

PANAJOTIS KONDYLLIS

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THEORIE DES KRIEGES

CLAUSEWITZ-MARX-ENGELS-LENIN

THEORY OF WAR

CLAUSEWITZ-MARX-ENGELS-LENIN

KLETT-COTTA, STUTTGART 1988

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ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

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ΘΕΩΡΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ

THEORY OF WAR

ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ / WAR AND POLITICS

ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ, ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ / WAR, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΗ / WAR AND REVOLUTION

**Ο ΘΕΡΜΟΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΨΥΧΡΟ ΠΟΛΕΜΟ / HOT WAR AFTER THE
COLD WAR**

ΕΛΛΗΝΟΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΟΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ / GRECO-TURKISH WAR

ΘΕΜΕΛΙΟ, ΑΘΗΝΑ, ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ

Β΄ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ 1998 (Α΄ ΕΚΔ. 1997)

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FOREWORD / PREFACE

The great sketches, outlines, designs, plans pertaining to the theory of war, which are presented and discussed here in this book, if looked at in their totality, entirety, have at their disposal / give us a conceptual framework, which is sufficiently comprehensive, inclusive and flexible(,) in order to make comprehensible, understandable basic aspects of the (war) phenomenon (of war) in its historical multi-dimensionality. Clausewitz's anthropological founding and founding pertaining to the philosophy of culture in respect of the theory of war has hitherto hardly been perceived, nevertheless, it (i.e. the said founding as to anthropology and the philosophy of culture in respect of the theory of war) / this founding constitutes a theoretical achievement, accomplishment of lasting, enduring, permanent value, worth and deserves to be reckoned amongst, included in the significant, important, great political conceptions in the tradition of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes; not only does it (the said founding) provide, offer the key for the understanding of the central concepts which (are supposed to) illuminate, elucidate the texture, nature, essence, character of war in general, but it fully, completely harmonises with strategic and tactical analyses. That which / Whatever we today call, name the social-historical and sociological way of looking at things, exists in Clausewitz only indirectly, namely in his perceptions pertaining to the philosophy of culture or in his rather short explications, analyses as regards the historical bindedness, determination of various forms of war. Precisely in this way of looking at things, which in Clausewitz had to come up short / be neglected / did not proceed any further, lies the strongest, powerful side of the efforts, endeavours in regard to the theory of war of Marx and Engels, whose excellent historical sense enabled them to pose the decisive questions on the basis of a still not particularly comprehensive material, which refer to the function of war and of the army in the greater and smaller turning points of history; the scale of their worthwhile, valuable insights and observations stretches, extends from the theory of history up to (the) (military) sociology (of the military, army). The inclusion of Lenin's theory of war in our investigation, research was again obvious, reasonable, plausible in view of its double reference to the fathers of historical

materialism and to Clausewitz. In particular / Particularly, the analysis of the Leninist understanding of (of the way, mode, with which Lenin understood) Clausewitz presupposes a correct understanding of Clausewitz / the latter, and accordingly, for this reason, the corresponding sections, chapters of this/our work belong not only in terms of the history of ideas, but also logically, together (are connected with one another logically, and not simply from the point of view of the history of ideas).

The excursions, digressions, deviations, diversions (want to) clarify how far/much the conceptuality processed, worked on, elaborated for / as regards the theoretical apprehension of concrete war phenomena or of modern strategic conceptual plans, perceptions is fruitful, fertile. Clausewitz did not say solely, only essential, decisive, crucial things about the relation between “military personnel / soldiers” and “politicians” (civilians and the military, armed forces) (albeit / even though his perception(s) on that (relation between civilians and the military) are/is very far from / differ(s) significantly from that/those which are as a rule ascribed to him), but also provided, supplied (gave us) a common thread, through / by means of the concept of friction, which offers a way out of the confusion, which dominates via, surrounds, encompasses terms, concepts like “war of annihilation (destruction, extermination)”, “total(itarian) war” and “atomic war”. The third excursus, digression, deviation, diversion reminds us of the inherent difficulties of the materialistic perception of history / historical materialism with regard to / vis-à-vis the phenomena of power and violence – difficulties, which are also mentioned, discussed in / due to the (relevant) statements (dicta) (concerning this) by Marx and Engels. And finally, the investigation, analysis of the Soviet military doctrine makes clear how alive, living, vivid the thought / intellectual current pertaining to the theory of war and strategy, which sprung, came from the source(s) of Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Lenin, can still be. Military authors like for instance Mao-Tse-Tung had to be overlooked here, since they did not present any original theory of war, but wrote only about the strategy and tactics of the guerilla warⁱ. The reasons will, incidentally, be explained why a deduction as to military theory of the partisan, i.e. guerilla wars of our [[20th]] century from the theories of war of the four protagonists of this book – contrary to (a) common(ly held) opinion, (point of) view – is false.

For the satisfactory investigation of / research into the aforementioned themes, topics pertaining to the theory of war, it proved necessary to go/enter into / address such

widely divergent / very different problems as/like the meaning (concept) and the relation (in respect) of power and violence, the attempt(s) at the periodisation of history, the development, evolution of European military theory in the period (of time) / epoch of 1870 to 1914, the character of both World Wars or the status, position of the military / armed forces inside of the ruling, dominant Soviet elite. General political theory, history and sociology can be separated from one another only in the imagination, phantasy or in the praxis, practice of political scientists, historians and sociologists educated in a one-sided manner – not, however, in the handling, treatment, negotiation of important factual complexes. That everything interrelates, interconnects with everything and that the ultimate or else / and most general questions, issues, problems have an existence / a tangible being, substance, subsistence only in concrete historical situations, is, of course, an insight / ascertainment which either leads to a deeper understanding or else can create, sow confusion. The well-informed, knowledgeable, expert reader will judge, evaluate which of these two possibilities was realised in the (present, extant) (our) book (before him).

I have to thank my friend Dr. F. Horst, who took the trouble to go through the text and make it more readable through his comments.

P. K.

PROLOGUE TO THE GREEK EDITION

A large part of this book deals with the views of Marx and of Marxists or Marxists-Leninists on war, and I would like to, in a few words, explain why I consider these analyses always essential and crucial from a theoretical point of view. The collapse of communism gave (begot in) most people the impression that occupying oneself with thinkers like Marx and Engels no longer has an object and that books which discuss their theses belong to the past equally with / just as much as the Cold War. Yet Marx's thought has a second history, very different from that which connected his name with the Soviet regime and the Soviet empire. It is the history of its profound, direct and indirect influence on the social sciences of the 20th century, which, precisely and especially in the countries of the West, certainly would not have been what(ever) they are today [[circa 1997]] without Marx's work, that is, without his examination of problems and entirely irrespective of his solutions. Someone like Max Weber, who certainly did not accept his [[i.e. Marx's]] solutions, said already in 1919 that without Marx and Nietzsche, subsequent, later, posterior social scientists would not have been in the position to give the best they gave; this is true nowadays [[in the mid-to late 1990s]] – after eighty years of additionally going deeper into social and economic history, into the forms and the mechanisms of ideologies – even more so, at least as to Marx. With regard to Marx, the reader will have no difficulty in the present, nor in the future, if he knows to read [interpret] him as we read [interpret] Montesquieu, Tocqueville or Pareto, being indifferent perhaps in depth for

their political sympathies and their political predictions and seeking in their texts whatever can constitute a conceptual or pragmatological / pragmatic aid in the perpetual and always incomplete, imperfect attempt at the understanding of the human and social world. Whoever would like to equate the fortune of Marx's thought with the fortune of Soviet communism would be making, as it appears to me, the same unforgiveable mistake as also considering Aristotle "out of date / outdated / old-fashioned" and conclusively convicted after the decomposition of slave(-owning) society.

They are probably the obvious matters, nevertheless difficult to blunt, dull the psychological obstacles, upon which (pre)occupation with Marx's work(s) stumbles after 1989. All those who approached it (i.e. Marx's work(s)) earlier, previously, usually had current political, rather than stable theoretical interests, and the eclipsing, disappearance of political timeliness, actuality deprives them of the central trigger, priming, tinder, spark to have recourse to Marxian and Marxist thought. This applies, of course, to the younger thinkers / intellectuals, who only in recent years have started to obtain / acquire more or less systematic intellectual(-spiritual) interests. It, however, applies to a very great degree, extent to the older thinkers / intellectuals, all those who in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, following the omnipotent, all-taming fashion in its then / at that time metamorphoses, channelled, according to (their) preference, their spiritual-intellectual concerns, worries, anxieties into various, different versions and offshoots of Marxism, "orthodox" and "heretical", with such, indeed, zeal, that their thought was characterised by ideological prejudice and theoretical one-sidedness, unilateralism. It is not at all incomprehensible / difficult to understand from a psychological point of view that these same people turn today, with the same prejudice and one-sidedness, unilateralism, towards all that current fashion commands / ordains and imposesⁱⁱ, taking care to wipe out, erase, outwardly and inwardly, the

traces of their spell, term, stint, service in / on behalf of Marxism or in / on behalf of whatever they considered that to be / as such. Because this spell, term, stint, service they connected first of all, primarily not with a substantive deepening of the study of social phenomena –whereupon, as we said, they would have read Marx or Lenin with the same sobriety or the same intellectual enthusiasm with which one reads Max Weber or Simmel–, but with the seeking of / searching for an individual and group redemption, with the atheistically seasoned, spiced demand of the salvation of their soul. As is known, whoever becomes disenchanted with / is disappointed by such elations and such (great) loves, develops grudges, resentments, rancours, malices or at any rate demonstrative indifference(s) vis-à-vis whatever disenchanted / disappointed him. To this is added the very prosaic need in respect of survival and of success inside a society which moves / revolves around cares, concerns much more material than the more or less millennialist and eschatological cares, concerns, which in the depth, basis of things, deeply, inspired accessions of intellectuals to Marxist and para-Marxist movements. This plexus, mesh, nexus, grid, network of motives and factors, which certainly is woven and acts in different ways / differently in every individual case, explains the rather great ease with which most of yesterday's champions or fellow-travellers of Sovietism have today become champions or fellow-travellers of Americanism. The moralistic-legitimising coating which they yesterday sought in the "laws of history", in the "classless society" or in the "fight against imperialism", they find it today in the "self-realisation, self-actualisation of the individual" and in universal "human rights". However, neither yesterday did they know, nor today do they know what they are doingⁱⁱⁱ, that is, and yesterday they served and today they serve, unintentionally and unsuspectingly, forces superior to themselves. But this is disregarded, overlooked and pushed away, repelled all the more easily, the more the resonant, sonorous advocacy in favour of the ideals of what is in

fashion, vogue coincides with the demands of (a) personal career and (self-) projection, promotion.

*Let us leave alone, however, psychology, in order to return / come back to social theory. The critical examination of the views of Marx and Engels on the phenomena of war and of peace certainly have diachronic significance, meaning, and in itself does not relate at all to/with the historical fortune of all those who invoked Marxism in order to promote their political aspirations, pursuits. If, however, the epoch of the Cold War drew its direct actuality, timeliness, currency mainly from the division of the world into a “Marxist” and a “liberal” or “anti-Marxist” camp, today it draws it mainly from a discourse which is different and perhaps seemingly, ostensibly paradoxical. The contradictions or at any rate the great queries, bewilderment, puzzlement of Marx and Engel’s theory of war are due, in large part, as our reader will see, in the deficient distinction in respect of the relation, the clash or the interweaving of the economic with the political factor. This deficiency was not born of some kind of indifference of the fathers of historical materialism vis-à-vis political happenings, occurrences, events, even in the narrow sense of the term; on the contrary, their purely political analyses could be most frequently co-signed also by whomever considers politics and political struggle as a determinative dimension of social life.** [[* I have shown elsewhere how, for instance, the negotiation of the Eastern Question / Issue on the part of Marx and Engels entails the primacy of politics vis-à-vis the economy, see my introduction to the volume : K. Marx-F. Engels, *Greece, Turkey and the Eastern (Oriental) Question / Issue*, Gnosi / Gnose, Athens 1985, esp. p. 67 ff..]] *But at the level of theoretical generalisation, the political element turned pale / paled and or was lost in view of the economic element, whose absolute precedence, priority was imposed for dogmatic-systematic reasons. Most often it is forgotten that this Marxist economism constitutes the direct offspring and the direct inheritance, legacy, heritage of liberalism^{iv}, which first in history made a priority in an absolute manner of economic activity – and it did it / so with*

polemical and ideological motives, wanting to prove that the mainstay, stylobate, prop of society is the “productive” capitalist bourgeois and not the “political” feudal aristocracy, which centred, focused, concentrated its honour on its war(-related), military performances, achievements. Precisely because economism is flesh from the flesh (i.e. the offspring) of liberalism, we observe that after 1989 the decomposition of “historical materialism” and of the “economic interpretation” of history” not only did not bring about the retreat of economism, but it had the opposite result, effect. During the epoch of the Cold War the “liberal” opponents of Marxism were obliged to combat, fight “materialism”, underlining the “spiritual-intellectual”, “political”, “cultural”, “national” and remaining non-economic factors. Today, however, Western capitalistic liberalism does not need to exercise ideological polemics from that point of view / standpoint, and it can overtly, openly, undisguisedly show –from time to time also unashamedly– its economistic face, hierarchising / putting in a hierarchy with regard to economistic criteria not only historical factors, but the (very) same “spiritual-intellectual” values; whoever knows e.g. the work of the economic school of Chicago^{vi}, will have ascertained that their interpretations regarding the phenomena of family, friendship, religion etc. surpass in economistic vulgarity even the grossest, most vulgar variants, versions of unforgettable and notorious “vulgar Marxism”^{vii}.

On the basis of its economistic presuppositions, today’s [[mid/late-1990s]], mainly of American inspiration, capitalistic liberalism^{viii} confronts both the problem of war and of peace. In practice, of course, “rapid intervention forces” are constituted, electronic equipment / outfitting, with the help of the militarisation of space, proceeds at a quick rhythm and the military junctions, nodes, knots of the globe are kept, protected, guarded as the apple of one’s eye with a network of bases and communication arteries. But the theory asserts,

maintains, contends that the continual expansion and the denser, thicker entanglement of economies, and more generally the concentration of social life on economic activity, will create one and only one united world society, inside of which the causes of / reasons for war will shrink and disappear, go out existence, be eclipsed. At this point, coming to light, at least for anyone familiar with the history of ideas and its oftentimes tragic ironies, are the common roots of Marxist and liberal eschatology. Few texts have stressed with so much emphasis the world-historical significance, meaning of the formation of the world market as the Communist Manifesto. In its initial inspiration, Marxism believed that the world-wide nature, universality of the economy created the fundamental precondition for the advent, arrival of the classless society, which would blot (wipe) out, eliminate, efface military clashes because that would necessarily entail the elimination, eclipse, disappearance of national differences too; in other words: genuine classless society could only be world-wide, but it could be world-wide only thanks to the world-wide nature / universality of the economy. This fundamental schema remains fully active also in(side) the ideology of present-day economic and universalistic liberalism, even though to a large extent it has become detached / broken off from the particular ethical and humanitarian demands, with which it was connected in the Marxist context/framework. But this is historically secondary, just as also historically secondary is the fact that capitalistic liberalism understands, perceives classlessness not as equality in pleasure, but as formal equality of opportunities and as the source of ceaseless social mobility, which will continually change, transform the composition of the possessors of social wealth, bringing those below above and those above below^{ix}. The essential common denominator of initial Marxism and of capitalistic liberalism rests on the certainty of the abolition of wars through the absorption of the political element by the economic element. That is precisely why the study of the manner, mode with which those two

elements go, walk, proceed together and clash with each other in Marx and Engel's thought, and above all, especially the manner, mode with which the political element most frequently imposes itself despite the economic dogmatics, is extremely instructive if we want to understand from a broader theoretical and historical perspective the neuralgic i.e. crucial, critical problems of today's world conjuncture.

It would be just, fair to say that the Marxist utopia, as much as this sounds strange, was more realistic than the liberal utopia. Not because all that it predicted had more, (a) greater chance(s) of being realised, but because it posited, set stricter preliminary conditions so that all that it predicted could be realised. I / Let me explain myself: when Marxism spoke of the abolition of wars, it made that dependent on the abolition of social classes, meaning with that the satisfactory for everyone solution to the problem of the distribution of goods. Yet present-day capitalistic liberalism comprehends, perceives, as we have said, the abolition of classes in an essentially different manner, it equates it, that is to say, simply with limitless horizontal and vertical social mobility and not with the definitive and generally accepted regulation of the distribution of material and remaining/other goods. Its, in terms of theory, stale and, in terms of practice, selfish, self-interested, self-seeking utopianism rests on the conviction that the globalisation of production, of communications and of trade will in itself bring about the desired peaceful result – and nothing essential is said on the issue of distribution, even though it has been made / become all the more obvious, patent that globalisation exacerbates it rather than blunting it (i.e. the issue of distribution).

Nonetheless, the political element comes into the economy precisely through the socially and psychologically central issue of distribution, consequently hopes are in vain in regard to an economic overcoming of politics as long as this issue [of distribution] remains pending, with a tendency, particularly in

circumstances of over-population and ecological encumbrance, to turn into something explosive. Naturally, social classes, as they were seen and defined by the 19th century, were raked and stirred up and in large part lost their contours in the mass-democratic melting pot of the 20th century. But the classical (class) arrangement (as to class) constituted one only of the forms which the problem of distribution took inside the course of history – and this form was by no means the final one / such form. Inside the circumstances, conditions of globalisation it is extremely probable that forms [of the problem of distribution] even more acute, accompanied by intense anomic phenomena, but also by wars on a grand scale, will crop / pop up, arise.

