

V. Rationality, symbol and language in the field  
of tension of the social relation



# 1. Levels, forms and degrees of rationality

## A. Preliminary remark

Talk of the levels, forms and degrees of rationality already shows that rationality in itself and as such, that is, irrespective of its bearer and its field of coming into being or of its field of unfolding and development, cannot make up and constitute the object of a handling and treatment which suffices for strict objective and factual examination, testing and proving. Whoever wants to treat and deal with “rationality” absolutely (per se or as such), must take a definition of the same “rationality” as a basis, which does not make do, and does not manage, without terms in need of interpretation; all theories of rationality with a claim of (or to) exclusivity and loud or quiet normative ambitions, contained, in any case, such terms [in need of interpretation] and, through that, got involved and tangled up in a vicious circle whose logical troubles, difficulties and inconveniences, though, have not been able to cool down their ethical zeal and eagerness. The task of a social ontology as a theoretical dimension of depths (or in-depth dimension) is, accordingly, not the setting up, formation or erection of a wider “philosophical” theory of rationality next to other (“philosophical” theories of rationality), which, incidentally, in many cases and frequently repeat one another, but is the establishment, investigation and determination of the reasons out of which rationality – always: in its various levels, forms and degrees – makes up a constitutive element of human living together, i.e. co-existence. Rationality does not constitute, seen thus, an Ought whose realisation needs a particular effort, endeavour and struggle exceeding and passing beyond the present human situation, but a reality which originally belongs together with

the rest of the realities of the social and or of the human. The change (Der Wechsel) of / in its (i.e. rationality's) levels, forms and degrees does not yield or result in any linear progress, rather it (i.e. the said change) is executed and carried out asymmetrically and underlies strong fluctuations (variations and deviations), whereby and in relation to which these levels, forms and degrees combine with one another in various or in the same collective or individual actors on each and every respective occasion, having an effect differently on one another. "Philosophical" and (in the ethical and technical sense) normative theories of rationality are symptoms and indicators of this eternal, everlasting and perpetual change; they register and record objectively, i.e. without knowing it and without wanting it, social-ontological possibilities, which temporarily and transiently became realities; but they are incapable of ever performing, achieving and accomplishing that which they – according to what they think they know – want to perform, achieve and accomplish: namely, to put an end to the great variety and multiformity of the social-ontological possibilities in the name of and in favour of the sole wished-for "rational" reality. The degrees of rationality are not put, classed or classified in [[and do not belong to]] a uniform, unitary, unified universal scale, whose summit serves as the yardstick and measure of the tiers, levels, stages or grades of the said degrees of rationality; they (i.e. the said degrees of rationality) are the functions of the levels at which rationality unfolds and develops, and of the form, which it (i.e. rationality) assumes and adopts on each and every respective occasion. Theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory), one cannot get on top of this situation and position (i.e. get this situation under control) through final, conclusive and definitive definitions; behind them (i.e. such definitions) hide admonitions, exhortations and warnings, but through a series of conceptual distinctions, which are supposed to relate, render, reflect and convey the levels, forms and degrees of rationality in their great contours and outlines, and with descriptive intent. From the standpoint of general methodology, conceptual distinctions,

supported and underpinned by the corresponding casuistry (i.e. a complete case-by-case list of cases), offer the sole available theoretical way out when definitions can neither be maintained and kept to for long, nor help any further – something which applies to most cases; and they (i.e. the said conceptual distinctions) typically enough arise precisely during the proving of the inadequacies, deficiencies, shortcoming and failings of this or that definition.

Although there is and cannot be – in its content – binding and conclusively defined “rationality”, talk of “rationality” is customary, normal, typical, usual and theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) legitimate; one, in fact, may or should not speak of the levels, forms and degrees of the same rationality when the reference to something is lacking, which can be expressed at least conventionally in the singular (i.e. when the said levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not refer to something which cannot be expressed at least conventionally in the singular). This singular, nonetheless, does not point to any content, but to a form-related (i.e. formal) anthropological and social-ontological factor, which, like all anthropological and social-ontological factors can be connected (and combined) with all humanly and socially conceivable, imaginable and thinkable content(s). Like “the” social relation or “language”, from which it (i.e. rationality) can hardly be separated genetically and functionally, “rationality” updates and refreshes its potential (or brings its potential up to date, making that potential topical) in the most different positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends/goals and activities. As an anthropological and social-ontological constituent and constant, it (i.e. rationality) finds itself or is found on the other side of, i.e. beyond the common and familiar contrast and opposition between “rationalism” and “irrationalism”, which comes up, arises and emerges only during the content-related use of rationality, and indicates or signals preferences of a content-related nature, that is to say, concretely normative fillings, i.e. arrangements (as

to content) of those positionings, attitudes, evaluations, assessments, ratings, ends / goals and activities; the level, form and degree of rationality does not necessarily depend, in any case, on the decision in favour of “rationalism” or of “irrationalism”, and the sense in which the anthropological and social-ontological way of looking at things ascribes and attributes the predicate “rational” to an action can differ considerably from that sense in which the actors themselves may or like and want to apostrophise (i.e. mention and refer to) an action as “rational” or “irrational”. The apparent paradox in rationality lies in the fact that it – thanks to its each and every respective level and form, as well as its each and every degree – is to be found, in practice, everywhere in the human-social [sphere, field, dimension, realm], however, precisely because it is deprived of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms), which goes way beyond what the anthropological and social-ontological formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) contain or imply already as a fact<sup>i</sup>. To someone acting in a concrete situation (and position), however, exactly this unreachable<sup>ii</sup> normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) is needed, so that he, in the hour (i.e. at the time) of probation (i.e. testing), is basically (placed) on his own – endowed, equipped and provided, though, with the aforementioned formalities (i.e. formal / form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), and with that which he himself has willingly or unwillingly made out of them. Precisely the ubiquity of rationality lends, confers to, bestows upon and gives, therefore, the theory of rationality such a general character that every specification in the direction of normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) cannot go out of and above (i.e. beyond) beginnings which must obtain and secure their general objective validity, soundness and conclusiveness with the staying and remaining in unbinding (i.e. non-binding)

formulae (and set phrases)<sup>1</sup>. In short: the concept of rationality is theoretically (i.e. as regards theory) fruitful and fertile, i.e. helpful and of assistance during the investigation, establishment and determination of and inquiry into anthropological and social-ontological facts and circumstances, to the extent it remains, in practice, vague. And conversely: every definition or normification (i.e. standardisation as the formation of norms) of rationality, which wants to be, in practice, (technically or ethically) useful, loses in (its) theoretical depth and breadth without gaining and winning much in another respect. As can, incidentally, be shown, the terms, which normative theories of rationality must make use of (e.g. consistency, the adequate correlation of the goal/end and means with each other etc.) constitute simple or more complicated re-descriptions and paraphrases (re-writings, re-brandings) of the formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically, and they only get and obtain, maintain and preserve a meaning when they are understood in respect of these (formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) having an effect anthropologically and social-ontologically). This indicates in itself the objective impossibility of being able to leave behind these formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)) [[to move]] in the direction of normatively binding content(s). Consequently, the treatment and handling of the examination of the problem of rationality remains in an eminent (i.e. exceptional and extreme (as total)) sense a matter of anthropology and of social ontology, which are technically and ethically blind. Whoever is on the lookout for content-related specifications of rationality in

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<sup>1</sup> See under D in this section, below.

narrower fields – exactly in the fields of technique (technology) or of ethics – (will) necessarily get tangled up in, entangled, embroiled and involved in new unsolvable paralogisms. The smuggling in of anthropological and social-ontological factors or concepts for the underpinning (backing-up and support) of such [content-related] specifications yields, brings, provides little [which is] tangible and moreover betrays (i.e. reveals) an ideational power claim, namely, that of gaining authority for partial preferences in part-fields (i.e. sub-fields or sub-sectors), which aim for and set their sights on an Ought through and by means of the whole weight of the human-social Is.

## B. The anthropological and social-ontological parameters of rationality

### a. Generally

Rationality seeps through, penetrates, permeates and pervades the being and essence of man and the Is of society so deeply that that being and essence and that Is again belong so intimately together that the handling and treatment of the examination of the problem of rationality feels first of all lost in this inextricable plexus, network or mesh: it (i.e. the said handling and treatment) does not rightly know where it is supposed and ought to start in order to – from there – unroll and unwind the real coherence of the individual aspects with the greatest possible clarity and logical necessity. It is up to the reader – at least in part – to apprehend through and by means of his imagination, as a unity, what in the description, – as successful as it may be –, must necessarily appear as an enumeration or list of multiple *disjecta membra* [= scattered (tossed about) limbs (members, parts, portions, divisions)]. In the hope that the result will justify the choice of the starting point, we shall begin with the familiar and common distinction between mere “instinctive” behaviour and action, which we already dealt with in regard to the intention of outlining the concept of the latter

(action) in greater / more detail<sup>2</sup>. The opening up (and reconstruction) of rationality as a phenomenon demands, nevertheless, to make this same distinction more deeply, i.e. to not set human behaviour apart from human action (*or*: to not contrast human behaviour to human action) any longer, but to put in one (i.e. to equate and identify) the difference between behaviour and action with that difference between animal/beast and man, no matter how highly one estimates, values and rates the animal/bestial-behavioural [element] in man; the difference [[between animal/beast and man]] remains and persists in any case, and it (i.e. this said difference) is what matters and interests us here. If rationality in the widest and fundamental sense is that feature and characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest of (those belonging as members to) the animal kingdom, and if this distinction may or can be re-written, re-described and paraphrased as the distinction between “instinctive” behaviour and action without a substantial shift or transposition of accent, stress or emphasis and content-related losses, then, also the source and the field of unfolding and development of rationality may or should be located where the more or less direct automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction is considerably loosened (up) and relaxed, and in the distance, interval and gap which comes into being, accordingly, between both stimulus and reaction, foresight, calculus (i.e. calculation) and choice between practical alternatives nest, lodge and settle<sup>3</sup>. Upon the clinging and sticking to the particular and the present, the more or less free visualisation of the no-more (i.e. no longer) present or not-yet-present follows, that is, of the past or of the future, which relate to each other like experience and planning, and since both are unreal / not real, i.e. in contrast to the tangible present, they exist only in the (idea as) imagination, thus, even their still intensive life in ideality permits and compels a – through thought – (i.e. an intellectual) performing and rendering processing and a combination of

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<sup>2</sup> See Ch. IV, Section 2Aa, above.

<sup>3</sup> Bennett, *Rationality*, pp. 5, 84ff..

data with regard to adaptations to the environment or to the re-shapings and re-mouldings (and rearrangements) of the same environment; transferred or translated into the ideational, data become more moveable (mobile, agile, flexible) and more manipulable.

The loosening of the automatic mechanism or process of stimulus and reaction means not only a growing distance, spacing and gap between both stimulus and reaction, but simultaneously also a growing great variety and multiformity in the sending, receiving and evaluating of the stimuli as well as in the temporal and qualitative palette (i.e. range) of reactions; more and more reactions can answer and respond to more and more constellations (or correlations of forces). And since the reaction aims at a material or ideational satisfaction of the actor, thus, the aforementioned growing distance, spacing or gap between reaction and stimulus during the growing differentiation of both stimulus and reaction means, moreover, a growing (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of the wished-for and desired satisfaction, as well as a growing differentiation of its (i.e. the said wished-for satisfaction's) forms and degrees of intensity. This postponement (delay or deferment), indeed, takes place under the pressure of external and outer circumstances, however, differently than in the rest of the animals (i.e. non-human animals), in which it (i.e. the said postponement of satisfaction) cannot be prolonged (extended, elongated and protracted) infinitely, endlessly and indefinitely without bringing about (causing and inducing) the abstention from (and or renunciation of) the initially wished-for and desired satisfaction, and its forgetting (i.e. the leaving behind of the said wished-for satisfaction); it (i.e. the said postponement) in man is converted and transformed into a normal internal and inner process, which in principle does not know (of) temporal boundaries. The put-off, deferred (postponed and delayed) satisfaction is now called a long-term goal/end, and rationality must pass its ordeal by fire (i.e. acid test) by filling the space (room) of postponement

(delay or deferment), i.e. the distance, spacing or gap between the concept(ual plan) and the reaching and achievement of the goal/end through the means which are supposed to lead to the reaching and achievement of the goal/end. The (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction and the elementary rationality of the correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consequently represent and constitute both sides of the same coin. The greater that (cap)ability [at the said postponement of satisfaction], the longer the chain of the means which must be set in motion; to the means, the means for the production of means etc. are then added, whereby and in relation to which rationality is intensified (multiplied) and refined to the extent it is distanced / distances itself from the original end / goal of satisfaction, in order to henceforth convert and transform the ends/goals into means as well as the other way around. During the increasing length of the chain of ends/goals and means (i.e. as the chain of ends/goals grows longer), rationality stands (is, finds itself) before a new task, which is called consistency. No means may or should neutralise another means, and no means may or should naturally thwart, frustrate or foil the end/goal itself, but the successive employment, use and deployment of the means must have an effect cumulatively, or else complementarily. Consistency in the use/usage of means simultaneously is called and signifies practice and exercise in elementary logic, that is, in regard to the fundamental principles of the identity and of contradiction. Through and by means of identical means under identical circumstances and conditions, identical ends/goals can be reached, attained and achieved; thus reads / sounds (i.e. is) the principle of the identity of acting rationality; and its principle of contradiction means: the most crass (blatant, extreme and gross) of all irrationalities is that of consciously using means which contradict the sincerely pursued end/goal. Precisely because the breach (violation, contravention, infringement) of the principle of contradiction in this form is so absurd that it hardly appears or is found in reality, in fact, it can hardly be realised in practice,

one often has ex contrario held the adequate correlation of end/goal and of means with each other to be the archetype or the sole genuine and in practice relevant rationality. That certainly does not go far enough (*or*: That is certainly not enough). Consistency as a feature of rationality is constantly in a relationship of friction with the inconsistent nature of reality, i.e. with the constant change in circumstances and conditions, which prohibits the enduring, lasting, long-term or permanent use of identical means and the eternal holding onto and adherence to identical ends/goals, and punishes the breaking, infringing and violating of the [[just said]] prohibition. The logical concept(ual plan) of consistency as the lack and absence of contradictions does not, hence, always and necessarily coincide with the praxeological concept(ual plan) of consistency as the remaining with the same ends/goals and means<sup>4</sup>; the former (logical concept of consistency) retains under all circumstances its validity; it is applied only to new content(s); the latter (praxeological concept of consistency) often appears as loyalty, faithfulness and fidelity to principles and shares as a rule the fate and destiny of Don Quixote after the decline of the knighthood, i.e. it ends (up) in pigheadedness, obstinacy and (pure, ridiculous) fantasy. Praxeological pigheadedness and obstinacy, which, though, in a technical respect indicates diminished rationality, can be founded on the actor's permanent difficulties of adaptation and of orientation, however, it can also go back and be reduced to past successes, which strengthen and solidify, consolidate the false impression that means and ends/goals, which once led to success, would have to always and everywhere happen to have the same luck and fortune<sup>5</sup>. Consistency becomes and turns into, therefore, the feature and characteristic of rationality only when the level at which it develops and unfolds is taken into account; the consistency at one level is not the same as the consistency at another level, and both levels can behave, i.e. be, inconsistent(ly)

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<sup>4</sup> V. Mises, *Action*, p. 103.

<sup>5</sup> See Ch. IV , footnote 445.

towards each other, although they, – each for itself –, is consistent. Precisely the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) of the (praxeological) consistency inside of inconsistent reality, as well as the constant mutual and reciprocal change of position (status, standing and place) of the goal / end and the means reveal that the anthropological and social-ontological dimension of rationality is absorbed and assimilated by (or exhausted in or disappears in) neither in consistency in itself and in general, nor in the adequate correlation of the end/goal and the means with each other. Behind these indispensable, but partial performances and achievements stands/is the performance-achievement of all performances-achievements, upon which the chances and prospects of self-preservation itself depend; it is a matter of the performance-achievement of general orientation, which exactly determines what on each and every respective occasion is regarded as end/goal and what as means. Rationality is, accordingly, the performance-achievement and (cap)ability in respect of the orientation of a being, which has outgrown (surpassed and risen above) the secure, safe and fast, rapid, but too narrow orientation in the schema of behaviour (or behavioural schema): “stimulus-reaction”.

What was said hitherto about the origins, features, characteristics and performances, achievements and accomplishments of rationality constitutes an anthropological thought/intellectual good, i.e. body of thought(s) and can also refer and relate to the individual human to the extent that this individual human is imagined in a lonely and solitary struggle against the objective (representational and concrete) world. The actual social-ontological dimension comes into play as soon as we explain the fundamental, basic concepts (postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consistency, orientation) introduced above, from the point of view and by means of the dynamic(s) of the social relation. This

conceptual distinction certainly does not mean that the anthropological dimension can have existence without the social-ontological dimension. The anthropological Robinson, who as human nature, grows into culture during his struggle against the objective (representational and concrete), rests and is based on a fiction. The correlation between end/goal and means with regard to each other, which in accordance with this fiction was supposed to have encouraged and fostered already in one such solitary, lonely struggle, rationality, was in reality a collective performance, achievement and accomplishment, and it is still always thus (i.e. a collective performance and achievement). Many animals / beasts live collectively and know, in fact, (of) elementary forms of the distribution of the means of subsistence for the preservation of the weaker adherents to, i.e. members of the herd, even though here the rule is that every normal animal/beast in the herd must look after, provide for, see to and take care of the/its own food, nourishment and sustenance alone. But only men (i.e. humans) *work and labour* (act) already as the most primitive of hunters together, in order to *produce* the means of subsistence of the group in which they must live, something which the collective dealing with the problem of the correlation of the end / goal and means with regard to each other demands. The social relation, into which men (i.e. humans) in and during the collective production of their means of subsistence step (i.e. enter), demands, requires and promotes, encourages and fosters, simultaneously, both rationality as well as the distribution of these same means of subsistence, during and in which, very soon, the biological points of view step, i.e. go behind and take a back seat (and concede territory (as prominence)) to the social points of view. Thus, the member of the human group develops and exercises, practises in the framework of the co-operative or antagonistic social relation both technical rationality, which he can then use also in situations which he alone has to deal and cope with, manage and overcome the forces of nature, as well as social rationality, namely, one such rationality having to (re)solve the question and problem of the

postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction, the correlation of end/goal and means with each other, consistency etc. exclusively or mainly and first and foremost with regard to men (i.e. humans), and not to the objective (representational and concrete) world.

In actual fact: the levels, forms and degrees of rationality do not remain uninfluenced by whether the actors must get over and cope with a situation whose outcome depends on a neutral factor like nature, or by whether the actors must get over and cope with such a situation in which the (kinds of) acting, actions and acts of other actors with different preferences stamp, mould and form the outcome [[in question]]<sup>6</sup>. But rationality is needed in both cases. It would undoubtedly be false to modify and to widen the Cartesian thesis of the impossibility of the subjection, subordination and subjugation of historical and “irrational” stuff (i.e. subject matter and material) in a strict science, [[in order to argue that]] rational action can take place and happen only where the object of action behaves and is in itself passive and consequently permits accurate and precise calculus (i.e. calculation). As Vico already objected, method does not have a single form, but both its basic and fundamental forms, the “geometric” and the “historical”, must exist next to each other<sup>7</sup>. In the same way, rational action stretches both (with)in the “geometrically” as well as (with)in the historically-socially apprehended field, whereby, though, the change of its levels, forms and degrees is not only reduced to the change in the field and in regard to its specific constitution, composition and texture, but also can take place inside of the same field. The pressure of rationality, to which the socially acting person is exposed, is second to none, and just as the transition from behaviour to action in general demands and requires higher achievements and accomplishments of rationality, so too that category of action which is called

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Rapoport, “Various Meanings”, p. 45.

<sup>7</sup> In relation to that, Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 436ff..

social action and is concretised in the social relation par excellence, very often demands and requires outstanding and top-class rational accomplishments and achievements. Rationality passes and runs (right) through, in other words, social action more deeply than action in general, and action in solitude (seclusion, isolation and loneliness), i.e. in the struggle against nature, turns out to be all the more rational on average, the more thorough (i.e. methodical and systematic) equipment the actor brings with him from his social action, to which, though, belongs learning from other people too. The social compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress as regards rationality has as a consequence that the socially acting person either puts, moves back and defers that which in each and every respective situation and position, one way or another, is classed or classified as “irrational”, in order to then secretly savour it (or enjoy it to the full) in seclusion, solitude and isolation or in the safety and security of the imagination, or else, decidedly sets and puts it aside as socially harmful and detrimental, and hence, worthy of hate (i.e. hateful, odious and detestable); this is, though, only the generally observable tendency, which expresses and conveys little about or regarding the level, form and degree of that putting and moving back and deferring and setting or putting aside in each and every individual case. As we shall see immediately, precisely the effect and impact of the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality enables in the social relation that difference between psychological motivation and reasons (or grounds) for acting, action or the act, which is so important praxeologically. From that, a fundamental and basic anthropological and social-ontological conclusion can be drawn. The theses that “the actor is rational” and that “the actor acts rationally” are not necessarily, and, in any case, not in their whole range, scope or to their entire extent identical with each other; just as little do the sentences (tenets or theorems) “man (as a genus, kind, type or species (race)) is rational” and “the actor (as this concrete actor) is rational” logically correspond, tally and coincide (with each other). The actor

does not have to be rational in any dispositional or ethical sense in order to hear and listen to the voice of (social, not necessarily of biological) self-preservation and bow, yield and submit happily, gladly and cheerfully or with gritted teeth (grudgingly, muttering under one's breath) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation, and rationality as an anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift) says, for its part, in itself little as regards in which manner and with which intensity the actor hears and listens to that voice. Individual convictions regarding the value and the un-value (i.e. anti-value or non-value) of rationality as the guiding principle of action are also slightly (or next to not at all) informative and enlightening regarding the presumed, probable or likely mode or manner of acting, action or of the act of an actor, if we disregard the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation. Whoever confesses faith in principle in rationalism, is not *because of that and accordingly* eo ipso in a position to confront, counter or check the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation more skillfully than the world-theoretical "irrationalist". And the same applies to whole societies and epochs: the symbolic-world-theoretical confession of faith in, and acknowledgement of, rationality does not in the least vouch for and guarantee the rational handling and the rationally desirable outcome of collective action<sup>8</sup>.

If the world-theoretical convictions here only count on the edge (i.e. marginally as borderline cases), thus one may, on the other hand, not deny that against the background of rationality as an anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift), from individual to individual, smaller or larger dispositional differences with reference to the capacity and (cap)ability for rational social action are and ought to be ascertained. Nonetheless, the stronger

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<sup>8</sup> More about that in Bc in this section.

compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality and in respect of the disciplining of the social relation is shown and is seen exactly in the fact that deep dispositions also have an effect and impact all the more effectively, the more empty of content [[they are]], that is to say, the more capable they are of following hot and hard on the heels of the unending and infinite content-related changes of the social relation, which command strategic and tactical watchfulness, alertness and vigilance. The social relation determines the fundamental data towards which dispositions orientate themselves and simultaneously must be refined. Rationality in respect of acting, action and the act does not simply flow from the once and for all given fixed and unchanging template, pattern or stereotype of a disposition, rather it is shaped, formed, moulded and changes constantly under the harder or softer compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress of the social relation; its (i.e. rationality's) levels, forms and degrees are subject to the fluctuations of the same social relation, and exactly because of that, it (i.e. rationality) escapes, evades and is beyond a definitive and a generally valid and applicable, i.e. abstract apprehension: in relation to that (said definitive and generally valid, i.e. abstract apprehension of rationality), the great variety and multiformity of the social relation is simply too broad and too unforeseeable. The social relation provides and makes (up) the training area or ground of rationality in respect of acting, action and the act, and as regards its aspects, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is, i.e. ought to be named in particular. The social-ontological necessity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives sets rationality in respect of acting, action and the act in permanent motion, so that the rational actor does not look at and handle his milieu as a constant, but founds his action on the anticipation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, in respect of which he knows that it (i.e. others' action), likewise, rests and is based on the (cap)ability of anticipating alien (i.e. another's or others') action through and by means of the assumption and taking

on/over of perspectives<sup>9</sup>. Since, however, the latter anticipation of alien action is an emotional identification of the I (ego) with the Other, thus, it can pass off, happen and take place as a reflexive act only to the extent or in as much it assumes rationality on both sides. The Ego can hardly put itself/himself in (and or empathises with) the position of the Other, if it does not assume a somewhat or reasonably consistent interrelation between its ends/goals and means, motives or else reasons and action plans (or designs, projects or blueprints in respect of acting and the act) (inconsistency can indeed be taken into account as a possibility; it, however, cannot be guessed in advanced through and by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives how and when inconsistency will manifest itself); and whilst the Ego assumes the rationality of the Other in this sense, the said Ego itself carries out and executes rational thought acts or acts of thought, it itself practises and exercises [[rationality]] in the rationality or subjects and subjugates itself nolens volens (i.e. whether wanting or liking or not) to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality. It (i.e. the said Ego) can just as little detach itself and break free from, or evade and dodge that compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality as it can live away from or out of every social relation. Because it does not have at its disposal any other access to the Other, which could guarantee and ensure it somewhat or reasonably reliable, dependable or trustworthy orientation; even as a recognisedly approximative solution or stopgap (provisional, temporary or expedient) solution, the assumption or adoption and acceptance of rationality promises in principle to go the furthest. Social experience in fact teaches the actor soon enough that rational action, which in the praxeological sense shows and exhibits consistency, correlates end/goal and means adequately with each other, [[and]] postpones (puts off, delays and defers) immediate and direct

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. the distinction between “parametrically rational actor” and “strategically rational actor” in Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 18ff..

pleasure (delight, enjoyment, consumption) etc., as a rule is worthwhile (or worth the effort). In light of this rule, (behind which stands and is the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race) as a rational animal,) hence alien action (i.e. the action of another or others) must normally be comprehended, especially since the greatest danger for one's own plans in respect of acting, action or the act comes from the rationally planned counter-actors, who are in a position to formulate wishes as existential settings (or positionings) and judgements, i.e. to support and back them up through and by means of analyses of the situation and position close to reality and corresponding instructions in respect of acting, action and the act. What disturbs, annoys and perturbs inimical wishes is not their content in itself<sup>iii</sup>, but the image or picture which we ourselves make of the situation and position after their (i.e. the said inimical wishes') possible or potential realisation; the slighter or less the (cap)ability of the Other to reach, attain and achieve through rational action his wishes, so much the smaller the felt and perceived threat and enmity. Assuming the Other's rationality, the Ego starts wisely or for good reason from the conceivably worst case when the Other is a foe; on the other hand, from the conceivably best case, when he (i.e. the Other) is counted and reckoned under, i.e. amongst (the Ego's) friends. In both cases, the Ego can err; nevertheless, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality remains (lasts and persists), no matter at which level, in which form and to which degree the potential (or capacity) for rationality is made topical or updated on each and every respective occasion.

The social-ontological necessity of looking at the social relation irrespective of the motives of the actors from a rational point of view, and as being practised as an exercise in rationality, is shown and seen quite clearly and vividly in the habit, routine, practice or custom of the most primitive tribes to interpret even animal behaviour (or the behaviour of animals and beasts)

anthropomorphically-rationally<sup>10</sup>; it (i.e. the said social-ontological necessity of ...) was, incidentally, already in antiquity, clearly apprehended theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory)<sup>11</sup>. Rationality exists as the not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. indispensable) concomitant or accompaniment of the social relation, as a condition and at the same time an outcome of the same social relation; action becomes rational only where it crisscrosses or intersects with action. And the thesis that understanding of alien (i.e. another's or others') action implies – at least at a certain level, in a certain form and to a certain degree – the assumption and adoption of the rationality on the part of the Ego and of the Other, obtains and preserves its actual meaning only when it (i.e. the aforesaid thesis) is interpreted from the point of view of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation. The thus attained and achieved rational interpretation of alien (i.e. another's or others') action, which at the same time subjects and subjugates one's own thought and action to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality, contains, though, abstractions and narrowings (shortenings, curtailments, abridgements or reductions), which in a gapless (i.e. complete and unbroken) psychological reconstruction of alien (i.e. another's or others') action (if one such complete psychological reconstruction were, in general, possible) might not or should and ought not to have been found (or have any place). Under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality, the interpretation of acting, action and of the act shifts and is displaced from the motivation (i.e. motive) to the

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<sup>10</sup> See e.g. Sliberbauer, "Hunter/Gatherers", p. 465ff..

<sup>11</sup> The great speeches (orations and addresses), which Thucydides is able to give to the protagonists of his history are, before the many-sided background of the description of a situation and position in respect of unsurpassable and matchless reconstructions of rational action plans (or designs, projects or blueprints in respect of acting and the act), reconstructions of the rationality of the actors or else of the foes, and imply general anthropological and social-ontological ascertainments. In the course of this, the author (i.e. Thucydides), knowing better retrospectively, helps his persons (i.e. characters (in his history)) with more rationality, by him, indeed, keeping, as he writes, "as closely as possible to the overall meaning of what was actually said [[*ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων*]]", simultaneously, however, he renders the speeches thus "as in accordance with my opinion every individual had to most likely speak about each and every existing case, i.e. as I thought each individual was most likely to speak about the case at hand" [[*«ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.»*]] (I, 22, 1).

grounds and reasons for action, so that this action, without precise and detailed knowledge of its psychological aetiology, appears to be sufficiently understandable for the ends/goals and purposes of the social relation<sup>12</sup>. Irrespective of the objective and factual correctness (accuracy, rightness and veracity) of this understanding, which from case to case can be very different, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality causes and brings about, in any case, a de-psychologisation, and to that extent, an objectification or objectivisation of the way of looking at things, as well as, possibly, of the action of the person looking at things in such a way. The attention is now directed mainly to the objective meaning of the action, i.e. to the putative or probable effect, consequence or implication of the same action on the course of events and the shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation. Naturally, in the course of this – at least in some cases – over and above the reasons of and for action, its (i.e. action's) motives must be taken into consideration; their (i.e. the said motives') analysis more or less contrasts with and stands out from, nevertheless, –under the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of the rationality of the social relation–, a psychological analysis. Even when the Ego regards and holds the Other to be “crazy and mentally ill”, and consequently makes or passes an – in practice – slightly helpful judgement over or about his (i.e. the Other's) motivation, he (i.e. the Ego) must trace and track down the logic of this craziness and mental illness in the action of the Other in order to cope, deal with and get over this action in the reality of the social relation. The logic of the action and the qualitatively, ethically etc. understood Reason of the actor are two (very) different things; the former (logic of the action) must be taken seriously, regardless of what one holds (i.e. considers, thinks) in respect of the latter (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood Reason of the actor). That is why

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Davidson, *Essays*, pp. 231ff., 237.

rationality keeps bears in mind that (logic of the action) rather than this (qualitatively, ethically etc. understood Reason of the actor); the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality brings with it and entails the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of objectification/objectivisation. And the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of objectification does not make itself noticeable only in and during the (relative) neglect of the motivation and or of the Reason of the actor for the sake of the logic of his action inside of and within the social relation. No less does it (i.e. the said compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of objectification) have less of an effect when the individual faces, confronts and is up against the impersonal logic of his society, as this (impersonal logic of his society) is crystallised or crystallises in the customs (conventions, manners or morals) and the everyday (kinds of) self-understanding, in the forms of dealing with others (i.e. manners, etiquette and behaviour(s) in public) and institutional constructs. Social order, whatever it looks like and however it seems, constitutes condensed, thickened and compressed rationality, it (i.e. social order) is comprehended as rationality and educates (brings up, trains, disciplines) or compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[people, humans]] towards rationality<sup>13</sup>.

The social relation as a relation between beings or creatures, whose nature is culture, whose kinds of acting, actions and acts are therefore connected and bound to meaning, lends and gives to rationality still further dimensions or forms. The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction and the consistency in its connection with meaning, –which originally came into being in the social relation, [[and]] [that said meaning] only in it (i.e. the social relation) exists, and hence, is by definition social meaning –, become and turn

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Diesing, *Reason in Society*, p. 236ff..

into ethical and logical values, which the individual can invoke (or to which the individual can appeal) in order to legitimise his own kinds of acting, actions or acts, or to condemn alien (i.e. another's or others') kinds of acting, actions or acts, in other words, in order to better assert and defend and maintain himself in the social relation. The postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction obviously takes place not only due to the objectively existing shortage of goods, which in an otherwise neutral milieu (i.e. surroundings, environment or setting) is supposed or ought to be overcome through and by means of productive labour / work, but also, and above all, due to subjective considerations, which appear only in the social relation. The presence of other people (actors), who have the same claim on and (in regard) to satisfaction, compels, coerces, forces, constrains and pressures [[the actor]] towards postponement (deferment and delay), and only through and by means of mutual and reciprocal consideration, or at least through and by means of an ethic(s) of mutuality and reciprocity, if at all, independent initiatives and single-handed efforts are and ought to be put off and discouraged (*or*: [actors] are and ought to be dissuaded from independent initiatives and single-handed efforts). Generally, it applies that the postponement (deferment and delay) of satisfaction as the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality is shaped, moulded and formed depending on with whom one has [[something]] to do (or with whom one is dealing) [[and]] in which situation and position. For its part, consistency is connected with ethical and logical meaning, as soon as the – through and by means of the said consistency – guaranteed and ensured (cap)ability at orientation is concretised in an individual or collective identity, which wants to be saved beyond the changes in the social relation, and it often can [[thus be saved]] too. However, a consistent identity, to an, in practice, sufficient extent, does not constitute only an inner/internal necessity, but also an outer/external necessity, which stems from the general social need of holding (i.e. keeping and maintaining) the constitutive imponderability (incalculability)

of subjectivity within bound(arie)s and limits, i.e. of making and rendering the social action of the members of society ponderable (calculable), and in this respect, “rational”; the social ethics of all cultures have hitherto denounced and pilloried the opportunists and the turncoats (i.e. renegades, apostates, traitors, defectors and deserters), no matter what the social praxis/practice looked like and what the [then] current doctrine and teaching of prudence and wisdom read / was. The compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality under the conditions and circumstances of culture, i.e. under the conditions and circumstances of obligatory meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) finds expression, finally, in the performances, achievements and accomplishments in respect of rationalisation and of legitimisation, which accompany inner/internal and outer/external action at every turn. To the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality, the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of meaning leads here, i.e. to the compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress for meaning to be articulated socially effectively. The social relation remains also in this respect decisive and determinative. Because rationalisations and legitimisations in foro interno or in foro externo (i.e. internally as to one’s own conscience or externally as to how others judge us) are needed because anyone and everyone calls into question or can call into question the action of the actor exactly in regard to its (i.e. the said actor’s action’s) meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness). Socialisation consists not least of all in of one learning to act not instinctively, but with (rational and reasoned) justification, that is to say, to put down and reduce kinds of acting, actions and acts to reasons, and through and by means of reasons legitimise kinds of acting, actions and acts, irrespective of whether this often amounts to in concreto (i.e. concretely) the mere rationalisation of one’s own motivation towards the inside (inwardly) and towards the outside (outwardly). In the statement and specification of the

reasons and grounds for one's kinds of acting, actions and acts, a wish in respect of justification, or else, the wish, "to anticipate a challenge to our actions"<sup>14</sup> is expressed.

With these general remarks and observations, we have hopefully indicated the breadth of the examination of the problem of rationality. A direct or indirect reduction of rationality to so-called "end-goal and purposeful/expedient rationality (or rationality in respect of an end/goal)", i.e. to the adequate correlation of end/goal and means with each other, proves itself to be too one-sided and narrow in order to fulfil and be up to the phenomenon [of rationality] even only in terms of its beginnings, i.e. elementarily. From the perspective of the social relation, on the other hand, all essential dimensions of rationality simultaneously appear and can be dealt with, treated and handled as an in itself differentiated unit(y) (uniformity or unified whole). Ends and goals are always relative, since they relate and refer to the ends and goals or, in any case, activities of other men (i.e. humans, people); their realisation aims at the consolidation (strengthening and stabilisation) or modification of a social relation. Rational performances, achievements and accomplishments do not merely demand their attainment and achievement and accomplishment through and by means of certain means, but likewise their justification and legitimising, which, again, refer to meaning as the constitutive element of a world theory (i.e. world view) and an identity; inseparable from them (the said world theory/view and identity) are the argumentative-theoretical and psychological processes of rationalisation. Instrumental rationality, symbolic rationality and the rationality of identity<sup>iv</sup> belong, anthropologically, social-ontologically and in concrete action together, whichever one of them dominates and rules and holds sway over the scene on each and every respective occasion. The relativisation, which befalls and happens to instrumental rationality through and by means of its

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<sup>14</sup> Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes", pp. 12ff., 7 (the citation/quote/quotation here).

being put into order, classification and categorisation in the broader complex of rationality, is, though, by no means to be understood as the overcoming of the same instrumental rationality through and by means of one ethical-normative rationality overarching (spilling over, overlapping, spreading) over and into all facets of rationality. A unification of rationality can never succeed, neither under instrumental, nor under ethical points of view. It (i.e. the said unification of rationality) remains a matter, affair, business, cause and case of anthropology and of social ontology. These (i.e. anthropology and social ontology) are, however, as we have said, ethically and technically blind.

b. The rationality of the means and the rationality of the ends/goals

The correlation of the means and ends/goals with each other becomes, as we know, a problem, whose managing demands rational performances and achievements as soon as the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction puts short-term or long-term goal/end-setting and planning on the agenda. But it (i.e. the said short-term and long-term goal/end-setting) is only in simple cases simple, namely only when the end/goal is clearly delineable (traceable) and realisable when the means exclusively apply to, and are valid for, the pursuit and pursuance of the end/goal, and when neither the attaining and achievement of the end/goal, nor the application of the means set off and bring on or cause unforeseeable and uncontrollable effects and impacts. Only in such cases can a theory of rationality be developed with security and certainty – provided that, that is to say, it (i.e. the said theory of rationality) moves within fairly narrow bound(arie)s, otherwise it does not make do without a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) which covers the main variations concerning the constitution, composition and texture and its own dynamic(s) of end/goal and means, as well as concerning their possible correlations with each

other (i.e. of the said end/goal and means). This casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) serves, though, theoretical ends/goals, it does not describe or convey the form-related (i.e. formal) structure of really (i.e. in reality) planned and carried out kinds of acting, actions and acts, but rather the deviations and divergences of real processes from the planned processes; the uncontrollable disharmonies between end/goal and means, which exactly came into being in and during the endeavour and effort of their harmonisation with each other. The ubiquity of the schema “end/goal-means” says little about the stringency with which it is – be it because of subjective inadequacies (deficiencies), be it because of objective reasons – handled. But for stringency to be in general possible and plannable, the simple case sketched above must exist, which, though, has, under no circumstances, the simple presupposition and precondition that the assessment of the situation and the correlation of the end/goal with the means on the part of the actor completely and fully suffices for the real given (actual) facts. Not without good reason, Aristotle handled and treated the question and problem of this correlation by assuming the (cap)ability of the actor to know what is in his power and from what to distance himself or refrain and desist, what, anyhow, lies outside of the range of his forces, strengths and powers. In order to use the suitable and appropriate means effectively, one must, hence, be clear about the end/goal and its attainability or achievability<sup>15</sup>. Not differently, did Pareto think, who defined the “logical kinds of acting, actions and acts” in accordance with two criteria: the absolute ponderability / calculability or (else) controllability of the end/goal, and, the determination of the end/goal on the basis of cool thought, consideration and logic. Whereas “not logical / non-logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts spring,

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<sup>15</sup> *Nikomachische Ethik*, III, 5 (1112b 13ff.) [= «βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεινο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἄν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ... » (12-20)]]

originate and arise from a psychological state (of affairs), i.e. certain feelings (sentiments and emotions) or unconscious motives, “logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts result from a “ragionamento”, an (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation), and strive after and aim for a real and not merely imaginary end / goal, i.e. such an end/goal which belongs within the realm or area of observation and experience; they (i.e. the said “logical” kinds of acting, actions or acts) consist in the use of means which are suitable for the attainment and achievement of the end/goal, and they connect, in a logically apt, appropriate and well-judged manner, means and end/goal with each other. Here the subjective (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation) and objective existence of the deed or act(ion) (i.e. objective state of affairs, facts, circumstances, whole truth of the matter or facts of the case) coincide, even though the ascertainment regarding this coincidence must be made by an observer standing outside [of what is being observed] or by an outside / external observer who thinks “logically-experimentally”; because the actors believe, anyway, that they act logically<sup>16</sup>.

Pareto was convinced of the preponderance of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and or acts in social life; he, however, did not underestimate at all the social meaning of the “very delicate and fragile” logical kinds of acting, actions and or acts, which he saw at work, above all, in the economic realm, but also in artistic and scientific work, as well as in military, political and juridical, legal undertakings and enterprises<sup>17</sup>. The weakness of his position does not lie in this apportionment of loads or burdens, but in the dichotomous way of looking at things, through and by means of which he gets to that apportionment of loads. In the interest of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) sharp distinction

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<sup>16</sup> *Trattato*, §§ 150, 151, 161.

<sup>17</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 152.

between logical and non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, he (i.e. Pareto) did not think that the former logical acts have to lose their purity as soon as they overstep and exceed a relatively narrow action radius (or radius of action), and can no longer manage or effect a clear and manageable correlation of end/goal and means with each other. Thus, he ascribes everything which does not represent and constitute an absolutely controllable practical result and or outcome of a logical-experimental (argumentative) reasoning (line of reasoning, way of thinking or (rational) argumentation), to the effect and impact of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, whereby and in relation to which he loses sight of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) and socially weighty, i.e. important and influential possibility that logical kinds of acting, actions and acts *as such*, over the long run, do not necessarily have to entail logical consequences, that, therefore, the social preponderance or predominance of the non-logical cannot be put down and reduced exclusively to the effect and impact of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts. With his precise distinction between “non-logical” and “illogical” kinds of acting, actions and acts, Pareto fully recognised the objective social logic of the – in a logical-experimental respect – non-logical; conversely, however, he did not want to cloud and muddy the logical kinds of acting, actions and acts with objective social non-logic. Faithful to his dichotomous way of looking at things, he did not systematically inquire and research into the unintended (unintentional) consequences of (logical) action, and consequently let it be known that the pure schema of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts is *socially* of worth and value as explanation only in its narrow version and within a short range, reach and scope – irrespective of its heuristic indispensability or its anthropological aspect. A narrow version and a short range, reach and scope means as much as the exclusion (or ruling out) of the time factor, because time is exactly the mother of the unintended (unintentional) consequences of otherwise logical action. It (i.e. time) also produces (causes and gives rise to) everything which

intervenes between end/goal and means, and makes their planned strict correlation with each other loose and slack or even destroys and annihilates such planned strict correlation of end/goal and means, – with the result that action is tangled and involved in a series of frictions which often lead to a different set of circumstances than that wished for. The imponderabilities in and during *logical* action also stretch and extend to two levels, which appear in the course of time; that level of the consequences after the attainment and achievement of the end/goal (a kind of acting, action and act can, therefore, be logical in itself, [[and]] be carried out and executed up until its planned end as the logical kind of acting, action and act, and nonetheless, prove – in the flow or flux of the action – to be non-logical), and that level during the application of the means. Before what is unforeseen and unexpected, the meticulous remaining in absolute foreseeability saves the actor in both cases, i.e. in and during the narrowest version of the schema “end/goal-means”. However, that is not always the case, without losing essential, substantial chances and opportunities in respect of acting, action and the act; immunity against every unwished-for side-effect is often or frequently bought by the slackening and waning (i.e. up to paralysis) of action.

Before we turn to the rationality of ends/goals and the consequences of attained and achieved or even non-attainable, non-achievable ends/goals, we must touch upon an aspect of the examination of the problem of means, regarding which Pareto, for obvious reasons, could say little: we mean the momentum of the means’ own dynamic(s) and logic, that is, the praxeological autonomisation of the means. It is obvious that the latter (praxeological autonomisation of the means), in and during the stringent and tight version of the schema “ends-means”, does not have to occur and happen at all; here the means exclusively serve the end/goal, and a logical acting, action or act is portrayed and depicted exactly by the fact that it (i.e. the said logical acting,

action or act) uses its own or the most expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-an-end/goal means in and during the full safeguarding and protection of the primacy of the end/goal. Said otherwise: the rationality of the means as means is guaranteed and ensured when the said means are not converted and transformed on the side and en route or on the way into ends and goals – whereas the rationality of the action as a whole (i.e. beyond the individual acting, action and or act) could demand exactly this conversion and transformation; the latter (conversion or transformation) occurs, anyhow, without difficulties when other or different reasons command it, since things and kinds of acting, actions and acts, isolated and in themselves, are neither means nor ends/goals, but can become both means and ends/goals: here we are dealing with functional, not with ontological attributes. The same conversion and transformation of means into ends/goals is favoured (or aided (and abetted)), in addition, by the fact that the actor, in the course of this, does not have to think in new categories; the form-related (i.e. formal) rationality of the schema “end/goal-means” remains unchanged and unmodified, the contents are only interchanged, substituted or replaced. But irrespective of what is regarded as an end/goal and what, on each and every respective occasion, is regarded as the means: means are only rational as long as they do not develop their own logic, and thereby bring consequences to light which more or less deviate, diverge or differ from those consequences originally intended and aimed at, i.e. expected on the basis of the attainment and achievement of the original goal/end. Into the heterogony of ends – regardless of whether it (i.e. such heterogony of ends) comes into being through the means’ own logic or through the uncontrollable consequences of the attainment and achievement of the ends/goals – runs and bumps every subjective rationality in its ultimate and final bound(arie)s and limits. “Logical kinds of acting, actions and acts” are here not exempted or excluded<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> Regarding the means’ own logic cf. ch. IV, Section 2Aa, esp. footnote 377, and 378, above.

From his dichotomous perspective, and in regard to his narrow, i.e. strict definition of the logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, Pareto had to, as we have said, exclusively assign the unintended (unintentional) consequences of action to non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, and indeed to a certain category amongst them. Whilst in and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, the subjective and the objective end/goal are identical, the non-logical kinds of acting, action and acts distinguish themselves and stand out through and by means of the distance (interval or gap) between the subjective and the objective end/goal, which can take (on) and assume and adopt four [[according to Pareto]] forms, out of which, again, four categories of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts arise and ensue. First, there is the case where the acting, action and act, neither objectively, nor in the awareness and consciousness of the actor, has a logical end/goal (e.g. purely habitual (and or consuetudinary) kinds of acting, actions and acts). Secondly, the logical bond or tie between acting, action and the act (as means) and consequence (as end/goal) is lacking, missing and absent, although the actor holds his kinds of acting, actions or acts to be expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-an-end/goal means for the realisation of his intentions (a typical example of this case : magic, witchcraft, wizardry and sorcery). Thirdly, kinds of acting, actions and acts, without the knowledge and the plan(ning) of the actor, can cause, give rise to and create the wished-for and desired results (this is actually the realm and area of the “behaviour”, i.e. of instinctive reactions, wherein men (i.e. humans) differ least from the rest of the animals). And finally, a discrepancy occurs between the objective consequences and the subjective ends/goals of the action, although the actor believes in the expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of an end/goal of his means (a typical example: the coming into being of a tyrannical regime from a revolution in the name of freedom). The first and the third of these kinds of acting, action and act are socially hardly of any weight and importance, as Pareto himself remarked, noticed and observed, since they

have no subjective end/goal, or else, subjectively meant meaning, and, hence, need no justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation); if such a justification proves to be necessary, then, the kinds of acting, actions and acts must be assigned to the second or fourth kind of non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts. The second non-logical kind of acting, for which Pareto offers a psychological and ethnological, rather than a social-ontological explanation, can, likewise, be neglected or ignored, since in it, the schema “end/goal-means” is, in practice, left out and unnecessary: the means do not achieve, attain or get any real, intended (desired, intentional or deliberate) or unintended result, [[but]] merely an imagined result. Only the fourth category of acting, action and the act raise the question and problem of the objective consequences of action, which are called “fine oggettivo [[= objective end (purpose)]]” by Pareto, and it is contrasted with the subjective end / goal (fine soggettivo [[= subjective end (purpose)]] of the person acting. Only this category, incidentally, fully fits in with or is suitable for Pareto’s definition of the unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, which are supposed or ought to be distinguished by the distance, interval or gap between the subjective and objective end/goal: because only in and during kinds of acting, actions and acts of this kind is there both a subjective end/goal as well as the visible consequences of the striving and aiming for this end; *therein* do such unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts agree with the logical (kinds of acting, actions and acts)<sup>v</sup>.

