

Panajotis Kondylis

**DIE NEUZEITLICHE
METAPHYSIKKRITIK**

- Klett-Cotta –

Panagiotis Kondylis

**THE NEW-TIMES
CRITIQUE OF
METAPHYSICS**

Stuttgart : Klett-Cotta, 1990

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BARBARIAN IDIOM BARBARIAN IDIOT

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

Η ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΦΥΣΙΚΗΣ ΣΤΗ ΝΕΟΤΕΡΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ

ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΜΕΝΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

ΤΟΜΟΣ Α΄

ἀπὸ τὸν ὄψιμο Μεσαίωνα

ὥς τὸ τέλος τοῦ Διαφωτισμοῦ

ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΑΚΕΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ · ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ

2012 (ΠΡΩΤΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ (I – III) : 1983 (ΓΝΩΣΗ))

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

THE CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS IN (MORE) MODERN THOUGHT

COMPLETE EDITION [[IN TWO VOLUMES]]

VOLUME A

from the late Middle Ages

to the end of the Enlightenment

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2012 (I – IV) (FIRST EDITION (I – III) : 1983 (GNOSI / GNOSE, ATHENS))

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IDIOM BY THE KRAZY MAN BARBARIAN IDIOT

My friend Dr. F. Horst read the manuscript and made worthwhile, valuable suggestions for / regarding the shaping, moulding, formation of the text. He has for years supported my work with his advice and in deed, practice, and for this reason I would like to express my gratitude to him.

Panagiotis Kondylisⁱ

PUBLISHER’S NOTEⁱⁱ

Panagiotis Kondylis first published the *Critique of metaphysics in (more) modern thought* in 1983 [[in Greek]], in the “Philosophical and Political Library” by (editions) Gnosi / Gnose (publishers), which (“Philosophical and Political Library”) he directed. This volume covered the period from the late Middle Ages until the end of the Enlightenment. In 1990, the German-language version of the book was published by the publishing house Klett-Cotta, which included an additional 4th part, with its object being the course of the critique of metaphysics during the 19th and 20th century. With the exception of this 4th part (which is fully, entirely, completely absent from the first Greek edition [[of 1983]]), the German edition essentially follows word for word (hot on the trail / in hot pursuit of) the Greek edition.

The complete Greek edition which we present here is separated into two volumes. In the first (such volume), the Greek edition of 1983 is republished, reprinted (without intervention(s), apart from the/a new pagination, the correction of certain oversights and the translation of the foreign-language – mainly Latin – terms appearing), which corresponds with/to the 3 first parts of the German edition. The new edition is complemented/supplemented with an analytical index of concepts.

In the Greek translation of the 4th partⁱⁱⁱ, the attempt is made to follow the terminological, stylistic and (apart from a minimal number of exceptions of

lesser, very slight significance, importance) grammatical-syntactical choices, selections of Kondylis himself, so that the linguistic unity between the two volumes is safeguarded as far as possible, but also the wider, broader coherence with the overall, total Greek-language work of the author, which, besides its in itself / inherent philosophical value, constitutes a supreme, paramount, tip-top, peak contribution to the cultivation of (more, contemporaneous) modern Greek philosophical language.

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Introduction

During the past one hundred years there have already been some attempts to write the history of metaphysics, which, of course, cannot be characterised as complete or otherwise flawless, faultless, impeccable, perfect, irreproachable, unobjectionable¹. However, hitherto no history of the critique of metaphysics has been propounded, submitted, presented, put forward, written, although this

¹ The first histories of metaphysics are written, not by chance, at/in a time (an epoch) in which the rise/development of the natural sciences and the humanities (sciences of the spirit), as well as the spreading of a scientist(ic)-positivist(ic) spirit(-intellect) gave / begot, gave birth to, generated the impression that metaphysics conclusively, irrevocably belonged to the past; thus, these histories have the character of a farewell / fare-thee-well review of a cycle of ideas, which appears to have closed forever [[as P.K. showed in many of his works, there's no such thing/closure; ideological-metaphysical thought is always present in all societies, and it can never be otherwise given that all value-axiological and aesthetical positionings are human constructs and that values, normative action etc. are absolutely unavoidable]]. Dilthey, who was no positivist, but like some others had seen through the consequences of the rise of the sciences for the orientation of new-times intellectual-spiritual life, was the first to set out to tell / sketch out / draft / plan a history of metaphysics, which would simultaneously be a structural analysis and a typology of the same metaphysics (GS, I; cf. ch. IV, sec. 4 d, below) (/ Dilthey, who he too, albeit alien to positivism, considers as the decisive feature of the New Times the autonomous development of various physical and social sciences, evaluates, appraises metaphysics as a passing, transient, transitory phenomenon inside the historically given system of the intellectual-spiritual forms of life; if myth and religion were preceded by metaphysics, contemporary special(ised) sciences succeed it, breaking up, abolishing, catalysing the cognitive unity of medieval theological metaphysics; metaphysics is broken up, fragmented itself into a multitude of contradictory systems and dies, not being able to demonstrate its fundamental hypothesis, that is, the logical systematic unity of everything; its (metaphysics') fusion, amalgamation, merging with the theory of knowledge constitutes a form of euthanasia (Einleitung, esp. 133, 357/9, 405) [Full/Complete bibliographical elements/details of the works referred to and of their available Greek translations are listed / put forward in the Table which is found at the end of the second volume ([[Greek]] publisher's note [[in relation to the 2012 Greek edition]]]]. Not very productive, fertile, profitable, on the contrary, is E. v. Hartmann's somewhat later work, which basically contains barely coherent summaries of philosophical systems and lacks insight into the broader outlines / great lines of the development as well as in the structural meaning, significance of their turning points (/ Under the impression of the rise of the positive sciences does E. v. Hartmann write a few years later his own history of metaphysics, which, however, constitutes a thorough report, essay (in respect) of philosophical systems with a relatively loose, slack coherence and with very few important, significant general observations regarding the great lines of development/evolution); the reference to the spirit of the times is at least established by the thesis that from now on metaphysics may only methodically proceed inductively (/ Hartmann announces the end of traditional metaphysics by saying that from now on metaphysics can solely be an inductive a posteriori science) (Geschichte, II, 594; cf. ch. IV, sec. 2 and 3, below). – Conversely, On the other hand, Heimsoeth's work came into being at a point in time when one / people wanted to confront the spirit of science and help metaphysics gain new strength and validity (/ comes from the reaction against positivism as it manifested itself particularly after the first world war in the efforts, endeavours for the revival, resuscitation, rejuvenation of a metaphysics in the traditional sense). Accordingly, the author does not want to quite accept (/ consciously pushes aside) the meaning, significance and consequences of the fact of new-times science (/ of the development of the positive sciences in the New Times), and he strives, endeavours to refute, confute, disprove, falsify, prove wrong, doubt, call into question the supposedly, ostensibly, allegedly shallow Enlightenment perception (/ conviction of the Enlightenment) that the New Times would have / had stood up (object) to (oppose) the Middle Ages and freed man, humans (/ mean the freeing, liberation of man) from the fetters, bonds of religion and metaphysics; the unity of the New Times and the Middle Ages is shown, seen, demonstrated in accordance with his opinion(, in his opinion,) in the unity of metaphysical questions (problem examination), which in turn are/is religiously moulded, stamped, minted, influenced, (/ has a religious character) etc. (Die sechs großen Themen, esp. 11 ff.). The book constitutes in reality a rhetorical treatise, tract, especially in its one-sided perspective pertaining to philosophy as a calling / occupation / professional philosophy, hardly perceiving the dynamics of other currents and forces in the history of ideas (/ Even though the book became quite widespread, nevertheless it constitutes an intensely rhetorical treatise which subjugates, subordinates, subjects historical development, evolution to the preliminary / in advance metaphysical and world-theoretical preferences of a professional of philosophy who is minimally (only slightly) familiar with the more general history of ideas). We can similarly talk (/ The same can be observed) about Schulz's treatise, which wants to just as little accept that the New Times brought about a radical break (change), upheaval / about-turn, or else, that it placed, put, set men / humans in the place of (man / humans displaced) God, although he admits the essential, substantial, substantive change, transformation of the Christian perception of God (Der Gott, esp. 11 ff., 55). Regarding / Concerning newer, (more) recent attempts to structurally, and at the same time in regard to its overall historical development/evolution, apprehend the metaphysical phenomenon with sociological and anthropological means, see ch. IV, sec. 4 c (esp. regarding Topitsch) (/ The most significant, important post-war general outlining of the metaphysical phenomenon is undoubtedly that of Topitsch. On the basis of findings and methods of the sociology of knowledge, of mass and individual psychology, of ethnography / the study of peoples etc., the author

critique (criticism) represents and constitutes (a) neuralgic, i.e. critical, crucial point / themes, topics of (new-times) (the) spiritual-intellectual life (of the New Times). This gap can be easily explained, if one ponders, contemplates, considers that the most distinguished, significant, important modern opponents of metaphysics belong to the so-called analytic(al) tendency, school of thought, direction in philosophy (/ come from the womb / bosom of so-called analytic(al) philosophy) and hence precisely / that is precisely why they are not distinguished by / do not stand out for the intensity of their interests pertaining to the history of philosophy, whereas, conversely, the direct or indirect heirs, inheritors and successors, continuers of traditional metaphysical thought / thinking have recourse to the history of philosophy in apologetic or eclectic rather than with critical intent. The fact is that *there is* a history of the critique of metaphysics – and indeed not in the sense of an asymmetrical row, series of incoherent and scattered, dissipated epochal attacks against the various versions of metaphysical thought, but rather in the organic sense of temporal succession or of the parallel use of fundamental anti-metaphysical theses, which can be apprehended, assembled retrospectively as a multi-dimensional whole, although every one of them came into being or gained ground only under particular conditions pertaining to the history of ideas. From that it is illuminated / elucidated / arises that a history of the critique of metaphysics taken seriously may not remain fixed to a doxographical one / (such) history. Just as a history of metaphysics, which would deserve / be worthy of the name, should proceed, progress, continue to a typology with (a) systematic claim(s), so too a history of metaphysics is faced with the task, job, duty, mission / obliged, obligated, - through / by means of arriving at the fundamental, basic types through / via / by the study of anti-metaphysical arguments in their conceptual and historical concreteness-, of making (to make) possible, enabling (enable) the logical

interprets the metaphysical construct(ion)s as secular / cosmic projections of human situations, both of biological data as well as of data related/relating to technical and social organisation (Vom Ursprung, 9/11)).

structuring of the material and at the same time an (/ by studying the multiformity of the anti-metaphysical arguments in their specific, concrete manifestation on each and every respective occasion, to deduce, derive from inside of the many-sidedness of the material, those basic types, which allow, permit not only the logical structuring of this material, but the) all-sided contradistinction of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical thought.

An (inadequate, insufficient) history of metaphysics could be perhaps imagined, which would be oriented towards the main perceptions of the being, nature, general character of metaphysics itself, or else, more specifically, towards its triple / threefold Aristotelian definition; then it would be investigated, researched when metaphysics would be looked at / considered and treated / handled principally, mainly as theology, when as ontology and when as the theory / teaching / doctrine of principles (i.e. of the most general principles and causes)². Such a method(ological) approach would, nevertheless, not be particularly fruitful, fertile, fecund for a history of the critique of metaphysics, which can touch upon the problem of the definition of metaphysics only to the extent that this appears necessary for its own ends, goals, purposes.

Notwithstanding that, the absence, lack of a(n) (unambiguous and) generally binding definition of metaphysics (with only one (sole) meaning) not in the least signifies, means that the development, evolution of anti-metaphysical ideas cannot be tracked, pursued with the help of certain conceptual-structural criteria, which formalise / give typical form to the plethora of the historical material (stuff) and simultaneously can make the great turning points in the course of the critique of metaphysics (more) comprehensible (in an elegant and

² Since a solution to this question, problem is not essential, indispensable / is not of direct interest as regards our context / in the context of this work, I shall only refer to some important publications, in which the various views on this question / problem are represented: Ando, *Metaphysics*, 8 ff.; Lotz, *Ontologie und Metaphysik*, 4 ff.; Vollrath, *Gliederung*, 271 ff.; Moser, *Metaphysik*, 1 ff.; Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, 101 ff.; Wagner, *Zum Problem*, esp. 141 ff.; Patzig, *Theologie*, esp. 190 f., 202 ff.; Mansion, *Philosophie première*, esp. 177 ff..

clear fashion). The question / problem is posed / posited / set / put as follows: which features (characteristics, traits, attributes) of the being, nature, (general) character of metaphysics are of immediate, direct significance, meaning for the history of the critique of metaphysics?

