

IV Social relation: the mechanism (Soziale Beziehung: Der Mechanismus)

1. The inner (internal, inside, inward) mechanism (Der innere Mechanismus)

A. Outlook (View, Prospect) (Ausblick)

Under/As (the) “inner (internal, inside, inward) mechanism” of the social relation, we understand the interrelating (interrelated) mental acts, whose execution (carrying out, performance) for the coming (bringing) about and the course (sequence or order of events) of a social relation is constitutive (Unter „innerem Mechanismus“ der sozialen Beziehung verstehen wir die zusammenhängenden mentalen Akte, deren Vollzug für das Zustandekommen und den Ablauf einer sozialen Beziehung konstitutiv ist). These acts can be isolated in terms of theory, and observed as isolated, in the sense that they take place in the “interior (or inner world (dimension, space))” (on the “inside”; im „Inneren“), that is in the “spirit(-intellect)” or in the “psyche (mind, soul)” of every individual subject (also im „Geist“ oder in der „Psyche“ jedes einzelnen Subjekts), which – either way (anyway) – has a (takes) part (participates) in (partakes of) a social relation; that which we want to call the “outer (external, outside, outward) mechanism” of the social relation (den „äußeren Mechanismus“ der sozialen Beziehung), cannot, on the other hand/however, be described if, concurrently, the “inner (internal)” and “outer (external)” acts (die „inneren“ und „äußeren“ Akte) are not taken into consideration in connection (association) [[with one another as acts]] (in respect) of all the – either way (one way or another, anyway) – participants in the social relation. The mental acts constantly interwoven with one another, which make up the inner (internal)

relation of the social relation, are fundamentally (basically, in principle) two: namely, [[1]] the perception of the Other (other) as subjectivity, together with all the implications and imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of this property (quality, characteristic), and [[2]](,) the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other (Die miteinander stets verwobenen mentalen Akte, die den inneren Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung ausmachen, sind grundsätzlich zwei: Nämlich die Wahrnehmung des Anderen als Subjektivität samt allen Implikationen und Unwägbarkeiten dieser Eigenschaft, und das Sichhineinversetzen in die Lage des Anderen), i.e. both in his (the Other's) "inner (internal)" as well as in his (the Other's) "outer (external)" situation (or position). Since the analysis of both these mental acts, which, for their part, consist (are made up (comprised, composed)) of a number of (multiple) individual acts, occurs (takes place) (with)in the social-ontological framework and with social-ontological intent, thus, it (this analysis) does not mean/signify an(y) indirect rehabilitation of that psychologism, which we wanted to avoid in (regard to) the description of the spectrum of the social relation. The inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation by no means depends – in regard to its general form-related (i.e. formal) course, which social-ontologically alone is worth considering (comes into question)ⁱ –, on the personal psychological properties (qualities, characteristics) of the I (ego, Ego) or of the Other (Alter (alter [= Latin])); it (the said inner mechanism) is in all human subjects in (regard to) its basic (fundamental) features (characteristics, traits, attributes), the same and – what will prove to be decisive (crucial) – it (also) does not vary in accordance with whether one stays (lingers, resides) in/ with the friendly or inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation; (the) joyous (people) and (the) melancholic(s) (people), (the) extroverted (people) (extroverts) and (the) introverted (people) (introverts), (the) "good" (people) and (the) "bad (evil)" (people), friends and foes(,) have to (must) make use of it equally, irrespective of what refinement or coarsening (oversimplification) it

(the said inner mechanism of the social relation) experiences or undergoes in every individual (person). Also, the unavoidable use/usage of psychological concepts must not here lead [[us]] to psychologistic false steps (missteps, indiscretions, lapses). Because these concepts are used as generally (universally) applicable formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), or as always present variables, which in accordance with the personal case can be bound to entirely different content(s); these contents (this content), which might concern ((pre)occupy, busy) the psychologists of (the) individual(s) and, if need be, the historian or the sociologist, are not taken into account here. However, already the handling of the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation on the part of actors is not in the least all along (right down) the line psychologically oriented. As we shall yet see (see later/below), the mental “system”, which (the) actors erect (set (put) up, build, construct), in order to become (the) master (ruler, lord) of the original and never conclusively (definitively, finally) conquerable (defeatable, beatable) imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, spreads (stretches, extends) across (out over) several levels, in relation to which the subjectively meant meaning (sense) of alien/foreign act(ion)s (i.e. of the acts of others), just as (like) the objectively meant meaning (sense) of these same alien act(ion)s (i.e. acts of others), comes into consideration.

It must not especially (specifically) be explained that the “interior (or inner world (dimension, space))” (what is on the “inside”) as a synonym of the “mental (dimension or element (system))” (des „Mentalen“) merely constitutes a spatial metaphor, which is capable of a number of (several, multiple) interpretations, depending on how one wants to think of or imagine the psycho-physical nexus; fortunately (luckily), this thorny question can remain to be seen, i.e. left open, (with)in the social-ontological context. Likewise, it goes without

saying that talk of the “inner (internal)” and “outer (external)” mechanism of the social relation is to (should, ought to) be comprehended as a simplifying (simplified) abstraction, which appears to be suitable, convenient and expedient for reasons (purposes) of (re)presentation and description. The formation, development, extension and completion of both mechanisms accompany each other genetically and structurally, although important conceptual distinctions (differentiations), like e.g. that between social action and the social relation, ultimately rest (are based) on the contrast between inner (internal) and outer (external) processes (orders or sequences of events)¹. Finally, we shall point out (refer to, indicate) a further objective interrelation between two conceptual abstractions, which, admittedly (mind you), seems to be far less self-evident, however, whose social-ontological relevance cannot be estimated highly enough. It is a matter of the manner with which the belonging together (togetherness or common bond) (shared (overlapping) (part of each other’s) identity) of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation is to be thought about. We (have) already said that the mechanism of the social relation behaves (is) indifferent(ly) towards (regarding) friendship and towards (regarding) enmity, that (it), therefore, (it) (the mechanism of the social relation) is capable of supporting every shape and form, and every crystallisation inside of the spectrum of the social relation, without functionally determined (conditioned) resistance. However, it is not a matter here merely of a mutual (reciprocal) indifference, which stands in the way of any possibility of the development (unfolding) of the social relation. Rather, a mutual (reciprocal) determination (or dependency) and a deep organic intertwining (entanglement) are present (exist), which must find expression in the logical unity (or coherence (cohesion)) of their social-ontological (re)presentation and description. Not only does the constantly remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) composition

¹ See below Section 2Aa in this chapter.

or texture (die stets gleichbleibende Beschaffenheit) of the mechanism of the social relation constitute a necessary precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) for the enormous speed of movements in the spectrum of this same relation, which would turn out to be essentially more inflexible if every time (along) with the character of the relation, also that composition or texture, and consequently the constitution (die Verfassung) of man himself had to change (alter, vary). Still deeper perhaps do the breadth and flexibility of the spectrum of the social relation influence the mechanism itself. The latter (mechanism) is formed and developed in fact in the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital, essential) striving or endeavouring of the social actor to adapt and adjust himself – through constant and flexible movement – to the constant and flexible movement of the rest of the (on each and every respective occasion, relevant) actors on (along, as regards) the whole breadth of the spectrum of the social relation. As the development of all the possibilities of this spectrum presupposes the uniformity of the mechanism of the social relation, thus, for its part, the full activation of this mechanism presupposes that the social relation is dealt with not merely with regard to each and every respective actor standing across or opposite from an actor, but by bearing in mind all – apart from that (otherwise) – known possibilities of/for the development and unfolding of the social relation. The already existing background knowledge regarding the latter (social relation) constitutes the tacit starting point when it applies (is a matter/case) that one (an actor) will put oneself/himself in the position (situation) of (and or empathise with) the Other, and assess or appraise (estimate) which (what) place in the spectrum of the social relation the Other will occupy vis-à-vis the [[one's or the actor's own]] Ego – at any rate, the actions and reactions of the Other, without that background knowledge, can hardly be put into order and classified socially (Das schon vorhandene Hintergrundwissen über letztere bildet den stillschweigenden Ausgangspunkt, wenn es gilt, sich in die Lage des Anderen hineinzusetzen und abzuschätzen, welchen Platz im Spektrum der sozialen

Beziehung der Andere dem Ego gegenüber einnehmen werde - jedenfalls lassen sich Aktionen und Reaktionen des Anderen ohne jene Hintergrundwissen kaum sozial einordnen). The other way around (Conversely): the relation of the Ego towards (vis-à-vis) the Other (alter) is not merely shaped and moulded on the basis of what the Ego knows or can know about the Alter thanks to the mechanism of the taking on (over) and assumption (taking on/over) of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking) (dank des Mechanismus der Rollenübernahme), but into the relation, all (things) (i.e. everything), – what(ever) the Ego in general knows about the possibilities of the development of the spectrum of the social relation, about the exchangeability of places in that (spectrum of the social relation) and about the character of the social relation –, flow(s) as a formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding; Gestaltungsfaktor). The socially mediated (re)presentation or notion of the spectrum of the social relation (Die sozial vermittelte Vorstellung von Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung) determines, in this respect, the inner (internal) mechanism of the same (social relation), and it is not at all essential to be familiar from one's own experience with all the places inside of the spectrum in order to jointly take them (the said places inside the spectrum of the social relation) into account (or in order to factor them in), in (regard to) the relation towards (vis-à-vis) the Other. It is, in the course of this, irrelevant with how much detail and how concretely the Ego imagines the spectrum – that can, naturally, vary enormously from man to man (person to person/human to human). However, everyone has at his disposal an, in practice, sufficient image (picture) of his polarity and continuity, and makes use (avails himself) of the mechanism of the social relation, by putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the position of the Other, with regard to exactly this image or picture.ⁱⁱ

For that reason (That is why), from a new point of view, the objective and methodological meaning of the fundamental thesis, which we formulated and

explicated in (regard to) the critical discussion of methodological individualism, becomes recognisable. The individual social relation takes place only before the background of the fact of society and of the social in its totality (Die einzelne soziale Beziehung findet erst vor dem Hintergrund des Faktums der Gesellschaft und des Sozialen in seiner Gesamtheit statt)². If there were only two human beings (creatures, entities) in the world, then it would hardly (barely) cross their mind to call their relation towards (as between or with) each other a *social* relation. And in view of the unavoidable narrowness of the spectrum of their relation, which no social experience would extend or expand (widen, broaden), the mechanism of the social relation would be reduced to the animal(bestial)-reflexive (würde sich auch der Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung auf das Tierisch-Reflexive reduzieren). Only in the diachrony and the synchrony of society does the spectrum of the social relation unfold and develop fully, and this fully developed spectrum flows then via the processes of socialisation and (via) the individually stamped social experience as (a) formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding) into individual social relations and into the form-related (i.e. formal) remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) mechanism of the social relation (über die Sozialisierungsprozesse und die individuell geprägte soziale Erfahrung als Gestaltungsfaktor in die einzelnen sozialen Beziehungen und in den formal gleichbleibenden Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung ein). The fact of society is not of course, for its part, perceived as an undifferentiated whole, but as a plexus, network or mesh of relations, whose differentiation makes up exactly the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity (Das Faktum der Gesellschaft wird freilich seinerseits nicht als undifferenziertes Ganzes, sondern als Geflecht von Beziehungen wahrgenommen, deren Differenzierung eben das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung in seiner Polarität und Kontinuität ausmacht).

² See Ch. II, Section 2Cc, cf. 3B, above.

When the social subject forms an overall or a total judgement about/regarding society, and often uses (employs, utilises) it (the said overall or total judgement of society) as a guiding principle (guide) of/for it's (the social subject's) action (als Richtschnur seines Handelns), thus, it does not lose sight of, or touch with, the rich-in-variants spectrum of the social relation, its peripeteias/peripeteiae and imponderabilities or incalculabilities, but it identifies (equates) merely (simply) for some practical goal or purpose "society" with one of the forms of the relation (relational forms) existing in it ("society"). It (The said social subject) does that, again, as a rule, with (a) reservation(s) (proviso(s)) (conditionally), because it knows from social experience what could be in store ([[ironically:]] flourish and blossom) for those who do this without reservations (unconditionally), that is, (by) acting without the always new and always growing activity (actuation or operation) of the mechanism of the social relation whilst bearing (being borne) in mind (in respect of) all of the possibilities of development of the spectrum of the (this) same (social relation).

B. The Other and his/its subjectivity (Der Andere und seine Subjektivität)

a. The openness (open nature) of the social relation and the imponderability (incalculability) of the Other (Die Offenheit der sozialen Beziehung und die Unberechenbarkeit des Anderen)

As legitimate as the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge and the phenomenological question as regards the constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego) (also) is (too) (So legitim die erkenntnistheoretische und phänomenologische Frage nach der Konstitution des

Anderen im Bewußtsein des Ich auch ist)³, yet (so, thus) it remains of slight (little) social-ontological interest. Because social ontology begins (starts), from its logic of founding (establishment, foundation), with (or in) the fact of society, that is, at an ontic and cognitive level at which the elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego) (beim Faktum der Gesellschaft, also bei einer ontischen und kognitiven Ebene an, auf der die elementare Konstitution des Anderen im Bewußtsein des Ich), regardless of how it (the said elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I) is executed (carried out or implemented) or is comprehended, must be presupposed as an already expired ((e)lapsed) process (series of events) (als bereits abgelaufener Vorgang). The plexus (mesh or network) of the social relation (Das Geflecht der sozialen Beziehung), without [[which]] society is absolutely (simply) inconceivable (unthinkable), comes about only through inner (internal) and outer (external) mechanisms, which indeed start from the process (series of events) of constitution, but leave it (the process of constitution) behind [[them (the inner and outer mechanisms of the social relation)]]. At the *social-*ontological level, the actor does not appear in connection with this latter process (of constitution), but only in connection with the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. This connection can be made (or restored) (manufactured, fabricated) by outlining the general representation (or notion) which the social actors – irrespective of the pre-history of the Other in their own consciousness – form in respect of one another, as follows: the Other exists and is made first of all perceptible in the shape or form of his body, which is distinguished from the rest of material things by means of the capability of independent movement (motion), that is, by the fact that he is the seat (or residence) and source of motives for independent movement (motion), as well as for forces which enable

³ See Ch. II, Section 1, above. We must come back to that (the said questions) in this chapter, Section 1E, and indeed on the occasion of the frequently attempted connection of the question (problem) of constitution with normative perceptions (views) about/regarding the essence of the social relation and of communication.

this (independent movement). In the course of this, it appears to be decisive or crucial that this animate, i.e. thinking, willing and mobile (moving or movable) body does not belong to any group of animals whatsoever, but to the same species as the I (ego) observing it, which, consequently, understandably, tends to draw between itself or the members of its own species, and all other animal species (or kinds of animal), a much sharper dividing line than between these latter (animal species) (“man and animal (beast)” [[as opposed to the differences between non-human animals (= translator’s addition)]]). The feeling (sense) of commonality (or common bond) between Ego and Alter is, of course, not primarily negative, i.e. it does not have to necessarily (unconditionally) or primarily be obtained (gained, won) by means of the common demarcation or delimitation against the rest of the animal species, but its positive character results from the immediate (direct) certainty that such a kind of animated body and such a kind of body looking that way must also be similar or like the Ego also as to what is not perceptible outwardly (externally). The framework of relations for social relations is therefore created, by – beyond the outer (external) perception of the Other as a member of the same animal species as the Ego – the Ego developing mental acts, which relate or refer especially to the mental acts of the Other, and in the process presuming (supposing or assuming) an essence-like (i.e. essential) affinity (or relationship) (wesensmäßige Verwandtschaft) or correspondence between one’s own and alien/foreign (i.e. another’s or others’) mental acts.

In short, the social relation takes place on the basis of the ability of the Ego to recognise in the Other, a human subject like itself (i.e. the Ego), and (or) to ascribe (attribute) to the Other, the predicate and the general properties (qualities or characteristics) of human subjectivity in the same sense as it does this (ascription or attribution) with regard to itself. But from what does the Ego recognise primarily and spontaneously his own and the (a(n)) alien/foreign

(another's) subjectivity, that is subjectivity in general and as such? What form-related (i.e. formal) features of it (i.e. the Ego) first come into consideration before there can be talk of any content(s) whatsoever? Because precisely the generality and the ubiquity of certain form-related/formal features make it possible to subsume under the great common denominator of human subjectivity, beings (creatures) which in every content-related comparison must prove to be more or less different. At the same time, the presence of these features is imposed or forced so directly (up)on the self-consciousness of the Ego that it (the Ego) itself and the Other cannot be comprehended as subjects other than as bearers of the same features. Still deeper than the dividing line between man and animal (beast), runs that (dividing line) between man and (the) inanimate thing (Noch tiefer als die Trennungslinie zwischen Mensch und Tier verläuft jene zwischen Mensch und unbeseeltem Ding), and human subjectivity must descend and come down to this ontic depth, in order to define its own utmost self (um ihr Eigenstes zu definieren) and in a second run-up or approach (i.e. attempt) to specify it (its own utmost self) in such a way that "human" and "animal or bestial" („Menschliches“ und „Tierisches“) can be distinguished or told apart at an ontologically subordinate(d) level. The human subject does not merely see in its own (cap)ability at movement (motion) (many (quite a few) inorganic [[things]] can move as well), its essential contrast or opposition to a thing (to things), but rather (it sees its own ability) in the fundamental capacity to make or omit this or that movement (motion), that is, to behave or comport itself in the same situation in this way or in another way. In actual fact, there is no situation (or position; Lage) and no necessity, to which the subject must bow (and obey), if it absolutely does not want to, i.e. if it is ready to accept its own death. Plato basically enunciated (expressed) this truth and not merely a prejudice of slave society, when he opined that the freeman differed from the slave exactly through (by means/way of) his readiness (preparedness) to die, in order to (so as) not (to) let (allow) himself (to) be

enslaved, whereas the slave preferred his naked (i.e. bare) life to freedom⁴. The subject can, therefore, choose *as* a subject not only between individual *acts and modes of behaviour (conduct)*, but in fact between Being (Is) and Not Being (Non-Is) (zwischen Sein und Nichtsein), and precisely this latter in principle possibility seems to distinguish its subjectivity in a particularly drastic manner. The question “to be or not to be” concerns not merely the meaning (sense) and value of the life of a subjectivity brooding, ruminating (speculating, cogitating) melancholically, but the subjectivity in itself and generally as a specifically human ability to be (als spezifisch menschliches Seinkönnen).

In so far now as the I (ego) accords (grants, confers, bestows) to the Other subjectivity in the same sense as it does (so) to itself, that is, it attributes (classifies) (ascribes) (to) itself and (to) the Other jointly and equally (under) the category “human subjects”, it (the I) thinks of him (the Other) as having the (cap)ability under all circumstances and in all situations of doing something instead of something other, of behaving in this way instead of otherwise (differently), irrespective out of which “rational” or “irrational” motives; and even if the Ego assumes the Other would on the basis of practical constraints (coercion(s), compulsion(s)), or simply stable (or fixed) dispositions follow with certainty this and not that mode (manner or way) of acting (action), thus because of that, it (the Ego) does not deny him (the Other) a limine the natural talent, gift or aptitude to imagine, even under outer (external) or inner (internal) need and necessity (want) in respect of acting (action) (Handlungsnot), other options (choices) and paths, and should the situation arise, even unexpectedly, to direct his deeds (doing, acts or action) towards these representations or notions. The mental acts of the I, which relate to the mental acts of the Other, and start from the conviction in respect of the equality of essence (essential equality or consubstantiality; Wesensgleichheit) of both, consequently revolve,

⁴ *Republic*, 387b, cf. 386b.

first of all, around the insight that the subject, the Other, is in general exactly like the subject, Ego, in the position to do or not do something, to behave in this (that) way (thus, so) instead of otherwise (differently). This insight constitutes, accordingly, a first fundamental paraphrase (re-description) of the (bilateral or mutual) knowledge (on both sides) around/about (regarding) the subjective character (character of the subject; Subjektcharakter) of the Ego and the Alter, and rests or is based on the direct and immediate data of the self-consciousness of both. It is of decisive (deciding) social-ontological meaning (significance), that precisely the mental act, which makes the social relation possible and initiates, namely, the ascertainment on both sides of the equal, in terms of essence, (i.e. (or) consubstantial) subjectivity of the Ego and the Alter, is originally connected to the knowledge that (the) Ego and (the) Alter would, exactly in their common peculiarity as subjects, equally be deprived of an accurate (precise, exact) calculation (reckoning or estimation) of their (i.e. each other's) future behaviour. Knowledge of the, in principle, possibility of a social relation amounts therefore to knowledge that this relation must, as a relation of subjects, contain an element or factor (moment) of changeability and imponderability (incalculability), regardless of how high the likelihood (probability) for/of that, on each and every respective occasion, is estimated (to be/as). And what characterises the starting point of the social relation is only confirmed in the course of the same (social relation). Inside the series of the mental acts of the Ego, which relate or refer to the mental acts of the Other, the special assumption (taking on/over) of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking), namely the putting itself of the Ego in (and or empathising of the Ego with) the (inner (internal)) situation (or position) of the Other, now follows the general knowledge around/ about (regarding) the subjectivity of the Other (folgt nun auf das allgemeine Wissen um die Subjektivität des Anderen die speziellere Rollenübernahme, nämlich das Sichhineinversetzen des Ego in die (innere) Lage des Anderen). The subject, Alter, proves itself (is proved), in the course of

this, on the basis of obvious ((most) plausible) (form-related, i.e. formal) comparisons with the subject, Ego, as the bearer of feelings, thoughts, intentions and action plans (plans of action (acting)) (als Träger von Gefühlen, Überlegungen, Absichten und Handlungsentwürfen), whose supposed or suspected great variety of form (multiformity) or ambiguity (equivocalness or multiple meanings), bears out or confirms the impression (that) the Ego stand across from someone, whose mental and outer (external) acts cannot be subjected to absolute control, and cannot be foreseen or anticipated with ultimate (conclusive) certainty. Even at this higher level of the social relation, precisely that which constitutes the formal (i.e. form-related) presupposition of the process turns out to be the possible source of equivocations and doubts with regard to (the), in practice, decisive and crucial content(s).

Both in the elementary (independent movement and choice between opposed options (choices)) as well as in the higher sense ([[a/the]] social relation through [[the]] assumption (taking on/over) of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking)), subjectivity contains, therefore, an indissoluble core or nucleus of impenetrability, opacity and obscurity, and imponderability (incalculability) (enthält Subjektivität also einen unauflösbaren Kern von Undurchsichtigkeit und Unberechenbarkeit), which is not accidental (random, chance) and inessential (immaterial, insignificant) (akzidentiell), but belongs to it (the said subjectivity) in terms of its (the said subjectivity's) essence, it (the indissoluble core of impenetrability etc.) characterises it (the said subjectivity) *as* subjectivity. This does not have anything to do with “irrationalism” („Irrationalismus“), it is not able to be put down (traced back or reduced) to “blind drives (urges, impulses)” („blinden Trieben“), rather the linear and uniform effect of such drives (urges, impulses), can (or could (would be able to)) make the behaviour of the subject precisely foreseeable (predictable) and ponderable (calculable) (vorherseh- und berechenbar); it only means that the

subject *as* subject, for whatever/whichever “irrational” or “rational” reasons, *can* at any time do something which runs counter to and goes against expectations and norms. The in principle (fundamental) and indomitable (invincible) imponderability (incalculability) of the subject (of the Alter *and* of the Ego!) is seen, in other words, paradoxically, not so much in the fact that the Ego can never know with some certainty what the Alter will do, but in (the fact) that the Ego knows with absolute certainty that, on the basis of its character as subject, the Alter could just as well not do this same acting (act or action), as unlikely as this may be under the given circumstances; finally, in fact only subjects can be “insane (mad)” or “act insanely (crazily)”. In the framework of the social relation, imponderability (incalculability) is not necessarily connected with friendship or enmity (see below), rather it refers to the impossibility of bringing the behaviour of the Other under (an) absolute control. Even at the moment in which the Other physically and outwardly (externally) completely submits, behaving in fact slavishly, the I can never fully determine (ascertain, detect or establish) with certainty whether behind the Other, contempt (disdain, scorn) does not for instance stand – and exactly here we run or bump into the human [[element, dimension]] and subjective [[element, dimension]] par excellence: because it cannot be imagined that another animal (beast) can feel contempt for a stronger (animal), to which it must be subject(ed) and subjugated, and in this contempt, it can maintain a piece of subjective freedom, that is uncontrollability and imponderability (incalculability) (Unkontrollier- und Unberechenbarkeit). Generally, therefore, the (possible) outer (external) or the (presumed or supposed) inner (internal) resistance of the Other is the element in which the Ego recognises the boundaries of its own wishes, intentions and plans of action (for acting) and exactly for this reason, it sees itself compelled (forced) to develop its own subjectivity consciously; in this same resistance it (the Ego) recognises, however, simultaneously, that the Other has equally and equally originally at its disposal, subjectivity. In the nature of

this resistance, incidentally, (from another perspective,) the difference between human subjects and things (menschlichen Subjekten und Dingen) is made noticeable (from another perspective). The resistance of the thing [[i.e. inanimate object]] is static, it cannot, that is, in the course of confrontation of (i.e. by) the subject, multiply, intensify and vary (er kann sich also nicht im Verlauf der Auseinandersetzung des Subjekts potenzieren und variieren); it (the thing) is coped with, overcome and conquered as soon as the subject exerts (masters, summons (up)) the necessary effort (or endeavour), and the degree of this effort remains in principle the same for the same object. Things look (are) different(ly) (otherwise) regarding the resistance of the subject, whose (i.e. resistance's) multiplication (or intensification (potentiation)) (Potenzierung) demands the multiplication of the effort of the other side up to a not-to-be-calculated-in-advance or a once-and-for-all ascertainable degree; here the boundary is death. Reflection upon/over/about the difference, which exists between the imponderability (incalculability) of subjects and the imponderability (incalculability) of things, appears to be just as revealing or illuminating. Things become imponderable (incalculable) because they have properties (qualities) or aspects which the subject does not know; subjects, in (regard to) their behaviour, cannot always, and not with the same (equal) certainty, be calculated, because knowledge regarding all possible motives and possible options (choices) cannot be tantamount to a prediction (forecast or prognostication) of/regarding/about (the) subsequent acting (action); in (regard to) the thing, there is no grey zone between properties, situations and behaviour, however, in (regard to) the subject there is it (i.e. a grey zone), which is only inferable hypothetically. Psychological observation of babies and infants (sucklings) has, by the way, proved (produced evidence for, demonstrated) the central function of the plexus (mesh or network) of imponderability (incalculability) and resistance for the early formation and development of the representation and notion of subjectivity. As long as the baby can make use of

the Other without problems for the instant(aneous) satisfaction of its own wishes, it hardly notices its (the Other's) character as a subject (subject character; Subjektcharakter); only resistance, that is, the non-fulfilment of its (the baby's) wishes, awakens in it (the baby), consciousness regarding actors, whose intentions do not coincide or correspond with its (the baby's) own (intentions), [[and]] in their (these actors') independent movement, cannot be treated or handled like things.⁵

With regard to the spectrum of the social relation, the uncontrollability or imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity means that any subject can at any time occupy any place in it (the spectrum of the social relation); otherwise, anthropologically predestined classes of subjects would always be found or met in the same place in the spectrum, against which every historical and social experience speaks (i.e. is contrary)⁶. The great variety of form (multiformity) of the spectrum lives off/on the versatility of subjectivity, in relation to which every ethics, but also every systemic arrangement of society and every eschatology of history (historical eschatology) limps along, i.e. lags, behind. The same facts and circumstances (state of affairs) can be apprehended by the subjectivity as follows: the spectrum of the social relation potentially emerges or looms on the horizon in the constitutive capacity of the subjectivity to develop motives and to make practical choices (choose from practical options), which can lead it (the subjectivity) to all possible places in the spectrum;ⁱⁱⁱ every place in the spectrum of one's own potentiality finds, as it were, a counterpart in the spectrum of the social relation. That of course (naturally) implies no kind of priority of a subjectivity comprehended in terms of being a substance vis-à-vis the spectrum of the social relation; it is a matter here, genetically and structurally, of the same thing, which is seen from two different perspectives,

⁵ Wolf, "Understanding Others", esp. pp. 304, 301.

⁶ See Ch. III, Section 2B, above.

and in the course of this, is conceptually reconstructed in a number of run-ups (i.e. approaches, attempts or onsets). Beside (Next to, Alongside) both these perspectives of the scientific observer, incidentally, the perspective of the Ego exists, in relation to which the Other likewise appears as the bearer of a spectrum of potentialities, which can find expression in various forms of the social relation. The Ego, therefore, quasi automatically connects its perception or its analysis of the Other with the possibilities of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the social relation. The specific experience of the encounter with the Other exists, accordingly, in the opening up of a spectrum of possible relations with him/it (the Other), irrespective of which of them are regarded *prima vista* as more likely/probable; that other sense or feeling, that, namely, already a false step (misstep) at the beginning can give another turn to the matter or case, (counter)balances the sense (feeling) of this (aforesaid *prima facie*) likelihood, after all (anyhow). The, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) or opacity and impenetrability of the Other is combined (pairs), therefore, in the Ego's eyes, with the, in principle, openness of the social relation. On the temporal horizon of the social relation, this combination (pairing) can only be solidified. Since the relation with the Other is seen from the crucial perspective of the future, the Ego cannot rely or count on, and be limited (restricted) by, the assessment of the Other's past behaviour, which corresponds with a certain possibility of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the relation. It (The Ego) must let several possible modes of behaviour in various situations parade (pass in review) before it, so that finally the picture or image of the Other extends and expands into a spectrum of likely or probable actions and reactions; in the course of this, a more stable, steady or fixed image and picture in respect of character (characterological picture) may or may not serve as a backdrop and aid in respect of orientation (orientating assistance/help); in any case, a tension between the same (image and picture regarding character) and the endeavour around/as regards more concrete prognoses of

behaviour often dominates. The temporal perspective consequently makes the image or picture of the Other all the more ambiguous (with many meanings) and turns it (the Other) into an open object of interpretation rather than into a completed and self-contained product of interpretation. The changes of/in behaviour unfold and develop in time, whereby in the imagination, every fold (i.e. aspect) in time is attributed to a fold (aspect) in the spectrum of the social relation.

Though (Admittedly), we should not forget that this analysis moves on social-ontological terrain (ground, earth, soil), that is, it is abstracted from historically and sociologically apprehensible constructs, and that is why those institutions and conventions do not come into view (and are not examined) which very often keep within certain relative boundaries the, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of subjectivity. Though (However), one would err in relation to this matter, and furthermore, would misjudge and fail to appreciate the methodical, i.e. methodological, meaning/sense of the interrelation between social ontology and history or sociology⁷, if one wanted to bring to bear the seeming firmness, stability or fixedness of the (what is) historically and sociologically ascertainable against the openness and fluidity of the social-ontological field, instead of apprehending the former (seemingly firm historical or sociological) from the point of view of the latter (open and fluid social-ontological). More fertile than every theoretical dispute, appears to us to be also in this case, the invocation of the innumerable (countless) testimonies and pieces of evidence from the collected wisdom in respect of (the) life of all cultures and epochs, which prove beyond (over) any doubt that the representation or notion of the Ego in respect of the Other as a bundle of intentions to be worked out or deciphered and still, in relation to that, variable, that is, the conviction that the imponderability (incalculability) and

⁷ See Ch. II, Section 3A, above.

uncontrollability of human subjectivity constitutes a commonplace of social experience, and at the same time the foundation of very common practical maxims (also die Überzeugung von der Unberechenbarkeit und Unkontrollierbarkeit menschlicher Subjektivität einen Gemeinplatz sozialer Erfahrung und zugleich die Grundlage sehr geläufiger praktischer Maximen bildet). The age of this conviction prohibits here any references to alleged “modern processes of differentiation”, which jointly seize, cover and include society and the individual, and thus (in this way, so) would have reinforced the complexity and the impenetrability, opacity and obscurity of both (society and the individual) as being in step (i.e. synchronised and in conformity with current society’s environment overall). Ethnologists have noted (registered, recorded, taken down, kept a record) how much the question of the, on each and every respective occasion, presented mode of appearance vis-à-vis a fellow human, calls on or makes demands of the spirits in “natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)”. In the course of this, it is not a matter only of the socially acceptable conduct or behaviour, but over and beyond that, of the choice of the right (correct) manner (mode, way) of acting (action) vis-à-vis another, which of its essence or nature cannot be absolutely transparent; multiple proverbs and sayings make exactly this embarrassment, predicament or this knowledge the, i.e. their, theme or topic (subject matter)⁸. The Zande^{iv} wonder (ask themselves) rhetorically: “can one see/look into someone, like one sees/looks through a widely-meshed basket?”⁹, and the Jabo^v formulate the same thought affirmatively: “one does not know what is going on in the head of the person next to him (his neighbour)”¹⁰. It (The said theme or topic) (has) in fact the semblance or appearance (appears) as if the certainty of the unrecognisability of

⁸ Thurnwald, *Bánaro*, p. 47; Lienhardt, “Self: public, private”, esp. p. 146.

⁹ Evans-Pritchard, *Essays*, p. 228 (in the English version: “Can one look into a person as one looks into an open-wove basket?”)

¹⁰ Herzog, *Jabo proverbs*, p. 157 (in the English version: “One does not know his fellow’s mind”). Cf. Herskovits-Tagbwe, “Kru Proverbs”, p. 247 (in the English version: “A man’s not a bunch of palm-nuts, that you may sample him”).

the Other represents and constitutes a kind/sort of a generally and universally acknowledged premise of social intercourse (des sozialen Verkehrs), in relation to which the deeper meaning (sense) of ritual and magic is supposed to exist exactly in bringing, with the usual (customary, common) means, the uncontrollable under control¹¹. One could fill many pages with vivid and graphic testimonies from the older and newer literature, which go into this social-ontological central theme in all (its) possible variations, and prove (and produce evidence for) the ubiquity of the experiences and insights in question¹². However, here we must return to the language and at the same time to the methods of abstraction, whilst we disregard or refrain from the relieving conventions and the socially mediated pre-understandings of “daily normality”, in order for us to imagine the presence of the Other in that elementary openness, which directly or indirectly, more or less consciously creeps (sneaks or slips) into every convention and into every mediated pre-understanding too. This complete Other, who is still not a friend and not a foe, can exactly because of that, become or turn into both friend as well as foe; from him, help just as much as danger can emanate; in short, he represents in parvo the Janus face of sociality and of social reality in general¹³. Social experience and the view or perception of the Ego meets, therefore, anew with scientific knowledge or the formation of hypotheses (hypotheses formation), in this case in (regard to) the thesis that subjectivity or personality must in principle be defined as potentiality in respect of/for acting/action and the development of subjectivity as the development of the potentiality in respect of/for acting/action¹⁴. Formal (i.e. form-related) a priori knowledge around/regarding the immediate or particular circumstances and the individual aspects of the potentiality for acting and

¹¹ Munn, “Gawan Kula”, p. 284.

¹² “A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other”, Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Book I, ch. 3 (beginning).

¹³ Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Der Mensch*, esp. pp. 210, 220ff..

¹⁴ Sears, “Theoretical Framework”, esp. pp. 478, 480ff..

action, (that is, (the) knowledge (knowing) about the fact that the Other in general has motives, intentions, plans, means), does not, though, say (state, declare) anything certain about the concrete content of the to-be-expected acting or action as the each and every respective actualisation of the/a subject's specific the potentiality for acting and action. The Ego can anticipate the [[said]] expected actualisation for lack of special knowledge and indications by projecting onto the image or picture of the Other all (everything) that it knows from personal or social experience, directly or mediatedly (i.e. indirectly) about the intersubjective relations of socially living men (humans) in general. This knowledge exists at this tier (level or stage (grade)) actually in (regard to) the banality that amongst men all (everything) is possible; a banality, which indeed may be made fun of by some refined theoreticians (theorists), but which is of central meaning and significance in every, in practice, relevant social respect. Only as potentiality for acting and action in this breadth, is the Other capable of transferring or shifting the Ego into the/a state (of affairs) of attention (attentiveness) or even alertness, vigilance and watchfulness. And the immediate, direct general knowledge regarding the necessary ingredients in respect of the Other's potentiality for acting (action) (motives, representations, plans), sets in the Ego, the Ego's own potentiality for acting (action) in motion, it (the said knowledge) constitutes [[does not (constitute)]]^{vi} in itself a reason for interaction (Interaktion). The Other's motives and intentions referring to the Ego and known to this Ego, must ipso facto call into being and bring to life the Ego's motives and intentions with reference and in relation to the Other.

The, in principle, impenetrability and imponderability (incalculability) of the Other (Die grundsätzliche Undurchdringlichkeit und Unberechenbarkeit des Anderen) is dealt (coped) with and managed, therefore, in respect of the Ego, first of all, through the summoning, enlisting and mobilising of personally acquired (gained) and socially mediated, general knowledge, which, of course,

by no means is sufficient for the concrete handling and dealing with concrete Other. However, already this knowledge as the possibility of knowing the Other fairly generally, without having known him/it (the Other) in detail, attests to and shows that the Ego's social-ontologically fundamental positioning (attitude and stance) vis-à-vis the Other has two equally constitutive aspects. The inscrutable, unfathomable and imponderable (incalculable) Other (Der undurchschaubare und unberechenbare Andere) is for the I (ego), the distant (far) and the alien (foreign(er)) (das Ferne und das Fremde), yet as a being, which shares the property of subjectivity fully with the Ego, it (the Other) is for this (Ego) the nearest and the most familiar. As an Ego, one can just as well say to the Other, with Plautus, "Tam ego homo sum quam tu (= Latin = I am a man as much as you [[are (a man)])]"¹⁵, or call out to him (the Other) with Shakespeare: "O, the difference of man and man!"¹⁶. The aspect of nearness (proximity) and of familiarity in the basic (fundamental) intersubjective relationship stems from the common certainty of subjects that the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation must be the same on all sides by virtue of their mere being as a subject (Subjektseins); and the aspect of distance (und der Aspekt der Ferne), of difference, of imponderability (incalculability) stems just as much from the firm (fixed) knowledge that that commonly (jointly) possessed mechanism is connected with the most different content(s), and can serve the most different intentions. The analysis of the taking on (over) and assumption (taking on) of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking) rests or is based on this dual (twin, double) foundation (i.e. the just mentioned aspect of proximity and aspect of distance), as the next sections of this chapter will show. The anthropologically–social-ontologically given (cap)ability at the taking on (over) and the assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger, foreigner, alien or others (Fremdverstehen) remains in itself form-related (i.e. formal) and

¹⁵ *Asinaria*, II, 4, V. 490.

¹⁶ *King Lear*, IV, 2, V. 26.

cannot lift (i.e. abolish, remove, set aside or do away with) the factor “imponderability (incalculability)” and “inscrutability (unfathomability)” („Unberechenbarkeit“ und „Undurchschaubarkeit“) through or by means of their mere existence (availability or presence), that is, it (the said (cap)ability) cannot vouch for and guarantee that the concrete behaviour of the Other can in principle be foreseen or anticipated in this or that concrete situation. The general form-related (i.e. formal) (cap)ability at the taking on (over) and assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking) and at the understanding of the stranger, foreigner, alien or others, differs, therefore, essentially from the (cap)ability at the taking on (over) and assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking) and at the understanding of the stranger, foreigner, alien or others in a concrete situation. Likewise, general knowledge about/regarding man as subjectivity, which is basically the same in the Ego and in the Other, differs from knowledge about/ regarding the (an) individual man in his concrete individuality. La Rochefoucauld hit the nail on the head in so far as he opined that it is easier to know and recognise man in general than an individual (hu)man (person)¹⁷.

Imponderability (Incalculability) as a basic or fundamental feature of subjectivity, as it must be treated, handled or examined at this social-ontological tier (level or stage (grade)) of abstraction does not self-evidently mean that absolutely nothing can be foreseen and pre-pondered/calculated in the institutionally structured life (living) of society. Such a state of affairs would be just as irreconcilable or incompatible with the concept of social life (living) itself as the proverbial war of all against all. But just as alien, foreign or strange to reality would a concept of social life be, which does not want to admit that the imponderable (incalculable) penetrates (forces its way into), or is even

¹⁷ «Il est plus aisé de connaître l'homme en général que de connaître un homme en particulier», *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 436.

always inherent in, the ponderable (calculable), in the same sense and to the (same) extent as the exception is interwoven with normality¹⁸. Max Weber did well in relation to that, to weave or work the word “chance (opportunity or prospects)” („Chance“) not only into the definition of “sociologically amorphous” power (Macht), but also into that (definition) of institutionally founded (backed up) (authority as) dominance (Herrschaft), which (“chance”) obviously is supposed (meant) to (should) mean/signify that not even punitive (i.e. disciplinary, punishing, punitory or penal) institutions may/are able to (can) be certain (sure) of individual behaviour in every concrete case¹⁹. Generally, ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) (Berechenbarkeit und Unberechenbarkeit) in social life are subject to the same fluctuations (vacillations) and peripeteias/peripeteiae as the places of (the) actors in the spectrum of the social relation. Also, no fixed (stable and steady, firm) interrelation between ponderability and friendship, or imponderability and enmity, can be established, made, manufactured or restored²⁰. The/A considerable difference does indeed exist between friendship and enmity in that the former (friendship) must be wanted by both sides, whereas the latter (enmity) can (be created or produced and) come into being through the initiative of one side; yet this difference does not necessarily coincide with the difference between ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), (it is not certain in advance whether the otherwise unknown Other wants to be (a) friend or foe, or whether the Ego wishes his friendship); furthermore, the difference concerns the genetic priority of the social relation, not its course (sequence or order of events): friendships can, as is known, in their course, give bad or terrible surprises; on the other hand, some enmity proceeds, for instance

¹⁸ See Ch. III, Section 3B, above.

¹⁹ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28.

²⁰ As de Jouvenel wants to establish, make or restore it, by calling or naming the foe «agent imprévisible» – «imprévisible parce qu’il n’est point partie à notre ligue d’amitié» (= “unpredictable agent” – “unpredictable because he is not at all a party to our league (alliance, bonds) of friendship”), see *Souveraineté*, p. 152.

as a result of the balance or equilibrium of forces, in or down relatively ordered and ponderable channels or courses and paths. One may not, therefore, confound and confuse ponderabilities (calculabilities) in general and as such with peace and security. Language use/usage knows (of) “ponderable (calculable) friends” just like social life; however, enmity means the precise opposite of peace and security. Said differently: only (with)in the framework of friendship is ponderability (calculability) synonymous with peace and security, and in this respect, one can define peace as the state of affairs which exists between friends²¹. This definition of peace has, though, the disadvantage that every enmity must be regarded as war, whereby the concept of peace can no longer be apprehended sharply (i.e. clearly) enough²². That is why it appears to be sensible and useful to stand the formula on its head (i.e. turn O. Brunner’s phrase and wording upside down), that is, to start from peace instead of friendship, and to say along with the profound saying of the Joruba-tribe(/clan): peace is the father of friendship (Friede ist der Vater der Freundschaft)²³. This means: friendship is not founded on the lack or absence of subjective imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities; Unwägbarkeiten), but in the lack or absence of objective dangers and risks. Furthermore, here, the bottom is knocked out of (i.e. the base is withdrawn from) psychological interpretations of the phenomenon by (the) pointing out that friendship would not create the good motives, but (friendship would create) (the) states of affairs in which bad or evil motives hardly could or would want to come to development (i.e. develop)^{vii}. Ponderability (Calculability; Berechenbarkeit) of states of affairs (situations) and ponderability of subjectivity are, however, two different (kinds of) thing(s).

²¹ Thus, e.g. Brunner, *Land*, p. 24 [[this is a very touching acknowledgement and reference to the great “NAZI” historian, Otto Brunner, by P.K., whose statement/thesis P.K. immediately proceeds to qualify as to its scientific validity = translator’s remark = absolutely nothing to do with P.K.]].

²² See Ch. III, footnote 212, above.

²³ Ellis, *Yoruba-Speaking Peoples*, p. 219 (in the English wording or version: “peace is the father of friendship”).

Likewise, two different things, however, are a ponderability (calculability) of states of affairs (situations), which concern or apply to concrete actors, ambiance(s) (i.e. atmospheres or environ(ment)s) and periods of time, and, a ponderability (calculability) which apprehends social life all in all (as a whole or in total), and is supposed to end up in the equation and identification of this same social life with “normality” per se and as such. Under, or as, normality, the dominance of fixed (steady, firm, stable) norms, that is, (the) immunity against the effects of the exception or against the state of affairs (situation) in which the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity can indeed further exist, but is socially irrelevant, is understood here; it (the said imponderability of subjectivity) simply belongs to the “environment”, not to the “system”. The theoretical attempt at equating and identifying ponderability (calculability), normality and social life was, of course, not only undertaken by system(s) theory, but in actual fact, also by the phenomenologists of the lifeworld. Representatives of so-called “ethnomethodology”, who wanted to harness and use Schütz for their own case, and correspondingly play him (Schütz) against Parsons, opined, however, that in the former (Schütz), typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) of perspectives as the basis of intersubjective communication remained constantly (permanently) contingent, that is, dependent on the action of the actors (blieben Typisierungen der Perspektiven als Basis intersubjektiver Kommunikation stets kontingent, also vom Handeln der Akteure abhängig); [[that]] Schütz does not attach any decisive effect to the common cultural background to these same actors²⁴. That could be conceded (accepted) in the sense that the typifications by Schütz avowedly apply to the wider (broader, more extensive) with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one’s contemporaries) rather than to the narrower environment (in der weiteren Mitwelt als der engeren Umwelt), with whose microscopic

²⁴ Thus, e.g. Heritage, *Garfinkel*, p. 56.

analysis the ethnomethodologists were concerned. During the transaction from the environment to the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), according to Schütz, a progressive or advanced anonymisation takes place, the personal type is transformed here from a concrete alter ego into an ideal type, and the "wealth of variations" of intersubjective relations is reduced and decreases²⁵. Schütz stresses in the course of this, that the ideal types of the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can often serve as "interpretive schemata (schemata in respect of interpretation) of the environment"; both the exchangeability and interchangeability of the perspectives – that is, the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the other (person) (also das Sichhineinversetzen in die Lage des anderen) – as well as the agreement, on both sides, of the systems of relevance, rest or are based on idealisations, or the leaving aside and exclusion of the personal and the biographical²⁶. – However, he (Schütz) does not go down the reverse(d) path, i.e. he does not proceed in the opposite direction. He (Schütz) does not, namely, investigate under which circumstances and effects the typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) and idealisations thus coming into being can become problematic anew or even invalid(ated) (untenable), he does not thematise (i.e. make as his subject matter for examination) their instrumental, i.e. precarious and changeable character, he disregards (pays no attention to) the constant movements in the spectrum of social relations, under whose pressure, typifications and idealisations must make a place (i.e. make room or make way) to concrete representations and notions. The distinction between environment and with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is by far not sufficient (in order) to make these complicated processes comprehensible, and is itself as extendable and expansible as one may like (or as it can be) and at all

²⁵ *Aufbau*, p. 256ff., 285; *Coll. Papers*, II, p. 37ff., 232ff..

²⁶ *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 11ff..

times, in need of interpretation. Schütz constructs, therefore, a “normality” beyond its ontological interweaving with the “exception”, a “natural positioning or attitude” beyond the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity *as* subjectivity. This ontology of daily life grasps (apprehends and comprehends) social action primarily as the production of commonly and jointly divided and split, i.e. shared, meaning (sense), not as the pursuit of the meaningful goals (ends or purposes) on the part of concrete actors, in whose framework and according to whose logic, exactly meaning (sense) is divided, shared or split and redistributed^{27 + viii}. In this important respect, Schütz comes nearer (closer) to Parsons than he perhaps would have liked it/to. He (Schütz) describes quasi automatised (i.e. automated) processes, which mean or signify action less, than a relief from, or relieving of, the tension/stress of existence (Entlastung) *towards* meaningful and expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful; zweckmäßigen) action, and in (regard to) their (the said quasi automated processes), harmlessness is able to be shared between friends and foes, without the core (nucleus) of the social relation – the meeting of identities – having to be touched upon even only in the least/slightest^{ix}. The model of the question and of the answer (response), which is supposed to (graphically-vividly) illustrate and demonstrate the communicative context of (mutual) understanding, (pre)supposes (assumes) a highly unreal self-sufficiency and possibility of self-isolation of the actor. In social life, this (actor) has little opportunity ([[nearly no]] occasion) to reflect (muse or ponder), in full peace and seclusion, on academic answers to academic questions of others, which are registered (recorded, noted or taken down) by others without commentary and without reaction. He (The actor) is not left “in peace” or “alone”, but is frequently placed (put) under direct or indirect pressure to do things which he would not have done of his own accord. Not one possibility of isolation or of retreat

²⁷ Cf. Zaret, “From Weber”, p. 1192.

(withdrawal), which would have saved and protected him from such a thing (i.e. the said pressure), but the potency given to him with his subjectivity to offer resistance, fight back and say no, bears witness and attests to his (cap)ability at acting (action) – still more than a consensus, which could also be interpreted as a lack of will. In the same manner, however, the subjectivity, as well as the (cap)ability at acting (action) of the Other, are proved. Every request or entreaty, every exchange, every compulsion and coercion takes place thanks to the autonomy and independence of the Other, that is, of the possibility of his (the Other's) rejection or his resistance [[of and towards others]]. But Schütz, just as little as for instance Parsons or Mead, goes into this by no means ubiquitous, but definitely (absolutely, quite) critical case²⁸.

One could now shove (thrust, push) aside such thoughts in view of the benevolent effects of norms as stabilisers of expectations. Yet with that, only the just described model in its one-sidedness, and consequently unreality, is reproduced. Because the existence (availability and presence) of norms does not lift (i.e. revoke, abolish, annul, do away with) the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity and its action; “you should (or ought)” is no prognosis, but only an appeal²⁹. Normative perceptions and views of society endeavour, nonetheless, to make out of appeals, prognoses, and for that reason accordingly shut out, exclude or eliminate from contemplation what(ever) could blur a prognosis thus/so gained (obtained). In an absolutely ponderable (calculable) world, though, the cognitive and normative expectations would coincide without any difficulty (just like that), but thus, as the world now just is, its essential difference to that (world of absolute ponderability) is already shown (seen) in the possibility of knowing that someone could violate or infringe norms. Over and above that, norms, which are supposed to regulate daily

²⁸ I am following here Tyrell's excellent analysis, *Vergesellschaftung*, esp. pp. 374ff., 384ff., 396ff., 444ff..

²⁹ Loc. cit., p. 406ff..

behaviour, frequently represent and constitute mere forms, whose content or tidings (i.e. message) which they communicate and transmit, depends on the subjectivity of those who make use of them (the said norms). One greets (someone) e.g., by (one) keeping to the outer/external form, but one does it in such a way that the corresponding gesture can betray or reveal indifference or even contempt, disdain and scorn. Every fairly experienced observer of social life (living) knows that the art – during the keeping to the form – of remaining “hard and unbending in regard to the matter at hand”, belongs to the most refined [[things]] in respect of what human – (being) (together) with one another (i.e. co-existence) – in the world has posited (or produced), and not only in the “differentiated modern”. Likewise, generally known, are the cases in which the form serves the purposes and ends of deception and deceit, or is kept to and observed, on both sides, in the knowledge of its substantial irrelevance. In general, it is thus, that the norms of the lifeworld are only valid and apply at face value as long as nothing or little is at stake, as, that is, the actual and real concerns (issues and affairs) of identity are in no way touched upon, as no-one deprives, or withholds from, themselves and refuses/denies, their self-understanding, due recognition. This is the decisive criterion, not for instance, the boundaries between the environment and the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one’s contemporaries), which, incidentally, are always defined anew with regard to that criterion. In themselves, norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground as well as a battlefield. The age-old distinctions between legality and morality, on the one hand, between “actual” and “formalistic” morality, on the other hand, also attest to the fact that socially living humans have never confused the keeping to forms with the ponderability (calculability) of the Other.

What applies to the norms of daily behaviour in the narrower or wider (broader) lifeworld, applies likewise to/for the more elevated, lofty or upscale

cultural norms and (the) culturally constructed meaning(ful) contexts (contexts in respect of/pertaining to meaning (sense)), that is, to/for the great systems of art, of science, of religion, of myth etc.. Schütz's statement, – it could also (have) emanate(d)/stem(med) from Parsons, – (that) these systems “as (interpretive) schemata (of interpretation), pre-exist every interpretation of meaning of alien (foreign) action (i.e. the action of others)”³⁰, must be understood *cum grano salis* (= Latin = with a grain of salt), they have, at any rate, pretty/fairly little to do with the ponderability (calculability) of alien action (the action of others). Because the culturally pre-given norms or meaning contexts (contexts of meaning) constitute, first of all, only a formal framework, inside of which very much is acted out (or takes place), namely, the spectrum of the social relation can unfold and develop in its entire breadth. The fact *that* the Ego commands and dominates the cultural language [[for itself(, not in general)]] in which the Other expresses itself as a social being, does not grant or offer him any certain and secure knowledge about *what* the Other will express. A German does not know in advance that another German will treat him in a friendly manner already because it is certain that this (German) speaks the same language as that (German); nothing else happens between Christians, scientists or artists, who think more or less (with)in the same (meaning) contexts (in respect of meaning). Formulated theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory): the commonality of the meaning context (or context of meaning), inside of which a social relation takes place and is acted out, may not be confused with the ponderability (calculability) of the process of this same social relation. Moreover, this meaning context is not understood at all by everyone, and always in the same manner. It (The said meaning context) constitutes at every moment an object of interpretation, and in the interpretations undertaken, the shifts in the spectrum of the social relation are reflected or shown (Die

³⁰ *Aufbau*, p. 45.

Gemeinsamkeit des Sinnrahmens, innerhalb dessen sich eine soziale Beziehung abspielt, darf nicht mit der Berechenbarkeit des Ablaufs dieser selben sozialen Beziehung verwechselt werden. Zudem wird dieser Sinnrahmen nicht einmal von allen und immer auf dieselbe Art und Weise verstanden. Er bildet jeden Augenblick einen Interpretationsgegenstand, und an den unternommenen Interpretationen spiegeln oder zeichnen sich Verschiebungen im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung ab). From that which occurs in this spectrum, the scientific interpretation of those interpretations must therefore start, not the other way around. The, in itself, correct talk of the intersubjective construction of cultural meaning contexts should not suggest the false impression that in this process all (people) (everyone) would participate (take part) as like-minded partners, and with equal rights. According to the movements in the spectrum of the social relation, everyone must reserve for himself here a right of interpretation and a right of deviation (deviance) or divergence, – that is, he/everyone reserves the right to be imponderable and incalculable, and partakes of ponderability (calculability) on condition of imponderability (incalculability). This can take place in two opposed forms, which are already implied in our explications (exposition(s), observations) above. On the one hand, the subject in daily life does not pay attention to (i.e. it completely ignores) banal or lofty (elevated) norms, because the subject is overwhelmed by the task of transforming and translating them (the said banal or lofty norms) into (or applying them to) each and every respective concrete situation. On the other hand, it (i.e. the subject) holds onto and clings to these (norms) because these are frequently proved as neutral enough to promote acts and actions which “normally” are not regarded as “normal”; thus, for instance, robbers and blackmailers (extortionists)

presuppose that rules and norms of language will be kept to by/on both sides, so that “(mutual) understanding functions”³¹.

Phenomenologists of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologists would come much nearer/closer to reality if they had taken as the starting point of their thoughts and considerations the image or picture which frequently attested to Common Sense makes of socially living humans about “(the) world and man”. Calming, reassuring and soothing anonymities and automatisms do not dominate this image/picture, but the feeling or sense predominates and preponderates that “normality” and “exception”, (the) ponderable (calculable) and (the) imponderable (incalculable) (elements), grip, grasp and intertwine with one another, that one indeed must, without [[doing]] any damage or harm to oneself, be courteous and obliging, but at the same time, forearmed and prepared for the unforeseen and unexpected, and “on guard/alert”. The consequences of inattentiveness (carelessness, negligence, inadvertence) and naivety have to be attributed to every person himself. Common Sense, therefore, does not draw up, devise or plan two different pictures (images) of the social world, one for good/nice (weather conditions) and one for bad/poor weather conditions, but one single relatively rich-in-nuances picture or image. At the centre or focal point of this picture, a likewise rich-in-nuances or ambivalent perception (view) of man as the object or reason/cause of trust and at the same time of mistrust, of hope and at the same time of fear – as a ponderable and a “rational”, but at the same time as an imponderable (incalculable) and an “affective” being, stands or is found. And even when the bright, light and dark tones of this united image or picture seems sometimes to become separated from one another, in order to emit, produce or constitute images or pictures independent from one another, then, nevertheless, one of these pictures (images)

³¹ See in relation to that, Goffman’s good remarks (comments and observations), “Interaction Order”, p. 5. This point is of central significance and importance for the judgement of normative communication theory, and we must come back to it, see Section D, below, in this chapter.

serves merely as the background of the other: the general representation and notion of the social and of man consequently remains mixed and ambivalent, even if it is placed under a vault (canopy, dome or arch) of a howsoever put together and made religious or secularised, in any case, relieving (as to the stress/tension of existence), theodicy. It is also not to be otherwise expected (There is nothing else as well to expect), if that “fundamental anxiety”, which Schütz himself rightly – but without drawing the necessary systematic conclusions from that – calls a “basic experience”³², is in actual fact fundamental, that is, it (the said “fundamental anxiety”) imbues (saturates and soaks) social behaviour in toto. Newer social-psychological approaches, which one subsumes under the rubric “dramaturgical model”, showed a finer and more refined sensorium or sixth sense for/as regards the situation of tension (stress or intensity), which comes into being in every interaction on the basis of the fact that the Ego must reckon with/on seeing the possibility his claims to recognition of its (the Ego’s) publicly-put-forward(presented) identity being rejected, repudiated or relativised, that it (the Ego), therefore, must at all times be prepared and braced for an emergency or the worst³³. They (The said newer social-psychological approaches) move, nonetheless, in the narrower horizon of that which Schütz called the environment; but for us here the knowledge is important that also the typified and anonymised with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one’s contemporaries) is not merely grey and neutral or indifferent, but rather a further (additional) source of the same ambivalences and split (divided) expectations of the environment. The with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one’s contemporaries) can likewise be insecure, uncertain and imponderable (incalculable); now here relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of existence can function as anonymisation and typification. But

³² *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 228.

³³ We shall concern ourselves and deal with these approaches in the discussion of the question and problem of identity in the 3rd volume of this work.

every relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of life and existence is a great weight on and weighs down that which is supposed to (should) be relieved (as regards the tension and stress of existence).

The subject trusts the great systems of culture, and daily life or norms of culture, so little that it probably develops its own “private scientific system”³⁴ in order to assess and evaluate the becoming and events, and accordingly to orientate itself in its action, in short, in order to become master of imponderability (incalculability). The social-ontological opening up, illuminating and reconstruction of this system appears to be possible, because it, in all subjects, revolves around ascertainable formal variables. The difficulty lies, not so much in its (this social-ontological opening up’s) formation and development, which on the basis of anthropological aptitudes or predispositions, as it were, takes place spontaneously, albeit in a reflected way (i.e. as to cognitive reflection), but in its handling and treatment, that is, in (the) cases of well-aimed judgements about each and every respective content-related formation of those formal variables, depending on each and every respective Other and on each and every respective concrete situation. (It is a matter here, obviously, of another form (shape) of the above-described discrepancy or complementarity between the formal mechanism of the social relation and the great variety and diversity of the content(s) with which it (the said formal mechanism of the social relation) can be connected – or as regards one further variation of the interlocking, interconnecting or intertwining of ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), whereby ponderability (calculability) more likely concerns the form, and imponderability (incalculability) more likely (concerns) the content.) As the foundation of this system, the knowledge of the Other functions as subjectivity, which does not constitute something to be merely manipulated (kein bloßes Manipulandum) but

³⁴ Ruesch-Bateson, *Communication*, p. 26.

an action centre (i.e. centre of action; Aktionszentrum), from which damage (harm and or hurt) and benefit or utility can emanate for the Ego – and indeed, in the widest (broadest, most extensive) sense of these terms, that is also unpleasant (uncomfortable) and pleasant (agreeable), friendly and inimical etc.. The tracing back of the effects of alien activity (i.e. the activity of the Other) to the intention of the Other, now marks a decisive turn in the social relation, as it (this social relation) is seen from the perspective of the I (ego). It (The said tracing back of ...) simultaneously marks a deepening of the understanding of the subjectivity of the Other. This (subjectivity of the Other) is perceived not merely as acting (active; handelnde) but also as perceiving (perceptive; wahrnehmende), whereby perception (Wahrnehmung) here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself/himself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other (das beiderseitige Vermögen bedeutet, sich in die Lage des jeweils Anderen hineinzusetzen), to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. Since the I (ego) perceives in this wider (broader) sense that the I (ego) perceives, and the other way around (conversely, contrariwise, vice versa), both sides ascribe to each other a higher degree of (self-)consciousness, awareness (Bewußtheit) and purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) (usefulness; Zweckmäßigkeit). This of course means also a higher degree of dangers and risks, but at the same time it creates the basis upon which end(goal)-rational (purposeful and expedient; zweckrationale) attempts for the influencing of the Other can take place. Since outer (external) action is founded on perception and since perception directly interrelates with the rating (evaluation and assessment) and the formation of motivation (Da äußeres Handeln in der Wahrnehmung gründet und da Wahrnehmung mit Wertung und Motivationsbildung direkt zusammenhängt), thus must the I (ego) want to influence the perception of the Other, that is, put himself in (and or empathise with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external)

position and situation in such a way that the putting of the Other in the position and situation of the I (ego) is carried out in accordance with the representations and notions of the I (ego) (sich das Hineinversetzen des Anderen in die Lage des Ich gemäß den Vorstellungen des Ich vollzieht). The Other endeavours (for and aspires to), on his part, [[being]] in the (i.e. in having) knowledge of the same mechanism, the same aim, such that the behaviour and endeavour of one side turns into the motivating cause (reason) of/for the behaviour and endeavour of the other (side) (as well as the other way around) and the interaction is potentised (i.e. becomes more intense, dynamic, multiplies and climaxes) (und die Interaktion sich potenziert).

But the, in practice, usable system of orientation, which the subject constructs, cannot only exist in the conjectures and suppositions about/regarding alien intentions (i.e. the intention of (the) other(s)). Since the perception of the Other means on the part of the I (ego), a comprehensive putting of oneself in (and or empathising with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation, thus to the assessment of intentions as the (i.e. what is) most subjective and most mobile and agile, an assessment of the more subjective^x and the more fixed (steady or stable) comes to be added (so kommt zur Einschätzung der Absichten als des Subjektivsten und Beweglichsten eine Einschätzung von Subjektiverem und Festerem hinzu). This objectification (or objectivisation; Objektivierung), which obviously is supposed to serve the reduction of imponderability (incalculability), begins in the subjectivity of the Other itself, to which more or less stable dispositions being manifested in identically recurring modes of acting and behaving are ascribed. Dispositions now appear as the united invariable background or backdrop, from which individual positionings and acts spring, yet the reduction of these (individual positionings and acts) to that (backdrop (with dispositions)) remains too linear and simplistic in order to be sufficient for all situations as a model of

explanation (i.e. explanatory model). Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, its (the subject's) (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for and take into account the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity (und schließlich erweitert sich das Orientierungssystem nochmals, um der äußern Objektivität, also der Gegebenheit der konkreten Lage Rechnung zu tragen, in der der Andere seine Tätigkeit entfalten muß). In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. Depending on whether the acting and action is derived from the (supposed) discretion of the Other or from the requirements and demands of an independent-of-it-(i.e. this (supposed) discretion) situation, the classification takes place, whereby the positioning and attitude of the I towards the Other is considerably influenced by the impression which the I (ego) itself has formed about the extent or degree of the conscious responsibility of the Other for its good or bad (evil) acts and deeds. The (supposed) intent(ion) of the acting (person, subject etc.) weighs so heavily and greatly during (the) judgement of the acting (or act(ion)), that one could almost think that inner or outer (internal or external) objective factors – that is, factors given without help or input of/from the subject concerned – would only be taken into account so that the effect of the intent(ion) can be isolated and assessed so much the more forcefully and or urgently. That is also not further surprising. Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity *as* subjectivity par

excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).

One could call this schema or system the “naive analysis of action”³⁵, which stamps (shapes or moulds) the social perception of subjects as actors and interacting (beings, entities) (als Akteure und Interagierende). The immediate (or direct) nearness (proximity, closeness) of Common Sense to the fundamental insights of every scientific analysis is also noticeable (or also stands out) here, and it (this nearness) would continue (carry on) standing out and being noticeable, if we wanted to illuminate and investigate this same schema or system from other sides (i.e. aspects or facets), like for instance descriptions of alien (foreign) (i.e. other) persons and self-descriptions of persons undertaken on the basis of the same, less numerous (i.e. small-in-number) categories of perception, like the more general or vaguer categories for the description of persons differ from the more special (particular) or more concrete categories for the description of situations etc.³⁶. Instead of this however, we want to linger or dwell somewhat longer on the central meaning (significance and importance) of (the) intent(ion) (Absicht) for the evaluation or judgement of act(ion)s, since precisely and primarily therein (i.e. the intention), the consciousness of the subjects manifests itself and finds expression so that they meet or encounter one another *as* subjects, i.e. as bearers of identities and abilities, which cannot be interpreted and handled or treated in the same manner as (what is) objective in general (things or unalterable and immutable situations). From action, on the basis of intentions, the unexpected can be expected, since intentions at least *prima vista* are more arbitrary than the compulsions of the objective (i.e. what is objective), and at the same time, its (the said intention-based action’s) assumption and acceptance founds and

³⁵ According to an expression by Heider, see *Psychology*, esp. Ch. 3, 4 and 10. Cf. the concise remarks of Tagiuri, “Introduction”, esp. x-xi, xv, as well as the “theory of correspondent inferences” developed by Jones-Davis, “From Acts to Dispositions” subsequent to (following) Heider’s analyses, esp. pp. 223ff., 226ff., 237ff..

³⁶ Hastorf et al., “Problem of Relevance”, p. 61.

legitimises the classifications and reactions on the part of the Other, who can, as a result, be active and act likewise as a subject. Because only vis-à-vis a subject can the subject fully and completely (entirely) be a subject. Investigation self-evidently at this level remains undiscussed and irrespective of whether in actual fact things are thus, whether, that is, intentions are really autonomous, whether the subject has a free will and is, in the absolute sense, capable of calculation etc.. It is only of interest to what/which perception of the Other as subject, is the I (ego) inevitably and invariably driven by its own subjectivity. Subjects can look at and regard one another only thus (in this/such a way) – sometimes even against a better knowledge (i.e. when knowing better). There exists, though, no doubt, that in every fairly sober judgement or interpretation of an act/ing (action; Handlung), the objective boundaries and compulsions (coercion(s) and constraints) are taken into account, and this also in the smaller or greater mad rush and hectic situation of everyday life. Just as indubitable is, however, the fact proven by social-psychological investigations that in actors, the strong and intense proclivity exists to accord to objective factors less weight than that which would benefit them (such objective factors) inside a purely rational reconstruction of the process of acting and action. The meaning and content of an act(ion) (Handlung) preserve (maintain) their intrinsic value irrespective of the circumstances under which these take place³⁷. The friendly or inimical attitude of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the Other accordingly depends essentially on an evaluation and judgement of the act(ion) of the Other by means of the criteria “intent(ion)”, “responsibility”, “justification”³⁸. That means that in regard to the imputation of good intentions to the Other, act(ion)s and modes of behaviour are not taken as being bad or evil, which would otherwise have to provide reason and grounds for conflict and enmity. Aggressivity increases normally not with the extent of the damage suffered, but correspondingly with the presumed

³⁷ Jones-Harris, “Attribution of Attitudes”, esp. 1, p. 22.

³⁸ Pepitone, “Attributions of Causality”, esp. pp. 259-264.

intensity of the Other's bad or evil intentions³⁹. Conversely, thankfulness, gratitude or gratefulness for good deeds (and blessings) received depends on the assessment and appreciation of the intentions and of the unselfish and altruistic motivation of the do-gooder and benefactor rather than on the material or other value of the gift (i.e. the thing given and donated)⁴⁰.

Naturally, the favourable or unfavourable evaluation or assessment of the intentions of the Other does not always translate linearly into friendly or inimical act(ion)s of the I (ego) vis-à-vis him (i.e. the Other). Because the I (ego) is at all times conscious of the difference between what is subjectively meant by the Other, and the objective (effects), that is, the effects of the foreseeable (estimated or anticipated) meaning of his (i.e. the Other's) acts, and must often orientate or align his (the I's) own action (Handeln) towards/with this latter (objective) meaning (of the Other's acts). The I will, consequently, normally defend himself if the Other made preparations and took measures to kill him (the I) out of love, and he (the I) can behave or conduct himself for reasons of purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) (usefulness) friendlily vis-à-vis someone in respect of whom, he (the I) knows that he places little value on (despises and disdains), and wants for him even something bad or evil (harm). Particular consideration of intentions, and the distinction between subjectively meant and objective meaning, or between intentions and the effects of alien action (i.e. the action of others), exist, therefore, in the social perception of the subject next to one another, and are combined in various ways. Nietzsche oversimplified things when he skipped (i.e. overlooked) that consideration and that distinction, and opined (thought, said) that the I (ego) clearly and obviously starts from the effects of alien act(ion)s (i.e. the acts of others) on himself (i.e. the I), he (the I) takes or infers from these effects, the intentions of the Other,

³⁹ Epstein-Taylor, "Instigation to Aggression", p. 288.

⁴⁰ Goranson-Berkowitz, "Reciprocity and Responsibility".

and from these intentions, he then judges the character of the Other⁴¹. The principal interrelation between subjectivity and more or less imponderable (incalculable) personal particularity inside social perception is seen (shown), however, not only in regard to the particular interest in intentions in their distinction as to/towards the effects of the (alien) action (i.e. action of others). It (The said principal interrelation between subjectivity and ...) is recognisable also in the interpretations of intersubjective constellations. In situations (Situationen), e.g., in which those taking part (the participants) behave similarly, behaviour is normally ascribed to the demands and requirements of the situation-position/circumstances (Lage) rather than to individual proclivities and propensities, whereas diverging opinions and modes of behaviour by way of preference (preferably) are in the habit of being put down and reduced to subjective peculiarities and particularities rather than to objective conditions or compulsions (constraints or coercion)⁴². The weight and the imponderability of the subjectivity are only downplayed or denied (gainsaid) when this is (lies) in the interest of a certain subject in dealing with another (subject). Since the ascription or attribution of intentions or dispositions is, not least of all, a means of orientation and a possible instrument of control, the I (ego) directs, as expected, its attention to the Other, which can vary, and at the same time is influenced, and conversely, (the I (ego)) moves into the foreground (i.e. comes to the fore) itself what more or less is supposed (meant) to appear unalterable (immutable). It (The I (ego)) tends, therefore, in relation to that to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) through/by means of intentions, and its own (act(ion)s), especially (act(ion)s) unpleasant for/to the Other, to, more

⁴¹ *Morgenröte*, § 102, cf. § 118 = Werke, II, pp. 1076, 1093. [[The Greek translator makes a comment here of some interest though I am not going to bother with it (it's not necessary; it's a bit "smart-arse"-like and does not affect the crux of P.K.'s point = translator's note = absolutely nothing to do with P.K. Further note: almost immediately after his comment, the Greek translator does not fully translate a phrase and FUCKS UP the meaning of P.K.'s text and line of thought/argumentation – he has done this a number of times throughout all of his translations of P.K., and such sloppiness is inexcusable, though overall the Greek Translator has done an excellent job, because overall he is an excellent, experienced, veteran translator.]]

