

PANAJOTIS KONDYLLIS
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Die Aufklärung
im Rahmen des
neuzeitlichen Rationalismus

The Enlightenment in the
framework (context) of new-
times rationalism

FELIX MEINER VERLAG, HAMBURG, 2022

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STARTING 07-07-2025, AND WILL DEFINITELY NEVER FINISH IT. KRAZY.

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ

ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLLIS

Ο ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟΣ

ΔΙΑΦΩΤΙΣΜΟΣ

The European Enlightenment

ΤΟΜΟΣ Α (VOLUME A)

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PRELIMINARY REMARKⁱ

The great book about the Enlightenment by Panagiotis Kondylis appeared in the German language in a hard-cover edition in 1981 by Klett-Cotta and then one more time in 1986 as a paperback/soft-cover edition (dtv 4450). In 1987 a Greek edition followed by Themelio in Athens (3rd ed. 1998). The German editions have been out of stock/print for a long time. The author could no longer prepare any new edition of this standard work of Enlightenment research; he died, all too early, in 1998. In the following, some of the central aspects of the book will be outlined.

German research into the Enlightenment stood for a long time in the formidable, overpowering, over-bearing shadow of idealism, of classicism, of the new humanism and of romanticism. Kondylis's book fundamentally changed our conceptions, notions, perceptions about the Enlightenment. Kondylis did not undertake any epoch reconstruction, he traverses the national Enlightenment traditions (of England, of France, of Germany), he does without, foregoes a social history of authors and intellectual groupings, he rather investigates the exchange processes between philosophy and the theory of science in the early New Times. At the (epi)centre of his book stands/is the reformulation (new formation) of philosophy from 1750. The book is oriented towards the reconstruction of the relationship between spirit (intellect) and matter. Kondylis distinguishes two phases of development of Enlightenment thought: first of all, the Cartesian separation of soul (psyche) and body (res cogitans – res extensa) dominates early new-times rationalism, which around 1750 was

replaced by a “rehabilitation of sensoriality”. The newly constituted sensualismⁱⁱ gives up, abandons, surrenders, relinquishes the older ideal of the methods of mathematics and mechanistic physics and orients itself towards the new life sciences of biologism. Kondylis follows (pursues) the theories of dualism or else the unity of body and soul back to late European humanism, he then / subsequently discusses the influence of mechanistic physics (Newton) on the rationalistic processes of system formation (development) of / in the 17th century, he determines, defines, specifies, identifies the relationship between the mathematical (methodological) ideal ((in respect) of methods) with / towards neo-Platonism and defines rational theology in the field of influence of mechanistic theories of the cosmos. In the middle of the 18th century a serious, grave conflict emerges, looms / is looming. Mechanistic intellectualism falls into crisis. The constructive Reason of God is no longer supposed to be the primal ground / very basis of creation, but the self-organisation of organic substances tends to replace the mechanical explanation, explication of God, cosmos, world and man (humans). With this paradigm shift pertaining to the theory of science, Kondylis may begin the second section of development of the European Enlightenment: the critique (criticism) of metaphysics and intellectualism leads to a revaluation, reappraisal of the concept of matter and of evolution (development) as well as a complementary theory of nature and culture. Aversion to / The turning away from the time-indifferent and place-indifferent arguments ((leading of) evidence) in favour of rationalism makes possible / enables the new putting in order / classification of the categories of thought and volition / wanting (willing), feeling and Reason, Nature, History and culture and leads to a relativisation of the difference between facticity and normativity. Through / By means of (the) consideration of the relationship between theories of science and philosophy, Kondylis expands, extends, widens, enlarges the reference and

object fields (fields of reference and of objects) of the empirical Enlightenment. Through / By means of the reappraisal, revaluation of the events of French research of the sixties and seventies of the theories of science of the 18th century, Kondylis succeeds in proving that between the points of tension as regards “Nature” and “culture”, new sciences (natural history, ethnology, cultural history, sociology, history) can be developed / unfold, which first, only in the 19th century and early 20th century are eliminated from (rejected by) philosophy. In this overview of the relationship between philosophy and the conceptions of Nature, of History and of culture, the philosophical traditions of England, France and Germany move closer togetherⁱⁱⁱ, the German “special way / path” in the history of philosophy begins (if at all) only, first with German idealism or else (the) new humanism. Ferment(ation)s between philosophy and the theory of science are in the 18th century the effects, impact(s) of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz. At the same time, Kondylis succeeds in integrating Kant and Kantianism directly, immediately in the determinations of the problem of (the) Enlightenment grounds, substantiations of empiricism. A united European axis of argumentation comes into being, which begins with English empiricism, [[and]] which is continued by French pre-materialism and is concluded / completed by the organicistic philosophy of Nature and culture of Germany. In this concept(ual plan), the boundaries between philosophy, the theory of Nature (natural theory), History (history), aesthetics, literature and culture become fluid, flowing. In this respect, Kondylis succeeds in analysing in the framework of a study pertaining to the history of philosophy, at the same time, the interdisciplinary possibility/potential in respect of argumentation of adjacent, abutting, neighbouring sciences in the mirror, reflection of spirit-matter problem. With the replacement of dogmatic rationalism by the empiricism pertaining to the philosophy of life in (the) Europe of / in

the 18th century, numerous interdisciplinary border crossings (i.e. crossing or the overstepping of erstwhile boundaries between disciplines) are anticipated, which we know from today's discussions (in respect) of science.^{iv}

Jörn Garber

Ulrich Kronauer

TO FOTI(S) APOSTOLOPOULO(S)

in memoriam^v

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NOTE FOR THE GREEK EDITION^{vi}

The Greek edition of this work constitutes a faithful and complete, full rendering of the German edition, as it circulated for the first time in 1981 by the [Publishing] House of Klett-Cotta and for a second time in 1986 by the [Publishing] House Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag (dtv). In order to make things easier for the Greek reader, I have also rendered in Greek the quoted excerpts from the French, English, German, Italian and Latin language(s), which in the German edition have been given in the, on each and every respective occasion, original.

