

Panagiotis Kondylis (Panajotis Kondylis)

Planetary Politics after the Cold War (Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg)

(Alternative words and phrases version with some German text.)

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C.F. contactable through the following email address: pkproject@live.co.uk)

References and Reminders

A more thorough discussion of the concept of mass democracy, which is fundamental for the analyses of this book, is found in my work *The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form (Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform)* (Weinheim 1991). The thoughts on the future of war (Sec. III) start from the theoretical conclusions and conclusions regarding the history of war of my book *Theory of War (Theorie des Krieges)* (Stuttgart 1988). Finally, for the question of the antiquatedness of political concepts (Sec. IV) as regards their social implementation and implementation in the history of ideas my monograph *Conservatism (Konservativismus)* (Stuttgart 1986) should be referred to.

Section IV and both parts of Section V were published in abridged form and with other titles in *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung* 5.10.1991, 12.2.1992 and 25.4.1992.

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I. Planetary politics in the mass-democratic age (Planetarische Politik im massendemokratischen Zeitalter)

1. Form and historical phases of planetary politics (Form und geschichtliche Phasen planetarischer Politik)

In trying to determine their historical position and imagine their historical perspectives, the respective (individual and collective) subjects (Subjekte) as a rule seek, as far as possible, accurate prognoses of developments and events, as if they wanted to and could take hold of the future with their hands. Fears and hopes very frequently flow in such prognoses, and of course it can be observed in many cases that the more concrete the prognoses come across as, the more they are monstrous inventions of uplifting or depressing feelings. People strive for, where possible, accurate prognoses because above all they want to know how they should behave or for what they should prepare themselves. In this respect, prognoses constitute anticipated deeds, and the practical impetus has such a strong effect that the rather narrow limits of historical foreseeability (predictability; Vorhersehbarkeit) are jumped over thoughtlessly. The history of events and event chains must, at any rate, be basically regarded as unforeseeable (unpredictable), which for (political) praxis means that detailed instructions can hardly be given with regard to future action (Handeln) and that this action must in the end be left to the "tact of

judgement" (»Takt des Urteils«), as the great theorist of war¹ (has) formulated it. However, a more or less thorough apprehension of the character of those driving (motive) forces (Triebkräfte) and those historically active subjects, which through their work (movements, acts; Wirken) and their encounters bring into being the variety of form of events and therefore mark out the field of possible action, is conceivable. Future events (things that happen; Geschehen) are, in other words, discernible as form and possibility (Form und Möglichkeit), not as content and event (Inhalt und Ereignis), and the contribution of such a knowledge to praxis consists in that it drills and refines the "tact of judgement", but neither generates nor replaces it (the said "tact of judgement").

A future-oriented description of the situation (today), which wants to take the place of the thankless attempt at the prediction of events, must emphasise those aspects of the relevant historical factors (relevanten geschichtlichen Faktoren) to which it credits (a potentially) event-constituting force (ereignisbildende Kraft). It must, therefore, track down the particularity of the situation and, if historical continuities exist, it must make the transformations of the constants (Konstanten) found (with them (the historical continuities)) comprehensible. The historical continuities of planetary (global; planetarischer) politics (Politik) extend over the entire New Times (Modern Era; Neuzeit), i.e. such politics has been taking (takes) cohesive and continuous form since the age of the great discoveries and in the course of the formation of the colonial system and the world market (der Herausbildung des Kolonialsystems und des Weltmarktes), in fact planetary politics is only now coming into being in a real sense. In former times, there was indeed also the representation of a

¹ Carl von Clausewitz.

comprehensive oikoumene (Ökumene), however in political reality (in der politischen Wirklichkeit) - even in that of the great empires - the one Oikoumene was subdivided into two, three or more, in practice, relevant oikoumenes, which hardly did not come into contact with one another or at the most had contact through friction(s) on their peripheries. The Roman oikoumene in the end remained (radically) different to the oikoumene of the Parthians, despite their protracted (border) struggles (Kämpfe), just as later the Arabic and Frankish world, after the violent fixing of the dividing line between them, had to live for a long time, while existing side by side, also in essentially closed political spaces - to say nothing of the (Eur)asian or American oikoumenes. The world-historical (weltgeschichtliche) novum² since the 16th century consists in the advent of Powers (Mächten), whose relevant oikoumene in practical terms embraced the whole planet, that is, whose interests stretched to every place (point, position) on the planet or at least could be extended everywhere if competition or expansion's own (internal) dynamics (Eigendynamik) required this. Politics becomes planetary to the extent that developments (Entwicklungen) in any region of the planet whatsoever can mobilise the forces and readiness to act of interested Powers - as no development and no place can be regarded from the outset and forever as uninteresting for certain Powers.

Two points are to (must) be paid attention to here. First, the planetary character of politics does not result from the subordination of political action *urbi et orbi*³ to certain norms (Normen), which meet with universal recognition. Rather, things are the other way around: norms with a universal character or at least a universal claim come into being as

² New (novel) thing; novelty; political innovation.

³ In the city [of Rome] and in the world; everywhere.

ideational concomitants (ideelle Begleiterscheinungen) of political phenomena of planetary range and aim at regulating the relations (intercourse) between planetary Powers (planetarischen Mächten) at least in times, which in accordance with the general feeling on each and every respective occasion, are normal. These norms are fixed by Powers which can pursue to varying degrees of intensity planetary politics, that is, they are fixed by the subjects and not the objects of planetary politics (von den Subjekten und nicht von den Objekten planetarischer Politik). Because, secondly, planetary politics does not mean that all nations, peoples or states (alle Nationen, Völker oder Staaten) actively shape planetary events (history; Geschehen) to their (its) entire extent or that all those who actively participate in the shaping of these events do it equally (to the same extent) and in the same way. Planetary politics, however, creates a situation in which all sides are forced to see that they fix their political behaviour more or less, directly or indirectly while being mindful of the correlation of forces (constellation of forces; Konstellation der Kräfte) on the whole planet, although the radius of action (scope for action) (Aktionsradius) of Powers is very different. Great Powers (Große Mächte), which as active subjects of planetary politics live up to the name "planetary Powers" must, in any event, always act by taking into account the planetary situation and the planetary consequences of their action (doing; Tuns). But even Powers, which because of their geopolitical and economic potential (ihrem geopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Potenzial) can pursue an active foreign policy (from) only at the regional level, must keep in mind the planetary conjuncture (constellation; Konstellation) at least in so far as one or more planetary Powers has vital interests in the region in question. The friendly or inimical, but unavoidable contact between middle and small Powers (mittleren und kleineren Mächten) with planetary Powers constitutes the way the middle and small Powers

participate in planetary events (occurrences, happenings; Geschehen). The prevailing world situation (Prevailing world relations (conditions, circumstances); Die herrschenden Weltverhältnisse) is reflected in every region of the planet in the constellation which arises from the presence ((over) there) of planetary Powers as well as from the interrelating actions and reactions of local Powers (lokalen Mächte). The result is that, given the relatively high density of planetary politics (relativ großer Dichte planetarischer Politik), there is hardly any international politics at the regional level without planetary aspects and implications. Just as planetary Powers cannot accept the independence of regional matters and regional claims, so too regional Powers (regionalen Mächte) for their part seek, in so far as they have not been turned in the meantime into an appendix of a planetary Power, to exploit to their advantage the (precisely) existing relations between the planetary Powers, whereby they intentionally or unintentionally contribute to the planetarisation (making planetary; Planetarisierung) of regional politics (subordination of regional politics to planetary politics).

The (so, thus) outlined form-related (i.e. formal) structures of the relations (formale Struktur der Beziehungen) between great, middle and small Powers can also be found (again) in preplanetary epochs. Constellations (Combinations), which appeared in one of the earlier oikoumenes or even in the small universe of the Greek city-states, were repeated very often - at least when seen as form-related (i.e. formal) (morphological) structures - in the planetary New Times, in which though, as a result of the drastic change of the social character of political subjects, the range of political events (activity) reached the outermost limits of earthly space. This ascertainment confirms our thesis that a description of the constants and of the possible constellations (of the

same outlined form-related structures of the relations between great, middle and small Powers) in the framework of today's planetary politics is not sufficient for an adequate apprehension of the present world situation without a social-historical clarification of the character of the acting (handelnden) political subjects. In other words, it is not decisive to register the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar structure and then conjecture who will occupy which pole, in relation to which one could (nearly, almost) make precarious and subjectively tinged prognoses, of which we spoke in the beginning. Such transitions are not a historical novum, and the propulsive and aggravating element of today's phase of planetary politics does not lie in them; rather in their present-day form, they constitute symptoms and manifestations (Erscheinungsformen) of deeper processes, which can be investigated only through an analysis of the character of the subjects of contemporary planetary politics. Just as little does the banality that the development of technology (technique; Technik), and in particular of informatics (information technology; Informatik) and telecommunications, has made the planet smaller, mutual dependence greater and co-operation more necessary, enhance understanding. Undoubtedly, planetary politics has today attained a density which knows no precedents and analogies from the distant or recent past, nevertheless this density is not simply due to the automatic effect of technology (technique), but interrelates with social-historical developments in which technical development for its part is embedded. Not just any network of interhuman (interpersonal) relations (Netz zwischenmenschlicher Beziehungen) brings forth such technology (technique) and not just any network of interhuman relations (society) in its formation (Ausgestaltung) can be influenced by such technology (technique).

A retrospective consideration and a proper periodisation of new-times planetary politics indeed show us that its large phases cannot be characterised by, for instance, a sudden change from monopolar or bipolar structures to multipolar structures and vice versa, but rather by the different degrees of density (durch unterschiedliche Dichtegrade), in relation to which each and every respective characteristic intensification of the density takes place at turning points which mark changes in the social-historical character of the political subjects. This ascertainment does not imply any theoretical defence of the primacy of domestic politics, and indeed in the sense which was often asserted on the part of "progressive" historians. Because (with that (ascertainment)) it is not meant that only certain developments in the interior of political entities set in motion striving for power (Machtstreben) in foreign policy as such and in general, which would fail to appear if the said striving for power's bearers (carriers; Träger) did not want to (through those developments) consolidate their position in regard to domestic policy. Domestic policy indeed conditions the means and methods of foreign policy, it determines who takes foreign policy in hand and (in the process) foreign policy is also used in terms of (the goals of) domestic policy - the necessity of driving foreign policy towards the aim (goal, end; Ziel) of the preservation and of the consolidation of power of the political entity in question inside of each and every respective relevant political universe, is however preceded by the decision over the concrete bearer of responsibility as regards foreign policy, and in this respect the necessity of exercising foreign policy remains an independent constant. Whoever directs foreign policy *must* serve the aforementioned paramount aim, but he *cannot* serve it other than through the means and methods which are typical of his social-political essence. Regardless of the reasons which bring into being the striving for power in foreign policy as such and in

general, this striving for power (therefore) finds expression in forms which correspond to the social-political character of the political subject, that is, to the group or class setting the tone (inside the political subject). That is the point of view from which a parallelism between the large phases of planetary politics and the decisive changes in the social history of the New Times can be worked (brought, borne) out (ascertained).

The first of these large phases begins with the voyages of discovery, the campaigns of conquest and the building up of colonial trade in the 16th century, and lasts until the Industrial and Liberal Revolution (zur industriellen und liberalen Revolution). During the three centuries which this period of time approximately encompasses, the subjects of planetary politics or the planetary Powers in the main were estate-based (feudal, corporative; ständische) states with strong feudal-patriarchal characteristics (elements) (feudal-patriarchalischen Zügen) (that is, states where the hereditary (landed) aristocracy, the clergy and various trade-handicraft (commercial-small industrial) elements dominate), which were balanced by absolutist and mercantilist tendencies (die den absolutistischen und merkantilistischen Tendenzen die Waage halten). The loose character of the early colonial system and the slight (low) density of planetary politics generally corresponds to the relative looseness of the early colonial system and the then planetary politics' inner organisation and the limited needs of their still mostly agrarian and self-sufficient (autarkic; autarken) economy. The modern states coming into being just then, have at their disposal the administrative apparatus (mechanisms) (Verwaltungsapparate) which would allow them an effective control over the total planetary space just as little as they are capable of subjugating their own territory to a uniform (unified) legislation which also encompasses all areas (sectors) of life. And just

like in their interior spaces the sites of what is new in the economy and administration leave the impression of larger or smaller islands in a sea of estate-based (feudal) patriarchalism (Patriarchalismus), so too the economic and military branches of the planetary Powers in the various continents constitute knots in a sparse network and operate like scattered outposts inside of a, for the most part, unexplored, exotic, (in fact) magical-unreal space whose dimensions only gradually penetrate the consciousness as concrete magnitudes (als konkrete Größen). The room to move (unfolding space; Spielraum) of planetary politics frequently consists of disjointed territories; the cohesion (coherence) between them is brought about not so much through the intensification of communications (and transportation), but rather through the endeavour of the planetary Powers at consolidating their own respective spheres of influence (Einflußsphären) and at delimiting them against other spheres of influence. This endeavour was intensive and triggered fierce struggles, nonetheless these struggles were conducted, in accordance with today's criteria, at a leisurely tempo and through the mobilisation of relatively small forces in a few decisive positions.

The degree of density and the general character of planetary politics changes substantially in the course of the subsequent phase, which is marked by the victorious Liberal and Industrial Revolution. The planetary network now becomes denser not only because modern industry needs and creates much greater possibilities of communication, while it simultaneously awakens or intensifies the need for exchange at many levels, but just as much because the modern state, which consistently put aside the remnants of estate-based society (patriarchalist feudalism; Ständetums), makes the administrative means (technical means of administration; verwaltungstechnischen Mittel) available for the

organisation of large territories. Now countries, which previously were watched over only through military bases and trading posts, can be brought under more or less tight control. Thus, the possibility is offered of making out of the network of former (military) bases (and trading posts) compact spaces (Raummassen) as well as of splitting up the spaces between the planetary Powers. We are here dealing with the classical epoch of imperialism (Imperialismus), which not by chance coincides with the heyday of European liberalism (Liberalismus). The planetary Powers are in this or that (one or another) form liberal and imperialistic (liberal und imperialistisch) at the same time, because only through the liberal-capitalistic (liberal-kapitalistische) unleashing (surge, swift rise) of the industrial economy as well as through the creation of bourgeois states (bürgerlichen Staates) did imperialism (Imperialismus) gain not only the impetus, but also the instruments of its unfolding (die Instrumente zu seiner Entfaltung). Social groups, with which at the high level the bourgeoisie (Bürgertum) had to now and then share political power (e.g. noblemen who as military officers in the colonies sought a substitute for their lost or endangered social position in the homeland), and at the low level possessionless (landless, propertyless; besitzlose) strata, which in their country of origin could not hope for a rosy future, of course participated in the imperialist undertaking. In spite of the, for these reasons, interrelated general popularity of imperialism in the interior of planetary Powers, it (imperialism) (nevertheless) remained a bourgeois-liberal venture (bürgerlich-liberales Unterfangen) both as to its driving force (Triebkraft) as well as in a historical and structural respect. That is seen not least in the parallelism between the inner (internal) structure of the liberal-capitalistic states and the structure of the imperialistic system in toto: the separation and relation between ruling and colonial peoples inside of the imperialistic system corresponded with the separation and

relation between bourgeois and proletarians in the liberal-capitalistic states (Das zeigt sich nicht zuletzt an der Parallelität zwischen der inneren Struktur der liberal-kapitalistischen Staaten und der Struktur des imperialistischen Systems in toto: der Trennung bzw. Beziehung zwischen Bürger und Proletarier in den ersteren entsprach die Trennung bzw. Beziehung zwischen Herren- und Kolonialvölkern innerhalb des letzteren). The effect of liberal capitalism (liberalen Kapitalismus), however, ran (operated) in parallel (both) in the interior of the planetary Powers and inside of the imperialistic system: the large mass of the population was detached, through industry and the party system (the functioning of multi-party parliamentarism), from the fetters of patriarchalism and was thrown into the melting pot of mass society (in den Schmelztiegel der Massengesellschaft) just as the large mass of the proletarian peoples was torn out of its isolation, in order to be integrated into international society which was becoming increasingly denser. The imperialistic system initiated a massification process (Vermassungsvorgang) at the international level just as industrial capitalism (industrielle Kapitalismus) had to drive forward massification inside each and every respective national framework.

It is evident that the difference or the distance between the subjects and the objects of planetary politics in both its aforementioned phases was fundamental for the functioning of the planetary system, especially as this difference or distance was sanctioned under international law (völkerrechtlich sanktioniert) and moreover was underpinned (legitimised) by arguments taken from the philosophy of history and of culture (geschichts- und kulturphilosophischen Argumenten). Planetary politics was shaped by the planetary Powers deep (late) into (until almost the middle of) the twentieth century, whereas the rest of the Powers

constituted, to this or that (one or another) extent, the objects of (a) politics which was dictated by the planetary Powers as sovereign subjects. This state of affairs changed at an increasingly quicker tempo in the course of our century⁴, and indeed in the same sense and in the framework of the same world-historical process, as in the interior of the advanced nations, which as a rule also constituted the planetary Powers, mass democracy (Massendemokratie) gradually displaced oligarchic (oligarchischen) liberalism, that is, the principle of equality through "affluence for all" (Gleichheitsgrundsatz durch den „Wohlstand für alle“) was substantialised, advancing democratisation put in the place of a more or less closed oligarchy, the game of the open elite, and in the place of fixed hierarchies, an in principle unlimited social mobility, and the dominant ideology took on an individualistic, egalitarian and at the same time (value-)pluralistic⁵ character (die fortschreitende Demokratisierung an die Stelle der mehr oder weniger geschlossenen Oligarchien das Spiel der offenen Eliten und an die Stelle der festen Hierarchien eine prinzipiell unbegrenzte soziale Mobilität setzte und die herrschende Ideologie individualistischen, egalitären und zugleich (wert)pluralistischen Charakter annahm). Through the massive appearance (appearing on the scene; Aufkommen) of new nations and states, legally equal amongst themselves, planetary politics now gains a density and mobility analogous to (the density and mobility of) mass societies or mass democracies, which followed oligarchic liberalism. For the first time in human history a true world society comes into being (Es entsteht zum ersten Mal in der menschlichen Geschichte eine wahre Weltgesellschaft), which is indeed characterised by considerable actual inequalities and heterogeneities (non-uniformities; Ungleichartigkeiten), nevertheless on the other hand

⁴ The 20th century.

⁵ For "(wert)pluralistischen" Kondylis's own Greek translation (p. 20) reads: "(even in relation to ethical [moral] values)".

this world society professes the in principle equality of its members and recognises the same rights for them. Just as in the interior of developed mass democracy, so too inside of world society, equality has not been realised materially and in an all-round way (nicht materiell und allseitig verwirklicht), yet it is guaranteed under international law as well as at the level of declarations, and is constantly propagated; racist and other (similar) teachings, which gave their blessing to colonialistic and imperialistic relations of domination (die kolonialistische und imperialistische Herrschaftsverhältnisse) and even before the First World War were all over Europe much more self-evident than what one wants to admit today, are now frowned upon and are superseded, on the one hand by universalistic anthropological and ethical principles (durch universalistische anthropologische und ethische Grundsätze), and on the other hand by the favourable appreciation of various cultures, their uniqueness and their contribution to universal culture (durch wohlwollende Würdigung der verschiedenen Kulturen, ihrer Einmaligkeit und ihres Beitrages zur universellen Kultur).

After the collapse (Zusammenbruch) of the classical imperialism of the (former) planetary Powers, which projected the liberal separation between bourgeois and proletarian within the world of nations, now the "underdeveloped" countries (»unterentwickelten« Länder) were no longer looked upon as ignorant children, who need the wise guardianship of White Man, but rather as those in need or as (inferior) partners, to whom the same prospects of advancement as the former proletarians in the industrial nations (Industrienationen) must be given. While putting those principles into force, which in the interior of advanced mass democracies had (already) found practical application, at the international level, it is expected that the lower strata of world society, through affluence and

democratisation (Demokratisierung), will become integrated with (approach) the higher strata, and that finally the planet, seen as a whole (in its unity), will resemble a giant market and at the same time a giant social state, in which the resources and riches could be redistributed in favour of those have hitherto been disadvantaged (Benachteiligten). However, the leading Powers do not expect a global social balancing out (Ausgleich) from such a direct redistribution, which would bring with it unwelcome and in the long term perhaps also pointless sacrifices for the rich, but rather from fast economic growth in the "underdeveloped" countries - just like in the advanced mass democracies the affluence of the broad masses (der breiten Massen) came about more through the creation of new wealth thanks to the development of technology (technique) and (the) rising labour productivity than through the drastic redistribution of wealth already in existence. Growth in the until now weak places (regions, spots, positions) of the world economy seems to, incidentally, be precisely an advantage for the strong national economies so that eventually (, as is reckoned,) the same process might be repeated on a world scale as in the Western mass democracies, in which the social rise of the worker (labourer) (as consumer) in the long term boosted industry, although industry had to, in the process, bear some of the load (burden) of the welfare state (social state) while gnashing its teeth.

The following aspect of the complex analogy between mass democracy and the world economy must now be particularly emphasised. Just as inside the former, so too inside the latter the behaviour of (collective) subjects ((kollektiven) Subjekte) is determined less through actual and apparently difficult to remedy inequality (Ungleichheit) and more through the in principle recognised right to equality (Recht auf Gleichheit) - and indeed not merely equality of formal (legal) rights (Gleichheit der

formellen Rechte), but equality of enjoyment (pleasure; Genusses). The solemn (festive) recognition of this right, and (even if) only at the level of the declarations of the principle, creates the horizons of expectation which inspire long-term action, although in the everyday life of realpolitik (the pragmatic exercising of politics), consideration of the actual inequalities in power and wealth continues to normally be the decisive factor. Nonetheless, inequality is from now on only the reality which one must take into account, not a principle to which one must submit. That is why the appearance of the lower strata of world society on the international stage becomes all the more self-assured (self-conscious) and the boundaries between the subjects and the objects of planetary politics become increasingly fluid. This dramatic and epoch-making (world-historical) change becomes manifest if we contemplate the status of quite a few Asian and Arab states in planetary politics fifty years ago in comparison to today. It started, not by chance, with the seizure of power of the Bolsheviks (der Machtergreifung der Bolschewiken), in order to take world-wide dimensions during the Cold War and to (then) become irreversible. In their endeavour to mobilise the coloured and colonial peoples against the capitalistic metropolises (centres; Metropolen), the communists have substantially contributed to the spreading of today's prevalent principles of equality (haben die Kommunisten wesentlich zur Verbreitung der heute vorherrschenden Gleichheitsprinzipien), and at the same time they forced through their competition the camp of the (former) colonial Powers (durch ihre Konkurrenz das Lager der (ehemaligen) Kolonialmächte) to gradually adopt (seize hold (take possession) of; bemächtigen) the same vocabulary and the same positions. And the antagonism between East and West, especially during (in the time of) the Cold War, has in still another respect considerably heightened the density of planetary politics in its

mass-democratic phase (massendemokratischen Phase). The irreconcilability of the conflict, which could only be overcome through the elimination of one of the two sides, in (actual) fact (actually) or potentially turned every region of the planet into a contested place (spot), that is, it moved everything that was for one side a much sought-after aim into the centre of world interest: because this suffices in order that the same object can become for the other side a much sought-after aim as well (because it is enough for one side to desire an object so that the other side also desires the same object immediately). The immobility (stiffening, freezing; Erstarrung) of both camps inside of the existing borders during the Cold War, despite some change in the periphery, was a consequence of the atomic deterrence, and in any case is not comparable with the division of the planet into spheres of influence as it was partly practised during the preceding phase of planetary politics, that is the phase of imperialism.

The collapse of communism (Der Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus) and the end of the Cold War necessarily increase the material and ideational expectations which thrive on the basis of the generally (on all sides) recognised material principle of equality (materiellen Gleichheitsprinzips). Because the victor of the Cold War, the mass-democratic West, seems to show a path to the future, which after the disappearance (obliteration) of the great adversary is the only possible and only promising path. The coupling of freedom and affluence, which the West propagated in its political-ideological struggle (politisch-ideologischen Kampf) against communism, increasingly gained, as it were, (the status of) apodictic (incontrovertible) evidence (proof) (gradually came to be regarded as a self-evident axiom), and since, even where there is no political freedom in the Western sense, the solution to

economic problems in the framework of what is politically allowed (permissible) (or tolerated) on each and every respective occasion is left to the free activity of the (economising) subjects (as economic actors). The confirmation of the "Western model" through the manifest failure of the planned economy (Planwirtschaft) seems to have forever put aside doubts and unfruitful temptations, and in this respect this confirmation seems to have had a liberating effect (on the mind) and at the same time an effect of pointing the (right) way (forward, in terms of orientation). Nonetheless, one would be evading the main (essential) matter if one did not pose the elementary question as to why precisely such concerns and problems have moved to the centre of planetary politics. Still more concretely, this same question can be formulated as follows: what is the social-historical and political identity of the collective subjects which must (inevitably) connect their political activity (doing, conduct; Tun) with such objectives (targets, set aims; Zielsetzungen), regardless of what they may otherwise foster as national or geopolitical aspirations? As far as it concerns the industrially highly developed (hochentwickelten) Western countries, it cannot be stressed enough that they achieved the coupling of freedom and affluence, to which they attribute their victory in the Cold War, not as liberal but as mass-democratic social formations (Gesellschaftsformationen), as they left behind (namely) oligarchic liberalism through the process of democratisation and bridged the gap between bourgeois and proletarian (which sociologically ought not be confused with the gap between rich and poor since this gap exists in all historically known societies) through mass consumption and social mobility (den Massenkonsum und die soziale Mobilität), which in the end did away with both the bourgeois as well as the proletarian as clearly outlined sociological types (see Sec. IV). The countries which want to follow the path of the West do not have in mind bourgeois liberalism as

an ideal, but exactly mass democracy, and for that matter, do not have at their disposal either a socially decisive bourgeoisie capable of (political) domination (ein sozial ausschlaggebendes und herrschaftsfähiges Bürgertum), or corresponding political traditions; should they therefore ever approach (find a connection (become integrated) with) the West, then (it will happen) only at the level of mass democracy. They have to heed mass-democratic objectives because in the meantime they constitute mass societies, they have, that is, more or less, nolentes (or) volentes⁶ said goodbye to (broken away from) agrarian patriarchy and (agrarian) traditionalism (Traditionalismus) and, if they want to (after all) have a social-historical position in the modern world, then this can only be at the threshold of mass democracy.

This classification (putting in order; Einordnung) may seem disconcerting (paradoxical) in an era (a time) in which all kinds of nationalisms, regionalisms and traditionalisms are being revived, and the wheel of History is being turned back. Nevertheless, whoever is (has been) practised in the art of distinguishing between the nominal (face) value of ideologies or of programmes and their objective functions, or whoever has enough of a historical sense in order to be able to see that the invocation of a principle often serves the realisation of its opposite, cannot be put off (misled, deceived) by them (such phenomena (nationalisms, regionalisms and traditionalisms)). A closer examination of traditionalistic (traditionalistischer) currents can show how they must exactly through the radicalisation of tradition turn into movements of modernisation (durch Radikalisierung der Tradition in Modernisierungsbewegungen) if they want to remain politically relevant (see Sec. II). (Still existing) Patriarchal-traditional elements

⁶ Those who are unwilling or willing; willingly or unwillingly; whether they like it or not.

(patriarchalisch-traditionelle Elemente) (still in existence) are not historically decisive, even if they quantitatively predominate in certain regions of the world. Already the colonialism of the imperialistic Powers had inaugurated the transformation of patriarchally-clan-like (family-based) organised societies into mass societies, while it (this colonialism) subjected formerly (previously) autonomous groups to a unified (uniform) administration, in order to eventually force them into the melting pot of states with arbitrarily drawn borders. The population explosion (Die Bevölkerungsexplosion) and even the anomie (Anomie) dominant in large (many, wide) parts of the world have for their part forcefully contributed to the massification of traditional societies (Vermassung von traditionellen Gesellschaften). To (all of) that were also added the social consequences of communistic domination (rule) in many countries, in which earlier, in many cases (ways) still pre-capitalistic structures, were violently destroyed, i.e. the existing social units (entities) were atomised (smashed (broken up, fragmented) into individuals; atomisiert) and then the individuals were incorporated into political and economic or administrative mass organisations without consideration for traditional affiliations and loyalties (Dazu kamen die sozialen Auswirkungen der kommunistischen Herrschaft in vielen Ländern, in denen die früheren, vielfach noch vorkapitalistischen Strukturen gewaltsam zerstört, d. h. die vorhandenen sozialen Einheiten atomisiert und dann die Individuen ohne Rücksicht auf traditionelle Zugehörigkeiten und Loyalitäten in politische und wirtschaftliche oder administrative Massenorganisationen eingegliedert werden).

The unstable mass societies, which came from this long and many-sided massification process, are (see themselves) confronted (faced) with both great questions (problems) which in the advanced mass democracies of

the West seem to have been more or less satisfactorily solved. First, it is a matter of the (in the course of this) question of democratisation, namely the inevitable participation of mobile and insistent (persistent, persevering, pressing) masses in political and social events (life; Geschehen). In so far as this participation takes place (ensues) through the granting and exercising of political rights, which are frequently understood as human rights and are demanded as such, such said rights should not be judged ethically-abstractly, but looked at as the practical means, which cause the constant expansion of the circle from which the ruling elite can be recruited in order to supersede the old oligarchies. Because such rights, e.g. freedom of speech, do not first see the light of day through democratisation; in the pre-democratic state of affairs (i.e. situation) their exercise was merely restricted to the circle of those ruling, and their transference (passing on, granting; Übertragung) to others concretely means that all the more people become able to rule (domination-capable) or may announce claims to domination. In its essential and primary interrelation with the massification process, democratisation even takes place in mass societies which hardly know or recognise political rights in the Western sense, so that in them political activity must unfold (develop; entfaltet werden) through other channels; (either) Caesars or homines novi⁷ here take care of democratisation, who disregard patriarchal oligarchies and put aside autonomous clan-based (forms of) rule (domination) (clans) in order to distribute (allocate) power and domination (rule, dominion, authority) to their followers (believers), (or) as well as mass movements (Massenbewegungen), irrespective of what colour, which derive their loyalties partly from charismatic leaders,

⁷ "New men" who seek political office, public power etc. (more specifically, in ancient Rome, these men were inter alia the first in their families to serve in the Senate or be elected as consul).

partly from universal principles, before whom individuals feel equal amongst one another in the(ir) common subjection.

Yet with democratisation on its own the job is not done in the newly coming into being or being shaped mass societies. Economic modernisation and economic growth must (also) arrive (be added), and indeed not only because the growing population needs nourishment or because the defence of a poor state increasingly meets with difficulties under today's technical conditions. Another, namely social (motive) is connected with these motives, which in themselves have a sufficiently pressing (coercive) effect. Only economic modernisation and intensification of the economic effort can ultimately create social structures (soziale Strukturen) which tie individuals to permanent (fixed) functions and an overarching (social) whole (übergreifendes Ganzes) so that the acute danger of anomie can be brought to a halt. The patriarchal-traditional forms of social organisation could only function with a limited number of people, the comprehensibility of the social whole (concise and controllable magnitude of the group) was therefore the condition of (their) existence, which ceases to apply when (the number of) people multiply (increase(s)) so much that they cannot be pressed any more into the narrow limits of conventional institutions (herkömmlichen Institutionen). Anomie and social disintegration automatically set in (come about, occur) when the old framework cannot absorb (include) (all) people, it (the old framework) in fact breaks into pieces (crumbles, fragments) under their pressure while there is no stable new framework (yet). In this intermediate state of affairs only modernisation and expansion of the economy can be a remedy (can help), because only the (with that) interrelated (contemporary) division of labour (Arbeitsteilung) can organise (structure) large masses in the form of a social whole and

accordingly discipline them. Massification can consequently prove to be the force which in itself presses for both democratisation as well as for economic modernisation.

Democratisation and economic growth on a highly technicised (advanced technical) basis (auf hochtechnisierter Basis) constitute for their part the bridge for the transition of a mass society to a mass democracy of the Western type. The latter of course arose from a mass society as well, which in the course of the Industrial Revolution conclusively destroyed feudal-patriarchal Europe and drove people in herds into cities. This pre-democratic mass society therefore here coincided to a great extent with the rule (domination) of oligarchic liberalism. Therein lies the important and for the future perhaps decisive (deciding) difference between Western development and the course of things in (most of) the other societies in which the massification process is not carried out in those forms which in the West (have) set the course for (prescribed, worked out) a more or less painless transition to modern mass democracy. In the West, the hierarchies of liberal class society were gradually brought down (demolished, made to collapse) through the tempestuous development of technology (technique), the progress in (refinement of) the division of labour, social mobility and mass affluence (Massenwohlstand).

Atomisation (The breaking up (smashing, fragmentation) of society into individuals; Atomisierung) and social leveling (soziale Nivellierung) followed these changes or accompanied them and were legitimised in fact through reinterpretations (i.e. meta-interpretations; Umdeutungen) of already victorious liberalism. In (most of) the other societies, however, social leveling and atomisation have long ago spread without being sufficiently offset (counterbalanced) by technical and economic progress; because of that, social leveling and atomisation very often set the forces

of anomie free, which then have to be contained (reined in, bridled) by totalitarian or authoritarian, religious or Caesaristic mass movements (durch totalitäre oder autoritäre, religiöse oder cäsaristische Massenbewegungen).

This discussion already points to the source of possible conflicts in the framework of (today's) planetary politics. A number of observers could (might) think (believe) that the unanimity (agreement) achieved (reached) for the time being after the end of the Cold War over (as regards) the superiority of the Western system and the founded (based) in (respect of) this unanimity, commonality of objectives (common goals (targets, aims); Gemeinsamkeit der Zielsetzungen), will (would) lead to consensus and co-operation. Peaceful co-existence in mutual harmony however does not at all result from the commonality of objectives in itself, but from the agreement over which position (rank) every side will take up during the pursuit of the common aim (goal) and what advantages every side will derive (draw) from the common aim's possible (potential) realisation. If the opinions over this, in practice, decisive question diverge (are divided, branch off from one another), then the commonality of the aim does not (for instance) contribute to the easing (moderation, mitigation) but precisely to the intensification of the conflicts, and indeed for the same reason that the butcher is in a state of enmity not with the fruiterer but with the butcher next door (down the street). The commonality of the aim means (the in fact) rivalry over the same resources, over the same spaces and over the same prizes. Precisely (Especially) successes, which would have been achieved on the path of the West (with Western methods), could bring those who are successful both into conflict with the West as well as into conflict amongst (with) one another. But the absence of such successes could bring about the same effect too. In the field of tension

(area of conflict; Spannungsfeld) between the unavoidability of the objective and the impossibility of its realisation, imponderable or even explosive reactions could be given vent to (When it is believed that certain aims must be necessarily set and realised, while at the same time it is ascertained that their realisation is impossible, there, explosive reactions are most likely to ensue); a sense (feeling) of historical hopelessness and aggressive disenchantment (disillusionment, disappointment) must overcome (seize) nations which would see that they are not in a position of bringing about (off) (managing) what, in accordance with the general view (opinion, perception), is to be expected of anyone who does not want to be the pariah and the leper of the modern world. The emerging universality of the objectives will constitute also in this respect more of a cause of tension than a factor of mutual understanding. This universality cannot be done any harm (damaged, substantially disturbed) by the fact that every side will apprehend and will realise the universally recognised aims (goals) and (corresponding) values as its concrete power position and situation (die universell anerkannten Ziele und Werte... wie ihre konkrete Machtposition and Lage) dictates to (prescribes) (can appear advisable to) it on each and every respective occasion. It will (would) not, incidentally, be a world-historical novum if mass democracy as (a) planetarily unfolded (developed) social formation (a social formation of planetary dimensions) would show (have, display, present) various forms which are due to the different level of development and different conditions of development; with (in respect of) slavery, feudalism or bourgeois liberalism it has not been (was not (any)) different (otherwise).

It must be expected that very many conflicts of the planetary period (age) underway will occur (appear) from the perspective and with the self-

understanding of the ideological subjects (Selbstverständnis der ideologischen Subjekte) as opposites between different historical traditions. The decisive factor, nevertheless, will be overlooked if one wanted to describe the situation by means of ((beginning) with) such categories. What is decisive is contained (hiding) in the question as to which driving (motive) forces today (of all days) mobilise traditions and lead them onto (into) the field (of combat) to face one another. These driving forces do not lie (are not latent (dormant)) in the traditions themselves, which for that matter take root for the most part in worlds dead long ago, but are the driving forces of modern mass-democratic objectives (aspirations and goals (aims)), which have already captured (embraced) the whole planet. If one does not see this, (thus, then) one is not able to appropriately judge (weigh up) either today's planetary conjuncture (constellation) nor the role and the weight of traditions in it. The blanket assertion that there have always been conflicts, and indeed bloody ones, between people and there will be (conflicts) in the future as well, would also be minimally enlightening. This assertion is right (correct), but we are here dealing with an anthropological and not a sociological and historical statement, which must remain empty if it cannot answer (clarify) the question as to what constitutes the most common (the leading (strongest)) and most likely (probable) cause of conflict in this concrete planetary situation. No science of man and of politics can get by without resorting to constants, however no concrete political analysis is possible if it neglects the specification of constants in each and every respective situation. For an analysis of planetary politics in the mass-democratic age such a specification is advisable particularly with regard to the (matter of the) relations between the political (politics) and the economic (economy) as well as to the functions (matter) of statehood.

2. The economisation of the political (The fusion of politics with the economy) (Die Ökonomisierung des Politischen)

The question of the relations between the political (politics) and the economic (economics) (Politischem und Ökonomischem) had to be posed in the New Times, as (when) a radical change (revolution, overturning; Umwälzung), whose world-historical meaning can be compared only with the "Neolithic (Agricultural) Revolution", namely the Industrial Revolution which erupted (broke out) after (the) long and lively (intense) merchant(mercantile)-capitalistic activity, created the impression of the independence (Eigenständigkeit), in fact the social primacy of the economic factor (amongst the forms of social action). That was not merely an academic or unpolemical impression (akademischer oder unpolemischer Eindruck), because the triumphant economic (economy) had a tangible social bearer, who had a real *political* interest in the spreading (diffusion; Verbreitung) of the perception that "politics" (i.e. the domination (rule) of monarchs and strata which stem from the pre-capitalistic world) is, in comparison to the economy which is obviously necessary for life, not only secondary, but even a hindrance (obstructive) and in the long term dispensable; the here implied sharp separation of the political (politics) from the economic (economy) appeared to be confirmed by the attempts of anti-bourgeois (conservative and absolutist) forces at controlling (ruling, governing), if possible, the state and at turning it into a bulwark against the unfolding (rise, development; Entfaltung) of the capitalistic bourgeoisie. Yet even after its partial or complete political imposition, the bourgeoisie did not substantially change (has not changed) this perception it has (its convictions) regarding the relations between the political (politics) and the economic (economy).

Politics continued to appear as a more or less necessary evil, however here the thesis (in respect) of the independence of society vis-à-vis the state, and of the economy vis-à-vis politics, fulfilled an additional ideological function; it intended to deny or hush (cover) up the concrete help which the state in several (many) (direct) ways and in roundabout ways was able to give (offer) (to) the capitalistic economy, and to make the state out to be the mere guarantor of the common good (public interest) (Gemeinwohls), which exercises its absolutely indispensable activity somewhere (or other) in the background and as discretely as possible. Socialists, above all of Marxist provenance (the Marxist wing), raised an objection to this fiction; nevertheless, despite the social-political conflict (opposition, contrasting) of liberalism and Marxism, liberal economism found its way (slipped) into the Marxist thoughts world (i.e. system of ideas) (Gedankenwelt) in the form of the sociological axiom ((fundamental) principle) also pertaining to the philosophy of history (in Form des geschichtsphilosophischen und soziologischen Grundsatzes), that the economy constitutes the base (Basis) upon which the political and ideological superstructure (Überbau) is built up (raised, erected). The common dogmatic confession of faith of liberalism and Marxism in the primacy of the economy and society vis-à-vis politics and the state is reflected (reverberates) in the social utopia of both trends (schools of thought, liberalism and Marxism), which vary (are variations on) the theme of the withering (away) (Dahinwelkens) of the state and politics. The Marxist vision of the future of a classless society, in which the (economising) subjects (as economic actors) (wirtschaftenden Subjekte) would govern (administer) themselves without having to exercise (pursue, drive) politics in the traditional sense, corresponded to (the) liberal wishful thinking (desired image; Wunschbild) (in respect) of the replacement of war with (by) trade inside of a unified world in which

partly the "invisible hand", partly universal-ethical principles (universalethische Prinzipien) would prevail (dominate). It is obvious that both (these) outlines (historical programmes) were founded on the belief in the possibility of an economisation of the political (the fusion of politics with the economy) (Ökonomisierung des Politischen), i.e. a coming undone (an absorption; eines Aufgehens) of political functions (with)in (the) economic (functions), and that this belief for its part was based on the assumption of the independence and the social priority of the economic (economy).

The economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) could not be realised either with liberal or with Marxist signs (i.e. symbolism) (Vorzeichen). The trader (and the businessman) had to call (ask) for (demand) the help (support), rather than the putting aside (abolition) (Beseitigung), of the politician and the military officer (warrior), whereas the Marxists who had come (came) to power practised an unprecedented politicisation of the economic (subjected to an unprecedented extent the economy to political goals) (Politisierung des Ökonomischen) instead of following the reverse (opposite) path. The economic (economy) could not develop the expected independent (self-sufficient) law bindedness (Eigengesetzlichkeit), and indeed for the simple reason because this independent law bindedness was an ideological assumption (construct) and not reality. That does not lie in the fact that - as one often argues against historical materialism - ideational, political, geographic etc. magnitudes are at least equal to the economy as historical factors, but is due to the original and essential (substantial; wesensgemäßen) interweaving of factors of the economic (economy) with factors of (interrelated with) power and domination (Macht- und Herrschaftsfaktoren); the "economy" is no less than "politics" or

"intellectual(mental)-spiritual (geistiges) life" a question of the concrete grouping (group formation) (konkreter Gruppierung) of people, of concrete relations of (between) concrete people ((as) between one another). But we cannot pursue (follow up) here this highly tricky (intricate) and at the same time fascinating (captivating, attractive) question any further. The inability of (both) liberalism and Marxism to economise the political (fuse politics with the economy) (each) in their (its own) sense, gains (acquires, obtains) its retrospective interest from (if compared to) the way an entirely different(ly crafted) economisation of the political (fusion of the two magnitudes) took place under the conditions (circumstances) of Western mass democracy. This mass-democratic economisation of the political (fusion of politics and economy) has namely neither brought about the sovereign autocracy (monocracy, sole reign) of the separated (pure, isolated; abgesonderten) economic (economy) nor the discontinuance (eclipse) of the political (politics), but (created) a state of affairs (situation) in which politics must (is obliged to) constantly and systematically deal with economic questions (matters), that is, it must go beyond the mere laying down (fixing) of general guidelines, while changes in the political correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) (Kräfteverhältnis) very often take place by means of redistributions (of the national income) and also through more or less institutionalised economic struggles - as well as conversely. The economy is indeed in large part (to a very large extent) in private hands, however the economic is (economic matters are) at the centre of public attention, and the political elite are judged on (in respect of) their performance (Leistung) not least (mainly) on the basis of the results of their activity with regard to the economy.

The existing discrepancy between the private ownership (proprietorship, possession; Besitz) of a very large part of the economy and the public character of the economic (economic matters) in mass democracy must be registered (noted) very carefully (accurately). It implies (entails) that the privately managed (controlled, run, directed, guided, steered; gelenkte) economy is under constant political pressure to prove its productivity (efficiency, competitiveness; Leistungsfähigkeit) and its suitability (ability) at serving the material common good (general material interest; materiellen Gemeinwohl) more effectively (better) than for instance a planned economy. Precisely because public expectations are linked to it (the privately managed economy), it finds itself (is) in a state (situation) of osmosis with the state and the political (politics) - it, that is, reckons on (expects, awaits) the support of "politics" in order to fulfil (do justice to) its social task (mission). Striving for (The pursuit of) profit and status (social prestige) in fact (of course) motivates the bearers of the private economy (sector) (privaten Wirtschaft) more than the pure love of people (one's neighbour, humankind, people), but "politics", which cannot possibly evade (get out of, shirk) the pressure of mass-democratic expectations, must keep in mind (weigh up, ponder) the effects (consequences) of the activity of the private economy (sector) (privatwirtschaftlicher Tätigkeiten) for the collective (all, everyone) (das Kollektiv) and (must), despite all (of its) possible sympathy for the "entrepreneur", take into account the vox populi. The successes of the private sector (privaten Sektors) of the economy in the Western mass democracies after the Second World War and its (the private sector's) new self-confidence (self-assurance) (Selbstbewußtsein) after the collapse (breakdown) of the communistic state economies (nach dem Zusammenbruch der kommunistischen Staatswirtschaften) all too often let (make) the social and political prerequisites (preconditions,

presuppositions; Voraussetzungen) of private economic (sector) activity be forgotten and suggest (leave), at least to (amongst) the favourably inclined ((pre)disposed) (to it (private economic activity)), the impression that the liberal economic (ökonomistische) dream would be (has (already) been) realised beyond (on the other side of) traditional "power politics" („Machtpolitik“). It is moreover overlooked that the public sector, despite all the "privatisations", quantitatively and often also qualitatively remains superior, and the "neoliberal" intoxication (high) of the last decade has also not been able to replace or restrict (moderate, reduce) it (the public sector) to a considerable (significant) extent. The economisation of the political (The fusion of politics with the economy) under mass-democratic conditions does not in the least mean therefore its (the political's) abolition or the increasing (progressive) weakening (attenuation), but a necessary interweaving of the *political* concept (Begriffs) of the common good (general interest) with economic questions (matters) against the background (in the context) of a mass-producing and mass-consuming society (society where the processes of mass production and mass consumption dominate) (einer massenhaft produzierenden und massenhaft konsumierenden Gesellschaft).

The concept of the economic (economy) crossed over (was connected) with the concept of the common good (general interest), and concern over (worrying (caring) about) the economy with concern over (worrying (caring) about) the common good (general interest), because mass democracy, (by virtue, because, out) of (from) its social character, must strive for the gradual conversion (transformation) of the formal right of equality into a material right. However, the materialisation of formal rights (Die Materialisierung formeller Rechte) can only be brought off (effected, managed) through the continuously higher (improved) output

(i.e. performance) (return) (Leistungen) of the economy and through redistributions of the profits generated (within the national income), which increases (heightens, boosts, strengthens) the purchasing power of the large (great) masses. The priority of concern over (worrying (caring) about) the economy is inseparably interrelated with the *political* process of democratisation (democratisation process), that is why the economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) in the explained sense (sense we explained (above)) constitutes a specific feature (characteristic) (differentia specifica; Spezifikum) of mass *democracy*, which (only with difficulty) goes together with (matches) other social formations, i.e. with other power relations and relations of domination (Macht- und Herrschaftsverhältnissen) (with difficulty). Incidentally, it (the economisation of the political) is already founded (based) on (dictated by) the necessity of making elementary provision for the existence (die elementare Daseinsvorsorge) of huge (enormous) congregations (gatherings) of people and consequently of maintaining (sustaining, conserving, safeguarding) an indispensable precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) of (social and) political order (eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung politischer Ordnung). The unheard-of (outrageous, unprecedented) and, one might say, scandalous novum of highly technicised (hyperdeveloped) industrial and service society in comparison to (the) earlier (former) agrarian societies, namely being able to supply (let) masses of people with (to come into) the ample (plentiful) consumption (enjoyment) of nourishment (i.e. food) and energy, who do not directly produce that sort of thing, must be fought for daily through innumerably (innumerable, huge numbers of) combined actions, and in its fragility it is not allowed to be left to coincidences and uncontrolled improvisations. It (This novum) turns into a political issue of the highest order, and no mass-democratic politics can endure if it is not able (in a

position) to guarantee (the) elementary provision for the existence (of the large masses).

In this direct dependence of modern mass existence (life) (Massendaseins) on a highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) and productive (efficient, competitive) economy (einer hochtechnisierten und leistungsfähigen Wirtschaft) lies the primary reason for the spreading of the mass-democratic economisation of the political over planetary politics (fusion of politics and economy spreads (extends) over the whole field of today's planetary politics). The mass societies of the Second and the Third World stand before the pressing (urgent) and complicated task of feeding (nourishing) enormous crowds (masses) of people, which moreover most of them (these crowds) quickly multiply. The necessity, caused already because of this, of an interweaving of political and economic endeavours (efforts) becomes understood in all its depth if we remind ourselves again that the economy and the division of labour, as a result of the progressive (gradual) dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of patriarchal-traditional structures of society (traditional patriarchal social structures) (der fortschreitenden Auflösung patriarchalisch-traditioneller Gesellschaftsstrukturen), increasingly undertakes (takes on) the role of socially disciplining forces (forces securing social discipline) (sozial disziplinierenden Kräften) in order to keep a tight rein on anomie (Anomie). The political (Politics) therefore is economised (fused with the economy) already to the extent a central political magnitude, inner (internal, domestic) order, is dependent on the performance of the economy. The transference of the so (thus) understood connection of the political and the economic (politics and economy) from the interior of states to the wide level of planetary politics results in the widespread view that the international order would best be consolidated

(strengthened) on the basis of general economic growth and (the) effective performance (and division) of labour amongst (between) the various nations. In the process it is assumed that (by the supporters of) such a development, if it proceeds harmonically (and in a balanced way), would make the demand for a more or less dirigiste (i.e. administrative) (dirigistischen) redistribution of world wealth of itself objectless (unnecessary, pointless; gegenstandslos). Nevertheless this latter demand arises (corresponds) for its part from (to) the transference of another essential aspect of the mass-democratic economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) to the level of planetary politics. The economisation of the political (fusion of politics and economy) (indeed also) means (inter alia) that politics is exercised (acted out) over (through) distributions and redistributions of economic goods, which become all the more urgent (pressing) the more the interpretation of the principle of equality gains ground and, apart from the redistribution of economic goods, forces (imposes) the redistribution of political goods, that is, of power and domination. The already begun material interpretation of human rights (materielle Interpretation der Menschenrechte) is interwoven (crossed over) with such egalitarian political-economic objectives (targets, set aims) and comes to the same practical result (see Sec. V, 2).

The economisation of the political (fusion of politics and economy) in the present (today's) phase of planetary politics means, finally (in the end), that politics is increasingly dependent on the most modern technology (technique) for the achievement (attainment) of power aims (Machtzielen) in the traditional strategic and geopolitical sense of the word. Certainly, this was no different (had not been otherwise) during the entire time (period) of the Second Industrial Revolution, however the

Third Industrial Revolution, whose great development (flourishing) was not coincidentally (by chance) accompanied by the building up (consolidation, rise) of Western mass democracy after the Second World War, resulted in (had the effect of) (the) disposing of (abolishing), on the basis of electronics and automation, the boundaries between "civilian" and "military" technology (Technologie). In order to bring developed (advanced) military technology to bear (on society) (For the development and use of advanced military technology), one does not have to use other methods of work and very frequently too neither other devices (machines; Geräte) than those used in the civilian economy, so that skipping (the transition) from the civilian to the military sector becomes increasingly unproblematic (cf. Sec. III). That again implies (entails) an increasing difficulty in raising the level of military technology above civilian technology to a significant (not inconsiderable) extent, that is, treating (dealing with) (the development of) military technology as a separate and privileged area as was partly still possible during the time of the Second Industrial Revolution. The concern over (worrying (caring) about) the safeguarding (protection, securing) of politics' traditional means of power (traditional means of political power) is therefore mixed more and more with concern over the safeguarding of its (politics' traditional means of power's) economic preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions), the political (politics) is in this respect economised (fused with the economy) to the same extent that the economic (economy) can pass from (the) civilian to (the) military (functions) without any profound differentiation.

With such a possibility of adapting the civilian economy to military goals (ends, purposes; Zwecke) or, (formulated) more generally, with such a pushing through (an imposition) of the economic with political possibilities (when the economy has such political possibilities) (from

military presence to development (foreign) aid), (then of course) the traditional liberal distinction between the political ("politics") and the economic ("economy") becomes obsolete and misleading. Both these terms in their contradistinction may only just be used conventionally and for the sake of understanding in order to outline (the) priorities in accordance with (corresponding to) common (familiar) notions. That is why the, in many places, celebrated revaluation of the economic factor and of the economic (economic matters) after the political-military race (competition) (Wettlauf) of the Cold War is not (cannot be) looked upon as the incipient realisation of the liberal utopia of the replacement of war with (by, through) trade, which starts out from the assumption of the autonomy (independence) of the economic (economy) in its contrasting to the political (politics). It can hardly be disputed that the network of international economic relations in recent decades has considerably (significantly) thickened, multinational enterprises (die multinationalen Unternehmen) have multiplied and the joint manufacture (production) of highly technical (high technology) (hochtechnischer) products on the part of two or more nations occurs more frequently. Nonetheless, this development by no means is so wide(spread) that it has (would have) reached the point of no return beyond (on the other side of) all interventionisms and protectionisms, and that is why we cannot know whether it (this development) will entail the putting aside (elimination, abolition) of all borders or the establishing (constitution) of new economic empires against which others will have to delimit themselves (fence themselves off). Historical analogies show, at any rate, that tensions (Spannungen) can grow precisely in times of (the) increasing (progressive) interweaving (interconnection) (of interests): proximity (nearness), not distance, generates (causes) (the many kinds of) friction(s). (Large-scale) Interweavings (Interconnections, Integrations)

(Verflechtungen) (of a greater extent) proceed (take place), as a rule, so that an economic Power (Wirtschaftsmacht) can penetrate deep enough into the territory (area) of another (economic Power), roughly (approximately) equivalent (gleichwertigen), in order to inspire unrest (restlessness) or angst (or fear) (Unruhe oder Angst) (disturb or frighten) (in) this (latter economic Power)), but not far enough in order to establish (bring about) a comprehensive community of interests on this or that (one or another) basis; as (while) it (the former economic Power) gains partners by its penetration, it simultaneously creates foes (enemies; Feinde) which feel threatened by the competition and do not want to shy away from the use of political means for the safeguarding (protection) of their economic interests. A community of interests is rather to be expected amongst partners of unequal strength (capacity), in relation to which the weaker side, with pleasure or reluctantly (willingly or unwillingly), adapts to the stronger (side) and through this adaptation more or less lives well. However, it is not such partnerships which determine the course of planetary politics.

Our conclusion can hence, once more in accordance with the use of the conventional (handed down) dualistic terminology (herkömmlichen dualistischen Terminologie), read as follows: behind the economisation of the political (the conversion of politics into economy), as it was shaped (took place) in the mass-democratic age (era), the possibility of the politicisation of the economic (economy) constantly looms (emerges). If the economy is the command and the fate (destiny) of the times, then striving for power must, i.e. the struggle over the consolidation (strengthening) or changing of certain relations between people, pave the way for itself through the economy. It is a logical and anthropological mistake (ein logischer und anthropologischer Fehler) to identify (equate)

striving for power with politics, in the sense of (understood as) the non-economic (im Sinne des Nicht-Ökonomischen), and from the discontinuance (eclipse) of the latter (politics) to conclude (infer) the inevitable elimination of the former (striving for power).⁸

3. End or change in function of sovereign statehood? (Ende oder Funktionswandel der souveränen Staatlichkeit?)

There has often been talk in our century of the end of modern (sovereign) statehood (Staatlichkeit) as this was constituted (formed) in the European New Times. The supporters of universal-ethical views (universal ethics), which thrive (rule, dominate) in the mass-democratic thoughts world (i.e. ideological universe) (Gedankenwelt) precisely as the reverse side of a radical (extreme) individualism, have connected with this end (of modern sovereign statehood) emancipatory hopes, others on the other hand (against that) fear the loss of real (tangible) political guarantees for inner (internal, domestic) and international order. In order to be able to look at things soberly (unemotionally), we must first of all leave behind us (aside) both the democratic as well as the authoritarian legend (mythology) of the modern sovereign state (souveränen Staat). If we see in the former (democratic legend) a power or rather a violence, which in the interests of those ruling, suppressed movements of freedom and demands of equality from below, (so) the latter (authoritarian legend) makes it (the modern sovereign state) out to be an autonomous entity standing above all classes and particular interests, a mortal God guarding

⁸ This is because power as an anthropological constant or category is something, when broadly defined, permeates all human behaviour and social action, including economic activity, since it is an inseparable part of self-preservation, i.e. living or survival, and of course intersects at all points within the spectrum of the social relation and its polarity of friendship and enmity. See Kondylis's key theoretical works: *Macht und Entscheidung* [Power and Decision] (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1984) and *Das Politische und der Mensch* [The Political and Man] (Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1999).

(looking after, minding) the public interest. In both cases the political-ideological intention led to the negative or positive hypostatisations (Hypostisierungen) which are barely suitable for the comprehension of the respective functions of the new-times states. Since its formation this state at times came to help reform, at other times reaction, sometimes the defence and sometimes the combating of existing interests. Democrats and socialists did (have) not feel unwell (discomfort) if they enjoyed state power (Staatsmacht), whereas authoritarian-minded people promptly (have) lost respect for the mortal God whenever it (this mortal God) granted its favour to others. That means: the new-times state (der neuzeitliche Staat) has been (was) an infinitely plastic and adaptable instrument, in its already centuries-old history it has allied itself with very different social strata and served the most different objectives, while on each and every respective occasion it changed its extent, its form of organisation and its physical bearers. Yet talk of the end of statehood could not and would not take into account the historical facts (of the case) and course (in their fluctuations). It (This talk) above all audibly protested (made protest) from the authoritarian point of view, and indeed on the one hand, against the increasing mass-democratic orientation of state politics in the 20th century, on the other hand, against what seemed (to be) the inability at acting as regards (exercising) foreign policy of a "liberal" or mass-democratic state. Here this talk had in mind an obviously normative (normativer) concept of the ("true") state which was acclaimed as a fact formative for an entire historical epoch. The attack of this authoritarian (in its social inspiration actually (mainly) old-liberal) perception against the mass-democratic state, which of course from the point of view of its (this authoritarian perception's) normative concept of the state could no longer be (constitute) a "true (genuine)" state, focused (concentrated) not least of all (primarily) on the economisation of the

political (fusion of politics with the economy), which supposedly (allegedly) deprived the state of its former dignity (exalted position; Würde) as guardian (custodian) of the common good (general interest) and made it the weak-willed organ of private interests. In the course of this, the (really) *political* aspects of the economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) were overlooked, which we indicated (mentioned, discussed) in the previous sub-section. Not only are the provision for (elementary) existence (as a barrier (damn) against anomie) and redistribution political acts par excellence, but also the economisation of the political (fusion of the political with the economy) (has) turned (made) the state to a great extent (into) the largest employer and the administrator of the lion's share of the national income. One must of course overlook the highly political character of these developments if one holds to a one-sided and long ago overtaken (surpassed) concept of politics.

With regard to the planetary politics of this century, the thesis of the end of (sovereign) statehood asserted (underlined) that the subjection (subjugation) of the foreign policy activity of states to universal-ethical principles would have to (necessarily) destroy (abolish) sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) because it (this subjection) criminalised (and made punishable) the *raison d' état* (state (national) interest) as legitimate guideline of state action and consequently deprived this (state action) of the (its) only (possible) (a unique) sovereign basis. In the Cold War it seemed that (sovereign) statehood was under fire from (being attacked by) both sides, because both conducted their struggle in the name of universalistic and internationalistic (internationalistischer), that is, liberal and proletarian principles, to which the loyalty of the individual was supposed (meant) to apply more than to one's own (no matter how

obtained) state (of origin). This description of the situation (things) indeed contains important observations and yet does not exhaust all aspects (of the problem) in such a way that from it (this description) the end of sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) in itself and in general might be concluded (inferred). First of all, it is not historically and methodologically (methodically) correct to contrast the ideological self-understanding of a stylised (European) past with partial (certain) aspects of the (planetary) reality of the present. Even in its heyday (golden age) the *raison d' état* (state (national) interest) did not at all spurn (disdain) the propagandistic alliance with Christian and ethical (that is, universalistic) principles, just as the propagation of universal-ethical principles as guidelines of international politics in this century contains a sizable (considerable) portion (amount) of *raison d' état* (state (national) interest) (favoured to a large extent the interests of certain states). (The concept of sovereign) Statehood in fact constituted (was used as) an argument under international law for one's own matters and one's own state (whenever one's own interests and one's own state were threatened), however one could often lack the necessary respect for one's own rules when it was a matter of another's state; because respect normally lasted only as long as the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) compelled (imposed) it (respect). For that reason, sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) on European soil took a particularly distinctive (clear-cut) shape as a system of states, having come into being, which either were equally strong amongst (as) one another or could atone for (rectify) (any) lack of strength through expedient (useful) alliances. That which was called "classical (sovereign) statehood", thrived under particular conditions which had to do with a certain power constellation (i.e. correlation of forces) (*Machtkonstellation*) *between* the large (great) European states and not necessarily with the inner (internal) development of states as

(specifically) new-times constructs (with specific features). Because of that, essentially only those states which compromised (constituted, formed) this constellation (the system of European powers) were furnished with (ascribed, granted) the attributes of (sovereign) statehood. The Napoleonic wars and the (arbitrary) way in which sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) was handled (confronted, faced) in those world-historically important years prove (by the way) *ex negativo*⁹ the dependence of "classical (sovereign) statehood" on a certain situation, in which the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) made possible and even required (demanded) certain rules of the game. It was an oligarchic sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) (sovereign statehood based on the oligarchy of a few states), if one may say so, and it faded not so much because (here) its principles ceased to apply (were annulled, lapsed), but rather because the latter (these principles) were extended to a broader - initially European and then planetary - space, in which states could not form amongst (between) themselves any constellation (political combinations) whatsoever of the aforementioned sort (kind).

The Cold War (has) actually called into question this partly fictive, partly, through the particularities of European foreign policy, conditioned (determined) "classical (sovereign) statehood", because one side was (made) (declared, proclaimed, preached) strongly (loudly) at the programmatic level for (in favour of) the putting aside (abolition) of all state borders and states, that is, for (in favour of) the fraternisation (fellowship) of all peoples inside of a classless world society, in relation to which it (this side) esteems the attachment to this ideal as more important ((something) higher) than loyalty to one's own respective state

⁹ From (Out of) the negative. Indicating what something is by showing what it is not.

(of origin); the other side, again, contrasted to totalitarian practices, universal-ethical principles, and to shutting oneself off (fortification) behind the Iron Curtain, a vision of an open and unified world. Had these positions been able to be put into action, then of course the substance and the form of (sovereign) statehood would have gone (withered away and been lost). However, reality proceeded by differentiating itself from these ideals and principles, it namely channeled the programmatic declarations in such a way that they could be instrumentalised (used) (sich... instrumentalisieren) in favour of (serve precisely) that (sovereign) statehood which they were supposed to have abolished if they were taken at face value. On the communistic side, proletarian internationalism (proletarische Internationalismus) was used for the ends (goals) of the sovereign statehood (souveränen Staatlichkeit) of the erstwhile (former) Soviet Union, and at the same time communistic movements of the greatest energy were interwoven with nationalistic objectives since the struggle against (the) capitalistic colonial masters (colonialism; Kolonialherren) pushed (impelled) (suggested to) communism (towards) belief in nationalism; states such as China or Vietnam for instance came from (out of) such movements, which asserted (defended) their state sovereignty (staatliche Souveränität) in a proud, one might almost say, "classical" way. On the other hand, in the Western camp the rejection of proletarian internationalism led to a positive attitude towards (assessment of) the nation and towards the independent state as the natural political units. Concurrently, also in the West, the universalistic starting point (ethical universalism) was frequently put in (at) the service of imperial aspirations of the leading sovereign state power (i.e. of the United States). Already the massive summoning of (appeal to) universalistic-human rights principles for the shaping of international politics after the First World War had incidentally shown exceedingly (abundantly) clearly how

these (principles) can be handled selectively and (be) turned into (power-political) instruments (of power politics) (machtpolitische Instrumente) of certain (particular) states against other states. The concrete and particular application of abstract and universal principles in fact means the weakening of the sovereign statehood of one state, however it simultaneously means the strengthening of that (the sovereign statehood) of another state. (Sovereign) Statehood could then only have been destroyed (abolished) through the spreading (diffusion) of universal principles if these were taken at face value and applied consistently.

This short retrospective account should sharpen the mind (focus) (increase (our) awareness) (in respect) of today's constellation (conjuncture), in which (likewise) the gaining of the upper hand (predominance) of human rights universalism (menschenrechtlichen Universalismus) - along with the effect of international organisations and (the) economic interweavings (fusions, interconnections) - seems to be initiating (presaging) the end of (sovereign) statehood. Seen in terms of today's politics, this gaining of the upper hand (predominance) (Überhandnehmen) corresponds to the vital interests of several (many) sides which want to articulate quite a few (various) tangible demands in the language of human rights (see Sec. V). In a structural respect, we are dealing with a further aspect of the planetarisation of mass-democratic phenomena (transfer of mass-democratic phenomena to the planetary level), since the sociological facts of (the) mass-democratic atomisation (fragmentation of society into isolated individuals) and mass-democratic value pluralism (Wertpluralismus) find expression in the ethical language of human rights universalism. The (practical) consequence of that (their planetary application) would in any case be an abolition of state sovereignty (Staatsouveränität) through the intervention of foreign

Powers which would legitimise themselves (their actions) by invoking (appealing to) human rights; the distinct boundary (dividing line) between domestic and foreign policy, without which the sovereign state hardly exists (gets by, manages), would consequently be wiped out (lapse), which could be regarded as (the) counterpart (pendant) of (and this again would go with) the blurring of the boundaries between the private (sphere) and the public (sphere) (Privatem und Öffentlichem) in the interior of mass democracy. - Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful whether planetary politics will go down this direct path (take this direct route) and will bid farewell (say goodbye) to (sovereign) statehood through the consistent application of universal-ethical and human rights principles. Because it cannot therefore be expected (reckoned) that, in practice, effective interventions in the domestic politics (affairs) of present-day states for the purpose of (towards) the imposition of these principles could be undertaken by all possible sides in the direction of all possible sides. The great Powers will prove to be in this regard (respect) much more agile (mobile) and efficient so that the actual difference between (the) subjects and objects of planetary politics will continue to exist under the resplendent (splendid) cover of generally recognised (acknowledged) (human rights) equality (as provided for by human rights). Put another way (In other words): human rights universalism will not exert its influence (unfold (develop, set out) its effect) in abstracto, at face value and irrespective of the constitution of its each and every respective representative. It must do this through (via) concrete actors (Akteure) which will instrumentalise it (this universalism) (use it as an instrument (tool)); when (if), however, a universalism is instrumentalised, then it is eo ipso¹⁰ particularised, that is it is put at (in) the service of state

¹⁰ By that very act or quality. The Greek text reads "ipso facto" ("by the fact itself") rather than "eo ipso".

ends (goals). From this perspective, the general confession of faith in universal-ethical principles ought not endanger (threaten) (sovereign) statehood, if this is not at risk because of immanent weaknesses; admittedly, it (sovereign statehood) will be obliged (forced) under various (certain) circumstances to play hide and seek, so long as it does not resort to the open (blunt) violation of those principles. The art of pretending (feigning, pretence) and of rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification) (Die Verstellungs- und die Rationalisierungskunst), at any rate, definitely will not disappear from the world in the age of human rights.

In spite of the lesser or greater mixing of domestic and foreign policy as a result of a general acceptance of (confession of faith in) universal ethical principles, (no) (that is) (the) total abolition of the boundaries between both of them and consequently that (the abolition) of (sovereign) statehood will (not) necessarily occur (kick in, come about). Rather, what will happen here will be like what happens with the interweaving of economies: borders become (much) more porous in normal times, but they do not fall (cease to exist), however they remain in the background as *ultima ratio*¹¹ in case of emergency. Sovereign statehood is today still far (away) from having betrayed (sold out) itself to such an extent that it cannot take back what it has wanted to hand over (cede) until now in this or that (one or another) form - provided (that) of course it has the actual power for (to do) this. One should not overrate (overvalue, overestimate) the political meaning of international law or of international organisations and interpret the attempts at their extension as purposeful (deliberate, well-aimed) and irreversible actions towards the abolition of sovereign statehood. International law and international organisations have, in view

¹¹ The last argument (resort, means).

of the density attained by planetary politics in the meanwhile, become indispensable, however it remains an open question as to whether they will constitute (provide) the common field (place) of (mutual) understanding or the common battlefield. Because their (international law and international organisations') formation is obviously in the interests of all those involved, but that cannot always be the case with their each and every respective handling (operation) (manipulation (guidance) and operation (functioning)).

Likewise, it would be a rash action (mistaken) to project in a straight line into the future those phenomena of mass-democratic life, in which lamenting (bemoaning, complaining) cultural critics (critics of contemporary culture) see signs (symptoms, indications) of decay (disintegration) and harmless "alternative thinkers" sure signs of emancipation, to prophesy their avalanche(snowball)-like increase (expansion, swelling) and to take them for (look upon them as) the beginning of the feared (nightmarish) and hoped-for (hopeful, promising) end of (sovereign) statehood. Undoubtedly, inside of the developed mass democracies it can often appear that state power has lost its undisputed authority and has been degraded (downgraded, demoted) to one under (of) several authorities of power competing amongst themselves, that the (what is) statelike and the (what is) private (the state and private citizens (civilians)) henceforth stand (are) at the same level or that the spreading of hedonistic stances (attitudes) (hedonistischer Eintellungen) undermines the ideological and psychological fundamental (basic, foundational, major, leading) forces of statehood. In relation to this (With that) two remarks are appropriate (We must say two things here). First, the structural necessity of such phenomena for the functioning of mass democracy as economy and institutional network must be underlined; of

course, not all their side effects and concomitants are foreseeable and controllable, however many social formations, which proved to be extremely tough (tenacious, durable, resistant), had to live in history until now with the ambivalence of (controversial) institutions and (vacillating social) stances (attitudes). Secondly, one may not hold (regard) phenomena, which in relatively quiet and prosperous times set the tone externally, as relevant or decisive for every future situation. (Sovereign) Statehood will have to loudly announce its presence (word, position) (make its presence intensely felt) inside of developed mass democracy then, when an inner (internal) or outer (external) danger appears on the horizon or when a sudden (abrupt) about turn (face) (change) in (respect of) the constellation (conjuncture) commands reorientation. We shall (yet) see which reasons make (sovereign) statehood indispensable for the less developed mass societies during the discussion of the question of nationalism (Sec. II). In both cases, there is today no alternative to the state as form of organisation.

We have already pointed out (referred to) the "neoliberal" overestimation of the functional independence of the private economy (sector) (Privatwirtschaft) as well as the new, pre-eminently political tasks (duties), which falls to the state as a result of the economisation of the political (politics fusing with the economy). The private economy (sector) can hardly develop without strong institutional guarantees and (without) the economic and fiscal (financial policy) framework established by the state, and it would be highly misleading to misjudge (overlook, pass over) the inner (internal) interrelation between the general expansion (broadening, widening) of state functions and the general flourishing of the private economy (sector) after the Second World War, although on the other hand the consequences of excessive and inexpedient

bureaucratisation are well known. In any case, the private economy (sector) very frequently lives directly from the fact that the state lets the private economy (sector) do (undertake) (delegates (assigns) to the private economy) tasks instead of doing them itself - and then it (the private economy) perhaps even lives best, as its great (sincere) effort (zeal) in respect of the undertaking (maintenance, preservation) of public works (öffentlichen Aufträgen) indicates. The actual economic indispensability of the state becomes clearer when we consider to whom protests and demands are directed as soon as the private sector (privatwirtschaftliche Sektor) stagnates. In other words, the private economy cannot be made liable (responsible) for anything and answerable for anything (guarantee anything and be responsible for anything) that has to do with the common good (general interest). However, only consideration for (the weighing up of) the common good (irrespective of whom defines it bindingly on each and every respective occasion (gleichviel, wer es jeweils verbindlich definiert)) can prevent descent (slipping) into anomie and consequently also the collapse (breakdown) of economic activity - especially a very complicated one (economic activity). The actual autonomisation of an internationalised private economy (Die faktische Autonomisierung einer internationalisierten Privatwirtschaft) while disregarding (over the heads of) (weakened) states (deprived of power) would bring about a state of affairs of profound (deep, extreme, intense) anomie, i.e. a return to the law of the jungle (lawlessness (in which a raw version of the survival of the fittest is the norm)) (Faustrecht). However, given the present constitution (state) of world society, anomie can be effectively combated only in the realm, and with the means, of conventional (traditional) (sovereign) statehood (with the traditional means of the sovereign state). This connection of economic functions with the colossal (gigantic) future

task of the containment (curbing) of anomie will constitute in the dawning (incipient) phase of planetary politics the foundation upon which (sovereign) statehood will continue to assert itself (exist) in older and newer forms. It is certainly superfluous to especially emphasise the role of conflicts regarding foreign policy or of emergencies for the preservation and, should the situation arise, the reinforcement of (sovereign) statehood. We want to hence conclude here with the observation, moreover, that state organisation will still remain the refuge of both the large as well as the small nations before the political uncertainties (imponderables) of universal-ethical and human rights principles. Because only as organised state power can a large or small nation defend itself against (resist) the interpretations of these principles, which it suspects of screening the power cravings (i.e. lust for power) (Machtgelüste) of other nations. Only as a state can, in particular, a large nation stand against (face, confront), in case of need (if necessary), the whole (entire) international community. And only as a state can a small nation talk to a large nation, which is also *a* state, as an equal to an equal.

4. Openness of constellations (Potential (possible) formations (configurations) of the planetary conjuncture) (Offenheit der Konstellationen)

Since there is human history and historical memory, the difficulties of the present lead to the idealisation of the past - even of the most recent past. No sooner was the Cold War at an end and the voices, which in dramatic tones warn of a looming international disorder (abzeichnenden internationalen Unordnung), have already multiplied so that one could gain the impression that until recently order and harmony still prevailed

(reigned) in the world. In reality, neither order (Ordnung) nor disorder have been able to be absolute and lasting in history (as we know it): absolute and lasting disorder would have soon resulted in (caused, brought about) the disintegration (breaking up; Auflösung) of social life, (whereas) absolute and lasting order would forever put an end to conflicts of all sorts, that is, it (absolute and lasting order) could never again be unhinged (disrupted, disturbed). When we talk of order in international relations of all times (so, then, thus) we may sensibly mean by that only a correlation (constellation) of forces (eine Kräftekonstellation), which thanks to its relative stability prevents serious conflicts at (the) key (crucial, weak) points (in the trouble areas) of (in) the system, although such conflicts often break out (erupt) in the periphery and although (even though) every now and then (from time to time) tremors are also felt (it (the correlation of forces) crackles) in the centre. Whenever order - with these restrictions - has prevailed (reigned, dominated, ruled), it was based, in any event, on two preconditions (presuppositions, prerequisites). First, there existed a direct or indirect balance of power (forces) (Gleichgewicht der Kräfte) (namely established (made) through alliances) between the major (leading) Powers (führenden Mächten) and simultaneously a more or less clear hierarchy in the relations between leading and subordinate Powers (führenden und untergeordneten Mächten); secondly, a guiding idea or guiding principle (eine Leitidee oder ein Leitprinzip) existed which was in fact accepted by many a (as a rule, subordinate) Power with reservations or contrary to their respective will (involuntarily), however with regard to its (the guiding idea or guiding principle's) political substance and its political consequences it did not allow any (room for) (give rise to) misunderstandings. Two examples from planetary politics in the last hundred years should illustrate this. The approximate balance of power (forces) between the

European imperialistic Powers was accompanied by the clear hierarchy between master and servant (Herr und Knecht) in an almost world-encompassing (worldwide) colonial system; and this hierarchy was legitimised through the self-imposed (unsolicited) civilising mission (selbstaufgelegte zivilisatorische Mission) of those Powers which saw (regarded, looked upon) themselves as common executor (i.e. enforcer) (als gemeinsame Vollstrecker) of the same (civilising mission) and at the same time as members with equal rights of a Christian, liberal etc. West (Western land (world)). It (The situation) was (looked) similar(ly) during the Cold War: both great Powers balanced one another in terms (on the scales) of power politics (die beiden Großmächte hielten sich die machtpolitische Waage), in relation to which one was in command (gave orders, commanded) unchallenged in its camp by invoking the (appropriately interpreted) principle of proletarian internationalism, whereas the other as the representative and indeed as embodiment (incarnation, personification) of the liberal principles (freiheitlichen Prinzipien) of the West, held the reins (pulled the strings), albeit more loosely.

With regard to the planetary constellation (politics) after the Cold War, the question must therefore be posed as to which guiding principle will move which Powers towards which notions of order (views regarding the formation of a new order) (Ordnungsvorstellungen) and towards which acts interrelated with them (these notions of order). As expected, the guiding principle of the victor of the Cold War has now become the guiding principle of world politics, namely, human rights universalism (menschenrechtliche Universalismus). However, the use of this principle as a weapon against communism was politically much easier than its practical transformation (transubstantiation, translation) (praktische

Umsetzung) into a viable (workable, firm) concept (conception) of order (regarding the formation of a new order inside) of planetary politics. There, where it (the principle of human rights universalism), if possible, is substantialised in corresponding civil rights, it is based on a developed (advanced) division of labour as a substitute for the dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of traditional (human) ties (bonds), on mass consumption and on the matching (interrelated) mentalities and modes of behaviour (behaviours) (Da, wo es nach Möglichkeit in den entsprechenden Bürgerrechten substanzialisiert wird, stützt es sich auf eine entwickelte Arbeitsteilung als Ersatz für die Auflösung traditioneller Bindungen, auf den Massenkonsum und auf dazu passende Mentalitäten und Verhaltensweisen). Yet the political constituent elements of the planet are by no means held together by the (same) forces which ensure the cohesion of Western mass democracies, and that is why the planetary applicability of the aforementioned guiding principle seems highly questionable (dubious). It would be theoretically conceivable and ethically orthodox to entrust (assign to), with its (this guiding principle's) planetary realisation, a world organisation in whose framework large and small states would be active in agreement (harmony) with one another (co-operate) in pursuing (towards) this goal (end) (the planetary realisation of the guiding principle in question). The touchstone for the so (thus) understood ability at acting and efficiency (practical effectiveness) of this world organisation would be the case in which a great or even a planetary Power could be punished on the initiative of smaller states, if necessary (even) with direct intervention, should it (the great or planetary Power) be guilty of the violation of generally recognised ethical-legal principles. There was never of course in practice any question of that during the Cold War and it also seems today simply inconceivable: China remains a completely self-assured permanent member of the (United

Nations) Security Council and works together (collaborates, co-operates) there with those Powers which impose or threaten to impose on it economic sanctions because of the flouting of human rights; just as little have the United States been made to suffer (punished) because of (its) false steps in respect (violations, infringements) of international law. The reverse (opposite) case, in which on the initiative and through the might (strike power; Schlagkraft) of a great Power a small Power is brought (made to listen) to human rights reason (corrected (punished) according to (the logic of) human rights), does not prove the least as regards the ability of a world organisation at making human rights universalism the guiding principle of planetary politics. Because until now it has never occurred that a great Power would have acted, when undertaking such an action (of enforcing human rights), against its own (power-political) interests (in relation to power politics) (machtpolitischen Interessen). Precisely the imposition of human rights principles on condition of their instrumentalisation in terms of power politics (use as means for the pursuit of political power; machtpolitischen Instrumentalisierung) attests to the fact of the impossibility of them (human rights principles) being converted at face value into praxis (realised at face value (in practice)) - something which certainly goes very well with the general confession of faith in them. Their selective handling, which is unavoidable (inevitable) (cannot be avoided) as long as world organisations are only capable of acting (can only be activated) under the leadership of great Powers, must (will necessarily) cause (give rise to) duplicity (deviousness) and confusion. To that is added the uncertainty (insecurity) of the international legal situation on the basis of the fact that norms theoretically ought (also) apply to places where they do not (cannot) apply in actual fact. Universal law does not take effect (achieve its ends)

(is not effective (effectual)), rather it floats (hangs, is suspended, hovers) above its putative (supposed) areas (fields) of application.