The unintended (unintentional) consequences of action in the context of the non-logical kinds of acting, actions and acts pose the question of the rationality of the subjective end/goal as follows: to what extent is the objective unattainability, unachieveability (i.e. non-achievability) and unreachability of the subjective end/goal *necessarily* the cause of (and reason for) unintended

(unintentional) consequences, to what extent does rational planning in respect of means in regard to and during unreachable, unattainable and unachievable subjective ends/goals *necessarily* contribute to the appearance (emergence, advent) of unintended consequences? Whereas in regard to and during logical kinds of acting, actions and acts, unintended consequences only appear after the achieving (attaining and reaching) of the subjective end/goal, such consequences come into being in regard to and during unlogical (i.e. non-logical) kinds of acting, actions and acts because the subjective end/goal is unattainable, unachievable and unreachable and because an unattainable and unachievable end/goal was striven for/after, aspired to and sought. The result of the striving for an unattainable and unachievable end/goal does not always have to equal nought, i.e. zero, that is, to be equal to and the same as the return to the starting (i.e. initial or original) situation. The more thoroughly, profoundly and rationally was the unattainable and unachievable end/goal striven after/for and sought, the more diverse, varied and powerful, formidable were the deployed and used means in the course of this, so much the more does the – in its nominal (i.e. face) value – undertaking and enterprise, [[which was]] unsuccessful from the outset, penetrate into the thicket, jungle and maze of real praxis (practice), [[and]] so much the more does the logic of the means, which substitute and replace the original end/goal to the extent its (i.e. the original end/goal's) unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) – at least *hic et nunc* (i.e. here and now) – is directly or indirectly admitted (owned up to and granted), makes itself (and becomes) independent. We may and can hold onto this: where unattainable and unachievable ends/goals were striven for and sought, the means' own logic unfolded and developed to the greatest probability and with the most power. That is why unattainable and unachievable ends/goals do not mean *eo ipso* the saying farewell to or parting from life, but should the occasion arise (and if necessary), a still deeper involvement, entanglement and embroilment therein (i.e. in life). This involvement, entanglement and

embroilment is not only carried out and executed via the nominal end/goal of action, but via in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals, which, from the perspective of the nominal end/goal, looked like means; now, however, they have become, in practice, ends/goals in themselves, which entail and bring with them a new content-related order of the schema “end/goal-means”. In the course of this, the original end/goal does not have to necessarily either be forgotten or disavowed and disclaimed, however, unavoidably and inevitably, action simultaneously moves at two levels of rationality, that level of the invoking of the original end/goal and that level of the practical striving for and aspiring to in-between, i.e. intermediate or interim ends/goals and or means becoming the practical ends/goals in themselves. The revolutionary does precisely this, e.g. he holds out the prospect of and promises a free classless society, but “temporarily” and even in name this latter end/goal (of a free classless society) establishes, builds and erects a strictly hierarchised dictatorship<sup>19</sup> – but also every parliamentary government, which more or less passes by or goes over (i.e. ignores and avoids) its programmatic declarations, as well as those men (people, humans) (and they are not the fewest of people), who confess their faith nominally in certain ethical values, but in their praxis in respect of life (or, in their life practice) follow rules of wisdom (as shrewdness, astuteness, cleverness, judiciousness, i.e. convenience and expediency). The unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-attainability and non-achievability) of the ultimate end/goal (e.g. to live purely ethically) does not condemn the actor to inaction at all, but only separates and divides the above-mentioned two levels of acting, action and the act from each other, whereby and in relation to which, though, the actor does not necessarily know or does not necessarily want to know of this separation and division, but probably possesses the more or less refined capability of serving two rationalities simultaneously. The absolute belief and

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<sup>19</sup> In greater detail, in relation to that, in Kondylis, “Utopie”.

faith in unattainable and unachievable ends/goals does not signify and mean the absolute adaptation and adjustment of the mode of conduct (or way of behaving, acting, action and the act) to that which that faith and belief, taken at face value, would dictate in practice. When the latter (belief and faith) is unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical), i.e. in Pareto's terminology, is "logically-experimentally" untenable and indefensible, and consequently threatens to paralyse the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital and essential) use of effective means, then the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (which can even run counter to and go against the biological drive, urge and impulse of self preservation<sup>vi</sup>) hinders, blocks and prevents idling or the leap into the void by virtue of the fact that the actor makes his way and proceeds to a level of acting, action and the act, which, with regard to the unattainable and unachievable end/goal, is supposed or ought to function as a means; in reality, however, it permits an independent, self-supporting and autonomous "logically-experimentally" secured and protected handling of the schema "end/goal-means". The relation with the unattainable, unreachable and unachievable end / goal, indeed, is retained and preserved, but it henceforth has symbolic meaning, i.e. it says something about the self-understanding of the actor or, in any case, something about the manner as to how he, for his part, wants to be seen by other actors. The pope believes in holiness as the ultimate end/goal of man; he, however, does not regulate the finances or the politics of the Vatican on the basis of this faith and belief, although he, in the eyes of the flock, whose shepherd he is, continues to appear to be the representative of the aforementioned ultimate end/goal, and not, for instance, as a financial administrator, manager, bursar or as a politician. In regard to these latter characteristics and traits, he does not, in principle, differ from other actors, who pursue other unattainable, unreachable, unachievable and/or attainable, achievable and reachable ends/goals. The displacement, shift and transfer of the practical activity from the level of unattainable, unreachable and unachievable

ends/goals to the level where the logically-experimentally secured and protected handling of the schema “(attainable, reachable, achievable) end/goal-means” takes place, makes understandable why actors, who have in mind and imagine different (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends/goals in the form of ideologies and world theories (i.e. world views), make use of the same practical rationality, and can meet and encounter one another as friends or foes in social life as representatives of the same rationality, regardless of their differences concerning the ultimate (unattainable, unreachable and unachievable) ends / goals. Also here, the social relation proves and turns out to be the determinative factor.

All this is not supposed to mean that it is, in practice, indifferent as to whether an actor pursues an attainable and achievable end/goal or an unattainable and unachievable end/goal. The question (and problem) is, however, constantly at which level and in which sense an end/goal is to be regarded as attainable and achievable or unattainable and unachievable, i.e. at which level does the actor move on each and every respective occasion. At the level where ends/goals – under penalty of practical failure – may or are supposed to be (in principle) attainable and achievable only, the rationality of the direct correlation of the end / goal and means with each other unfolds and develops more or less successfully, whereby until the conclusion and finalisation of the acting, action and act, the ends/goals remain exactly ends/goals, and the means remain means too. At the level, again, where the unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the declared ends/goals does not bring with it and entails no immediate or even any punishment (on the contrary: the sincere, heartfelt, or mendacious, propagation of unrealisable ideals as ends/goals of individual or social action can, in practice, be worthwhile), rationality unfolds and develops in the wider sense of the anthropological (pre)disposition or aptitude, whereby the criterion of the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or

meaningfulness) of the ends/goals frequently puts into the shade, i.e. overshadows that criterion of the said ends/goals' (actual) attainability and achievability. In the constitution of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) possesses, obviously, a higher, superior ontological status than rationality in the sense of the pursuit of attainable and achievable ends/goals through suitable means; because not only attainable and achievable ends/goals are meaning-like, i.e. meaningful – in other words: rationality *as* (an) anthropological (pre-)disposition or aptitude only guarantees meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness), not the (in principle) attainability and achievability of the ends/goals. The schema “end(goal)-means” belongs, however, also to the original (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), which, incidentally, can hardly be separated from meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) as such. From that ensues and results that this schema, seen as a form, has just as little – like meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) – to do with attainable and achievable ends/goals. In the spirit of the originator (author, creator and fabricator) of unlogical (i.e. non-logical and illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts, it (i.e. the said schema of end/goal-means) is shaped, moulded and formed in accordance with the same form-related (i.e. formal) points of view (angles and perspectives) as in the spirit of the originator of logical kinds of acting, actions and acts. No man (i.e. human or person) can intentionally (deliberately and on purpose) use means which go against and run counter to his end/goal, because, in this case, his true end/goal would consist in thwarting, frustrating, foiling and preventing his declared end/goal; and every man (i.e. human or person) must, already on account of the fact he has ends/goals and can only live socially, develop activities, which he necessarily comprehends as means for the attainment and achievement of those ends/goals. If the latter ends

/ goals are unattainable and unachievable, thus he fails conclusively and definitively as a social being, or he makes a new beginning. Very often he does, however, neither the one or the other, but swings and oscillates between the levels of the unattainable and unachievable, and, the levels of the attainable and achievable, whereby and in relation to which he, as we have described, converts and transforms – at the level of the latter (what is achievable) – the means of the former (what is unachievable) into ends/goals without ever expressly repudiating and disowning the unattainable and unachievable ends/goals. We do not have to especially (specifically or expressly) explain that all these types of acting, action and the act can be represented by the same actor at various points in time, or even simultaneously. Because no-one exclusively and solely pursues attainable and achievable or exclusively and solely unattainable and unachievable ends/goals.

The interplay between what is unattainable, unachievable and what is attainable, achievable, between what is meaning-like, i.e. meaningful and what is realisable, in particular leaves to the unintended (unintentional) consequences of action more room for unfolding and development, i.e. more room to move, above all, however, it points to the fragility and frailty of the narrower concept(ual plan) of rationality, which rests and is based on the schema of “end/goal-means”. Into the area and realm of the application of this schema, other levels and forms of rationality constantly force their way, penetrate and make inroads, and they widen or loosen and slacken it (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema) in such a way that it is of little use and hardly suitable for concrete praxis (practice). Its (i.e. the said area and realm of the application of the “end/goal-means” schema’s) reduced practical suitability (fitness and efficiency) can, though, simply, hence, touch upon the fact that in regard to and during demonstrably attainable and achievable ends / goals, the means were falsely chosen or used. This is,



(the said rationality of the ends / goals) only (or first) makes possible and enables the wished-for and desired effect and impact of the rational means. Against which measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark, however, is the rationality of the ends/goals to be measured? Which kind of rationality of the ends/goals permits the direct and stable connection and binding between the rationality of the ends/goals and of the rationality of the means, i.e. such a connection and binding, in regard to and during which the possibility of a conversion and transformation of the (starting, initial) means into (new) ends/goals is excluded? Here, one can go beyond Aristotle or Pareto with difficulty, irrespective of which world-theoretical premises one has (or: irrespective of the world-theoretical premises underlying one[‘s fundamental position(ing)]) on each and every respective occasion. The sole measure, standard, criterion, yardstick or benchmark in respect of the rationality of the end/goal, which suffices for (or comes up to, meets and fulfils) “logical-experimental” demands, remains attainability and achievability, and this achievability, again, can only be ascertained often only *ex eventu* (i.e. from the event (*or*: after the event, following the occurrence of)), something which converts the rationality of the end/goal into a tautology. (We want to disregard here cases like the attainment and achievement of the end/goal through and by means of coincidence, accident, contingency, happenstance and chance etc..) No other determination of the rationality of the end/goal permits its (i.e. the rationality of the end/goal’s) direct connection and binding with the rationality of the means, and in this respect, it is also psychologically correct and right to look at the regular, orderly and regulated carrying out, realisation and implementation of the models, blueprints, outlines, sketches or drafts in respect of acting, actions and acts (or action plans) with regard to the most favourable point in time for their realisation as signs of dispositional rationality<sup>21</sup>. An

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<sup>21</sup> Bandura, “Self Efficacy”.

ethical definition of that rationality would e.g. in and during the possible and potential or eventual unattainability or unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ethical end/goal leave open the possibility described above of shifting, transferring or moving the centre of gravity, main emphasis or focal point of the practical activity from the level of unattainable and unachievable ends/goals to the level where a logically-experimentally safeguarded, secured and protected handling of the schema “end/goal-means” can take place – with the result of a factual transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends / goals. On the other hand, ethically irrational<sup>vii</sup> ends/goals would not in the least stand in the way of a stable and direct, logical connection and combining of end/goal and means with each other. A rational choice and handling of the means does not at all obstruct or hinder the end/goal of committing a murder. The former (means) are actually not endangered or put at risk through and by means of the constitution, composure and texture of the end/goal in itself, but through and by means of the intellectual-spiritual (mental-emotional) constitution (i.e. state, condition or state and frame of mind) of the actor.

The attempt to safeguard, secure and protect the general rationality of action via the rationality of the end/goal stems from the permanent human concern or anxiety around (i.e. regarding) the avoidance of the unintended (unintentional) consequences of the acting, action or act and a transformation and conversion of the (initial, starting) means into (new) ends/goals – irrespective of whether the actor himself in retrospect regretted or welcomed this transformation and conversion. (Formal) guarantees for the appeasement (or easing) of this concern or anxiety can, however, in the end, grant or accord only a narrow version of the rationality of the end/goal, whereupon rationality means just as much as (i.e. the same as) justice<sup>viii</sup>. The same concern or anxiety stems from another attempt at the safeguarding, securing and protecting of the general rationality of the action, which proceeds in the reverse manner and bumps or runs into and encounters

reverse(d) difficulties. Here the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals is declared to be meaningless and the ultimate guarantee for rationality is seen, perceived or espied in the expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of means. Since human action finds itself always on the search for means and uses means in order to realise ends/goals, thus, action is – on the basis of the ubiquity of the schema “end/goal-means” – by definition and always rational, and indeed regardless of the subjective rationality and of the motivation of the actor or of the success of his endeavours and efforts; with regard to the determination of the ends/goals in themselves, the familiar and common contrast and opposition between what is rational and what is irrational (i.e. between the Rational and the Irrational) loses its meaning fully<sup>22</sup>. But the recourse and reverting to the broader anthropological level does not solve the problems of the narrower acting-theory levels (i.e. the narrower levels pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act), but blurs, on the contrary, their specific character; the narrower the logical level, the more specific must the concepts be, which are supposed or ought to bring clarity<sup>ix</sup>. Said differently: the allusion and reference to (or indication of) the anthropological taking root of the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end/goal-means” says nothing about the determination of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means, which no theory of rationality in respect of acting, action and the act, and also no actor, can go around and circumvent. Rationality as a human attribute in the form of the “end/goal-means”-schema, and, rationality in the form of that determination (of the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means), are two different things and move at different logical levels: the former (rationality as a human attribute) is in all men, i.e. humans, the same, the latter (rationality as the determination of

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<sup>22</sup> Thus, v. Mises, *Grundprobleme*, p. 32ff., 63; *Human action*, p. 12ff., 18ff..

the relations between the constitution, composition and texture of the end/goal and the choice of means) changes from actor to actor, and exactly because of that, the theory of acting, action and the act stands before the task of naming the criteria for the ends/goals and of the means. Whoever is satisfied with the form-related (i.e. formal) schema “end/goal-means” and puts in the files (i.e. archives) the question and problem of the rationality of the ends/goals, does not want to admit that the attainability and achievability or else the unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals, called (i.e. taken as) the yardstick, measure, standard for rationality, determines both the effectiveness and effectuality of the means, as well as their fate and destiny, i.e. determines the rationality of the ends/goals, whether the means remain up to the conclusion and the finalisation of the acting, action and act, means, or whether they (i.e. the said means) will – en route and along or on the way – be converted and transformed into (new) ends/goals; likewise it (i.e. the attainability and achievability or else the unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals) determines the manner, as well as the point in time, of the appearance and emergence or advent of the unintended (unintentional) consequences. The leaving aside or exclusion of the rationality of the ends/goals happens, though, for good reason, when, with that, it is meant that the ethical character of the ends/goals has no influence on praxeological rationality. However, the ethical neutrality of the ends/goals would be tantamount to a neutrality of the ends/goals vis-à-vis rationality and irrationality only if ethics and rationality were identical right and all down the line and across the board; and this is not the case. Even after the leaving aside or exclusion of the ethical factor in and during the determination of the ends/goals, the constitution, composition and texture of the ends/goals, especially with regard to the criterion of attainability and achievability, influence the unfolding and development of the schema “end/goal-means” in the concrete acting area or sphere (i.e. in the concrete space (in respect) of acting, action and the act). That

leaving aside or elimination (of the ethical factor in the determination of the ends/goals) does not at all result in or yield eo ipso a clean or neat rationality of acting, action or the act. Incidentally, it sounds comical when the same v. Mises, who wants to set aside and eliminate irrationality and rationality at the level of the ends/goals, and sees at work the rationality of the form-related (i.e. formal) end/goal-means schema even in the kinds of acting, actions and acts of psychopaths, takes to the field and goes into battle against the “totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism (or the liberalism of the economy) with the argument, of all arguments, that these (“totalitarian” foes of economic liberalism) would trigger, spark and set off a “Revolt against Reason”<sup>23</sup>. Polemical needs and requirements bring into being very quickly, again, the in principle disavowed, disowned and repudiated connection and binding of ethics and rationality.

c. Rationality as world-theoretical rationalisation<sup>x</sup>

We have already had the opportunity to discuss the anthropological and social-ontological status of meaning, as well as to point out the original interrelation or connection between meaning-likeness (i.e. related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) and rationality as regards each other, which proves that the equating of rationality with the pursuit of attainable, reachable and achievable ends/goals through and by way of suitable means as being too narrow<sup>24</sup>. If meaning transfers and shifts the framework or context of reference of the human (sphere, dimension) (*or*: the Human), from the biological (sphere, dimension) (the Biological) to the ideational (sphere, dimension) (the Ideational), and through and by means of the mediation of social life gives concepts like self-preservation a radically new content, which can in fact go against their

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<sup>23</sup> *Human action*, p. 72ff..

<sup>24</sup> See Ch. IV, 2Ac and Section 1Bb in this chapter, above.

biological content, then rationality undertakes the task of articulating meaning consistently and effectively. Obviously, meaning is, in practice, inconceivable without such articulation; that is why rationality reaches and extends anthropologically and social-ontologically as far back as meaning itself. If we disregard the connected with it (i.e. the animal rationale) ethical-self-satisfied connotations, thus, the self-understanding of the genus (i.e. species as human race), which describes itself as an animal rationale, aptly represents, reflects and conveys the facts of the situation. Hence, its (i.e. the genus's / human race's) members can forego the invocation of rationality just as little as its (i.e. the genus's / human race's) kinds of acting, actions or acts can withdraw from and evade and go and be beyond meaning. That invocation underpins, in fact, par excellence the claim of being a worthier and more dignified member of the human genus (i.e. species or race), whilst the reproach or accusation that a person is lacking in rationality, moves this person within the vicinity and proximity of the animal kingdom; it degrades and debases him and takes away human seriousness a limine (i.e. from the beginning) from his words and deeds. Consequently, rationality constitutes the desirable ally and an effective weapon of every individual or collective vis-à-vis other people; language usage knows it by verifying (and characterising) with the adverb or adjective "reasonable / reasonably, sensible / sensibly, (in a) level-headed (manner), rational(ly)", very different wished-for or actual form(ation)s of the social relation. ("We have, finally, spoken reasonably, sensibly, rationally and in a level-headed manner to each other", "you, as a reasonable, sensible, rational and level-headed person must see that", "that was a reasonable, sensible, rational and level-headed compromise", "I warn you: be reasonable, sensible, rational, level-headed", "I shall bring you to your senses / I shall bring you to a state of reason, sensibleness, level-headedness)" etc.) Everyone wants to have the generally recognised anthropological and social-ontological constants on their side, provided, though, that one reserves the competence and jurisdiction (i.e. the

right) to their interpretation turned towards or within the Normative (the normative sphere). Whoever more or less convincingly and persuasively connects the meaning of life, which can only be meaning-like, i.e. meaningful as human life, with his own matters of concern and ends/goals, has a good chance of mobilising the social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation of humans in favour of these matters of concern and ends/goals, and, in fact, in relation to that, to bring humans to [[the point of]] overcoming their biological drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation (e.g. voluntary death in favour of a “great idea” etc.). Rationality is no different. Whoever more or less effectively invokes it (i.e. rationality), offers to other people everything which is commonly regarded as an attribute or practical result of rationality: the postponement (delay or deferment) of egotistical kinds of satisfaction and the stemming and checking of blind drives, urges and impulses; consistency, calculability, ponderability and order in private or public relationships and circumstances. It is certainly, in general, correct that in social life, in concrete persons, situations and circumstances, not “reason” or “rationality” mould, shape and form the positionings, attitudes and the action [[of these concrete persons, situations and circumstances]], but rather a reason in respect of an occasion, opportunity or chance, and a situation-bound, on-occasion / occasional rationality, in practice, is the deciding factor<sup>25</sup>. From this ascertainment, however, the norms which some “postmodern” foes of the “totalitarianism of reason” want to deduce and derive, cannot in the least be deduced and derived; that every invocation of “reason” or of “rationality”, in the interest of tolerance and of peace, is supposed to or ought to fail to materialise and stay away. That might be ethically expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) or not, however, it certainly and surely can hardly be realised<sup>xi</sup>. Even pluralistic Western mass democracy, in which such ideologemes find favourable ground, soil and terrain,

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<sup>25</sup> In relation to that, Spinner, *Grundsatzvernunft und Gelegenheitsvernunft*.

and are functionally indispensable, must pull on the brakes and slow things down as soon as the in principle propagated pluralism of values and/or of rationalities threatens to degenerate into complete anarchy. The great variety / multiformity of values is tolerated under the reservation, i.e. with the proviso of the exclusive validity of the value of tolerance and, moreover, those values (e.g. “human dignity”), which are supposed or ought to bear and support these values<sup>xii</sup>. In this respect, it (i.e. pluralistic Western mass democracy) must accord to “reason” and “rationality” the same value as other societies which have to deal with problems of legitimation, irrespective of how they are accustomed to calling “reason” and “rationality”<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, the level of the actual use of rationality does not necessarily coincide with that level of legitimisation through and by means of rationality or else of that level of rationalisation, as we shall immediately see. Without the array (i.e. mobilisation) of “rational” principles towards ends/goals of legitimation and or polemical ends/goals, individual and collective identities hardly get by and manage, whereby and in relation to which, each and every respective dominant social relation determines the form and the extent of the array (i.e. mobilisation). The same applies, in fact, with reference to questions, problems or kinds of acting, actions and acts which barely touch upon the core of identity. As a rational animal, man (i.e. humans) is, as it were, under the prohibition of doing something without declaring the rational grounds/reasons for what he does. This aspect of rationality, which especially interrelates and correlates and connects with the need for rationalisation and the endeavour and effort at rationalisation, Benjamin Franklin had once outlined wittily and cleverly: “So convenient a thing is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do”<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> In relation to that, in detail, Kondylis, „Universalismus“.

<sup>27</sup> *Autobiography*, p. 42.

Rationality and rationalisation are, as just indicated, not one and the same [[thing]]. The latter (rationalisation) constitutes one amongst the many forms of the former (rationality), when it is not understood merely as a process in and during which higher degrees of rationality are attained, reached and achieved (e.g. the “rationalisation of the economy”, the rationalisation of the legislation” etc.). Rationalisation, as we want to discuss it in this and in the next section, means the intellectual / thought(-related) processing of a psychical or a theoretical stuff (i.e. (subject) matter, material or topic), so that the positionings, attitudes and kinds of acting, actions and acts or interpretations of the world (at whatever level) appear as the work of rationality, and hence the accusation of instinctive self-interest or of prejudice may not be entailed (i.e. made). Rationalisation is, accordingly, in the widest sense, legitimisation through and by means of rationality, whereby and in relation to which the term more likely is suited to cases in which the suspicion of self-interest and of prejudice is and ought to be class(ifi)ed as particularly strong. It (i.e. the said rationalisation) proceeds and takes place both in foro interno (i.e. internally or inwardly (in the court of one’s conscience)) as well as in foro externo (i.e. externally or outwardly (in the court of public opinion)), without both of the fora (i.e. forums or courts of conscience and public opinion) having to be in harmony and agreement with each other; the greater or smaller distance between them (i.e. the said fora) causes and gives rise to either unease and embarrassment, awkwardness, perplexity, or it (i.e. the said distance) is bridged by hypocrisy or even both occur simultaneously. At the level of acting, action and the act, (the) rationalisation serves in relation to that, to blur the boundaries between logical and unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts – in accordance with Pareto’s terminology –, and to give to the latter (unlogical (i.e. non-logical or illogical) kinds of acting, actions and acts the appearance of the former (logical kinds of acting, actions and acts), since through and by means of rationalisation, the motive for the acting, action and act, or else the “irrational

drive, urge and impulse”, is transformed and converted into a reason for the acting, action and act. Without doubt, the processes of psychological and of world-theoretical rationalisation are narrowly and tightly (i.e. closely) related to each other and exhibit and show central structural similarities. We begin with world-theoretical rationalisation and make use of the old-fashioned and antiquated, but irreplaceable concept of the “world theory (i.e. world view)”, in order to indicate that it is not merely a matter here of theories in the narrower sense, but, in general, of the manner as to how an individual or collective subject sees the social and the natural world, and, above all, how he or it defines his/its place inside of the same (social and natural world) in comparison with the place of other subjects (i.e. from the perspective of the social relation)<sup>28</sup> – irrespective of with which means and at which theoretical height, i.e. no matter whether, in the course of this, concepts or rather symbols or mixtures of both, namely “poetry, seals or sealings of the concept” (Fr. Lange) dominate.

The social relation leaves (behind it) powerful traces not only in regard to the content of the rationally shaped and formed world-theoretical thought construct (*or*: construction of thought); it (i.e. the social relation) moreover constitutes a main motor (engine or driving force) of the undertaking of rationalisation itself, which forces and compels the same (undertaking of rationalisation). If the undertaking of rationalisation is supposed to have prospects of socially recognised success, thus, it must, first of all, offer explanations (of the “mythical” or of the “scientific” kind) for social, cosmological etc. phenomena,

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<sup>28</sup> Dilthey put at the centre of attention of his teaching, doctrine and theory of the world theory (i.e. world view) the interrelation and connection between world image and the meaning of life, or else the (basic or fundamental) principles, tenets, axioms of the conducting of life (*Ges. Schriften*, VIII, p. 82). This thematisation (i.e. setting of the theme and topic of world view) is in itself well-aimed (appropriate and fitting), since the important thing sought in relation to that is that a world theory (i.e. world view) as a rule derives and deduces its Ought out from an objectively given Is. However, every world theory (i.e. world view) also constitutively contains an image of “evil”, i.e. of the foe, whose activity is supposed or ought to be tamed, restrained, brought under control or eliminated. The foe, as it appears in a world theory (i.e. world view), may bear an abstract name, e.g. be called “the devil or Satan”, but the social relation in its concreteness makes its presence felt as soon as tangible social subjects are connected with this abstract foe and correspondingly handled. Regarding the presence and function of the foe in world images, see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, in particular, pp. 35ff., 63ff., 100.

which for the given historical moment are regarded as serious and significant. Such explanations represent and constitute a fundamental, rational performance, achievement and accomplishment, which, nevertheless, is not (completely) accepted by everyone or always. The endeavour to refute, disprove or anticipate counter-explanations, forces and compels [[one]] towards the refinement and complication of the undertaking of rationalisation, which, in and during increasing complexity, must deal with a new important task, job, function and mission: it must, namely, achieve rationality as consistency, to organise individual explanations or positions into a coherent whole, to not want to become easy prey for the inimically minded and inimically disposed. Because the sharpest weapon of an animal rationale (rational animal) can be no other than rationality. Rationality as consistency is the best shield against rationality as critique / criticism, and internal contradictions constitute an – at first – hardly noticed wound, which soon turns into an Achilles heel and popular target (butt of jokes, laughing stock or object of ridicule). The extent, range, scope, complexity and main emphasis of the world-theoretical construct depend on the intensity of the pressure of rationalisation, i.e. on how great and large the real or supposed ideational threat is and how high one's own power claim aims, i.e. how comprehensive the social relation is which it (i.e. one's own power as a subject) wants to influence or control. Considerable performances, achievements and accomplishments in respect of rationality and rationalisation of competitors and rivals in the intellectual-spiritual-mental field and realm force and compel corresponding (quid pro quo) counter-performances, counter-achievements, counter-accomplishments; a single dispute or controversy branches out and ramifies into several or multiple disputes or controversies as soon as it becomes serious in the social relation, so that, in the end, on both sides, multi-dimensional thought / intellectual constructs mount up (stack up and are built up and tower over lesser constructs), which culminate in ultimate world-theoretical / world-view decisions. Under certain circumstances

pertaining to the history of ideas, an undertaking in respect of rationalisation lasts in competition only because of the fact it is all-encompassing and all-embracing, that is, it takes a position in relation to all the – on each and every respective occasion – relevant themes, i.e. topics and subject matters. The complexity increases also according to the quantity of the competitors and rivals, i.e. the more numerous in a society those are who deal with mainly intellectual-spiritual-mental work, the more complex must, already for this reason, be the performances, achievement and accomplishments of rationalisation and of the rationalisations. One can observe this phenomenon already in Greek antiquity, in which the lack or absence of a theocracy of an oriental type permitted an active, lively, busy and vivid intellectual life, but also in the European New Times, which, above all, in their present-day, as it were, Alexandrian late phase, and since everything can be combined with everything, and everyone can argue and or reason with (respect to) or against everyone, a wave of rationality and of rationalisation without equal and previously unheard of was set in motion. That of course points to a phenomenon which ought to be explained in terms of the sociology of knowledge rather than pointing to progress in so-called “substantial rationality”. Because behind the complexities and the pedantries and hair-splitting, which thrive and flourish in the argumentative war of all professors and intellectuals against all professors and intellectuals, one discovers, if one – in the knowledge of the history of ideas – reduces them (i.e. the said complexities and pedantry, hair-splitting) to their structural core and nucleus, patterns, models, examples and paradigms known long ago. Nothing shows more clearly that rationalisation as the legitimisation through and by means of rationality is mainly a function of the social relation<sup>29</sup>.

Rationalisation is not bound and tied to “rationalistic” world-theoretical

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<sup>29</sup> Regarding the content of this paragraph, see Kondylis, *loc. cit.*, pp. 96ff., 106ff., as well as „Wissenschaft“.

(world-view) positions. “Irrationalistic” theories take part and operate, in their own way, (with)in rationalisation by offering explanations of phenomena in the form of logically consistent theories. As rationalism can never overcome the suspicious paradox that it must declare Reason as the judge of its own cause (case and (subject) matter)<sup>xiii</sup>, thus irrationalism is for all eternity, in relation to that, condemned to argue rationally-consistently, e.g. to justify, give reasons for and explain through arguments its higher (cap)ability in respect of knowledge, insight and intuition. The coherence of the argumentation does not depend on a confession of faith in “rationalism” as a philosophical tendency or school of thought. It (i.e. the coherence of the argumentation) is imperative and mandatory through and by means of the necessity of an effective presence in the social space / realm, because whoever does not argue with justification, giving reasons and cohesively and in a self-contained fashion (irrespective of what he asserts and claims in terms of content), is not taken seriously or is not at all understood – and consequently lets his opponents have their way without hindrance or obstruction<sup>xiv</sup>. Rationality as the (cap)ability in respect of rationalisation constitutes the minimal condition for a somewhat successful participation in social life. From this fact, “rationalists” seek to profit, wanting to monopolise anthropological “rationality” for themselves, and deny those who do not accept their theories the (cap)ability and capacity for rational-logical thought in general. But precisely because rationality represents and constitutes an anthropological predisposition, it is by no means exhausted in that part of mankind which likes to call itself “rationalist”. The struggle between “rationalists” and “irrationalists” is in reality conducted at a level which stretches above the level of anthropological predispositions, and has to do with content(s) whose contrast and opposition as to one another goes back and is reduced to the constellations (or correlations of forces) in the spectrum of the social relation, i.e. to the forms of the (social) relation between ideas which connect their social identity as theoreticians with questionable (doubtful and

debatable) content(s). The validity, soundness and conclusiveness of the content(s) represented on each and every respective occasion is asserted and claimed by both sides with reference to the advantages of a certain ability (capacity, (set of) powers and means) and certain way of knowledge.

“Rationalists” think and opine that they ought to be found nearer to rationality and the rational truth already because they bet and gamble on an intellect, which by definition is supposed or ought to be free of what reason generally is of the opinion is dim, dull, blurry, obfuscatory and murky: the passions and drives, urges and impulses; the right and correct use of the intellect vouches for and guarantees, accordingly, in itself, the rationality of the world image or of the ethics. “Irrationalists” regard in reply and hold in contrast, for their part, with respect to the “cold” and “superficial” intellect, the depth of existence and the force and powers of apprehension of existential ways, modes and manners of knowledge and cognition, e.g. intuition, love etc.. To the accusation of inconsistency and of the lack in fixed (firm, steady or stable) orientation, they counter by the invocation of a “higher” rationality, which climbs over and goes beyond the supposedly narrow-minded and dense, compact horizon of the intellect, and founds the truth of the world image and of the doctrine or teaching of acting, action and the act, or else ethics, better than the intellect. The rejection and disapproval of rationalism means, therefore, in concreto (i.e. in a concrete sense), the renunciation and denial of intellectualism, not of the work in respect of rationalisation as such, although at the level of the declarations of principle, all work in respect of rationalisation is disapproved of in so far as it is regarded as the unavoidable flattening and leveling out of what is genuine, authentic, real and what is true by means of the intellect. This rhetorical rather than practical disapproval and reproach of the work in respect of rationalisation is genuinely meant polemically, i.e. through it, certain content-related positions are defended, which seem to be endangered and put at risk by rationalisation as such. The struggle against rational thought or intellectual work does not in

actual fact turn against it (i.e. rational thought), (it *cannot* in fact turn against it because there is no alternative to thought as thought), but turns against the connection or combining of the same rational thought / intellectual work with certain content(s) – a connection / combining which in certain constellations or conjunctures or correlations of forces pertaining to the history of ideas flourishes and thrives so much that the (above-)mentioned content(s) seem to come and emerge from the mere use of rational thought. But in and during this struggle of theirs, “irrationalists” must, as we have said, on pain of / subject to the penalty of social irrelevance, bring and put forward against arguments, further arguments, that is to say, consistently and with respect to elementary logical rules, defend and advocate for their perceptions, views (opinions, ideas and conceptions). They do this also in a carefree and light-hearted manner, because logical arguing (argumentation or reasoning), seen formally (i.e. in relation to form), does not demand or desire any express concession to content-related theses or topics which on each and every respective occasion are connected and combined with “rationalism”. Because logic is not identical with right or wrong, moral or un-moral (i.e. immoral) content(s), but it (i.e. logic) consists in the argumentatively correct unfolding and development of a position, whereby and in relation to which correctness is measured in regard to form-related (i.e. formal) criteria, e.g. in regard to the lack of logical leaps, ambiguous terms etc.. That is why “rationalistic” and “irrationalistic” thought can unfold and develop equally logically, i.e. possible, eventual or potential logical mistakes or errors would not necessarily emerge, arise or result from a “rationalistic” or “irrationalistic” confession of faith. Elementary logic does not decide about the character of a thinking / mode of thought, but the contents decide about the character of a thinking / mode of thought. And logic can be put exactly in the service of all possible positions, because it (i.e. logic) itself does

not produce, cause, breed or make them (i.e. all possible positions)<sup>30</sup>.

Just as little in favour of “rationalistic” or “irrationalistic” thought, does logic have any preferences for scientific theories with claims in respect of truth or in favour of rationalisations of an ideological character. In both cases, it is a matter of *thought* constructs which in regard to a certain degree of form-related (i.e. formal) processing, hardly differ from each other outwardly / externally; the difference comes to light only through a closer examination of the content(s). Because in both cases, thought proceeds similarly, i.e. on the basis of abstractions, selections, schematisations and hierarchisations, on the basis of reductions and analogies. The same ideational steps, which for the ascertainment, determination and investigation of empirically valid generalisations *must* be taken, can, hence, lead to error, not least of all because rationality at this [[i.e. other]] level and in this [[i.e. other]] form acts as legitimising rationalisation<sup>xv</sup>. Even wishful thinking can be formally (i.e. in terms of form) be built and constructed flawlessly and impeccably on the basis of empirically verifiable and provable data – this is not difficult for it (i.e. wishful thinking), but the blatant and flagrant conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, and often not even this [is difficult for wishful thinking]<sup>31</sup>. As a matter of fact: in view of monumental thought constructions (or constructions of thought/thinking) like e.g. the *Summa theologica*, one can only with a very bad will, which self-evidently accompanies a certain perception and view of “true” rationality, deny or contest that in practice everything, –nonsense and mischief not excluded–, can be rationalised, even at a high form-related (i.e. formal) level. One has denied the rationality of ideologies as an apparatus which is economical as to thought, with the argument

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<sup>30</sup> Regarding the content of this paragraph, see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 36ff.; *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 93ff..

<sup>31</sup> Regarding the taking root and rootedness of “inferential failures” in otherwise unavoidable and inevitable thought methods (or methods of thought/thinking) and thought structures (or structures of thought/thinking), see the good analyses by Nisbett-Ross, *Human Inference*, Ch. 1-3 and 10. Regarding abstraction, selection and hierarchisation as the basis both of world images in general as well as of theories pertaining to the natural sciences, in particular see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 14ff., as well as „Wissenschaft“.

that no-one consciously decides in favour of ideological thought for the sake of the economy of thought; if we, again, ascribed to ideology unconscious rationality, thus, we would lapse into a teleological functionalism<sup>32</sup>. But precisely the necessary identity (i.e. sameness) of the above-mentioned form-related (i.e. formal) features in and during ideological and non-ideological thought makes the question and problem irrelevant as to whether here a conscious decision was taken or not – whatever “conscious” may mean; after all, in fact, the conscious decision to not think ideologically, for its part, does not provide or give any guarantee of that, i.e. that one does it or can do it (i.e. not think ideologically). In and during the construction of world-theoretical thought/intellectual constructs through and by means of rationalisation, the decision functions not in the usual sense of the choice between existing and known alternatives, but as a de-cision (de-cisio), namely, as an act or process of separation and segregation and isolation, whereby and in relation to which an identity separates and divides for itself what is relevant from what is irrelevant, and through and by means of abstractions, schematisations and hierarchisations creates a world image, which grants it (i.e. the said identity) the necessary (cap)ability at orientation for (social) self-preservation. Thus seen, all men (i.e. all humans) decide, and not only the chosen<sup>xvi</sup> bearers of existential “authenticity or authentic being”, as existentialist and militant decisionists (i.e. decision-takers or decision-makers) believe<sup>33</sup>. In this ubiquitous act or process of the de-cision, rationalisation undertakes exactly the task of building the more or less fixed, steady and stable bridges between what is “conscious” and what is “unconscious”, whereby and in relation to which it (i.e. the said rationalisation) draws its good conscience also from the fact that it makes use of – in accordance with anthropological criteria – normal means of thought (or normal intellectual means). We should not or ought not to, incidentally, if we want to

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<sup>32</sup> Hence, Elster, *Ulysses*, p. 58.

<sup>33</sup> In relation to that, Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 7ff; „Jurisprudenz“, p. 354ff.

remain with the conventional separation between what is unconscious and what is conscious, underestimate the independent and self-sufficient activity of the latter (conscious) in and during the formation and development of world-theoretical rationalisation. The subject can be led and guided in regard to its kinds of acting, actions and acts by already crystallised(-out) individual or collective rationalisations, not seldom, however, it determines through calculus, i.e. calculation, which rationalisations can give wing(s) to, i.e. inspire, spur on, quicken and justify its intended action; if, for instance, ends-goals are rationalised on the basis of values, thus it also occurs that values are judged and evaluated consciously in regard to their expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of (an-)end(s)/goal(s), sometimes [[values]] even with moral intent (one rejects and disapproves of, e.g., a strict ethic(s) in respect of mindset (mentality, way of thinking) exactly because of its supposed fateful, disastrous, catastrophic and ominous consequences for the well-being, welfare and good of most people). The decision to handle and treat facts or values instrumentally, i.e. to place or put them in the service of a rationalisation through their being put in order, classification or through their exclusion, can no doubt be conscious, however, one becomes master (i.e. tamer) of the unease, discomfort and malaise coming into being and arising from that because of the fact that the consciousness and deliberateness of the decision is driven and relegated to the unconscious: the actor “does not want to admit, accept or believe” that his deed, doing and act is the result (corollary, aftereffect) of a conscious decision. He behaves thus, “as if he did not know anything”. Not only does the unconscious steer and direct the conscious, the conscious also sometimes determines what belongs in the unconscious. This is, from a broader perspective, better understood if we visualise and make clear to ourselves that at the level of intellectual-spiritual acts bringing about rationalisations, rationality basically is active and basically acts in the same manner as at the level of intellectual-spiritual acts which steer and direct external or outer action and in the world of

the social relation grant and accord orientation. A functionalistically apprehended teleology is not at work here, which satisfies pre-existing (ideological) needs, but it is a matter of more or less alternating and variable ideational answers to the ideational challenges or provocations which the social relation sets, whereby and in relation to which their concrete character determines which importance or value befits the ideational in and during the friendly or inimical meeting of actors with one another on each and every respective occasion. World-theoretical rationalisations are, just as much as other forms of the ideational, crystallised social relations, i.e. not simply something wherein social relations are “reflected or mirrored”, but an articulation of the positionings and stances of the rationalising actor in relation to the rationalised positionings and stances of other actors. Accordingly, it is social-ontologically indifferent / unimportant as to whether a world theory (i.e. world view) is taken at nominal value, i.e. face-value, if it postulates the (onto)logical primacy of the extra-human (i.e. outside-of-the-human) world or of the human world (very often the former happens in order to underpin and shore up and fortify, –by invoking higher(-standing) tiers of jurisdiction, i.e. authorities–, the, in practice, decisive statements or propositions regarding the essence and duties of man (i.e. humans). Either way, the human world, the world of the social relation, therefore, represents and constitutes the motor, driving force and the reason for the formation and development of such – and all – thought (intellectual) constructs. Only men (i.e. humans) can – vis-à-vis other men, in relation to whom they want to enter into a certain relation – assert that God, Nature, History or Ethical Law should or ought and or are supposed to guide, direct and lead the doings and omissions (i.e. the activities, movements, actions and behaviour(s)) of men (i.e. humans).

Since a world-theoretical thought (intellectual) construct must offer a synthesis of theory, teaching and doctrine pertaining to the world, meaning and

praxis / practice, thus, the work of rationalisation aims first and foremost at working out, elaborating and formulating the logical consistency between these levels, whereby and in relation to which the (intellectual-historical) relevance to the present and topicality (pertaining to the history of ideas) determines the main focus, main emphasis and centre of gravity of the thought/intellectual effort and endeavour. As we have said, difficulties and failures in action arise and result from asymmetries between the rationality of the assumptions, upon which the setting of a goal/end rests, the rationality of the end/goal in the sense of its attainability and achievability and of the rationality of the means in the sense of their expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and their serving of (an-) end(s)/goal(s). Rationalisation manages and effects, though, the unity of these rationalities only ideationally, and it cannot give any tangible guarantees. In actual fact, it is difficult to see how one out of the reason for the world, or a generally formulated moral law, is supposed to be able to deduce and derive *hic et nunc* (here and now) without the mediation or intervention/intercession of other tiers of jurisdiction / authorities, or without one's own activity as to interpretation, instructions for successful action. In this respect, the unity, which is produced or restored between the world-theoretical levels through rationalisation can only be a feigned unity. This does not at all mean, however, that everyone who acts by invoking world-theoretical rationalisation must in reality fail. Here the mechanisms are activated anew which enable and facilitate the effective action in and during unattainable and unachievable nominal ends-goals. From the analysis of the previous (sub-)section, we know how those mechanisms function: the world-theoretical fundamental or basic principles are honoured, upheld and preserved nominally, but (f)actually are abandoned or interpreted in such a manner that they can be imparted, given or conveyed (mediated or interposed) with respect to attainable and achievable ends-goals. General convictions about the world and men (i.e. humans) are – through and by means of smaller or greater logical leaps – in practice translated into usable

and realisable maxims, whilst the ultimate world-theoretical ends-goals are diverted, directed or re-routed accordingly. The general world-theoretical schema is hence pressed and moulded more or less neatly into the narrower schema: “achievable and attainable ends/goals-means”. Before or against the background of this possibility, or rather, this common and familiar praxis, it is by no means settled that the representatives of a “rationalistic” world theory (i.e. world view) must necessarily be at an advantage in principle in the practical field or realm. Whoever, e.g., sincerely believes in the nonsense and rubbish of the Trinity dogma [or dogma of the Holy Trinity in Christianity]<sup>xvii</sup>, may perhaps conduct, direct or run a business and or company more effectively than someone for whom only scientific answers to ultimate questions and problems may claim validity. The world-theoretical belief or faith in rationalism does not vouch for and guarantee superior social rationality. Rather it (i.e. the said world-theoretical belief/faith in rationalism) has merely the same symbolic status as every other comparable belief or faith as well, i.e. it connects or combines itself symbolically with an identity, which with its (i.e. the said identity’s) help, shows and displays, states and declares its friendship with other identities or its enmity towards other identities, without it (i.e. the said world-theoretical belief/faith in rationalism), in and during concrete action, being taken at its nominal, i.e. face value unconditionally, and, in the course of this, without this belief/faith necessarily being the deciding factor<sup>xviii</sup>.

d. Rationality as disposition and self-control and rationality as psychological rationalisation (justification) and the logic of identity

Rationality constitutes an anthropological (pre-)disposition (talent, aptitude or gift), its differentiation into levels, forms and degrees begins, however, already with the fact that every single man (i.e. human) possesses his own disposition

for/to rationality. The disposition for/to rationality is, therefore, the mode, manner and way of the existence of rationality as an anthropological pre-disposition in every single man (i.e. human). From the ubiquity of the [[said]] pre-disposition, the equality of the disposition cannot be derived and deduced, as the generally known, but still difficult-to-explain fact teaches us that there are the philistines (low-brows, “peasants”, boorishly uncultured) and the virtuosos of rationality; in between them there are many mediocre practitioners / users of rationality too/as well. That by no means implies that men (i.e. humans) can be class(ifi)ed in a fixed, steady and stable hierarchy according to their individual disposition as to rationality. This would also be possible only with regard to a single criterion of classification and a single area or realm of unfolding and development of the disposition in respect of rationality. Just as little as rationality in general, the disposition in relation to that rationality can be defined once and for all, i.e. without consideration of levels, forms and degrees. One can, though, divide it (i.e. the pre-disposition for rationality) roughly into types, and connect every one of them with a certain type of rationality. A disposition for rationality in the form of logical consistency and a form-related (i.e. formal) drawing-up, working-out and elaboration obviously differ typologically from a disposition in the form of the quick comprehension and the skillful handling of unique (singular) situations. Also, the disposition for “substantial rationality” is something different to that disposition for “functional rationality”: the former (“substantial rationality”) means the (cap)ability as to and capacity for insight into the interrelation and correlation and (inter)connection of events, incidents and occurrences and large contexts in general, the latter (“functional rationality”) is the talent in relation to the organisation of a row or series of kinds of acting, actions and acts so that they lead to a prescribed aim and objective<sup>34</sup>. A typology of such dispositions would

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<sup>34</sup> Mannheim, *Mensch*, p. 61ff..

come close to a characterology, yet the theoretical yield (profit) would remain meagre, especially if one wanted to make use of it as a framework of orientation in the dizzy (giddy) great variety (and multiformity) of concrete phenomena (occurrences, appearances). Because in no man, i.e. human, does the disposition for rationality exist unmixed and unblended with competing elements; from man to man (i.e. human to human) the disposition of the same kind of rationality changes gradually, in the same man (i.e. human) the disposition for a type of rationality takes on and adopts/assumes individual features, attributes and characteristics, and is activated in – on each and every respective occasion – different degrees of intensity and of clarity. In short, the disposition in respect of rationality exhibits even more forms and degrees than there are men (i.e. humans), since it (i.e. rationality) does not only change from man to man (i.e. human to human), but also in the same man (i.e. human). It (i.e. rationality) is connected on each and every respective occasion with an individual endowment or talent (gift, (cap)ability) and with the area or realm of unfolding and of development of this endowment/talent; it (i.e. the said endowment/talent/ability) is, therefore, different in the astronomer than in the thief, and in each of them, it, again, concerns a certain property (quality, feature, characteristic) or dimension; whoever, for instance, possesses the disposition for rational self-control, does not, because of that, necessarily have, eo ipso, at his disposal the disposition for rational research into nature. Just as there cannot be “rationality” in abstracto, i.e. with a ubiquitous claim of application, so too there is no “disposition” for rationality which penetrates, pervades and permeates man (i.e. humans) as a whole, and makes him capable of the rational coping and coming to terms with all conceivable situations (and positions). The higher disposition for rationality may not even be equated with higher intelligence, [[and]] naturally, also not with the ethical level of a character. Higher intelligence or ethical level attest to only specific dispositions for rationality, they do not make up and constitute a common denominator for the unification of all these dispositions under the

rubric (of) “disposition for rationality”.

