

V. Rationality, symbol (sign, icon) and language
(speech, tongue) in the field of tension (stress,
strain) (tension field) of the social relation
(Rationalität, Symbol und Sprache im
Spannungsfeld der sozialen Beziehung)

1. Levels, forms (shapes, guises, figures) and degrees (grades, stages, extents) of rationality (Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade der Rationalität)

A. Preliminary remark (comment, note) (introduction) (Vorbemerkung)

Talk of the levels, forms and degrees of rationality already shows, reveals or suggests that rationality in itself and as such, that is, irrespective of its bearer and its (field of) coming into being or of its field of unfolding and development cannot make up and constitute the object of a handling and treatment which suffices for strict objective and factual examination, testing and proving (also ungeachtet ihres Trägers und ihres Entstehungs- oder Entfaltungsgebietes nicht den Gegenstand einer Behandlung abgeben kann, die strenger sachlicher Prüfung genügt). Whoever wants to treat and deal with “rationality” absolutely (per se or as such), must take a definition of the same (“rationality”) as a basis, which does not make do, and does not manage, without terms in need of interpretation (ohne interpretationsbedürftige Termini); all theories of rationality with (a) claim of (or to) exclusivity and loud or quiet (faint, soft) normative ambitions contained, in any case, such terms and, through that, got involved and tangled up in a vicious circle whose logical troubles, difficulties and inconveniences, though, have not been able to cool down (their) ethical zeal and eagerness. The task of a social ontology as (a) theoretical dimension of depths (or in-depth dimension) (Aufgabe einer Sozialontologie als theoretischer Tiefendimension) is, accordingly, not the setting up, formation or erection of a

wider “philosophical” theory of rationality („philosophischen“ Rationalitätstheorie) next to other(s) (“philosophical” theories of rationality), which, incidentally, in many cases and frequently repeat one another, but the establishment, investigation and determination of the reasons (grounds), out of which rationality (Rationalität) – always: in its various levels, forms and degrees – makes up a constitutive element of human living together, i.e. co-existence (ein konstitutives Element menschlichen Zusammenlebens ausmacht). Rationality does not constitute, seen thus, an Ought whose realisation needs a particular or especial effort, endeavour and struggle going over and above, exceeding and passing beyond the present human situation, but a reality which originally belongs together with the rest of the realities of the social and or of the human (Rationalität bildet, so gesehen, kein Sollen, dessen Realisierung einer besonderen, über die gegenwärtige menschliche Situation hinausgehenden Anstrengung bedarf, sondern eine Realität, die mit den übrigen Realitäten des Sozialen bzw. des Menschlichen ursprünglich zusammengehört). The change (Der Wechsel) of / in its levels, forms and degrees does not yield or result in any linear progress, rather it (i.e. the said change) is executed and carried out asymmetrically and underlies stark, i.e. strong fluctuations (variations and deviations), whereby and in relation to which these levels, forms and degrees combine with one another in various or in the same collective or individual actors on each and every respective occasion, having an effect differently on one another (jeweils anders miteinander kombinieren, anders aufeinander wirken). “Philosophical” and (in (the) ethical and technical sense) normative theories of rationality („Philosophische“ und (im ethischen und technischen Sinne) normative Rationalitätstheorien) are symptoms and indicators of this eternal, everlasting and perpetual change; they register and record objectively, i.e. without knowing it and (without) wanting (it), social-ontological possibilities (sozialontologische Möglichkeiten), which temporarily and transiently became realities (die vorübergehend Wirklichkeiten wurden); but

they are incapable of ever performing, achieving and accomplishing that which they – according to what they think they know – want to perform, achieve and accomplish: namely, to put an end to the (great) variety and multiformity of (the) social-ontological possibilities in (the) name (of) and in favour of the sole wished-for “rational” reality (der einzig erwünschten „rationalen“ Wirklichkeit). The degrees of rationality are not put, classed or classified in a uniform, unitary, unified universal scale (Die Grade der Rationalität stufen sich nicht in eine einheitliche universelle Skala ein), whose summit, peak or height serves as (the) yardstick and measure of the tiers, levels, stages or grades (rungs or ranks) (deren Gipfel als Gradmesser der Stufen dient) [of the said degrees of rationality]; they are (the) functions of the levels at which rationality unfolds and develops, and of the form, which it (i.e. rationality) assumes and adopts on each and every respective occasion. Theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory), one cannot get on top of this situation and position (i.e. get this situation under control) through final, conclusive and definitive definitions; behind them are (lodged, hiding, stuck) / hide admonitions, exhortations and warnings, but through a row / series of conceptual distinctions (sondern durch eine Reihe von begrifflichen Unterscheidungen), which are supposed to relate, render, reflect and convey (the) levels, forms and degrees of rationality in their great contours and outlines and with descriptive intent. From the standpoint of general methodology, conceptual distinctions, supported, propped up and underpinned by the corresponding casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases), offer the sole available theoretical way out when definitions can neither be maintained and kept to for long, nor help along / (any) further – something which applies to most cases; and they (i.e. the said conceptual distinctions) typically (enough) arise precisely during (the) proving of the inadequacies, deficiencies, shortcoming and failings of this or that definition.

Although there is and cannot be – in its content – binding and conclusively

defined “rationality” (Obwohl es „die“ in ihrem Inhalt verbindlich und endgültig definierte Rationalität nicht gibt und nicht geben kann), talk of “rationality” is customary, normal, typical, conventional, standard, usual and theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) legitimate (ist die Rede von „der“ Rationalität üblich and auch theoretisch legitim); one, in fact, may or should not speak of (the) levels, forms and degrees of the same (rationality), when the reference to something is lacking / missing, which can be expressed at least conventionally in the singular (i.e. when the said levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not refer to something which cannot be expressed at least conventionally in the singular). This singular, nonetheless, does not point to any content, but to a form-related (i.e. formal) anthropological and social-ontological factor, which, like all anthropological and social-ontological factors can be connected (and combined) with all humanly and socially conceivable, imaginable and thinkable content(s). Like “the” social relation or “language”, from which it (i.e. rationality) can hardly be separated genetically and functionally, “rationality” updates and refreshes its potential (or brings its potential up to date, making that potential topical) in the most different positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends/goals and activities (in den unterschiedlichsten Einstellungen, Wertungen, Zwecken und Tätigkeiten). As (an) anthropological and social-ontological constituent and constant (Als anthropologische und sozialontologische Konstituente und Konstante), it (i.e. rationality) finds itself or is found on the other side of, i.e. beyond the common and familiar contrast and opposition between “rationalism” and “irrationalism” („Rationalismus“ und „Irrationalismus“), which comes up, crops up, arises and emerges only during (the) content-related use/usage of rationality, and indicates or signals preferences of (a) content-related nature, that is, concretely normative fillings, i.e. arrangements (as to content) (konkrete normative Besetzungen) of those positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends/goals and activities; (the) level, form and degree of

rationality does not necessarily depend, in any case, on the decision in favour of (the) “rationalism” or of (the) “irrationalism”, and the sense in which the anthropological and social-ontological way of looking at things ascribes and attributes the predicate “rational” to an action (und der Sinn, in dem die anthropologische und sozialontologische Betrachtung einem Handeln das Prädikat „rational“ zuschreiben) can differ considerably from that (sense) in which the actors themselves may or like and want to apostrophise (i.e. mention and refer to) an action as “rational” or “irrational” (als „rational“ oder „irrational“ apostrophieren mögen). The apparent paradox in (the) rationality lies therein (in the fact)(,) that it – thanks to its each and every respective level and form, as well as its each and every degree – is to be found, in practice, everywhere in the human-social [sphere, field, dimension, realm] (praktisch überall im Menschlich-Sozialen zu finden ist), however(,) precisely because it is deprived of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) (aber sich gerade deshalb jeder Normierung entzieht), which goes way beyond what the anthropological and social-ontological formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) contain or imply already as (a) fact (die über das hinausgeht, was die anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Formalien schon als Faktum beinhalten oder implizieren)ⁱ. To someone acting in a concrete situation (and position), however, exactly this unreachableⁱⁱ normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) is needed (Dem in einer konkreten Lage Handelnden tut jedoch eben diese unerreichbare Normierung not), so that he, in the hour (i.e. at the time) of probation (i.e. testing), is basically (placed, put, posited) on his own (so daß er in der Stunde der praktischen Bewährung im Grunde auf sich allein gestellt ist) – endowed, equipped and provided, though, with the aforementioned formalities (i.e. formal / form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), and with that which he

himself has willingly or unwillingly made out of them. Precisely the ubiquity of (the) rationality lends, confers to, bestows upon and gives, therefore, the theory of rationality such a general character that every specification in the direction of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) cannot go out of and above (i.e. beyond) beginnings which must buy and purchase (i.e. obtain and secure) their general objective validity, soundness and conclusiveness with the staying and remaining in unbinding (i.e. non-binding) formulae (and set phrases) (in unverbindlichen Formeln)¹. In short: the concept of rationality is theoretically (i.e. as regards theory) fruitful and fertile, i.e. helpful and of assistance during the investigation, establishment and determination of and inquiry into anthropological and social-ontological facts and circumstances, to the extent it remains, in practice, vague. And conversely: every definition or normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) of rationality, which wants to be, in practice, (technically or ethically) useful, loses in (its) theoretical depth and breadth without gaining and winning much in another respect. As can, incidentally, be shown, the terms, which normative theories of rationality must make use of (e.g. consistency, (the) adequate correlation of the goal/end and means with each other etc.) (die Termini, deren sich normative Rationalitätstheorien bedienen müssen (z. B. Konsistenz, adäquate Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander etc.)) constitute simple or more complicated re-descriptions and paraphrases (re-writings, re-brandings) (Umschreibungen) of the formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically, and they only get and obtain, maintain and preserve a sense (i.e. meaning) when they are understood (in respect) of these (formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to

¹ See under D in this section, below.

forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically). This indicates in itself the objective impossibility of being able to leave behind these formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) [[to move]] in the direction of normatively binding content(s) (in Richtung auf normativ verbindliche Inhalte). Consequently, the treatment and handling of the examination of the problem of rationality remains in (an) eminent (i.e. exceptional and extreme (as total)) sense (a) matter (thing, cause, issue, affair, business, case) of (the) anthropology and of (the) social ontology, which are technically and ethically blind. Whoever is on the lookout for content-related specifications of rationality in narrower fields – exactly in the fields of (the) technique (technology) or of (the) ethics (eben den Gebieten der Technik oder der Ethik) – (will) necessarily get tangled up in, entangled, embroiled and involved in new unsolvable paralogisms. The smuggling in of anthropological and social-ontological factors or concepts for / towards (the) underpinning (backing-up and support) of such specifications yields, brings, provides little [which is] tangible and moreover betrays (i.e. reveals) an ideational power claim, namely, that of gaining authority for partial preferences in part-fields (i.e. sub-fields or sub-sectors), which aim for and set their sights on an Ought through and by means of the whole weight of (the) human-social Is (einen ideellen Machtanspruch, nämlich den, partiellen Präferenzen auf Teilgebieten, die ein Sollen anvisieren, durch das ganze Gewicht des menschlich-sozialen Seins Autorität zu verschaffen).

B. The anthropological and social-ontological parameters of rationality (Die anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Parameter der Rationalität)

a. General(ly) (In general) (Allgemeines)

Rationality seeps through, penetrates, permeates and pervades the being and essence (nature, character, creature, entity) of man and the Is (To Be) of society so deeply that that being and essence and that Is again belong so intimately together that the handling and treatment of the examination of the problem of rationality feels first of all lost in this inextricable plexus, network or mesh: it (i.e. the said handling and treatment) does not rightly know where it is supposed and ought to start/begin in order to – from there – unroll and unwind the real coherence of the individual aspects with the greatest possible clarity and logical necessity. It is up to the reader – at least in part – to apprehend through and by means of his imagination as (a) unity what in the description, – as successful as it may be –, must (necessarily) appear(s) as (the/an) enumeration or list of multiple *disjecta membra* [= scattered (tossed about) limbs (members, parts, portions, divisions)] (Rationalität durchdringt das Wesen des Menschen und das Sein der Gesellschaft so tief, jenes Wesen und dieses Sein gehören wiederum so innig zusammen, daß sich die Behandlung der Rationalitätsproblematik in diesem unentwirrbaren Geflecht zunächst verloren fühlt: Sie weiß nicht recht, wo sie ansetzen soll, um von da aus die reale Kohärenz der einzelnen Aspekte mit der größtmöglichen Klarheit und logischen Notwendigkeit aufzurollen. Dem Leser bleibt es wenigstens zum Teil überlassen, durch seine Vorstellungskraft das als Einheit zu erfassen, was in der Darstellung, so gelungen sie auch sein mag, als Aufzählung von mehreren *disjecta membra* vorkommen muß). In the hope that the result will justify the choice of the starting point, we shall begin with the familiar and common distinction between mere “instinctive” behaviour and action („instinktivem“ Verhalten und Handeln), which we already dealt with in (regard to) / with the intention of outlining (delineating and sketching out) the concept of the latter (action) in greater / more detail². The opening up (and reconstruction) of rationality as (a)

² See Ch. IV, Section 2Aa, above.

phenomenon demands, nevertheless, to make this same distinction more deeply, i.e. to not set human behaviour apart from human action (*or*: to not contrast human behaviour to human action) any longer, but to put in one (i.e. to equate and identify) the difference between behaviour and action with that (difference) between animal / beast and man (sondern die Differenz zwischen Verhalten und Handeln mit jener zwischen Tier und Mensch in eins zu setzen), no matter how highly one estimates, values and rates the animal/bestial-behavioural [element] in man (das Tierisch-Verhaltensmäßige am Menschen); the difference [[between animal/beast and man]] remains and persists in any case, and it (i.e. this said difference) is what matters and interests us here. If rationality in the widest and fundamental sense is that feature and characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest of (those belonging as members to) the animal kingdom (von den übrigen Angehörigen des Tierreichs), and if this distinction may or can be re-written, re-described and paraphrased as (the/a) distinction between “instinctive” behaviour and action („instinktivem“ Verhalten und Handeln) without (a) substantial shift or transposition of accent, stress or emphasis and content-related losses, then, also (the) source and (the) field of unfolding and development of rationality (auch Ursprung und Enfaltungsgebiet der Rationalität) may or can or should be located (there) where the more or less direct automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction (die mehr oder weniger direkte Automatik von Stimulus und Reaktion) is considerably loosened (up) and relaxed, and in the distance, interval and gap (Abstand) which comes into being, accordingly, between both (stimulus and reaction), foresight, calculus (i.e. calculation) and choice (Voraussicht, Kalkül und Wahl) amongst, i.e. between practical alternatives nest, lodge and settle³. Upon the clinging and sticking to (the) particular and (the) present, the more or less free visualisation of the no-more (i.e. no longer) (present) or not-yet-present (die mehr oder

³ Bennett, *Rationality*, pp. 5, 84ff..

weniger freie Vergegenwärtigung des Nicht-Mehr- oder Noch-Nicht-Gegenwärtigen) follows, that is, of the past or of the future, which relate to each other like experience and planning (Erfahrung und Planung), and since both are unreal (irreal), i.e. in contrast to the tangible present, they exist only in the (idea as) imagination (Vorstellung), thus, even their still intensive life (living) in (the) ideality permits and compels, forces a – through thought – (i.e. an intellectual) performing and rendering processing and (a) combination of data with regard to adaptations to the environment or to the re-shapings and re-mouldings (and rearrangements) of the same (environment); transferred or translated into the ideational, data become more moveable (mobile, agile, flexible) and more manipulable (so gestattet und erzwingt sogar ihr nunmehr intensives Leben in der Idealität eine durch Denken zu leistende Bearbeitung und Kombination von Daten im Hinblick auf Anpassungen an die Umwelt oder auf Umgestaltungen derselben; ins Ideelle übersetzt, werden Daten viel beweglicher und manipulierbarer).

The loosening of the automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction means not only a growing distance, spacing and gap between both (stimulus and reaction), but simultaneously also a growing great variety and multiformity in the sending, receiving and evaluating of the stimuli as well as in the temporal and qualitative palette (i.e. range) of reactions (Die Auflockerung der Automatik von Stimulus und Reaktion bedeutet nicht nur einen wachsenden Abstand zwischen den beiden, sondern gleichzeitig auch eine wachsende Vielfalt im Senden, Empfangen und Bewerten der Stimuli sowie in der zeitlichen und qualitativen Palette der Reaktionen); more and more reactions can answer and respond to more and more constellations (or correlations of forces) (immer mehr Reaktionen können auf immer mehr Stimuli zu sehr verschiedenen Zeitpunkten und in immer neuen Konstellationen antworten). And since the reaction aims at a material or ideational satisfaction of the actor,

thus, the aforementioned growing distance, spacing or gap between reaction and stimulus during (the) growing differentiation of both (stimulus and reaction) means, besides / moreover, (the/a) growing (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) wished-for and desired satisfaction, as well as (the / a) growing differentiation of its (i.e. the said wished-for satisfaction's) forms and degrees of intensity (Und da die Reaktion auf eine materielle oder ideale Befriedigung des Akteurs abzielt, so bedeutet der gennante wachsende Abstand zwischen Reaktion und Stimulus bei wachsender Differenzierung beider überdies wachsende Fähigkeit zum Aufschub der erwünschten Befriedigung sowie wachsende Differenzierung ihrer Formen und Intensitätsgrade). This postponement (delay or deferment), indeed, takes place under the pressure of external and outer circumstances, however, differently than in the rest of the animals (i.e. non-human animals), in whom/which it (i.e. the said postponement of satisfaction) cannot be prolonged (extended, elongated and protracted) infinitely, endlessly and indefinitely without bringing about (causing and inducing) the abstention from (and or renunciation of) the initially wished-for and desired satisfaction, and the (its) forgetting (i.e. the leaving behind of the said wished-for satisfaction); it (i.e. the said postponement) in man is converted and transformed into a normal internal and inner process, which in principle does not know (of) temporal boundaries (Dieser Aufschub erfolgt zwar unter dem Druck äußerer Umstände, anders aber als bei den übrigen Tieren, bei denen er sich nicht unendlich verlängern kann, ohne den Verzicht auf die zunächst erwünschte Befriedigung und das Vergessen herbeizuführen, verwandelt er sich beim Menschen in einen normalen internen Vorgang, der grundsätzlich keine zeitlichen Grenzen kennt). The put-off, deferred (postponed and delayed) satisfaction is now called (a/the) long-term goal/end, and (the) rationality must pass its ordeal by fire (i.e. acid test) by filling the space (room) of postponement (delay or deferment), i.e. the distance, spacing or gap between (the) concept(ual plan) and (the) reaching and achievement of the goal/end through the means

which are supposed to lead to the reaching and achievement of the goal/end
 (Die aufgeschobene Befriedigung heißt nun langfristiger Zweck, und die
 Rationalität muß ihre Feuerprobe bestehen, indem sie den Raum des Aufschubs,
 d. h. den Abstand zwischen Konzept und Erreichen des Zweckes durch die
 Mittel füllt, die zum Erreichen des Zweckes führen sollen). The (cap)ability at
 the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) satisfaction and the elementary
 rationality of the correlation of end/goal and means with each other,
 consequently represent and constitute both sides of the same coin (Fähigkeit
 zum Aufschub der Befriedigung und die elementare Rationalität der
 Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander stellen somit die beiden
 Seiten derselben Medaille dar). The greater that (cap)ability [at the said
 postponement of satisfaction], the longer the chain of the means which must be
 set in motion; to the means, the means for the production of means etc. are then
 added, whereby and in relation to which rationality is intensified (multiplied)
 and refined to the extent it is distanced / distances itself from the original end /
 goal of satisfaction, in order to henceforth convert and transform the ends/goals
 into means as well as the other way around (conversely, vice versa) (Je größer
 jene Fähigkeit, desto länger die Kette der Mittel, die sie in Bewegung setzen
 muß; zu den Mitteln kommen dann die Mittel zur Produktion von Mitteln etc.
 hinzu, wobei sich Rationalität in eben dem Maße potenziert und verfeinert, wie
 sie sich vom ursprünglichen Zweck der Befriedigung entfernt, um fortan die
 Zwecke in Mittel zu verwandeln sowie umgekehrt). During the increasing
 length of the chain of ends/goals and means (i.e. as the chain of ends/goals
 grows longer), (the) rationality stands (is, finds itself) before a new task, which
 is called consistency (Bei zunehmender Länge der Kette von Zwecken und
 Mitteln steht die Rationalität vor einer neuen Aufgabe, die Konsistenz heißt).
 No means may or should neutralise another means, and no means may or should
 naturally thwart, frustrate or foil the end/goal itself, but the successive
 employment, use and deployment of (the) means must have an effect

cumulatively or else complementarily. Consistency in the use/usage of means simultaneously is called and signifies practice and exercise in (the) elementary logic (Übung in der Elementarlogik), that is, in (regard to) the fundamental principles of (the) identity and of (the) contradiction (in den Grundsätzen der Identität und des Widerspruchs). Through and by means of identical means under identical circumstances and conditions (identische Mittel unter identischen Umständen), identical ends/goals (identische Zwecke) can be reached, attained and achieved; thus reads, runs, sounds (i.e. is) the principle of the identity of acting rationality (das Identitätsprinzip handelnder Rationalität); and its principle of contradiction (ihr Widerspruchsprinzip) means: the most crass (blatant, extreme and gross) of all irrationalities is that of consciously using means which contradict the sincerely (honestly) pursued end/goal (Die krasseste aller Irrationalitäten ist die, bewußt Mittel einzusetzen, die dem aufrichtig verfolgten Zweck zuwiderlaufen). Precisely because the breach (violation, contravention, infringement) of the principle of (the) contradiction in this form is so absurd that it hardly appears or is found in (the) reality, in fact, it can hardly be realised in practice, one often has ex contrario held the adequate correlation of (the) end/goal and of (the) means with (regard to) each other to be the archetype or the sole genuine and in practice relevant rationality (die adäquate Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander für den Urtyp bzw. für die einzig echte und praktisch relevante Rationalität gehalten). That certainly does not go/reach far enough (or: That is certainly not enough). Consistency as (a) feature of rationality stands/is constantly in a relationship of friction towards/with the inconsistent nature of (the) reality, i.e. with the constant changing of / change in circumstances and conditions, which prohibits the enduring, lasting, long-term or permanent use of identical means and the eternal holding onto and adherence to (the) identical ends/goals, and punishes the breaking, infringing and violating of the [[said]] prohibition (Konsistenz als Merkmal der Rationalität steht ständig in einem Friktionsverhältnis zur

inkonsistenten Natur der Wirklichkeit, d. h. zum ständigen Wechsel der Umstände, der den dauerhaften Gebrauch identischer Mittel und das ewige Festhalten an identischen Zwecken verbietet und beim Übertreten des Verbots bestraft). The logical concept(ual plan) of consistency as the lack and absence of contradictions does not, hence, always and necessarily coincide with the praxeological concept(ual plan) of consistency as (the) remaining with the same ends/goals and means (Das logische Konzept der Konsistenz als Fehlen von Widersprüchen fällt daher nicht immer und nicht notwendig mit dem praxeologischen Konzept der Konsistenz als Verbleiben bei denselben Zwecken und Mitteln zusammen)⁴; the former (logical concept of consistency) retains under all circumstances its validity, it is applied only to new content(s); the latter (praxeological concept of consistency) often appears as loyalty, faithfulness and fidelity to principles and shares as a rule the fate and destiny of Don Quixote after the decline of the knighthood, i.e. it ends (up) in pigheadedness, obstinacy and (pure, ridiculous) fantasy. Praxeological pigheadedness and obstinacy, which, though, in (a) technical respect indicates diminished rationality, can be founded on the actor's permanent difficulties of adaptation and of orientation, however, it can also go back and be reduced to past successes, which strengthen and solidify, consolidate the false impression that means and ends/goals, which once led to success, would have to always and everywhere happen to have the same luck and fortune (ersteres behält unter allen Umständen seine Gültigkeit, es wendet sich nur auf neue Inhalte an, letzteres tritt oft als Prinzipientreue auf und teilt in der Regel das Schicksal des Don Quichotte nach dem Untergang des Rittertums, d. h. es endet beim Starrsinn oder der Phantasterei. Praxeologischer Starrsinn, der in technischer Hinsicht allerdings verminderte Rationalität anzeigt, kann in permanenten Anpassungs- und Orientierungsschwierigkeiten des Akteurs gründen, er kann

⁴ V. Mises, *Action*, p. 103.

aber auch auf vergangene Erfolge zurückgehen, die den falschen Eindruck festigen, Mitteln und Zwecken, die einmal zum Erfolg führten, müßte immer und überall dasselbe Glück widerfahren)⁵. Consistency becomes and turns into, therefore, the feature and characteristic of rationality only when the level at which it develops and unfolds is taken into account; the consistency at one level is not the same as the consistency at another level, and (the) both levels can behave, i.e. be, inconsistent(ly) towards/with (regard to) each other, although they, – each for itself –, is consistent (Konsistenz wird also erst zum Merkmal der Rationalität, wenn der Ebene Rechnung getragen wird, auf der sie sich entfaltet; die Konsistenz auf einer Ebene ist nicht mit der Konsistenz auf einer anderen gleich, und die beiden Ebenen können sich zueinander inkonsistent verhalten, obwohl sie, jede für sich, konsistent sind). Precisely the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) of the (praxeological) consistency inside of (the) inconsistent reality, as well as the constant mutual and reciprocal change of position (status, standing and place) of (the) goal/end and (the) means reveal (show, indicate, suggest) that the anthropological and social-ontological dimension of rationality is absorbed and assimilated by (or exhausted in or disappears in) neither in (the) consistency in itself and in general, nor in the adequate correlation of (the) end/goal and (the) means with each other (Gerade die Peripetien der (praxeologischen) Konsistenz innerhalb der inkonsistenten Wirklichkeit sowie der ständige gegenseitige Stellungswechsel von Zweck und Mitteln lassen erkennen, daß die anthropologische und sozialontologische Dimension der Rationalität weder in der Konsistenz an sich und überhaupt, noch in der adäquaten Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander aufgeht). Behind these indispensable, but partial performances and achievements, accomplishments stands/is the performance-achievement of all performances-achievements, upon which the

⁵ See Ch. IV , footnote 445.

chances and prospects of self-preservation itself depend; it is a matter of the performance-achievement of (the) general orientation, which exactly determines what on each and every respective occasion is regarded as (the) end/goal and what as (the) means (Hinter diesen unentbehrlichen, aber partiellen Leistungen steht die Leistung aller Leistungen, von der die Chancen der Selbsterhaltung selbst abhängen: Es geht um die Leistung der allgemeinen Orientierung, die eben bestimmt, was jeweils als Konsistenz, was als Zweck und was als Mittel zu gelten hat). Rationality is, accordingly, the performance-achievement and (cap)ability (in respect) of the orientation of a being, which has outgrown (surpassed and risen above) the secure, safe and fast, rapid, but too narrow orientation in the schema of behaviour (or behavioural schema) (of) “stimulus-reaction” (Rationalität ist demnach die Orientierungsleistung oder -fähigkeit eines Wesens, welches über die sichere und schnelle, aber zu enge Orientierung am Verhaltensschema „Stimulus-Reaktion“ hinausgewachsen ist).

What was said hitherto over/about/regarding (the) origins, features, characteristics and performances, achievements and accomplishments of rationality constitutes (an) anthropological thought/intellectual good, i.e. body of thought(s) (Gedankengut) and can also/even refer and relate to the individual human to the extent that this (individual human) is imagined in (the/a) lonely and solitary struggle against the objective (representational and concrete) world (in einsamen Kampf gegen die gegenständliche Welt). The actual social-ontological dimension comes into play as soon as we explain (elucidate, expound and explicate) the fundamental, basic concepts (postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, correlation of (the) end/goal and (the) means with each other, consistency, orientation) introduced above, from the point of view and through / by means of the dynamic(s) of the social relation (Die eigentliche sozialontologische Dimension kommt ins Spiel, sobald wir die oben eingeführten Grundbegriffe (Aufschub der Befriedigung, Korrelierung von

Zweck und Mitteln miteinander, Konsistenz, Orientierung) aus der Sicht und durch die Dynamik der sozialen Beziehung erläutern). This conceptual distinction certainly does not mean that the anthropological dimension can have existence without the social-ontological (dimension). The anthropological Robinson, who as human nature, grows into (the) culture in/during his struggle against the objective (representational and concrete), rests and is based on a fiction (Diese begriffliche Unterscheidung heißt gewiß nicht, daß die anthropologische Dimension ohne die sozialontologische Bestand haben kann. Der anthropologische Robinson, der in die Kultur als menschliche Natur bei seinem Kampf gegen die gegenständliche Welt hineinwächst, beruht auf einer Fiktion). The correlation between end/goal and means with (regard to) each other, which in accordance with this fiction was supposed to have encouraged and fostered already in one such solitary, lonely struggle, (the) rationality, has been / was in reality a collective performance, achievement and accomplishment, and it is still (always so/thus) (Die Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander, die gemäß dieser Fiktion schon in einem solch einsamen Kampf der Rationalität Vorschub geleistet haben soll, ist in Wirklichkeit eine kollektive Leistung gewesen, und sie ist es noch immer). Many animals/beasts live collectively and know, in fact, (of) elementary forms of the distribution of the means of subsistence for the preservation of the weaker adherents to, i.e. members of the herd, even though here the rule is that every normal animal/beast in the herd must look after, provide for, see to and take care of the/its own food, nourishment and sustenance alone (Viele Tiere leben kollektiv und kennen sogar elementare Formen der Verteilung von Subsistenzmitteln zur Erhaltung der schwächeren Angehörigen der Herde, wenn auch hier die Regel ist, daß jedes normale Tier in der Herde für die eigene Nahrung allein sorgen muß). But only men (i.e. humans) *work and labour* (act) already as the most primitive of hunters together, in order to *produce* the means of subsistence of the group in which they must / have to live, something which

the collective dealing with the problem of the correlation of the end / goal and means with (regard to) each other demands (Aber nur Menschen *arbeiten* (handeln) schon als primitivste Jäger zusammen, um die Subsistenzmittel der Gruppe, in der sie leben müssen, zu *produzieren*, was die kollektive Bewältigung des Problems der Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander erfordert). The social relation, into which (the) men (i.e. humans) in and during the collective production of their means of subsistence step (i.e. enter), demands, requires and promotes, encourages and fosters, simultaneously, both rationality as well as the distribution of these same means of subsistence, during and in which, very soon, the biological points of view step, i.e. go behind and take a back seat (and concede territory (as prominence)) to the social (points of view) (Die soziale Beziehung, in die die Menschen bei der kollektiven Produktion ihrer Subsistenzmittel treten, erfordern und fördern zugleich ebenso Rationalität wie die Verteilung dieser selben Subsistenzmittel, bei der sehr bald die biologischen Gesichtspunkte hinter die sozialen zurücktreten). Thus, the member of the human group develops and exercises, practises in the framework of the co-operative or antagonistic social relation both technical rationality, which he can then use also in situations which he alone has to deal and cope with, manage and overcome the forces of nature, as well as social rationality, namely, one such (rationality) having to (re)solve the question and problem of the postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction, the correlation of end/goal and means with (regard to) each other, (the) consistency etc. exclusively or mainly and first and foremost with regard to men (i.e. humans), and not to the objective (representational and concrete) world (So entwickelt und übt das Mitglied der menschlichen Gruppe im Rahmen der kooperativen oder antagonistischen sozialen Beziehung sowohl technische Rationalität, die es dann auch in Situationen gebrauchen kann, die es allein gegen die Kräfte der Natur bewältigen muß, als auch soziale Rationalität, nämlich eine solche, die Fragen des Aufschubs der Befriedigung, der

Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander, der Konsistenz etc. ausschließlich oder vornehmlich im Hinblick auf Menschen und nicht auf die gegenständliche Welt zu lösen hat).

In actual fact: the levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not remain uninfluenced by whether the actors must get over and cope with a situation whose outcome depends on a neutral factor like (the) nature, or (by whether the actors must get over and cope) with such a (situation) in which the (kinds of) acting, actions and acts of other actors with different preferences stamp, mould and form the outcome⁶. But rationality is needed in both cases (In der Tāt: Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade der Rationalität bleiben nicht davon unbeeinflusst, ob der Akteur mit einer Situation fertig werden muß, deren Ausgang von einem neutralen Faktor wie der Natur abhängt, oder mit einer solchen, in der Handlungen anderer Akteure mit unterschiedlichen Präferenzen den Ausgang prägen. Aber Rationalität tut in beiden Fällen not). It would undoubtedly be false to modify and to widen the Cartesian thesis (in respect) of the impossibility of the subjection, subordination and subjugation of historical and “irrational” stuff (i.e. subject matter and material) (there) under/in a strict science, [[in order to argue that]] rational action (rationales Handeln) can take place and happen only (there) where the object of action (der Gegenstand des Handelns) behaves and is in itself passive and consequently permits accurate and precise calculus (i.e. calculation). As Vico already objected, method does not have a single form (shape), but both its basic and fundamental forms, the “geometric” and the “historical” must exist next to each other⁷. In the same way, rational action stretches both in (the) “geometrically” as well as in (the) historically-socially apprehended field, whereby and in relation to which, though, the change of its levels, forms and degrees not only goes back to and is

⁶ Cf. Rapoport, “Various Meanings”, p. 45.

⁷ In relation to that, Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 436ff..

reduced to the change of/in the field and in regard to its specific constitution, composition and texture (nature) (und im Hinblick auf dessen spezifische Beschaffenheit), but also can take place inside of the same field. The pressure of rationality, to which the socially acting (person) is exposed, is second to none, and just as the transition from behaviour to action in general demands and requires higher performances, achievements and accomplishments of rationality, so too that category of action which is called social action and is concretised in the social relation par excellence, very often demands and requires outstanding and top-class rational performances, accomplishments and achievements. Rationality goes and passes and runs (right) through, in other words, social action more deeply than action in general, and action in (the) solitude (seclusion, isolation and loneliness), i.e. in the struggle against nature, turns out to be all the more rational on average(,) the more thorough (i.e. methodical and systematic) equipment the actor brings with him from his social action, to which, though, belongs learning from other (people) too (Der Rationalitätsdruck, dem der sozial Handelnde ausgesetzt ist, steht keinem anderen nach, und wie der Übergang vom Verhalten zum Handeln im allgemeinen höhere Rationalitätsleistungen erfordert, so erfordert auch jene Kategorie des Handelns, die soziales Handeln heißt und sich in der sozialen Beziehung par excellence konkretisiert, sehr oft rationale Spitzenleistungen. Rationalität durchzieht m. a. W. soziales Handeln tiefer als Handeln überhaupt, und Handeln in der Einsamkeit, z. B. im Kampf gegen die Natur, fällt durchschnittlich um so rationaler aus, eine je gründlichere Ausstattung der Akteur von seinem sozialen Handeln her mitbringt, zu dem allerdings auch Lernen von anderen gehört). The social compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress towards and as regards rationality has as the/its/a consequence that the socially acting (person) either puts, moves back and defers that which in each and every respective situation and position, one way or another, is classed or classified as “irrational”, in order to then secretly (in

secret, privily, privately) savour it (or enjoy it to the full) in seclusion, solitude and isolation or in the safety and security of the imagination, or else, decidedly sets and puts (it) aside as socially harmful, detrimental, damaging, injurious, noxious, destructive and pernicious, and, hence, worthy of hate (i.e. hateful, odious and detestable); this is, though, only the generally observable tendency, which expresses and conveys little about or regarding (the) level, form and degree of that putting and moving back and deferring and setting or putting aside in each and every individual case (Der soziale Zwang zur Rationalität hat zur Folge, daß der sozial Handelnde das, was in der jeweiligen Lage so oder so als „irrational“ eingestuft wird, entweder zurückstellt, um es dann insgeheim in der Abgeschlossenheit bzw. in der Sicherheit der Einbildungskraft auszukosten, oder aber entschieden als sozial schädlich und daher hassenswert beiseitelegt; dies ist allerdings nur die allgemein beobachtbare Tendenz, die wenig über Ebene, Gestalt und Grad jenes Zurückstellens oder Beiseitelegens in jedem einzelnen Fall aussagt). As we shall see immediately (straight away), precisely the effect and impact of the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality enables in the social relation that difference between psychological motivation and reasons (or grounds) of/for acting, action or the act, which is so important praxeologically. From that, a fundamental and basic anthropological and social-ontological conclusion can be drawn (Wie wir gleich sehen werden, ermöglicht gerade die Wirkung des Rationalitätszwanges in der sozialen Beziehung jene Differenz zwischen psychologischer Motivation und Handlungsgründen, die praxeologisch so wichtig ist. Daraus läßt sich eine grundsätzliche anthropologische und sozialontologische Folge ziehen). The theses “the actor is rational” and “the actor acts rationally” are not necessarily, and, in any case, not in their whole range, scope or to their entire extent identical with each other; just as little do the sentences (tenets or theorems) “(the) man (as (a) genus, kind, type or species (race)) is rational” and “the actor (as this concrete actor) is rational” logically correspond, tally and coincide (with

each other) (Die Thesen „der Akteur ist rational“ und „der Akteur handelt rational“ sind nicht notwendig und jedenfalls nicht in ihrem ganzen Umfang miteinander identisch; genausowenig decken sich logisch die Sätze „der Mensch (als Gattung) ist rational“ und „der Akteur (als dieser konkrete Akteur) ist rational“). The actor does not have to be rational in any dispositional or ethical sense in order to hear and listen to the voice of (the) (social, not necessarily of (the) biological) self-preservation and bow, yield and submit happily, gladly and cheerfully or with gritted teeth (grudgingly, muttering under one's breath) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation, and (the) rationality as (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) says, for its part, in itself little as regards / regarding in which manner and with which intensity the actor hears and listens to that voice (Der Akteur muß nicht in irgendeinem dispositionellen oder ethischen Sinne rational sein, um die Stimme der (sozialen, nicht unbedingt der biologischen) Selbsterhaltung zu hören und sich dem Rationalitätszwang der sozialen Beziehung froh oder zähneknirschend zu beugen, und die Rationalität als anthropologische Anlage besagt ihrerseits an sich wenig darüber, in welcher Weise und mit welcher Intensität der Akteur jene Stimme hört). Individual convictions regarding (the) value and (the) un-value (i.e. anti-value or non-value) (Wert und Unwert) of (the) rationality as (the) guiding principle of action (als Richtschnur des Handelns) are also slightly (or next to not at all) informative, instructive, illuminating and enlightening regarding the presumed, probable or likely mode or manner of acting, action or of the act of an actor, if we disregard the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation. Whoever confesses faith in principle in rationalism, is not *because of that and accordingly* eo ipso in a position to confront, face, counter or check the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation more skillfully than the world-theoretical

“irrationalist” (Wer sich grundsätzlich zum Rationalismus bekennt, ist nicht *deshalb* eo ipso imstande, dem Rationalitätszwang der sozialen Beziehung geschickter zu begegnen als der weltanschauliche „Irrationalist“). And the same applies to whole societies and epochs: the symbolic-world-theoretical confession of faith in, and acknowledgement of, rationality (Das symbolisch-weltanschauliche Bekenntnis zur Rationalität) does not in the least vouch for and guarantee the rational handling and the rationally desirable outcome of collective action (die rationale Handhabung und den rational wünschenswerten Ausgang kollektiven Handelns)⁸.

If (the) world-theoretical convictions (Wenn weltanschauliche Überzeugungen) here only count on the edge (i.e. marginally as borderline cases), thus one may, on the other hand, not deny that on/with/against the background of rationality as (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) (auf der Folie der Rationalität als anthropologischer Anlage), from individual to individual, smaller or larger/greater dispositional differences with reference to the capacity and (cap)ability for rational social action are to be ascertained. Nonetheless, the stronger compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of (the) rationality and (in respect) of (the) disciplining of the social relation (der stärkere Rationalitäts- und Disziplinierungszwang der sozialen Beziehung) is shown and is seen exactly in (the fact) that deep dispositions also have an effect and impact all the more effectively, the more empty of content, that is to say, (the) more capable they are of following hot and hard on the heels of the unending and infinite content-related changes of the social relation, which command strategic and tactical watchfulness, alertness and vigilance (auch tiefe Dispositionen um so effektiver wirken, je inhaltsleerer, also fähiger sie sind, den unendlichen inhaltlichen Wandlungen der sozialen Beziehung, die strategische und taktische

⁸ More about / in relation to that under/in Bc in this section.

Wachsamkeit gebieten, auf den Fersen zu folgen). The social relation determines the fundamental data towards which (the) dispositions orientate themselves and simultaneously must be refined. Rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act does not simply flow from the once and for all given weatherproof (i.e. fixed and unchanging) template, pattern or stereotype of a disposition (Die soziale Beziehung bestimmt der grundlegenden Daten, an denen sich Dispositionen orientieren und zugleich verfeinern müssen.

Handlungsrationalität fließt nicht einfach aus der ein für allemal gegebenen wetterfesten Schablone einer Disposition), rather it is shaped, formed, moulded and changes constantly under the harder or softer compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress of the social relation; its (i.e. rationality's) levels, forms and degrees are subject to the fluctuations of the same (social relation), and exactly because of that, it (i.e. rationality) escapes, eludes or evades and is beyond a definitive and a generally valid and applicable, i.e. abstract apprehension: in relation to that (said definitive and generally valid, i.e. abstract apprehension of rationality), the great variety and multiformity of the social relation is simply too broad and too unforeseeable. The social relation provides and makes (up) the training area or ground of (the) rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act (Die soziale Beziehung gibt den Übungsplatz der Handlungsrationalität ab), and under (i.e. in regard to) its aspects, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Perspektivenübernahme) is, i.e. ought to be named in particular. The social-ontological necessity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (Die sozialontologische Notwendigkeit der Perspektivenübernahme) sets (the) rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act in permanent motion, so that the rational actor (der rationale Akteur) does not look at and handle his milieu as a constant (sein Milieu nicht als eine Konstante), but founds his action on the anticipation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, (in respect) of which he knows that it, likewise, rests and is based on the (cap)ability of anticipating

alien (i.e. another's or others') action through and by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives⁹. Since, however, the latter (anticipation of alien action) is an emotional identification of the I (ego) (eine emotionale Identifizierung des Ich) with the Other (dem Anderen), thus, it can pass off, happen and take place as (a) reflexive act (als reflexiver Akt) only to the extent or in as much it assumes rationality on both sides. The Ego (Das Ego) can hardly put itself/himself in (and or empathises with) the position of the Other (in die Lage des Anderen hineinversetzen), if it does not assume (unless it assumes) a somewhat or reasonably consistent interrelation between its ends/goals and means, motives or else grounds, reasons and action plans (or designs, projects, outlines or blueprints in respect of acting and the act) (wenn es nicht einen einigermaßen konsistenten Zusammenhang zwischen dessen Zwecken und Mitteln, Motiven bzw. Gründen und Handlungsentwürfen annimmt) (inconsistency (Inkonsistenz) can indeed be taken into account as (a) possibility; it, however, cannot be guessed in advanced through and by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives how and when it (i.e. inconsistency) will manifest itself); and whilst the Ego assumes the rationality of the Other in this sense, it (the said Ego) itself carries out and executes rational thought acts or acts of thought (rationale Denkakte), it itself practises and exercises (in the) rationality or subjects and subjugates itself nolens volens (i.e. whether wanting or liking or not) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality. It (i.e. the said Ego) can just as little detach itself and break free from, or evade, elude, dodge that (compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality) as it can live away from or out of every social relation. Because it does not have at its disposal any other access to the Other, which could

⁹ Cf. the distinction between “parametrically rational actor” and “strategically rational actor” in Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 18ff..

guarantee and ensure it somewhat or reasonably reliable, dependable or trustworthy orientation; even as (a) recognisedly approximative solution or stopgap (provisional, temporary or expedient) solution, the assumption or adoption and acceptance of rationality (Rationalitätsannahme) promises in principle to be led (i.e. to go) the furthest. (The) Social experience in fact teaches the actor soon (enough) that rational action, which in the praxeological sense shows and exhibits consistency, correlates end/goal and means adequately with each other, [[and]] postpones (puts off, delays and defers) immediate and direct pleasure (delight, enjoyment, consumption) (unmittelbaren Genuß aufschiebt) etc., as a rule is worth(while) (or worth the effort). In light of this rule, (behind which stands and is the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race) as (a) rational animal,) hence alien action (i.e. the action of another or others) must normally be comprehended, especially since the greatest danger for the (one's) own plans (in respect) of acting, action or the act (Handlungspläne) comes from the rationally planned counter-actors (von rational [= rational] planenden Gegenakteuren ausgeht), who are in a position to formulate wishes as existential settings (or positionings) (als Existentialsetzungen) and judgements, i.e. to support and back them up through and by means of analyses of the situation and position near/close to reality and corresponding instructions (in respect) of acting, action and the act. What disturbs, bothers, annoys and perturbs inimical wishes is not their content in itselfⁱⁱⁱ, but the image or picture which we ourselves make of the situation and position after their (i.e. the said inimical wishes') possible or potential realisation; the slighter or less the (cap)ability of the Other to reach, attain and achieve through rational action his wishes, so much the smaller the felt and perceived threat and enmity. Assuming the Other's rationality, the Ego starts wisely or for good reason from the conceivably worst case when the Other is (a) foe; on the other hand, from the conceivably best (case), when he (i.e. the Other) is counted and reckoned under, i.e. amongst (the Ego's) friends. In both

cases, the Ego can err; nevertheless, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality remains (lasts and persists), no matter at which level, in which form and to which degree the potential (or capacity) for rationality (Rationalitätspotential) is made topical or updated on each and every respective occasion.

The social-ontological necessity of looking at the social relation irrespective of the motives of the actors under, i.e. from (a) rational point of view, and as being practised as (an) exercise in rationality, is shown and seen quite clearly, graphically and vividly in the habit, routine, practice or custom of the most primitive tribes (an der Gewohnheit primitiver Stämme) to interpret even animal behaviour (or the behaviour of animals and beasts) anthropomorphically-rationally¹⁰; it (i.e. the said social-ontological necessity of ...) was, incidentally, already in antiquity, clearly apprehended theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory)¹¹. Rationality exists as (the) not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. indispensable) concomitant or accompaniment of the social relation, as (a) condition and at the same time (an) outflow, i.e. outcome of the same (social relation); action becomes rational only (there) where it crisscrosses or intersects with action (Rationalität existiert als nicht wegzudenkende Begleiterscheinung der sozialen Beziehung, als Bedingung und zugleich Ausfluß derselben; rational wird Handeln erst da, wo es sich mit Handeln kreuzt). And the thesis that

¹⁰ See e.g. Sliberbauer, "Hunter/Gatherers", p. 465ff..

¹¹ The great speeches (orations and addresses), which Thucydides is able to hold for (i.e. give to) the protagonists of his history are, before the many-sided background of the description of a situation and position (in respect) of unsurpassable and matchless reconstructions of rational action plans (or designs, projects, outlines or blueprints in respect of acting and the act), reconstructions of the rationality of the actors or else of the foes, and imply general anthropological and social-ontological ascertainments. In the course of this, the author (i.e. Thucydides), knowing better retrospectively, helps his persons (i.e. characters (in his history)) to / with more rationality, by him, indeed, keeping, as he writes, "as closely as possible to the overall meaning of what was actually said (möglichst eng an den Gesamtsinn des tatsächlich Gesagten) [*ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων*]]", simultaneously, however, he renders the(ir) speeches thus "as in accordance with my opinion every individual had to most likely speak about each and every available / existing case, i.e. as I thought each individual was most likely to speak about the case at hand (wie meiner Meinung nach jeder einzelne über den jeweils vorliegenden Fall am ehesten sprechen mußte)" [*«ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.»*]] (I, 22, 1).

understanding of alien (i.e. another's or others') action implies – at least at a certain level, in a certain form and to a certain degree – the assumption and adoption of (the) rationality on the part of the Ego and of the Other, obtains and preserves its actual sense/meaning only when it (i.e. the aforesaid thesis) is interpreted from (the point of view of) the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation (wenn sie vom Spektrum und dem Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung her gedeutet wird). The thus attained and achieved rational interpretation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, which at the same time subjects and subjugates one's own thinking (thought) and acting (action) (Denken und Handeln) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality, contains, though, abstractions and narrowings (shortenings, curtailments, abridgements or reductions) (Abstraktionen und Verkürzungen), which in a gapless (i.e. complete and unbroken) psychological reconstruction of alien (i.e. another's or others') action (if one such (complete psychological reconstruction) were in general possible) might not or should and ought not to have occurred (been found, come forward, had any place). Under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality, the interpretation of acting, action and of the act shifts and is displaced from (the) motivation to the grounds and reasons for action, so that this (action), without precise and detailed knowledge of its psychical aetiology appears to be sufficiently understandable for the ends/goals and purposes of the social relation (ohne genaue Kenntnis seiner psychischen Ätiologie für die Zwecke der sozialen Beziehung ausreichend verständlich erscheint)¹². Irrespective of the objective and factual correctness (accuracy, rightness and veracity) of this understanding (Ungeachtet der sachlichen Richtigkeit dieses Verständnisses), which from case to case can be very different, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress

¹² Cf. Davidson, *Essays*, pp. 231ff., 237.

(in respect) of rationality causes, effects, effectuates and brings about, in any case, a de-psychologisation, and to that extent, an objectification or objectivisation of the way of looking at things, as well as, possibly, of the action of the person looking at things in such a way (bewirkt der Rationalitätszwang jedenfalls eine Entpsychologisierung und insofern eine Objektivierung der Betrachtung sowie wahrscheinlich auch des Handelns des derart Betrachtenden). The attention is now directed mainly / first and foremost to the objective sense and meaning of (the) action (auf den objektiven Sinn des Handelns), i.e. to the putative or probable effect, impact, consequence, repercussion or implication of the same (action) on the course (of events) and (the) shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation (die vermutlichen Auswirkungen desselben auf Ablauf und Gestaltung der sozialen Beziehung). Naturally, in the course of this – at least in some cases – over and above and beyond the grounds and reasons of and for action, its (i.e. action's) motives must be taken into consideration; their (i.e. the said motives') analysis more or less contrasts with and stands out from, nevertheless, under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of the rationality of the social relation, a psychological (analysis). Even (then) when (the) Ego regards and holds the Other to be “crazy, mad, nuts, insane, loony, mentally ill” („verrückt“), and consequently makes or passes an – in practice – slightly helpful judgement over or about his (i.e. the Other's) motivation, he (i.e. the Ego) must trace and track down the logic of this craziness, madness, insanity, looniness and mental illness (die Logik dieser Verrücktheit) in the action of the Other in order to cope, deal with and get over this action in the reality of the social relation (um mit diesem Handeln in der Realität der sozialen Beziehung fertig zu werden). The logic of the action and the qualitatively, ethically etc. understood reason (Reason) of the actor are two ((very) different) things (Die Logik des Handelns und die qualitativ, ethisch etc. verstandene Vernunft des Akteurs sind zweierlei); the former (logic of the action) must be taken earnestly

(i.e. seriously), regardless of what one holds (i.e. considers, thinks) (in respect) of the latter (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood reason/Reason of the actor). That is why rationality keeps an eye on, i.e. bears in mind, that (logic of the action) rather than this (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood reason/Reason of the actor); the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality brings with it and entails the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of objectification or objectivisation (Rationalitätszwang bringt Objektivierungszwang mit sich). And the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of objectification or objectivisation does not make itself noticeable only in and during the (relative) neglect of the motivation and or of the Reason of the actor for the sake of the logic of his action inside of and within the social relation (Und der Objektivierungszwang macht sich nicht nur bei der (relativen) Vernachlässigung der Motivation bzw. Vernunft des Akteurs zugunsten der Logik seines Handelns innerhalb der sozialen Beziehung bemerkbar). No less does it (i.e. the said compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of objectification or objectivisation) have less of an effect when the individual stands across from, faces, confronts and is up against the impersonal logic of his society (der unpersönlichen Logik seiner Gesellschaft), as this (impersonal logic of his society) is crystallised or crystallises in (the) customs (conventions, manners or morals) and the everyday (kinds of) self-understanding(s), in the forms of dealing with others (i.e. manners, etiquette and behaviour(s) in public) and institutional constructs (wie sich diese in Sitten und alltäglichen Selbstverständlichkeiten, in Umgangsformen und institutionellen Gebilden kristallisiert). Social order, whatever it looks like and however it seems (to be), constitutes condensed, thickened and compressed rationality, it (i.e. social order) is comprehended as rationality and educates (brings up, trains, disciplines) or compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[people, humans]] towards rationality (Soziale Ordnung, wie auch immer sie aussieht,

bildet verdichtete Rationalität, sie wird als Rationalität aufgefaßt und erzieht oder zwingt zur Rationalität)¹³.

