeding up) of desired developments in thought and in the world. These are the implications – and at the same time the presuppositions – of the new primacy of the deed (act).¹⁵ Certainly, totality is not simply forgotten (after all, in fact through the realisation of philosophy, basically nothing other is striven for (sought) than the founding of a genuine (authentic, true, real) and this time definitive (conclusive) totality), and its existence and presence (availability) in the form, and at the level, of philosophical theory, is not called into question. However, the fact that farewell has been bidden (goodbye has been said) to Hegelian belief (faith) in the real existence (presence, availability) of totality *hic et nunc*, has grave consequences for totality as a philosophical construction: its contrast (opposition) to existing deficient reality and this latter (existing deficient reality) itself are reflected in it (i.e. the said (Hegelian real existence of) totality as philosophical construction), so that philosophy ultimately disintegrates (decomposes, decays, crumbles) into parties struggling and fighting against one another, and collapses (crumbles, falls apart) exactly in the attempt to itself be realised (to realise itself).¹⁶ This collapse symbolises in itself the possibility of a(n) upholding (maintenance) of the primacy of theory inside of a deficient reality, and makes clear the necessity of the primacy of the deed (act).

It must now be set straight (clarified) that when the radical Young Hegelians talk of the deed (act), they actually mean one theoretical activity, that activity namely, to which philosophy devotes itself (or: in which philosophy indulges)

when it abandons (gives up) speculative positioning, in order to turn to critique (criticism).¹⁷ Said (Stated) otherwise/differently: philosophy puts the primacy of theory aside, since now its (philosophy's) main concern (care) is aimed at the critique (criticism) of the existing (what exists), however, the putting aside of the primacy of theory takes place within limits (inside (of) boundaries), and with the help of the conceptual instruments of philosophy itself – it (philosophy) remains, therefore, a theoretical [[phenomenon]], not of course in the sense that it does not take place really, but rather in the sense that it makes up an element or factor, and indeed the axis, of a philosophy, that is, of a theoretical construction. The primacy of the deed (act), which follows the primacy of theory, does not mean hence that as from now, philosophy wants to be left at the mercy of direct political action, but only that the character of philosophy itself changes by the philosophising concentrating on critique (criticism), that is, by measuring empirical existence on the scale, or by the yardstick, of the idea, by bringing its defects and shortcomings to light and by denouncing them (it). This changing of the character of philosophy was so radical and it was connected with such crucial points of young-Hegelian thought, that insight could not fail to materialise that the relation(ship) with/towards Hegel is not entirely harmonic – despite all attempts at re-interpreting (meta-interpreting) him, and at invoking him in every given case. The disharmony came in fact to the surface/to light in regard to an essential point. To the extent, namely, philosophy was converted into critique (criticism), and came into conflict with the (what is) existing, Hegel's already notorious (re)conciliation with the (what is) existing, and indeed with the particularly hated Prussian state, stood out as all the more unpleasant (disagreeable) and disturbing. Symptomatic for the character of the young-Hegelian movement, but also for Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) development is the fact that the latter (Marx) wants to put Hegel's compromises with (the) dark powers and dark forces not down to personal motives (angst, fear, self-interest, and other personal motives), but to the nature of his (Hegel's)

theoretical principles.¹⁸ Marx does not explicate which then, concretely, are the theoretical defects, flaws and shortcomings which made Hegel's practical compromises, or the practical compromises of some his (Hegel's) adherents (followers), unavoidable. His (Marx's) brief intimation contains, however, already in nuce the later distinction between system and method in Hegel,¹⁹ which means exactly that agreement with the individual theses of the Hegelian system is not in the least obligatory for everyone who in principle accepts and adopts (assumes) the validity of the Hegelian method.

Philosophy can now obviously be a critique (criticism) of the empirically pre-given world only if it simultaneously constitutes a transcending of this same empirically pre-given world, and even if only in the theoretical field. In order to be able to evaluate the empirical world, philosophy, namely, must stand/be outside of the same (empirical world), or at least outside of its defects, flaws, faults and shortcomings, that is, be no mere reflection of the world, but perhaps a force which opposes this bad (evil, wicked) world, and can reshape and remould the said bad and evil world in accordance with the commands of (the) thought and of the idea (of (the) Thought and of the Idea). The strong, intense idealistic orientation of Marx's early thought is shown (seen) in the lack (absence) of one of the most important and most fertile teachings of historical materialism, namely, the teaching of ideology as "false consciousness". Belief (Faith) in the world-bettering/improving role of "philosophy" springs in(side) the young Marx, as in all conscious or unconscious idealists too, out of (from) ignorance (un/non-knowledge) of, or the failure to appreciate, the social and psychological determination/determinedness of each and every respective form of philosophical thought coming into question. "Philosophy", as the young Marx comprehends it, is not determined through (by (means or way of)) the world, but it can and should determine the world; it is no "false consciousness" and no fiction, which veils (covers or masks) the true character of social reality

for the purpose of the shielding of tangible interests, but it makes up, on the contrary, the reasonable/rational reality in its contrast and opposition to unreasonable, irrational and imperfect (incomplete) experience. Exactly because Marx still does not have at his disposal his later concept of ideology, he wants to explain Hegel's compromises with the (what is) existing, logically and theoretically, not sociologically.²⁰ Of course, Marx's sharp view, i.e. keen eye, does not escape (elude) the dissolving effect of broken up, fragmented and unreasonable (irrational) reality on reasonable, rational philosophical totality, for which reason also his description of the conflict between philosophy and social life simultaneously seems like a description of their interweaving or mutual dependence (or interdependence); nonetheless, the standpoint, from which this description was undertaken, differs completely from the later apprehension of the relation(ship)s between philosophy and society by historical materialism.²¹ When the young Marx relativises philosophy, then he does this not by putting down and reducing its content to social factors, but merely by regarding as possible the existence (presence, availability) of an imperfect, incomplete world outside of the field of its (philosophy's) own perfection and completeness, that is, by underlining its (philosophy's) – albeit only transitory – practical powerlessness, which stands/is in contrast to its theoretical power/force (strength). The parallel existence of both these, however, is considered quite (absolutely, thoroughly) conceivable, and exactly this can conclude or infer the independence of theory from reality. Consequently, the paradox occurs that the young Marx separates philosophy and (imperfect, incomplete) reality from each other, with the intention of improving the latter ((imperfect) reality) with the help of the former (philosophy), whereas Hegel, on the contrary, had connected philosophy and reality inseparably to each other, because he wanted to prove the reasonable and rational character of the latter (reality).

So long as Marx had not yet discovered the concept of ideology, he rejected (disapproved of) an identification (equating) of philosophy, even in its metaphysical and idealistic version, with religion. Whereas he already in 1844, when he stood at the threshold of his mature perception regarding the historical activity of men/humans, no longer wanted to distinguish between philosophy and religion,²² he still at the time of the writing/drafting of his dissertation looked at “philosophy” as the diametrical opposite (contrast) of/to religion, as religion’s greatest and genuine (natural, real) foe. Marx’s zeal (eagerness) to distinguish between (keep apart) or contrast philosophy and religion, is so great that he not once wants to recognise an intellectual(-spiritual) kinship (relationship) between Platonism and Christianity.²³ The contradistinction (contrasting) between philosophy and religion constitutes in actual fact a leitmotif of Marx’s – at that time – thought, through which his moral ideals and his perception of an individual and social life in accordance with human dignity, found expression. Because the essential and unbridgeable contrast/opposition between philosophy and religion, as Marx understands it, is a difference (distinction) in ethos – and the difference (distinction) in this contrast/opposition’s ethos corresponds, in turn, with the difference (distinction) of its image of men (humans) and their (philosophy and religion’s) expectations of this image of men. Philosophy embodies (incarnates) that ethos which Reason commands; in its practical dimension, it is the behaviour of the free and autonomous individual, which in agreement with his (the individual’s) anthropological main feature, therefore, deals with his rational/reasonable essence (substance). Religion can, on the contrary, be defined as the complete absence of Reason, which means just as much as the omnipresence (ubiquity) of God; because God is only the precise opposite or the reverse of Reason,²⁴ in other words, the hypostatized angst (or fear) of people before their evil (wicked) deeds (acts).²⁵ From that, he elucidates (sheds light on) which human feelings religion sets in motion, and how religion comprehends men (humans). When

religion threatens [[men/humans]] with punishment, or when religion promises immortality and bliss (felicity), religion equally is directed/directs itself to (complies with, follows, is guided by) a despicable (malicious, vile, base, wicked) hedonism, to (with, by) a faint-hearted (timid, despondent, pusillanimous) and selfish self-love. The promise of bliss (felicity) is only the vulgarised version of that which Epicurean philosophy strove for at a high level; religion represents and constitutes, in this respect, the Epicureanism of the masses. But also the pseudo-philosophical and theological teachings of Eternal Life and of Divine Providence, which arrive on the scene as products of fine reflection of chosen (selected) men (humans) and thinkers, actually bring in idealised form, that is, in the form of postulates of Reason, only that to the concept (notion) [[of religion]] which makes up the hopes and the angsts (and fears) of the mass[[es]] (crowd, mob). To selfish, and at the same time, anxious and fearful (timorous) individualism, which brings into being belief (faith) in the immortality of the soul, Marx contradistinguishes the altruism of Reason and the conviction that only the genus (i.e. mankind or the human species/race), not the individual, is truly immortal.²⁶

Marx's struggle against religion was not only conducted with the help of anthropological and moral-philosophical theses. The emphatic rejection (disapproval) of scepticism and of agnosticism serves the same end. Hegel's already early critique (criticism) of the Kantian theory of the insurmountable limits of human knowledge is obviously familiar to Marx; if human knowledge is incurably limited (restricted, confined), then faith (belief) must gain (i.e. be given) a free hand; the (negative) agreement between fideistically minded (inclined, positioned, adjusted) theologians, and Sceptics or Agnostics, amongst philosophers, is by no means coincidental, as Marx himself remarks.²⁷ Still more important, from a broader perspective, does Marx's alliance, i.e. bond or connection (agreement) with materialism seem. It is a matter here exclusively of

an alliance (bond or connection) against religion, since the young Marx, despite all denial and renunciation of God and of the immortality of the soul, does not confess to a materialistic ontology, that is, he does not intimate (imply, suggest, hint at) at all (in any sense, by any means) a belief in the priority of matter vis-à-vis the spirit(-mind-intellect); even his denial and renunciation of God and of the soul turns, incidentally, against the personal anthropomorphic God and the eternity of the individual soul; this denial logically does not in the least exclude, therefore, a pantheistic and monistic spiritualism – like for instance that which could be ascribed to Hegel with good reason(s). Be that as it may, Marx does not at all pose the ontological question; he welcomes (greet, salutes) materialism only as a consistent and open rejection of the fairy tales (stories) (fables) of religion, i.e. as a positioning which could be reconciled with every pure (set of) morals (morality, ethics) – namely with every (set of) morals which would be free of the angsts, fears and hopes in which the essence (substance) of religion exists. Whilst Marx starts from a moral, and not from an ontological evaluation of materialism, he class(ifi)es materialism with those currents which assemble/compose (put together) the Enlightenment as a movement which is primarily directed against every superstition and every prejudice. In an age in which the development of political things in Prussia seemed to favour the Christian-feudal restorative ideology, Marx felt, like his young-Hegelian friends too, obliged to protect and come to the defence of the intellectual(-spiritual) legacy (heritage, inheritance) of the Enlightenment, whereby in fact/even the reservations which Hegel had expressed (uttered), in particular against the French Enlightenment, were pushed (thrust, shoved) aside.²⁸

This is in all possible brevity the general framework of ideas (ideas context), inside of which Marx's dissertation moves. By us bearing it (such framework of ideas) in mind, we can now turn to the question (problem) of the direct influences which have decisively shaped and moulded (stamped, left their mark

on) the starting point of Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) development (unfolding). No commentator disputes (denies, contests) that Marx's thought until 1841, for the most part, follows the (i.e. his) contemporary radical Young Hegelians. Quite a few (commentators) (and they provide (produce, make up) or are the majority), stress Bruno Bauer's particular influence; others underline that (influence) of Feuerbach; and in turn, others show above all what they regard as Marx's personal contribution, and as the harbinger (precursor, herald) of his later perceptions. By these latter commentators, it has been asserted that Marx from the start was moving towards materialism, or that he was leaving behind the rest of the Young Hegelians in as much as he undertakes a critique of the principles of Hegelian philosophy itself, or that he conducts and pursues in a pioneering and trailblazing manner, the connection (link) of (between) philosophical critique (criticism) with (and) the social-political (social-political critique [[?]]), or finally that he overcomes the Fichtean subjectivism of self-consciousness, as Bruno Bauer represented it, in favour of a dialectical-synthetic perception regarding the unity of subject and object. In reality, none of all these interpretations, which assume a(n) appreciable (considerable, noteworthy) overcoming of the young-Hegelian circle of ideas by Marx up to 1841, can – on the basis of the testimonies (references), i.e. evidence, available to us – be proved; rather, in them a more or less deficient knowledge, or a one-sided understanding of the writings of Feuerbach or Bauer is made noticeable (clear), to say nothing of (to be silent/keep quiet about) the efforts and endeavours to track down Marx's mature insights in the earliest phases of development of his thought.

Something, first of all, concerning the problem of materialism in Marx's dissertation; thus, it suffices here to repeat the result (outcome, upshot) of our preceding analysis, that namely Marx is still interested exclusively in the ethics which could arise or emerge from the (the assumption or adoption (acceptance)

of) materialistic principles, whereas materialistic ontology remains foreign (alien, strange) to him.²⁹ For the refutation and disproof of the view (perception) that Marx would have – as the first or even as the only one amongst the Young Hegelians – wanted to perceive (feel) and overcome the weaknesses of the theoretical principles of Hegel’s philosophy,³⁰ we can again refer to not only Bruno Bauer, who in 1841 vindicates his service to (or proves his merit for) the young-Hegelian movement by having freed Hegel’s theoretical principle from its narrow confines (limits, boundaries),³¹ but also and above all to Feuerbach, who already in 1838 *expressis verbis* stressed the necessity for an overcoming of Hegelian philosophy, and held the view of the conclusive or definitive crystallisation of philosophy as such, in one single of its historical forms, to be a superstition;³² only a year later, he published a treatise which was dedicated to the critique of the fundamental theoretical positions of Hegelian philosophy.³³

[[translator’s note: in other words, both Bauer and Feuerbach critiqued Hegel before and or apart from Marx]]

A more attentive reading of Bruno Bauer’s writings e.g. can likewise dispel the impression that at that time Marx’s concept of critique was more radical, it had, that is to say, a direct social-political reference. It is a mistake to think that Bauer’s statement about the theoretical character of praxis – a statement incidentally, which Marx agrees with, as shown above – would be tantamount to the command for detachment from social-political questions, and for a staying in the realm of pure speculation. Nothing less than that: young-Hegelian theory turns towards society – however, young-Hegelian theory does it only as theory, as critique (criticism). Bauer himself gave lively (vital) and stimulating (exhilarating) examples of this social-political function of critical theory,³⁴ and in 1842 he in fact ascertained that the young-Hegelian opposition “threatened to turn from a scientific to a political revolution, from a thought (i.e. an intellectual) revolution to a critical deed (act)”.³⁵ Finally, as regards the perception that the young Marx had already overcome (got over) the Fichtean subjectivism and activism of the self-consciousness, no clues or grounds can be

found in the relevant texts, and over and above that, it is refuted by simple deliberation (reflection or consideration) that self-consciousness and its subjectivistic-activistic character provides (offers, gives) the weapons which Marx needed at a time at/in which he combated (fought) religion, without being able to appeal or have recourse to the concept of ideology: the contradistinction between subject and object is here still just as sharp (acute, strong) as the contradistinction between truth (philosophy) and error (falsehood) (religion).³⁶

Nonetheless, the fact that Marx's thought, at least until 1841, moved wholly within the general framework of young-Hegelian perceptions (views) does not mean *eo ipso* (a) proof/[piece of] evidence of the complete intellectual(-spiritual) dependence of the young Marx on Bruno Bauer,³⁷ and this for two reasons. First, the left-wing Young Hegelians, from the time of Marx's arrival in Berlin (that is, (in) the beginning of 1837), had not yet crystallised ideologically, however, he (Marx) found himself exactly in the phase of his radicalisation. That is why the presumption (or conjecture) can be ventured that Marx had from the beginning taken part in, and contributed to, the rather or very detailed working out and elaborating of ideas, which already were in the air (above all, the critique of religion through its contradistinction with (*vis-à-vis*) philosophy and atheism in the form of the deification of Man); by the way, eloquent testimonies (reports, pieces of evidence) have been handed down to us that Marx, despite his youthful age, thanks to his unusual intelligence, education (learning, erudition, formation, culture, shaping) and strength of character, exercised a strong influence, in fact a fascination, (with)in the young-Hegelian circle.³⁸ And secondly, Bauer did not monopolise the entire spectrum of young-Hegelian thought, but the effect (impact and influence) of many a fundamental idea by him (or: of some of his basic ideas) increasingly intersected, and in ever more complicated ways, with the suggestions and stimuli which came from other authors – not least of all from Feuerbach. In order to be able to fix or

demonstrate the effects of Feuerbach's thoughts on Marx's thinking at that time, one may – or should – not exactly, however, inflate or even absolutise them. It is e.g. false that Marx already at the time of the drafting and writing of his dissertation apprehends man (humans) not primarily on the basis of Bauer's criteria, that is, man's spirituality and his self-consciousness (self-awareness, self-confidence), but in accordance with Feuerbach's standards (measures, yardstick), that is, his corporeality and his sociality.³⁹ Because Marx is still not interested, in relation to that, in asserting and arguing for the boundaries (limits) and deficiencies (defects, shortcomings) of self-consciousness as [[being]] a bloodless entity (being), which away from the material and the social world, cannot have any relevance and also any (continued) existence, but he wants, on the contrary, to emphasise its (i.e. self-consciousness as a bloodless entity's) revolutionary, world-shaping(moulding) potency, which precisely in its contrast and opposition to the necessarily finite and the (morally) imperfect (incomplete) character of all dimensions of sensoriality – of biological, just as of social, sensoriality – becomes active (operates) and increases (intensifies).

