

PANAJOTIS KONDYLLIS

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**Die Aufklärung
im Rahmen des
neuzeitlichen Rationalismus**

*The Enlightenment in the
framework (context) of new-
times rationalism*

FELIX MEINER VERLAG, HAMBURG, 2022

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STARTING 07-07-2025, AND WILL DEFINITELY NEVER FINISH IT. KRAZY.

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ

ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ

PANAGIOTIS KONDYLIS

Ο ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟΣ

ΔΙΑΦΩΤΙΣΜΟΣ

The European Enlightenment

ΤΟΜΟΣ Α (VOLUME A)

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PRELIMINARY REMARKⁱ

The great book about the Enlightenment by Panagiotis Kondylis appeared in the German language in a hard-cover edition in 1981 by Klett-Cotta and then one more time in 1986 as a paperback/soft-cover edition (dtv 4450). In 1987 a Greek edition followed by Themelio in Athens (3rd ed. 1998). The German editions have been out of stock/print for a long time. The author could no longer prepare any new edition of this standard work of Enlightenment research; he died, all too early, in 1998. In the following, some of the central aspects of the book will be outlined.

German research into the Enlightenment stood for a long time in the formidable, overpowering, over-bearing shadow of idealism, of classicism, of the new humanism and of romanticism. Kondylis's book fundamentally changed our conceptions, notions, perceptions about the Enlightenment. Kondylis did not undertake any epoch reconstruction, he traverses the national Enlightenment traditions (of England, of France, of Germany), he does without, foregoes a social history of authors and intellectual groupings, he rather investigates the exchange processes between philosophy and the theory of science in the early New Times. At the (epi)centre of his book stands/is the reformulation (new formation) of philosophy from 1750. The book is oriented towards the reconstruction of the relationship between spirit (intellect) and matter. Kondylis distinguishes two phases of development of Enlightenment thought: first of all, the Cartesian separation of soul (psyche) and body (res cogitans – res extensa) dominates early new-times rationalism, which around 1750 was

replaced by a “rehabilitation of sensoriality”. The newly constituted sensualismⁱⁱ gives up, abandons, surrenders, relinquishes the older ideal of the methods of mathematics and mechanistic physics and orients itself towards the new life sciences of biologism. Kondylis follows (pursues) the theories of dualism or else the unity of body and soul back to late European humanism, he then / subsequently discusses the influence of mechanistic physics (Newton) on the rationalistic processes of system formation (development) of / in the 17th century, he determines, defines, specifies, identifies the relationship between the mathematical (methodological) ideal ((in respect) of methods) with / towards neo-Platonism and defines rational theology in the field of influence of mechanistic theories of the cosmos. In the middle of the 18th century a serious, grave conflict emerges, looms / is looming. Mechanistic intellectualism falls into crisis. The constructive Reason of God is no longer supposed to be the primal ground / very basis of creation, but the self-organisation of organic substances tends to replace the mechanical explanation, explication of God, cosmos, world and man (humans). With this paradigm shift pertaining to the theory of science, Kondylis may begin the second section of development of the European Enlightenment: the critique (criticism) of metaphysics and intellectualism leads to a revaluation, reappraisal of the concept of matter and of evolution (development) as well as a complementary theory of nature and culture. Aversion to / The turning away from the time-indifferent and place-indifferent arguments ((leading of) evidence) in favour of rationalism makes possible / enables the new putting in order / classification of the categories of thought and volition / wanting (willing), feeling and Reason, Nature, History and culture and leads to a relativisation of the difference between facticity and normativity. Through / By means of (the) consideration of the relationship between theories of science and philosophy, Kondylis expands, extends, widens, enlarges the reference and

object fields (fields of reference and of objects) of the empirical Enlightenment. Through / By means of the reappraisal, revaluation of the events of French research of the sixties and seventies of the theories of science of the 18th century, Kondylis succeeds in proving that between the points of tension as regards “Nature” and “culture”, new sciences (natural history, ethnology, cultural history, sociology, history) can be developed / unfold, which first, only in the 19th century and early 20th century are eliminated from (rejected by) philosophy. In this overview of the relationship between philosophy and the conceptions of Nature, of History and of culture, the philosophical traditions of England, France and Germany move closer togetherⁱⁱⁱ, the German “special way / path” in the history of philosophy begins (if at all) only, first with German idealism or else (the) new humanism. Ferment(ation)s between philosophy and the theory of science are in the 18th century the effects, impact(s) of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz. At the same time, Kondylis succeeds in integrating Kant and Kantianism directly, immediately in the determinations of the problem of (the) Enlightenment grounds, substantiations of empiricism. A united European axis of argumentation comes into being, which begins with English empiricism, [[and]] which is continued by French pre-materialism and is concluded / completed by the organicistic philosophy of Nature and culture of Germany. In this concept(ual plan), the boundaries between philosophy, the theory of Nature (natural theory), History (history), aesthetics, literature and culture become fluid, flowing. In this respect, Kondylis succeeds in analysing in the framework of a study pertaining to the history of philosophy, at the same time, the interdisciplinary possibility/potential in respect of argumentation of adjacent, abutting, neighbouring sciences in the mirror, reflection of spirit-matter problem. With the replacement of dogmatic rationalism by the empiricism pertaining to the philosophy of life in (the) Europe of / in

the 18th century, numerous interdisciplinary border crossings (i.e. crossing or the overstepping of erstwhile boundaries between disciplines) are anticipated, which we know from today's discussions (in respect) of science.^{iv}

Jörn Garber

Ulrich Kronauer

TO FOTI(S) APOSTOLOPOULO(S)

in memoriam^v

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NOTE FOR THE GREEK EDITION^{vi}

The Greek edition of this work constitutes a faithful and complete, full rendering of the German edition, as it circulated for the first time in 1981 by the [Publishing] House of Klett-Cotta and for a second time in 1986 by the [Publishing] House Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag (dtv). In order to make things easier for the Greek reader, I have also rendered in Greek the quoted excerpts from the French, English, German, Italian and Latin language(s), which in the German edition have been given in the, on each and every respective occasion, original.

P.K.

I. Basic (Fundamental) concepts for the apprehension (understanding) of the texture, essence, nature of the Enlightenment

1. Spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality (/ senses, what is sensed) or the question of being / Is and the question of value(s) (/ the ontological and axiological problem)

The question (problem) in respect of the relations between spirit/intellect and sensoriality (/ senses, what is sensed) can, in a certain respect (/ from a certain point of view), be looked at as / considered to be the central problem of all philosophy. From a historical point of view / Historically, the central meaning / significance of this question is proved, certified, verified already through the pointing to the adherence of the first approaches of philosophy with the animistic way of looking at the world (/ if we ponder, consider the relationship of the first forms of philosophy with the animistic perception of the world).¹ The first organised and all-encompassing, full, complete world image is

¹ P. Radin [[(April 2, 1883 – February 21, 1959), a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID]] has shown that the animistic world view must be considered, class(ifi)ed as a philosophical achievement (performance) (/ composed, structured philosophy), and indeed both in regard to its setting of the question (problem examination) (the origin(s) and the composition, texture, constitution of the world, the meaning of human life, rules of moral / ethical behaviour etc.) and its capacity for, ability at abstract thought (/ abstract capability) as well as regarding, concerning its provenance from the intellectual / thought endeavours, efforts (/ on account of its formation on the part) of certain, only, individuals. Radin confutes, rebuts above all the perception represented by Levy-Bruhl [[né le 10 avril 1857 à Paris et mort le 13 mars 1939 dans la même ville, another ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID]] and Cassirer [[28. Juli 1874 in Breslau; † 13. April 1945 in New York, another ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID, so we have JOOZ TORKING TO JOOZ ABOUT JOOZ in a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-FUCK-FEST]] of a pre-logical, mythical thought, which is sharply, intensely counterposed to “rational” thought and should be subordinated, subjected (/ is inferior) to it (i.e. the said “rational” thought) – a perception, which, as Radin correctly remarked, only reflects, mirrors the complacent, smug, self-satisfied evaluations, assessments and the habits of thought of European scholars, savants (Primitive Man as Philosopher, esp. xxiv ff., 30ff., 99ff., 208ff., 246ff., 252ff., 292ff., 345ff.). In his critique, criticism of / Rejecting Levy-Bruhl’s separation between “rational” and “irrational” thought, Lévy-Strauss [[né le 28 novembre 1908 à Bruxelles et mort le 30 octobre 2009 à Paris 16e, another ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID, so P.K. is in full Werner Conze et al. ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-PARTY MODE !!!]] to a great extent, largely, extensively confirmed Radin’s results, findings (La pensée sauvage, see esp. ch. 1, the first part of 8 and the final part of 9.). The analyses of Topitsch [[* 20. März 1919 in Wien; † 26. Jänner 2003 in Graz]] about / regarding the continuity of thought / intellectual (/ conceptual) structures in mythology and traditional philosophical metaphysics must be looked at as a corroboration, reinforcement, confirmation of the same position (Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik, esp. 3ff., 18ff., 95ff., 221ff., 285ff.).

dualistic, i.e. it comes into being on the foundation, basis of the “discovery” of the spirit(-intellect) or else of the spirits, which are separated from the sensorial-perceptible (/ regarded as separate from the sensory world) and are supposed to guide its (i.e. the sensorial-perceptible’s) fates, destinies (/ it is believed that they direct its (i.e. the sensory world’s) fortunes). That is why it is no coincidence, accident, chance when philosophemes (/ philosophical theories), which were determinative for the spiritual-intellectual tradition of the so-called Occident (Western world) pay homage to, embrace, advocate dualism, i.e. the fundamental, programmatic opposition, antithesis of / between spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality (the senses / what is sensed). It suffices to recollect / remind ourselves of Platonism, whose original, initial version is precisely deeply connected, with reference to the dualistic principle, (/ owed a lot) to (the) animistic-religious ideas / body of thought of the Orphic-Pythagorean cult², and whose historical impact, effect, influence, no least of all through / especially with the mediation of Christendom, Christianity,³ was so lasting, persistent (/ exceptionally intense); the Cartesian separation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*⁴ as well as the Kantian separation between the intelligible and the sensible⁵ equally, also, likewise represent and constitute prominent examples for the same thing (facts of the case). Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate, errant (/ not be correct) to hold, consider the question (problem) of the relations between spirit and sensoriality (senses) to be / as central only when a dualistic thought structure is present/exists, or to assume the primacy (priority, precedence) of this question will be visible exclusively in dualistic thought structures (/ when we are dealing with dualistic philosophies). The not to be disregarded / indispensable spiritualistic or materialistic signs of our already well-known monistic philosophemes (/ of all of the until today known monistic philosophical theories irrefutably show that the latter monistic philosophical theories) constitute in themselves an eloquent argument for the thesis that here it is a matter of the attempts to overcome, surpass, transcend exactly the antagonism between spirit and sensoriality in the sense (/ from the point of view) of the former or of the latter – in other words; not only does this antagonism constitute the starting point and consequently the *conditio sine qua non* of the thought (intellectual) endeavour / effort at thought (/ philosophical thought), but also each and every “overcoming, surpassing, transcendence” is achieved on the basis only through / (by means) of the absolutisation of one of its competing limbs (/ of one of the two antagonistic elements); it is (has), therefore, polemically meant (/ a polemical character), and because of this it cannot also bring about the conclusive end of the above-mentioned antagonism.

² In relation to that, Leisegang, “Platon”, lines 2421, 2424, 2433. Cf. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, p. 540..

³ See in general / generally, Ivánka, *Plato Christianus*, esp. 68f., 469ff..

⁴ Descartes had connected his separation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* not least of all with the teaching, doctrine, theory of Platonic innatism (/ innate (inherent, immanent, inborn) ideas). But the Platonic definition of *χώρα* would have to have been known to him (i.e. Descartes) too. See Taylor, *Platonism*, 51ff.; Gilson, *Études sur le rôle . . .*, 28f.; Smith, *New Studies*, 194 note 1. Cf. below, p. 182.

⁵ The influence of metaphysical-religious traditions, customs, lores on Kant’s teaching, theory, doctrine of two worlds was investigated, worked upon, processed recently by Topitsch, *Die Voraussetzungen der Transzendentalphilosophie*, p. 21 ff.. [[Sensible as in pertaining to the senses]]

From a systematic point of view, again, the general significance, meaning which may be attributed to the question, problem of the relations between spirit/intellect and sensoriality (the senses) becomes more easily recognisable, perceptible when/if we visualise and make clear to ourselves (/ ponder, consider) the conceptual pair in(to) which the aforementioned question, problem can be (re)solved or else translated: subject-object, God-world, possibility-reality, soul-body, intellect-senses, Reason-drives (urges, impulses), Ought-Is, normative-causal, realm of God or else of Reason-History. All the important problems of philosophy are represented in this conceptual pair, and that implies that a complete answer to the question (/ from a full solution to the problem) of the relations between spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality (the senses) must generate, produce, engender a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of history too, which structurally correspond with each other (/ there must arise a cosmology, an ethics, a theory of knowledge and also a philosophy of history) when/if the thinker concerned proceeds logically consistently or else / and with systematic intent. This / That, certainly, happens, occurs relatively seldomly because at the start, commencement / in the beginning of the endeavour at thought / intellectual effort stands / is not usually the whole complex, but only one of the above-mentioned conceptual pairs – which, naturally, is time(-determined) and temperament-determined / determined as to time and as to temperament (/ that which the epoch and temperament bring to the fore). Nonetheless, there always exists an implied (/ latent) connection with the other parts of the complex; the unavoidability, necessity of this complex could be explained in the framework of a general investigation of / into the logical and ideological belonging together / affinity / relatedness of ethics and metaphysics^{vii}. In the course of our investigation the (inter)connection between ethics and ontology will be repeatedly discussed and in a double, dual regard: on the one hand, as the ascertainment of the interweaving of the question of being and the question of value(s) or else of the designing, sketching, outlining of ontology in the light of moral needs, requirements and postulates (/ ontological and axiological problem, that is, the formation of ontology on the basis of ethical needs and demands); on the other hand, as proof / evidence / a demonstration of the (concomitant) structural parallelism of the ontological and moral-philosophical levels in the framework of this same philosophy / philosophical theory. Moreover, it will be shown that the same structural parallelism extends as well to the levels of the theory of knowledge or the philosophy of history, especially since these represent and constitute just as much individual (special) cases of the general interweaving of the question of being and the question of value(s) (/ ontological with the axiological problem). For the proof, evidence, demonstration of all these structural interrelations, the question, problem of the relations between spirit(-intellect) and sensoriality, the senses in its aforementioned metamorphoses will be used as the / our criterion; consequently, we shall at the same time prove / show its central systematic meaning.

We shall better understand why this question, problem is (must be) necessarily central when / if we more carefully examine / take a closer look at the concept of the spirit(-intellect). In the course of this, it will not interest us to find out whether the spirit(-

intellect) “exists” (whatever this may mean / signify) or what it “is”; we want to purely descriptively (/ in a purely descriptive manner) get on the trail only of / trace, detect, track the function of this concept in the philosophical tradition. Of course, it must appear to be impossible to discover behind the confusing, bewildering, puzzling, baffling, chaotic ambiguity / multiplicity of meanings of the concept of the spirit(-intellect) a common thread, which could lead to the decoding of (/ in order to clarify, elucidate) its function(ing). In fact, it is (well-)known that in Greek antiquity the word πνεῦμα did not even once have its later meaning, but stood for a refined, yet always material principle of life – a perception, which remained living also in the Christian Middle Ages and had an effect until the New Times⁶. The hyper/supra-sensorial/sensible (world) as “discovered” and represented first of all chiefly, principally, mainly by (/ with the help of) the concept of νοῦς, whereas / whilst the πνεῦμα, which was still understood by the Stoics materially, first reached, attained complete de-sensorialisation / de-sensualisation under the influence of Judeo-Christian^{viii} perceptions, ideas⁷, so that it could be counterposed not merely to the σῶμα, but also to the ψυχή⁸. The Latin Middle Ages predominantly, mainly, chiefly uses the concept spiritus (as the translation of (the term) πνεῦμα) for the Holy Spirit, whereas the spirit as higher, superior human capacity, faculty, power, strength, force, ability, asset(s) is expressed (brought to expression) mainly by the term *mens*, in which not only the Stoic-Ciceronian, but also the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition of νοῦς and διάνοια continues to have an effect /

⁶ The ancient conception, representation, notion, perception of the material «πνεῦμα» (Jaeger, *Das πνεῦμα im Lykeion*, esp. 43ff., 55ff.) survives in the Stoa in a prominent position (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I, 73f., 83, 85 f., 342 f.) and was adopted by the Christian Middle Ages (see e.g. Thomas, *Summ. Theol.*, III, Qu. 27, Art. 2, ad 1) in the translation of Cicero (*spiritus vitalis*, *De Nat. Deorum*, Lib II, ch. 45). This concept played an important role in the New Times too (see F. Bacon, *De augm. scient.*, IV, 3 = *Works*, I, 605f., and above all Descartes, *Passions de l'âme*, I, 10 and 34 = *AT*, XI, 334 f., 354 f.).

⁷ For the investigation of this development, the study, essay by H. Siebeck about / regarding the development of the teaching of the spirit from the 1880s has been groundbreaking (see bibliography). More than three decades later, Siebeck supplemented/complemented, taking into account the literature appearing in the meanwhile, his analyses with a second study, treatise, in which he stresses the meaning, significance of Philo, yet he attributes, ascribes the conclusive de-sensorialisation/ de-sensualisation of the pneuma-concept primarily to Paul (*Neue Beiträge*, esp. 5f., 15). Leisegang concentrated on Philon as the typical figure of the upheaval, radical change, transitional period and pointed out, stressed his relations with the religious ideas of Hellenism and partially of the stoa, whilst he disputed a decisive, determinative influence of the biblical concept of the spirit (*Der Heilige Geist*, esp. 13f., 75, 114ff.). In contrast to that, Fr. Rüsche put forward, formulated the thesis that the de-sensorialisation / de-sensualisation of the concept of the pneuma (spirit) was not executed / carried out by Philon, who fuses, merges the Platonic-Aristotelian νοῦς with the stoic perception of the pneuma and consequently, similarly to Poseidonius, at very most reaches the construction of the light-pneuma (spirit in the light), but first/only by Origenes and above all by Augustine, and indeed under the decisive influence of Platonic ideas; in the neo-Platonists, an, in fact, return to Philo's middle position is ascertained (*Das Seelenpneuma*, esp. 20, 23 f., 30 f., 42 f., 46 f., 55, 68; this book constitutes the summary and further development, deepening of the results of research, findings which were presented in two earlier works, see bibliography). G. Verbeke asserted, emphasised, stressed yet again / anew Philo's central role, nevertheless, he underlined, stressed against Leisegang the biblical origin(s), provenance of his (Philo's) pneuma-perception (perception of the spirit) (*L'Evolution de la doctrine du Pneuma*, esp. 172 ff., 219 f., 257 ff., 510 ff.; against Leisegang, above all 247 ff.).

