

Panajotis Kondylis

DIE NEUZEITLICHE

METAPHYSIKKRITIK

- Klett-Cotta –

Panagiotis Kondylis

THE CRITIQUE OF NEW-

TIMES METAPHYSICS

Stuttgart : Klett-Cotta, 1990

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BARBARIAN IDIOM BARBARIAN IDIOT

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

Η ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΦΥΣΙΚΗΣ ΣΤΗ ΝΕΟΤΕΡΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ

ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΜΕΝΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

ΤΟΜΟΣ Α΄

ἀπὸ τὸν ὄψιμο Μεσαίωνα

ὥς τὸ τέλος τοῦ Διαφωτισμοῦ

ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΑΚΕΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ · ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ

2012 (ΠΡΩΤΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ (I – III) : 1983 (ΓΝΩΣΗ))

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

THE CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS IN (MORE) MODERN THOUGHT

COMPLETE EDITION [[IN TWO VOLUMES]]

VOLUME A

from the late Middle Ages

to the end of the Enlightenment

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2012 (I – IV) (FIRST EDITION (I – III) : 1983 (GNOSI / GNOSE, ATHENS))

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My friend Dr. F. Horst read the manuscript and made worthwhile, valuable suggestions for / regarding the shaping, moulding, formation of the text. He has for years supported my work with his advice and in deed, practice, and for this reason I would like to express my gratitude to him.

Panagiotis Kondylisⁱ

PUBLISHER’S NOTEⁱⁱ

Panagiotis Kondylis first published the *Critique of metaphysics in (more) modern thought* in 1983 [[in Greek]], in the “Philosophical and Political Library” by (editions) Gnosi / Gnose (publishers), which (“Philosophical and Political Library”) he directed. This volume covered the period from the late Middle Ages until the end of the Enlightenment. In 1990, the German-language version of the book was published by the publishing house Klett-Cotta, which included an additional 4th part, with its object being the course of the critique of metaphysics during the 19th and 20th century. With the exception of this 4th part (which is fully, entirely, completely absent from the first Greek edition [[of 1983]]), the German edition essentially follows word for word (hot on the trail / in hot pursuit of) the Greek edition.

The complete Greek edition which we present here is separated into two volumes. In the first (such volume), the Greek edition of 1983 is republished, reprinted (without intervention(s), apart from the/a new pagination, the correction of certain oversights and the translation of the foreign-language – mainly Latin – terms appearing), which corresponds with/to the 3 first parts of the German edition. The new edition is complemented/supplemented with an analytical index of concepts.

In the Greek translation of the 4th partⁱⁱⁱ, the attempt is made to follow the terminological, stylistic and (apart from a minimal number of exceptions of

lesser, very slight significance, importance) grammatical-syntactical choices, selections of Kondylis himself, so that the linguistic unity between the two volumes is safeguarded as far as possible, but also the wider, broader coherence with the overall, total Greek-language work of the author, which, besides its in itself / inherent philosophical value, constitutes a supreme, paramount, tip-top, peak contribution to the cultivation of (more, contemporaneous) modern Greek philosophical language.

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Introduction

During the past one hundred years there have already been some attempts to write the history of metaphysics, which, of course, cannot be characterised as complete or otherwise flawless, faultless, impeccable, perfect, irreproachable, unobjectionable¹. However, hitherto no history of the critique of metaphysics has been propounded, submitted, presented, put forward, written, although this

¹ The first histories of metaphysics are written, not by chance, at/in a time (an epoch) in which the rise/development of the natural sciences and the humanities (sciences of the spirit), as well as the spreading of a scientist(ic)-positivist(ic) spirit(-intellect) gave / begot, gave birth to, generated the impression that metaphysics conclusively, irrevocably belonged to the past; thus, these histories have the character of a farewell / fare-thee-well review of a cycle of ideas, which appears to have closed forever [[as P.K. showed in many of his works, there's no such thing/closure; ideological-metaphysical thought is always present in all societies, and it can never be otherwise given that all value-axiological and aesthetical positionings are human constructs and that values, normative action etc. are absolutely unavoidable]]. Dilthey, who was no positivist, but like some others had seen through the consequences of the rise of the sciences for the orientation of new-times intellectual-spiritual life, was the first to set out to tell / sketch out / draft / plan a history of metaphysics, which would simultaneously be a structural analysis and a typology of the same metaphysics (GS, I; cf. ch. IV, sec. 4 d, below) (/ Dilthey, who he too, albeit alien to positivism, considers as the decisive feature of the New Times the autonomous development of various physical and social sciences, evaluates, appraises metaphysics as a passing, transient, transitory phenomenon inside the historically given system of the intellectual-spiritual forms of life; if myth and religion were preceded by metaphysics, contemporary special(ised) sciences succeed it, breaking up, abolishing, catalysing the cognitive unity of medieval theological metaphysics; metaphysics is broken up, fragmented itself into a multitude of contradictory systems and dies, not being able to demonstrate its fundamental hypothesis, that is, the logical systematic unity of everything; its (metaphysics') fusion, amalgamation, merging with the theory of knowledge constitutes a form of euthanasia (Einleitung, esp. 133, 357/9, 405) [Full/Complete bibliographical elements/details of the works referred to and of their available Greek translations are listed / put forward in the Table which is found at the end of the second volume ([[Greek]] publisher's note [[in relation to the 2012 Greek edition]]]]. Not very productive, fertile, profitable, on the contrary, is E. v. Hartmann's somewhat later work, which basically contains barely coherent summaries of philosophical systems and lacks insight into the broader outlines / great lines of the development as well as in the structural meaning, significance of their turning points (/ Under the impression of the rise of the positive sciences does E. v. Hartmann write a few years later his own history of metaphysics, which, however, constitutes a thorough report, essay (in respect) of philosophical systems with a relatively loose, slack coherence and with very few important, significant general observations regarding the great lines of development/evolution); the reference to the spirit of the times is at least established by the thesis that from now on metaphysics may only methodically proceed inductively (/ Hartmann announces the end of traditional metaphysics by saying that from now on metaphysics can solely be an inductive a posteriori science) (Geschichte, II, 594; cf. ch. IV, sec. 2 and 3, below). – Conversely, On the other hand, Heimsoeth's work came into being at a point in time when one / people wanted to confront the spirit of science and help metaphysics gain new strength and validity (/ comes from the reaction against positivism as it manifested itself particularly after the first world war in the efforts, endeavours for the revival, resuscitation, rejuvenation of a metaphysics in the traditional sense). Accordingly, the author does not want to quite accept (/ consciously pushes aside) the meaning, significance and consequences of the fact of new-times science (/ of the development of the positive sciences in the New Times), and he strives, endeavours to refute, confute, disprove, falsify, prove wrong, doubt, call into question the supposedly, ostensibly, allegedly shallow Enlightenment perception (/ conviction of the Enlightenment) that the New Times would have / had stood up (object) to (oppose) the Middle Ages and freed man, humans (/ mean the freeing, liberation of man) from the fetters, bonds of religion and metaphysics; the unity of the New Times and the Middle Ages is shown, seen, demonstrated in accordance with his opinion(, in his opinion,) in the unity of metaphysical questions (problem examination), which in turn are/is religiously moulded, stamped, minted, influenced, (/ has a religious character) etc. (Die sechs großen Themen, esp. 11 ff.). The book constitutes in reality a rhetorical treatise, tract, especially in its one-sided perspective pertaining to philosophy as a calling / occupation / professional philosophy, hardly perceiving the dynamics of other currents and forces in the history of ideas (/ Even though the book became quite widespread, nevertheless it constitutes an intensely rhetorical treatise which subjugates, subordinates, subjects historical development, evolution to the preliminary / in advance metaphysical and world-theoretical preferences of a professional of philosophy who is minimally (only slightly) familiar with the more general history of ideas). We can similarly talk (/ The same can be observed) about Schulz's treatise, which wants to just as little accept that the New Times brought about a radical break (change), upheaval / about-turn, or else, that it placed, put, set men / humans in the place of (man / humans displaced) God, although he admits the essential, substantial, substantive change, transformation of the Christian perception of God (Der Gott, esp. 11 ff., 55). Regarding / Concerning newer, (more) recent attempts to structurally, and at the same time in regard to its overall historical development/evolution, apprehend the metaphysical phenomenon with sociological and anthropological means, see ch. IV, sec. 4 c (esp. regarding Topitsch) (/ The most significant, important post-war general outlining of the metaphysical phenomenon is undoubtedly that of Topitsch. On the basis of findings and methods of the sociology of knowledge, of mass and individual psychology, of ethnography / the study of peoples etc., the author

