

V. Rationality, symbol and language in the field  
of tension of the social relation



# 1. Levels, forms and degrees of rationality

## A. Preliminary remark

Talk of the levels, forms and degrees of rationality already shows that rationality in itself and as such, that is, irrespective of its bearer and its field of coming into being or of its field of unfolding and development, cannot make up and constitute the object of a handling and treatment which suffices for strict objective and factual examination, testing and proving. Whoever wants to treat and deal with “rationality” absolutely (per se or as such), must take a definition of the same “rationality” as a basis, which does not make do, and does not manage, without terms in need of interpretation; all theories of rationality with a claim of (or to) exclusivity and loud or quiet normative ambitions, contained, in any case, such terms [in need of interpretation] and, through that, got involved and tangled up in a vicious circle whose logical troubles, difficulties and inconveniences, though, have not been able to cool down their ethical zeal and eagerness. The task of a social ontology as a theoretical dimension of depths (or in-depth dimension) is, accordingly, not the setting up, formation or erection of a wider “philosophical” theory of rationality next to other (“philosophical” theories of rationality), which, incidentally, in many cases and frequently repeat one another, but is the establishment, investigation and determination of the reasons out of which rationality – always: in its various levels, forms and degrees – makes up a constitutive element of human living together, i.e. co-existence. Rationality does not constitute, seen thus, an Ought whose realisation needs a particular effort, endeavour and struggle exceeding and passing beyond the present human situation, but a reality which originally belongs together with

the rest of the realities of the social and or of the human. The change (Der Wechsel) of / in its (i.e. rationality's) levels, forms and degrees does not yield or result in any linear progress, rather it (i.e. the said change) is executed and carried out asymmetrically and underlies strong fluctuations (variations and deviations), whereby and in relation to which these levels, forms and degrees combine with one another in various or in the same collective or individual actors on each and every respective occasion, having an effect differently on one another. "Philosophical" and (in the ethical and technical sense) normative theories of rationality are symptoms and indicators of this eternal, everlasting and perpetual change; they register and record objectively, i.e. without knowing it and without wanting it, social-ontological possibilities, which temporarily and transiently became realities; but they are incapable of ever performing, achieving and accomplishing that which they – according to what they think they know – want to perform, achieve and accomplish: namely, to put an end to the great variety and multiformity of the social-ontological possibilities in the name of and in favour of the sole wished-for "rational" reality. The degrees of rationality are not put, classed or classified in [[and do not belong to]] a uniform, unitary, unified universal scale, whose summit serves as the yardstick and measure of the tiers, levels, stages or grades of the said degrees of rationality; they (i.e. the said degrees of rationality) are the functions of the levels at which rationality unfolds and develops, and of the form, which it (i.e. rationality) assumes and adopts on each and every respective occasion. Theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory), one cannot get on top of this situation and position (i.e. get this situation under control) through final, conclusive and definitive definitions; behind them (i.e. such definitions) hide admonitions, exhortations and warnings, but through a series of conceptual distinctions, which are supposed to relate, render, reflect and convey the levels, forms and degrees of rationality in their great contours and outlines, and with descriptive intent. From the standpoint of general methodology, conceptual distinctions,

supported and underpinned by the corresponding casuistry (i.e. a complete case-by-case list of cases), offer the sole available theoretical way out when definitions can neither be maintained and kept to for long, nor help any further – something which applies to most cases; and they (i.e. the said conceptual distinctions) typically enough arise precisely during the proving of the inadequacies, deficiencies, shortcoming and failings of this or that definition.

Although there is and cannot be – in its content – binding and conclusively defined “rationality”, talk of “rationality” is customary, normal, typical, usual and theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) legitimate; one, in fact, may or should not speak of the levels, forms and degrees of the same rationality when the reference to something is lacking, which can be expressed at least conventionally in the singular (i.e. when the said levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not refer to something which cannot be expressed at least conventionally in the singular). This singular, nonetheless, does not point to any content, but to a form-related (i.e. formal) anthropological and social-ontological factor, which, like all anthropological and social-ontological factors can be connected (and combined) with all humanly and socially conceivable, imaginable and thinkable content(s). Like “the” social relation or “language”, from which it (i.e. rationality) can hardly be separated genetically and functionally, “rationality” updates and refreshes its potential (or brings its potential up to date, making that potential topical) in the most different positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends/goals and activities. As an anthropological and social-ontological constituent and constant, it (i.e. rationality) finds itself or is found on the other side of, i.e. beyond the common and familiar contrast and opposition between “rationalism” and “irrationalism”, which comes up, arises and emerges only during the content-related use of rationality, and indicates or signals preferences of a content-related nature, that is to say, concretely normative fillings, i.e. arrangements (as

to content) of those positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends / goals and activities; the level, form and degree of rationality does not necessarily depend, in any case, on the decision in favour of “rationalism” or of “irrationalism”, and the sense in which the anthropological and social-ontological way of looking at things ascribes and attributes the predicate “rational” to an action can differ considerably from that sense in which the actors themselves may or like and want to apostrophise (i.e. mention and refer to) an action as “rational” or “irrational”. The apparent paradox in rationality lies in the fact that it – thanks to its each and every respective level and form, as well as its each and every degree – is to be found, in practice, everywhere in the human-social [sphere, field, dimension, realm], however, precisely because it is deprived of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms), which goes way beyond what the anthropological and social-ontological formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) contain or imply already as a fact<sup>i</sup>. To someone acting in a concrete situation (and position), however, exactly this unreachable<sup>ii</sup> normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) is needed, so that he, in the hour (i.e. at the time) of probation (i.e. testing), is basically (placed) on his own – endowed, equipped and provided, though, with the aforementioned formalities (i.e. formal / form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), and with that which he himself has willingly or unwillingly made out of them. Precisely the ubiquity of rationality lends, confers to, bestows upon and gives, therefore, the theory of rationality such a general character that every specification in the direction of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) cannot go out of and above (i.e. beyond) beginnings which must obtain and secure their general objective validity, soundness and conclusiveness with the staying and remaining in unbinding (i.e. non-binding)

formulae (and set phrases)<sup>1</sup>. In short: the concept of rationality is theoretically (i.e. as regards theory) fruitful and fertile, i.e. helpful and of assistance during the investigation, establishment and determination of and inquiry into anthropological and social-ontological facts and circumstances, to the extent it remains, in practice, vague. And conversely: every definition or normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) of rationality, which wants to be, in practice, (technically or ethically) useful, loses in (its) theoretical depth and breadth without gaining and winning much in another respect. As can, incidentally, be shown, the terms, which normative theories of rationality must make use of (e.g. consistency, the adequate correlation of the goal/end and means with each other etc.) constitute simple or more complicated re-descriptions and paraphrases (re-writings, re-brandings) of the formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically, and they only get and obtain, maintain and preserve a meaning when they are understood in respect of these (formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically). This indicates in itself the objective impossibility of being able to leave behind these formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) [[to move]] in the direction of normatively binding content(s). Consequently, the treatment and handling of the examination of the problem of rationality remains in an eminent (i.e. exceptional and extreme (as total)) sense a matter of anthropology and of social ontology, which are technically and ethically blind. Whoever is on the lookout for content-related specifications of rationality in

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<sup>1</sup> See under D in this section, below.

narrower fields – exactly in the fields of technique (technology) or of ethics – (will) necessarily get tangled up in, entangled, embroiled and involved in new unsolvable paralogisms. The smuggling in of anthropological and social-ontological factors or concepts for the underpinning (backing-up and support) of such [content-related] specifications yields, brings, provides little [which is] tangible and moreover betrays (i.e. reveals) an ideational power claim, namely, that of gaining authority for partial preferences in part-fields (i.e. sub-fields or sub-sectors), which aim for and set their sights on an Ought through and by means of the whole weight of the human-social Is.

## B. The anthropological and social-ontological parameters of rationality

### a. Generally

Rationality seeps through, penetrates, permeates and pervades the being and essence of man and the Is of society so deeply that that being and essence and that Is again belong so intimately together that the handling and treatment of the examination of the problem of rationality feels first of all lost in this inextricable plexus, network or mesh: it (i.e. the said handling and treatment) does not rightly know where it is supposed and ought to start in order to – from there – unroll and unwind the real coherence of the individual aspects with the greatest possible clarity and logical necessity. It is up to the reader – at least in part – to apprehend through and by means of his imagination, as a unity, what in the description, – as successful as it may be –, must necessarily appear as an enumeration or list of multiple *disjecta membra* [= scattered (tossed about) limbs (members, parts, portions, divisions)]. In the hope that the result will justify the choice of the starting point, we shall begin with the familiar and common distinction between mere “instinctive” behaviour and action, which we already dealt with in regard to the intention of outlining the concept of the latter



(action) in greater / more detail<sup>2</sup>. The opening up (and reconstruction) of rationality as a phenomenon demands, nevertheless, to make this same distinction more deeply, i.e. to not set human behaviour apart from human action (*or*: to not contrast human behaviour to human action) any longer, but to put in one (i.e. to equate and identify) the difference between behaviour and action with that difference between animal/beast and man, no matter how highly one estimates, values and rates the animal/bestial-behavioural [element] in man; the difference [[between animal/beast and man]] remains and persists in any case, and it (i.e. this said difference) is what matters and interests us here. If rationality in the widest and fundamental sense is that feature and characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest of (those belonging as members to) the animal kingdom, and if this distinction may or can be re-written, re-described and paraphrased as the distinction between “instinctive” behaviour and action without a substantial shift or transposition of accent, stress or emphasis and content-related losses, then, also the source and the field of unfolding and development of rationality may or should be located where the more or less direct automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction is considerably loosened (up) and relaxed, and in the distance, interval and gap which comes into being, accordingly, between both stimulus and reaction, foresight, calculus (i.e. calculation) and choice between practical alternatives nest, lodge and settle<sup>3</sup>. Upon the clinging and sticking to the particular and the present, the more or less free visualisation of the no-more (i.e. no longer) present or not-yet-present follows, that is, of the past or of the future, which relate to each other like experience and planning, and since both are unreal / not real, i.e. in contrast to the tangible present, they exist only in the (idea as) imagination, thus, even their still intensive life in ideality permits and compels a – through thought – (i.e. an intellectual) performing and rendering processing and a combination of

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<sup>2</sup> See Ch. IV, Section 2Aa, above.

<sup>3</sup> Bennett, *Rationality*, pp. 5, 84ff..

data with regard to adaptations to the environment or to the re-shapings and re-mouldings (and rearrangements) of the same environment; transferred or translated into the ideational, data become more moveable (mobile, agile, flexible) and more manipulable.