The answer to this question, problem must highlight, emphasise, point out two aspects (/ In an aphoristic form / the form of an aphorism, the answer is the following). Every metaphysics rests and is based on the distinction between the transcendental and the immanent, or else, between the supra/hyper-empirical On That Side / Over There / Thence / Beyond / Hereafter / That World and the empirical On This Side / Over Here / Hence / Within / Here(in) / This World, (whilst) understanding, considering the former (On That Side) as the “true” unadulterated (pristine, unspoilt, genuine) reality and at the same time (at least in its great traditional forms, versions) as the source of ethical-normative principles^{iv}. As, in fact, Aristotle writes with classical conciseness, succinctness, pithiness, terseness, if there were no substance outside of those substances which we encounter in empirical(ly given) nature, so/thus physics would be the only science; the precedence, priority, primacy, in fact, the necessity and the existence of metaphysics itself is based, founded in/on (/ is secured by) the conviction that there is an unchangeable, immutable substance on that side / beyond and above nature³. The hierarchy of being founds, consequently, the hierarchy of the levels of knowledge, and the term “metaphysics” aptly, tellingly reflects / accurately renders this double hierarchy⁴. As a / the *form* of knowledge (/ cognitive form), i.e. as a / the system of propositions, which on the basis of

³ Metaphysik, 1526 a 10-23.

⁴ Reiner has compellingly, convincingly shown that the term “metaphysics”, which, as is known, does not come / prop up, appear in Aristotle himself, was created not for mere biblionomic (i.e. as regards the classification of books) reasons by Andronicus of Rhodes [[1st century B.C.]], as dominant / the ruling (/ the generally accepted) tradition (particularly from the 19th century) wants it; rather, it came into being / was born already in the circles of the older Peripatetic philosophers, and indeed in connection with a certain didactic arrangement of the philosophical disciplines (/ didactic series of philosophical lessons), which go back to (/ was instituted, established, founded, enacted by) Aristotle and corresponded with (was/is relevant to) the content, that is, the ontological hierarchy of Aristotelian philosophy (Die Entstehung, esp. 228 ff.).

logical rules are connected with (/ tied to) one another, and irrespective of its each and every respective content or else irrespective of its each and every respective definition of the Transcendent and the Immanent, metaphysics strives after / seeks / pursues the rational-demonstrative apprehension of being and its ultimate, final principles^v. From this point of view, the composition, texture, constitution of (the actually) being does not principally, mainly, chiefly come into play (/ have (carry, possess) importance, gravitas, weight), but rather (of interest is) the fact that the human intellect in its highest and most intensive endeavour(s), effort(s) apprehends (and expresses) being and can bring it into (in) a system of propositions free of contradiction(s). Consequently, metaphysics appears as tangible, (f)actual proof of the omnipotence of Reason.

In order to be able to comprehend the escalation (gradation) and the phases of the new-times critique of metaphysics, we must hold onto the fact / point out that both aforementioned features of metaphysical constructs (i.e. the distinction between (the) Transcendental (Over There) and (the) Immanent (Over Here) as well as the demand for a rationally complete / total, full knowledge of (the actually) being) do not either logically or historically belong together, although / even though they are interwoven in some of the / many an important metaphysical system(s) of philosophical tradition. (Because) The distinction between (the) transcendental (Over There) and (the) immanent (Over Here) can be conceded, granted, allowed, admitted without Reason being regarded as capable of apprehending the former (transcendental / Over There) – and the other way around / vice versa / inversely, conversely: the knowledge-based omnipotence of Reason can still be believed (accepted) even after the above-mentioned distinction (as we know it from tradition) has been put / set aside, eliminated⁵. The following analysis of the historical material will put to the test

⁵ In this case the term “metaphysics” preserves, maintains, keeps, retains, gets, receives a(n) (theory of knowledge(-related) and) epistemological meaning (also pertaining to the theory of knowledge) (as this, incidentally, usually, commonly, most frequently occurs / happened since (from) Bacon (and thereafter), see

(proof) / will prove / will show us the fertility, fecundity, fruitfulness of this elementary conceptual differentiation. And in actual fact, (the) new-times polemics against metaphysics points to two logically different, albeit temporally in many ways / in many cases intertwined with one another (in part successive / on top of one another / multi-layered) aspects. On the one hand, metaphysics is rejected / disapproved / spurned / attacked as complete, full, self-contained rational knowledge (science), i.e. as the extraction, sourcing of (the) ultimate truths by / with (the) means of Reason, on the other hand, the metaphysical distinction between (the) Transcendental and (the) Immanent is relativised or cancelled / lifted / rejected. This latter (rejection of the distinction between the Transcendental and the Immanent) / second —much (and by far) more radical— form (of the critique) of metaphysics (criticism) is moulded, shaped, formed considerably, significantly later than the former (rejection of metaphysics as complete knowledge extracting ultimate truths by means of Reason) / first, i.e. it is openly and systematically / consciously articulated first by the materialism of the 18th century, even though it is prepared by the pantheistic tendencies of the natural philosophy of the Renaissance and by Spinozism. However, the new-times struggle, fight, combat against metaphysics commences, starts, begins with the calling into question, doubting or with the direct rejection of (the knowledge) claims (to / on knowledge) of/by metaphysical Reason, that is, with the fundamental denial, renunciation of the possibility of metaphysics as the

below ch. II, 3; III, 3; IV, 3) and it means, suggests the ultimate or else first principles (/ the totality of the ultimate axioms), upon which every knowledge must rest / be based. The distinction between Over There / On That Side and Over Here / On This Side no longer relates / refers to the difference of / in essence of the ontological levels (as) between one another in the traditional sense, but it arises out of / from the contrast, opposition, contradistinction of / between the hyper / supra-empirical character of those principles (axioms) vis-à-vis mere empirical knowledge; the intelligible Over There / On That Side is therefore here the ensemble of the logical or mathematical relations, which, as it were / so to speak, bear, carry, support / stand behind (the) empirical appearances, occurrences, phenomena (propping them up in some kind of way). [[The following is not in the German edition, but only in the Greek edition of P.K.'s text]] Precisely such a(n) expansion, dilation of Over There and Over Here gives / provides the possibility of talk of "metaphysics" occurring, taking place, even though its (metaphysics') traditional content has been set / put aside. For a contemporary logico-mathematical metaphysics in the aforementioned sense see typically Scholz, *Metaphysik*, esp. 158 ff., 174 ff. (cf. footnote 517, below).

complete, full, self-contained rational knowledge (science) of (the actually) being. Since the rejection of metaphysics *in this sense* does not touch upon / doubt the (crucial) – at least for the ideologically dominant, ruling Christian perception – (central) distinction between That Side / Over There and This Side / Over Here, thus the critique (rebuttal, rebuff, confutation) of metaphysics of the earlier New Times was ambivalent and ambiguous, because the innovative / latest profane (secular) tendencies on many occasions intersected / were fused in its framework with the reaction of broad theological circles against the Thomasian attempt at the coupling, marriage, espousal, wedding of theology and metaphysics, faith/belief and Reason – a reaction which drew its strength, force, power from / was fed (nurtured) by the Augustinian tradition and took / adopted, as we shall see, the form of nominalism in order to thereafter manifest itself anew (/ before peaking / climaxing) in Lutheranism.

The new-times critique of metaphysics begins, therefore, with the cutting, curtailment, truncation, clipping, pruning, trimming, cutback, lopping, paring of the (cognitive) (cap)abilities (at knowing / of knowledge) of Reason with regard to (the) ultimate truths, i.e. the rational apprehension of the transcendental (Over There). This process is accordingly complicated, and contradictorily, in that for this cutting, curtailment, truncation, clipping, pruning, trimming, cutback, lopping, paring, (/ This curtailment is preached —and this precisely makes this process complicated and contradictory— by) both theologians / theologists use, employ that which in (/ who fear that) the mixing, mixture, blending of Reason and faith/belief they see, behold, perceive to (/ in the end will) be a danger, risk for (/ necessarily harm, damage) the latter (faith/belief), as well as / and / whereas (by) pioneers of new-times rationalism, who under the circumstances of the ideological omnipotence (and the ideological present/presence) of religion (and the Church) do not dare (even if they think in relation to that) to attack (/ turn against) the On That Side / Over There, and hence attempt (/

attempting) to make it / the On That Side / Over There irrelevant, indifferent in practice: if the On That Side / Over There cannot be apprehended rationally, then Reason should preferably turn towards the On This Side / Over Here, towards (the) physical and human reality. Agnosticism, which in the early New Times provides, supplies (constitutes) the most powerful / clear-cut (main) theoretical weapon for the combating of metaphysics, can consequently be of theological-fideist(ic) as well as profane(secular)-sceptical lineage, origin, ancestry, descent, without this ambiguity (two-sidedness) (ever) (initially) being conscious to those concerned (/ even many of its (agnosticism's) representatives). An important step in the history of anti-metaphysical^{vi} thought is made (taken) / carried out at the moment at which (/ when) both types of (the aforementioned) agnosticism are separated from each other (/ expanded more and more) in order to be put / placed / posited in/at the service of two fundamentally / basically / radically different world-theoretical stances, attitudes: theological agnosticism combats, fights metaphysics as rational knowledge in order to protect God and faith / belief from the decomposing, subversive, poisonous, destructive effect, impact of Reason and of rational argumentation (/ far from every dangerous contact with the criticism of Reason), whereas profane (secular, mundane) agnosticism asserts, stresses the impossibility of the rational knowledge (of being or else) of God, not with the intent of keeping (/ to protect) faith/belief (intact), but on the contrary, in order to conclusively, definitively decouple (fortify, establish the autonomy of) rational knowledge (from belief/faith and to make it (i.e. rational knowing/knowledge) independent, autonomous, self-contained, self-reliant, self-standing),(/ ;) by declaring its exclusive object and field of activity to be the On This Side / Over Here and the empirical world (/ in the first case, i.e. faith/belief was primarily of interest, whilst in the second case knowledge — which moreover, after its programmatic separation from God and faith/belief, has as its exclusive object and field of activity the Over Here, the generally

empirical world)^{vii}. Despite the (this) radical contrast / opposition (being revealed / seeing the light of day) in the orientation and in the function of both types of agnosticism, the representatives of profane (secular) anti-metaphysical agnosticism continued gladly and often to invoke their (negative) agreement with the theological rejection of metaphysics as rational knowledge^{viii}, since they sought / looked for in that an ideological alibi, which could safeguard, protect them from attacks by the still (always) (almost) omnipotent, all-powerful Church.

The appearance, emergence, advent of mathematical natural science at the beginning of the 17th century strongly promoted, fostered, encouraged the moving / going away from each other, breakup (/ assisted the expansion, dilation [away from each other]) of both types of agnosticism, which from the 14th until the 16th century blossomed, flourished, thrived in a tense symbiosis. Whilst mathematical natural science counterposed / contrasted a radically novel / new kind of and no(t) less complete, self-contained, full secular / profane / mundane world image to the Scholastic-Aristotelian (theological) world image / perception, pushed, propelled the theological and religious positions into the / a defensive position / to take a defensive stance and forced them into a mistrust, distrust against perceptions which in earlier times could appear as / to be harmless, not dangerous, safe or else legitimate, but which under the new circumstances had to take / adopt / assume another (different) character. From the point of view of our setting of the question / question formulation, the essential contribution of mathematical natural science consists in the ontological revaluation of the sensorial, sense-related, sensual^{ix} world. If this (sensorial world) was ontologically held / considered to be defeated, inferior in the framework, context of classical ancient-Christian metaphysics, i.e. to be irrational or contingent in its structure and hence (in contrast to the sphere of the transcendental spirit) inaccessible to / for purely intellectual apprehension (/

impervious (not susceptible) to a purely mental conception), thus it now appears as a coherent system of strict law-bound (deterministic or law(rule)-based) relations, which are capable of a logical-mathematical understanding and interpretation and exactly because of that/this make up / constitute not merely the object of a science which must stand / be (found) under (/ (of) secondary (value/significance) in relation to) metaphysics, but of a science par excellence – if only the word ‘science’ is understood in the (new-times) sense (of the New Times). In this way / Thus, (the) ontological setting of the question / problem (question) (formulation, examination) is displaced, supplanted by (the) methodological problem (formulation, examination), and the search for the *certitudo modi procedendi* puts / overshadows the traditional primacy of the *certitudo objecti* (in the shade). Simultaneously, mathematical natural science unifies the world image and it is completely subjected / subjugated / subordinated to a complete, total law bindedness (determinism, law-based necessity); the putting / setting aside, sidelining, elimination, abolition of the Aristotelian division of the cosmos into a celestial, heavenly and a sublunar, earthly, terrestrial region, in which there was alone, only, solely movement, motion and decay, spoilage, corruption, wear and tear, wastage, fading, ceasing to exist, extracted, took away, withdrew, so to speak, from the metaphysical distinction between On That Side / Over There and On This Side / Over Here its cosmological concomitant or prop, support, pillar, rest. If (a(ny)) metaphysics cannot be understood / thought about without a certain hierarchy / hierarchisation of (the) ontological levels, then mathematical natural science was extremely, markedly, pronouncedly anti-metaphysical in the sense that it brought down in one fell swoop / crashing down or at least drastically simplified the traditional hierarchy of the substances, which served not merely, simply, only classificatory, but precisely normative (axiological) goals, ends, purposes. The mathematicisation or else quantification of nature, which was counterposed to the Scholastic-Aristotelian qualitative way of looking at things,