The social relation as (a) relation amongst (i.e. between) beings or creatures, whose nature is culture, whose kinds of acting, actions and acts are therefore connected and bound to sense, i.e. meaning, lends or gives to, or confers upon and grants to rationality still further dimensions or forms (Die soziale Beziehung als Beziehung unter Wesen, deren Natur die Kultur ist, deren Handlungen also mit Sinn verbunden werden, verleiht der Rationalität noch weitere Dimensionen oder Formen). The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction and (the) consistency in its connection with meaning, which originally came into being in the social relation, [[and]] only in it (i.e. the social relation) exists [that said meaning] and hence is by definition social meaning, become and turn into [i.e. the said postponement of satisfaction and consistency in its connection with meaning] ethical and logical values, which the individual can invoke (or to which the individual can appeal) in order to legitimise his own kinds of acting, actions or acts, or to condemn alien (i.e. another's or others') (kinds of acting, actions or acts), in other words, in order to better assert and defend and maintain himself in the social relation (Der Aufschub der Befriedigung und die Konsistenz werden in ihrer Verbindung mit Sinn, der ursprünglich in der sozialen Beziehung entsteht, nur in ihr besteht und daher definitionsgemäß sozialer Sinn ist, zu ethischen oder logischen Werten, worauf sich das Individuum berufen kann, um eigene Handlungen zu legitimieren oder fremde zu verurteilen, m.a.W. um sich in der sozialen Beziehung besser zu behaupten). The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction obviously takes place not only due to (the) objectively existing shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods (wegen objektiv bestehender Güterknappheit), which in an otherwise neutral milieu (i.e. surroundings, environment or setting) is supposed or ought

¹³ Cf. Diesing, *Reason in Society*, p. 236ff..

to be overcome through and by means of productive labour/work (die in einem ansonsten neutralen Milieu durch produktive Arbeit überwunden werden soll), but also and above all due to subjective considerations (wegen subjektiver Rücksichten), which step into appearance, i.e. appear only in the social relation. The presence of other(s) (people, actors), who have the same claim on and (in regard) to satisfaction, compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[the actor]] towards postponement (deferment and delay), and only through and by means of (the) mutual and reciprocal consideration, or at least through and by means of an ethic(s) of mutuality and reciprocity, if at all, independent initiatives and single-handed efforts are and ought to be put off and discouraged (or: [actors] are and ought to be dissuaded from independent initiatives and single-handed efforts) (von egoistischen Alleingängen abzubringen sind). Generally, it applies that the postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction as (the) compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality is shaped, moulded and formed depending on with whom one has [[something]] to do (or with whom one is dealing) [[and]] in which situation and position (Generell gilt, daß sich der Aufschub der Befriedigung als Rationalitätszwang je nachdem gestaltet, mit wem man in welcher Lage zu tun hat). For its part, consistency is connected with ethical and logical meaning, as soon as the – through and by means of it (i.e. the said consistency) – guaranteed and ensured (cap)ability (in respect) of/at orientation is concretised in an individual or collective identity (die durch sie gewährleistete Orientierungsfähigkeit in einer individuellen oder kollektiven Identität konkretisiert), which wants to be saved beyond the changes of/in the social relation, and it often can [[do that/be thus saved]] too. However, (a/the) consistent identity (Konsistente Identität) to (an), in practice, sufficient extent does not constitute only an inner/internal (necessity), but also an outer/external necessity, which stems from the general social need of holding (i.e. keeping and maintaining) the constitutive imponderability (incalculability) of (the)

subjectivity (die konstitutive Unberechenbarkeit der Subjektivität) within bound(arie)s and limits, i.e. of making and rendering the social action of the members of society ponderable (calculable) and in this respect/as far as that goes “rational” (d. h. das soziale Handeln der Mitglieder der Gesellschaft berechenbar und insofern „rationaler“); the social ethics of all cultures have hitherto denounced and pilloried the opportunists and the turncoats or quick-change artists (i.e. renegades, apostates, traitors, defectors and deserters), no matter what the social praxis/practice looked like and what the [then] current doctrine and teaching of prudence and wisdom read/sounded/said/was (die Sozialethiken aller Kulturen haben bisher den Opportunisten und den Wendehals angeprangert, gleichviel, wie die soziale Praxis aussah und die geläufige Klugheitslehre lautete). The compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality under the conditions and circumstances of culture, i.e. under the conditions and circumstances of obligatory meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) finds expression, finally, in the performances, achievements and accomplishments (in respect) of rationalisation and of legitimisation (legitimising, legitimation), which accompany inner/internal and outer/external action at every turn (step of the way). To the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of rationality, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress (in respect) of sense/meaning leads here, i.e. to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress for meaning to be articulated socially effectively (Der Rationalitätszwang unter den Bedingungen der Kultur, d. h. unter den Bedingungen obligatorischer Sinnhaftigkeit schlägt sich schließlich in den Rationalisierungs- und Legitimierungsleistungen nieder, die inneres und äußeres Handeln auf Schritt und Tritt begleiten. Zum Rationalitätszwang führt hier der Sinnzwang, d. h. der Zwang, Sinn sozial wirksam zu artikulieren). The social relation remains also in this respect decisive and determinative. Because

rationalisations and legitimisations in foro interno or in foro externo (i.e. internally as to one's own conscience or externally as to how others judge us) are needed because anyone and everyone calls into question or can call into question the action of the actor exactly in (regard to) its (i.e. the said actor's action's) meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) (Die soziale Beziehung bleibt auch in dieser Hinsicht maßgeblich. Denn Rationalisierungen und Legitimierungen in foro interno oder in foro externo tun deshalb not, weil jemand anders das Handeln des Akteurs eben in seiner Sinnhaftigkeit in Frage stellt oder stellen kann). (The) Socialisation consists not least of all (therein) in of one learning to act not instinctively, but with (rational and reasoned) justification, that is to say, to put down and reduce (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts to reasons, and through and by means of reasons legitimise ((kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts), irrespective of whether this often amounts and is tantamount to in concreto (i.e. concretely) the mere rationalisation of one's own motivation towards the inside (inwardly) and towards the outside (outwardly) (Die Sozialisierung besteht nicht zuletzt darin zu erlernen, wie man nicht instinktiv, sondern begründet handelt, also Handlungen auf Gründe zurückführt und durch Gründe legitimiert, gleichgültig, ob dies oft in concreto der bloßen Rationalisierung der eigenen Motivation nach innen und nach außen gleichkommt). In the statement and specification of the reasons and grounds for (one's) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, a wish (in respect) of justification (ein Rechtfertigungswunsch) or else the wish, "to anticipate a challenge to our actions"¹⁴ is expressed.

Through and by means of / With these general remarks, observations and comments, we have hopefully indicated, implied, suggested (hinted at, intimated) the breadth of the examination of the problem of rationality (Rationalitätsproblematik). A direct or indirect reduction of rationality to (the)

¹⁴ Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes", pp. 12ff., 7 (the citation/quote/quotation here).

so-called “end-goal and purposeful/expedient rationality (or rationality (in respect) of an end/goal)” („Zweckrationalität“), i.e. to the adequate correlation of end/goal and means with each other, proves itself to be too one-sided and narrow in order to fulfil, meet, be up to or comply with the phenomenon [of rationality] even only in terms of its beginnings, i.e. elementarily. From the perspective of the social relation, on the other hand, all essential dimensions of rationality simultaneously appear ((be)come/are into appearance) and can be dealt with, treated and handled as (an) in itself differentiated unit(y) (uniformity or unified whole) (und können als in sich differenzierte Einheit behandelt werden). Ends and goals are always relative, since they relate and refer to (the) ends and goals or, in any case, activities of other men (humans, people); their realisation aims at the consolidation (strengthening and stabilisation) or modification of a social relation. Rational performances, achievements and accomplishments do not merely demand their attainment and achievement and accomplishment through and by means of certain means, but likewise their justification and legitimisation / legitimising, which, again, refer to (the) meaning as (the) constitutive element of (a) world theory (i.e. world view) and (an) identity; inseparable from them (the said world theory/view and identity) are (the) argumentative-theoretical and psychological processes of rationalisation (Rationale Leistungen erfordern nicht bloß ihre Erreichung durch bestimmte Mittel, sondern ebenso ihre Begründung und Legitimierung, welche wiederum auf den Sinn als konstitutives Element von Weltanschauung und Identität verweisen; davon sind argumentativ-theoretische und psychologische Rationalisierungsprozesse unzertrennlich). Instrumental (rationality), symbolic (rationality) and (the) rationality of identity^{iv} belong, anthropologically, social-ontologically and in concrete action together, may this or that amongst them (i.e. whichever one of them) dominate(s) and rule(s) and hold(s) sway over the scene on each and every respective occasion (Instrumentelle, symbolische und Identitätsrationalität gehören anthropologisch, sozialontologisch und im

konkreten Handeln zusammen, mag diese oder jene unter ihnen jeweils die Szene beherrschen). The relativisation, which befalls and happens to (the) instrumental rationality through and by means of its being put into order, classification and categorisation in the broader complex of rationality, is, though, by no means to be understood as (the) overcoming of the same (instrumental rationality) through and by means of one ethical-normative rationality overarching (spilling over, overlapping, spreading) over and into all facets of rationality (Die Relativierung, die der instrumentellen Rationalität durch ihre Einordnung in den breiteren Rationalitätskomplex widerfährt, ist allerdings keinesfalls als Überwindung derselben durch eine alle Facetten der Rationalität übergreifende ethisch-normative Rationalität zu verstehen). A unification of rationality can never succeed, neither under instrumental, nor under ethical points of view. It (i.e. the said unification of rationality) remains (a) matter, affair, cause and case or thing, business of (the) anthropology and of (the) social ontology. These (i.e. anthropology and social ontology) are, however, as (we have) said, ethically and technically blind (Eine Vereinheitlichung der Rationalität kann weder unter instrumentellen noch unter ethischen Gesichtspunkten je gelingen. Sie bleibt Sache der Anthropologie und der Sozialontologie. Diese sind aber, wie gesagt, ethisch und technisch blind).

b. The rationality of the means and the rationality of the ends/goals (Die Rationalität der Mittel und die Rationalität der Zwecke)

The correlation of the means and ends/goals with each other becomes or turns into, as we know, a problem, whose coping with, managing and getting over demands rational performances, achievements and accomplishments as soon as the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) satisfaction puts short-(term) or long-term goal/end-setting (the short- and long-term setting of a goal/end) and

planning on the agenda (or sets such short-term and long-term goal/end-setting as the order of the day) (sobald der Aufschub der Befriedigung kurz- oder langfristige Zwecksetzungen und Planungen auf die Tagesordnung setzt). But it (i.e. the said short-term and long-term goal/end-setting) is only in simple cases simple, namely only (then) when the end/goal is clearly delineable (traceable; umreißbar) and realisable when the means exclusively apply to, and are valid for, the pursuit and pursuance of the end/goal, and when neither the attaining and achievement of the end/goal, nor the application of the means trigger, set and spark off and bring on or cause unforeseeable and uncontrollable effects and impacts. Only in such cases can a theory of rationality be developed with security, safety, reliability and certainty – under the condition or provided that, that is to say, it (i.e. the said theory of rationality) moves (with)in quite / pretty / fairly narrow bound(arie)s, otherwise it does not make do and it does not manage without a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) (Kasuistik) which covers the main variations regarding or concerning the constitution, composition and texture and its own dynamic(s) of end/goal and means, as well as regarding or concerning their possible correlations (Korrelierungen) with each other (i.e. of the said end/goal and means). This casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) serves, though, theoretical ends/goals, it does not describe, represent, reflect or convey the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of really (i.e. in reality) planned and executed, carried out and performed kinds of acting, actions and acts, but rather the deviations, divergences (digressions and departures) of real processes from the planned (processes); the uncontrollable disharmonies between end/goal and means, which exactly came into being in and during (the) endeavour and effort of their harmonisation with each other. The ubiquity of the schema “end/goal-means” says little about the stringency with which it is – be it out/because of subjective inadequacies (deficiencies, shortcomings, failings), be it out / because of objective reasons (grounds) – handled, used, operated and dealt with.

But so that stringency is (But for stringency to be) in general possible and plannable, the simple case sketched above must be available (exist), which, though, has, in no case/way (under no circumstances), the simple presupposition and precondition that the assessment of the situation and position and (the) correlation of the end/goal with the means on the part of the actor completely and fully suffices for, and satisfies or fulfills, the real given (actual) facts (den realen Gegebenheiten). Not without good reason, Aristotle handled and treated the question and problem of this correlation by supposing and assuming the (cap)ability of the actor to know what stands/is in his power and from what to distance himself or refrain and desist, what, anyhow, lies outside of the range of his forces, strengths, energies and powers. In order to use the suitable and appropriate means effectively, one must, hence, be clear about the end/goal and its attainability or achievability (reachability)¹⁵. Not otherwise / differently, [[did]] Pareto [[think]], who defined the “logical kinds of acting, actions and acts (logischen Handlungen)” in accordance with two criteria: the absolute ponderability / calculability or (else) controllability of the end/goal, and, the determination of the end/goal on the basis of cool thought, consideration and logic (der absoluten Berechenbarkeit bzw. Kontrollierbarkeit des Zweckes und der Bestimmung des Zweckes auf der Basis kühler Überlegung und Logik). Whereas (Whilst) “not logical / non-logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts („nicht logische“ Handlungen) spring, originate and arise / come from a psychical state (of affairs) (einem psychischen Zustand), i.e. certain feelings (sentiments and emotions) (bestimmten Gefühlen) or unconscious motives (unbewußten Motiven), (the) “logical (logischen)” (kinds of acting, actions or acts) result from a “ragionamento”, an (argumentative) reasoning (line of

¹⁵ *Nikomachische Ethik*, III, 5 (1112b 13ff.) [[= «βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλείονων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἄν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατον ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ... » (12-20)]]

reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) (Raisonnement), and strive after and aim for a real and not merely imaginary end / goal, i.e. such an (end/goal) which belongs within the realm or area of observation and experience (der in den Bereich der Beobachtung und Erfahrung hineingehört); they (i.e. the said “logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts) consist in the use of means which are suitable for the attainment and achievement of the end/goal, and they connect, in (a) logically apt, appropriate and well-judged manner, means and end/goal with each other. Here (the) subjective (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) and objective existence of the deed or act(ion) (i.e. objective state of affairs, facts, circumstances, (whole) truth of the matter or facts of the case) (objektiver Tatbestand) coincide, even though the ascertainment regarding this coincidence must be made by an observer standing outside [of what is being observed] or by an outside / external observer (von einem außenstehenden Beobachter) who thinks “logically-experimentally”; because the actors believe, anyway, that they act logically¹⁶.

Pareto was convinced of the preponderance of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and or acts in social life, he, however, did not underestimate at all the social meaning of the “very delicate and fragile” logical (kinds of acting, actions and or acts), which he saw at work above all in the economic realm (area), but also in (the) artistic and scientific work / labour as well as in military, political and juridic(al), juristic, legal undertakings and enterprises (bei der künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Arbeit sowie bei militärischen, politischen und juristischen Unternehmungen am Werk sah)¹⁷. The weakness of his position does not lie in this division, assignment or apportionment of weights, i.e. loads or burdens (in dieser Einteilung der Gewichte), but in the

¹⁶ *Trattato*, §§ 150, 151, 161.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, § 152.

dichotomous way of looking at things, through and by means of which he gets to that or reaches and attains that (division or apportionment of loads). In the interest of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) sharp, strong and strict distinction between logical and non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, he (i.e. Pareto) did not think that the former (logical acts) have to lose their purity as soon as they overstep and exceed a relatively narrow action radius (or radius of action) (einen relativ Engen Aktionsradius) and can no longer manage or effect (a) clear and manageable correlation of end/goal and means with each other (und überschaubare Korrelierung von Zweck und Mitteln miteinander). Thus, he ascribes all/everything which does not represent and constitute (an/the) absolutely controllable practical result and or outcome of (a) logical-experimental (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) (absolut kontrollierbares praktisches Ergebnis logisch-experimentellen Rasonnements), to the effect and impact of not logical or non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, whereby and in relation to which he loses sight of the theoretically and socially weighty and heavy, i.e. important and influential possibility that logical kinds of acting, actions and acts *as such* (logische Handlungen *als solche*) long-term/over the long run do not necessarily have to entail logical consequences (logische Folgen), that, therefore, the social preponderance or predominance of the not logical or non-logical (das soziale Übergewicht des Nicht-Logischen) cannot be put down and reduced exclusively to the effect and impact of not logical or non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts (auf die Wirkung nicht logischer Handlungen). Through and by means of/With his precise distinction between “non-logical” and “illogical” kinds of acting, actions and acts (Durch seine präzise Unterscheidung zwischen „nicht logischen“ und „illogischen“ Handlungen), Pareto fully recognised the objective social logic of the – in (a) logical-experimental respect – non-logical (die objective soziale Logik des in logisch-experimenteller Hinsicht Nicht-Logischen); conversely, however, he did not want to cloud, muddy, dull, blur,

spoil or mar the logical kinds of acting, actions and acts through and by means of/with objective social non-logic (durch objective soziale Nicht-Logik). Faithful, loyal and devoted to his dichotomous way of looking at things, he did not systematically inquire and research into the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (logical) action (den unbeabsichtigten Folgen des (logischen) Handelns), and consequently made it known (or let it be known) that the pure schema of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts has *social* explanation-worth (is *socially* of worth and value as explanation) (*sozialen* Erklärungswert) only in the/its narrow version and (with)in the/a slight and short range, reach and scope (nur in der engen Fassung und in geringer Reichweite) – irrespective / regardless of its heuristic indispensability or its anthropological aspect (ungeachtet seiner heuristischen Unentbehrlichkeit oder seines anthropologischen Aspekts). (A) narrow version and (a) slight and short range, reach and scope means as much as (the) exclusion (or ruling out) of the time factor (or factor of/as regards time), because time is exactly the mother of the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (the) otherwise logical action. It (i.e. time) produces (causes, brings about and gives rise to) also all / everything which steps in and intervenes between end/goal and means, and makes their planned strict correlation with each other loose and slack or even destroys and annihilates (such planned strict correlation of end/goal and means), – with the result that action is tangled and caught up and embroiled and involved in a series of frictions which (it) often lead to a different riverbed (i.e. set of circumstances) (Strombett) than that wished for. The imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities; Unwägbarkeiten) in and during *logical* action (*logischen* Handeln) also stretch and extend to two levels, which appear in (i.e. during) the course of time; that (level) of the consequences after the attainment and achievement of the end/goal (a kind of acting, action and act can, therefore, be logical in itself, [[and]] be carried out and executed up until the/its planned

end as (the) logical kind of acting, action and act, and nonetheless, prove – in the flow or flux of (the) action – to be not logical or non-logical), and that (level) in and during the application of the means. Before the (i.e. what is) unforeseen and unexpected (Vor dem Unvorhergesehenen), the meticulous (pernickety or precise) remaining with/in absolute foreseeability (das penible Verbleiben beim absolut Vorhergesehenen) saves [the actor] in both cases, i.e. in and during the narrowest version of the schema “end/goal-means”. However, that does not always go that way/is not always the case, without losing essential and substantial chances and opportunities (in respect) of acting, action and the act; (the) immunity against every unwished-for side-effect is often or frequently bought (through and) by (means of) (the) slackening, flagging and waning (i.e. up to paralysis) of (the) action.

Before we turn to the rationality of (the) ends/goals and the consequences of attained and achieved or even not attainable and non-achievable ends/goals, we must touch upon an aspect of the examination of the problem of means (Mittelproblematik), regarding/about which Pareto, out of/for obvious reasons, could say little: we mean (the) momentum of the [[means’s]] own dynamic(s) and (of the [[means’s]] own) logic (die Eigendynamik und -logik), that is, the praxeological autonomisation of the means (die praxeologische Autonomisierung der Mittel). It is (so) obvious that (the) latter (praxeological autonomisation of the means), in and during the stringent, rigorous, compelling and tight version of the schema (:) “ends-means” must not occur and happen at all; here the means exclusively serve the end/goal, and (a) logical acting, action or act is portrayed and depicted exactly by the fact that it (i.e. the said logical acting, action or act) uses the (its) own or the best (or most) expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means (die besten zweckdienlichen Mittel) in and during the full maintenance, safeguarding and protection of the primacy of the end/goal. Put/Said otherwise / differently: the

rationality of the means as means is guaranteed and ensured when they (i.e. the said means) are not converted and transformed unofficially (privately, under the counter, on the side) and en route or on the way into ends and goals – whereas the rationality of the action as a whole (i.e. over and above, i.e. beyond, the individual acting, action and or act) could demand and require exactly this conversion and transformation; the latter (conversion or transformation) occurs, anyhow, without difficulties when other or different reasons command it, since things and kinds of acting, actions and acts, isolated and in themselves, are neither means nor ends/goals, but can become both (means and ends/goals): here we are dealing with functional, not with ontological attributes. The same conversion and transformation of (the) means into ends/goals is favoured (or aided (and abetted)), in addition, by the fact that the actor, in the course of this, does not have to think in new categories; the form-related (i.e. formal) rationality of the schema(:) “end/goal-means” remains unchanged and unmodified, the content(s) is/are only interchanged, substituted or replaced. But irrespective of what is regarded as (an) end/goal and what, on each and every respective occasion, (is regarded) as (the) means: means are only rational as long as they do not develop their own logic, and thereby bring consequences to light which more or less deviate, digress, diverge or differ from those (consequences) originally intended and aimed at, i.e. expected on the basis of the attainment and achievement of the original goal/end. Into the heterogony of ends (*An der Heterogonie der Zwecke*) – regardless of whether it (i.e. such heterogony of ends) comes into being through and by means of the means’ own logic or through and by means of the uncontrollable consequences (*die unkontrollierbaren Folgen*) of the attainment and achievement of the ends/goals – runs and bumps every subjective rationality in its ultimate and final boud(arie)s and limits. “Logical kinds of acting, actions and acts” are here not

excepted, exempted or excluded¹⁸.

From his dichotomous perspective, and in (regard to) his narrow, i.e. strict definition of (the) logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, Pareto had to, as (we have) said, exclusively assign (and class) the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (the) action to (and with) not logical (i.e. non-logical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, and indeed to a certain category amongst them. Whilst in and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, (the) subjective and (the) objective end/goal are identical, the not logical (i.e. non-logical) (kinds of acting, action and acts) distinguish themselves and stand out through and by means of the distance (interval or gap) between (the) subjective and (the) objective end/goal, which can take (on) and assume and adopt four [[according to Pareto]] forms, from/out of which, again, four categories of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts arise and ensue. First, there is the case that/where the acting, action and act, neither objectively, nor in the awareness and consciousness of the actor, has a logical end/goal (e.g. purely habitual (and or consuetudinary) kinds of acting, actions and acts (rein gewohnheitsmäßige Handlungen)). Secondly, the logical bond or tie (das logische Band) between acting, action and the act (as (a) means (als Mittel)) and consequence (as (an) end/goal (als Zweck)) is lacking, missing and absent, although the actor holds his kinds of acting, actions or acts to be expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means (zweckdienliche Mittel) for the realisation of his intentions ((a) typical example for/of this case : (the) magic, witchcraft, wizardry and sorcery (Zauberei)). Thirdly, kinds of acting, actions and acts (Handlungen), without (the) knowing/knowledge and (the) plan(ning) of the actor (ohne Wissen und Planung des Akteurs), can cause, give rise to and create the wished-for and desired results (this is actually the realm and area of (the) “behaviour”, i.e. of (the) instinctive reactions, wherein /

¹⁸ Regarding the means' own logic cf. ch. IV, Section 2Aa, esp. footnote 377, and 378, above.

in relation to which men (people, humans) differ least from the rest of the animals (beasts)). And finally, a discrepancy occurs between (the) objective consequences and (the) subjective ends/goals of (the) action, although the actor believes in the expediency, usefulness, relevance, pertinence, purposefulness and the serving of (an-)end(s)/goal(s) (Zweckdienlichkeit) of his means ((a) typical example: the coming into being of a tyrannical regime out of/from a revolution in the name of freedom). The first and the third of these kinds of acting, action and act (dieser Handlungsarten) are socially hardly of any weight and importance, as Pareto himself remarked, noticed and observed, since they have no subjective end/goal or else subjectively meant sense/meaning, and, hence, need no justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) (Begründung); if such a (justification) proves to be necessary, then, (the) kinds of acting, actions and acts must be assigned to the second or fourth kind (of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts). The second (non-logical kind of acting), for which Pareto offers a psychological and ethnological rather than a social-ontological explanation, can, likewise, be neglected or ignored, since in it, the schema(:) “end/goal-means” is, in practice, left out, dropped and unnecessary: the means do not achieve, attain or get any real, intended (desired, intentional or deliberate) or unintended (result), [[but]] merely an imagined result. Only the fourth category of acting, action and the act raise the question and problem of the objective consequences of (the) action, which are called “fine oggetivo [[= objective end (purpose)]]” by Pareto, and [[it]] is contrasted with the subjective end / goal (fine soggettivo [[= subjective end (purpose)]] of the person acting (des Handelnden). Only this category, incidentally, fully fits in with, suits or is suitable for Pareto’s definition of (the) unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts (der unlogischen Handlungen), which are supposed or ought to be distinguished by the distance, interval or gap between (the) subjective and objective end/goal: because only in and during kinds of

acting, actions and acts of this kind is there both a subjective end/goal as well as (the) visible consequences of the striving and aiming for this end (Denn nur bei Handlungen dieser Art gibt es sowohl einen subjektiven Zweck als auch sichtbare Folgen des Erstrebens dieses Zweckes); *therein* do such unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts agree with the logical (kinds of acting, actions and acts) (*darin* stimmen solche unlogischen Handlungen mit den logischen überein)^v.

The unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of (the) action in the context of the non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts pose the question of the rationality of the subjective end/goal as follows: to what extent is the objective unattainability, unachieveability (i.e. non-achievability) and unreachability of the subjective end/goal (die objektive Unerreichbarkeit des subjektiven Zweckes) *necessarily* (the) cause (reason) of (ground / occasion for) unintentional (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences (Ursache von unbeabsichtigten Folgen), to what extent does (the) rational planning (in respective) of means (rationale Mittelplanung) in (regard to) and during unreachable, unattainable and unachievable subjective ends/goals *necessarily* contribute to the appearance (on the scene) (emergence, advent; Aufkommen) of unintended consequences? Whereas in (regard to) and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, unintended consequences only appear after (the) achieving (attaining and reaching) of the subjective end/goal, such consequences come into being in (regard to) and during unlogical (i.e. non-logical) kinds of acting, actions and acts because the subjective end/goal is unattainable, unachievable and unreachable and because an unattainable and unachievable end/goal was striven for/after, aspired to and sought (Während bei logischen Handlungen unbeabsichtigte Folgen erst nach Erreichen des subjektiven Zweckes in Erscheinung treten, entstehen solche Folgen bei unlogischen Handlungen

deshalb, weil der subjektive Zweck unerreichbar ist und weil ein unerreichbarer Zweck erstrebt wurde). The result of the striving for an unattainable and unachievable end/goal does not always have to equal nought, i.e. zero, that is, to be equal to and the same as the return to the starting (point) (i.e. initial or original) situation (Ausgangssituation). The more thoroughly, profoundly and rationally (Je gründlicher und rationaler) the unattainable and unachievable end / goal was striven after/for, aspired to and sought, the more diverse, varied, manifold and powerful, mighty, formidable (je vielfältiger und gewaltiger) were the deployed and used means in the course of this, (so much) the more (does) the – in the/its nominal (i.e. face) value – undertaking and enterprise, [[which was]] unsuccessful from the outset, penetrate(s) into the thicket, jungle and maze of real praxis (practice), [[and]] (so much) the more does the logic of the means, which substitute and replace the original end/goal to the extent its (i.e. the original end/goal's) unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) – at least hic et nunc (i.e. here and now) – is directly or indirectly admitted (owned up to and granted), makes itself and becomes independent (desto mehr dringt das im Nominalwert von vornherein gescheiterte Unternehmen ins Dickicht der realen Praxis ein, desto mehr verselbständigt sich die Logik der Mittel, die den ursprünglichen Zweck in dem Maße substituieren, wie dessen Unerreichbarkeit – mindestens hic et nunc – direkt oder indirekt zugegeben wird). We may or can hold onto this: where unattainable and unachievable ends/goals were striven for, aspired to and sought, (there) the means' own logic unfolded and developed to the greatest probability and with the most power. That is why unattainable and unachievable ends/goals do not mean eo ipso the saying farewell to or parting from life, but should the occasion arise (and if necessary), a still deeper involvement, entanglement and embroilment therein (i.e. in life). This involvement, entanglement and embroilment is not only carried out and executed via the nominal end/goal of (the) action, but via in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals (sondern

über Zwischenzwecke), which from the perspective of the nominal end/goal look(ed) like means, now, however, they have become, in practice, ends/goals in themselves (Selbstzwecken), which entail and bring with them a new content-related order of the schema “end/goal-means”. In the course of this, the original end/goal does not have to (necessarily) either be forgotten or disavowed and disclaimed (disowned and repudiated), however, unavoidably and inevitably action simultaneously moves at two levels of rationality, that (level) of the invoking of the original end/goal and that (level) of the practical striving for and aspiring to in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals and or means becoming the practical ends/goals in themselves (und jener des praktischen Erstrebens der zu praktischen Selbstzwecken gewordenen Zwischenzwecke bzw. Mittel). The revolutionary does precisely this e.g., he holds out the prospect of and promises (sets his sights on) a free classless society, but “temporarily” and even in name this latter end/goal (of a free classless society) establishes, builds and erects a strictly hierarchised dictatorship¹⁹ – but also every parliamentary government, which more or less passes by or goes over (i.e. ignores and avoids) its programmatic declarations, as well as those men (people, humans) (and they are not the fewest [of people]), who confess their faith nominally in certain ethical values, but in their praxis (in respect) of life (or life practice) follow rules of wisdom (as shrewdness, astuteness, cleverness, judiciousness, i.e. convenience and expediency) (Klugheitsregeln). The unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-attainability and non-achievability) of the ultimate end/goal (e.g. to live purely ethically) does not condemn the actor to inaction (passivity and a failure to act) (Tatenlosigkeit) at all, but only separates and divides the (above-)mentioned two levels of acting, action and the act from each other, whereby and in relation to which, though, the actor does not necessarily know or (does not necessarily) want to know of this separation

¹⁹ In greater detail, in relation to that, in Kondylis, “Utopie”.

and division, but probably possesses the more or less refined capability of serving two rationalities simultaneously. The absolute belief and faith in unattainable and unachievable ends/goals does not signify and mean (the) absolute adaptation and adjustment of the mode of conduct (or way of behaving, acting, action and the act) (Handlungsweise) to that which that faith and belief, taken at (its) nominal (i.e. face) value, would dictate in practice. When the latter (belief and faith) (is) unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical), i.e. in Pareto's terminology is "logically-experimentally" untenable, intolerable and indefensible, and consequently threatens to paralyse the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital and essential) (lebensnotwendigen) use of effective means, then the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (der soziale Selbsterhaltungstrieb) (which can even run counter to and go against the biological (drive, urge and impulse of self preservation^{vi})) hinders, blocks and prevents (the) idling (den Leerlauf) or the leap into the void because/by virtue of the fact that the actor makes his way and proceeds to a level of acting, action and the act, which with regard to the unattainable and unachievable end/goal is supposed or ought to function as (a) means, in reality, however, it permits an independent, self-supporting and autonomous "logically-experimentally" secured and protected (guarded) handling of the schema "end/goal-means". The relation to(wards)/with the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable end/goal indeed is retained and preserved, but it (as from) now/henceforth has symbolic meaning, i.e. it says something about the self-understanding of the actor or, in any case, something about the manner (as to) how he, for his part, wants to be seen by other (actors). The pope believes in (the) holiness as (the) ultimate end/goal of man, he, however, does not regulate the finances or the politics of the Vatican on the basis of this faith and belief, although he, in the eyes of the sheep (i.e. flock), whose shepherd he is, continues to appear to be the representative of the (afore)mentioned ultimate end/goal, and not, for instance, as (a) finance/financial administrator/manager, bursar (Finanzverwalter) or as

(a) politician. In (regard) to these latter characteristics, qualities, traits, properties, he does not, in principle, differ from other actors, who pursue other unattainable, unreachable, unachievable or also (and/or) attainable, achievable and reachable ends/goals. The displacement, shift and transfer of the practical activity from the level of unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals to the level where the logically-experimentally secured, guarded and protected handling of the schema “(attainable, reachable, achievable) end/goal-means” takes place, makes understandable why actors, who have in mind and imagine different (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends/goals in (the) form of ideologies and world theories (i.e. world views) (in Form von Ideologien und Weltanschauungen), make use of the same practical rationality, and can meet and encounter one another as friends or (as) foes in social life as representatives of the same rationality, regardless of their differences concerning the(ir) ultimate (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends / goals. Also here, the social relation proves and turns out to be the determining (determinative) factor (Auch hier erweist sich die soziale Beziehung als der bestimmende Faktor).

All (of) this is not supposed to mean that it is, in practice, indifferent (as to) whether the/an actor pursues an attainable, reachable and achievable (end/goal) or an unattainable, unreachable and unachievable end/goal. The question (and problem) is, however, constantly at which level and in which sense an end/goal is to be regarded as attainable, reachable and achievable or unattainable, unreachable and unachievable, i.e. at which level does the actor move on each and every respective occasion. At the level where ends/goals – under penalty of practical failure – may, can or are supposed to be (in principle) attainable, reachable and achievable only, the rationality of the direct correlation of the end/goal and means with each other (die Rationalität der direkten Korrelierung von Zweck und Mittel miteinander) unfolds and develops more or less

successfully, whereby and in relation to which up until the conclusion, completion, finishing and finalisation of the acting, action and act, the ends/goals remain exactly ends / goals, and the means remain means too. At the level, again, where the unattainability, unreachability and unachievability (i.e. non-achieveability) of the declared ends/goals does not bring with it and entails no immediate or even any punishment (on the contrary: the sincere, heartfelt, honest, frank and candid or mendacious propagation of unrealisable ideals as ends/goals of individual or social action can, in practice, be worthwhile / be worth it), (the) rationality unfolds and develops in the wider sense of (the) anthropological (pre)disposition or aptitude (der anthropologischen Anlage), whereby and in relation to which the criterion of the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) of the ends/goals (wobei das Kriterium der Sinnhaftigkeit der Zwecke) frequently puts into the shade, i.e. overshadows that (criterion) of their (the said ends/goals') (actual) attainability, reachability and achievability. In the constitution of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) possesses, obviously, a higher, superior ontological status than (the) rationality in the sense of the pursuit of attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals through and by means of suitable means (In der Konstitution des animal rationale besitzt die Sinnhaftigkeit offenbar einen höheren ontologischen Status als die Rationalität im Sinne der Verfolgung erreichbarer Zwecke durch die geeigneten Mittel); because not only attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals are meaning-like, i.e. meaningful – in other words: rationality *as* (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition or aptitude only vouches for and guarantees meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness), not (for) the (in principle) attainability, reachability and achievability of the ends/goals (denn sinnhaft sind nicht nur erreichbarer Zwecke – m. a. W.: Rationalität *als* anthropologische Anlage bürgt nur für die Sinnhaftigkeit, nicht für die (grundsätzliche) Erreichbarkeit der Zwecke). The

schema “end(goal)-means” belongs to the original (primeval and primordial) (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), however, too, which (i.e. the said schema of “end(goal)-means”), incidentally, can hardly be separated from (the) meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) as such (Zu den Uranlagen des animal rationale gehört aber auch das Schema „Zweck-Mittel“, das sich übrigens von der Sinnhaftigkeit als solcher kaum trennen läßt). From that ensues, arises and results that this schema, seen as (a) form, has just as little – like meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) – to do with attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals (Daraus ergibt sich, daß dieses Schema, als Form gesehen, ebensowenig wie die Sinnhaftigkeit ausschließlich mit erreichbaren Zwecken zu tun hat). In the spirit of the originator (author, creator and fabricator) of unlogical (i.e. non-logical and illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, it (i.e. the said schema of end/goal-means) is shaped, moulded and formed in accordance with the same form-related (i.e. formal) points of view (angles and perspectives) as in the spirit of the originator of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts (Im Geiste des Urhebers unlogischer Handlungen gestaltet es sich nach denselben formalen Gesichtspunkten wie im Geiste des Urhebers logischer Handlungen). No man (i.e. human or person) can intentionally (deliberately and on purpose) use means which go against and run counter to his end/goal, because, in this case, his true end/goal would consist in thwarting, frustrating, foiling and preventing his declared end/goal; and every man (i.e. human or person) must, already on account of the fact he has ends / goals and can only live socially, develop activities, which he necessarily comprehends as means for the attainment, reaching and achievement of those ends/goals (Kein Mensch kann absichtlich Mittel einsetzen, die seinem Zweck zuwiderlaufen, denn in diesem Fall würde bloß sein wahrer Zweck darin bestehen, seinen erklärten Zweck zu vereiteln; und jeder Mensch muß schon dadurch, daß er Zwecke hat und nur sozial leben kann, Aktivitäten entwickeln,

die er notwendigerweise als Mittel zur Erreichung jener Zwecke auffaßt). If the latter (ends/goals) are unattainable, unreachable and unachievable, thus he fails conclusively, definitively, once and for all and finally as (a) social being or he makes a new beginning. Very often he does, however, neither the one or the other, but swings and oscillates between the levels of the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable, and, (the levels) of the attainable, reachable and achievable, whereby and in relation to which he, as (we have) described, converts and transforms – at the level of the latter (achievable) – the means of the former (unachievable) into ends/goals without ever expressly repudiating, denying, disavowing and disowning the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals (Sind letztere unerreichbar, so scheitert er endgültig als soziales Wesen oder er macht einen neuen Anfang. Sehr oft tut er aber weder das eine noch das andere, sondern pendelt zwischen den Ebenen des Unerreichbaren und des Erreichbaren, wobei er, wie geschildert, die Mittel der ersteren auf der letzteren in Zwecke verwandelt, ohne je die unerreichbaren Zwecke ausdrücklich abzuleugnen). We do not have to especially (specifically or expressly) explain that all these types of acting, action and the act can be represented by the same actor at various points in time or even simultaneously. Because no-one exclusively and solely pursues attainable, reachable and achievable or exclusively and solely unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals (Wir müssen nicht eigens erklären, daß all diese Handlungstypen durch denselben Akteur auf verschiedenen Gebieten seiner sozialen Tätigkeit zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten oder auch gleichzeitig vertreten werden können. Denn keiner verfolgt ausschließlich erreichbare oder ausschließlich unerreichbare Zwecke).

The interplay of/between (the/what is) unattainable, unreachable, unachievable and (the/what is) attainable, reachable, achievable, between (the/what is) meaning-like, i.e. meaningful and (the/what is) realisable, in

particular leaves to the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of action more room for unfolding and development, i.e. more room to move, above all, however, it points to the fragility and frailty of the narrower conceptual plan of rationality, which rests and is based on the schema (of) “end/goal-means” (Das Wechselspiel von Unerreichbarem und Erreichbarem, von Sinnhaftem und Realisierbarem insbesondere läßt den unbeabsichtigten Folgen des Handelns mehr Entfaltungsraum, vor allem deutet es aber auf die Gebrechlichkeit des engeren Rationalitätskonzeptes hin, welches auf dem Schema „Zweck-Mittel“ beruht). In(to) the area and realm of the application of this schema, other levels and forms of rationality constantly force their way, penetrate and make inroads, and they widen or loosen and slacken it (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema) in such a way that it is of little use and hardly suitable and good for (the) concrete praxis (practice) (In den Anwendungsbereich dieses Schemas dringen ständig andere Ebenen und Gestalten der Rationalität ein, und sie erweitern oder lockern es derart, daß es für die konkrete Praxis wenig taugt). Its (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema’s) reduced practical suitability (fitness and efficiency) (verminderte praktische Tauglichkeit) can, though, simply, hence, touch upon / say something [(about) the fact]] that in (regard to) and during demonstrably attainable, reachable and achievable ends / goals, the means were falsely chosen or used. This is, however, a task which must be resolved from case to case and does not raise in principle questions. In general, the problem of the ends/goals seems to be of a more in principle nature than that (problem) of the means. Because even someone, who does not share an end/goal, can find (out) the suitable means for its (the said end/goal’s) attainment and achievement; differences of opinion over / regarding the ends/goals allow agreements over / regarding questions and problems of means, whereas the question and problem of (the) ends/goals cannot be (re)solved on account of the fact that (an) agreement dominates (i.e. is

(reached and) in force) over / regarding the suitability of these or those means with regard to this or that end/goal. Ends/goals are, incidentally, not preferred neither only nor in general because they can be attained, reached and achieved through simpler means than other (means); the simplicity of the means decides or tips the scales in favour of only in and during decisions between (approximately) equivalent ends/goals. This state of affairs explains why authors, who suggest a comprehensive concept(ual plan) of rationality, tacitly presuppose the rational choice and handling of the means and concentrate on the rationality of the ends/goals as the main feature of rational action; irrational wishes, desires and ends/goals would have to, accordingly, cross out, thwart, frustrate and foil every rational choice and handling of (the) means (irrationaler Wünsche und Zwecke müßten demnach jede rationale Wahl und Handhabung der Mittel durchkreuzen), something which would prove the inadequacy, deficiency, shortcoming and failing of a rationality (Unzulänglichkeit einer Rationalität), which wanted to build upon the mere correlation of (the) end/goal and (the) means with each other²⁰. Above the choice of the means(, does) is the choice, therefore, of the ends/goals (stand). The rationality of the latter (ends/goals) vouches for and guarantees the successful course (or sequence of events) of the acting, action or act, since it (the said rationality of the ends / goals) only (or first) makes possible and enables the wished-for and desired effect and impact of the rational means (die erwünschte Wirkung rationaler Mittel). At, i.e. against which measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark, however, is the rationality of the ends/goals to be measured? Which

kind of rationality of the ends/goals permits the direct and stable connection and binding between the rationality of the ends/goals and of the rationality of the means, i.e. such a connection and binding, in (regard to) and during which the possibility of a conversion and transformation of the (starting, initial) means into (new) ends/goals is excluded? Here, one can go beyond Aristotle or Pareto with difficulty, irrespective of which world-theoretical premises one has (or: irrespective of the world-theoretical premises underlying one[‘s fundamental position(ing)]) on each and every respective occasion. (The) sole measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark (in respect) of the rationality of the end/goal, which suffices for (or comes up to, meets and fulfils) “logical-experimental” demands, remains (the) attainability, reachability and achievability, and this (achievability), again, can only be ascertained often only ex eventu (i.e. from the event (or: after the event, following the occurrence of)), something which makes out of / from the rationality of the end/goal (or: something which converts the rationality of the end/goal into) a tautology. (We want to disregard here cases like the attainment and achievement of the end/goal through and by means of coincidence, accident, contingency, happenstance and chance etc..) No other determination of the rationality of the end/goal permits its (i.e. the rationality of the end/goal’s) direct connection and binding with the rationality of the means, and in this respect, it is also psychologically correct and right to look at the regular, orderly and regulated carrying out, execution, perpetration, realisation and implementation of the designs, models, blueprints, outlines, sketches or drafts (in respect) of acting, actions and acts (or action plans) (die regelmäßige Ausführung von Handlungsentwürfen) towards (i.e. with regard to) the most favourable point in time for their realisation as signs of dispositional rationality²¹. An ethical definition of that rationality would e.g. in and during the possible and potential or eventual unattainability, unreachability

²¹ Bandura, “Self Efficacy”.

or unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ethical end/goal leave open the possibility described above of shifting, transferring or moving the centre of gravity, main emphasis or focal point of (the) practical activity from the level of unattainable, unreachable and unachievable ends/goals to the level where a logically-experimentally safeguarded, secured and protected handling of the schema “end/goal-means” can take place – with the result of a factual transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends / goals. On the other hand, ethically irrational^{vii} ends/goals would not in the least stand in the way of a stable and direct, logical connection and combining of end/goal and means with each other. A rational choice and handling of the means does not at all obstruct or hinder the end/goal of committing a murder (Der Zweck, einen Mord zu begehen, verhindert überhaupt nicht eine rationale Wahl und Handhabung der Mittel). The latter [[former]] (means) are actually not endangered or put at risk through and by means of the constitution, composure and texture of the end/goal in itself, but through and by means of the intellectual-spiritual (mental-emotional) constitution (i.e. state, condition or state and frame of mind) of the actor (die geistige Verfassung des Akteurs).

The attempt to safeguard, secure and protect the general rationality of (the) action via the rationality of the end/goal stems from the permanent human concern, care, worry or anxiety around the avoidance of (the) unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences of the acting, action or act and a transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends/goals – irrespective of whether the actor himself in retrospect regretted or welcomed this transformation and conversion. (Formal) guarantees (Formale Garantien) for the appeasement (pacification, calming down, soothing and or easing) of this concern, care, worry or anxiety can, however, finally / in the end, grant, give, afford or accord only a narrow version of the rationality of the end/goal, whereupon / according to which / after which rationality means

just as much as (i.e. the same as) justice (wonach Rationalität ebensoviel wie Gerechtigkeit heißt)^{viii}. The same concern, care, worry or anxiety stems from another attempt at the safeguarding, securing and protecting of the general rationality of the action, which proceeds in the reverse manner and bumps or runs into and encounters reverse(d) difficulties. Here the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals is declared to be meaningless and the ultimate guarantee for (the) rationality is seen, perceived or espied in the expediency, usefulness, relevance, pertinence, purposefulness and the serving of (the) means (in der Zweckdienlichkeit der Mittel). Since human action finds itself always on the search for means and uses means in order to realise ends / goals, thus, it (i.e. action) is – on the basis of the ubiquity of the schema “end / goal-means” – by definition and always rational, and indeed regardless of the subjective rationality and of the motivation of the actor or of the success of his endeavours and efforts; with regard to the determination of the ends/goals in themselves, the familiar and common contrast and opposition between (the / what is) rational and (the / what is) irrational (the Rational and the Irrational) (zwischen Rationalem und Irrationalem) loses its meaning fully (completely, totally and entirely)²². But the recourse, going back and reverting to the broader anthropological level does not solve the problems of the narrower acting-theory levels (i.e. the narrower levels pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act) (die Probleme der engeren handlungstheoretischen Ebene), but blurs, on the contrary, their specific character; the narrower the logical level, the more specific must the concepts be, which are supposed or ought to bring clarity^{ix}. Turned / Said otherwise / differently: the allusion and reference to (or indication of) the anthropological taking root of the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end / goal-means” says nothing about the determination of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means,

²² Thus, v. Mises, *Grundprobleme*, p. 32ff., 63; *Human action*, p. 12ff., 18ff..

which no theory of (the) rationality (in respect) of acting, action and the act and also no actor can go around and circumvent. Rationality as (a) human attribute in (the) form of the “end/goal-means”-schema (Rationalität als menschliches Attribut in Form des „Zweck-Mittel“-Schemas) and rationality in (the) form of that determination (of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means) are two different things and move at different logical levels: the former (rationality as a human attribute) is in all men, i.e. humans, the same, the latter (rationality as the determination of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means) changes from actor to actor, and exactly because of that, (the) theory of acting, action and the act stands/is before the task of naming (the) criteria for the ends/goals and of the means. Whoever is satisfied with the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end/goal-means” and lays, places or puts down to / in the files (i.e. archives) (ad acta legen) the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals, does not want to admit that the attainability, reachability and achievability or else (the) unattainability, unreachability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals, called the yardstick, benchmark, measure, standard or criteria of or for rationality, determines both the effectiveness and effectuality of the means as well as their fate and destiny, i.e. determines the rationality of the ends/goals, whether the means remain up to the conclusion and the finalisation of the acting, action and act, means, or whether they (i.e. the said means) will – en route and along or on the way – be converted and transformed into (new) ends/goals; likewise it (i.e. the attainability, reachability and achievability or else (the) unattainability, unreachability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals) determines the manner as well as the point in time of the appearance (on the scene) and emergence or advent of the unintended (unintentional, inadvertent, accidental, involuntary) consequences. The leaving aside or exclusion of the rationality of the ends/goals happens, though, for good reason(s), when, with

that, it is meant that the ethical character of the ends/goals has no influence on praxeological rationality (Die Ausklammerung der Rationalität der Zwecke geschieht allerdings aus guten Gründen, wenn damit gemeint ist, daß der ethische Charakter der Zwecke keinen Einfluß auf praxelogische Rationalität hat). However, the ethical neutrality of the ends/goals (die ethische Neutralität der Zwecke) would amount and be tantamount to a neutrality of the ends/goals vis-à-vis (the) rationality and (the) irrationality (Rationalität und Irrationalität) only (then) if ethics (Ethik) and rationality were identical right and all down the line and across the board; and this is not the case. Even after the leaving aside or exclusion of the ethical factor in and during the determination of the ends/goals, the constitution, composition and texture of the ends/goals, especially with regard to the criterion of attainability, reachability and achievability, influence the unfolding and development of the schema “end/goal-means” in (the) concrete acting area or sphere (i.e. in the concrete space (in respect) of acting, action and the act) (im konkreten Handlungsraum). That leaving aside or elimination (of the ethical factor in the determination of the ends/goals) does not at all result in or yield eo ipso a clean or neat rationality of acting, action or the act. Incidentally, it sounds comical when the same v. Mises, who wants to set or put aside and eliminate irrationality and rationality at the level of the ends/goals, and sees at work the rationality of the form-related (i.e. formal) end/goal-means schema even in the kinds of acting, actions and acts of psychopaths, takes to the field and goes into battle against the “totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism (or the liberalism of the economy) with the argument, of all arguments, that these (“totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism) (would) trigger, spark and set off a “Revolt against Reason”²³. Polemical needs and requirements call into life, i.e. bring into being very quickly again the in principle disavowed, disowned, disclaimed and repudiated connection and binding of ethics and rationality.

