

PANAJOTIS KONDYLLIS

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THEORIE DES KRIEGES

CLAUSEWITZ-MARX-ENGELS-LENIN

THEORY OF WAR

CLAUSEWITZ-MARX-ENGELS-LENIN

KLETT-COTTA, STUTTGART 1988

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ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

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ΘΕΩΡΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ

THEORY OF WAR

ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ / WAR AND POLITICS

ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ, ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ / WAR, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΗ / WAR AND REVOLUTION

**Ο ΘΕΡΜΟΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΨΥΧΡΟ ΠΟΛΕΜΟ / HOT WAR AFTER THE
COLD WAR**

ΕΛΛΗΝΟΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΟΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ / GRECO-TURKISH WAR

ΘΕΜΕΛΙΟ, ΑΘΗΝΑ, ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ

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FOREWORD / PREFACE

The great sketches, outlines, designs, plans pertaining to the theory of war, which are presented and discussed here in this book, if looked at in their totality, entirety, have at their disposal / give us a conceptual framework, which is sufficiently comprehensive, inclusive and flexible(,) in order to make comprehensible, understandable basic aspects of the (war) phenomenon (of war) in its historical multi-dimensionality. Clausewitz's anthropological founding and founding pertaining to the philosophy of culture in respect of the theory of war has hitherto hardly been perceived, nevertheless, it (i.e. the said founding as to anthropology and the philosophy of culture in respect of the theory of war) / this founding constitutes a theoretical achievement, accomplishment of lasting, enduring, permanent value, worth and deserves to be reckoned amongst, included in the significant, important, great political conceptions in the tradition of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes; not only does it (the said founding) provide, offer the key for the understanding of the central concepts which (are supposed to) illuminate, elucidate the texture, nature, essence, character of war in general, but it fully, completely harmonises with strategic and tactical analyses. That which / Whatever we today call, name the social-historical and sociological way of looking at things, exists in Clausewitz only indirectly, namely in his perceptions pertaining to the philosophy of culture or in his rather short explications, analyses as regards the historical bindedness, determination of various forms of war. Precisely in this way of looking at things, which in Clausewitz had to come up short / be neglected / did not proceed any further, lies the strongest, powerful side of the efforts, endeavours in regard to the theory of war of Marx and Engels, whose excellent historical sense enabled them to pose the decisive questions on the basis of a still not particularly comprehensive material, which refer to the function of war and of the army in the greater and smaller turning points of history; the scale of their worthwhile, valuable insights and observations stretches, extends from the theory of history up to (the) (military) sociology (of the military, army). The inclusion of Lenin's theory of war in our investigation, research was again obvious, reasonable, plausible in view of its double reference to the fathers of historical

materialism and to Clausewitz. In particular / Particularly, the analysis of the Leninist understanding of (of the way, mode, with which Lenin understood) Clausewitz presupposes a correct understanding of Clausewitz / the latter, and accordingly, for this reason, the corresponding sections, chapters of this/our work belong not only in terms of the history of ideas, but also logically, together (are connected with one another logically, and not simply from the point of view of the history of ideas).

The excursuses, digressions, deviations, diversions (want to) clarify how far/much the conceptuality processed, worked on, elaborated for / as regards the theoretical apprehension of concrete war phenomena or of modern strategic conceptual plans, perceptions is fruitful, fertile. Clausewitz did not say solely, only essential, decisive, crucial things about the relation between “military personnel / soldiers” and “politicians” (civilians and the military, armed forces) (albeit / even though his perception(s) on that (relation between civilians and the military) are/is very far from / differ(s) significantly from that/those which are as a rule ascribed to him), but also provided, supplied (gave us) a common thread, through / by means of the concept of friction, which offers a way out of the confusion, which dominates via, surrounds, encompasses terms, concepts like “war of annihilation (destruction, extermination)”, “total(itarian) war” and “atomic war”. The third excursus, digression, deviation, diversion reminds us of the inherent difficulties of the materialistic perception of history / historical materialism with regard to / vis-à-vis the phenomena of power and violence – difficulties, which are also mentioned, discussed in / due to the (relevant) statements (dicta) (concerning this) by Marx and Engels. And finally, the investigation, analysis of the Soviet military doctrine makes clear how alive, living, vivid the thought / intellectual current pertaining to the theory of war and strategy, which sprung, came from the source(s) of Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Lenin, can still be. Military authors like for instance Mao-Tse-Tung had to be overlooked here, since they did not present any original theory of war, but wrote only about the strategy and tactics of the guerilla warⁱ. The reasons will, incidentally, be explained why a deduction as to military theory of the partisan, i.e. guerilla wars of our [[20th]] century from the theories of war of the four protagonists of this book – contrary to (a) common(ly held) opinion, (point of) view – is false.

For the satisfactory investigation of / research into the aforementioned themes, topics pertaining to the theory of war, it proved necessary to go/enter into / address such

widely divergent / very different problems as/like the meaning (concept) and the relation (in respect) of power and violence, the attempt(s) at the periodisation of history, the development, evolution of European military theory in the period (of time) / epoch of 1870 to 1914, the character of both World Wars or the status, position of the military / armed forces inside of the ruling, dominant Soviet elite. General political theory, history and sociology can be separated from one another only in the imagination, phantasy or in the praxis, practice of political scientists, historians and sociologists educated in a one-sided manner – not, however, in the handling, treatment, negotiation of important factual complexes. That everything interrelates, interconnects with everything and that the ultimate or else / and most general questions, issues, problems have an existence / a tangible being, substance, subsistence only in concrete historical situations, is, of course, an insight / ascertainment which either leads to a deeper understanding or else can create, sow confusion. The well-informed, knowledgeable, expert reader will judge, evaluate which of these two possibilities was realised in the (present, extant) (our) book (before him).

I have to thank my friend Dr. F. Horst, who took the trouble to go through the text and make it more readable through his comments.

P. K.

PROLOGUE TO THE GREEK EDITION

A large part of this book deals with the views of Marx and of Marxists or Marxists-Leninists on war, and I would like to, in a few words, explain why I consider these analyses always essential and crucial from a theoretical point of view. The collapse of communism gave (begot in) most people the impression that occupying oneself with thinkers like Marx and Engels no longer has an object and that books which discuss their theses belong to the past equally with / just as much as the Cold War. Yet Marx's thought has a second history, very different from that which connected his name with the Soviet regime and the Soviet empire. It is the history of its profound, direct and indirect influence on the social sciences of the 20th century, which, precisely and especially in the countries of the West, certainly would not have been what(ever) they are today [[circa 1997]] without Marx's work, that is, without his examination of problems and entirely irrespective of his solutions. Someone like Max Weber, who certainly did not accept his [[i.e. Marx's]] solutions, said already in 1919 that without Marx and Nietzsche, subsequent, later, posterior social scientists would not have been in the position to give the best they gave; this is true nowadays [[in the mid-to late 1990s]] – after eighty years of additionally going deeper into social and economic history, into the forms and the mechanisms of ideologies – even more so, at least as to Marx. With regard to Marx, the reader will have no difficulty in the present, nor in the future, if he knows to read [interpret] him as we read [interpret] Montesquieu, Tocqueville or Pareto, being indifferent perhaps in depth for

their political sympathies and their political predictions and seeking in their texts whatever can constitute a conceptual or pragmatological / pragmatic aid in the perpetual and always incomplete, imperfect attempt at the understanding of the human and social world. Whoever would like to equate the fortune of Marx's thought with the fortune of Soviet communism would be making, as it appears to me, the same unforgiveable mistake as also considering Aristotle "out of date / outdated / old-fashioned" and conclusively convicted after the decomposition of slave(-owning) society.