It seems to me, therefore, out of place to remove from the pantheon of important, significant social theorists, theoreticians Marx, but also premature to completely forget Lenin's theory of war. This has, of course, like the Marxian theory of war, its autonomous, self-contained diachronic meaning, significance, since it directly abuts Clausewitz's immortal, undying contribution and starts from the same fundamental conception of the relations between war and politics. However, it also has its historical dimension, which is connected with the imperialist(ic) epoch and refers, in its way, to the constitution and to the manner, mode of functioning of a world economic system. Wars here leap out of/from the many and deep cracks, fissures of this system. This idea is worth holding onto, and I believe – with sadness / with my own regret – it will prove to be very useful to the historian of the future. But also for the historian of the relatively recent past, the typology of wars, as we encounter it in Lenin, cannot be indifferent. In the final analysis, his (i.e. Lenin's) prediction in respect of the dissolution of the European colonial empires within a long series of national-liberation wars proved to be true. Retrospectively, perhaps this was the most / more dramatic turning point in the history of the 20th century, because from inside it,

particularly in the Asian realm, space, a wide, broad road opened (up) for the release of those elemental forces, before which the West today stands with increasing perplexity, bewilderment, puzzlement, and indeed awe. Whoever compares the world map of 1914, or even of 1945 as well, with today's [1990s] world map, will understand straightaway that the transformation of 1989 was perhaps not the most dramatic of this [20th] century. Other transformations preceded the transformation of 1989, more likely more fundamental for the formation of our now united planetary history. And the occupation of governmental power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 played the role of the catalyst for those national-liberationist movements which brought about the collapse of the colonial empires and the radical change of the world map and of the world correlation of forces. China would not be whatever it is today—and above all what she will be in the 21st century—without the communist revolution, and indeed not only in its local, but also in its world dimensions. All those who measure these cosmogenic upheavals in terms of “socialism” and “capitalism” stand on the surface of things; the historical essence is not found here, but in the rise of new world Powers able to displace / capable of displacing the old Powers. From this wide, broad and non-ideological perspective, the historical function of the communist(ic) movement inside the context/framework of the 20th century must / ought to be appraised, evaluated, judged very differently than/from what usually occurs under the impression of 1989. It is a given that this function cannot be understood (because they are not in such a position) either by many naïve people, who from the establishment, institution of the communist(ic) regimes expected the arrival of “classless society”, and thus now feel “betrayed”, or the even by those greater in number, who today, as old or as late anti-communists, critically adopt the standpoint of the victor of the Cold War, thinking, viewing, considering that the struggle for “freedom” and “totalitarianism” was judged, at last, in favour of the former and that humanity is now re-entering the straight path. ||* My*

texts contain an attempt at an objective evaluation, appraisal of the communist(ic) movement inside the planetary history of the 20th century : 1) «Was war der Kommunismus?», *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992, 121-138 = «Τί ήταν ο κομμουνισμός ;», *Πλανητική πολιτική μετά τόν Ψυχρό πόλεμο*, Αθήνα 1992, 133-150· 2) «Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln», *Festschrift für H.-J. Arndt*, Bruchsal 1993, 163-175 = «Οὐτοπία καὶ ἱστορική πράξη», *Ἡ ἡδονή, ἡ ἰσχὺς, ἡ οὐτοπία*, Αθήνα 1992, 105-136· 3) «Marxismus, Kommunismus und die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts», *Der Marxismus in seinem Zeitalter*, hg. von H. Fleischer, Leipzig 1994, 14-36 = «Ὁ μαρξισμός, ὁ κομμουνισμός καὶ ἡ ἱστορία τοῦ 20^{οῦ} αἰώνα», *Τὰ Ἱστορικά*, 20 (Ιούνιος 1994), 3-18.]]

Before, then, one confronts with a condescending smile, as the possessor of the easy ex post facto / after the event wisdom, the often gross, crude, coarse generalisations or schematisations inside the texts of Marxism-Leninism, it would do him good to ponder the historical forces which they (the said texts of Marxism-Leninism) condensed or released, many times beyond the intentions and the desires of their authors. Theory, when it acts inside history, is very different from that which is prepared, compounded, fabricated, with, - according to one's likes, preference-, the refinement, filtration, the dosage and the mixing of elements inside of study centres (seminaries) in order to be used in conflicts, disputes, quarrels between intellectuals, every one of whom considers himself to be more or less the salt of the earth. Answers to historical problems are not found inside (of) constructed theory, but the opposite: answers to theoretical problems are found in history. The theory which is developed in this book is systematised and conceptually clarified thought on historical phenomena, and for anyone who wants to seriously think about such phenomena, Soviet military dogma, its formation and its logic, is not in 1997 history less instructive, didactic than in 1977 or, more generally, less interesting as regards the theory of war than that of the two World Wars. From the perspective of history, the phenomena have a more permanent, lasting, enduring interest than from the perspective of journalism. And one would not be barking up the wrong tree very much / very amiss, if he contended, argued, maintained that genuine historical interest starts to grow from the time journalistic interest has already been / become exhausted^x.

I. Clausewitz

[[GREEK ED. =

I.

WAR AND POLITICS :

CLAUSEWITZ]]

1. Preliminary remark / observation

No party, faction can (perfectly, faultlessly) logically invoke Clausewitz, the historically thinking and (strictly) descriptive(ly proceeding (and methodical)) theorist / theoretician of war – not a bellicist(ic) / “war-mongering” party, and also not a pacifist(ic) party, a civil-liberal party just as little as a nationalistic or militaristic party. Because the highly, extremely, exceptionally peculiar, odd, idiosyncratic and spiritually-intellectually independent Prussian general has in his great work basically only ascertained that wars take place and that they can on each and every respective occasion take, adopt, assume the most different forms; his long-standing effort (endeavours of many years) applied / referred / had to do with the explanation of these facts, and he neither recommended the abolition of war or contemplated or advised to seek and wage war at the first opportunity; nor did he consider the utmost intensity / over-intensity or, conversely, the least possible effort in war to be (a) necessarily desirable ends in themselves (end in itself). But now a classic(al) work always constitutes a coveted, desirable ally, even or precisely in the case in which a foe (opponent) has already taken possession of (laid siege to) it / invokes it. Thus, Clausewitz first of all, in relation to that, served / was of use to provide, supply, furnish to the intensified, strengthened, reinforced self-conviction of the German General Staff after 1871^{xi} a higher, superior legitimization in terms of military theory and military history, which, though, remained rather, quite, pretty vague in terms of content; Clausewitz’s deeper thought / intellectual approach (ultimate (intellectual) aim (in respective of thought)) was not perceived, whereas / whilst the in part considerable, noteworthy strategic and tactical discussions, analyses, which educated, learned German military personnel / officers dedicated, devoted, gave / did in following Clausewitz / in Clausewitz’s footsteps essentially ran counter to the aforementioned concern for legitimization / legitimacy, at least insofar as they mostly, and sometimes even explicitly opposed (in expressed demarcation, delimitation against / from) Clausewitz himself, supported the then (at that time) prevailing, predominant

view of the unconditional (strategic) primacy, precedence, priority of the offensive (offence vis-à-vis defence). It must / ought (is) to be called to mind / We must remember that this same primacy of (the) offens(iv)e was at the same time in France orthodoxy pertaining to the theory of war (military theory) too, where a decisive, weighty, determinative, significant group of military (armed forces) men / people / personnel conducted and promoted, encouraged the study of German military theoreticians / theorists in the expectation of finding in these texts the secret of / to the German victory of 1871 and simultaneously the recipe, prescription for a successful revanche; then did Clausewitz experience / undergo / go through in Foch^{xiii}'s land / country his first great moment / hour (session) of stardom¹. After the First World War, the willingness, preparedness, readiness to identify with German, (and) even if only in the theoretical area, field, understandably declined, diminished considerably, and partially / in part under the influence of the in the West already common(place) (re)presentation, conception, notion, perception(s) of militaristic-bloodthirsty "Prussianism" some military writers / authors shifted the responsibility (on)to Clausewitz's theories for the previous, preceding slaughter, carnage, massacre².

The use, which was occasionally made of Clausewitz's name in national-socialistic propaganda³, seemed to confirm this interpretation. All the more noteworthy is / For that reason precisely the fact that (which) has not been (duly) appreciated (paid enough attention to) that the first more or less deep(ened) / systematic liberal Clausewitz-interpretation / interpretation of Clausewitz, that / whereby the primacy of politics must finally / in the end be equal / tantamount / equivalent to a command of moderation, was worked on / processed by German military and political opponents of National Socialism, who, in the course of this, in part followed, developed, tied onto the argumentative strategy developed, formed, used already during the First World War, by / in criticising the offensive extremism of the Supreme Army / Military Command with regard to / starting with the "correct / right understanding" of Clausewitz⁴. Summoning

¹ Regarding the at that time predominant strategic tendencies in Germany and France, see Excursus / Digression B, below.

² Liddell Hart, *The Ghost*, 104, cf. 140 ff., 118 ff., esp. 123 f., 125. And after the Second World War the English author supported this position, see his *Strategy*, 415 ff.. Similarly, Fuller, *Die entartete Kunst* [= *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct* (Rutgers University Press, 1961) in three volumes]], 64 ff..

³ See e.g. Metzsch, *Zeitgemäße Gedanken; Hierl, Grundlagen*, 4 f., 8 ff..

⁴ Beck, *Die Lehre* (contradistinction between Clausewitz and Ludendorff); Rothfels, *Clausewitz* (argued / he argues against Liddell Hart and other Anglo-Saxon authors); Ritter, *Die Lehre*.

/ Invoking the war theorist / theoretician of war par excellence against the warmongers was in actual fact a clever, brain, bright, wise undertaking, but which under the (given) circumstances (at that time) had to remain without practical effect, impact. The situation of the spreading, diffusion, dissemination of the liberal Clausewitz-interpretation / interpretation of Clausewitz after the Second World War proved to be more favourable, first of all, of course, inside of a historical schema, which the victor-ideology / ideology of the victors of the “German special path/way/road” affirmed at least in so far here the German catastrophe would be reduced / go back / be attributed to an increasing, growing militarisation of politics and of the political setting of the aim/end, objective(s), target(s); Clausewitz was supposed to stand / appears here at the beginning of this path, way, road as the great warner, warning voice [as to the consequences of the increasing militarisation of politics and of political objectives]⁵. From this point of view, Clausewitz could become socially acceptable / presentable in / amongst the enlightened, more sober Anglo-Saxons and French, whilst at the same time in the socialist(ic) camp he was (also) acknowledged, recognised, approved of (as well) (/ (his) / the “progressivity” (in him) was certified), albeit with certain reservations⁶.

The in this way newly discovered and in principle positively judged Clausewitz was now, as was to be expected, read in the light of the great questions, problems, issues which (the) strategic debates / discussion of recent decades [[as to the 1980s]] had raised. (Nonetheless,) Despite all the approaches towards / attempts, efforts, endeavours at an all-sided / all-round interpretation / comprehension of his thought and despite all advances of Clausewitz-philology / writings on Clausewitz / in philological research, it cannot be overlooked, disregarded (is obvious) that the newest hermeneutic(ist) research / newer interpretations stand(s) / is (are) under the sign / influence of (remain tied / bound to) the old, polemically-normatively conceived setting of the question / problem examination, as it was reformulated in the shadow of atomic / nuclear war or in the flames of (the) world civil war^{xiii}; how can “rational / reasonable / sensible”

⁵ Mainly / Decisively, Ritter, Staatskunst, esp. I, 76 ff.. This perception would later in a number of, at most superficial works, be repeated or varied, which either stems from left-wing representatives of the victory-ideology / ideology of the victors of the “German special path/way/road” or else of the (erstwhile) nationalists of the Right, who (silently) miss (can’t find) in Hitler’s politics the right, correct political eye for detail / proportion for the achievement of in itself welcome great-German aims/ends (/ (tacitly) accuse Hitler’s politics that the lack / absence of moderation impeded it from restricting itself to the (in itself desirable) constitution of a great(er) Germany).

⁶ See in relation to that Excursus / Digression D.

politics limit, restrict or ban, prohibit, forbid, eliminate, exorcise war? How can the military be tamed, restrained, subdued, harnessed, mastered, quelled by the civil government (/ the civil government control military personnel) for the sake of the effective securing, safeguarding of (in order to secure, ensure) peace? It is undoubtedly correct/right – and by the way unavoidable (inevitable) – that the Clausewitz-exegeses / critical explications and analyses of Clausewitz (are) principally, mainly concentrate(d) on the problem of the relations between war and politics; but if this problem is investigated from the point of view of the aforementioned questions, which for the theoretician Clausewitz himself (more likely) concern / were (rather) marginalia / marginal questions, then / thus it loses its theoretical – that is anthropological(, pertaining to the philosophy of culture / cultural) and historical – depth (pertaining to the philosophy of culture). Inside of the constellation described, we implied, alluded to as regards the history of ideas, the liberal Clausewitz-interpretation / interpretation of Clausewitz was imposed / (pre)dominated in the West, and it represents and constitutes today the sole, singular, only (serious) interlocuter / conversation partner ((to be) taken seriously); because (there have not been) analogous bellicist(ic) (war-related) or militarist(ic) interpretations (have not existed), and that, which in previous, former times / the past was summoned / appeared with such intent, in reality constituted only nationalistic rhetoric, which was adorned, decorated, garnished with Clausewitz-citations / quotes from (by/of) Clausewitz.

2. ‘Pure’ and ‘real’ war from the point of view of anthropology and the philosophy of culture

The full of implications / fatal (fateful) *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of the predominant interpretation of Clausewitz exists in / rests on the thesis that the concept of war / war concept set (laid) out / formulated at the start of his main work is something ideational and unreal (non-existent), an ideal type lying outside of reality, a purely theoretical conception, perception, notion or a fiction⁷. Since now in this concept, inter alia, the factor of ‘violence’ stands / is / finds itself in the foreground / dominates, thus out of /

⁷ In chronological order (/ accordance with the chronological sequence, series, succession): Rothfels, Clausewitz, 273; Kessel, Genesis, 410; Ritter, Staatskunst, I, 83; Weil, Guerre, 298; Schmitt, Clausewitz, 251; Aron, Penser la guerre, I, 121.

from the supposed, alleged abstractness of the concept, the abstract character of violence itself is concluded / deduced / derived / enclosed and to the conceptual pair (of) ‘abstract war — blind violence’, the coupling of real war and rational, that is, moderate political action (acting), is counterposed. In other words: since (the) unadulterated, undiluted (unmitigated) violence seems by definition to be bound, tied to / the aftereffect of (the) (conceptual) abstraction, thus left over / there is nothing else left for the total, overall, whole area, realm of reality, which according to Clausewitz is in actual fact the area, realm of politics, (is nothing) other than moderate(d), temperate action; and finally, this action relates / refers to certain political, civil (i.e. non-military), far/long-sighted, perspicacious and responsible etc. bearers, carriers, whose decisive / leading status, position during the waging, conducting of war is made out to be / poses (appears) as the command which is supposed to arise / supposedly drawn from (the) theoretical insight into / understanding of the political character of war. In contrast / On the contrary, we will prove in what follows / below, that Clausewitz’s concept of war does not point / refer to an(y) abstract entity, being, to an(y) *ens rationis*^{xiv}, but contains, encompasses, includes, embodies a(n) increased, reinforced, enhanced, raised, intensified, aggravated reality, which exactly in this (its) reinforcement, increase, enhancement, intensification, aggravation (of it) can only be apprehended / mentally comprehended through the abstracting from the rest of reality^{xv}; that the first and decisive, deciding moderation, mitigation, temperance of the most extreme, so to speak, conceptually pure violence goes back / is reduced to factors which to do not have the least / slightest to do with the mode of conduct / way of acting and the intentions of any (kind of) civilian / political or military authority, but to anthropological and cultural constants, whose effect, impact is independent of the will and knowledge of governments and subjects; and that already for these reasons, here no (ethical/moral-)normative statements, propositions are in / have any place; Clausewitz speaks of maxims of acting, albeit again not with normative-moral intent, only at an, in terms of theory, subordinate(d) level, where politics in the sense of subjective modes of conduct / ways of acting / acts and intentions comes into play / slips in and the contrast, opposition, antithesis between war of annihilation, destruction and limited, restricted war is thematised / made into a topic (of discussion) / analysed^{xvi}.