²³ *Human action*, p. 72ff..

c. Rationality as world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) rationalisation (justification)^x (Rationalität als weltanschauliche Rationalisierung)

We had (have) already (had) (the) opportunity (occasion, chance) to discuss the anthropological and social-ontological status of meaning (sense), as well as to point/refer to (point out) the original interrelation or connection (context) of / between meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) and rationality (as regards/in relation) (to) each other, which proves that the equating of rationality with the pursuit of attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals through and by means of suitable means as (being) (is) too narrow (Wir hatten schon Gelegenheit, den anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Status von Sinn zu erörtern sowie auf den ursprünglichen Zusammenhang von Sinnhaftigkeit und Rationalität aufeinander hinzuweisen, welcher die Gleichsetzung der Rationalität mit der Verfolgung von erreichbaren Zwecken durch geeignete Mittel als zu eng erweist)²⁴. If meaning (sense) transfers and shifts the framework or context of reference (in respect) of the human (sphere, dimension) (the Human), from the biological (sphere, dimension) (the Biological) to the ideational (sphere, dimension) (the Ideational), and through and by means of the mediation (intervention, intercession) of (the) social life (living) gives concepts like (the) self-preservation a radically new content, which can in fact go against and run counter to their biological content, then rationality undertakes the task of articulating meaning consistently and effectively (Wenn Sinn den Bezugsrahmen des Menschlichen vom Biologischen aufs Ideelle verlagert und durch die Vermittlung des sozialen Lebens Begriffen wie der Selbsterhaltung einen radikal neuen Inhalt gibt, der ihrem biologischen Inhalt sogar zuwiderlaufen kann, so übernimmt Rationalität die Aufgabe, Sinn konsistent

²⁴ See Ch. IV, 2Ac and Section 1Bb in this chapter, above.

und wirksam zu artikulieren). Obviously, meaning is, in practice, inconceivable, unimaginable and unthinkable without such articulation; that is why rationality ranges, reaches and extends anthropologically and social-ontologically as far back as meaning itself (Offenbar ist Sinn ohne solche Artikulierung praktisch undenkbar, daher reicht Rationalität anthropologisch und sozialontologisch so weit zurück wie der Sinn selbst). If we disregard the connected with it (i.e. animal rationale) ethical-self-satisfied/complacent/smug connotations, thus, the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race), which describes itself as (an) animal rationale (i.e. which describes [[man as]] a rational animal), aptly represents, reflects and conveys the facts (of the case/situation) (Wenn wir von den damit verbundenen ethisch-selbstgefälligen Konnotationen absehen, so gibt das Selbstverständnis jener Gattung, die sich als animal rationale bezeichnet, den Tatbestand treffend wieder). Hence, its (i.e. the genus's / human race's) members can forego, do without, abstain and refrain from the invocation of rationality just as little as its (i.e. the genus's / human race's) kinds of acting, actions or acts (can) withdraw, keep away, keep apart, detach / extract / free themselves from and evade, shirk, dodge, elude and go and be beyond meaning (Ihre Angehörigen können daher auf die Berufung auf Rationalität so wenig verzichten wie ihren Handlungen den Sinn entziehen). That invocation underpins, backs up, substantiates, corroborates, shores up and supports, in fact, par excellence the claim of being the (a) (more) worthy and (more) dignified member of the human genus (i.e. species or race), whilst the reproach or accusation that a (person) (someone) is lacking in rationality, moves this (person/someone) (with)in the vicinity and proximity of the animal kingdom; it degrades and debases him and takes (away) (the) human seriousness a limine (i.e. from the beginning) from his words and deeds. Consequently, rationality constitutes the (a) desirable, coveted and sought-after ally and an effective weapon of every individual or collective vis-à-vis other(s) (people); (the) language usage knows it by verifying, registering, documenting, flagging,

vouching (and characterising) with the adverb or (else) adjective “reasonable / reasonably, sensible / sensibly, (in a) level-headed (manner), rational(ly) (vernünftig)”, very different wished-for or actual form(ation)s of the social relation (Gestaltungen der sozialen Beziehung). (“We have, finally, spoken reasonably, sensibly and in a level-headed manner to each other”, “you, as (a) reasonable, sensible and level-headed man / person, must see that”, “that was a reasonable, sensible, level-headed compromise”, “I warn you: be reasonable, sensible, level-headed”, “I shall bring you to your senses / I shall bring you to a state of reason, sensibleness, level-headedness”) etc.) Everyone wants to have the generally recognised anthropological and social-ontological constants on their side, under the condition / provided, though, that he / one reserves the competence and jurisdiction (i.e. the right) to their interpretation turned (towards) / in / within the Normative (the normative sphere). Whoever more or less convincingly and persuasively puts in (a) combination, i.e. connects the meaning of life, which can only be meaning-like, i.e. meaningful as human life/living, with his own matters of concern and ends/goals, has good chances/prospects (i.e. has a good chance) of mobilising / to mobilise the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation of men (i.e. humans / people) (den sozialen Selbsterhaltungstrieb der Menschen) for / in favour of these matters of concern and ends/goals, and, in fact, in relation to that, to bring men, i.e. humans and people to overcoming, surmounting, outgrowing and getting over their biological drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (ihren biologischen Selbsterhaltungstrieb) (e.g. voluntary death for / in favour of a “great/grand idea” etc.). Nothing otherwise is [the case] with (regard to) rationality (or: Rationality is no different) (Nicht anders verhält es sich mit der Rationalität). Whoever more or less effectively invokes it (i.e. rationality), offers to other(s) (people) all / everything which is commonly held to be and regarded as an attribute or practical result of rationality: (the) postponement (delay or

deferment) of egotistical (kinds of) satisfaction(s) and (the) stemming, hindering, hampering, checking and inhibition of blind drives, urges and impulses; consistency, calculability, ponderability and order in private or public relationships and circumstances (Aufschub egoistischer Befriedigungen und Hemmung blinder Triebe, Konsistenz, Berechenbarkeit und Ordnung in den privaten oder öffentlichen Verhältnissen). It is certainly, in general, correct that in social life (living), in (the) concrete persons, situations and circumstances, not “reason” or “rationality” mould, shape and form the positionings, attitudes and the action [[of these concrete persons, situations and circumstances]], but rather a reason (in respect) of the/an occasion, opportunity or chance, and a situation-bound, on-occasion / occasional rationality, in practice, decides the issue and is the deciding factor (Es ist gewiß im allgemeinen richtig, daß im sozialen Leben, in dem konkrete Personen, Situationen und Umstände die Einstellungen und das Handeln prägen, nicht „die“ Vernunft oder „die“ Rationalität, sondern eher eine Gelegenheitsvernunft und eine situationsgebundene okkasionelle Rationalität praktisch den Ausschlag geben)²⁵. From/Out of this ascertainment, (the) norms cannot, however, in the least be deduced and derived which some “postmodern” foes of the “totalitarianism of reason” (die mancher „postmoderne“ Feind des „Totalitarismus der Vernunft“) want to deduce and derive; that every invocation of “reason” or of “rationality”, in the interest(s) of tolerance and of peace, is supposed to or ought to fail to materialise, fail to appear and stay away. That might be ethically expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) or not (Das mag ethisch zweckmäßig sein oder nicht), however, it certainly and surely can hardly be realised^{xi}. Even (the) pluralistic Western mass democracy (die pluralistische westliche Massendemokratie), in which such ideologemes (solche Ideologeme) find favourable (propitious, auspicious) ground, soil and terrain,

²⁵ In relation to that, Spinner, *Grundsatzvernunft und Gelegenheitsvernunft*.

and are functionally indispensable, must pull on the brakes and slow things down as soon as the in principle propagated pluralism of values or else / and/or of rationalities threatens to degenerate into complete(d) anarchy (der grundsätzlich propagierte Pluralismus der Werte bzw. der Rationalitäten in vollendete Anarchie auszuarten droht). The great variety and multiformity of values is tolerated under the reservation, i.e. with the proviso of the exclusive validity of the value of tolerance and, moreover, those values (e.g. “human dignity”), which are supposed or ought to bear and support these (values) (Die Vielfalt der Werte wird toleriert unter dem Vorbehalt der ausschließlichen Geltung des Wertes der Toleranz und außerdem jener Werte (z. B. „Menschenwürde“), die diesen tragen sollen)^{xii}. In this respect, it (i.e. pluralistic Western mass democracy) must lay and put down (i.e. accord) to (the) “reason” and (the) “rationality” (the) same value as other societies which have to deal with problems of legitimation (die Legitimationsprobleme), irrespective of how they are accustomed to or in the habit of calling (the) “reason” and (the) “rationality”²⁶. Furthermore, the level of the actual usage / use of rationality does not necessarily coincide with that (level) of (the) legitimisation (legitimising) (der Legitimierung) through and by means of rationality (Rationalität) or (else) of that (level) of rationalisation (der Rationalisierung), as we shall immediately see. Without (the) array (i.e. mobilisation) of “rational” principles towards/for ends/goals of legitimation or (else) polemical (ends / goals), individual and collective identities hardly get by and manage, whereby and in relation to which (the) each and every respective dominating / dominant social relation (die jeweils dominierende soziale Beziehung) determines (the) form and (the) extent of the array (i.e. mobilisation). The same applies in fact / even with reference to questions, problems or (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts which barely / slightly / little touch upon the core / nucleus of (the) identity.

²⁶ In relation to that, in detail, [[see]] Kondylis, „Universalismus“.

As (a) rational animal, (the) man (i.e. humans) is, as it were, under the prohibition of doing something without declaring, indicating, pointing out, finding or inventing and making up (the) rational grounds/reasons for that (i.e. what he does). This aspect of rationality, which especially interrelates and correlates and connects with the need (in respect) of/for rationalisation and (the) endeavour and effort at / (in respect) of rationalisation (mit dem Rationalisierungsbedürfnis und -bestreben), Benjamin Franklin has/had once outlined wittily and cleverly: “So convenient a thing is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do”²⁷.

Rationality and rationalisation are, as just indicated, not one and the same [[thing]]. The latter (rationalisation) constitutes one amongst the many forms of the former (rationality), when it is not understood merely as a process in and during which higher degrees of rationality are attained, reached and achieved (e.g. (the) “rationalisation of the economy”, (the) rationalisation of the legislation” etc.) (Rationalität und Rationalisierung sind, wie soeben angedeutet, nicht ein und dasselbe. Letztere bildet eine unter den vielen Gestalten der ersteren, wenn sie nicht bloß als ein Vorgang verstanden wird, bei dem höhere Rationalitätsgrade erreicht werden (z. B. „Rationalisierung der Wirtschaft“, „Rationalisierung der Gesetzgebung“ etc.)). Rationalisation, as we want to discuss it in this and in the next section, means the intellectual / thought(-related) (notional, mental) processing of a psychical or a theoretical stuff (i.e. (subject) matter, material or topic), so that the positionings, attitudes and (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts or interpretations of the world (world interpretations) (at whatever level) appear as (the) work of (the) rationality, and hence the accusation of (the) instinctive self-interest or of prejudice may not be entailed (i.e. made) (Rationalisierung, wie wir sie in diesem und im nächsten

²⁷ *Autobiography*, p. 42.

Abschnitt erörtern wollen, heißt die gedankliche Bearbeitung eines psychischen oder eines theoretischen Stoffes, so daß die sich daraus ergebenden Einstellungen und Handlungen oder Weltdeutungen (auf welcher Ebene auch immer) als Werk der Rationalität erscheinen und daher nicht den Vorwurf des instinktiven Eigennutzes oder der Voreingenommenheit auf sich ziehen dürfen). Rationalisation is, accordingly, in the widest sense, legitimisation (legitimising) through and by means of rationality, whereby and in relation to which the term (Terminus) more likely is (is rather) suited to cases in which the suspicion of self-interest and of prejudice is to be class(ifi)ed as particularly stark (i.e. strong). It (i.e. the said rationalisation) proceeds and takes place both in foro interno (i.e. internally or inwardly (in the court of one's conscience)) as well as in foro externo (i.e. externally or outwardly (in the court of public opinion / judgment)), without both of the fora (i.e. forums or courts of conscience and public judgment) having to be in harmony, line, accord or agreement with each other; the greater or smaller distance between them (i.e. the said fora) causes, induces, provokes and gives rise to either unease, discomfort, disquiet and embarrassment, awkwardness, perplexity, or it (i.e. the said distance) is bridged by hypocrisy or even both (are caused / occur) simultaneously (Rationalisierung ist demnach im weitesten Sinne Legitimierung durch Rationalität, wobei der Terminus eher zu den Fällen paßt, in denen der Verdacht des Eigennutzes und der Voreingenommenheit als besonders stark einzustufen ist. Sie geht sowohl in foro interno als auch in foro externo vonstatten, ohne daß die beiden Fora in Einklang miteinander stehen müssen; der größere oder kleinere Abstand zwischen ihnen ruft entweder Unbehagen und Verlegenheit hervor oder er wird durch Heuchelei überbrückt oder auch beides gleichzeitig). At the level of acting, action and the act, (the) rationalisation serves in relation to that, to blur the boundaries between logical and unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts – in accordance with Pareto's terminology –, and to give to the latter (unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) (kinds of)

acting(s), actions and acts) the appearance of the former (logical (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts), since through and by means of (the) rationalisation, the motive of/for the acting, action and act, or else the “irrational drive, urge and impulse”, is transformed and converted into a reason of/for the acting, action and act. Without doubt, the processes of (the) psychological and of (the) world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) rationalisation are narrowly and tightly (i.e. closely) related to each other and exhibit and show central structural similarities (Auf Handlungsebene dient die Rationalisierung dazu, die Grenzen zwischen logischen und unlogischen Handlungen – nach Paretos Terminologie – zu verwischen und letzteren den Schein der ersteren zu geben, da durch die Rationalisierung das Motiv der Handlung bzw. der „irrationalen Trieb“, in einen Handlungsgrund verwandelt wird. Zweifelsohne sind die Prozesse der psychologischen und der weltanschaulichen Rationalisierung genetisch eng untereinander verwandt und weisen zentrale strukturelle Ähnlichkeiten auf). We begin with world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) rationalisation and make use of the outmoded, old-fashioned and antiquated, but irreplaceable concept of the “world theory (i.e. world view)”, in order to indicate, suggest and intimate that it is not merely a matter here of theories in the narrower sense, but, in general, of the manner (as to) how an individual or collective subject sees the social and the natural world, and, above all, how (he or it) defines his/its place inside of the same (social and natural world) in comparison with the place of other subjects (i.e. from the perspective of the social relation) (Wir beginnen mit der weltanschaulichen Rationalisierung und benutzen bewußt den altmodischen, aber unersetzlichen Begriff von der „Weltanschauung“, um anzudeuten, daß es sich hier nicht bloß um Theorien im engeren Sinne handelt, sondern im allgemeinen um die Art und Weise, wie ein individuelles oder kollektives Subjekt die soziale und die natürliche Welt sieht und vor allem wie es seinen Platz innerhalb derselben im Vergleich zum Platz anderer Subjekte (d.h. in der Perspektive der sozialen

Beziehung) definiert)²⁸ – irrespective of with which means and at which theoretical height, i.e. no matter whether, in the course of this, concepts or rather symbols or mixtures (out) of both, namely “poetry, seals or sealings of the concept” (Fr. Lange) dominate (gleichviel, mit welchen Mitteln und auf welcher theoretischen Höhe, d. h. gleichgültig, ob dabei eher Begriffe oder eher Symbole oder Mischungen aus beiden, nämlich „Begriffsdichtungen“ (Fr. Lange) dominieren).

The social relation leaves (behind it) powerful traces not only in (regard to) the content of the rationally shaped and formed world-theoretical thought construct (*or*: construction (creation, shape, formation) of thought); it (i.e. the social relation) moreover constitutes a main or chief motor (engine or driving force) of the undertaking (in respect) of rationalisation itself, which forces and compels the same (undertaking of rationalisation) (Die soziale Beziehung hinterläßt mächtige Spuren nicht nur im Inhalt des rational gestalteten weltanschaulichen Denkgebildes; sie bildet zudem einen Hauptmotor des Rationalisierungsunternehmens selbst, welches dasselbe erzwingt). Should the / that undertaking (in respect) of rationalisation have prospects of socially

²⁸ Dilthey put/placed at the centre of attention/interest of his teaching, doctrine and theory (in respect) of the world theory (i.e. world view) the interrelation and connection between world image and (the) sense/meaning of life / living, or (else) (the) (basic or fundamental) principles, tenets, axioms of the conducting of life/living (Dilthey stellte in den Mittelpunkt seiner Weltanschauungslehre den Zusammenhang zwischen Weltbild und Lebenssinn bzw. Grundsätzen der Lebensführung (*Ges. Schriften*, VIII, 82)). This thematisation (i.e. setting of the theme and topic of world view) is in itself well-aimed (accurate, applicable, appropriate, fitting), since the important thing sought, and what matters and counts, in relation to that, is that a world theory (i.e. world view) as a rule derives and deduces its Ought out of/from an objectively given Is. However, every world theory (i.e. world view) also constitutively contains an image (picture) (Bild) of “evil”, i.e. of the foe, whose activity is supposed or ought to be tamed, restrained, brought under control or eliminated (Diese Thematisierung ist an sich zutreffend, da es einer Weltanschauung in der Regel darauf ankommt, ihr Sollen aus einem objektiv gegebenen Sein abzuleiten. Jede Weltanschauung enthält aber auch konstitutiv ein Bild vom „Bösen“, d. h. von Feind, dessen Tätigkeit gebändigt oder eliminiert werden soll). The foe, as it appears in the/a world theory (i.e. world view), may bear an abstract name, e.g. be called “(the) devil or Satan”, but the social relation in its concreteness makes its presence felt as soon as tangible social subjects are brought into combination, i.e. connected with this abstract foe, and correspondingly handled (Der Feind, wie er in der Weltanschauung auftritt, mag einen abstrakten Namen tragen, z. B. „Teufel“ heißen, die soziale Beziehung in ihrer Konkretheit meldet sich aber, sobald mit diesem abstrakten Feind handfeste soziale Subjekte in Verbindung gebracht und entsprechend behandelt werden). Regarding the presence and function of the foe in (the) world images (Über Anwesenheit und Funktion des Feindes in den Weltbildern), see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, in particular / especially, pp. 35ff., 63ff., 100.

recognised success, thus, it must, first of all, offer explanations (of (the) “mythical” or (of (the)) “scientific” kind) for (the) social, cosmological etc. phenomena, which for the given historical moment / instant are regarded as serious, grave and significant. Such explanations represent and constitute a fundamental, rational performance, achievement and accomplishment (eine grundlegende rationale Leistung), which, nevertheless, is not (completely) accepted by all / everyone or always. The endeavour / effort / making the effort / going to a lot of trouble / striving in refuting, disproving or anticipating / to refute, disprove or anticipate (the) counter-explanations, forces and compels [[one]] towards the refinement and complication of the undertaking (in respect of rationalisation, which, in and during increasing complexity, must / has to deal with a new important task, job, function and mission: it must, namely, achieve, attain and get rationality as consistency (Rationalität als Konsistenz), to organise individual explanations or positions into a coherent whole (einzelne Erklärungen oder Positionen zu einem kohärenten Ganzen organisieren), to not want to become easy prey for the inimically minded and inimically disposed (will es den feindlich Gesinnten nicht zur leichten Beute werden). Because the most cutting, i.e. sharpest weapon of an animal rationale (rational animal) can be no other (weapon) / (nothing other) than (the) rationality (Rationalität). Rationality as consistency (Rationalität als Konsistenz) is the best shield against rationality as critique / criticism (Rationalität als Kritik), and inner/internal contradictions constitute a(n) – first of all / at first – hardly noticed (noted, observed) wound, which soon becomes and turns into (the/an) Achilles heel and popular target (butt of jokes, laughing stock or object of ridicule). (The) extent, range, scope, complexity and main emphasis / main focus / centre of gravity of the world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) construct (construction, creation, shape, formation) (Umfang, Komplexität and Schwerpunkte des weltanschaulichen Gebildes) depend on the intensity of the pressure (in respect) of rationalisation (der Intensität des

Rationalisierungsdrukkes), i.e. on how great and large the real or supposed ideational threat is (wie groß die reale oder vermutete ideelle Bedrohung ist) and how high one's own power claim aims (und wie hoch der eigene Machtanspruch zielt), i.e. how comprehensive the social relation is which it (i.e. one's own power as a subject) wants to influence or control (d. h. wie umfassend die soziale Beziehung ist, die er beeinflussen oder kontrollieren will). Considerable (significant, remarkable, formidable, notable) performances, achievements and accomplishments (in respect) of rationality and rationalisation of competitors and rivals in the intellectual-spiritual-mental field and realm force and compel corresponding (quid pro quo) counter-performances, counter-achievements, counter-accomplishments; a single dispute or controversy branches out and ramifies into several or multiple (disputes or controversies) as soon as it becomes earnest, i.e. serious in the social relation, so that, finally and in the end, on both sides, multi-dimensional thought / intellectual constructs mount up (stack up and are built up and tower over lesser constructs), which culminate in ultimate world-theoretical / world-view decisions (Beachtliche Rationalitäts- und Rationalisierungsleistungen der Konkurre[n]ten auf geistigem Gebiet zwingen zu entsprechenden Gegenleistungen, eine einzelne Streitfrage verästelt sich in mehrere, sobald es in der sozialen Beziehung ernst wird, so daß sich schließlich auf beiden Seiten multidimensionale Denkgebilde auftürmen, die in letzten weltanschaulichen Entscheidungen gipfeln). Under certain (historical-intellectual-spiritual) circumstances (pertaining to the history of ideas) (Unter bestimmten geistesgeschichtlichen Umständen), an undertaking (in respect) of rationalisation lasts and continues in (the) competition and rivalry only because of the fact it is all-encompassing and all-embracing (allumfassend), that is, it takes (a) position towards / in relation to / regarding all the – on each and every respective occasion – relevant themes, i.e. topics and subject matters. The complexity increases also according to the quantity or mass (Menge) of the competitors and rivals, i.e. the more numerous in a society those

are who deal, concern and occupy themselves with mainly (the) intellectual-spiritual-mental work, the more complex must, already for this reason, be the performances, achievement and accomplishments (in respect) of rationalisation and of the rationalisations (die Rationalitätsleistungen und die Rationalisierungen). One can observe this phenomenon already in Greek antiquity, in which the lack or absence of a theocracy of an oriental type permitted an active, lively, busy and vivid intellectual life, but also in the European New Time(s) (Modern Era) (in der europäischen Neuzeit), which, above all, in their / its current / present-day, as it were, Alexandrian late phase (in ihrer gegenwärtigen gleichsam alexandrinischen Spätphase), [[and]] since all / everything (can be) combined with all / everything, and everyone can argue and or reason with (respect to) or against everyone, a wave of rationality and of rationalisation (eine Rationalitäts- und Rationalisierungswelle) without equal / unequalled / [[previously]] unheard of was set in motion. That of course points to and indicates a phenomenon to (which ought to) be explained in terms of the sociology of knowledge rather than (as) (pointing to and indicating) progress(es) in (the) so-called “substantial rationality” (Das deutet freilich eher auf ein wissenssoziologisch zu erklärendes Phänomen als auf Fortschritte in der sogenannten „substantiellen Rationalität“ hin). Because behind the complexities and the pedantries / pedantry and hair-splitting (Spitzfindigkeiten), which thrive and flourish in (the) argumentative war of all professors and intellectuals against all professors and intellectuals, one discovers, if one – in (the) knowledge of the history of ideas (Geistesgeschichte) – reduces them (i.e. the said complexities and pedantry, hair-splitting) to their structural core and nucleus (auf ihren strukturellen Kern), patterns, models, examples and paradigms (Muster) known long ago. Nothing shows more clearly that rationalisation as the legitimisation (legitimising) through and by means of rationality is mainly and chiefly and principally (a) function of the social relation (Nichts zeigt deutlicher, daß Rationalisierung als Legitimierung durch

Rationalität hauptsächlich Funktion der sozialen Beziehung ist)²⁹.

Rationalisation is not bound and tied to “rationalistic” world-theoretical (world-view) positions (Rationalisierung ist nicht an „rationalistische“ weltanschauliche Positionen gebunden). “Irrationalistic” theories take part (in) and carry on and operate, in their ([own] kind of) way / manner, (with)in rationalisation by offering explanations of phenomena in (the) form of logically consistent theories („Irrationalistische“ Theorien betreiben auf ihre Art Rationalisierung, indem sie Erklärungen von Phänomenen in Form von logisch konsistenten Theorien bieten). As rationalism (der Rationalismus) can never overcome the suspicious paradox that it must declare (the) Reason (die Vernunft) as (the) judge of its own cause (case, (subject) (matter))^{xiii}, so / thus irrationalism (der Irrationalismus) is in/for all eternity, in relation to that, condemned to argue rationally-consistently (rational-konsistent zu argumentieren), e.g. to justify, give reasons for, explain, found, lay the foundations for and establish through arguments the/its higher (cap)ability (in respect) of knowledge, insight and intuition (die höhere Erkenntnisfähigkeit der Intuition durch Argumente zu begründen). The coherence of the argumentation (Die Kohärenz der Argumentation) does not depend on the/a confession of faith in “rationalism” as (a) philosophical tendency or school of thought. It (i.e. the coherence of the argumentation) is imperative, necessary and mandatory through and by means of the necessity of an effective presence in the social space / realm (im sozialen Raum), because whoever does not argue with justification, giving reasons and cohesively and in a self-contained fashion (begründet und geschlossen argumentiert) (irrespective of what he asserts and claims and maintains in terms of content), is not taken seriously or (is not) at all understood – and consequently lets / allows his opponents have their way

²⁹ Regarding / In relation to the content of this paragraph, see Kondylis, *loc. cit.* [= *Macht und Entscheidung*], pp. 96ff., 106ff., as well as „Wissenschaft“.

without hindrance or obstruction^{xiv}. Rationality as (the) (cap)ability for / in respect of / as regards rationalisation constitutes the minimal condition for a somewhat / fairly successful participation in social life. From this fact, (the) “rationalists” (die „Rationalisten“) seek to profit, wanting to monopolise (the) anthropological “rationality” for themselves, and deny them / those who do not accept their theories (the) (cap)ability and capacity for / as regards rational-logical thought / thinking (rational-logischen Denken) in general. But precisely because rationality represents and constitutes an anthropological predisposition (talent, layout, installation, system, structure, construction, aptitude, gift, tendency, investment, facility, arrangement, attachment) (Rationalität eine anthropologische Anlage darstellt), it is by no means exhausted in that part of mankind / humanity which likes to call itself “rationalist(s)”. The struggle between “rationalists” and “irrationalists” (zwischen „Rationalisten“ und „Irrationalisten“) is in reality conducted at a level which stretches above the level of anthropological predispositions, and has to do with content(s) whose contrast and opposition towards/as to one another goes back and is reduced to the constellations (or correlations of forces) in the spectrum of the social relation, i.e. to the forms of the (social) relation between ideas which connect their social identity as theoreticians with questionable (doubtful and debatable) content(s) (auf Konstellationen im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung, d. h. auf Beziehungsformen zwischen Ideen zurückgeht, die ihre soziale Identität als Theoretiker mit fraglichen Inhalten verbinden). The validity, soundness and conclusiveness of the content(s) represented on each and every respective occasion is asserted and claimed on/by both sides with reference to the advantages of a certain ability (capacity, (set of) powers and means) and certain way/manner of knowledge (knowing) (Die Stichhaltigkeit der jeweils vertretenen Inhalte wird von beiden Seiten unter Hinweis auf die Vorzüge eines bestimmten Vermögens und einer bestimmten Erkenntnisweise behauptet). (The) “Rationalists” („Rationalisten“) think and opine that they are (ought) to

be found nearer to rationality and the rational truth (der rationalen Wahrheit) already because they bet and gamble on an intellect (auf einen Intellekt setzen), which by definition is supposed, should and ought to be free of what (the) reason (die Vernunft) generally is of the opinion is dim, dull, blurry, obfuscatory and murky: (the) passions and drives, urges and impulses (Leidenschaften und Triebe); the right and correct usage / use of the intellect vouches for and guarantees, accordingly, in itself, the rationality of the world image or of the ethics (der richtige Gebrauch des Intellekts bürge demnach an sich für die Rationalität des Weltbildes oder der Ethik). "Irrationalists" regard in reply and hold in contrast / contrarily, for their part, (with respect) to the "cold" and "superficial" intellect, the depth of (the) existence and the force and powers of apprehension of existential ways, modes and manners of knowledge and cognition, e.g. (the) intuition, (the) love etc. („Irrationalisten“ halten ihrerseits dem „kalten“ und „oberflächlichen“ Intellekt die Tiefe der Existenz und die Erfassungskraft existentieller Erkenntnisweisen, z. B. der Intuition, der Liebe etc. entgegen). To the accusation of inconsistency and of the lack in fixed (firm, steady or stable) orientation, they counter through and by means of the invocation of a "higher" rationality, which climbs over, goes beyond and exceeds the supposedly narrow-minded and dense and compact horizon of the intellect, and founds the truth of the world image and of the doctrine or teaching of acting, action and the act, or else ethics, better than the intellect (Dem Vorwurf der Inkonsistenz und des Mangels an fester Orientierung begegnen sie durch die Berufung auf eine „höhere“ Rationalität, die den angeblich bornierten Horizont des Intellekts übersteige und die Wahrheit von Weltbild und Handlungslehre bzw. Ethik besser als der Intellekt begründe). The rejection and disapproval of rationalism (Rationalismus) means and signifies, therefore, in concreto (i.e. in a concrete sense), the renunciation and denial of (the) intellectualism (Intellektualismus), not of the work (effort, exertion, task, job) (in respect) of rationalisation (die Rationalisierungsarbeit) as such, although at

the level of the declarations of principle (Grundsatzserklärungen), every or all work (effort, exertion, task, job) (in respect) of rationalisation is disapproved of and reproved in so far as it is regarded as (the) unavoidable flattening and leveling out of the (what is) genuine, authentic, real and the (what is) true (unvermeidliche Verflachung des Echten und Wahren) through and by means of the intellect. This rhetorical rather than practical disapproval and reproach of the work (effort, exertion, task, job) (in respect) of rationalisation is genuinely meant polemically, i.e. through and by means of it certain content-related positions are defended (ist eigentlich polemisch gemeint, d. h. durch sie werden bestimmte inhaltliche Positionen verteidigt), which seem to be endangered and put at risk by rationalisation (Rationalisierung) as such. The struggle against (the) rational thought or intellectual work (die rationale Denkarbeit) does not in actual fact turn against it, (it *cannot* in fact turn against it because there is no alternative to thought / thinking as thought / thinking (Denken als Denken)), but (turns) against the connection or combining of the same (rational thought / intellectual work) with certain content(s) – a connection / combining which in certain (intellectual-historical / historical-intellectual) constellations or conjunctures or correlations of forces (pertaining to the history of ideas) (in gewissen geistesgeschichtlichen Konstellationen) flourishes and thrives so much that the (above-)mentioned content(s) seem to come and emerge from / out of the mere use / usage of rational thought / thinking. But in and during this (their) struggle (of theirs), “irrationalists” („Irrationalisten“) must, as (we have) said, on pain of / subject to the penalty of social irrelevance, bring and put forward against arguments, further arguments, that is to say, consistently and with respect to elementary logical rules, represent, defend, advocate for and support their perceptions, views (opinions, ideas and conceptions) (ihre Auffassungen). They do this also in a carefree and light-hearted manner (light-heartedly), because (the) logical arguing (argumentation or reasoning), seen formally (i.e. in relation to form) (Das tun sie auch unbeschwert, weil das

logische Argumentieren, formal gesehen), does not demand or desire any express concession to (the) content-related theses or topics which on each and every respective occasion are connected and combined with (the) “rationalism” („Rationalismus“). Because logic is not identical with right (correct) or wrong (false), moral or un-moral (i.e. immoral) content(s), but it (i.e. logic) consists in the argumentatively correct unfolding and development of a position, whereby and in relation to which correctness is measured in (regard to)/by form-related (i.e. formal) criteria, e.g. in (regard to)/by (the) lack of logical leaps, ambiguous terms (Denn Logik ist mit keinen richtigen oder falschen, moralischen oder unmoralischen Inhalten identisch, sondern sie besteht in der argumentative korrekten Entfaltung einer Position, wobei Korrektheit an formalen Kriterien gemessen wird, z.B. am Fehlen von logischen Sprüngen, zweideutigen Termini) etc.. That is why “rationalistic” and “irrationalistic” thought / thinking („Rationalistisches“ und „irrationalistisches“ Denken) can unfold and develop equally logically, i.e. possible, eventual or potential logical mistakes or errors would not necessarily come, emerge, arise or result from / out of the / a “rationalistic” or “irrationalistic” confession of faith. Elementary logic does not decide about the character of a thinking / mode of thought, but the contents decide (about the character of a thinking / mode of thought). And (the) logic can be put exactly in the service of all possible positions, because it (i.e. logic) itself does not produce, generate, engender, cause, breed or make them (i.e. all possible positions) (Über den Charakter eines Denkens entscheidet nicht die elementare Logik, sondern entscheiden die Inhalte. Und die Logik kann sich eben deshalb in den Dienst aller möglichen Positionen stellen, weil sie dieselben nicht erzeugt)³⁰.

Just as little as for/in favour of “rationalistic” or “irrationalistic” thought/thinking, does logic have any preferences for/in favour of scientific

³⁰ Regarding the content of this paragraph, see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 36ff.; *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 93ff..

theories with claims (in respect) of/to truth or for/in favour of rationalisations of (an) ideological character. In both cases, it is a matter of *thought* constructs which in (regard to) / during a certain degree of form-related (i.e. formal) processing, hardly differ from each other outwardly / externally; the difference comes to light only through (a) nearer, i.e. closer examination (investigation, scrutiny, trialing, proofing, testing, reviewing) of the content(s). Because here as there (i.e. Because in both cases), thought / thinking proceeds similarly, i.e. on the basis of abstractions, selections, schematisations and hierarchisations, of reductions and analogies (Ebensowenig wie für „rationalistisches“ oder „irrationalistisches“ Denken hat Logik irgendwelche Präferenzen für wissenschaftliche Theorien mit empirischem Wahrheitsanspruch oder für Rationalisierungen ideologischen Charakters. In beiden Fällen handelt es sich um *Denkgebilde*, die sich bei einem gewissen Grad an formaler Bearbeitung äußerlich kaum voneinander unterscheiden; der Unterschied kommt erst durch nähere Prüfung der Inhalte zutage. Denn hier wie da verfährt Denken ähnlich, d. h. an Hand von Abstraktionen, Selektionen, Schematisierungen und Hierarchisierungen, von Reduktionen and Analogien). The same ideational steps, which for the ascertainment, determination and investigation of empirically valid generalisations *must* be (under)taken, can, hence, lead to error, not least of all because rationality at this level and in this form acts (operates, works, is active) as legitimising rationalisation (Dieselben ideellen Schritte, die zur Ermittlung empirisch stichhaltiger Verallgemeinerungen unternommen werden *müssen*, können daher zum Irrtum führen, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil sich Rationalität auf dieser Ebene und in dieser Gestalt als legitimierende Rationalisierung betätigt)^{xv}. Even wishful thinking can be formally (i.e. in terms of form) be built and constructed flawlessly, perfectly and impeccably on the basis of empirically verifiable and provable data – this is not hard, difficult, arduous and troublesome for it (i.e. wishful thinking), but the blatant and flagrant conflict between the pleasure (principle) (principle of pleasure) and the

reality principle (principle of reality) (sondern der eklatante Konflikt zwischen Lust- und Wirklichkeitsprinzip), and often not even / so much as this³¹. As a matter of fact: in view of monumental thought constructions (or constructions of thought/thinking) like e.g. the *Summa theologica*, one can only with (a) very bad will, which self-evidently/of course accompanies a certain perception and view of (the) “true” rationality, deny or contest that in practice everything, –(not excluding) nonsense and mischief (not excluded)–, can be rationalised, even at (a) high form-related (i.e. formal) level (In der Tat: Angesichts von monumentalen Denkkonstruktionen wie z. B. der *Summa theologica* kann man nur bei sehr bösem Willen, der selbstverständlich mit einer bestimmten Auffassung von der „wahren“ Rationalität einhergeht, in Abrede stellen, daß sich praktisch alles, Unfug nicht ausgenommen, sogar auf hohem formalen Niveau rationalisieren läßt). One has denied, disputed and contested the rationality of ideologies (die Rationalität von Ideologien) as (an) (economical-as-to-thought / intellect) apparatus (which is economical as to thought) (als denkökonomischen Apparat) with the argument (that) no-one consciously decides for / in favour of (the) ideological thought/thinking (das ideologische Denken) for the sake of the economy of thought / thinking (um der Denkökonomie willen); if we, again, ascribed / attributed to (the) ideology unconscious rationality (der Ideologie unbewußte Rationalität), thus, we would lapse into a teleological functionalism (einem teleologischen Funktionalismus)³². But precisely the necessary identity of the (above-)mentioned form-related (i.e. formal) features (characteristics) in and during ideological and not ideological / non-ideological thought / thinking makes the question and problem irrelevant (as to) whether here a conscious decision was taken or not – whatever “conscious” may mean / signify; after all,

³¹ Regarding the taking root and rootedness (die Verwurzelung) of “inferential failures” in otherwise unavoidable and inevitable thought methods (or methods of thought/thinking) and thought structures (or structures of thought/thinking), see the good analyses by Nisbett-Ross, *Human Inference*, Ch. 1-3 and 10. Regarding abstraction, selection and hierarchisation as (the) basis both of world images (Weltbildern) in general as well as of (natural-scientific) theories (pertaining to the natural sciences), in particular see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 14ff., as well as „Wissenschaft“.

³² Hence, Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 58.

in fact the conscious decision to not think ideologically, for its part, does not provide or give any guarantee for/of that, (i.e.) that one does it or can do it (i.e. not think ideologically) (Aber gerade die notwendige Identität der erwähnten formalen Merkmale beim ideologischen und nicht ideologischen Denken macht die Frage irrelevant, ob hier eine bewußte Entscheidung getroffen wurde oder nicht – was „bewußt“ auch bedeuten mag; schließlich bietet ja die bewußte Entscheidung, nicht ideologisch zu denken, ihrerseits keine Garantie dafür, daß man es tut oder tun kann). In and during the construction / building / structuring of world-theoretical thought/intellectual constructs through and by means of rationalisation, (the) decision functions not in the usual sense of the choice between existing and known alternatives, but as (a) de-cision (de-cisio), namely, as (an) act or process of separation and segregation and isolation, whereby and in relation to which the/an identity separates and divides for itself (the / what is) relevant from (the / what is) irrelevant, and through and by means of abstractions, schematisations and hierarchisations creates a world image, which grants, gives and affords it the (a) necessary (cap)ability at/(in respect) of orientation for (social) self-preservation (Beim Aufbau von weltanschaulichen Denkgebilden durch Rationalisierung fungiert Entscheidung nicht im üblichen Sinne der Wahl zwischen bestehenden und bekannten Alternativen, sondern als Ent-scheidung (de-cisio), nämlich als Absonderungsakt oder -vorgang, wodurch die Identität das für sich Relevante vom Irrelevanten trennt und durch Abstraktionen, Schematisierungen und Hierarchisierungen sich ein Weltbild schafft, welches ihr die zur (sozialen) Selbsterhaltung nötige Orientierungsfähigkeit gewährt). Thus seen, all men (i.e. all humans) decide (make a decision), and not only the chosen^{xvi} bearers (carriers) of (the) existential “authenticity or authentic being”, as existentialist and militant decisionists (i.e. decision-takers or decision-makers) believe (So gesehen, entscheiden sich alle Menschen und nicht nur die auserwählten Träger der existenziellen „Eigentlichkeit“, wie Existenzialisten und militante Dezisionisten

glauben)³³. In this ubiquitous act or process of the de-cision (In diesem ubiquitären Ent-scheidungsakt oder -vorgang), rationalisation undertakes exactly the task of building (the) more or less fixed, firm, steady and stable bridges between (the / what is) “conscious” and (the / what is) “unconscious” (zwischen „Bewußtem“ und „Unbewußtem“), whereby and in relation to which it (i.e. the said rationalisation) draws its good conscience (ihr gutes Gewissen) also from / out of the fact that it makes use of – in accordance with anthropological criteria – normal means of thought (or normal intellectual means). We should not or ought not to, incidentally, if we want to remain in / with the conventional separation (division) between (the / what is) unconscious and (the / what is) conscious, underestimate the independent, self-sufficient, self-reliant and autonomous activity of the latter (conscious) in and during the formation and development of world-theoretical rationalisation (die selbständige Tätigkeit des letzteren bei der Herausbildung von weltanschaulicher Rationalisierung). The subject can be led and guided in (regard to) its kinds of acting, actions and acts by already crystallised(-out) individual or collective rationalisations, not seldom, however, it determines through calculus, i.e. calculation, which rationalisations can give wing(s) to, i.e. inspire, spur on, quicken and justify the / its intended action (Das Subjekt läßt sich in seinen Handlungen von bereits herauskristallisierten individuellen oder kollektiven Rationalisierungen leiten, nicht selten bestimmt es aber durch Kalkül, welche Rationalisierungen das beabsichtigte Handeln beflügeln und rechtfertigen können); if, for instance, ends-goals are rationalised on the basis of values, thus it also occurs that values are judged and evaluated consciously in regard to their expediency, usefulness, relevance, pertinence, purposefulness and the serving of (an-)end(s)/goal(s), sometimes even in (regard to) / with (a) moral intent(ion) (one rejects and disapproves of, e.g., a strict ethic(s) (in

³³ In relation to that, Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 7ff; „Jurisprudenz“, p. 354ff..

respect) of mindset (mentality, way of thinking, views, attitude, conviction, persuasion) exactly because of its supposed fateful, fated, disastrous, catastrophic and ominous consequences for the well-being, welfare and good of most men, i.e. people (wenn etwa Zwecke an Hand von Werten rationalisiert werden, so kommt es auch vor, daß Werte bewußt im Hinblick auf ihre Zweckdienlichkeit beurteilt werden, manchmal sogar in moralischer Absicht (man lehnt z. B. eine strenge Gesinnungsethik eben wegen ihrer vermuteten verhängnisvollen Folgen für das Wohl der meisten Menschen ab)). The decision to handle and treat facts or values instrumentally, i.e. to place or put them in the service of a rationalisation through (their) being put in order, classification or through (their) exclusion (Die Entscheidung, Tatsachen oder Werte instrumentell zu behandeln, d. h. sie durch Einordnung oder durch Ausschluß in den Dienst einer Rationalisierung zu stellen), can very well (probably, no doubt, arguably) be conscious, however, one becomes master (i.e. tamer) of the unease, discomfort, queasiness and malaise coming into being and arising from/out of that, because / as a result of the fact that the consciousness, awareness and deliberateness (Bewußtheit) of the decision is driven and relegated to (and suppressed and repressed in) the unconscious (ins Unbewußte verdrängt wird): the actor “does not want to admit, accept or believe” that his deed, doing and act (sein Tun) started from / is the result (corollary, aftereffect) of a conscious decision. He behaves thus, “as if he would have / had / did not know(n) anything (he knew nothing)”. Not only does the unconscious steer, guide, drive and direct the conscious, the conscious also sometimes determines what belongs in the unconscious (Nicht nur das Unbewußte lenkt das Bewußte, auch das Bewußte bestimmt manchmal, was ins Unbewußte gehört). This is, from a broader perspective, better understood if we visualise, imagine and make clear to ourselves that at the level of intellectual-spiritual acts (auf der Ebene der geistigen Akte) bringing about rationalisations, rationality basically is active and basically acts in the same manner as / like at the level of intellectual-

spiritual acts which steer, guide, drive and direct external or outer action (äußere Handeln) and in the world of the social relation grant, give, allow, offer, afford and accord orientation (und in der Welt der sozialen Beziehung Orientierung gewähren). A functionalistically apprehended teleology is not at work here (Nicht eine funktionalistisch erfaßbare Teleologie ist hier am Werk), which satisfies (pre-existing) (ideological) needs (existing in advance) (die im voraus vorhandene (ideologische) Bedürfnisse befriedigt), but it is a matter of more or less changing, alternating and variable ideational answers to the ideational challenges or provocations which the social relation sets, whereby and in relation to which their concrete character determines which (relative) importance or (place) value falls to or befits the ideational in and during the friendly or inimical meeting/encounter of (the) actors with one another on each and every respective occasion (sondern es handelt sich um mehr oder weniger wechselnde ideelle Antworten auf die ideellen Herausforderungen, die die soziale Beziehung stellt, wobei deren konkreter Charakter bestimmt, welcher Stellenwert dem Ideellen bei der freundlichen oder feindlichen Begegnung der Akteure miteinander jeweils zukommt). World-theoretical rationalisations are, just as much as other forms of the ideational, crystallised social relations (Weltanschauliche Rationalisierungen sind ebensosehr wie andere Gestalten des Ideellen kristallisierte soziale Beziehungen), i.e. not simply something wherein social relations are “reflected or mirrored”, but an articulation of the positionings and stances of the rationalising actor towards / in relation to the rationalised positionings and stances of other actors (d. h. nicht einfach etwas, worin sich soziale Beziehungen „widerspiegeln“, sondern eine Artikulierung von Stellungnahmen des rationalisierenden Akteurs zu den rationalisierten Stellungnahmen anderer Akteure). Accordingly, it is social-ontologically indifferent / unimportant (as to) whether the/a world theory (i.e. world view) is taken at nominal value, i.e. face-value, if it postulates the (onto)logical primacy of the extra-human (i.e. outside-of-the-human) (world) or of the human world

(very often the former happens in order to underpin and shore up (fortify), –by invoking higher(-standing) tiers of jurisdiction, i.e. authorities–, (the,) in practice, decisive statements or propositions regarding (the) essence and duties of man (i.e. humans)) (Es ist deshalb sozialontologisch gleichgültig, ob die Weltanschauung im Nominalwert genommen, das (onto)logische Primat der außermenschlichen oder der menschlichen Welt postuliert (sehr oft geschieht ersteres, um die praktisch entscheidenden Aussagen über Wesen und Pflichten des Menschen unter Berufung auf höherstehende Instanzen zu untermauern)). Either way, the human world, the world of the social relation, therefore, represents and constitutes the motor, driving force and the reason for the formation and development of such – and all – thought (intellectual) constructs (So oder so stellt die menschliche Welt, die Welt der sozialen Beziehung also, den Motor und den Grund zur Herausbildung solcher – und aller – Denkgebilde dar). Only men (i.e. humans) can – vis-à-vis other men, towards / in relation to whom they want to step/enter into a certain relation – assert that God, (the) Nature, (the) History or (the) Ethical Law should or ought and or are supposed to guide, direct and lead (the) doings and leaving/omissions (i.e. the activities, movements, actions and behaviour(s)) of men (i.e. humans)) (Nur Menschen können – gegenüber anderen Menschen, zu denen sie in eine bestimmte Beziehung treten wollen – behaupten, daß Gott, die Natur, die Geschichte oder das ethische Gesetz Tun und Lassen der Menschen leiten sollen).

Since a world-theoretical thought (intellectual) construct must offer a synthesis of world-, meaning- and practical teaching (i.e. theory, teaching and doctrine pertaining to the world, meaning and praxis / practice), thus the work of rationalisation aims first and foremost at working out, elaborating and formulating the logical consistency between these levels, whereby and in relation to which the (intellectual-historical) relevance to the present and topicality (pertaining to the history of ideas) determines the main focus, main

emphasis and centre of gravity of the thought/intellectual effort / endeavour (Da ein weltanschauliches Denkgebilde eine Synthese von Welt-, Sinn- und praktischer Lehre bieten muß, so zielt die Rationalisierungsarbeit vornehmlich darauf ab, die logische Konsistenz zwischen diesen Ebenen auszuarbeiten, wobei die geistesgeschichtliche Aktualität die Schwerpunkte der Denkbemühung bestimmt). As (we have) said, difficulties and failures in action arise and result from asymmetries between the rationality of the assumptions, upon which the goal/end-setting (the setting of a goal/end) rests, the rationality of the end/goal in the sense of its reachability, attainability and achievability and of the rationality of the means in the sense of their expediency, usefulness, relevance, pertinence, purposefulness and their serving of (an-)end(s)/goal(s) (Wie gesagt, ergeben sich Schwierigkeiten und Mißerfolge im Handeln nicht zuletzt aus Asymmetrien zwischen der Rationalität der Annahmen, auf denen die Zwecksetzung beruht, der Rationalität der Zwecke im Sinne ihrer Erreichbarkeit und der Rationalität der Mittel im Sinne ihrer Zweckdienlichkeit).