They are probably the obvious matters, nevertheless difficult to blunt, dull the psychological obstacles, upon which (pre)occupation with Marx's work(s) stumbles after 1989. All those who approached it (i.e. Marx's work(s)) earlier, previously, usually had current political, rather than stable theoretical interests, and the eclipsing, disappearance of political timeliness, actuality deprives them of the central trigger, priming, tinder, spark to have recourse to Marxian and Marxist thought. This applies, of course, to the younger thinkers / intellectuals, who only in recent years have started to obtain / acquire more or less systematic intellectual(-spiritual) interests. It, however, applies to a very great degree, extent to the older thinkers / intellectuals, all those who in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, following the omnipotent, all-taming fashion in its then / at that time metamorphoses, channelled, according to (their) preference, their spiritual-intellectual concerns, worries, anxieties into various, different versions and offshoots of Marxism, "orthodox" and "heretical", with such, indeed, zeal, that their thought was characterised by ideological prejudice and theoretical one-sidedness, unilateralism. It is not at all incomprehensible / difficult to understand from a psychological point of view that these same people turn today, with the same prejudice and one-sidedness, unilateralism, towards all that current fashion commands / ordains and imposesⁱⁱ, taking care to wipe out, erase, outwardly and inwardly, the

traces of their spell, term, stint, service in / on behalf of Marxism or in / on behalf of whatever they considered that to be / as such. Because this spell, term, stint, service they connected first of all, primarily not with a substantive deepening of the study of social phenomena –whereupon, as we said, they would have read Marx or Lenin with the same sobriety or the same intellectual enthusiasm with which one reads Max Weber or Simmel–, but with the seeking of / searching for an individual and group redemption, with the atheistically seasoned, spiced demand of the salvation of their soul. As is known, whoever becomes disenchanted with / is disappointed by such elations and such (great) loves, develops grudges, resentments, rancours, malices or at any rate demonstrative indifference(s) vis-à-vis whatever disenchanted / disappointed him. To this is added the very prosaic need in respect of survival and of success inside a society which moves / revolves around cares, concerns much more material than the more or less millennialist and eschatological cares, concerns, which in the depth, basis of things, deeply, inspired accessions of intellectuals to Marxist and para-Marxist movements. This plexus, mesh, nexus, grid, network of motives and factors, which certainly is woven and acts in different ways / differently in every individual case, explains the rather great ease with which most of yesterday's champions or fellow-travellers of Sovietism have today become champions or fellow-travellers of Americanism. The moralistic-legitimising coating which they yesterday sought in the "laws of history", in the "classless society" or in the "fight against imperialism", they find it today in the "self-realisation, self-actualisation of the individual" and in universal "human rights". However, neither yesterday did they know, nor today do they know what they are doingⁱⁱⁱ, that is, and yesterday they served and today they serve, unintentionally and unsuspectingly, forces superior to themselves. But this is disregarded, overlooked and pushed away, repelled all the more easily, the more the resonant, sonorous advocacy in favour of the ideals of what is in

fashion, vogue coincides with the demands of (a) personal career and (self-) projection, promotion.

*Let us leave alone, however, psychology, in order to return / come back to social theory. The critical examination of the views of Marx and Engels on the phenomena of war and of peace certainly have diachronic significance, meaning, and in itself does not relate at all to/with the historical fortune of all those who invoked Marxism in order to promote their political aspirations, pursuits. If, however, the epoch of the Cold War drew its direct actuality, timeliness, currency mainly from the division of the world into a “Marxist” and a “liberal” or “anti-Marxist” camp, today it draws it mainly from a discourse which is different and perhaps seemingly, ostensibly paradoxical. The contradictions or at any rate the great queries, bewilderment, puzzlement of Marx and Engel’s theory of war are due, in large part, as our reader will see, in the deficient distinction in respect of the relation, the clash or the interweaving of the economic with the political factor. This deficiency was not born of some kind of indifference of the fathers of historical materialism vis-à-vis political happenings, occurrences, events, even in the narrow sense of the term; on the contrary, their purely political analyses could be most frequently co-signed also by whomever considers politics and political struggle as a determinative dimension of social life.** [[* I have shown elsewhere how, for instance, the negotiation of the Eastern Question / Issue on the part of Marx and Engels entails the primacy of politics vis-à-vis the economy, see my introduction to the volume : K. Marx-F. Engels, *Greece, Turkey and the Eastern (Oriental) Question / Issue*, Gnosi / Gnose, Athens 1985, esp. p. 67 ff..]] *But at the level of theoretical generalisation, the political element turned pale / paled and or was lost in view of the economic element, whose absolute precedence, priority was imposed for dogmatic-systematic reasons. Most often it is forgotten that this Marxist economism constitutes the direct offspring and the direct inheritance, legacy, heritage of liberalism^{iv}, which first in history made a priority in an absolute manner of economic activity – and it did it / so with*

polemical and ideological motives, wanting to prove that the mainstay, stylobate, prop of society is the “productive” capitalist bourgeois and not the “political” feudal aristocracy, which centred, focused, concentrated its honour on its war(-related), military performances, achievements. Precisely because economism is flesh from the flesh (i.e. the offspring) of liberalism, we observe that after 1989 the decomposition of “historical materialism” and of the “economic interpretation” of history” not only did not bring about the retreat of economism, but it had the opposite result, effect. During the epoch of the Cold War the “liberal” opponents of Marxism were obliged to combat, fight “materialism”, underlining the “spiritual-intellectual”, “political”, “cultural”, “national” and remaining non-economic factors. Today, however, Western capitalistic liberalism does not need to exercise ideological polemics from that point of view / standpoint, and it can overtly, openly, undisguisedly show –from time to time also unashamedly– its economistic face, hierarchising / putting in a hierarchy with regard to economistic criteria not only historical factors, but the (very) same “spiritual-intellectual” values; whoever knows e.g. the work of the economic school of Chicago^{vi}, will have ascertained that their interpretations regarding the phenomena of family, friendship, religion etc. surpass in economistic vulgarity even the grossest, most vulgar variants, versions of unforgettable and notorious “vulgar Marxism”^{vii}.