critique (criticism) represents and constitutes (a) neuralgic, i.e. critical, crucial point / themes, topics of (new-times) (the) spiritual-intellectual life (of the New Times). This gap can be easily explained, if one ponders, contemplates, considers that the most distinguished, significant, important modern opponents of metaphysics belong to the so-called analytic(al) tendency, school of thought, direction in philosophy (/ come from the womb / bosom of so-called analytic(al) philosophy) and hence precisely / that is precisely why they are not distinguished by / do not stand out for the intensity of their interests pertaining to the history of philosophy, whereas, conversely, the direct or indirect heirs, inheritors and successors, continuers of traditional metaphysical thought / thinking have recourse to the history of philosophy in apologetic or eclectic rather than with critical intent. The fact is that *there is* a history of the critique of metaphysics – and indeed not in the sense of an asymmetrical row, series of incoherent and scattered, dissipated epochal attacks against the various versions of metaphysical thought, but rather in the organic sense of temporal succession or of the parallel use of fundamental anti-metaphysical theses, which can be apprehended, assembled retrospectively as a multi-dimensional whole, although every one of them came into being or gained ground only under particular conditions pertaining to the history of ideas. From that it is illuminated / elucidated / arises that a history of the critique of metaphysics taken seriously may not remain fixed to a doxographical one / (such) history. Just as a history of metaphysics, which would deserve / be worthy of the name, should proceed, progress, continue to a typology with (a) systematic claim(s), so too a history of metaphysics is faced with the task, job, duty, mission / obliged, obligated, - through / by means of arriving at the fundamental, basic types through / via / by the study of anti-metaphysical arguments in their conceptual and historical concreteness-, of making (to make) possible, enabling (enable) the logical

interprets the metaphysical construct(ion)s as secular / cosmic projections of human situations, both of biological data as well as of data related/relating to technical and social organisation (Vom Ursprung, 9/11)).

structuring of the material and at the same time an (/ by studying the multiformity of the anti-metaphysical arguments in their specific, concrete manifestation on each and every respective occasion, to deduce, derive from inside of the many-sidedness of the material, those basic types, which allow, permit not only the logical structuring of this material, but the) all-sided contradistinction of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical thought.

An (inadequate, insufficient) history of metaphysics could be perhaps imagined, which would be oriented towards the main perceptions of the being, nature, general character of metaphysics itself, or else, more specifically, towards its triple / threefold Aristotelian definition; then it would be investigated, researched when metaphysics would be looked at / considered and treated / handled principally, mainly as theology, when as ontology and when as the theory / teaching / doctrine of principles (i.e. of the most general principles and causes)². Such a method(olog)ical approach would, nevertheless, not be particularly fruitful, fertile, fecund for a history of the critique of metaphysics, which can touch upon the problem of the definition of metaphysics only to the extent that this appears necessary for its own ends, goals, purposes.

Notwithstanding that, the absence, lack of a(n) (unambiguous and) generally binding definition of metaphysics (with only one (sole) meaning) not in the least signifies, means that the development, evolution of anti-metaphysical ideas cannot be tracked, pursued with the help of certain conceptual-structural criteria, which formalise / give typical form to the plethora of the historical material (stuff) and simultaneously can make the great turning points in the course of the critique of metaphysics (more) comprehensible (in an elegant and

² Since a solution to this question, problem is not essential, indispensable / is not of direct interest as regards our context / in the context of this work, I shall only refer to some important publications, in which the various views on this question / problem are represented: Ando, *Metaphysics*, 8 ff.; Lotz, *Ontologie und Metaphysik*, 4 ff.; Vollrath, *Gliederung*, 271 ff.; Moser, *Metaphysik*, 1 ff.; Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, 101 ff.; Wagner, *Zum Problem*, esp. 141 ff.; Patzig, *Theologie*, esp. 190 f., 202 ff.; Mansion, *Philosophie première*, esp. 177 ff..

clear fashion). The question / problem is posed / posited / set / put as follows: which features (characteristics, traits, attributes) of the being, nature, (general) character of metaphysics are of immediate, direct significance, meaning for the history of the critique of metaphysics?

