

V. Rationality, symbol (sign, icon) and language
(speech, tongue) in the field of tension (stress,
strain) (tension field) of the social relation
(Rationalität, Symbol und Sprache im
Spannungsfeld der sozialen Beziehung)

1. Levels, forms (shapes, guises, figures) and degrees (grades, stages, extents) of rationality (Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade der Rationalität)

A. Preliminary remark (comment, note) (introduction) (Vorbemerkung)

Talk of the levels, forms and degrees of rationality already shows, reveals or suggests that rationality in itself and as such, that is, irrespective of its bearer and its (field of) coming into being or of its field of unfolding and development cannot make up and constitute the object of a handling and treatment which suffices for strict objective and factual examination, testing and proving (also ungeachtet ihres Trägers und ihres Entstehungs- oder Entfaltungsgebietes nicht den Gegenstand einer Behandlung abgeben kann, die strenger sachlicher Prüfung genügt). Whoever wants to treat and deal with “rationality” absolutely (per se or as such), must take a definition of the same (“rationality”) as a basis, which does not make do, and does not manage, without terms in need of interpretation (ohne interpretationsbedürftige Termini); all theories of rationality with (a) claim of (or to) exclusivity and loud or quiet (faint, soft) normative ambitions contained, in any case, such terms and, through that, got involved and tangled up in a vicious circle whose logical troubles, difficulties and inconveniences, though, have not been able to cool down (their) ethical zeal and eagerness. The task of a social ontology as (a) theoretical dimension of depths (or in-depth dimension) (Aufgabe einer Sozialontologie als theoretischer Tiefendimension) is, accordingly, not the setting up, formation or erection of a

wider “philosophical” theory of rationality („philosophischen“ Rationalitätstheorie) next to other(s) (“philosophical” theories of rationality), which, incidentally, in many cases and frequently repeat one another, but the establishment, investigation and determination of the reasons (grounds), out of which rationality (Rationalität) – always: in its various levels, forms and degrees – makes up a constitutive element of human living together, i.e. co-existence (ein konstitutives Element menschlichen Zusammenlebens ausmacht). Rationality does not constitute, seen thus, an Ought whose realisation needs a particular or especial effort, endeavour and struggle going over and above, exceeding and passing beyond the present human situation, but a reality which originally belongs together with the rest of the realities of the social and or of the human (Rationalität bildet, so gesehen, kein Sollen, dessen Realisierung einer besonderen, über die gegenwärtige menschliche Situation hinausgehenden Anstrengung bedarf, sondern eine Realität, die mit den übrigen Realitäten des Sozialen bzw. des Menschlichen ursprünglich zusammengehört). The change (Der Wechsel) of / in its levels, forms and degrees does not yield or result in any linear progress, rather it (i.e. the said change) is executed and carried out asymmetrically and underlies stark, i.e. strong fluctuations (variations and deviations), whereby and in relation to which these levels, forms and degrees combine with one another in various or in the same collective or individual actors on each and every respective occasion, having an effect differently on one another (jeweils anders miteinander kombinieren, anders aufeinander wirken). “Philosophical” and (in (the) ethical and technical sense) normative theories of rationality („Philosophische“ und (im ethischen und technischen Sinne) normative Rationalitätstheorien) are symptoms and indicators of this eternal, everlasting and perpetual change; they register and record objectively, i.e. without knowing it and (without) wanting (it), social-ontological possibilities (sozialontologische Möglichkeiten), which temporarily and transiently became realities (die vorübergehend Wirklichkeiten wurden); but

they are incapable of ever performing, achieving and accomplishing that which they – according to what they think they know – want to perform, achieve and accomplish: namely, to put an end to the (great) variety and multiformity of (the) social-ontological possibilities in (the) name (of) and in favour of the sole wished-for “rational” reality (der einzig erwünschten „rationalen“ Wirklichkeit). The degrees of rationality are not put, classed or classified in a uniform, unitary, unified universal scale (Die Grade der Rationalität stufen sich nicht in eine einheitliche universelle Skala ein), whose summit, peak or height serves as (the) yardstick and measure of the tiers, levels, stages or grades (rungs or ranks) (deren Gipfel als Gradmesser der Stufen dient) [of the said degrees of rationality]; they are (the) functions of the levels at which rationality unfolds and develops, and of the form, which it (i.e. rationality) assumes and adopts on each and every respective occasion. Theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory), one cannot get on top of this situation and position (i.e. get this situation under control) through final, conclusive and definitive definitions; behind them are (lodged, hiding, stuck) / hide admonitions, exhortations and warnings, but through a row / series of conceptual distinctions (sondern durch eine Reihe von begrifflichen Unterscheidungen), which are supposed to relate, render, reflect and convey (the) levels, forms and degrees of rationality in their great contours and outlines and with descriptive intent. From the standpoint of general methodology, conceptual distinctions, supported, propped up and underpinned by the corresponding casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases), offer the sole available theoretical way out when definitions can neither be maintained and kept to for long, nor help along / (any) further – something which applies to most cases; and they (i.e. the said conceptual distinctions) typically (enough) arise precisely during (the) proving of the inadequacies, deficiencies, shortcoming and failings of this or that definition.

Although there is and cannot be – in its content – binding and conclusively

defined “rationality” (Obwohl es „die“ in ihrem Inhalt verbindlich und endgültig definierte Rationalität nicht gibt und nicht geben kann), talk of “rationality” is customary, normal, typical, conventional, standard, usual and theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) legitimate (ist die Rede von „der“ Rationalität üblich and auch theoretisch legitim); one, in fact, may or should not speak of (the) levels, forms and degrees of the same (rationality), when the reference to something is lacking / missing, which can be expressed at least conventionally in the singular (i.e. when the said levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not refer to something which cannot be expressed at least conventionally in the singular). This singular, nonetheless, does not point to any content, but to a form-related (i.e. formal) anthropological and social-ontological factor, which, like all anthropological and social-ontological factors can be connected (and combined) with all humanly and socially conceivable, imaginable and thinkable content(s). Like “the” social relation or “language”, from which it (i.e. rationality) can hardly be separated genetically and functionally, “rationality” updates and refreshes its potential (or brings its potential up to date, making that potential topical) in the most different positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends/goals and activities (in den unterschiedlichsten Einstellungen, Wertungen, Zwecken und Tätigkeiten). As (an) anthropological and social-ontological constituent and constant (Als anthropologische und sozialontologische Konstituente und Konstante), it (i.e. rationality) finds itself or is found on the other side of, i.e. beyond the common and familiar contrast and opposition between “rationalism” and “irrationalism” („Rationalismus“ und „Irrationalismus“), which comes up, crops up, arises and emerges only during (the) content-related use/usage of rationality, and indicates or signals preferences of (a) content-related nature, that is, concretely normative fillings, i.e. arrangements (as to content) (konkrete normative Besetzungen) of those positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends/goals and activities; (the) level, form and degree of

rationality does not necessarily depend, in any case, on the decision in favour of (the) “rationalism” or of (the) “irrationalism”, and the sense in which the anthropological and social-ontological way of looking at things ascribes and attributes the predicate “rational” to an action (und der Sinn, in dem die anthropologische und sozialontologische Betrachtung einem Handeln das Prädikat „rational“ zuschreiben) can differ considerably from that (sense) in which the actors themselves may or like and want to apostrophise (i.e. mention and refer to) an action as “rational” or “irrational” (als „rational“ oder „irrational“ apostrophieren mögen). The apparent paradox in (the) rationality lies therein (in the fact)(,) that it – thanks to its each and every respective level and form, as well as its each and every degree – is to be found, in practice, everywhere in the human-social [sphere, field, dimension, realm] (praktisch überall im Menschlich-Sozialen zu finden ist), however(,) precisely because it is deprived of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) (aber sich gerade deshalb jeder Normierung entzieht), which goes way beyond what the anthropological and social-ontological formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) contain or imply already as (a) fact (die über das hinausgeht, was die anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Formalien schon als Faktum beinhalten oder implizieren)ⁱ. To someone acting in a concrete situation (and position), however, exactly this unreachableⁱⁱ normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) is needed (Dem in einer konkreten Lage Handelnden tut jedoch eben diese unerreichbare Normierung not), so that he, in the hour (i.e. at the time) of probation (i.e. testing), is basically (placed, put, posited) on his own (so daß er in der Stunde der praktischen Bewährung im Grunde auf sich allein gestellt ist) – endowed, equipped and provided, though, with the aforementioned formalities (i.e. formal / form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), and with that which he

himself has willingly or unwillingly made out of them. Precisely the ubiquity of (the) rationality lends, confers to, bestows upon and gives, therefore, the theory of rationality such a general character that every specification in the direction of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) cannot go out of and above (i.e. beyond) beginnings which must buy and purchase (i.e. obtain and secure) their general objective validity, soundness and conclusiveness with the staying and remaining in unbinding (i.e. non-binding) formulae (and set phrases) (in unverbindlichen Formeln)¹. In short: the concept of rationality is theoretically (i.e. as regards theory) fruitful and fertile, i.e. helpful and of assistance during the investigation, establishment and determination of and inquiry into anthropological and social-ontological facts and circumstances, to the extent it remains, in practice, vague. And conversely: every definition or normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) of rationality, which wants to be, in practice, (technically or ethically) useful, loses in (its) theoretical depth and breadth without gaining and winning much in another respect. As can, incidentally, be shown, the terms, which normative theories of rationality must make use of (e.g. consistency, (the) adequate correlation of the goal/end and means with each other etc.) (die Termini, deren sich normative Rationalitätstheorien bedienen müssen (z. B. Konsistenz, adäquate Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander etc.)) constitute simple or more complicated re-descriptions and paraphrases (re-writings, re-brandings) (Umschreibungen) of the formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically, and they only get and obtain, maintain and preserve a sense (i.e. meaning) when they are understood (in respect) of these (formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to

¹ See under D in this section, below.

forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically). This indicates in itself the objective impossibility of being able to leave behind these formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) [[to move]] in the direction of normatively binding content(s) (in Richtung auf normativ verbindliche Inhalte). Consequently, the treatment and handling of the examination of the problem of rationality remains in (an) eminent (i.e. exceptional and extreme (as total)) sense (a) matter (thing, cause, issue, affair, business, case) of (the) anthropology and of (the) social ontology, which are technically and ethically blind. Whoever is on the lookout for content-related specifications of rationality in narrower fields – exactly in the fields of (the) technique (technology) or of (the) ethics (eben den Gebieten der Technik oder der Ethik) – (will) necessarily get tangled up in, entangled, embroiled and involved in new unsolvable paralogisms. The smuggling in of anthropological and social-ontological factors or concepts for / towards (the) underpinning (backing-up and support) of such specifications yields, brings, provides little [which is] tangible and moreover betrays (i.e. reveals) an ideational power claim, namely, that of gaining authority for partial preferences in part-fields (i.e. sub-fields or sub-sectors), which aim for and set their sights on an Ought through and by means of the whole weight of (the) human-social Is (einen ideellen Machtanspruch, nämlich den, partiellen Präferenzen auf Teilgebieten, die ein Sollen anvisieren, durch das ganze Gewicht des menschlich-sozialen Seins Autorität zu verschaffen).

B. The anthropological and social-ontological parameters of rationality (Die anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Parameter der Rationalität)

a. General(ly) (In general) (Allgemeines)

Rationality seeps through, penetrates, permeates and pervades the being and essence (nature, character, creature, entity) of man and the Is (To Be) of society so deeply that that being and essence and that Is again belong so intimately together that the handling and treatment of the examination of the problem of rationality feels first of all lost in this inextricable plexus, network or mesh: it (i.e. the said handling and treatment) does not rightly know where it is supposed and ought to start/begin in order to – from there – unroll and unwind the real coherence of the individual aspects with the greatest possible clarity and logical necessity. It is up to the reader – at least in part – to apprehend through and by means of his imagination as (a) unity what in the description, – as successful as it may be –, must (necessarily) appear(s) as (the/an) enumeration or list of multiple *disjecta membra* [= scattered (tossed about) limbs (members, parts, portions, divisions)] (Rationalität durchdringt das Wesen des Menschen und das Sein der Gesellschaft so tief, jenes Wesen und dieses Sein gehören wiederum so innig zusammen, daß sich die Behandlung der Rationalitätsproblematik in diesem unentwirrbaren Geflecht zunächst verloren fühlt: Sie weiß nicht recht, wo sie ansetzen soll, um von da aus die reale Kohärenz der einzelnen Aspekte mit der größtmöglichen Klarheit und logischen Notwendigkeit aufzurollen. Dem Leser bleibt es wenigstens zum Teil überlassen, durch seine Vorstellungskraft das als Einheit zu erfassen, was in der Darstellung, so gelungen sie auch sein mag, als Aufzählung von mehreren *disjecta membra* vorkommen muß). In the hope that the result will justify the choice of the starting point, we shall begin with the familiar and common distinction between mere “instinctive” behaviour and action („instinktivem“ Verhalten und Handeln), which we already dealt with in (regard to) / with the intention of outlining (delineating and sketching out) the concept of the latter (action) in greater / more detail². The opening up (and reconstruction) of rationality as (a)

² See Ch. IV, Section 2Aa, above.