If what matters is the (specific) weight and the particular aims of the great Powers inside of the world organisation, then one could imagine that they will jointly and in the long term direct (steer, drive, guide) whatever happens in the world by means of the tactically flexible invocation of human rights principles, that is, on the whole they will maintain the status quo or they will undertake some change (adjustment, changes) which will guarantee greater stability. However, for that to take place, long-term unchanged relations between these Powers on the basis of their potential today and their status today - perhaps with small adjustments - are required. As guarantor of this system a great Power would have to be made the head (put at the head) of the others (rest of the) (other Powers), which would then coordinate and lead them (these other Powers), without in fact acting in important matters (affairs) against their will, but also without granting (ceding) them exclusive and closed spheres of influence. In favour of this possibility is the fact that immediately after the Cold War and under its (the Cold War's) still fresh impression, acute and irreconcilable competition between (the) great Powers, with which it (the great Power as guarantor of the system in question) could not live, does not seem to be prevalent; incidentally, only in retrospect can one know with which conflicts (is) a situation (is) pregnant. In addition, the indispensable *primus inter pares*¹² is also in existence, which can coordinate (harmonise) opinions and actions with one another and if necessary undertake (to process) all of them (these opinions and actions) (in practice) alone. Indeed, there is, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only one great Power in the world, which fully deserves the description

¹² First amongst equals.

"planetary": the United States. It is the only Power which has at its disposal a dense and worldwide strategic-military network as well as the entire range (gamut, scale) of logistics and weapons which permits interventions in every situation and every position (place) in (on) the planet with each and every respective suitable means. The foundations for that (of this might (strength, power)) were already laid during the Second World War, and the Cold War made the erection (construction, establishment) of today's mighty (powerful) construction (structure) inevitable (und der Kalte Krieg machte die Errichtung des heutigen mächtigen Baus unvermeidlich). This extraordinary (exceptional) historical constellation (i.e. conjuncture) (Konstellation) will not be repeated in (for) the foreseeable future, and because of that no other great Power - assuming it would have the economic potency (ability, power; Potenz) (for that, to do so) - will so quickly come into possession of such strategic advantages, unless it goes, before (in the presence of) all the world, on a direct collision course with the United States and can also survive (overcome, get through, withstand) the competition (rivalry, emulation; Wettkampf) with it (the United States). Should, in any case, a modus vivendi¹³ between the great Powers be consolidated, in which - because of general weakness or because of equal strength or after the weighing up of the advantages and disadvantages (pros and cons) - every one of them (the great Powers) possesses a sufficient unfolding space (Entfaltungsraum) inside of a common (commonly supported) system of security, then it is allowed to (may) be assumed that the United States would be (position itself as) the primus inter pares, even if the accent (stress, emphasis) must be put on the "primus" rather than on the "pares".

¹³ Mode (way) of living (e.g. between those whose opinions differ but nonetheless agree to disagree).

Now, as we said, such a constellation (arrangement) (Konstellation) presupposes stable relations and limited (restricted) ambitions of the great Powers supporting it. Furthermore, it (this constellation) requires that the leading Power is ready at any time to use (deploy) the means (contained) in its exclusive possession for goals which are not always its own, nevertheless they could be considered common (goals). That will necessarily (must) be done with irreparable loss of forces (wear and tear) if the other Powers do not help it (the leading Power) economically and financially. That again must take place (be carried out) on an, as it were, institutionalised basis, so that the leading Power is not left standing (does not appear) as the others' headless mercenary in the hour of need; an adjustment (arrangement) of world trade in its favour would be e.g. a plausible consequence of the (such a) planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture). As (the) leading Power of the West during (in) the Cold War, the United States depended to a relatively small extent on such assistance (backing, support) of (from) its allies (in the first years after the Second World War in fact precisely the opposite (reverse) was the case), yet now it seems the situation (things) in respect of this (as to this) has (have) changed. The great Powers which would be (constitute) the security partners of the United States in the framework of the constellation (i.e. conjuncture) outlined (described) here (on the occasion of the realisation of such a plan for the consolidation of planetary security), would have to become convinced (attain (come to) the conviction) that the benefit from it (being the United States' security partners) would cover the economic and possibly also political costs. If the benefit is estimated, for lack of visible dangers or because of the wrong (false) assessment (evaluation; Einschätzung) (misjudgement, miscalculation) of the existing dangers, as not being high enough, then friction(s) must come about between the leading Power and the rest of the

great Powers. Because the intimated political-military-economic division of labour would above all be convenient for (serve the interests of) the leading Power, whereas the others would rather (prefer to) live in a world in which the one great world's policeman was completely (altogether) - but without risk - superfluous. The centrifugal forces would have to be reinforced, should it repeatedly come to light (be proved) that the leading Power becomes partly or completely (partially or wholly) involved only (then) when its own interests are affected, or that it - again, out of consideration for its own concerns - favours one great Power and puts the other great Powers at a disadvantage (treats the others detrimentally (unfavourably)). It is also not easily imaginable (easy to imagine) that the leading Power would be ready to carry out a large (the greatest possible) deployment (with extreme decisiveness (the utmost determination)), if the interests of a sole allied Power were exclusively at stake. Likewise, it is hard to image the full (complete) and unconditional sympathy (support) of the other Powers in such a case. And finally, one must, even in joint undertakings, expect (anticipate) constant differences of opinion over the chosen course of action in which different interests would be reflected.

If the friction(s) inside of this constellation (arrangement) reaches (attains, generates) such an intensity that the necessary basis of (mutual) trust falls apart (is destroyed) or the earmarked (intended) mechanism of coping with crises in critical situations breaks down (fails to function), then the transition to other constellations (arrangements) becomes inevitable. It is plausible that in such a case great Powers, which already have at their disposal their own relatively closed economic and political unfolding space, will free (extricate) themselves (disengage) from the obligation of joint (co-ordinated) action and will go (down) their own way (path), at whose end would be the formation (shaping) of large

spaces (regions; Großräumen) with a ban (prohibition) on intervention (Interventionsverbot) in respect of other (third) Powers. This consideration (assumption, observation, hypothesis) remains popular and bobs up (appears, is formulated) time (again) and again (from time to time) (for that matter, it lingers (is latent) sometimes also in the common (familiar) talk of the "multipolar" system), because it satisfies the need for order and for symmetry and moreover it lets subjective wishes, in accordance with the promotion of this or that (one or another) Power to a Power (dominating) in a large space (Großraummacht), be articulated in an objectively sounding legal or political language. Not from nowhere (by chance) did similar thoughts (considerations, ideas) and (similar) plans, which were in many cases (frequently) founded (established, justified) by means of (the) "geopolitics" just then coming into being (the at that time still new "geopolitical" science), gain (obtain, enjoy) their greatest popularity in the age of imperialism, as the division of the planet into large spaces was (became) for the most part reality. It (the division of the planet into large spaces) was likewise reality, even though with essentially different signs (i.e. symbolism), at the time (during) of the Cold War, however at that time the words "geopolitics" and "large space", because of their popularity with the National Socialists, were frowned upon (essentially forbidden). One often sees today a real basis for the creation of large spaces in the development of the highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) economy which from its inner (internal) dynamics breaks (bursts) out of (shatters, smashes, demolishes) national borders, yet during its internationalisation it does not spread (out) (is not diffused) aimlessly, but shows (reveals) tendencies towards the formation of a chain (series, row) of massed points of (rallying (clustering) and) concentration (einer Reihe von geballten Konzentrationspunkten) inside of certain regions of the planetary space.

Every one of these regions lies (is found) in the wider area (surroundings) of the country (land) in which the strongest (national) economy (Volkswirtschaft) is located (based), and must be characterised by the fact that the trade carried out constitutes the main volume of trade both of the strongest (national) economy as well as of the dependent (on the strongest economy) (national) economies, whereas the trade with other countries (lands) or regions is not necessary for life (vitally necessary, essential). The weaker or smaller (national) economies can prosper - not despite, but precisely - because of their dependence on the strongest ((national) economy) because the quantitative and qualitative growth (development) of this latter economy creates more and more (increasingly) new possibilities of work and an increasingly complicated division of labour, which in part asks (demands) too much of (exceeds, surpasses) the workforce (manpower) of the strongest (national) economy and functions (at least) in several entirely (wholly) specialised (spezialisierten) but also elementary sectors (areas), as it were, through the delegating of tasks (to third parties). This division of labour can make progress in so far as that the dependent (national) economies at times are able to develop the self-confidence of relative autonomy until they are then (in order to then be) taught otherwise (of a better state of affairs) by the symptoms (signs, phenomena) of fatigue in the locomotive (driving force, impetus) (of their respective economies).

Observers, who expect the coming into being of geopolitically clear-cut (clearly defined) large spaces from (thanks to) the automatic mechanism (Automatik) of a large expanding (national) economy and the integration (interconnection, fusion) (Verflechtung) of neighbouring (national) economies, basically vary the old leitmotif of the replacement (substitution) of war with trade, which is understandably (enough) going

through (experiencing) a renaissance after the Cold War. However, the path (road) which leads to such large spaces is not at all so linear (straight) as economic thinking (thought; Denken) suggests (imagines) (it to be). As (we have) already remarked (observed), economic integrations (interconnections, fusions) are still by no means advanced to such an extent that the political emergency brake could not be pulled at any time (moment) - of course with the corresponding cost; new editions of the Edict of Nantes, this time against foreign investors, would in our time (nowadays), even without religious motivation (motives) and even in the knowledge of the economic consequences, be conceivable. Yet resistance against the formation of genuine large spaces under the aegis of each and every respective strongest (national) economy must not only come from nations which are (found, situated) in the region in question and fear a surprise attack (or being reduced to a state of servitude), but also from the outside, namely from a great Power which already possesses at least in its infancy (rudimentarily, incipiently) its own large space, and over and above that, possibilities of planetary action which it does not want to see limited (restricted) by bans (prohibitions) on intervention of (imposed by) (other) great Powers (dominating in other large spaces). This great Power today is the United States. An economic great Power which would undertake (embark on, tackle) the construction (setting up) of a, in every respect (sense), sovereign large space would have (be obliged) to cut from the planetary political-military network of the United States a fairly large piece and then not merely replace this piece with its own political-military potential (Potenzial), but furthermore be in a position to make its presence felt (noticeable) beyond the bounds of (the) (its own) large space both in normal as well as in unsettled (troubled) times; a power (dominating) in a large space would have to therefore (simultaneously) also more or less be (constitute) a planetary

Power. Today's (great) economic (great) Powers (Japan and Germany for instance) will not (find themselves) so quickly and not so easily (be) in the situation of (achieving) that, and indeed not so much because this cannot be managed (brought off) technically with the appropriate (adequate, corresponding) effort, but rather out of the ambiguity of their position. They became great - and in fact aspirants to a large space (so much that they have the ambition of hegemony in a large space) (Großraumaspiranten) - during the Cold War and in the greenhouse (hothouse) of the United States (if one may say so (put it this way)) and are still under its military umbrella (shield, aegis). Moreover, they fear that the total or partial curtailment of the American political-military network could give rise to (cause, bring about, be pregnant with) imponderable (incalculable) dangers; that is why they remain directly or indirectly dependent on the United States in order to set (build) up (construct) an (economic) large space whose political-military autonomisation (Verselbständigung) would have to (necessarily) lead to conflict with exactly this United States. If we disregard (overlook) the paradoxical relationship of the present (today's) great economic Powers with (vis-à-vis) the United States, there are also other important obstacles (hindrances) which stand in the way of the formation of genuine large spaces - and indeed even if it would come (came) to an (of course in itself (basically) implausible ((highly) unlikely)) voluntary and quick withdrawal (retreat) of the United States to the Western hemisphere: we have recently experienced (gone through) (the fact) that empires can also collapse (break down) without visible pressure from the outside. The regions which qualify as (constitute prospective, are possibly) large spaces do not consist of a unique (single) recognised great Power and several (some) smaller Powers which have rightly or wrongly come to terms with (accepted) the existing hierarchy, but in them are found two,

three or more major (greater) Powers (größere Mächte) in relation to which the supposed (putative) aspirant to a large space (prospective hegemon of a large space) amongst them (the Powers in the regions (i.e. large spaces) in question) is monitored (observed, put under surveillance) by the others (other Powers) with understandable mistrust. It is more than doubtful that this situation will change in the foreseeable future. (The) Developed East Asia (Far East) cannot be joined together (united) into a large space as long as China has not yet had the (its) last (final) word vis-à-vis Japan and the world¹⁴. And "Europe" for obvious and incidentally generally (well-)known reasons will never have a unified (uniform) political and military will (volition) on the basis of the hitherto intended (planned, contemplated, provided for) procedures; other procedures or driving forces are also not in sight. The great advantage of the United States in a possible (potential) conflict with aspirants to a large space (Powers which are candidates for hegemony in large spaces) in the Asian or European region would consist (precisely) in the political room to move (leeway, latitude, scope) which such discord (disputes, rivalries) provides it (the United States).¹⁵

¹⁴ Perhaps if Kondylis had lived to 2010 he may have added something about the possibility of China attempting to create its own large space and the difficulties and opposition it would encounter.

¹⁵ In his article "Europa an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts", *Tumult*, 22 (1996), and, in *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg: Manutius, 2001, especially pp. 126-129 («Η Ευρώπη στο κατώφλι του 21ου αιώνα: μία κοσμοϊστορική και γεωπολιτική θεώρηση» στο *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1998, ειδικά σσ. 117-119; "Europe on the threshold of the 21st century"), Kondylis refers to not only the USA's geopolitical interest in limiting Russian geopolitical power, but also to the fact of Germany's (and the EE's) dependence on USA-led NATO possibly pushing Russia towards closer ties with China, despite the fact that the long-term survival of Europe could possibly only be guaranteed by its emergence as part of a great Eurasian Power or alliance of Powers including Russia, given Europe's dire demographic decline and lack of natural resources. In other words, Germany and Europe's lack of initiative will most likely see them unable to survive the fierce competition that will likely drive the USA, Russia and China apart (or possibly together in the case of the latter two Powers), as well as in the face of the (North) African and Middle Eastern (and Asian) population explosion and the attendant ecological and political implications (even the medium-term survival of weak (nation) states such as (some of) those in Southern Europe becomes particularly doubtful). Mackinder's theorem regarding Eurasia retains its value, but instead of Germany being the focal point for holding Eurasia, the shift in the world balance of power away from Europe now means that the focal point moves to the Siberian and Central Asian regions.

Instead of the formation of genuine large spaces, another phenomenon will perhaps characterise the (already begun) phase of planetary politics (already underway): the advent (appearance, emergence) and the consolidation (strengthening) of various middle Powers with (a) regional hegemonic claim(s) (ambitions) (verschiedener Mittelmächte mit regionalem hegemonialem Anspruch). These (middle Powers) can exploit (take advantage (make the most) of) the many gaps which will constantly open up (arise, be created) inside of the politically amorphous (amorphen) large spaces between the disputing (quarreling, rival, competing) great Powers and under the tired gaze of the leading great Power (führenden Großmacht). They would have increasingly serious prospects (chances, odds) of realising their (regional) power aims (in their geopolitical region) if the great Powers, which for political and psychological reasons wish to avoid repeated and dedicated (decisive, resolute, determined, decided) deployments (operations, actions, interventions) abroad (in foreign countries), wanted to use them, as it were, as regional governors (i.e. deputies) (Statthalter). This tactic is already emerging (looming) (There are already early signs of this tactic), however it will probably only (partly) produce (give) (in part) the expected results; it will at least just as much bring into being (to the surface) counteracting (conflicting, opposing, reactive) forces and will involve (entangle) the great Powers concerned in exactly those local conflicts which they would prefer to (rather) keep out of (avoid, evade). The unavoidable (inevitable) gradual lessening (decreasing) of (reduction in) the military chasm (gulf) between middle and (some (certain)) great Powers would (also) contribute, for its part, to the regionalisation of planetary politics in the form of a tense (strained) co-existence (living side by side) of more or less heterogeneous major (greater) states (heterogenen größeren Staaten), which direct their attention principally

(mainly) towards their own geopolitical surroundings (environs, environment) (Umgebung) and would maintain (support, have) changing relations with the rest of the middle and great Powers. Certain simple or complex political and economic units (entities) could (perhaps) in the course of this be more active (exhibit more intense activity) than other such units and group smaller Powers around themselves, without however in this way bringing about a radical change in the overall picture. Such a constellation (arrangement) must not (would not necessarily) cause (effect, bring about) an equalisation or homogenisation of its constituent parts (eine Egalisierung oder Homogenisierung ihrer Bestandteile). Rather, it would be based on an actual hierarchisation of the regions (of the planet) so that some (certain) regions would be planetarily important (significant) and some others planetarily secondary. Moreover (In addition), it is to (must) be expected (anticipated) that the political units (entities) which take part either as subjects or as objects, or as subjects and objects at the same time, in the current (present) phase of planetary politics, are characterised by the variety of form of their constitutions (i.e. polities or systems of government) (Verfassungen), but also of their inner (internal) texture (composition) (ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit). Western mass democracies will exist next to authoritarian pseudo-parliamentarisms (forms of pseudo-parliamentarism) (Scheinparlamentarismen) and Caesaristic regimes or dictatorships promoting (of) development (Entwicklungsdiktaturen) - and economically or nationally cohesive (cohering, coherent) spaces next to multinational states or loose linguistic and religious state communities as well as breakaway (splintered, fragmented) regions (und wirtschaftlich oder national zusammenhängende Räume neben multinationalen Staaten oder lockeren sprachlichen and religiösen Staatengemeinschaften sowie zersplitterten Regionen). World society can in this respect (from this

perspective) be imagined as a motley mass society (eine bunte Massengesellschaft) which knows only regionally viable and efficient (productive) forms of coming together (rallying), and otherwise is held together either by means of (through) occasional concentrated planetary actions of great Powers or of the leading Power - or else merely by (through) the nightmare of the question (problem) of survival of the whole of humanity (Menschheit).

That is why the openness of constellations (malleability of combinations and the open character of arrangements) (Offenheit der Konstellationen) is (constitutes) an essential feature (characteristic, trait) (wesentliches Merkmal) of the ((current) incipient) phase of planetary politics ((currently) underway). That can mean that on the basis of the existing starting position (point) either one of several constellations (arrangements) will prevail in the long term and a whole (entire) age will be shaped (shaping (leaving its mark on, stamping, moulding) a whole age) (und ein ganzes Zeitalter prägen wird), or else that various constellations (arrangements) will alternate (follow one another) or (that) finally (lastly) the overall picture will be constituted by a mixture (eine Mischung) of all of them (the constellations) with different regional centres of gravity (regionalen Schwerpunkten). As we explained at the beginning (start) (initially), prognoses can and may (should) only have regard (refer) to the possible (potential) unfolding (development) of structures, not to concrete events. Prognoses can only apprehend orders (i.e. well-ordered situations) (Ordnungen), and the provident (prescient, predictive) capacity (vorausschauende Fassungsvermögen) has (reaches) its limits (boundaries) there where orders (i.e. well-ordered situations) (order) cease to exist (stop existing) and only unconnected (disjointed, incoherent) events (facts, occurrences) are left over (remain). However,

disorder consists of events (facts, occurrences) without cohesion (coherence) and direction, (and) which (such disorder) hence (consequently) can be examined (looked into) only as to its possible causes, but not (it cannot be) concretely apprehended in advance.

*5. From the economisation to the biologisation of the political?
(From the economic to the biological character of politics?)
(Von der Ökonomisierung zur Biologisierung des Politischen?)*

Disorder (Unordnung) - normal disorder inside of every political order is not meant here, but elemental (elementary) and unbridled (unleashed) (elementare und entfesselte) disorder - comes into being not because (of the fact that) a party (one side) consciously strives after (pursues) it (disorder) and forces (imposes, enforces) its victory over order. It (Disorder) comes into being temporarily during the struggle between the representatives of two different perceptions (notions, views) of (the "correct") order (Ordnungsvorstellungen), until one (party) asserts itself (prevails) over the other (party), or else because (of the fact that) the principles which ought to (should) support order, during (in) their practical application encounter (bump into) insurmountable obstacles and in the process bring to light an entirely (a completely (wholly)) unexpected inner (internal) logic (innere Logik) which can (even) reverse their (these principles') face (nominal) value. In today's (the present) planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture) there are indications (signs) (of the fact) that exactly this could be the fate of (visited upon, met with by) both great guidelines which ought to (should) henceforth guide (lead, direct) the action (acts; Handeln) of the actors of (those exercising) planetary politics: the economisation of the political (fusion of politics

with the economy) and human rights universalism. Their close (tight) social (sociological) connection and the commonality of their historical destiny (fate) both inside of the Western mass democracies as well as at the planetary level can today hardly be doubted (called into question). Both aspects of the economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) - that is, the providing (securing, ensuring, supplying) of a minimum subsistence for (an elementary existence to) large masses on a highly technicised (i.e. high-technology) basis (auf hochtechnisierter Basis) and through the highly developed (advanced) (hochentwickelte) division of labour, and the redistribution of goods for the purpose of the materialisation of formal rights - are ideationally founded in human rights universalism which awards (attributes, ascribes) to all individuals equal (the same) dignity irrespective of every other affiliation (membership, sense of belonging, incorporation, accession), quality or bond (tie) (jeder anderen Zugehörigkeit, Eigenschaft oder Bindung gleiche Würde). One will certainly (definitely) scandalise our ethicists (that means: the ideologues of *our (own)* society), if one ascertains as a sociologist that in that universalism both social atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals), which is indispensable for the highly developed (advanced) division of labour against the background of unlimited mobility, as well as the democratic claim of material equality, are reflected ideologically (ideologisch widerspiegelt). Nevertheless, this same ascertainment has to be clear (self-evident) to anyone who thinks soberly (every sober thinking person, is sober-minded) if one formulates it banally (in the vernacular, in the common tongue (expression)) and thinks of the old experience: where there is little bread to be distributed, room for dignity also narrows. If that is the case, then the question must be posed as to what extent (how far) the Western concept of order (or plan for the creation of a new planetary order) could be unintentionally,

and on the quiet (secretly), turned (changed) into a trigger (cause) of disorder, should the realisation of its (the Western concept of order's) premises, i.e. the overcoming (exceeding, getting over) of the shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods and the dignified (i.e. in accordance with human dignity) (that is, democratic) redistribution of sufficient goods at the planetary level, fails to materialise (d. h. die Überwindung der Güterknappheit und die menschenwürdige (also demokratische) Umverteilung von ausreichenden Gütern auf planetarischer Ebene ausbleiben). Theoretically the answer is clear: (economic) bottlenecks would lead to instability, and long-lasting (permanent) crises to states of affairs (situations), in which the economisation of the political (the (former) fusion of politics with the economy) would be intensified (increased) towards (and end up at the) an identification of politics with the distribution of not quite enough (limited) (even ecological) goods (it should not be forgotten that in (amongst) such goods elementary ecological goods are today also even included, e.g. water (aquatic) resources). If however politics is reduced in times of greatest need (i.e. hardship or distress) (in Zeiten höchster Not) to the distribution of goods, then a biologisation (eine Biologisierung) of the same (politics) must occur (kick (set) in) (it (politics) will take on (acquire) a biological character) in two respects (a double respect): not only would the (direct or indirect) aim (goal) of political struggle be a biological (one) (aim), namely survival in a more or less narrower (strict) sense, but also the distinctive (i.e. distinguishing) features (distinctions) (die Unterscheidungsmerkmale) which (in the course of this) would serve as criteria for grouping (group formation) (in the political struggle) would most likely (probably) be of a biological nature, since the traditional ideological and social distinctions would have become invalid (would

have abated (waned) (been vitiated)) by (means of) (via) human rights universalism.

The avoiding (avoidance) of such a state of affairs (situation) is now hoped for on account of a convergence (an approach) of the planetary average level (von einer Annäherung des planetarischen Durchschnittsniveaus) with (towards) the average level of Western mass democracies. This (The latter) (average level of Western mass democracies) is based on preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions) which can only be recreated with great difficulty. At the same time (Here) it is not merely a matter of historical and cultural given facts (Gegebenheiten) whose meaning in itself can be decisive, although it (this meaning) is easily underestimated if one does not know from long experience how wide-ranging, differences in mentality, can be and branch out. Yet even if one overlooks ((only) abstracts something from) them (these differences in mentality), one (again) faces (stands before) the fact that the extensive distribution and redistribution of huge (enormous) masses (quantities, amounts) of goods (Gütermassen), which inaugurated (initiated) and consolidated Western mass-democratic conditions (circumstances, relations) (Verhältnisse) could take place only against the demographic background of a, for decades (since decades ago), stable and sometimes even declining population. At the planetary level on the other hand, the growth rate in the production of goods lags behind the growth rate of the population, or at best it (the growth rate in the production of goods) exceeds this (growth rate of the population) to a small extent, so that either the shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods increases (rises) (is exacerbated) or no appreciable (considerable, remarkable, notable, significant) redistribution is feasible (possible). Countries, (like the Eastern European ones (countries),) which are not (found) at the Western

level, yet have (show) a stable population, again have a doubtful (dubious) advantage; because they thereby (through that (stable population)) lack the social pressure and at the same time the social mobility which the economic progress of the Western nations caused (brought about) (along with this economic progress) (entailed) during the First and the Second Industrial Revolutions. The West has (had) enjoyed the double (dual) advantage (prerogative, privilege) of a growing population in the age of liberal capitalism and a stable population in the age of mass democracy. It is well-known with how many (what number of) human victims, with what methods of exploitation (exploitative methods; Ausbeutungsmethoden) and under what living conditions the economic progress in the era of liberal capitalism was accomplished - and exactly the political, ethical and psychological impossibility of going down the same path today must (will necessarily) have an effect as (be) a disadvantage in (a) purely economic respect (terms). To cherish (entertain, harbour, have) material and political expectations without having behind them (been through) the purgatory of liberal capitalism of a Western kind, that is (constitutes) an explosive situation for many countries, and it would become an explosive situation for the entire (whole) planet should such expectations also be simultaneously asserted (formulated as demands) under the influence of a materially interpreted human rights universalism (materiell interpretierten menschenrechtlichen Universalismus) by all sides. It would (into the bargain, moreover) barely (scarcely) (be of little) help if the Western nations paid the price of (tribute to) logical and moral consistency and with (in a state of) historically unprecedented (unparalleled) self-denial (self-abnegation; Selbstverleugnung) transformed (transubstantiated) the mass-democratic ideal of material equality into planetary praxis (das massendemokratische Ideal der materiellen Gleichheit in die planetarische Praxis umsetzen).

Even if they (the Western nations) (- something (which is) improbable -) were willing to make up (compensate) for (put right, rectify, offset) the lack of output (i.e. performance) of the majority through the redistribution of the output (i.e. performance) of the minority, this would mean (signify) an equality in general poverty.

A biologisation of the political can set in (start, begin) (Politics can take on a biological character) already because planetary politics in the (near) future will have to more and more intensely (all the more directly) come up against (confront, tackle the problem of) a biological factum brutum¹⁶: (against) the population explosion. The public consciousness in the affluent regions (regions of affluence) still shies away from (recoils from (before)) thinking through (apprehending) the extent and consequences of this breathtaking world-historical process without euphemisms (embellishments) and prevarications (excuses, evasions, subterfuges), and the reason for that (it, this) lies not merely in (is not merely) the effect (impact) of the well-known displacement (suppression) mechanisms (Verdrängungsmechanismen) which guard (protect the soul) against nightmares. This inhibition or awkwardness (embarrassment) (Gehemmtheit oder Verlegenheit) springs (arises) just as much from the simple fact that on the basis of the ideologically dominant human rights universalism one cannot (begin to) theoretically and in practice grapple with a phenomenon like the population explosion. Typically (Characteristically), religious and other ethical movements which want to take the concept of human dignity (Menschenwürde) seriously with ultimate consistency reject birth control - and (also) typically other ethicists, who do not want to go so far, can justify (account (give reasons) for, substantiate, support) their rejection of (aversion to) that (birth

¹⁶ Brutish fact (event, deed, action).

control) only with reference (by referring) to practical necessities and to roundabout ways of arguing, but not through (by (means of)) a direct invocation of (appeal to) the unadulterated (pure, unmixed, unwatered-down) concept of human dignity. Indeed it is inconceivable what one could say (argue) against the population explosion on the mere basis of this concept (of human dignity) (and without (having) recourse to any other factor). This (The population explosion) (in fact) constantly produces (creates) humans (people), every one of these humans has his own unique and inviolable (sacrosanct) (unantastbare) dignity, and although quantity is not always conducive to quality, nevertheless the quality of dignity is (so) defined (in such a way) that it must not suffer under the pressure of quantity; because of that (therefore, that is why)(,) ten or twenty billion inviolable (human) dignities would possibly be better than five billion, since they could increase (expand, enlarge) the cumulative dignity of the human genus (race) (des Menschengeschlechts) - in any case, they cannot do any harm (harm themselves, be regarded as harmful) if one does not want to accept that the quality of dignity subsides (declines, falls, drops) because (by means) of (through) (a, its) great quantity. One could dismiss such thoughts (considerations) as (bad) jokes (in bad taste) (and our (the various) ethicists would, as I fear, think nothing better of them (to say about these thoughts)), nonetheless in them (these thoughts) (it) is seen (these thoughts show) that (the) attempts to cope (deal) with the problem of the population explosion with the (conceptual) instruments (Instrumentarium) of human rights universalism, must (necessarily) lead to witty (funny) paradoxes. Human rights universalism, if it wants to remain true to itself, may not (is not allowed to) in fact look at (regard, consider, observe) the population explosion even as an ethical problem, since such (ethical) problems cannot be quantified either downwardly or upwardly (downwards or

upwards). In this respect it can be said that it (human rights universalism) constitutes the ideological concomitant (consequence) or even (if not) (the unintentional (involuntary)) legitimation of the population explosion, just (exactly) as it is socially interwoven with the process of atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) and the highly developed (advanced) division of labour in Western mass democracies; human dignity, self-contained (self-sufficient, resting in itself) and indifferent now even vis-à-vis metaphysical kinds of founding (substantiations, justifications) (die in sich ruhende, inzwischen auch gegen metaphysische Begründungen indifferente Menschenwürde), is the rapidly (by leaps and bounds) growing self-admiration of rapidly multiplying (increasing) humanity. However, what is missing here is not only the possibility of an answer to the banal, yet burning question of quantity (amount, number). Also, the ecological question cannot be conclusively (definitively) answered, which is why some (certain) contemporary ethicists have also had to take refuge in (resort to) such animistic spectres (phantoms, phantasms, fantasies, chimeras) as the "dignity of Nature". The ecological question is far more concrete and it is (amounts to): can the planet secure (ensure) "dignified (i.e. in accordance with human dignity)" living conditions (conditions of life) for x-number billion people (x-beliebigen Milliarden von Menschen) without being irreparably destroyed in the near future (in a minimum period of time)? Is it ecologically tenable (possible) that a Chinese or an Indian, who possesses (has) equal (the same) dignity as a North American, uses up (expends, consumes) the same (amount of) energy (and the same quantity of raw materials) per capita (as the North American)? If the answer here is not in the affirmative (positive), then one must at least concede that the concept of human dignity in this case will (in the future perhaps) detach (separate, dissociate) itself (be detached (dissociated, separated)) from the

materially interpreted ideal of equality (Gleichheitsideal), that after all (that is, therefore) it must discard its specific and today's decisive (weighty) mass-democratic meaning (significance, importance) in order to again achieve (attain, gain, acquire) its pre-democratic connotations which could be reconciled with the ideals of poverty and also with very tangible (solid, palpable) social hierarchies.

We have already noticed (observed, remarked) that in the face of the growing - or even only strongly (greatly) feared - shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods, the biologisation of the political (biological character of politics) is grasped (comprehended, revealed) (becomes clear) both in the aims (goals) of politics (the goods necessary for survival) as well as in the criteria for grouping (group formation). The population explosion takes place (is brought about) not (in fact) in the abstract form of an accumulation (amassing) of neutral numbers, but in the highly concrete form (shape) of the multiplying (increase) of human beings who belong to certain nations and races (Nationen und Rassen) and occupy or want to occupy certain space. Angst (or fear) before (in the face of, with regard to) quantity in difficult situations will most likely (probably), for broad masses, change (turn, be converted) into (become) a hatred against quality. A significant (major) (An important, eminent) historian has impressively described the effect (impact) of angst (or fear) as (the) psychological trigger (catalyst) of fascistic movements¹⁷. This same elementary angst (or fear), this time merely (simply) with other targets to (of) attack (Angriffszielen) and with other signs (i.e. symbolism), is already emerging (looming) in reactions inside of Western mass

¹⁷ Presumably the author is referring to Wilhelm Reich or Erich Fromm, though this, owing to the author's death, cannot be verified - unless a reference was made e.g. in Kondylis's hand-written manuscript of the original text.

democracies¹⁸ as well as in the character of many nationalisms worldwide (throughout the world) (see Sec. II). A gross misjudgement (false estimation, mistaking) of the situation would follow if one wanted to close one's mind to (shut oneself off from knowledge of) the fact that long-term and strong trends in today's (the present) planetary constellation (i.e. conjuncture) will feed (increase, nurture, reinforce) rather than weaken (lessen, diminish) such angst (or fear). And it would likewise be a grave error (serious mistake, miscarriage of justice) to deduce (derive) the still relatively small movements, which in the West and elsewhere loudly articulate this angst (or fear), simply from the racist and the fascistic thoughts world (i.e. ideas). Whoever here senses (gets wind of) (sees in them (the said small movements)) incorrigible (unrepentant) or still (even) inexperienced ideologues and pities (feels sorry off) their stupid supporters, is wrong (misses the point), and moreover he attributes to these movements an intellectual(mental)-spiritual dimension (eine geistige Dimension) which they do not have. Something much more elemental (elementary) is at work here, namely the aggression of an animal when (if) an alien (foreign, strange, different, another) animal penetrates (finds (forces) its way) into its territory (lair, nest). Ideological rags (scraps), which can be found (are collected, thrown together) (both) on the right and on the left, are then quickly stitched (patched, sewed) together to form (as) "programmes" and "principles",

¹⁸ The translator's view is that it still remains to be seen, as of 2014, whether "extreme" nationalist ideological and political reaction to the mass (legal and illegal) settlement of non-Western foreigners in Western countries will seriously put a dent in the prevalence of the human rights individualist, internationalist, anti-national or "anti-White" broader group/kinship ideologies, propaganda and life stances. Presumably the (re)appearance of mass authoritarian or "populist-nationalist democratic" movements and ideologies in the West would be contingent on the breakdown of hedonistic mass consumption and "value pluralism" - something Kondylis implies at the end of this paragraph. However, in the following paragraph, another possible scenario is referred to which sees the absence of any kind of national collective action, i.e. the case of the movement of countless masses of people across all borders and the confrontation (as struggle for survival) of man against man, individual against individual in circumstances of generalised anomie. Another scenario referred to at the end of this Section is the possible emergence of a new asceticism, perhaps with a new religiosity, which will seek to contribute to political order through social disciplining.

however neither the (what is) essential (element, aspect) lies in that nor will these movements fail (founder) because of ideological inadequacy (insufficiency, deficiency) if other circumstances give them a boost (lift) (impetus, buoyancy) (favour them).

The apprehension of political magnitudes on the basis of biological categories or perceptions (representations, depictions, portrayals) (Wahrnehmungen) has in the Western world an old and solid (well-established) tradition even if well-meaning censors of the history of ideas (Geistesgeschichte) want to see (consider, regard) such perceptions either as blemishes (flaws, insignificant deplorable incidents (sideshow)) (Schönheitsfehler) or short-term divergences (deviations) from the noble path of the (civilised) West (Western land (world)). For the unbiased (impartial, unprejudiced) observer, the ascertainment is important (counts) that the gross (crude, coarse) reductionism manifesting itself (appearing, made known) in them (the said biological categories or perceptions) sometimes was (precisely) met with broad approval (enjoyed broad appeal) and was even socially acceptable precisely in times which, in terms of intellectual(-spiritual) refinement (an geistigem Raffinement), otherwise did not leave anything to be desired (were (moved) at a very high level). Their (These biological categories or perceptions') effect (i.e. influence) (Wirkung) - and at the same time their far-reaching (ostensible) self-evidence (naturalness) (to the extent they were self-evident (accepted as a matter of course)) (Selbstverständlichkeit) - in liberal Europe in the second half of the 19th century can (should) be mentioned as an example. This epoch is particularly interesting for our formulation of the question (i.e. examination of the problem) (Fragestellung) because precisely at that time (then) planetary politics was distinguished (characterised) by a clear (distinct) increase in

(intensification of) its degree of density. Biologistic thinking (thought) (Biologistisches Denken) served many times (was frequently of use) as a reference framework for coping (dealing) with (answering) the questions (problems) (addressing the issues) which the relation(s), that has (have) now become closer, of (between) the peoples with one another posed (set). From the European point of view, (the) imperialistic hierarchy (rule, domination) was supposed to be founded through (because of) this (biologistic thinking) and the world-historical mission of white man was legitimised. The biologisation of the political can (Politics can take on a biological character), however, (take place) not only directly on the basis of the notion (concept) of hierarchy, but can also come on the scene (the same thing can happen) as an indirect and unintentional (involuntary) side effect of human rights universalism. Because this (human rights universalism) puts aside ideological and social distinctions (divisions, separations, segregations) so that humans, who bump (run) into (intersect with) one another only as humans and not for instance as communists or liberals, bourgeois or proletarians, cannot make up (find) any other distinctive (i.e. distinguishing) characteristic (mark) (Unterscheidungsmerkmal) and criterion for grouping (group formation) (in order to regulate the relations) amongst (between) themselves (any) more than (apart from) that which manifestly (visibly) stays with (is attached (adheres) to) each and every respective individual human being from birth. It will, in the course of this, often be irrelevant (minor, trivial) as to whether one, out of consideration for (in order to satisfy) current legitimisation (legitimising) needs, puts forward national (conditional) factors behind which (are) (hidden) biological (conditional) factors (are hidden). This (putting forward of national factors behind which biological factors are hidden) can happen only (for) as long as the confrontations occurring (going on, taking place) take place (are acted out) between

nations living apart (separately), however it (this putting forward) would be pushed (retreat, withdraw) into the background if masses of humans (people) looking for (in search of) goods forced (broke) open (leaped across (over)) the borders between nations and the direct confrontation (altercation, clash) of man against man began (commenced, started). Human rights universalism paves the way (does work in advance) - incidentally thoroughly consistently - to (for) this forcing (breaking) open (putting (setting) aside) of borders in so far as it attempts (tries, seeks) to extract (withdraw) the individual in certain respects from the jurisdiction (responsibility) of the nation state (der Zuständigkeit des Nationalstaates) and to commission international authorities in respect of (with) the protection of human rights. Hence, the consciousness (awareness) is gradually formed that one floats (hovers) between humanity (mankind) (Menschheit) and the nation, and that what was thought of (planned) as the legal safeguarding of human dignity turns (is transformed) into a prelude to the uncontrolled (unchecked) migration of the peoples (Völkerwanderung) - and to the just now mentioned direct confrontation (altercation, clash) of man against man. We must come back to the political dark side of human rights (die politischen Schattenseiten der Menschenrechte) later (Sec. V, 2).