Rationalisation manages and effects, though, the unity of these rationalities only ideationally (nur ideell), and it cannot give any tangible guarantees. In actual fact it is difficult to see how one out of the reason of/for the world (aus dem Weltgrund)(,) or the/a generally formulated moral law (oder dem allgemein formulierten Moralgesetz)(,) is supposed to be able to deduce and derive hic et nunc (here and now) without the mediation or intervention/intercession of other tiers of jurisdiction / authorities(,) or without one's own activity (in respect) of / as to interpretation, instructions (in respect) of/for successful action. In this respect the unity, which is produced, established, fabricated, manufactured or restored between the world-theoretical levels through and by means of rationalisation can only be a feigned or faked (unity). This does not at all mean, however, that everyone who acts by invoking (the) world-theoretical rationalisation must in reality fail. Here the mechanisms are activated anew which enable and facilitate (the) effective action in and during unreachable,

unattainable and unachievable nominal ends-goals. From / Out of the analysis of the previous (sub-)section, we know how those mechanisms function: the world-theoretical fundamental or basic principles are honoured, upheld and preserved nominally, but (f)actually are abandoned or interpreted in such a manner that they can be imparted, given or conveyed (mediated or interposed) with (respect to) reachable, attainable and achievable ends-goals. General convictions about the world and (the) men (i.e. humans) are – through and by means of smaller or greater logical leaps (durch kleinere oder größere logische Sprünge), which need new rationalisations (die neuer Rationalisierungen bedürfen) – in practice translated into usable and realisable maxims, whilst the ultimate world-theoretical ends-goals are diverted, directed or re-routed accordingly. The general world-theoretical schema is hence pressed and moulded more or less neatly (elegantly, smartly, sleekly) into the narrower schema: “reachable, achievable and attainable ends/goals-means”. Before or against the background of this possibility or rather this common and familiar praxis, it is by no means settled that the representatives of a “rationalistic (rationalistischen)” world theory (i.e. world view) must (necessarily) be at an advantage in principle in the practical field or realm. Whoever, e.g., sincerely believes in the nonsense and rubbish of the Trinity dogma [or dogma of the Holy Trinity in Christianity] (an den Blödsinn des Trinitätsdogmas)^{xvii}, may / can perhaps conduct, direct or run a business and or company more effectively than someone for whom only scientific answers to (the) ultimate questions and problems may or should or ought to claim validity (für den nur wissenschaftliche Antworten auf die letzten Fragen Geltung beanspruchen dürfen). (The) world-theoretical belief or faith in rationalism (Der weltanschauliche Glaube an den Rationalismus) does not vouch for and guarantee superior social rationality (überlegene soziale Rationalität). Rather it (i.e. the said world-theoretical belief/faith in rationalism) has merely the same symbolic status as every other comparable belief or faith as well, i.e. it connects

or combines itself symbolically with an identity, which with its (i.e. the said identity's) help shows and displays, states and declares its friendship with other (identities) or its enmity towards other identities, without it (i.e. the said world-theoretical belief/faith in rationalism), in and during concrete action, being taken at its nominal, i.e. face value unconditionally, and, in the course of this, (without it (i.e. this belief / faith)) necessarily being the deciding factor (ohne daß er beim konkreten Handeln unbedingt in seinem Nominalwert genommen werden und dabei den Ausschlag geben muß)^{xviii}.

d. Rationality as disposition and self-control and rationality as psychological rationalisation (justification) and (the) logic of identity (Rationalität als Disposition und Selbstkontrolle und Rationalität als psychologische Rationalisierung und Logik der Identität)

(The) Rationality constitutes an anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) (Die Rationalität bildet eine anthropologische Anlage), its differentiation in(to) levels, forms and degrees (in Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade) begins, however, already with the fact that every single man (i.e. human) possesses his own disposition for (towards, in relation to) rationality (jeder einzelne Mensch seine eigene Disposition zur Rationalität besitzt). The disposition for rationality is, therefore, the mode, manner and way of the existence of (the) rationality as (an) anthropological pre-disposition in every single man (i.e. human) (Die Disposition zur Rationalität ist also die Existenzweise der Rationalität als anthropologischer Anlage in jedem einzelnen Menschen). From / Out of the ubiquity of the pre-disposition (Anlage), the equality of the disposition (Disposition) cannot be derived and deduced, as the generally (well-)known, but still difficult-to-explain (explainable-with-difficulty) fact teaches us that there are the philistines (low-brows, "peasants",

boorishly uncultured) and the virtuosos of (the) rationality (die Banausen und die Virtuosen der Rationalität), [[and]] in between them there are many mediocre ones (i.e. mediocre practitioners / users of rationality) too/as well. That by no means implies that (the) men (i.e. humans, people) can be put into order and class(ifi)ed in a fixed, steady and stable hierarchy (made to measure/fit) according to their individual disposition (in respect) of/as to rationality. This would also be possible only with regard to a single criterion (in respect) of classification and a single area or realm of unfolding and development of (the) (disposition (in respect) of) rationality. Just as little as rationality in general, the disposition in relation to that (rationality) can be defined once and for all, i.e. without consideration of levels, forms and degrees (Ebensowenig wie Rationalität überhaupt läßt sich die Disposition dazu ein für allemal, d. h. ohne Rücksicht auf Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade definieren). One can, though, divide it (i.e. the pre-disposition for rationality) roughly into types, and put into a combination / connect every one of them with a certain type of rationality. A disposition for rationality in (the) form/shape of logical consistency (in Gestalt logischer Konsistenz) and (the/a) form-related (i.e. formal) drawing-up, working-out and elaboration (Ausarbeitung) obviously differ(s) typologically from a disposition in the form/shape of (the) rapid/quick comprehension and (the) skilled/skillful/clever handling of unique (singular) situations (und geschickten Handhabung von einmaligen Situationen). Also, the disposition for “substantial rationality” („substantiellen Rationalität“) is something other than/different to that (disposition) for “functional rationality” („funktionellen Rationalität“): the former (“substantial rationality”) means (the) (cap)ability as to and capacity for insight into the interrelation and correlation and (inter)connection of events, incidents and occurrences and great/large contexts in general, the latter (“functional rationality”) is (the) talent in relation to (the) organisation of a row or series of (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts so that they lead to a prescribed aim and objective (Erstere heißt Fähigkeit zur

Einsicht in den Zusammenhang von Ereignissen und in große Zusammenhänge überhaupt, letztere ist Talent zur Organisation einer Reihe von Handlungen so, daß sie zu einem vorgeschriebenen Ziel führt)³⁴. A typology of such dispositions would come near/close to a characterology (Eine Typologie solcher Dispositionen würde einer Charakterologie nahekomen), yet the theoretical yield (fruits, returns, profit) would remain meagre, especially (then) when/if one wanted to (make) use (of) it as (a) framework of orientation (als Orientierungsrahmen) in the dizzy (giddy, astronomical, vertiginous) great variety (and multiformity) of (the) concrete phenomena (occurrences, appearances) (der konkreten Erscheinungen). Because in no man, i.e. human, does the disposition for rationality (Disposition zur Rationalität) exist unmixed and unblended with competing elements, from man to man (i.e. human to human) the disposition of the same kind of rationality (Art von Rationalität) changes gradually, in the same man (i.e. human) the disposition for a type of rationality takes on and adopts/assumes individual features, attributes and characteristics, and is activated in – on each and every respective occasion – different degrees of intensity and of clarity. In short, the disposition of rationality exhibits still/even more forms and degrees than there are men (i.e. humans), since it (i.e. rationality) does not only change from man to man (i.e. human to human), but also in the same man (i.e. human). It (i.e. rationality) is connected on each and every respective occasion with an individual endowment or talent (gift, (cap)ability) (Begabung) and with the area or realm of unfolding and of development of this endowment/talent (und mit dem Entfaltungsbereich dieser Begabung); it (i.e. the said endowment/talent/ability) falls/is, therefore, different(ly) in/to the astronomer than in/to the thief, and in each of them, it, again, concerns a certain property (quality, feature, characteristic) or dimension (Eigenschaft oder Dimension); whoever, for instance, possesses the/a

³⁴ Mannheim, *Mensch*, p. 61ff..

disposition for rational self-control (rationalen Selbstkontrolle), does not, because of that, necessarily have, eo ipso, at his disposal the disposition for (the) rational research into / investigation of nature. Just as there cannot be (“the”) “rationality” in abstracto, i.e. with (a) ubiquitous claim of application, so too there is no (“the”) “disposition” for rationality, which penetrates, pervades and permeates (a) man (i.e. humans) as (a) whole, and makes him capable of (the) rational coping, management and coming to terms with (regard to) all (only, just, merely) conceivable, imaginable and thinkable situations (and positions) (aller nur denkbaren Lagen). The higher disposition for rationality may not even be equated with (the) higher intelligence (Intelligenz), naturally, also not with the ethical level (standard, grade, rating) (dem ethischen Niveau) of a character. Higher intelligence or ethical level attest to only specific dispositions for rationality, they do not make up and constitute a common denominator for the unification of all these dispositions under the rubric (of) “disposition for rationality” („Disposition zur Rationalität“).

The great variety and multiformity of the dispositions for rationality is obviously (a) function of the constitutive plasticity of (the) human being (creature, character, essence, nature, entity). This same plasticity, which makes man (i.e. humans) (an) animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), gives, grants, lends to and confers upon his rationality and his disposition, in relation to that, numerous (a great many, a large number of) levels, forms and degrees (Die Vielfalt der Dispositionen zur Rationalität ist offenbar Funktion der konstitutiven Plastizität des menschlichen Wesens. Dieselbe Plastizität, die den Menschen zum animal rationale macht, verleiht seiner Rationalität und seiner Disposition dazu zahlreiche Ebenen, Gestalten und Grade). Otherwise turned (i.e. Put/Said differently, Conversely, The other way around): with regard to the disposition for rationality, the plasticity of the human being (creature, character, essence, nature, entity) not only signifies/means that this disposition takes on

and adopts multiple / several forms, but also, that any / every one of these forms is in itself plastic (jede dieser Formen in sich plastisch ist), whether it maintains and keeps up a narrower/tighter or looser, in any case, permanent relation towards / in relation to that which we, indeed, in itself define with difficulty, yet [[which]] can empirically fix and attach to individual men (i.e. humans): (the) character as (an/the) ensemble (whole, total, sum, aggregate) of relatively stable basic and fundamental stances (outlooks, approaches, attitudes) and recurring modes of behaviour, which survive the/a change/changing of/in the situation (den Charakter als Ensemble von relativ stabilen Grundhaltungen und wiederkehrenden Verhaltensweisen, die den Wechsel der Situation überleben). The inner / internal plasticity of the disposition for this or that form of rationality says (i.e. means) that dispositions may not be looked at as once-and-for-all given magnitudes, from which (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts can be deduced (recti)lineally and simultaneously a priori. Certainly, in some cases the actor out of/from (i.e. based on) (his) force of character (aus Charakterkraft) or out of (his) in(cap)ability to do something intellectually-spiritually (which is) more demanding/exacting, follows his disposition, and has, with that, success, or he fails. It is, nevertheless, by no means settled / a deal (i.e. certain) that the disposition must always have the last word, its firmness, stability, steadfastness and resolve is accidental rather than substantial (akzidentiell als substantiell). It (i.e. the said disposition) can, anyhow, only assert and impose itself in and during smaller or larger losses against the logic of the situation, and it is lost or else it unfolds and develops its plasticity when the actor nolens volens (i.e. willingly or not) decides to take into consideration primarily that logic. Because that is rationality too – namely, to follow the objective rationality of the situation and not the subjective disposition for a certain kind of rationality (nämlich der objektiven Rationalität der Situation und nicht der subjektiven

Disposition zu einer bestimmten Art von Rationalität zu folgen)³⁵. Not otherwise it stands in general (i.e. Things are not different in general) when we modify and adapt fixed dispositions (festen Dispositionen) (in regard) to rational convictions (rationale Überzeugungen), and rational wishes (rationale Wünsche) resting and being based on those (rational convictions). In accordance with this view (opinion, idea and conception), the convictions of the actor must, already because of the logical necessities of the combining and connection of thoughts or else propositions with one another, exhibit rational consistency (rationale Konsistenz), whilst his wishes have to behave, i.e. act in principle (or fundamentally) consistently towards / regarding / in relation to the logical consistency of the convictions; the logically structured content(s) of the convictions and wishes penetrate, pervade, permeate and rationalise (i.e. make rational) the intentional acting, action and act (die logisch strukturierten Inhalte der Überzeugungen und Wünsche durchdringen und rationalisieren die intentionale Handlung)³⁶. The actor is supposed to bear and carry in himself this supply, store or these reserves (diesen Vorrat) of rational convictions and wishes like a (military) field kit or a portfolio from situation to situation and draw from that stable criteria for the determination of the imperative, mandatory and necessary course of action on each and every respective occasion, which would, hence, result and ensue from / out of those criteria with similar consistency and congruity (Folgerichtigkeit) as the conclusion of an argument from / out of its premises. This “portfolio model of the actor” misjudges, fails to appreciate and underestimates, underrates the same praxeological factor as the (recti)linear deduction and derivation of kinds of acting, actions and acts from dispositions, namely, the specialised techniques which are brought, worked and carved out and elaborated by the actor for the coming to terms and coping with new kinds of concrete situations (and positions) (Lage), and, in the course of

³⁵ See Ch. II, Section 2Ccd as well as Ch. IV, footnote 395, above.

³⁶ Thus, Davidson, “Rational animals”, p. 475 ff..

this, surpass and outstrip not only fixed, stationary and established convictions and wishes, but also give the impetus for the coming into being of new (convictions and wishes). The rationality of acting, action and the act or of behaviour, which must hold good and be proved in (regard to) the logic of the situation (Situation), may or should not, without more, be deduced from the rationality of the basic and fundamental attitude or approach, which has to do with a supposedly stable or even innate (inborn) neutral state (of affairs) (condition and situation) of the actor (darf also nicht ohne weiteres aus der Rationalität der Grundeinstellung deduziert werden, die mit einem angeblich stabilen oder gar angeborenen neutralen Zustand des Akteurs zu tun hat)³⁷.

³⁷ Cf. Hindess, *Choice*, esp. pp. 44, 48ff., 86ff., 96, who critically investigates and examines Davidson's "portfolio model of the actor". Regarding the distinction between "behavioural rationality" and "attitudinal rationality", which Hindess also uses, see Macdonald-Pettit, *Semantics*, p. 59ff.. The unmediated connection of behavioural rationality and attitudinal rationality with each other is accompanied in Davidson with the misjudgement and underestimation of intent(ion) (Absicht) as (the/a) necessary middle / connecting joint / link (Mittelglied) between convictions and/or wishes and acting, action and the act (see Ch. IV, footnotes 411, 412 above.): Intent(ion) leads, guides, steers and directs exactly the development of (the) behavioural rationality, which in Davidson seems to be (the/a) mere appendage of (the) attitudinal rationality. In actual fact, Davidson's deduction of the former (behavioural rationality) from the latter (attitudinal rationality) reminds one/us of the method of explanation of the "covering law model" [[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): BECAUSE ZIO-JOOZ AND ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOOZ WANT TO PRE-DETERMINE "RIGHT AND WRONG", "TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD", "JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE" ETC. ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN POWER CLAIMS AT ANY PARTICULAR GIVEN TIME, AND THEREFORE CANNOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION SEES AN OPEN FIELD OF POSSIBLE HUMAN ACTION WITHOUT ANY AXIOLOGICAL-ETHICAL-AESTHETIC PREFERENCE FOR ANYONE OR ANYTHING]]. Davidson, though, shared (i.e. accepted) the objections raised against that (i.e. his deduction of behavioural rationality from attitudinal rationality), and rightly stressed, in the process, that the supposed laws which the model summons for the explanation of rational kinds of acting, actions and acts is factually deduced and derived from/out of the generalisation of individual dispositions, whilst rational kinds of acting, actions and acts are regarded as cases of (the) application of laws won/gained/obtained/got in such a manner. Rational action does not go back and is not reduced to generalisable dispositions, however, but to rational convictions and wishes which characterise one sole actor and not – as laws – several/multiple/many actors or even the whole human race (*Essays*, pp. 265ff., 274). But at the level of the individual actor, Davidson – looked at in terms of form and even though/although he replaced the rational disposition with rational convictions and wishes – proceeded in a way similar to Hempel, who made out of (the) rational disposition a generally valid "covering law". Hempel's argumentation is, incidentally, (also) logically ambiguous (as well, too). In order to make use of / exploit the "covering law model" praxeologically, he put, as (we have) said, the rational disposition in the place of normatively understood rationality, because, as he rightly opined/thought, this can only specify/indicate/state/declare what every rational actor in a situation X would do, and makes merely probable (likely, plausible) that actor A in the same situation would act in the same way; it, however, does not in the least prove that A in actual fact (had) acted as such/in such a manner (*Aspects*, pp. 464ff., 470ff.). But precisely such an argument strikes the logic of the "covering law model" itself in the heart (i.e. fatally), which can likewise only specify/indicate/state/declare what every actor would have had to do/have done, and not what actor A in actual fact had done/did. The defect/deficiency hardly remedies/rectifies/redresses the replacement of (the) normative rationality by the/a rational disposition. Because either dispositions are individual and are then not suitable/no good as (the/an) explanation through/by means of (a) law, or they get

One of the fundamental dispositions for rationality or else one of the fundamental forms of (the) rationality is the permanent and the practised, trained, skilled capacity and (cap)ability in relation to self-control (Eine der grundlegenden Dispositionen zur Rationalität bzw. eine der grundlegenden Gestalten der Rationalität ist die permanente und geübte Fähigkeit zur Selbstkontrolle). In (regard to) this ascertainment, anthropological-social-ontological findings meet still one more time in best agreement, understanding, comity, concert (i.e. on the best of terms and in perfect harmony) with age-old, ancient and always topical (current) commonplaces of (the) popular and elevated and exalted (i.e. higher) social ethics and life wisdom (i.e. sagacity in respect of life/living) (In dieser Feststellung treffen sich nochmals in bestem Einvernehmen anthropologisch-sozialontologische Befunde mit uralten und immer aktuellen Gemeinplätzen der populären und gehobenen Sozialethik und Lebensweisheit), which has always / ever since time immemorial / for donkey's years highlighted the social worth/value of the survival (in respect) of that capacity and (cap)ability, and at the same time has translated/converted/transposed its general kinds of knowledge into specialised commands (keep your mouth shut, exercise patience etc. etc.) (die den sozialen Überlebenswert jener Fähigkeit seit eh und je besonders hervorgehoben und zugleich ihre allgemeinen Erkenntnisse in spezialisierte Gebote umgesetzt hat (Mund halten, Geduld üben etc. etc.)); the first formulations of such commonplaces in high cultures (i.e. developed and advanced civilisations) bear witness especially in relation (to the fact) that the animal rationale (rational animal) already in his oldest self-descriptions knew wherein his specific features, traits and characteristics consist (die ersten Formulierungen solcher Gemeinplätze in den Hochkulturen zeugen besonders davon, daß das animal rationale bereits in

tangled up and embroiled/involved in the thicket, labyrinth, jungle of different situations and they then lose the clear outlines/contours of the/a law.

seinen ältesten Selbstbeschreibungen wußte, worin seine spezifischen Züge bestehen)³⁸ – or the other way around: it was precisely these features, characteristics and traits which suggested such self-descriptions and corresponding deontologies (or teachings, doctrines and theories of duty (ethics)) (oder anders herum: Es waren gerade diese Züge, die solche Selbstbeschreibungen und entsprechende Pflichtlehren nahelegten). In (an) anthropological-social-ontological respect, it is easily understood why self-control belongs to the core of rationality in general (In anthropologisch-sozialontologischer Hinsicht ist leicht verständlich, warum Selbstkontrolle zum Kern der Rationalität überhaupt gehört). If rationality is based on the capacity for and (cap)ability (in respect) of the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, and if only this postponement (delay or deferment) creates space and makes room for the unfolding and development of the end(goal)-means-schema, then that which enables and makes possible the postponement (delay or deferment), namely self-control, must also be thought of together with rationality (Wenn Rationalität in der Fähigkeit zum Aufschub der Befriedigung gründet und wenn erst dieser Aufschub Raum zur Entfaltung des Zweck-Mittel-Schemas schafft, dann muß auch das, was den Aufschub ermöglicht, nämlich die Selbstkontrolle, mit der Rationalität zusammengedacht werden). From this perspective, it can be said with good ground(s)/reason that a man is so much/all the less rational, the slighter/lesser his capacity and (cap)ability is in postponing (delaying or deferring), should the occasion arise/if necessary/if need be, the satisfaction of his needs, in subjecting and subordinating short-term needs to long-term (needs), and in bridging the distance between short-(term) and long-term (needs) with expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) activity (In dieser Perspektive läßt sich mit gutem Grund sagen, ein Mensch sei umso weniger rational, je geringer seine Fähigkeit ist,

³⁸ An abundance/A plethora/Plenty of such attestations and evidence are found in Hertzler, *Social Thought*.

gegebenenfalls die Befriedigung seiner Bedürfnisse aufzuschieben, kurzfristige Bedürfnisse langfristigen zu unterwerfen und den Abstand zwischen kurz- und langfristigen mit zweckdienlicher Tätigkeit zu überbrücken). From the same perspective, the trite and hackneyed word/saying that one should behave like a man (i.e. human), and not like an animal, obtains/gets/receives its actual meaning. We are touching upon, here, the roots of ethics, which cannot exist in any form without taking (a) position in one way or another in relation to the question and problem of self-control of man (i.e. humans) (In derselben Perspektive erhält auch das abgedroschene Wort seinen eigentlichen Sinn, man solle sich wie ein Mensch und nicht wie ein Tier benehmen. Wir rühren hier offenbar an den Wurzeln der Ethik, die in keiner Form bestehen kann, ohne zur Frage der Selbstkontrolle des Menschen so oder so Stellung zu nehmen).

Because whoever thinks/opines that (the) man is (out) of (his) nature “good”, and would gain, obtain, reach, get, acquire ethics through and by means of the unhindered, unchecked, unobstructed unfolding and development of his “good” pre-dispositions (talents, aptitudes or gifts), he must admit/concede/confess that this, hic et nunc (i.e. here and now), i.e. without (the) previous/prior setting / putting aside, elimination, disposal, removal, sidelining of (the) [[existing]] socially deplorable (bad) state of affairs (nuisances, grievances, anomalies, outrages, defects, malaises) (ohne vorherige Beseitigung sozialer Mißstände) and the – thereby / through that / in this way – (resulting) “distortion” of man’s (i.e. humans’) “true” nature (caused / brought about) (und der dadurch verursachten „Verzerrung“ der „wahren“ Natur des Menschen)(,) is not possible; until it (i.e. the unhindered unfolding of man’s “good” pre-dispositions) becomes possible, man (i.e. humans), therefore, must continue to act against, counter and oppose – through and by means of self-control – the distortion of his true nature. Only in a – paradisiacal or animal/bestial – state (of affairs), in which every [[kind of]] self-control would be superfluous, would ethics (Ethik) also be completely superfluous, in fact incomprehensible,

unintelligible and unthinkable (unimaginable and inconceivable). When we now in this manner/way do justice to ethics and its traditions, thus, we must, on the other hand, point to the seemingly, in any case / anyhow, momentous, seminal and far-reaching paradox that ethics and technique (technology) (Ethik und Technik) (in the sense of the end/goal-means-schema) spring, originate and arise from the same source, from/out of which all forms of rationality emerge and come too/as well, and, in fact, in many cases/frequently they overlap and intersect with one another. The figure of Odysseus stands/is paradigmatical for/regarding/in regard to the age-old insight (understanding, knowledge and perception) that rationality can also be (a) technique (technology) free of / without ethical attributes, which just like the rationality of ethics presupposes an overcoming of (the) instinctive “animal-bestial” behaviour (of immediate, direct pleasure (enjoyment), whatever the cost is). In the hiatus (gap, chasm) between drive-urge-impulse-like (or impulsive(-driven) and or compulsive) need and satisfaction (Im Hiatus zwischen triebhaftem Bedürfnis und Befriedigung), in the hampering, checking and obstruction of the drive, urge, impulse (in der Hemmung des Triebes) and through and by means of the same hampering etc., ethics and technique (technology^{xix}) come into being in the same move, and their differentiation from each other will never be complete. The schema end/goal-means runs and bumps into and comes across its own application in (regard to) (its) very narrow / tight bound(arie)s when the capacity for and (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction does not care for [[the fact]] that preference can be given not to the first best, but, possibly only to long-term ends/goals and (the) corresponding chosen means; and ethical life (ethisches Leben) starts, for its part, in / during / with the same postponement (delay or deferment): whoever does not possess the capacity and (cap)ability in relation to that (i.e. the postponement of satisfaction in regard to long-term ends/goals), cannot regret any acting, action or act and cannot be liable and responsible for any acting, action or act.

On the other hand, the blood relationship, kinship and consanguinity (Blutsverwandtschaft)^{xx} of/between ethics and technique (technology) against the background/backdrop of their common origin(s) makes itself felt in a positive and in a negative sense. The positive (sense) is obvious: ethics may look down at (the) mere technique (technology) and (the) “instrumental thought / thinking (instrumentelle Denken)” and denounce, pillory and smear its “fateful, fatal consequences (verhängnisvollen Folgen)”, at the same time, it itself, however, at every turn, makes use of/uses the schema “end/goal-means”, and in fact gets tangled and caught up and embroiled in the paradoxes discussed above. Because the fact that there is (in general) an ethics (at all) and ethical commands are put forward (constructed, put together, erected), means exactly that the ethical ends/goals were/have not been yet (completely, totally) realised, they, therefore, are still/yet to be realised. That is why the question is automatically posed as to the suitable e.g. religious or Enlightenment(-related) means for (the) attainment and achievement of these ends/goals, whereby and in relation to which the paradoxes (in respect) of acting, action and the act, i.e. the conversion of the means into (new) ends/goals and the heterogony of ends (die Verwandlung der Mittel in (neue) Zwecke und die Heterogonie der Zwecke) are founded on the fact that the state (of affairs) or situation/condition in which the ethical ends/goals are formulated differs qualitatively from that (state of affairs) which is supposed or ought to come/emerge/result out of/from the realisation of these ends/goals. On the sharp dividing line (borderline, line of separation / demarcation) between both states of affairs, the breaking of the wave of acting, action and of the act in the sense of (the) heterogony occurs (results), here, that is to say, the (recti)linear / lineal conversion of the ethical ends/goals into the planned ethical state of affairs fails (breaks down, founders, becomes a wreck). But even if we assume that ethical ends/goals are determined rationally in the sense of the(ir) reachability, attainability and achievability and can also in actual fact – at least at the individual level – be reached, attained and achieved, this

victory of (the) ethical “rationality of Reason” would not at all get rid of (rid from the world) the necessity of “instrumental rationality (instrumentellen Rationalität)” outside and inside of ethical action (ethischen Handelns)³⁹. In regard to such action, (the) self-control (die Selbstkontrolle) has (a) double (dual, twin) importance and (relative) value (Stellenwert): it is end/goal and means at the same time, i.e. its complete possession signifies that someone has broken through (perforated, pierced) the barriers, gates, bounds, limits (Schranken) of sensoriality (the sensorial world, (sensuality) (i.e. the senses)) (Sinnlichkeit) and has risen to (the) holiness, sanctity, sacredness and saintliness as (the) absolute ethical end/goal, whereas its, in practice, sufficient handling or else the damming, checking, controlling and containment of one’s own selfishness and egotism (die Eindämmung eigener Selbstsucht) is merely the precondition and prerequisite to do (un)to others good. On the other hand, in and during non-ethical action, self-control can only be (the) means to/for (an) end / goal, however this does not remain socially decisive, but the fact that also non-ethical and, in fact, unethical action requires, desires and demands rationality in the form of self-control, and that, hence, the specific difference between ethical and non-ethical or unethical action (der spezifische Unterschied zwischen ethischem und nicht ethischem bzw. unethischem Handeln) cannot lie therein^{xxi}.

We have, consequently, reached the point at which ethics and technique (technology), or else, ethical and “instrumental” rationality, both in the form of self-control, meet / come together in the negative sense, i.e. they use the same rational means in order to pursue opposed / opposing / conflicting / contrasting / contrary ends/goals. Because the successful handling, processing, carrying out, completion, conclusion, running of kinds of acting, actions and acts, which serve (the) social self-preservation and (the) striving for/after power commands

³⁹ Especially regarding this point cf. Benn-Mortimore, “Can ends be rational?”, esp. p. 291ff..

and demands, as a rule, at least (the) same rationality in the form of self-control as the striving after/for ethical perfection / improvement on the part of a man (i.e. person) who has to bridle / keep in check / keep a tight rein on the “irrational” or “bad/evil” emotions (affects) in him (Wir erreichen somit den Punkt, an dem sich Ethik und Technik bzw. ethische und „instrumentelle“ Rationalität, beide in Gestalt der Selbstkontrolle, im negative Sinne treffen, d. h. dieselben rationalen Mittel einsetzen, um entgegengesetzte Zwecke zu verfolgen. Denn die erfolgreiche Abwicklung von Handlungen, die der sozialen Selbsterhaltung und dem Machtstreben dienen, gebietet in der Regel mindestens gleiche Rationalität in Gestalt der Selbstkontrolle wie das Streben nach ethischer Vervollkommnung seitens eines Menschen, der „irrationale“ oder „böse“ Affekte in sich im Zaum zu halten hat). The insight into and understanding of these social-ontologically fundamental facts (of the case) and circumstances is obstructed, blocked and spoiled by the dominant ethical-normativistic direction, tendency and school of thought of the philosophical tradition, which in agreement with social-ethical kinds of purposefulness (and social-ethical kinds of end (goal) orientation or social-ethical expediencies) (social-ethical kinds of usefulness) has always asserted the absolute form-related (i.e. formal) (difference/distinction) and difference/distinction (in respect) of essence (essential difference/distinction) between ethical (effort (struggle, strain and stress)) and effort (struggle, strain and stress) (in respect) of power (Die Einsicht in diesen sozialontologisch fundamentalen Sachverhalt wird durch die herrschende ethisch-normativistische Richtung der philosophischen Tradition verbaut, die in Übereinstimmung mit sozialetischen Zweckmäßigkeiten immer den absoluten formalen und Wesensunterschied zwischen ethischer und Machtanstrengung behauptet hat). The main argument is already found in Plato, who, as is (well-)known, reserves the factor (of) power and (of) striving for/after power for the same lowest tier, level, stage or grade (rung or rank) in his ontological and anthropological order of ranks, precedence

and priority (or ranking and hierarchy), which he assigns and allocates to the type of the sophist or of the demagogue in his ethical-social order of ranks, precedence and priority (or ranking and hierarchy) (der bekanntlich dem Faktor Macht und Machtstreben dieselbe unterste Stufe in seiner ontologischen und anthropologischen Rangordnung vorbehält, die er dem Typus des Sophisten oder des Demagogen in seiner ethisch-sozialen Rangordnung zuweist)⁴⁰.

Striving after power and striving after pleasure (appetite and lust) are basically the same irrational passion, they spring and come from the same dark lower stratum of the human psyche, they represent the purely animal-bestial in man (i.e. humans) (Streben nach Macht und Streben nach Lust seien im Grunde dieselbe irrationale Leidenschaft, sie würden derselben dunkeln Unterschicht menschlicher Psyche entspringen, das rein Tierische im Menschen vertreten).

Objectively seen, the argumentation shows through and by means of the manner (as to) how it (i.e. the said argumentation) serves the power claim of the “expert (specialist, knower of the thing)” that striving for/after power must not necessarily be (the) irrational, i.e. (the) satisfaction of the drive, urge and impulse directed against every rational [[kind of]] self-control (Objektiv gesehen zeigt die Argumentation durch die Art und Weise, wie sie dem Machtanspruch des „Sachverständigen“ dient, daß Machtstreben nicht unbedingt irrationale, d. h. gegen jede rationale Selbstkontrolle gerichtete Triebbefriedigung sein muß)^{xxii}. Taken at face-value (its nominal value) and objectively-factually proved (checked, tested, examined and verified) (sachlich geprüft), the argumentation of the Platonic type fails again in (regard to) the tangible fact that under the conditions of social life no lasting and sustainable private or public striving for / after power has (any) chance / prospect(s) of success if the actor is not capable of the postponement (delay or deferment) of (the) satisfaction, of the subjection and subjugation of the short-term

⁴⁰ For the following (i.e. what follows) see *Gorgias*, 466Aff., 482Cff.

(end(s)/goal(s)) to the long-term (end(s)/goal(s)), in a word, of rationality as self-control (Im Nominalwert genommen und sachlich geprüft scheitert wiederum die Argumentation platonischen Typs an der handfesten Tatsache, daß unter den Bedingungen sozialen Lebens kein nachhaltiges privates oder öffentliches Machtstreben Aussicht auf Erfolg hat, wenn der Akteur zum Aufschub der Befriedigung, der Unterwerfung des Kurzfristigen unter das Langfristige, mit einem Wort zur Rationalität als Selbstkontrolle nicht fähig ist). Formulated as (an) anthropological and social-ontological ascertainment, this means that striving after/for power and ethics are not alike / similar, merely in that / when they both demand such renunciation [[of power]] (Als anthropologische und sozialontologische Feststellung formuliert heißt dies, daß Machtstreben und Ethik sich nicht bloß darin ähneln, daß beide solchen Verzicht verlangen)^{41 + xxiii}.

Ethical-normativistic thought, however, does not conceptually confuse only (striving for / after) power and striving for / after pleasure (Ethisch-normativistisches Denken bringt aber nicht nur Macht- und Luststreben begrifflich durcheinander)^{xxiv}. In (a) similar manner and for the same polemical reasons, power and violence (Macht und Gewalt) are lumped together and tarred with the same brush, whereby and in relation to which (the) striving for power is mitigated, softened, alleviated, reduced, tempered and moderated in all its despicable, atrocious, awful, heinous and dreadful one-sidedness, whilst simultaneously that thinking/thought, already in its characteristic or capacity as (the) “foe of every (kind of) / all violence” is supposed to be acquitted / forgiven (in respect) of (i.e. freed from) the suspicion of striving for power (während gleichzeitig jenes Denken schon in seiner Eigenschaft als „Feind jeder Gewalt“ von Verdacht des Machtstrebens freigesprochen werden soll). But the

⁴¹ Regarding this thought-complex (or complex of thoughts), cf. my introduction to the volumes *Der Philosoph und die Macht* as well as *Der Philosoph und die Lust*, from which several formulations are taken.

taming, breaking, control and harnessing of violence must / does not have to, by no /any means, be a performance, achievement and accomplishment in relation to which (the) ethics alone is capable; it (the taming of violence) can likewise be in the interest of the striving for power, although between this (striving for power) and a certain kind of ethics of attitude and conviction (Gesinnungsethik) the distinction exists that in and during the latter (ethics of attitude and conviction) the exercising and wielding of violence (Gewaltausübung) is excluded as (the) ultima ratio (i.e. the last resort). (Just) as not all (kinds of) ethics exclude the exercising and wielding of violence, so / thus, conversely, not every (kind of) striving for power promotes, fosters and encourages the same (exercising of violence) at every point in time. The rationality which guides such striving and commands (the) postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction or else/and self-control, can also become aware (in respect of it (i.e. such postponement of satisfaction and self-control) that on the basis of the complexity of social life, the direct ill-considered and thoughtless, rash and injudicious pursuit / pursuance of the (what is) desired with violent means (mit gewaltsamen Mitteln) (will) already fail in the bud (i.e. at its very beginning) or at least would have to bring with it / entail an irreparable wear and tear (in respect) of one's own forces. If this becomes clear, thus, the ways, paths and roads of the striving for power, which from now on (henceforth) has to be longsighted and prudent, circumspect, separates itself from (the) blind violence, which thirsts for immediate satisfaction. (The) Violence now puts itself in the same sense and (to the same) extent in the service of the striving for power, (just) as rationality in (the) form of self-control restrains, curbs and checks or purposefully and in a single-minded manner (i.e. consciously as to its aim) channels (im Zaum hält bzw. zielbewußt kanalisiert) "irrational" drives, urges, impulses and affects (i.e. emotions) in order to realise, actualise, achieve and attain its plans. Consequently, the striving for power sets boundaries and limits on/for/in respect of violence, it puts it (i.e. violence) under control, it measures

out and dispenses the right dose of its (i.e. violence's) possible, potential application according to and in line with the aims in mind on each and every respective occasion. The combinatorics (i.e. gamut of possible combinations) of power (Die Kombinatorik der Macht) is much richer in nuances than the crude, awkward, crass, clumsy mechanics of violence (die plumpe Mechanik der Gewalt), it allows, approves, authorises and permits numerous variations and ways out; – power is, in short/a word, interwoven with rationality and the possible and potential identity of its aims with those of violence does not abolish, cancel or annul this essential distinction/difference. To make use of violence and to fall (into or under) the intoxication of violence are two different things. Between them stands/is rationality as self-control⁴².

From the point of view of this particular form of rationality and in (the) light of the previous ascertainments (statements, conclusions, findings, observations), one can also assert: (the) ethicists / moralists (Die Ethiker) are in their opinion right (that) whoever acts ethically / morally, acts rationally; they err, however, in the assumption (that) whoever acts unethically / immorally, acts irrationally. The already – stressed many times – absolute ethical / moral neutrality of the fundamental social-ontological magnitudes, which characterises (the) rationality in all its forms, makes itself likewise noticeable when rationality is activated as psychological rationalisation (justification) (Die schon mehrmals betonte absolute ethische Neutralität der grundlegenden sozialontologischen Größen, die auch die Rationalität in all ihren Gestalten kennzeichnet, macht sich ebenfalls bemerkbar, wenn sich Rationalität als psychologische Rationalisierung aktiviert). Through the mediation (intervention or intercession) of such rationalisation (justification) (Durch die Vermittlung solcher Rationalisierung), ethical / moral action (ethisches Handeln) is brought about and achieved, behind which no ethical / moral motives (ethisches Motive) stand / are (e.g. (the) search

⁴² Cf. in relation to that, Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, p. 28ff..

for self-affirmation, (a boost to one's ego and) self-confidence or self-confirmation (Suche nach Selbstbestätigung) after this search was/became disappointed (let down or frustrated) in other fields); however, unethical action can also be set in motion, thus, e.g., when someone justifies the annihilation or extermination of a man (i.e. someone) unsympathetic to him (wenn jemand durch Rationalisierung die Vernichtung eines ihm unsympathischen Menschen rechtfertigt), who does not deserve such enmity^{xxv}. For (the) psychological rationalisation, the same applies as for (the) world-theoretical (rationalisation) (die weltanschauliche): it is legitimisation (legitimising) through and by means of rationality (Sie ist Legitimierung durch Rationalität), which the actor above all needs (then) when he must in foro interno (i.e. inwardly in the internal / inner court of his conscience) spiritual-intellectually work (and deal) with, process, handle, treat and (put to) use his own wishes in such a manner/way (wenn der Akteur in foro interno eigene Wnsche geistig derart verarbeiten) that they are possibly or potentially allowed to be shown in foro externo (i.e. outwardly to the court of public opinion) too/as well. The compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress towards/for/(in respect) of rationality in foro interno (i.e. inwardly, in the court of one's own conscience) comes into being, in other words, only in social life, i.e. only against the background of a forum externum (i.e. an external court of public opinion), irrespective of whether the inner / internal processes in every concrete case find expression in, are reflected or manifest themselves in visible acts or not (Der Zwang zur Rationalisierung in foro interno entsteht m. a. W. nur im sozialen Leben, d. h. nur vor dem Hintergrund eines forum externum, gleichviel, ob sich die inneren Vorgänge in jedem konkreten Fall in sichtbaren Akten niederschlagen oder nicht): there are, in fact, rationalisations which are determined, specified, stated, set and fixed merely for (the) use/usage on the part of the / one's conscience (von seiten des Gewissens). Either way, rationalisations justify (rechtfertigen Rationalisierungen) an inner/internal or outer/external action either because this

(internal or external action) runs counter to and goes against individually or socially accepted norms or because it (i.e. the said internal or external action) is supposed or ought to be presented vis-à-vis third parties in a certain way, or finally, because the actor can only act if he sees his action in the light of such a justification (einer solchen Rechtfertigung). The effective and actual expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) rationality, which must (be done, i.e. completed with regard to and) deal with (and tackle and handle) the concrete situation, and the justification of the same (effective and expedient rationality) move in (a) parallel (manner) / parallelly towards/in relation to each other at different levels, without having to cross each other / intersect; not seldom (often) they contradict each other (Die effektive zweckdienliche Rationalität, die mit der konkreten Situation fertig werden muß, und die Rechtfertigung derselben durch argumentative Rationalisierung bewegen sich parallel zueinander auf verschiedenen Ebenen, ohne sich kreuzen zu müssen, nicht selten sogar widersprechen sie sich)⁴³. The former (actual expedient rationality) unfolds and develops through and by means of the schema “ends / goals-means” either before or during the (outer/external) acting, action and act, the latter (justification of the actual expedient rationality) can likewise be shaped, formed and moulded before or during the same ((external) acting, action or act), occasionally, however, it is required, necessary and essential only after the conclusion, finalisation, settlement and end/close of the acting, action or act when the actor is got / taken / finds himself from the outside under (the) pressure of justification. It’s (i.e. justification’s) simplest and grossest (coarsest and crudest) form, which, however, shows the way/path/road to the rest of the forms (of justification), is the direct invocation of (the) Reason, even when / if the self-interest or the arbitrariness of the actor sticks out a mile/like a sore thumb / is palpable (wenn der Eigennutz oder die Willkür des Akteurs mit

⁴³ Cf. in relation to that, Evans, *Psychology*, p. 124ff..

Händen zu greifen sind): “O, strange excuse, / When reason is the bawd to lust’s abuse!”⁴⁴. And its regular effect consists in the removal and elimination of (the) inner inhibitions (Und ihre regelmäßige Wirkung besteht in der Beseitigung von inneren Hemmungen), which make lame, cripple and paralyse outer/external action, and over and above that, in the additional strengthening and fortification of the impetus (motivation, motive, incentive, urge, drive, propulsion) (in respect) of acting, action and the act through and by means of the consciousness and awareness (that) one does what is/stands in harmony with (the) Reason (in der zusätzlichen Stärkung der Handlungsantriebe durch das Bewußtsein, man tue das, was mit der Vernunft im Einklang steht)^{xxvi}. One knows / People (Humans) knew since long ago that exactly this consciousness / awareness increases, heightens and intensifies (the) aggressivity, and the transformation / conversion / metamorphosis of man (i.e. humans) into a wild animal/beast sometimes succeeds most easily precisely via such use of (the) Reason⁴⁵.

Psychological rationalisation as legitimisation (legitimising) (Psychologische Rationalisierung als Legitimierung) differs from psychological rationalisation in the comprehensive/general sense of the reflexive/reflective processing / treatment of the psychical raw stuff, i.e. raw material (psychologischen Rationalisierung im umfassenderen Sinn der reflexiven Verarbeitung des psychischen Rohstoffes) – if one may say so/thus. Obviously, the stirrings (movements, impulses) which take place in the barely explorable and investigable grey zone between (the / what is) biological and (the / what is) psychological attain, acquire and obtain praxeological and other and further relevance only through and by means of that processing / treatment (Offenbar erlangen die Regungen, die in der kaum erforschbaren grauen Zone zwischen

⁴⁴ Shakespeare, *Venus and Adonis*, V. 791ff..

⁴⁵ “A man that doth not use his reason is(t) a tame beast; a man that abuses it is a wild one”, Halifax [[= George Savile, 1st Marquess of Halifax, PC, DL, FRS (11 November 1633 – 5 April 1695)]]], *Works*, p. 242. On the same page stands/there is a reflection which strikingly/aptly outlines the process of rationalisation as justification (den Rationalisierungsvorgang): “Most men put their reason out to service to their will”.

Biologischem und Psychologischem stattfinden, erst durch jene Verarbeitung praxeologische und sonstige Relevanz). We must not here discuss / We don't have to discuss here whether and to what extent the psychical so-to-speak raw stuff / material is distinguished originally and from the very beginning by signs capable of the unfolding and development of reflexive activity (mit entwicklungsfähigen Zeichen reflexiver Tätigkeit), or whether its reflexive transformation (seine reflexive Transformation) – to use a(nother) metaphor (again) – occurs at (the) “higher” tiers, levels, stages or grades of (the) consciousness and awareness (Stufen des Bewußtseins) and through and by means of (the) mediation (intervention and intercession) of other “tiers of jurisdiction, i.e. authorities (Instanzen)” of the same consciousness. Either way, only the thus understood psychological rationalisation produces, makes, manufactures, fabricates or restores that from which the actor as (the) consciously acting subject starts / takes as his starting point. The cogito-principle gains here its actual and irrefutable sense/meaning: whether (a) psychical datum or datum of the external/outer world (psychisches Datum oder Datum der Außenwelt), nothing possesses relevance which has not gone / passed through (the) psychological rationalisation as reflexive activity, which does not already have the status of (the / what is) reflected (upon) or else / and or (the / what is) thought (about) (den Status des Reflektierten bzw. Gedachten). This kind of psychological rationalisation presupposes not merely the healing of “irrational passions”, as the poet thought⁴⁶, but already the passion as (the) possibility of (the) consciousness (Nicht bloß die Heilung von irrationalen Leidenschaften, wie der Dichter dachte, sondern bereits die Leidenschaft als Möglichkeit des Bewußtseins setzt diese Art psychologischer Rationalisierung voraus). And on top of that, the latter (psychological rationalisation) is commanded by the fact of (the) social living together, i.e. social co-existence,

⁴⁶ “Quod nunc ratio est, i[[#]]mpetus ante fuit [[What is now reason, was a violent impulse / inclination / desire / onset / impetuosity / ardour / passion before]]”, Ovid, *Remed. Amoris*, V.10.

which only accepts – in such a manner (of psychological rationalisation) – rationalised and correspondingly articulated drives, urges, impulses, needs, affects, emotions etc. (Und obendrein wird letztere durch das Faktum des sozialen Zusammenlebens geboten, welches nur derart rationalisierte und entsprechend artikulierte Triebe, Bedürfnisse, Affekte etc. gelten läßt). Seen thus, in (the) social living together (i.e. social co-existence) there is hardly any place/room for “irrational (irrationales)” or “drive/urge/impulse-like or impulsive(-driven) and compulsive (triebhaftes)” behaviour of the pure water, i.e. kind. Whatever socially wants to count, must – either way – be converted and transformed into Ratio (Ratio), i.e. Reason / reason or else appear as Ratio, i.e. Reason in the elementary sense of the form of rationality meant here. The psychological process of rationalisation, which yields and results in this elementary rationality, gets and procures for the in themselves dumb i.e. silent and mute deeper strata of (the) existence(,) valves, vents, outlets and articulation in a society which to the full and complete, total lack of rationalisation can counter and respond only with (the) full and complete, total lack of social attention: outbreaks of “blind” drives, urges and impulses, if there could be (such outbreaks), would, in fact, be biological rather than social phenomena (occurrences, appearances) (biologische als soziale Erscheinungen). As we know⁴⁷, drives, urges, impulses and affects, emotions represent and constitute as “primary processes” in the Freudian sense mere reservoirs (in respect) of motives of acting, action and the act; they neither completely flow into such motives, nor do they make up their sole source. They acquire and obtain, get the status of the/a motive (Motivs) via higher reflexivity (Reflexivität), which is accompanied by/accompanies (the) growing, increasing end/goal-directedness (mit wachsender Zielgerichtetheit), as it characterises every motive irrespective of its origin(s). Motives of acting, action and the act (Handlungsmotive) can be

⁴⁷ See Ch. IV, Section 2Ab, above.

(or not be) set against and oppose the urge, drive, itch, pressure and longing (need, yearning and desire) of the reflected “primary processes” (dem Drang der reflektierten „primären Prozesse“) (or not). In the former case (of the motives of acting being set against the urge of the reflected “primary processes”), the ways, paths and roads of psychological rationalisation in the general sense of the reflexive processing of the psychical raw stuff/material, and those (ways, paths and roads) of the psychological rationalisation in the special sense of legitimisation (legitimising) (die Wege der psychologischen Rationalisierung im allgemeinen Sinne der reflexiven Verarbeitung des psychischen Rohstoffes und jene der psychologischen Rationalisierung im speziellen Sinne der Legitimierung) separate, divide (divorce); in the latter (case of the motives of acting not being set against the urge of the reflected “primary processes”) that processing already leads and flows into legitimisations (kinds of legitimising) or else (and, and/or) rationalisations as legitimisations are shaped, moulded and formed already in the course of the reflexive processing of the psychical raw stuff/material (im Laufe der reflexiven Verarbeitung des psychischen Rohstoffes). That does not mean, though, that rationalisations as legitimisations must and have to come about only in this mode, manner and at this tier, level, stage or grade of psychical processes (Rationalisierungen als Legitimierungen nur in dieser Weise und auf dieser Stufe der psychischen Prozesse zustandekommen müssen). They (i.e. rationalisations as legitimisations) can be connected also with motives of acting, action and the act, which are formed and developed at higher tiers, levels, stages or grades of reflexion (auf höheren Reflexionsstufen) and in contrast and opposition to the urge, drive, itch, pressure and longing (need, yearning and desire) of the “primary” processes (und im Gegensatz zum Drang der „primären“ Prozesse). So multi-dimensional and multi-layered, complex does psychological rationalisation present itself and appear.

By building bridges constantly between “primary” and “secondary” processes, it is proved that both (anthropologies) (in respect) of drives, urges and impulses, as well as dualistic anthropologies miss / fail (as to) what is decisive (Indem sie ständig Brücken zwischen „primären“ und „sekundären“ Prozessen schlägt, stellt sie unter Beweis, daß sowohl triebpsychologische als auch dualistische Anthropologien sozialontologisch Entscheidendes verfehlen). Neither (the) irrational man (i.e. human) as (a) factotum (and eager servant) of drives, urges and impulses, nor (the) rational man as (the) master over the same (drives, urges and impulses) dominates in social life, but the deciding factor is the man (i.e. human) who exercises and practises rationality as rationalisation, and through that produces mixtures or forms of co-existence (or however one may call it / whatever one likes to call it) of those strata, layers of his essence (being, nature or character), which we partly for reasons pertaining to the economy of thought, partly with social-ethical intent, sharply separate from one another or contrast to one another (Weder der irrationale Mensch als Faktotum der Triebe noch der rationale Mensch als Herr über dieselben dominieren im sozialen Leben, sondern den Ausschlag gibt der Mensch, der Rationalität als Rationalisierung übt und dadurch Mischungen oder Koexistenzformen (oder wie immer man es nennen mag) jener Schichten seines Wesens herstellt, die wir teils aus denkökonomischen Gründen, teils in sozialetischer Absicht voneinander scharf trennen oder einander gegenüberstellen). The thus understood unity of the human has an effect, in/during (the) different dosages of its components, both at the level of high rational performances, i.e. great rational achievements and accomplishments, as well as at the other end of the scale or sequence of stages, i.e. (there) where rationality leaves deep traces in the so-called “irrational” or even “lunatic, madman, maniacal, insane, crazy” (Die so verstandene Einheit des Menschlichen wirkt bei unterschiedlicher Dosierung ihrer Komponenten sowohl auf der Ebene rationaler Hochleistungen als auch am anderen Ende der Stufenfolge, d. h. da, wo Rationalität tiefe Spuren im sogenannten „Irrationalen“

oder gar „Verrückten“ hinterläßt). As both of the observers of Hamlet's behaviour say: "there is method in his madness", [[and]] they can mean two kinds of things: that he (i.e. Hamlet), behind the façade of lunacy, madness, insanity, craziness and mania hides well-thought-out plans in order to, accordingly, be able to realise the same (plans) ((so) much/all the) more easily, or else that he can act purposefully and in a planned manner, systematically (zielstrebig und planmäßig), although in actual fact he is (a) lunatic, madman, maniacal, insane, crazy. In the latter case, they would have anticipated e.g. the findings of the psychoanalytical investigation of the obsessional / compulsive neurosis (or neurosis of compulsion / obsession / inhibition) (die Ergebnisse der psychoanalytischen Erforschung der Zwangsneurosen). The absence of motives, ends/goals or expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means does not (Nicht die Abwesenheit von Motiven, Zwecken oder zweckdienlichen Mitteln) here characterise the behaviour, but the fact that the consistent concatenation, linkage, chaining and interconnection (Verkettung) of the same (motives, ends/goals or expedient means) with one another lies on the other side of, i.e. beyond the bound(arie)s and limits the neurotic can consciously step over, exceed, overreach or cross. His illness / sickness consists in a rationality which wants to remain hidden from itself and does not want to appear. The job, task, responsibility of the therapist looks (like it) / appears to correspond(s) (to this). This (therapist) is not supposed to simply move / transfer / shift the patient from an irrational state (of affairs) (in)to a rational (state (of affairs)), but on the contrary, to bring to light the unconscious rationality of his present (current, nowadays, prevailing) intellectual-spiritual state (of affairs), to show him which needs through and by way of which means are satisfied on the detour or in the roundabout (and indirect) way of his illness / sickness. The healing (cure and recovery) presupposes, in other words, the acceptance, assumption and adoption of the inner/internal rationality of the illness / sickness and the reconstruction of this rationality, i.e. its translation

from the language of its own symbolism into that of healthy prose⁴⁸. We can, generalising, say that precisely the rationality of unconscious kinds of acting, actions and acts makes clear the extent and the depth of the belonging together, togetherness, common bond or shared identity (Zusammengehörigkeit) of rationality and human nature (von Rationalität und menschlicher Natur).