phenomenon demands, nevertheless, to make this same distinction more deeply, i.e. to not set human behaviour apart from human action (*or*: to not contrast human behaviour to human action) any longer, but to put in one (i.e. to equate and identify) the difference between behaviour and action with that (difference) between animal / beast and man (sondern die Differenz zwischen Verhalten und Handeln mit jener zwischen Tier und Mensch in eins zu setzen), no matter how highly one estimates, values and rates the animal/bestial-behavioural [element] in man (das Tierisch-Verhaltensmäßige am Menschen); the difference [[between animal/beast and man]] remains and persists in any case, and it (i.e. this said difference) is what matters and interests us here. If rationality in the widest and fundamental sense is that feature and characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest of (those belonging as members to) the animal kingdom (von den übrigen Angehörigen des Tierreichs), and if this distinction may or can be re-written, re-described and paraphrased as (the/a) distinction between “instinctive” behaviour and action („instinktivem“ Verhalten und Handeln) without (a) substantial shift or transposition of accent, stress or emphasis and content-related losses, then, also (the) source and (the) field of unfolding and development of rationality (auch Ursprung und Entfaltungsgebiet der Rationalität) may or can or should be located (there) where the more or less direct automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction (die mehr oder weniger direkte Automatik von Stimulus und Reaktion) is considerably loosened (up) and relaxed, and in the distance, interval and gap (Abstand) which comes into being, accordingly, between both (stimulus and reaction), foresight, calculus (i.e. calculation) and choice (Voraussicht, Kalkül und Wahl) amongst, i.e. between practical alternatives nest, lodge and settle³. Upon the clinging and sticking to (the) particular and (the) present, the more or less free visualisation of the no-more (i.e. no longer) (present) or not-yet-present (die mehr oder

³ Bennett, *Rationality*, pp. 5, 84ff..

weniger freie Vergegenwärtigung des Nicht-Mehr- oder Noch-Nicht-Gegenwärtigen) follows, that is, of the past or of the future, which relate to each other like experience and planning (Erfahrung und Planung), and since both are unreal (irreal), i.e. in contrast to the tangible present, they exist only in the (idea as) imagination (Vorstellung), thus, even their still intensive life (living) in (the) ideality permits and compels, forces a – through thought – (i.e. an intellectual) performing and rendering processing and (a) combination of data with regard to adaptations to the environment or to the re-shapings and re-mouldings (and rearrangements) of the same (environment); transferred or translated into the ideational, data become more moveable (mobile, agile, flexible) and more manipulable (so gestattet und erzwingt sogar ihr nunmehr intensives Leben in der Idealität eine durch Denken zu leistende Bearbeitung und Kombination von Daten im Hinblick auf Anpassungen an die Umwelt oder auf Umgestaltungen derselben; ins Ideelle übersetzt, werden Daten viel beweglicher und manipulierbarer).

The loosening of the automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction means not only a growing distance, spacing and gap between both (stimulus and reaction), but simultaneously also a growing great variety and multiformity in the sending, receiving and evaluating of the stimuli as well as in the temporal and qualitative palette (i.e. range) of reactions (Die Auflockerung der Automatik von Stimulus und Reaktion bedeutet nicht nur einen wachsenden Abstand zwischen den beiden, sondern gleichzeitig auch eine wachsende Vielfalt im Senden, Empfangen und Bewerten der Stimuli sowie in der zeitlichen und qualitativen Palette der Reaktionen); more and more reactions can answer and respond to more and more constellations (or correlations of forces) (immer mehr Reaktionen können auf immer mehr Stimuli zu sehr verschiedenen Zeitpunkten und in immer neuen Konstellationen antworten). And since the reaction aims at a material or ideational satisfaction of the actor,

thus, the aforementioned growing distance, spacing or gap between reaction and stimulus during (the) growing differentiation of both (stimulus and reaction) means, besides / moreover, (the/a) growing (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) wished-for and desired satisfaction, as well as (the / a) growing differentiation of its (i.e. the said wished-for satisfaction's) forms and degrees of intensity (Und da die Reaktion auf eine materielle oder ideale Befriedigung des Akteurs abzielt, so bedeutet der gennante wachsende Abstand zwischen Reaktion und Stimulus bei wachsender Differenzierung beider überdies wachsende Fähigkeit zum Aufschub der erwünschten Befriedigung sowie wachsende Differenzierung ihrer Formen und Intensitätsgrade). This postponement (delay or deferment), indeed, takes place under the pressure of external and outer circumstances, however, differently than in the rest of the animals (i.e. non-human animals), in whom/which it (i.e. the said postponement of satisfaction) cannot be prolonged (extended, elongated and protracted) infinitely, endlessly and indefinitely without bringing about (causing and inducing) the abstention from (and or renunciation of) the initially wished-for and desired satisfaction, and the (its) forgetting (i.e. the leaving behind of the said wished-for satisfaction); it (i.e. the said postponement) in man is converted and transformed into a normal internal and inner process, which in principle does not know (of) temporal boundaries (Dieser Aufschub erfolgt zwar unter dem Druck äußerer Umstände, anders aber als bei den übrigen Tieren, bei denen er sich nicht unendlich verlängern kann, ohne den Verzicht auf die zunächst erwünschte Befriedigung und das Vergessen herbeizuführen, verwandelt er sich beim Menschen in einen normalen internen Vorgang, der grundsätzlich keine zeitlichen Grenzen kennt). The put-off, deferred (postponed and delayed) satisfaction is now called (a/the) long-term goal/end, and (the) rationality must pass its ordeal by fire (i.e. acid test) by filling the space (room) of postponement (delay or deferment), i.e. the distance, spacing or gap between (the) concept(ual plan) and (the) reaching and achievement of the goal/end through the means

which are supposed to lead to the reaching and achievement of the goal/end (Die aufgeschobene Befriedigung heißt nun langfristiger Zweck, und die Rationalität muß ihre Feuerprobe bestehen, indem sie den Raum des Aufschubs, d. h. den Abstand zwischen Konzept und Erreichen des Zweckes durch die Mittel füllt, die zum Erreichen des Zweckes führen sollen). The (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) satisfaction and the elementary rationality of the correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consequently represent and constitute both sides of the same coin (Fähigkeit zum Aufschub der Befriedigung und die elementare Rationalität der Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander stellen somit die beiden Seiten derselben Medaille dar). The greater that (cap)ability [at the said postponement of satisfaction], the longer the chain of the means which must be set in motion; to the means, the means for the production of means etc. are then added, whereby and in relation to which rationality is intensified (multiplied) and refined to the extent it is distanced / distances itself from the original end / goal of satisfaction, in order to henceforth convert and transform the ends/goals into means as well as the other way around (conversely, vice versa) (Je größer jene Fähigkeit, desto länger die Kette der Mittel, die sie in Bewegung setzen muß; zu den Mitteln kommen dann die Mittel zur Produktion von Mitteln etc. hinzu, wobei sich Rationalität in eben dem Maße potenziert und verfeinert, wie sie sich vom ursprünglichen Zweck der Befriedigung entfernt, um fortan die Zwecke in Mittel zu verwandeln sowie umgekehrt). During the increasing length of the chain of ends/goals and means (i.e. as the chain of ends/goals grows longer), (the) rationality stands (is, finds itself) before a new task, which is called consistency (Bei zunehmender Länge der Kette von Zwecken und Mitteln steht die Rationalität vor einer neuen Aufgabe, die Konsistenz heißt). No means may or should neutralise another means, and no means may or should naturally thwart, frustrate or foil the end/goal itself, but the successive employment, use and deployment of (the) means must have an effect

cumulatively or else complementarily. Consistency in the use/usage of means simultaneously is called and signifies practice and exercise in (the) elementary logic (Übung in der Elementarlogik), that is, in (regard to) the fundamental principles of (the) identity and of (the) contradiction (in den Grundsätzen der Identität und des Widerspruchs). Through and by means of identical means under identical circumstances and conditions (identische Mittel unter identischen Umständen), identical ends/goals (identische Zwecke) can be reached, attained and achieved; thus reads, runs, sounds (i.e. is) the principle of the identity of acting rationality (das Identitätsprinzip handelnder Rationalität); and its principle of contradiction (ihr Widerspruchsprinzip) means: the most crass (blatant, extreme and gross) of all irrationalities is that of consciously using means which contradict the sincerely (honestly) pursued end/goal (Die krasseste aller Irrationalitäten ist die, bewußt Mittel einzusetzen, die dem aufrichtig verfolgten Zweck zuwiderlaufen). Precisely because the breach (violation, contravention, infringement) of the principle of (the) contradiction in this form is so absurd that it hardly appears or is found in (the) reality, in fact, it can hardly be realised in practice, one often has ex contrario held the adequate correlation of (the) end/goal and of (the) means with (regard to) each other to be the archetype or the sole genuine and in practice relevant rationality (die adäquate Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander für den Urtyp bzw. für die einzig echte und praktisch relevante Rationalität gehalten). That certainly does not go/reach far enough (or: That is certainly not enough). Consistency as (a) feature of rationality stands/is constantly in a relationship of friction towards/with the inconsistent nature of (the) reality, i.e. with the constant changing of / change in circumstances and conditions, which prohibits the enduring, lasting, long-term or permanent use of identical means and the eternal holding onto and adherence to (the) identical ends/goals, and punishes the breaking, infringing and violating of the [[said]] prohibition (Konsistenz als Merkmal der Rationalität steht ständig in einem Friktionsverhältnis zur

inkonsistenten Natur der Wirklichkeit, d. h. zum ständigen Wechsel der Umstände, der den dauerhaften Gebrauch identischer Mittel und das ewige Festhalten an identischen Zwecken verbietet und beim Übertreten des Verbots bestraft). The logical concept(ual plan) of consistency as the lack and absence of contradictions does not, hence, always and necessarily coincide with the praxeological concept(ual plan) of consistency as (the) remaining with the same ends/goals and means (Das logische Konzept der Konsistenz als Fehlen von Widersprüchen fällt daher nicht immer und nicht notwendig mit dem praxeologischen Konzept der Konsistenz als Verbleiben bei denselben Zwecken und Mitteln zusammen)⁴; the former (logical concept of consistency) retains under all circumstances its validity, it is applied only to new content(s); the latter (praxeological concept of consistency) often appears as loyalty, faithfulness and fidelity to principles and shares as a rule the fate and destiny of Don Quixote after the decline of the knighthood, i.e. it ends (up) in pigheadedness, obstinacy and (pure, ridiculous) fantasy. Praxeological pigheadedness and obstinacy, which, though, in (a) technical respect indicates diminished rationality, can be founded on the actor's permanent difficulties of adaptation and of orientation, however, it can also go back and be reduced to past successes, which strengthen and solidify, consolidate the false impression that means and ends/goals, which once led to success, would have to always and everywhere happen to have the same luck and fortune (ersteres behält unter allen Umständen seine Gültigkeit, es wendet sich nur auf neue Inhalte an, letzteres tritt oft als Prinzipientreue auf und teilt in der Regel das Schicksal des Don Quichotte nach dem Untergang des Rittertums, d. h. es endet beim Starrsinn oder der Phantasterei. Praxeologischer Starrsinn, der in technischer Hinsicht allerdings verminderte Rationalität anzeigt, kann in permanenten Anpassungs- und Orientierungsschwierigkeiten des Akteurs gründen, er kann

⁴ V. Mises, *Action*, p. 103.

aber auch auf vergangene Erfolge zurückgehen, die den falschen Eindruck festigen, Mitteln und Zwecken, die einmal zum Erfolg führten, müßte immer und überall dasselbe Glück widerfahren)⁵. Consistency becomes and turns into, therefore, the feature and characteristic of rationality only when the level at which it develops and unfolds is taken into account; the consistency at one level is not the same as the consistency at another level, and (the) both levels can behave, i.e. be, inconsistent(ly) towards/with (regard to) each other, although they, – each for itself –, is consistent (Konsistenz wird also erst zum Merkmal der Rationalität, wenn der Ebene Rechnung getragen wird, auf der sie sich entfaltet; die Konsistenz auf einer Ebene ist nicht mit der Konsistenz auf einer anderen gleich, und die beiden Ebenen können sich zueinander inkonsistent verhalten, obwohl sie, jede für sich, konsistent sind). Precisely the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) of the (praxeological) consistency inside of (the) inconsistent reality, as well as the constant mutual and reciprocal change of position (status, standing and place) of (the) goal/end and (the) means reveal (show, indicate, suggest) that the anthropological and social-ontological dimension of rationality is absorbed and assimilated by (or exhausted in or disappears in) neither in (the) consistency in itself and in general, nor in the adequate correlation of (the) end/goal and (the) means with each other (Gerade die Peripetien der (praxeologischen) Konsistenz innerhalb der inkonsistenten Wirklichkeit sowie der ständige gegenseitige Stellungswechsel von Zweck und Mitteln lassen erkennen, daß die anthropologische und sozialontologische Dimension der Rationalität weder in der Konsistenz an sich und überhaupt, noch in der adäquaten Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander aufgeht). Behind these indispensable, but partial performances and achievements, accomplishments stands/is the performance-achievement of all performances-achievements, upon which the

⁵ See Ch. IV , footnote 445.

chances and prospects of self-preservation itself depend; it is a matter of the performance-achievement of (the) general orientation, which exactly determines what on each and every respective occasion is regarded as (the) end/goal and what as (the) means (Hinter diesen unentbehrlichen, aber partiellen Leistungen steht die Leistung aller Leistungen, von der die Chancen der Selbsterhaltung selbst abhängen: Es geht um die Leistung der allgemeinen Orientierung, die eben bestimmt, was jeweils als Konsistenz, was als Zweck und was als Mittel zu gelten hat). Rationality is, accordingly, the performance-achievement and (cap)ability (in respect) of the orientation of a being, which has outgrown (surpassed and risen above) the secure, safe and fast, rapid, but too narrow orientation in the schema of behaviour (or behavioural schema) (of) “stimulus-reaction” (Rationalität ist demnach die Orientierungsleistung oder -fähigkeit eines Wesens, welches über die sichere und schnelle, aber zu enge Orientierung am Verhaltensschema „Stimulus-Reaktion“ hinausgewachsen ist).