This exposition (The previous explanations (analysis)) is (are) not the gloomy (sinister) prognosis (forecast, prediction) of a development which will occur (set in) with absolute certainty and will unleash an elemental (elementary) disorder. It is rather a matter of an emphatic extrapolation (condensation) of the - indeed weighty (very (most) serious) - reasons which suggest (the conclusion) that the mass-democratically inspired (planetary) concept of (permanent) (planetary) order is realisable only with great difficulty. The intent here is descriptive and analytical (Die

Absicht ist hier deskriptiv und analytisch); the accusation should not be made that someone has not put across (propounded) the correct concept of order, and such a concept should also not be suggested (proposed). For that matter, I know of no alternative proposal to be taken seriously, and what is astonishing in today's (the present) constellation (i.e. conjuncture) is exactly the almost unanimous confession of faith in mass-democratic aims (goals) and values. That can only mean that that (the aforementioned) concept of order does not so much constitute a consciously (deliberately) chosen and arbitrarily arranged (ordered, composed, structured) construct (ein bewußt gewähltes und willkürlich angeordnetes Konstrukt), which could be replaced by any other (concept of order) whatsoever, but rather (is) the necessary resultant of the social and historical forces having an effect (acting, working) today (die notwendige Resultante der heute wirkenden sozialen und geschichtlichen Kräfte). Under these circumstances, one must believe with the zeal (passion, emotiveness) of a preacher in the power of one's own words in order to want to put forward (express, formulate, state) one's own personal wishes. Instead of that, I would like to conclude (close) (this section) with two remarks (observations). The possible (potential) practical realisation of the mass-democratic world programme, that is, the convergence (approach) of the planetary political and economic average with (to) the Western (one) (average) would anyway not bring about the end of bloody conflicts and wars. Wars do not take place only between the poor and the rich; the worst wars of this tragic century were waged (conducted, carried out) between the richest nations, and History has not allowed us to know that tragedies will be completely (entirely) abolished or in the future it (History) will stage (perform, direct) them only with poor protagonists. Secondly, the failure of the mass-democratic concept of order (plan for the formation of new planetary order) can lead not only

to a long and wild disorder, but also to a brutal (brutish) order in which politics, reduced to the distribution of goods, would impose a strict social disciplining (Disziplinierung) exactly for the purpose of coping with the task (problem) of the distribution of goods. The ideal of equality could then be (remain) preserved (maintained, saved, salvaged) and continue to be interpreted in the democratic-material sense, but (not) the hedonistic stances (would disappear), which ideationally bear (carry, take the weight of) mass consumption in today's Western mass democracies (in which mass consumption in today's Western mass democracies is ideationally founded); a new asceticism and perhaps a new religiosity (religiousness) (Religiosität) under the circumstances of a great (high, thick) population density and shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods would put an end to the pluralism of mass-democratic views (perceptions, notions) and values. It cannot be stressed (emphasised) enough and repeated (too much (many times)): pluralism is only possible where there is room for many and for much (many people and many things) (Pluralismus ist nur da möglich, wo es Raum für Viele und Vieles gibt).

II. Nationalism between radicalised tradition and mass-democratic modernisation (Nationalismus zwischen radikalisierten Tradition und massendemokratischer Modernisierung)

The robust (forceful, strong) and militant (combative, attacking, aggressive) nationalisms (Die kräftigen und kämpferischen Nationalismen) which promptly sprang (popped out) from the ruins of the Soviet empire touched off (triggered) disconcertment (puzzlement) and embarrassment for many (people) in the West. The long earnest (serious, profound) preoccupation with mass consumption and the corresponding refinement of manners (morals, custom, practices; Sitten) and of psyches (Psychen) gradually brought forth (produced, created, formed) here another perception (view, conception) of the purpose (destiny) of man on this earth, so that one could no longer rightly understand how civilised beings (zivilisierte Wesen) could be so enthusiastic (filled with such enthusiasm, get so excited) about something so (as) primitive as the nation. To that was added a sense (feeling) of vague and only half pronounced (expressed) (in part confessed) concern (disquiet), because in the face of such an outbreak (outburst, eruption) of emotions, which for a long time have been considered outdated (held to be overcome), doubts must (necessarily) have crept in (creep in) over its (the West's) own situation and future (the common future), namely the question arises

(suggests itself) as to whether also Western, and indeed West European societies, could relapse (backslide, regress, retrogress). Even (the, a) normal, as it were, conjugal (marital) quarrel(s) (squabble(s)) between (the) Western nations is (are) henceforth (from now on) observed (monitored) by all sides with such secret (concealed) thoughts (ulterior motives), and one begins to think about (contemplate, consider, ponder) the precarious character of the supranational (übernationalen) institutions created in the meantime and (queries) the irreversibility of the direction followed (pursued) or at least the completibility (or perfectibility; Vollendbarkeit) of the common deed (work, task, (European) project) (with a question mark over them (large pinch of salt)) (to what extent the common deed can be completed). The attempt to have West European nationalisms through the European Community (Europäische Gemeinschaft) definitively (conclusively, finally) put (placed) ad acta¹⁹ (i.e. made irrelevant) was in fact based on special (specific, particular) political preconditions (presuppositions), i.e. apart from the growing integration (fusion) of dynamic (national) economies there was for the first time a common foe (enemy) of all West European nations whose dangerousness (threat) (Gefährlichkeit) greatly exceeded (seemed to be much greater than) every (their) mutual mistrust (distrust), and there was also American political and military patronage (cover, protection; Schirmherrschaft). After the discontinuance (eclipse) of both latter preconditions (the existence of a dangerous common foe and American political and military patronage), the former (growing integration of West European national economies) could also (perhaps) prove to be fragile or at least (in any case (event)) politically secondary. Such half-suppressed doubts in respect of one's own affairs (matters, things) and situation frequently are carried (over, through) (slip) into the noisy (loud, fervent)

¹⁹ Into archives.

or quiet (tacit) angst (or fear) before East European and Balkan nationalisms. The politically and strategically thoroughly (absolutely) justified concern over the presumable (putative, supposed) knock-on (chain) effects of wars or unrest (disturbances) in other parts of the continent would at any rate be slighter (smaller, less) if the European Community could be from the outset (start) certain of the unity and the resolve (decisiveness, resoluteness, determination) of its action. Instead of that, the lack of firm (indestructible) common ground (commonality) in the present lets reminiscences of the conflicts (clashes) of interest(s) (Interessengegensätze) of the nationalistically shaped (determined, marked) past become vivid - and indeed regarding (concerning) the same places and the same actors (acting subjects).

The psychologically explicable (explainable) fixation on the past however suggests misjudgements (mistaken judgements) in respect of (over) the character of nationalism in the present. The interpretation of nationalism as a kind of incursion (invasion, break-in, penetration) of the past into the present is again very often connected with anthropologically underpinned perceptions (views) or perceptions (views) underpinned by the philosophy of history (perceptions drawn from anthropology or the philosophy of history) which put (reduce) the tenacious (dogged, insistent, persistent) continued existence (survival) of the nationalistic cast of mind (way of thinking, conviction, views) (down) to the ineradicable need of man for emotional and substantial bonds (ties) (emotionalen und substanziellen Bindungen) with (in respect of) a corresponding identity, that is, in nationalism they see an (as) expected rebellion (uprising, insurrection) against the instrumental rationality of the technicised world and at the same time against the utilitarian rationality of the (state under the) rule of law (gegen die instrumentelle

Rationalität der technisierten Welt und gleichzeitig gegen die utilitaristische Rationalität des Rechtsstaates). But regardless of whether one feels for (sympathises with) and welcomes or fears and condemns the (this) rebellion: for (in respect of) the analysis of today's concrete situation (konkreten Lage), as we remarked (observed, noticed, stressed) at the start of the previous section, there is little to be gained as long as the constants or long-lived (long-lasting) historical magnitudes are not specified in more detail (nicht näher spezifiziert werden). "Irrational (Irrationale)" or "emotional" needs work (act) differently (have a different effect) in every situation and in every era (age, epoch), that is why they can hardly be properly evaluated (assessed) as historical and social factors if one does not ask through which content and which notions (perceptions) they are concretised, which foe (enemy) they have and which aims (goals) they want to pursue. (With) A general reference to "the" nation without a more detailed (further) description of the world in which the nation holds its own (asserts itself), unfolds - and wants to define itself, does not suffice (is not enough) (one does not get by). Even if certain nations over longer periods of time perennially (time and again, repeatedly) are grouped (approximately) in accordance with the same pattern (model) as friends and foes (nach dem selben Muster in Freunde und Feinde gruppieren), we must every time pose anew the question as to (according to) the driving forces moving them (which driving forces set them in motion) and look into (investigate, scrutinise) the relation of these (latter) driving forces with the predominant world-historical tendencies. It is demonstrably false to attribute friendship or enmity (Freundschaft oder Feindschaft) between nations to immutable (invariable) racial given facts (unwandelbaren rassistischen Gegebenheiten) or inflexible (stiff, rigid) psychical archetypes and to overlook the infinite (endless) plasticity (undendliche Plastizität) of the interests and the aims

(objectives; Zielvorstellungen) constantly being (newly) defined (from the beginning); "eternal enmities" merely result from situations of permanently conflicting (opposing, contrasting) interests.

If Western observers were not worried (alarmed) and embarrassed in respect of the reasons just stated (referred to, explained), they would have had to look at (regard) the revival (resurgence) (Wiederaufleben) of East European and Balkan nationalism as a normal phenomenon in a century whose first half also in Europe, and in whose second half (the same occurred especially) outside of Europe, was (stood, took place) under the influence (sign) of nationalism. This then of course becomes evident (is the case) only if one dispenses with the navel-gazing of (a) (the) (supranationally talking and acting) Western Europe (Western Europe which would like to perceive itself supranationally (as a supranational entity (unity))), if one brings to mind (visualises) the planetary dimension and simply counts how many (sovereign) states there were forty years ago in comparison to today. The large quantity (amount, number) of (newly) added (founded) (ensuing, newfangled) states spread (pushed) through a huge (enormous) nationalistic wave on the African and Asian continents, (and) many of them were the result (outcome, upshot) of long (and bloody) struggles (which also involved many sacrifices), in the course of which national identities (consciousnesses) were consolidated. An approach to the comprehension of the historical character of this nationalism is offered to us if we contemplate (pinpoint) its fundamental difference to European bourgeois nationalism of the 19th century, which developed under the early or late influence of the French Revolution. The Revolution constituted the nation through the political catchwords (mottoes, slogans) of freedom and equality (durch die politischen

Losungen der Freiheit und der Gleichheit), which in concreto²⁰ meant (signified, stood for) the homogenisation of the national space (nationalen Raumes) through the putting aside of estate-based privileges (i.e. privileges of the aristocracy and the clergy) and local or feudal (local-feudal) autonomies. Therefore bourgeois nationalism in its antifeudal-antiparticularistic stance (since it turned against the separatist and localistic tendencies) was a conquest towards the interior (inside) (inwardly), namely an occupation of the national space through social forces which were willing and able (had the will and the ability) to nationalise (nationalisieren) this space, i.e. to unify (standardise) it politically, legally and economically. Certainly, the (internal) unification (standardisation; Vereinheitlichung) of the national space (inwardly, towards the interior) made its (external) borders (outwardly, towards the exterior) more clear-cut (sharper) and this had to entail conflicts with neighbouring states, irrespective of whether the latter (these neighbouring states) were estate-based-absolutist or national-liberal states. However, the historical centre (of gravity) (main emphasis (stress, focus)) of bourgeois nationalism did not lie (was not) (was not detected, pinpointed) in these conflicts, which are (have) to be looked upon (regarded, considered) as its (bourgeois nationalism's) (inevitable (unavoidable)) side effects, but in the (afore)mentioned conquest and homogenisation of each and every respective available internal (inner, interior) space.

The priorities were reversed during the anti-colonial nationalisms of the 20th century. Not that here no endeavours at unification towards the internal (inner, interior) space occurred (happened, emerged); on the contrary, such endeavours were undertaken very energetically by some nationalisms, above all the communistically oriented ones (nationalisms),

²⁰ In a concrete sense.

however they could also more or less slacken (ease (drop) off, abate, wane, subside) if for instance at the head of the nationalistic movement stood (were) patriarchal-traditionalistic forces. Whereas, that is, the European nationalism of the 19th century had an identifiable social bearer, namely the bourgeoisie (even in countries like e.g. Germany in which the national question one way or another was solved through the political action of a wing of the conservative forces, this happened under the pressure of the bourgeois programme (programmatic approach) and in order to take the wind out of the bourgeoisie's sails), very different strata or (various) elite(s) undertook (took) each and every respective political guidance (leadership, command) of the nationalisms of the 20th century. Because here the fundamental problem and the main (chief) matter of concern (aim, objective, request) (Hauptanliegen) was another (a different) (one), it was namely not (primarily) a matter of the conquest of the internal (inner, interior) national space, but of the independence towards the exterior (outside) (outwardly) against a foreign ruler or at any rate of the freedom of movement in foreign policy against a threatening (menacing) neighbour. Nationalism was henceforth (from now on) primarily the effort (attempt) of every particular nation to win (occupy) a fixed (firm) and indisputable place (position) inside of the world society being formed. In the face of (Given) the density, which planetary politics in the meantime had reached (attained) through imperialism, nationalism had (was obliged) to exactly fit in (comply) with (adapt to) the character of planetary politics. Henceforward, the constitution of the nation as an independent state constituted the only possibility of its participation in a world society which one could not stay away from without committing long-term political and economic suicide.

From this perspective, the new editions of East European and Balkan nationalisms can be (better) understood (more). The question of the homogenisation of the national space is not posed here - especially as communistic rule practised (conducted, realised), over and above (in addition to) homogenisation, leveling and atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) -, but the main effort (concern) is (concerns) the immediate and as far as possible most advantageous incorporation (Eingliederung) in world society. The disintegration of multinational states into national states is connected with this effort: every nation wants to arrange its own management of (manage on its own) the aforementioned incorporation, that is, take into its own hands the representation of its interests, since it believes (thinks) it could achieve more for itself through (thanks to) direct contact with the rest of the members of world society - and furthermore, its economic self-determination (wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung), that is, the ending (termination) of the real (actual) or supposed exploitation on the part of a foreign nation, will permit (allow) an optimal utilisation (use, exploitation) of its resources. With regard (As) to this latter desideratum (i.e. the ending of the real or supposed exploitation by a foreign nation), these nationalisms are partly similar to anti-colonial movements as (since) they denounce as colonialistic the autocratic behaviour of the hegemonic nation in the (former) multinational state. How modern the coupling of national-cultural and economic matters of concern (or demands) (Anliegen) is, (and) how much it (this coupling) articulates desires in respect of (as regards, for) redistribution (redistribution wishes) and in this respect (hence) has a genuine mass-democratic impetus - (this) is seen today precisely in the interior of some West European mass democracies where ethnicities and minorities are belatedly rediscovered or even partly constructed (rediscover, and sometimes invent, with great

delay ((at a) very late (stage)) their identity) when it is a matter of (comes to) pinning the blame (attributing responsibility) for the relative poverty of their regions on (to) the "foreign rule (domination)" of the metropolis(es) and demanding appropriate redress (compensation).

Undoubtedly, the hasty (hastily brought about) autonomisation and separation (severance, separatism) of the nations in the former communistic dominion (or territory) (Herrschaftsbereich) has very much to do with redistribution and expectations of affluence. The political passivity of the great majority of people living there points to (indicates) the fact that they would also be content (satisfied, pleased) with nationally (much) looser (slacker) political solutions should these guarantee (ensure) a considerably higher standard of living. The political and intellectual elite(s) who give priority to (place (put)) the national cause (matter, case) (in the foreground (spotlight)) nevertheless necessarily (must) prevail (assert themselves) quite (rather) unchallenged (uncontested) since (as) exactly no other practical solutions are in sight. The nation constitutes the nearest (closest) minimal (minimum) (political) unit which can articulate wishes of redistribution both against yesterday's confederates (allies) as well as against world society (help for the economy (economic aid (assistance)), military aid (help, assistance)). Individuals or private clubs (associations, organisations) do not then have any prospect (chance), that is, whoever wants to ask (call) for (demand) and gain (achieve) something, and whoever, moreover, does not want to share (it, that something) with others, he can only appear as a nation in the sense of the aforementioned nearest minimal (political) unit. The nation therefore today constitutes the smallest possible interest group (Interessengruppe) inside of world society - of course on condition (provided) that it is constituted as a sovereign state. Unrest (restlessness,

disturbance) does not simply come (arise, ensue) because (of the fact that) nations have rediscovered themselves and they want to enjoy their cultural identity in peace, but because nations must constitute themselves as states in order to achieve their, as they hope, effective and lucrative (profitable, productive) incorporation in world society (more precisely: their convergence with (approach to) the prosperous (well-to-do) strata of the same (world society)). Unrest during the constitution of the nation as state is again inevitable (unavoidable) for two reasons. The fluidity and the openness (or uncertain outcome) of the circumstances (i.e. developments) setting in as a result of (after) the dissolution (disintegration) of the old imperial and hegemonic structures offers every nation a unique opportunity to now demand (lay claim to) everything from its neighbours which it considers (holds to be) its own; incidentally, the joining together of all national forces reinforces (strengthens, boosts) the new state and provides (grants, affords) a better starting (initial) position (point) for the future inside of the world society. On the other hand, the constituting (constitution) of the national (i.e. nation) state (die Konstituierung des nationalen Staates) is of necessity (necessarily) accompanied by (interwoven with) the decision as to who will rule (dominate) in it, who, that is, will represent the nation and who should bindingly interpret its will (volition) - a decision, which as is known, as a rule, is taken (made) after much (many) internal discord (strife) (conflicts, disputes) (inneren Zwist).

The apparently inexorable (irrepressible, unstoppable) urge (or propensity) (Drang) of nations, which just shook (threw) off (got rid of) an imperial or hegemonic yoke, to safeguard (secure) their borders and at the same time their identity as well as their political and material claims through the form of organisation (organisational form) of the state, must

be judged (assessed, considered) as an important sign (indication) of the role and the viability of (sovereign) statehood as such in the (now begun) phase of planetary politics (now underway). Nations, which at zero hour had the choice between various possibilities of political organisation, passed by (overlooked) without much thought (consideration) (any further ado) federal and supranational solutions in general and gave their preference to sovereign statehood. Moreover, it is illuminating that these nations simultaneously declared their faith in the principle of human rights universalism. However, in this way they did not want to undertake something which would have led partly or totally to the overcoming of sovereign statehood as (the) form of (their) political organisation (political organisational form), but they use this declaration of faith not least of all in order to achieve as soon and as easily as possible their main aim (goal), namely their incorporation in world society. The role of the long-suppressed thirst for freedom (needs of freedom) should (in the course of this) neither be overlooked (misjudged) nor trivialised, the predominantly human rights orientation of East European and Balkan nationalism was (is) however primarily due to (caused by) the fact that here the foe (enemy), that is, the imperial or hegemonic lord (power, force; Herr) thought little of (cared little for) human rights in the Western sense. Against its proletarian internationalism, which concealed exactly the (its) imperial or hegemonic claim, nationalism therefore had to be summoned, and against its totalitarian or despotic praxis, human rights universalism was summoned. The constituting (constitution) of the nation as state and the appropriation (adoption) of human rights universalism on the other hand jointly make possible the accession of the defeated in the Cold War to a world society, in which, understandably, from now on the ideology of the victor sets the tone (prevails, dominates).

If we understand (get the point of) the multi-faceted inner (internal) logic of the appropriation (adoption) of human rights universalism on the part of the new European (and Eurasian) states, then one cannot be surprised by very likely (probable) future developments in their realm (space, territory). First of all, in many cases only partial (approximate, approaching) implementation of its (human rights universalism's) principles is to be expected (anticipated) in political praxis, which then might (should) (will then probably) head towards an authoritarian pseudo-parliamentarism. Yet still more important is the following. If the appropriation (adoption) of human rights, parliamentary etc. principles is connected with the wish (desire) and expectation (anticipation) of finding (a) quick Anschluss (i.e. union or participation; Anschluß) in respect of the affluence and freedom of the West, then a failure in this endeavour must (will necessarily) change (alter) the positive attitude (or positioning) (Einstellung) towards the West and its ideology. The relation of these nations towards the West is afflicted (shadowed) from the outset by an ambivalence, (and) it (this relation) is burdened by a reservation, in view of the uncertainty of their (these nations') practical success. Ambivalent, even though in a different sense on each and every respective occasion, is also the relation of those nations with the West, which were constituted as states not through the(ir) freeing (being freed (set free), liberation) from a communistic ruler (master; Herren), but exactly through the(ir) struggle against the West or at any rate they feel they exist (are) in contrast (conflict) to the West and Western values. Here again we must distinguish between two main (basic) types. The largest nation in the world(, the Chinese nation,) still continues to demarcate (delimit) itself against the West through the communistic disguise (embellishment) of its nationalism. In practical terms this means that it (China) strives for quick (rapid) and extensive (comprehensive) economic progress on the basis of

modern (that is, Western) technology, while at the same time it rejects the political transformation (transubstantiation) of human rights universalism into a parliamentary system. The difference of its own national traditions vis-à-vis the Western ones (national traditions) is indeed (of course) underlined (every now and then) for obvious reasons (when this seems expedient), however traditionalism as world theory (i.e. world view) or as way (mode) of life (Weltanschauung oder Lebensweise) is not set (summoned) against (contradistinguished to) the West, but on the contrary, technical rationality is openly and programmatically promoted (driven forward, expedited) in parallel with the dissolution (disintegration, breakdown) of traditional social structures (Sozialstrukturen).

The situation looks different in the other anti-Western version of nationalism, which after the Iranian Revolution received much attention and frequently was taken for (as) a novum, although preforms (Vorformen) of a mixing of traditional, and indeed Muslim, with national-anti-Western, elements can already be found in "Arabic socialism" of (a) Nasserite inspiration, which was then varied by the so-called Baath parties. In this case, traditionalism does not simply constitute a defence of the threatened local (native) manners and customs (heimatlichen Sitten und Bräuche), but it emerges aggressively as a world-theoretically founded (established, backed up) declaration of war (als weltanschaulich fundierte Kampfansage) against Western society, its way (mode) of life and its values. One would nonetheless be ill-advised as an analyst to conclude from these slogans a wish to remain in the pre-democratic and preplanetary world. This traditionalism opens in its way a path to incorporation in world society just like for other nations and under other circumstances the confession of faith in the human rights ideology

of the West also does it (that) (opens a path to incorporation in world society). That (This) will be better understood if we consider that in the perception of those concerned, incorporation does not mean (an) admission (acceptance) at any price, but the effort (attempt) at obtaining (the occupation, conquering) the (a) most advantageous position possible: in this way the nationalistic elan (vigour, verve, zest) and zeal is in fact explained in a world in which the density of planetary politics attained (achieved) in the meanwhile does not allow any long-term (political) hermit existence (monasticism, isolation; Einsiedlerexistenz).

The by no means traditionalistic effect(s) (result(s)) of traditionalism is now brought about (arises) through its radicalisation. The possibility of such a radicalisation can of course only be comprehended (grasped) if we free ourselves from the favourite conservative notion that tradition is, as it were, a hyperpersonal hypostasis (überpersönliche Hypostase) which floats (hovers) over (above) peoples and individuals and evades (does not succumb to) the arbitrariness (Willkür) of their decisions. Not in the least (Far from it). Traditions, especially in the modern world, exist and take effect (act) in (accordance with) the interpretation of concrete bearers, they are constructed - on the basis of pre-given (already existing) (vorgegebenen), but also freely processed or invented - materials, and are summoned (mobilised) against other traditions or interpretations of tradition. The first step towards the radicalisation of tradition takes place when he who is able to interpret tradition bindingly represents the opinion that tradition is not (the) dead past, but (the) living present, that is, whoever wants to live (in accordance with) tradition must not turn away from today's world and meticulously (with scholastic precision) (penibel) reconstruct the past in order to nest in it (the past) again, but find in tradition faith and guidelines with whose help the tasks (problems) of the

present could best be dealt (coped) with (managed). Tradition should not mean encapsulation (shutting oneself off) in time and in space (Abkapselung in der Zeit und im Raum), but constitute a force turned towards the outside (outwardly) which is able to afford (provide) (something) more than rearguard action.

If tradition is (constitutes) instructions (directions) for action in the present and if the present moves, as is obvious, in broader spaces and larger dimensions than the past, then tradition must detach itself from the (its) old particularism (Partikularismen) and turn into an (overarching) idea (of great scope (a large range)), which embraces (captures (the imagination of), grasps) (the) masses in a unified (uniform) way (manner). As such an idea - for instance as a religious idea against the background of (interwoven with) a nationalistic activism which turns against an "atheistic" and "materialistic" foe (enemy) - traditionalism generalises and unifies (standardises) (the) loyalties (feelings of loyalty), that is, it accepts (tolerates) conventional (long gone by, obsolete) locally conditioned (determined) patriarchal loyalties (feelings of loyalty) only in so far as they represent under the new conditions (in the new circumstances) the overarching (broader) idea, and awakens (wakes) a sense (feeling, consciousness) of a comprehensive (extensive) common bond (togetherness, belonging together, community; Zusammengehörigkeit) and equality, since the status (exalted position) of individuals - all individuals - is now defined in accordance with the new criterion of service to (directed towards, of) (servicing) the idea (neuen Kriterium des Dienstes and der Idee). The congregation (or rallying) (Zusammenballung) and homogenisation of masses of people (human masses), achieved through this service to the idea, constitutes the first modernistic (modernising) component or effect (action) of radicalised

traditionalism (die erste modernistische Komponente oder Wirkung des radikalisierten Traditionalismus). The second lies in its power (i.e. ability) to motivate and to mobilise these masses to an extent which was simply inconceivable (unthinkable) for genuinely traditional societies. Tradition becomes (turns into) a motive for (of) political action (acting) (politischen Handlungsmotiv) when it is not only lived (experienced), but is (really) demanded (and claimed (contested)) - obviously they are two very different moods (Gemütslagen). The woman who demonstrates in favour of (for) the retention (keeping, maintenance) of traditional dress and in (a) militant mood together with other women takes to the streets (goes out on (marches down) the street) is no longer the woman who has (always) worn this (same) dress (for ages). Certainly, this dress did not always have only one use, but also a symbolic value, however formerly (previously) it stood for instance for the traditional position of (the) woman vis-à-vis (the) man (men), now on the other hand (contrary) it is supposed (meant) (aims) to primarily symbolise that the woman who wears it wants to pointedly delimit herself against (declare her opposition to) another culture, and no longer that she unconditionally (absolutely) accepts in the former (earlier) sense the social superiority of man. While, that is, tradition is militantly demanded (claimed, contested) and not lived (experienced) in accordance with an interpretation which became self-evident, the content and the polemical point of its symbols (die polemische Spitze ihrer Symbole) change, the modification or even reversal (inversion) of the old content takes place (is brought about) on the quiet (clandestinely, secretly) exactly in the name of the dogged (determined, tenacious) defence of "tradition". Therefore the job (work) of the interpretation of tradition becomes more important than the real remnants of tradition. That is the point of extreme psychological importance for the unfolding of the process of modernisation

(modernisation process) under the aegis of radicalised traditionalism. One such (, in such a way,) veiled (masked) unfolding actually also brings with it (entails) inhibitions (Hemmungen), simultaneously it offers, however, a considerable (psychic) relieving of the tension of existence (eine erhebliche Entlastung), which in certain situations is needed more pressingly (urgently, intensely) than freedom from inhibitions. Modern content (elements) can be appropriated (adopted) much more easily in (a) (its (their)) traditional disguise, without in the process the humiliating feeling coming into being that one is aping the hated West or that one is betraying one's own identity; and the impression that one anyway (has) never deviated from (broke with) one's own tradition protects one, on the other hand, from disappointments, should it turn out (come to light) that the attempt at modernisation (has) failed.

These observations (remarks) bring us to a third modernistic aspect of radicalised traditionalism, which should (will) be of no small (slight) significance (importance, meaning) for the future. This aspect in itself incidentally constitutes (an) eloquent proof (piece of evidence) of the fact that radicalised traditionalism makes up (constitutes, amounts to) an inhibited and disguised (embellished) process of modernisation under the pressure of a very dense planetary politics, (but) not sterile "reaction" in the familiar (usual, current) sense. It is obvious that neither in its theory nor in its praxis (and in its praxis even less than in the (its) theory) modern technology (technique) and industry are not rejected out of hand (straight out) nor is a return to pre-industrial methods of economising striven for (after) (pursued) (oder eine Rückkehr zu vorindustriellen Methoden des Wirtschaftens angestrebt werden). In (respect of) this crucial (key) field (area), radicalised traditionalism does not permit itself free rein (follies, craziness) and illusions as regards (over) the political

weight and fate (destiny) of a nation, which for the safeguarding (preservation) of its traditions would consciously and programmatically do (go) without (abstain from, renounce) the means of modern technology (technique) and industry. But on the basis of the inner logic (inneren Logik) of historical movement, the use of modern means proves to be more decisive than the propagating (propagation) of traditionalistic goals. Precisely the inevitable (unavoidable) daily contact (dealings) with the means, the division of labour and the interhuman (interpersonal) relations (between people) conditioned by the said contact and division of labour, shape (form) the social whole (entirety) in the long-term. The incorporation of growing (increasing, more and more) parts (sectors) of the population in modern economic relations (circumstances, conditions) (moderne Wirtschaftsverhältnisse) or in modern armies will bring about the inescapable (inevitable) restructuring of the village, the tribe, the clan (or kinship group) and the family (Umstrukturierung des Dorfes, des Stammes, der Sippe und der Familie), and even if many facades are supposed to (also) remain intact for reasons of political symbolism or anti-Western self-understanding (the projection of the (an) anti-Western identity), nonetheless their (these facades') function will no longer be the old (one, function). If the mechanisms of the psychological relieving of the tension of existence (die psychologischen Entlastungsmechanismen), of which we spoke before (previously), worked (operated, functioned), then the process of modernisation can proceed (make progress, advance, go) very far (to a great extent, greatly) without most people feeling an unbearable contradiction between means and ends (goals) or between modernistic praxis and traditionalistic ideology. Symbol-bearing(laden) acts (Symbolträchtige Handlungen) like the regular ostentatious (indicative) prayer of the devout (pious, god-fearing) and the equally ostentatious (indicative) cutting (chopping) off of the hand for thieves,

are even possibly carried out (executed) in the search for (in search of) (over)compensation all the more persistently the more political modernisation takes place in the form of massification and economic modernisation (takes place) in the form of the developed (advanced) division of labour. It would not be, for that matter, the first time since the beginning of the industrial age where movements, which arrived (came) on the scene with traditionalistic slogans (mottoes) have conducted rapid (speedy, swift) modernisation. The set phrase (or claptrap) "blood and soil" did not at all prevent e.g. the National Socialists from driving forward (promoting, advancing) technical-industrial development and from unconcernedly (unhesitatingly) thinning (clearing) the ranks of the "peasantry (peasants)".

Whether as (attempted) imitation of the West or as traditionalistic refusal (rejection) of it (the West): contemporary (today's) nationalism, which wants to, in fact must, participate in the planetary becoming (i.e. events) (planetarischen Geschehen) follows through various (straight) paths (routes) and detours (roundabout ways) mass-democratic logic and ultimately has mass-democratic objectives (targets, set aims). As has already been observed (As we already remarked) (Sec. I, 1), in the future most probably (likely) different types of mass democracy will develop, which will diverge from the - in itself already diverse (multifarious) - Western type. In this respect it is not a matter of indifference whether a nation defines itself as modernistic or traditionalistic, on the other hand however, one may (should, ought) not expect that today's nationalism will be tied to (supported by) achievements which characterise its past. Those who expect from the "resurgence (revival) (Wiederaufleben) of nationalisms" a new creative epoch of national cultures in their individuality, will above all experience (go through) disappointment.

"Culture" in general and as such was a bourgeois value and "national culture" was the culture from the perspective of bourgeois nationalism. There can be no doubt that the *concept* of national culture will (still) survive for a long time, since (because) it will obviously continue to fulfil legitimation (legitimising) tasks (functions) and will be further required (needed) as a weapon towards the outside as well as an identity-constituting(forming) factor (a factor for the composition of an identity) in the interior (inwardly) (als indentitätsstiftender Faktor im Inneren). It can even be predicted that under certain circumstances entire (whole) nationalistic mythologies and self-complacent(satisfied) collective epopees will come into being. However, all of this (of itself) is still not (does not mean) cultural creativity. The great questions (matters) of content and form (Die großen Fragen des Inhalts und der Form) are posed at the level of world society in the mass-democratic age, and indeed already from the time of the great turn (i.e. change or watershed) (Wende) around (about) 1900, - and only questions which are posed here spur (stimulate, inspire, encourage) today truly creative intellectual(-spiritual) activity. (For) As long as (No matter how much) one still likes to chew over (ruminate on) one's own national culture: as an exclusively *national* culture in the future it will hardly (barely) be anything more than a couleur locale, "interesting" peculiarity (particularity; Besonderheit) or sight worth seeing (spectacle) inside of the motley (multicoloured) pantheon or pandemonium of mass-democratic world society. In no other example is this tendency seen (shown) so clearly as in the inability of traditionalistic nationalism to (plain and simple) adhere (stick) (simply and just) (to) (persist (remain) with) traditional elements (pure traditional elements and only them).

In conclusion, (we must draw attention to) two (further, more) possible functions of contemporary (today's) nationalism (must be contemplated). The just mentioned possible (potential) coming into being or swelling (inflation, expansion) of nationalistic mythologies could in part serve (be of use) as a substitute (replacement) for the just (in the meantime, recently) nullified (invalidated, cancelled, deceased) grand(iose), utopian blueprints (outlines) (Entwürfe) underpinned by the philosophy of history, that is, it (the said coming into being or swelling of nationalistic mythologies) could, as it were, produce (various kinds of) short- and medium-term utopias. To the extent that vigorous (robust) nationalisms would (indeed) usurp (appropriate) a supranational, for instance religious idea and would represent it with (a) claim(s) to exclusivity, (then) the short- and medium-term chiasm could be put in (at) the service of the hegemonic ambitions of middle and major (greater) Powers. In the course of this (In this case) however, a fragmentation (splintering) of the bearers and the interpretations of the supranational idea in question must always be expected. On the other hand, it is (would be) conceivable (imaginable) that nationalism, in circumstances of a growing (an increasing) shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods, would foster (promote, boost) at the planetary level the biologisation of the political (contribute to politics itself taking (on) a biological character). (Possible) Bottlenecks (narrowness, tightness) in the distribution of goods would have to - as long as they (these bottlenecks) at least did not lead to (end up in) a struggle of all against all - deepen (intensify, strengthen) the points of delimitation (borders) between the groupings of world society and would possibly (probably) make racially conceived (understood, interpreted) nationality the decisive characteristic (trait, criterion) of (for) differentiation (segregation, demarcation) and classification(s)²¹. From this perspective,

²¹ As of 2014, this certainly does not seem to be the case in Western countries, apart from the opinion

it is (indeed) a telltale sign (eloquent and instructive) that the groupings, which today for the first time (want to) walk onto (appear on) the stage of planetary politics in the form of sovereign states in order to announce (declare, defend, champion) their interests in the planetary struggle over distribution and redistribution now beginning (starting), were constituted as a matter of preference, in fact almost spontaneously, on the basis of a true (real) or supposed (putative) blood community as the nearest (closest thing to a, most obvious) common denominator (Blutsgemeinschaft als dem nächstliegenden gemeinsamen Nenner).

of small minorities within the (indigenous, in macro-historically relative terms) European peoples, though nationalism with strong racial overtones is definitely alive and well in many non-Western countries. However, the bottlenecks referred to have by no means arisen to any significant extent in the Western world, and the twenty-first century is still young.

III. The new shape (form, face) of hot (warm) war (Die neue Gestalt des warmen Krieges)

If war constitutes the continuation of politics with (by) other means (Bildet der Krieg die Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln), if, that is, in the conduct (waging) of war (warfare, way of conducting (waging) war; Kriegführung) the texture (composition) of the dominant political circumstances is reflected, then it is no wonder (it is natural) if (that) war (for war) in the mass-democratic age must be (to be) democratised (sich... demokratisieren muß). Here (This time) it is not a matter, of course, of the introduction (establishment, institution) of universal conscription beside (next to) general (universal) suffrage, from (in relation to) which many socialists formerly (in the 19th century) expected the democratisation of the armed forces (Streitkräfte). Rather, the means of (the conduct (waging) of) war (Kriegsmittel) are democratised, and indeed in the course (framework, context) of an ambivalent development, during which the former (previous) overall (total) social relation(ship) between the civil(ian) (civilians) and the military (military personnel) (das frühere gesamtgesellschaftliche Verhältnis zwischen Zivil und Militär) is changed (altered, varied) against (to the detriment of) the military (military personnel), however simultaneously (at the same time), the new flexibility of weapons and forms of war (Flexibilität der Waffen und der Kriegsformen) make easier (facilitate), in fact (and indeed) provoke, military deployments (interventions, operations). In light of (In

the face of, Given) the very close (tight, narrow) connections (relations, links) between technological possibilities and strategy or tactics (Strategie bzw. Taktik) in (of) war existing at the (very) latest since the Second Industrial Revolution, this (the above) development (of the (ambivalent) democratisation of the means of war) had to start from the technologically advanced Western mass democracies (technologisch fortgeschrittenen westlichen Massendemokratien); and in the face of (in view of, given) the density of planetary politics reached (attained, achieved) in the meantime it (this development) must, above all after the end of the Cold War, embrace the whole of(, from now on more mobile,) world society (which is entering a phase of intense mobility). In the course of this, the blurring (making blunt) of the boundaries between civilian and military technology (das Verfließen der Grenzen zwischen ziviler und militärischer Technologie) has a pioneering (groundbreaking) effect, which was fostered (promoted) by (thanks to) the Third Industrial Revolution. The more civilian and military technology is dependent on (the services of) electronics (Elektronik) and informatics (information technology), the more the distance between them decreases (is reduced), not indeed (of course) at the lower, but surely at the higher and the highest levels; however precisely here (at the higher and highest levels) the decisions are made (taken) over the guidance (steering) of the entire (total) available apparatus (machinery, mechanism, (technological) setup; Apparates), in order to then set in motion its (the available apparatus's) parts (sections, members) through the same technology, which provides the data (information; Daten) for the taking of the fundamental (basic) decisions. The smooth (unhindered, unobstructed) transition from civilian to military technology and vice versa (the other way around, inversely) implies (means) that for the promotion of the latter (military technology) no special (and extensive) efforts (on a large scale) are needed

(necessary), as much as the application of generally valid (kinds of) (general) knowledge in the military sector as well as the (its, their) particular (specific, special) military (detailed) processing (work) (in detail) (die speziell militärische Kleinarbeit) require(s) time and specialists (people with corresponding specialisation, qualified personnel) (may take time and enlist specialists). The pressure of reducing (the) costs (of production), under which civilian technology is (finds itself), affects (influences) (has a favourable effect on) the manufacture of military products (favourably), while moreover the parallel advances in both sectors (areas, fields) shorten (reduce) the (length of) time which the development of new weapons systems (Waffensystemen) requires (from their design (Entwurf) until their readiness for use (or action) (operational readiness) (Einsatzbereitschaft)). In the extreme case, progress in civilian technology eo ipso enables (permits) its direct military use.

Because of (Through) that (For these reasons), the previous (former), frequently politically privileged position of (the) military (officer(s)) is impaired (reduced, damaged, diminished, downgraded, demoted, degraded) in so far as the weapons (arms) industry gradually (step by step) ceases to be (stops being) surrounded by the grim (gloomy, sinister, bleak, dark) aura of the arcanum imperii²², and the civilian technician (Techniker) can partly supersede (be a substitute for), (and) partly direct (guide, lead) the military (officer) (what is military); simultaneously the self-understanding of (the) military (officer(s)) changes, that is - to contrast two common (familiar) stereotypes with each other - the modern sober technician takes the place of (replaces) the "warhorse" (i.e. bellicose warrior; Haudegens). The possibility of a numerical reduction (reduction in the number) of personnel in the armed forces during (their,

²² Secret of power ((imperial) government).

the armed forces') increasing technicisation (Technisierung) also contributes to the belittlement (downgrading) of the social position of (the) military (officer(s)), at least inside of the Western mass democracies. Nevertheless, these developments (events, occurrences, processes) point to an elimination of the military factor just as little as the economisation of the political (the fusion of politics with the economy) excludes the politicisation of the economic (economy). Under certain political and psychological-ideological conditions it can be even assumed (presumed, conjectured) that military modernisation or the consolidation (improvement) of the military (sector) can be conducted (done) (take place) more comfortably and more effectively through (thanks to) the (its) interweaving with civilian (non-military) technology and behind its (the civilian technology's) harmless (innocent, inoffensive) facade. Precisely this interweaving can e.g. allow (permit) Powers (like Japan and Germany), which in the strategic constellation (conjuncture) of the Cold War could indeed be economically strong (powerful) but militarily had to remain second-rate(class) (inferior, subordinate), to very quickly catch up on (with) (rectify, make up for, cover) the deficiencies (failings) in this (the military) sector (area, field), since they can (are in a position to) simply adapt (adjust, switch over (around)) their advanced (high) technology from civilian to military use. The same technological abundance (profusion) of the West also fills the channels (conduits) through which (the) modern weapons, and indeed often in civilian packaging (package), reach extra-European spaces (außereuropäischen Räume). The middle and major Powers of these spaces are of course more or less removed (far away) from an interweaving of civilian and military technology at the high level, yet they require (need) above all those weapons, which are produced at this level. Incidentally, they (the middle and major Powers) cannot see (understand, recognise) why they

should not possess what the great Powers already have and do not want to simply scrap (want to also hold (retain) in the future). A ban (prohibition) on them (the middle and major Powers) from procuring nuclear weapons or other (further) modern armaments (Rüstzeug)(, which would (be) specifically directed (turn) against them (the middle and major Powers),) could ultimately only be justified by the assumption (argument, acceptance) that the great Powers alone would know how (are in a position) to handle (use) such weapons and armaments rationally (and sensibly) (vernünftig), but not they (the middle and major Powers) themselves (the rest of the world). Such a (discriminating) distinction (differentiation) ((which is) so disparaging (derogatory) for so many) however cannot be drawn (made, attempted, undertaken) without disdaining (despising, holding in contempt, flouting, disregarding) the declared (proclaimed) anthropological and universal-ethical principles of equality of the West (the declared Western principles of the equality of humans and of universal ethics). That is why it appears (seems) the conclusion is compelling (mandatory) that humans with equal (the same) dignity (if all humans have the same dignity,) may also (then they should also be allowed to) possess (be in the possession of) the same weapons.

