

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

# NOTES ON SOCIAL ONTOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

## I. BIOPHYSICAL PRECONDITIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAN

<sup>4258</sup> Already during the study regarding the behaviour (Verhalten) of female workers/labourers and the queen in regard to and amongst bees, Legewie ascertains that the strong concentration on a drive, urge or impulse (Trieb) means the constriction, curbing or restriction of the (f)actual environment (Umwelt) (the queen's sex drive (Geschlechtertrieb)), whereas the reduction of the effect and impact of (the) drive(s) (urge(s), impulse(s)) means the widening, extension and expansion of the environment (in regard to and amongst the female workers) p. 124ff..

<sup>4222\*\*\*\*</sup> Social hierarchy appears first of all in vertebrates, because here – in contrast to that [[situation]] of insects – the genetically determined distribution of roles is not decided absolutely, that is, society is not erected and built/constructed alone on the basis of genetic pre-determination, but the neurophysiological energy (neurophysiologische Energie) of the individual (vertebrates) is diverse and of various kinds. The relations, circumstances and conditions of power determine the course of mating (coupling, copulation or pairing; Paarung). See Count, in *Am. Anthropol.* 1958, p. 1050 And/Or: Where the absolute correspondence between instinct (Instinkt) and acting/action or the

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<sup>1</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): Translated from the German text (by Fotis Dimitriou in *Zeno*, *Jahrheft für Literatur und kritik*, »Identität«, Heft 35, 2015, S. 58-73) by C.F., ©, September 2019. The translator did not have access to P.K.'s Greek notes at the time of undertaking this translation. Hopefully, the notes will be published in Germany within the next few years. These notes constitute something like the "Holy Grail" of social-scientific knowledge (macro/general theory); clearly, they are not P.K.'s "final position", since he did not get to write the second and third volumes of his social ontology, and thus a fairly high degree of caution needs to be exercised in interpreting what they mean. Enjoy your lives, if you can.]]

act (Handlung) comes loose and slackens, the striving for and after power (Machtstreben)<sup>2</sup> begins.

<sup>4228</sup> As the striving after and for power (Machtstreben) opens the path/way to sociability (Soziabilität): a potent influence causing enlarging of the cortex and the related parts of the amygdala, which is found in man, could have been the result of competition for dominance, such as can be seen most acutely in the social behavior of present day macaques and baboons under certain circumstances. The more intensive this competitive behavior is, the more it is correlated with a breeding premium, which means a very rapid rate of selection for the characteristics that lead to dominance, the most important of which is the ability to control motive expression at high levels of social excitement. This latter faculty, dependent on an enlarged amygdala, would also be a predisposing mechanism for the development of “tameness”, the suggested basis upon which co-operative social life can emerge in hunting communities. Chante, Nature, p. 29ff..

<sup>4215</sup> Thus, just as striving after and for power and dominance (as dominant authority) (Macht- bzw. Herrschaftsstreben) are necessary, in order to explain the coming into being and emergence of institutions (Institutionen), also necessary is the striving for and after self-preservation (Selbsterhaltungsstreben), in order to explain why the beings, creatures (or essences) of deficiencies, defects, shortcomings (Mängelwesen) did not fall into ruin and perish, but developed compensatory or redeeming mechanisms (ausgleichende Mechanismen). Striving for and after power and striving for and after self-preservation are two large gaps or holes in Gehlen.

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<sup>2</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): it’s very important to always keep in mind that power in P.K. is or can be associated with physical violence and or control, but more often than not in conditions of human culture, directly relates to non-physical forms of mental-ideological/emotional or “spiritual” control (which the MadMan calls “lobotomisation” (or “full-spectrum **ZIO**-lobotomisation” in the case of countries under the Hegemony and or Imperialism (depending on which term you prefer and how you define them) of **ZIO**-USA) ... etc..]]

<sup>4240</sup> The development of the intellect takes place in a complex society. A society already becomes complex because in it, various generations exist, provided that the children find themselves and are in prolonged dependence and come into contact with older people/adults, from whom they learn. Human intelligence is greater than that of apes, already because humans have the most complex kinship structures, the longest period of dependence and the widest overlap of generations.<sup>3</sup> Additional complexity stems from internal pressures, whilst if it is ascertained that intellectual prowess is correlated with social success, then an unstoppable, inexorable evolution begins in this direction. When the first men/humans saw that technical intelligence gives them advantages in respect of survival, [coming into being and emerging] pressures to give children an even better schooling created a social system of unprecedented complexity. – This social intelligence, developed initially to cope with local problems of interpersonal relationships, has in time found expression in the institutional creations of [[the]] “savage mind”.<sup>4</sup> However, if man’s intellect is suited primarily to thinking about people and their institutions, how does it fare with non-social problems? He sees them simply anthropomorphically – and here lies the source of errors, but also creativity! Humphrey, Function of Intellect, esp. p. 310ff..

## II. SOCIO-CULTURAL SELECTION OCCURS IN MAN IN PLACE OF NATURAL (SELECTION)

<sup>4241\*\*\*</sup> If we recognise that culture did not develop only after the biological completion and perfection of man, but reached this (development), thanks to

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<sup>3</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously, Western mass democracy has somewhat undermined this as we return in part to the animal kingdom (from the Age of Satan to the Age of the Ape).]]

<sup>4</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously, reference is being made to “High Culture” attitudes in the West, China, India, Arabia, etc. towards “primitive” peoples, reaching a peak in the West c. 1850-1900.]]

culture (fabrication, production and manufacture of tools, instruments and implements, social organisation) (reaching) its biological completion and perfection (development of the brain/mind) – then we must draw the necessary conclusions from such interweaving of biology and culture: not only is biology imbued and saturated with culture, but also culture (is imbued and saturated) with biology.<sup>5</sup> Moreover: in the central and most important period of time of the concrescence (i.e. growing together) between culture-biology (i.e. culture and biology), this concrescence/growing together is (found) not under the influence and aegis of normative ideas, but of self-preservation. Or: we cannot invoke a role of culture for moral goals and ends; culture is no ethical concept as the usual contradistinction nature-culture (i.e. between nature and culture) suggests<sup>6</sup> (Wenn wir anerkennen, Kultur habe sich nicht erst nach der biologischen Vollendung des Menschen entwickelte, sondern diese gelangte, dank der Kultur (Herstellung von Werkzeugen, soziale Organisation) zu seiner biologischen Vollendung (Entwicklung des Gehirns) – dann müssen wir die notwendigen Schlüsse aus einer solchen Verflechtung von Biologie und Kultur ziehen: Nicht nur die Biologie ist mit Kultur durchtränkt, sondern auch die Kultur mit Biologie. Außerdem: im zentralen und wichtigsten Zeitraum des Zusammenwachsens zwischen Kultur-Biologie befand sich dieses Zusammenwachsen nicht im Zeichen normativer Ideen, sondern der Selbsterhaltung. Bzw: wir können uns nicht auf eine Rolle der Kultur für moralische Zwecke berufen, Kultur ist kein ethischer Begriff, wie die übliche Gegenüberstellung Natur-Kultur suggeriert).

4243\*\*\*\* It is not only essential that symbolic value surpasses the biological [[dimension, aspect, element, factor, etc.]] (der symbolische Wert den Biologischen), but also that inside of that value, the form-related (i.e. formal)

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<sup>5</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously, in relation to man, i.e. the human species (homo sapiens).]]

<sup>6</sup> [[Translator's footnote: i.e. culture as seen social-ontologically (scientifically), and not for normative-ideological-aesthetic purposes.]]