⁴² Kelley, "Attribution"; cf. Jones-Harris, "Attribution", p. 23.

likely, make plausible through/by means of circumstances⁴³. All this can proceed in good faith or via unconscious rationalisations, or else reflectively (i.e. with reflection) and calculatedly. Something else is, nevertheless, decisive. The downplaying of the weight and significance (importance) (of), and the role of subjectivity remains the work of subjectivity, one of its (subjectivity's) possible social strategies. From strategy there will, of course, be no social-ontological fact. Because from the perspective of the Other, the matter appears to be different (otherwise), and the constant mutual (reciprocal) replacement of the I-role (role of the I (ego)) (Ichrolle) by the Other-role (role of the Other) (Anderenrolle), the constant interchange or exchange of the view of things and of the strategies in the subjects remaining the same, lets the predominance of the subjective factor in social perception stand out and become evident all to more clearly.

b. Alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and trust (confidence) (Fremdheit und Vertrauen)

In the previous (sub-)section it was explained why ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) do not have to be considered as the simple correlat(iv)es of friendship and enmity. Just as little may alienness (strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) (Fremdheit und Vertrautheit) be regarded as such correlates. The foe (enemy) can be – since earlier (i.e. from beforehand) – familiar (vertraute), – or in the course of the inimical relation(ship) – a person who became familiar (vertraut gewordene Person sein), whereas aliens (or strangers; Fremde) in principle enjoy hospitality and can be regarded as untouchable, inviolable, sacrosanct and holy,

⁴³ Kelley, "Attribution".

sacred.^{xi} Neither, also, must the overcoming of alienness entail friendship, nor must alienness in itself (necessarily) entail enmity. In the alien or strange (foreign and unfamiliar) and in the uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious), though, the possibility of enmity is contained, or the tension, stress and intensity inhering or residing in it (the alien or strange, etc.) can be unloaded or discharged into enmity (Im Fremden und Unheimlichen ist allerdings die Möglichkeit der Feindschaft enthalten bzw. kann sich die ihm innewohnende Spannung in Feindschaft entladen). It (The alien or strange, etc.) does not have to [[end up in enmity]], as long as vital interests (in respect) of identity are not endangered and put at risk; nevertheless, that which is detrimental (prejudicial, harmful and damaging) to those interests, has, as was rightly remarked and observed, only in the most seldom of cases the character of the uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious)^{44 + xii}. During the discussion of this question, as a rule, directly or indirectly, cultural yardsticks, benchmarks and criteria are taken as this discussion's basis, which creates a certain confusion. The alien and stranger can in fact just as well stem or emanate from one's own cultural circle; in this case, alienness and strangeness is related or refers to other (i.e. different) aspects, i.e. not to that abstract generality, which is called "culture" or "nation", but to narrower abstractions, which are meant (supposed) to characterise subsystems of one's own lifeworld, or else also to outlandish (strange, queer, odd or disconcerting) peculiarities and particularities of the/an individual[['s]] demeanour and conduct („befremdliche“ Besonderheiten des individuellen Auftretens)⁴⁵. Under [[certain]] circumstances, "human" alienness (foreignness,

⁴⁴ Plessner, „Macht und menschliche Natur“, *Gesammelte Schriften*, V, p. 195.

⁴⁵ Thus, Simmel thought mainly of the person from a foreign culture who lingered, stayed and dwelled for a fairly long time in a certain society, but never quite became for it a joining member, i.e. he never quite joined it (grew close or affiliated and aligned himself with the said certain society), when he called the alien and stranger the/a "potential(ly) wanderer (drifter, roamer, floater)" („potenziell Wandernden“), who, although he had not moved on, had not completely overcome the relaxed manner or mood of coming and going. [[This is real P.K. JOO-Time Here! HAHAAAAHA!!! = Translator's comment, ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with P.K.]] Precisely in his quality and characteristic of representing the "unity of nearness (proximity) and farness (remoteness and distance)", he can objectively see the cultural community, in which he stays and spends his time, from the inside, and at the same time, from the outside (*Soziologie*, pp. 509, 510). Compared with this (On the other hand), Wood widened or extended/expanded the concept of the alien or stranger in that the alien/stranger is "one

strangeness, unfamiliarity) or alienation and estrangement (Entfremdung) grows (more likely) into enmity as cultural distance.^{xiii} Admittedly, the culturally alien, strange and foreign is normally perceived as a provocation, since through its mere existence and presence the self-evidence of one's own cultural values is shown to be a lie or untrue. However, overlooking the fact that similar feelings can also turn against innovative phenomena inside one's own culture^{xiv}, that provocation by no means must lead to enmity. The automatic relativisation of one's own values (Die automatische Relativierung eigener Werte) by means of the existence and presence of alien, strange, and just as firmly believed (values), only sows, then, enmity, when it (the said relativisation of one's own values) is seen as a sign that sooner or later real acts of attack against one's own identity must follow. Otherwise, the cultural distance between two individual or collective subjects does not represent and constitute a(ny) necessary or sufficient reason for enmity – in fact, extreme conflicts have existed, which have been acted out and taken place on a common cultural terrain (ground, soil, territory, basis) (e.g. civil wars), or against the background or backdrop of narrow lifeworld(ly) nearness and proximity (e.g. family vendettas). And the other way around; the frequent use/usage in the history of ideas of alien, foreign and strange, even “primitive” models and examples (like that of the “noble savage” or of the “wise Chinaman” at the time or in the Age (times) of the Enlightenment), as a means in the struggle against one's own cultural anomalies, abuses or deplorable states of affairs, proves that alienness, foreignness and strangeness as such by no means must repel (and repulse people).

who has come into face-to-face contact with the group for the first time”. Being an alien and stranger depends, therefore, not on the possible duration of the contact, not even on the provenance or origin(s) of the alien/stranger; prophets, geniuses or psychopaths etc. could likewise be aliens and strangers inside their own society, even if in another meaning or sense than that for those facing and appearing in a society for the first time (*Stranger*, p. 43ff.).

The encounter or meeting with the (culturally or otherwise) alien or strange (foreign and unfamiliar), awakens a spontaneous impression whose content depends less on the alleged original and unspoilt uncanniness, weirdness (eeriness or mysteriousness) (*Unheimlichkeit*) of every alien, foreigner or stranger, but rather on the concrete momentous disposition and situation or position of that which encounters and meets the alien and stranger. Whoever drowns (i.e. is about to drown) is suddenly (abruptly, all of a sudden) thankful to the appearing and helping stranger (i.e. the alien appearing and helping him not drown), as uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious) as he (the stranger) may otherwise look. This same stranger or alien, with the same outer or external [[appearance]], is experienced at first sight entirely differently if his going into and penetrating the area or territory of the I (ego), for whatever reasons, seems to always entail troubles, disturbances and dangers and risks, or if the exercising of dominance (or dominant authority) over him (the stranger) is supposed or ought to be legitimised. “Prejudice” is an economical (as in sparing and not wasteful) way of thinking or mode of thought, and as such is not to be got rid of and eliminated, as every other relieving typification (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) too, however the dynamic(s) of the social relation normally proves itself as stronger than the *original* prejudices, i.e. it (these dynamics/this dynamic) do/es not (entirely) abolish indeed prejudice in general and as such, it (the dynamic(s)) can, however, fill it (the said prejudice) on each and every respective occasion with other content, and put it (the prejudice) at its own service, depending on how it (the social relation) unfolds and develops on each and every respective occasion. According to the fundamental or in principle subjection and subjugation of alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) under/to the dynamic(s) and logic of the social relation, also the ponderability (calculability) or imponderability (incalculability) of the course (or series of events) of a meeting and encounter or interaction (*einer Begegnung oder Interaktion*) with aliens, foreigners and

strangers does not essentially differ from that encounter or meeting which adheres and attaches to, or is inherent in, the social relation in general. If we disregard the (pre)disposition, the situation (and or position) and the prejudices of him standing across or opposite from the alien, foreigner or stranger, and concentrate our consideration on the alien, foreign or strange Other, that is, at a relatively high level of abstraction, nevertheless, we can put forward and assert the following difference: the imponderability (incalculability) of the familiar (person) becomes noticeable and perceptible in the exchange or switching of his (i.e. the familiar person's) already known place inside the spectrum of the social relation with another and unexpected (place); the completely alien, foreigner or stranger, who, though, is met and encountered only at the above-mentioned level of abstraction, possesses, first of all, no place at all in the spectrum, and by remaining temporarily outside of the same, he refers to its (the spectrum's) entire breadth; he (the alien, stranger etc.) is, as it were, at the zero or nought point of the social relation, and in this respect, is basically identical with the complete(ly) Other, of whom there was talk in the previous [[sub-]]section. Schematically, it can be said: in the encounter or meeting with the imponderable (incalculable) familiar, the belated or ex post facto surprise predominates and prevails, during that encounter/meeting with the complete(ly) alien, foreigner or stranger, the initial tension, stress or intensity (predominates and prevails). But this tension etc. does not last long, since the alien (foreigner or stranger), whether through the interaction starting or through the newly confirmed prejudices or fresh, new impressions, quickly finds a place in the spectrum of the social relation (relation(ship) (in respect) of the social) (einen Platz im Spektrum der Sozialbeziehung).

In favour of this overall way of looking at things of being alien, foreign, strange and unfamiliar (Fremdseins) from the superordinate point of view of the social relation, the fact that the "alien, stranger or foreigner" does not make up a

statistical category of social existence (or social being (t)here) (keine statistische Kategorie sozialen Daseins ausmacht), speaks for itself. Everyone can in relation or with reference to everyone else, appear as a stranger or alien; everyone can become “estranged and alienated”, or the other way around (contrariwise), enter into a relationship of familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) (Vertrautheit) with strangers and aliens.⁴⁶ The to and fro (i.e. back and forth) between alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) (Fremdheit und Vertrautheit) is reinforced both by ambiguity (with multiple meanings) and their gradations, as well as by their mixing and blending. Even the most alien, strangest, and first of all, most incomprehensible and unintelligible, has, as Husserl said, “a core or nucleus of the state of knowing and familiarity (Bekanntheit), without which it could not at all be experienced, even as an alien or stranger”⁴⁷. Just as much, also, does the familiar (and or intimate) (Vertrautes) have an aspect of alienness (strangeness and unfamiliarity), which either is (consciously) left aside and ignored, because it does not touch or impinge upon the vital points of the social relation in question, or only (then) stands out and is noticed when the social relation falters, comes to a standstill or breaks down. In fact, in accordance with the turn which a social relation takes, the aspect of alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) moves into the foreground (or comes to the fore), something which accompanies (or is accompanied by) a change of evaluations or ratings. Behind them stand, of course, the variable and mutable needs (requirements) of the identity and the always – in the becoming – comprehended formation and development of the identity. If non-Greeks were not yet in Homer, barbarians, in the 5th century no doubt existed, in relation to that, that they were it

⁴⁶ Tiryakian, “Sociological Perspectives”, pp. 53, 56.

⁴⁷ *Husserliana*, XV, p. 432.

(barbarians)⁴⁸. Types of an attitude, stance or positioning towards the/an alien, foreigner or stranger can also be carved, worked or brought out depending on the tier, level stage or grade of social development and the overall character of the social formation⁴⁹. If one structures this historical great variety (of form) (or multiformity) with the help of social-ontological categories, thus one ascertains that both the treatment or handling of the alien and stranger, as well as the reaction of the alien/stranger in relation to that (treatment), and to life in the alien and strange (i.e. life in an alien, foreign, strange and unfamiliar society) in general, stretches across the whole spectrum of the social relation. The alien and or stranger can therefore be killed (put to death), he can, however, also be treated like a quasi god, from whom himself the highest and holiest or most sacred privileges may (are) not (allowed to) be withheld; in between [[the two extremes of killing the alien/stranger and treating him like a quasi god]], other forms of the relation lie or are found (exist), like for instance partnership through gift exchange (the exchange of gifts), adoption or blood brotherhood⁵⁰. If a friendly relation(ship) towards the alien/foreigner/stranger unfolds or develops, then he becomes in the case of a visit, like a guest; in the case of a temporary stay, like a resident; and in the case of a remaining/lasting, i.e. permanent stay like a newly accepted member of the community; if, however, the relation(ship) turns into [[something]] inimical, then one treats him (the stranger/alien), in the first case, like an intruder/interloper/penetrator/infiltrator/invader; in the second (case), like the/an internal foe; and in the third

⁴⁸ Dihle, *Die Griechen und die Fremden*.

⁴⁹ Thurnwald, „Fremder“; „Probleme der Fremdheit“, p. 51.

⁵⁰ Wood, *Stranger*, chap. III, cf. p. 17 and Tiryakian, “Sociological Perspectives”, p. 49. No different than in “folks of nature (i.e. primitive peoples)”, are things, seen as a whole, in today’s “West”, something which confirms the social-ontological stability of these attitudes, stances and positionings. Some would like most or best to crush the intruding (penetrating, infiltrating, invading) alien, foreigner and stranger on the spot, if no punishment threatened [[them]] for that, others want to worship him (the alien/stranger) virtually or actually like a god, and because of that, they want, in a first phase, to equip, vest or endow him with the features and characteristics of the/a suffering god. Idealisation and daemonisation represent and constitute also here both poles between which the mixed positionings and attitudes move, or binding and non-binding “contacts” are cultivated.

(case) like a pariah or outcast⁵¹. Not all these modes/ways/manners of treatment and positionings or attitudes (stances) occur and are found, of course, in all polities or communities; some (polities or communities) e.g. receive and welcome guests, but do not grant any permanent rights of residence, and do not permit (any) naturalisation; moreover, it is open whether the privileges or rights granted or accorded to the alien, foreigner or stranger, are granted or accorded to him as a person, or in principle to every alien/foreigner/stranger. On/For his (the alien's, foreigner's or stranger's) part, the alien, foreigner or stranger dwelling and abiding for a shorter or longer (period of) time amongst strangers, reacts to the pressure to adapt to the new yardsticks or criteria and modes of behaviour, either through zeal to conform or else, above all, when he, in the course of this, founders and fails and endures or suffers frustrations, by growing aggressivity and contempt, disdain or scorn for those yardsticks or criteria and modes of behaviour. The fool's licence to do whatever one wants, which he (the alien, foreigner and stranger) may enjoy, serves less as comfort, solace or consolation, and more as a valve (vent or outlet) of/for his aggressivity^{52 + xv}. The inimical pole of the social relation is, therefore, here occupied when the alien/stranger in (regard to)/on all points stresses the differences between himself and the new surroundings or environment; the friendly (pole of the social relation is occupied) when he wants to desperately and absolutely be assimilated, in relation to which he may express the same inability to really understand foreign (alien or strange) mores (manners, customs, morals) and ways of thinking, both in regard to exaggerated and overdone censure and reproach, or in regard to exaggerated and overdone praise. In between (the said two exaggerated and overdone extremes), there are stances like for instance outer (external) adaptation during inner (internal) distance/distancing etc.⁵³.

⁵¹ According to a schematisation by Levine, *Flight*, p. 83.

⁵² Zajonc, "Aggressive Attitudes", esp. pp. 207, 208.

⁵³ Michels, „Materialien“, esp. pp. 296, 300ff., 310.

Trust and mistrust (Vertrauen und Mißtrauen) stand/are in no unambiguous, linear and stable relation(ship) with/towards/vis-à-vis familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) and alienness (strangeness, unfamiliarity) (Vertrautheit und Fremdheit); trust presupposes indeed (a certain) familiarity, but mistrust can come into being both as a result of alienness/strangeness as well as familiarity. In general, trust and mistrust are as concepts and (a) social relation just as ambiguous (with multiple meanings) and plastic as alienness and familiarity, they just as much are subject to the more comprehensive logic of the social relation and take place against the background of the entire spectrum of the same (social relation), or (against the background) of the in principle imponderable (incalculable) shifts and transpositions of the subjects inside this spectrum. Just as alienness is not always and unmediatedly a negative point of reference, so too trust does not represent and constitute an individually or collectively, essentially, positive point of reference and any harbour and haven perceived and felt as a whole to be safe and secure. Trust is, namely, no primary social magnitude and no supporting pillar (i.e. mainstay) of society. It grows and increases *inside* the already existing (society), which, at any rate, is not a society close to being founded on mutual, reciprocal trust, and whoever loses it (trust), cannot, anyway, get out of social life. There is, incidentally, no kind of trust which specially applies to society as such and in general, regardless of the concrete subjects, and would solely and exclusively live off the presence of society as a whole; *knowledge* about the fact of society is self-evidently a completely different matter (and another story). Trust is always particular (i.e. a part or a portion as opposed to the whole), it relates to certain aspects of social life, certain subjects or certain properties and qualities of these subjects, which, by the way, means that it is regularly accompanied by mistrust against other aspects of social life, against other subjects or against other properties and qualities of these subjects. Accordingly, the kinds of trust can be easily classified in accordance with two points of view, namely, according to extent

(or scope) and the special point of reference. Even the most comprehensive trust, that is, the steady or firm confidence in and assurance of the adherence to socially recognised norms and rules, does not encompass society in toto, in which many things flourish which directly or indirectly are/run contrary to those norms and rules. That is why trust in general norms and rules resembles and is similar to partisanship in favour of the “healthy” or “genuine, real” part of society against the “unhealthy” or “ungenuine (false, fake, phony)” (part of society). In practice, what remains more important, after all, is a less extensive trust, i.e. towards persons and the formal or informal practices, customs and habits of dealing with and handling the relevant environment, which, if need be, can serve as the ultimate refuge, shelter or sanctuary for the failure and breakdown or the uselessness of the general norms and rules.

The proud trust of the citizen in the police and the courts is hardly of use, avail and benefit when one is robbed by one’s own son or taken for a ride and hoodwinked by a (work) colleague, associate or workmate. As far as the structuring, organisation or arrangement of the kinds of trust on the basis of each and every respective point of reference is concerned, thus, above all, the following distinction seems to be of significance and importance: trust can be connected with the expectation that the Other will perfectly and faultlessly perform and accomplish a technical achievement, or else, he will conduct himself and behave, (with regard to the fact that) “no matter what happens”, “finely and meticulously”, “altruistically”, “tidily, neatly, pretty well” etc.. The particularity of the trust appears here to be especially clear. Because it is obvious and (it) is also generally felt that both these kinds of trust or expectations by no means have to interrelate or be connected, that the I (ego) can in fact cultivate and protect trust in one respect, and mistrust, in another respect. Accordingly related, but not identical is the distinction between trust in the intentions and trust in the (f)actual behaviour of the Other. It rests or is

based upon the distinction which the social perception of the I (ego) between the subjective and the objective sense makes (in respect) of alien action (i.e. the action of others (incl. strangers))⁵⁴.

The word “expectations” is no coincidence when the talk is of trust, and this [[is the case/so]](,) for many reasons. Ponderability (Calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) are defined obviously with regard to expectations, and trust is, for/on its part, basically nothing other than an ultimate or final irreducible statement on/about ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability): absolute trust applies to the absolutely ponderable (calculable); imponderability (incalculability) is synonymous, equivalent and tantamount with/to untrustworthiness and unreliability (Unzuverlässigkeit). On the other hand, the extent, scope, and the special point of reference, that is, the particularities of trust (mistrust), and expectations, necessarily accompany one another. And finally, the subject develops trust (mistrust), because it, *as* a subject, has intentions and aims. The latter (aims of the subject) can be described as expectations if one overlooks the aspect of the assessment of the situation, which is implicit in the “expectation”. Expectations can rest or be based upon trust, that is, grow upon the terrain (ground) of already existing trust. They (Expectations) are, however, as to content, under no circumstances to be derived or deduced from the existence and presence of trust, because it cannot be made out and agreed in advance *what* the I (ego) expects of the Other, if it places/puts trust in it. The content of the expectation depends, therefore, on the intentions and aims of the subject, which, hence, must be class(ifi)ed as the primary factor. Trust in legality does not prejudice which legal activity someone wants to exercise, and trust in a person does not likewise prejudice if someone expects from him (that person) their legal or

⁵⁴ See the previous [[sub-]]section above. For the here proffered elementary classification of the kinds of trust cf. Barber, *Logic and Limits*, pp. 9, 17ff..

illegal, moral or immoral services; amongst criminals, there can also be firm, solid, steady trust towards one another^{xvi}. The orientation of expectation to existing trust does not necessarily prove, therefore, the primacy of trust before (i.e. vis-à-vis) expectation, or the indispensability of trust for the advent of expectations, (those who mistrust harbour such expectations too), but it (trust) rather interrelates with that aspect of expectation which we described as the “assessment of the situation (or position)”. There are, though, also cases, in which the advent and content of the expectation quasi automatically is connected with the one-dimensional content-related offer of an already existing trust in an institution or in a person. But such cases are neither the rule, nor are they socially crucial and decisive; individual and collective life would in fact become paralysed if it (such individual and collective life) were to rely for its development on that (kind of trust). In any case, it is decisive that both most, as well as the fewest, cases, both the more comprehensive concept or notion of expectation, as well as the less comprehensive concept or notion of trust, are subject to the general logic and dynamic(s) of the social relation. As the implied assessments of the situation (or position) or, all the same, as wishes for the modification of the situation (or position), expectations can be translated into statements on/about the possible or aimed-at outcome of social relations between concrete humans (people, men): how would these relations seem and be, how would the spectrum of the social relation be shaped and formed if the intentions and the aims animating and fulfilling the expectations were realised? Trust is also tantamount to a judgement regarding which place an individual or collective (organised) subject occupies inside of the spectrum of the social relation. What is meant here no doubt is a place in the friendly half of the spectrum: the more fixed this place (is), the steadier, firmer and more fixed the trust. This cannot get rid of and eliminate the social-ontologically fundamental fact that the socially acting (individual and or collective subject) must act with regard to, and in view of, the entire spectrum of the social relation. It only

assumes that in the concrete case, shifts and displacements in the spectrum are impossible or at least highly improbable. Trust does not, therefore, represent and constitute an original magnitude, but presupposes a certain shaping and formation of the social relation. Sometimes this shaping or formation is only imagined, i.e. trust is offered already before the coming into being of friendship so that friendship can come into being. The goal remains, that is, again, a certain shaping and formation of the spectrum of the social relation, and the non-attainment of this goal must lead to the taking back of trust, unless trust has been transformed into a belief in the Other with masochistic features and characteristics. No psychical inevitability exists to return trust to trust (i.e. to reciprocate trust with trust), although this stands to reason (suggests itself): whoever gives or bestows (upon someone) trust, confirms his (i.e. the person being given trust's) identity, and the return or reciprocation of trust functions as the recognition for this recognition. If, however, the Other does not need this recognition or confirmation on the part of this concrete Ego, then he goes along with and accepts the offer of trust only because he positively judges and evaluates the possibilities of shaping and formation of the social relation. Even in regard to the few-in-number cases in which (one-sidedly) given, bestowed, shown or proven trust lies ahead of (i.e. takes place before) the shaping and formation of the friendly social relation, the course and series of events of the relation finally decides its (the said social relation's) conclusive and definitive character – not differently than in most cases where trust only arises upon the basis of an already stabilised social relation.

The aforementioned possibility of trust amongst criminals proves in itself that trust is normatively colourless, that, therefore, under its (trust's) cover both socially sanctioned as well as subversive norms can be served; in conspiracies, one needs acts of terror and coups d'état perhaps the most (i.e. more than in any other situation). Trust is based upon friendship and under (certain)

circumstances it initiates and inaugurates friendships, but the existence and presence of trust in society does not in the least mean that in the spectrum of the social relation, seen in terms of society overall, the friendly half (of the social relation) must outweigh and prevail over the inimical (half of the social relation). As often and as long as this happens (i.e. the prevailing of the friendly half of the social relation), it does not, at any rate, rely on the effect of trust, because, as (we have) said, neither does it (trust) connect or link the totality of (the) societal extent, scope or reference, nor does it, at a certain moment, connect all members of society with all members of this same society. Social-ontological or sociological analysis cannot explicate in greater detail how trust is gained and acquired or can be gained and acquired; in relation to that, there are innumerable ways and paths (to gain/acquire trust), and only penetration into the concrete case permits a more or less successful reconstruction of the way or path pursued or adopted (to gain/acquire trust). Also, the individual or collective effect of trust constitutes a function of the concrete case and the object of corresponding investigations. Social-ontologically, of interest is the ascertainment that existing trust indeed promotes and reinforces friendship and co-operation, but by no means suffices to guarantee their (friendship and co-operation's) smooth course; in very many cases in fact, precisely this (course) constitutes the precondition and prerequisite (*Vorbedingung*) for the emergence of trust. At the overall societal level, trust develops its effect not in chemical purity, but in its – from case to case – mix and blend of heterogeneous elements in different doses. It (Trust) co-exists in a fortunate or unfortunate, at any rate, strained and tense relationship with a “rational mistrust”, which fulfils the important task of protecting and shielding trust placed in the Other from misuse and abuse, and interacts (*interagiert*) in various ways or alternates its effect with in part formal, in part informal mechanisms of social control (*mit teils*

formellen, teils informellen Mechanismen der sozialen Kontrolle)⁵⁵. It cannot be reckoned or calculated in advance which mix or blend of these elements with one another is optimal; it (the mix/blend of these elements) varies incessantly amongst the same subjects too. If one, in general, may at all dare a general judgement, then this [[would be the judgement]]: where the impersonal “rational mistrust” of institutions and of social controls most zealously keeps watch over the righteous and just, and, the unjustifiably wicked and unjust, (there) also trust flourishes between persons the best, that is, as it were, in a secondary function. Because the trust of the I (ego) in institutions stems from the fact that the Other has (a certain) angst and fear before these institutions, which the I (ego), incidentally, knows from its own experience^{xvii}. So, it is reasonable to confuse the ritualisation of the behaviour, which stems and springs from the visible or invisible effect of institutions, with subjective reliability and trustworthiness, that is, to look at as a personal attribute that which actually represents and constitutes an impersonal automatisisation (making automatic) or modeling/ making a model of behaviour for the purpose of the reduction of/in the imponderabilities (incalculabilities) constantly stirring, moving and being active in the background. In this sense, the Joruba are right: peace, that is, an institutionally fairly well-ordered state of affairs, not, for instance, trust, is the father of friendship. But intersubjective trust (intersubjektives Vertrauen) as the other side or the supplement of impersonal “rational mistrust” must, for its part, likewise more or less seem to be impersonal, (pact sunt servanda [[= Latin = agreements are to/must be kept/observed]], therefore I trust in you). That is why trust very often is precisely – in an obstinate and dogged way – personal (there) where the guarantees of “rational mistrust” are extensively lacking or play no role in the concrete case. A concept like “besë” [[= Albanian = trust, faith (= Greek =

⁵⁵ Loc. cit., p. 166ff., and Gambetta, “Can we trust trust?”, p. 223.

μπέσα = being true to one's word)]] does not stem by chance from the Albanian. With that, of course, as we shall immediately see, there is not at all (any) talk of the contrast between “community” and “society”. The above constellations are social-ontologically meant, they have taken and take place in the same society^{xviii}.

The social-ontologically secondary status of trust is reflected not least of all in the logic of institutions, which all together build upon “rational mistrust”, and according to their character and their function, threaten milder or harder punishments – from showing someone the door up to the exercising of violence. The passed or handed down (or traditional) wisdom in respect of life has always and everywhere taken into account this real situation, which, that is, commences from the social-ontologically secondary status of pure trust, and from the necessity of “rational mistrust”, as much as it also often regretted and deplored this necessity. Where with drawing up and putting forward of rules of wisdom, prudence and good sense, a moral claim and an educational-instructional striving and effort/endeavour are connected, Emerson's recommendation is taken to heart and heeded: “Trust men and they will be true to you”⁵⁶. If this recommendation were objectively correct, then it would, at the same time, be superfluous, i.e. one would have translated it from the beginning of the world into praxis/practice, and it would represent and constitute a self-evident, even unreflected-upon mode of behaviour. Because everyone wants that the other (person) vis-à-vis him be honest, sincere and genuine; everyone would, therefore, (since) forever/always without further ado (or without a second thought) give (his) trust (i.e. entrust) [[another person]], if this, and this alone, would automatically bring about the sincerity and honesty of the other (person) vis-à-vis him. Why do not people (humans) do precisely that which allegedly leads in such a straight and direct (linear) manner to the generally wished-for

⁵⁶ *Essays* (first Series), VII: “Prudence”, p. 147.

aim? Why must, therefore, the recommendation be repeated? Obviously not only because the moral teachers are tireless, indefatigable – the thousands-of-years-old failures in practice would have discouraged, disheartened and demoralised even them long ago –, but rather because, regardless of the hope for real success, in this recommendation the ideal self-understanding of society is expressed and carries on living, of which it (society) has unconditional need in order to be able to function as a society. The pressure of reality, which extends on this side of (i.e. not beyond) this ideal self-understanding, makes itself felt (there) where, despite all the in principle adherence to the moral claim, the advice and counsel is given to handle and manage trust sparingly and carefully. Already Democritus knew that the level-headed and prudent only trust proven people; on the other hand, the simple-minded and stupid trust everyone⁵⁷. Similarly, Seneca formulated the agonising dilemma of the person, who wants to be humane, but simultaneously does not want to be ruined; it is just as wrong to give one's trust to everyone as to no-one⁵⁸. He (Seneca) also indicated – characteristically, immediately before an emphatic summary of elementary moral duties – the daily danger and risk which emanates from man to man (person to person) in order to explain the impossibility of a generalised trust⁵⁹. With that, he (Seneca) indirectly addressed the existential angst and fear founded, established and based on the dangerous and risky imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, which is the ultimate source of/for the, in practice, offered and shown “rational mistrust”. One could, in actual fact, comprehend mistrust as the sober angst and fear or conversely as angst and fear in statu nascendi [[= Latin = in the state of gestating (being gestated/born)/in the nascent state/in the course of being formed or developed]]. In any event, trust is very often felt to be and described as the Other or the exact opposite of angst and

⁵⁷ Fr. 67 = Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente*, II, 158.

⁵⁸ *Epistulae ad Lucilium*, III, 4 (utrumque enim vitium est, et omnibus credere et nulli [[= in truth, it is a vice and flaw to (whether you) trust and believe everyone and no-one]]).

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., CIII, 2.

fear⁶⁰. Then the grounding of wisdom in respect of life in mistrust seems like a logical consequence of angst and fear before the dangerousness and riskiness of man, as for instance in Chamfort⁶¹. It would be rash to brush aside and dismiss such trains of thought(s) as the mere outcome of an anthropological pessimism; the Ashanti^{xix}, who little understand Western anthropological subtleties and Weltschmerz/world-weariness-moods, recommend: “fear your neighbour (or: be afraid of the person next to you)!”⁶²

The hardly noticeable role, which this concept and notion (of trust) played until relatively recently in social theory, corresponded to/with the actual social-ontologically secondary status of trust. Only mass-democratic social theory brought it (the status of trust) eminence, and this for reasons which have to do with its (mass democracy’s) character or matters of concern. The sentimentality conceived and thought-of in terms of emancipation of mass democracy was theorised (i.e. made a subject/an object of theory) by means of terms like communication or trust, which exactly through their sentimentalisation found broader acceptance (i.e. they struck a chord, met with approval and caught on); on the other hand, precisely the confession of faith in the pluralism of values and (in the pluralism (in respect)) of the way of life (mode of living), makes the search for a new kind of “putty (cement or filler)” of/for society essential (imperative), and “trust” could here just as much offer its good services like for instance “rationality” (offered) its own (services); finally, the evolutionistic theorem of objectification (Versachlichung) in the modern era (or modernity) differentiating itself, made the thesis plausible that increasing objectification means increasing ponderability (imponderability), and hence, more chances and

⁶⁰ See e.g. Shakespeare, *King Lear*, I, 4, v. 351: Albany “Well, you may fear too far.” Goneril: “Safer than trust too far.”

⁶¹ *Maximes*, Nr: 116: «Je ne conçois pas de sagesse sans défiance. L’Écriture a dit que le commencement de la sagesse c’était la crainte de Dieu; moi, je crois que c’est la crainte des hommes» [[= French = “I do not conceive of wisdom at all without mistrust. Scripture has said that the commencement of wisdom is the fear of God; for me, I think it’s the fear of men”]].

⁶² Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 148 (in the English version: “Fear him who is near you”).

opportunities for trust. This error (mistake or fallacy) was prepared by the functionalist Simmel^{xx}, who placed or set his analysis of trust entirely from the perspective of the contrast of “community” vs. “society”. According to his nice and attractive (beautiful) formulation, trust is “as a hypothesis, an intermediate state of affairs between knowledge and non-knowledge (i.e. ignorance) about man (humans)” – but “which masses or quantities of knowledge and non-knowledge (i.e. ignorance) must be mixed”, so that trust can come about, should not merely depend on the individuals and fields of interest(s) being considered, but also on the “age or epoch/era/the times”. In the modern era (modernity), the institutions and the positions of the individuals inside society have become “so firm, steady and reliable” („so fest und zuverlässig“ geworden) that “the motivation and regulation of behaviour has become so objective („die Motivierung und Regulierung des Verhaltens hat sich so versachlicht, ...“), that trust no longer requires actual personal knowledge”; in “less differentiated relationships”, one would know (in respect) of the (his) partner, very much more in a personal respect, and very much less with reference to purely objective reliability (dependability and trustworthiness)⁶³. Not only the direct experience of modern men (i.e. humans, people) and a vast amount of literary testimonies provide evidence that here in mind is a schema of social evolution rather than a reality. Conversely, the manner with which, for instance, the Platonic Socrates speaks (talks) of/about the knowledgeable and well-informed person (i.e. expert) in (regard to) handiwork (the arts and crafts), medicine and philosophy, or how, for instance, a distinction is made between the function and the person of the magician in “natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)”, allows and permits the justified guess, conjecture or supposition that the objective and the personal are less new discoveries or realities, but rather manners of speech or ways of talking, which, for certain reasons, hold and occupy a purely key (i.e.

⁶³ Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 263ff..

central and crucial) function in the self-understanding of the modern (era) (or modernity)^{xxi}.

Now, we must say that Simmel, despite this error (mistake or fallacy), did not go so far as to completely detach trust from “rational mistrust”, on the contrary: mistrust resting mainly on the objective reliability and mistrust shrugging off and ignoring the personal (element or dimension), comes fairly close (near) to “rational mistrust”. But Simmel’s error (mistake or fallacy) multiplies and intensifies, if one is able a limine to leave aside and exclude the real mistrust of foes, which can burst open or break up the “social system”, in the interest of the systematic fiction of unity, in order to regard trust and mistrust as the equivalent possible “strategies” for the formation and development of social systems. At this level, wherever enmity is expelled or eliminated, by definition, by means of the effect of system rationality, and the latter (system rationality) is served by trust *and* mistrust, the essence of trust consists in that it is “given and bestowed (as a gift)”, whereas mistrust becomes noticeable in that one enters into risks only when one has taken preventive measures “for eventualities”, for instance by the threat of sanctions⁶⁴. Mistrust means, therefore, here “rational mistrust” or trust by virtue or on the strength of objective-institutional reliability (dependability and trustworthiness), which must be connected with sanctions. Precisely this, as a matter of preference, approach or approximation of the objective-institutional to mistrust turns trust into a free “gift”, whereby it is no longer apparent how (so) trust can be called a “universal social state of affairs, facts and circumstances” and the “strategy with the greatest reach and range”. Is society grounded and based more in and on “given/bestowed/donated (as a gift)” trust and less in and on “mistrustful” institutions? That can – in no case – be empirically proved, and precisely the impossibility of objectively founding and establishing the primacy of trust before or vis-à-vis (rational) mistrust

⁶⁴ Thus, Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 179ff..

makes here the meaningless phrases, clichés and empty words unavoidable: trust is to be preferred, because it [[supposedly]] constitutes “bottomless, indescribable thoughtlessness and frivolity/frivolousness” “to delude or cheat proven trust”. Formulations, as is known, turn out and become all the more emphatic, the greater the thought (intellectual) gaps (or the holes/lacunae in thought) are, which they (the said formulations) are supposed to cover (up or over). Is it merely “bottomless, indescribable thoughtlessness and frivolity/frivolousness” on the part of institutions when they threaten [[people]] with sanctions? Is every society known to us organised in such a manner only because men (humans, people) are bottomlessly, indescribably thoughtless and frivolous? It does not seem to be so. If we consider trust and mistrust from the broader perspective of the social relation and of the connected with that possible constellations and correlations of power (Machtkonstellationen), as we ought to, also, do, then more cogent and valid reasons come to light/the surface than seriousness and thoughtlessness or frivolity/frivolousness, as to why trust is proved or deceived and feinted. Here, for example, are some of these constellations and correlations. The possibility that trust will be placed in someone grows with the relative difference in power (Machtdifferenz), the stronger can, therefore, in possession of effective means of control, trust the (behaviour of) the weaker rather than the other way around. During equality of power (Machtgleichheit), very probably to the unconditional trust of (the) one side quite often – at least over the long term – by means of exploitative behaviour will (the unconditionally trusting side) be reciprocated; whereas conditional trust will run into (the) greater respect and (the) greater effort of the other side. To the more powerful, conversely, unconditional trust on the part of the weaker is to the more powerful’s liking, and conditional trust is suspect⁶⁵. The weaker can, again, give the stronger unconditional trust, because they,

⁶⁵ Solomon, “Influence”, esp. p. 229.

anyway, are not in a position to control him (the stronger), and instead of that, they want to gain at least his favour (goodwill or patronage), and through this option or choice they will in advance have a good (i.e. clear, calm or tranquil) conscience for their part. In other cases, he who from the position of equal strength has been given and bestowed trust, is placed under pressure not only morally, but also to do the (what is) expected by the fact that the advance payment/reward (i.e. trust given in advance) is in the knowledge of third parties. Trust can be given in terms of mistrust, if the person giving trust is not at all sure/certain of the result of his step or move, yet wants to undertake (to give) it (the said trust), because the aim is to gain or win over the Other's friendship appearing to him more important than every, in the process, risk into which he enters and undertakes. And so on, and so forth. The reality of the social relation does not permit us, at any rate, to operate with concepts like "thoughtlessness or frivolity/frivolousness". Social Common Sense has constantly seen "thoughtlessness or frivolity/frivolousness" in the ill-considered and indiscriminate giving (of trust) rather than in the deception or feigning of trust. And over and above that, whether (the) mistrust or (the) trust of a man (person) in society is the more expedient (purposeful or goal(end)-oriented) positioning and attitude, a plebiscite takes place on a daily basis, when everyone in leaving their home, locks the door, and puts the key in his pocket.

C. Assumption (Adoption, Takeover, Taking on/over, Undertaking)
of perspectives (perspective taking) (Perspektivenübernahme)

a. Sociological and phenomenological preliminary work(s) (preparations)
(Soziologische und phänomenologische Vorarbeiten)

The uncoupling (decoupling, disconnecting) of sociology from the philosophy of history opened in research, in principle, two schools (lines) of thought (directions, tendencies), which partly were represented by various researchers, [[and]] partly in the work of one and the same researcher intersecting in various (differing, different, varying) manners. On the one hand, the erstwhile (former, previous) tiers (levels, grades, stages) of the development (unfolding or evolution) of history (historical development) could now be reorganised and reconstructed into functional-structural systems up to the point where the functional-structural thought (i.e. idea or concept) is loosened and untied from every concrete historical reference, in order to define the social, per se (as such), that is, (in order to define) every real and conceivable (imaginable, thinkable) society. On the other hand, the same analytical spirit(-intellect), which corroded, decomposed and undermined the philosophically-eschatologically comprehended unity of history, was now transferred to society, which was now dissolved or broken up into its supposed (presumed, presumptive) ultimate, last constituent (integral) elements or parts (components), namely, into actors, in order to then be reconstructed from/out of the interactions (or mutual influences) (interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (Wechselwirkungen) between these actors. The concept of the interaction (or mutual influence) (Wechselwirkung) or of the interaction (Interaktion) became, therefore, the focus (moved, therefore, into the centre) of attention, and in the course of this, the old question had to emerge (surface, appear) in a new context(,) (as to) how then this interaction (or mutual influence) (Wechselwirkung) proceeds, unwinds

and turns out, which mechanisms does the friendly or inimical meeting (or encounter) between humans set and keep (maintain, hold) in motion. In the course of this, it was inevitable that to the subjective sense, i.e. meaning, which actors connect with their interaction (Interaktion), a new rank, position or standing vis-à-vis the objective sense/meaning of their action be granted, allowed or conceded. The latter (objective sense/meaning) retained (maintained, kept), logically, inside the philosophy of history, the upper hand, since here act(ion)s were judged and evaluated exclusively concerning their weight (gravity) for a process, whose direction (course) as to aim (target, objective) (Zielrichtung) remained normally unconscious (i.e. not consciously known) in the actors. It (Objective meaning) of course did not vanish/disappear with the philosophy of history. The heterogony of ends survived (outlived, outlasted) the philosophy of history, and the functional-structural perceptions and views could not, on their part, hardly manage or get by without the objective sense (meaning) of action or without the channeling of the subjective doing and wanting (ohne die Kanalisierung des subjektiven Tuns und Wollens) inside the, and through the, comprehensive rationality of the social system. Nonetheless, the epistemological putting first of interaction (or mutual influence) after the turning away, break from, or renunciation of, the philosophy of history, brought an enormous revaluation of the subjectively meant meaning (or sense), and of all of that which enables subjectivity, out of/from its predisposition, to develop (its) subjective sense or meaning during interacting (Trotzdem brachte die epistemologische Voranstellung der Wechselwirkung nach der Abkehr von der Geschichtsphilosophie eine ungeheure Aufwertung des subjektiv gemeinten Sinnes und all dessen, was Subjektivität von ihrer Anlage her befähigt, beim Interagieren subjektiven Sinn zu entwickeln).

Pathbreaking or pioneering approaches, in relation to that, can be traced and tracked down already in the framework of formal sociology. The elementary

definition of the social relation reads (is) here this (social relation) is “a mutual and reciprocal effect, which in so far as it is given from/on one side, from/on the other (side) [[it]] is suffered, endured or received and accepted”⁶⁶. Tönnies, the originator (creator or author) of this definition, obviously did not notice that – with that – *strictu sensu* (*sensu stricto*, *stricto sensu*), an outer (external) mechanic(s) applicable to inanimate bodies is described rather than an inner (internal) mechanism which can connect social subjects with one another. However, the insight into the existence (presence) of this mechanism, was nonetheless already well-founded (close-by, plausible, reasonable, logical, sensible), and Simmel’s hints (clues) or intimations confirmed it. The fact of the You (Du) belongs to the a priori preconditions of socialisation (*Zu den apriorischen Bedingungen der Vergesellschaftung*), however, at the same time, (so does) the ability of the I (ego) to transfer or transmit its own “absoluteness(es) (or absolute characteristics)”, namely, (the) certainty about (as regards, regarding) its own reality and about the sovereign handling of its own content(s) to the You⁶⁷. At one point, at which, typically enough, there is talk of extreme enmity, he (Simmel) opined, again, that a relationship (*ein Verhältnis*) between equal subjects towards (as between, *vis-à-vis*) one another rests or is based on the “knowing of the outer/external situation (position)” and the “sympathetic feeling within oneself and empathy in regard to the inner (internal) (situation or position)”⁶⁸. This feeling within oneself and empathy means, nevertheless, not the (temporary) dissolution or breaking up (disintegration) of one’s own I (ego), but rather the objectification (*Objektivierung*^{xxii}) of the You on the part of the I (ego), which for its (the objectification’s) part, seems possible because the I (ego) itself or the human spirit in general has the “fundamental ability” “to face and confront itself, and

⁶⁶ *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 3.

⁶⁷ *Soziologie*, p. 23.

⁶⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 93.

look at (behold) itself as another (person)”⁶⁹; Simmel did not want to decide whether this ability is spontaneous and inborn (innate) or a transference of the intersubjective relationship to the psyche of the I (ego) – already the formulation of the dilemma implies, however, the insight into the interrelation between reflexivity (i.e. reflectivity as the capability of quiet thought or contemplation; reflectiveness; thoughtfulness; Reflexivität) and intersubjectivity as well as between the self-reference (reference to the self) and alien-reference (reference to the other) of the reflexivity, i.e. reflectivity. Yet he (Simmel) did not get around to a deepening of this insight within (inside of) formal sociology, despite sparse (few, sparing, sporadic) allusions⁷⁰. The gaining the upper hand and prevalence of the striving for formalisation (i.e. the effort at making formal constructs) did not leave any time for similar thoughts and considerations, so that even sociologists, who were kindly or favourably disposed to the basic thought or fundamental notion/idea of this line of thought or intellectual tendency, had to accuse v. Wiese that he connects ready (finished) and closed- (united or unified)-in-themselves individuals, that is, he (v. Wiese) barely (hardly) notes their interpenetration as the presupposition (precondition) of their interdependence (er nehme also von ihrer Interpenetration als Voraussetzung ihrer Interdependenz kaum Kenntnis)⁷¹.

A broader perspective was opened by M. Weber’s translation of interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) (Wechselwirkung) into the language of social action and of the social relation, whereby the definition of action as the meaning-like or meaning-bearing (i.e. meaningful; sinnhaftem), and the equating of the meaning-like/bearing or meaningful (Sinnhaftem) and the understandable with each other, factually raised the question or problem of the mechanism of understanding also at the

⁶⁹ Loc. cit., p. 41.

⁷⁰ Thus, Vierkandt defines “genuine interaction or mutual influence” as that in which “every partner... in (regard to) the effect exercised on him, as it were, receives back his own behaviour” (*Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 34).

⁷¹ Gurvitch, *Vocation*, I, p. 239ff..

level of actors, as much as Weber (also) was concerned primarily about understanding at the level of the scientific observer (auf der Ebene des wissenschaftlichen Beobachters): the structural distinction between both is, anyhow, gradual (i.e. gradational or as to grades or degrees) rather than qualitative (ist ohnehin eher graduell als qualitativ)⁷². Social action (Soziales Handeln) and very often also “inner (internal) behaviour or conducting oneself (Sichverhalten)” refers to the action or behaviour of other (people) and is oriented in its course to that (action of other people); and the social relation comes about and takes place when this reference and this orientation occur on a mutual or reciprocal basis⁷³. Schütz could tie or fasten onto that, in order with the help of phenomenological concepts and findings, to grant or lend to this fundamental schema more concrete content. The meaning (sense; Sinn) of action proves itself, upon closer inspection of the plan as regards acting (i.e. action plan), to be that (action plan) which concerns the Other and whereupon (i.e. in relation to which action plan) the Other must react (Der Sinn des Handelns erweist sich bei näherem Hinsehen als Handlungsentwurf, der den Anderen betrifft und worauf der Andere reagieren muß). That is why the plan has no prospect of success if it does not take into account, in the form of an anticipation, this reaction, in relation to which it exactly aims. Since, however, the alien (i.e. other’s) (outer or external) reaction is grounded in or based on that which is acted out and takes place in the alien/other’s consciousness, thus, also one’s own meaning-like/bearing and meaningful social action is of necessity based on the (presumed) insights into the alien/the other’s (present and future) situation (state) of consciousness. The alien/other’s “experiences of consciousness” must, consequently, be anticipated *modo futuri exacti* [[i.e. in terms of the future]]^{xxiii} in the plan of the acting person; the alien attitude (i.e. the other’s positioning) of the Other becomes necessarily the motive of/for

⁷² Cf. below, Section 1C in this chapter.

⁷³ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 1, 11, 13.

one's own alien having an effect (i.e. the motive of the other having an effect upon, and acting vis-à-vis, oneself) (zum Motiv des eignen Fremdwirkens), and through that a “backward-or-around-relation of the – included in the plan of my own action – alien (i.e. the other's) experiences of consciousness in relation, in fact, to my experiences of consciousness, takes” place („Rückbeziehung der in dem Entwurf meines Handelns einbezogenen fremden Bewußtseinserebnisse auf je meine Bewußtseinserebnisse statt“)⁷⁴. Through the real mediation (intervention or intercession) of the plan or acting (i.e. action plan), which connects the two – one way or another – motivated actors – one way or another – with each other, the context of meaning proves itself to be a context of motivation. But in the to and fro (back and forth) of the interaction, in which the I (ego), through its meaning-like/bearing (meaningful) or motivated action motivates the Other to a reaction, in order to then, on its part, through the – in such a way – motivated reaction, be able to motivate itself, the motives have an effect, in principle, as the motive-in-order-to [[think and or do...]] and the because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]] (Um-Zu-Motive und Weil-Motive). With that, not two ontologically or psychologically different categories, but rather, two opposed directions inside the same interaction are meant. The motive-in-order-to motivates the I (ego) when it (the I (ego)) strives for or aims at an alien effect (i.e. an effect on the Other) (Fremdwirkung), and consequently (strives for) a certain aim, which the plan of acting (i.e. action plan) is supposed (meant) to serve, in (regard to) which the reaction of the Other is anticipated. Now if the I (ego) acts (in a later phase) under the effect and influence of this reaction or (under the effect and influence of) an original action of the Other, then it (the I (ego)) is motivated by a because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]], it (re)acts, that is, because the Other has or had (re)acted. Now, the following happens: the I (ego) anticipates the motive-

⁷⁴ *Aufbau*, pp. 209, 223, 202 (here [[is]] the citation).

in-order-to of its own action as the because-motive of the expected reaction of the Other and, the other way around, it looks at the in-order-to-motive of the Other as the because-motive of one's own action⁷⁵. This process obviously presupposes, on both sides, the ability at the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of each and every respective Other, whereby alien understanding (i.e. understanding of the Other) and self-interpretation (or self-exegesis) (Fremdverstehen und Selbstausslegung) must interrelate very closely. Because the mental operation basically rests on an exchange of persons (Personenvertauschung): the I (ego) fathoms the experiences of alien (i.e. other's) consciousness (die fremden Bewußtseinserlebnisse) by being placed in the position of the Other, that is, by being identified with this (Other) in the imagination, and by designing, sketching and planning the plans of acting (i.e. action plans) (Handlungsentwürfe) of it (the Other) as one's own, whose aims of acting (i.e. action aims) (Handlungsziele) are set as one's own in order to prepare oneself for the possibility of their realisation, and to orientate one's own action towards that (realisation of such aims of acting of the Other). Alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of another (person)) must, therefore, proceed through self-interpretation (or self-exegesis), nevertheless, by no means does this status of self-interpretation/exegesis in the process of alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of the Other/another person) vouch for the fact or guarantee that the I (ego) can recognise the peculiar mental texture, composition and constitution of the Other through the simple linear transference of the I's (the ego's) own individual experiences to the Other, or through "empathy". Here, a general ascertainment is achieved or attained regarding the structural equality of one's own and the alien/another person's course (or (out)flow(ing)) of consciousness, and the content-related classifications regarding (the) motivation

⁷⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 116ff., 206ff., 226. Cf. Section 2Ab in this chapter.

and plans of acting (i.e. action plans) of the Other adhere or cling to the merely formal-structural too. In the construct of the I (ego) in respect of the plan of acting (i.e. action plan) of the Other, in fact, the behaviour of the Other as ideality and expectation is included, which can also remain unfulfilled⁷⁶.

Even so (Nevertheless), there is, phenomenologically, no alternative for the self-interpretation or self-exegesis of alien understanding (i.e. understanding the Other). Schültz followed Husserl in (regard to) the perception that transcendence is to be gained through self-interpretation/exegesis or constitution. Whilst the Other, however, is constituted analogously as to/ towards the Ego, it (the Ego) must perceive (the Other) as the bearer of intentionality. Self-interpretation/exegesis ineluctably leads, therefore, to the insight that being finds itself [[along]] with being (Seiendes befinde sich mit Seiendem) “in an intentional community”⁷⁷. The ability to put oneself in the position (situation) of (and or empathise with) the Other, or (to put oneself) in the structure of his (the Other’s) intentionality, represents or constitutes a mere implication or even the mere paraphrasing and re-description or rewriting of this intentional community. “I know not only that he will act so and so, that he can be motivated by me, and not only that I want that ... but he knows also that I have this intent(ion) and accepts this intention as determined by the will in his will ... These are, therefore, the specifically social acts ...”⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 156ff., 239.

⁷⁷ Husserl, *Cart. Meditationen*, §§ 62, 55, 56 = pp. 175, 153, 157.

⁷⁸ *Zur Phänom. d. Intersubj.*, *Hu IV*, pp. 171, 185 (here [[is]] the citation) = *Ideen*, II. Cf. the formulation of Löwith, *Individuum*, p. 79: “whilst the behaviour of the one (person) has intent with regard to the behaviour of the other/another (person), (the) one (person) behaves towards the other/another (person) from the outset in anticipation of the other person’s behaviour’s possible recoil [[onto him]] (or simply, the other person’s possible reaction). The come back or getting back of the other (person) to one (person) motivates the same tendency of his/the other person’s intended come back or getting back being exposed and found out from the beginning”. See Eb below in this chapter.

b. The reflexivity (i.e. reflectivity as the capability of quiet thought or contemplation; reflectiveness; thoughtfulness) of the assumption (adoption, takeover, taking on/over, undertaking) of perspectives (perspective taking), its two levels and the spectrum of the social relation (Die Reflexivität der Perspektivenübernahme, deren zwei Ebenen und das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung)

Between the mechanism of the assumption (taking on/over) of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking) (Rollenübernahme) and imponderability (incalculability) as the constitutive feature of subjectivity, there is an obvious interrelation: the need and the necessity of the Ego to move and transfer itself (in)to the position or situation of the Other (Das Bedürfnis und die Notwendigkeit des Ego, sich in die Lage des Anderen zu versetzen), grow to exactly the extent the behaviour of the Other cannot be predicted or forecast with certainty already through mere/simple perception and the unproblematic interpretation of unequivocal (unambiguous) outer/external signs (marks, indications, signals and symbols/symbolism). Were this possible, we could spare ourselves of talk of the assumption of roles, and instead of that, much more simply, talk (speak) about an adequate reaction to existing (present) stimuli, like those which are encountered in the rest of the animal kingdom, where an animal (beast) can indeed successfully confront and or go into action against the behaviour of another animal (beast), and in fact can anticipate it, however, only because the course or breadth (Bahn) of possible actions and reactions on both sides are fixed, definite and certain, and in fact the manoeuvres of deception (bluff, deceit, illusion) are largely typified. In man, though, behaviour is composed, on top of that, for the most part, of such adequate reactions, but in the specifically human field, which interests us here, this (situation) changes drastically by means of the complementary effect of two

factors. It is a matter of the displacement or shifting of the instinctive processes recognisable in the outer or external signs (indications or symbols/symbolism) at a symbolic level, the level of verbalised thought (thinking) or even speech [[which is]] thought/imagined, which remains invisible from the outside, and is managed by a consciousness; and of the, with that, accompanying ability at planning the future, at precaution (i.e. taking precautions and making preparations) and farsightedness. The more pronounced, marked or distinctive and the more specific as to [[the human]] genus/species/race this ability is, the more certain the I (ego) and the Other are allowed to be that the – on each and every respective occasion – other side can forge or hammer out long-term and many-sided plans of acting (i.e. action plans), (all) the more is the trying, endeavouring and making an effort at tracing, understanding and fathoming these (plans) intensified and refined; and since it is known with equal certainty on both sides that in the plans and action, the invisible symbolic level participates definitively, and that here all threads are gathered or converge in the hands of a guiding authority (lenkenden Instanz) conscious of itself, then it is tenable and well-founded to seek the key for the working out and deciphering of alien (i.e. another's or other people's) act(ion)s – relevant for the I (ego) in practice or theoretically –, in the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the permanent or momentary situation (or position) of this authority.

Consequently, an inner (internal) activity unfolds and develops, which is reflexive in multiple respects. First of all, in the fundamental/basic sense, that the I (ego), in order to in general activate the mechanism of the assumption of roles, must behave towards itself reflexively. It knows that it, as this certain I (ego), i.e. as the bearer of these certain interests in knowledge and of this certain capacity and capability in respect of knowledge, makes an effort at the assumption of a/the role, as “subjective” or “prejudiced and biased” as the perspective may be from which it (the I (ego)) judges and evaluates those

interests and that capacity and capability. Thereupon, in the likewise constitutive sense that the reflecting (reflective) activity (die reflektierende Tätigkeit) of the I (ego) not only has only itself, but parallelly, in relation to that, the reflecting (reflective) activity of the Other, as its object, in relation to which reflection (reflexion; Reflexion) about one's own reflecting (reflective) activity, that is the – either way – achieved self-interpretation/exegesis as the positive or negative starting point and reference point (point of reference), guides (conducts, directs, leads) the reflection upon the reflecting activity of the Other. (We shall understand the extent to which the reference must be positive or can be negative, when we become acquainted with and get to know the two levels of the assumption and taking on/over of roles.) The activity of reflection experiences a wider multiplication and intensification (with)in the framework of the mechanism of the assumption of roles as soon as the Other, together with his plans of acting (action plans) and his real act(ion)s, is taken (or classed) as a factor or element in the action plans and the real act(ion)s of the I (ego), as well as the other way around. The I (ego) and the Other touch, in this manner, as it were, upon the hard core of the social relation. The – on both sides – reflecting/reflective getting into and penetrating the reflecting/reflective activity of each and every respective Other must here take the concrete form that in the plan of acting or action plan of the I (ego), the presumed reaction of the Other – on the basis of that getting into and penetrating – must be jointly taken into account as the reflecting/reflective interpreter of the I's (ego's) plan of acting (action plan). The Other jointly takes into account, for his part, under the same premises, the I's (ego's) reaction to his (the Other's) reaction, in (regard to) his/the Other's plan of acting (action plan); the I (ego) responds (answers) to that, with an extending or expanding (widening, broadening) of the I's own action plan as regards a presumption about the Other's new reaction to the I's own most recent reaction to the preceding reaction of the Other, and so on, and so forth. The multiplication and intensification of the interpreting activity in

respect of reflection (reflective activity) here rests or is based – on both sides – on the knowledge regarding its (the said reflective activity's) both/two-sidedness (i.e. bilateralness, mutualness, mutuality or reciprocity; *Beiderseitigkeit*). And it (such reflective activity) is strengthened for the additional reason, because the signs and indications, on the basis of which the reflecting/reflective interpretation of alien (i.e. another's) behaviour takes place, very often themselves are in need of interpretation. During the interpretation of these signs and indications, reflection upon one's own and alien (another's) inner (internal) processes is paired and combined with that (reflection) upon the meaning (sense) and status (or place value) of outer (outward) signs and indications, which may give information about the inner processes. – Over and above that, it (the said reflection upon one's own and alien inner processes) is paired and combined with reflection about outer/external situations (positions), which indeed are not necessarily the work of the Other, whose more or less proper or appropriate and objective apprehension, however, appears to the I (ego) to be necessary, in order to be able to move and transfer itself into the Other's motivation and way of thinking. Regarding whether the process of the assumption of roles begins in (regard to) the judgement and evaluation of the outer/external or else of the inner/internal situation or position (for instance of the "character" or of the "disposition") of the Other, likewise, in every concrete case, the outer/external and the inner/ internal situation or position of the actors, or, the concrete constitution, composition or texture of their social relation towards/as to each other, decides (i.e. is decisive).

The many-sidedness and the capacity and ability at multiplication and intensification of reflection in the process of the assumption of roles constitute in themselves strong indications for its (this process's) active character. The I (ego) knows, of course, that in the Other, the same reflective (reflexive) process (reflexive *Vorgang*) takes place, however, it (the I (ego)) is just as certain of that

which goes on in it (the Other), despite all intentionality and referentiality to an object (bei aller Intentionalität und Gegenstandsbezogenheit), has an autonomous and independent character, and aims at or aspires to the realisation of autonomous/ independent plans of acting (action plans). The assumption (undertaking, adoption, taking on/over, takeover) of a role (or role-taking) (Die Übernahme einer Rolle), i.e. the intellectual (thought) reconstruction of the perspective and the presumed mode, manner or way of acting (action) of the Other on the part of the (i.e. by the) I (ego), is (stands) in no necessary relation(ship) with the readiness and preparedness of the I (ego) to play the role of the Other itself, to identify itself with the Other once and for all, and to allow one's own action to be fully (entirely, completely, totally) engrossed or wrapped up in the imitation (mimicking, emulation) of the Other's action (sich mit dem Anderen ein für allemal zu identifizieren und eigenes Handeln voll und ganz in der Nachahmung des Anderen-Handelns aufgehen zu lassen). That can, though, often occur (happen), (in relation to which imitation as a rule concentrates on certain aspects of the behaviour or of the action by the possibly idealised Other, which the I (ego) regards as particularly important). Nonetheless, that is due to psychological and social needs, which in themselves do not in the slightest have to do with the mechanism of the assumption (taking on/over) of roles (role assumption (adoption), role-taking) (Rollenübernahme), although this (mechanism of the assumption of roles), at the same time and in the process, – as with any social relation too – must be presupposed. In actual fact, the structural differences between the assumption and undertaking/taking on(/over), and the playing, of a role (zwischen der Übernahme und dem Spielen einer Rolle), between role-taking and role-playing, immediately stand out. The former (assumption of a role or role-taking) remains an inner (internal) reflective activity; the latter (playing of a role, i.e. role-play(ing)) concerns outer/external behaviour; the former has the role of the Other (perspective, positioning (stance or attitude), presumed mode (manner, way) of acting or action) as its object, the

latter basically revolves around the role which the I (ego) wants to or must play. During the assumption and taking on/over (undertaking, adoption), the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other is only temporary (Bei der Übernahme ist das Sichhineinversetzen in die Lage des Anderen nur vorläufig); during (the) playing, the I (ego) tries, as it were, to sink into the Other and, in the process, be forgotten⁷⁹. Generally, the assumption of roles is – in practice – non-binding, that is, in contrast to the playing of an already fixed and established role, it (the assumption of roles) by no means prejudices the social behaviour of the I (ego), and does not in itself lessen its (the I's (ego's)) imponderability (incalculability). The analysis of Mead's contradictions in the next [[sub-]]section will remind us most forcefully (or urgently) of this necessity of distinguishing between the assumption/taking and the playing of a role.

The two levels, at which the process of the assumption of roles unfolds and develops concurrently^{xxiv}, can already be gathered or inferred from its (the said assumptions of roles') reflective structure, i.e. they can become the object of distinct or separate reflection, although they normally fuse or merge with each other in social praxis/practice just as reflecting (reflective) activity makes up one single whole. (The fundamental analytical distinctions of scientific description remain, of course, at the same time real thought/intellectual possibilities of the reflectively acting social subject, to which this (subject), irrespective of each and every respective used or not-used nomenclature, if need be, falls back on or resorts to^{xxv}). At the level which the scientific observer calls the social-ontic (level) (Auf der Ebene, die der wissenschaftliche Beobachter die sozialontische nennt), an I (ego) and an Other stand, which know in respect of each other, with certainty, that they are provided or supplied with the mechanism of the assumption of roles, and also that via the usage of the same

⁷⁹ Coutu, "Role-Playing", p. 181 ff.; Flavell, *Rollenübernahme*, p. 43ff..

(mechanism of the assumption of roles), they possess different places in the spectrum of the social relation, and in general, can do everything of which a human subject is (cap)able. This, in principle, and, first of all, purely formal knowledge or evidence seeks its concrete content, and finds it (such concrete content), at the second level, at which each and every respective interaction (Interaktion) is acted out and takes place. With their own basic social-ontic equipment or potency (power and ability) presupposed on both sides, the actors pose themselves the question *what* is to be (under)taken or assumed as a role or perspective on each and every respective occasion, *what* is the appropriate response or answer as a reaction to the Other's action, *what* is to be given/ granted as a place in the social spectrum, to the I (ego), and to the Other, as a result of their co-ordinated activity, which *rests* or *is based* on the mechanism of the assumption of roles (role-taking). The difference between That and What coincides with the distinction between social-ontic necessity and social contingency. The necessary exists here, though, always only at [[the point of]], in and with the contingent, both in its already formed and developed form, when, that is, the mechanism of the assumption of roles functions (thus,) [[1]] as is expected in a normal, mature human; as well as [[2]] genetically: because to the extent it (the said mechanism) must be learnt, it is always learnt in contingent interactions, and can – despite all of its social-ontic necessity – be learnt so little before contact with contingency (i.e. it is not learnt before contact with contingency), like one before every contact with water can [[so little/ barely]] learn to swim [[i.e. you cannot learn to swim unless there is contact with water]]⁸⁰. At the social-ontic level, the I (ego) and the Other are bearers of the same mechanism of the assumption of roles, which have, so to speak (as it

⁸⁰ The/A baby makes its own, appropriates or becomes familiar with – within a few weeks – the basic mechanism of interaction. Certainly it (the/a baby) does not see the light of the world already equipped with a finished, completed or ready conceptual schema for the interpretation of intersubjective processes; but it possesses the inborn or innate/inherent capacity and (cap)ability to/at develop(ing) such schemata, and accordingly, its advances and progress in this direction are quick; see Bruner, “Ontogenesis”, p. 96.

were, so to say), the same formal/form-related schema in mind, and they can also with certainty know of their necessary commonality (common ground or common point), which goes back or is reduced to their unabolishable (not abolishable, non-abolishable) commonality (common ground or common point) as socially living human beings (creatures). At the level of the concrete social context, that is, of concrete interaction (der konkreten Interaktion), where the mechanism of the assumption of roles must be activated, the content(s), however, come(s) to the fore (or move(s) into the foreground/forefront), and since the commonality (common ground or common point) was only formal, it now ceases to be necessary, it (the said commonality etc. as to form) can, indeed, carry on existing, however it then has content-related and contingent meaning. At the level of concrete interaction (Interaktion), the real question is in fact posed of alien understanding (i.e. understanding the other (person)), and the mechanism of the assumption of roles is supposed to here provide information about whether the Other's plans of acting (i.e. action plans) and modes, manners or ways of acting and action will assign or allocate to him this or that place in the spectrum of the social relation, whether they (the said action plans and modes/ways of acting/action of the Other) are, therefore, commensurable or incommensurable with the I's (ego's) action plans and modes, manners or ways of acting and action, and for what subjective or objective reason. The situation or position is, at this level, open, and the possible (potential or eventual) content-related non-commonality (lack of common ground or absence of a common point) is ascertained exactly by virtue of – under all the circumstances – existing formal commonality at the social-ontic level, something which, conversely, implies that also the ascertainment of content-related commonalities or (content-related) common ground and common points in the concrete interactional context is an independent act, which does not in the least understand itself (i.e. which is not in the least self-evident) on the basis of formal social-ontic commonality (aufgrund der formalen sozial-ontischen

Gemeinsamkeit). The formal social-ontic commonality is, therefore, at the content-related level of concrete interaction, completely neutral (verhält sich also auf der inhaltlichen Ebene der konkreten Interaktion vollkommen neutral), because in everything, which belongs to the social-ontic [[dimension, realm, sphere, domain]] (denn in allem, was zum Sozialontischen gehört), all places in the spectrum of the social relation and all conceivable concrete uses of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles are contained eo ipso. Here it is a matter of the That, not of the What (Es handelt sich hier um das Daß, nicht um das Was). And the That as such does not provide or put at anyone's disposal a(ny) categorial apparatus whose mere application would yield, produce or result in each and every respective What, How, When, etc.. In terms of categories (Categorially), the [[said]] mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles has as its own, only variables, whose each and every respective concretisation, however, (with)in the framework of social interaction (im Rahmen der sozialen Interaktion), escapes and eludes absolutely certain and sure prognosis. In any case, attempts at such prognoses, which must rest or be based on concrete judgements and evaluations of persons and of the situation, is no task, duty or mission of social ontology, but the matter or cause of historical-psychological and sociological analysis. Cum grano salis (= Latin = With a grain of salt), it can be asserted that the two levels of the fully developed mechanism of the assumption of roles [[i.e. the common level as to the form of the mechanism, and, the level as to variable and varying content]] would relate towards each other like social ontology towards history and sociology. This makes one think about the social-ontic reasons for the structuring and constitution (texture and composition) of the scientific disciplines.

The necessity of the co-existence of both levels, that is, the necessary interweaving of necessity and contingency in this co-existence, explains an age-old and ubiquitous fundamental (basic) human experience: that man, for man, is

something very familiar and, at the same time, alien/foreign/strange-impenetrable(-inscrutable)⁸¹. Familiarity comes into being out of the social-ontically founded, established and substantiated certainty that in the Other, exactly the same abilities for the assumption of roles exist, are available and present as in the I (ego); and alienness, foreignness and strangeness take root in the uncertainty about whether in concrete interaction those formal abilities will bear fruit in terms of content, whether, that is, the undertakings (ventures and enterprises) of the I (ego) to put itself in [[the position/situation of]] (and or empathise with) the Other (sich in den Anderen hineinzusetzen), will make available all respective interesting (pieces of) information about it (i.e. the Other) and its (the Other's) plans of acting (i.e. action plans). The real or presumed, in any case, constantly possible differences in content(s) at the level of concrete interaction put the formal commonalities and formal common ground/common points at the social-ontic level in the shade. Even if we wanted to accept, (along) with Hume, that men (i.e. humans, people) are always and everywhere moved by the same motives and passions, that is to say, that the content(s) – understood in such a way – of human nature remain(s) diachronically stable, thus it is again hardly possible to know from beforehand (in advance) which motive and which passion – love or hate, angst, fear or aggression – will determine in every concrete case the behaviour of the I (ego) and of the Other. Hume, in fact, made himself (it) clear (explained) that the constant “passions” of the human psyche do not produce or constitute – in chemical purity and separated from one another, but only “mixed in various degrees” – the source “of all the actions and enterprises”⁸². If individual behaviour and social processes could be explained by the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses, thus the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other would be a considerably more simple

⁸¹ See footnote 16 and 17, above, in this chapter.

⁸² “Human Understanding”, VIII = *Essays*, II, p. 68.

matter of concern than it is (it) in actual fact. We want, at any rate, to raise that the social-ontically constitutive human capacity for and ability at the assumption of roles, as well as the always present knowledge of the I (ego), that the Other has at its disposal the same and equal capacity and ability, do not in the least vouch for or guarantee the success of alien understanding (i.e. understanding another or others), or, in [[the case of]] success of this same understanding of others, consensus between the I and the Other at the level of contents or of concrete interaction. That means: an, in practice, sufficient consensus is even possible notwithstanding, on both sides, a deficient or even false, incorrect/mistaken alien understanding (i.e. understanding of others); and dissent can come into being/arise exactly as a result of an accurately (or absolutely) correct alien understanding (i.e. understanding of another or others). Discussion of (the examination of) the problem of communication will prove the importance of this distinction⁸³.

We shall dwell or linger, here, first of all, on the still elementary distinction between the social-ontically constitutive and – in all humans – in principle given capacity, capability and ability in regard to the assumption of roles, and the actual talent, knack or skill of every (hu)man at making use of this (cap)ability at the content-related level of concrete interaction, and accordingly, at making judgements about the plans of acting (action plans) (Handlungsentwürfe) and the possible movements of each and every interesting Other in the spectrum of the social relation. There is, therefore, a general and form-related (i.e. formal) and a special or content-related ability at the assumption of roles. The latter (special or content-related ability at role-taking/the assumption of roles) does not always and does not necessarily depend on individual intellectual talent or endowment (because it can vary greatly in the same individual from case to case), but it constitutes a resultant of several

⁸³ See Section 1E in this chapter, below.

factors, which in every constellation is dosed (i.e. dispensed, measured or handed out) differently and must be especially and specifically detected or ascertained – in so far as this seems to at all be possible without unprovable psychological presumptions. Of gaps, holes or mistakes in/ of alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of others), there can be talk meaningfully only in connection with the special ability at the assumption of roles, since gaps, holes or mistakes point to content(s) which certainly are lacking at the formal level (in respect) of the general ability at the assumption of roles. That is why Common Sense oriented in terms of practice is accustomed – for good reason – to reducing alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of others) in general to the special ability in relation to that (assumption of roles), and it (the said Common Sense) believes, likewise for good reason, in (regard to) the development of this ability that, not least of all, egotistical or even solipsistic inclinations and tendencies of the individual concerned are guilty (i.e. responsible). Since the oaf, clumsy idiot or fool, as one in/of the tribe/clan of the Sechuana believes, regards all men/humans as oafs, clumsy idiots or fools⁸⁴, thus it must be expected that in every concrete case they (all men) will behave just as oafishly, clumsily, foolishly and loutishly as him. Social-ontologically, this solipsism can be interpreted as the total mixing of the general and special ability at the assumption of roles. The I (ego), indeed, form-relatedly (i.e. formally or in terms of form) transfers (moves or puts) itself in(to) the position or situation of the Other, wherein it can, however, seek and find only its own content(s), and then it identifies the lingering and dwelling on these with the form-related (i.e. formal) putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other. Non-solipsistic self-reference can lead to quite, thoroughly or absolutely different results; they (such results) however presuppose that the I (ego) is in the position to look at and regard as its own

⁸⁴ Cited by Hertzler, *Social Thought*, p. 383 (in the English version: “the lout considers all other people louts”).

content(s) – not merely the, in it (i.e. the I (ego)), momentarily predominating (content(s)), but far-sightedly and retrospectively, visualising and making clear the great variety (of form) (multiformity) of its own feelings, positionings, attitudes, etc., in order to then conclude upon a similar great variety (of form) [[existing]] in the Other. Solipsistic is the conviction that the Other would have to unconditionally select or choose from this great variety (of form) the same content(s) as the I (ego).