If the process of democratisation on a highly technicised (an advanced technical) basis in the West changes (transforms) the military (profession) into a "job" amongst others - of course into such a job of which in case of emergency completely special (particular) performances (achievements) are still expected -, the democratisation of war at a planetary level takes place (is brought about) through (by means of) the watering down (weakening, slackening) or the ending (termination) of (the) (military-technical(technological)) monopolies of (military technology (technique)) (militärtechnischen Monopolen). One cannot help thinking of the saying

(phrase, quotation) of the philosopher²³ - "Mankind required gunpowder, and forthwith it was there" -, when one looks at today's forms which the convergence of political and military factors take. (The) Strategic atomic weapons (Die strategischen Atomwaffen) become obsolete and let smaller, more flexible and relatively easily acquirable weapons take precedence precisely from the moment (at) which the middle and major Powers, which are able to possess (own) and need them, come on the scene. The revaluation of weapons, which can be used with high precision in very different local situations, corresponds to the fragmentation (splintering) of political forces after the Cold War. The situation looked precisely the other way around (like the reverse) during the Cold War, although in its (the Cold War's) final years it (this reverse situation) slackened (became looser) through (thanks to) the development of middle(medium)- and short-range missiles (or rockets) (Mittel- und Kurzstreckenraketen). Nonetheless, (the fact) that strategic atomic weapons by no means lost (forfeited) their meaning lay (was) in (depended on) the logic of the (overall) constellation (situation) (as a whole). The fundamental irreconcilability of the two giant (enormous, huge) and massive (compact, solid) camps, which stood stiffly (rigidly) opposite each other (face to face) and rather seldom found byways in order to outwit (outsmart, dupe) one another or to consult (and understand) each other, was reflected (mirrored) in the most vivid (clearest) way in the (bilateral, mutual, reciprocal) piling up (accumulation, amassing) of apocalyptic arsenals (by (on) both sides). The characteristic quality (property) of these strategic weapons was that they could not concentrate their tremendous (enormous, vast) destructive energy towards a certain militarily sensible (reasonable, plausible, legitimate) target (aim) (sinnvolles Ziel) (towards a target (aim) that was

²³ G.W.F. Hegel.

legitimate (sensible) from a military point of view (in military terms)); they (the strategic weapons) had to (massively) destroy (to a massive degree, in a massive manner, on a massive scale) (sow mass destruction), that is, much more than what was necessary for the politically desirable (wished for) subjugation (subjection) of the foe (enemy). Precisely this ungainliness (clumsiness, awkwardness) of theirs (these strategic weapons), if one may say so (the expression is permitted), secured for them (a, the) deterrence function (function of deterrence, an ability at exercising intimidation) (Abschreckungsfunktion). The exercising of politics with them (the said strategic weapons) meant (amounted to) deterring (i.e. acting as a deterrent) (exercising intimidation) (abschrecken), however waging (conducting) war with them (such means) (was) (had) more or less unpredictable (imponderable, unforeseen consequences) (unberechenbar).

After the Cold War, the planetary landscape is no longer dominated (ruled) by two massive bulwarks standing opposite one another and (which are also) strategically equipped (which have strategic armaments at their disposal), but rather it (the planetary landscape) resembles (looks like, is similar to) an electronic board on which small red lights lying closely side by side constantly turn on and off. The world war which did not take place has been (was) apportioned (shared out) to (divided up into) a number of (several, many) regional conflicts of which some (a few) could attain (achieve, gain) planetary relevance. Inside of the fragmented (splintered) planetary space and outside of (beyond) the shadow of an atomic world war, wars become more feasible (easier); the superseding (supplanting, replacing, displacement) of (the) strategic nuclear weapons by (through, with) (the) precision weapons (weapons of precision) (die Verdrängung der strategischen Kernwaffen durch die

Präzisionswaffen) corresponds to the replacement (substitution) of the old deterrence (nuclear intimidation) by the new conduct (waging) of war. The openness (open outcome) of the new planetary constellation (conjunction) commands (the) flexibility of military use (usage, deployment, operation) (in the use of military means), while the variety (diversity) of possible targets to (of) attack (Angriffsziele), every one of which can in turn go on the attack, demands the (a) rapid (fast, quick, speedy) concentration of (the) means and that target accuracy (accuracy of aiming; Zielgenauigkeit) which constitutes one of the astonishing results of the new weapons technologies (technology; Waffentechnologien). The planetary Power which has won the Cold War must now, if it wants to remain (carry on as) a planetary Power, perfect with the help of new civilian-military technology that concept (i.e. strategic dogma) (Konzept) which initially (first of all) was formed (still) inside of the old deterrence strategy (strategy of deterrence (intimidation)) as its (the said concept's) supplement (complement); however "flexible response" cannot now (from now on) merely (simply) mean the ability at reacting, at every stage (tier, grade, level) of any escalating confrontation, with the military means which correspond to the seriousness of the situation without immediately having to resort to extremes, but - more generally - (it ("flexible response" must mean) the ability at intervening in every conflict with the right (suitable) equipment on each and every respective occasion.

As is self-evident, a planetary Power, which through (by means of, with) frequent (constant) flexible responses wants to put down (suppress) or (bring under) control (planetarily relevant) conflicts (of a planetary relevance (significance)), must be interested in (concern itself with) not allowing the possible originators (creators) (Urheber) of ((collective)

subjects responsible for) such conflicts or at least its own possible opponents (i.e. foes) (rivals; Gegner) to (at the same time, in the process) come into possession of nuclear weapons (Kernwaffen), but also of (high-precision) weapons (of high precision) (Waffen hoher Präzision); the same would be in the interest of Powers which feel (believe) that (in certain regions) they are represented by the planetary Power. From this perspective, the oligarchy of the bearers (possessors, carriers) of ultra-modern (very (highly) modern) (advanced) weapons (hochmoderner Waffenträger) seems a more effective (expedient) guarantee of peace than the (an) egalitarian weapons democracy (armed egalitarian democracy) (egalitäre Waffendemokratie). Nevertheless, it can be said that for two reasons the spreading (diffusion) of the aforementioned weapons in the long term cannot be prevented. The political reason is the necessity, in which (in respect of) the great Powers including (together with) the planetary Power (are (found)), to delegate regional police (policing) tasks (duties) (regionale polizeiliche Aufgaben) to allied middle or major Powers. It is to be expected that these latter (middle or major Powers) will make the fulfilment of their tasks (duties) dependent on the supply of modern armaments and they will take advantage (make use) of (exploit) the possible (potential) defence of foreign (alien) interests for the consolidation (and extension) of their own regional power position (position of power; Machtposition). The economic reason for which the export of highly developed (advanced) weapons technology will more likely intensify is partly reduced (traced back) to the aforementioned interweaving of civilian and military technology and is joined (attached) to (connected with) the pressure of competition. To the extent that more and more (increasingly more) middle Powers are able to (can) sell the usual conventional weapons (üblichen konventionellen Waffen) to those interested, the head (chief, principle, leading, top) producers must (will be

obliged to) offer highly developed (advanced) weapons systems in order to - above all amongst themselves - remain competitive. The already mentioned shortening of the time between a(n) (weapons-technical) invention (with regard to weapons technology) and its practical implementation (carrying out) will also contribute to all the respective newest achievements in this sector finding (a) rapid diffusion (the rapid (quick, fast) spreading (diffusion) of all the respective newest (latest) achievements in this sector (area, field)). In the course of this, the technological chasm (gulf) between the producer and the buyer (customer, purchaser) will not necessarily constitute an insurmountable obstacle because the operation (handling; Bedienung) of the systems is less complicated than their structure.

The spreading (diffusion) of highly developed (advanced) weapons technology in countries which scarcely (hardly) or only rudimentarily produce such weapons (are only at the threshold of their production) will surely (of course, certainly) not be able to bring about an automatic equalisation (balancing; Ausgleich) of the military potential of exporters and importers. The same amount (quantity) and quality of material (materiel) has in every country a different value (and status (importance)) (Stellenwert) which is determined by the general technological and cultural level; the truism (old and self-evident truth) of (regarding) the priority of the human factor will therefore - at least in this sense - (further) retain its validity (force; Gültigkeit). Moreover, countries, which are exclusively or mainly dependent on the import (importation, importing) of weapons technology, can only ever import and master (handle, operate) a part or fragment of the same (weapons technology) (with success), but not the overall context inside of which these parts or fragments reach (attain, achieve) their maximum (maximal) performance

(output, achievement) (maximale Leistung). Accordingly, only sections (segments, parts) of the armed forces familiarise themselves (are made familiar (familiarised)) with the operation (handling) of (a) modern device(s) (apparatus(es)) (and machine(s)) (Geräts), that is, highly developed (advanced) technicisation is basically restricted (limited) to elite units (Eliteeinheiten), while the great mass of troops in its way of conducting operations and mentality more or less remains unaffected (untouched, not influenced) by it (this highly developed technicisation). From that follows (results) a considerable (notable) lack of homogeneity, at the same time however also the (there is a) necessity of maintaining (need to maintain) mass armies. Because a significant (considerable) numerical reduction (cutback) in the same (mass armies) without the (a) (parallel) decrease in their fighting (combat) power could only be carried out (done, undertaken) on condition of (during) an extreme technological refinement of (the) management (and control) systems for reconnaissance, target detection and weapon guidance (which collect (gather) information, track down (detect, locate) targets and guide (steer) weapons) (bei einer extremen technologischen Verfeinerung der Führungssysteme für Aufklärung, Zielerfassung und Waffenlenkung), which (so that the said significant numerical reduction) would multiply (the) firepower (Feuerkraft), heighten (increase) mobility (agility, manoeuvrability; Beweglichkeit) and economise (save) on munitions (ammunition) thanks to high target (i.e. aiming) accuracy. That is why sizable (considerable, appreciable) differences in level would undoubtedly arise (occur, appear) should ever a country which exports highly developed (advanced) weapons technology wage war against a country which imports such weapons technology. This case could occur not seldom (infrequently) in the future, however the effects (consequences, impact) of the democratisation of the means of war will

not be made (rendered) noticeable only in it (such a case). In regional conflicts, which (now) become more probable (likely) as a result (because) of the emergence (rise, advent, appearance) of middle and major Powers, the marked (appreciable) technological lead (superiority) of a local Power must (will necessarily) influence the correlation (circumstances) of forces (i.e. balance of power) (Kräfteverhältnisse), even if the bulk (greater (major) part) of the armed forces on (of) all sides has otherwise remained at an outdated (overtaken) stage (grade, level, phase) of technological development. Technologically underdeveloped countries, which display (evince, bring to light) (an) acute (intense) need (requirements) for (acquiring) modern armaments (Ausrüstung), do this (display an acute need for modern armaments) exactly with regard to (while bearing in mind) foreign or their own hegemonic claims (aspirations) (Hegemonialansprüche) and (to) the ((inter)related imminent) conflict situations (situations of conflict; Konfliktsituationen) (arising (resulting, ensuing) out of (from) them (hegemonic claims)).

The first-mentioned case (of the two cases above) would now occur (appear) if e.g. a supraregional great Power (überregionale Großmacht) wanted to oppose (resist, line up against) the hegemonic claims of a certain regional Power and in the course of this was (would be) determined to bring its (complete, full) technological superiority (fully, completely) to bear. The question which would then be posed would have to read as follows: can a regional Power, which in any case is not a match for (in a position to get the better of (overcome)) a great Power in an all-round (a full-scale) struggle (fight, battle) (up to (capable of withstanding) an all-round struggle with a great Power), nevertheless cause (inflict on) it (the great Power) such damage (harm) that this acts as a deterrent (deterrence) (has a deterrent effect)? The answer, which the

future will give to this question, should (will, might) have enormous (tremendous) consequences for the formation of the constellation (conjuncture) in today's (the present) phase of planetary politics. It can be regarded as (considered) certain (definite) that the firepower of all sides as well as the mobility (agility, manoeuvrability) of its (this firepower's) use (deployment, operation) will increase. More and (Increasingly) more countries will have at their disposal missiles (or rockets) with an increasing range and (increasing) target accuracy (accuracy of aiming) (Raketen mit wachsender Reichweite und Zielgenauigkeit), all the more frequently will ballistic missiles be equipped with chemical or biological weapons (ballistische Flugkörper mit chemischen oder biologischen Waffen ausgerüstet). Should the interested great Powers prove to be incapable of constructing (making, producing, manufacturing) (unable to construct) effective early warning and interception systems (wirksame Frühwarn- und Abfangsysteme) or of preventing (stopping) (to prevent) the spreading (diffusion) of such weapons through (by means of) constant well-aimed (precise) interventions (gezielte Eingriffe), then they must, sooner or later, accept (sustain, risk) heavy losses even in (during) ultimately (in the end) victorious military (war) confrontations (conflicts, clashes) with regional powers. It is therefore (with that) to be expected that countries, which because of their general economic situation cannot cherish (have) any hope of familiarising themselves with (learning about) (the) ultra-modern (latest modern) technology in its entire breadth, will at least strive for (pursue) the acquisition of weapons which would not fail in their deterrence (deterrent) effect even in respect of the great Powers. If this possibility is realised, then the political and military distance between middle, major and great Powers will be smaller than what one would presume (imagine) on the basis of each and every respective

existing general difference in technological level (technologisches Niveauunterschiedes).

The different degree of technicisation (Technisierungsgrad) of armies already points to (indicates, shows) (the fact) that in the future there will be a number of (several, many) forms of battle (combat, fighting) and kinds of conduct (waging) of war. An ideal image (picture) (Idealbild) of the modern, that is, in every way (totally, without exception) technicised conduct (waging) of war will indeed be outlined (sketched), however that does not at all (by any means) mean that in certain situations other forms of battle (combat, fighting) could be decisive - both between technologically equivalent (equal) as well as between technologically non-equivalent (unequal) foes. That would be possible not only because external adversity (adversities; Widrigkeiten) would prevent (impede, obstruct, hinder) the use of hypersensitive (übersensibler) technology but also on account of the fact that weapons can be destroyed with (through) simpler means than those which are required (necessary) for their manufacture, although of course every direct confrontation of technically highly developed (advanced) (weapons) with less developed weapons *ceteris paribus*²⁴ must turn out to be in favour of the former. In this way (Thus), for instance at a technologically higher level, the destruction of defence systems in outer space by space bombers (von Verteidigungssystemen im Weltraum durch Weltraumbomber) can more easily be carried out (undertaken) (is easier) than their (the space defence systems') construction, whereas at a technologically lower stage (grade, level, tier), terroristic actions and commando operations (undertakings) (terroristische Aktionen und Kommandounternehmen) (should) gain

²⁴ With other things the same; all other things being equal (or held constant).

(acquire) in (a greater) military significance (importance, meaning) precisely under the circumstances of a hyper-technicisation (Übertechnisierung). It is to be expected that a particular technique (technology) for the neutralisation of peak (leading, top) military technology (von militärischer Spitzentechnologie) will be developed and that in general (a main emphasis (focus) of) (weapons-technical) efforts (endeavours) (with regard to weapons technology) (waffentechnischen Bemühungen) (in large part) will be concentrated on (in) the area which lies (is) between nuclear weapons and (the) traditional conventional weapons (herkömmlichen konventionellen Waffen).

Nevertheless, the nuclear weapons and the connected with them (interrelated) forms of war will by no means disappear (vanish, be effaced) from the broad spectrum (Spektrum) of possibilities of today's conduct (waging) of war. Conventional weapons of a new sort (kind, type) can in fact (of course) already undertake (perform, fulfil, carry out) the tasks (function) of tactical (taktischen) atomic weapons, no-one however can guarantee that all future belligerents (Kriegführenden) regardless of the course of war ((military) operations) would refrain from the use of these latter (tactical atomic weapons). Furthermore, an agreement of all states over (regarding, for) the non-proliferation (spreading, diffusion) (Nicht-Verbreitung) of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and over the destruction of the existing (ones, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons) faces what is (are), in practical terms, insurmountable (obstacles). The great Powers - disregarding (even if we disregard) the rivalry with one another (between them) - cannot do (go) without them (tactical and strategic nuclear weapons) already because (otherwise) the abstruse (paradoxical) situation could occur (set in) that an atomically armed (nuclear-armed) middle Power blackmails

much stronger (more powerful) states. Such weapons give, again (on the other hand), to the weaker states possibilities of deterrence and secure for them at this level a certain parity with the stronger (more powerful) (ones, states), which (the said certain parity) they can hardly achieve at the (a) conventional level. And finally, no side can be absolutely certain that a general destruction of nuclear weapons is possible in practice and will also be lasting. The readiness (willingness) shown (displayed) in recent years by both leading atomic Powers to in part reduce (cut back) their potential (i.e. arsenal) should not be interpreted (regarded) as the beginning of a gradual, yet complete (full) destruction (putting aside, getting rid, elimination) of this same (potential (i.e. arsenal)); not least (primarily, first of all), it (the said readiness) stems from (goes back to) (the) insight (ascertainment) into the obsolescence (Obsoletheit) of strategic nuclear weapons of the old kind (sort) after the development of precision weapons.

Highly technicised military Powers (Militärmächte) are understandably strategically and tactically even more dependent on the advances and the changes (transformations) in technology than other(s) (Powers) - particularly (then) when it is a matter of the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) between them. An important technical invention or (technical) renewal (i.e. innovation) would here have to entail (occasion, cause, spark off) most probably (likely) (in all probability) restructurings (reconstructions; Umstrukturierungen) on a grand scale (weapons of deterrence could e.g. no longer have U-boats (i.e. atomic (nuclear) submarines) (U-Boote) as privileged carriers (bearers, vehicles) (U-boats (i.e. atomic (nuclear) submarines) would cease e.g. to be privileged carriers of weapons of deterrence) if the sea (ocean) could be made (became) transparent). In the case of highly (extremely) technicised and

roughly equivalent (equal) opponents, which would fully (completely) exploit the above-mentioned possibility of an extreme pullback (withdrawal) of their military organisation through (thanks to) the use of the latest (most modern) management (and control) systems, one could presume (assume) a(n) far-reaching (extensive, large-degree of) dependence of the conduct (waging) of war on exactly these systems without a considerable massive deployment of troops. A war for instance between Japan and the United States²⁵ could for the most part be waged in outer space and in the ocean through (by) the use of automated air (aerial, aviation) means (automatisierten Luftmitteln) as well as surface and underwater vessels (surface vessels (ships) and (or) submarines) (Über- und Unterwasserschiffen). But that is only one end (i.e. extremity) of a wide-ranging ((very) diverse, diversified) spectrum of forms of war (eine Ende eines weitgefächerten Spektrums von Kriegsformen), which are theoretically and in practice possible on the basis of today's planetary given facts. A more precise anticipatory (advance) classification of these forms of war presents serious difficulties (goes against the grain) because the possible belligerents represent (only, just) all conceivable stages (tiers, grades) of political and military development - incidentally, their number increased considerably after the breaking up (dissolution) of both camps of the Cold War and the growing (progressive) autonomisation of many a region in the world and many a state. The local wars, which now consequently become more likely (possible), should in a strategic and conceptual respect be all the more amorphous, the more they are conducted (waged) in spaces (areas, regions) which do not really (directly) interest any great Power. At the other end (i.e. extremity) of the

²⁵ Kondylis is not of course suggesting that this is a likely or even vaguely possible scenario in the present era, however, apart from illustrating what might happen between two technologically advanced combatants, he reminds us that throughout history we have seen that today's allies might become, but by no means necessarily, tomorrow's foes. It is the investigation of the (past or present) concrete situation which is always paramount when one seeks to specify actors, causes, outcomes etc..

aforementioned spectrum we can hence put (place) wars which, with relatively antiquated (obsolete) means of battle (combat, fighting) and an approximate equilibrium of forces (balance of power) (Kräftegleichgewicht) (which are conducted (waged) with relatively antiquated means between approximately equivalent opponents), drag on for a long time without (presenting) (significant) strategic and tactical (brilliant) achievements (Glanzeleistungen).

Even though, however, hypothetical classifications of the future variety (diversity) of the forms of war are theoretically risky (reckless, hazardous) (theoretisch riskant) and in practice pointless (meaningless, purposeless; sinnlos), one could, starting from (with) the factors which have hitherto been (were) (previously) discussed (above), formulate (put forward) criteria in order to at least approximately (roughly) apprehend (grasp) each and every respective character of future war from a broader perspective as regards (pertaining to) the history of war (in general) (in der breiteren kriegsgeschichtlichen Perspektive). Our typological effort (endeavour) (Die typologische Bemühung) would gain (obtain, acquire) clearer contours if we, moreover, made (undertook, attempted, managed) comparisons with classical forms of war from the past with the help (assistance) of a familiar - even if often misunderstood (falsely understood) - terminology. A basic (fundamental) clarification could (would) here first of all be given (offered) by the ascertainment that, given the present social-political texture (composition) of the actors of planetary politics, "total" wars (»totale« Kriege), like those into which the First and Second World War (had) developed (evolved), are hardly to be expected. So-called "total" war was the manner (way) of (the) conduct (waging) (of) war of nations which were (found) in (at) an already ripe phase of the Second Industrial Revolution. It ("Total" war) was (made)

possible through the economic capacity (ability) of the mobilised working "civilian population at home (on the home front)" to incessantly supply the fighting "front" with masses of (war) material (materiel) which were then used in battles of material (materiel) (i.e. battles in which much (extensive) (war) material (materiel) was used) and which (the material (materiel)) was used up (exhausted, consumed) relatively quickly (Er wurde durch die wirtschaftliche Fähigkeit der mobilisierten arbeitenden »Heimat« möglich, die kämpfende »Front« unaufhörlich mit Materialmassen zu beliefern, die dann in Materialschlachten eingesetzt und relativ rasch verbraucht wurden). However the means of war of all belligerent (warring) sides were not sufficient (enough) - even during the massive use (deployment) of the air force in the Second World War -, (in order) to mortally (fatally) strike (hit) (to death) (to strike a mortal blow to), beyond (apart from) the destruction of inimical (the foe's) material (materiel) on (at) the front, the economic sources of the supply of (the) material (materiel) from amongst the "civilian population at home (on the home front)", and exactly this inability (incapacity) made possible (enabled) the long duration of "total" war. Through the introduction (appearance) of atomic or long-range nuclear weapons (Atom- bzw. atomaren Fernwaffen), which at the same time meant the start (beginning) of the Third Industrial Revolution, this situation changed in two decisive respects: the "civilian population at home (on the home front)" could in a short time be put out of action through (with, by) concentrated strikes, *and* its "total" mobilisation in times of war would be superfluous in so far as the (now determinative) production of atomic weapons(, which now matters the most,) did not require any such mobilisation; therefore, a much more extensive destruction to (on the side of, of) the foe could be achieved (brought about, occasioned) with a considerably smaller mobilisation. It is to be assumed (We must assume)

that in future wars between economically highly developed nations and irrespective of whether atomic weapons come into use (are used) or not, (actually) highly technicised means of war will be used, whose production, especially in view of the interweaving of civilian and military technology (which has progressed considerably), will not (once, for a start, at all) require a particularly conspicuous collective effort. Nations, which have (gone through) the Second Industrial Revolution (behind them), either (already) possess such means of war or can quickly (easily) acquire them, while at the same time cases will occur increasingly often (become all the more frequent) in which nations which have hardly known the Second Industrial Revolution, (but) in part possess the means of war which were produced on the basis (with the technological possibilities) of the Third (Industrial Revolution). The forms of war which could (would) result (arise) from (out of) the crossing (intersection) of such factors and such actors (der Kreuzung solcher Faktoren und solcher Akteure), should (would) scarcely (hardly) resemble (be similar to) "total" war in the true (genuine, authentic, real, literal) (historical) sense of the word explained (meant) above. Only theoretical and historical confusion can in fact be brought about (caused) if one described (characterised) as "total" amorphous (various) wars which are conducted (waged) on (at, along) a(n) (interstate, international) border (between states (countries)) (an einer zwischenstaatlichen Grenze) and only last for a long time because both sides are economically and militarily weak, not because they are exceedingly (extremely) strong (have large reserves of strength).

If one wants, in view of the (most) probable (presumable) non-appearance (absence, disappearance, eclipse; Ausbleiben) of "total" war under today's circumstances, to talk about (the possibility of) a return to

(the) "war of annihilation" (Vernichtungskrieg), then one must (again) keep in mind the historically sharply outlined (historically given and clear) meaning of this term (concept) (die geschichtlich scharf umrissene Bedeutung) and carry out (make) the necessary modification on the basis (mindful) of (bearing in mind) today's planetary situation. In spite of the impression which has been (was) spread by war historians, "war of annihilation" did not constitute either a synonym nor a precursor of "total" war, but the exact opposite of it ("total" war). The "annihilation" exclusively referred to the inimical (rival) armed forces, and here again it did not necessarily or primarily mean (their) physical elimination, but (their) neutralisation (die Unschädlichmachung) in a military sense, that is, it implied that war is (was) conducted (waged) exclusively between armies and through (by means of) armies, without the mobilisation and also without the intentional (deliberate) destruction of the civilian realm (sector) (i.e. the civilian population and its property (assets)) (absichtliche Zerstörung des zivilen Bereichs); the wars of 1866 and 1870 for instance can serve as classic (prime, model) examples of such a conduct (waging) of war. The conduct (waging) of a (thus understood) war of annihilation (understood in that sense) would today be conceivable (thinkable, possible) between highly technicised (i.e. technologically hyperdeveloped) Powers which would exclusively rely (be based) on their management and (control) systems and their precision weapons in order to break (overcome, overpower) the foe's military spine (backbone, organisation) and force him (it, the foe) to capitulate (force upon him capitulation (his surrender)); if such a possibility is real, then the deliberate (intentional; absichtliche) destruction of civilian (non-military) objects or deliberate (purposeful, well-aimed; gezielte) attacks on (against) the civilian population are not only superfluous, but they fragment (splinter) their forces in (virtually) one action (act), whose

success depends not least (first of all) on speed and concentration. If, however, both sides were below the level of high technicisation (a high technological level), a war of annihilation would be *stricto sensu*²⁶ problematic. It (A war of annihilation) could indeed (of course, in fact) be conducted (waged) relatively effortlessly by a technologically highly (much more) superior Power against a technologically weak foe (enemy), should however the weaker side possess (atomic) (or other) long-range weapons, which could use them for the purposes of retaliation (in retaliation), then this of necessity limited (restricted) retaliation would be directed against the civilian population rather than against military targets: because the military force (power, strength) (*militärische Kraft*) of the, at any rate, superior foe would not be broken (overcome, overpowered) through (by) limited means, but civilian casualties (losses) could (well, perhaps) set in motion political chain reactions which would possibly paralyse the militarily superior (Power).

The striking (noticeable, obvious) difference in the quality of the available means of war would, in any case, result in (have as a consequence, give rise to) a considerable difference in character (texture) between the war of annihilation of the 19th century and that of the 21st (century). The former was conducted (waged) through (by) armies which for the most part (mostly) had to be deployed on the spot (there and then), that is, its (the 19th century's war of annihilation's) preparation took place in front of the whole (entire) world, even if it only lasted for a few weeks or days. That again allowed (permitted) the observance of the proprieties (forms, formal rules) of (under) international law, i.e. there was always time for a formal (i.e. official) declaration of war without (thereby) the course and the outcome of the war (hostilities) being essentially

²⁶ In a strict (or narrow) sense.

influenced (affected). Conversely, the growing importance (significance) of a surprising (surprise, unexpected) massive use of modern (teleguided) long-range weapons - especially in a state (situation) of (an) approximate parity - would (have to) clearly (noticeably, greatly) debase (corrupt, impair, worsen) international manners (morals, customs, practices) in respect of this (crucial (key) point). Lightning preventive wars (Blitzartige Präventivkriege) would become more likely (probable) and more numerous should it emerge (come to light) that already for technical reasons only such wars are to (can) be won. The difference between offensive and defensive wars (wars of attack and of defence) (Angriffs- und Verteidigungskriegen) would then completely fade (be completely effaced) and in general the boundaries between war and peace would become all the more (increasingly) fluid. Well-aimed (targeted, concentrated) strikes of a "surgical" or simply rapacious (predatory, bandit's) character could in (over, with) time be looked upon as (considered) a normal state of international affairs (Gezielte Schläge »chirurgischen« oder einfach räuberischen Charakters könnten mit der Zeit als internationaler Normalzustand angesehen werden), especially if great Powers often made use of them in order to punish smaller Powers partly for insubordinate (disobedient, unruly) acts, (and) partly in order to prevent (hinder) their armament (arming, equipping) (Rüstung) with highly developed (advanced) weapons. International public opinion could get used (become accustomed (addicted); gewöhnen) to a spreading (proliferation) and routinisation (daily exercising; Veralltäglichung) of such violence (force) (solcher Gewalt) through (by means of) the fact that this would every time claim (bring about) relatively few victims, although the cumulative result (effect) would perhaps be still more regrettable (unfortunate) (sadder) than a systematically conducted (waged) war - it indeed can even be ascertained that such habituation (addiction;

Gewöhnung) is already very (well) advanced (has already progressed a lot). A (thoroughly, really) limited (restricted) and scattered (dispersed), but quasi institutionalised exercising of military violence (force) (Eine zwar begrenzte und verstreute, aber quasi institutionalisierte militärische Gewaltausübung) would necessarily (have to) be mixed (mix), by the way, with other, even criminal forms of exercising of violence (force). (The exercising of) Violence (force), whose extent (range, scope, scale) would only seldom reach that of a real (proper, regular, normal; regelrechten) (interstate, international) war (between states (countries)), would also be more difficult to bring under control. Such circumstances (a situation) could in the long term lead to (flow into, end up in) worldwide anomie or bring into being a great and centrally controlled (steered, directed) exercising of violence (force) (zentral gesteuerte Gewaltausübung) in order for the smaller and scattered (dispersed) (exercising of violence (force)) to be bridled (checked, curbed) (kept in check). In any case, one must assume (presume) that the way in which world society will tackle the problem of (confront) anomie, will considerably (significantly, substantially) influence (affect) both the structure of the future world order (Weltordnung) as well as the character of future wars.

IV. The antiquatedness (obsoletness) of political concepts (notions, terms, ideas) (Die Antiquiertheit der politischen Begriffe)

Not only in the days of the failed Moscow putsch (coup; Putsches)(, in August 1991,) could one time (again) and again (hear and) read that the "conservatives" (»Konservativen«) of the KGB and the CPSU wanted to obstruct the path (block the way) to the market economy (free market; Marktwirtschaft) and to parliamentarism. And many journalistic organs, which verified (rebuked, reproved, reprimanded, upbraided) with (by) the adjective "conservative" the (those) otherwise characterised as "Stalinist(s)" or "orthodox communist(s)" (putschists), completely (entirely, wholly) uninhibitedly (without any inhibition, in a carefree manner) ascribed (attributed), sometimes on the same page (in the next column), the same attribute to political personalities like Reagan or Thatcher, Bush or Kohl. From that, the (a) credulous (trusting, gullible) reader, who would want to take at face value the printed word (pr)ffered to him, would have to logically infer a commonality of views (casts of mind, ways of thinking, convictions) and of aims (goals) (Gesinnungs- und Zielgemeinschaft) between the aforementioned Western politicians and the Soviet enemies (foes) of "Perestroika". Common sense (gesunde Menschenverstand) could protect (one, us) from such an absurdity; however this (common sense) has not proved to be (turned out) self-

willed (eigenwillig) enough in order (for it) to take steps (act) against (oppose, counter) the schizophrenia of the prevalent (familiar, current) political vocabulary (politischen Vokabulars), and it (indeed) seems (with that, therefore) to have even accepted (come to terms with) it (the said political vocabulary) without murmuring (grumbling, complaining) (uncomplainingly). The assertion (claim) that conservative is the defender of each and every respective Establishment (i.e. existing social order) (Bestehenden), irrespective of how (in what) the Establishment (i.e. existing social order) looks (consists) in every individual case, of course offers a way out; (so, in this way, hence), conservative politicians, who live in entirely (completely) different societies, (cannot but) stand up for entirely (completely) different, indeed (downright) opposite programmes. If however political content (the positioning of every side vis-à-vis concrete (specific) problems of content) (politische Inhalte) does not serve (is of no use) as (a) yardstick (criterion, benchmark) for political classifications, then these classifications must be founded on psychological or anthropological factors (psychologischen oder anthropologischen Faktoren), on commonalities (similarities) in the attitude to life and in the sense (i.e. awareness) of life (feeling for life, feeling of being alive) (common experiential elements) (Gemeinsamkeiten der Lebenseinstellung und des Lebensgefühls). But even if one meant (was supposed to) in good conscience to insinuate (contend) (be capable of insinuating (contending)) (that there are) such commonalities (common ground, similar common elements) for instance between Helmut Kohl and the Russian putschists, nevertheless (all the same) this interpretive approach (interpretatorische Ansatz) would furnish (produce) little that elucidates (sheds light on, clarifies) (be of very little assistance to) the (an) analysis of the concrete situation. Because in such situations it is always a matter of the predominance (prevailing) of certain

(political) content(s) or aims (goals) defined (determined) in terms of content (die Durchsetzung von bestimmten Inhalten oder inhaltlich definierten Zielen) in view of the shaping (forming, formation) of a national or international collective (political entity) (Kollektivs), in relation to which the friendly or inimical groupings (group formations) result (arise) from the positioning (attitude, stance) of every one of the respective acting subjects (Handelnden) vis-à-vis exactly this (these) content(s) and (these) aims (goals). The legitimation of these latter (contents and aims) in political *struggle* is admittedly (of course) carried out (takes place, follows) most (very) often with the invocation of (appeal to) anthropological assumptions (perceptions, views); (the, a) political *analysis* cannot nevertheless deduce (derive) from form-related (i.e. formal) and in themselves abstract anthropological constants, concrete content(s), without falling (lapsing, turning) into (becoming) a bad metaphysics.

All of this does not apply only with regard to the concept of conservatism (Konservativismus). The journalistic, but also the scientific language (speech or linguistic) usage (wissenschaftliche Sprachgebrauch), appears (seems) no less (equally) muddled (confused), when (if) we turn to the other (rest of the) fundamental concepts (notions, terms) (fundamentalen Begriffen) around (on) which the political vocabulary of the last (one) hundred and fifty years positively or negatively (has) revolved (centred). Certainly (Of course), ambiguity (or multiple meanings) (Mehrdeutigkeit) accompanies (the) political - and not only (the) political - fundamental concepts from the time of their birth, it (the said ambiguity) is unavoidable (hardly to be avoided) because of the polemical use of these concepts, and yet it differs from that referencelessness (i.e. lack of specific reference) or amorphousness (shapelessness, lack of form)

(Bezuglosigkeit oder Amorphie) of their content, which indicates their historical decline (geschichtlichen Untergang). As long as concepts are alive and bear (carry) the weight of social phenomena (are socially workable (referable)) (lebendig und sozial tragfähig sind), they can be interpreted positively or negatively, narrowly or widely and varied according to every one of the respective strategic or tactical needs (requirements), nevertheless (however) they explicitly or implicitly refer to an identifiable and identical bearer (carrier). Whoever in the 19th century said "conservative", primarily meant the social-political matters of concern (aims, objectives) of the anti-liberal nobility (i.e. hereditary aristocracy) and large patriarchal ownership of land (landholding) (die sozialpolitischen Anliegen des antiliberalen Adels und des großen patriarchalischen Grundbesitzes), which felt threatened by the advances (progress) of industrial capitalism, whereas at times advocates (champions) of the planned economy and of dictatorship in the East, at other times proponents (advocates, supporters) of the market economy (free market) and of parliamentarism in the West, at times ecologically motivated friends of untouched (intact, undamaged) nature, at other times the religiously minded foes of the miniskirt, are cited (referred to) as social bearers of that which one today calls "conservatism" on each and every respective occasion. "Liberal" also originally (initially) meant (What was called "liberal" was originally) primarily a politics which articulated the economic or constitutional perceptions (views, notions) of the bourgeoisie, not for instance a pleading (advocacy, defence) for (of) the freedom of (right to) abortion or the unrestricted right of asylum (or abolition of the death penalty). The non-bindedness (Unverbindlichkeit) of the vocabulary bears witness (attests) to its obsolescence. Indeed (Actually, In fact), politics of the 20th century for the most part (mostly, largely) has been (is) acted out (has taken place) under the influence

(sign) of concepts which had more or less (lost) or progressively (increasingly) lost their real (tangible, palpable) historical content (realen geschichtlichen Gehalt). That could in fact (of course) be noticed (seen) by the distant (i.e. uninvolved) (distanced) observer, however the actors (acting subjects) needed (required) (continued to use) the vocabulary of the 19th century (further) because this (vocabulary) was necessary for polemical reasons. In addition (Moreover), the long struggle between the Western system and communism (has) contributed significantly (considerably) to the spreading of a language (speech or linguistic) usage which in neither of both (the two) camps had its exact (precise) factual (real) correspondences (equivalents) (seine genauen sachlichen Entsprechungen). Precisely because of that, the end of the Cold war and indeed its (the Cold War's) outcome, reveals just how empty (devoid) of content (vacuous) (inhaltsleer) political language (speech) had (has) become in the meantime. That (This ascertainment) cannot of course be a final judgement of its (the said political language's) effectiveness (influence) in the past and in the future.

The three fundamental (basic) concepts (Grundbegriffe) of the political vocabulary of the last (one) hundred and fifty years, namely "conservatism", "liberalism" and "socialism" (or social democracy) (»Sozialismus« (oder soziale Demokratie)) in actual fact (genuinely) embodied, only (just, solely) at the time of their (incidentally almost parallel) formation, three real and clear (unambiguous) social options. Because only around 1848 (did) (were) aristocracy (nobility), bourgeoisie and proletariat (stand) face to face on a single (the same) battlefield. That triptych (Triptychon) however (even) shrunk (already) in the course of the 19th century to a diptych (Diptychon) because the already weakened (enfeebled) aristocracy (nobility) was absorbed for the most part (mostly,

largely) into (taken up with (in)) the (grand (great)) bourgeoisie ((Groß)Bürgertum), as it (the aristocracy) gave up (abandoned) nolens volens²⁷ its patriarchal rule (control, dominion, power) in the country(side) and shared (was embodied (incorporated)), to various degrees and in various forms, in capitalistic economic life as well as in the parliamentary game. After (When) the statics (i.e. static nature) (Statik) of *societas civilis*²⁸ gave (caved) in (yielded) to (had given in to) capitalistic dynamics (the dynamics of capitalism) (kapitalistischen Dynamik), there could not be talk any more of conservatism in the real

²⁷ Whether willing or unwilling.