(kinds of) law bindedness (determinisms, law(rule)-based necessities) (die formalen Gesetzmäßigkeiten) of the biological persists and survives. Only in this way can the phenomenon be explained that man can sacrifice biological values for the sake of symbolic values!! Symbolic value can, therefore, be preferred vis-à-vis the biological [[dimension, factor, etc.]] because it itself becomes (the) vehicle of the principle of selection (selection principle) – or else, under the conditions of society, those (seen/respected as) ready and willing to die for a symbol and or a value, are (seen/respected) as those who fear for their life/lives.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4244</sup> (The fact) that man is a symbol-creating animal or beast (ein symbolschaffendes Tier), means: a) tribal-historical development (*or*: the unfolding of the history of tribes) (Stammesgeschichtliche Entwicklung), which is based upon hereditary changes, becomes replaced by history, which is based on the tradition of symbols (Tradition von Symbolen).<sup>8</sup> b) in the place of corporeal-physical testing of animals, steps (i.e. goes) intellectual-spiritual testing (an die Stelle des körperlichen Probierens der Tiere tritt geistiges Probieren). c) a clear meaning preserves (the) purposefulness (end (goal) orientation, usefulness, expediency; Zweckmäßigkeit) which no instinctive acting, action or act (keine instinktive Handlung) possesses. d) Symbols gain their own life, their own logic of development/unfolding (or developmental logic); they (i.e. symbols) come at any time into conflict with psychical

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<sup>7</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): so, fear (whether an irrational phobia or not) is only a symbolic-cultural issue for humans (and not non-human animals), and obviously if one values one's own values, one fears any (potential) threat to these values ... and that's exactly why e.g. the Satanic Circus Monkey Compound and Bunker SEALS ITS BORDERS in TOTAL BORDERS CLOSED SOCIETY fashion, whilst SATANISTS promote "Multi-Kulti One World Global Village" Open Society, No Borders Satanic Circus Monkey SELF-RACIST, AUTO-LOBOTOMISING SATAN-TENT ZIO-COST WORSHIPPING AUTO-GENOCIDAL HATE for other (formerly Western, now APE-LAND) countries. *Fucking Unbelievable Fucking STUFF!* ... which only FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISED BRAIN WASHED ZIO-USA ZOMBIES could possibly ever believe in.]]

<sup>8</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): which means that a collective can refer to racial and or cultural and or other facts and myths in any kind of combination it chooses in giving itself and handing down and re-creating and or maintaining and or adapting and or amending etc. its collective identity and (self-)understanding (of itself).]]

inclinations and propensities. e) Symbols develop the I (ego) and the world in clear contours and outlines. Bertalanffy, ... but from man, p. 58ff..

<sup>4248</sup> All those who use – against bio-sociology (biosociology) – the argument that biological structure is one (die biologische Struktur sei eine), whereas human behaviours are many, and these would not be biologically handed down (*or*: are not transmitted biologically), but learnt (e. g. Washburn, Human and An. Behavior, p. 278), overlook two main points: a) precisely a certain, specific and unique biological structure (eine bestimmte und einzige biologische Struktur) allows a supplementing through learning, or, the manifoldness and (great) diversity of behaviour is possible thanks to the specific character of human biology (dank des spezifischen Charakters der menschlichen Biologie) b) precisely on the basis of the interrelation between a biostructure (Biostruktur) and the huge number (or multiplicity) of behaviours (und der Vielzahl von Verhaltens), can the huge number (or multiplicity) [[of behaviours]] only inside and within the given biological boundaries move (kann sich die Vielzahl nur innerhalb der gegebenen biologischen Grenzen bewegen), and on the basis of this limitation or restriction it (i.e. the huge number/multiplicity of human behaviours) is forced to exercise biologically specific/particular functions (biologisch bestimmte Funktionen), or, functions of self-preservation (Funktionen der Selbsterhaltung) (translated into symbolic language, biological self-preservation possibly becomes abolished (übersetzt in die symbolische Sprache, wird eventuell die biologische Selbsterhaltung aufgehoben)).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): whilst P.K. never discussed the Human Race as consisting of races or sub-races, with certain distinctive characteristics such as mean strength or mean intelligence or mean appearance/skin colour etc., he did from time to time refer to "race" (and by implication as both a biological and or ideological category), and the notes here do not at all preclude the possibility of there being certain traits or characteristics which are in some way race-dependent, given that everything that is culturally-socially learnt cannot ever escape fully or be fully autonomous from humans' biostructure and, therefore, also nature. On the other hand, whatever the scientific findings are: it is a matter of POLITICS as to what a society does with such findings.]]

<sup>4246</sup> Human constants are visible less in cognitive-technical behaviour, and more in moral principles (Die menschlichen Konstanten sind weniger im kognitiv-technischen Verhalten sichtbar und mehr in den moralischen Prinzipien), which, as history shows, are reduced to a few, and regulate and control the behaviour of men: all (such human constants)<sup>10</sup> make do and manage with, regarding this, extremely/entirely few principles, which have not changed since the primitive epoch (seit der primitiven Epoche). The complexity of laws has technical significance and meaning (Die Kompliziertheit der Gesetze hat technische Bedeutung).

<sup>4249</sup> The opponents of sociobiology err and are mistaken when they stress that e.g. “human groups adapt through knowledge and organization”, and become widespread and prevail by learning[[.]] not genes (e.g. Washburn, Human and Animal behavior, p. 266). That is correct,<sup>11</sup> yet here the term adapt is essential. This is mostly mentioned biologically in a function, which now is not completed and perfected through genes, but through learning and symbols. The deciding/decisive element (for sociobiology) is not the transition from the genes (themselves) to the (changing) symbols, but the function of adaption, or, of natural choice (Das ist richtig, doch ist hier der Terminus adapt wesentlich. Dies wird meist in einer Funktion biologisch erwähnt, die nun nicht durch genes vollendet wird, sondern durch Erlernen von Symbolen. Das entscheidende Element (für die sociobiology) ist nicht der Übergang von den genes (selbst) zu

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<sup>10</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): from the biological constant of death, to the anthropological and or social-ontological constants of the drive/urge/impulse of self-preservation, power striving, the assumption and taking on/over of the situation/position of the Other (the mechanism of the social relation), the friend-foe spectrum of the social relation, rationality/language/understanding/meaning/interpretation-culture, the political, power and identity etc..]]

<sup>11</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously, P.K. means that the relevant proposition is correct only when understood in a particular way in accordance with the empirical evidence. Whichever way you look at this note, it is again clear that man is both animal (i.e. from the animal kingdom and nature), and, rationality/symbols (inter-action within the social relation etc.), which distinguish man from other animals.]]

den (wechselnden) Symbolen, sondern die Funktion der adaption, bzw. der natürlichen Auswahl).

<sup>4251</sup> In social man, biologically understood natural selection becomes a socio-cultural selection, which is probably seldom dependent on biological superiority, provided that it (i.e. the said socio-cultural selection) is acted out and takes place at the level of symbolic forms.<sup>12</sup> If these (symbolic) forms were not organs of selection, they could not constitute ideologies in Marxist meaning or weapons in social struggle (Beim sozialen Menschen wird die biologisch verstandene natürliche Selektion eine soziokulturelle Selektion, die wahrscheinlich selten von der biologischen Überlegenheit abhängig ist, vorausgesetzt sie spielt sich auf der Ebene der symbolischen Formen ab. Wenn diese Formen nicht Organe der Selektion wären, könnten sie nicht Ideologien in der marxistischen Bedeutung bzw. Waffen im sozialen Kampf bilden).