The great variety and multiformity of the dispositions for rationality is obviously a function of the constitutive plasticity of the human being. This same plasticity, which makes man (i.e. humans) an animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), gives to and confers upon his rationality and his disposition, in relation to that, numerous levels, forms and degrees. Said the other way around: with regard to the disposition for rationality, the plasticity of the human being not only signifies that this disposition takes on and adopts several forms, but also, that every one of these forms is in itself plastic, whether it maintains and keeps up a tighter or looser, in any case, permanent relation towards that which we, indeed, in itself define with difficulty, yet [[which]] can empirically fix and attach to individual men (i.e. humans): character as an ensemble (whole) of relatively stable basic and fundamental stances (outlooks) and recurring modes of behaviour, which survive a change in the situation. The inner plasticity of the disposition for this or that form of rationality means that dispositions may not be looked at as once-and-for-all given magnitudes, from which kinds of acting, actions and acts can be deduced lineally and simultaneously a priori. Certainly, in some cases the actor based on his force of character or his inability to do something intellectually-spiritually which is more demanding/exacting, follows his disposition, and has, with that, success, or he fails. It is, nevertheless, by no means settled (certain) that the disposition must always have the last word; its firmness, stability, steadfastness and resolve is accidental rather than substantial. It (i.e. the said disposition) can, anyhow, only assert and impose itself in and during smaller or larger losses against the logic of the situation, and it is lost or else it unfolds and develops its plasticity when the actor nolens volens (i.e. willingly or not) decides to take into consideration primarily that logic. Because that is rationality too – namely, to follow the objective rationality of the situation and not the subjective disposition for a certain kind of

rationality<sup>35</sup>. Things are not different in general when we modify and adapt fixed dispositions in regard to rational convictions, and rational wishes resting and being based on those rational convictions. In accordance with this view, the convictions of the actor must, already because of the logical necessities of the combining and connection of thoughts, or else propositions, with one another, exhibit rational consistency, whilst his wishes have to behave, i.e. act in principle (or fundamentally) consistently towards the logical consistency of the convictions; the logically structured content(s) of the convictions and wishes penetrate, pervade, permeate and rationalise (i.e. make rational) the intentional acting, action and act<sup>36</sup>. The actor is supposed to bear and carry in himself this supply, store or these reserves of rational convictions and wishes, like a (military) field kit or a portfolio, from situation to situation, and draw from that stable criteria for the determination of the necessary course of action on each and every respective occasion, which would, hence, result and ensue from those criteria with similar consistency and congruity as the conclusion of an argument out of its premises. This “portfolio model of the actor” misjudges, fails to appreciate and underestimates the same praxeological factor as the linear deduction and derivation of kinds of acting, actions and acts from dispositions, namely, the specialised techniques which are brought and carved out and elaborated by the actor for the coming to terms and coping with new kinds of concrete situations (and positions), and, in the course of this, surpass and outstrip not only fixed, stationary and established convictions and wishes, but also give the impetus for the coming into being of new convictions and wishes. The rationality of acting, action and the act or of behaviour, which must hold good and be proved in regard to the logic of the situation, may or should not, without more, be deduced from the rationality of the basic and fundamental

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<sup>35</sup> See Ch. II, Section 2Ccd as well as Ch. IV, footnote 395, above.

<sup>36</sup> Thus, Davidson, “Rational animals”, p. 475 ff..

attitude or approach, which has to do with a supposedly stable or even innate (inborn) neutral state of affairs (condition and situation) of the actor<sup>37</sup>.

One of the fundamental dispositions for rationality, or else one of the fundamental forms of rationality, is the permanent and the practised, trained, skilled capacity and (cap)ability in relation to self-control. In regard to this ascertainment, anthropological-social-ontological findings meet still one more time on the best of terms and in perfect harmony with age-old, ancient and always topical (current) commonplaces of popular and elevated and exalted (i.e. higher) social ethics and life wisdom (i.e. sagacity in respect of life/living), which has ever since time immemorial highlighted the social worth/value of the survival in respect of that capacity and (cap)ability, and at the same time has

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Hindess, *Choice*, esp. pp. 44, 48ff., 86ff., 96, who critically investigates and examines Davidson's "portfolio model of the actor". Regarding the distinction between "behavioural rationality" and "attitudinal rationality", which Hindess also uses, see Macdonald-Pettit, *Semantics*, p. 59ff.. The unmediated connection of behavioural rationality and attitudinal rationality with each other is accompanied in Davidson with the misjudgement and underestimation of intent(ion) as the necessary middle / connecting joint or link between convictions and/or wishes and acting, action and the act (see Ch. IV, footnotes 411, 412 above.): Intent(ion) leads, guides, steers and directs exactly the development of behavioural rationality, which in Davidson seems to be the mere appendage of attitudinal rationality. In actual fact, Davidson's deduction of the former (behavioural rationality) from the latter (attitudinal rationality) reminds us of the method of explanation of the "covering law model" [[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): BECAUSE ZIO-JOOZ AND ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOOZ WANT TO PRE-DETERMINE "RIGHT AND WRONG", "TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD", "JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE" ETC. ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN POWER CLAIMS AT ANY PARTICULAR GIVEN TIME, AND THEREFORE CANNOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION SEES AN OPEN FIELD OF POSSIBLE HUMAN ACTION WITHOUT ANY AXIOLOGICAL-ETHICAL-AESTHETIC PREFERENCE FOR ANYONE OR ANYTHING]]. Davidson, though, shared (i.e. accepted) the objections raised against that (i.e. his deduction of behavioural rationality from attitudinal rationality), and rightly stressed, in the process, that the supposed laws which the model summons for the explanation of rational kinds of acting, actions and acts is factually deduced and derived from the generalisation of individual dispositions, whilst rational kinds of acting, actions and acts are regarded as cases of the application of laws gained/got in such a manner. Rational action does not go back and is not reduced to generalisable dispositions, however, but to rational convictions and wishes which characterise one sole actor and not – as laws – multiple/many actors or even the whole human race (*Essays*, pp. 265ff., 274). But at the level of the individual actor, Davidson – looked at in terms of form and even though he replaced the rational disposition with rational convictions and wishes – proceeded in a way similar to Hempel, who made out of the rational disposition a generally valid "covering law". Hempel's argumentation is, incidentally, logically ambiguous as well. In order to make use of / exploit the "covering law model" praxeologically, he put, as we have said, the rational disposition in the place of normatively understood rationality, because, as he rightly opined/thought, this can only specify what every rational actor in a situation X would do, and makes merely probable (likely, plausible) that actor A in the same situation would act in the same way; it, however, does not in the least prove that A in actual fact acted in such a manner (*Aspects*, pp. 464ff., 470ff.). But precisely such an argument strikes the logic of the "covering law model" itself in the heart (i.e. fatally), which can likewise only specify what every actor would have had to have done, and not what actor A in actual fact did. The defect hardly remedies the replacement of normative rationality by a rational disposition. Because either dispositions are individual and are then no good as an explanation by means of a law, or they get tangled up and embroiled in the thicket, labyrinth, jungle of different situations, and they then lose the clear outlines/contours of a law.

converted its general kinds of knowledge into specialised commands (keep your mouth shut, exercise patience etc. etc.); the first formulations of such commonplaces in high cultures (i.e. developed and advanced civilisations) bear witness especially in relation to the fact that the animal rationale (rational animal) already in his oldest self-descriptions knew wherein his specific features, traits and characteristics consist<sup>38</sup> – or the other way around: it was precisely these features, characteristics and traits which suggested such self-descriptions and corresponding deontologies (or teachings, doctrines and theories of duty (ethics)). In an anthropological-social-ontological respect, it is easily understood why self-control belongs to the core of rationality in general. If rationality is based on the capacity for and (cap)ability in respect of the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, and if only this postponement (delay or deferment) creates space and makes room for the unfolding and development of the end(goal)-means-schema, then that which enables the postponement (delay or deferment), namely self-control, must also be thought of together with rationality. From this perspective, it can be said with good reason that a man is all the less rational, the lesser his capacity and (cap)ability is in postponing (delaying or deferring), should the occasion arise, the satisfaction of his needs, in subjecting and subordinating short-term needs to long-term needs, and in bridging the distance between short-term and long-term needs with expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-an-end/goal activity. From the same perspective, the trite and hackneyed saying that one should behave like a man (i.e. human), and not like an animal, obtains its actual meaning. We are touching upon, here, the roots of ethics, which cannot exist in any form without taking a position in one way or another in relation to the question and problem of man's (i.e. humans') self-control. Because whoever thinks that man is of his nature "good", and would acquire ethics through and

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<sup>38</sup> An abundance of such attestations and evidence are found in Hertzler, *Social Thought*.

by means of the unhindered and unobstructed unfolding and development of his “good” pre-dispositions (talents, aptitudes or gifts), must admit that this, *hic et nunc* (i.e. here and now), i.e. without the previous setting aside and elimination of the [[existing]] socially deplorable state of affairs and the – thereby – resulting “distortion” of man’s (i.e. humans’) “true” nature, is not possible; until it (i.e. the unhindered unfolding of man’s “good” pre-dispositions) becomes possible, man (i.e. humans), therefore, must continue to act against, counter and oppose – through and by means of self-control – the distortion of his true nature. Only in a – paradisiacal or animal/bestial – state of affairs, in which every [[kind of]] self-control would be superfluous, would ethics also be completely superfluous, in fact incomprehensible, unimaginable and inconceivable. When we now, in this manner, do justice to ethics and its traditions, thus, we must, on the other hand, point to the seemingly, in any case, momentous, seminal and far-reaching paradox that ethics and technique (technology) (in the sense of the end/goal-means-schema) spring from the same source, from which all forms of rationality emerge and come too, and, in fact, in many cases they overlap and intersect with one another. The figure of Odysseus is paradigmatical regarding the age-old insight (understanding, knowledge and perception) that rationality can also be a technique (technology) free of ethical attributes, which just like the rationality of ethics presupposes an overcoming of the instinctive “animal-bestial” behaviour (of immediate, direct pleasure (enjoyment), whatever the cost is). In the hiatus (gap, chasm) between drive-urge-impulse-like (or impulsive(-driven) and or compulsive) need and satisfaction, in the hampering, checking and obstruction of the drive, urge, impulse and through the same hampering etc., ethics and technique (technology<sup>xix</sup>) come into being in the same move, and their differentiation from each other will never be complete. The schema end/goal-means runs into and comes across its own application in regard to its very tight bound(arie)s when the capacity for and (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of

satisfaction does not care for [[the fact]] that preference can be given not to the first best, but, possibly only to long-term ends/goals and the corresponding chosen means; and ethical life starts, for its part, during the same postponement (delay or deferment): whoever does not possess the capacity and (cap)ability in relation to that (i.e. the postponement of satisfaction in regard to long-term ends/goals), cannot regret any acting, action or act and cannot be liable and responsible for any acting, action or act.

On the other hand, the blood relationship, kinship and consanguinity<sup>xx</sup> of ethics and technique (technology) against the background of their common origins makes itself felt in a positive and in a negative sense. The positive sense is obvious: ethics may look down at mere technique (technology) and “instrumental thought” and denounce, pillory and smear its “fateful, fatal consequences”, at the same time, it (i.e. ethics) itself, however, at every turn, uses the schema “end/goal-means”, and in fact gets tangled up and embroiled in the paradoxes discussed above. Because the fact that there is an ethics at all and ethical commands are put forward, means exactly that the ethical ends/goals have not been yet (completely) realised, they, therefore, are still to be realised. That is why the question is automatically posed as to the suitable e.g. religious or Enlightenment(-related) means for the attainment and achievement of these ends/goals, whereby and in relation to which the paradoxes in respect of acting, action and the act, i.e. the conversion of the means into (new) ends/goals and the heterogony of ends are founded on the fact that the state of affairs or situation/condition in which the ethical ends/goals are formulated differs qualitatively from that state of affairs which is supposed or ought to result from the realisation of these ends/goals. On the sharp dividing line between both states of affairs, the breaking of the wave of acting, action and of the act in the sense of the heterogony occurs, here, that is to say, the linear conversion of the ethical ends/goals into the planned ethical state of affairs fails. But even if we

assume that ethical ends/goals are determined rationally in the sense of their reachability, attainability and achievability and can also in actual fact – at least at the individual level – be reached, attained and achieved, this victory of the ethical “rationality of Reason” would not at all rid the world of the necessity of “instrumental rationality” outside and inside of ethical action<sup>39</sup>. In regard to such action, self-control has a dual importance and (relative) value: it is end/goal and means at the same time, i.e. its complete possession signifies that someone has broken through (pierced) the barriers and bounds of sensoriality (the sensorial world, (sensuality) (i.e. the senses)) and has risen to holiness, sacredness and saintliness as the absolute ethical end/goal, whereas its, in practice, sufficient handling or else the controlling and containment of one’s own selfishness and egotism is merely the precondition and prerequisite to do unto others good. On the other hand, in and during non-ethical action, self-control can only be the means to an end / goal, however this does not remain socially decisive, but the fact that also non-ethical and, in fact, unethical action requires and demands rationality in the form of self-control, and that, hence, the specific difference between ethical and non-ethical or unethical action cannot lie therein<sup>xxi</sup>.

We have, consequently, reached the point at which ethics and technique (technology), or else, ethical and “instrumental” rationality, both in the form of self-control, meet / come together in the negative sense, i.e. they use the same rational means in order to pursue opposing or contrary ends/goals. Because the successful handling and carrying out of kinds of acting, actions and acts which serve social self-preservation and striving for power commands, as a rule, at least the same rationality in the form of self-control as the striving for ethical perfection / improvement on the part of a man (i.e. person) who has to keep in check the “irrational” or “bad/evil” emotions (affects) in him. The insight into

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<sup>39</sup> Especially regarding this point cf. Benn-Mortimore, “Can ends be rational?”, esp. p. 291ff..

and understanding of these social-ontologically fundamental facts (of the case) and circumstances is obstructed, blocked and spoiled by the dominant ethical-normativistic tendency and school of thought of the philosophical tradition, which in agreement with social-ethical kinds of purposefulness (and social-ethical kinds of end (goal) orientation or social-ethical expediencies) has always asserted the absolute form-related (i.e. formal) difference and difference in respect of essence between ethical (effort (struggle, strain and stress)) and effort (struggle, strain and stress) in respect of power. The main argument is already found in Plato, who, as is known, reserves the factor of power and of striving for power for the same lowest tier, level, stage or grade (rung or rank) in his ontological and anthropological order of ranks, precedence and priority (or ranking and hierarchy), which he assigns and allocates to the type of the sophist or of the demagogue in his ethical-social order of ranks, precedence and priority (or ranking and hierarchy)<sup>40</sup>. Striving after power and striving after pleasure (appetite and lust) are basically the same irrational passion, they spring and come from the same dark lower stratum of the human psyche, they represent the purely animal-bestial in man (i.e. humans). Objectively seen, the argumentation shows through the manner it serves the power claim of the “expert”, that striving for power must not necessarily be irrational, i.e. the satisfaction of the drive, urge and impulse directed against every rational [[kind of]] self-control<sup>xxii</sup>. Taken at face-value and objectively-factually proved, the argumentation of the Platonic type fails again in regard to the tangible fact that under the conditions of social life no lasting and sustainable private or public striving for power has any chance of success if the actor is not capable of the postponement (delay or deferment) of the satisfaction, of the subjection and subjugation of the short-term end(s)/goal(s) to the long-term end(s)/goal(s), in a word, of rationality as self-control. Formulated as an anthropological and social-

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<sup>40</sup> For the following (i.e. what follows) see *Gorgias*, 466Aff., 482Cff.

ontological ascertainment, this means that striving for power and ethics are not alike merely when they both demand such renunciation [[of power]]<sup>41 + xxiii</sup>.

Ethical-normativistic thought, however, does not conceptually confuse only striving for power and striving for pleasure<sup>xxiv</sup>. In a similar manner and for the same polemical reasons, power and violence are lumped together and tarred with the same brush, whereby striving for power is mitigated in all its despicable and dreadful one-sidedness, whilst simultaneously that thinking, already in its characteristic or capacity as the “foe of all violence” is supposed to be freed from the suspicion of striving for power. But the taming and harnessing of violence does not have to, by any means, be a performance, achievement and accomplishment in relation to which ethics alone is capable; it (the taming of violence) can likewise be in the interest of the striving for power, although between this (striving for power) and a certain kind of ethics of attitude and conviction, the distinction exists that during the latter (ethics of attitude and conviction) the exercising and wielding of violence is excluded as the *ultima ratio* (i.e. the last resort). Just as not all (kinds of) ethics exclude the exercising and wielding of violence, thus, conversely, not every (kind of) striving for power promotes, fosters and encourages the same (exercising of violence) at every point in time. The rationality which guides such striving and commands the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction, or else, self-control, can also become aware (in respect of such postponement of satisfaction and self-control) that on the basis of the complexity of social life, the direct ill-considered and thoughtless pursuit of what is desired with violent means will already fail at its very beginning, or at least would have to entail an irreparable wear and tear in respect of one’s own forces. If this becomes clear, thus, the paths of the striving for power, which henceforth has to be longsighted and

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<sup>41</sup> Regarding this thought-complex, cf. my introduction to the volumes *Der Philosoph und die Macht* as well as *Der Philosoph und die Lust*, from which several formulations are taken.

prudent, separates itself from blind violence, which thirsts for immediate satisfaction. Violence now puts itself in the same sense and to the same extent in the service of the striving for power, just as rationality in the form of self-control restrains and checks or purposefully and in a single-minded manner (i.e. consciously as to its aim) channels “irrational” drives, urges, impulses and affects (i.e. emotions) in order to realise/achieve and attain its plans.

Consequently, the striving for power sets boundaries and limits in respect of violence, it puts it (i.e. violence) under control, it measures out and dispenses the right dose of its (i.e. violence’s) possible/potential application according to and in line with the aims in mind on each and every respective occasion. The combinatorics (i.e. gamut of possible combinations) of power is much richer in nuances than the crude mechanics of violence; it (the said combinatorics) allows numerous variations and ways out; – power is, in short, interwoven with rationality, and the possible/potential identity of its aims with those of violence does not abolish this essential distinction/difference. To make use of violence and to fall under the intoxication of violence are two different things. Between them stands/is rationality as self-control<sup>42</sup>.

From the point of view of this particular form of rationality and in light of the previous ascertainments, one can also assert: the ethicists / moralists are in their opinion right that whoever acts ethically / morally, acts rationally; they err, however, in the assumption that whoever acts unethically / immorally, acts irrationally. The already – stressed many times – absolute ethical / moral neutrality of the fundamental social-ontological magnitudes, which characterises rationality in all its forms, makes itself likewise noticeable when rationality is activated as psychological rationalisation (justification). Through the mediation (intervention or intercession) of such rationalisation (justification), ethical/moral action is brought about and achieved behind which

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. in relation to that, Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, p. 28ff..

no ethical/moral motives stand/are (e.g. the search for self-confirmation after this search became let down or frustrated in other fields); however, unethical action can also be set in motion, thus, e.g., when someone justifies the annihilation or extermination of someone unsympathetic to him, who does not deserve such enmity<sup>xxv</sup>. For psychological rationalisation, the same applies as for world-theoretical rationalisation: it is legitimisation through and by means of rationality, which the actor above all needs when he must in foro interno (i.e. inwardly in the internal / inner court of his conscience) spiritual-intellectually work (and deal) with and put to use his own wishes in such a manner that they are possibly or potentially allowed to be shown in foro externo (i.e. outwardly to the court of public opinion) as well. The compulsion, coercion, force, constraint, pressure and duress in respect of rationality in foro interno (i.e. inwardly, in the court of one's own conscience) comes into being, in other words, only in social life, i.e. only against the background of a forum externum (i.e. an external court of public opinion), irrespective of whether the inner / internal processes in every concrete case find expression in, are reflected or manifest themselves in visible acts or not: there are, in fact, rationalisations which are determined merely for use on the part of one's conscience. Either way, rationalisations justify an inner/internal or outer/external action either because this (internal or external action) runs counter to and goes against individually or socially accepted norms or because it (i.e. the said internal or external action) is supposed or ought to be presented vis-à-vis third parties in a certain way, or finally, because the actor can only act if he sees his action in the light of such a justification. The effective and actual expedient, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) rationality, which must (be done, i.e. completed with regard to and) deal with the concrete situation, and the justification of the same (effective and expedient rationality) move in a parallel manner towards each other at different levels, without having to cross each other and intersect; not

seldom they contradict each other<sup>43</sup>. The former (actual expedient rationality) unfolds and develops through and by means of the schema “ends/goals-means” either before or during the (outer/external) acting, action and act, the latter (justification of the actual expedient rationality) can likewise be shaped, formed and moulded before or during the same (external acting, action or act), occasionally, however, it is required and essential only after the conclusion, finalisation, settlement and end of the acting, action or act when the actor finds himself from the outside under the pressure of justification. It’s (i.e. justification’s) simplest and grossest (coarsest and crudest) form, which, however, shows the way to the rest of the forms of justification, is the direct invocation of Reason, even when the self-interest or the arbitrariness of the actor sticks out like a sore thumb: “O, strange excuse, / When reason is the bawd to lust’s abuse!”<sup>44</sup>. And its regular effect consists in the removal and elimination of inner inhibitions which cripple and paralyse outer/external action, and over and above that, in the additional strengthening and fortification of the impetus (motivation, motive, incentive, urge, drive, propulsion) in respect of acting, action and the act through and by means of the consciousness and awareness that one does what is in harmony with Reason<sup>xxvi</sup>. Humans knew since long ago that exactly this consciousness / awareness increases and intensifies aggressivity, and the transformation / metamorphosis of man (i.e. humans) into a wild animal/beast sometimes succeeds most easily precisely via such use of Reason<sup>45</sup>.

Psychological rationalisation as legitimisation differs from psychological rationalisation in the comprehensive/general sense of the reflexive/reflective processing/treatment of the psychological raw material – if one may say so.

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. in relation to that, Evans, *Psychology*, p. 124ff..

<sup>44</sup> Shakespeare, *Venus and Adonis*, V. 791ff..

<sup>45</sup> “A man that doth not use his reason is(t) a tame beast; a man that abuses it is a wild one”, Halifax [[= George Savile, 1st Marquess of Halifax, PC, DL, FRS (11 November 1633 – 5 April 1695)]], *Works*, p. 242. On the same page there is a reflection which aptly outlines the process of rationalisation as justification: “Most men put their reason out to service to their will”.

Obviously, the stirrings (movements, impulses) which take place in the barely investigable grey zone between the biological and the psychological obtain praxeological and further relevance only through and by means of that processing / treatment. We do not have to discuss here whether and to what extent the psychical so-to-speak raw material is distinguished from the very beginning by signs capable of the unfolding and development of reflexive activity, or whether its reflexive transformation – to use another metaphor – occurs at the “higher” tiers, levels, stages or grades of consciousness and awareness and through and by means of the mediation (intervention and intercession) of other “tiers of jurisdiction, i.e. authorities” of the same consciousness. Either way, only the thus understood psychological rationalisation produces or restores that from which the actor as the consciously acting subject takes as his starting point. The cogito-principle gains here its actual and irrefutable meaning: whether a psychical datum or datum of the external/outer world, nothing possesses relevance which has not passed through psychological rationalisation as reflexive activity, which does not already have the status of what is reflected (upon) or else what is thought (about). This kind of psychological rationalisation presupposes not merely the healing of “irrational passions”, as the poet thought<sup>46</sup>, but already the passion as the possibility of consciousness. And on top of that, psychological rationalisation is commanded by the fact of social co-existence, which only accepts – in such a manner (of psychological rationalisation) – rationalised and correspondingly articulated drives, urges, impulses, needs, affects, emotions etc.. Seen thus, in social co-existence there is hardly any place/room for “irrational” or “drive/urge/impulse-like or impulsive(-driven) and compulsive” behaviour of the pure kind. Whatever socially wants to count, must – either way – be converted and transformed into Ratio, i.e. Reason / reason or else appear as

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<sup>46</sup> “Quod nunc ratio est, i[[#]]mpetus ante fuit [[What is now reason, was a violent impulse (inclination / desire / ardour / passion) before]]”, Ovid, *Remed. Amoris*, V.10.

Ratio, i.e. Reason in the elementary sense of the form of rationality meant here. The psychological process of rationalisation, which yields and results in this elementary rationality, gets and procures for the in themselves dumb i.e. silent and mute deeper strata of (the) existence, valves/vents, outlets and articulation in a society which, to the total lack of rationalisation, can counter and respond only with the total lack of social attention: outbreaks of “blind” drives, urges and impulses, if there could be such outbreaks, would, in fact, be biological rather than social phenomena (occurrences, appearances). As we know<sup>47</sup>, drives, urges, impulses and affects, emotions represent and constitute as “primary processes” in the Freudian sense mere reservoirs (in respect) of motives of acting, action and the act; they neither completely flow into such motives, nor do they make up their sole source. They acquire and obtain, get the status of a motive via higher reflexivity, which is accompanied by growing end/goal-directedness, like it characterises every motive irrespective of its origin(s). Motives of acting, action and the act can be set against and oppose the urge, drive, itch, pressure and longing (need, yearning and desire) of the reflected “primary processes” or not. In the former case (of the motives of acting being set against the urge of the reflected “primary processes”), the paths of psychological rationalisation in the general sense of the reflexive processing of the psychical raw material, and those paths of the psychological rationalisation in the special sense of legitimisation separate; in the latter (case of the motives of acting not being set against the urge of the reflected “primary processes”) that processing already leads and flows into legitimisations and rationalisations as legitimisations are shaped, moulded and formed already in the course of the reflexive processing of the psychical raw material. That does not mean, though, that rationalisations as legitimisations have to come about only in this mode, manner and at this tier, level, stage or grade of psychical processes. They (i.e.

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<sup>47</sup> See Ch. IV, Section 2Ab, above.

rationalisations as legitimisations) can be connected also with motives of acting, action and the act, which are formed and developed at higher tiers, levels, stages or grades of reflexion/reflection and in contrast and opposition to the urge, drive, itch, pressure and longing (need, yearning and desire) of the “primary” processes. So multi-dimensional and multi-layered, complex does psychological rationalisation present itself and appear.

By building bridges constantly between “primary” and “secondary” processes, it is proved that both anthropologies in respect of drives, urges and impulses, as well as dualistic anthropologies miss what is decisive. Neither (the) irrational man (i.e. human) as factotum (and eager servant) of drives, urges and impulses, nor rational man as master over the same drives, urges and impulses dominates in social life, but the deciding factor is the man (i.e. human) who exercises and practises rationality as rationalisation, and through that produces mixtures or forms of co-existence (or however one may call it) of those strata, layers of his essence (being, nature or character), which we partly, for reasons pertaining to the economy of thought, partly with social-ethical intent, sharply separate from one another or contrast to one another. The thus understood unity of the human has an effect, in/during the different dosages of its components, both at the level of high rational performances, i.e. great rational achievements and accomplishments, as well as at the other end of the scale or sequence of stages, i.e. where rationality leaves deep traces in the so-called “irrational” or even “lunatic, madman, maniacal, insane, crazy”. As both of the observers of Hamlet’s behaviour say: “there is method in his madness”, [[and]] they can mean two kinds of things: that he (i.e. Hamlet), behind the façade of lunacy, madness and mania hides well-thought-out plans in order to, accordingly, be able to realise the same plans much more easily, or else that he can act purposefully and in a planned manner, although in actual fact he is a lunatic, madman, maniacal. In the latter case, they would have anticipated e.g. the

findings of the psychoanalytical investigation of the obsessional / compulsive neurosis (or neurosis of compulsion / obsession / inhibition). The absence of motives, ends/goals or expedient, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means does not here characterise the behaviour, but the fact that the consistent concatenation, linkage, chaining and interconnection of the same motives, ends/goals or expedient means with one another lies beyond the bound(arie)s and limits the neurotic can consciously step over, exceed, overreach or cross. His illness / sickness consists in a rationality which wants to remain hidden from itself and does not want to appear. The job, task, responsibility of the therapist appears to correspond to this. This therapist is not supposed to simply move / transfer / shift the patient from an irrational state of affairs (in)to a rational state of affairs, but on the contrary, to bring to light the unconscious rationality of his present (current, prevailing) intellectual-spiritual state (of affairs), to show him which needs through and by way of which means are satisfied on the detour or in the roundabout (and indirect) way of his illness / sickness. The healing (cure and recovery) presupposes, in other words, the acceptance, assumption and adoption of the inner/internal rationality of the illness / sickness and the reconstruction of this rationality, i.e. its translation from the language of its own symbolism into that of healthy prose<sup>48</sup>. We can, generalising, say that precisely the rationality of unconscious kinds of acting, actions and acts makes clear the extent and the depth of the belonging together, togetherness, common bond or shared identity of rationality and human nature.

The reconstruction of the rationality of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) on the part of an observer can, for its part, be called rationalisation of this behaviour too, in relation to which the term “rationalisation” obviously obtains a new meaning, and rationality simultaneously appears in another form. This time it is a matter of the hypothesis of rationality not merely as what is

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. Mischel, “Psychology”, esp. the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section.

heuristically most favourable, but actually as the unavoidable starting point in and during the apprehension of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others). This applies equally to the actor, as to the scientific observer. Let it, first of all, be noted that with respect to the actor, next to the psychological rationalisation in the double sense of the word discussed (above), we may talk of an external / outer rationalisation of his action also. Accordingly, the endeavour and effort is meant of the actor adapting his social behaviour to practical or ethical norms which, in accordance with the understanding of each and every respective relevant narrower or wider milieu (surroundings and environment) is regarded as rational; that the intent(ion) behind the said endeavour and effort is not necessarily ethical and does not have to mean an inner/internal adaptation (adjustment), as the case shows in which a lie and a deception draw and derive or create their force of persuasion and conviction from a perfect external / outer rationalisation of one's own behaviour. What now concerns the alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others), thus forces the actor<sup>49</sup>, as we know, to its (i.e. the behaviour of others') rationalisation already in respect of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which to the extent one's own self is projected into what is alien, barely manages without the ends/goal-means-schema, without assumptions of consistency and without typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms). The scientific understanding of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) relies on it (i.e. all that) still further for obvious reasons, which (the said scientific understanding of the behaviour of others) in fact is founded on the same anthropological and social-ontic fundamental and basic given facts as non-scientific understanding. The compulsion, constraint and pressure in respect of the rationalisation of the behaviour of others on the part of the observer is strengthened, reinforced and boosted here on the basis of the greater needs in

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<sup>49</sup> In relation to the following, see Ch. IV, Section 1Cb as well as 1D, above.

respect of formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) (renditions, making, conversions) into forms) (structuring(s) in terms of form, formal structuring(s)) and typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms), which are most likely satisfied by recourse to the consistently applied ends / goals-means-schema, and it has no necessary relation to the belief in a howsoever understood rationality of human nature in general or of the precisely scientifically observed actor in particular. Max Weber already said the most important thing about that when he called the “rationalistic” procedure (method or process) of social science a methodical decision in respect of purposefulness (and end / goal-orientation or expediency)<sup>50</sup>, and, hence, we don’t have to linger and dwell any longer on this question. Two points still ought to be clarified. The rationalisation of the behaviour of others for the purpose, end/goal of the scientific observer (but of the actor too) also stretches and extends (concerns and applies) to (seemingly) irrational behaviour, since this often brings to light, unveils, unmask and exposes as rational i.e. action oriented to a consistent end / goal-means schema on the basis of a false (wrong and incorrect) or even freely, openly, i.e. entirely imaginary (fictitious, invented) interpretation of the situation; ignorance, stupidity or practical ineptitude do not therefore necessarily stand the principle of rationality on its head (i.e. render such a principle of rationality inapplicable). Not only successful kinds of acting, actions and acts can, therefore, undergo a scientific rationalisation, rather it appears to be normal that the potential for rationality of (seemingly) irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts ought to be exhausted, and their practical failure ought to be put down and reduced to the distance (gap) between the interpretation of the situation of the actor and the objective constitution, composition and texture of the situation<sup>51</sup>. On the other hand, the enhanced, increased and intensified formalism which the rationalisation (justification) of

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<sup>50</sup> *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 543, 545.

<sup>51</sup> J. Watkins, “Imperfect Rationality”, esp. pp. 168ff., 175, 209ff..

the behaviour of others for the purpose of scientific understanding invariably entails, should not allow that optical illusion to come into being which consists in a confusion of the formal rationality of the scientific procedure (method or process) with a rationality of the actors comprehended in terms of content, which only too gladly throws its colourless mantle over the (multi-)coloured great diversity of the actors and their motives or ends/goals. Acting subjects are anything but users or operators of an undifferentiated rationality<sup>52</sup>. The great variety of the levels, of the forms and of the degrees of rationality goes back and is reduced not least of all to the great variety of human individualities, in fact, to the inner / internal great variety of every individuality.

It is not strange that people since time immemorial have connected so closely the concept of irrationality with in(cap)ability in respect of self-control, [[and]] of the mastery, command and domination of the drives, urges and impulses and affects (emotions) by (means of) Reason / reason: that could not be otherwise when human rationality ultimately emerged from the (cap)ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction. This lacking self-mastery / command/domination/control, this intemperance, immoderation or acrasia (acrasia) (i.e. a lack of self discipline, by which a person acts contrary to usual judgment), as the Greeks called it, took on several forms<sup>53</sup>, and interferes with and detracts from, and has a negative effect on, ethical and technical action equally; that ethical action, because drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions) in accordance with the general understanding are at least in large part “egotistical and selfish”, this technical action, because a sober end/goal-means-calculus (i.e. calculation and assessment of end/goal and means) demands an intellectual-spiritual-mental clarity which only self-mastery / command / domination / control can bestow. The intellect-mind-spirit has,

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<sup>52</sup> See the – directed against the formalism of the interactionist school – observations of Rock, *The Making*, esp. pp. 164, 175: “formalism is a great leveller”.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Rorty’s useful casuistry, “Acrasia and Conflict”.

though, its special acrasia which is called self-delusion or wishful thinking and co-operates, collaborates and has a joint effect with the acrasia of the drives, urges, impulses and of the affects (emotions) in multiple forms and at multiple levels. Self-delusion can be put in the service of this latter (acrasia of the drives and of the affects), so-to-speak, of classical acrasia, either before the concrete external action (then the actor acts on the basis of his self-delusion and of the assessment, evaluation and judgement of the situation arising from that), or else in accordance with the acting, action or act (then the self-deception comes into being as the psychological rationalisation of the acting, action or act in retrospect) – either, therefore, the acting, action or act adapts and adjusts to and conforms with the self-deception or the self-deception legitimises the acting, action and act. Whether now the self-deception goes back and is reduced exclusively to the effects and impacts of wishful thinking or not, does not interest [[us]] here and, incidentally, [[it]] can in general be answered with difficulty – despite the (well-)known quasi-omnipresence of wishful thinking in different dosages. Because cases in which wishful thinking is obvious, and other cases, in which the roots of self-deception cannot be determined and ascertained beyond doubt, or else can be described as “the weakness of reason”, are distinguished to the greatest possible extent by the same features: the selective reception of the available information, the one-sided processing (assimilation or digestion) of the information received, the rapid generalisation of superficial impressions and the sticking and clinging to them despite contrary indications / evidence (clues), the schematic explanation of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) through and by means of supposedly evident dispositions etc.<sup>54</sup>.

Whatever are the commonalities and differences between wishful thinking and self-deception, “irrational” kinds of acting, actions and acts are not restricted

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<sup>54</sup> Cf. in relation to that, Pears, *Motivated Irrationality*, pp. 40ff., 60ff.; Nisbett-Ross, *Human Inference*, Ch. 8.

and limited to the case in which they are connected with wishful thinking, or else, self-deception as the *acrasia* (*acrasia*) of the intellect-spirit. Another category of such kinds of acting, actions and acts is likewise statistically strongly represented and, in terms of theory, possibly even more interesting. Here no rationalisations precede the acting, action and act, but it is clear to the actor that he acts “irrationally”, no matter on the basis of which criteria he defines rationality and irrationality with regard to this concrete acting, action and act, whether, therefore, he acts, thereby, against ethical commands, against social norms or even against his own interests. That is the classical case of *acrasia* (i.e. a lack of self discipline, by which a person acts contrary to usual judgment), which the poet summed up in the words: “*video meliora proboque / Deteriora sequor*» [[= I see and approve of better things / I try to pursue worse things]]”<sup>55</sup>. As a rule it (i.e. the said *acrasia*) is depicted and portrayed as an elemental storm of drives, urges, impulses and passions which tears down (pulls down and demolishes) all dams, i.e. barriers, in respect Reason (reason) in no time. But the facts of the case (circumstances) are also much more complicated when there seem to exist classical or prime examples of classical *acrasia*. Because not simply and not always rationality of a pure kind and an equally pure irrationality struggle against each other, but two different rationalities meet and run into each other, regardless of the existing readiness of the actor or of the observer of ascribing and of attributing to both kinds of rationality the predicate of rationality to the same extent and in the same sense. The acting, action or act apostrophised (i.e. mentioned or referred to) in *concreto* (i.e. concretely or palpably thinking or speaking, or, with reference to actual, verifiable facts, rather than in theory) as “irrational” exhibits, namely, normally, the formal (i.e. form-related) structure of the acting, action or act looked at in *concreto* as “rational”, i.e. it unfolds and develops according to the end/goal-means-schema,

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<sup>55</sup> Ovid, *Metam.*, VII, 21.

it can pursue perfectly attainable and achievable ends/goals, and on top of everything, can be planned coolly and long-term; whole plans in respect of life are in fact, sometimes characterised as “irrational”. The end/goal of questionable kinds of acting, actions and acts which goes against and runs counter to the end/goal of the “rational” acting, action or act competing in concreto with it, or which goes against and runs counter to the supposed ends / goals of “rational” action in general, actually looks “irrational”. The opposition or contrast is therefore of a content-related nature and implies that the “irrational” acting, action and act, looked at as a means, could never serve the end/goal of the “rational” acting, action and act. Both of the rationalities, accordingly, behave inconsistently with each other, whereby and in relation to which the rationality of the “irrational” consists in the fact that the actor, in the course of this, pursues ends/goals, uses means and has motives or else reasons for acting, action or the act; the “irrational” in the “irrational” is again this, that he (i.e. the said actor), knows, all the same, that he has other and (from a certain “higher” point of view) better reasons to pursue other ends/goals, to make use of other means and, in this respect, to act “rationally”. The rationality for the “irrational” and that rationality for the “rational” action have an effect at different levels, and the choice of the actor actually concerns not the choice between irrationality and rationality in abstracto, but that choice between two levels, one of which represents the – at the concrete moment – superior rationality, i.e. that, without whose presence the “irrational” would no longer be considered as “irrational”. Because only the direct and indirect comparison with the really (i.e. in reality) or in the imagination given “rational” turns the “irrational” into the “irrational”.

Now the question is whether the option/choice in favour of the irrational can be explained, and, if yes, in which direction should the explanation be sought. As people have thought, there can exist here only psychological explanations

(acrasias / acrasies of the intellect-spirit or of the drives, urges, impulses), but no rational explanations; in and during irrational action, the explanation of the acting, action and act meets and runs into – through and by means of assumptions of rationality – its outermost limits; the actor does not, in the process, understand himself anymore, that is why he cannot give or indicate any (rational) reasons as to why he does not follow the better reasons he would have, although he has (psychological) reasons to not follow the better reasons<sup>56</sup>. In relation to that, there are a few things to be observed, namely, first of all, regarding the meaning of the connection of the psychological explanation and the non-compliance with the better reasons as the criterion of irrationality. In relation to the psychological reasons of that non-compliance, both “self-deception” as well as “overpowering desires” are reckoned. However, in the case of self-deception, the problem of the compliance and non-compliance with the better reasons is not posed at all: self-deception and wishful thinking have by definition the better reasons on their side, i.e. their rationalisations overcome a *limine* (i.e. from the very beginning) the agony, i.e. great difficulty of the choice between better and less good reasons. The dilemma emerges only in the case of an *acrasia* (*acrasia*) of the drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions) (*deteriora sequor* [[I follow the worse]]) in the “clearly thinking” intellect-spirit-mind (*meliora probo* [[I approve of the better]]) – and irrationality is called, then, not self-deception as the unproblematic guideline of *praxis* / practice, but, on the contrary, the *in(cap)ability* of obeying one’s own realistic insight and understanding. Already the elementary classification of the psychological reasons in respect of irrationality demands, therefore, a differentiation of the criteria of irrationality, which may not be one-sidedly reduced to the non-compliance with the better reasons in the knowledge of the same better reasons. On the other hand, the contrast between rational and psychological explanation,

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<sup>56</sup> Thus, Davidson, *Essays*, p. 42; cf. “Rational Animals”, p. 476.

which the decision in favour of the use of the latter (psychological explanation) especially in and during irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts follows, is based on a muddling and confusing of the formal (i.e. form-related) and content-related aspects of the examination of the problem of rationality. Since, as we have said, formally, in relation to form, kinds of acting, actions and acts can also be rational, which in comparison to other kinds of acting, actions and acts which in terms of matter, substance or content look rational, are classified as irrational, thus, as the criterion of rationality which defines the better reasons, the content of the ends/goals of the acting, action and act finally is left. The content-related difference of the ends/goals in respect of one another seems, from this perspective, to determine the difference between rationality and irrationality; it (i.e. the said content-related difference) can, however, be ascertained always only by a comparison. Someone can have “better” reasons who compares these “better” reasons with other reasons, that is, he defines a rationality in relation to an irrationality. Without this comparison, the phenomenon of affectual action, whatever that may mean, is not in itself decisive for the examination of the problem of rationality. Not every uncontrolled spread, rampancy and getting out of hand of the drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions) in fact leads in itself to “irrational” kinds of acting, actions and acts. It is not appreciated why the affect (emotion) for a woman, which flows into and leads to a happy/felicitous love affair (sexual relationship), ought to be called irrational; this same affect (emotion), however, is commonly regarded as irrational when in the heart of a father with many children and a jealous wife it bursts into flames, i.e. is roused for a young woman. The irrationality of the affect (emotion) stands out here only against an established measure / standard / benchmark / yardstick of behaviour which is regarded as (ethically) rational, and there would be no talk of irrationality at all were not the affect (emotion) not in the way of compliance with the better reasons.

In short, the comparison between better and less good reasons implies that rational and irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts are contrasted with each other on the basis of content-related criteria. But the levels at which the rational or irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts are carried out and connected with better or less good reasons, differs from the level at which the choice between better or less good reasons takes place: both rational as well as irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts have their reasons; from that, however, it is not decided whether these (better reasons) or those (less good reasons) will prevail. Corresponding distinctions must be made with regard to the explanation of the acting, action and act. An explanation of the non-compliance with the better reasons actually constitutes a meta-explanation, i.e. it concerns neither the reasons of the “irrational” acting, action or act, nor all the (better) reasons of the rational acting, action or act in itself, but those reasons which give precedence to the former (reasons of the “irrational” acting) vis-à-vis the latter ((better) reasons of the rational acting) [[in relation to the said explanation of the non-compliance with the better reasons]]. At the level of the meta-explanation, one encounters the reasons of reasons, that is to say, the meta-reasons which should or ought to give the thread – if one exists – to one’s hand for the theoretical approaching of the problem of irrationality. Let us begin with the observation that at the level of the meta-explanation and of the meta-reasons, the difference between what is rational and what is irrational, as it is represented and constituted at the level of the reasons for acting, action and the act, becomes invalid and untenable. At the level of the reasons for acting, action and the act, the actor cannot, as we have said, give any rational, i.e. from the point of view of the better reasons, sound, valid and conclusive justification (and substantiation) for the fact that he does x, although better reasons speak in favour of y – and in actual fact: such an undertaking boils down to and ends up in the absurdity of wanting to find the reasons for acting, action and the act which would be still better than the better reasons for acting, action and the act.

Just as little, however, is the actor (and the observer), at the level of the meta-reasons or else of the meta-explanation, capable of offering an absolutely binding – i.e. for all men (i.e. humans), but also for all points in time and situations and positions in respect of his own life – justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) for the fact that he considers the reasons which speak in favour of y as the better reasons. That means: he can opt for y only from the point of view of an already adopted and assumed hierarchy of values (or value hierarchy), which at the higher tier (level, stage or grade) of justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) can be underpinned, substantiated and corroborated only tautologically or self-referentially. That also means: shifts, displacements and rearrangements inside the hierarchy of values (or value hierarchy) where the difference between the rational and the irrational lacks an objective meaning, has a corresponding effect at the level of the reasons for acting, action and the act, at which the rational sets itself against and opposes irrational acrasias / acrasies in the form of the better reasons.