nevertheless implied the separation of the properties, qualities, characteristics of the natural bodies into (the) primary (i.e. hyper / supra-empirical and mathematically apprehensible (/ expressed in purely mathematical relations)) and (the) secondary (i.e. empirical and incapable of / a total, complete mathematical apprehension (/ impervious to mathematical expression)) (properties of the natural bodies). This seemed to bring back to life anew the classical metaphysical distinction between the substance and its accidental occurrences (happenings, incidents, events) (accidents), albeit this time from an essentially different perspective (/ with a totally new meaning). That is why it came about / happened that at precisely the moment at which / precisely when mathematical natural science immobilised, incapacitated metaphysics as a rational science of being (qua being / as such)^x, a new (kind of) / novel metaphysics came into being, which revolved (circled) around / referred primarily to the problem of substance (essence), which predominated in the metaphysical constructions of the 17th century. It would, nonetheless, be an optical illusion to think that “metaphysics” in (regard to) its essence would (have) simply continue(d) on its regal, kingly path, way, road and would (have) remain(ed) untouched by the new developments. Precisely the opposite was (is) the case. Not only were its questions (problem examinations) reformulated in the light of the problem examination (/ on the basis of the questions) of mathematical natural science / physics, but its basic concepts were structured (less so or more so) in accordance with models pertaining to natural science too; in most cases, furthermore, the new primacy of the theory of knowledge explicitly or implicitly replaces the traditional primacy of ontology. For these reasons, and although the works of a Malebranche or Leibniz, for instance, in themselves of course do not represent and constitute a contribution to the critique of metaphysics, yet the history of this latter critique of metaphysics necessarily concerns certain aspects (characteristics) of them (i.e. the works of Malebranche or Leibniz): the crisis of metaphysics is inseparably connected

with the critique of metaphysics.

Already in the 17th century, therefore, the essential difference between traditional philosophical thought from modern philosophical thought becomes visible. In the former (traditional philosophical thought), *the metaphysical problem* in the sense of the investigation of the character of the Is of being^{xi} is the focus (stands at the centre) of attention, [[and]] thus the latter (modern philosophical thought) deals with the *problem of metaphysics*, and indeed often in the sense of a (radical) doubt(ing) of the expediency, purposefulness (end (goal) orientation) and usefulness, utility of that investigation⁶. In the age, epoch of the Enlightenment – and if we leave to one side / forego / do without / disregard some kinds / a certain kind of / certain, some philosophical construction(s) like the Wolffian, which (rather / more likely) gives the impression of a(n) antediluvian, pre-historic monster – the venerable question, problem, issue of the being as being [[ὄντος ἢ ὅν “of the being indeed being”, or, “the actual reality of being”]] is hardly posed / posited, and the concept of substance, which had still concerned, preoccupied Locke so intensively, moves completely into the background / margins after Berkley’s and Hume’s objections (critique). Generally, the philosophical literature of the Enlightenment devotes, dedicates considerably less space to the (thorough) critique (criticism) of basic, fundamental concepts of Scholastic-Aristotelian logic and metaphysics (ὅν ἢ ὅν, catholic / universal concepts, categories etc.) than the anti-metaphysical literature of the 15th or of the 16th century(,) and the reason for this is, of course, not the (some kind of) respect of the Enlighteners / Enlightenment philosophers for the aforementioned concepts – on the contrary: these were held / considered to be so empty of content / contentless and meaningless that hardly anyone felt compelled to (seriously) concern themselves with them (in earnest). Instead of this, the Enlightenment

⁶ In accordance with a formulation by Faggiotto, Problema, 15.

philosophers / Enlighteners do something else: when they do not polemicise openly against metaphysics, they deprive, revoke, extract, take away from its concept its traditional sense/meaning and correspondingly interpret it with regard to the new primacy of the theory of knowledge over ontology, whereby / in relation to which metaphysics is reduced to gnoseology or epistemology (is changed / transformed (into) (or restricted, limited) to general epistemology). This development / These developments(, which we shall study analytically, in detail below / in what follows,) take(s) place, again, in the framework, context of a hitherto / until then unprecedented, unheard-of intensification, aggravation (the most dramatic culmination) of the anti-metaphysical struggle, i.e. of the first massively open and programmatic (expressed, explicit) rejection of the difference, distinction between the transcendental / Transcendental and the immanent / Immanent in all its Christian and pre-Christian variations (separation of the On That Side / Over There / In That World and the On This Side / Over Here / In This World both in its pre-Christian as well as its Christian forms).

The putting / setting aside of the Transcendental, of the foundation stone / cornerstone of every metaphysics, was accompanied by the appearance, advent, arrival of new *types* of the critique of metaphysics. From the 14th century until the 16th century, when one, as mentioned, rejected metaphysics from the standpoint of the theological or profane (secular) denial of the possibility of a rational knowledge of being^{xiii}, two basic / fundamental types of the critique of metaphysics were used. The first of them / the said types was the kind pertaining to the theory of knowledge and rested / was based on the proof / proving of the limits, boundaries of human reason, which must rely on / be supported, propped up, underpinned, bolstered by uncertain, incomplete, or even deceptive sensory (sensorial) data and hence cannot obtain, acquire either ultimate certainties or decisively widen, broaden its horizon – unless / except

with the help of godly, divine enlightenment. The empiricism pertaining to the theory of knowledge served, in the course of this, not always a profane(secular)-on-this-side/of-this-world world-theoretical positioning, stance (/ was put in the service not of a secular this-world-worshipping orientation), as this happened as a rule in the 18th century, but it accompanied (the) theological teaching, doctrine, theory of the Fall of Man / Original Sin and the limitedness, limitations or else obscurity reduced / going back to this Fall of Man / Original Sin, which can only be overcome, surmounted through (dissolved by) faith, belief and not for instance rational metaphysical knowledge^{xiii}. After Sextus's and Cicero's (*Academicae Questiones*) rediscovery in the 16th century, the leitmotif, theme of the boundaries, limits of human reason in its dependence on unreliable sensory (sensorial) data was (gradually) translated into profane (secular) language and incorporated in profane(secular)-anti(-)theological scepticism. In the second main type of the early critique of metaphysics, again, the weight, *gravitas* (centre of gravity of attention) is laid / falls on language and the attempts at the working out / processing / outlining of a metaphysics are denounced, pilloried / regarded as a(n) abuse, misuse of the language's inherent logical deficiencies / expressive imperfections or as a violation, transgression of its rules / laws. This type is formed, moulded, shaped in times when the humanist movement rediscovers ancient rhetoric and counterposes it to logic and to (the) dialectic(s); rhetoric is here understood in the wide, broad sense of the knowledge of rules, laws of human communication in the framework, context of social life and with the help of the medium (/ the basic organ) of language, which, hence, becomes the object of particular and systematic interest. This / These (/ It is worth underlining the) old origin(s), provenance, descent, lineage, derivation, extraction of the critique / criticism of metaphysics as the critique of language itself must especially, particularly be emphasised, especially in view of (/ refuting, confuting, opposing, rebutting) today's widespread perception that this kind of critique of metaphysics would first arise

/ first appeared with the so-called analytic(al) philosophy of our [[20th]] century^{xiv}.

In the age / epoch of the Enlightenment, both of these earlier, previous types of the new-times critique of metaphysics retain their strength unabated: agnosticism always serves / continues to serve in the sense explained above as an alibi vis-à-vis theology, and the phenomenon of language likewise stands / is at the (epi)centre of philosophical attention, although / even though this time, of course, from a new point of view, it is, namely, investigated in the attempt at / the context (framework) of the construction (building, constitution, composition, formation) of a satisfactory empiricist theory of knowledge, which is supposed to explicate, explain the critical transition from sensory (sensorial) data to the higher, superior (thought (intellectual)) operations (of thought) also by means of the (/ with the intermediate stage being the genesis and) gradual formation, development of a(n) always more / more and more complicated language (sign) system (of signs) (– first and foremost of linguistic / language signs); metaphysics (here again) is dismissed / brushed aside (anew) as the illegitimate result (aftereffect, consequence) of the shortcomings (defects) of language or as the/a violation, transgression against / of its rules (laws). Nonetheless, the radical approach to / radicality of the putting (setting) aside (abolition) of the metaphysical distinction between / separation of the On That Side / Over There / Thence / Beyond / Hereafter / That World and the On This Side / Over Here / Hence / Within / Here(in) / This World, had to / could not but bring into being / call into life / be accompanied by the appearance of (new and more) radical types of the critique of metaphysics. From (In other words: from) the moment at which the decision for / in favour of the setting (putting) aside, elimination of (traditional) Transcendence occurs (/ the moment the Transcendental is abolished), the main / chief anti-metaphysical task does not consist anymore in proving, demonstrating the incapability of metaphysics at /

for / as regards the rational apprehension (and in terms of proof) of this Transcendence, but rather (much more) in making comprehensible the fact that(,) and how(,) such a great illusion as the separation (of the world) between (into) the Transcendental and the Immanent could have come about at all. A double, twofold explanation is offered for that, which brings about / forth (/ The explanation is given in two ways, which, in (their) turn, beget) two new types of the critique of metaphysics. The first of these we can call the historical-sociological type and look at as the product of the intersection of two important and characteristic aspects (sides) of (the intellectual life of) (the) Enlightenment (ideas / body of thought / thoughts world), i.e. the critique of Christianity and at the same time the formation, development of a new kind, not merely political, but rather sociologically oriented description of history / historiography, from whose bosom, womb the modern concept of “ideology” (as false, – reflecting, mirroring in a distorted, warped fashion, manner, social conditions / states (of affairs) of life and simultaneously claims to / on rule, dominance / dominant authority of rationalising and legitimising – consciousness) finally arose / resulted (/ was born as false consciousness which indirectly reflects specific, concrete biotic, vital, life(-related) situations or conceals, covers up claims of rule, dominance (dominant authority)). The critique of Christianity, which often(times) could go / pass over (/ was automatically converted) to a critique of religion in general, made both the religious roots and the features, characteristics, attributes, traits of metaphysics as well as its entanglement, interconnection, interlocking, interweaving with religiously sanctioned forms of rule, dominance / dominant authority clear, apparent^{xv}; thus understood, metaphysics appeared as the mere, simple philosophical processing of / working on (kinds of) religious illusions, conceits (imagination), fantasies, which stemmed (originated, came) from (/ took root in) dark passions and still darker prejudices, yet gradually had to take on, adopt and retain the form of a system of ideas (an ideas system) (which was perpetuated)(,) because it fulfilled a

(specific/concrete) social function, blessing the rule, dominance, dominant authority of some and alleviating, sweetening the subjugation of others with all sorts (kinds) of consolations. From these ascertainments (/ this point of view), it followed / seemed that the metaphysical illusion could not last any longer than its causes, that it would therefore inevitably, inescapably, unavoidably disappear, vanish after the universal maturation, ripening of human Reason and after social emancipation^{xvi}. Precisely at this point does the second of both new types of the critique of metaphysics, -which we want to name/call the anthropological type in contrast to the just mentioned historical-sociological type-, differ, deviate, diverge from this first type. Also here metaphysics does not appear as the reliable, dependable, trustworthy rational apprehension (knowledge) of (the really, truly) being, but as the outflow (aftereffect, consequence, effluent, discharge) of certain deeper needs of human nature – needs both of a cognitive as well as a volitive and normative (/ ethical, moral) character. But completely irrespective of whether metaphysics takes root in the Irrational and consists of illusions, delusions (or not)^{xvii}, it will remain living, alive and socially having an effect, effective, effectual, functional, influential as long as human nature and its needs (/ the aforementioned needs of human nature) do not change.