<sup>4252\*\*</sup> The fundamental mistake by Gehlen: he begins with the static image or picture of man (statischen Bild des Menschen), which he already has used in his (i.e. man's) (in whichever manner whatsoever) biological completion and perfection, or with his (man's) developed-unfolded (present-day) intellectual-spiritual functions. With that, the points are lost: culture – the intellect/spirit was its (culture's) organ of survival (Kultur – der Geist war ihr Organ des Überlebens), so that it (i.e. the intellect/spirit) takes the place of (and replaces) biol. (i.e. biological) completion. Whilst Gehlen lets go or leaves out the intellect-spirit (in order to avoid the old dilemmas), he cannot apprehend the specific [[dimension, element, factor]] of culture (das Spezifische der Kultur).

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<sup>12</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): this clearly means that a society can decide (irrespective of how and why) to alter its racial make-up or other characteristics, depending on the correlation(s) of forces as regards symbols, values, understanding and social-political action, whilst **e.g.** having a basketball league in which 12% of the population provides in many cases 90%+ of the players, or a financial system where 2% of the population are in 70+% of the key positions, etc..]]



<sup>4253</sup> If we connect sense (i.e. meaning) [the setting of meaning, norms] with the mechanisms of selection, we overcome with one blow/strike (i.e. at one fell swoop), biologism and moralism (Wenn wir den Sinn [Sinnsetzung, Normen] mit den Mechanismen der Selektion verbinden, überwinden wir mit einem Schlag Biologismus und Moralismus).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>4256</sup> Self-sacrifice (Das Selbstopfer) becomes possible as acting, action or act of self-preservation (als Selbsterhaltungshandlung) at the moment at which at the biological level, the symbolic-cultural [[dimension, element, factor]] is founded on it (i.e. the biological level): all that which I lose in biological goods, I gain in symbolic (goods). Every self-sacrifice is the loss of physical (goods) and gain of symbolic goods (in dem auf der biologischen Ebene sich das Symbolisch-Kulturelle darauf gründen wird: all das, was ich an biologischen Gütern verliere, gewinne ich an symbolischen. Jedes Selbstopfer ist Verlust physischer und Gewinn symbolischer Güter). No-one ever looked at the gains of physical (goods) and the abandonment and relinquishment of symbolic goods as self-sacrifice: this clearly shows and demonstrates that seen from the point of view of the species (kind, sort, nature, variety or type), the biological(ly) physical goods are the criterion (aus der Sicht der Art gesehen, das Kriterium die biologisch physischen Güter sind).

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<sup>13</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): in the production of ideologies (obviously, by humans), what is very common is reductionism e.g. to biology (race, sex/"gender", etc.) to a certain ethics and morality (relating e.g. to religion, characteristics, economics etc.), etc..]]

### III. SOCIO-CULTURAL BONDING, ALLIANCE, ASSOCIATION, COMBINING DEMANDS THE SETTING OF MEANING, DISCIPLINING (DER SOZIOKULTURELLE VERBUND VERLANGT SINNSETZUNG, DISZIPLINIERUNG)

<sup>4227</sup> \*\*\*\* Meaning and culture → sacrifice → principle of social discipline (Sinn und Kultur → Opfer → Grundsatz sozialer Disziplin). Ritual cannibalism is in the hunter culture of the *Sinanthropus* [[approx. 750,000 years ago in China, discovered in the 1920s]] and of the early Neanderthal [[lived in Eurasia from circa 400,000 until 40,000 years ago]], that is, long before (coming across) the advent of *Homo Sapiens*. This means/signifies that already at that time there were act(ion)s loaded or charged with meaning, act(ion)s for the sake of meaning (dass es schon damals mit Sinn aufgeladene Handlungen gab, Handlungen um des Sinnes willen). To eat from someone, in relation to which I pursue certain ends/goals and not in order to become full (replete), means that one does something not for biological reasons, but solely because you carry out your acting, action, act with meaning (Sinn). Moreover, this meaning is connected from the beginning with the idea of sacrifice. Sacrifice sacrifices itself in favour of supra-individual goals, purposes and ends, a thing, matter or cause which eo ipso shows that the group (die Gruppe) has a higher value than the individual – and that the primacy or precedence of the group is stressed, even if the (i.e. what is) demanded is the regulation of the relation with the forces of the spirit-intellect, or, of objectified meaning with the help or on the basis of animistic thought/intellectual means (auch wenn das Verlangte die Regelung der Beziehung mit den Kräften des Geistes ist, bzw. des an Hand animistischer Denkmittel objektivierten Sinnes).

<sup>4230</sup> Primitive society represents and constitutes an unexpected and surprising great diversity of honours, tributes, rites and infinite changes in their application, dissemination etc.. This great diversity, by far, goes beyond and surpasses economic-social or also general(ly) anthropological reasons, and

bears witness and attests to a spiritual-intellectual creative force and power reaching (out) far beyond the functionally necessary (Die primitive Gesellschaft stellt eine überraschende Mannigfaltigkeit von Ehrungen, Riten und unendlichen Veränderungen in deren Anwendung, Verbreitung usw. dar. Diese Mannigfaltigkeit übertrifft bei weitem ökonomisch-soziale- oder auch allgemein anthropologische Gründe, und bezeugt eine weit über das funktionell Nötige hinausreichende geistige Schöpferkraft).

<sup>4231</sup> Taming is no moral magnitude! Even a social Darwinist like W. Bagehot believes that “the tamest are the strongest” (Physics and Politics, 1872, ch. II, p. 2) Or: self-disciplining gives power, which is equivalent to the priority and precedence of collective self-preservation vis-à-vis individual (self-preservation). Because collective self-preservation means mutual renunciation and abandonment of, or abstention from, blind egoism, which means precisely “taming” (die Selbstdisziplinierung gibt Macht, die mit dem Vorzug der kollektiven Selbsterhaltung gegenüber der individuellen äquivalent ist. Denn kollektive Selbsterhaltung bedeutet gegenseitigen Verzicht auf blinden Egoismus, das genau bedeutet “taming.”).

<sup>4233</sup> The sole constant in human societies is self-preservation – and indeed collective self-preservation. Object of supra-historical considerations<sup>14</sup> can be forms, which spring from self-preservation (i.e. forms can be the object of the supra-historical ways of looking at things, which (forms) spring from self-preservation) (Die einzige Konstante in den menschlichen Gesellschaften ist die Selbsterhaltung – und zwar die kollektive Selbsterhaltung. Objekt der überhistorischen Beobachtungen können die Formen sein, die aus der Selbsterhaltung entspringen).

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<sup>14</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): i.e. social-ontological and anthropological observations.]]

#### IV. CONSTITUTION OF THE I (EGO) THROUGH SOCIO-CULTURAL BONDING, ALLIANCE, ASSOCIATION, COMBINING

<sup>4193</sup> The need for classification and being put in (an) order in a group determines the assumption and acceptance of our foe images (*or*: images of our enemies). One creates foes in order to be able to belong somewhere. Enmity is mixed with libido – for or towards, on each and every respective occasion, other subjects of reference (reference subjects) (Das Bedürfnis nach Einordnung in eine Gruppe bestimmt die Annahme unserer Feindbilder. Man schafft sich Feinde, um irgendwohin gehören zu können. Die Feindschaft vermischt sich mit Libido – zu jeweils anderen Bezugssubjekten).