On the basis of its economistic presuppositions, today’s [[mid/late-1990s]], mainly of American inspiration, capitalistic liberalism^{viii} confronts both the problem of war and of peace. In practice, of course, “rapid intervention forces” are constituted, electronic equipment / outfitting, with the help of the militarisation of space, proceeds at a quick rhythm and the military junctions, nodes, knots of the globe are kept, protected, guarded as the apple of one’s eye with a network of bases and communication arteries. But the theory asserts,

maintains, contends that the continual expansion and the denser, thicker entanglement of economies, and more generally the concentration of social life on economic activity, will create one and only one united world society, inside of which the causes of / reasons for war will shrink and disappear, go out existence, be eclipsed. At this point, coming to light, at least for anyone familiar with the history of ideas and its oftentimes tragic ironies, are the common roots of Marxist and liberal eschatology. Few texts have stressed with so much emphasis the world-historical significance, meaning of the formation of the world market as the Communist Manifesto. In its initial inspiration, Marxism believed that the world-wide nature, universality of the economy created the fundamental precondition for the advent, arrival of the classless society, which would blot (wipe) out, eliminate, efface military clashes because that would necessarily entail the elimination, eclipse, disappearance of national differences too; in other words: genuine classless society could only be world-wide, but it could be world-wide only thanks to the world-wide nature / universality of the economy. This fundamental schema remains fully active also in(side) the ideology of present-day economic and universalistic liberalism, even though to a large extent it has become detached / broken off from the particular ethical and humanitarian demands, with which it was connected in the Marxist context/framework. But this is historically secondary, just as also historically secondary is the fact that capitalistic liberalism understands, perceives classlessness not as equality in pleasure, but as formal equality of opportunities and as the source of ceaseless social mobility, which will continually change, transform the composition of the possessors of social wealth, bringing those below above and those above below^{ix}. The essential common denominator of initial Marxism and of capitalistic liberalism rests on the certainty of the abolition of wars through the absorption of the political element by the economic element. That is precisely why the study of the manner, mode with which those two

elements go, walk, proceed together and clash with each other in Marx and Engel's thought, and above all, especially the manner, mode with which the political element most frequently imposes itself despite the economic dogmatics, is extremely instructive if we want to understand from a broader theoretical and historical perspective the neuralgic i.e. crucial, critical problems of today's world conjuncture.

It would be just, fair to say that the Marxist utopia, as much as this sounds strange, was more realistic than the liberal utopia. Not because all that it predicted had more, (a) greater chance(s) of being realised, but because it posited, set stricter preliminary conditions so that all that it predicted could be realised. I / Let me explain myself: when Marxism spoke of the abolition of wars, it made that dependent on the abolition of social classes, meaning with that the satisfactory for everyone solution to the problem of the distribution of goods. Yet present-day capitalistic liberalism comprehends, perceives, as we have said, the abolition of classes in an essentially different manner, it equates it, that is to say, simply with limitless horizontal and vertical social mobility and not with the definitive and generally accepted regulation of the distribution of material and remaining/other goods. Its, in terms of theory, stale and, in terms of practice, selfish, self-interested, self-seeking utopianism rests on the conviction that the globalisation of production, of communications and of trade will in itself bring about the desired peaceful result – and nothing essential is said on the issue of distribution, even though it has been made / become all the more obvious, patent that globalisation exacerbates it rather than blunting it (i.e. the issue of distribution).

Nonetheless, the political element comes into the economy precisely through the socially and psychologically central issue of distribution, consequently hopes are in vain in regard to an economic overcoming of politics as long as this issue [of distribution] remains pending, with a tendency, particularly in

circumstances of over-population and ecological encumbrance, to turn into something explosive. Naturally, social classes, as they were seen and defined by the 19th century, were raked and stirred up and in large part lost their contours in the mass-democratic melting pot of the 20th century. But the classical (class) arrangement (as to class) constituted one only of the forms which the problem of distribution took inside the course of history – and this form was by no means the final one / such form. Inside the circumstances, conditions of globalisation it is extremely probable that forms [of the problem of distribution] even more acute, accompanied by intense anomic phenomena, but also by wars on a grand scale, will crop / pop up, arise.

It seems to me, therefore, out of place to remove from the pantheon of important, significant social theorists, theoreticians Marx, but also premature to completely forget Lenin's theory of war. This has, of course, like the Marxian theory of war, its autonomous, self-contained diachronic meaning, significance, since it directly abuts Clausewitz's immortal, undying contribution and starts from the same fundamental conception of the relations between war and politics. However, it also has its historical dimension, which is connected with the imperialist(ic) epoch and refers, in its way, to the constitution and to the manner, mode of functioning of a world economic system. Wars here leap out of/from the many and deep cracks, fissures of this system. This idea is worth holding onto, and I believe – with sadness / with my own regret – it will prove to be very useful to the historian of the future. But also for the historian of the relatively recent past, the typology of wars, as we encounter it in Lenin, cannot be indifferent. In the final analysis, his (i.e. Lenin's) prediction in respect of the dissolution of the European colonial empires within a long series of national-liberation wars proved to be true. Retrospectively, perhaps this was the most / more dramatic turning point in the history of the 20th century, because from inside it,

particularly in the Asian realm, space, a wide, broad road opened (up) for the release of those elemental forces, before which the West today stands with increasing perplexity, bewilderment, puzzlement, and indeed awe. Whoever compares the world map of 1914, or even of 1945 as well, with today's [1990s] world map, will understand straightaway that the transformation of 1989 was perhaps not the most dramatic of this [20th] century. Other transformations preceded the transformation of 1989, more likely more fundamental for the formation of our now united planetary history. And the occupation of governmental power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 played the role of the catalyst for those national-liberationist movements which brought about the collapse of the colonial empires and the radical change of the world map and of the world correlation of forces. China would not be whatever it is today—and above all what she will be in the 21st century— without the communist revolution, and indeed not only in its local, but also in its world dimensions. All those who measure these cosmogenic upheavals in terms of “socialism” and “capitalism” stand on the surface of things; the historical essence is not found here, but in the rise of new world Powers able to displace / capable of displacing the old Powers. From this wide, broad and non-ideological perspective, the historical function of the communist(ic) movement inside the context/framework of the 20th century must / ought to be appraised, evaluated, judged very differently than/from what usually occurs under the impression of 1989. It is a given that this function cannot be understood (because they are not in such a position) either by many naïve people, who from the establishment, institution of the communist(ic) regimes expected the arrival of “classless society”, and thus now feel “betrayed”, or the even by those greater in number, who today, as old or as late anti-communists, critically adopt the standpoint of the victor of the Cold War, thinking, viewing, considering that the struggle for “freedom” and “totalitarianism” was judged, at last, in favour of the former and that humanity is now re-entering the straight path. ||* My*