⁸ See e.g. Paul, 1 Cor. 2, 14; 1 Thess. 5, 23; He. 4, 12.

remains alive⁹. By means / From inside of this and such, similar terminological shifts, displacements, transpositions and struggles, quarrels, that astonishing (amazing, surprising, astounding) (great) variety (polysemy) of the concept of the spirit, which is undertaken since the New Times in order to be adapted to (the) new relations, conditions (not abolished in the New Times, but only, solely adapted to the new circumstances), comes into being. It can, however, be shown that when / [even] if the situation (position) pertaining to social history and the history of ideas changed, nevertheless the needs, which originally, initially led to the adoption and formation (creation and the spreading, dissemination) of the concept of the spirit, more or less remained the same, which moreover / otherwise explains the acceptance, adoption, taking over, undertaking not only of the old (great) variety (of the concept of the spirit), but also of traditional thought (intellectual) structures. Precisely the ascertainment of this continuity puts us in the position of duly appreciating / enables us to duly appreciate (will give us the possibility of evaluating as we must) the specific, peculiar consequences of the approach, tendency, trend as to (in respect of) the elimination, putting / setting aside of the concept of the spirit¹⁰(,) emerging (a trend, tendency which becomes increasingly apparent) in the New Times.

A first / An initial (point of) access (point) to/for the apprehension, understanding of the function of the concept of the spirit is provided to us by the remark, observation, comment that in the classical philosophical tradition the assumption, acceptance of a spirit in man, humans is tied, bound to the assumption, acceptance of a spirit in the metaphysical sense or else in the sense of a God (/ ... tradition, the spirit, in its human dimension, is connected to a divine, godly spirit, which has, that is, a metaphysical dimension).¹¹ This bond, (inter)connection, interrelation explains why the “true” spirit

⁹ Decisive, Determinative, Dominant for the Middle Ages was Augustine’s language use (see the Gilson’s summaries, synopses, Saint Augustine, 53, footnote 1; 282, footnote 2 and Rüsche, *Das Seelenpneuma*, 64 ff.). Cf. Bonaventura’s Definition, *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, I, 4 = Opera V, 297; cf. Thomas Sentent. Lib. I, Dist. III, Qu. V = Opera I, 123 ff.. Regarding Cicero’s reception or else reconstruction, reorganisation, reshuffle, reshuffling (appropriation and conversion) of Stoic psychological terminology we are informed by Schindler, *Die stoische Lehre . . .*, esp. 84 ff. (regarding the term *mens*), 93 (“Precisely the stressing of the ethical element makes the upper tiers, gradations of (the) *animus* clearer / more recognisable”).

¹⁰ In recent decades this demand was raised, made both by representatives of analytical philosophy (above all Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, esp. p. 167 ff.) as well as exponents of the more or less biologically oriented anthropology (Plessner still insists on significant, essential reservations (/ is still cautious, guarded), *Die Stufen des Organischen* 304 ff.; Gehlen, *Urmensch.* p. 89 ff., and Portmann, *Biologie und Geist*, 10 ff.) go much further). Tendencies like that typically represented by Armstrong (“mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain”, *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, xi) are / ought to be mentioned too, as well. The fact that in a Marxist-Leninist philosophical dictionary, like that edited by G. Klaus and M. Buhr, the word, entry “spirit” does not appear, pop / crop up, appear at all, does not seem strange / is natural. I point out / refer to these and similar tendencies because a thesis of our work is exactly that they represent and constitute the continuation and the culmination, coronation, crowning, high point of currents which for the New Times overall / as a whole are characteristic, and systematically manifest themselves, come forward above all in the Enlightenment, (in order) to come to the fore even more strongly, intensely in the 19th and 20th century.

¹¹ Typically, Plato in *Tim.* 41 cd, 69 cd.. Aristotle also looks at / considers the *voũc* as the/a certain sign of/for the taking part / participation of man in the godly / spiritual, *de Part. Anim.* 656 a 8, 686 a 28—29; *de An.* 408 b 29; *de Gen. Anim.* 736 b 28, 737 a 10. Cicero summarises, synopsis the Stoic perception in regard to this question in *Tusc. Disp.*, V, Cap. 13 § 38 and Cap. 25 § 70. For Augustine, (the) spirit in man / humans is *imago*

in man (humans) is not or not principally (mainly) looked at as / considered to be the capacity for / ability at knowledge (simple cognitive strength (force, power)), but (as) the authority / tier of jurisdiction which stands / is (found) above the capacity for / ability at knowledge (simple cognitive strength (force, power)) in the narrower sense and guides, steers it with consideration for its own higher postulates and ends, goals (/ directing it on the basis of its own, higher demands and purposes)¹². Therefore / In this way, the spirit appears to be more comprehensive (and) or different / of another kind than the individual / in-part capacity of knowledge, knowing / cognitive forces, abilities; it does not serve or not merely serve as the organ or as the classifier, sorter, force putting things in order (in respect) of empirically founded knowledge (/ knowledge of (an) empirical origins (provenance, derivation, ancestry, extraction, descent, lineage)), but precisely as the discoverer, explorer, detector, tracker or else / and or as the bearer of the highest and ultimate truths, at least to the extent that these, on each and every respective occasion, are judged, evaluated, considered to be accessible, open to man / humans. In

and particeps Dei, Enarr. in Psalm. XLII, § 6 = PL 36, Sp. 480; cf. De Symb., I, § 2 = PL 40, Sp. 628. Following (In connection with) Augustine, Bonaventura, In I. Libr. Sententiarum, Dist. IX, Dub. IV = Opera, I, 189; cf. Dist. III, Qu. III = Opera, I, 75. See moreover Leisegang's analysis with reference to Philo(n), Der Heilige Geist, 93, 104ff.

¹² That/This is in the final analysis (in respect of the ultimate end) the meaning of the Platonic distinction between νοῦς, which has to do with / refers to τοῦ παντός ἀρχήν (Politeia, 511 b) and is identical with the truth (Phil. 65 d), and διάνοια (about/regarding that, Politeia, 511 cd). The Aristotelian contradistinction between νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη (Anal. Post. 100 b) has the same status / value (is analogous). The function / purpose of this distinction consists in the strengthening / reinforcement of the moral-normative component, side of the concept of the spirit; from their perspective, standpoint, namely, a spirit thinking axiologically freely (in a value-free manner) or acting merely end/goal-rationally (rationally as to ends/goals / exclusively in accordance with the schema "ends/goals-means") appears to be imperfect, incomplete; even a highly intelligent "immoralism", whatever that may mean on each and every respective occasion, is, therefore, eo ipso a sign of ontological inferiority. And the other way around / vice versa: (the) "right, correct", "true" knowing, knowledge ought to always promote, foster, facilitate, boost, assist morality, morals, ethics (as Jaeger with reference to Plato(n) formulated (it) / in accordance with Jaeger's formulation referring to Plato: "by knowing one ought to think not about modern scientific knowledge (science) (/ when we here say knowledge, we must not mean contemporary science as science / scientia), but about spiritual-intellectual sense as regards values (/ but rather the spiritual feeling for certain values), which the Greeks call phronesis [cast of mind, mentality]", Paideia, S. 1277 footnote 1. And Leisegang also, too remarks, observe correctly that in Plato(n), the Stoa and Philo, knowledge and virtue are / constitute "interchangeable, alternative concepts", Der Heilige Geist, 118). In view of this its central function, it is not strange that this distinction runs/goes through / pervades (/ Having a function so central, this distinction governs, dominates in) the whole philosophical tradition. And Paul / Paul too distinguishes between mere understanding-related / understanding-like (/ simply intellectual) and higher, superior knowledge (1 Cor 1, 19—21; cf. the wordplay / play on words in Eph. 3, 19). With regard to the change in meaning or else (/ and at the same time) the revaluation of the word "πνεῦμα", it is characteristic/typical that Paul, who not seldom uses the νοῦς of the ancient philosophy synonymously with πνεῦμα, in order to express the "higher, superior" or else "true" spirit (e.g. 1 Cor. 14, 15; Ro. 2, 2; 1 Co 2, 1), nevertheless always writes νοῦς when he is thinking of states of affairs / situations of weakness or corruption, depravity, foulness, badness (e.g. 1 Co 14, 14; Eph. 4, 17; 2 Ti 3, 8). In Augustine the thesis is likewise found that intellectus directly affected by God (/ , which refers directly to God) is superior to the discursive, analytical ratio (Sermo XLIII, II, 3 – III, 4 = PL, 38, verses / lines 254-256). Thomas reports similarly / Similarly with Thomas, following / who follows Aristotle: the intellectus directly and intuitively refers to the principia, whereas ratio and scientia proceed discursively and apply (having applied) the principia recognised / comprehended by the intellectus (Summ. Theol. I, Qu. LIX, Art. 1 ad 1; II, II, Qu. XLIX, Art. V ad 3; De Ver., Qu. XV Art. 1 = Quaest. Disput. I, 418). In the philosophy of the New Times, the same constellation/schema appears in the form of the antithetical pairs of concepts / conceptual pairs Raison-entendement, Reason-understanding, Vernunft-Verstand (cf. footnote 17, below).

other words, the spirit of / in the philosophical tradition is / ought not to be apprehended primarily in terms of the theory of knowledge (epistemologically), at least (for) as long as the object of knowledge applies to / is valid for / is not merely the perceptible / perceivable / sensorial / sensory / sensible world^{ix}); the spirit resorts / has recourse to his higher (cognitive) capabilities (in / of knowledge) as long as it is a matter of the / an ontological reason whose knowledge above all must be presented as objective and irrefutable when it is supposed / ought to underpin, support or else justify / give reasons for a certain moral-normative value scale (/ its / the spirit's superior cognitive capabilities are mobilised / called upon / summoned with the end / goal / purpose of seeking the ontological depth of things, which its knowledge, in (its) turn, ought to be presented as objective and irrefutable, above all when with it / such knowledge, a(n) ethical/moral-normative scale of values is to be justified). Only the spirit opens up the on each and every respective occasion "true" world of Is (/ Being / To Be) and of Ought. With regard to (this) its / the spirit's double chief/main task, mission^x, it is (a(n)) minor, incidental, irrelevant, negligible, secondary (thing, matter) whether it is comprehended intellectualistically / in terms of the intellect or not (exactly for this reason two different concepts of rationalism can be deduced / derived from / out if its / the spirit's determination / definition, as we shall see); the decision in (regard to) this question, problem, issue depends on each and every respective constellation as regards / pertaining to the history of ideas, or else(,) on each and every respective opponent, and first of all does not have to necessarily do with the assumption, adoption, acceptance of a spirit with the above-mentioned double chief / main task (/ aforementioned perception of the double, dual, twin mission of the spirit). The ambiguity, many meanings, polysemy of the concept of the spirit arises / results, therefore, inter alia / amongst other things, from the fact that it encompasses, at times, principally, mainly the intellect in opposition to the drives, urges, impulses and the body, at other times, principally, mainly the soul-related, psychical, mental, spiritual functions in general in opposition to the physiological-corporeal/bodily functions in their narrow sense¹³. According to / In

¹³ Plato's double or else ambivalent stance with reference to the question, problem of the parts, molecules, particles of the soul already marks (out), delimits, demarcates both positions, inside of / between which the philosophical tradition chiefly (has) moved / moves. Plato, as is (well-)known, undertakes a three-part division of the soul, and indeed with regard to (/ when he is interested in anthropologically fortifying, consolidating) the inner / internal organisation (/ hierarchy) of the ideal state (Politeia, 435 c—444a), whereas, on the other hand, he must stress, emphasise the unity of the soul (/ the its / the soul's united character)(,) when it is a matter of the problem of (/ when he want to prove its) immortality, i.e. of (the) contrast, clash with (/ deducing, deriving it (the soul) from the antithesis, opposition to) the mortal body (Politeia, 611 b—612 a). Important / Of importance for the further development of this problem examination was Stoic psychology / the psychology of the Stoics, which developed / unfolded / starting from Zenon's still elastic teaching, doctrine, theory of capacity / the powers of the soul to / reached Chrysipp's intellectualistic monism (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I, 85 ff., 142 ff.). And Paul, who counterposed the πνεῦμα [spirit] not only to the σῶμα [body], but also to the ψυχή [soul] (see footnote 8), speaks likewise of πνεῦμα in general / an undifferentiated manner, when he chiefly has in mind its opposition to the body (Ro. 18, 13; 1 Co 7, 34; above all Gal. 5, 17; in 1 Co 12, 4 he speaks, obviously, of several / a number of faculties, capacities, powers, or part(icle)s, molecules of the one same / a unified πνεῦμα). All these, incidentally fluctuating, vacillating, wavering, distinctions and classifications aim at / have as their aim, end of safeguarding, securing, fortifying, consolidating in terms of theory the autonomy, independence, self-reliance, self-containment or else dominance / rule of the higher, superior or pure spirit(,) and at the same time of explaining, explicating, at least to some extent / degree, why

accordance with the extent, range, scope of the spirit, the extent, range, scope of sensoriality (the senses, what is sensed) / the sensorial, sensory (sensational, sensual) world fluctuates, vacillates, oscillates, varies, wavers too¹⁴, (;) nonetheless, the line of separation / dividing line / segregation and the antagonism between them / both [[the spirit and the senses]] always remains, especially since, as we have said, even monistic conceptions in the name of that or this / one or the other appear / arrive on the scene / come to the fore.

Since the spirit in the philosophical tradition, under any name whatsoever / whatever name it takes, refers *at the same time* to the “true” Is and the “true” Ought, in fact this (spirit) is supposed to carry, bear, support them within itself (/ and indeed constitutes their bearer, carrier, vehicle), thus their contrast, opposition, antithesis to sensoriality, the senses means, signifies not merely a precondition, prerequisite, presupposition for the winning, gaining, sourcing, drawing of conclusive knowledge, i.e. free(d) / liberated from the contradictory variety, diversity of the sensorial / the senses, but eo ipso also the defence of a value scale / scale of values against factors which are perceived to be threatening (menacing, ominous, dangerous) (/ vis-à-vis factors which seem to threaten it / the said scale of values). The threat (menace, danger) comes, of course, from the sensoriality / senses / sensory world (in) whose determination, definition appears / concept contains the same connection / combining of the ontological and normative question, problem like / as in the concept of the spirit — only this time with negative signs, symbolism (/ the signs are negative): sensoriality / the sensory world in itself is made out to be / presented as, namely, both the lower / lowest stratum of the Is and at the same time a(n) hindrance, obstruct(ion), impediment, barrier to / for the realisation

this dominance, rule frequently is absent / missing / lacking in a practical regard / is not realised. We shall see later what an important role such question formulations have / problem examination has played in the debates pertaining to moral / ethical philosophy of the 18th century.

¹⁴ Like / As the aforementioned conceptual pair / pair of concepts already imply, entail and like / as the (great) variety, diversity of the philosophical levels demands (it), the word / expression “sensoriality” / “the senses” or “sensorial (sensory) world” will have in our study, investigation, examination several / a number of meanings. First of all, it will(, with that,) mean biological sensoriality / man’s purely biological dimension; then / thereafter, “inner / internal sensoriality (/ the inner sensory world)” (according to / in accordance with Herder’s well-aimed, successful expression, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden* = SW, VIII, 190, 239), namely, the drives, urges, impulses, passions etc., which go back / are reduced to man’s bodily, corporeal composition, constitution, texture and are taken / considered / assumed to be (in respect of them) as standing in the way of the dominance, rule or else / and/or activity of the intellect; thirdly, geographical and social-historical sensoriality (/ the sensorial world in the geographic and social-historical sense), as the sum / totality of the factors which influence the spirit of man / humans living in a geographically determined, specific, concrete land / country and in a historically determined, specific, concrete society; and fourthly, cosmic sensoriality, i.e. the matter of the universe in contrast to the (re)presentation, notion of God (/ the universe as matter in contrast / antithesis to God). (Also, the sensoriality of the capability of knowing / capacity for knowledge in the Kantian sense should not be forgotten (/ the sensorial / sensory particle of the soul or sensoriality / sensibility, sentience, the sensory faculty as a cognitive force, power in the Kantian sense must also not be forgotten). We want to ascertain with the help of this multi-dimensional definition of sensoriality the structural similarities of various, different levels (from the anthropological to the social-historical and cosmological), which arise / result from the assessment, evaluation, appraisal of sensoriality (/ the sensory factor) in its each and every respective sense, which [[in turn]] corresponds / corresponding [[in turn]] with a just as multi-dimensional definition of the spirit.

of morality, morals, ethics — or in the best case (scenario) as morally, ethically indifferent (—) ¹⁵; only as – to an on each and every respective occasion different extent – (/ in a more or less) spiritualised sensoriality in the framework, context of a spiritualistic monism or else of a consciously or unconsciously teleologically coloured (dyed, tinged) materialism (/ or of an (often unconscious) teleological materialism) can it (i.e. sensoriality or the sensory world) be perceived as completely, totally, fully lacking in danger / risk-free, harmless, safe in a normative-moral regard (/ from an ethical-normative point of view). That is why the defence of the spirit means / signifies not merely taking sides, partisanship for / in favour of a certain perception of (the) Is (, therefore, not only theoretical effort at the fortification, consolidation of a certain ontological perception), but also – and not seldom primarily, principally – engagement, mobilisation for / in favour of those (/ under the flag of) values, with which this latter perception (of the Is) is connected. In view of the normative function of the spirit (/ Since the spirit has normative functions), which one is supposed to be aware of to its whole, total, complete extent and in all its metamorphoses, it is neither (a) coincidence, accident, chance, happenstance, nor (a) triviality, when the fundamental / basic difference between man and the (other) animals, beasts is seen, espied, spotted, beheld / considered to be in the exclusive presence of the spirit in the former (man)¹⁶ – whereby / in relation to which, this spirit is accustomed to be described not merely as a value-free / axiologically free cognitive organ / organ of knowing (knowledge) or instrument for self-assertion / the assertion of one’s self in the struggle for being (t)here (/ as a means of self-preservation in the struggle for existence), but as normatively-morally/ethically coloured (dyed, tinged) and correspondingly as a (binding (mandatory, compulsory)) authority / tier of jurisdiction (causing obligation). In this regard, it is indicative, characteristic, typical, illustrative that in the language of philosophical tradition, exactly those terms which denote, describe, connote, suggest the spirit as an ontologically given magnitude or else as a source of the highest ontological knowledge, simultaneously – in relation to that – are used to make the force, strength, power of moral, ethical insight, knowledge in man (humans) visible / noticeable (/ in parallel in relation to the ethically oriented functions of the human mind); then they intertwine, interlock to the point of unrecognisability (/ are confused) with other terms, like for instance ὁρθὸς λόγος, Ratio,

¹⁵ The ontological downgrading and thus, consequently also downgrading in terms of moral / ethical philosophy of sensoriality / the sensory world constitutes, as is known, a main feature of the Platonic-Christian tradition. Even / And Aristotle, despite / notwithstanding the revaluation of sensoriality / the sensory world in comparison to Platonism, reserves the power / function of the primum movens to pure νόησις, and accordingly he sees, espies, beholds, spots the highest perfection, completion of human life in theory [[which essentially means giving meaning to life, otherwise plain animalistic / cave no meaning]]. Sensoriality / The sensory world, again, is looked at as morally / ethically indifferent or else becomes completely, fully, totally alien to morals, morality, ethics, when it (i.e. sensoriality / the sensory world) is understood as the mere realm / kingdom of mechanical causality. Then, as Kant’s example shows, a new separation between the intelligible and the sensible (i.e. referring to the senses) (/ the intellect (what is intellectualised), the mental and the senses) for the purpose of the safeguarding, securing, security, fortifying, reinforcement, consolidation of morals, morality, ethics becomes necessary (already Plato knew of the opposition, antithesis between causal ἀνάγκη and autonomous νοῦς, see e.g. Tim. 48 a).