As the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment reached its close, conclusion, end(ing), all four main types of the critique of metaphysics, as we know them today, had more or less been developed, formed: the critique of metaphysics pertaining to the theory of knowledge, the linguistic, the historical-sociological and the anthropological [[critiques of metaphysics]]^{xviii}. Contrary to a widespread impression, we must point out here that the critique of metaphysics in the 19th and 20th century has not essentially enriched the anti-metaphysical yield, return, output, proceeds, harvest of the four or five previous, preceding centuries; the above-mentioned, already established, settled, fixed, definite main

types undergo, experience various, different modifications, adaptations, variations or elaborations, extensions, kinds of deepening, consolidations: the critique pertaining to the theory of knowledge was varied and enriched on the part of (the) positivists and (some, a number of) philosophers (/ theoreticians) oriented towards (the) natural science(s) as well as representatives of the neo-Kantian school of thought / tendency; the historical-sociological analysis of metaphysical thought / intellectual constructs was further advanced and refined by (/ thanks to) the spectacular development (unfolding, evolution) of the corresponding sciences (in / over the last two centuries): the working on / processing of the logical shortcomings, deficiencies of the language of metaphysics became above all the work of so-called analytic(al) philosophy: and the anthropological way of looking at metaphysics found in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Dilthey, despite essential, significant (content-related) differences (in content) in their each and every respective approach, their leading, authoritative, prevailing modern exponents (pioneers). Nonetheless, as much as this might seem to be a paradox, we must say that in regard to the 19th and 20th century, it is not so important (/ the problem is not) that the modifications, adaptations, variations or elaborations, extensions, kinds of deepening, consolidations of pre-given / predetermined leitmotifs, themes pertaining to the history of ideas be pursued, followed with understanding, but rather it is much more important that an explanation be given of / to explain the reasons why the struggle against metaphysics took on such an extent and such an intensity precisely at a time / in an epoch when metaphysics, after centuries-long attacks against it (/ attacks of four centuries) and all possible arguments had been put forward against its content and form in the past (/ the accumulation of all possible arguments against it), already seemed to be dying. It would be a mistake to think, opine that the harsh (violent, fierce, intense, severe, vigorous, vehement) tones which one finds against metaphysics (/ anti-metaphysical rage, fury, ire, ferocity) in the 19th and 20th century constituted the irritated, petulant (/

was born / begot, generated as a) response to a new (vigour, a) new major, great creative phase in the history of metaphysics (/ creative drive, urge, impulse of metaphysical thought). Attempts at a revival, resuscitation, resurrection and renewal of metaphysics were, of course, by no means absent during the aforementioned period; however when / if we do not look at things from the narrow perspective of professional (career, paid, salaried, University) philosophers, but have a(n over)view of the overall, total development, unfolding, evolution of the history of ideas, then we must call, describe, denote it as a storm in a teacup. The purely, genuinely metaphysical aspect of Hegel's system did not in practice survive the philosopher (/ died with him); English Hegelianism was an intellectual game of a few (idiosyncratic) aristocrats of the spirit-intellect and would have gone unnoticed had it not drawn the polemical attention / fire of the pioneers of analytic(al) philosophy, whilst / whereas the metaphysical elements, moments which appear, arise, crop / pop up (/ and whatever genuinely metaphysical exists) in Kierkegaard, Heidegger or Jaspers have taken / took effect not independently, on a self-contained / self-reliant basis (/ could not function autonomously), but only in their (its) interweaving with the strong, stark -(no matter willingly and confessed, avowed, admitted or unwillingly and unconfessed, unavowed, not admitted)- anthropological tendency of the philosophy of life and of phenomenology.

If now metaphysics in actual fact had already (in the 18th century conclusively) lost its old status, position and for the most part its (cap)ability at renewing itself as well, too, how is then the vehemence, ferocity, intensity, ardour of the critique of metaphysics in the 19th and 20th century to be explained (/ to what is due the outbreak and deepening of the critique, criticism against it (metaphysics))? The amazing, astonishing, astounding, surprising, striking, extraordinary rise, ascent, climb, advancement (unprecedented growth, development) of / in (the) natural science(s), technique (technology,

engineering, mechanics) and industry in / during the course of the 19th century was first of all sustained by a sense of confidence in the capabilities of the human spirit oriented to this side (i.e. earthly endeavour) (/ was accompanied by a climate of trust(fulness), confidence in the human mind) and in the historical future, the extent of which is difficult to imagine today ; this positioning, stance had often sought its own world-theoretical (self-)confirmation in the spectacular defeat, rout (prostration, suppression) of a foe, opponent already bleeding to death, who was attacked all the more frequently the more certain (the) victory seemed / appeared to be. Of course, Certainly, (/ It is a fact that) the ideological reorganisation of social-political “reaction” after 1789 and in particular after 1815 (had) favoured the (some kind of) revival (resuscitation, resurrection) of metaphysical tendencies (here, hither belong not only *certain* aspects of post-Kantian German idealism, but also the Romantic aestheticisation of Christian metaphysics, whereby / in relation to which, of course, its traditional content and meaning was partially diluted, watered-down, [[and]] partly abandoned, relinquished, betrayed), so that the victory of new-times rationalism over metaphysics (had to be repeated) in miniature / on a small scale, or else, the game of centuries in / over [[a few]] decades(, had to be repeated) (/ had to be played again synoptically over a few decades which previously had lasted for centuries) ; in the course of this, (/ the result was that) the impression came into being that here it is a matter of a new struggle, and not merely the concluding phase of an old struggle. The rapid, quick content-related widening, broadening, extension, expansion of the (natural and social) sciences (of nature and of society) (/ enrichment of the sciences of society and of man) offered, for its part, the anti-metaphysical struggle so many arguments that the feeling of a groundbreaking, pioneering, trailblazing new approach could not fail to appear, materialise / was unavoidable (/ was reinforced, even if these (sciences of society and of man) did not mean, signify some kind of substantive caesura, breakthrough, revolution, turn of events from a form-related, morphological

point of view^{xix}).

The in(cap)ability of traditional metaphysics to essentially, substantively renew itself / be renewed under these circumstances, conditions (/ from the point of view of its content after the growth in / development of the newer, (more) modern physical and social sciences), did not eo ipso bring about / on, cause, induce, mean, signify its (traditional metaphysics') death. Its putting, being put / setting aside could not in the least be complete, absolute as long as that which we can / could call (folk) metaphysics (of the people, folk), i.e. religion, survived and still unfolded, developed a social effect, impact; the meaning, significance of the survival of folk metaphysics for the non, not or less folk(sy), popular, traditional metaphysics was shown, demonstrated, by the way, directly by the appearance, arrival of currents like e.g. neo-Thomism. This tenacious, tough, stiff, dogged, hard-boiled, hardened, hard-as-nails persistence, perseverance of traditional metaphysics lies / is due, (despite the multi-front polemics against it and despite its in(cap)ability, incapacity for, at / in respect of essential, substantive renewal), in the final analysis, in / to the moral/ethical-normative functions of the fundamental difference / basic distinction between the (spiritual-intellectual) On That Side / Over There / In That World and the (sensorial, sensory) On This Side / Over Here / In This World; as is (well-) known, the sphere of the (divine, godly and of the in many cases/ways related, affiliated and intertwined with it human) spirit constituted in the metaphysical tradition the bearer, carrier and guarantor of moral/ethical-normative principles⁷. If / When we consider / It suffices to reflect upon how obvious, evident and necessary the relation between spirit and norm(s) (/ of the concept of values with the concept of the spirit) in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of men, humans, people still was / seemed (before) two centuries (ago)^{xx}, [[and]] then

⁷ Regarding the ethical-normative function of the concept of the spirit(-intellect) in (the) philosophical tradition, see (in detail, analytically) Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, 19ff..

we can more easily explain the longevity of (folk) metaphysics. On the basis of the original interweaving of ethics and metaphysics, the metaphysical sanction(ing) of norms and values had (was destined) to, necessarily suffer(ed) the least and last as a result of the collapse of the ideological monopoly of religion^{xxi}.

The organic unity of ethics and metaphysics now sprang from the need of the former to “objectively” justify, rationalise, found, establish, fortify, give reasons for its each and every respective command, (respective) order(s), by appealing (invoking) not merely (to) the righteousness, uprightness, integrity, honesty, probity, rectitude, correctness, tact and the insight, understanding, pure intent(ions) of those acting, (the) actors (on its behalf) (/ its respective representatives), but by invoking the constitution, composition, texture of (the really, truly, (f)actually) being; only an ethics can pose as objective and binding, unshaking, unwavering which agrees with the eternal and unchangeable, invariable laws of “true” reality, as these laws reveal(ed), open(ed) up the metaphysical apprehension of being (/ this latter “true” reality). Nonetheless – and this is a point of decisive meaning, significance for the fate, destiny, lot of metaphysics no longer as content, but as a / the structure of (the) concept(s) / conceptual structure – the representatives of new-times rationalism wanted to attribute, give, lend to / confer, bestow upon their own ethical norms and values^{xxii} the same highest, supreme, paramount objectivity and bindingness, which (was claimed by those (values) of / connected with) traditional metaphysics (laid claim to in respect of its own values). That / This constituted an effective weapon in the ideological struggle/fight, however, the price for that was the unconscious acceptance, acquisition, appropriation, adoption of fundamental structures of precisely traditional metaphysics. In order (to be able) to set up, establish, install, lay down, erect, put forward, find an On That Side / Over There / In That World capable of fulfilling ethical-normative functions, the

representatives, pioneers of new-times (“anti-metaphysical”) rationalism had to take refuge in concepts like Nature, Man, Reason or History, which contained a hyper/supra-empirical aspect in whose light its empirical component, dimension was seen and valued, evaluated, assessed, judged, appraised ; the objective, end, aim here also remained the subjection, subjugation, subordination, compliance, conformity, conformation of the empirical (component, dimension, element) under / to, with the hyper/supra-empirical, e.g. the adaptation, adjustment, harmonisation of the behaviour and of the way of thinking, mode of thought of empirical man to, with the command(ment)s of the Idea of Man or else to, with a hyper / supra-individual Reason or the moulding, shaping, formation of (an) individual, in-part human act(s), action(s), way(s) of acting in agreement with the course and the sense of “Nature” or of “History”⁸. Precisely because the aforementioned, above-mentioned central concepts of new-times rationalism absorbed, took on / in, received, adopted, appropriated the essential structural features of traditional metaphysics, they drew, attracted (were targeted by) the fire(power) (upon themselves) of modern anti-metaphysical directions, tendencies, schools of thought, like e.g. of so-called critical rationalism^{xxiii} ; consequently, hence, the seeming paradox happens, comes about, arises that the modern opponents of metaphysics do not so much combat, battle, fight the traditional forms [[of metaphysics]] themselves, but rather those forms which were counterposed to the traditional forms [[of metaphysics]](,) often with an anti-theological intent(ion). That / This (apparent, seeming) paradox becomes clear if we consider, reflect upon, think about which social-political constructs were ideologically legitimised / legitimated by slogans, (watch)words, mottoes, paroles like Man or History and which, on the contrary, are the social-political options, choices of the opponents of such slogans. To the extent/degree, namely, that the struggle between the/an “open” and the/a “closed” society replaced /

⁸ Ibid., esp. 53 ff., 342 ff..

took the place of the old struggle between the feudal-absolutist(ic) and the bourgeois-liberal (bourgeois and the feudal) order (of things), (it was natural that) the secularised metaphysics as the ideology of a “closed” society was also declared (considered) to be the main, chief foe (of the liberal^{xxiv} critique of metaphysics). Also, the struggle of the advocates, champions, proponents, defenders (/ It must, nevertheless, be underlined, emphasised, highlighted that also the polemics of the theoreticians) of the “open” society against “totalitarianism” must / is necessarily, however, (be) conducted, waged, led in the name of (/ with reference to) certain values (Freedom, Humanity, Human Rights etc.) (/ Reason^{xxv}, freedom, human individuality and personality), which exactly like all other values represent and constitute the products of hyper / supra-empirical world-theoretical decisions too, as well. This speaks for / in favour of (/ This fact reinforces) the assumption (supposition, hypothesis) that certain fundamental metaphysical thought (intellectual) structures (/ (the) basic conceptual structures of metaphysics), irrespective of the extent, magnitude, degree, scale, size, volume of their secularisation, will continue to exist for as long as people, humans, men set up, establish, put forward, lay down and champion, defend, advocate, uphold (/ formulate and believe) moral/ethical-normative principles.