The loosening of the automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction means not only a growing distance, spacing and gap between both stimulus and reaction, but simultaneously also a growing great variety and multiformity in the sending, receiving and evaluating of the stimuli as well as in the temporal and qualitative palette (i.e. range) of reactions; more and more reactions can answer and respond to more and more constellations (or correlations of forces). And since the reaction aims at a material or ideational satisfaction of the actor, thus, the aforementioned growing distance, spacing or gap between reaction and stimulus during the growing differentiation of both stimulus and reaction means, moreover, a growing (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of the wished-for and desired satisfaction, as well as a growing differentiation of its (i.e. the said wished-for satisfaction's) forms and degrees of intensity. This postponement (delay or deferment), indeed, takes place under the pressure of external and outer circumstances, however, differently than in the rest of the animals (i.e. non-human animals), in which it (i.e. the said postponement of satisfaction) cannot be prolonged (extended, elongated and protracted) infinitely, endlessly and indefinitely without bringing about (causing and inducing) the abstention from (and or renunciation of) the initially wished-for and desired satisfaction, and its forgetting (i.e. the leaving behind of the said wished-for satisfaction); it (i.e. the said postponement) in man is converted and transformed into a normal internal and inner process, which in principle does not know (of) temporal boundaries. The put-off, deferred (postponed and delayed) satisfaction is now called a long-term goal/end, and rationality must pass its ordeal by fire (i.e. acid test) by filling the space (room) of postponement

(delay or deferment), i.e. the distance, spacing or gap between the concept(ual plan) and the reaching and achievement of the goal/end through the means which are supposed to lead to the reaching and achievement of the goal/end. The (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction and the elementary rationality of the correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consequently represent and constitute both sides of the same coin. The greater that (cap)ability [at the said postponement of satisfaction], the longer the chain of the means which must be set in motion; to the means, the means for the production of means etc. are then added, whereby and in relation to which rationality is intensified (multiplied) and refined to the extent it is distanced / distances itself from the original end / goal of satisfaction, in order to henceforth convert and transform the ends/goals into means as well as the other way around. During the increasing length of the chain of ends/goals and means (i.e. as the chain of ends/goals grows longer), rationality stands (is, finds itself) before a new task, which is called consistency. No means may or should neutralise another means, and no means may or should naturally thwart, frustrate or foil the end/goal itself, but the successive employment, use and deployment of the means must have an effect cumulatively, or else complementarily. Consistency in the use/usage of means simultaneously is called and signifies practice and exercise in elementary logic, that is, in regard to the fundamental principles of the identity and of contradiction. Through and by means of identical means under identical circumstances and conditions, identical ends/goals can be reached, attained and achieved; thus reads / sounds (i.e. is) the principle of the identity of acting rationality; and its principle of contradiction means: the most crass (blatant, extreme and gross) of all irrationalities is that of consciously using means which contradict the sincerely pursued end/goal. Precisely because the breach (violation, contravention, infringement) of the principle of contradiction in this form is so absurd that it hardly appears or is found in reality, in fact, it can hardly be realised in practice,

one often has ex contrario held the adequate correlation of end/goal and of means with each other to be the archetype or the sole genuine and in practice relevant rationality. That certainly does not go far enough (*or*: That is certainly not enough). Consistency as a feature of rationality is constantly in a relationship of friction with the inconsistent nature of reality, i.e. with the constant change in circumstances and conditions, which prohibits the enduring, lasting, long-term or permanent use of identical means and the eternal holding onto and adherence to identical ends/goals, and punishes the breaking, infringing and violating of the [[just said]] prohibition. The logical concept(ual plan) of consistency as the lack and absence of contradictions does not, hence, always and necessarily coincide with the praxeological concept(ual plan) of consistency as the remaining with the same ends/goals and means<sup>4</sup>; the former (logical concept of consistency) retains under all circumstances its validity; it is applied only to new content(s); the latter (praxeological concept of consistency) often appears as loyalty, faithfulness and fidelity to principles and shares as a rule the fate and destiny of Don Quixote after the decline of the knighthood, i.e. it ends (up) in pigheadedness, obstinacy and (pure, ridiculous) fantasy. Praxeological pigheadedness and obstinacy, which, though, in a technical respect indicates diminished rationality, can be founded on the actor's permanent difficulties of adaptation and of orientation, however, it can also go back and be reduced to past successes, which strengthen and solidify, consolidate the false impression that means and ends/goals, which once led to success, would have to always and everywhere happen to have the same luck and fortune<sup>5</sup>. Consistency becomes and turns into, therefore, the feature and characteristic of rationality only when the level at which it develops and unfolds is taken into account; the consistency at one level is not the same as the consistency at another level, and both levels can behave, i.e. be, inconsistent(ly)

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<sup>4</sup> V. Mises, *Action*, p. 103.

<sup>5</sup> See Ch. IV , footnote 445.

towards each other, although they, – each for itself –, is consistent. Precisely the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) of the (praxeological) consistency inside of inconsistent reality, as well as the constant mutual and reciprocal change of position (status, standing and place) of the goal / end and the means reveal that the anthropological and social-ontological dimension of rationality is absorbed and assimilated by (or exhausted in or disappears in) neither in consistency in itself and in general, nor in the adequate correlation of the end/goal and the means with each other. Behind these indispensable, but partial performances and achievements stands/is the performance-achievement of all performances-achievements, upon which the chances and prospects of self-preservation itself depend; it is a matter of the performance-achievement of general orientation, which exactly determines what on each and every respective occasion is regarded as end/goal and what as means. Rationality is, accordingly, the performance-achievement and (cap)ability in respect of the orientation of a being, which has outgrown (surpassed and risen above) the secure, safe and fast, rapid, but too narrow orientation in the schema of behaviour (or behavioural schema): “stimulus-reaction”.

What was said hitherto about the origins, features, characteristics and performances, achievements and accomplishments of rationality constitutes an anthropological thought/intellectual good, i.e. body of thought(s) and can also refer and relate to the individual human to the extent that this individual human is imagined in a lonely and solitary struggle against the objective (representational and concrete) world. The actual social-ontological dimension comes into play as soon as we explain the fundamental, basic concepts (postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consistency, orientation) introduced above, from the point of view and by means of the dynamic(s) of the social relation. This

conceptual distinction certainly does not mean that the anthropological dimension can have existence without the social-ontological dimension. The anthropological Robinson, who as human nature, grows into culture during his struggle against the objective (representational and concrete), rests and is based on a fiction. The correlation between end/goal and means with regard to each other, which in accordance with this fiction was supposed to have encouraged and fostered already in one such solitary, lonely struggle, rationality, was in reality a collective performance, achievement and accomplishment, and it is still always thus (i.e. a collective performance and achievement). Many animals / beasts live collectively and know, in fact, (of) elementary forms of the distribution of the means of subsistence for the preservation of the weaker adherents to, i.e. members of the herd, even though here the rule is that every normal animal/beast in the herd must look after, provide for, see to and take care of the/its own food, nourishment and sustenance alone. But only men (i.e. humans) *work and labour* (act) already as the most primitive of hunters together, in order to *produce* the means of subsistence of the group in which they must live, something which the collective dealing with the problem of the correlation of the end / goal and means with regard to each other demands. The social relation, into which men (i.e. humans) in and during the collective production of their means of subsistence step (i.e. enter), demands, requires and promotes, encourages and fosters, simultaneously, both rationality as well as the distribution of these same means of subsistence, during and in which, very soon, the biological points of view step, i.e. go behind and take a back seat (and concede territory (as prominence)) to the social points of view. Thus, the member of the human group develops and exercises, practises in the framework of the co-operative or antagonistic social relation both technical rationality, which he can then use also in situations which he alone has to deal and cope with, manage and overcome the forces of nature, as well as social rationality, namely, one such rationality having to (re)solve the question and problem of the

postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction, the correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consistency etc. exclusively or mainly and first and foremost with regard to men (i.e. humans), and not to the objective (representational and concrete) world.

In actual fact: the levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not remain uninfluenced by whether the actors must get over and cope with a situation whose outcome depends on a neutral factor like nature, or by whether the actors must get over and cope with such a situation in which the (kinds of) acting, actions and acts of other actors with different preferences stamp, mould and form the outcome [[in question]]<sup>6</sup>. But rationality is needed in both cases. It would undoubtedly be false to modify and to widen the Cartesian thesis of the impossibility of the subjection, subordination and subjugation of historical and “irrational” stuff (i.e. subject matter and material) in a strict science, [[in order to argue that]] rational action can take place and happen only where the object of action behaves and is in itself passive and consequently permits accurate and precise calculus (i.e. calculation). As Vico already objected, method does not have a single form, but both its basic and fundamental forms, the “geometric” and the “historical”, must exist next to each other<sup>7</sup>. In the same way, rational action stretches both (with)in the “geometrically” as well as (with)in the historically-socially apprehended field, whereby, though, the change of its levels, forms and degrees is not only reduced to the change in the field and in regard to its specific constitution, composition and texture, but also can take place inside of the same field. The pressure of rationality, to which the socially acting person is exposed, is second to none, and just as the transition from behaviour to action in general demands and requires higher achievements and accomplishments of rationality, so too that category of action which is called

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Rapoport, “Various Meanings”, p. 45.

<sup>7</sup> In relation to that, Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 436ff..

social action and is concretised in the social relation par excellence, very often demands and requires outstanding and top-class rational accomplishments and achievements. Rationality passes and runs (right) through, in other words, social action more deeply than action in general, and action in solitude (seclusion, isolation and loneliness), i.e. in the struggle against nature, turns out to be all the more rational on average, the more thorough (i.e. methodical and systematic) equipment the actor brings with him from his social action, to which, though, belongs learning from other people too. The social compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress as regards rationality has as a consequence that the socially acting person either puts, moves back and defers that which in each and every respective situation and position, one way or another, is classed or classified as “irrational”, in order to then secretly savour it (or enjoy it to the full) in seclusion, solitude and isolation or in the safety and security of the imagination, or else, decidedly sets and puts it aside as socially harmful and detrimental, and hence, worthy of hate (i.e. hateful, odious and detestable); this is, though, only the generally observable tendency, which expresses and conveys little about or regarding the level, form and degree of that putting and moving back and deferring and setting or putting aside in each and every individual case. As we shall see immediately, precisely the effect and impact of the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality enables in the social relation that difference between psychological motivation and reasons (or grounds) for acting, action or the act, which is so important praxeologically. From that, a fundamental and basic anthropological and social-ontological conclusion can be drawn. The theses that “the actor is rational” and that “the actor acts rationally” are not necessarily, and, in any case, not in their whole range, scope or to their entire extent identical with each other; just as little do the sentences (tenets or theorems) “man (as a genus, kind, type or species (race)) is rational” and “the actor (as this concrete actor) is rational” logically correspond, tally and coincide (with each other). The actor



does not have to be rational in any dispositional or ethical sense in order to hear and listen to the voice of (social, not necessarily of biological) self-preservation and bow, yield and submit happily, gladly and cheerfully or with gritted teeth (grudgingly, muttering under one's breath) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation, and rationality as an anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) says, for its part, in itself little as regards in which manner and with which intensity the actor hears and listens to that voice. Individual convictions regarding the value and the un-value (i.e. anti-value or non-value) of rationality as the guiding principle of action are also slightly (or next to not at all) informative and enlightening regarding the presumed, probable or likely mode or manner of acting, action or of the act of an actor, if we disregard the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation. Whoever confesses faith in principle in rationalism, is not *because of that and accordingly* eo ipso in a position to confront, counter or check the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation more skillfully than the world-theoretical "irrationalist". And the same applies to whole societies and epochs: the symbolic-world-theoretical confession of faith in, and acknowledgement of, rationality does not in the least vouch for and guarantee the rational handling and the rationally desirable outcome of collective action<sup>8</sup>.