Under these conditions (circumstances), the early impact (influence) of Feuerbach on Marx (the later (impact) began, as is known, only after 1841, that is, after the appearance of Feuerbach's main work), can be summarised in regard to three points. The first was already mentioned above: it is a matter of the ascertainment of the necessity of a revision of certain theoretical principles of Hegelian philosophy. The second concerns the genetic analysis of the religious phenomenon as the upside-down (twisted, wrong) projection of human magnitudes in the metaphysical. Feuerbach represented this process as a transformation (conversion, transubstantiation, transmutation, change) of predicates into subjects, or as the subjugation of the original subjects under/to subjectified (subjectivised) predicates: the predicates of the subject "man" become independent (and a subject themselves); from adjectives, they (the said

predicates) become (turn into) nouns, and in the end they condense into a new subject, which is called (and means) “God”; from which, good or wise man becomes, therefore, hypostatised goodness or wisdom, and this again is identified with God, who from now on magisterially stands opposite and opposes the same human existence from whose predicates He was composed (put together, assembled). Accordingly, man is abased (degraded, humiliated), but God is humanised too. As it is called/put in another turn of phrase by Feuerbach: the human [[element, dimension]] is transformed (transubstantiated, transfigured) into the godly/divine [[element, dimension]], and then this same human is deduced (inferred) or derived as something subordinate(d) to that godly/divine, which actually constitutes only a metamorphosis of the human.⁴⁰ Marx obviously immediately comprehended the meaning of this perception (view) for the critique of religion, because already in the third notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work in respect of his dissertation, there are two allusions to the transformation of the/a predicate into the/a subject.⁴¹ Shortly thereafter, Bauer translated Feuerbach’s analysis into the language of self-consciousness by characterising religion as an inner (internal) relation(ship) of self-consciousness with (towards) itself, whereby its own activity appears as passivity, or as an act of a(n) alien (foreign, strange) superior power.⁴² Typical for the intersection (crossing) of ideas of different origin in the thought of the Young Hegelians and of Marx is now this, that the latter (Marx) indeed agreed with and endorsed Feuerbach’s explanation of the religious phenomenon in general, simultaneously, however, he (Marx) deviates (differs) from Feuerbach in regard to an important point, in order to – as far as this matter is concerned – share Bauer’s position. Whereas, namely, for Feuerbach, God comes into being through the projection of the highest (most supreme, paramount, upmost) and most beautiful properties (qualities and characteristics) of human nature in the metaphysical [[dimension, sphere]] (what is metaphysical), for Bauer and Marx, reflected (mirrored) in the deity (godhead), albeit in a wrong, upside-down

form, is everything which in humans is base, wicked and bestial (animal) (angst (fear) before punishment, or, hope for reward and recompence), and over and above that, the cutting up, dismemberment and disfigurement (deformation, defacing, spoiling, scarring) of the true human essence.⁴³

The third point, which can indicate or suggest an early impact and influence of Feuerbach on Marx's thought, concerns the emphatic putting first of the concept of the human genus (species, race) (mankind). As [[we have already]] said (stated), the young Marx set the collective immortality of the genus (species or race, i.e. mankind) against the immortality of the individual soul by wanting to replace faint-hearted and timid self-love, which is found in the hope of the latter (soul), with altruism, which faith (belief) in the former (mankind) is supposed to bring into being. Feuerbach had expressed exactly the same thoughts already in one of his first texts, where he defined true faith (belief) in immortality as faith/belief in the unendingness (endlessness, infinity) of the spirit, and in the indestructible youth of mankind, which exists irrespective (independent) of today's existing individuals.⁴⁴ Following Feuerbach, therefore, the young Marx contrasts selfish individualism to the (continued) collective existence and value of the human race. But he (Marx) does not yet come, in relation to that, to set the concept of the genus (species, race, mankind) (and of the *social* individual) against Bauer's self-consciousness (self-awareness, self-confidence). Genus (mankind) and self-consciousness appear here still not as both members of a contrast or an opposition, which seeks to be voided or abolished (neutralised, rescinded, cancelled (out), annulled) in a higher synthesis, but only as allied (or allies) in the struggle against religion; their alliance (or coalition) allows their logical heterogeneity to be – for the time being (temporarily) – forgotten. Self-consciousness (self-awareness, self-confidence) is, in the course of this, a proud (an imposing), individual critical presence, which fights and combats human subjugation under (to) religiously

sanctioned institutions, whereas the human genus (species or race) (mankind) comes on the scene as the higher authority (tier (grade, level, stage) of jurisdiction), which shoves (pushes, thrusts) aside the individual angsts (or fears) and the little personal reckonings (i.e. calculations) from which religious feeling comes into being and from which it (such religious feeling) lives. Marx will later search for (seek) the synthesis of both these magnitudes in the concept of the social individual. From this point of view, therefore, Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) development (unfolding) after 1841 can, therefore, be summarised as follows (like this, thus). Marx no longer compares the immaterial and the asocial with religion, that is, abstract self-consciousness, but with corporeal (bodily), material man, as Feuerbach understands it.⁴⁵ Simultaneously, he asks, however, not only about the physical, but also about the social definition (determination) of material man, whereby he discovers the concept of ideology, and in its light, radically changes (alters) his earlier perceptions and views about philosophy and religion. Motive, which previously (beforehand) was connected with the idea of self-consciousness, however, does not disappear, although it is now reshaped (remodeled). To the extent Marx sees (into) (recognises) Feuerbach's mechanistic-materialistic one-sidedness, he summons against it, praxis, just as he previously had summoned against the subjectivistic-activistic one-sidedness of self-consciousness, material – and at the same time – social man. The idea of social man and the discovery of "ideology" jointly have an effect in the transformation (conversion) of individual activism into political praxis: just as the ideological phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) have their social roots, so too does praxis have its social bearers.

Still quite a bit needs to be said about the contribution of Marx's dissertation to the history of philosophy. The possibility of such a contribution is necessarily thrown into doubt from the outset, when (if) we think about the close (tight, narrow) dependence of the content – as regards the history of ideas – of the

dissertation on the general philosophical principles and dogmas outlined [[above]], so that the historical and doxographic(al) expositions and explanations (presentations) of/by Marx frequently appear as the mere area (realm) of application and area (realm) of development of these latter (general philosophical principles and dogmas). And in actual fact: Epicurus is transformed (converted) here into an advocate and proponent of self-consciousness; self-consciousness means autonomy; autonomy manifests itself (is manifested) through the declination of the atom; and the theory of this declination gives rise to difference and the difference between Epicurus's natural philosophy and that of Democritus. As an advocate and proponent of self-consciousness, Epicurus-Marx [[i.e. Marx's (understanding of) Epicurus]] contrasts or compares autonomy and indeterminateness (indefiniteness, ambiguity, vagueness) to or with the religious perception (view) of the world – not for instance to (with) a materialistic determinism;⁴⁶ the idea of praxis, which is later summoned against Feuerbach, is already in contrast and opposition to Democritus's philosophy of nature (natural philosophy).⁴⁷ Over and above that, the young-Hegelian renunciation (abandonment) of philosophical systematic totality in favour of the critical positioning and of the activism of self-consciousness is reflected therein (i.e. praxis), so that the Epicurus of the dissertation is not satisfied with the complete dialectical synthesis of the Meteors-Gods (Gods of the Meteors), but turns his back on it (such dialectical synthesis) in order to defend their (the Gods of the Meteors') autonomy against transcendence and religion. In the contradistinction of Epicurus and Plutarch, again the contrast and opposition between philosophical and religious ethos is made clear, whilst in the context of anti-religious polemics, Democritus's agnosticism is rejected (disapproved (of)) and Epicurus's sensualism (sensoriality) is endorsed (approved (of)) – however not because Marx himself philosophically subscribes to and embraces sensualism, but simply out of (i.e. because of) the reason that sensualism (sensoriality) at least offers something

tangible and palpable (concrete), and that is why he has to counter and oppose faith and belief with a (certain) knowledge, whereas agnosticism opens door and gate (or opens the door) – through its renunciation of every secure, certain knowledge – to blind faith (blind belief). – The dependence, in terms of the history of ideas, of the (i.e. Marx's) dissertation on the personal philosophical positioning of the author makes the effort and trouble to translate the concepts and thoughts of ancient philosophers into the language of Hegelian dialectics, – and to pour them into the forms (moulds) of their (such language of Hegelian dialectics') categories – noticeable (clear, obvious). This makes the text, in terms of content, heterogeneous and sometimes understandable with difficulty, i.e. difficult to understand, and moreover the not unfair and unjust(ified) impression can come into being that the analysis often moves at a fictive level, where concepts are formed and combined with one another, of which there is no talk in regard to the philosophers concerned. As was rightly remarked,⁴⁸ (the) dialectic(s) in Marx's first (early) work (juvenilia) does not constitute an analytical instrument which is (would be) intertwined with the given content, but it leads its own existence, and in its separation from content, it falls into the (a) void (emptiness, vacuity, blankness). All the same, the early effort by Marx remains – at apprehending through Hegel's logical categories a certain problem and a certain content – noteworthy (remarkable), and indeed exactly with regard to his mature (ripe) thought: the relation(ship) between Hegel's "logic" towards/ as regards the construction (building) of the conceptuality in "Capital" is in the meanwhile sufficiently (adequately) (i.e. well) known.

In (regard to) what (Wherein) can, therefore, the contribution of the Marxian dissertation to the investigation of (research into) the history of philosophy be extant and persist (come through, endure), if its content is moulded (shaped) to such an extent by non-historical and non-academic question formulations and examinations of problems (central themes)? First of all, in relation to the fact

that Marx highlighted something which modern research in its entirety (totality) recognises, that, namely, Epicurus's physics is no less subject(ed) (subjugated) to the demands of moral philosophy than Stoic moral philosophy,⁴⁹ namely, that it regards the knowledge of nature not as an end-in-itself, but as an intellectual(-spiritual) activity and a task which has to be classified (or put in order) in regard to the broader and more significant framework of the search for the higher ethical aims of life. Furthermore, Marx realises, for the most part, his programme pertaining to the history of ideas, he namely shows that the traditional identification (equating) of the physical (i.e. natural) theories of Epicurus and Democritus rest and are based on a misunderstanding;⁵⁰ and if he, in the course of this, overshoots the mark once more (i.e. once again), thus he rightly (correctly) understands and describes, on the other hand, the meaning of this epistemological contrast (or opposition pertaining to the theory of knowledge) between both ancient philosophies, and moreover he brings this epistemological contrast into connection with the distinction in their positioning as regards (towards) the problem of necessity and of chance.⁵¹ One could of course object that on both these points the in itself correct (appropriate) description of the differences between Democritus and Epicurus does wrong (and injustice) or is unfair to Democritus in so far as his theory of knowledge simply is held to be contradictory, without any serious attempt being made to discuss and to comprehend that which appears as a dichotomy (conflict) in it, or as its double (dual) nature, in light of epistemological concepts, as for instance Kantian criticism (it is in fact to be presumed that precisely this nearness or proximity (closeness) of Democritus's theory of knowledge to the [[said Kantian]] criticism repulses the Hegelian Marx); furthermore, the meaning of Democritean determinism and phenomenalism for the coming into being (emergence) and the development of new-times natural science in general is not taken note of (noted) at all, and no satisfactory solution is offered for the paradox in Epicurus's natural philosophy (philosophy of nature), namely, for

the declination of atoms. These weaknesses do not at all diminish (lessen, decrease), nevertheless, the above-mentioned merits as regards the history of ideas, of Marx's dissertation. This first/early writing (work) (juvenilia) constitutes, seen as a whole, a multi-layered whole, in which the analysis of the question pertaining to the history of ideas, without losing its (own) intrinsic value, merges with a [[at that time]] current (topical, timely) philosophical examination of a problem (posing of a question, central theme), and appears in the guise of a modern conceptuality, whilst simultaneously making clear within its framework the first stirrings of a great spirit(-intellect), which precisely becomes conscious (aware) of its own power.

II.

THE CHANGES IN MARX'S IMAGE OF ANCIENT GREECE

1. The Thesis

Viewed in its entirety, Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) relation(ship) with ancient Greece can be represented in the form of a three-sided (tripartite) schema. The chronologically first side of this schema is oriented philosophically-aesthetically, and almost unconditionally affirmative; the second is again more likely (rather) historically and sociologically moulded (shaped, formed), whereby the Greek phenomenon is looked at critically and relativised; inside the third side, a logically problematic (re)conciliation of the affirmative and of the relativising attitude is carried out from the point of view of a certain philosophy of history. All three sides co-exist, and indeed consciously, in Marx's mature thought, that is, in his thought as the author of "Capital" and of "Grundrisse"; however, they are not formed simultaneously, but one after the other, and this formation of theirs is accompanied by the general movement of Marxian thought from his young-Hegelian beginnings towards that grand(iose) apprehension of the historical life of men (humans), which undoubtedly makes Marx one of the great founders of modern social science. In other words: still before the formation (of the basic features) of historical materialism, Marx maintains a certain, in principle, positive perception of the Greek phenomenon, which in his eyes symbolises the historical realisation of certain moral and aesthetic values, or is supposed to give the daily struggle for their (such values)

realisation a corresponding impulse. In later years, when the theory of historical materialism (in its basic features) already exists (is present (available)), Marx sees ancient Greece and its renowned spiritual(-intellectual) representatives and exponents (supporters) (with)in their historical dependencies and confines (limits, boundaries, borders); simultaneously, however – and obviously driven by his always and forever living sympathies for the classical ideal – he (Marx) poses the question as to how the at least partially supra-historical character of this ideal can be combined with the ascertainment of the historical bindedness and relativity of the Greek phenomenon; the answer to this question is given from a – pertaining to the history of ideas – and indeed strongly Hegelianising perspective, from which the third of the above-mentioned sides of Marx's spiritual(-intellectual) relation towards (with) ancient Greece arises. The three-sided schema, in which the hermeneutic thesis represented/supported here can be summarised, hence indicates that a reconstruction of Marx's interesting views here is possible, which can simultaneously keep an eye on the logical aspect.⁵²

2. The two aspects of the classical ideal in Marx's earliest writings (works)

Like most scions (sprout, shoots) of bourgeois families of his times (era, age), thus Marx also came systematically into contact with ancient Greek culture and its linguistic monuments (memorials) in the classical gymnasium (high school) of his home town.⁵³ The intellectual and intuitive-emotional (instinctive) details of this contact are not in the case of Marx, the student, known (very) well, however, we know of a very positive and lasting (enduring) result of it (such contact): it imparted (conveyed) to Marx, namely, an excellent (superb) knowledge of the Greek and the Latin language, which allowed him as a

student, to engage in serious philological, philosophical and juristic studies by being able to have recourse to the relevant classical texts without difficulty; over and above that, however, the more detailed (pre)occupation with ancient literature often had the character of an aesthetic end-in-itself adopted and imagined apart (away) from topical (then current) scientific interests. Thus, the law (jurisprudence) student Marx found during his first semester in Berlin (Summer 1837) sufficient time in order to tackle – next to (apart from) many other works and studies –, also the translation of texts like Tacitus's "Germania", Ovid's "Tristia" or Aristotle's "Rhetoric".⁵⁴ In and from the beginning of 1839 and for two whole years he (Marx) took an interest in and busied himself with the collection of material for his dissertation and, in the process, he evaluated the Greek authors, chiefly Aristotle and his commentators, Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus, Eusebius, Clemens, Plutarch, Sextus and Stobaeus.

Marx's dissertation can, however, by no means be identified with the sum of its literary sources. Its intention is consciously philosophical, it (Marx's dissertation) wants to make a contribution to the young-Hegelian inspired clarification of basic theoretical questions.⁵⁵ The strong presence of the classical ideal in Marx's first writing (work) is, for its part, correspondingly committed and militant, it is supposed to serve declared radical philosophical aims. The classical ideal represents here, life in its sensorial taking root, in its pulsating energy and force (strength), in its compulsive urge (yearning, thirst, drive, impulse) (in respect) of the will – however, at the same time, also in the harmony of its elements, in the grace(fulness) of the (re)conciliation of its contrasts and opposites, and in the peaceful (quiet) security which arises from existential fullness. This all preserves again its exact (accurate, precise) philosophical and polemical sense (i.e. meaning), by turning against Christian transcendentalism, i.e. against the theological subjugation of the earthly From

Here (i.e. This World or Life) to and under a supra-natural From There (i.e. That World or Life). According to Marx's conviction (belief), this subjugation means the denial, disavowal (disownment) and drying up (draining, dehydration) of life, and on top of everything, the corruption and (the) degeneration of man, who now in life after death seeks faint-hearted (timid) consolation (solace and comfort) for equally faint-hearted angsts and fears, or, a reward (recompense) for actions (acts), which already because of a concomitant or motivating expectation of a reward (recompense), cannot be truly good, i.e. unselfish (altruistic, selfless). By religion suppressing, therefore, life in its tangible sensoriality, it (religion) simultaneously suppresses the rational (reasonable) and moral essence (being, nature) of man too. In this, his contrast(ing) with regard and opposition to religion, the classical ideal – as it was comprehended by Marx in (towards, from) that early period [[of his thought]] – means the same as the arch-foe/enemy of religion, namely, philosophy: it means both the unreserved affirmation of earthly life, as well as of the ethos borne (carried) by Reason, the attitude to life (or the positioning in respect of life) of the free and autonomous individual.

It is known that the classical ideal since (the) Renaissance period (times), quite often was used in relation to that to combat or to undermine (erode) Christian transcendentalism and asceticism – although the newer (more recent) research clarifies (elucidates) more and more that the Renaissance seen in its entirety was less paganistic than assumed previously (earlier), and that the legend of the 19th century of the paganistic Renaissance itself constituted a phase in the struggle over the pushing through, i.e. imposing, of the classical ideal. In particular, in Germany, where for particular historical reasons, the Enlightenment was less radical on average than e.g. in France, the impressive philosophical and aesthetic carving (bringing) out and elaboration of the classical ideal by thinkers like Winckelmann or Schiller undertook the task

(mission, duty) pertaining to the history of ideas, and or the ideological task, of closing the gap which the deficient radicality of the Enlightenment had left behind, and of offering or providing the educated (learned, cultured) parts of the aspiring bourgeoisie (with) points of orientation in their smaller or larger conflicts with the still, for the most part, predominant Christian-feudal ideology; this state of affairs (situation of things) perhaps constituted the most important general reason for the wholly peculiar (odd) development of humanistic studies in Germany. There is no doubt in relation to that, that Marx, by paying homage to and embracing the classical ideal, by and large receives (absorbs, takes in, assimilates) and continues the – at that time – still not very long tradition of the bourgeois-humanistic education (learning) of his country, as he had got to learn (know) (as he became acquainted with) it in school and in his immediate (direct) surroundings (environment). We do not know exactly what Marx had read in and picked up from Schiller,⁵⁶ Marx occupied/concerned himself with Winckelmann, at any rate, in 1837 in Berlin,⁵⁷ and this study found its expression (reflection, precipitation) in the text of his dissertation, when he talks about the plastic Gods of Greek art, whose main character exists in the calm(ness) (tranquility, peace, silence) of theory.⁵⁸ It must, nonetheless, be emphasised (highlighted) that from the perspective of the philosophical radicalism of the young Marx, the classical ideal retains (preserves) another colouring/colouration and meaning than that which it had (with)in the framework of bourgeois-humanistic education – it distances itself (moves away), therefore, from bourgeois moderation, which the classical idea of measure or sense of proportion was accustomed to summoning with (for) the purpose and goal of rationalising (away) vacillations or giving(s) (indulging(s)) in (pandering(s) (yielding(s)) (to) (on) the ideological and social-political field, and it converted (transformed) itself into a militant paganistic cult of the From Here (i.e. This World or Life), into the unreserved (unconditional) affirmation of human existence in its completely sensorial dimension. This interpretation of

the classical ideal makes the elation (enthusiasm, ardour) with which Marx briefly thereafter appropriates Feuerbach's anthropology (or makes Feuerbach's anthropology his own), understandable, which [[in turn (had)]] put in the foreground so emphatically the corporeality and materiality of the human essence (essence of man).

The radicality of the classical ideal in the young Marx arises not only from its – of this world or life – and paganistic, but also from its Promethean and Titanic component. Man, who completely and fully approves of and affirms earthly life, who is intoxicated (exhilarated) in his own existential fullness (abundance), and wants to take his fate into his own hands – this man must rebel (revolt) against the Gods and against God as the power which stands in the way of his full autonomy. Philosophy, as it – at that time – was comprehended by Marx, embodies exactly the programmatic and irreconcilable contrast and opposition to every religion, and that is why it makes – as we read in the foreword of the dissertation – Prometheus's confession of faith, its own: ἀπλῶ λόγῳ τοὺς πάντες ἐχθαίρω θεοὺς (= In simple words, I'm hostile to and hate all (of) the gods [translator's translation]); Prometheus was, because of this proud attitude and positioning towards the gods, the most exalted (lofty, majestic) saint and martyr of the philosophical calendar.⁵⁹ The Promethean and Titanic element belongs in this sense to the decisive (crucial) constituent parts (elements) and to the most important legacies of the classical ideal. The ancient Greek philosopher, Marx believes, is the creator of a world (δημιουργός)⁶⁰ – and “he who no longer gets (derives) pleasure by building (constructing) the whole world from (out of) his own means, by being the creator of the world (world creator) . . ., regarding whom the Spirit has pronounced (expressed) its anathema, he is shoved from (pushed out of) the temple and from the eternal pleasure (enjoyment) of the Spirit”.⁶¹ Irrespective of the later change of/in views – occurring (which occurred) – on philosophy in general and ancient Greek philosophy in

particular, Marx remains true to this Promethean imperative throughout his life; Aeschylus was in fact – next to Goethe and Shakespeare – Marx’s favourite (beloved) poet, whom he was in the habit of reading every year time (again) and again in the original [[ancient Greek]].⁶² Here, we are of course not dealing with a question (problem) of literary taste, but rather of a positioning (attitude) towards a decisive (crucial) question pertaining to the history of ideas. Because Marx, exactly as other Young Hegelians around 1840 too, interprets Hegel’s teaching of History as God’s unfolding space (room for development) (then), a God, who needs (requires) for his own unfolding (development) History, could not be anyone else other than Man, i.e. the human genus (species, race) (mankind) in the succession of its generations and in the accumulation (piling up) of its achievements (accomplishments, performances). If History is the Universe (the Universe is History), then the Master (Lord, Ruler) and Creator of the Universe must be Man. By Man attaining/achieving clarity in light of these insights regarding his true nature and position, Man topples (brings down, deposes, overthrows) the old false gods and makes himself (the) (i.e. turns into) God, without however, in the course of this, losing the urge (yearning, thirst, drive, impulse) and energy of the revolting (i.e. in a state of revolt; rebelling) Titan. Although Marx in later years was somewhat more prosaic, he nevertheless never ceased to comprehend the relation(ship) between Man and History from the perspective of this schema. That is why the Promethean element and symbol always retains (protects) for him, his meaning (sense) and value.