What was said hitherto over/about/regarding (the) origins, features, characteristics and performances, achievements and accomplishments of rationality constitutes (an) anthropological thought/intellectual good, i.e. body of thought(s) (Gedankengut) and can also/even refer and relate to the individual human to the extent that this (individual human) is imagined in (the/a) lonely and solitary struggle against the objective (representational and concrete) world (in einsamen Kampf gegen die gegenständliche Welt). The actual social-ontological dimension comes into play as soon as we explain (elucidate, expound and explicate) the fundamental, basic concepts (postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, correlation of (the) end/goal and (the) means with each other, consistency, orientation) introduced above, from the point of view and through / by means of the dynamic(s) of the social relation (Die eigentliche sozialontologische Dimension kommt ins Spiel, sobald wir die oben eingeführten Grundbegriffe (Aufschub der Befriedigung, Korrelierung von

Zweck und Mitteln miteinander, Konsistenz, Orientierung) aus der Sicht und durch die Dynamik der sozialen Beziehung erläutern). This conceptual distinction certainly does not mean that the anthropological dimension can have existence without the social-ontological (dimension). The anthropological Robinson, who as human nature, grows into (the) culture in/during his struggle against the objective (representational and concrete), rests and is based on a fiction (Diese begriffliche Unterscheidung heißt gewiß nicht, daß die anthropologische Dimension ohne die sozialontologische Bestand haben kann. Der anthropologische Robinson, der in die Kultur als menschliche Natur bei seinem Kampf gegen die gegenständliche Welt hineinwächst, beruht auf einer Fiktion). The correlation between end/goal and means with (regard to) each other, which in accordance with this fiction was supposed to have encouraged and fostered already in one such solitary, lonely struggle, (the) rationality, has been / was in reality a collective performance, achievement and accomplishment, and it is still (always so/thus) (Die Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander, die gemäß dieser Fiktion schon in einem solch einsamen Kampf der Rationalität Vorschub geleistet haben soll, ist in Wirklichkeit eine kollektive Leistung gewesen, und sie ist es noch immer). Many animals/beasts live collectively and know, in fact, (of) elementary forms of the distribution of the means of subsistence for the preservation of the weaker adherents to, i.e. members of the herd, even though here the rule is that every normal animal/beast in the herd must look after, provide for, see to and take care of the/its own food, nourishment and sustenance alone (Viele Tiere leben kollektiv und kennen sogar elementare Formen der Verteilung von Subsistenzmitteln zur Erhaltung der schwächeren Angehörigen der Herde, wenn auch hier die Regel ist, daß jedes normale Tier in der Herde für die eigene Nahrung allein sorgen muß). But only men (i.e. humans) *work and labour* (act) already as the most primitive of hunters together, in order to *produce* the means of subsistence of the group in which they must / have to live, something which

the collective dealing with the problem of the correlation of the end / goal and means with (regard to) each other demands (Aber nur Menschen *arbeiten* (handeln) schon als primitivste Jäger zusammen, um die Subsistenzmittel der Gruppe, in der sie leben müssen, zu *produzieren*, was die kollektive Bewältigung des Problems der Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander erfordert). The social relation, into which (the) men (i.e. humans) in and during the collective production of their means of subsistence step (i.e. enter), demands, requires and promotes, encourages and fosters, simultaneously, both rationality as well as the distribution of these same means of subsistence, during and in which, very soon, the biological points of view step, i.e. go behind and take a back seat (and concede territory (as prominence)) to the social (points of view) (Die soziale Beziehung, in die die Menschen bei der kollektiven Produktion ihrer Subsistenzmittel treten, erfordern und fördern zugleich ebenso Rationalität wie die Verteilung dieser selben Subsistenzmittel, bei der sehr bald die biologischen Gesichtspunkte hinter die sozialen zurücktreten). Thus, the member of the human group develops and exercises, practises in the framework of the co-operative or antagonistic social relation both technical rationality, which he can then use also in situations which he alone has to deal and cope with, manage and overcome the forces of nature, as well as social rationality, namely, one such (rationality) having to (re)solve the question and problem of the postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction, the correlation of end/goal and means with (regard to) each other, (the) consistency etc. exclusively or mainly and first and foremost with regard to men (i.e. humans), and not to the objective (representational and concrete) world (So entwickelt und übt das Mitglied der menschlichen Gruppe im Rahmen der kooperativen oder antagonistischen sozialen Beziehung sowohl technische Rationalität, die es dann auch in Situationen gebrauchen kann, die es allein gegen die Kräfte der Natur bewältigen muß, als auch soziale Rationalität, nämlich eine solche, die Fragen des Aufschubs der Befriedigung, der

Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander, der Konsistenz etc. ausschließlich oder vornehmlich im Hinblick auf Menschen und nicht auf die gegenständliche Welt zu lösen hat).

In actual fact: the levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not remain uninfluenced by whether the actors must get over and cope with a situation whose outcome depends on a neutral factor like (the) nature, or (by whether the actors must get over and cope) with such a (situation) in which the (kinds of) acting, actions and acts of other actors with different preferences stamp, mould and form the outcome⁶. But rationality is needed in both cases (In der Tāt: Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade der Rationalität bleiben nicht davon unbeeinflußt, ob der Akteur mit einer Situation fertig werden muß, deren Ausgang von einem neutralen Faktor wie der Natur abhängt, oder mit einer solchen, in der Handlungen anderer Akteure mit unterschiedlichen Präferenzen den Ausgang prägen. Aber Rationalität tut in beiden Fällen not). It would undoubtedly be false to modify and to widen the Cartesian thesis (in respect) of the impossibility of the subjection, subordination and subjugation of historical and “irrational” stuff (i.e. subject matter and material) (there) under/in a strict science, [[in order to argue that]] rational action (rationales Handeln) can take place and happen only (there) where the object of action (der Gegenstand des Handelns) behaves and is in itself passive and consequently permits accurate and precise calculus (i.e. calculation). As Vico already objected, method does not have a single form (shape), but both its basic and fundamental forms, the “geometric” and the “historical” must exist next to each other⁷. In the same way, rational action stretches both in (the) “geometrically” as well as in (the) historically-socially apprehended field, whereby and in relation to which, though, the change of its levels, forms and degrees not only goes back to and is

⁶ Cf. Rapoport, “Various Meanings”, p. 45.

⁷ In relation to that, Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 436ff..

reduced to the change of/in the field and in regard to its specific constitution, composition and texture (nature) (und im Hinblick auf dessen spezifische Beschaffenheit), but also can take place inside of the same field. The pressure of rationality, to which the socially acting (person) is exposed, is second to none, and just as the transition from behaviour to action in general demands and requires higher performances, achievements and accomplishments of rationality, so too that category of action which is called social action and is concretised in the social relation par excellence, very often demands and requires outstanding and top-class rational performances, accomplishments and achievements. Rationality goes and passes and runs (right) through, in other words, social action more deeply than action in general, and action in (the) solitude (seclusion, isolation and loneliness), i.e. in the struggle against nature, turns out to be all the more rational on average(,) the more thorough (i.e. methodical and systematic) equipment the actor brings with him from his social action, to which, though, belongs learning from other (people) too (Der Rationalitätsdruck, dem der sozial Handelnde ausgesetzt ist, steht keinem anderen nach, und wie der Übergang vom Verhalten zum Handeln im allgemeinen höhere Rationalitätsleistungen erfordert, so erfordert auch jene Kategorie des Handelns, die soziales Handeln heißt und sich in der sozialen Beziehung par excellence konkretisiert, sehr oft rationale Spitzenleistungen. Rationalität durchzieht m. a. W. soziales Handeln tiefer als Handeln überhaupt, und Handeln in der Einsamkeit, z. B. im Kampf gegen die Natur, fällt durchschnittlich um so rationaler aus, eine je gründlichere Ausstattung der Akteur von seinem sozialen Handeln her mitbringt, zu dem allerdings auch Lernen von anderen gehört). The social compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress towards and as regards rationality has as the/its/a consequence that the socially acting (person) either puts, moves back and defers that which in each and every respective situation and position, one way or another, is classed or classified as “irrational”, in order to then secretly (in

secret, privily, privately) savour it (or enjoy it to the full) in seclusion, solitude and isolation or in the safety and security of the imagination, or else, decidedly sets and puts (it) aside as socially harmful, detrimental, damaging, injurious, noxious, destructive and pernicious, and, hence, worthy of hate (i.e. hateful, odious and detestable); this is, though, only the generally observable tendency, which expresses and conveys little about or regarding (the) level, form and degree of that putting and moving back and deferring and setting or putting aside in each and every individual case (Der soziale Zwang zur Rationalität hat zur Folge, daß der sozial Handelnde das, was in der jeweiligen Lage so oder so als „irrational“ eingestuft wird, entweder zurückstellt, um es dann insgeheim in der Abgeschlossenheit bzw. in der Sicherheit der Einbildungskraft auszukosten, oder aber entschieden als sozial schädlich und daher hassenswert beiseitelegt; dies ist allerdings nur die allgemein beobachtbare Tendenz, die wenig über Ebene, Gestalt und Grad jenes Zurückstellens oder Beiseitelegens in jedem einzelnen Fall aussagt). As we shall see immediately (straight away), precisely the effect and impact of the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality enables in the social relation that difference between psychological motivation and reasons (or grounds) of/for acting, action or the act, which is so important praxeologically. From that, a fundamental and basic anthropological and social-ontological conclusion can be drawn (Wie wir gleich sehen werden, ermöglicht gerade die Wirkung des Rationalitätszwanges in der sozialen Beziehung jene Differenz zwischen psychologischer Motivation und Handlungsgründen, die praxeologisch so wichtig ist. Daraus läßt sich eine grundsätzliche anthropologische und sozialontologische Folge ziehen). The theses “the actor is rational” and “the actor acts rationally” are not necessarily, and, in any case, not in their whole range, scope or to their entire extent identical with each other; just as little do the sentences (tenets or theorems) “(the) man (as (a) genus, kind, type or species (race)) is rational” and “the actor (as this concrete actor) is rational” logically correspond, tally and coincide (with

each other) (Die Thesen „der Akteur ist rational“ und „der Akteur handelt rational“ sind nicht notwendig und jedenfalls nicht in ihrem ganzen Umfang miteinander identisch; genausowenig decken sich logisch die Sätze „der Mensch (als Gattung) ist rational“ und „der Akteur (als dieser konkrete Akteur) ist rational“). The actor does not have to be rational in any dispositional or ethical sense in order to hear and listen to the voice of (the) (social, not necessarily of (the) biological) self-preservation and bow, yield and submit happily, gladly and cheerfully or with gritted teeth (grudgingly, muttering under one's breath) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation, and (the) rationality as (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) says, for its part, in itself little as regards / regarding in which manner and with which intensity the actor hears and listens to that voice (Der Akteur muß nicht in irgendeinem dispositionellen oder ethischen Sinne rational sein, um die Stimme der (sozialen, nicht unbedingt der biologischen) Selbsterhaltung zu hören und sich dem Rationalitätszwang der sozialen Beziehung froh oder zähneknirschend zu beugen, und die Rationalität als anthropologische Anlage besagt ihrerseits an sich wenig darüber, in welcher Weise und mit welcher Intensität der Akteur jene Stimme hört). Individual convictions regarding (the) value and (the) un-value (i.e. anti-value or non-value) (Wert und Unwert) of (the) rationality as (the) guiding principle of action (als Richtschnur des Handelns) are also slightly (or next to not at all) informative, instructive, illuminating and enlightening regarding the presumed, probable or likely mode or manner of acting, action or of the act of an actor, if we disregard the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation. Whoever confesses faith in principle in rationalism, is not *because of that and accordingly* eo ipso in a position to confront, face, counter or check the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation more skillfully than the world-theoretical

“irrationalist” (Wer sich grundsätzlich zum Rationalismus bekennt, ist nicht *deshalb* eo ipso imstande, dem Rationalitätszwang der sozialen Beziehung geschickter zu begegnen als der weltanschauliche „Irrationalist“). And the same applies to whole societies and epochs: the symbolic-world-theoretical confession of faith in, and acknowledgement of, rationality (Das symbolisch-weltanschauliche Bekenntnis zur Rationalität) does not in the least vouch for and guarantee the rational handling and the rationally desirable outcome of collective action (die rationale Handhabung und den rational wünschenswerten Ausgang kollektiven Handelns)⁸.