<sup>4254</sup> As (a) symbolic animal, man needs no external stimuli in order to be become worried (or moved/transplanted/put into a state of restlessness and agitation) (Als symbolisches Tier braucht der Mensch keine äußeren Reize, um in Unruhe versetzt zu werden). He produces (the) stimuli with his phantasy himself; he is, therefore, the restless (anxious, worried, troubled) animal par excellence. On the other hand, precisely this property, quality or characteristic frees him from dependence on the uniform (and even) rhythm of the return or recurrence of inner stimuli (Andererseits befreit ihn gerade diese Eigenschaft aus der Abhängigkeit vom gleichmäßigen Rhythmus der Wiederkehr innerer Reize). Precisely his freeing, liberation (relief, release or deliverance) makes the stimuli lasting, durable, enduring and persevering (dogged and persistent) (e.g. sexual desire (das sexuelle Verlangen)). The freeing (of oneself) (liberation etc.) from the (kinds of) rhythm of the instincts (Die Befreiung von der Rhythmik der Instinkte) contributes – to the extent that it (i.e. the said freeing) is completed – to the increase, heightening (or aggravation) of restlessness and agitation (zur Steigerung der Unruhe)!! Not accidently, a greater part of his (i.e. man's) intellectual-spiritual-philosophical striving consists of recipes, prescriptions or

remedies (Rezepten) for the attainment of inner peace, rest, calm and quiet (repose) (Ruhe)!

<sup>4242</sup> In or during the permeating and penetrating of facts with values (that is, with the matters of concern of the subject), the mechanisms of the animistic fusion of the I (ego) with the world survive at an extremely refined level (Bei der Durchdringung der Tatsachen mit Werten (also mit den Anliegen des Subjekts) überleben auf einem äußerst verfeinerten Niveau die Mechanismen der animistischen Fusion des Ich mit der Welt).

<sup>4255</sup> Constituting of the I (ego): self-objectification contains not only the physical aspect, but also the normative, which, again, has two aspects: a) that which its (i.e. self-objectification's) ego is supposed or should have in its own eyes b) the inter-relating (interrelated or coherent) relation of the I (ego) with the symbolic-moral order of society, its (i.e. the I's (ego's) position inside of it (the symbolic-moral order of society) and the self-assessment of the I (ego) as regards its (the I's/ego's) moral-symbolic activity (Konstituierung des Ich: Die Selbstobjektivierung enthält nicht nur den physischen Aspekt, sondern auch den normativen, der wieder zwei Aspekte hat: a) den, den sein Ego in den eigenen Augen haben sollte b) die zusammenhängende Beziehung des Ich mit der symbolic-moral order der Gesellschaft, seiner Position innerhalb von ihr und der Selbsteinschätzung des Ich zu seiner moralisch-symbolischen Aktivität).

<sup>4190</sup> It is correct/right that the I (ego) to a large extent comes into being through the assumption, acceptance or adoption of the manner and way other (people) see us. Yet it is also thus, that we do not assume, accept or adopt all the manners and ways in which other (people) see us, but only certain/particular (such manners and ways), which correspond to needs of and for recognition (Anerkennungsbedürfnis) etc..

<sup>4257</sup> Provided that society means norms and value systems, then obviously self-feeling (or sense of self), self-awareness, is formed in confrontation (dispute or altercation) with (the ruling and dominant) values and norms, and the individual becomes conscious of its self originally in the dimension of morally acting people. The consciousness of the I (ego) originally and initially goes with the question of values and norms – and this, again, with the relations of the [[thus]] formed I (ego) as regards the particular loca(lisa)tion and hierarchy of persons (Vorausgesetzt, Gesellschaft bedeute Normen und Wertsystem, dann formt sich offenbar das Selbstgefühl, die self-awareness, in der Auseinandersetzung mit (den herrschenden) Werten und Normen, und das Individuum wird sich seiner selbst ursprünglich in der Dimension des moralisch Handelnden bewusst. Das Bewusstsein des Ich gehe ursprünglich mit der Wert- und Normfrage zusammen – und diese wiederum mit den Beziehungen des geformten Ich zur bestimmten Verortung und Hierarchie von Personen).

<sup>4191</sup> Although the distinction I (ego)-Super I (Super Ego) comes into being early in the familial environment, its complete equipping needs also contact with the cultural environment. Ego and Superego develop parallelly and are formed only through the acceptance or assumption of ideational goods (Obwohl die Unterscheidung Ich-ÜberIch früh in der familiären Umwelt entsteht, braucht ihre komplette Ausstattung auch den Kontakt mit der kulturellen Umwelt. Ich und ÜberIch entwickeln sich parallel und formen sich nur durch die Annahme ideeller Güter).

<sup>4209</sup> The first (childish) form of the need for recognition is the growing desire for unity of one's own image of success or achievement and the Yes of spectator and leader, (have you seen how well I have done that?/did you see how well I did that?) Baumgarten, Versuch p. 524.

<sup>4210</sup> Sympathy (Die Sympathie) develops on the basis of recognition (Anerkennung): I believe that someone shows understanding of my actions, acts

and my motives (meine Handlungen und meine Motive) to the degree (extent) that he recognises my self-understanding. Conversely, I recognise someone, if I accept his motives, I identify myself with them. Or, I follow his activities with an interest (ich verfolge seine Aktivitäten mit einem Interesse), as if I would expect recognition for that (i.e. following his activities).

<sup>4213</sup> a) I like someone because he shows me that I like him b) I like someone, and because of that, I think that I like him too<sup>15</sup>, both cases are possible. C. Backman / P. Secord, The Effect of Perceived Liking on Interpersonal Attraction, Human Relations 12 (1959), pp. 379-384.

<sup>4224</sup> The Superego reverberates, resounds or echoes with the self-description, self-representation or self-portrayal of the subject (Selbstdarstellung des Subjekts). This self-description/representation/portrayal gives its (the subject's) behaviour continuity, which it usually defends vis-à-vis other (subjects/people), that is why it communicates with other (subjects/people); hence, its communication is loaded (tainted or afflicted) with a power claim too.

## V. POWER STRIVING (STRIVING AFTER/FOR POWER) IN (A) SOCIO-CULTURAL BONDING, ALLIANCE, ASSOCIATION, COMBINING (MACHTSTREBEN IM SOZIOKULTURELLEN VERBUND)

<sup>4192</sup> Even if we assume and accept that hate comes into being out of frustrated wishes of/for love and of/for friendship, thus, it is something of the second rank/order (i.e. it is secondary or of secondary importance) in relation/with reference to love – and again the question remains why love and friendship are not reciprocated. For what reasons does someone bestow [[on another/others]] love and friendship? Precisely here something deeper than these feelings, or

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<sup>15</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): Oh my God! You've just been JOOED – AAAAAAA-  
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!]]

needs of/for power and of/for identity, are incorporated (Auch wenn wir annehmen, Hass entstehe aus frustrierten Liebes- und Freundschaftswünschen, so ist das etwas Zweitrangiges in Bezug zur Liebe – und wieder bleibt die Frage, warum Liebe und Freundschaft nicht erwidert werden. Aus welchen Gründen schenkt jemand Liebe und Freundschaft? Gerade hier wird etwas Tieferes als diese Gefühle bzw. werden Macht- und Identitätsbedürfnisse einbezogen).