When Clausewitz defines war as (an/the) “act of violence”, “in order to force, compel,

coerce the / our opponent as to (in favour of / for / towards) the fulfillment / to fulfill our will”⁸, he exclusively takes into consideration / account existential magnitudes (violence, opponent, will, force / forcing (compulsion, coercion, obligation, constraint)), which in their constancy (/ are stable and) can be thought of/about, understood irrespective of every particular society, culture or politics because they are present (available) / exist in all societies, cultures and politics one way or another. Whenever Clausewitz talks, speaks of war, he never loses sight of the elementary existential constellation, situation, conjuncture and confrontation: the “raw element”⁹, “hate” and “enmity”, which “must be seen (looked at) as (considered to be) a blind drive (urge, impulse)”¹⁰, the “unbound (unbridled) element of enmity”¹¹, the “mere (pure, unmixed, undiluted, sole) principle of enmity”¹², “authentic (genuine, real, actual) enmity”¹³, the unloading, discharging, discharge, execution, settlement, relief of enmity, of hate”¹⁴ — these make up the “authentic (genuine, real, actual) principle of war”¹⁵. Even in the more recent / newer wars on a grand scale (of a great extent, range, magnitude), which do not spring from / are not provoked by the hate of the/an individual against the/an individual foe and in which, hence, a conversion, transformation of the/a “hostile (unfriendly, malevolent, antagonistic) feeling” into the/a “hostile (unfriendly, malevolent, antagonistic) intent” takes place, “such a(n) psychical / emotional / dispositional / mental activity (process) / activity of the disposition / temperament (mind, soul) never is lacking / goes (is) missing”; (the state of) violence, retribution (retaliation, reciprocation, repayment) and revenge, vengeance call into being / beget / give birth to / generate one another, and the cycle (circle, circuit) of their effectiveness, impact, action, having an effect is extended, widened, expanded to the extent / degree that they are connected with “ambition, ((the loving (of)) domination, (every kind of) enthusiasm etc.”. All of this “is human or else bestial, animal, if one will / wants to put it that way, but it is so / thus (/ that’s how things are)”, does Clausewitz add, remark, observe dryly in relation to that¹⁶. As impersonal as the motives of war and as capable of transformation and of sublimation (idealisation)

⁸ Vom Kriege, I, 1, § 2 = 191 f.. [[NOTE : KRAZY MAN NO KNOWS HOW TO DO THE OTHER SQUIGGLY SECTION SIGN IN P.K.’s German ed. of *Theorie des Krieges*, so I do this one : § (which is used in the Greek ed., anyway).]]

⁹ Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 192 and III, 16 = 410.

¹⁰ Ibid., I, 1, § 28 = 213.

¹¹ Ibid., VIII, 6B = 991.

¹² Ibid., VIII, 2 = 952.

¹³ Ibid., VI, 8 = 659.

¹⁴ Ibid., IV, 11 = 468.

¹⁵ Feldzug des Herzogs v. Braunschweig, § 1 = Werke, X, 262.

¹⁶ Vom Kriege, II, 2 = 285 f..

the primordial, primeval, primitive feeling of enmity may (also) (have) be(come), the voice of raw, naked nature can never be silenced^{xvii}. The struggle as the immediate, direct, not further reducible existential confrontation as it is encountered in the wrestling, fight(ing) of two men, humans, people with bare hands (body to body, hand to hand)¹⁷, constitutes the common source and (common) denominator of all phenomena, appearances, occurrences interrelating, interconnecting with war, it is, in Clausewitz's words, "alone the (active) principle (having an effect) in the multifarious, diverse, multifaceted activity, which man calls war in the widest sense [of the word]"¹⁸. It is true that because of the complexity of a war between cultivated / civilised (sophisticated, refined) peoples, its (two men fighting with their bare hands') inviolable, not to be thought away / dismissed, essential existential foundation, base, basis or source is, as it were, buried, hidden (away), and (in the self-evidence, naturalness of its presence,) it no longer catches they eye(,) (since its presence is self-evident). And yet (nevertheless) its effect, impact, influence extends, stretches up to the most remote / furthest branches of the war phenomenon / phenomenon of war. Even if the elementary, elemental desire, lust of those fighting, the combatants, warriors, fighters, to simply, just fall upon the foe and annihilate, massacre, butcher, exterminate, kill him / making him a nothing (nobody) with one's own hands, -under the conditions, circumstances of a modern complicated war-, can no longer act / have an effect as a self-sufficient, self-reliant, standing on its own, independent, autonomous factor in its purity, but must be brought into a combination / connected with all kinds of "political ends/goals/purposes and conditions" and consequently enter (pass) into a(n) "subordinate(d) relationship (inferior fate)", nevertheless, yet, however, it does not cease to be the "nerve" "which gives (lends, confers, bestows) movement to (upon) (the) higher will (volition)"¹⁹. That it from now on / henceforth is "only" this nerve, does not in any case, of course, mean / signify that it could be absent / go missing / be lacking in the case of war. This becomes most apparent / clear in (regard to) the central systematic use Clausewitz makes of the concept of the battle (fighting, engagement, skirmish) in the / his presentation, exposition, explanation of (issues of) tactics and strategy²⁰, whereby / in relation to which he, again, he does not fail / miss / neglect to apprehend / apprehending the battle /

¹⁷ Ibid., II, 1 = 269.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., IV, 8 = 449.

²⁰ See Sec. 3, p. 44 ff., below.

fighting itself in (regard to) its existential core, nucleus, namely to “undress / disrobe / strip” it from all “modifications”, under / in(side) which it appears according to / in accordance with the various circumstances of its coming into being, genesis, beginning(s) and development, evolution, in order to, through that / accordingly, come to the ascertainment that then / thereafter / after this “undressing, disrobing, stripping” “only the naked, bare concept of the battle, i.e. a (formless, amorphous, shapeless) struggle (without form)” is leftover / remains²¹.

When Clausewitz makes the existential source — and at the same time components / dimension — of war the systematic starting point of his theory of war, thus he stresses something which in his eyes is an — of course full of implications / implications-rich — banality, because in this banality was an elementary truth (escaping the notice of / eluding) (which) some (war) theorists / theoreticians (of war) of his time (forgot), precisely as (today) it is interpreted away (i.e. as irrelevant) / circumvented or downplayed / trivialised / made to seem insignificant / downgraded by some / various (of today's) Clausewitz(-commentators) (commentators on Clausewitz). The tracking down / detection of the above-mentioned existential magnitudes, preferably / if possible in a state of chemical purity, simply means that without them, in short, without enmity, no war is imaginable, thinkable, conceivable and possible. Everything else / All other things — organisation, weaponry, weapons, armament(s), armour etc. — can be thought away, i.e. taken away, subtracted from war as (an) existential confrontation, only enmity cannot / but not enmity as well (too). To that, of course / though, a second presupposition is added: enmity must assume, adopt, take on an extent, degree, scale, magnitude, volume, size, bulk, mass that it does not shy away from the application of the most extreme violence (/ flinch, balk before the use of extreme violence) — and violence reaches its highest intensity with (the) killing (of another / the other),(:) a wider, broader increase, intensification, aggravation is impossible (/ it cannot go any further). Without killing out of enmity there is no war (although, it is understood, that (the) private killing out of private enmity still does not make up, constitute a war). Clausewitz's declaration that in(side) the “philosophy” of war (i.e. in the (theoretical) apprehension (comprehension, conception) of war irrespective of its respective forms (of occurrence, appearance)), a principle of “moderation, mitigation, reduction, abatement” can never enter / slip in, infiltrate / be interposed without an absurdity

²¹ Vom Kriege, III, 8 = 374.

being committed / perpetrated²², merely, simply expresses the obvious / self-evident, that wherever no enmity and no extreme (/ most extreme kind of) violence culminating in (the) killing (of another / the other) is present, there (there) also may be no talk of war. That is why the lack / absence of a “moderation, mitigation, reduction, abatement” in war does not lie at all in (/ have any relation with) the character of war, that is with the fact that (the) war is for instance a war of annihilation, destruction and not a limited, restricted, confined war; it suffices (is enough) that *war* takes place (/ is conducted, waged). Because violence reaches, even in a (very) limited, restricted, confined war, its utmost / most extreme point, at which moment, namely, one single / one and only (one) warrior kills a foe standing across from / opposite / facing him. Not the extent of the violence is at this level of theory decisive, but of interest is only its intensity, how it (i.e. the violence) culminates in killing, even if it is only of one person. What changes, varies from war to war if not the degree of intensity of the violence, which, in any case, cannot surpass / go beyond killing (of another / the other), but its concentrated and gapless, seamless, uninterrupted use, i.e. the (cap)ability or readiness, preparedness, willingness of those waging war / the warring parties / belligerents during the time of war / the duration of the war to do nothing else / other than to apply the most extreme / utmost violence. Two hateful / hate-filled / mutually hostile individual existences or small groups can obviously do this, however, the difficulties grow in relation to this with the magnitude of the army and of the war, as we shall explain / explicate immediately / right away / straightaway. One thing is certain now / For now we must hold onto the fact, in any case / at any rate / anyhow, that moderation, restraint, mitigation *in (a situation, state of) war* is not tantamount to (/ does not mean, signify that the belligerents) (a) getting stuck (bogged down) before the highest tiers, levels, grades of (/ stop before the highest (uppermost) steps on) the scale of violence / violence scale, but to (/ declares) a more or less short, more or less discontinuous stay(ing) on them. Without the (most) extreme / utmost violence of killing (of another / the other) there is no war. And as this culmination of/in violence is existent / available / present / exists also in moderated, mitigated, abated, tempered, reduced or limited, restricted war, thus every real war also encloses, entails (closes), completely, entirely irrespective of its intensity, the concept of war (in itself), that is, it is not separated from this concept with that chasm, gap, gulf which is supposed to / must, ought to separate / (supposedly) separates the merely

²² Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 193.

(something, what is merely, simply) ideational from the (something, what is) real.

Therefore, the definition of war is not the opposite of its reality, but only the conceptual separation, segregation, isolation and condensation of existential factors, which bring it into being / provoke it and at the same time make up its core, nucleus. Clausewitz himself introduces, institutes, initiates, inaugurates, prefaces his definition of war with the explanation, explication that he wants to begin / start “with a look at the essence, nature of the whole (thing)”, that is, to penetrate directly, immediately into a(n) area, realm which lies deeper than the accidental occurrences (happenings, incidents, events) (accidents) of the historical reality of war, and he adds that here must “more than anywhere else, together with the parts, the whole always at the same time too be thought of / about”²³, which obviously means that the whole (or the essence, substance) really exists / is present (available) / inheres in every part (i.e. in every historical form (of appearance, occurrence) of it (the whole) / in all its historical forms), (and) it is inseparable from this ([each and every respective] part). Clausewitz is not thinking here at all of / about a fiction or abstraction in the sense of a mere, simple ens rationis. What can he (Clausewitz) therefore mean when he talks of “abstraction” and of “abstract” or “ideal / ideational” war?²⁴ First of all, it must be reminded in relation to that(,) / we must remind ourselves / recollect that he (Clausewitz) does not in the least use / make use of these terms exclusively or preferably / according to preference, but uses them in parallel with other terms of equal value/worth, like the “mere / bare / simple”, “pure”, “strict” or “original, initial, primordial” concept of war²⁵. Already, therefore, in his groping, touching, tactile, touchy-feely and fluctuating, wavering, oscillating terminology, the intention becomes noticeable to summarise certain specific elements of the reality of war in their purity and irreducibility (/ distinctive, especial, particular, differentiating, ultimate and pure elements of the reality of war). However, these elements can be apprehended in a pure state of affairs only when they are seen apart / their separation is realised, that is, abstracted / their abstraction (is realised), from other

²³ Ibid., I, 1, § 1 = 191.

²⁴ Ibid., I, 1, § 6 = 196; I, 2 = 216; I, 1, § 10 = 199.

²⁵ Ibid., I, 1, § 6 = 195 and I, 2 = 216; I, 2 = 214; I, 2 = 230; I, 2 = 216. Regarding / For the particular content in respect of reality (factual / reality-based/related content) of the term “original, initial, primordial” concept, there will be talk immediately, directly below in this section / the next sub-chapter; the term “absolute war” is, will be first discussed, explained, explicated in sec. 4, since it –(regardless of the hermeneutically fatal confusion, which dominates in research in regard to this highly, extremely, exceptionally important point)- does not coincide at all with the definition of war as it is set out / established / formulated in the end/final phase of his / Clausewitz’s path of thought / intellectual journey (evolution) (see esp. S [p]. 58 [[P.K.’s German ed.]]).

elements, which are just as real and are of necessity mixed (up) / blended with the former elements in the womb, bosom, lap, fold, bay of a(n) all-encompassing, many-sided, multi-faceted reality. The definition of war is, in other words, abstract because it comes into being through / by means of (a process of) separation, segregation, through / by means of a process of abstraction / an abstractive process^{xviii}, and not for instance because it itself refers to the in itself abstract / something (that is inherently) abstract, unless we want to assume, accept that abstract is all reality in its separation, segregation (/ everything real becomes abstract if we separate, segregate it) from the rest of reality; but then also a conceptual apprehension of social-political reality, which would not take into consideration war as a real magnitude in (hitherto) history (until now), would be just as abstract as the pure concept of war. To put it differently / otherwise: the abstraction in the concept of war consists in the fact that in (accordance with) the methodologically self-evident search for the specific (features, traits, attributes, characteristics) of war, first of all the factors which prevent, hinder, obstruct the perpetuation and omnipresence of enmity and extreme violence, that is, the specific features, traits, attributes, characteristics of war, are excluded / left outside — exactly as / like war, for its part, does not allow, let, permit the undisturbed and uninterrupted predominance of those factors [of enmity and extreme violence] in social-political life —, and not for instance in the fact that enmity and the (most) extreme / utmost violence arising, resulting from that (enmity) (would represent and) constitute mere, simple fictions (fictional construct(ion)s). Were they such / If they were such, then no *real* obstacles, hinderances would be essential for their obstruction, stemming, hindering, inhibition, bridling, reining (in). That is why their abstractness in the framework / context of the definition of war does not concern their ontological composition, constitution, texture, but the possibility of their undiluted, unadulterated, boundless effect, impact inside of complex social constructs: because they were abstracted / abstraction took place precisely in respect of the factors which stand in the way / obstruct / hinder of such an effect / impact. Whilst now the specific, distinct, differentiating relevant-to-war real factors are discovered, detected, revealed through / by (means of) abstraction, and the abstraction reveals, unveils, discloses, exposes the existential core, nucleus of the war phenomenon / phenomenon of war, a fiction does not come into being before our eyes, but an ideal-typically apprehended “intensified, enhanced, heightened, increased, maximised, aggravated, stepped-up reality”, to remind us of M. Weber. The ideal type here truly summarises the authentic, genuine, real,

actual reality of war, whereas / whilst that which is commonly, usually called the “reality of war” constitutes nothing other / else than the reality of the *various* wars in their uniqueness. If we remain conscious of this (/ If we become conscious of this once and for all) and do not fall / lapse into deception suggested by (/ the traps of) language, then we shall also have to refrain / keep our distance from looking at the ideal type as a fiction / fictional construct(ion) and the disparate forms (of appearance, occurrence) (aspects) of war as “the” reality (“reality”); we shall, in other words, see / understand / have insight into the fact that (*the* reality) *reality* can only be apprehended, if at all, in (regard to) ideal-typical abstractness (/ with the ideal-typical abstraction).

The essential, actual, real, true theoretical problem lies, therefore, not therein, to counterpose / contrast a conceptual fiction to “reality”, but rather therein / herein, to name, identify the real factors which neither extinguish (eliminate, expunge, erase, wipe / blot out / snuff out, obliterate, annihilate, efface) nor mitigate (soften, alleviate, relieve, ease, soothe, allay, palliate) enmity and extreme violence, but [[also]] certainly do not let them become continual, continuous and all-encompassing, all-embracing, universal, global, catholic. The issue, in other words, is to explain the reasons which make necessary, force a mix(ing), blending, mixture of the various levels of one and the same human and historical-social reality with one another, whereby / in relation to which it must be remarked, commented, observed that the / a start / starting from the ideality or else from the concept of war is not due to / does not lie in its (the ideality or concept of war’s) lower, slighter, less content as to reality, but simply lies in / is due to the fact that the theme, topic, subject matter of the / our work is war (/ let it be observed here that if our starting point is something ideational, that is to say, the concept of war, we did not select it because it entails / contains less reality, but rather simply because our topic, theme, subject is war); were the topic e.g. peace, then / thus the author would have – if he had wanted to method(olog)ically proceed on the same path (/ since he will have followed the same method) – had to have started from the ideality (ideational essence) or else concept of peace in order to subsequently, afterwards explain why peace (in the world) until today / hitherto could not (was not able to) be continual, continuous and all-encompassing, all-embracing, universal, global, catholic. Precisely the content (in respect) of / as to reality of the “abstract” or “pure” concept of war is vividly, clearly, graphically brought back to our attention (/ Precisely the real content of the “abstract” or “pure, unadulterated” concept of war comes vividly, graphically to our memory)

when Clausewitz names it / that same concept also the “original / initial” concept, with which he means / meaning, in the first phase of human history, that is, in “raw, crude, rough, primitive, uncivilised peoples” the (f)actual conducting, waging of war and the concept of war (the continual, continuous and all-encompassing, all-embracing, universal, global, catholic application of extreme violence towards / up to / for the annihilation (destruction, extermination, obliteration, extinction) of the foe) had become identical. The fundamental – and hitherto / until today hardly observed / unobserved – role which the (formalised) opposition, contrast, conflict, clash between the conducting, waging of war by “raw, crude, rough, primitive, uncivilised” and (that) [war] by “educated, cultured, cultivated, civilised, refined, polished, learned, erudite, well-read” peoples plays in Clausewitz’s syllogistic reasoning, syllogistics²⁶, leaves no doubt as to / about the fact that the transition from abstract or pure war to real wars may, should, ought not be conceived / thought of as/like (such) a transition from the realm of (the) fictive-ideational (/ ideational and the fictitious construct(ion)) to the realm of the real, but rather as a historically-culturally determined, conditioned transition between human constellations (/ from human situations), in which an absolute concentration of the whole existential and other (further, remaining) potential to enmity and to extreme violence is possible (like, as e.g. in / during the struggle, wrestling, fight, grappling of two foes with their bare hands or in / during war between “raw, crude, rough, primitive, uncivilised peoples”), to those human constellations, situations in which such a concentration must (necessarily) run(s) / bump(s) into, against / encounter(s), come(s) across, stumble(s) on insurmountable, insuperable objective hindrances, obstacles, impediments.