P.K.

I. Basic (Fundamental) concepts for the apprehension (understanding) of the texture, essence, nature of the Enlightenment

1. Spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality (/ senses, what is sensed) or the question of being / Is and the question of value(s) (/ the ontological and axiological problem)

The question (problem) in respect of the relations between spirit/intellect and sensoriality (/ senses, what is sensed) can, in a certain respect (/ from a certain point of view), be looked at as / considered to be the central problem of all philosophy. From a historical point of view / Historically, the central meaning / significance of this question is proved, certified, verified already through the pointing to the adherence of the first approaches of philosophy with the animistic way of looking at the world (/ if we ponder, consider the relationship of the first forms of philosophy with the animistic perception of the world).¹ The first organised and all-encompassing, full, complete world image is

¹ P. Radin [[[April 2, 1883 – February 21, 1959), a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID]] has shown that the animistic world view must be considered, class(ifi)ed as a philosophical achievement (performance) (/ composed, structured philosophy), and indeed both in regard to its setting of the question (problem examination) (the origin(s) and the composition, texture, constitution of the world, the meaning of human life, rules of moral / ethical behaviour etc.) and its capacity for, ability at abstract thought (/ abstract capability) as well as regarding, concerning its provenance from the intellectual / thought endeavours, efforts (/ on account of its formation on the part) of certain, only, individuals. Radin confutes, rebuts above all the perception represented by Levy-Bruhl [[né le 10 avril 1857 à Paris et mort le 13 mars 1939 dans la même ville, another ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID]] and Cassirer [[28. Juli 1874 in Breslau; † 13. April 1945 in New York, another ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID, so we have JOOZ TORKING TO JOOZ ABOUT JOOZ in a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-FUCK-FEST]] of a pre-logical, mythical thought, which is sharply, intensely counterposed to “rational” thought and should be subordinated, subjected (/ is inferior) to it (i.e. the said “rational” thought) – a perception, which, as Radin correctly remarked, only reflects, mirrors the complacent, smug, self-satisfied evaluations, assessments and the habits of thought of European scholars, savants (Primitive Man as Philosopher, esp. xxiv ff., 30ff., 99ff., 208ff., 246ff., 252ff., 292ff., 345ff.). In his critique, criticism of / Rejecting Levy-Bruhl’s separation between “rational” and “irrational” thought, Lévy-Strauss [[né le 28 novembre 1908 à Bruxelles et mort le 30 octobre 2009 à Paris 16e, another ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID, so P.K. is in full Werner Conze et al. ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-PARTY MODE !!!]] to a great extent, largely, extensively confirmed Radin’s results, findings (La pensée sauvage, see esp. ch. 1, the first part of 8 and the final part of 9.). The analyses of Topitsch [[* 20. März 1919 in Wien; † 26. Jänner 2003 in Graz]] about / regarding the continuity of thought / intellectual (/ conceptual) structures in mythology and traditional philosophical metaphysics must be looked at as a corroboration, reinforcement, confirmation of the same position (Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik, esp. 3ff., 18ff., 95ff., 221ff., 285ff.).

dualistic, i.e. it comes into being on the foundation, basis of the “discovery” of the spirit(-intellect) or else of the spirits, which are separated from the sensorial-perceptible (/ regarded as separate from the sensory world) and are supposed to guide its (i.e. the sensorial-perceptible’s) fates, destinies (/ it is believed that they direct its (i.e. the sensory world’s) fortunes). That is why it is no coincidence, accident, chance when philosophemes (/ philosophical theories), which were determinative for the spiritual-intellectual tradition of the so-called Occident (Western world) pay homage to, embrace, advocate dualism, i.e. the fundamental, programmatic opposition, antithesis of / between spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality (the senses / what is sensed). It suffices to recollect / remind ourselves of Platonism, whose original, initial version is precisely deeply connected, with reference to the dualistic principle, (/ owed a lot) to (the) animistic-religious ideas / body of thought of the Orphic-Pythagorean cult², and whose historical impact, effect, influence, no least of all through / especially with the mediation of Christendom, Christianity,³ was so lasting, persistent (/ exceptionally intense); the Cartesian separation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*⁴ as well as the Kantian separation between the intelligible and the sensible⁵ equally, also, likewise represent and constitute prominent examples for the same thing (facts of the case). Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate, errant (/ not be correct) to hold, consider the question (problem) of the relations between spirit and sensoriality (senses) to be / as central only when a dualistic thought structure is present/exists, or to assume the primacy (priority, precedence) of this question will be visible exclusively in dualistic thought structures (/ when we are dealing with dualistic philosophies). The not to be disregarded / indispensable spiritualistic or materialistic signs of our already well-known monistic philosophemes (/ of all of the until today known monistic philosophical theories) irrefutably show that the latter monistic philosophical theories) constitute in themselves an eloquent argument for the thesis that here it is a matter of the attempts to overcome, surpass, transcend exactly the antagonism between spirit and sensoriality in the sense (/ from the point of view) of the former or of the latter – in other words; not only does this antagonism constitute the starting point and consequently the *conditio sine qua non* of the thought (intellectual) endeavour / effort at thought (/ philosophical thought), but also each and every “overcoming, surpassing, transcendence” is achieved on the basis only through / (by means) of the absolutisation of one of its competing limbs (/ of one of the two antagonistic elements); it is (has), therefore, polemically meant (/ a polemical character), and because of this it cannot also bring about the conclusive end of the above-mentioned antagonism.