<sup>4194</sup> If we determine the attempt at the preservation of the (i.e. one's or a) relative power position (or position of power) as power striving (striving after or for power), we must count amongst power striving all that which serves the preservation of the existing power position, all that appears to be the attempt at the preservation of (the) social equilibrium. From the point of view of the (collective) power striving springs conformism (what I do not have, no other (person) can have<sup>16</sup>) and similar phenomena (Wenn wir als Machtstreben den Versuch zur Erhaltung der relativen Machtposition bestimmen, müssen wir zum Machtstreben all das zählen, was der Erhaltung der bestehenden Machtposition dient, alles, was als Erhaltungsversuch des sozialen Gleichgewichts erscheint. Aus dieser Sicht von (kollektivem) Machtstreben entspringen Konformismus (was ich nicht habe, wird auch kein anderer haben) und ähnliche Phänomene).

<sup>4203</sup> Hobbes would not say that I preventively (or as a precautionary measure) multiply, augment and increase my power because I do not know what other (people) will do, but on the contrary: from all that which I must know about, it is only logical to assume and accept that also other (people) wish for and desire the widening, extension and expansion of their power. He expressly says that I know other (people) by exploring and investigating myself, because all (people) have the same suffering(s), afflictions, troubles and complaints (Hobbes würde

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<sup>16</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously as it applies to the majority or the mass(es) – don't forget, these are notes, and not included in a fully written (sub-)chapter etc..]]



nicht sagen, dass ich meine Macht deshalb vorbeugend vermehre, weil ich nicht weiß, was die andern tun werden, sondern im Gegenteil: von all dem, was ich über mich weiß, ist es nur logisch anzunehmen, dass auch die anderen die Erweiterung ihrer Macht wünschen. Er sagt ausdrücklich, ich kenne die anderen, indem ich mich selbst erforsche, denn alle haben die gleichen Leiden).

<sup>4204</sup> The distinction man-beast (i.e. between human and animal) in Hobbes (Leviathan, De Homine) tends towards the assumption, supposition or acceptance that power striving (i.e. the striving for and after power) is specifically in man, because only he finds no peace, rest, calm and quiet (repose) in the satisfaction of his drives, urges and impulses. This results from the fact that we have a surplus of drives, urges and impulses, or an incomplete and imperfect correspondence of drive-object satisfaction (i.e. an incomplete and imperfect correspondence between the satisfaction of drives-urges-impulses and objects). The gain(ing) of the object does not offer satisfaction free of every restlessness and agitation. EW, III, 157 (Die Unterscheidung Mensch-Tier bei Hobbes (Leviathan, De Homine) tendiert zur Annahme, Machstreben sei beim Menschen spezifisch, weil nur er in der Befriedigung seiner Triebe keine Ruhe findet. Dies ergibt sich daraus, dass wir einen Triebüberschuss haben, bzw. eine unvollständige Entsprechung Trieb-Objekt- Befriedigung. Der Gewinn des Objekts bietet nicht die Befriedigung ledig von jeder Unruhe. EW, III, 157).

<sup>4221</sup> To the extent which biological magnitudes are transformed into ideational-symbolic (magnitudes), the satisfaction of power striving (the striving after and for power) is achieved ideationally-symbolically. Ideas and symbols can, however, also be enjoyed in solitude (In dem Maße, wie sich biologische Größen in ideell-symbolische verwandeln, kann die Befriedigung des Machstrebens ideell-symbolisch erreicht werden. Ideen und Symbole lassen sich aber auch in der Einsamkeit genießen).

<sup>4229</sup> For all (people) who stress “sociality”: man creates culture, not only because he is a social being (creature (or essence)); were this the sole condition or prerequisite, then other kinds of animals would have developed culture too (Für alle, die „Sozialität” betonen: der Mensch schaffte Kultur, nicht nur weil er ein soziales Wesen ist; wäre dies die einzige Bedingung, dann würden auch andere Tierarten Kultur entwickelt haben).<sup>17</sup>

<sup>4269</sup> Power striving (i.e. striving for and after power) can mean two things: a) that I myself strive to achieve a position, in which decisions, which I take and make for other (people), are binding already on the basis of my position b) that I find myself already in the position where I take and make binding decisions and already try to impose and enforce them (Das Machtstreben kann zweierlei bedeuten: a) dass ich mich bestrebe, eine Position zu erreichen, bei der die Entscheidungen, die ich für andere treffe, schon aufgrund meiner Position verbindlich sind b) dass ich mich schon in der Position befinde, wo ich verbindliche Entscheidungen treffe und jetzt versuche sie durchzusetzen).

<sup>4270</sup> Submission to group influence – and in power generally – varies directly with (1) motivation toward participation in the group (2) intensity of group expectations and (3) status insecurity. Emerson, Power Dependence Relations: Two Experiments, 283.

Or: in order to receive, sustain and preserve encouragement, someone is ready to submit to a power (sich einer Macht zu unterwerfen). Power satisfies this need (Die Macht befriedigt dieses Bedürfnis)! Better subordinated than without status!

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<sup>17</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously, according to P.K.’s terminology, animals can also be social, but without culture, which is a human phenomenon. But what makes man, man, is not just sociality, but those attributes man has from nature, incl. those “drives, urges, impulses and passions” which in man are translated into culture incl. the postponement of the drives, urges, impulses and passions’ satisfaction etc. as social disciplining in order to have some kind of human social cohesion/order in a human society. And there is a lot more to consider too, discussed elsewhere.]]

VI. THROUGH THE POWER STRIVING OF MEN/HUMANS LIVING IN  
(A) COMMUNITY, SOCIAL CENTRES (IN RESPECT) OF [[POWER]]<sup>18</sup>  
CRYSTALLISATION COME INTO BEING (DURCH DAS  
MACHTSTREBEN DES IN GEMEINSCHAFT LEBENDEN MENSCHEN  
ENTSTEHEN SOZIALE KRISTALLISATIONSZENTREN)

<sup>4207</sup> Struggle between meaning/sense and mere force or strength: social centres (in respect) of [[power]] crystallisation are formed under the effect a) of technical means and political powers that be or potentates b) magicians and priests. These two forces are frequently found in conflict with each other, (in relation to) which one tries to subjugate the other. Intermediate solutions exist in the form of God Kingship or Divine Monarchy (Kampf zwischen Sinn und bloßer Kraft: Soziale Kristallisierungszentren formen sich unter der Wirkung a) technischer Mittel und politischer Machthaber b) Zauberer und Priester. Diese zwei Kräfte befinden sich häufig in Konflikt miteinander, die eine versucht die andere zu unterwerfen. Zwischenlösungen gibt es in der Form wie das Gottkönigtum. Thurnwald, Fortschritt..., 584f).

<sup>4226</sup> From the moment (when) meaning/sense [the setting of meaning] is invented and objectified in the animistic universe, the struggle begins for/around its possession and its management and control. One time, the meaning specialists (i.e. specialists in meaning) exist, another time, the ruler has completely at his disposal (the) meaning, at another time, one (meaning) (works) or (the) other (meanings) work together, and at another time, they (i.e. the meanings) stand/are against one another. As has already been remarked regarding the shamanism of the natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples or Red

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<sup>18</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): I'm adding "power/Macht" because it reads better in English. If I've fucked up in doing so, then P.K. can scold me if and when I meet him in the After Death Land.]]

Indians) of North-Western North America (Von dem Augenblick an, wo der Sinn [die Sinnsetzung] erfunden und im animistischen Universum objektiviert wird, beginnt der Kampf um seinen Besitz und seine Verwaltung. Einmal existieren die Sinnspezialisten, einmal verfügt der Herrscher ganz über den Sinn, einmal arbeiten die einen oder die anderen zusammen, einmal stehen sie gegeneinander. Wie schon über den Schamanismus bei den Naturvölkern des nordwestlichen Nordamerikas bemerkt wurde): “Political and spiritual power could stand side by side in these cultures or indeed could allow a development of interacting and / or opposing constellations.” (Spencer, Shamanism, p. 358).