²⁶Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 192f.; I, 1, § 23 = 209; I, 3 = 232; IV, 3 = 422. This contrast, opposition, conflict, clash was not uncommon, unusual, unfamiliar in the literature of the time(s), and Decken [[1800]] e.g. invoked it in order to give reasons for, justify, establish, found his advocacy for / in favour of the war of (the) cabinet, i.e. restricted, limited, contained, confined war (/ restricted pre-revolutionary wars) and against (the) people’s war (war of the folk, people) : modern, contemporary people’s war, he wrote, opined, believed, is tantamount to a return to the / a barbarian states of affairs (situation), when all (capable of [bearing, using] arms, weapons) men (fit to bear arms) took part in war and the outcome of the war was decided with regard to one or at most a pair / two battles (slaughters, killings) ; this concentration and intensity of the act of war (hostilities, acts between enemies) found an end with progressing, progressive, advanced culture (/ ended with (the) progress of / in civilisation) (Betrachtungen, esp. 24, 30 f., 32, 37). It is (should, ought) to be added here that the long debate of the 18th and of the early 19th century over, regarding, about the interrelation between the military, war-related, (warlike, martial, belligerent, bellicose) function(ing) and the social status, position of the nobility, aristocracy had the effect of / caused a sensitisation, sensibilisation, awareness (raising) of the spirits (/ had rendered the spirits more sensitive) in regard to / vis-à-vis the relation between social-historical and military questions, issues, problems.

In the relations, conditions, circumstances of “educated, cultured, cultivated, civilised, refined, polished, learned, erudite, well-read peoples”, in the state (of affairs) / situation of culture^{xix}, therefore, that dilution (decompression, decondensation, thinning, rarefaction, attenuation, watering down) takes place of the existential factors summarised in the pure concept of war by (means of) / through (/ with the admixture, addition of) other elements, which make an abstract-ideal-typical apprehension of the war-related (warlike, martial, belligerent, bellicose, bellicist(ic)) act from now on retrospectively necessary, required, essential and unavoidable, inevitable. In the course of this, we should, ought, may not / are not permitted, of course, to forget that the aforementioned factors^{xx} continue to constitute, make up, even in culture, the “nerve” of war and that without them, wars in general would be unthinkable, unimaginable, inconceivable. Their effect, impact, influence, however, henceforth, from now on experiences profound, far-reaching (/ are subject to radical) changes, and accordingly the physiognomy of war changes, not of course because its (war’s) essence, nature, character, as it (this said essence of war) is apprehended in its (war’s) definition, is (fundamentally, in principle) transformed (from the ground up), but rather because this essence cannot manifest itself continually, continuously, ceaselessly, unceasingly on the whole, entire field and in all aspects of ongoing, armed conflicts, confrontations, altercations, clashes. The main, chief feature of culture is the increasing differentiation and complexity of the “soci(et)al association (uni(s)on, syndicate, league, federation, organisation)” (/ The principal feature of culture is that society is differentiated and becomes all the more complex), so that whatsoever makes up, constitutes war in its conceptual purity – under the influence of the ceaselessly coming into being / appearing, having an effect against / running counter to one another or having an effect with / on / running together with one another, fluctuating or stable, subjective or objective factors, which constitute, move and define continually anew the whole of culture – must come to / arrive at a(n) inhibition, obstruction, hindering, stemming, hampering, diversion, detour, fragmentation or partial concealing, cover(ing) (up), obscuring, hiding and disguise, disguising, cover(ing) of itself (/ be interrupted, diverted, fragmented or partially covered up and disguised). The “partition, barrier, dividing wall”, which hinders, obstructs, impedes “the total, complete unloading, discharging, offloading (relieving of the pressure of life)”, lies from now on / henceforth / here on in “in the great, large number of things, forces, relations, circumstances, which war touches in the

life of (the) state(s)". Even if an "intelligence" / some (kind of) "mind", i.e. a (wanting, willing) person, (a) group or (a(n)) (dominant, governing) authority were / was capable and willing of not allowing itself to be put off / misled, disconcerted in (regard to) its pure intention (in respect) of (to go to) war by any of these obstacles, hindrances, impediments, yet / nevertheless / and again(,) (the) differentiating (cause-of-differences) and differentiated culture has brought about (forth) (yielded, produced, spawned, thrown up) a(n) amount, quantity, heap, load, mass, multitude, lot of other, different and other kinds of "intelligences, minds" into the state (/ other heterogeneous rational bearers, carriers, vehicles), which do not want to and cannot do the same (thing), so that the "inertia of the whole, entire mass" cannot be (is not) (ultimately, finally) overcome (in the long run / end)²⁷. In this way, the "compound, complex, composite, put together, assembled, composed relations and forms of war between educated, cultured, cultivated, civilised, refined, polished, learned, erudite, well-read peoples" are shaped, (and that) "thus, in such a manner, complex activity, such as a war between civilized nations" (is formed)²⁸;(;) whereby / in relation to which / of course, the / its / war's simple nature by definition (/ as it is expressed in its definition) is indeed not dissolved, eliminated, nor is it immobilised, crippled, paralysed, brought to a halt / standstill, but from now on, henceforth is overlapped / arched (domed, covered) over by (/ has as a(n) arch, dome over it) the "composite, compound and mutable, changeable texture, nature, character of war"²⁹.

Wherein exists / lies now the difference in the waging, conducting, carrying out, execution of war in / during the primitive, uncivilised, raw, crude, rough and in / during the civilised, developed, educated, cultured, cultivated, refined, polished state (of affairs), situation, phase of culture? Whereas in the "simple relations, circumstances, conditions of wild peoples, folks" the state and war power (might, force, strength), power (might, force, strength) in respect of war / armed force are a unity and hence war constitutes a single great, large battle, engagement, fighting, encounter;(;) "our wars" consist of several, a number of, multiple, more battles, engagements, whereby / in

²⁷ Vom Kriege, VIII, 2 = 953 [THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT IS HAPPENING IN ZIO-2026 BETWEEN THE PARTIALLY RULING ZIO-USA ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITES OF THE ZIO-SATAN STATE (AND THEIR MANY ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE STOOGEZ) AND THE OTHER PARTIALLY RULING ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITES WITH THEIR MANY ZIO-ANGLO-JOO-ZOMBEE-STOOGEZ OF ZIO-USA WHO DON'T WANT ZIO-USA TO BE THE ZIO-SATAN STATE'S SLAVE (ZIO), WHICH IS A "HOLDOVER" FROM USA AS A NON-ZIO-USA FROM THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES BASED ON THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY]].

²⁸ Feldzüge von 1799, § 21 = Werke, V, 221.

²⁹ Vom Kriege, I, 2 = 214.

relation to which this “fragmentation, breaking up, crumbling, decomposing, disintegration of activity into so many individual acts has its basis, reason(s), grounds in / is due to the great manifoldness, multiformity of relations, circumstances, conditions, out of / from which war is born / emerges, arises in, amongst us” ; also the political end, goal here is not united (obviously because of the simultaneous existence of several, many “intelligences, minds, volitions, wills” in the state), and even if it (the political goal) were (it, i.e. united), thus, so, again the act would have to(,) for its attainment, achievement(,) be divided into several, more, multiple acts³⁰. Decisive therefore in Clausewitz’s eyes is the objectively determined incapability of a “civilised (developed, educated, cultured, cultivated)” people, folk to realise, in the literal sense (of the term), what one in our century (has) named somewhat abusively total (complete) mobilisation(,) for the purpose / with the end, goal of the annihilation, extermination, destruction, extinction, obliteration of the foe in one single war(like/-related) (martial, belligerent, bellicose, bellicist(ic)) act^{xxi}; (the) duel (single combat) between/of hate-filled, (mutually) hateful existences can indeed be repeated in magno in wild (savage, fierce, ferocious, feral) peoples, folks, but not to that extent which has become in the meanwhile necessary, essentially by (means, way of) / through the magnitude, size, greatness, dimensions, bulk, vastness, mass of “our” peoples, folks, states and armies. Clausewitz characterises the command(ment) of a truly total and extreme (outmost, uttermost) exertion, effort, strain, endeavour in war as a “logical daydream (dream of logic)”³¹, and means with that / accordingly its (an extreme exertion’s) practical impracticability, unfeasibility, unviability, unworkability, unachievability in a cultural world / world of culture, which no longer can possess that primitive monolithic unity, cohesion, solidity, coherence which must / has to be presupposed for the realisation of the huge, enormous, giant, massive, colossal, gigantic, vast uninterrupted, unbroken duel, single combat of two warrior peoples/ nations/folks/tribes warriors; because culture not only multiplies (the) forces, but fragments them / breaks (carves, cuts, divides, hacks, hews, fritters) them (up) into pieces too – if it does not rest on weakness and does not generate, beget, create, produce weakness (see below / excursus (digression) (below)); that is why the possible result(ant) of the striving after / for, attempt at a total mobilisation in the aforementioned sense would be under the given historical and social conditions,

³⁰ Ibid., IV, 3 = 422.

³¹ Ibid., I, 1 § 6 = 196.

circumstances a “useless, pointless expenditure, spending, waste of energy, effort, forces / strain”³². Also, the other reasons, which according to Clausewitz effect(uate), have the effect of, cause, engender, occasion the diversion, digression, deflection of real war from its pure concept, can be derived, deduced from the direct, immediate or indirect, not immediate influence of (the) (state (of affairs) of) culture (cultural situation). If war does not come into being / is not born suddenly, abruptly, all of a sudden, unexpectedly, rapidly³³, but the inimical intentions of both sides are already known / have been apparent since (for) some time / quite a while (now), thus, this is due to a somehow, more or less organised society of peoples, folks being in existence, whose members communicate with one another politically or otherwise and have developed a code(x) of understanding, if only / even if it is just a symbolic one / code of understanding; and when war does not consist anymore of a single strike (blow, hit)³⁴, it is so / thus / the reason is because here more or less organised and prepared opponents fight, go into battle / combat (against one another), who are able to plan and act for / over the long term (run) / on a long-term basis. In / During this incessant, unremitting, unceasing weighing up, pondering, calculation, reckoning and looking ahead / foresight, anticipation, forecasting, prediction, which culture demands or else presupposes, such spiritual-intellectual forces are at work, however, which cannot be derived, deduced just like that / without anything further from / out of the existential core, nucleus of war, that is from / out of enmity and violence. This again suggests (the existence of) a conflict, dichotomy, rift, gulf, discrepancy in culture and in man, whose discussion, analysis will lead us to the focal, central point of Clausewitz’s anthropology and philosophy of culture / cultural philosophy.

Let us, first of all, hold onto / remember the most important result, outcome, consequence of the preceding, previous analysis. During the transition from pure to real war, politics as the subjective striving for, endeavour / effort, attempt at (the) moderation, restraint (of violence) of / by / on the part of a government, administration or other decisive, relevant, competent, leading, influential, definitive (dominant) authority (tier of jurisdiction) is (completely) out of the (not at all in) question / plays no role; solely, exclusively decisive here is the contradistinction, comparison, contrast of

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., I, 1, § 7 = 196 f.

³⁴ Ibid., I, 1, § 8 = 197 f.

two types of society, of the “raw, crude, rough, primitive, uncivilised” and of the “civilised (developed, educated, cultured, cultivated)”, and (the) talk (may be) of politics is allowed / permitted only when / if, accordingly, the / a “societal / social association, union, formation” (of people) is meant (as Clausewitz calls it). “Politics” means, signifies, then, the whole, total social life / life of the social (whole) of (civilised) peoples, folks (of culture)(,) and (a) politically led, conducted, waged war is *every* war between exactly such peoples, folks. At this level of theory, the contrast, opposition, clash, antithesis between war of annihilation (extermination, obliteration, extinction, destruction) and restricted, limited, confined war is (does) not yet thematised / turned into (made) a topic / (constitute) an object of discussion, which only *in(side)* a state (of affairs) / situation of culture is of (obtains) meaning / meaningful(,) and in / during which politics in the sense of subjective intentions and goals, ends could possibly, potentially, perchance play a certain role³⁵. After / Since we have avoided the just as common, usual as fatal error, mistake of confusing the contrast, opposition, clash, antithesis between pure and real war with that contrast between war of annihilation (extermination, obliteration, extinction, destruction) and restricted, limited, confined war^{xxii}, we must, of course, pose the question(,) (as to) what then causes (provokes, occasions, brings on (about), gives rise to) the transition from pure to real war, if/when the reason for that (transition) cannot be any subjective (and) humane, philanthropic, humanitarian, charitable, benevolent, friendly-to-man endeavour, effort, attempt at / striving for (the) moderation (of violence). Clausewitz’s answer, response to this question is an anthropological one / response, and reads / is, in short/brief, so, thus : man is composed, constituted, made in such a way, manner that he cannot do without / renounce, abstain (resign himself) from extreme violence, that is (the) killing, execution (of another / the other / others), but simultaneously he cannot live permanently with it / that (extreme violence as the killing of another / others). The framework of orientation of Clausewitz’s anthropological thoughts, considerations and ascertainments hence remains that “dichotomy, division, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy which is grounded, founded, established, set up / takes root in man himself, and therefore cannot be solved, overcome, surpassed by philosophical understanding, logic”³⁶. However, it is not here a matter of that contrast, clash, opposition, antithesis between normatively aligned,

³⁵ See Sec. 5, esp. p. 74 ff., below.

³⁶ Vom Kriege, VIII, 6B = 990.

oriented Reason (reason) and dark drives, urges, impulses, which stood / was at the centre of attention / focal point, mid-point of (the) traditional (moral, ethical) philosophy (of morality, ethics). A(n) contrast, clash, opposition, antithesis understood in such a way is already for (not of interest to) Clausewitz (not a theme, topic, subject matter [[for discussion, consideration]]) because man, according to his view, perception, can / is always be led, guided and driven, propelled, impelled, pushed, urged, goaded by feelings. “The strongest, most powerful inducement, urge, urging, abetment, encouragement, incitement, instigation of / towards / for action(,) humans always get, obtain, receive through / by means of feelings, sentiments”³⁷; (he, man) being used / accustomed to “act in both large and small ways more in accordance with individual prevailing, predominant notions, (re)presentations, perceptions and feelings (sentimental proclivities) than in accordance with (a) strict logical consistency, consequence, order, progression, sequence”³⁸. The (above-) mentioned irrevocable, irrepealable, non-abrogable, non-rescindable, non-voidable, insurmountable, insuperable, unexcelled dichotomy, division, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy in(side) man can only result, arise, come (about) from (out of) the existence of two opposing, opposed, contrasting, conflicting, set-against-each-other (groups of) feelings, sentiments in his psyche, soul. And in actual fact : on the one hand, man is “the bearer, carrier, vehicle of the simple, mere, bare, pure, unmixed, undiluted, immiscible principle of enmity”³⁹; and furthermore, many other feelings, sentiments (also) stir, move, boil in his breast, chest (too, as well), which can promote, encourage, foster, facilitate, further, stimulate, capable of exciting the / a fighting, battling, competitive, antagonistic spirit (temperament, disposition) (lust, desire, appetite to, for fight(ing), struggle / struggling, wage / waging war), like ambition, addiction, obsession, lust, passion (in regard) to, for power, holding sway, reigning, presiding, dominating (over) (others), enthusiasm of any / every kind (for this and for that) etc.⁴⁰; on the other hand, his (man’s) “incomplete, imperfect organisation”⁴¹ is seen, shown, evident in his “natural restrictedness, limitedness, restrictions, limit(ation)s, constraints and weakness(es), shortcomings,

³⁷ Ibid., I, 3 = 252.

³⁸ Ibid., VIII, 2 = 953.

³⁹ Ibid., VIII, 2 = 952.

⁴⁰ Ibid., II, 2 = 286; cf. I, 3 = 239 (the “thirst of the soul (psyche)” for fame, reputation, renown and glory, honour, kudos as the “true, genuine, actual breath of life”).