The plastic field at which all of that is acted out and takes place is the identity. Its inner structuring (arrangement and organisation) and the rearrangements (regroupings, adjustments) inside of it determine – always in the closest connection with the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation – at the level of the reasons for the acting, action and act, the interplay between rational and irrational kinds of acting, actions and acts, however, they also determine what on each and every respective occasion should or ought to be considered rational and irrational, what as the better or less good reasons – and they determine, finally, when, how, how long and to what extent, in what way, in what respect one revolts against the better reasons or retreats from them. To judge in accordance with these empirically easily ascertainable effects and

impacts (and we do not have any other material of proof, i.e. evidence at our disposal), identity is neither carved from a single piece of wood (i.e. identity is not made out of only one material), nor is it bound by an unchangeable hierarchy of its components. One should imagine it (i.e. identity) structurally similarly to society or history as a whole: in it there is – in retrospect – detectable, ascertainable causality, [[but]] no law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) which – in advance – permits absolutely secure (certain and reliable) prognoses (forecasts). No covering law exists here, from which the individual kinds of acting, actions and acts or reasons for acting, action and the act could be derived and deduced, but kinds of acting, actions, acts or else reasons for acting, action and the act represent and constitute functions of the – on each and every respective occasion – balance of power (relative strength or correlation of forces) between its (i.e. identity's) components. Every one of these components has its own multi-valent logic and its own – on each and every respective occasion – better reasons, it (i.e. every one of these components) gets into conflict with the other components, it submits to them or interacts (has an effect jointly) with them. The – on each and every respective occasion – decisive reason for acting, action and the act is dictated by the component which – on each and every respective occasion – retains the upper hand. Reasons are good or bad, less good or better according to the needs, the habits, routines or the (changing, variable) intensity of every component, which often claims for itself to represent the identity as a whole, to make its logic the logic of the identity. This explains the inner conflicts and splits, divisions, schisms which belong to the everyday life of the identity, it explains, however, the unity, uniformity and solidity of the identity as soon as one of its components undertakes the undisputed, if also often transient, temporary hegemony. In view of these possible outcomes of the games of power and strength and force, interplays of forces or power plays on the plastic field of the identity, it is not unimportant to visualise and make clear that

images of men (i.e. humans) which hitherto been made, outlined or draughted for ethical-normative ends/goals, can be class(ifi)ed for ethical-normative ends / goals fundamentally / in principle into two types. Either (in regard to such an image of man) there is supposed to be one component of the identity, as a rule called Reason, controlling and dominating all other components, or, there is in mind a state of affairs in which all components unfold and develop harmonically next to and with one another, perhaps under the mild direction, guidance or leadership of one or of another of the components. These sketches, plans, outlines are, naturally, both in regard to the mixture, blend and assortment of their elements, as well as in regard to their world-theoretical justification (and substantiation / founding (establishment) in terms of reasons, argument and or explanation) determined historically (as regards the intellect-spirit). All the more interesting appears to be the ascertainment that, taken together, they cover the whole spectrum which the permanent anthropological and social-ontological parameters mark out and make clear. Above all, they put – in their each and every respective way –the age-old and generally conscious fundamental problem of identity into the foreground: that it (i.e. identity) consists of multiple components which one way or another co-exist, and in the course of this, must be partly disciplined, partly cultivated.

The indication of the multi-dimensionality and the multi-facetedness of identity is supposed to underline the great variety of the – in it – permanently contained practical possibilities which at any time can appear and which must always be reckoned with; imponderability (incalculability) would not constitutively belong to subjectivity were the identity of the subject one-dimensional. The pregnant-with-conflict, i.e. conflict-bearing and potentially explosive multitude or multiplicity of components of the identity, which next to the multitude or multiplicity of the concrete situations and positions makes understandable the multitude or multiplicity of the ways, manners, modes of

and reasons for acting, action and the act, may or should not, however, be interpreted in the sense of a constitutively weak identity or even an identity in respect of the occasion, opportunity or chance. The social relation, which places more or less traceable bound(arie)s on the effect and impact of the centrifugal forces inside of the identity, and influences the components of the identity in regard to their behaviour towards one another similarly to how an external foe influences the parties of a civil war, already ensures and provides for fact that it cannot be thus [[in regard to a constitutively weak identity etc.]]. The social relation – more generally and more abstractly formulated: social life and survival – commands and requires, in other words, consistency, and identity consists in exactly the extent consistency is given, it (i.e. identity) constitutes the ensemble of its components, but from the point of view of their (i.e. the said components’) consistency. This consistency is, though, just like rationality, a question of level, of form and of degree. It (i.e. the said consistency) is established and produced in very different ways, manners and modes, and the manner of its establishment, fabrication and production can change even in the same subject, in accordance with which component of the identity on each and every respective occasion undertakes the lead, and how dense, thick and compact the unity, uniformity and solidity is, which is attained and achieved under this lead. We would have to wait in vain if we wanted to talk about identity only after the attainment and achievement of perfect consistency. Of course, some philosophers underline without adding anything further such consistency, and do it because they have in mind a unification of the subject under the aegis of a certain ethical or social norm. Others, to whom this norm is fishy, strange, dubious, reverse the schema and assert the open and provisional character of the identity, as it were, as the product of an – on each and every respective occasion – convenient, agreeable, acceptable, likable or expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) improvisation. (It is obvious why this consideration, of all things, found dissemination and spread under mass-

democratic circumstances and conditions, and in the demarcation and delimitation against the classical bourgeois comprehension of individuality<sup>57</sup>.) Polemical points of view, however, do not determine only the content of theories of identity, but likewise the positionings and stances of the identity in relation to itself, i.e. its self-understanding and its self-(re)presentation. They can, naturally, have an effect in contrary directions, that is, both strengthen and reinforce the coherence as well as give rise to and cause internal/inner split(ting)s, fissions, schisms, divisions and discrepancies, when in several simultaneous polemical (or even friendly) positionings and stances they take – in terms of content – different or even contrary stances and accordingly develop their kinds of argumentation. Then the identity must find the ways of working out, conceiving, developing, formulating and constructing sound, reliable, firm and stable balances and equilibria, and bring the practical need for flexibility, after a fashion and somehow, into line and harmony with the likewise necessary-for-life, vital and essential fixed, firm and stable orientation. In the course of this, it (i.e. identity) can swing and oscillate back and forth according to each and every individual composition, constitution, texture and concrete situation/position from one extreme to the other. Sometimes it connects its self-understanding only temporarily with certain content(s) (e.g. persons, convictions or values), sometimes, again, this connection or combination occurs for better or for worse so that the self-preservation of the identity appears to be more valuable and worthwhile than physical self-preservation. Everything is possible here. Because – we must repeat it – also here there are only causalities, no kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities), which determine absolutely fixed hierarchies. But the multifarious and manifold causalities which in general push towards consistency, i.e. no matter what their form on each and every respective occasion, have a practical effect incessantly,

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<sup>57</sup> In relation to that, Kondylis, *Niedergang*, pp. 228, 256ff..

even if consistency is successful only at the minimal level, i.e. through and by means of the fading or cutting out of the rest of the components of the identity in favour on one single component<sup>xxviii</sup>. With regard to the following analysis, it ought to be noted that consistency and the self-confirmation of the identity belong together. Consistency is not produced, made or restored through and by means of abstract plan(ning)s in loneliness, solitude and isolation, but is shaped and stabilised, fixed partly by groping and feeling, partly through and by means of the decisive experiences in a parallel manner in relation to experiences of self-confirmation, no matter which components of the identity concern these experiences. The identity, represented by each and every respective decisive and determinative component or even by a broader synthesis of its components, tends towards that kind of consistency which allows and affords it the greatest self-confirmation, or else recognition. Whether the latter (greatest self-confirmation and greatest recognition) is sought in foro externo (i.e. externally amongst other people) or rather in foro interno (i.e. internally as regards one's own consciousness and conscience), and how both fora behave with regard to each other, depends on numerous factors.

This short exposition by far does not exhaust the problem of identity<sup>58</sup>, however it gives hints and tips for the understanding of central aspects of the always swaying and wavering, and always to-be-defined anew, relation between rationality and irrationality. Consistency (as the essential feature, characteristic and trait of identity) and rationality are connected, linked and interrelate just as much in the anthropological and the social-ontological sense as, for instance, rationality and the ability at the postponement (delay or deferment) of satisfaction. Consistent identity and rationality represent and constitute with reference to the need for orientation equivalent and – to the point of being mistaken and confused – similar instruments. And the possibility of this

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<sup>58</sup> More in relation to that in the third volume of this work.

mistaken identity, mixing up and confusion, already in the roots of the psyche, contributes much to the slipping and lapsing of rationality into irrationality, or else into the victories of irrationality over rationality. Because it means that the logic of the identity or else the logic of its – on each and every respective occasion – leading components can be identified per se, absolutely or par excellence with rationality; then it is converted into a more or less autonomous form of rationality, which wants to drive out, displace, repress or suppress or put in the shade (eclipse and outclass) all other identities, and sometimes can even do just that. That with which the identity at the concrete moment connects its self-understanding and its self-confirmation, leads and guides its behaviour irrespective of whether this behaviour is in agreement with its (i.e. the identity's) ideal self-understanding and its ideal self-confirmation or not. Since the identity as a multi-dimensional and multi-layered whole just as little coincides with the individual levels, forms and degrees of rationality as with its own ideal self-understanding and its own ideal self-confirmation, thus it can find its ideal self-confirmation in what is “irrational” (the “Irrational”), regardless of what price [[has to be paid for that]], regardless also of whether the “irrational” is represented by the acrasia / acrasia of the spirit or that acrasia of the drives, urges, impulses and affects and emotions. The logic of the identity then surpasses and outstrips and gets ahead of the rationality of the better reasons, it determines in a willful and headstrong manner what the better reasons are, it turns itself into, in a word, the sovereign tier of jurisdiction, i.e. authority. Before we say more in greater detail in relation to that, let it be remembered that the formal quality of the thought and intellectual performances and achievements which accompany the rationalising or planning action does not depend on which component of the identity undertakes its leadership and defines its logic. The dominance of the affect and emotion does not by any means prevent or hinder in itself foresight and prescience and the well-thought-out, well-considered and judicious correlation of end/goal and means with each

other (Count Montecristo's revenge), just as the virtue of self-control (self-mastery, self-domination) in itself does not in the least vouch for that fact or guarantee that the master over his drives, urges, impulses and affects and emotions can otherwise think with instrumental perfection. Things may, naturally, be the other way around too. But the great variety of the possibilities reveals that "irrationality", especially when it allies itself with the (currently predominant) logic of the identity does not have to – from the beginning – be ashamed of either its stupidity, ignorance or ungainliness, crudeness and already, accordingly, go to work (i.e. act) half-heartedly.

This becomes particularly clear in regard to that rationality which we called the *acrasia* of the spirit, i.e. the self-delusion of wishful thinking. This irrationality is in fact of its essence and nature determined (i.e. set and certain) in relation to that of giving wing to, i.e. spurring on and inspiring the feeling in respect of oneself (i.e. self-esteem) and self-confidence, self-assurance, it is dictated directly by the logic of the identity and directly serves its self-confirmation; self-delusion is called, in other words, that self-understanding of the identity which puts to one side and eliminates a *limine* (i.e. from the beginning) all ideational hindrances, obstacles, barriers and obstructions on the road to self-confirmation. Such hindrances, obstacles pile up and accumulate, however, in the other typical case of *acrasia*, when, namely, the logic of the identity does not rule over, control and govern the whole field, but the "better reasons" face and stand in front of its (i.e. the said identity's) reasons, and hence, self-confirmation is problematic and in danger since it lacks the self-consciousness of self-deception. The being victorious of the less good reasons against the better reasons is made possible / facilitated by the fact that the logic of the identity (its currently predominant component), or else of its self-confirmation confers upon or grants to these (less good) reasons a particular status and a specific rationality so that, finally, the competition between better

and less good reasons is converted from a competition between normatively unequal reasons into a competition between (f)actually equal reasons; the better and less good reasons become merely reasons of a different order; as a result the possibility of the direct comparison is cancelled, and the comparative degree “better” loses its meaning and its compelling, coercive and cogent influence. Thus, as the logic of the identity of Michael Kohlhaas<sup>xxviii</sup> unfolded and developed, no-one could convince him anymore in relation to that, that he was acting against the “better reasons”. Those, again, who stick fast to the dilemma and carry on recognizing the superiority of the better reasons, although they let their action to be dictated by the less good reasons, are suspended, hang and hover between cynicism, unhappy and unfortunate consciousness and schizophrenia. But all of them have the feeling that something more or less strong and more or less consistently potent binds them to the less good reasons temporarily or constantly, and that the self-confirmation of their identity, at least in a particular respect, without this binding, would limp; not seldom, in fact, the decision as choice in favour of the better reasons entails a certain inner emptiness / void and a melancholy, which are founded on a shameful feeling in not having been brave, courageous, daring and plucky, stoical enough in order to act even by paying a high price against “every convention” or even against “every Reason” and to have to fight for a “lost cause”. Only the analysis of the logic of the identity in its each and every respective concretisation can shed light on and inform us about such and similar “irrationalities”, which are normal phenomena (occurrences, appearances) in social life.

If the phenomenon of the howsoever defined “irrationality” proves something, thus it proves this, that rationality, however it may be defined, is conceptually and objectively, factually less comprehensive than identity. For that reason, the logic of the identity can, as it were, absorb and assimilate or combat it (i.e. rationality) head on and defeat it. Rationality is a function of identity, not the

reverse, and there is no rationality which can, as it were, conquer and capture an identity from the outside. If one disregards the identity completely, thus rationality cannot be more than a formal (i.e. form-related) instrumental teaching, doctrine or theory, which turns and revolves around the end/goal-means schema; because the search for the expedient, purposeful, serving-(an-) end(s)/goal(s) means for the attainment and achievement of a (pre-)given (set, fixed) end/goal can bring to light results, outcomes and consequences which are generally binding, that is, they are valid irrespective of whether the end/goal is approved of and sanctioned or not. But as soon as it is a matter of the constitution, composition and texture or else rationality of the ends/goals, the identity must make its presence felt (in the form of its dominant logic at that time), since the choice of the ends/goals directly or indirectly raises the question of meaning in its lesser or greater breadth – and the question and problem of meaning is the central question and problem of the identity: the manner how the identity comprehends its place in the world, how it, therefore, strives for, aims at and aspires to the confirmation and recognition of itself, constitutes its answer to the question of meaning. With the question of meaning, and with it the question of identity, via the determination of the (ultimate) ends and goals of acting, action and the act forcing their way into and penetrating the examination of the problem of rationality, they set the course both of the definition of the “rational” and of the irrational, as well as of the occasional or frequent violation / infringement of the rational in favour of the irrational in the knowledge of the consequences of the same violation. As we know, the world-theoretical preference for “irrationalism” is in itself no indication that one acts less rationally than the “rationalists”. However, the imperious and domineering logic of the identity can (but not necessarily) give rise to and cause both amongst the “irrationalists” as well as amongst the “rationalists”, at the level of acting, action and the act, “irrationalities” in the form of the uncontrolled spread or extension/expansion of symbolic-expressive factors vis-à-vis instrumental

factors or else vis-à-vis the logic of the situation. That does not mean that the “end/goal-means” schema does not apply and is overridden, because at least from the subjective perspective of the actor and in the narrowest, i.e. strictest sense and within his radius of action, it (i.e. the said “end/goal-means” schema) retains its validity even in and during “blind reactions”. It, however, means that in another handling of this schema at another level, that is, during and in regard to other ends/goals, the actor would get or procure ideational or material benefits, which, from the point of view of other actors (and from the point of view of the actor himself, to the extent that this actor does not avoid the dominant measures, yardsticks, benchmarks, criteria in foro externo (i.e. in the external world)), would surpass the in actual fact pursued course of acting, action and the act attained and achieved.

Towards the thus understood “irrational” preference does the logic of his identity in its constitutive connection with meaning-like / meaningful, i.e. symbolic-expressive or normative factors push the actor. If we wanted to very broadly or grossly, and only for the ends/goals and purposes of orientation, wanted to distinguish between expressive and instrumental components of behaviour, thus, we would ascribe to those expressive components of behaviour the attributes of the spontaneous, to a large extent bio-psychically determined, uncontrolled or uncontrollable, and of the end/goal in itself, to these instrumental components of behaviour, on the other hand, the attribute of the expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful)-planned, to a large extent culturally conditioned and determined, more easily controlled or controllable, and of the means<sup>59</sup>. With regard to the problem of rationality and in particular the expression “instrumental rationality”, it must be made clear that the “instrumental” here, of course, does not signify the mere presence of the means in the absence of ends/goals, but only that the question in accordance with the

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<sup>59</sup> According to Maslow, “Expressive Component”, esp. pp. 261ff., 264 ff..

constitution, composition and texture of the ends/goals is left aside and excluded, since it is regarded as solved in foro externo or in foro interno, and hence, that (conditioned-in-terms-of-content) conflict between better and less good reasons, which enable irrationalities, cannot arise. Under this precondition, presumption and prerequisite, we should or can contrast the instrumental and the expressive against each other, knowing very well that the relative conceptual clarity of this contrast is found again only to a very limited extent in the facts. Because every instrumental acting, action and act has to a greater or lesser extent an expressive or symbolic aspect, not to mention that it, in relation to that, can be designed, laid out, structured and set up to serve expressive-symbolic ends/goals. It is expressive, anyhow, in the elementary sense, since it – through its success – indicates, displays and notifies an ability and a quantum of power of the actor, who already therein finds a self-confirmation. Expressive kinds of acting, actions and acts are, for their part, ends/goals in themselves because they have this same self-confirmation of the identity as their sole object, their end/goal is, therefore, already contained in their execution, without, in the course of this, having to take into consideration the schema “end/goal-means” and the external circumstances or the logic of the situation. The showing and demonstrating of the state of mind, mental condition and sensitivity or of the ability and or the power of the actor suffices, which makes apparent and clear what dominates topically / currently in the logic of his identity. Here lies (or is found) the source of many types of “irrationalities”. The actor may, in fact precisely through and by means of his disregard, contempt and disdain for socially acceptable norms, his human milieu / surroundings or for his objective constraints, compulsions, pressures and coercions, be confirmed in his identity, and indeed out of multiple “malicious, malign, malignant” or “innocent” motives: he may through and by means of such a stance avenge a lack of recognition or, conversely, believe that he will invariably and undoubtedly win (over) and gain this recognition as soon as he

thus shows and presents himself “as he is”. The postponement (deferment or delay) of satisfaction or of the uninhibited, unchecked expression of the affects and emotions, which in fact represents and constitutes a satisfaction too, is needed where one is thinking of or imagining a long-term handling of the schema “end/goal-means”. On the other hand, in and during the expressive acting, action and act as end/goal in itself, what is long-term is absorbed by what is immediate and direct, that is to say, under these particular circumstances, the logic of the identity can command the free unleashing (releasing, unblocking, untying, detachment) of the affect / emotion. And not only in the expressive kinds of acting, actions and acts as such, but also in the kinds of acting, actions and acts which indeed have an external end/goal and use expedient, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means, yet basically express / state something about the logic of the identity. To that equally belong kinds of acting, actions and acts which are regarded commonly and generally as moral, and other kinds of acting, actions and acts which are commonly and generally regarded as unmoral, i.e. immoral. Whoever, e.g., hurts or upsets the self-understanding of the identity and consequently hinders and obstructs its self-confirmation, whoever, therefore, violates (injures, wounds) the identity’s self-confirmation’s “honour” etc., must then reckon with his (i.e. of the person with violated honour) act of revenge, even if this act of revenge seems to be “irrational” since it interferes with, spoils, detracts from and infringes other (material or social) interests of the actor. As La Bruyère in a brilliant aphorism opined, it is for a passion an easy thing to defeat Reason, its great triumph it celebrates only if it (i.e. the said passion) imposes itself against its interest<sup>60</sup>. Already Guicciardini rebuked and found fault with those who, contrary to their own advantage (i.e. benefit, profit and interest), thought of revenge, and via its

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<sup>60</sup> «Rien ne coûte moins à la passion que de se mettre au-dessus de la raison: son grand triomphe est de l’emporter sur l’intérêt [[nothing costs the passion less than to master reason: its great triumph is to prevail over its interest]]», *Les Caractères*, IV, p. 77.

satisfaction, forgot everything else<sup>61</sup>. This same logic of the identity, which wants to disregard and disdain “interest” in the current sense for the sake of honour or of revenge, and in this respect acts against the “better reasons”, can motivate [[someone]] (or act as a motivating factor) for altruistic kinds of acting, actions and acts and personal sacrifices. In this case, the identity connects its self-confirmation absolutely with the renunciation of the pursuit of its own interests and it would “lose every respect for itself” if it acted otherwise. Here belongs a broad palette or gamut of positionings and stances and modes and ways of acting, action and the act, which reaches and stretches from suicide out of shame up to heroic death on the battlefield or a life full of privations in the service of the poor, and through and by means of its great variety and multiplicity reveals how difficult the determination of the “better reasons”, consequently, as the criterion for rationality, or else irrationality, is, as soon as one leaves the field of banalities in which the newer / modern debate in moral philosophy feels at home (“when I see thick clouds in the sky, then I have better reasons to take my umbrella with me than not to do this”). The said newer debate in moral philosophy, in fact, takes no notice, in genuine philosophical naivety, of questions and problems of identity, of an identity’s unceasing struggle for self-confirmation and its real dilemmas, which directly concern the examination of the problem of rationality and irrationality.

The questionability of the “better reasons” as the criterion of rationality and irrationality becomes, from another perspective, clear as well: as we have said, the better and less good reasons, in the final analysis, must be evaluated and judged from the standpoint of particular ends / goals defined in terms of content, on the other hand, the logic of the identity bears / carries its own ends/goals in itself, it is an end/goal in itself or, expressed otherwise, it is built and set up / constructed self-referentially. The logically-experimentally ascertainable

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<sup>61</sup> *Ricordi*, II, p. 150.

realisability (i.e. feasibility and viability) of the ends/goals of acting, action and the act is here – regardless of the possible / potential self-delusions of the actor in this respect (self-delusions, incidentally, which serve the self-confirmation of the identity) – hardly of any weight, i.e. significance, whereas in and during “logical action” it has primary significance and meaning. This explains why under certain circumstances, or else in and during “higher irrationality”, the logic of identity can outstrip the logic of the situation. Of course, the identity knows itself to be always in a situation, but the situation out of which it draws its self-understanding and its self-confirmation does not necessarily coincide with that in which it precisely must act; the former can be more or less fictive or else a past or future situation of a “higher” order, in regard to which the topical, current situation is measured and is reduced to a pseudo (apparent, mock, fictitious, bogus and sham) situation. The logic of the identity changes in order to adapt and adjust itself to the logic of the topical, current situation only under the pressure of the social relation. Such a change, as is known, does not necessarily occur, but its possibility, as soon as another component of the identity undertakes the representation of the identity as a whole, demonstrates in itself that the logic of the identity should or may not at all be confused with a fixed, stable and firm disposition. Just as little ought it (i.e. the logic of the identity) to be class(ifi)ed one-sidedly as the source of irrationalities. Finally, behind, in fact, “rational” action, an identity stands too, whose logic springs from the demands of such actions and whose self-confirmation consists in the success of such action. The difference lies therein, that in and during “rational” action, the uniformity and solidity of the schema “end/goal-means” and the realisability of the end/goal clarifies, as it were, exhaustively the theme, subject and topic “rationality”, and a going into the identity of the actor seems to be superfluous. But for the asymmetries and dissonances which characterise the “irrationalities”, an explanation must be given, and here one does not make do or manage without consideration of the logic of the identity. Its (i.e. the

identity's) changeability and variability, corresponding with the multi-dimensionality of the identity, makes understandable why the same actor can act, at times, "rationally", at times "irrationally". In general, from this perspective it becomes clearer and more obvious why rationality can have an effect at a number of levels, in a number of forms and to various degrees, why it (i.e. rationality) is mixed and blended in and during various kinds of acting, actions and acts with "irrationality" at all these levels, in all these forms and all these degrees. Such a result and outcome may appear to be theoretically (i.e. in regard to theory) unsatisfactory to the rationalistic ethicists and moralists. They should not or ought not, nonetheless, forget how unsatisfactory their own theories in practice have hitherto turned out be.

### C. The misleading concept of "end/goal rationality" and M. Weber's problematic typification of social action

Max Weber was convinced of the relativity of ethical values, and hence as a social scientist was hardly led into the temptation of connecting the concept of ratio (i.e. reason(ing)) and of rationality with a certain ethically defined or coloured, i.e. tinged or biased content, that is, in the sense of the ethical-normativistic tradition in theology and philosophy of demarcating or delimiting the concept of ratio (i.e. reason(ing)) and of rationality against a "false" ratio (i.e. reason(ing)) and a "false" rationality<sup>62</sup>. In his view, and in relation to that he was not wrong, it was a matter of a "historical concept, which contained a world of contrasts and opposites/oppositions within itself", that is, it is distinguished by "many-sidedness" and in terms of content can be defined, if at all, only by a negative-polemical reference: rational (irrational) is not something

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<sup>62</sup> "Corrupta ratio non est ratio... regula humanorum actuum non est ratio quaelibet, sed ratio recta [[= corrupt reason is not reason... the rule of human actions is not just any reason, but right reason]]", Thomas von Aquin (Thomas Aquinas), *In II. Sent.*, dist. 24, qu.3, ad 3.

in itself, but comes out of a certain irrational (rational) point of view; something which is e.g. economically (i.e. as regards the economy) rational can exactly because of that be ethically irrational<sup>63</sup>. This historical way of looking at things in respect of the examination of the problem of rationality is underpinned theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) by the distinction between form-related (i.e. formal) and material rationality. The former (formal rationality) is measured in regard to a single neutral yardstick, benchmark or criterion and is accordingly unambiguous, unequivocal and has a single meaning; the ambiguity having many meanings of the latter (material rationality) arises from the possibility of its connection with several value-yardsticks / standards or benchmarks and criteria as to values<sup>64</sup>. If the form-related (i.e. formal) and material meet each other here in principle and not merely “empirically” and occasionally and now and then, thus, this would imply that only the assumption, adoption and acceptance of certain values on the part of the actor could make this actor capable of rational action; the history of rationality would have to therefore be subjected and subjugated, subordinated to the yardsticks, benchmarks, criteria, standards and measures of ethical rationality. On the other hand, the material value relativism (of the researcher) makes possible the historical procedure (method or process) and also historical balance / (counter) balancing. The formal (i.e. form-related) analysis of rationality, which constitutes the counterpart of the material value relativism (of the researcher), does not postulate, though, that the actor must act ethically in a value-free manner in order to be able to act rationally, because in this case a negative binding of the analysis of rationality to the material point of view would arise and ensue; the latter (negative binding of the analysis of rationality to the material point of view) shows, on the contrary, that material rationality at the level of the actor, i.e. the confession of faith in certain values does not in the

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<sup>63</sup> *Prot. Ethik*, pp. 65, 84ff.; *Wirtschaft*, p. 335.

<sup>64</sup> *Wirtschaft*, pp. 44ff., 59.

least stand in the way of rational and rationalised acts, which can be apprehended from formal (i.e. form-related) points of view. The form-related (i.e. formal) analysis of rationality, in other words, establishes that the rationality of the actor or else of the “moulding, shaping and formation of life” “allows different kinds of contents”<sup>65</sup>. Correspondingly, rationalisation<sup>xxix</sup>, i.e. the practical conversion or effect and consequences and result(s) of rationality is distinguished by “ambiguity and many meanings”<sup>66</sup>, and it stretches and extends, motivated by the most different content(s) and or values, to the most different realms and areas of social reality and of social action. It pioneers and blazes the trail, opens roads as the “disenchantment of the world”, as the adaptation and adjustment of behaviour to ethical commands, as the conceptual systematisation of ideas, as the bureaucratisation and regulation of social life through and by means of form-related (i.e. formal) prescriptions and (the) positivisation of the order of right/law/justice, i.e. of the legal order etc. etc.. What Weber thought of these processes of rationalisation has in the meanwhile been sufficiently and adequately researched and does not have to be verified anew<sup>xxx</sup>. To be kept in mind, however, is Weber’s explanation that the processes of rationalisation “in the individual areas and realms of life” would “by no means” exhibit a “parallel progressive development or unfolding”<sup>67</sup>, they would not, therefore, all of them, flow into one single riverbed wherein rationality is constituted as a united (uniform and homogenous) whole and consequently would have to overcome the contrasts and oppositions between its form-related (i.e. formal) and material, ethical and technical aspects. Such completion, perfection and consummation of rationality is not allowed or granted in the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal).

Weber placed the historical forms of rationality or rationalisation in two large

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<sup>65</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 675.

<sup>66</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 15ff..

<sup>67</sup> *Prot. Ethik*, p. 65.

and simple categories. He spoke of the theoretical domination and control of reality by all the more precise concepts, and of the methodical attainment and achievement of a practical aim/end/objective by all the more precise calculation of the adequate means, that is, by the all the more effective methodicalness and regularity as to a plan / plans / planning<sup>68</sup>. If one adds to both these categories the two other categories introduced in and during the classification of the types of social action (“end/goal rationality (or rationality as to an end/goal)” and “value rationality (or rationality as to a value)”), thus arises and results an ensemble or whole of four types of rationality (or rationality types) which appears to be sufficiently comprehensive in order to be fair to the totality and entirety of Weber’s statements and suggestions in this connection<sup>69</sup>. It is now apparent that both of the former types of rationality (of more precise concepts and of more precise means) lie at another logical level than both of the latter rationality types (of end/goal rationality and value rationality). Weber did not ask, of course, about the anthropological and social-ontological backgrounds or backdrops of rationality<sup>70</sup>, yet, with regard to those (anthropological and social-ontological backgrounds of rationality), closely related points of view flowed (were infused) into his typology of social action, which does not have the ambition to summarise historically-sociologically reconstructable processes, but is supposed to put forward real (if also ideal-typically purified) constants. On the other hand, kinds of potential and capabilities in respect of rationality convertible into processes of rationalisation (or rationalisation processes) float and hover freely in the sense that they as such cannot make up any separate, stable type of acting, action or act (or acting-action-act type). They can indeed, generally, be reckoned or counted amongst “end/goal-(rationality)” or amongst

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<sup>68</sup> *Aufsätze z. Rel.*, I, p. 265ff.

<sup>69</sup> Despite the use of slightly different terminology, both of the most thorough classifications of the Weberian types of rationality (rationality types) agree with each other in relation to this result; see Kalberg, “Weber’s Types”, esp. p. 1151ff. and Levine, *Flight*, esp. p. 157ff..

<sup>70</sup> See 1Ba in this chapter, above.

“value rationality”, however, “end/goal-(rationality)” or “value rationality” in themselves do not make any “kinds of progress or advances”, they are not subject to any change like that which the processes of rationalisation represent and constitute. Even if one wanted to in misjudgement and underestimation of this state of affairs and present situation to assert that “end/goal” rationality is perfected in the course of history or else it is rationalised in the form of an all the more effective methodicalness and regularity as to a plan / plans / planning, thus one would completely certainly cause Weber’s fierce and intense opposition and objection in regard to the thesis that “value rationality” makes in itself, i.e. via the increasing quality of values and of value-related and judgemental thought, any kinds of progress or advances, which could be detached and separated from the (incidentally symmetrical and revocable) historical processes of rationalisation. What, however, Weber rejected in principle, both in regard to end/goal rationality, as well as in regard to value rationality, he smuggled, under the influence of the dichotomy “community-society”, understood in terms of the history of philosophy, into his considerations about the former (community), by describing the development and evolution of the Occident/West as a unique and singular process of rationalisation in the sense of technical rationality or else of “end/goal rationality”. Against that there would be no objection, if the historical-sociological analysis of rationalisation had not wormed its way and crept into the anthropological and social-ontological realm, if, therefore, the in principle hyper-historical or supra-historical typology of social action had not been constructed under the palpable influence of the same dichotomous schema which guided the historically sociological description of the occidental (Western) processes of rationalisation. Much to the detriment of theoretical consistency and clarity, two logically heterogenous levels are here mixed with each other, but above all the attempt suffers thereunder of defining the concept of “end/goal rationality” satisfactorily, and of delimiting and demarcating it (i.e.

the concept of “end/goal rationality”) in a convincing way against “value rationality”. We shall introduce our observations and comments regarding that with some reflections in relation to the processes of rationalisation in the Occident (West).

The description of these processes would have been a relatively simple matter of concern if it were, in the course of this, a matter of the victory of undisguised “end/goal rationality” over traditionalisms and older “value rationalities”, that is to say, of an objectively correct and clear self-understanding of certain historical actors regarding the likewise objectively correct and clear self-understanding of other actors. The talented and gifted historian Weber knew, though, about the enormous complexity of development (evolution, advancement), and he also knew that a main source of the complexity of historical developments in general is found in the asymmetry between the self-understanding of the actors and the objective consequences of their action. Irrespective of how one may judge his opinions and views on the (relative) value and importance of the Protestant spirit inside of the overall development of capitalism, they prove his awake and alert consciousness and awareness of those asymmetries, in fact of their necessity for the unwinding of collective action in long periods of time. That which in accordance with Weber’s perception and view was supposed to be proved at the end of the occidental (Western) process of rationalisation as the pushing through and imposition and achievement of “end/goal rationality”, paved the way by the invocation of old and new “value-rationalities”; “value rationalities” moulded, shaped and formed the methodical ways of life, in fact in areas and realms in which form-related (i.e. formal) “end/goal rationality” purely seems to dominate (the sense of duty of the government official or civil servant etc.)<sup>71</sup>. Although Weber was now clear about the “value-rational” preconditions and prerequisites of “end/goal rationality” (if one may say so) for

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. in relation to that, Tenbruck, „Das Werk“, esp. p. 689; Kalberg, “Weber’s Types”, esp. p. 1162ff..

the period of origin and coming into being of capitalism, on the other hand, he believed that the capitalistically-bureaucratically determined process of rationalisation in the end would entail the radical disenchantment of the world and would erect, set up and establish the mechanical Reich (kingdom, empire, realm) of “end/goal rationality” on earth, in fact that this in essence had already happened. The reason for this very one-sided and to a great extent faulty and erroneous assessment of the historical situation is based on Weber’s tendency to connect the enchantment of the world (inside of the Occident / West) primarily or exclusively with the Christian religion, from which arose and resulted the fact that secularisation, understood as the dissolution of Christianity, boiled down to and ended up in consistent disenchantment. Here it became apparent that Weber had a weaker feeling and sense for the inner/internal structure, the social-psychological effect and impact and (cap)ability in respect of the change in ideologies than for instance Pareto. The same historical-social subjects, who mercilessly, pitilessly expelled and banished Christian magic from all corners of the world, filled the sensorial emptiness (void or emptiness and void in respect of meaning) with new godheads, divinities, deities or hypostases and, in the process, summoned ideological arts of magic and witchcraft which were hardly behind or inferior (subordinate) to the theological kinds of magic<sup>72</sup>. These godheads, divinities, deities or hypostases were called “Nature”, “History” or “Man”, and in their name stood atheists with the same and equal fervour, zeal and devoutness before the execution squad as in their time Christians who went to their martyrdom. Secularisation, far from drying up the sources of magical thought (i.e. thought in respect of magic) forever, ensured the survival of age-old thought structures in the sharpest contrast and opposition to the content(s) with which the same thought structures were accompanied; because there are thought structures and conceptual structures which are indispensable in regard

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 3, above.

to every ethically-normatively thought-of and conceived assumption of meaning. That has hardly changed, though, after the collapse of the Marxist philosophy of history and the temporary victory of Western “pragmatism”. Today’s Western legal positivism, which mistakenly imagines itself as perfectly and completely devoid or free of illusions, can only flourish and thrive against the background of anthropological-world-theoretical postulates (the “dignity of man” / “human dignity”, the “rights of man” / “human rights”), whilst resigned scepticism, which allegedly or supposedly supports pluralism and tolerance, promptly gives way and yields to decisive measures as soon as someone seriously calls into question pluralism and tolerance; on which world-theoretical preferences, not to mention eschatological expectations, the oftentimes propagated primacy of the economy and of technique (i.e. technology) vis-à-vis “power politics” is founded, is also adequately known. The end of ideologies constitutes only the ideological self-understanding of the times, just as the self-understanding pertaining to the critique of culture of the times commands already since decades ago comprehending the times as the work of blind instrumental thought. Seen from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge, it is a matter here of the thought products of intellectuals who want to play the part of (put on airs or show off as) the champions or pioneers of the “substantial” against the “instrumental”<sup>xxxii</sup>. In an anthropological and social-ontological respect, things are again much more banal than the – of its essence, i.e. by its nature – pompous, stuck-up and self-important critique of culture can admit and wants to admit<sup>xxxiii</sup>.

The influence of the currents pertaining to the critique / criticism of culture, which since the final third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century united, joined and merged in itself motifs of classical conservatism and of Romanticism with newer “left” and “right” refusals (i.e. rejections) of capitalism, on Weber’s definition and determination of the character of an occidental / Western present, which stands

at the end of a unique process of rationalisation, cannot be over-estimated. Within this intellectual-spiritual framework, the dichotomy of “community-society”, whose diagnosis of the present declared or sounded the advent of pure instrumentality and end/goal rationality, i.e. the imposition and pushing through of “the intrinsic logic of the means” as they are handled by the individualistic “voluntary or “free-choice” will” without taking substantial ends/goals into account<sup>73</sup>. However, in contrast and in opposition to many others, Weber, despite occasional rhetorical failures, did not imagine any return to “community”, – at any level of modernisation and in any form whatsoever. Even when he raved about the “rebirth of old thoughts and ideals” or wanted to put forward and advance charisma against bureaucracy, he remained – often grinding i.e. gnashing one’s teeth, grudgingly – on the terrain of “society”, i.e. of the liberal-capitalistic social order<sup>74 + xxxiii</sup>. This basic stance was based on, though, the assumption that “society” had been constituted irrevocably as an epoch of history, it (i.e. society) had therefore first made out of its own specific features the feature of social life in general, so that – and therein lay the never clearly drawn, i.e. defined, but latent and misleading implication – its historical-sociological analysis merged with social-ontological categorisations. “End/goal rationality”, concretised as the dominance of technique (i.e. technology), of the economy and of legality, could against the background of this assumption be declared as the law of the form and of the movement of social action, or else as the measure, yardstick or criterion against which other laws of the form and movement of social action could be measured. Generally, the contrast and opposition between the Rational and the Irrational was seen in the light of the contrast and opposition between capitalistic and pre-capitalistic social behaviour, or else between “society” and “community”, even when that

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<sup>73</sup> Tönnies, „Zweck und Mittel“, p. 39.

<sup>74</sup> See, in relation to that, the fine analyses of Breuer, *Bürokratie und Charisma*, as well as „Von Tönnies zu Weber“.

(contrast between the Rational and the Irrational) was not totally or not expressly identified with this (contrast between capitalistic and pre-capitalistic behaviour or “society” and “community”)<sup>75</sup>. Thus the positivistic apologists of “legal dominance (as authority) or legal domination” and of the “rationality of the economy”, who therein saw the dawn of an ideology-free age, felt more or less justified in invoking Weber’s diagnosis of the present, whereas others, who, with ethical-normative intent, wanted to get out of, or set their sights further than, “instrumental” thought, reproached him for raising exactly this thought to an ideology, and of putting this ideology in the service of capitalism<sup>76</sup>. Positivistic invocations of Weber would have been impossible if he had further worked out and elaborated upon the “value-rational” backgrounds of capitalistic and legalistic “end/goal rationality”; and the “left-wing” critique of him, i.e. Weber, would have been in vain and fallen on deaf ears, if he had not given cause for the assumption that his concept of end/goal rationality constituted merely the formalisation (i.e. rendering into a form or forms) (structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) and typification (i.e. rendering into a type or types or classification under a typifying form or forms) of occidental / Western processes of rationalisation<sup>xxxiv</sup>.

Weber’s susceptibility and proneness to such ambiguities and such fusions and blending of historical analyses with supra-historical categorisations sprang and originated – seen epistemologically – from his deficient and incomplete consciousness and awareness of the differences and the boundaries between social-ontology and the sociological kind of knowledge<sup>77</sup>. The mixing of what is theoretical pertaining to acting, action and the act with the historical-sociological handling of rationality leads, for its part, to a logical-structural contrast and opposition between the in principle social-ontological cut-to-size

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<sup>75</sup> Cf. already, Landshut, *Kritik der Soziologie*, p. 54ff.

<sup>76</sup> Typically, Marcuse, „Industrialisierung“; cf. Vogel, „Überlegungen“.

<sup>77</sup> See Ch. II, Sec. 2A and 3A, above.

scale or calibre of the typology of acting, action and the act and of the concrete arrangement and structuring of this same typology on the basis of quasi-evolutionistic assumptions, which revolve around the transition from “community” to “society”, from unreflected tradition to capitalistic rationalisation and methodicalness and regularity as to a plan / plans / planning<sup>78</sup>. The Evolutionism at the historical-sociological level finds expression and is reflected in, namely, at the level pertaining to the typology of acting, action and the act, in the arrangement and structuring of the types of social action in accordance with the principle of descending and ascending rationality; “end/goal rationality” takes up and occupies, as conscious and complete rationality, the highest place in this graduation, scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages and degrees, whereas traditional and affectual (emotional, affective) action, in and during which such awareness, consciousness and deliberateness and cool or cold (cap)ability in respect of calculation seems to fade and dwindle away, occupies and fills the lower places. Nevertheless, it is very questionable and dubious whether types of acting, action and the act, which were constituted on the basis of different criteria, may be put into order and classified in one and the same graduation and sequence of tiers, levels, stages and degrees. A classification yields and results in meaning only when it is undertaken with the help of one sole criterion, which founds, justifies and gives reasons for the necessity of the conceptual separation and division of the concerned magnitudes from one another and their typological independence and autonomy, whilst through and by means of its application it is excluded that these magnitudes represent and constitute merely different, distinct aspects of the same phenomenon. Weber’s typology of acting, action and the act, however, does not achieve precisely this. “End/goal rationality” is defined in accordance with the criterion of efficiency and effectiveness, “value rationality” with regard

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<sup>78</sup> That is what Mannheim had already remarked briefly, see *Ideologie*, p. 261.

to the composition, texture and constitution (state, condition, nature) of the end/goal, traditional and affectual (emotional) action correspondingly with psychological determination and or motivation. And it is quite possible that someone has acted “end/goal-rationally, i.e. in terms of rationality as to an end/goal or ends/goals”, whilst at the same time the end/goal of the acting, action and the act was determined and defined “value-rationally, i.e. in terms of rationality pertaining to a value or values” and the motivation for the acting, action and the act is affective, emotive or traditional<sup>79</sup>. In actual fact, only a confusion of motivation and of the external order, course or sequence of events of action between one another can lead to the assumption that affective / emotive and “end/goal-rational” action would have to necessarily be assigned to or class(ifi)ed as different types of action. Action cannot obviously be “end / goal-rational”, that is efficient in the sense of the chosen end/goal if its order, course or sequence of events, i.e. the handling of the means is destroyed by uncontrolled (affective and emotional) outbreaks, eruptions and outbursts of an affect/emotion. However, nothing which puts the actor under the pressure of strong affects and emotions of love and of hate in principle hinders (blocks, obstructs) ends/goals pertaining to acting, action and the act from being pursued with cool[-headed] planning and the skillful handling of suitable means. We have already had the opportunity to name the considered, well-thought-out and well-planned long-term satisfaction in respect of the thirst for revenge as an example of that<sup>80</sup>. Weber speaks of revenge only in connection with affectual, emotional action, in regard to which he denies the (cap)ability in respect of “consistent systematic-and-methodical-as-to-plans orientation”, like for instance value-rational action possesses. But if affectual, emotional action seeks merely the “topical, current, i.e. of the moment and at that very moment” direct

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<sup>79</sup> Aron, *Philosophie critique*, pp. 253ff., 305.

<sup>80</sup> See the previous (sub-)section. Cf. Byron, *Marino Faliero*, IV, 2, V, 102-104: “There are things/ Which make revenge a virtue by reflection,/ And not an impulse or mere anger.”

satisfaction or abreaction (i.e. to release repressed emotions by acting out, as in words, behavior, or the imagination, the situation causing the conflict), then there is no compelling reason for conferring and bestowing upon it the status of a type of acting, action and the act, especially, as Weber remarked, in and during the “conscious unloading, venting, discharge and dumping” of feelings, the transition to the value(-rational) or end/goal-rational has already been carried out, executed and performed<sup>81</sup>. Its single apparent and evident function within the typology is that which illustrates its absolute contrast and opposition to end/goal rationality – this is, however, contained already in the Weberian concept of “behaviour”. And in general, the affectual, emotional (element, factor) belongs to the realm of motivation, it can, therefore, not found any type of acting, action and act; because something more than motivation belongs to (external) action, and there is no necessary connection or interrelation between the type of motivation and the order, course or sequence of events of action<sup>xxxv</sup>.

The type of traditional action<sup>82</sup> does not face lesser difficulties. Here, first of all, the dependency of the Weberian typology on the contrast and opposition in “community-society” is made directly noticeable. The definition of the traditional type of acting, action and act is abstracted from the – at that time – current descriptions of “community”, above all from the Tönniesian, and furthermore it reminds us of Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity and the contemporary ethnological literature, which contrasted “primitive” and “civilised” social life with each other on the basis of similar coarse, crude and gross ideas, perceptions, concepts and notions. The dominating features of “strictly” defined traditional action (Weber characteristically and typically uses the term “behaviour”) are accordingly lacking reflectivity, the “dull, muffled” reacting / reaction to usual, accustomed and common stimuli in the usual

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<sup>81</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 12.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

manner, and often beyond the bounds and limits of meaningfully oriented action. A conceptual unclarity comes into being already by virtue of the fact that Weber reckons on, with regard to traditional action defined in such a way, the “mass of all attuned and acclimatised everyday actions”, without distinguishing between individual and collective habits of life, and also without outlining in greater detail / more precisely “tradition” against the background of this distinction as well as the – for every tradition – constitutive demarcation and delimitation against other traditions. But within one single collective tradition several types of individual habits can exist alongside one another, whereas the character of demarcation and delimitation of a tradition (which can even turn against innovators and renegades from its own ranks, and indeed from *every* traditionalistic collective, even from the most traditionalistic collective) needs a relatively high degree of reflectivity. If “tradition” is supposed to have a specific meaning, thus we must take both these points of view seriously. Precisely the mix-up and confusion of traditional and habitual action blurs the borders, bound(arie)s and limits between each other, which Weber wanted to sharply draw, i.e. the borders, bound(arie)s and limits between capitalistic society and pre-capitalistic or non-capitalistic community. Because also the men, i.e. people who live inside of the former capitalistic society have habits, and e.g. the “end/goal rationality” itself becoming a second nature and a thought style can belong to these habits. On the other hand, the character of the delimitation and demarcation of tradition is based on the conscious identification of its essence with certain (symbolic, ritual, ethical etc.) aspects of collective life, which lie outside of the realm and area of individual habits and symbolise, represent and typify the higher and superior values of the ideals on which the concerned collective life is supposed to be founded, established, based and set up in accordance with the in it dominant interpretation. A traditionalistic ideology does not differentiate itself through and by means of these structural features from other ideologies, but merely through and by

means of its content, i.e. through and by means of the belief that those values or ideals constituted the foundation(s) and basis of collective life since old times or even since time immemorial. The perception, view (opinion, idea and conception) represented and supported on the tide and in the course of the dichotomy “community-society”, that pre-capitalistic societies lived an unreflected traditionalism, which only the revolutionary threat converted into a reflected conservatism, is demonstrably false<sup>83</sup>. The invocation of tradition and the claim on the binding interpretation of its meaning and content has always and everywhere been an instrument for the pushing through and imposition of public and private power claims. Weber also mentions a form of traditional action which goes beyond and surpasses the unreflected-habitual/habit-related and strives for, aims at and aspires to a conscious binding, bonding, bond, attachment to the habitual as value and life ideal (or ideal of life); characteristically and typically, however, he accepts this same form of traditional action only as a tier, level, stage or grade (rung or rank) of the transition to “value rationality”. In the background, therefore, again the idea (in the imagination or conception) of an ascending scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades, steps and degrees of rationality has an effect, and the arrangement and structuring of this scale, graduation and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades, steps and degrees permits [us] indeed to bring the traditional in the vicinity of the “value-rational”, it however does not allow any points of contact between the traditional and the “end/goal-rational”. Weber explains, though, that real social action can be mixed out of all pure types of acting, action and the act; this explanation would, nonetheless, leap over the chasm only when all types of acting, action and the act could claim for themselves the equal socialontological status. Traditional action constitutes, however, a historical-sociological category which was hastily and hurriedly

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<sup>83</sup> In relation to that in detail and in depth, Kondylis, *Konservativismus*, pp. 11ff., 102ff., 124ff..

promoted and upgraded to a social-ontological constant, and Weber himself uses it, incidentally, in order to characterise that social action in its historical-sociological dimension, thus, e.g., when he spoke of “pre-rationalistic epochs” in which “tradition and charisma divided and split up nearly the entirety of the directions, ways, trends and tendencies of the orientation of action amongst themselves<sup>84</sup>. For “end/goal rationality” obviously here not much space was left over. One such thesis can be pardoned from the reproach of absurdity only under one condition: that “end/goal rationality” is comprehended just like traditional action as a historical-sociological category, which specifically characterises the “rationalistic” epoch of capitalism, and that is why, by definition, (it, i.e. the “rationalistic” epoch of capitalism) must have been alien, strange, foreign to the pre-rationalistic epoch. If one understands, on the other hand, “end / goal rationality” in the social-ontological sense, thus one does not see why “end/goal rationality” is supposed or ought to not be a part of and not exist in “pre-rationalistic” epochs. All collectives are in fact, in the final analysis, dependent for their survival on the fact that the great majority of the in them kinds of acting, actions and acts are carried out and executed on a daily and everyday basis “end/goal-rationally”, that is, are done, carried out, executed and performed through and by means of the choice of each and every respective expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means for the attainment and achievement of the each and every respective imagined and or thought-about ends/goals – irrespective of whether the actors defined these ends/goals in accordance with “traditional” or “rationalistic” criteria; (this is exactly a historical-sociological, not a social-ontological question or problem.) The men, i.e. people of all epochs have regarded it as irrational to consciously use means which hindered and obstructed the attainment and achievement of declared ends/goals. The concept of acting, action or of the act is since time

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<sup>84</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 142.

immemorial connected with the adequate correlation of end/goal and means. Traditional action is, as a historical-sociological category, under (subordinated to) the thus understood social-ontological command of end/goal rationality. In relation to that, nothing changes if one, as Weber did it, thinks of “end/goal rationality” together with “interest (for one’s own benefit and advantage or self-interest)”. Because the pursuit or defence of one’s own interests in “pre-rationalistic” epochs is not any less than those interests in “rationalistic” epochs. And only the mixing of capitalistically or else “rationalistically” understood (self-)interest with the social-ontological concept of (self-)interest – as the self-assertion of an identity, irrespective of which material or ideational good the identity connects its self-assertion with – lets the false impression come into being that the concept of (self-)interest is suitable for the description of “society” rather than for the description of “community”.