¹⁶ Typically, Aristotle’s formulation, Pol. 1253 a 10.

Reason etc., which partially have a direct reference to moral / ethical philosophy¹⁷. Through this / In this way / Accordingly, the concept of the spirit becomes still more ambiguous / one which bears many meanings / multisemantic / polysemantic / polysemous / multisemous. But its ambiguity, many meanings does not hinder, obstruct, impede it in relation to fulfilling its normative task, mission, job – on the contrary : it (the said ambiguity / multiple meanings) comes / stems from the need to fulfill the aforementioned task, mission, job under (in) – on each and every respective occasion – various, different circumstances (instances) and against – on each and every respective occasion – various, different opponents, and furthermore, it makes easier, facilitates the fusion, merger, merging, fusing, amalgamation of the ontological and normative level.

This fusion, merger, merging, fusing, amalgamation culminates, reaches a crescendo, finds / reaches its completion, consummation or else takes root in the aforementioned / direct connection of the acceptance, assumption, adoption of a spirit in man with the acceptance, assumption, adoption of a spirit in the metaphysical sense, i.e. of a God, howsoever it may be understood : in any case, it represents and constitutes also, on its part, as it were, a(n) illustration, demonstration, exemplification of the unity of the (what is) ontological [dimension, sphere, element] and the (what is) normative [dimension, sphere, element], by supposedly embodying, incorporating, incarnating, personifying, epitomising not only (the) “true” being, but also (the) highest wisdom and goodness / kindness / benevolence / (what is) good (/ No matter how God is / becomes

¹⁷ The synonymy of νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, σύνεσις and φρόνησις is encountered in Plato when they take the field (go into battle) against the hedonistic principle (/ (the) hedonism pertaining to moral / ethical philosophy is refuted, countered) (see e.g. Phil. 21 b, 59 d, 66 b etc. etc.). Also in Aristotle, the morally / ethically active νοῦς is identical with γνώμη, σύνεσις or φρόνησις (see e.g. Eth. Nic. 1143 a 20 — 28). On the other hand, νοῦς and λόγος in a practical regard are just as much identical (both in fact ought / are supposed to dominate / rule ((over) the passions), cf. Pol. 1254 b 5 with 1295 b 6, 8 and 1260 a 19) as ὀρθός λόγος and φρόνησις (Eth. Nic. 1144 b 28). K. Bärthlein has shown against one-sided interpretations that in the Corpus Aristotelicum and in the Platonic writings, texts, the term ὀρθός λόγος means / signifies both “correct, right knowing / knowledge” as well as the objectively existing and ontologically-anthropologically founded moral / ethical law (the ΟΡΘΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ in the major / great ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum, esp. 239 f., 245 f., and: the ΟΡΘΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ and the ethical basic / fundamental principle in platonic writings, texts, esp. 129, 139, 141 f., 151 f.). It is a matter here again of the stereotypical equating of “true” knowing / knowledge and “right, correct” action or else of the thesis that knowing, knowledge is inadequate, deficient, lacking, insufficient, poor, defective, imperfect (for) as long as it does not agree with certain moral, ethical (basic / fundamental) principles / axioms / propositions (see footnote 12, above). That is the reason why also in the Christian tradition the / those terms which are supposed to / should describe, suggest the capacity, faculty for / the capability at / function(ing) of scientific knowledge are used synonymously with the terms intended for the higher, superior (/ referring to the higher tiers of the) spirit only when it is accepted, assumed that that knowledge was (already) perfected, completed or else founded (solely) by insight into (/ with the assistance of the knowledge of) the “true” Is and Ought. Characteristic / Typical of that is the double, dual, twin use, usage of the word ratio, which can mean, signify both the merely, simply scientific (see footnote 12, above) as well as (the) higher, superior normative knowledge, knowing. See Gilson’s excellent, magnificent analyses (Saint Augustin, 141 ff.; Saint Bonaventure, 362 ff.), which concern, strike upon, comprehend the world-theoretical sense, meaning, core, nucleus of the problem. Regarding / On / For the double, dual use of ratio in Thomas, see Summ. Theol., I, Qu. LXXIX, Art. IX, Concl. (distinction between ratio superior and ratio inferior). In contrast to the / Thomas’s cited statements, propositions, sentences in footnote 12, in other passages / excerpts, the terms intellectus and ratio are used synonymously, and indeed / especially (just / exactly as in Aristotle) when the talk is of the control, mastery, domination, command of the drives, urges, impulses, i.e. of the moral, ethical function of the higher, superior (tiers of the) spirit (see e.g. Summ. Theol. I, LXXXI, Art. III, ad. 2).

perceived, He always expresses with perspicuity, clarity, lucidity the unity of the ontological and of the normative element, embodying not only the “true” being, but (also) the highest, paramount, supreme wisdom and goodness, kindness, benevolence (too, as well)). Consequently / Thus / Hence, the normative function of the spirit receives, gets, obtains ontological support, assistance, backing, i.e. it (the said normative function of the spirit) appears as the unavoidable, inevitable consequence of its (the spirit’s) origin(s), provenance, descent and hence of its character¹⁸. The interrelation of ethics, morals, morality and ontology appears, pops / crops up, arises, emerges here in its classic(al) – until two hundred years ago still determinative, decisive – form. In view of the long co-existence, cohabitation, (period of) belonging together, togetherness / long-standing interweaving of spirit and God, naturally the putting / setting aside, elimination, obliteration, sidelining of the latter (God) had to directly endanger / put at risk the former (spirit). And in view of the interweaving, amalgamation, blending, fusion, merger, merging, fusing of the (what is) ontological (dimension, sphere, element) and of the (what is) normative (dimension, sphere, element) at all levels (at the/that level of the human (spirit) and at the/that level of the divine, godly spirit as well as at the/that level of their relations with each other), the strife, conflict, fight, dispute, controversy, argument, quarrel, battle, contention, discord, squabble about / around the character and the fate, destiny, lot, fortune of the spirit had to simultaneously be converted, transformed, changed into a struggle over/for/about/around certain moral / ethical-normative perceptions. Still / Even more : the endangering, jeopardising, risking, putting at risk of / threat to the spirit was battled, combatted, put under fire, bombarded, fought from the idealist(ic) side all / so much the more passionately because it seemed to (call into) question the (very) possibility (in general, generally) of objective values¹⁹. Even where there was a readiness, preparedness, willingness (/ Even also

¹⁸ This is the meaning of the thesis that man is only able to live in accordance with the command(ment)s of the Godly, Divine or else of the Spirit(ual) (only) because the same / latter Spirit(ual) is anchored in him ontologically (exists inside of him from the very beginning) or else he behaves morally, ethically because his constitution, composition, texture, character is fundamentally, basically moral, ethical (see Plato, *Politeia*, 590d; similarly Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1177 a 13—17). Paul expresses the same connection (interrelation) very succinctly, concisely, incisively (with clarity) by using / when he uses the word πνεῦμα [[spirit]] twice in a row / two times successively in order to, through that, accordingly, denote, indicate, describe, mean, connote, suggest on the one occasion / once / one time the ontological principle of life and on the other occasion / once / one time the normatively commanding authority (highest normative tier of jurisdiction / authority) (Gal. 5, 25). Heinze has in his always worth reading book, briefly, but clearly, described the attempt at an ontological founding of ethics, morality, morals on the basis of the ancient teaching, doctrine, theory of logos (*Die Lehre vom Logos*, esp. 66 f., 145 ff., 197 f., 270 ff.; cf. his critical remarks, observations, comments in relation to that 264 f.). As we shall see, (one felt) the need for an ontological or at least (after the putting / setting aside of traditional theology) anthropological founding of ethics (became) no less (felt) in the 18th century than in all earlier times.

¹⁹ Highly eloquent is the way, manner how / with which for instance M. Stirner connects, combines, links, associates, binds, ties his nihilistic critique / criticism of traditional ethics with, to a polemic against the concept of the spirit (*Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*, 10 ff.). It is perhaps not a coincidence, accident when Heidegger right, immediately, precisely at the start, beginning of a treatise, which is dedicated (devoted) to the question, problem of nihilism, thematises / addresses / makes a topic of / picks out as a central theme (emphatically refers to) the putting (setting) aside of the spirit : “the removal, dethronement, deposition, ousting, ouster, dismissal, cancellation of the hyper/supra-sensorial ends (up) in a Neither-Nor / indifference for, towards, vis-à-vis, in (with) reference to the distinction between the sensorial (sensory) (αἰσθητόν) and the non-sensorial (νοητόν (intelligible, conceivable)). The removal, dethronement, deposition, ousting, ouster,

whoever was found to be ready, prepared, willing) to delete, remove, cross out the concept “spirit” from the philosophical vocabulary because / on account of its content-related unclarity, lack of clarity, obscurity, uncertainty, vagueness, thus one could not avoid (/ he did not cease, stop) seeking / looking for new hyper/supra-sensorial(sensory) tiers of jurisdiction / authority / authorities²⁰, which could (/ were able to) preserve, keep, retain, conserve, save the possibility of values and value-setting / the making (setting, fixing, positing) of values. That was felt, perceived and expressed as the ultimate, final (/ The ultimate purpose, goal, end was always the) defence of the *meaning* of life. Philosophy can, therefore, even after the abandoning, relinquishment of the spirit / “spirit” as a terminus technicus / technical term (and) or even as a metaphysical magnitude, remain true to its original attachment, adherence to / initial relation, nexus, contiguity, relevancy with (respect to) the animistic way of looking at / perception of the world by wanting to trace, track, feel, sense, perceive in / behind things the / that breath, hint, whiff, breeze, smell, waft, puff of the spirit(ual) which it calls their “meaning”. It (Philosophy) needs, in the course of this, to believe / have faith in neither God, nor His assistants, helpers, accomplices or in His adversaries, opponents, antagonists as the powers which stir, move, budge behind or in (the) things and invisibly guide, steer their fates, destinies, lots, fortunes, prospects in order to maintain, sustain, keep up, uphold, preserve, perpetuate the/a connection to/with its own source^{xi}; the assertion, claim, contention that life or else the world has a *meaning*, fully, completely suffices in relation to that^{xii}. In reality this assertion, claim, contention, (in respect) of whose concrete social relevance, function(ing) there will (still is to) be talk / we shall speak, get to know later / below, is more comprehensive than every / any theology or d(a)emonology (that is why it is surrendered, sacrificed, given up, exposed, abandoned, relinquished much more reluctantly / with much greater hesitation than God (/ for that reason it is doubted with much greater difficulty)),(;) which is also evident in the fact that the latter (theologies and d(a)emonologies) serve exactly the interpretation of the meaning of life and prove to be useless, unusable as soon as they are not able to / cannot fulfill this task, job, mission any longer for what(so)ever reason / for all sorts of reasons (/ the latter, in any case, have

dismissal, cancellation ends (up) in the senseless, meaningless, pointless, useless, futile, purposeless (leads to the loss of meaning). However (Nevertheless), it (the said removal, dethronement, deposition, ousting) remains the unexamined (thoughtless, rash, unconsidered, ill-considered) and insurmountable (invincible, insuperable, impregnable) precondition, prerequisite, presupposition for the misguided, blind attempts, experiments, tries to escape, flee, elude, evade, free / distance oneself from meaninglessness through, by means of a mere attribution, imposition, giving (of) meaning / interpretation / sense (meaning) giving (/ continues to be the thoughtless, reckless permanent, perpetual starting point of the blind attempts, efforts, endeavours at transcending the non-sensical / non-understandable(conceivable, intelligible) through / by means of a meaning-giving / giving of meaning)” (Nietzsches Wort „Gott ist tot“, in : Holzwege, 193). Cf. footnote 10, above.

²⁰ This was / is / had been the case with Kant, who (had) “put / set aside” the concept of (the) spirit relatively early (see *Träume eines Geistersehers*. . ., AA, II, 351/2, cf. *KdU*, AA, V, 467 f.) and instead of this (concept of the spirit) in his mature work uses concepts like “I”, “Consciousness, Awareness (in general)” or “Intelligence / Understanding”. Nonetheless, this putting / setting aside of the term spirit did not lead to any (/ did not mean the) rejection of the Hyper/Supra-sensorial(sensory) at all – and the reason for this was not merely a reason pertaining to the theory of knowledge (/ solely gnoseo-theoretical, gnoseological, epistemological), but at least equally, just as much pertaining to the philosophy of morals, morality, ethics (/moral-philosophical).

as their goal, end, purpose to establish, reinforce, fortify in terms of theory the meaning of life and prove to be useless when, for various reasons, they can no longer do so / that)^{xiii}. — Completely, Entirely, Totally, Wholly irrespective, however, of whether the question, problem of meaning or the question, problem of the spirit will be given, either way, priority (/ logical primacy, precedence, priority will be given to the “spirit” or to “meaning”), until recently it was considered self-evident that the spirit is / was the (a) value-bearing, norm-imparting, i.e. meaning-giving and meaningful authority (/ value-imparting and meaning-giving principle). The attack, aggression, assault, strike, onslaught against it / the spirit, first of all in its godly, divine and then also in its human dimension, had to, accordingly, because of that, mobilise the whole, entire philosophical front (/ That is why the attack against it / the spirit, initially in its divine, godly, and thereafter in its human dimension, set in motion who whole philosophical front). The question, problem of being / Is was fought over as if it were a question, problem of value(s) — and nothing else was to be expected, since questions, problems of being and of value(s) have always been thought about / contemplated / pondered over / considered together within the philosophical tradition (/ The struggle over the ontological problem was equated / identified with the struggle over the problem of values – and nor could it have been otherwise, since in the philosophical tradition, those two (the ontological problem and the problem of values) were always intertwined / interwoven / interconnected). Through / By means of the orientation of our investigation, research towards the question, problem, understood thus far in accordance with the relations between the spirit and sensoriality (the senses, the sensory world) (in the wide, broad sense which we explained), we shall touch upon, therefore, a(n) or rather *the* nerve / crucial / central point of philosophical thought in general. And at the same time, we shall enter, step / go into a(n) area, realm of themes, topics / subject area, in which (/ And furthermore, we (shall) enter a(n) realm, area, space, where), beyond the disputes, quarrels, squabbles of the study, (study) lounge, room for / of scholars, the learned / the seminary, decisions of the greatest social-political relevance are made / taken.

2. The polemical character of (the) thought, thinking in the Enlightenment and in its interpretations

I shall (would like to) now support, establish, set (lay) out, put forward the thesis that the so-called Enlightenment is / constitutes an attempt or rather a variety, diversity (motley, eclectic, assorted, varied, diverse entirety, sum, totality) of attempts, efforts, endeavours to answer / for an answer to be given as regards the question, problem in accordance with / pertaining to / of the relations between the spirit and sensoriality, the senses, what is sensory, the sensory world. This point of view is, after all that has hitherto been (/ we have) said, neither incidental, irrelevant, minor, negligible,

peripheral, nor does it disregard the specific features, character, nature, element, dimension of / what is specific in the enlightenment ((since) one could in fact rightly, justifiably, justly, legitimately retort, counter-observe that all times, eras, epochs have / had attempted to respond to / answer the same question, problem (/ until now, hitherto done the same (thing))). Quite the opposite / reverse (/ Entirely the opposite takes place). Because(,) it ought to be exactly shown (/ as we shall demonstrate,) in the age, epoch of the Enlightenment (that) the problem of sensoriality / the sensory world was posed, set, posited in a particularly urgent, pressing, acute way, manner, (and) that is why (also) the question, problem of its (the sensory world's) relations with the spirit got, received, obtained, took on a(n) until then / hitherto unknown and over and above that permanent (/ completely unprecedented) intensity^{xiv}. The Enlightenment had to pose these questions emphatically, expressly (/ was obliged to put, place / bring these problems in the foreground / to the fore), since (the rehabilitation of the sensory world constituted) one of its (the Enlightenment's) most important world-theoretical / world-view-related weapons in the struggle against theological ontology and theological morals, morality, ethics (consisted of the rehabilitation of sensoriality). At the same time, one of the nerve, crucial, cardinal, central points of new-times thought in general lay here. Because the rehabilitation of sensoriality, the sensory world raised, posed(, in other words,) enormous, colossal logical problems, whose resolution, settlement, solution, management, coming to terms / dealing with was all the more pressing, urgent, imperative, the more unavoidable and the more essential, indispensable the aforementioned rehabilitation appeared to be in this or that form. Because / On account of the (conceptual) scope, extent, range of the question, problem of the relations between spirit and sensoriality, the sensory world as well as this question's, problem's quasi inherent, immanent force, power, strength to adopt, take on the most varied, different forms, the rehabilitation of sensoriality, the sensory world in the age, epoch of the Enlightenment set all levels of philosophical investigation simultaneously in feverish motion, movement. In the theory of knowledge, the antagonism between intellectualism and empiricism or else the mathematical-geometrical (method) and the experimental method peaked / reached a culmination(;) in cosmology, the relations between God and the world had to be re-conceived, thought of / through anew(;) in anthropology and morality, morals, ethics, Reason and drives, urges, impulses demanded, required, battled for the recognition, acknowledgement of their own (particular) rights(,) and consequently sharpened (/ thus making more acute) the relations between Is and Ought(;) whilst / whereas in the philosophy of history, the contrast, clash, antithesis between the causal perception, conception, comprehension of the course of history / the historical course (process) and its desired, wished-for(, from the normative point of view,) (aim, objective or else) end (apprehended in normative categories)(,) becomes downright explosive, blatant, striking, flagrant, blaring, spectacular.