If (the) world-theoretical convictions (Wenn weltanschauliche Überzeugungen) here only count on the edge (i.e. marginally as borderline cases), thus one may, on the other hand, not deny that on/with/against the background of rationality as (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) (auf der Folie der Rationalität als anthropologischer Anlage), from individual to individual, smaller or larger/greater dispositional differences with reference to the capacity and (cap)ability for rational social action are to be ascertained. Nonetheless, the stronger compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of (the) rationality and (in respect) of (the) disciplining of the social relation (der stärkere Rationalitäts- und Disziplinierungszwang der sozialen Beziehung) is shown and is seen exactly in (the fact) that deep dispositions also have an effect and impact all the more effectively, the more empty of content, that is to say, (the) more capable they are of following hot and hard on the heels of the unending and infinite content-related changes of the social relation, which command strategic and tactical watchfulness, alertness and vigilance (auch tiefe Dispositionen um so effektiver wirken, je inhaltsleerer, also fähiger sie sind, den unendlichen inhaltlichen Wandlungen der sozialen Beziehung, die strategische und taktische

⁸ More about / in relation to that under/in Bc in this section.

Wachsamkeit gebieten, auf den Fersen zu folgen). The social relation determines the fundamental data towards which (the) dispositions orientate themselves and simultaneously must be refined. Rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act does not simply flow from the once and for all given weatherproof (i.e. fixed and unchanging) template, pattern or stereotype of a disposition (Die soziale Beziehung bestimmt der grundlegenden Daten, an denen sich Dispositionen orientieren und zugleich verfeinern müssen. Handlungsrationalität fließt nicht einfach aus der ein für allemal gegebenen wetterfesten Schablone einer Disposition), rather it is shaped, formed, moulded and changes constantly under the harder or softer compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress of the social relation; its (i.e. rationality's) levels, forms and degrees are subject to the fluctuations of the same (social relation), and exactly because of that, it (i.e. rationality) escapes, eludes or evades and is beyond a definitive and a generally valid and applicable, i.e. abstract apprehension: in relation to that (said definitive and generally valid, i.e. abstract apprehension of rationality), the great variety and multiformity of the social relation is simply too broad and too unforeseeable. The social relation provides and makes (up) the training area or ground of (the) rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act (Die soziale Beziehung gibt den Übungsplatz der Handlungsrationalität ab), and under (i.e. in regard to) its aspects, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Perspektivenübernahme) is, i.e. ought to be named in particular. The social-ontological necessity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Die sozialontologische Notwendigkeit der Perspektivenübernahme) sets (the) rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act in permanent motion, so that the rational actor (der rationale Akteur) does not look at and handle his milieu as a constant (sein Milieu nicht als eine Konstante), but founds his action on the anticipation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, (in respect) of which he knows that it, likewise, rests and is based on the (cap)ability of anticipating

alien (i.e. another's or others') action through and by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives⁹. Since, however, the latter (anticipation of alien action) is an emotional identification of the I (ego) (eine emotionale Identifizierung des Ich) with the Other (dem Anderen), thus, it can pass off, happen and take place as (a) reflexive act (als reflexiver Akt) only to the extent or in as much it assumes rationality on both sides. The Ego (Das Ego) can hardly put itself/himself in (and or empathises with) the position of the Other (in die Lage des Anderen hineinversetzen), if it does not assume (unless it assumes) a somewhat or reasonably consistent interrelation between its ends/goals and means, motives or else grounds, reasons and action plans (or designs, projects, outlines or blueprints in respect of acting and the act) (wenn es nicht einen einigermaßen konsistenten Zusammenhang zwischen dessen Zwecken und Mitteln, Motiven bzw. Gründen und Handlungsentwürfen annimmt) (inconsistency (Inkonsistenz) can indeed be taken into account as (a) possibility; it, however, cannot be guessed in advanced through and by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives how and when it (i.e. inconsistency) will manifest itself); and whilst the Ego assumes the rationality of the Other in this sense, it (the said Ego) itself carries out and executes rational thought acts or acts of thought (rationale Denkakte), it itself practises and exercises (in the) rationality or subjects and subjugates itself nolens volens (i.e. whether wanting or liking or not) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality. It (i.e. the said Ego) can just as little detach itself and break free from, or evade, elude, dodge that (compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality) as it can live away from or out of every social relation. Because it does not have at its disposal any other access to the Other, which could

⁹ Cf. the distinction between “parametrically rational actor” and “strategically rational actor” in Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 18ff..

guarantee and ensure it somewhat or reasonably reliable, dependable or trustworthy orientation; even as (a) recognisedly approximative solution or stopgap (provisional, temporary or expedient) solution, the assumption or adoption and acceptance of rationality (Rationalitätsannahme) promises in principle to be led (i.e. to go) the furthest. (The) Social experience in fact teaches the actor soon (enough) that rational action, which in the praxeological sense shows and exhibits consistency, correlates end/goal and means adequately with each other, [[and]] postpones (puts off, delays and defers) immediate and direct pleasure (delight, enjoyment, consumption) (unmittelbaren Genuß aufschiebt) etc., as a rule is worth(while) (or worth the effort). In light of this rule, (behind which stands and is the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race) as (a) rational animal,) hence alien action (i.e. the action of another or others) must normally be comprehended, especially since the greatest danger for the (one's) own plans (in respect) of acting, action or the act (Handlungspläne) comes from the rationally planned counter-actors (von rational [= rational] planenden Gegenakteuren ausgeht), who are in a position to formulate wishes as existential settings (or positionings) (als Existentialsetzungen) and judgements, i.e. to support and back them up through and by means of analyses of the situation and position near/close to reality and corresponding instructions (in respect) of acting, action and the act. What disturbs, bothers, annoys and perturbs inimical wishes is not their content in itselfⁱⁱⁱ, but the image or picture which we ourselves make of the situation and position after their (i.e. the said inimical wishes') possible or potential realisation; the slighter or less the (cap)ability of the Other to reach, attain and achieve through rational action his wishes, so much the smaller the felt and perceived threat and enmity. Assuming the Other's rationality, the Ego starts wisely or for good reason from the conceivably worst case when the Other is (a) foe; on the other hand, from the conceivably best (case), when he (i.e. the Other) is counted and reckoned under, i.e. amongst (the Ego's) friends. In both

cases, the Ego can err; nevertheless, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality remains (lasts and persists), no matter at which level, in which form and to which degree the potential (or capacity) for rationality (Rationalitätspotential) is made topical or updated on each and every respective occasion.

The social-ontological necessity of looking at the social relation irrespective of the motives of the actors under, i.e. from (a) rational point of view, and as being practised as (an) exercise in rationality, is shown and seen quite clearly, graphically and vividly in the habit, routine, practice or custom of the most primitive tribes (an der Gewohnheit primitiver Stämme) to interpret even animal behaviour (or the behaviour of animals and beasts) anthropomorphically-rationally¹⁰; it (i.e. the said social-ontological necessity of ...) was, incidentally, already in antiquity, clearly apprehended theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory)¹¹. Rationality exists as (the) not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. indispensable) concomitant or accompaniment of the social relation, as (a) condition and at the same time (an) outflow, i.e. outcome of the same (social relation); action becomes rational only (there) where it crisscrosses or intersects with action (Rationalität existiert als nicht wegzudenkende Begleiterscheinung der sozialen Beziehung, als Bedingung und zugleich Ausfluß derselben; rational wird Handeln erst da, wo es sich mit Handeln kreuzt). And the thesis that

¹⁰ See e.g. Sliberbauer, “Hunter/Gatherers”, p. 465ff..

¹¹ The great speeches (orations and addresses), which Thucydides is able to hold for (i.e. give to) the protagonists of his history are, before the many-sided background of the description of a situation and position (in respect) of unsurpassable and matchless reconstructions of rational action plans (or designs, projects, outlines or blueprints in respect of acting and the act), reconstructions of the rationality of the actors or else of the foes, and imply general anthropological and social-ontological ascertainments. In the course of this, the author (i.e. Thucydides), knowing better retrospectively, helps his persons (i.e. characters (in his history)) to / with more rationality, by him, indeed, keeping, as he writes, “as closely as possible to the overall meaning of what was actually said (möglichst eng an den Gesamtsinn des tatsächlich Gesagten) [[*ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ζυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων*]]”, simultaneously, however, he renders the(ir) speeches thus “as in accordance with my opinion every individual had to most likely speak about each and every available / existing case, i.e. as I thought each individual was most likely to speak about the case at hand (wie meiner Meinung nach jeder einzelne über den jeweils vorliegenden Fall am ehesten sprechen mußte)” [[*ὡς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ζυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.*»]] (I, 22, 1).

understanding of alien (i.e. another's or others') action implies – at least at a certain level, in a certain form and to a certain degree – the assumption and adoption of (the) rationality on the part of the Ego and of the Other, obtains and preserves its actual sense/meaning only when it (i.e. the aforesaid thesis) is interpreted from (the point of view of) the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation (wenn sie vom Spektrum und dem Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung her gedeutet wird). The thus attained and achieved rational interpretation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, which at the same time subjects and subjugates one's own thinking (thought) and acting (action) (Denken und Handeln) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality, contains, though, abstractions and narrowings (shortenings, curtailments, abridgements or reductions) (Abstraktionen und Verkürzungen), which in a gapless (i.e. complete and unbroken) psychological reconstruction of alien (i.e. another's or others') action (if one such (complete psychological reconstruction) were in general possible) might not or should and ought not to have occurred (been found, come forward, had any place). Under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality, the interpretation of acting, action and of the act shifts and is displaced from (the) motivation to the grounds and reasons for action, so that this (action), without precise and detailed knowledge of its psychical aetiology appears to be sufficiently understandable for the ends/goals and purposes of the social relation (ohne genaue Kenntnis seiner psychischen Ätiologie für die Zwecke der sozialen Beziehung ausreichend verständlich erscheint)¹². Irrespective of the objective and factual correctness (accuracy, rightness and veracity) of this understanding (Ungeachtet der sachlichen Richtigkeit dieses Verständnisses), which from case to case can be very different, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress

¹² Cf. Davidson, *Essays*, pp. 231ff., 237.

(in respect) of rationality causes, effects, effectuates and brings about, in any case, a de-psychologisation, and to that extent, an objectification or objectivisation of the way of looking at things, as well as, possibly, of the action of the person looking at things in such a way (bewirkt der Rationalitätszwang jedenfalls eine Entpsychologisierung und insofern eine Objektivierung der Betrachtung sowie wahrscheinlich auch des Handelns des derart Betrachtenden). The attention is now directed mainly / first and foremost to the objective sense and meaning of (the) action (auf den objektiven Sinn des Handelns), i.e. to the putative or probable effect, impact, consequence, repercussion or implication of the same (action) on the course (of events) and (the) shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation (die vermutlichen Auswirkungen desselben auf Ablauf und Gestaltung der sozialen Beziehung). Naturally, in the course of this – at least in some cases – over and above and beyond the grounds and reasons of and for action, its (i.e. action's) motives must be taken into consideration; their (i.e. the said motives') analysis more or less contrasts with and stands out from, nevertheless, under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation, a psychological (analysis). Even (then) when (the) Ego regards and holds the Other to be “crazy, mad, nuts, insane, loony, mentally ill” („verrückt“), and consequently makes or passes an – in practice – slightly helpful judgement over or about his (i.e. the Other's) motivation, he (i.e. the Ego) must trace and track down the logic of this craziness, madness, insanity, looniness and mental illness (die Logik dieser Verrücktheit) in the action of the Other in order to cope, deal with and get over this action in the reality of the social relation (um mit diesem Handeln in der Realität der sozialen Beziehung fertig zu werden). The logic of the action and the qualitatively, ethically etc. understood reason (Reason) of the actor are two ((very) different) things (Die Logik des Handelns und die qualitativ, ethisch etc. verstandene Vernunft des Akteurs sind zweierlei); the former (logic of the action) must be taken earnestly

(i.e. seriously), regardless of what one holds (i.e. considers, thinks) (in respect) of the latter (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood reason/Reason of the actor). That is why rationality keeps an eye on, i.e. bears in mind, that (logic of the action) rather than this (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood reason/Reason of the actor); the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality brings with it and entails the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of objectification or objectivisation (Rationalitätszwang bringt Objektivierungszwang mit sich). And the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of objectification or objectivisation does not make itself noticeable only in and during the (relative) neglect of the motivation and or of the Reason of the actor for the sake of the logic of his action inside of and within the social relation (Und der Objektivierungszwang macht sich nicht nur bei der (relativen) Vernachlässigung der Motivation bzw. Vernunft des Akteurs zugunsten der Logik seines Handelns innerhalb der sozialen Beziehung bemerkbar). No less does it (i.e. the said compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of objectification or objectivisation) have less of an effect when the individual stands across from, faces, confronts and is up against the impersonal logic of his society (der unpersönlichen Logik seiner Gesellschaft), as this (impersonal logic of his society) is crystallised or crystallises in (the) customs (conventions, manners or morals) and the everyday (kinds of) self-understanding(s), in the forms of dealing with others (i.e. manners, etiquette and behaviour(s) in public) and institutional constructs (wie sich diese in Sitten und alltäglichen Selbstverständlichkeiten, in Umgangsformen und institutionellen Gebilden kristallisiert). Social order, whatever it looks like and however it seems (to be), constitutes condensed, thickened and compressed rationality, it (i.e. social order) is comprehended as rationality and educates (brings up, trains, disciplines) or compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[people, humans]] towards rationality (Soziale Ordnung, wie auch immer sie aussieht,

bildet verdichtete Rationalität, sie wird als Rationalität aufgefaßt und erzieht oder zwingt zur Rationalität)¹³.