## VII. POWER, POWER RELATIONS (I.E. RELATIONS (IN RESPECT) OF POWER) AND THEIR FUNCTION (MACHT, MACHTBEZIEHUNGEN UND IHRE FUNKTION)

<sup>4262</sup> Power, its existence and exercising/wielding, is connected with the existence of different positions and interests. Had this difference not existed, the need would also not exist to exercise and wield power, to influence other (people), that it (power) makes (i.e. does) what I want. Power is connected inseparably (i.e. inextricably) with conflict (Macht, ihre Existenz und Ausübung, ist mit der Existenz unterschiedlicher Positionen und Interessen verbunden. Gäbe es diesen Unterschied nicht, würde es auch nicht das Bedürfnis geben, Macht auszuüben, den andern so zu beeinflussen, dass er macht, was ich will. Macht verbindet sich untrennbar mit Konflikt).

<sup>4263</sup> Since power is (a) relation, it means, the other way around, that no relation without the factor power (i.e. without the factor of power) is conceivable, or, the description of a relation coincides with the description of a power constellation (i.e. a correlation or conjuncture of relations of power) (Da die Macht Beziehung ist, bedeutet es umgekehrt, dass keine Beziehung ohne den Faktor

Macht denkbar ist, bzw. die Beschreibung einer Beziehung fällt mit der Beschreibung einer Machtkonstellation zusammen).

<sup>4264</sup> The acting, action or act of a person or of a subject is not determined by the “objective” power constellation, but by the value judgement of it (i.e. the said power correlation), it (i.e. the said acting, action or act of a person or of a subject) is, therefore, not determined by the relations, circumstances and conditions of power, but by the feeling or sense of power or lack of power (i.e. powerlessness). There is no objective assessment of power – only the result of a comparison makes it (i.e. an (objective) assessment of power) possible, yet the comparison itself is not only determined by the power relationship, but by the becoming of consciousness and the telling/striking/apt or lacking (missed, misfired, astray, failed, mistaken) use, benefit or utility of this relation on the part of those interested (Die Handlung einer Person oder eines Subjektes wird nicht von der „objektiven” Machtkonstellation bestimmt, sondern von deren Werturteil, sie wird also nicht von den Machtverhältnissen bestimmt, sondern vom Macht- oder Ohnmachtgefühl. Eine objektive Einschätzung der Macht gibt es nicht – nur das Ergebnis eines Vergleichs macht sie möglich, doch wird der Vergleich selbst nicht nur vom Machtverhältnis bestimmt, sondern vom Bewusstwerden und dem treffenden oder verfehlten Nutzen dieser Beziehung seitens der Interessierten).

<sup>4265</sup> Many perceptions of power begin under the tacit assumption (presupposition) that the exerciser (i.e. wielder [[of power]]) is the active [[actor/side]] and the other (actor/side) the passive [[recipient of the wielder of power]]. It never turns out so. Because power is exercised and wielded when both sides are (found) in motion – except when it is a matter of the case of a fixed distribution of roles, where, again, both sides are “passive”, that is, every (side) plays the role [[set]] for itself, without developing (any) particular or special activity because the other side is content and satisfied with its role too/as

well; (with)in the horizon of perception nothing exists which could hinder or obstruct one of both sides searching for or seeking a new role<sup>19</sup> (Viele Wahrnehmungen der Macht beginnen unter der stillschweigenden Voraussetzung, der Ausübende sei der Aktive und der andere der Passive. So läuft es nie ab. Denn Macht wird ausgeübt, wenn sich beide Seiten in Bewegung befinden – außer wenn es sich um den Fall einer festen Rollenverteilung handelt, wo wiederum beide Seiten „passiv“ sind, also jede die Rolle für sich spielt, ohne besondere Aktivität zu entwickeln, weil auch die andere Seite sich mit ihrer Rolle begnügt; im Wahrnehmungshorizont existiert nichts, was eine der beiden Seiten hindern könnte, eine neue Rolle zu suchen).

<sup>4266</sup> When the power relationship (relationship (in respect of) power) becomes perceptible (and is perceived) as causality, this does not occur reciprocally or mutually, but as power becomes understood as one side manipulating the other side rather than simply as the force/violence of possession, power of disposition, right of disposal or control. But, also, the latter (force of possession, control etc.) is, in practice, exercised only (then) when the subordinated side gives rise or occasion to that [[i.e. recognises and makes it appear to itself (as the subordinated side) as such]], or, it (the force of possession, control etc.) is activated in one way or another and exceeds and goes beyond the fixed framework of the crystallised power relation (Wenn Machtverhältnis als Kausalität wahrnehmbar wird, erfolgt dies nicht gegenseitig, sondern als Macht wird vielmehr die Fähigkeit der einen Seite verstanden, die andere Seite zu manipulieren oder einfach als Verfügungsgewalt. Aber auch die letztere wird praktisch nur dann ausgeübt, wenn die untergeordnete Seite den Anlass dazu gibt, bzw. sie wird so oder so aktiviert und übersteigt den festen Rahmen der kristallisierten Machtbeziehung).

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<sup>19</sup> [[Translator's footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): which means that there can never be any permanent and lasting peace without conflict (and without group violence as war, even though war is infinitely far less common than non-violent conflict).]]

<sup>4267</sup> (A) power relation is not causality, it is a mutual or reciprocal assessment, farsightedness/vision, weighing up, fantasy/imagination, manufacture, production, making or creation of future situations as levels of struggle or combat levels, crossing or intersecting of psycho(i.e. psychical)-syntheses and subjectivities (Machtbeziehung ist nicht Kausalität, sie ist gegenseitige Einschätzung, Weitsicht, Abwägung, Fantasie, Herstellung zukünftiger Situationen als Kampfebenen, Kreuzung von Psychosynthesen und Subjektivitäten).

<sup>4268</sup> The problem: how does the structure of the power relations remain the same at different levels, we say: how do two individuals go/run/pass through the same curve of power relations (die gleiche Kurve von Machtbeziehungen) like two peoples/folk also (go/run/pass through that same curve of power relations)?

<sup>4271</sup> When we say that someone “has” power, we mean to be (i.e. we are) able to imagine what he will do and how he will impose himself and prevail on the basis of the means (being) available to him in the A or B case. We identify power not with the means, because we often say someone has means, but is not in the situation or position to act in accordance with these means, i.e. to come with other (people) into a – for him – advantageous and beneficial relation. That/The fact that he “has” power, we know from his acting, action or act in the past. How much power he now “has”, we conclude from that which we expect from him in (his) future acting, action or act (Wenn wir sagen, jemand „habe” Macht, meinen wir uns vorstellen zu können, was er tun wird und wie er sich aufgrund der ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel im A oder B Fall durchsetzen wird. Wir identifizieren die Macht nicht mit den Mitteln, weil wir oft sagen, jemand habe Mittel, aber sei nicht in der Lage, entsprechend dieser Mittel zu handeln, d. h. mit anderen in eine für ihn vorteilhafte Beziehung zu kommen. Dass er Macht „hat”, wissen wir von seinen Handlungen in der Vergangenheit.

Wie viel Macht er jetzt „hat“, schließen wir aus dem, was wir von ihm an zukünftigen Handlungen erwarten).