Solipsistic behaviour is often socially punished, and then (thereafter) it can be abandoned, at least in its socially unsuccessful (failed) form. It does not have to be (abandoned) when the identity has so closely connected its self-understanding and its will-to-live with this particular form that it (the said identity) prefers the task and mission of decline, downfall, destruction and ruin. Whether solipsistic to the/a “pathological” extent and degree or not, the assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives (Rollen- und Perspektivenübernahme) remains, anyway, a function of identity and its possible peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances). In this respect, there is an element or an impact of “normal” solipsism in every assumption or taking on/over of roles and of perspectives; nevertheless, the social (not necessarily biological^{xxvi}) process of self-preservation, in essence, synonymous with, and tantamount to, identity, of/from the [[very]] nature of its needs, as a rule leads way past solipsistic boundaries. Under or according to these needs, orientation and ponderability (calculability) are right at the top. They are attained and achieved on (or by way of) innumerable individual paths, whose great variety (of form) (multiformity) mocks and scoffs at rash or hasty classifications. Certain variables, nonetheless, reveal (show) the close or tight interrelation between the magnitudes “identity”, “orientation” and the assumption and taking on/over of roles and/or of perceptions. The Ego prefers most of all to be moved, put or transferred (in)to a ponderable (calculable)

Other. It is not enough for it (the Ego) to anticipate this or that isolated plan of acting (action plan) of the Other (diesen oder jenen isolierten Handlungsentwurf), whilst exerting every time new spiritual(-intellectual) effort; the need for orientation is only (then) satisfied when the entire behaviour and the Other's character standing behind (that behaviour) becomes the object of the assumption of roles or role-taking, so that from this permanent basic given (actual) fact, all respective plans of acting (action plans) can then be derived, as it were, deductively – and without doubt, with greater intellectual(-spiritual) convenience or comfort –. The I (ego) puts, therefore, to the Other the claim of consistency and of consequence (Das Ich stellt somit an den Anderen den Anspruch der Konsistenz und der Konsequenz), whereby the claim does not necessarily take root in the actual constitution, texture or composition of the Other, but rather in the uncertainty of the I (ego), which allows or makes the Other to appear perhaps more ponderable (calculable) than he is in reality. Whilst the I (ego) satisfies his need for orientation through recourse to law-like generalities such as “behaviour” or “character”, he commits or perpetrates precisely the same logical mistake as the advocates and proponents of the Covering Law Model lapse into and, as social experience abundantly and plentifully teaches, he lives through, in the process, often both pleasant as well as bad or awful surprises (of the kind: “I did not expect that of him”). Yet that need, for the most part, proves itself and turns out to be stronger, especially since the Other, even if he belongs to the unmediated, i.e. the immediate environment, as a rule – anyhow – is experienced and class(ifi)ed via a personal ideal type (einen personalen Idealtyp), which, though, was formed as a(n) response (answer) to certain questions of the I (ego) with reference/regard to the Other⁸⁵. That, (in)to which the I (ego) through the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives is put, moved or transferred,

⁸⁵ For the “personal ideal type” see Schütz, *Aufbau*, esp. pp. 266, 270.

represents and constitutes a typification (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) or a construct whose extent and scope vary greatly, and not seldom puts in the place of the concrete Other, completely general representations and notions about human essence, being and (human) behaviour, in order to then from that draw conclusions about the Other and his action in the past and (in the) future. In practice, though, such representations and notions often prove and turn out to be more well-aimed and more useful than attempts at specified, specialised (i.e. specific) statements. Things can, however, also lie/be the other way around – and this makes clear to us again the fact that there are no certain or secure recipes for orientation and the assumption and taking on/over of roles. Social-ontological analysis can only name the necessary (formal), not the sufficient (content-related), preconditions and prerequisites of the successful assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. These latter (preconditions and prerequisites) can be detected and ascertained, established or determined only a posteriori for every concrete case, and philosophers, who necessarily offer here their good services, sell an – in practice – useless, albeit pressingly, urgently or compelling necessary, requisite and, hence, much sought-after ware (i.e. product or goods).

Typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms; Typisierungen) in or at the service of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives vary greatly in their degree of generality and of abstractiveness or abstraction, depending on the social distance between the I (ego) and the Other, as well as on the present or prospective and expected intensity and direction of the social relation, although the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles remains, in the course of this, structural: typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) and variations take place at the level of contents. The variable or mutable fate and destiny of the typifications follows the ceaseless changing and alternation of the centre of

gravity, main emphasis or focal points and points of view of the assumption and taking on/over of roles in the dynamic process of interaction (Interaktion). The assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives (Rollen- und Perspektivenübernahme) constitute, especially in (regard to) the high intensity of the social relation, as it were, a permanent experiment, whose intermediate results can – again and again – be called into question, even if they, first of all, seem to be conclusive and definitive. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives takes place itself from a certain perspective whose breadth and direction depends upon which (peripheral or central) existential aspects of the I (ego) are activated in the social relation in question, and which (peripheral or central) existential aspects of the Other are of interest with regard to the course and outcome of the social relation. There is no question (about it) that interaction (Interaktion) does not begin (until) only when and after (since) the I – through the assumption and taking on/over of roles – has formed an image/a picture of the Other. The assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives is (the/a) function of the interactive process, and it does not – at the same time – necessarily matter whether the (partial) image (picture) of the Other is “objective” or whether the I (ego), on the basis of its/his own life experiences, puts itself/himself in (and or empathises with) the corresponding (life experiences) of the Other (ob sich das Ich aufgrund eigener Erlebnisse in die entsprechenden des Anderen hineinversetzt), so that it/he (the said I (ego)) can “truly understand” it/him (the Other), but in regard to that, (what matters is) which experiences (Erfahrungen), properties (qualities or characteristics) and intentions of the Other, the I (ego) (regards) – in accordance with its own interpretation – as (holds to be) important and allows (them, such experiences, properties and intentions) to have a motivating effect on it/him (i.e. the I (ego)). The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and (the) understanding of the Other as a whole person do not necessarily coincide. With regard to the Other, only one particular aspect can be of interest to the I (ego), an (aspect)

whose apprehension and practical handling do not require any knowledge about the person as a whole. It is, however, also conceivable that it/he (the I (ego)) demands/requires it (such knowledge about the person as a whole). (In order to influence a public official for a certain goal, I find out and learn about “what kind of man/person he is.”) Much more than an empirically provable “true understanding” – and although the I (ego) views or looks upon its/his [[own]] understanding of the Other, and passes this understanding of the Other off, for obvious inner/internal and outer/external reasons, as true – of interest here, in actual fact, is the aim of the interaction (Interaktion) in the wider/broader sense, which directly or indirectly determines the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. This perspective is crystallised/crystallises in the manner (how) – from (out of) many more extensive or wider objective interrelations and contexts – the features or elements become detached and stand out, which then (thereafter) constitute, in (an) independent combination, the construct of the inner/internal and outer/external situation and position of the Other (das Konstrukt von der inneren und äußeren Lage des Anderen), in which the I (ego) puts itself/himself or empathises with. Of course (it is self-evident that)(,) the (this) process is acted out and takes place neither in (regard to) the schematisation, nor in the sequence or order, in which it must be outlined or sketched out at the analytical level. The attempt(,) to tell apart and distinguish beginning and end, motive and aim, truth and fantasy (poetry) (or fact and fiction)(,) in it (the said process), must involve, entangle or embroil the observer, in themselves, constantly renewing (ever-renewing) vicious circles. However, in general there is no doubt that the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives forces (the/a) choice (selection) and processing of the – for the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – necessary (pieces of) information in a certain direction, that the strategic focus of social perception shifts depending on the type of the social relation, and that simplifications and typification (i.e. rendering into (a) type(s) or

classification(s) under (a) typifying form(s)) are subject to the same rich-in-variants logic of the social relation, whereby/in relation to which inevitable, obligatory specifications of (the) typical and of (the) nuanced [[aspects]] of (the) simple [[elements]] take place, as soon as – in the concrete case – deviations (divergences) are detected and ascertained in the behaviour of the, on each and every respective occasion, subjects having an interest (i.e. interested subjects), from the assumed model of behaviour (or behavioural model) of each and every respective super/supra(-)ordinate(d) (superior, higher) group(,) or in the behaviour of the individual from this model of behaviour(,) which until then was the typical behaviour ascribed to him (Der Versuch, bei ihm Anfang und Ende, Motiv und Ziel, Wahrheit und Dichtung auseinanderzuhalten, muß den Beobachter in sich ständig erneuernde Teufelskreise verwickeln. Aber es unterliegt im allgemeinen keinem Zweifel, daß die Perspektive der Perspektivenübernahme Auswahl und Verarbeitung der für die Perspektivenübernahme nötigen Informationen in eine bestimmte Richtung hineinzwingt, daß sich der strategische Fokus der soziale Wahrnehmung je nach Typ der sozialen Beziehung verschiebt und daß Vereinfachungen und Typisierung derselben varientenreichen Logik der Sozialbeziehung unterworfen sind, wobei zwangsläufig Spezifizierungen des Typischen und Nuancierungen des Einfachen erfolgen, sobald im konkreten Fall Abweichungen im Verhalten der jeweils interessierenden Subjekte vom angenommenen Verhaltensmuster der jeweils übergeordneten Gruppe oder im Verhalten des Individuums von diesem, ihm bis dahin zugeschrieben typischen Verhalten festgestellt werden)⁸⁶.

The depth and extent or scope of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives varies no less than the, in the course of this, unavoidable typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms)

⁸⁶ Regarding the content of this series of sentences or compound sentence cf. Jones-Thibaut, "Interaction Goals", esp. pp. 151ff., 153, as well as Gage-Cronbach, "Conceptual and methodological Problems", p. 413.

corresponding to the extent and scope and to the intensity of the social relation. Before we call to mind the – in this regard – fundamental/basic variables, the most important situations will be mentioned, in which the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives does not seem to be a central or pressing task, although the I (ego) and the Other by no means stand indifferently across from (opposite to) (or indifferently face) each other. In (regard to) an act(ion) or a plan of acting (i.e. action plan (plan of action)), one can distinguish the subjectivity of the creator or originator [[of the said action plan]], which lends to or confers/bestows upon the (intended) act(ion) (acting) its subjective meaning/sense, from the objective course and the objective results of the same (act(ion)), which can be characterised as the objective meaning/sense of the act(ion) (or acting). With regard to this distinction, three possibilities emerge (loom on the horizon) and stand out: [[1]] the I (ego) is interested in a thorough assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, because for it (the I (ego)), the subjective meaning (sense) of acting (the act or action) is everything (all [[things]]) and the objective nothing, because it, that is to say, would accept for itself even the most unpleasant consequences of the act (action or acting) (Handlung), if it were convinced of the pure or sincere and genuine motivation of the Other^{xxvii}. [[2]] Or the I (ego) wants to, and must, enter into, take on/over, accept and go along with the perspective of the Other, because to it (the I (ego)), otherwise, the objective meaning (sense) of acting (the act or action) would not be quite (i.e. sufficiently) clear; namely, it (the I (ego)) does not know what it should do with the consequences of acting (the act or action) when it does not know what the Other has in mind as its object and aims at (bringing about), with that (acting or act(ion)). [[3]] With (regard to) the third possibility, in the I's (ego's) eyes, the objective meaning (sense) of acting (act or action) solely and exclusively counts, and that is why it (the I (ego)) shows no consideration for (does not take into account) the motives and intentions of the Other. But, also, in this case, the I (ego) can be forced, in a later phase (i.e. at a later stage), into

the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, when the reaction of the Other to the indifference of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the motives of that (Other) turns out to be so vehement, fierce, strong or violent and effective that it (such indifference) cannot be ignored. Here, the relationship of power (power relationship; Machtverhältnis) is decisive, and consequently the interrelation between the character of the social relation and the extent, scope or intensity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives appears (and makes itself felt). With (regard to) a starkly (or strongly) asymmetrical power relationship (relationship of power), the superior [[side, person]] spares itself of or puts aside the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives when it does not expect of that (assumption and taking on/over of perspectives), even over the long run, any unpleasant consequences – although we must note (mark) that already this assessment of the situation presupposes a putting oneself in (and or empathising with) – by the superior [[side, person]] – the mental state (in die mentale Befindlichkeit) of the inferior [[side, person]], and that, hence, in the cold light of day, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can never be fully and entirely (completely) neglected. Nonetheless, the inferior [[side, person]] remains rather reliant on that (assumption and taking on/over of perspectives), since its fate or destiny depends – to a much greater extent – on the more precise knowledge of the situation, of the preferences or weaknesses of the superior [[side, person]]⁸⁷. In more or less symmetrical power relationships (relationships of power), again, a number of constellations, are conceivable: the I (ego) and the Other come only superficially into contact and conceive of, plan

⁸⁷ Already texts from the time of the archaic high cultures provide evidence for (verify) the close connection between the knowledge of humans and the rules of wisdom and prudence for use by (the) weaker (people). The courtier or the underling (subject) puts himself in, and empathises with, the king's psyche, in order to detect, establish, determine and ascertain what could be pleasant to him, and to act accordingly: "laugh, if and when he laughs; this will be very much to the liking of his spirit and intellect" (cited in Hertzler, *Social Thought*, p. 55, cf. the author's remarks at p. 72; in the English version it says: "Laugh when he laughs. That will be exceedingly pleasing to his mind"). In the European courtly literature of the early New Times there is an abundance of similar motifs. The phenomenon, with which we are dealing here, certainly did not come to an end with courtly life. Upon that, does the grosser or finer, at any rate, immortal art of flattery, in all times (ages, eras, epochs) and in all societies, build. And not only this (immortal art of flattery).

or design, or, pursue, in practice, their plans of acting (i.e. action plans) without having to put themselves in (or empathise with) the situation (or position) of each and every respective other (person). The I (ego) and the Other do not actually (really) have long-term, on both sides, positively or negatively interesting plans of acting (action plans), and act with regard to each other merely reactively, without (a) deeper and permanent assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The I and the Other foster, cherish or entertain more or less comprehensive aligned or oriented towards each other plans of acting (action plans), and, in the process, they must constantly anticipatorily (in an anticipating manner) take into (consideration in) their planning regarding acting and action, and, their way, manner or mode of acting or action (in ihre Handlungsplanung und Handlungsweise), the reaction of the other [[person and or side]] on each and every respective occasion⁸⁸. This latter case represents, as it were, the ideal type of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (gleichsam den Idealtyp der Perspektivenübernahme). However, it by no means makes up or constitutes the quantitatively predominant part of (the) social interaction (den quantitativ überwiegenden Teil der sozialen Interaktion). And one gets (obtains) a skewed and distorted picture (image) of social reality, when one assumes and presumes (alleges [[that]]) it (the aforesaid ideal type) [[is]] everywhere on the assumption that the equality of the interaction partners (Interaktionspartner) in the ideal type of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives eo ipso vouches for or guarantees the consensual harmony of the corresponding social relation. As will be shown (seen), the ideal type is able to be applied just as much to (an) inimical as well as (a) friendly interaction (Interaktion).

⁸⁸ Jones – Gerard (*Foundations*, p. 506ff.) characterise these three constellations as “pseudocontingence”, “reactive contingence” and “mutual contingence”. In addition to that comes (the) “asymmetrical contingence”, i.e. the unequal power relationship (relationship of power).

The simultaneous (concurrent) development of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at a form-related (i.e. formal) and a content-related level procures for the actors a possibility, whose meaning for social life can hardly be overestimated: the possibility of suggestion and of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) (die Möglichkeit der Suggestion und der Täuschung). The I (ego) can only undertake the attempt to delude (deceive, fool or cheat) the Other because it knows with certainty that the Other, in terms of form (i.e. formally), has at its disposal and possesses the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. It (The I (ego)) puts, therefore, into the perspective of the Other, contents, (in respect) of which it believes that they (i.e. the said contents) would trigger (off) in the Other, for it, that is to say, for the I (ego), pleasant reactions. The I (ego) gives rise to the impression, therefore – through feigned or fake signs, symbolism or acts (deeds) – of making as its own and of appropriating the perspective expressed (i.e. referred to), and [[that it]] wants to take its cue from, and comply with, that (perspective) in the future (Es legt also in die Perspektive des Anderen Inhalte hinein, von denen es glaubt, sie würden beim Anderen die ihm, also dem Ich, genehmen Reaktionen auslösen. Das Ich erweckt also durch vorgetäuschte Zeichen oder Taten den Eindruck, als mache es sich die in diesen Zeichen oder Taten ausgedrückte Perspektive zu eigen und wolle sich künftig danach richten). The deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) succeeds (if and) when the Other assumes or adopts (takes on/over) this perspective, in order to take it (the said perspective) as the basis of his (the Other's) own perspective in regard to thoughts and (to) acting (or action), i.e. in order to shape and form its/his (i.e. the Other's) own thoughts or actions as inner (internal) or outer (external) reactions in relation to that (perspective) (Die Täuschung gelingt, wenn der Andere diese Perspektive übernimmt, um sie der eigenen Denk- und Handlungsperspektive zugrundezulegen, d. h. um die eigenen Gedanken oder Aktionen als innere oder äußere Reaktionen darauf zu gestalten). Since the I

(ego) suggests to the Other a deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)), it guides the behaviour of the Other in such a way that now the appropriate (apt, suitable, fitting) reaction to the Other's (re)action suggested by the deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)) is that action which the I (ego) in truth (or in reality) intended, planned or aimed at. This many-branched, complex game is (not) restricted (not) to the plans of acting (action plans) with goals, which are independent of the personality of the actors (Indem das Ich dem Anderen ein Trugbild suggeriert, lenkt es das Verhalten des Anderen derart, daß nun die passende Reaktion auf die durch das Trugbild suggerierte (Re)Aktion des Anderen jene Aktion ist, die das Ich in Wahrheit beabsichtigte. Dieses verzweigte Spiel beschränkt sich nicht auf Handlungsentwürfe mit Zwecken, die unabhängig von der Persönlichkeit der Akteure sind). It (The said game) extends (and stretches) just as much to the narrower field of intersubjective relations, that is thither (to there) where images and pictures of personality are negotiated or suggestively imposed, where identities, irrespective of outer/external objectives (and settings of an aim) (often accompanying them (such identities)), seek to gain recognition and to make themselves felt, stand out (and or otherwise be effective) (Es erstreckt sich ebenso auf das engere Gebiet der intersubjektiven Beziehungen, also dorthin, wo Persönlichkeitsbilder ausgehandelt oder suggestiv durchgesetzt werden, wo Identitäten unabhängig von (oft damit einhergehenden) äußeren Zielsetzungen sich Anerkennung verschaffen und zur Geltung kommen wollen). The I (ego) shapes and forms its image and its behaviour with regard to the (its) evaluation by the Other. This is as old as the world, and the motivation can, in the process, vary significantly and substantially (Das Ich gestaltet sein Image und sein Verhalten im Hinblick auf die Bewertung durch den Anderen. Dies alles ist so alt wie die Welt, und die Motivation kann dabei beträchtlich variieren). The I (ego) may simply enjoy and take its pleasure in the art of (or skill at) deception (delusion, illusion or deceit), and show every individual

Other another (i.e. different) face. In the other extreme case, it can be that the recognition of a certain individual or collective subject (for instance, a beloved or a church) matters so much to the I (ego) that it can even internalise (“change or vary”) that which first of all was meant only as a mask (Das Ich mag einfach seine Freude and der Täuschungskunst haben und jedem einzelnen Anderen ein anderes Gesicht zeigen. Im anderen Extremfall kann es sein, daß dem Ich an der Anerkennung eines bestimmten individuellen oder kollektiven Subjekts (etwa einer Geliebten oder einer Kirche) so viel liegt, daß es das, was zunächst nur als Maske gemeint war, sogar verinnerlichen („sich ändern“) kann). The Other can, for its part, react in various ways to the ascertainment that the I (ego) wants to deceive (delude, fool or cheat) him. It can punish the I (ego) or else leave it alone or let it have its own way, and silently (tacitly) take countermeasures [[against it (the I (ego))]]. Then the game of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives intensifies and the deceiver is deceived, the cheat is cheated, the swindler is swindled(, the trickster is tricked). Not seldom, finally, does it happen that the I (ego) wants to suggest to the Other not a certain picture or image of itself (i.e. of the I (ego)), but such a picture or image of the Other (Der Andere kann seinerseits auf die Feststellung, daß das Ich ihn täuschen will, verschiedenartig reagieren. Er kann das Ich bestrafen oder aber es gewähren lassen und stillschweigend Gegenmaßnahmen treffen. Dann potenziert sich das Spiel der Perspektivenübernahme und der Betrüger wird betrogen. Nicht selten kommt es schließlich vor, daß das Ich dem Anderen nicht ein bestimmtes Bild von sich, sondern ein solches vom Anderen suggerieren will). The I (ego) behaves vis-à-vis the Other (thus) as if the Other is this particular person with these particular properties, qualities or characteristics, or even tells him (the Other) which is his (the I’s (ego’s)) picture or image of him (i.e. the Other). This behaviour and this message, notice or announcement very often exercise an influence on the thought and action of the Other. If the I (ego) assesses this influence correctly, then it can motivate the Other towards such a behaviour,

that the appropriate reaction to that (behaviour) is the action originally intended, planned or aimed at by the I (ego) (Das Ich verhält sich dem Anderen gegenüber so, als ob der Andere diese bestimmte Person mit diesen bestimmten Eigenschaften sei oder sagt ihm gar, welches sein Bild von ihm sei. Dieses Verhalten und diese Mitteilung üben sehr oft auf Denken und Handeln des Anderen einen Einfluß aus. Schätzt das Ich diesen Einfluß richtig ein, so kann es den Anderen zu einem solchen Verhalten motivieren, daß die passende Reaktion darauf die von Ich ursprünglich beabsichtigte Aktion ist)⁸⁹.

The fact that into the process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, questions and problems of power and of identity, as well as the – connected with them – affects (emotions or sentiments), so strongly flow, that they can determine in fact/even the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, does not stand in contradiction to the, of necessity, reflexive character of this same process (Die Tatsache, daß in den Vorgang der Perspektivenübernahme Macht- und Identitätsfragen sowie die damit verbundenen Affekte so stark einfließen, daß sie sogar die Perspektive der Perspektivenübernahme bestimmen können, steht nicht im Widerspruch zum notgedrungen reflexiven Charakter dieses selben Vorgangs^{xxviii}). We shall clear up (clarify), first of all, what, with that, *cannot* be meant. Of course, affects (emotions or sentiments) have their reflexive and cognitive components, they do not exist in the consciousness^{xxix} and that is why they cannot also serve as motives (or inducements; Beweggründe) if they are not reflexively mediated (“*I* experience joy, pain etc.”). But this reflection has the content of the affect (emotion or sentiment) exclusively as the/its object; over and above that, it is not capable of making any (pieces of) information accessible, let alone meaningfully connect them with one another and with practical instructions. So-

⁸⁹ From these structurally central constellations it can be easily inferred how tightly the process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is interwoven with that of the formation or assertion of identity. One must, therefore, go into (or reopen) the same setting or posing of the question and problem also from this latter point of view (i.e. regarding identity), as we want to do it in the third volume of this work.

called “empathy (or insight)” (Einfühlung) is likewise set tight or narrow limits and boundaries. If the concept, in general, is supposed to have a meaning, then it must point to the meeting of two affects, sentiments and (or) emotions of the same kind, and to the certainty of this state of being of the same kind (or uniformity; Gleichartigkeit). The uniformity (i.e. state of being of the same kind) of affects (sentiments or emotions) is ascertained in the different bearers of course only by a reflecting authority (i.e. authority engaged in reflection; reflektierenden Instanz), which is indeed not identical with the cognitive component of the affects (sentiments and or emotions) themselves, but, likewise, has many restricted and limited competencies: it (the said uniformity) must be limited/restricted to the aforementioned ascertainment regarding the uniform (i.e. of-the-same-kind) content(s) of the affects (sentiments and emotions). In contrast to the reflexive/reflective aspect of the affects (sentiments and emotions) and of empathy, reflexive (reflective) activity – during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – demands as-far-as-possible independence from the content of any particular and fixed or established affects (sentiments or emotions), and indeed exactly because it (the said reflective/reflexive activity), at the level of content(s), must be capable connecting the Other in terms of understanding, possibly, with any affect (sentiment or emotion) whatsoever. It (The said reflective activity) is, also, in itself affect/emotion/sentiment-free (affektfrei), when it, at the form-related (i.e. formal) level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, apprehends the Other as the bearer of the corresponding mechanism, as well as (an) actor on the basis of the end/goal-means-schema. It can obviously do that regardless of whether the I (ego) loves or hates the Other. The place (locus or position), where affect-freedom (i.e. freedom from sentiments and emotions) is settled and established (die Affektfreiheit angesiedelt ist), can be detected if we linger over or dwell on the already-introduced-above distinction between the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the perspective of the assumption and

taking on/over of perspectives (Unterscheidung zwischen Perspektivenübernahme und Perspektive der Perspektivenübernahme). The not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. the inseparable and indispensable) reflexivity or reflectivity of the former must not in principle be impaired or interfered with by the possibly affect-laden (i.e. loaded-with-sentiments-and-emotions) narrowness or tightness of the latter. The perspective, from which the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives takes place, may be so clouded and muddied under the effect of persistently or temporarily intense and strong affects (sentiments or emotions) such that the reflexive (i.e. reflective) element or factor (Moment) is reduced here to the reflexive/reflective component of the affects (sentiments or emotions), and even so, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in itself functions very well. Thus, someone could, for example, fatally hate another (person), and (could), in a cold-blooded fashion, plan his murder (or assassination), whilst putting himself in (and empathising with) his habits (i.e. of the person to be murdered) as to thought and living (Denk- und Lebensgewohnheiten); the Other is seen here from the – truly very narrow or tight – perspective of blind hate, without, in the course of this, the, in practice, relevant assumption and taking on/over of perspectives being hindered or hampered. This example is, of course, supposed to prove only the, in principle, theoretical possibility of the distinction or differentiation between the (very) reduced reflexivity/reflectivity of the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the developed reflexivity/reflectivity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives itself. It does not imply that in practice the reverse cannot also be [[the case]] – the social-ontic field is, in fact, precisely in this sense, always open. Naturally, the affect-laden (i.e. loaded-with-sentiments-and-emotions) perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can very often, in practice, suppress (smother or stifle, suffocate or choke) the reflexivity/reflectivity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at the level of content(s) (in relation to which, though,

love can be as obstructive (or as much as a hindrance) as hate). However, important to us is the ascertainment that this does not *have to* happen, that, therefore, to the reflexivity/reflectivity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, nonetheless, (an) independence or autonomy is to be ascribed, without having to infer, deduce or conclude from that, that the actor is “rational” in any ethical or anthropological sense whatsoever, that is to say, he should or ought to be – at will (or as he likes) and all along ((the way) down) the line – master of his affects (emotions and sentiments), in order to be able to remain interaction-able (i.e. capable of interacting; interaktionsfähig). Affectivity and reflectivity (reflexivity) have, as (we have) shown, their own place (locus or position) and part and separate from each other or meet (encounter) each other in a different respect on each and every respective occasion. The (An) absolute line of separation, which an absolute and many-sided incompatibility of both (affectivity and reflectivity) towards each other would show, does not exist. That is why the successful opposition and contrast between affectivity and reflectivity (reflexivity) means (signifies) no identity of the latter with “rationality” in the above-mentioned sense. The proof of the reflexive or reflective character of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives does not say a word (in respect) of any one-sided cognitive psychology, which then is supposed to serve as (a/the) bridge to an ethically meant rationality (ethisch gemeinten Rationalität)^{xxx}.

The possibility of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) with the full functioning of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives proves in itself that between (the) interaction partners (i.e. partners engaged in interaction) (Interaktionspartnern), equality in (regard to) intellectual talent and available information does not have to dominate or reign, and also that their aims are diametrically (really and absolutely) opposed, they (the said interaction partners), that is to say, can be foes too, without this impairing or

detracting from the social-ontic structure of the interaction. These ascertainments apply, though, not only when deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) is present, but they remain fundamental for the whole (entire, total) process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives or of understanding and of communication. What concerns the first point, thus it can be asserted without great risk that only in few, in fact, rather rare (i.e. very few) cases, the interaction partners have the same level of information and the same intellectual talent (or endowment) at their disposal. The openness of the social-ontic field prohibits/forbids, however, also here, every certain (secure) prognosis about (regarding) the outcome of the social relation. With (regard to) the inequality of the level of information, which favours the intellectually more talented person^{xxxix}, the outcome – ceteris paribus – should be clear. What, however, happens (is the case) when this inequality turns out to be in favour of the less talented, and to what extent can it (the said inequality) be redressed, atoned for and made good by the intellectual superiority of the more talented? Even this superiority can, if the same level of information is presupposed, become dangerous to its possessor within the framework or context of a simple or intensified (reaching a climax) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives: the intellectually superior (person, side) can project the entire (whole, complete) freedom and complexity of his own considerations, thoughts and deliberations inside the Other, consequently – during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – he puts himself in (and or empathises with) a fiction, and just the same or similarly, – albeit for the reverse reason –, errs like the less talented, who is not capable of following the Other in his flights of fancy (or high-minded, lofty thoughts)^{xxxix}. After all (Ultimately), it is open (i.e. it depends on the concrete case), in which respect and at which level; at which tier, grade or level of information, and with which intellectual talent (or endowment), the reflexive/reflective and affective (sentimental and emotional) components will jointly act and collaborate during the assumption and taking

on/over of perspectives, or will be reciprocally inhibited, obstructed or hampered. Formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) (renditions, making, conversions) into forms) (structuring(s) in terms of form, formal structuring(s)) of the interaction process (process of interaction) (Formalisierungen der Interaktionsprozesse), which put the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at the centre of attention, are, hence, in advance condemned in relation to that, to exclude precisely (exactly) those factors which give interaction (Interaktion) its each and every respective unique or one-time (singular) stamping or moulding and determine its outcome (ausgerechnet jene Faktoren auszuklammern, die der Interaktion ihre jeweilige einmalige Prägung geben und ihren Ausgang bestimmen). Formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms or structuring(s) in terms of form) must, therefore, presuppose equal (or the same) intellectual talent/endowment, (an) equal or the same level of information and equal or the same affective (sentimental and emotional) neutrality in the interaction partners, because precisely (the) consideration of unending and infinite variations and combinations of talent, information and affectivity (sentimentality or emotionality) – by definition – break open or burst the framework of every formalisation (i.e. rendering(s) into forms or structuring(s) in terms of form). On the basis of the conceptuality developed here, we can say that formalisation (i.e. rendering into form(s) or structuring in terms of form) is possible only at the social-ontic level of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, but not at the level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in the content-related sense (Anhand der hier entwickelten Begrifflichkeit können wir sagen, daß Formalisierung nur auf der sozialontischen Ebene des Mechanismus der Perspektiven übernahme im inhaltlichen Sinne möglich ist). Formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms or structuring(s) in terms of form), which beyond the social-ontic [[dimension, realm, sphere]] (das Sozialontische), either way, were combined with content-related preferences for a certain outcome of the

interpretation process (process of interpretation) or with attempts at prognoses of such outcomes, had to shut out and exclude the individualising, literally imponderable and incalculable factors, and start from the assumption and acceptance of equally talented, endowed, informed and “rational” actors^{xxxiii}. The best (most) known amongst them are two, namely, Mead’s social psychology, and game theory first sketched or drawn up in the mathematical framework without (an) apparent relation(ship) to Mead’s interactionist(ic) approach, but later mixed, in many ways, with it (nämlich Meads Sozialpsychologie und die zunächst im mathematischen Rahmen ohne ersichtliche Beziehung zu Meads interaktionistischem Ansatz entworfene, aber später mit ihm vielfach vermischte Spieltheorie). Mead’s drive or urge towards formalisation (i.e. rendering into form(s) or structuring in terms of form) stood/was in/at the service of ethics; the assumption and acceptance of equally talented, endowed and “rational” actors was, that is, in him (Mead), not merely an unavoidable theoretical convention, but actually an ethical postulate, or at least an ethical aim. Later versions of symbolic interactionism had to, though, nuance and modify Mead’s relatively simple schema⁹⁰. Game theory, on the contrary, was from the beginning put in the service of strategies and power-technical thoughts (i.e. technical considerations as regards power), whereby their formalism, which resulted from the aforementioned inner (internal) necessities^{xxxiv}, hindered and obstructed them (the said strategies and considerations pertaining to power), regarding that, of fulfilling their actual goal/end, namely of saying anything decisive in advance about the concrete case. Here everything remained thus, as it was already before game theory; the strategist, namely, carried on remaining dependent or reliant on the “tact of judgement” (Clausewitz). In terms of theory (Theoretically), game theory,

⁹⁰ See, in relation to that, Rock, *The Making*, esp. pp. 164, 166ff., as well as Goffman, *Strategic Interaction*, esp. pp. 72ff., 136ff., who underlines also, in terms of content, meaningless formalism as the great common denominator between Mead’s social psychology and game theory.

especially in its refined interactionist(ic) variations, in comparison to Mead's approach, is at an advantage in that it specifically underlines the effect of the same mechanism of the simple or intensified assumption or taking on/over of perspectives with regard to all basic forms of interaction (Interaktion) (pure conflict, pure co-ordination, mixture of conflict and interdependence), and interrelating and connected with that, deduces (or infers) the special role of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) as the means of struggle in conflict from exactly that effect, without social-ethical connotations⁹¹.

The questions and problems of power and of identity, which determine the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, can be described or paraphrased by the sentence that the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives will be defined during (in, with) the attempt of the I (ego) to assume and take on/over the perspective of the Other (whilst bearing in mind the actual or presumed place in the spectrum of the social relation of that (Other), that is, (by) bearing in mind its (the Other's) actual or presumed friendly or inimical relation towards the I (ego). The spectrum of the social relation is (stands) (found) in the background as the shaping and formative representation or notion of the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in every assumption and taking on/over of perspectives; the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation (the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) can unfold and develop only against the background (backdrop) of the spectrum of the social relation⁹². The perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives shows (displays, indicates) the place of the I (ego) in this spectrum; the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives through which the I (ego) is put in (and empathises with) the situation (and position) of the Other is supposed or ought

⁹¹ See e.g. Schelling, *Strategy*, esp. pp. 87, 96ff., 160.

⁹² See Section 1A in this chapter, above.

to show (indicate) which place the Other will occupy in the spectrum. Through the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, the I (ego) interprets the thought (thinking) and practical positioning of the Other; this assumption and taking on/over (adoption, undertaking, takeover; Übernahme) does not in the least, therefore, constitute a passive acceptance (Annahme) of the verbal and other signs or symbolism which the Other gives (is giving) from itself, on the part of the I (ego) (i.e. the I (ego) does not passively accept the Other's verbal and other signs), no[[r does it constitute the]] automatic co-ordination of the actions of the Other and of the I (ego) or of reactions on the basis of such an acceptance, but a never-breaking off-and-never-stopping and rich-in-variations process of interpretation in always new concrete situations (sondern einen nie aussetzenden und variantenreichen Interpretationsvorgang in immer neuen konkreten Situationen), in which all possible kinds of the social relation between the actors appear. This meaning of the activity of interpretation (interpretation (interpretive) activity) in the course of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives was emphatically and rightly asserted by the experts of symbolic interactionism against the structuralist(ic) perceptions and views, and systems theories or theories of roles (role theories)⁹³. That was, however, only half of the job, which was not brought to an end (completed or finished) because the authority standing behind the activity of interpretation, namely, the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, was not apprehended sharply enough in its connection with the movement or motion of the actors inside of the spectrum of the social relation. It was not, therefore, understood how tightly, how originally and causally the functioning of the mechanism of the social relation, the extent, the scope and the depth of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives are connected with the – in the actors – always present polarity and continuity of that spectrum. This omission

⁹³ Above all, Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism*, esp. pp. 52ff., 83ff.; “Mead”, pp. 150, 154, 156.

was no accident or coincidence. Mead's ethical legacy (heritage) continued to have an effect also on those of his students, who wanted to protect him against a monopolising [[of him (Mead)]] by the consensual system(s) theory and theory of roles (role theory). Some amongst them, like for instance Blumer^{xxxv}, who in (the) place of Mead's term "social act" preferred the term "joint action", in order to stress the interactive element, self-evidently counted amongst "joint actions" a war just as much as a commercial (trade) transaction, a court trial or a game or a marriage. In all these actions, the actors (would) do the same [[thing]], namely, interpret the basic or fundamental character of the common action and, accordingly, interpret their own and the foreign (alien or other) activity or role (with)in its (the said common action's) framework⁹⁴. Attention was not, here, nonetheless, directed to the tangible weight/gravity of the action and acts and their real consequences for the form (or shape) of the social relation, but to the activity of interpretation in itself, in relation to which (whereby) social reality, as it were, was dissolved in(to)/inside (the) constructs of interpretation. This muted proceeding and action [[also]] being played-down, accepted – over and above that – in most symbolic interactionists, the same programmatic form as in the many sociologists of post-war-time [[i.e. after WW2]], who, if they did not directly deny or dispute, as regards enmity, in general, the [[existence of the]] property and quality of the social relation, then, nevertheless, they excluded extreme enmity from the circle of the theoretically relevant setting of the question and examination of the problem⁹⁵.

Retrospectively, more sober authors, also qualified as specialists, beheld or caught sight of a serious deficiency and shortcoming of interactionist(ic) social psychology in (regard to) the assumption that actors *wanted* in principle to attune (i.e. co-ordinate) their activities as to one another, and would be hindered or obstructed only by problems of co-ordination in relation to that. That is why

⁹⁴ *Symbolic Interactionism*, pp. 70, 71ff.

⁹⁵ See Ch. III, Section 4, above.

interactionist(ic) social psychologists, in practice, occupied themselves and dealt with only cases in which the motivation of co-ordination is high, but neglected the cases in which this motivation is low or entirely lacking (missing), and finally they overlooked (the fact) that often a questionable motivation stemmed from outside pressure or from the threat of punishment on the part of a socially stronger (person, side or party)^{xxxvi}. Also, between the outer or external co-ordination of acting (action or the act) and the “complete” consensus resting on an intensifying (and climaxing) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, there is both an essential difference as well as several gradations⁹⁶. A usual logical and objective mistake of ethically-normatively adjusted symbolic interactionism is, moreover, the confusion of (the) consensus at the level of the assumption and taking over/on of perspectives with (the) consensus at the level of interests and the aims of actors, or else, the deduction of the later from the former. But the successful – on both sides – assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, i.e. the ability or capacity of two actors, to put themselves in (or empathise with) the situation and or position of each and every respective other (person), to correctly recognise this situation and or position in terms of content, and to come up with and achieve agreement over the correctness of this recognition, has not the slightest to do with an agreement between their intentions and plans of acting (i.e. action plans). The outer (external) co-ordination of acting (i.e. outer action co-ordination), that is,

⁹⁶ Scheff, “Toward a Sociological Model”, pp. 35, 33ff., 37. Some authors, who take as their basis the interactionist(ic) model (interaktionistische Modell), openly admit, incidentally, that in their analyses, phenomena of enmity are not taken into account at all, see e.g. Simon, *Formal Theory*, p. 210. This avenges itself. Because, by investigating friendship in isolation, it no longer stands out and is noticed that the factors, which should or ought to strengthen it (friendship) or even constitute it (friendship), fulfil identical functions with regard to enmity. More intensive interaction (Intensivere Interaktion), to which Simon ascribes the intensification of friendship (loc. cit., p. 203), can just as much entail more intensive enmity – therefore, the specific motor (i.e. driving force) of the friendly relation does not lie therein (i.e. in more intensive interaction). Homans, who from behaviouristic premises, in principle connects the frequency of interaction and friendship with each other, involuntarily and unwillingly confutes himself (proving himself wrong), when he thinks that during/in inimical relations, the frequency of interaction must be correspondingly slight – in order to equally add: “unless the form of competition requires interaction” (*Social Behaviour*, p. 144). The restriction or limitation does not abolish the rule as a whole [[translator’s addition: in other words, competition, enmity and friendship ... all require interaction – there is no way of getting out of (a form of) interaction when talking about human relations!]].

friendship and co-operation, results from (the) consensus with regard to the interests and the aims (objectives, goals or ends), not from the (equal) capacity or (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and from the consensus about the content-related findings of this assumption and taking on/over of perspectives⁹⁷. For that reason, the behaviour of an actor can be foreseen or predicted, not on the basis of the mere certainty the he (the said actor) is willing and able to put himself in (and or empathise with) a certain role⁹⁸. On a social scale (or in regard to the/a social benchmark or yardstick), again, nowhere is that quasi material dividing line to be found, which the harmonising interactionism of the theory of roles and of systems theory wants to draw between norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms) and norm infringement (i.e. the violation of norms). Social-psychologically (and social-ontologically) there is no structural difference between actors, who behave in conformity with norms and such (actors), who ignore or ride roughshod over norms. The process of acting and reacting by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and, in general, the being aim-directed of behaviour (i.e. the direction of behaviour towards an aim, end, goal, objective or target), which is simultaneously shaped by perception, action, thought and affect (emotion or sentiment), remain in both cases the same (Im sozialen Maßstab ist wiederum nirgendwo jene quasi materielle Trennungslinie zu finden, die der harmonisierende Interaktionismus der Rollen- und Systemtheorie zwischen Normkonformität und Normübertretung ziehen will.

Sozialpsychologisch (und -ontologisch) gibt es keinen strukturellen Unterschied zwischen Akteuren, die sich normkonform verhalten und solchen, die sich über Normen hinwegsetzen. Der Vorgang des Agierens und Regierens durch Perspektivenübernahme und überhaupt das Zielgerichtetsein des Verhaltens, das durch Wahrnehmung, Handeln, Denken und Affekt gleichzeitig gestaltet wird,

⁹⁷ Shibutani, *Society*, pp. 147, 165, 167ff..

⁹⁸ R. Turner, "Role Taking, Role Standpoint", p. 324.

bleiben in beiden Fällen dieselben)⁹⁹. Models of interaction, which directly or indirectly start from the assumption that the I (ego) assumes and takes on/over (adopts or undertakes) the perspective of the Other because it wants to correspond to the expectations of it (the Other) and wants, in general, to behave in a norm-conforming manner, cannot raise (i.e. make) any theoretical claim to generality. Conformity with the expectations of the Other or with norms, constitutes a special case of a general principle of interaction, not the general principle itself¹⁰⁰.

(The) Social-psychological critique (criticism) in (regard to) the ethical-normative narrowing and constriction of symbolic interactionism made, obviously unknowingly, use of arguments and insights which were explicitly put forward and talked about, or implicitly unfolded and developed, already in the classical sociological theory of social action¹⁰¹. For a sociologist like Elias^{xxxvii}, who grew up in the intellectual(-spiritual) tradition of classical sociology, it was self-evident that friendship and enmity are equally interdependent, and in (regard to/the case of) enmity, this interdependence manifests itself in the compulsion, coercion or necessity of taking one's own decisions with regard to the foe's action¹⁰², of being put in (and or empathising with) the inner (internal) logic of these decisions and generally in the foe's situation or position. And it does not take (a) miracle for, or it is no wonder that, exactly the greatest theoreticians of enmity and of war pointed emphatically to the necessity and function of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. When Machiavelli puts forward the maxim: "you should never believe that Your Foe does not understand his thing (i.e. matter, cause, affair or business)" or: "you should look after and guard yourself from easily believing

⁹⁹ Newcomb, "Discussion", p. 168ff.

¹⁰⁰ R. Turner, "Role Taking", pp. 33, 35.

¹⁰¹ See above Section 1Ba in this chapter.

¹⁰² *Soziologie*, p. 80.

in things (sc.^{xxxviii} inimical acts and actions) which make little sense”^{103 + xxxix}, because precisely then the danger of deception and deceit is at the (its) greatest – so (thus) he implies that the Other as foe is not merely the bearer of his own intentions and plans of acting (action plans), but also is in possession of the ability, during the practical realisation or implementation of his aims and plans, of taking into account (or allowing for) the reaction of the I (ego) in order to guide his (i.e. the Other’s) behaviour in the desired direction. The I (ego) should or ought to constantly catch sight and be aware of this capacity and (cap)ability of the Other, and in the conviction (i.e. whilst having the conviction) that in him (i.e. the I (ego)), this same capacity and (cap)ability exists, to see through and understand the plans of the Other on the basis of the same syllogistic reasoning which led the Other to the sketching (setting out or drawing up) of his (i.e. the Other’s) plans. Precisely the tacit, but – at/in the back of one’s mind – effective assumption and acceptance of the anthropologically or social-ontologically same and equal constitution (composition and texture) (“rationality”) („Rationalität“) of the (inimical) partners in/of interaction (interaction partners) forbids (prohibits) every underestimation of the foe. As long as friendship, for these or those inner (internal) or outer (external) motives and reasons, is not in danger or risk, the negligent or selective assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is not punished in practice, on the contrary: it can serve or be of use for the consolidation and strengthening of friendship in the event this (friendship) rests or is based upon – on both sides – pleasant fictions. But in enmity, the vital necessity of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is shown and seen in its entire extent and scope or range; here the unavoidable or avoidable weaknesses and gaps (or holes) prove

¹⁰³ *Arte della guerra*, V, p. 457 (“non hai a credere mai che il nimico non sappia fare i fatti suoi”, “dei stare accorto di non credere facilmente a quelle cose sono poco ragionevoli”; my [= P.K.’s] translation). Cf. *Discorsi*, III, p. 18.

to be life-endangering or life-threatening¹⁰⁴. In particular, the increasing (heightening or intensification) of enmity can be apprehended as a process of intensifying (and climaxing) assumption and taking on/over or perspectives, in which it (the situation) comes, or things go, to extremes in that both sides think and do the same (thing(s)). Clausewitz curtly described this, which he called “interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect)” („Wechselwirkung“). First of all, he (Clausewitz) underlines that it is a matter here of something which exclusively and specifically characterises the behaviour of human social subjects (das Verhalten menschlicher sozialer Subjekte). An “interaction (or mutual influence)” like that between foes cannot be occasioned and caused by “the effect (working, operation) of a living force on a dead mass”, but comes into being only (there) where “the impact of two living forces against each other” takes place. Its mechanism consists in that “every (side) gives the other (side) the law” („jeder dem anderen das Gesetz gibt“), that, therefore, every side determines by its own behaviour, the behaviour of each and every other (side). And every side can put itself in (and or empathise with) the thought of each and every other (side), because both (sides/of them) start from the same premises and aim for (by setting their sights on) the same objective (and aim), only under or with reverse(d) signs (or symbolism). The one (side) wants, indeed, to hinder or obstruct the attainment and achievement of this aim/objective by the other (side), exactly through that, however, both (sides) are pushed and forced into the same logic, which permits

¹⁰⁴ Whether for both sides or only for one, the relationship (in respect) of power, which determines the possibilities and aims of the foes, decides about that (danger or threat to life) (cf. footnotes 86 and 87, as well as the [[relevant]] text, above). The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over perspectives must of course – anyway – function, irrespective of whether enmity stands/is under the aegis or influence of a symmetrical or asymmetrical relationship of power (power relationship) (or correlation of forces) (Machtverhältnisses). But in the former case (of a symmetrical power relationship), the foes have before their eyes (i.e. in mind) the same aim, i.e. victory; however, in the latter (case) (of an asymmetrical power relationship), which in extremis (i.e. in the extreme case or in an extremely difficult situation) looks like a regular hunt for (or chasing after) fair game, the weaker (person, side) struggles merely for his or its bare (naked) survival: for *him* or *it*, the mistakes (errors) or gaps (holes) during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives are literally life-endangering or life-threatening. Regarding this distinction or difference between symmetrical conflict and the hunt/chase, see Couch, “Elementary Forms”, p. 121ff.

the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The ultimate and final (last) aim of warlike or belligerent acting (i.e. the act of war), writes Clausewitz, that is, the throwing down (i.e. quelling, suppression and vanquishment or defeat) of the foe, “must be thought about by both parts (i.e. sides). Here is, therefore, again, interaction (or mutual influence). As long as I have not thrown down (i.e. quelled, defeated and vanquished) the foe, I must fear that he quells and vanquishes me; that is to say, I am not master of myself but the other gives me the law, like I give it (the law) to him (i.e. lays down the law to me, like I lay down the law to him)” (Das letzte Ziel der kriegerischen Handlung, schreibt Clausewitz, also die Niederwerfung des Feindes, „muß von beiden Teilen gedacht werden. Hier ist also wieder Wechselwirkung. Solange ich den Gegner nicht niedergeworfen habe, muß ich fürchten, daß er mich niederwirft, ich bin also nicht Herr meiner, sondern er gibt mir da Gesetz, wie ich es ihm gebe“). Every side has a certain (particular) representation and notion of the powers of resistance of the opponent (in relation to which its spiritual(-intellectual) powers of resistance, that is, its capacity for and (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, is counted too), and accordingly it exerts, harnesses and extends its own forces (under/amongst them (such forces), also its own capacity for and (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) – “but the opponent does the same; that is, new reciprocal (mutual) heightening, exacerbation and intensification etc.” („aber dasselbe tut der Gegner; also neue gegenseitige Steigerung etc.“)¹⁰⁵. The spiral of enmity heightens and intensifies precisely due to the fact that both foes put themselves in the situation and position – at ever higher tiers, levels, stages or grades – of the other (side) on each and every respective occasion.

Through that, the spiral of friendship can obviously heighten and intensify too. The full development of the mechanism of the social relation does not tell

¹⁰⁵ *Vom Kriege*, I, 1, §§ 3-5 = p. 194ff..

us anything at all about the place which the concrete interaction will occupy in the spectrum of the social relation, nothing about its friendly or inimical character. Irrespective of the friendly or inimical character of the interaction, likewise (there) is the content-related correctness or incorrectness (faultiness) of the results at which the actor arrives by activating the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. A content-related incorrect assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can awaken in the I (ego) the belief that the Other is his friend or his foe. As (So) long as only the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives of the I (ego) is false in terms of content, the behaviour of the Other – sooner or later – forces (will force) the I (ego) to the necessary correction. However, it happens that the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives on both sides and in the same sense is false in terms of content; then, friendship or enmity can come into being for a shorter or longer time, which, irrespective of its fictive origin and substructure, unfolds and develops its own dynamic(s). In any case, friendship like enmity can rest and be based upon misunderstandings, which do not have to necessarily come to light. Neither does friendship identify with the, in terms of content, correct assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, nor enmity with the false (such assumption etc. of perspectives). In both cases, the interaction partners (or partners in interaction) do not have (a) reason(s) only for misunderstandings, but also (a) reason(s) for the deepening and refining of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The friend wants to penetrate (and or force one's way) into the psyche of the friend, in order to give him that which he needs and requires most (of all), without perhaps being able to articulate it clearly or even being able to only apprehend it. The foe wants to do the same, in order to detect and ascertain what could wound, hurt or offend the Other most (of all). And as the selfless and unselfish friend wants to – during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – relieve himself and get rid of egocentrism, in order to serve the (his) friend, so/thus must the foe endeavour to put himself in (and or to

empathise with) the Other's situation or position, as much as possible, prejudice-freely and affect-freely (i.e. free of bias and of emotion or sentiment) (vorurteils- und affektfrei), in order to find the real and genuine weak points (spots). Nowhere is the egocentric faith – that the Other has to unconditionally (i.e. necessarily) think thus or be thus, as the I (ego) would like it – as dangerous as in a struggle relation (i.e. relation(ship) of struggle, competition or fighting) (Kampfbeziehung). Naturally, neither all friendships are selfless and unselfish, nor all enmities prejudice-free (i.e. free of bias), when we are dealing with the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. Yet already the attested-to and witnessed real existence of such cases proves what we want to prove here.

The identity (i.e. sameness) of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in friendship and enmity sheds light on (illuminates), from a very instructive and informative point of view, the distinction or difference between sociality and socialisation (Sozialität und Sozialisierung), which has been already pointed out¹⁰⁶. The direct or indirect mixing of both concepts with each other constitutes a just as usual/common trick of ethically-normatively oriented social theory like (as in/with) the muddling up and confusing of consensus related to content(s) with (consensus related to) expectations. Enmity and struggle unwind and uncoil no less than friendship via social acts, namely, such (as those) in which the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is at work, and guides or directs the meaningful action of subjects referring to one another and oriented towards one another. They (Enmity and struggle), however, are not only social in the general social-ontological sense of the word. Over and above that – albeit in connection with that (socialness in the general social-ontological sense of the word) – they (enmity and struggle) demand a degree of socialisation which in principle, and

¹⁰⁶ See above Ch. II, Sec. 3B.

of/from the nature of the matter or thing, must not remain behind (i.e. be lower or less than) the friendly relation; already the connection of enmity with legitimations (Legitimationen) bears witness and attests to this¹⁰⁷. Only [[one]] can here determine or make out (a) lack of sociality or socialisation, who picks, gathers, thinks and understands from these concepts directly or indirectly norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms and rules) (and indeed conformity with ruling and dominant norms), [[and that]] the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives must lead to norm conformity and consensus regarding/over aims and expectations. If, however, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and norm conformity coincided, then the former (assumption etc. of perspectives) would be superfluous. The I (ego) could simply be oriented towards (the) (rules and) norms and then it would automatically fulfil the (likewise norm(/rule)-conforming) expectations of the Other, without having to show the slightest consideration for his (the Other's) psyche.^{x1}

c. Mead's ascertainties, aims and contradictions (Meads Feststellungen, Ziele und Widersprüche)

Although the symbolic interactionists, who directly or indirectly stand in succession of Mead, did not discern and recognise the constitutive interrelation between the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation, they one-sidedly concentrated their interest – in respect of the in-itself-justified struggle against behaviourism – on the symbolic dimension of the interacting (auf die symbolische Dimension des Interagierens), and consequently, social-ontologically seen, came to a standstill at (the) half(-)way [[mark, point]], they, nonetheless, took an appreciable step in the right direction, by counterposing to

¹⁰⁷ Tyrell, *Vergesellschaftung*, pp. 509ff., 82ff..

the normative model of interaction of systems theory and the theory of roles (role theory), an interpretive [[one, model]]¹⁰⁸. They loosened, detached, removed and freed the assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives from their quasi obligatory connection to the fulfillment of alien (i.e. others') expectations on the basis of jointly, collectively or commonly shared social-culturally transmitted norms, and vis-à-vis the consensual definition of the interaction situation (or situation of interaction), with the help of such norms, they stressed the independent and potentially conflict-bearing interpretation/interpretive activity of the actors, as it develops (with)in the framework of each and every respective one-time, unique situation, and under the effect and influence of personal motives, aims, etc.. These positionings demanded, nonetheless, an indeed respectful, but clear distancing from their master or expert [[i.e. G.H. Mead]], which, moreover, did not concern marginalia. The mere "roughly sketched and general" character of his (Mead's) central theorem (in respect) of the assumption and or taking on/over of roles or of the generalised Other was related to the lack of consideration of the creative aspects of action of the concrete actors in more and more new situations, in favour of a quasi ritualised behaviour, in which institutional values and norms have a decisive or determinative effect, although they, actually, make up only a part of the relevant backdrop or scenery of acting and action (Handlungskulisse)¹⁰⁹. This critique implied the admission or confession that the opponent, i.e. normativistic systems theory and (the) theory of roles (role theory), could not entirely unjustly invoke Mead's core thought or notion, and in fact aptly interpreted the aim of this thought or notion, since Mead's putting first of ritualised-norm-conforming behaviour obviously said and meant something. In comparison or in contrast to that, the symbolic interactionists remained convinced that they would more likely do justice to the inner logic of

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the contradistinction of both models in Th. Wilson, "Conceptions of Interaction", esp. pp. 699, 700ff..

¹⁰⁹ Thus, Blumer, "Mead", pp. 151, 168.

Mead's ascertainties and insights, and could protect and safeguard the same (ascertainties and insights) from disfiguring, distorting (kinds of) one-sidedness(es). In the dispute and wrangle of the normative and of the interpretive perception/view of interaction with one another, the inner contradiction of/in Mead's thought/thinking consequently came to light, that is, the contradiction between his normative aims and the independent of them (i.e. independent of the normative aims) logic of the/his social-psychological and (social)-ontological ascertainties. The analysis of this contradiction touches upon some fundamental (basic) questions, and it is worth dwelling upon them.

Vis-à-vis Watson's "narrow" behaviourism, who wanted to restrict and limit himself to the study of directly observable behaviour, Mead had in mind a social behaviourism, which would take seriously the "not external (or non-outer/outward) area or realm" („nicht äußerlichen Bereich“)^{xli} of societal/social acts¹¹⁰. The deciding/decisive widening (broadening) of this area in man goes (hand in hand) with his capacity and (cap)ability of creating and using all kinds of symbols, that is of thinking: that is why this social behaviourism moves the symbolic-communicative dimension into the foreground. What later becomes (a) symbol (Symbol), is, first of all, (a) gesture (Geste), i.e. (a) (corporeal (bodily, physical) or vocal) motion (movement) of an organism, which has an effect (and acts) as a specific stimulus upon another organism (d. h. (körperliche oder vokale) Bewegung eines Organismus, die als spezifischer Reiz auf einen anderen Organismus wirkt). The gesture is indeed still animal (bestial; tierisch), however it points already beyond the animal (bestial) and, by attaching, tying or making conditions or requirements between organisms, it sets the elementary mechanism of the assumption and taking on/ over of perspectives in motion. Remarkably, Mead uses – even at this level of investigation and research – exactly (of all things) the example of struggle, in order to make clear (or make

¹¹⁰ *Geist*, § 1, pp. 40, 44.

us aware of) this so-to-speak pre-symbolic or half-symbolic function of the gesture: with/in (regard to) two dogs fighting (or struggling [[with each other]]), the acting or action of each (of both) turns into and becomes the/a stimulus which influences the reaction of the other, whereby by means of this reaction, every act, acting or action is varied (changed or modified) etc.¹¹¹. The development or shaping of the symbolic-reflexive component opens up to the actor the possibility of triggering and setting off in himself the reaction which his gesture triggers and sets off in the Other, and thereafter of controlling – with regard to the reaction of the Other – his own further behaviour. Even here, where it is a matter of human behaviour, Mead draws on and uses – without hesitation or reservation – examples from the entire (whole) spectrum of competition and of enmity. The boxer, who begins with a punch (blow), in order to open (i.e. break through) the/his opponent’s cover, and makes use of the defensive and protective reaction induced by him (i.e. the opponent) as (a) stimulus in order to execute or throw the, in actual fact, planned blow or punch, moves and transfers himself (in)to the position or situation of his opponent, he triggers and sets off an act(ion) (namely, the presumed reaction of the opponent to his attempt at deception or bluff), and gains, through that, the stimulus for his later reaction¹¹². The warrior, “who moves and transfers himself (in)to the position (Stelle) of his opponent”, is named in one breath with (i.e. at the same moment as) the teacher and the student, who in the framework of an entirely differently constituted or disposed relation, must do exactly the same [[thing(, of moving and transferring themselves (in)to the position of the Other/opponent)]]¹¹³. In general, the basic or fundamental experience of communication, namely the taking (capture or occupation) of the stance of other (people) (die Einnahme der Haltung anderer), also then continues, when an

¹¹¹ Loc. cit., § 7, p. 81ff..

¹¹² Loc. cit., § 10, p. 112.

¹¹³ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 375.

identity “consciously asserts itself vis-à-vis other identities, in connection with a feeling of power or of predominance (sich bewußt gegenüber anderen Identitäten behauptet, in Verbindung mit einem Gefühl der Macht oder der Vorherrschaft)”. Exactly though that, the domination of a man differs from that (domination) of a leader of a herd (Eben dadurch unterschiede sich Domination eines Menschen von der des Leittieres eines Rudels)¹¹⁴. Man remains, therefore, – also as a foe and oppressor of man – in a specific sense, man.

[[The fact]] That enmity uses, just like friendship, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, could perhaps be regarded as irrelevant for ethical-normative settings of the/an aim and objectives, if at least the permanent social weight of the former (enmity) was considerably less than that of the later (friendship). But Mead does not argue thus (in that way), on the contrary. He speaks (talks) of two “main (chief) categories” of social-psychological “impulses or behavioural tendencies (tendencies of behaviour), which are common to all men, and lead these men to form organised societies”: those, which lead to “soci(et)al co-operation” and those, which lead to “soci(et)al antagonism”, “that is, those which trigger and set off the friendly stances and relations ... and those which entail hostile (inimical) stances and relations”¹¹⁵. Apart from (Excepting) the very questionable or dubious founding (establishment) in respect of the anthropology of drives (urges and impulses) of friendship and enmity, which is present here (i.e. we have before us here), these formulations let no doubt arise or come up about the fact that Mead attributes, grants or ascribes to enmity precisely the same socially constitutive function as friendship. He also sets out, argues and explains in greater detail how this function should be understood and, in the course of this, distinguishes two cases. In watered-down form and on each and every respective occasion in a

¹¹⁴ Loc. cit., § 25, p. 237.

¹¹⁵ Loc. cit., § 39, p. 351.

different dosage, enmity is mixed or mixes with friendship in peaceful, at any rate, violentless (i.e. non-violent or bloodless; gewaltlosen) relations of competition and rivalry. In (a/the) pure form, it (i.e. enmity) forges, again, firm, stable or fixed social ties or bonds inside of a society, when it turns against an external foe. Thus seen, inimical stances are “everything other than forces of disintegration and of destruction”¹¹⁶. In both cases, there are in fact indications that the effect of enmity reaches and achieves deeper strata than that of the rest of the “impulses”. With regard to the imperative and essential combative, contentious or martial element in the politics of peace time, Mead believes or thinks that we are psychologically “reliant or dependent upon the game of low or base impulses, in order to functionally preserve our normal institutions (*or*: in order to preserve our normal institutions in a function-capable manner (i.e. in a manner in which the said normal institutions are able to function))”¹¹⁷. And regarding the cementing and reinforcing force of enmity, it is reported from a psychological point of view, “the easiest way or manner of joining together and uniting” is “against a common foe”¹¹⁸. There must be a cogent and compelling reason such that this is precisely the easiest way or manner. In an essay/article in which Mead literally repeated the thesis: “There is no ground upon which men get together so readily as that of a common enemy”, he also names the (psychological) reason for that: “The instinct of hostility ... when fully aroused and put in competition with the other powerful human complexes of conduct ... has proved itself as more dominant than they”¹¹⁹. In the same text, the effects of that “instinct” for the formation of individual identity are emphasised, and from enmity of the collective identity against the criminal, the basic features and basic propositions of criminal justice are derived. Mead, full of hope, adds that

¹¹⁶ Loc. cit., § 39, p. 353ff.. In another place (§ 31, p. 286), “mutual or reciprocal defence” and “common or joint attack” are equally counted and reckoned amongst “co-operative stances”; both are “situations, from which identity develops”.

¹¹⁷ Loc. cit., § 28, p. 264ff..

¹¹⁸ Loc. cit., § 26, p. 252, cf. § 29, p. 265.

¹¹⁹ “The Psychology”, p. 599. Cf. *Geist*, § 39, p. 352.

“evolution” will put in the place of “self-confirmation” through enmity, that (“self-confirmation”) through service, contribution and social respect and esteem¹²⁰. The invocation of evolution, nevertheless, is in contradiction with his (i.e. Mead’s) social-psychological analysis, which did not want to be a mere description of a historical situation, but precisely raised, i.e. made (a) social-ontological claim.

The (fundamental) social-psychological principles referred to until now would have brought Mead into disrepute precisely in (regard to) his many later admirers, had he (Mead) used them in/with this clarity and unambiguity for the basis of a logically closed, united and cohesive theory. But he (Mead) does not do exactly this. Those (fundamental) principles crop up and appear in various places, as it were, as casual and in-passing observations, remarks and comments, without discussion of their systematic place and their systematic consequences. The theoretical expositions and explanations stand all in all *expressis verbis* under the influence and in the service of a starkly and strongly democratically coloured ethical-normative matter of concern, and Mead himself in fact names, without angst and or fear before self-contradiction, the constructs through/by means (way) of which he wants to – so to speak, in terms of theory – outwit and outsmart the aforementioned (fundamental) social-psychological principles. It is a matter, on the one hand, of an ethical definition of the social relation and, on the other hand, of a restrictive interpretation of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which builds upon a schematic theory regarding the structure of identity. The former (definition of the social relation) reminds [[us]] of several similar attempts^{121 + xliii}, and it appears in Mead as the distinction between two meanings of the soci(et)al. In its “widest or broadest (most extensive)” sense, the soci(et)al encompasses both inimical as well as

¹²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 593. Mead’s theory of criminal justice will be dealt by us in the 2nd volume of this work.

¹²¹ See Ch. III, Sec. 4, above.

(the) friendly positionings, in its “much more narrowly grasped definition, in which ethical values befit it (i.e. the soci(et)al)”, it (the soci(et)al) relates or refers, on the other hand, only to friendly (positionings and attitudes)¹²². However, it [[the matter]] does not remain with the mere distinction. Mead wants to – over and above that – suggest that this distinction is connected somehow with the better or worse functioning of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives; where(ver), that is, the soci(et)al is to (i.e. ought to) be comprehended in the narrower ethical sense, only there can communication achieved through that mechanism come to its full development too. For that, Mead does not offer any objective arguments, he does not explain, therefore, in which sense and [[to what]] extent the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and communication must structurally vary in accordance with both meanings of the soci(et)al. The sole presuppositions or preconditions, which he names for their (i.e. the assumption of perspectives and communication’s) execution and carrying out, are the development of the nervous system and organised soci(et)al activity, obviously in the “widest, broadest” sense of the word¹²³. On the other hand, he manufactures, makes or restores, again and again, an interrelation between the fact that the individual takes up the stance of other (people, members) in the group, and, “the normal presuppositions or preconditions (prerequisites)”, i.e. the co-operative norm-conforming behaviour of the members of the group, in relation to which the lifting (i.e. abolition) of these normal presuppositions or preconditions is tantamount to a loss or deficit of/in the capacity and (cap)ability at the taking up (Einnehmen) of alien (i.e. other) stances¹²⁴. Or he protests as a Democrat (democrat) against the influence of social “castes”, which erect walls between those belonging as members of a community, and “it

¹²² *Geist*, § 39, p. 352.

¹²³ Loc. cit., § 42, p. 384ff.

¹²⁴ See e.g. loc. cit., § 27, p. 254.

makes it impossible for people to assume and take on/over the stance of other people”¹²⁵. Only in the “ideal society”, we subsequently read, is “ideal communication” possible, only there can individual people move and transfer themselves (in)to the position and situation of all other people in an unhindered and undistorted manner. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and (the) thereon founded and established communication constitute, therefore, (the) one time, a “social-psychologically” constitutive function, the other (another) time, a yet-to-be-reached-and-achieved norm, which can be realised under present-day circumstances, conditions and relations only partially and intermittently. The ambiguity would be defensible and justifiable if Mead could make plausible that the difference between present and future communication concerns the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives itself, that with (the) growing norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms) and ethicisation at the level of contents of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, sooner or later, an essential perfection (completing and perfecting) of the mechanism itself must occur as (a) form-related (i.e. formal) structure. Nonetheless, no – as we showed in the previous [[sub-]]section – necessary interrelation can be made out between the form-related (i.e. formal) and the content-related level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. When Mead, therefore, talks of (the) ideal communication, then he can only mean (the) contents in their norm bindedness; he hopes for a future identification (and equating) of the socie(ta)l in the wider/broader sense with the soci(et)al in the narrower (stricter) sense of the word. The lifting (i.e. abolition) of the present partial and intermittent character of communication wants to mean (means) that communication will become entirely and constantly norm-conformingly and ethically oriented. However, if the constitution, composition and texture of the contents of communication has nothing to do with its

¹²⁵ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 376.

mechanism, and if the latter (mechanism) remains structurally, in any case, the same, then it cannot be logically legitimised to derive or deduce (infer) expectations with reference to those contents/that content from thoughts and considerations about the aforementioned mechanism, i.e. an Ought from an Is (Being). If, though, already in the present-day existing structure of this same mechanism, (the) soci(et)al in the (i.e. Mead's) narrower/stricter sense, that is, friendship, is thoroughly (absolutely, quite) possible, then obviously the reasons for the emergence and appearance of friendship or enmity may not be sought in its (the mechanism's) perfectiveness or imperfectiveness, especially since not only enmity, but also friendship, can occasionally (now and then) come into being through content-related mistakes in the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. That is why the conclusion appears to be unavoidable that the mechanism of the social relation can be consistent or compatible with all contents which are conceivable in the spectrum of the social relation. And we must do justice to Mead and admit he was right in (regard to) his neutral ascertainment that the man (person), who takes on or over the stance of another (man, person), "adapts to (the other man/person's) own identity, or assumes, accepts and adopts (the) struggle"¹²⁶.

This sentence contains a quite clear admission or confession that the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives as such cannot vouch for and guarantee the ponderability (calculability) of the human subject – in the end it (the said human subject) was developed in fact with regard and in view of its imponderability (incalculability). Mead himself indirectly concedes or admits this, by looking out for additional guarantees for the safeguarding of ponderability (calculability). He believed to be able to put these guarantees into such a construction of identity, which would bind or tie the assumption and the taking on/over of perspectives with the greatest possible probability and

¹²⁶ Loc. cit., § 25, p. 237.

likelihood in the taking on/over of certain contents. What the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in itself did not accomplish and achieve, was supposed to now be accomplished and achieved through the guidance of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives on the part of a correspondingly structured self. This Self (self) is supposed to be founded and established structurally on the/a positive or negative relation, at any rate, on the necessary co-existence of “I” and “Me”¹²⁷, whereby the “I” provides the sense or feeling of “freedom” and “initiative”, and exactly because of that, “it is never (ever) completely ponderable (calculable)”. One has it “never fully (totally) in (one’s) grip (grasp) (i.e. under control)” and it is “always a little different from that which the situation itself demands or requires”¹²⁸. Whereas, therefore, the “I” dominates, when the “normal presuppositions, prerequisites or preconditions” are put out of force (i.e. are annulled and not in force), and “the identity asserts and imposes itself only in opposition to other (identities)”¹²⁹, the task falls to the “Me” to make (the) identity as a whole socially ponderable (calculable), by it (the “Me”) exercising (the) “soci(et)al control” inside of the area or sector of identity, by the (“Me”) constituting the “control organ” (or “organ of control”) for one’s own acts and actions, and indeed due to the fact that it (the “Me”) takes up the stance of other (people) and solidifies, reinforces and strengthens it (the said stance) to scale (i.e. as a yardstick). It (The “Me”) is therefore clearly outlined and objectively given, whereas the reaction of the “I” to the so created yardsticks and the control activity (or the activity of control) of the “Me” remains more or less undetermined¹³⁰. The “Me” represents and constitutes as a whole all those perspectives from which the person knows that it (the person) is seen from them (those perspectives) by the other (persons). It (The “Me”) represents, thus, the positionings which the identity assumes and takes on/over

¹²⁷ Loc. cit., § 23, p. 225.

¹²⁸ Loc. cit., § 22, p. 221; § 26, p. 247ff.

¹²⁹ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 254.