It is now important / Our purpose, goal, end now is not only to illustrate, clarify, elucidate, spell out the structural interrelation of all these levels in the works of every thinker and to justify, give reasons for potential, possible divergences, deviations, departures from the ideal type of the same work, but also, and above all, to adequately,

suitably, satisfactorily, correctly assess, evaluate, judge the logical character of the questions, problems posed, posited, set in the age, epoch, times of the Enlightenment in order to be able to understand, comprehend the unity of the – at that time (of/in the age of the Enlightenment) – (thought / intellectual) effort, endeavour, manifestations (at / of thought) (precisely) in(side) the (great) variety, diversity of the ways, manners, modes of thought / their multiplicity. The unity rests / is based, namely, not on the answers, but on the questions – an ascertainment which is of (the) utmost, paramount, supreme importance, significance, meaning for the proper apprehension, understanding of that age, epoch, era and could / can protect, keep, conserve, save research from many a debacle. The (great) variety, diversity, multiplicity of the answers springs from the (great) variety, diversity, multiformity of the fundamental, basic (intellectual-spiritual) stances or else the polemical needs of the individual (various) thinker(s). In my opinion, the/a study of the sources shows that the interpretation pertaining to the history of ideas of the various positions and counter positions, starting from the assumption, perception that thought is in / of its essence, character, nature, texture polemical, can lead [us] the furthest / is the most fertile, productive, fecund, fruitful, high-yielding. Because from this point of view, not only, solely can the consistency, but also the contradictoriness of a certain thought be completely explained / explicated, which above all for the investigation, exploration of / research into the Enlightenment, —in which dualistic vacillation, sway(ing), oscillation caused, conditioned, determined by embarrassment, perplexity, awkwardness, fear before / in the face of the ultimate, final consequences of the rehabilitation of sensoriality, the senses, the sensory world, stands, is the order of the day / on the agenda—, means, signifies a particular advantage. The best way to comprehend, understand a certain philosophy in terms (/ from inside the prism) of the history of ideas is, accordingly, consequently, to clearly focus on / determine, see, keep in mind with clarity its opponent and weigh up / consider what it must and what it *wants* to prove, in order to take (knock out) this opponent (out of action). In the polemics of all / everyone against all / everyone, or else, of the philosophical parties against one another, – according to the aim, objective of polemics or else / and the imagined, envisioned (its each and every respective) ideal – the (great) variety, diversity, multiplicity of the variations, themes on one and the same theme, i.e. on the basic, fundamental question, problem, around which polemics rotates, comes into being, is born. The logical structure of the / this basic, fundamental question, problem constitutes the consistent and at the same time unavoidable / stable, firm, solid and necessary magnitude,(;) the fundamental, basic individual stances and the polemics are, constitute, make up the variable and interchangeable, exchangeable, replaceable factors : in this way / thus, the general intellectual-spiritual image, picture of the times, age, epoch, era in its manifoldness, diversity, plurality comes into being, is created, whereas, whilst the particular image, picture of the work of every thinker arises, results from the intersection of the logical structure of the fundamental, basic problem, question with each and every respective fundamental, basic stance (/ the personal fundamental stance of each and every respective individual).

Out of / From the so / thus founded insight into, understanding of the unity and

(great) variety, diversity of the age, epoch of the Enlightenment (/ If we see the theme, topic, matter of the unity and of the multiformity of the epoch of the Enlightenment in this way), it is illuminated, revealed that the widespread assumptions / perceptions that this (Enlightenment) is the age, epoch of *rationalism* or of *optimism* etc., necessarily prove to be of little, slight help / sterile. Just as / Equally untenable, baseless in regard to the chronological series of the publication and effect, impact, influence of significant, important works, and moreover highly misleading, is the in its time popular / at that time general assertion, claim, contention, impression that the period of extreme Enlightenment rationalism was followed, succeeded by the / a pre-Romantic (protesting) feeling, sentiment (of protest). In reality, i.e., in (the) light of (the) sources, optimism and pessimism, in fact eschatology and nihilism, belief / faith in Reason and the glorification, celebration, apotheosis, extolment, praising of / adulation for feeling / sentiment, confidence, trust, faith, belief in the power of the human spirit and (gnoseo-theoretical, gnoseological) despair, desperation, distress, exasperation, desolation (pertaining to the theory of knowledge), in any case / either way, motivated religiosity (of various degrees and hues, tints, nuances, shades) and atheism, moralism and eudaemonism, altruism and egoism are not to be thought away (discarded) / indispensable tendencies (/ constitute undetachable parts) of one and the same age, epoch, era, whose (equally / evenly matched / co-equal, equal, equivalent) sons, offspring (of equal birth) are so / such various, varied, different personalities, people and thinkers as / like Rousseau and La Mettrie, Herder and Locke, Fichte and the Marquis de Sade. All these currents, streams and contrasting, conflicting, opposite, opposed directions, tendencies, schools of thought (/ opposing, counterbalancing trends) must be seen in their unity, namely as possible answers to the fundamental / basic question, problem, which the rehabilitation of sensoriality, the sensory world positively or negatively posed, posited, set. Their co-existence is a *fact*, and not in its (the said fact's) denial, renunciation, renouncement, but in its explanation, explication is the key found for a(n) appropriate, adequate, reasonable, correct, right understanding of the overall, total, whole phenomenon, which one is accustomed / we got used to call(ing) "the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment". In view of this state of affairs, situation / these circumstances (/ Since things are thus), older research inevitably reached (/ was necessarily led, driven into) a dead end, the more, wider, more broadly the discovery and the study of neglected sources thrived, flourished, prospered, developed, progressed, advanced – and above all, the more certain rationalistic positions, which made up, constituted, condensed, concentrated, compressed, made compact the ideological core, nucleus of the older one-dimensional notion, conception, idea, perception, (re)presentation of the Enlightenment, -after two world wars and enormous, gigantic, colossal social upheavals, (radical) changes-, lost their suggestive force, strength, power (/ became less self-evident). It is therefore a double necessity that in recent years the demand for a radical detachment, break from / to radically abandon all linear, lineal perceptions on, as regards / interpretations of the Enlightenment^{xv} has been raised, made ever more loudly / become increasingly urgent²¹.

²¹ See above all Dieckmann's (well-)founded / (well) backed-up (argued, justified) critique, criticism of the works of Hazard and Cassirer, who wanted to work out / process, give an as far as possible coherent, cohesive,

The (great) variety, diversity, multiformity and multi-dimensionality of that age, epoch, era, was, hence, consequently, asserted, stressed : until now / hitherto, however, in my view / opinion and to my knowledge a convincing *explanation* of the same (multiformity and multi-dimensionality of the age of the Enlightenment) is missing, lacking. It is the ambition of this work to give, perform, achieve, accomplish this explanation with the help of the here developed conceptual (set of) instruments, tools (/ conceptuality which we developed above) — namely, by means of both theses (in respect) (/ we mean first the thesis) of the interweaving of the question, problem of Is, being with the (value(s)) question, problem (of values) (/ the ontological and axiological problem), as it, this appears from the perspective of the relations between (the) spirit and (the) sensoriality / sensory world / senses, and of the (philosophical just as much as the political) polemical character of thought (of the philosophical just as much as the political polemical character of thought) (/ second, the thesis of the polemical character of thought generally).

The expression “the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment”, which we have (hitherto) used (until now), is supposed to, first of all, suggest, imply that the Enlightenment does not coincide with its age, epoch, era, times, but is acted out and takes place in it (its age). The age is therefore wider, more extensive, broader than the Enlightenment. At the same time, however, the Enlightenment takes root in its age, which without it (the Enlightenment), it (the said age) would not have been what it was. The belonging together of the Enlightenment with its age means, signifies, therefore, (/ When we say, therefore, that the Enlightenment belongs to its age, epoch, we mean) two (kinds of) things : that it is characteristic for its age (/ gives to its age its (age’s) character) *and* that it is determined by the (this) age / it. Since, however, the age, epoch is multi-

closed intellectual(-spiritual) image, picture of the Enlightenment, whereby / in relation to which(,) they very often had to conceal, hide, withhold, keep from, hush up, keep silent about or overlook, disregard facts and texts (An Interpretation of the 18th Century, in : Studien, 218 ff.; also : Themen und Struktur der Aufklärung, in : Diderot und die Aufklärung, 4 ff.). Cf. Boas’s book review, esp. 246 f. who above all found fault / decried / criticised the teleological character, texture of Cassirer’s concept(ual plan), perception (Kant as the completion and perfection, consummation, fulfilment of the Enlightenment etc.), as well as Price’s good remarks, comments, observations regarding / vis-à-vis the abstract-fictive course, train, procession, trait / abstract character of the (Cassirerian) (supposedly, allegedly) “(united) form of thinking / thought form of the Enlightenment” (, as Cassirer outlines it) (Cassirer on/and the Enlightenment, esp. 108 ff.). Crocker showed / has shown to what (content-related) mistakes (of evaluation) Hazard’s linear construction, perception compels [[Hazard]], drives : he sets, puts, places the crisis of the Enlightenment at its end, even though it (the crisis) accompanied it / the Enlightenment from the beginning / start (Recent Interpretations, 434). — Paradoxically, / It is paradoxical that Gay makes / appropriates / embraces the aforementioned / above critique of Cassirer and Hazard (his own) / (for himself) (Rise of Modern Paganism, 426, 428), in order, for his part, to make, commit, perpetrate the same (method(ological) and content-related) mistakes (of method and of content). Because he wants “the” Enlightenment obviously, apparently as a preliminary step, stage of the modern philosophy of “critical rationalism”, that is, to be comprehended from the point of view of normative / normativistic premisses. For him, the Enlightenment is mainly, chiefly, principally critical thought / thinking against the irrationality of the myth / mythos and the striving for autonomy against Christian authority (464, 495 f.). That is actually the reason why he hardly wants to take notice of / seriously the sceptical-nihilistic aspect of the Enlightenment (cf. / see his unjust polemic(s) against Crocker and the wholly, entirely short, brief mention of the work of / by Vyverberg, 427 f. and 449) and why he is also (cap)able to/of discover(ing), see(ing) (/ not in a position to see anything else) in the contrasts, clashes of the philosophes with one another only (/ other than) the “complexity of synthesis” (p. X).

dimensional, and since the Enlightenment contains positionings towards / vis-à-vis the -on each and every respective occasion- various aspects of the same age, epoch, thus it (the Enlightenment) can be just as little in agreement with itself / united as it is / can be identical with its age, epoch, era, times. That is why one must make, carry out a double distinction in order to demarcate the area, realm of the Enlightenment : on the one hand, under / as “Enlightenment” the intellectual(-spiritual) currents are (ought) to / must be understood, which in the place of (/ want to replace) the traditional theological perception of the world want to put (/ with) a secular perception of the world or else an as far as possible immanent explanation, explication of the world, and on the other hand — in the narrower / stricter sense — those currents, which defend a normative-moral / ethical ideal, whatsoever that may mean, signify on each and ever respective occasion, not only against traditional theology, but also against the scepticism and / or nihilism coming into being in(side) or else out of / from the process of secularisation itself (/ (the) detachment / breaking away from theology). (Which aspects of the reformed theology are to be attributed, ascribed, belong to the Enlightenment in the narrower, stricter sense or else have been motivated by / accept stimuli from this Enlightenment, must be evaluated, judged in every case separately / on a case-by-case basis). It is absolutely necessary to recognise (understand, have insight into the fact) (/ The ascertainment is fundamental) that the immanent explanation / explication of the world — in contrast to the transcendental explanation of the world, where(by) / in (during) which God was a / the ontological *and at the same time* a / the normative-moral/ethical principle — does not have to be / is not connected either logically(,) or in terms of the history of ideas(,) (/ in accordance with logic or in accordance with historical necessity) with the assumption, acceptance of moral ideals. Even belief / faith in the power of human Reason does not mean / signify *eo ipso* a confession of faith in a moral scale of values / value-scale, since for now / for the time being / for the moment / for the present / in principle it (the question) remains open / unanswered whether Reason from / of its (very own) essence, texture, nature, character must be bound (refer) to / tied with such a moral scale of values / value scale(,) as it was it (i.e. of its essence) / occurred, took place in the Platonic-Aristotelian-Christian Tradition²², or whether it (Reason) can act merely value-freely and end / goal-rationally, expediently, purposefully / in a value-free and in an end/goal-rational, expedient, purposeful manner (/ it acts whilst being indifferent towards / vis-à-vis / as regards values and with its sole, only end/aim/objective being to achieve, attain its ends / goals, whatever they may be). How central the meaning of such elementary conceptual distinctions is, will be clarified, explained, elucidated, shown clearly, spelled out in the analysis following in a number of / multiple examples (/ The analysis below will show, with enough, many, a sufficient number of examples, how central a meaning, significance these elementary conceptual distinctions have). Their function as to orientation (for our research) consists, for the time being / for the present / provisionally, in teaching us about the necessity of drawing from the very beginning the necessary, requisite line(s), boundary, boundaries not only between the age, epoch of the Enlightenment and the Enlightenment^{xvi}, but also between the Enlightenment in the

²² See footnote 17, above.

wider, broader (negative, anti-theological) sense and the Enlightenment in the narrower, stricter (positive, normative, normativistic) sense^{23 + xvii}. In this work, there will not be talk of (/ This work does not have as its object) the age, epoch of the Enlightenment in general / generally, but of the Enlightenment in which there is talk of both of the / its often contradictory meanings, significations ; (/ we cannot concern / occupy ourselves directly with) the traditional theological opponent (cannot be treated, handled), yet he must remain in the background, because only a side(long) glance, squint, look at him makes the many actions and reactions of the heroes of the Enlightenment stage, platform understandable (/ since it is necessary to follow his movements in order to understand many acts and reactions of the heroes of / on the stage of the Enlightenment). What now the age, epoch is, in which the Enlightenment is acted out / takes place and consequently gains, wins, obtains its completely, totally, wholly specific features, traits, attributes, characteristics can only be determined when we have to some extent/degree, reasonably, somewhat overseen, taken in, had a view of, reviewed the essence and development, unfolding of new-times rationalism²⁴.

The distinction between the aforementioned three levels^{xviii} in respect of one another by no means implies, entails that the individual intellectual(-spiritual) appearances, occurrences, phenomena or else thinkers of the age, epoch, era, times of the Enlightenment can be classified in three groups without further differentiation(s). If we take the level of the Enlightenment in the moral(ist)(ic)/ethical-normative/normativistic sense as an example, thus we ascertain that its double opposition against / to traditional theology and nihilist(ic) approaches, tendencies brought to life / gave birth to / generated a (great) variety, diversity of thought / intellectual constructs, theories, since, corresponding with, depending on the concrete, specific situation, preference, primacy, precedence, priority was (had been) given to different, indeed significantly diverging, deviating, differing from one another, argumentative (/ sometimes contradictory as between themselves theoretical) means of protecting / for the protection of the imagined, envisioned (/“right, correct” ethical, moral) ideal. Also, radical skepsis, scepticism

²³ Dieckmann distinguishes in principle, programmatically between the Enlightenment and its age, epoch, era, times(,) Religiöse und metaphysische Elemente im Denken der Aufklärung, in : Studien, 266, und : Themen und Struktur ..., in : Diderot, 15 f.. However, he does not proceed to our distinction between the anti-theological and the normativistic / normative Enlightenment(,) so that he can (/ and that is why he is not in the position to) satisfactorily tackle, concern himself with, treat the question, problem of nihilism in the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment (/ 18th century). In relation to that (/ For this purpose, As to this goal/end), it does not suffice / it is not enough to ascertain the co-existence (/ the general ascertainment) of contrasts, clashes, antitheses in the 18th century (/ in the womb of the epoch of the Enlightenment is insufficient) (Dieckmann speaks of / talks about that / such antitheses, clashes, contrasts(,) *ibid.*, 11f., and indeed following Dilthey, Friedrich der Große . . ., Ges.Schr. III, 97 ff., and Schalk, Formen und Disharmonien . . ., esp. 254f., 265, 267). The role of the light metaphor / metaphor of light stemming, arising, coming from / out of mythical-religious (re)presentations, notions, ideas, perceptions in the concealment of the contrasts, clashes, differences, antitheses between the philosophes / Enlighteners has been / was investigated by Delon, who rightly, justly, justifiably draws attention to the fact / stresses that the contradictions, clashes, contrasts present, existing, existent in the thought of the Enlightenment cannot / may not be comprehended in accordance with a dualistic-Manichaeian schema — whereto again, in turn (/ like that which is suggested by) (the light or else darkness) metaphor (of light and of darkness) (could entice, tempt, mislead, misguide, seduce us) (Les Lumières . . ., esp. 529 f., 533 f.).