With these observations we gain a guide in order to discuss the vague concept of “end / goal rationality” in its equivocal and enigmatic relation with the likewise vague concept of “value rationality”. Whilst Weber defines “end/goal rationality” starting from (self-)interest, and “value rationality” starting from ethics, against the background of this contrast (comparison, opposition or juxtaposition) of two types of rationality and acting, action and the act, the contrast between two historical-sociological ideal types of human behaviour stands out and is reflected, which, as is well-known, dominate in Weber’s thought and intellectual world, and also made his heart beat faster in an, on each and every respective occasion, different sense. In order to express it schematically, yet properly: here the coolly calculating capitalist faces the charismatic, fiery, impassioned prophet. As with the traditional type of acting, action and the act, thus this time [in the case of the capitalist] also a historical-sociological magnitude receives the blessing of a social-ontological category. In a social-ontological respect, however, the difference or distinction or even the

contrast and opposition between “end/goal rationality” and “value rationality” does not at all exist in the clarity of the historical-sociological distinction, difference or contrast, opposition between both of the ideal types, that is, of the capitalist and of the prophet. And it is not a matter of the varied, diverse, multifarious and manifold real mixings and kinds of blending of “end/goal rationality” and “value rationality” with each other, which in fact Weber himself underlines, but of the epistemological and pragmatological legitimacy of the types, from which one starts, in order to ascertain their mixings and kinds of blending with each other; if the types are not applicable, thus that which seems as the mixing and blending of the same types with each other, ought to in principle or fundamentally be comprehended differently. The historical-sociological charging and loading of the types of acting, action and the act and of rationality gives rise to, as a result of the incommensurability between the historical-sociological and social-ontological levels, contradictions and inconsistencies inside of the latter (social-ontological level), which are reflected and manifest themselves in a confused, muddled and occasionally bizarre word usage. This begins already in and during the contrast (comparison, opposition or juxtaposition) of the terms “end/goal rationality” and “value rationality”, which logically implies the by no means at all self-evident assumption that ends/goals in themselves do not represent and constitute values, and that values in themselves do not at all represent and constitute ends/goals. The question and problem does not finish with Weber’s explanation that the values of “value rationality” are “their own values, intrinsic values” or else ends/goals in themselves, and indeed for the simple reason because all ends/goals are ends/goals in themselves when they are not supposed to be serving as means for higher ends/goals – and Weber nowhere asserts that the ends/goals of “end/goal rationality” would have to be comprehended only as means for the attainment and achievement of other ends/goals. The version that the values of “value rationality” could be characterised as “intrinsic values or their own values” or as

ends/goals in themselves, because in this type of acting, action and the act “the consequences of the action are not reflected upon”<sup>85</sup>, is likewise, for several reasons, weak. It (i.e. the aforesaid version) first of all factually identifies value-rational and affectual, emotional action ([or] rather, behaviour) with each other, and consequently destroys the possibility of a value-rational *action*, since action, in whichever form, must reflect upon its consequences as soon as it develops and comes to fruition, i.e. from the sketch and plan it goes over to the outer/external acting, action or act, and in the course of this (necessarily) pursues ends/goals, with whose realisation are (necessarily) connected certain expectations. Should, again, with “consequences”, “success” is specifically meant (Weber uses in fact this term too), success could only make up and constitute a fundamental and in principle criterion of differentiation between “value-rational” and “end/goal-rational” action if the “value-rationally” acting person, in contrast to the “end/goal-rational” actor, was from the beginning and out of conviction averse to success. But to strive after and to pursue failure is, however, just as much an impossibility as the conscious use of means which thwart and foil the attaining and achieving of a sincerely and genuinely pursued end/goal. The current failure of the prophet, death (by burning) at the stake or social ostracism can always be interpreted as a success in a higher sense, for instance as personal redemption and salvation or as the sowing of the good seed for a happier future. Only an inadmissible identification of success in general with success, as this is evaluated from the perspective of “end/goal rationality” (that is, again, as the smuggling in of a historically-sociologically determined factor into a social-ontological context), enables logically the proposition that in and during “value-rational” action no consideration will be had for success; the frequently attested to megalomania and obsession, fanatical zeal with regard to power of prophets of the first, second or third rank teaches us, in any case, to

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<sup>85</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 13.

open our eyes. Should, finally, the lacking reflection of the “value-rationally” acting person regarding the consequences of his doing(s) (i.e. activities and action(s)) mean his indifference vis-à-vis the lot and fate/destiny of third parties, thus also here no essential difference in regard to “end/goal rationality” ought to be recognised; whoever pursues interests in their (i.e. “end/goal rationality’s”) sense, can prove to be just as inconsiderate, thoughtless, reckless, ruthless and merciless against third parties as an “ethicist of conviction and morality/morals (high-mindedness or humanitarianism)”.

In short, the distinction between “end/goal rationality“ and “value rationality” is saved only by the linguistic trick that “end/goal” means something, in terms of content, certain (i.e. definite, particular and specific), that therefore not everything, e.g. ethical ends/goals too, but only certain ends/goals may be called “ends/goals” in the sense of “end/goal rationality”. And nonetheless, the realisation of a value can just as much be an end/goal in respect of acting, action and the act as the realisation of any other end/goal. The paradox of the usage of language stretches, however, even to the value concept (or concept of value), which likewise is defined in arbitrary one-sidedness. In the context of “value rationality” it (i.e. the concept of value) may refer only to ideational (ethical, religious) values, excluding the rest of the – very numerous – things, which are striven for, aimed at, aspired to and pursued exactly because the actor ascribes to them a (psychological, material or whatsoever other) value; motivation is set off, triggered and brought on in fact exactly with regard to values, by values and evaluations (assessments and ratings) in the widest sense. The segregation or separation of ethical or religious values and their connection or combining with a social-ontologically conceived (planned) type of acting, action and act would be justified only if it were proved that action, which is motivated especially or specifically, particularly by these values, exhibits and shows entirely its own – and found nowhere else – structural-social-ontological characters (i.e.

characteristics or nature). There can be no talk, nevertheless, of that, and Weber's carving and working out / processing of the sociological characteristic feature, peculiarity, distinctiveness of such action is very far from bringing to light a social-ontological characteristic feature, peculiarity, distinctiveness. When one, therefore, does not load/charge words in advance with content – and Weber does this with the (afore)mentioned historical-sociological (human) ideal types in the back of his mind, even if values and ends/goals are social-ontologically open fields –, thus, one must equally assign to values and ends/goals, “end/goal rationality” and “value rationality”, and in this respect, blur and cover up the dividing line (or borderline, boundary) between them. The common and joint subsumption, incidentally, of “end/goal rationality” and “value rationality” under the generic term/concept “rationality” seems to point to the necessity of this blurring and covering up. However, this subsumption would have an effect in a standardising or unifying or normalising manner only when rationality could be reduced to a form-related (i.e. formal) structure, which would make irrelevant the content-related orientation of rational action, i.e. the content of the “values” and “ends/goals”. Then also the question about the choice of the “value” or “end/goal” in itself would play no role. Weber does not indeed say a word about the choice of values in the context of “value rationality”, since he regards the said choice of values a process *ultra rationem* (i.e. beyond reason); in regard to the choice of the “ends/goals” in the context of “end/goal rationality”, he, however, calls for a “rational” weighing up of the “various possible ends/goals against one another”<sup>86</sup> – and this stands in the way of a unification of both rationalities from the form-related (i.e. formal) point of view. Because the form-related (i.e. formal) concept(ual plan) in respect of rationality would have to absorb in itself either the rational choice of the end / goal or else of the value as a form-related (i.e. formal) variable, i.e. postulate

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

such a choice for all cases of acting, action and the act, or else exclude the same choice generally from its circle of competence. With reference to Weber this means: either he would have to drive away and expel the rational weighing up of the (ultimate, final) ends/goals against i.e. vis-à-vis one another also from the context of “end/goal rationality”, or else he would have to abstain from his ethical decisionism, that is, he would have to explain ethical-religious decisions as the object of a rational weighing up too. In relation to that, we must return, since, as will be shown, the concept of “(self-)interest” also does not possess that evidence which would put aside and eliminate such aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) or else would make watertight (i.e. having no flaws or loopholes) the dividing line (or borderline, boundary) between “end/goal(-) (rationality)” and “value rationality”.

Having partially anticipated gotten ahead of ourselves, let us now look at something in greater detail, how Weber undertakes the content-related founding of both types of rationality and how, in the course of this, the concept of “end / goal rationality” is split in a double regard: one time, whilst he on occasion includes and encompasses end/goal and means equally, at another time he includes and encompasses only the means; and another time, because the form-related (i.e. formal) meaning, which it (i.e. such end/goal rationality) keeps and preserves through its limitation and restriction on the means, comes into contradiction with its content-related determination. It is easy to verify or prove that the ideal type of the prophet or of the ethicist of conviction and morality / morals (high-mindedness or humanitarianism) in regard to the concept(ual plan) of “value rationality” was the inspiration for and behind, and had played an important part in, the concept(ual plan) of “value rationality”. Weber expressly says that it is a matter here of “ethical” and “religious” concerns, issues, affairs; and names, in the course of this, as examples “pure conviction, morality, morals, high-mindedness or humanitarianism”, “absolute goodness and

kindness”, “absolute dutifulness (and the absolute fulfilment of obligations)” etc.; the aesthetic [dimension] he touches upon only by way of mention of the word “beauty”. The “end/goal-rational” actor orientates himself, on the other hand, originally and primarily towards “subjective stirrings, motions, movements, impulses in respect of a need”<sup>87</sup>. With that, Weber obviously does not mean any elementary bio-psychical needs, because the analysis has already left behaviour behind it, and is moving at the level of social action. The basic subjective stirring, motion, movement and impulse in respect of a need at this level is called “(self-)interest”, and Weber builds a bridge between the concept(ual plan) of “end/goal rationality” and the capitalist as the prototype of the homo oeconomicus (i.e. economic man), reminding us that the observation of the “orientation” of the actor “towards naked own and alien (i.e. others’) situations and positions in respect of interests” was one of the “sources of the coming into being of the (study of the) national economy (i.e. political economy) as a science”. He carries out and executes, at the same time, a turn from the economic (sphere, dimension) to the social-ontological (sphere, dimension) with the addition that this same orientation applies “to all fields of action in the same way”. And the evolutionistic perspective, which in the theory of acting, action and the act assumes the form of a graduation, scale and sequence of tiers, levels, stages, grades and degrees of the types of acting, action and of the act, is thereupon opened up by the observation that the “planned (scheduled, according-to-plan, methodical) adaptation and adjustment to situations and positions in respect of interests” constitutes “in its consciousness, awareness and inner unbindedness, i.e. state of not being binding (non-attachment, non-restriction, non-commitment, independence)” the “polar opposite, contrast or opposition” both of traditional as well as of value-rational action. It (i.e. such planned acting in terms of interests) is indeed, as Weber

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

makes clear, not the only driving force of the rationalisation (justification) of action; but whose high point it must surely be, because it overcomes and gets past even that which “conscious value rationalisation (justification)” attains and achieves, “in favour of a value-unbelieving (value-disbelieving, value-incredulous) end/goal-rational action at the cost, i.e. expense of value-rationally bound action (or action bound in terms of value rationality)”<sup>88</sup>. Interest-led / guided / steered action means, therefore, in the final analysis, action of the absolutely enlightened actor, who has broken away and cut himself loose from all traditionalistic, ethical, religious etc. illusions, and should the occasion arise is also capable of subjecting, subjugating and subordinating his own passion(s) to his own (self-)interest(s). One does not have to look far in order to discover the straight line which connects and combines this version of “end/goal rationality” with today’s theories of rationality, which equally take their content-related presuppositions from the (study of the) liberal national economy (i.e. political economy) and economistic thought in general<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

The orientation of the action to the (self-)interest(s) of the actor founds “end / goal rationality” in the sense that here rationality befits the end/goal in itself and not only the means. In other words: the sole truly rational end/goal is the pursuit of one’s own interest, and the sole truly rational (self-)interest comes to light through and by means of the breaking away and detachment from traditional and “value-rational” points of view. That is why Weber’s remark and observation about the rational weighing up and considering carefully of the various ends/goals vis-à-vis one another in and during “end/goal-rational” action cannot concern the absolute end/goal itself, i.e. one’s own interest(s), but only relative ends/goals, that is, the question: which end/goal should I pursue in order to best serve my (self-)interest(s)? If the absolute end/goal is rationally incontestable and final, thus the rationally defined relative ends/goals must be

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<sup>88</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 15.

comprehended as means for the attainment and achievement of that end/goal. Weber does not draw this rich-in-implication(s) conclusion, which would pose the question of the value character too of the – in the sense of “end/goal rationality” – absolute end/goal, and would make the boundary and border between “value” and “end/goal” flowing and fluid. Instead of this, he wants to reinforce and confirm this boundary / border through and by means of the observation and comment that a choice of the ends/goals not in accordance with “end/goal-(rational)”, but in accordance with “value-rational” criteria, has as its conclusion that “action [is] only in regard to its means end/goal rational”<sup>89</sup>. The language use here becomes bizarre, and simultaneously a wedge is driven into the unity, uniformity and solidity of the concept(ual plan) of “end/goal rationality”. Because it does not conceptually and objectively stand to reason that the characterisation “end/goal-rational”, which in principle is supposed to demarcate and delimit a whole type of action in regard to its social-ontological self-sufficiency (independence, self-reliance) against other types of acting, action and the act, simultaneously is used in order to characterise that which in regard to another type of acting, action and the act only has to do with the expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) use of means. At least in the latter case, “end/goal rationality” would have to be replaced by “means rationality (or the rationality of means)” or simply by “rationality” as neutral in terms of content, i.e. vis-à-vis the field or area of application, an indifferent term. Otherwise “end/goal rationality” becomes ambiguous: one time it is defined in terms of content and form, i.e. on the basis of the end/goal, the other time it is defined formally, in terms of form (i.e. irrespective of the content of the ends/goals) and on the basis of the means, and both definitions are found, besides, at different logical levels. The heuristic gain does not compensate for and offset these complications, and the putting in front and prefixing of the

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<sup>89</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 13.

seemingly full-of-meaning words “end/goal” and “value” before “rationality” hardly contributes to the illumination of the examination of the problem of rationality, unless one connects with it mainly the historical-sociological question formulations (formulations of the question, problem examinations, examinations of the problem, central themes) which guided Weber.

For the clarification of the terminology, it would perhaps be helpful to define “end/goal rationality” as “rationality with regard to a pre-given end/goal”, i.e. as the rational use of expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) means, and to express clearly the content-related determination of the type of acting, action or act, which Weber calls “end/goal rationality”, by the term “(self-)interest rationality or rationality of interests” as the opposite (or counterpart) of “value rationality”. This solution would, nonetheless – in and during the investigating and researching of the rationality of the ends/goals in respect of acting, action and of the act –, have little effect since the conceptual dividing line (borderline) between “(self-)interest” and “value” is just as blurred, fuzzy and vague as that (dividing line) between “end/goal” and “value”. The ambiguity and many meanings of “(self-) interest” take care of that, of which Weber was well aware. He divided interests into “material” and “ideational” interests, and the situations and positions of interest(s), i.e. interests into “external, socially determined/conditioned and inner, psychologically determined/conditioned”, and although he saw and perceived the immediate and direct motive of human action in interests and not in ideas, at the same time he admitted that ideas in the form of world images had “very often as a pointsman / switchman (i.e. moving force or guiding spirit) determined the paths in which the dynamics of interests moved action along”<sup>90</sup>. The ideational, inner, but also the social character of many forms of (self-)interest determines exactly their interweaving with the adoption, acceptance and defence of values – an

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<sup>90</sup> *Aufsätze z. Rel.*, I, pp. 252, 253.

interweaving which often is so tight that value and (self-)interest (read: self-understanding and the logic of the identity) coincide and, if the value is ethically defined, the pushing/carrying through and imposition and predominance of the ideational (sphere, dimension) against the material (sphere, dimension) is regarded as one's own "true" self-interest. It also, as is known, works the other way around, and it is, in the final analysis, possible that the materially unselfish pursuit of ideational interests in the name of values turns out being "more egotistic" than for instance the satisfaction of money-grubbing avarice / mammonism / greed for money. "(Self-)interest" constitutes, in a word, social-ontologically, just like "value" and "end/goal", an open field<sup>91</sup>, and hierarchisations of its forms in accordance with psychological or social criteria are, –even in relatively well-known individual cases –, a need of the economy of thought rather than a secure and definite knowledge. In the open field of (self-)interest, at every historical point in time, all possible mixes, mixtures of its forms are present; even the temporary predominance of one of its (self-)interest's forms in certain groups or individuals is not lacking, regardless of through and by means of which historically-sociologically ascertainable channels these forms and the mixings, mixtures of the same forms of (self-)interest with one another must find their way (and plough). A fullness, i.e. abundance, wealth and plethora of evidence leaves no doubt in relation to the fact that in traditional or else "primitive" societies, the pursuit of "egotistical" or "material" interests by no means took second place to analogous phenomena under capitalism, or the other way around, that striving for power in the name of values or the putting of material interests on the back burner in favour of ideational interests has never disappeared from social life. Even in times in which for polemical reasons (e.g. in and during the ideological struggle against estate-based, (feudal, corporative)-patrimonial bindings/bonds/ties or against

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<sup>91</sup> More in relation to that in the 3<sup>rd</sup> volume of this work.

“totalitarian collectivism”) or on the basis of an overcoming of the shortage, scarcity/dearth of goods and a loosening of social hierarchies, individual interest is declared as a value, the current social ethics moderates the excesses of individualistic ideologem(e)s through and by means of calls for “solidarity” and “mankindness i.e. humanity and humaneness”, without though ever calling into question the right to the defence of one’s own “well-understood interest”, since no social ethics has any prospect(s) of broad acceptance if does not accept elementary rights of self-preservation (to which belongs self-defence too). Where (self-)interest becomes a value, values are summoned, in any case, against (self-)interest, and despite the temporary ideological and/or practical superiority of one or other tendency, none of the two said tendencies can forever impose itself down the line. This ambivalent situation (and position) on the social-ethical field reflects in its way the social-ontological openness of (self-)interest, of which we spoke above. And in view of this same openness and this same social-ethical ambivalence, the actor takes care of, as a rule, the – on each and every respective occasion – socially expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) mixture, combination, mixing, blending of “value” and “(self-)interest” with each other in and during the rationalisation (as justification) of his action in foro externo (i.e. outwardly, in the court of public opinion) and in foro interno (i.e. inwardly, in the court of his own conscience). The great variety of the possible mix(tur)es is here commanded by the flexible logic and the morphological richness and wealth and abundance of the spectrum of the social relation. The each and every respective structure of the each and every respective friendly or inimical social relation determines, ultimately, the each and every respective meaning of “value” and “(self-)interest”, it determines also which aspect of its complex unity will prevail in foro interno or in foro externo.

Let it be repeated: Weber did not err (and as a sensitive (and tactful)

historian he could also here not err) with regard to the great variety of the possible mix(tur)es of “value rationality” and “end/goal rationality” with each other, but he erred (as a sociologist) with regard to the factors or concepts from which we must start in order to be able to apprehend this great variety in its essence (being, nature or character). He extrapolated ideal-typically worked upon and processed historical-sociological content(s) into the social-ontological (realm, sphere) and comprehended the contrast (comparison, opposition or juxtaposition) of this/these content(s) as the key for the understanding of social-ontological facts and circumstances instead of (at the level of analysis pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act) abandoning that contrast in the light of these facts and circumstances. We have now named a series of reasons why the border (boundary) between “value” and “end/goal” cannot even hold up and stand firm ideal-typically, let alone practically (i.e. in terms of practice and in a practical sense). The pursuit of “ends/goals” (in the sense of “interests”) must be declared as a value so that “end/goal rationality” can be regarded as an independent, self-sufficient and autonomous type of acting, action and act – exactly because of that, however, its contrast (comparison, confrontation or juxtaposition) with “value rationality” is dropped, omitted and inapplicable. The “end/goal”, which is contained in the compound “end/goal rationality” as a general description, name, term of a type of acting, action and act, belongs logically to another category than the separate and individual ends / goals; it is the end and final, terminal, last, ultimate end/goal or the end/goal in itself, i.e. an absolute value, and where end, final, terminal, last, ultimate ends / goals exist, the “irrational” [element] and “value” get, force their way, seep, break, penetrate into the “end/goal rational”; and since belief in rationality lies in general ultra rationem (i.e. beyond reason) (unless one grants exclusively to ratio, i.e. reason, the dubious privilege of being judge in its own case), thus an own value, i.e. value in itself or intrinsic value exists here too, which exists irrespective of “success” and has an effect in respect of, or else determines

arbitrarily, what should or ought to be called “success” and what not<sup>92</sup>. The basic and fundamental structure in “value rationality” does not look differently. The ultimate, final, last “ends/goals” or else “values” are found here ultra rationem and success is also striven for, aspired to and aimed at here, even if under the condition that it is a matter of “true” success in the struggle for the “true” cause; the fulfilment of this condition allows intrepidity vis-à-vis failures in the sense of “end/goal rationality”, inclusive of death<sup>93</sup>. As we have already said, the inclusion and incorporation of “value rationality” in the types of social *action* a limine (i.e. from the very outset) would be nonsensical, ridiculous and absurd, if here the use of suitable means for the attainment and achievement of an end/goal were lacking. Weber had also recognised this when he – in the contrast of “value-rational” action with merely affectual and emotional action – confirmed and vouched for in the former (“value-rational” action) “consistent systematic-and-methodical-as-to-plans orientation” in the “ultimate, final, last reference, aiming and bearing points or targets”<sup>94</sup>. In actual fact: it is the setting-the-tone, leading consideration for the moulding, shaping and formation of the social relation which condemns and sentences every action nolens volens to one such systematic and methodical orientation, and in the course of this it is indifferent whether the actor bears in mind “interests” in the sense of “end/goal rationality” or “values” in the sense of “value rationality”. The social relation is the superordinate, i.e. higher, superior, of-overriding-importance social-ontological factor before which the contrast (comparison, opposition or juxtaposition) of both these types of rationality proves to be dispensable, non-essential and indeed misleading.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this structural approach (convergence, reconciliation, approximation) or identification of “value rationality” and “end /

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<sup>92</sup> Cf. already Schmalenbach, „Kategorie des Bundes“, p. 91ff..

<sup>93</sup> Sophokles, *Antigone*, esp. vv. 450ff..

<sup>94</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 12.

goal rationality” with each other? Should we for that reason exclude the question of the content of the ends/goals of acting, action and the act completely from the examination of the problem of rationality, to seek and search for a form-related (i.e. formal) unification of the types of acting, action and the act as to rationality exclusively in the correctly calculated, coherent and possibly or potentially methodically generalisable use of the means, and, finally, declare the model of “end/goal rationality” – irrespective of in and during which “ends / goals” or “values” – as the single applicable model of “end / goal rationality”? This solution, which looks like the egg of Columbus, was supported and represented by some Weber-knowers, i.e. some people with knowledge of Weber<sup>95</sup>, it, nevertheless, still falls short. We already know<sup>96</sup> in which respect the content of the ends/goals cannot be disregarded, when it is a matter of the rationality of acting, action and the act; the attainability and achievability and unattainability and unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) of the ends/goals is obviously a function of its content, and it determines in principle the effectiveness and efficacy (read: rationality) of the means used, the actual, in reality conversion of the (original, initial) means into (final and conclusive) ends/goals etc., etc.. Not insignificant is, in the course of this, whether attainability, achievability or unattainability, unachievability (i.e. non-achievability) have a fundamental, in principle character or are only situation-bound/conditioned/determined, situational. The distinction between attainable, achievable and unattainable, unachievable ends/goals does not, though, coincide with that distinction between “ends/goals” and “values” in the sense of the Weberian “end/goal rationality” and “value rationality”, but it goes right through the latter distinction. Because there are even absolute values which at least at the individual level are – through “consistently systematically and

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<sup>95</sup> See e.g. v. Mises, *Grundprobleme*, p. 79ff.; Eisen, “Meanings”, p. 58ff.. Cf. Schütz, *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 28, n. 42.

<sup>96</sup> See Sec. 1Bb in this chapter, above.

methodically planned orientation” – attainable and achievable (e.g. “holiness (sacredness and sainthood)”), although the attempt at their realisation in regard to the overall/whole societal/social yardstick, benchmark, scale, measure, criterion must necessarily be tangled up, embroiled and involved in the insurmountable paradoxes of the heterogony of ends.

#### D. “Rational choice” and the tact of judgement

“Rationality” has – in recent decades – been promoted as, and risen to the position of – not coincidentally – a central philosophical and social-theoretical concept. At the social and historical end of the bourgeois era, the gradual putting aside and elimination of the remains (relics, vestiges) of its ideologem(e)s, which not least of all revolved around universal Reason and its generally binding commands, followed. To the extent that functionalistic atomisation took the place of substantialistic bourgeois individualism, the replacement of “Reason” by “rationality” also reflects the need of the socially and intellectually(-spiritually) mobile mass-democratic individual for a guide in life, who is supposed or ought to be less “metaphysical” or supra-temporal, [[and]] by contrast more flexible and pragmatic, and moreover modest (humble) in the sense of from-now-on socially respectable relativism. The great (monetary) note of Reason was, as it were, exchanged for the small change of rationality. But the taking leave and bidding farewell (in respect) of in principle Reason was not allowed and could not have, however, had as a consequence the par excellence lack of orientation or disorientation, and thus the concept of rationality now offered the new guarantees of ponderability and calculability<sup>97</sup>, which had to take into account the peculiarity and distinctiveness of today’s situation and position in atomised Western mass democracy (the particular

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 1, in this volume, above.

attention given to the examination of the problem of “collective action” and of the “free rider” bears witness and attests to this). So-called rational choice theory formulated these guarantees in the shape/form of directions and instructions for use and did this typically enough in a sharp confrontation / showdown with sociological normativisms like the Parsonian sociological normativism, which accorded to the ethical and cultural factor in the wide sense a primary function in and during the maintenance and keeping up of the social order. One does not have to be a follower / adherent of rational choice theory in order to kindly and benevolently register its service in and during the overcoming of a perception, view, which made out socially living man to be a “cultural dope”<sup>98</sup>. It (i.e. rational choice theory), however, lapsed / fell – from the beginning – into the other extreme, and the reason for that lay in the fact that it formed and developed in an economic and at the same time individualistic thought and intellectual framework, whereupon the old and still always fresh construction of homo oeconomicus cast its mighty shadow. The undiluted versions of the theory continue to retain their influence, above all in certain national-economic directions (i.e. schools of thought pertaining to political economy), and they will undoubtedly retain [such influence] for as long as the capitalistic impetus persists / continues<sup>xxxvii</sup>. But partly the scientific critique (also on the part of prominent national, i.e. political economists), partly the application of the theory (of rational choice) to extra-economic fields and areas led to modifications and limitations, which in reality represent and constitute new discoveries (i.e. rediscoveries) of age-old commonplaces (truisms and platitudes) of the social experience of men (i.e. humans).

Regarding the anthropological background of rational choice theory, we have said whatever was necessary in another place<sup>99</sup>. One would not do an injustice /

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<sup>98</sup> Thus Heath, *Rational choice*, p. 105; cf. Ch. I, footnote 161, in this volume.

<sup>99</sup> See Ch. I, Sec. 5, above.

wrong to the theory if one characterised it as rationalistic behaviourism, in order – with that – to express that rationality here is deduced and derived from constants of motivation which can be apprehended already through and by means of the elementary psychological (set of) instruments of behaviourism. The priority of the motivation is reflected in the construction of the concept(ual plan) in respect of rationality starting from the content of the ends/goals. This content consists in the utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit) maximisation or else utility optimisation, and since all humans strive after that (i.e. utility maximisation/optimisation), thus we can start from the assumption that men, i.e. humans are in principle rational or that rationality is a ubiquitous and in fact existing/available-in-abundance good<sup>100</sup>. The ubiquity of rationality interrelates and is connected here obviously with its narrow definition as utility maximisation, because only “narrow rationality” in the form/shape of interest-directed motivation and excluding “extra-rational”, e.g. ethical and social motives, resurfaces / turns up again and is found uniformly in all men (i.e. humans, people)<sup>101</sup>. That does not have to necessarily mean that all kinds of utility maximisation relate to the same object, but that they (i.e. all kinds of utility maximisation) exhibit the same motivation structure (or structure of motivation). Accordingly, the question and problem of the “objectivity” of each and every respective utility option (i.e. choice of utility) is put aside and eliminated a limine (i.e. from the very beginning), without its non-response interfering with the rationality of the actor. But the priority of the motivation or else of the end/goal also has a second implication: it is supposed to break or detach the rationality concept(ual plan) away from the end/goal-means-schema, i.e. to file away and shelve the problem of the rationality of the means, and in its place, as a sufficient condition of success (in respect of) of acting, action and the act, to put the inner stability and coherence of the wishes of the utility-

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<sup>100</sup> Cf. Tobin, *Essays*, I, p. 18; Lekachman, *Economists*, p. 108.

<sup>101</sup> Hardin, *Collective Action*, pp. 9ff., 101ff..

maximising actor. That is, although rational choice theory leaves open [[the question of]] individual preferences (tastes), on the other hand, it must presuppose that they (i.e. the said individual preferences and tastes) neither change capriciously, nor differ considerably from man to man (i.e. human to human and person to person)<sup>102</sup> + xxxviii. Only under this precondition can their change be in principle put down and reduced to economic factors (e.g. prices). The behaviouristic inspiration of rational choice theory becomes here particularly clear. Prognoses about behaviour rest and are based on the knowledge of the preference plus the assumption and acceptance of coherence, they suppose and assume, therefore, uniform action on the basis of the pre-given stable preference<sup>xxxix</sup>. We do not see why the – described as consistency of behaviour – schema “stimulus-reaction” is supposed or ought to be called “rationality” at all<sup>103</sup>. With this observation of things, the investigation of and research into the formation, development and reshaping / remodel(l)ing / reorganization of preferences not only suffers<sup>104</sup>. Over and above that, it is not appreciated that the coherence of the behaviour in itself does not in the least vouch for and guarantee the satisfaction of each and every respective need; the (recti)linear projection of the preference does not necessarily end at the point where the satisfaction is, but in between preferences, orientating kinds of acting, actions and acts must take place. The question and problem of orientation is posed too, as soon as the general framework changes inside of which the preference originally was regarded as obvious (convincing and cogent) or self-evident. Inconsistencies between such frameworks are possibly still more difficult to be abolished than other inconsistencies – and here rational choice theory knows no advice, recommendation i.e. solution (Rat). It assumes that “irrational” deviations and divergences from the coherence model can be

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<sup>102</sup> Stigler-Becker, “De gustibus”, p. 191.

<sup>103</sup> Brennan, “What might Rationality fail to do?”, pp. 54ff., 57.

<sup>104</sup> Goodin, “De gustibus”, p. 221.

corrected, rectified by subjective learning, studying or by the objective effect and impact of market mechanisms. But against “irrationalities”, which attack and strike the large number or great crowd of individuals simultaneously, market mechanisms are not capable of much either<sup>105 + xl</sup>.

It must be noticed by an undogmatic economist (of political economy) that the definition of rationality as utility maximisation differs considerably from the Common-Sense perception and view, in accordance with which rational action is based on the examination, sifting, sorting of the available information and the corresponding determination of ends/goals and means<sup>xli</sup>. He must, moreover, likewise register that rational choice theory does not manage without a series of auxiliary hypotheses of another logical order; among them, the homogeneity of individuals<sup>xlii</sup> stands out, which, though, is in a contradiction with the fundamental principle pertaining to political economy that gains and profits / earnings would be made through transactions which presuppose differences of individuals; pure and perfect, complete competition is another auxiliary hypothesis, which has little backing and support in reality. He can, finally, observe how the simplicity, plainness and clarity of the rational choice fail before the imperfectness (and incompleteness) of the markets and their influence by very different factors (in respect) of power, so that assumptions about economic balances, equilibria and imbalances, disequilibria, which assume such rational choices, go against and run counter to undisputed, uncontested ascertainments of facts. And from all of that he would draw the conclusion that a concept(ual plan) of rationality, which builds on utility maximisation and the assumption of homogeneity, invariably becomes shaky and falters as soon as inside of a populous society, the perception of others and their rationality on the part of the individual is converted and transformed into an essential factor for the shaping, moulding and formation of his (i.e. the

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<sup>105</sup> Tversky-Kahneman, “Framing”, p. 458; “Rational choice”, pp. 89-91.

individual's) own rationality<sup>106 + xliii</sup>. Already from the widened perspective of the political economist, it can therefore be seen how deeply the social relation forces its way into and penetrates the context of rationality, and where the incurable point of rational choice theory lies. Options (choices) are not shaped, formed and moulded with regard to an individually carved/worked out and elaborated idea (in the imagination or conception) of utility maximisation, which then as a norm guides action and lends or grants it coherence, but always on the basis of comparisons with that, which others, and indeed the relevant for the actor, fellow men, i.e. human beings do or leave (out) and or let go. They articulate a calculation, which concerns relative, rather than absolute, profits, gains and earnings, that is profits (gains and earnings) which the actor correlates comparatively with the probable profits of other actors, in order then to announce – considering the situation – his own claims and expectations. The level or standard of the expectations is a “comparison level” and is mainly socially determined<sup>107</sup>. In actual fact, the theory of the “revealed preference” (Samuelson), whereupon the buyer / purchaser / customer through and by means of the act of purchase / buying reveals and discloses his preference, can be applied to other animals<sup>xliv</sup>, which through and by means of their option (choice) give their preference direct expression, rather than to men (i.e. humans), whose action is not exhausted in the statement or expression or utterance of personal preferences, but can be brought into existence in relation to that through and by means of social factors, i.e. by the logic of the social relation, thus being shaped, moulded and formed as if the actor had other preferences than those which he as a person actually has<sup>108</sup>.

The lack of understanding as regards the consequences, implications and repercussions of the social relation in the broadest sense (i.e. including those

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<sup>106</sup> I refer here to Arrow, “Rationality”, esp. pp. 202-206, 213 ff., cf. the texts of/in the anthology by Moser (ed.), *Rationality in action*.

<sup>107</sup> Marini, “Role of Models”, p. 26ff..

<sup>108</sup> Sen, “Behaviour”, pp. 73, 79.

which one is in the habit of calling social-institutional factors) has as a consequence that rationality reduced to utility maximisation can only offer very short-winded orientation in respect of acting, action and the act<sup>109</sup>. When the term “utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit) maximisation” is supposed or ought to have a fairly precise meaning in the context pertaining to the study of the political economy, thus it may or should refer only to material utility (use, profit, gain, advantage, benefit) in the form of the attainment of measurable (quantifiable) goods. Then there are two possibilities: either every other practical effort and endeavour (strain, stress, exertion) must – except the thus understood utility maximisation – be class(ifi)ed as “irrational”, with the result that the allegedly ubiquitous rationality appears like an island in a sea of irrationality, or the attempt to make the “irrational” understandable in the light of rational utility maximisation, pushes out and sprouts strange/odd/weird blossoms of absurdity, – when e.g. religious action is characterised as an investment or capital expenditure with regard to “afterlife consumption”<sup>110 + xlv</sup>. Just like the concept of exchange<sup>111</sup>, so too is that concept of utility maximisation widened and broadened up to meaninglessness (pointlessness, senselessness, futility) in the economic context in order to be able to grasp the objectively existing and waiting-and-hoping-for an explanation great variety and multiformity of the social [realm, sphere, dimension, whole] in itself; but precisely this broadening can no longer see why the concerned process should or ought to be named, of all things, by an economic term, unless one would like to thus define rationality bindingly and once and for all as economic logic dictates; by the way, certain national (i.e. political) economists (i.e. theorists of political economy) are not at all the only ones who want to monopolise for themselves rationality. Thus “rational choice theory” remains not only incapable

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<sup>109</sup> Cf. Bohman, “Limits”, p. 224ff..

<sup>110</sup> Thus, Azzi-Ehrenberg, “Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance”, p. 28.

<sup>111</sup> See Ch. IV, Sec. 2Da in this volume, above.

of making and rendering somewhat understandable the classic case of irrationality (video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor [[= I see and try or approve of the better things, I follow the worse things]]) starting from its premisses<sup>112</sup>, also the thought is par excellence alien and foreign to it (i.e. rational choice theory) that rationalities of a different kind can compete with one another, that therefore the logic of the social relation and that logic of identity can regard as rational something other than the logic of utility maximisation. But that's the way it is. The behaviour of the reciprocating person is determined e.g. very often not through expectations of immediate utility maximisation, but through the overall interpretation of the past and present course (of events) of the social relation towards the concerned Other, whose motivation again is not evaluated and judged on the basis of his topical / current contribution to the utility maximisation of the Ego, but rather on the basis of his supposed intentions and ends/goals; and the judgement regarding the motivation of the giver or donor weighs more heavily than the material value of his gift (donation or contribution). The subjective interpretations of the interaction determine, therefore, in the narrowest having an effect together (collaboration, cooperation or synergy) with the logic of the identity, the practical behaviour, and the results of the earlier learning creates no automatisms, which the utility maximiser appropriates once and for all in order to act in this sense consistently, but they (the said subjective interpretations) can be revised promptly, or after some hesitation, as soon as the logic of the social relation or that logic of the identity changes<sup>113</sup>.

Economistic rational choice theory rests and is based on a naive realism or objectivism by postulating a single world for all actors, in relation to which these actors support, maintain, keep, entertain an objectively rational relation

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<sup>112</sup> Elster, "Introduction", p. 16; cf. footnote 55 in this chapter, above.

<sup>113</sup> Larson, "Psychology"; Nemeth, "Bargaining". Cf. Ch. IV, footnote 489, above.

through and by means of consistent action. Between the objective constitution, composition and texture (nature) of the world and its subjective perception on the part of the actor there is here no chasm, and accordingly no questions and problems come up and arise; just as little do the intellectual (cap)abilities<sup>xlvi</sup> of the actors seem to run into / encounter individually determined boundaries which could endanger and put at risk rational action. To this substantial rationality one contrasts and pits – in Simon's<sup>xlvii</sup> terminology – a procedural or limited and restricted rationality when one, following psychological kinds of knowledge, distinguishes between objective reality and the image/picture of the actor in respect of that objective reality, not taking the ends/goals of acting, action and the act for granted, but observes their formation, development and change over time, putting under the magnifying glass the development of thought and intellectual strategies under the influence of social and individual factors, [[and]] of available and existing intellectual (cap)abilities and temporary emotions or fixed, firm and stable prejudices etc.. The limitations and restrictions in respect of rationality come into being both through the surroundings and environment, in which decisions must be taken, as well as through the physiological and psychological qualities, features, characteristics, attributes, peculiarities of the actor, which set barriers to his thought and intellectual faculties and capacities. Ascertainments regarding both these sources of limitations and restrictions in respect of rationality force a renunciation and abandonment of rationally optimal programmes of acting, action and the act and of global perceptions, views (opinions, ideas and conceptions) in respect of rationality in favour of attainable and achievable ends/goals and limited and restricted or else modest and meagre models of rationality. The economic theory of rationality indeed does not want, in principle, to be reconciled with this renunciation and abandonment, however, since it can only save and rescue economic phenomena in their complexity only through the silent and tacit introduction of complementary assumptions, thus it

must also, whenever it goes beyond and surpasses the triviality of utility maximisation, in actual fact more or less weaken, mitigate, tone down its vigorous and robust concept of rationality<sup>114</sup>. The psychological untenability of rational choice theory was in actual fact worked out by several sides with reference to the results of research of the main schools of thought of modern psychology<sup>115</sup>, as well as, in the course of this, stressed and emphasised in regard to everyday experience that (also economic) actors, especially in uncertain, insecure and unsafe, dangerous situations and positions, made their decisions not on the basis of calculations of utility maximisation, but rather thanks to tried and tested experiences and analogies deduced and derived from those<sup>116</sup>; it was also stressed and emphasised that a real decision was only gradually and fragmentarily shaped, moulded, formed and taken, whereby and in relation to which information was worked on and processed through and by means of drastic selections and reductions<sup>117</sup>, and that preferences are basically adaptive and take their cue from and comply with the existing and available possibilities in respect of acting, action and the act rather than from and with abstract optimal aims, ends and objectives<sup>118</sup>. It was easy and tenable (reasonable, logical, sensible) to conclude from all of this that limited and restricted rationality is a state (of affairs), condition and situation which humans as a rule soberly take note of and learn from, and in which they – far from being constantly ashamed of their intellectual and moral afflictions, disabilities, shortcomings – pragmatically adapt themselves to and make ends meet<sup>119</sup>.

So far, so good. But limited, restricted or incomplete (fragmentary, broken, inchoate) rationality as inescapable, ineluctable human fate, and limited,

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<sup>114</sup> From Simon's numerous articles see esp. "Rationality in Psychology and Economics", pp. 26-28, 38ff.; "Human Nature", pp. 294, 303; "From substantive to procedural rationality"; "A Behavioral Model"; cf. *Models of Thought*, pp. 8, 10, 15, as well as *Models of Man*, p. 241ff..

<sup>115</sup> Abelson, "Social psychology's rational man".

<sup>116</sup> Ortiz, "Expectations".

<sup>117</sup> Watkins, "Imperfect Rationality", p. 179ff., esp. p. 206ff..

<sup>118</sup> Elster, *Sour grapes*, p. 109ff..

<sup>119</sup> March, "Bounded Rationality", p. 150ff..

restricted and incomplete rationality as a norm, which one is supposed or ought to follow, in order to protect and defend oneself from the certain practical debacle / débâcle of an optimally fancied and imagined and thought of rationality, are two entirely different things. The theories of incomplete rationality represent and constitute, in so far as they rest and are based on correct and generalisable observations, at best descriptions of what is – from which, however, no norms follow with which action could comply and be modeled after. Not only because no instructions in respect of acting, action and the act can be deduced and derived in general from descriptions anyhow, but also because of the particular reason that it is silly, ridiculous, absurd to raise incompleteness to a norm<sup>xlvi</sup>. The actor is always – psychologically and practically – out to aim at and aspire to optimal effects and impacts (results) under the guidance of an optimal rationality, in fact so much that he often – despite the practical failures – continues to regard his own rationality as optimal<sup>xli</sup>, and ascribes an absence of optimal effects and impacts (results) to “circumstances”, “bad luck/misfortune” etc.. He attains and achieves less than that which he would attain and achieve under the guidance of an optimal rationality, and indeed for inner/internal and outer/external reasons which do not allow any optimal rationality to develop, and not, for instance, because he consciously follows the norm of incomplete rationality. He is, incidentally, anyhow, unable to establish, postulate, formulate such a norm, because this would presuppose knowledge of the distance between complete and incomplete rationality: in order to know what incomplete rationality means, he must therefore have already found in his spiritual-intellectual possession the optimal rationality, and then it is not known why he needs incomplete rationality, unless it perfectly and completely suffices for the situation and position to be mastered – then it (i.e. his rationality) is itself optimal in a very concrete way. From these thoughts and contemplations it is evident that not so much strict logic, but rather the intellectual(-spiritual) climate of the “post-modern” programmatic bidding

farewell to the One Reason has got/procured for the theories of “incomplete” rationality such popularity. But also here it ought to be remarked that the social-ontologically and anthropologically determined praxis / practice of rationality changes far less than theory regarding rationality; and in general human praxis / practice does not change already because theories about it change. The followers, supporters or preachers of optimal rationality and of the One Reason were in the past objectively bearers of an incomplete rationality and still continue to be so; precisely as the advocates, proponents and champions of this latter (incomplete rationality) they cannot but direct their action to what the – on each and every respective occasion – optimal use of their rationality commands, no matter how far this may be distant and remote from the optimal rationality. The theories of incomplete rationality would positively influence future praxis / practice only when the earlier authority (as dominance) of the belief in the existence of an optimal rationality had paralysed the action of those waiting in vain for such instruction and guidance. Theories about rationality are subject in principle to strategic use, i.e. they articulate the practical rationality of the theoreticians, who in a concrete situation and position pertaining to the history of ideas decide in favour of this course of action vis-à-vis other theoreticians and against any other course of action – which does not at all mean that this praxis/practice of theirs has to necessarily correspond with the content of the theory set up, established, postulated, formulated, drawn up by themselves. Theory in general is a form of praxis (practice), and theories are kinds of acting, actions and acts, which – for or against other kinds of acting, actions and acts – in the area and realm of theoretical activity take a position / stance. As intellectual(-spiritual) praxis/practice – not merely in the narrower sense of theory, but also in the wider anthropological and social-ontological sense – rationality is shaped, moulded and formed in connection with a strategy, whose ends/goals and means result from the logic of the situation, as this, on each and





his own self)) from his own sympathies and wishes, that is, by a higher objectivity. Social Common Sense knows just as well – and it articulates this knowledge in common sayings and practical (pieces of) advice –, that a maximum in regard to objectivity is worth wishing for and worth striving after, but a minimum is absolutely indispensable and essential for social survival. Objectivity as control over personal sympathies or antipathies and rationality as guidance of acting, action and the act are hardly separated in social and individual consciousness. Common property (i.e. part of the everyday understanding of people) is also the knowledge that successes in cases of objectivity and rationality overall more or less fall far short of the set aims, ends and objectives or, in any case, of imagined ideals, irrespective of how every individual may evaluate and judge his own performances, achievements and accomplishments. Objectivity (not necessarily in the sense of ethically nuanced impartiality, but certainly in the sense of reliable orientation) and rationality (in the same sense) remain, nevertheless, the generally declared and striven-for and desired aims, ends and objectives, whose attainment and achievement procures, gets and gains (some) respect, admiration and power. The overall picture in regard to scientific rationality does not seem to be otherwise. Scientific refinements of objectivity and of rationality are indeed possible in many fields, their practical meaning, however, is partly relativised, partly canceled by the effect and impact of a number of factors. On the one hand, they concern questions and problems whose solution influences, in this or the opposed direction, the anthropological and social-ontic fundamental given (actual) facts<sup>lii</sup> just as little as for instance the decision in favour of Newton's mechanics or in favour of Einstein's theory of relativity improves or worsens the natural sense of orientation<sup>liii</sup>. On the other hand, and indeed to a very large extent, they arise and result from internal scientific debates and serve merely the polemics and the formation of parties within that realm of social life, which is called science, and knows of specific variations and modifications of the spectrum and of the

mechanism of the social relation. Since methodologies and methods in reality do not represent and constitute in advance fixed instructions in respect of research, but rationalisations of research practice in retrospect and with regard to certain content-related pre-decisions, thus practical rationality can draw little utility, benefit, gain and profit from this crown or blossoming and flowering of scientificity, if one may say so. On the contrary, it (i.e. practical rationality) is very close to what science in actual fact does: it starts from a certain phenomenon (occurrence, appearance) or certain phenomena (occurrences, appearances), it suggests an explanation for it/them and formulates or implies, in the course of this, generalisations, which, for their part, are confirmed or contradicted by others by invoking other phenomena. The interpretation of a situation, on the basis of which a course of acting, action and the act is sketched, designed and planned, runs and proceeds essentially in the same pattern, and errors lurk here likewise, not only in a false perception or explanation, but also in the overestimation or underestimation of the significance and importance of certain in-part-phenomena inside of each and every topically, currently or potentially relevant whole<sup>liv</sup>.