¹³⁰ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 254; § 25, p. 240; § 22, pp. 218, 219.

vis-à-vis itself, when it (the identity) assumes and takes on/over the role of another (person) vis-à-vis itself. It (The “Me”) is, as Mead opines, comparable with Freud’s I (ego), it (the “Me”) rules and prevails in the office of the censor (i.e. the “Me” censors) and lends (or grants) to the “I” the “conventional”, namely the norm-conforming form¹³¹.

This notion of the basic or fundamental structure of the self (Self) is, though, not particularly original. It starts from premises pertaining to the anthropology of drives (urges and impulses), and offers or provides a new edition of the age-old dichotomy between an often explosive and always suspect potential in respect of drives, urges and impulses in the individual, and controlling authorities or tiers of jurisdiction, which the “voice of society”, that is, of the collective interest or of collective norms, articulates, and at the same, internalises. Contemporary philosophers and sociologists have developed similar dichotomous concepts or conceptual plans, in which the personal-individual and the impersonal-social inside of the self (Self) are contrasted with each other, and at the same time, are connected, and Mead might (should or must) have known about some of them¹³². But it is not a matter here for us of

¹³¹ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 253.

¹³² James uses the terms “I” and “Me” differently to Mead, but with related intent. The “I” represents here the “pure Ego” or the “pure principle of personal identity”, it bears, as the/an inseparable thought or idea, knowledge regarding the unity and continuity of the/this same (thought or idea). The “Me” means the empirical self, which, for its part, is put together or composed out of a material, a social and a spiritual self (Self). The social and the spiritual self relate with each other approximately like that of Mead’s “Me” and “I”: the social self varies depending on all respective relevant persons in its environment or surroundings, it sees its own image or picture in the spirit of the Other; the spiritual self is the active element, which affirms (approves) or rejects (*Principles*, I, pp. 371, 400ff., 296, 294, 324, 321, 297). Bergson distinguishes between the «moi fondamental, réel, concret» (= the “fundamental, real, concrete Me (I)”) and the «moi conventionnel» (= the “conventional Me (I)”), which is formed in view of or with regard to social demands, and is supposed to satisfy or fulfil them; it is a «représentation symbolique» (“symbolic representation”) (*Essai sur les données*, p. 97ff.). Cf. Scheler: “to every finite person, an individual person and an overall or total/whole person, belongs”, (*Formalismus*, p. 509ff., esp. p. 511ff.). Finally, let us recall Durkheim, whose social-psychological dualism, incidentally, was connected with the same normative representations and notions as Mead: «Il y a en nous deux consciences: l’une ne contient que des états qui sont personnels à chacun de nous ..., tandis que les états que comprend l’autre sont communs à toute la société...» (= “There are in us two consciences, awarenesses or consciousnesses: one contains only states which are personal to every one of us ..., whilst the states that the other (conscience, awareness or consciousness) understands are common to all of society...”) (*Division*, p. 74, cf. p. 99). Also, the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives became a theme or topic in the social psychology at the turn of the century [[i.e. from the 19th to the 20th century]], see e.g. McDougall, *Social*

intellectual(-spiritual) influences. The social-ontologically relevant question is (that (question) as to) whether Mead, with the help of his conceptual instruments or equipment succeeds in the proof that the “Me” is in the position to exercise upon the “I” the expected by it (the “Me”) ethical-normative influence, regardless of which meaning it (the “Me”) may otherwise have for the “I”, or which reasons may otherwise motivate the “I”, to behave ethically and in a norm-conforming manner. Turned (i.e. Put or Said) differently (otherwise): how far, or to what extent, are the achievements, feats or performances of the “Me”, that is, the content-related findings and results of the taking on of the stance of other (people), binding for the “I” indeed cognitively, but not at all ethically-normatively? How far, or to what extent, does the “I” need the cognitive services of the “Me” even (then) when it wants to step over (i.e. transgress, infringe, contravene or violate) the ruling, dominating and dominant norms (knowingly)? In Mead’s fundamental conceptuality there is nothing which would force us to exclude the possibilities indicated or insinuated in (respect of) these questions. Precisely, then, it is forbidden to do this, when we take this conceptuality seriously. If the “Me” represents and constitutes basically merely a “situation”, in(to) which (the) behaviour drains off (i.e. unfolds and merges), whereas the entire “factual reaction” to (or in) this situation is concentrated on the “I”¹³³, then in actual fact (the) “Me” can, beyond the erecting or setting up of objective obstructions, barriers and hindrances determined by the situation, hardly influence the outer/external, let alone the inner/internal, positioning of the “I” – so much the less, as Mead does not want to know about the simple stimulus-reaction(-)schema, and emphasises, against Watson, the constant imminence of “alternative reactions”¹³⁴. Under these circumstances, the “I” indeed is unconditionally or necessarily bound and tied to

Psychology, p. 185ff., where in fact the question or problem was treated (handled) in (an) interrelation with (or in relation to) the formation of identity.

¹³³ *Geist*, § 35, p. 325.

¹³⁴ *Loc. cit.*, § 2, p. 50; cf. § 5, p. 67, regarding the selective character of consciousness.

the “Me”, or to the content-related findings of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as these are assumed or taken on/over by (the) “Me”, however, what it (the “I”) does with these findings, is another matter. To the “I” of the burglar, the taking in or including of the stance of his victims of his (i.e. the burglar’s) “Me” serves as the authority of control (control authority) and organ of regulation (regulation/regulatory organ) of his (the burglar’s) behaviour. He (The burglar) shows, in the literal sense of the word, consideration for other (people), he takes them into account at every turn (wherever one goes, every step of the way), no less than a mother(,) who walks on tiptoes in order to not disturb the sleep of her children. That means: the (impersonal) assumption and taking on/over of an alien (i.e. another’s) perspective by the “Me” and the (personal) affirmation and approval of the same (“Me”) by the “I” are two different things, the assumption and the taking on/over of perspectives takes place in full consciousness of the difference of the identities concerned. (It must, in fact, take place thus, when the I (ego), as norm-conforming man of honour stands opposite or across, for instance, a criminal.) And only a false, – but still frequent –, confusion of the perspective with processes of (a) positive, emotional fixation on the Other can make every difference out of sight (i.e. not perceived). Particular talent or endowment and marksmanship, shrewdness or accuracy in the assumption and or taking on/over of perspectives does not limit or restrict in itself, in the least/slightest, the probability of a contrasting or opposition of the settings of the aim or aims (objectives or targets), and just as little does it (such talent etc.) strengthen and reinforce altruistic propensities automatically. The fundamental, or in principle, difference between the matter or case of the “I” and that of the “Me” becomes immediately clear, if one considers and reflects that (the) “Me” indeed assumes

and takes on/over a number of perspectives and roles simultaneously, but the “I” can only identify with a single (one, perspective) amongst them (if at all)¹³⁵.

Another reason why (the) “Me” does not have to necessarily influence the stances and act(ion)s of the “I”, stands partially or entirely in opposition to the above-mentioned (case), i.e. it partially or entirely concerns other concrete cases. Until now it has been assumed and accepted that (the) “I” registered the findings of the “Me” soberly, irrespective of how it (i.e. the “I”) positioned itself in relation to that/those findings and results. However, it may/should not be forgotten that the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, for its part, takes place from a certain perspective, that the latter (certain perspective) can be, at times, broad and bright, at other times, narrow and cloudy, turbid, dim, especially when the identity, for any motives whatsoever, has less angst and fear before the danger or risk of solipsism than before other dangers/risks. If now, the “Me” is the taking on of alien (another’s or others’) stances, that is, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, then the “I” represents the perspective inside of which the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives should, is supposed to or ought to take place. When this perspective heavily pressures the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, then it (what) happens (is) that the “I” indeed bends and submits to the control by (the) “Me”, but only after it (the “I”) in advance has indirectly censored the contents of the “Me” and, hence, has controlled how the authority of control (control authority) is supposed to turn out, to which it (the “I”) must submit or be subjected/ subjugated: still before (the) “Me” can bind and tie the “I”, (the) “I” has brought (the) “Me” (therein) (to) where it (the “I”) would like to have (the) “Me”. (The) “I” functions not merely as (a) reaction to (the) “Me”, but as the force of shaping and forming of (the) same (“Me”). How far this activity (in respect) of shaping and forming goes, depends on the individual case. (The empirically

¹³⁵ Cf. R. Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint”, p. 319.

attested to and witnessed spectrum stretches from solipsism up to the establishing, determining or fixing of a certain horizon of interests with the greatest possible cool registration of that which is acted out (with)in it (the said spectrum)). Mead alludes – in passing – to the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, by having to ascertain that the world of the “Me”, that is, the organisation of (the) community(,) “is expressed in the particular (cap)abilities and the particular soci(et)al situation of the individual”, which has “a certain inheritance, legacy or heritage” and “a certain standpoint”(,) which distinguishes it (the said individual) from all other members of the community”¹³⁶. Mead, nonetheless, does not want to go into the implications of this ascertainment for the relations between (the) “I” and (the) “Me”. He is(,) in principle (fundamentally)(,) interested in the objectivity of the “Me”, so that this can have at its disposal, so-to-speak, enough prestige in order to be able to have a credible effect on the “I”; if this effect fails to materialise, then the “I” is to blame for the consequences. Here starkly or strongly simplifying and simplistic hypostatisations or personifications of processes of consciousness are present, which are mixed with one another beyond recognition (or up to indecipherability or unrecognisableness); the mere stressing of the necessity of their co-existence passes by the real question or problem. If the “Me”, at least up to a certain degree (grade; Grad), represents and constitutes the objectivised optics (i.e. point of view; Optik) of the “I” or even the self-reflection (or self-mirroring (up to narcissism)) (Selbstbespiegelung) of the same (“I”), (thus,) the taking in of alien (i.e. another’s or others’) stances cannot be separated so neatly from the reaction to that (taking in) as Mead would like [[to separate]] it. The differences between individuals are not reduced merely to the “I”, but at least partially already to the constitution of a “Me”. The putting itself of the I (ego) (Das Sichversetzen des

¹³⁶ *Geist*, § 26, p. 244.

Ich) in the position and situation of the Other depends in every case on that image or picture which the I (ego) has of the Other and its (the Other's) actions and reactions, no matter (regardless of) its (cap)ability or readiness and willingness to examine (check, test, validate or prove) this image or picture against or in respect of data and (pieces of) knowledge¹³⁷. And the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives does not self-evidently mean that that which the I (ego) assumes and takes on/over is necessarily and always the perspective or stance meant in actual fact by the Other. This is to be grasped or recorded above all with regard to an aspect which Mead rightly and justifiably highlights. The I (ego) develops self-control not least of all because the/its self-image (or picture of itself), which essentially belongs to its constitution, is shaped and formed in the tightest contact with that which it (the I (ego)) – through the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – believes has to make up the image or picture of the Other by this I (ego). Social experience, nevertheless, proves that precisely the gulf between self-assessment, and, the assessment of the self by other (people), very often turns out to be greater than other wrong assessments, miscalculations and misjudgements (in respect) of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. If it (such a gulf) becomes known (i.e. people become conscious and aware of it), then as a rule it (the said gulf) leads to alienation, estrangement or open enmity, when the I (ego) feels downgraded, disparaged and belittled^{xliii}. If it remains unconscious, then this proves that the “Me” can be a fiction constructed by the “I”, and, despite all that, a functioning fiction. In Mead's schema, which wants to describe the predominant and prevailing mechanisms of the manufacture, making, production or restoration of equilibria, the so-called everyday/daily life of the identity (self-description, self-understanding, fluctuations of or in (the) same (self-description and self-understanding)) falls by the wayside and is passed over, or rather/more likely,

¹³⁷ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 366; § 28, p. 258.

falls into the area or realm of the “I”, whereas (the) “Me” seems to remain untouched by that.

Mead places, in actual fact, particular value on the compact and united character of the “Me”, probably with the intent, through that, of lending or conferring additional authority (Autorität) to, or upon, the normative commands of this tier of jurisdiction (or authority) (Instanz). The “Me” is, in fact, not merely the stance taken in, of this or that Other, but over and above that, the “generalised Other” [[= in English]](,) (the generalised Other (der verallgemeinerte Andere)) or the voice of society: it constitutes “that which is common to all”, its (the “Me’s”) values are the values of society¹³⁸. Mead knows, though, of/about the differentiation of this society, of/about its separation into groups, strata, classes or even castes, but even in (regard to) this last case, he wants to – in his way of looking at things – give priority or preference to the uniting [[factor, i.e. what unites]] before (i.e. over) the separating [[factor, i.e. what separates]]¹³⁹. He knows also that organisms construct their natural environment or surroundings via mechanisms of selection¹⁴⁰ and that human consciousness is likewise the constructive choice of an environment, yet (Mead) does not want to see the social milieu or the “Me” disintegrate on the basis of this insight. It is, however, an unworldly abstraction to assume and accept that concrete people in concrete positions and situations can orientate themselves merely with the help of that which is common to all members of society. The latter constitutes a frequently imaginary or make-believe background which one swears to, conjures up or invokes in times of crisis – when, namely, it (what is common to all members of society as the said imaginary background) threatens to crumble and disintegrate and should or is supposed to be rescued – rather than that one consults (consulting it) in

¹³⁸ The “(f)actual” actions and reactions of the Other do not, in fact, matter, but the manner the I (ego) itself perceives and interprets, see Miyamoto-Dornbusch, “Test”, pp. 399, 403.

¹³⁹ See e.g. loc. cit., § 41, p. 367; § 20, p. 198ff..

¹⁴⁰ Loc. cit., § 21, p. 208, (foot)note 10; § 17, p. 170ff..

everyday/daily life. Decisive or crucial in concrete action remains the, on each and every respective occasion, Other, whether it (the Other) is an individual or a group. Correspondingly numerous must the “Me” be, whereby they either come into conflict with one another, or are hierarchised by the actors and/or are distinguished from one another as cleanly as possible. That which is common to “all, everyone” or is postulated as such, represents and constitutes a formal structure, which constantly requires content-related specification by (the) relevant Others, even when taken at face value, of or by itself, it refers to a content (e.g. “good manners”, “equality”, “human dignity”)^{xliv}. We can, however, also turn the tables and assert that (the) “Me” does not have to fulfil its foreseen ethical-normative task, duty or function not only because of (a) deficient unity, cohesion and generality, but also (then) when such predicates are generously ascribed or attributed to it (daß “Me” nicht nur wegen fehlender Geschlossenheit und Allgemeinheit, sondern auch dann seine vorgesehene ethisch-normative Aufgabe nicht erfüllen muß, wenn ihm solche Prädikate großzügigerweise zugeschrieben werden). When talking about the “Me”, Mead always presumes normality, i.e. the more or less smooth following, observance and complying with norms of general validity in the “civilised” daily life of a society of, in principle, that is, (individuals) with equal rights and – in (respect of) the Fundamentals (or Fundamental Matters and Issues) – like-minded individuals, that is, “rational” individuals¹⁴¹. In this case, as abstract as it may be, the “generalised Other” has to, in actual fact, spread, disseminate, diffuse and propagate the message of norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms). What, however, does he (Mead) have to teach people seeking social orientation in a society lying under the intolerant spell (or being in the intolerant grip) of a charismatic dictator or of collective psychosis?^{xlv} What is [[the case (or What happens)]] when “rational individuals” are transformed into a violent and

¹⁴¹ Cf. Stryker’s remarks and observations, “Conditions”, p. 58ff..

inquisitorial “mob” – possibly, incidentally, by invoking the (religion of) rationality itself?^{xlvi} It is illuminating or instructive how Mead argues or rather contradicts himself, when he attempts to explain the phenomenon of the violent mob. The “Me” is not here at work, in which the “I” is lost, but it is a matter of the unleashing of the “I”, of the failure of its “integration”. In the same characteristic and distinctive style or manner (*Duktus*), the relation of the individual towards or with the mob is described as follows: “He is one with the community and the community is one with him”¹⁴².

However, the issue or matter (thing) is tricky, difficult, awkward or thorny, not only if and when norm conformity and subjugation under/to the logic of the mob do not coincide. It is also difficult when the “I” is confirmed ethically-normatively in the present-day sense, that is, to do “the (i.e. what is) good” for (the) Others, but, in the process, by no means wanting to identify with (the) norms and values of the generalised Other. In the course of this, the relevant “Me” may be narrower than the “Me” in the sense of this latter (generalised Other) (e.g. a heretical sect or a revolutionary party), or it can also occur that the individual, the hermit (recluse) or the fiery prophet revolts and rebels against the totality or whole, and circumvents the disapproval of the entire community, by erecting, setting up or establishing a higher ideational community (e.g. the afterworld)¹⁴³. Regarding such phenomena, only the reference to the “I” as (the) source of spontaneous and creative stances (e.g. artists) comes to Mead’s mind¹⁴⁴, in relation to which, for him (Mead) (the) systematic criteria for the distinction or differentiation between the genius and the criminal are lacking. A real explanation of the uprising or insurrection of the ethically-normatively meant “I” against the “Me” as the generalised Other would require or demand of Mead precisely that which he does not want to do: to detach the generalised

¹⁴² *Geist*, § 28, p. 262ff..

¹⁴³ Mead mentions this case (*loc. cit.*, § 21, p. 210ff.) – again, incidentally, and without explaining how it can be reconciled with his perception and view regarding the formation of identity (identity formation).

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. *loc. cit.*, § 28, p. 258.

Other and its norms from every particular content, making them or turning them (the generalised Other and its said norms) into, as one likes and wants, interpretable empty formulae or words. Then the “I” can define the generalised Other in such a way that out of/from the declared will to bow and submit to social norms, the assumption and acceptance of precisely ruling, dominating and dominant norms does not have to follow. The generalised Other amounts, in other words, to the (a) mere confession of faith in the necessity of social norms in general, not to the (a) confession of faith in the ruling or dominant (social norms); the “Me” orders and commands only *that* there should be norms, not *what* for norms this must be (i.e. what these norms ought to be). When the voice of the generalised Other is internalised in the sense of this form-related (i.e. formal) That, then the renegade or apostate “I” feels, precisely by invoking the “Me”, responsible and in a position to determine the What based on its own power (i.e. without anyone’s permission, or, just like that), and at the same time in fact, having (a) good (i.e. clear) conscience on its side (i.e. for its part). Precisely such an interpretation and internalisation or taking in of the generalised Other can encourage (an) uprising or insurrection against the present-day or current “Me”. The uprising and insurrection of the revolutionary or of the prophet, of course, constitutes only the most exalted, sublime, lofty or eminent shape and form of this game of interpretation and of power (or: this power and interpretation game), which in the everyday life of the very often resourceful and imaginative “little man” does not in the least flow into the questioning or contesting of the generalised Other, but probably or definitely into the – on each and every respective occasion – opportune handling of its (the generalised Other’s) commands.

In cases, in those of the “I” determining or wanting to determine the content of the “Me”, that is, the What of the That, a fusion or merger of “I” and “Me” is present and exists. However, Mead does not think about that/those cases when

he talks about such a “fusion/merger”. Rather, he means the – in his mind, imagined – normatively ideal case in which the stance triggered and set off in another (person) stimulates and prompts in the same (“I”) the same stance, whereby (the) “Me” needs to control the “I”, and the common co-operative effort or exertion can allow everyone a “high feeling (i.e. feeling of elation or exhilaration)” to come into being^{145 + xlvii}. Otherwise, (a) competition, rivalry or a “dialogue” between (the) “I” and (the) “Me” takes place, and the “situation” decides which of both (competition/rivalry or dialogue) predominates and prevails¹⁴⁶. In any case, this dialogue is constitutive for identity, because (the) interactions (or mutual influences; Wechselwirkungen) with Others contribute to the formation of identity only in so far as they are taken in and absorbed by it (the said dialogue)¹⁴⁷. Now, however, (the) “Me” in this dialogue has a lead, head start or precedence, in this dialogue, for structural reasons, over (the) “I”. The psychological forces which lie beyond (the) self-consciousness and result in “that we never are entirely conscious of (us) ourselves (our same selves), that we are surprised and astonished by our own actions”, are categorically (wholesale or across the board) allocated to the “I”¹⁴⁸. On the other hand, (the) “Me” means just as much as self-consciousness and identity, because these come into being through the taking over/on or assumption of the stance of the Other vis-à-vis itself (i.e. the Other’s self), not simply through “organic sensations (feelings and perceptions)” of which the individual is conscious^{xlviii}. In other words: self-consciousness is present and exists only (then) when the self/ Self puts itself/himself in (and or empathises with) other (people) and looks at itself with the eyes of other (people), that is, it has developed the notion and

¹⁴⁵ Loc. cit., § 35, p. 320ff..

¹⁴⁶ Loc. cit., § 25, p. 242.

¹⁴⁷ Loc. cit., § 23, p. 222. This very correct and important thought can – with regard to the plexus, network or mesh of the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation, be rewritten, paraphrased or described as follows: the correlation of “I” and “Me” in the Ego determines which place (the) Ego occupies in the spectrum of the social relation. And the determination of this same correlation in the Other through the Ego’s assumption and taking on/over of perspectives should (or ought to) foresee or explain the place of the Other in the spectrum of the social relation.

¹⁴⁸ Loc. cit., § 22, p. 217.

representation of a “Me”¹⁴⁹. To the obvious question, *who* then is that who develops this notion and representation, Mead does not answer at all; he believes and opines (means, thinks), in fact, that such an answer is impossible: at every attempt at (an) approach, (the) “I” is transformed automatically into (a) “Me”, it (i.e. the “I”) has a part and participates in (the/its) self-consciousness only as (the/a) “Me”, and in our inner experience, it (the “I”) does not appear directly, but as (a) historical figure in the (our) memory¹⁵⁰. But the absolute identification of the self/Self and (the) “Me” remains not without consequences for the unity of the former. As (the) taking in of the stance of other (people), (the) “Me” must change its contents and stances according to these other (people), “that is why we split ourselves up into the most varied identities” and “it depends on the soci(iet)al reactions appearing, which identity we shall have”¹⁵¹. But as the everyday experience of (the) consciousness teaches, all people can know that they play vis-à-vis various persons, various roles, and, at the same time, they remain (the) same person, especially since the successful appearance in various roles vis-à-vis various persons, (absolutely) presupposes the consciousness of the identity remaining the same: the roles must be co-ordinated with one another, and there is also a very perceptible and noticeable authority (or tier of jurisdiction), which does this/that (co-ordination). Mead does not show that he is inclined to think about and reflect upon it (the said authority) in greater detail. The systematic place of the “I”-concept is downgraded through that, and functions in Mead’s theoretical schema like a kind of collecting, collective category for everything, which the “Me”-concept, despite the striving to stretch and expand it (the “Me”) as far as possible, cannot contain in itself. The reason for this vagueness of the “I” cannot be its above-mentioned historical character, [[i.e. it cannot]] be its (the “I’s”) presence in

¹⁴⁹ Loc. cit., § 21, p. 209; § 18, p. 180.

¹⁵⁰ Loc. cit., § 22, p. 217ff.

¹⁵¹ Loc. cit., § 18, pp. 184, 185.

mere memory. Because if Mead's perception or view is right (correct) that we can have no consciousness of our action before we react reflexively/reflectively to this action, then this must equally concern (the) "I" and (the) "Me": the "Me" has, in this respect, also a merely historical presence in the consciousness. Over and above that, Mead's vague "I" not once fulfils the assigned task, namely to take care of the originality of the reaction or of the acting and action. When it (the "I") constantly must be transformed or converted into (the) "Me", when the same psychical act means, (the) one time, (the) "I", and the next time, (the) "Me", then one knows no longer from where the actor should draw or create his originality¹⁵².

This partly unclear, partly weak status of the "I" comes or stems, though, from Mead's decision to tackle and solve the problem of identity in accordance with an ethically-normatively inspired paedogogics of socialisation. Only with regard to an all-sided socialisation of the self/Self can Mead equate identity and society, that is, call "the structure of (the) complete identity" a "mirroring of the complete soci(et)al process", and behold and see in (the) aspects of identity, aspects of the soc(iet)al process¹⁵³. Behind this thought, the conviction stands that the structure of (the) identity is "selfless-soci(et)al", its individual content(,) (is) "self-seeking (selfish and egotistical)"¹⁵⁴. These statements or propositions mean, if one takes them seriously, that (the) individuals only distinguish themselves from one another because of their selfishness and egotism, and that the ethically-paedagogically wished-for overcoming of this selfishness and egotism would have to bring about the far-reaching, extensive homogenisation of individuals inside of a far-reaching, extensive homogenised society. When morals and morality are generally or universally applicable and are the same for everyone, then the equating of "organised identity" with "character in the moral

¹⁵² Kolb, "Critical Evaluation", esp. p. 292ff.; cf. Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology", esp. p. 20ff..

¹⁵³ *Geist*, § 18, p. 186.

¹⁵⁴ *Loc. cit.*, § 30, p. 276, footnote 2.

sense”¹⁵⁵ must end up in, or boil down to, the identity (i.e. equating) of identities with one another. Mead would certainly broadly reject or repudiate such levelling ideals. He believes in the value or worth of individuality, though under the condition that it (individuality) distinguishes itself and stands out “functionally”, i.e. through charitable achievements beneficial to the public¹⁵⁶. The ultimate logical consequences of his (Mead’s) position must, however, not necessarily be compatible or in accord with his sympathies, above all (then) when he cannot indicate or point out any criteria for that which is supposed to be a charitable service or achievement of benefit to the public in the field or area of politics or of art, without being entangled or embroiled in – in practice – unsolvable questions and problems of interpretation. Moreover, his individualistic sympathies should or ought to often come into contact with his ethical (sympathies) during the judgement of concrete cases. Ethical sympathies find expression when he (Mead) characterises the identity, which “exploits” the group, as (a) “narrowed or constricted identity”¹⁵⁷. (How should, however, “exploitation” and “narrowness” be defined here objectively and bindingly?) And what [[should we]] (to) do when precisely an “exploitative” positioning gives wing to, spurs on and inspires individual creativity, or conversely, consoles inner (internal) wretchedness by means of morals and morality. Mead himself stresses, incidentally, what significance and meaning for the “realisation” of identity, the striving to occupy certain positions inside of groups has – and behind this striving stands the “feeling” or perhaps the “to all (everyone), common conviction” that “we are basically better than other men”, as well as the “demand for one’s own identity to be realised by some kind of superiority over fellow men surrounding (or around) us”; this demand is “constant”, that is, obviously ineradicable and simultaneously regrettable and

¹⁵⁵ Loc. cit., § 20, p. 204ff..

¹⁵⁶ Loc. cit., § 26, p. 252; § 36, p. 332; § 40, p. 346.

¹⁵⁷ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 255ff..

morally reprehensible¹⁵⁸. If that is so, then society consists inevitably and always of “narrowed and constricted” identities, and only of such (identities).

Mead’s comprehensive programme of socialisation does not, however, suffer under, i.e. from, the contrast and opposition between the content of social-psychological ascertainments and the height of ethical expectations. It rests and is based on a confusion which results from the, in principle, connection of the concept of socialisation with ethical contents. From this point of view, it looks as if successful socialisation and (the) “realisation” of identity in the just described regrettable and unfortunate manner would have to stand in contrast and opposition to each other, as if the refusal to follow the voice of the generalised Other went back or was reduced to deficient, inadequate and faulty or defective socialisation. In relation to that, two remarks are called for and appropriate. A socialisation, which precisely in Mead’s sense should or ought to be regarded as successful, can e.g. proceed in the womb (bosom or belly) of a sect, which takes a negative, disapproving or rejective attitude and stance to the institutionally anchored (embodied, fixed or embedded) and approved – by the majority of the society concerned – norms. The, in this case, relevant generalised Other is not generally sufficient to steer, direct or guide the behaviour of the socialised individual beyond demarcations, delimitations, inner (internal) splits and outer/external conflicts. That is why the extent and scope of each and every decisive and determinative “Me” constitutes a self-sufficient and independent factor having an effect, which irrespective of the quality of the socialisation, has an effect, and its determination by no means is in the hands of, and up to, the adolescent (becoming an adult). Even if the socialisation is oriented to dominant and ruling norms, i.e. it starts from the widest possible extent and scope; through that, the problem connected with the “Me” is not

¹⁵⁸ Loc. cit., § 26, pp. 249ff., 250, 252. The feeling of superiority steps backwards and recedes in situations in which the continuing existence and survival of the individual depends (up)on the group (§ 39, p. 355).

solved forever; it is posed only in the reverse(d) sense. The successive and consecutive concrete situations and positions in which the socialised individual finds himself, require and demand of him to more or less constrict the extent and scope of the “Me”, to specify the norms, in terms of content, transmitted to him at the widest level of socialisation, and, in the course of this, often to modify [[them]] purposefully and expediently, or even to rationalise [[them]] away (i.e. neutralise the said norms through rationalisation). The generalised Other, as Mead would like to comprehend it, could only in a closed-undifferentiated society be an always valid, applicable and useful authority of/for socialisation; such a society, however, has never existed. On the other hand, a successful socialisation offers – just as little as a particular capacity for, and (cap)ability at, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – guarantees for ethical-norm-conforming behaviour. Just like the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, so too does socialisation have its formal and its content-related level, which do not necessarily (have to) coincide. A perfection at the form-related (i.e. formal) level is impossible without successful socialisation, if we remove from the latter concept (of socialisation) (the) ethical connotations, and thereunder (i.e. in relation to socialisation), understand the ability to make someone feel comfortable and familiar “in society” and “amongst humans”, and quietly do – on each and every respective occasion – [[what is]] “right (correct and proper)”, irrespective of with what intent and whether with (i.e. for) or against the will of Others. Such a differentiation of both levels of socialisation from one another is extremely important for theoretical goals or ends and also not foreign to the common or usual social understanding, which does not regard the misanthrope ascetic in the desert, despite all the admiration for his ethical stance, as the model of successful socialisation. Conversely, everyone knows that a con man (fraud or confidence trickster), whose socialisation in the formal or form-related sense limps (i.e. is faulty or flawed), and has repulsive (revolting or repellent) manners, is not destined to [[have]] any great prospects

of a brilliant career. The appropriation or acquisition of forms, in which a successful socialisation (Die Aneignung der Formen) is recognisable, can show the inner or internal subjection and subjugation of the individual under the dominant or ruling norms, however, it can just as well serve as the means for the outwitting, outsmarting, outflanking or duping of these norms; the “Me” is here transformed and converted into a factotum (i.e. an assistant or employee who serves in a wide range of capacities and or does all kinds of work; Faktotum) of the “I”. Through that, not only are material aims better promoted, especially if under the given circumstances, the use of force (or application of violence) is out of the question. Even the striving – underlined by Mead – after superiority is quite often damaged or harmed by arrogant and presumptuous “asocial or anti-social” appearances, manners, demeanours or behaviour. Bindedness to form in the expectation of striven-for, aimed-at or aspired-to recognition: one does not have to search long in order to find examples of that. And we already know that even the more general need for sociality can be founded on the same expectation^{159 + xlix}.

The preceding critical analysis does not aim at the proof (i.e. proving) that normatively sanctioned equilibria are impossible in a society, or that the mechanisms of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the processes of socialisation founded upon them (i.e. the said mechanisms of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) would play no role in their (i.e. normatively sanctioned equilibria’s) manufacture, making, production or restoration. It (the said preceding critical analysis) wanted to make readers aware that Mead’s conceptual instruments are neither consistently nor comprehensively sufficient in order to satisfy social-ontological claims. Undoubtedly, they (Mead’s conceptual instruments) can be applied to many, important and permanent phenomena of social life, but their (Mead’s conceptual

¹⁵⁹ See Ch. III, footnote 71.

instruments') boundaries and gaps or holes become noticeable as soon as these phenomena are classified or put in order in the broader social-ontological framework, and, hence, are relativised. Mead's social psychology found, of course, in part, spreading, dissemination and supporters precisely because of their ethically-normatively determined one-sidedness and ambiguity. As we said at the beginning, symbolic interactionism did not become its sole legitimate successor. If one puts at the centre of attention the ethical-normative aspect, then the, regarding that, claims of Parsonian system(s) theory are still more legitimate, which is marked by the equal or same one-sidedness and ambiguity. Mead's constant oscillations and swings between the "wider" and the "narrower" concept of the soci(et)al finds its correspondence in Parsons's double talk of "interaction". Its (Parsons's "interaction's") structure rests upon the "complementarity of expectations", which in themselves refer to both friendship as well as to enmity, since also the behaviour of two foes mutually and reciprocally complement each other in (regard to) (the) expectation and in the outer or external act(ing) – there is no enmity without an antagonist or opponent. Quite often, however, the magnitude "complementarity of expectations" establishes a connection or link exclusively with interactions which are founded on (the) common norm orientation (i.e. orientation as to norms)¹⁶⁰. Also, the radical-democratic intent brings Mead's social psychology and Parsons's system(s) theory together (i.e. into contact, or reconciles one with the other). The comprehensive norm system (or system of norms), which binds or ties individuals to one another via the complementarity of expectations and the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and or roles, shoves, pushes or thrusts both social models of classical liberalism aside – both the model of the invisible hand as well as that (model) which builds on (the) ethical insight into, or (ethical) understanding of, (the) autonomous individual Reason.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Toward a General Theory*, p. 16ff., with *Social System*, p. 252.

D. Social-ontic foundations of social-scientific understanding (Sozialontische Grundlagen sozialwissenschaftlichen Verstehens)

Since the Age of the Enlightenment, all the more frequently have – above all in the/a sociological context and context pertaining to the philosophy of culture – the “social backgrounds” of the formation and development of scientific paradigms and scientific concept formation been pointed out (Seit dem Zeitalter der Aufklärung wurde immer öfter vor allem im soziologischen und kulturphilosophischen Kontext auf die „sozialen Hintergründe“ wissenschaftlicher Paradigmen- und Begriffsbildung hingewiesen).

Accordingly, cogent and convincing partial insights arose, which, however, could never be built up and extended (in)to a closed, cohesive and united theory which takes into account all the thought and intellectual constructs attested to and witnessed in the history of ideas. It mostly remained unclear not only how then “social influence” is (ought) to be understood in regard to the formation and development of the thought or intellectual construct, but also, whether and to what extent the overall formal structure or individual contents in regard to that ((the said) thought construct) are affected. And no-one can still say with ultimate and utmost certainty whether, and in which sense, categories of thought (or intellectual categories) like, for instance, causality or mathematical magnitudes are subject to “social influences”. Philosophers discovered, as usual, with some delay, these question formulations and examinations of the problem, which found entry, i.e. became established, in Husserl’s matters of concern as regards bringing to light the pre-scientific roots of scientific conceptuality (die vorwissenschaftlichen Wurzeln wissenschaftlicher Begrifflichkeit ans Licht zu

bringen). Husserl, nonetheless, hardly contributed something concrete to the solution of the just mentioned puzzle, enigma or conundrum. The “ontology of the lifeworld” (Die „Ontologie der Lebenswelt“) was indeed supposed to – beyond the “constant change of/in relativities” – open up and disclose the until then incomprehensible background of the self-evident (pieces of) evidence of the objective sciences – including logic and mathematics –, however it was not said how one has to imagine the bridge between (the) lifeworld and those pieces of evidence. The centre of gravity or main focus was placed also in this late phase of phenomenology on the, in part, thankless question and problem of constitution, especially since Husserl was interested – for ethical reasons – in deducing and deriving from the constitution of intersubjectivity itself the prototype of an ideal community of communication¹. Still less than the lifeworldly (i.e. lifeworld-related) origin, provenance and shaping or moulding of “objectively scientific” conceptuality, was that (shaping or moulding) of (the) social-scientific (conceptuality) brought up (for discussion). But precisely (there) where the human aspires, seeks or strives to make out and recognise man does the specifically intersubjective, that is, the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation stand out, come into play and make itself felt (Aber gerade da, wo der Mensch den Menschen zu erkennen trachtet, kommt das spezifisch Intersubjektive, also das Spektrum und der Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung direkt zur Geltung) – this only happens in that special area of human praxis, which we are accustomed to calling “theory”. What in the social-ontological way of looking at the social relation is called, in general, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, is referred to in the language of social science (Sozialwissenschaft) as understanding (Verstehen). In order to be able to intellectually (or in terms of thought) apprehend social action in the present and past as the/an object of knowledge, the social scientist has at his disposal basically the same social-ontically pregiven equipment, of which he makes use as the/a social subject in the present of his own lifeworld. As a result,

though, something completely different than/to the assumption, acceptance or adoption of relativistic vulgar sociology (relativistischen Vulgärsoziologie) is meant, according to which the social scientist basically projects his own judgements and prejudices onto alien, foreign, strange and other worlds and times. Because it is not a matter here at all of the level of the variable and constantly varying contents, but of the unchanging and immutable structure of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The arrangement of the social world or of the lifeworld, in which social-ontologically apprehensible components and sociologically or historically apprehensible (components) stand (are) next to (beside) one another, corresponds with/to this difference of/in (the) levels of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, – i.e. they stand next to or are beside one another in (the) separating or separative scientific abstraction, not in the real social space (d. h. sie stehen nebeneinander in der trennenden wissenschaftlichen Abstraktion, nicht im realen sozialen Raum). The uncritical transference of (the) sociologically and historically apprehensible (components) to alien or strange lifeworlds must (necessarily) cause(s) confusion, and the other way around: the starting from the – common to all lifeworlds – social-ontic component constitutes precisely the prerequisite, precondition or presupposition for the understanding of alien, strange and foreign (or other) lifeworlds¹⁶¹. Irrespective of where and when he lives, no matter how he calls himself on each and every respective occasion (sociologist, historian, philosopher, poet etc.), the interpreter of social phenomena and social action cannot [[do]] otherwise, he must be active or busy himself as the natural bearer of that social-ontic component, that is, (he must) aim at understanding via the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. In the process, he may – as is possible from every perspective – strike upon the (i.e. what is) right and correct, or, err and be

¹⁶¹ On that, more in Ch. V., Sec. 2.

wrong and mistaken. But that is not the issue. Social-scientifically, understanding is no methodical (i.e. methodological) recipe, which can in certain circumstances be exchanged for (or replaced by) another (recipe), but a necessity, which arises from the fact that an (admittedly, one-sided) social relation exists, that men (i.e. humans) (as theoretically acting interpreters of human act(ion)s) stand across from other men/humans (whose theoretical or practical act(ion)s are supposed to be interpreted). In this social-ontically anchored or fixed sense of social-scientific understanding, the achieved or attained tier (level, stage, degree or grade; Stufe) of methodological reflection and refinement is irrelevant; historicism or Max Weber did not first make (or turn), therefore, understanding (into) the key for the interpretation of social action¹⁶². We want, incidentally, to show that precisely the social-ontic origin, provenance and shaping or moulding of social-scientific understanding lends to this (social-scientific understanding) those reflexive/reflective character(istic)s which distinguish it from so-called “empathy (or insight)” („Einführung“), “intuitive” sympathy („intuitiven“ Sympathie).

Before we move on and proceed to the discussion of these character(istic)s with the help of known theoretisations of understanding, some things are (ought) to be made clear. The necessary use/usage of the understanding (cognitive) access or approach to the social-sciences does not in the least mean that the latter (social sciences) do not have any other methodical (i.e. methodological) instruments apart from understanding at their disposal. It refers only to the fact that understanding as the assumption and taking on/over of

¹⁶² In ancient historiography we find numerous examples of conscious attempts of authors to move and transfer themselves (in)to the inner and outer situation of historical persons. The speeches, which Thucydides puts into the mouth of several protagonists of the Peloponnesian War are basically ideal-typically prepared understanding (cognitive) explanations of meaningful action (idealtypisch präparierte verstehende Erklärungen sinnhaften Handelns). Thucydides says it also in his manner quite clearly: “I have reproduced the speeches in such a way as it seemed to me that every individual had to express themselves about each and every respective situation most appropriately and reasonably, whereby I as far as possible kept to the overall sense and meaning of what was said in reality” (I, 22, 1; my translation [[i.e. P.K.’s translation into German from the Greek «ὡς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκειν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.».] Cf. Sec. 1F in this chapter.

perspectives can only be at home in the social sciences. Consequently, two problem circles (i.e. problem areas) arrive on the scene (or come to the fore). The possible and often fertile methodical (i.e. methodological) great variety in the social sciences, above all, the being next to each other (i.e. parallel or co-existence) of “quantitative” and “qualitative” analyses of materials, does not constitute any necessary concomitant of the real being next to each other (i.e. parallel or co-existence) of ontically heterogenous facts. Historical and sociological facts are, therefore, not in themselves understandable and not understandable (i.e. non-understandable), but they are dependent on the methodical (i.e. methodological) approach, for which the researcher opts. The investigation of, or research into, demographic data does not get by on and manage e.g. without statistics and quantification, but it can, simultaneously, be pursued or carried out/on from the understanding (cognitive) point of view, as soon as the obvious question is posed (as to) which positionings and attitudes regarding life and death, regarding age and race, regarding technique (i.e. technology) and medicine shape and form the general demographic picture or image. Seen in the cold light of day, demographic quantities prove to be synopses or summaries of qualities, although this proof does not have to be brought up or regurgitated in every research context¹⁶³. Over and above that, the arbitrary or vacuous, insignificant or meaningless statistical correlations can only be avoided if the preparative understanding (cognitive) thought and intellectual activity has given information (as to) which meaningful act(ion)s may, should or ought to be correlated with which meaningful act(ion)s, and which not¹⁶⁴. Between understanding and social quantities, it is similar, mutatis mutandis, as it is between understanding and social facts, which arose and resulted out of and from the effect and operation of the heterogony of ends, and now are present as objective constructs and overarching, general and

¹⁶³ Cf. Gruner, “Understanding”, p. 154ff..

¹⁶⁴ Tucker, “Weber’s Verstehen”, p. 165.

comprehensive impersonal contexts of meaning. These (general and comprehensive impersonal contexts of meaning or meaningful contexts) can be studied even and also without the understanding (cognitive) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, however, methodical (or methodological) understanding is in such a study not only absolutely possible, but also necessary. Because only knowledge of the original, subjectively meant meaning provides (the) proof and evidence that here the unintended consequences of action are present, and the same (knowledge) illuminates the causal context between the action of the subjects concerned and its (this action's) unwanted, unintended objective outcome, since not any kind of action whatsoever entails any kind of outcome of the course of acting and action whatsoever¹⁶⁵. What constitutes the objective social fact is accordingly not the ontic stuff (i.e. matter, material(, subject or topic)), but the point of view (Was die objektive soziale Tatsache konstituiert, ist demnach nicht der ontische Stoff, sondern der Gesichtspunkt). The relations of the I (ego) towards or with third parties do not differ e.g. in their quality as social relations from the relations of the I (ego) towards and with the Other. However, in these latter (relations of the I (ego) towards the Other), they (i.e. the relations of the I (ego) towards third parties) are taken (i.e. incorporated, encompassed or classified) as an objectively existing magnitude, which does not have to necessarily be reduced through understanding (cognitive) thought (or intellectual) acts to subjective contents (meaning, goal or end), although they can (be) it (i.e. be so reduced to such subjective contents) at any time. The Janus face (i.e. duplicitous or two-faced character) of social facts, as well as the possibility of apprehending, in terms of understanding, overarching, general or comprehensive meaning contexts (or meaningful contexts) (see below), let us recognise that methodical understanding and methodological individualism (methodisches Verstehen und

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Ch. II, Section 2A, above.

methodologischer Individualismus) are two different things, which simply very often go hand in hand. Ex negativo, incidentally, their (i.e. methodical understanding and methodological individualism's) different nature or quality is shown and seen in the forceful and powerful effect of a behaviouristic variant of methodological individualism inside of the social theory of the second half of the twentieth century.

We come now to the second of the problem circles (i.e. problem areas) mentioned above by means of the observation that the practised (i.e. the carried-out and put-into-practice; praktizierte) method of understanding forces or compels the (complete) assumption and acceptance of the old idealistic contradistinction between the natural sciences and the humanities just as little as the (complete) assumption and acceptance of methodological individualism. The necessity of the methodical (i.e. methodological) great variety and diversity in the social-scientific field already indicates this, in which the various ontological levels or strata next to – or on (top of) – one another (social facts and individuals, normalities or regularities and exceptions etc.) are directly or indirectly expressed, despite all the identity (i.e. equating or sameness) of the social-ontic stuff (i.e. material or matter) (Darauf deutet schon die Notwendigkeit methodischer Vielfalt auf oder Aufeinander verschiedener ontologischer Ebenen oder Schichten (soziale Tatsachen und Individuen, Normalitäten bzw. Regelmäßigkeiten und Ausnahmen etc.) bei aller Identität des sozialontischen Stoffes niederschlägt). Statistical and quantifying procedures or form-related (i.e. formal) thought or intellectual necessities (typification (i.e. rendering into types or classification under typifying forms) and formalisation, thought experiments and (the) hypothetical isolation of factors for the investigation, detection or ascertainment of causal interrelations and contexts) bring (the) natural and the social sciences nearer/closer together than the ontic constitution, composition or texture of the corresponding fields or

areas [[of both the natural and the social sciences]] seemed to allow this in (regard to) (the) old historicism (Typisierung und Formalisierung, Denkkperimente und hypothetische Isolierung von Faktoren zur Ermittlung kausaler Zusammenhänge führen Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften näher zusammen als die ontische Beschaffenheit der entsprechenden Gebiete dies dem alten Historismus zu gestatten schien). Simultaneously, the advancing or progressive historicisation of the natural sciences made clear that in their (i.e. the natural sciences’) formation and development, not merely an – in itself – categorially unchangeable subject pertaining to the theory of knowledge, but at least just as much, a variable or changing historical-social subject, is massively or all-out involved, so that also in this respect, the ontic difference between the natural and social sciences could be relativised or seen in a different light (Gleichzeitig machte die fortschreitende Historisierung der Naturwissenschaften deutlich, daß an ihrer Herausbildung nicht bloß ein an sich kategorial unwandelbares erkenntnistheoretisches, sondern zumindest ebenso ein veränderliches geschichtlich-soziales Subjekt massiv beteiligt ist, so daß auch in dieser Hinsicht die ontische Differenz zwischen Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften relativiert bzw. in anderem Licht gesehen werden konnte)¹⁶⁶. Finally, the much conjured-up or invoked same-kindness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) of the subject and the object in the social sciences (die vielbeschworene Gleichartigkeit von Subjekt und Objekt in den Sozialwissenschaften) must be understood with the necessary differentiations and limitations or restrictions. As (a) social subject, man does not cease/stop being a piece of nature, which is subject to the same kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) of Nature, – (something) which also influences his social behaviour. And his same-kindness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) with the object of his social-scientific study indeed

¹⁶⁶ In relation to that, Kondylis, „Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung“ (= “Science, Power and Decision”).

constitutes the presupposition, prerequisite and precondition of an understanding (cognitive) apprehension of this object, but by no means the guarantee for the content-related correctness or rightness of this apprehension (Als soziales Subjekt hört der Mensch nicht auf, ein Stück Natur zu sein, das gleichen Naturgesetzmäßigkeiten wie ein Stein oder ein Hund unterworfen ist, – was auch sein soziales Verhalten beeinflusst. Und seine Gleichartigkeit mit dem Objekt seines sozialwissenschaftlichen Studiums bildet zwar die Voraussetzung einer verstehenden Erfassung dieses Objekts, keineswegs aber die Garantie für die inhaltliche Richtigkeit dieser Erfassung). (Were that/this so, then we would call the social sciences rather than the natural sciences, the “exact sciences” (Wäre dem so, so würden wir eher die Sozial- als die Naturwissenschaften „exakte Wissenschaften“ nennen):) The difference between (the) certainly existing and present presupposition or prerequisite and precondition and the by no means certain guarantee corresponds precisely with the difference between the form-related (i.e. formal) and the content-related level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The same-kindness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) of subject and object enables or makes social-scientific knowledge possible, but it does not make it easy (or does not facilitate it).

Given these differentiations and limitations and restrictions, the elementary fact remains that methodical ((and) or methodological) understanding is connected in (a) specific manner with the work of the social sciences, that it must often also then be practised silently or tacitly, even if this is not intended methodically or methodologically, and that it mostly can then also be practised when the stuff (i.e. material or matter) concerned can, first of all, be handled and treated even with the help or on the basis of other methods. As (a) theoretical-scientific actor, the social scientist moves in a field or area, which is populated or inhabited with beings (creatures), who are capable of the

assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and move (i.e. enter) into (or have) corresponding relations with one another. Those acting practically-socially (i.e. in practice and socially) must move and transfer themselves (in)to the position of each and every respective Other; and the theoretically-socially acting social scientist (i.e. the social scientist acting in terms of theory, as well as socially) wants or must move and transfer himself (in)to the position of those who have moved and transferred themselves (in)to the position of Others (Als theoretisch-wissenschaftlich Handelnder bewegt sich der Sozialwissenschaftler auf einem Gebiet, das mit Wesen bevölkert ist, die zur Perspektivenübernahme befähigt sind und in entsprechende Beziehungen zueinander treten. Die praktisch-sozial Handelnden müssen sich gegenseitig in die Lage des jeweils Anderen versetzen; und der theoretisch-sozial handelnde Sozialwissenschaftler will oder muß sich in die Lage jener versetzen, die sich in die Lage Anderer versetzt haben). The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is intensified at the social-scientific level, or the perspective of the acting subject handled and treated by social science, is absorbed by or totally wrapped up and embodied in the meta-perspective of the social scientist etc., however, the mechanism does not change: the social scientist cannot, in principle, encounter or face his specific objects, that is, human subjects, differently than how the latter (human subjects), amongst and as between one another, encounter or face one another. Everyone, observers and those acting (i.e. actors), are equally *social* subjects (Die Perspektivenübernahme wird auf sozialwissenschaftlicher Ebene potenziert bzw. die Perspektive des handelnden Subjekts, von dem Sozialwissenschaftler handelt, geht in der Metaperspektive des Sozialwissenschaftlers auf etc., aber der Mechanismus ändert sich nicht: Der Sozialwissenschaftler kann seinen spezifischen Objekten, also den menschlichen Subjekten, grundsätzlich nicht anders begegnen als so, wie sich dies letzteren untereinander begegnen. Alle, Beobachter und Handelnde, sind gleichermaßen *soziale* Subjekte). That is why the form-related (i.e. formal)

basic given (actual) facts of the *social*-ontic apply equally for everyone – entirely irrespective of what happens at the level of content(s), (where e.g. the social scientist may (i.e. is able to) handle and treat the socially acting (i.e. the social actor), whom he is supposed to study, as a friend or a foe, on the basis of pleasant or unpleasant to/for him (i.e. the social scientist) findings *of his* assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) (Die formalen Grundgegebenheiten des *Sozialontischen* gelten daher für alle gleichermaßen – ganz unabhängig davon, was auf der Ebene der Inhalte geschieht, (wo z. B. der Sozialwissenschaftler den sozial Handelnden, den er studieren soll, aufgrund der ihm genehmen oder unangenehmen Befunde *seiner* Perspektivenübernahme als Freund oder Feind behandeln mag)). Since in the natural sciences, the objects of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) acting social subjects (of the scientist) are not social subjects, and do without and lack the capacity and ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, so that also no observer can move and transfer himself (in)to their assumption and taking on/over of perspectives meta-perspectively (i.e. in terms of a meta-perspective), thus, here methodical (or methodological) understanding has by definition no place (Da in den Naturwissenschaften die Objekte des theoretisch handelnden sozialen Subjekts (des Wissenschaftlers) keine sozialen Subjekte sind und der Fähigkeit zur Perspektivenübernahme entbehren, so daß sich auch kein Beobachter in ihre Perspektivenübernahme metaperspektivistisch versetzen kann, so hat hier methodisches Verstehen definitionsgemäß keinen Platz). Tendencies, approaches or dispositions become, nevertheless, in in-between (i.e. intermediate) areas, noticeable, as soon as e.g. an ethologist believes that the existence, presence or availability of an elementary capacity for and (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is necessarily ascertained in animals (Ansätze machen sich dennoch in Zwischenbereichen bemerkbar, sobald z. B. ein Ethologe glaubt, das Vorhandensein einer elementaren Fähigkeit zur Perspektivenübernahme bei Tieren feststellen zu

müssen)¹⁶⁷. The parameters which determine the reflective/reflexive character of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives likewise belong to the social-ontic common property (or heritage/inheritance), which the theoretically-scientifically acting person (i.e. actor) shares with his object, i.e. the person acting in practice (who can just as well be another theoretical, aesthetic etc. acting person/actor). The reflexive/reflexive distance, which necessarily accompanies understanding, and distinguishes it before every “empathy (or insight)” – if it (i.e. such empathy or insight) exists –, springs from the elementary consciousness of the I (ego) that its own self, together with its own thought acts and aims, is different to or distinct – in terms of content – from the self of the Other together with its thought acts and contents, or, that the partial or even total content-related agreements over these fields could be lifted, i.e. canceled or abolished (Zum sozialontischen Gemeingut, das der theoretisch-wissenschaftlich Handelnde mit seinem Objekt, d. h. dem praktisch Handelnden teilt (der freilich ebensogut ein anderer theoretisch, ästhetisch etc. Handelnder sein kann), gehören ebenfalls die Parameter, die den reflexiven Charakter der Perspektivenübernahme bedingen. Die reflexive Distanz, die das Verstehen notwendig begleitet und es vor jeder „Einfühlung“ – wenn sie gibt – unterscheidet, entspringt dem elementaren Bewußtsein des Ich, das eigene Selbst samt den eigenen Denkakten und Zielen sei vom Selbst des Anderen samt dessen Denkakten und Inhalten inhaltlich verschieden bzw. partielle oder auch totale inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen auf diesen Gebieten könnten aufgehoben werden). That means: knowledge about the possibility of content-related differences vis-à-vis the Other already belongs to the form-related (i.e. formal) equipment of the consciousness of the I (ego) (formalen Ausrüstung des Bewußtseins des Ich). The Other can, therefore, at any time, occupy another place in the spectrum of the social relation than [[the place of]] the I (ego), and

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Lorenz, *Er redete mit dem Vieh den Vögeln und den Fischen*

the reflective (reflexive) understanding of the I (ego) aims, in relation that, to determine in advance this place, bearing in mind the motives and aims of the Other, or to explain in retrospect [[these motives and aims of the Other]]. The consciousness of the reality or the possibility of the difference nourishes and feeds the reflectivity (reflexivity) of the understanding (cognitive) endeavour. And this consciousness is founded, for its part, on a knowledge, which likewise belongs to the form-related (i.e. formal) equipment of the consciousness of every socially living (human subject) and consequently to the human subject, subject (and subjugated) to social-ontic(al) necessities. The knowledge, namely, that subjectivity *as* subjectivity evades, defies, escapes or is beyond absolute calculation, reckoning or estimation, that it (i.e. subjectivity) under the same or equal circumstances does not necessarily behave in the same or equal manner. The growing and increasing imponderability and incalculability of subjectivity (Wachsende Uberechenbarkeit der Subjektivität) and the refinement of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives go hand in hand. To this social-ontic basic given (actual) fact does, in the end, the reflexive/reflective character of the intensified assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in social science go back (i.e. is reduced), namely, to that (social-ontic basic given fact) of understanding (Auf diese sozialontische Grundgegebenheit geht schließlich der reflexive Charakter der potenzierten Perspektivenübernahme in der Sozialwissenschaft, nämlich der des Verstehens, zurück). Because also this (understanding) strives and endeavours to explain the place of an acting subject in the spectrum of the social relation, bearing in mind its (i.e. the said acting subject's) motives and aims, or else, (bearing in mind) the logic of its (the said acting subject's) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – always in the knowledge of the fact that this place (Platz) could be another (place). Would this possibility not exist (i.e. if this possibility did not exist), then the understanding (cognitive) detection, establishment and ascertaining of the motives and aims would be superfluous, just as it (such detection and

ascertainment of motives and aims) is superfluous when it is a question of explaining the fall of a body.

Understanding becomes the main/chief question/problem of social-scientific methodology (or approach pertaining to method) when its social-ontic foundation, as well as the historical character of human social activity, remain conscious or in our consciousness (i.e. when we remain aware of understanding's social-ontic foundation and the historical character of human social activity). In unhistorical, i.e. non-historical social-theoretical constructions, understanding, against that (or on the other hand), becomes a topic or theme at most in the context of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (and) or roles at the level of actors. For the social-scientist, who for instance looks into and deals with "systems" and does not look into and deal with historically acting men (i.e. humans), he does not have to also "understand" the latter (historically acting men/humans) (Verstehen wird zur Hauptfrage sozialwissenschaftlicher Methodik, wenn ihre sozialontische Grundlage sowie der historische Charakter menschlicher sozialer Tätigkeit bewußt bleiben. Bei unhistorischen sozialtheoretischen Konstruktionen wird Verstehen dagegen höchstens im Kontext der Perspektiven- bzw. Rollenübernahme auf der Ebene der Akteure zum Thema. Zur Sozialwissenschaftler, der sich etwa mit „Systemen“ und nicht mit historisch handelnden Menschen befaßt, muß auch letztere nicht „verstehen“).

Renunciations or refusals of methodical (or methodological) understanding (methodische Verstehen) are legitimised often scientifically by their general, wholesale or global – and ignorant – interweaving with an irrational, quasi-mystical "empathy (or insight)" („Einfühlung“) or "intuition" („Intuition“), which one contradistinguishes to the advantages of rational-behaviouristic transparency. (This custom or practice (Usus) of Anglo-Saxon^{li} authors is followed by those German (authors) – with pleasure – who would like to get rid

and dispose of, or away from, the “irrationalism” of their own inheritance (legacy or heritage) pertaining to the history of ideas.) Let us, however, look at a well-known attempt in much greater detail of the dissolving or breaking up of understanding into behaviouristic categories and, in the process, of using and applying the Covering-Law-Model. Accordingly, “Operation Understanding” succeeds if the person understanding carries out or executes three inner acts: he internalises the stimulus, he internalises the reaction and he uses maxims (in respect) of behaviour (behavioural maxims) in order to connect both acts of internalisation with each other. I see e.g. and understand that someone is cold (or freezing), I see and understand too, that he, thereupon or as a result, makes (i.e. lights) a fire, and I apprehend, in the end, the overall process through the maxim in respect of behaviour: whoever is cold lights a fire¹⁶⁸. Two false assumptions underlie this behaviouristic theory of understanding, that, namely, internalisations of alien experiences (i.e. the experiences of others) take place on the basis of one’s own experiences, and that (the) becoming and events become comprehensible only in the light of certain maxims in respect of behaviour. Let us assume that someone is cold/freezing and, notwithstanding that, lights no fire because he is hardening and toughening his body for hygienic reasons (i.e. for reasons of wanting to become healthier), because he wants to save money, or because he – due to a sin he has committed – wants to punish himself by means of asceticism. When the I does not know of these motivations and positionings from its own experience, then it (i.e. the said I) can understand the act(ion)s of the Other only through the enrichment and expansion of its own experience, it (the I) must break through the narrow behaviouristic circle of stimulus and reaction. And in the course of this, the I must constantly find itself in the search and on the lookout for explanatory maxims (in respect) of behaviour, because every one of these maxims is suitable obviously only for

¹⁶⁸ Abel, “Operation”, esp. p. 215ff.

one single case or one single category of cases. We know, in fact, already of the weakness of the Covering-Law-model¹⁶⁹, because the actor does not have to act on the basis of the Covering Law, which is supposed to have had an effect in the concrete case, is named in retrospect on the basis of knowledge of the act or action already executed and carried out. If the actor in (regard to) the imponderability (incalculability) of his subjectivity decides in favour of another course of acting/action, then he must – for the explanation of the same (course of acting/action) – be responsible to provide another maxim in respect of behaviour, which, for its part, again, would have no absolute claim on or to generality. The task of understanding is not solved through maxims, but is only set, because such maxims are not suitable.

Behaviouristic or cybernetic models of understanding celebrate easy victories or preach to the converted when they underline that in understanding (cognitive) communication, no transference of the same thought or feeling from the inside/interior of one of the communication partners (or partners in communication) takes place on the inside/interior of the other partner in communication. Rather, it is a matter that every side has at its disposal lists of meaningful act(ion)s and wants to recognise in its own lists the act(ion)s of each and every other (side), which it wants to understand. The conclusions extracted and gained through such a comparison regarding the intentions and deeds of the other (side or person) would have to then be proven with the help of additional data¹⁷⁰. However, one by no means must make this version one's own (i.e. one does not at have to appropriate this version), in order to sharply demarcate and delimit understanding as an of necessity reflexive/reflective process against and from the representations and notions in respect of the interweaving and fusion of spirits(-intellects) or of the psyche in the medium of the same content(s) –

¹⁶⁹ See Ch. II, Section 2Cd, above.

¹⁷⁰ Warriner, "Social Action", p. 509.

representations and notions, incidentally, which no somewhat or fairly systematic theory of understanding has ever represented and supported. On the contrary, the precisely referred perception or view makes the possibility of understanding dependent on the existence and presence of identical mental content(s) on both sides, so that every one of them – only with recourse to one's own list – can decipher, decode or unscramble the individual keywords of the alien, i.e. other, side. And the ascertainment that the findings of the comparison of the lists would have to be proved, checked and tested in (regard to) external data, indeed implies a recognition of the boundaries of the behaviouristic schema; it cannot, however, make clear the smaller or larger extent of the enrichment and expansion of one's own content(s) or (thought-)experiences, which can become inevitable or essential in the process of understanding. Contents are not, in reality, the starting point of understanding, but rather its end or final point, and in this end point they (i.e. the said contents) are no longer quantitative and qualitative themselves as at the beginning/start of the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought). In this beginning/start stands or is found – as the absolute prerequisite, precondition and presupposition and motivation of understanding – the in itself empty-of-content social-ontically fundamental representation and notion of the Other as subjectivity with the by definition (per definitionem) capacity for meaningful action, for the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and for more or less (im)ponderable ((in)calculable) movement/motion inside of the spectrum of the social relation. This representation and notion of the Other certainly corresponds with the representation and notion of the I (ego) of its [[very/own]] self; however, it remains decisive/deciding that the recognised common ground or commonality, which the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought) must unconditionally and necessarily presuppose, first of all, encompasses the field, area or sector of the stable social-ontic form, not that of variable and mutable (thought) experiences. Understanding means, in this

respect, pre-given correspondence or identity (i.e. equating) in regard to the formal (i.e. what is form-related or at the form-related level) (im Formalen), and a journey of discovery in the content-related (i.e. what is related to content or at the content-related level) (im Inhaltlichen), whose aim it is to also make, manufacture, create, produce or restore an identity in the sense that that I (ego) which proceeds and happens in the Other, wants to reconstruct itself (or to be reconstructed in itself) as faithfully as possible with the help of reflexion/ reflection. If the I (ego) renounces from the outset this voyage of discovery and believes that its already available mental content(s) would suffice for the coming to terms with the task of understanding beyond the form-related (das Formale), then it may sometimes be right, but often also not (right), because the tempting and alluring, enticing, seductive trap of solipsism always lies in wait and lurks. Nonetheless, the recognised common ground and commonality with (regard to) the Other at the form-related (i.e. formal) social-ontic level invites [[the I (ego)]] to go on the voyage of discovery in the field, area or sector of content(s), and with that, to the enrichment and expansion of one's own content(s) in the thought act of understanding. Because it (i.e. understanding) is inseparably connected with the insight that the Other just like the I (ego) in principle can appropriate a great deal of content (multiple contents), and or, in (regard to) the very different motivations and settings of the aim and objectives can occupy several places in the spectrum of the social relation – in short, that the Other, not despite, but precisely because of his social-ontic-form-related/formal common ground and commonality with the I (ego), can more or less differ from this (I (ego)) in (regard to) the content-related (im Inhaltlichen). The in itself empty-of-content notion and representation of the Other, which stands and is found at the beginning of the understanding (cognitive) process, consequently pushes of its own accord to the detection and ascertainment of those contents which concretise understanding, and in the framework of the given social relation, is supposed to make (understanding) useful in practice –

irrespective of whether the contents in question are already familiar or new to the I (ego).

Already the transition from the formality of the constantly presupposed social-ontic common ground and commonality with the Other, to the content-related level, at which both common ground and commonalities, as well as the differences between the I (ego) and the Other are possible, demands reflexive/reflective work. At the content-related level, reflection (reflexion) again is not only set in motion by the ascertainment of differences and by the consciousness of content-related otherness or alterity (inhaltlich Andersseins). Also, content-related commonalities and (content-related) common ground do not – in any case – abolish the factual circumstances that the understanding by the I (ego) of the acts of consciousness of the Other is accompanied by the consciousness that here it is a matter of not one's own, but of alien, i.e. the Other's or others' acts of consciousness (das Verstehen des Ich von Bewußtseinsakten des Anderen durch das Bewußtsein begleitet wird). To the understanding of alien (i.e. others') acts of consciousness belongs the knowledge that their (i.e. the alien/others' acts of consciousness's) alienness, strangeness and unfamiliarity is constitutive in relation to that (i.e. such understanding of alien and others' acts of consciousness), and the inclination or proclivity of the I (ego) to – in (regard to) far-reaching and extensive content-related common ground and commonalities – feel like “one heart and one soul” („ein Herz und eine Seele“), goes back and is reduced to psychological needs and wishes, which are connected with the shaping, formation and course of the concrete social relation, that is, they move between independence, security and optimism as to goal, purpose and end (Abhängigkeit, Geborgenheit und Zweckoptimismus). The consciousness of alienness, strangeness and unfamiliarity of alien (and others') acts of consciousness can, however, under all circumstances, get or bust out of displacement (repulsion, repression, suppression or denial) (kann aber

unter allen Umständen aus der Verdrängung herausgeholt), and be knowingly put to the side of/beside every act of consciousness of one's own referring to alien or others' consciousness. In relation to the act of reflection, which founds and establishes the knowledge that the streams (currents or rivers) of consciousness (Bewußtseinsströme) from the I (ego) and to the Other (vom Ich und dem Anderen) are not identifiable, or else that the acts of consciousness of the Other are comprehensible by the I (ego) only as acts of consciousness of the I (ego), two other [[things]] automatically join up, i.e. flow or are added. The I (ego) experiences its own acts of consciousness as the reflexive/reflective interpretation (or exegesis) of their (i.e. the I's/ego's own acts of consciousness') meaning, or as self-interpretation, self-exegesis (or as the interpretation of the self) – and it (i.e. the said I (ego)) also interprets the acts of consciousness of the Other by interpreting, through reflexive/reflective activity, their (i.e. the Other's acts of consciousness') meaning. Alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of the Other or others) procures or imparts just as little as self-understanding, any “intact” and “original” acts of consciousness whatsoever; it is constituted through the detection and ascertaining or establishment of meaning, and this detection etc. takes place – for its part – on the basis of a more or less incomplete reconstruction of alien or the Other's/others' stream (current or river) of consciousness, from whose continuum only discontinuous segments can be apprehended (Das Ich erfährt die eigenen Bewußtseinsakte als reflexive Auslegung ihres Sinnes bzw. als Selbstausslegung – und es erfährt auch die Bewußtseinsakte des Anderen, indem es durch reflexive Tätigkeit ihren Sinn auslegt. Fremdverstehen vermittelt also ebensowenig wie Selbstverstehen irgendwelche „intakten“ und „ursprünglichen“ Bewußtseinsakte, es wird durch die Ermittlung von Sinn konstituiert, und diese Ermittlung findet ihrerseits auf der Basis einer mehr oder weniger unvollkommenen Rekonstruktion des fremden Bewußtseinsstromes statt, aus dessen Kontinuum nur diskontinuierliche Segmente erfaßt werden

können)¹⁷¹. As we shall see later, in this structure of intersubjective understanding, two basic or fundamental features of social-scientific understanding emerge and stand out; on the one hand, this (social-scientific understanding) – of necessity – constitutes the reconstruction of an alien, foreign or other interrelation of meaning (or meaningful context) through the acts of consciousness of the researcher; on the other hand, the reconstruction occurs from the perspective of a particular interest (in respect) of knowledge (i.e. of a particular cognitive interest), and with the help (and or on the basis) of – accessible to the researcher – segments of alien (i.e. of others’) streams (currents or rivers) of consciousness, it (the said reconstruction) must, therefore, remain partial and determined by interest (or interest-dependent). Finally, an essential commonality lies between intersubjective and social-scientific understanding in that – in both cases – the reconstruction of alien (the Other’s or others’) acts of consciousness must rest and be based on the interpretation of external or outer signs (signals or symbols), of “behaviour”, and over and above that, of objective situations and positions (objektiven Lagen); only through that can it become hardened (i.e. can understanding be founded and consolidated) (die Rekonstruktion fremder Bewußtseinsakte auf der Deutung von äußeren

¹⁷¹ Cf. Schütz’s excellent, superb analysis, *Aufbau*, pp. 140ff., 146ff., 159ff., which of course could be supported on (or underpinned by) phenomenological findings. Husserl set forth, explained and expounded in clear words the reflexive/reflective character of self-perception and alien-perception (i.e. the perception of the Other or others): “As we apprehend solely in terms of themes and topics our subjective (character or nature) through or by means of reflection (reflexion), so, obviously, [[do we apprehend]] the alien (the Other’s or others’) [[subjective character or nature]] through and by means of reflection/reflexion in empathy (or insight) (Einfühlung)” (*Hu*, XV, p. 427). The subjective sphere of the individual cannot be given in any other (sphere) “originally”; the a-presence, i.e. after(-the-fact)-presence (die „Appräsenz“) of alien, the Other’s or others’ experiences in the I (ego) is – under no circumstances – transformed into an “original presence” („Urpräsenz“). For the ego’s act of consciousness (Für den Bewußtseinsakt Egos), which refers to an original act of consciousness of the Other, but as one such (act of consciousness) which the ego itself cannot execute or carry out originally (i.e. from the very beginning), Husserl uses the term “empathy (or insight)” („Einfühlung“); “empathy (or insight)” as a “reproductive act” („reproduktiver Akt“) means also in the same context the understanding of alien-personal motivation (i.e. the understanding of the personal motivation of another person) (das Verstehen fremdpersonaler Motivation), or the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the other/another subject (*Ideen*, II = *Hu*, IV, pp. 198, 199, 228ff., 274ff.; *Ideen*, I = *Hu*, III, p. 347ff., vgl. *Phänom. Psychol.*, *Hu*, IX, pp. 506, 510). Occasionally, he (i.e. Husserl) found this term “slightly or a little suitable, appropriate or apt”, and he spoke of “perception through or by means of original interpretation” and “apprehension through interpretation” (*Erste Phil.*, *Hu*, VIII, 1, p. 63). Regarding Husserl’s theory of understanding cf. Waldenfels, *Zwischenreich*, pp. 269ff., 374, 155.

Zeichen, von „Verhalten“, und darüber hinaus von objektiven Lagen beruhen muß, nur dadurch läßt sie sich erhärten). It (i.e. the said reconstruction) must be revised as a whole when (the) new “data” and “testimonies” demand a new interpretation of “behaviour” and of the “situation (position)”. The illumination and elucidation of motives and goals/ends makes sense only in their connection with the analysis of a concrete situation or position (macht erst in ihrer Verbindung mit der Analyse einer konkreten Lage Sinn); the (corporeal, linguistic (language) etc.) signs, signals and symbols, which allow or permit inferences and conclusions as regards these motives and goals/ends, appear to be the context in respect of meaning only against the background of a broad objective context (vor dem Hintergrund eines breiteren objektiven Zusammenhanges), that is, of one which exists regardless of the to-be-understood subject (der unabhängig von dem zu verstehenden Subjekt). Above all, here the reflective (reflexive) character of understanding comes into view and becomes apparent. It is also clear that social-scientific understanding, which for the most part seeks to enter into and penetrate temporally and spatially distant subjects, is still more dependent than topical, current or relevant (to a particular occasion) intersubjective understanding, on this indirect path or way to understanding (cognitive) reconstruction (zur verstehenden Rekonstruktion).