The answer to this question, problem must highlight, emphasise, point out two aspects (/ In an aphoristic form / the form of an aphorism, the answer is the following). Every metaphysics rests and is based on the distinction between the transcendental and the immanent, or else, between the supra/hyper-empirical On That Side / Over There / Thence / Beyond / Hereafter / That World and the empirical On This Side / Over Here / Hence / Within / Here(in) / This World, (whilst) understanding, considering the former (On That Side) as the “true” unadulterated (pristine, unspoilt, genuine) reality and at the same time (at least in its great traditional forms, versions) as the source of ethical-normative principles^{iv}. As, in fact, Aristotle writes with classical conciseness, succinctness, pithiness, terseness, if there were no substance outside of those substances which we encounter in empirical(ly given) nature, so/thus physics would be the only science; the precedence, priority, primacy, in fact, the necessity and the existence of metaphysics itself is based, founded in/on (/ is secured by) the conviction that there is an unchangeable, immutable substance on that side / beyond and above nature³. The hierarchy of being founds, consequently, the hierarchy of the levels of knowledge, and the term “metaphysics” aptly, tellingly reflects / accurately renders this double hierarchy⁴. As a / the *form* of knowledge (/ cognitive form), i.e. as a / the system of propositions, which on the basis of

³ Metaphysik, 1526 a 10-23.

⁴ Reiner has compellingly, convincingly shown that the term “metaphysics”, which, as is known, does not come / prop up, appear in Aristotle himself, was created not for mere biblionomic (i.e. as regards the classification of books) reasons by Andronicus of Rhodes [[1st century B.C.]], as dominant / the ruling (/ the generally accepted) tradition (particularly from the 19th century) wants it; rather, it came into being / was born already in the circles of the older Peripatetic philosophers, and indeed in connection with a certain didactic arrangement of the philosophical disciplines (/ didactic series of philosophical lessons), which go back to (/ was instituted, established, founded, enacted by) Aristotle and corresponded with (was/is relevant to) the content, that is, the ontological hierarchy of Aristotelian philosophy (Die Entstehung, esp. 228 ff.).

logical rules are connected with (/ tied to) one another, and irrespective of its each and every respective content or else irrespective of its each and every respective definition of the Transcendent and the Immanent, metaphysics strives after / seeks / pursues the rational-demonstrative apprehension of being and its ultimate, final principles^v. From this point of view, the composition, texture, constitution of (the actually) being does not principally, mainly, chiefly come into play (/ have (carry, possess) importance, gravitas, weight), but rather (of interest is) the fact that the human intellect in its highest and most intensive endeavour(s), effort(s) apprehends (and expresses) being and can bring it into (in) a system of propositions free of contradiction(s). Consequently, metaphysics appears as tangible, (f)actual proof of the omnipotence of Reason.

In order to be able to comprehend the escalation (gradation) and the phases of the new-times critique of metaphysics, we must hold onto the fact / point out that both aforementioned features of metaphysical constructs (i.e. the distinction between (the) Transcendental (Over There) and (the) Immanent (Over Here) as well as the demand for a rationally complete / total, full knowledge of (the actually) being) do not either logically or historically belong together, although / even though they are interwoven in some of the / many an important metaphysical system(s) of philosophical tradition. (Because) The distinction between (the) transcendental (Over There) and (the) immanent (Over Here) can be conceded, granted, allowed, admitted without Reason being regarded as capable of apprehending the former (transcendental / Over There) – and the other way around / vice versa / inversely, conversely: the knowledge-based omnipotence of Reason can still be believed (accepted) even after the above-mentioned distinction (as we know it from tradition) has been put / set aside, eliminated⁵. The following analysis of the historical material will put to the test

⁵ In this case the term “metaphysics” preserves, maintains, keeps, retains, gets, receives a(n) (theory of knowledge(-related) and) epistemological meaning (also pertaining to the theory of knowledge) (as this, incidentally, usually, commonly, most frequently occurs / happened since (from) Bacon (and thereafter), see

(proof) / will prove / will show us the fertility, fecundity, fruitfulness of this elementary conceptual differentiation. And in actual fact, (the) new-times polemics against metaphysics points to two logically different, albeit temporally in many ways / in many cases intertwined with one another (in part successive / on top of one another / multi-layered) aspects. On the one hand, metaphysics is rejected / disapproved / spurned / attacked as complete, full, self-contained rational knowledge (science), i.e. as the extraction, sourcing of (the) ultimate truths by / with (the) means of Reason, on the other hand, the metaphysical distinction between (the) Transcendental and (the) Immanent is relativised or cancelled / lifted / rejected. This latter (rejection of the distinction between the Transcendental and the Immanent) / second —much (and by far) more radical— form (of the critique) of metaphysics (criticism) is moulded, shaped, formed considerably, significantly later than the former (rejection of metaphysics as complete knowledge extracting ultimate truths by means of Reason) / first, i.e. it is openly and systematically / consciously articulated first by the materialism of the 18th century, even though it is prepared by the pantheistic tendencies of the natural philosophy of the Renaissance and by Spinozism. However, the new-times struggle, fight, combat against metaphysics commences, starts, begins with the calling into question, doubting or with the direct rejection of (the knowledge) claims (to / on knowledge) of/by metaphysical Reason, that is, with the fundamental denial, renunciation of the possibility of metaphysics as the

below ch. II, 3; III, 3; IV, 3) and it means, suggests the ultimate or else first principles (/ the totality of the ultimate axioms), upon which every knowledge must rest / be based. The distinction between Over There / On That Side and Over Here / On This Side no longer relates / refers to the difference of / in essence of the ontological levels (as) between one another in the traditional sense, but it arises out of / from the contrast, opposition, contradistinction of / between the hyper / supra-empirical character of those principles (axioms) vis-à-vis mere empirical knowledge; the intelligible Over There / On That Side is therefore here the ensemble of the logical or mathematical relations, which, as it were / so to speak, bear, carry, support / stand behind (the) empirical appearances, occurrences, phenomena (propping them up in some kind of way). [[The following is not in the German edition, but only in the Greek edition of P.K.'s text]] Precisely such a(n) expansion, dilation of Over There and Over Here gives / provides the possibility of talk of "metaphysics" occurring, taking place, even though its (metaphysics') traditional content has been set / put aside. For a contemporary logico-mathematical metaphysics in the aforementioned sense see typically Scholz, *Metaphysik*, esp. 158 ff., 174 ff. (cf. footnote 517, below).