⁴¹ Ibid., I, 1, § 7 = 197.

deficiency, debility, frailty, feebleness”⁴², in the “whole, entire, total, complete inconsistency, inconsequence, unclarity, ambiguity and despondency, diffidence, unassertiveness of the human spirit”⁴³, in his “incomplete, imperfect insight, understanding (/ perceptive (cap)ability) and judgement”⁴⁴ just as / like in his “aversion to(wards) excessive, all-too-great effort(s), exertion(s), endeavour(s), struggles, strains”⁴⁵, in the / his “natural fearfulness, timorousness and indecision, irresolution, irresoluteness, undecidedness of the human spirit”, in the / his “aversion to danger, risk, hazards and responsibility, accountability, liability”⁴⁶ and in the / his “weakness”, which (the) “by / of nature fearful, timorous man”⁴⁷ “occupies, befalls, possesses [him]” in every “great, big decision [[he takes (makes)]]”⁴⁸. Two kinds of human properties, characteristics, qualities, stand / obstruct, therefore, for the most part / on the whole / generally speaking / by an large / to all intents and purposes / in the main / in general terms / overall, (in the way of) a(n) complete, total, absolute active unfolding, development of enmity and of the fighting, battling, competitive, antagonistic spirit (temperament, disposition) (lust, desire, appetite to, for fight(ing), struggle / struggling, wage / waging war) interrelating, interrelated, interconnecting, interconnected with it, of the “(internal) need for (the) fight, struggle, battle, war”⁴⁹; spiritual-intellectual restrictedness, limitedness, restrictions, limit(ation)s, constraints (/ the finite, finished character of the spirit / intellect-emotions) and fear (dread, awe, terror, anxiety).

Clausewitz himself in the late(r) phase of his (intellectual) development, evolution (of thought) also / even in a systematic regard became aware / conscious of the fundamental meaning of the anthropological factor for the theory of war. “The theory is supposed / ought to also take into consideration (account) / consider the human (element)”, he wrote at that time (then)⁵⁰, and he repeated this programmatic demand in his last remaining, posthumous note in, on, to his main, chief, principal work⁵¹. But already at, in the beginning(s), start of his theoretical career, he had to very often argue

⁴² Ibid., VIII, 6A = 988.

⁴³ Ibid., VIII, 2 = 954.

⁴⁴ Ibid., III, 16 = 408.

⁴⁵ Ibid., I, 1, § 8 = 199.

⁴⁶ Ibid., III, 16 = 408.

⁴⁷ Ibid., VIII, 6B = 992

⁴⁸ Ibid., IV, 11 = 469.

⁴⁹ Ibid., II, 1 = 269.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1, § 22 = 208.

⁵¹ Ibid., 181 (“the political and human side of war”).

anthropologically, since he was known to be a proponent, advocate, champion of the view that he repeatedly reaffirmed later on, that the art of war has “to do with living and with moral, ethical forces”⁵²: no-one other than man is, however, the bearer, carrier, vehicle of / for these forces and, accordingly / because of that, the question, problem in accordance with his constitution, composition, texture, nature, character must move into the foreground / come to the fore. Thus, the young Clausewitz rationalised, gave reasons for his aversion to / dislike, disinclination of / for (the) “waiting (for time to bring you) for favourable, advantageous, beneficial conjunctures (over time)” with the argument that “the natural fearfulness, timorousness of the usual, accustomed men during / in (regard to) great, large, big undertakings, ventures, operations, activities” finds in that (here) a(n) pretext, excuse, smokescreen in order to not / so as not to undertake, venture [(into) war]] (/ for ((in respect) of) inaction, inactivity, idleness)⁵³. And against Bülow’s “pure strategy”, he suggests, puts forward, proposes the term “general strategy”, since, as he means, thinks, opines, in it (/ it can formulate) principles (can be specified, indicated, stated, declared)(,) which “are based, founded on no less (equally) general circumstances, like / as e.g. (on) the general character of man (is)”⁵⁴. Also, in the years of the Prussian debacle, catastrophe, calamity, when he sought far and wide (as much as he could) for means and ways in order to mobilise (the) souls against the foe, he often thought / had thoughts about / contemplated the dichotomy, dilemma, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy in / (in respect) of human nature, (about) that is, the “sluggish, lazy, inert, indolent, lethargic, languid animal, beast” in it / which it hides, conceals within it, (and) which “cowardly, faint-heartedly and fearfully, timidly” allows itself to be chained / put in chains, and at the same time about the feelings of “hate and revenge . . . , which one has to wait for very unjustly only from religious enthusiasm, infatuation, passion, rapture (/ very wrongly, badly exclusively connects with religious fanaticism)” and which in the hour of great danger, risk or / and of misfortune, calamity, disaster, woe, tribulation or / and of despair, desperation, hopelessness, distress, exasperation lift (raise) man above his “usual, ordinary, common, accustomed being there / existence / life”(,) and gives / giving him courage, heart, spirit, nerve,

⁵² Ibid., I, 1, § 22 = 208; cf. Feldzüge von 1799, § 87 = Werke, VI, 274 (“the influence . . . , which in the waging, conducting, carrying out of war, the consideration, observation of man in general, and in(side) man, again, his comfortable, pleasant, cosy, restful, relaxed, quiet, comforting side / affect / associated emotion, has”).

⁵³ Strategie, 53.

⁵⁴ Bemerkungen, 14 f..

boldness and energy, vigour, spirit, zip⁵⁵; nevertheless, he was convinced that the great, large mass, multitude, crowd, throng, mob “stands in the middle between the extremes of human nature”⁵⁶, and that, in any case, (it is) not (the) understanding, mind, but the affect, emotions, spirit, mind, soul, disposition, feeling, nature in / of man -either way- decides^{xxiii} : “the one interest of the emotions, spirit is courage, but the other is fear”⁵⁷. Finally, Clausewitz expressly refers to (the) anthropological points of view / factors when he for the first time prepared, attempted to systematically set forth, expound, express, exhibit, formulate, state, propound, present his thoughts, considerations, views, opinions. Here (the) “fear before / (in the face) of a decisive, final, conclusive, definitive decision, verdict, ruling, judgement” or a “blow, strike, hit, beat, stroke of destiny, fate” appears as / to be (a) natural (feeling), that is, (a feeling) taking root / rooted “in man himself”, which has an effect / equally acts in war (just as much) as (no less than) in / during a card game : “because precisely in the traits, characteristics, attributes (/ as concerns the deepest, most secretive) features of the heart and of the spirit, which reside most secretly, furtively within us, . . . human nature is (the) most similar / remains the same, even under / in (regard to) the most unequal, unlike, different kind of relations, circumstances, conditions”. This fear constitutes, in any case, “an almost always more or less effective cause for the weakening, debilitating, enfeeblement of the natural force of this element”, i.e. of war, and it makes the historical experience comprehensible, that war “in general is so little warlike (martial, Mars-like/related, maniacal)”. Subsequently / Thereafter, and in / during the conscious systematic putting forward, precedence of this central anthropological knowledge (“on the basis of / proceeding (going) with these findings (analyses, break downs, classifications), let us now ask history”), (Clausewitz briefly describes) the development, unfolding, evolution of the waging, conducting, carrying out of war from “raw, crude, rough, primitive, uncivilised peoples” up to the French Revolution (is briefly, in short described, outlined, portrayed, depicted)⁵⁸.

In the light of this anthropology, which the manifoldness, diversity, plurality of the human (element, condition) groups around both poles of the dichotomy expounded,

⁵⁵ Epistle, letter to the / his bride, fiancée, betrothed from 11. 9. 1807 and Aufzeichnungen from the years 1807/8 and 1809 = Politische Schriften, 21, 66, 75; Bekenntnisschrift (1812) = Schriften, 739.

⁵⁶ Bermerkungen und Einfälle (1807) = Rothfels, C. v. Clausewitz, Anhang, 224.

⁵⁷ Bekenntnisschrift = Schriften, 707.

⁵⁸ Ueber das Fortschreiten, esp. 233, 237, 236 f.. Through / By means of this treatise, discourse, Clausewitz wanted to “bring ((in)to / shed upon / give to) strategy (into) (the) light and context (clarity and coherence)”, see the letter to Gneisenau from 4. 3. 1817, *ibid.*, 240.

explained, explicated, elucidated / which we pointed out/to (above), the hybrid (hermaphrodite, dual, twin, double) essence / nature (Janus-faced character) of war can be explained : war cannot remain, stay, adhere, keep, hold, be closed in / with / to its pure concept because it has to be waged, conducted, carried out not only because of enmity, but also with fear. Clausewitz summarises, sums up this contradictory situation, position with successful (luck) formulations : “But as wild as the nature of war is, so / thus, nevertheless it (the said nature) lies on the chain of (is chained to) human weaknesses, shortcomings, deficiencies, debilities, frailties, feebleness, and the contradiction, which is seen / shown / manifests itself here, that man seeks and creates danger, risk, which he nevertheless also fears / is afraid of, will not seem strange to (disconcert) anyone”⁵⁹. Or : Complete / The totality of war / War as a whole (in its entirety) presupposes human weakness, and is directed / turns against this (human weakness)”⁶⁰. In this way, he wants, first of all, to explain, explicate with (the) narrow(er) intent (context) (i.e. in strict terms) as regards the theory of war (the “stagnation, standstill, stoppage, stasis, pause(s) in the (war(like /-related), martial, belligerent, bellicose, bellicist(ic)) act (of war)”, whose cause(s) he espies, sees, locates in the “natural fearfulness, timorousness and indecisiveness of / in the human spirit(-intellect)”, in the “incompleteness, imperfection, imperfectness, imperfect nature” of human insight, understanding, cognition, comprehension and “judgement” and only thirdly / in third place in the “greater strength (superior power) of defence”⁶¹. After / Once / When he (Clausewitz), however, saw, espied, located the taking root / the roots of the (war) phenomenon (of war) in the social whole / the totality of society and had handled, treated, understood in terms of theory the difference between pure and real war, he (then) put in order / embodied, incorporated his explanation, explication, interpretation of the standstill, stagnation, stoppage, stasis, pause(s) in war in this broader context⁶², which he again based, rested, supported on / underpinned by, in its totality, entirety, the same anthropological perceptions, views. It is by no means coincidental, accidental, by / a matter of chance, happenstance that the indication of /

⁵⁹ *Vom Kriege*, III, 16 = 407.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, 10 = 465.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, III, 16 = 408 f.. Cf. IV, 11 = 469 ((the) fear “before the thought of the decision given (/ outcome of the war being decided) with (by) one blow” or else / and “this weakness which befalls, comes over, possesses man in every (other / different) great decision” as the reason for the avoidance of the decisive battle) as well as *Feldzug von 1815*, § 12 = *Werke*, VIII, 33.

⁶² *Ibid.*, I, 1, §§ 17 —18 = 205 —6.

pointing, allusion to the “dichotomy, dilemma, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy, which is founded, grounded, established, based, rooted / takes root in/on man himself”, appears precisely in that chapter in which the teaching of war as the continuation, continuity of political communication, intercourse, circulation, traffic, transport(ation), contact with the mixing, mixture, involvement, blending, interference, intervention, meddling, intrusion of other means is for the first time systematically put forward, presented, introduced, whereby / in relation to which (– indeed,) Clausewitz characterises, describes this teaching, theory, doctrine as the “unity” “to / with which these contradictory elements [which make up / constitute the dichotomy in man] are connected (/ which these connected contradictory elements constitute [sc. the elements which make up the dichotomy inside man]), as / whilst they partially mutually, reciprocally neutralise each other”⁶³; and just as little coincidental, accidental, chance, happenstance is the fact that where he (Clausewitz) discusses the distinction, difference between pure and real war, he underlines, points out, points, refers to the “shortcomings, deficiencies, imperfections, defects, incompleteness(es), imperfectness(es)” of / in man as the “relieving, reducing, abating, discounting principle” (/ “principle of mitigation, moderation, palliation, reduction, lessening, alleviation, diminishing” of violence)⁶⁴. Now, however, it is no longer a matter of / it is not a matter about the character of the standstill, stagnation, stoppage, stasis, pause(s) in war, but of / about the character of war itself in the life of a “civilised, cultured, educated, cultivated” people, folk, whereby / in relation to which a partially explicit and partially implicit philosophy of culture / cultural philosophy comes into being (/ is formed). Accordingly / In accordance with that (philosophy of culture), there is inside (of) culture (as the objectivisation / objectification of (the) dichotomous (human) nature (of man)), both an in practice sufficient equilibrium of the counterbalancing, opposing, conflicting, contrasting, contrary tendencies, inclinations, propensities, proclivities in man, so that peace can dominate, rule, be maintained, as well as enough, sufficient tension, stress, strain, intensity, so that war is not excluded, but rather / probably is being prepared (for). This mixing, mixture, blending of war and peace, which in the state (of affairs) / situation of peace takes (on), adopts, assumes the form of (the) preparation of / for war (or of action, activity in regard to (in view of) the possibility of a

⁶³ Ibid., VIII, 6B = 990.

⁶⁴ Ibid., I, 1, § 7 = 197.

decision of (for the use of) weapons, i.e. an armed confrontation), appears in / during wars between “civilised” peoples in the form of a saturation, permeation, impregnation, pervasion, penetration of the waging, conducting of war with political goals, ends and of a standstill, stagnation, stoppage, stasis, pause in the war(like /-related), martial, belligerent, bellicose, bellicist(ic)) act (/ as the interpolation, intervention of pauses in / during hostilities). It depends on / The issue is / It is a matter now of which “interests” prevail, predominate on each and every respective occasion. Because the state (of affairs) / situation of culture, the “soci(et)al association, union (formation, syndicate, league, federation, organisation)”, inside of which peace and war are acted out / take place, is formed, shaped, moulded on the basis of / with the having a joint effect / participation, involvement, cooperation, collaboration, partnership of both fundamental, basic aspects of human nature, it, therefore, simultaneously serves different human interests⁶⁵. If there were a “societal (social) association (union)”, which had never known any war, then / thus we could assert, claim, maintain it would exclusively rest / be based on the feelings of fear (angst) and weakness (regardless / irrespective of / no matter how one would call, name these). This would, of course, be / constitute a pure culture, as it were / so to speak, a reversal of pure war. However, as war, insofar / inasmuch as / to the extent it represents violence under the conditions, relations of culture, can no longer be pure, thus / so, culture too / as well, insofar / inasmuch as / to the extent it cause, effects, effectuates, brings about a moderation, restraint, temperance, mitigation, palliation of pure war, it does this only at the (a) cost of / to its purity (/ it can induce, occasion, provoke this moderation only by itself losing its pure character), by letting / allowing namely war to come into being and be waged, conducted in its own womb, bosom. Pure culture and pure war can be contrasted, counterposed at the conceptual level precisely, exactly as / like aggressive hate and (stifling, burdensome, oppressive) fear (angst) that shrinks back from the fight / before danger, risk, struggle ; the theoretical validity, soundness of their distinction from one another stands / is, however, just as little in the way of their real, actual interweaving, entanglement as the ascertainment of a dichotomy (dilemma, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy) in man obstructs, hinders, impedes his united, unified appearance (/ him

⁶⁵ Cf. the sentence : “. . . in the division, disagreement, dissension, dichotomy, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy in which the nature of war stands / is (found) with *other* interests of the individual (human) and of the societal / social association (union)” (VIII, 6B = 990, my italicisation, underlining).

from presenting himself) as a (united) person or (a) (united) people.

Now one could think, mean, opine that the “reduction, discount(ing), relief, mitigation, moderation, palliation, reduction, lessening, alleviation, diminishing, abatement” of / in pure war in / during the transition to culture, and consequently to real, actual wars, would be connected with an, in essence, humanisation or moralisation / ethicisation lying in (/ is due to progress, advancements in morality, ethics and in humanism related to the character of) culture itself. Clausewitz would not (have) approve(d) of, uphold / upheld, endorse(d) such an interpretation of his thought already because he did not see, does not believe that the formation, development of (the) “understanding, intellect” in “civilised, cultured, educated, refined” peoples / folks goes, went (hand in hand) with a(n) withdrawal, slackening, abatement, retreat, subsidence of the “uncivilised, primitive, raw, crude, rough element” ; the contradistinction of / between rawness, brutality, roughness, crudeness, barbarity and culture, understanding / intellect and affect, emotions, feeling, disposition, mind, soul, nature, spirit loses, hence, every / any moral / ethical connotation, and the real possibility of (a) (moral) progress (in morals, morality, ethics) is not considered at all / does not at all come into view / consideration / discussed at all. The priority, precedence, predominance, prevalence, supremacy of the affect, emotions, feeling, disposition, mind, soul, nature, spirit in the uncivilised, raw, uncultured, uneducated, barbarian peoples and of (the) understanding, intellect in the civilised, cultivated, cultured, educated peoples, writes Clausewitz, “does not lie in / is not due to the essence, texture, nature of the rawness, barbarity and education, culture themselves, but in the concomitant, attendant, accompanying circumstances, conditions, institutions, arrangements etc.”, because “even the most civilised, educated, cultured, cultivated peoples can passionately fire (flare) up, erupt, be aroused, burst out against one another”⁶⁶; inventions, fabrications like gunpowder and (the) firearm(s) show that “the tendency for/towards/of the annihilation of the opponent is factually / in actual fact / in (as a matter of) practice in no way / by no means disturbed, hindered, obstructed or distracted, diverted by increasing / the progress of education, cultivation, civilisation”⁶⁷.

⁶⁶ Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 193. Already in the / his notes of 1807/8, Clausewitz thinks, opines, says that the medieval fighting of all/everyone against all/everyone has “finally finished, not because men have gradually become more unwarlike, unbelligerent / less warlike”, but thanks to the establishment, institution, constitution, installation, arrangement of the absolute monarchy (Politische Schriften, 54).