² In relation to that, Leisegang, “Platon”, lines 2421, 2424, 2433. Cf. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, p. 540..

³ See in general / generally, Ivánka, *Plato Christianus*, esp. 68f., 469ff..

⁴ Descartes had connected his separation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* not least of all with the teaching, doctrine, theory of Platonic innatism (/ innate (inherent, immanent, inborn) ideas). But the Platonic definition of *χώρα* would have to have been known to him (i.e. Descartes) too. See Taylor, *Platonism*, 51ff.;, Gilson, *Études sur le rôle . . .*, 28f.; Smith, *New Studies*, 194 note 1. Cf. below, p. 182.

⁵ The influence of metaphysical-religious traditions, customs, lores on Kant’s teaching, theory, doctrine of two worlds was investigated, worked upon, processed recently by Topitsch, *Die Voraussetzungen der Transzendentalphilosophie*, p. 21 ff.. [[Sensible as in pertaining to the senses]]

From a systematic point of view, again, the general significance, meaning which may be attributed to the question, problem of the relations between spirit/intellect and sensoriality (the senses) becomes more easily recognisable, perceptible when/if we visualise and make clear to ourselves (/ ponder, consider) the conceptual pair in(to) which the aforementioned question, problem can be (re)solved or else translated: subject-object, God-world, possibility-reality, soul-body, intellect-senses, Reason-drives (urges, impulses), Ought-Is, normative-causal, realm of God or else of Reason-History. All the important problems of philosophy are represented in this conceptual pair, and that implies that a complete answer to the question (/ from a full solution to the problem) of the relations between spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality (the senses) must generate, produce, engender a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of history too, which structurally correspond with each other (/ there must arise a cosmology, an ethics, a theory of knowledge and also a philosophy of history) when/if the thinker concerned proceeds logically consistently or else / and with systematic intent. This / That, certainly, happens, occurs relatively seldomly because at the start, commencement / in the beginning of the endeavour at thought / intellectual effort stands / is not usually the whole complex, but only one of the above-mentioned conceptual pairs – which, naturally, is time(-determined) and temperament-determined / determined as to time and as to temperament (/ that which the epoch and temperament bring to the fore). Nonetheless, there always exists an implied (/ latent) connection with the other parts of the complex; the unavoidability, necessity of this complex could be explained in the framework of a general investigation of / into the logical and ideological belonging together / affinity / relatedness of ethics and metaphysics^{vii}. In the course of our investigation the (inter)connection between ethics and ontology will be repeatedly discussed and in a double, dual regard: on the one hand, as the ascertainment of the interweaving of the question of being and the question of value(s) or else of the designing, sketching, outlining of ontology in the light of moral needs, requirements and postulates (/ ontological and axiological problem, that is, the formation of ontology on the basis of ethical needs and demands); on the other hand, as proof / evidence / a demonstration of the (concomitant) structural parallelism of the ontological and moral-philosophical levels in the framework of this same philosophy / philosophical theory. Moreover, it will be shown that the same structural parallelism extends as well to the levels of the theory of knowledge or the philosophy of history, especially since these represent and constitute just as much individual (special) cases of the general interweaving of the question of being and the question of value(s) (/ ontological with the axiological problem). For the proof, evidence, demonstration of all these structural interrelations, the question, problem of the relations between spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality, the senses in its aforementioned metamorphoses will be used as the / our criterion; consequently, we shall at the same time prove / show its central systematic meaning.

We shall better understand why this question, problem is (must be) necessarily central when / if we more carefully examine / take a closer look at the concept of the spirit(-intellect). In the course of this, it will not interest us to find out whether the spirit(-

intellect) “exists” (whatever this may mean / signify) or what it “is”; we want to purely descriptively (/ in a purely descriptive manner) get on the trail only of / trace, detect, track the function of this concept in the philosophical tradition. Of course, it must appear to be impossible to discover behind the confusing, bewildering, puzzling, baffling, chaotic ambiguity / multiplicity of meanings of the concept of the spirit(-intellect) a common thread, which could lead to the decoding of (/ in order to clarify, elucidate) its function(ing). In fact, it is (well-)known that in Greek antiquity the word πνεῦμα did not even once have its later meaning, but stood for a refined, yet always material principle of life – a perception, which remained living also in the Christian Middle Ages and had an effect until the New Times⁶. The hyper/supra-sensorial/sensible (world) as “discovered” and represented first of all chiefly, principally, mainly by (/ with the help of) the concept of νοῦς, whereas / whilst the πνεῦμα, which was still understood by the Stoics materially, first reached, attained complete de-sensorialisation / de-sensualisation under the influence of Judeo-Christian^{viii} perceptions, ideas⁷, so that it could be counterposed not merely to the σῶμα, but also to the ψυχή⁸. The Latin Middle Ages predominantly, mainly, chiefly uses the concept spiritus (as the translation of (the term) πνεῦμα) for the Holy Spirit, whereas the spirit as higher, superior human capacity, faculty, power, strength, force, ability, asset(s) is expressed (brought to expression) mainly by the term *mens*, in which not only the Stoic-Ciceronian, but also the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition of νοῦς and διάνοια continues to have an effect /

⁶ The ancient conception, representation, notion, perception of the material «πνεῦμα» (Jaeger, *Das πνεῦμα im Lykeion*, esp. 43ff., 55ff.) survives in the Stoa in a prominent position (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I, 73f., 83, 85 f., 342 f.) and was adopted by the Christian Middle Ages (see e.g. Thomas, *Summ. Theol.*, III, Qu. 27, Art. 2, ad 1) in the translation of Cicero (*spiritus vitalis*, *De Nat. Deorum*, Lib II, ch. 45). This concept played an important role in the New Times too (see F. Bacon, *De augm. scient.*, IV, 3 = *Works*, I, 605f., and above all Descartes, *Passions de l'âme*, I, 10 and 34 = *AT*, XI, 334 f., 354 f.).