complete, full, self-contained rational knowledge (science) of (the actually) being. Since the rejection of metaphysics *in this sense* does not touch upon / doubt the (crucial) – at least for the ideologically dominant, ruling Christian perception – (central) distinction between That Side / Over There and This Side / Over Here, thus the critique (rebuttal, rebuff, confutation) of metaphysics of the earlier New Times was ambivalent and ambiguous, because the innovative / latest profane (secular) tendencies on many occasions intersected / were fused in its framework with the reaction of broad theological circles against the Thomistic attempt at the coupling, marriage, espousal, wedding of theology and metaphysics, faith/belief and Reason – a reaction which drew its strength, force, power from / was fed (nurtured) by the Augustinian tradition and took / adopted, as we shall see, the form of nominalism in order to thereafter manifest itself anew (/ before peaking / climaxing) in Lutheranism.

The new-times critique of metaphysics begins, therefore, with the cutting, curtailment, truncation, clipping, pruning, trimming, cutback, lopping, paring of the (cognitive) (cap)abilities (at knowing / of knowledge) of Reason with regard to (the) ultimate truths, i.e. the rational apprehension of the transcendental (Over There). This process is accordingly complicated, and contradictorily, in that for this cutting, curtailment, truncation, clipping, pruning, trimming, cutback, lopping, paring, (/ This curtailment is preached —and this precisely makes this process complicated and contradictory— by) both theologians / theologists use, employ that which in (/ who fear that) the mixing, mixture, blending of Reason and faith/belief they see, behold, perceive to (/ in the end will) be a danger, risk for (/ necessarily harm, damage) the latter (faith/belief), as well as / and / whereas (by) pioneers of new-times rationalism, who under the circumstances of the ideological omnipotence (and the ideological present/presence) of religion (and the Church) do not dare (even if they think in relation to that) to attack (/ turn against) the On That Side / Over There, and hence attempt (/

attempting) to make it / the On That Side / Over There irrelevant, indifferent in practice: if the On That Side / Over There cannot be apprehended rationally, then Reason should preferably turn towards the On This Side / Over Here, towards (the) physical and human reality. Agnosticism, which in the early New Times provides, supplies (constitutes) the most powerful / clear-cut (main) theoretical weapon for the combating of metaphysics, can consequently be of theological-fideist(ic) as well as profane(secular)-sceptical lineage, origin, ancestry, descent, without this ambiguity (two-sidedness) (ever) (initially) being conscious to those concerned (/ even many of its (agnosticism's) representatives). An important step in the history of anti-metaphysical^{vi} thought is made (taken) / carried out at the moment at which (/ when) both types of (the aforementioned) agnosticism are separated from each other (/ expanded more and more) in order to be put / placed / posited in/at the service of two fundamentally / basically / radically different world-theoretical stances, attitudes: theological agnosticism combats, fights metaphysics as rational knowledge in order to protect God and faith / belief from the decomposing, subversive, poisonous, destructive effect, impact of Reason and of rational argumentation (/ far from every dangerous contact with the criticism of Reason), whereas profane (secular, mundane) agnosticism asserts, stresses the impossibility of the rational knowledge (of being or else) of God, not with the intent of keeping (/ to protect) faith/belief (intact), but on the contrary, in order to conclusively, definitively decouple (fortify, establish the autonomy of) rational knowledge (from belief/faith and to make it (i.e. rational knowing/knowledge) independent, autonomous, self-contained, self-reliant, self-standing),(/ ;) by declaring its exclusive object and field of activity to be the On This Side / Over Here and the empirical world (/ in the first case, i.e. faith/belief was primarily of interest, whilst in the second case knowledge — which moreover, after its programmatic separation from God and faith/belief, has as its exclusive object and field of activity the Over Here, the generally

empirical world)^{vii}. Despite the (this) radical contrast / opposition (being revealed / seeing the light of day) in the orientation and in the function of both types of agnosticism, the representatives of profane (secular) anti-metaphysical agnosticism continued gladly and often to invoke their (negative) agreement with the theological rejection of metaphysics as rational knowledge^{viii}, since they sought / looked for in that an ideological alibi, which could safeguard, protect them from attacks by the still (always) (almost) omnipotent, all-powerful Church.

The appearance, emergence, advent of mathematical natural science at the beginning of the 17th century strongly promoted, fostered, encouraged the moving / going away from each other, breakup (/ assisted the expansion, dilation [away from each other]) of both types of agnosticism, which from the 14th until the 16th century blossomed, flourished, thrived in a tense symbiosis. Whilst mathematical natural science counterposed / contrasted a radically novel / new kind of and no(t) less complete, self-contained, full secular / profane / mundane world image to the scholastic-Aristotelian (theological) world image / perception, pushed, propelled the theological and religious positions into the / a defensive position / to take a defensive stance and forced them into a mistrust, distrust against perceptions which in earlier times could appear as / to be harmless, not dangerous, safe or else legitimate, but which under the new circumstances had to take / adopt / assume another (different) character. From the point of view of our setting of the question / question formulation, the essential contribution of mathematical natural science consists in the ontological revaluation of the sensorial, sense-related, sensual^{ix} world. If this (sensorial world) was ontologically held / considered to be defeated, inferior in the framework, context of classical ancient-Christian metaphysics, i.e. to be irrational or contingent in its structure and hence (in contrast to the sphere of the transcendental spirit) inaccessible to / for purely intellectual apprehension (/