texts contain an attempt at an objective evaluation, appraisal of the communist(ic) movement inside the planetary history of the 20th century : 1) «Was war der Kommunismus?», *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992, 121-138 = «Τί ήταν ο κομμουνισμός ;», *Πλανητική πολιτική μετά τον Ψυχρό πόλεμο*, Αθήνα 1992, 133-150· 2) «Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln», *Festschrift für H.-J. Arndt*, Bruchsal 1993, 163-175 = «Οὐτοπία καὶ ἱστορική πράξη», *Ἡ ἡδονή, ἡ ἰσχὺς, ἡ οὐτοπία*, Αθήνα 1992, 105-136· 3) «Marxismus, Kommunismus und die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts», *Der Marxismus in seinem Zeitalter*, hg. von H. Fleischer, Leipzig 1994, 14-36 = «Ὁ μαρξισμός, ὁ κομμουνισμός καὶ ἡ ἱστορία τοῦ 20^{οῦ} αἰώνα», *Τὰ Ἱστορικά*, 20 (Ιούνιος 1994), 3-18.]]

Before, then, one confronts with a condescending smile, as the possessor of the easy ex post facto / after the event wisdom, the often gross, crude, coarse generalisations or schematisations inside the texts of Marxism-Leninism, it would do him good to ponder the historical forces which they (the said texts of Marxism-Leninism) condensed or released, many times beyond the intentions and the desires of their authors. Theory, when it acts inside history, is very different from that which is prepared, compounded, fabricated, with, - according to one's likes, preference-, the refinement, filtration, the dosage and the mixing of elements inside of study centres (seminaries) in order to be used in conflicts, disputes, quarrels between intellectuals, every one of whom considers himself to be more or less the salt of the earth. Answers to historical problems are not found inside (of) constructed theory, but the opposite: answers to theoretical problems are found in history. The theory which is developed in this book is systematised and conceptually clarified thought on historical phenomena, and for anyone who wants to seriously think about such phenomena, Soviet military dogma, its formation and its logic, is not in 1997 history less instructive, didactic than in 1977 or, more generally, less interesting as regards the theory of war than that of the two World Wars. From the perspective of history, the phenomena have a more permanent, lasting, enduring interest than from the perspective of journalism. And one would not be barking up the wrong tree very much / very amiss, if he contended, argued, maintained that genuine historical interest starts to grow from the time journalistic interest has already been / become exhausted^x.

I. Clausewitz

[[GREEK ED. =

I.

WAR AND POLITICS :

CLAUSEWITZ]]

1. Preliminary remark / observation

No party, faction can (perfectly, faultlessly) logically invoke Clausewitz, the historically thinking and (strictly) descriptive(ly proceeding (and methodical)) theorist / theoretician of war – not a bellicist(ic) / “war-mongering” party, and also not a pacifist(ic) party, a civil-liberal party just as little as a nationalistic or militaristic party. Because the highly, extremely, exceptionally peculiar, odd, idiosyncratic and spiritually-intellectually independent Prussian general has in his great work basically only ascertained that wars take place and that they can on each and every respective occasion take, adopt, assume the most different forms; his long-standing effort (endeavours of many years) applied / referred / had to do with the explanation of these facts, and he neither recommended the abolition of war or contemplated or advised to seek and wage war at the first opportunity; nor did he consider the utmost intensity / over-intensity or, conversely, the least possible effort in war to be (a) necessarily desirable ends in themselves (end in itself). But now a classic(al) work always constitutes a coveted, desirable ally, even or precisely in the case in which a foe (opponent) has already taken possession of (laid siege to) it / invokes it. Thus, Clausewitz first of all, in relation to that, served / was of use to provide, supply, furnish to the intensified, strengthened, reinforced self-conviction of the German General Staff after 1871^{xi} a higher, superior legitimation in terms of military theory and military history, which, though, remained rather, quite, pretty vague in terms of content; Clausewitz’s deeper thought / intellectual approach (ultimate (intellectual) aim (in respective of thought)) was not perceived, whereas / whilst the in part considerable, noteworthy strategic and tactical discussions, analyses, which educated, learned German military personnel / officers dedicated, devoted, gave / did in following Clausewitz / in Clausewitz’s footsteps essentially ran counter to the aforementioned concern for legitimation / legitimacy, at least insofar as they mostly, and sometimes even explicitly opposed (in expressed demarcation, delimitation against / from) Clausewitz himself, supported the then (at that time) prevailing, predominant

view of the unconditional (strategic) primacy, precedence, priority of the offensive (offence vis-à-vis defence). It must / ought (is) to be called to mind / We must remember that this same primacy of (the) offens(iv)e was at the same time in France orthodoxy pertaining to the theory of war (military theory) too, where a decisive, weighty, determinative, significant group of military (armed forces) men / people / personnel conducted and promoted, encouraged the study of German military theoreticians / theorists in the expectation of finding in these texts the secret of / to the German victory of 1871 and simultaneously the recipe, prescription for a successful revanche; then did Clausewitz experience / undergo / go through in Foch^{xiii}'s land / country his first great moment / hour (session) of stardom¹. After the First World War, the willingness, preparedness, readiness to identify with German, (and) even if only in the theoretical area, field, understandably declined, diminished considerably, and partially / in part under the influence of the in the West already common(place) (re)presentation, conception, notion, perception(s) of militaristic-bloodthirsty "Prussianism" some military writers / authors shifted the responsibility (on)to Clausewitz's theories for the previous, preceding slaughter, carnage, massacre².

The use, which was occasionally made of Clausewitz's name in national-socialistic propaganda³, seemed to confirm this interpretation. All the more noteworthy is / For that reason precisely the fact that (which) has not been (duly) appreciated (paid enough attention to) that the first more or less deep(ened) / systematic liberal Clausewitz-interpretation / interpretation of Clausewitz, that / whereby the primacy of politics must finally / in the end be equal / tantamount / equivalent to a command of moderation, was worked on / processed by German military and political opponents of National Socialism, who, in the course of this, in part followed, developed, tied onto the argumentative strategy developed, formed, used already during the First World War, by / in criticising the offensive extremism of the Supreme Army / Military Command with regard to / starting with the "correct / right understanding" of Clausewitz⁴. Summoning

¹ Regarding the at that time predominant strategic tendencies in Germany and France, see Excursus / Digression B, below.

² Liddell Hart, *The Ghost*, 104, cf. 140 ff., 118 ff., esp. 123 f., 125. And after the Second World War the English author supported this position, see his *Strategy*, 415 ff.. Similarly, Fuller, *Die entartete Kunst* [= *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct* (Rutgers University Press, 1961) in three volumes]], 64 ff..