The secularisation of metaphysics has not been / was not the single, only, unique, singular form of its survival(.) (in which it –) next to / alongside the massive, significant, important remnants, leftovers, relics of its traditional versions, variants (– (has) survived). It also happened, occurred / The phenomenon also appeared that whole circles of ideas, which originally, initially came into being / were born in the womb, bosom, lap of traditional metaphysics and belonged organically to it, have (had) been / were detached / broke away from it (traditional metaphysics) (/ their initial natural context, framework) and were reproduced, propagated, transplanted (as a whole, intact, in an integral,

undivided form and in a critical position) in areas, realms, sectors of philosophy which (otherwise) were genuinely, actually regarded as new creations and characteristic (thought, intellectual) approaches (of thought / to thinking) (representative) of new-times rationalism. I would like here to mention an example, which, despite / notwithstanding its wide/far-reaching, extensive meaning, significance, has not(, from what I know,) yet been given / received due attention / pointed out, noted yet. It is a matter of the origin(s), provenance, source, descent, emanation of central, basic magnitudes of the new-times theory of knowledge, namely of a philosophical discipline which(,) successfully denied, disputed, contested, challenged the traditional, conventional primacy, priority, precedence of ontology and consequently, hence seemed to exactly embody, incorporate the field of new-times philosophy (/ (in) displacing ontology from the top, peak of philosophical learning, lessons, was considered (to be) the proof par excellence for the preponderance, overriding, predominance, prevailing, prevalence of anti-metaphysical priorities in the realm, field of philosophy). As is (well-)known, a / the main, chief, basic task, job, mission, concern of the new-times, modern theory of knowledge has existed – at least until the beginning of our [[20th]] century – in the fact that the responsibilities (areas of responsibility) of the intellect and of sensoriality (the senses / sensorial / sensory, sensuality as the sensory, sensorial sphere in general (and not only in relation to sex)) were/had to be demarcated, delimited, differentiated and their relations towards/with each other plausibly explained (/ the delineation, demarcation, delimitation of the responsibilities and the regulation of relations between sense, sensation and intellect), often with the help of (the) subdivisions of both of these central cognitive (cap)abilities, capacities, magnitudes. The perception that the I (Ego) constitutes a hierarchy of (cap)abilities, capacities ruled, dominated, governed by (a/the) (pure) intellect, had not been / was not, nevertheless, originally, initially an(y) empirical “discovery, ascertainment”, but it was moulded, formed, shaped already in the

framework, context of traditional metaphysics and basically, essentially represented and constituted, meant, signified for this latter (traditional metaphysics) a projection of the decisive dualism, division, split between spirit and matter in man himself. The first philosophically worked out / upon, processed hierarchisation of (the) cognitive (cap)abilities, capacities in this sense, as we encounter them in Plato⁹, expressly rested / was (expressly) based on a correspondence to the hierarchy of ontological levels. In its turn, the parallelism of the psychic forces and strata, layers of (the) being had as its purpose / set as its goal the demonstration of the direct and necessary (inter)relation, correlation of the highest, at least, forms of human understanding, cognition, reason with (the) really, truly being^{xxvi}. The “Copernican turn” of the New Times put/set aside the primacy of ontology^{xxvii} and detached / broke off the human spirit from its earlier assumed, supposed metaphysical source (/ the bonds, ties of human understanding, cognition with (the) really, truly being), however, the hierarchical structure of knowledge and of the I (Ego) —modelled, copied on the metaphysical pattern— remained largely unchanged, unaltered. The reason was also in this case not least of all (the) fear, angst before the moral/ethical-normative consequences of an abolition of the free “spirit” independent of (the) sensoriality (senses, sensorial, sensory) (/ a sudden marginalisation, crowding (forcing) out, displacement, putting / bumping aside of the spirit).

This introduction in several, some central motives and aspects of the new-times critique of metaphysics simultaneously constitutes a simplified, simplifying summary of our work, and hence there is no need / it is not

⁹ Politeia, 476 a–480 a as well as 509c–511 e. [[“You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul — **reason (cognition, understanding, perception via the mind [νόησις])** answering to the highest, **understanding (intellect, mind [διάνοια])** to the second, **faith (or conviction, belief [πίστις])** to the third, and **perception of shadows (image, similitude, conjecture, implication, guessing [εἰκασία])** to the last — and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth”. (511 e, Plato, THE REPUBLIC Translated by Benjamin Jowett)]]

necessary, essential to (especially) set out, explain our program (in detail). We want to attempt, try to (re)present as briefly as possible the history and typology of the new-times critique of metaphysics and in the course of this to pay special attention to (the) less noticed, studied or overlooked, ignored, disregarded interrelations, interconnections, like (it is [in the case of]) e.g. the relation between the humanistic movement vis-à-vis, towards / and metaphysics or its (metaphysics') (essentially) new definition in the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment – a definition, by the way / incidentally, which nowadays / in our days, times became highly topical, relevant again. But important, significant turns, changes and phases of the new-times history of philosophy and history of ideas (of the spirit) are connected so closely, tightly, narrowly with the history of the critique of metaphysics, (so) that the satisfactory treatment, handling of the topic, theme has to / must apprehend, record, capture, grasp, register, touch upon questions, problems, issues seemingly lying far apart from one another like for instance the early formation, development of the natural-scientific method, the restructuring of Scholastic metaphysics in the 17th century or the character of philosophemes, philosophical ideas, notions in the 20th century. The multi-dimensionality of a topic, theme was / has always (been) an opportunity and at the same time a risk, danger ; hopefully, the opportunity was (used) well (utilised, exploited) here and the danger, risk was weathered, got through, survived with minimal losses (leakages, deficits) (/ ... or its (metaphysics') essentially new definition in the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment. That / The fact that our work stops, temporarily / provisionally I hope, with the examination of the anti-metaphysical argumentation of the Enlighteners, would be able to be justified, given reasons for rather easily : as we (have) said, the end of the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment finds formed, albeit / even if not with(out) all the (later) fullness, completeness (that eventuated thereafter, afterwards), also (all of) the four fundamental types of the critique, criticism of metaphysics).

I. Nominalism, humanism
and the critique of Aristotelian logic and
of metaphysics from the 14th to the 16th century

(FIRST PART

NOMINALISM, HUMANISM
AND THE CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTE-
LIAN LOGIC AND OF METAPHYSICS
FROM THE 14TH TO THE 16TH CENTURY)

1. The problem of rational metaphysical knowledge in medieval theology and the general character of nominalism

The metaphysical setting of the question / Metaphysical problem examination in medieval theology does not revolve around the (reality of the) distinction between the On That Side (Over There / Thence / Beyond / Hereafter / In That World) and the On This Side (Over Here / Hence / Within / Here(in) / In This World), since (the reality of) this distinction from a Christian perspective is accepted, assumed, adopted without (adding, saying anything) further / further ado (just like that, without thinking twice about it) (/ is considered to be a given), but around the problem (questions) (as to) whether metaphysics is possible as rational knowledge and, if in fact (/ in the case of being possible), whether God or (the) being / Is / To Be makes up, constitutes its object as its most general determination (destiny, purpose, designation, definition) (/ its (metaphysics') object is directly, straightaway God or (the) being as (a, the) general determination) ¹⁰[[=1]]. Here of interest to us is only, solely the first aspect of this double problem (/ the first question); we shall deal with the second (aspect) later when we discuss the separation, division (from each other) between metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis (general and especial metaphysics) in the 17th century ¹¹[[=2]]. Our ambition in / during the handling, treatment of the question, problem, issue of rational knowledge in medieval

¹⁰ [[=1 in the German text, which I can't do here and below because I'm a retard. In actual fact, footnote 10 here is footnote 11 (and 11 = 12 etc. etc. etc.) in the 2012 edition Greek text, because the editor of the 2012 edition of that Greek text added a footnote explaining differences between the Greek and German texts at the end of the previous section.]] Regarding the complicated question, problem of the definition of the object of metaphysics in late medieval theology, see Zimmermann's excellent, exceptional work, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, passim.

¹¹[[=2]] See Ch. II, 6, below.

theology is again not the enrichment of the almost, nearly, virtually, just about impossible to overlook, immense, incalculable, inestimable, vast literature on / in respect of / regarding, concerning that around / in relation to essentially new data and interpretations, but a reconstruction [done] in such a manner of the hitherto / until today findings, results of research that the often forgotten problem examination or the misunderstood interrelation, interconnection between the old theological problem examination and the origins of the new-times profane, secular critique of metaphysics becomes clear and conscious (/ In talking about the problem of rational metaphysical knowledge in medieval theology, we shall not have the ambition of adding some essential new element to the immense relevant research, but rather our aim is to reconstruct its findings in such a way, manner that the often ignored or neglected interrelation between the older theological examination of the problem and the beginnings of the modern secular critique of metaphysics becomes patent, obvious and conscious).

The quarrel, fight, strife, dispute, battle, contention, squabble around, about, regarding the relations between faith, belief and knowledge or between (-what is close to that / similar-) Christian and philosophical truth(,) has, as is known, accompanied, marked (from its first stages) the theoretical formation, development of Christian doctrine (from the beginning, start) and has also never come to an end (/ without ever settling on a firm, stable, fixed consensus)^{xxviii}. Although / Even though the efforts, endeavours of Christians regarding / at / around a positive evaluation, assessment, judgement, appraisal and use, usage, utilisation, exploitation of heathen, pagan, ethnic / national^{xxix} philosophy persisted, lasted, continued even until / into the 6th century, (yet) the Augustinian perception, view (ultimately) prevailed, was imposed, — in accordance with which / whereby knowledge, insofar as it is at all attainable, reachable, feasible and desirable, actually can and may (is permitted to) only represent and

constitute (/ it cannot be anything other than) a rationalisation of belief, faith^{xxx} —, (from) early on(,) and had a significant, decisive impact, effect (/ exercised a determinative influence) in (the) (subsequent, following) centuries (that followed) ^{12[[=3]]}. The (contentious) point / bone (of contention, dispute, quarrel, strife, in question) was from now on / henceforth not so much whether, if and how (the) individual insights of heathen, pagan, ethnic / national philosophers ought / were to be used, utilised, exploited, made use of in(side) the (Christian-theological) framework (of theological truths), but rather to what extent theology as an all-round, comprehensive and coherent system of divine, godly truths will use for its / their adequate formulation a philosophical technique and method, insofar as it can and may, therefore, become / turn into a rational demonstrative knowledge in the philosophical sense par excellence. The conversion, transformation of theology into an organised scientia^{xxxi} began, started, commenced already in, during (the) Carolingian time(s), age, era, epoch, Renaissance / renaissance^{xxxii}, when rhetoric, grammar and (the) dialectic(s) were used for the first time for the purpose (with the goal) of the better understanding of the biblical text,(;) it (is) continued / continues in the 11th and 12th century, when (the content of dogmas, dogmata, articles of faith was cast, moulded in the language of) metaphysics and logic, or else dialectics (/ and logic-dialectics are used so that theological articles of faith are expressed more fully / in a more complete manner), and it peaked, culminated in the 13th century when first Bonaventura grapples, deals with / confronts the question, issue, problem of the scientific, cognitive organisation of theology to (all of) its (whole, complete, full) extent and in all its technical implications, complications; this (the) change of theology in (towards) the sense (direction) of a self-contained, independent, autonomous, self-reliant scientia was externally characterised, marked by the fact that (the) biblical texts / (Holy) Scripture no

^{12[[=3]]} See in relation to that in general, generally, Grabmann's treatise, study, Augustins Lehre von Glauben und Wissen und ihr Einfluß auf das mittelalterliche Denken = Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, II, 35-62.

longer served as the basis, foundation, starting point for theological expositions, presentations, explanations, analyses and commentaries, but (Petrus Lombardus's) (the) *Sententiae* (of Petrus Lombardus) (did, served as the basis for theological expositions and commentaries) (and their (the said *Sententiae*'s) annotation)^{13[[=4]] + xxxiii.}

The use (usage, application, utilisation) of metaphysics and of dialectics / the dialectic in the field, area of theology entailed, had (brought) important consequences (with it), first of all, concerning (the) form (of the latter / theology). With the help of metaphysical conceptuality, the general architectural, architectonic framework, context was fixed (established, outlined), in which then / thereafter the individual, in-part problems and propositions (theorems, sentences) (/ the more partial issues) were put in order, classified, whereby / by which they got, received, obtained, kept, preserved their theoretical status (/ obtaining in this manner their real dimension and significance, importance) ; the logical instruments of dialectics / the dialectic (i.e. definitions, distinctions, findings (consecutive clauses, corollaries, deductions) etc.) (were) put / added / placed together (used)(, again,) (so that the members, links of this systematic (thought(s) (intellectual)) world (of thoughts) (chain) (were / are assembled) in a clear, perspicuous and solid, steady, firm manner, way, mode^{14[[=5]]}. The radical formal (form-related) reformation, reshuffle / reshuffling, reconstruction, reorganisation, remoulding, transformation of theology was, of course, not undertaken with the intention to (somehow) modify (in any way (whatsoever)), let alone undermine (erode, sap, wear away) the traditional content(s) (of theology) (/ of some kind of transformation, conversion or undermining of its (theology's) handed-down content) ; on the contrary, it was a matter here of an attempt, effort, endeavour

¹³[[=4]] Chenu, *Théologie comme science*, 14 ff., 37 ff. outlines, describes the stages of this development, evolution, unfolding; regarding / on Bonaventura, 53 ff..

