

IV Social relation: the mechanism

1. The inner (internal) mechanism

A. Outlook

As the “inner (internal) mechanism” of the social relation, we understand the interrelating (interrelated) mental acts, whose execution is constitutive for the coming (or bringing) about, and the course (sequence and order of events), of a social relation. These acts can be isolated in terms of theory, and observed as isolated, in the sense that they take place in the “interior (or inner world (dimension, space))”, that is in the “spirit(-intellect)” or in the “psyche (mind, soul)” of every individual subject, which – either way – has a (and takes) part in a social relation; that which we want to call the “outer (external) mechanism” of the social relation, cannot, on the other hand, be described if, concurrently, [[both]] the “inner (internal)” and “outer (external)” acts are not taken into consideration, in connection [[with one another]], in respect of all the – either way – participants in the social relation. The mental acts constantly interwoven with one another, which make up the inner (internal) relation of the social relation, are fundamentally two: namely, [[1]] the perception of the Other as subjectivity, together with all the implications and imponderabilities of this property, and [[2]], the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other, i.e. both in his (the Other’s) “inner (internal)”, as well as in his (the Other’s) “outer (external)”, situation (or position). Since the analysis of both these mental acts, which, for their part, consist of a number of individual acts, occurs within the social-ontological framework and with social-ontological intent, thus, this analysis does not mean any indirect rehabilitation of that psychologism, which we wanted to avoid in regard to the description of

the spectrum of the social relation. The inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation by no means depends – in regard to its general form-related (i.e. formal) course, which social-ontologically alone is worth consideringⁱ –, on the personal psychological properties of the I (Ego) or of the Other (Alter); it (the said inner mechanism) is in all human subjects in its basic features, the same, and – what will prove to be decisive – it also does not vary in accordance with whether one stays in the friendly or inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation; the joyous and the melancholic, the extroverted and the introverted, the “good” and the “bad (evil)”, friends and foes, must make use of it (the said inner mechanism of the social relation) equally, irrespective of what refinement or coarsening it experiences or undergoes in every individual. Also, the unavoidable use of psychological concepts must not here lead [[us]] to psychologistic false steps. Because these concepts are used as generally (universally) applicable formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought), or as always present variables, which in accordance with the personal case, can be bound to entirely different content(s); these contents, which might concern the psychologists of the individual and, if need be, the historian or the sociologist, are not taken into account here. However, already the handling of the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation on the part of actors is not in the least all along the line psychologically oriented. As we shall see later, the mental “system”, which the actors erect or set up, in order to become the master of the original and never conclusively (definitively) conquerable imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, spreads (stretches, extends) across several levels, in relation to which the subjectively meant meaning of alien/foreign act(ion)s (i.e. of the acts of others), just like the objectively meant meaning of these same alien act(ion)s (i.e. acts of others), comes into consideration.

It must not especially be explained that the “interior (or inner world (dimension, space))” as a synonym of the “mental (dimension or element)” merely constitutes a spatial metaphor, which is capable of a number of interpretations, depending on how one wants to think of, or imagine, the psycho-physical nexus; fortunately, this thorny question can remain to be seen, i.e. left open, in the social-ontological context. Likewise, it goes without saying that talk of the “inner (internal)” and “outer (external)” mechanism of the social relation should be comprehended as a simplifying abstraction, which appears to be suitable, convenient and expedient for reasons of (re)presentation and description. The formation, development, extension and completion of both mechanisms accompany each other genetically and structurally, although important conceptual distinctions, like e.g. that between social action and the social relation, ultimately rest (are based) on the contrast between inner (internal) and outer (external) processes (orders or sequences of events)¹. Finally, we shall point out a further objective interrelation between two conceptual abstractions, which, admittedly, seems to be far less self-evident, however, whose social-ontological relevance cannot be estimated highly enough. It is a matter of the manner in which the belonging together (togetherness or common bond) of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation is to be thought about. We have already said that the mechanism of the social relation behaves indifferently (is indifferent) towards friendship and towards enmity, that it, therefore, is capable of supporting every shape and form and every crystallisation inside of the spectrum of the social relation, without functionally determined resistance. However, it is not a matter here merely of a mutual (reciprocal) indifference, which stands in the way of any possibility of the development (unfolding) of the social relation. Rather, a mutual determination (or dependency) and a deep organic intertwining

¹ See below Section 2Aa in this chapter.