²⁴ See Ch. II Sec. 1.

appears for understandable reasons in one way or another nuanced (/ under different cloaks), i.e. not always as open, overt nihilism. Finally, at the level of theology, a readiness, willingness, preparedness for the appropriation of positions of the normative, normativistic Enlightenment becomes apparent, when one from such a tactic promises, pledges or anyhow, in any case means (/ expects, awaits) the disarmament of (the) Enlightenment opponent(s), (/ or when the impression predominates) that the concrete (/ new) situation makes (/ imposes) certain concessions for one's own survival (unavoidable, essential, necessary, inevitable). From / Out of all these approaches, tendencies, a(n) image, picture of the greatest, utmost, paramount, highest variety, diversity (/ exceptional multiformity) arises, results, since it is a matter of a manifold, multiple, multifaceted struggle on many, several, multiple levels at the same time. In reality, this constellation / general picture is, seen in terms of form, not in the least strange, odd, curious, unusual, extraordinary or unique, singular. For all great epochs of / in the history of ideas, after the initial, oversimplifying enthusiasm (had) subsided, research gradually revealed the (great) variety, diversity, multiformity of the (formative) factors (having an effect / at play) (on each and every respective occasion); thus it happened, took place, occurred e.g. with both legends, myths of (the) Greek culture / distinctiveness, particularity / essence / character, Hellenism and of the Renaissance, which helped, assisted, aided the bourgeoisie (bourgeois class) towards, vis-à-vis its historically founded self-consciousness²⁵. An epoch comprehended as the suspenseful, tension-filled, strained co-existence of various, different, in fact conflicting, opposing, contrary positions (completely, totally irrespective of whether there can be a form-related, retrospective / additional / belated / ex post factum-hermeneutic to-be-constructed framework of classification, ordering or else general concept / overall term for a number of these positions), is actually self-evident if / when one only, -first of all from a social-historical perspective-, brings to mind the fullness, abundance, wealth, plethora of individuals and groups, which at every time, on every occasion and in -on each and every respective occasion- their own way, manner, fashion, raise, make power claims and consequently must / necessarily, inevitably move(s), go(es), come(s) into conflict(s) with one another, and one, over and above that, concretely (i.e. without any escape into the realm of ideas) apprehends the function of thought (intellectual) constructs in concrete existential situations (/ The perception that an epoch constitutes the tense, strained, taut co-existence of different, and indeed contradictory, tendencies (regardless of the possibility of the retrospective construction of a conceptual framework, context of, for the integration, incorporation for many of those/such tendencies), is essentially self-evident, obvious, as long as we consider, ponder, reflect upon -in principle from a social-historical perspective- the plethora of individuals and groups, which, ceaselessly and in their particular way, mode, manner, make, raise claims of / to / on dominance (dominant authority) and come for this reason as a matter of destiny, fate into conflict, determining in this way, thus the function of theories in specific, concrete existential situations too, as well). The tension-filled, tense, strained,

²⁵ Cf. Rüegg, Die Humanismuskussion, 310 ff.; Ferguson, The Renaissance in Historical Thought, 175 f., 181 ff., 199 ff.

taut, rich-in-tension (strain, stress, intensity) (great) variety, diversity, multiformity of the / an epoch becomes, in other words, self-evident, obvious if we take seriously the thesis of the polemical essence, character, nature, texture of thought and understand, have insight into the fact (/ the viewpoint that the texture of thought is polemical, and if we see) that every position must / necessarily entail(s) a counter-position, in fact that every position comes into being as a counter-position. The struggle and the growing, increasing grouping, formation of groups in accordance with the friend-foe-relation explains, therefore, the (great) variety, diversity, multiformity in all great epochs of the history of ideas — and the age of the Enlightenment does not constitute an(y) exception. Even the, in regard to certain basic, fundamental questions, problems, unity to be ascertained in the ranks, turns, procession(s), series, rows of the Enlightenment is no indication, clue against the polemical function of thought, since it (the said unity) itself is polemically determined; it exists as long as a monolithic theological opponent faces, opposes, confronts it²⁶, and it crumbles in the case where(ver) this monolithic theological opponent even pretends to be somewhat willing to reform itself (/ Even the unity, which is apparent in the lines of the Enlightenment with reference to certain fundamental points, is not an indication against the polemical function of thought generally, since it itself is due to polemical reasons: it exists, that is to say, for as long as the theological opponent is monolithic, and it relaxes, becomes loose(r), slackens as soon as this theological opponent, which is monolithic, shows even the slightest willingness, readiness, preparedness for reform(s)). The fictively (fictitiously) or else polemically determined character of the unity of the Enlightenment comes to light when / if we put (examine) the – on each and every respective occasion – common denominator of this unity under the microscope (closely, in detail). Concepts like Reason or Nature are so ambiguous, polysemantic / have so many meanings that a subsumption of the Enlightenment under them can take place, occur, happen only purely formally / in terms of form (only a contemplation of / way of looking at the Enlightenment which is purely formal(istic), form-related, can reduce / put down the Enlightenment to those (concepts like Reason and Nature): to want to derive, deduce, infer from / out of them an essence of the Enlightenment in a binding manner in terms of content, would be roughly the same as if one wanted to define for instance our [[20th]] century as the age of Democracy / democracy and of Freedom / freedom because all parties invoke these slogans, catchwords, key words, headwords, catchphrases.^{xix} But this, that exactly shows that they are to be comprehended, understood purely formally / in terms of form (or as empty formulae, formulas), which, incidentally, by the way, is proven by the fact that everyone who invokes them usually adds / is accustomed to adding that he means – on each and every respective occasion – “true” Reason or Freedom / freedom. Not only, therefore, with regard to the great variety, diversity of the intellectual(-spiritual) currents in the age of the Enlightenment, but also in view of the formal(istic), form-related character of the slogans, catchwords, key words, headwords, catchphrases of the

²⁶ Already Troeltsch (had / has) reduced, put down, attributed the only “relatively united character” of the Enlightenment (back) to the common “struggle, fight, battle against Church supernaturalism / supra/hyper-naturalism”, Die Aufklärung, in : Ges. Schr. IV, 339.

normative / normativist(ic) Enlightenment itself is (ought) the concept “Enlightenment” to be used as a conventional terminus technicus (technical term)²⁷. A fortiori must this happen / This must happen a fortiori if one has failed to strictly distinguish, differentiate between the Enlightenment and its age, era, epoch (/ ... like Reason and Nature): however, it is impossible to deduce, infer from these same concepts binding and concrete practical positions – that is (the reason) why who(so)ever invoked them, took care to add that he means (the) – on each and every respective occasion – “true” Reason etc.. Hence / So / Thus, not only on account of the heterogeneous, hodgepodge, mishmash, disparate, potpourri-like, miscellaneous, farrago-like, sundry multiformity of the intellectual(-spiritual) currents of the age, epoch, era of the Enlightenment, but also on account of the purely typical, formal(istic) character of the slogans of the ethical/moral-normative Enlightenment, we would have to use the concept “Enlightenment” much more as a technical term. Who(so)ever omits the distinction between the Enlightenment and its epoch, era, age should have to do so a fortiori^{xx}).

The need for periodisation stems, comes, arises (/ constitutes) without doubt / undoubtedly (from) (a) scientific necessities (necessity), and it could not be put / set aside, got around, circumvented even if one wanted to see in (consider) periodisation(s) only a great evil (as only something very bad). We are dependent on fictions and abstractions, and (the) radical opposition, resistance to (rebellion against) them means, signifies in the final analysis / ultimately that one cannot be satisfied with the nature of human cognitive abilities (/ Fictional construct(ion)s and abstractions are necessary in science, and rebellion, insurrection against them means essentially that the texture of man’s cognitive abilities does not satisfy us). Rightly / Justly / Justifiably (so), I would say, opine, but that does not get us anywhere (/ As to that / far as that is concerned, we would not be too wrong, mistaken, but with this ascertainment, and only this ascertainment, we would not gain much). In any case / After all / All the same / Anyway, (the) unavoidable fictions fulfill their hermeneutic task, job, mission better when one does not forget that they are exactly fictions. That must in the interest of a scientific way of looking at things / consideration / contemplation be stressed, emphasised so much the more firmly, forcibly, expressly / all the more emphatically (/ with particular emphasis), when / because the necessity of periodisation very often is turned (changed) into a hypostatisation of an epoch(,) which serves (/ for) ideological goals, ends, purposes. Through / By means of it / that, historical rights, i.e., rights founded / grounded in “reality” itself, are supposed to be granted namely to a particular normative, normativist(ic) perception, view, so that each and every respective Ought becomes, backhandedly, on the quiet, underhandedly, secretly, privately, furtively, an irrefutable, irrevocable, impregnable, incontrovertible, inexorable Is. But the reverse (also) occurs, takes place (too, as well) : a(n) whole, entire, complete epoch is demonised (/ presented with gloomy, dark, obscurantist colours) so that a later, subsequent epoch in the struggle against it or else in its “overcoming” can seek and find its own self-affirmation (confirmation) / smug, self-satisfied, complacent, self-important self-consciousness. The

²⁷ In accordance with a(n) apt, telling, well-aimed proposition, proposal, suggestion by Belaval, L’héritage Leibnizien, 255.

polemical essence, character, nature of thought is shown, seen not only when looking at the Enlightenment, but in the same way, manner(,) in / during the contemplation, consideration of / way of looking at research into / (in respect) of the Enlightenment. In the following / Hereinafter / Below / Later, I shall briefly point / allude / refer to, indicate some typical ideologically determined (typical ideological) misinterpretations, misconceptions. Of course, / It is self-evident that their ideological importance and effect(iveness), impact is not being disputed, denied here, and no less so (in dispute is) the right of those struggling, fighting on this or that front to conceive, devise, think up, invent such (typical ideologically determined / typical ideological) interpretations. We do not want to or cannot keep / eliminate these interpretations (away) from philosophical great, grand, high politics, but at most from the framework, context of this investigation / our own work.

From the mythology of liberalism stems, arises, comes, first of all, the identification of the Enlightenment in general with its moral/ethical-normative/normativist(ic) version. The liberal perception of the Enlightenment can, namely, sometimes / when the need arises / if need be / should the situation arise do without, renounce, forgo, relinquish, give up the equating of the Enlightenment with its age, epoch, era²⁸, especially since in the existence, presence of a still always dangerous “obscurantist” opponent one’s own current justification is seen, beheld, espied; however, any / every in principle, programmatic decoupling, separation, segregation of the Enlightenment (in the sense of the immanent interpretation of the world or else in the sense of the disenchantment of the world) from certain ideals and slogans, catchwords, catchphrases, keywords, to / with which (interpretation), however, nevertheless, these latter ideals and slogans, as we have already remarked, commented, observed, neither logically, nor in terms of the history of ideas, always and necessarily belong (together), would be ideologically fatal for it (the said liberal perception of the Enlightenment). The concept of the “Enlightenment” may / is not allowed, permitted, therefore, in (the) liberal terminology, never / to ever be used as a mere terminus technicus (technical term), and indeed not only because of the aforementioned, above-mentioned identification of the Enlightenment with norms (normative principles), but over and above that because / on account of the liberal belief, faith, conviction that they / the latter (norms, normative principles) are not merely formal and as such possibly, perhaps in concrete situations (/ consequently in practice) unbinding, but that they (would) have a(n) completely, entirely obvious (manifest, evident, plain, blatant) content – exactly that which the liberals mean, say, opine (give to them (the said norms, normative principles)) on each and every respective occasion²⁹. From the perspective / point of view of the historical

²⁸ Already Kant, who on occasion, sometimes talks, speaks of his own age, times, era, epoch as that of “an enlightened age” (Prolegomena, AA IV, 383), distinguishes in another place between an “enlightened age” and an “age of the Enlightenment” (Was ist Aufklärung?, AA VIII, 40). Cf. in relation to that the good analysis by Stuke, Aufklärung, 265 ff..

²⁹ Cobban gives, provides, delivers, supplies a good example of this tendency in his book In Search of Humanity, passim. In relation to that, the critical remarks, comments, observations by Crocker, Recent Interpretations . . . , 452 f.. Funke as well / also uses the concept of the Enlightenment in the sense of a modern liberalism in his treatise : „Aufklärung — eine Frage der moralischen Haltung?“ His explanations, analysis are supposed to, in

self-understanding, self-consciousness of liberalism, the gradual imposition / pushing (carrying) through, prevailing, prevalence, predominance of those norms / principles (is presented in addition) as the self-evident, indispensable, essential consequence of the de-theologisation of the world image (world-theoretical de-theologisation) interrelating (in its interrelation) with a (the social/societal) de-theologisation (of society appears)(, additionally, furthermore, moreover,) as an eternal gain, win of a forever (more) / conclusively, completely, perfectly, definitively freed, liberated mankind, humankind, humanity³⁰. This/That, however, is a [[kind of]] short circuit, rash action, erroneous / incorrect / wrong conclusion / moment of madness in a double, twin, dual regard (/ constitutes a leap in logic from two points of view) : because it is thoroughly conceivable that, first of all / first(ly), the de-theologisation of the world image / world view and of society benefits / reinforces, strengthens completely, wholly, entirely, totally different norms (normative principles) (say: / and forms of dominance (dominant authority)) than liberal norms (this possibility has, in the meantime / meanwhile, become reality for / on / over a great, large part of our planet^{xxi}), or that, (/ ; and) second(ly), the consistent(ly) carried out / accomplished disenchantment of the world / de-theologisation (has) reached, reaches / can reach (end up, result in) relativist(ic), in fact (/ and or) nihilist(ic) conclusions. For the liberal mythology of the Enlightenment, it must be a bitter irony that new-times nihilism found exactly in the age of the Enlightenment its first programmatic and consistent processing / working out / formulation — and indeed above all by (means of) / through / thanks to La Mettrie and de Sade. It is obvious, reasonable that such occurrences, appearances, phenomena are looked at / viewed / seen as (considered to be) freaks, monstrosities, abortional, abortive or (as) cosmetic flaws, blemishes, disfigured, defective, unimportant, insignificant³¹. Psychologically and ideologically that / this can in fact be successful, fruitful,(;) nonetheless, the scientific apprehension of the Enlightenment must suffer from it, above all if it can be shown that such and similar phenomena, occurrences, appearances, irrespective of their numerical might, power, strength, force, only lead, carry, conduct to the(ir) end approaches (/ are the logical conclusion, end(ing) of tendencies)(,) which also are (to be) found in the moralistically, ethically meant Enlightenment and which were / have (had) been used by these as weapons against traditional theology. The liberal conception, perception of the Enlightenment must doubt, contest precisely this : that, namely, the world-theoretical-ontological presuppositions, preconditions, prerequisites of its own norms (/ normative principles) (for instance, the primacy of anthropology vis-à-vis theology,) as soon as / when it takes (on), assumes, adopts, accepts the form of

the course of this, show that behind the question (mark), interrogation point of the title ((there) is) only a theoretical question (stands) (/ the question of the title is rhetorical). Over and above / Beyond that / Moreover / Furthermore, he identifies, equates the Enlightenment and the 18th century (p. 24, above [[not of this PDF, obviously]]), whereby / in relation to which phenomena, occurrences, appearances, which do not fit in (with) / match the liberal-normative / normativist(ic) concept(ual plan) / schema, are simply kept secret / not talked about / silenced / omitted, left out. This ahistorical positioning is typical for all those who, like Funke (see e.g. p. 33), are found in the ideological proximity, nearness of (/ ideologically follow) so-called “critical rationalism”; cf. e.g. Mittelstrass, *Neuzeit und Aufklärung*, 87 ff..

³⁰ Hobhouse, *Liberalism*, 32.

³¹ Lecky, *Rationalism in Europe*, II, 375.

radical atheism) would be able to / could / can entail the rejection, condemnation, discarding, warping of every norm.

The Marxist (and Marxist-Leninist) interpretation of the Enlightenment necessarily gets entangled, embroiled in similar difficulties to the extent that it exclusively has, keeps in mind / focuses on / stresses, emphasises the moral(istic)/ethical-normative / normativistic aspect of the age of the Enlightenment, which it looks at / regards as the ideology of the bourgeois and takes it at its word / at (its) face value, in order to through that / accordingly get into a position / be able to accuse the bourgeoisie of betraying / the betrayal, treason, treachery (in respect) of its own original ideals³². The Enlightenment constitutes, therefore, the world-theoretical banner, flag, standard, colours of the upwardly mobile / striving, aspiring upwards / ascendant bourgeoisie, which (flag, banner, standard, colours) is / are lowered / brought down by the victorious (and conservatively becoming, evolving / conservative, by now) bourgeoisie / bourgeois class (which has also become conservative). Marxism is supposed to now take up, come into the heritage, legacy of / inherit the Enlightenment and realise those ideals in terms of content(,) which the bourgeoisie only formally / in terms of form, -if also, albeit in the name of the whole / all of (hu)mankind, humanity-, could announce, pronounce, proclaim, declare, preach, promulgate, presage. In this perception / From this perspective, (there is talk of) two concepts of successive (/ successive historical) epochs (come up for discussion). Marxism must, in other words, view, look at, consider the Enlightenment as a cohesive, closed, autonomous, self-contained epoch, because it understands itself as an epoch-making (central) movement or else as a concept of epochs (of a whole historical epoch), which, according to the stage-by-stage, schema of the (an) evolution, development of history (ascendant, ascending historical course), follows a previous and imperfect, incomplete one / epoch³³. As an emancipatory movement, on the other hand, Marxism could never have lined up, assembled, been presented as the heir, inheritor, legacy, heritage, inheritance of the bourgeois Enlightenment, if this (Enlightenment) could not be identified with certain in principle, generally acceptable

³² Engels, Anti-Dühring, in : MEW 20, 16 f.. From a Marxist point of view in relation to that Besse, Marx, Engels et le XVIII^e siècle français, esp. 159 f., 162 ff.

³³ Engels, Die Lage Englands, in : MEW 1, 550 f. Under the compulsion, coercion, pressure, constraint (in respect) of (the need for) periodisation of the Marxist schema of the evolution, unfolding, development of history, Krauss claims, asserts that although a periodisation according to the self-understanding of individual epochs (/ way an individual epoch understands itself) is in principle inadmissible, improper, illegitimate, impermissible, one, nevertheless, in the case of the Enlightenment must make an exception and take at (its) face value its (supposed, alleged) self-assessment as a united epoch under the sign, aegis / governed by philosophy and progress (Zur Periodisierung der Aufklärung, VIII; elsewhere Krauss in fact speaks / talks not merely of the self-understanding of the Enlightenment / the way (opinion of) the Enlightenment understands (about) itself, but of the 18th century generally (per se, as such), see Siècle im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, 88 f.). Krauss, however, invokes only certain sayings, statements of Enlightenment philosophers of a certain (normative / normativist(ic)) direction, school of thought, tendency, and consequently his proof(s) / evidence consist(s) / constitute(s) actually / in essence only in a tautology / tautologies. Moreover, he overlooks that the systematic use of the Enlightenment as a concept of / referring to a whole epoch began, commenced, started only in the second half of the 19th century (Stuke, Aufklärung, 244 ff.), and that precisely then / at that time the Marxists discovered or constructed / moulded, conjured up, made their double, dual relation towards / with / vis-à-vis the "bourgeois Enlightenment" described above (Fetscher, Aufklärung, Sp. / column 451).

norms / normative principles, even if / albeit meant / embraced, as is said, purely formally / in terms of form by the bourgeoisie. From / Out of that arises, results the double, dual, twin positioning, stance of Marxism towards, vis-à-vis the Enlightenment : in so far / to the extent it (Marxism) understands / considers itself (to be / as) the overcomer of (the movement which overcame / surpassed, transcended) the Enlightenment or else (as) the originator, creator, author, bearer, carrier of a new, post-bourgeois historical epoch, it has to identify the Enlightenment with the bourgeoisie / bourgeois class ; and in so far / to the extent it perceives, feels, presents itself as / to be the finisher, completer, perfecter of the Enlightenment, it must naturally make as its own / appropriate its (the latter's) / the Enlightenment's normative / normativist(ic) (emancipatory) version³⁴.