<sup>4273</sup> Power a) as (the) direct steering and control, or, conquest, defeat (and control) of the Other and power b) as the determination of the rules of the game, under which the encounter/meeting (friendly or inimical) is carried out (performed) and takes place with the Other (Die Macht a) als direkte Steuerung oder Zwangung des Anderen und die Macht b) als Bestimmung der Spielregeln, unter denen sich die Begegnung (freundliche oder feindliche) mit dem Anderen vollzieht).

<sup>4274</sup> Elias<sup>20</sup> sees the source of power in the interdependence, which constitutes a not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. an entirely and totally indispensable and essential) feature of the condition humaine – power is, therefore, one such (feature) too. The interd. [= interdependence]] does not come into being out of and from violence-determined dependence, it can come into being because I love someone, because I require and need wealth, status etc.. (This means that power in itself is contained in every communication.) We must, nonetheless, distinguish between the power relations or constraints (compulsions, kinds of coercion and forcing of others), which contain every possible interdependence of humans/people, and such (constraints, compulsions and kinds of coercion), which come into being from the unequal equipping of soci(et)al positions with (regard to) power chances (i.e. opportunities in respect of and for power),<sup>21</sup> (the latter (opportunities as regards/for power) are evidently/obviously the institutional and the much more changeable or even (also) the institutional.<sup>22</sup>) Elias, *Sociologie*, p. 97ff. (Elias sieht die Quelle der Macht in der

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<sup>20</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): don’t forget, P.K. referred to this JOO as a “sociologist” in *The Political and Man*, which means he held the JOO in a fairly high regard.]]

<sup>21</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!]]

<sup>22</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!]]



Interdependenz, die ein nicht-wegzudenkendes Merkmal der condition humaine bildet – auch Macht ist also eine solche. Die Interd. entsteht nicht aus gewaltbedingter Abhängigkeit, sie kann entstehen, weil ich jemanden liebe, weil ich geliebt werden will, weil ich Reichtum benötige, Status usw. (Dies bedeutet, dass die Macht an sich in jeder Kommunikation enthalten ist.) Wir müssen dennoch zwischen den Machtbeziehungen oder Zwängen unterscheiden, die jede mögliche Interdependenz von Menschen enthält und solchen, die aus der ungleichen Ausstattung gesellschaftlicher Positionen mit Machtchancen entstehen, (die letzteren sind offenbar die institutionellen und die viel mehr wandelbaren oder auch die institutionellen.) Elias, Soziologie, p. 97f.).

#### VIII. MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONS, NORMS FOR SELF-PRESERVATION (BEDEUTUNG VON INSTITUTIONEN, NORMEN FÜR DIE SELBSTERHALTUNG)

<sup>4216</sup> Necessity of the interweaving of one's own and (the/a) social power claim:  
in society [[**in society** (translator's emphasis)]] the command, order or instruction is given if it is to be successful over the long run, never from person to person. The command-givers (i.e. givers of orders or instructions) is not an individual person, but they have a certain/particular position in the net (network, web or grid) of social relations. The net(work), web or grid has both sides jointly (and together), which, furthermore, shares the same symbolic system (system of symbols). As the bearer of this symbolic system and the, with that, connected routine, someone can in fact exercise and wield unconscious power (Richter, e.g.) (Notwendigkeit der Verflechtung von eigenem und sozialem Machtanspruch: In der Gesellschaft wird der Befehl, wenn er langfristig erfolgreich sein soll, nie von Person zu Person gegeben. Befehlsgeber ist nicht eine einzelne Person, sondern sie hat eine bestimmte Position im Netz der

sozialen Beziehungen. Das Netz haben beide Seiten gemeinsam, die außerdem das gleiche Symbolsystem teilen. Als Träger dieses Symbolsystems und der damit verbundenen Routine kann jemand sogar unbewusst Macht ausüben (Richter z. B.)

<sup>4218</sup> Norms are also necessary because behaviour is future-oriented. I cannot move in my everyday/daily life if I am not sure/certain in advance that the other (person, people or side) will be up to(/set about) and or carry out this or that, if I do not have the confidence and trust (therein) that the other (people) will not be up to(/set about) and or not carry out this or that. If/When the members of a society (a)wait/expect in relation to that, that someone else acts first (of all), then the activities would be slow and elementary. Behavioural orientation (i.e. orientation in respect of behaviour) must include, incorporate or integrate the expected future behaviour of, on each and every respective occasion, other (people). The behavioural regularities (i.e. the regularities in respect of behaviour) are the norms, that is, the (various kinds of) self-evidence, which give relief (from the tensions (and strains) of existence) (in regard) to our behavioural decisions (i.e. decisions (in respect of) behaviour). Popitz, Die normative Konstruktion, p. 1ff. (Die Normen sind auch notwendig, weil das Verhalten zukunftsorientiert ist. Ich kann mich im täglichen Leben nicht bewegen, wenn ich von vornherein nicht sicher bin, dass die andern dies oder jenes anstellen werden, wenn ich nicht das Vertrauen darin habe, dass die anderen nichts anstellen werden. Wenn die Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft darauf warten, dass jemand anders zuerst handelt, dann würden die Aktivitäten langsam und elementar sein. Verhaltensorientierung muss das erwartete zukünftige Verhalten der jeweils anderen einbeziehen. Die Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten sind die Normen, also Selbstverständlichkeiten, die unsere Verhaltensentscheidungen entlasten. Popitz, Die normative Konstruktion, 1ff.).

<sup>4219</sup> The future orientation (i.e. orientation as to the future) of action brings two (things) to the fore: both the search for norm(ality) (as Popitz shows it) as well as power striving (i.e. the striving after and for power) (Die Zukunftsorientierung des Handelns bringt beides hervor: sowohl die Suche nach Norm(alität) (wie es Popitz zeigt) als auch das Machtstreben).

<sup>4187\*</sup> Stability in relations with other (people) stems from two sources: a) institutional and subinstitutional regularities (e.g. in the family) (289) b) The individual's active ~~afforts~~ [[= efforts]] to maintain congruency, despite the existence of mutual and reciprocal tensions (stresses, strains). A state of congruency exists when his (i.e. the individual's) behaviour and that of alter [[i.e. the other]] imply definitions of self congruent with aspects of his self concept – Two forms of congruency: a) Congruency by implication: S may perceive that O sees him as possessing a particular characteristic corresponding to an aspect of his self concept. (he thinks of himself, that he is beautiful/nice/lovely/good/fine/handsome (schön) and thinks that other (people) regard him as beautiful/nice etc.) b) congruency by validation: the behaviour or other characteristics of O allow or call for behaviour on the part of S that confirms a component of self (someone looks at himself as powerful and acts preventively against a weaker (person/party)) That is cognitive congruency, but affective (congruency) also exists: when the individual believes that alter [[= the other]] feels toward him as he feels toward himself (overall or as any point of view of himself or of his behaviour.) (290) Bacman-Secord, Self and Role Selection.

IX. THE FRIEND-FOE DISTINCTION GENERALLY AND IN (THE)  
SOCIAL BONDING, ALLIANCE, ASSOCIATION, COMBINING (DIE  
FREUND-FEIND UNTERSCHIEDUNG ALLGEMEIN UND IM SOZIALEN  
VERBUND)

<sup>4199</sup> Prejudice or bias is, if you will, an image or picture of the foe of the second category, which fulfills a double function: it simplifies orientation and creates the binding, tie or bond to wished-for/desired or familiar groups through the demarcation and delimitation from all other groups<sup>23</sup> (Das Vorurteil ist, wenn man so will, ein Feindbild zweiter Kategorie, das eine doppelte Funktion erfüllt: es vereinfacht die Orientierung und schafft die Bindung in gewünschte oder vertraute Gruppen durch die Abgrenzung gegen alle anderen Gruppen).