¹⁴[[=5]] Grabmann, *Geschichte*, I, 322 f..

at consolidating, strengthening, solidifying, cementing faith, belief on the basis of the fundamental / basic principles (/ at the rationalisation of faith / belief on the basis of the axioms) (of) *fides quaerens intellectum* [faith seeking understanding] and *credo ut intelligam* [I believe so that I may understand] with the help, aid, assistance of Reason. The fundamental Augustinian perception of the relations between faith, belief and knowledge, knowing remained, in other words, unchanged, unaltered, unmodified, unvaried, undoubted, uncontested, indisputable; the *certitudo fidei* (certainty of faith), again, rested / was based on the tripartite (triple, treble, threefold, triplex) *auctoritas* (authority) of the Bible / (Holy) Scripture, of the (Church) Fathers and of the Church, and the rational processing, working (on), editing, handling of the articles of faith was supposed to be *fidei ratio* or *fidei intellectus*, that is to say, Reason / Logos which started from faith, belief in order to lead, in (its) turn, to the strengthening / corroboration / reinforcement, support, confirmation of (the same) (faith / belief) [[through understanding / the intellect (mind)]]]. *Auctoritas* and *ratio* as the two fundamental, basic pillars of method(ological) Scholastic (/ foundations of Scholastic-methodical) theology, appear also in Thomas, and indeed in the form of the thesis, position that the former (*auctoritas* / authority) guarantees in advance / from beforehand the general truth of those articles of faith which the latter (*ratio* / Reason) then finds, justifies, gives reasons for, rationalises in detail (more precisely)^{15[[=6]]}. Nonetheless — and although theology as a *scientia* does not want to detract from / negatively touch upon (the) *auctoritas* [authority] — the introduction of a rational method in the handling, treatment of questions, problems, matters, issues of faith, belief brought into being considerable, substantial difficulties and correspondingly, accordingly strong, fierce, intense,

^{15[[=6]]} Ibid., 33, 35. The -for our setting/putting of the question / problem (question) formulation- important Thomasian perception (in respect) of / regarding / on theology as a *scientia* as well as (in respect) of / regarding / on the relation between the *lumen fidei* [light of faith] and the *intellectus principiorum* [understanding (intellect) of ((the) first) principles] is summarised, synthesised in Chenu (*Théologie comme science*, 64 ff., 71 ff.).

vehement, violent, severe reactions. Because to what extent, degree / how far can discursive Reason permeate / penetrate into the essence of the Revelation (revelation) / Apocalypse (apocalypse)(,) without disfiguring, defacing, deforming, scarring, uglifying it (/ leaving it intact)? If Reason is in a position to (capable of) exhaust(ing) the essence and the content of (the) Revelation / Apocalypse, for what reason, on what basis / why does one really, actually need, then, revealed religion and those / social institutions(,) whose (self-imposed / inflicted / levied) task, duty, job, mission, function consists in the binding interpretation of its mysteries (/ which have as their mission the interpretation of its (religion's) mysteries in a binding manner for all / everyone)? If, the other way around, contrariwise, again, on the other hand, Reason is bound to / will necessarily fail before the depths of (the) Revelation / Apocalypse in any case (/ cannot shed light on the revelation), why should one be admitted / let at all into the / a dangerous game with its artful devices / (clever) tricks / skilful manoeuvres and sophisms, which, once (it has) begun, probably can no longer be ended, terminated in good time and at one's own convenience (/ it is impossible to be interrupted as one commands in accordance with one's volition (by order and at one's discretion))? It is (/ We understand), therefore, obvious which / what concerns, worries, anxieties already since the 11th century (had) called into being / caused / provoked the most acute / sharpest / strident / biting polemics of broad theological circles (a large portion of theologues / theologists) against the introduction of (the) dialectic(s) and of metaphysics (as forms of rational knowledge) in(to)/(side) the realm, area of theology^{16[=7]}. The early / Early Scholastic theology has / had shown, presented a remarkable, noteworthy, notable (great) variety, diversity, multiformity of views, opinions on, regarding this critical question, problem, and when / if in (the) (late(-

^{16[=7]} The necessary, essential (pieces of) information in relation to that is / are found in Grabmann, *Geschichte*, II, 111 ff., and in other significant textbooks, handbooks, manuals of the history of medieval philosophy.

ripening / maturing) Scholasticism / Scholastic School of the) 13th century (/ the ruling, dominant tendency, trend became) the assumption, supposition of the harmony between theology and (“true”) philosophy (predominated, prevailed, was imposed) at least temporarily, so, thus, in no way / not in the least did the differences, varieties of opinion concerning / as to the determination, definition of the relations between supra/hyper/super-natural and natural knowledge, as well as concerning the essence, nature, texture of knowledge in general, generally, disappear, vanish^{17[[=8]]}.

If we understand, see the development of Scholasticism as the constant, continuous conflict of different tendencies, directions, schools of thought which are (found) in a tense, strained equilibrium and necessarily yielded precedence to one of their number / such tendencies, directions, schools of thought only temporarily, transitorily, then we should also say goodbye (bid farewell) to / take leave of / abandon the widespread view, perception — favoured above all, especially by historians of a Thomasian persuasion (inclined, oriented, adjusted to(wards) Thomasian positions) — that this (the) development (of medieval philosophy) culminated / reached its peak quasi with logical inevitability, unavoidability (/ followed an approximately prescribed course which came to its organic culmination) in the Thomasian harmonisation of faith, belief and knowledge, knowing, Reason (and indeed through the founding, justification of belief, faith by means of a metaphysics as the rational knowledge of being / Is / To Be), only to get hopelessly lost / lose its way / (become) scatter(ed) after the dissolution of the Thomasian synthesis (/ subsequently degenerate when the equilibrium was dissolved)^{18[[=9]]}. In reality, Thomism was neither the necessary

^{17[[=8]]} Betzendörfer, *Glauben und Wissen*, 88 ff., 248 ff. (synopsis of theses, positions and conclusions of the work [[not in German text, only in P.K.'s Greek text]]).

^{18[[=9]]} Moody (*Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy – Studies*, 287 ff.) opposes this / This schematic perception, view of the development, unfolding of medieval philosophy (is opposed by Moody (*Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy – Studies*, 287 ff.)) with good arguments, which, furthermore, stress(ed), pronounce(d) the Orthodox Christian origin(s) of anti-metaphysical and at the same

outcome, result, distillation, (quint)essence, precipitation or the peak, culmination of previous theology, nor the sole, only possible complete, full, whole theological system, but the concrete answer of a genial (brilliant, ingenious, inspired, resourceful) theologian to the concrete questions, problems of that / a historical moment (in time) ; and when it (Thomism) in later times / much later turned into / became (the / a) quasi(-)official Church doctrine, thus this was due again to concrete historical reasons, grounds, and indeed, to the fact that the (Roman) (Catholic) Church (of Rome) wanted to fundamentally support the fidei ratio (Reason, rationale of faith) against, vis-à-vis the fideistic irrationalism of Lutheranism and at the same time against, vis-à-vis (the) (straight, direct(ly) precise(ly) swelling, surging / in parallel developing tendencies of) profane, secular agnosticism^{xxxiv}. Thomism upgraded, marked up, revalued, increased the value / enhanced the status of rational knowledge — and consequently also its highest form, namely metaphysics — in its efforts, endeavours, attempt to theoretically / in (terms of) theory conquer, defeat, overcome, beat, vanquish, tame, rein in Arabian / Arabic Aristotelianism, since it saw here that it was confronted with an opponent (/ opening up in this manner, way a dialogue with an opponent of another / a different religion,) for whom (the) Christian Revelation / Apocalypse meant, signified nothing and proved nothing from the outset. Thomas saw / (had) understood, seen that (the) philosophical truth, which secured for itself / obtained / gained access to (a(n)) increasing, growing autonomy under Arabian / Arabic influence^{xxxv} even, also in (the) Christian universities, could be brought under control only by entanglement with (/ entrance into a common framework of) the articles of faith (inside of a widened / extended, broader framework) ; the separation of theology and philosophy would (have) merely grant(ed) the latter (philosophy) more, a greater independence, intellectual sovereignty (state of self-contained,

time anti-Thomsonian theological currents of the 14th century [[e.g. GREGORY PALAMAS / ΓΡΗΓΟΡΙΟΣ ΠΑΛΑΜΑΣ (1296-1359) (THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274))].

self-reliant intellectual affairs) and self-conviction(,) under the given circumstances / in the specific, concrete conjuncture [[of those times]]. This / If this strategy met with little, slight understanding in decisive theological circles, and indeed because / on account of (/ then this was due to) the traditionally anti-metaphysical and anti-philosophical positioning (orientation) of theology^{xxxvi}, which, incidentally, saw no reason to take philosophy seriously(,) (for) as long as it did not have any philosophers as (its) opponents. Such (philosopher opponents) appeared only with Arabic / Arabian Aristotelianism, which the anti-Thomasian continuers (successors) of the Augustinian tradition wanted to counter with / counterpose / combat not (with) any kind of systematic combination (/ some kind of merging, fusion, amalgamation, blending) of philosophy and theology, but (with) the perception (demonstration) of the boundaries, borders, limits of human Reason and knowledge in statu isto^{xxxvii}, that is, after the Fall (of Man) (/ in the situation after (in the state of) Original Sin), which was tantamount to a rejection of the possibility of metaphysics as the rational knowledge of being or of God^{xxxviii}. The connected with that / Such a denial, renunciation, renouncement, rejection of the possibility of a metaphysics as (the) rational knowledge of being implied, entailed, for its part, the rejection, denial, refusal, disapproval of intellectualism and the assumption, acceptance of an (gnoseological, epistemological) empiricism (pertaining to the theory of knowledge), which aimed (/ had as its goal) to remove, withhold, take away the truth of faith from the control of human knowledge, which relies / relying, dependent on empirical evidence and is hence, therefore necessarily limited (/ to place, posit, put the truths of faith outside of every test of empirical,) and hence, of necessity, limited, restricted human knowledge (how strong, powerful, forceful this motif was in the theological thought of the time is seen / shown in its use by Thomas himself). The having an effect together / interweaving, intertwining, collaboration, acting in combination, interaction of all these ideas and motives now gives us the key (in order) to better understand

the general character and (but also) the anti-metaphysical thrust (drive, impetus, momentum, basic point, culmination, climax, tip, top, peak, point, lace, spike, apex, nib, spicule, pinpoint, head, lead, end, front, toe) of the nominalist current / movement.

Here we must also, first of all, clean (tidy, clear) up / clear (sweep, put, tidy) away / push (put, set) aside, discard, override, shelve, sidestep, sideline some, certain widespread, common misunderstandings, misconceptions, prejudices, biases. Such a widespread misunderstanding is the just mentioned (neo-Thomasian) evaluation, appraisal, assessment, judgement of the theology of the 14th century as a more or less backward-looking tendency or even (decadent) phenomenon, appearance, occurrence (of decadence). A second (such widespread misunderstanding), which stems from / out of the mythological genealogy of positivism of the 19th century and (still) continues to have an effect (to this day), sees / espies in nominalism a precursor, forerunner, progenitor, predecessor of the modern scientific-experimental spirit^{19[[=10]]}, whereby / in relation to which the subsequent, later, additional effect, impact of *certain* nominalist(ic) positions are confused with, mistaken for the genetic reasons / the generative (root) causes (/ of the nominalist(ic) movement) and the intentions of

^{19[[=10]]} This positivist(ic) assessment of nominalism has (/ echoes) e.g. in (/ all that) Lange (Geschichte, I, 241 ff.) found resonance / been met with a positive response (/ writes). Also, in the Marxist-Leninist history (historiography) of philosophy, which pays homage (subscribes) to, embraces, indulges in (/ programmatically devotes itself to) the schema of the everlasting (eternal) struggle (battle, fight) between idealistic and materialistic tendencies, directions, schools of thought and hence can hardly explain the phenomenon of a(n) theologically motivated empiricism (/ empiricism with purely theological objectives, expediencies, kinds of purposefulness), nominalism appears as the precursor or ally of materialism (and related tendencies); see e.g. Trachtenberg, William of Occam, esp. 222. The author (219) wonders / is disappointed, of course, because Occam rejects, discards the theory of the species (that is to say, of the copies of things, which constitute the intermediate / in between space between the world and the soul)(,) and (preferring) instead of that (to) talk(s), speak(s) of (simple) signa [signs] and leans / is inclined towards (/ opening in this manner the way, road to) phenomenism – whereas / whilst precisely Thomas sympathises with / is close to the sensualistic (i.e. pertaining to the senses in general, sensorially) standpoint in regard to this question, problem (/ at the moment, indeed, Aquinas takes up, adopts / adheres to the “materialist” position!). Such paradoxes, however, do not compel, force him (in)to a revision of his dogmatic view, opinion, idea, notion. [[THE WHOLE “PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION” ABOUT MIND AND MATTER OR IDEAS AND MATERIAL ETC. IS STOOPID AND POINTLESS ARGUING FOR ARGUMENT’S SAKE ETC. (-SOMETHING LENIN LIKED TO DO IN RELATION TO BISHOP BERKELEY, IF I REMEMBER WELL-), BECAUSE ALL HUMANS NECESSARILY CONSIST OF AND ACT WITH BOTH : I.E. BOTH MIND AND MATTER, IDEAS AND MATERIAL, “THE SPIRIT” AND THE FLESH ETC..]]

the great representatives of nominalism (/ its pioneers). Against / In contrast to these interpretations, research in recent decades(,) (/ surveying, looking over for the first time the totality of (the) texts, made an essential turn,)^{20[[=11]]} has not (/ which) only carved / worked / brought out, elaborated upon, highlighted, pointed out (/ not only) the inner / internal differentiation of the nominalist(ic) movement^{21[[=12]]}, but has also shown that the common denominator of the various nominalist(ic) tendencies, directions, schools of thought is to be sought in certain theological, and not for instance logical or (gnoseological, epistemological) theses (pertaining to the theory of knowledge). Central, in the course of this, is the thesis of the absolute power of God (*potentia absoluta*), which is not bound / tied (/ remains superior and untied / unbound) to any natural, logical or moral law and hence differs / is strictly distinguished from (the) so-called (well-)ordered / put-in-order, orderly, arranged power of God (*potentia ordinata*)(,) which is manifested / manifests itself in(side) (of) the order of nature (/ the existent natural world) and (in(side)) (of) generally recognised, acknowledged logical and moral laws^{22[[=13]]}. This distinction was not new in Christian theology, in the 14th century, however, it was emphasised, highlighted because it turned against the Arabian/Arabic-Aristotelian binding, tying of God to a necessity, which was still stronger than God himself ; consequently, another argumentative strategy than the / a Thomasian argumentative strategy could be pursued, adopted, undertaken against Arabian / Arabic Aristotelianism, which was simultaneously directed / oriented against the Thomasian attempt at a(n) interweaving, merging, fusing, fusion, merger, amalgamation, amalgamating of metaphysics and theology. As a result of the putting forward, precedence, placing at the beginning, priority, predominance / With the underlining of God's *potentia absoluta vis-à-vis* his *potentia ordinata*,

^{20[[=11]]} In relation to that, in summary Courtenay, *Nominalism* (esp. the first two parts of the treatise).