⁷ For the investigation of this development, the study, essay by H. Siebeck about / regarding the development of the teaching of the spirit from the 1880s has been groundbreaking (see bibliography). More than three decades later, Siebeck supplemented/complemented, taking into account the literature appearing in the meanwhile, his analyses with a second study, treatise, in which he stresses the meaning, significance of Philo, yet he attributes, ascribes the conclusive de-sensorialisation/ de-sensualisation of the pneuma-concept primarily to Paul (*Neue Beiträge*, esp. 5f., 15). *Leisegang* concentrated on Philon as the typical figure of the upheaval, radical change, transitional period and pointed out, stressed his relations with the religious ideas of Hellenism and partially of the stoa, whilst he disputed a decisive, determinative influence of the biblical concept of the spirit (*Der Heilige Geist*, esp. 13f., 75, 114ff.). In contrast to that, Fr. Rüsche put forward, formulated the thesis that the de-sensorialisation / de-sensualisation of the concept of the pneuma (spirit) was not executed / carried out by Philon, who fuses, merges the Platonic-Aristotelian νοῦς with the stoic perception of the pneuma and consequently, similarly to Poseidonius, at very most reaches the construction of the light-pneuma (spirit in the light), but first/only by Origenes and above all by Augustine, and indeed under the decisive influence of Platonic ideas; in the neo-Platonists, an, in fact, return to Philo's middle position is ascertained (*Das Seelenpneuma*, esp. 20, 23 f., 30 f., 42 f., 46 f., 55, 68; this book constitutes the summary and further development, deepening of the results of research, findings which were presented in two earlier works, see bibliography). G. Verbeke asserted, emphasised, stressed yet again / anew Philo's central role, nevertheless, he underlined, stressed against *Leisegang* the biblical origin(s), provenance of his (Philo's) pneuma-perception (perception of the spirit) (*L'Évolution de la doctrine du Pneuma*, esp. 172 ff., 219 f., 257 ff., 510 ff.; against *Leisegang*, above all 247 ff.).

⁸ See e.g. Paul, 1 Cor. 2, 14; 1 Thess. 5, 23; He. 4, 12.

remains alive⁹. By means / From inside of this and such, similar terminological shifts, displacements, transpositions and struggles, quarrels, that astonishing (amazing, surprising, astounding) (great) variety (polysemy) of the concept of the spirit, which is undertaken since the New Times in order to be adapted to (the) new relations, conditions (not abolished in the New Times, but only, solely adapted to the new circumstances), comes into being. It can, however, be shown that when / [even] if the situation (position) pertaining to social history and the history of ideas changed, nevertheless the needs, which originally, initially led to the adoption and formation (creation and the spreading, dissemination) of the concept of the spirit, more or less remained the same, which moreover / otherwise explains the acceptance, adoption, taking over, undertaking not only of the old (great) variety (of the concept of the spirit), but also of traditional thought (intellectual) structures. Precisely the ascertainment of this continuity puts us in the position of duly appreciating / enables us to duly appreciate (will give us the possibility of evaluating as we must) the specific, peculiar consequences of the approach, tendency, trend as to (in respect of) the elimination, putting / setting aside of the concept of the spirit¹⁰(,) emerging (a trend, tendency which becomes increasingly apparent) in the New Times.

A first / An initial (point of) access (point) to/for the apprehension, understanding of the function of the concept of the spirit is provided to us by the remark, observation, comment that in the classical philosophical tradition the assumption, acceptance of a spirit in man, humans is tied, bound to the assumption, acceptance of a spirit in the metaphysical sense or else in the sense of a God (/ ... tradition, the spirit, in its human dimension, is connected to a divine, godly spirit, which has, that is, a metaphysical dimension).¹¹ This bond, (inter)connection, interrelation explains why the “true” spirit

⁹ Decisive, Determinative, Dominant for the Middle Ages was Augustine’s language use (see the Gilson’s summaries, synopses, Saint Augustine, 53, footnote 1; 282, footnote 2 and Rüsche, *Das Seelenpneuma*, 64 ff.). Cf. Bonaventura’s Definition, *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, I, 4 = Opera V, 297; cf. Thomas Sentent. Lib. I, Dist. III, Qu. V = Opera I, 123 ff.. Regarding Cicero’s reception or else reconstruction, reorganisation, reshuffle, reshuffling (appropriation and conversion) of Stoic psychological terminology we are informed by Schindler, *Die stoische Lehre . . .*, esp. 84 ff. (regarding the term *mens*), 93 (“Precisely the stressing of the ethical element makes the upper tiers, gradations of (the) *animus* clearer / more recognisable”).