impervious (not susceptible) to a purely mental conception), thus it now appears as a coherent system of strict law-bound (deterministic or law(rule)-based) relations, which are capable of a logical-mathematical understanding and interpretation and exactly because of that/this make up / constitute not merely the object of a science which must stand / be (found) under (/ (of) secondary (value/significance) in relation to) metaphysics, but of a science par excellence – if only the word ‘science’ is understood in the (new-times) sense (of the New Times). In this way / Thus, (the) ontological setting of the question / problem (question) (formulation, examination) is displaced, supplanted by (the) methodological problem (formulation, examination), and the search for the *certitudo modi procedendi* puts / overshadows the traditional primacy of the *certitudo objecti* (in the shade). Simultaneously, mathematical natural science unifies the world image and it is completely subjected / subjugated / subordinated to a complete, total law bindedness (determinism, law-based necessity); the putting / setting aside, sidelining, elimination, abolition of the Aristotelian division of the cosmos into a celestial, heavenly and a sublunar, earthly, terrestrial region, in which there was alone, only, solely movement, motion and decay, spoilage, corruption, wear and tear, wastage, fading, ceasing to exist, extracted, took away, withdrew, so to speak, from the metaphysical distinction between On That Side / Over There and On This Side / Over Here its cosmological concomitant or prop, support, pillar, rest. If (a(ny)) metaphysics cannot be understood / thought about without a certain hierarchy / hierarchisation of (the) ontological levels, then mathematical natural science was extremely, markedly, pronouncedly anti-metaphysical in the sense that it brought down in one fell swoop / crashing down or at least drastically simplified the traditional hierarchy of the substances, which served not merely, simply, only classificatory, but precisely normative (axiological) goals, ends, purposes. The mathematicisation or else quantification of nature, which was counterposed to the scholastic-Aristotelian qualitative way of looking at things,

nevertheless implied the separation of the properties, qualities, characteristics of the natural bodies into (the) primary (i.e. hyper / supra-empirical and mathematically apprehensible (/ expressed in purely mathematical relations)) and (the) secondary (i.e. empirical and incapable of / a total, complete mathematical apprehension (/ impervious to mathematical expression)) (properties of the natural bodies). This seemed to bring back to life anew the classical metaphysical distinction between the substance and its accidental occurrences (happenings, incidents, events) (accidents), albeit this time from an essentially different perspective (/ with a totally new meaning). That is why it came about / happened that at precisely the moment at which / precisely when mathematical natural science immobilised, incapacitated metaphysics as a rational science of being (qua being / as such)^x, a new (kind of) / novel metaphysics came into being, which revolved (circled) around / referred primarily to the problem of substance (essence), which predominated in the metaphysical constructions of the 17th century. It would, nonetheless, be an optical illusion to think that “metaphysics” in (regard to) its essence would (have) simply continue(d) on its regal, kingly path, way, road and would (have) remain(ed) untouched by the new developments. Precisely the opposite was (is) the case. Not only were its questions (problem examinations) reformulated in the light of the problem examination (/ on the basis of the questions) of mathematical natural science / physics, but its basic concepts were structured (less so or more so) in accordance with models pertaining to natural science too; in most cases, furthermore, the new primacy of the theory of knowledge explicitly or implicitly replaces the traditional primacy of ontology. For these reasons, and although the works of a Malebranche or Leibniz, for instance, in themselves of course do not represent and constitute a contribution to the critique of metaphysics, yet the history of this latter critique of metaphysics necessarily concerns certain aspects (characteristics) of them (i.e. the works of Malebranche or Leibniz): the crisis of metaphysics is inseparably connected

with the critique of metaphysics.

Already in the 17th century, therefore, the essential difference between traditional philosophical thought from modern philosophical thought becomes visible. In the former (traditional philosophical thought), *the metaphysical problem* in the sense of the investigation of the character of the Is of being^{xi} is the focus (stands at the centre) of attention, [[and]] thus the latter (modern philosophical thought) deals with the *problem of metaphysics*, and indeed often in the sense of a (radical) doubt(ing) of the expediency, purposefulness (end (goal) orientation) and usefulness, utility of that investigation⁶. In the age, epoch of the Enlightenment – and if we leave to one side / forego / do without / disregard some kinds / a certain kind of / certain, some philosophical construction(s) like the Wolffian, which (rather / more likely) gives the impression of a(n) antediluvian, pre-historic monster – the venerable question, problem, issue of the being as being [[ὅντος ἢ ὅν “of the being indeed being”, or, “the actual reality of being”]] is hardly posed / posited, and the concept of substance, which had still concerned, preoccupied Locke so intensively, moves completely into the background / margins after Berkley’s and Hume’s objections (critique). Generally, the philosophical literature of the Enlightenment devotes, dedicates considerably less space to the (thorough) critique (criticism) of basic, fundamental concepts of Scholastic-Aristotelian logic and metaphysics (ὅν ἢ ὅν, catholic / universal concepts, categories etc.) than the anti-metaphysical literature of the 15th or of the 16th century(,) and the reason for this is, of course, not the (some kind of) respect of the Enlighteners / Enlightenment philosophers for the aforementioned concepts – on the contrary: these were held / considered to be so empty of content / contentless and meaningless that hardly anyone felt compelled to (seriously) concern themselves with them (in earnest). Instead of this, the Enlightenment

⁶ In accordance with a formulation by Faggiotto, Problema, 15.

philosophers / Enlighteners do something else: when they do not polemicise openly against metaphysics, they deprive, revoke, extract, take away from its concept its traditional sense/meaning and correspondingly interpret it with regard to the new primacy of the theory of knowledge over ontology, whereby / in relation to which metaphysics is reduced to gnoseology or epistemology (is changed / transformed (into) (or restricted, limited) to general epistemology). This development / These developments(, which we shall study analytically, in detail below / in what follows,) take(s) place, again, in the framework, context of a hitherto / until then unprecedented, unheard-of intensification, aggravation (the most dramatic culmination) of the anti-metaphysical struggle, i.e. of the first massively open and programmatic (expressed, explicit) rejection of the difference, distinction between the transcendental / Transcendental and the immanent / Immanent in all its Christian and pre-Christian variations (separation of the On That Side / Over There / In That World and the On This Side / Over Here / In This World both in its pre-Christian as well as its Christian forms).