^{21[[=12]]} On / Regarding the various tendencies inside of the nominalist(ic) movement see Oberman, *Some Notes*, 54 f., as well as Courtenay, *Nominalism*, 51 ff..

^{22[[=13]]} Oberman, *Some Notes*, 56f., 60 f..

the fact was no longer regarded as decisive (/ the main part (centre of gravity) of attention does not fall upon the fact) that God created the world known to us and the laws known to us, but rather (on) his (cap)ability, capacity to create a completely different world and completely different laws (is now considered decisive); our world and our logical or moral laws are accordingly not necessary in the absolute sense, but in them the contingencia (contingency, possibility, chance) of creation, Creation is expressed (/ but rather they express the randomness or coincidence (contingencia) of Creation) as the result of the uncontrollable and unfathomable, unresearchable, undiscoverable, ergo potentially endlessly, infinitely variable, changeable divine, godly will (volition). The concept of contingencia had some obviously dangerous consequences, above all in its application to moral (ethical) categories; the chasm, gulf, abyss which seemed to open up here between the omnipotence (all-powerful nature / all-pervading power) and the morality of God, (had) brought into being (on), provoked, induced, generated many concerns, cares, worries and corresponding differentiations in the bosom, heart, womb of the nominalist(ic) movement (/ nominalism)^{23[[=14]]}. The perception of the contingencia of the world had, nevertheless, not gained ground only because it corresponded with central existential and social experiences of the 14th century (the shattering, disintegration, destruction, smashing, splitting, wrecking of the at least in theory / theoretically united *res publica christiana* (Christian Republic) by the coming into being of national centres of power and the humiliation, degradation, abasement of the papacy in Avignon, (;) enormous, huge, tremendous, immense, powerful, large peasant revolts (uprisings), the terrible, horrible, awful, dreadful, terrifying, horrid, horrible, horrifying event, occurrence, incidence, occasion, fact of the Black Death / (Bubonic) Plague), but also because Christian theology seemed to be secured, safeguarded,

²³ [[=14]] Leff, *Heresy*, I, 294 ff..

protected in an effective manner against the theoretical threat of the Arabian / Arabic-Aristotelian teaching, doctrine, theory regarding, about, on the eternity of the World, (the) *ex nihilo nihil fit* [out of nothing, nothing comes / nothing comes out of nothing] etc., which was putting, placing, carving, marking out, drawing visible limits, bound(arie)s on the omnipotence of God. If (the) *contingentia* allowed, let, gave birth, begot, generated uncertainties, insecurity in the field of nature, logic and morality, ethics ((to) come into being), thus, on the other hand, it instilled, entailed unshakable, unwavering, imperturbable confidence, trust, faith, reliance, certainty in the steering, guidance, guiding of the happenings of the world / world events by God's will (*volition*) (/ as to divine, godly dominance / dominant authority)^{24[=15]}. The denial, renunciation, renouncement of (the) (natural) causality (of nature), as it was accepted in the Thomasian / Thomasistic system in the form of *causae secundae* [secondary causes] on the part of leading, guiding, prominent, radical nominalists reminds us, indeed / of course, of Hume and consequently seems to be a harbinger, precursor, herald, presage of modern philosophy, in reality, however, is supposed to adduce, provide, furnish, produce merely proof / evidence that the (sole, only, singular) certain, secure cause of (the) (natural) phenomena, appearances, occurrences (of nature) in detail / all their, nature's individual parts and in their, nature's totality, entirety, wholeness is (sole, only, singular) God and no other (cause) (other) than God^{25[=16]}.

^{24[=15]} Leff, Gregory, 22; cf. 130 ff. regarding, about, on Gregor's (Gregory of Rimini's) rejection, disapproval of the (logical) principles of (the) sufficient ground/reason and of contradiction with the intention, purpose, goal, end to combat / of rebutting, refuting, confuting the (afore)mentioned teaching, doctrine, theory of Arabian/Arabic Aristotelianism (Arabic-Aristotelian teachings). See also the analyses, explanations, details, discourses of (/all, everything that) Rice (/ writes), Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, 19 ff., about/on/as regards (the) *coincidentia oppositorum* [coincidence of opposites] in Nicolaus Cusanus.

^{25[=16]} Weinberg, Nicolaus, 49, 66 f.. Weinberg highlights, emphasises, accentuates, underlines Nicolaus's opposition, contrast to(wards) Arabic / Arabian Aristotelianism (Arabo-Aristotelian philosophy) (87ff., 92 f., 96 ff.) and asserts, stresses against Lappe that Nicolaus did, had, does / would have not ascribe(d) / attribute(d) every individual phenomenon, occurrence, appearance to (the) (God's) immediate, direct effect, impact (of God) (/ separately to divine, godly intervention); Lappe (Nicolaus, 24) opined, thought, said, says only, nevertheless, that this would be the (unexpressed) ultimate, final, last consequence of Nicolaus's position(, which is not declared expressly).

Let us now consider, contemplate, look at, see, view the consequences of these theological fundamental, basic principles (/ the theses, positions above) for metaphysics as the rational knowledge of being. The contingencia of the world means, signifies that this world does not represent and constitute an(y) (/ is not the) incarnation of an (/ some) eternal, recognisable, knowable, cognisable and necessary order ponderable in advance, which would be the immediate, direct and unexchangeable, irreplaceable, non-interchangeable result, outcome, outflow, effluent, discharge of (/ inherent, congenital in the texture of) divine, godly wisdom^{xxxix}. Precisely the assumption of such an order allowed, permitted, however, in accordance with the / a Scholastic-Aristotelian understanding, the setting (drawing) up / laying out, assembly, building, construction, erection, installation, formation, putting forward of that hierarchy of substances, which, as it were, rendered, made up, delivered, constituted the backbone, spine of being, as this was apprehended and depicted, (re)presented in the / a (metaphysical) framework (of metaphysics). The apprehension of every (individual) substance (separately), as well as of the context, sequence, coherence, cohesion, correlation, interconnection, interrelation formed above all from all substances (/ of all [substances] together), presupposed, however, the transition from the empirical (sphere, dimension) to the intelligible (sphere, dimension) by means of the/a system of categories. From the moment (at / in) which (the) divine, godly potentia absoluta and the contingencia of Creation resulting, arising, emanating from that (divine potentia absoluta) ruined / brought to ruin the idea of the knowable, recognisable, cognisable, intelligible order of substances, a transcending of the bound(arie)s, limits of merely empirical knowledge could no longer be regarded as possible: metaphysics was unreachable, unattainable, unachievable^{xl}. The unbridgeable gulf, chasm between God and Creation took the form of the incurable, irrevocable

discrepancy between contingent and necessary knowledge^{26[[=17]]}. Inter alia / Amongst other things, the proof of God is abandoned, renounced, foregone, given up, which would need / have to be given, provided, supplied, delivered from / out of the (intellectual, thought) processing, working, handling (of thought, thinking) of (sensory, sensorial, sense) data (of the senses) of abstracted substances (/ by means of a chain of causes or intelligible, conceivable, comprehensible, thinkable, imaginable, understandable substances drawn abstractly from the processing of empirical data). Theology as scientia [science] is hence, consequently just as impossible as metaphysics as the rational knowledge of being.

^{26[[=17]]} Leff, Gregory, 23.

THE FOOTNOTES ARE P.K.'s UNLESS INDICATED BY [|||], WHEREAS THE END NOTES CONSTITUTE KRAZY MAN STUFF

ⁱ German edition only.

ⁱⁱ 2012 Greek edition only.

ⁱⁱⁱ The first 3 parts of the Greek edition were written by P.K., whereas the 4th part of the Greek edition is a translation of the German part 4 by Μιχάλης Παπανικολάου / Michael Papanikolaou.

^{iv} The TOTAL FILTH OF THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SHIT-SKATA-EXCREMENT-FAECES-MONKEY-PITHIKOS FREAK SHOW LUNA PARK LOONY BIN MENTALLY RETARDED KOST which is mandated by law !!! as to its number !!! without any !!! investigation allowed of the number !!! and or of the gas !!! etc. !!!, whilst everyone else's number and gas etc. can be investigated and questioned !!!, along with ZIO-USA-promoted "human rights", which are totally non-existent !!! and have never existed !!! is just the secular / non-traditional religious ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ideological form of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-GREAT SATAN rule via ZIO-USA-INTERNATIONAL ZOROS! JOOZ-KIKES-YIDZ (SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY) et al. in "the West" post-ZIO-WW2, supporting ZIO-NEO-NAZI-IZIM in ZIO-JOO-KRANE in our times incl. via ZIO-JOO-ROPA-CHANNEL !!! To the extent that the MAGA-Trump et al. faction can break ZIO-USA away from all the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-"master race, rool da world" ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULL-CRAP-SHIT, then that'll also mean a recalibrating of ZIO-USA values, ideology and practice/praxis. And all the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULL-SHIT about "anti-Satanism" means that the ANTI-CHRIST, GREAT SATAN, EVIL-DEVIL SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGUE Satanists are in power, for Christians in power would only ever care about anti-Christianity, and definitely not "anti-Satanism".

^v All humans act normatively constructing meaning, which is understood in relation to values, which are also constructs. There are no inherent normative values and principles in nature.

^{vi} I.e. anti-metaphysical in relation to the existence of substances, deities, spirits etc. beyond the human and natural world, but not in relation to the existence of ideas as phenomena of false consciousness / ideology which people believe in with up to a fanaticism causing one's own or another's death, even though ideas are constructed by man and don't objectively exist outside of man and the social relation. I believe a cow is a rhinoceros just like you believe a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANOCRACY is a democracy, for instance.

^{vii} Whereas Krazy Man say that you use rational and empirical knowledge to observe that everyone believes (if only in themselves and or in what they do) since everyone must act normatively in relation to self-preservation and or its negation, given the total absence of values and matter-of-taste aesthetical preferences outside of man's construction of values and matter-of-taste aesthetical preferences, and then you believe or don't believe in God based on what you think of the Heterogony of Ends and all other facts you can observe, including the fact that no human or no group of humans can control [KONTROL] everything, either with or without reference to the Great Religious Traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, (Confucianism / Taoism), non-Synagogue of Satan Judeo-Christianity (i.e. the Old Testament and Philo along with the New Testament, but not the traitorous and lying Synagogue of Satan ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ of Judas Iscariot and Doubting Thomas), Mohammedanism). Whilst Scientific Observation does not believe in God, it does observe the existence of values and meaning constructed by man, the fact that man cannot help believing because he must act normatively in a state of false consciousness / ideology, the existence of the Great Religious Traditions and of the Heterogony of Ends and man's inability to fully control (KONTROL) all other men and nature, i.e. to be God.

^{viii} I.e. they did not directly attack Faith / belief in God.

^{ix} As to the senses in general, and not just meant sexually.

^x ὄντος ἢ ὄν.

^{xi} I.e. of the ὄντος ἢ ὄν (which is P.K.'s Greek text), meaning "of the being indeed being", or, "the actual reality of being".

^{xii} As a reaction to the actual Devil / Satan / Lucifer and Lizzard-Entry-ist-JOO-BALL and or ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGUE, i.e. (ZIO-DEVIL-SATAN-cap-wearing doubting Thomas) Aquinas (1225-1274) et al., who sought to delimit God's omnipotence by confining Him within man's knowledge and logic !!!