¹⁰ In recent decades this demand was raised, made both by representatives of analytical philosophy (above all Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, esp. p. 167 ff.) as well as exponents of the more or less biologically oriented anthropology (Plessner still insists on significant, essential reservations (/ is still cautious, guarded), *Die Stufen des Organischen* 304 ff.; Gehlen, *Urmensch*. p. 89 ff., and Portmann, *Biologie und Geist*, 10 ff.) go much further). Tendencies like that typically represented by Armstrong (“mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain”, *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, xi) are / ought to be mentioned too, as well. The fact that in a Marxist-Leninist philosophical dictionary, like that edited by G. Klaus and M. Buhr, the word, entry “spirit” does not appear, pop / crop up, appear at all, does not seem strange / is natural. I point out / refer to these and similar tendencies because a thesis of our work is exactly that they represent and constitute the continuation and the culmination, coronation, crowning, high point of currents which for the New Times overall / as a whole are characteristic, and systematically manifest themselves, come forward above all in the Enlightenment, (in order) to come to the fore even more strongly, intensely in the 19th and 20th century.

¹¹ Typically, Plato in *Tim.* 41 cd, 69 cd.. Aristotle also looks at / considers the *voûç* as the/a certain sign of/for the taking part / participation of man in the godly / spiritual, *de Part. Anim.* 656 a 8, 686 a 28—29; *de An.* 408 b 29; *de Gen. Anim.* 736 b 28, 737 a 10. Cicero summarises, synopses the Stoic perception in regard to this question in *Tusc. Disp.*, V, Cap. 13 § 38 and Cap. 25 § 70. For Augustine, (the) spirit in man / humans is *imago*

in man (humans) is not or not principally (mainly) looked at as / considered to be the capacity for / ability at knowledge (simple cognitive strength (force, power)), but (as) the authority / tier of jurisdiction which stands / is (found) above the capacity for / ability at knowledge (simple cognitive strength (force, power)) in the narrower sense and guides, steers it with consideration for its own higher postulates and ends, goals (/ directing it on the basis of its own, higher demands and purposes)¹². Therefore / In this way, the spirit appears to be more comprehensive (and) or different / of another kind than the individual / in-part capacity of knowledge, knowing / cognitive forces, abilities; it does not serve or not merely serve as the organ or as the classifier, sorter, force putting things in order (in respect) of empirically founded knowledge (/ knowledge of (an) empirical origins (provenance, derivation, ancestry, extraction, descent, lineage)), but precisely as the discoverer, explorer, detector, tracker or else / and or as the bearer of the highest and ultimate truths, at least to the extent that these, on each and every respective occasion, are judged, evaluated, considered to be accessible, open to man / humans. In

and particeps Dei, Enarr. in Psalm. XLII, § 6 = PL 36, Sp. 480; cf. De Symb., I, § 2 = PL 40, Sp. 628. Following (In connection with) Augustine, Bonaventura, In I. Libr. Sententiarum, Dist. IX, Dub. IV = Opera, I, 189; cf. Dist. III, Qu. III = Opera, I, 75. See moreover Leisegang's analysis with reference to Philo(n), Der Heilige Geist, 93, 104ff..

¹² That/This is in the final analysis (in respect of the ultimate end) the meaning of the Platonic distinction between νοῦς, which has to do with / refers to τοῦ παντός ἀρχήν (Politeia, 511 b) and is identical with the truth (Phil. 65 d), and διάνοια (about/regarding that, Politeia, 511 cd). The Aristotelian contradistinction between νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη (Anal. Post. 100 b) has the same status / value (is analogous). The function / purpose of this distinction consists in the strengthening / reinforcement of the moral-normative component, side of the concept of the spirit; from their perspective, standpoint, namely, a spirit thinking axiologically freely (in a value-free manner) or acting merely end/goal-rationally (rationally as to ends/goals / exclusively in accordance with the schema "ends/goals-means") appears to be imperfect, incomplete; even a highly intelligent "immoralism", whatever that may mean on each and every respective occasion, is, therefore, eo ipso a sign of ontological inferiority. And the other way around / vice versa: (the) "right, correct", "true" knowing, knowledge ought to always promote, foster, facilitate, boost, assist morality, morals, ethics (as Jaeger with reference to Plato(n) formulated (it) / in accordance with Jaeger's formulation referring to Plato: "by knowing one ought to think not about modern scientific knowledge (science) (/ when we here say knowledge, we must not mean contemporary science as science / scientia), but about spiritual-intellectual sense as regards values (/ but rather the spiritual feeling for certain values), which the Greeks call phronesis [cast of mind, mentality]", Paideia, S. 1277 footnote 1. And Leisegang also, too remarks, observe correctly that in Plato(n), the Stoa and Philo, knowledge and virtue are / constitute "interchangeable, alternative concepts", Der Heilige Geist, 118). In view of this its central function, it is not strange that this distinction runs/goes through / pervades (/ Having a function so central, this distinction governs, dominates in) the whole philosophical tradition. And Paul / Paul too distinguishes between mere understanding-related / understanding-like (/ simply intellectual) and higher, superior knowledge (1 Cor 1, 19—21; cf. the wordplay / play on words in Eph. 3, 19). With regard to the change in meaning or else (/ and at the same time) the revaluation of the word "πνεῦμα", it is characteristic/typical that Paul, who not seldom uses the νοῦς of the ancient philosophy synonymously with πνεῦμα, in order to express the "higher, superior" or else "true" spirit (e.g. 1 Cor. 14, 15; Ro. 2, 2; 1 Co 2, 1), nevertheless always writes νοῦς when he is thinking of states of affairs / situations of weakness or corruption, depravity, foulness, badness (e.g. 1 Co 14, 14; Eph. 4, 17; 2 Ti 3, 8). In Augustine the thesis is likewise found that intellectus directly affected by God (/ , which refers directly to God) is superior to the discursive, analytical ratio (Sermo XLIII, II, 3 – III, 4 = PL, 38, verses / lines 254-256). Thomas reports similarly / Similarly with Thomas, following / who follows Aristotle: the intellectus directly and intuitively refers to the principia, whereas ratio and scientia proceed discursively and apply (having applied) the principia recognised / comprehended by the intellectus (Summ. Theol. I, Qu. LIX, Art. 1 ad 1; II, II, Qu. XLIX, Art. V ad 3; De Ver., Qu. XV Art. 1 = Quaest. Disput. I, 418). In the philosophy of the New Times, the same constellation/schema appears in the form of the antithetical pairs of concepts / conceptual pairs Raison-entendement, Reason-understanding, Vernunft-Verstand (cf. footnote 17, below).