<sup>4200</sup> Thinking orientates itself to the friend-foe distinction, irrespective of whether this action leads to tangible and palpable confrontations or antitheses. Because every thought/thinking makes a good-bad(/evil) distinction, even though not every acting, action or act leads to conflict (Das Denken orientiert sich an der Unterscheidung Freund-Feind, unabhängig davon, ob dieses Handeln zu Konfrontationen oder greifbaren Antithesen führt. Denn jedes Denken trifft die Unterscheidung gut-böse, auch wenn nicht jede Handlung zum Konflikt führt).

<sup>4201</sup> Society teaches at the same time the separation into friends and foes, just as it teaches to distinguish between good and bad(/evil). (A matter of concern, incidentally, which is absolutely necessary for self-preservation.) Both these opposing/opposed pairs are connected (recti)linearly (the “bad(/evil)” is the foe), but also indirectly: by learning (*or*: being taught) to identify someone bad(/evil) and inimical, he/one learns to rationalise his/one’s [[own]] enmity

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<sup>23</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): doesn’t that just about sum it all up, dumb fucking retards?]]

and to name the inimical “bad(/evil)”<sup>24</sup> (Die Gesellschaft lehrt zugleich die Trennung in Freunde und Feinde genauso, wie sie lehrt, zwischen gut und böse zu unterscheiden. (Eine Angelegenheit übrigens, die für die Selbsterhaltung absolut notwendig ist.) Diese beiden gegensätzlichen Paare verbinden sich geradlinig (der „Böse” ist der Feind), aber auch indirekt: indem jemand böse und feindlich zu identifizieren lernt, lernt er seine Feindschaft zu rationalisieren und das feindliche „Böse” zu benennen).

<sup>4202</sup> The categories “friend-foe” serve, as well as other categories of thought (intellectual categories), for the relief (from (or relieving of) the tensions (and strains) of existence) of thought/thinking and for help or assistance (in respect of orientation. Thus, the following happens: precisely because he (i.e. man) subliminally (or via an underlying manner)<sup>25</sup> learns and hears that there is good and bad(/evil), or, friends and foes, he hurries to put in order and classify preventively his/its corresponding category already (with)in the framework of the/a general attempt at orientation (Die Kategorien „Freund-Feind” dienen, wie auch die anderen Denkkategorien, zur Entlastung des Denkens und zur Orientierungshilfe. So geschieht folgendes: gerade weil er unterschwellig lernt und hört, dass es Gute und Böse bzw. Freunde und Feinde gibt, beeilt er sich

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<sup>24</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.):  
AAAAAA  
AAAAAA-  
HA  
HA  
!!  
!!  
!! FUCK-YEAHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]

<sup>25</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.):  
AAAAAA  
AAAAAA-  
HA  
HA  
!!  
!!  
!! FUCK-YEAHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  
**THIS, OF COURSE, APPLIES, MUTATIS MUTANDIS, TO ALL SOCIETIES, NOT JUST FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA ZIO-LOBOTOMISED ONES ...]]**

vorbeugend seine entsprechende Kategorie schon in den Rahmen des generellen Orientierungsversuchs einzuordnen).

*From the Greek: Fotis Dimitriou*

FOTIS DIMITRIOU

## **FACTORS OF EVOLUTION INTO MAN**

(OR: FACTORS OF INCARNATION)

Posthumous notes on “social ontology”

by Panagiotis Kondylis

In both his first major (large-scale, great) works pertaining to the history of ideas, “The coming into being (emergence) of (the) dialectic(s)” and “The Enlightenment”, Kondylis could already use, employ or apply important (kinds/pieces of) knowledge, which are deducible from the law (Gesetz<sup>26</sup>) of power and decision. In the slim/slender volume “Power and Decision” he put forward or presented his own philosophical approach, after which he had already tested and proven his fertility, that is to say, for/in the history of ideas. The anthropological theory of “descriptive decisionism” also demonstrates and establishes in the “social ontology” its extraordinary force or strength (power) of description. Of the – in three volumes laid out (drawn up) – work, Kondylis could, however, only finish and complete the first volume. For volumes 2 and 3, over/more than 4000 notes exist (are available); except for all relevant citations, they are drafted/written (up) in Greek. They are supposed or ought to be – (with)in the framework of a doctorate – translated into German and, with that, made easier to access.

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<sup>26</sup> [[Translator’s footnote (absolutely nothing to do with P.K. or F.D.): I have referred to the use of the term “law” elsewhere (in relation to K. Verykios) and (unless I am mistaken) P.K. himself avoided the use of the term in relation to the social sciences (unless there’s (quite a lot) in the Notes to Social Ontology of which I am not aware (cf. note 4246 above)). Either way, it’s not a major matter.]]

The notes came into being/were created or produced during the compilation of the material for social ontology, volume 1. They are in the majority as they were filed on the basis of their sequence of excerpts in the framework of a confrontation (discussion and debate) with other authors. Thus, a number of (multiple) interrelated notes often follow, in relation to which, summaries with positionings, (something) which often includes certain argumentative deficiencies, shortcomings and failings. The notes are – on the basis of their relatively small quantity/number/amount – only in part conceptually pre-ordered (i.e. put in order preliminarily); here then can – section by section – a process of argumentation be manufactured, made, fabricated, produced or restored. In the unordered parts, a framework or outline of arguments can often be opened up or developed on the basis of the content of the notes. Out of/from a more randomly (or by chance) chosen series or sequence of notes of numbers 4178-4280, nine conceptual fields are selected here which are related to one another, and can be associated with the antithesis described by Kondylis as the central problem of philosophy, namely, with the contrast and opposition between nature and culture, body and spirit-intellect, matter and spirit/intellect. Kondylis is certain (sure) that the antithesis is able to be dissolved (i.e. terminated) with his approach. In the given or declared series or sequence, he noted some bio-psychical preconditions and prerequisites, which are constitutive for the development from simple living beings/organisms to humans, whereby the striving for/after self-preservation plays a special or particular role. In (the) place of natural selection, goes – in man – on the basis of socialisation, socio-cultural selection, which puts into operation an acceleration/speeding up of development. Thus, (the) socio-cultural bonding, alliance, association, combining compels and forces – through the setting of meaning or norms – a channeling of drives, urges and impulses in a useful and beneficial form for the group. To disciplining belongs, above all, that the ratio (reason), which the drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation creates as (a) tool and help



(assistance, aid), could emancipate itself from this and reach an independence or autonomy which can in the/an interrelation with the socio-cultural setting of meaning, in fact turn against the biological drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation. On the basis of socialisation this is re-moulded and re-shaped into a drive, urge or impulse (in respect) of power. Kondylis discovers this in various forms and can make or constitute it as the central, all-deciding/all-decisive drive, urge or impulse of man. Through the power striving (i.e. the striving for and after power) of humans/people/men living in (a) community social centres (in respect) of [[power-]]crystallisation come into being, which co-found institutions and dominance structures (i.e. structures in respect of dominant authority). It is ascertained which important functions have power relations and institutions with reference/in relation to the self-preservation of individuals and of the group. For both, as shown (and demonstrated or proven to be), the friend-foe distinction (which on the basis of the presentation in Carl Schmitt occasionally led to irritations), is an elementary criterion (in respect) of differentiation.