Marx’s concern (care, worry) about the theoretical safeguarding of this radical version of the classical ideal is so great, that in 1840 he does not want to accept an essential intellectual(-spiritual) kinship (relationship, affinity) between

Platonism and Christianity [[translator’s note – another example of Marx being within the broad Western European Protestant-Secular-Catholic(-ZIO/Jew) framework of **not** recognising the Hellenic Christian world’s Patristic-Platonist philosophers (e.g. Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil of Caesarea/Saint Basil the Great,

Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor/Theologian, Gregory Palamas, et al.), and the elements of Continuity of Ancient Greece into Christian Hellenism, etc.]]; Plato had merely taught (learnt) philosophy with religious enthusiasm (elation, ardour), but without disavowing (disowning) the self-sufficiency (self-reliance, independence) of philosophical Reason and its redeeming force (strength, power).⁶³ The decline of philosophy in ancient Greece took place at a later point in time, and it was characterised exactly by the abandoning of both components of the classical ideal outlined above [[sensoriality/harmony etc., and, Reason ag. religion/Christianity etc.]]. Plutarch and the Stoics put aside (sidelined) the strict distinction between philosophy and religion, and transposed (moved, transferred) philosophy, and indeed morals (morality), back to the level of angsts (or fears) and to the hopes of uneducated (unlearned, uncultured) old wives; Marx dedicates/devotes a snappy, scathing (vicious) polemic in exactly this sense to/against Plutarch in the appendix of his dissertation,⁶⁴ and almost five years later – when he in the »Deutschen Ideologie (= German Ideology)« inter alia (amongst other things) also refutes Stirner's views regarding ancient philosophy – he moreover accuses (reproaches) the Stoics of paving the way for Neoplatonism, and disputes (contests) that they had/would have worked out (elaborated upon) a natural science worth mentioning, especially such a natural science which could come about not merely through the renewal of the dynamic Heraclitean perception of nature, but only through empirical research (investigation).⁶⁵ In the same text, it can be hinted wherein the abandoning of the classical ideal on the part of Sceptics consisted (existed), namely, in their detachment from the Promethean demand for a re-creation (new creation, creation anew) of the world. By the Sceptics assuming that man knows only an Appearance (Pretence; Schein) and no(t) (any) Truth (Wahrheit), they, in actual fact, accept the existing (what(ever) exists) and satisfy themselves (are satisfied) with that, by renaming (rechristening) sensorial reality misleading (deceptive) imagination.⁶⁶ Still earlier, Marx had denounced the other deadly (mortal, cardinal) sin of the

Sceptics, that they, namely, opened the door (door and gate) through (by means (way) of) their limiting (restricting) or even setting aside (sidelining) of the area (realm) of the secure and certain knowledge to religion, since the gaps of/in knowledge were filled in (out) by faith (belief).⁶⁷

An important reason now why in the (i.e. Marx's) dissertation mistrust is shown to Democritus, whereas good-will (benevolence) is shown to Epicurus, is exactly that the former agrees (chimes in) with an agnosticism; the latter, on the other hand (against (compared with) that), assumes and accepts the possibility of a secure and certain knowledge, even if this can only be sensorial.⁶⁸

Democritus's phenomenalism prevents, therefore, the setting up (establishment, installation, institution) of an ontology which would be worthy of (deserve, merit) this name, and correspondingly atomistic theory (i.e. the theory of atoms) is transformed (converted) into a merely scientific hypothesis for the explanation of phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) of nature.⁶⁹ Marx expects, nevertheless, from atomistic theory (i.e. the theory of atoms) something more, namely that which – according to his perception (view) – the Epicurean theory achieves (accomplishes, renders, performs) from the declining (as in declining of declination) motion (movement) of atoms: an ontological underpinning of human freedom.⁷⁰ Epicurus's physics, therefore, is/are given priority (preference) not so much because of its scientific, but rather because of its moral-philosophical advantages, since it founds (bases) human happiness (felicity, fortune, bliss) and human freedom in (on) a natural-scientific perception (view), which is conceived or designed purely on this side, i.e. in the From Here (i.e. This World or Life), and is capable of freeing (liberating, emancipating, releasing) the human soul from metaphysical angsts (or fears) and hopes. Epicurus's merit corresponds, therefore, exactly to nature and the demands of the classical ideal, as Marx himself interpreted in the struggle against religion.

3. Ancient Greek society and ancient Greek thought in light of the Marxian teaching of ideology and of industrial society

In order to outline Marx's mature perception (view) regarding Greek antiquity, we must for the time being clarify which aspects or points of the theory of historical materialism have proved to be decisive (crucial) in the new interpretation and evaluation of the Greek phenomenon deviating essentially and substantially from the initial one (i.e. interpretation and evaluation of the Greek phenomenon). Two of these come principally into consideration, namely, the teaching (theory, doctrine) of ideology, and, the assessment of the historical role of industry. We have already said that for the young-Hegelian Marx, the classical ideal in general fulfils similar functions like philosophy too, with which it is connected in terms of content, and struggles jointly against the arch-foe/enemy, i.e. religion, which constitutes the ideational linchpin (prop, pillar) and the ideational expression of an irrational, unreasonable and morally unacceptable social-political reality. For the young Marx, philosophy can only be one single philosophy, it is the rational (or: what is reasonable), and the moral (what is moral), in its world-altering and world-bettering(improving, ameliorating) claim and effect; it is not determined by means of bad (wicked, evil) reality, but faces (stands across from) it (i.e. such reality) whilst being irreconcilable and unforgiving, and it strives (endeavours) that such reality is (be) determined and changed (modified, transformed); philosophical theory constitutes in short not the ideological outcome (outflow, discharge, issue) or result of a deficient empirical reality, but the autonomous embodiment of irrational (reasonable) reality or of the reality of Reason.

Obviously, this idealistic perception (view) of philosophy is not in harmony with the fundamental thesis of the mature Marx regarding the primacy of societal (social) being vis-à-vis societal (social) consciousness. As a form of societal (social) consciousness, philosophy constitutes the outcome (outflow) or result of a societal (social) being, and since this (societal being) remains (still) always imperfect and torn – otherwise society would neither be needing a theoretically formulated imperative, nor (would it be) seeking the fulfilment of wishes in the sphere of ideas –, then philosophy must also remain imperfect (incomplete), it is therefore put together (assembled) from (out of) several forms contradicting and competing with one another, each of which expresses a certain subjective perspective or a certain “false consciousness”, which in various ways rationalises concrete social-political efforts (endeavours) and interests. Thus seen, the earlier irreconcilable contrast and opposition between philosophy and religion is no longer upheld (sustained, preserved), since both equally represent and constitute ideological forms or forms of ideological consciousness. Marx came to this insight already in 1844,⁷¹ and for instance, a year later he (Marx) criticises Stirner because this person (i.e. Stirner) derives (infers, deduces) material history from ideational history, and accordingly represents (portrays) the history of ancient philosophy in such a way that not the real, but only the philosophical relationship of the ancients as regards (towards) their world moves into the foreground (i.e. is given prominence), in relation to which (whereby) the history of ancient philosophy substitutes (i.e. replaces) the history of antiquity.⁷² Marx’s priorities here become undoubtedly established (set(tled), determined, fixed). Philosophy and its history constitute parts of a very comprehensive history, in other words, the ideational or subjective and ideological aspect of the real social process – that is why philosophy cannot also offer the key to understanding this latter (real social process). Philosophy, and indeed ancient philosophy, is (becomes) relativised by being connected to a certain social (societal) form (form of society), which, for its part, is put in order

(is ordered or classified) in a certain schema of overall historical development (or: the total development of history). However, in this manner, ancient philosophy and ancient thought in general are comprehended and evaluated from a double point of view, i.e. with the help (on the basis) of the yardsticks (benchmarks, criteria, measures, gauges) of their own times (age, era, epoch), and at the same time, on the basis of the criteria of the development of history in its entirety and in regard to its perfection (completion). Comprehending and evaluating take place, therefore, in connection with a perception (view) of the essence (being, nature) and course (passage, movement) of History. Because it is of primary importance how the course of History as a whole is comprehended and structured (organised, articulated).

Consequently, we have come to the second of both historical points (points in respect of history), which Marx's mature positioning vis-à-vis the Greek phenomenon determines, namely, as to his perception (view) of the historical process (process of history) as a whole, in which a main focus/emphasis is placed/put on the industrial revolution and the historical role of industry in general. Marx belongs to those who have fully understood the meaning of the industrial phenomenon at the world-historical level, and his historical-theoretical approach exactly consisted in apprehending world history and its internal driving forces in the light of this phenomenon anew and unitedly (uniformly): this explains the hermeneutic primacy of concepts such as "forces of production" in the Marxian perception (view) of history, which at the anthropological level, correspond with/to the representation (idea or notion) of man as the tool or instrument of the creating animal (creative beast), and with/to the image (picture) of the struggle of man (man's struggle) with nature often conjured up or invoked by Marx. With the advent of industry, the development of the forces of production, or the struggle of man with nature, entered into a radically new phase, and this fact must have – for a perception (view) of history

– the most serious of theoretical consequences, which revolve around the basic concepts mentioned just now. The question could be concretely formulated thus: how must history be periodised, if its course undergoes (experiences) such a radical turn? We cannot here, of course, go into the delicate question (problem) of the Marxian periodisation of history in greater detail. For the understanding of Marx's mature perception (view) of ancient Greek society and ideology, we must, however, hold onto (cling to) the following. From the perspective of the capitalistic, i.e. the first industrial society, all previous (former, earlier) social formations can be reduced to one single social formation, which indeed according to time and place must vary considerably (substantially), always and overall, however, retaining (keeping) its essential feature: it rests and is based on the agrarian (agricultural) economy and landed property. This way of looking at things lets, on the one hand, the turn, which the historical course (or: the sequence/order of events of history) takes through the advent of industry, appear in its whole radicality, and on the other hand, within the framework of a somewhat looser structural classification, brings pre-capitalistic social formations nearer (closer) to one another, which, first of all, appear to be completely (fully, entirely, wholly) different/varied (differing, distinct) as to one another. Thus, according to Marx, ancient Greek or old Roman society belong to the same broad historical category as for instance the Asiatic or the Germanic agrarian/agricultural society, *when/if* we, though (mind you), use its (pre-industrial and capitalistic society's) distance or its deviation (divergence) from the specific features of capitalistic-industrial society as the yardstick (benchmark, measure, gauge).⁷³ This belonging together (togetherness) of the pre-capitalistic social formations is not cancelled (reversed, abolished, neutralised) by the fact that the Greek/Greco-Roman type developed the city (town; die Stadt) to the extent that the other just mentioned [[Asiatic/Germanic agrarian society]] types never knew. Because also this city, writes Marx, was basically only the abode or residence of smaller or larger

landowners, whose land (real property, realty) is found outside the city wall[[s]]; in the course of this, he mentions that still at the time of the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants only less than 5 000 Athenians possessed (owned, held, had) any land(ed property). Ancient Greek society remains, therefore, agrarian (agricultural), and its ideal – both in the sphere of theory as well as in the field of production – was accordingly autarky, in its opposition to (the) modern industrial division of labour.⁷⁴ The occasional blossoming (flourishing) of trade/commerce could not essentially change/alter this fundamental reality; as Marx remarked, trade/commerce exercised on the ancient economy a just as slight influence as Epicurus's gods did this (i.e. exercise influence) on whatever happens in the world (world happenings (occurrences)).⁷⁵

On the basis of these presuppositions, Marx now understands not only the general character of ancient Greek society, but also the preparedness (readiness) of ancient Greek theory or ideology. Because his mature assessment of this latter (ancient Greek theory or ideology) emerges exactly from the combination of both above-mentioned basic insights, that namely philosophy constitutes an ideological form amongst several ideological forms, and that industrial society posited something radically new in comparison to all previous societies in the world. Ancient Greek thought in general is therefore the ideological outcome or result of a pre-industrial society, and as such was subject to the historical limitedness (limited nature, restrictedness, restriction, narrowness) of this latter pre-industrial society. From this point of view, Marx investigates (looks into, examines) the economic and social views of Greek philosophers and above all of Aristotle, whom he incidentally held to be the greatest thinker of antiquity.⁷⁶ Marx reminds us (recalls) that a discipline like political economy in a conceptually worked (hammered) out, elaborated and systematic form could only come about in the New Times, and indeed in the age of manufacture; the – often significant – statements pertaining to the economic theory of antiquity, as

well as the social models, which are sketched out (outlined) in connection with such statements, express the reality of the closed agrarian (agricultural) economy, whose supreme (uppermost, topmost, highest, ultimate) aim lies in autarky. This is first of all shown (seen) in the (i.e. Marx's) positioning (attitude) towards the question of the division of labour. Whilst the modern political economy sees (views, looks at) the division of labour from the perspective of the industrial and commercial process (that is, as the means for the generation (production) of a greater quantity of products or exchange values (Tauschwerten), and for the acceleration (speeding up) of accumulation), the classical authors keep not the quantity, but the concrete quality of the product in mind, thanks to which it represents and constitutes a tangible use value (Gebrauchswert). For Plato, e.g., Marx remarks (comments) that the division of labour takes place not for the purpose (goal) of accumulation, or of economic expansion, in the dynamic framework of a money and commodity (goods, merchandise, wares, product) economy (Warenwirtschaft), but for two other reasons: first, because there are inside a community – which is looked at (regarded) as an in principle (fundamentally) autarkic (self-sufficient) whole – several needs simultaneously, and secondly, because every working, labouring man (i.e. worker, labourer) of necessity has at his disposal a one-sided talent (gift, endowment, aptitude), so that his knowledge and skills (skillfulness, cleverness, adroitness) must be supplemented by the other members of the community. Accordingly, Plato's social ideal looks static: "Plato's Republic, in so far as in it the division of labour is developed (unfolds) as the moulding and shaping (formative) principle of the state, is only the Athenian idealisation of the Egyptian caste system, as Egypt is regarded as the industrial model country (land) also by others of his contemporaries, e.g. by Isocrates."⁷⁷

From the narrow point of view of a closed agrarian (agricultural) economy, the classical authors assess, judge or evaluate the economic function of money,

whilst not being able to make their own, i.e. appropriate, thoughts (notions, ideas, considerations) that money can be something more than the mere means for commodity exchange (the exchange of commodities (goods, merchandise, wares, products); Warenaustausch) for the purpose of the acquisition of indispensable use values, that is, an independent and self-multiplying/increasing force and power, i.e. capital. The Ancients looked at this phenomenon, of which they – incidentally – only knew elementary forms, as the misuse and abuse of money, as the illegitimate transformation of the same (i.e. money) from a servant to a master, and at the same time as the rational (reasonable) rejection of true wealth, which according to the logic of the closed agrarian (agricultural) economy, can exist (consist) only in natural produce or in use values. Plato wants to limit (restrict or confine) the role of money to the facilitating (easing or alleviation) of commodity exchange (the exchange of commodities and goods), whereas Aristotle regarded (the) simple commodity circulation (circulation of commodities and goods) (Warenzirkulation) ($C - M - C$) as natural, whilst money remains a mere means, and condemned the circulation of money as capital ($M - C - M$), as well as the making independent (autonomisation), i.e. independence (autonomy, self-sufficiency), of exchange values as such.⁷⁸ Marx cites in extenso the passage from the “Politics”, in which Aristotle distinguishes between (the) Economic(s) and (the) Chrematistic(s) (i.e. of, denoting, or relating to money-making) (Ökonomik und Chrematistik),⁷⁹ which correspond to both these forms of circulation. If here the Chrematistic is rejected with fierce (vehement) words, thus the reason is exactly that the unlimited (unrestricted) accumulation of wealth, that is, a constant expansion of the economic activity of man is aimed at, which is incompatible (inconsistent) with the economic and ethical principle of autarky; and if the Economic is praised, then that is because true wealth, as Aristotle declares, exists in use values, i.e. it is defined on the basis of the criteria of the closed agrarian (agricultural) economy. The intensity of the conscious opposition and conflict by Aristotle towards the open money

(economy) and commodity economy becomes/is still clearer when man bethinks, i.e. considers, that he (Aristotle), as Marx emphasises (highlights), knows of the double value of the commodity (good, merchandise, ware, product) as a use (value) and exchange value.⁸⁰ The Aristotelian condemnation of the Chrematistic amounts, therefore, to a condemnation of every making independent (autonomisation), i.e. independence (autonomy, self-sufficiency) of exchange value as such. The condemnation of the usurer – which according to Aristotle, as Marx reports it,⁸¹ represents and constitutes nothing other than the Chrematistik in its application to the circulation of money – coincides with this ethical-economic rejection of the Chrematistic. As is known, this condemnation of the usurer will (would) be repeated with undiminished emphasis and vigour in the whole of the medieval theological-political literature, and this indicates how right, i.e. correct Marx was when he pointed out (adverted to, indicated) the fundamental economic and ideological belonging together (togetherness) of pre-capitalistic social formations.

The standing still in the realities of the closed agrarian (agricultural) economy and in the qualitative way of looking at things (in that, that is, which accepts (assumes) the primacy of the tangible and – qualitatively different from one another – use values, without the general element being borne in mind and contemplated, which constitutes every value regardless of its specific quality, and which, because of that, can be apprehended only abstractly), impedes (prevents, hinders, hampers), finally, according to Marx's perception (view), Aristotle from working out the law of value (Wertgesetz) in terms of theory, that is, from seeing (recognising, having insight) that the measure for the determination of the value of every product is none other than human labour (work) as such, namely, in its abstract-general apprehension. This abstract labour does not itself appear, emerge or [[otherwise]] make itself felt, but it does it (i.e. appears and makes itself felt) by means of its own conceptual

opposite, namely, all the concrete labour on each and every respective occasion, which must be expended (spent) for the manufacture (production, fabrication, making) of a product; furthermore, it is realised only through the personal labour of individuals, although it originally has a social character (precisely the quantity of the abstract labour, which is (put, lodged, stuck) in a product, confers (bestows, lends) in fact this value it has, and through that, enables it its exchange with another product and the formation (development) of social relations (circumstances, conditions) of labour). Behind every qualitatively concrete personal labour stands abstract-general labour, the labour in itself and as such. It constitutes the magnitude which in the end allows the subsumption of qualitatively different things under a common denominator, so that its value is reckoned (calculated) and its exchange can take place. Aristotle now in actual fact gets to the bottom of it (susses it (finds) out, realises)(,) that this reduction of the qualitatively dissimilar kind (of thing) to a common factor for the establishing (determining, fixing) of exchange equivalences/equivalencies/equivalents is indispensable, however, he remains incapable of tracking down (locating, discovering, finding) this factor, and still less does he think, in the process, of abstract labour, of labour in itself. Marx explains this incurable theoretical inadequacy (insufficiency, deficiency) of Aristotle (therewith) (so) that “Greek society rested or was based on slave labour; that is why for its basis, Greek society had the inequality of men (humans) and of its labour force (work force(s), manpower). The secret of value expression (the expression of value) (Wertausdrucks), the equality and equal validity of all labour(s) (works), because and in so far as they are human labour in general, can only be deciphered when the concept of human equality already possesses the firmness (solidity) of a popular prejudice. That is, however, only possible in a society wherein the commodity form (form of commodities (goods, products, wares, merchandise) (Warenform)), is the general form of the product of labour, that is, also the relationship of men (humans) with (towards) one another as commodity

possessors (possessors (owners, proprietors, holders) of commodities (goods, products, wares, merchandise) (Warenbesitzer)) is the dominant social (societal) relationship.”⁸² Marx sets here basically the model of economic and political liberalism, which constructs society in terms of theory on the basis of the representation and notion of a market, upon which the individuals appear in principle equal and equivalent producers (manufacturers), in order to exchange their products with one another, against the model of ancient society, in which the in principle (fundamental) inequality of men (humans) is accompanied by the closed agrarian (agricultural) economy and consequently by the precedence (primacy, priority) of the use values before (i.e. over) exchange values.