Understanding is therefore no “irrational” operation; it is no unreflected immediacy, and indeed for the simple reason because it *cannot* be such an (unreflected immediacy). The always still persistent (sustained, perennial, lasting) quarrel (dispute) between rather “irrationalistic” or “intuitionistic” and rather “intellectualistic” or “rationalistic” positions in matters of understanding has nothing to do with the actual process of understanding, which, incidentally, runs, flows or drains off (i.e. proceeds and takes place) in both parties (i.e. both the “rationalists” and the “irrationalists”) – for social-ontic reasons – in precisely the same manner, but it goes back to and is reduced to world-

theoretical sympathies (auf weltanschauliche Sympathien). As so often [[is the case]] in the history of ideas, also this time, behind the pleading and advocacy in favour of the intuitive immediacy or reflective mediation, in favour of “irrationalism” and “rationalism” are content-related pre-decisions (i.e. preliminary decisions), which are then projected onto questions and problems of knowledge and of methods, or, are connected with these (questions and problems of knowledge and of methods) symbolically-confessionally (i.e. in a confessional manner)¹⁷². It is now a completely different matter or another story that certain men/humans (people) in certain situations and positions develop (the) feeling (das Gefühl entwickeln) or, in any case, assert that they would understand other subjects by means of direct empathy (or insight), that is, they know one another in mind and spirit (i.e. absolutely). As we implied above, in such feelings or assertions, euphoric impressions or wishes regarding the character and intensity of a social relation – rather than psychological and cognitive realities – are reflected. Just as obvious and, at the same time, misleading is the talk about empathy (or insight) and intuitive apprehension of subjective factual circumstances and contexts in respect of meaning, if, with that, a very thick and quick process of reflection (reflexion) is actually meant, which during long-lasting exercise and practice, and unusual combinatory talent, aptitude or endowment, becomes still thicker and quicker. That is why the phenomenon of the ingenious and brilliant researcher or interpreter in the social sciences and in general, wrongly and without justification, gives wings to (i.e. inspires) “irrationalists” or “intuitionists”, and, it brings, rightly and justifiably, many “rationalists” into a predicament and state of embarrassment and perplexity, who naively believe that clearly formulated methodical (i.e. methodological) rules could – for the handling and treatment of “materials” or for the “understanding” of social and historical actors – shove or push aside the

¹⁷² Dazu Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 36ff..

factor [[of]] “personal talent, endowment and formation (education, learning, cultivation)”, and serve as weapons of compensation for mediocrity. The question or problem of the reflective/reflexive character of the apprehension of subjective and objective contexts of meaning, and the question or problem of social-scientific genius or ingenuity have, however, not the slightest to do with each other. Reflecting and thinking (thought) do not necessarily constitute the area or realm in which the non-ingenious flourish, and “intuition” does not necessarily lead to ingenious discoveries or insights. Where the boundary and the border between genius/ingenuity and golden or wooden mediocrity runs, we shall perhaps never find out (discover). Yet it certainly does not coincide with that (boundary or border) between reflection (reflexion) and “empathy (or insight)”, especially as we cannot know whether “rational” thought proceeds in terms of an ability to standardise [[things]] “rationally”. And perhaps it is a genuine feature of genius or ingenuity when anyone – justifiably (in the manner of giving reasons) – that is, on the basis of his performances and achievements or accomplishments, can elevate himself above such contrasts and oppositions.

This feeling may have prompted or given cause to Max Weber to stress the role of “phantasy” in the construction of ideal types as the main instrument of understanding¹⁷³, and simultaneously to define methodical (i.e. methodological) understanding precisely starting from the demarcation or delimitation against intuitionism and psychologism. Remarkable and noteworthy here is how Weber can found the theory of social-scientific understanding on a perception or view of the reflectivity/reflexivity of the acts of consciousness, and on this detour or roundabout way, – without being able to be systematically clear about the implication –, touch upon the social-ontic background of the examination of the problem of understanding. Under this somewhat neglected point of view, and thanks to the preceding analysis, we now should explicate his theses. The

¹⁷³ *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 194.

starting point is – already in the earliest methodological essays (writings) – the conviction that even one’s own experiences (as (or of) going through life) or “moods” elude, escape or are beyond immediate, that is, reflectively/reflexively unmediated interpretation (selbst eigene Erlebnisse oder „Stimmungen“ entzögen sich der unmittelbaren, also reflexiv unvermittelten Deutung). As soon as they are supposed to be apprehended, they are transformed and converted into an object of judgement and accordingly subjected to, in fact, a structural change by being seen from a new perspective and being put in order (and classified) in new contexts. The same process takes place when it is a matter of the – of necessity interpreting (i.e. interpretive) – apprehension of the alien (i.e. the Other’s and others’) experience. One could perhaps imagine that in (or during) the execution, carrying out and fathoming of purely mathematical thoughts, an identity (i.e. equating) of acts of consciousness of two persons exists (is present and available), but otherwise, every attempt at the “empathising with (or having insight into)” the Other must (necessarily) lead to an act of thought (thought act), to a consciousness and or contemplation on (i.e. in regard to) the Alien (i.e. something strange, foreign or different) as an object. What, in the course of this, comes about, is a thought (intellectual) construct, produced, made, fabricated or manufactured “by a generalising abstraction or by isolation and synthesis” – a thought and intellectual construct, that is, which can be founded on “purposefully (end/goal-rationally or expediently) chosen constituent elements or parts” of the alien, strange, foreign or other experience, not on their entirety (wholeness or completeness)¹⁷⁴. In accordance with these ascertainties, now the construction of ideal types as the methodical (i.e. methodological) instrument for the interpreting (i.e. interpretive) apprehension of supra-individual constructs and contexts of meaning (“average (or mean) types”), of historical events – but also of the meaningful action of individuals, is

¹⁷⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 104, 280, 110, 107, 108, 96 footnote 1.

adjusted and regulated (or put in order), because also this time it applies that through the “increased or enhanced unambiguity or explicitness of the concepts” of the social-scientific way of looking at things an – in itself – confused material is to be opened up and revealed: real action (Reales Handeln) seldom, if at all, achieves that clarity of the meaningful (jene Klarheit des Sinnhaften), which would amount to a social-scientific (piece of) evidence/proof (einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Evidenz), and hence social-scientific interpretations and constructions (sozialwissenschaftliche Deutungen und Konstruktionen) would be made superfluous¹⁷⁵. Methodical (i.e. methodological) understanding as the social-scientific assumption and taking on/over of perspectives must therefore of its nature be just as ideal-typical (idealtypisch) as for instance the social-scientific understanding of “feudalism”. It (i.e. such methodical/methodological understanding) shows or contains the basic (fundamental) features (characteristics, traits, attributes) which characterise every ideal type, however over and above that, they (such basic features) structure already the pre-scientific apprehension of alien experiencing as (or of) going through the living or lives of the Other and of others), that is, the social-ontically pre-given assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Es weist die Grundzüge auf, die jeden Idealtyp kennzeichnen, darüber hinaus aber schon die vorwissenschaftliche Erfassung des Fremderlebens, also die sozialontisch vorgegebene Perspektivenübernahme strukturieren)! It is, namely, not any faithful or true re-living and re-experiencing of alien living and experiencing life (i.e. the living and experiencing of life of the Other and others), but a construct of thought (or an intellectual construct), which came into being or was created and produced on the basis of selections and abstractions, that is, it does not represent the Other in his (its) totality as a person, but aspects of him come to the fore (or move into the foreground), which are regarded as

¹⁷⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 560-62.

decisive in the concrete context (Es ist nämlich kein getreues Nacherleben fremden Erlebens, sondern ein Gedankengebilde, das auf der Basis von Selektionen und Abstraktionen entstand, also nicht den Anderen in seiner Totalität als Person vertritt, sondern Aspekte von ihm in den Vordergrund rückt, die im konkreten Zusammenhang als entscheidend gelten). Those selections and abstractions articulate, in fact, both in extra-scientific, as well as in scientific praxis, a certain interest of a certain subject – in the former case, the interest of a certain shaping and moulding of the social relation, in the latter (case), a theoretical interest in (respect of) knowledge (i.e. a theoretical cognitive interest) – (in which, though, the practical interests of the researcher with regard to the shaping and moulding of the – *for him* – relevant social relations slip, sneak or creep in, in the form of value judgements and corresponding kinds of censorship or distortions) (Jene Selektionen und Abstraktionen artikulieren ja sowohl in der außerwissenschaftlichen als auch in der wissenschaftlichen Praxis ein bestimmtes Interesse eines bestimmten Subjekts – im ersteren Fall das Interesse an einer bestimmten Gestaltung der sozialen Beziehung, im letzteren ein theoretisches Erkenntnisinteresse – (in welches sich allerdings die praktischen Interessen des Forschers im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung der *für ihn* relevanten sozialen Beziehungen in Form von Werturteilen und entsprechenden Zensuren oder Verzerrungen einschleichen)). In the unavoidable selections and abstractions, the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in (regard to) social-scientific research consequently asserts itself, which, as is, in fact, well known, can be carried on and conducted – according to Weber – only under the influence or aegis of a “value relation”, that is, a decision on the, in general, or on each and every respective occasion, values of knowledge (i.e. what is worth knowing). It is patently obvious how much the choice of a scientifically fertile value relation depends on the “irrational” extra-methodical (i.e. extra-methodological) presuppositions of knowledge, that is, on the personal talent and learning (education, cultivation, formation) of the

researcher (In den unumgänglichen Selektionen und Abstraktionen macht sich folglich die Perspektive der Perspektivenübernahme in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung geltend, die sich ja bekanntlich nach Weber nur im Zeichen einer „Wertbeziehung“, also einer Entscheidung über das überhaupt oder jeweils Wissenswerte betreiben läßt. Es liegt auf der Hand, wie sehr die Wahl einer wissenschaftlich fruchtbaren Wertbeziehung von den irrationalen außermethodischen Voraussetzungen der Forschung, also von der persönlichen Begabung und Bildung des Forschers abhängt).

The ideal type, which is supposed or ought to guide the understanding of the alien experiencing of life and action (i.e. the living and experiencing of life and action of the Other and others), is certainly determined social-ontologically, not only as to its formal structure, but also as to its content. The question formulations, around which it (i.e. the ideal type) is constructed around stable axes, concerns magnitudes, (in respect) of which it is pre-scientifically and generally known that they cannot be thought away or divorced from (i.e. they are integral to) socially living human subjectivity: meaning, end (goal) and means, (the) orientation of action to the supposed reactions of Others, action in concrete and only in concrete situations. Understanding succeeds only to the extent it is capable of covering – in its gradual (or stage-by-stage) extension – all these aspects one after the other, i.e. consecutively (Der Idealtyp, der das Verstehen fremden Erlebens und Handelns leiten soll, ist allerdings nicht nur seiner formalen Struktur, sondern auch seinem Inhalt nach sozialontisch bedingt. Die Fragestellungen, um die er wie um stabile Achsen konstruiert wird, betreffen Größen, von denen vorwissenschaftlich und allgemein bekannt ist, daß sie sich von der sozial lebenden menschlichen Subjektivität nicht wegdenken lassen: Sinn, Zweck und Mittel, Orientierung des Handelns an vermuteten Reaktionen Anderer, Handeln in konkreten und nur in konkreten Lagen. Verstehen gelingt in dem Maße, wie es in seiner allmählichen

Erweiterung all diese Aspekte nacheinander abzudecken vermag). The conceptual differentiations, which Weber introduces in the context of understanding, refer or point to just as many steps in the sense of this extension. First of all, the distinction between “topical, current, relevant” and “explaining (cognitive)” understanding, in relation to that, achieves the transition from meaningful action looked at in isolation, to the broader area, sector or field of the setting of the goal and end, or, of the motivation of the person acting. “Topical, current, relevant” understanding refers exclusively to the inherent meaning of an acting, act or action, which makes this what it is, irrespective of who functions as (the) actor (Die begrifflichen Differenzierungen, die Weber im Zusammenhang mit dem Verstehen einführt, verweisen auf ebensoviele Schritte im Sinne dieser Erweiterung. Zunächst dient die Unterscheidung zwischen „aktuellem“ und „erklärendem“ Verstehen dazu, den Übergang von der isoliert betrachteten sinnhaften Handlung zum breiteren Gebiet der Zwecksetzung bzw. der Motivation des Handelnden zu leisten. Das aktuelle Verstehen bezieht sich ausschließlich auf den inhärenten Sinn einer Handlung, der diese zu dem macht, was sie ist, unabhängig davon, wer als Akteur fungiert). Explaining (cognitive) understanding, however, strives and endeavours to put in order and classify the topical, current, relevant or objective meaning of acting, action or the act in contexts of meaning (or meaningful interrelations), which can be outlined or delineated through the exploration of the subjective motivation or setting of a goal/end (end-goal setting and objective) of the actor¹⁷⁶. Now, therefore, it is asked to which goal or end does the actor undertake the act or action (acting),

¹⁷⁶ Loc. cit., p. 546ff.. Regarding the difference between (the) meaning and (the) goal (end) or (the) motive of an act, action or acting cf. the useful remarks and observations of Munch, “Empirical Science”, p. 29, and Tucker, “Weber’s understanding”, p. 161.. Weber undertook or adopted the distinction between the objective understanding of meaning and the interpretation of subjective motives from Simmel, against whom he means or opines, however, that the objective understanding of meaning would not be restricted or limited merely to theoretical sentences or propositions; in their objective meaning, sentences or propositions could be understood, which aim at – in regard to that – “producing, begetting, generating or engendering an action and feeling (or sense) becoming immediately practical (i.e. put(table) into practice)”, e.g. commands, instructions or orders (die darauf abzielten, „ein unmittelbar ‘praktisch’ werdendes Handeln und Fühlen zu erzeugen“, z. B. Befehle), *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 93ff..

which has this topical, current or relevant meaning (diesen aktuellen Sinn), and which motivation brought or carried him to that. A second conceptual distinction leads then from the setting of the goal/end (end-goal setting, objective or target) of the actor (von der Zwecksetzung des Akteurs) to concrete situations and positions (zu konkreten Lagen), inside of which he must realise his goals and ends. A distinction is (*or*: Distinctions are) made, this time between subjective end-goal-purposeful/expedient rationality and objective as to correctness (or accuracy) rationality (Unterschieden wird diesmal zwischen subjektiver Zweckrationalität und objektiver Richtigkeitsrationalität). Understanding must account, regarding that, for how the actor imagines the course of acting (action or the act) through which he wants to attain and achieve his goals (and ends), how he – in the course of this – thinks of relating means and ends/goals to one another. (To this complex belong, obviously, also the thought acts (acts of thought), through which the actor moves and transfers himself (in)to the situation and or position of other (persons), and takes (i.e. includes) their (the others’) presumed reactions in(to) his (i.e. the said actor’s) action (Verstehen muß Rechenschaft darüber ablegen, wie sich der Akteur den Ablauf der Handlung vorstellt, durch die er seine Zwecke erreichen will, wie er dabei Mittel und Zwecke aufeinander zu beziehen gedenkt. (Zu diesem Komplex gehören offenbar auch die Denkakte, durch die sich der Akteur in die Lage anderer versetzt und ihre vermuten Reaktionen in sein Handeln hineinnimmt)). During the investigation of or into the subjective end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality of the actor, just as much as beforehand during the inquiry into and ascertaining or determination of his (i.e. the actor’s) goals/ ends and motives, the person understanding obviously assumes and takes on/over the perspectives of the person to be understood (Bei der Untersuchung der subjektiven Zweckrationalität des Akteurs ebenso wie vorher bei der Ermittlung seiner Zwecke und Motive muß der Verstehende offenbar die Perspektiven des zu Verstehenden übernehmen). This is no longer necessary

during the concluding phase of the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought), in (regard to) which the objective rationality as to correctness (or accuracy) of the acting (action or act) is supposed to or ought to be judged and evaluated. Such judgement and evaluation constitute the result of a comparison between the subjective end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality and the requirements of the concrete situation and or position, from/out of which it is evident to what extent the means chosen by the actor for the attainment and achievement of his goal/end in actual fact were suitable for the attaining and achieving of the goal/end, or even to what extent the end/goal itself had chances or prospects at all or in general of realisation (Das ist mehr nötig bei der abschließenden Phase des verstehenden Denkaktes, in der die objektive Richtigkeitsrationalität der Handlung beurteilt werden soll. Solche Beurteilung bildet das Ergebnis eines Vergleichs zwischen der subjektiven Zweckrationalität und den Erfordernissen der konkreten Lage, woraus erhellt, inwiefern die vom Akteur zur Erreichung seines Zwecks gewählten Mittel in der Tat geeignet waren, den Zweck zu erreichen, oder auch inwiefern der Zweck selbst überhaupt Chancen auf Realisierung hatte). The analysis of the situation (and position) consequently rounds off and completes the understanding (cognitive) thought act or act of thought (Die Lageanalyse rundet somit den verstehenden Denkakt ab). Subjective rationality and objective rationality as to correctness (and accuracy) can – it is understood – be investigated only with the help of ideal-typical constructions, whose rational structure, however, may not be confused or confounded with the real structure of real acts or actions (kinds of acting); precisely for the understanding of “irrational” acts or actions (kinds of acting), are rational means of help and assistance needed (Subjektive Rationalität und objektive Richtigkeitsrationalität können, versteht sich, nur anhand idealtypischer Konstruktionen untersucht werden, deren rationale Struktur aber nicht mit der realen Struktur der realen Handlungen verwechselt werden darf; gerade zum Verstehen „irrationaler“ Handlungen tun rationale

Hilfsmittel not)¹⁷⁷. Consciousness about that shows how high the level or standard is which reflexive/reflective activity reaches during methodical (or methodological) understanding, since here both the thought acts (acts of thought) of the person acting as well as those of the researcher, must be *simultaneously* considered, thought over, borne in mind, taken into account and thematised (i.e. made a topic or subject of contemplation and or discussion). An act of *thought (thinking)* is, however, also understanding because of its character as *causal* explanation. The theoretical interpretation of “personal action” exhibits – qua (i.e. as) causal knowing (knowledge) – no in principle differences vis-à-vis the forms of “objectifying” knowledge; it makes use of control through experience (i.e. it is empirically tested) “in the logically same sense as the hypotheses of the natural sciences” (Das Bewußtsein darüber zeigt an, wie hoch das Niveau ist, das die reflexive Tätigkeit beim methodischen Verstehen erreicht, da hier sowohl die Denkakte des Handelnden als auch jene des Forschers *gleichzeitig* bedacht und thematisiert werden müssen. Akt des *Denkens* ist aber auch das Verstehen wegen seines Charakters als *kausale* Erklärung. Die theoretische Deutung des „persönlichen Handelns“ weist qua kausales Erkennen keine grundsätzlichen Unterschiede gegenüber den Formen „objektivierender“ Erkenntnis auf, sie bedient sich der Kontrolle durch Erfahrung „in logisch gleichem Sinne wie die Hypothesen der Naturwissenschaften“)¹⁷⁸.

In the eyes of many, in particular Anglo-Saxon positivists, whose knowledge of German philosophical texts often rests or is based on hearsay, Dilthey stands as, i.e. is, (there) the main exponent of the “typically German”, “irrationalistic” etc. perception or view of understanding. The misinterpretation begins already in the key concept of “experience (as (or of) going through life) (Erlebnisses)”,

¹⁷⁷ Loc. cit., pp. 434ff., 544ff..

¹⁷⁸ Loc. cit., pp. 102, 111, 95, 436. For conformation of his doubt on the specific “certainty” and the “higher content (in respect) of reality of inner/internal experience (höheren Wirklichkeitsgehalt der inneren Erfahrung)”, Weber refers to Husserl *Logische Untersuchungen*, loc. cit., p. 102 footnote 2, p. 109 footnote 2 and 3.

which is accustomed to being quickly associated with the “living, lively, vital (lebendigen)” emotional aspect of psychical activity in its contrast with and opposition to abstracting/abstractive and abstract thought (emotionalen Aspect der psychischen Tätigkeit in seinem Gegensatz zum abstrahierenden und abstrakten Denken). This was by no means Dilthey’s opinion. His terminology can, of course, be misleading for today’s readers with an altered and changed sense of (or feeling for) language and speech, and furthermore, overlooked is that the contradistinction “concept-life” in the Diltheyan context very often describes, paraphrases or outlines merely the fundamental separation between the natural sciences and the humanities (sciences of the spirit/intellect), and does not denote or describe a fatal dichotomy inside the latter (humanities). This means: the natural sciences must exclusively be a/the construct of abstract-conceptual thought, because the deep ontological chasm between its object, subject matter and human being (t)here (or existence) can only be bridged in this manner – not in actual fact and reality, but in and through science, it goes without saying (die Gegenüberstellung „Begriff-Leben“ im Diltheyschen Kontext sehr oft bloß die fundamentale Trennung zwischen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften umschreibt und nicht eine fatale Dichotomie innerhalb der letzteren bezeichnet. Dies heißt: Naturwissenschaften müssen ausschließlich Konstrukt abstrakt-begrifflichen Denkens sein, weil sich die tiefe ontologische Kluft zwischen ihrem Gegenstand und dem menschlichen Dasein nur auf diese Art und Weise überbrücken läßt – nicht in der Tat, sondern in der und durch die Wissenschaft, versteht sich). On the other hand, the (abstract) thought pertaining to the humanities (*or*: intellectual-spiritual-scientific (abstract) thinking) relates and refers to an object (subject matter) whose apprehension is not reliant and dependent merely on essentially alien and foreign to it intellectual constructs (e.g. mathematical natural laws), and, in this respect, is in itself “living, lively, vital”. The conflict between “experiencing and going through life” and “reflexion/reflection” or “thought/thinking” does not

constitute, in any case, all in all or by and large, a topic or theme and a weak point in Dilthey's methodical/methodological approach pertaining to the humanities, which in its development and unfolding towards maturity tended towards more and more of a multi-dimensional perception (and view) of understanding. The concept(ual plan) of "experience as (or of) going through life" did not under any circumstances stand in the way (Hingegen bezieht sich geisteswissenschaftliches (abstraktes) Denken auf einen Gegenstand, dessen Erfassung nicht bloß auf ihm wesensfremde intellektuelle Konstrukte (z. B. mathematische Naturgesetze) angewiesen ist, und insofern ist es an sich „lebendiger“. Der Konflikt zwischen „Erleben“ und „Reflexion“ oder „Denken“ bildet jedenfalls insgesamt kein Thema und keine schwache Stelle in Diltheys geisteswissenschaftlicher Methodik, die in ihrer Entwicklung zur Reife immer mehr zu einer multidimensionalen Auffassung vom Verstehen tendierte. Dem stand das Konzept vom „Erlebnis“ keinesfalls im Wege). Because it (the said concept(ual plan) of "experience as (or of) going through life") did not mean a specific act of consciousness in its demarcation and delimitation against other (specific acts of consciousness), not for instance a "feeling" in contrast to "perception" or to "thought", but the mode of consciousness in general – not, that is, the content of the act of consciousness, which can consist equally in an imagined quality (in respect) of meaning, a feeling/sense of pain (grief, ache or hurt) or a mathematical relationship, but "the kind (of feeling/sense), as it is there (i.e. as the feeling/sense exists)", and indeed as the smallest unity with (a) united meaning in the flow of time. The experience as (or of) going through life represents and constitutes now an absolute identity (i.e. equating) of the act of consciousness and (of each and every respective) content of consciousness; the consciousness of it (i.e. experience as (or of) going through life) and its constitution, composition and texture are one and the same (Denn es meinte nicht einen spezifischen Bewußtseinsakt in seiner Abgrenzung gegen andere, nicht etwa ein „Gefühl“ im Gegensatz zur „Wahrnehmung“ oder zum

„Denken“, sondern den Modus von Bewußtsein überhaupt – nicht also den Inhalt des Bewußtseinaktes, der gleichermaßen in einer vorgestellten Sinnesqualität, einem Schmerzgefühl oder einem mathematischen Verhältnis bestehen kann, sondern „die Art, wie er da ist“ und zwar als kleinste Einheit mit einheitlicher Bedeutung im Fluß der Zeit. Das Erlebnis stellt nun eine absolute Identität von Bewußtseinakt und (jeweiligem) Bewußtseinsinhalt dar, das Bewußtsein von ihm und seine Beschaffenheit sind eins und dasselbe). When it (i.e. experience as (or of) going through life), therefore, cannot stand across or opposite from or face the I (ego) like an image, then it must in retrospect turn into and become the object (or subject matter) of reflection (reflexion) (Wenn es also dem Ich nicht wie ein Bild gegenüberstehen kann, so muß es im nachhinein zum Gegenstand der Reflexion werden). On this point, I find Dilthey’s position ambivalent, but the matter is in itself so touchy, tricky and thorny that one can hardly hold the ambivalence against him (i.e. Dilthey). Because, on the one hand, he writes that experience as (or of) going through life will “first of all, be illuminated by elementary intellectual performances of functions (or achievements and accomplishments in thought) (Denkleistungen)”; on the other hand, he affirms and reassures that it shuts (encloses or embodies) these elementary intellectual performances of functions (or achievements and accomplishments in thought) “in themselves”, that it has at its disposal and possesses its own “intellectuality” („Intellektualität“), which comes into appearance (becomes evident and noticeable) independently and autonomously with the “increase, heightening and intensification of the state of being conscious (i.e. consciousness or awareness)” (“Steigerung der Bewußtheit”)¹⁷⁹.

The hint, suggestion or indication regarding the specific intellectuality of experience as (or of) going through life refers to Dilthey’s original intent(ion), namely, of overcoming the dualism of (sensory) perception (sensation, feeling,

¹⁷⁹ See the pertinent or relevant passages in: *Aufbau*, GS, VII, pp. 26, 136ff., 194ff..

sense or emotion) (Empfindung), and, understanding (Verstand) in the classical theory of knowledge by means of a psychology of a new type: this intent(ion), not the one-sided defence of the rights of “life” („Lebens“) against the tyranny of “thought/thinking” („Denkens“), underlies the struggle by “experience as (or of) going through life” („Erlebnis“). But the reflectivity (reflexivity) inhering (inherent, innate or immanent) in experience as (or of) going through life or (the reflectivity) directly connected to it (i.e. experience as (or of) going through life) cannot leave behind (i.e. surpass) the bound(arie)s of the immediate, that is it cannot perform or bring about any understanding, and Dilthey also sees into and recognises – not least of all via his own analysis of temporality (existence in time) –, that no thesis (in respect) of any immediacy with regard to understanding can be maintained, perpetuated, stood by or upheld (Aber die dem Erlebnis innewohnende oder mit ihm direkt verbundene Reflexivität kann nicht die Grenzen des Unmittelbaren hinter sich lassen, also kein Verstehen leisten, und Dilthey sieht auch – nicht zuletzt über seine Analyse der Zeitlichkeit – ein, daß sich keine Unmittelbarkeitsthese im Hinblick auf Verstehen aufrechterhalten läßt). That is why he increasingly turns his attention to the necessary mediations, and in the unity of experience going through life, expression and understanding, he finally finds a formula, which appears to him to be sufficiently comprehensive and flexible¹⁸⁰. The “basic or fundamental relationship” of the expression (of experience as (or of) going through life) with experience as (or of) going through life, which is expressed in it (i.e. the expression of experience as (or of) going through life), does not constitute a conclusion of an effect (or result) on a cause, but it founds and establishes understanding. Understanding, however, at this level still remains “elementary”, and moreover, expression can in itself be unreliable and untrustworthy (“adjustment as pretending and feigning; lie and falsehood; deceit, illusion,

¹⁸⁰ See Rossi’s solid, strong, sound analysis, *Storicismo*, esp. pp. 60ff., 71ff..

delusion, bluff and deception”), contradictions and uncertainties, obscurities and ambiguities come into being, and the henceforth required – in greater detail – “examination, test or trial (proofing)” leads to a “higher” understanding, which does not only find expression in judgements regarding the character and (cap)abilities of individual humans/people, but over and above that, must apprehend (the) milieu (i.e. environment, setting and surroundings) and (the) circumstances. It (i.e. the aforementioned “basic or fundamental relationship” of the expression (of experience as (or of) going through life) with experience as (or of) going through life, which is expressed in it (i.e. the expression of experience as (or of) going through life)) brings, in short, “out of/from given expressions – in a conclusion or inference of induction – the context of a whole, to understanding” (Das „Grundverhältnis“ des Ausdrucks zum Erlebnis, das in ihm ausgedrückt ist, bildet keinen Schluß von einer Wirkung auf eine Ursache, sondern es begründet Verstehen. Aber Verstehen bleibt auf dieser Ebene noch „elementar“, überdies kann der Ausdruck an sich unzuverlässig sein („Verstellung, Lüge, Täuschung“), es entstehen Widersprüche oder Unklarheiten, und die nunmehr erforderliche nähere „Prüfung“ führt zu einem „höheren“ Verstehen, welches sich nicht nur in Urteilen über Charakter und Fähigkeiten einzelner Menschen niederschlägt, sondern darüberhinaus Milieu und Umstände erfassen muß. Es bringt kurzum „aus gegebenen Äußerungen in einem Schluß der Induktion den Zusammenhang eines Ganzen zum Verständnis“)¹⁸¹. Only higher understanding lifts (i.e. abolishes or cancels), therefore, “the restriction, limitation or confinement of the experience as (or of) going through life of the individual”, and consequently puts aside the danger of turning one’s own experience as (or of) going through life into the yardstick and measure for the decipherment or decoding of alien (i.e. the Other’s or others’) experiences as (or of) going through life. In relation to that, we, as Dilthey

¹⁸¹ *Aufbau*, GS, VII, p. 200ff..

observed and remarked, (being) (all) the less justified, when by no means self-experience (i.e. personal experience as (or of) going through life; Selbsterfahrung) distinguishes itself and stands (clearly) out: “we do not even understand ourselves. To us ourselves, everything, in fact, is self-evident; on the other hand, we have for ourselves no yardstick and measure”¹⁸². That is why in the context of higher understanding “re-living (*or*: experiencing going through life again) (Nacherleben)” cannot simply mean that the I (ego) re-encounters or meets again in the Other, experiences as (or of) going through life, which he already knows from his own (personal) experience (Eigenerfahrung). It is a matter rather of an activation of possibilities, which in the real life of the I (ego) did not appear, and are opened for him only in his striving to understand the Other. A historical process or (series of) event(s) like the Reformation lies/is beyond all the daily possibilities of experience as (or of) going through life – “but I can re-live it (or experience it again as (or in respect of) going through life) (aber nacherleben kann ich ihn). I move or transfer myself into the circumstances”. Precisely because re-living (*or*: experiencing going through life again) (Nacherleben) is something more and something other (i.e. different) than a copy (Kopie) of my own experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life (Erleben), necessary or requisite for the (a) higher understanding is a “particular personal genius, ingenuity or brilliance” („besonderen persönlichen Genialität“), which, though, does not have to be (i.e. is not necessarily) lost in the “irrational” („Irrationalen“): it (i.e. this higher understanding) “becomes or turns into a technique” („wird zu einer Technik“)¹⁸³. This binding or tying of genius, ingenuity or brilliance to a technique is supposed to vouch for and guarantee that the understanding (cognitive) humanities (i.e. sciences of the spirit and intellect), being far from renouncing or abjuring rational thought, can achieve “the objectivity of scientific knowledge”. Understanding leads “from

¹⁸² Loc. cit., pp. 141ff., 347.

¹⁸³ Loc. cit., p. 214ff..

the narrowness and subjectivity of experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life” to the region “of the whole and of the general” or of “general truths”; it (understanding) demands and requires “for its completion (and perfection), systematic knowledge or knowing” (Diese Bindung der Genialität an eine Technik soll dafür bürgen, daß die verstehenden Geisteswissenschaften, weit davon entfernt, rationalem Denken abzuschwören, „die Objektivität der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis“ erzielen können. Verstehen führt „aus der Enge und Subjektivität des Erlebens“ in die Region „des Ganzen und des Allgemeinen“ bzw. der „allgemeinen Wahrheiten“ hinaus, es fordert „zu seiner Vollendung das systematische Wissen“) ¹⁸⁴.

Dilthey hints at and suggests, fleetingly or in passing, also the social-ontic background of understanding (den sozialontischen Hintergrund des Verstehens). This arises “first of all, in the interests of practical life”, in which people (humans) are dependent or reliant on one another, and everyone must know what the other (person) wants. In addition, we do not behave/act understandingly (i.e. with understanding) only vis-à-vis other (people), but also vis-à-vis ourselves ¹⁸⁵. This insight obviously applies to and is valid for all times, ages, epochs, eras and all cultures, diachronically and universally-historically (i.e. world-historically as regards the history of the universe (of mankind)). The greatest weakness of Dilthey’s argumentation regarding the prerequisites or preconditions of understanding consists in the un-reflected (i.e. lacking in reflection) to and fro, back and forth between the social-ontic level of the diachronic-universally historical (or world-historical), and, the social-historical level of each and every respective culture and society coming into question and being considered (Diese Einsicht gilt offenbar für alle Zeiten und Kulturen, diachronisch und universalgeschichtlich. Die große Schwäche von Diltheys

¹⁸⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 135, 143, 146.

¹⁸⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 200, 196.

Argumentation über die Voraussetzungen des Verstehens besteht im unreflektierten Hin und Her zwischen der sozialontischen Ebene des Diachronisch-Universalgeschichtlichen und der sozialhistorischen Ebene der jeweils in Frage kommenden Kultur und Gesellschaft). As Dilthey writes, understanding constitutes a “finding again of the I (ego) in the You” („Wiederfinden des Ich im Du“) – but on the common or joint foundation of the spirit-intellect objectified in supra-individual constructs through (the) participation in it (i.e. the objectified (in supra-individual constructs) spirit-intellect) on both sides (aber auf der gemeinsamen Grundlage des in überindividuellen Gebilden objektivierten Geistes und durch die beiderseitige Beteiligung an ihm). This founds and establishes the “(self-)sameness of the spirit-intellect in the I (ego), in the You, in every subject”, and this also founds and establishes the identity (as equating) of the subject of knowledge with its object (or subject matter), as well as the identity (as equating) of the object (or subject matter) with itself (i.e. the object) “at all tiers, levels, stages, degrees or grades of its objectification” (Diese begründet die „Selbigkeit des Geistes im Ich, im Du, in jedem Subjekt“, und diese begründet auch die Identität des Subjekts des Wissens mit seinem Gegenstand sowie die Identität des Gegenstandes mit sich selbst „auf allen Stufen seiner Objektivierung“)¹⁸⁶. In (regard to, or amongst) the objectifications of the spirit-intellect (Geistes), Dilthey now counts – without distinction – both every “community” („Gemeinschaft“) and “every system of culture” („jedes System der Kultur“), as well as the “totality of the spirit-intellect and of universal history” („Totalität des Geistes und der Universalgeschichte“). It is, nevertheless, evident that the spirit/intellect, which is – totally and universally-historically or world-historically, that is always and all over, everywhere – objectified, cannot coincide with that which experiences and undergoes its specific objectification

¹⁸⁶ Loc. cit., p. 191.

in every culture and every community (Es liegt indes auf der Hand, daß der Geist, der sich total und universalgeschichtlich, also immer und überall, objektiviert, nicht mit jenem zusammenfallen kann, der seine spezifische Objektivierung in jeder Kultur und jeder Gemeinschaft erfährt). The common denominator of both can only be a form-related (i.e. formal) one/common denominator, otherwise the former (total and universal-historical or world-historical, always and all over, everywhere objectification) would have to coincide in toto and in terms of content with the latter (specific objectification in every culture and every community), which in view of the great variety and multiformity of cultures and of the community (i.e. human associations) would be an absurdity: if the universal-historical or world-historical (i.e. universally applicable throughout all of human history) spirit-intellect was objectified (or objectified itself) in every culture and community in toto and in terms of content, then social and historical individuation would never have come about (Der gemeinsame Nenner der beiden kann nur ein formaler sein, sonst müßte der erstere in toto und inhaltlich mit dem letzteren zusammenfallen, was angesichts der Vielfalt der Kulturen und der Gemeinschaft eine Absurdität wäre: Objektivierte sich der universalgeschichtliche Geist in jeder Kultur und Gemeinschaft in toto und inhaltlich, so käme soziale und geschichtliche Individuation nie zustande). The identity of the spirit-intellect as such and in general, that is, in its generally valid and applicable form-related (i.e. formal) structure, can, therefore, only make up (or deliver) the necessary, not the sufficient condition of the “finding again of the I (ego) in the You”; it does not in the least vouch for or guarantee the understanding of content: the Eskimo is not in a position to understand the Zulu’s culture in terms of content, although he has social-ontically at his disposal the same equipment. If the universally-historically (i.e. as regards the whole historical universe of mankind), world-historically, or, social-ontically intended, meant, imagined, thought and conceived (of) identity of the spirit (or of “human nature” or whatever else)

were sufficient for understanding absolutely or per se and as such, then every understanding, even the most arbitrary, would be – in terms of content – correct, because every (understanding), even the most arbitrary, has as its basis, that identity (of the spirit-intellect as such and in general, that is, in its generally valid and applicable form-related (i.e. formal) structure). In general, Dilthey's explanations or observations regarding the presuppositions of understanding only preserve [[their]] coherence and meaning when one recognises in the mystifying talk of the “(self-)sameness” of the spirit being objectified or objectifying itself, the remaining-always-the-same, constant and invariable social-ontic formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), and at the same time, clearly separates this level of understanding from the content-related (level of understanding) – when one, in short, duly bears in mind the difference between (the) social-ontological and (the) social-historical way of looking at things (Die Identität des Geistes als solchem und überhaupt, also in seiner allgemeingültigen formalen Struktur kann also nur die notwendige, nicht die ausreichende Bedingung des „Wiederfindens des Ich im Du“ und des Verstehens abgeben, sie bürgt keineswegs für das Verstehen von Inhalten: Der Eskimo ist nicht imstande, die Kultur des Zulus inhaltlich zu verstehen, obwohl er sozialontisch über die gleiche Ausrüstung verfügt. Genügte die universalgeschichtlich bzw. sozialontisch gedachte Identität des Geistes (oder der „menschlichen Natur“ oder was auch immer) zum Verstehen schlechthin, so wäre jedes Verstehen, auch das willkürlichste, inhaltlich richtig, denn jedem, auch dem willkürlichsten, liegt jene Identität zugrunde. Überhaupt erhalten Diltheys Ausführungen über die Voraussetzungen des Verstehens erst dann Kohärenz und Sinn, wenn man in der mystifizierenden Rede von der „Selbigkeit“ des sich objektivierenden Geistes die gleichbleibenden sozialontischen Formalien wiedererkennt und zugleich diese Ebene des Verstehens von der inhaltlichen klar trennt – wenn man kurzum die Differenz

zwischen sozialontologischer und sozialhistorischer Betrachtung gehörig beachtet).

We can assume why Dilthey did not bear it (the said difference between social-ontological and social-historical consideration) in mind. The dividing line, which dominated his thought, was that between the natural sciences and the sciences of the intellect and spirit (i.e. the humanities), between (the) ontic heterogeneity of subject and object in the former (natural sciences), and, (the) ontic homogeneity of the subject and the object in the latter (humanities). Since what mattered was that this homogeneity was to be brought out and underlined as the precondition of understanding pertaining to the humanities with all possible emphasis, thus, the necessary differentiation between its (i.e. understanding pertaining to the humanities') social-ontic and its (i.e. understanding pertaining to the humanities') social-historical sense was not made as it should have been (and was thus done an injustice), especially as such a differentiation necessarily has a relativising effect and impact: it (i.e. the said differentiation with a relativising effect) shows that the homogeneity of (the) subject and (the) object in itself and in general cannot be a sufficient condition of and for understanding. Dilthey certainly inherited this weighty, serious and grave unclarity from historicism, which already made or turned the – resting and being based on the “essential uniformity” of all humans amongst one another (i.e. as between themselves) – “congeniality” between (the) subject and (the) object of social-scientific research into the real prerequisite and precondition of understanding pertaining to the humanities in contrast to natural-scientific explaining (i.e. explanation) (Wir können vermuten, warum Dilthey sie nicht beachtet hat. Die Trennungslinie, die sein Denken beherrschte, war jene zwischen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften, zwischen ontischer Heterogenität von Subjekt und Objekt bei den den ersteren und ontischer Homogenität von Subjekt und Objekt bei den letzteren. Da es galt, diese

Homogenität als Voraussetzung geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehens mit allem möglichen Nachdruck herauszustellen, so kam die nötige Differenzierung zwischen ihrem sozialontischen und ihrem sozialhistorischen Sinn zu kurz, zumal sich eine solche Differenzierung relativierend auswirken muß: Sie zeigt, daß die Homogenität von Subjekt und Objekt an sich und überhaupt keine ausreichende Bedingung des Verstehens sein kann. Dilthey erbt übrigens diese schwerwiegende Unklarheit vom Historismus, welcher schon die auf der „wesentlichen Gleichförmigkeit“ aller Menschen untereinander beruhende „Kongenialität“ zwischen Subjekt und Objekt sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung zur realen Voraussetzung geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehens im Gegensatz zum naturwissenschaftlichen Erklären machte)¹⁸⁷. Droysen questioned, just as little as Dilthey after him^{lii}, at which level – on each and every respective occasion – this “congeniality” („Kongenialität“) extends, and how it, on each and every respective occasion, is to (or should) be comprehended. But he (i.e. Droysen) was just as much as Dilthey far away from confusing the/this same (“congeniality”) with an identity (i.e. equating) of spirits, intellects and psyches constituted, composed and textured in such a way that methodical (or methodological) understanding could be replaced by effortless and at the same time absolutely accurate and perfectly or well-aimed intuition (dieselbe mit einer derart beschaffenen Identität der Geister und der Psychen zu verwechseln, daß sich methodisches Verstehen durch die mühelose und zugleich absolut treffsichere Intuition ersetzen ließe). Historical understanding is “just as much synthetic as analytical, just as much induction as deduction”, whereas “immediate and direct intuition” takes place only during the “understanding” of certain factual circumstances, which, though, clearly differs from the “logical mechanism of understanding”¹⁸⁸. The question of how [[the aforementioned]] congeniality [[between (the) subject and (the) object of

¹⁸⁷ Droysen, *Historik*, p. 328ff..

¹⁸⁸ Loc. cit., p. 329.

social-scientific research]] acts towards or relates with methodical or methodological reflection, was of interest, as is understandable, most of all with regard to the assessment of the function of one's own subjective experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life for the understanding (cognitive) apprehension of (the) other ((kinds of) experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life). Here Simmel created or established the necessary conceptual clarity, which highly probably did not miss its effect (i.e. did not miss out on having an effect) also on Dilthey's late explanations regarding the topic or matter/theme. The, in that case, – adopted and undertaken by Weber, and modified in terms of content – distinction between topical, current or relevant and explaining (i.e. explanatory) understanding¹⁸⁹ served Simmel first of all exactly in relation to that (in respect) of contrasting the possibility of a direct reproducing/reproduction of alien or foreign experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life in/during theoretical thought/intellectual content(s) with the impossibility of such (a reproducing) in and during all other acts of consciousness (Historisches Verstehen sei „ebenso synthetisch wie analytisch, ebenso Induktion wie Deduktion“, während „unmittelbare Intuition“ nur beim „Verständnis“ bestimmter Sachverhalte stattfindet, welches sich allerdings vom „logischen Mechanismus des Verstehens“ klar unterscheidet. Die Frage, wie sich Kongenialität zur methodischen Reflexion verhalte, interessierte verständlicherweise am meisten im Hinblick auf die Einschätzung der Funktion eigenen subjektiven Erlebens für die verstehende Erfassung des fremden. Hier schuf Simmel die nötige begriffliche Klarheit, die höchstwahrscheinlich auch auf Diltheys späte Ausführungen zum Thema ihre Wirkung nicht verfehlte. Die dann von Weber übernommene und inhaltlich modifizierte Unterscheidung zwischen aktuellem und erklärendem Verstehen diente Simmel zunächst eben dazu, die Möglichkeit eines direkten Nachbildens fremden Erlebens bei

¹⁸⁹ See footnote 174 above. For the description of this distinction Simmel later used the terms “objective/factual (sachliches)” and “historical (historisches)” understanding, *Wesen*, p. 18.

theoretischen Denkinhalten mit der Unmöglichkeit eines solchen bei allen anderen Bewußtseinsakten zu kontrastieren). Whereas during the understanding of the theorem or proposition $2 + 2 = 4$, the certainty, in practice, exists that the I (ego) can reproduce the acts of consciousness of the Other faithfully, in all other cases, in which the I (ego) moves and transfers itself (in)to [[the position of]] the Other, a “re-shaping, re-moulding or transformation” is carried out and takes place, whereby attention is not directed merely to the content of the (i.e. what has been) understood, but likewise or even principally to the fact that here it is a matter of acts of consciousness of another subject. Already because of that, the way to linear psychological projections is blocked, especially since alien experiences (as (or of) going through life) (i.e. the experience of others (as (or of) going through life) are typified (i.e. rendered into types or classified under typifying forms/ types) and are apprehended only via the agreement of one’s own with the alien (i.e. the Other’s or others’) type of experience (as (or of) going through life) at the level and in the manner of reflection. The understanding of a historical personality can be formed (and/or developed) so much the less as the projection of one’s own properties, qualities and characteristics or experiences (as (or of) going through life), as it requires and demands a “putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the entire/whole great diversity of an enormous system of forces”.^{liii} In order for Caesar to be understood (*or*: In order to understand Caesar), one does not, therefore, have to be Caesar – such “congeniality” could in fact vitiate, impair or reduce the sharpness, clarity and depth of understanding: because even if the I (ego) finds its own experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life with certainty in the Other, who guarantees that the I (ego) also *understands* itself away from or beyond all bias, prejudice and self-satisfaction, complacency or smugness (Während beim Verstehen des Satzes $2 + 2 = 4$ praktisch Gewißheit besteht, daß das Ich die Bewußtseinsakte des Anderen getreu nachbilden kann, vollzieht sich in allen anderen Fällen, in denen sich das Ich in den Anderen versetzt, eine

„Umformung“, wobei sich das Augenmerk nicht bloß auf den Inhalt des Verstandenen, sondern ebenso oder gar vornehmlich auf die Tatsache richtet, daß es sich hier um Bewußtseinsakte eines anderen Subjekts handelt. Schon deshalb ist geradlinigen psychologischen Projektionen der Weg versperrt, zumal fremde Erlebnisse in der Regel typisiert und nur über die Übereinstimmung des eigenen mit dem fremden Erlebnistyp auf der Ebene und in der Weise der Reflection erfaßt werden. Das verstehen einer historischen Persönlichkeit kann sich um so weniger als Projektion eigener Eigenschaften oder Erlebnisse herausbilden, wie es ein „Sichhineinversetzen in die ganze Mannigfaltigkeit eines ungeheuren Systems von Kräften“ erfordert. Um Cäsar zu verstehen, muß man also kein Cäsar sein – solche „Kongenialität“ dürfte sogar Schärfe und Tiefe des Verstehens beeinträchtigen: Denn selbst wenn das Ich im Anderen mit Sicherheit eigenes Erleben wiederfindet, wer garantiert, daß das Ich sich auch selber abseits aller Befangenheit und Selbstgefälligkeit *versteht*^{190?})

Simmel touched upon the social-ontic origin or provenance of social-scientific understanding, when he opined that the latter (social-scientific understanding) differs from daily (everyday) inter-subjective understanding only “gradually i.e. by degrees”, or “quantitatively”. He also pointed out that in the “reproduction” of alien (i.e. of others’) acts of consciousness, two conceptually separable from each other strata of one’s own acts of consciousness take part: the “natural forces and categories” as well as “the (f)actual experiences, which give these categories content”.¹⁹¹ Finally, he lent, gave or conferred upon understanding(, an) ontological status, by calling it an “original, primordial, primeval phenomenon”, “in which a relationship of man in respect of the world is expressed” (Simmel streifte die sozialontische Herkunft

¹⁹⁰ *Probleme*, p. 317ff; *Wesen*, p. 8ff.. It looks or seems to be puzzling that Collingwood wants to support the thesis: “in order to understand Caesar, one must be Caesar” against Simmel and Dilthey, with whom he actually largely agrees in the matter [[of understanding (others)]] (*Idea of History*, pp. 170ff., 172, 174, 297, 215). The puzzle or enigma has, though, its psychological explanation. When Collingwood, towards the end of the 1930s, wrote his book, his political-philosophical struggle against “German irrationalism” reached a high point.

¹⁹¹ *Probleme*, pp. 330ff., 325.

sozialwissenschaftlichen Verstehens, als er meinte, letzteres unterscheide sich vom alltäglichen intersubjektiven Verstehen nur „graduell“ oder „quantitativ“. Er wies auch darauf hin, daß in der „Nachbildung“ fremder Bewußtseinsakte zwei begrifflich voneinander trennbare Schichten eigener Bewußtseinsakte beteiligt sind: die „natürlichen Kräfte und Kategorien“ sowie „die tatsächlichen Erfahrungen, die diesen Kategorien den Inhalt geben“. Schließlich verlieh er dem Verstehen ontologischen Status, indem er es ein „Urphänomen“ nannte, „in dem sich ein Weltverhältnis des Menschen ausdrückt“¹⁹². Heidegger could pick up the thread of that in order to then, though, – in the framework and in the name of the/a “fundamental ontology” („Fundamentalontologie“) –, remove from the concept of understanding every concrete *social*-ontological content, which is its content par excellence (dem Begriff des Verstehens jeden konkrete *sozial*ontologischen Inhalt zu entziehen, der sein Inhalt par excellence ist). Thus, in Heidegger’s analysis of this concept (of understanding), the genetically and structurally solely fertile standpoint, namely, the social inter-subjective relation (die soziale intersubjektive Beziehung), does not play any role, but “understanding” means in him (i.e. in Heidegger’s thought regarding the concept (of understanding)) just as much as the capability of the being (t)here (or existence) at orientating itself in the world of subjects and objects (die Fähigkeit des Daseins, sich in der Welt der Subjekte und Objekte zu orientieren). Understanding makes up and constitutes the “view (or perspective)” of being (t)here (or existence) (die „Sicht“ des Daseins), through which (whereby) this (understanding) is capable of opening up and revealing both its own being in the world as well as its being-with with Others as the constitutive elements (or factors) of its (i.e. understanding’s) existence (sowohl sein eigenes Sein in der Welt als auch sein Mitsein mit Anderen als die konstitutiven Momente seiner Existenz)¹⁹³. For the character of “understanding”

¹⁹² *Wesen*, p. 29.

¹⁹³ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 146.

it is not here, therefore, decisive whether the understanding (cognitive) being (t)here (or existence) stands across from or faces another being (t)here (existence) or natural things (den natürlichen Dingen). Heidegger in fact writes that “understanding”, in his sense, is more original or primordial than “understanding” in the sense in which it is assumed and accepted within the epistemological contradistinction between “explaining or accounting for” and “understanding” („Erklären“ und „Verstehen“)¹⁹⁴: but this contradistinction rested and was based precisely on the difference between man and all other beings (Wesen) in the world. From the equating of understanding with the general capability at orientation of the being (t)here (or existence), its (i.e. understanding’s) “project character (*or*: character in respect of (a) project (draft, outline, plan or blueprint))” (seine „Entwurfscharakter“), in which “the manner or kind of being of the being (t)here (or existence) as being able to be” („Seinsart des Daseins als Sein-können“) is seen. As (the) being-seen of this being-able-to-be, and as (the/a) project (draft, outline, plan or blueprint), understanding again is “pushed through and imposed completely and totally by possibility”, that is – expressed in the language of temporality – (understanding is) “primarily in the future or future-related” (Als sich Zeigen dieses Seinkönnens und als Entwurf ist Verstehen wiederum „ganz und gar von Möglichkeit durchsetzt“, also – in der Sprache der Zeitlichkeit ausgedrückt – „primär zukünftig“)¹⁹⁵. In (a) purely conceptual and terminological respect, this considerable content-related widening and extension of “understanding” would probably bring about confusion rather than clarity. In regard to this point or matter, fairly little is won or gained. Because Heidegger’s bringing, carving and working out of the – directed towards the future – project character (*or*: character in respect of (a) project (draft, outline, plan or blueprint)) (in respect) of understanding basically constitutes merely quite a long-winded and awkward

¹⁹⁴ Loc. cit., p. 143.

¹⁹⁵ Loc. cit., p. 145, 146, 337.

paraphrasing or re-description of that which one already knew since long ago from historical, Marxist(ic) and pragmatist(ic) approaches regarding the genetic and structural primacy of the praxis of a subject, which is compelled and forced into constant orientation and re-orientation in the world, vis-à-vis every “explaining” or “understanding” in the narrow theoretical sense. Typically enough, Heidegger – precisely in the framework of his thoughts and considerations regarding understanding – fires at (i.e. attacks) the priority or primacy of pure looking-at[[-things]] (des puren Anschauens), and opines that looking-at[[-things]] and thinking (thought; Denken) are “both already distant and remote derivatives of understanding”¹⁹⁶. That may be [[so]], but the question is *how* looking-at[[-things]] and thinking/thought have sprung from understanding, and *how* understanding must be understood so that this derivation can at all be understandable. Here the answer should or ought to be clear: only understanding in the *social*-ontological sense of mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives could, through its reflectivity, which must be intensified in the intersubjective relation, enable and qualify (man) for higher achievements in language and thought (*or*: higher linguistic and intellectual performances and accomplishments) (zu höheren Sprach- und Denkleistungen befähigen). Instead of taking and going down this path, Heidegger, for whom the specifically *social*-ontological setting, posing or formulation of the question or examination of the problem and its implications remains alien, foreign and strange, explicates the interpretation (that is, the “education, training and development of understanding” („Ausbildung des Verstehens“)), on the one hand, in (regard to) the mute and silent “being available” („Zuhandenen“); on the other hand, in (regard to) (the) “historical interpretation” („historischen Auslegung“). Precisely the interpretation of the being (t)here (or existence) by the being (t)here (or existence) against the

¹⁹⁶ Loc. cit., p. 147.

background of the spectrum of the social relation, and by the effect or result of its (i.e. the social relation's) mechanism, does not come into consideration and is not examined.^{liv} But precisely this latter (mechanism of the social relation) sets things in motion and or pulls the strings both in the interpretation of being-available (bei der Auslegung des Zuhandenen), as well as in historical interpretation. How a piece of furniture, a tool or a device, instrument or apparatus is to be interpreted, social relations (soziale Beziehungen) decide about that or about the circumstances of its/their invention, fabrication and use, which is founded on the interpretation of the being (t)here (or existence) by the being (t)here (or existence), that is, they imply the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and mutual and reciprocal expectations, whether now primordial, primitive man swings the/his club against primordial, primitive man, whether the refined use of knife and fork is supposed to signal and be indicative of social distinctions, or whether tractors cultivate the soil. The same applies to, and is valid for, – and indeed fortiori (i.e. more strongly) –, historical interpretation (die historische Auslegung). It is a tautology, to describe or outline the hermeneutic circle as a dependence of interpretation on the “location, position or site of the observer” („Standort des Betrachters“) and/or else as an “expression of the existential pre-structure of being (t)here (or existence) itself” („Ausdruck der existenzialen Vorstruktur des Daseins selbst“)¹⁹⁷. The interpreting (interpretive) being (t)here (or existence) is pre-structured and/or else it structures its interpretation by several friendly or inimical positionings or stances towards other (positionings and stances), already existing or, for its part, interpretations simultaneously coming into being, whose every (interpretation) is borne and carried by another concrete being (t)here (or existence), which interprets the alien or foreign being (t)here (or existence) (Das auslegende Dasein wird vorstrukturiert bzw. es strukturiert

¹⁹⁷ Loc cit., pp. 148ff., 153.

seine Auslegung durch mehrere freundliche oder feindliche Stellungnahmen zu anderen, bereits vorhandenen oder seinerseits gleichzeitig entstehenden Auslegungen, deren jede von einem konkreten Dasein getragen wird, welches fremdes Dasein auslegt). The interpretation of alien being (t)here (or existence) as a bearer of interpretations belongs constitutively to the formation and development of one's own interpretations about the (i.e. what is) historical (über Historisches) – and *thereon* is the hermeneutic circle founded (und *darin* gründet der hermeneutische Zirkel). Allusions to the result and effect of tradition and to the “pre-understanding”¹⁹⁸ stamped by tradition are – precisely as the talk of the “existential pre-structure of being (t)here (or existence)” – abstractions, which cut out the *social*-ontological backgrounds or backdrops of understanding. Tradition stamps (shapes or moulds) the “pre-understanding” (read: the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) only, in so far as present-day people are interpreted in such a way, and accordingly, related to one another, that in the eyes of each and every respective Other, they appear as bearers of a certain content, namely of “tradition”, or of a certain interpretation of the same (tradition) (Hinweise auf die Wirkung der Tradition und auf das durch Tradition geprägte „Vorverständnis“ sind – genauso wie die Rede von der „existentialen Vorstruktur des Daseins“ – Abstraktionen, welche die *sozial*ontologischen Hintergründe des Verstehens ausblenden. Tradition prägt das „Vorverständnis“ (lies: die Perspektive der Perspektivenübernahme) nur, insofern sich gegenwärtige Menschen derart auslegen und dementsprechend aufeinander beziehen, daß sie in den Augen der jeweils Anderen als Träger eines bestimmten Inhalts, nämlich der „Tradition“ bzw. einer bestimmten Interpretation derselben erscheinen). This ought not/is not supposed to mean that tradition is necessarily pure fiction (pure Fiktion) or that it (i.e. tradition) can be conjured up in accordance with (one's) sheer will

¹⁹⁸ Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, pp. 250ff., 261ff..

out of nothing. It also does not mean that traditions do not contain unreflected pieces of self-evidence (*or*: not-reflected-upon self-evident elements) (unreflektierten Selbstverständlichkeiten). However, the ad hoc invention of traditions constitutes also a fact – and indeed an age-old or ancient (fact) –, whereas the traditional pieces of self-evidence (or self-evident elements), for their part, are normally subject to topical, current or relevant purposeful and expedient interpretations, and to more or less strict supervision. In this respect, tradition represents and constitutes that product of interpretation, which in accordance with the – on each and every respective occasion – ruling or dominant interpretation of certain subjects, which interpret the traditional contents, *and*, at the same time, the present-day positioning of other subjects towards these (traditional contents), has to be regarded as the precondition or prerequisite of interpretation. How much tradition is the function of the mutual or reciprocal interpretation of contemporary people is seen in the most direct manner (then) when it (tradition) directly, and in terms of content, becomes the topic, subject matter or theme, when, therefore, (the) friends and foes of (thus, and not otherwise interpreted) “tradition” clash with one another. Also, this phenomenon, incidentally, is age-old and ancient – already in the archaic high cultures one constantly raised complaints owing to the contempt, disdain and scorn for traditional customs and conventional morals and manners or ways of thinking – and one overlooks its significance and meaning because one is caught up in and labours under the schema (in respect) of the contradistinction: “community vs. society”, which suggests the impression that only during the transition from (the) socially and intellectually-spiritually immobile agrarian society to (the) all-round mobile industrial society, a break has taken place in the matter (of) “tradition”. The problematic character of tradition is likewise so old as tradition itself (more precisely: as the invocation of it (tradition)), and it stems from the primacy and priority of factors permanently having a social-ontological effect – the unceasing interpretation of the being (t)here (or

existence) by the being (t)here (or existence) against the background and backdrop of the social relation, and under the effect of its mechanism – vis-à-vis every institutional or habitual crystallisation, which is sociologically or historically apprehensible (gegenüber jeder institutionellen oder gewohnheitsmäßigen Kristallisierung, die soziologisch oder historisch erfaßbar ist).

E. Communication (Kommunikation)

a. Preliminary remark (observation, comment): (the) boom and ambiguity (or multiple meanings) of the concept (Vorbemerkung: Hochkonjunktur und Mehrdeutigkeit des Begriffes)

In accordance with the research programme of this chapter, the concept of communication (der Kommunikationsbegriff) must be illuminated here in its connection with the phenomenon of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which, for its part, refers to the specific character of human subjectivity (in seiner Verbindung mit dem Phänomen der Perspektivenübernahme beleuchtet werden, das seinerseits auf den spezifischen Charakter menschlicher Subjektivität verweist). For the/our introduction some conceptual differentiation seems essential, since the inflationary (i.e. expanding or increasing) usage/use of the concept of communication in recent decades has as the/a consequence its (i.e. the concept of communication's) ambiguity (and multiple meanings). The reasons for the new lustre, sparkle, splendour, glow, glory or shine of the concept of communication takes root deeply in mass-democratic reality and (in) the predominant and prevailing in it (i.e. in mass democracy) thought/intellectual models (wurzeln tief in der

massendemokratischen Wirklichkeit und den in ihr vorherrschenden Denkmodellen). They (i.e. such predominant mass-democratic thought models) were (have been) already discussed¹⁹⁹; the reminding and recollection of them interrelates, nonetheless, not immaterially and not inessentially (i.e. interrelates materially and essentially) with the conceptual differentiation which we want to make and carry out. Since the source from which the concept of communication flows in contemporary discourse was double, dual or twin, thus its usage/use was channelled chiefly in two directions. The question how human subjectivity, especially in the form or shape of the Other, is to (or ought to) be comprehended, came into contact with the concept of communication inside of approaches which directly or indirectly refer to phenomenological or dialogical theories of communication, and were characterised by their ethical impulse (die sich direkt oder indirekt auf phänomenologische oder dialogische Kommunikationstheorien bezogen und durch ihren ethischen Impuls gekennzeichnet waren). On the other hand, (the) cybernetically inspired systems theories (die kybernetisch inspirierten Systemtheorien), which in (a) systematic respect, put absolutely first the concept of communication, pursued declaredly the aim of driving away, ousting and expelling the classical examination of the problem of subjectivity and of action from the field or area of social theory (die klassische Problematik der Subjektivität und des Handelns aus dem Gebiet der Sozialtheorie zu vertreiben). This was thought and conceived of or imagined as (the) radical final reckoning with subject philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of the subject) and of anthropology in accordance with the logic of the mass-democratic thought figure (Dies war als radikale Endabrechnung mit der Subjektphilosophie und der Anthropologie gemäß der Logik der massendemokratischen Denkfigur gedacht). The talk of acting, the act and action (Handlung und Handeln) henceforth serves primarily in relation to that,

¹⁹⁹ See Ch. I., Sec. 2, above.

to play man as protean actor against man as invariable and immutable substance, in order to then break up and dissolve – in a further step – acting, the act or action itself in a processing and working on, of signs and symbols (den Menschen als proteischen Akteur gegen den Menschen als unveränderliche Substanz auszuspielen, um dann in einem weiteren Schritt die Handlung selbst in eine Bearbeitung von Zeichen aufzulösen)²⁰⁰. The manner in which the social-theoretical primacy of communication was gained before [[and over]] acting, the act and action, was based, of course, merely on conceptual decisionism or else on a conceptual artifice, trick or contrivance (Die Art und Weise, auf die der sozialtheoretische Primat der Kommunikation vor der Handlung und dem Handeln gewonnen wurde, beruhte freilich bloß auf begrifflichen Deziisionismus bzw. einem begrifflichen Kunstgriff). Because one shortened, curtailed or reduced action – quite behaviouristically – to external(ly) observable orders, courses or sequences of events, and thereupon, it was an easy thing for communication to be declared an extensive, comprehensive and fundamental concept.^{lv} This should in fact, according to its definition, encompass not only information, (the) communication (as notification and transmission) of information and (the) understanding of the (such) communication or notification, but also the – connected with these three [[elements, dimensions or factors]] – selections, that is, it encompasses in contrast to acting and the act, next to the observable communication and notification many more unobservable [[elements, dimensions or factors]] (Diese soll ja definitionsgemäß nicht nur Information, Mitteilung der Information und Verstehen der Mitteilung, sondern auch die mit diesen drei verbundenen Selektionen umfassen, sie umfaßt also im Gegensatz zur Handlung neben der beobachtbaren Mitteilung viel mehr Unbeobachtbares)²⁰¹. Areas, which earlier

²⁰⁰ See e.g. Warriner, *Emergence*, chap. 1, and p. 72: “Action takes place in a sign situation in which there are a wide variety of signs. The action therefore [!] is a product of the processing of the various signs and their meanings in relation to each other”.

²⁰¹ Luhmann, *Soz. Systeme*, p. 225ff..

were attributed to acting, action and the act (Handlung), thereunder, i.e. amongst them, also the intellectual(-spiritual) acts of giving meaning, choosing and understanding (Akte des Sinngebens, Wählens und Verstehens), are now therefore, without much ado and without wasting any time, classed with and assigned to communication (Kommunikation), and the concept of acting, action and the act is literally constricted up to [[the point of and within]] meaninglessness (und der Handlungsbegriff buchstäblich bis zur Sinnlosigkeit eingeengt). If, nonetheless, action and acting or the act did not have exactly those invisible components, which (the) traditional theory in the narrowest alliance with every social experience ascribes to them, if, therefore, meaning, goal (end), the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives etc. do not constitutively belong to their (i.e. action, acting's and the act's) essence, and they constituted a mere epiphenomenon "on the basis of the fundamental becoming or series of events of communication", thus they would hardly be in a position to bring about and cause that which even must be ascribed by systems theoreticians, and even if only indirectly, to their (i.e. action, acting's and the act's) effect: the making asymmetrical of communication through the insertion and incorporation of an understanding of acting, the act or action in the communicative becoming or series of events (Hätten dennoch Handeln und Handlung nicht eben jene unsichtbaren Komponenten, die ihnen die traditionelle Theorie im engsten Bündnis mit jeder sozialen Erfahrung zuschreibt, gehörten also Sinn, Zweck, Perspektivenübernahme etc. nicht konstitutiv zu ihrem Wesen, bildeten sie ein bloßes Epiphänomen „auf der Basis des Grundgeschehens Kommunikation“, so wären sie kaum imstande, das herbeizuführen, was auch von Systemtheoretikern, und sei es nur indirekt, ihrer Wirkung zugeschrieben werden muß: die Asymmetrisierung der Kommunikation durch Einbau eines Handlungsverständnisses in das

kommunikative Geschehen)²⁰². The objective yield, return, fruits or profit from the reversal or inversion of the social-theoretical priorities consequently remains unclear and can also basically be asserted merely by invoking the general superiority of the system-theoretical paradigm (i.e. the paradigm pertaining to systems theory) – that is a typical circle of argumentation (i.e. typically circular argumentation). Otherwise, either plausible banalities are summoned (neither communication nor action would have been capable of evolution independently of each other), or easily reversible statements or propositions, like e.g. that, the social system, which is constituted as (a) system of acting, the act or action, must presuppose the communicative context of action, or that, communicative carrying on and continuing presupposes the communicative value of acting, the act or action (Der sachliche Ertrag aus der Umkehrung der sozialtheoretischen Prioritäten bleibt somit unklar und kann auch im Grunde bloß unter Berufung auf die allgemeine Überlegenheit des systemtheoretischen Paradigmas behauptet werden – ein typischer Argumentationskreis also. Ansonsten werden entweder plausible Banalitäten (weder Kommunikation noch Handeln wären unabhängig voneinander evolutionsfähig gewesen) oder leicht umkehrbare Aussagen angeboten, wie z. B. die, das soziale System, welches sich als Handlungssystem konstituiere, müsse den kommunikativen Kontext des Handelns voraussetzen, oder die, kommunikatives Weitermachen setze den Kommunikationswert von Handlungen voraus)²⁰³. However, it can be said with just as good grounds (i.e. just as justifiably), that acts of communication objectively and subjectively presuppose the existence of acting men, or they (the said acts of communication) would sooner or later become value-less, i.e. worthless (or without value), if they were fully missing and lacking or deprived of the(ir) specific value (in respect) of acting, the act and action (Es läßt sich aber mit ebensoguten Gründen sagen, Kommunikationsakte setzen objektiv und

²⁰² Loc. cit., p. 227.

²⁰³ Loc. cit., pp. 240, 233.

subjektiv das Vorhadensein von handelnden Menschen voraus oder sie würden früher oder später wertlos, wenn sie des spezifischen Handlungswertes vollends entbehrten). That would even in fact apply if one wanted to reduce the acting, action and the act to their external/outer course; because precisely this creates – in a real, actual and true sense – the absolute, accomplished, consummate and irrevocable facts, which in the eyes of actors, as is known, counts so much that these (actors) often gear their wishes and endeavours, – under/with conscious disregard of, or disdain for, all inner components of acting, action and the act, or, communication – exclusively to them (i.e. the aforesaid absolute and irrevocable facts)^{lvi}. Communicative effects or actions – no matter how broadly (i.e. how much) one grasps them – can incomparably more easily be abolished, reversed, canceled or made up for than real acts or actions – [[and]] one may grasp them (such real acts or actions) as narrowly as one wants. The hard core or nucleus of acting remains socially the ultima ratio (i.e. the final reason, argument, reckoning, account or last resort), irrespective of how the ratio (Reason) of social theoreticians thinks about that. Since systems theory compensated the conceptual narrowing of action through (or with) the conceptual widening of “communication”, it could, by virtue of this conceptual decisionism, refuse to tolerate a limine the obvious objections, which assume a different and indeed narrower concept of communication, like e.g. that, which says and means that the logic of exchange and understanding of (pieces of) information via messages, notifications and announcements is subject to the logic of the social relation of acting humans, and not the other way around (Kommunikative Wirkungen – egal, wie weit man sie faßt – lassen sich unvergleichlich leichter aufheben oder wiedergutmachen als reale Handlungen – man mag sie so eng fassen, wie man will. Der harte Kern der Handlung bleibt sozial die ultima ratio, gleichgültig, wie die Ratio der Sozialtheoretiker darüber denkt. Da die Systemtheorie die begriffliche Einengung des Handelns durch die begriffliche Erweiterung der „Kommunikation“ kompensierte, konnte sie sich

vermöge dieses begrifflichen Dezisionismus a limine naheliegende Einwände verbitten, die einen anderen und zwar engeren Kommunikationsbegriff unterstellen, wie z. B. den, der besagt, die Logik des Austausches und Verstehens von Informationen über Mitteilungen sei der Logik der sozialen Beziehung handelnder Menschen unterworfen und nicht umgekehrt)^{lvii}. It (Systems theory) could have also avoided difficulties which someone necessarily runs into, who indeed wants to found the social process on communication, but who has not sufficiently and adequately freed himself from the straitjacket of the behaviouristic way of looking at things²⁰⁴. But this conceptual widening and flexibilisation of communication occurs around (i.e. by paying) the unavoidable price, at every turn, of brushing against and touching upon factors and given (actual) facts which point to acts, actions and the plans or designs (in respect) of the acting (*or*: of the action plans) of concrete actors (Sie konnte auch Schwierigkeiten vermeiden, auf die jemand stoßen muß, der zwar den sozialen Prozeß auf Kommunikation gründen will, dieselbe aber aus der Zwangsjacke einer behavioristischen Betrachtung nicht ausreichend befreit hat. Aber diese begriffliche Erweiterung und Flexibilisierung der Kommunikation erfolgt um den unvermeidlichen Preis, auf Schritt und Tritt Faktoren und Gegebenheiten zu streifen, die auf Handlungen und Handlungsentwürfe konkreter Akteure hindeuten). If, for instance, the understanding of a message, notification or announcement also belongs to communication, then [[one]] must – during each and every respective message, notification or announcement – be able to distinguish between its (i.e. the message’s or the notification’s or the announcement’s) nominal and its real value (in respect) of acting, action and the/an act. Both values indeed often coincide; they do not, however have to, and then understanding leads one astray, unless it is extended and concerns and applies to – through the

²⁰⁴ On (As regards) Mead’s difficulties concerning this, see Zaner, “Theory”, p. 76ff.

assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and through the assessment of the concrete situation (and position) – the motives, ends, goals and plans of acting (or action plans) of the Other requiring interpretation (und durch Einschätzung der konkreten Lage auf die interpretationsbedürftigen Motive, Zwecke und Handlungspläne des Anderen). Understanding is here, therefore, to be performed, achieved and accomplished not from the communication (Kommunikation), but from the action (Handeln). The same content (in respect) of the message, notification or announcement can serve different ends and goals of acting, action and the act, and the same goals and ends of acting, action and the act can make use of different contents (in respect) of the message, notification or announcement. And this possible or potential asymmetry between content of the message, notification or announcement and the goal and end of acting, action and the act constitutes a strong indication or sign of the (f)actual primacy of action (den faktischen Primat des Handelns), as everyone knows^{lviii}. Because everyone seeks the unraveling or decipherment of the former (content of the message etc.) with the help or on the basis of the latter (the goal of the acting etc.); no-one is content with messages, notifications or announcements when real, even incomprehensible, acts or actions flagrantly contradict them (niemand gibt sich mit Mitteilungen zufrieden, wenn reale, selbst unverständliche Handlungen ihnen flagrant widersprechen).