³ See e.g. Metzsch, *Zeitgemäße Gedanken; Hierl, Grundlagen*, 4 f., 8 ff..

⁴ Beck, *Die Lehre* (contradistinction between Clausewitz and Ludendorff); Rothfels, *Clausewitz* (argued / he argues against Liddell Hart and other Anglo-Saxon authors); Ritter, *Die Lehre*.

/ Invoking the war theorist / theoretician of war par excellence against the warmongers was in actual fact a clever, brain, bright, wise undertaking, but which under the (given) circumstances (at that time) had to remain without practical effect, impact. The situation of the spreading, diffusion, dissemination of the liberal Clausewitz-interpretation / interpretation of Clausewitz after the Second World War proved to be more favourable, first of all, of course, inside of a historical schema, which the victor-ideology / ideology of the victors of the “German special path/way/road” affirmed at least in so far here the German catastrophe would be reduced / go back / be attributed to an increasing, growing militarisation of politics and of the political setting of the aim/end, objective(s), target(s); Clausewitz was supposed to stand / appears here at the beginning of this path, way, road as the great warner, warning voice [as to the consequences of the increasing militarisation of politics and of political objectives]⁵. From this point of view, Clausewitz could become socially acceptable / presentable in / amongst the enlightened, more sober Anglo-Saxons and French, whilst at the same time in the socialist(ic) camp he was (also) acknowledged, recognised, approved of (as well) (/ (his) / the “progressivity” (in him) was certified), albeit with certain reservations⁶.

The in this way newly discovered and in principle positively judged Clausewitz was now, as was to be expected, read in the light of the great questions, problems, issues which (the) strategic debates / discussion of recent decades [[as to the 1980s]] had raised. (Nonetheless,) Despite all the approaches towards / attempts, efforts, endeavours at an all-sided / all-round interpretation / comprehension of his thought and despite all advances of Clausewitz-philology / writings on Clausewitz / in philological research, it cannot be overlooked, disregarded (is obvious) that the newest hermeneutic(ist) research / newer interpretations stand(s) / is (are) under the sign / influence of (remain tied / bound to) the old, polemically-normatively conceived setting of the question / problem examination, as it was reformulated in the shadow of atomic / nuclear war or in the flames of (the) world civil war^{xiii}; how can “rational / reasonable / sensible”

⁵ Mainly / Decisively, Ritter, Staatskunst, esp. I, 76 ff.. This perception would later in a number of, at most superficial works, be repeated or varied, which either stems from left-wing representatives of the victory-ideology / ideology of the victors of the “German special path/way/road” or else of the (erstwhile) nationalists of the Right, who (silently) miss (can’t find) in Hitler’s politics the right, correct political eye for detail / proportion for the achievement of in itself welcome great-German aims/ends (/ (tacitly) accuse Hitler’s politics that the lack / absence of moderation impeded it from restricting itself to the (in itself desirable) constitution of a great(er) Germany).

⁶ See in relation to that Excursus / Digression D.

politics limit, restrict or ban, prohibit, forbid, eliminate, exorcise war? How can the military be tamed, restrained, subdued, harnessed, mastered, quelled by the civil government (/ the civil government control military personnel) for the sake of the effective securing, safeguarding of (in order to secure, ensure) peace? It is undoubtedly correct/right – and by the way unavoidable (inevitable) – that the Clausewitz-exegeses / critical explications and analyses of Clausewitz (are) principally, mainly concentrate(d) on the problem of the relations between war and politics; but if this problem is investigated from the point of view of the aforementioned questions, which for the theoretician Clausewitz himself (more likely) concern / were (rather) marginalia / marginal questions, then / thus it loses its theoretical – that is anthropological(, pertaining to the philosophy of culture / cultural) and historical – depth (pertaining to the philosophy of culture). Inside of the constellation described, we implied, alluded to as regards the history of ideas, the liberal Clausewitz-interpretation / interpretation of Clausewitz was imposed / (pre)dominated in the West, and it represents and constitutes today the sole, singular, only (serious) interlocuter / conversation partner ((to be) taken seriously); because (there have not been) analogous bellicist(ic) (war-related) or militarist(ic) interpretations (have not existed), and that, which in previous, former times / the past was summoned / appeared with such intent, in reality constituted only nationalistic rhetoric, which was adorned, decorated, garnished with Clausewitz-citations / quotes from (by/of) Clausewitz.

2. ‘Pure’ and ‘real’ war from the point of view of anthropology and the philosophy of culture

The full of implications / fatal (fateful) *πρῶτον ψεύδος* of the predominant interpretation of Clausewitz exists in / rests on the thesis that the concept of war / war concept set (laid) out / formulated at the start of his main work is something ideational and unreal (non-existent), an ideal type lying outside of reality, a purely theoretical conception, perception, notion or a fiction⁷. Since now in this concept, inter alia, the factor of ‘violence’ stands / is / finds itself in the foreground / dominates, thus out of /

⁷ In chronological order (/ accordance with the chronological sequence, series, succession): Rothfels, Clausewitz, 273; Kessel, Genesis, 410; Ritter, Staatskunst, I, 83; Weil, Guerre, 298; Schmitt, Clausewitz, 251; Aron, Penser la guerre, I, 121.

from the supposed, alleged abstractness of the concept, the abstract character of violence itself is concluded / deduced / derived / enclosed and to the conceptual pair (of) ‘abstract war — blind violence’, the coupling of real war and rational, that is, moderate political action (acting), is counterposed. In other words: since (the) unadulterated, undiluted (unmitigated) violence seems by definition to be bound, tied to / the aftereffect of (the) (conceptual) abstraction, thus left over / there is nothing else left for the total, overall, whole area, realm of reality, which according to Clausewitz is in actual fact the area, realm of politics, (is nothing) other than moderate(d), temperate action; and finally, this action relates / refers to certain political, civil (i.e. non-military), far/long-sighted, perspicacious and responsible etc. bearers, carriers, whose decisive / leading status, position during the waging, conducting of war is made out to be / poses (appears) as the command which is supposed to arise / supposedly drawn from (the) theoretical insight into / understanding of the political character of war. In contrast / On the contrary, we will prove in what follows / below, that Clausewitz’s concept of war does not point / refer to an(y) abstract entity, being, to an(y) *ens rationis*^{xiv}, but contains, encompasses, includes, embodies a(n) increased, reinforced, enhanced, raised, intensified, aggravated reality, which exactly in this (its) reinforcement, increase, enhancement, intensification, aggravation (of it) can only be apprehended / mentally comprehended through the abstracting from the rest of reality^{xv}; that the first and decisive, deciding moderation, mitigation, temperance of the most extreme, so to speak, conceptually pure violence goes back / is reduced to factors which do not have the least / slightest to do with the mode of conduct / way of acting and the intentions of any (kind of) civilian / political or military authority, but to anthropological and cultural constants, whose effect, impact is independent of the will and knowledge of governments and subjects; and that already for these reasons, here no (ethical/moral-)normative statements, propositions are in / have any place; Clausewitz speaks of maxims of acting, albeit again not with normative-moral intent, only at an, in terms of theory, subordinate(d) level, where politics in the sense of subjective modes of conduct / ways of acting / acts and intentions comes into play / slips in and the contrast, opposition, antithesis between war of annihilation and limited, restricted war is thematised / made into a topic (of discussion) / analysed^{xvi}.