Precisely, the wakeful and alert (wide-awake) sense of the contrast and opposition between the liberal-capitalistic and the ancient Greek model – a contrast/opposition which interrelates most closely (tightly) with the fundamental historical contrast/opposition between industrial and pre-industrial society – allows Marx to get out of the way of (i.e. avoid) a very common, widespread mistake, i.e. to deduce new times political democracy from ancient democracy. Certainly, Marx knows that the ideological invocation of idealised democratic models from antiquity played a considerable (substantial) role in the social-political struggles of the New Times (and in particular at the time (in the age/period) of the French Revolution);⁸³ on the other hand, however, he does not take ideological positions at (their) face value, and he distinguishes the apprehension of the historical past, as it is determined through these or those ideological positions, from the concrete structure of authority as dominance (domination, rule, ruling (holding sway) over others) in a society, which does not exist anymore. That is why the revival (resurrection, resuscitation) of antiquity and of ancient democratic models (examples) appears as a gigantic (huge) masquerade, especially, as Marx writes, history only repeats itself as comedy (farce). Such resurrections of antiquity were supposed to confer

(bestow, lend) authority, gloss (glamour, shine, radiance, sheen) and grandeur (magnitude, size), something which later proved to be a prosaic bourgeois social and life perception (or: view of society and life), or, a concrete form of dominance; precisely because they (the said resurrections of antiquity) were also superfluous when this latter (concrete forms of bourgeois dominance) found its own language and its own historical style. Marx, by looking – from this sober point of view – at both antiquity, as well as at the new-times republican-democratic cult of the same (antiquity), had no difficulties in classifying (putting in order) – with regard to the exploitation of surplus-labour – the Athenians καλὸν καγαθόν (= the beautiful(, noble) and good) in the same sociological category as the Etruscan priesthood, the civem romanum (= Roman citizen), the Norman baron or the American slaveholder of the 19th century.⁸⁴

4. The problem of ancient Greek art and the sense or meaning of the viability (or: the capacity for life/living) of ancient culture from the point of view of (the) Hegelian and Marxian philosophy of history

We have hitherto determined (ascertained, found out) that the young philosopher Marx greatly emphasises (underlines) the classical ideal, and connects it with his – at that time – perception of the essence (nature) and of the function of philosophy, whereas on the contrary, the mature sociologist and historian Marx relativises ancient Greek thought, and critically evaluates (judges) it, notwithstanding his admiration e.g. for Aristotle. It is a matter here of two positions, which first of all cannot be reconciled with one another. Is it therefore thus (true), that Marx disowned his youthful love for ancient Greece? And if not, how can then both those positions be brought into harmony with each other? Marx gives his answer to this question in a short text, which around

(about) 1857/58 was thrown/tossed/cast, i.e. put, on(to) paper [[hurriedly, without a great deal of preparation or aforethought]] together with other preparatory/preliminary works, i.e. writings (sketches, drafts) for »Kapital«.⁸⁵ It reads (He says):

“In art it is known that certain heydays (or periods of flowering) of the same (art), by no means stand (are) in a relationship with the general development of society, that is, also with the material basis or foundation, [[or]] as it were, with the bone structure of its (society’s) organisation. For example, the Greeks compared with the Moderns or even Shakespeare. Of certain forms of art, e.g. with regard to the epic, it is recognised that they, in their world-epoch-making, classical form can never be produced [[again]], as soon as the production of art as such (i.e. as (mass) production) occurs; that is to say, that within the perimeter (ring) of art itself certain important forms of the same (art) are possible at an undeveloped tier (stage, level or grade) of the development of art. If (When) this – in regard to the relationship of various kinds of art inside of the realm (area) of art itself – is the case, it is already less conspicuous and striking that it – in regard to the relationship of the whole area of art towards (as regards, vis-à-vis) the general development of society – is the case [[= (C.F.’s interpretation:) when art is undeveloped, many important forms of art are possible; when the general development of society is advanced, it is not necessary that art as a whole is advanced]]. The difficulty consists only in the general grasping of this contradiction. As soon as it becomes specified, it is already explicated.

Let us take, e.g. the relationship of Greek art, and then Shakespeare, with (towards) the present. It is known that Greek mythology is not only the arsenal of Greek art, but its terrain (ground, soil, land). Is the point of

view (outlook, conception, approach, opinion) of nature and of societal relations, which underlies Greek fantasy and hence Greek [mythology], possible with selfactors [[C.F.'s note: "**automotive (self-moving/ propelling) machines**" is the rendering from P.K.'s translation of Marx's term "selfactors" into Greek]] and railways (railroads) and locomotives and electric(al) telegraphs? Where does Vulcan stay (stand, remain) (or: Where is Vulcan) against Roberts et Co., Jupiter against the lightning rod (conductor), and Hermes against Crédit mobilier? All mythology overcomes and dominates (controls, masters, commands) and shapes (moulds) the forces of nature (natural forces) in the imagination and by means of the imagination; it (i.e. mythology) therefore disappears (vanishes) with real authority as dominance over the same (forces of nature). What will become of Fama next to (alongside) Printinghouse square? Greek art presupposes Greek mythology, i.e. nature and the societal forms themselves are already processed (treated, handled) in an unconscious artistic manner by means of folk (popular) fantasy. That is its material. Not any kind of mythology whatsoever, i.e. not any unconscious artistic processing (treatment, handling) of nature whatsoever (here amongst all that is representational (graphic or concrete), that is, society included). Egyptian mythology could never be the terrain (ground etc.) of the womb of Greek art. But, at any rate, [[it is]] *a* mythology. Therefore, on no account [[is there]] a development (an evolution/unfolding) of society, which excludes all/every mythological relationship(s) towards(/vis-à-vis/with) nature, all/every mythologising relationship(s) towards(/vis-à-vis/with) it; that is, [[no development of society]] demands from artists, a fantasy independent of mythology.

On the other hand: is Achilles possible with (gun)powder and lead? Or, in general, the Iliad with the printing press, or even the printing machine? Do not singing and reciting (saying, speaking, talking) [[in respect of

poetry]] and the muse necessarily cease with the press lever (i.e. the lever used to tighten the screws of the printing press), that is, do not the necessary conditions of epic poetry vanish (disappear)?

However, the difficulty in/of understanding does not lie in that Greek art and the Greek epic are attached (knotted, tied, linked) to/with certain historical forms of development. The difficulty is that they still accord (afford, impart) to (grant) us artistic pleasure (enjoyment) and are regarded as the norm and unattainable (unachievable) model (pattern, specimen).

A grown man (adult male, a grown-up) cannot turn into a child again, or he becomes (will be) childish. But, does not the naivete of the child please him, and does he not himself have to again strive for, or aspire to, a higher tier (level, stage, grade) to reproduce his truth? Does not his own character in regard to the truth of nature (natural truth) come back to life again (revive) in every epoch in the nature of children (childish nature)? Why is the historical childhood of mankind (humankind) supposed to – where it unfolds (develops) at its most beautiful, as a never recurring tier (stage, level or grade) –, not exert eternal charm? There are ill/bad-mannered (naughty) children and precocious children. Many of the ancient folks (peoples) belong to this category. The Greeks were normal children. The charm of their art for us is (stands) not in the contradiction towards/as regards the undeveloped tier (stage, level or grade) of society, whereupon (after which) it grew (up). Rather it (the said charm) is its (ancient Greek society's) result(ant) (outcome), and rather it is inseparably interrelated with the fact that the unripe/immature societal conditions, under which it came into being, and alone could come into being, can never recur (come back, return)."

This important (significant) text can stimulate (prompt, encourage) various thoughts (ideas, notions) regarding central questions of Marxian theory. Here we must, however, confine (limit, restrict) ourselves to what is relevant for the relationship of Marx towards/with Greek antiquity. First of all, we shall remark (comment) that also here the starting point of our considerations is the contrast and opposition between pre-industrial and industrial society as two essentially different levels of the human struggle against nature. In the pre-industrial phase of history, when this struggle remains still for the most part ineffective, the real weaknesses with regard to the dominating, control (mastering or commanding) of the forces of nature (natural forces) is compensated by way of mythological constructions, whereby in the realm of fantasy everything that is tamed and dealt (coped) with and managed is what cannot be brought under real control. Marx distinguishes, by the way, between that specific kind of imaginary force (force (power) of imagination), which generates mythology, and other kinds of the same (imaginary force), which (also) can flourish (thrive) in times (eras, epochs) which stand opposite genuine (authentic, real, true, original) mythology as being alien (foreign, strange). That means that the development (unfolding) of art does not in the least end with antiquity, and that human nature no longer suffers irreparable losses after the expiration (or course (order/sequence of events)) of that historical period, which is marked by the prevalence of mythological constructions in the realm of ideology. If such losses could be irreparable (i.e. they could not be made up or atoned/compensated for), then the modern attitude/positioning towards antiquity would also have to more or less be fixed, known or made certain in advance: it would be the partly angst-ridden or fearful and partly envious stance of severely disabled or [[otherwise]] damaged and afflicted people towards healthy people. However, Marx rejects precisely such an attitude.

If now Marx looks at mythology as the terrain/ground (soil, land), upon which ancient Greek art flourishes, thus he undoubtedly calls to mind that which he had read two decades earlier in Winckelmann, and somewhat later in Hegel too. Now he understands, however, the term “mythology” not merely religiously and aesthetically, but primarily sociologically, that is, in the sense of that which he calls “ideological forms”, as these are shaped (moulded) in the struggle of man against nature and in the – with that – interrelating struggle of man against man. The peculiarity and distinctiveness of ancient Greek art is connected with the peculiarity and distinctiveness of the ideological forms of ancient Greek society in contrast/opposition to those of e.g. Egyptian society – although the ideologies of all pre-industrial societies exhibit (show, feature) certain common general features, namely, the form-related, i.e. formal structure of mythology as mythology, irrespective of its each and every respective content. If, therefore, in light of the Marxian teaching of ideology, i.e. the independence of the intellectual(-spiritual) forms from the texture and composition of (the) social being –, ancient Greek art appears to be inseparable from the space, from the time and from the circumstances of its coming into being, then the causes of its effect and impact in essentially different historical epochs have to be questioned (queried). This question is posed for Marx not by chance (accidentally, coincidentally) or from the outside, but it arises from the logic of the Marxian teaching of ideology itself. Can, however, an aporia or query, which springs from a certain teaching be treated or dealt with, with the conceptual means of this latter (Marxian teaching of ideology)? Marx does not give any direct answer to this question. The answer, which he offers, is of course given on the basis of the conceptual means of Marxism – not however that which stems from specifically Marxian sociology, but that which stems from the Hegelian (and Marxian) philosophy of history. In other words: if Marx wanted to directly answer a question, which arose from his teaching of ideology, then he would have to argue similarly to the modern sociology of knowledge, and should say

the following: “As art and as perception (a view) of life, antiquity was already in the early New Times (Modern Era) revived (brought back to life), and indeed was perceived as a cultural model, because a certain group of historically relevant subjects saw in it (therein) an effective ideological weapon in the struggle against its opponents. The image (picture) of antiquity, which in this struggle was used ideologically, found itself, incidentally, in no necessary relation(ship) with ancient reality, but it was (strongly (intensely)) idealised and adapted to the needs of the aforementioned struggle; and since ideological constructions, in order to be able to fulfil their social function effectively must be comprehended by their representatives as objective truths, then the ideologically determined idealisation of antiquity was also looked at as objective to the extent its proponents prevailed and predominated socially, so that the model character of ancient art and culture was generally accepted (adopted). That is the reason why ancient art e.g. seems still today “beautiful”. The historical and social bindedness of this perception is, however, proved by the fact that the ancient models themselves in the times (period, age, epoch(s), era(s)) of their greatest dissemination (spreading), were not recognised as such by everyone – and above all, not by those who socially and ideologically combatted (fought) the proponents (champions, advocates) of exactly these models.”⁸⁶ [[Translator’s note: the quotation marks “” here are P.K. “quoting” what Marx should have written, and are not an actual citation from Marx]]

Such an answer, as regards the sociology of knowledge, to Marx’s question would imply that belief in the objective beauty of ancient art, e.g., is for its part subjective and ideological, that is an additional (further) socially determined form of “false consciousness”. Marx, however, does not call into question the objective beauty of ancient art, and just as little does he assert that the aesthetic fascination, which starts from it, is (i.e. has) an ideological character – entirely on the contrary. That is why he answers also his own question not with the help of the conceptual means of the teaching of ideology developed by him himself,

whose further development (or meta-development), incidentally, the 20th century's sociology of knowledge represents [[translator's note: obviously K. Mannheim is "the main (but of course not only) man" re: the sociology of knowledge]], but he has recourse (runs back (returns)) to the Hegelian component of his thought, in order to solve his aporia or query from the perspective of the Hegelian philosophy of history – a way of looking at things (consideration), that is, which explained the particular by means of the general, the function and the possible (eventual) survival of the part by means of the course (running, working, operation, action, passage), and the – on each and every respective occasion – higher tier (stage, level, grade) of the whole. As is known, Hegel's philosophy makes for itself – both logic as well as the philosophy of nature and of history – the methodical (i.e. methodological) and ontological task of combining with each other, the idea of the Whole, and the idea of unfolding or development (evolution), to the completion (conclusion, end(ing)) of a dialectical path, in such a way that the Whole, whose whole/entire wealth (richness) comes to light in determinations (provisions, designations, ascertainties) only at the end of the unfolding (development, evolution), does not make up (constitute) a mere negation of the earlier tiers (stages, levels, grades) themselves, but a recapitulation and condensing of their Truth – i.e. of that which is recognised from the point of view of the Whole formed as their true (veritable, real) reasonable and rational function and meaning. With reference to the history of mankind (humankind), this means that its ((the history of) mankind's) individual temporally and spatially determined forms are put in order (classified) in the Whole, and are evaluated from its (the Whole's) higher point of view. The subject of History, i.e. the human genus (species, race) (mankind), remains united in its consecutive/successive metamorphoses, and the unfolding (development, evolution) and end(ing) (close, conclusion, completion) of History remains united too, thus must its (History's) lower tiers (stages, levels, grades) be contained in the higher ones (i.e. tiers, stages etc.), just as the flower holds

(contains, grasps, takes hold of) in itself the seed and the bud, or the grown man (adult male) the child – although the flower is the negation of the bud, and the grown man, the negation of the child. And when in the formed Whole not every constituent part or element and every manifestation (appearance, occurrence) of the preceding tiers, stages etc. of unfolding (development, evolution) are assumed and accepted, but only that which Hegel calls their “Truth”, then in the Whole of the mature (ripe) manhood of the human genus (species, race) (mankind), the best (i.e. that which is best) is contained or “broken off and kept”, something its childhood has brought forth (spawned, produced, created): and precisely this is, according to Marx, ancient Greek art.

This syllogistic reasoning, which Marx summarised in the cited text, had already been reflected (or had already found expression) in Hegel’s comparison of the Greek world with the adolescence of mankind (humankind) or with that “youthfulness of spiritual(-intellectual) life”, which “in the sensorial present” appears as “the embodied (incarnate, personified) Spirit and spiritualised sensoriality”. “The highest form (shape, figure), which (the) Greek representation (idea, notion) has in mind”, further writes Hegel, “is Achilles, the son of the poet, the Homeric youth (youngling, stripling, sapling) from the Trojan War” (as one sees, Achilles’s mention in Marx’s cited text is by no means coincidental (accidental); “Greek life is a true act (expression) of youth [[C.F.’s note: Hegel’s German is „Jünglingsthat“, in regard to which I’m not exactly sure of the translation: does it mean “act of youth” (more likely) or “that youth” (far less likely) or ?]] Achilles, the poetic youth, opened it (i.e. Greek life), and Alexander the Great, the effective youth, brought it (Greek life) to an end” [[C.F.’s note: Hegel was a typical HUN-KRAUT-TEUTON in the “Fallmerayer-Protestant-Papist-ZIO(JEW)-Atheist-Pagan School” of HATE, BIAS, PREJUDICE and IGNORANCE against (elements of) Greek continuity throughout all of the Orthodox Christian Era until about the end of the Ottoman Empire]].⁸⁷ The more recent (newer, latest) research has now shown how much Hegel as a philosopher in general and as a philosopher of history owes (has to thank), in particular, Hölderlin.⁸⁸ It is therefore not odd

(peculiar, strange) when we in Hölderlin run into/encounter the statements, which almost word-by-word (literally) recall Marx's text. So, in the Hyperion-Fragment of 1797 it is said: "Thus, must . . . the punishment (revenge, avengement) of childhood then, rise (stand, get) up in the Spirit of Man. Thus, wither (fade, decay) the beautiful youthful myrtles of the pre-world, Homer's poesies and his times, the Prophesying(s) (prophecies) and the Revelations, but the germ or seed (sprout, shoot), which lay in them, goeth forth as ripe fruit in Autumn. The simplicity (naivety, simple-mindedness) and innocence (purity, virginity) of the first period dies, that it returns (comes back) in perfect and complete formation, and the holy (sacred) Peace of Paradise goes under (is submerged), [[so]] that, what was only the gift (present, donation) of Nature, blooms and flourishes (blossoms out) again, as the earned (won, gained, acquired, obtained) property of mankind (humankind)".⁸⁹

When Marx, therefore, requests (asks, invites, challenges) us to enjoy (savour, relish) and take pleasure in ancient Greek art, then he does not mean that we were supposed to elevate (raise) ourselves to something historically higher, but on the contrary, (that) we were supposed to turn in (with) love and affection (fondness, attachment, liking) towards the historically inferior and outdated (obsolete, antiquated, outmoded). Because he relativises that which he himself cautiously (and prudently) (tentatively) characterises "in a certain relation(ship) as norm and unreachable (unattainable, unachievable) model (pattern)", in a tripartite respect (three kinds of respects/ways): first, through his teaching (theory, doctrine) of ideology, secondly, through the Hegelian perception (view) of the ascending (ascendant) unfolding (development, evolution) of History, and thirdly, when he (Marx) means that even the fascination, which emanates (starts) from ancient art, is hard to imagine without the underdeveloped historical conditions of its coming into being; and a part of this same fascination is again to (should again) be put down (traced back, reduced) to the knowledge

that the – at that time – performed and accomplished (or what was rendered and achieved) cannot be repeated – however, not because human forces – at that time – had attained (reached, achieved) a never-again-to-be-attained (reached, achieved) high point, but rather because the then (former) immaturity (unripeness, greenness) was overcome (got over, conquered, surmounted) forever. Man (Grown man), that is, mature (ripe) mankind (humanity), dove in and immersed himself in the enjoyment and pleasure (indulgence) of ancient art in the fragrant, airy and light quintessence of an earlier phase of his life. That can be an enrichment or strengthening (reinforcement, boosting, enhancing) of life – at any rate, it does not constitute the sole (single, only, lone) or the decisive (deciding, crucial) spiritual(-intellectual) task (duty, mission).⁹⁰ If mature(d) (ripe(ned)) mankind cannot simply copy and forget ancient Greece, then the reason lies only in (the fact) that in the formed Whole, the “Truth” of its individual tiers (stages, levels and grades) of unfolding (development, evolution) survives and lives on as a suspended (raised, lifted up, abolished, cancelled) moment, factor or element. As such a moment, factor or element, and indeed as one of the most valuable (precious, worthy) moments, factors or elements, classical Greece and the classical ideal is also to be seen – not for instance as an, every time, given rule for the consideration and conducting (leading) of life. In order to be able to class(ify) the Ancients as children, one must, however, himself be a (grown) man (an adult male). On the contrary, peoples (folks), who understand and attempt (try) to intimate the Ancients as insurmountable (insuperable) models (examples), remained children themselves. That demonstrates (shows, proves), incidentally, the history of modern Greece well enough (only to well).

(END)NOTES

I

¹ Letter to Lassalle of 21. 12. 1857 = MEW, 29, 547 (cf. the letter to the same (Lassalle) of 31. 5. 1858 in the same volume, p. 561). Marx named in this letter the interests which stimulated (prompted, encouraged) him in his engagement with and study of the topic (theme or subject) of his dissertation, however, at the crucial (decisive) passage (point), the letter's paper is damaged.

² Cf. the good studies by Stuke, *Philosophie der Tat*, and, Gebhardt, *Politik und Eschatologie*. I shall cite/quote two additional testimonies (pieces of evidence) from Marx's immediate surroundings (environment). His – at that time – close friend Köppen writes at the beginning of his little/short book appearing (published) in 1840 and dedicated to Marx: »The twilight of the gods draws near(er) (approaches), the decisive battle has begun ... Everywhere division (rupture, split) and struggle and wrangling (argument, dispute(s))... Never have the contrasts/oppositions stood out as so sharp and piercing, so complicated, intricate and convoluted as they are exactly now.« (p. 1 ff.) In the same year Bauer wrote to Marx: »The catastrophe will be terrible (frightful, horrendous, awful, dreadful) and will necessarily be a great one, and I would almost say that it will be greater and more monstrous than that catastrophe was with which Christianity entered the world.« (MEGA, I, 1 b, p. 241) [[translator's note: Oh, my fucking GOD!]]

³ See especially the 6th notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work for the dissertation, MEW, supplement(ary volume), 1st part, p. 214 ff.. Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch*, esp. p. 59, stresses, above all, the epigonic consciousness in these texts.

⁴ Sannwald, Marx and antiquity, esp. p. 67 ff..

⁵ Marx here refers to the »Phänomenologie des Geistes«, SW, II, p.158 ff., and the »Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie«, SW, XVIII, p. 423 ff.. Cf. Köppen, Friedrich, p. 39: »Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Scepticism are the nerve-muscles and intestinal systems of the ancient organism, whose immediate/direct, natural unity determined (caused) the beauty and morality of antiquity, and which, during the dying (out) of the same (ancient organism), fell apart/fell to pieces/disintegrated.»

⁶ Marx himself evaluated (judged) the style and content of these poems (this poetry) most aptly (incisively) and strikingly; see the letter to his father of 10. 11. 1837, MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note. 3), p. 4. Cf. the analysis of Hillmann, Marx and Hegel, p. 49 ff..