Theoreticians of the decision, who strive after a scientification (i.e. making scientific) of the processes of the decision through and by means of the construction of models in accordance with which the rational actor has to align himself with and follow, assume a qualitative difference between scientific and practical rationality. The general methodological legitimacy and usefulness (utility, expedience) of such models is indisputable, above all in the area and realm of the modern national (i.e. political) economy<sup>lv</sup>, and there is in actual fact a hard core of cases in which the rational-choice-model functions smoothly and without a hitch<sup>lvi</sup>, although one does not have to necessarily conclude from that its indispensability<sup>124</sup>. John Stuart Mill opined once that the national (i.e.

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<sup>124</sup> Like Elster does, *Ulysses*, p. 116.

political) economists had to indeed start from the principle of competition and rivalry (or competition principle) in order to make out of their discipline a strict and rigorous theoretical science, however, they would misunderstand “human affairs” if they overlooked the effect and impact of social factors in the wide sense (“custom”) and attributed to their theoretical principle ubiquitous practical validity<sup>125 + lvii</sup>. These wise words touch upon the essential point: even the proven epistemological indispensability of a theoretical principle says little about the ontological facts (of the case) and circumstances in their totality and entirety, and the simplicity or evident nature and obviousness of this principle can indeed epistemologically legitimise it, but not eo ipso prove the illegitimacy of other theoretical starting points<sup>126</sup>. Moreover, from the suitability of the models which are based on this principle, not in the least do their appropriateness, adequacy and suitability follow as normative instructions in respect of acting, action and the act for theoretical-analytical ends/goals. Because action unfolds and develops obviously not at the level of theoretical analysis, but in its closest [[possible]] contact with the ontological facts (of the case) and circumstances, which the principles of the analysis more or less had to strongly simplify in order to be constituted as such. This explains why rational choice theory, as already mentioned, at every turn must seek and obtain help from additional and indeed inconsistent – with its (basic) principle – hypotheses in order to maintain and perpetuate its contact with social reality. It is, hence, not at all certain that the successes, which above all are achieved through and by means of their normative use at the level of individual decisions, would have to fail to materialise were the actor to approach and go about the matter on the basis of different models or else practical principles (in respect) of acting, action and the act, whose, in fact, conscious reference to the magic word “rationality” could be missing and lacking<sup>lviii</sup>. Not least of all, the coupling of rationality and

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<sup>125</sup> *Principles*, p. 170ff. (Book II, chap. IV.)

<sup>126</sup> Lechner, “The New Utilitarianism”, p. 97.

utility maximisation with each other could be absent if the interpretation of the situation and position on the part of the actor, as well as his self-understanding, gave precedence and priority to other cares and concerns<sup>127</sup>.

Normative theories of the decision are in principle incapable of breaking the tautological vicious circle. They are formed, shaped and moulded as idealisation (i.e. rendering into an ideal / ideals) and formalisation (i.e. rendering into a form / forms; structuring in terms of form, formal structuring) of the real aspects of action, as the theoretical extrapolation of a part, which then makes a claim on the entirety, totality or whole, and as soon as they return to praxis/practice in order to guide it as norms, they find again only themselves or else the aspects of the real from which they were distilled. Every attempt to go beyond and surpass these individual aspects and to obtain effective and actual universality gets tangled in a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a supposedly complete case-by-case list of cases), which makes necessary auxiliary assumptions, and clouds, dulls, blurs the clarity with which they wanted to captivate (impress) the actor. To the extent they offer in a very general sense [[something]] in practice useful, they constitute long-winded, complicated, pedantic and cumbersome “scientific” paraphrases (circumlocutions) of age-old maxims, aphorisms and teachings and doctrines of wisdom. Authors, who, for instance, rediscover the game-theory principles in Machiavelli’s writings on war and therein see a confirmation of their general validity<sup>128</sup>, do not think that exactly through that rediscovery the originality of their game theory as a normative theory of the decision vanishes into thin air. In actual fact, originality in a radical sense is hardly considered here from the outset, since by the nature of things, every normatively meant definition of rationality can only contain banalities, which anthropologically and social-ontologically indeed immediately make sense and are clear, but in every

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<sup>127</sup> Brennan, “What might...”, p. 56ff..

<sup>128</sup> See e.g. Barbut, »‘L’ Art de la Guerre’ et la praxéologie mathématique«.

concrete situation and position must be interpreted anew – and precisely this interpretation, which in practice is most needed, is not offered by any normative theory of the decision and cannot be offered by it too. If one dwells on definitions of rational action, which at the same time want to be instructions and directions in relation to that rational action<sup>129</sup>, in every sentence one runs into and encounters some common nouns or adjectives, which at first sight do not raise questions and problems, however, on closer inspection, all of them are in need of interpretation and, as experience shows, according to the actor and situation, are connected with very different thought (intellectual) procedures, methods, processes and content(s). “Available” or “sufficient information”, “suitable means”, “weighing up and consideration” or “the determination of the value of the possible consequences”, “deduction and derivation of the correct acting, action and act to be carried out and taken” from such (pieces of) information, kinds of weighing up and considerations and value determinations – that all sounds absolutely self-evident and at the same time leaves one exactly where one found oneself before the communication of such wisdom<sup>lix</sup>. The practical irrelevance of norms in respect of the theory of the decision is accordingly shown by the fact that several actors simultaneously affirm these norms taken at face value, and in fact have the subjective feeling of following the same norms precisely, and, despite all of that, can embark on courses of acting, action and of the act which differ *toto coelo* (i.e. by the whole extent of the heavens, i.e. utterly) between one another and even seem to be in the eyes of the each and every respective other side “irrational”. Naturally too, of little help are the aforementioned norms even when the actor must choose between two equally good or equally bad alternatives, when he cannot have a view of all objectively available alternatives, or is forced, compelled and coerced to act in a

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<sup>129</sup> Pioneering and seminal here is Schoeffler, “Toward a General Definition of Rational Action”. Amongst his most important successors in the economic context, Downs will be mentioned, *Ökonomische Theorie*, esp. p. 5ff., and Gäfgen, *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entscheidung*, esp. p. 25ff..

situation or position in which he – through no fault of his own – is not familiar with. The practical irrelevance of the normative theory of the decision shines, incidentally, right through the unavoidable vagueness of its theoretical formulations. Because a compilation and survey of the demands and requirements of form-related (i.e. formal) rationality fails before the task of putting forward and establishing one single and unambiguous concept of the rational, and must be content with a combination of features of rationality more or less corresponding with one of the each and every respective theoretical claims<sup>130</sup>.

No-one will want to, though, blame in a meaningful way the normative theories of the decision because they cannot specify and indicate criteria with the help of which ultimate world-theoretical preferences and value conceptions could be rationally defined. Their inability to stand by the actor in a helpful manner in the reality of his action is however noticeable likewise in the questions and problems which can be regarded as value-free or technical. Let us take e.g. the question and problem of the evaluation, analysis and interpretation of information. The sole thing which can here be regarded unambiguously as “irrational” is the conscious and deliberate ignoring of information relevant to acting, action and the act. (How many people, however, feel guilty of such an ignoring?) And the sole thing again which the adviser has to recommend in matters and cases of rationality is the precise and sober sifting through and examination of all information relevant to acting, action and the act. But with these maxims, which must have been known to socially living men (i.e. humans) already some millennia before the emergence and advent of modern theories of the decision<sup>lx</sup>, little can be started, i.e. done in practice, because the real problems begin precisely where the theory stands on its own, properly formulated, and its interpretation with regard to the concrete situation and

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<sup>130</sup> Priester, „Rationalität“, p. 477.

position and the intellectual gift, talent and endowment of the actor is supposed to take place. Pieces of information are not registered, recorded and used irrespective of *who* collected them on the basis of which aims, objectives and ends and to the extent he has at least partially evaluated, analysed and interpreted them in advance<sup>lxi</sup>. The fact that action sometimes is motivated only by already available and existing information does not change the above facts (of the case) and circumstances. Above all, the rational command to build action at the highest standing position and level of information raises questions. However, regarding this standing position, level (of information), the quality, not the quantity of the pieces of information is decisive, and for the judgement and evaluation of the [said] quality, no general rules can be given. The accumulation of information with the aim, end and objective of completeness, integrity and wholeness is unnecessary and superfluous when the actor already possesses the decisive single piece of or sole and separate information<sup>lxii</sup> – no matter whether he (i.e. the actor) knows of it or through coincidence, chance and happenstance came, i.e. happened upon it, and then has made use of it. It is incumbent only on the actor, not on any theory, for when the standing position and level of information of the imagined practical ends/goals suffices or not. And only the actor, not any theory, can attach to and confer upon a fundamental factor the – on each and every respective occasion – appropriate and fitting meaning which it deserves and merits in real action. We mean the temporal factor (or the factor of time), which in theory functions only as a form-related (formal), that is in practice insignificant form-related, formal variable, however in the reality of the situation speaks with an imperious and authoritative, commanding voice. Every rationality is under the pressure of time; the pressure of time and the pressure of the decision are for the most part synonymous, and hence the decision obeys the commands of time rather than those commands of an – as it were – timeless rationality (i.e. a rationality not bound to time pressures). The search, the sifting, sorting, examination and the evaluation,

analysis and interpretation of information takes place inside of a framework of time (temporal framework), and an immense, vast, incalculable abundance of available, existing or deducible, inferable pieces of information can, in the process, in fact make difficult, complicate and hamper the practical tasks of the actor. Then the mechanisms of relief from, or relieving of, the tension/stress of existence which have taken root anthropologically have a protective effect and impact, and chance, coincidence and happenstance often determines from which information in and during the formation of the decision one is supposed or ought to start<sup>131</sup>. It would be rash, as one often does, to construct, regarding this, absolute differences between scientific and practical rationality. Theoreticians and scientists handle and deal with information, partly due to subjective prejudices, partly for methodical and epistemological reasons, no less selectively than people acting in practice, and the success of their undertaking and venture is evaluated and judged likewise in retrospect, i.e. on the basis of the ability of the theory to satisfactorily interpret information originally, initially not taken into account or added [[later]]. Also, after the success of a practical undertaking and venture, previously ignored pieces of information become irrelevant, and the earlier situation and position is from now on interpreted retrospectively, i.e. from the point of view of the success which has in the meanwhile occurred. It is not correct, moreover, that time pressure in and during the elaboration, drawing up and working out and formulation of theories in general plays no role; this role fluctuates only according to the biographical circumstances and concrete situation and position pertaining to the history of ideas. A difference in relation to practical rationality lies, though, in the fact that this practical rationality has a certain subjective bearer, who stands before – on each and every respective occasion – unique and singular situations, positions and tasks, whereas the formation and development of a theoretical tradition

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<sup>131</sup> Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 3, in this volume, above.

permits scientific rationality to work cumulatively for longer stretches of time. An abrupt paradigm shift can, however, strengthen, reinforce and boost the effect and impact of the time factor (factor of time).

Normative theories of the decision run into and encounter considerable difficulties also concerning the weighing up of the consequences of acting, action and the act, which they, likewise, have to include in their models as an unconditional and absolute technical task. The theories of rationality, which want to appear as instructions for perfect prognoses, were already early on convincingly and conclusively criticised<sup>132</sup>, and indeed in the context of political economy, both concerning their realisability, as well as because of their logical inconsistency. In principle, there is a contradiction between the form-related (i.e. formal) character of normative theories of the decision and their suitability in making prognoses. Their economic postulates regarding the ends / goals of acting, action and of the act have, in any case, only explanatory value and are not distinguished and singled out by psychological realism<sup>133</sup>; prognoses can, however, be ventured only when – apart from the general ends/goals of acting, action and the act (utility maximisation), as they are captured, i.e. recorded in the form-related (i.e. formal) model, more detail is known about the ideas, perceptions, concepts and notions of the actor and his interpretation of the situation, which guide his action more precisely (and in its separate parts); the form-related (i.e. formal) form, wording and version of the general ends/goals of acting, action and the act must lose something of its vagueness through and by means of content-related information and data so that the prognosis finds a support or resisting force on which it can build and be based. If this concretisation is absent and does not take place, then the normative theory of the decision contains merely a norm, and from norms, no prognoses can be

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<sup>132</sup> Cf. Morgenstern, “Vollkommene Voraussicht”.

<sup>133</sup> Foldes, “Note”, p. 326.

derived and deduced by definition. The main concern of such theories does not, nonetheless, seem to be to build conceptual bridges for the putting forward of a prognosis, but rather that main concern of describing real action in such a way that the description of acting, action and the act and the norm of acting, action and of the act coincide. The logic of the form-related (i.e. formal) model can then substitute the logic of the actor, and in a next step the (improvement up to) perfection of the model is confused with the (improvement up to) perfection of the action<sup>lxiii</sup>. Overall, where such confusions, mix ups, mistakes in this or that form are present, the analysis is tangled up in the antinomies of the Covering-Law-Model. It (i.e. the analysis) can determine what the rational actor should or ought to do on the basis of the normative premises of the theory of the decision, but does not know in advance what the actual actor will do. And even when the actor fulfils the normative expectations of the model, it is not fixed with final certainty whether he went down this path because of the motives which the model postulates as the motives for every rational actor.

This fundamental and in principle inability of the prognosis stretches to the unintended consequences of action, which hardly emerges and appears for obvious reasons in the theoretical horizon of normative theories of the decision. Naturally, no theory of acting, action and of the act can anticipate the unintended consequences of action, because in this case the possibility would exist on the part of the actor of eliminating such consequences through and by means of the conscious guidance and steering, something, though, which would change human history as we know it, thoroughly and completely / from the ground up, namely it would mark the beginning of, and usher in, the transition from the “realm of necessity” to the “realm of freedom”. The special difficulty of the normative theory of the decision does not therefore simply lie in the fact that even rational choices bring forth, occasion and produce – at least over the long run – unintended consequences, which in the end can also turn out to be

pleasant, but in the fact that action on the basis of rational choices brings – for the actor himself – unpleasant effects and impacts into being. Constellations are in fact conceivable in which on both sides / mutual “irrational” action would have been more beneficial [[than mutual “rational” action]] to those concerned<sup>134</sup>. In general, the (recti)linear deduction and derivation of an outcome in respect of acting, action and the act conforming with rationality, from the rationality of the motives or else of the ends/goals, can only raise false or at least exaggerated theoretical expectations in respect of the decision (i.e. exaggerated expectations from the theory of the decision). And such a danger grows when one – apart from the possible onset and occurrence of unintended consequences after the successful conclusion of a (kind of) acting, action or act – considers and contemplates the imponderabilities of the course (sequence) (of events) of the acting, action and act, which likewise have little to do with the rationality of the motivation or else of the ends/goals. Between these ends/goals, which determine the outline and draft and the actual/factual outcome of the action there is – as a rule – a smaller or larger gap or distance, namely as the result of the frictions which the course or sequence of events of the acting, action and act gives rise to by running into and encountering external/outer unforeseen impediments and obstacles, accidents, etc., or by bringing to light the internal/inner inadequacies, deficiencies of the actor. Such frictions thwart attempts to realise (achieve, attain) a “rational” outline and draft of acting, action and of the act without the slightest deduction, curtailment or cut(back), and consequently to blur and smear the boundaries between the norm and the reality of the action. They (i.e. the said frictions) represent and constitute the manner as to how time, along with everything which time brings with it and entails, forces its way into and penetrates the rational design and outline of the acting, action and act, which on the basis of its explicit or implicit reference to

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<sup>134</sup> Jervis, “Rational Deterrence” esp. p. 188 (in reference to the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”).

the constants of rationality would like to make a certain louder claim to timelessness (i.e. being beyond the constraints of time)<sup>lxiv</sup>. And they hence constantly remind the person acting of the finiteness / finite nature of his undertakings and enterprises, which is not to (i.e. cannot) be separated from the finiteness of his rationality.

A great theoretician of acting, action and of the act in the name of Clausewitz made use of the concept of friction. To him we also owe another key concept, which was formed as the answer to the question and problem as to how the cognitive presuppositions of action inside of a human reality which constantly flows are comprehended, [[which]] knows only probabilities and likelihoods and does not allow any fixed outlines and contours of things and situations and positions to exist, from which one could deduce and derive any laws whatsoever and norms built upon them (i.e. the said laws). The intellect generalising beyond the concrete case cannot keep and retain, i.e. have the last word here, but the “tact of judgement” undertakes the guidance (conducting and direction) of the action, an “intellectual(-spiritual) instinct”, which sees through and understands the “peculiarity and particularity of the case”, distinguishes between and tells apart what is relevant and what is irrelevant and “hits upon/discovers what is right almost unconsciously”<sup>135</sup>. Action is accordingly not science (if one understands this term in the conventional intellectualistic sense), but art, and it (i.e. action) has, just like art, its virtuosi and its philistines (low-brows, incompetents, “peasants”), irrespective of what everyone regards – in terms of theory – as art and irrespective of which prescriptions or recipes someone wants to follow in respect of the theory of acting, action and the act; the best normative theories of the decision help the philistine little anyhow. Here it is as with the art of writing: philologists (i.e. language (and literature) experts)

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<sup>135</sup> Regarding “friction” and the “tact of judgement” in Clausewitz see Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, esp. pp. 60ff., 71ff., in which the evidence and quotes are too.

command the grammatical and syntactical rules better than great poets, yet for linguistic virtuosity, the philological equipment, nevertheless, suffices just as little as deepening, absorption, engrossment in normative theories of the decision for the person acting. The tact of judgement is based indeed on “natural astuteness, shrewdness, acumen”, but over and above that, it must be “formed and developed” through and by means of “thinking, reflection, contemplation” and the attentive and considerate observation of human things/affairs: the preoccupation with and involvement in theory is indeed very recommendable and advisable, it has, none the less, a propaedeutic character, it sharpens the intellectual(-spiritual) sense, but guarantees in practice nothing. And even if it (i.e. a theory) is true, right and correct, if the rules of acting, action and the act laid down, established and drawn up by it are all together apt, appropriate and well-judged and in actual fact indispensable, thus, accordingly, the meaning and necessity of the tact of judgement is not diminished in the slightest. Because the norms pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act are, as we know, always formulated in terms needing interpretation, and this interpretation, which is supposed to build a bridge between the norm and a concrete situation / position, remains exactly the thing, affair, matter of the tact of judgement; the attempt to lay down, establish and draw up new norms for the application of norms etc., would also make the use of new terms requiring interpretation essential, and consequently gives rise to a *circulus vitiosus* (i.e. vicious circle or cycle), which, again, only the tact of judgement could break. The distance between the models and the tact of judgement is therefore, in view of the necessity of interpretation of the former (models), much smaller than someone who cannot think beyond the common and usual contrasts between “rationalism” and “irrationalism” may believe, and moreover, regards “rationalism” and “irrationalism” to be one and the same thing. The impossibility of defining the tact of judgement once and for all, just as little constitutes an argument against its rationality as the impossibility of a definition

of the norms of acting, action and the act without the use of terms needing and requiring interpretation must have as a consequence the irrationality of these norms<sup>lxv</sup>. The ascertainment regarding the praxeological weight of the tact of judgement may not, incidentally, in any case be understood as an appeal to “irrational” action with the neglect of the (pieces of) information regarding the concrete situation and position, of the weighing up and consideration of the alternatives as between one another. It refers only to the synthetic capacity and ability that evaluates and weighs up, considers the (pieces of) information. The tact of judgement does not put forward, establish or lay down any norm, but it interprets them (i.e. norms) and very often it despises, disdains, scorns and defies them (i.e. norms). That is also why the norm “follow the tact of judgement” would be silly, ridiculous, absurd, nonsensical. Because it (i.e. the said norm of “follow the tact of judgement”) is followed, observed, complied with and abided by anyhow, and furthermore, it could not say anything about the most important thing and the most concrete thing, namely about the quality of the tact, which is exactly what matters when it comes to practical orientation within the concrete situation (and position).

## 2. Universal rationality and universal understanding: in which sense?

Like the notion, idea and conception of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), thus the, with that, closely related assumption of a universal rationality was also connected since time immemorial with ethical-normative intentions and the corresponding power claims; universal rationality was supposed to constitute or provide the measure, standard, yardstick, benchmark or criterion

for the behaviour of all men (i.e. humans), and indeed *as* men (i.e. humans), whereby that man who succeeded or was able to give the binding content-related definition of this measure, standard, yardstick, benchmark or criterion had to be promoted and rise to the position of the direct or indirect driver, i.e. ruler of men (i.e. humans). It is not surprising that an – in such a manner – ambitious power claim could not hitherto be realised by anyone comprehensively and lastingly, and will never be realised in the future either. The necessity of the interpretation of concepts, like universal rationality, invites indeed of itself, as well, the announcement of power claims regarding activity in respect of interpretation; the invitation is directed, however, simultaneously to a number of actors – with foreseeable consequences. On the other hand, the anthropologically-social-ontologically invested, set up, positioned or anchored concept of rationality as such hardly lends itself, despite its by definition universality, to the underpinning, backing up and supporting of ethical-normative ends/goals and ends/goals pertaining to power. As we have shown, it (i.e. the said anthropologically-social-ontologically invested and moored concept of rationality) is structured in respect of several levels, forms and degrees, its universality applies therefore only under the presupposition, precondition and prerequisite of its repeated and multiple content-related splitting and division, in fact, contradictability (i.e. contradictable nature). Said differently : Precisely the anthropologically-social-ontologically determined universal character of rationality explains the impossibility of making out of universal rationality a vehicle for the permanently undisturbed and uninterrupted attainment and achievement of generally acceptable ethical-normative aims/objectives and power claims connected with them.

Which consequences arise and result from this fact for the knowledge and understanding of social phenomena? For the answer to the question, one of the oldest prejudices of the philosophical tradition must first of all be eliminated and overcome, namely this, that the thesis of the relativity of values, that is to

say the breaking up and dismemberment of ethical rationality, and scepticism (doubt) pertaining to the theory of knowledge (or epistemological scepticism (doubt)), that is the rejection of the possibility of firm, stable, steady and fixed rational knowledge, with logical necessity, belong together (or form a pair, form a set and are closely connected). Both in its ancient as well as in its definitive New-Times / Modern-Era forms, scepticism has connected that thesis (of the relativity of values) with this rejection (of certain rational knowledge) and tended, leant towards epistemological empiricism (or empiricism in the theory of knowledge) or even sensualism (i.e. sensorialism or sensationalism as sensation being the source of knowledge) exactly in the belief that between the uncertainty and changeability, variability of sensorial knowledge and the corresponding [[uncertain, changeable, variable]] qualities, distinctive features, characteristics, properties, peculiarities of ethical values, a convincing, cogent, illuminating parallel can be drawn. Platonists and idealists in general assume and adopt the same parallelism, only they reverse the omen, portent (i.e. signs, symbols): the certainty and permanence of rational knowledge went hand in hand with and accompanied the certainty and the unchangeability, invariability of the Good. Consequently, Platonism or else idealism was always a scepticism standing on its head and scepticism was always an inverted Platonism or else idealism. However, the parallel between the cognitive and the ethical level, which both sides, i.e. the scepticists and Platonists/idealists, drew for polemical reasons, is not at all logically compelling, especially by no means from the thesis of the relativity of values, does the thesis of the impossibility of a knowledge of human affairs or an understanding of other men, i.e. humans necessarily follow. In fact, entirely on the contrary. The statement or proposition, "I cannot know human affairs", can found and establish only the conclusion, "I cannot know whether there are objective values", but not prove "there are objective values". In order to know that values in actual fact are relative, or else why and in which sense they must be relative, one must have at

his disposal a sufficient knowledge of human affairs. It is a question of only to which stratum (layer) of depth(s) (i.e. stratum of depth) this knowledge must stretch and extend. Social-ontological observation can transmit exactly those insights into human affairs which allow and tolerate understanding on the basis of a universal rationality founded and established in the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation in and during the simultaneous ascertainment of the relativity (of the content) of values. The in principle possibility of the understanding of alien, foreign and strange, other men, i.e. humans and cultures indicates that their differences in respect of one another do not concern social-ontologically-anthropologically defined rationality, but the (content(s) of their) values and world views, that therefore there is between the rationality defined in such a way and those values or world views no direct and necessarily logical or historical-social interrelation, correlation or connection. Only cleansed and purified of every admixture of ethical-world-theoretical content(s) is rationality capable of demarcating and defining the foundation of a universal understanding – irrespective what special e.g. scientific forms of rationality achieve for the understanding of alien, foreign, strange ethical-world-theoretical content(s) and how far they can go in this direction. Ethical or world-theoretical relativism must not in the least thwart or prevent understanding if this starts where it ought to start. Then that relativism proves to be precisely the presupposition, precondition and prerequisite and vehicle of social-ontologically underpinned understanding. Because this understanding makes use of a rationality, and at the same time it apprehends the effects and impacts of the acting, action and act of a rationality which is activated beneath the level at which ethical and world-theoretical contents experience their historically and sociologically explainable stamp and character.

The social-ontological way of looking at things does not want to, consequently, play what is universal against what is relative or vice versa, it does not know of the opposition and contrast between both of them, and [[does

not]]<sup>lxvi</sup> take care to determine their each and every respective content-related meaning and logical place. In its connection with the value question (i.e. the question and problem of values), on the other hand, siding with universalism or relativism does not serve social-ontological, but rather polemical ends/goals. We have already hinted at what the preacher, herald and harbinger of universal rationality and Reason expects from the possession of the monopoly of the interpretation of the same (universal rationality). Relativists attempt, for their part, to relativise the declared universal claims of validity of others, and consequently to shift the relationship (or correlation) of forces or balance of power and relative strength on the field of politics or of the intellect(-spirit) in their own favour. If in a situation and position pertaining to the history of ideas, the place of universalism is already occupied, thus for those aspiring [[to power]] only the path of relativism is left, as well as the other way around. And like universalism, for it to be, in practice, relevant, having to through interpretation adapt and adjust itself to, or conform and align itself with, the concrete situation and position, that is, it must be in fact actually particularised and relativised, so must also relativism, if it wants to even get a hearing, universalise itself by recommending and presenting itself as the best recipe for coping and coming to terms with general human tasks – (thus e.g. the founding and justification of the demand for tolerance through and by means of the thesis of the relativity of all ethical or cognitive claims in respect of validity<sup>lxvii</sup>). Otherwise, it must appear as consistent nihilism and face social ostracism. This inner ambivalence of the social-ethically and, in terms of the history of ideas, effective forms of universalism and relativism makes possible complementarities and interdependencies between them, which do not characterise only the European New Times (Modern Era) and not only the

mass-democratic planetary present<sup>136</sup>. Incidentally, they also become apparent and make themselves felt by the fact that indeed both positions [of universalism and relativism] stand before opposite, but symmetrical difficulties. In the debates of recent decades, universalists have asserted against relativist(ic) ethnologists for instance the possibility of the understanding of alien, foreign, strange, others' cultures and in general of other men, i.e. humans, in relation to which they founded this assertion on the assumption of general human, e.g. "rational" (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes. There would be no objection to such a thesis, though, provided that these (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes were not taken ethically-normatively and consequently interpreted one-sidedly. However, (the) (most) universalists had this in mind, since they thought and opined that the proof of such (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes paves the way to common ways of thinking and common values and consequently to ubiquitous consensus<sup>lxviii</sup>. Universal understanding on the basis of common (pre-)dispositions and universal consensus have, none the less, nothing to do with each other. As we know, understanding is normatively neutral, i.e. it can just as much be connected with friendly as with inimical positionings, attitudes. It is normally assumed that friends understand one another (although friendship can very well rest and be based on mutual/reciprocal misunderstandings). Yet two generals, who stand on the battlefield opposite each other, possibly try even harder to have an understanding of each other, because in this case it appears to be more vital (and important for life) to abstain from and renounce personal prejudices and feelings. Understanding on the basis of common (joint, shared, mutual) (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes, and accordingly, determined rational modes of thought or ways of thinking, as well as on the basis of the reciprocal and mutual capability in respect of the fathoming and understanding of alien, foreign,

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<sup>136</sup> In relation to that, see in general Kondylis, „Universalismus, Relativismus und Toleranz“; [[and]] in detail and in depth for the polemical function and for the ambivalent character of the sceptical-relativistic currents in the European New Times (Modern Era), see Kondylis, *Aufklärung* and *Neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik*.

others' thoughts and kinds of acting, actions and acts, indisputably exists here; nonetheless, consensus remains absent. The universal human (pre-) dispositions or aptitudes are obviously thus constituted / made that, despite the identity of the forms and functions (bei Identität der Formen und Funktionen), the(ir) occupation by content(s) remains open (die Besetzung durch Inhalte offenbleibt). The misjudgement and or underestimation of this fundamental fact drives the universalists to the logically fatal leap from an Is / Being (Sein) to an Ought (Sollen) (“(The) Men, i.e. humans possess common (pre-)dispositions or aptitudes, that is why they can and should live with one another in (a) good unanimity, agreement and understanding (in gutem Einvernehmen”). The relativists also made the same leap, however, in so far as they out of an ascertainment (“standpoints and values are relative”) deduced and derived a normative command like for instance the demand (in respect) of / for tolerance (die Toleranzforderung) (“You be conscious of the relativity of Your positions and values, and do not attempt to impose the same (positions and values of Yours) with all means [[onto Others]]”).

Not only because of its coupling with the demand for tolerance did relativism necessarily become en vogue (i.e. in vogue, fashionable) within the mass-democratic pantheism of the modes, manners, ways of life and of values. No less favourable to it (i.e. relativism) is the breaking up and dissolution of bourgeois substantialistic anthropology, whose counterpart is the belief in the most extensive and far-reaching (or as far as possible) forming and shaping of man (i.e. humans) by contingent (i.e. accidental and coincidental) cultural factors. Thus, the democratically-meant [and also meant as] egalitarian and extremely relativistic American anthropology of culture (i.e. cultural anthropology) assumed, accepted and adopted the unending, infinite plasticity of man (i.e. humans) according to his special cultural surroundings and environment, with the declared intention to ensure and guarantee his educability

in accordance with a plan<sup>137 + lxix</sup>. The description of that which man does, thinks and *is* (i.e. humans do, think and *are*), coincides basically here with the meticulous description of the corresponding culture, and indeed the culture in its constant, frequently imperceptible and indiscernible change and movement, which carries and drags along man, i.e. humans on all sides, i.e. universally, generally, and in an all-round manner<sup>138</sup>. It is though, questionable whether out of the in itself correct thesis that man is a being of culture (or cultural creature), i.e. one such being of culture whose nature in the creation of culture exists as the condition of his survival, the infinite and total plasticity of man (i.e. humans) corresponding to, and commensurate with, each and every respective form and shape of culture, can be concluded (i.e. can be drawn as a conclusion). Because in the description “being of culture / cultural creature (being)”, culture is contained merely as an anthropologically given form-related (i.e. formal) variable; the special forming, shaping, moulding and formation of man (i.e. humans) through and by means of historical and social contingency is a completely different matter, and in itself it does not override (and set outside of power) the factors which develop their effect and impact permanently in the general sense of culture comprehended in terms of form, that is of culture as a ubiquitous anthropological attribute; contingency can influence e.g. universal rationality as an anthropological disposition and inclination bearing and supporting culture only as regards its level, its form and its degree, but not firstly bring universal rationality into being or make it (i.e. universal rationality) disappear. The problem of cultural universals was posed by an important school of cultural anthropology and handled with considerable success<sup>139</sup>, however, the relativistic school of thought ignored it nonchalantly because its programme was exactly the reduction of cultures to contingency and the depiction of the

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<sup>137</sup> Typically, for this school of thought pertaining to the anthropology of culture: Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*.

<sup>138</sup> Thus, Geertz, “The Impact”, esp. p. 112.

<sup>139</sup> See above all Murdock, “The Common Denominator”, and Kluckhohn, “Universal Categories”.

development of culture as a chain of contingencies. Every culture looks here like a windowless monad, whose interior would only be describable with the help of the symbolic code and categories which constitute this interior itself. Seen epistemologically, this meant an often unconscious renewal and at the same time radicalisation of the historical and hermeneutic approach on the field of the science of culture; that is why it is no wonder that relativistic cultural anthropology in its effect and impact encountered other relativisms which had appropriated the historical and hermeneutical tradition on other detours. One such detour was e.g. Wittgenstein's theory of language games, which was then widened to a relativistic social theory<sup>lxx</sup>. According to that (language-game theory), a life form or else a society is constituted through a common language use which consists in the following of certain rules, so that interpersonal consensus in the final analysis is reduced to the belonging to a tradition defined by the observance of rules; tradition is not therefore (incidentally in express agreement with Parsons) understood merely in the sense of unreflected habit, but as a norm of behaviour (or behavioural norm). In view of the linguistically determined unity, uniformity and solidity of the form of life (or life form), which for its part, as a result of the language-determination of thought, boils down to and ends up in a monad-like unity, uniformity and solidity of the thought form and of the symbolic world in general, an understanding of life forms with the help of a, to it (i.e. to the said monad-like unity, uniformity and solidity of the thought form and of the symbolic world in general), alien, foreign and strange conceptual set of instruments, or else, of a, to it, alien, foreign and strange language, seems to be a virtually impossible, in fact absurd undertaking. Understanding is basically self-referential, the life form simultaneously represents and constitutes its subject and its object<sup>140 + lxxi</sup>.

Now in this concept(ual plan), the sharp demarcation and delimitation

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<sup>140</sup> Thus, Winch, *Idea*, esp. pp. 31, 49, 95.

(dissociation and separation) of the life forms (or forms of life) from one another, which is supposed to found and establish their impenetrable singularity, is bought and paid off by the fiction of their absolute internal unity, uniformity and solidity. The following of rules which determines language use tolerates and condones no exception, it creates the unity of the life form, and precisely because of that, the rules-conducted (rules-led, rules-managed or rules-based) understanding (as agreement) between the participants in this life form functions so frictionlessly and smoothly, that exclusivity comes into being which makes so very difficult fundamental understanding (as agreement) with outsiders<sup>lxxii</sup>. Yet no compelling evidence can be given for the assumption or acceptance that language use as the following and observance of and compliance with rules, as it were, cements and makes water-tight the life form (or form of life). No life form (or form of life) is affirmed unreservedly by everyone in all its aspects, and the partial or comprehensive calling into question of the same (life form) finds expression mostly also in the deviation from the momentarily ruling and dominant language use, in the constant introduction of newer – and the reinterpretation (reframing, new interpretation) of – older concepts or figures of speech (idiomatic expressions). The interpretation of the rules puts the following of the same rules in the shade. The philosopher of language advanced and promoted to a social philosopher is transformed and converted, consciously or not, into a defender of the ruling and dominant convention and into a normativist who denounces and stigmatises the deviations from rules-conducted (rules-led, rules-managed or rules-based) language use as (“philosophical”, but also ethical or political) illnesses, maladies and afflictions<sup>141</sup>. Moreover, he overlooks that that right which he denies to the social scientist, namely to want to understand a life form (or form of life) on the basis of its external, that is its self-understanding of alien criteria,

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<sup>141</sup> Cf. the apt, striking, appropriate, telling, well-aimed remarks, comments and observations by Gellner, “New idealism”, esp. pp. 391, 393.

is laid claim to always by some, and sometimes also by many, members of the life form concerned itself, who distance themselves from their own tradition and its self-understanding in order to apply critical standards, benchmarks to it (i.e. their own tradition).

Critique (or criticism) is not of course the same as understanding; understanding needs, however, just as much as critique, distance, even if the ultimate aim, end, objective may remain a higher intellectual(-spiritual) unification (confluence or association) of the person understanding with that which is to be understood. Either the person understanding belongs to the culture being understood or not: he cannot understand and simultaneously himself identify in an unreflected manner with the culture concerned, because in this case he constitutes the object rather than the subject of understanding. If, in particular, he is a member of an alien culture and he in fact as a scientist is able to survey and review several cultures, thus the inevitable use of benchmarks, yardsticks, criteria and concepts which deviate from the average or mean unreflected self-understanding of the culture concerned assume the form of more or less systematic comparisons. (By way of such comparisons, though, even members of this same culture are motivated towards critique or towards understanding, and the historically amply documented and witnessed effect and impact of the comparison of one's own culture with alien cultures shows from a new perspective how little the conception (or notion) of a quasi-monad-like unity, uniformity and solidity of life forms is the case). Comparisons have, nevertheless, from their nature a Janus face (i.e. two sides / faces). They ascertain similarities or differences and at the same time tacitly or expressly assume a backdrop upon which the similarities or differences can only become visible; the backdrop encompasses, so-to-speak, the superordinate, superior benchmarks, yardsticks, criteria against which similarities or differences are to be measured; they encompass, hence, implicit or explicit generalisations which

go beyond the particular objects (things, items, articles, subjects, matters) which are compared with one another. It is not difficult to see and to understand why the work of an e.g. ethnologist hardly proceeds and makes headway without such a backdrop, in fact it cannot begin at all. In order to make elementary contact with the locals, natives, indigenous, he must spontaneously accept fundamental commonalities between the thought (intellectual) apparatus and thought (intellectual) mode (identity, contradiction, causality), he must presume that he for the most part perceives the external world in the same manner as them, and at least in simple situations judges [[things]] similarly to them (otherwise for him access to the foreign language would be completely barred)<sup>142</sup>. In this enumeration or list of the, of necessity, assumed – and by the way, not in the least merely imaginary – commonalities, elements are already contained which refer to a universal rationality. The relativist may object that rationality as such is a purely form-related (i.e. formal) concept and that only the content-related differences in regard to that which applies from culture to culture as rational behaviour place rather narrow bound(arie)s and limits on understanding<sup>143</sup>. This distinction between the forms and the content(s) of rationality is, though, in general undisputed; it, however, is a question of which epistemological level is meant on each and every respective occasion, whether, therefore, the distinction refers to the social-ontological (level, sphere), the sociological (level, sphere) or the historical (level, sphere), and how the forms and content(s) of every one of these levels relates to those of the rest of the levels. First of all, however, we must raise the objection and point out to the relativist, who wants to justify and found his position by means of Wittgenstein's theory on life forms and language games, the consideration that the distinction between form and content applies to language likewise, and that inside of the same life form, stable forms of speech, i.e. language forms can be

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<sup>142</sup> Hollis, "Reason and Ritual", esp. p. 49.

<sup>143</sup> Thus, Winch, "Understanding", esp. p. 99.

occupied by variable content(s); language cannot, therefore, already because of this constitutive duality<sup>144</sup> vouch for and guarantee the unity, uniformity and solidity of a life form. The corresponding duality of rationality has an effect, for its part, in the same ambivalent sense inside of one and the same life form, which is regarded in itself united, uniform and solid. That is why the distinction between the form and the content of rationality does not prove in itself the relativity of the life forms, to the extent that this assumes the unity, uniformity and solidity of every individual life form, but it goes right (transversely) across the life forms and refers to an overarching, comprehensive dimension or a superordinate, superior level. More accurately said: in so far as the distinction between form and content means just as much as the distinction between universal and special rationality, i.e. rationality incorporated in a particular life form, the investigation of the content(s) and the explanation of contingency (as the topsoil, i.e. native soil or fertile soil (Mother Earth) of relativity) remains the task of sociology and of history; the analysis of the taking root of universal rationality in the realities of anthropology and of the social relation is, on the other hand, the object of social ontology. Universal rationality has, therefore, also its own material or content-related aspects, which, though, have nothing to do with – defined in terms of content – institutional or ethical norms (such crop up and emerge only at the level which can be treated sociologically and historically), but indicate the pre-normative and pre-ethical terrain on which the factors grow which then specifically characterise life forms and cultures.

Even relativists can only with difficulty deny the presence of this terrain. Owing to their fixation on what is contingent, their notion (conception, idea) of social theory does not go beyond, however, the framework which sociology and history stake out and demarcate; because of that, they leap over the level of social ontology and search in the most direct way the common fundament (i.e.

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<sup>144</sup> See Sec. 4 in this chapter, below.

foundation(s), base and underpinnings) underlying all cultures and life forms in the border zone between nature and culture, e.g. in phenomena like birth, death or sexuality<sup>145</sup>. Accordingly, a universal (element, dimension) is indeed recognised next to the relative (element, dimension), but no universal is gained, which on the basis of its social-ontologically detectable composition, constitution and texture can deeply penetrate the relative or else contingent. And that is exactly what matters if social theory wants to be fair and just and rise to the occasion of the multi-layeredness, multi-facetedness, complexity and intricacy, and at the same time, unity (uniformity, consistency, homogeneity) of its object (subject matter). Such a universal, which cannot be imagined as being absent from any relative social life form, is universal rationality as it is shaped, formed and moulded in the social relation and has an effect in that (social relation). In actual fact, human rationality would never have come to genuine development (i.e. human rationality would never have flourished), regardless of how rich in the mere dealing with, contact, relations and interaction of the individual with the objective (representational and concrete) world were the disposition and inclination of this individual. It (i.e. human rationality) necessarily owes its acutest and most piercing sharpness to the constant dealing, grappling and coming to terms with the innumerable facets and the imponderabilities of the subjectivity inside of the social relation, and, in the course of this, it must also refine its logical operations, which in and during the dealing, grappling and coming to terms with the objective (representational and concrete) world, are just as indispensable and essential. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives demands e.g. causal thought for the correlation of the motives of acting, action and the act with the (assumed) mode and manner of acting, action and the act of the Other, it (i.e. the said assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) likewise cannot do without the categories of identity

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<sup>145</sup> Thus, Winch, "Understanding", p. 107ff..

and of contradiction, in so far as it is on the lookout for agreements, correspondences and concurrences between the assumed action and the assumed character of the Other, and it makes use of symbolic thought every time and whenever it interprets words, gestures etc. as open or concealed signs, signals or marks of certain intentions as regards the acting, action and act of the Other. Looked at in this way, rationality is just as universal as the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation, and indeed this universality exists not merely objectively, but it is conscious in all actors at all times, irrespective of their belonging(ness), affiliation to (or membership of) different cultures and life forms. Robinson and Friday could, without major difficulties, understand each other in the rational language of the social relation and could promptly regulate their relation with regard to each other, although neither of the two understood down to the last detail the codex (i.e. code) of communication of the other; the not understood or misunderstood (i.e. in the narrow sense of culturally determined) expressions and signs (remarks, comments, statements), were obviously however not decisive, their meaning could in fact be opened up, conjectured and reconstructed through and by means of being put into order and classified in the broader context of the social relation. Because both have seen a rational being or creature in each other, one such rational being which acts intentionally and on purpose in accordance with the concrete situation (and position), and in the course of this, takes into account alien behaviour whilst considering the whole and entire spectrum of the social relation. In the spectrum and in the mechanism of the social relation, a universal rationality is therefore founded and established, whose elementary language is understood regardless of the life form and of the culture of the actors. This rationality is not only universal in its ubiquity, but also in the diachronic sense, i.e. it remains the same through all changes and transformations of the contingent cultural content (or contents of culture) and its language is understood arbitrarily, i.e. indefinitely long after the death of the actors. Historical epochs and cultures may radically

differ from one another on the basis of their world images, religions or customs, manners; they meet, however, with understanding when they speak the language of the thus understood universal rationality and when they translate the special language of cultural contingency into that generally understood language, as far as it is possible on each and every respective occasion. In any case, the fate or destiny, lot of universal rationality does not for instance depend on whether a historical epoch or culture likes calling itself “rationalistic” or not.

These observations lead us to the examination of the problem of understanding and of its universality. With the universality of understanding, no understanding is meant which can do everything that there is in the social and historical world without anything further, [[i.e.]] an understanding accessible and available to every observer and actor because he has at his disposal an infallible and unerring set of conceptual instruments. On the contrary, the universality refers to the object of understanding; it means, therefore, that the universal character of certain phenomena makes possible their general understandability. Social ontology in principle handles such phenomena, and rationality belongs to them, on condition, though, its (i.e. rationality’s) taking root in the social relation is kept in mind. Alien life forms and cultures are understood in the universality of their rationality and by way of the means of universal rationality when they are comprehended as a plexus, network or mesh of social relations, whose functions are contingent, i.e. changeable and “relative” achievements, accomplishments and performances of culture. The universal constant which serves understanding as a guiding thread, is the social relation, but precisely because the unceasing movement inside of a broad spectrum and in forever newer combinations belongs to the concept of the social relation itself, this constant (of all constants) must produce in and during its crossing and intersection with other (ideational and material) factors what is non-constant and what is not universal, that is, what is relative and what is

contingent. Universal understanding is not due, accordingly, to the lack of contingency, but it aims at and aspires to the opening (up) and revealing of its social-ontological sources and indeed in the consciousness of the fact that from these sources only contingency can flow. In the same way, the fact that the specimen of the genus, i.e. species or race “man” (i.e. “humans”) living in contingency and constantly producing what is contingent does not stand in the way of an anthropology. The social-ontologically ascertainable, determinable, discoverable basic and fundamental pattern of human behaviour in this or that situation is not beyond understanding because, for instance, the ideas or norms in whose constellation or under whose aegis and symbolism the situation is found, are relative and contingent. The political behaviour of the contemporaries of Thucydides, for instance, appear to us in their main features, traits and characteristics very familiar, although their religion, their morals or their language have long ago become alien. We know indeed, in principle, that the various sides of ancient culture belong together and go hand in hand [as a whole], and only can be completely understandable in their unity. Yet also when we isolate the deep(er) layers (or strata of depth(s)) of behaviour from cultural contingency through and by means of abstractions, we believe we have apprehended something essential and real, not a mere fiction.