When Clausewitz defines war as (an/the) “act of violence”, “in order to force, compel,

coerce the / our opponent as to (in favour of / for / towards) the fulfillment / to fulfill our will”⁸, he exclusively takes into consideration / account existential magnitudes (violence, opponent, will, force / forcing (compulsion, coercion, obligation, constraint)), which in their constancy (/ are stable and) can be thought of/about, understood irrespective of every particular society, culture or politics because they are present (available) / exist in all societies, cultures and politics one way or another. Whenever Clausewitz talks, speaks of war, he never loses sight of the elementary existential constellation, situation, conjuncture and confrontation: the “raw element”⁹, “hate” and “enmity”, which “must be seen (looked at) as (considered to be) a blind drive (urge, impulse)”¹⁰, the “unbound (unbridled) element of enmity”¹¹, the “mere (pure, unmixed, undiluted, sole) principle of enmity”¹², “authentic (genuine, real, actual) enmity”¹³, the unloading, discharging, discharge, execution, settlement, relief of enmity, of hate”¹⁴ — these make up the “authentic (genuine, real, actual) principle of war”¹⁵. Even in the more recent / newer wars on a grand scale (of a great extent, range, magnitude), which do not spring from / are not provoked by the hate of the/an individual against the/an individual foe and in which, hence, a conversion, transformation of the/a “hostile (unfriendly, malevolent, antagonistic) feeling” into the/a “hostile (unfriendly, malevolent, antagonistic) intent” takes place, “such a(n) psychical / emotional / dispositional / mental activity (process) / activity of the disposition / temperament (mind, soul) never is lacking / goes (is) missing”; (the state of) violence, retribution (retaliation, reciprocation, repayment) and revenge, vengeance call into being / beget / give birth to / generate one another, and the cycle (circle, circuit) of their effectiveness, impact, action, having an effect is extended, widened, expanded to the extent / degree that they are connected with “ambition, ((the loving (of)) domination, (every kind of) enthusiasm etc.”. All of this “is human or else bestial, animal, if one will / wants to put it that way, but it is so / thus (/ that’s how things are)”, does Clausewitz add, remark, observe dryly in relation to that¹⁶. As impersonal as the motives of war and as capable of transformation and of sublimation (idealisation)

⁸ Vom Kriege, I, 1, § 2 = 191 f.. [[NOTE : KRAZY MAN NO KNOWS HOW TO DO THE OTHER SQUIGGLY SECTION SIGN IN P.K.’s German ed. of *Theorie des Krieges*, so I do this one : § (which is used in the Greek ed., anyway).]]

⁹ Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 192 and III, 16 = 410.

¹⁰ Ibid., I, 1, § 28 = 213.

¹¹ Ibid., VIII, 6B = 991.

¹² Ibid., VIII, 2 = 952.

¹³ Ibid., VI, 8 = 659.

¹⁴ Ibid., IV, 11 = 468.

¹⁵ Feldzug des Herzogs v. Braunschweig, § 1 = Werke, X, 262.

¹⁶ Vom Kriege, II, 2 = 285 f..

the primordial, primeval, primitive feeling of enmity may (also) (have) be(come), the voice of raw, naked nature can never be silenced^{xvii}. The struggle as the immediate, direct, not further reducible existential confrontation as it is encountered in the wrestling, fight(ing) of two men, humans, people with bare hands (body to body, hand to hand)¹⁷, constitutes the common source and (common) denominator of all phenomena, appearances, occurrences interrelating, interconnecting with war, it is, in Clausewitz's words, "alone the (active) principle (having an effect) in the multifarious, diverse, multifaceted activity, which man calls war in the widest sense [of the word]"¹⁸. It is true that because of the complexity of a war between cultivated / civilised (sophisticated, refined) peoples, its (two men fighting with their bare hands') inviolable, not to be thought away / dismissed, essential existential foundation, base, basis or source is, as it were, buried, hidden (away), and (in the self-evidence, naturalness of its presence,) it no longer catches they eye(,) (since its presence is self-evident). And yet (nevertheless) its effect, impact, influence extends, stretches up to the most remote / furthest branches of the war phenomenon / phenomenon of war. Even if the elementary, elemental desire, lust of those fighting, the combatants, warriors, fighters, to simply, just fall upon the foe and annihilate, massacre, butcher, exterminate, kill him / making him a nothing (nobody) with one's own hands, -under the conditions, circumstances of a modern complicated war-, can no longer act / have an effect as a self-sufficient, self-reliant, standing on its own, independent, autonomous factor in its purity, but must be brought into a combination / connected with all kinds of "political ends/goals/purposes and conditions" and consequently enter (pass) into a(n) "subordinate(d) relationship (inferior fate)", nevertheless, yet, however, it does not cease to be the "nerve" "which gives (lends, confers, bestows) movement to (upon) (the) higher will (volition)"¹⁹. That it from now on / henceforth is "only" this nerve, does not in any case, of course, mean / signify that it could be absent / go missing / be lacking in the case of war. This becomes most apparent / clear in (regard to) the central systematic use Clausewitz makes of the concept of the battle (fighting, engagement, skirmish) in the / his presentation, exposition, explanation of (issues of) tactics and strategy²⁰, whereby / in relation to which he, again, he does not fail / miss / neglect to apprehend / apprehending the battle /

¹⁷ Ibid., II, 1 = 269.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., IV, 8 = 449.

²⁰ See Sec. 3, p. 44 ff., below.

fighting itself in (regard to) its existential core, nucleus, namely to “undress / disrobe / strip” it from all “modifications”, under / in(side) which it appears according to / in accordance with the various circumstances of its coming into being, genesis, beginning(s) and development, evolution, in order to, through that / accordingly, come to the ascertainment that then / thereafter / after this “undressing, disrobing, stripping” “only the naked, bare concept of the battle, i.e. a (formless, amorphous, shapeless) struggle (without form)” is leftover / remains²¹.