The reconstruction of the rationality of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) (Fremdverhalten) on the part of an observer can, for its part, be called rationalisation of this behaviour too, whereby and in relation to which the term “rationalisation” obviously obtains a new meaning and rationality simultaneously appears in another form. This time it is a matter of the hypothesis of rationality not merely as (the/what is) heuristically most favourable, but actually as (the) unavoidable starting point in and during the apprehension of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others). This applies equally to the actor, as to the scientific observer (Dies gilt gleichermaßen für den Akteur wie für den wissenschaftlichen Beobachter). Let it / It should, first of all, be noted that with respect to the actor, next to / alongside the psychological rationalisation in the double sense of the word discussed (above), we may / there may be talk of an external/outer rationalisation of his action too / as well / also. With that / Accordingly the endeavour and effort is meant of (the actor) adapting his social behaviour to practical or ethical norms (praktischen oder ethischen Normen) which, in accordance with the understanding of each and every respective relevant narrower or wider milieu (surroundings and environment) is regarded as rational; that the intent(ion) (standing, being) behind (the said endeavour and effort) is not necessarily ethical and does not have to mean an inner/internal adaptation (adjustment), (as) the case shows in which the lie and the deception (die Lüge oder die Täuschung) draw and derive or create their force of persuasion and conviction / powers of persuasion /

⁴⁸ Cf. Mischel, “Psychology”, esp. the 3rd Section.

persuasiveness from/out of a perfect external / outer rationalisation of one's own behaviour. What now concerns the alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others), thus forces the actor⁴⁹, as we know, to its (i.e. the behaviour of others') rationalisation already (in respect) of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which to the extent one's own (self) is projected into the / what is alien (wie hier Eigenes in Fremdes hineinprojiziert wird), barely / hardly manages and gets by without the ends/goal-means-schema, without assumptions of consistency and without typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) (ohne das Zweck-Mittel-Schema, ohne Konsistenzannahmen und ohne Typisierungen kaum auskommt). The scientific understanding of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) relies on it (i.e. all that) still further for obvious reasons which in fact is founded on the same anthropological and social-ontic fundamental and basic given (actual) facts as (the) non-scientific (understanding) (das wissenschaftliche Verstehen des Fremdverhaltens noch mehr angewiesen, welches ja in denselben anthropologischen und sozialontischen Grundgegebenheiten wie das nichtwissenschaftliche). The compulsion, constraint, obligation and pressure (Der Zwang) towards/in respect of the rationalisation of alien behaviour, i.e. the behaviour of others on the part of the observer is strengthened, reinforced and boosted here on the basis of the greater needs (in respect) of formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) (renditions, making, conversions) into forms) (structuring(s) in terms of form, formal structuring(s)) and typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) (Formalisierungs- und Typisierungsbedürfnisse), which are most likely satisfied by recourse to the consistently applied ends/goals-means-schema, and it has no necessary relation to/with the belief in a however understood rationality of human nature in general or of the precisely scientifically observed actor in particular (zum

⁴⁹ In relation to the following, see Ch. IV, Section 1Cb as well as 1D, above.

Glauben an eine wie auch immer verstandene Rationalität der menschlichen Natur im allgemeinen oder des gerade wissenschaftlich beobachteten Akteurs insbesondere). Max Weber (has, had) already said the most important (thing) about that when he called the “rationalistic” procedure (method or process) of social science a methodical decision (in respect) of purposefulness (and end / goal-orientation or expediency) (usefulness) (als er das „rationalistische“ Verfahren der Sozialwissenschaft eine methodische Zweckmäßigkeitssentscheidung nannte)⁵⁰, and, hence, we don’t have to linger and dwell any longer on this question. Two points still are/ought to be clarified. The rationalisation of (the) alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) for the purpose, end/goal of the scientific observer (but of the actor too) also stretches and extends (concerns and applies) to (seemingly, apparently) irrational behaviour, since this often brings to light, unveils, unmaskes and exposes as rational i.e. action (Aktion) oriented to(wards) (a) consistent end/goal-means schema on the basis of a false (wrong and incorrect) or even freely, openly, i.e. entirely imaginary (fictitious, invented) interpretation of the situation; ignorance, stupidity or practical ineptitude do not therefore necessarily stand the principle of rationality on the/its head (render it/such a principle inapplicable). Not only successful kinds of acting, actions and acts can, therefore, undergo a scientific rationalisation, rather it appears to be normal that the potential (in respect) of / for rationality (das Rationalitätspotential) of (seemingly) irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts is / ought to be exhausted, and their practical failure is / ought to be put down and reduced to the distance (space, interval, gap) between the interpretation of the situation of the actor and the objective constitution, composition and texture (quality, nature and state) of the situation (den Abstand zwischen der Situationsinterpretation des Akteurs und der objektiven Situationsbeschaffenheit)⁵¹. On the other hand, the enhanced,

⁵⁰ *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 543, 545.

⁵¹ J. Watkins, “Imperfect Rationality”, esp. pp. 168ff., 175, 209ff..

increased and intensified formalism (der gesteigerte Formalismus), which the rationalisation (justification) of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) for the purpose of scientific understanding (zwecks wissenschaftlichen Verstehens) invariably (inevitably) entails, may/should not allow that optical illusion to come into being which consists in a confusion of the formal rationality of (the) scientific procedure (method or process) with a rationality of the actors comprehended in terms of content (die in einer Verwechslung der formalen Rationalität des wissenschaftlichen Verfahrens mit einer inhaltlich aufgefaßten Rationalität der Akteure besteht). Formalism is a great leveller (Formalismus ist ein großer Nivellierer), which only too gladly throws its colourless mantle (cloak, (over)coat, sheath) over the (multi)coloured great diversity of the actors and their motives or ends/goals. Acting subjects are anything but users or operators (Bediener) of an undifferentiated rationality⁵². The great variety of the levels, of the forms and of the degrees (grades) of rationality goes back and is reduced not least of all to the great variety of human individualities, in fact, to the inner / internal great variety of every individuality (auf die Vielfalt menschlicher Individualitäten, ja auf die innere Vielfalt jeder Individualität).

It is not strange that one (people) since time immemorial (ancient times) has / have connected so tightly / closely / narrowly the concept of irrationality with (the) inability / incapability / incapacity for/at/as regards/in respect of self-control, for/of (the) mastery, command and domination (control; Beherrschung) of the drives, urges and impulses and affects (emotions) by (means of) Reason / reason: that could not be otherwise when human rationality ultimately (in the end, in the final analysis) emerged from the (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction (Es befremdet nicht, daß man seit Urzeiten den Begriff der Irrationalität mit der Unfähigkeit zur Selbstkontrolle, zur

⁵² See the – directed against the formalism of the interactionist school – remarks, comments and observations of Rock, *The Making*, esp. pp. 164, 175: “formalism is a great leveller”.

Beherrschung der Triebe und Affekte durch die Vernunft so eng verbunden hat: Das konnte nicht anders sein, wenn menschliche Rationalität letztlich aus der Fähigkeit zum Aufschub der Befriedigung hervorgegangen ist). This lacking and wanting self-mastery/command/domination/control (Selbstbeherrschung), this intemperance, immoderation or acrasia (acrasia) (i.e. a lack of self discipline, by which a person acts contrary to usual judgment) (Unmäßigkeit oder Akrasie), as the Greeks called it, took (on)/adopted/assumed several forms⁵³, and interferes (with), diminishes, detracts from and has a negative effect on ethical and technical action (ethisches und technisches Handeln) equally, that (ethical action), because drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions) (Triebe und Affekte) in accordance with (the) general understanding are at least in large part “ego(t)istical and selfish (egoistisch)”, this (technical action), because a sober end/goal-means-calculus (i.e. calculation and assessment of end/goal and means) (Zweck-Mittel-Kalkül) demands an intellectual-spiritual-mental clarity (clearness, lucidity, brightness, perspicuity) (eine geistige Klarheit) which only self-mastery / command / domination / control (Selbstbeherrschung) can give and/as a gift (bestow, donate). The intellect-mind-spirit (Der Geist) has, though, its special acrasia which is called self-delusion or wishful thinking (Selbsttäuschung oder Wunschdenken) and co-operates, collaborates and has a joint effect with the acrasia of the drives, urges, impulses and of the affects (emotions) in multiple forms and at multiple levels. Self-delusion can be put in the service of this latter (acrasia of the drives and of the affects), so-to-speak, (in the service) of classical acrasia, either before the concrete external action (then the actor acts on the basis of the/his self-delusion and of the assessment, evaluation and judgement of the situation arising from it/that), or else in accordance with the acting, action or act (then the self-deception comes into being as (the) psychological rationalisation of the acting,

⁵³ Cf. (Rorty's) (The) useful casuistry (of Rorty), “Acrasia and Conflict”.

action or act in retrospect) – either, therefore, the acting, action or act adapts and adjusts to and conforms with the self-deception or the self-deception legitimises the acting, action and act (legitimiert die Handlung). Whether now the self-deception goes back and is reduced exclusively to (the) effects and impacts of wishful thinking or not, does not interest [[us]] here and, incidentally, [[it]] can in general be answered with difficulty – despite the (well-)known quasi-omnipresence / ubiquity of (the) wishful thinking in different dosages. Because cases, in which wishful thinking is obvious (evident, clear, manifest, blatant), and other (cases), in which the roots of self-deception cannot be determined, ascertained, established, discovered, detected, identified beyond doubt (perfectly, properly) or else can be described as “(the) weakness of reason” are distinguished to the greatest possible extent / largely by the same features (characteristics, attributes, traits): the selective reception (absorption, taking in, ingestion, recording) of the available information, (the) one-sided processing (assimilation or digestion) of the information received / recorded, (the) rapid generalisation of the superficial impressions and (the) sticking and clinging and holding on to them despite contrary indications / evidence (clues), (the) schematic explanation of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) through and by means of allegedly (supposedly, professedly) evident dispositions (Denn Fälle, in denen Wunschdenken offenkundig ist, und andere, in denen sich die Wurzeln der Selbsttäuschung nicht einwandfrei ermitteln bzw. als „Schwäche der Vernunft“ umschreiben lassen, zeichnen sich weitestgehend durch dieselben Merkmale aus: selektive Aufnahme der verfügbaren Information, einseitige Verarbeitung der aufgenommenen Information, rasche Verallgemeinerung von oberflächlichen Eindrücken und Festhalten daran trotz gegensätzlicher Indizien, schematische Erklärung von Fremdverhalten durch angeblich evidente Dispositionen) etc.⁵⁴.

⁵⁴ Cf. in relation to that, Pears, *Motivated Irrationality*, pp. 40ff., 60ff.; Nisbett-Ross, *Human Inference*, Ch. 8.

Whatever are (ordered/appointed as) the commonalities and differences between wishful thinking and self-deception, “irrational” kinds of acting, actions and acts are not restricted and limited to the case in which they are connected with wishful thinking or else self-deception as (the) *acrasia* (*acrasia*) of the intellect-spirit (als *Akrasie des Geistes*). Another category of such kinds of acting, actions and acts is likewise statistically starkly, i.e. strongly represented and theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) possibly even more interesting. Here no rationalisations precede the acting, action and act, but it is clear to the actor / the actor is aware/realises that he acts “irrationally”, no matter on the basis of which criteria he defines rationality and irrationality with regard to this concrete acting, action and act (aufgrund welcher Kriterien er im Hinblick auf diese konkrete Handlung Rationalität und Irrationalität definiert), whether, therefore, he acts, thereby, against ethical commands, against social norms or even against his own interests (gegen ethische Gebote, gegen soziale Normen oder gar gegen eigenes Interesse). That is the classical case of *acrasia* (i.e. a lack of self discipline, by which a person acts contrary to usual judgment) (der klassische Fall der *Akrasie* [= *ἀκρασία*]), which the poet summed up in the words: “*video meliora proboque/Deteriora sequor*» [= I see (behold, look at, observe) and approve of (examine, inspect) better things (what is better)/I try to pursue (aim at, seek to gain, follow) worse things (what is worse)]]”⁵⁵. As a rule it (i.e. the said *acrasia*) is depicted and portrayed as (an) elemental storm (gale, tempest) of drives, urges, impulses and passions which tears down (pulls down and demolishes) all dams, i.e. barriers, (in respect) of/to Reason (reason) in no time / in an instant / in a flash (In der Regel wird er als elementarer Sturm von Trieben und Leidenschaften dargestellt, der im Nu alle Dämme der Vernunft niederreißt). But the facts (of the case) (circumstances) are also much more complicated when there seem to be (present)/exist classical or prime

⁵⁵ Ovid, *Metam.*, VII, 21.

examples of classical acrasia. Because not simply and not always rationality of clean water, i.e. of a pure kind and an equally pure irrationality struggle against each other, but two different rationalities meet, come across, run into and strike each other, regardless of the existing readiness (preparedness) of the actor or of the observer of ascribing and of attributing to both (kinds of rationality) the predicate of rationality to the same extent and (in the same) sense. The acting, action or act apostrophised (i.e. mentioned or referred to) in concreto (i.e. concretely or palpably thinking or speaking, or, with reference to actual, verifiable facts, rather than in theory) as “irrational” exhibits, namely, normally, the formal (i.e. form-related) structure of the acting, action or act looked at in concreto as “rational”, i.e. it unfolds and develops according to the end/goal-means-schema, it can pursue perfectly (quite, absolutely) reachable, attainable and achievable ends/goals, and on top of everything / to top it all, can be planned coolly (coldly) and long-term; whole plans (in respect) of life are in fact, sometimes (occasionally), characterised as “irrational”. The end/goal of questionable kinds of acting, actions and acts which goes against and runs counter to the end/goal of the “rational” acting, action or act competing in concreto with it, or (which goes against and runs counter to) the supposed ends / goals of “rational” action in general, actually looks “irrational”. The opposition or contrast is therefore of a content-related nature and implies that the “irrational” acting, action and act, looked at as (a) means, could never serve the end/goal of the “rational” acting, action and act. Both of the rationalities, accordingly, behave inconsistently with each other, whereby and in relation to which the rationality of the “irrational” consists in (the fact) that the actor, in the course of this, pursues ends/goals, uses means and has motives or else reasons for acting, action or the act; the “irrational” in the “irrational” is again this, that he (i.e. the said actor), knows, all the same / nevertheless, that he has other and (from a certain “higher” point of view) better grounds/reasons to pursue other ends/goals, to make use of other means and, in this respect, to act “rationally”.

The (rationality) for (the) “irrational” and that (rationality) for (the) “rational” action have an effect at different levels, and the option (i.e. choice) of the actor actually concerns not the choice between irrationality and rationality in abstracto, but that (choice) between two levels, one of which represents the – at the concrete moment – superior rationality, i.e. that, without whose presence the “irrational” would no longer be considered as “irrational” (das „Irrationale“ nicht mehr als „irrational“ gelten würde). Because only the direct and indirect comparison with the really (i.e. in reality) or in the imagination given “rational” („Rationalen“) makes (turns) the “irrational” (into) the “irrational”.

Now it is questioned/asked (the question is) whether the option for/in favour of the irrational can be explained, and, if yes, in which direction should / ought the explanation be sought. As one has opined / people have thought, there can exist here only psychological (explanations) (acrasiae / acrasias / acrasies of the intellect-spirit or of the drives, urges, impulses) (Akrasien des Geistes oder der Triebe), but no rational explanations; in and during irrational action, the explanation of the acting, action and act meets, comes across, runs into – through and by means of assumptions of rationality – its outermost / most extreme / furthest limits; the actor does not, in the process, understand himself anymore, that is why he cannot give or indicate any (rational) reasons/grounds (for that,) (as to) why he does not follow the better reasons (he would have), although he has (psychological) reasons (for that,) to not follow the better reasons⁵⁶. In relation to that, there are a few things / there is quite a bit to be remarked / observed, namely, first of all, regarding/about the meaning of the connection or combination of (the) psychological explanation and (the) non-observance of / non-compliance with the better reasons as (the) criterion of irrationality (den Sinn der Verbindung von psychologischer Erklärung und Nichtbefolgung der besseren Gründe als Irrationalitätskriterium). In relation to /

⁵⁶ Thus, Davidson, *Essays*, p. 42; cf. “Rational Animals”, p. 476.

Amongst the psychological reasons of that non-observance or non-compliance, both “self-deception” as well as “overpowering desires” are reckoned / counted. However, in the case of self-deception, the problem of the observance / compliance and non-observance / non-compliance (Befolgung oder Nichtbefolgung) of/with the better reasons is not posed at all: self-deception and wishful thinking have by definition the better reasons on their side, i.e. their rationalisations overcome a *limine* (i.e. from the very beginning) the torture, agony, anguish, i.e. great difficulty of the choice between better and less good reasons. The dilemma emerges / surfaces / appears / turns (comes) up only in the case of an *acrasia* (*acrasia*) of the drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions) (*deteriora sequo*[[r]] [[= I follow / aim at / accede or fall to what is / the worse / worst]]) in and during (the) “clearly thinking” intellect-spirit-mind (*meliora probo* [[I try / test / examine / inspect / approve of what is / the better / best]]) – and irrationality is called, then, not (the) self-deception as (the) unproblematic guideline / guiding rule of praxis / practice, but, on the contrary, the in(cap)ability of obeying one’s own realistic insight / understanding. Already the elementary classification of the psychological reasons of (the) irrationality demands/requires, therefore, a differentiation of the criteria of irrationality, which may not be one-sidedly reduced to the non-observance / non-compliance of/with the better reasons in (the) knowledge of the same (better reasons). On the other hand, the contrast between rational and psychological explanation, which the decision for/in favour of the use of the latter (psychological explanation) especially in and during irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts follows, rests and is based on a muddling, mixing up and confusing of the formal (i.e. form-related) and content-related aspects of the examination of the problem of rationality. Since, as (we have) said, *formaliter* (i.e. formally, in relation to form), kinds of acting, actions and acts can also be rational, which in comparison to other (kinds of acting, actions and acts) which *materialiter* (i.e. in terms of matter, substance or content) look rational, are

class(ifi)ed as irrational, thus, as (the) criterion of rationality which defines the better reasons, the content of the ends/goals of the acting, action and act finally remains left over / is left. The content-related difference of the ends/goals (in respect) of one another seems, from this perspective, to determine the difference between rationality and irrationality; it (i.e. the said content-related difference) can, however, be ascertained always only by a comparison. Someone can have “better” reasons who compares these (“better”) reasons with other reasons, that is, he defines a rationality in relation to an irrationality. Without this comparison, the phenomenon of affectual action (das Phänomen affektuellen Handelns), whatever that may mean, is not in itself decisive for the examination of the problem of rationality. Not every uncontrolled spread, rampancy and getting out of hand (Überhandnehmen) of the drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions) in fact leads in itself to “irrational” kinds of acting, actions and acts. It is not (to be) seen / realised / appreciated, i.e. understood why the affect (emotion) for a woman, which flows into and leads to a happy/felicitous love affair (sexual relationship), is (ought) to be called irrational; this same affect (emotion), however, is commonly / generally regarded as irrational when in the heart of a father with many children (and a) jealous wife it bursts into flames, i.e. is set alight / roused / kindled, for a young blood (i.e. a young woman). The irrationality of the affect (emotion) stands out here only against an established measure / standard / benchmark / yardstick of behaviour which is regarded as (ethically) rational, and there would be no talk of irrationality at all were not the affect (emotion) not in the way of the observance of or compliance with (the) better reasons.

In short/brief, the comparison between better and less good reasons (der Vergleich zwischen besseren und weniger guten Gründen) implies that rational and irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts are contrasted with each other on the basis of content-related criteria (aufgrund inhaltlicher Kriterien). But the

levels at which the rational or irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts are executed and carried out and connected / combined with better or less good reasons, differs from the level at which the choice between better or less good reasons takes place: both rational as well as irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts have their reasons; from that, however, it is not decided whether these (better reasons) or those (less good reasons) will be victorious / prevail.

Corresponding distinctions must be made with regard to the explanation of the acting, action and act. An explanation of the non-observance of or non-compliance with (the) better reasons actually constitutes a meta-explanation (Metaerklärung), i.e. it concerns neither the reasons of the “irrational” acting, action or act, nor all (the) (better) reasons of the rational acting, action or act in itself, but those reasons which give precedence to the former (reasons of the “irrational” acting) over / vis-à-vis the latter ((better) reasons of the rational acting) [[in relation to the said explanation of the non-observance of or non-compliance with the better reasons]]. At the level of the meta-explanation (Auf der Ebene der Metaerklärung) one meets / encounters / strikes upon the reasons of reasons (die Gründe der Gründe), that is to say, the meta-reasons (die Metagründe) which should or ought to give the thread – if one exists – to the/one’s hand for the theoretical approaching of the problem of irrationality.

Let us begin with the remark, comment, observation that at the level of the meta-explanation and of the meta-reasons, the difference between (the/what is) rational and (the/what is) irrational (Rational and Irrational), as it is represented and constituted at the level of the reasons (in respect) of/for acting, action and the act, becomes invalid and untenable (Fangen wir mit der Bemerkung an, daß auf der Ebene der Metaerklärung und der Metagründe der Unterschied zwischen Rationalem und Irrationalem, wie er sich auf der Ebene der Handlungsgründe darstellt, hinfällig wird). At the level of the reasons (in respect) of/for acting, action and the act, the actor cannot, as (we have) said, give any rational, i.e. from the point of view of the better reasons, sound, valid and conclusive

justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) (stichhaltige Begründung) for (the fact) that he does x, although better reasons speak for (i.e. in favour of) y – and in actual fact: such a venture / an undertaking comes or boils down to and ends up in the absurdity of wanting to find the reasons (in respect) of/for acting, action and the act which would be still better than the better reasons (in respect) of/for acting, action and the act. Just as little, however, is the actor (and the observer), at the level of the meta-reasons or else of the meta-explanation, capable of offering an absolutely binding – i.e. for all men (i.e. humans), but also for all points in time and situations and positions (in respect) of his own life – justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) for (the fact) that he considers the reasons which speak for, i.e. in favour of y as the better (reasons). That means: he can opt for y only from the point of view of an already adopted and assumed hierarchy of values (or value hierarchy) (Wertehierarchie), which at the higher tier (level, stage or grade) of justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) can be underpinned, shored up, substantiated and corroborated only tautologically or self-referentially (nur tautologisch oder selbstreferentiell). That also means: shifts, displacements and rearrangements (regroupings, adjustments) (Verschiebungen und Umstellungen) inside the hierarchy of values (or value hierarchy) where the difference between (the/what is) rational and (the/what is) irrational (between (the) Rational and (the) Irrational (zwischen Rationalem und Irrationalem)) is without and lacks the/an objective meaning, has a corresponding effect at the level of the reasons (in respect) of/for acting, action and the act, at which the (what is) rational (the Rational; das Rationale) presses against and resists / sets itself against and opposes irrational acrasiae, acrasias / acrasies in the form of (the) better reasons.

The plastic field at which all of that is acted out and takes place is the identity

(Das plastische Feld, auf dem sich das alles abspielt, ist die Identität). Its inner structuring (arrangement and organisation) and the rearrangements (regroupings, adjustments) inside of it determine – always in the closest connection with (the) spectrum and (the) mechanism of the social relation – at the level of the reasons (in respect) of/for the acting, action and act, the interplay between rational and irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts, however, they also determine what on each and every respective occasion should or ought to be considered rational and irrational, what (should or ought to be considered) as (the) better or less good reasons (Ihre innere Gliederung und die Umstellungen innerhalb ihrer bestimmen – immer in engster Verbindung mit Spektrum und Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung – auf der Ebene der Handlungsgründe das Wechselspiel zwischen rationalen und irrationalen Handlungen, sie bestimmen aber auch, was jeweils als rational und irrational, was als besserer oder weniger guter Grund gelten soll) – and they determine, finally, when, how, how long and to what extent, in what way, in what respect one revolts against the better reasons or retreats from them (wann, wie, wie lange und inwiefern gegen die besseren Gründe revoltiert oder vor ihnen zurückgewichen wird). To judge in accordance with these empirically easily ascertainable effects and impacts (and we do not have any other material of proof, i.e. evidence (Beweismaterial) at our disposal), identity is neither carved from a single piece of wood (i.e. identity is not made out of only one material), nor is it bound by an unchangeable hierarchy of its components. One should imagine it (i.e. identity) structurally similarly to (the) society or (the) history as a whole: in it there is – in retrospect – detectable, discoverable, traceable, ascertainable causality, [[but]] no law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) which – in advance – permits absolutely secure (certain and reliable) prognoses (forecasts) (In ihr gibt es im nachhinein ermittelbare Kausalität, keine Gesetzmäßigkeit, die von vornherein absolut sichere Prognosen gestattet). No covering law exists here, from / out of which

(the) individual kinds of acting, actions and acts or reasons (in respect) of/for acting, action and the act could be derived and deduced, but kinds of acting, actions, acts or else reasons for acting, action and the act represent and constitute functions of the – on each and every respective occasion – balance of power (relative strength or correlation of forces) (Kräfteverhältnis) between its components (Komponenten). Every one of these components has its own multivalent logic (Jede dieser Komponenten hat die eigene multivalente Logik) and its own – on each and every respective occasion – better reasons, it gets into conflict with the other (components), it submits to them or interacts (has an effect jointly) with them. The – on each and every respective occasion – decisive reason for acting, action and the act is dictated by the component which – on each and every respective occasion – retains the upper hand. Reasons are good or bad, less good or better according to the needs, the habits, routines or the (changing, variable) intensity of every component, which often claims for itself to represent the identity as a whole, to make its logic the logic of the identity. This explains the inner conflicts and splits, divisions, schisms which belong to the everyday life of the identity, it explains, however, the unity, uniformity and solidity (Geschlossenheit) of the identity as soon as one of its components undertakes the undisputed, if also often transient, temporary hegemony. In view of these possible outcomes of the games of power and strength and force, interplays of forces or power plays (Kräftespiele) on the plastic field of the identity (auf dem plastischen Feld der Identität), it is not unimportant to visualise and make clear that images of men (i.e. humans) (die Menschenbilder) which were / have hitherto been made, outlined or draughted for ethical-normative ends/goals (für ethisch-normative Zwecke), can be class(ifi)ed for ethical-normative ends / goals fundamentally / in principle into two types. Either (in regard to such an image of man) there is supposed/ought to / should be one component of the identity, as a rule called Reason (Entweder soll eine Komponente der Identität, in der Regel Vernunft genannt), controlling

and dominating all other (components), or, there is in mind a state of affairs in which all components unfold and develop harmonically next to/beside and with one another, perhaps under the mild direction, guidance or leadership of one or of another (of the components). These sketches, plans, outlines, drafts, blueprints are, naturally, both in (regard to) the mixture, blend, assortment of their elements, as well as in (regard to) their world-theoretical justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) determined historically (as regards the intellect-spirit) (Diese Entwürfe sind selbstredend sowohl in der Mischung ihrer Elemente als auch in ihrer weltanschaulichen Begründung (geistes)geschichtlich bedingt). All the more interesting appears to be the ascertainment that taken together they cover the whole spectrum which the permanent anthropological and social-ontological parameters mark out and make clear (das die permanenten anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Parameter abstecken). Above all, they put – in their each and every respective way – the age-old and generally conscious fundamental and basic problem of identity into the foreground: that it (i.e. identity) consists of several/multiple components which one way or another co-exist and in the course of this must be partly disciplined, partly cultivated (die so oder anders koexistieren und dabei teils diszipliniert teils kultiviert werden müssen).

The indication of the multi-dimensionality and the richness/wealth of/in facets, i.e. multi-facetedness of (the) identity is supposed to underline the great variety of the – in it – permanently contained practical possibilities which at any time can appear and which must always be reckoned with; (the) imponderability (incalculability) would not constitutively belong to subjectivity were the identity of the subject one-dimensional (Der Hinweis auf die Mehrdimensionalität und den Facettenreichtum der Identität soll die Vielfalt der in ihr permanent enthaltenen praktischen Möglichkeiten unterstreichen, die

jederzeit in Erscheinung treten können und mit denen immer gerechnet werden muß; die Unberechenbarkeit würde nicht konstitutiv zur Subjektivität gehören, wäre die Identität des Subjekts eindimensional). The pregnant-with-conflict, i.e. conflict-bearing and potentially explosive multitude or multiplicity of components of the identity, which next to the multitude or multiplicity of the concrete situations and positions makes understandable the multitude or multiplicity of the ways, manners, modes of and reasons for acting, action and the act, may or should not, however, be interpreted in the sense of a constitutively weak (identity) or even an identity (in respect) of the occasion, opportunity or chance (Die konfliktträchtige Vielheit der Identitätskomponenten, die neben der Vielheit der konkreten Lagen die Vielheit der Handlungsweisen und -gründe verständlich macht, darf jedoch nicht im Sinne einer konstitutiv schwachen oder gar einer Gelegenheitsidentität gedeutet werden). The fact that it cannot be so/thus/the case, the social relation already ensures and provides for, which places more or less traceable bound(arie)s on the effect and impact of (the) centrifugal forces inside of the identity and influences the components of the identity in (regard to) their behaviour towards / with (regard to) one another similarly to how the/an external foe (influences) the parties of/to a civil war (Dafür, daß dem nicht so sein kann, sorgt bereits die soziale Beziehung, die der Wirkung zentrifugaler Kräfte innerhalb der Identität mehr oder weniger spürbare Grenzen setzt und die Identitätskomponenten in ihrem Verhalten zueinander ähnlich beeinflusst wie der äußere Feind die Bürgerkriegsparteien). The social relation – more generally and more abstractly formulated: (the) social living/life and surviving/survival – commands and requires, in other words, consistency, and identity consists in exactly the extent consistency is given, it (i.e. identity) constitutes the ensemble of its components, but from the point of view of their (i.e. the said components') consistency. This consistency is, though, just like (the) rationality, a question of (the) level, of (the) form and of (the) degree (Die soziale Beziehung – allgemeiner und

abstrakter formuliert: Das soziale Leben und Überleben – gebietet m. a. W. Konsistenz, und Identität besteht in eben dem Maße, wie Konsistenz gegeben ist, sie bildet das Ensemble ihrer Komponenten, aber unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Konsistenz. Diese Konsistenz ist allerdings ebenso wie die Rationalität eine Frage der Ebene, der Gestalt und des Grades). It (i.e. the said consistency) is established, made, produced in very different ways, manners and modes, and the manner of its establishment, fabrication and production can change even in the same subject, in accordance with which component of the identity on each and every respective occasion undertakes the lead(ership) (die Führung), and how dense, thick and compact the unity, uniformity and solidity (die Geschlossenheit) is, which is reached, attained and achieved under this lead(ership). We would have to wait in vain if we wanted to talk about identity only after the reaching, attainment and achievement of perfect consistency. Of course, some philosophers underline without (adding anything) further / just like that such consistency and do it because they have in mind a unification of the subject under the sign / influence / aegis of a certain ethical or social norm. Others, to whom this norm is fishy, strange, dubious, reverse the schema and assert the open and provisional character of the identity, as it were, as (the/a) product of (the/an) – on each and every respective occasion – convenient, agreeable, acceptable, likable or expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) improvisation (genehmen oder zweckmäßigen Improvisation). (It is obvious why this consideration, of all things, found dissemination and spread under (the) mass-democratic circumstances and conditions, and in (the) demarcation and delimitation against the classical bourgeois comprehension of individuality⁵⁷.) Polemical points of view, however, do not determine only the content of theories of identity, but likewise the positionings and stances (die Stellungnahmen) of the identity towards/in relation to itself, i.e. its self-

⁵⁷ In relation to that, Kondylis, *Niedergang*, pp. 228, 256ff..

understanding and its self-(re)presentation (d. h. ihr Selbstverständnis und ihre Selbstdarstellung). They can, naturally, have an effect in contrary (contrasting and opposite) directions, that is, both strengthen and reinforce the coherence (die Kohärenz verstärken) as well as give rise to and cause internal/inner split(ting)s, fissions, schisms, divisions and discrepancies (innere Spaltungen und Diskrepanzen), when in several simultaneous polemical (or also/even/and or friendly) positionings and stances they take – in terms of content – different or even contrary stances (Haltungen) and accordingly develop their (kinds) of argumentation(s). Then the identity must find the ways of working out, hammering, conceiving, developing, formulating and constructing sound, reliable, firm and stable balances and equilibria, and bring the practical need for flexibility, after a fashion and somehow, into line and harmony with (the) likewise necessary-for-life, vital and essential fixed, firm and stable orientation. In the course of this, it (i.e. identity) can swing and oscillate back and forth according to (each and every) individual composition, constitution, texture and concrete situation/position from one extreme to the other (Dann muß die Identität Wege finden, um tragfähige Gleichgewichte auszuarbeiten und das praktische Bedürfnis nach Flexibilität mit der ebenso lebensnotwendigen festen Orientierung recht oder schlecht in Einklang zu bringen. Dabei kann sie je nach individueller Beschaffenheit und konkreter Lage von einem Extrem zum anderen hin und her pendeln). Sometimes it connects its self-understanding only temporarily with certain content(s) (e.g. persons, convictions or values), sometimes, again, this connection or combination occurs for better or for worse so that the self-preservation of the identity appears to be more valuable and worthwhile than (the) physical self-preservation (die Selbsterhaltung der Identität wertvoller als die physische Selbsterhaltung). All/Everything is possible here. Because – we must repeat it – also here there are only causalities, no kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities), which determine absolutely fixed hierarchies (auch hier gibt es nur

Kausalitäten, keine Gesetzmäßigkeiten, die absolut feste Hierarchien bedingen). But the multifarious and manifold causalities which in general push towards consistency, i.e. no matter what their form on each and every respective occasion, have a practical effect incessantly, even when/if consistency is successful only at the minimal level, i.e. through and by means of (the) fading or cutting out (Ausblendung) of the rest of the components of the identity in favour on one single (component)^{xxvii}. With regard to the following analysis, it is / ought to be held onto, i.e. noted that consistency and (the) self-confirmation of the identity belong together. Consistency is not manufactured, fabricated, produced, made or restored through and by means of abstract plan(ning)s in loneliness, solitude and isolation (durch abstrakte Planungen in Einsamkeit), but is shaped and stabilised, fixed partly (by) groping and feeling, partly through and by means of the decisive experiences in (a) parallel (manner) / parallelly towards / in relation to experiences of self-confirmation, no matter which components of the identity concern these experiences (diese Erlebnisse). The identity, represented by each and every respective decisive and determinative component or even by a broader synthesis of its components, tends towards that kind of consistency which allows and affords it the greatest self-confirmation, or else and / or recognition. Whether the latter (greatest self-confirmation and greatest recognition) is sought in foro externo (i.e. externally amongst other people) or rather in foro interno (i.e. internally as regards one's own consciousness and conscience), and how both fora behave towards/with regard to each other, depends on numerous factors.

This short exposition by far does not exhaust the problem of identity⁵⁸, however it gives hints and tips for the understanding of central aspects of the always swaying and wavering and always (newly) to-be-defined (anew) relation between rationality and irrationality. Consistency (as (the) essential feature,

⁵⁸ More in relation to that in the third volume of this work.

characteristic and trait of identity) (Konsistenz (als wesentlicher Zug der Identität)) and rationality are connected, linked and interrelate just as much in the anthropological and the social-ontological sense as, for instance, rationality and the ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction (Fähigkeit zum Aufschub der Befriedigung). Consistent identity and rationality represent and constitute with reference to the need of/for orientation (Orientierungsbedürfnis) equivalent and – to the point of being mistaken and confused (zum Verwechseln) – similar instruments. And the possibility of this mistaken identity, mixing up and confusion (dieser Verwechslung) already in the roots of the psyche (schon an den Wurzeln der Psyche) contributes much to the slipping and lapsing of rationality into (the) irrationality, or else into the victories of (the) irrationality over (the) rationality. Because it means that the logic of the identity or else the logic of its – on each and every respective occasion – leading components can be identified per se, absolutely or par excellence with (the) rationality; then it is converted into a more or less autonomous form of rationality, which wants to drive out, oust, displace, repress or suppress or put in the shade (eclipse and outclass) all other (identities), and sometimes can even (do) it (just that). That with which the identity in/at the concrete moment connects its self-understanding and its self-confirmation, leads and guides the / its behaviour irrespective of whether this (behaviour) stands/is in agreement with its (i.e. the identity's) ideal self-understanding and its ideal self-confirmation or not. Since the identity as (a) multi-dimensional and multi-layered whole (Da die Identität als multidimensionales und vielschichtiges Ganzes) just as little coincides with the individual levels, forms and degrees of (the) rationality as with its own ideal self-understanding and its own ideal self-confirmation, thus it can find its ideal self-confirmation in the / what is “irrational” (the “Irrational”), regardless of what price [[has to be paid for that]], regardless also of whether the “irrational” is represented by the acrasia / acrasia of the spirit or that (acrasia) of the drives, urges, impulses and affects and

emotions (durch die Akrasie des Geistes oder jene der Triebe und Affekte vertreten ist). The logic of the identity then surpasses and outstrips and gets ahead of the rationality of the better reasons (Die Logik der Identität überflügelt dann die Rationalität der besseren Gründe), it determines in a willful and headstrong manner what the better reasons are, it makes / turns itself (into), in a word, the sovereign tier of jurisdiction, i.e. authority (souveränen Instanz). Before we say more in greater detail in relation to that, let it be remembered that the formal quality of the thought and intellectual performances and achievements (Denkleistungen) which accompany the rationalising or planning action does not depend on which component of the identity undertakes its leadership and defines its logic. The dominance of the affect and emotion (Die Herrschaft des Affektes) does not by any means prevent or hinder in itself foresight and prescience and (the) well-thought-out, well-considered and judicious correlation of end/goal and means with each other (Count Montecristo's revenge), just as the virtue of self-control (self-mastery, self-domination) in itself does not in the least vouch for (that fact) or guarantee that the master over (his) drives, urges, impulses and affects and emotions can otherwise think with instrumental perfection (instrumenteller Perfektion). It / Things may, naturally / of course, behave / be the other way around too. But the great variety of the possibilities reveals that (the) "irrationality", especially when it allies itself with the (currently / topically predominant) logic of the identity does not have to – from the (very) beginning / start – be ashamed of either its stupidity / idiocy / ignorance or ungainliness, clumsiness, crudeness and already/really/anyway, accordingly, go to work (i.e. act) half-heartedly.

This becomes particularly clear in (regard to) that rationality which we called the acrasia of the spirit, i.e. the self-delusion of (the) wishful thinking (der Selbsttäuschung oder des Wunschdenkens). This (irrationality) is in fact of its essence and nature determined (i.e. set and certain) in relation to that of giving

wing to, i.e. spurring on and inspiring (the) feeling in respect of oneself (i.e. self-esteem) and self-confidence, self-assurance (Selbstgefühl und -vertrauen), it is dictated directly by the logic of (the) identity (durch die Logik der Identität) and directly serves its self-confirmation; self-delusion is called, in other words, that self-understanding of the identity (jenes Selbstverständnis der Identität) which puts to one side, moves out of the way, gets rid of, eliminates a limine (i.e. from the beginning / the start) all ideational hindrances, obstacles, barriers and obstructions on the road of/to self-confirmation (alle ideellen Hindernisse auf dem Wege der Selbstbestätigung a limine beseitigt). Such hindrances, obstacles pile up and accumulate, however, in the other typical case of acrasia, when, namely, the logic of the identity does not rule over, control and govern the whole field, but the “better reasons” face and stand in front of its (i.e. the said identity’s) reasons, and hence, (the) self-confirmation is problematic and in danger (endangered) since it lacks the self-consciousness of (the) self-deception. The being victorious of the less good reasons against the better (reasons) (Das Obsiegen der weniger guten Gründe gegen die besseren) is enabled / made possible / facilitated by the fact that the logic of the identity (its currently predominant component), or else of the/its self-confirmation confers upon or grants to these reasons a particular status and a specific rationality so that, finally / in the end, the competition between better and less good reasons is converted from a competition between normatively unequal (reasons) into a competition between (f)actually / in actual fact equal (reasons); the better and less good reasons become / are turned into merely reasons of (a) different order; as a result the possibility of the direct comparison is cancelled / dropped / omitted / eclipsed, and the comparative (degree) “better” loses its meaning and its compelling, coercive and cogent influence. Thus, as the logic of the identity of Michael Kohlhaas^{xxviii} unfolded and developed, no-one could convince him anymore in relation to that, that he was acting against (the) “better reasons”. Those, again, who get stuck on and stick fast to the dilemma and carry on

recognizing the superiority of the better reasons, although they let / allow their action to be dictated by the less good reasons, are suspended, hang and hover between cynicism, unhappy and unfortunate consciousness and schizophrenia. But all of them have the feeling that something more or less stark/strong and more or less consistently potent binds them to the less good reasons temporarily or constantly, and that the self-confirmation of their identity, at least in a particular respect, without this binding, would limp; not seldom, in fact, the decision as choice of the better reasons entails a certain inner/internal emptiness / empty space / void and a melancholy, which are founded on the/a shameful feeling in not having been / being brave, courageous, gutsy, bold, daring and valiant and plucky, stoical enough in order to act even at (i.e. by paying) a high price against “every convention” or even against “every Reason” and to have to fight for a “lost cause”. Only the analysis of the logic of the identity in its each and every respective concretisation can shed light on and inform us about such and similar “irrationalities”, which are normal phenomena (occurrences, appearances) in social life (die normale Erscheinungen im sozialen Leben sind).

If the phenomenon of the howsoever defined “irrationality” proves something, thus (it proves) this, that rationality, however it may be defined, is conceptually and objectively, factually less comprehensive than identity (Wenn das Phänomen der wie auch immer definierten „Irrationalität“ etwas beweist, so dies, daß Rationalität, wie man sie auch definieren mag, begrifflich und sachlich weniger umfangreich als Identität ist). For that reason, the logic of the identity can, as it were, absorb and assimilate or combat it (i.e. rationality) head on and defeat (it). Rationality is (a) function of identity, not the reverse / other way around, and there is no rationality which can, as it were, conquer, take, seize and capture (the/an) identity from the outside (Deshalb kann die Logik der Identität die Rationalität gleichsam aufsaugen oder sie frontal bekämpfen und besiegen. Rationalität ist Funktion der Identität, nicht umgekehrt, und es gibt

keine Rationalität, die die Identität gleichsam von außen erobern kann). If one disregards the identity completely, thus rationality cannot be more than a formal (i.e. form-related) instrumental teaching, doctrine or theory, which turns and spins, i.e. revolves around the end/goal-means schema; because the search for the expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means for the reaching, attainment and achievement of a (pre-)given (set, fixed) end/goal can bring to light results, outcomes and consequences which are generally (universally) binding, that is, they are valid irrespective of whether the end/goal is approved of and sanctioned or not (Wenn man von der Identität ganz absieht, so kann Rationalität nicht mehr als eine formale instrumentelle Lehre sein, die sich um das Schema Zweck-Mittel dreht; denn die Suche nach dem zweckdienlichen Mittel zur Erreichung eines vorgegebenen Zweckes kann Ergebnisse ans Licht bringen, die allgemein verbindlich sind, also unabhängig davon gelten, ob der Zweck gutgeheißen wird oder nicht). But as soon as it is a matter of the constitution, composition and texture or else rationality of the ends / goals, the identity must make its presence felt (in the form of its dominant (current, at-the-moment, right now) logic (at that time)), since the choice of the ends/goals directly or indirectly raises the question of meaning in (its) lesser / slighter or greater / larger breadth – and the question and problem of meaning is the central question and problem of the identity: the manner how the identity comprehends its place in the world, how it, therefore, strives for, aims at and aspires to (the) confirmation and recognition of itself, constitutes its answer to the question of meaning (Aber sobald es um die Beschaffenheit bzw. Rationalität der Zwecke geht, muß sich die Identität (in Gestalt ihrer gerade herrschenden Logik) melden, da die Wahl des Zweckes direkt oder indirekt, in geringerer oder größerer Breite die Sinnfrage aufwirft – und die Sinnfrage ist die zentrale Identitätsfrage: Die Art und Weise, wie die Identität ihren Platz in der Welt auffaßt, wie sie also selbst Bestätigung und Anerkennung anstrebt, bildet ihre Antwort auf die Sinnfrage). With the question of meaning and with it

(the question) of identity via the determination of the (ultimate) ends and goals of acting, action and the act forcing their way and getting into and penetrating the examination of the problem of rationality, they set the course both of the definition of the “rational” and of the irrational, as well as of the occasional or frequent violation / infringement of the rational in favour of the irrational in (the) knowledge of the consequences of the same (violation) (Indem die Sinn- und mit ihr die Identitätsfrage über die Bestimmung der (letzten)

Handlungszwecke in die Rationalitätsproblematik eindringen, stellen sie die Weichen sowohl für die Definition des „Rationalen“ und des Irrationalen als auch für die gelegentliche oder häufige Übertretung des Rationalen zugunsten des Irrationalen in Kenntnis der Folgen derselben). As we know, the world-theoretical / world-view preference for (the) “irrationalism” is in itself no indication for/of (the fact) that one acts less rationally than the “rationalists” (Wie wir wissen, ist die weltanschauliche Präferenz für den „Irrationalismus“ an sich kein Indiz dafür, daß man weniger rational als die „Rationalisten“ handelt). But the imperious and domineering logic of the identity can (it does not have to (do) it, i.e. but not necessarily) give rise to and cause both in/amongst the “irrationalists” as well as in/amongst the “rationalists”, at the level of acting, action and the act, “irrationalities” in (the) form of the uncontrolled spread or extension/expansion of symbolic-expressive (factors) vis-à-vis instrumental factors or else vis-à-vis the logic of the situation (Aber die gebieterische Logik der Identität kann (sie muß es nicht) sowohl bei „Irrationalisten“ als auch bei „Rationalisten“ auf der Handlungsebene „Irrationalitäten“ in Form des Überhandnehmens von symbolisch-expressiven gegenüber instrumentellen Faktoren bzw. gegenüber der Logik der Situation hervorrufen). That does not mean that the “end/goal-means” schema is put outside of force, i.e. does not apply and is overridden, because at least from the subjective perspective of the actor and in the narrowest, i.e. strictest sense and within (his) radius of action, it (i.e. the said “end/goal-means” schema) retains its validity even in and during

“blind reactions” (Das heißt nicht, daß das Schema „Zweck-Mittel“ außer Kraft gesetzt wird, denn wenigstens in der subjektiven Perspektive des Akteurs und im engsten Sinne und Aktionsradius behält es seine Geltung selbst bei „blinden Reaktionen“). It, however, means that [[in]] another handling of this schema at another level, that is, during and in (regard to) other ends/goals, the actor would get or procure ideational or material benefits, which, from the point of view of other(s) (actors) (and from the point of view of the actor himself, to the extent that this (actor) does not use up, go through, erode (or avoid) the dominant measures, yardsticks, benchmarks, criteria in foro externo (i.e. in the external world)) would surpass the in actual fact pursued course of acting, action and the act reached, attained and achieved (Es heißt aber, daß eine andere Handhabung dieses Schemas auf einer anderen Ebene, also bei anderen Zwecken dem Akteur ideellen oder materiellen Nutzen verschaffen würde, der aus der Sicht anderer (und aus der Sicht des Akteurs selbst, insofern sich dieser den in foro externo herrschenden Maßstäben nicht verschließt) den beim tatsächlich eingeschlagenen Handlungskurs erreichten übertreffen würde).

Towards the so/thus understood “irrational” preference does the logic of his identity in its constitutive connection with meaning-like / meaningful (in ihrer konstitutiven Verbindung mit sinnhaften), i.e. symbolic-expressive or normative factors (mit sinnhaften, d. h. symbolisch-expressiven oder normativen Faktoren) push the actor. If we wanted to entirely greatly, i.e. very broadly or grossly, and only for the ends/goals and purposes of orientation(,) wanted to distinguish between expressive and instrumental components of behaviour, thus, we would ascribe to those (expressive components of behaviour) the attributes of the spontaneous, to a large extent bio-psychically determined, uncontrolled or uncontrollable and of the self-end/goal, i.e. the end/goal in itself, to these (instrumental components of behaviour), on the other hand, the attribute of the expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful)-planned, to a large extent

culturally conditioned and determined, more easily controlled or controllable and of the means (Wenn wir ganz groß und nur für Orientierungszwecke zwischen expressiven und instrumentellen Verhaltenskomponenten unterscheiden wollten, so würden wir jenen eher die Attribute des Spontanen, weitgehend biopsychisch Determinierten, Unkontrollierten oder Unkontrollierbaren und des Selbstzweckes, diesen hingegen eher die Attribute des Zweckmäßig-Geplanten, weitgehend kulturell Bedingten, leichter Kontrollierten oder Kontrollierbaren und des Mittels zuschreiben)⁵⁹. With regard to the problem of rationality and in particular the expression “instrumental rationality (instrumentelle Rationalität)”, it must be made clear / clarified that (the/what is) “instrumental / Instrumentelles” here, of course, does not signify/mean the mere presence of the means in (the) absence of ends/goals, but only that the question in accordance with the constitution, composition and texture of the ends/goals is left aside and excluded, since it is regarded as solved in foro externo or in foro interno, and hence, that (conditioned-in-terms-of-content) conflict between better and less good reasons, which enable / make possible irrationalities, cannot arise. Under this precondition, presumption and prerequisite, we should or can contrast (the/what is) instrumental and (the/what is) expressive (Instrumentelles und Expressives) against each other, knowing (full/very/quite) well that the relative conceptual clarity of this contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition; Gegenüberstellung) is found again only to a very limited extent in the facts. Because every instrumental acting, action and act (instrumentelle Handlung) has to a greater or lesser extent an expressive or symbolic aspect, not to mention that it, in relation to that, can be designed, laid out, structured and set up to serve expressive-symbolic ends/goals. It is expressive, anyhow, in the elementary sense, since it – through its success – indicates, signals, displays and notifies an ability and a

⁵⁹ According to Maslow, “Expressive Component”, esp. pp. 261 ff., 264 ff..

quantum of power of the actor (ein Können und ein Machtquantum des Akteurs), who already therein finds a self-confirmation. Expressive kinds of acting, actions and acts (Expressive Handlungen) are, for their part, ends/goals in themselves (Selbstzwecke) because they have this same self-confirmation of the identity as the(ir) sole object (weil sie diese selbe Selbstbestätigung der Identität zum einzigen Gegenstand haben), their end/goal is, therefore, already contained in their execution, without, in the course of this, having to take into consideration the schema “end/goal-means” and the external circumstances or the logic of the situation. The showing and demonstrating of the state of mind, mental condition and sensitivity or of the ability and or the power of the actor suffices (Es genügt das Zeigen der Befindlichkeit oder des Könnens bzw. der Macht des Akteurs), which makes apparent and clear what dominates topically and currently in the logic of his identity (was aktuell in der Logik seiner Identität dominiert). Here lies (or is found) the source of many types of “irrationalities”. The actor may, in fact precisely through and by means of (the/his/a) disregard, contempt and disdain for socially acceptable norms, his human milieu / surroundings or (for) the/his objective constraints, compulsions, pressures and coercions (Zwänge), be confirmed in his identity, and indeed out of multiple “malicious, malign, malignant” or “innocent” motives: he may through and by means of such (a) stance avenge a lack of recognition or, conversely, believe that he will invariably and undoubtedly win (over) and gain this recognition as soon as he thus shows and presents himself “as he is”. The postponement (deferment or delay) of satisfaction (Die Aufschiebung der Befriedigung) or of the uninhibited, unchecked expression of the affects and emotions, which in fact represents and constitutes a satisfaction too / as well, is needed / necessary (there) where one is thinking of or imagining a long-term handling of the schema “end/goal-means”. On the other hand, in and during the expressive acting, action and act as end/goal in itself the / what is long-term is absorbed by the / what is immediate and direct, that is to say, under these

particular circumstances, the logic of the identity can command the free unleashing (releasing, unblocking, untying, detachment) of the affect / emotion. And not only in the expressive kinds of acting, actions and acts as such, but also in the kinds of acting, actions and acts which indeed have an external end/goal and use expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means, yet basically express / state something about the logic of the identity. To that / those equally belong kinds of acting, actions and acts which are regarded commonly and generally as moral, and other (kinds of acting, actions and acts) which (are) commonly and generally (regarded) as unmoral, i.e. immoral. Whoever, e.g., hurts or upsets the self-understanding of the identity and consequently hinders and obstructs its self-confirmation, whoever, therefore, violates (injures, wounds, infringes, hurts, bruises) its (i.e. the identity's self-confirmation's) "honour" etc., must then reckon with his (i.e. of the person with violated honour) act of revenge, even if this (act of revenge) seems to be "irrational" since it interferes with, encroaches upon, spoils, detracts from and infringes other (material or social) interests of the actor. As La Bruyère in a brilliant aphorism opined / thought, it is for the/a passion an easy thing to defeat (the) Reason, its great triumph it celebrates only if it (i.e. the said passion) imposes itself against its interest⁶⁰. Already Guicciardini reprimanded, rebuked and found fault with those who, against/contrary to their own advantage (i.e. benefit, profit and interest; Vortail), thought of revenge and via its satisfaction, forgot all / everything else⁶¹. This same logic of the identity, which wants to disregard and disdain (the) "interest" in the current sense for the sake of honour or of revenge, and in this respect acts against (the) "better reasons", can motivate [[someone]] (or act as a motivating factor) for altruistic kinds of acting, actions and acts and personal sacrifices. In this case, the identity

⁶⁰ «Rien ne coûte moins à la passion que de se mettre au-dessus de la raison: son grand triomphe est de l'emporter sur l'intérêt [[nothing costs the/a passion less than to put itself above (master, defeat) reason: its great triumph is to prevail (impose itself) over (outweigh) the i.e. its interest]]», *Les Caractères*, IV, p. 77.