The putting / setting aside of the Transcendental, of the foundation stone / cornerstone of every metaphysics, was accompanied by the appearance, advent, arrival of new *types* of the critique of metaphysics. From the 14th century until the 16th century, when one, as mentioned, rejected metaphysics from the standpoint of the theological or profane (secular) denial of the possibility of a rational knowledge of being^{xiii}, two basic / fundamental types of the critique of metaphysics were used. The first of them / the said types was the kind pertaining to the theory of knowledge and rested / was based on the proof / proving of the limits, boundaries of human reason, which must rely on / be supported, propped up, underpinned, bolstered by uncertain, incomplete, or even deceptive sensory (sensorial) data and hence cannot obtain, acquire either ultimate certainties or decisively widen, broaden its horizon – unless / except

with the help of godly, divine enlightenment. The empiricism pertaining to the theory of knowledge served, in the course of this, not always a profane(secular)-on-this-side/of-this-world world-theoretical positioning, stance (/ was put in the service not of a secular this-world-worshipping orientation), as this happened as a rule in the 18th century, but it accompanied (the) theological teaching, doctrine, theory of the Fall of Man / Original Sin and the limitedness, limitations or else obscurity reduced / going back to this Fall of Man / Original Sin, which can only be overcome, surmounted through (dissolved by) faith, belief and not for instance rational metaphysical knowledge^{xiii}. After Sextus's and Cicero's (*Academicae Questiones*) rediscovery in the 16th century, the leitmotif, theme of the boundaries, limits of human reason in its dependence on unreliable sensory (sensorial) data was (gradually) translated into profane (secular) language and incorporated in profane(secular)-anti(-)theological scepticism. In the second main type of the early critique of metaphysics, again, the weight, *gravitas* (centre of gravity of attention) is laid / falls on language and the attempts at the working out / processing / outlining of a metaphysics are denounced, pilloried / regarded as a(n) abuse, misuse of the language's inherent logical deficiencies / expressive imperfections or as a violation, transgression of its rules / laws. This type is formed, moulded, shaped in times when the humanist movement rediscovers ancient rhetoric and counterposes it to logic and to (the) dialectic(s); rhetoric is here understood in the wide, broad sense of the knowledge of rules, laws of human communication in the framework, context of social life and with the help of the medium (/ the basic organ) of language, which, hence, becomes the object of particular and systematic interest. This / These (/ It is worth underlining the) old origin(s), provenance, descent, lineage, derivation, extraction of the critique / criticism of metaphysics as the critique of language itself must especially, particularly be emphasised, especially in view of (/ refuting, confuting, opposing, rebutting) today's widespread perception that this kind of critique of metaphysics would first arise

/ first appeared with the so-called analytic(al) philosophy of our [[20th]] century^{xiv}.

In the age / epoch of the Enlightenment, both of these earlier, previous types of the new-times critique of metaphysics retain their strength unabated: agnosticism always serves / continues to serve in the sense explained above as an alibi vis-à-vis theology, and the phenomenon of language likewise stands / is at the (epi)centre of philosophical attention, although / even though this time, of course, from a new point of view, it is, namely, investigated in the attempt at / the context (framework) of the construction (building, constitution, composition, formation) of a satisfactory empiricist theory of knowledge, which is supposed to explicate, explain the critical transition from sensory (sensorial) data to the higher, superior (thought (intellectual)) operations (of thought) also by means of the (/ with the intermediate stage being the genesis and) gradual formation, development of a(n) always more / more and more complicated language (sign) system (of signs) (– first and foremost of linguistic / language signs); metaphysics (here again) is dismissed / brushed aside (anew) as the illegitimate result (aftereffect, consequence) of the shortcomings (defects) of language or as the/a violation, transgression against / of its rules (laws). Nonetheless, the radical approach to / radicality of the putting (setting) aside (abolition) of the metaphysical distinction between / separation of the On That Side / Over There / Thence / Beyond / Hereafter / That World and the On This Side / Over Here / Hence / Within / Here(in) / This World, had to / could not but bring into being / call into life / be accompanied by the appearance of (new and more) radical types of the critique of metaphysics. From (In other words: from) the moment at which the decision for / in favour of the setting (putting) aside, elimination of (traditional) Transcendence occurs (/ the moment the Transcendental is abolished), the main / chief anti-metaphysical task does not consist anymore in proving, demonstrating the incapability of metaphysics at /

for / as regards the rational apprehension (and in terms of proof) of this Transcendence, but rather (much more) in making comprehensible the fact that(,) and how(,) such a great illusion as the separation (of the world) between (into) the Transcendental and the Immanent could have come about at all. A double, twofold explanation is offered for that, which brings about / forth (/ The explanation is given in two ways, which, in (their) turn, beget) two new types of the critique of metaphysics. The first of these we can call the historical-sociological type and look at as the product of the intersection of two important and characteristic aspects (sides) of (the intellectual life of) (the) Enlightenment (ideas / body of thought / thoughts world), i.e. the critique of Christianity and at the same time the formation, development of a new kind, not merely political, but rather sociologically oriented description of history / historiography, from whose bosom, womb the modern concept of “ideology” (as false, – reflecting, mirroring in a distorted, warped fashion, manner, social conditions / states (of affairs) of life and simultaneously claims to / on rule, dominance / dominant authority of rationalising and legitimising – consciousness) finally arose / resulted (/ was born as false consciousness which indirectly reflects specific, concrete biotic, vital, life(-related) situations or conceals, covers up claims of rule, dominance (dominant authority)). The critique of Christianity, which often(times) could go / pass over (/ was automatically converted) to a critique of religion in general, made both the religious roots and the features, characteristics, attributes, traits of metaphysics as well as its entanglement, interconnection, interlocking, interweaving with religiously sanctioned forms of rule, dominance / dominant authority clear, apparent^{xv}; thus understood, metaphysics appeared as the mere, simple philosophical processing of / working on (kinds of) religious illusions, conceits (imagination), fantasies, which stemmed (originated, came) from (/ took root in) dark passions and still darker prejudices, yet gradually had to take on, adopt and retain the form of a system of ideas (an ideas system) (which was perpetuated)(,) because it fulfilled a

(specific/concrete) social function, blessing the rule, dominance, dominant authority of some and alleviating, sweetening the subjugation of others with all sorts (kinds) of consolations. From these ascertainties (/ this point of view), it followed / seemed that the metaphysical illusion could not last any longer than its causes, that it would therefore inevitably, inescapably, unavoidably disappear, vanish after the universal maturation, ripening of human Reason and after social emancipation^{xvi}. Precisely at this point does the second of both new types of the critique of metaphysics, -which we want to name/call the anthropological type in contrast to the just mentioned historical-sociological type-, differ, deviate, diverge from this first type. Also here metaphysics does not appear as the reliable, dependable, trustworthy rational apprehension (knowledge) of (the really, truly) being, but as the outflow (aftereffect, consequence, effluent, discharge) of certain deeper needs of human nature – needs both of a cognitive as well as a volitive and normative (/ ethical, moral) character. But completely irrespective of whether metaphysics takes root in the Irrational and consists of illusions, delusions (or not)^{xvii}, it will remain living, alive and socially having an effect, effective, effectual, functional, influential as long as human nature and its needs (/ the aforementioned needs of human nature) do not change.