(entanglement) are present, which must find expression in the logical unity (or coherence) of their social-ontological (re)presentation and description. Not only does the constantly remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) composition or texture of the mechanism of the social relation constitute a necessary precondition (prerequisite) for the enormous speed of movements in the spectrum of this same relation, which would turn out to be essentially more inflexible if every time, along with the character of the relation, also that composition or texture, and consequently the constitution of man himself, had to change. Still deeper, perhaps, do the breadth and flexibility of the spectrum of the social relation influence the mechanism itself. The latter (mechanism) is formed and developed in fact in the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital, essential) striving or endeavouring of the social actor to adapt and adjust himself – through constant and flexible movement – to the constant and flexible movement of the rest of the (on each and every respective occasion, relevant) actors along the whole breadth of the spectrum of the social relation. As the development of all the possibilities of this spectrum presupposes the uniformity of the mechanism of the social relation, thus, for its part, the full activation of this mechanism presupposes that the social relation is dealt with not merely with regard to each and every respective actor standing across or opposite from an actor, but by bearing in mind all – apart from that – known possibilities of the development and unfolding of the social relation. The already existing background knowledge regarding the latter (social relation) constitutes the tacit starting point when it is a matter that one (an actor) will put oneself/himself in the position of (and or empathise with) the Other, and assess or appraise which place in the spectrum of the social relation the Other will occupy vis-à-vis the [[one's/the actor's own]] Ego – at any rate, the actions and reactions of the Other, without that background knowledge, can hardly be put into order and classified socially. Conversely: the relation of the Ego towards (vis-à-vis) the Other (alter) is not merely shaped and moulded on the basis of what the Ego

knows, or can know, about the Alter thanks to the mechanism of the taking on (over) and assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption)), but into the relation, all (things) (i.e. everything), – what(ever) the Ego in general knows about the possibilities of the development of the spectrum of the social relation, about the exchangeability of places in that (spectrum of the social relation) and about the character of the social relation –, flow(s) as a formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding). The socially mediated (re)presentation or notion of the spectrum of the social relation determines, in this respect, the inner (internal) mechanism of the same (social relation), and it is not at all essential to be familiar from one's own experience with all the places inside of the spectrum in order to jointly take them (the said places inside the spectrum of the social relation) into account (or in order to factor them in), in regard to the relation towards the Other. It is, in the course of this, irrelevant with how much detail and how concretely the ego imagines the spectrum – that can, naturally, vary enormously from (hu)man to (hu)man. However, everyone has at his disposal an – in practice – sufficient image (picture) of his polarity and continuity, and makes use (avails himself) of the mechanism of the social relation, by putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the position of the Other, with regard to exactly this image or picture.ⁱⁱ

For that reason, from a new point of view, the objective and methodological meaning of the fundamental thesis, which we formulated and explicated in the critical discussion of methodological individualism, becomes recognisable. The individual social relation takes place only before the background of the fact of society and of the social in its totality². If there were only two human beings in the world, then it would hardly cross their mind to call their relation towards (as between or with) each other a *social* relation. And in view of the unavoidable narrowness of the spectrum of their relation, which no social experience would

² See Ch. II, Section 2Cc, cf. 3B, above.