⁶¹ *Ricordi*, II, p. 150.

connects its self-confirmation absolutely / virtually / really / straight away with the renunciation of the pursual of its own interests and it would “lose every respect for itself / self-respect” if it acted otherwise. Here belongs a broad palette or gamut of positionings and stances and modes and ways of acting, action and the act, which reaches and stretches from suicide out of/from shame up to (a) heroic death on the battlefield or a life (rich and) full of privations in the service of the poor, and through and by means of its great variety and multiplicity reveals how difficult the determination of the “better reasons”, consequently, as the criterion of/for rationality or else irrationality is, as soon as one leaves the field of banalities in which the newer moral-philosophical debate (i.e. the newer / modern debate in moral philosophy) (die neuere moralphilosophische Debatte) feels at home (“when I see thick clouds in the sky, then I have better reasons to take my umbrella with me than not to do this”). Of questions and problems of identity, of its (i.e. an identity’s) unceasing struggle for self-confirmation and its real dilemmas, which directly concern the examination of the problem of rationality and irrationality, it (i.e. the said newer debate in moral philosophy), in fact, takes no notice, in genuine philosophical blue-eyedness, i.e. naivety.

The questionability of the “better reasons” as (the) criterion of rationality and irrationality becomes, from another perspective, clear (plain, obvious) as well: as (we have) said, (the) better and less good reasons, ultimately / in the final analysis, must be evaluated and judged from the standpoint of particular ends / goals defined in terms of content, on the other hand, the logic of the identity bears / carries the/its own ends/goals in itself, it is an end/goal in itself or, expressed otherwise, (it is) built and set up / constructed self-referentially. The logically-experimentally ascertainable realisability (i.e. feasibility and viability) of the ends/goals of acting, action and the act is here – regardless of the possible / potential self-delusions of the actor in this respect (self-delusions, incidentally,

which serve the self-confirmation of the identity) – hardly of (any) weight, i.e. significance, whereas in and during “logical action” it has primary significance and meaning. This explains why under certain circumstances or else in and during “higher irrationality” the logic of identity can outstrip the (logic of) the situation. Of course, the identity knows itself (to be) always in a situation, but the situation from/out of which it draws its self-understanding and its self-confirmation does not necessarily coincide with that in which it precisely must act; the former can be more or less fictive or else a past or future situation of (a) “higher” order, in (regard to) which the topical, current situation is measured and is reduced, lowered and downgraded to a pseudo (apparent, mock, fictitious, bogus and sham) situation (Scheinsituation). The logic of the identity changes in order to adapt and adjust itself to the logic of the topical, current situation only under the pressure of the social relation. Such a change, as is known, does not necessarily occur, but its possibility, as soon as another component of the identity undertakes the representation of the identity as (a) whole, shows/demonstrates in itself that the logic of the identity should or may not at all be confused with a fixed, stable and firm disposition (einer festen Disposition). Just as little is / ought it (i.e. the logic of the identity) to be class(ifi)ed one-sidedly as (the) source of irrationalities. Finally, behind, in fact, “rational” action, an identity stands too, whose logic springs from the demands of such actions and whose self-confirmation consists in the success of such action. The difference lies therein, that in and during “rational” action the uniformity and solidity of the schema “end/goal-means” (Geschlossenheit des Schemas „Zweck-Mittel“) and the realisability of the end/goal clarifies, as it were, exhaustively the theme, subject and topic “rationality”, and a going into the identity of the actor seems (to be) superfluous (und ein Eingehen auf die Identität des Akteurs sich zu erübrigen scheint). But for the asymmetries and dissonances which characterise the “irrationalities” an explanation must be specified / stated / given, and here one does not make do or manage without

consideration of/for the logic of the identity. Its (i.e. the identity's) changeability and variability, corresponding / in accordance with the multi-dimensionality of the identity, makes understandable why the same actor can act, at times, "rationally", at times "irrationally". In general, from this perspective it becomes clearer and more obvious why rationality can have an effect at a number of levels, in a number of forms and to various degrees, why it (i.e. rationality) is mixed and blended in and during various kinds of acting, actions and acts with "irrationality" at all these levels, in all these forms and all these degrees. Such a result and outcome may appear to be theoretically (i.e. in regard to theory) unsatisfactory to the rationalistic ethicists and moralists. They should not or ought to not, nonetheless, forget how unsatisfactory their own theories in practice (praxis) have until now / hitherto turned out be.

C. The misleading concept of "end/goal rationality" and M. Weber's problematic typification (i.e. rendering into a type or classification under a typifying form) of social action (Der irreführende Begriff der „Zweckrationalität“ und M. Webers problematische Typisierung sozialen Handelns)

Max Weber was convinced of the relativity of ethical values, and hence as (a) social scientist was hardly tempted/put/led into (the) temptation to connect / of connecting the concept of (the) ratio (i.e. reason(ing)) and of (the) rationality with a certain ethically defined or coloured, i.e. tinged or biased content, that is, in the sense of the ethical-normativistic tradition in theology and philosophy of demarcating or delimiting it (i.e. the concept of ratio (i.e. reason(ing)) and of rationality) against (the/a) "false" ratio (i.e. reason(ing)) and (the/a) "false" rationality (Max Weber war von der Relativität der ethischen Werte überzeugt und geriet daher als Sozialwissenschaftler kaum in Versuchung, den Begriff der

Ratio und der Rationalität mit einem bestimmten ethisch definierten oder gefärbten Inhalt zu verbinden, ihn also im Sinne der ethisch-normativistischen Tradition in Theologie und Philosophie gegen die „falsche“ Ratio und die „falsche“ Rationalität abzugrenzen)⁶². In his eyes / view, and in (relation) to that he did not err/was not wrong, it was a matter of a “historical concept, which contained a world of contrasts and opposites/oppositions within itself”, that is, it is distinguished by (its) “many-sidedness” and in terms of content can be defined, if at all, (then) only by a negative-polemical reference (einen negative-polemischen Bezug): rational (irrational) is not something in itself, but [[is / comes]] out of a certain irrational (rational) point of view; something which is e.g. economically (i.e. as regards the economy) rational can exactly because of that be ethically irrational⁶³. This historical way of looking at things (in respect of the examination of the problem of rationality is underpinned theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) by the distinction between form-related (i.e. formal) and material rationality (formaler und materialer Rationalität). The former (formal rationality) is measured in (regard to) a single neutral yardstick, benchmark or criterion and is because of that/accordingly unambiguous, unequivocal and has a single meaning, the ambiguity having many meanings of the latter (material rationality) arises from the possibility of its connection/combination with several value-yardsticks/standards or benchmarks and criteria as to values (Wertmaßstäben)⁶⁴. If the form-related (i.e. formal) and material meet / encounter each other here in principle and not merely “empirically” and occasionally and now and then, thus, this would imply that only the assumption, adoption and acceptance of certain values on the part of the actor could make this (actor) capable of rational action; the history of rationality would have to

⁶² “Corrupta ratio non est ratio... regula humanorum actuum non est ratio quaelibet, sed ratio recta [[= corrupt reason is not reason... the rule of human actions is not just any reason, but right reason]]”, Thomas von Aquin (Thomas Aquinas), *In II. Sent.*, dist. 24, qu.3, ad 3.

⁶³ *Prot. Ethik*, pp. 65, 84ff.; *Wirtschaft*, p. 335.

⁶⁴ *Wirtschaft*, pp. 44ff., 59.

therefore be subjected and subjugated, subordinated to the yardsticks, benchmarks, criteria, standards and measures of ethical rationality (Träfen Formales und Materiales hier prinzipiell und nicht bloß „empirisch“ und gelegentlich zusammen, so würde dies implizieren, daß nur die Annahme bestimmter Werte von seiten des Akteurs diesen zum rationalen Handeln befähigen könnte; die Geschichte der Rationalität müßte sich also den Maßstäben ethischer Rationalität unterwerfen). On the other hand, the material value relativism (of the researcher) enables / makes possible the historical procedure (method or process) and also historical balance / (counter) balancing. The formal (i.e. form-related) analysis of rationality, which constitutes the counterpart of (the) material value relativism (of the researcher), does not postulate, though, that the actor must act ethically in a value-free manner in order to be able to act rationally, because in this case a negative binding of the analysis of rationality to the material point of view would arise and ensue (Hingegen ermöglicht der materiale Wertrelativismus (des Forschers) historisches Verfahren und auch historische Ausgewogenheit. Die formale Rationalitätsanalyse, die das Pendant zum materialen Wertrelativismus (des Forschers) bildet, postuliert allerdings nicht, daß der Akteur ethisch wertfrei handeln muß, um rational handeln zu können, denn in diesem Fall würde sich eine negative Bindung der Rationalitätsanalyse an materiale Gesichtspunkte einstellen); (the) latter (negative binding of the analysis of rationality to the material point of view) shows, on the contrary, that material rationality at the level of the actor, i.e. the confession of faith in certain values does not in the least stand in the way of rational and rationalised acts, which can be apprehended under / from formal (i.e. form-related) points of view. The form-related (i.e. formal) analysis of rationality, in other words, establishes / shows / proves that (the) rationality of the actor or else of the “moulding, shaping and

formation of life (Lebensgestaltung)” “allows different kinds of contents”⁶⁵. Correspondingly, rationalisation (Rationalisierung)^{xxix}, i.e. the practical conversion or effect and consequences and result(s) of rationality is distinguished by “ambiguity and many meanings (Vieldeutigkeit)”⁶⁶, and it stretches and extends, motivated by the most different content(s) and or values, to the most different realms and areas of (the) social reality and of (the) social action. It pioneers and blazes the trail, opens the road / opens roads as the “disenchantment of the world” („Entzauberung der Welt“), as (the) adaptation and adjustment of behaviour to ethical commands, as (the) conceptual systematisation of ideas, as (the) bureaucratisation and regulation of (the) social life through and by means of form-related (i.e. formal) prescriptions and (the) positivisation of the order of right/law/justice, i.e. of the legal order (als Anpassung des Verhaltens an ethische Gebote, als begriffliche Systematisierung von Ideen, als Bürokratisierung und Regulierung des sozialen Lebens durch formale Vorschriften und Positivierung der Rechtsordnung) etc. etc.. How, i.e. what Weber thought of / about these processes of rationalisation (Rationalisierungsprozesse) has in the meanwhile been sufficiently and adequately researched and does not have to be substantiated, backed up, proved and verified anew^{xxx}. To be held onto/retained/kept in mind, however, is Weber’s explanation that the processes of rationalisation “in the individual areas and realms of life” would “by no means” exhibit a “parallel progressing / progressive development or unfolding”⁶⁷, they would not, therefore, all of them, flow into one single riverbed(,) wherein rationality is constituted as (a) united (uniform and homogenous) whole (als einheitliches Ganzes) and consequently would have to overcome the contrasts and oppositions between its form-related (i.e. formal) and material, ethical and technical aspects. Such (a) completion,

⁶⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 675.

⁶⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 15ff..

⁶⁷ *Prot. Ethik*, p. 65.

perfection and consummation (Vollendung) of (the) rationality is not allowed or granted in the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal).

Weber placed (accommodated, stored, subordinated) the historical forms of (the) rationality or rationalisation (die geschichtlichen Gestalten der Rationalität bzw. Rationalisierung) in two large and simple categories. He spoke of the theoretical mastery, command, domination and control of (the) reality by all the / ever more precise concepts (theoretischen Beherrschung der Realität durch immer präzisere Begriffe) and of the methodical reaching, attainment and achievement of a practical aim/end/objective by (the) all the more / ever more precise calculation of the adequate means, that is, by the all the more / ever more effective methodicalness and regularity as to a plan / plans / planning (methodischen Erreichung eines praktischen Ziels durch immer präzisere Berechnung der adäquaten mittel, also durch immer wirksamere Planmäßigkeit)⁶⁸. If one adds to both these categories the (two other categories) introduced in and during the classification of the types of social action (bei der Klassifizierung der Typen sozialen Handelns) (“end/goal rationality (or rationality as to an end/goal) (Zweckrationalität)” and “value rationality (or rationality as to a value) (Wertrationalität)”), thus arises and results an ensemble or whole of four types of rationality (or rationality types) (Rationalitätstypen) which appears to be sufficiently comprehensive in order to be fair to the totality and entirety of Weber’s comments, remarks, statements and suggestions, insinuations and indications concerning this / in this connection⁶⁹. It is now apparent that both of the former types of rationality (of more precise concepts and of more precise means) lie / are found at another logical level (auf einer anderen logischen Ebene) than both of the latter (rationality types (of end/goal rationality and value rationality)). Weber did not ask, of course, about the

⁶⁸ *Aufsätze z. Rel.*, I, p. 265ff..

⁶⁹ Despite the use of (s)lightly different terminology, the two / both of the most thorough classifications of the Weberian types of rationality (rationality types) agree with each other in relation to this result; see Kalberg, “Weber’s Types”, esp. p. 1151ff. and Levine, *Flight*, esp. p. 157ff..

anthropological and social-ontological backgrounds or backdrops of rationality (anthropologischen und sozialontologischen Hintergründen der Rationalität)⁷⁰, yet, with (regard to) those (anthropological and social-ontological backgrounds of rationality), closely related points of view flowed (were infused / injected / instilled) into his typology of social action (in seine Typologie sozialen Handelns), which (is) not of (does not have) the ambition to summarise historically-sociologically reconstructable processes, but is supposed to or should or ought to put forward, propose or establish real (if also ideal-typically purified / clean(s)ed / purged) constants (reale (wenn auch idealtypisch gereinigte) Konstanten). On the other hand, kinds of potential and capabilities (in respect) of / for rationality (Rationalitätspotentiale) convertible into processes of rationalisation (or rationalisation processes) (Rationalisierungsprozesse) float and hover freely in the sense that they as such cannot make up any separate stable type of acting, action or act (or acting-action-act type) (gesonderten stabilen Handlungstyp). They can indeed, generally, be reckoned or counted amongst “end/goal-(rationality)” or amongst “value rationality” (zur „Zweck-“ oder zur „Wertrationalität“), however, “end/goal-(rationality)” or “value rationality” in themselves do not make any “kinds of progress or advances (Fortschritte)”, they are not subject to any change like that which the processes of rationalisation represent and constitute. Even if one wanted to in misjudgement and underestimation of this state of affairs and present situation (Sachlage) to assert that “end/goal” rationality is perfected in the course of history or else it is rationalised (sie rationalisiere sich) in (the) form of a(n) more and more / all the more effective methodicalness and regularity as to a plan / plans / planning (immer wirksameren Planmäßigkeit), thus one would completely certainly cause and induce Weber’s fierce and intense opposition and objection (and contradiction; Widerspruch) (in regard) to

⁷⁰ See 1Ba in this chapter, above.

the thesis that (the) “value rationality” makes in itself, i.e. via the increasing quality of values and of (the) value-related and judgemental thinking/thought (des wertenden Denkens), any kinds of progress or advances, which could be detached, separated and severed from the (incidentally symmetrical and revocable) historical processes of rationalisation. What, however, Weber rejected in principle, both in regard to (the) end/goal (rationality), as well as (in regard to) (the) value rationality, he smuggled (in) under the influence of the dichotomy “community-society” understood in terms of the history of philosophy (unter dem Einfluß der geschichtsphilosophisch verstandenen Dichotomie „Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft“) into his considerations over/about/regarding the former (community), by describing the development and evolution of the o(O)ccident/w(W)est (die Entwicklung des Okzidents) as a unique and singular process of rationalisation in the sense of (the) technical (rationality) or else of (the) “end/goal rationality”. Against that there would be no objection, if the historical-sociological analysis of rationalisation had not wormed its way and stole and crept into the anthropological and social-ontological realm/area, if, therefore, the in principle hyper-historical or supra-historical typology of social action (die prinzipiell überhistorische Typologie des sozialen Handelns) had not been constructed under the palpable, noticeable, perceptible, marked, distinct, considerable, tangible influence of the same dichotomous schema which guided, steered and directed the historically sociological description of the occidental (Western) processes of rationalisation. Much to the detriment (damage, harm, injury) of theoretical consistency and clarity, two logically heterogenous levels are here mixed with each other, but above all the attempt suffers thereunder of defining the concept of (the) “end/goal rationality (Zweckrationalität)” satisfactorily, and of delimiting and demarcating it (i.e. the concept of “end/goal rationality”) in a convincing way/manner against (the) “value rationality (Wertrationalität)”. We shall introduce our remarks, observations and comments regarding that with some

reflexions/reflections (in relation) to the processes of rationalisation in the Occident (West).

The description of these processes would have been a relatively simple matter of concern (affair) if it were, in the course of this, a matter of the victory of (the) undisguised, outspoken, blunt, forthright “end/goal rationality (Zweckrationalität)” over traditionalisms (Traditionalismen) and older “value rationalities (Wertrationalitäten)”, that is to say, of an objectively right/correct and clear self-understanding of certain historical actors regarding the likewise objectively right/correct and clear self-understanding of other actors. The talented and gifted historian Weber knew, though, about the enormous complexity of (the) development (evolution, advancement) (Entwicklung), and he also knew that a main source of the complexity of historical developments (eine Hauptquelle der Komplexität geschichtlicher Entwicklungen) in general lies / is found in the asymmetry between the self-understanding of the actors and the objective consequences of their action (in der Asymmetrie zwischen dem Selbstverständnis der Akteure und den objektiven Folgen ihres Handelns liegt). Irrespective of how one may judge his opinions and views on/regarding / over the (relative) value and importance of the Protestant spirit(-intellect) inside of the overall development of capitalism, they prove his awake and alert consciousness and awareness of those asymmetries, in fact of their necessity for the unwinding of collective action in long periods of time (ihrer Notwendigkeit für die Abwicklung kollektiven Handelns in langen Zeiträumen). That which in accordance with Weber’s perception, conception and view was supposed to be proved at (the) end of the occidental (Western) process of rationalisation as the pushing through and imposition and accomplishment/achievement of “end/goal rationality”, paved the way by (the) invocation of old and new “value-rationalities”; “value rationalities” moulded, shaped and formed the methodical ways of life (die methodischen Lebensführungen), in fact in (the) areas and

realms in which (the) form-related (i.e. formal) “end/goal rationality” purely seems to dominate ((the) feeling/sense of duty of the government official or civil servant etc.)⁷¹. Although Weber was now clear about the “value-rational” preconditions and prerequisites of “end/goal rationality” (if one may/can say so) for (the) period of origin and coming into being of capitalism, on the other hand, he believed that the capitalistically-bureaucratically determined process of rationalisation in the end would entail the radical disenchantment of the world and would erect, set up and establish the mechanical Reich (kingdom, empire, realm) of “end/goal rationality” on earth, in fact that this in essence had already happened (Obwohl Weber sich nun über die „wertrationalen“ Voraussetzungen der „Zweckrationalität“ (wenn man so sagen darf) zur Entstehungszeit des Kapitalismus klar war, glaubte er andererseits, daß der kapitalistisch-bürokratisch bedingte Rationalisierungsprozeß schließlich die radikale Entzauberung der Welt nach sich ziehen und das mechanische Reich der „Zweckrationalität“ auf Erden errichten würde, ja daß dies im wesentlichen schon geschehen sei). The reason for this very one-sided and for long stretches (i.e. to a great extent or largely) faulty, defective, flawed, imperfect, erroneous assessment of the historical situation (and position) rests and is based on Weber’s tendency to connect the enchantment of the world (inside of the Occident / West) principally, primarily or exclusively with the Christian religion, from which arose and resulted (the fact) that (the) secularisation, understood as (the) dissolution of Christianity came and boiled down to and ended up in consistent disenchantment. Here it became apparent that Weber had a weaker feeling and sense for (the) inner/internal structure, (the) social-psychological effect and impact and (the) (cap)ability (in respect) of the change in / changing of ideologies than for instance Pareto (Der Grund für diese sehr einseitige und auf weite Strecken fehlerhafte Einschätzung der geschichtlichen

⁷¹ Cf. in relation to that, Tenbruck, „Das Werk“, esp. p. 689; Kalberg, “Weber’s Types”, esp. p. 1162ff..

Lage beruhte auf Webers Neigung, die Verzauberung der Welt (innerhalb des Okzidents) vornehmlich oder ausschließlich mit der christlichen Religion zu verbinden, woraus sich ergab, daß die Säkularisierung, als Auflösung des Christentums verstanden, auf konsequente Entzauberung hinauslief. Hier zeigte sich, daß Weber ein schwächeres Gespür für innere Struktur, sozialpsychologische Wirkung und Wandlungsfähigkeit von Ideologien hatte als etwa Pareto). The same historical-social subjects, who mercilessly, pitilessly and unmercifully expelled, drove out, drove away and banished (the) Christian magic from / out of all corners of the world, filled the emptiness and void (in respect) of sense (i.e. sensorial emptiness/void or emptiness and void (in respect) of meaning) with new godheads, divinities, deities or hypostases and, in the process, summoned ideological arts of magic (i.e. kinds of magic and witchcraft) which were hardly behind or inferior (subordinate) to the theological (kinds of magic) (Dieselben geschichtlich-sozialen Subjekte, die erbarmungslos den christlichen Zauber aus allen Ecken der Welt vertrieben, füllten die Sinnesleere mit neuen Gottheiten oder Hypostasen und boten dabei ideologische Zauberkünste auf, die den theologischen kaum nachstanden)⁷². These godheads, divinities, deities or hypostases were called “Nature”, “History” or “Man”, and in their name stood atheists with (the) same and equal ardour, fervour, zeal and devoutness before the execution squad as in their time/day Christians, who went to (their) martyrdom (Diese Gottheiten oder Hypostasen hießen „Natur“, „Geschichte“ oder „Mensch“, und in ihrem Namen standen Atheisten mit gleicher Inbrunst vor dem Hinrichtungskommando wie seinerzeit Christen, die zum Martyrium gingen). (The) Secularisation, far from drying up the sources of magical thought (i.e. thought (in respect) of magic) forever, secured and ensured the survival of age-old thought structures in the sharpest contrast and opposition to the content(s) with which the same thought structures were accompanied;

⁷² Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 3, above.

because there are thought (structures) and conceptual structures (structures (in respect of) a concept) which are indispensable in (regard to) every ethically-normatively thought-of and conceived assumption of sense, i.e. meaning (Die Säkularisierung, weit davon entfernt, die Quellen des Zauberdenkens für immer auszutrocknen, sicherte das Überleben von uralten Denkstrukturen bei schärfstem Gegensatz zu den Inhalten, mit denen die gleichen Denkstrukturen früher einhergingen; denn es gibt Denk- und Begriffsstrukturen, die bei jeder ethisch-normativ gedachten Annahme von Sinn unverzichtbar sind). That has hardly changed, though, after the collapse (breakdown) of the Marxist philosophy of history and the temporary victory of (the) Western “pragmatism”. Today’s Western legal positivism, which mistakenly imagines itself (as) perfectly and completely illusionless, i.e. devoid or free of illusions, can only flourish and thrive against the background of anthropological-world-theoretical postulates ((the) “dignity of man/men” / “human dignity”, (the) “rights of man / men” / “human rights”), whilst resigned scepticism, which allegedly or supposedly supports pluralism and tolerance, promptly gives way and yields to decided / decisive measures as soon as someone seriously questions (earnestly puts / calls into question) pluralism and tolerance; on which world-theoretical preferences(,) and even / not to mention eschatological expectations(,) the oftentimes propagated primacy of the economy and of technique (i.e. technology) vis-à-vis (the) “power politics” is founded, is also adequately / sufficiently known (Das hat sich allerdings nach dem Zusammenbruch der marxistischen Geschichtsphilosophie und dem vorläufigen Sieg des westlichen „Pragmatismus“ kaum geändert. Der heutige westliche Rechtspositivismus, der sich vollkommen illusionlos wähnt, kann erst auf der Folie von anthropologisch-weltanschaulichen Postulaten („Menschenwürde“, „Menschenrechte“) gedeihen, während die resignierte Skepsis, welche angeblich Pluralismus und Toleranz trägt, prompt entschlossenen Maßnahmen weicht, sobald jemand Pluralismus und Toleranz ernsthaft in Frage stellt; in

welchen weltanschaulichen Präferenzen und gar eschatologischen Erwartungen das vielfach propagierte Primate der Ökonomie und der Technik gegenüber der „Machtpolitik“ gründet, ist auch hinreichend bekannt). The end of (the) ideologies constitutes only the ideological self-understanding of the time(s) / era / age, just / precisely as the self-understanding pertaining to the critique of culture of the time(s) / era / age commands already since decades ago comprehending the time(s) / era / age as (the) work of blind instrumental thought. Seen from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge, it is a matter here of the thought products of intellectuals who want to play the part of (put on airs or show off as) the champions or pioneers of the “substantial” against the “instrumental”^{xxxix}. In (an) anthropological and social-ontological respect, things are again much more banal than the of its essence, i.e. by its nature pompous, stuck-up and self-important critique of culture can (admit) and wants to admit (Das Ende der Ideologien bildet nur das ideologische Selbstverständnis der Zeit, genauso wie das kulturkritische Selbstverständnis der Zeit es seit Jahrzehnten schon gebietet, die Zeit als Werk blinden instrumentellen Denkens aufzufassen. Wissenssoziologisch gesehen handelt es sich hier um Denkprodukte von Intellektuellen, die sich als Vorkämpfer des „Substantiellen“ gegen das „Instrumentelle“ aufspielen wollen. In anthropologischer und sozialontologischer Hinsicht verhält es sich wiederum viel banaler als die von ihrem Wesen her wichtiguerische Kulturkritik wahrhaben kann und will)^{xxxii}.

The influence of the currents pertaining to the critique / criticism of culture, which since the final third of the 19th century united, joined and merged in itself motifs of classical conservatism and of (the) Romanticism with newer “left” and “right” refusals (and cancellations, i.e. rejections) of capitalism, on Weber’s definition and determination of the character of an occidental / Western present, which stands at the end of a unique process of rationalisation, cannot be

estimated highly enough (or cannot be over-estimated). (With)In this intellectual-spiritual framework the dichotomy (of) “community-society”, whose diagnosis of the present read, i.e. declared or sounded the rise, advent or emergence of pure instrumentality and end/goal rationality, i.e. the imposition and pushing through of “the own (or intrinsic) logic of the means” as they are handled by the individualistic “voluntary or “free-choice / freestyle” will” without taking substantial ends/goals into account (Der Einfluß der kulturkritischen Strömungen, die seit dem letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts Motive des klassischen Konservativismus und der Romantik mit neueren „linken“ und „rechten“ Absagen an den Kapitalismus in sich vereinigten, auf Webers Bestimmung des Charakters einer okzidentalen Gegenwart, die am Ende eines einmaligen Rationalisierungsprozesses steht, kann nicht hoch genug veranschlagt werden. In diesem geistigen Rahmen wirkte die Dichotomie „Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft“, deren Gegenwartsdiagnose auf die Heraufkunft der puren Instrumentalität und Zweckrationalität lautete, d. h. auf Durchsetzung der „Eigenlogik der Mittel“, wie sie der individualistische „Kürwille“ handhabt, ohne Rücksicht auf substantielle Zwecke zu nehmen)⁷³. However, in contrast and in opposition to many other(s) (people, thinkers), Weber, despite / notwithstanding occasional rhetorical failures / breakdowns / lapses, did not imagine any return to “community”, – at any level of modernisation and in any form whatsoever. Even when he raved / gushed / enthused about the “rebirth of old thoughts and ideals” or wanted to put forward and advance (the) charisma against (the) bureaucracy, he remained – often grinding i.e. gnashing one’s teeth, grudgingly, muttering under his breath – on the soil, ground i.e. terrain of “society”, i.e. of the liberal-capitalistic social order (Aber im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen schwebte Weber trotz gelegentlicher rhetorischer Ausfälle keine Rückkehr zur „Gemeinschaft“ vor, – auf welcher Modernisierungsebene und in

⁷³ Tönnies, „Zweck und Mittel“, p. 39.

welcher Gestalt auch immer. Auch wenn er von der „Wiedergeburt alter Gedanken und Ideale“ schwärmte oder das Charisma gegen die Bürokratie ins Feld führen wollte, blieb er – oft zähneknirschend – auf dem Boden der „Gesellschaft“, d. h. der liberal-kapitalistischen Sozialordnung)⁷⁴ + xxxiii. This basic or fundamental stance rested and was based on, though, the assumption that (the) “society” had been constituted irrevocably as an epoch of history, it (i.e. society) had therefore first made out of its own specific features (the) feature of social life in general, so that – and therein lay the never clearly drawn, i.e. defined, but latent and misleading implication – its historical-sociological analysis merged, fused and blended with social-ontological categorisations. (The) “End/goal rationality”, concretised as (the) dominance of technique (i.e. technology), of the economy and of legality, could against the background of this assumption be declared as the law of the form and of the movement/motion of social action, or else as the measure, yardstick, benchmark, standard or criterion against which other laws of the form and movement/motion of social action could be measured. Generally, the contrast and opposition between (the / what is) rational / Rational and (the / what is) irrational / Irrational was seen in the light of the contrast and opposition between capitalistic and pre-capitalistic social behaviour, or else between “society” and “community”, even when that (contrast between (the) Rational and (the) Irrational) was not totally / completely or not expressly identified with this (contrast between capitalistic and pre-capitalistic behaviour or “society” and “community”) (Diese Grundhaltung beruhte allerdings auf der Annahme, die „Gesellschaft“ habe sich unwiderruflich als eine Epoche der Geschichte konstituiert, sie habe also aus ihren spezifischen Merkmalen erst Merkmale des sozialen Lebens überhaupt gemacht, so daß – und darin lag die nie klar gezogene, aber latente und irreführende Implikation – ihre historisch-

⁷⁴ See, in relation to that, the fine analyses of Breuer, *Bürokratie und Charisma*, as well as „Von Tönnies zu Weber“.

soziologische Analyse mit sozialontologischen Kategorisierungen verschmolz. Die „Zweckrationalität“, als Herrschaft der Technik, der Wirtschaft und der Legalität konkretisiert, konnte vor dem Hintergrund dieser Annahme zum Form- und Bewegungsgesetz sozialen Handelns bzw. zum Maßstab erklärt werden, an dem sich andere Form- und Bewegungsgesetze sozialen Handelns messen ließen. Überhaupt wurde der Gegensatz zwischen Rationalem und Irrationalem im Lichte des Gegensatzes zwischen kapitalistischem und vorkapitalistischem Sozialverhalten bzw. zwischen „Gesellschaft“ und „Gemeinschaft“ gesehen, auch wenn jener nicht ganz oder nicht ausdrücklich mit diesem identifiziert wurde)⁷⁵. Thus (the) positivistic apologists of “legal dominance (as authority) or legal domination” and of the “rationality of the economy”, who therein saw (beheld, caught sight of) the start, dawn and point of departure of an ideology-free age, felt more or less justified in invoking Weber’s diagnosis of the present, whereas other(s) (people, thinkers), who, with ethical-normative intent, wanted to get out of or set their sights further than (the) “instrumental” thought/thinking, reproached him for raising exactly this thought/thinking to (an) ideology, and of putting this ideology in the service of capitalism (So fühlten sich positivistische Apologeten der „legalen Herrschaft“ und der „Wirtschaftsrationalität“, die darin den Aufbruch eines ideologiefreien Zeitalters erblickten, mehr oder weniger berechtigt, sich auf Webers Gegenwartsdiagnose zu berufen, während andere, die in ethisch-normativer Absicht über das „instrumentelle“ Denken hinauswollten, ihm den Vorwurf machten, eben dieses Denken zur Ideologie zu erheben und diese Ideologie in den Dienst des Kapitalismus zu stellen)⁷⁶. Positivistic invocations of Weber would have been impossible if he had further worked out and elaborated upon the “value-rational” backgrounds of capitalistic and legalistic “end/goal rationality”; and the “left(-wing)” critique of him, i.e. Weber, would have run

⁷⁵ Cf. already, Landshut, *Kritik der Soziologie*, p. 54ff.

⁷⁶ Typically, Marcuse, „Industrialisierung“; cf. Vogel, „Überlegungen“.

and gone into the void, emptiness, i.e. would have been in vain and fallen on deaf ears, if he had not given cause (occasion, reason) for the assumption / to assume that his concept of end/goal rationality constituted merely the formalisation (i.e. rendering (rendition, making, conversion) into a form or forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) and typification (i.e. rendering into a type or types or classification under a typifying form or forms) of (the) occidental / Western processes of rationalisation (Positivistische Berufungen auf Weber wären unmöglich, wenn er die „wertrationalen“ Hintergründe kapitalistischer und legalistischer „Zweckrationalität“ herausgearbeitet hätte; und die „linke“ Kritik an ihm lief ins Leere, wenn er keinen Anlaß zur Annahme gegeben hätte, sein Begriff von Zweckrationalität bilde bloß die Formalisierung okzidentaler Rationalisierungsprozesse)^{xxxiv}.

Weber's susceptibility and proneness to such ambiguities and such fusions and blending of historical analyses with supra-historical (hyper-historical) categorisations sprang and originated – seen epistemologically – from the (his) lacking and wanting (deficient and incomplete) consciousness and awareness of the differences and the boundaries between social-ontology and (the) sociological kind (type, manner) of knowledge (Webers Anfälligkeit für solche Zweideutigkeiten und solche Verschmelzungen von historischen Analysen mit überhistorischen Kategorisierungen entsprang – epistemologisch gesehen – dem mangelnden Bewußtsein von den Unterschieden und den Grenzen zwischen Sozialontologie und soziologischer Erkenntnisart)⁷⁷. The mixing, blending and “interbreeding” of the / what is theoretical pertaining to acting, action and the act with the historical-sociological (der handlungstheoretischen mit der historisch-soziologischen) handling of rationality leads, for its part, to a logical-structural contrast and opposition between the in principle social-ontological cut-to-size scale or calibre of the typology of acting, action and the act and of

⁷⁷ See Ch. II, Sec. 2A and 3A, above.

the concrete arrangement and structuring (plan, pattern, structure, organisation, division, classification, segmentation, outline) (dem prinzipiell sozialontologischen Zuschnitt der Handlungstypologie und der konkreten Gliederung) of this same typology on the basis of quasi-evolutionistic assumptions (quasi evolutionistischer Annahmen), which revolve around the transition from (the) “community” to (the) “society”, from (the) unreflected tradition to (the) capitalistic rationalisation and methodicalness and regularity as to a plan / plans / planning (von der unreflektierten Tradition zur kapitalistischen Rationalisierung und Planmäßigkeit)⁷⁸. (The) Evolutionism (Der Evolutionismus) at (the) historical-sociological level finds expression and is reflected and manifests itself in, namely, at the level pertaining to the typology of acting, action and the act (auf handlungstypologischer Ebene) in the arrangement and structuring of the types of social action (in der Gliederung der Typen sozialen Handelns) in accordance with the principle of (the) downward, falling, descending and (the) upward, rising, ascending rationality; “end/goal rationality” takes up and occupies, as conscious and complete, full, whole, entire rationality, the highest place in this graduation, scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades and degrees (Stufenfolge), whereas traditional and affectual (emotional, affective) action (traditionelles und affektuelles Handeln), in and during which such awareness, consciousness and deliberateness (Bewußtheit) and cool or cold (cap)ability (in respect) of calculation seems to fade and dwindle away, occupies and fills the lower places. Nevertheless, it is very questionable and dubious whether types of acting, action and the act (Handlungstypen), which were constituted on the basis of different criteria, may be put into order and classified in one and the same graduation and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades and degrees. A classification yields, produces, reveals and results in (then) sense, i.e. meaning, only when it is undertaken with

⁷⁸ That is what Mannheim had already remarked briefly, see *Ideologie*, p. 261.

the help or on the basis of one single/sole criterion, which founds, justifies and gives reasons for the necessity of the conceptual separation and division of the concerned magnitudes from one another and their typological independence, autonomy, self-sufficiency and self-reliance (welches die Notwendigkeit der begrifflichen Trennung der betreffenden Größen voneinander und ihre typologische Selbständigkeit), whilst through and by means of its application it is excluded that these magnitudes represent and constitute merely different, differing, distinct, varying, various, miscellaneous aspects of the same phenomenon. Weber's typology of acting, action and the act (Webers Handlungstypologie), however, does not perform, achieve and accomplish precisely this. "End/goal rationality" is defined in accordance with the criterion of efficiency and effectiveness (Effizienz), "value rationality" with regard to the composition, texture and constitution (state, condition, nature) of the end/goal (die Beschaffenheit des Zweckes), traditional and affectual (emotional) action correspondingly with (the) psychological determination and or motivation. And it is absolutely (quite, perfectly, thoroughly) possible that (someone) has acted "end/goal-rationally, i.e. in terms of rationality as to an end/goal or ends/goals (zweckrational)", whilst at the same time the end/goal of the acting, action and the act (der Handlungszweck) was determined and defined "value-rationally, i.e. in terms of rationality pertaining to a value or values (wertrational)" and the motivation of / for the acting, action and the act is affective, emotive or traditional (und die Handlungsmotivation affektiv oder traditional ist)⁷⁹. In actual fact, only a confusion of (the) motivation and of the outer/external order, course or sequence of events of action amongst/between one another can lead to the assumption that affective / emotive and "end/goal-rational" action would have to (necessarily) be assigned to or class(ifi)ed as different types of action. Action cannot obviously be "end/goal-rational", that is efficient (effizient) in

⁷⁹ Aron, *Philosophie critique*, pp. 253ff., 305.

the sense of the chosen end/goal if its order, course or sequence of events, i.e. the handling of the means is destroyed by uncontrolled (affective and emotional) outbreaks, eruptions and outbursts (of the/an affect/emotion) (Affektsausbrüche). However, nothing which puts the actor under the pressure of strong affects and emotions of love and of hate in principle hinders (blocks, obstructs) ends/goals pertaining to acting, action and the act from being pursued with cool[-headed] planning and (the) skillful handling of (the) suitable means. We (have) already had the opportunity to name / call / designate / mention the considered, well-thought-out and well-planned long-term satisfaction (in respect) of the thirst for revenge as (an) example of that⁸⁰. Weber speaks / talks of revenge only in (the) connection (in respect) of/with affectual, emotional action, (in regard) to which he denies the (cap)ability (in respect) of/for “consistent systematic-and-methodical-as-to-plans orientation (konsequenter planvoller Orientierung)”, like for instance value-rational action possesses (it). But if affectual, emotional action seeks merely the “topical, current, i.e. of the moment and at that very moment (aktuelle)” direct satisfaction or abreaction (i.e. to release repressed emotions by acting out, as in words, behavior, or the imagination, the situation causing the conflict) (Abreaktion), then there is no compelling reason for/in respect of conferring and bestowing upon it the status of a type of acting, action and the act, especially, as Weber remarked, in and during (the) “conscious unloading, venting, discharge and dumping (bewußter Entladung)” of (the) feelings, the transition to(wards) (the) value(-rational) or end/goal-rational (zum Wert- oder Zweckrationalen) is (has) already (been) carried out, executed and performed⁸¹. Its single apparent and evident function inside of / within the typology is that which illustrates the (its) absolute contrast and opposition to end/goal rationality – this is, however, contained already in

⁸⁰ See the previous (sub-)section. Cf. Byron, *Marino Faliero*, IV, 2, V, 102-104: “There are things/ Which make revenge a virtue by reflection,/ And not an impulse or mere anger.”

⁸¹ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 12.

the Weberian concept of (the) “behaviour (Verhaltens)”. And in general, the affectual, emotional (element, factor) (das Affektuelle) belongs to the realm, area of (the) motivation (Motivation), it can, therefore, not found any type of acting, action and act; because to (outer, external) action belongs something more than (the) motivation, and there is no necessary connection or interrelation between the type of motivation and the order, course or sequence of events of (the) action^{xxxv}.

The type of traditional action⁸² does not face (is not up against) lesser / slighter difficulties. Here, first of all, the dependency of the Weberian typology on the contrast and opposition [between/in (regard to)] “community-society” is made directly noticeable. The definition of the traditional type of acting, action and act is abstracted from the at that time / back then / in those days current descriptions of “community”, above all from the Tönniesian, and furthermore it reminds us of Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity and (the) contemporary ethnological literature, which contrasted “primitive” and “civilised” social life with each other on the basis of similar coarse, crude and gross ideas, perceptions, concepts and notions (Die Definition des traditionellen Handlungstyps ist von den damals geläufigen Schilderungen der „Gemeinschaft“, allen voran der Tönniesschen, abstrahiert, und außerdem erinnert sie an Durkheims mechanische Solidarität und zeitgenössisches ethnologisches Schrifttum, welches „primitives“ und „zivilisiertes“ Sozialleben aufgrund ähnlicher grober Vorstellungen miteinander kontrastierte). The dominating features, attributes and characteristics of “strictly” defined traditional action (Weber characteristically and typically uses the term “behaviour”) are accordingly (the) lacking or missing reflectivity (die mangelnde Reflektiertheit), the “dull, muffled (dumpfe)” reacting / reaction to usual, accustomed and common stimuli (gewohnte Reize) in the usual manner,

⁸² *Ibid.*

and often beyond the bounds and limits of (the) meaningfully oriented action. A conceptual unclarity comes into being already by virtue of the fact that Weber reckons on (with regard) to traditional action defined in such a way the “mass of all settled-down, immersed, attuned and acclimatised everyday actions” (die „Masse alles eingelebten Alltagshandelns“), without distinguishing between individual and collective habits of life (ohne individuelle und kollektive Lebensgewohnheiten auseinanderzuhalten), and also without outlining in greater detail / more precisely “tradition (Tradition)” against the background of this difference/distinction as well as the for every tradition constitutive demarcation and delimitation against and from other traditions. But inside of and within one single collective tradition several and a number of types of individual habits can exist alongside/next to one another, whereas the character (in respect) of demarcation and delimitation of the/a tradition (which can even / also turn against innovators and renegades (Neuerer und Abtrünnige) from its own ranks, and indeed from *every* (traditionalistic collective), even from the most traditionalistic collective) needs a relatively high degree of reflectivity. If “tradition” is supposed to have a specific meaning, thus we must take both these points of view earnestly, i.e. seriously. Precisely the mix-up and confusion of traditional and habitual action blurs the borders, bound(arie)s and limits with, i.e. between each other (Gerade die Verwechslung traditionellen und gewohnheitsmäßigen Handelns miteinander verwischt Grenzen), which Weber wanted to sharply draw, i.e. the borders, bound(arie)s and limits between capitalistic society and pre(-capitalistic) or non-capitalistic community. Because also / even the men, i.e. people, humans, who live inside of the former (capitalistic society) have habits, and to these e.g. the “end/goal rationality” itself becoming (a) second nature and (a) thought style can belong. On the other hand, the character of the delimitation and demarcation of (the) tradition rests and is based on the conscious identification of its essence with certain (symbolic, ritual, ethical etc.) aspects of (the) collective life, which lie outside

of the realm and area of individual habits and symbolise, represent and typify (versinnbildlichen) the higher and superior values of the ideals on which the concerned collective life is supposed to be founded, established, based and set up in accordance with the in it dominant interpretation (in denen das betreffende kollektive Leben nach der in ihm dominierenden Interpretation gründen soll). A traditionalistic ideology (eine traditionalistische Ideologie) does not differentiate itself through and by means of these structural features from other(s) (ideologies), but merely through and by means of its content, i.e. through and by means of the belief that those values or ideals (jene Werte oder Ideale) constituted the foundation(s) and basis of collective life (das Fundament kollektiven Lebens) since old (times) or even (since) time immemorial. The perception, view (opinion, idea and conception) represented and supported on the tide and in the course of the dichotomy “community-society”, that pre-capitalistic societies lived (on) an unreflected traditionalism (vorkapitalistische Gesellschaften lebten einem unreflektierten Traditionalismus), which only the revolutionary threat converted into a reflected conservatism (den erst die revolutionäre Bedrohung in einen reflektierten Konservatismus verwandelte), is demonstrably false⁸³. The invocation of (the) tradition and the claim on the binding interpretation of its meaning and content has always and everywhere been (an) instrument for the pushing through and imposition of public and private power claims (Instrument zur Durchsetzung öffentlicher und privater Machtansprüche). Weber also mentions a form of traditional action (eine Gestalt traditionellen Handelns), which goes beyond, exceeds and surpasses the unreflected-habitual/habit-related (das Unreflektiert-Gewohnheitsmäßige) and strives for, aims at, aspires to a conscious binding, bonding, bond, attachment (Bindung) (in relation) to the habitual (das Gewohnte) as value and life ideal (or ideal of life) (als Wert und Lebensideal); characteristically and typically,

⁸³ In relation to that in detail and in depth, Kondylis, *Konservatismus*, pp. 11ff., 102ff., 124ff..

however, he accepts this same (form of traditional action) only as (a) tier, level, stage or grade (rung or rank) of the transition to “value rationality (Wertrationalität)”. In the background, therefore, again the idea (in the imagination or conception) (Vorstellung) of an ascending scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades, steps and degrees of rationality (aufsteigenden Stufenfolge der Rationalität) has an effect, and the arrangement and structuring (plan, pattern, structure, organisation, division, classification, segmentation, outline) of this scale, graduation and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades, steps and degrees (die Gliederung dieser Stufenfolge) permits [us] indeed to bring (the / what is) traditional in the vicinity of / near or close to the “value-rational” (Traditionales in die Nähe des „Wertrationalen“), it however does not allow any points of contact between (the / what is) traditional and (the / what is) “end/goal-rational” (zwischen Traditionalem und „Zweckrationalen“). Weber explains, though, that real social action can be mixed out of all pure types of acting, action and the act (reales soziales Handeln aus allen reinen Handlungstypen gemischt sein kann), this explanation would, nonetheless, leap/jump over the chasm, abyss or gulf (Kluft) only (then) when all types of acting, action and the act could claim for themselves the equal socialontological status. Traditional action (Traditionales Handeln) constitutes, however, a historical-sociological category which was hastily and hurriedly promoted and upgraded to (a) social-ontological constant (die eilig zur sozialontologischen Konstante befördert wurde), and Weber himself uses it, incidentally, in order to characterise the/that social action in its historical-sociological dimension (in seiner historisch-soziologischen Dimension), thus, e.g., when he spoke of “pre-rationalistic epochs (vorrationalistischen Epochen)” in which “tradition and charisma divided (up) and split up nearly/almost the totality/entirety of the directions, ways, trends and tendencies of the orientation of action amongst themselves („Tradition und Charisma nahezu die Gesamtheit der

Orientierungsrichtungen des Handelns unter sich aufteilten“)⁸⁴. For “end/goal rationality (Zweckrationalität)” obviously here not much place, i.e. space/room remained/was left over. One such thesis can be forgiven/pardoned/acquitted from the reproach / accusation / allegation of (the) absurdity only under one condition: that “end/goal rationality” is comprehended just like traditional action as (a) historical-sociological category, which specifically characterises the “rationalistic” epoch of capitalism, and that is why, by definition, (it, i.e. the “rationalistic” epoch of capitalism) must have been alien, strange, foreign to the pre-rationalistic epoch (den vorrationalistischen Epochen). If one understands, on the other hand, “end / goal rationality” in the social-ontological sense, thus it is not to be seen / one does not see why it (i.e. “end/goal rationality”) is supposed or ought to come up short, i.e. not be a part of and not exist in “pre-rationalistic” epochs. All collectives are in fact, in the final analysis, dependent for their survival on (the fact) that the great majority of the in them kinds of acting, actions and acts are carried out and executed on a daily and everyday basis “end/goal-rationally”, that is, are done, carried out, executed and performed through and by means of the choice of each and every respective expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means for the attainment and achievement of the each and every respective imagined and or thought-about ends/goals – irrespective of whether the actors defined these ends/goals in accordance with “traditional” or “rationalistic” criteria; (this is exactly a historical-sociological, not a social-ontological question or problem.) The men, i.e. humans or people of all epochs have held it to be or regarded it as irrational to consciously use means which hindered and obstructed the attainment and achievement of declared ends / goals. The concept of acting, action or of the act is since time immemorial connected with the adequate correlation of end/goal and means. Traditional action stands/is, as (a) historical-

⁸⁴ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 142.

sociological category, under (subordinated to) the so/thus understood social-ontological command of end/goal rationality (Traditionales Handeln steht, als historisch-soziologische Kategorie, unter dem so verstandenen sozialontologischen Zweckrationalitätsgebot). On/In relation to that, nothing changes if one, as Weber did it, thinks of “end/goal rationality” together with “interest (for one’s own benefit and advantage or self-interest) (Interesse)”. Because the pursuit or defence of one’s own interests (stands) in “pre-rationalistic” epochs not in the least behind (i.e. is not any less than) those (interests) in “rationalistic” (epochs). And only the mixing of (the) capitalistically or else “rationalistically” understood (self-)interest with the social-ontological concept of (self-)interest – as (the) self-assertion of the/an identity, irrespective of which material or ideational good (the) identity connects its self-assertion with (als Selbstbehauptung der Identität unabhängig davon, mit welchem materiellen oder ideellen Gut Identität ihre Selbstbehauptung verbindet) – lets the false impression come into being that the concept of (self-)interest is suited to/suitable for the description of (the) “society (Gesellschaft)” rather than (for the description) of (the) “community (Gemeinschaft)”.