The social relation as (a) relation amongst (i.e. between) beings or creatures, whose nature is culture, whose kinds of acting, actions and acts are therefore connected and bound to sense, i.e. meaning, lends or gives to, or confers upon and grants to rationality still further dimensions or forms (Die soziale Beziehung als Beziehung unter Wesen, deren Natur die Kultur ist, deren Handlungen also mit Sinn verbunden werden, verleiht der Rationalität noch weitere Dimensionen oder Formen). The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction and (the) consistency in its connection with meaning, which originally came into being in the social relation, [[and]] only in it (i.e. the social relation) exists [that said meaning] and hence is by definition social meaning, become and turn into [i.e. the said postponement of satisfaction and consistency in its connection with meaning] ethical and logical values, which the individual can invoke (or to which the individual can appeal) in order to legitimise his own kinds of acting, actions or acts, or to condemn alien (i.e. another's or others') (kinds of acting, actions or acts), in other words, in order to better assert and defend and maintain himself in the social relation (Der Aufschub der Befriedigung und die Konsistenz werden in ihrer Verbindung mit Sinn, der ursprünglich in der sozialen Beziehung entsteht, nur in ihr besteht und daher definitionsgemäß sozialer Sinn ist, zu ethischen oder logischen Werten, worauf sich das Individuum berufen kann, um eigene Handlungen zu legitimieren oder fremde zu verurteilen, m.a.W. um sich in der sozialen Beziehung besser zu behaupten). The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction obviously takes place not only due to (the) objectively existing shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods (wegen objektiv bestehender Güterknappheit), which in an otherwise neutral milieu (i.e. surroundings, environment or setting) is supposed or ought

¹³ Cf. Diesing, *Reason in Society*, p. 236ff..

to be overcome through and by means of productive labour/work (die in einem ansonsten neutralen Milieu durch produktive Arbeit überwunden werden soll), but also and above all due to subjective considerations (wegen subjektiver Rücksichten), which step into appearance, i.e. appear only in the social relation. The presence of other(s) (people, actors), who have the same claim on and (in regard) to satisfaction, compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[the actor]] towards postponement (deferment and delay), and only through and by means of (the) mutual and reciprocal consideration, or at least through and by means of an ethic(s) of mutuality and reciprocity, if at all, independent initiatives and single-handed efforts are and ought to be put off and discouraged (or: [actors] are and ought to be dissuaded from independent initiatives and single-handed efforts) (von egoistischen Alleingängen abzubringen sind). Generally, it applies that the postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction as (the) compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality is shaped, moulded and formed depending on with whom one has [[something]] to do (or with whom one is dealing) [[and]] in which situation and position (Generell gilt, daß sich der Aufschub der Befriedigung als Rationalitätszwang je nachdem gestaltet, mit wem man in welcher Lage zu tun hat). For its part, consistency is connected with ethical and logical meaning, as soon as the – through and by means of it (i.e. the said consistency) – guaranteed and ensured (cap)ability (in respect) of/at orientation is concretised in an individual or collective identity (die durch sie gewährleistete Orientierungsfähigkeit in einer individuellen oder kollektiven Identität konkretisiert), which wants to be saved beyond the changes of/in the social relation, and it often can [[do that/be thus saved]] too. However, (a/the) consistent identity (Konsistente Identität) to (an), in practice, sufficient extent does not constitute only an inner/internal (necessity), but also an outer/external necessity, which stems from the general social need of holding (i.e. keeping and maintaining) the constitutive imponderability (incalculability) of (the)

subjectivity (die konstitutive Unberechenbarkeit der Subjektivität) within bound(arie)s and limits, i.e. of making and rendering the social action of the members of society ponderable (calculable) and in this respect/as far as that goes “rational” (d. h. das soziale Handeln der Mitglieder der Gesellschaft berechenbar und insofern „rationaler“); the social ethics of all cultures have hitherto denounced and pilloried the opportunists and the turncoats or quick-change artists (i.e. renegades, apostates, traitors, defectors and deserters), no matter what the social praxis/practice looked like and what the [then] current doctrine and teaching of prudence and wisdom read/sounded/said/was (die Sozialethiken aller Kulturen haben bisher den Opportunisten und den Wendehals angeprangert, gleichviel, wie die soziale Praxis aussah und die geläufige Klugheitslehre lautete). The compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality under the conditions and circumstances of culture, i.e. under the conditions and circumstances of obligatory meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) finds expression, finally, in the performances, achievements and accomplishments (in respect) of rationalisation and of legitimisation (legitimising, legitimation), which accompany inner/internal and outer/external action at every turn (step of the way). To the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of sense/meaning leads here, i.e. to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress for meaning to be articulated socially effectively (Der Rationalitätszwang unter den Bedingungen der Kultur, d. h. unter den Bedingungen obligatorischer Sinnhaftigkeit schlägt sich schließlich in den Rationalisierungs- und Legitimierungsleistungen nieder, die inneres und äußeres Handeln auf Schritt und Tritt begleiten. Zum Rationalitätszwang führt hier der Sinnzwang, d. h. der Zwang, Sinn sozial wirksam zu artikulieren). The social relation remains also in this respect decisive and determinative. Because

rationalisations and legitimisations in foro interno or in foro externo (i.e. internally as to one's own conscience or externally as to how others judge us) are needed because anyone and everyone calls into question or can call into question the action of the actor exactly in (regard to) its (i.e. the said actor's action's) meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) (Die soziale Beziehung bleibt auch in dieser Hinsicht maßgeblich. Denn Rationalisierungen und Legitimierungen in foro interno oder in foro externo tun deshalb not, weil jemand anders das Handeln des Akteurs eben in seiner Sinnhaftigkeit in Frage stellt oder stellen kann). (The) Socialisation consists not least of all (therein) in of one learning to act not instinctively, but with (rational and reasoned) justification, that is to say, to put down and reduce (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts to reasons, and through and by means of reasons legitimise ((kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts), irrespective of whether this often amounts and is tantamount to in concreto (i.e. concretely) the mere rationalisation of one's own motivation towards the inside (inwardly) and towards the outside (outwardly) (Die Sozialisierung besteht nicht zuletzt darin zu erlernen, wie man nicht instinktiv, sondern begründet handelt, also Handlungen auf Gründe zurückführt und durch Gründe legitimiert, gleichgültig, ob dies oft in concreto der bloßen Rationalisierung der eigenen Motivation nach innen und nach außen gleichkommt). In the statement and specification of the reasons and grounds for (one's) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, a wish (in respect) of justification (ein Rechtfertigungswunsch) or else the wish, "to anticipate a challenge to our actions"¹⁴ is expressed.

Through and by means of / With these general remarks, observations and comments, we have hopefully indicated, implied, suggested (hinted at, intimated) the breadth of the examination of the problem of rationality (Rationalitätsproblematik). A direct or indirect reduction of rationality to (the)

¹⁴ Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes", pp. 12ff., 7 (the citation/quote/quotation here).

so-called “end-goal and purposeful/expedient rationality (or rationality (in respect) of an end/goal)” („Zweckrationalität“), i.e. to the adequate correlation of end/goal and means with each other, proves itself to be too one-sided and narrow in order to fulfil, meet, be up to or comply with the phenomenon [of rationality] even only in terms of its beginnings, i.e. elementarily. From the perspective of the social relation, on the other hand, all essential dimensions of rationality simultaneously appear ((be)come/are into appearance) and can be dealt with, treated and handled as (an) in itself differentiated unit(y) (uniformity or unified whole) (und können als in sich differenzierte Einheit behandelt werden). Ends and goals are always relative, since they relate and refer to (the) ends and goals or, in any case, activities of other men (humans, people); their realisation aims at the consolidation (strengthening and stabilisation) or modification of a social relation. Rational performances, achievements and accomplishments do not merely demand their attainment and achievement and accomplishment through and by means of certain means, but likewise their justification and legitimising, which, again, refer to (the) meaning as (the) constitutive element of (a) world theory (i.e. world view) and (an) identity; inseparable from them (the said world theory/view and identity) are (the) argumentative-theoretical and psychological processes of rationalisation (Rationale Leistungen erfordern nicht bloß ihre Erreichung durch bestimmte Mittel, sondern ebenso ihre Begründung und Legitimierung, welche wiederum auf den Sinn als konstitutives Element von Weltanschauung und Identität verweisen; davon sind argumentativ-theoretische und psychologische Rationalisierungsprozesse unzertrennlich). Instrumental (rationality), symbolic (rationality) and (the) rationality of identity^{iv} belong, anthropologically, social-ontologically and in concrete action together, may this or that amongst them (i.e. whichever one of them) dominate(s) and rule(s) and hold(s) sway over the scene on each and every respective occasion (Instrumentelle, symbolische und Identitätsrationalität gehören anthropologisch, sozialontologisch und im

konkreten Handeln zusammen, mag diese oder jene unter ihnen jeweils die Szene beherrschen). The relativisation, which befalls and happens to (the) instrumental rationality through and by means of its being put into order, classification and categorisation in the broader complex of rationality, is, though, by no means to be understood as (the) overcoming of the same (instrumental rationality) through and by means of one ethical-normative rationality overarching (spilling over, overlapping, spreading) over and into all facets of rationality (Die Relativierung, die der instrumentellen Rationalität durch ihre Einordnung in den breiteren Rationalitätskomplex widerfährt, ist allerdings keinesfalls als Überwindung derselben durch eine alle Facetten der Rationalität übergreifende ethisch-normative Rationalität zu verstehen). A unification of rationality can never succeed, neither under instrumental, nor under ethical points of view. It (i.e. the said unification of rationality) remains (a) matter, affair, cause and case or thing, business of (the) anthropology and of (the) social ontology. These (i.e. anthropology and social ontology) are, however, as (we have) said, ethically and technically blind (Eine Vereinheitlichung der Rationalität kann weder unter instrumentellen noch unter ethischen Gesichtspunkten je gelingen. Sie bleibt Sache der Anthropologie und der Sozialontologie. Diese sind aber, wie gesagt, ethisch und technisch blind).

b. The rationality of the means and the rationality of the ends/goals (Die Rationalität der Mittel und die Rationalität der Zwecke)

The correlation of the means and ends/goals with each other becomes or turns into, as we know, a problem, whose coping with, managing and getting over demands rational performances, achievements and accomplishments as soon as the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) satisfaction puts short-(term) or long-term goal/end-setting (the short- and long-term setting of a goal/end) and

planning on the agenda (or sets such short-term and long-term goal/end-setting as the order of the day) (sobald der Aufschiebung der Befriedigung kurz- oder langfristige Zwecksetzungen und Planungen auf die Tagesordnung setzt). But it (i.e. the said short-term and long-term goal/end-setting) is only in simple cases simple, namely only (then) when the end/goal is clearly delineable (traceable; umreißbar) and realisable when the means exclusively apply to, and are valid for, the pursuit and pursuance of the end/goal, and when neither the attaining and achievement of the end/goal, nor the application of the means trigger, set and spark off and bring on or cause unforeseeable and uncontrollable effects and impacts. Only in such cases can a theory of rationality be developed with security, safety, reliability and certainty – under the condition or provided that, that is to say, it (i.e. the said theory of rationality) moves (with)in quite / pretty / fairly narrow bound(arie)s, otherwise it does not make do and it does not manage without a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) (Kasuistik) which covers the main variations regarding or concerning the constitution, composition and texture and its own dynamic(s) of end/goal and means, as well as regarding or concerning their possible correlations (Korrelierungen) with each other (i.e. of the said end/goal and means). This casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) serves, though, theoretical ends/goals, it does not describe, represent, reflect or convey the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of really (i.e. in reality) planned and executed, carried out and performed kinds of acting, actions and acts, but rather the deviations, divergences (digressions and departures) of real processes from the planned (processes); the uncontrollable disharmonies between end/goal and means, which exactly came into being in and during (the) endeavour and effort of their harmonization with each other. The ubiquity of the schema “end/goal-means” says little about the stringency with which it is – be it out/because of subjective inadequacies (deficiencies, shortcomings, failings), be it out / because of objective reasons (grounds) – handled, used, operated and dealt with.