other words, the spirit of / in the philosophical tradition is / ought not to be apprehended primarily in terms of the theory of knowledge (epistemologically), at least (for) as long as the object of knowledge applies to / is valid for / is not merely the perceptible / perceivable / sensorial / sensory / sensible world^{ix}); the spirit resorts / has recourse to his higher (cognitive) capabilities (in / of knowledge) as long as it is a matter of the / an ontological reason whose knowledge above all must be presented as objective and irrefutable when it is supposed / ought to underpin, support or else justify / give reasons for a certain moral-normative value scale (/ its / the spirit's superior cognitive capabilities are mobilised / called upon / summoned with the end / goal / purpose of seeking the ontological depth of things, which its knowledge, in (its) turn, ought to be presented as objective and irrefutable, above all when with it / such knowledge, a(n) ethical/moral-normative scale of values is to be justified). Only the spirit opens up the on each and every respective occasion "true" world of Is (/ Being / To Be) and of Ought. With regard to (this) its / the spirit's double chief/main task, mission^x, it is (a(n)) minor, incidental, irrelevant, negligible, secondary (thing, matter) whether it is comprehended intellectualistically / in terms of the intellect or not (exactly for this reason two different concepts of rationalism can be deduced / derived from / out if its / the spirit's determination / definition, as we shall see); the decision in (regard to) this question, problem, issue depends on each and every respective constellation as regards / pertaining to the history of ideas, or else(,) on each and every respective opponent, and first of all does not have to necessarily do with the assumption, adoption, acceptance of a spirit with the above-mentioned double chief / main task (/ aforementioned perception of the double, dual, twin mission of the spirit). The ambiguity, many meanings, polysemy of the concept of the spirit arises / results, therefore, inter alia / amongst other things, from the fact that it encompasses, at times, principally, mainly the intellect in opposition to the drives, urges, impulses and the body, at other times, principally, mainly the soul-related, psychical, mental, spiritual functions in general in opposition to the physiological-corporeal/bodily functions in their narrow sense¹³. According to / In

¹³ Plato's double or else ambivalent stance with reference to the question, problem of the parts, molecules, particles of the soul already marks (out), delimits, demarcates both positions, inside of / between which the philosophical tradition chiefly (has) moved / moves. Plato, as is (well-)known, undertakes a three-part division of the soul, and indeed with regard to (/ when he is interested in anthropologically fortifying, consolidating) the inner / internal organisation (/ hierarchy) of the ideal state (Politeia, 435 c—444a), whereas, on the other hand, he must stress, emphasise the unity of the soul (/ the its / the soul's united character)(,) when it is a matter of the problem of (/ when he want to prove its) immortality, i.e. of (the) contrast, clash with (/ deducing, deriving it (the soul) from the antithesis, opposition to) the mortal body (Politeia, 611 b—612 a). Important / Of importance for the further development of this problem examination was Stoic psychology / the psychology of the Stoics, which developed / unfolded / starting from Zenon's still elastic teaching, doctrine, theory of capacity / the powers of the soul to / reached Chrysipp's intellectualistic monism (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I, 85 ff., 142 ff.). And Paul, who counterposed the πνεῦμα [spirit] not only to the σῶμα [body], but also to the ψυχή [soul] (see footnote 8), speaks likewise of πνεῦμα in general / an undifferentiated manner, when he chiefly has in mind its opposition to the body (Ro. 18, 13; 1 Co 7, 34; above all Gal. 5, 17; in 1 Co 12, 4 he speaks, obviously, of several / a number of faculties, capacities, powers, or part(icle)s, molecules of the one same / a unified πνεῦμα). All these, incidentally fluctuating, vacillating, wavering, distinctions and classifications aim at / have as their aim, end of safeguarding, securing, fortifying, consolidating in terms of theory the autonomy, independence, self-reliance, self-containment or else dominance / rule of the higher, superior or pure spirit(,) and at the same time of explaining, explicating, at least to some extent / degree, why

accordance with the extent, range, scope of the spirit, the extent, range, scope of sensoriality (the senses, what is sensed) / the sensorial, sensory (sensational, sensual) world fluctuates, vacillates, oscillates, varies, wavers too¹⁴, (;) nonetheless, the line of separation / dividing line / segregation and the antagonism between them / both [[the spirit and the senses]] always remains, especially since, as we have said, even monistic conceptions in the name of that or this / one or the other appear / arrive on the scene / come to the fore.