With/Through and by means of these remarks, comments and observations, we gain/win a thread/string/guide in order to discuss the vague concept of “end / goal rationality” in its iridescent, opalescent, shimmering i.e. equivocal / ambiguous / illusive / enigmatic relation to(wards)/with the likewise vague concept of (the) “value rationality”. Whilst Weber defines “end/goal rationality” (starting) from/in respect of (self-)interest and “value rationality” (starting) from/in respect of (the) ethics (Ethik), against the background of this contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition; Gegenüberstellung) of two types of rationality and acting, action and the act, the contrast of/between two historical-sociological ideal types of human behaviour stands out/looms on

the horizon/is reflected, which, as is well-known, dominate in Weber's thought and intellectual world, and also made/let his heart beat higher/faster/harder in an, on each and every respective occasion, different sense. In order to express it schematically, yet properly and appropriately: here the coolly / coldly calculating capitalist faces / confronts / opposes / is up against the charismatic, fiery, impassioned prophet. As in/during/with (the) traditional type of acting, action and the act, thus this time [in the case of the capitalist] also a historical-sociological magnitude takes holy orders and is consecrated (as) / receives the blessing of a social-ontological category (Hier steht der kühl kalkulierende Kapitalist dem charismatischen, feurigen Propheten gegenüber. Wie beim traditionellen Handlungstyp, so empfängt auch diesmal eine historisch-soziologische Größe die Weihen einer sozialontologischen Kategorie). In (a) social-ontological respect, however, the difference or distinction or even the contrast and opposition between "end/goal(-)(rationality)" and "value rationality" does not at all exist in the clarity of the historical-sociological distinction, difference or contrast, opposition between both of the ideal types, that is, of the capitalist and of the prophet. And it is not a matter of the varied, diverse, multifarious and manifold real mixings and kinds of blending/blendings of "end/goal (rationality)" and "value rationality" with each other, which in fact Weber himself underlines, but of the epistemological and pragmatological legitimacy of the types (sondern um die epistemologische und pragmatologische Legitimität der Typen), from which one starts, in order to ascertain their mixings and blendings with each other; if the types are not applicable / are cancelled / dropped / omitted, thus that which seems as the mixing and blending of the same (types) with each other, is / ought to in principle or fundamentally be comprehended otherwise / differently. The historical-sociological charging / loading (Die historisch-soziologische Aufladung) of the types of acting, action and the act and of rationality gives rise to, brings about and causes, as a result of the incommensurability between (the) historical-sociological and social-

ontological levels, contradictions and inconsistencies inside of the latter (social-ontological level), which are reflected and find expression and manifest themselves in a confused, muddled, involved, intricate and occasionally (now and then, from time to time) bizarre word usage. This begins/starts already in and during the contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition) of the terms “end/goal(-)(rationality)” and “value rationality”, which logically implies the by no means at all self-evident assumption that ends/goals in themselves do not (represent and constitute) values, and that values in themselves do not at all represent and constitute ends/goals. The question and problem does not finish / is not done by (means of / through)/with Weber’s explanation that the values of (the) “value rationality” are “their own values, intrinsic values (Eigenwerte)” and or / or else ends/goals in themselves (Selbstzwecke), and indeed for the simple reason because all ends/goals are ends/goals in themselves when they are not supposed to be serving as means for higher ends/goals – and Weber nowhere asserts that the ends/goals of (the) “end/goal rationality” would (have to) be comprehended only as means for the attainment and achievement of other ends/goals. The version that the values of “value rationality” could be characterised as “intrinsic values or their own values (Eigenwerte)” or (as) ends / goals in themselves (Selbstzwecke), because in this type of acting, action and the act “the consequences of (the) action are not reflected (upon) (die Folgen des Handelns nicht reflektiert)”⁸⁵, is likewise for several reasons weak. It (i.e. the aforesaid version) first of all factually identifies value-rational and affectual, emotional action (rather behaviour) with each other (wertrationales und affektuelles Handeln (vielmehr Verhalten) miteinander), and consequently destroys the possibility of a value-rational *action* (und destruiert somit die Möglichkeit eines wertrationalen *Handelns*), since action, in whichever form, must reflect upon its consequences (seine

⁸⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 13.

Folgen reflektieren muß) as soon as it develops, blossoms, is realised, finds its full expression and comes to fruition, i.e. from (the) sketch, plan, blueprint, outline, draft it goes or passes over to (the) outer/external acting, action or act, and in the course of this (necessarily) pursues ends/goals, with whose realisation are (necessarily) connected certain expectations. Should, again, with “consequences” especially / specifically (the) “success” is meant (Weber uses in fact this term too), (the) success could (only) (then) make up and constitute a fundamental and in principle criterion of differentiation / distinction / difference between “value(-rational)” and “end / goal-rational” action (only) when/if the “value-rationally” acting (person) in contrast to the “end/goal-rational” actor was from the beginning/start and out of conviction averse to success. But to strive after / aim at / aspire to / seek / pursue failure is, however, just as much an impossibility as the conscious use of means which thwart / frustrate / foil the attaining and achieving (das Erreichen) of a sincerely, honestly, genuinely pursued end/goal. The topical, current, up-to-date failure of the prophet, (the) death (by burning) at the stake or (the) social ostracism / proscription can always be interpreted as (a) success in a higher sense, for instance as personal redemption and salvation or as the sowing of the good seed for the/a more fortunate, happier and luckier future. Only an inadmissible, not allowed and illicit identification of (the) success in general with (the) success, as this is evaluated, assessed and judged from the perspective of (the) “end/goal rationality” (that is, again, as the smuggling in of a historically-sociologically determined factor into a social-ontological context (interrelation, (inter)connection, correlation)), enables logically the proposition that in and during “value-rational” action no consideration will be had of / for success; the frequently / in many cases / oftentimes / many times attested to / witnessed megalomania and obsession and fanatical zeal with (regard to) power (Machtbesessenheit) of prophets of the first, second or third rank teaches us, in any case, that which is better / to open our eyes. Should, finally, the lacking

reflexion / reflection (thinking, contemplation, consideration, meditation)
 (Reflexion) of the “value-rationally (wertrational)” acting (person)
 (Handelnden) over/regarding/about the consequences of his doing(s) (activities and action(s)) (Tuns) mean his indifference vis-à-vis the lot, fate or destiny of third parties, thus also here / here too / as well no essential difference (in regard to(wards) “end/goal rationality” is / ought to be recognised; whoever pursues interests in their (i.e. “end/goal rationality’s”) sense, can prove to be / appear to be / show, present himself to be just as inconsiderate, thoughtless, reckless, ruthless and merciless, pitiless against third parties as the/an “ethicist of conviction and morality/morals (high-mindedness or humanitarianism) (Gesinnungsethiker)”).

In short/brief, the distinction between “end/goal(-)(rationality)” and “value rationality” is saved only by the linguistic trick (den sprachlichen Kniff) that “end/goal” means something, in terms of content, certain (i.e. definite, particular and specific) (etwas inhaltlich Bestimmtes), that therefore not all (things) / everything, e.g. ethical (ends/goals) too, but only certain ends/goals may be called “ends/goals” in the sense of “end/goal rationality”. And nonetheless, the realisation of a value can just as much be an end/goal (in respect) of acting, action and the act as the realisation of some/any other end/goal. The paradox of the usage of language stretches, however, also / even to the value concept (or concept of value), which likewise is defined in arbitrary one-sidedness (in willkürlicher Einseitigkeit). In (the) context of (the) “value rationality” it (i.e. the concept of value) may refer only to ideational (ethical, religious) values, under (the) exclusion of / excluding the rest of (the) – very numerous – things, which are striven for, aimed at, aspired to, sought, pursued exactly because the actor ascribes to them a (psychological, material or whatsoever / whatever else/other) value; motivation is set / sparked off, triggered, brought on in fact exactly with regard to values, by (means of) /

through values and evaluations (assessments and ratings) in the widest sense. The segregation or separation (Die Absonderung) of ethical or religious values and their connection or combining with a social-ontologically conceived (designed, drafted, planned) type of acting, action and act would (only) (then) be justified (only) if it were proved that action, which is motivated especially or specifically, particularly by (means of) / through these values, exhibits and shows completely, entirely, wholly its own and found nowhere else structural-social-ontological characters (i.e. characteristics or nature) (strukturell-sozialontologische Charaktere). There can be no talk, nevertheless, of that, and Weber's carving, bringing and working out / processing of the sociological characteristic feature, peculiarity, peculiar characteristic, distinctiveness, specific or special character (or nature) of such action (und Webers Herausarbeitung der soziologischen Eigenart solchen Handelns) is very far from bringing to light (a) social-ontological characteristic feature, peculiarity, peculiar characteristic, distinctiveness, specific or special character (or nature) (ist weit davon entfernt, sozialontologische Eigenart zutage zu fördern). When one, therefore, does not load/charge (the) words in advance in terms of / with content – and Weber does this with the (afore)mentioned historical-sociological (human) ideal types in the back of his mind, even if values and ends/goals are social-ontologically open fields –, thus, one must equally assign and allot and distribute to values and ends/goals (the) “end/goal(-)(rationality)” and “value rationality”, and in this respect, blur, smear and cover up the dividing or demarcation line (or borderline, boundary) (Grenzlinie) between them. The common and joint subsumption, incidentally, of “end/goal(-)(rationality)” and “value rationality” under the generic term/concept (Oberbegriff) (of) “rationality” seems to point to the necessity of this blurring, smearing and covering up. However, this subsumption would have an effect in a standardising or unifying or normalising manner (vereinheitlichend) only (then) when rationality could be reduced to a form-related (i.e. formal) structure, which

would make irrelevant the content-related orientation of rational action, i.e. the content of the “values” and “ends/goals”. Then also the question about the choice of the “value” or “end/goal” in itself would play no role. Weber does not indeed say a word about the choice of (the) values in the context of (the) “value rationality”, since he regards it (i.e. the said choice of values) a process *ultra rationem* (i.e. beyond reason); in regard to the choice of the “ends/goals” in the context of (the) “end/goal rationality”, he, however, asks/calls for / demands, a “rational” weighing up / consideration (*Abwägung*) of the “various possible ends/goals against one another (*verschiedenen möglichen Zwecke gegeneinander*)”⁸⁶ – and this stands in the way of a unification of both rationalities under/from the form-related (i.e. formal) point of view. Because the form-related (i.e. formal) concept(ual plan) (in respect) of rationality (*das formale Rationalitätskonzept*) would have to take into itself, i.e. absorb in itself either the rational choice of the end/goal or else of the value as (a/the) form-related (i.e. formal) variable (*als formale Variable*), i.e. postulate such a choice for all cases of acting, action and the act, or else exclude the same (choice) generally from its circle of competence. With reference to Weber this means: either he would have to drive away and expel the rational weighing up of the (ultimate, final) ends/goals against i.e. *vis-à-vis* one another also from the context of (the) “end/goal rationality”, or else (he would have to) abstain and refrain from his ethical decisionism (*auf seinen ethischen Dezsionismus verzichten*), that is, (he would have to) explain ethical-religious decisions as the object of (a) rational weighing up and consideration too/as well. On/In relation to that, we must return/come back, since, as will be shown/seen, the concept of “(self-)interest (*Interesses*)” also does not possess that evidence which would put aside and eliminate such aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) (*Aporien*) or else would make watertight (i.e. having no flaws or loopholes;

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

impossible to fault, refute, or evade, or, absolutely certain) the dividing or demarcation line (or borderline, boundary) between “end/goal(-)(rationality)” and “value rationality”.

Having partially anticipated [[things]] (i.e. gotten ahead of ourselves), let us now look at something in greater detail, how Weber undertakes the content-related founding of both types of rationality and how, in the course of this, the concept of (the) “end/goal rationality” is split in a double regard: one time, whilst he at one time/sometimes/on occasion includes and encompasses end/goal and means equally, at another time/sometimes/on occasion (he includes and encompasses) only the means, and another time, because the form-related (i.e. formal) meaning, which it supports, keeps, maintains, preserves through its limitation and restriction on (in respect of) the means, comes into contradiction with its content-related determination. It is easy to verify or prove that the ideal type of the prophet or of the ethicist of conviction and morality / morals (high-mindedness or humanitarianism) in (regard to) the concept(ual plan) (Konzept) of (the) “value rationality” had been (a) godparent, i.e. was the inspiration for and behind and had played an important part in the concept(ual plan) of “value rationality”. Weber expressly says that it is a matter here of “ethical” and “religious” concerns, issues, affairs, and names, in the course of this, as examples (the) “pure conviction, morality, morals, high-mindedness or humanitarianism (reine Gesinnung)”, (the) “absolute goodness and kindness (absolute Güte)”, (the) “absolute dutifulness (and the absolute fulfilment of obligations) (absolute Pflichtmäßigkeit)” etc.; the aesthetic [dimension] (das Ästhetische) he touches upon only through / by way of (the) mention of the word “beauty (Schönheit)”. The “end/goal-rational (zweckrationale)” actor orientates himself, on the other hand, originally and primarily towards “subjective stirrings, motions, movements, impulses (in respect) of (a) need

(subjektiven Bedürfnisregungen)”⁸⁷. With that, he (i.e. Weber) obviously does not mean any elementary bio-psychical needs (keine elementaren biopsychischen Bedürfnisse), because the analysis has already left behind it behaviour (Verhalten), and moves / is moving at the level of social action (auf der Ebene des sozialen Handelns). The fundamental and basic subjective stirring, motion, movement and impulse (in respect) of (a) need (Bedürfnisregung) at this level is called “interest (for one’s own benefit and advantage or self-interest) (Interesse)”, and Weber builds the/a bridge between the concept(ual plan) of (the) “end/goal rationality” and the capitalist as the prototype of the homo oeconomicus (i.e. economic man), reminding us that the observation of the “orientation” of the actor “towards naked own and alien (i.e. others’) situations and positions of interest(s), i.e. (in respect of) interests (Interessenlagen)” had/has been / was one of the “sources of the coming into being of the (study of the) national economy (i.e. political economy) as (a) science (Quellen des Entstehens der Nationalökonomie als Wissenschaft)”. He carries out and executes, at the same time, the/a turn from the economic (sphere, dimension) to the social-ontological (sphere, dimension) through and by means of / with the addition that this same orientation applies “to all fields of action in the same way (von allen Gebieten des Handelns in gleicher Art)”. And the evolutionistic perspective(,) which in the theory of acting, action and the act takes on and adopts and assumes the form of a graduation, scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades and degrees of the types of acting, action and of the act (die Gestalt einer Stufenfolge der Handlungstypen), is thereupon / then / subsequently / consequently opened up by / with the remark or observation that the “planned (scheduled, according-to-plan, methodical) adaptation and adjustment to situations and positions of interest(s), i.e. (in respect of) interests (planmäßige Anpassung an Interessenlagen)” constitutes “in its consciousness,

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

awareness and inner / internal unbindedness, i.e. state of not being binding (non-attachment, non-restriction, non-commitment, independence) (in ihrer Bewußtheit und inneren Ungebundenheit)” the “polar opposite, contrast or opposition (polaren Gegensatz)” both towards/of traditional as well as towards / of value-rational action. It (i.e. such planned acting in terms of interests) is indeed, as Weber makes clear / clarifies / sets straight, not the only driving force (motor, engine) of the rationalisation (justification) of (the) action (der einzige Motor der Rationalisierung des Handelns); but whose high point it must well / probably / no doubt / surely / absolutely be, because it overcomes and gets past even that which “conscious value rationalisation (justification) (bewußte Wertrationalisierung)” attains and achieves, “in favour of a value-unbelieving (value-disbelieving, value-incredulous) end/goal-rational (action) at the cost, i.e. expense of (the) value-rationally bound / tied action (or action bound in terms of value rationality) (zugunsten eines wertungsläubigen rein zweckrationalen auf Kosten von wertrational gebundenem Handeln)”⁸⁸. Interest-led/guided/steered/directed/managed/conducted action means, therefore, in the final analysis, action of the absolutely enlightened actor (Interessegeleitetes Handeln heißt also schließlich Handeln des absolut aufgeklärten Akteurs), who has broken away and freed and cut himself loose from all traditionalistic, ethical, religious etc. illusions (von allen traditionalistischen, ethischen, religiösen etc. Illusionen) and should the occasion arise / if necessary is also capable of subjecting, subjugating and subordinating the (his) own passion(s) (die eigene Leidenschaft) to (his own) interest(s) (dem Interesse zu unterwerfen). One does not have to look far (in order) to discover the straight line which connects and combines this version of “end/goal rationality” with today’s theories of rationality, which equally take/gather/infer/draw their content-related presuppositions from the (study of the) liberal national economy (i.e. political

⁸⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 15.

economy) (der liberalen Nationalökonomie) and economic thought / thinking in general (und ökonomistischem Denken überhaupt)^{xxxvi}.

The orientation of (the) action to(wards) the (self-)interest(s) of the actor founds (the) “end/goal rationality” in the sense that here rationality falls to and befits the end/goal in itself and not only the means. In other words: the sole truly / really rational end/goal is the pursuit of one’s own interest, and the sole truly / really rational (self-)interest comes to light through and by means of the breaking away and detachment from traditional and “value-rational” points of view. That is why Weber’s remark and observation about the rational weighing up and considering carefully (Abwägen) of the various ends/goals against i.e. vis-à-vis one another in and during “end/goal-rational” action cannot concern the absolute end/goal itself, i.e. the (one’s own) interest(s), but only relative ends / goals, that is, the question: which end/goal should / ought I pursue in order to best serve my interest(s)? If the absolute end/goal is rationally incontestable (unchallengeable, irrefutable, unassailable) and final, thus the rationally defined relative ends/goals must be comprehended as means for (the) attainment and achievement of that end/goal. Weber does not draw this rich-in-implication(s) conclusion (Weber zieht nicht diese implikationsreiche Schlußfolgerung), which would pose the question of the value character (Wertcharakter) (also, as well, too) of the – in the sense of (the) “end/goal rationality” – absolute end/goal, and would make the boundary and border between “value” and “end/goal” flowing and fluid. Instead of this, he wants to reinforce and confirm this boundary / border through and by means of the remark, observation and comment that a choice of the ends/goals not in accordance with “end/goal-(rational)”, but in accordance with “value-rational” criteria has as its conclusion that “action [is] only in (regard to) its means end/goal rational” („Handeln nur in seinen Mitteln zweckrational“ sei)⁸⁹. The

⁸⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 13.

language use here becomes bizarre, and simultaneously a wedge is driven into the unity, uniformity and solidity (Geschlossenheit) of the conceptual plan of (the) “end/goal rationality”. Because it does not conceptually and objectively make sense/stand to reason / it is not conceptually and objectively obvious that the characterisation “end/goal-rational”, which in principle is supposed to demarcate and delimit a whole / an entire type of action in (regard to) its social-ontological self-sufficiency (independence, self-reliance) (sozialontologischen Selbständigkeit) against other types of acting, action and the act, simultaneously is used in order to characterise that which in (regard to) another type of acting, action and the act only has to do with the expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) use / usage of means (dem zweckdienlichen Mittelgebrauch). At least in the latter case “end/goal rationality (Zweckrationalität)” would have to be replaced by “means rationality (or the rationality of means) (Mittelrationalität)” or simply by “rationality (Rationalität)” as neutral in terms of content, i.e. vis-à-vis the field or area of application, (an/the) indifferent term. Otherwise “end/goal rationality” becomes ambiguous: (the) one time it is defined in terms of content and form, i.e. on the basis of the end / goal, the other time (it is defined) formally, in terms of form (i.e. irrespective of the content of the ends/goals) and from, i.e. on the basis of the means, and both definitions lie (are found), furthermore/besides, at different logical levels. The heuristic gain/win does not compensate for and offset, counteract these complications, and the putting and placing in front and prefixing of the seemingly full-of-meaning words “end/goal” and “value” before “rationality” hardly contributes to the illumination of the examination of the problem of rationality (der Rationalitätsproblematik), unless one connects with it/that mainly the historical-sociological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) (die historisch-soziologischen Fragestellungen), which (have/had) guided Weber.

For the clarification of the terminology, it would perhaps be helpful to define “end/goal rationality” as “rationality with regard to a pre-given end/goal (Rationalität im Hinblick auf einen vorgegebenen Zweck)”, i.e. as (the) rational use of expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means (zweckdienlichen Mitteln), and to express clearly the content-related determination of the type of acting, action or act, which Weber calls “end/goal rationality”, by the term “(self-)interest rationality or rationality of interests (Interessenrationalität)” as (the) opposite (or counterpart) of “value rationality”. This solution, nonetheless, would – in and during the investigating and researching of the rationality of the ends/goals (in respect) of acting, action and of the act –, have little effect or bring about and cause little, since the conceptual dividing line (borderline, line of separation / demarcation) (die begriffliche Trennunglinie) between “(self-)interest” and “value” is just as blurred, fuzzy, unsharp, out of focus, hazy, fuzzy, vague as that (dividing line) between “end/goal” and “value”. The ambiguity and many meanings of “(self-)interest” look after/take care of that, of which Weber was well conscious / aware. He divided / split (up) (the) interests in(to) “material” and “ideational” (interests), and the situations and positions of interest(s), i.e. interests (Interessenlagen) in(to) “external/outer, socially (determined/conditioned) and internal/inner, psychologically determined/conditioned”, and although he saw, beheld, caught sight of, espied and perceived the immediate and direct motive of human action in (the) interests (Interessen) and not in ideas (Ideen), at the same time he admitted that ideas in (the) form of world images (Weltbildern) had “very often as a pointsman / switchman (i.e. moving force or guiding spirit) determined the paths in which the dynamics of interests moved action along (sehr oft als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln fortbewegte)”⁹⁰. The ideational, inner/internal, but also

⁹⁰ *Aufsätze z. Rel.*, I, pp. 252, 253.

the social character of many forms of (self-)interest determines exactly their interweaving (intertwining, interlacing, entanglement, integration, interconnection, involvement, combining; Verflechtung) with the adoption, acceptance and defence of values – an interweaving which often is so tight that value and (self-)interest (read: self-understanding and (the) logic of the identity) coincide and, if / in case the value is ethically defined, the pushing/carrying through and imposition and predominance and prevalence, prevailing of the ideational (sphere, dimension) (die Durchsetzung des Ideellen) against the material (sphere, dimension) (gegen das Materielle) is regarded as (the / one's (own)) “true” self-interest / interest of one's own / own interest (als „wahres“ eigenes Interesse gilt). It also, as is known, goes/works the other way around, and it is, in the final analysis, possible that the materially unselfish pursuit of ideational interests in the name of values turns out being “more ego(t)istic” than for instance the satisfaction of money-grubbing avarice / mammonism / greed for money (die materiell uneigennützigte Verfolgung von ideellen Interessen im Namen von Werten „egoistischer“ als etwa die Befriedigung der Geldgier ausfällt). “Interest / (Self-)interest” constitutes, in a word, social-ontologically just like “value” and “end/goal” an open field⁹¹, and hierarchisations of its forms in accordance with psychological or social criteria are, even in relatively well-known individual cases (or cases of the individual), a need of the economy of thought rather than a safe, secure, assured, definite, solid, protected knowledge. In the open field of (the) (self-)interest, at every historical point in time, all possible mixes, mixtures, blends and combinations, mixings, blendings (Mischungen) of its forms are present; even/also the temporary, transient predominance (supremacy, prevalence, domination; Vorherrschaft) of one of its (i.e. (self-) interest's) forms in certain groups or individuals is not lacking/missing, regardless of through and by means of which historically-

⁹¹ More in relation to that in the 3rd volume of this work.

sociologically ascertainable-traceable-determinable channels / canals these forms and the mixings, mixtures, blending(s), interbreeding(s), mingling(s) (die Vermischungen) of the same (forms of (self-)interest) with one another have to/must find their way (and plough). A fullness, i.e. abundance, wealth and plethora of evidence leaves no doubt on/in relation to (the fact) that in traditional or else “primitive” societies, the pursuit of “ego(t)istical” or “material” interests by no means took second place to / trail or lag behind analogous phenomena (occurrences, appearances) under (the) capitalism, or the other way around, that striving for power (Machtstreben) in (the) name of values (Werten) or (the) putting back, i.e. the putting on the back burner or the putting aside or the putting last of material interests in favour of ideational (interests) (oder Zurückstellen materieller Interessen zugunsten ideeller) (has) never disappeared / vanished from social life. Even in times in which for polemical reasons (e.g. in and during the ideological struggle against estate-based (feudal, corporative)-patrimonial bindings/bonds/ties (ständisch-patrimoniale Bindungen) or against (the) “totalitarian collectivism”) or on the basis of an overcoming (exceeding, getting over) of the shortage, scarcity/dearth of goods (Überwindung der Güterknappheit) and a loosening (easing, relaxation, slackening) of social hierarchies (und einer Lockerung sozialer Hierarchien), (the) individual interest is declared as/to be (a) value (das individuelle Interesse zum Wert erklärt wird), the current/running social ethics moderates the excesses of individualistic ideologem(e)s (die Auswüchse individualistischer Ideologeme) through and by means of calls for (appeals to, invocations of) “solidarity (Solidarität)” and “mankindness/humanness, i.e. humanity and humaneness (Menschlichkeit)”, without though ever calling into question the right to (the) defence of one’s own “well-understood interest”, since no social ethics has (any) prospect(s) of broad acceptance if does not accept elementary rights of self-preservation (to which / whereto belongs self-defence too / which includes self-defence (wozu auch Notwehr gehört)). Where

(the) (self-)interest (Interesse) becomes (a) value, values are summoned, in any case, against (the) (self-)interest, and despite (the) temporary ideological or also / even practical superiority of one or other tendency, none of both/the two (said tendencies) can forever impose itself down the line. This ambivalent situation (and position) on the social-ethical field reflects in its way/manner/mode the social-ontological openness of (the) (self-)interest, of which the talk was above. And in view of this same openness and this same social-ethical ambivalence, the actor takes care of / looks after / cares for, as a rule, the – on each and every respective occasion – socially expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) mixture, blend, assortment, mix, combination, mixing, blending (sozial zweckmäßige Mischung) of “value (Wert)” and “(self-)interest (Interesse)” with each other in and during the rationalisation (as justification) of his action in foro externo (i.e. outwardly, in the court of public opinion) and in foro interno (i.e. inwardly, in the court of his own conscience). The great variety of the possible mix(tur)es is here commanded by the flexible logic and the morphological richness and wealth and abundance of the spectrum of the social relation. The each and every respective structure of the each and every respective friendly or inimical social relation determines, ultimately / in the final analysis, the each and every respective meaning of “value” and “(self-)interest”, it determines also which aspect of its complex unity (will) prevail(s) in foro interno or in foro externo.

It is / Let it be repeated: Weber did not err (and as (a) sensitive (and tactful) historian he could also here not err) with regard to the great variety of the possible mix(tur)es of “value(-)(rationality)” and “end/goal rationality” with each other, but he erred (as (a) sociologist) with regard to the factors or concepts from which it had to be started (i.e. from which we must start) in order to be able to apprehend this great variety in its essence (being, nature or character) (in ihrem Wesen). He extrapolated ideal-typically worked upon and

processed historical-sociological content(s) in(to) (the) social-ontological (realm, sphere) (Er extrapolierte idealtypisch bearbeitete historisch-soziologische Inhalte ins Sozialontologische) and comprehended the contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition) of this/these content(s) as (the) key for the understanding of social-ontological facts and circumstances instead of (at the level of analysis pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act) dropping (i.e. abandoning) that contrast in the light of these facts and circumstances (und faßte die Gegenüberstellung dieser Inhalte als Schlüssel zum Verständnis sozialontologischer Sachverhalte auf, anstatt (auf der handlungstheoretischen Eben der Analyse) jene Gegenüberstellung im Lichte dieser Sachverhalte fallen zu lassen). We have now named a series of reasons why / wherefore the border (boundary, limit, frontier) between “value” and “end / goal” cannot even hold up and stand firm ideal-typically, let alone practically (i.e. in terms of practice and in a practical sense). The pursuit of “ends/goals” (in the sense of “interests”) must be declared to be / as (a) value so that “end / goal rationality” can be regarded as (an) independent, self-sufficient, self-reliant and autonomous type of acting, action and act (als selbständiger Handlungstyp) – exactly because of that, however, its contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition) to / with “value rationality” is dropped, omitted, cancelled and inapplicable. The “end/goal”, which is contained in the compound (Kompositum) “end/goal rationality” as (a) general description, name, term, designation, marking, indication, appellation of a type of acting, action and act, belongs logically to another category than the separate and individual ends / goals (als die einzelne Zwecke), it is (the) end and final, terminal, last, ultimate (end/goal) or the end/goal in itself, i.e. an absolute value (er ist End- oder Selbstzweck, d. h. absoluter Wert), and where end, final, terminal, last, ultimate ends/goals (Endzwecke) are present/available and exist, (there) (the) “irrational” [element] („Irrationales“) and “value (Wert)” get, force their way, seep, break, penetrate into the “end/goal rational”; and since (the) belief in (the) rationality

lies / is found in general *ultra rationem* (i.e. beyond reason) (unless one grants exclusively to ratio, i.e. reason the dubious (suspicious, suspect, fishy) privilege of being (the) judge in its own case), thus an own value, i.e. value in itself or intrinsic value (*ein Eigenwert*) is present/available (exists) here too, which exists irrespective of “success” and has an effect (in respect) of, or else determines, in a high-handed and unauthorised manner, i.e. arbitrarily (*eigenmächtig*), what should or ought to be called “success” and what not⁹². The basic and fundamental structure in (the) “value rationality” does not look otherwise / differently. The ultimate, final, last “ends/goals” or else “values” lie / are found here *ultra rationem* and (the) success is also striven for, aspired to and aimed at here, even if under the condition that it is a matter of (the) “true” success in the struggle for the “true” cause; the fulfilment of this condition allows (the) intrepidity vis-à-vis failures in the sense of (the) “end/goal rationality”, inclusive of death⁹³. As (we have) already said, the inclusion and incorporation of “value rationality” in the types of social *action* *a limine* (i.e. from the very outset) would be nonsensical, ridiculous and absurd, if here the use of suitable means for the attainment and achievement of an end/goal were lacking. Weber has/had also recognised this when he – in the contrast of “value-rational” action with (the) merely affectual and emotional (action) – confirmed and vouched for in the former (“value-rational” action) “consistent systematic-and-methodical-as-to-plans orientation (*konsequente planvolle Orientierung*)” in the “ultimate, final, last reference, aiming and bearing points or targets (*letzten Richtpunkten*)”⁹⁴. In actual fact: it is the setting-the-tone, leading consideration for the moulding, shaping and formation of the social relation which condemns and sentences every action *nolens volens* to one such systematic and methodical orientation, and in the course of this it is indifferent

⁹² Cf. already Schmalenbach, „Kategorie des Bundes“, p. 91ff..

⁹³ Sophokles, *Antigone*, esp. vv. 450ff..

⁹⁴ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 12.

whether the actor keeps/has an eye on, i.e. bears/has in mind “interests” in the sense of “end/goal rationality” or “values” in the sense of “value rationality”. The social relation is the superordinate, i.e. higher, superior, of-overriding-importance social-ontological factor before which the contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition) of both these types of rationality proves to be dispensable, non-essential and indeed misleading.

Which conclusion is to be drawn from / out of this structural approach (convergence, reconciliation, approximation) or identification of “value(-) (rationality)” and “end/goal rationality” with each other? May (Should) we for that reason exclude the question of the content of the ends/goals of acting, action and the act completely from the examination of the problem of rationality, to seek and search for a form-related (i.e. formal) unification of the types of acting, action and the act as to / with regard to rationality exclusively in the correctly calculated, coherent and possibly or potentially methodically generalisable use/usage of the means, and, finally, declare/pronounce/explain the model of “end/goal rationality” – irrespective of in and during / with (regard to) which “ends/goals” or “values” – as the single applicable (model of “end / goal rationality”)? This solution, which looks like the egg of Columbus, was supported and represented by some Weber-knowers, i.e. some people with knowledge of Weber⁹⁵, it, nevertheless, still falls short. We already know⁹⁶ in which respect (the) content of the ends/goals cannot be disregarded, when it is a matter of the rationality of acting, action and the act; the attainability and achievability and unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals is obviously a function of its content, and it determines in principle the effectiveness and efficacy (*Wirksamkeit*) (read: rationality) of the means used, the actual, in reality conversion of the (original, initial) means into

⁹⁵ See e.g. v. Mises, *Grundprobleme*, p. 79ff.; Eisen, “Meanings”, p. 58ff.. Cf. Schütz, *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 28, n. 42.

⁹⁶ See Sec. 1Bb in this chapter, above.

(final and conclusive) ends/goals etc., etc.. Not insignificant is, in the course of this, whether attainability, achievability or unattainability, unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) have (a) fundamental, in principle character or are only situation-bound/conditioned/determined or situational (situationsbedingt). The distinction between attainable, achievable and unattainable, unachievable ends / goals does not, though, coincide with that (distinction) between “ends/goals” and “values” in the sense of (the) Weberian “end/goal(-)(rationality)” and “value rationality”, but it goes right through the latter. Because there are even absolute values which at least at the individual level are – through “consistently systematically and methodically planned orientation (konsequent planvolle Orientierung)” – attainable and achievable (e.g. “holiness (sacredness and sainthood) (Heiligkeit)”), although the attempt at their realisation in (regard to) the overall/whole societal/social yardstick, benchmark, scale, measure, criterion must (necessarily) be tangled up, embroiled and involved in (the) insurmountable / unsurmountable paradoxes of the heterogony of ends (in unüberwindliche Paradoxien der Heterogonie der Zwecke).

D. “Rational choice” and (the) tact of judgement („Rational choice“ und Takt des Urteils)

“Rationality” has – in (the) recent decades – been promoted as, and risen/advanced to the position/post of – not coincidentally – (the/a) central philosophical and social-theoretical concept. At the social and historical end of the bourgeois age/epoch/era, the gradual putting/setting aside, getting rid of, disposal, removal, sidelining and elimination of the remains (relics, vestiges) of its ideologem(e)s, which not least of all revolved around (the) universal Reason and its generally binding commands, followed. To the extent that (the) functionalistic atomisation took the place of (the) substantialistic bourgeois

individualism (die funktionalistische Atomisierung an Stelle des substantialistischen bürgerlichen ~~Individualismus~~ Individualismus tritt), the replacement of “Reason” by “rationality” reflects and mirrors also the need of the socially and intellectually(-spiritually) mobile mass-democratic individual for a guide in life, who is supposed or ought to be less “metaphysical” or supra-temporal (supertemporal, timeless, hyper-temporal), [[and]] by contrast more flexible and pragmatic, and moreover modest (humble, unassuming, undemanding) in the sense of (the) from-now-on socially respectable relativism. The great (monetary) note (appearance, bill, glow, pretence, glimmer) of Reason was, as it were, exchanged for the small change of rationality. But the taking leave and bidding farewell (in respect) of (the) in principle Reason was not allowed and could not have, however, had as a consequence (the) par excellence / as such / absolute lack of orientation or disorientation, and thus the concept of rationality now offered the new guarantees of ponderability and calculability⁹⁷, which had to take into account the peculiarity and distinctiveness of today’s situation and position in (the) atomised Western mass democracy (the particular attention for / [given to] the examination of the problem of “collective action” and of the “free rider” bears witness and attests to this) („Rationalität“ avancierte in den letzten Jahrzehnten nicht zufällig zum zentralen philosophischen und sozialtheoretischen Begriff. Auf das soziale und geschichtliche Ende des bürgerlichen Zeitalters folgte die allmähliche Beseitigung der Überreste seiner Ideologeme, die sich nicht zuletzt um die universal Vernunft und ihre allgemeinverbindlichen Gebote drehten. In dem Maße, wie die funktionalistische Atomisierung an Stelle des substantialistischen bürgerlichen Individualismus tritt, spiegelt auch die Ersetzung der „Vernunft“ durch „Rationalität“ das Bedürfnis des sozial und geistig mobilen massendemokratischen Individuums nach einem Leitfaden im Leben wider, der

⁹⁷ Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 1, in this volume, above.

weniger „metaphysisch“ oder überzeitlich, dagegen mehr flexibel oder pragmatisch, außerdem bescheiden im Sinne des nunmehr sozial respektablen Relativismus sein sollte. Der große Schein der Vernunft wurde gleichsam gegen das Kleingeld der Rationalität getauscht. Der Abschied von der prinzipiellen Vernunft durfte und konnte aber nicht die Orientierungslosigkeit schlechthin zur Folge haben, und so bot nun der Rationalitätsbegriff die neuen Berechenbarkeitsgarantien, die der Eigenart der heutigen Lage in den atomisierten westlichen Massendemokratien Rechnung tragen mußten (die besondere Aufmerksamkeit für die Problematik der “collective action” und des “free rider” bezeugt dies)). (The) So-called rational choice theory formulated these guarantees in (the) shape/form of directions and instructions for use and did this characteristically / typically (enough) in a sharp argument / confrontation / conflict / clash / discussion / debate / showdown (in einer scharfen Auseinandersetzung) with sociological normativisms (mit soziologischen Normativismen) like the Parsonian (one, sociological normativism) (wie dem Parsonsschen), which accorded to / conferred upon the ethical and cultural factor in (the/a) wide sense a primary function in and during the maintenance and keeping up of the social order. One does not have to be a follower / disciple / supporter / partisan / devotee / adherent of (the) rational choice theory in order to kindly and benevolently register its service in and during the overcoming of a perception, view (opinion, idea and conception), which made out (the) socially living man to be (a) “cultural dope”⁹⁸. It (i.e. rational choice theory), however, expired / lapsed / decayed / declined / fell – from the beginning – into the other extreme, and the reason for that lay in the fact that it formed and developed in an economic and at the same time individualistic thought and intellectual framework (in einem ökonomistischen und zugleich individualistischen Denkraum), on which / whereupon the old

⁹⁸ Thus Heath, *Rational choice*, p. 105; cf. Ch. I, footnote 161, in this volume.

and still always fresh construction of (the) homo oeconomicus cast its mighty shadow. The undiluted versions of the theory continue to retain their influence, above all in certain national-economic directions (i.e. schools of thought pertaining to political economy) (in bestimmten nationalökonomischen Richtungen), and they will undoubtedly retain [such influence] so / for as long as the capitalistic impetus (swing; Schwung) persists / continues / holds on^{xxxvii}. But partly the scientific critique (also on the part of prominent national, i.e. political economists (Nationalökonomenen)), partly the application of the theory (of rational choice) to extra-economic fields and areas led to modifications and limitations, which in reality represent and constitute new discoveries (i.e. rediscoveries) of age-old commonplaces (truisms and platitudes) of the social experience of men (i.e. humans).

On/Regarding the anthropological background of (the) rational choice theory, we (have) said whatever was necessary in another place⁹⁹. One would not do an injustice / wrong to the theory if one characterised it as (a) rationalistic behaviourism (als rationalistischen Behaviorismus), in order – with that – to express that rationality here is deduced and derived out of/from constants of (the) motivation which can be apprehended already through and by means of the elementary psychological (set of) instruments of (the) behaviourism. The priority of the motivation is reflected in the construction of the concept(ual plan) (in respect) of rationality (starting) from the content of the ends/goals. This content consists in the utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit) maximisation or else (utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit))(-) optimisation (in der Nutzenmaximierung bzw. -optimierung), and since all humans strive after that (i.e. utility maximisation/optimisation), thus we can start from the assumption that men, i.e. humans are in principle rational or (that)

⁹⁹ See Ch. I, Sec. 5, above.

rationality is a ubiquitous and in fact existing/available-in-abundance good¹⁰⁰. The ubiquity of rationality interrelates and is connected here obviously with its narrow definition as utility maximisation, because only “narrow rationality” in the form/shape of (the) interest-directed/led/guided/steered motivation and excluding “extra-rational”, e.g. ethical and social motives resurfaces / turns up again and is found uniformly in all men (i.e. humans, people) (Die Übiquität der Rationalität hängt hier offenbar mit ihrer engen Definition als Nutzenmaximierung zusammen, denn nur "narrow rationality" in Gestalt der interessegeleiteten Motivation und unter Ausschluß von „extrarationalen“, z. B. ethischen und sozialen Motiven findet sich gleichförmig bei allen Menschen wieder)¹⁰¹. That does not have to / necessarily mean that all kinds of utility maximisation relate to the same object, but that they (i.e. all kinds of utility maximisation) exhibit / feature / show the same motivation structure (or structure of motivation). Accordingly, the question and problem of the “objectivity” of each and every respective utility option (i.e. choice / selection of utility) (Nutzenoption) is put / set aside, sidelined and eliminated a limine (i.e. from the very beginning), without its non-response or failure to reply or lack of an answer interfering with / encroaching upon / infringing / impeding / affecting / having a negative effect on / marring / spoiling / lessening / diminishing / detracting from the rationality of the actor. But the priority of the motivation or else of the end / goal also has a second implication: it is supposed to break or detach the rationality concept(ual plan) (away) from the end/goal-means-schema, i.e. file away and shelve the problem of the rationality of the means and in its place, as (the/a) sufficient condition of (the) success (in respect of) of acting, action and the act, to put the inner/internal stability and coherence of the wishes of the utility-maximising actor (des nutzenmaximierenden Akteurs). That is, although (the) rational choice theory leaves open (the)

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Tobin, *Essays*, I, p. 18; Lekachman, *Economists*, p. 108.

¹⁰¹ Hardin, *Collective Action*, pp. 9ff., 101ff..

individual preferences (tastes) (or preferences (tastes) as to their each and every respective detail in their each and every respective case), on the other hand, it must presuppose that they (i.e. the said preferences and tastes) neither change capriciously, nor differ considerably from man to man (i.e. human to human and person to person)¹⁰² + ^{xxxviii}. Only under this precondition can their change / changing be in principle put down and reduced to economic factors (e.g. prices). The behaviouristic inspiration of (the) rational choice theory becomes here particularly clear. Prognoses about behaviour rest and are based on the knowledge of the preference plus the assumption and acceptance of coherence, they suppose and assume, therefore, uniform action on the basis of the pre-given stable preference^{xxxix}. It is not to be seen / We do not see why the – described as consistency of behaviour – schema “stimulus-reaction” is supposed or ought to be recorded with (i.e. called) the name “rationality” at all¹⁰³. Under, i.e. with this observation of (the) things, the investigation of and research into the formation, development and reformation / reshaping / remodel(l)ing / reorganization of preferences (die Erforschung der Heraus- und Umbildung von Präferenzen) not only suffers¹⁰⁴. Over and above that, it is not appreciated that the coherence of (the) behaviour in itself does not in the least vouch for and guarantee the satisfaction of each and every respective need; the (recti)linear projection of the preference does not necessarily end at the point where the satisfaction stands / is, but in between (preferences) orientating kinds of acting, actions and acts must take place. The question and problem of orientation is posed too, as soon as the general framework changes inside of which the preference originally was regarded as obvious (convincing and cogent) or self-evident. Inconsistencies between such frameworks are possibly still more difficult to be abolished than other (inconsistencies) – and here (the) rational

¹⁰² Stigler-Becker, “De gustibus”, p. 191.

¹⁰³ Brennan, “What might Rationality fail to do?”, pp. 54ff., 57.

¹⁰⁴ Goodin, “De gustibus”, p. 221.

choice theory knows no advice, suggestion, recommendation i.e. solution (Rat). It assumes that “irrational” deviations and divergences from the coherence model can be corrected, rectified by subjective learning, studying or by the objective effect and impact of (the) market mechanisms. But against “irrationalities”, which attack and strike the large number or great crowd of individuals simultaneously, market mechanisms are not capable of much either^{105 + xl}.

It must strike, i.e. come to the attention of / be noticed by an undogmatic national economist (i.e. economist of political economy) that the definition of (the) rationality as utility maximisation differs considerably from the Common-Sense perception and view (Common-Sense-Auffassung), in accordance with which rational action rests and is based on (the) examination, sifting, sorting, combing out, sighting of the available information and (the) corresponding determination of ends/goals and means^{xli}. He must, moreover, likewise register that (the) rational choice theory does not make do and does not manage without a series of help(ing) / auxiliary hypotheses (or hypotheses of assistance) of another logical order; among them the homogeneity of individuals^{xlii} stands out, which, though, stands/is in (a) contradiction to(wards)/with the fundamental principle pertaining to political economy that gains and profits/earnings would be made through transactions which presuppose (the) differences of individuals; (the) pure and perfect, complete competition is another auxiliary hypothesis, which has little backing and support in (the) reality. He can, finally, observe how the simplicity, plainness and clarity of the rational choice fail before the imperfectness (and incompleteness) of the markets and their influence / influencing by very different factors (in respect) of power (or power factors) (Machtfaktoren)(,) so that assumptions about economic balances, equilibria and imbalances, disequilibria, which assume such rational choices, go against and

¹⁰⁵ Tversky-Kahneman, “Framing”, p. 458; “Rational choice”, pp. 89-91.

run counter to undisputed, uncontested ascertainties of facts. And from all of that he would draw the conclusion that a concept(ual plan) of rationality, which builds on utility maximisation and (the) assumption of homogeneity, invariably becomes shaky and falters as soon as inside of a numerous (i.e. populous) society, the perception of (the) others and their rationality on the part of the individual is converted and transformed into an essential factor of/for the shaping, moulding and formation of his (i.e. the individual's) own rationality¹⁰⁶ + xliii. Already from the widened perspective of the national, i.e. political economist, it can therefore be recognised / seen how deeply the social relation forces its way into and penetrates the context of rationality, and where the incurable point of (the) rational choice theory lies. Options are not shaped, formed and moulded with regard to an individually carved/worked/brought out and elaborated idea (in the imagination or conception) of utility maximisation (Optionen gestalten sich nicht im Hinblick auf eine individuell herausgearbeitete Nutzenmaximierungsvorstellung), which then as (a) norm guides action and lends or grants it coherence (Kohärenz), but always on the basis of comparisons with that which others, and indeed the relevant for the actor fellow men, i.e. human beings (Mitmenschen) do or leave (out) and or let go. They articulate a calculus, i.e. calculation, which concerns relative rather than absolute profits, gains and earnings, that is profits (gains and earnings) which the actor correlates comparatively with the probable, likely, plausible profits of other(s) (actors), in order then to declare and announce – considering the situation – his own claims and expectations. The level or standard of the expectations is a “comparison level” and (is) mainly socially determined¹⁰⁷. In actual fact, the theory of the “revealed preference” (Samuelson), whereupon the buyer / purchaser / customer through and by means of the act of purchase /

¹⁰⁶ I refer here to Arrow, “Rationality”, esp. pp. 202-206, 213 ff., cf. the texts of/in the anthology by Moser (ed.), *Rationality in action*.

¹⁰⁷ Marini, “Role of Models”, p. 26ff..

buying (Kaufakt) reveals and discloses his preference, can be applied to other animals^{xliv}, which through and by means of their option give their preference direct expression, rather than to men (i.e. humans), whose action is not exhausted in the statement or expression or utterance of personal preferences, but can be brought about/into existence / made/done in relation to that through and by means of social factors, i.e. by the logic of the social relation, thus being shaped, moulded and formed as if the actor had other preferences than those which he as a person actually/really has¹⁰⁸.

The lacking/missing or lack of understanding for/as regards the consequences, implications and repercussions (Auswirkungen) of the social relation in the widest / broadest sense (i.e. including those which one is accustomed to / in the habit of calling social-institutional factors (sozial-institutionelle Faktoren)) has for/as (a) consequence that (the) rationality reduced to utility maximisation can only offer very short-winded / short-of-breath orientation (in respect) of acting, action and the act¹⁰⁹. When the term “utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit) maximisation (Nutzenmaximierung)” is supposed or ought to have a fairly / more or less precise meaning/sense in the national(i.e. political-economic) context (or context pertaining to the study of the political economy), thus it may or should refer only to (the) material utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit) in (the) form of the attainment of measurable (quantifiable) goods. Then there are two possibilities: either every other practical effort and endeavour (strain, stress, exertion) (Anstrengung) must – except the thus understood utility maximisation – be class(ifi)ed as “irrational”, with the result that the allegedly / supposedly ubiquitous rationality appears like an island in (the/a) sea of (the) irrationality, or the attempt to make (the) “irrational” understandable in the light of rational utility maximisation, pushes out and

¹⁰⁸ Sen, “Behaviour”, pp. 73, 79.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Bohman, “Limits”, p. 224ff..

sprouts strange/odd/weird blossoms of absurdity, – when e.g. religious action is characterised as (an) investment or capital expenditure (Investition) with regard to “afterlife consumption”^{110 + xlv}. (Just) like the concept of exchange¹¹¹, so too is that (concept) of utility maximisation widened and broadened up to meaninglessness (pointlessness, senselessness, futility; Sinnlosigkeit) in the economic context in order to be able to grasp the objectively existing and waiting-and-hoping-for (an) explanation great variety and multiformity of the social [realm, sphere, dimension, whole] in itself; but precisely this widening / broadening can no longer see why the concerned process should or ought to be named, of all things, by the/an economic term, unless one would like to thus define rationality bindingly and once and for all as economic logic dictates / commands (it); by the way, certain national (i.e. political) economists (i.e. theorists of political economy) are not at all the only (ones) who want to monopolise for themselves (the) rationality. Thus (the) “rational choice theory” remains not only incapable of making and rendering somewhat understandable the classic case of (the) irrationality (*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor* [[= I see and try or approve of the better (things), I follow the worse (things)]) (starting) from its premisses¹¹², also the thought is par excellence alien and foreign to it (i.e. rational choice theory) that rationalities of (a) different kind can compete with one another, that therefore the logic of the social relation and that (logic) of (the) identity can regard as rational something other than the logic of utility maximisation. But that is thus, all the same (But that’s the way it is). The behaviour of the reciprocating (person) is determined e.g. very often not through expectations of immediate utility maximisation, but through the overall interpretation of the past and present course (of events) of the social relation towards the concerned Other, whose motivation again is not evaluated and

¹¹⁰ Thus, Azzi-Ehrenberg, “Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance”, p. 28.

¹¹¹ See Ch. IV, Sec. 2Da in this volume, above.

¹¹² Elster, “Introduction”, p. 16; cf. footnote 55 in this chapter, above.

judged on the basis of his topical/current contribution to the utility maximisation of the Ego, but rather on the basis of his presumed/supposed intentions and ends/goals; and the judgement regarding the motivation of the giver or donor weighs more heavily than the material value of his gift (donation or contribution). The subjective interpretations of the interaction (Interaktion) determine, therefore, in (the) narrowest having an effect together (collaboration, cooperation or synergy; Mitwirkung) with the logic of (the) identity, the practical behaviour, and the results of the earlier learning creates no automatisms, which the utility maximiser appropriates once and for all in order to act in this sense consistently, but they (the said subjective interpretations) can be revised promptly, or after some hesitation, as soon as the logic of the social relation or that (logic) of the identity changes¹¹³.

(The) Economistic rational choice theory rests and is based on a naive realism or objectivism by postulating a single world for all actors, in relation to which these (actors) support, maintain, keep, entertain an objectively rational relation through and by means of consistent action. Between the objective constitution, composition and texture (nature) of the world and its subjective perception on the part of the actor there is here no chasm (abyss, gap, divide, rift, gulf), and accordingly no questions and problems come up and arise; just as little do the intellectual (cap)abilities^{xlvi} of the actors seem to run into / encounter individually determined boundaries which could endanger and put at risk rational action. To this substantial rationality one contrasts and pits – in Simon's^{xlvii} terminology – a procedural or limited and restricted (rationality) when one, following psychological (kinds of) knowledge(s), distinguishes between (the) objective reality and the image/picture of the actor in respect of that (objective reality), not taking the ends/goals of acting, action and the act for granted, but observes their formation, development and change in (regard to)

¹¹³ Larson, "Psychology"; Nemeth, "Bargaining". Cf. Ch. IV, footnote 489, above.

(the) time / over time, putting under the magnifying glass the development of thought and intellectual strategies under the influence of social and individual factors, [[and]] of available and existing intellectual (cap)abilities and temporary emotions or fixed, firm and stable prejudices etc.. The limitations and restrictions on/in respect of rationality come into being both through the surroundings and environment (Umgebung), in which (the) decisions must be taken, as well as through (the) physiological and psychological qualities, features, characteristics, attributes, peculiarities (Eigenschaften) of the actor, which set barriers to his thought and intellectual faculties and capacities. Ascertainments over/regarding both these sources of limitations and restrictions (in respect) of rationality force a renunciation and abandonment of rationally optimal programmes of acting, action and the act and of global perceptions, views (opinions, ideas and conceptions) (in respect) of rationality in favour of attainable and achievable ends/goals and limited and restricted or else modest and meagre models of rationality. (The) economistic theory of rationality indeed does not want, in principle, to be reconciled with this renunciation and abandonment, however, since it can only save and rescue (the) economic phenomena in their complexity only through the silent and tacit introduction of complementary assumptions, thus it must also, whenever / every time it goes beyond and surpasses the triviality of utility maximisation, in actual fact more or less weaken, mitigate, reduce, town down, attenuate, extenuate its strong, vigorous and robust concept of rationality¹¹⁴. The psychological untenability (indefensibleness, unsustainability, intolerability; Unhaltbarkeit) of (the) rational choice theory was in actual fact worked out by several sides with reference to the results of research (or research results) of the main schools of thought / lines / directions / tendencies of modern psychology¹¹⁵, as well as, in

¹¹⁴ Out of/From Simon's numerous articles see esp. "Rationality in Psychology and Economics", pp. 26-28, 38ff.; "Human Nature", pp. 294, 303; "From substantive to procedural rationality"; "A Behavioral Model"; cf. *Models of Thought*, pp. 8, 10, 15, as well as *Models of Man*, p. 241ff..