If the world-theoretical convictions here only count on the edge (i.e. marginally as borderline cases), thus one may, on the other hand, not deny that against the background of rationality as an anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift), from individual to individual, smaller or larger dispositional differences with reference to the capacity and (cap)ability for rational social action are and ought to be ascertained. Nonetheless, the stronger

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<sup>8</sup> More about that in Bc in this section.

compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality and in respect of the disciplining of the social relation is shown and is seen exactly in the fact that deep dispositions also have an effect and impact all the more effectively, the more empty of content [[they are]], that is to say, the more capable they are of following hot and hard on the heels of the unending and infinite content-related changes of the social relation, which command strategic and tactical watchfulness, alertness and vigilance. The social relation determines the fundamental data towards which dispositions orientate themselves and simultaneously must be refined. Rationality in respect of acting, action and the act does not simply flow from the once and for all given fixed and unchanging template, pattern or stereotype of a disposition, rather it is shaped, formed, moulded and changes constantly under the harder or softer compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress of the social relation; its (i.e. rationality's) levels, forms and degrees are subject to the fluctuations of the same social relation, and exactly because of that, it (i.e. rationality) escapes, evades and is beyond a definitive and a generally valid and applicable, i.e. abstract apprehension: in relation to that (said definitive and generally valid, i.e. abstract apprehension of rationality), the great variety and multiformity of the social relation is simply too broad and too unforeseeable. The social relation provides and makes (up) the training area or ground of rationality in respect of acting, action and the act, and as regards its aspects, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is, i.e. ought to be named in particular. The social-ontological necessity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives sets rationality in respect of acting, action and the act in permanent motion, so that the rational actor does not look at and handle his milieu as a constant, but founds his action on the anticipation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, in respect of which he knows that it (i.e. others' action), likewise, rests and is based on the (cap)ability of anticipating alien (i.e. another's or others') action through and by means of the assumption and taking

on/over of perspectives<sup>9</sup>. Since, however, the latter anticipation of alien action is an emotional identification of the I (ego) with the Other, thus, it can pass off, happen and take place as a reflexive act only to the extent or in as much it assumes rationality on both sides. The Ego can hardly put itself/himself in (and or empathises with) the position of the Other, if it does not assume a somewhat or reasonably consistent interrelation between its ends/goals and means, motives or else reasons and action plans (or designs, projects or blueprints in respect of acting and the act) (inconsistency can indeed be taken into account as a possibility; it, however, cannot be guessed in advanced through and by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives how and when inconsistency will manifest itself); and whilst the Ego assumes the rationality of the Other in this sense, the said Ego itself carries out and executes rational thought acts or acts of thought, it itself practises and exercises [[rationality]] in the rationality or subjects and subjugates itself nolens volens (i.e. whether wanting or liking or not) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality. It (i.e. the said Ego) can just as little detach itself and break free from, or evade and dodge that compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality as it can live away from or out of every social relation. Because it does not have at its disposal any other access to the Other, which could guarantee and ensure it somewhat or reasonably reliable, dependable or trustworthy orientation; even as a recognisedly approximative solution or stopgap (provisional, temporary or expedient) solution, the assumption or adoption and acceptance of rationality promises in principle to go the furthest. Social experience in fact teaches the actor soon enough that rational action, which in the praxeological sense shows and exhibits consistency, correlates end/goal and means adequately with each other, [[and]] postpones (puts off, delays and defers) immediate and direct

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. the distinction between “parametrically rational actor” and “strategically rational actor” in Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 18ff..

pleasure (delight, enjoyment, consumption) etc., as a rule is worthwhile (or worth the effort). In light of this rule, (behind which stands and is the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race) as a rational animal,) hence alien action (i.e. the action of another or others) must normally be comprehended, especially since the greatest danger for one's own plans in respect of acting, action or the act comes from the rationally planned counter-actors, who are in a position to formulate wishes as existential settings (or positionings) and judgements, i.e. to support and back them up through and by means of analyses of the situation and position close to reality and corresponding instructions in respect of acting, action and the act. What disturbs, annoys and perturbs inimical wishes is not their content in itself<sup>iii</sup>, but the image or picture which we ourselves make of the situation and position after their (i.e. the said inimical wishes') possible or potential realisation; the slighter or less the (cap)ability of the Other to reach, attain and achieve through rational action his wishes, so much the smaller the felt and perceived threat and enmity. Assuming the Other's rationality, the Ego starts wisely or for good reason from the conceivably worst case when the Other is a foe; on the other hand, from the conceivably best case, when he (i.e. the Other) is counted and reckoned under, i.e. amongst (the Ego's) friends. In both cases, the Ego can err; nevertheless, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality remains (lasts and persists), no matter at which level, in which form and to which degree the potential (or capacity) for rationality is made topical or updated on each and every respective occasion.

The social-ontological necessity of looking at the social relation irrespective of the motives of the actors from a rational point of view, and as being practised as an exercise in rationality, is shown and seen quite clearly and vividly in the habit, routine, practice or custom of the most primitive tribes to interpret even animal behaviour (or the behaviour of animals and beasts)

anthropomorphically-rationally<sup>10</sup>; it (i.e. the said social-ontological necessity of ...) was, incidentally, already in antiquity, clearly apprehended theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory)<sup>11</sup>. Rationality exists as the not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. indispensable) concomitant or accompaniment of the social relation, as a condition and at the same time an outcome of the same social relation; action becomes rational only where it crisscrosses or intersects with action. And the thesis that understanding of alien (i.e. another's or others') action implies – at least at a certain level, in a certain form and to a certain degree – the assumption and adoption of the rationality on the part of the Ego and of the Other, obtains and preserves its actual meaning only when it (i.e. the aforesaid thesis) is interpreted from the point of view of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation. The thus attained and achieved rational interpretation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, which at the same time subjects and subjugates one's own thought and action to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality, contains, though, abstractions and narrowings (shortenings, curtailments, abridgements or reductions), which in a gapless (i.e. complete and unbroken) psychological reconstruction of alien (i.e. another's or others') action (if one such complete psychological reconstruction were, in general, possible) might not or should and ought not to have been found (or have any place). Under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality, the interpretation of acting, action and of the act shifts and is displaced from the motivation (i.e. motive) to the

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<sup>10</sup> See e.g. Sliberbauer, "Hunter/Gatherers", p. 465ff..

<sup>11</sup> The great speeches (orations and addresses), which Thucydides is able to give to the protagonists of his history are, before the many-sided background of the description of a situation and position in respect of unsurpassable and matchless reconstructions of rational action plans (or designs, projects or blueprints in respect of acting and the act), reconstructions of the rationality of the actors or else of the foes, and imply general anthropological and social-ontological ascertainments. In the course of this, the author (i.e. Thucydides), knowing better retrospectively, helps his persons (i.e. characters (in his history)) with more rationality, by him, indeed, keeping, as he writes, "as closely as possible to the overall meaning of what was actually said [*ἔχομένω ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων*]]", simultaneously, however, he renders the speeches thus "as in accordance with my opinion every individual had to most likely speak about each and every existing case, i.e. as I thought each individual was most likely to speak about the case at hand" [*«ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένω ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.»*]] (I, 22, 1).

grounds and reasons for action, so that this action, without precise and detailed knowledge of its psychological aetiology, appears to be sufficiently understandable for the ends/goals and purposes of the social relation<sup>12</sup>. Irrespective of the objective and factual correctness (accuracy, rightness and veracity) of this understanding, which from case to case can be very different, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality causes and brings about, in any case, a de-psychologisation, and to that extent, an objectification or objectivisation of the way of looking at things, as well as, possibly, of the action of the person looking at things in such a way. The attention is now directed mainly to the objective meaning of the action, i.e. to the putative or probable effect, consequence or implication of the same action on the course of events and the shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation. Naturally, in the course of this – at least in some cases – over and above the reasons of and for action, its (i.e. action's) motives must be taken into consideration; their (i.e. the said motives') analysis more or less contrasts with and stands out from, nevertheless, –under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation–, a psychological analysis. Even when the Ego regards and holds the Other to be “crazy and mentally ill”, and consequently makes or passes an – in practice – slightly helpful judgement over or about his (i.e. the Other's) motivation, he (i.e. the Ego) must trace and track down the logic of this craziness and mental illness in the action of the Other in order to cope, deal with and get over this action in the reality of the social relation. The logic of the action and the qualitatively, ethically etc. understood Reason of the actor are two (very) different things; the former (logic of the action) must be taken seriously, regardless of what one holds (i.e. considers, thinks) in respect of the latter (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood Reason of the actor). That is why

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Davidson, *Essays*, pp. 231ff., 237.

rationality keeps bears in mind that (logic of the action) rather than this (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood Reason of the actor); the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality brings with it and entails the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of objectification/objectivisation. And the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of objectification does not make itself noticeable only in and during the (relative) neglect of the motivation and or of the Reason of the actor for the sake of the logic of his action inside of and within the social relation. No less does it (i.e. the said compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of objectification) have less of an effect when the individual faces, confronts and is up against the impersonal logic of his society, as this (impersonal logic of his society) is crystallised or crystallises in the customs (conventions, manners or morals) and the everyday (kinds of) self-understanding, in the forms of dealing with others (i.e. manners, etiquette and behaviour(s) in public) and institutional constructs. Social order, whatever it looks like and however it seems, constitutes condensed, thickened and compressed rationality, it (i.e. social order) is comprehended as rationality and educates (brings up, trains, disciplines) or compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[people, humans]] towards rationality<sup>13</sup>.

The social relation as a relation between beings or creatures, whose nature is culture, whose kinds of acting, actions and acts are therefore connected and bound to meaning, lends and gives to rationality still further dimensions or forms. The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction and the consistency in its connection with meaning, –which originally came into being in the social relation, [[and]] [that said meaning] only in it (i.e. the social relation) exists, and hence, is by definition social meaning –, become and turn

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Diesing, *Reason in Society*, p. 236ff..

into ethical and logical values, which the individual can invoke (or to which the individual can appeal) in order to legitimise his own kinds of acting, actions or acts, or to condemn alien (i.e. another's or others') kinds of acting, actions or acts, in other words, in order to better assert and defend and maintain himself in the social relation. The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction obviously takes place not only due to the objectively existing shortage of goods, which in an otherwise neutral milieu (i.e. surroundings, environment or setting) is supposed or ought to be overcome through and by means of productive labour / work, but also, and above all, due to subjective considerations, which appear only in the social relation. The presence of other people (actors), who have the same claim on and (in regard) to satisfaction, compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[the actor]] towards postponement (deferment and delay), and only through and by means of mutual and reciprocal consideration, or at least through and by means of an ethic(s) of mutuality and reciprocity, if at all, independent initiatives and single-handed efforts are and ought to be put off and discouraged (*or*: [actors] are and ought to be dissuaded from independent initiatives and single-handed efforts). Generally, it applies that the postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction as the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality is shaped, moulded and formed depending on with whom one has [[something]] to do (or with whom one is dealing) [[and]] in which situation and position. For its part, consistency is connected with ethical and logical meaning, as soon as the – through and by means of the said consistency – guaranteed and ensured (cap)ability at orientation is concretised in an individual or collective identity, which wants to be saved beyond the changes in the social relation, and it often can [[thus be saved]] too. However, a consistent identity, to an, in practice, sufficient extent, does not constitute only an inner/internal necessity, but also an outer/external necessity, which stems from the general social need of holding (i.e. keeping and maintaining) the constitutive imponderability (incalculability)



of subjectivity within bound(arie)s and limits, i.e. of making and rendering the social action of the members of society ponderable (calculable), and in this respect, “rational”; the social ethics of all cultures have hitherto denounced and pilloried the opportunists and the turncoats (i.e. renegades, apostates, traitors, defectors and deserters), no matter what the social praxis/practice looked like and what the [then] current doctrine and teaching of prudence and wisdom read / was. The compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality under the conditions and circumstances of culture, i.e. under the conditions and circumstances of obligatory meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) finds expression, finally, in the performances, achievements and accomplishments in respect of rationalisation and of legitimisation, which accompany inner/internal and outer/external action at every turn. To the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of meaning leads here, i.e. to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress for meaning to be articulated socially effectively. The social relation remains also in this respect decisive and determinative. Because rationalisations and legitimisations in foro interno or in foro externo (i.e. internally as to one’s own conscience or externally as to how others judge us) are needed because anyone and everyone calls into question or can call into question the action of the actor exactly in regard to its (i.e. the said actor’s action’s) meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness). Socialisation consists not least of all in of one learning to act not instinctively, but with (rational and reasoned) justification, that is to say, to put down and reduce kinds of acting, actions and acts to reasons, and through and by means of reasons legitimise kinds of acting, actions and acts, irrespective of whether this often amounts to in concreto (i.e. concretely) the mere rationalisation of one’s own motivation towards the inside (inwardly) and towards the outside (outwardly). In the statement and specification of the

reasons and grounds for one's kinds of acting, actions and acts, a wish in respect of justification, or else, the wish, "to anticipate a challenge to our actions"<sup>14</sup> is expressed.