⁷ See e.g. the 4th notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work, MEW, loc. cit., p. 154, and cf. the first foreword for/as regards the dissertation.

⁸ In typical form, this syllogistic reasoning is found in Bauer, Posaune, esp. pp. 151ff., 157ff.. In Köppen's work there are also characteristic statements about the unity and or identity (identicalness) of the godly (divine) and the human, or, God and man (Man), see esp. pp. 79, 81, 84.

⁹ See the letter to his father from/of 10. 11. 1837, MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 9.

¹⁰ See the critique of Platonic dualism in the 3rd notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work, and the comments/remarks regarding the positive interpretation (exegesis) of the Absolute in the 6th notebook, MEW, loc. cit., pp. 136, 226 ff..

¹¹ Bauer mentions as additional evidence (proof) for Hegel's atheism, Hegel's intellectual(-spiritual) affinity (kinship, relationship) with Spinoza, and Hegel's allegedly favourable evaluation of ancient atomism, which refutes (confutes, disproves) the theological teaching (theory, doctrine, dogma) of creation, see Posaune, pp. 166, 165. The meaning of these two points for Marx's dissertation is obvious; Spinoza's affinity (kinship, relationship) with Hegel is again pointed to/out in the 6th notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work, MEW, loc. cit., p. 224. For Marx's – at that time – perception (view) regarding Hegel's atheism cf. Hillmann, Hegel and Marx, p. 150ff.. In view of this perception of/by Marx (i.e. which Marx had), Oiserman's assertion is rejected (dismissed, repudiated) that the Marx of the dissertation already knows and rejects the theological implications of Hegelianism, although he (Marx) still does not (is yet to) have any insight into the internal interrelation between idealistic philosophy and religion (*Die Entstehung*, p. 70) [[translator's note: in other

words, Marx knew of the internal interrelation between idealistic philosophy and religion [[i.e. dualism]] and also knows/rejects the theological implications of Hegelianism]]. Likewise, Oiserman (loc. cit., p. 69) erroneously assumes that Marx regarded Hegel as a proponent of the proof of God. In reality, Marx looked at the ontological proof of God as the mere confirmation of the principle of self-consciousness, see the last (foot)note in the appendix of his dissertation, MEW, loc. cit., p. 372.

¹² Regarding this point see Wildermuth, *Marx und die Verwirklichung*, p. 67ff..

¹³ On the Fichtean motive in Bauer's concept of self-consciousness cf. Cornu, *Marx and Engels*, I, p. 160ff.. The thoughts discussed in this paragraph are found in a treatise by Bauer summarised as follows: "If and when the existing circumstances (relations or conditions) completely contradict the idea, where can the idea then exist other than in pure self-consciousness, which has rescued (saved, salvaged) itself from corruption (depravity), and first of all carries/bears (with)in itself the true forms of its existence as ideals? Does not self-consciousness exactly as such have the right to demand (ask) that it finds again (recovers, regains) its inner determinations in the laws and institutions of the/(those laws and institutions) existing?" *Bekenntnisse einer schwachen Seele* (= Confessions of a weak soul) (1842) = *Feldzüge*, p. 81ff..

¹⁴ Cf. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth*, p. 73 ff..

¹⁵ Hillmann, *Marx and Hegel*, esp. pp. 310, 312, 360 ff., stresses the primacy of thus understood praxis in Marx's thought at that time. One cannot follow (go along with) him (Hillmann), however, without any effort or problems when he means that Marx would be more interested in the contrast/opposition between philosophy and the world, whereas Bauer and Feuerbach e.g. direct their attention/focus rather to the contrast/opposition between philosophy and religion. As we shall still see, such differentiations are far-fetched in view of the era then.

¹⁶ See the second (foot)note in the fourth chapter of the first part of the dissertation, which represents and constitutes the locus classicus for the examination of the problem discussed in this paragraph, MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 326 ff..

¹⁷ Cf. Marx's theorem (proposition or sentence) regarding the theoretical-critical character of philosophical praxis, loc. cit., p. 326. In a letter to Marx, Bauer writes: »Die Theorie ist jetzt die stärkste Praxis« (= "Theory is nowadays the strongest practice/praxis"), MEGA, loc. cit. ((foot)note 2), p. 250.

¹⁸ Loc. cit..

¹⁹ According to a remark/comment/observation by Mende, *Marx's Development*, p. 43. Engels treats (handles) the contrast (opposition) of/between system and method in Hegel's philosophy, as is known, in the first chapter of his writing(s) on Feuerbach and the start(ing point)/opening/commencement of classical German philosophy (1888).

²⁰ According to a remark/comment/observation by Friedrich, *Philosophie und Ökonomie*, p. 40ff..

²¹ Cf. Rossi's striking (apt, incisive) objections (*Marx e la dialettica*, p. 215, cf. pp. 218ff., 231ff.) against/to Cornu's assertion that in the text by Marx mentioned above (see above (end)note 16), his (Marx's) mature perception would stand out/emerge. Cf. also Wildermuth, *Marx und die Verwirklichung*, p. 101ff., as well as Oiserman, *Die Entstehung*, p. 75ff.. Likewise, the assertion by Bekker (*Marx' philos. Entwicklung*, p. 14ff.) and Post (*Kritik der Religion*, p. 83), that the young Marx found himself already on the path/road to his later teaching (theory) of ideology rests on very meagre (pieces of) evidence (indications).

²² *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* (= "Economic-philosophical manuscripts"), MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 569.

²³ See the 6th notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work, loc. cit., p. 220ff.. This defence of Platonism interrelates with Marx's – at that time – confession of faith in the classical ideal, which he – in his opposition to Christian transcendentalism – understood and polemically used. Regarding this aspect of Marx's – at that time – thought cf. Sannwald, *Marx und die Antike*, p. 159 ff..

²⁴ See the last/final (foot)note in the appendix of the dissertation, MEW, loc. cit., p. 372.

²⁵ See the 3rd notebook of the preparatory/preliminary work, loc. cit., p. 106.

²⁶ Loc. cit., p. 118ff.. Cf. Baumgardt, *Über den »verloren geglaubten« Anhang*, esp. p. 106ff..

²⁷ Cf. the 2nd notebook of the preparatory/preliminary notebook, loc. cit., p. 70. Also, Köppen (*Friedrich der Große*, pp. 44-46) issues a rejection of (i.e. rejects) scepticism and agnosticism, since this (author, i.e. Köppen) shares the perception of theologians in respect of the insurmountable limits of human reason. Hegel's early work, to which we are referring to here, is of course »Glauben und Wissen« (1802), see his analysis in Kondylis, *Die Entstehung*, p. 691 ff..

²⁸ Köppen's defence of the Enlightenment is particularly emphatic: "The Enlightenment and again the Enlightenment and always the Enlightenment! It (The Enlightenment) was . . . the Prometheus which brought (the) heavenly (celestial, divine) light to earth, in order to enlighten (illuminate) the blind, the people (folk), the laity, and free (liberate, relieve, release) them from their prejudices and errors" (*Friedrich der Große*, p. 32). Still two points from Köppen's comments/remarks regarding the Enlightenment are worth mentioning with regard to Marx. On the one hand, he (Köppen) thinks (believes, opines) that Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism constituted intellectual(-spiritual) positionings which appeared in the New Times, and indeed again during the

Enlightenment, on the other hand, he discards and condemns the “gross (coarse, uncouth, crude)” materialism of Holbach and Helvétius, which indirectly confirms our preceding analysis in respect of the – at that time – evaluation of (the) materialistic ontology by Marx (loc. cit., p. 39 ff., 34). Bauer also praises the Enlightenment as the beginning of a Western development (unfolding) of (the) self-consciousness, *Der christliche Staat und unsere Zeit* (1841) = *Feldzüge*, p. 23.

²⁹ Lenz (*Marx und die epik. Phil.*, p. 218) asserts in fact that Marx is a materialist and indeed rejects mechanistic materialism, to which he counterposes a refined materialism, by simultaneously putting the contradistinction of both these materialisms at the centre of his work. Lukács assumes (accepts) the same too, and he accordingly interprets Marx's contradistinction between Democritus and Epicurus (*Zur philos. Entwicklung*, p. 516). Other Marxist interpreters, like for instance Mehring (*Marx*, p. 52) and Krüger (*Über die Doktor-Diss.*, p. 106), regard, nevertheless, the fundamental (basic) philosophical positioning of Marx's dissertation as thoroughly idealistic.

³⁰ This view or notion is represented by Lukács, *Zur philos. Entwicklung*, p. 511ff..

³¹ *Die Posaune*, p. 127.

³² *Zur Kritik der »positiven Philosophie«* = *Werke*, II, p. 204.

³³ *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie* (1839) = *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 78-123.

³⁴ See e.g. the treatise cited in (foot)note 28.

³⁵ *Bekenntnisse einer schwachen Seele* = *Feldzüge*, p. 71. In another passage (place), Bauer mentions as a jointly/commonly shared view of the Young Hegelians regarding Hegel that this (i.e. Hegel) would remain within the framework of speculation, and averse to praxis, although his philosophy basically represents a critique of the (what is) existing, see *Die Posaune*, p. 171 ff.. Regarding the social-political implications of Bauer's critical theory, see Rosen, Bauer and Marx, pp. 157-9.

³⁶ Cf. the reasoned and well-founded polemic by Hillmann (*Marx und Hegel*, pp. 219ff., 285ff.) against Cornu. Hillmann shows convincingly that, and how, the concept of self-consciousness corresponded with Marx's – at that time – polemical needs. Cornu (*Marx et Engels*, I, pp. 176ff., 191, 202) asserts that Marx came nearer – already at that time – to a dialectical perception of the interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) between thought and reality, wherein not only did he excel (surpass, go beyond, improve upon) the Young Hegelians, but also Hegel himself; however, his assertion rests (is based) upon conjecture(s) (guesses, suppositions, suspicions, presumptions), and incidentally he admits himself that the supposed contrast/opposition between Marx and the Young Hegelians was only a latent contrast/opposition (loc. cit., p. 206). Cornu's perception uncritically follows Sannwald, *Marx und die Antike*, esp. pp. 103-105. Cf. (end)note 21 above.

³⁷ Wildermuth, *Marx und die Verwirklichung*, p. 60; McLellan, *Junghegelianer und Marx*, p. 87; above all Rosen, Bauer und Marx, esp. p. 133 ff., assert such a dependence. The fact is that in the eyes of many Young Hegelians, Bauer and Marx represented identical philosophical theses, so that G. Jung in a letter to Ruge opined/stated/said that »Posaune« was a joint work [[i.e. by both Bauer and Marx]] (*MEGA*, I, 1b, p. 262).

³⁸ Evidence in *MEGA*, loc. cit., pp. 268 ff., 262. Cf. Hess's letter to Auerbach, *Briefwechsel*, p. 80.

³⁹ Thus, Bockmühl, *Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaft*, p. 135 ff..

⁴⁰ *Zur Kritik der »positiven Philosophie«* = *Werke* II, pp. 194, 195.

⁴¹ *MEW*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), pp. 110, 126. Cf. Breuer, *Der junge Marx*, p. 75ff., as well as Bockmühl, *Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaft*, p. 120ff..

⁴² *Die Posaune*, pp. 151, 182.

⁴³ Bockmühl, *Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaft*, p. 132ff.; Rosen, Bauer and Marx, pp. 134ff., 148.

⁴⁴ *Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (1830) = *Werke* I, p. 230ff.; cf. Breuer, *Der junge Marx*, esp. p. 67ff.. The role of the concept of the human race in the young-Hegelian critique of religion is graphically (vividly) seen/shown in the argument through which (whereby) [[D.]] Strauss rejects Jesus' divinity (godhead), as well as the general bindedness (binding nature) of his religion. Jesus's person, he writes, is “one-sided” and that is why it does not deliver, make (up) or constitute the template (model, specimen, pattern) for every human activity; because only the entire history of mankind encompasses the human [[element, dimension]] (what is human) in its generality; see *Leben Jesu* (*Schlußbetrachtung* (= Concluding consideration)), p. 379.

⁴⁵ Cf. Kadenbach, *Religionsverständnis*, p. 64 ff..

⁴⁶ Oiserman's assertion that Marx would (have) reject(ed) the Epicurean founding (establishment) of freedom by means of the nullification (annulment) of nature's necessity, as well as the subjugation (subjection) of physics to (under) morals (morality) (*Die Entstehung*, p. 62 ff.), is simply plucked from the air (i.e. is made up and is a pure invention). Precisely the opposite is the case.

⁴⁷ According to a good observation (comment, remark) by Mehring, *Marx*, p. 52ff..

⁴⁸ Krüger, *Über die Doktor-Dissertation*, p. 109.

⁴⁹ Cf. Mehring, *Marx*, p. 54; Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, p. 74.

⁵⁰ What this point concerns is that in fact Marx is characterised quasi as a pioneer in research by an as good a knower of the (subject) matter as Bailey; see Bailey's item (note, notation, memo(randum), notice) mentioned in the index of the cited writings.

⁵¹ Sannwald, Marx und die Antike, p. 106 ff..

II

⁵² [[= Endnote 1 of Part II in the German, but I (the translator) cannot get Microsoft Word to make "52" = "1", so it becomes "52", and 2 = 53, 3 = 54, etc..]] The distinction often made in this study between Marx's early and mature perception (view) of antiquity does not have to do with the dividing line drawn by many commentators between the initial and later orientation of his (Marx's) interests and settings of the question (question formulation, problem examination). Those, who draw this dividing line, contrast the "Manuscripts" of 1844 to "Capital", whereas from the point of view of our distinction, the far less problematic shift in standpoint from the thoughts world of the dissertation to Marx's entire later work, including the "Manuscripts" and "Capital", appears decisive and crucial. It is obvious why in a study on Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) relation(ship) with (towards) Greek antiquity, his first writing (work) must occupy a much broader (wider) area (space) than that which it might claim in a general account (representation, portrayal) of his intellectual(-spiritual) development.

⁵³ Regarding Marx's gymnasial (High School) studies see Sannwald, Marx und die Antike, p. 32ff..

⁵⁴ Letter to (Marx's) father of 10. 11. 1837 = MEW, supplementary volume, 1st part, p. 8.

⁵⁵ See the first study in this volume.

⁵⁶ In an early satirical poem Marx expressed himself, at any rate, against those who strove for a (re)conciliation of Schiller with Christianity, see MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 610.

⁵⁷ Letter to Marx's father of 10. 11. 1837, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3).

⁵⁸ MEW, loc. cit., p. 283. Also in Marx's excerpts from the year 1842, the distinction as regards essence (the essential distinction) between Greek and Christian art, in which "ugliness, nastiness and fear, abundance (plenty, affluence) and magnificence (grandeur, splendor)" predominated, was strongly stressed [[translator's note: whereas I and Kostas Papaioannou et al. see also the Elements of Continuity in the Art and Culture/Life World in general from the Ancient Greek and Roman (Pagan) worlds into the (Eastern) Roman and Hellenic (Christian) world]]; see MEGA, I, 1b, p. 117, and cf. Sannwald, Marx und die Antike, p. 164 ff., as well as Lifschitz, The Philosophy of Art, p. 35ff.. Marx here continues/resumes a debate which had begun with Heine's polemic(s) against the Nazarenes in painting [[translator's note: "the epithet Nazarene was adopted by a group of early 19th century German Romantic painters who aimed to revive honesty and spirituality in Christian art" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazarene_movement)]]; Feuerbach and Bauer adopted a position in favour of Heine; the latter (Heine) in fact (even) opined (believed, thought) that Hegel's praise for Romantic art was not to be taken seriously (in earnest), since the true sympathies of the master (i.e. Hegel) had been applied to ancient classicism. For the debate in general, see Rose, Marx's lost Aesthetic.

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., p. 263.

⁶⁰ Preparatory/preliminary notebook to (of) the dissertation, loc. cit., p. 78.

⁶¹ Loc. cit., p. 154.

⁶² See the articles contained in the volume: Karl Marx. Homme, penseur et révolutionnaire by/of P. Lafargue, Karl Marx (Souvenirs personnels), and D. Riazanov, La »confession« de Karl Marx.

⁶³ MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 219.

⁶⁴ Loc. cit., p. 306ff., and already in the preparatory/preliminary notebook, p. 104ff..

⁶⁵ Die deutsche Ideologie, MEW, 3, p. 130ff..

⁶⁶ Loc. cit., p. 133 ff..

⁶⁷ MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 68ff..

⁶⁸ Loc. cit., p. 270ff..

⁶⁹ Loc. cit., p. 305; cf. Die deutsche Ideologie, loc. cit. ((foot)note 14), p. 132 ff..

⁷⁰ MEW, loc. cit. ((foot)note 3), p. 283 ff..

⁷¹ Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, MEW, loc. cit., p. 569.

⁷² Die deutsche Ideologie, loc. cit., ((foot)note 14), p. 129.

⁷³ Grundrisse, p. 375 ff..

⁷⁴ Das Kapital, I = MEW, 23, p. 387, (foot)note 79.

⁷⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 93, 342, as well as Grundrisse, p. 741; cf. Das Kapital, III, MEW, 25, p. 612.

⁷⁶ Das Kapital, I, loc. cit. ((foot)note 23), p. 430. Apparently (Seemingly), the admiration of the mature Marx for Aristotle is considerably (substantially) warmer than the author [[i.e. the younger Marx]] of the dissertation. Already in 1845/6, Stirner is reproached (accused) that he fails to appreciate (misjudges) Aristotle's significance for the development of ancient Greek philosophy, see Die deutsche Ideologie, loc. cit. ((foot)note 14), pp. 130,

134 ff.. The mature Marx of course hardly (barely) shows himself to be ready (prepared) to defend the philosophical authenticity of Platonism, as (like) he does this in 1840. On the contrary, in Capital, I, loc. cit., p. 388, (foot)note, a somewhat ironic intimation (allusion, insinuation) is found, in relation to which (or: which thereupon) [[it]] can be concluded (inferred), that Platonism could justify an inhuman disciplining of the labour force.

⁷⁷ Capital, I, loc. cit., pp. 386-88.

⁷⁸ Grundrisse, p. 928ff..

⁷⁹ Das Kapital, I, loc. cit. ((foot)note 23), p. 167, (foot)note 6.

⁸⁰ Loc. cit., p. 100, (foot)note 39.

⁸¹ Loc. cit., p. 179.

⁸² Loc. cit., p. 74.

⁸³ See the first pages of »Der 18. Brumaire von Louis-Bonaparte«; cf. the (i.e. Marx's) letter to Lassalle of 22. 7. 1861 = MEW, 30, p. 615.

⁸⁴ Das Kapital, I, loc. cit., ((foot)note 23), p. 249.

⁸⁵ Grundrisse, p. 30ff..

⁸⁶ Cf. Hess, Is there a Theory of Art in Marx?, p. 311: "Marx failed to see that what he calls 'charm' is really prestige, and that the prestige of Greek antiquity . . . had been deliberately maintained . . . he did not see that it was not the same thing which had survived, it had lost its content."

⁸⁷ Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, SW, XI, p. 295 ff..

⁸⁸ In detail in relation to that Kondylis, Die Entstehung.

⁸⁹ Hyperion-Fragment, SW, III, 1, p. 180.

⁹⁰ Cf. Müller's comments (observations, remarks), Hegel und Marx, esp. pp. 22, 30ff..