⁶⁷ Vom Kriege, I, 1, § 3 = 194; cf. I, 3 = 243: “But even / also amongst the civilised, educated, cultured peoples and / as well as in the(ir) most civilised, educated, cultured [social] classes (of the same (civilised peoples))”, “men, humans, people are swept (carried) away by violent (the most powerful) passions”.

Culture does not, therefore, mean, signify the drying up, running dry, failure, petering out of the existential source of war, but it brings with it (about) / entails, on the contrary, a completion, perfection of the art of war, the art of (the) killing (of another / the other / others) ; since from “educated, civilised, cultured peoples”, the “more or less warlike, war-related, belligerent, bellicose, martial, bellicist(ic) direction, tendency, proclivity and unfolding, development, evolution” is not lacking/missing/absent, thus/so, the refinement of understanding / the intellect takes part (participates) / partakes / contributes, in relation to that, in / of / to the substitution, replacement of the “warlike, bellicose, martial spirit” with / by the “warlike, bellicose, martial genius”, which only enables, makes possible, facilitates (the) great achievements, accomplishments, performances in war : besides, in (the) “times, ages, epochs of a higher learning, education, culture, civilisation” has / have, for famous, famed, celebrated, legendary, noted, prominent, eminent, reputed peoples(,) their art of war always in fact had an effect (/ peoples acted who were renowned for their art of war)⁶⁸.

If culture does not bring about / effect(uate) a weakening, attenuation of the war-related (warlike, martial, belligerent, bellicose, bellicist(ic)) tendencies, proclivities of / in man (humans), although for objective reasons it / culture does not any longer allow pure war, thus / so, “understanding, sense, the mind / brain” or “intelligence”, whose development, unfolding characterises the state (of affairs) / situation of “education, cultivation”, cannot have a moral/ethical-humane/humanistic, but only, simply a(n) end/goal-rational, instrumental, expedient, purposeful character(, it means the rational finding, discovery of (the) means for the achievement of an end, goal, purpose, irrespective of its ethical / moral quality, character(istics), nature^{xxiv}). Intelligence is, therefore, now supposed / called upon to serve those (psychical) forces (of the mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche), which, already before its (the said intelligence’s) own refinement, determined (the course of) events, occurrences, happenings, facts, even though the influence, having an effect of intelligence considerably, substantially changes the course and the physiognomy of the events^{xxv}. “Struggle is a measuring (up), weighing of the spiritual and corporeal, bodily forces by means of the latter (corporeal forces)”⁶⁹, the fact, therefore, that ((the) struggle can be conducted) only with tangible means (can there be struggle), does not mean,

⁶⁸ Ibid., I, 3 = 232.

⁶⁹ Ibid., II, 1 = 269.

signify that the spirit would become / is alien, foreign (to) (or averse, opposed to) the struggle (or would loathe, abhor it). For Clausewitz, “intelligence” and the “(raw) element (of rawness, brutality, crudeness)” are just as little (/ do not constitute) opposites, contrasts as (like) “education” and war (do not constitute opposites); he stresses, by the way, incidentally, besides, though, that “the use of physical violence in its whole range, scope / entirety, totality / to its/the greatest extent does not in any way exclude collaboration, having an effect, co-action, acting together with intelligence”, “violence equips, arms, furnishes itself / is equipped / gets prepared, ready with the inventions of the arts and of the sciences”⁷⁰. This collaboration of / having an effect (acting) together, co-action between violence and intelligence causes, brings about, forces, induces, leads to the transition from pure war to war under the conditions, circumstances of culture (/ of civilised peoples) not in the sense that intelligence strives, struggles to restrain, subdue, harness, tame, quell or even (and/or) eliminate, deactivate violence always and everywhere. It is true that intelligence has a moderating, tempering effect on (moderates, tempers) violence;(;) it does this, however, only out / because of a higher, superior end/goal-rationality, expediency (/ it better weighs up the means in relation to the ends), because it, namely, is able to understand, see / have insight into the fact (/ being in this way in a position to ascertain) that victory in war, as this war is waged, conducted, carried out in (the conditions, circumstances of) culture, can be attained, achieved, accomplished only under / with / through the taking into account / consideration and utilisation, exploitation of all subjective and objective factors of the from now on / henceforth highly complex (/ by now so complicated) “societal, social association, union” (of men, humans, people). Mere, Simple, Pure, Unmixed, Undiluted violence could (still) be imposed in(side) pure war, however, the blind strikes, blows and (plain, pure) bravado, recklessness, derring-do, daredevil(t)ry, daring (deeds), brave action, heroic risk (often, frequently) necessarily prove to be (most of the time / on most occasions) disastrous, catastrophic, fatal, ill-fated, ominous, pernicious, ruinous, calamitous, noxious, baneful when it is a matter of circumstances, relations, conditions, whose manifoldness, multiformity, diversity (and multi-dimensionality) make, render unavoidable, inevitable / essential elements (of the act) the weighing up of things, calculation (calculus) and manoeuvring (on the part of every person acting / actor) : “That one gets out of the way (avoidance) of an obstacle, hindrance, impediment, is for

⁷⁰ Ibid., I, 1, §§ 3 and 2 = 192.

man (already) (an) instinct”⁷¹, and an extreme refinement of this instinct is intelligence inside of (the circumstances, conditions of) culture, so that it is able to guarantee, ensure / capable of guaranteeing, ensuring (the) (vitally necessary) orientation (necessary, essential for life) and (allows) the surveying of things / a(n) overall view, overview, summary, synopsis (of things). It / The same (intelligence) cannot and also will not condemn the remaining (residual) (psychical, mental) forces (of the mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche) for ineffectiveness, inaction, idleness, inactivity because they would (appear to) be for instance dangerous, hazardous, risky, perilous, unsafe – the abolition of wars is for (the) intelligence in Clausewitz’s sense no declared or feasible, achievable, possible end, aim, objective, target, goal ; it (intelligence) can and will, however, channel them (the said psychical forces) in an end/goal-rational, expedient, purposeful manner (/ so as to serve as means its goals), and only in regard to a higher effectiveness in action (/ to make action more effective, effectual) does it tame, subdue, restrain, harness, master, quell, keep down, bring under control (the) unbridled, unchecked, unrestrained, uncontrolled, unrestricted violence : “if we find, therefore, that civilised peoples do not kill (give / rain death to / upon) captives, prisoners, do not destroy, ruin (the) city / cities and (the) land (countryside), it is so, thus / the reason is because intelligence in its (enters, slips, worms, slides more into the) waging, conducting of war (is more sophisticated) and has taught them (the said civilised peoples) more effective means for the application / towards (the) exercising (of) / of using violence than these raw, crude, uncivilised expressions, manifestations of (the) instinct”⁷² + xxvi. “Blind pouncing” / The “blind onrush, aggressive push / charge” for the purpose of the annihilation, elimination of the foe is / (ought) (to be) condemned exactly from the point of view of the uppermost / supreme / top / paramount criterion of “superior, higher effectiveness”⁷³. And the subjugation, subjection, submission of (the) “blind passion” to / under the political goal, end, purpose of war also means, signifies nothing other than the imposition, prevalence, predominance of the same criterion and of the same end/goal-rational, expedient, purposeful, instrumental mode, manner, way of thought / thinking; because this prevailing, superiority of the political end/goal implies, entails an act(ion) of intelligence, (whereby / by (through)) which (determines) the magnitude of the sacrifice(s) (is

⁷¹ Gustav Adolfs Feldzüge, Werke, IX, 77.

⁷² Vom Kriege, I, 1, § 3 = 193 f..

⁷³ Ibid., I, 2 = 226.

determined) analogous to / depending on / in accordance with the value, worth of the end / goal / purpose⁷⁴.

The best service which (the) intelligence can render, give, bestow, extend, accord to the “(raw) element (of rawness)” inside of the “societal, social association, union” (of men, humans, people) is, therefore, to tame (restrain, subdue, master, harness, quell) it / for it to be tamed (restrained) in accordance with end/goal-rational, expedient, purposeful, instrumental point(s) of view, standpoints, perspectives (/ the logic of its purposes, ends, goals). We repeat : it is a matter here of a service to it (i.e. the societal association), not of a(n) opposition, contrast to it⁷⁵. This taming, restraining, curbing for the sake / towards the achievement of “higher, superior, greater effectiveness” does not occur / is not realised only directly / on the direct path, i.e. through, by means of express prohibitions, social disciplining and military discipline, training, education, breeding, cultivation, but also indirectly, by / when, namely, the bearers of enmity being (are) summarised, condensed, included in collective forms of organisation so that they can no longer move and act at will / as they want (to) — when they are obliged / have to review, examine, inspect, sift through and direct, guide (/ subordinate) their feelings, sentiments through, by means (/ to the control and guidance) of (the) existing social and military institutions, arrangements : “all the inventions of art, weapons, organisation, practised tactics and the principles for the use of (the) troops in battle (fighting, engagement), are restrictions, limits of / on the natural instinct, since it (the instinct) is supposed to be led (through them) to the roundabout way, detour, side roads, backstreets to(wards), for / of a more effective, beneficial use of it forces” — even though / although “(a) certain space, room to play, leeway / degree of freedom” must be granted to the still, continually indispensable (psychical / emotional) forces (of the mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche)⁷⁶. Accordingly / Hence, enmity becomes impersonal, more cerebral, if one may say so / the expression be permitted, and the refinement, perfection of weapons has the same effect too / as well : whereas in (the) “raw, crude fistfight (pugilism, boxing (contest)) / barbarian body-to-body struggle” the dagger, knife, stiletto and the battleaxe, hatchet are still used,(;) those weapons “with which the foe is fought already from (at) a distance” constitute “more (the) instruments

⁷⁴ Ibid., 217.

⁷⁵ Cf. Kondylis, Macht und Entscheidung, 80 ff.. [= ἰσχύς καὶ Απόφαση, 143 κέ.]

⁷⁶ Leitfaden zur Bearbeitung der Taktik, § 45, in : Vom Kriege, 1108.

of understanding / the mind, intellect ; they almost completely suppress (/ they leave in almost complete, full tranquility, calm(ness), rest(fulness), stillness, quietness, quietude) the (psychical / emotional) forces (of the mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche) and the (actual) (fighting) instinct (of struggle) (in itself / as such)”⁷⁷. And yet^{xxvii} (no) war can(not) be imagined / conceived (of) without “enmity”, without the “instinct of (for) attack and of (for) annihilation, extermination, destruction”⁷⁸, precisely, exactly like, as in the circumstances, relations of “civilisation, education, learning, culture” no waging, conducting, carrying out of war is thinkable, imaginable, possible, conceivable without a guiding, leading, conducting (the guidance) and (the) planning (of) intelligence. In / During the henceforth unavoidable co-effect, having an effect together, collaboration, co-action of both forces of the psyche, (the) intelligence obtains, gets, receives, preserves, maintains its driving, propelling force / motive, germinating power (strength) from the will, volition for victory over the foe⁷⁹, whereas / whilst enmity more or less partially survives, lives on (in an) undiluted (form) by being transformed into “collective hate” or is inflamed / re-ignited (comes back, re-appears) in the struggle itself,(;) partially it is represented in sublimated form through / by means (/ idealised, taking the form) of feelings, sentiments like (the) desire, longing, craving, yearning for glory, fame, renown, stardom etc.⁸⁰. At the highest military level, where the fighting (battling, competitive, antagonistic, warlike, martial, belligerent, bellicose, bellicist(ic)) genius dwells, abides, stays, tarries in the form of / is represented by talented, endowed, victorious general, strategist, commander, field marshal, war chief, this same co-effect, having an effect together, collaboration, co-action (of both forces of the psyche [of the instinct to prevail/win and intelligence]) appears as “a harmonic union of forces”, as the inseparable, indivisible unity of courage (heart, spirit, nerve, boldness, pluck, grit, braveness, hardihood) and insight (knowledge, understanding, perception), from / out of which the genuine (real, authentic), unerring (accurate, trenchant, well-aimed) resolution, resoluteness,

⁷⁷ Ibid., §§ 46—47 = 1109.

⁷⁸ Ibid., §§ 30—31 = 1107.

⁷⁹ “But thus, so is human nature ; when the nerve of the force of the will / volition is lacking, missing, absent, notions, ideas, (re)presentations, perceptions play (out) in vain, futilely, uselessly, fruitlessly, unsuccessfully (/ float (about), hover, dangle) in(side) the soul”, *Feldzüge von 1799*, § 86 = *Werke*, VI, 264.

⁸⁰ *Leitfaden*, §§ 35—37 = *Vom Kriege*, 1107.

determination alone can arise, result⁸¹.

Now we can have a view of / survey the whole, entire, total, complete spectrum of the forces of the spirit(ual) or else / and of the (psychical / emotional) (forces) (of the) (mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche), which develop, unfold their effectiveness in(side) (the) war between “civilised peoples” : hate and enmity, then / thereafter the middle field of the “free (psychical) activity (of the soul)”, in which the known-to-us / (well-)known sublimated, idealised metamorphoses of enmity are mixed with qualities, properties, faculties, characteristics like courage, and finally, intelligence. Clausewitz calls this ensemble, whole, totality of the “dominating, ruling tendencies” in war a “wondrous (peculiar, strange, odd, quaint, bizarre, fantastic, sui genesis) trinity”, and attributes, ascribes the (its / the said trinity’s) first element “more to the people”, the second “more to the general, commander-in-chief, field marshal, generalissimo and his army” and the third “more to the government”⁸². He does not, therefore, identify the three aforementioned spiritual-intellectual or else (psychical / emotional) forces (of the mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche) with their main, chief, principal bearer, carrier, vehicle, which, of course, means, signifies that all three are to (must) be / necessarily found in all three subjects (in respect) of the waging, conducting of war in a different dosage on each and every respective occasion. He does not also / even undertake, carry out any attempt (try) to instruct, commission, give an order to, charge, impose upon intelligence, or else / that is to say, government (with) (regard to) the task, duty, mission, job of a taming, harnessing, subduing, controlling, mastering or even eliminating, elimination, turning / switching off of both other (psychical / emotional) forces (of the mind, soul, disposition, character, heart, nature, sense, feeling, temper, psyche) or else subjects — he knows, incidentally, how false it would be “to put down, reduce (the / a) war of / between civilised peoples to a mere, simple act of (the) understanding (mind, sense, intellect, reason) / intellectual act(ing) of governments”⁸³. The tripartite, ternary formula does not, hence, contain any judgement on / about the “right, correct” hierarchisation of the magnitudes mentioned in it / it includes(,) and it also (consequently) does not constitute

⁸¹ Vom Kriege, I, 3 = 232, 236. Cf. Feldzug von 1796, § 28 = Werke, IV, 94 (“One, however, does not wage, conduct war with the mind, understanding alone . . . The whole (of), complete / All of man wages, conducts war . . .”).

⁸² Vom Kriege, I, 1, § 28 = 213.

⁸³ Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 193.

a new definition of war next to, besides the one / those already known to us / we already known ; rather, there is a(n) enumeration, list of / it enumerates, lists (the) variables which are effective / have an effect, impact / act in a / every war between “civilised peoples”, whereby / in relation to which the guiding, leading, basic intent(ion) remains to explain with the help / on the basis of these variables not, for instance, the essence (of war), but the infinite, unending (great) variety, diversity of the (its) real and possible forms (of war)⁸⁴.

Not by chance, coincidentally, accidentally, therefore, the exposition, formulation, presentation, statement of the tripartite, ternary formula begins, starts, commences with the renowned, famous, reputed, celebrated, famed characterisation of war as a / the “true chameleon”, and just as consistent (it) is when (/ equally reasonably) Clausewitz sets (asks of) his theory (the task, job, mission that it) (to) remain suspended, floating, hovering between these three tendencies (elements) like / as (if) (they constituted) (between) three (points, centres, poles of) attraction(s)⁸⁵ : because to war under / between “civilised peoples” belong all three (tendencies, elements) equally, equivalently, and the fixing, setting, determination of their possible, internal relations towards / with one another is not a (prescriptive and normative) matter (of concern) (of normative principles), but a question of concrete considerations, which can (greatly, starkly, strongly) vary (to a great / large extent) from case to case.

3. War and politics or violence and power

We want now to show that the antithetical unity of “instinct” and (expedient, purposeful, end/goal-rational) intelligence (able to rationally select the best means for the realisation of its goals) is found in a systematic relationship towards, with, vis-à-vis the antithetical unity of violence and power(, and) (;) also, that violence and power are separated and intersect in the same sense as war and politics inside / in the framework

⁸⁴ Hepp showed that / this in his critique, criticism of Aron very well, *Der harmlose Cl.*, esp., 404 ff.. Aron himself (had) then, in his response, reply, answer, retort, counter, at least partially modified his original thesis (*Verd. Anwalt*, 292 f.). By reading in / deducing, deriving from the tripartite, ternary formula a primacy of (the / a) (moderate) political intelligence (having a moderating, tempering, relieving, reducing, discounting effect), he (Aron) basically renews Ritter’s misleading, erroneous perception that Clausewitz’s thought is “idealistic” and “completely, wholly, totally, entirely saturated, permeated by / with a victorious belief, faith in the power, might, strength, force of Reason” (*Staatskunst*, I, 92).

⁸⁵ *Vom Kriege*, I, 1, § 28 = 213.