Without a clear conceptual distinction between the epistemological responsibilities and competencies of social ontology on the one hand, and sociology or history on the other hand, we do not, therefore, make headway in the theory and the praxis of the understanding of life forms and cultures. Because only the conceptual distinction right from the beginning makes possible and enables here the synergy and interplay in the course of the endeavour and effort at understanding, which, incidentally, cannot, in the end, be legitimised by programmatic theoretical positionings and stances, but only by fertile results. Obviously, understanding in the social-ontological sense does

not guarantee the validity, soundness and conclusiveness of sociological and historical understanding, which aims at the explanation of what is relative or else contingent, and makes specific demands on scientific research or also the simple observer. How deeply the latter (sociological and historical understanding) can penetrate is not a question that can be decided in principle and in abstracto (i.e. in the abstract), as one often attempts in thankless methodological debates, but its solution depends on the concrete case and on the concrete researcher or else observer. It ought to be, in any case, undisputed that on the sociological and historical field, understanding by means of its praxis / practice often has surpassed and gone past the bound(arie)s which the relativists wanted to draw. Long before modern sociologically oriented ethnology, the direct gaze of ancient historians, from Herodotus to Tacitus, and from Appian to Priscus was directed to alien customs, mores, manners and ways, modes of life, without letting the conviction being impeded that here it is a matter of something in principle understandable, and indeed even when the observed phenomenon appeared to be particularly strange, odd, peculiar, weird or unnatural. The logic and as a result the understandability of the alien was sought without unnecessary methodological complications in the particular circumstances of life (or living circumstances) as well as in the particular shaping, moulding (polishing, refining) of the social relations in the corresponding collective. And behind such social relations of the corresponding collective always stood a general notion of social-ontological basic and fundamental given (actual) facts, the anthropological dimension, but also concerning the social relation and its possible peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances). Despite all the uncertainty about the success of the endeavour and effort at understanding, in every case to be investigated sociologically and historically, the indispensability of social-ontological observation remains certain, and indeed not merely as the general and vague framework of understanding, but directly for the analysis of the

contingent life form, which, though, is never exhausted in the social-ontological (sphere, dimension, realm). This applies both for aspects of social life, like e.g. relations and circumstances of dominance (as authority) or institutional regulations, in and during which the social relation makes its presence felt tangibly, as well as for the language of the symbols and of the values in their entirety and totality, in which on each and every respective occasion a particular moulding and stamping finds expression and is reflected in social relations in a more or less direct manner.

Apart from the universal social-ontological fundamental and basic given (actual) facts, the universality of some fundamental cognitive processes and modes, ways comes to the assistance of the understanding of the contingent life forms. Inter-cultural comparisons show, establish and prove that no organised human group makes do and lives without abstracting, categorising and classifying (without inductive (conclusions), deductive (conclusions) or analogy / analogical conclusions (reasoning)) or without causal explanations and the principles of identity and of contradiction in everyday contact, relations, interaction, not to mention the higher intellectual(-spiritual) activities of some of their members<sup>146</sup>. The (set of) (conceptual) instruments of rational thought is at the disposal of everyone, regardless of what is believed or said and stated in terms of content. That means: between rationality (this time meant in the sense of the universal, fundamental composition, texture and constitution of the thought (intellectual) apparatus) and truth there is no necessary relation; with the help of the same form-related (i.e. formal) use of logical principles and instruments, the most different content-related positions can be articulated, and because of that it would not be a paradox, for instance, to talk of a logical-scientific and a logical-mythical thought/thinking. The universal fundamental and basic operations of human thought mentioned above, structure, on the other

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<sup>146</sup> Cf. Cole-Scribner, *Culture and Thought*, esp. p. 193.

hand, both the general and universal human “primary theory” about the world, as well as the culturally determined “secondary theory”. The former (“primary theory”) comprehends the world as a spatial continuum which is filled with perceptible objects and subjects separated from one another or bordering with and adjacent to one another occasionally in relations of causality with one another, and – depending on the position of the observer – is put in order in accordance with certain directions in respect of orientation (right-left, above-below (top-bottom), in front-(at the) back (before-behind), inside-outside). Time is in principle divided into past, present and future, whilst the fundamental classification of beings, which (can) exist in this space or this time, occurs in accordance with two great points of view: subjects in general face and stand opposite of objects, and in the realm of the subjects, again, an Other (as You, You [[plural]] or He, She, It) faces and stands opposite an Ego. Only at the level of “secondary theories” do contrasts and oppositions (antitheses and contradictions) like for instance that between the animistic and the mechanistic world image appear; but as much as “secondary theories” may distance themselves from “primary theories” as well, they remain, in the end, dependent on the terms of the “primary theories” and are evaluated with regard to their implications for the “primary” world image<sup>147</sup>. The universality of this latter (“primary” world image) is connected and interrelates obviously first of all with the universality of the mechanisms and processes of perception, which is seen for instance in the interculturally stable perception of the basic colours<sup>148</sup>. Even the proven culturally dependent deviations and divergences in the perception of the outside world, and of the objects in it, take place against the background of the decisively fixed or stable commonalities, which only enables the ascertainment of the deviations and divergences. We would hardly be capable of

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<sup>147</sup> This distinction between “primary” and “secondary theory” comes from Horton, “Tradition”, p. 288ff.. Cf. the distinction between universal and context-dependent rationality in Lukes, “Some Problems”, p. 208ff..

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Berlin-Kay, *Basic color terms*.

distinguishing deviations and digressions in the perception of mistakes in respect of communication if cultures perceived the outside world in an – on each and every respective occasion – exclusive manner<sup>149</sup>. The universality of the elementary categorisation of properties, qualities and characteristics on the basis of a threefold criterion, i.e. their evaluation as good or bad (pleasant or unpleasant, positive or negative etc.), strong or weak (hard or soft, heavy or light etc.) and finally active or passive (fast or slow, irritable or dull etc.) joins this universality of the mechanisms and processes of perception as well as the quasi universality of the content(s) of perception<sup>150</sup>. The – in such a manner, in binary schematisms – categorised properties, qualities and characteristics are not only used by everyone, but also for everyone and everything, i.e. they are ascribed to both objects as well as subjects, and over and above that, to situations and relations.

For the support of the relativistic position, the allusion to, or indication of, the determination of the perception or of the interpretation of things by means of – independent from them – already fixed and established concept(ual plan)s and theories, which – so to speak – peg out, demarcate and make clear the framework of that which in general may be perceived and thought about is often of use. Here, the anthropologically pre-given stable categorial apparatus of thought is not meant, to which, anyhow, all men (humans) are bound and which can be looked at and observed from the outside just as little as they (i.e. men, humans) can jump over (or escape from) their own shadow, but rather the culturally determined and hence (long-term) changeable thought (intellectual) schematism or (thought (intellectual)) automatism, which in the form of created convictions regarding the constitution, composition and texture of the natural and social world, unconsciously guides and directs the registration, recording

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<sup>149</sup> Campbell, “Distinguishing Differences”; cf. Deregowski, “Some Aspects”, esp. p. 89.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. Osgood, “Speculation” and “Studies”.

and interpretation of experience into certain paths. The influence of such schematisms and automatisms is undisputed, however, it does not go so far as to unhinge the “primary theory” from the world or to make superfluous the invocation of generally observable phenomena for the support of this or that interpretation of nature or of men, i.e. humans. The penetration, permeation and pervasion of empirical experience (or empirical evidence) by theory does not mean that theory can be rescued against every piece of evidence of empirical experience/evidence, if, for its part, it does not “rescue or recover” the phenomena in the Platonic sense – whereby and in relation to which, though, the decisive point must be kept in mind that the “rescuing and recovering” of the phenomena does not in the least prove the ontologically or metaphysically understood truth of the theory<sup>lxxiii</sup>. The fact that even obviously weak “secondary” theories are under the compulsion to invoke the whichever way interpreted empirical experience/evidence proves, nonetheless, the universal authority of the “primary” theory of the world. General “secondary theories” are formed as power claims at the level of intellectual(-spiritual) argument / confrontation / conflict, they represent and constitute ideational projections or extrapolations of certain aspects of experience which go beyond and surpass the – on each and every respective occasion – empirically recognisable and discernible, so that on the basis of the same (“secondary theories”), various in regard to basis theorems / propositions confirmed by all sides, and in themselves equal, axiomatic systems can be erected and established. Precisely because of that, and in this sense, one may assert that the hard core of empirical facts is theory-independent and theory-indifferent (or independent of, and indifferent to, theory), just like the development of technique (i.e. technology) for the most part took place away and apart from the theoretical development of natural science or even preceded the latter (natural science). Theory, therefore, arrived on the scene as a belated explanation of technical development without

having or exercising a noteworthy influence on this (technical development)<sup>151</sup>. Relative here was theory, not the separable-from-it (i.e. theory) technique (i.e. technology) and its hard empirical core.

The penetration of empirical experience (or empirical evidence) by theory, *when* theory is striven for or (pre-)given, and the cultural relativity of “secondary” theory, do not, therefore, prove, without anything else, the theses of strict relativism, which does not want to accept any theory-independent perception of the world<sup>152</sup>. Similar misunderstandings and errors characterise the attempt to declare language as the forming, shaping, moulding force of thought, in order to from that draw the conclusion that two language communities would have to, already because of the language difference, perceive the world differently. Whorf, who undertook this attempt most consistently<sup>153</sup>, supported, in the course of this, in regard to an analysis of the expressions regarding temporal relations (or relations of time) in the language of the Hopi-Indians, and opined that therein a decisive proof for the fundamentally different sense of time of natural “primitive” folks (or native “primitive” peoples) in comparison to the nations of Western culture may be beheld. Now later and more fundamental investigations have shown that the Hopi-Indians use time forms which are close to ours<sup>154</sup>, and that still more generally, the metaphors for time/temporal relations in hardly-related (cognate, kindred)-to-one another languages differ from one another only slightly. The depiction of time as movement in space obviously belongs to the universals of human language<sup>155</sup>. But no matter the misinterpretation and the selective handling, treatment of the realia (i.e. real things or facts, realities), linguistically founded relativism rests and is based on a tautology or a truism. The socio-

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<sup>151</sup> Cf. Kondylis, „Wissenschaft“, p. 94ff.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Lukes, “On the social determination”, p. 236ff..

<sup>153</sup> Cf. *Language, Thought and Reality*.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Malotki, *Hopi time*.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. Alverson, *Semantics and experience*.

culturally determined perception of the world must, though, find expression, be reflected and manifest itself in a language, in fact it must fuse and merge with a language, and since this process can be held onto, retained and recorded only through and by means of language, thus language appears – after the completion, ending and conclusion of the same process – to be the primary factor<sup>lxxiv</sup>. The necessity of language / linguistic mediation, intercession and intervention and of language / linguistic expression of certain thought content(s) is confused with the a necessary determination of thought by language; language becomes and turns into – on this detour – the matrix of culture. One could leave aside genetic points of view and take into serious consideration the assumption of the primacy of (ready(-made), mature, completed) language over thought (forming itself, being formed), at least with heuristic intent, if the conviction standing behind the said assumption were correct, that the language / linguistic form in actual fact and adequately provides expression to a particular perception of the world, that, therefore, the categories of language necessarily and univocally accompany the categories of thought. But this is not the case. What through language is described differently (e.g. a phenomenon (occurrence, appearance) of nature or a natural phenomenon) is not perceived already because of that also differently. Richer inner / internal differentiation of certain terms in one language in comparison to other languages is not reduced to certain qualities, properties and characteristics of the mechanism of perception and of the thought mechanism, which only make possible and enable such differentiations, but they are due to concrete circumstances, under which communication, understanding and or agreement in respect of, and the coping and coming to terms with, everyday life do not make do without a (great) terminological variety. Only Eskimos had to develop and use names, descriptions, designations for various states (of affairs) and conditions and the changing colours of snow. The greater the value and significance a designatum (i.e. that which is named or designated by a linguistic term) inside of a culture

has, so much less is it to be reckoned and counted with regard to a synoptic or monolectic description (name, term, label). In regard to whatever dominates life, even parts and nuances have their own weight, importance and higher relevance. And finally, let it be noted that a direct and univocal connection between grammar and semantics may just as little be accepted as one such connection between language and thought in general. Linguistic relativism deduces and derives differences in semantics, i.e. in that which the speakers have in mind when they use a grammatical form, from the differences between the used grammatical and syntactical forms. However, it is completely possible and in fact usual that the same semantics, i.e. therefore the same (re)presentations, notions, associations and affective, emotional or conceptual structures, can be conveyed, reproduced, rendered or interpreted by very different combinations of the grammatical elements. The relevant data is structured, arranged, classified and organised on each and every occasion differently; all languages possess, however, means and ways in order to express fundamental relationships and circumstances. The grammatical system as such and the articulation of thoughts are not in any necessary relation to each other, and the “primary theory” of the world is hence not – because of the differences between the grammatical systems – abolished and cancelled<sup>156</sup>.

Undoubtedly, this “primary theory” does not suffice when we want to communicate and be understood with regard to the people belonging to another culture or with regard to the advocate, champion, promoter of another life form in regard to individual/discreet questions and problems – although it (i.e. “primary theory”) represents a *conditio sine qua non* (i.e. an indispensable and essential action, condition, or ingredient) of every such communication and understanding. Over and above that, we must translate our culturally-

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<sup>156</sup> Osgood, “Language Universals”, p. 318; Brown, “Language”, pp. 311, 307ff.; Brown-Lenneberg, “A study of language and cognition”; Haugen, “Linguistic Relativity”, p. 18ff..

determined “secondary” world image at least in part into the language of the alien “secondary” world image and this (alien “secondary” world image) into our own language. Regarding the in principle possibility of such a translation, as is well-known, opinions differ, but both those who affirm it (i.e. the in principle possibility of such a translation), as well as those who reject it, missed the social dynamic of this undertaking, upon which its success also depends. One mostly pictures this translation task/job in such a manner as if one analyses, dissects, dismembers the symbolic language of a culture in rows and series of primary and secondary terms, and then is supposed to seek correspondences (equivalences, analogies, counterparts, parallels, analogues) of these terms in the likewise analysed, dissected, dismembered symbolic language of the alien culture. Only in the patient and scholastic (pedantic, nitpicking, hair-splitting, quibbling) academic laboratories, nonetheless, does the translation task assume the form of a contrast (comparison, confrontation, opposition or juxtaposition) of individual terms in the hope of attaining, reaching, getting via the ascertainment of partial-agreements commensurability of two entireties / totalities. Praxis appears to be different. Representatives of different cultures or life forms (forms of life), who want to understand one another, and, in relation to that, need the translation task or job of translation, do not meet one another abstractly, i.e. as pure bearers of culture and of ideas, who comprehend their relation with one another exclusively with regard to this quality, property, characteristic of theirs, but they face one another – in the sense of the “primary theory” of the world – as men (i.e. humans, people) who have certain ends/goals and corresponding plans, designs in respect of acting, action and the act; that is why the meeting sets, therefore, in motion the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation, even before the question of the importance of the cultural factor and of the meaning of the translation task comes up. The latter (translation task) serves henceforth the shaping and moulding, forming of the social relation according to the ends/goals and the plans, designs of acting,

action and the act of those meeting one another. The shaping, moulding or forming of the social relation does not depend on the success of a preceding translation task, as it were as the preparation for the genuine meeting of the translation task being operated, but things are precisely the reverse: the translation is regarded as successful as soon as both sides gain the firm, fixed, stable, steady impression that they have common concerns and interests, friends or foes. Presumptions and indications that such commonalities exist or that it is, in any case, for the time being more expedient to go down the path of friendship, encourage a *limine* (i.e. from the very beginning) the translation task in the sense of the stressing or discovery of cultural points of contact; conspicuous differences or contrasts, conflicts are then downplayed, and they are looked at as amusing coincidences or as possibilities for mutual and reciprocal supplementation. The translation must not, therefore, be literal, it very often makes use of more or less generous, liberal, loose analogies and metaphors, which help get over the actual, but topically (and currently) irrelevant discrepancies and underline the topically and currently relevant commonalities. In general, the translation task starts with what is topically and currently relevant and proceeds with regard to that; its main emphases and centres of gravity and its perspectives change correspondingly. We do not have to expressly explain that in and during inimical meetings, the translation task sets other practical priorities than in and during friendly meetings. But it (i.e. the translation task) continues to be done, because understanding, which is equally indispensable and essential for friends and foes dealing with one another, cannot make do and manage with the merely formal use of the mechanism of the social relation; content-related indications/clues are essential, and these are provided by the transmission and translation of the symbols of the alien culture into one's own culture. Not least of all, it is often seen in enmity that mutual and reciprocal cultural understanding can be much more accurate, precise and exact than relativists like to imagine it.

In short, the relationship of cultures and the, with that, connected translation task stand under the sign and are under the influence and aegis of the social relation. Actually, two cultures do not in fact ever meet and encounter each other across the board and all along the line and in their whole wealth of facets, but only men (i.e. humans) encounter one another, who on each and every respective occasion represent or simply incorporate certain aspects of their own culture. Thus seen, that which one calls in a hypostatized manner the “meeting of cultures” always has a contingent character, because it is by no means certain that, in the course of this, the typical average [[of one culture]] meets the typical average [[of another culture]]. Such meetings take place rather at the (study) desk of the relativists, for whom the individual is absorbed in “his” culture in order [[for them, i.e. the relativists]] to then demarcate and delimit and differentiate cultures from one another all the more sharply. However, no culture is so closed that the cultural factor could gain inside of it (i.e. that said culture) and vis-à-vis other cultures the upper hand over the logic of the social relation. There is plenty historical evidence for that. Collectives, which proudly and self-consciously confessed their faith in a certain culture, religion etc. have not seldom allied themselves with “barbarians” and “unbelievers” against their own cultural comrades, mates, companions, associates and religious comrades, mates, companions, associates; and inside of individual collectives there have always been groups which in what is culturally alien have sought and found a foothold for the claim, assertion or the extension, development, expansion of their power position (or position of power) vis-à-vis other groups of the same collective. Every attempt to comprehend history as the struggle of cultures against one another lacks just as much objective foundation and factual basis as for instance an interpretation of history from the point of view of the struggle of the races<sup>157 + lxxv</sup>. The primacy of the social relation vis-à-vis the cultural factor

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<sup>157</sup> Cf. Kondylis, „Globale Mobilmachung“.

(or factor of culture) shows that the question and problem of the translatability of symbolic language between cultures is posed – bearing in mind the fact that no culture ever reaches and attains and achieves absolute inner unity, uniformity and solidity and no culture is ever capable of putting a stop to and preventing in its womb the coming into being of ever new life forms (or forms of life); the question and problem is posed no less within an individual culture as between cultures. The distance or the agreement between cultures makes therefore in itself the positive or negative, i.e. the friendly or inimical alignment, orientation of understanding and of communication as probable or improbable as every other existential or interest-determined, interest-dependent difference or similarity between any actors whatsoever. The decisive factor here is not agreement or difference in themselves, but is the relevance of the each and every respective agreement and of the each and every respective difference inside of each and every respective concrete situation. A one percent difference can for the shaping, moulding and formation of the social relation be more important than ninety-nine percent agreement when in the opinion of the actors it comes down to that one percent. Quantitative points of view are, anyhow, in regard to the shaping, moulding and formation of the social relation rather unimportant or negligible.

The primacy of the social relation in and during the meeting of cultures with one another vis-à-vis the abstract comparison of culture(s) (or cultural comparison) also determines the meaning and the extent to which here understanding and evaluating go together and accompany each other, differ from each other or are in contrast and or opposition to each other. Since the mere existence of an alien life form automatically puts into question the absolute claim of validity of one's own life form and hence encloses in itself a potential threat, (which, though, is actualised only with the contribution and having a joint effect, synergy of other factors,) thus actors tend spontaneously in

relation to that to conduct and engage in the obvious comparison of the corresponding cultures with one another first of all as the comparison of socially influential and seminal value conceptions (or notions, (re)presentations and ideas, images of values), in relation to which they come to the comforting conclusion that, seen overall, one's own value scale (or scale of values) is "more rational" or "more natural". (This does not contradict the polemical idealisation of alien cultures as weapons of critique/criticism against supposed grievances, wrongs and shortcomings in one's own culture, as it, for instance, occurred in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but already in antiquity too<sup>158</sup>; because here the alien became the mouthpiece and speaking trumpet of the familiar). But the (self-)complacent, self-satisfied and smug declaration of one's own superiority in the realm of the supposedly essential and vital values does not in the least suffice in order to cope with the practical problems which the meeting of cultures, seen as a social relation, poses. The Indian may believe that the paleface "white" men, who kill with (shot)guns, rifles, and steer clear of the manly (brave and courageous) duel (i.e. man-to-man, hand-to-hand combat), are cowardly, but bitter experiences push him (i.e. the native American Indian), however, sooner or later, in relation to that, to equipping and arming himself with (shot)guns, rifles as well. Today's Muslim fundamentalist takes a similar position towards modern technique (i.e. technology), who, otherwise, brands and stigmatises the "West" as a monstrosity / excrescence of devilish, demonic, evil and diabolical spirit. In such examples it becomes especially clear how the praxis (practice) or else the logic of the situation itself compels one to make an (often unacknowledged, yet frequently conscious) distinction between ethical and technical-instrumental evaluation. (The technically, i.e. technologically superior is likewise, in principle, capable of this distinction, thus e.g. when he admires the bravery of the technically (i.e. technologically) inferior and reduces

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<sup>158</sup> Fairchild, *Noble Savage*; Guy, *French Image of China*; Lovejoy-Boas, *Primitivism*. The same weapon was in the 20<sup>th</sup> century used often against bourgeois culture and "Western rationalism".

the same bravery to his (i.e. the technologically inferior's) value conceptions (or notions, (re)presentations and ideas, images of values.) The distinction between ethical and technical-instrumental evaluation signifies, for its part, just as much as the distinction between motivation and the practical success of action.

Motives are understood on the basis of cultural values standing behind the motives, but external and outer kinds of acting, actions and acts are evaluated and judged on the basis of their expediency, purposefulness and their serving of ends/goals – their expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and their serving of ends/goals, though, inside of a concrete situation: because the pale-faced “white” man observing will evaluate and judge in a technical regard the action of the Indian-tribe differently when this Indian-tribe fights, battles with a tomahawk against another Indian tribe armed in the same manner, than in the case in which the tomahawk is supposed to cope with the (shot)guns and rifles of the colonists. In the understanding remaining the same of the culturally determined motivation of the action, the evaluation and judgement of the expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of ends/goals of this same action can change thoroughly and fundamentally. Here two lines of rationality in the more or less clear consciousness of their different character is pursued. Thus, every cultural meeting – in so far as it is not exhausted in the confirmation of blind prejudices – suggests the insight and understanding that rationality is universal only when its (i.e. rationality's) many levels, forms, shapes and degrees, grades are not lost sight of or denied outright.

It is quite possible that the understanding observer neglects the difference between culturally determined value rationality (or rationality pertaining to values) and technical rationality in favour of a unified and uniform, consistent and coherent way of looking at the culture concerned, i.e. at a very general level of looking at things, he comprehends the manner as to how tasks are technically coped with or mastered as the function and the outcome of the dominant value

system. In this case, he does not ask about the expediency, usefulness, purposefulness and the serving of ends/goals of the dominant form of technical rationality under all circumstances, but only under the circumstances of that culture, even though it must also be said that already from this narrow perspective, the difference between the value system and technical rationality, i.e. the difference between the corresponding criteria of evaluation necessarily is conspicuous: because even inside of the same culture and during the assumption of the same value system, not all kinds of acting, actions and acts are equally expedient, useful, purposeful and serving of ends/goals – and they are also not felt as equally expedient and useful. But that difference shines in a very bright, startling light in every meeting of a culture with another culture, or else in and during every consideration of cultures from the viewpoint of their meetings with one another. The more universal the way of looking at things, the more universal rationality differentiates itself around the axis of the distinction between the understanding of the culturally determined value system and the evaluation of the technical-instrumental aspect. If the observer, who is simultaneously the bearer and the advocate, champion, promoter of another value system, is not interested in the understanding of alien values on the basis of the corresponding circumstances of living (or life circumstances, circumstances of life), thus he remains at the general (global, inclusive and wholesale) evaluation of the alien culture, i.e. he contrasts and compares merely alien values with his own and asserts the superiority of the latter (i.e. his own values) – whereby and in relation to which he takes the risk of underestimating the alien culture, and as a result, of experiencing unpleasant surprises. If he, on the other hand, goes to the trouble of – whether out of theoretical curiosity and inquisitiveness or out of practical constraints and pressures or for both reasons – the understanding of the alien culture, thus he must restrict and limit his evaluation to the technical-instrumental aspect, and does not carry out any evaluation of the alien values (at least not any which could do harm in practice,

no matter the strength and perseverance of his subjective sympathies or antipathies). This, in practice, entirely possible, i.e. for Common Sense evident and obvious and for practical reasons likewise useful dichotomy is objectively based on the fact that there is for the evaluation of technical-instrumental rationality objective clues, evidence, indications, namely such which success provides irrespective of the self-understanding of the actors; it is a matter of the (cap)ability of dealing and coping with and getting through and managing a concrete situation better than someone else and of demonstrating, in this respect, practical superiority, which the Other nolens volens i.e. willy-nilly must submit and bow to, whatever he may otherwise think about the ethical dimension. The success is therefore measured in regard to the demands of the situation and position, whereby and in relation to which he who has at his disposal the more effective technical-instrumental rationality, approaches the situation and position with higher demands, and consequently excludes opponents, competitors and antagonists from this situation and position, who in regard to such demands (no matter how they otherwise may be evaluated in a non-technical respect) cannot follow suit (in regard to meeting such demands). On this basis, value-neutral comparisons of the corresponding rationalities are not merely possible, but also normal, and they are based on the measurement of the quantities of the same (technical-instrumental) quality. On the other hand, no value-neutral comparisons are possible by definition where it is a matter of partisanship in favour of non-technical values; then different quantities of the same quality do not exist here, but different qualities. (The pragmatic evaluation of an ethical value in regard to its social utility takes us, in the final analysis, back to technical-instrumental logic.) One can remain in principle with his values, even when on the battlefield of technical-instrumental rationality he has to admit defeat. The social drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation does not stop most men, i.e. people from following Cato's proud example<sup>lxxvi</sup> and, showing contempt for the verdict of the Gods, devoting themselves to (and

espousing) the cause of the vanquished. But the possibility of doing this speaks for the validity, soundness and conclusiveness of our distinction and at the same time makes more understandable a phenomenon which deserves particular attention, especially in today's planetary constellation. We mean the use of technique (i.e. technology) and the application and usage of technical rationality in connection with very different culturally determined value systems. Modern technique (i.e. technology) owes, though, its coming into being to a certain "spirit(-intellect, mind)", to a specific world-theoretical positioning, attitude and approach, which was first formed and developed in the "West". But coming into being and use, or else spreading, are two completely different things, since the originator (author, creator, initiator) only in the fewest of cases is capable of determining over the long run the meaning in regard to which his creations are supposed to be interpreted and made use of and exploited. The possibility of a growing discrepancy between the value system of the coming into being and the value systems (or systems of values) with which the use or else the spreading are more or else narrowly connected, will no longer strike us as strange and take us aback when we recall that the relation between a world-theoretical positioning and attitude and real action is frequently a symbolic rather than a logical relation<sup>159</sup>.

The questions and problems which we have discussed here were since the time of the great geographical discoveries in the framework of the meeting of the Western culture with the extra-European cultures time and again posed and answered in various manners both in theory as well as in practice. As we have remarked, some ancient historians have already illustrated in their uninhibited, impartial and direct manner how the general practice of the understanding of alien cultures looked against the background of many-faceted universal

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<sup>159</sup> See Sec. 1Bc in this chapter. For the world-theoretical neutrality of technique (i.e. technology) in the present-day planetary constellation or conjuncture, see Kondylis, „Was heißt schon westlich?“

rationality or else of the “primary theory” of the world. The experiences of Western culture<sup>lxxvii</sup> as a result of its meeting with other cultures have in two ways given particular occasion for fundamental thoughts. On the one hand, because that culture as the first which strove after and achieved a genuinely planetary expansion, and, on the other hand, on account of its superiority in the realm and area of technical-instrumental rationality, which sooner or later forced the extra-European peoples and states to orientate themselves to the Western example regarding this technical-instrumental rationality, in order to be able to assert themselves and hold and stand their own ground. Such superiority, the sole in practice verifiable, testable and checkable superiority, brought, as was to be expected, into being ideologies which wanted to found and establish the general, empirically no longer verifiable, testable and checkable superiority of Western values and world views. In their roughest, coarsest, grossest, crudest, most vulgar, unrefined versions, these ideologies dissolved and came undone in parallel with the European empires; they, nonetheless, survive in the form of the belief that Western rationality is a more or less unified, uniform and coherent construct and as such is in the position of embodying the universal claim of rationality, i.e. of ousting, superseding, displacing and suppressing the many levels, degrees and forms of the in actual fact existing universal rationality by one sole version of rationality, which then deservedly would obtain the name of universal rationality. In the course of this, one does not want to equate Western and technical-instrumental rationality (on the contrary, in a number of cases one fears or records a topical or possible danger in respect of – understood in terms of values – Western rationality by means of technical-instrumental rationality); decisive remains, nevertheless, the following: no defence of the universal claim of Western rationality can simply delete technical-instrumental rationality, because this technical-instrumental rationality – as theoretical and above all as applied science – bore the brunt / burden of the struggle for the disenchantment of the world, for the freeing of man (i.e.

humans, people) from animistic and religious prejudices<sup>lxxviii</sup> and created, as a result, the foundation for the autonomy of these same humans in respect of traditional authorities as well as for the erecting and construction of a value scale on the basis of this autonomy. Obviously, no such perception and view of humans and perception and view of values can come from a feudal agrarian / agricultural society. Against the background of this elementary ascertainment, comparisons between Western and non-Western rationality understandably varied the old motif of the contrast and opposition between the magical and the scientific way of thinking, in relation to which even authors by no means suspicious of scientific and instrumental sympathies used the superiority<sup>lxxix</sup> of the latter (scientific way of thinking) vis-à-vis the former (magical way of thinking) as an argument for their partisanship in regard to the question and problem of rationality<sup>160</sup>.

The measurable superiority of technical-instrumental rationality does not prove, though, in itself the superiority of non-measurable cultural values, as much as these latter (non-measurable cultural values) may also be connected inside of a certain cultural milieu with that rationality. But the decisive point for our question formulation lies somewhere else. Inside of Western culture, not for one moment has the variety / diversity of the levels, degrees and forms of rationality been eliminated, nor has the co-existence or the interweaving of the rational and the irrational been abolished in favour of the absolute rule and complete control (sole dominance) of the former (rational); already because of that, it is inadmissible to talk of such a manner of unification of Western rationality which would qualify this rationality as the most promising candidate for the position of the sole representative of universal rationality. In the West, no less enormous ideological movements accompanied the enormous advances of technical-instrumental rationality, and indeed not always as competing

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<sup>160</sup> See e.g. Ch. Taylor, "Rationality", esp. p. 102ff.; cf. Dixon, "Is cultural relativism self-refuting?", p. 84.

ideological movements, but literally as facilitative and complementary forces; constructs like Man, Nature, History, Utopia have in their way partly encouraged, partly legitimised those advances. On the other hand, the penetration of social life by the products of technical-instrumental rationality and the mechanisation of everyday life has not at all brought about a general cessation and discontinuance of mythical or magical thought; on the contrary: it looks very much as if the sphere of mass-democratic consumption, which follows a logic different to the sphere of technical production, on the basis of its pantheism and syncretism, absolutely needs and nourishes such mythical or magical thought. The co-existence or the interweaving of both modes of thought remains today – seen in terms of society as a whole and or in terms of the psychology of the individual – despite fluctuations in the dosage in the average, a just as normal phenomenon as the parallel effect of an animistic world image and a rational organisation of the hunt or of the expedient, useful, purposeful, serving-an-end/goal manufacture of tools and implements in the life of a primitive horde. That is why the sharp contrast of both modes of thought (or thought modes) is in regard to the Western Modern (i.e. modernity) just as out of place as in regard to other epochs and cultural circles<sup>161</sup>. Such a contrast is, though, at the conceptual level absolutely possible and legitimate, especially if it is set up in and based on real, historically and sociologically isolatable and describable phenomena (occurrences or appearances) with concrete bearers. However, it may or should not in any case be equated with the contrast of two types of society which, on top of that, follow each other in time, as the evolutionistic philosophy of history wants it [[to happen]]. The urge (compulsion, drive) or the compulsion (coercion, constraint, duress) to go beyond and surpass logically-experimentally controllable experience, which must underlie and constitute the basis of every technical-instrumental

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<sup>161</sup> Cf. Goody, *Domestication*, esp. Ch. 1 and 8, as well as Ch. I, Sec. 3 in this volume.

rationality, is already, because of that, in principle equally strong in all societies, because in all societies the perceptions and views regarding the meaning of life and the – (inter)connected, interrelated with that – world-theoretical assumptions or doctrines, teachings and theories in respect of duty and virtue, of necessity stem and come from empirically barely verifiable (testable, checkable) articles of faith, no matter how their social functionality under given circumstances may appear to be. But also inside of science, the logic of specific power claims which characterise this field of social action drives towards generalisations which, already on account of that, overstep every possible experience because they want to encompass every possible experience and subjugate and subject and subordinate every possible experience to laws<sup>lxxx</sup>; from that, for instance, the asymmetry between theory pertaining to the natural sciences and technique (i.e. technology) is explained<sup>162</sup>, not to mention at all the overgrowth of supra-empirical theory in the social sciences, philosophy etc.. Such and similar ascertainments, for instance regarding the use of models and analogies in science<sup>163</sup>, encourage attempts to carve out and elaborate formal-structural parallelisms between scientific and mythical explanations of the world<sup>164</sup>. These, however, only apply under the condition that they investigate and examine the world-theoretical-supra-empirical at the highest and the most abstract level of generalisation, and that they, for their part, do not – in this case – generalise their observations, [[so that what is]] between the empirically verifiable (testable, checkable) and the non-verifiable (testable, checkable) can no longer be distinguished; [[so that]] there is, therefore, no level, as low as it might be, at which such a distinction would be possible. As is known, relativists suggest such conclusions, who quite unhesitatingly make the leap from ethical, world-theoretical etc. relativism to cognitive relativism. If one does not put the

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<sup>162</sup> See footnote 151 in this chapter, above.

<sup>163</sup> See, above all, Hesse, *Models and analogies*.

<sup>164</sup> In the most consistent (attempt): Horton, “African Traditional Thought”; cf. B. Barnes, “Comparison”. Already, Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 286ff..

aforementioned attempts at the service of such a blanket, lump, general and sweeping relativism, thus one may quote them (i.e. the said attempts) as additional evidence for the thesis that the part of what is world-theoretical-supra-empirical in the life of societies which have particularly developed technical-instrumental rationality will neither be necessarily nor decisively diminished by this development, regardless of with which content(s) or names it (i.e. the said world-theoretical-supra-empirical (element, dimension, sphere)) may be connected under such circumstances. (If a whole epoch or culture sums up and condenses its self-understanding in words like “Reason” or “rationality”, thus much must also, with those words, be proved [[as pertaining to “Reason” or “rationality”]] which previously straight out dared to appear as “irrational”.) The pluralism of theories and opinions does not in itself constitute an indication that a society from dependence in respect of irrational authority, which does not tolerate any divergences, digressions, deviations, has passed over and proceeded to the rationality of the autonomous man (i.e. human), which exactly generates, produces, makes the said (great) variety. It does not first of all make sense why rational research as such puts a number of theories and opinions in the world and not on each and every respective occasion one sole theory and opinion, when rationality is supposed to be for all men (i.e. humans, people) one and the same or else equally binding. How would it otherwise be delimited and demarcated from subjective arbitrariness? The logical demands of rationality or the necessary consequences of its autonomous exercising do not nurture, nourish and feed (support and maintain) pluralism, but this pluralism goes back and is reduced to a functional need of societies, whose formation and development was characterised by an ideological struggle against (especially Church) “authorities”. In bourgeois-liberal, and above all in mass-democratic, circumstances, conditions and relations, social differentiation must increase and grow on the basis of the progress of technical-instrumental rationality, and this is again anchored in institutions, which, inter alia, take care of and worry about

and concern themselves with the production and reproduction of theories and opinions. Wherever there are many scientists, there must be many scientific theories too, and these must quickly take the place of and give way to one another, even when hardly any individual or collective progress towards an ideal of rationality fixed and established in advance can be registered and recorded<sup>165</sup>. Moreover, it is to be taken into consideration that pluralism is not only put forward, brought to bear and asserted in societies in which the dominant and ruling ideology in principle confesses its faith in pluralism as a good and a value. For every society, even for the simplest society, pluralism (e.g. in the elementary form of the characterological distinctions of its members from one another) is functionally indispensable; – and it is unavoidable in view of the smaller and greater power claims which are constantly and simultaneously raised, i.e. made in every collective by several sides. No religion and no state doctrine, also no private world-theoretical direction or school of thought, has ever reached, attained and achieved the unity, uniformity and solidity which their originators, creators, authors or official representatives imagined and had in mind<sup>166</sup>.

The inner/internal differentiation of rationality at various levels, in various forms and to various degrees, as well as its co-existence or interweaving with the howsoever defined irrational, are, therefore, just as much universal phenomena as rationality itself, in fact whose universality they found and establish. And they do not ever disappear and vanish, even when that which one today calls Western rationality or culture is supposed to flood and inundate the entire world with its technique (i.e. technology) and its propagated values. In this universal pushing through, i.e. imposition of a certain culture and in the unification of the world in regard to its signs (i.e. under its influence), many

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<sup>165</sup> See Barnes, “Paradigms”, esp. p. 100ff..

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 1 and 3, above.



number of forms of political organisation and social ethics can flourish and thrive. Since to Western values, which one wants to export with (Western) technique (i.e. technology), belongs tolerance, thus two components of Western ideology, namely evolutionism and universalism come into contrast and opposition with each other. Because the former (evolutionism) de facto demands the putting aside and elimination of certain life forms which obviously cannot be accepted as “rational” with regard to the partly expected, partly already occurring high stage of development of world history; the latter (universalism), on the other hand, if it wants to be realised *hic et nunc*, i.e. here and now must accept the universal rationality and worthiness of tolerance of all existing life forms. Whereas cultural relativism, through and by means of the praxis and practice of understanding and the many-faceted and rich-in-facets universal rationality, for its part is relativised, no logical or practical solution can be thought of as regards the contrast and opposition between evolutionism and universalism (including the demand for tolerance). But this is not necessary. Because history prefers to cut through and chop to pieces rather than loosen and untie its Gordian knots.

### 3. The constitutive ambiguity of the symbol and the rationality of the ritual

The detailed discussion of the genetic and functional factors which make out of man (i.e. a human) an animal symbolicum (i.e. a symbolic animal) and lend to his social life the specific features of the social life of an animal symbolicum, actually belongs to the anthropological part, and part pertaining to the

philosophy of culture, in respect of social ontology<sup>169</sup>. Here we are anticipating suggestively only as much as it is necessary to explain the interrelation and (inter)connection between the fundamental composition, constitution and texture of the symbol and the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. From the point of view of the social relation, the, incidentally, examination of the problem of the symbol touches upon – in many ways – that examination of the problem of rationality, whereby it ought to be noted that the common denominator of both question formulations lies not only in their theoretical possibility, but in the necessity of their investigation from the aforementioned point of view (as regards the social relation). It (i.e. the aforesaid common denominator) has just as much an anthropological character, since the definition of the animal rationale (i.e. rational animal), seen in the cold light of the day, largely coincides (almost identifies) with that of the animal symbolicum. The former (animal rationale) is, as is known, the by far older [[term]] in the history of ideas, nevertheless, it was, as it were, formulated in anticipation and with the inclusion of the latter (animal symbolicum), since amongst the essential properties, qualities and characteristics of the animal rationale, the (cap)ability as regards speaking, i.e. the – in the whole of the animal kingdom – singular (cap)ability for the creation of (language) symbols, was always reckoned. The concept of the Logos (i.e. the rational principle of speech) in its stressed ambiguity and equivocation (double interpretability) left no doubt to arise regarding the inseparable unity of rational thought and articulated, i.e. composed from distinctive symbols, language. The reasons for which the animal symbolicum overshadowed in our [[20<sup>th</sup>]] century the animal rationale in certain directions, tendencies and schools of thought of the spirit(-intellect) ought to be sought in the tendency towards the precedence of “communication” and its language or other means<sup>170</sup>, not for instance in the fact

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<sup>169</sup> See the 3<sup>rd</sup> volume of this work.

<sup>170</sup> See Ch. IV, Sec. 1Ea, above.

that previously one had forgotten everything which the Logos contains in itself.

The general knowledge of the necessary identity of the animal rationale and animal symbolicum does not free or release us, though, of the task of naming the structural conditions which make this identity (of the animal rationale and animal symbolicum) necessary. As we know<sup>171</sup>, the germ of rationality is formed and shaped via the (cap)ability at postponing (putting off, delaying, adjourning) satisfaction (gratification) and at bridging the gap which comes into being through and by means of this postponement with the help of the “end / goal-means” schema, that is by way of action plans. Symbolic activity in its compulsivity also springs and arises from a gap that likewise comes into being as a result of a loss of immediacy and directness; it (i.e. the said symbolic activity) is equally directed at making up for the loss at the level of immediacy and directness through and by way of ideational means, and, in the course of this, as in the case of rationality, going far beyond the mere making amends for something as compensation, i.e. by turning a loss into a gain (win, profit). It (i.e. the said symbolic activity), therefore, leaves the immediacy and directness of sensorial perception behind and replaces its percepts with ideational constructs, when the former (percepts) do not suffice for the securing (and safeguarding) of the socially necessary communication (for instance through the symbolic use of the body, which is frequently witnessed in the animal kingdom) and of the individual activity taking place inside of a social network (web, mesh, netting) of communication. But detachment from symbolic (allegorical, emblematic) perception demands, just as much as the working out and processing of a coherent action plan, at least elementary acts of abstraction, whose results, if one may call them thus, are then condensed in corresponding symbols. In this respect, the observation is correct that all means for the making of abstractions

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<sup>171</sup> See Sec. 1Ba in this chapter, above.

have a symbolic character and every abstraction involves symbolisation<sup>172</sup>. Abstractions in the symbolic context are not supposed to merely refrain from and disregard certain aspects or elements in favour of other aspects or elements, which in themselves do not need any processing, but provide straight out for the creation of a new, on a new ontological field, resident quality. The – understood in the sense of an ontological quality – abstraction does not separate, but rather brings together, whereby and in relation to which the summary or combination or integration means a leveling of particularities in favour of it (i.e. the said abstraction), which on each and every respective occasion is regarded as the general [[thing, quality, dimension, aspect]] to be held onto and kept. Since the abstraction and the generality of this constitution of theirs are empty, thus they can be filled or stuffed with more or less different and changing particular or else concrete content(s), and correspondingly set in motion different associations or feelings. The constitutive ambiguity (of many meanings) of the symbol is founded and based, cognitively seen, on its formation and development and composition, constitution and texture as an abstraction. Its social-ontological meaning obtains this cognitive given (actual) fact when actors, who are in a social relation with one another, announce their interest to determine the concrete content(s), with which the in themselves abstract symbols can be filled or stuffed – that is, the content(s), whose choice signals a certain formation, shaping and moulding or turn(ing) of the social relation in favour of one or another actor.

To the extent that the question formulation turns from the barely

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<sup>172</sup> Langer, *Philosophical Sketches*, p. 63. Some have wanted to place the prototype of symbolic abstractions even in sensorial perception, whose percepts, hence, are “signs” of the perceived objects (see e.g. Cassirer, *Wesen und Wirkung*, p. 208 ff.; already Ogden-Richards, *Meaning*, p. 77ff.: “the simplest case of a sign-chain is best studied in Perception”). The performances, achievements and functions of abstraction in respect of sensorial perception can hardly be disputed, yet they are found not only in men (i.e. humans), and, incidentally, they represent and constitute a perhaps necessary, but not in the least sufficient condition of symbolic activity as we know it. That means: the – humanly-socially relevant – abstraction, which interrelates and (inter)connects with symbolic activity, takes place on this side of the level of perception [[i.e. it is an exclusively human and not a non-human animal endeavour / phenomenon]].

anthropological to the social-ontological, and the anthropological basic and fundamental given (actual) facts are interpreted social-ontologically, the need arises to differentiate [[things, symbols]] conceptually. Purely anthropologically, it seems to be indifferent whether the products of the symbolic activity are called symbols, signs or howsoever else. Here, in any case, the theoretically most general and deepest level is meant, which lies on the other side of the differentiation of these products in accordance with their kind or function and upon which the elementary mechanisms of their formation and development, as well as their general essence, are thematised, whereby and in relation to which the cognitive (element, dimension, sphere), whether looked at genetically or in terms of form, is in the foreground<sup>173</sup>. Every terminology is, though, in the final analysis, a question and a problem of convention; nonetheless, conventions are established in connection with content-related preferences, and after their establishment, they normally exercise a significant influence on the content-related preferences themselves. The conceptual delimitation and demarcation of “sign” and of “symbol” from each other indicates, likewise, directions, schools of thought or main areas of thought and of the understanding of things, although it, because of language habits, which one time favoured the one concept, other times, the other concept, could hardly be implemented and executed with total consistency. Thus, also those who detested the vagueness and ambiguities (as many meanings) of the ritual, poetic or ideological symbols above all else and suggested as a remedy against that the introduction of exact systems of signs, had to continue to talk about

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<sup>173</sup> Thus Cassirer understands under “symbolic forms” the forms in general, in which objectivity is given to us, and he places his philosophy of these forms in direct succession of the theoretician of knowledge Kant, *Wesen und Wirkung*, pp. 208ff., 227ff.. At the highest level of generalisation, that of the animal symbolicum (*Essay*, Ch. 2 and 3), the symbolical forms encompass everything which one may call in detail and specifically signs or symbols – just as much as mathematical symbolism and language signs as ritual symbols etc.. Equally comprehensive and hence in practice synonymous with the concept of the sign is the concept of the symbol in Ogden-Richards, *Meaning*, p. 23 cf. p. 9ff.. Conversely, “sign” constitutes for Peirce the genus (kind, type, species, genre), and the symbol, next to the “icon” and the “index”, one of its three species, see the text in Ogden-Richards, *loc. cit.*, p. 292ff.. Peirce defines, incidentally, very aptly, the symbol as that sign which only on the strength and by force of interpretation makes a reference to an object. The question and problem of interpretation is posed, though, even if less pressingly and urgently, also with regard to the sign, see below.