With these general remarks and observations, we have hopefully indicated the breadth of the examination of the problem of rationality. A direct or indirect reduction of rationality to so-called "end-goal and purposeful/expedient rationality (or rationality in respect of an end/goal)", i.e. to the adequate correlation of end/goal and means with each other, proves itself to be too one-sided and narrow in order to fulfil and be up to the phenomenon [of rationality] even only in terms of its beginnings, i.e. elementarily. From the perspective of the social relation, on the other hand, all essential dimensions of rationality simultaneously appear and can be dealt with, treated and handled as an in itself differentiated unit(y) (uniformity or unified whole). Ends and goals are always relative, since they relate and refer to the ends and goals or, in any case, activities of other men (i.e. humans, people); their realisation aims at the consolidation (strengthening and stabilisation) or modification of a social relation. Rational performances, achievements and accomplishments do not merely demand their attainment and achievement and accomplishment through and by means of certain means, but likewise their justification and legitimising, which, again, refer to meaning as the constitutive element of a world theory (i.e. world view) and an identity; inseparable from them (the said world theory/view and identity) are the argumentative-theoretical and psychological processes of rationalisation. Instrumental rationality, symbolic rationality and the rationality of identity<sup>iv</sup> belong, anthropologically, social-ontologically and in concrete action together, whichever one of them dominates and rules and holds sway over the scene on each and every respective occasion. The relativisation, which befalls and happens to instrumental rationality through and by means of its

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<sup>14</sup> Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes", pp. 12ff., 7 (the citation/quote/quotation here).

being put into order, classification and categorisation in the broader complex of rationality, is, though, by no means to be understood as the overcoming of the same instrumental rationality through and by means of one ethical-normative rationality overarching (spilling over, overlapping, spreading) over and into all facets of rationality. A unification of rationality can never succeed, neither under instrumental, nor under ethical points of view. It (i.e. the said unification of rationality) remains a matter, affair, business, cause and case of anthropology and of social ontology. These (i.e. anthropology and social ontology) are, however, as we have said, ethically and technically blind.

b. The rationality of the means and the rationality of the ends/goals

The correlation of the means and ends/goals with each other becomes, as we know, a problem, whose managing demands rational performances and achievements as soon as the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction puts short-term or long-term goal/end-setting and planning on the agenda. But it (i.e. the said short-term and long-term goal/end-setting) is only in simple cases simple, namely only when the end/goal is clearly delineable (traceable) and realisable when the means exclusively apply to, and are valid for, the pursuit and pursuance of the end/goal, and when neither the attaining and achievement of the end/goal, nor the application of the means set off and bring on or cause unforeseeable and uncontrollable effects and impacts. Only in such cases can a theory of rationality be developed with security and certainty – provided that, that is to say, it (i.e. the said theory of rationality) moves within fairly narrow bound(arie)s, otherwise it does not make do without a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) which covers the main variations concerning the constitution, composition and texture and its own dynamic(s) of end/goal and means, as well as concerning their possible correlations with each

other (i.e. of the said end/goal and means). This casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) serves, though, theoretical ends/goals, it does not describe or convey the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of really (i.e. in reality) planned and carried out kinds of acting, actions and acts, but rather the deviations and divergences of real processes from the planned processes; the uncontrollable disharmonies between end/goal and means, which exactly came into being in and during the endeavour and effort of their harmonisation with each other. The ubiquity of the schema “end/goal-means” says little about the stringency with which it is – be it because of subjective inadequacies (deficiencies), be it because of objective reasons – handled. But for stringency to be in general possible and plannable, the simple case sketched above must exist, which, though, has, under no circumstances, the simple presupposition and precondition that the assessment of the situation and the correlation of the end/goal with the means on the part of the actor completely and fully suffices for the real given (actual) facts. Not without good reason, Aristotle handled and treated the question and problem of this correlation by assuming the (cap)ability of the actor to know what is in his power and from what to distance himself or refrain and desist, what, anyhow, lies outside of the range of his forces, strengths and powers. In order to use the suitable and appropriate means effectively, one must, hence, be clear about the end/goal and its attainability or achievability<sup>15</sup>. Not differently, did Pareto think, who defined the “logical kinds of acting, actions and acts” in accordance with two criteria: the absolute ponderability / calculability or (else) controllability of the end/goal, and, the determination of the end/goal on the basis of cool thought, consideration and logic. Whereas “not logical / non-logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts spring,

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<sup>15</sup> *Nikomachische Ethik*, III, 5 (1112b 13ff.) [= «βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἄν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ... » (12-20)]]

originate and arise from a psychological state (of affairs), i.e. certain feelings (sentiments and emotions) or unconscious motives, “logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts result from a “ragionamento”, an (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation), and strive after and aim for a real and not merely imaginary end / goal, i.e. such an end/goal which belongs within the realm or area of observation and experience; they (i.e. the said “logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts) consist in the use of means which are suitable for the attainment and achievement of the end/goal, and they connect, in a logically apt, appropriate and well-judged manner, means and end/goal with each other. Here the subjective (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) and objective existence of the deed or act(ion) (i.e. objective state of affairs, facts, circumstances, whole truth of the matter or facts of the case) coincide, even though the ascertainment regarding this coincidence must be made by an observer standing outside [of what is being observed] or by an outside / external observer who thinks “logically-experimentally”; because the actors believe, anyway, that they act logically<sup>16</sup>.

Pareto was convinced of the preponderance of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and or acts in social life; he, however, did not underestimate at all the social meaning of the “very delicate and fragile” logical kinds of acting, actions and or acts, which he saw at work, above all, in the economic realm, but also in artistic and scientific work, as well as in military, political and juridical, legal undertakings and enterprises<sup>17</sup>. The weakness of his position does not lie in this apportionment of loads or burdens, but in the dichotomous way of looking at things, through and by means of which he gets to that apportionment of loads. In the interest of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) sharp distinction

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<sup>16</sup> *Trattato*, §§ 150, 151, 161.

<sup>17</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 152.

between logical and non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, he (i.e. Pareto) did not think that the former logical acts have to lose their purity as soon as they overstep and exceed a relatively narrow action radius (or radius of action), and can no longer manage or effect a clear and manageable correlation of end/goal and means with each other. Thus, he ascribes everything which does not represent and constitute an absolutely controllable practical result and or outcome of a logical-experimental (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation), to the effect and impact of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, whereby and in relation to which he loses sight of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) and socially weighty, i.e. important and influential possibility that logical kinds of acting, actions and acts *as such*, over the long run, do not necessarily have to entail logical consequences, that, therefore, the social preponderance or predominance of the non-logical cannot be put down and reduced exclusively to the effect and impact of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts. With his precise distinction between “non-logical” and “illogical” kinds of acting, actions and acts, Pareto fully recognised the objective social logic of the – in a logical-experimental respect – non-logical; conversely, however, he did not want to cloud and muddy the logical kinds of acting, actions and acts with objective social non-logic. Faithful to his dichotomous way of looking at things, he did not systematically inquire and research into the unintended (unintentional) consequences of (logical) action, and consequently let it be known that the pure schema of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts is *socially* of worth and value as explanation only in its narrow version and within a short range, reach and scope – irrespective of its heuristic indispensability or its anthropological aspect. A narrow version and a short range, reach and scope means as much as the exclusion (or ruling out) of the time factor, because time is exactly the mother of the unintended (unintentional) consequences of otherwise logical action. It (i.e. time) also produces (causes and gives rise to) everything which

intervenes between end/goal and means, and makes their planned strict correlation with each other loose and slack or even destroys and annihilates such planned strict correlation of end/goal and means, – with the result that action is tangled and involved in a series of frictions which often lead to a different set of circumstances than that wished for. The imponderabilities in and during *logical* action also stretch and extend to two levels, which appear in the course of time; that level of the consequences after the attainment and achievement of the end/goal (a kind of acting, action and act can, therefore, be logical in itself, [[and]] be carried out and executed up until its planned end as the logical kind of acting, action and act, and nonetheless, prove – in the flow or flux of the action – to be non-logical), and that level during the application of the means. Before what is unforeseen and unexpected, the meticulous remaining in absolute foreseeability saves the actor in both cases, i.e. in and during the narrowest version of the schema “end/goal-means”. However, that is not always the case, without losing essential, substantial chances and opportunities in respect of acting, action and the act; immunity against every unwished-for side-effect is often or frequently bought by the slackening and waning (i.e. up to paralysis) of action.

Before we turn to the rationality of ends/goals and the consequences of attained and achieved or even non-attainable, non-achievable ends/goals, we must touch upon an aspect of the examination of the problem of means, regarding which Pareto, for obvious reasons, could say little: we mean the momentum of the means’ own dynamic(s) and logic, that is, the praxeological autonomisation of the means. It is obvious that the latter (praxeological autonomisation of the means), in and during the stringent and tight version of the schema “ends-means”, does not have to occur and happen at all; here the means exclusively serve the end/goal, and a logical acting, action or act is portrayed and depicted exactly by the fact that it (i.e. the said logical acting,

action or act) uses its own or the most expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-an-end/goal means in and during the full safeguarding and protection of the primacy of the end/goal. Said otherwise: the rationality of the means as means is guaranteed and ensured when the said means are not converted and transformed on the side and en route or on the way into ends and goals – whereas the rationality of the action as a whole (i.e. beyond the individual acting, action and or act) could demand exactly this conversion and transformation; the latter (conversion or transformation) occurs, anyhow, without difficulties when other or different reasons command it, since things and kinds of acting, actions and acts, isolated and in themselves, are neither means nor ends/goals, but can become both means and ends/goals: here we are dealing with functional, not with ontological attributes. The same conversion and transformation of means into ends/goals is favoured (or aided (and abetted)), in addition, by the fact that the actor, in the course of this, does not have to think in new categories; the form-related (i.e. formal) rationality of the schema “end/goal-means” remains unchanged and unmodified, the contents are only interchanged, substituted or replaced. But irrespective of what is regarded as an end/goal and what, on each and every respective occasion, is regarded as the means: means are only rational as long as they do not develop their own logic, and thereby bring consequences to light which more or less deviate, diverge or differ from those consequences originally intended and aimed at, i.e. expected on the basis of the attainment and achievement of the original goal/end. Into the heterogony of ends – regardless of whether it (i.e. such heterogony of ends) comes into being through the means’ own logic or through the uncontrollable consequences of the attainment and achievement of the ends/goals – runs and bumps every subjective rationality in its ultimate and final bound(arie)s and limits. “Logical kinds of acting, actions and acts” are here not exempted or excluded<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> Regarding the means’ own logic cf. ch. IV, Section 2Aa, esp. footnote 377, and 378, above.