²⁸ In Kondylis's works "*societas civilis*" is an ideal type which as such never totally concretely existed in any kind of "pure form", but which can be seen by the reader as referring, inter alia, to the estate-based (feudal and patriarchalist) forms of societal organisation in (Western) Europe mostly preceding both a) the Thirty Years' War, the peace treaties of Westphalia (1648), the ensuing system of state sovereignty and of course the French Revolution, as well as b) the rise (at an advanced stage) of the bourgeoisie and (later) of industrial capitalism. For Kondylis, "*societas civilis*" (which is roughly synonymous with his use of "*ancien régime*"), with its "medieval" or traditional world theory (i.e. world view) based on relatively fixed (pyramidal) hierarchies in (unchanging) nature and (unchanging) society and "blind" faith in God, or what some of its liberal critics called "magic" in the context of "medieval chaos" and or "absolutism", is contrasted to the bourgeois liberal ideals and myths of Reason, Nature, Man and History (and Progress) as well as values such as "tolerance" and "individual freedom of opinion" (in part) accompanying the rise in social (particularly economic) power and influence of the bourgeoisie, which in turn often commenced before the bourgeoisie achieved significant political power in the form of liberal oligarchies, and before the (First) Industrial Revolution reached its climax in the first half of the nineteenth century. (From around the middle of the nineteenth century, social democracy as ideology and program of political demands and action "from below" in mass societies made itself strongly felt, and it chronologically commenced after or contemporaneous with oligarchic bourgeois liberalism, and leads into the (ideal type of) mass democracy of the twentieth century with its mass production, mass consumption, advanced technology and division of labour, atomisation and unlimited social mobility, and ideology of, inter alia, (both legal and material) "equality" and "pluralism". See Kondylis's books: *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humaniora, Weinheim 1991) and *Konservatismus* [Conservatism] (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1986) - the reader should always keep in mind that this footnote like all other footnotes is the creation of the translator and not of Kondylis).

(genuine, unadulterated) sense of the preserving (safeguarding, protecting) of a god-given(,) eternal and hierarchical order on earth. If, nonetheless (all the same), the concept of conservatism (on top of that, furthermore) remained (continued to remain) alive, (then) it owed this less to the vitality of its natural social bearers and more to the polemical fury (force) of its triumphant adversaries (opponents, rivals). Above all, the Left (die Linke) in all its shades (hues) was now ideologically interested in making (presenting) the (its) bourgeois-liberal main (basic, chief) opponent out to be (as) (a) renegade (traitor) (in respect) of its own "progressive" (»fortschrittlichen«) past and as continuer of "obscurantistic" or "reactionary" positions and practices, which allegedly (supposedly) still immediately before(hand) characterised the hustle and bustle (activity) of the "feudal party". From this perspective, "conservative" was defined (here) in contrast to the Left, "conservative" was therefore something to the extent that it conflicted with the objectives (targets, set aims) of the Left, and indeed regardless of whether it otherwise in actual fact changed society: because if the Left possessed (had) by definition (per definitionem) the (a) monopoly of (on) progress (Fortschritts), then the changing of society in a direction which ran counter (was contrary) to the wishes of the Left was (could) not (be) recognised as "genuine" change. This thought schema (Denkschema) for decades formed (had an effect of forming) an entire school not only in international politics. Also, the established (official) "progressive" political science and sociology in Germany (has) helped in the predominance (prevailing, imposition) of the perception (view) that conservatism is not (does not constitute) a historically bound (determined, fixed) and transitory concept, but a (permanent) positioning (stance) which is defined anew in each and every respective context (every one of the (other) respective (various) correlations) and correspondingly comes

to fruition (has an effect) in practice. Especially at a time (in an era) of philistine (otherwise non-binding) fellow travelling (Mitläufertum) (with communistic positions) (namely one (such a fellow travelling) in which all the back doors (loopholes) are kept (held) open) was intellectually chic (fashionable), one placed value on the ascertainment (many ascertained with pleasure) that the political scientists of the Eastern Bloc shared this conviction.

The liberals had to, for their part, appropriate (claim for themselves) the concept of conservatism when they noticed (saw, realised) that the original (initial) bourgeois sense (meaning) of the notion (concept) of liberalism faded, while its reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) (Uminterpretation) with an anti-bourgeois democratic-egalitarian intent(ion) (purpose) constantly (continuously) gained ground; the ideas (thoughts) and the social-political praxis of classical liberalism (klassischen Liberalismus), which wanted to expressly (explicitly) delimit itself against egalitarian socialistic-democratic endeavours, were now called "conservative". These (egalitarian socialistic-democratic endeavours) of course often arrived (came) on the scene with the claim of creatively managing (handling) the "true" inheritance (heritage, legacy) of liberalism and of consistently thinking through (about) "genuine" liberal thought (ideas; Gedanken) to its (their) logical conclusion (meditating (reflecting) on "genuine" liberal thought (ideas) with extreme consistency), while (when) they (the said egalitarian socialistic-democratic endeavours) deduce (derive) material (rights) from formal rights and social (equality) from legal equality (indem sie aus den formellen Rechten materielle und aus der rechtlichen Gleichheit die soziale ableiteten). Under these circumstances and in light of this reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation), liberalism as theory and concept

had to (necessarily) more or less seem(ed) (appear(ed)) suspicious to classical liberals themselves who thought in (terms of) (on the basis of) bourgeois categories. The great catchwords (mottoes, slogans) of freedom and equality, which were (had been) already propagated in the 17th century in the language of secular (profane) natural law (säkularen Naturrechts), indeed (actually, in fact) allowed (permitted), with much (quite a bit of, corresponding) good will, an extensive interpretation, however this possibility generally came into consciousness (awareness) (was generally understood) only in the 19th century. Because the originators (creators) of the aforementioned catchwords (mottoes, slogans) (when they formulated them) (merely) had in mind (thought, meant, were thinking) (of) (in relation to) (them) (merely of) the putting (setting) aside (removal, sidelining) of the estate-based barriers (obstacles) and hierarchies ((with)in the classes (or ranks) of the ancien régime), however the social inequalities, which were (meant (supposed, had) to be) (would constitute) the bone of contention for the later (subsequent) democrats (who came later), were in their (the originators of the said catchwords') eyes perfectly (completely, entirely, absolutely) natural, and that is why they could hardly imagine (contemplate) that if natural rights fully (completely) applied (with the full (complete) validity (force, effectiveness, imposition) of natural rights) the master would no longer be master and the servant no longer servant; a reminder of the debates of the 19th century over the right to vote suffices (is sufficient (enough)) in order to clarify this point. In any case, it happened that (things came to a point that), with reference to (an invocation of) an ethically charged (loaded) concept of liberalism, (one) even (approved) (dirigiste (i.e. state-controlled administrative)) tendencies towards the welfare (social) state (and dirigisme) (were approved (hailed, saluted)), and indeed bearing in mind (mindful of) the high status (standing)

(exalted position) of the individual in the liberal thought framework (framework (context) of thought) (Auf jeden Fall kam es dazu, unter Hinweis auf einen ethisch geladenen Liberalismusbegriff sogar sozialstaatliche und dirigistische Tendenzen gutzuheißen, und zwar eingedenk des Stellenwerts des Individuums im liberalen Denkraum). As highest value, the individual ought (had) therefore to now enjoy the protection of society through (by means of) the mediation (agency; Vermittlung) of the state and to obtain (get) from it (the state) guarantees for his free and all-round (full-scale) development. These positions constituted of course (At the same time of course it is a matter of) a drastic (radical) reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of the classical liberal concept of individualism; nevertheless here the legitimacy of this reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) (interpretation) is not of interest (does not interest us), but the fact that it was undertaken (happened, took place) and influenced practical politics. The more mass society shaped (moulded; geprägt) by (the dominant influence of) the bourgeoisie approached modern mass democracy, the more closely (tightly, narrowly) was the concept of liberalism connected with partly ethical-dirigiste (i.e. statist), partly radically individualistic (and cultural-revolutionary) tendencies (born of the (Western mass-democratic) cultural revolution (kulturrevolutionären Tendenzen)²⁹). For (obvious) social-historical reasons (which suggest themselves), language (speech or linguistic) usage was rightful (legitimate, proper, correct) in regard to (properly (fairly, correctly) conveyed) this (factual) situation (Sachlage) only in the United States, whereas it (language usage) in Europe remained with the (continued to have the said) ambiguity (two meanings; Doppeldeutigkeit).

²⁹ The full effect of this cultural revolution in Western mass democracies was acutely felt in the 1960s and 1970s. See Kondylis, P. *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humaniora, Weinheim 1991).

Thus, in the 20th century the concept of conservatism could be used for (bourgeois-)liberal ends (goals) and the concept of liberalism for an altogether (entirely, as a whole) anti-bourgeois politics. However, the concept of socialism or of social democracy was just as polysemous (i.e. ambiguous) (vieldeutig) and wavering (vacillating) in the course of (over) time. The Bolsheviks' seizure of power was not able to (could not) unify (capable of unifying) the pre-existing (already previously existing) socialisms under the banner of the only victorious (socialism) and therefore give to the idea of socialism an exclusive (and) unambiguous (eindeutigen) content (with only one meaning (or interpretation)). On the contrary, it brought about (effected, caused) the (a) definitive (conclusive, decisive, final) split in (fragmentation of) the socialistic movement into a revolutionary and a reformistic wing, while at the same time (in relation to which) the particular (specific) unfolding of communism in some regions of the Third World brought with it (had as a result, caused) the label "socialism" being applied to regimes (the labeling of regimes as "socialistic"), which apart from the ideological make-up, were nothing other than nationalistic dictatorships. The reformistic socialism of the Western mould (shaping, type) took up (followed), for its part, the aforementioned ethical reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of liberal-individualistic commonplaces (banalities), whereas the attempts (efforts) of apostate (renegade, heretical) Marxists (or (even) (and) Marxist-Leninists) to break away from "Stalinism" as theory and praxis and to bring into being (form) the (an) "unadulterated (pure)" socialism, enriched, with ever increasing (more and more) new variations, a game which long ago had become confused - and boring.³⁰

³⁰ Anyone familiar with the almost innumerable Trotskyist, Maoist and other communistic groups and parties (particularly until the 1990s) and their never-ending squabbles and "correct" interpretations of "proletarian internationalism" or ways to build the "true" "vanguard revolutionary workers' party" or promises of the coming of "real" "communism", "emancipation" and "justice" so that life can be

Therefore, we are already at (have (already, now) come to) the consequences of the Cold War for the eventful (tumultuous, stormy) fate (destinies) of the modern political vocabulary. Because the Cold War, that is, the political-military (political and military) antagonism of (between) the Western camp and of the communistic camp after the Second World War, has not merely partly brought about (caused) and partly increased (intensified, fostered) the ambiguity (many (multiple) meanings) and practical non-bindedness of the concept of socialism. It exercised (exerted) a similar influence on the content (of the meaning) of liberalism and conservatism. In its new function as counter concept (Gegenbegriff) of (vis-à-vis) "totalitarianism" (»Totalitarismus«), liberalism (also) of course meant economic liberalism and consequently the private ownership of the means of production, however the main emphasis (focus) (centre of gravity) was not (placed) (did not fall) on (at) this prosaic fact, which incidentally was dismissed by the (communistic) opponent as (sheer, mere, bare, naked) "rule (domination) of (by) (a handful of) capitalists", but on (at) the opportunities (prospects, chances) for the development of society and of the individual connected with economic liberalism. Liberalism accordingly existed (was) (consisted) in (the) principle (In accordance with this interpretation, liberalism is the principle) (of) (as) the unlimited renewal and openness (open possibilities), tolerance (Toleranz) and human dignity (or freedom) - in short, (of) Freedom with a capital "F". This same freedom was meant when (if) one used the concept of democracy synonymously with liberalism and contrasted (contradistinguished) the "Western democracies" to the "communistic tyrannies". (In this context) "Liberalism" and "democracy" were therefore here comprehended

"genuinely enjoyed by everyone and not just by the few who do not suffer oppression and are not exploited" either by "capitalism in its advanced stage of decay" or by "the deformed workers' state" of, or the "state capitalistic", Soviet Union, etc., etc., etc., will know exactly what Kondylis means.

axiologically-normatively (in terms of values and normatively; werthaft-normativ) rather than determined (fixed, established) by (without being connected to (with)) concrete social content(s) and forms of rule (i.e. domination) (Herrschaftsformen). On the other hand, the communists spoke of "conservatism" or "reaction" in order to describe (characterise) the system of "state-monopolistic capitalism", which in accordance with their perception (view) was not capable of any essential progress, rather it was condemned to permanent crises and sacrificed the development of society and of individuals (the individual) to the reckless (unscrupulous, inconsiderate) striving for profit (profit seeking) (on the part) of a ruling clique. Interestingly, many of those who otherwise as anti-communists called (characterised) themselves "liberals" or "democrats" when (if) they wanted in this way (with it) (to express the fact of wanting) to defend eternal truths and values which communism threatened, often confessed (their) faith (belief) in "conservatism". The anti-communistic confession of faith in "conservatism" became more concrete when it was a matter of (what was sought was) (the, a) defence (effective fight) against those who in the interior of the Western states conducted the aforementioned democratic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of liberalism and that is why, rightly or wrongly, they were accused of fellow travelling with (being (as) fellow travellers of) the communists.

At the (very) latest after the outcome of the Cold War everyone must now know that the communistic and left-wing diagnosis of the "conservative" or even (and or) "reactionary" character of the Western system, as this (Western system) was formed after the Second World War in the major (great, large) industrial nations, was not simply untenable, but really (virtually) meaningless (empty (devoid) of content). One can and may (is allowed to) reject this system for many different aesthetic or (and) ethical

reasons (aus sehr verschiedenen ästhetischen oder ethischen Gründen) - but not because it is "conservative", because, that is, it (the Western system) hinders (obstructs) the technical progress and the interrelated (belonging together) *with it* reshaping (restructuring, reorganisation; Umgestaltung) of society. Regardless of how one assesses (evaluates) technical progress, possibilities of consumption and freedoms as values, one cannot dispute (deny, doubt) the superiority of the West in these sectors (areas, fields). The reproach of "conservatism" was directed literally nonsensically (in a literally absurd way) against a system which revolutionised the development of the productive forces to (on) a (world-historically) hitherto unknown extent (scale) (in world history) and put at the individual's disposal material and ideational (other) possibilities which likewise constitute an exception as an astonishing (amazing, startling) world-historical novum. If quite a few (certain, some) bearers or supporters (proponents) of this system want to carry on (continue) calling themselves "conservative", (then) the reason for it lies partly in the fact of the aforementioned polemical needs, but partly also in their ethical-ideological self-understanding, which does not want to be reconciled with the insight that this system in the meanwhile long ago (for a long time) lives off (on the basis of) the constant undermining (or destruction) of old values (Zersetzung alter Werte), indeed (and) even of basic biological given facts (biologischer Grundgegebenheiten) - it lives, that is, off (on the basis of) that which one in truly conservative times called "hubris". However, no matter how such "conservatives" call themselves in the future: the victory of the West in the Cold War will make (leave) (paralyse the speech (language) of) "progressives"³¹ of all hues (tints,

³¹ Kondylis is of course referring to a group of people including supporters and sympathisers of communistic or leftist regimes and or communistic or Marxist theories, and not merely to supporters of various lifestyle causes so prominent in the post-Soviet era - the former having roots in the "Old Left"

shades) (speechless) or at least muddle up (jumble) the(ir) vocabulary as (since) it now hardly seems (appears) plausible (self-evident, perspicuous) to associate (connect, interrelate) the more vital or, in any event (at any rate), victorious system with a sluggish (languid) conservatism. Since the activity of "progressive" intellectuals above all consists in incessant (never-ending) talk (chatter), (hence) it is for them particularly difficult to cope with (a) sudden (abrupt) radical changes (overturning, reversals) in (of) the familiar vocabulary. In Germany at any rate in recent years and months, (the concept) "conservatism" is used less and less and (or) all the more half-heartedly in a pejorative sense.

We have therefore come to (arrived at) a point where we must touch upon a very important terminological and factual (real) question. If it is namely wrong (false) to perceive (understand) the outcome of the Cold War as a victory of the conservative West over the revolutionary East, (then, so, hence) it is likewise an optical illusion to celebrate the collapse of communism as the prevailing (victory) of liberalism. One can talk in this way (thus) only if one understands by "liberalism" the counter concept of "totalitarianism", as (this) was usual (common, customary) in the time (era) of (during) the Cold War. We have already indicated (intimated) that in this contradistinction (contrasting) the specific bourgeois sense (meaning) of liberalism came off badly (was lost). That was by no means coincidental (chance, accidental). In the course of (connection with) the discussed democratic reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) of the concept of liberalism and undoubtedly in connection with the gradual social decline (Abstieg) of the bourgeoisie, which was in the process of change itself, the bourgeois substance (content, essence) of classical liberalism had been considerably (significantly) diluted (watered down)

of the 19th and early 20th centuries and the latter mostly springing from the "New Left" of the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.

even before the Second World War. Bourgeois mass society found itself on the path to modern mass democracy already from the time the mechanisation of everyday (daily) life started (began) and the worker was discovered as consumer (Die bürgerliche Massengesellschaft befand sich bereits zu der Zeit auf dem Wege zur modernen Massendemokratie, als die Mechanisierung des Alltags einsetzte und der Arbeiter als Konsument entdeckt wurde). This decisive turn occurred (happened, took place) only (just) after the Second World War and not least under the influence of the Cold War for (in terms of) its massive breakthrough (i.e. on a broad front). Because regardless of the social-historical tendencies having an effect in the long term, the transformation (conversion) of bourgeois-liberal mass society into modern mass democracy was promoted and accelerated (hastened, expedited) (also) through (thanks to) the endeavour (effort) at preventing the danger of a communistic seizure of power (rise to power) through the quick (rapid) improvement of the standard of living of the masses. This process was accompanied by an extensive (broad) democratisation in all sectors (areas, fields) and by the formation (shaping) of new elites in the economy and politics, which largely (to a great extent) displaced (drove out, put aside) or succeeded (took over from, superseded) the old bourgeoisie; their own personal composition changes, for that matter, much quicker than that (the composition) of former (previous) ruling groups as a result of (the) generally increased social mobility. Managers, technocrats and yuppies are as sociological types and bearers of functions (functioning) something essentially different than the bourgeois; bourgeoisness (i.e. bourgeois morals, manners and ethos) as lifestyle (way of life) (Bürgerlichkeit als Lebensstil) today fulfils, if one keeps in mind the overall (general) picture, the same picturesque-chic functions (or tasks) (within "high (good) society") which once were carried out (dealt with, taken care of,

fulfilled) by the survivors (remnants, whatever survived) of (from) (the) noble lineage (old noble families; Adelsgeschlechter). Extreme atomisation (i.e. splitting or segmentation of society into individuals) (Extreme Atomisierung), social mobility and value pluralism or permissiveness reveal (outline, amount to, result in) - in conjunction (combination, connection) with the parallel (ongoing) leveling of hierarchies and authorities (powers) (taking place), that is, in conjunction with democratisation - a general picture (image), which only by failing to appreciate (overlooking) central sociological factors and factors (fundamental magnitudes) pertaining to (in) the history of ideas (zentraler soziologischer und geistesgeschichtlicher Faktoren), may (can, is allowed to) be described (characterised) as the picture (image) of a bourgeois-liberal society. Modern mass democracy indeed (of course) arose from the inside (womb, bosom) (aus dem Schoße) of bourgeois society, but it constitutes a structurally new social formation. For that very reason the political vocabulary, which was formed in the bourgeois age, has lost in it (this new social formation of mass democracy) its real content and meaning (sense), although the competing elites still have to (must) use it in the absence (given the lack) of another (political vocabulary), in order to ideologise their practical matters of concern (desires) (um ihre praktischen Anliegen zu ideologisieren), to be symbolically distinguished from one another and to consequently make themselves more interesting (appealing).

(So) The West (therefore) defeated the East only when bourgeois class society gave way (its place) to mass democracy, whereby the communistic criticism of capitalism became obsolete and unattractive. (In order) To say (put) it as a paradox (paradoxically): the farewell of Utopia in the East became possible (was enabled) by (thanks to) the

realisation of Utopia in the West. Indeed (Actually), in Western mass democracy for the first time in world history the shortage (scarcity) of goods was overcome and the structuring of society was achieved (society was structured to a great extent) in accordance with (on the basis of) functional and performance (output) criteria, that is, equality based on (in close connection with) an extreme atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) was realised in principle, while at the same time the self-realisation of the individual was declared, as it were, the supreme (highest) purpose (goal) of the state (Tatsächlich wurde in der westlichen Massendemokratie zum ersten Mal in der Weltgeschichte die Güterknappheit überwunden und eine Gliederung der Gesellschaft nach funktionalen und Leistungskriterien erreicht, es wurde also die auf extremer Atomisierung beruhende Gleichheit grundsätzlich realisiert, während gleichzeitig die Selbstverwirklichung des Einzelnen gleichsam zum obersten Staatszweck erklärt wurde). The gaps (i.e. deficiencies or failings) and dark side (i.e. drawbacks) (Lücken und Schattenseiten) of this picture (image) are known only too well (well enough) (are sufficiently known), but they do not change the fact that this - distorted (abortive, monstrous, freakish; vererrte), grotesque (cartoonish), burlesque (tragicomic) or however one wants (to call it) (whatever else) - realisation of Utopia in the end (finally, ultimately) took the wind out of the sails of the communistic critique (criticism) of liberalism and capitalism. Consequently (In this way), modern mass democracy at one blow (stroke) (all at once) made the concepts "conservatism", "liberalism" and "socialism" objectless (pointless, redundant, unnecessary). Through (By means of) the extreme atomisation of society and unlimited (boundless, unbounded; unbegrenzte) (social) mobility, which it (mass democracy) absolutely needs on the basis (by virtue) of its way (mode) of functioning (in order to function), it (mass

democracy) broke up (disintegrated, dissolved) (has broken up) the large (great) collective subjects with which those concepts were connected (associated) so long as they possessed a concrete historical content and (concrete historical) reference. Their (The said concepts') common fate (destiny) was incidentally brought about (caused) by (emanated (sprang) from) their common origin (descent) and career (i.e. path or course) (Herkunft und Laufbahn). They came into being (were formed) during (from inside of) the world-historical turn from *societas civilis* to mass society or from agrarian to industrially shaped (moulded) civilisation (Zivilisation), and they gave answers, from different social-political and world-theoretical standpoints, to the great questions which it (this turn) had to, in the process, pose. The process, which we here mean, began (in fact) with the pious (devout) subjection (subjugation) of man to (under) God and ended with his (man's) haughty (arrogant, proud, supercilious) dominance (rule, domination) over Nature, it started (set out, began) with the in principle (or self-evident) inclusion (incorporation) of the individual in a social group (or class) (in einen Stand) and ended up in (at) (amounted to, reached) the atomisation of society, it was driven (motivated) by fixed hierarchised heavenly and earthly substances and resulted in (lead up to) any combinable functions whatsoever (functions combinable at will) (arbitrarily combinable functions). These key terms (words) (Stichworte) (already, really) contain the central themes (and formulations of a question) of the New Times which were (have been) specified in the particular (examination (study) of) (the) problem(s) (in der besonderen Problematik) of philosophy and social theory. In this respect, conservatism, liberalism and socialism belong in a specific way (because of (due to) their specific features) to the New Times, and that is why (consequently) the ascertainment in regard to the growing (increasing, progressive) loss of content and irreality (Inhaltslosigkeit und

Irrealität) of these concepts during our century raises the question as to whether the New Times as (a) historical epoch have reached their conclusion (come to their end). From this perspective, the dissolution (disintegration, breakdown) of Marxism cannot even be simply interpreted (regarded) as the victory of liberal ideas. Because seen from the point of view of the history of ideas, Marxism took (has taken, adopted) its essential premises from liberalism: just like this (liberalism), it (Marxism) (has) sought (tried hard to achieve) a synthesis of economism and humanism (die Synthese von Ökonomismus and Humanismus), while at the same time it (has) wanted to understand the world (on the basis) of history as progress. From this viewpoint, the defeat of Marxism meant the putting (setting) aside (removal, sidelining) of the last systematically organised remnants of humanistic liberalism and the final (definitive, conclusive) victory of a thinking (thought) which one may (can) for the time being (provisionally, tentatively) call postmodern (postmodern), if one, in course of this, (continuously) keeps in mind (remembers) its (this postmodern thought's) concrete mass-democratic roots and functions.

Insight into the obsolescence of the political vocabulary after the victory of Western mass democracy over communism is not merely indispensable with regard to (for) academic purposes (ends, goals) (for the purposes of academic research). Because planetary politics will be shaped (formed, moulded; gestalten) in the future against the background of (given) the fact that those participating in (the acting subjects of) it (planetary politics) will heed (accept, adopt) mass-democratic values and aims (goals), from the simply (only) quantitatively understood constant raising of (improvement in) the standard of living, to the qualitative equalisation of opportunities (chances, prospects) (Egalisierung der

Chancen) and of pleasure, both inside of individual (separate) nations as well as in (respect of) the relations of nations with one another. That means first of all that economic questions and disputes will attain (achieve, gain, obtain, acquire) a greater political weight, that is, that the political (politics) will be increasingly understood and handled (exercised, conducted, managed, manipulated) by (starting with) the economic (economy), whereas the traditionally primary question as regards the best (optimal) state and the best (optimal) constitution (i.e. polity or system of government) (besten Verfassung) will be pushed (fade, move) into the background (margins). Remarkably, (It is remarkable (noteworthy) that) after the end of the Cold War a(n) almost (nearly, virtually) worldwide concord (agreement) over (in relation to) this question prevails (holds sway, dominates), namely there is a willingness (readiness) to imitate (mimic, copy) the political institutions of the West in this or that variation. That is interrelated (connected) with the economisation of the political (fusion of politics and the economy) in so far as it is assumed (presumed) that such institutions boost (favour, stimulate, foster) economic progress. At the same time, (very, most) serious (important) problems appeared (arose) on the horizon of the planet becoming narrower (more cramped), as for instance the ecological or overpopulation problem, which can hardly be apprehended (grasped) and dealt (coped) with (managed) on the basis of the (intellectual, mental) categories and thought habits of conservatism, liberalism and socialism. One knows in fact that in the meantime: conserving (preserving, conservation; Bewahren) has long ago become a question of organisation, freedom in mass societies can easily lead to disintegration (dissolution; Auflösung) or explosion, whereas rigorous (rigid, inflexible) planning gives birth to (begets, engenders) evils which it (of) itself cannot remedy (heal, cure, treat). It would nevertheless be wishful thinking

(Wunschdenken) to think (believe) that the ineluctable (unavoidable) detachment from traditional political content(s) and concepts as well as the economisation of the political (fusion of politics with the economy) will abolish or even (just) (at least) mitigate (moderate, temper) the conflicts between (the) interested (human) groups. They (the detachment from traditional political content and concepts, and, the economisation of the political) will without doubt largely (for the most part) de-ideologise (entideologisieren) politics, i.e., they will reduce (diminish, lessen) or will ruin (destroy, force back, wreck, annihilate) the influence of those ideologies which since the French Revolution (and thereafter) were supposed (meant) to (should) legitimise political action (activity; Handeln). Yet it is short-sighted to attribute (ascribe) the political struggles conducted in the last two centuries merely to ideological fanaticism and await (expect) ex contrario³² the end of struggles from the "end of ideologies". De-ideologised (Entideologisierte) struggles will possibly be (still, even) more fierce (violent, acute) than the ideologically conducted (ones) (struggles), should certain goods (of all goods) prove to be scarce in (at) a time (an era) in (at) which the overcoming of the shortage (scarcity) of goods is considered the supreme (uppermost) aim (goal) of mankind (humankind). The de-ideologisation and the economisation of the political (the fusion of politics with the economy) means in the final analysis that henceforth (as of now) they (struggles) will be fought (conducted) over tangible material goods without significant ideological mediation(s). In order to be precise (exact), one would have (ought) to then describe (characterise) de-ideologisation as a partial return to the animal kingdom. Whether it is nice and desirable that the farewell to (for the farewell of) Utopia goes (to go) so far, remains of course a question (matter) of taste (Entideologisierte Kämpfe werden

³² From the contrary view or standpoint.

womöglich noch heftiger als die ideologisch geführten sein, sollten sich bestimmte Güter ausgerechnet in einer Zeit als knapp erweisen, in der die Überwindung der Güterknappheit als oberstes Ziel der Menschheit erachtet wird. Die Entideologisierung und die Ökonomisierung des Politischen bedeuten letzten Endes, daß nunmehr um handfeste materielle Güter ohne nennenswerte ideologische Vermittlungen gekämpft wird. Um genau zu sein, müßte man dann die Entideologisierung als teilweise Rückkehr zum Tierreich bezeichnen. Ob es schön und wünschenswert ist, daß der Abschied von der Utopie so weit geht, bleibt freilich eine Frage des Geschmacks).

V. Planetary politics and universal ethics (Planetarische Politik und universale Ethik)

1. The philosophical turn (about-turn, about-face, change) towards ethical universalism (Die philosophische Wendung zum ethischen Universalismus)

During the past two decades ethical(-philosophical) thinking (thought) (ethisches Denken) took (made, carried out) a turn which interrelates (connects) with world-historical developments and gives (grants, offers) cause (reason, occasion) for corresponding thoughts (deliberations, considerations; Überlegungen). In respect of ideal-typical pointing (or intensifying) (By (In) schematising) (In idealtypischer Zuspitzung), we can say that it (in the course of this) is a matter of the turn from naturalism, historicism and relativism towards ethical universalism or towards universalistic ethics (die Wende vom Naturalismus, Historismus und Relativismus zum ethischen Universalismus oder zur universalistischen Ethik). As regards (In) a retrospective (survey, review, look) of (at) the history of ideas in the time after the Second World War, this turn cannot of course appear as (seem) a sudden caesura (pause, break). As is known, natural law thinking (thought) (Naturrechtliches Denken) went through (experienced) a real (genuine) resurrection (rebirth, renaissance, revival) as a result of the experiences with (in respect of) National Socialism, since for many (thinkers) the impression

came into being (was created) of an, if not intentional (wanted, desired), (then) at any rate objective complicity (connivance) between (the) (legal-positivistic) relativism (of legal positivism) and totalitarian amorality (zwischen rechtspositivistischem Relativismus und totalitärem Amoralismus). Under the same impression and with (a) similar motivation (motives), modernised reformulations of Kantian and idealistic ethical(-philosophical) ideas (thoughts) (kantischen und idealistischen ethischen Gedankengutes) were undertaken. On the other hand, ethical universalism still does not dominate (prevail, rule) unchallenged (uncontested, undisputed). Sceptical meta-ethics in which the (moral-philosophical) efforts (endeavours) (as regards the moral philosophy) of the Analytical School (Die skeptische Metaethik, in die die moralphilosophischen Bemühungen der analytischen Schule) had to (necessarily) lead to (end up in), and (the) so-called cultural relativism (kulturelle Relativismus), which relies (is based, refers) above all on (to) ethnological findings (results) (ethnologische Befunde), continue to (well) assert themselves (carry on holding their positions) (well) in the Anglo-Saxon world, whereas in the Romance-speaking (or Latin) countries (of Europe) (in den romanischen Ländern) the jovial(carefree, cheerful, insouciant)-indifferent and tolerant gospel of postmodernism (Postmodernismus) has spread (been diffused). Germany's intellectual in-crowd (fashionable intellectuals) indeed willingly flirt with postmodernistic (postmodernistischen) harmlessness (i.e. painless inanities), yet the reasons are also generally well-known that (on the other hand however, for generally well-known reasons,) a more or less clear (unambiguous) confession (i.e. declaration) of faith in ethics and Reason (Vernunft) in this country has become (been made, turned into) a compulsory exercise (or ritual act).

Although our contemporary ethical universalism has its forerunners (precursors) in the still recent past and its rivals in the present, nevertheless it can be looked at as a novum and at the same time as (a) bearer of a change (turning point). Indeed, it (ethical universalism) already constitutes in its various forms the most influential current of ethical thinking (thought), in relation to which its influence appears (seems) all the more stronger (intense) the more one turns away (distances oneself) from the narrower spectrum of intellectual(-spiritual) production and turns to(wards) the broader social spectrum. Its (Ethical universalism's) force (strength, power; Kraft) is visible (seen) (appears) not least in that it dictates to a great extent to politics (politicians) its (their) rhetoric, and over and above that (furthermore) shapes (forms, moulds) and supports (the) socially necessary intellectual(-spiritual) forms of self-evidence (naturalness) (states of being self-evident) and forms of conformism (die sozial notwendigen geistigen Selbstverständlichkeiten und Konformismen). No less characteristic is its (ethical universalism's) in the meanwhile frequently proven ability at (capacity for) forcing (obliging, impelling, compelling) its rivals into (adopting) its logic. In this way (So), ethical relativism (ethischer Relativismus), both of the analytical as well as of the postmodernistic mould (shaping), is in the habit of being legitimised with reference to the proposition (by saying) that only the insight of all sides into the relativity and perspectivity of standpoints (points of view) and of values (in die Relativität und Perspektivität der Standpunkte und der Werte) can ultimately create (produce) the ideational foundation (basis) for (of) tolerance and peaceful co-existence; a universal ethical ideal consequently serves (is used) in a logically questionable manner (way) to (socially) justify a scepticism (eine Skepsis) (at a social level) in relation to (for) which from the beginning every justification must be fragile.

Logical leaps (leaps in logic; Logische Sprünge) nonetheless indicate (pressing) practical (situational) constraints - in this case, out of the necessity to adapt oneself to a thought style (way (manner) of thought; Denkstil) and a strategy of argumentation which has been surrounded by (with) an aura of the indisputable (unquestionable) and of what is (the) immediately clear (self-evident). Mass democracy, which in the meantime has appropriated (embraced, adopted) certain life forms (forms (ways) of life; Lebensformen) and ideas of the cultural revolution (Kulturrevolution) of the (19)60s and (19)70s in (a) watered-down (moderated) form, indeed (of course, certainly) allows (permits) value pluralism and permissiveness (Permissivität), in fact it (mass democracy) partly even lives off (on) them (these phenomena), however on the other hand, it (mass democracy) may not and cannot let unbounded freedom (i.e. the freedom to do whatever one wants) (die Narrenfreiheit) in ethical(-philosophical) thinking (thought) be followed by (be converted into) unbounded freedom in social action (activity) (sozialen Handeln). That is why it is not therefore to (it ought not therefore) be expected (anticipated) that the verbal Nietzscheanism of postmodern *ideology* inside of (within) (the framework (context) of) postmodern *reality* will be transformed (transubstantiated) into the (determinative (decisive)) form (setting the tone) of social praxis (die tonangebende Form von sozialer Praxis). Not only has universalistic ethics imbued (permeated, pervaded) the broader social consciousness (soziale Bewußtsein), in which it (universalistic ethics) of course mixes (is mixed) with various versions of "live and let live", but (however) also national and international institutions, which base their work on ethical principles with universal validity, increase (in number) (multiply) and are consolidated.

The characteristic (content-related(filled) (substantive)) novum of this turn(, if we see it from the point of view of its intellectual(-spiritual) content,) (Das charakteristische inhaltliche Novum dieser Wende) becomes noticeable (manifest, evident, all too clear) in the nonchalance (insouciance, carefreeness) with which universal-ethical (universalistic ethical; universaethisches) thinking (thought) disregards (overlooks) empirical, both anthropological as well as historical, factors (empirische, sowohl anthropologische als auch geschichtliche Faktoren). If one in the middle of the sometimes breathtaking (staggering) succession (sequence) of intellectual fashions (fads) has not yet forgotten that (only) just recently every enlightened (or seasoned and immoral) intellectual considered as important (stressed, emphasised) first (of all) the social determination of all forms and norms (rules) of behaviour and asserted (expressed) that the suspicion (inkling) of ideology (and of "false consciousness") applied (referred) to (absolutely, just) everything one could think of (all possible directions) (die soziale Bedingtheit aller Verhaltensformen und -normen geltend machte und den Ideologieverdacht auf alles nur Mögliche bezog), then one must be astonished (amazed, astounded) at (with, by) the ascertainment that in the meanwhile ethically(-philosophically) inspired theories of justice (which) on an avowedly unhistorical basis pertain(ing) to contract theory (ethisch inspirierte Gerechtigkeitstheorien auf erklärtermaßen unhistorischer vertragstheoretischer Basis) would be (are) formulated (put forward) and discussed - without anyone(, because of that,) protesting or laughing (about (because of) it (that)). In recent years in fact so-called "moral realism" (»moralische Realismus«), which wants to locate (detect) moral properties (qualities; Eigenschaften) on (in) things themselves in the same way that one can ascertain in relation to them (their) colour or volume, is sought (requested, asked (called) for) and offered to an increasing extent

(continuously increasingly). Of all the variants of ethical universalism, communication theory (die kommunikationstheoretische)³³ is that (theory) which most likely (more than other theories) courts (tries to get, seeks) sociological explanations (or interpretations) and justifications (substantiations), however these (variants of ethical universalism) pay tribute to an already past Zeitgeist (i.e. spirit or general outlook of the time) and (or) Marxist reminiscences (memories), and neither touch upon its (communication theory's) (willingly, with pleasure) proclaimed (declared, admitted, confessed) belief (faith) in universal ethical principles nor upon the internal (inner) structure of the (communication) theory. The (This) latter (communication theory) is (found) (finds itself) actually much nearer (closer) to moral realism and metaphysical thinking (thought) (metaphysischem Denken) in general than it itself wants to admit. Because it projects into (inside) an axiomatically presumed (presupposed) (primordial or original) texture (composition) of "genuine (true)" communication that which it ethically expects (anticipates) from "genuine (true)" communication, that is, it makes (converts), in accordance with an age-old (ancient) tried and tested (proven) pattern or ruse (model or trick), out of the Ought (Should) an Is (i.e. Being or To Be) (the Ought into an Is) in order to then derive this same Ought from the Is constructed in this way (thus (so) constructed Is) (Denn sie projiziert in eine axiomatisch angenommene Urbeschaffenheit der »wahren« Kommunikation das hinein, was sie sich von der »wahren« Kommunikation ethisch verspricht, sie macht also nach uraltem bewährtem Muster aus dem Sollen ein Sein, um dann dieses selbe Sollen aus dem so konstruierten Sein abzuleiten). Regardless of its ethical merits (advantages), communication theory will not be suitable (any good, worth

³³ The best known such theory, and the theory Kondylis is presumably referring to, is J. Habermas's "theory of communicative action".

a great deal (much)) as (a) scientific theory (wissenschaftliche Theorie) as (so) long as it does not offer (render, afford, give) what one ought to (should, may) reasonably (plausibly, sensibly, meaningfully) expect from every scientific theory: that it, namely, first of all explains those phenomena which contradict (go against, conflict with) it³⁴. How, in view of the asserted (claimed) structure as regards its essence (i.e. the texture) of (true) human communication, (If the texture of true human communication is that which the (said communication) theory asserts, how) (angesichts der behaupteten Wesensstruktur menschlicher Kommunikation) have enmity (between people) and (their) mutual annihilation (extermination) in (previous) history (until now) so often been possible? A normatively laid out (drawn up, calculated) communication theory, which would (seriously) be prepared to answer (pose (and try to answer), face) this question (in all seriousness), would run (bump) into (come upon, encounter) the same difficulty because (on account) of (due to) its basically theological character (theologischen Charakters) as every (other) normativistic metaphysics (normativistische Metaphysik) ((does) too) - namely (it runs) into the difficulty of deciphering (or explaining) the origin and persistent (continuous, lasting, incessant) effect of evil.