Panagiotis Kondylis

Marx and Ancient Greece

[[ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE GREEK TEXT (Study One of the German-language book is not included in the Greek-language booklet at all and includes far greater detail about Hegel, The Young Hegelians, Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Fichte, Stirner, Marx himself, et al., etc., and, Study Two of the German Text is largely the same as the whole of the Greek text – though there are some differences which are not (entirely or at all) insignificant, and hence I have translated both the German-language and Greek-language book(let)s separately.)**]]**

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1. The interpretive position

Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) relationship with ancient Greece can be incorporated in a tripartite schema, which would include one side (aspect) oriented philosophically-aesthetically, and almost without reservation affirmative, another side (aspect) oriented historically-sociologically, where the ancient-Greek phenomenon is seen critically and is relativised, and finally, a third side (aspect), where affirmative and critical-relativistic consideration are reconciled within the framework of a certain philosophy of history. These three sides (aspects) co-exist, and indeed in conscious equilibrium, inside the mature thought of Marx, that is to say, of Marx especially as author of *Grundrisse* and *Capital*; nonetheless, the said sides (aspects) are not formed simultaneously, but successively, and their formation interrelates with the general movement of Marx's thought from its philosophical and aesthetic neo-Hegelian beginnings, towards that grandiose conception of the historical life of humans, which undoubtedly makes Marx one of the great founders of the contemporary social sciences. In other words: still before Marx became... a Marxist, he already had shaped (moulded or formed) a certain, definitely affirmative perception of the ancient-Greek phenomenon, which, moreover, in his eyes symbolises the realisation, or in any case, is connected with the pursuance, of specific (concrete) ethical and aesthetic values. Later, when he had more or less concluded and settled on his personal way of looking at social phenomena, Marx sees ancient Greece and its intellectual(-spiritual) representatives inside their historical dependencies and inside their historical limits (boundaries);

parallelly, nevertheless, driven apparently by his initial, still living –and always– sympathies for the classical ideal, Marx poses to himself the question as to how the at least partial hyper-historicity(/historicalness) or rather inter-historicity(/historicalness) of this ideal is reconciled with the ascertained fact of the historical dependencies of the ancient-Greek phenomenon; the answer is given from a philosophical-historical (i.e. pertaining to the history of ideas) and intensely Hegelian perspective, where the third side (aspect) emerges, the synthetic side (aspect) of Marx’s intellectual(-spiritual) relationship towards ancient Greece. This tripartite schema, in which at the same time the interpretive position which I shall support is summarised (synopsised), shows that a re-composition (reformulation, reconstitution) of Marx’s views is possible which is simultaneously genetic-evolutionary and logical-systematic.¹

¹ The distinction which is frequently made in this text between Marx’s early (premature, germinal) and mature view or perception of Greek antiquity has no relation with the caesura (break, rupture, cut(ting), incision), which a portion of the studiers/researchers of Marx make (undertake) between Marx’s early and his late general orientation of his interests and examination of the problem [[at hand]] (problematisation). All those who make this caesura/break contrast (contradistinguish) the *Manuscripts of 1844* to *Capital*, whereas from the point of view of our own distinction, of significance is only the essential (substantial, substantive) – and accepted by all studiers/researchers – difference in viewpoint between Marx’s doctoral dissertation, and, all of his later (posterior) work, including the *Manuscripts of 1844* and the *German Ideology* (1845/6). It is obvious why in a work relating to Marx’s intellectual(-spiritual) relationship towards ancient Greece, his juvenile (immature) work necessarily will have to occupy in the spectrum of research a(n) area (expanse, extent, scope) much greater than whatever in a survey of his general intellectual(-spiritual) evolution, with the possible result being the creation of an optical illusion. We shall see, nonetheless, that already in the text of the dissertation, motifs exist like e.g. the Promethean element, which integrally retain (wholly retain) their significance also in Marx’s later (posterior) thought.

2. The two aspects of the classical ideal in Marx's early work

Like most offspring (progeny, scions) of bourgeois families of his epoch, so too Marx came for the first time into contact with ancient Greek culture (civilisation) and its linguistic monuments in the classical gymnasium (high/secondary school, lyceum) of his birthplace (native town/region).² This contact is not known to us as to its emotional and intellectual details, however we know one of its very positive and permanent results: it provides Marx with an exceptional knowledge both of ancient Greek as well as of the Latin language, which allows him, even from the beginning of his university student years (days), to undertake serious philosophical, philological and legal studies by referring to, and going back over, classical texts without the slightest linguistic difficulty. This intense engaging (engagement) with ancient texts in those years makes plausible the conclusion that the – in all probability – hard and at least in part dry grammatical education of the gymnasium (high/secondary school, lyceum) did not at all cool or dampen the young Marx's early enthusiasm for the classical world; in (during) the whole of his life, besides, Marx never belonged to those otiose (lazy, indolent, idle) [[(types of) people]], who consider – by definition and from the very outset – being occupied (occupation) with the letter (with letters) as the opposition or antithesis to being occupied with the spirit(-intellect) – on the contrary: the possession of the letter, i.e.

² For Marx's gymnasium (high/secondary school, lyceum) studies see R. Sannwald, *Marx und die Antike*, Zürich 1957, p. 32 ff..

letters, forever remains – for that unbelievably learned (erudite, scholarly, well-read) human (person) (i.e. Marx), a self-evident presupposition and prerequisite/precondition of a substantial (substantive, essential) and not simply rhetorical contact with the spirit(-intellect). Thus, we see him already from the first semester of his university studentship (attendance) in Berlin, in the summer of 1837 – and whilst officially he is studying law – to be spending (wasting) his time (with great effort), next to many other things, in the translation of texts like the *Germania* of Tacitus, the *Tristia* of Ovid and the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle.³ After some time, that is, from the beginning of 1839, and for two consecutive years, he will go about (get involved in, fling himself into, devote himself to) the collection of the material for his dissertation, which as is known, had as its subject (theme, topic) the *Difference of/between Democritean and Epicurean natural philosophy*; from Greek letters (literature) he will use mainly Aristotle and Aristotle's commentators, Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus, Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus and Stobaeus.⁴

Nonetheless, Marx's dissertation is not in the least equated with the sum (aggregate) of its philological sources. Its intention is philosophical, that is, it wants to constitute a contribution to the theoretical investigations (searches, research) of the Young Hegelians, to whom Marx belongs in that epoch.⁵ The intense, now, presence of the classical ideal in the early work is combative (fighting) and militant; it serves, that is, his radical philosophical aims too. The classical ideal represents here life in its sensorial (sensory, material) vigour (forcefulness), its pulsating dynamism and its impulsive state of willing/wanting, i.e. volition – at the same time, however, also in the harmony

³ Epistle to father from 10 November 1837. See the Greek translation of the text in the volume: K. Marx, *Διαφορὰ τῆς δημοκρίτειας καὶ ἐπικούρειας φυσικῆς φιλοσοφίας* (= *Difference of Democritean and Epicurean natural philosophy*), εισαγωγή - μετάφραση - ὑπομνηματισμός Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης, ἐκδ. Γνώση, Ἀθήνα 1983, σ. 261 καὶ 263.

⁴ See loc. cit. the table of referred/referenced works, pp. 288-90.

⁵ For how Marx's relations appear as regards the young-Hegelian movement from within the text of Marx's dissertation, see my introduction to the Greek edition, loc. cit., esp. p. 14 ff..

of its elements, in the grace of its syncretism (conflation, mixing, coalescence) of its opposites, and in the serene (tranquil, placid) certainty, which existential fulness (plenitude, repleteness, completeness) grants (gives away, donates). All of those things, again, acquire their precise philosophical and polemical meaning since they turn against Christian other-worldliness, that is, the theological subjugation of the earthly From Here (i.e. This World or Life) to a hyper-celestial(/heavenly/empyrean/ethereal) (supernal) From There (i.e. That World or Life). As Marx is convinced, this subjugation or subordination signifies the negation and shrinkage of life, and moreover the perversion and corruption of man, since he asks for and seeks in the other life, pusillanimous consolations for equally pusillanimous fears or pusillanimous remuneration(s) (payments) for good deeds/acts, which already the expectation of (a) remuneration (payment) prohibits them from being in truth good, that is, unselfish (selfless). By trampling therefore on life in regard to its tangible, sensorial dimension, religion tramples at the same time on the ethical or rational essence (substance) of man too. In its opposition towards religion, the classical ideal signifies in this epoch (period) in Marx's thought whatever precisely the pre-eminent antagonist (polemicist, disputant) of religion, verily, philosophy in general means: it signifies, that is, the full affirmation of earthly life as well as the ethos which is inspired by Reason (Logos), the life stance of the free and autonomous individual.

It is known that from the epoch of the Renaissance and thereafter, the classical ideal was frequently used with the goal (purpose) of openly striking at the ascetic Christian perception of the world (world view), or of that perception of the world being tacitly undermined – even though more recent (newer) research has shown that the Renaissance in its totality was much less paganistic than what was believed in days gone by, and that the 19th century myth regarding the – of essence – paganistic Renaissance, constitutes itself a phase in the struggle

for the imposition of the classical ideal. Particularly in Germany, where for specific (concrete) historical reasons the movement of the Enlightenment was on average less radical than that in France e.g., the impressive philosophical and aesthetical processing and elaboration of the classical ideal on the part of thinkers such as Winckelmann or Schiller, undertook to make up for the gap (vacuum, void) which the deficient radicalness of the Enlightenment left, and to give the educated (learned) sectors of the bourgeoisie points of ideological orientation in accordance with their initial friction(s) and later clashes with the still dominant Christian-feudal ideology; this historical oddity (quirk(iness), peculiarity) constituted the most significant perhaps reason for the entirely separate flourishing of classical studies in Germany. There is no doubt that when the young Marx defends the classical ideal, to a great extent he adopts and continues the not still then long tradition of bourgeois *paideia* (education, learning) in his country, in the way he became acquainted with it in school, but also in his wider family/familial environment. We do not know when and how much he read Schiller,⁶ however he is already studying Winckelmann in 1837 in Berlin,⁷ and this study is echoed in the text of his dissertation, (there) where he talks about the plastic Gods of Greek art, whose major characteristic is the peacefulness (serenity, placidity, calmness) of theory.⁸ It must, at any rate, be noted that from the perspective of the philosophical radicalism of the young Marx, the classical ideal acquires (obtains) a hue (tinge, tint, tone, complexion) and concept different from that which it had within the framework of bourgeois *paideia*; it distances itself, that is, from bourgeois moderation, which used the classical idea of measure in order to cover over/up ideologically a philosophical, political and social conciliatoriness or vacillation, and it is changed or transformed itself into the militant paganistic worship of this world (worldly

⁶ In one of his satirical poems, the young Marx opposes those who would want to reconcile Schiller with Christianity, see *Marx – Engels – Werke*, supplement(ary volume), 1st part, Berlin 1968, p. 610.

⁷ Loc. cit. ((foot)note 2), p. 261.

⁸ Loc. cit., pp. 92 and 271 (foot)note 28.

worship), into the unconditional affirmation of human existence in all its sensorial (material) dimension and texture. This interpretation of the classical ideal makes understandable the enthusiasm with which Marx embraces, in that approximate epoch, Feuerbach's anthropology, with all the emphasis which this gives to the corporeality and the tangible materiality of the being, "(hu)man".

The radicality of the classical ideal of the young Marx does not rest only on the this-world-worshipping and paganistic element, but equally on the Promethean and Titanic element. Man, who from all sides, i.e. totally and holistically, affirms worldly (mundane) life (the life of this world), who gets drunk from (on, because of) his existential fullness (repleteness), and who yearns to wholly make his own luck and take all matters into its own hands, it is not possible for him to not but come into direct conflict (clash directly) with the gods and God, as the force/power by definition which is an opponent of full human autonomy. Philosophy, as Marx perceives it during that epoch (era, in those times), constitutes precisely the programmatic opposite of every religion, and for that reason, as we read in the prologue of the (his, i.e. Marx's) dissertation, Marx embraces and espouses Prometheus's confession of faith: *ἀπλῶ λόγῳ τοὺς πάντας ἐχθαίρω θεούς* (= *in simple words, I am hostile to and hate all the gods* [C.F.'s translation] – or – *In one word, I hate all the gods* [translation by Herbert Weir Smyth, Ph. D.] [[v. 975 of *Prometheus Bound* by Aeschylus]]); Prometheus, then, Marx continues, is the most exceptional saint and martyr of the philosophical calendar.⁹ The Promethean and Titanic element in this sense belongs thus from the very beginning to the organic component elements/parts and to the consignment or stock of the Greek classical ideal. The ancient Greek philosopher, Marx believes, is a cosmos/world-moulder/maker (*δημιουργός* (= *creator*)),¹⁰ whereas whoever desires *to build with his own means the whole world and to be the cosmos/world-moulder/maker..., has*

⁹ Loc. cit., p. 61.

¹⁰ Notebooks regarding Epicurean, Stoic and sceptical philosophy, loc. cit., p. 201.

*drawn and attracted the anathema (curse, damnation) of the spirit..., he has, that is, been driven away from the temple and the eternal pleasure and enjoyment (delight) of the spirit.*¹¹ Irrespective, now, of his later change of views as to philosophy generally and to ancient-Greek philosophy more specifically, Marx will remain for all of his life faithful to that Promethean command; as we know, Aeschylus was always, together with Goethe and Shakespeare, his beloved poet, whom once a year he was in the habit of (accustomed to) reading in the original.¹² Nonetheless, here it is not so much a matter of philological preferences as a positioning vis-à-vis a capital (i.e. cardinal or major) problem of/in the philosophy of history. Because Marx, also like the other left-wing Young Hegelians around 1840, meta-interprets Hegel's teaching regarding human History as an unfolding space (room) (an area for unfolding) of God in the sense that one God who needs human History in order to unfold cannot be anyone other than Man, that is, from the human *genos*/genus/species/race (mankind) in the progressive succession of the generations and of his (Man's) achievements. If, therefore, the Universe is History, then the God and creator of this Universe is Man himself. In becoming conscious, in light of these ascertainments (findings), of the (his, Man's) true nature and position, Man knocks down and demolishes the old pseudo-gods and becomes God himself, yet whilst retaining the drive (urge, impulse) and the dynamism of the rebelling (insurrectionist) Titan. Even though in his later years, Marx became somewhat more prosaic, nonetheless, he did not cease to perceive and understand the relation of Man with History from the perspective of this general schema. That is why also the Promethean element and symbol held permanently for him its value and its significance.

¹¹ Loc. cit., p. 228.

¹² See P. Lafargue, «Karl Marx (Souvenirs personnels)», and D. Riazanov, «La “confession” de Karl Marx», in the volume: *Karl Marx. Homme, penseur et révolutionnaire. Recueil d'articles, discours et souvenirs collationnés* par D. Riazanov, Paris 1928, pp. 113, 175, 183/4.

The concern of the young Marx for the safeguarding of this radical version of the classical ideal in its unity is so intense, such that in 1840 he denies to recognise that an essential intellectual(-spiritual) relationship or kinship between Platonism and Christianity exists; simply, Plato taught philosophy with religious enthusiasm, Marx writes, holding, however, the autonomy of philosophical Reason (Logos) and its liberating/emancipating force (power, strength).¹³ The decline of philosophy in ancient Greece is located/posited or found to have taken place, later, and is marked precisely by the going back on (abrogation, setting aside) of the two sides (aspects) of the classical ideal, as we outlined it (in the passages) above. Thus, Plutarch and the Stoics abandon the strict distinction between philosophy and religion, and bring back (restore) philosophy, and indeed moral (ethical) philosophy, at the level of the fears and of the hopes of ignorant little old ladies; if Marx dedicates to Plutarch already in the appendix of his dissertation, a scathing (biting) critique with that spirit,¹⁴ to the Stoics, Marx –almost five years later, when in the *German Ideology* inter alia (between/amongst other things) he refutes Stirner's views regarding ancient philosophy– imputes (apportions, ascribes), moreover, [[i.e. to the Stoics]] that they constituted one of the spiritual(-intellectual) sources of neo-Platonism, and doubts that they created notable (distinguished, worthwhile) natural science, for which, as he observes, the renewal of the Heraclitean dynamic perception regarding nature does not suffice, but rather empirical observation is needed.¹⁵ In the same text, Marx allows us to understand on what the brushing aside (dismissing or discarding) of the classical ideal on the part of the Sceptics rests: on severance from the Promethean cosmos(/world)-moulding(/making) demand. Believing, therefore, that man can get to know only appearances and pretences, and not truths, the Sceptics in practice leave things as they are, being satisfied

¹³ Loc. cit. ((foot)note 2), pp. 242/3.

¹⁴ Loc. cit., p. 123 ff.. Already in the Notebooks, loc. cit., esp. p. 211 ff..

¹⁵ *Die Deutsche Ideologie* (1845/6) = *Marx – Engels – Werke*, v. 3, Berlin 1958, pp. 130/1.

(feeling adequate) to rename sensorial (material) reality as illusory (illusive, deceitful) imagination or fantasy.¹⁶ Even earlier, nonetheless, Marx had reproached the Sceptics also as regards the other mortal/deadly sin, that is to say, that by restricting to the minimum, or by annihilating, the circle of certain knowledge, they leave the field open for religion, since faith comes to fill the gap (void) in (of) knowledge.¹⁷

Let us note now, in returning to the text of the dissertation, at whose (epi)centre, as is known, the contradistinction (contrasting) between Democritus and Epicurus is found, that a significant reason which inspires in Marx disbelief and mistrust vis-à-vis Democritus, and favour (propitiousness) vis-à-vis Epicurus, rests on the fact that the former adopts an agnostic stance, whereas the latter accepts the possibility of certain knowledge, albeit if such knowledge can be only sensorial knowledge.¹⁸ The phenomenological positioning of Democritus closes therefore to Democritus the path (road) to an ontology worthy of the name, whereupon atomic theory becomes a simple scientific hypothesis for the explanation of physical/natural phenomena.¹⁹ However, Marx awaits (expects) something further from atomic theory, that is to say, that which he thinks Epicurean theory provides regarding the deviating movement/motion of atoms: the ontological founding of human freedom.²⁰ Epicurus's physics is preferred, thus, not so much for the scientific, as for its moral/ethical-philosophical advantages, since it safeguards (entrenches, fortifies, consolidates) human felicity by releasing the soul from every metaphysical fear, whereas parallelly, the fertile role which the phenomenological individualism of Democritus in the birth (genesis, coming into being) of the newer (modern) physics during the 17th century played, is overlooked. This constitutes the

¹⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 133/4.

¹⁷ Loc. cit., ((foot)note 2), pp. 195/196.

¹⁸ Loc. cit., p. 73 ff..

¹⁹ Loc. cit., p. 121; cf. *Deutsche Ideologie*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 15), pp. 132/3.

²⁰ Loc. cit. ((foot)note 2), p. 92 ff..

consequence of the fact that the young Marx formulates and puts forward his judgements and preferences from the perspective of the classical ideal, as this is enlisted and mobilised in the struggle against religion. On the other hand, nonetheless, the paradox must be pointed out that because Marx's juvenile work precisely follows this syllogistic reasoning, it reaches those two findings, which give them value as a contribution in (to) the history of philosophy: the first of these is the demonstration of the essential differences between Democritus and Epicurus, and indeed against the dominant view until then, whilst the second is the ascertainment that Epicurus's natural (physical) theories are dependent on his moral/ethical-philosophical views.

Excursus: the influence of the classical paideia (education) of Marx on his writing register (style or mode).

In this way the first side (aspect) of Marx's intellectual(-spiritual) relationship with ancient Greece is presented with every possible brevity. Before I move onto the examination of the second side (aspect), and together [[with that]] to the mature thought of this great German, I want to make a small digression on (to go on a small excursus regarding) the elements which Marx frequently draws from his classical paideia (education) in order to arrange (prepare, devise, equip) his written speech. The experienced reader of Marx knows that Marx at his best moments as a(n) author (writer) vainly feels a sense of gratification for ((coquettishly) takes pride in) a beautiful/nice register (style or mode) and is charmed (mesmerised, enraptured) himself by this, equally to the extent he knows how to charm (mesmerise, enrapture) others as well. This charmingly (mesmerisingly) meretricious (pretentious) Marxian register (style or mode) is nourished (fed) by two heterogeneous elements, that is to say, both by the scintillating pungency (sharpness, acuteness, acidity), the aggressive, attacking spike (edge, peak, tip, spearhead), and frequently (the) lethal (deadly, fatal) sarcasm, as much as by a multitude of philological remembrances (memories) and references, which are dragged up and invoked every so often, pleasantly (agreeably, congenially) surprising [[us]], by an unimaginably diverse consignment or stock of readings and of (kinds of) knowledge. As to its structure, now, this register (style or mode) rests or is based on classical

schemata, like e.g. the symmetrical development of sentences with antithetical content, the rhetorical question, the metaphor and the simile. With some examples taken [[chosen]] almost at random, I shall try to show how Marx's familiarisation with ancient-Greek philosophy, mythology and literature became the occasion (reason, trigger(ing event), motive) not only of cogitations (musings, thoughts), but of stylistic findings, similes, metaphors or lettered (scholarly) intimations (hints, insinuations). Thus, in order to say that the ancient economy was essentially agricultural (agrarian) and closed, and that the existence of trade did not overturn this basic datum (fact), Marx writes that *the ancient trading (mercantile, commercial) peoples [lived and moved] like the gods of Epicurus in the intervals (spaces) of (between) (the) worlds*, they did not have an effect, that is, determinatively (decisively), on economic life.²¹

Elsewhere again he talks about the – worn-down, suffering and scarred by the exhaustive, grueling work (labour) – workers (labourers), and says that *they are pushed and crowded forward around us with a drive (impulse) greater/more than the souls of the killed around Odysseus*:²² talk here is, of course, about Odysseus's journey to Hades, as it is described in rhapsody I (L) of the *Odyssey*. A similar allusive (suggestive) reference is contained in the phrase:

Contemporary society, which from its still childhood age pulls Pluto in order to bring him out of the bowels or depths of earth, salutes (hails) in gold the sparkling (shiny, radiant) embodiment of the biotic (living, vital) principle:²³

here Marx recalls/retraces that which Athenaeus writes, that is, that avarice and stinginess hopes that it can bring up from the bowels (depths) of earth even also

²¹ *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Rohentwurf 1857-1858), Berlin 1953, p. 741 = *Das Kapital*, I = Marx – Engels – Werke, v. 23, Berlin 1967, pp. 93 and 342. In the third volume of *Capital* (= Marx – Engels – Werke, v. 25, Berlin 1969), p. 612, the phrased is paralleled as follows: “the usurer lives in the sources of production like the gods of Epicurus in the intermediate intervals (spaces) between (of) (the) worlds”.