From his dichotomous perspective, and in regard to his narrow, i.e. strict definition of the logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, Pareto had to, as we have said, exclusively assign the unintended (unintentional) consequences of action to non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, and indeed to a certain category amongst them. Whilst in and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, the subjective and the objective end/goal are identical, the non-logical kinds of acting, action and acts distinguish themselves and stand out through and by means of the distance (interval or gap) between the subjective and the objective end/goal, which can take (on) and assume and adopt four [[according to Pareto]] forms, out of which, again, four categories of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts arise and ensue. First, there is the case where the acting, action and act, neither objectively, nor in the awareness and consciousness of the actor, has a logical end/goal (e.g. purely habitual (and or consuetudinary) kinds of acting, actions and acts). Secondly, the logical bond or tie between acting, action and the act (as means) and consequence (as end/goal) is lacking, missing and absent, although the actor holds his kinds of acting, actions or acts to be expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-an-end/goal means for the realisation of his intentions (a typical example of this case : magic, witchcraft, wizardry and sorcery). Thirdly, kinds of acting, actions and acts, without the knowledge and the plan(ning) of the actor, can cause, give rise to and create the wished-for and desired results (this is actually the realm and area of the “behaviour”, i.e. of instinctive reactions, wherein men (i.e. humans) differ least from the rest of the animals). And finally, a discrepancy occurs between the objective consequences and the subjective ends/goals of the action, although the actor believes in the expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of an end/goal of his means (a typical example: the coming into being of a tyrannical regime from a revolution in the name of freedom). The first and the third of these kinds of acting, action and act are socially hardly of any weight and importance, as Pareto himself remarked, noticed and observed, since they

have no subjective end/goal, or else, subjectively meant meaning, and, hence, need no justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation); if such a justification proves to be necessary, then, the kinds of acting, actions and acts must be assigned to the second or fourth kind of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts. The second non-logical kind of acting, for which Pareto offers a psychological and ethnological, rather than a social-ontological explanation, can, likewise, be neglected or ignored, since in it, the schema “end/goal-means” is, in practice, left out and unnecessary: the means do not achieve, attain or get any real, intended (desired, intentional or deliberate) or unintended result, [[but]] merely an imagined result. Only the fourth category of acting, action and the act raise the question and problem of the objective consequences of action, which are called “fine oggettivo [[= objective end (purpose)]]” by Pareto, and it is contrasted with the subjective end / goal (fine soggettivo [[= subjective end (purpose)]] of the person acting. Only this category, incidentally, fully fits in with or is suitable for Pareto’s definition of the unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, which are supposed or ought to be distinguished by the distance, interval or gap between the subjective and objective end/goal: because only in and during kinds of acting, actions and acts of this kind is there both a subjective end/goal as well as the visible consequences of the striving and aiming for this end; *therein* do such unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts agree with the logical (kinds of acting, actions and acts)<sup>v</sup>.

The unintended (unintentional) consequences of action in the context of the non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts pose the question of the rationality of the subjective end/goal as follows: to what extent is the objective unattainability, unachieveability (i.e. non-achievability) and unreachability of the subjective end/goal *necessarily* the cause of (and reason for) unintended

(unintentional) consequences, to what extent does rational planning in respect of means in regard to and during unreachable, unattainable and unachievable subjective ends/goals *necessarily* contribute to the appearance (emergence, advent) of unintended consequences? Whereas in regard to and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, unintended consequences only appear after the achieving (attaining and reaching) of the subjective end/goal, such consequences come into being in regard to and during unlogical (i.e. non-logical) kinds of acting, actions and acts because the subjective end/goal is unattainable, unachievable and unreachable and because an unattainable and unachievable end/goal was striven for/after, aspired to and sought. The result of the striving for an unattainable and unachievable end/goal does not always have to equal nought, i.e. zero, that is, to be equal to and the same as the return to the starting (i.e. initial or original) situation. The more thoroughly, profoundly and rationally was the unattainable and unachievable end/goal striven after/for and sought, the more diverse, varied and powerful, formidable were the deployed and used means in the course of this, so much the more does the – in its nominal (i.e. face) value – undertaking and enterprise, [[which was]] unsuccessful from the outset, penetrate into the thicket, jungle and maze of real praxis (practice), [[and]] so much the more does the logic of the means, which substitute and replace the original end/goal to the extent its (i.e. the original end/goal's) unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) – at least *hic et nunc* (i.e. here and now) – is directly or indirectly admitted (owned up to and granted), makes itself (and becomes) independent. We may and can hold onto this: where unattainable and unachievable ends/goals were striven for and sought, the means' own logic unfolded and developed to the greatest probability and with the most power. That is why unattainable and unachievable ends/goals do not mean *eo ipso* the saying farewell to or parting from life, but should the occasion arise (and if necessary), a still deeper involvement, entanglement and embroilment therein (i.e. in life). This involvement, entanglement and

embroilment is not only carried out and executed via the nominal end/goal of action, but via in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals, which, from the perspective of the nominal end/goal, looked like means; now, however, they have become, in practice, ends/goals in themselves, which entail and bring with them a new content-related order of the schema “end/goal-means”. In the course of this, the original end/goal does not have to necessarily either be forgotten or disavowed and disclaimed, however, unavoidably and inevitably, action simultaneously moves at two levels of rationality, that level of the invoking of the original end/goal and that level of the practical striving for and aspiring to in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals and or means becoming the practical ends/goals in themselves. The revolutionary does precisely this, e.g. he holds out the prospect of and promises a free classless society, but “temporarily” and even in name this latter end/goal (of a free classless society) establishes, builds and erects a strictly hierarchised dictatorship<sup>19</sup> – but also every parliamentary government, which more or less passes by or goes over (i.e. ignores and avoids) its programmatic declarations, as well as those men (people, humans) (and they are not the fewest of people), who confess their faith nominally in certain ethical values, but in their praxis in respect of life (or, in their life practice) follow rules of wisdom (as shrewdness, astuteness, cleverness, judiciousness, i.e. convenience and expediency). The unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-attainability and non-achievability) of the ultimate end/goal (e.g. to live purely ethically) does not condemn the actor to inaction at all, but only separates and divides the above-mentioned two levels of acting, action and the act from each other, whereby and in relation to which, though, the actor does not necessarily know or does not necessarily want to know of this separation and division, but probably possesses the more or less refined capability of serving two rationalities simultaneously. The absolute belief and

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<sup>19</sup> In greater detail, in relation to that, in Kondylis, “Utopie”.

faith in unattainable and unachievable ends/goals does not signify and mean the absolute adaptation and adjustment of the mode of conduct (or way of behaving, acting, action and the act) to that which that faith and belief, taken at face value, would dictate in practice. When the latter (belief and faith) is unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical), i.e. in Pareto's terminology, is "logically-experimentally" untenable and indefensible, and consequently threatens to paralyse the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital and essential) use of effective means, then the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (which can even run counter to and go against the biological drive, urge and impulse of self preservation<sup>vi</sup>) hinders, blocks and prevents idling or the leap into the void by virtue of the fact that the actor makes his way and proceeds to a level of acting, action and the act, which, with regard to the unattainable and unachievable end/goal, is supposed or ought to function as a means; in reality, however, it permits an independent, self-supporting and autonomous "logically-experimentally" secured and protected handling of the schema "end/goal-means". The relation with the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable end / goal, indeed, is retained and preserved, but it henceforth has symbolic meaning, i.e. it says something about the self-understanding of the actor or, in any case, something about the manner as to how he, for his part, wants to be seen by other actors. The pope believes in holiness as the ultimate end/goal of man; he, however, does not regulate the finances or the politics of the Vatican on the basis of this faith and belief, although he, in the eyes of the flock, whose shepherd he is, continues to appear to be the representative of the aforementioned ultimate end/goal, and not, for instance, as a financial administrator, manager, bursar or as a politician. In regard to these latter characteristics and traits, he does not, in principle, differ from other actors, who pursue other unattainable, unreachable, unachievable and/or attainable, achievable and reachable ends/goals. The displacement, shift and transfer of the practical activity from the level of unattainable, unreachable and unachievable

ends/goals to the level where the logically-experimentally secured and protected handling of the schema “(attainable, reachable, achievable) end/goal-means” takes place, makes understandable why actors, who have in mind and imagine different (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends/goals in the form of ideologies and world theories (i.e. world views), make use of the same practical rationality, and can meet and encounter one another as friends or foes in social life as representatives of the same rationality, regardless of their differences concerning the ultimate (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends / goals. Also here, the social relation proves and turns out to be the determinative factor.

All this is not supposed to mean that it is, in practice, indifferent as to whether an actor pursues an attainable and achievable end/goal or an unattainable and unachievable end/goal. The question (and problem) is, however, constantly at which level and in which sense an end/goal is to be regarded as attainable and achievable or unattainable and unachievable, i.e. at which level does the actor move on each and every respective occasion. At the level where ends/goals – under penalty of practical failure – may or are supposed to be (in principle) attainable and achievable only, the rationality of the direct correlation of the end / goal and means with each other unfolds and develops more or less successfully, whereby until the conclusion and finalisation of the acting, action and act, the ends/goals remain exactly ends/goals, and the means remain means too. At the level, again, where the unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the declared ends/goals does not bring with it and entails no immediate or even any punishment (on the contrary: the sincere, heartfelt, or mendacious, propagation of unrealisable ideals as ends/goals of individual or social action can, in practice, be worthwhile), rationality unfolds and develops in the wider sense of the anthropological (pre)disposition or aptitude, whereby the criterion of the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or

meaningfulness) of the ends/goals frequently puts into the shade, i.e. overshadows that criterion of the said ends/goals' (actual) attainability and achievability. In the constitution of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) possesses, obviously, a higher, superior ontological status than rationality in the sense of the pursuit of attainable and achievable ends/goals through suitable means; because not only attainable and achievable ends/goals are meaning-like, i.e. meaningful – in other words: rationality *as* (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition or aptitude only guarantees meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness), not the (in principle) attainability and achievability of the ends/goals. The schema “end(goal)-means” belongs, however, also to the original (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), which, incidentally, can hardly be separated from meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) as such. From that ensues and results that this schema, seen as a form, has just as little – like meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) – to do with attainable and achievable ends/goals. In the spirit of the originator (author, creator and fabricator) of unlogical (i.e. non-logical and illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, it (i.e. the said schema of end/goal-means) is shaped, moulded and formed in accordance with the same form-related (i.e. formal) points of view (angles and perspectives) as in the spirit of the originator of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts. No man (i.e. human or person) can intentionally (deliberately and on purpose) use means which go against and run counter to his end/goal, because, in this case, his true end/goal would consist in thwarting, frustrating, foiling and preventing his declared end/goal; and every man (i.e. human or person) must, already on account of the fact he has ends/goals and can only live socially, develop activities, which he necessarily comprehends as means for the attainment and achievement of those ends/goals. If the latter ends

/ goals are unattainable and unachievable, thus he fails conclusively and definitively as a social being, or he makes a new beginning. Very often he does, however, neither the one or the other, but swings and oscillates between the levels of the unattainable and unachievable, and, the levels of the attainable and achievable, whereby and in relation to which he, as we have described, converts and transforms – at the level of the latter (what is achievable) – the means of the former (what is unachievable) into ends/goals without ever expressly repudiating and disowning the unattainable and unachievable ends/goals. We do not have to especially (specifically or expressly) explain that all these types of acting, action and the act can be represented by the same actor at various points in time, or even simultaneously. Because no-one exclusively and solely pursues attainable and achievable or exclusively and solely unattainable and unachievable ends/goals.