In all its variations, universalistic ethics is therefore characterised (marked) by an effacing (effacement) (or blurring) of the difference between Is and Ought (polemics against it in recent years has not by

³⁴ This notion is related to "saving the phenomena", i.e. no empirical observation contradicts or goes against the (crystallised) generalisations being made about what is being observed and explained. Apart from "saving the phenomena", absolute logical consistency, non-normative value neutrality and conceptual clarity are other pillars of scientific theory (See e.g. Kondylis's: *Das Politische und der Mensch* [The Political and Man] (Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1999), "Interview: Skeptische Wahrheitssuche gegen normative Entscheidung (Fragen von Marin Terpstra)" in Kondylis, P. *Machtfragen* (WBG, Darmstadt 2006, pp. 157-172), *Το Αόρατο Χρονολόγιο της Σκέψης* (Νεφέλη, Αθήνα 1998) and "Science, Power and Decision" [Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung, also in *Machtfragen*, pp. 129-156] translated by C. F. (www.panagiotiskondylis.com)).

chance (from nowhere) become all the more fierce (violent, severe)) as well as by (the, a) detachment from empirical anthropology and history. Compared with the classical ethical(-philosophical) tradition - from the pre-Socratics up to the Enlightenment via (with intermediaries such as) Plato, Aristotle and Christianity - (in the process) a loss (squandering, evaporation) in (of) the content of reality (tangible reality) and in (of) the sense of reality (and a blunting (weakening) of the sense of the (what is) real) (ein Verlust an Wirklichkeitsgehalt und Realitätssinn) is to (thus) be noted (observed) in so far as that tradition started (out) (set out) from the fact and from the necessity of the unremitting (incessant) struggle of Reason against the escalating (increasing) yearning (thirst or urge) ((rising) tide) of ineradicable drives (urges, impulses, instincts) and passions (gegen den ausufernden Drang unausrottbarer Triebe und Leidenschaften), and directly or indirectly placed (put) this struggle at the centre (focal point, heart) of its considerations (observations, contemplation(s))³⁵. However (On the contrary), universalistic ethics does not today seem have serious, as well as theoretically articulated worries about the ability (capacity) of man to become permanent master (lord) (permanently rule) over the darker strata (layers) of his existence (der dunkleren Schichten seiner Existenz). Its (Universalistic ethics') (theoretical) efforts rather apply to (are meant for, revolve around) epistemologically consolidated (workable) definitions of Reason, of (ethical) obligation etc., from which then - quite tautologically though (in a more or less tautological way) - the ethical desiderata (demands) and the beneficial (agreeable) social consequences of their (the said definitions of Reason, obligation's) realisation are deduced. With the programmatic or actual (factual, real) putting aside (dispelling) of

³⁵ For the complete picture, read Kondylis's masterpiece as regards the history of ideas: *Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus* [The Enlightenment in the framework of new-times rationalism (The European Enlightenment)] (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1981).

anthropological and historical factors, every binding teaching (doctrine) in respect of virtue and duty (virtues and duties) (jede verbindliche Tugend- und Pflichtlehre) must (necessarily) also (does) not apply (must also vanish (be dropped (eclipsed))), and the (theoretical) constructions pile (build, tower, rise) up in(side) the vacuum of logical coherence (cohesion) (und die Konstruktionen türmen sich im luftleeren Raum logischer Geschlossenheit); not by chance (it is indicative that) the use of mathematical formulae has in the meantime become naturalised in respect of (i.e. adopted into) ethical tracts (i.e. treatises) (der Gebrauch mathematischer Formeln in ethischen Traktaten). Man is in the process (course of this) reduced to a single point, namely to his rationality (or reasonableness) and his ability at (capacity for) rational discourse or calculation (conversing or calculating (weighing things up) rationally) (Der Mensch wird dabei auf einen einzigen Punkt reduziert, nämlich auf seine Vernünftigkeit und seine Fähigkeit zum rationalen Diskurs oder Kalkül), so that he, without resisting (showing resistance) and as it were through (thanks to) a pre-established harmony, promptly (readily) joins in all theoretical games of ethicists (i.e. moral philosophers) and at least on paper is able to behave in accordance with their (these ethicists') expectations. (Having been) Reduced to rationality (or reasonableness) (the dimension of Reason), humans now resemble one another like pins (ähneln die Menschen einander nun wie Stecknadeln), in relation to which, as is known, not even the heads are distinguishable from one another. Because if the heads or the individual rationalities (or reasonablenesses) (the forms of Reason (Reasons) of the various individuals) are not identical to (with) one another, hence (then) universal ethical aims (goals) can hardly be contemplated (formulated), let alone (and much less) realised, then (that is) Reason cannot be the foundation (basis) and cannot be the vehicle (conduit) of universal mutual

understanding (und kein Vehikel universaler Verständigung sein). The world is therefore broken down (dissolved), in actual fact, into a community of homogenous intellects(-spirits) (in eine Gemeinschaft homogener Geister), which one again could derive (deduce) - if one brought (along his) metaphysical courage (to it (the said community)) (if one had the metaphysical courage) - from a single intellectual(-spiritual) world substance (as the substance of Being) (einer einzigen geistigen Weltsubstanz).

This unequivocally (flat out, explicitly) unhistorical characteristic (feature; Zug) of universalistic ethics, which really (truly, indeed) comes across (appears) as a novum after the long predominance (supremacy) of historicism and of sociological-ethnological relativism, bears witness (attests) par excellence to the rootedness (origin) of today's (present) versions of this ethics in the mass-democratic thoughts world (i.e. in mass-democratic ideas). Because it can be proven that (the) anthropological and historical consideration (observation) (way of looking at things; Betrachtung) constituted an essential feature of the bourgeois perception of the world (das Wesensmerkmal der bürgerlichen Weltwahrnehmung), which necessarily foundered (perished, sunk) in the post-bourgeois (postbürgerlichen) or "postmodern" or mass-democratic age³⁶. Incidentally, the structural relationship (or affinity) which exists between the universalistic thought style (way (manner) of thought) and its present-day opponents in puncto unhistoricity (i.e. as regards their

³⁶ Kondylis is clearly suggesting that *stricto sensu* "postmodern" is not an acceptable scientific term to describe a period in history (unlike "post-bourgeois" or "mass-democratic") simply because one could not sufficiently explain in terms of *differentiae specifica* how the "postmodern" era differs from the "modern" era given that macro-historically the former (through further industrialisation) simply increases the massification, atomisation, urbanisation, general undermining of the Christian God and of strict social and cultural hierarchies etc. of the latter. However, the term "postmodern" is nonetheless used, given that after World War 2 the mechanisation of everyday life and the cultural revolution occurred *on a mass scale*, and in order to assist today's reader's orientation in terms of familiar terminology (see *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* [The Decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form] (Acta humoniora, Weinheim 1991)).

common unhistorical orientation) (Unhistorizität) is instructive. Cultural relativism is based to a large extent (large degree) on ethnological models which are functionalistically conceived (established (constituted) on the basis of the criterion of social functionality; funktionalistisch konzipiert) and ethical values are understood as (effective, active, working) components (constituent elements) (having an effect) of an in itself closed system of social factors complementing one another (mutually complementary factors). This functionalistic ethnology (Diese funktionalistische Ethnologie) found its sociological pendant (i.e. counterpart) in ethically neutral system (systems) theories (ethisch neutralen Systemtheorien) which in their inflexible (rigid, stiff) unhistoricity are (here) of interest for our context (interrelation) (us, the context of our discussion) because in the final analysis (end) (ultimately) they (the said system theories) have to (must, necessarily) explain social action (activity) like universal-ethical thinking (thought) (ethical universalism) (also) explains it, i.e. by postulating (while they postulate) a rationality (or reasonableness) functioning and calculating in the same way in respect of individuals (i.e. with the axiomatic acceptance of a Reason which weighs things up and functions in the same way in all individuals) (wie das universalethische Denken es erklärt, d. h. indem sie eine gleichartig funktionierende und kalkulierende Vernünftigkeit der Einzelnen postulieren).³⁷

But ethical universalism appears in another important respect as (a) genuine intellectual(-spiritual) product of the mass-democratic age. The reduction of man to a mere (bare) rational (reason-able) humanity (state of being human) (Die Reduktion des Menschen auf sein bloßes

³⁷ For a fully referenced discussion of ethnology, functionalism, system theories, (ethical) universalism in the 20th century and other related social theories see Kondylis's magnum opus: *Das Politische und der Mensch* [The Political and Man] (Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1999).

vernunftbegabtes Menschsein) translates the fact of extreme atomisation (i.e. splitting or segmentation of society into individuals), which is constitutive (fundamental) for democratic mass society, into the idealising language of philosophy (in die idealisierende Sprache der Philosophie). Exactly this reduction and this atomisation make the transition to universalism possible, since the proclaiming (proclamation) of Reason as the sole decisive aptitude or predisposition (i.e. psycho-intellectual(-spiritual) force) of man (zur allein entscheidenden Anlage des Menschen) puts (sets) aside (removes, sidelines) all substantial bonds (ties) (alle substanziellen Bindungen) (e.g. those with (to) the family or with (to) the nation) and consequently all barriers and boundaries between all individuals on this planet. Reason can set (put, place) itself (settle) with ethical absoluteness (as something ethically absolute) and unite (bring together) all individual humans (with one another) only (then) after the process of atomisation (i.e. splitting or segmentation of society into individuals) is well (far, widely) advanced (has progressed a lot). The inner (internal) common bond (interrelation or togetherness) and the parallel progress of atomisation and universalism characterises world society gradually coming into being (as it was formed) since the time of decolonisation (the collapse of the colonial systems; Entkolonialisierung). Present (contemporary) ethical universalism owes its momentum or verve (drive or impetus) and its remarkable (considerable) success to this new planetary reality. From the point of view of the optimistic ethicist it could appear that ((seem) as if) the growing (increasing) influence of universal-ethical thinking (thought) (universalistic ethics) is due (put down) to growing insight (or good sense) (some (kind of) progress in human good sense or wisdom) and (as well as) to the collective wish (desire) to make a new, ethically inspired and founded (established, backed up, sound) beginning (start) after bitter historical experiences and in the face of great

future tasks (duties); the epistemological elimination of History in the name of Reason would then be (constitute) the correlate (Korrelat) of the actual (real, factual) removal (putting aside) of obstacles which History had until now placed (put) in the way of universal (mutual) understanding.

(The) Reality looks (is) more prosaic. The universalisation of ethics (Die Universalisierung der Ethik) constitutes a concomitant (consequence) of the progressive (advancing) unification of the world market and of planetary politics in the same sense and to the same degree as, for instance, the gradual standardisation of economic and legal rules or customs (habits or practices) (die allmähliche Standardisierung von wirtschaftlichen und juristischen Regeln oder Gepflogenheiten). The unification of ethical discourse facilitates (makes) mutual daily understanding (easier) and promotes (further) international physical and intellectual(-spiritual) mobility just as a unified semiotics also does it (that). In this respect, the (universal-ethical) common places (of universalistic ethics) constitute a part of the international lingua franca already (precisely) being formed, and whoever spreads (diffuses, disseminates) them (the said common places of universalistic ethics) has good prospects (a good chance) of rapid international success. We must though (of course) add (To be added though is (the fact)) that the intellectual (thought) work (Denkarbeit) which (is done (achieved, completed) by) philosophers and other theoreticians (do) in the course of this (this sector (area)) (in relation to the said ethical discourse), becomes (is) perceived and is judged in (as to) its conceptual peculiarity (constitution, individuality, characteristic) (begrifflichen Eigenart) and (its) technical quality only inside of (within) the(ir) narrower and broader circle of the(ir) guild (sectional (corporate) circle); it (the said intellectual

work) only has an (takes) effect towards the outside (outwardly) as (while, when, provided) it is (by being) vulgarised (i.e. popularised), selectively dealt with (treated, handled) and (is) fused (merged) with analogous approaches (currents, tendencies) (in part even (indeed) of (a) mystical inspiration (texture)). Under these circumstances, those aspects of universal-ethical (universalistic ethical) thinking (thought), which are connected with current (today's, topical) questions in dispute (matters at issue) or come (arrive) on the scene as applications of general ethical principles (in relation) to concrete and at the same time (concurrent) planetarily relevant activities, meet with (receive, enjoy, find) particular (exceptional) and broad interest. The swelling of (i.e. huge increase in) the literature regarding human rights as well as regarding medical and ecological (i.e. environmental) ethics corroborates (confirms, verifies) this.

It would of course be naive to put down (attribute) the growing influence of universalistic ethics to the growing ethicisation (Ethisierung) of world society. And as (like) the real (actual) reasons for its (universalistic ethics') spreading (diffusion) are not those which its originators (creators) or supporters would like (want) to assume, so too most probably (likely) its real effects (results) will not coincide with its hoped-for (expected, anticipated) effects (results)³⁸. We want to now turn (ourselves) briefly to this highly political question.

³⁸ Kondylis is here referring to the "heterogony of ends" (Heterogonie der Zwecke) (see *Das Politische und der Mensch* for this descriptive concept's analytical use in the broader context of social(-historical) theory).

2. The political dark side(s) (i.e. drawbacks) of human rights (Die politische Schattenseiten der Menschenrechte)

Talk of human rights has moved into the centre (heart) of the political vocabulary during recent (the last two) decades. An optimistic observer could draw from that (come to) a conclusion that politics has now set itself the task, after the bitter experiences of the century, of moulding (shaping) the world in accordance with ethical principles. However, often in the historical past it was the case (so,) that during the combining (working (having an effect) together) of (whenever) the ethical (ethics) and the political (politics) (collaborated) (beim Zusammenwirken des Ethischen und des Politischen) the ethical (ethics) was subjugated (subordinated, subjected) to the logic of the political (politics) - and in addition (moreover, furthermore), that the reasons for the mobilisation of the ethical (ethics) itself were primarily political. Things did not stand essentially differently (The situation was not essentially different, The same happened) also (as well) in the recent past, and this entitles us (gives us the right) to underline certain political aspects and implications of the (examination (study) of the) problems of human rights.

Human rights universalism (Der menschenrechtliche Universalismus) was used in the time of (during) the Cold War on the part of (by) the West as a political weapon against communism - not without (a) long-term result(s) (outcome). However, its (human rights universalism's) political role was not at all exhausted with the collapse (breakdown) of the Eastern Bloc, rather the opposite is to (must) be expected. Because in the meantime it (human rights universalism) has developed its own logic and dynamism (dynamics) while at the same time several (a number of, many) sides have a vital interest in invoking (appealing to) it. Not only the victors of the Second World War against fascism and not only the

West against communism: also, the numerous peoples, which in the course of (thanks to) decolonisation (the disintegration of colonialism) achieved their independence, have usurped (appropriated) the language of human rights, in order to justify (account for, substantiate) (with ultimate arguments) their claim to equal rights (parity, equivalence, equality) in the framework of the world society (precisely) coming into being. Human rights consequently became the lingua franca, the great(est) ideological common denominator of this world society - and exactly the universal confession of faith in their (human rights') nominal (i.e. face) value makes their concrete interpretation and application so complicated. Because if the universalisation of ethics and of rights interrelates (connects) with the coming into being (genesis) of a world society, then it (world society) will be afflicted (tainted) by contradictions and tensions which (over)burden (put a strain on) today's (the present) world society in a dramatic way. The worldwide recognition of human rights principles will not then constitute (make up) the foundation (basis) for worldwide ethical (mutual) understanding, but rather the common battlefield upon which every one of the competing sides will struggle (fight, battle) for the imposition (predominance, prevailing) of their own interpretation of the aforementioned principles and against all other interpretations. We must emphatically warn against (It must be empathically warned against) the illusion (delusion) that the nominal (i.e. face) value of ideas can prevent their polemical instrumentalisation (use) (ihre polemische Instrumentalisierung). Were it so (thus), wars would never have taken place between nations which all sincerely declared support for (espoused, embraced, adopted) the religion of love.

The possibility of the transformation (conversion) of human rights into a new field of tension (area of conflict) attaches (is joined) to an elementary

(fundamental, crucial) fact, which on the basis (because) of the existing willingness (readiness) of all sides to (spontaneously) identify their own objects (goals, matters, causes; Sache) with the objects (goals, matters, causes) of (all of) humanity, is hardly perceived. It is a matter of the fact that in (given) today's constitution of world society there can be no talk of human rights *stricto sensu* (Es handelt sich um die Tatsache, daß bei gegenwärtigen Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft von Menschenrechten *stricto sensu* keine Rede sein kann). With that (Here) we do not mean for instance the "human rights violations (breaches)" in many countries, but something fundamental (i.e. the very essence of the thing; etwas Grundsätzliches). Human rights, i.e. rights, which humans possess in their mere (bare) quality (i.e. characteristic) as humans (simply and only because they possess the human quality (i.e. characteristic)) (in ihrer bloßen Eigenschaft als Menschen), can only then have real (tangible) meaning and existence if all humans can (may) enjoy them (human rights) without restriction(s) (reservation) everywhere on earth, and indeed in the place of their free choice, by virtue of their naked (bare) humanness (only and only thanks to the fact they are humans) (kraft ihres nackten Menschseins) and irrespective of their origin or other prerequisites (presuppositions, preconditions). As long as this does not happen, i.e. as long as the (a) Chinese does not have (at his disposal) the same rights in the United States as the (an) American and the (an) Albanian does not have the same rights in Italy as the (an) Italian, one may, if one does not want to strain (twist, distort, misrepresent) concepts (the meaning of words), only talk of civil rights (Bürgerrechten)³⁹, but not of human rights. A state-organised political unit (entity) (political unit organised by a state; eine staatlich organisierte politische Einheit) always

³⁹ Kondylis is obviously referring to "state-bound" or "political" rights provided by sovereign states within their respective jurisdictions.

grants (provides, affords) that which today is euphemistically called "human rights" to its own nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens) (Staatsangehörigen), and (its, the) validity (force, effect) (of that which the said political unit grants) can only be guaranteed inside of (within) each and every respective (state) territory (Staatsgebietes). No state can therefore guarantee that rights, which are regarded as (considered to be) human rights par excellence, as for instance the right to bodily (i.e. physical) integrity and freedom of speech⁴⁰, can be enjoyed (exercised) outside of its borders. And conversely: no state can, without breaking up (dissolving, disintegrating) (i.e. eliminating itself) (ohne sich aufzulösen), grant to all humans without exception certain rights, which are generally (commonly, usually) regarded (thought of) as (considered to be) civil rights, as for instance the right to vote and the right of settlement (i.e. permanent residence) (wie etwa das Wahl- und Niederlassungsrecht). In other words: not *all* humans can *as* humans possess *all* rights (no matter whether these are called human or civil rights in the prevalent (current, familiar, common) terminology), regardless of where they are (find themselves). Rights, which are given and guaranteed by the (a) state and are in force (apply) with the reservation that (sovereign) statehood exists (subject to (the existence of) (sovereign) statehood), would be able to (could) be described (characterised) as human rights (only) if the attribute (quality, characteristic, property) of man could be exclusively allocated (assigned, granted) by the state concerned (in question) (if the state concerned (exclusively) recognised (could exclusively allocate) the attribute of man) to its own nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens). But even if it (the state in question) did this, it still (again) could not thereby

⁴⁰ In the more than two decades since *Planetary Politics...* was published, it has become apparent that "freedom of speech" is being redefined under the pressure of maintaining social order in Western mass democracies, where increasing "multiracialism and multiculturalism" have given rise to the concept of, however defined, "hate speech" and its prohibition. Consequently, it is not clear anymore that "freedom of speech" is as highly valued as it was during and immediately after the Cold War.

manage (achieve) that its nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens) would be treated (recognised, dealt with) in other countries as (absolutely equal) citizens (having absolutely equal rights) and as possessors of universal human rights. Humanity (Mankind) as a constituted and unified political subject (einheitliches politisches Subjekt) could (only) grant (give) human rights as *human* rights. Only the end of (sovereign) statehood in every one of today's known forms would inaugurate (initiate) the age of real human rights (realen Menschenrechte).⁴¹

Human rights universalism indeed (of course) started (darted) (out) (rushed, dashed) from the rich countries of the West and was first politically instrumentalised by them (first used by them as a political tool) (politisch instrumentalisiert), however it increasingly (progressively) finds a hearing (favourable acceptance (reception)) and advocates (proponents) in the less developed and the poor countries of the East and of the South which understandably see in it (this human rights universalism) a welcome means to highlight (project, pursue) their claims in relation to the distribution of the world's wealth and the world's resources. They (The said less developed and poor countries) find themselves (are) of course faced with (in) a dilemma, because they are nolentes (or) volentes not in a position to apply (realise) in the(ir) interior those principles (fully (completely)), in respect of whose realisation (i.e. implementation) at the international level they expect (anticipate) a noticeable (appreciable, marked) improvement in their position (or situation) as nations and states. The perception (view), which is

⁴¹ Provided of course a world state could ensure that all humans fully enjoy all human rights everywhere and anywhere in the world (See Kondylis, P. "»Menschenrechte«: begriffliche Verwirrung und politische Instrumentalisierung" in P. Kondylis *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Manutius, Heidelberg 2001, pp. 61-67 [««Ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα»: εννοιολογική σύγχυση και πολιτική εκμετάλλευση» στο Κονδύλης, Π. *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Θεμέλιο, Αθήνα 1998, σσ. 61-67; English translation: Stafford, S. and Petridis, R. "'Human Rights': Conceptual Confusion and Political Exploitation" in *Telos*, no. 166, Spring 2014, pp. 161-165]).

widespread (diffused, common) in the West too, (The widespread also in the West perception) that only the improvement of their (these less developed and poor countries') material position (or situation) will enable the ethicisation of their internal (inner) social-political life, helps (assists) them at some time (or other) come out of this catch-22 situation (or tug of war) (Zwickmühle). It is to (must) be expected (assumed) that from possible (potential) advances (progress) in this direction they (the less developed and poor countries) will derive a (the) right to greater "help (assistance, aid)" on the part of the rich nations. Either way, the West will come (fall, find itself) under moral and political pressure (from) which it cannot easily evade (be exempted (excused, relieved, absolved)).

Whoever wants to explain the debacle (bankruptcy, abject failure) of real (actually existing) socialism (des realen Sozialismus) from (with reference to) the fact (by asserting (maintaining)) that this (real socialism) could not redeem (i.e. carry out) both (either) its eschatological as well as (or) its direct (immediate) (material) promises, must also seriously think about (ponder) the possibility that the nations, which want to follow the path of the West but could not go there (down that path) (do it), will eventually (in the end, finally) in their disappointment (disenchantment) turn against the West and at the same time against its universalistic ethics. Because they (the less developed and poor countries) will be disposed (inclined, willing, minded) to interpret their failure as the betrayal of the full (i.e. well-fed or satiated) and egotistical West of (against) their (the West's) own ethical principles. In the expectations which the West has awoken (aroused) through (by) the world (global) export of its ethical universalism, an explosive potential is hiding (latent). The victory of its (the West's) ideas has not relieved (eased, unburdened) the West, but on

the contrary loaded it with tasks (or duties) and a burden of guilt (handicaps) under whose pressure it itself could fundamentally change.⁴²

This pressure must (will necessarily) increase (intensify, be reinforced) to the extent that universal human rights will be interpreted materially (materiell ausgelegt werden), in relation to which *mutatis mutandis*⁴³ that which happened (took place) for the first time in the 19th century will be repeated, when the socialists demanded the material interpretation and realisation of the formal (legal) freedoms and rights propagated by the bourgeoisie. The Christian perception (view) of human dignity was not originally (initially) connected to (with) a(n) idea (notion) of a material "minimum (level) of existence (i.e. living conditions)" (»Existenzminimum«), whatever "progressive" theologians like to (may) think (say) about (in relation to) that. In accordance however with today's opinion (view, perception), (the, a) minimum (minimal) (level of) human dignity and (the, a) minimum (minimal) (level of) consumption belong together (are inseparable); whoever goes hungry (starves, dies of hunger) is merely a human without (substantial) rights, not for instance someone whom god-willed material (de)privation gives the opportunity to be completely (altogether) rid of (released from) concern over (worrying (caring) about) material goods. If now human rights are interpreted materially and are connected with expectations (or requirements) in respect of consumption, then they (human rights) must come into conflict with the existing shortage (scarcity) of goods at the world level, i.e. they must (will necessarily) be transformed (change) into weapons in the struggle over the distribution of scarce (limited) goods. Whoever as

⁴² See translator's footnotes 15, 18 and 21 for various thoughts regarding possible changes in and of the West.

⁴³ Changing [only] those things which need to be changed; or, [only] the necessary changes having been made.

someone belonging to (a member of) a rich nation stands up for (defends) the strict (exact, consistent) observance (keeping) of human rights will have to share his human rights with other, unknown to him, humans, and from that (fairly) certainly a(n) confrontation (altercation) will follow (arise) during which (one side's) human rights will take the field against (come face to face with) (another side's) human rights.

In any case, it must be regarded as certain that the more humans invoke human rights, the more extensive (broader) will their interpretation turn out to be (become). In other words, this means that more and more humans will demand (require) more and more ideational and material goods in the knowledge (believing) that these (ideational and material goods) (rightfully) belong to them (as of right) (they are entitled to these as of right). In light of this (irrefutable) observation (ascertainment, consideration)(, which can hardly be refuted,) one must prepare (reconcile) oneself for (with) the fact (prospect) that the function and meaning of human rights will change in the future. Especially as materially understood human rights (Human rights, especially if they are interpreted materially,) cannot mean the same (thing) irrespective of whether two or whether five or (but) whether ten billion humans simultaneously and consistently (fully, completely, emphatically) make (raise) a claim to (demand) their (the said materially understood human rights') possession and their active exercising. What the "principle of responsibility" (»Prinzip Verantwortung«) will dictate after the new doubling of the world population to be (that is) expected in the coming decades, no-one can today say (know) with certainty (cf. Sec. I, 5). The fact that (universal-ethical) commands (of universal ethics) and in particular human rights are still (continue to be) practised (put into practice, applied, enforced) with the far-reaching reservation of (subject

extensively to) the rights of state sovereignty must at any rate be interpreted as (a) presentiment (premonition, foreboding) of future friction(s) and as (a) precautionary (provident, preventive) endeavour (effort) at keeping (holding) open a safety valve (Als Vorahnung künftiger Friktionen und als vorsorgliches Bestreben, ein Sicherheitsventil offen zu halten). Even states which fully (completely) recognise human rights and guarantee them inside of (within) their own boundaries, reserve the right (for themselves) to carry on denying (refusing) foreign (alien) nationals (i.e. subjects or citizens) the enjoyment of these same rights in their territory; already the ancient democracies jealously (vigilantly) guarded (protected, minded, looked after) the sharp dividing line (line of separation) between their own citizens and foreigners (aliens) (die scharfe Trennungslinie zwischen den eigenen Bürgern und den Fremden). The propagation (declaration) of human rights is therefore connected today - and soon (in the future) it (the propagation of human rights) will do this (be connected) (even) more strongly (forcefully, closely) - with the sometimes even bluntly expressed (explicit, unequivocal) wish (desire) that dear fellow man should (ought to) kindly (remain and) enjoy his dignity to the full (make the most of his dignity) in his own country of origin. An unrestricted (unlimited) application (or implementation or enforcement) (Eine uneingeschränkte Anwendung) of human rights, i.e. a consistent and legally safeguarded (protected) reduction of humans to their naked (bare) humanness (human quality or attribute and only that), without any consideration for (regard to) (taking into consideration) nationality and citizenship (Nationalität und Staatsangehörigkeit) (at all), would automatically entail the abolition (annulment) of (sovereign) statehood and of all barriers (obstacles) in respect of freedom of movement and freedom of settlement (or permanent residence) - a vision of terror (a true nightmare; eine Schreckensvision)

for EC-Europeans and North Americans⁴⁴. Universal ethicists (i.e. the champions of universal ethics) (Die Universalethiker), who are extremely (exceptionally) imaginative (eloquent) when it is a matter of declarations of principle(s) and in practice non-binding theoretical hair-splitting, have typically until now been lost for words (lost (quite a) few words) regarding (have until now typically not told us anything about) the concrete consequences of a consistent (unswerving, undeviating) application (or implementation or enforcement) of human rights (i.e. of the rights of man in his mere humanness (as man and only as man)) at the planetary level.

While (Since, As) the West can practise (apply, implement, enforce) human rights only with the reservation of (subject to) sovereign statehood (state sovereignty), it becomes entangled in a contradiction which understandably appears (seems) more flagrant (blatant, striking) and unbearable (intolerable, insufferable, unendurable) to those who knock (are knocking) on its door. This contradiction would only deepen (even more) should the West be tempted to impose (push through) human rights (that is to say (i.e., read): rights which apply to the citizens of the West) through (by means of) political or even military interventions in other parts of the World. Because such interventions would have to of necessity be implemented (occur) selectively (a campaign (expedition) against China e.g. would be out of the question (inconceivable)), and that is why (in this way) they (such interventions) would quickly lose credibility; it

⁴⁴ Kondylis is obviously not referring here to the hundreds of thousands of, or few million, "non-White" and or "non-Christian" people entering the European Union and the USA (every year) in the last two decades, but to the movement of tens (and tens) of millions of people in the event border controls were completely removed in an attempt by Western countries to be "true" to their own human rights propaganda (c.f. Kondylis, P. »Europa an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts«, p. 133, in *Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg: Manutius, 2001 («Η Ευρώπη στο κατώφλι του 21ου αιώνα: μία κοσμοϊστορική και γεωπολιτική θεώρηση», σ. 123, στο *Από τον 20ο στον 21ο αιώνα*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1998; "Europe on the threshold of the 21st century") where he makes it clear that the connection between increasing anomie and the sudden mass movement of people is not a question of "race" and cultural quality or character per se, but of quantity).

would (must) even be expected that fanaticised masses in countries like e.g. Iran would launch the motto (slogan) "Down with human rights!" in exactly the sense of the Spanish combatants (fighters) who, (standing) before the (a) firing squad, shouted against Napoleon "Down with freedom!". Over and above that, it is not acceptable (possible) (it is quite out of the question) in the long run to violate (breach, transgress) (foreign, alien) (the) sovereign statehood (state sovereignty) (of others) in the name of human rights and to shut (cut) (entrench) (while simultaneously cutting off (entrenching)) one's own sovereign statehood (off) against that which others hold (consider) to be (take for) *their* human rights. In other words: the West will find itself obliged (be forced) to offset (counterbalance) the imposition (pushing through) of formal human rights in other countries with (through) concessions to the material interpretation of these same human rights - and to spend some (money) (pay (quite a bit)) for this offsetting (counterbalancing) (pay the price for this balancing act). In short, the first duty of the liberator will be to nourish (support) the (those who have been) liberated (Die erste Pflicht des Befreiers wird kurzum die sein, die Befreiten zu ernähren).

There is also a still deeper reason for which a growth (growing) in (of) the tensions in the human universe - and indeed not despite, but during the simultaneous (in parallel with the) spreading (diffusion) of (the) (universal-ethical) principles (of universal ethics) - can be presumed (is highly likely). The ethically-normatively charged (loaded) word "human (man)" (»Mensch«) functioned linguistically as an honorific (revaluing) adjective so (as) long as one demarcated (delimited) it against other adjectives which seemed (simply) to indicate (connote, denote, describe) the (merely) historically determined (conditioned), abolishable (annullable) and to be abolished (annulled) distinctions (divisions,

segregations) between humans; in the language of ethical universalism "human (man)" (has) always meant something nobler and higher than words like Jew or Greek, Christian or heathen (pagan, Gentile), black or white, communist or liberal. If (From the moment however) all particular counter (i.e. partial) concepts (Gegenbegriffe) in respect of (towards) the universalium (i.e. the universal (concept)) (Universalium) "human (man)" cease to apply (exist) (are discontinued (abolished)), (so) the word "human (man)" will no longer constitute an adjective, that is, it will no longer point to a higher quality, but it (the word "human") will be converted (transformed, changed) into a noun for the description of (which will name) a certain animal species (Tierart). Humans will all be called "humans" just as lions (are called) lions and mice - mice without further national or ideological differentiation. It may sound (seem) (perhaps sounds) paradoxical and yet it is thus (so, true), that man (has) differentiated himself from all the other animal species exactly because (of the fact that) he was not (merely) man (and only man) free of all other attributes (without any other attribute (predicate, complement)) (ledig aller anderen Attribute war). Not only did culture come into being (arise, result) through (thanks to) the overcoming of bare (naked, mere) humanness (or the bare human quality) and the gradual attainment (acquisition, acquirement, obtaining) of historically determined attributes (predicates, complements), but also altercations (confrontations, clashes, contrarities) and the struggles between humans gained (got, won), thanks to the presence and the effect (impact) exactly of these attributes (predicates, complements), emotional (or sentimental) (instinctive) and ideological dimensions which went (reached, stretched, extended) far beyond the mere (what is merely) animal (bestial) (i.e. the world of animals) (Nicht nur entstand Kultur durch die Überwindung des bloßen Menschseins und die allmähliche Erlangung geschichtlich bedingter

Attribute, sondern auch die Auseinandersetzungen und die Kämpfe zwischen den Menschen gewannen dank der Anwesenheit und Wirkung eben dieser Attribute gefühlsmäßige und ideologische Dimensionen, die weit über das bloß Tierische hinausreichten). That is why it is not excluded that the reduction of man to his mere (bare) humanness (or human quality) will inaugurate (initiate) and will accompany an epoch (era) in which humans will have to (necessarily) fight (battle) against one another for (over) goods which are absolutely necessary for the naked (elemental) survival of the animal species "man" - in the worst case for air and water. In accordance with a well-known paradox of historical action (the historical activity of humans), the imposition (pushing through) of universal ethics will then bring about (lead to) effects (consequences) entirely (completely) different to the originally intended (desired) (ones, effects).⁴⁵

It is for factual (objective; sachlichen) reasons indeed superfluous, but perhaps advisable for other reasons and reasons suggesting themselves (It is perhaps superfluous), in conclusion, to make clear (clarify, clear up) that these thoughts (considerations) cannot (do not) mean that human rights universalism is to be held responsible (blamed) for (all) bad things (that happen) (i.e. for all evils) (für schlimme Sachen) or that (a) (declared) belief in (the adoption of) ethical relativism would be the appropriate (suitable) solution for the great (large) aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) (Aporien) of our (already begun) planetary history. Things take their course, and this course is determined by (through) ideas - in the sense of independent (self-sufficient, self-standing) forces which intervene from the outside in a becoming (i.e. in events) and are able to (can) direct (guide, steer) it (this becoming or

⁴⁵ See footnote 38.

these events) - far less than what the producers and consumers of ideas believe or want to make others believe (Die Dinge nehmen ihren Lauf, und dieser Lauf wird durch Ideen - im Sinne von selbständigen Kräften, die von außen in ein Geschehen eingreifen und es lenken können - viel weniger bestimmt als die Produzenten und Konsumenten von Ideen glauben oder glauben machen wollen)⁴⁶. Nevertheless the predominance (prevalence) of human rights universalism taking place today remains symptomatic (indicative) of certain important (essential) political developments - and it is better to think about these developments than not to do it (so) (think).

⁴⁶ Kondylis is here, by way of his always incomparable ability at elucidating key matters of social theory, alluding to the fact that neither the simplistic Marxist base-superstructure analytical tool is valid (at least in many cases), nor is the mass-democratic ideological position of the primacy of signs, language, discourse etc. (so favoured by "deconstructionist", "postmodern", "poststructuralist" etc. polemicists with programs of individual or "minority group" "emancipation" or "liberation") vis-à-vis social action and social facts of any (substantial) scientific use. For an analysis of the social relation, social action, language, rationality and other related social, political and anthropological factors in understanding societies and human action or behaviour scientifically, i.e. in a descriptive, non-normative, value-free manner, see *Das Politische und der Mensch*).

VI. What was communism (Was war der Kommunismus)?

It is understandable and unavoidable that the (various) explanations (or interpretations) regarding the defeat of communism in the Cold War in the time (period) immediately following (the Cold War) are frequently (many times) mixed with the loud or discrete self-celebrations (or jublations) (exultations) of the victors. Human is the wish of the convinced and consistent (uncompromising, intransigent, unyielding) Cold Warriors, now with reference to (by invoking) the (occurred) fact (that has occurred) (of the outcome of the Cold War) (recent facts), to talk up (present, acclaim, promote, puff (hype) up; hochzustilisieren) as the verdict of historical justice and as proof (evidence) of their own foresight that which formerly (previously, earlier) constituted the content of their polemics - and all too human is the endeavour (effort) of those who still (even) recently denounced every "blind anti-communism" as (a) mortal (i.e. deadly) sin of the human-progressive intellect(mind)-spirit [intellect(-spirit)] (human-fortschrittlichen Geistes) and did not want to in any way provoke, and in many ways wanted to appease, the dictators of the East, after the unexpected for them turn of events (change in (of) things), through ostentatious (indicative) complaints (repudiations, disavowals) against "totalitarianism" and through active participation in the unmasking (exposure, disclosure, discovery, detection; Entlarvung) and persecution of (the) guilty parties and of (the) fellow-travellers, to

(exactly) make be forgotten (erase from memory) (and to reject (deny)) that which yesterday still separated (divided) them from today's actual (real, true) victors, so that they do not have to share (in) the bitter lot (fate, destiny) of the outcasts (pariahs). In the (either way (one way or another) produced (made, established)) general euphoria(, which is produced either way,) it seems that, at any rate, the view (perception, opinion) has been consolidated that (supposedly) History, after a just as enigmatic (puzzling, mysterious) as terrifying (terrible, horrible, frightening) divergence (deviation), (now) returns (goes back, is returning) to the royal (regal) path of freedom and human nature (die menschliche Natur) can develop anew (once (and) again) (freely), since because of (thanks to) its resistance the attempt (effort) at totalitarian re-education ("totalitarianism" (re-educating it (human nature))) failed. The Whig interpretation of English history is consequently extended (expanded, broadened, widened) to a Whig interpretation of world history in general.

That view (perception, opinion) and this interpretation will undoubtedly dominate (rule) the intellectual(-spiritual)-political scene until the next great historical overturning or radical change (reversal; Umwälzung) lets (allows) (yesterday's) (the) atrocities (abominations; Greuel) (of yesterday) (to) be displaced from (driven out of) memory or lets (allows) them (to) appear in other dimensions (psychologically covers (up), or presents in other dimensions, the atrocities of yesterday). Nevertheless, one does not have to (need not) wait so long in order to be able to see (understand, recognise) that they (the abovementioned view and interpretation) are suitable as (the) object of an analysis pertaining to the critique of ideology (als Gegenstand einer ideologiekritischen Analyse) rather than as (the) key to the understanding (comprehension) of the

historical character of communism. If today's Western political and economic system is not unconditionally (absolutely, without fail) interwoven (knitted, grown together) with human nature (how otherwise could it (human nature) have survived in the far longer period of time of its existence?) and if History has no ethical aims (goals) or possibly (it) is heading (steers) (on) towards even (still) worse catastrophes than those which communism (has) brought about, then the historical assessment (judgement, evaluation; Beurteilung) of this latter (communism) must obviously (apparently) be undertaken on the basis of other criteria. It is namely to be asked (We must namely ask) which were the great (large) motive forces (bewegenden Kräfte) of the epoch in which communism unfolded, and in what relation did it (communism) stand (find itself) (was it) with these forces, to what extent it represented them (these driving forces) and boosted (encouraged, fostered, strengthened, reinforced) them or hampered (hindered, checked, stopped) them or (and) (to what extent), despite all (of) its (communism's) interweaving (interconnection) with universal tendencies, it (communism) served particular (i.e. specific or distinct) (power-political) goals (ends) (in terms of power politics) and in the (this) process (course of this) was (has been) modified on each and every respective occasion. From such a perspective, of course, the world-historical or Messianic self-understanding of communism (way communism understood itself) can be taken (cannot be taken) at face value just as (little as) the self-assessment (Selbsteinschätzung) of its foes (enemies) (i.e. the idea its foes have about themselves) (cannot be taken at face value). Ethical-normative ideas are not made up (invented, contrived, concocted) in order to be taken (or understood) and to be realised at face value, but in order to constitute (form, make) an identity and to be used as weapons of this identity in the struggle against other identities. Whoever cannot understand that (this) will also not be able to

ever comprehend (understand, apprehend) either their (ethical-normative ideas') internal (inner) intellectual (thought) structure nor their external (outer) historical effect (impact, influence) (Ethisch-normative Ideen werden nicht erdacht, um in ihrem Nominalwert genommen und verwirklicht zu werden, sondern um Identität zu stiften und als Waffen dieser Identität im Kampfe gegen andere Identitäten eingesetzt zu werden. Wer das nicht verstehen kann, der wird auch nie weder ihre innere gedankliche Struktur noch ihre äußere geschichtliche Wirkung erfassen können).