When Clausewitz makes the existential source — and at the same time components / dimension — of war the systematic starting point of his theory of war, thus he stresses something which in his eyes is an — of course full of implications / implications-rich — banality, because in this banality was an elementary truth (escaping the notice of / eluding) (which) some (war) theorists / theoreticians (of war) of his time (forgot), precisely as (today) it is interpreted away (i.e. as irrelevant) / circumvented or downplayed / trivialised / made to seem insignificant / downgraded by some / various (of today's) Clausewitz(-commentators) (commentators on Clausewitz). The tracking down / detection of the above-mentioned existential magnitudes, preferably / if possible in a state of chemical purity, simply means that without them, in short, without enmity, no war is imaginable, thinkable, conceivable and possible. Everything else / All other things — organisation, weaponry, weapons, armament(s), armour etc. — can be thought away, i.e. taken away, subtracted from war as (an) existential confrontation, only enmity cannot / but not enmity as well (too). To that, of course / though, a second presupposition is added: enmity must assume, adopt, take on an extent, degree, scale, magnitude, volume, size, bulk, mass that it does not shy away from the application of the most extreme violence (/ flinch, balk before the use of extreme violence) — and violence reaches its highest intensity with (the) killing (of another / the other),(:) a wider, broader increase, intensification, aggravation is impossible (/ it cannot go any further). Without killing out of enmity there is no war (although, it is understood, that (the) private killing out of private enmity still does not make up, constitute a war). Clausewitz's declaration that in(side) the “philosophy” of war (i.e. in the (theoretical) apprehension (comprehension, conception) of war irrespective of its respective forms (of occurrence, appearance)), a principle of “moderation, mitigation, reduction, abatement” can never enter / slip in, infiltrate / be interposed without an absurdity

²¹ Vom Kriege, III, 8 = 374.

being committed / perpetrated²², merely, simply expresses the obvious / self-evident, that wherever no enmity and no extreme (/ most extreme kind of) violence culminating in (the) killing (of another / the other) is present, there (there) also may be no talk of war. That is why the lack / absence of a “moderation, mitigation, reduction, abatement” in war does not lie at all in (/ have any relation with) the character of war, that is with the fact that (the) war is for instance a war of annihilation and not a limited, restricted, confined war; it suffices (is enough) that *war* takes place (/ is conducted, waged). Because violence reaches, even in a (very) limited, restricted, confined war, its utmost / most extreme point, at which moment, namely, one single / one and only (one) warrior kills a foe standing across from / opposite / facing him. Not the extent of the violence is at this level of theory decisive, but of interest is only its intensity, how it (i.e. the violence) culminates in killing, even if it is only of one person. What changes, varies from war to war if not the degree of intensity of the violence, which, in any case, cannot surpass / go beyond killing (of another / the other), but its concentrated and gapless, seamless, uninterrupted use, i.e. the (cap)ability or readiness, preparedness, willingness of those waging war / the warring parties / belligerents during the time of war / the duration of the war to do nothing else / other than to apply the most extreme / utmost violence. Two hateful / hate-filled / mutually hostile individual existences or small groups can obviously do this, however, the difficulties grow in relation to this with the magnitude of the army and of the war, as we shall explain / explicate immediately / right away / straightaway. One thing is certain now / For now we must hold onto the fact, in any case / at any rate / anyhow, that moderation, restraint, mitigation *in (a situation, state of) war* is not tantamount to (/ does not mean, signify that the belligerents) (a) getting stuck (bogged down) before the highest tiers, levels, grades of (/ stop before the highest (uppermost) steps on) the scale of violence / violence scale, but to (/ declares) a more or less short, more or less discontinuous stay(ing) on them. Without the (most) extreme / utmost violence of killing (of another / the other) there is no war. And as this culmination of/in violence is existent / available / present / exists also in moderated, mitigated, abated, tempered, reduced or limited, restricted war, thus every real war also encloses, entails (closes), completely, entirely irrespective of its intensity, the concept of war (in itself), that is, it is not separated from this concept with that chasm, gap, gulf which is supposed to / must, ought to separate / (supposedly) separates the merely

²² Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 193.

(something, what is merely, simply) ideational from the (something, what is) real.

Therefore, the definition of war is not the opposite of its reality, but only the conceptual separation, segregation, isolation and condensation of existential factors, which bring it into being / provoke it and at the same time make up its core, nucleus. Clausewitz himself introduces, institutes, initiates, inaugurates, prefaces his definition of war with the explanation, explication that he wants to begin / start “with a look at the essence, nature of the whole (thing)”, that is, to penetrate directly, immediately into a(n) area, realm which lies deeper than the accidental occurrences (happenings, incidents, events) (accidents) of the historical reality of war, and he adds that here must “more than anywhere else, together with the parts, the whole always at the same time too be thought of / about”²³, which obviously means that the whole (or the essence, substance) really exists / is present (available) / inheres in every part (i.e. in every historical form (of appearance, occurrence) of it (the whole) / in all its historical forms), (and) it is inseparable from this ([each and every respective] part). Clausewitz is not thinking here at all of / about a fiction or abstraction in the sense of a mere, simple ens rationis. What can he (Clausewitz) therefore mean when he talks of “abstraction” and of “abstract” or “ideal / ideational” war?²⁴ First of all, it must be reminded in relation to that(,) / we must remind ourselves / recollect that he (Clausewitz) does not in the least use / make use of these terms exclusively or preferably / according to preference, but uses them in parallel with other terms of equal value/worth, like the “mere / bare / simple”, “pure”, “strict” or “original, initial, primordial” concept of war²⁵. Already, therefore, in his groping, touching, tactile, touchy-feely and fluctuating, wavering, oscillating terminology, the intention becomes noticeable to summarise certain specific elements of the reality of war in their purity and irreducibility (/ distinctive, especial, particular, differentiating, ultimate and pure elements of the reality of war). However, these elements can be apprehended in a pure state of affairs only when they are seen apart / their separation is realised, that is, abstracted / their abstraction (is realised), from other

²³ Ibid., I, 1, § 1 = 191.

²⁴ Ibid., I, 1, § 6 = 196; I, 2 = 216; I, 1, § 10 = 199.

²⁵ Ibid., I, 1, § 6 = 195 and I, 2 = 216; I, 2 = 214; I, 2 = 230; I, 2 = 216. Regarding / For the particular content in respect of reality (factual / reality-based/related content) of the term “original, initial, primordial” concept, there will be talk immediately, directly below in this section / the next sub-chapter; the term “absolute war” is, will be first discussed, explained, explicated in sec. 4, since it –(regardless of the hermeneutically fatal confusion, which dominates in research in regard to this highly, extremely, exceptionally important point)- does not coincide at all with the definition of war as it is set out / established / formulated in the end/final phase of his / Clausewitz’s path of thought / intellectual journey (evolution) (see esp. S [p]. 58 [[P.K.’s German ed.]]).