The interplay between what is unattainable, unachievable and what is attainable, achievable, between what is meaning-like, i.e. meaningful and what is realisable, in particular leaves to the unintended (unintentional) consequences of action more room for unfolding and development, i.e. more room to move, above all, however, it points to the fragility and frailty of the narrower concept(ual plan) of rationality, which rests and is based on the schema of “end/goal-means”. Into the area and realm of the application of this schema, other levels and forms of rationality constantly force their way, penetrate and make inroads, and they widen or loosen and slacken it (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema) in such a way that it is of little use and hardly suitable for concrete praxis (practice). Its (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema’s) reduced practical suitability (fitness and efficiency) can, though, simply, hence, touch upon the fact that in regard to and during demonstrably attainable and achievable ends / goals, the means were falsely chosen or used. This is,





(the said rationality of the ends / goals) only (or first) makes possible and enables the wished-for and desired effect and impact of the rational means. Against which measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark, however, is the rationality of the ends/goals to be measured? Which kind of rationality of the ends/goals permits the direct and stable connection and binding between the rationality of the ends/goals and of the rationality of the means, i.e. such a connection and binding, in regard to and during which the possibility of a conversion and transformation of the (starting, initial) means into (new) ends/goals is excluded? Here, one can go beyond Aristotle or Pareto with difficulty, irrespective of which world-theoretical premises one has (or: irrespective of the world-theoretical premises underlying one[‘s fundamental position(ing)]) on each and every respective occasion. The sole measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark in respect of the rationality of the end/goal, which suffices for (or comes up to, meets and fulfils) “logical-experimental” demands, remains attainability and achievability, and this achievability, again, can only be ascertained often only *ex eventu* (i.e. from the event (*or*: after the event, following the occurrence of)), something which converts the rationality of the end/goal into a tautology. (We want to disregard here cases like the attainment and achievement of the end/goal through and by means of coincidence, accident, contingency, happenstance and chance etc..) No other determination of the rationality of the end/goal permits its (i.e. the rationality of the end/goal’s) direct connection and binding with the rationality of the means, and in this respect, it is also psychologically correct and right to look at the regular, orderly and regulated carrying out, realisation and implementation of the models, blueprints, outlines, sketches or drafts in respect of acting, actions and acts (or action plans) with regard to the most favourable point in time for their realisation as signs of dispositional rationality<sup>21</sup>. An

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<sup>21</sup> Bandura, “Self Efficacy”.

ethical definition of that rationality would e.g. in and during the possible and potential or eventual unattainability or unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ethical end/goal leave open the possibility described above of shifting, transferring or moving the centre of gravity, main emphasis or focal point of the practical activity from the level of unattainable and unachievable ends/goals to the level where a logically-experimentally safeguarded, secured and protected handling of the schema “end/goal-means” can take place – with the result of a factual transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends / goals. On the other hand, ethically irrational<sup>vii</sup> ends/goals would not in the least stand in the way of a stable and direct, logical connection and combining of end/goal and means with each other. A rational choice and handling of the means does not at all obstruct or hinder the end/goal of committing a murder. The former (means) are actually not endangered or put at risk through and by means of the constitution, composure and texture of the end/goal in itself, but through and by means of the intellectual-spiritual (mental-emotional) constitution (i.e. state, condition or state and frame of mind) of the actor.

The attempt to safeguard, secure and protect the general rationality of action via the rationality of the end/goal stems from the permanent human concern or anxiety around (i.e. regarding) the avoidance of the unintended (unintentional) consequences of the acting, action or act and a transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends/goals – irrespective of whether the actor himself in retrospect regretted or welcomed this transformation and conversion. (Formal) guarantees for the appeasement (or easing) of this concern or anxiety can, however, in the end, grant or accord only a narrow version of the rationality of the end/goal, whereupon rationality means just as much as (i.e. the same as) justice<sup>viii</sup>. The same concern or anxiety stems from another attempt at the safeguarding, securing and protecting of the general rationality of the action, which proceeds in the reverse manner and bumps or runs into and encounters

reverse(d) difficulties. Here the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals is declared to be meaningless and the ultimate guarantee for rationality is seen, perceived or espied in the expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of means. Since human action finds itself always on the search for means and uses means in order to realise ends/goals, thus, action is – on the basis of the ubiquity of the schema “end/goal-means” – by definition and always rational, and indeed regardless of the subjective rationality and of the motivation of the actor or of the success of his endeavours and efforts; with regard to the determination of the ends/goals in themselves, the familiar and common contrast and opposition between what is rational and what is irrational (i.e. between the Rational and the Irrational) loses its meaning fully<sup>22</sup>. But the recourse and reverting to the broader anthropological level does not solve the problems of the narrower acting-theory levels (i.e. the narrower levels pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act), but blurs, on the contrary, their specific character; the narrower the logical level, the more specific must the concepts be, which are supposed or ought to bring clarity<sup>ix</sup>. Said differently: the allusion and reference to (or indication of) the anthropological taking root of the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end/goal-means” says nothing about the determination of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means, which no theory of rationality in respect of acting, action and the act, and also no actor, can go around and circumvent. Rationality as a human attribute in the form of the “end/goal-means”-schema, and, rationality in the form of that determination (of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means), are two different things and move at different logical levels: the former (rationality as a human attribute) is in all men, i.e. humans, the same, the latter (rationality as the determination of

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<sup>22</sup> Thus, v. Mises, *Grundprobleme*, p. 32ff., 63; *Human action*, p. 12ff., 18ff..

the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means) changes from actor to actor, and exactly because of that, the theory of acting, action and the act stands before the task of naming the criteria for the ends/goals and of the means. Whoever is satisfied with the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end/goal-means” and puts in the files (i.e. archives) the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals, does not want to admit that the attainability and achievability or else the unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals, called (i.e. taken as) the yardstick, measure, standard for rationality, determines both the effectiveness and effectuality of the means, as well as their fate and destiny, i.e. determines the rationality of the ends/goals, whether the means remain up to the conclusion and the finalisation of the acting, action and act, means, or whether they (i.e. the said means) will – en route and along or on the way – be converted and transformed into (new) ends/goals; likewise it (i.e. the attainability and achievability or else the unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals) determines the manner, as well as the point in time, of the appearance and emergence or advent of the unintended (unintentional) consequences. The leaving aside or exclusion of the rationality of the ends/goals happens, though, for good reason, when, with that, it is meant that the ethical character of the ends/goals has no influence on praxeological rationality. However, the ethical neutrality of the ends/goals would be tantamount to a neutrality of the ends/goals vis-à-vis rationality and irrationality only if ethics and rationality were identical right and all down the line and across the board; and this is not the case. Even after the leaving aside or exclusion of the ethical factor in and during the determination of the ends/goals, the constitution, composition and texture of the ends/goals, especially with regard to the criterion of attainability and achievability, influence the unfolding and development of the schema “end/goal-means” in the concrete acting area or sphere (i.e. in the concrete space (in respect) of acting, action and the act). That

leaving aside or elimination (of the ethical factor in the determination of the ends/goals) does not at all result in or yield eo ipso a clean or neat rationality of acting, action or the act. Incidentally, it sounds comical when the same v. Mises, who wants to set aside and eliminate irrationality and rationality at the level of the ends/goals, and sees at work the rationality of the form-related (i.e. formal) end/goal-means schema even in the kinds of acting, actions and acts of psychopaths, takes to the field and goes into battle against the “totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism (or the liberalism of the economy) with the argument, of all arguments, that these (“totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism) would trigger, spark and set off a “Revolt against Reason”<sup>23</sup>. Polemical needs and requirements bring into being very quickly, again, the in principle disavowed, disowned and repudiated connection and binding of ethics and rationality.

c. Rationality as world-theoretical rationalisation<sup>x</sup>

We have already had the opportunity to discuss the anthropological and social-ontological status of meaning, as well as to point out the original interrelation or connection between meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) and rationality as regards each other, which proves that the equating of rationality with the pursuit of attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals through and by way of suitable means as being too narrow<sup>24</sup>. If meaning transfers and shifts the framework or context of reference of the human (sphere, dimension) (*or*: the Human), from the biological (sphere, dimension) (the Biological) to the ideational (sphere, dimension) (the Ideational), and through and by means of the mediation of social life gives concepts like self-preservation a radically new content, which can in fact go against their

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<sup>23</sup> *Human action*, p. 72ff..

<sup>24</sup> See Ch. IV, 2Ac and Section 1Bb in this chapter, above.

biological content, then rationality undertakes the task of articulating meaning consistently and effectively. Obviously, meaning is, in practice, inconceivable without such articulation; that is why rationality reaches and extends anthropologically and social-ontologically as far back as meaning itself. If we disregard the connected with it (i.e. the animal rationale) ethical-self-satisfied connotations, thus, the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race), which describes itself as an animal rationale, aptly represents, reflects and conveys the facts of the situation. Hence, its (i.e. the genus's / human race's) members can forego the invocation of rationality just as little as its (i.e. the genus's / human race's) kinds of acting, actions or acts can withdraw from and evade and go and be beyond meaning. That invocation underpins, in fact, par excellence the claim of being a worthier and more dignified member of the human genus (i.e. species or race), whilst the reproach or accusation that a person is lacking in rationality, moves this person within the vicinity and proximity of the animal kingdom; it degrades and debases him and takes away human seriousness a limine (i.e. from the beginning) from his words and deeds. Consequently, rationality constitutes the desirable ally and an effective weapon of every individual or collective vis-à-vis other people; language usage knows it by verifying (and characterising) with the adverb or adjective “reasonable / reasonably, sensible / sensibly, (in a) level-headed (manner), rational(ly)”, very different wished-for or actual form(ation)s of the social relation. (“We have, finally, spoken reasonably, sensibly, rationally and in a level-headed manner to each other”, “you, as a reasonable, sensible, rational and level-headed person must see that”, “that was a reasonable, sensible, rational and level-headed compromise”, “I warn you: be reasonable, sensible, rational, level-headed”, “I shall bring you to your senses / I shall bring you to a state of reason, sensibleness, level-headedness”) etc.) Everyone wants to have the generally recognised anthropological and social-ontological constants on their side, provided, though, that one reserves the competence and jurisdiction (i.e. the

right) to their interpretation turned towards or within the Normative (the normative sphere). Whoever more or less convincingly and persuasively connects the meaning of life, which can only be meaning-like, i.e. meaningful as human life, with his own matters of concern and ends/goals, has a good chance of mobilising the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation of humans in favour of these matters of concern and ends/goals, and, in fact, in relation to that, to bring humans to [[the point of]] overcoming their biological drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (e.g. voluntary death in favour of a “great idea” etc.). Rationality is no different. Whoever more or less effectively invokes it (i.e. rationality), offers to other people everything which is commonly regarded as an attribute or practical result of rationality: the postponement (delay or deferment) of egotistical kinds of satisfaction and the stemming and checking of blind drives, urges and impulses; consistency, calculability, ponderability and order in private or public relationships and circumstances. It is certainly, in general, correct that in social life, in concrete persons, situations and circumstances, not “reason” or “rationality” mould, shape and form the positionings, attitudes and the action [[of these concrete persons, situations and circumstances]], but rather a reason in respect of an occasion, opportunity or chance, and a situation-bound, on-occasion / occasional rationality, in practice, is the deciding factor<sup>25</sup>. From this ascertainment, however, the norms which some “postmodern” foes of the “totalitarianism of reason” want to deduce and derive, cannot in the least be deduced and derived; that every invocation of “reason” or of “rationality”, in the interest of tolerance and of peace, is supposed to or ought to fail to materialise and stay away. That might be ethically expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) or not, however, it certainly and surely can hardly be realised<sup>xi</sup>. Even pluralistic Western mass democracy, in which such ideologemes find favourable ground, soil and terrain,

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<sup>25</sup> In relation to that, Spinner, *Grundsatzvernunft und Gelegenheitsvernunft*.



and are functionally indispensable, must pull on the brakes and slow things down as soon as the in principle propagated pluralism of values and/or of rationalities threatens to degenerate into complete anarchy. The great variety / multiformity of values is tolerated under the reservation, i.e. with the proviso of the exclusive validity of the value of tolerance and, moreover, those values (e.g. “human dignity”), which are supposed or ought to bear and support these values<sup>xii</sup>. In this respect, it (i.e. pluralistic Western mass democracy) must accord to “reason” and “rationality” the same value as other societies which have to deal with problems of legitimation, irrespective of how they are accustomed to calling “reason” and “rationality”<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, the level of the actual use of rationality does not necessarily coincide with that level of legitimisation through and by means of rationality or else of that level of rationalisation, as we shall immediately see. Without the array (i.e. mobilisation) of “rational” principles towards ends/goals of legitimation and or polemical ends/goals, individual and collective identities hardly get by and manage, whereby and in relation to which, each and every respective dominant social relation determines the form and the extent of the array (i.e. mobilisation). The same applies, in fact, with reference to questions, problems or kinds of acting, actions and acts which barely touch upon the core of identity. As a rational animal, man (i.e. humans) is, as it were, under the prohibition of doing something without declaring the rational grounds/reasons for what he does. This aspect of rationality, which especially interrelates and correlates and connects with the need for rationalisation and the endeavour and effort at rationalisation, Benjamin Franklin had once outlined wittily and cleverly: “So convenient a thing is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do”<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> In relation to that, in detail, Kondylis, „Universalismus“.