But so that stringency is (But for stringency to be) in general possible and plannable, the simple case sketched above must be available (exist), which, though, has, in no case/way (under no circumstances), the simple presupposition and precondition that the assessment of the situation and position and (the) correlation of the end/goal with the means on the part of the actor completely and fully suffices for, and satisfies or fulfills, the real given (actual) facts (den realen Gegebenheiten). Not without good reason, Aristotle handled and treated the question and problem of this correlation by supposing and assuming the (cap)ability of the actor to know what stands/is in his power and from what to distance himself or refrain and desist, what, anyhow, lies outside of the range of his forces, strengths, energies and powers. In order to use the suitable and appropriate means effectively, one must, hence, be clear about the end/goal and its attainability or achievability (reachability)¹⁵. Not otherwise / differently, [[did]] Pareto [[think]], who defined the “logical kinds of acting, actions and acts (logischen Handlungen)” in accordance with two criteria: the absolute ponderability / calculability or (else) controllability of the end/goal, and, the determination of the end/goal on the basis of cool thought, consideration and logic (der absoluten Berechenbarkeit bzw. Kontrollierbarkeit des Zweckes und der Bestimmung des Zweckes auf der Basis kühler Überlegung und Logik). Whereas (Whilst) “not logical / non-logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts („nicht logische“ Handlungen) spring, originate and arise / come from a psychological state (of affairs) (einem psychischen Zustand), i.e. certain feelings (sentiments and emotions) (bestimmten Gefühlen) or unconscious motives (unbewußten Motiven), (the) “logical (logischen)” (kinds of acting, actions or acts) result from a “ragionamento”, an (argumentative) reasoning (line of

¹⁵ *Nikomachische Ethik*, III, 5 (1112b 13ff.) [= «βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἄν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ... » (12-20)]

reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) (Raisonnement), and strive after and aim for a real and not merely imaginary end / goal, i.e. such an (end/goal) which belongs within the realm or area of observation and experience (der in den Bereich der Beobachtung und Erfahrung hineingehört); they (i.e. the said “logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts) consist in the use of means which are suitable for the attainment and achievement of the end/goal, and they connect, in (a) logically apt, appropriate and well-judged manner, means and end/goal with each other. Here (the) subjective (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) and objective existence of the deed or act(ion) (i.e. objective state of affairs, facts, circumstances, (whole) truth of the matter or facts of the case) (objektiver Tatbestand) coincide, even though the ascertainment regarding this coincidence must be made by an observer standing outside [of what is being observed] or by an outside / external observer (von einem außenstehenden Beobachter) who thinks “logically-experimentally”; because the actors believe, anyway, that they act logically¹⁶.

Pareto was convinced of the preponderance of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and or acts in social life, he, however, did not underestimate at all the social meaning of the “very delicate and fragile” logical (kinds of acting, actions and or acts), which he saw at work above all in the economic realm (area), but also in (the) artistic and scientific work / labour as well as in military, political and juridic(al), juristic, legal undertakings and enterprises (bei der künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Arbeit sowie bei militärischen, politischen und juristischen Unternehmungen am Werk sah)¹⁷. The weakness of his position does not lie in this division, assignment or apportionment of weights, i.e. loads or burdens (in dieser Einteilung der Gewichte), but in the

¹⁶ *Trattato*, §§ 150, 151, 161.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, § 152.

dichotomous way of looking at things, through and by means of which he gets to that or reaches and attains that (division or apportionment of loads). In the interest of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) sharp, strong and strict distinction between logical and non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, he (i.e. Pareto) did not think that the former (logical acts) have to lose their purity as soon as they overstep and exceed a relatively narrow action radius (or radius of action) (einen relativ Engen Aktionsradius) and can no longer manage or effect (a) clear and manageable correlation of end/goal and means with each other (und überschaubare Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander). Thus, he ascribes all/everything which does not represent and constitute (an/the) absolutely controllable practical result and or outcome of (a) logical-experimental (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) (absolut kontrollierbares praktisches Ergebnis logisch-experimentellen Rasonnements), to the effect and impact of not logical or non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, whereby and in relation to which he loses sight of the theoretically and socially weighty and heavy, i.e. important and influential possibility that logical kinds of acting, actions and acts *as such* (logische Handlungen *als solche*) long-term/over the long run do not necessarily have to entail logical consequences (logische Folgen), that, therefore, the social preponderance or predominance of the not logical or non-logical (das soziale Übergewicht des Nicht-Logischen) cannot be put down and reduced exclusively to the effect and impact of not logical or non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts (auf die Wirkung nicht logischer Handlungen). Through and by means of/With his precise distinction between “non-logical” and “illogical” kinds of acting, actions and acts (Durch seine präzise Unterscheidung zwischen „nicht logischen“ und „illogischen“ Handlungen), Pareto fully recognized the objective social logic of the – in (a) logical-experimental respect – non-logical (die objective soziale Logik des in logisch-experimenteller Hinsicht Nicht-Logischen); conversely, however, he did not want to cloud, muddy, dull, blur,

spoil or mar the logical kinds of acting, actions and acts through and by means of/with objective social non-logic (durch objective soziale Nicht-Logik). Faithful, loyal and devoted to his dichotomous way of looking at things, he did not systematically inquire and research into the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (logical) action (den unbeabsichtigten Folgen des (logischen) Handelns), and consequently made it known (or let it be known) that the pure schema of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts has *social* explanation-worth (is *socially* of worth and value as explanation) (*sozialen* Erklärungswert) only in the/its narrow version and (with)in the/a slight and short range, reach and scope (nur in der engen Fassung und in geringer Reichweite) – irrespective / regardless of its heuristic indispensability or its anthropological aspect (ungeachtet seiner heuristischen Unentbehrlichkeit oder seines anthropologischen Aspekts). (A) narrow version and (a) slight and short range, reach and scope means as much as (the) exclusion (or ruling out) of the time factor (or factor of/as regards time), because time is exactly the mother of the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (the) otherwise logical action. It (i.e. time) produces (causes, brings about and gives rise to) also all / everything which steps in and intervenes between end/goal and means, and makes their planned strict correlation with each other loose and slack or even destroys and annihilates (such planned strict correlation of end/goal and means), – with the result that action is tangled and caught up and embroiled and involved in a series of frictions which (it) often lead to a different riverbed (i.e. set of circumstances) (Strombett) than that wished for. The imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities; Unwägbarkeiten) in and during *logical* action (*logischen* Handeln) also stretch and extend to two levels, which appear in (i.e. during) the course of time; that (level) of the consequences after the attainment and achievement of the end/goal (a kind of acting, action and act can, therefore, be logical in itself, [[and]] be carried out and executed up until the/its planned

end as (the) logical kind of acting, action and act, and nonetheless, prove – in the flow or flux of (the) action – to be not logical or non-logical), and that (level) in and during the application of the means. Before the (i.e. what is) unforeseen and unexpected (Vor dem Unvorhergesehenen), the meticulous (pernickety or precise) remaining with/in absolute foreseeability (das penible Verbleiben beim absolut Vorhergesehenen) saves [the actor] in both cases, i.e. in and during the narrowest version of the schema “end/goal-means”. However, that does not always go that way/is not always the case, without losing essential and substantial chances and opportunities (in respect) of acting, action and the act; (the) immunity against every unwished-for side-effect is often or frequently bought (through and) by (means of) (the) slackening, flagging and waning (i.e. up to paralysis) of (the) action.

Before we turn to the rationality of (the) ends/goals and the consequences of attained and achieved or even not attainable and non-achievable ends/goals, we must touch upon an aspect of the examination of the problem of means (Mittelproblematik), regarding/about which Pareto, out of/for obvious reasons, could say little: we mean (the) momentum of the [[means’s]] own dynamic(s) and (of the [[means’s]] own) logic (die Eigendynamik und -logik), that is, the praxeological autonomisation of the means (die praxeologische Autonomisierung der Mittel). It is (so) obvious that (the) latter (praxeological autonomisation of the means), in and during the stringent, rigorous, compelling and tight version of the schema (:) “ends-means” must not occur and happen at all; here the means exclusively serve the end/goal, and (a) logical acting, action or act is portrayed and depicted exactly by the fact that it (i.e. the said logical acting, action or act) uses the (its) own or the best (or most) expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means (die besten zweckdienlichen Mittel) in and during the full maintenance, safeguarding and protection of the primacy of the end/goal. Put/Said otherwise / differently: the

rationality of the means as means is guaranteed and ensured when they (i.e. the said means) are not converted and transformed unofficially (privately, under the counter, on the side) and en route or on the way into ends and goals – whereas the rationality of the action as a whole (i.e. over and above, i.e. beyond, the individual acting, action and or act) could demand and require exactly this conversion and transformation; the latter (conversion or transformation) occurs, anyhow, without difficulties when other or different reasons command it, since things and kinds of acting, actions and acts, isolated and in themselves, are neither means nor ends/goals, but can become both (means and ends/goals): here we are dealing with functional, not with ontological attributes. The same conversion and transformation of (the) means into ends/goals is favoured (or aided (and abetted)), in addition, by the fact that the actor, in the course of this, does not have to think in new categories; the form-related (i.e. formal) rationality of the schema(:) “end/goal-means” remains unchanged and unmodified, the content(s) is/are only interchanged, substituted or replaced. But irrespective of what is regarded as (an) end/goal and what, on each and every respective occasion, (is regarded) as (the) means: means are only rational as long as they do not develop their own logic, and thereby bring consequences to light which more or less deviate, digress, diverge or differ from those (consequences) originally intended and aimed at, i.e. expected on the basis of the attainment and achievement of the original goal/end. Into the heterogony of ends (An der Heterogonie der Zwecke) – regardless of whether it (i.e. such heterogony of ends) comes into being through and by means of the means’ own logic or through and by means of the uncontrollable consequences (die unkontrollierbaren Folgen) of the attainment and achievement of the ends/goals – runs and bumps every subjective rationality in its ultimate and final bound(arie)s and limits. “Logical kinds of acting, actions and acts” are here not

excepted, exempted or excluded¹⁸.

From his dichotomous perspective, and in (regard to) his narrow, i.e. strict definition of (the) logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, Pareto had to, as (we have) said, exclusively assign (and class) the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (the) action to (and with) not logical (i.e. non-logical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, and indeed to a certain category amongst them. Whilst in and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, (the) subjective and (the) objective end/goal are identical, the not logical (i.e. non-logical) (kinds of acting, action and acts) distinguish themselves and stand out through and by means of the distance (interval or gap) between (the) subjective and (the) objective end/goal, which can take (on) and assume and adopt four [[according to Pareto]] forms, from/out of which, again, four categories of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts arise and ensue. First, there is the case that/where the acting, action and act, neither objectively, nor in the awareness and consciousness of the actor, has a logical end/goal (e.g. purely habitual (and or consuetudinary) kinds of acting, actions and acts (rein gewohnheitsmäßige Handlungen)). Secondly, the logical bond or tie (das logische Band) between acting, action and the act (as (a) means (als Mittel)) and consequence (as (an) end/goal (als Zweck)) is lacking, missing and absent, although the actor holds his kinds of acting, actions or acts to be expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means (zweckdienliche Mittel) for the realization of his intentions ((a) typical example for/of this case : (the) magic, witchcraft, wizardry and sorcery (Zauberei)). Thirdly, kinds of acting, actions and acts (Handlungen), without (the) knowing/knowledge and (the) plan(ning) of the actor (ohne Wissen und Planung des Akteurs), can cause, give rise to and create the wished-for and desired results (this is actually the realm and area of (the) “behaviour”, i.e. of (the) instinctive reactions, wherein /

¹⁸ Regarding the means' own logic cf. ch. IV, Section 2Aa, esp. footnote 377, and 378, above.

in relation to which men (people, humans) differ least from the rest of the animals (beasts)). And finally, a discrepancy occurs between (the) objective consequences and (the) subjective ends/goals of (the) action, although the actor believes in the expediency, usefulness, relevance, pertinence, purposefulness and the serving of (an-)end(s)/goal(s) (Zweckdienlichkeit) of his means ((a) typical example: the coming into being of a tyrannical regime out of/from a revolution in the name of freedom). The first and the third of these kinds of acting, action and act (dieser Handlungsarten) are socially hardly of any weight and importance, as Pareto himself remarked, noticed and observed, since they have no subjective end/goal or else subjectively meant sense/meaning, and, hence, need no justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) (Begründung); if such a (justification) proves to be necessary, then, (the) kinds of acting, actions and acts must be assigned to the second or fourth kind (of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts). The second (non-logical kind of acting), for which Pareto offers a psychological and ethnological rather than a social-ontological explanation, can, likewise, be neglected or ignored, since in it, the schema(:) “end/goal-means” is, in practice, left out, dropped and unnecessary: the means do not achieve, attain or get any real, intended (desired, intentional or deliberate) or unintended (result), [[but]] merely an imagined result. Only the fourth category of acting, action and the act raise the question and problem of the objective consequences of (the) action, which are called “fine oggetivo [[= objective end (purpose)]]” by Pareto, and [[it]] is contrasted with the subjective end / goal (fine soggettivo [[= subjective end (purpose)]] of the person acting (des Handelnden). Only this category, incidentally, fully fits in with, suits or is suitable for Pareto’s definition of (the) unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts (der unlogischen Handlungen), which are supposed or ought to be distinguished by the distance, interval or gap between (the) subjective and objective end/goal: because only in and during kinds of

acting, actions and acts of this kind is there both a subjective end/goal as well as (the) visible consequences of the striving and aiming for this end (Denn nur bei Handlungen dieser Art gibt es sowohl einen subjektiven Zweck als auch sichtbare Folgen des Erstrebens dieses Zweckes); *therein* do such unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts agree with the logical (kinds of acting, actions and acts) (*darin* stimmen solche unlogischen Handlungen mit den logischen überein)^v.

The unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (the) action in the context of the non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts pose the question of the rationality of the subjective end/goal as follows: to what extent is the objective unattainability, unachieveability (i.e. non-achievability) and unreachability of the subjective end/goal (die objektive Unerreichbarkeit des subjektiven Zweckes) *necessarily* (the) cause (reason) of (ground / occasion for) unintentional (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences (Ursache von unbeabsichtigten Folgen), to what extent does (the) rational planning (in respective) of means (rationale Mittelplanung) in (regard to) and during unreachable, unattainable and unachievable subjective ends/goals *necessarily* contribute to the appearance (on the scene) (emergence, advent; Aufkommen) of unintended consequences? Whereas in (regard to) and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, unintended consequences only appear after (the) achieving (attaining and reaching) of the subjective end/goal, such consequences come into being in (regard to) and during unlogical (i.e. non-logical) kinds of acting, actions and acts because the subjective end/goal is unattainable, unachievable and unreachable and because an unattainable and unachievable end/goal was striven for/after, aspired to and sought (Während bei logischen Handlungen unbeabsichtigte Folgen erst nach Erreichen des subjektiven Zweckes in Erscheinung treten, entstehen solche Folgen bei unlogischen Handlungen

deshalb, weil der subjektive Zweck unerreichbar ist und weil ein unerreichbarer Zweck erstrebt wurde). The result of the striving for an unattainable and unachievable end/goal does not always have to equal nought, i.e. zero, that is, to be equal to and the same as the return to the starting (point) (i.e. initial or original) situation (Ausgangssituation). The more thoroughly, profoundly and rationally (Je gründlicher und rationaler) the unattainable and unachievable end / goal was striven after/for, aspired to and sought, the more diverse, varied, manifold and powerful, mighty, formidable (je vielfältiger und gewaltiger) were the deployed and used means in the course of this, (so much) the more (does) the – in the/its nominal (i.e. face) value – undertaking and enterprise, [[which was]] unsuccessful from the outset, penetrate(s) into the thicket, jungle and maze of real praxis (practice), [[and]] (so much) the more does the logic of the means, which substitute and replace the original end/goal to the extent its (i.e. the original end/goal's) unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) – at least hic et nunc (i.e. here and now) – is directly or indirectly admitted (owned up to and granted), makes itself and becomes independent (desto mehr dringt das im Nominalwert von vornherein gescheiterte Unternehmen ins Dickicht der realen Praxis ein, desto mehr verselbständigt sich die Logik der Mittel, die den ursprünglichen Zweck in dem Maße substituieren, wie dessen Unerreichbarkeit – mindestens hic et nunc – direkt oder indirekt zugegeben wird). We may or can hold onto this: where unattainable and unachievable ends/goals were striven for, aspired to and sought, (there) the means' own logic unfolded and developed to the greatest probability and with the most power. That is why unattainable and unachievable ends/goals do not mean eo ipso the saying farewell to or parting from life, but should the occasion arise (and if necessary), a still deeper involvement, entanglement and embroilment therein (i.e. in life). This involvement, entanglement and embroilment is not only carried out and executed via the nominal end/goal of (the) action, but via in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals (sondern

über Zwischenzwecke), which from the perspective of the nominal end/goal look(ed) like means, now, however, they have become, in practice, ends/goals in themselves (Selbstzwecken), which entail and bring with them a new content-related order of the schema “end/goal-means”. In the course of this, the original end/goal does not have to (necessarily) either be forgotten or disavowed and disclaimed (disowned and repudiated), however, unavoidably and inevitably action simultaneously moves at two levels of rationality, that (level) of the invoking of the original end/goal and that (level) of the practical striving for and aspiring to in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals and or means becoming the practical ends/goals in themselves (und jener des praktischen Erstrebens der zu praktischen Selbstzwecken gewordenen Zwischenzwecke bzw. Mittel). The revolutionary does precisely this e.g., he holds out the prospect of and promises (sets his sights on) a free classless society, but “temporarily” and even in name this latter end/goal (of a free classless society) establishes, builds and erects a strictly hierarchised dictatorship¹⁹ – but also every parliamentary government, which more or less passes by or goes over (i.e. ignores and avoids) its programmatic declarations, as well as those men (people, humans) (and they are not the fewest [of people]), who confess their faith nominally in certain ethical values, but in their praxis (in respect) of life (or life practice) follow rules of wisdom (as shrewdness, astuteness, cleverness, judiciousness, i.e. convenience and expediency) (Klugheitsregeln). The unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-attainability and non-achievability) of the ultimate end/goal (e.g. to live purely ethically) does not condemn the actor to inaction (passivity and a failure to act) (Tatenlosigkeit) at all, but only separates and divides the (above-)mentioned two levels of acting, action and the act from each other, whereby and in relation to which, though, the actor does not necessarily know or (does not necessarily) want to know of this separation

¹⁹ In greater detail, in relation to that, in Kondylis, “Utopie”.

and division, but probably possesses the more or less refined capability of serving two rationalities simultaneously. The absolute belief and faith in unattainable and unachievable ends/goals does not signify and mean (the) absolute adaptation and adjustment of the mode of conduct (or way of behaving, acting, action and the act) (Handlungsweise) to that which that faith and belief, taken at (its) nominal (i.e. face) value, would dictate in practice. When the latter (belief and faith) (is) unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical), i.e. in Pareto's terminology is "logically-experimentally" untenable, intolerable and indefensible, and consequently threatens to paralyse the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital and essential) (lebensnotwendigen) use of effective means, then the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (der soziale Selbsterhaltungstrieb) (which can even run counter to and go against the biological (drive, urge and impulse of self preservation^{vi})) hinders, blocks and prevents (the) idling (den Leerlauf) or the leap into the void because/by virtue of the fact that the actor makes his way and proceeds to a level of acting, action and the act, which with regard to the unattainable and unachievable end/goal is supposed or ought to function as (a) means, in reality, however, it permits an independent, self-supporting and autonomous "logically-experimentally" secured and protected (guarded) handling of the schema "end/goal-means". The relation to(wards)/with the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable end/goal indeed is retained and preserved, but it (as from) now/henceforth has symbolic meaning, i.e. it says something about the self-understanding of the actor or, in any case, something about the manner (as to) how he, for his part, wants to be seen by other (actors). The pope believes in (the) holiness as (the) ultimate end/goal of man, he, however, does not regulate the finances or the politics of the Vatican on the basis of this faith and belief, although he, in the eyes of the sheep (i.e. flock), whose shepherd he is, continues to appear to be the representative of the (afore)mentioned ultimate end/goal, and not, for instance, as (a) finance/financial administrator/manager, bursar (Finanzverwalter) or as

(a) politician. In (regard) to these latter characteristics, qualities, traits, properties, he does not, in principle, differ from other actors, who pursue other unattainable, unreachable, unachievable or also (and/or) attainable, achievable and reachable ends/goals. The displacement, shift and transfer of the practical activity from the level of unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals to the level where the logically-experimentally secured, guarded and protected handling of the schema “(attainable, reachable, achievable) end/goal-means” takes place, makes understandable why actors, who have in mind and imagine different (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends/goals in (the) form of ideologies and world theories (i.e. world views) (in Form von Ideologien und Weltanschauungen), make use of the same practical rationality, and can meet and encounter one another as friends or (as) foes in social life as representatives of the same rationality, regardless of their differences concerning the(ir) ultimate (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends / goals. Also here, the social relation proves and turns out to be the determinating (determinative) factor (Auch hier erweist sich die soziale Beziehung als der bestimmende Faktor).

All (of) this is not supposed to mean that it is, in practice, indifferent (as to) whether the/an actor pursues an attainable, reachable and achievable (end/goal) or an unattainable, unreachable and unachievable end/goal. The question (and problem) is, however, constantly at which level and in which sense an end/goal is to be regarded as attainable, reachable and achievable or unattainable, unreachable and unachievable, i.e. at which level does the actor move on each and every respective occasion. At the level where ends/goals – under penalty of practical failure – may, can or are supposed to be (in principle) attainable, reachable and achievable only, the rationality of the direct correlation of the end/goal and means with each other (die Rationalität der direkten Korrelierung von Zweck und Mittel miteinander) unfolds and develops more or less

successfully, whereby and in relation to which up until the conclusion, completion, finishing and finalisation of the acting, action and act, the ends/goals remain exactly ends / goals, and the means remain means too. At the level, again, where the unattainability, unreachability and unachievability (i.e. non-achieveability) of the declared ends/goals does not bring with it and entails no immediate or even any punishment (on the contrary: the sincere, heartfelt, honest, frank and candid or mendacious propagation of unrealisable ideals as ends/goals of individual or social action can, in practice, be worthwhile / be worth it), (the) rationality unfolds and develops in the wider sense of (the) anthropological (pre)disposition or aptitude (der anthropologischen Anlage), whereby and in relation to which the criterion of the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) of the ends/goals (wobei das Kriterium der Sinnhaftigkeit der Zwecke) frequently puts into the shade, i.e. overshadows that (criterion) of their (the said ends/goals') (actual) attainability, reachability and achievability. In the constitution of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) possesses, obviously, a higher, superior ontological status than (the) rationality in the sense of the pursuit of attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals through and by means of suitable means (In der Konstitution des animal rationale besitzt die Sinnhaftigkeit offenbar einen höheren ontologischen Status als die Rationalität im Sinne der Verfolgung erreichbarer Zwecke durch die geeigneten Mittel); because not only attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals are meaning-like, i.e. meaningful – in other words: rationality *as* (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition or aptitude only vouches for and guarantees meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness), not (for) the (in principle) attainability, reachability and achievability of the ends/goals (denn sinnhaft sind nicht nur erreichbarer Zwecke – m. a. W.: Rationalität *als* anthropologische Anlage bürgt nur für die Sinnhaftigkeit, nicht für die (grundsätzliche) Erreichbarkeit der Zwecke). The

schema “end(goal)-means” belongs to the original (primeval and primordial) (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), however, too, which (i.e. the said schema of “end(goal)-means”), incidentally, can hardly be separated from (the) meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) as such (Zu den Uranlagen des animal rationale gehört aber auch das Schema „Zweck-Mittel“, das sich übrigens von der Sinnhaftigkeit als solcher kaum trennen läßt). From that ensues, arises and results that this schema, seen as (a) form, has just as little – like meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) – to do with attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals (Daraus ergibt sich, daß dieses Schema, als Form gesehen, ebensowenig wie die Sinnhaftigkeit ausschließlich mit erreichbaren Zwecken zu tun hat). In the spirit of the originator (author, creator and fabricator) of unlogical (i.e. non-logical and illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, it (i.e. the said schema of end/goal-means) is shaped, moulded and formed in accordance with the same form-related (i.e. formal) points of view (angles and perspectives) as in the spirit of the originator of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts (Im Geiste des Urhebers unlogischer Handlungen gestaltet es sich nach denselben formalen Gesichtspunkten wie im Geiste des Urhebers logischer Handlungen). No man (i.e. human or person) can intentionally (deliberately and on purpose) use means which go against and run counter to his end/goal, because, in this case, his true end/goal would consist in thwarting, frustrating, foiling and preventing his declared end/goal; and every man (i.e. human or person) must, already on account of the fact he has ends / goals and can only live socially, develop activities, which he necessarily comprehends as means for the attainment, reaching and achievement of those ends/goals (Kein Mensch kann absichtlich Mittel einsetzen, die seinem Zweck zuwiderlaufen, denn in diesem Fall würde bloß sein wahrer Zweck darin bestehen, seinen erklärten Zweck zu vereiteln; und jeder Mensch muß schon dadurch, daß er Zwecke hat und nur sozial leben kann, Aktivitäten entwickeln,

die er notwendigerweise als Mittel zur Erreichung jener Zwecke auffaßt). If the latter (ends/goals) are unattainable, unreachable and unachievable, thus he fails conclusively, definitively, once and for all and finally as (a) social being or he makes a new beginning. Very often he does, however, neither the one or the other, but swings and oscillates between the levels of the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable, and, (the levels) of the attainable, reachable and achievable, whereby and in relation to which he, as (we have) described, converts and transforms – at the level of the latter (achievable) – the means of the former (unachievable) into ends/goals without ever expressly repudiating, denying, disavowing and disowning the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals (Sind letztere unerreichbar, so scheitert er endgültig als soziales Wesen oder er macht einen neuen Anfang. Sehr oft tut er aber weder das eine noch das andere, sondern pendelt zwischen den Ebenen des Unerreichbaren und des Erreichbaren, wobei er, wie geschildert, die Mittel der ersteren auf der letzteren in Zwecke verwandelt, ohne je die unerreichbaren Zwecke ausdrücklich abzuleugnen). We do not have to especially (specifically or expressly) explain that all these types of acting, action and the act can be represented by the same actor at various points in time or even simultaneously. Because no-one exclusively and solely pursues attainable, reachable and achievable or exclusively and solely unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals (Wir müssen nicht eigens erklären, daß all diese Handlungstypen durch denselben Akteur auf verschiedenen Gebieten seiner sozialen Tätigkeit zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten oder auch gleichzeitig vertreten werden können. Denn keiner verfolgt ausschließlich erreichbare oder ausschließlich unerreichbare Zwecke).