If we disregard, from the beginning, the above-mentioned reasons, talk of communication in the mass-democratic context gained popularity because it gave sustenance and nourishment to the pious wish that the shifting and displacement of action at (or to) the level of communication would allow reducing real conflicts to communicative (kinds of) disfunction(s), and eliminating (such real conflicts) with – likewise and at the same time – communicative and “rational” means (weil sie dem frommen Wunsch Nahrung gab, die Verschiebung des Handelns auf die Kommunikationsebene würde es

gestatten, reale Konflikte auf kommunikative Disfunktionen zurückzuführen und mit gleichfalls kommunikativen und „vernünftigen“ Mitteln aus der Welt zu schaffen)²⁰⁵. Despite the converging favourable conditions, objective, factual obstacles and hindrances, which we just indicated, however, stand in the way of that shifting and displacement^{lix}. And since the concept of acting, action and the act could not be eradicated from social theory, it came to (*or*: there were) between it (the concept of acting (action and the act)) and the concept of communication, various terminological and content-related combinations, whereby the extent, range or scope of both (i.e. the concept of acting and the concept of communication) was enlarged and increased, or reduced and decreased, symmetrically, albeit in, on each and every respective occasion, (a) reverse(d) relationship. That is why the definitions of communication swung, oscillated and fluctuated between communication as (a) one-sided process, in and during which the transmission of a (piece of) information or of a sign (signal or symbol) by the communicator to the recipient takes place, and, communication as a two-sided process, which in the extreme case is equated absolutely (or par excellence) with interaction (Die Definitionen der Kommunikation pendelten daher zwischen der Kommunikation als einseitigem Prozeß, bei dem die Transmission einer Information bzw. eines Zeichens vom Kommunikator zum Rezipienten stattfindet, und der Kommunikation als zweiseitigem Prozeß, der im Extremfall mit der Interaktion schlechthin gleichgesetzt wird)²⁰⁶. The first definition reminds [[us]] directly of the origin or provenance of that language, which via cybernetics and informatics, that is, out of/from isolatable technical processes, penetrated (and or forced its way into) the description of intersubjective phenomena. The absolute identification (i.e.

²⁰⁵ See e.g. the characteristic formulation in Duncan, *Symbols*, p. 130: “Disrelationships are not reflected in communication; they originate in communication... It is not differences of status, rank, sex, age, class or condition that create pathological states in society (as well as in individuals), but a lack of symbols we might use to express differences yet subordinate them to some great social principle of order”. But why are precisely *these* symbols lacking? [[Translator’s addition (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): AAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!]]

²⁰⁶ See the useful classification of the definition of communication in Merten, *Kommunikation*, Part I.

equating) of communication and interaction, i.e. in intersubjective action, reduces again the whole to a terminological matter of concern without theoretical importance and significance, although the feeling for and sense of language is reluctant (or hates) to hear that the murderer and the murdered “communicated” with each other. However, the widening (extension or expansion) of the concept of communication made (or came to) – via its technical-formal (i.e. technical and form-related) meaning –, as a rule, a stop precisely before such cases; it (the said widening of the concept of communication) was executed and carried out, therefore, through the one-sided inclusion or incorporation of the *inner (internal)* mechanism of the social relation in the process of communication or, turned (i.e. put or said) otherwise (and on the other hand), through the connection of the transmission of signs (signals or symbols), and, of expressive acts, with the – on both sides – act of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. According to that, interpersonal communication (interpersonale Kommunikation) consists of three components: an expressive act (einem expressiven Akt), the perception (Perzeption) of the/this same (expressive act) by the Other, and the perception of the I (ego)(,) that an expressive act was perceived(,) so that the – as of now – acts of the Other become perceived as answers to the latter (expressive act). The system of communication is manufactured, created, produced, fabricated or restored by the mutual and reciprocal knowledge that every partner in (respect) (of) communication has entered into the field of perception of the each and every respective other (partner in communication)²⁰⁷. To the extent that communication is supposed to mean something more than the mere exchange of information, of interest in it (i.e. communication) is not the semantic, but the pragmatic aspect, i.e. its effect on behaviour (ihre Wirkung auf das Verhalten), so that behaviour in the sense of observable interactions (or mutual influences)

²⁰⁷ Ruesch-Bateson, *Communication*, pp. 15, 23.

(interplay(s), alternating (changing) effects) (Wechselwirkungen) and communication may be considered synonymous (i.e. as having the same or equal meaning)²⁰⁸. When one, pushed by the logic of the matter, case, cause or thing, – and matter (etc.) here means the dynamic social relation of acting subjects –, arrives at this point, then one must pose the question or set the problem of communication against a concrete background, and (must) at least indicate that it, in the course of this, is a matter of the communicants “defining” “the nature of their relation” („die Natur ihrer Beziehung“ zu „definieren“) ²⁰⁹. Consequently, our above(-mentioned) thoughts and considerations on the social-ontological status of the hard core/nucleus of action are confirmed. Because a definition of the social relation, which neither directly nor indirectly says and signifies something about the weight and gravity of registered (i.e. recorded) or supposed concrete acts and actions, during the past or future shaping, moulding or forming of the relation concerned, lacks (a) subjective sense/meaning and practical interest. It represents and constitutes only during fleeting, or, in any case, not vital and not capable-of-development encounters, a more or less static inventory of stable signs (signals or symbols), which, as it were, exist of their own accord, and are exchanged with no consideration for what stands/is “behind” them. In such cases, expressive acts and acts in general are, in actual fact, fused with one another. Yet this is merely a socially indispensable economical (i.e. not wasteful, and sparing) course (process, progression or sequence) (ein sozial unentbehrlicher ökonomischer Vorgang), which presupposes a possible, probable or closed process of several (of one’s own and alien or others’) acts and actions, and consequently points to concrete plans in the spectrum of the social relation (auf konkrete Pläne im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung). Human acts are naturally, for the most part (and usually), symbolically and expressively loaded or charged, but for the dividing line to be

²⁰⁸ Watzlawick, *Kommunikation*, p. 22ff., 50ff..

²⁰⁹ Loc. cit., p. 116.

blurred between such acts which have an effect through their expressive-symbolic aspect, and such (acts) which do not do this (i.e. have an effect through their expressive-symbolic aspect), is [[something]] tantamount to a breaking up or dissolution of social processes into signs (signals or symbols), and thus (is tantamount [[also]]) to a playing down or minimisation of these same (social processes) (Natürlich sind menschliche Akte meistens symbolisch und expressiv geladen, aber die Trennungslinie zu verwischen zwischen solchen Akten, die durch ihren expressiv-symbolischen Aspekt wirken, und solchen, die dies nicht tun, kommt einer Auflösung sozialer Vorgänge in Zeichen und somit einer Verharmlosung derselben gleich). Precisely this, of course, is quite often pursued and aimed at. The sober analytical way of looking at things does well, in relation to that, by not letting itself be carried away by the dominant vocabulary together with its technical or ethical connotations, however – bearing in mind the isomorphisms (i.e. similarities in form, but differences in content) and equivalences between communicative processes and those which concern the distribution of social influence and social power²¹⁰ – by defining communication as the “medium of social interaction”, whose shape and form is determined by the level at which interaction takes place, i.e. the level of sensorial perception, of feelings and of emotions or of ideas and of symbols²¹¹. Regarding this containment and limitation of the concept of communication, which its precise social-theoretical usage can only be beneficial, one feels encouraged by the fact that only through the usurpation of much older theoretical achievements and accomplishments of sociological and phenomenological theory of acting (action or the act) could one lay claim to (a)

²¹⁰ See e.g. King, *Communication*, esp. p. 14.

²¹¹ I borrow this definition from the since long ago forgotten sociological work: Park-Burgess, *Introduction*, p. 341 ff.. [[Translator’s note (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): the fact that the book in question was published in 1921 says a heck of a lot, as the transition was then starting to be slowly, but surely, made to language-communication-based ideologies and attendant Lobotimisation/Brain Washing based on mass Konsum and Hedonismus (Exotismus, Toleranz, Pluralismus, Drugs etc.) within the context of ZIO-USA Hegemony, which really got going from the 1960s and 1970s etc.. In other words, there was still room in the 1920s up to the 1970s for real sociology to take place until the Retarded Joos and their Allies totally GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY took over ...]]

higher theoretical status. It's (i.e. the concept of communication's) confinement and limitation might, therefore, be comprehended also as (an) act of justice pertaining to the history of ideas, apart from being comprehended as an objective necessity (Die nüchterne analytische Betrachtung tut gut daran, sich nicht vom herrschenden Vokabular samt seinen technischen oder ethischen Konnotationen hinreißen zu lassen, sondern – eingedenk der Isomorphien oder Äquivalenzen zwischen kommunikativen Vorgängen und jenen, die die Verteilung sozialen Einflusses und sozialer Macht betreffen – Kommunikation als das „Medium der sozialen Interaktion“ zu definieren, dessen Gestalt durch die Ebene bedingt wird, auf welcher Interaktion stattfindet, d. h. die Ebene der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung, der Gefühle und der Emotionen oder der Ideen und der Symbole. Zu dieser Eingrenzung des Kommunikationsbegriffes, die seinem präzisen sozialtheoretischen Gebrauch nur förderlich sein kann, darf man sich durch die Tatsache ermutigt fühlen, daß er erst durch die Usurpation von viel älteren theoretischen Leistungen der soziologischen und phänomenologischen Handlungstheorie höheren theoretischen Status beanspruchen konnte. Seine Eingrenzung durfte somit außer als sachliche Notwendigkeit auch als Akt geistesgeschichtlicher Gerechtigkeit aufgefaßt werden).

b. The Other as subject and as object or as end/goal and as means (Der Andere als Subject und als Objekt oder als Zweck und als Mittel)

That (or: The fact that) “communication” as (a) buzzword (vogue word, in-word or word in fashion) symbolically crystallises the deeper matters of concern of the zeitgeist (i.e. spirit of the times), many a time (many times) was put on or applied (displayed and exhibited) as (a) shield or label for contents of (an) older and heterogenous origin, is seen/evident not only in systems theories, whose inspiration (was) cybernetics and informatics (information technology) (were, stood). Even the ethical-normativistic theory of communication (or

communication theory) led (conveyed, guided or steered), at least in part, its content-related theses – despite (the) influence by (means/way of) the linguistic turn – away from older approaches, which had been articulated in the area of phenomenological and dialogical thoughts and considerations on the nature of intersubjectivity (Daß die Kommunikation als Modewort, das tiefere Anliegen des Zeitgeistes symbolisch kristallisiert, vielfach Inhalten älteren und heterogenen Ursprungs als Schild aufgelegt wurde, zeigt sich nicht nur an Systemtheorien, denen Kybernetik und Informatik Pate standen. Auch die ethisch-normativistische Kommunikationstheorie leitete wenigstens zum Teil ihre inhaltlichen Thesen trotz Beeinflussung durch die linguistische Wende aus älteren Ansätzen her, die sich im Umkreis phänomenologischer und dialogischer Überlegungen zur Natur der Intersubjektivität artikuliert hatten).

The great common denominator between this theory of communication (communication theory) and its phenomenological-dialogical precursors, forerunners and predecessors exists in the conviction that the Other as human subject is an end-in-himself (end-in-itself) (der Andere sei als menschliches Subjekt Selbstzweck), and should under no circumstances be looked at or used as (a) means for the achievement of other ends and goals.^{lx} What is socially set up, invested or laid out/down in intersubjectivity comes into its own only (there) where it becomes acted upon in accordance with this conviction that ethical action constitutes, that is, basically, action according to the real, actual nature and logic of the ontically (der eigentlichen Natur und Logik der ontisch) “genuine (true, authentic, real; echten)” social relation. On the other hand, a distinction lies between the older dialogical school and the newer normativistic theory of communication (or communication theory) in that the former (dialogical school) emphasised and underlined in (an) existentialistic manner the character of intensity, of suddenness and of directness and of immediacy or even of revelation of the meeting and encounter between (the) I and (the) You (Ich und Du), whereas the latter sought quasi impersonal

regularities and normalities, which in the course (order or sequence) of events of ethical-communicative action were supposed to be made immune against the onset (incursion or invasion) of the imponderable (i.e. what is imponderable and incalculable) and of the exception. Here “genuineness and authenticity (Echtheit)” and (the) “state of being real and actual (or realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness) (Eigentlichkeit)” live as thoughts and ideas corresponding to the impetus (Impetus) for further moral renewal; however, they take (on), assume and adopt other forms and shapes than the existentialistic (forms and shapes), and demarcate or delimit themselves, in fact emphatically, against the latter (existentialistic forms (and shapes))²¹². With some right (i.e. justification) we can say that here personal and intensive intersubjectivity had to give way to (and make way for) norm-regulated/adjusted/controlled/governed (i.e. normative) and extensive (intersubjectivity) (die persönliche und intensive Intersubjektivität der normgeregelten und extensiven weichen mußte). Consequently, the threads which bind and tie the normativistic theory of communication to Kant’s transcendentalism (die normativistische Kommunikationstheorie an Kants Transzendentalismus), came more clearly to light (or came more clearly to the surface). However, the relation with Kant, from whose ethical inheritance (legacy, heritage), anyway, everyone, who wants to lend or grant to (or confer upon) the Other the attribute of the end-in-himself/itself (der dem Anderen das Attribut des Selbstzweckes verleihen will), must draw, remains just as ambivalent as that of the dialogical approach, since simultaneously – in the

²¹² The reason for that is the following. The existentialistic negation of normality as the area, sector or realm of impersonal norms and the corresponding glorification and apotheosis of the “marginal/border situation (Grenzsituation)”, which (i.e. the impersonal norms) turned against the social-theoretical metamorphoses of “natural-scientific” thought, could be interpreted not only in the interests of (an) intensive meeting or encounter in (regard to) love and friendship, but just as much in the sense of an “exception”, in which friendship as (the) existential high point breaks through the normality of regulated social or personal daily/everyday life. It is (well-)known which authors and schools of thought supported both these logical possibilities. For us, the ascertainment remains important that the opposition or contrast between normality and exception, and that between friendship and enmity, are, relate or act asymmetrically towards each other. But (the) normativistic communication theory (theory of communication) prefers to play it safe and shuts out and excludes preventively, besides (i.e. apart from) (the) bad, also (the) good exceptions.

course of the transition from bourgeois to mass-democratic philosophy – the philosophy of the subject and of consciousness was supposed to be replaced by the philosophy of intersubjectivity (blieb genauso ambivalent wie jene zur Dialogik, da gleichzeitig – im Zuge des Übergangs von der bürgerlichen zur massendemokratischen Philosophie – die Subjekt- und Bewußtseinsphilosophie durch die Philosophie der Intersubjektivität abgelöst werden sollte). And it was not, in the course of this, proven without doubt that the transference or shifting of the ethical examination of the problem to the area or field of intersubjectivity was the only possible path in order to found propositions of Ought (i.e. deontological propositions) (Sollensätze), which originally – and logically conclusively – were formulated under (i.e. according to) the premises of the philosophy of the subject (Subjektphilosophie). In this and the next (sub-)section it will be shown to what extent that transference or shifting amounted to a badly concealed attempt to achieve something which Kant would have rightly (or justifiably) rejected and repudiated: a (social-)ontological founding of ethics.

Without losing sight of this ambivalence in the structural relation between the dialogical approach and (the) normativistic theory of communication (communication theory), our analysis starts from their common denominator. Because the thesis that the Other is – precisely in its specific property, quality or characteristic as (a) subject – an end-in-itself, implies that already (the) insight into the character of the subject or of the person of the Other compels and forces us towards its consideration (i.e. the way we look at the Other) as (an) end-in-itself, that is to say that the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which affords or achieves this insight, and over and above that, specifically manufactures, produces or restores and supports the relation between human subjects, somehow must interrelate with such a consideration and way of looking at the Other. Otherwise, the thesis remains an ethical

postulate which does not need and require any direct or indirect social-ontological founding, and whose validity and soundness is (i.e. ought) to be judged at the level of Ought independent of that (social-ontological founding), as Kant already knew it. The wish that the ethical thesis of the Other as (an) end-in-itself anchored in social-ontological structures or in the original given (actual) facts of intersubjectivity, had as the (a) consequence that the dialogical approach, amongst other things/inter alia, got involved in or tangled and mixed up in aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) pertaining to the theory of knowledge, since it (i.e. the said dialogical approach) now had to solve the phenomenological question and matter of constitution (die phänomenologische Konstitutionsfrage) with regard to and in view of that (aforesaid) anchoring and (had to) find (i.e. see or regard) every other solution as the reduction and lowering (i.e. debasement, disparagement or downgrading) of the ethically understood subjectivity of the subject. At the same time, the dialogicians (Dialogiker) thought (opined or considered) that Heidegger's fundamental ontology (is/was) "monological (monologisch)"²¹³, that precisely the self-consciousness, bias and prejudice of the fundamentalist (i.e. the studier (scholar and academic et al.) of what is (philosophically, ontologically) fundamental) (die Befangenheit des Fundamentalogen) is responsible and to blame therein (i.e. in regard to being "monological") (with)in the horizon of the Husserlian question and problem of constitution. The syllogistic reasoning reads/is as follows: just as in Husserl's teaching, theory or doctrine of constitution, the constitution of the alter ego rests and is based on the constitution of the thing world (i.e. the world of things), to which, accordingly, priority is given (or comes to be seen as prior and or better), thus, in Heidegger the meeting/encounter of the being (t)here or existence with the being (t)here(/existence-)with hardly differs from its meeting/encounter with (the)

²¹³ The word stems from Buber (*Das Problem*, p. 102), the objection in terms of content goes back to Löwith (*Das Individuum*, p. 80ff.).

being at hand (i.e. whatever is close by, near and readily available), which, incidentally, in the framework of the being-in-the-world is originally equal and the same as the alter ego (Wie in Husserls Konstitutionslehre die Konstitution des alter ego auf der Konstitution der Dingwelt ruhe, der demnach ein Prius zukomme, so unterscheide sich bei Heidegger die Begegnung des Daseins mit dem Mitdasein kaum von seiner Begegnung mit dem Zuhandenen, welches übrigens im Rahmen des In-der-Welt-Seins mit dem alter ego gleichursprünglich sei). Both this, as well as the fact resulting from this, that the meeting and encounter of the being (t)here (or existence) with (the) being (t)here as (a) meeting-with occurs in the being with a character which is not related to being (t)here (or existence), withdraws from, or deprives, it (i.e. the said meeting and encounter of the being (t)here (or existence) with ...) (of) every immediacy (Sowohl dies, als auch die sich daraus ergebende Tatsache, daß die Begegnung von Dasein mit Dasein als Mitbegegnen am Seienden von nicht daseinsmäßigem Charakter erfolge, entzögen ihr jede Unmittelbarkeit)²¹⁴. The dual (twin, double) wish to sketch or outline a structure of the/a concept (*or*: a conceptual structure), from which the [[wished-for]] ethical desideratum emerges or arises with ontic necessity, and at the same time everything which seems to stand and come against this desideratum, is to be subsumed under another likewise closed – and subsequently equally recognisable structure of the concept or conceptual structure – leads here to a dual (twin, double) misunderstanding. Because neither the position (standing or status; Stellung) of the phenomenological question or problem of constitution implies any ontic priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better) whatsoever of inanimate or animate(d) things in the world (irgendein ontisches Prius der unbeseelten oder beseelten Dinge in der Welt), nor does the solution in Husserl have anything to do with the revaluation, upgrading or “degrading, degradation, downgrading or

²¹⁴ This is Theunissen’s argumentation, *Der Andere*, esp. p. 169ff.. Cf. already [[in]] Zeltner, „Das Ich und die Anderen“, esp. p. 311.

demotion” (Aufwertung oder „Degradierung“) of the alter ego in the wider and broader ethical sense. And this already because the cognitive and the ontic priorities (die kognitiven und die ontischen Prioritäten) under no circumstances have to intersect, in fact, precisely the reverse can be (the case). If one subsumes the different aspects of the here implied or suggested complex, wholesale (or across the board), under the keyword “degradation, downgrading or demotion” of the alter ego, thus, the decisive points of view (aspects, perspectives or factors) are moved from sight (i.e. are lost from sight (and being known about)). The false coupling of the supposed priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better) (Prius) of the thing world (i.e. the world of things) or of worldliness (or secularism; Weltlichkeit) (in its opposition or contrast to the alter ego), with the question and problem of constitution, that is, the deduction of the Heideggerian handling or treatment of the being-with from the keeping and holding tight or adherence to phenomenological premises, covers, first of all, the objective and important fact pertaining to the history of ideas, that Heidegger precisely through the by-passing and circumvention of *Husserl’s* question and problem of constitution, and the shifting and displacement of the philosophical examination of the problem to another level could assert the equal/same ontic originality of (the) being-in-the-world and (the) being-with or (the) being (t)here(/existence-)with (die ontische Gleichursprünglichkeit von In-der-Welt-Sein und Mitsein bzw. Mitdasein behaupten konnte). And exactly this by-passing, circumvention or shifting and displacement he (i.e. Heidegger) shared – in his manner – with the approach of the dialogicians^{215 + lxi}. Still further (i.e. moreover), the assertion of Heidegger’s supposed insistence and persistence on the theoretical horizon of the Husserlian question and problem of constitution is founded not on the objectively correct understanding of this latter (Husserlian question/problem of constitution), but it constitutes rather a

²¹⁵ See ch. II, p. 1, above.

retrospective construction, which ex post facto is supposed to make understandable and explain why Heidegger from his talk of being-with and being (t)here(/existence-)with does not draw the same ethical-normative conclusions as the dialogicians, for whom, those terms may only mean and signify the “genuine (true, authentic or real; echte)” meeting and encounter. Only under this by no means (necessarily) compelling premise can the accusation or reproach be made against Heidegger that he defines (the) being (t)here(/or existence-)with as (the) existential determination and definition of the being-in-the-world and paints (depicts, imagines or visualises) – at the same time – the/a picture and image of the thinning out (i.e. isolation; Vereinzelung) and loneliness (and seclusion; Einsamkeit) vis-à-vis the somebody (people or the They) (dem Man) as the precursor or forerunner of (or to) death²¹⁶. Finally, only he who can postulate the character of immediacy and of directness of the meeting and encounter between (the) You and (the) I (zwischen Du und Ich), or, regards (that character of immediacy/directness) as an accepted fact (or foregone conclusion) can call into question and doubt the ontic equal/same originality of (the) being at hand (i.e. whatever is close by, near and readily available), or of (the) thing world (i.e. world of things) and being (t)here (or existence) (die ontische Gleichursprünglichkeit von Zuhandensein bzw. Dingwelt und Dasein). But every experience and every thought and consideration proves that it is an unavoidable (and absolutely essential) fact that every relation between men – one way or another – must refer to (the (i.e. what is)) socially and naturally concrete and objective (soziales oder naturhaftes Gegenständliches), and only the general ascertainment that our world consists of pure men/humans/people and (the) pure meeting (and encounter) between these (humans), would bring down or trip up the assumption and acceptance of that equal/same originality (und erst die allgemeine Feststellung, unsere Welt

²¹⁶ Thus, Theunissen, *Der Andere*, p. 176ff..

bestehe aus puren Menschen und pure Begegnung zwischen diesen würde die Annahme jener Gleichursprünglichkeit zu Fall bringen).^{lxiii} But such an ascertainment cannot be made – otherwise immediacy and directness would not be a desideratum – and the prospects for its realisation would appear again to be (only ever so) slightly conceivable. Because if the thesis (in respect) of/about the intentionality of the consciousness stands in contradiction to (i.e. is inconsistent with) the concept(ual plan) of (the) “genuine (true, authentic, real)” dialogical approach (zum Konzept „echter“ Dialogik)²¹⁷, then the latter (“genuine and authentic” dialogical approach) is eo ipso unrealisable amongst men. From the point of view of each and every respective later and more radical dialogical concept(ual) plan, it can of course be proved that the earlier or previous (dialogical concept(ual) plan) was not able to consistently eradicate, wipe out or eliminate the mediate(d)ness of the meeting and encounter (die Vermitteltheit der Begegnung), because of/owing to its conceptual design (construction, arrangement, layout, structure, tendency or disposition) (begrifflichen Anlage)²¹⁸. Such critique (criticism), however, if it is meant as an “overcoming”, can put in the world (i.e. give rise to or beget) merely new conceptual combinations, which on paper look (or are made out to be) irrefutable and incontrovertible if (and when) one accepts the premises without question – and otherwise nothing happens. Objectively much more illuminating (instructive or informative) is the confession or admission of some “philosophers of existence (i.e. existential philosophers)” („Existenzphilosophen“), who in principle regard unmediated communication as the momentary (immediate or instantaneous) “becoming (of) one” (die unvermittelte Kommunikation als augenblickliches „Einswerden“) as possible, that this same communication without the mediation by the contents of the world (world contents) [[i.e. content from the outside and external vis-à-vis the

²¹⁷ Loc. cit., p. 375.

²¹⁸ Thus, Theunissen regarding Buber, loc. cit., p. 279ff..

individual/subject world]] (ohne Vermittlung durch Weltinhalte) would have to fall into (a state of) impoverishment²¹⁹.

Let us now explain briefly why Husserl's question and problem (in respect) of constitution has fairly little to do with the social-ontic problem of the "meeting or encounter", and its real or imagined ethical implications, although it seems that the starting from the constitution of the I (ego) "degrades, demotes or downgrades" the other to the/an object, which the I (ego) meets and encounters during the progress of (the) constitution amongst other objects (obwohl das Ausgehen der Konstitution vom Ich den Anderen zum Objekt zu „degradieren“ scheint, dem das Ich beim Fortschreiten der Konstitution unter anderen Objekten begegnet). Even in his last writing (i.e. text), and in accordance with his deepening and absorption into the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of inter-subjectivity, Husserl stressed that the starting from the I (ego) and the systematics (or systematic approach) of its transcendental functions and achievements or accomplishments are "methodically (or methodologically)" essential and imperative (then) even when it is a matter exactly of the solution of those aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) (Selbst in seiner letzten Schrift und nach seiner Vertiefung in die Aporien der Intersubjektivität betonte Husserl, daß das Ausgehen vom Ich und der Systematik seiner transzendentalen Funktionen und Leistungen „methodisch“ auch denn unerlässlich sei, wenn es sich eben um die Lösung jener Aporien handele)²²⁰. The constitution of (the/what is (in)) being does not in fact disclose or reveal simply the inner or internal composition, texture or nature of it (i.e. what is in being), but its manner of appearing (i.e. appearance) for the – directed towards that (internal composition etc.) – consciousness; that is why it (i.e. the constitution of what is in being) is the constitution of (the) being/to be *for* (the)

²¹⁹ Jaspers, *Philosophie*, pp. 502, 504, 353ff..

²²⁰ *Krisis, Hu*, VI, p. 189ff..

consciousness, and, as such, (a) function or achievement of consciousness, (a) creation of (the) being/to be through the functions and achievements of the setting of (the) consciousness (Die Konstitution des Seienden erschließt ja nicht einfach dessen innere Beschaffenheit, sondern seine Weise des Erscheinens für das darauf gerichtete Bewußtsein; sie ist daher Konstitution des Seins *für* das Bewußtsein und, als solche, Leistung des Bewußtseins, Schöpfung des Seins durch die Setzungsleistungen des Bewußtseins)²²¹. The averting and distancing of philosophical reflection from the/a naive positioning can, in general, take place only by virtue of the insight that we inevitably make our way from the level of the objective external/outer world to that (world) of the (transcendental, that is, raised over and beyond personal psychological coincidences) I (ego), that is to say, in the place of the “natural” order of things steps and goes the cognitive order of constitution (Die Abwendung der philosophischen Reflexion von der naiven Einstellung kann überhaupt nur vermöge der Einsicht stattfinden, daß wir uns nun unweigerlich von der Ebene der objektiven äußeren Welt auf jene des (transzendentalen, also über persönliche psychologische Zufälligkeiten erhabenen) Ich begeben, daß also an die Stelle der „natürliche“ Ordnung der Dinge die kognitive Ordnung der Konstitution tritt). In actual fact, it is not seen or appreciated (i.e. it is unclear) how the phenomenal world *in its manner, way or mode as (a) phenomenon* (wie die phänomenale Welt *in ihrer Weise als Phänomen*) could otherwise be explained than through (the) retreat or retrogression to that “performing and functioning subjectivity” („leistende Subjektivität“), which as the only one (i.e. subjectivity) (*or*: which alone) constitutes and sees phenomena (not things) (Phänomene (nicht Dinge) konstituiert und sieht). And, likewise, it is unclear how philosophical reflection, at the same time, could jump/skip over or leap/go beyond the I (ego), in order to take the Other as the starting point of its observations or the (i.e. its)

²²¹ See Landgrebe, *Weg*, p. 146 ff., who calls and draws on Fink’s interpretation authorised by Husserl.

constitution. Such a decision would in fact, again, be a decision of the I (ego); the constitutive performances, functions and achievements of the Other would have to, again, be constituted by the I (ego) etc. and so forth. The Is/being of the transcendental I (ego) (Das Sein des transzendentalen Ich) “precedes in an obvious and self-evident manner – *for me*, the person philosophising – *in terms of knowledge*, all objective Is/being”²²². The sheer, complete, absolute or pure cognitive necessity in/during which constitution starts from the ego (Ego), or (else) the constitution of the phenomenal world is able to accompany the constitution of the transcendental ego, does not prejudge anything regarding ontic priorities in the absolute metaphysical sense; it (the said absolute or pure cognitive necessity) does not find any real or ethical priority of the I (ego) (Ich) vis-à-vis the thing world (i.e. the world of things) or vis-à-vis the Other. On the contrary, only insight into the nature of this necessity gives to transcendental phenomenology vis-à-vis (the) natural consciousness the lead, head start (advantage or edge), (in) being clear about the I(ego)-relativity of the world (i.e. the relativity of the world as such relativity pertains to the I (ego) (die Ichrelativität der Welt)²²³, that is, in mistrusting the metaphysical claims of absoluteness of the I (ego). If philosophical reflection wants – in (a) natural positioning (in natürlicher Einstellung), to start from the fact of the world or being-with, then this does not automatically mean that it would, in the absolute metaphysical sense, be false (or wrong and in error). It means, however, that it has gone around (circumvented or bypassed) the question and problem of constitution. This going around (circumvention or bypassing) may (or should) not, though, be misunderstood as the solution of the *same* problem [[of constitution]]; rather, through that (going around), the setting of the question (or question formulation) is shifted and displaced to another level, and if this shifting or displacement takes place in an unreflected manner, then it is

²²² *Cart. Meditationen*, *Hu*, I, p. 11 (my punctuation and italics).

²²³ Husserl, *Hu* vol. IV, *Ideen*, II, p. 182.

tantamount with or amounts to a confusion of the cognitive with the ontological way of looking at things (more precisely: of naive with phenomenological-transcendental ontology).^{lxiii}

It is not, therefore, to be dared or allowed, to see in (the) constitution as (a) philosophical procedure and method, a “degrading, degradation, downgrading or demotion” of the Other (eine „Degradierung“ des Anderen), because the I (ego) in the course of this, by constituting the Other and, consequently, asserting priority for itself (or coming to be seen as prior and or better), with that, breaks free and detaches itself from, or evades and is beyond, equal (or same) originality with the Other²²⁴. Equal (or the same) originality exists (and the ascertainment of its existence is objectively correct) only from the perspective of the social ontologist or of the theoretician of the dialogical approach. However, from each and every respective perspective of the I (ego) (as I (ego)) and of the Other (as I (ego)), from which the question and problem of constitution is posed and *must* be posed, the partners of the dialogue or of the meeting and encounter *cannot* be equally original. The (just) mentioned [[dialogical]] theoretician imagines in his ethical eagerness and zeal that the partners would as the constituting (i.e. constitutive) I (ego) be able and should or ought to behave in accordance with *his* (i.e. *the said theoretician's*) perspective of equal (or same) originality, and, accordingly, regards the change of the theoretical concept(ual plan) or the shifting and displacement of the theoretical level as a sufficient condition for that. But even if the I (ego) wanted to grant to (or confer upon) the Other, the predicate of equal (and same) originality, or even of absolute originality in reference/regard to itself (i.e. the I (ego)), thus, this would not in the least change in relation to that (the fact) that from the perspective of the question or problem of constitution, the I (ego), and only the I (ego), can braid (i.e. weave) such predicates into the constitution of

²²⁴ Thus, Theunissen, *Der Andere*, p. 153.

the Other. Because *I* constitute nature in me as [[being]] constituted by the Other²²⁵, and by means of the – in my own self – constituted alien, foreign or other and different constitutions, the – for us all – common world is constituted *for myself*²²⁶. What the I (ego) transcends, becomes absorbed or assimilated by – always from the perspective of the question and problem of constitution – the immanence of the I; “transcendence is an immanent, inside of the ego – constituting itself –, character of being” (Denn *ich* konstituiere die Natur in mir als vom Anderen konstituiert und mittels der in meinem eigenen Selbst konstituierten fremden Konstitutionen konstituiert sich *für mich* die für uns alle gemeinsame Welt. Was das Ich transzendiert, geht – immer in der Perspektive der Konstitutionsfrage – in der Immanenz des Ich auf, „Transzendenz ist ein immanenter, innerhalb des Ego sich konstituierender Seinscharakter“)²²⁷. The thus understood priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better) of the constituting (i.e. constitutive) I (ego) continues to exist and persists, therefore, even (then) when the I (ego) as (an) ethical person altruistically devotes and dedicates himself (or itself) passionately (completely and with abandon) to the Other; it (i.e. the said priority etc.) is, therefore, (a priority etc.) irrespective of each and every respective place (Platz) of the interaction partners (or partners in and of interaction; Interaktionspartner) inside of the spectrum of the social relation. The master (lord or ruler) must constitute the servants (and slaves) just as much as – and understand, see the next (sub-)section – the servant (and slave) (must constitute and understand) the master (lord or ruler) (Der Herr muß die Knechte genauso konstituieren – und verstehen, s. nächster Absatz – wie der Knecht den Herrn). And something else must be explained here. With regard to the cognitive unavoidability and inevitability of that priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better), it is completely indifferent how the transcendental I

²²⁵ *Cart. Meditationen*, § 55 = *Hu*, I, p. 155.

²²⁶ *Loc. cit.*, § 41, p. 120.

²²⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 32.

(ego) carries out (implements and enforces) the constitution, and indeed the constitution of the Other (und zwar die Konstitution des Anderen) in its individual details, whether it, therefore, gains (gets, reaches or attains) the Other through (i.e. by means/way of) (an) analogism (or argument by analogy) (Analogieschluß), as Husserl suggests, or whether it, in the process, proceeds (methodically) otherwise and differently, or whether, finally, the You (Du) is present and exists as (an) original (re)presentation²²⁸, and intersubjectivity is not at all derivable or deducible from the performances, achievements or functions of the consciousness of the transcendental ego (Ego), but simply is a given fact of the life world²²⁹. Without wanting to go much deeper into the matter, let us remark here that the thesis as regards immediacy and directness does not have to have any specific reference to the examination of the problem of the You (Du) and inter-subjectivity since it can just as well be applied to the thing world (i.e. the world of things). Husserl's analogism (or argument by analogy) may have problematic aspects, on the other hand, he rightly places, as I believe, value on the fact that the Other, first of all, must have a real presence in space, and irrespective of this presence, which it shares with the rest of things, is not of this world (nicht von dieser Welt ist)^{lxiv}. The emphasis on this fact has, of course, nothing to do with an ethically suspect "degradation, downgrading or demotion" of the person. Finally, the objection that inter-subjectivity cannot be gained from the performances, achievements and functions of the consciousness of the transcendental Ego, might be the case and true in the narrower sense of textual criticism (im engeren textkritischen Sinne); however, its objective relevance is not unconditionally and definitely great. Because in the context of the question and problem of constitution, it is not a matter – anyhow – of proving, with metaphysical strictness, the reality of the social world, but rather of concretely grasping the constitutive sense and meaning of the assumption and

²²⁸ Simmel already meant this, *Wesen*, pp. 11, 8. Cf. ch. II, footnote 12, above.

²²⁹ Thus, Schütz, „Problem“, esp. pp. 94, 97ff., 100ff..

acceptance of this reality, that is of pointing out and demonstrating that constitution cannot be achieved under solipsistic presuppositions (or conditions). Solipsism is indirectly rejected for lack and want of a better solution²³⁰. And it is not certain that one directly rejects it (i.e. solipsism) through the thesis of the immediate and direct pre-givenness (or pre-existence) of inter-subjectivity (die These von der unmittelbaren Vorgegebenheit der Intersubjektivität).^{lxv}

We might or shall have to be content with these suggestions or comments, since we are interested in the social-ontological relevance or irrelevance, and not in the special, specific and particular suitability of Husserlian constitution in founding inter-subjectivity on the/a phenomenological fundamentum inconcussum [= firm (unshaken, unshakeable, solid) foundation]]. Social ontology starts, indeed, during or in already constituted inter-subjectivity, and must presuppose the fact of inter-subjectivity just as much as it (i.e. social ontology) reflects some biological and anthropological given facts, or tacitly has (such biological and anthropological given facts) as a basis (Die Sozialontologie setzt ja bei der bereits konstituierten Intersubjektivität an und muß das Faktum der Intersubjektivität genauso voraussetzen wie sie manche biologische und anthropologische Gegebenheiten reflektiert oder stillschweigend zugrundelegt). If now it could be shown that the constitution of the Other by the I (ego) in no case prejudices an object character (i.e. character as an object) of the Other, then a further point of view can be confirmed with the help and on the basis of Husserl's observations, which we have already gained in the discussion (as argument) of or about the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and which we must again pick up in the discussion of this (sub-)section (Wenn nun gezeigt werden konnte, daß die Konstitution des Anderen durch das Ich keinesfalls einen Objektcharakter des Anderen präjudiziert, so

²³⁰ Cf. Hutcheson, "Husserl's Problem".

läßt sich anhand von Husserls Beobachtungen ein weiterer Gesichtspunkt bestätigen, den wir schon bei der Erörterung des Mechanismus der Perspektivenübernahme gewonnen haben und in der Diskussion dieses Abschnitts wiederaufnehmen müssen). Husserl made it clear that neither the social, nor the subject character (i.e. a character pertaining to being a subject) (Subjektcharakter) of human relations depends upon whether they (i.e. the said human relations) stand and are under the sign (i.e. influence or aegis) of friendship or of enmity. “Regarding and concerning their social character”, men (humans) in my surroundings, vicinity or environment (in meiner Umgebung) are “my ‘friends’ or ‘foes’, my ‘servants’ or ‘superiors (bosses)’, ‘strangers (foreigners, aliens) or ‘relatives’ etc.”²³¹; the “specifically social communicative acts”, through which “sociality” is constituted, encompass likewise acts “of love and of counter-love (or anti-love), of hate and counter/anti-hate, of trust and counter/anti-trust etc.” – and the communicative [[element, factor or dimension]] lies in them (i.e. the aforesaid various (specifically social communicative) acts), in the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives occurring here, and during which the I (ego) turns to (and addresses) Others, to those who it (i.e. the I (ego)) knows that they understand this turn, expression, phrase or figure of speech, accordingly aligning themselves in their action, and “turn themselves back (i.e. reciprocate and address the I (ego)) in acts of the same voice (i.e. agreement) or of the contrary voice or counter-voice (i.e. disagreement)” (und sich „in gleichstimmigen oder gegenstimmigen Akten zurückwenden“) ²³². In other places, Husserl connects, likewise, the mechanism of the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (“as soon as we know now both in one (i.e. we both know), not only one (in respect) of the other, but we also know as one knowing of the other, mutually, reciprocally or alternately”)

²³¹ *Ideen*, I, § 27 = *Hu*, III, p. 59ff.

²³² *Ideen*, II, § 51 = *Hu*, IV, p. 194.

(„sobald wir nun beide in eins nicht nur einer vom anderen wissen, sondern uns auch wissen als wechselseitig voneinander Wissende“), indiscriminately, with “loving” and “hating” acts, and stresses subsequently, such acts would “connect the subjects *as subjects*”²³³. How little the content of the social relation determines its specific subject character (i.e. character as a subject), Husserl shows unintentionally, but highly instructively, when he draws on and uses exactly the example of the master and the servant, in order to illustrate how through (the) mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of “an intermonadic [[being]] in(side) one another of I-related (or egoic, egoical or ego-like) living, life and acting, having an effect” („ein intermonadisches Ineinander ichlichen Lebens und Wirkens“) is manufactured, made, produced or restored, and a common consciousness comes into being, “in which his intentionality and mine (i.e. my intentionality), notwithstanding and irrespective of the separation of experiences (i.e. the segregation and distinction(s) in experiences) (der Trennung der Erlebnisse), comes towards or into [[a state of]] unity”²³⁴. With the same words, an intimate, sexual relationship (or love affair) can also be described in a purely form-related (i.e. formal) respect. And this is not paradoxical, if only one can clearly distinguish (the) form and (the) content of subjectivity and of the specifically (inter)subjective mechanism, i.e. of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Und dies is nicht paradox, wenn man nur Form und Inhalt der Subjektivität und des spezifisch (inter)subjektiven Mechanismus, d. h. der Perspektivenüberahme, klar auseinanderhalten kann).

The example of master and servant (Das Beispiel von Herr und Knecht), as Husserl interprets it, is quite particularly suitable as (a) transition to the discussion of (the) dialogical fundamental or basic theses, because it codifies, as it were, their pure negation. The core or nucleus of the dialogical approach (and

²³³ *Phänom. Psychol.* (Beil. XXVIII) = *Hu*, IX, p. 512ff. (my italics and emphasis).

²³⁴ *Loc. cit.*, (Beil. XXV) = *Hu*, IX, p. 484ff.. Cf. *Zur Phänom. d. Intersubj.*, II = *Hu*, XIV, p. 181: „Sklassenverhältnis“ als „Willenseinheitlichkeit“.

of (the) normativistic communication theory (theory of communication)) lies in the conviction that an ethically not (fully) acceptable social relation does not entail merely a content-related deficiency or shortcoming, but, absolutely, a distortion and reversal or twisting of fundamental social-ontological factors, a shrinking of (the) social-ontological (not merely content-related) potential (and possibilities). The thought or consideration reads/is: as long as the Other does not enjoy the ethical status of the end-in-itself, it cannot also be a subject in the full sense of the word, it becomes or is, therefore, “degraded, downgraded or demoted” to the/an object, in relation to which the need for forcing one’s way into and penetrating its psyche and its world decreases and diminishes, and the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives comes to [[a state of]] languishing and waning. From the ontic realm of subjects, ethical incapacity and in(cap)ability brings us to the ontic area or realm of objects, (in regard) to which an essentially other type of relation, the instrumental (type of relation), predominates (Solange der Andere nicht den ethischen Status des Selbstzwecks genießt, kann er auch kein Subjekt im vollen Sinne des Wortes sein, er wird also zum Objekt „degradiert“, wobei das Bedürfnis nach Eindringen in seine Psyche und seine Welt entsprechend nachläßt und der Mechanismus der Perspektivenübernahme zum Erlahmen kommt. Vom ontischen Bereich der Subjekte bringt uns das ethische Unvermögen auf den ontischen Bereich der Objekte, auf dem ein wesentlich anderer Beziehungstyp, der instrumentelle, vorherrscht). According to this schema, (the) dialogical approach-related or normativistic theory of communication (or communication theory) put at the centre or focus of attention, the contrast and opposition between the dialogical-communicative [[dimension, factor or element]] and the instrumental [[dimension, factor or element]], whereby the characterisation of the instrumental [[dimension etc.]] stems from a perception or view of the technical-natural-scientific habitus, which decisively influenced (the) criticism/critique of culture (cultural critique) of the twentieth century. The two

most well-known chief or main motifs of cultural criticism and the critique of culture frame and serve as a setting for e.g. Buber's first and most important (proper) formulation of the dialogical approach (Ausformulierung des dialogischen Ansatzes), which wants to diagnose the "illness of our age" and initiate, inaugurate, usher in and mark the beginning of the "movement of reversal, turning back, the counter-march or about face"²³⁵. On the one hand, that is, from the perspective of the history of philosophy [[pertaining to]] the contradistinction between community and society, "the advancing, progressive increase, growth and rise in or of the It-world" (die „fortschreitende Zunahme der Eswelt") and the "decrease and reduction of the force, strength or power of the relation of/between men/humans" is lamented²³⁶; on the other hand, the type of (hu)man, who flourishes, thrives and prospers in the It-world is described as one who wants to experience, use and conquer all (things) (i.e. everything) as (an) object (andererseits der Menschentyp, der in der Eswelt gedeiht, als einer geschildert, der alles als Gegenstand erfahren, gebrauchen und erobern will); objectification (or reification) (Vergegenständlichung), i.e. "renunciation and relinquishment of all immediacy and directness", accordingly, characterises the whole of life in (the) economy and (the) state^{237 + lxvi}. Consequently, the present-day human world becomes (or turns into) the image, likeness, reflection, portrayal, reproduction or copy of the universe, as natural science apprehends the/this same (universe) (Die gegenwärtige menschliche Welt wird somit zum Abbild des Universums, wie die Naturwissenschaft dasselbe erfaßt): in it (i.e. the universe), "causality rules and prevails unrestrictedly and without limits" („waltet uneingeschränkt die Ursächlichkeit")²³⁸; and now it is a question of in the place of this it-world (Eswelt), which has "cohesion in space and in time", to

²³⁵ *Dial. Prinzip*. pp. 58, 60.

²³⁶ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 39, 41.

²³⁷ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 43, 49ff.. Like the bent, tendency and inclination towards "actuality, authentic being and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit)" (see ch. II, sec. 1 above), thus, these motifs pertaining to cultural critique and the criticism of culture also constitute further points of contact with Heidegger.

²³⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 53.

put the You-world (Duwelt), which does not know (of) such cohesion. The dislike for or aversion towards the “fixed and beneficial, congenial chronicle or annal” and the preference for (the) “strange, peculiar or wondrous lyrical-dramatic episodes” go, in fact, so far that Buber means that the person hating directly is nearer to the (“real, genuine, true or authentic (echten)”) relation than the love(-less) or hate-less (i.e. without hate) (person), and “violence and force in the really experienced being” is better “than the ghostly, spectral and eerie care and welfare in faceless numbers”²³⁹.

The reminding of these banalities pertaining to the critique of culture, cultural criticism, and existentialistic banalities, offers, of course, no gain in knowledge (Die Erinnerung an diese kulturkritischen und existentialistischen Banalitäten bietet freilich keinen Erkenntnisgewinn), it helps us, however, to (come to) the ascertainment that the dialogical contradistinction between (the) real, genuine, true or authentic (echter) and non-real, ungentine, untrue or inauthentic (fake, artificial, false) (unechter) relation, between (the) You-world and (the) It-world, does not in the least rest and depend upon the concrete analyses of the interaction between humans, but represents and constitutes a conceptual schematisation or rather an emotional, lofty, dramatic (and or pathetic) stylisation (die dialogische Gegenüberstellung von echter und unechter Beziehung, von Du- und Eswelt keineswegs auf konkreten Analysen zwischenmenschlicher Interaktion beruht, sondern eine begriffliche Schematisierung oder vielmehr eine pathetische Stilisierung darstellt), which was constructed in accordance with a preconceived pattern, model or specimen pertaining to cultural criticism and the critique of culture. In this contradistinction, a relation, which has as (its) goal and end “its own essence, being or nature (Wesen)”, that is, is (an) end-in-itself (Selbstzweck), contrasts with or forms a contrast to another (relation), which makes the It “serviceable”

²³⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 37, 20, 28.

to (i.e. puts the It at and in the service of) the case of the I (ego)²⁴⁰. Accordingly, does the character of those relating to one another turn out (Entsprechend fällt der Charakter der sich aufeinander Beziehenden aus). Where the “basic word (term or expression)” means I (ego)-It, and above all, where with this It, “he” or “she” is meant, there a “point/dot/spot-like” and “functional” I (ego) without “subjectivity” has an effect, whereas the I (ego) of the basic word (term or expression), I (ego)-You, may be called exactly “subjectivity” and “person”; “in subjectivity the intellectual(-spiritual) substance of the person matures” (Wo das „Grundwort“ Ich-Es heißt, und vor allem, wo mit diesem Es „Er“ oder „Sie“ gemeint ist, da wirkt ein „punkthaftes“ und „funktionelles“ Ich ohne „Subjektivität“, während das Ich des Grundwortes Ich-Du eben „Subjektivität“ und „Person“ heißen darf; „in der Subjektivität reift die geistige Substanz der Person“)²⁴¹. The functional I (ego) (Das funktionelle Ich) remains, in fact, – according to conventional language use –, (a) “subject”; however, the (its) real, actual properties, qualities, characteristics and possibilities of subjectivity as subjectivity come to light and appear only in the “person”. For the explication and founding of this aphoristic dichotomy, Buber undertakes, though, no empirically verifiable investigation and exploration of the inner/internal and outer/external mechanism of the social relation. The in itself correct thesis, that the social relation takes place in the area and realm of the [[in-]]between/Zwischen, is too general, and otherwise says and means absolutely nothing about the ontic or ethical quality of the relation. It (i.e. the said in itself correct thesis) was, incidentally, supported in (the) form-related (i.e. formal) sociology without any normative connotation²⁴². Just as little are there for the “essential meeting and encounter” ultimate anthropological guarantees. Because no man (person, human) is (a) “pure” person and no (man) is entirely “real” or

²⁴⁰ Loc. cit., pp. 65, 70.

²⁴¹ Loc. cit., pp. 7, 12, 65, 71, 66 ([[from]] here the citation/quote).

²⁴² L. v. Wiese, *System* esp. p. 5 (the [[in-]]between human[[s]] as the social (das Zwischenmenschliche als das Soziale)).

“unreal, i.e. non-real or not real”; “everyone lives in the twofold I (ego)”, and that is why on every You in the world [[it]] is “imposed that [[it/the said You]] becomes (a) thing or still always goes back into thinghood (i.e. a state of being a thing) („verhängt, Ding zu werden oder doch immer wieder in Dinghaftigkeit einzugehen“)²⁴³. Thus, the essential meeting and encounter, and with it, the full unfolding and development of subjectivity, if it, overall, is possible, necessarily remains in a statistical respect a marginal, secondary (and peripheral) phenomenon; the founding of a comprehensive social ontology with the help (or on the basis) of the model of such a meeting and encounter must likewise fall into the/a void²⁴⁴ – and, nevertheless, the aphoristic dichotomy applies: “subjectivity or end-in-itself – thing or means” continue as the fundamental criterion in the classification and judgement of social relations in their totality and entirety („Subjektivität bzw. Selbstzweck – Ding bzw. Mittel“ weiterhin als grundlegendes Kriterium bei der Klassifizierung und Beurteilung der sozialen Beziehungen in ihrer Gesamtheit).

It (i.e. the said dichotomy) becomes invalid as soon as we carry out the necessary conceptual differentiations, which, above all, must aim at telling and keeping apart and distinguishing the ethical and the social-ontological aspect. That can, otherwise, also be formulated the other way around: the ethical and the social-ontological aspect automatically fall apart from each other (i.e. they are separated), as soon as it is seen and insight is had that the structures of the relation, which the social-ontological aspect means, remain the same, whether the I (ego) wants to handle and treat the You as (a) “person” or as (a) “thing”, as (a) friend or as (a) foe. The ascertainment that the foe cannot, *in (a) social-ontological respect*, be by definition a “thing”, should or ought not to mean that the decision to handle and treat the Other as (a) friend or foe, *in (an) ethical*

²⁴³ *Dial. Prinzip*. pp. 67, 21.

²⁴⁴ See Ch. II, sec. 1, above.

respect, is indifferent. It (i.e. the said ascertainment) implies, however, that the social-ontological level lies and is deeper than the ethical (level), that is, it equally encompasses moral and immoral positionings, attitudes and stances, no matter howsoever one defines them – and precisely because of the existing formal-structural (or form-related-structural) commonalities and common ground between them. The equating of both levels, which we also met and encountered in the shape and form of the direct identification as equating of the “real, genuine, true or authentic” social relation and friendship²⁴⁵, constitutes one of the most usual, common and oldest clever tricks or sleights of hand of ethical-normative thought, as soon as it (i.e. such ethical-normative thought) in the search for ultimate objective arguments must spill over into or overlap with and spread to the ontological [[domain, sphere, field]] (Sie impliziert aber, daß die sozialontologische Ebene tiefer als die ethische liegt, also moralische und unmoralische Einstellungen, wie auch immer man sie definieren mag, gleichermaßen umfaßt – und gerade wegen der vorhandenen formal-strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen ihnen. Die Ineinssetzung der beiden Ebenen, die uns auch in Gestalt der direkten Gleichsetzung von „echter“ sozialer Beziehung und Freundschaft begegnete, bildet einen der üblichsten und ältesten Kunstgriffe ethisch-normativen Denkens, sobald es auf der Suche nach letzten objektiven Argumenten aufs Ontologische übergreifen muß). Now, the dichotomous contradistinction of the subject character (i.e. the character of being a subject) of the friend towards the thing character (i.e. the character of being a thing) of the foe leaps and jumps over the distinction between social ontology and ethics. It overlooks, as a result of this, also the distinction between the will of the I (ego) to handle and treat the Other as (a) thing, and its real possibility of doing this also. Because, in (an) ethical respect, it comes and boils down to the same (thing) whether one says that the I (ego) uses the Other as (a)

²⁴⁵ See Ch. III, Sec. 4, above.

mere means for the achievement of one's own ends and goals, or whether one says that the I (ego) looks at the Other as (an) object (oder ob man sagt, das Ich betrachte den Anderen als Objekt). But socio-ontologically, it is by no means so/thus(/the case). In order to be able to successfully instrumentalise the Other, the I (ego) must find out – via the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – the specifically human-subjective qualities, properties and characteristics of the Other – even (then) when the power relationship (or relationship of power) appears to be extremely asymmetrical, when the I (ego), therefore, “does not have to take into account” the Other (Um den Anderen erfolgreich instrumentalisieren zu können, muß das Ich über den Mechanismus der Perspektivenübernahme die spezifisch menschlich-subjektiven Eigenschaften des Anderen herausfinden – selbst dann, wenn das Machtverhältnis extrem asymmetrisch erscheint, wenn das Ich also auf den Anderen „keine Rücksicht nehmen muß“). Because such thoughtlessness, recklessness or ruthlessness (Rücksichtslosigkeit) has often or is often avenged by “completely and entirely unexpected” explosive reactions^{lxvii}. It is, therefore, not conceivable that there is any state of affairs, also any coercive relationship (or relationship of compulsion and constraint)²⁴⁶ amongst humans, in which the including of possible reactions of the Other in one's own action plan (or plan of acting) would be completely superfluous, and [[one]] would be able to treat and handle the Other literally as (a) thing, irrespective of whether he (i.e. the Other), ethically seen, is used as (a) means. Using the Other as (a) means, and handling and treating (the Other) at the same time as (a) thing, happens at the I's (ego's) peril, risk or danger, and does not go back (i.e. is not reduced) to a social-ontological necessity, but to subjective properties, qualities and characteristics, i.e. to the negligence or arrogance of the I (ego) (Den Anderen als Mittel zu

²⁴⁶ Nisbet, *Bond*, p. 71 ff.: “... what the coercer does is in some part conditioned by what he expects the effect of coercion to be on the one coerced. Similarly, the response of the coerced is in some degree conditioned by the effect he expects it to have on the person doing the coercing.”

gebrauchen und zugleich als Ding zu behandeln, geschieht auf die Gefahr des Ich hin und geht nicht auf eine sozialontologische Notwendigkeit, sondern auf subjektive Eigenschaften, d. h. auf Nachlässigkeit oder Überheblichkeit des Ich zurück)²⁴⁷. In any case, the Other must, regarding that, react as (a) subject to the fact that the I (ego) wants to look upon or handle and treat him (i.e. the Other) as (an) object. Over and above that, however, not even the terms “means” and “thing” may or can be comprehended literally here. Because they can only mean that the I (ego) expects the full subjugation of the Other under and to its own will. But this subjugation must be concretised in stances and act(ion)s for which only a human subject is (cap)able. The effort and endeavour of the I (ego), for the Other to be subjugated (fully and) completely [[to it/the I (ego)]], would be meaningless if the I (ego) could attain the same achievements (accomplishments and performances) from a non-human being (creature or essence). Slaves are humans like all other humans as well, because only humans can be slaves. And the foe can be a foe only because he (i.e. the foe) is (a) human, because, that is, from him (the foe) dangers and risks start and arise, which can only start and arise from specifically human act(ion)s. The (cap)ability at and of distinguishing between the resistance of a thing and of (the resistance) of a human, as well as the knowledge that to and against each one of both types of resistance, a particular type of acting, action or act is and ought to be opposed and set, belongs to the field kit or pack (i.e. equipment) of every (cap)ability at and of orientation and at and of survival (with)in society (Die Bemühung des Ich, sich den Anderen voll und ganz zu unterwerfen, wäre sinnlos, könnte das Ich dieselben Leistungen von einem nicht menschlichen Wesen erlangen.

²⁴⁷ Hegel’s master, who is completely fixed upon the pleasure of the thing, and uses the servant/slave merely as (a) means, in order to come into (i.e. attain and achieve) pleasure, misjudges and fails to appreciate the priorities so much, that in contrast to the servant/slave, (he) appears to be unreal (i.e. beyond and not aware of reality); thus, the spoiled and careless, reckless son of the master might have behaved or might behave rather than the master himself, who knew how to and was able to subjugate the servant/slave and keep (the servant) under subjugation. Social realities stand and are nearer to Xenophon’s tyrant, who imagines and visualises in/during sleepless nights how every citizen thinks, and how he would probably react to this or that action of (his) tyrannical reign and government (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, IV, A, bzw. *Hieron*, ch. II-VI).

Sklaven sind nur deshalb Menschen wie alle anderen Menschen auch, weil nur Menschen Sklaven sein können. Und der Feind kann nur deshalb Feind sein, weil er Mensch ist, weil also von ihm Gefahren ausgehen, die nur von spezifisch menschlichen Handlungen ausgehen können. Die Fähigkeit zwischen dem Widerstand eines Dinges und eines Menschen zu unterscheiden, sowie die Erkenntnis, daß jedem dieser beiden Widerstandstypen ein besonderer Handlungstyp entgegensetzen sei, gehört zum Marschgepäck jedes orientierungs- und überlebensfähigen Menschen in Gesellschaft).

This and similar observations suggest and make plausible the conclusion that the factor which decides, regarding that, whether the subjectivity of the Other becomes and is registered and recorded as specifically human subjectivity, is not the “dialogical” or “monological”, friendly or inimical quality of the social relation, but its (i.e. the social relation’s) intensity (Intensität). The quality of the relation determines only under which aspect that which is looked at might be regarded as (a) feature of human subjectivity par excellence: the richness and wealth of its (i.e. human subjectivity’s) possibilities in thought and action. No relation, even the most intensive, can exhaust this richness and wealth, since intensity can be achieved either as friendship or as enmity, and in both cases the I (ego) can get to know and learn about the Other – so to speak – only as to (the) (one) half – although abrupt or slow changes in the relation show the Other “entirely as he is”. Whatever the case may be, intensity remains in this context the decisive and determinative point of view. The intentional, wanted, but also the unintentional, unwanted nearness of the Other brings the I (ego), in relation to that, to more and more clearly contrasting the Other from the rest of the subjects, which and who people and populate the social environment, to perceiving by means of contrasting and comparing his (i.e. the Other’s) personal qualities, properties and characteristics, from each and every respective interesting perspective (i.e. perspective of interest (for the I (ego))). Whoever

crops up and appears on the horizon of the I (ego) as friend or foe in a privileged place and position, raises and makes (a) claim on the constant and lively, active attention of the I (ego), even if it is a matter of getting out of his (i.e. the I's (ego's)) way (i.e. avoiding the I (ego)). Also, the process by which the Other achieves this privileged position varies structurally not essentially on the basis of the different quality of the relation. One has described the shaping of the “dialogical” relationship as a development which starts from the tier (level, stage or degree) of common topical (objective or property) interests (Sachinteressen), and reaches its peak when the interest in the Other gains “in living and vital originality” the absolute upper hand²⁴⁸. The dynamic(s) of the relation can, of course, be imagined otherwise and differently, but here it is a matter of something else. Namely, an inimical relation too can take precisely the same course, which does not at all have to be based on “hate at first sight”, but on the contrary, on common topical (objective or property) interests, in relation to which it turns out that (the) Ego and the Other have claims and aspirations, endeavours or efforts on the same field, which cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Because the question is posed “who this man is” and “what he in actual fact wants” or “is up to” – a question which some gourmets of enmity answer (or respond to) by way and means of binding personal dealings and relations (durch verbindlichen persönlichen Umgang). Self-evident is that the intensity of the relation constitutes only a guarantee for the fact that the I (ego) pays especial attention to the Other (i.e. as a matter of prime importance), [[but]] not also for the “correct” understanding of the Other on the part of the I (ego)²⁴⁹. The depth and sharpness of such (an) understanding likewise remain

²⁴⁸ Thus, e.g. Waldenfels, *Zwischenreich*, p. 219ff..

²⁴⁹ Jaspers wants to contradistinguish to “psychological understanding”, which converts or transforms the Other into an object of observation, “complete and perfect understanding”, which becomes possible or is facilitated and enabled by love, but also hate (*Psychology*, pp. 125, 127). The contradistinction is rhetorically built and constructed rather than objectively explicated; it presupposes, in any case, a level at which the reflective/reflexive objectification of the Other ceases, and immediacy and directness kicks in and starts as a result of the intensity. The error obviously interrelates with the explanation of friendship and enmity pertaining to the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses, which minimalises the reflective/reflexive potential and capabilities of both (the “psychological understanding” and the “complete and perfect understanding”).

(are left over or linger), irrespective of the quality of the relation^{lxviii}. Enmity can come into being because both sides tellingly and successfully apprehend (the) motives and aims of each and every respective other (side), whilst friendship lives from and off even consciously constructed fictions not seldom gladly (and willingly) believed. The opposite can, of course, occur just as much during friendship as during enmity. Psychologically relieving or – in practice – functional, effective and expedient typifications (i.e. renderings into types or classifications under typifying forms) equally crop up or happen in both cases. The foe then becomes typified (i.e. rendered into (a) type(s) or classified under (a) typifying form(s)) around the axes of [[those elements or factors]] doing the separating; the friend (becomes typified) around those (axes) of [[those elements or factors]] (which are (held) in) common, under (i.e. with) the elimination or exclusion of disturbing and disruptive elements and factors (Psychologisch entlastende oder praktisch zweckmäßige Typisierungen kommen gleichermaßen in beiden Fällen vor. Der Feind wird dann um die Achse des Trennenden, der Freund um die des Gemeinsamen unter Ausschaltung störender Momente typisiert). And just as friendship can sometimes like to deceive, and willingly idealises [[people and or things]], so too does enmity like to drive on and carry on with distorted images, and mislead through that which seems to confirm (the) original and initial mistrust. These symmetries indicate that attempts to explain friendship as the privileged or exclusive place or locus of subjectivity in the specifically human sense, are indeed ethically praiseworthy, but social-ontologically groundless, unfounded and baseless.

It appears to be still more difficult to bind and tie “subjectivity” and (the) “end-in-itself” („Subjektivität“ und „Selbstzweck“) in principle to each other. Because a further necessary conceptual differentiation or distinction teaches that not even inside the area, sector or realm of friendship, which is in general

narrower than subjectivity, the partners must mutually take themselves (i.e. each other) as (an) end-in-itself. Without over-the-top, excessive or exaggerated malice we can in fact support the opinion that the world would still await the blessing or godsend of friendship, if the friend had to be (a) pure end-in-itself²⁵⁰. Buber admitted to at least the difference between friendship (in the social-ontological sense of the word) and (the) end-in-itself, by demarcating and delimiting, for instance, erotic love on account of its strong and intense “monological” components from and against the “dialogical approach”²⁵⁰. The area, sector or realm where relations can flourish and thrive as (an) end-in-itself, was consequently conceivably narrow; furthermore, the possibility of such relations was not proved by any concrete example and any psychological or ontological analysis. In (regard to) the thought of the concept of the end-in-itself, (the end-in-itself) is connected with the representation and notion of a beautiful rose, from which one already does not want anything, because it cannot give anything, rather than with the representation and image of a man, who precisely during a “dialogical” relation can, in (a) pure form, gift or give that for which the psyche of the other (person) craves and longs the most: for recognition and (the) confirmation of one’s own identity (nach Anerkennung und Bestätigung der eigenen Identität), even at the price of modifying this same (identity) in accordance with the demands and the process of the “dialogue”. In general, the successful dialogue, in which the I (ego) and (the) You through the effect and impact on each other develop their real, actual subjectivity, can hardly be imagined other than as (the) full mutual, reciprocal recognition and confirmation of the partners [[in the said successful dialogue]] as persons and identities, wherein even the tacit or explicit leadership role of one of both (e.g. in the teacher-student/pupil-relationship) would not change what is essential and of the essence. If, again, only the one side treats the other (side) as (an) end-in-

²⁵⁰ *Dial. Prinzip*, pp. 144, 168ff..

itself, then a “monological” altruistic positioning is possibly available and present, but no(t a) “dialogical” relation. One must not directly parallelise the relation of the I (ego) towards and with the Other with that (relation) towards and with stuff and things (Sachen)²⁵¹, in order to gain insight and understand that (the) talk of the Other and of the I (ego) as mutually and reciprocally recognised pure “ends-in-themselves (Selbstzwecke)” can barely be concretised social-ontologically. The Other can, in fact, be (a) “means” even when the I (ego) therefore looks at, considers and handles, treats him as (an) “end-in-itself” in order to be able to put to the proof and prove that it (the Other) is so/thus, or should or ought to be so/thus (i.e. an “end-in-itself”). The Other becomes and turns into an end-in-itself, therefore, as (the) case of the application of the general principle “the Other is an end-in-itself”. This is no paradox, but the ideational background or backdrop of every educational and paedagogical dictatorship exercised consciously or unconsciously, mildly or wildly, directly or indirectly, in good or in bad faith (Dies ist kein Paradoxie, sondern der ideelle Hintergrund jeder unbewußt or bewußt, mild oder wild, mittelbar oder unmittelbar, in gutem oder bösem Glauben ausgeübten Erziehungsdiktatur). Whoever wants to educate, in relation to that, other (people) (so) that they hold and regard people to be ends-in-themselves, cannot eo ipso class or classify the to-be-educated (person) in his present state of affairs as (an) end-in-himself, otherwise it would be absurd and non-sensical to want to change him “with good intent” and “for his own good”; precisely the shaping, formative urge, drive itch and longing (gestaltende Drang), however, cannot help but reify and

²⁵¹ As Husserl does it in a graphic, vivid and descriptive comparison: I (ego) concern myself with people “as with stuff and things (Sachen). I want their being different (i.e. I want them to be different) (Ich will ihr Anderssein) [[Crazy Man Addition (nothing to do with P.K.): typical fucking JOO!!! HAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Which, of course, Stupid Adolf also thought with the shoe on the other foot ...]], I want to handle and treat them in changing (them), changing (them) in the same wide/broad sense as for (i.e. in the case of) things (Dinge). E.g. they should or ought not to be here, but somewhere else, they should or ought not to be ‘qualitatively’ so and thus, but be otherwise... they should or ought not to be... thus, I can want to kill a man.” (HU, XV, p. 508).

objectify people (Menschen zu vergegenständlichen)^{252 + lxx}. Whoever, therefore, would like to handle and treat people as “ends-in-themselves”, would have to do without, renounce and relinquish every paedagogics or paedagogy, and consequently leave or keep and retain in its present being-so and being-thus (state or essence) a world (und somit eine Welt in ihrem gegenwärtigen Sosein bestehen lassen)(,) which in its praxis is far away/off from handling and treating man as (an) end-in-itself. The contradiction is social-ontologically insurmountable and impregnable, and that is why – generally speaking – always only someone other than the concretely existing and present man/person will be able to be (an) “end-in-itself”: “man” [[in general]] (und daher wird – allgemein gesprochen – immer nur ein anderer als der konkret vorhandene Mensch „Selbstzweck“ sein können: „der“ Mensch). Thus seen, the broad ethical use or usage of the talk of the end-in-itself is explained from the fact that precisely (the) “end-in-itself” can very easily be converted into (a) “means”.

From the comments of the last (few) paragraphs, it has hopefully become apparent and evident why – apart from the dialogical (direction, tendency or school of thought), also an anti-dialogical direction, tendency or school of thought errs, which (anti-dialogical school of thought) believes and opines that (the) mutual and reciprocal reification, objectification or concretisation is the necessary structure of the inter-subjective relation (die gegenseitige Verdinglichung sei die notwendige Struktur der intersubjektiven Beziehung).^{lxxi}

²⁵² Cf. Valéry, *Regards*, p. 82: «Mais toute politique tend à traiter les hommes comme des choses... Même l'intention sincère de laisser à ces individus le plus de liberté possible, et de leur offrir à chacun quelque part du pouvoir, conduit à leur imposer, en quelque manière, ces avantages, dont il arrive, parfois, qu'ils ne veulent guère, et parfois qu'ils pâtissent indirectement... De toute façon, l'esprit ne peut, quand il s'occupe des 'hommes', que les réduire à des êtres en état de figurer dans ses combinaisons. Il n'en retient que les propriétés nécessaires et suffisantes qui lui permettent de poursuivre un certain 'idéal' (d'ordre, de justice, de puissance ou de prospérité ...) ... Il y a de l'artiste dans le dictateur, et de l'esthétique dans ses conceptions.» (= “But every politics or policy tends to treat people as things... even the sincere intention to allow these individuals the most liberty/freedom possible, and to offer every one of them a part of power, ends up imposing upon them, in some way, these advantages, which they sometimes hardly want (at all), and sometimes they suffer indirectly ... in some case, the spirit/intellect-mind cannot – when it occupies and concerns itself with “humans” – but reduce them to beings in a state of featuring within/in(side) its combinations. It retains only the necessary and sufficient properties which permit it to pursue a certain “ideal” (of order, of justice, of power or of prosperity ...) ... There is the artist in the dictator, and aesthetics in his conceptions.”).