The two (Both) world-historical decisive (determinative) and closely (tightly) connected with one another processes of this century are the unprecedented (unparalleled) condensing (thickening, condensation) of the network of planetary politics and the worldwide leveling of all known hierarchies from the past through mass democracy (die beispiellose Verdichtung des Netzes planetarischer Politik und die weltweite Nivellierung aller aus der Vergangenheit bekannten sozialen Hierarchien durch die Massendemokratie). Communism (has) substantially (fundamentally) contributed to both of them, (said, put) more precisely, it (communism) was a force (power) which arose (resulted, came from) from these processes and for its part (in turn) intensified them. Its (Communism's) theoreticians and practitioners (have) from the beginning conceived of (grasped, understood) and planned their politics in planetary dimensions. They believed that the creation (formation) of a world market by (through) capitalism meant a decisive world-historical turn and that world history (History) only after its unification can reveal its until then hidden meaning (sense), namely the setting up (establishment) of (the) classless society (die Errichtung der klassenlosen Gesellschaft); (apart from that,) the abolition of classes should (was supposed (meant)

(ought) to, would) (in fact) entail the abolition of states and borders, that is, an even (a still) more fundamental (deeper) unification of the world. In this utopia of classless (world) society (In dieser Utopie der klassenlosen Weltgesellschaft), the planetary character of the future of humanity (mankind) was already reflected in mystified form (in mystifizierter Form). However, the (this) (general) plan (concept) also contained (included) a wider (broader), politically more concrete aspect. If capitalism was the first genuinely planetary social formation which History has known, then on its enemies' (foes') flags the motto (slogan) had to be written: "Proletarians of all countries, unite (yourselves) (Workers of the world, unite)!" (»Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!«). The revolution against a worldwide foe (enemy) had (was obliged) to therefore be a world revolution (eine Weltrevolution), and the General Staff of the world revolution was supposed (meant, obliged) to guide (direct) the proletarian army according to (on the basis of) superordinate (superior, higher; übergeordneten) criteria, i.e. to subordinate (unterordnen) the struggle at the national level to the tactical or strategic needs of the world struggle (Weltkampfes). The authoritarian centralism which the founders of the First International had in mind (sought, aimed at) was the consistent concretisation of this concept (conception, notion, idea, view) (of a classless world society) (Der autoritäre Zentralismus, der den Gründern der Ersten Internationale vorschwebte, war die konsequente Konkretisierung dieses Konzepts), which certainly at first (initially, first of all) did not bear any fruit and in the time (era) of the Second International further weakened (abated, dropped off). When it (this authoritarian centralism) could be translated (converted) into praxis (i.e. put into practice), proletarian internationalism was already an instrument (tool) in the hands of a great Power which wanted to become a world Power (Als es in die Praxis umgesetzt werden

konnte, war der proletarische Internationalismus bereits ein Instrument in den Händen einer Großmacht, die Weltmacht werden wollte). However, that does not have anything to do with what we are dealing with (does not matter in respect of) (the matter (problem) of concern (interest)) here. In all the phases of this development - and regardless of whether the (world) revolutionary (world) strategy (die revolutionäre Weltstrategie) (first of all) allowed for (had in mind, planned, foresaw) (as first objective aim) the storming (charging) of (assault on) the capitalistic strongholds (bastions, bulwarks) or the breaking of the world capitalistic chain at its weakest points - there was (always) consciousness that the movement as a whole participated in a worldwide process, (that) it developed (promoted, brought into development) worldwide, and world-historical, tendencies and (that) in its course it (its course) depended on the world-political situation (der weltpolitischen Lage) which must (has to) be taken into account at all times. Worldwide, the movement pursued the same long-term aims (goals, objectives) and, worldwide, the class enemy (foe) (Klassenfeind) felt the same shivers (down their spine). The appropriation and binding interpretation of proletarian internationalism by the Soviet great and world Power (die sowjetische Groß - und Weltmacht) reinforced (increased, intensified) the pressure which heightened (increased) the degree of density of planetary politics. Now indeed there was a centre which regarded the entire (whole) planet as a chessboard and incorporated (included) in an extensive (comprehensive) plan its individual (separate) moves on the flanks (wings, sides) or in the centre (middle). The universal power claim (Der universale Machtanspruch) veritably (really) or potentially (aktuell oder potenziell) transformed (changed) every place (locus) of (on) the planet into a contested position (eine umkämpfte Stelle), and indeed into such a position in relation to

which every time the struggle for the Whole was conducted in miniature (vicariously).

The worldwide communistic movement (has) also condensed (thickened; verdichtet) the network of planetary politics in another important (significant) respect. At a time (In an era) when (in which) the colonial system of European imperialism was till at its zenith, it (the worldwide communistic movement) claimed (called for, demanded) the abolition (removal, lifting) of the difference between (the) subjects and (the) objects of planetary politics, that is, it espoused (argued for, supported) the political emancipation, the state organisation and the equal rights under international law (legal equality (parity, equivalence)) of the colonial peoples; the General Staff of the world revolution not least (, apart from that,) focused (of course) its attention on these peoples, since it (the General Staff) had opted for the strategy of the breaking of the weakest points (links) of the world capitalistic chain (die Strategie der Brechung der schwächeren Stellen der kapitalistischen Weltkette). Notwithstanding all the (power-political) motivation and praxis (on the basis of power politics) of the Moscow General Staff (As much as the General Staff of Moscow was driven by the motivation of power and acted on the basis (in respect of the criterion) of the acquisition of power), it can hardly (only) be disputed (doubted, denied) (with difficulty) that its mottoes (slogans) exercised an enormous influence on the intellectual and political elites, being formed, of the colonial peoples and that moreover its mere existence (has) constituted (a) strong material support (prop, basis) of (for) the young nations in all the phases of decolonisation (the collapse of the colonial system). Colonial Powers, which until then hardly deigned (condescended) to (make, proceed to) egalitarian gestures, had to now fear the competition with the communistic metropolis (centre) and

gradually discovered the equality of all nations, all races and all people (humans). The collective self-confidence of the (former) colonial peoples and the peoples of the "Third World" in general, as it became noticeable (manifested (revealed) itself) above all in the decades of decolonisation (the breakdown (abolition) of the colonial system), seems today to have evaporated (vanished, faded away) or to only still be represented by a few middle and major (greater) Powers (mittleren und größeren Mächten), however its meaning for the formation of planetary politics after the Second World War can hardly be overestimated (was primary). It (The said collective self-confidence) was not merely based on the new possibilities of political work (i.e. action) (politischen Wirkens) hinted at after the consolidation of Soviet communism, but just as much on the sense (feeling) of world-historical role, in fact mission, which likewise directly or indirectly sprang (arose) from communistic influence (the influence of communism). From the perspective of the communistic interpretation of History, the proletarian peoples had to fulfil at the world level a task (or duty) analogous to that of the proletariat in the interior of the developed capitalistic nations; in this way, they got (acquired, gained) for the first time a world-historical identity and (were assigned) a world-historical position (eine weltgeschichtliche Identität und einen weltgeschichtlichen Standort). Therein (Here, In that), incidentally (for that matter), lay the hitherto unnoticed (overlooked) political relevance of the well-known Stalinistic five-stage schema of the course of History (schema of the five stages which the course of History obligatorily (mandatorily) traverses (travels (across)) (stalinistischen fünfstufigen Schemas von Geschichtsablauf). In the rigidity with which it (this schema) was formulated (put forward) and defended (advocated, protected, safeguarded, championed) one (has) only saw (seen) dogmatic stubbornness (narrow-mindedness, obstinacy), but it was a matter of

something much more substantial. If all nations, with ultimately insignificant (minor) divergences (deviations) or modifications, must (necessarily) go through (travel, traverse) all the stages of historical development, then the distinction between advanced peoples or peoples capable of progress and forever backward (retarded) peoples (remaining behind) (die Unterscheidung zwischen fortgeschrittenen bzw. fortschrittsfähigen und auf immer zurückgebliebenen Völkern) does not apply (vanishes, is dropped); the question of the historical uniqueness of the Occident and of the unrepeatability of its achievement in terms of its civilisation and culture cannot (even) be posed (at all). The five-stage historical (five stages of History) schema is therefore transformed (turned) into a command for (in favour of) development (developmental command; eine Entwicklungsgebot), a promise - even (still) more: into the certainty of participation in a development at whose end all nations will be (stand) at (on) the same stage (or tier) (auf derselben Stufe).

Communism could hence (therefore) be a planetary movement and demand the participation of all nations in the planetary becoming (i.e. in planetary events), because its social blueprint (draft) (sein sozialer Entwurf) made a claim to (had claims on) universal application. The differences in the level of development of the various nations were indeed (of course) admitted (recognised) and were even emphasised (underlined) when looking for the appropriate (suitable, right) strategy and tactics in the local political struggle, nevertheless, ultimately (in the end (final analysis)), they appeared as, seen from an overall historical point of view, transient (temporary) phenomena (als gesamthistorisch gesehen vorübergehende Phänomene) which the faster tempo (rhythm) of historical development (i.e. History) would supplant (displace, supersede, abolish, push aside) in the sense of (as prescribed by) the aforementioned

schema. The national form was supposed (meant, had) to be filled (connected) with a socialistic content (Die nationale Form sollte mit einem sozialistischen Inhalt gefüllt werden): the communist ideologues found in this formula the theoretical middle way (path, course) (theoretischen Mittelweg) in order to reconcile the universal social blueprint (draft) with particular (i.e. separate or distinct) realities which obviously (apparently) could not be put aside (discarded) from the world from one day to another. In any case (Be that as it may), the social direction was clear. The future society of the equal was now inaugurated (initiated, anticipated) in so far as (at least in the sense that) the hierarchies of wealth and of (social) status (position) of the old regime were eliminated (abolished, done away with) with (by means of) violence (force); the elite which assumed (took, seized, appropriated) power, exercised (wielded) it in the name of equality and with the declared (proclaimed) aim (goal) of the realisation of equality. In this way (manner), a(n) immense (vast, massive, gigantic, huge) process of massification was instituted (initiated, brought about) above all in countries in which pre-capitalistic-patriarchal social structures still set the tone (prevailed, predominated) and bourgeois individualism was weak or alien (foreign, strange, unfamiliar) (in denen vorkapitalistisch-patriarchalische Sozialstrukturen den Ton noch immer angaben und der bürgerliche Individualismus schwach oder fremd war). The shattering (smashing, breaking up, crushing) of the village community and of the rural clan (or kinship group) (Die Zerschlagung der Dorfgemeinschaft und der Sippe), (the) equal rights for (equality of) women, the incorporation of individuals in large (great) economic, occupational (professional or vocational) or political organisations - in fact even (the) brutal (crude) uprooting and deportation(s) (exile, banishment) have promoted this process in a different sense on each and every respective

occasion. Not only the new structuring (restructuring) of society (die Neustrukturierung der Gesellschaft), also the spying (or policing), the persecution, the terror (reign of terror, state terror, terror tactics, terrorism) favoured leveling and atomisation (i.e. the splitting or segmentation of society into individuals).

From an economic-evolutionistic standpoint (ökonomistisch-evolutionistischen Standpunkt) one could of course remark (observe) that the disintegration (breaking up, dissolution) of pre-capitalistic societies would (gradually) take place (result, follow) in (over (the course of)) time anyway (in any case) thanks to gradual industrialisation (allmählichen Industrialisierung) and the (an) opening to(wards) the world market, therefore (and that consequently) the thus understood (such an) effect (impact) of communism was basically historically superfluous or even (and or) (has been) harmful (damaging, injurious) in its hardness (i.e. harshness). This judgement would be agreed with (approved) (We would agree with such a judgement (only)) if (the) individual (separate) historical questions arrived (came) on the scene (came to the fore) separately from one another (singly) and in order (turn), so that they could be ordered (put in order, classified, arranged) and dealt (coped) with, (managed) with (the) corresponding end(goal)-rational (rational purposefulness (expediency) and) unambiguity (perspicuity, clarity) (mit entsprechender zweckrationaler Eindeutigkeit) - if, that is, (the) economic questions e.g. were only economic questions and if only subjects thinking in terms of economics (with exclusively economic thought) (ökonomisch denkende Subjekte) dealt with (turned one's hand to, handled) their solution away from or beyond other interests and points of view (cares, concerns). However things are not in the least (at all) (by no means) like that (thus). Every historical question (problem), economic or other

(question), is posed (put) (arises) and tackled (treated, dealt with) inside of (within) a concrete network of power (relations), its (the question's) formulations and its solution take place (occur) in accordance with the texture (composition) of this network, which results (arises) from a dynamic (the dynamics) of human relations (Jede geschichtliche Frage, ökonomische oder andere, stellt sich und wird angepackt innerhalb eines konkreten Machtgeflechts, ihre Formulierung und ihre Lösung finden gemäß der Beschaffenheit dieses Geflechts statt, welches sich aus einer Dynamik von menschlichen Beziehungen ergibt). History does not give (grant) power to him who (whomever) can solve its questions (problem) as painlessly as possible, but on the contrary (conversely): it (History) forces (compels, coerces) him who has (seized (taken)) power to channel his energy as (in the way (manner)) the questions (problems), which it (History) posed (put), command (dictate to) him. The result is the coping (dealing) with (answering) each and every respective question (problem) (for instance that of economic or social modernisation) from the point of view, and with the means, of the possessor (holder) of power (i.e. the ruler) (aus der Sicht und mit den Mitteln des Machthabers). We shall (still) see below that the process of massification and of democratisation, which the communists (have) promoted (drove (driven) forward, pushed along) in their dominion (or territory), was shaped (formed, moulded) in the, in the meantime, well-known way (manner) because it was connected with the striving of certain nations to win (secure, gain, achieve) a new and stronger position inside of (within) planetary politics.

However, communism also (has) indirectly assisted (helped, succoured) the prevailing (pushing through, predominance) of the mass-democratic mainstream (main trend (current)) (massendemokratischen Hauptströmung) of the (our, 20th) century, and indeed through its

negative and its positive influence inside of (within) the industrially developed countries of the "capitalistic camp". The influence which it (communism) exercised (exerted) on the positioning (stance) and the (mode (way, manner) of) behaviour of its "class enemy (foe)" can be called negative. The danger of revolution and the certainty that the internal (inner) revolution could henceforth be supported (propped (shored) up) by the great red land of the East, prompted (induced, forced, compelled, persuaded) a bourgeoisie, which was already changing (being transformed) and increasingly (progressively) had (was obliged) to share its social predominance (domination) (seine soziale Vorherrschaft) with the ascendant (rising, ascending) economic and political elite(s), to a rethink (to reorientate its thought) (zu einem Umdenken bewogen), which was (in a way) analogous to that of (the readjustment of the stance of) the colonial masters vis-à-vis the colonial peoples - in fact it was at the same time frequently (in many cases) a matter of the same (social) stratum and the same persons. This rethink (reorientation) found expression (was expressed) in the (its, the bourgeoisie's) readiness (willingness) to give (involve) (make, appoint) the moderate socialists or that which (whatever) the Bolsheviks called the "labour aristocracy" (»Arbeiteraristokratie«), (a share) (in) (to) (participants in) government business (duties), as well as (to) accept (welfare (social) state) institutions (of the welfare (social) state) and redistributions (sozialstaatliche Einrichtungen und Umverteilungen) in the framework (context) of the (what is) unavoidable (inevitable) on each and every respective occasion. Now the pressure for (towards) more (of a) (a larger) (the direction of the) welfare (social) state (Sozialstaat) and a more just distribution of material and political goods (materiellen und politischen Güter) was for the most part (mostly, largely) due to what we may (could) call the positive influence of communism on the "capitalistic camp". This

consisted in the gradual imbuing (permeation, pervasion, saturation, impregnation, penetration) of an otherwise in large or for the most part anti-communistically inclined (adjusted, focused, set, prepared) public consciousness (awareness) with the ideal of material equality. The demand for the consistent social materialisation of the formal-legal equality of liberalism (Die Forderung nach konsequenter sozialer Materialisierung der formell-rechtlichen Gleichheit des Liberalismus) stood (was) at the centre (heart) of communistic agitation (propaganda; Agitation) and incidentally resulted (arose) directly from the tradition of the Marxist critique (criticism) of capitalism. Typically, (It is characteristic that) precisely this demand, in whatever (no matter in which) (of its) variations (regardless in which variation), became a commonplace of the mass-democratic thoughts world (i.e. ideology), in fact it became banal self-evidence (naturalness); inequality in (respect of) pleasure (enjoyment, consumption) (Ungleichheit im Genuß) may only take place (occur) on the basis of unequal performance (achievement, output) (ungleicher Leistung) (only unequal performance legitimises inequality in respect of pleasure) and also then it (inequality in respect of pleasure) is not immune to (safe (secure) as regards) the command of social redistribution. It is of course very well-known that mass-democratic reality is more or less removed (far away) from material equality as well as from the consistent application (implementation or enforcement) of the performance (or achievement) principle (der folgerichtigen Anwendung des Leistungsprinzips) - however it is also certain that in no other (past) society (of the past) did equality as an ideal to be materially concretised (als materiell zu konkretisierendes Ideal) have this generally recognised (relatively high) (social) status (high standing, exalted position).

(Yet, Be that as it may,) The direct or indirect redistributions that have taken place, above all (however) the overcoming of the shortage of goods, have made (enabled), at any rate, partly the appearance (pretence), partly the dream (dreamlike fantasy) of material equality (possible). The pendant (i.e. counterpart) of this economic process at the social level was the dissolution (disintegration) of the classical bourgeoisie as well as of the classical proletariat, and over and above that (furthermore) the replacement of the more or less closed ruling class by (with) more or less open elites whose composition constantly changes. The paradoxical result of all of that was a caricaturish (caricatural, caricature-like, cartoonish) realisation (eine karikaturhafte Realisierung) of the original communistic ideal of (the) classless society in relation to which of course its (this original communistic ideal's) ethical-humanistic aspects were (forgotten or) barely or (and) only just (with great difficulty) kept alive (salvaged, preserved) as (in) individual "self-realisation"; social "alienation (estrangement)" (soziale »Entfremdung«) remained, and the power struggles (struggles (fights) for power) (Machtkämpfe) remained too. Considering (In view of) this historical paradox (we must of course pose) a very interesting question (is of course to be posed) as to what extent utopias pre-empt (anticipate) real tendencies of (in) historical development, i.e. to what extent each and every respective utopian draft (plan or project) (utopische Entwurf) is constructed (constituted, set up, formed, organised) so that it reflects in an idealised form the much (far) more banal (trite) reality of a social formation already being formed (einer sich bereits herausbildenden Gesellschaftsformation). Utopia would then be in this (its) unconscious historical determination (of Utopia, that characterises it) (If Utopia is determined historically in this sense and without it itself knowing it (that it is determined historically), then it is) not simply the antipode (diametrical (very) opposite) of

"political realism", but a trigger (catalyst) of energies (acts, deeds or actions) which realise the (what is) historically possible as the abridged version (abridgement) or caricature of the original draft (plan or project) (sondern ein Auslöser von Energien, die das geschichtlich Mögliche als Kurzfassung oder Karikatur des ursprünglichen Entwurfs realisieren). If (As soon as) Utopia has fulfilled (fulfils) this (its) function (of Utopia, it has), then it can resign (abdicate, relinquish or renounce power or responsibility) (it leaves (abandons) the scene (stage)). And only an optical illusion or an intellectually(-spiritually) sluggish (languid) adherence (holding (on), persistence, perseverance) to (with) an obsolete vocabulary (oder ein geistig träges Festhalten an einem obsoleten Vokabular) can conceal (cover up) the fact that communism as utopia and as politics only (then) collapsed (broke down) when its original (initial) foes (enemies), namely the bourgeoisie and classical liberalism, had (already) died a (slow and) peaceful (gentle, quiet, calm) death (see Sec. V, 2). The end of the Cold War also marked the visible end of the ideas and the forces which in the final analysis came from the 19th century. What begins (starts) now and what is (will) still coming (come) moves on another social (historical) level and can only be intellectually dealt (coped) with (managed) (conceived, grasped, apprehended, comprehended, understood), with the help of other (different) categories and concepts (Was jetzt anfängt und was noch kommt, bewegt sich auf einer anderen gesellschaftlichen Ebene und läßt sich nur and Hand anderer Kategorien und Begriffe gedanklich bewltigen).

We already intimated (indicated, hinted at the fact) that communism promoted central world-historical tendencies not abstractly and generally, but first in its interweaving (interconnection) with the striving (i.e. efforts) (mit dem Streben) of great (large) nations after (for, as regards) a

strengthening (boosting, reinforcement) of their power position (position of power) inside of (within) world society becoming (all the) more (increasingly) dense(r). This is a point of extreme importance if we want to understand (comprehend) the historical course (sequence) of events (development) (geschichtlichen Hergang) and avoid ideologically inspired talk (positions) which makes (undertakes, attempts) comparisons between "(social) systems" (»Systemen«) in a historical vacuum in order to then for instance infer the superiority of the "Western system" on the basis of immanent (inherent, intrinsic) structural criteria. What can be compared with one another are (Comparisons can only be made between) concrete nations and societies with specific (particular) traditions, culturally determined (conditioned) mentalities and corresponding technical-economic possibilities. Communism, as we knew (know, have known) it since (from) 1917 (and later), was always bound (tied) to such a pre-given framework and its deficiencies (shortcomings, flaws, faults, disadvantages) as well as its achievements (accomplishments) always bore (carried) the stamp of a long and extremely characteristic historical past. Thus (So) seen (If we see things in this way), (then) it is more sensible (reasonable, meaningful, plausible) - and more just -, to not talk of the defeat of Utopia by realism (the victory of realism over Utopia) but for instance of the victory of the considerably richer and more productive industrial nations of the West over the poorer and less productive Soviet Union. Because it is not at all certain that a capitalistic Russia, considering the other (remaining, further) social and cultural factors, can (ever, really) seriously compete with the United States economically (at the economic level), and it may also be doubted (questioned) (we can also doubt) that (if) a free market economy in a politically independent Pakistan would ever overtake (outflank) a planned economy in a politically independent Germany. It is often asserted (claimed,

maintained) that exactly communism was the cause of (the) impoverishment (bankruptcy) and of economic failure (breakdown). However the opposite could have also occurred (happened, been the case). With the exception of certain European countries which were conquered by the Red Army and through (because of) that (in this way) (actually hampered (hindered, checked, stopped)) their already differently proceeding development (was actually hampered) and (they) (were) socially set (thrown) back (retrogressed), communism (has) prevailed (asserted itself, been imposed) with its own (indigenous (or native)) forces (powers) only in nations which in any event (at any rate) had only covered (travelled, traversed) (a) short distance(s) on the technical and cultural road (path) of the modern era (age, epoch) (der Moderne). The perception (view) that the freedom of economic activity (Freiheit des Wirtschaftens) can in itself be (constitute) a panacea (cure-all), irrespective of other historical and cultural prerequisites (preconditions, presuppositions), is refuted (proved wrong, confuted) at any rate by the mass squalor (misery, wretchedness) in many Latin-American, African and Asian countries.

In order that this thesis be sufficiently substantiated (corroborated, underpinned, backed up, supported; untermauern) (for us to sufficiently substantiate this thesis of ours) we would actually have (ought) to examine (look into, scrutinise) the history of communism in the two great (large) nations in which it was independently (autonomously) victorious (won) and (has) held or still holds, for a longer period of time, power, and we would have (ought) to again regard (look at (upon)) this history not as the history of the defeat (failure) of Utopia, but rather as the history of answers to nationally burning (compelling) questions (problems). It must (should) be clear (obvious) that when (if) two nations with the

geopolitical potency (weight) (geopolitischen Potenz) and with the traditionally strong (intense) self-confidence (self-assurance) of Russia and China usurp (appropriate) a world-historical idea and an ideology with (of) a universal character, they then thereby (through that) announce their claim to become world Powers and to constitute subjects - not objects - of planetary politics; incidentally, even the United States could hardly be able to appear in the role of a world Power without an ideology presenting itself as universal (i.e. as having universal demands). The more or less symmetrical relation(ship) between the physical size (magnitude, extent) of these nations (as (an) indication (sign, clue) of their potential position in the world) and the range of the world-historical ideas adopted (appropriated) by them was fundamental and (an) (absolutely) indispensable (necessary) (condition) for the history of communism. Had it (communism) namely only prevailed (been carried through (imposed)) in Albania or Zanzibar, then it would remain an oddity (curiosity, odd (curious) thing; Kuriosum) for ethnologists; only the planetary potency (i.e. power) and (planetary) ambition of (its, the) bearers (carriers) (of the world-historical idea of communism) (has) lent (given) to (conferred on) the world-historical idea of communism the (its) great (great, extreme), threatening (menacing) seriousness (earnestness). And once (from the moment) this relation between bearer and idea was restored, (so, then, hence) the (great (large)) nation concerned had (was obliged) to henceforth act in the name of History, to dress national matters of concern (aims, objectives) in (with) dogmatic statements (opinions, pronouncements, assertions) (in dogmatische Aussagen). What(ever) was passed off (appeared) as praxis which theory dictated, resulted (arose) from internal or external political necessities. That however means that a lot of things (them, those internal or external political necessities) (much, many phenomena), which from the point of

view of the opponent appear as (seem to be) ideological paranoia and thereby (because of (through) that) motivated crimes (i.e. crimes with corresponding motives), can be effortlessly explained from (in(side)) the national perspective and they must (are) not at all (able to) be attributed to the supposedly inner logic of Utopia, irrespective of the concrete national conditions and objectives (targets, set aims). We shall (Let us) take a central event of Soviet history as an example whose meaning is almost without exception misunderstood even though (although) there are repeated (recurring) and most (extremely) clear (relevant, relative) explanations of the Soviet leadership at that time - to say nothing of (not to mention) the logic of the (historical) situation. The forced (rapid, fast; forcierte) industrialisation since the end of the (decade of the) 1920s was tackled (undertaken) not least (first and foremost) in the well-founded (justified, reasonable) expectation of a new great war in which the Soviet Union would have been at the mercy of its industrially far (vastly) superior foes (enemies), had (if) it (the Soviet Union) (had) not in the shortest (possible) period of time been able to make up for (cover) its delay (slow progress) in the sector (area) of heavy industry and of the production of modern equipment (including armaments) (und der Produktion moderner Ausrüstung). Yet (At the same time) industrialisation did not mean only tanks and aeroplanes (aircraft), but also very (quite) numerous (many) people who were able to (could) handle (operate) machines and (a, the) modern device(s) (apparatus(es)) in general (also (including) those which the allies (those allied to them) then (later) supplied (furnished, provided) in (during) the war), it meant, that is, ultimately (in the final analysis) (the) destruction of the pre-industrial village community in which the great mass of people still lived. In (With) (the) full knowledge of the brutality (acts of violence) and the suffering (trials, tribulations) which all this (has) brought with it

(entailed), one can today soberly (unemotionally, dispassionately) ascertain: without (the) forced (coerced, violent) collectivisation (Zwangskollektivierung) and (the) forced industrialisation, national-socialistic (National Socialist) Germany would have won the war against the Soviet Union. It is up to (Let) the ethicists (of ethe, casts of mind, ways of thinking) (or moralists) [ethicists (of ethe) (or moralists)] (Gesinnungsethikern) (to) undo(, if they can,) this Gordian knot, the Bolsheviks had (were obliged) to cut it.

A decisive (determinative) structural feature (characteristic, trait) (ein maßgebliches strukturelles Merkmal) of communistic regimes also arose (resulted) out of (from) (national power-political) (the) necessities (of national power politics): their extreme centralism, that is, that which (has) lent to (gave (given)) (conferred on) them the character of "Oriental despotisms" (»orientalischen Despotien«). In countries like for instance Albania, centralism meant apart from the consolidation (strengthening, extension) of party control, at the same time, the formation of a nation (i.e. nation-building) (Nationbildung), namely the violent subordination (or inward forcing) (Hineinzwängen) of the largely (widely, broadly) independent and mainly (chiefly, principally) patriarchal loyalties of trusting clans (or kinship groups) (of independent clans (or kinship groups) with local and personal loyalties) under a steamroller(, which is) called the nation; this nation, again, had (to have) communistic signs (i.e. symbolism), because all others (the other signs (i.e. symbolism)) (for instance religious (signs (i.e. symbolism))) were connected with old patriarchal loyalties for lack of a national bourgeoisie (waren mangels eines nationalen Bürgertums mit den alten patriarchalischen Loyalitäten verbunden). Both (The two) great (large) nations, in which communism prevailed (asserted itself, was imposed), had to for their part deal (cope)

with (manage) other tasks (problems) with the help (assistance) of centralism. In China the trauma (traumatic memory) of the falling apart (breaking) (to pieces) (disintegrating, disintegration) of the Middle Kingdom (country) into several (a number of) small partly half-feudal, partly military despotisms (was and is (still) alive) (had and still has an effect) - the trauma (traumatic memory) of a powerlessness (weakness, impotence; Ohnmacht) which had to be paid with grave humiliations. The West may believe (is perhaps deluding itself by believing) that through (by means of, with) today's human rights rhetoric it has received (got) absolution for its colonial past, but it will be very much (sadly) mistaken in assuming (if it thinks) that an old and proud people like the Chinese would (will) ever forget cannon boat (gunboat) diplomacy and the Opium Wars (die Kanonenbootdiplomatie und die Opiumkriege). In any case, the centralistic cohesion (or unification) (Der zentralistische Zusammenhalt) of the state and the nation constituted here an indispensable precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) both of the independence as well as of the demanding (exacting) participation in the now dense (condensed, thick) planetary politics. Russia aimed at (desired) a still more demanding (exacting) participation in that (dense planetary politics); however, in order to achieve it (this participation), it (Russia) had to secure (ensure, guarantee) the unity (cohesion) of the gigantic multinational state ruled (dominated) by it through a rigorous (strict) centralism which incidentally had an already long tradition behind it. Opinion can be divided over (about) the political and ethical value (merit) or anti-value (demerit) (Wert oder Unwert) of such a state, one thing however is definite (certain) in light of the latest (newest) development(s): if anything (after all) (for good or ill, rightly or wrongly), it (the said gigantic multinational state) could only be held together (someone wanted to preserve its cohesion, one could only do this) with centralistic and authoritarian

methods - regardless of where one would like to put (draw) the boundary (dividing line) between "inevitable (necessary)" and "pointless (meaningless, purposeless)" coercion (compulsion) («notwendigem« und »sinnlosem« Zwang). The internal combining (or interrelation) between authoritarian centralism and world power standing (or status) (a powerful global political presence) (Weltmachtstellung) in the case of Russia was seen (appeared) on an even larger scale (even more intensely) when the Red Army conquered large parts (sections) of Europe. However, whereas Russia through (thanks to, by means of) communism could secure (safeguard) at least its hegemonic position (hegemoniale Position) in the Soviet Union and simultaneously pursue (conduct, carry on, exercise, practise) an imperial world politics (eine imperiale Weltpolitik), the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, who could not harbour (cherish, nourish) (suchlike) (power-political) ambitions (in respect of power politics) (like that), have, seen on the whole (overall), had to only suffer (necessarily only suffered) damage (loss) through (because of) communistic rule (domination). *They* have been (are) the greatest, in fact the true (real) victims of a (the) catastrophe (disaster, havoc) whose effects (consequences, impact) can(not) perhaps never more (ever again) be entirely (completely) rectified (put right, made up for) (effaced, erased). Nevertheless, also here (we should (ought) not lose sight of) the interweaving (interconnection) of communism and national power politics (should (ought) not be forgotten): communism *was* in these countries Soviet occupation.

In the epoch (era, period, time) of (During) the Cold War (reference was made quite a lot to) the internal (inner) interrelation (connection) between (of) communism and (Russian-national) (the) world power politics (of the Russian nation) (was pointed out (stressed, indicated) many a time),

because the polemics of the West was intensely (keenly) interested in the uncovering (disclosure, revealing) of the concrete political content (der Aufdeckung des konkreten politischen Inhalts) of the slogan "proletarian internationalism". But after the disintegration (breaking up) of the Eastern Bloc and of the Soviet Union one in the West is less willing (ready) to interpret the course (sequence, development) of events (things, affairs, matters) as a victory of nations over (other) nations; it would presumably (probably, possibly) sound (seem, ring) prosaic and (would) not (resemble a) particularly glorious (renowned, famous) (achievement, accomplishment) if one (had) (most, very) simply said that the more numerous and the economically much (far) more superior camp (has) finally (in the end, eventually, ultimately) prevailed (asserted itself) against (over) *Russia*. It is an old custom (tradition, habit) to celebrate every great victory as the victory of higher ideals or superior social systems and its (the victory's) supposed (putative) inevitability (necessity, unavailability) is passed off (interpreted) as the necessity of the prevailing (i.e. victory or predominance) of exactly these ideals or systems. The wish to emphatically underline (emphasise, highlight) the superiority of the Western system in the central sector (area, realm) of the economy drives (pushes) now e(x) contrario (and although this is not at all logically necessary) to put (attribute) the collapse (breakdown) of the Eastern Bloc, and indeed of Soviet communism, (down) to a (serious) failing (or malfunctioning) of the planned economy, which, beyond the usual (customary) inflexibilities and blockages, ineluctably (had to) culminate(d) in (a) total paralysis. This explanation, which of course is caught up (arrested) in (betrays, discloses, reveals) an economic way (manner) of thinking (ökonomistischen Denkweise), can invoke (refer to) (as an argument) the collapse (Kollaps) (which actually occurred) of the Soviet planned economy(, as we saw it taking place in actual fact,) as

well as (to) its since long ago well-known (long-known) lower (inferior) productivity in comparison with the Western economy. However, the *necessity* of the total breakdown (collapse) does not at all follow (logically) from these in themselves correct (right) observations, and it was also not asserted (claimed, foreseen) by any expert for instance in the 1970s with full (complete, firm) conviction - on the contrary: (the) voices (reactions) in the West betrayed (revealed), after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, much more angst (or fear) before the arrogant appearance of a world power, which after a(n) tremendous (colossal, huge, enormous) effort stood (was) at least on the borderline of military parity with the West, rather than (self-)confidence (Zuversicht) and carefreeness (nonchalance, unconcern, insouciance, carelessness) in the face (view) of its (the Soviet Union's) forthcoming (upcoming, impending, imminent) economic debacle (disaster, calamity).

If one (can) put(s) (set(s)) aside the economistic prejudices and apologetic or panegyric needs, (then) one must (will) ascertain that the collapse (breakdown) of the Soviet planned economy did not bring about the dissolution (disintegration, breakdown) of the communistic system, but that precisely the opposite occurred (things happened the other way around): in view of (given) the institutionally anchored (secured, guaranteed, safeguarded) extensive (far-reaching) subjection of the economic (economy) to the political (politics) in the Soviet system (angesichts der institutionell verankerten weitgehenden Unterwerfung des Ökonomischen unter das Politische im Sowjetsystem), the uncertainty (insecurity), disruption (shock, blow, unsettling) and finally (in the end, eventually) the decomposition (decay, disintegration; Zersetzung) of the organised bearer of political power necessarily (had to) entail(ed) economic chaos - entirely irrespective of whether (differences of opinion

(discord, disagreements) over (in respect of) the economic (the progress (course) of the economy) (also) paved the way for) this development in the (area (domain, realm) of the) political (politics) (was (also) prepared by differences of opinion (discord, disagreements) over (in respect of) the economic (the progress (course) of the economy)). Where(ever) the political (factor), that is the party apparatus (or machine), controls (the) administration (or management) and the distribution system, where, that is, the dividing lines of the Western state under the rule of law between party, state and economy are unknown, there economic collapse must (will necessary) follow political collapse (wo also die Trennungslinien des westlichen Rechtsstaates zwischen Partei, Staat und Wirtschaft unbekannt sind, da muß der wirtschaftliche Kollaps auf den politischen folgen). And political collapse (Und der politische Kollaps) resulted (came) ultimately (eventually) from the - on top of everything (to boot, furthermore), in terms of detail, clumsy (inept) - attempt, to reform a system which could not be appreciably (significantly) reformed without abolishing (doing away with, canceling, annulling) itself. It is of little help to summon (use) a classical metaphysical term and to assert (maintain, claim) that the system was not reformable of (by, as to) its "essence (substance)" (von seinem »Wesen«): every system must in fact (of course) give up (surrender, abandon, betray) its "essence (substance)" should its reform exceed (overstep, go beyond, transgress, transcend) a certain limit. The non-reformability (Die Nicht-Reformierbarkeit) of the (Soviet) system must rather again be understood (seen) in its close (tight) interrelation with its nationally determined (conditioned) formation, with (the) national political traditions and (national political) objectives (targets): what could "reform" mean and how (what) would it take effect (repercussions (effects, implications) would it (this) have) in a multinational state in which the centrifugal forces in politics were kept in

check (bridled) not least (also) through the central directing (or management) (steering, guiding) (durch die zentrale Lenkung) of the economy?

No-one can say (pronounce) with absolute certainty whether the reform process (in the Soviet Union) was inaugurated (initiated) through (on account (because) of) the oppressive (pressing) practical (situational) constraints (unbearable real pressures) or through a subjective decision (durch drückende Sachzwänge oder durch eine subjektive Entscheidung), which was (highly) consequential (had momentous (enormous) consequences) because owing to (of the reason of) the hierarchical structure of the system, decisions, which were taken (made) in (at) the highest positions (top), had to have an effect on (go through) the whole (pervade (permeate) the social whole from one end to the other (end)). Quite (Very) likely (probably), the end of communism in the Soviet Union was just as little (not at all) a historical necessity as its victory through (by means of, thanks to) the putsch (coup) of 1917 (was) (not at all a historical necessity). Western observers should, at any rate, be on guard against adopting (taking on), with other signs (i.e. symbolism), (the) ill-fated (or "of blessed memory") Hegelian-Marxist determinism (unseligen hegelianisch-marxistischen Determinismus) in order to (be able to) prove that the breakdown (collapse) of the Soviet Union was a command of world(-historical) Reason or of iron economic laws (ein Gebot der Weltvernunft oder eiserner Wirtschaftsgesetze war). One will perhaps after several (a few) years judge (assess) the performance (or achievements) of the planned economy *in Russia* with greater understanding should it be proved (turn out) that also under the conditions (in the circumstances) of the free market the Russians will not be considerably better off economically (the economic activity of the

Russians will not significantly improve). And one will likewise evaluate (assess) differently the historical performance (achievements) of the centralistic steering (i.e. management or directing) (Steuerung) of the multinational Soviet state should (the) development(s) in its former territory (area, realm, dominion) raise time (again) and again (anew) the old aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) of political philosophy as to whether, namely, despotism is preferable (to be preferred) to civil war or not. - Either way, communism in its original sense is dead. In China it can still (just) fulfil national and internal (power-political) functions (or tasks) (in respect of power politics), however the utopian momentum or verve (drive, impetus) and the (historical-philosophical) legitimation (pertaining to the philosophy of history) have irrevocably gone (died down, been extinguished). The "realists", however, would be ill-advised to exult (gloat, rejoice) over that (this). On each and every respective occasion a(n) individual (separate) utopia dies, not Utopia *as such* (in general). And individual (separate) atrocities (acts of cruelty) and crimes (einzelne Grausamkeiten und Verbrechen) fade (die away, vanish, disappear, elapse, are extinguished) in the course of time, not atrocity (act of cruelty) and crime *as such* (in general). The communists were (as) the latest (to, who) (have) temporarily embodied both (these) sides of the human paradox in closest (tightest) connection (interrelation) with each other. As champions (advocates, defenders) of a humanistic utopia and as executors (i.e. enforcers) of naked (callous, cruel) terror (a reign of terror, state terror, terror tactics, terrorism) they like hardly any (no) other movement shaped (left a mark on, stamped, moulded) the grandeur (greatness, magnificence) and the tragedy (or tragicality) of their epoch (era, times, age). They were (simultaneously) dreamers and politicians thirsty for power, desperado(e)s and strategists, demagogues (agitators, rabble-rousers) and secret agents, crusaders and technocrats, heretics and

inquisitors, victims and executioners (in one). World history will not easily forget these strange (odd, unusual, extraordinary, outlandish) people (humans, men), who broke into (invaded) the 20th century with such violence (force) (so violently).

Regarding the translation

The translation is from the German text compared, at all points, with Kondylis's own Greek version of the book. Where Kondylis adds words or phrases to the Greek translation not in the German text (or where he (rarely) translates the German into Greek by paraphrasing rather than word for word), and if the translator is of the view that these words or phrases' inclusion would be helpful to the English reader, they are included in parentheses, as are German words that do not necessarily need to be translated into English such as certain adverbs, as well as important German terms in German usually only on their first appearance, and alternative or additional English words in regard to key, and or difficult to translate, words or phrases (occasionally Kondylis's Greek text's phrasing is preferred to the German for the English translation - but only in regard to phrases not involving key social-scientific terms). The translator is firmly of the view that whilst the translation must be readable in English, faithfulness to the German text (with due regard given to Kondylis's own Greek version) is not to be sacrificed in order to achieve a completely "fluid" English book. The present text is also available in a "plain English" version should that be required for publication in the form of a book. All footnotes are the translator's and have nothing to do with Kondylis himself.

The texts used for this translation:

Kondylis, P. *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992.

Κονδύλης, Π. *Πλανητική πολιτική μετά τον ψυχρό πόλεμο*, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, 1992.