The interplay of/between (the/what is) unattainable, unreachable, unachievable and (the/what is) attainable, reachable, achievable, between (the/what is) meaning-like, i.e. meaningful and (the/what is) realisable, in

particular leaves to the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of action more room for unfolding and development, i.e. more room to move, above all, however, it points to the fragility and frailty of the narrower concept(ual plan) of rationality, which rests and is based on the schema (of) “end/goal-means” (Das Wechselspiel von Unerreichbarem und Erreichbarem, von Sinnhaftem und Realisierbarem insbesondere läßt den unbeabsichtigten Folgen des Handelns mehr Entfaltungsraum, vor allem deutet es aber auf die Gebrechlichkeit des engeren Rationalitätskonzeptes hin, welches auf dem Schema „Zweck-Mittel“ beruht). In(to) the area and realm of the application of this schema, other levels and forms of rationality constantly force their way, penetrate and make inroads, and they widen or loosen and slacken it (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema) in such a way that it is of little use and hardly suitable and good for (the) concrete praxis (practice) (In den Anwendungsbereich dieses Schemas dringen ständig andere Ebenen und Gestalten der Rationalität ein, und sie erweitern oder lockern es derart, daß es für die konkrete Praxis wenig taugt). Its (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema’s) reduced practical suitability (fitness and efficiency) (verminderte praktische Tauglichkeit) can, though, simply, hence, touch upon / say something [[(about) the fact]] that in (regard to) and during demonstrably attainable, reachable and achievable ends / goals, the means were falsely chosen or used. This is, however, a task which must be resolved from case to case and does not raise in principle questions. In general, the problem of the ends/goals seems to be of a more in principle nature than that (problem) of the means. Because even someone, who does not share an end/goal, can find (out) the suitable means for its (the said end/goal’s) attainment and achievement; differences of opinion over / regarding the ends/goals allow agreements over / regarding questions and problems of means, whereas the question and problem of (the) ends/goals cannot be (re)solved on account of the fact that (an) agreement dominates (i.e. is

(reached and) in force) over / regarding the suitability of these or those means with regard to this or that end/goal. Ends/goals are, incidentally, not preferred neither only nor in general because they can be attained, reached and achieved through simpler means than other (means); the simplicity of the means decides or tips the scales in favour of only in and during decisions between (approximately) equivalent ends/goals. This state of affairs explains why authors, who suggest a comprehensive concept(ual plan) of rationality, tacitly presuppose the rational choice and handling of the means and concentrate on the rationality of the ends/goals as the main feature of rational action; irrational wishes, desires and ends/goals would have to, accordingly, cross out, thwart, frustrate and foil every rational choice and handling of (the) means (irrationale Wünsche und Zwecke müßten demnach jede rationale Wahl und Handhabung der Mittel durchkreuzen), something which would prove the inadequacy, deficiency, shortcoming and failing of a rationality (Unzulänglichkeit einer Rationalität), which wanted to build upon the mere correlation of (the) end/goal and (the) means with each other²⁰. Above the choice of the means(, does) is the choice, therefore, of the ends/goals (stand). The rationality of the latter (ends/goals) vouches for and guarantees the successful course (or sequence of events) of the acting, action or act, since it (the said rationality of the ends / goals) only (or first) makes possible and enables the wished-for and desired effect and impact of the rational means (die erwünschte Wirkung rationaler Mittel). At, i.e. against which measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark, however, is the rationality of the ends/goals to be measured? Which

²⁰ See e.g. Nathanson, *Ideal*, Ch. 9; Rescher, *Rationality*, Ch. 6. Economistic social theoreticians have represented the same opinion, view, idea and conception in the form that the “means-ends model”, which reduces rational action to a choice between alternative means for the attainment and achievement of a certain end/goal, [[and which]] is and ought to be supplemented and complemented by the model of the rational choice between alternative ends/goals “on the basis of a given set of preferences and opportunities”; this “preferences-opportunities model” defines rational action as utility maximisation (*or*: the maximisation of use, profit, gain, advantage and benefit) (Nutzenmaximierung) (Harsanyi, “Advances”, p. 85ff.). [[TRANSLATOR’S QUESTION (= ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): IS THIS SOME KIND OV ZIQ-ANGLO-JOO GANG BANG OV “ONLY WE “AS CHOZEN” ARE ALLOWED TO DEFINE WHAT IS RATIONAL AND A RATIONAL END/GOAL”? AAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH !!]]

kind of rationality of the ends/goals permits the direct and stable connection and binding between the rationality of the ends/goals and of the rationality of the means, i.e. such a connection and binding, in (regard to) and during which the possibility of a conversion and transformation of the (starting, initial) means into (new) ends/goals is excluded? Here, one can go beyond Aristotle or Pareto with difficulty, irrespective of which world-theoretical premises one has (or: irrespective of the world-theoretical premises underlying one[‘s fundamental position(ing)]) on each and every respective occasion. (The) sole measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark (in respect) of the rationality of the end/goal, which suffices for (or comes up to, meets and fulfils) “logical-experimental” demands, remains (the) attainability, reachability and achievability, and this (achievability), again, can only be ascertained often only ex eventu (i.e. from the event (or: after the event, following the occurrence of)), something which makes out of / from the rationality of the end/goal (or: something which converts the rationality of the end/goal into) a tautology. (We want to disregard here cases like the attainment and achievement of the end/goal through and by means of coincidence, accident, contingency, happenstance and chance etc..) No other determination of the rationality of the end/goal permits its (i.e. the rationality of the end/goal’s) direct connection and binding with the rationality of the means, and in this respect, it is also psychologically correct and right to look at the regular, orderly and regulated carrying out, execution, perpetration, realization and implementation of the designs, models, blueprints, outlines, sketches or drafts (in respect) of acting, actions and acts (or action plans) (die regelmäßige Ausführung von Handlungsentwürfen) towards (i.e. with regard to) the most favourable point in time for their realisation as signs of dispositional rationality²¹. An ethical definition of that rationality would e.g. in and during the possible and potential or eventual unattainability, unreachability

²¹ Bandura, “Self Efficacy”.

or unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ethical end/goal leave open the possibility described above of shifting, transferring or moving the centre of gravity, main emphasis or focal point of (the) practical activity from the level of unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals to the level where a logically-experimentally safeguarded, secured and protected handling of the schema “end/goal-means” can take place – with the result of a factual transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends / goals. On the other hand, ethically irrational^{vii} ends/goals would not in the least stand in the way of a stable and direct, logical connection and combining of end/goal and means with each other. A rational choice and handling of the means does not at all obstruct or hinder the end/goal of committing a murder (Der Zweck, einen Mord zu begehen, verhindert überhaupt nicht eine rationale Wahl und Handhabung der Mittel). The latter [[former]] (means) are actually not endangered or put at risk through and by means of the constitution, composure and texture of the end/goal in itself, but through and by means of the intellectual-spiritual (mental-emotional) constitution (i.e. state, condition or state and frame of mind) of the actor (die geistige Verfassung des Akteurs).

The attempt to safeguard, secure and protect the general rationality of (the) action via the rationality of the end/goal stems from the permanent human concern, care, worry or anxiety around the avoidance of (the) unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of the acting, action or act and a transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends/goals – irrespective of whether the actor himself in retrospect regretted or welcomed this transformation and conversion. (Formal) guarantees (Formale Garantien) for the appeasement (pacification, calming down, soothing and or easing) of this concern, care, worry or anxiety can, however, finally / in the end, grant, give, afford or accord only a narrow version of the rationality of the end/goal, whereupon / according to which / after which rationality means

just as much as (i.e. the same as) justice (wonach Rationalität ebensoviel wie Gerechtigkeit heißt)^{viii}. The same concern, care, worry or anxiety stems from another attempt at the safeguarding, securing and protecting of the general rationality of the action, which proceeds in the reverse manner and bumps or runs into and encounters reverse(d) difficulties. Here the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals is declared to be meaningless and the ultimate guarantee for (the) rationality is seen, perceived or espied in the expediency, usefulness, relevance, pertinence, purposefulness and the serving of (the) means (in der Zweckdienlichkeit der Mittel). Since human action finds itself always on the search for means and uses means in order to realise ends / goals, thus, it (i.e. action) is – on the basis of the ubiquity of the schema “end / goal-means” – by definition and always rational, and indeed regardless of the subjective rationality and of the motivation of the actor or of the success of his endeavours and efforts; with regard to the determination of the ends/goals in themselves, the familiar and common contrast and opposition between (the / what is) rational and (the / what is) irrational (the Rational and the Irrational) (zwischen Rationalem und Irrationalem) loses its meaning fully (completely, totally and entirely)²². But the recourse, going back and reverting to the broader anthropological level does not solve the problems of the narrower acting-theory levels (i.e. the narrower levels pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act) (die Probleme der engeren handlungstheoretischen Ebene), but blurs, on the contrary, their specific character; the narrower the logical level, the more specific must the concepts be, which are supposed or ought to bring clarity^{ix}. Turned / Said otherwise / differently: the allusion and reference to (or indication of) the anthropological taking root of the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end / goal-means” says nothing about the determination of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means,

²² Thus, v. Mises, *Grundprobleme*, p. 32ff., 63; *Human action*, p. 12ff., 18ff..

which no theory of (the) rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act and also no actor can go around and circumvent. Rationality as (a) human attribute in (the) form of the “end/goal-means”-schema (Rationalität als menschliches Attribut in Form des „Zweck-Mittel“-Schemas) and rationality in (the) form of that determination (of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means) are two different things and move at different logical levels: the former (rationality as a human attribute) is in all men, i.e. humans, the same, the latter (rationality as the determination of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means) changes from actor to actor, and exactly because of that, (the) theory of acting, action and the act stands/is before the task of naming (the) criteria for the ends/goals and of the means. Whoever is satisfied with the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end/goal-means” and lays, places or puts down to / in the files (i.e. archives) (ad acta legen) the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals, does not want to admit that the attainability, reachability and achievability or else (the) unattainability, unreachability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals, called the yardstick, benchmark, measure, standard or criteria of or for rationality, determines both the effectiveness and effectuality of the means as well as their fate and destiny, i.e. determines the rationality of the ends/goals, whether the means remain up to the conclusion and the finalisation of the acting, action and act, means, or whether they (i.e. the said means) will – en route and along or on the way – be converted and transformed into (new) ends/goals; likewise it (i.e. the attainability, reachability and achievability or else (the) unattainability, unreachability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals) determines the manner as well as the point in time of the appearance (on the scene) and emergence or advent of the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences. The leaving aside or exclusion of the rationality of the ends/goals happens, though, for good reason(s), when, with

that, it is meant that the ethical character of the ends/goals has no influence on praxeological rationality (Die Ausklammerung der Rationalität der Zwecke geschieht allerdings aus guten Gründen, wenn damit gemeint ist, daß der ethische Charakter der Zwecke keinen Einfluß auf praxelogische Rationalität hat). However, the ethical neutrality of the ends/goals (die ethische Neutralität der Zwecke) would amount and be tantamount to a neutrality of the ends/goals vis-à-vis (the) rationality and (the) irrationality (Rationalität und Irrationalität) only (then) if ethics (Ethik) and rationality were identical right and all down the line and across the board; and this is not the case. Even after the leaving aside or exclusion of the ethical factor in and during the determination of the ends/goals, the constitution, composition and texture of the ends/goals, especially with regard to the criterion of attainability, reachability and achievability, influence the unfolding and development of the schema “end/goal-means” in (the) concrete acting area or sphere (i.e. in the concrete space (in respect) of acting, action and the act) (im konkreten Handlungsraum). That leaving aside or elimination (of the ethical factor in the determination of the ends/goals) does not at all result in or yield eo ipso a clean or neat rationality of acting, action or the act. Incidentally, it sounds comical when the same v. Mises, who wants to set or put aside and eliminate irrationality and rationality at the level of the ends/goals, and sees at work the rationality of the form-related (i.e. formal) end/goal-means schema even in the kinds of acting, actions and acts of psychopaths, takes to the field and goes into battle against the “totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism (or the liberalism of the economy) with the argument, of all arguments, that these (“totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism) (would) trigger, spark and set off a “Revolt against Reason”²³. Polemical needs and requirements call into life, i.e. bring into being very quickly again the in principle disavowed, disowned, disclaimed and repudiated connection and binding of ethics and rationality.

²³ *Human action*, p. 72ff..

TRANSLATOR'S ENDNOTES (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.)

ⁱ The fact e.g. that all humans relate to world-views, good vs. evil, the urge-drive-impulse of self-preservation and the extension of one's own power, death, the mechanism and (friend-foe) spectrum of the social relation, society as a political collective, the political (social order, social cohesion, social disciplining), ideology, culture, nature, identity, power, rationality-understanding-language, etc. etc. etc..

ⁱⁱ From the point of view of the individual who must act, but who must act in relation to an already ordered society of culture, the political, dominant values etc., which he had no say in shaping, though he does have a say in how he will act.

ⁱⁱⁱ Obviously because all sides can often up to always want to win, rule, come out on top, have fun, kill one's foe, etc., etc., etc..

^{iv} Instrumental rationality refers to end/goal and means rationality; symbolic rationality refers to the created meaning / rationality relating to the world theory/view of a human collectivity; and the rationality of identity refers to rationalities and the identities of collectivities and their members in relation to the identities of other collectivities and their members, including cases of the over-lapping of identities and collectivities and rationalities.

^v In that they are both present as intention (in memory and or carrying over until now) and actual consequences now, whether the consequences are the intended or unintended ones.

^{vi} I.e. in the case of individual self-sacrifice for the greater, collective good.

^{vii} I.e. what are considered on each and every respective occasion to be ethically "irrational" ends/goals (since nothing is "rational/irrational (compared to rational)" and "ethical/unethical", imminently, outside of man / human society).

^{viii} I.e. rationality and justice are nothing more or less than a reflection of all the relevant correlation of forces as crystals of power and identity as to what happens in practice.

^{ix} This complements the Weberian position that the broader the range of relevant facts, the narrower does the ideal type need to be to have comparative macro-historical-sociological use.