(context) of a (the) “societal, social association, union” (of men, people, humans) (do it / are separated and intersect), which, for its part, is just as united and conflicting, ambivalent, dual-natured, mixed as human nature, whose objectiv(is)ation, objectification it makes up / constitutes (/ since it does not but make up, constitute its (human nature’s) objectification)^{xxviii}. However, before we begin with / engage in an analysis of an explanation, explication of this finely branched(-out), but clearly structured thought (intellectual) complex (of thought(s)), we must emphatically, firmly, expressly call to memory / recollect / remind ourselves that the first and decisive, determinative “moderation, mitigation, tempering, reduction, discounting, relief, relieving”, which war experiences, undergoes during / in the transition from pure war to real war, does not have the slightest, least to do with the objectives, targets, aim, settings of the aim and ways, modes, manners of acting, action of a humane or “responsible” politics, but goes back / is reduced to a “politics” which is the same as the “societal, social association, union” itself, which means, signifies the political whole or community, commonwealth, polity, body ; the concept “politics” does not have, in other words, the sense, meaning of a determined, purposeful, single-minded, expedient act(ion), but it expresses the political public communication (intercourse, contact, circulation, transport(ation), traffic) of men, people, humans amongst one another inside / in the framework (context) of a “societal, social association, union”, whereby / in relation to which it keeps, retains a good portion, piece, part of its Aristotelian pre-history (/ retaining, in this way, a large part of its Aristotelian meaning, significance), as was quite, absolutely, thoroughly, completely, most common, usual still at the beginning of the 19th century(,) when the liberal and democratic^{xxix} concept of politics (= “to make, do, engage in politics”) had still not (been) completely, totally prevailed, (become) predominate(d) (imposed). Clausewitz, incidentally, leaves no room for doubt about the purely objective reasons for the “moderation, mitigation, tempering, reduction, discounting, relief, relieving” of pure war : “If the wars of civilised peoples are far less awful, cruel, savage, atrocious, barbarous, callous, heartless, gruesome and destructive than those / the wars of (the) uncivilised (peoples), thus, so, (the reason for) that / this lies / is (found) in the societal, social state (of affairs), situation, both of / within / inside states (in) themselves / as such as amongst (between) (states) themselves”^{86 + xxx}. This reduction, lessening of the cruelty, savagery, barbarity, heartlessness, gruesomeness or

⁸⁶ Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 192.

else deviation, differentiation, divergence from pure war, of course, does not at all mean, signify, as we shall see later (/ are still to see), that “civilised peoples” do not wage, conduct a(ny) war of annihilation, extermination, destruction against one another, since such wars also lie / are (found) on this side / within, inside the bound(arie)s, limits, confines of pure war^{xxx}ⁱ. This constitutes an additional proof / piece of evidence for the fact that the “moderation, mitigation, tempering, reduction” of pure war interrelates / is interconnected with subjective intentions just as little as the general phenomenon of friction [[interrelates with subjective intentions]], whose [[i.e. friction’s]] analysis Clausewitz’s description of the transition from pure to real war influenced considerably, substantially and in part (also) inspired (as well, too)⁸⁷. We could say that the “moderation, mitigation, tempering, reduction” represents and constitutes merely that friction which pure war must / necessarily undergo(es), sustain(s), meet(s) with, incur(s), endure(s), suffer(s) inside of (the / a) complex “societal / social association, union” (of men, humans, people)^{xxx}ⁱⁱ. Seen / If we see things in this way / thus, (then) “politics” has(, of course,) the / an always moderating, tempering, curbing, reducing, abating, toning down effect in the objective sense of political-public communication inside / in the framework (context) of a “civilised” commonwealth (polity, body) / political community — those (Clausewitz-)interpreters (of Clausewitz), however, who call (consider) politics (to be) always and everywhere the (an) element having a moderating, tempering, curbing effect (of moderation)(,) and with that / accordingly mean the benevolent, beneficial end/goal-oriented, targeted, purposeful, expedient activity of a civil, non-military (dominant) authority, institution⁸⁸, simply do not understand at all about what the talk is in Clausewitz’s text ; in(side) their moralist, ethical zeal, ardour, eagerness, enthusiasm they make, commit a logical leap / leap in logic and comprehend the objective effect, impact, influence of the “societal, social association, union” as the conscious achievement, accomplishment, performance of a normatively thinking subject.

Instead of us being oriented towards / at, in the misleading thread of subjective political purposes, objectives, ends, (settings of an) aim(s), it appears much more fruitful, fertile, fecund to seek the core, nucleus, kernel, essence, gist of the examination

⁸⁷ See Sec. 4, esp. p. ?? f., below. [[I DON'T KNOW WHICH PAGE APPLIES IN MY TRANSLATION YET. THE GERMAN TEXT IS AT PAGE 29 AND THE FOOTNOTE REFERS TO PAGE 60 AND THE FOLLOWING PAGE.]]

⁸⁸ In lieu (place) / Instead of many, Ritter, Lehre, 47.

of the problem / problem examination in the intersection of anthropological(, cultural-philosophical and war-theoretical) observation, consideration(, (and / as well as observation, consideration, contemplation pertaining to) the philosophy of culture and (to) the theory of war). For Clausewitz, the “opposing, opposed elements”, of which the unity of politics and war consists, constitute, compose a “dichotomy (dilemma, conflict, gulf, rift, discrepancy), which takes root / is founded, grounded, rooted in man himself”, — (and) the perception, theory regarding the unity of politics and war comes into being (is born) exactly as the answer to the question as to / of how both aspects of human nature / the nature of man and simultaneously of the “societal, social association, union” can be thought of, understood together, in common / jointly considered, contemplated⁸⁹. In the previous section / Previously, we described how Clausewitz imagines, perceives the unity of opposing, conflicting, opposed, counterbalancing tendencies in(side) man and in(side) culture ; as regards / in relation to / building on (continuing) this (that) / picking up the/this thread / on this basis, we can now outline this same unity in the field, sector of the relations between war and politics. Overall / Generally / In general terms, politics relates to war like / as man (relates) to violence, (from) which he cannot do without, renounce, forego, abstain, relinquish, give up, resign, but also cannot live permanently with it (violence). Corresponding(ly), Analogous(ly) is the “societal, social association, union” (constituted, composed) : it cannot exist (be carried on, kept up, maintained) in a state (of affairs), situation of continual, continuous, perpetual, permanent and ubiquitous, omnipresent, general, universal violence, simultaneously / at the same time its (the societal association’s / society’s) structure and mode, way, manner of function(ing) must, however, from time to time, bring into being, give rise to, call forth, induce, create, invoke violence. The necessity of peace between two wars is not (due to) moral, but (to) anthropological(ly) and cultural(ly) determined (factors). And the same reasons, which in the final analysis / ultimately make impossible the perpetuation, immortality of the state (of affairs), situation of war, also bring about (on), cause, induce the (being at a) standstill, standing still, pause(s) *in(side)* / *within* war, hostilities and with that / accordingly, consequently, the politicisation of war, that is to say, its subjection, subjugation, subordination under / to the general forms (kinds) of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) which prevail, predominate, command things/matters/affairs in (the) societal, social association, union / society as the

⁸⁹ Vom Kriege, VIII, 6B = 990. Cf. our analysis in the previous section / sub-chapter.

objectification, objectiv(is)ation of human nature. Those “general relations, out of which war emerges”, “have turned most wars into half-measures (something ambiguous, equivocal, “in between”, “demi”), where (real, actual) enmity (in itself, as such) has (had, was obliged) to / must wind, write, squirm, meander, wiggle, coil, manoeuvre through, around such a conflict of / so many conflicting relations that only a very weak element (of it) remained/remains”⁹⁰. Every waging, conducting of war in the complex state (of affairs), situation of “civilisation” is therefore of necessity a political waging of war, since it must stray, deviate, move/get away from pure war to the extent (degree) / insofar that (as) (it more or less tames, harnesses, holds back, bridles, curbs, reins (in)) (the) blind violence and (the) (hateful, aggressive) recklessness, derring-do, daredevil(t)ry (most filled with hate / filled with the most hate) (fury, furiousness, rabidness) (are more or less tamed), in order to take into account (consideration) / consider (the) manifoldness / manifold nature / multiformity of (the) subjective and objective factors(.) and accordingly, correspondingly, analogously(.) to be able to act in an end / goal-rational, expedient, purposeful manner (/ that is, by determining in/with cold logic the means which its (the waging of war’s) ends, goals, purposes demand). The main (chief) thing, issue, matter, case, affair, problem here is not whether it (the political waging of war) does this “correctly, rightly” or with (a) moral intent(ion), but only that it *must* (/ it is *obliged, necessitated, forced* to) do this. To the extent that the political waging, conducting of war diverges, varies, deviates, departs, digresses, wanders from pure war, the “inimical, hostile, antagonistic feeling, sentiment” is (becomes) covered up / over (concealed) by the / a(n) “inimical, hostile, antagonistic intent(ion), although / even though, as we know, the former continues to act / have an effect inside the latter”⁹¹. The “political end, goal, purpose” of war comes, through that / accordingly / hence, to the fore(ground), and with it also the political way of looking at the necessities of the waging, conducting of war, namely, a “calculus, calculation of possibilities / the possibility [of war] emerging from / out of certain persons and relations, circumstances”⁹². The blind violence of pure war knew / had (only) the (singular, sole, unique) end, objective, aim of the prostration, defeat, suppression, subjugation, subjection of the foe — an end, objective, aim, which exactly in this (its) generality and rigidity (of it / that it possesses, has) (/ if formulated in this way generally and rigidly)

⁹⁰ Ibid., VI, 8 = 659.

⁹¹ Ibid., I, 1, § 3 = 193 ; II, 2 = 286.

⁹² Ibid., I, 1, § 12 = 200.

(of necessity appears to be very abstract) inside of a concrete and complex situation (must / necessarily appear(s) to be most / highly abstract). Calculus / Calculation / The calculus, calculation of (the) possibilities, i.e. the political waging, conducting of war means the flexibility of behaviour and the setting of an / the aim according to / in accordance with the situation, it means the “consideration of / taking into account the peculiarities, characteristic, singularity, particular nature of the states involved, acting, having an effect”⁹³. War is of its essence / nature, enmity and the endeavour, effort at (the) subjugation, subjection, prostration, defeat, suppression [[of the foe]], but the political waging, conducting of war is the end/goal-rational, expedient, purposeful inhibition (hindering, obstruction, stemming) / rational suspension / abeyance, diversion (detour, channelling, relocation) and exploitation (instrumentalisation) of the essential element(s) / element of the essence of war in the framework of a calculus, calculation of (the) possibilities and on the basis of a consideration / the knowledge of the complexity (complex character) of an – on each and every respective occasion – peculiar, characteristic, singular, particular constellation (/ grid, mesh, plexus, nexus of relations); the political waging, conducting of war is, in brief/short, war(,) which is waged, conducted in the state (of affairs), situation / inside the circumstances, conditions of “civilisation”.

Politics and war, however, represent and constitute a unity not only in the sense (of the fact) that every waging, conducting of war of / by / between civilised peoples / folks of culture must be political / necessarily has a political character. Their (Politics and war’s) interweaving is shown / seen in a still deeper dimension in the analysis of (/ when we analyse) the genetic character (texture, nature) of war, i.e. in the ascertainment of its origins, provenance, extraction, ancestry from / out of “political communication (circulation, intercourse, contact, transport(ation), traffic”^{xxxiii}. Clausewitz repeatedly, again / time and again, frequently stresses that war, “and especially, in particular of / between civilised peoples”, starts “always from (/ has as its motive, cause, reason) a political state (of affairs) / situation” and is “induced, provoked, brought / called into being” “only by / through a political motive”⁹⁴, “only by the political communication of governments and of peoples”⁹⁵, politics “(has) gives (given) birth to, begets (begot),

⁹³ Ibid., 201.

⁹⁴ Ibid., I, 1, § 23 = 209.

⁹⁵ Ibid., VIII, 6B = 990.

creates (created), spawns (spawned), breeds (bred), generates (generated)” war⁹⁶. These statements do not mean, signify, as is often assumed, supposed, that as an exclusive cause, thing, matter, subject, issue, case of a political (civil) “intelligence” / dominant (governing) authority, war ought to be waged, conducted in accordance with its (the said “intelligence’s” / governing authority’s) by (of its) nature, naturally, essentially, inherently moderate, temperate, restrained, mitigated, curbed will, volition. We know that the transition from pure to real war has to do with the effect, impact of “political communication” in general, but not with the purposeful, single-minded, determined action (/ expedient activity) of a subjective (/ political) will, volition, which only at the(,) theoretically (in terms of theory,) subordinated level of the choice between the – on each and every respective occasion – possible forms of real war plays a smaller, lesser or larger, greater role. When Clausewitz speaks here of / about the “political goal / end” of war or of / about war as a “political act”, he stands / is / finds himself / moves still at that level of theory(,) which is found still on that / the other side of / beyond the choice between war of annihilation / extermination and restricted, limited, confined war ; the “political end / goal” is, in other words, introduced / mentioned first of all / in principle not as the product of the conscious choice of a subjective will / volition, but only formally / in terms of form / as a form-related (formal) magnitude, (with) which is to say (it should be said) / something which means that (the) political communication must be reflected / find expression only in subjective political ends / goals and decisions, with that / accordingly it can / in order to cause, create, induce, evoke, give rise to, call forth, arouse, stimulate war, however the content of the choice remains here still open. In the framework of the/a “civilised” state (of affairs) / situation (/ Inside the circumstances, conditions of civilisation), politics condensed for a political end / goal / purpose (/ politics, having crystallised in a political end / goal / purpose) cannot indeed decide in favour of (the waging of) pure war, but only in favour of (the waging of) all the possible forms of real war, “from (the) war of annihilation / extermination up to (the) mere, simple armed observation”⁹⁷. Politics is, therefore, not the/a normative intelligence, which over and above / beyond the unavoidable divergence, deviation from pure war, also wants to eliminate, deactivate, switch off, disconnect the most violent forms of real war a limine ; it is an intelligence which can guide war *because* and *only when* it begets,

⁹⁶ Ibid., 993.

⁹⁷ Ibid., I, 1, § 11 = 201.

generates, gives birth/rise to, causes, creates, evokes, induces it (war), in other words, it can subject, subjugate, subordinate war to its ends, goals, purposes because these (its) ends, goals, purposed must be of use to / serve its realisation of war (/ cannot be realised without the waging, conducting of war). War is the continuation, that is, the product and the spawn (monstrous invention) of politics, not the sudden, inexplicable interruption, disruption, break, disconnection, intermission, severance of / in political communication, something which is alien, foreign, strange to the essence of politics : then, in this case, its (war's) coming into being, genesis and waging, conducting would be (remain) completely incomprehensible, unintelligible.

From this perspective, it seems, of course, natural that the renowned, famous, famed, celebrated formulation / formula that war is a continuation of political communication with the intervention, involvement, interference, meddling of other means, comes immediately after the ascertainment that war is born, begot, caused of / by exactly this political communication, whereby / in relation to which, simultaneously, it is polemicised against (/ the view of) those (is rejected, rebutted) who assume and mean, opine / accept an essential difference between war and politics,(;) (and who believe that with war, a(n) completely, entirely different state (of affairs), situation arises (is inaugurated)(,) subject to different laws⁹⁸. These sentences, phrases, clauses are as a rule interpreted in such a way as if (/ the sense that) Clausewitz wanted to (allegedly, supposedly) say with them that the political (civil) leadership should / ought to remain firmly in control (/ immoveable at the helm of the state) even (and) after the outbreak (eruption, explosion) of war. However, this question interests / is of interest to our theoretician only marginally (a little / as a secondary matter of importance), if at all. His attention applies rather to the (essential) affinity, relationship, kinship, relations (of essence) between political communication and war, that is, between the constitution, composition, texture of the former (political communication) as the objectification, objectiv(is)ation of all aspects of human nature and the genetic reasons (grounds) of the latter (war) in the light of that constitution, composition, texture. Above all, he (Clausewitz) avoids every contradistinction of / between “good” politics and “bad, evil” war, and hence he is also in no hurry to demand the taming of evil by good, but insists, on the contrary, on the fact of a continuity which goes back / is reduced (owed) to homogeneity. We repeat : war would not be the continuation of political communication

⁹⁸ Ibid., VIII, 6B = 990.

if this were constituted (composed, made) in such a manner, so, thus that it did not have to, necessarily or at least could not engender, generate, spawn, produce, beget war. If war has “not its own logic” / “does not [have] its own logic”⁹⁹, then the logic of politics and the logic of war obviously coincide ; and if political communication “in its essence continues (to exist) / survives, lingers” in(side) war¹⁰⁰, then the essence of political communication is not of / in pure peace, i.e. peace as a state of affairs / situation which embodies, incorporates in chemical purity the precise opposite of war and hence, consequently cannot cause, create, induce, evoke, give rise to, beget, give birth to (a(ny)) war. Politics is, in other words, not the counter concept of war, as / like “civil” and “military” or “war” and “peace”, purely conceptually looked at / observed (/ from a purely conceptual point of view), represent and constitute opposites, contrasts / opposite, contrasting magnitudes. Rather, war is a “part” of the whole, of politics¹⁰¹, i.e. both a sub-field, sub-area in its (politics’) field, area (it is a particular, especial field inside its / politics’ wider, broader field) as well as (/ and at the same time) a modification (variation, variant) of its (politics’) essential quality, texture, that is a certain form of political communication. The peculiarity, characteristic, singularity of war, however, is understandable, understood only against the background, backdrop / under (from within) the prism of its aforementioned belonging together, togetherness, unity, identity or essential affinity, kinship, relationship, relations with politics, and consists merely in the “peculiar, characteristic nature, singularity of its means”¹⁰². When Clausewitz writes of war : “it is a conflict of great interests, which is (re)solved, undone, untied, released (unravels) bloodily / in a bloody manner, and only therein / in this does it differ from other conflicts”¹⁰³, then he leaves (lets) not the least, slightest doubt (come about / appear on the scene), that he (Clausewitz) sees, views, looks at, considers war as (to be) only one amongst several, multiple, many conflicts, which indeed are not (re)solved bloodily, in a bloody manner, but irrespective of this just as much characterise, mark political communication. Politics and war can, therefore, be subsumed under the wider, broader, overall, general concept of “conflict”, and this explains, declares, states their essential affinity, kinship, relationship, relations, which, for its part, makes (renders) understandable the thesis that politics is “the womb,

⁹⁹ Ibid., 991.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., I, 1, § 24 = 210.