As the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment reached its close, conclusion, end(ing), all four main types of the critique of metaphysics, as we know them today, had more or less been developed, formed: the critique of metaphysics pertaining to the theory of knowledge, the linguistic, the historical-sociological and the anthropological [[critiques of metaphysics]]^{xviii}. Contrary to a widespread impression, we must point out here that the critique of metaphysics in the 19th and 20th century has not essentially enriched the anti-metaphysical yield, return, output, proceeds, harvest of the four or five previous, preceding centuries; the above-mentioned, already established, settled, fixed, definite main

types undergo, experience various, different modifications, adaptations, variations or elaborations, extensions, kinds of deepening, consolidations: the critique pertaining to the theory of knowledge was varied and enriched on the part of (the) positivists and (some, a number of) philosophers (/ theoreticians) oriented towards (the) natural science(s) as well as representatives of the neo-Kantian school of thought / tendency; the historical-sociological analysis of metaphysical thought / intellectual constructs was further advanced and refined by (/ thanks to) the spectacular development (unfolding, evolution) of the corresponding sciences (in / over the last two centuries): the working on / processing of the logical shortcomings, deficiencies of the language of metaphysics became above all the work of so-called analytic(al) philosophy: and the anthropological way of looking at metaphysics found in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Dilthey, despite essential, significant (content-related) differences (in content) in their each and every respective approach, their leading, authoritative, prevailing modern exponents (pioneers). Nonetheless, as much as this might seem to be a paradox, we must say that in regard to the 19th and 20th century, it is not so important (/ the problem is not) that the modifications, adaptations, variations or elaborations, extensions, kinds of deepening, consolidations of pre-given / predetermined leitmotifs, themes pertaining to the history of ideas be pursued, followed with understanding, but rather it is much more important that an explanation be given of / to explain the reasons why the struggle against metaphysics took on such an extent and such an intensity precisely at a time / in an epoch when metaphysics, after centuries-long attacks against it (/ attacks of four centuries) and all possible arguments had been put forward against its content and form in the past (/ the accumulation of all possible arguments against it), already seemed to be dying. It would be a mistake to think, opine that the harsh (violent, fierce, intense, severe, vigorous, vehement) tones which one finds against metaphysics (/ anti-metaphysical rage, fury, ire, ferocity) in the 19th and 20th century constituted the irritated, petulant (/

was born / begot, generated as a) response to a new (vigour, a) new major, great creative phase in the history of metaphysics (/ creative drive, urge, impulse of metaphysical thought). Attempts at a revival, resuscitation, resurrection and renewal of metaphysics were, of course, by no means absent during the aforementioned period; however when / if we do not look at things from the narrow perspective of professional (career, paid, salaried, University) philosophers, but have a(n over)view of the overall, total development, unfolding, evolution of the history of ideas, then we must call, describe, denote it as a storm in a teacup. The purely, genuinely metaphysical aspect of Hegel's system did not in practice survive the philosopher (/ died with him); English Hegelianism was an intellectual game of a few (idiosyncratic) aristocrats of the spirit-intellect and would have gone unnoticed had it not drawn the polemical attention / fire of the pioneers of analytic(al) philosophy, whilst / whereas the metaphysical elements, moments which appear, arise, crop / pop up (/ and whatever genuinely metaphysical exists) in Kierkegaard, Heidegger or Jaspers have taken / took effect not independently, on a self-contained / self-reliant basis (/ could not function autonomously), but only in their (its) interweaving with the strong, stark -(no matter willingly and confessed, avowed, admitted or unwillingly and unconfessed, unavowed, not admitted)- anthropological tendency of the philosophy of life and of phenomenology.

**THE FOOTNOTES ARE P.K.'s UNLESS INDICATED BY [!!!],
WHEREAS THE END NOTES CONSTITUTE KRAZY MAN STUFF**

ⁱ German edition only.

ⁱⁱ 2012 Greek edition only.

ⁱⁱⁱ The first 3 parts of the Greek edition were written by P.K., whereas the 4th part of the Greek edition is a translation of the German part 4 by Μιχάλης Παπανικολάου / Michael Papanikolaou.

^{iv} The TOTAL FILTH OF THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SHIT-SKATA-EXCREMENT-FAECES-MONKEY-PITHIKOS FREAK SHOW LUNA PARK LOONY BIN MENTALLY RETARDED KOST which is mandated by law !!! as to its number !!! without any !!! investigation allowed of the number !!! and or of the gas !!! etc. !!!, whilst everyone else's number and gas etc. can be investigated and questioned !!!, along with ZIO-USA-promoted "human rights", which are totally non-existent !!! and have never existed !!! is just the secular / non-traditional religious ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ideological form of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-GREAT SATAN rule via ZIO-USA-INTERNATIONAL ZOROS! JOOZ-KIKES-YIDZ (SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY) et al. in "the West" post-ZIO-WW2, supporting ZIO-NEO-NAZI-IZIM in ZIO-JOO-KRANE in our times incl. via ZIO-JOO-ROPA-CHANNEL !!! To the extent that the MAGA-Trump et al. faction can break ZIO-USA away from all the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-"master race, rool da world" ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULL-CRAP-SHIT, then that'll also mean a recalibrating of ZIO-USA values, ideology and practice/praxis. And all the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULL-SHIT about "anti-Satanism" means that the ANTI-CHRIST, GREAT SATAN, EVIL-DEVIL SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGUE Satanists are in power, for Christians in power would only ever care about anti-Christianity, and definitely not "anti-Satanism".

^v All humans act normatively constructing meaning, which is understood in relation to values, which are also constructs. There are no inherent normative values and principles in nature.