The description of the “meeting and encounter” turns out to be in Sartre no less unreal (i.e. non-real or not real) and melodramatic than in Buber, only the signs and symbolism are reversed. I live with and experience the Other as subjectivity with (an) evident nature and obviousness, not because my own subjectivity, in the course of this, lives with and experiences its (i.e. the Other’s) state of being real and actual (or realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness) (Eigentlichkeit), but on the contrary, because the Other already by his glance or view [[at or of me]] converts me into an object (Objekt), and in general occupies the world, which was my world as (a) subject; by defending myself against him, I must, for my part, convert the Other into an object. As long as the Other is activated (i.e. acts) as (a) subject (Subjekt), I have no knowledge of him and no influence on him; and as soon as I am activated and act as a subject, and my influence on the Other is asserted, that (Other) sinks down and descends into the world of objects²⁵³. For Sartre, there can just as little be a mediation between the Other as (an) Object, and the Other as (a) subject, as between me as (a) subject and me as (an) object. Seen structurally, the contrast and opposition between being (a) subject and (being (an)) object (zwischen Subjekt- und Objektsein) as possible positions, situations and attributes of human actors (als möglichen Lagen oder Attributen menschlicher Akteure) remain just as rigid, fixed, inflexible and unforgiving and irreconcilable as in Buber, even though the line of (the) dichotomy runs and proceeds differently in each case: in Buber between I-You and I-It, in Sartre between I and You. But Buber and Sartre equally equate the being an object (Objektsein) of the I (ego) in the Other’s eyes with a degradation, demotion or downgrading or even a threat to the ontic substance and potency of the I (ego) by the Other (oder gar Bedrohung der ontischen Substanz und Potenz des Ich durch den Anderen), and overlook that the being a subject (Subjektsein) does

²⁵³ *Être*, p. 298ff., esp. p. 349.

not necessarily mean a state of affairs in which (the) subjectivity (Subjektivität) can fully develop its “state of being real and actual (or realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness)” or “freedom” („Eigentlichkeit“ oder „Freiheit“), but plainly and simply the consciousness of the subject at being (a) subject (or that it is a subject) (sondern schlicht und einfach das Bewußtsein des Subjekts, Subjekt zu sein). And man (i.e. a human) comes to this consciousness exactly through (by means/way of) the fact that another man directs his attention (irrespective, how) at/to him. Subjectivity is specifically lived through and experienced only when it – under whatever conditions – stands and is opposite and across from another subjectivity – when it becomes and turns into the object of another subjectivity, if one (puts and understands) it so/thus, but without wanting to formulate (a) normative connotation. Sartre forgets that the I (ego), which under the Other’s gaze feels degraded, demoted and downgraded to the/an object, and rebels and revolts against that, can only do this because it is already a constituted subject and was or became such a (thus constituted subject) by means/way of (through) intersubjective meetings and encounters (how (then) otherwise?). And during these meetings and encounters it (i.e. the I (ego)) exercised something social-ontologically considerably deeper and more important than that “shame” (honte), that “angst or fear” and that “pride”, which, according to Sartre as regards that, propels it (i.e. the I (ego)) to put up resistance to the Other’s gaze, and to move onto or proceed to the/a counterattack, that is, to convert, for its part, the Other into an object: it (has) exercised the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (den Mechanismus der Perspektivenübernahme). However, during the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, the Other is simultaneously [[both]] subject and object (Subjekt und Objekt), because only as (an) object (in the value-free sense, that is, without consideration for ethical or existential “realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness (Eigentlichkeit)”), can it (i.e. the Other as an object) generally be perceived and

observed, and only as (a) subject (again in the value-free sense), does it have a perspective, which is supposed to be assumed and taken on/over. Buber skipped, jumped or leaped over the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, because this could not play any central role both during the degradation, downgrading or demotion of the You to (the/an) It (der Degradierung des Du auf Es), as well as during the absolute immediacy of the “essence-related meeting and encounter (wesenhaften Begegnung)”. Sartre does the same, or else leaves or entrusts the shaping, formation and moulding of the meeting and encounter preferably to the feelings of shame, angst (or fear) and pride, because he holds the struggle on both sides around the degradation, downgrading or demotion of the Other – on each and every respective occasion – to the status of the/an object to be an unalterable ontological pre-givenness (or pre-existence) (eine unabänderliche ontologische Vorgegebenheit). The original intersubjective relation must be called conflict, when already the fact of the free existence of the Other sets, puts or places boundaries and borders on my free existence (wenn schon das Faktum der freien Existenz des Anderen meiner freien Existenz setzt), when, that is, the “blueprint or project of/for the recovery, recapture or re-attainment of my I (ego)” must basically be a “blueprint or project of/for the absorption of the Other”; the I (ego) is here for the Other, forever (an) object as well as the other way around²⁵⁴. After our comments and exposition about the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation²⁵⁵, we do not have to especially explain why such a perception hardly does justice to the fact and the great variety and multiformity of social life. The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, that is, the simultaneous objectification and subjectification of the Other lies (goes or comes) before the friendly or inimical relation, *it* (i.e. the said mechanism of perspective taking) only gives insight into this quality and its possible changes, and unfolds and

²⁵⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 413ff., 459ff., 465.

²⁵⁵ See Ch. III, Sec. 3, above.

develops in such breadth because it must reckon with a number of/multiple possibilities, – after all, friendship and enmity, co-operation and conflict are equally original in social life, and that is why they are at all times taken into account as (the) horizons of orientation of (the) plans of acting (or action plans). Wherever the social relation is restricted, limited and confined from the very beginning to one single possibility, (there) every reference to the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is also superfluous; the I (ego) and the Other know, anyhow, how the meeting and encounter are going to proceed. But as (we have) said, this has merely melodramatic, not social-ontological value or worth.

Ethical-normativistic critics have declared Sartre's description of (the) intersubjective meeting and encounter as (a) process of mutual and reciprocal objectification, as (being) one-sided and or false, and pointed to the – at the same time and in the process – necessarily subjective-communicative components having an effect²⁵⁶. The critique/criticism hits the mark and is correct, but from the bringing out of these components up to the – through that – intended proof of the ethical-normative quality of the meeting and encounter it is a long way. Only whoever connects value judgements with subjectivity and objectivity – and therein between Sartre and his critics, unspoken and presumably unreflected negative agreement prevails and dominates (rules, holds sway) – can accept that the overcoming of the objective character of the meeting and encounter ipso facto accentuates and bears out (or brings to bear) (the) “good” subjectivity. Subjectivity (Subjektivität), however, *as* subjectivity is no(t) less rich in real and possible content than its specific inner/internal mechanism for the manufacture, production or restoration of intersubjectivity (Intersubjektivität), namely the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. As (a/the) possible bearer of all values (Als möglicher Träger aller Werte), subjectivity in itself is value-free (wertfrei), i.e. free

²⁵⁶ See e.g. Taylor, „Negative Freiheit?“, pp. 9ff., 29ff.; Honneth, *Die zerrissene Welt*, p. 149ff..

of/from this or that concrete value^{lxxiii}. Sartre, by the way, in a later work, expounded and explicated the subjective essence (character or nature; *Wesen*) of the social relation, and its specific unfolding and development via the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, in (regard to) the example of the struggle, of all examples (*ausgerechnet am Beispiel des Kampfes*). The choice of the example goes back and is reduced of course to the old one-sided assessment of the social-ontological status of the struggle, but already the inclusion of the factor of (the) “mutual/reciprocal perspective” in the analysis of the intersubjective relation brings about, causes or effects an essential change in (regard to) the point which primarily interests us here. It makes, namely, clear that an intersubjective relation, may never be ascribed exclusively an object character (i.e. character as an object; *Objektcharakter*), unless in the term “object”, ethical or existential value judgements have been inserted or put. During the mutual/reciprocal action of the struggle (*Bei der gegenseitigen Aktion des Kampfes*), which rests and is based upon the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, (being an) object and being a subject (*Objekt- und Subjektsein*) are simultaneously and originally given on both sides, and the necessity of being »objet-sujet« for someone, who faces and or opposes him as »sujet-objet«, sets and keeps the great variety and multiformity of »dimensions humaines« in motion. The being a subject is connected in the same actor with the being an object in the sense that the person struggling, who in fact – in the eminent sense – is a subject, sees himself with the eyes of his own foe, that is, he must turn himself into the/an object in order, for his part, to be able to force his way into [[knowing]] and penetrate the foe’s plans of acting (i.e. action plans). To be converted under the gaze of the Other into an object, is not only merely (a) passive state of affairs, but (an) aspect or phase of the struggle activity (i.e. the activity (in respect) of struggle) of two subjects *as* subjects (*Das Subjektsein verbindet sich beim selben Akteur mit dem Objektsein in dem Sinne, daß sich der Kämpfende, der*

sogar im eminenten Sinne Subjekt ist, mit den Augen seines eigenen Feindes sehen, also sich selbst zum Objekt machen muß, um seinerseits in die Handlungswentwürfe des Feindes eindringen zu können. Sich unter dem Blick des Anderen in ein Objekt zu verwandeln, ist nun nicht bloß passiver Zustand, sondern Aspekt oder Phase der Kampfaktivität zweier Subjekte *als* Subjekte). Not feelings like shame or angst and fear are in this activity of struggle the social-ontologically decisive element or factor, as heavily and seriously as they may also weigh psychologically, but the (cap)ability at understanding (is the social-ontologically decisive element or factor). The mutuality and reciprocity of the struggle is the function of the mutuality and reciprocity of understanding, and only (then,) when one of both sides loses the (cap)ability at understanding, does it become and turn into the/a mere object in the eyes and at the hands of the other side²⁵⁷. The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives proves consequently to be the decisive factor, and already its ubiquitous effect deprives (the) talk of the degradation, downgrading or demotion of the Other through its objectification, of every social-ontological sense, i.e. meaning (Nicht Gefühle wie Scham oder Angst sind bei dieser Kampfaktivität das sozialontologisch maßgebliche Moment, so schwer sie auch psychologisch wiegen mögen, sondern die Fähigkeit zum Verstehen. Die Gegenseitigkeit des Kampfes ist Funktion der Gegenseitigkeit des Verstehens, und nur dann, wenn eine von beiden Seiten die Fähigkeit zum Verstehen verliert, wird sie zum bloßen Objekt in den Augen und den Händen der anderen. Der Mechanismus der Perspektivenübernahme erweist sich somit als der maßgebliche Faktor, und schon seine ubiquitäre Wirkung entzieht der Rede von der Degradierung des Anderen durch seine Objektivierung jeden sozialontologischen Sinn).

²⁵⁷ *Critique*, p. 745ff., esp. pp. 747, 750, 753: «...la lutte comme réciprocité est fonction de la réciprocité de compréhension. Si l'un des adversaires cesse de comprendre, il est l'objet de l'Autre.» (= "...the struggle like reciprocity is (the/a) function of the reciprocity of comprehension. If one of the adversaries ceases to comprehend, he is the object of the Other.")

c. The community of communication (communication community) of honest (genuine, sincere) subjects (Die Kommunikationsgemeinschaft der ehrlichen Subjekte)

The theory of communicative action (Die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) is a loose, slack and heterogeneous construct, whose chief components belong neither logically, nor in terms of content, or as regards the history of ideas, together. Its journalistically omnipresent, ubiquitous author tried to underpin his ethical-normative matters of concern through all/ everything that/which crossed precisely his path, and thus he could take inventory and stock of (i.e. record) not only a certain zeitgeist (i.e. spirit of the time(s)/age), which carried and swept along even his opponents, but also the current and ongoing philosophical and social-scientific debates; this explains, for the most part, the great journalistic (and publication-related) success of the theory, which was often denied to – in terms of logic and of content – more demanding, exacting and ambitious creations (or: which was often denied to creations with greater claims on logic and as to content). The commonplaces, which the theory shares with other versions of mass-democratic social theory, as well as its components pertaining to the history of ideas have been/were already discussed²⁵⁸; its (i.e. the said theory's) precarious underpinning as regards language and linguistics, which could not be absent in the years of the linguistic turn (or fashion), will again have to be briefly dealt with in another context²⁵⁹. Here it is a matter of its ethical and social-ontological hard core, which exists independent and irrespective of its outer shells (wrappers or casings) pertaining to the history of ideas and linguistics – just as, incidentally, both these outer shells in themselves have nothing to do with each other. Thus, speech acts (or

²⁵⁸ See Ch. I, Sec. 2 and 3, above.

²⁵⁹ See Ch. V, Sec. 2, below.

acts of speech) in today's form exist since time immemorial, whilst with and to the evolution of history, expectations were tied, linked, combined or connected, which from today's point of view, were never to be realised in "pre-modern" societies. The hard core of theory stands/is very near/close to the dialogical approach and goes back (or is reduced) to the same sources pertaining to the history of ideas; Habermas (has) in fact himself recollected the religious-mystical origins of the "fundamental intention" of (the) theory of communication (or communication theory)²⁶⁰, and consequently betrayed (i.e. divulged or revealed) (what is) illuminating about (the) character and (the) roots of every ethical *rationalism* (ethischen *Rationalismus*). He (i.e. Habermas) has also, with commendable, praiseworthy openness admitted and confessed that the main (chief) representatives of American pragmatism, to whom he owes a deep intellectual(-spiritual) debt of gratitude, (have) "elevated or promoted (raised or lifted) to the/a philosophical rank" the "religious motive of alliance or confederacy (religiöse Motiv der Bundesgenossenschaft)" in the form or shape of these theories^{261 + lxxiii}; Habermas is deeply indebted to Peirce as the originator, author and creator of a "consensus theory of truth" and to Mead as the originator, author and creator of a "theory of communication or communication theory of society"^{lxxiv}. "Ideal communication" and "universal speech" as (a) "process of organisation (or organisation process)" of a through and through democratic "ideal society" was/ had been Mead's secularisation (Säkularisierung) of that motif and at the same time Habermas's declaration of principle(s)²⁶². At the same time, however, there were also other secularisations, which wanted to marry and wed "Reason" and "intersubjectivity" partly (with)in the framework of a politically militant liberalism²⁶³, partly from a

²⁶⁰ *Neue Unübersichtlichkeit*, p. 202.

²⁶¹ *Diskurs*, p. 378.

²⁶² *Geist*, p. 376 ff.. A good decade before (the) appearance of his main work, Habermas programmatically cites this passage („Universalitätsanspruch“, p. 100).

²⁶³ See e.g. Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 27: „Reason does not exist in the singular..., but it (i.e. Reason) must be imagined as (an) interpersonal process in which everyone's contribution is proofed and corrected by others.“

broadly grasped humanistic perspective. To the latter (kind of secularisation) belongs Husserl's plan, outline or blueprint of a "universal sociality as (a) space for all I (ego)-subjects (Ichsubjekte)", in which "latent Reason" attains and achieves (an) evident nature or obviousness, and the entelechy^{lxxv} of Reason would develop – in mankind and humanity on (an) inter-subjective basis –, all its potentialities, in order to finally overcome monological-subjective distortions (monologisch-subjektiven Verzerrungen); this was the plan or blueprint, outline of and for an "ontology of the life world (Ontologie der Lebenswelt)"²⁶⁴.

The theory of communicative action (Die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) has/did not fail(ed) or neglect(ed) to appropriate and make its own the Husserlian secularisation of the religious motive of alliance and confederacy next to the rest [[of various kinds of secularisation]]. In the course of this, it (i.e. the theory of communicative action), incidentally, let in (i.e. embodied) one of its many internal contradictions, because the life world (world of life; Lebenswelt) was supposed to, on the one hand, be the place or locus in which communicative action unfolds and develops principally through the critique and counter-critique of claims (in respect) of validity (durch die Kritik und Gegenkritik von Geltungsansprüchen), but on the other hand, through and by means of its pre-reflexive/pre-reflective backdrops and backgrounds and solidarities (i.e. kinds and forms of solidarity) serves as "the conservative counterweight to the risk of dissent (in respect) of ongoing processes of understanding regarding and via claims of validity (validity claims)"²⁶⁵. That the given actual facts of the life world are either socially neutral and, in this respect, irrelevant as concrete motives of acting, action and the act, or else in need of

²⁶⁴ *Krisis*, pp. 9ff., 13ff., 126ff., 175ff.; cf. *Zur Phän. d. Intersubjektivität*, III = *Hu*, XV, p. 378ff., 403ff., 593ff.. [[Translator's addition (nothing to do with P.K.): typical JOO!!! He wants **GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE** accumulations of forms of power and wealth for his Tribe, but also "universal intersubjective human Reason" so everyone can simply accept that **ZIO SUPREMACY** "just happens"!!! On the other hand, Husserl was one of the better minds overall – and there can be no doubt about that.]]

²⁶⁵ Thus, Habermas, *Diskurs*, p. 379, cf. p. 365; regarding the power claim cf. Matthiesen, *Dickicht*, esp. pp. 64, 79. See also Ch. I, footnote 60, above.

interpretation, and consequently conflict-prone or pregnant with and bearing (potential) conflict, we already know and we do not have to come back and refer to that (matter); finally, in fact, civil wars break out precisely against the background of common lifeworlds²⁶⁶. Regardless of that, the communicative appropriation of the Husserlian concept rests and is based on an important and significant philosophical question. The theory of communication (or communication theory) attributed its own performances and achievements to the decision to free itself and break away from the paradigm of the philosophy of the subject (or subject philosophy; *Subjektphilosophie*). Now, Husserl's effort and endeavour teaches us that there are means and ways/paths to cope and deal with the examination of the problem of intersubjectivity (by) starting from a subject-philosophical position (i.e. a position pertaining to the philosophy of the subject). (The) presupposition, precondition and prerequisite for that remains, incidentally, the purely transcendental consideration of the individual and of the collective Ego, through which, by definition, everything is distanced from the former (individual Ego) which could make the latter (collective Ego) in itself contradictory and brittle or fragile. The founding of intersubjectivity on Reason rests and is based, for its part, on the bringing, carving and working out of the components of Reason in the transcendental Ego as the element and factor which the I (ego) shares with the rest of the I-s (i.e. egos) in the same sense and to the same extent. This yields and results in the epoch (*Epoche*), i.e. the way of looking at and consideration of the I (ego) under and by means of the putting aside or elimination of the (i.e. what is) individual and the (i.e. what is) accidental^{lxxvi}. (The) transcendental orientation is, finally, more decisive than the form-related (i.e. formal) start(ing) (point) of the subjectivity or of the intersubjectivity when, anyhow, harmonising-communicative aims (*harmonisierend-kommunikative Ziele*) are borne in mind and aimed at, (in regard) to whose

²⁶⁶ See Section 1Ba in this chapter, above.

realisation Reason-gifted or Reason-talented (i.e. rational) men/humans/people (vernunftbegabte Menschen) were called (i.e. summoned). The theory of communication (or communication theory) sets [[as its task]], indeed, already at the beginning, that which (the) old and new subject theory (i.e. theory of the subject) wanted to achieve at the end. However, it (i.e. the theory of communication) must equally make use of the transcendental epoch (der transzendentalen Epoche) at least in the form that it a limine disregards the irreducible (individual, accidental etc.) differences of subjects (as) between one another, in order to prepare the ground – for everyone, common, and in (regard to) everyone, equal – communicative Reason. Whoever attempts to imagine the participants in dominance-free discourse (i.e. discourse free of dominant authority) in all its particulars (Wer sich die Teilnehmer am herrschaftsfreien Diskurs im einzelnen auszumalen veruscht), can connect with their (the said participants’) shape and form concrete persons as little as with Kant’s or Husserl’s transcendental Ego (transzendentelem Ego); some followers and supporters of the theory of communication identify and equate, by the way, in their imagination, often the participants in dominance-free discourse with their own ideal Ego (Idealego), and since they are also not capable of recognising between their ideal Ego and their empirical Ego any great or major differences, thus they consider dominance-free discourse thoroughly doable and feasible also on this side of transcendence pertaining to the theory of communication (so halten sie den herrschaftsfreien Diskurs auch diesseits kommunikationstheoretischer Transzendenz für durchaus machbar). The transcendental bridges between subject philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of the subject) and theories regarding (the) communication communities (or communities of communication) of rational subjects (Die transzendentalen Brücken zwischen Subjektphilosophie und Theorien über Kommunikationsgemeinschaften vernünftiger Subjekte) are, by the way, very old. Classical subject philosophy produced its own (kinds of) secularisation(s)

of the “religious motive of alliance or confederacy (religiösen Motivs der Bundesgenossenschaft)”, e.g. by the young Hegel in the phase of his radical Kantianism and in connection (or contact) with Fichte’s perceptions and views pointing the way forward or to the future [[for (German) philosophical thought]]²⁶⁷.

A further thought or consideration likewise shows that the renunciation of the philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) in itself does not in the least suffice in order to found all (the) normative claims of the theory of communicative action (der Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns), rather these (normative claims) have to be presupposed separately. Because every [[such]] renunciation would only then bring about the (theoretical) freeing or liberation of the subject from its isolation and encapsulation (Abkapselung) and only then (theoretically, i.e. in terms of theory) eliminate the tendency or proclivity of the isolated and encapsulated subject (die Neigung des abgekapselten Subjekts) to handle and treat other subjects end(goal)-rationally (purposefully, rationally or expediently) as objects, if intersubjectivity and communication amongst subjects could mean nothing other than a relation which would have to stand and be under the aegis and influence of ethically-normatively comprehended communicative action. This is not the case. The area or realm of intersubjectivity and communication is co-extensive with the spectrum of the social relation in its entire breadth. Kant, who knew of this breadth and its necessity (“unsociable or asocial sociability” („ungesellige Geselligkeit“)), did not feel impelled precisely because of that to search for and seek the cause of (or reason for) ethics and of/for moral behaviour beyond Reason and the subject’s insight and understanding (nach dem Grund der Ethik und des moralischen Verhaltens jenseits der Vernunft und der Einsicht des Subjekts zu suchen). And in actual fact: if/when the moral demand before the conscience of

²⁶⁷ Regarding that, Kondylis, *Entstehung*, p. 424ff..

the individual does not last (and has no existence), then no other guarantees for its (i.e. the said moral demand's) realisation can be recognised. That is not supposed to mean that it is realisable, it means however, only in this manner is its realisation conceivable and imaginable. Compared with and in contrast to this, the renunciation of subject philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of the subject) must shift or transfer the cause of or reason for the (i.e. what is) ethical to the intersubjective level, and it may [[do]] this logically only if this level – in accordance with its essence or nature – constitutes a favourable terrain for the tree of ethics. That is why the necessity [[arises]] of occupying the concept of communication a limine with ethical-normative content(s). Habermas was also not the first, who did this. In Mead, approaches can be clearly recognised in relation to that, and an American sociologist^{lxxvii}, who argued in his (i.e. Mead's) spirit, had in fact defined “communication” as the counter concept of “competition”; he meant, (the) former (concept of “communication”) is the principle of integration and of socialisation, (the) latter (concept of “competition”) that (principle) of individuation²⁶⁸. In an essentially different tradition, Jaspers – (in/by) varying the existential contrast and opposition between the authentic (real, actual, genuine or true) and inauthentic (non-real, unactual, ungenthine or untrue) (den existentialistischen Gegensatz von Eigentlichem und Uneigentlichem variierend) – distinguished between “existential” communication, which is supposed to describe or refer to becoming real and being oneself (das Wirklichwerden und Selbstwerden) jointly and in common with the Other, and (the) mere “communication of being (t)here or existence (Daseinskommunikation)”, during which (the) subjects remain substances separated from one another²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁸ Park, “Reflections”, esp. pp. 192, 195.

²⁶⁹ *Philosophie*, pp. 305ff., 338ff..

We, consequently, approach and draw near(er) to the social-ontological essence of the matter, case or thing, and at the same time, the hard core of the theory of communicative action. The ethical-normative concept of communication does not want to be a mere call, request or exhortation towards or for (the purpose of) corresponding action, but raises or makes the claim of describing, outlining or portraying a social-ontologically autonomous type of action (einen sozialontologisch selbständigen Typ des Handelns), which can be demarcated and delimited structurally against the type of strategic action^{lxxviii}. Under both these types, entirely concrete acts, actions and kinds of acting are able to be classified, not for instance, different aspects of one single act, action or (kind of) acting²⁷⁰. The theoretical analysis starts here during and in this decisionistically imported dichotomy, i.e. by ignoring the in itself obvious (suggesting itself) question [[as to]] whether (then) between both types of acting or (the) act(ion) there are form-related (i.e. formal) structural commonalities, and what these are: on the basis of which criteria may or should one otherwise characterise both (types) equally, as it happens in fact here, as types of *social* action (Die theoretische Analyse setzt hier bei dieser deziisionistische eingeführten Dichotomie an, d. h. sie überspringt gleich am Anfang die sozialontologische Tiefendimension, indem sie die an sich naheliegende Frage ignoriert, ob es denn zwischen den beiden Handlungstypen formal strukturelle Gemeinsamkeiten gebe und welche diese sein; aufgrund welcher Kriterien darf man sie sonst beide gleichermaßen, wie es ja hier geschieht, als Typen *sozialen* Handelns bezeichnen)? In the place (i.e. instead) of a detailed and thorough discussion of the social-ontological depth dimension (i.e. dimension of depth) goes (or there is) the/a vague supposition that communicative action is the genuine and original type of action, the act or acting; on the other hand, strategic action (is) a kind of falling away, decline and deterioration from (and

²⁷⁰ Habermas, *Theorie d. komm. Handelns*, I, p. 385ff..

compared with) this model, pattern or sample (An die Stelle einer eingehenden Erörterung der sozialontologischen Tiefendimension tritt die vage Vermutung, kommunikatives Handeln sei der echte und ursprüngliche Handlungstyp, strategisches Handeln hingegen eine Art Abfall von diesem Muster). However, how did it (or things) come to this decline and deterioration, and indeed to such an extent that the genuine and original [[element or dimension]] from now on – admittedly²⁷¹ – hardly or [[only]] slightly determines social reality? The mere formulation of such elementary aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) would of course blow up, blast or burst open the foundations of the theory of communicative action^{lxxix}. The silence regarding that leads [[us]] again to an unintentional or unwilled/unwanted acknowledgement of the fact that thus, as things just are now, they must start, emanate and originate in terms of practice and of theory from the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation. Whoever underlies or takes as his basis the dichotomy “strategic-communicative action”, has basically signed, underwritten or subscribed to the dichotomy “enmity-friendship”. With the one difference, [[being]] that in Habermas the concept of communicative action is understood in a still narrower sense than friendship, social-ontologically understood. Strategic action encompasses in fact, as game theories report, relate or tell, not only action in conflict situations (situations of conflict), in which one’s gain or win must entail alien or another’s loss, but also co-ordinated action, in which conflict and co-ordination go and accompany each other, that is, both sides draw unequal gains and wins from the co-operation²⁷². Normatively meant communicative action aims not at friendship in the sense of strategic co-ordination and still less in the sense of strategic co-operation. In such a case, amongst other things (inter alia), the contrast and opposition between “system” and “lifeworld” would take care of itself, because the former (“system”) can exclusively and solely live from and

²⁷¹ Loc. cit., pp. 150, 198.

²⁷² See e.g. Hardin, “Social Evolution”, p. 359ff..

on co-ordinated (and co-operative) act(ion)s and kinds of acting. Regarding the fact that the theory of communicative action cannot be satisfied with such calculatedly selfish and self-serving friendship (kalkuliert eigennützigem Freundschaft), there is only one single reason or cause: its ethical impulse and its ethical character.

The primacy of the ethical factor explains, finally, why the social-ontological depth dimension (or dimension of depth), in which exactly this factor is lost and dies out and perishes, is simply leapt over, and the analysis only starts at the tier or level where ethical distinctions and differentiations are possible. In taking a closer and more detailed look, in fact the difference between communicative and strategic action does not turn out or prove to be one such (difference) of form-related (i.e. formal) structure, but a difference of ethical content(s), i.e. of the ethical positionings, stances, attitudes and intentions of the actors (nicht als eine solche der formalen Struktur, sondern als Differenz der ethischen Inhalte, d. h. der ethischen Einstellungen und Absichten der Akteure). And here the theoretical proposition is restricted and limited to old platitudes. Habermas defines the contrast and opposition between communicative and strategic action with the help and on the basis of the same criteria(,) which Buber took as his basis in order to conceptually tell apart and distinguish between the basic word (term or expression) I (ego)-You and the basic word (term or expression) I-It. In his (i.e. Buber's) definition, the *social-ontological* fact that in strategic action, not differently than in communicative (action), the Other *must* be handled and treated as (a) *subject*, that is, as (an) essence which constitutively has at its disposal the (cap)ability of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and correspondingly of flexible acting and reacting (flexiblen Agierens und Reagierens), does not count in any way. It (i.e. Buber's said definition) exclusively and solely counts (i.e. takes into account) the *ethical* point of view that the I (ego) *intends* to use the Other as (an) object or as (a) means for the

attainment and achievement of its/his goals and ends. That is why the strategically acting person does not make any “ontological” (!) distinction between physical objects and men/humans, it starts from an undifferentiated “one-world-concept” (einem undifferenzierten „Ein-Welt-Begriff“)^{273 + lxxx}. Instrumental rationality, which is after (i.e. seeks to attain and aims at) “self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung)” and “making [[something, things]] available (Verfügarmachung)”, does not stand out from and contrast with (the) strategic (rationality) through the/a (decisive and determinative) manipulatory intention, but merely through the object of this intention (Gegenstand dieser Intention): there, in the one case, it is a matter of nature and technique (i.e. technology) (Natur und Technik), here, in the other case, it is a matter of human antagonists and opponents („Gegenspieler“). (The) “instrumental” and “strategic” [[element or dimension]] seem in a decisive respect to be passing, blending or turning into each other so much that from (the) “communicative” action, “instrumental” (action) is often contradistinguished as such²⁷⁴. The obvious structural nearness and proximity of this position to the premises of the dialogical approach becomes also terminologically tangible, when, for instance, the non-communicative concept of acting, action and the act is characterised as “monological”²⁷⁵. Here Weber is meant, who allegedly or supposedly defines and determines subjective sense (i.e. meaning) as a “pre-communicative” intention (in respect) of acting, action and the act, and hence, cannot introduce or import/ bring in the concept of social action by means and way of an explication of the concept of meaning. Nonetheless, Weber stresses that in *social* action, the subjectively meant meaning refers and relates to other (people’s) behaviour. This fully and completely suffices for the manufacture, making or restoration of a constitutive interrelation between meaning and social

²⁷³ *Theorie d. komm. Handelns*, I, p. 131ff..

²⁷⁴ Loc. cit., I, pp. 28, 385, 525.

²⁷⁵ Loc. cit., I, p. 378, cf. p. 455.

action if one – in the interest of the “communicative” formation and elaboration of acting, action and the act – does not want to suggest that the actor should, regarding the normative meaning of his own act, achieve consensus with other (people). Social-ontologically seen, the meaning of action is formed, shaped and moulded in fact, anyway, in talk, conversation or discussion with the rest of the actors, irrespective of whether this talk, conversation or discussion is aloud or silent, real or constructed (i.e. manufactured or fabricated): it is the talk, conversation or discussion which makes the reflexive/reflective and the intensified assumption and taking on/over of perspectives unavoidable. Whether the actor wants to give this talk, conversation or discussion the (narrower) meaning of the/an express search for a normative consensus with other (people) or not – this is an ethical, not a social-ontological matter of concern (Gemeint ist hier Weber, welcher angeblich den subjektiven Sinn als eine „vorkommunikative“ Handlungsabsicht bestimmt und daher den Begriff des sozialen Handelns nicht durch eine Explikation des Sinnbegriffes einführen kann. Weber betont indes, daß beim *sozialen* Handeln der subjektiv gemeinte Sinn auf das Verhalten anderer bezogen wird. Dies reicht zur Herstellung eines konstitutiven Zusammenhanges zwischen Sinn und sozialem Handeln vollkommen aus, wenn man, im Interesse der „kommunikativen“ Ausgestaltung der Handlung, nicht suggerieren will, der Akteur solle über den normativen Sinn eigenen Handelns mit anderen Konsens erreichen. Sozialontologisch gesehen gestaltet sich ja ohnehin der Sinn des Handelns im Gespräch mit den übrigen Akteuren, gleichgültig, ob dieses Gespräch laut oder stillschweigend, real oder konstruiert ist: Es ist das Gespräch, das die reflexive und potenzierte Perspektivenübernahme unumgänglich macht. Ob der Akteur diesem Gespräch den (engeren) Sinn der ausdrücklichen Suche eines normativen Konsenses mit anderen geben will oder nicht – dies ist eine ethische, nicht eine sozialontologische Angelegenheit).

The background and backdrop of this simplistic contradistinction between instrumental-strategic and communicative action constitute the – also in the dialogical approach – old motifs pertaining to cultural critique having an effect, i.e. the stylised contrasts and opposition(s) between technique (technology) and humanity, on the one hand, (between) society and community, on the other hand, which now live through and are experiencing their (for the) umpteenth (time) metamorphosis in the form and shape of the opposition and contrast between system and lifeworld. The communicative end-in-itself is set against the end/goal-means(or means-ends)-schema of instrumental-strategic rationality (Den Hintergrund dieser simplizistischen Gegenüberstellung von instrumentell-strategischem und kommunikativem Handeln bilden die auch bei der Dialogik wirkenden alten kulturkritischen Motive, d. h. die stilisierten Gegensätze zwischen Technik und Humanität einerseits, Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft andererseits, die nun ihre x-malige Metamorphose in Gestalt des Gegensatzes zwischen System und Lebenswelt erleben. Dem Zweck-Mittel-Schema der instrumentell-strategischen Rationalität steht hier der kommunikative Selbstzweck entgegen). Of course, Habermas makes clear and clarifies – rather incidentally – that (the) communicative acting, action and act shares the teleological structure of all (kinds of) acting, action and the act, that it (i.e. communicative acting/action) is not absorbed by or assimilated in the act of understanding (in communication, up to agreement) (im Akt der Verständigung), and that (the) actors have different aims, which they pursue via this act (Akt)²⁷⁶. More emphatically, he (i.e. Habermas) underlines, however, that the acts of understanding (in communication, up to agreement) (Verständigungsakte), which tie together, link, combine and associate the plans of acting, action and the act of several actors to and with an interaction context (or interrelation and context of interaction; Interaktionszusammenhang), “for

²⁷⁶ Loc. cit., I, pp. 150, 151, 385.

their part are not able to be reduced to teleological action”, that understanding (in communication, up to agreement) is no mere “solution of a problem of co-ordination”²⁷⁷. With the matter of concern, wish or desire of freeing and liberating communicative understanding (in communication, up to agreement) (kommunikative Verständigung) from the load, weight or burden of practical cares, troubles and worries, goes the methodical (i.e. methodological) decision to study the structure of this understanding exclusively and solely at the level of speech acts (or acts of speech; Sprachakte). And here again the search for “realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness (Eigentlichkeit)” and “originality (or naturalness and the unspoilt state) (Ursprünglichkeit)” is made noticeable, whilst – without historical-genetic(al) or empirical speech analyses – it is ensured or assured that language use/usage oriented towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement) (der verständigungsorientierte Sprachgebrauch) is the “original mode (Originalmodus)”²⁷⁸. However, the elevation or raising of communicative acting, action or the communicative act to the status of the end-in-itself or of the highest goal and end, notwithstanding prosaic considerations, is implied already in the fundamental division of all act(ion)s into “success-(oriented)” and “understanding-oriented” act(ion)s (in „erfolgs-“ und „verständigungsorientierte“ Handlungen). Were, namely, the admitted teleological structure of all act(ion)s decisive in the context of theory, so, the “end and goal” would have to serve as (a) supra-concept(notion) (i.e. generic (major) term) (Oberbegriff), and the concepts “(orientation towards) success”, as well as “orientation towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement)” (die Begriffe „Erfolgs-“ sowie „Verständigungsorientierung“) would have to then be found at the same logical level or else be equally subordinated to the supra-concept(notion) (i.e. generic (major) term) of the goal

²⁷⁷ Loc. cit., I, p. 388.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

and end, such that they would signify two in principle methodical procedures with equal rights (zwei grundsätzlich gleichberechtigte Verfahren) in attaining and achieving the/a goal/end. The preference for one or the other methodical procedure would then be a purely technical question, matter or problem. The dichotomy, however, does not mean: success via strategy *or* success via understanding (in communication, up to agreement), but success vs. understanding (in communication, up to agreement), in relation to which already the equating of “strategy” and “success” classifies the teleological components unilaterally (under) strategic action, and makes the communicative (component) correspondingly goal/end-free. Communicative action is not defined by the end/goal, but by the manner of its constituting and constitution (Konstituierung); here, therefore, the “unconstrained and unforced” character of understanding (in communication, up to agreement) and the motivation of the person acting by means of reasons exclusively and solely counts²⁷⁹. For success-oriented action, success is by definition everything. Understanding (in communication, up to agreement) can, however, also during practical failure (i.e. failure in practice) succeed perfectly, it (i.e. understanding) does not go back and is not reduced to intersubjective difficulties (in respect) of understanding (in communication, up to agreement), but to a false judgement of data and of the situation (and position) shared by all (the) communication partners (i.e. partners in and of communication). This case shows *ex negativo*, yet very graphically, descriptively, clearly and demonstratively, in which sense and to what extent understanding (in communication, up to agreement) is conceived of as (an) end-in-itself.

If understanding (in communication, up to agreement) as (an) act of ethical rationality is (an) end-in-itself or, in any case, the highest value, thus it is explained why social act(ion)s are not classified in accordance with the

²⁷⁹ Loc. cit., I, p. 525.

objective criterion of their end-goal rationality or their effects and side effects, but merely or only with regard to the subjective “positioning” and the subjective intentions of the actors (Ist Verständigung als Akt ethischer Rationalität Selbstzweck oder jedenfalls höchster Wert, so erklärt sich, warum die sozialen Handlungen nicht gemäß dem objektiven Kriterium ihrer Zweckrationalität oder ihrer Wirkungen und Nebenwirkungen, sondern lediglich im Hinblick auf die subjektive „Einstellung“ und die subjektiven Absichten der Akteure klassifiziert werden). Either one is “oriented” towards success, or towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement); and this latter orientation presupposes (and has as a prerequisite), again, the/a good moral quality, that is, the subjective honesty and “truthfulness”²⁸⁰ of actors. It is indeed admitted that on occasion the strategically acting person also pursues his aims, yet in principle, hushing [[things]] up and hypocrisy belong to his trade. On the other hand, truthfulness is the constitutive feature of communicative action oriented towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement). Concerning truthfulness and deception, illusion and deceit or self-deception (In punkto Wahrhaftigkeit und Täuschung bzw. Selbsttäuschung), a long [[form of]] casuistry can, though, be developed, which has to do with real dilemmas or with the psychology of ethical action, and in itself already can ruin simplifications of the theory of communicative action alien, strange and foreign to life. However, we want to leave that to one side (or leave it open), and raise the question (as to) whether and how far or to what extent understanding (in communication, up to agreement) resting on mutual and reciprocal truthfulness represents and constitutes a sufficient condition for the attainment and achievement of the ethical aims of communicative action. Two men/people, who look at each other in the eyes, and both say “I hate you”, understand each other perfectly and completely and in complete and perfect truthfulness, however, with that,

²⁸⁰ Loc.cit., I, p. 412.

obviously nothing is achieved which communicative action would have liked to achieve with regard to human living together/co-habitation^{lxxxii}. From the example, in any case, to be gathered and inferred, we must clearly distinguish between (truthful) understanding (in communication, up to agreement) about the situation (or position) and (truthful) understanding (in communication, up to agreement) about the aims of the those acting. But even if this distinction is made, the specific difference between strategic and communicative action has not yet been stated, since also those strategically acting can openly confess their faith in (contrary and opposed) aims, and moreover, they can share (in) the [[same]] judgement or assessment of the/a (common) situation (or position). The single/sole [[thing]], whereby those who are communicatively acting stand out from and are contrasted with these (strategically acting people), is their (i.e. the communicatively acting people's) content-related agreement regarding aims, and if only be it in (the) form of the generally practiced conviction that consensus or peace are in all cases and under all circumstances to be preferred to dissent or (bloody) struggle. For the definition of communicative action, not in the least does the proposition "all participants adjust their individual plans of action or acting to one another" and pursue unreservedly their illocutionary, i.e. truthfully and honestly expressed aims, suffice²⁸¹. Because this "adjusting (abstimmen)" can mean two kinds of things: "formally (i.e. in terms of form) adapting and adjusting to each other or one another (formal aufeinander einstellen)", as strategically acting people must do it by means and way of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, anyhow; and "in terms of content, to bring each other or one another into line (i.e. to harmonise content mutually and reciprocally)", agreeing, in terms of content, over/about the aims, as only friends can do it. Habermas hardly takes any notice of all these fundamental distinctions, because in his zeal to carve, work and bring out

²⁸¹ Loc. cit., I, p. 395.

understanding (in communication, up to agreement) as the “original mode”, and at the same time to prop up and support – through the ontological dignity of the original mode – the ethical claim of communication theory (i.e. the theory of communication), he equates and identifies understanding (in communication, up to agreement) with agreement (approval or consent; *Einverständnis*)²⁸², although already common and popular lexicons and dictionaries cleanly and conscientiously distinguish under the lexical entry “understanding (in communication, up to (but not necessarily with) agreement) (*Verständigung*)” the meaning “to make oneself understood (*Sichverständlichmachen*)” from the meaning “agreement (*Einigung*)”. With that goes the fact that he (i.e. Habermas) only in passing and parenthetically touches upon the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and then only as the confirmation of the understanding(-related) capacity for consensus of those acting (*als Bestätigung der verstehenden Konsensfähigkeit der Handelnden*). Mead’s ambiguity on this important point eludes him (i.e. Habermas) completely, or else the reading of Mead helps him get past and go beyond the content-related double-sidedness of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives²⁸³.

One could now believe and or opine that understanding (in communication, up to agreement) as consensus can be attained and achieved both regarding and concerning the judgement of the position and situation (or situational assessment), as well as regarding and concerning the aims by way and means of the putting forward, formulation and discussion of “criticisable claims of validity” on the part of all partners in communication. That which neither truthfulness, nor understanding (in communication, up to agreement) could offer, afford, achieve or accomplish, namely, drawing an absolutely clear

²⁸² Loc. cit., I, p. 386ff.

²⁸³ Loc. cit., II, p. 23ff..

dividing line between strategic and communicative action, is supposed to now be ensured and guaranteed by means of the critique of each and every respective raised and made claim of validity, which allegedly specifically characterises communicative action (Das, was weder Wahrhaftigkeit noch die Verständigung leisten konnten, nämlich eine absolut klare Trennungslinie zwischen strategischem und kommunikativem Handeln zu ziehen, soll nun durch die Kritik der jeweils erhobenen Geltungsansprüche gewährleistet werden, welche angeblich kommunikatives Handeln spezifisch kennzeichnet). This is (does) not (hold) true. Claims of and to validity are always criticisable, regardless of whether they want to be criticised or not. Foes do not, in fact, do anything other than (to) criticise and critique (negatively) the claims of validity of each and every respective other side, so that again neither the concept “claim of validity (Geltungsanspruch)” nor the concept “critique (Kritik)” are capable in themselves of yielding, making up and constituting the ultimate and absolutely autonomous criterion for the distinction and differentiation between “communicative” and non-communicative act(ion)s. Only the fact, or in any case, the certainty of a consensus after critique specifically befits communicative action, however, this comes down to, ends up in or amounts to a – by the way, unavoidable, see below – tautology. Apart from that, one can, as Habermas repeatedly reassures [[us]], take a position as regards a claim of and to validity with a Yes or a No. We learn nothing [[about]] how it is/things are supposed to continue, carry on and proceed after a No. Obviously, to negation, a second claim of validity must be counterposed and said in reply, to a new negation, a third (claim of validity) and so on, and so forth; one steps into a vicious circle, and with that in the best case boredom [[arises]], and in the worst case, aggressive nervousity (i.e. nervousness). Be that as it may, the putting forward, formulation and critique of always newer claims of and to validity throws (i.e. sends) those communicating (die Kommunizierenden) back to the problem of understanding (in communication, up to agreement) and to the level

of [[such]] understanding. Because every new claim of validity must be more comprehensive than the earlier (claim of validity), it (i.e. every new claim of validity) must therefore contain it (i.e. the previous claim of validity) and found it (i.e. this new claim of validity) at a higher level of generalisation, wherefore also understanding (in communication, up to agreement) will be concerned with always more fundamental questions, until it (i.e. this understanding) touches upon the ultimate questions and problems of meaning and legitimation, which can hardly be separated from questions and problems of identity and recognition.^{lxxxii} In (regard to) the critique of claims of validity, a linear course is possible, in which the founding of claims of validity directly or via logical mid-stations or halfway stations (Mittelstationen) take place by invoking the highest authorities (“that is God’s will”, “ethics demands that”, “rationality commands that”). Several divergences, deviations or digressions from (a) linear schema and combinations are, however, also conceivable. Ultimate questions and problems can remain left aside, ignored and excluded, be it because both sides (nominally) confess faith in and profess the same fundamental principles and values, be it because – conversely – they consider, their, regarding this fundamental principle, opposition to be unbridgeable, and pragmatically, that is, on the basis of the existing correlation of forces, want to concentrate on the “doable and feasible”^{lxxxiii}. For (i.e. as regards) the course of the relation it is, though, in terms of practice, indifferent whether the highest claims of validity on both sides are approved of and endorsed, and consequently are outside of the (i.e. what is) criticisable or whether they do not do it (i.e. approve of and endorse the highest claims of validity). Because in the latter case, critique of them (i.e. the highest claims of validity) are – in practice – irrelevant(,) when the communication in the field of interest functions perfectly – that is, in accordance with the rules of the theory of communicative action. In the former case, again, dissent concerning the critique of a claim of validity, which, logically and in terms of content, is more or less narrower than the highest

claims of validity, can bring about and lead to consequences which can be as regards the logical and content-related extent of the claim of validity in question not at all analogical (i.e. consequences which do not proportionately correspond to the said dissent concerning a critique of a claim of validity). (The) extensivity and intensity of (the) claims of and to validity (Extensität und Intensität der Geltungsansprüche) stand and are in fact in no necessary relation with each other, and accordingly no table can be set up which will show or indicate in advance with what persistence, perseverance and thoroughness may every claim of and to validity be criticised. Regarding that, every time concrete actors in concrete situations (and positions) (die konkreten Akteure in den konkreten Lagen) decide and make a decision anew, according to which place the – on each and every respective occasion – brought-forward or put-forward (or proposed) claim of validity occupies in their (the said concrete actors’) horizon of expectation on each and every respective occasion, in relation to which this place influences the course of the communication normally more than the logical and content-related extent of the claim of validity looked at absolutely (i.e. in absolute terms).

These thoughts and considerations were/are supposed to have explicated our thesis that the announcement of a criticisable claim of validity must – every time – unroll or re-open anew the problem of the level of understanding (in communication, up to agreement). That means that [[such]] understanding as (the) critique of claims of validity presupposes a critique of the claim of validity of every logical and content-related level, at which (the) claims of validity should be criticised. Communication contains a meta-communicative component (Die Kommunikation enthält eine metakommunikative Komponente), that is a tacit or expressive understanding (in communication, up to agreement) about the conditions under which communication as (the) critique of claims of and to validity takes place. If one starts from the not in the least

self-evident – and to boot rather naive – conviction that meta-communicative claims of and to validity are criticisable in this manner like (the) communicative (claims of and to validity), that is to say that in meta-communication and communication the same rules of argumentation apply (bei Metakommunikation und Kommunikation dieselben Argumentationsregeln gelten), then one merely exposes the communicative process in its totality all the more to the danger of the/an argumentative vicious circle^{lxxxiv}. The theory of communicative action does precisely this by ignoring the meta-communicative problem and consequently suggests that all levels and fields would be argued and would proceed with the same presuppositionlessness (Voraussetzungslosigkeit). On the other hand, it (i.e. the theory of communicative action) avoids, prudently and very wisely, to give information about the case in which the criticisable claim of validity or of dissent concerns (the) meta-communicative (level). It a limine restricts and limits the search for consensus (Konsens) to cases in which not abstract-general norms, but “conflicts (in respect) of acting, action and the act” are up for debate “in a concrete situation” („Handlungskonflikte in einer konkreten Situation“)²⁸⁴. Apart from the fact that this restriction and limitation does not necessarily influence the intensity of a conflict, in a concrete conflict in respect of acting, action or the act, the possibility always inheres of the transforming and converting [[of this concrete conflict]] into an (explicit) conflict regarding (the) norms of acting, action and the act (Handlungsnormen). The (fundamental) principle of universalisation (Der Universalisierungsgrundsatz), that, namely, all people concerned accept the consequences which arise and result from the general keeping to and following of the norms of acting, action and of the act, for the interests of every individual, cannot help [[us]] along [[in solving the problem]]; it merely shifts the criticisable claims of and to validity to a higher and more comprehensive

²⁸⁴ Habermas, *Moralbewußtsein*, p. 113.

logical and content-related level. Because it is now asked whether the disputed norm of acting/action and the act is in actual fact universalisable or whether its application is correct. (The fact) that/That even in norms of acting, action and the act recognised generally as universal, material points of view, in practice, are decisive, is incidentally, conceded and admitted – although without reflection, thought and consideration of the implications²⁸⁵. In which catch-22 situation or dilemma, the critique of claims of validity find themselves, can be recognised when we visualise, picture or make clear to ourselves both standpoints from which it (the said critique of claims of and to validity) is undertaken: it either touches upon the legitimacy of the claims of validity or upon their legality (Sie rührt entweder an der Legitimität der Geltungsansprüche oder an ihrer Legalität)²⁸⁶. Since legitimacy concerns “moral” issues and affairs, then in a certain deepening of critique, the levels of understanding (in communication, up to agreement), sooner or later, both as regards the fundamental discussion of the norms of acting, action and the act in connection with ultimate questions of meaning and value(s), as well as about/with regard to the meta-communicative dimension, must be widened, extended and expanded and, consequently, continuously go on and on forever. If, again, the claim of and to legality stands and is under critique, thus, this implies the acceptance of a limit (in respect) of and to critique, since the legality standing and being on this side of (i.e. within) legitimacy, at least (with)in the framework of running (i.e. current) understanding (in communication, up to agreement), must be regarded as given and unalterable and irrevocable; this, of course, must detract from and be detrimental to the dignity and the omnipotence of rationality^{lxxxv}.

²⁸⁵ Loc. cit., p. 76. Here we read that the universal norm of acting, action and the act “makes possible” an “agreement in practical discourses always when and if matters can be managed, controlled or regulated in the uniform, even, equal, symmetrical or well-proportioned interests of all those concerned” (ein „Einverständnis in praktischen Diskursen immer dann ermöglicht, wenn Materien im gleichmäßigen Interesse aller Betroffenen geregelt werden können.“)

²⁸⁶ *Theorie d. komm. Handelns*, I, p. 405.

The form-related/formal-structural equating of the meta-communicative and communicative levels, of the preconditions and the course of communicative action, with one another, takes on the shape and form of the/a postulate that for the unimpeded handling and processing of the critique and counter-critique of the claims of and to validity, the having and bearing equal rights (or the equivalence or equality) of the partners in and of communication and the lack of every relationship of dominance (and dominant authority) or of power guarantee and vouch for [[this state of affairs of equality]] amongst them (i.e. the said partners in/of communication); ((the) equal and same rationality, intelligence and education, learning and formation are regarded as self-evident and are not a theme, topic or matter (of concern and for discussion).^{lxxxvi}) Dominance freedom (i.e. being free from dominant authority) and equality constitute the presupposition, the structural basis or fundamental feature and happy, felicitous or fortunate result of communicative action in one (Die formal-strukturelle Gleichsetzung von metakommunikativer und kommunikativer Ebene, von Vorbedingungen und Ablauf des kommunikativen Handelns miteinander nimmt die Gestalt des Postulats an, für die ungehinderte Abwicklung der Kritik und Gegenkritik von Geltungsansprüchen würde die Gleichberechtigung der Kommunikationspartner und das Fehlen jedes Herrschafts- bzw. Machtverhältnisses unter ihnen bürden; (ihre gleiche Rationalität, Intelligenz und Bildung gilt als selbstverständlich und ist kein Thema.) Herrschaftsfreiheit und Gleichheit bilden die Voraussetzung, das strukturelle Grundmerkmal und glückliche Ergebnis des kommunikativen Handelns in einem). In this manner, the meaning of this which could be considered to be the main thing and the most difficult, i.e. the clarification of the content-related points of contention by critique is starkly and strongly lessened and downgraded, whereby theory hopes for relief from the painful burden of the proof of practical testing (i.e. testing and proving (itself as theory) in practice) (wodurch sich die Theorie Entlastung von der peinlichen Beweislast der praktischen Bewährung erhofft). Because if

freedom from dominance (as dominant authority) and equality are present and exist already at the beginning, and if it is agreed that they will also ride things out and come out alive unscathed and unharmed, then there is no content any longer in the world, which could seriously summon and muster the spirits and intellects earnestly against one another. The content-related dissimilarities, varieties and differences in and of opinion have, in fact, anyway, their meaning not of themselves, but because their course and outcome determines the relative position of the subjects concerned within each and every respective framework in question (Die inhaltlichen Meinungsverschiedenheiten haben ja ohnehin ihre Bedeutung nicht von sich aus, sondern darum, weil deren Verlauf und Ausgang die relative Position der betreffenden Subjekte innerhalb des jeweils in Frage stehenden Rahmens bestimmt). If this position is steady, stable or fixed and – above all – is not after and behind (i.e. is not inferior or subordinate to) any other position, the contents lose very much from their potential as the stuff (i.e. subject matter) of conflict. In addition to that [[is]] the circumstance or fact that already the dominance-free and egalitarian preconditions of communicative discourse anticipate the most important of all content-related decisions (Hinzu kommt der Umstand, daß schon die herrschaftsfreien und egalitären Vorbedingungen des kommunikativen Diskurses die wichtigste aller inhaltlichen Entscheidungen vorwegnimmt). That/The (decision), namely, that there may be no conflict which goes beyond and surpasses the harmlessness of the arguing (i.e. what is being argued or argumentation) (Die nämlich, daß es keinen Konflikt geben darf, der über die Harmlosigkeit des Argumentierens hinausgeht)^{lxxxvii}. What, therefore, the theory of communicative action (die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) offers in reality is a *description* of the mode and manner of the function and existence of an ideal community of communication, *provided that* it (i.e. such an ideal community of communication) can exist. It (i.e. the theory of communicative action), however, offers neither a *proof* that it (i.e. an ideal community of

communication) can exist, nor a concrete direction for its realisation. If one makes or renders a proof (in respect) of reality from the (pr)ffered description, then one must – absolutely theologically – put in the effort, struggle and fight for a thought structure and a (methodical) thought procedure (eine Denkstruktur und ein Denkverfahren), which, for its part, characterised the ontological proof of God^{lxxxviii}: from the attribute of perfection, reality or realisability must be derived and deduced as the inseparable quality, property or characteristic of perfection²⁸⁷. Said more banally, it is a matter of a more extensive version of the age-old interweaving of Is and Ought, of which ethical-normativistic thought as a rule makes use, in order to be founded (and established) with ultimate arguments (Banaler gesagt, handelt es sich hier um eine weitere Version der uralten Verflechtung von Sein und Sollen, deren sich ethisch-normativistisches Denken in der Regel bedient, um sich mit letzten Argumenten zu fundieren). The “real, genuine or authentic” and “true” being/Is is here the “original mode” of communication, as it allegedly arises or is produced already out of the “original mode” of language (Das „echte“ und „wahre“ Sein ist hier der „Originalmodus“ der Kommunikation, wie er sich angeblich schon aus dem „Originalmodus“ der Sprache ergibt). The Ought (Das Sollen), in fact, fulfills with its essence (Wesen) and its effect or impact (Wirkung) not the quantitatively far more overriding and predominant area or realm of the “rotten, decayed, foul, putrefied existence (faulen Existenz)” (this is Hegel’s expression, Habermas uses adjectives like “wrong, amiss, miscast (verfehlt)” or “misguided and led astray (irregeleitet)”), but definitely or absolutely the qualitatively unscathed, intact and ontologically decisive field. Against the background (or on the basis) of the thus thought-of and conceived interweaving of I and Ought (Verflechtung von Sein und Sollen), a confusion of the level of communicative

²⁸⁷ This remark equally concerns Apel’s plan or outline of and for a community of communication (or communicative community) (*Transformation*, II, p. 220ff., 359ff.), whose particular explanation is not here worth [[our while/time]]. Cf. Burger’s incisive and acute critique, „Lob“, esp. p. 448ff..

action takes place or proceeds with the level of the communicative theory of acting, action and the act. Since the theory tellingly (or in a well-aimed manner) describes communicative action, and since such action contains ethical-normative claims, so the theory wants, from its ethical-normative essence, of which it speaks, to derive and deduce its own right to formulate ethical-normative instructions. However, the level of description and that of reality, in which such instructions have to be tried and tested, are obviously two different kinds (of level). We subsequently return on a new roundabout way to the old aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of the ontological proof of God.^{lxxxix}

From the structural equating and identification of the preconditions and (the) course of communicative action a (further) conclusion is still to be drawn.

Communicative action as (the) model or blueprint which is supposed to ensure or verify peace between men (humans), can either totally and globally realise (peace), or cannot realise (peace) at all. Because we can imagine that mankind (humanity), or a certain society as a whole broken up into groups, inside of which consensus is manufactured, produced or restored in accordance with all (the) formal rules of communicative action, but every one of these consensus(es) differs – in part or completely – in terms of content, from the other (Aus der strukturellen Gleichsetzung von Vorbedingungen und Verlauf kommunikativen Handelns ist noch eine Schlußfolgerung zu ziehen.

Kommunikatives Handeln als Entwurf, der den Frieden unter den Menschen sicherstellen soll, läßt sich entweder total und global oder überhaupt nicht realisieren. Denn wir können uns vorstellen, daß die Menschheit oder eine bestimmte Gesellschaft als ganze in Gruppen zerfallen, innerhalb deren sich Konsens nach allen formalen Regeln des kommunikativen Handelns herstellt, jeder dieser Konsense sich aber von den anderen inhaltlich zum Teil oder vollkommen unterscheidet). Said otherwise: if “formal pragmatics”

(„Formalpragmatik“)^{xc} remains really formal, and it contains in actual fact no content-related ethical pre-decisions (keine inhaltlichen ethischen Vorentscheidungen) (which would throw theory back (*or*: return theory) into the arms of the traditional teaching or doctrine of virtue (der traditionellen Tugendlehre)), then a – in terms of formal pragmatics – flawless (consensus), but (a) consensus capturing and taking in only a fraction of mankind (humanity) or of society, can bring into the world the war of all against all because of different or even opposed content(s). The difference or contrast and opposition of the contents towards or vis-à-vis one another, can again, as indicated or intimated above, come into being either from the/a diverging interpretation of the same fundamental principles or from the confession of faith in different fundamental principles. And the contents themselves do not necessarily have to have (an) ethical character, so that their proponents, advocates and champions can mutually attest truthfulness, and can share the same judgement and assessment of the situation and position as regards an unforced, unconstrained or casual discourse (ungezwungenem Diskurs). Thus seen, and remaining strictly with criteria pertaining to formal pragmatics, it could be said cum grano salis [[= with a grain of salt]] that this image or picture is not very far from historically attested and witnessed human-social reality (geschichtlich bezeugten menschlich-sozialen Wirklichkeit). Because those who face other (people) as foes are amongst themselves friends, i.e. – at least in (regard to) the questions and problems which separate them from their foes, and to the extent that this separation is important and effective – they mutually and reciprocally hold and consider one another to be truthful and rationally arguing partners of and in communication (*or*: communication partners who are truthful and argue rationally)^{xc}. But the theory of communicative action obviously wants to be something other than this, and since its matter of concern cannot be attained and achieved purely in terms of formal pragmatics, then it smuggles into its premises the ethically correct content(s) (und da sich ihr Anliegen rein

formalpragmatisch nicht erreichen läßt, so schmuggelt sie in ihre Prämissen die ethisch korrekten Inhalte ein). In actual fact, only the certainty that all partial communities (partiellen Gemeinschaften) would have to – already on the basis of the following of and adherence to (or compliance with) the same discursive (methodical) procedure – come across the (one) truth, and, in the course of this, could never err, can found, justify or give reasons for hope in peace amongst them (i.e. the said partial communities). Habermas is of the one (and same) opinion with the prophet Mohammed: “my community will never agree upon an error”^{288 + xcii}.

If the course of communicative action (der Verlauf des kommunikativen Handelns) is dependent on its preconditions and prerequisites (seine Vorbedingungen), what determines then, these preconditions and prerequisites? The answer means/signifies simply (*or*: is simple): the decision of the actor, as the theoretician, of course, likes to imagine or visualise [[things]] (die Entscheidung des Akteurs, wie ihn sich der Theoretiker freilich gerne ausmalt). Whoever wants to behave communicatively in the ethical-normative sense is bound to norms (ist an Normen gebunden), however, no norm prescribes and dictates that one should or ought to act at all or generally, communicatively²⁸⁹. The formulation (putting forward, setting or making up) of norms, which (a communicative action) of that sort commands, amounts or is tantamount to the construction of an ethics, and the appeal to respecting and paying attention to the norms of this ethics must be directed to the insight, understanding and the conscience of the individual (die Einsicht und das Gewissen des Einzelnen) in order to set this (individual) in motion (or drive this individual) to the decision to act communicatively and not strategically. In other words: if the factor “decision (Entscheidung)” and “moral consciousness (moralisches

²⁸⁸ Rosenthal cites the saying, *Pol. Thought in Medieval Islam*, 37 (English version: “my community will never agree upon an error”).

²⁸⁹ Cf. St. Lukes, “Of Gods and Demons”, p. 145.

Bewußtsein)“ cannot be got around or circumvented, then the striven-for overcoming of the philosophy of the subject (Subjektphilosophie) proves to be a fiction. Certainly, one could make the decision to act communicatively out to be the mere return to the realness and actualness (or authenticity, genuineness and trueness) (Eigentlichkeit) of the “original mode”, and ascribe to the latter (realness, actualness, authenticity etc.), not to the subject, the energy (die Energie) for such a decision. Under such circumstances however, under which, admittedly, “wrong, amiss, miscast (verfehlt)” or “misguided and led astray (irregeleitet)” interactions (Interaktionen) have buried or submerged the “original mode” extensively, the ethical force and powers of resistance and (the) determination or resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) of the individual has to still make up for and rectify – up to a point and to some extent – the ontological damage. And just as at the start of communicative action, despite the in principle ostracism of decisionism, a decision must stand (i.e. a decision must be taken and made) (Und wie am Anfang kommunikativen Handelns trotz prinzipieller Ächtung des Dezionismus eine Entscheidung stehen muß), so too the/a dominance(as dominant authority)-free discourse must end with a decision in the event it (i.e. the said discourse) does not lead to the consensus of all with all (i.e. everyone and all parties (concerned) with everyone and all parties (concerned)). We do not mean here the decision by means or by way of the demonstration of power, show of force or passage at arms (i.e. military engagement, engagement with weapons) (Machtdemonstration oder Waffengang), but precisely a procedure, which is generally regarded as the best conceivable regulation for the peaceful-dialogical settlement (arbitration, arrangement or (re)conciliation) of conflicts and, notwithstanding that, is pregnant and burdened by a deep mistrust vis-à-vis the effectiveness of dominance-free dialogue (i.e. dialogue free of dominant authority) (des herrschaftsfreien Dialogs) amongst equals, although it nominally rests and is based upon the dialogical principle. It is a matter of parliamentarism and

parliamentary discussion (Es geht um den Parlamentarismus und die parlamentarische Diskussion). One knows how the dialogical principle was summoned by liberal parliamentarism in order to – as (the) incarnation of collective rationality and transparency (als Inkarnation von kollektiver Rationalität und Transparenz) – expel and drive out the dark arcana imperii, which were kept, guarded, protected and looked after in (the) cabinets (i.e. councils advising a sovereign or a chief executive; groups of persons who help to manage governments; executive and policy-making bodies of countries, consisting of all government ministers or just the senior ministers; bodies of persons appointed by heads of state or prime ministers to head the executive departments of governments and to act as official advisers. etc. [[see standard dictionary definitions]]) (die in den Kabinetten gehütet wurden)^{xciii}. The polemical summoning and the consistent practical application of a principle constitute, however, two entirely different things^{xciv}. In dominant, ruling and practised parliamentarism, governing was never made dependent on the attainment and achievement of a consensus of all with all (i.e. everyone and every party with everyone and every party) as the result of rational discussion (Der herrschende und praktizierte Parlamentarismus hat nie das Regieren von der Erreichung eines Konsenses aller mit allen als Ergebnis rationaler Diskussion abhängig gemacht). Its (i.e. parliamentarism's) saving worldly or life wisdom (i.e. wisdom in respect of life (Lebensweisheit)) was shown and made known in the precaution(ary measure) and provision that discussions were to be put and brought to an end relatively quickly through decisions of and by the majority (i.e. majority decisions) (Mehrheitsentscheidungen), and as a result of rational discussion, in recognising that which on each and every respective occasion seems to be right and correct to the majority. At the end of the/a discussion, a decision, not a consensus must stand (i.e. be taken or made and exist; or: there must be a decision, not a consensus); – thus is (or means) the life-preserving/sustaining principle of parliamentarism, as well as the

sovereignty of the people (or folk) (heißt das lebenserhaltende Prinzip des Parlamentarismus sowie der Volkssouveränität)^{x^{cv}}. This is no fault, flaw, shortcoming or deficiency and it founds or justifies no accusation; it is matter, simply, of a necessity. Foes of parliamentarism, who reduced its (i.e. parliamentarism's) essence to actless (i.e. without act(ion)(s)) joyfulness and gladness in respect of talk, conversation and discussion, have confused its (i.e. parliamentarism's) ideological self-understanding with its praxis and practice (Praxis). The theory of communicative action does the same (Dasselbe tut die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns), even if with different intent. It (i.e. the theory of communicative action) likewise takes the ideal of dominance-free rational discourse at face value; it only wants to, from that, make a consistent praxis under (i.e. during) the failure to appreciate (or whilst misjudging) the relations and circumstances of power and inequality^{x^{cv}}. Such a positioning is indeed, as a well-known sociologist remarked, “hopelessly naive”²⁹⁰, yet behind the naivety, which considers the power claims of other (people and parties) to be revocable (repealable, abrogable, rescindable or voidable) (die die Machtansprüche anderer für aufhebbar hält), hides a power claim of its (i.e. the theory of communicative action's) own (ein eigener Machtanspruch), which models the concrete subjects in accordance with its own normative notions and representations, and – beyond all accidental (random, chance) and inessential (or immaterial) elements, features, characteristics, attributes, traits and dimensions (jenseits aller Akzidentien) – makes and turns them into bearers of a sole and exclusive, and for all (i.e. everyone), binding Reason (verbindlichen Vernunft); the foreground is dialogical, the decisive and determinative transcendental level, monological^{x^{cvii}}. We (have) already explained in which sense and in which way the consideration of man as end-in-himself (die

²⁹⁰ J. Turner, *A Theory*, p. 98. [[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE, NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.: FOR P.K. TO CALL J.H. TURNER A “SOCIOLOGIST” (JUST LIKE ROBERT E. PARK AND NORBERT ELIAS), THERE MUST BE SOME QUALITY TO HIS WORK, UNLIKE THE VAST MAJORITY OF CLOWNS AND RETARDED COMICS (*JOQ* OR NOT) POSING AS “SOCIOLOGY” AND “PHILOSOPHY” ETC. PROFESSORS IN “THE WEST” UNDER (*ZIQ*-)USA (IMPERIALISTIC AND OR HEGEMONIC) DOMINATION.]]

Betrachtung des Menschen als Selbstzweck) can flow into and end up in that which is supposed to be put aside and eliminated: his (i.e. man's) objectification (or reification) (seine Vergegenständlichung)²⁹¹. The ethically motivated theoretician opines and believes, with good and clear conscience, that people/humans as actors or factotums in his rational plan, design or blueprint, are being served well and correctly, and (they are) "real, genuine or authentic subjects". But precisely because people/humans are, anyhow, real, genuine or authentic subjects, they do not fit into any plan, design or blueprint (Der ethisch motivierte Theoretiker meint guten Gewissens, als Akteure oder gar Faktota in seinem rationale Entwurf seien die Menschen gut bedient und „echte Subjekte“. Aber gerade weil die Menschen ohnehin echte Subjekte sind, passen sie in keinen Entwurf hinein).

F. Excursus (i.e. Digression): pity and sympathy. Regarding the pre-history of the theory (in respect) of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Exkurs: Mitleid und Sympathie. Zur Vorgeschichte der Theorie von der Perspektivenübernahme)

Like the concept of the social relation, also that (concept) of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives or (that/the concept) of understanding was influenced or even shaped, moulded or stamped always already by ethical-normative considerations (Wie der Begriff der sozialen Beziehung, wurde auch jener der Perspektivenübernahme oder des Verstehens immer schon durch ethisch-normative Rücksichten beeinflusst oder gar geprägt). The social relation

²⁹¹ See footnote 252 in this chapter, above.

had to just as much mean and signify friendship and co-operation (Freundschaft und Kooperation), in order to be able to equate and identify enmity with asociality and anti-sociality (Feindschaft mit Asozialität). And the (cap)ability as regards the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives was already in Mead looked at as the basis of/for a democratic programme of socialisation (als Basis eines demokratischen Sozialisierungsprogramms). One has often also used “understanding (Verstehen)” and “understanding (in communication, up to agreement) (Verständigung)” one-sidedly in the sense of “agreement (Einverständnis)”, something which suggested the conclusion that conflicts were put down and reduced to “misunderstandings”²⁹². Not otherwise was it with the concepts, to which (be)fell (or went) a noteworthy and conspicuous role in the pre-history of the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. “Pity (Mitleid)” and “sympathy (Sympathie)” have in all ages, eras and epochs, in most authors and in general language usage, ethical connotations; in some cases they had to, in fact, make and constitute the foundation and basis of ethics (das Fundament der Ethik)²⁹³. However, the social-ontological components of these concepts, which build the bridge towards and for the modern theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives were hardly perceived, and they can be brought or carved out from the doxographic tangle, maze, jumble and confusion only when and if the decisive structural points of view serve as the guide (guideline or guiding thread) of the overview of the history of ideas. With the help and on the basis of the same (structural points of view), we can schematise the development (or evolution) [[in the history of ideas]] as follows: in one phase, in which antiquity and the early New Times coincide, stands/is the concept of pity at the centre of

²⁹² Cf. footnotes 282 and 205 in this chapter, above. Cf. from the older sociological literature, Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 233ff.; Stok, „Nähe und Ferne“, pp. 246ff., 259. Also, Shils, “Calling”, p. 1431: “...empathy, which is the essential constituent of consensus.” Regarding a value-neutral (wertneutralen) use of the term “empathy (Empathie)”, see Sec. 1F, the final/last paragraph, below.

²⁹³ Regarding Rousseau’s and Schopenhauer’s attempts at the founding of an ethics of pity, and regarding the history of the concept of “pity” in general, see Hamburger, *Mitleid*.

attention, which indeed is regarded as (an) immediate and direct relation of feeling (Gefühlsbeziehung), however, at the same time, its mechanism is described in such a way that today's reader can gather and infer from that, by means of a more precise analysis, the reflective/reflexive character of this supposed or alleged relation of immediacy and directness. The express ascertainment of this reflectivity/reflexivity constitutes a preliminary stage (pre-tier, pre-level or pre-grade) towards the modern theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and it is encountered in the 18th century in the concept of sympathy (am Sympathiebegriff), which now dominates in the vocabulary, even though it, of course, is mixed and interchanged with the ongoing common concept of pity (mit dem weiterhin geläufigen Mitleidsbegriff). The going into each other, fusion, merging or alternating of both concepts was, of course, through that, facilitated and made easy by the fact that "sympathy" frequently gets and catches (i.e. has) the same ethical connotations which the earlier "pity" had, and, accordingly, it occasionally takes on/over and adopts the tasks and functions of founding in ethics. Only seldom is their ambivalence lost. Social-ontologically pathbreaking and pioneering remains, nonetheless, the fact that now the content-related spectrum of the concept of sympathy is widened, and the more this (concept of sympathy) is opened up for psychological states of affairs, which vary and differ from one another, or in fact stand and are in contrast to one another, so much the clearer does the reflective/reflexive-value-neutral character of sympathy (der reflexive-wertneutrale Charakter der Sympathie) come to light. Because only a reflexive/reflexive-value-neutral sympathy can in principle be moved, transferred and shifted to in themselves opposed psychological situations (and positions), or else accompany different positionings and stances vis-à-vis the same situation (and position). (The fact) that the pain of the Other (der Schmerz des Anderen), can give rise to and cause in observers just as much "pity", as schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) (Schadenfreude) too, tries, tests and proves that (reflective-value-

neutral) character of sympathy. Hence, both levels of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives already emerge, as/in the way we explained the(se) same (levels of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) [[above]]²⁹⁴; the form-related (i.e. formal) mechanism unfolds and develops uniformly, irrespective of how much points of reference, references and positionings or stances may vary at the content-related level.