¹⁰³ Ibid., II, 3 = 303.

bosom, lap, in which war unfolds, develops”^{103a}. The renowned, famous formula (as regards the continuation of politics and war) says (suggests, implies) that war and politics (both of them) differ from each other only in (terms of) (the) means, but that should not / is not supposed to mean that their commonality, common ground is limited, restricted to the(ir) ends, goals, purposes¹⁰⁴ ; rather / contrariwise, it stretches, extends across their contradictory, multi-dimensional structure, which lives off / from “conflict” and begets, gives birth / rise to, generates, continuously produces “conflict”, in whichever / in any kind of (regardless of the) form¹⁰⁵.

If the described (essential) (/ inner) affinity, relationship, kinship (of essence) (/ as to texture) of / between war and politics makes, therefore, the character of their unity understandable, thus/so, the apprehension of what is inherent, peculiar, particular to war, i.e., its specific feature (attribute, trait, characteristic), is of no lesser, slighter theoretical significance, meaning, importance, especially since, after the ascertainment, establishment of that affinity, relationship, kinship, (there is) a / the danger, risk (exists) of treating, handling all aspects, sides of politics as war or all aspects, sides of war as politics, and consequently, thus not taking / failing to take note of / noticing, notice / having, have cognizance of the particularity, peculiarity of concrete situations, which are distinguished, marked, characterized exactly by the predominance of an – on each and every respective occasion – single aspect, either in bellicist(ic), bellicose, belligerent, martial intoxication, drunkenness, rapture, frenzy, exhilaration, fervour or in pacifist(ic) naiveté. Although Clausewitz thinks in the – at that time / in those days / (back) then – usual, common categories of the European equilibrium, balance of Great Powers, he looks at the same (European equilibrium of Great Powers) purely pragmatically, i.e. as a(n) expedient, useful, advantageous, beneficial, functional, convenient, purposeful relationship, correlation of forces, and does not connect this (his) perception (of his) with a(n)(y) (international-law-related / rights-of-peoples/folks) definition of war (in international law), which would aim at its preservation (/ with the purpose, end, goal of its taming, containment, nurturing, cherishing). Regarding, About the moderating, tempering effect, impact of international law / the rights of (the)

^{103a} Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Thus, Schering, Wehrphilosophie, 91.

¹⁰⁵ Clausewitz on occasion also refers to the individual / in-part similarities of war with “the rest of life”, thus e.g. he compares the examination of the problem of attack and defence with “the -so similar to war- legal transactions, dealings, system (the traffic, transportation, communication, intercourse, circulation of right, justice, law)” (Vom Kriege, VI, 1, § 2 = 614).

peoples (folks), he speaks only in passing, parenthetically, incidentally, casually and rather contemptibly, contemptuously, scornfully, disdainfully, scoffingly, despicably¹⁰⁶, and correspondingly he places, puts, posits, locates the (what is) specific [element, feature] / distinguishing, distinctive specific features, attributes, traits of war in real magnitudes, and indeed in (the exercising of) violence, as can be taken, inferred, gathered, seen / arises from the known-to-us fundamental definition of war as well as from the determination of its (war's) peculiarity on the basis of violent means used in the course of this / on each and every respective occasion. If we(,) towards / for the theoretical separation, segregation of (/ in order to distinguish, differentiate, separate in terms of theory) war and peace from each other(,) wanted to use a material (distinctive, differentiating) feature, characteristic (of differentiation, distinction, difference), like for instance (the) (on) (each and every respective) (occasion) intensity of the “conflict”, then its distinction would only (turn out to) be gradual, i.e. of different grades, degrees / one of degree and in the final analysis unclear. If we, on the other hand / against that, remain, persist with the formal / form-related criterion of the application, use, exercising of violence, then we gain, win / have at our disposal an indeed relatively narrow, but, in any case, clear and verifiable, checkable, testable, controllable (dividing) line (of separation, division). Clausewitz prefers the latter, especially as he sees, espies, perceives in the “separation of the (what is) unlike, disparate, uncongenial / heterogeneous things” a “main, chief task, job, mission of theory”¹⁰⁷, without, with that / accordingly, of course, wanting to say that the ascertainment of (a(n)) unlikeness, disparateness, heterogeneity would exclude the presence, existence of similarities, resemblances, likenesses, similitudes or relationships, affinities, kinships, congenialities. (And) In / in actual fact, this (methodical) procedure / method proves to be extremely fertile, fruitful, productive in the present / our case. First of all, Clausewitz accordingly / through that / in this way succeeds (again without reference to constructions of / pertaining to international law) in making a clear (clean, neat, tidy, accurate, cripis, unspoiled) distinction (keeping / telling apart of) between (of) war and (from) peace – for him / in his eyes “concepts” which are not capable of any gradation¹⁰⁸. When peace

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., I, 1, § 2 = 192 : “Imperceptible, Indiscernible, Indistinguishable, barely, hardly noticeable / insignificant restrictions, limitations, confines, which it [sc. violence] imposes on itself under (in) the guise / the name of international custom, practice, convention accompany it, without essentially, substantially, significantly weakening its (the said violence's) strength, force, might, power”.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., II, 1 = 272.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 6A = 988.

is defined as the / a (non-violent) state (of affairs), situation (without / lacking in violence), so/thus this criterion, as (we) just (now) said, is meant formally / in terms of form, [[and]] it is therefore not asked whether for instance preparations for war will take place, which can or must soon bring an end to the currently predominating, prevailing lack of violence / (state of) non-violence, but it is only, simply ascertained that *hic et nunc* no violence is applied / exercised, practised, that is, no war is being waged, conducted. The seeming, apparent paradox(ical) lies in the fact that Clausewitz views, regards, sees the application of violence as the specific feature, trait, attribute, characteristic of war precisely because he held / considered peace to be by no means a (conflict-free) state (of affairs), situation (free from, of / without conflict(s)). Because were (if) peace (were) really such a (conflict-free) state (of affairs), situation (free from, of conflicts), then/thus/so it would be sufficient, enough to define war merely as conflict. Precisely because conflicts are present, exist in peace, a wider, broader specification (an additional conceptual differentiation) is here necessary, and indeed (we must say) that war is a conflict (under the application of) (in which) (armed) violence (is exercised, practised). From this point of view, (we ought to understand) an observation, comment, remark by Clausewitz (is to be understood), which some readers have comprehended as a sophism by him¹⁰⁹, and some as (a) mere wit(ticism)¹¹⁰, that, namely, the defender / the party, side defending itself starts war first since the attacker / the party, side attacking first would prefer a (peaceful, struggleless) takeover, occupation, appropriation, conquering (without struggle, combat, a fight, battle) (/ to conquer something without fighting)¹¹¹. Here Clausewitz thinks, as he himself writes, that in regard to the “concept of war”, that is to say, in regard to the application of violence as its (war’s) specific (feature, characteristic, thing, element, attribute, trait), the remark, observation, comment simultaneously implies, entails that peace is anything / everything other than / anything but a *per definitionem* (conflict-free) state (of affairs), situation (free from conflicts), since the / an attack, i.e. “advancing, progressing towards takeover, occupation, appropriation, conquering” / the “project with the purpose, end, goal of conquest, capture, seizure, taking”, was (is) still “conceived of, thought about, planned

¹⁰⁹ Thus, Carrias, *Pensée*, 212.

¹¹⁰ Thus, e.g. Lenin, Clausewitz’ *Werk*, 23.

¹¹¹ *Vom Kriege*, VI, 7 = 644.

outside of war”¹¹² and in part (was, is) executed too (even before war started, began, starts, begins).

¹¹² Ibid., 645. Not even the manufacture, fabrication, making, construction of weapons belongs to (is included in,) (the struggle, fight, battle, combat or else to) (in itself,) (in) war itself (ibid., II, 1 = 269) and must obviously be seen, considered (as (a) peaceful activity)(,) (-)in contrast, opposition to the use of weapons, arms(-)(, as (a) peaceful activity).

ⁱ Che Guevara also belongs to this category of military theorists. This is not a criticism, just a defining of the scope of P.K.'s extant work. It is noted by P.K. later in this text, inter alia, that with the progressive deforestation of the world in the 20th century, the guerrilla war approach lost much of its relevance, anyway.

ⁱⁱ Some form of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID "post-modernism", "deconstruction" etc. under ZIO-USA and ZIO-JOO-ROMA-CHANNEL. Marxism was ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDDED, but its national-liberationist, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist side was receptive to and furthered ethno-patriotism, national liberation etc. of a non-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SATANIK SERKOOS MONKEY-INTERNATIONAL JOO-ZIO-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-MAMMON-LUCIFER-nature.

ⁱⁱⁱ **AAAA-HAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!**

^{iv} Here in the scientific sense of liberalism before circa 1900 and the domination of mass democracy.

^v The "economic interpretation of history" began with liberalism and "trade replacing war" and continued in Marxism as "communism as classless society arising from capitalism (albeit as proletarian revolution in respect of capitalism bringing about eternal peace through communism)", notwithstanding that both trade and proletarian revolution require an up to large degree of political intervention in economic life.

^{vi} A bunch of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ and their ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOGEZ.

^{vii} Of course, the Trump era, (almost 20 years after P.K.'s death) marked the return of politics (which never went away) in the mass media / ideological-rhetorical sphere.

^{viii} P.K. using "liberalism" here rhetorically-ideologically in line with mainstream use.

^{ix} In practice, though, always keeping the SICK-FUCKING-KRAZY-PSYCHO-PATH-INCESTUAL-INBRED-RAT-TUNNEL-RODENT-PARASITE-FAECES-EXCREMENT-ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID in power.

^x History is much more than the surface facts of journalism, it is an investigation of factual causes, causal chains (to the extent possible) in situational and diachronic / dynamic factual context(s) over the long run.

^{xi} The Franco-Prussian War or Franco-German War, often referred to in France as the War of 1870, was a conflict between the Second French Empire and the North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia. Lasting from 19 July 1870 to 28 January 1871 (6 months, 1 week and 2 days), the conflict was caused primarily by France's determination to reassert its dominant position in continental Europe, which appeared in question following the decisive Prussian victory over Austria in 1866. France 140,000 dead approx.. Germany 45,000 dead approx..

Location :

France and the Rhine Province, Prussia

Result :

German victory

End of the Second French Empire

Unification of Germany and establishment of the German Empire

Territorial changes : German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine

^{xii} Ferdinand Foch (2 October 1851 – 20 March 1929) was a French general, Marshal of France and a member of the Académie Française and Académie des Sciences. He distinguished himself as Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front during the ZIO-First World War in ZIO-1918.

^{xiii} Presumably "civil war" as to the world of all of "humanity", which only became an intense conscious reality in the first half of the 20th century.

^{xiv} An object or entity that exists only in the mind or through thought, rather than having independent, real-world existence. It is contrasted with an ens reale, which is a real being that exists independently of thought.

^{xv} Because ens reale objective reality is so multi-form, multifarious, varied, diverse, the only way to understand what is a diachronic constant in all societies and/or a differentia specifica when comparing societies, is to use the ideal-typical method of reinforcement and then compare one's findings with concrete, specific situations of objective reality.

^{xvi} In other words, the political decisions and or the Takt des Urteils (as we shall see later in this work) relate to specific, concrete situations of politics and war as politics' continuation by other means, whereas "the superior level of theory" deals with the existence of ((the) potential (for)) war in all societies at all times.

^{xvii} As we shall see later in the work, there cannot, however, be non-stop, perpetual war / violence, there must also be pauses and peacetime, for man has never lived in a state of perpetual war, but neither has he ever lived without the potentiality of war occurring.

^{xviii} War has many forms, layers etc., albeit with common elements, but is not a relatively simple object like an apple, a cow, a stone etc. which is defined relatively easily and simply.

^{xix} Scientifically, all peoples, even "primitive peoples", are in a state of culture, i.e. pertain to the social and the cultural and the anthropological and the social-ontological, and have their own historical and or mythological and sociological dimensions, but for the purposes of the Clausewitzian ideal type of "pure war", "primitive people" are not in culture like civilised peoples are in cities beyond nomadic hunting-gathering, animal husbandry, fishing etc..

^{xx} Enmity and extreme violence.

^{xxi} Obviously (the possibility of) total nuclear annihilation (which hasn't yet happened as of 08-07-2026) was not on Clausewitz (1780-1831)'s "radar", so to speak, though "the primitive tribal stuff" was.

^{xxii} Man does not improve ethically / morally, he adjusts to his "environment" / conditions accordingly, and not only changes his ethics and morals, but pretends that his ethics / morals are now (much) "better" and (much) "improved", when they are just ethics / morals in a new situation with a new correlation of forces. (This, from the scientific point of view of value freedom, value neutrality and no ethical / normative / moral / aesthetic preference). Furthermore, whilst pure war means war of annihilation, real war does not necessarily have to always be restricted, it can, theoretically at least, reach annihilation, even though this is not in Clausewitz's thoughts (or at the forefront thereof) as we explained in endnote xxi, immediately above. As we can see from the discussion which follows, the continued existence of man is taken for granted, since man as man as a whole cannot live continually in a state of war.

^{xxiii} This is debatable. It's probably, in fact I'd say certainly, both (though the extent of input of each to the taking of a decision remains very likely unfathomable).

^{xxiv} This sentence in parentheses appears only in P.K.'s Greek, and not in P.K.'s German, text.

^{xxv} There is constant interaction between feelings, emotions and the mind, intelligence. Don't allow the possible English translations (e.g. mind for both feelings and intelligence) to blur the fundamental distinction.

^{xxvi} A variation of this is "I do not want to kill you because I want to make you my money-mammon slave under ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-PLANET ZOG".

^{xxvii} P.K. starts a new paragraph with "And yet" in the Greek, but not in the German, edition of his book.

^{xxviii} I.e. human nature is objectified by both united and conflicting war and politics, violence and power, "instinct" and expedient intelligence ... inside of society.

^{xxix} Circa 1800 we are talking both about the incipient "mass-democratic" as well as the actual pre-mass, pre-industrial, pre-(post-)modern notion of real deal democracy (based on patriarchy and the household, oikos of extended families including servants / slaves), and not about the ZIO-caricature and associated ZIO-ideology of circa 1900 and thereafter.

^{xxx} Of course, Clausewitz's "if" is most telling, given that it alludes to "generally" and "grosso modo", but he (dead by 1831) could not have known what the ZIO-20TH century under ZIO-PLANET ZOG had in store for tens of millions of people on the basis of "highly advanced civilisational development". Again, notwithstanding the until then unheard-of destruction of ZIO-WW2, not all of the Soviet Union, all of Germany, all of China, all of Japan etc. was destroyed as would happen in "pure war" between "uncivilised savages" fighting in tribes of a few hundred (/ thousand at most) tribal warriors(, tribesmen) and tribes-woe-men. See next endnote, too.

^{xxxi} Unless I'm mistaken, and we shall see later on, for Clausewitz a "war of extermination / annihilation / destruction" refers to the extermination / annihilation / destruction of the (core/decisive part of the) foe's military force(s), not of the foe himself in his totality as can, but does not necessarily, occur in the case of "savage and primitive" "**pure war**" (= **war not moderated by friction** (S. 28-29)), which seeks the foe's prostration, defeat, suppression, subjugation (**das Ziel der Niederwerfung des Feindes** (S. 30) – up to and including total annihilation, but not necessarily so. This means that the total annihilation of the foe is theoretically possible in states of "civilisation" too, so it does depend on the specific, concrete situation. In other words, "civilised" peoples are characterised by the capacity to wage war short of the foe's (total) subjugation, but are not in any way necessarily restricted to war short of the total annihilation / extermination of the foe).

^{xxxii} Which refers to endnote xxxi, immediately above.

^{xxxiii} This ultimately addresses the Carl Schmitt error (see P.K.'s *The Political and Man*) of the friend/foe relation arising only from the political, since the friend/foe relation resides in the social as wider than the political, i.e. there can be conflict in the social which is not political (e.g. a personal dispute without legal implications), whilst any conflict within the political can, but does not necessarily have to, become war.