¹¹⁵ Abelson, "Social psychology's rational man".

the course of this, stressed and emphasised (underlined and underscored) in (regard to)/[[based on]] everyday experience that (also economic) actors, especially in uncertain, insecure and unsafe, dangerous situations and positions, took/made their decisions not on the basis of calculi, i.e. calculations of utility maximisation, but rather thanks to tried and tested (well-tried, proved, reliable, established) experiences and analogies deduced and derived from those¹¹⁶; it was also stressed and emphasised that (the/a) real decision was only gradually and fragmentarily shaped, moulded, formed and taken, whereby and in relation to which information was worked on and processed through and by means of drastic selections and reductions¹¹⁷, and that preferences are basically adaptive and take their cue from / are modeled after and comply with the existing and available possibilities (in respect) of acting, action and the act rather than from / after / with abstract optimal aims, ends and objectives (nach abstrakten optimalen Zielen)¹¹⁸. It was easy and tenable (reasonable, logical, sensible) to conclude from all of that/this that limited and restricted rationality is a state (of affairs), condition and situation (Zustand) which (the) humans as a rule soberly take note of and learn from, and in which they – far from being constantly ashamed of their intellectual and moral afflictions, disabilities, shortcomings (infirmities, ailments, maladies, vices; Gebrechen) – pragmatically adapt themselves to and make ends meet¹¹⁹.

So wide/far, so good. But (the) limited, restricted or incomplete (fragmentary, broken, inchoate) rationality (die begrenzte oder unvollständige Rationalität) as inescapable, ineluctable human fate/destiny/lot/doom (Schicksal), and (the) limited, restricted and incomplete rationality as (a / the) norm (Norm), which one is supposed or ought to follow, in order to protect and defend oneself from the certain practical debacle / débâcle (Debakel) of an optimally fancied and

¹¹⁶ Ortiz, “Expectations”.

¹¹⁷ Watkins, “Imperfect Rationality”, p. 179ff., esp. p. 206ff..

¹¹⁸ Elster, *Sour grapes*, p. 109ff..

¹¹⁹ March, “Bounded Rationality”, p. 150ff..

imagined and thought of rationality, are two completely / entirely / wholly different / varied things. The theories of (the) incomplete rationality represent and constitute, in so far as they rest and are based on correct and generalisable observations, at best descriptions of that which is (of what is) – from which, however, no norms follow with which action could comply and be modeled after (Die Theorien von der unvollständigen Rationalität stellen, insofern sie auf richtigen und generalisierbaren Beobachtungen beruhen, bestenfalls Beschreibungen dessen dar, was ist, aus denen aber keine Normen folgen, nach der sich Handeln richten könnte). Not only because no instructions (in respect of acting, action and the act can be deduced and derived in general from descriptions anyhow, but also from/out of/because of the particular reason(,) (that) (because) it is silly, ridiculous, absurd (unsinnig) to raise incompleteness to (the/a) norm^{xlvi}. The actor is always – psychologically and practically – out to aim at and aspire to optimal effects and impacts (results; Wirkungen) under the guidance of an optimal rationality, in fact so much that he often – despite/notwithstanding (the) practical failures – continues to regard his own rationality as optimal^{xli}, and ascribes an absence of (the) optimal effects and impacts (results) to “circumstances”, (the) “bad luck/misfortune” etc.. He attains and achieves less than that which he would attain and achieve under the guidance of an optimal rationality, and indeed for inner/internal and outer/external reasons which do not allow an(y) optimal rationality to grow up, i.e. develop, and not, for instance, because he consciously follows the norm of (the) incomplete rationality. He is, incidentally, anyhow, unable to establish, erect, postulate, formulate, set up such a norm, because this would presuppose (the) knowledge of the distance between complete and incomplete rationality: in order to know what incomplete rationality means / is called, he must therefore have already found in (his) spiritual-intellectual possession the optimal rationality, and then it is not (to be) known why he needs (the) incomplete (rationality), unless it perfectly and completely suffices for the situation and

position to be mastered – then it (i.e. his rationality) is itself optimal in a very concrete manner/way/mode. From/Out of these thoughts and contemplations it is evident that not so much strict logic, but rather the intellectual(-spiritual) climate of the “post-modern” programmatic bidding farewell to the One Reason (Einen Vernunft) has got/procured for the theories of (the) “incomplete” rationality such popularity. But also here it is / ought to be remarked that the social-ontologically and anthropologically determined praxis / practice of (the) rationality changes far less than the theory regarding/about (the) rationality; and in general (the) human praxis/practice does not change already because (the) theories about it change (und überhaupt ändert sich die menschliche Praxis nicht schon deshalb, weil sich die Theorien über sie ändern). The followers, supporters or preachers of (the) optimal rationality and of the One Reason were in the past objectively (the) bearers/carriers of an incomplete rationality and still are / continue to be so; precisely as the advocates, proponents and champions of this latter (incomplete rationality) they cannot otherwise/but direct their action (than) to what the – on each and every respective occasion – optimal use of their rationality commands, no matter how far this may be distant and remote from the optimal rationality. The theories of (the) incomplete rationality would positively influence (the) future praxis/practice only (then) when the earlier authority (as dominance) (Herrschaft) of the belief in the existence of an optimal rationality had paralysed the action of those waiting in vain for such instruction and guidance. Theories about/regarding rationality are subject in principle to strategic use/usage, i.e. they articulate the practical rationality of the theoreticians, who in a concrete situation and position pertaining to the history of ideas decide for/in favour of this course of action (Aktionskurs) vis-à-vis other theoreticians and against any other (course of action) – which does not at all mean that this (their) praxis/practice (of theirs) must/has to (necessarily) correspond with the content of the theory set up, established, erected, postulated, formulated, drawn up by (them) themselves. Theory in general is a

form of praxis (practice), and theories are kinds of acting, actions and acts, which – for or against other kinds of acting, actions and acts – in the area and realm of theoretical activity take (a) position / stance (standing, posture, pose) (Stellung). As intellectual(-spiritual) praxis/practice (Als geistige Praxis) – not merely in the narrower sense of (the) theory, but also in the wider/broader anthropological and social-ontological sense – rationality is shaped, moulded and formed in connection with a strategy, whose ends/goals and means result from the logic of the situation (deren Zwecke und Mittel sich aus der Situationslogik ergeben), as this, on each and every respective occasion, is evaluated by (the) actor^{120 + 1}. In and during the determination of the strategic ends/goals of acting, action and the act (and of the expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means for their attainment and achievement), rationality must, for its part, use all means, i.e. all intellectual(-spiritual) instruments (alle geistigen Instrumente) which are available to it, irrespective of whether it assigns to the action absolute or else optimal or only limited/restricted ends/goals. An essential mistake/error of theories regarding incomplete rationality lies in the insinuation or assumption and presumption (Unterstellung) that limited and restricted ends/goals (in respect) of acting, action and the act (merely “satisficing” [ends/goals] in Simon’s terminology) would demand a merely limited and restricted use/usage of the available (set of) (conceptual) instruments (Instrumentariums) of rationality. Yet only the full and complete use of the same ((set of) (conceptual) instruments) makes possible / enables or facilitates the actor to (have/make) a judgement (judge) over / regarding that / as to whether he may have utility-maximising, damage-limiting or simply modest ends/goals, of what(so)ever kind.

Attempts to arrange / structure / divide / subdivide (into), classify / organise /

¹²⁰ In relation to this point, see (the) (Prattis’s) apt, striking, well-aimed, well-judged remarks, comments and observations (of Prattis), “Strategising Man”, esp. p. 46ff..

deploy the degrees (grades) of (the) rationality in a graduation, scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades and degrees, put/place/posit at the top/uppermost/highest/topmost/supreme/paramount point, place, site, location (the) scientific rationality, which has the/a full and complete overview (in respect) of / regarding a totality / entirety of data, and is supposed or ought to take (potential, possible) practical decisions exclusively on the basis of this overview and of a just as clear end/goal-means-calculus/calculation, and at the lower end, the clouding and blurring of (the) judgement through and by means of uncontrollable drives, urges, impulses and (the/a) flight into the realm of (the) phantasy / fantasy^{121 + li}. Scientific rationality can, for its part, be divided up, arranged and classified in a cognitive-value-free (rationality) and in a practical (rationality) (in eine kognitiv-zweckfreie und in eine praktische), which must / has to prove itself/its worth through and by means of successful action. It remains to be seen where the boundaries, limits or borders between both (of those) may lie, or else whether the distinction between them is founded and established merely in (regard to) different definitions of the concept of acting, action and the act. Let us remain at/with the contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition) between widely understood scientific rationality and practical rationality, how these are handled in concrete situations of social life by concrete actors. One easily makes out of this contrast and comparison/juxtaposition an opposition, if one assumes that social life in its everyday/daily course and sequence of events is characterised or distinguished by a low degree or grade of reflexion/reflection, that its rationality consists in (the / a) keeping to and complying with in themselves not rationally or non-rationally declarable rules and norms, and that interaction (Interaktion) hardly or only from afar follows rational patterns and models (specimens and designs); the

¹²¹ P. Cohen [[TRANSLATOR'S ADDITION, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K. : AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]] posits / provides / displays such a graduation, scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades and degrees, "Rational conduct", pp. 150-153, *ibid.*. Cf. Mortimore, "Rational Action", esp. pp. 99, 102, 105 as well as Mortimore-Maund, "Rationality in Belief", esp. p. 12.

postulate of (the) rationality is, therefore, finally introduced rather/more for the sake of (the) scientific analysis, as it were, as (the/a) measure, yardstick, standard or benchmark, criterion for the measurement of the deviations and divergences in relation to it (i.e. such a yardstick)¹²². Nonetheless, the distance between scientific rationality and practical rationality must appear to be considerably less, in fact minimal, if one visualises and makes clear to oneself the anthropological and social-ontological parameters. We already know of the common social-ontological foundations of (social-)scientific and non-scientific understanding¹²³, and we can confidently, safely, easily assert (claim, maintain, say) that it is / things are not otherwise/different with (regard to) the relation between (social-)scientific and practical rationality. Their objectively existing commonalities appear, though, even more clearly when we disregard the proud self-understanding of (the) science and forget the current opinion that the scientist is distinguished by (the) abstraction (i.e. withdrawal and removal (of his own self)) from his own sympathies and wishes, that is, by (a) higher objectivity. (The) Social Common Sense knows just as well – and it articulates this knowledge in common sayings and practical (pieces of) advice / counsel –, that a maximum in (regard to) objectivity is worth wishing for and (worth) striving after, but a minimum is absolutely indispensable and essential for (the) social survival. Objectivity as (the) control over personal sympathies or antipathies and rationality as guidance of acting, action and the act are hardly separated in social and individual consciousness. Common property (i.e. part of the everyday understanding of people) (Allgemeingut) is also the knowledge that (the) successes in cases of objectivity and rationality overall more or less

¹²² See e.g. Schütz, *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 32ff., and II, pp. 79, 86ff.; cf. Ch. IV, Sec. 1Ba, above. Worth reading are Parsons's thoughts and reflections against the all-too-sharp contrasting (Kontrastierung) of scientific and practical rationality in Schütz, see Schütz-Parsons, *Zur Theorie*, p. 90ff.. Garfinkel approves of and explains Schütz's position, *Studies*, p. 263ff. [[TRANSLATOR'S ADDITION, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K. : MORE **JOOZ** UPON MORE **JOOZ**, WHAT A **ZIO-JOO**-DAS-INCEST IN DA BRAIN-**ZIO-JOO**-GANG-BANG-FUCK-FEST (WITH ONLY PARSONS DA NON-**JOO**, BUT **ZIO**-ANGLO-**JOO**, IN "RESISTANCE AND OPPOSITION" !!!) AAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]

¹²³ See Ch. IV, Sec. 1D, above.

remain far behind / fall far short of the set aims, ends and objectives (den gesteckten Zielen) or, in any case, of (the) imagined ideals (den vorschwebenden Idealen), irrespective of how every individual may evaluate and judge the/his own performances, achievements and accomplishments. Objectivity (not necessarily in the sense of ethically nuanced impartiality, but certainly in the sense of reliable orientation) and rationality (in the same sense) remain, nevertheless, the generally declared and striven-for and desired aims, ends and objectives, whose attainment and achievement procures, gets and gains (a/some) respect, admiration and power (einem Respekt, Bewunderung und Macht). The overall picture in (the) (regard to) scientific rationality does not seem (to be) otherwise/different(ly). Scientific refinements of (the) objectivity and of (the) rationality are indeed possible in many fields, their practical meaning, however, is partly relativised, partly canceled by the effect and impact of several/a number of factors. On the one hand, they concern questions and problems whose solution influences, in this or the opposed direction, the anthropological and social-ontic fundamental and basic given (actual) facts (die anthropologischen und sozialontischen Grundgegebenheiten)^{lii} just as little as for instance the decision for/in favour of Newton's mechanics or for/in favour of Einstein's theory of relativity improves or worsens the [[man's / humans' / one's]] natural sense of orientation (den natürlichen Orientierungssinn)^{liii}. On the other hand, and indeed to a very large extent, they arise and result from internal scientific debates and serve merely the polemics and the formation of parties inside of / within that realm of (the) social life, which is called science, and knows (of) specific variations and modifications of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation. Since methodologies and methods in reality do not represent and constitute in advance fixed, stationary, established, definite, set (research) instructions ((in respect) of research), but rationalisations of (the) (research) praxis and practice (of research) in retrospect and with regard to certain content-related pre-decisions, thus practical rationality can draw

little/slight utility, benefit, gain and profit from this crown or blossom(ing) (bloom, flower(ing)) of scientificity (Wissenschaftlichkeit), if one may say so. On the contrary, it (i.e. practical rationality) stands/is very near/close to what science in actual fact does: it starts from a certain phenomenon (occurrence, appearance) or certain phenomena (occurrences, appearances) (einer bestimmten Erscheinung oder bestimmten Erscheinungen), it suggests an explanation for it/them and formulates or implies, in the course of this, generalisations, which, for their part, are confirmed or contradicted by other(s) (scientists, people) by invoking / under the invocation of other phenomena (Phänomene). The interpretation of a situation, on the basis of which a course of acting, action and the act is sketched, designed and planned, runs and proceeds essentially in the same pattern, and errors lurk here likewise, not only in the/a false perception or explanation, but also in the over(-)(estimation) or underestimation of the significance and importance, (place) value and weight (Stellenwertes) of certain in-part-phenomena inside of each and every topically, currently or potentially relevant whole^{liv}.

Theoreticians of the decision (Entscheidungstheoretiker), who strive after a scientification (i.e. making scientific) (eine Verwissenschaftlichung) of the processes (in respect) of (the taking of) the decision (Entscheidungsprozesse) through and by means of the construction of models in accordance with which the rational actor (der rationale Akteur) has to align himself, comply with and follow, assume a qualitative difference between scientific and practical rationality. The general methodological legitimacy and usefulness (utility, expedience, handiness, helpfulness, profitableness, advantage) (Die allgemein methodologische Legitimität und Nützlichkeit) of such models is indisputable, above all in the area and realm of the modern national (i.e. political) economy (der modernen Nationalökonomie)^{lv}, and there is in actual fact a hard core of cases (einen harten Kern von Fällen) in which the rational-choice-model

functions smoothly and without a hitch^{lv}, although one does not have to / must not necessarily conclude from that its indispensability¹²⁴. John Stuart Mill opined once that the national (i.e. political) economists (die Nationalökonomien) had to indeed start from the principle of competition and rivalry (or competition principle; Konkurrenzprinzip) in order to make and render out of their discipline a strict and rigorous theoretical science, however, they would misunderstand “human affairs” if they overlooked the effect and impact of social factors in the wide/broad sense (“custom”) and attributed to their theoretical principle ubiquitous practical validity^{125 + lvii}. These wise words touch upon the essential point: even the proven epistemological indispensability of a theoretical principle says little about the ontological facts (of the case) and circumstances in their totality and entirety, and the simplicity or evident nature and obviousness (Evidenz) of this principle can indeed epistemologically legitimise it, but not eo ipso prove the illegitimacy of other theoretical starting points¹²⁶. Moreover, from the suitability of the models (der Eignung der Modelle), which rest and are based on this principle, not in the least do their appropriateness, adequacy and suitability (Angemessenheit) follow as normative instructions of acting, action and the act (als normative Handlungsanweisungen) for theoretical-analytical ends/goals. Because action unfolds and develops obviously not at the level of theoretical analysis, but in its closest [possible] contact with the ontological facts (of the case) and circumstances (mit den ontologischen Sachverhalten), which the principles of the analysis (die Prinzipien der Analyse) more or less had to strongly simplify in order to be constituted as such. This explains why (the) rational choice theory, as already mentioned, at every turn / every step along the way must take, i.e. seek and obtain help from additional and indeed inconsistent with its (basic) principle (Grundsatz) hypotheses in order to

¹²⁴ Like Elster does it, *Ulysses*, p. 116.

¹²⁵ *Principles*, p. 170ff. (Book II, chap. IV.)

¹²⁶ Lechner, “The New Utilitarianism”, p. 97.

maintain, perpetuate and keep going the/its contact with social reality. It is, hence, not at all certain that the successes, which above all are achieved through and by means of their normative use/usage at the level of individual decisions, would have to fail to appear, not take place and fail to materialise were the actor to approach and go about the matter on the basis of different models or else practical principles (in respect) of acting, action and the act, whose, in fact, conscious reference to the magic word “rationality” could be missing and lacking (denen sogar der bewußte Bezug auf das Zauberwort „Rationalität“ fehlen könnte)^{lviii}. Not least of all, the coupling of rationality and utility maximisation with each other could be missing/lacking/absent if the interpretation of the situation and position on the part of the actor, as well as his self-understanding, gave (the) precedence and priority to other cares and concerns¹²⁷.

Normative theories of the decision are in principle incapable of breaking the tautological vicious circle. They are formed, shaped and moulded as idealisation (i.e. rendering into an ideal / ideals) and formalisation (i.e. rendering into a form / forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) (Idealisierung und Formalisierung) of (the) real aspects of (the) action, as (the) theoretical extrapolation of a part, which then raises i.e. makes a claim on/to the entirety, totality or whole, and as soon as they return to praxis/practice in order to guide it as norms, they find again only themselves or else / and (or) the aspects of the real (die Aspekte des Realen) from which they were distilled. Every attempt to go beyond and surpass these individual aspects and to obtain (gain, attain, reach) effective and actual universality (effektive Universalität) gets tangled in a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases; Kasuistik), which makes necessary assumptions of help/assistance (i.e. auxiliary assumptions; Hilfsannahmen), and clouds, dulls, blurs (the) clarity with which

¹²⁷ Brennan, “What might...”, p. 56ff..

they wanted to captivate (impress, tempt, buy off, bribe, corrupt) the actor. To the extent they offer in a very general sense [something] in practice useful, they constitute long-winded, complicated, pedantic, awkward, laborious and cumbersome “scientific” paraphrases (circumlocutions, descriptions, definitions) (umständliche „wissenschaftliche“ Umschreibungen) of age-old and ancient, from-time-immemorial maxims, aphorisms, worldly kinds of wisdom and teachings and doctrines of cleverness, shrewdness, astuteness, good sense, smartness and wisdom (uralter Lebensweisheiten und Klugheitslehren). Authors, who, for instance, rediscover the game-theory principles in Machiavelli’s (war) writing(s) / scripture (on war) and therein see and catch sight of a confirmation of their general validity¹²⁸, do not think that exactly through that (rediscovery) the originality of the(ir) game theory as (a) normative theory of the decision vanishes into thin air. In actual fact, originality in a radical sense is hardly considered here from the outset, since by the nature of things every normatively meant definition of rationality can only contain banalities, which anthropologically and social-ontologically indeed immediately and instantly/at once/straight away make sense and are clear, but in every concrete situation and position must be interpreted anew – and precisely this interpretation, which in practice is most in need / needed, is not offered by any normative theory of the decision and cannot be offered by it too/also/as well. If one lingers (in regard to) and dwells on definitions of rational action, which at the same time want to be instructions and directions in relation to that (rational action)¹²⁹, in every sentence one runs into and encounters some common nouns or adjectives, which at first sight do not raise questions and problems, however, up close / on closer (inspection), all of them are in need of interpretation and, as

¹²⁸ See e.g. Barbut, »‘L’ Art de la Guerre’ et la praxéologie mathématique«.

¹²⁹ Pioneering and pathbreaking, seminal here (is) Schoeffler, “Toward a General Definition of Rational Action”. Amongst his most important successors in the economic context (we (shall) mention) Downs (is/will be mentioned), *Ökonomische Theorie*, esp. p. 5ff., and Gäfen, *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entscheidung*, esp. p. 25ff..

(the) experience shows, according to the actor and situation, are connected with very different thought (intellectual) procedures, methods, processes and content(s). “Available” or “sufficient information”, “suitable means”, “weighing up and consideration” or “(the) value determination / determination of the value of (the) possible consequences”, “deduction and derivation of the correct acting, action and act to be carried out and taken” from such (pieces of) information, kinds of weighing up and considerations and value determinations (Informationen, Abwägungen und Wertbestimmungen) – that all sounds absolutely self-evident, natural, obvious and at the same time leaves one exactly (there) where one found oneself before the communication, notification, announcement, report(ing), message/messaging, statement of such wisdom^{lix}. The practical irrelevance of norms (in respect) of the theory of the decision is accordingly shown by the fact that several actors simultaneously affirm these norms taken at face value, and in fact have the subjective feeling of following the same (norms) precisely, and, despite all of that, can embark on courses of acting, action and of the act which differ *toto coelo* (i.e. by the whole extent of the heavens, utterly) between one another and even / perhaps seem to be in the eyes of the each and every respective other side “irrational”. Naturally too, slightly helpful / of little help are the aforementioned norms even (then) when the actor must choose between two equally good or equally bad alternatives, when he cannot have a view of all objectively available alternatives or is forced, compelled and coerced to act in a situation or position in which he – through no fault of his own / without himself to blame – does not recognise / is not familiar with. The practical irrelevance of the normative theory of the decision gleams, glimmers, shimmers, shines, incidentally, (right) through the unavoidable vagueness of its theoretical formulations. Because a compilation and survey (drawing up) of the demands and requirements of form-related (i.e. formal) rationality fails before the task of putting forward and setting (drawing) up, establishing one single and unambiguous concept of the rational (einen einzigen

und eindeutigen Begriff des Rationalen), and must / has to be content with (a) combination of features of rationality more or less corresponding with one of the each and every respective theoretical claims¹³⁰.

No-one will want to, though, (meaningfully, reasonably) make accusations against / blame (in a meaningful way, for logical/rational/sensible reasons) the normative theories of the decision because they cannot specify and indicate criteria with the help / on the basis of which (the) ultimate world-theoretical preferences and value conceptions (or notions, representations and ideas, images of values) could be rationally defined (an Hand deren sich letzte weltanschauliche Präferenzen und Wertvorstellungen rational definieren ließen). Their inability to stand by the actor helpfully / in a helpful manner in the reality of his action is however noticeable likewise in the questions and problems which can be regarded as value-free or technical (die als wertfrei oder technisch gelten können). Let us take e.g. the question and problem of the evaluation, analysis and interpretation of information (Informationsauswertung). The sole (thing) which can here be regarded unambiguously as “irrational” is the conscious and well-aimed, targeted and deliberate (gezielte) ignoring of information relevant to acting, action and the act. (How many (people), however, are (made/feel) guilty of such an ignoring?) And the sole (thing) again which the adviser / counselor has to recommend in matters and cases of rationality is the accurate, precise and sober sifting through and examination of all information relevant to acting, action and the act. But with these maxims, which must have been known to (the) socially living men (i.e. humans) already some millennia / thousands of years before the emergence and advent of modern theories of the decision (moderner Entscheidungstheorien)^{lx}, little can be started, i.e. done in practice, because the real problems begin precisely (there) where the theory stands on its own, properly formulated, and its interpretation

¹³⁰ Priester, „Rationalität“, p. 477.

with regard to the concrete situation and position and the intellectual gift, talent and endowment of the actor is supposed to take place. Pieces of information are not registered, recorded and used irrespective of *who* collected them on the basis of which aims, objectives and ends and to the extent he has at least partially evaluated, analysed and interpreted (ausgewertet hat) them in advance^{lxi}. (The fact) That action sometimes is motivated only through/by already available and existing information does not change the above facts (of the case) and circumstances. Above all, the rational command, requirement, imperative to build action on/at the highest standing position, situation, state, condition, level of information raises questions (Vor allem wirft das rationale Gebot, Handeln auf höchsten Informationsstand zu bauen, Fragen auf). However, regarding this standing position, situation, state, condition, level (of information), the quality, not the quantity of the pieces of information decides (things, matters) / is decisive, and for the judgement and evaluation of the [said] quality, no general rules can be given. The accumulation of information with the aim, end and objective of completeness, integrity and wholeness (Vollständigkeit) is unnecessary and superfluous when the actor already possesses the deciding/decisive single (piece of) or sole and separate information (Einzelinformation)^{lxii} – no matter whether he (i.e. the actor) knows (of it) or through coincidence, chance and happenstance came, i.e. happened upon it, and then has made use of it. (It is incumbent) Only (on) the actor, no(t (on) any) theory (is responsible) for (/ to judge) when the standing position, situation, state, condition, level of information of the imagined practical ends/goals suffices or not. And only the actor, no(t any) theory can attach to and confer upon a fundamental factor the – on each and every respective occasion – appropriate, proper, fitting meaning, which it deserves and merits in real action. We mean the time/temporal factor (or the factor of time), which in (the) theory functions only as (a) form-related (i.e. formal), that is in practice insignificant form-related, formal variable, however in the reality of the situation speaks with

an imperious, imperative and authoritative, commanding, domineering, masterful, peremptory voice. Every rationality stands/is under (the) pressure of time / time (temporal) pressure; the pressure of time and (the pressure) of the decision are to a great extent / for the most part synonymous, and hence (the) decision obeys the commands of time rather than those (commands) of a – as it were – timeless rationality (i.e. a rationality not bound to time pressures). (The) search (Suche), (the) sifting, sorting, examination (Sichtung) and (the) evaluation, analysis and interpretation (Auswertung) of information takes place inside of / within a framework of time (temporal framework), and an immense, vast, incalculable abundance of available, existing or deducible, inferable (capable of being opened up, developable, educible, inducible, conjecturable, inferential, accessible) pieces of information (erschließbaren Informationen) can, in the process, in fact make difficult, complicate, impede and hamper the practical tasks of the actor. Then the mechanisms of relief from, or relieving of, the tension/stress of existence which have taken root anthropologically (die anthropologisch verwurzelten Entlastungsmechanismen) have a protective effect and impact, and (the) chance, coincidence and happenstance often determines from which information in and during the formation of the decision (one) is supposed or ought to start¹³¹. It would be rash, as one often does (it), to construct, regarding this, absolute differences between scientific and practical rationality. Theoreticians and scientists handle and deal with information, partly due to subjective prejudices, partly for methodical and epistemological reasons, no less selectively than the (people) acting in practice, and the success of their undertaking and venture is evaluated and judged likewise in retrospect, i.e. on the basis of the ability of the theory to satisfactorily interpret information originally, initially not taken into account or added [later]. Also, after the success of a practical undertaking and venture, previously ignored pieces of

¹³¹ Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 3, in this volume, above.

information become irrelevant, and the earlier situation and position is from now on interpreted retrospectively, i.e. from the point of view of the success (which has) in the meanwhile occurred. It is not right/correct/true, moreover, that time pressure in and during the elaboration, drawing up, formulation and working out (Ausarbeitung) and formulation (Formulierung) of theories in general plays no role, this role fluctuates only according to the biographical circumstances and concrete situation and position pertaining to the history of ideas (der konkreten geistesgeschichtlichen Lage). A difference in relation to practical rationality lies, though, in (the fact) that this (practical rationality) has a certain subjective bearer, who stands/is before – on each and every respective occasion – unique and singular situations, positions and tasks, whereas the formation and development of (the/a) theoretical tradition (theoretische Traditionsbildung) permits scientific rationality to work cumulatively over/for longer stretches (periods) of time. (An) abrupt paradigm shift (Paradigmenwechsel) can, however, strengthen, reinforce and boost the effect and impact of the time factor (factor of time).

Normative theories of the decision run into, come across, encounter considerable difficulties also concerning the weighing up of the consequences of acting, action and the act, which they, likewise, have to/must include (incorporate, integrate) in(to) in their models as (an) unconditional and absolute technical task (als unbedingte technische Aufgabe). The theories of rationality, which want to appear as instructions for perfect prognoses, were already early (on) convincingly and conclusively criticised¹³², and indeed in the (national i.e. political-economic) context (of political economy), both concerning their realisability, as well as because of their logical inconsistency. In principle there is a contradiction between the form-related (i.e. formal) character of normative theories of the decision and their suitability in/for positing i.e. making

¹³² Cf. Morgenstern, “Vollkommene Voraussicht”.

prognoses. Their economic postulates regarding the ends/goals of acting, action and of the act have, in any case, only explanatory value (or worth of/as explanation) and are not distinguished and singled out by psychological realism¹³³, prognoses can, however, be dared/ventured only (then) when – apart from the general ends/goals of acting, action and the act (utility maximisation)(,) as they are captured, i.e. recorded in the form-related (i.e. formal) model, more detail / further details (Näheres) is / are known about the ideas, perceptions, concepts and notions of the actor and his interpretation of the situation, which guide his action in detail, more precisely (and in its separate parts) (die sein Handeln im einzelnen leiten); the form-related (i.e. formal) form, wording and version (die formale Fassung) of the general ends/goals of acting, action and the act must lose something of its vagueness through and by means of content-related information and data (durch inhaltliche Angaben) so that the prognosis finds a support or resisting force (Widerhalt) on which it can build and be based. If this concretisation is absent and does not take place, then the normative theory of the decision contains merely a norm, and from norms no prognoses can be derived and deduced by definition. The main/chief concern of such theories does not, nonetheless, seem to be to build conceptual bridges for the positing and putting forward of a prognosis, but rather that/the (main concern) of describing real action in such a way that (the) description of acting, action and the act and (the) norm of acting, action and of the act coincide. The logic of the form-related (i.e. formal) model can then substitute the logic of the actor, and in a next step the (improvement up to) perfection of the model is confused with the (improvement up to) perfection of the action^{lxiii}. Overall, (there) where such confusions, mix ups, mistakes (Verwechslungen) in this or that form are present, the analysis is entangled / tangled up in the antinomies of the Covering-Law-Model. It (i.e. the analysis) can determine what the rational

¹³³ Foldes, “Note”, p. 326.

actor should or ought to do on the basis of the normative premises of the theory of the decision, but does not know in advance what the actual actor will do. And even (then) when he (i.e. the actor) fulfils the normative expectations of the model, it is not fixed with final certainty whether he took/went down this path out i.e. because of the motives which the model postulates as (the) motives for every rational actor.

This fundamental and in principle inability of the prognosis stretches to the unintended (unintentional) consequences of (the) action (unbeabsichtigten Folgen des Handelns), which hardly emerges and appears for obvious reasons in the theoretical horizon of normative theories of the decision. Naturally, no theory of acting, action and of the act can anticipate the unintended consequences of action, because in this case the possibility would exist on the part of the actor of eliminating such consequences through and by means of (the) conscious guidance and steering, what/something, though, (which would) change (the) human history(,) as we know it thoroughly and completely / from the ground up, namely it would mark the beginning of and usher in the transition from the “realm of necessity” to the “realm of freedom”. The special difficulty of the normative theory of the decision does not therefore simply lie in (the fact) that even rational choices bring forth, occasion and produce – at least over the long run – unintended consequences, which in the end can also turn out to be pleasant, but (in the fact) that action on the basis of rational choices brings – for the actor himself – unpleasant effects and impacts into the world / being. Constellations are in fact conceivable in which on both sides / mutual “irrational” action would have been more beneficial [than mutual “rational” action] to those concerned¹³⁴. In general the (recti)linear / (recti)lineal deduction and derivation of an outcome (in respect) of acting, action and the act conforming with rationality, from/out of the rationality of the motives or else of

¹³⁴ Jervis, “Rational Deterrence” esp. p. 188 (in reference to the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”).

the ends/goals, can only raise false or at least exaggerated theoretical expectations (in respect) of the decision (i.e. exaggerated expectations from the theory of the decision). And such (a) danger/threat/risk grows when one – apart from the possible onset and occurrence of unintended consequences after (the) successful conclusion of an acting, action or act – considers and contemplates the imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities; Unwägbarkeiten) of the course (sequence) (of events) of the acting, action and act (des Handlungsablaufs), which likewise have little to do with the rationality of the motivation or else of the ends/goals. Between these ends/goals, which determine the outline and draft and the actual/factual outcome of the action (die den Handlungsentwurf bedingen und dem tatsächlichen Ausgang des Handelns) there is – as a rule – a smaller or larger gap (space, interval) or distance, namely as (the) result of the frictions (als Ergebnis der Friktionen) which the course or sequence of events of the acting, action and act gives rise to, causes, provokes and creates by bumping, running into and encountering external/outer unforeseen impediments and obstacles, hindrances, accidents, coincidences, etc., or by bringing to light (the) internal / inner inadequacies, deficiencies, shortcomings, failings, disabilities of the actor (oder innere Unzulänglichkeiten des Akteurs). Such frictions (Solche Friktionen) thwart/frustrate/foil/prevent attempts to realise (achieve, attain; verwirklichen) a “rational” outline and draft of acting, action and of the act without the slightest deduction, curtailment or cut(back), reduction (i.e. retreat, discount or concession; Abstrich), and consequently to blur and smear the bound(arie)s between (the) norm and (the) reality of the action (und somit die Grenze zwischen Norm und Realität des Handelns). They (i.e. the said frictions) represent and constitute the manner (as to) how/with which time along/together with everything which it (i.e. time) brings with it and entails, forces its way, gets, breaks into and penetrates, pierces into the rational design and outline of the acting, action and act, which on the basis of its explicit or implicit reference to (the) constants of rationality

would like to raise, i.e. make a certain louder/noisier claim to/on timelessness (i.e. being beyond the constraints of time) (Zeitlosigkeit)^{lxiv}. And they hence constantly remind the person acting (den Handelnden) of the finiteness and finite nature of his undertakings and enterprises (die Endlichkeit seiner Unternehmungen), which is not to (i.e. cannot) be separated from the finiteness of his rationality.

A great theoretician of acting, action and of the act in the name of Clausewitz (has) made use of the concept of (the) friction (Vom Begriff der Friktion hat ein großer Handlungstheoretiker namens Clausewitz programmatischen Gebrauch gemacht). To him we also owe another key concept, which was formed as (the) answer to the question and problem (as to) how the cognitive presuppositions / preconditions, prerequisites of (the) action inside of a human reality (wie die kognitiven Voraussetzungen des Handelns innerhalb einer menschlichen Realität) are comprehended, which [human reality] constantly flows, [[which]] knows only probabilities and likelihoods (Wahrscheinlichkeiten) and does not allow any fixed outlines and contours of (the) things and (the) situations and positions to exist, from which (one) could deduce and derive any laws whatsoever and norms built upon them (i.e. the said laws) (aus denen sich irgendwelche Gesetze und darauf bauende Normen ableiten ließen). The intellect generalising beyond the concrete case (der über den konkreten Fall hinaus generalisierende Intellekt) cannot keep and retain, i.e. have the last word here, but the “tact of judgement” undertakes the guidance (conducting and direction) of the action, an “intellectual(-spiritual) instinct”, which sees through and understands the “peculiarity and particularity of the case”, distinguishes between and tells apart (the/what is) relevant and (the/what is) irrelevant and “hits upon/discovered/finds the/what is right almost unconsciously” (sondern die Leitung des Handelns übernimmt der „Takt des Urteils“, ein „geistiger Instinkt“, der die „Eigentümlichkeit des Falles“ durchschaut, Relevantes und

Irrelevantes auseinanderhält und „das Rechte fast bewußtlos trifft“¹³⁵. Action is accordingly not science (if one understands this term in the conventional intellectualistic sense), but art, and it (i.e. action) has, likewise/just like art, its virtuosi and its philistines (low-brows, incompetents, “peasants”), irrespective of what everyone regards – in terms of theory – as art and (irrespective of) which prescriptions or recipes he/someone wants to follow in respect of the theory of acting, action and the act; the best normative theories of the decision help the philistine little anyhow/anyway (Handeln ist demnach nicht Wissenschaft (wenn man diesen Terminus im konventionellen intellektualistischen Sinne versteht), sondern Kunst, und es hat ebenso wie Kunst seine Virtuosen und seine Banausen, gleichviel, was jeder theoretisch vom Handeln hält und welchen handlungstheoretischen Rezepten er folgen will; die besten normativen Entscheidungstheorien helfen dem Banausen ohnehin wenig). Here it is as with the art of writing: philologists (i.e. language (and literature) experts) command (the) grammatical and syntactical rules better than great poets, yet for linguistic virtuosity, (the) philological equipping/equipment, nevertheless, suffices just as little as (the) deepening, absorption, engrossment in normative theories of the decision for the (person) acting (Hier verhält es sich wie mit der Kunst des Schreibens: Philologen mögen die grammatischen und syntaktischen Regeln besser als große Dichter beherrschen, doch zur sprachlichen Virtuosität reicht indes die philologische Ausrüstung ebensowenig aus wie dem Handelnden die Vertiefung in normative Entscheidungstheorien). The tact of (the) judgement rests and is based indeed on “natural astuteness, shrewdness, acumen”, but over and above that it must be “formed and developed” through and by means of “thinking, reflection, contemplation” and (the) attentive and considerate observation of human things, affairs: the

¹³⁵ On/Regarding/About “friction (Friktion)” and (the) “tact of judgement (Takt des Urteils)” in Clausewitz see Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, esp. pp. 60ff., 71ff., there(in) / in which the (pieces of) evidence (documents, quotes) (is/are) too.

preoccupation with and involvement in theory is indeed very recommendable and advisable, it has, none the less, (a) propaedeutic character, it sharpens the intellectual(-spiritual) sense, but guarantees in practice nothing (Der Takt des Urteils beruht zwar auf „natürlichen Scharfsinn“, darüber hinaus muß er aber auch durch „Nachdenken“ und aufmerksame Beobachtung der menschlichen Dinge „gebildet“ werden; die Beschäftigung mit Theorie ist zwar sehr empfehlenswert, sie hat indes propädeutischen Charakter, sie schärft den geistigen Sinn, garantiert aber praktisch nichts). And even if it (i.e. a theory) is true, right and correct, if the rules of acting, action and the act laid down, established, set up and drawn up by it are all of them / all together apt, appropriate and well-judged and in actual fact indispensable, thus, accordingly, (the) meaning and necessity of the tact of (the) judgement is not diminished, reduced and lessened in the slightest (Und selbst wenn sie stimmt, wenn die von ihr aufgestellten Handlungsregeln allesamt treffend und in der Tat unentbehrlich sind, so vermindern sich dadurch Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit des Taktes des Urteils nicht im geringsten). Because the norms pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act are, as we know, always formulated in terms needing and requiring interpretation, and this interpretation, which is supposed to build (a) bridge between (the) norm and (a) concrete situation/position, remains exactly (the) thing, affair, matter of the tact of judgement; the attempt to lay down, establish, set up and draw up new norms for the application of norms etc., would also make the use of new terms needing and requiring interpretation essential, and consequently gives rise to, provokes, creates and causes a *circulus vitiosus* (i.e. vicious circle or cycle), which, again, only the tact of judgement could break (Denn die handlungstheoretischen Normen sind, wie wir wissen, immer in interpretationsbedürftigen Termini formuliert, und diese Interpretation, die die Brücke zwischen Norm und konkreter Lage schlagen soll, bleibt eben Sache des Taktes des Urteils; der Versuch, für die Anwendung der Normen neue Normen aufzustellen etc., würde auch den Gebrauch von neuen

interpretationsbedürftigen Termini erforderlich machen und somit einen circulus vitiosus hervorrufen, den wiederum nur der Takt des Urteils brechen könnte). The distance between the models and the tact of judgement is therefore, in view of the necessity of interpretation of the former (models), much smaller than someone who cannot think beyond the common and usual contrasts (comparisons, confrontations, oppositions or juxtapositions) of / between “rationalism” and “irrationalism” may believe, and moreover, regards “rationalism” and “irrationalism” to be one and the same thing (Der Abstand zwischen Modellen und Takt des Urteils ist also angesichts der Interpretationsbedürftigkeit der ersteren viel kleiner als mancher glauben mag, der über die geläufigen Gegenüberstellungen von „Rationalismus“ und „Irrationalismus“ nicht hinausdenken kann und zudem „Rationalismus“ und „Irrationalismus“ für ein und dieselbe Sache hält). The impossibility of defining the tact of judgement once and for all just as little constitutes an argument against its rationality as the impossibility of a definition of the norms of acting, action and the act without the use of terms needing and requiring interpretation must have as (a) consequence the irrationality of these norms (Die Unmöglichkeit, den Takt des Urteils ein für allemal zu definieren, bildet ebensowenig ein Argument gegen seine Rationalität, wie die Unmöglichkeit einer Definition von Handlungsnormen ohne den Gebrauch interpretationsbedürftiger Termini die Irrationalität dieser Normen zur Folge haben muß)^{lxv}. The ascertainment regarding the praxeological weight of the tact of judgement may not, incidentally, in any case be understood as (an) appeal to “irrational” action under/amongst/with (the) neglect of the (pieces of) information regarding/in respect of the concrete situation and position, of the weighing up and consideration of the alternatives against/as between one another (Die Feststellung über das praxeologische Gewicht des Taktes des Urteils darf übrigens auf keinen Fall als Aufruf zu „irrationalen“ Handeln unter Vernachlässigung der Informationen über die konkrete Lage, der Abwägung

von Alternativen gegeneinander etc. verstanden werden). It refers only to the synthetic capacity and ability that evaluates and weighs up, considers (the) (pieces of) information. The tact of judgement does not put forward, draw up, establish or lay down any norm, but it interprets them (i.e. norms) and very often it despises, disdains, scorns, defies them (i.e. norms). That is also why the norm “follow the tact of judgement” would be silly, ridiculous, absurd, nonsensical (Sie verweist nur auf das synthetische Vermögen, das Informationen auswertet und abwägt. Der Takt des Urteils stellt keine Norm auf, sondern er interpretiert sie und sehr oft verachtet er sie. Daher wäre auch die Norm „folge dem Takt des Urteils“ unsinnig). Because it (i.e. the said norm of “follow the tact of judgement”) is followed, observed, complied with and abided by anyhow, and furthermore, it could not say anything about the most important (thing) and the most concrete (thing), namely about the quality of the tact, which is exactly what matters when it comes to/is a matter of practical orientation inside of/within the concrete situation (and position) (Denn sie wird ohnehin befolgt und außerdem würde sie nichts über das Wichtigste und Konkreteste sagen können, nämlich über die Qualität des Takts, auf die es eben ankommt, wenn es um die praktische Orientierung innerhalb der konkreten Lage geht).

TRANSLATOR'S ENDNOTES

(ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.)

¹ The fact e.g. that all humans relate to world views, good vs. evil, the urge-drive-impulse of self-preservation and the extension of one's own power, death, the mechanism and (friend-foe) spectrum of the social relation, society as a political collective, the political (social order, social cohesion, social disciplining), ideology, culture, nature, identity, power, rationality-understanding-language, etc. etc. etc..

ii From the point of view of the individual who must act, but who must act in relation to an already ordered society of culture, the political, dominant values etc., which he had no say in shaping, though he does have a say in how he will act.

iii Obviously because all sides can often up to always want to win, rule, come out on top, have fun, kill one's foe, etc., etc., etc..

iv Instrumental rationality refers to end/goal and means rationality; symbolic rationality refers to the created meaning / rationality relating to the world theory/view of a human collectivity; and the rationality of identity refers to rationalities and the identities of collectivities and their members in relation to the identities of other collectivities and their members, including cases of the over-lapping of identities and collectivities and rationalities.

^v In that they are both present as intention (in memory and or carrying over until now) and actual consequences now, whether the consequences are the intended or unintended ones.

^{vi} I.e. in the case of individual self-sacrifice for the greater, collective good.

vii I.e. what are considered on each and every respective occasion to be ethically “irrational” ends/goals (since nothing is “rational/irrational (compared to rational)” and “ethical/unethical”, imminently, outside of man / human society).

viii I.e. rationality and justice are nothing more or less than a reflection of all the relevant correlation of forces as crystals of power and identity as to what happens in practice.

^{ix} This complements the Weberian position that the broader the range of relevant facts, the narrower does the ideal type need to be to have comparative macro-historical-sociological use.

^x Obviously, the Weberian bureaucratic rationalisation (or centralisation under state law and the associated streamlining, standardisation, organisation, systematisation, etc.) of circa (1800-)1900 is not meant here.

^{xi} Since all humans per definitionem are *rational* animals (with a basic rationality), and not just animals.

^{xii} In other words, if one defines tolerance e.g. in terms of traditional patriarchal Christianity, all the ZIO-anti-Christ-“secular”-Satanism of our times would be deemed totally and utterly intolerant.

^{xiii} I.e. Reason as something which is subjectively made up as to content beyond the objective capacity all humans have to reason via anthropologically and social-ontologically given rationality.

^{xiv} Obviously, this applies within each and every particular level of rationality and rational discourse. Scientific rational discourse (at least in its most consistent and complicated forms), for example, has no place in mainstream rational discourse, notwithstanding absolutely consistent argumentation.

^{xv} E.g. the rationality of identity trumps the rationality of means and ends/goals or the rationality of scientific observation.

[illegible]

xvii Exactly the same applies regarding nonsense and rubbish to the “Ten Commandments”, “Human Rights”, **ZIO**-controlled elections in a mass and (post-)industrialised and atomised and religiously and or racially non-relatively homogeneous society constituting “dimo-krasi”, the **ZIO**-KOST as a “privileged and uninvestigable” massacre, **HOMO-POOFTER-LEZZO-DEGENERATE** marriage as “an unalienable right” etc., etc., etc..

^{xxvii} E.g. normal as neither man or woe-man but a TOTALLY-ZIO-JOO-DAS-CONTROLLED-FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-LOBOTOMISED-ZIO-PSYCHO-OP-ZIO-BRAIN-WASHED-[[ZIO-NANO-MICRO-CHIPPED-ZIO-ROBOTISED-]]ZIO-SATANIC-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANISED-ZIO-JOO-SSINGER-ZIO-“ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE” IT.

^{xxviii} Cf. the novella by Bernd **Heinrich Wilhelm von Kleist** (18 October 1777 – 21 November 1811).

^{xxix} Here we are no longer talking about rationalisation as just argumentative verbal justification for what has been done and or what is in place, but also in respect of changes to the social whole, particularly as regards the rampant “progress” of (post-)modernity in regard to the centralising state, bureaucratisation, standardisation, the tendency towards monopolisation of the national economy and culture along with the centralising state GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY AND VASTLY ASYMMETRICALLY UNDER ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITE PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY, SAVAGE TRIBE, ORGANISED CRIMINAL, INCESTUAL, RAT-TUNNEL, ANTI-CHRIST, DEVIL-EVIL SATANISTS etc..

^{xxx} According to ZIO-JOO-DAS-JOOGLE “Weber described the eventual effects of rationalization in his *Economy and Society* as leading to a “polar night of icy darkness”, in which increasing rationalization of human life traps individuals in an “iron cage” (or “steel-hard casing”) of rule-based, rational control.” If we accept this as accurate (I can’t remember if that’s Weber’s only position or not), this, for the scientific observer of human affairs, is wrong if any kind of axiological and or aesthetical like or dislike is meant. If what is meant is an increase in technicised-state-related-legal control of masses of people without being axiologically and or aesthetically for or against, then “no problemo” given that what’s described above is *grosso modo* what happened during the course of the 19th and early 20th century.

^{xxxi} Obviously the main and most famous “make me a ZIO-JOO-DAS-STAR” “school of thought” being referred to here is the ZIO-JOO-INCESTUAL-ORGANIZED KRIMINAL-RAT-TUNNEL-PRIMITIVE SECRETE SOCIETY-SAVAGE TRIBE-RODENT-PARASITICAL “I’M A SERIOUS INTELLECTUAL AND PHILOSOPHER” RETARD ZIO-JOO-FURT “SCHOOL”, which simply mixed-up ZIO-JOO-Marxian themes with ZIO-JOO-Freud and Weber into a grand ZIO-JOO-free-for-all ZIO-JOO-theoretical mess, GREAT FUCKING ZIO-JOO-BALL-ANTI-CHRIST-SATAN. But note in the next paragraph the pre-history of the 20th century critique of culture / capitalism (which has roots going back to the 18th century).

^{xxxii} OH JOQ-DAS, OH YOO-DAS, OH ZIO-JOO-DAS-ZIO-YOO-DAS-ZIO-JOO !!! WHY ARE YOU SO FUCKING INSANE AND STUPID AND YET THINK YOU ARE SO FUCKING SMART? AAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

^{xxxiii} The transition to pluralistic mass democracy was well underway during Weber’s lifetime, but for an individual thinker not having the benefit of knowing the developments post-1920, it was too early before his death for Weber to view pluralistic mass democracy as another kind of society / social formation compared with bourgeois oligarchic liberalism, and hence “liberal-capitalistic social order”, even though the phrase “mass democracy” is in *Economy and Society*.

^{xxxiv} Since end/goal rationality is a feature of all human societies everywhere and always, no matter what the level and nature of a society’s “development”.

^{xxxv} In reality, and conceptually, all external action which is not “(instinctive) behaviour” involves end/goal-rational calculation and a motivation which have some kind of relationship with emotions and values, even when it is being non-normative and value-free, since that in itself is a stance or “value” of being non-normatively value-free and value-neutral.

^{xxxvi} All this kind of reasoning, of course, is all so fucking convenient for those who as a group continually enjoy from circa 1800/1900 the possession of grossly disproportionate and vastly asymmetrical forms of wealth and economic-state-ideological-etc.-power, great fucking ZIO-JOO-BALL-SATAN !!!

^{xxxvii} This is very “prophetic” in the sense that ZIO-capitalistic-imperialism is premised and based on continual ZIO-monopolistic-ZIO-oligopolistic-ZIO-JOO-BALL-imperialistic expansion, and if China and Russia, along with India, Persia-Iran et al. can act as a self-saving coalition of states against ZIO-USA-led ZIO-JOO-capitalistic-imperialistic ZIO-JOO-SATANISM, the game will be up for the ZIO-JOO and ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOQ capitalistic-imperialistic MAMMON-DEVIL-EVIL-SATANISTS.

^{xxxviii} Since the ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITES want a TOTAL ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE “FREE [!!!] MARKET” !!!

^{xxxix} In other words, the ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE “FREE [!!!] MARKET” is based on FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-PSYCHO-OP-ZIO-JOO-PAVLOV’S DOG STIMULUS-REACTION-CREATION OF “NEEDS”-ZIO-JOO-BRAIN-WASHING-ZIO-JOO-ZOMBI-FICATION of “consumers with their own free [!!!] will” !!!