^{xiii} This is essentially da KRAZY MAN position that everyone must act normatively to survive, i.e. must believe in doing x rather than y (whatever x and y may be), and that since we all must believe and act to live (like it or

not) and since no human or humans can control (KONTROL) all other humans and all of nature, then God exists based on the FACTS of necessary belief and the Heterogony of Ends if one decides to believe in Him and to oppose as one's eternal FOE, SATAN, i.e. THE DEVIL, EVIL, DA JOO, DA KIKE, DA SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN, THE GREAT SATAN, LUCIFER, MAMMON AND DA YID.

^{xiv} Dis essentially means that da ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND HIS ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-ET AL-JOO-ZOMBEE-STOOGES with his JOO-T-GEN-STEYENZ and his JOO-REE-DARZ AND HIS JOO-ZIO-KIKE-YID-LERZ AND HIZ ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES-HOMO-GLOBO-GLOBO-HOMO-JOO-KOZ and his POST-MODERNISMZ-DEE-KON-JOB-STRUKTIONZ ETC. ETC. ETC. AND "REALITY IS LANGUAGE" ETC. ETC. ETC. TOTAL ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT IS FULL OF ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT, APART FROM CHURNING OUT RE-GURGITATED "I'M SO FUCKING INTELLIGENT, I'M SUCH A FUCKING JOO-NIOOS" ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT (DONE UP TO CENTURIES AND MILLENNIA BEFORE BY NON-JOOZ), AND TONNES OF IT TOO!!!

^{xv} Exactly what the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES can't see in the age of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID POWER AND CONTROL (KONTROL) from circa 1800, esp. 1900, onwards until today in "the West".

^{xvi} Only to be replaced by the ANTI-CHRIST ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID illusion of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANOCRACY being the ideological phantasm "dee-mok-ra-see" and of the other ideological phantasm of "human rights" existing such that JOOZ, KIKES AND YIDZ GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY AND VASTLY ASYMMETRICALLY CONTROL (KONTROL) economy, state and culture.

^{xvii} All ideological constructions, -and ideological constructions are absolutely necessary for the functioning of all societies-, mean false consciousness on the part of those having / pretending to have such false consciousness compared to scientifically (i.e. non-normatively and descriptively and explanatorily-analytically) understood empirical-objective reality, whether they refer to traditional and or religious metaphysics or other ideological phantasms Over There, On That Side such as "freedom", "equality", "emancipation", "dee-mok-ra-see", "human rights" etc. etc. etc.. In other words, a kind of metaphysics (starting from the Irrational as a Decision in relation to Power and Identity) is always inevitable in human societies since there are no inherent values, and no society can exist without dominant values and the necessarily authoritarian social order, social cohesion and social disciplining which ensues in relation to a ruling oligarchy, otherwise civil war.

^{xviii} Or put in this crude way : 1) scepticism, agnosticism, Sextus, Cicero & Co + from Comte & Co positivists to a whole host of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID and other neo-Kantians; 2) the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-ET AL-JOO GANG BANG FUCK FEST INCL. Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, ZIO-Ludwig Wittgenstein and from Carnap to ZIO-POP, POP, POP, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-POP-ER "OPEN SOCIETY, NO BORDERS" ZOROS!-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY INTERNATIONAL KIKE AND INTERNATIONAL YID (ZIO) (ending up in totally retarded ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-"I AM A ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES-RETARD" "POST MODERNISM"; 3) from Montesquieu and Tocqueville to ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY INTERNATIONAL KIKE AND INTERNATIONAL YID (ZIO) Marx DA JOO, Spencer, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-Durkheim, Pareto, Toennies, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-Simmel, Veblen, Sombart, ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-Mannheim et al. et al. et al.; 4) from Schopenhauer, JOO-LOVER ANTI-CHRIST Nietzsche and Dilthey to ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY INTERNATIONAL KIKE AND INTERNATIONAL YID (ZIO) Freud DA JOO ... [[BUT OBVIOUSLY THERE'S A LOT MORE TO IT, YOOZ NEED TO STUDY THE WHOLE P.K. TEXT OF DIS BOOK]].

^{xix} I.e. it still remains, as it has always been, a question of The Over There / On That Side and The Over Here / On This Side.

^{xx} The "now, today" of P.K.'s book is 1990.

^{xxi} Of course when religion made way for ZIO-globalist-imperialist-satanist "diversity" under ZIO-JOO-BALL-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-MAMMON-LUCIFER-ANTI-CHRIST PLANET ZOG from ZIO-GREAT BRITAIN to ZIO-JOO-ES-HEY-ZIO-JOO-ROPA-CHANNEL-ZIO-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY-ZOROS!-DA ZIO-SATAN STATE, morality became a question of keeping the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-INBRED-INCESTUAL-HYPER-ORGANISED KRIMINAL-HYPER-CONSPIRATORIAL-HYPER-RAT-TUNNEL-SCUMBAGS in power with their "sacred" TOTAL FILTH SHIT SKATA EXCREMENT FAECES PITHIKOOS MONKEY FREAK SHOW KOST and other ideological absurdities such as "human rights", "humanity", "freedom", "equality", "individuality, personality" and "dee-mok-ra-sea" etc., which the masses of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-ZOMBEE-STOOGES lapped up in orgies of self-racist TOORIZMOOS-EXOTIZMOOS HEDONIZMOOS-KONZOOM "LIVE AND LET LIVE", "ANYTHING GOES", "SELF-ACTUALISATION", "SELF-REALISATION" DRUGS PORN CASINO-BORDELLO SOCIETY KONSENS AND ZIO-BRAIN WASHING based inter alia on the overcoming of the scarcity of goods along with massification-atomisation, heightened social mobility and a refined division of labour, i.e. metaphysics, ideology and false consciousness never die, they just take on different forms in line with the extant correlation of forces / powers.

^{xxii} These are not as "advanced" and "progressive" as the values referred to in the previous endnote, but do refer to (a) normatively conceptualised Reason, Progress, Science, Nature, Man, Nation, People (Volk), History

etc. in times when the overcoming of the scarcity of goods was not yet a mass and generalised / universal reality.

^{xxiii} Leading, inter alia, to the totally ludicrous notion of THE **POP! POP! POP! POPPER!!!** “open society” where “all ideas” are allowed to be “openly and freely challenged” except for the FACT that JOOZ, KIKES AND YIDS AS AN INBRED-INCESTUAL HYPER-ORGANISED CRIMINAL, HYPER-MAFIA, HYPER-CONSPIRATORIAL, HYPER-RAT-TUNNEL PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY AND SAVAGE TRIBE OF HYPER CRIMINALS GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY AND VASTLY ASYMMETRICALLY CONTROL (KONTROL) THE ECONOMY, THE STATE AND CULTURE HIDING BEHIND ALL THE IDEOLOGICAL ABSURDITIES REFERRED TO IN THE PREVIOUS ENDNOTE AS WELL AS THEIR MANY ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL-JOO-ZOMBEE-STOOGES, JOINED AT THE HIP WITH THE JOO, DA KIKE AND THE YID AS THEIR SATANIC ANTI-CHRIST PARTNERS IN CRIME, I.E. ZIO-M-C-M-CAPITALISM-IMPERIALISM-SATANISM-GLOBALISM.

^{xxiv} This is left out of the Greek-language version because what is meant here is “liberal” as in the mass-democratic and anti-bourgeois-liberal ideology of “liberalism” and not the really, true anti-feudal liberalism of bourgeois liberalism. Obviously, this can be very confusing for those not familiar with P.K.’s *societas civilis* / oligarchic bourgeois liberalism / mass democracy ideal types and the associated social history, whilst the distinction between the really, true in historical context liberalism of bourgeois oligarchy and “liberalism” as Western mass-democratic ideology (under ZIO-JOO-ES-HEY-ZIO PLANET ZOG) is another prominent aspect of our discussion.

^{xxv} Obviously, not bourgeois Reason, but the mass-democratic notion of what is “rational”, i.e. whatever keeps the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-SCUMBAG-CONSPIRATORIAL-RAT-TUNNEL-ORGANISED MAFIA CRIMINAL i.e. THE SYNAGOGUE OF ANTI-CHRIST SATAN GREAT SATAN AND EVIL DEVIL LUCIFER MAMMON in power. This set of concepts in parentheses is in the Greek, not the German text.

^{xxvi} This sentence is not in the German text. It’s only in the Greek text.

^{xxvii} This means in practice that God “was implicitly laid to rest” (though not to the point yet of “God is dead”) and Satan as the anti-God and or non-God “was invited to the party” (though not to the point yet of “live and let live” and “anything goes”).

^{xxviii} This is because the ideologues of whichever side and of whatever hue have not recognised the difference between being 1) an ideologue, i.e. believer, (secularly or traditionally) religious and being 2) a non-normative, axiologically free/neutral observer, who recognises that all positions are rationalisations of decisions and power claims without any basis (in nature or anywhere) outside of the decision and the power claim of the ideologue or scientific observer. One must be an ideologue to live, but being an ideologue is not scientific observation, which can only happen “on the outskirts of town / on the fringes of society” and as an activity separate to what is necessary for life, i.e. normative action beyond scientific observation.

^{xxix} In the Greek and Greco-Roman world, the Christians, including Christian Greeks, viewed the 12-gods and pagan Greeks as “nationals, ethnics / ethnikai” as opposed to Jews, who were either biblical Jews or of The Synagogue of Satan, leading eventually to ZIO-M-C-M-capitalism-imperialism, the two related NOVA, and ZIO-JOO-DAS-ANTI-CHRIST-PLANET ZIO-ZOG in and under which all JOOZ, KIKES AND YIDZ are of THE SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN along with all of their very many ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL-JOO-ZOMBEE STOOGES.

^{xxx} This is actually correct in line with endnote xxviii, above, though, of course, St. Augustine meant it only in relation to Christian content / belief-faith and not in relation to any content / faith whatsoever, which is the position of scientific observation.

^{xxxi} In the sense understood by the actors themselves “back then”, and not in P.K.’s (Weberian) sense of scientific observation as expounded, inter alia, in *Power and Decision* and *Science, Power and Decision*.

^{xxxii} 8th and 9th centuries AD.

^{xxxiii} It can’t be an accident that “the dawn” of ZIO-M-C-M-CAPITALISM-IMPERIALISM, including in (substantially still) non-ZIO forms, commenced dimly and faintly and partially and or relatively slightly somewhere in the period of the 11th to the 13th (to the 15th) centuries ...

^{xxxiv} **THIS IS IMPORTANT** : DON’T GET CONFUSED OR BOGGED DOWN IN WHO IS A “FIDEIST” AND WHO IS A “RATIONALIST” ETC.. THE REALITY IS, NO MATTER WHAT THE SURFACE “SAYS” / APPEARS AS (“HE STARTS OFF BY BELIEVING, WHEREAS HE APPLIES HIS REASON” ETC.), THAT ALL SIDES START FROM THE IRRATIONAL NOTHING, I.E. ALL SIDES (**DECIDE** TO) BELIEVE IN SOMETHING, AND ALL SIDES THEN USE RATIONALISM (AS A **POWER CLAIM**) (**POWER AND DECISION**), -A SKILL INHERENT IN HUMAN RATIONALITY ALL HUMANS HAVE-, TO RATIONALISE, JUSTIFY WITH ARGUMENTS THEIR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION(S) / WORLD VIEW(S).

^{xxxv} This almost certainly was run / “nudged along” by ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-LIZZARD-ENTRYIST ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANISTS posing as “Arabs” and or encouraging Arabs and or their ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-ZOMBEE-STOOGES. And even if it was not, any “tumult” in the Christian world was exactly not unwelcome by the ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANISTS and or their ZIO-ZOMBEE-STOOGES, including Arabs / “Arabs” / Saracens / Moors et al..

^{xxxvi} Again, what is meant here is that traditional theology had not need to develop the discourse and rationalisation of metaphysics, since faith needed no argumentative justification in very “religious” times, not that metaphysics as such was absent, given that every positing of values, norms and or ideals in order to justify human action eo ipso means a metaphysics as a positing of an Over There, an ideology, false consciousness, religion ... whether in (very) “religious” times, or in (very) “secular” times.

^{xxxvii} In that state / condition, in the current state, in (the) status quo.

^{xxxviii} Again, it’s not that “true believers” don’t use their Reason / human rationality as “true believers” (from the point of view of *The Political and Man*, i.e. social ontology and anthropology), **like everyone must, regardless of position**, it’s just that they (the “true believers”) have no need for an extended rationalisation / “systematisation” of a metaphysics which posits Reason above Faith in the hierarchy of “how one gets there” as to the proof of and or belief in the existence of God.

^{xxxix} For me this is irrelevant, even if it is not irrelevant for others. What God has done “is his business” and I can only know (some) things up to a point, and not any further. **And that’s it.**

^{xl} This obviously relates to metaphysics as knowledge of the real /objective world in toto and not to the metaphysics which characterises all kinds of normative thought, since no norms are to be found in nature and are made up / constructed / invented by humans ideationally-ideologically.