“symbolism” in logic and mathematics. Following the basic principles of linguistics according to Saussure, in whose semiology there is hardly any place for symbols next to signs<sup>174</sup>, and the ambitions of neo-positivism in creating a formalised language of signs in order to eliminate “metaphysics” together with the symbolic-metaphorical language nourishing it, not only those, whose interests pertaining to the philosophy of culture and sociological interests were alien, preferred the term “sign”, but also structuralist ethnologists or e.g. psycho-analysts, who in their fields wanted to proceed in accordance with the model or example of mathematical formalism, but above all of the newer linguistics. Symbols, which earlier analysts of the primitive or collective psyche comprehended as crystallisations of unfathomable and or all-consuming elementary forces, appear now as mere signs inside of exactly structured systems of signs or as principles of classification, whereby and in relation to which their emotional content and their intentional or conative aspect falls by the wayside and or is abandoned<sup>175</sup>. The symbols were here, so-to-speak, dried out from the inside, whereas the neo-positivists wanted to eradicate them (i.e. the symbols) from the roots. But in both cases, a linguistic concept(ual plan) or ideal stood in the background. The discursive symbolism of formalised language was supposed to, in accordance with the neo-positivistic programme, put aside and eliminate all along the line and across the board non-discursive symbolism, because true thought could supposedly be expressed only through the means of this language, and what exceeded its boundaries and limits, automatically jumped into the void. To such a perception or view (opinion, idea and conception), it had to be said in reply that rationality reaches deeper than discursive thought and its language, that, therefore, non-discursive symbolism has meaning, and in this meaning its specific rationality ought to be sought<sup>176</sup>.

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<sup>174</sup> The evidence [[for that]] is in Todorov, *Théories*, p. 337.

<sup>175</sup> V. Turner, *Ritual Process*, p. 38ff.; Sperber, *Symbolisme*.

<sup>176</sup> Langer, *Philosophy*, p. 94ff..

Of course, there are barely any external criteria which would allow the clean separation between symbols and signs as soon as we leave the aforementioned most general level of anthropologically meant symbolic activity and begin the search for social-ontologically relevant differentiations. There are, therefore, no things (acts, words, objects etc.), which of their composition, constitution and texture would be predestined only for the function of the symbol, and other things (acts, words, objects etc.), which for the same reason would be predestined only for that function of the sign. Symbol and sign share the fundamental property, quality and characteristic of standing for something else, their difference as to each other can therefore only lie in the manner how they fulfill this function, and not, for instance, in any essential features whatsoever. The property, quality and characteristic of standing for something else implies that an interpreter must ascertain whether something currently possess this property, quality and characteristic or not. Because it is not a matter of a property, quality and characteristic which has looked at something anyhow and in itself, but of the wholly particular and by no means captive and undetachable property, quality and characteristic pointing to something else, making or restoring a relation between itself and something else. Especially relations, which are not necessary in the sense of a conspicuous ontic necessity, must be felt as such so that they can claim for themselves at all the right of existence, they must therefore be interpreted by concrete subjects as relations. The manner as to how signs and symbols fulfil their function is, accordingly, a question and problem of interpretation, and if the difference between sign and symbol consists in the manner as to how they fulfill their (common) function in standing for something else, thus this difference comes and boils down to the difference between the corresponding interpretation of each other. Now interpretations in general move between both extremes of unambiguity, clarity (of one meaning only) and ambiguity (as up to many meanings). From the point of view of the social relation this means that in the former case (of unambiguity)

agreement dominates so that the interpreter often does not so much as have to reflect upon his activity of interpretation since he does not expect from any side contradiction, objection or disagreement and hence, in fact, can act in the consciousness that he is following the natural order of the world. When he, for instance, expresses or utters the word “table” and therein interprets a relation with a certain object, thus he may or can, in view of the socially dominant conviction that between the word and the object exists in actual fact such a relation, claim for his own interpretation the same absolute unambiguity (of one meaning only). In general, in a society, something is regarded as a mere sign, whose interpretation is at that moment absolutely undisputed and is regarded as self-evident, since no side connects its self-understanding and its particular claims with a deviation and divergence from the generally accepted interpretation. That is why with regard to signs, the (conscious) activity of interpretation remains minimal and the dealing and relations with them [[are]] in themselves emotionless, as for instance during the learning and use of the alphabet. Something becomes a symbol to the extent and to the degree its ambiguity (as to up to many meanings) increases as the result of the fact that one or several sides want to interpret therein different meanings, or else, as we shall see later, as a result of the fact that the dominant interpretation of the symbol for the purpose of the making and restoration of equilibria or of the pretence and simulation of concord and unity puts up with or even approves of ambivalences and admits and allows certain freedoms of interpretation. Under these circumstances and conditions, the interpretation of symbols cannot proceed neither, as it were, automatically, nor emotionlessly; the activity of reflexion and at the same time emotionality increase with the intensity and the extent of the transition from the realm of signs to that realm of symbols. Since there are no natural signs or symbols and therefore no natural boundaries between their corresponding areas and realms, thus that transition always remains flowing and fluid, i.e. already before the interpretation of each and

every respective existing sign or symbol, the activity of interpretation concerns the question and problem whether something ought to be regarded in the concrete case as a sign or as a symbol. This question is posed even for scientific concepts or categories, thus e.g. when “capital” is supposed to refer to a “bourgeois”<sup>lxxxii</sup> or “determinism” is suspected of immoral implications. It ought to be added that the transition from unambiguity (as to one meaning only) to ambiguity (of up to many meanings), which is characterised by the transition from the sign to the symbol, simultaneously, however, means, in the reverse sense, a transition from plurality to singularity. This ought to be understood as follows: signs as a rule can be replaced, paraphrased etc. by other signs, but not symbols. To symbols belong, therefore, as of their essence, the singularity of their quality, it stands, if one may say so, under the law of substance, whereas in the Reich of signs the law of function prevails. The singularity of the symbol rhymes well together with its ambiguity (as up to many meanings), because ambiguity (as up to many meanings) comes into being exactly from the compulsion to interpret a lot from inside a single form, which cannot be replaced by another form. The many interpretations or else contents must, so-to-speak, live forcibly under the single available roof, unless a concrete individual or collective subject completely refuses and denies the symbol in question recognition, and puts another symbol in its place, which, however, must again make the claim of singularity<sup>lxxxiii</sup>. On that point, we shall come back later.

The singularity of the symbol means, therefore, that a symbol does not tolerate any other symbol next to it as regards the same thing. It does not imply in any way that symbols are context-independent (or independent of their context), and appear in an isolated and scattered manner in empty space. The context-dependence of the symbol is not expressed now, again, in the determination of its form by foreseeable psychical or objective (representational and concrete) factors. Because as signs, apart from a few exceptions (e.g. onomatopoetic words), they are not in any necessary form-related (i.e. formal)

relation with a designatum (i.e. that which is named or designated by a linguistic term), thus no necessity can also be ascertained concerning the reasons why a symbol has taken this and not that form, although the appearance of such a necessity comes into being regularly in retrospect. The lack of any form-related (i.e. formal) necessity interrelates here, though, just like in signs, with the essence of human symbolic activity in general, which could not have made any great advances (or progress) were it, in the choice of the form of its products, bound and tied to laws. In principle, therefore, every stimulus can give rise to a (great) variety and diversity of symbols, although the law of singularity, under which symbols stand, compels and forces this (great) variety and diversity, so-to-speak, towards latency, and only to one symbol amongst the many possible symbols does it (i.e. the said stimulus) grant for the same thing the right to tangible existence. What is now decisive when singularity is bestowed upon this certain symbol and not to any other symbol? The assumption is evident that here the psychology of association would be decisive, i.e. the narrow, close and frequent associative connection of a stimulus with a representation (conception, notion, idea) would gradually lend to the latter (representation, conception, notion, idea) the status of a symbol, which henceforth takes over the exclusive representation of the stimulus. The significance of factors pertaining to the psychology of association in and during the formation and development of the symbol can in a very general sense not be disputed, however, whether associations, in the course of this, have the final word or else whether symbols draw their strength and force from the narrow, close and frequent associative connection with the thing symbolised on the basis of similarity or contiguity, seems to be more than doubtful; often they (the said factors pertaining to the psychology of association) do not count or matter and cede the field to the free powers of imagination, to the individual or collective memory, and not least of all to polemical considerations and to general rational contemplations and deliberations. The symbol has, in short, its own rationality,

and its singularity constitutes a function of this rationality, which must first and foremost be satisfied, no matter what the merely associative habits may command. Symbolic rationality takes the context into account in which the symbol is supposed to have an effect, and if it does not always extract or take its materials from the context, thus it certainly takes care and makes sure that the symbolic representation, regardless of the origins of its material components, unites and unifies in a more or less coherent whole various kinds of knowledge, ideals and expectations with one another, which contain answers to questions and problems which the (social) context (and context pertaining to the history of ideas etc.) poses<sup>177</sup>.

Such kinds of knowledge, ideals or expectations represent and constitute the ideational content of the symbol, which the symbol as sensorial phenomenon (occurrence or appearance) is supposed to express. As Kant correctly saw, symbols come into being only when a “concept” (i.e. an ideational content) is given one such sensorial perception in regard to which no sensorial perception can in itself be appropriate. Likewise correct was his observation that between both of these heterogeneous magnitudes (of the “concept” and the sensorial perception) it must be somehow mediated so that the “indirect depiction of the concept in the symbol” can succeed at all. This mediation is performed and accomplished by an analogy in which the force or power of judgement has to do two things: to apply a concept to the object of a sensorial perception and then to apply the mere rule of the reflexion on that perception to a completely different object, in respect of which the other object is only a symbol<sup>178</sup>. The analogising needs, therefore, practice and exercise in rational thought, since the symbolised object is apprehended in a certain way which is illuminated from reflexion the composition, constitution and texture of the symbolic-illustrative object. (In actual fact, the reverse can take place too: a certain perception (view, opinion,

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<sup>177</sup> Sperber, “Is Symbolic Thought Prerational?”, esp. pp. 33, 42, 43.

<sup>178</sup> *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, §59.

idea, conception) of the symbolised object is simply read into the symbol.) Freud spoke, instead of “analogy”, of a “simile or comparison” as the “essence of the symbolic relation (or relation in respect of the symbol)”, whose particular determination can indeed be suspected, perceived or expected, but not ascertained accurately; because not everything, with which something can be compared, appears as a symbol of this Something. Symbols could be so vague that we can hardly know which is the tertium comparationis (i.e. third part / symbol of comparison), which makes possible the comparison at all<sup>179</sup>. Comparisons which are supposed to decipher, unscramble and decode symbols would be made more difficult not least of all by the frequent asymmetry between “dream thoughts / the thoughts of a dream” (said in Kantian terms: “concept”) and “dream content / the content of a dream” (said in Kantian terms: “sensorial perception”). Because that which is the essential content of the former does not need to be represented directly in the latter, not completely or not at all; the latter is, therefore, centred differently than the former, and this “shift, displacement”, which disfigures, defaces and distorts the dream thoughts is due to a censorship which exercises a psychological tier of jurisdiction, i.e. authority against another psychological authority<sup>180</sup>. Such a shift or displacement obviously makes up and constitutes one of the most important morphological elements in the formation and development of the symbol in general, and an essential reason for the vagueness or else ambiguity (of up to many meanings) of symbols<sup>lxxxiv</sup>. The censorship, which hides behind the shift or displacement, brings about in fact nothing other than an adaptation and adjustment of the symbol to the context, even at the cost of disfigurement, defacement, distortion, deformation and of vagueness, if the psychological or the social context demands or desires it. Symbols would individually or collectively be of slight value if they did not have the double property, quality and characteristic of unveiling,

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<sup>179</sup> *Vorlesungen* (X), p. 160ff..

<sup>180</sup> *Traumdeutung*, Ch. VI, Sec. B.

revealing, showing, unmasking, exposing, bringing something to light, and, covering up, disguising, concealing, cloaking.

Why is this ambivalence so beneficial, advantageous and important?

Collective (just like individual) identities are never cut from the same cloth, i.e. they consist of more or less heterogenous components and hence the factors around which the identities in – on each and every respective occasion – different degrees of intensity and of density, concentration and thickness concentrate must be able to satisfy the needs of every component of the identity to, in practice, a sufficient extent, to be able to have something in stock for every such component, and to be able to offer something to every component. Identities are constituted in fact in vague or clear knowledge of their own heterogeneity and search for the common denominator which is supposed to make possible the bringing together, uniting and living together, cohabiting of the heterogenous elements, often through the clever trick of letting every individual component of the identity believe that the whole is only at its service. That is why the finding and the use of the great common denominator are bought, obtained of necessity with the ambiguity (of up to many meanings) of the symbols, which symbolise and represent the existence and the will of assertion of an identity, and are exactly because of that indispensable because they can only be ambiguous (of up to many meanings): in view of the heterogeneity of the identity, the ultimate unambiguity (of one meaning, of one interpretation) would in all probability cause a civil war between its components. On this point, the internal interrelation and context of the logic of the symbol with the logic of the social relation emerges and makes itself felt. The ambiguity (of up to many meanings) of the symbol corresponds with the fundamental ambivalence of the social, namely with the unalterable, irrevocable fact that the spectrum of the social relation encompasses both friendly as well as inimical positionings and attitudes. Both friendly and inimical positionings must, nevertheless, be subordinated to higher points of view, if the collective

identity is supposed to remain intact and exist; and symbols have at their disposal and make available the framework inside of which the mediation of those points of view with regard to the friendly or inimical positionings succeeds due to the fact that the former (symbols) can be interpreted from the perspective of the latter (higher points of view) without the alteration or modification of the symbols' face value. As the spectrum of the social relation encompasses all forms of the social relation, thus also codified in the symbol indirectly, i.e. via the (great) variety and diversity of its aspects and its possible interpretations, is a scale of positionings, which as a result of the movement of the actors in the spectrum of the social relation, gradually comes to light. Socially relevant or dominant symbols possess a basic arrangement or a basic stem and branch out simultaneously in a number of variations, whose every variation is connected with concrete subjects and articulates through its particular features the situation and position and the expectations of the same (concrete subjects)<sup>181</sup>. The preparedness of these subjects to belong to a given collective is expressed in the fundamental assumption, acceptance and adoption of the socially dominant symbols; their partial demarcation and delimitation against other subjects inside of the same collective find expression in the variation and modification of these same symbols. From the common fundamental assumption, adoption and acceptance of symbols on the part of several subjects, the equality of mentality of the same subjects may by no means, therefore, be deduced and derived in advance with regard to this or that question or problem. Every (individual or collective) subject nuances the symbol differently, and indeed changes from time to time its own kinds of nuancing in accordance with the constellation (or correlation of forces) in the spectrum of the social relation. Such changeability does not only entail instability. Symbols owe their longevity and durability not least of all to their

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<sup>181</sup> Crumrine, "Mayo Santos", esp. pp. 136ff., 139ff..

chameleonic<sup>lxxxv</sup> character; the – in such a manner –longevity and durability gained cares and provides, however, for an appearance, semblance and pretence of continuity, which the society as a whole, or some subjects, can put to good use. The (cap)ability at adaptation, adjustment, alignment and acculturation, which grants duration, lends to the symbol an almost – according to its will – wide extent, scope and range, and hence puts it in the position of fulfilling in an economic manner several partly contradictory complementary functions simultaneously (for instance by keeping alive in the members of a collective both the feeling of belonging together as well as the sense of hierarchy). This effect even increases more through vagueness when the rest of the preconditions and prerequisites are present<sup>182</sup>.

The vagueness of symbols constitutes, though, an ascertainment of the observer standing on the outside (i.e. of the external observer), who registers and records the interpretation of symbols on the part of the social actors, and in the course of this, discovers more or less essential differences. For every individual actor, on the other hand, the symbol is absolutely unambiguous (with only one meaning and interpretation), because it can and may only, and is only allowed to, have the meaning which he (every individual actor) attaches to it on each and every respective occasion. Symbols exist, in fact, only in the interpretation of concrete subjects in concrete situations and positions, who, with their activity in respect of interpretation connect questions and problems of identity and questions and problems of power, that is, they strive for the shaping, moulding and forming of the spectrum of the social relation in this or that sense. To the complex of symbolism belongs, apart from the actual symbol and the accordingly symbolised, also the interpreter of the relation between symbol and symbolised, which (said relation) in fact must be made and restored constantly, since the state of being a symbol is not an innate quality, property or

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<sup>182</sup> A. Cohen, *Two-Dimensional Man*, p. 32; cf. Duncan, *Symbols*, p. 7ff..

characteristic of objects, kinds of acting, actions, acts, statements, propositions etc.. That is why a chasm always separates symbol and symbolised in which the interpreter – and with him the spectrum of the social relation – is lodged and settles. This interpreter must henceforth provide the symbol with evidence (indications, signs, clues) which declare and point out its “true” meaning and the permitted conditions of its use. He performs and achieves, therefore, a rational thought (intellectual) task or job by taking a position vis-à-vis other interpretations of the symbol concerned and moreover he sometimes must consider and weigh up the possibility of putting a new symbol in the place of an old one (i.e. of replacing an old symbol with a new symbol). If no monopoly of interpretation or – more modestly – no competence, powers, “jurisdiction” of interpretation for the already dominating symbol is to be attained, then there remains for the satisfaction of symbolic power claims no other way than that of launching new symbols in order to have at one’s disposal the monopoly of interpretation at least in reference to them (i.e. the newly launched symbols). The attainment of this monopoly over already existing and still effective symbols seems in practice to be more advisable because it gets for the interpreter the additional authority of tradition. If, on the other hand, trust in the old symbols dwindles or disappears for any reasons whatsoever, thus it is recommended to start up anew (i.e. with new symbols)<sup>183</sup>.

The activity in respect of interpretation defines, therefore, the relation of the symbol with the symbolised and at the same time determines the relation of the symbol with regard to social praxis. There can be no question or doubt that in regard to this complex, social praxis, that is the social relation, represents and constitutes the decisive dimension. This banality would not have to be especially stressed if the inflationary talk of “symbolic interaction” etc. in the framework of the general social-theoretical revaluation of “communication” vis-

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<sup>183</sup> Cf. Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 75ff..

à-vis action had not, in relation to that, led astray, seduced and tempted (many) into granting symbols, as it were, the status of ontological autonomy and of understanding interaction based on the symbols' supposed own logic<sup>lxxxvi</sup>. The fact that symbols develop such a logic of their own into which they can often indeed squeeze, pressurise and force action, is indisputable, but they do that only because concrete identities have identified themselves completely with the symbols concerned. But such identification in some cases does not in the least exclude that in other cases the actors without much fuss give up and abandon old symbols in order to appropriate new symbols when they find the former be straight-jackets. One elementary thought is sufficient in order to prove the social-ontological primacy over the symbol: symbols via which interaction uncoils (unwinds, unrolls) and is carried out, have in the course of history often changed, the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation have, however, remained stable. An obvious consequence of that primacy makes itself noticeable in the content of symbols. Neutral technical-instrumental practices are hardly ever symbolised (unless in the technical e.g. the genial (i.e. ingenious) or the daemonic is read), but symbols condense rather given (actual) facts out of which directly or indirectly, logically or illogically (or non- logically) instructions, directions, guidance in respect of acting, action and the act are deduced and derived. The normative component is embedded, lodged and or hides, therefore, regularly in the symbol even when this has a general world-theoretical and not an especially praxeological character. Because the symbolic condensations, compressions, expansions and consolidations want to apprehend and convey not mere realities or experiences, but their deeper meaning; the apprehension and the conveying of meaning boils down to and ends up in, nevertheless, in practice, the call and exhortation to assume, adopt and accept a certain stance and to reject another stance. The call and exhortation has an effect which is so much more convincing, the better the symbol represents and symbolises the interpretation of a situation or a certain pattern or

model of experience<sup>184</sup>. Self-evidently, the suitability of the symbols to model emotions and to encourage or challenge subjects to action by no means depends on their inner logical unity, uniformity and solidity or on the directness and clarity of their praxeological reference; what here seems in itself to be confused, muddled, can very clearly be felt and in practice have an effect with corresponding unambiguity (as one meaning only)<sup>185</sup>.

As we have said, the normative dimension can often be seen in the content of the symbol, or it hides behind symbolisations without direct praxeological reference. That is why symbols first of all can be divided into two groups, in accordance with whether the symbolic (allegorical, emblematic) (re-) presentation and portrayal, description has a categorial-explanatory character and is supposed to symbolise the world as a whole or aspects thereof (e.g. the world as machine or as organism) or whether the same categorial-explanatory character of symbolisation (representation, typification) aims at a pattern or model of acting, action and the act (e.g. the saint or the hero). Opposite such symbols, which seem to carve and work out and elaborate explanations or else categories of explanation, there are other symbols, which are supposed to summarise with emotional emphasis and without further differentiation an idea or an ideal in a symbol (as allegory, emblem, ideogram, ensign or ideograph) (e.g. a flag (banner or standard)). On closer inspection, it turns out, though, that even the latter contain hints of a world-explanatory and praxeological character; (thus the flag refers to a certain perception or view, opinion, idea or conception of the structuring (arrangement and organisation) of the social world and of the connected with that loyalties and duties of the individual)<sup>186</sup>. Classifications of symbols on the basis of other criteria can, likewise, be illuminating, enlightening and useful. Thus, it can be distinguished, for instance, between

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<sup>184</sup> Burke, *On Symbols*, p. 109ff..

<sup>185</sup> Cf. Gellner, "Concepts", esp. pp. 36, 47ff..

<sup>186</sup> Ortner, "Key Symbols", esp. pp. 1340ff., 1343.

those who relate and refer to passing, fading, transitory social hierarchies, and those who have as their object the “eternal” questions of existence (love, death). Some symbols are posited absolutely, i.e. they do not need, first of all, any counter-symbol in order to reveal and bring to light their meaning (e.g. the cross); other symbols appear on the scene in antithetical pairs and consequently convey and impart the Manichaeic thought, notion, idea of an everlasting, perennial and eternal struggle (e.g. Light and Darkness); what can be comprehended without antithesis, first of all, has not therefore come into being without any opponent or antagonist, it can also in relation to that be that in concrete situations it is only comprehensible with reference to counter-symbols (e.g. the cross against the crescent of the moon). Nothing hinders or obstructs in themselves antithetical symbols inside of an overarching symbolic whole co-existing and mutually and reciprocally supplementing or complementing one another. A main or chief performance, achievement, accomplishment or function of the great symbolic syntheses with a world-theoretical or praxeological claim consists in fact exactly in the putting into order or classifying of first of all separate symbols in hierarchical (perpendicular, vertical) or cyclical (horizontal) symbolic orders, whereby the individual symbol henceforth draws its primary meaning from the position which it holds and possesses inside of the whole<sup>187</sup>. The higher or lower status of symbols inside of symbolic syntheses ought, though, not to be confused with the status of this or that symbol inside of social life as a whole. In this there are symbols of high constancy and consistency, which, so-to-speak, embody and recall and remind us of the axiomatic values of a collective, and other symbols which in comparison to the former function instrumentally, i.e. they serve particular

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<sup>187</sup> V. Turner has aptly called this the “positional meaning” of the symbol. Otherwise, he distinguishes between “indigenous” and “operational meaning”, i.e. the meaning which the actors themselves attach to the symbol, and that meaning the symbol has on the basis of its use, see *Forest*, p. 50ff..

ritual and other ends/goals<sup>188</sup>.

In all symbols, therefore, be they individual objects, whole events, occurrences or incidents and contexts of acting, action and the act, gestures, hypostatised abstractions, images or language abstractions, in all we encounter a howsoever shaped, moulded and formed interweaving of the practical-normative call or exhortation and the description of the (on each and every respective occasion relevant aspects of the) world with regard to each other, which finally aims at the sanctioning or the modification of a directly or indirectly thematised, narrowly or widely grasped social relation. The practical effectiveness seems, in the course of this, to be ensured and guaranteed in two ways, i.e. on the one hand, by the identity (i.e. identicalness and sameness) of the symbol and the symbolised in the eyes of the actors concerned, who regarding this do not obviously otherwise think like uninvolved (unconcerned and indifferent) observers and analysts<sup>189</sup>; on the other hand, and as the consequence of that identity, the assumed, accepted and adopted narrow parallelism or even fusion, amalgamation, blending, merging of a symbolic and real kind of acting, action and act<sup>190</sup>. What motivates actors towards such parallels or identities might obviously be the wish to become the master of each and every respective relevant reality as rapidly and directly as possible via summary kinds of acting, actions and acts. The particular meaning of the symbolic form, which is called a ritual, lies in the graphic vividness with which the identity between symbol and symbolised as well as the interrelation and context between symbolic activity and social relation is brought forward and demonstrated. From a broader perspective, the ritual could in fact lay claim to precedence in the realm of the symbolic forms. The elementary ritual symbolism, which is articulated via behaviour, i.e. via the language of the body,

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<sup>188</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 31ff.. What Turner names “dominant symbols” is called in Gerth-Mills (*Character*, p. 277) “master symbols” and in Ortner, in his essay of the same name, “key symbols”.

<sup>189</sup> Lewis, *Day*, p. 198.

<sup>190</sup> Skorupski, *Symbol*, p. 119.

is amply evidenced in the animal kingdom, and genetically precedes the specific human symbolism via symbols which are external to the symbolised and are supposed to represent it. In the former case, a mere condensation of physically existing elements with symbolic intent takes place, in the latter case, on the other hand, there is a doubling of the physical elements by means of artificial elements, whereby the relation between both of the series / rows is referential<sup>191</sup>. Now the symbolic-ritual use of the body demands already at the lowest tier, level, stage, a disciplining and an expedient channeling of emotions – and this reveals at which existential depths the roots of rationality with those of symbolic-ritual action are interwoven. In the ritual, the emotional element, though, is not dominated by a – for it – alien or inimical rationality which in the final analysis foresees its (i.e. the emotional element's) putting aside and elimination, but rationality is here the formalisation (i.e. the rendering into a form or forms) of the emotional itself, without denying or abnegating its essence and its original intentionality; on the contrary, the ritual normally leaves significant room to move, leeway, room for manoeuvre, scope and latitude for expression and even for the outbreak of emotions if the latter serve the symbolic end/goal.

Whereas the rituals or else ritual symbols, on the one hand, unify and condense disparate things, elements, on the other hand, they distinguish themselves by a polarity of their meaning, which ensues from the double endeavour and effort to offer practical-normative instructions and at the same time descriptions of the world or rather explanations of the world. The latter always, constantly constitute the more or less visible background before the former are formulated; symbolically recorded and captured world-theoretical certainties lend to or confer upon the symbolically conveyed practical norms legitimation and emphasis. One has known for a long time, and it is perennially

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<sup>191</sup> The distinction between “referential” and “condensation symbolism” is in Sapir, “Symbolism”, p. 493.

confirmed, that the religious ritual symbolically conveys an ontology or cosmology with an ethics and even an aesthetic<sup>192</sup>. Under these circumstances, no dividing line can be drawn between ritual and mythos; this (mythos) merely puts into words what that (ritual) expresses through kinds of acting, actions and acts; the mythos does not, therefore, actually constitute a justification or founding and rationale in respect of the ritual, but a description of the same ritual – in mythical language<sup>193</sup>. In the myth, the social reference which is contained in the ritual in an encrypted or encoded manner is often expressed *expressis verbis* (i.e. explicitly, expressly). However, the reverse path, namely the interpretation of the social message of the myth by the ritual can likewise suggest itself. Rituals exhort people to social action, but they do it by at the same time outlining or delineating the horizon inside of which such action is wished. The widest of the possible horizons in respect of acting, action and the act and the object of the highest loyalty, to which the highest symbolic level of abstraction corresponds, is here the each and every respective collective itself in its unity and continuity; even rituals which are actually arranged, organised or mounted on special and partial, even private occasions, often contain allusions to the values which, in accordance with the general feeling or opinion and sense, hold together and cohere the collective. In rituals which symbolise the idea of the collective, the people participating do so as if conflicts amongst them were of wholly secondary importance, in fact unknown. The real presence or threat of conflict becomes apparent and makes itself felt, in the meanwhile, *ex contrario* not only in the ardour and fervour with which the ritual conjures up and invokes harmony, concord, peace and unity; it manifests itself also, as we have said, in the particular interpretation and handling of the ritual symbols of the collective on the part of various particular actors<sup>194</sup>.

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<sup>192</sup> V. Turner, *Forest*, p. 28, cf. *Ritual*, p. 48ff.; Geertz, *Interpretation*, pp. 112, 113, 127, 129.

<sup>193</sup> Leach, *Political Systems*, p. 13.

<sup>194</sup> V. Turner, *Forest*, pp. 21ff., 39ff., 45.

The ritual and rationality do not meet only in their origins, i.e. in the – for both – constitutive (cap)ability at formulating or else disciplining drives, urges, impulses and emotions. In another of its forms, the in practice instrumental form, rationality accompanies the ritual act on a good part of its journey. Some researchers have wanted to draw a clear dividing line between what is ritual, what is holy and sacred, and what is symbolic on the one hand, and, what is profane or practical-instrumental on the other hand, and indeed with regard to the observation that natural folks (i.e. “primitive” peoples) to a large extent deal with and get through their daily matters, concerns, affairs on the basis of the current pragmatic rationality, without, in the course of this, being directed or guided by the differently composed, constituted or textured logic of the (religious) symbolic ritual, to which they seem to be completely, wholly and entirely devoted at certain hours<sup>195</sup>. Other researchers argued in reply to this dichotomous view or conception, that what is technical and what is ritual, what is profane and what is holy and sacred do not represent and constitute two varying and different types of acting, action and the act, but rather aspects of, in practice, every acting, action or act<sup>196</sup>. Both positions are false and wrong: the former, when it is supposed to imply that between what is ritual and what is practical-instrumental rationality there are no points of contact worth mentioning; the latter, when it wants to deny the existence of (changing) areas in which the reflected practical-instrumental rationality of Common Sense no longer prevails and dominates without considerable symbolic-ritual loads, stresses, burdens and strains. The real problem lies in the investigation of the devious paths on which practical-instrumental rationality and what is ritual-symbolic meet on the terrain of the latter. How this occurs on each and every respective occasion depends, though, on the concrete case; for a general orientation, nonetheless, two points of view ought to be taken into

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<sup>195</sup> See e.g. Malinowski, *Magic*, p. 25ff..

<sup>196</sup> See e.g. Leach, *Political Systems*, p. 12ff.; “Ritual”, p. 522ff..

consideration. First of all, the ritual is not uniform or equally weighted, rather it appears on the scene in varying and different forms which for their part endure, tolerate or are compatible with, to a different extent, practical-instrumental ends / goals or can be subjected to practical-instrumental examinations and scrutiny. Worth mentioning here is primarily the religious ritual, which is supposed to make or restore some relation with supra-natural beings (creatures) or forces and hence needs a theological-mythological background; the magical, which is not (directly) dependent on such relations and aims at and has as its object the influencing of real processes in the given milieu by means of prescribed kinds of acting, actions and acts; and finally, ceremonies, which indeed can contain religious or magical elements, yet are neither religious nor magical, but accompany important moments of private and of public life<sup>197</sup>. On the other hand, the notion of practical-instrumental rationality, already as a result of its connection with this or that form of the ritual, must be widened considerably. In general, rationality in the ritual in the sense of strict logical thought cannot come into play, make itself felt and be effective; it constitutes rather a double tie or bond which creates the coherence or interdependence between the ritual assumptions amongst one another, as well as between this (double tie or bond) and the practical considerations which are behind those assumptions<sup>198</sup>. In the framework of this widened rationality, the ritual acting, action or act cannot be interpreted only from the practical end/goal in mind, (e.g. the appeasement of the gods or the killing of a foe via the magical entreaty or invocation of mysterious, enigmatic or sibylline, arcane, mystic forces). The ritual act remains indeed the means for the reaching and attainment of that end/goal, but not a plain, modest, unpretentious, unadorned expedient means; it has, therefore, aspects which go beyond and surpass the technical demands of the undertaking or venture and to different degrees of clearness and distinctness refer to its

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<sup>197</sup> Goody, "Religion and Ritual", p. 159ff.; cf. Skorupski, *Symbol*, p. 169.

<sup>198</sup> Hollis, "Reason and Ritual", pp. 233, 235, 237.

world-theoretical meaning or context, just like the latter is structured in such a way that it – in any case, according to the opinion of the actors – must flow into and lead to this ritual praxis (practice) and these practical ends/goals.

Nonetheless, the purposefulness (and end / goal-orientation or expediency) (usefulness) of the ritual act in itself can explain neither the ritual symbolism, nor the manner how a natural cause can explain a natural effect or impact, nor thus, how the composition, constitution and texture of a technical end/goal can explain the composition, constitution and texture of the technical means.

If one takes note of the various forms and the specific practical rationality of the ritual, thus it appears to be still more difficult to draw sharp boundaries between technical praxis (practice) and what is symbolic-expressive, and then assign ritual behaviour to the latter (i.e. what is symbolic-expressive)<sup>199</sup>. First of all, it should or ought to be clear that even in and during such an assumption, the area and realm of the ritual is considerably narrower than that of what is expressive: the ritual means totally particular and determinate acts which obey, submit and respond to explicit, imperative rules, although their meaning can be implicit and in need of interpretation<sup>200</sup>; this lies far away from the directness and spontaneity of the merely expressive. If one wants to ascribe to all social kinds of acting, actions and acts the character of what is expressive or symbolic, thus one deprives these concepts of every unambiguous and useful, usable, practicable content<sup>lxxxvii</sup>. Especially the one-sided binding of the ritual to what is symbolic-expressive, –and indeed in its (i.e. what is symbolic-expressive’s) contrast and opposition to what is technical or what is expedient–, bears witness basically to the inability of the observer to infiltrate into and permeate the subjectively meant meaning of the actors, that is, to read or distinguish in their acts something which could be interpreted as an end/goal-means-relation<sup>201</sup>.

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<sup>199</sup> See e.g. Beattie, *Other Cultures*, esp. p. 202ff..

<sup>200</sup> Lewis, *Day*, p. 19ff..

<sup>201</sup> Goody, “Religion and Ritual”, p. 156ff..

Because from the perspective of the actors, it is in actual fact thus that their own religious, magical etc. kinds of acting, actions and acts aim at and have as their object something, and (their said religious, magical etc. acts) fundamentally can be just as effective as those acts we regard as instrumental kinds of acting, actions and acts. The “primitive” person does not employ or use certain ritual practices because they are the most suitable as symbols, but because he believes in their effectiveness; he does not want to simply symbolise (i.e. cause something to be a symbol, use symbols) or express something; he does only that which to him seems to be expedient. The roots of such practices may become lost in the “irrationality” of angst (as fear) etc., but the genesis of a phenomenon says very little about the reasons for its social proving and reliability, which is dependent on considerable work in respect of rationalisation. The propensity, inclination or tendency to narrowly comprehend rationality and rationalisation, i.e. to think of them together with the logical-instrumental method, leads to the result of attributing an irrational purity to what is symbolic-expressive, and with that, to the ritual, which they have never had, in order to then be able to contrast them more easily to technical or else logical-experimental rationality<sup>202</sup>. The gained, through that, gross, coarse dichotomous typology, nevertheless, hardly takes into account the complexity which in the final analysis springs from the incessant and unceasing, manifold, varied, diverse, multifarious having an effect of the social relation<sup>lxxxviii</sup>.

#### 4. The form-related (i.e. formal) parameters of language and their content-related

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<sup>202</sup> Peel, “Understanding”, pp. 75, 80ff.; Maund, “Rationality of belief”, esp. pp. 36, 40ff..

concretisation by (way of) the social relation\* +

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\* *F/note of the ed.*: as recorded in the “Preliminary note”, pp. 5-6, this final sub-chapter has remained a fragment.

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## **TRANSLATOR'S ENDNOTES**

### **(ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.)**

<sup>i</sup> The fact e.g. that all humans relate to world-views, good vs. evil, the urge-drive-impulse of self-preservation and the extension of one's own power, death, the mechanism and (friend-foe) spectrum of the social relation, society as a political collective, the political (social order, social cohesion, social disciplining), ideology, culture, nature, identity, power, rationality-understanding-language, etc. etc. etc..

<sup>ii</sup> From the point of view of the individual who must act, but who must act in relation to an already ordered society of culture, the political, dominant values etc., which he had no say in shaping, though he does have a say in how he will act.

<sup>iii</sup> Obviously because all sides can often up to always want to win, rule, come out on top, have fun, kill one's foe, etc., etc., etc..

<sup>iv</sup> Instrumental rationality refers to end/goal and means rationality; symbolic rationality refers to the created meaning / rationality relating to the world theory/view of a human collectivity; and the rationality of identity refers to rationalities and the identities of collectivities and their members in relation to the identities of other collectivities and their members, including cases of the over-lapping of identities and collectivities and rationalities.

<sup>v</sup> In that they are both present as intention (in memory and or carrying over until now) and actual consequences now, whether the consequences are the intended or unintended ones.

<sup>vi</sup> I.e. in the case of individual self-sacrifice for the greater, collective good.

<sup>vii</sup> I.e. what are considered on each and every respective occasion to be ethically "irrational" ends/goals (since nothing is "rational/irrational (compared to rational)" and "ethical/unethical", imminently, outside of man / human society).

<sup>viii</sup> I.e. rationality and justice are nothing more or less than a reflection of all the relevant correlation of forces as crystals of power and identity as to what happens in practice.

<sup>ix</sup> This complements the Weberian position that the broader the range of relevant facts, the narrower does the ideal type need to be to have comparative macro-historical-sociological use.

<sup>x</sup> Obviously, the Weberian bureaucratic rationalisation (or centralisation under state law and the associated streamlining, standardisation, organisation, systematisation, etc.) of circa (1800-)1900 is not meant here.

<sup>xi</sup> Since all humans per definitionem are *rational* animals (with a basic rationality), and not just animals.

<sup>xii</sup> In other words, if one defines tolerance e.g. in terms of traditional patriarchal Christianity, all the **ZIO**-anti-Christ-"secular"-Satanism of our times would be deemed totally and utterly intolerant.

<sup>xiii</sup> I.e. Reason as something which is subjectively made up as to content beyond the objective capacity all humans have to reason via anthropologically and social-ontologically given rationality.

<sup>xiv</sup> Obviously, this applies within each and every particular level of rationality and rational discourse. Scientific rational discourse (at least in its most consistent and complicated forms), for example, has no place in mainstream rational discourse, notwithstanding absolutely consistent argumentation.

<sup>xv</sup> E.g. the rationality of identity trumps the rationality of means and ends/goals or the rationality of scientific observation.

<sup>xvi</sup> **AAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHA !!!**

<sup>xvii</sup> Exactly the same applies regarding nonsense and rubbish to the "Ten Commandments", "Human Rights", **ZIO**-controlled elections in a mass and (post-)industrialised and atomised and religiously and or racially non-relatively homogeneous society constituting "dimo-krasi", the **ZIO**-KOST as a "privileged and uninvestigable" massacre, **HOMO-POOFTER-LEZZO-DEGENERATE** marriage as "an unalienable right" etc., etc., etc..



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<sup>xxvii</sup> E.g. normal as neither man or woe-man but a TOTALLY-ZIO-JOO-DAS-CONTROLLED-FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-LOBOTOMISED-ZIO-PSYCHO-OP-ZIO-BRAIN-WASHED-[[TO BE ZIO-NANO-MICRO-CHIPPED-ZIO-ROBOTISED-]]ZIO-SATANIC-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANISED-ZIO-JOO-SSINGER-ZIO-“ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE” IT.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Cf. the novella by Bernd **Heinrich Wilhelm von Kleist** (18 October 1777 – 21 November 1811).

<sup>xxix</sup> Here we are no longer talking about rationalisation as just argumentative verbal justification for what has been done and or what is in place, but also in respect of changes to the social whole, particularly as regards the rampant “progress” of (post-)modernity in regard to the centralising state, bureaucratisation, standardisation, the tendency towards monopolisation of the national economy and culture along with the centralising state GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY AND VASTLY ASYMMETRICALLY UNDER ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITE PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY, SAVAGE TRIBE, ORGANISED CRIMINAL, INCESTUAL, RAT-TUNNEL, ANTI-CHRIST, DEVIL-EVIL SATANISTS etc..

<sup>xxx</sup> According to ZIO-JOO-DAS-JOOGLE “Weber described the eventual effects of rationalization in his *Economy and Society* as leading to a “polar night of icy darkness”, in which increasing rationalization of human life traps individuals in an “iron cage” (or “steel-hard casing”) of rule-based, rational control.” If we accept this as accurate (I can’t remember if that’s Weber’s only position or not), this, for the scientific observer of human affairs, is wrong if any kind of axiological and or aesthetical like or dislike is meant. If what is meant is an increase in technicised-state-related-legal control of masses of people without being axiologically and or aesthetically for or against, then “no problemo” given that what’s described above is *grosso modo* what happened during the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Obviously the main and most famous “make me a ZIO-JOO-DAS-STAR” “school of thought” being referred to here is the ZIO-JOO-INCESTUAL-ORGANIZED KRIMINAL-RAT-TUNNEL-PRIMITIVE SECRETE SOCIETY-SAVAGE TRIBE-RODENT-PARASITICAL “I’M A SERIOUS INTELLECTUAL AND PHILOSOPHER” RETARD ZIO-JOO-FURT “SCHOOL”, which simply mixed-up ZIO-JOO-Marxian themes with ZIO-JOO-Freud and Weber into a grand ZIO-JOO-free-for-all ZIO-JOO-theoretical mess, GREAT FUCKING ZIO-JOO-BALL-ANTI-CHRIST-SATAN. But note in the next paragraph the pre-history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century critique of culture / capitalism (which has roots going back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century).

<sup>xxxii</sup> OH JOQ-DAS, OH YOO-DAS, OH ZIO-JOO-DAS-ZIO-YOO-DAS-ZIO-JOO !!! WHY ARE YOU SO FUCKING INSANE AND STUPID AND YET THINK YOU ARE SO FUCKING SMART? AAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA !!!

<sup>xxxiii</sup> The transition to pluralistic mass democracy was well underway during Weber’s lifetime, but for an individual thinker not having the benefit of knowing the developments post-1920, it was too early before his death for Weber to view pluralistic mass democracy as another kind of society / social formation compared with bourgeois oligarchic liberalism, and hence “liberal-capitalistic social order”, even though the phrase “mass democracy” is in *Economy and Society*.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Since end/goal rationality is a feature of all human societies everywhere and always, no matter what the level and nature of a society’s “development”.

<sup>xxxv</sup> In reality, and conceptually, all external action which is not “(instinctive) behaviour” involves end/goal-rational calculation and a motivation which have some kind of relationship with emotions and values, even when it is being non-normative and value-free, since that in itself is a stance or “value” of being **non-normatively** value-free and value-neutral.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> All this kind of reasoning, of course, is all so fucking convenient for those who as a group continually enjoy from circa 1800/1900 the possession of grossly disproportionate and vastly asymmetrical forms of wealth and economic-state-ideological-etc.-power, great fucking ZIO-JOO-BALL-SATAN !!!

<sup>xxxvii</sup> This is very “prophetic” in the sense that ZIO-capitalistic-imperialism is premised and based on continual ZIO-monopolistic-ZIO-oligopolistic-ZIO-JOO-BALL-imperialistic expansion, and if China and Russia, along with India, Persia-Iran et al. can act as a self-saving coalition of states against ZIO-USA-led ZIO-JOO-capitalistic-imperialistic ZIO-JOO-SATANISM, the game will be up for the ZIO-JOO and ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOQ capitalistic-imperialistic MAMMON-DEVIL-EVIL-SATANISTS.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Since the ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITES want a TOTAL ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE “FREE [!!!] MARKET” !!!

<sup>xxxix</sup> In other words, the ZIO-JOO-RODENT-PARASITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE “FREE [!!!] MARKET” is based on FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-PSYCHO-OP-ZIO-JOO-PAVLOV’S DOG STIMULUS-REACTION-CREATION OF “NEEDS”-ZIO-JOO-BRAIN-WASHING-ZIO-JOO-ZOMBI-FICATION of “consumers with their own free [!!!] will” !!!







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REALITY, BUT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANYWHERE NEAR ALL OF REALITY, WHICH IS MADE UP OF THE NATURAL WORLD, INCLUDING HUMANS AND THE SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN HUMANS, AND HUMANS' RELATIONS WITH NATURE. THE IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAMME TO EQUATE REALITY WITH LANGUAGE SIMPLY MEANS THAT THE RULING ELITE-OLIGARCHY, I.E. IN THE FORMER WEST, ANTI-CHRIST-SATANIC-DEVIL-EVIL-MAMMON-GREAT SATAN-RAT-RODENT-SCUMBAG-JOOZ AND THEIR ALLIES, DO NOT WANT THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RELATION TO CHANGE AGAINST THEM, SO THEY SEEK VIA LANGUAGE TO FURTHER ATOMISE AND DESTROY GROUP CRYSTALLISATIONS OF POWER WHICH COULD CHALLENGE ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANIC-DEVIL-EVIL POWER. IN OTHER WORDS, ALL THE NON-STOP ZIO-JOO-CRAP AND ZIO-JOO-BULLSHIT TAUGHT IN "UNIVERSITIES" IN THE FORMER WEST IS AN EXPRESSION OF ZIO-JOO-IDEOLOGICAL-RHETORICAL AND ACTUAL SOCIAL-POLITICAL-ECONOMIC-CULTURAL SUPREMACY AND PRIVILEGE AND RACISM (I.E. ZIO-JOO-BIGOTRY, ZIO-JOO-CHAUVINISM, ZIO-JOO-PREJUDICE AND ZIO-JOO-HATE). AND THE MASSES OF THE FORMER WEST ACCEPT SUCH A STATE OF AFFAIRS BECAUSE THEY ARE EITHER FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISED-ZIO-BRAIN-WASHED ZOMBIES (PORN, STERILITY, DRUGS, CONTRA NATURAM LIFE STANCES, SELF-RACIST EXOTICISM ETC.) AND OR TOO BUSY TRYING TO MAKE A LIVING / SURVIVE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THIS MEANS THAT ONLY WHAT IS OUTSIDE OF THE FORMER WEST CAN BE SAVED, AND JOO-DAS WON'T LET THEM WHO ARE OUTSIDE OF THE FORMER WEST CONTINUE IF HE CAN'T GET WHAT HE WANTS (I.E. TOTAL ZIO-JOO-“MASTER RACE, RULE THE WORLD” POWER), SO JOO-DAS, SOONER OR LATER, AS THE ANTI-CHRIST,

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WILL BLOW THE WHOLE FUCKING WORLD UP. AND THAT IS THAT  
(DE NIRO, *CASINO* (1995)).

FINALLY, EVEN THOUGH THE BARBARIAN IDIOM MAKES THE  
TRANSLATOR SICK, IT WAS MY PRIVILEGE TO BE THE FIRST (AND  
VERY PROBABLY ONLY) PERSON IN THE HISTORY OF MEN, I.E.  
PEOPLE, PERSONS OR HUMAN BEINGS, TO COMPLETELY  
TRANSLATE **THE GREATEST WORK EVER PRODUCED IN THE**  
**SOCIAL-POLITICAL SCIENCES AND “PHILOSOPHY” IN GENERAL,**  
A TRUE HIGH-POINT IN HUMAN ACHIEVEMENT, AND A WORTHY  
WAY FOR THE AUTHOR’S AND MY, THE TRANSLATOR’S, **GENOS** TO  
SAY GOOD-BYE TO EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF OUR  
ANCIENT AND OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS. **BYE-BYE EVERYONE !!!**  
**DUCK YOOZ SUCKERZ !!! AND DEATH TO THE ZIO-JOO-ZIO-JOO-**  
**DAS-ZIO-JOO-BALL-ZIO-JOO-RAT-RODENT-SCUM-BAG-VOMIT-**  
**EXCREMENT-SNAKE-SERPENT-LIZZARD-FLEA-LEACH-VULTURE-**  
**BLOOD SUCKING-VAMPIRE-GREAT SATAN-DEVIL-EVIL-MAMMON-**  
**SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY !!! DEATH TO SATAN !!!**