²² *Das Kapital*, I, loc cit. ((foot)note 21), p. 268.

²³ Loc. cit., pp. 146/7. Cf. *Δειπνοσοφ.* (= *Deipnosophistés* [= a literary work by Athenaeus, an expert in affairs of the kitchen, equivalent to Greek *deîpno(n)* meal + *sophistés* sophist (<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/deipnosophist>)], VI, 23: ἐλπίζουσης τῆς πλεονεξίας ἀνάξειν ἐκ τῶν μυχῶν τῆς γῆς αὐτὸν τὸν Πλούτωνα (= *hoping an advantage and gain in bringing up from the bowels of earth this Pluto*).

Pluto. And one more simile with the – beloved by Marx – Promethean symbol: *the law, which always keeps in equilibrium... the reserve industrial army with the extent and the dynamism of accumulation, ties/binds the worker to capital even more tightly than Hephaestus's hooks tie Prometheus to the rock/cliff.*²⁴ Finally, in connection with Marx's habit of adducing gnomic/aphoristic phrases (mottoes) of ancient authors (writers) in order to reinforce one of his views – which was also a general habit of the epoch when classical paideia (education) was flourishing– it suffices if we refer as an example the fact that the corrosive influence of money on human mores (morals and manners), he clarifies and explains with verses of Sophocles, with mentions of (references to) *Wealth* by Aristophanes, and with a phrase by Athenaeus, which indicates (implies) that a wealthy/rich man has no other family and fatherland than that which his wealth imposes: Ἔστιν δὲ ποδαπὸς τὸ γένος οὗτος; πλούσιος (= Of which country is this man born/descended? A wealthy country/Wealth).²⁵ And in order to remind [[us]] that some [[people]], next to everything else, fall in love with money also from an aesthetic point of view, as something beautiful in itself, Marx refers to Pindar: ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ (= gold like a fiery (burning, shining, hot) fire/flame).²⁶

²⁴ Loc. cit., p. 675.

²⁵ *Grundrisse*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), pp. 894/5. Cf. *Das Kapital*, I, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), pp. 146/7.

²⁶ *Grundrisse*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), p. 871 (foot)note.

3. The texture of ancient Greek society and thought in light of Marxian teachings about ideology and industrial society.

We now move onto the description of the position which ancient Greece possesses (occupies) in Marx's mature thought. A precondition/prerequisite in order to proceed to this description is for us to define which are those elements of Marx's mature thought, which play a decisive role in the new – essentially different to the initial – interpretation and evaluation (appraisal) of the ancient-Greek phenomenon. These elements are two: the Marxian teaching regarding ideology, and the Marxian appraisal (assessment) of the historical role of industry. We said previously that for the young-Hegelian Marx, the classical ideal fulfils functions analogous with/to the functions of philosophy generally, with which the said classical ideal is connected as to its content, and with which this classical ideal jointly fights against the no. 1 foe: religion, which, again, constitutes the intellectual(-spiritual) footing or basis, and intellectual(-spiritual) expression, of an irrational and ethically unacceptable social-political reality. For the young Marx, therefore, *philosophy* is one and only [[one philosophy]], it is the Rational and the Ethical in its cosmos/world-moulding/making and cosmos/world-corrective claim and function; it is not determined by the bad/evil reality, rather it stands uncompromisingly opposite such bad reality, and seeks to determine the said reality and transform it; consequently, theory is not the ideological aftereffect (corollary) of an incomplete and imperfect empirical reality, rather theory itself constitutes the autonomous embodiment of rational

reality. It is obvious that this idealistic way of looking at (consideration of) philosophy is not reconciled with Marx's fundamental perception regarding the priority (precedence) of social being vis-à-vis social consciousness. As a form of social consciousness, philosophy constitutes the aftereffect of a social being, and since this social being remains incomplete and imperfect –otherwise, society would not project (come up with) commands, nor would it seek the fulfilment of desires in the sphere of ideas– philosophy necessarily is also itself incomplete and imperfect, that is to say, it is made up of (constituted by) many forms often clashing with one another, every one of which expresses a certain subjective perspective, a certain “false consciousness”, which rationalises in various ways, specific/concrete pursuits and specific/concrete interests. If we see things in that way, then the old unbridgeable opposition between philosophy and religion is lost, since and the two (philosophy and religion) equally constitute ideological forms; Marx ends up in (comes to) this perception/view already in 1844,²⁷ whereas one–one-and-a-half year(s) later, Marx reproaches Stirner because Stirner deduces material history from ideational history, and presents the history of ancient philosophy in such a way that interest is concentrated not on the real, but the philosophical relationship of the ancients towards/with their world, whereupon the history of ancient philosophy substitutes (i.e. is a substitute for and replaces) ancient history in its totality.²⁸ Marx's priorities are here obvious and unmistakable (not open to accepting any divergent views). Philosophy – and philosophy's history – constitutes a part of a history much more encompassing, or, also, constitutes simply the ideational, that is to say, subjective and ideological side (aspect) of a real social process – that is why it (philosophy/philosophy's history) also cannot on its own give us the key to the comprehension of this latter (real social process). Philosophy, and

²⁷ «Ökonomisch – philosophische Manuskripte» (= “Economic – philosophical manuscripts”) = *Marx – Engels – Werke*, Ergänzungsband (= supplement(ary volume)), 1st Part, Berlin 1968, p. 569.

²⁸ *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 15), p. 129.

indeed ancient philosophy, is (are) relativised by being incorporated within a certain schema of the historical evolution of humanity. Thus, however, ancient philosophy and ancient thought, more generally, are comprehended and evaluated from a double point of view, that is, with the criteria of their own epoch/era, and with the criteria of that, or of the other subsequent(-in-time), and according to the evidence, higher, superior stage of historical evolution. Their appraisal, therefore, is the function of a way of looking at, and consideration of, the course of history. For that reason, also, (the) how the course of history is analysed in its totality, and (the) how such course of history in its totality is demarcated, has primary significance.

We thus come to the second of the elements which determine the mature Marx's stance vis-à-vis the ancient-Greek phenomenon, that is to say, his general way of looking at, and consideration of, the course of history, where the centre of gravity (i.e. importance and focus of attention) falls on the industrial revolution and on the appearance of industry in the historical foreground. Marx's work is exceptionally multilateral and can be comprehended –or not be comprehended!– with a starting point of one of its different sides (aspects) on each and every respective occasion. Here, it does not interest us which side (aspect) ensures the exclusively correct approach, if such an approach exists, rather only that – one way or another – Marx belongs to those who from the very beginning bring into their consciousness the significance of the industrial phenomenon at a world-historical level, and rethink or contemplate again world history and its driving (motive) forces in light of this phenomenon: this explains the interpretive primacy (paramountcy) which magnitudes like “productive forces” or, if we translate the same thing into anthropological categories, “the struggle of man with nature”, possess in Marx's historical way of looking at things (consideration). With the appearance of industry, the development/ evolution of productive forces, or the struggle of man with nature, enters into a

radically new stage, and this fact cannot but have serious theoretical consequences for the comprehension of history focused on precisely these magnitudes. The question is concretely/specifically posed as follows: how must history be periodised, when its course knows such a radical turning point (bend, critical juncture)? I cannot here go (enter/slip) into the problem of the Marxian periodisation of history, which presents many more aspects, difficulties and contradictions than all those which – the perceptions which predominate in relation to that – permit us to imagine. The comprehension of the relations of the mature Marx with ancient-Greek society and thought imposes, nonetheless, that we point out the following: from the point of view of capitalistic – that is, the first industrial – society, all the previous (anterior, earlier) social formations can be reduced to one and only social formation, which varies of course according to loci/place(s) and according to times/era(s), however, it maintains everywhere the same decisive feature: it rests and is based on the agricultural/agrarian economy and property. This way of looking at things has two adjuncts: *and* it demonstrates in all its radicality (radicalness) the turn, which industry gave to the totality of previous history, *and* it allows pre-capitalistic social formations – which on an initial view appeared to be completely irrelevant as between one another – to approach (and come closer to) one another within the framework of a wider/broader structural classification. Thus, ancient Greek and Roman society for Marx belong to the same broad historical category, as the Asiatic or the proto-Germanic agrarian/agricultural community, *if* of course, their distance from industrial society's features is taken to be the criterion [[of measurement and judgement]].²⁹ This nexus (pertinence, relevance) is not negated (refuted, negated) by the fact that the Greco-Roman type of pre-industrial society develops the polis (city, large town), the city, to a degree unknown to the two other types which we previously referred to (i.e. the Asiatic

²⁹ *Grundrisse*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), p. 375 ff..

and proto-Germanic agrarian community): because also this city (polis), Marx says, of its essence was the centre for the distribution of small and large owners of land, whose lots (allotments) were found outside of the city itself; and he invokes the fact that still in the epoch of the fall of the Thirty Tyrants, less than 5.000 Athenians without land ownership (ownership of land) existed. Ancient Greek society remains, therefore, agricultural, and its ideal, both in the area of theory, as well as in the sector of production, is self-sufficiency (autarky), which runs counter and goes against the division of labour in the contemporary/modern sense.³⁰ Trade (commerce), as much as it flourished (bloomed), did not overturn this basic reality; previously, incidentally, we referred to Marx's simile, according to which trade did not exercise on the ancient economy an effect greater than (whatever) Epicurus's gods (exercised) on the world.

That (These things) had to be said, because it would truly be incongruous if in talking about the relation(ship) of a sociologist and historian par excellence, like Marx, with ancient Greece, we left out explaining (an explanation of) the manner (way) with which he perceived the general character of ancient-Greek *society*. However, the above is indispensable also for the comprehension of the mature Marx's relation(ship) towards/with ancient-Greek *thought*. Because precisely the combination of the two theses above –that is to say, that philosophy is an ideological form amongst other ideological forms *and* that industrial society is something radically new in relation to all other previous societies without exception– is, therefore, Marx's mature positioning vis-à-vis ancient Greek thought. Verily: ancient Greek thought is the ideological aftereffect (upshot, result) of a pre-industrial society; that is why it is subjected to the historical restrictions (limitations) of the latter. From this point of view, Marx discusses the economic-social perceptions of the ancient Greek philosophers, and particularly Aristotle, for whom – in other respects – Marx

³⁰ *Das Kapital*, I, loc. cit. ((foot-)note 21), p. 387 note 79.

expresses himself most warmly, calling Aristotle the “greatest thinker (cogitator) of antiquity”.³¹ Marx reminds us that cognitive branches, like political economy in its systematic and processed (elaborated, carved/worked out) form, appear only just in the New Times, and indeed in the period (at the time) of manufacture/manufacturing, that is, of a relatively large scale of organised handicraft (handiwork, arts and crafts); but also, as many statements as the ancients make on matters of economic theory –and they make many (such statements), often indeed significant (ones)– as well as the social models, which they outline (sketch) in these social models’ nexus with such statements of theirs, they express the reality of the closed agrarian/agricultural economy, whose paramount (supreme, uppermost) goal and purpose is autarky (self-sufficiency). This appears first and foremost in the addressing and treatment of the problem of the division of labour. Whereas the newer (more modern) political economy sees the division of labour from the perspective of the commercial(-mercantile-trade)-industrial process, as the means for the derivation (drawing, getting) of a greater quantity of goods, that is to say, of a greater exchange value and a larger/greater accumulation, the classical authors insist not on the quantity, but on the specific/concrete quality of the product, which allows it to constitute a direct and tangible use value. Regarding Plato, e.g., Marx observes that the division of labour is carried out not to achieve accumulation or for the purposes/goals of economic extension and expansion within the dynamic framework of a commercial (mercantile, trade) economy, but, on the one hand, because from the inside (within the bosom/womb) of a community – looked at and considered as an independent, autonomous whole –

³¹ Loc. cit., p. 430. It seems that the mature Marx’s admiration for Aristotle is perceptibly greater than that of the author of the dissertation. Already in 1845/46, Stirner is criticised/censured because he mistakes (misunderstands, misconstrues) Aristotle’s significance in the evolution of ancient Greek philosophy. See *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 15), pp. 130, 134/5. Naturally, the mature Marx does not at all show himself anymore to be disposed to defending the philosophical genuineness (authenticity) of Platonism, as he did in 1840. On the contrary, in the first volume of *Capital*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), p. 388 (foot)note, an ironic clue (hint, indication, implication, insinuation) exists, which probably lets it be understood that from Platonism, for good or ill, arguments could be derived (drawn) for (in favour of) the inhuman(e) disciplining of workers (labourers).

multiple needs exist, and on the other hand, because every worker is unilaterally endowed; he has at his disposal, therefore, only certain (pieces of) knowledge and skills (aptitudes), which must be supplemented with (pieces of) knowledge and the skills of others. Plato's social ideal is correspondingly static: *Plato's Republic... constitutes simply the Athenian idealisation of Egyptian organisation in castes; as to the organisation of labour/work, incidentally, Egypt was the model for his (Plato's) other contemporaries, e.g. Isocrates.*³²

From the narrow point of view of the closed economy, the classical authors judge (adjudicate) also the economic function(ing) of money, whilst not being able to be reconciled with the idea that money becomes something over and above the simple means of the exchange of goods, with the goal (purpose) of acquiring the necessary use values – money becomes, therefore, an autonomous, independent power/force, which is automatically reborn and self-increases, i.e. it increases itself by means of itself, it becomes, in a word, capital. The ancients see this phenomenon, of which, incidentally, they were only aware of the elementary forms, as the abuse/misuse of money; money's conversion from an organ to being dominant (ruling, a ruler), and at the same time as the humiliation and debasement of true wealth, which from the point of view of the closed economy cannot but be comprised or consist of natural goods and (or) use values. *And* Plato wants to restrict (confine, limit) money to the role of the simple assisting (helping, facilitating) means in respect of the exchange of products, *and* Aristotle considers as natural and rational the simple circulation of goods (C/G (commodity/good) – M (money) – C/G), where money is a simple means, whilst condemning the circulation of money as capital (M – C/G – M), and the autonomisation (i.e. making autonomous) of exchange values as such.³³ Marx cites (quotes) in extenso the passage from *Politics*, where Aristotle distinguishes between (the) Economic and (the) Monetary/Financial/

³² *Das Kapital*, I, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), pp. 386-88.

³³ *Grundrisse*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), pp. 928/9.

Pecuniary,³⁴ which equate with the two forms of circulation above. If the Monetary/etc. is criticised here with acridity and severity, the reason is that it has as its aim the unlimited (unrestricted) widening (expansion) of wealth, that is, a ceaseless extension of human activity irreconcilable with the economic and the ethical/moral principle of autarky (self-sufficiency); and if the Economic is praised and extolled, the reason is that, as Aristotle elucidates, true wealth rests on use values – in other words, such true wealth becomes perceived on the basis of the closed economy's criteria. The intensity of Aristotle's conscious opposition to the open commercial/trade/mercantile economy becomes more apparent (obvious) from the fact that he knows, as Marx himself notes elsewhere,³⁵ of the double (dual) value of every commodity/good, that is, use value and exchange value. As we have already observed, the Aristotelian condemnation of the Monetary/etc. is tantamount to the denial of every autonomisation, i.e. becoming autonomous, of exchange value as such. Equally however, also the condemnation of usury, – which according to Aristotle, as Marx³⁶ notes also again, is not but the Monetary/Financial/Pecuniary applied to the circulation of money and only [[that (circulation of money)]] –, interrelates (is connected) with the Aristotelian ethical(moral)-economic condemnation of the Monetary/etc.. As is known, the condemnation of usury lasts with the same intensity in the whole of the medieval political-theological philology/literature, and this shows how correctly Marx stresses the economic and ideological continuity of pre-capitalistic social formations.

Finally, persistence (obsession) with the realities of the closed economy and with qualitative consideration, [[persistence]] with that reality, therefore, which gives primacy (first place) to tangible and – qualitatively different between them – use values, without [[going]] up to the general element being cancelled –

³⁴ *Das Kapital*, I, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), p. 167 (foot)note 6.

³⁵ Loc. cit., p. 100 (foot)note 39.

³⁶ Loc. cit., p. 179.

which constitutes every value –, irrespective of its (every value's) qualitative manifestation (appearance), and which consequently can only abstractly be comprehended – this persistence (obsession), therefore, obstructs, according to Marx, Aristotle from comprehending the law of value, that is to say, human labour (work) as such, in its general and abstract hypostasis (existence), as the ultimate measure in respect of the determination of the value of every product produced. This abstract labour (work) does not come to the surface and show up (manifest itself, appear) (is not revealed) of course in itself, but rather through its opposite, through therefore, on each and every respective occasion, the specific/concrete labour which is expended for the production of a good; and also, even though it (this abstract labour) has a social texture, since precisely the quantity of the abstract labour which is hidden in a commodity gives it value, and thus makes possible its exchange with another commodity and the entering into (of) social relations of labour; nonetheless, it (the said abstract labour) is realised through (a) personal and private labour (or: through labour [[which is]] personal and private). Behind, therefore, every quantitatively specific and personal labour, stands abstract and general labour, labour in itself. This constitutes the magnitude, which in the final analysis, permits the reduction of qualitatively dissimilar things to a common denominator, so that their value is calculated and their exchange becomes possible. Aristotle, now, understands that this reduction to a certain third element is necessary in order for an exchange equivalence to be defined, however, he cannot say which this element is, and even less does it cross his mind that it can be labour in itself, in its abstract hypostasis (existence) and comprehension. This is (or: See here) how Marx gives the causes of/reasons for (justifies, accounts for) this weakness of Aristotle: *...Greek society was based on slavery and consequently had for (as) its natural basis, the inequality of humans and their labour potential (force, strength, power, potency). The secret of the expression of value, the equality and the equivalent [[dimension, element]] of all labours, because and since*

*these constitute human labour in general, can be decoded and deciphered only then, where the concept (meaning) of human equality will be equally established as much as a popular superstition (prejudice). However, this is only possible in a society where the form of the commodity became the general form of the product of labour, where consequently the relation of people considered as possessors of commodities became the dominant social relation.*³⁷ As we see, Marx here contrasts the model of economic-political liberalism – which in its mature form was outlined or sketched out by Locke, Mandeville and classical political economy, and which constitutes, in terms of theory, society with the starting point(,) [[being]] the (re)presentation of a market where the distinct, separate individuals appear as in principle equals and equivalent individual producers in order to exchange their products –, with the model of ancient society, where the, also from the very beginning, given inequality of people goes hand in hand with the closed economy, and consequently with the primacy (paramountcy) of use values vis-à-vis exchange values.

Precisely this intense sense of the opposition between the capitalistic-liberal and the ancient Greek model – an opposition which, incidentally, closely (narrowly) interrelates with the basic historical opposition between industrial and pre-industrial society – allows Marx to avoid a very widespread mistake, to deduce, that is to say, the democracy of the New Times from ancient democracy. Marx knows, of course, that the ideological invocation of idealised democratic models drawn from antiquity played a not negligible role in the social disputes (quarrels) of the newer epoch/times ((more) modern era), particularly in the Romance countries around (about) the epoch of the Revolution of 1789;³⁸ on the other hand, nonetheless, he (Marx) does not take the ideological positions at (their) face value, and dilates (enlarges, extends, expands) the comprehension of the historical past, precisely as a or b

³⁷ Loc. cit., p. 74.

³⁸ See the first pages of the work *Der 18. Brumaire von Louis-Bonaparte* (1852).

ideological positions impose it, from the specific, concrete structure of authority as dominance in a given society which no longer exists. The revival of antiquity and of ancient democratic models appears in this way as a gigantic masquerade, since indeed, as Marx writes very nicely (beautifully), history is repeated only as (a) comedy (farce). Such resurrections of antiquity took place in order to attach prestige and grandeur to whatever later was proven as a prosaic bourgeois perception and a specific, concrete form of dominance; that is why they died out (off) (disappeared, vanished) as soon as the latter (concrete form of dominance) found its own language, its own, autonomous historical style. Seeing both antiquity, as well as the newer (more modern) democratic antiquity-worship from this sober standpoint, Marx does not encounter any difficulty in incorporating or classifying the Athenaeon (i.e. of Athenaeus) καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν (= the beautiful(, noble) and good) – from the point of view of the exploitation of hyper-labour (over(-)work) – in the same category as the Etruscan priesthood (clergy), the civem romanum (=Roman citizen), the Norman baron or the American slave-owner of the 19th century.³⁹

³⁹ *Das Kapital*, I, loc. cit., ((foot)note 21), p. 249.