Since the spirit in the philosophical tradition, under any name whatsoever / whatever name it takes, refers *at the same time* to the “true” Is and the “true” Ought, in fact this (spirit) is supposed to carry, bear, support them within itself (/ and indeed constitutes their bearer, carrier, vehicle), thus their contrast, opposition, antithesis to sensoriality, the senses means, signifies not merely a precondition, prerequisite, presupposition for the winning, gaining, sourcing, drawing of conclusive knowledge, i.e. free(d) / liberated from the contradictory variety, diversity of the sensorial / the senses, but eo ipso also the defence of a value scale / scale of values against factors which are perceived to be threatening (menacing, ominous, dangerous) (/ vis-à-vis factors which seem to threaten it / the said scale of values). The threat (menace, danger) comes, of course, from the sensoriality / senses / sensory world (in) whose determination, definition appears / concept contains the same connection / combining of the ontological and normative question, problem like / as in the concept of the spirit — only this time with negative signs, symbolism (/ the signs are negative): sensoriality / the sensory world in itself is made out to be / presented as, namely, both the lower / lowest stratum of the Is and at the same time a(n) hindrance, obstruct(ion), impediment, barrier to / for the realisation

this dominance, rule frequently is absent / missing / lacking in a practical regard / is not realised. We shall see later what an important role such question formulations have / problem examination has played in the debates pertaining to moral / ethical philosophy of the 18th century.

¹⁴ Like / As the aforementioned conceptual pair / pair of concepts already imply, entail and like / as the (great) variety, diversity of the philosophical levels demands (it), the word / expression “sensoriality” / “the senses” or “sensorial (sensory) world” will have in our study, investigation, examination several / a number of meanings. First of all, it will(, with that,) mean biological sensoriality / man’s purely biological dimension; then / thereafter, “inner / internal sensoriality (/ the inner sensory world)” (according to / in accordance with Herder’s well-aimed, successful expression, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden* = SW, VIII, 190, 239), namely, the drives, urges, impulses, passions etc., which go back / are reduced to man’s bodily, corporeal composition, constitution, texture and are taken / considered / assumed to be (in respect of them) as standing in the way of the dominance, rule or else / and/or activity of the intellect; thirdly, geographical and social-historical sensoriality (/ the sensorial world in the geographic and social-historical sense), as the sum / totality of the factors which influence the spirit of man / humans living in a geographically determined, specific, concrete land / country and in a historically determined, specific, concrete society; and fourthly, cosmic sensoriality, i.e. the matter of the universe in contrast to the (re)presentation, notion of God (/ the universe as matter in contrast / antithesis to God). (Also, the sensoriality of the capability of knowing / capacity for knowledge in the Kantian sense should not be forgotten (/ the sensorial / sensory particle of the soul or sensoriality / sensibility, sentience, the sensory faculty as a cognitive force, power in the Kantian sense must also not be forgotten). We want to ascertain with the help of this multi-dimensional definition of sensoriality the structural similarities of various, different levels (from the anthropological to the social-historical and cosmological), which arise / result from the assessment, evaluation, appraisal of sensoriality (/ the sensory factor) in its each and every respective sense, which [[in turn]] corresponds / corresponding [[in turn]] with a just as multi-dimensional definition of the spirit.

of morality, morals, ethics — or in the best case (scenario) as morally, ethically indifferent (—) ¹⁵; only as – to an on each and every respective occasion different extent – (/ in a more or less) spiritualised sensoriality in the framework, context of a spiritualistic monism or else of a consciously or unconsciously teleologically coloured (dyed, tinged) materialism (/ or of an (often unconscious) teleological materialism) can it (i.e. sensoriality or the sensory world) be perceived as completely, totally, fully lacking in danger / risk-free, harmless, safe in a normative-moral regard (/ from an ethical-normative point of view). That is why the defence of the spirit means / signifies not merely taking sides, partisanship for / in favour of a certain perception of (the) Is (, therefore, not only theoretical effort at the fortification, consolidation of a certain ontological perception), but also – and not seldom primarily, principally – engagement, mobilisation for / in favour of those (/ under the flag of) values, with which this latter perception (of the Is) is connected. In view of the normative function of the spirit (/ Since the spirit has normative functions), which one is supposed to be aware of to its whole, total, complete extent and in all its metamorphoses, it is neither (a) coincidence, accident, chance, happenstance, nor (a) triviality, when the fundamental / basic difference between man and the (other) animals, beasts is seen, espied, spotted, beheld / considered to be in the exclusive presence of the spirit in the former (man)¹⁶ – whereby / in relation to which, this spirit is accustomed to be described not merely as a value-free / axiologically free cognitive organ / organ of knowing (knowledge) or instrument for self-assertion / the assertion of one's self in the struggle for being (t)here (/ as a means of self-preservation in the struggle for existence), but as normatively-morally/ethically coloured (dyed, tinged) and correspondingly as a (binding (mandatory, compulsory)) authority / tier of jurisdiction (causing obligation). In this regard, it is indicative, characteristic, typical, illustrative that in the language of philosophical tradition, exactly those terms which denote, describe, connote, suggest the spirit as an ontologically given magnitude or else as a source of the highest ontological knowledge, simultaneously – in relation to that – are used to make the force, strength, power of moral, ethical insight, knowledge in man (humans) visible / noticeable (/ in parallel in relation to the ethically oriented functions of the human mind); then they intertwine, interlock to the point of unrecognisability (/ are confused) with other terms, like for instance ὁρθὸς λόγος, Ratio,

¹⁵ The ontological downgrading and thus, consequently also downgrading in terms of moral / ethical philosophy of sensoriality / the sensory world constitutes, as is known, a main feature of the Platonic-Christian tradition. Even / And Aristotle, despite / notwithstanding the revaluation of sensoriality / the sensory world in comparison to Platonism, reserves the power / function of the primum movens to pure νόησις, and accordingly he sees, espies, beholds, spots the highest perfection, completion of human life in theory [[which essentially means giving meaning to life, otherwise plain animalistic / cave no meaning]]. Sensoriality / The sensory world, again, is looked at as morally / ethically indifferent or else becomes completely, fully, totally alien to morals, morality, ethics, when it (i.e. sensoriality / the sensory world) is understood as the mere realm / kingdom of mechanical causality. Then, as Kant's example shows, a new separation between the intelligible and the sensible (i.e. referring to the senses) (/ the intellect (what is intellectualised), the mental and the senses) for the purpose of the safeguarding, securing, security, fortifying, reinforcement, consolidation of morals, morality, ethics becomes necessary (already Plato knew of the opposition, antithesis between causal ἀνάγκη and autonomous νοῦς, see e.g. Tim. 48 a).