Both assumptions, perceptions are sociologically and in terms of the history of ideas untenable / baseless. What the identification / equating of the Enlightenment and of the bourgeoisie concerns, thus does not consider, regard, take into account (consideration) the fact that completely irrespective of whether the rise of the bourgeoisie and the resulting / through that / accordingly, to one degree or another, consequent(ial) displacement of the social power of church and theology created the preconditions, prerequisites for the appearance of (the newer, modern) materialism and atheism, yet / nevertheless, the ((very) same) bourgeoisie as a whole behaved always distrustfully, mistrustfully, suspiciously and dismissively, unfavourably, unsympathetically vis-à-vis such approaches, tendencies, trends [[of materialism and atheism]] ; it found them (to be / as) damaging, detrimental, injurious, harmful or else compromising and gave preference to / preferred fluctuating, vacillating, wavering, ambivalent dualistic positions. The sharp, acute criticism, critique by Voltaire, in fact / even by Diderot (too, as well) of materialists like La Mettrie and Helvétius is an expression of this bourgeois care, concern, worry. Now, however, the Marxist interpretation looks at exactly materialism as the truly, really revolutionary force, strength, power in the bourgeois Enlightenment³⁵, something which interrelates also with the self-understanding, self-consciousness of (the way / the opinion of) materialist(ic) Marxism as the legacy,

³⁴ In the course of this, the "Enlightenment" is, as it were, used as a supra/hyper-historical concept, cf. e.g. Ley's book, *Geschichte der Aufklärung und des Atheismus*, which begins with the "Enlightenment" in the old, ancient river(ine) / river-side cultures and in Greece (I, 45 ff., 155 ff.). Characteristic for the kinship, relationship, affinity stressed, emphasised here between the Marxist and the liberal perception with reference to the normative / normativist(ic) understanding of the Enlightenment is the fact that even "critical rationalists" talk of the "former", i.e. the Greek Enlightenment (thus, e.g. Mittelstrass, *Neuzeit und Aufklärung*, 15 ff., obviously following Gay, *Enlightenment*, 72ff.; since there is talk, both in Gay, 207 ff., of the "retreat of reason" as well as in Mittelstrass, 76 ff., of the "disorientation of Reason" during the "Middle Ages", thus here obviously there is (present) an implicit resurrection, restoration of the triadic schema of the (conception of) course of history (the historical course/process). Regarding the downgrading of the "Middle Ages" as a topos / commonplace of militant new-times self-understanding (of the militant, combative self-projection of the advocates, defenders, champions of the New Times) see Ch. II, footnote 5, below.

³⁵ Engels, Introduction to the engl. edition of the "Entwicklung des Sozialismus", in : MEW, 22, 203. In the same sense, Krauss even goes so far in his argumentation as to make out of d'Alembert e.g. a militant materialist : "The replacement of Voltaire by Diderot and d'Alembert [in the direction, management, editing of the *Encyclopaedia*] means, signifies the full, complete, total victory of materialism in this preparatory, preliminary work of bourgeois triumph" (*Einführung in das Studium der franz. Aufk.*, in : *Studien*, 199).

heritage, inheritance, inheritor, heir, benefactor of the best traditions of that age [[of the Enlightenment]] (looks at itself / of itself). Consequently, we come to the second of the above-mentioned assumptions, perceptions, to which three points are ((ought) to be) countered / counterposed / pitted / opposed. First(ly), should there have been / if there were a necessary interrelation between materialism and “progressivity” – not merely in the anti-theological, but also, something which here is by far more important, in the moral/ethical-normative(/normativist(ic)) sense –, thus it would have to be shown, demonstrated that the materialists *eo ipso* were “more democratic” than other philosophers. That / This is not the case. Holbach e.g. is by no means more democratic than for instance Voltaire, whereas conversely the democrat Rousseau passionately, ardently, fervently fought, combatted materialism and atheism. Secondly, in view of the ideologically wished-for, desired togetherness, unity, (shared) identity, solidarity, relevance, coherence, nexus of materialism and progressivity – and indeed in the moral / ethical-normative(/normativist(ic)) sense! – the Marxist perception necessarily / must denies / deny that materialists reached, attained, ended up in nihilist(ic) positions (when it is for instance a matter of La Mettrie, then the texts are simply violated, raped³⁶), and vice versa / the other way around / conversely, must look at / consider / regard scepticism as / to be the mere precursor, preliminary stage to / of materialism³⁷. Over and above that / Furthermore, it is not investigated whether materialists, who at the level of social and moral philosophy remain with / insist on normativism (/ accept normative principles), are consistent, i.e. act in agreement / is in logical agreement with its (normativism’s) / their (normative principles’) (basic / fundamental) metaphysical principles (starting point) or not. Thirdly : since Marxism is presented / poses as not only the continuation, but also as the overcoming, transcendence of Enlightenment materialism, thus the latter must be characterised as imperfect, incomplete or else undialectical or mechanicistic / mechanicalistic, whereby / in relation to which the source of this mechanicism / mechanicalism is supposed to be Descartes’s natural philosophy / philosophy of nature³⁸. Our analysis will, nevertheless, show that the materialism of the 18th century became / was possible only on the basis of the rejection of Cartesian mechanicism / mechanicalism³⁹.

Also, the debate over the influence of Enlightenment ideas in the outbreak, eruption, explosion and course (of events) of the French Revolution was held, carried out to a great extent from polemical points of view (/ with polemical criteria). That / This becomes / is clear when we remind ourselves of / recall / remember the very first statements about the topic, matter, theme, which generally / by the way more or less stem from those directly concerned, involved (/ come from persons who directly or

³⁶ See Ch. VII footnote 68. The assertion, contention, claim by Marx-Engels (Die Heilige Familie, in : MEW 2, 138), the materialists had taught the “original, primordial, primeval / inherent, immanent, innate, inborn good” of man / humans, is, moreover / incidentally, demonstrably false, at least as far as La Mettrie and Helvétius are concerned.

³⁷ Engels on / regarding Hume, Die Lage Englands, in : MEW 1, 553; cf. Engels, L. Feuerbach . . . , in : MEW 21, 276; cf. Engels, Intro. to the Engl. ed. of “Entwicklung des Sozialismus”, in : MEW, 22, 295 f.

³⁸ Marx-Engels, Die Heilige Familie, in : MEW, 2, 132 f. (cf. Engels, in : MEW 22, 303).

³⁹ Ch. IV, Sec. 4 b.

indirectly took part in the events [of the French Revolution]). The Revolution is looked at / regarded as the necessary consequence, in fact as the high point (culmination) of the Enlightenment, and indeed both by revolutionaries, who wanted their own cause, case, affair, thing to be understood not for instance as a prosaic power claim (claim to / on dominance (dominant authority, rule)), but as a noble struggle for noble (precious, fine, aristocratic, gallant, regal) ideas⁴⁰, as well as by conservatives or else (and) reactionaries, who had already fought, combatted Enlightenment ideas previously, beforehand (/ before the Revolution) and that is why in the “cruelty (savagery, barbarity, atrocity)” of the Revolution only saw, espied the confirmation of their warnings, cautions about those ideas or who, in their (un)willing blindness to deeper historical causes, would have liked / wanted, desired to shift the main (chief) responsibility for what happened (on)to a handful of ideologues⁴¹. This kind of polemics lasted for a long time and found prominent representatives on both sides⁴², however, it was gradually overshadowed, shaded, eclipsed, covered up by another polemics or else it was fused, amalgamated, merged with it, which referred to general historical questions, problems or rather to questions, problems pertaining to the history of ideas. Historians from the liberal bourgeoisie / bourgeois class hypostatized the Revolution in order to be able to monopolise and elevate, integrate, classify it to / in their own glorious (/ the glorious bourgeois) tradition⁴³, and therein (the said bourgeois tradition) (/ on this point) (the) Marxist historiography (writing of history) followed, mimicked them, which [Marxist historiography] was interested in a hypostatized “bourgeois” Revolution in order to prop up, support its schema of the ascending, ascendant (sequence of) stages (/ upward trajectory) of history. With regard to the hypostatisation of the Revolution, which, as it were/so to speak, turned into a »personnage métaphysique«⁴⁴, the liberal and Marxist perception show, present, therefore, the same partial and only seemingly, apparently paradoxical agreement which we ascertained also on / as in the question, problem, issue of the Enlightenment in general – something which was generally to be expected (/ in any case, reasonable), since on both sides the positioning, stance towards, vis-à-vis the Revolution essentially moulds, determines the opinion, evaluation of /

⁴⁰ Brissot formulated it as follows : notre révolution n'est pas le fruit d'une insurrection, c'est l'ouvrage d'un demi-siècle de Lumières. Les Lumières ont fondé la Liberté [our revolution / Revolution is not the fruit, result of an insurrection; it is the work of half a century of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment founded Liberty] etc.”, *Le Patriote Français*, 10 oct. 1791, 426 (cited by Trenard, *Lumières et Révolution* 10).

⁴¹ As one of the first, Burke, *Reflections*, 211 f.. Regarding / On (the) conspiracy theory (theories) / the theory of the conspiracy (plot) (conspiracies, plots) in general see Epstein, *Ursprünge des Konservativismus*, 583 ff..

⁴² Taine (»Plusieurs millions de sauvages sont ainsi lancés par quelques milliers de parleurs [Several million savages are thus unleashed by a few thousand speakers, talkers, rhetoricians]«, *Les Origines . . .* II 351, cf. II, 77 f.: *La Propagation de la Doctrine*) and partially also Tocqueville (*L' Ancien Régime*, III, 1 = *Oeuvres* II, 193 ff.) may be seen as Burke's continuers. Michelet, on the other hand, shares Brissot's perception, *Histoire de la Rév. Franç.*, *Introd.*, V = I, 55 ff..

⁴³ Gooch, *Geschichte und Geschichtschreiber im 19. Jahrhundert*, 200f., 213 ff..

⁴⁴ According to a telling, well-aimed expression by Furet, *Le catéchisme révolutionnaire*, 279. Furet rightly, justly criticised the teleological perception regarding the coming into being, genesis and course (sequence) (of events), unfolding of the Revolution, and remarks, comments, observes that it is especially for Marxist interpretations »un peu paradoxale [a little (bit) paradoxical]« that they are directed, oriented towards the self-understanding of (the way) the persons acting at that time (saw themselves) (/ the subjective opinion of -at that time- historically active persons as regards themselves) (262 f.; cf. footnote 33, above).

stance taken towards the Enlightenment or even / just as conversely, vice versa, the other way around. Just as to the hypostatised Enlightenment the concrete (great) variety, diversity, multiformity of the age was countered / counterposed, contrasted, opposed, so too to the hypostatised Revolution of both aforementioned positions [[of liberalism and Marxism]], the Revolution as a concrete, multi/many-layered, multi-dimensional event, fact must be counterposed. There is not *the* Revolution, but a series, row, sequence of revolutions, which not only follow, succeed one another, but unfold next to one another / in parallel, and pursue / pursuing their own (particular) ends, goals, purposes⁴⁵. The fact that the huge, tremendous, massive, gigantic, enormous, colossal upheavals, radical changes which are accustomed to be / in the habit of being / commonly summarised under the name / with the expression “French Revolution”, in the end / final analysis / ultimately came good for / benefited the bourgeoisie / bourgeois class (whereby / in relation to which it must / should / may not / is not permitted, allowed to be forgotten that in France, the bourgeoisie (bourgeois class), otherwise / differently than for instance the ruling, dominant class in England, had to share its victory with (the) self-sufficient, self-reliant, self-contained, autonomous, independent revolutionary peasantry, farming class, farmers^{xxii}) does not entitle, justify us at all in characterising these upheavals, radical changes in toto as a bourgeois revolution. Otherwise / Differently does a metaphysical-teleological way of looking at things gain the upper hand / prevail / predominate and the historian becomes / turns into, according to / in accordance with Fr. Schlegel’s dictum, a retrospective prophet.

This first abstraction, which lies in the hypostatisation of the Revolution, easily suggests a second, namely the hypostatisation of the Enlightenment, and finally also a third hypostatisation in relation to that / follows : if the Revolution is (equally) united, uniform, unitary like / as the Enlightenment, thus that Revolution / the former is (for an idealistically thinking historian in fact really) derivable, deducible at least ideologically from / out of this Enlightenment / the latter. It is astonishing and at the same time amusing to observe how similarly — though, certainly with reverse(d), opposite signs — a schematising / schematic Marxism and a(n) (anti-Marxistically-anti-materialistically meant) stressing, emphasis (meant in an anti-Marxist and anti-materialist manner) of the role of ideas in the Revolution proceed / confront the problem. For the former / first (schematic Marxism), the share, (pro)portion, stake, influence of Enlightenment literature is in / on the Revolution (is) “considerable (substantial, extensive, sizeable, great, appreciable, notable) enough”⁴⁶, but / however under the methodic(al) / methodological condition that (the) (thought of the) Enlightenment body of thought, ideas was / were thus / so made up / prepared / got ready / standardised that its basic, fundamental currents, tendencies, proclivities more or less correspond exactly with those of the Revolution ; thus the political theory of the bourgeois Enlightenment was

⁴⁵ Above all, Lefebvre stressed, emphasised, highlighted both the multiplicity, variety of the Revolutions (revolutions) as well as the independent or else anti-bourgeois (independent-anti-bourgeois) character of the movement of the peasants / villagers, *La Révol. française et les paysans*, in : *Études*, esp. 248, 250, 260. Cf. Furet, *Le catéchisme*, 282 f. and Cobban, *Aspects of the French Revolution*, 22 ff..

⁴⁶ Thus Krauss, *Einführung*, in : *Studien*, 201.

supposed to be in the first phase of the Revolution in the ideological field, domain of pure water i.e. pure (/ it is said, therefore, that in the first phase of the Revolution the political theory of the pure bourgeois Enlightenment (pre)dominated, prevailed), whereas, yet, but, however in the Jacobin phase of the Revolution, Rousseauism (pre)dominated, prevailed⁴⁷. Researchers, who, contrary to attempts to explain the Revolution primarily / first and foremost politically-sociologically and not intellectually / ideologically, [[and]] wanting to assert (/ stress, highlight, emphasise) the importance, significance of Enlightenment ideas, imagine, envision the overall constellation, conjuncture, situation things not (/ did not see things) essentially, very differently⁴⁸. In both cases the (same) correspondence of the historical course (of events) and of ideology has to / must be present (presupposed), completely regardless of which of both factors on each and every respective occasion is given/granted/accorded primacy / considered to be primary. And in both cases the fiction of “the” (/ the fictional construction of the hypostatised) Revolution thus becomes the/a true “obstacle épistémologique [epistemological obstacle]” when it is a matter of a / for the concrete apprehension of the Enlightenment⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ Volguine, *L'idéologie révolutionnaire en France*, 217 f.. Volguine develops a mechanistic conception in accordance with the orthodox Marxist schema : practical-political ferment(ation) follows the preliminary theoretical work of the ideologues, and in the course of this, the work of the Enlightenment philosophers (thinkers), Enlighteners considerably contributes to the formation, development of the revolutionary consciousness “of the masses” (206, 213). How this process is concretely executed (carried out), remains, though, obscure, dark, dim, shady.

⁴⁸ Peyre's attempt in this direction rests / is based on two erroneous assumptions : that France before 1789 lived in relative prosperity, affluence, which is why / wherefore the unrest, restlessness, agitation, trouble(s) could, supposedly, allegedly, only have (had) ideological reasons, grounds, causes, and that the Revolution disintegrated, decomposed, decayed, fell apart, crumbled into two phases ruled, dominated respectively by Montesquieu's and Rousseau's principles. (The Influence of eighteenth century ideas, 72 f., 77). As far as the first point is concerned, thus one can (/ even if we) overlook, disregard reference to the great famine of 1789, in general it applies that (the most intense) social (not merely ideological) tensions, stresses, rivalries, antagonisms do (are) not necessarily come into being (created) in a state (of affairs) (situation) of the greatest need, distress, hardship, poverty, destitution, want, neediness, penury ; as far as the above-mentioned division (separation) of the Revolution (into two phases) is concerned, thus it shows not only a neglect of the (great) variety, diversity, plethora of the concrete events, facts, incidents, occurrences, but also a mechanistic perception of the effect, impact, influence of ideas : that e.g. Rousseau was also used by aristocrats (see footnote 50, below) is not mentioned. Instead of looking at, seeing ideas as weapons after the outbreak of the Revolution, Peyre sees, looks at, views ideas as forces for the determination of its (the Revolution's) course. Nevertheless, he himself cites (73) Desmoulin's statement, phrase, that before 1789 in the whole of France there were not even ten republicans [[P.K.'s Greek text reads “democrats” (in line with the modern Greek term for “republican”), which is not that much of a problem given that the talk here is still largely of pre-mass society without the first of two successive novorum having yet reached its crescendo, and some one-hundred years before the second novum got going.]]

⁴⁹ The expression stems, comes, emanates from Gusdorf, *Les principes de la pensée*, 22. Goulemot (has) developed the same thesis in a witty, intelligent manner, (who) stresses / stressing, emphasises / emphasising that the way of looking at / contemplation (consideration) of the overall, total, whole Enlightenment from the point of view of the Revolution permits, allows (can) only (be) a teleological and, in relation to that, Manichaeic perception of it (the Revolution). Just as / Equally right, correct is his remark, observation that the Enlightenment and the bourgeoisie / bourgeois class do (are) not completely and not self-evidently identify with each other / identical (to be identified with each other) (*De la Polémique sur la Révolution . . .*, esp. 238, 239 ff.).

The effect, impact of ideas during the revolutionary time(s), period, epoch in / of France can then be assessed (evaluated, judged, rated) objectively if we radically / once and for all dispel, purge, set / put aside not only ideologically determined constructions like the (ones) just mentioned (ones), but also certain interrelated with them (very widespread) notions, perceptions, conceptions, (re)presentations(, having / which have become almost, nearly self-evident,) about / on the historical function of ideas in general / generally. The effect, impact of ideas is / ought, namely, not (to) be understood linearly, rectilinearly, in a straight line, i.e. as the attempt to apply ideas which the person concerned / somebody read in books, (otherwise) learnt (from elsewhere) or even imagined, concocted, made up, thought for himself. To argue, fight, quarrel, dispute / contend matters / Disagreements at this level is (are) scientifically unfruitful, infertile, sterile or else is / are / constitute the most certain, secure way of lapsing, falling into an – in the end – (/ research ending up in a) teleological way of looking at things / consideration, contemplation. The attempt at the application of ideas takes place in the / a struggle and by (means of) struggling, fighting, battling persons, and the struggle has its own logic, to which the logic of (the) texts or of (the/any) preconceived convictions, beliefs must be subjected, subjugated, subordinated, if it (the said attempt at the application of ideas) wants to in general remain in the game / play a role. (The fact that) / That ideas have an effect, impact, influence [[people]] only means / signifies (/ does not mean anything other / different, else than) that certain men, humans, people invoke them ; ideas in their first, earliest virginity do not move, stir, prompt, budge, excite (the) men, humans, people inspired by them, but (the opposite, reverse [occurs] :) men, humans, people, who are found (to be) in(side) concrete, specific situations, positions, use certain, (perhaps) already in part, partly known to them ideas, which, however, must be asserted, projected selectively or be interpreted anew / from the beginning. Said / Put differently, otherwise / In other words : ideas come into effect / exercise, exert (an) influence(,) exactly because they are used in situations, which are no product of ideas / ideas-related product, idea(s) product / do not simply constitute concoctions, results, the offspring / whatsoever is born of ideas, but are existential-political seriousness in the purest sense of the word (/ to the fullest, utmost, serious in the existential and political sense, concept of the term) ; the seriousness, earnestness of the situation makes the effect, impact, influence of ideas a serious matter, case, cause, issue, thing, affair. That / This is, however, simultaneously the reason why effective ideas can freely choose, select, pick (out) neither the area, realm, nor the circumstances, conditions of their effect, impact, influence in the sense of the (recti)linear schema indicated, hinted at above. They (i.e. ideas) cannot, in other words, determine in advance / from beforehand their each and every respective interpreter (/ interpreters on each and every respective occasion) and because of that, accordingly, nor can they determine the form and / or the end, goal, purpose of their use, manner, occurrence, appearance, incidence, presence, demeanour on each and every respective occasion. They (i.e. ideas) are first of all / initially only available weapons ; by whom they will be used, and the when and how [[of their use]] (/ the who, when and how of he who will use them) does not depend (only) on them, and because of that / accordingly, the history of their effect, impact, influence, in fact their own history is basically, fundamentally only the history of their

interpretations. Without the interpretation of an idea in a concrete situation or else / that is to say without the struggling, fighting, battling interpreter, there is no effect, impact, influence of ideas. From / In respect of that (fact), must a scientific understanding of this effect, impact, influence start. For / From the point of view (standpoint) of (recti)linear / (recti)lineal idealistic or materialistic perceptions of history, it will necessarily / forever remain, for instance, a puzzle, enigma, mystery, riddle (as to) how, why it was possible that precisely, exactly the favourite of the Jacobins, Rousseau, could render, perform, bestow, extend ideological services to conservatives⁵⁰. One can, naturally, here / in this case talk of “abuse / misuse / malpractice” etc., but / yet, however this/that could be asserted with reference to every (any) party / all the parties — (let us) think, for instance, of / about the Jacobian Terror — and, anyway, besides, moreover, otherwise, such moral/ethical-nostalgic settings of the question, examinations of the problem, problem examinations do not lead us much further / solve any problem. In any case / Whatever the case may be, the relatively free interpretability of ideas in situations of struggle is (constitutes) a / the key for the understanding of their function as weapons and hence of their effect, impact, influence too / as well —and it constitutes at the same time the strongest argument both against a materialistic theory of reflection / mirroring as well as against the various versions of the idealistic primacy of the history of ideas (say / in other words : of the spiritual-intellectual-mental in history) (/ and at the same time (it) also (constitutes) the most powerful argument both against the theory of knowledge as reflection as well as against the various, different versions of the idealistic primacy of ideas).