elements, which are just as real and are of necessity mixed (up) / blended with the former elements in the womb, bosom, lap, fold, bay of a(n) all-encompassing, many-sided, multi-faceted reality. The definition of war is, in other words, abstract because it comes into being through / by means of (a process of) separation, segregation, through / by means of a process of abstraction / an abstractive process^{xviii}, and not for instance because it itself refers to the in itself abstract / something (that is inherently) abstract, unless we want to assume, accept that abstract is all reality in its separation, segregation (/ everything real becomes abstract if we separate, segregate it) from the rest of reality; but then also a conceptual apprehension of social-political reality, which would not take into consideration war as a real magnitude in (hitherto) history (until now), would be just as abstract as the pure concept of war. To put it differently / otherwise: the abstraction in the concept of war consists in the fact that in (accordance with) the methodologically self-evident search for the specific (features, traits, attributes, characteristics) of war, first of all the factors which prevent, hinder, obstruct the perpetuation and omnipresence of enmity and extreme violence, that is, the specific features, traits, attributes, characteristics of war, are excluded / left outside — exactly as / like war, for its part, does not allow, let, permit the undisturbed and uninterrupted predominance of those factors [of enmity and extreme violence] in social-political life —, and not for instance in the fact that enmity and the (most) extreme / utmost violence arising, resulting from that (enmity) (would represent and) constitute mere, simple fictions (fictional construct(ion)s). Were they such / If they were such, then no *real* obstacles, hinderances would be essential for their obstruction, stemming, hindering, inhibition, bridling, reining (in). That is why their abstractness in the framework / context of the definition of war does not concern their ontological composition, constitution, texture, but the possibility of their undiluted, unadulterated, boundless effect, impact inside of complex social constructs: because they were abstracted / abstraction took place precisely in respect of the factors which stand in the way / obstruct / hinder of such an effect / impact. Whilst now the specific, distinct, differentiating relevant-to-war real factors are discovered, detected, revealed through / by (means of) abstraction, and the abstraction reveals, unveils, discloses, exposes the existential core, nucleus of the war phenomenon / phenomenon of war, a fiction does not come into being before our eyes, but an ideal-typically apprehended “intensified, enhanced, heightened, increased, maximised, aggravated, stepped-up reality”, to remind us of M. Weber. The ideal type here truly summarises the authentic, genuine, real,

actual reality of war, whereas / whilst that which is commonly, usually called the “reality of war” constitutes nothing other / else than the reality of the *various* wars in their uniqueness. If we remain conscious of this (/ If we become conscious of this once and for all) and do not fall / lapse into deception suggested by (/ the traps of) language, then we shall also have to refrain / keep our distance from looking at the ideal type as a fiction / fictional construct(ion) and the disparate forms (of appearance, occurrence) (aspects) of war as “the” reality (“reality”); we shall, in other words, see / understand / have insight into the fact that (*the* reality) *reality* can only be apprehended, if at all, in (regard to) ideal-typical abstractness (/ with the ideal-typical abstraction).

**THE FOOTNOTES ARE BY P.K. (UNLESS WITHIN []), WHEREAS THE
ENDNOTES ARE BY DA KRAZY MAN, WHILST THE PROLOGUE TO THE
GREEK CONDITION CONTAINS TWO P.K. NOTES [] NOT PART OF HIS
NUMBERED FOOTNOTES**

ⁱ Che Guevara also belongs to this category of military theorists. This is not a criticism, just a defining of the scope of P.K.'s extant work. It is noted by P.K. later in this text, inter alia, that with the progressive deforestation of the world in the 20th century, the guerrilla war approach lost much of its relevance, anyway.

ⁱⁱ Some form of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID "post-modernism", "deconstruction" etc. under ZIO-USA and ZIO-JOO-ROPA-CHANNEL. Marxism was ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDDED, but its national-liberationist, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist side was receptive to and furthered ethno-patriotism, national liberation etc. of a non-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY-INTERNATIONAL JOO-ZIO-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-MAMMON-LUCIFER-nature.

ⁱⁱⁱ **AAAA-HAAA !!!**

^{iv} Here in the scientific sense of liberalism before circa 1900 and the domination of mass democracy.

^v The "economic interpretation of history" began with liberalism and "trade replacing war" and continued in Marxism as "communism as classless society arising from capitalism (albeit as proletarian revolution in respect of capitalism bringing about eternal peace through communism)", notwithstanding that both trade and proletarian revolution require an up to large degree of political intervention in economic life.

^{vi} A bunch of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ and their ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES.

^{vii} Of course, the Trump era, (almost 20 years after P.K.'s death) marked the return of politics (which never went away) in the mass media / ideological-rhetorical sphere.

^{viii} P.K. using "liberalism" here rhetorically-ideologically in line with mainstream use.

^{ix} In practice, though, always keeping the SICK-FUCKING-KRAZY-PSYCHO-PATH-INCESTUAL-INBRED-RAT-TUNNEL-RODENT-PARASITE-FAECES-EXCREMENT-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID in power.

^x History is much more than the surface facts of journalism, it is an investigation of factual causes, causal chains (to the extent possible) in situational and diachronic / dynamic factual context(s) over the long run.

^{xi} The Franco-Prussian War or Franco-German War, often referred to in France as the War of 1870, was a conflict between the Second French Empire and the North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia. Lasting from 19 July 1870 to 28 January 1871 (6 months, 1 week and 2 days), the conflict was caused primarily by France's determination to reassert its dominant position in continental Europe, which appeared in question following the decisive Prussian victory over Austria in 1866. France 140,000 dead approx.. Germany 45,000 dead approx..

Location :

France and the Rhine Province, Prussia

Result :

German victory

End of the Second French Empire

Unification of Germany and establishment of the German Empire

Territorial changes : German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine

^{xii} Ferdinand Foch (2 October 1851 – 20 March 1929) was a French general, Marshal of France and a member of the Académie Française and Académie des Sciences. He distinguished himself as Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front during the ZIO-First World War in ZIO-1918.

^{xiii} Presumably "civil war" as to the world of all of "humanity", which only became an intense conscious reality in the first half of the 20th century.

^{xiv} An object or entity that exists only in the mind or through thought, rather than having independent, real-world existence. It is contrasted with an ens reale, which is a real being that exists independently of thought.

^{xv} Because ens reale objective reality is so multi-form, multifarious, varied, diverse, the only way to understand what is a diachronic constant in all societies and or a differentia specifica when comparing societies, is to use the ideal-typical method of reinforcement and then compare one's findings with concrete, specific situations of objective reality.

^{xvi} In other words, the political decisions and or the Takt des Urteils (as we shall see later in this work) relate to specific, concrete situations of politics and war as politics' continuation by other means, whereas "the superior level of theory" deals with the existence of ((the) potential (for)) war in all societies at all times.

^{xvii} As we shall see later in the work, there cannot, however, be non-stop, perpetual war / violence, there must also be pauses and peacetime, for man has never lived in a state of perpetual war, but neither has he ever lived without the potentiality of war occurring.

^{xviii} War has many forms, layers etc., albeit with common elements, but is not a relatively simple object like an apple, a cow, a stone etc. which is defined relatively easily and simply.