<sup>27</sup> *Autobiography*, p. 42.

Rationality and rationalisation are, as just indicated, not one and the same [[thing]]. The latter (rationalisation) constitutes one amongst the many forms of the former (rationality), when it is not understood merely as a process in and during which higher degrees of rationality are attained, reached and achieved (e.g. the “rationalisation of the economy”, the rationalisation of the legislation” etc.). Rationalisation, as we want to discuss it in this and in the next section, means the intellectual / thought(-related) processing of a psychical or a theoretical stuff (i.e. (subject) matter, material or topic), so that the positionings, attitudes and kinds of acting, actions and acts or interpretations of the world (at whatever level) appear as the work of rationality, and hence the accusation of instinctive self-interest or of prejudice may not be entailed (i.e. made). Rationalisation is, accordingly, in the widest sense, legitimisation through and by means of rationality, whereby and in relation to which the term more likely is suited to cases in which the suspicion of self-interest and of prejudice is and ought to be class(ifi)ed as particularly strong. It (i.e. the said rationalisation) proceeds and takes place both in foro interno (i.e. internally or inwardly (in the court of one’s conscience)) as well as in foro externo (i.e. externally or outwardly (in the court of public opinion)), without both of the fora (i.e. forums or courts of conscience and public opinion) having to be in harmony and agreement with each other; the greater or smaller distance between them (i.e. the said fora) causes and gives rise to either unease and embarrassment, awkwardness, perplexity, or it (i.e. the said distance) is bridged by hypocrisy or even both occur simultaneously. At the level of acting, action and the act, (the) rationalisation serves in relation to that, to blur the boundaries between logical and unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts – in accordance with Pareto’s terminology –, and to give to the latter (unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts the appearance of the former (logical kinds of acting, actions and acts), since through and by means of rationalisation, the motive for the acting, action and act, or else the “irrational

drive, urge and impulse”, is transformed and converted into a reason for the acting, action and act. Without doubt, the processes of psychological and of world-theoretical rationalisation are narrowly and tightly (i.e. closely) related to each other and exhibit and show central structural similarities. We begin with world-theoretical rationalisation and make use of the old-fashioned and antiquated, but irreplaceable concept of the “world theory (i.e. world view)”, in order to indicate that it is not merely a matter here of theories in the narrower sense, but, in general, of the manner as to how an individual or collective subject sees the social and the natural world, and, above all, how he or it defines his/its place inside of the same (social and natural world) in comparison with the place of other subjects (i.e. from the perspective of the social relation)<sup>28</sup> – irrespective of with which means and at which theoretical height, i.e. no matter whether, in the course of this, concepts or rather symbols or mixtures of both, namely “poetry, seals or sealings of the concept” (Fr. Lange) dominate.

The social relation leaves (behind it) powerful traces not only in regard to the content of the rationally shaped and formed world-theoretical thought construct (*or*: construction of thought); it (i.e. the social relation) moreover constitutes a main motor (engine or driving force) of the undertaking of rationalisation itself, which forces and compels the same (undertaking of rationalisation). If the undertaking of rationalisation is supposed to have prospects of socially recognised success, thus, it must, first of all, offer explanations (of the “mythical” or of the “scientific” kind) for social, cosmological etc. phenomena,

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<sup>28</sup> Dilthey put at the centre of attention of his teaching, doctrine and theory of the world theory (i.e. world view) the interrelation and connection between world image and the meaning of life, or else the (basic or fundamental) principles, tenets, axioms of the conducting of life (*Ges. Schriften*, VIII, p. 82). This thematisation (i.e. setting of the theme and topic of world view) is in itself well-aimed (appropriate and fitting), since the important thing sought in relation to that is that a world theory (i.e. world view) as a rule derives and deduces its Ought out from an objectively given Is. However, every world theory (i.e. world view) also constitutively contains an image of “evil”, i.e. of the foe, whose activity is supposed or ought to be tamed, restrained, brought under control or eliminated. The foe, as it appears in a world theory (i.e. world view), may bear an abstract name, e.g. be called “the devil or Satan”, but the social relation in its concreteness makes its presence felt as soon as tangible social subjects are connected with this abstract foe and correspondingly handled. Regarding the presence and function of the foe in world images, see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, in particular, pp. 35ff., 63ff., 100.

which for the given historical moment are regarded as serious and significant. Such explanations represent and constitute a fundamental, rational performance, achievement and accomplishment, which, nevertheless, is not (completely) accepted by everyone or always. The endeavour to refute, disprove or anticipate counter-explanations, forces and compels [[one]] towards the refinement and complication of the undertaking of rationalisation, which, in and during increasing complexity, must deal with a new important task, job, function and mission: it must, namely, achieve rationality as consistency, to organise individual explanations or positions into a coherent whole, to not want to become easy prey for the inimically minded and inimically disposed. Because the sharpest weapon of an animal rationale (rational animal) can be no other than rationality. Rationality as consistency is the best shield against rationality as critique / criticism, and internal contradictions constitute an – at first – hardly noticed wound, which soon turns into an Achilles heel and popular target (butt of jokes, laughing stock or object of ridicule). The extent, range, scope, complexity and main emphasis of the world-theoretical construct depend on the intensity of the pressure of rationalisation, i.e. on how great and large the real or supposed ideational threat is and how high one's own power claim aims, i.e. how comprehensive the social relation is which it (i.e. one's own power as a subject) wants to influence or control. Considerable performances, achievements and accomplishments in respect of rationality and rationalisation of competitors and rivals in the intellectual-spiritual-mental field and realm force and compel corresponding (quid pro quo) counter-performances, counter-achievements, counter-accomplishments; a single dispute or controversy branches out and ramifies into several or multiple disputes or controversies as soon as it becomes serious in the social relation, so that, in the end, on both sides, multi-dimensional thought / intellectual constructs mount up (stack up and are built up and tower over lesser constructs), which culminate in ultimate world-theoretical / world-view decisions. Under certain circumstances

pertaining to the history of ideas, an undertaking in respect of rationalisation lasts in competition only because of the fact it is all-encompassing and all-embracing, that is, it takes a position in relation to all the – on each and every respective occasion – relevant themes, i.e. topics and subject matters. The complexity increases also according to the quantity of the competitors and rivals, i.e. the more numerous in a society those are who deal with mainly intellectual-spiritual-mental work, the more complex must, already for this reason, be the performances, achievement and accomplishments of rationalisation and of the rationalisations. One can observe this phenomenon already in Greek antiquity, in which the lack or absence of a theocracy of an oriental type permitted an active, lively, busy and vivid intellectual life, but also in the European New Times, which, above all, in their present-day, as it were, Alexandrian late phase, and since everything can be combined with everything, and everyone can argue and or reason with (respect to) or against everyone, a wave of rationality and of rationalisation without equal and previously unheard of was set in motion. That of course points to a phenomenon which ought to be explained in terms of the sociology of knowledge rather than pointing to progress in so-called “substantial rationality”. Because behind the complexities and the pedantries and hair-splitting, which thrive and flourish in the argumentative war of all professors and intellectuals against all professors and intellectuals, one discovers, if one – in the knowledge of the history of ideas – reduces them (i.e. the said complexities and pedantry, hair-splitting) to their structural core and nucleus, patterns, models, examples and paradigms known long ago. Nothing shows more clearly that rationalisation as the legitimisation through and by means of rationality is mainly a function of the social relation<sup>29</sup>.

Rationalisation is not bound and tied to “rationalistic” world-theoretical

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<sup>29</sup> Regarding the content of this paragraph, see Kondylis, *loc. cit.*, pp. 96ff., 106ff., as well as „Wissenschaft“.

(world-view) positions. “Irrationalistic” theories take part and operate, in their own way, (with)in rationalisation by offering explanations of phenomena in the form of logically consistent theories. As rationalism can never overcome the suspicious paradox that it must declare Reason as the judge of its own cause (case and (subject) matter)<sup>xiii</sup>, thus irrationalism is for all eternity, in relation to that, condemned to argue rationally-consistently, e.g. to justify, give reasons for and explain through arguments its higher (cap)ability in respect of knowledge, insight and intuition. The coherence of the argumentation does not depend on a confession of faith in “rationalism” as a philosophical tendency or school of thought. It (i.e. the coherence of the argumentation) is imperative and mandatory through and by means of the necessity of an effective presence in the social space / realm, because whoever does not argue with justification, giving reasons and cohesively and in a self-contained fashion (irrespective of what he asserts and claims in terms of content), is not taken seriously or is not at all understood – and consequently lets his opponents have their way without hindrance or obstruction<sup>xiv</sup>. Rationality as the (cap)ability in respect of rationalisation constitutes the minimal condition for a somewhat successful participation in social life. From this fact, “rationalists” seek to profit, wanting to monopolise anthropological “rationality” for themselves, and deny those who do not accept their theories the (cap)ability and capacity for rational-logical thought in general. But precisely because rationality represents and constitutes an anthropological predisposition, it is by no means exhausted in that part of mankind which likes to call itself “rationalist”. The struggle between “rationalists” and “irrationalists” is in reality conducted at a level which stretches above the level of anthropological predispositions, and has to do with content(s) whose contrast and opposition as to one another goes back and is reduced to the constellations (or correlations of forces) in the spectrum of the social relation, i.e. to the forms of the (social) relation between ideas which connect their social identity as theoreticians with questionable (doubtful and

debatable) content(s). The validity, soundness and conclusiveness of the content(s) represented on each and every respective occasion is asserted and claimed by both sides with reference to the advantages of a certain ability (capacity, (set of) powers and means) and certain way of knowledge.

“Rationalists” think and opine that they ought to be found nearer to rationality and the rational truth already because they bet and gamble on an intellect, which by definition is supposed or ought to be free of what reason generally is of the opinion is dim, dull, blurry, obfuscatory and murky: the passions and drives, urges and impulses; the right and correct use of the intellect vouches for and guarantees, accordingly, in itself, the rationality of the world image or of the ethics. “Irrationalists” regard in reply and hold in contrast, for their part, with respect to the “cold” and “superficial” intellect, the depth of existence and the force and powers of apprehension of existential ways, modes and manners of knowledge and cognition, e.g. intuition, love etc.. To the accusation of inconsistency and of the lack in fixed (firm, steady or stable) orientation, they counter by the invocation of a “higher” rationality, which climbs over and goes beyond the supposedly narrow-minded and dense, compact horizon of the intellect, and founds the truth of the world image and of the doctrine or teaching of acting, action and the act, or else ethics, better than the intellect. The rejection and disapproval of rationalism means, therefore, in concreto (i.e. in a concrete sense), the renunciation and denial of intellectualism, not of the work in respect of rationalisation as such, although at the level of the declarations of principle, all work in respect of rationalisation is disapproved of in so far as it is regarded as the unavoidable flattening and leveling out of what is genuine, authentic, real and what is true by means of the intellect. This rhetorical rather than practical disapproval and reproach of the work in respect of rationalisation is genuinely meant polemically, i.e. through it, certain content-related positions are defended, which seem to be endangered and put at risk by rationalisation as such. The struggle against rational thought or intellectual work does not in

actual fact turn against it (i.e. rational thought), (it *cannot* in fact turn against it because there is no alternative to thought as thought), but turns against the connection or combining of the same rational thought / intellectual work with certain content(s) – a connection / combining which in certain constellations or conjunctures or correlations of forces pertaining to the history of ideas flourishes and thrives so much that the (above-)mentioned content(s) seem to come and emerge from the mere use of rational thought. But in and during this struggle of theirs, “irrationalists” must, as we have said, on pain of / subject to the penalty of social irrelevance, bring and put forward against arguments, further arguments, that is to say, consistently and with respect to elementary logical rules, defend and advocate for their perceptions, views (opinions, ideas and conceptions). They do this also in a carefree and light-hearted manner, because logical arguing (argumentation or reasoning), seen formally (i.e. in relation to form), does not demand or desire any express concession to content-related theses or topics which on each and every respective occasion are connected and combined with “rationalism”. Because logic is not identical with right or wrong, moral or un-moral (i.e. immoral) content(s), but it (i.e. logic) consists in the argumentatively correct unfolding and development of a position, whereby and in relation to which correctness is measured in regard to form-related (i.e. formal) criteria, e.g. in regard to the lack of logical leaps, ambiguous terms etc.. That is why “rationalistic” and “irrationalistic” thought can unfold and develop equally logically, i.e. possible, eventual or potential logical mistakes or errors would not necessarily emerge, arise or result from a “rationalistic” or “irrationalistic” confession of faith. Elementary logic does not decide about the character of a thinking / mode of thought, but the contents decide about the character of a thinking / mode of thought. And logic can be put exactly in the service of all possible positions, because it (i.e. logic) itself does



not produce, cause, breed or make them (i.e. all possible positions)<sup>30</sup>.