This insight into the most extreme plastic function of ideas, which are (seriously) used (in seriousness, earnest(ness)) in a situation as weapons, should / is supposed to make understandable why the statement, ascertainment of their effect, impact, influence before and during (the) revolutionary time(s), age, epoch, era (/ If we see in this way the exceptionally plastic function(ing) of ideas, which inside the existential seriousness of a situation are used as weapons, we shall understand perhaps why the ascertainment of their influence, effect, impact before, from and during the Revolution) does not constitute a(ny) argument against the thesis that (the) Enlightenment ideas could never have set (put) in train (motion) / got (set) going (under way / off the ground), actuated in themselves (the) revolutionary upheaval, radical change, overturning. The reverse, opposite is true / applies, correct, right : only the outbreak, explosion, eruption, breakout of the Revolution made their (ideas’) revolutionary effect, impact, influence unavoidable, inevitable – but only in the interpretations which the situation of struggle, fight, battle, combat dictated on each and every respective occasion. The complex of the French Revolution after 1789 is therefore to be explained in terms of the history of

⁵⁰ In relation to that, see the excellent, exceptional, magnificent, splendid, admirable, expert work by McDonald, Rousseau and the French Revolution, which also makes good (general) observations, remarks, comments with reference to the effect, impact, influence or else rediscovery and re-interpretation / meta-interpretation of ideas (3 ff., 20 f., 115 f., 155). See also Sozzi, *Interprétations de Rousseau*, esp. 190, 199 f., 205 ff., 217 f., 223 ; *Barney, Rousseau dans la Révolution*, esp. 65, 74 f., 83, 96.

society / social history (social-historically) and not (in terms) (/ on the basis of social history and not on the basis) of the history of ideas⁵¹. It is a matter of two completely different things (as to) whether certain Enlightenment ideas could have started / set off a Revolution / revolution, or whether some, a few, in fact many revolutionaries had to resort to / fall back (depend) on these ideas (/ That some and or many revolutionaries invoked certain Enlightenment ideas does not at all mean that these (ideas) could also provoke the Revolution). The latter (invoking of certain Enlightenment ideas) was, moreover, -already due to the role – which can be explained from a socio-historical perspective! (to be explained in terms of social history / social-historically!) – that the elements of the new, above all petty bourgeois intelligentsia had played in the events after 1789-, completely, entirely natural (/ The reference to ideas was, in any case, totally, wholly natural already on account of the – sociologically interpretable – role of the elements of the new petty bourgeois intelligentsia after 1789). Rather one should therefore ask how the bearers of certain ideas came into being / were born, than the other way around / conversely / vice versa, how these ideas found champions, defenders, advocates. Were this the case (i.e. of asking how ideas found champions) / If the latter took place (occurred, happened), thus the (fictive, fictitious) average of Enlightenment ideas would have had to coincide, correspond, tally (be congruent) with the (fictive, fictitious) average of the social content of the Revolution. In the sense (terms) (/ On the basis, however,) of the express political-social (/ political and social) demands of the decisive, authoritative bourgeois Revolution, the Revolution would have been concluded, completed already on the night of the 4th of August 1789, since in them (the said political-social demands) neither (/ anything but) Robespierre (n) or Napoleon was foreseen / predicted – wholly, completely, entirely on the contrary / the opposite (was the case). The fate, destiny, lot, fortune of the immediate, direct collaborators, colleagues, co-workers and students, pupils, disciples of the Encyclopaedists / Encyclopédistes is the best proof of that / this / for our view, opinion⁵². But / However / Yet the revolutionary time(s), age, epoch, era developed an entirely, completely, wholly monstrous, tremendous, enormous, colossal, prodigious, dreadful dynamic / dynamism of its own, which characteristically / typically (enough) not least of all goes back / is reduced to the fact that masses stepped onto / entered the stage (arrived on the scene) (/ came to the revolutionary fore(ground)), which only / first then got / came to hear / heard something about / of Enlightenment ideas⁵³. Exactly inside of (the) revolutionary dynamic(s) did certain Enlightenment ideas find too, -interpreted and used as weapons in accordance with the needs of the concrete situation-, their own dynamic(s) (/ In the framework (context) of revolutionary dynamics did certain Enlightenment ideas, interpreted in accordance with the needs of the specific situation and used as weapons, develop their

⁵¹ Mornet, *Les origines intellectuelles*, 440 ff., 469 ff.. Sée, *The economic and social origins*, 13. In his review / critique of Mornet's book (366 ff.) Lefebvre made important observations, remarks, comments about, on the defects, shortcomings of a consideration, contemplation, way of looking at things purely pertaining to (/ from the point of view of) the history of ideas, although / even though he basically, fundamentally, in principle accepts the (author's, writer's) findings (results) (of the author, writer).

⁵² Kafker, *Les Encyclopédistes et la Terreur*, 295 : Mortier, *Les Héritiers des »Philosophes«*, esp. 55.

⁵³ Lefebvre, *Foules révolutionnaires* 3 f., 13 ff.. Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution*, 199 ff.

own dynamic(s) too / as well). That / This should actually, really, truly, verily be / becomes self-evident if one only carefully, meticulously, painstakingly avoids every hypostatisation of “the” Enlightenment or of “the” Revolution.

I would like to conclude, close, finish, complete this short, brief overview, survey, review of the polemically-ideologically determined misinterpretations of the age, era, epoch of the Enlightenment with regard to / (a) mention of a spiritual-intellectual current, which (appeared) overall in / throughout (all of) Europe – and indeed very early – (made its presence felt, appeared, came / stepped forward, was reported (announced)(,)) and found (/ taking) in Germany (a) particularly typical shaping, markedness (/ characteristic expression). It’s a matter of the equating, identification of Enlightenment rationalism and intellectualism, whereby / in relation to which the former is accused of / blamed for the suppression, repression, oppression, marginalisation, putting aside of “life / living” and of (the) “(whatsoever is) living in man / humans” / “human existence” in favour / for the sake of abstract schemata. Our analysis will show that the Enlightenment as a whole not only was not (intellectualistically) oriented (in an intellectualist manner), but was developed, formed, cultivated in fact not least of all in the struggle, fight against (with) Cartesian intellectualism. The accusation, reproach of intellectualism was, however, raised (made) across the board / generally against the Enlightenment, since one(,) through that / accordingly(,) wanted to combat, fight certain (of its) *content-related* (specific) positions (of the same Enlightenment). It was, therefore, for this reason, on account of this, hence, because of that, no coincidence that / when it was primarily, mainly, principally, chiefly the opponents of the Revolution, who smelt, sniffed, got wind of, sensed the roots of evil in the Enlightenment, who [[also]] denounced, pilloried, castigated, decried its alleged, supposed intellectualism / intellectualist positioning⁵⁴. In Germany, this kind of critique found, even among (reserved) friends of the Revolution, a hearing / resonance⁵⁵, especially since the main current of the late German Enlightenment, which followed the decline of Wolffianism and [[also followed]] the Sturm-und-Drang-movement / the movement of Storm (Tempest, Gale, Hurricane, Squall) and Stress (Momentum, Impetus, Urge, Rush, Drive, Impulse, Thirst) / the Storm and Stress movement, connected itself / was connected, interwoven for particular reasons with a(n) pronounced, marked, extreme, intense anti-intellectualist(ic) tendency and sought its national identity often in a proud demarcation, delimitation against French “shallowness”⁵⁶. National consciousness and the struggle against the supposed, alleged

⁵⁴ Burke, Reflections, 156; Maistre, Considérations sur la France, chap. VI — VII = Oeuvres, Sp. 49, 54.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Humboldt’s explanations, theses, positions, analyses on / regarding the arbitrariness of Enlightenment-revolutionary Reason in his (work) „Ideen einer Staatsverfassung“ from the year 1791 = Werke I, 35 f.. This type of critique, criticism culminates in Hegel’s description of “absolute freedom and of terror, horror” (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke II, 441 ff.) after a metaphysically underpinned (corroborated, backed up, substantiated, supported) formulation had already been found, located, discovered, encountered / formulated in Hölderlin’s “Hyperion” (cf. Kondylis, Entstehung der Dialektik, 338 f., 357 ff.).

⁵⁶ See e.g. Humboldt’s analysis of the French national character in comparison with the German national character, Das 18. Jahrhundert, in: Werke I, 448 f., 456 f.. Herder denies the French the (cap)ability at / capacity for metaphysics or else at / for higher / superior (not merely “reasoning”) thought in general (Journal = Werke IV, 416).

intellectualist(ic) Enlightenment therefore very often / frequently / many times / many a time went hand in hand / accompanied each other / were closely (tightly, narrowly) connected. This positioning was, understandably / as was natural, for the leading thinkers of the Restoration period / time(s), epoch, age of Restoration, decisive⁵⁷,(;) it survived (/ was preserved intact in/throughout) the 19th century (unscathed, unharmed, undamaged),(,) and in fact (celebrated, revelled in) in the 20th century (it appeared to undergo / live through / enjoy) a Renaissance. Thus were e.g. the effects of the school's aestheticising euphemism around Stefan George (/ The influence, impact of the aestheticism of Stefan George School), as it was (became felt, spread) above all in the time between both World Wars (spread, disseminated), being / was / happened to be disastrous, devastating for the scientific apprehension, comprehension, conception, conceptualisation of the Enlightenment. Nationalistically minded / Nationalist(ic) representatives and fellow travellers, followers of this current, trend, tendency, attaching themselves to / building on / who appropriated the older (positions of the”)philosophy of life(”) (positions) and (well-)known polemics against the “Western spirit”, from those years [of] 1914—18⁵⁸, which were extremely warlike, wild, frantic, fierce even for prominent scholars, (had) wanted to see, espy, behold, find the “essence of the German spirit” in the overcoming, surpassing, transcendence of the “cold” or else / and “shallow” (Western European) rationalism (of the West); this was supposed to obviously be the ideational revanche, revenge of / for (- the humiliated in / at Versailles and in the Ruhr -) Germany(, after the humiliations of Versailles and of Ruhr). In the course of this, rationalism was defined so narrowly, tightly that this (its) concept became precisely meaningless (lost its meaning),(;) conversely, against that, on the other hand, the polemic(s) against it became correspondingly easier. That / The fact that Kant and Fichte were no less German than Goethe and Herder was either forgotten or was not interpreted thoroughly, extensively, profoundly, soundly, carefully, searchingly, exhaustively, rigorously, seriously enough, and it was also overlooked that the so-called reaction against rationalism took in / absorbed (within itself) essential, substantial elements of this same rationalism⁵⁹. In the (national-socialist(ic)) time(s), period, era (of national socialism), this assessment (evaluation) of the Enlightenment saw, witnessed, underwent, experienced, lived through, found, for obvious reasons, wide(spread) / (a) greater dissemination, spreading, circulation⁶⁰, in order for it to go almost completely, fully extinct (/ disappear, be eclipsed, die out almost completely) after the Second World War and the (subsequent, following that) prevalence, prevailing, predominance of the liberal-Enlightenment or else / and Marxist(ic)-Enlightenment ideology of the victors in both parts of today's^{xxiii} Germany (which took place after that). Our reminder,

⁵⁷ Evidence / Proof / Documents in Stuke, *Aufklärung*, 323 f..

⁵⁸ See the collection of texts edited and introduced by K. Böhme : *Aufrufe und Reden . . .*, passim. Cf. Lübke, *Politische Philosophie in Deutschland*, 171 ff., esp. 205 ff..

⁵⁹ It is, constitutes a service, contribution of E. Cassirer to have stressed this (point), and indeed in the framework of a fundamental, programmatic rejection of the legend, myth of the one-sided intellectualist(ic) character of the Enlightenment. See e.g. his analysis / analyses on / regarding the relations of Romantic historicism towards, vis-à-vis, with the Enlightenment, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*, 253 ff..

⁶⁰ Typically, passages in Korff, *Geist der Goethezeit I*, 24 ff. ; Böhm, *Anti-Cartesianismus* 42 ff., 77 ff., 129 ff., 235 ff. ; Hildebrandt, *Hölderlin*, 35 ff. ; Scheibe, *Die Krisis der Aufklärung*, 4, 30, 33 ff., 53 f..

reminding, mention of this current has / had, however, on the other hand, nevertheless, no historical intent(ion), but wants / wanted to show (with) a typical example that such widespread assumptions, perceptions like the direct or indirect equating, identification of rationalism and intellectualism should / ought not be taken at (their) face value, since they came into being / were born from / for polemical considerations, purposes. A scientific clarification of this question / point is, however, for its part, impossible without a fundamental discussion of the concept of rationalism (/ if beforehand the concept of rationalism is not investigated as to its essence).

3. Rationalism and Irrationalism

The unclarity / lack of clarity, obscurity, uncertainty, ambiguity which encases, envelops, wreathes, wraps, surrounds such central concepts as, like “rationalism” constitutes a further considerable, substantial hindrance, impediment, obstacle on the path towards the proper, objective, thorough, comprehensive, erudite, informed, expert apprehension of the Enlightenment, especially since this so often has been characterised as the rationalist(ic) age, era, epoch, times (/ the latter (Enlightenment) has been characterised as “(the) epoch of rationalism”). This lack of clarity, ambiguity is, though / by the way, precisely a consequence of the extremely, exceedingly, most frequent use of the concept of rationalism in unavoidably, inevitably various, varying, different, disparate contexts, correlations and in the many meanings, ambiguity coming into being from that (/ a different on each and every occasion correlation so / such that polysemy (the existence of many meanings) becomes inevitable). However, it would be naïve to want to set (put) aside / eliminate once and for all the lack of clarity, ambiguity or else / and the many meanings, polysemy through, by means of, with generally accepted agreement(s) / kinds of understanding on the terminology. Because each and every respective use of the concept of rationalism usually (organically) interrelates, interconnects with the content-related intentions of thought (/ so closely, tightly with the content and the intentions of the corresponding thought), that a (/ so that no) thinker would be (found to be) ready, prepared for / willing as regards the renunciation, abandonment, renouncement, waiver of his personal nuancing, nuance (in respect) of this concept and consequently the surrendering, relinquishment, abandonment, betrayal of more or less essential points of his theories. The binding, tying, connection of rationalism to / with a certain content and to / with certain theses is / constitutes(,) in fact, in any case(,) one of the most important weapons in philosophical polemics and politics. It aims at / has as its objective to make dependent the (cap)ability at, capacity for the logical use of thought in general on the acceptance, assumption, adoption of theories of certain content(,) and to make, present, paint those who do not want to accept these theories as (out to be the) opponents of logical thought in general or as bad, evil, sick, foul or else unreliable, untrustworthy, undependable, unsound (/ unreliable

thinkers)^{xxiv}. Because / On account of this polemical use of the concept of rationalism, its many meanings, ambiguity, polysemy came about, since it was / has been coupled from time to time with the most various, different, varying content-related theses ; we do not betray, reveal, give away, let out any secret when we point to / if we mention, cite, memorialise, recall, recollect the elementary fact — even though, although philosophers do not like to mention it (/ which philosophers refer to with such displeasure / so unpleasantly) — that for / as regards a way of looking at / the contemplation, consideration of the history of ideas, logically proceeding, methodical thought / thinking has been put at / in the service of (entirely different) views and intentions (diverging, deviating, differing extremely from one another). The (It is up to the) champions / advance guard, pioneers, forward strugglers / fighters, battlers, combatants of this or that theory (can / are able) (to) not only call into question / doubt the theses of the opponent / opponent's theses, but also his capacity / (cap)ability ((cap)abilities) for / at logical thought / thinking emotionally, dramatically, emotively, histrionically, pathetically or else / — and indeed in the name of one Reason (which, strangely enough / oddly, remarkably, always coincides with one's own (personal way of thinking)). A(n) understanding, knowing way of looking at things / consideration / contemplation cannot / is not able in such (a) strife, quarrel, dispute, argument, controversy, battle, fight, contention, disagreement (to) take sides / embrace, take up, resort to one party [instead of another] if it wants to remain in general understanding, knowing (/ A way of looking at things / consideration, contemplation which wants to understand, comprehend things, matters, affairs cannot take a position in such a dispute, struggle, fight). That is why it must seek / look for a definition of rationalism which would be a definition of rationalism not in terms of content (/ independent of every (kind of) content of thought (on each and every respective occasion)), but consistently formal / form-related (in terms of form) (/ and strictly formal)(,) and would (pr)offer a schema which could be applied to every [kind of] rationalism, irrespective of its content (/ whatsoever its content may (happen to) be). There is no other way, path, road if one wants to not commit, perpetrate, celebrate the absurdity of declaring, proclaiming, stating, professing, explaining (that) Thomas (of) Aquinas as / is less rationalistic than Hobbes, or Machiavelli as / is less rationalistic than Kant (a(n) serious, earnest, careful, attentive reflection, meditation, contemplation, examination upon / of these and similar examples suffices in order to make clear the meaninglessness (/ demonstrate how absurd is) — in a purely scientific, not ideological regard (/ from a scientific, and not ideological point of view) — (of) a connection of rationalism with certain (thought) content(s) (of thought)).