Mind you, the talk here is of the theory and its development (or evolution). If the theory was completed and perfected relatively late, then this is not in the least supposed to mean and signify that people handle and deal with the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, before the formation and development of the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, differently than after its (i.e. the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives’) formation and development. The social being is not shaped and formed in accordance with the ups and downs (or highs, and lows and depths) of social ontology (Das soziale Sein gestaltet sich nicht entsprechend den Höhen und Tiefen der Sozialontologie), and people speak prosaically long before they learn what prose means. Naturally, there are – since ancient times – untheorised testimonies, reports and evidence of a clear consciousness of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and indeed not only since Marcus Aurelius asked of and requested from himself: “Get used to following very carefully the talk of other (men) and move and transfer yourself, as well as you can, into the psyche of he who is speaking [[to you]]”²⁹⁵. Already Calypso assured Odysseus that she is/was thinking about how she would advise herself (i.e. decide for herself) as regards getting into such a (state of) need and hardship (or dire straits) as he (was in)²⁹⁶. Her (i.e.

²⁹⁴ See Sec. 1Cb in this chapter.

²⁹⁵ *Ad se ipsum*, VI, 53 [[Translator’s addition: = «Ἐθισον σεαυτὸν πρὸς τῷ ὑφ’ ἐτέρου λεγομένῳ γίνεσθαι ἀπαρενθυμήτως καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ λέγοντος γίνου.»]]

²⁹⁶ *Odyssee*, V, 188-191 [[Translator’s addition: = ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν νοέω καὶ φράσσομαι, ἅσσο’ ἂν ἐμοὶ περ/αὐτῇ μηδοίμην, ὅτε με χρεῖω τόσον ἴκοι/καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ νόος ἐστὶν ἐναίσιμος, οὐδέ μοι αὐτῇ/θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι σιδήρεος, ἀλλ’ ἐλεήμων». = “Nay, I have such thoughts in mind, and will give such counsel, as I should devise

Calypso's) reflection/reflexion, consequently, moves at three levels simultaneously: [[1]] she speaks or talks of that which she precisely is bearing and has in mind; [[2]] she moves, transfers and shifts herself into the situation and position of the needy, suffering-deprivation (notleidenden) Odysseus, and finally, [[3]] she pictures, imagines or visualises a future state of affairs, in which she – against this same need and hardship – would have to struggle, which at that moment descends upon (strikes, ravages and haunts) Odysseus. She (i.e. Calypso) does all that, however, as she declares and explains – in relation to which the clarification implies that this reason does not have to always be given, when or if thought about in this manner – because she is “well (kindly or in a friendly manner) disposed” to him, she feels, in fact, “pity” for him. These propositions of natural speech already contain Aristotle's theoretical description of pity, which likewise touches upon the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. This cannot in fact be avoided if one takes into account that pity is actually a special case of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives generally, which appears or takes place under two conditions. If, namely, the person pitying (another) stands near (i.e. is close (physically and or emotionally) to) the person suffering (der Mitleidende dem Leidenden nahestehe), and moreover thinks that this (person suffering) would be undeservedly affected by suffering (Leid). Aristotle names these conditions²⁹⁷, and points to and emphasises the reflectivity/reflexivity of the pitying and compassionate (mitleidigen) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives through the remark that pity ceases (there) where personal nearness and proximity to the person suffering is so narrow and tight (i.e. close), that his (i.e. the person suffering's) suffering without (any) distinction in (regard to)

for mine own self, if such need should come on me. [190] For I too have a mind that is righteous, and the heart in this breast of mine is not of iron, but hath compassion” (Homer. *The Odyssey* with an English Translation by A.T. Murray, PH.D. in two volumes. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1919 (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0136%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D145>)).]]

²⁹⁷ *Rhetorik*, 1385b 13-15.

quality (or without any qualitative difference) becomes one's own suffering²⁹⁸, where, that is, in the place of (a) relationship of non-immediacy and indirectness goes a relationship of immediacy and directness (des Mittelbarkeits- ein Unmittelbarkeitsverhältnis). Irrespective of whether this is true and thus is the case, and of whether the conversion of alien (i.e. another's) pain into one's own suffering annuls, cancels or puts out of action/force the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, pity is still tacitly or implicitly described against the backdrop or on the basis of this mechanism. This is to be indirectly gathered and inferred from the fine (delicate, nice or subtle) observation that whoever is already terrified does not feel any pity, because he is already dealing with his own affect and emotion²⁹⁹ – that is why he does not have either (the) appetite, desire or craving nor (the) time to move and be transferred into the situation and position of another (person). The process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is directly characterised by the application of verbs like οἴεσθ[[θ]]αι, φαίνεσ[[θ]]αι, λαβεῖν^{xcviii}, in order to apprehend what is going on or taking place in pity: one thinks, one supposes that one imagines that one could *in actual fact* find oneself *in the future* in the situation and position of the suffering Other³⁰⁰, and one finds this possibility terrifying (horrible, terrible, awful or dreadful) because one *presently* and *in thought* takes in and adopts the stance of the other (person). The imagined identification of one's own stance with the alien (i.e. other person's) stance therefore follows this taking in and adoption of the alien (i.e. another's) stance, and this is added to the rest of the conditions which make out of pity a special case of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. This special case shares with the rest of the cases, though, a quality, property or characteristic that the intensity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as well as the

²⁹⁸ Loc. cit., 1386a 18-24.

²⁹⁹ Loc. cit., 1385b 32-35.

³⁰⁰ Loc. cit., 1385b 16-18, 1386a 26-29.

positioning towards the content taken in and adopted of the/this same (assumption and taking in/over of perspectives), that is, towards the Other's stance, are more or less dependent on the (supposed and assumed) power relationship (or relationship (in respect) of power) between the I (ego) and the Other (Machtverhältnis zwischen dem Ich und dem Anderen)³⁰¹. Aristotle takes this into account by restricting and limiting the effect and impact of pity in principle to the circle of those who live in similar circumstances, conditions and relations, and that is why they can understand themselves rather/more likely as (a) community of [[the same or common]] fate and destiny, no matter whom it (i.e. fate or destiny) hits (i.e. affects and or attacks) today, and whom it (hits, affects or attacks) tomorrow. On the other hand, the absolutely weak (person) is incapable of pity, who (i.e. the absolutely weak person) is absorbed by and in his own suffering, as well as that (person) who in his present and current selfness (as sameness regarding one's own identity) (Selbigkeit) and power thus looks from above down upon alien (i.e. another's or other people's) suffering, as if it could never concern him personally³⁰². This stance can be accompanied by an entire scale of feelings, emotions and sentiments, which range from condescension (up) to contempt and disdain (for allegedly deserved suffering). Accordingly, the co-existence of the always-the-same, constant and invariable formal (i.e. form-related) mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives with varying, in fact, opposed contents and positionings, is confirmed once more.

We must now make a giant leap in time, which, nevertheless, will not tear off or cut the threads of our setting of the question (and problem examination). The European reception of Aristotle in the 16th century and 17th century has, in fact, two different faces. The ontologist and metaphysician is regarded by the

³⁰¹ See Sec. 1Cb in this chapter.

³⁰² *Rhetorik*, 1385b 19-23.

advocates and proponents of (the) new ideas as the foster father of scholasticism, and hence as (a) persona non grata; on the contrary, the teaching of affects and emotions of the (i.e. Aristotle's) *Rhetoric*, is evaluated with or on the basis and in accordance with the needs of the new primacy of anthropology for (the) corresponding studies. (The) classic example of this ambiguous Aristotle-reception (i.e. reception of Aristotle) is none other (*or*: no less [[a thinker]]) than Hobbes, who in his own teaching and theory of men (i.e. humans) and their affects and emotions, appropriates the Aristotelian definition of pity³⁰³. This may appear to be strange, odd or peculiar, and indeed in view of the fact that Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian perception or view of the sociality of man (i.e. humans) (die aristotelische Auffassung von der Sozialität des Menschen). But the explanations and observations of the Greek about pity could be reconciled (or harmonised) with the anthropological primacy of self-love (egoism or amour-propre) (mit dem anthropologischen Primat der Selbstliebe) by means of the thought or notion that the person pitying and being compassionate (der Mitleidige) is basically thinking about himself and about himself alone, when he can only take an interest and sympathise with the suffering of another (person) only because of the fact that he must necessarily imagine his own analogous suffering. Hence, we understand why precisely La Rochefoucauld defines pity for the most part in an Aristotelian manner³⁰⁴. The rise of the Enlightenment philosophy of (the) sentiment(s) (emotion(s) and feeling(s)) (aufklärerischer Gefühlsphilosophie) shifted the examination of the problem in as much as the inclusion and incorporation of pity in the group of spontaneous natural sentiments (emotions and feelings) repelled and drove away its reflective/reflexive structure from the focal point of theoretical

³⁰³ Vol. IV, *Human nature*, IX, 10: "imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity."

³⁰⁴ *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 264: «La pitié est souvent un sentiment de nos propres maux dans les maux d'autrui. C'est une habile prévoyance des malheurs où nous pouvons tomber.» (= "Pity is often a sentiment or feeling of our own ills (troubles, difficulties, evils and wrongs done to us) in the ills (troubles, difficulties, evils and wrongs done in respect) of others. It is a clever (skilful, deft, shrewd or cunning) foresight of the troubles, ills or misfortunes where (i.e. upon which) we can fall.")

attention. From now on, pity would be classified (or rated) ethically in accordance with the/a basic and fundamental anthropological decision³⁰⁵. Whoever considered men controlled by sentiments, feelings and emotions “egotistical” or “bad and evil”, could look at pity indeed as an “Impulse of Nature” amongst others (i.e. amongst other “Impulses of Nature”), but deny it every ethical relevance, since even a murderer at the sight of an infant, which will be eaten by a sow (i.e. adult female pig), feels pity³⁰⁶. Presuming the natural goodness of man (i.e. humans), on the other hand, pity could be declared the foundation stone of ethics resting and being based on sentiment(s), feeling(s) and emotion(s). Still before Rousseau the British opponents of the Hobbesian image and picture of man mapped this path, who, of course, sought the direct counterweight to egotistical self-love (or amour-propre) in natural “benevolence”, yet, in the course of this, summoned pity too. Thus, for instance, can Hutcheson’s position³⁰⁷, but also Butler’s be outlined or sketched. This (i.e. Butler) interestingly looks at “compassion” from the double point of view of altruistic spontaneity and self-referred reflectivity (reflexivity), and comes to the result (i.e. conclusion) that only the former (altruistic spontaneity) expresses “real sorrow and concern”, however, there can be no talk of that (“real sorrow and concern”) where the sight of alien (i.e. another’s) suffering brings about either contentment and satisfaction as regards our own happy, fortunate and felicitous state of affairs, or else merely a reflection (reflexion) as regards one’s own human predisposition against (or sensitivity to) such suffering³⁰⁸.

“Compassion” constitutes the linguistic middle (or connecting) point between “pity” and “sympathie (i.e. sympathy)”. Before we study in (regard to) the example of Hume’s texts, the ambivalence of the concept of sympathy, which

³⁰⁵ Regarding the anthropological ambivalence of the Enlightenment philosophy of (the) sentiment(s), see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, esp. p. 337ff..

³⁰⁶ Thus, Mandeville, *Fable*, pp. 91, 264ff..

³⁰⁷ *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, Sect. I = Selby-Bigge, I, pp. 393 ff., 398.

³⁰⁸ Sermon V: *Upon Compassion*, § 1 = *Works*, II, p. 81ff.. Cf. the polemic(s) against Hobbes loc. cit., Note I, p. 78ff..

carries the burden (or spreads the load) of the founding of ethics in respect of the philosophy of (the) sentiment(s) (feeling(s) and emotion(s)), whilst it at the same time does the groundwork and prepares the ground for insight into and the understanding of the – in principle – value-neutral character (grundsätzlich wertneutralen Charakter) of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, we must record and make clear that the problem examination, settings of the question and discoveries of the Enlighteners (i.e. Enlightenment philosophers), contrary to a superficial impression³⁰⁹, did not advance and penetrate up to the decisive point of the theory of interaction (interaction theory) (Interkationstheorie) of our century [[i.e. the 20th century]]. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is here, namely, described one-sidedly from the point of view of the I (ego), that is, it remains – apart from and disregarding fleeting intimations – undiscussed that the Other likewise and simultaneously moves and is transferred into the position and situation of the I (ego), and that the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives of the I (ego) is influenced precisely through the knowledge about that, as well as the other way around. On the other hand, the older one-sided theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the newer theory of the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, grew and developed on the terrain of a common anthropological assumption, which, incidentally, has enabled and facilitated the transition from the former (older theory of ...) to the latter (newer theory of perspective-taking). Hume formulated this (anthropological) assumption emphatically: “the minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations”³¹⁰. They (i.e. men, people, humans) are also similar in that they all have at their disposal the capacity to be aware of the similarity amongst themselves. It is a matter here of the “imagination”, the power(s) (or force(s)) of

³⁰⁹ See e.g. Shott, “Society, Self and Mind”.

³¹⁰ *Treatise*, III, 3, 1. Put another way: “the minds of all men are mirrors to one another” (II, 2, 5, cf. II, 1, 11). (The) direct connection of this thesis with the “principle of sympathy”: II, 2, 7 (beginning).

imagination (die Vorstellungskraft) which grants and affords every man a direct access to the feelings of other (men), and to that which happens in other (men), on the basis of which can be concluded what we feel and perceive immediately and directly in us³¹¹. The similarity of the spirits as (the) presupposition of sympathy, says, though, nothing concrete about its essence. Similarity can, in fact, be apprehended both as the simultaneous predominance and prevalence (Vorherrschen) of the same thoughts and feelings in all spirits and intellects, whereby sympathy must have an effect and operate as the direct and immediate transference of feelings and thoughts, as well as the in the sense of the availability, existence and presence of several predispositions, aptitudes and contents in all spirits and intellects, which enable every one of them (i.e. those predispositions, aptitudes and contents) amongst them, in relation to that, to apprehend the processes in every other (person), irrespective of whether he is ruled, dominated, controlled and commanded by the same feelings and thoughts as the other (person). (The) Reflective/reflexive recourse to the general and universal human reservoir at each and every respective point in question suffices then in order to manufacture, produce, make or restore the sympathetic relation towards another spirit(-intellect) with regard to (and in view of) each and every respective topical and relevant interrelation and or context. Hume oscillates between both these perceptions and views in accordance with the strength and intensity of his momentary interest in a founding of ethics pertaining to the philosophy of feeling(s) (emotion(s) and sentiment(s)). He sometimes equates and identifies sympathy with mutual contagion or transmission through and by means of emotions (i.e. with the reciprocal transmission of emotions (Ansteckung durch Emotionen)), and in this “easy communication of sentiments” or “passions” he beholds and sees the medium of the instincts of herds (i.e. herd instincts), which have an effect and operate in

³¹¹ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9 (beginning); II, 2, 1 (end); II, 2, 7.

the animal kingdom and likewise bear the human “desire of society”³¹². As (an) emotional contagion or transmission, sympathy is understandably “easy and agreeable” between “similar characters”, it explains the positive influence on the I (ego) by the feelings (emotions and sentiments) of the Other, it accompanies “liking” – and passes, turns, blends or merges into “compassion”³¹³. We come, consequently, to that – crucial for ethics – special case of emotional contagion or transmission, in which the I (ego) can be infected (i.e. tainted) by the suffering of the Other. In so far as it is in actual fact a contagion or transmission, alien (i.e. another (person’s)) suffering must necessarily be felt and perceived like one’s own (suffering), it (i.e. another’s suffering) must, that is, set off and trigger feelings (emotions or sentiments) of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) (Unlust) which are akin to wrath, anger and hatred/hate (Zorn und Haß) (against the source of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance)). Why does the I (ego) suffer with the Other, instead of turning away from him (i.e. the Other), or (instead of) even hating him as the source of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance)? Hume indeed poses the question, however since he knows that the fate and destiny of the ethics of pity depends on his answer, and he wants to avoid (an) open break with it (i.e. the ethics of pity) and, consequently, identification with the notorious Hobbes, thus he pulls himself out of (i.e. withdraws from) the admitted difficulty with a conceptual distinction. Only “weak sympathy”, which stands still and stops at (or with (regard to)) the first awkward, painful or nasty impression, gives rise to and causes feelings (sentiments and emotions) of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) and of hate and hatred; “strong, stark” or “complete” (sympathy) (complete sympathy), on the other hand, can jump over (i.e. overcome) (or disregard and ignore) this impression, and be converted into pity and goodwill

³¹² Loc. cit., II, 2, 12; II, 2, 5.

³¹³ Loc. cit., II, 2, 4; III, 3, 2.

(pity and benevolence)³¹⁴. Thus reads and is the founding of the ethics of pity through and by means of sympathy, and one can easily see why it (i.e. the said founding of the ethics of pity through sympathy) rests and is based on a *petitio principii*^{xcix}. Because the simultaneous increase in/of morally active pity and sympathy may be assumed only under the condition that both these psychical factors (in respect) of effect and impact (i.e. these psychical factors bearing an effect and impact) are somehow interrelated from the beginning. The suggested solution does not cancel therefore the (afore)mentioned objection, especially since in (regard to) their premises it is unclear on what basis which criteria of weak and strong sympathy generally belong together, and may bear the same name [[i.e. of sympathy]]: which is the genus, whose species they both (i.e. both kinds/species of sympathy) are? If, in any case, this genus is supposed to or ought to continue being called “sympathy”, then it (i.e. sympathy) must behave and act neutrally (i.e. be neutral) towards pity and hatred/hate, which characterise its (i.e. sympathy’s) both species in terms of content^c.

In so far as Hume founds his ethics of pity on sympathy, he cannot accept that sympathy is something other than emotional contagion or transmission, and that it leads to something other than pity and goodwill or benevolence. It (i.e. sympathy) vouches for and guarantees the positive moral relation with or towards with-men (i.e. fellow humans) (*Mitmenschen*), as long as it operates in (a) pure form and alone without the with-effect (i.e. synergy, co-operation or collaboration) (*Mitwirkung*) “of another principle”³¹⁵. This principle is called “comparison (*Vergleich*)”, and it is responsible for the fact that once imagination (*die Vorstellungskraft*) introduced us into the interior or inner (realm) of an alien, foreign or another’s spirit (and intellect), our own spirit and intellect cannot be infected by the alien, foreign or another’s (spirit and

³¹⁴ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9.

³¹⁵ Loc. cit., III, 3, 6 (Anfang).

intellect) (or have something transmitted to it from the alien spirit), but on the contrary, takes on and adopts a reflective/reflexive stance, and in the course of this, feels and perceives the opposite of that which makes up and constitutes the feeling and perception of the alien or another's spirit and intellect: its (i.e. the alien spirit/intellect's) joy is to it (i.e. our own spirit and intellect) a (kind of) suffering, and its suffering (to us, is) joy, because it suggests and urges the comparison of one's own situation and position with the alien or another's (situation and position)³¹⁶. Thus, in (the) place of pity; malice, evilness, wickedness and schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) (Bosheit und Schadenfreude) come into being, as soon as sympathy under the effect, impact and influence of the comparing, comparative principle (des vergleichenden Prinzips) is converted from a (kind of) emotional contagion or transmission into a reflective/reflexive act. It is asked whether the conversion of the concept of sympathy is necessary, in order to account for the change or transformation of the positioning towards the Other, and, if it is not the case, which of both concepts of sympathy is best suited as the overall explanation of (the) conceivable positionings towards the Other. As we know, Hume did not succeed in asserting, affirming and maintaining the inner belonging together and co-existence of pity and sympathy without the help of the problematic distinction between weaker and stronger sympathy. Just as little can he conclusively prove that the coming apart and disintegrating of pity and sympathy merely is and ought to be ascribed to the effect and impact of an external factor, namely, of the comparing and comparative act (des vergleichenden Aktes). This implies that this reflective/reflexive act resides and inheres in every sympathetic process without exception, which in other words means that sympathy represents and constitutes in every concrete case (the) function of a social relation and itself in terms of content, that is, in accordance

³¹⁶ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9 (Anfang).

with the finding of the/a comparison which the I (ego) does and engages in between itself and the Other, it directs and aligns itself towards this social relation. The introduction of the reflexive/reflective component in the sympathetic process becomes even more unavoidable, the more clearly do we envisage, consider or contemplate the factor “social relation” and or “power relationship (relationship (in respect) of power)”. We recollect how Aristotle took it (i.e. the said factor of the “social relation” and or “power relationship”) into consideration in his description of pity, and indeed precisely because he assumed and granted (as given) reflectivity/reflexivity here.^{ci}

Let us now explain in greater detail why Hume out of (i.e. for) objective reasons cannot restrict and limit the reflective (reflexive) act of comparison exclusively to negative positionings of the I (ego) towards the Other, and how he – despite his philosophical intentions and premeditations pertaining to morality, morals and ethics – sketches, outlines or portrays a neutral concept(ual plan) (in respect) of sympathy next to the just explicated and expounded (one). It is first of all to be repeated that already the relation of exclusivity between sympathy as emotional contagion or transmission, and, pity is not in the least compelling. Pity constitutes merely a special case of such a contagion or transmission – assuming it comes about through it (the said contagion or transmission) at all. Hatred or hate can be another special case. It stands out and is really obvious with what decisiveness Hume renounces the traditional – also represented by the spectre of (and the bogeyman) Hobbes – perception and view of pity³¹⁷, which rested and was based exactly on the assumption of a comparison of the I’s (ego’s) own situation and position with that of (the person) suffering, regardless of whether the comparison flowed into (the) sympathy (for or sharing in) (the suffering), or into hubris. By overturning that

³¹⁷ Loc. cit., II, 2, 7 (“Those philosophers, who derive this passion [pity] from... our being liable to the same miseries we behold...”).

perception and view, he (i.e. Hume) holds the comparing, comparative act (comparison) to be a force which breaks up (disintegrates and decomposes) pity. Comparison must in fact bring about and effect a reversal of the sentimental and emotional positioning which comes about through transmitting sympathy (i.e. sympathy which is contagious or is transmitted) (Der Vergleich müsse ja eine Umkehrung der gefühlsmäßigen Einstellung bewirken, die durch ansteckende Sympathie zustandekommt). This (transmitting sympathy) awakens and arouses in us, naturally, pleasure, joy (lust or desire) (Lust) at the sight of alien (i.e. another's) pleasure etc., and suffering at the sight of alien (i.e. another's) suffering; comparison entails that a greater alien pleasure or joy (i.e. pleasure or joy of another person) (causes) one's own aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) (Unlust), and greater alien suffering (i.e. suffering of another) causes one's own pleasure or joy etc.. It generally applies that every comparison calls forth and gives rise to the opposite feeling from that which an object or subject effects, induces and brings about directly and immediately, i.e. without (the) mediation and intercession of comparisons with other objects or subjects³¹⁸. Here Hume puts forward and establishes an untenable generalisation only because he wants to, in terms of theory, underpin, shore up and substantiate an ethically critical and touchy special case. He manufactures, produces or restores, that is, a necessary relation between comparison and reversal in order to e contrario conclude that sympathy as pity is the direct emotional contagion and transmission through and by means of alien (i.e. another's) suffering. The aforementioned generalisation might, in fact, structurally explain malice, evilness, wickedness and schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) (in them (i.e. malice and schadenfreude), in actual fact, a reversal of alien (i.e. another's) suffering through and by way of comparison with one's own situation and position without suffering, does take

³¹⁸ Loc. cit., II, 2, 8; II, 2, 10.

place), after the fulfilment of the especial task pertaining to moral philosophy (or the philosophy of morality and ethics), for which it was conceived or conceptualised, does not, however, always prove to be apt, well-aimed or useful.^{cii} One does not get around and avoid the question or problem as to whether in the sympathetic identification and equating with alien (i.e. another's) suffering, comparisons can completely fail to materialise: whence (*or*: how) then should the I (ego) without a – and be it (i.e. without an at the very least) implicit – comparison know that it feels the same *as* the Other? Only as a result of a literal dissolution of the I (ego) in the Other, the comparison would here be superfluous. An example that is supposed to confirm, support, corroborate, reinforce or endorse Hume's thesis implies not merely the possibility of comparisons of situations without (the) reversal of feelings, sentiments or emotions, but it goes, rightly interpreted, a step beyond this implication, and says and means that such comparisons can take place even before the sympathetic equating and identification with the Other^{ciii}. Hume speaks of two merchants and traders, who as residents of the same city are competitors, but from afar co-operate, since their interests do not, because of nearness and proximity, come into conflict with each other. In both cases, the motivation is "concern for our interest", however, sympathy is present and exists in the case of co-operation, since the pleasure, joy (lust or desire) (Lust) and aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) (Unlust) of the partners simultaneously decreases and increases; on the other hand, in the case of competition, the pleasure and joy of the one side entails the aversion and displeasure of the other (side), as well as conversely and vice versa³¹⁹. What can we learn from that? That sympathy did not bring to life (the) partnership (die Partnerschaft) in the sense of an emotional contagion and transmission, but the other way around: from the comparison of one's own situation and position with the situation and

³¹⁹ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9.

position of each and every respective other (situation and position), both sides came to the conclusion that (the) partnership lies and is in the interests of and on both sides. And one must accept that a sympathy, which comes into being on the basis of a comparison, is kept up and maintained through and by means of constant (tacit or silent) similar comparisons in the course of the co-operative relation.

We come, consequently, to the already broached theme, topic or subject of reflexivity (Reflexivität) in its interrelation with the factor “social relation (soziale Beziehung)”. As mentioned, Hume believed and opined that the reversal of feelings, sentiments and emotions takes place under the impression of the ascertainment that alien (i.e. another’s) pleasure and joy, or, alien (i.e. another’s) suffering is greater than the (pleasure and joy) or that (suffering) of one’s own. Only a superficial consideration or way of looking at things would, nonetheless, comprehend this process quantitatively. It cannot here be a matter of the comparison between the exactly measured own and alien (i.e. another’s) feelings, sentiments and emotions, which would be weighed up, balanced or carefully considered against one another in isolation and irrespective of their bearers on each and every respective occasion. Entirely on the contrary, the quantitative comparison of (the) feelings (sentiments and emotions) (“greater” pleasure and joy, “greater” suffering) says and means something about the situation and position of two subjects in their reference towards each other, it sketches a social relation or a power relationship (relationship of power). The parameter “social relation” puts, for its part, the act of comparison on a multi-dimensional basis and provides for the great variety of its possible outcomes, so that the simple automatic procedure or mechanism of reversal can no longer function under the pressure of complexity. Hume himself speaks of comparisons, which do not concern feelings (sentiments and emotions), but qualities, and by stressing that these qualities are judged or are compared with

one another always in their reference (or relation) to concrete subjects, he lets the social relations standing behind (these said qualities) shimmer and come through. Pride or humiliation awaken and stir up, in fact, not by objects and qualities in themselves, but only the comparison with that which other (subjects) possess awakens or stirs up it (i.e. pride or humiliation) (Den Stolz oder die Demütigung erwecken ja nicht Objekte und Qualitäten an sich, sondern nur der Vergleich mit dem erweckt es, was andere davon besitzen)³²⁰. The spectrum of the social relation is, though, in Hume – as [[was]] usual and common in the 18th century – attributed to the language of the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses (in der Sprache der Triebanthropologie). To the I (ego), which is compared with other (subjects or I's (egos)), pride and humiliation are related, to the Other, the love or hate/hatred of the I (ego) is related³²¹. As one sees, it is a matter of intersubjective positionings in (regard to) these basic and fundamental feelings (sentiments and emotions). If one now visualises and makes clear to oneself the possible combinations of these basic and fundamental feelings (emotions and sentiments), and moreover, incorporates in this combination or combinatory game (i.e. game of combinations), the many conceivable correlations of persons and properties, qualities and characteristics, both with regard to the I (ego) and also to the Other, then, in practice, already the whole and entire spectrum of the social relation spreads and stretches out, unfolds and extends before our (very) eyes. Inside its great variety and multiformity and on the basis of the great variety and multiformity of the psychical acts, which the encounters in it (i.e. such great variety) demand, sympathy would soon lose the ubiquity which Hume ascribes to it, if it were merely that emotional contagion or transition, out of whose potency, strength and power (Stärke), pity draws, allegedly, its (i.e. pity's) ethical force and strength (Kraft). Said otherwise and put differently, in the great variety and

³²⁰ Loc. cit., II, 1, 2; II, 1, 6.

³²¹ Loc. cit., II, 2, 1.

multiformity of intersubjective relations and psychological acts (in der Vielfalt der intersubjektiven Beziehungen und psychischen Akte), sympathy can develop all over and everywhere only under the precondition and prerequisite of its reflectivity (reflexivity) and value neutrality (Wertneutralität). What in the ethical context was emotional identification with the person suffering (Was im ethischen Kontext emotionale Identifizierung mit dem Leidenden war), becomes now (the) reflective/reflexive putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the alien spirit (*or*: another's intellect(-spirit)) (reflexives Sichhineinversetzen in den fremden Geist), irrespective of what its content is and how the I (ego) places itself in relation to that (alien, foreign or another's spirit(-intellect)). (The) Identification with the Other converts itself, therefore, from a strong and stark emotion to a cool reflection (aus einer starken Emotion in eine kühle Reflexion), and furthermore, it concerns from now on only each and every respective content, not necessarily the positioning connected with this (content) on each and every respective occasion.

Not coincidentally does Hume formulate this alternative concept(ual plan) of sympathy precisely in the chapters of his book in which he with the help of conceptuality pertaining to the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses draws up and sets out an elementary inventory of intersubjective relations, and in the course of this, touches upon the central question and problem of recognition (und dabei die zentrale Anerkennungsfrage streift). Do others hold us in contempt and disdain and scorn us, or do they share with us our self-understanding? We experience and learn that, in both cases, through and by means and way of the mechanism of sympathy; in the former (case), discomfort and discontent (uneasiness) follows, of course, the sympathetic act, in the latter (case), satisfaction (follows, of course, the sympathetic act). Sympathy means, therefore, here, merely the understanding of an alien or another's positioning, no matter what content it has, and (no matter) how the positioning of the I (ego)

towards the positioning of the Other vis-à-vis the I (ego) will be (*or*: turns out). Sympathy *must* be value-neutral (wertneutral), when a subject, which knows itself uniformly (i.e. which knows it is a united entity), is supposed to move and transfer itself into different contents without every time having to forget itself or be split. Both are impossible. Shortly before his staying and lingering at or in both extreme cases of intersubjective recognition (intersubjectiver Anerkennung), Hume had in actual fact described the sympathetic (cap)ability of man in such a way that the difference between the in itself neutral understanding and fathoming of alien or another's thoughts or feelings (sentiments and emotions) from (and) his own stances in relation to that, had emerged and become clear: "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, but in itself and its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, *however different from, or even contrary to our own*. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition". The temperament (of the I (ego)) and the I's (ego's) own disposition do not essentially influence the *construction* of the contents, which the I (ego) takes up regarding (the) communication with other (people). Nonetheless, these clear statements or propositions fall (i.e. are made), as it were, casually and in passing, and do not at all serve as the foundation of/for systematic explanations³²². In the same context, Hume underlines, especially, in fact, the similarity of the nature of all humans, and over and above that, the similarity of their customs, conventions, morals, mores and characters as (a) factor which considerably simplifies the act of sympathy; the unifying and homogenising (element) continues to concern him more than the distancing element. Not (the) clear philosophical intent and purpose, but the inner logic of his setting of the

³²² That is why one transfers (i.e. conveys) a very one-sided impression of Hume's ambivalent overall position, if one only cites this, see e.g. Hamburger, *Mitleid*, p. 111 ff..

question or problem examination, drives him to the form-related (i.e. formal)-neutral concept of sympathy³²³.^{civ}

This circumstance is explained, of course, above all through his (i.e. Hume's) already stressed (i.e. underlined and emphasised) ethical concerns and worries, however, his view of the I (ego) as (a) "bundle, cluster, package or collection of various perceptions (Perzeptionen)" has a reinforcing (intensifying and amplifying) effect too. Such a fluid I (ego) naturally tends, in relation to that, to be assimilated with (i.e. into) its (sensorial) perceptions (Wahrnehmungen) or to give itself up to them sympathetically (i.e. with sympathy), if, especially, alien, foreign and another's or others' feelings (sentiments and emotions) are perceived. Thus seen, the lacking (or lack of) (exerting (of)) influence (die fehlende Einflußnahme) of the I (ego) on its perceptions (Perzeptionen) constitutes not the consequence of its – resting and based on potency, strength and power – (cap)ability at distancing, but on the contrary, the result of its weakness, of its ontological characterlessness (i.e. lack of character) (seiner ontologischen Charakterlosigkeit)³²⁴. Hume does not worry at all about the difficulties in reconciling this I (ego)-theory (or theory of the I (ego)) with the formidable, mighty, enormous and ubiquitous presence of self-love (i.e. amour-propre and egoism as vanity and self-importance; Selbstliebe), which he constantly emphasises. Widely understood self-love creates, through and by means of its strategic calculations, that distance between the psychical contents of the I (ego) and the alien or another's (psychical contents), which founds (the) form-related (i.e. formal)-neutral sympathy. Did not exactly the discussion of the intersubjective question and problem of recognition bring Hume the nearest

³²³ The analysis of this paragraph rests and is based upon (the) *Treatise*, II, 1, 11. The italicisation in the citation stems from me.

³²⁴ Thus, must, for instance, the sentence: "in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves" be read, and not as evidence of (the) distance of the I (ego), as Hamburger thinks and opines in ignorance of the context (*Mitleid*, p. 111). To (and after) this sentence, incidentally, the remark: "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing", attaches and follows. (II, 2, 2).

to this concept(ual plan) of sympathy? Furthermore, to self-love (or amour-propre) belongs the unceasing comparison between (the) self and another (person); the comparing, however, for its part, likewise, points to the same concept(ual plan) of sympathy. Hume himself calls an ethically inspired contradistinction between sympathy and comparing into question when he (re)assures [[us]] or affirms that comparing is “an *original* quality of the soul”³²⁵, and equally encompasses the comparing (or comparison) of objects or properties, qualities and characteristics as that (comparing) of persons with one another – we, in fact, tend(ed) to compare “at every moment” in relation to that, ourselves with other (people)³²⁶. Reflective (reflexive) acts, which can implausibly appear to be a perception of sympathy as emotional contagion or transmission (i.e. it is implausible that reflective acts can appear to be a view of sympathy as emotional contagion or transmission), are acted out and take place, however, also at a level which lies deeper than that of comparison. We may call it (i.e. the said level) the level of the constitution of sympathy, and its description occurs with the help of the fundamental concepts of the Humean theory of knowledge, i.e. of “ideas” and “impressions”. Cognitively looked at, sympathy consists in a transition from ideas to impressions, it is, in this respect, “exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding”. As Hume says, in the sympathetic act, first of all, (the) alien (i.e. another’s) feelings (sentiments and emotions) and passions appear in our spirit(-intellect) as mere ideas (die fremden Gefühle und Leidenschaften in unserem Geist als bloße Ideen) “and are conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact”. The idea is completely and perfectly objectively and neutrally registered and recorded as (the/something) alien, foreign and strange. Only the following,

³²⁵ Loc. cit., II, 2, 8 (Hume’s italics and emphasis!).

³²⁶ Loc. cit., II, 1, 6. Cf. III, 3, 2: “no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves”. The pastoral [[dimension or aspect]] gains the upper hand anew when Hume, contrary to such anthropological statements teaches that the rational and reasonable man is satisfied with himself, and only the fool needs comparisons in order to confirm (and validate) himself (III, 3, 2).

ensuing conversion of ideas into impressions can make the I (ego) sympathise with the other (person) in the/an affective/emotional sense. Noteworthy (or remarkable), however, is the founding of this conversion. It “arises from the relation of the objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us”³²⁷. The spectral and flowing, fluid I (ego), which lives off/on/from its (sensorial) perceptions (Perzeptionen) and gives in to them (the said perceptions) all the more spontaneously, here makes (a) place (i.e. makes way) for an I (ego) which is constantly present in the spirit(-intellect). The self-reference (i.e. reference to the self) (Selbstbezug) of the I (ego) facilitates and makes possible the reference (Bezugnahme) of the I (ego) to external given (actual) facts and the – on the basis of this (obviously reflective-selective) reference – conversion of ideas into impressions occurring and taking place. But ideas must already be there (present and existent) beforehand – even before a possible or potential emotional contagion or transmission.

In the construction of sympathy – always (with)in the framework of Hume’s information, description and statements – still further authorities of reflective/reflexive mediation can be incorporated, for instance, the force or power(s) of imagination (die Vorstellungskraft), or the necessary precursory interpretation of alien (i.e. another person’s or other persons’) behaviour³²⁸. All these materials for a form-related (i.e. formal) theory of sympathy remain, nevertheless, in Hume scattered and unevaluated. Ethical concern, care and worry preponderates, and it (the said ethical concern) is taken into account by two different concepts of sympathy, which embroil and entangle the philosopher^{cv} into two structurally different contradictions. The precarious distinction between weaker and stronger sympathy was supposed to explain unmediated (i.e. direct and immediate) sympathy with the suffering Other, and

³²⁷ The analysis rests and is based on II, 1, 11.

³²⁸ “No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes and effects. From *these* we infer the passion: And consequently *these* give rise to our sympathy.” (Loc. cit., III, 3, 1; Hume’s italics and emphasis).

stood/was in contradiction with the approaches towards the formal (i.e. form-related) concept of sympathy. Hume, however, also introduces or imports a second ethically meant concept of sympathy, this time, of course, with (the) opposite and opposed intent(ion): irrespective of the general ethical duties and the common (general) good, a psychological-anthropological support or prop is supposed to be created by concrete pity. This “disinterested sympathy” wipes or casts off (and gets rid of) every unmediatedness (i.e. directness or immediacy) and inconsistently moves into nearness and proximity to Reason as force, strength, which can successfully oppose the stirrings, motions, impulses and movements (Regungen) of feeling (sentiment and emotion) and of self-interest. This does not have to here be pursued in greater detail³²⁹. In any case, Hume does not succeed and manage in (providing) (the) compelling proof that “extensive Sympathie” is something more, or has more of an effect, and (is) something other/different than enlightened self-love (or amour-propre). The intensive and dense, thick sympathy of pity with difficulty rhymes (i.e. matches) with the extensive and thin, slim or scant sympathy of moral judgements, and in addition, neither of both (kinds of sympathy) is in itself logically or psychologically sound or conclusive.

Adam Smith can avoid the back and forth, to and fro between the ethically stamped, shaped or moulded, and the value-neutral, concept of sympathy just as little as Hume, however, regarding and concerning the latter (value-neutral) concept, he goes a few steps further than Hume, and contemplates its reflective/reflexive structure. He finds that the sympathetic act, as Hume describes it, reminds [[one]] of a rather “well-contrived machine”, and regarding that, he (i.e. A. Smith) wants to develop a concept of sympathy through which “we enter into the motives of the agent” and, at the same time, can share the feelings

³²⁹ See in relation to that, Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 499ff. [[translator’s addition: issues of morality and justice, inter alia, are addressed by Hume, with the former being natural and giving the latter (as artificial, but not independent of morality), and with relativism being avoided in favour of the common good, etc.]]. Cf. Mercer, *Sympathy and Ethics*, p. 66ff..

(sentiments and emotions) which are touched or affected by alien (i.e. another's or others') act(ion)s or kinds of acting (Handlungen)³³⁰. He in principle uncouples (decouples) or disconnects sympathy from "pity and compassion", irrespective of historical and etymological affinities, in order, with that, to describe "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever"³³¹. A further important conceptual clarification concerns the difference between the sympathising with alien (another's or others') feelings (emotions or sentiments), which we approve and endorse, and sympathy as (the/a) possibility of moving and transferring ourselves (in)to the situation and position of someone whose feelings (sentiments or emotions) we do not want to share³³². That is why decisive for the sympathetic act is the intellectual reconstruction of the situation and position in which the Other finds himself, on the part of the I (ego), and the putting of it (i.e. this I (ego)) into the situation and position of the Other through and by way of imagination. Regarding that, Smith as (the) first [[to do so,]] uses— as far as I can see – today's current expression, and the fact that he varies it many times³³³, proves his consciousness of the meaning and significance and importance of this situation and fact(s) of the case. As (the) reconstruction of an alien (foreign or another's) situation and position in imagination, the sympathy of the I (ego) can never attain or reach and achieve the intensity of feeling (emotion and sentiment) which the other (person) precisely lives through and experiences. The sympathising I (ego) knows at all times (every time, always) that it is a matter here of something which is acted out and takes place in an alien (i.e. another person's) psyche, and even the meeting of the psyches by means of the imaginative exchange of the situation (or: the imaginative exchange of

³³⁰ *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, VII, 3, 3, § 17.

³³¹ Loc. cit., I, 1, 1, § 5.

³³² Loc. cit., I, 1, 3, § 1.

³³³ "By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation", "by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the same situation", "what would be our own [way], if we were in his case" (I, 1, 1, §2); "by changing places in fancy" (I, 1, 1, §3); "by bringing the case home to myself" (I, 1, 1, §4). Similar formulations [[are]] in III, 1, §§2, 6. Cf. VII, 3, 1, §4: "an imaginary change of situations" etc..

situations) lasts merely a moment³³⁴. Already for that reason, sympathy does not have anything to do with an emotional contagion or transmission. But also because it (i.e. sympathy) actually comes into being not so much from the sight or view of alien (or another's) feelings (sentiments or emotions), but rather thanks to the situation (Situation) which these feelings (sentiments or emotions) give rise to and create³³⁵. Only the apprehension of the situation (Situation) can fully understand the motives and the reaction of the Other, the putting oneself in(to) the situation and position of the Other (das Sichversetzen in die Lage des Anderern) means, therefore, both its inner/internal as well as its (the Other's) outer/external situation and position (Lage). The reflection (reflexion) of the person sympathising must move at several levels simultaneously, before it (i.e. the said reflection of the person sympathising) can reach and attain a somewhat (well-)rounded (all-round and comprehensive) image and picture of that which precisely represents and constitutes its object.

Smith now makes use of two means in order to incorporate into the/his concept(ual plan) of sympathy his ethical positions, and through that, procure for them (i.e. Smith's ethical positions), anthropological rank (status, authority, prestige, repute or dignity; *Würde*). On the one hand, he makes as far as possible the extent, range, scope and depth of the sympathetic act dependent on the nature of all respective feelings (sentiments and emotions) in question, so that (the) "true" sympathy finally applies to feelings (sentiments, emotions) and positionings which seem to be conducive and beneficial for morality, morals, ethics and good customs, conventions and mores (die der Moral und den guten Sitten förderlich zu sein scheinen). Feelings (sentiments and emotions) would be considered decent and proper or indecent and improper precisely to the extent that mankind (or humanity) would feel inclined to sympathise with them.

³³⁴ Loc. cit., I, 1, 4, §7; VII, 3, 1, §4.

³³⁵ Loc. cit., I, 1, 1, § 10.

We feel, asserts Smith, most likely, sympathy for feelings (sentiments and emotions) which cause and give pleasure and joy to the Other himself, however, such are precisely those (feelings) which lead men to one another and do not bring them away from one another (i.e. which unite people and do not separate people); sympathy with asocial or unsocial feelings runs and bumps into the greatest inner inhibitions³³⁶. Disregarding the mere assertoric identification of pleasant (enjoyable and agreeable) feelings (sentiments and emotions) with (the) socially beneficial (feelings, sentiments and emotions), Smith does not directly explain how the privileged relation of sympathy towards exactly these feelings (sentiments and emotions) can be reconciled with his own thesis that sympathy would be (or is) distinguished from (the) approval, approbation or endorsement, [[given]] that the latter (approval) is always pleasant and agreeable, the former (sympathy), however, is both pleasant and agreeable, as well as unpleasant and disagreeable, in accordance with the nature of its object, just as with his observation that our sympathy (as condolence or empathy; Anteilnahme) with or towards alien (i.e. another's) suffering would not stand in the way of [[us sympathising with]] its unpleasant and disagreeable character³³⁷. Smith's indirect response or answer to this aporia (doubt, contradiction or paradox) is a new selective handling and treatment of (the) concepts: the predicate of the unpleasant and disagreeable with regard to sympathy is reserved exclusively and solely for the unmoral (i.e. immoral or amoral). Apart from that and otherwise, humanity consists in sympathising not only with the joys and in general the interests, but also with the suffering of other (people)³³⁸. Presupposing the moral positioning of all sides, sympathy may, consequently, be moved into or within nearness (i.e. proximity) (in respect) of emotional contagion or transmission. And in its ethically stamped, moulded and shaped

³³⁶ Loc. cit., I, 1, Introduction; VI, 3, §§ 14-16; I, 2, 3.

³³⁷ Loc. cit., I, 3, 1, § 9, Note; II, 1, 2, § 5.

³³⁸ Loc. cit., IV, 2.

determination or definition, it (i.e. sympathy) becomes one-sided and now has a counter-concept, for an inappropriate and unsuitable behaviour, namely, sympathy is completely lacking and missing, and in(to) its (i.e. sympathy's) place steps (or goes) antipathy³³⁹. – On the other hand, Smith asserts precisely the reflexive/reflective character of the sympathetic act, in order to derive or deduce (infer) from that a kind of collective ethical Reason; here he (i.e. Smith) stands (i.e. is) much nearer and closer to Mead. By moving and transferring the I (ego) (in)to the situation and position of the Other, it (i.e. the said I (ego)) learns of and experiences what for it/him is pleasant and agreeable and good, and it (i.e. the said I (ego)) acts accordingly. The Others do the same with regard to the I (ego), and the overall result is the dominance of virtue in social life, since the main feature of virtue consists exactly therein, to earn or deserve the love of other (people) and (the) recompense on the part of society. The I (ego) judges, therefore, (the) other (people) on the basis of the same measures, criteria, yardsticks and benchmarks as (the) other (people) (judge) the I (ego); these collective yardsticks etc. make up and constitute the basis of/for the ethical, and are represented by an ideal “impartial spectator”, who, as it were, as (the) harbinger (precursor, forerunner or herald) of the generalised Other watches over and supervises the effect and impact in foro interno (i.e. in the inner court (of justice and conscience)). Because the reflective/reflexive structure of sympathy becomes internalised in the form that the I (ego), as it were, is split into two persons, one of which, the observer, is moved and transferred into the situation and position of (the) other (people), [[i.e.]] of actors, and their act(ion)s are judged in accordance with the (afore)mentioned yardsticks³⁴⁰. Whereas sympathy and ethics in the argumentation analysed beforehand were connected through and by the exclusive receptiveness of the former (sympathy) for (i.e. as regards) certain content(s), Smith now builds an

³³⁹ Loc. cit., II, 1, 5, § 4.

³⁴⁰ The analysis rests and is based on III, 1.

entirely different bridge between sympathy and ethics. The concept of sympathy remains in principle formal, and just as formal are the attributes of ethics, which it (i.e. the said concept of sympathy) is supposed to found. But the orientation of the I (ego) to that which is supposed to be pleasant, agreeable and dear, also applies to the member of a band of thieves or (burglary/robber) gang, and cannot in itself found and establish any material distinction between good and bad/evil.

In the ambivalences which adhere to the concept(ual plan) of sympathy in Hume or A. Smith, different aspects of its (i.e. the said concet(ual plan) of sympathy's) manifold use/usage in the 18th century appear, which are combined on each and every respective occasion with one another in a different manner. An interesting variant of this game of combination(s) (or combinatory game) is found in Hartley^{cvi}. He indeed hardly discusses the formal (form-related) mechanism of sympathy (and it can in actual fact be seen and appreciated with difficulty how his (i.e. Hartley's) mechanical theory of association would have been able to make that mechanism entirely understandable), however, he tacitly builds upon Hume's conceptuality and points to the function of the "imagination", yet above all he notices and calls our attention to "comparison", which can be explained as positive or negative association. If Hume through the act of comparison wants to demarcate and delimit schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) and malice, wickedness against the unmediatedness (i.e. directness or immediacy) of pity, then Hartley gains his concept of sympathy through a dilation and expansion of the act of comparison to all sympathetic acts. He can, consequently, ditch and abandon the assumption of a spontaneous and at the same time positive sympathy, and comprehends, instead of that, sympathy in general, and in all cases, as (the) unity of understanding and opinion or statement [[in relation to all cases]]; it is a matter here, therefore, of all "possible ways in which the happiness or misery of one can be combined

with the happiness or misery of another”³⁴¹. The form-related (i.e. formal) character of the act of sympathy results indirectly from the fact that understanding can be accompanied by both positive as well as by negative “pleasing and tormenting, moral and immoral”³⁴² opinions or statements, and although Hartley condemns (the) immoral or inimical (opinions or statements) amongst them (i.e. all positive and negative opinions and statements), nonetheless his systematisation encompasses all four possible classes of “sympathetic affections”. We are glad about alien (another’s or others’) luck and happiness, and we suffer under (i.e. as regards) alien (another’s or others’) suffering, or else, we are glad about alien (another’s or others’) suffering and we suffer under (i.e. as regards) alien (another’s or others’) luck and happiness. In both the former cases, sociality, good will, benevolence and pity are present; in both the latter cases, the opposite of that (is present), namely, malice, malevolence, revenge, vengeance, envy, jealousy, cruelty, competition, rivalry etc.³⁴³.

The most important contributions of the 20th century to the theory of sympathy and of pity (Sympathie- und Mitleidstheorie) can structurally without [[much]] difficulty be apprehended on the basis of the thus reconstructed discussion of the 18th century, as differently as the basic or fundamental motives may also be nuanced. In Scheler, the in principle (fundamental) separation of the understanding and of the emotional aspect in (regard to) the act of sympathy (die prinzipielle Trennung des verstehenden und des emotionalen Aspekts im Sympathieakt) from each other, stands or is in contradiction to the attempt to think of love and sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) (Liebe und Mitgefühl) together, which again for its part, comes to a standstill at half way (i.e. at the half-way stage or mark and thus is incomplete). The “component of

³⁴¹ *Observations on Man*, I, p. 471.

³⁴² Loc. cit., I, p. 482.

³⁴³ Loc. cit., I, p. 471 ff..

understanding”, also called “after-feeling or post hoc feeling (Nachfühlen)” and “after-living or post hoc life (Nachleben)”, according to Scheler captures and includes the facts (of the matter) of alien (i.e. another’s or others’) feeling (sentiment or emotion), and of the – belonging to that – “value behaviour or behaviour or conduct as regards values (Wertverhaltes)”, whereas (the) sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) represents and constitutes a “reaction (Reaktion)” of the I (ego) to the apprehension of this state of these facts of the matter, i.e. “in coming up to join” the already understood alien experiences (i.e. experiences of another person or of others) (Fremderlebnissen). After-feeling or post hoc feeling (Nachfühlen) is therefore no “morally and ethically relevant act (sittlich relevanter Akt)”, and can be accompanied not merely by indifference (Gleichgültigkeit), but also by (acts of) cruelty (and atrocities) (Grausamkeit), since the cruel (person) patently feels pleasure (joy or lust) (Lust) only (then) when he can feel post hoc or afterwards alien (i.e. another’s or others) suffering (wenn er fremdes Leid nachfühlen kann)^{344 + cvii}. The “sharp, acute or hard” separation between after-feeling or post-hoc feeling, and, sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) should, nonetheless, not at all mean or signify that (the) reflectivity/reflexivity and ethical neutrality are restricted or limited only to the former (after-feeling or post-hoc feeling). Sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) is neither unmediated (i.e. immediate and direct) sympathy (as compassion or commiseration), in which two people, driven (propelled, forced, prompted or goaded) by the same external cause, feel the same, nor mere contagion or transmission of feeling (sentiment or emotion), nor the setting up, establishment or institution of one’s own I (ego) with an alien (i.e. another’s) I (ego). It is rather with-joy (i.e. feeling joy and delight along with another or others) (Mitfreude) or pity (Mitleid), and exactly because of that, it excludes, just like after-feeling or post hoc feeling,

³⁴⁴ *Wesen und Formen*, pp. 19, 20, 24ff..

(the) real identification with the Other. Because “pitying is suffering in (regard to) the suffering of another (person), as this other (person)”]; in understanding we experience what is being understood “in no manner really (i.e. in no way which is real)”, and that is why no imitation or copying (Nachahmung) and no contagion or transmission of alien (i.e. another’s or others’) affects and emotions (Affekte) takes place³⁴⁵. Scheler distinguishes, moreover, between (the) “mere sympathising or commiserating (Mitfühlen)”, which is basically identical with (the) “after-feeling or post hoc feeling (Nachfühlen)” or the “act of understanding (Verständnisakt)” and is in itself “value-blind, i.e. blind to values (wertblind)”, and, actual, real sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) (Mitgefühl), which he calls “positive-valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value (positivwertig)”, which he contradistinguishes to (the) “negative-valent, i.e. having a negative valency or value (negativwertigen)” (sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)). Through this contradistinction, he (i.e. Scheler) wants to take into account the fact that the act of understanding also precedes and comes before such feelings (emotions or sentiments) which “represent and constitute the precise opposite of (the) actual, real sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)”, like, for instance, (acts of) cruelty (and atrocities), envy, jealousy or schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) (Grausamkeit, Neid oder Schadenfreude). The “ambiguity and equivocalness rich and replete with (regard to) fate and destiny” („schicksalsreiche Zweideutigkeit“) in the concept of sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) (Mitgefühl) comes into being from the fact that on (i.e. after) the in itself value-free acts of understanding, both “positive-(valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value)” as well as “negative-valent, i.e. having a negative valency or value” positionings or stances can follow, i.e. ensue. Here, Scheler considers and contemplates the same four “classes” as Hartley: “there is a

³⁴⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 22, 23, 44, 48.

rejoicing, being happy, glad and pleased (Sichfreuen) in (regard to) alien (i.e. another's or others') joy, pleasure, happiness and delight (an der fremden Freude)", and a suffering in (regard to) this joy, pleasure etc.; a suffering in (regard to) alien (i.e. another's or others') suffering and a rejoicing, being happy, glad and pleased in (regard to) alien (i.e. another's or others') suffering", and he ascribes the attribute of the positive-valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value, or actual and real sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) to the first members of these (pairs of (the)) opposite(s)³⁴⁶. The dominant language usage indeed already commands and demands this^{cviii}, but the philosopher^{cix} wants to go beyond that and recognise and acknowledge in "genuine, real, true, veritable sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) (echten Mitgefühl)" an intensity which leaves the structure of reflexivity/reflectivity behind. The "psychology of the Enlightenment", opines Scheler, who explained behaviour by means and by way of egotistical motives, had to assume and accept that sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) is mediated by the thought or consideration: "yet how would it be if it came out (i.e. happened) to me thus (i.e. in the same way)?" The "founding" of sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) by love, however, makes out of it (i.e. sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)) an "unmediated (i.e. immediate and direct) direction as to feeling, sentiment and emotion towards the other (person) as another (person)", therefore, it puts aside thoughts, considerations and mediations, intercessions or interventions. Love is a spontaneous act, differing and varying from sympathising or commiserating (Mitfühlen) in the sense of "taking in, absorbing, assimilating, taking up, entering into or incorporating (Aufnehmens)", and, despite that, [[is]] determinative for the measure, extent, degree and depth of sympathising or commiserating. After this explanation of (the) genuine, real, true, veritable sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)

³⁴⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 17ff., 139-141.

by means and by way of love, it is odd and strange that Scheler assures [[us]] that we would also sympathise or commiserate with people whom we did not love³⁴⁷ – unless he does not mean here the spontaneously loving (person), but indeed the positive-valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value, yet still always reflective/reflexive sympathy (as compassion or commiseration). His terminology varies, fluctuates and vacillates, and accordingly, the attribute of (the) genuine, true, veritable or real and actual sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) (das Attribut des echten oder eigentlichen Mitgeföhls) is ascribed, at times, to the former (spontaneous love and being happy for someone who is happy), or to the latter (reflective love and suffering for those who are suffering). And this, lends, finally, to sympathy (as compassion or commiseration), in general, an ethical colouring, tint or hue, which differs from the mere act of understanding.^{cx}

The philosophical and social-psychological terminology oscillated, and swung, and fluctuated, in general, between the identification (as equating) of “sympathy (Sympathie)” and value-free “understanding” (wertfreiem „Verstehen“) as regards each other, and the use of “sympathy (Sympathie)” for the description of value-laden and judgemental positionings and stances which follow the act of understanding (wertenden Stellungnahme, die auf den Verständnisakt folgt). In this latter case, again, to and in the area and realm of “sympathy”, either the entire spectrum of (the) affective (emotional and sentimental) positionings and stances, or else only its (i.e. the said spectrum’s) positive half, was attributed and classed, and then the negative (half of the spectrum) was called “antipathy”. It must, though, be emphasised that terminological distinctions by no means here have to mean objective varieties, dissimilarities and differences of opinion, and that often, despite the opposite usage/use of terms, the same view or perspective is, as matter of fact, being

³⁴⁷ Loc. cit., pp. 50ff., 146ff..

supported and represented. Several examples may/are able to clarify and elucidate this. As we know, Husserl, despite occasional reservations, has/had (spoken) of empathy (or insight) (Einfühlung) in order to name the I's (ego's) putting oneself in [[the position and situation of]] (and or empathising with) the Other (das Sichhineinversetzen des Ich in den Anderen), regardless of (the) value-laden and judgemental positionings and stances. "Sympathy (Sympathie)" was to him (i.e. Husserl), on the other hand (or compared to this), "the real, actual domain of the concepts [[of]] love and hate/hatred", that is, the domain of "value", which the I (ego), of course, can enter only after it (i.e. the I (ego)) through empathy (or insight) manages and achieves "the putting (Hineinversetzen)" into the [[position and situation of]] the Other^{348 + cxi}. Litt^{cxii} especially related "sympathy (Sympathie)" to (the) widely grasped [[notion of]] love, and "antipathy (Antipathie)" to (the) widely grasped [[notion of]] hate/hatred, and distinguished both ("sympathy" and "antipathy") from understanding through and by means/way of the observation that this (understanding) is dependent neither exclusively on love, nor on hate/hatred, or else, the person hating, just as much as the person loving, can come to the understanding of the Other, but obviously not because he hates or loves, but irrespective of whether, and (the fact) that, he hates or loves³⁴⁹. Where "sympathy" has "antipathy" as the/its counter-concept, we find ourselves nearest and closest to the common and familiar language use/usage. One then imagines the process as follows: the I (ego) tries to think and to feel what the Other thinks or feels, and when it (i.e. the I (ego)) suspects or ascertains that a commonality or common ground in the thinking and feeling [[of both the I (ego) and the Other]] is present, then it (i.e. the I (ego)) develops sympathy for the Other, otherwise antipathy arises (comes/crops up and emerges). Pseudo-sympathies and (pseudo)-antipathies come into being when the I (ego) projects

³⁴⁸ *Zur Phänom. d. Intersubj.*, II, Beilage XXIV = *Hu*, XIV, pp. 191, 186. Cf. footnote 169, above.

³⁴⁹ *Individuum*, p. 192ff..

its own feelings (sentiments or emotions) into the Other or misunderstands it (i.e. the Other) in the negative sense. In any case, the I (ego) does not get around (the) real or imagined understanding as (the) presupposition of sympathy and antipathy³⁵⁰.

If “sympathy (Sympathie)” and “pity (Mitleid)” in principle are distinguished from each other, as a rule, “sympathy” means and signifies as much as value-neutral understanding (wertneutrales Verstehen). Thus, for instance, in (regard to) Cooley: “Sympathy is not compassion, it denotes the sharing of any mental state that can be communicated”³⁵¹. From that follows that sympathy does not have to be connected with any particular feeling (sentiment or emotion), it can, thus, be “hostile as well as friendly”. Cooley uses, by the way, the expression “hostile sympathy” in order to describe a relation in which the I (ego) understands very well what the Other means when it (i.e. the Other) in reference to something says “mine”, which the I (ego) also looks at as “mine”³⁵². Where the value-neutral character of sympathy is extracted or derived through its demarcation and delimitation against and from pity, there we may talk of a continuation of the debate of the 18th century. Incidentally, (the) reference to it (the said debate of the 18th century) often takes place expressly, and some noteworthy attempts to bring and work out the reflexive/reflective components of sympathy and pity have drawn from a direct confrontation with Hume. Thus Mercer writes that the concept(ual plan) of “cognitive sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) (kognitiven Mitgeföhls)” (cognitive fellow-feeling) is for the concept(ual plan) of sympathy (Sympathiekonzept), fundamental. In such sympathy (as compassion or commiseration, or as fellow-feeling) (Bei solchem Mitgeföh) – totally different than in [[the case of]] an emotional contagion or transmission – an intellectual(-spiritual) exercise, in which both self-

³⁵⁰ See e.g. Bryant, “Antipathy and Sympathy”, pp. 366, 365.

³⁵¹ *Human Nature*, p. 136.

³⁵² Loc. cit., pp. 158, 192.

consciousness, as well as the imagination of the I (ego), takes part and is involved, and whose form-related (i.e. formal) character is compatible and goes together with feelings (sentiments and emotions) of hate/hatred, as well as with (feelings (sentiments and emotions)) of love. Sympathy (Sympathie) accordingly has very little to do with pity (Mitleid); pity can, in fact, express hardly veiled, disguised contempt, disdain or scorn³⁵³. Hamburger^{cxiii} (has) emphatically pointed to such pejorative attributes (in respect) of pity in order to make clear the “distance structure (or structures in respect of distance) (Distanzstruktur)” of pity. But her main argument, however, derives from the “objectivity of sympathy (Objektivität der Sympathie)”, namely, from the possibility of a value-neutral understanding, which must likewise underlie pity (*or*: take pity as its basis). Pity remains, in this respect, alien-understanding (i.e. understanding of the foreigner, stranger or of another (person or other people) (Fremdverstehen)) as the I (ego) pities because it does not itself suffer, because it, therefore, indeed knows about alien suffering (i.e. the suffering of another person or other people), but it cannot feel the/this same suffering originally [[i.e. as the person suffering feels his suffering]]³⁵⁴.

The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives or “role-taking” is sometimes characterised in the Anglo-Saxon literature by the term “empathy”, which sounds more value-neutral than “sympathy”, although it is not always used value-neutrally³⁵⁵. Empathy (Empathie) demonstrates its objectivity when it – apart from the subjective element or factor which the actor brings into a situation – apprehends the features, characteristics or attributes of the situation (die Züge der Situation), and consequently makes its real, actual object (or

³⁵³ *Sympathy*, pp. 8, 10, 12, 18ff.. A “practical concern” for the Other, according to Mercer, should also belong to sympathy (as compassion or commiseration, or as fellow-feeling) (Mitgefühl), however, he (i.e. Mercer) cannot found and justify in greater detail and more precisely the necessary interrelation between (the) value-neutral-cognitive and (the) positive-practical aspect of sympathy (as compassion or commiseration, or as fellow-feeling).

³⁵⁴ *Mitleid*, pp. 81ff., 106ff.. Cf. footnote 324, above.

³⁵⁵ See footnote 292 in this chapter, above.

subject matter), the interaction (or mutual influence) (interplay, alternating (changing) effect) of the actor and the situation (das der zu ihrem eigentlichen Gegenstand die Wechselwirkung von Akteur und Situation macht)³⁵⁶. The main emphases are distributed somewhat differently when empathy is defined in the psycho-analytical context as vicarious and representative self-observation (stellvertretende Selbstbeobachtung) (vicarious introspection). If self-observation and introspection (Selbstbeobachtung), as Freud taught, is the first duty and best school of the psycho-analyst, then it is patently obvious that the empathic acts (empathischen Akte), through which the therapist moves and transfers himself into the psyche of the/his patients, represents and constitutes a broadening of his self-observation and introspection, or a transference of introspection (Introspektion) into the Other and consequently a vicarious (and representative) introspection (stellvertretende Introspektion)³⁵⁷. If, though, empathy and self-observation and introspection (Empathie und Selbstbeobachtung) are connected so tightly with each other, then self-observation/introspection means and is just as much as empathy itself (*or*: then self-observation/introspection is a kind of empathy); empathy (means and is) just as much as (the) self-observation/introspection of or in regard to the Other. The empathic act actually, really consists in (the fact) that the I (ego) observes in itself that feeling (sentiment or emotion) which is supposed to represent the feeling (sentiment or emotion) of the Other. In order to observe the Other, the I (ego) must observe itself, but in such a way that it knows that that which it observes in itself stands for something which is going on, proceeding and happening in the Other (Um den Anderen zu beobachten, muß das Ich sich beobachten, aber so, daß es weiß, daß das, was es in sich beobachtet, für etwas steht, was im Anderen vorgeht). The I's (ego's) notion that its vicarious and

³⁵⁶ See e.g. Vernon-Stewart, "Empathy", p. 48ff..

³⁵⁷ Kohut, "Introspection, Empathy", p. 463. The expression "vicarious experience" was, as far as I can see, first coined by Znaniecki, see *The Method of Sociology*, p. 167 ("a specific kind of information which the natural experimenter... ignores altogether").

representative feelings (sentiments or emotions) would more or less correspond and be identical, in terms of content, with those (feelings (sentiments or emotions)) of the Other, is accompanied by the notion that the I (ego) itself remains at all times a different subject than/to the Other³⁵⁸.

³⁵⁸ Agosta, "Empathy", pp. 51, 55.

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!
!!

^{xxxix} I presume what is meant is that affects/emotions do not exist in the consciousness as a whole in toto, i.e. they have a strong basis in physiological feelings, but of course are, inter alia, expressed too through language and conscious mediation (though, not necessarily always)... [[?]]

^{xxx} All humans qua humans are subject to a social-ontological and anthropological rationality, which means all humans are potentially subject to all the passions and emotions, as well as to all psychological states, from love to hate, and from depression to optimism. This fundamental knowledge of human existence belies and undercuts all ideological presentations of “love, hate, mental repression” etc., etc., etc., incl. in our “Western” mass-democratic era, in relation to which the ZIO-USA Excrement-JOO-HEBROO-VOMIT-animals (and their partners) (as viewed as a subjective matter of Taste) are GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY involved in all kinds of Mass-Media and Mass-“Education” Brain-Washing and Full-Spectrum ZIO-USA indoctrination and lobotomisation.

^{xxxix} Is this absolutely face-value mono-semantic, or is there some irony involved? (since access to information and e.g. having “high verbal IQ” is also a function of very concrete power relations – AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!). Reading the sentences following, tells us a lot!

^{xxxii} All this to me means, that “intellectual talent or endowment” – when all other things are *not* equal, as in the case of the “dumber side” being on the side of the strong, i.e. those bearing a dominant ideology – provides nothing in terms of power in relation to others, when the others are acting and moving and cogitating within the material and ideological relations of relatively dominant forms of power, and the more “intellectually talented” is trying to e.g. make a point “from the outside”, so to speak, “looking in”. All of this cannot take place, of course, without attempted, successful or unsuccessful, or otherwise distorted, assumptions and taking on/over of perspectives.

^{xxxiii} Now, this takes us to the heart of mass-democratic “equality” ideology, and as we shall see, a central figure was a non-JOO (the sort of, kind of great George Herbert Mead), though many “participants” following Mead are GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY JOOs, Judases, Devil-Evil-Evil-Devils, Satanists, Primitive Secret Society Mammon-People, etc. (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste as regards to objective facts of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE involvement of JOOs – including through Primitive Secret Society Networking – in a whole host of elite positions in certain countries). It’s no “accident” that the thinkers in the broader “G.H.M. circle” c. 1890 – c. 1920/1930 such as Josiah Royce, William James, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, et al. were not JOOs, because JOOs, really got going in ZIO-USA in the academic world from about WW2 or in the decade or two after WW2, after getting to GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE BIG MONEY involvement in the USA by about WW1 (c.f. W. Wilson’s observation; also Henry Ford et al.). The point is that the American-centred mass-democratic social formation had strong social, economic and ideological roots in times when JOOs were not so pervasively GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY dominant throughout elite levels of USA society, starting from the second half of the 19th century up until WW1 and WW2, whereas by the 1960s and 1970s, the whole West, so to speak, had been “JOOed”. Now, we’re entering into the Era of De-JOOing, but unfortunately for what remains of the West, Han Man only looks after the Han, and Ape Man only looks after the APE, etc.. The Parasitical ZIO-Cancer in ZIO-USA was literally the End, the Death of the West, and even the End of Humanity, if “The Big Fuck YOU!” means things will go BANG, BOOM, BANG!

^{xxxiv} As regards the social-ontic reality of the mechanism of the social relation and the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and roles etc..

^{xxxv} Herbert George Blumer (March 7, 1900 – April 13, 1987) = NOT A JOO (Yipee!!!) (and according to Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Blumer)) was influenced by Mead, William Isaac Thomas (August 13, 1863 – December 5, 1947) and Robert Ezra Park (February 14, 1864 – February 7, 1944) who were also non-JOO sociologists. It’s quite clear that the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ZIO-JOO DEVIL-EVIL, EVIL-DEVIL SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY (MAMMON-LUCIFER-HEBROO-JUDAS) TAKEOVER of sociology and elite academia in ZIO-USA had to wait before it “really got going” from c. 1960/1970 (grosso modo = the after Talcott Parsons dominance period), with the likes of Erving Goffman, who as far as I can tell and know, was a significant thinker and worthy of serious study and consideration (and the Satanic Super Trio of Horkheimer-Adorno-Marcuse, because of their Marxist background and their comparatively broad learning,

also have their analytical value, and not just their Satanic value). The “Circus”, though, took off with the Arch-ZIO-JOO-Satanist DER-RI-DA and those of the FREAK SHOW around him, who “de-constructed” everything Western except as it “just happens” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of ZIO-JOO (HEBROO-JUDAS-MAMMON) power and wealth centred in the key former and current Imperialist Centres of ZIO-UK, ZIO-France and ZIO-USA (the non-JOO Poofter Foucault had some analytical, albeit limited value, whereas the JOOs Durkehim, Simmel, Löwith, Kantorowicz, Aron, even L. Strauss, are either worthy of not insignificant respect up to being ALL-TIME SUPER LEGENDS, notwithstanding some very serious flaws). It goes without saying that the Greatest of the Greats in terms of modern Western sociology include Montesquieu, Ferguson, Marx, Pareto, Weber, Mannheim et al., who were mostly not of the Ultimate EXTREMIST HATE TRIBE of the Joos (Judas-Mammon-ZIO-HEBROO-Excrement-POO-Faeces-DUNG (= seen as a subjective Matter of Taste in relation to the Objective Fact of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ZIO-JOO-MAMMON-DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL-SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY-HEBROO-JUDAS forms of power and wealth, including through Primitive Secret Society networking and centuries in Banking, Finance and later Corporations at elite level etc.).

xxxvi **AAAAAA-**

**HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!
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xxxvii For P.K. to call Norbert Elias (22 June 1897 – 1 August 1990) a “sociologist” it means at the very least he had some respect of him, as he should have, because Elias might have been ZIO-JOO filth (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste), but his work overall has definite value when compared to the “post-modern” Excrement-“icons” of ZIO-USA c. 1970 and later.

xxxviii “Sc.”, abbreviation for “scilicet”, Latin for “it is permitted to know”, which means, depending on the context, something like: “namely”, “that is to say”, “to wit”, “which is”, or “as follows”.

xxxix **AAAAAA-**

**HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!
!!**

xl This is exactly what Brain-Washing and (FULL-SPECTRUM) Lobotomisation want to do, whether ZIO-centric or ZIO-biassed or otherwise ZIO-inclined **or not**, and can never ever do all of the time and forever, no matter how relatively and or apparently successful during particular historical conjunctures.

xli For whatever reason, P.K. consulted the German translation of Mead’s *Mind, Self and Society* and I can’t be bothered finding what Mead’s exact English terminology is, so if there is any reader “out there” you will have to do your own research in regard to Mead’s actual words and phrasing, because I’m translating into English from the German, rather than finding out what Mead’s actual wording and phrasing was.

xlii V. Mises, Radcliff-Brown, Coser, Dahrendorf, P. Blau, Luhmann, Vierkandt, Schütz, Gurvitch, Sorokin, McIver-Page, Bales, Shils, Lipset (six out of these 14 (mostly, but not all) monkeys are JOOS! Fucking HELL!).

xliii **AAAAAA-**

**HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!
!!**

xliv This has very significant implications for how “equality” and “racism” and “sexism” and “human dignity” and “good manners” and “-phobia this” and “anti-that” etc. are interpreted, and what content-related definitions

[Germany](#)) was a [Germanist](#), literary scholar and [philosopher](#). She was a professor at the [University of Stuttgart](#).
= https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A4te_Hamburger).