¹⁶ Typically, Aristotle's formulation, Pol. 1253 a 10.

Reason etc., which partially have a direct reference to moral / ethical philosophy¹⁷.

¹⁷ The synonymy of νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, σύνεσις and φρόνησις is encountered in Plato when they take the field (go into battle) against the hedonistic principle (/ (the) hedonism pertaining to moral / ethical philosophy is refuted, countered) (see e.g. Phil. 21 b, 59 d, 66 b etc. etc.). Also in Aristotle, the morally / ethically active νοῦς is identical with γνώμη, σύνεσις or φρόνησις (see e.g. Eth. Nic. 1143 a 20 — 28). On the other hand, νοῦς and λόγος in a practical regard are just as much identical (both in fact ought / are supposed to dominate / rule ((over) the passions), cf. Pol. 1254 b 5 with 1295 b 6, 8 and 1260 a 19) as ὀρθός λόγος and φρόνησις (Eth. Nic. 1144 b 28). K. Bärthlein has shown against one-sided interpretations that in the Corpus Aristotelicum and in the Platonic writings, texts, the term ὀρθός λόγος means / signifies both “correct, right knowing / knowledge” as well as the objectively existing and ontologically-anthropologically founded moral / ethical law (the ΟΡΘΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ in the major / great ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum, esp. 239 f., 245 f., and: the ΟΡΘΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ and the ethical basic / fundamental principle in platonic writings, texts, esp. 129, 139, 141 f., 151 f.). It is a matter here again of the stereotypical equating of “true” knowing / knowledge and “right, correct” action or else of the thesis that knowing, knowledge is inadequate, deficient, lacking, insufficient, poor, defective, imperfect (for) as long as it does not agree with certain moral, ethical (basic / fundamental) principles / axioms / propositions (see footnote 12, above). That is the reason why also in the Christian tradition the / those terms which are supposed to / should describe, suggest the capacity, faculty for / the capability at / function(ing) of scientific knowledge are used synonymously with the terms intended for the higher, superior (/ referring to the higher tiers of the) spirit only when it is accepted, assumed that that knowledge was (already) perfected, completed or else founded (solely) by insight into (/ with the assistance of the knowledge of) the “true” Is and Ought. Characteristic / Typical of that is the double, dual, twin use, usage of the word ratio, which can mean, signify both the merely, simply scientific (see footnote 12, above) as well as (the) higher, superior normative knowledge, knowing. See Gilson’s excellent, magnificent analyses (Saint Augustin, 141 ff.; Saint Bonaventure, 362 ff.), which concern, strike upon, comprehend the world-theoretical sense, meaning, core, nucleus of the problem. Regarding / On / For the double, dual use of ratio in Thomas, see Summ. Theol., I, Qu. LXXIX, Art. IX, Concl. (distinction between ratio superior and ratio inferior). In contrast to the / Thomas’s cited statements, propositions, sentences in footnote 12, in other passages / excerpts, the terms intellectus and ratio are used synonymously, and indeed / especially (just / exactly as in Aristotle) when the talk is of the control, mastery, domination, command of the drives, urges, impulses, i.e. of the moral, ethical function of the higher, superior (tiers of the) spirit (see e.g. Summ. Theol. I, LXXXI, Art. III, ad. 2).

[[ALL END NOTES ARE BY THE KRAZY MAN, WHEREAS THE FOOTNOTES ARE P.K.'s UNLESS SPECIFICALLY INDICATED OTHERWISE [[]]]]

ⁱ To the German edition being translated.

ⁱⁱ Obviously, here we are talking about what the senses perceive and not hedonistic life stances, experiences etc..

ⁱⁱⁱ A reflection of, at least in part, the concentration of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-M-C-M-CAPITALISTIC-IMPERIALISTIC POWER, from ZIO-Great Britain to ZIO-USA.

^{iv} I suggest yooz all read Kondylis's "the multi-dimensional Enlightenment" I've translated on the P.K. site (<https://www.panagiotiskondylis.com/the-multi-dimensional-enlightenment.php>)

to get a much meatier "preliminary remark" than the waffle of this preliminary remark.

^v Only in the Greek edition.

^{vi} Obviously, only in the Greek edition.

^{vii} With no inherent ethics anywhere in nature, metaphysics as ideological / normative thought is as inevitable as is the inevitability of the constructed by humans nature of all ethics.

^{viii} Judeo-Christian as compared to classical / ancient Greek, but not to be confused with today's ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ who are the SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN. The biblical Jews are not the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ of M-C-M-CAPITALISM-IMPERIALISM AND THE SYNANGOGUE OF SATAN. These, today's Jews are the SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ who Judas Iscariot betrayed and Caiaphas et al. SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN killed Christ and who have destroyed all "the West" in the last 2-3 centuries.

^{ix} The translation from the Greek text reads : "the spirit in the philosophical tradition is not understood primarily in epistemological terms, at least as long as the object of knowledge [[does not]] remains exclusively the sensible world", which does not seem to me to be in line with the German text without a "does not" as in, "at least as long as the object of knowledge does not remain exclusively the sensible world", which to me makes more sense, i.e. the Greek text seems to have left out the δὲν / not as a typographical omission / error.

^x Of giving / letting us understand the reality of being and morality.