Rationalism, would (is), therefore, (be) for us the(,) formally-logically / in terms of form and logic / from the point of view of formal logic(,) expedient (purposeful, intentional, deliberate, end(goal)-oriented) flawless, faultless, unobjectionable (free-of-objection(s)), perfect, impeccable, irreproachable use of (the) argumentative means (of thought)(,) which thought has at its disposal)(,) for the underpinning, substantiation, corroboration, fortifying (theoretically / in terms of theory) of a (given) fundamental, basic stance (attitude) (vis-à-vis the world). This / Our definition implies, suggests that the /this fundamental, basic stance (attitude) or else fundamental, basic decision itself

lies (is found) on that side / beyond (the) logical founding, justification, giving of reasons, establishment, setting up, grounds, substantiation, reasons(s), even if / though it (the logical justification) is considered proven from the point of view of militant rationalists (/ the rationalists consider the logical giving of reasons as provable or proven/proved) : this / that is(,) ultimately / in the final analysis(,) the aim, end, objective of their (/ what they seek, strive for, pursue in) binding, tying of (/ connecting) rationalism to a certain ((some kind of) specific, concrete) content. Only / Solely the rationalisation of the basic, fundamental stance or decision can be logically consistently carried out, performed, be in operation (/ can be realised with logical consistency),(;) and only / solely it / this (rationalisation) can, accordingly / because of that/this, be up for (/ constitute an object of) scientific debate(,) (—) not the basic, fundamental stance itself : because the answer / response to the ultimate, last question, problem takes place, occurs through / by means of power claims (/ to ultimate, final questions the answer is given with axiomatic decisions). There can, therefore, be as many kinds of logical consistency as (there are) (of) (kinds of) fundamental, basic stances ; although the logical means, formally seen / seen in terms of form, remain the same / equal, they serve, nevertheless, on each and every respective occasion the rationalisation (in terms of content) of different fundamental, basic decisions (with different content). Since now these / the latter (fundamental decisions) lie / are found ultra rationem, thus they must be described, characterised as / considered to be mystical in (regard to) / as to their essence, nature, character, something which again / in its turn implies / entails the thesis that the mystical (element) is not the opposite, but the source or else the beginning, start of (the) rational endeavour, effort, thought / thinking. With regard to the answer, response to final, ultimate, last questions, the distinction between the rational and the irrational fully, completely, totally loses its meaning ; that is why this distinction must be limited, restricted, confined to the level of the thought-related, intellectual execution, carrying out, implementation, undertaking, performance or else rationalisation of the fundamental, basic decision, especially since the decision lies in favour / for the benefit of the Ratio / Reason ultra rationem (/ consequently, it (the said distinction) must refer solely to the level of the rationalising job, task, where arguments are called upon, summoned to support the fundamental stance or decision on each and every respective occasion). Only / Solely at this level can there be / exist a direct opposition, antithesis between the rational and the irrational (element). The mystical (element), which stands / is found at the beginning, start, commencement of the (thought / intellectual) endeavour, effort (at thought, thinking) (/ thought,) and constitutes / constituting its emotional source, is, naturally / of course, irrational (too, as well), nonetheless this (what is) mystical-irrational (element) must be strictly distinguished from the (what is) logical-irrational (element) (/ we must strictly distinguish between the irrational element in the mystical sense of the term from the irrational element in the logical sense of the term). Since for us the criterion of the rational in the (logical) consistency of formal-logical / form-related-logical thought, thinking lies in the thought-related, intellectual execution, carrying out, implementation, undertaking, performance of a fundamental, basic stance, so / thus the rational stands / is (found) not in the mystical-irrational, but only in opposition, contrast to the logical-irrational. The mystical-irrational is found, in other

words, deeper than the rational as well as the logical-irrational, which both stand at the same level and only because of that can argue, fight, battle, quarrel, squabble with each other (/ The irrational element (in the mystical sense of the term) is found, in other words, deeper than both the generally rational element and the generally irrational element in the logical sense of the term : the two latter elements are found at the same level and that is why they can also clash (with each other)). (Precisely,) On / on account / Because / because of this dissimilarity, diversity, difference, variety of the levels one may not / is not permitted (allowed) / should not / ought not confuse, mistake, confound, mix up the mystical-irrational source of thought, thinking with this (intellectual) execution, carrying out, implementation, undertaking, performance (of a fundamental stance) (/ its methodical development, unfolding) and from the rationality of the latter / second derive, deduce the rationality of the former / first (mystical-irrational source of thought) — and vice versa, the other way around / conversely : one should not interpret (logical) irrationality (in the logical sense of the term) as the effect, impact, influence, consequence of the mystical-irrational (/ irrational element (in the mystical sense of the term))^{xxv}. From our point of view, therefore, only the logical-irrational (/ irrational element in the logical sense of the term), not the mystical-irrational, is the opposite of rationalism. That / This explains why religious systems of thought / intellectual (thought) systems cannot be looked at / regarded as the opponents of rationalism generally ; struggle comes into being only between these systems and certain, defined in terms of content, kinds of rationalism, but which does not mean, signify any fundamental, programmatic, in principle difference with regard to the rationality of both : because (/ on the basis of the same criteria we can explain the apparently paradoxical phenomenon that) non-religious rationalisms stand, are no less inimical vis-à-vis themselves than religious rationalisms vis-à-vis non-religious or anti-religious rationalisms^{xxvi}.

In (regard to) / During a(n) overall, total evaluation, assessment, judgement of the hitherto / until now / historically known confrontations, disputes, altercations, debates between rationalism and irrationalism, the purely polemical element / side in (of, to) them should not be overlooked / disregarded ; since, according to (the) time(s), age, period, era and (the) men, people, sometimes the rational, at other times the irrational serves / is used as a(n) reproach, accusation, slur, censure, thus scientific research may, ought not / is not allowed (permitted) to take the statements, propositions in question, concerned at (their) face value. Our schema (/ analysis above) shows why the strict contradistinction between rationalism and irrationalism is (/ becomes) objectively inappropriate, misplaced, misguided, unsuitable, mistaken (/ baseless) if only the mystical-irrational and the logical-irrational are properly distinguished from each other (/ if we divide, distinguish, separate, differentiate, expand, dilate the irrational element in the mystical sense of the term from the irrational (element) in the logical sense of the term). If the first / former (mystical-irrational) lies on the other side of / beyond logical founding, thus /so the second / latter (logical-irrational) in reality is a much more seldom / infrequent phenomenon than the rationalists, who pass off / consider, regard their own rationalism as the sole, single possible rationalism, want to make people

believe. Under logical-irrational I understand not merely the violation of formal-logical rules (since this happens, occurs, exists, comes about in / with the rationalists too), but also and above all the fundamental, in principle refusal to convert, transform the mystical-irrational into a rational system or else to rationalise one's own fundamental, basic stance [[of whatever kind]] (/ The irrational element (in the logical sense of the term) is not equated, identified with the transgression of the rules of formal logic (since rationalists also do it), but especially means the programmatic denial of the conversion of the irrational element (in the mystical sense of the term) into a rational system, that is, the denial of the rationalisation of (every kind of) (the) fundamental world-theoretical stance or decision (on each and every respective occasion) [[in general]]. As I mean, think, opine, this refusal is primarily meant polemically (/ has as its source above all polemical motives), i.e. through it certain content-related positions are defended (/ it seeks the defence of specific positions), which (through) the process of rationalisation as such seem(s to threaten) (to be put in danger / at risk (endangered)). The struggle against thought / rational thought turns in actual fact not against thought as such / every (kind of) thought, but against the connection of thought with certain content(s) — a connection, which in certain times, ages, periods, eras, epochs flourishes, thrives, prospers to such an extent (/ becomes so close, tight) that the aforementioned content(s) seem(s) to necessarily emerge, come / emanate from the mere use of thought (/ of logical thought as such).

Apart from this its negative or else in accordance with the circumstances wavering, fluctuating, oscillating character, the other great weakness, shortcoming of logical irrationalism consists in the fact that its decision against the rationalisation of the (its) represented [[by it]] fundamental, basic stance can hardly be realised (/ Apart from (the fact) that the character of irrationalism (in the logical sense of the term) wavers, fluctuates every time in accordance with the circumstances and the opponent, its other great disadvantage rests / lies in its inability to realise its basic decision, that is, its denial to proceed to the rationalisation of its fundamental world-theoretical stance). From the standpoint (/ the point of view and means) of rationalism, this decision naturally cannot be reproached, combatted, yet, nevertheless, it unavoidably, inevitably becomes, gets entangled, embroiled, involved in contradictions as soon as it tries, attempts to be articulated argumentatively (/ wants to express itself / be expressed in the form of arguments). The consistent logical-irrational is exactly because of that hardly to be arrested, pinned down, captured, put in gaol, determined, ascertained because its representatives never do without, renounce, forego, abstain from, relinquish, waive (in relation to that) their position to communicate (be transmitted, communicated, imparted, announced, declared) argumentatively (/ Consistent irrationalism (in the logical sense of the term) is not encountered anywhere, precisely because its representatives do not cease to declare their positioning with the help of arguments).

[[ALL END NOTES ARE BY THE KRAZY MAN, WHEREAS THE FOOTNOTES ARE P.K.'s UNLESS SPECIFICALLY INDICATED OTHERWISE [[]]]]

ⁱ To the German edition being translated.

ⁱⁱ Obviously, here we are talking about what the senses perceive and not hedonistic life stances, experiences etc..

ⁱⁱⁱ A reflection of, at least in part, the concentration of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-M-C-M-CAPITALISTIC-IMPERIALISTIC POWER, from ZIO-Great Britain to ZIO-USA.

^{iv} I suggest yooz all read Kondlyis's "the multi-dimensional Enlightenment" I've translated on the P.K. site (<https://www.panagiotiskondylis.com/the-multi-dimensional-enlightenment.php>)

to get a much meatier "preliminary remark" than the waffle of this preliminary remark.

^v Only in the Greek edition.

^{vi} Obviously, only in the Greek edition.

^{vii} With no inherent ethics anywhere in nature, metaphysics as ideological / normative thought is as inevitable as is the inevitability of the constructed by humans nature of all ethics.

^{viii} Judeo-Christian as compared to classical / ancient Greek, but not to be confused with today's ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ who are the SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN. The biblical Jews are not the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ OF M-C-M-CAPITALISM-IMPERIALISM AND THE SYNANGOGUE OF SATAN. These, today's Jews are the SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ who Judas Iscariot betrayed and Caiaphas et al. SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN killed Christ and who have destroyed all "the West" in the last 2-3 centuries.

^{ix} The translation from the Greek text reads : "the spirit in the philosophical tradition is not understood primarily in epistemological terms, at least as long as the object of knowledge [[does not]] remains exclusively the sensible world", which does not seem to me to be in line with the German text without a "does not" as in, "at least as long as the object of knowledge does not remain exclusively the sensible world", which to me makes more sense, i.e. the Greek text seems to have left out the δὲν / not as a typographical omission / error.

^x Of giving / letting us understand the reality of being and morality.

^{xi} The clause "in order to ... own source" is not in P.K.'s Greek text.

^{xii} Hence, under ZIO-JOO-ES-HEY, the JOO, DA KIKE AND DA YID remove and or displace or sideline God in favour of the ideological phantasms of "human rights", "freedom" and "dee-mok-ra-sea" (along with attendant life stances of Hedonismus, Konsum, Toorizmoos, Exotizmoos, Self-Racizmoos, Self-Ethnic Cleansing, Self-Genocide, Licentiousness, Abnormality, Perversion, Vandalism, Drugs, Porn, Filth, Ape-Monkey-Other-worship etc. etc. etc.) in order to mask the real relations of economic, state and cultural power **grossly disproportionately and vastly asymmetrically** in favour of the ruling ANTI-CHRIST "LEFT/RIGHT" ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID and its ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOGEZ of the ANTI-CHRIST, SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN, GREAT SATAN EVIL DEVIL INBRED, INCESTUAL HYPER-ORGANISED CRIMINAL, HYPER-MAFIA, HYPER-CONSPIRATORIAL, HYPER-RAT TUNNEL, HYPER-BEHIND DA KERTEN ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID VOMIT-EXCREMENT-FAECES. Hence, the non-stop nauseating ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT about "DA KOST" and "ANTI-SATANISM", rather than what really happened in ZIO-WW2 and anti-Christianity.

^{xiii} See endnote xii, immediately above.

^{xiv} And since ideas don't mechanically and directly reflect material reality (though *that* thesis is not necessarily wrong always and everywhere, particularly over the very long-term), we had a partial return to the cave, so to speak, in philosophy from the seventeenth century (based on developments in philosophy during the Renaissance) (whilst ordinary people were still grappling with the "Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism" and saving, accumulating their money etc.), (there were Locke and Newton, but also Descartes etc.), which in the eighteenth century reached the unspeakable (equivalent of Aristippus (435-356)) depths of consistent nihilism in de Sade, and even more so in La Mettrie (Hume "got there" but pretended he didn't, whilst smiling, whereas Voltaire and Diderot "knew all about it" i.e. dethroning God means putting Satan, JOOZ, KIKES and YIDZ of the Synagogue of Satan Great Satan Evil Devil Anti-Christ on the throne), with mass culture "catching up" to the avant garde of the second "God is Dead, Hail Satan, the JOO, da KIKE and da YID" half of the 19th century and circa 1900, only under ZIO-JOO-ES-HEY from the ZIO-1960s and ZIO-1970s, when social conditions as a whole were "ripe" for a full-programme of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-CAVE-HEDONISMUS-KONSUM-TOORIZMOOS-EXOTIZMOOS-BORDELLO-CASINO-SOCIETY-FREAK SHOW-EXCREMENT-VOMIT-FAECES of childless, sterile abort-fuck-sluts, homoz, lezzoz, tranz-freaks, drugz, pillz, porn, vandalism, tattooz, piercing, body defilement, plastic sugery, lip fillers, botox, graffitti, laziness, degeneracy, self-racism, self-ethnic cleansing, self-genocide, monkey-

ape-other-kost-worship, zombee-izim, stooge-izim (e.g. da 3 Stoogez, da Marx Brothers, Jerry Lewis et al.), “anything goes”, “live and let live” etc. etc. etc. under the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID, without, of course, abandoning all norms and values, since the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-GREAT SATAN-ANTI-CHRIST and its many ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGEZ want to rool ... and hence the endless ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT about the ideological phantasms and or outright lies (backed up by anti-Christ, pro-Satanic laws etc.) of “human rights”, “freedom”, “dee-mok-ra-sea”, “da hollow-KOST” etc. etc. etc..

^{xv} Included here is “post-modernism”, which rejects Christianity and Patriarchy fully in favour of the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-GREAT SATAN cave-world of promiscuity, abnormality, perversion and degeneracy, sterility, childlessness, self-racism, self-ethnic-cleansing and self-genocide under the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-INBRED-INCESTUAL-ULTRA-CRIMINALLY ORGANISED-ULTRA-MAFIA-ULTRA-RAT-TUNNEL-ULTRA-BEHIND DA KERTEN-ULTRA-CONSPIRATORIAL-RAT-RODENT-PARASITE-VOMIT-FAECES-EXCREMENT-SCUMBAG. (The bourgeois view of the Enlightenment may have moved God and the Church “out of the way”, but religion for the popolo and or the masses was not (fully) abolished, neither was Patriarchy and the oikos / household, nor the genos and the ethnos / the people of a relatively common descent with an agricultural and or industrial base).

^{xvi} The Age of the Enlightenment is the (17th and) 18th century (with a mainstream ideological-normative meaning in favour of “true” Reason and Nature (whilst sidelining (but not yet abolishing) God)), whereas the “Enlightenment” as anti-traditional theology and in all its multifarious complexity (ignored by the ideological mainstream understanding of the Enlightenment) has roots (including as part of, or the period leading into, new-times rationalism) in (at least ostensibly) theological thought beginning around the time of Averroes (12th century), Thomas (“I’m going to restrict omnipotent God’s power by way of my Reason as a ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LIZZARD-ENTRY-IST EVIL-DEVIL-MAMMON-LUCIFER-SATANIST”) Aquinas (“and some six centuries later ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LEVINAS will back me up, for instance”), Bonaventure (13th century) and Duns Scotus, Ockham (13th/14th century) et al..

^{xvii} Referring to the (17th and) 18th century, with an ideology of anti-theological (and “rational / scientific” esp. in the 19th century) Progress, whilst side-stepping the sceptical and nihilist currents and implications of and in Enlightenment thought.

^{xviii} Of the theological opponent, the (many and up to very different) Enlightenment philosophes and new-times rationalism.

^{xix} This clause from the German text, is not in the Greek text.

^{xx} Because they mean the or an ideological, mainstream, normative version of “The Enlightenment” in relation to Reason, Nature(, Progress, The Rights of Man) etc..

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a%20fortiori>

a fortiori

with greater reason or more convincing force

—used in drawing a conclusion that is inferred to be even more certain than another

the man of prejudice is, *a fortiori*, a man of limited mental vision

A fortiori in Latin literally means “from the stronger (argument)”. The term is used when drawing a conclusion that’s even more obvious or convincing than the one just drawn. Thus, if teaching English grammar to native speakers is difficult, then, a fortiori, teaching English grammar to nonnative speakers will be even more challenging.

^{xxi} Obvious reference in ZIO-1981 to the “second world”, “eastern” “socialist / communist block(s) / camp(s)”.

^{xxii} Grosso modo, massification-atomisation-mammon-monetary-isation had progressed far or relatively more in England historically than the more “corporatist” / “statist” France in the 19th century, which had repercussions into the 20th century as to differences between England and France.

^{xxiii} ZIO-1981.

^{xxiv} In our ZIO-SATANIC-MAMMON-EVIL-DEVIL-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-GREAT SATAN-LUCIFER-ANTI-CHRIST era, that means SICK-FUCKING-KRAZY-PSYCHO-PATH-ULTRA-CRIMINAL-ULTRA-CONSPIRATORIAL-ULTRA-MAFIA-RAT-TUNNEL-INBRED-INCESTUAL JOOZ, KIKES, YIDZ and their ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGES accusing ad nauseum anyone who does not agree with ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ANTI-CHRIST-GREAT SATAN-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN-EVIL-DEVIL-LUCIFER-MAMMON-SATANISM AND CONTROL-POWER (KONTROL) as being “irrational” up to “insane, mad” etc..

^{xxv} The mystical-irrational fundamental decision or stance can proceed intellectually either rationally / logically or irrationally / illogically (with contradictions, leaps in logic etc. whereby polemics trumps logical consistency / consistently rational argumentation) as to its intellectual-argumentative unfolding.

^{xxvi} And or as betwixt themselves (as different kinds of religious rationalisms).