Excursus: the use of ancient authors as sources of social history.

Before I move onto the third and final part of this analysis, I desire to make also again a small digression, in order to focus [[the reader's]] attention on the way in which the historian and sociologist Marx uses the texts of the ancient writers, and indeed historians, as sources of social history. This use is varied/diverse and scattered, and an author can be used in multiple ways, or a problem (can be) illuminated with statements by different authors. In Diodorus Siculus e.g. Marx has recourse to various nexus(es) in order to explain how the ancients extracted (drew) gold from ore (minerals, metal), to what extent (point) the exploitation of the labour of slaves could reach, how the castes in Egypt were useful, or how the diet (sustenance) and reproduction of Egyptians confirms the principle that the biotic minimum constitutes a function of the natural environment.⁴⁰ There again where he speaks of the division of labour, Plato and Aristotle do not suffice, as we saw, but he cites/quotes the first oration (to the Demos) by Pericles from Thucydides, where it is said that the *αὐτουργοὶ* (= the self-working, i.e. (work)men (working for themselves)) use different means in war, that is, those who have at their disposal a closed economy with a rudimentary (substandard) division of labour; and different means, those who have at their disposal an economy more open, with a greater variety of professions and skills;

⁴⁰ Loc. cit., pp. 157 (foot)note 108, 250, 360 (foot)note 29, 535/6.

only the latter (i.e. those of the more open economy) can deploy a notable (significant) naval force, that is, men specialised (i.e. who are specialists) in that kind of undertaking (venture).⁴¹ A number of times, of course, recourse to ancient authors is not direct, rather the (interesting) excerpts (of interest) are taken second hand, from various, therefore, historical and philosophical works. Thus, e.g. Herodotus's and Hesiod's (pieces of) information in relation to the use of metals and metal coins or currency (currencies) in antiquity is/are referred to (attributed/ascribed [[to e.g. Herodotus and Hesiod]]) in accordance with the work of G. Garnier, *Histoire de la Monnaie*, Paris 1819, whilst from the two-volume book of W. Jacob, *An historical Inquiry into the Production and Consumption of the Precious Metals*, London 1831, all things that Homer and Hesiod say about the use of sheep and oxen (cattle) instead of money, are lifted (i.e. copied).⁴² In F. Lassalle's book, *Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln von Ephesos*, Berlin 1858, Marx still finds that famous (renowned) excerpt which says that fire becomes everything and everything becomes fire, the same as gold is transformed into all goods and all goods into gold; Marx uses that excerpt (there) where he talks about the two inter-supplementing metamorphoses inside of the exchange process, the metamorphosis of the commodity into money, and of money into a commodity.⁴³ In order to discourage the malicious and spiteful [[amongst you/any readers]], I add that Marx, in contrast to most of the older and youngest (latest, most recent) authors, mentions himself, his source, when he takes something second hand [[i.e. via a third party author]].

⁴¹ Loc. cit., p. 387 (foot)notes 79 and 80.

⁴² *Grundrisse*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), pp. 96/8 and 107 (cf. p. 679). Cf. *Das Kapital*, I, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), p. 76.

⁴³ Loc. cit., p. 120. In the edition of the pre-Socratics by Diels, Heraclitus's excerpt bears no. 90 (= *πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός*).

4. The problem of ancient Greek art and the concept of the viability and the sustainability of ancient civilisation (culture) from the point of view of the Hegelian and Marxian philosophy of history.

Until now, we have seen that Marx, the young philosopher, glorifies (praises, honours) the classical ideal, connecting it with his perception at that time regarding the texture and the function of philosophy as such, whereas, conversely, Marx the mature sociologist and historian relativises, and considers from a critical distance, ancient Greek thought, despite the admiration he feels for Aristotle, for instance. It is a matter of two positions *prima vista* opposite and or irreconcilable. Is it really thus? Does Marx definitively renounce (abnegate) his youthful love for classical antiquity? And if not, how are the two theses above reconciled? Marx gives the answer to this question in a small text written around 1857/8 amongst the other preparatory, preliminary works/drafts (sketches) of *Capital*.⁴⁴ It is a nice/beautiful sample of writing and thought, and hence I shall translate it all in order to comment on it thereafter:

⁴⁴ *Grundrisse*, loc. cit. ((foot)note 21), pp. 30/1.

In the area of art, it is known that certain epochs of artistic blossoming do not at all correspond with the general evolution (development) of society and consequently of its material base, which constitutes in some kind of way its (society's) skeleton. Take the Greeks as an example, if we compare them with [[our = Marx's]] contemporary epoch and or with Shakespeare. Indeed, it has been recognised that certain kinds of art, e.g. the epic, can never be produced with (in) their classical form, with which they created an epoch, as soon as their per se (ipso facto) production as artworks (works/pieces of art) begins; that is to say, that in the realm of art itself, certain of its significant constructs are possible only at an undeveloped tier (stage, level or grade) of artistic evolution (development). If this takes place inside the same area of art as to the relation(ship) of the various artistic kinds (sorts, types, genres) between themselves, the fact that the same happens as to the relation(ship) of the area of art in its totality with the general development (evolution) of society occasions/engenders a lesser (smaller) impression. The difficulty rests only on the general comprehension of these contradictions. Once we locate/pinpoint on what their peculiarity (oddity, mannerism) rests, we have already explained them.

Let us take as an example the relation(ship) of Greek art, and later-on the relation(ship) of Shakespeare, towards the present. It is known that Greek mythology did not exist only as the armoury (arsenal) of Greek art, but also as its soil or terrain (ground). However, is that way of looking at nature and at social relations possible, which supports Greek imagination or fantasy and consequently Greek [mythology] as well, when we have automotive (self-moving/propelling) machines, railways and electrical telegraphs? What does Hephaestus (Vulcan) become vis-à-vis Roberts & Co.,⁴⁵ Zeus (Jupiter) vis-à-vis

⁴⁵ Richard Roberts (1787 or 1789-1859 or 1864) was the inventor of various machines. In 1828 he founded (instituted) together with Thomas Sharp the tool and steam-engine factory Sharp, Roberts & Co., which in 1843, after the death of his partner, took the name Roberts & Co.

*the lightning rod (conductor) and Hermes (Mercury) vis-à-vis Crédit mobilier?*⁴⁶ Every mythology surpasses and tames and forms natural forces inside of imagination or fantasy and through imagination or fantasy; for that reason, [mythology] also vanishes when they [natural forces] are (really, actually) dominated and ruled over (in reality). What becomes of the goddess PHEME [= Fame]] before Printing House Square?⁴⁷ Greek art presupposes Greek mythology, that is, the processing and elaborating of nature and of social forms by popular imagination in a manner which is unconsciously artistic. This is its material – and not any mythology whatsoever, that is, not any unconsciously artistic processing of nature (in the concept of nature whatever is an object is included here, consequently society too). Egyptian mythology could never have been the soil, terrain (ground) or the maternal vagina (bay) [[womb]] of Greek art. Whatever the case may be, at any rate, some kind of mythology is needed, and not a social evolution/development, which excludes every mythological and mythologising relation(ship) towards nature, demanding in this way [[something]] from artistic imagination (fantasy), regardless of mythology.

On the other hand: is an Achilles strong with gunpowder and lead? Or The Iliad with the printing press or the printing machine? Does not song, narration and the muse necessarily cease with the lever of the press ((printing) press lever), and do not indispensable conditions/terms of epic poetry thus disappear?

Nonetheless, the difficulty does not rest on comprehending that Greek art and the epic are connected with certain forms of social development (evolution). The difficulty is that they continue to provide us with aesthetic pleasure, and from a

⁴⁶ The Société générale de crédit mobilier was founded in 1852 with the main aim(,) [[being]] the provision (supplying) of (forms of) credit (overdrafts) for the foundation (establishment, institution) of industries. Quickly did its businesses (undertakings) take (on) an international character.

⁴⁷ In this square, in Marx's epoch/era, the offices of the *Times* were found/located.

certain point of view, they apply as norms/rules and as unreachable (unattainable) models.

A man cannot become also a child again, except if he behaves like a childish twit. However, does not the naivety of the child give him joy, and ought not he pursue again the reproduction of his truth at a higher tier (stage, level or grade)? Inside of childish nature, does not in every epoch, the childish nature's character live again as (a) natural truth? Why also should not the infantile (juvenile, childish) age of human history, (there) where it blossomed more beautifully, exercise eternal charm as a tier (stage, level, grade) which will never come back again any more? Children exist who are churlish (impolite, uncivil), and children who act like grown-ups (adults). Many of the ancient peoples belong to this category. The Greeks were natural (physiological, normal) children. The charm and allurements of their art for us does not live in opposition to the undeveloped social tier (stage, level or grade), upon which it was formed. Rather it (the charm/allurements of Greek art) is its (the said undeveloped social tier's) result, and it probably – in an unbreaking manner and lastingly – interrelates with the fact that the immature social conditions, inside of which the said charm/allurements of Greek art was born, and only in which it could be born, cannot come back.

This significant text gives cause for various (diverse) thoughts on central problems of Marxian theory. These, however, we have to skip (pass) over, and confine (restrict) ourselves to whatever concerns the relationship of Marx with ancient Greece. I observe first and foremost that also here, the starting point of his cogitations is the opposition between pre-industrial and industrial society as two essentially different levels of man's fight and struggle with nature. At the pre-industrial stage, when this fight and struggle is still to a great extent ineffective, the real weaknesses as to the domineering or domination of natural

forces are overcompensated for (hyper-replenished) (with the psychological meaning of the term) by mythological creations, where in the field of the imagination (fantasy), whatever is not able to be put under real control, is tamed. Let it be noted that Marx makes a distinction between that particular kind of imagination (fantasy) which creates mythology, and other kinds which can thrive also in epochs alien (foreign) to(wards) mythology in itself (per se, ipso facto); this means, naturally, that artistic development (evolution) does not at all end with antiquity, and also neither does human nature suffer irreparable losses after the eclipse of that phase of history, which is characterised by the dominant presence of mythologies in the area of ideology: because if such losses were fatal, then it is clear that also our stance vis-à-vis antiquity would be predetermined, it would be the in part scared-stiff, and in part envious stance of the amputated vis-à-vis the able-bodied. However, precisely this stance is rejected by Marx.

When now Marx considers mythology as the terrain (ground) where ancient Greek art germinated and sprouted (grew), he undoubtedly remembers all that he read decades earlier in Wickelmann, and in part thereafter also in Hegel, entwining in this manner perhaps inside of himself philological memories with experiential memories. Parallely, however, Marx now comprehends the term “mythology” not simply aesthetically or religiously, but sociologically, he gives the term, that is to say, that meaning which he himself calls “ideological forms”, as these are moulded (fashioned, formed) in man’s related fight with man. The particularity of Greek art has to do with the particularity of the ideological forms of ancient Greek society in opposition e.g. to the ideological forms of Egyptian society, even though, as Marx stresses, the ideologies of all pre-industrial societies have certain most general common features, that is, the structures which every mythology presents as mythology, irrespective of its each and every respective content. If, therefore, in light of Marx’s mature

teaching regarding ideology, that is to say, as regards the dependence of the forms of the spirit(-intellect) on the texture of the social being, ancient Greek art is presented interrelated with time without breaks (or as being unbreakable in interrelation with time), space and the conditions of its genesis, why should it exercise charm (allurement, fascination) in epochs radically different? As we can see, this question is not posed to Marx by chance (accidentally, coincidentally) or from the outside, but rather springs (stems) from the same logic as the Marxian teaching as regards ideology. Can, however, an aporia or query, which emerges from the fundamental principles of the teaching regarding ideology, be solved with the help of the same teaching which begot it? Marx does not offer a direct answer to this question. Of course, the answer which he offers is given with the theoretical means of Marxism, if we take Marxism in its totality, not, however, with those things (all that) which come(s) from (the) exclusively Marxian sociology, rather with those things (all that) which come(s) from Marxian – and at the same time the Hegelian – philosophy of history. In other words: if Marx wanted to answer a question which emerges from his teaching regarding ideology, which according to my opinion constitutes one of his most significant discoveries, then he would have to argue similarly (in a similar fashion) with our contemporary sociology of knowledge and say the following: “antiquity, as thought and as art, came back to life (was revived) in the New Times, and indeed, became perceived as a cultural model, because a specific (concrete) group of historical subjects considered this ideological weapon effectual in the social fight or battle (tussle, bout, struggle) against the said group’s opponents; naturally, the image (picture) of antiquity, which was used ideologically in this fight or battle, did not have any necessary relationship with ancient reality, rather it was idealised and conformed to (compliant with) the needs of the fight/battle; and since the ideological constructs, in order to effectually exercise their social function, must be construed from their bearers as objective social, ethical or aesthetic truths, that is why also the ideological

idealisation of antiquity was regarded an objective truth to the degree that their social bearers imposed themselves (were imposed), in such a way that the model (standard) character of ancient art and of ancient culture (civilisation) became generally accepted. See now/here why ancient art e.g. appears to be also today beautiful.* Nevertheless, the socially and historically determined character of this perception (view) is brought to mind (recollected) always by the fact that even also in the epochs of their greatest dissemination, the ancient models were not in the least recognised as such by everyone – and they were especially not recognised as such by all those who socially and ideologically combatted the ideological proponents of precisely the ancient models.”

Such a sociological answer to Marx’s question would make obvious (or strongly imply) that belief in the objective beauty of ancient art e.g. is also itself subjective and ideological, a – that is to say – further form of socially determined “false consciousness”. However, Marx does not doubt the objective beautifulness of ancient art, nor does he say that the charm (allurement, fascination), which this ancient art exercises on us, has an ideological character; indeed, on the contrary. In this way, therefore, we repeat, he does not answer his own question by using the conceptual tools of his own teaching regarding ideology, from whose processing (elaborating) – incidentally – today’s sociology of knowledge came, rather he has recourse to the Hegelian side of his

• [[The translator would like to add that what P.K. wrote regarding ancient art and beauty was or might have still been generally the case in the West in Marx’s day and even in 1984, when the Greek booklet on Marx was written, but in 2018, things have definitely changed with the constant anti-white-European propaganda, indoctrination and brainwashing by the Mass Media and Mass Entertainment centred in the USA and the UK, France, Germany, etc. including all the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE Jewish (ZIO) input. However, as this paragraph progresses, it becomes clear that Marx would not take the further step of viewing all art from all historical epochs as ultimately relativised by sociological-historical knowledge, i.e. as being ultimately a subjective matter of Taste (when we do a theoretical comparative abstraction from all known real, historical, empirical evidence), – as are all social forms of human existence for which humans (can) express a like or dislike.]]

own thought in order to solve his aporia and query from the perspective of the Hegelian philosophy of history, that is, of a theory which explains the partial with the general; the function and the potential (possible, probable) survival of the part with the course and each and every respective higher developmental (evolutionary) tier (stage, level, grade) of the Whole. As is known, Hegel's philosophy, both logic, as well as the philosophy of nature and of history, posits as a methodological, but also as its ontological demand, the harmonisation of the idea of the Whole and of the idea of evolution or development at the end (terminus) of a dialectical course, so that the Whole, which appears only at the end (terminus) of evolution (development) in all the richness (wealth) of its determinations, does not constitute the simple denial of its prior stages, but the synopsis or aggregation and condensation of their truth, that is to say, that which is diagnosed as truly rational meaning, and their (the said prior stages') function from the perspective of the thus formed Whole. In relation to the history of mankind (humanity, humankind), this means that its individual chronologically and locally determined manifestations are classified in the Whole, as this arises finally, and are evaluated by their higher perspective. If the subject of History, that is to say, the human genus (species, race) (mankind), inside its historical metamorphoses, remains basically united, and if evolution (development) is united and united is its end (terminus), then its lowest phases are contained in the highest phases, [[just]] the same as a seed and the bud are contained inside the blossom or flower, or the child is contained in a man/male – even though the blossom/flower is the denial of the germ, and man the denial of the child. And if, as we said, in the final Whole, every constituent element (part) of the tiers (stages or phases) of evolution (development) is not contained distinctly and equivalently (equally), rather only that which Hegel and Marx call their “truth”, then in the Whole of the male (manly) age of mankind/humanity, whatever mankind's childhood gave [[which is]] more or most beautiful, is

dialectically encompassed: and this precisely, says Marx, is ancient Greek thought and art.

This syllogistic reasoning, which Marx condenses in the text that we read, had already pushed Hegel to compare *the Greek world with the youthful age of mankind (humanity)*, with which he means *the cool breeze (cool(ness), dew) of the spirit(-intellect)* which in Greece *emerges from inside the sensorial and material (sensory, sensual, perceptible) present as the incarnated spirit(-intellect) and as spiritualised(-intellectualised) sensoriality*. *The uppermost (paramount) form which Greek imagination (fantasy) moulded*, adds Hegel, *is Achilles, the poet's child, the Homeric sapling (young man, youth)* (as we see, the mentioning of Achilles in Marx's text is not coincidental (accidental, (by) chance); ...*Greek life is true youthful praxis (action)*. *Achilles started it, the poetical sapling, and Alexander brought it to its end (terminus), the real sapling*.⁴⁸ The newer (more recent) research has shown how much Hegel owes, as a philosopher generally, and as a philosopher of history in particular, to Hölderlin, from the epoch of their close friendship and cooperation (collaboration).⁴⁹ It is not therefore also so paradoxical that in Hölderlin we find phrases which remind us of – no only as to meaning, but even also verbally – Marx's writings in the text that we read. Thus, in a passage by Hölderlin published in 1797, the excerpt below exists: *the presentiments (premonitions, foreboding(s)) of childhood age will go or blow out (be extinguished) in order to be resurrected also again as truths inside the spirit(-intellect) of man*. *The beautiful cool myrtle of the former (sometime, other) world, Homer's poems and the poems of his epoch, the prophesies and the revelations, wither (wilt), however the sperm, which they (en)closed in them, spurts (darts) (out) in autumn as (a) ripe fruit*. *The naivety and the innocence of the first (period of)*

⁴⁸ *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Stuttgart (Reclam), 1961, pp. 320/1.

⁴⁹ See in greater detail on this point: P. Kondylis, *Die Entstehung der Dialektik. Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802*, Stuttgart 1979.

*time dies, in order to come back (full circle) inside complete education (learning), and the holy peace of paradise is lost in order for whatever was only a gift of nature to bloom and flourish also again, [this time] as the possession (property, estate) of mankind (humanity) won with struggles.*⁵⁰

When, therefore, Marx call us to enjoy (take pleasure in) ancient Greek art he does not call (upon) us to glorify something historically superior (higher), but rather for us to bow (stoop) with love and emotion towards the historically inferior. Because Marx relativises thrice that which he himself carefully calls *from a certain point of view insuperable (unbeatable) models*: one time he relativises it with his own teaching regarding ideology, a second time he relativises it with the Hegelian evolutionary philosophy of history, and finally he relativises it even one more time, when he says that also the charm (allurement) which ancient art exercises on us is not understood separately from the undeveloped social tier (stage, level, phase, grade) of its creation; and a part again of this same charm (allurement), Marx tells us, is due precisely to the knowledge of how whatever became then, cannot happen again – not, however, because human forces then reached a culmination (where, [[which]]) they cannot reach again, but because, on the contrary, the – at that time – immaturity, had been overcome irrevocably. Man, that is, mature mankind (humanity), in enjoying ancient art is called (upon) to be baptised in the delicious distillate of a previous stage of his life. This can be experiential enrichment or revivification (revitalisation) – in any case, it does not have the character of the singularly and exclusively binding intellectual(-spiritual) debt. If mature mankind (humanity) cannot annul (wipe out) and forget ancient Greece, the reason is that inside the formed Whole, the “truth” of the Whole’s evolutionary (developmental) tiers (stages, phases, levels, grades) survives as a/the dialectical moment, whatever, that is to say, from time to time constituted the transient (blooming) florescence

⁵⁰ «Hyperion – Fragment» = Sämtliche Werke, hg. v. Fr. Beissner, Stuttgart 1946 ff., v. III, 1, p. 180.

and propelling force of progressive movement (motion) towards the formation of the Whole. Ancient Greece possesses a choice (select) position inside these dialectical moments, and exists as such, not, however, as the evermore given norm or rule of life or (norm or rule) of consideration of the world. The schema pertaining to the history of ideas permits, and indeed imposes, the active survival of the classical ideal, but with the condition that this constitutes one only of the constitutive elements (parts) of developed culture (civilisation). The memory and love for antiquity, as regards whatever is viable, is maintained and secured in perpetuity; the worship of antiquity, and the various classicisms or Hellenocentrisms, are considered to be regressions. This of course means that in order for someone to see the ancients as children, he himself must be a (grown) man [[an adult, a grown-up]]. Conversely, peoples who see the ancients as unexcelled men, have themselves remained children. This, by the way, the history of modern (newer, more recent) Hellenism has shown most vividly (graphically).

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