Just as little in favour of “rationalistic” or “irrationalistic” thought, does logic have any preferences for scientific theories with claims in respect of truth or in favour of rationalisations of an ideological character. In both cases, it is a matter of *thought* constructs which in regard to a certain degree of form-related (i.e. formal) processing, hardly differ from each other outwardly / externally; the difference comes to light only through a closer examination of the content(s). Because in both cases, thought proceeds similarly, i.e. on the basis of abstractions, selections, schematisations and hierarchisations, on the basis of reductions and analogies. The same ideational steps, which for the ascertainment, determination and investigation of empirically valid generalisations *must* be taken, can, hence, lead to error, not least of all because rationality at this [[i.e. other]] level and in this [[i.e. other]] form acts as legitimising rationalisation<sup>xv</sup>. Even wishful thinking can be formally (i.e. in terms of form) be built and constructed flawlessly and impeccably on the basis of empirically verifiable and provable data – this is not difficult for it (i.e. wishful thinking), but the blatant and flagrant conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, and often not even this [is difficult for wishful thinking]<sup>31</sup>. As a matter of fact: in view of monumental thought constructions (or constructions of thought/thinking) like e.g. the *Summa theologica*, one can only with a very bad will, which self-evidently accompanies a certain perception and view of “true” rationality, deny or contest that in practice everything, –nonsense and mischief not excluded–, can be rationalised, even at a high form-related (i.e. formal) level. One has denied the rationality of ideologies as an apparatus which is economical as to thought, with the argument

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<sup>30</sup> Regarding the content of this paragraph, see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 36ff.; *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 93ff..

<sup>31</sup> Regarding the taking root and rootedness of “inferential failures” in otherwise unavoidable and inevitable thought methods (or methods of thought/thinking) and thought structures (or structures of thought/thinking), see the good analyses by Nisbett-Ross, *Human Inference*, Ch. 1-3 and 10. Regarding abstraction, selection and hierarchisation as the basis both of world images in general as well as of theories pertaining to the natural sciences, in particular see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 14ff., as well as „Wissenschaft“.

that no-one consciously decides in favour of ideological thought for the sake of the economy of thought; if we, again, ascribed to ideology unconscious rationality, thus, we would lapse into a teleological functionalism<sup>32</sup>. But precisely the necessary identity (i.e. sameness) of the above-mentioned form-related (i.e. formal) features in and during ideological and non-ideological thought makes the question and problem irrelevant as to whether here a conscious decision was taken or not – whatever “conscious” may mean; after all, in fact, the conscious decision to not think ideologically, for its part, does not provide or give any guarantee of that, i.e. that one does it or can do it (i.e. not think ideologically). In and during the construction of world-theoretical thought/intellectual constructs through and by means of rationalisation, the decision functions not in the usual sense of the choice between existing and known alternatives, but as a de-cision (de-cisio), namely, as an act or process of separation and segregation and isolation, whereby and in relation to which an identity separates and divides for itself what is relevant from what is irrelevant, and through and by means of abstractions, schematisations and hierarchisations creates a world image, which grants it (i.e. the said identity) the necessary (cap)ability at orientation for (social) self-preservation. Thus seen, all men (i.e. all humans) decide, and not only the chosen<sup>xvi</sup> bearers of existential “authenticity or authentic being”, as existentialist and militant decisionists (i.e. decision-takers or decision-makers) believe<sup>33</sup>. In this ubiquitous act or process of the de-cision, rationalisation undertakes exactly the task of building the more or less fixed, steady and stable bridges between what is “conscious” and what is “unconscious”, whereby and in relation to which it (i.e. the said rationalisation) draws its good conscience also from the fact that it makes use of – in accordance with anthropological criteria – normal means of thought (or normal intellectual means). We should not or ought not to, incidentally, if we want to

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<sup>32</sup> Hence, Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 58.

<sup>33</sup> In relation to that, Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 7ff; „Jurisprudenz“, p. 354ff..

remain with the conventional separation between what is unconscious and what is conscious, underestimate the independent and self-sufficient activity of the latter (conscious) in and during the formation and development of world-theoretical rationalisation. The subject can be led and guided in regard to its kinds of acting, actions and acts by already crystallised(-out) individual or collective rationalisations, not seldom, however, it determines through calculus, i.e. calculation, which rationalisations can give wing(s) to, i.e. inspire, spur on, quicken and justify its intended action; if, for instance, ends-goals are rationalised on the basis of values, thus it also occurs that values are judged and evaluated consciously in regard to their expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of (an-)end(s)/goal(s), sometimes [[values]] even with moral intent (one rejects and disapproves of, e.g., a strict ethic(s) in respect of mindset (mentality, way of thinking) exactly because of its supposed fateful, disastrous, catastrophic and ominous consequences for the well-being, welfare and good of most people). The decision to handle and treat facts or values instrumentally, i.e. to place or put them in the service of a rationalisation through their being put in order, classification or through their exclusion, can no doubt be conscious, however, one becomes master (i.e. tamer) of the unease, discomfort and malaise coming into being and arising from that because of the fact that the consciousness and deliberateness of the decision is driven and relegated to the unconscious: the actor “does not want to admit, accept or believe” that his deed, doing and act is the result (corollary, aftereffect) of a conscious decision. He behaves thus, “as if he did not know anything”. Not only does the unconscious steer and direct the conscious, the conscious also sometimes determines what belongs in the unconscious. This is, from a broader perspective, better understood if we visualise and make clear to ourselves that at the level of intellectual-spiritual acts bringing about rationalisations, rationality basically is active and basically acts in the same manner as at the level of intellectual-spiritual acts which steer and direct external or outer action and in the world of

the social relation grant and accord orientation. A functionalistically apprehended teleology is not at work here, which satisfies pre-existing (ideological) needs, but it is a matter of more or less alternating and variable ideational answers to the ideational challenges or provocations which the social relation sets, whereby and in relation to which their concrete character determines which importance or value befits the ideational in and during the friendly or inimical meeting of actors with one another on each and every respective occasion. World-theoretical rationalisations are, just as much as other forms of the ideational, crystallised social relations, i.e. not simply something wherein social relations are “reflected or mirrored”, but an articulation of the positionings and stances of the rationalising actor in relation to the rationalised positionings and stances of other actors. Accordingly, it is social-ontologically indifferent / unimportant as to whether a world theory (i.e. world view) is taken at nominal value, i.e. face-value, if it postulates the (onto)logical primacy of the extra-human (i.e. outside-of-the-human) world or of the human world (very often the former happens in order to underpin and shore up and fortify, –by invoking higher(-standing) tiers of jurisdiction, i.e. authorities–, the, in practice, decisive statements or propositions regarding the essence and duties of man (i.e. humans). Either way, the human world, the world of the social relation, therefore, represents and constitutes the motor, driving force and the reason for the formation and development of such – and all – thought (intellectual) constructs. Only men (i.e. humans) can – vis-à-vis other men, in relation to whom they want to enter into a certain relation – assert that God, Nature, History or Ethical Law should or ought and or are supposed to guide, direct and lead the doings and omissions (i.e. the activities, movements, actions and behaviour(s)) of men (i.e. humans).

Since a world-theoretical thought (intellectual) construct must offer a synthesis of theory, teaching and doctrine pertaining to the world, meaning and

praxis / practice, thus, the work of rationalisation aims first and foremost at working out, elaborating and formulating the logical consistency between these levels, whereby and in relation to which the (intellectual-historical) relevance to the present and topicality (pertaining to the history of ideas) determines the main focus, main emphasis and centre of gravity of the thought/intellectual effort and endeavour. As we have said, difficulties and failures in action arise and result from asymmetries between the rationality of the assumptions, upon which the setting of a goal/end rests, the rationality of the end/goal in the sense of its attainability and achievability and of the rationality of the means in the sense of their expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and their serving of (an-) end(s)/goal(s). Rationalisation manages and effects, though, the unity of these rationalities only ideationally, and it cannot give any tangible guarantees. In actual fact, it is difficult to see how one out of the reason for the world, or a generally formulated moral law, is supposed to be able to deduce and derive *hic et nunc* (here and now) without the mediation or intervention/intercession of other tiers of jurisdiction / authorities, or without one's own activity as to interpretation, instructions for successful action. In this respect, the unity, which is produced or restored between the world-theoretical levels through rationalisation can only be a feigned unity. This does not at all mean, however, that everyone who acts by invoking world-theoretical rationalisation must in reality fail. Here the mechanisms are activated anew which enable and facilitate the effective action in and during unattainable and unachievable nominal ends-goals. From the analysis of the previous (sub-)section, we know how those mechanisms function: the world-theoretical fundamental or basic principles are honoured, upheld and preserved nominally, but (f)actually are abandoned or interpreted in such a manner that they can be imparted, given or conveyed (mediated or interposed) with respect to attainable and achievable ends-goals. General convictions about the world and men (i.e. humans) are – through and by means of smaller or greater logical leaps – in practice translated into usable

and realisable maxims, whilst the ultimate world-theoretical ends-goals are diverted, directed or re-routed accordingly. The general world-theoretical schema is hence pressed and moulded more or less neatly into the narrower schema: “achievable and attainable ends/goals-means”. Before or against the background of this possibility, or rather, this common and familiar praxis, it is by no means settled that the representatives of a “rationalistic” world theory (i.e. world view) must necessarily be at an advantage in principle in the practical field or realm. Whoever, e.g., sincerely believes in the nonsense and rubbish of the Trinity dogma [or dogma of the Holy Trinity in Christianity]<sup>xvii</sup>, may perhaps conduct, direct or run a business and or company more effectively than someone for whom only scientific answers to ultimate questions and problems may claim validity. The world-theoretical belief or faith in rationalism does not vouch for and guarantee superior social rationality. Rather it (i.e. the said world-theoretical belief/faith in rationalism) has merely the same symbolic status as every other comparable belief or faith as well, i.e. it connects or combines itself symbolically with an identity, which with its (i.e. the said identity’s) help, shows and displays, states and declares its friendship with other identities or its enmity towards other identities, without it (i.e. the said world-theoretical belief/faith in rationalism), in and during concrete action, being taken at its nominal, i.e. face value unconditionally, and, in the course of this, without this belief/faith necessarily being the deciding factor<sup>xviii</sup>.