^{vi} I.e. anti-metaphysical in relation to the existence of substances, deities, spirits etc. beyond the human and natural world, but not in relation to the existence of ideas as phenomena of false consciousness / ideology which people believe in with up to a fanaticism causing one's own or another's death, even though ideas are constructed by man and don't objectively exist outside of man and the social relation. I believe a cow is a rhinoceros just like you believe a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANOCRACY is a democracy, for instance.

^{vii} Whereas Krazy Man say that you use rational and empirical knowledge to observe that everyone believes (if only in themselves and or in what they do) since everyone must act normatively in relation to self-preservation and or its negation, given the total absence of values and matter-of-taste aesthetical preferences outside of man's construction of values and matter-of-taste aesthetical preferences, and then you believe or don't believe in God based on what you think of the Heterogony of Ends and all other facts you can observe, including the fact that no human or no group of humans can control [KONTROL] everything, either with or without reference to the Great Religious Traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, (Confucianism / Taoism), non-Synagogue of Satan Judeo-Christianity (i.e. the Old Testament and Philo along with the New Testament, but not the traitorous and lying Synagogue of Satan ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ of Judas Iscariot and Doubting Thomas), Mohammedanism). Whilst Scientific Observation does not believe in God, it does observe the existence of values and meaning constructed by man, the fact that man cannot help believing because he must act normatively in a state of false consciousness / ideology, the existence of the Great Religious Traditions and of the Heterogony of Ends and man's inability to fully control (KONTROL) all other men and nature, i.e. to be God.

^{viii} I.e. they did not directly attack Faith / belief in God.

^{ix} As to the senses in general, and not just meant sexually.

^x ὄντος ἢ ὄν.

^{xi} I.e. of the ὄντος ἢ ὄν (which is P.K.'s Greek text), meaning "of the being indeed being", or, "the actual reality of being".

^{xii} As a reaction to the actual Devil / Satan / Lucifer and Lizzard-Entry-ist-JOO-BALL and or ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGUE, i.e. (ZIO-DEVIL-SATAN-cap-wearing doubting Thomas) Aquinas (1225-1274) et al., who sought to delimit God's omnipotence by confining Him within man's knowledge and logic !!!

^{xiii} This is essentially da KRAZY MAN position that everyone must act normatively to survive, i.e. must believe in doing x rather than y (whatever x and y may be), and that since we all must believe and act to live (like it or not) and since no human or humans can control (KONTROL) all other humans and all of nature, then God exists based on the FACTS of necessary belief and the Heterogony of Ends if one decides to believe in Him and to

oppose as one's eternal FOE, SATAN, i.e. THE DEVIL, EVIL, DA JOO, DA KIKE, DA SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN, THE GREAT SATAN, LUCIFER, MAMMON AND DA YID.

^{xiv} Dis essentially means that da ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND HIS ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-ET AL-JOO-ZOMBEE-STOOGES with his JOO-T-GEN-STEYENZ and his JOO-REE-DARZ AND HIS JOO-ZIO-KIKE-YID-LERZ AND HIZ ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES-HOMO-GLOBO-GLOBO-HOMO-JOO-KOZ and his POST-MODERNISMZ-DEE-KON-JOB-STRUKTIONZ ETC. ETC. ETC. AND "REALITY IS LANGUAGE" ETC. ETC. ETC. TOTAL ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT IS FULL OF ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT, APART FROM CHURNING OUT RE-GURGITATED "I'M SO FUCKING INTELLIGENT, I'M SUCH A FUCKING JOO-NIOOS" ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT (DONE UP TO CENTURIES AND MILLENNIA BEFORE BY NON-JOOZ), AND TONNES OF IT TOO!!!

^{xv} Exactly what the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES can't see in the age of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID POWER AND CONTROL (KONTROL) from circa 1800, esp. 1900, onwards until today in "the West".

^{xvi} Only to be replaced by the ANTI-CHRIST ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID illusion of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANOCRACY being the ideological phantasm "dee-mok-ra-see" and of the other ideological phantasm of "human rights" existing such that JOOZ, KIKES AND YIDZ GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY AND VASTLY ASYMMETRICALLY CONTROL (KONTROL) economy, state and culture.

^{xvii} All ideological constructions, -and ideological constructions are absolutely necessary for the functioning of all societies-, mean false consciousness on the part of those having / pretending to have such false consciousness compared to scientifically (i.e. non-normatively and descriptively and explanatorily-analytically) understood empirical-objective reality, whether they refer to traditional and or religious metaphysics or other ideological phantasms Over There, On That Side such as "freedom", "equality", "emancipation", "dee-mok-ra-see", "human rights" etc. etc. etc.. In other words, a kind of metaphysics (starting from the Irrational as a Decision in relation to Power and Identity) is always inevitable in human societies since there are no inherent values, and no society can exist without dominant values and the necessarily authoritarian social order, social cohesion and social disciplining which ensues in relation to a ruling oligarchy, otherwise civil war.

^{xviii} Or put in this crude way : 1) scepticism, agnosticism, Sextus, Cicero & Co + from Comte & Co positivists to a whole host of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID and other neo-Kantians; 2) the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-ET AL-JOO GANG BANG FUCK FEST INCL. Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, ZIO-Ludwig Wittgenstein and from Carnap to ZIO-POP, POP, POP, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-POP-ER "OPEN SOCIETY, NO BORDERS" ZOROS!-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY INTERNATIONAL KIKE AND INTERNATIONAL YID (ZIO) (ending up in totally retarded ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-"I AM A ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES-RETARD" "POST MODERNISM"; 3) from Montesquieu and Tocqueville to ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY INTERNATIONAL KIKE AND INTERNATIONAL YID (ZIO) Marx DA JOO, Spencer, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-Durkheim, Pareto, Toennies, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-Simmel, Veblen, Sombart, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-Mannheim et al. et al. et al.; 4) from Schopenhauer, JOO-LOVER ANTI-CHRIST Nietzsche and Dilthey to ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY INTERNATIONAL KIKE AND INTERNATIONAL YID (ZIO) Freud DA JOO ... [[BUT OBVIOUSLY THERE'S A LOT MORE TO IT, YOOZ NEED TO STUDY THE WHOLE P.K. TEXT OF DIS BOOK]].