extend or expand, the mechanism of the social relation would be reduced to the animal-reflexive. Only in the diachrony and the synchrony of society does the spectrum of the social relation unfold and develop fully, and this fully developed spectrum flows then via the processes of socialisation and (via) the individually stamped social experience as (a) formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding) into individual social relations and into the form-related (i.e. formal) remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) mechanism of the social relation. The fact of society is not of course, for its part, perceived as an undifferentiated whole, but as a plexus, network or mesh of relations, whose differentiation makes up exactly the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity. When the social subject forms an overall or a total judgement about society, and often uses it (the said overall or total judgement of society) as a guiding principle for its (the social subject's) action, thus, it does not lose sight of, or lose touch with, the rich-in-variants spectrum of the social relation, its peripeteias and imponderabilities or incalculabilities, but it identifies (equates) merely for some practical goal or purpose, "society" with one of the forms of the relation existing in it ("society"). It (The said social subject) does that (identifying/equating), again, as a rule, with a reservation, because it knows from social experience what could be in store for those who do this (identifying/equating) without a reservation (i.e. do this unconditionally), that is, by acting without the always new and always growing activity (actuation or operation) of the mechanism of the social relation being borne in mind in respect of all the possibilities of development of the spectrum of the same (social relation).

B. The Other and his subjectivity

a. The openness of the social relation and the imponderability of the Other

As legitimate as the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge, and the phenomenological question as regards the constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego), is too³, yet these questions remain of slight social-ontological interest. Because social ontology begins, from its logic of founding, with (or in) the fact of society, that is, at an ontic and cognitive level at which the elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego), regardless of how it (the said elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I) is executed (carried out or implemented) or is comprehended, must be presupposed as an already expired process (series of events). The plexus (mesh or network) of the social relation, which without society is absolutely inconceivable, comes about only through inner (internal) and outer (external) mechanisms, which indeed start from the process (series of events) of constitution, but leave it (the process of constitution) behind [[them (the inner and outer mechanisms of the social relation)]]]. At the *social-*ontological level, the actor does not appear in connection with this latter process (of constitution), but only in connection with the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. This connection can be made (or restored) by outlining the general representation (or notion) which social actors – irrespective of the pre-history of the Other in their own consciousness – form in respect of one another, as follows: the Other exists and is made, first of all, perceptible in the shape or form of his body, which is distinguished from the rest of material things by means of the capability of independent movement (motion), that is, by the fact that he is the seat (or residence) and source of motives for independent

³ See Ch. II, Section 1, above. We must come back to that in this chapter, Section 1E, and indeed on the occasion of the frequently attempted connection of the question of constitution with normative perceptions about the essence of the social relation and of communication.

movement, as well as for forces which enable this (independent movement). In the course of this, it appears to be decisive and crucial that this animate, i.e. thinking, willing and mobile (moving or movable) body does not belong to any group of animals whatsoever, but to the same species as the I (ego) observing it, which, consequently, understandably, tends to draw between itself or the members of its own species, and all other animal species (or kinds of animal), a much sharper dividing line than between these latter (animal species) (“man and animal (beast)” [[as opposed to the differences between non-human animals (= translator’s addition)]]). The feeling of commonality (or common bond) between Ego and Alter is, of course, not primarily negative, i.e. it does not have to necessarily or primarily be obtained by means of the common demarcation or delimitation against the rest of the animal species, but its positive character results from the immediate (direct) certainty that such a kind of animated body and such a kind of body looking that way, must also be similar, or like the Ego also, as to what is not perceptible outwardly (externally). The framework of relations for social relations is therefore created, by – beyond the outer (external) perception of the Other as a member of the same animal species as the Ego – the Ego developing mental acts, which relate or refer especially to the mental acts of the Other, and in the process presuming (supposing or assuming) an essence-like (i.e. essential) affinity (or relationship) or correspondence between one’s own and alien (i.e. another’s or others’) mental acts.

In short, the social relation takes place on the basis of the ability of the Ego to recognise in the Other, a human subject like itself (i.e. the Ego), and (or) to ascribe to the Other, the predicate and the general properties (qualities or characteristics) of human subjectivity in the same sense as it does this (ascription or attribution) with regard to itself. But from what does the Ego recognise primarily and spontaneously its own and alien (another’s) subjectivity, that is, subjectivity in general and as such? What form-related (i.e.

formal) features of it (i.e. the Ego) first come into consideration before there can be talk of any content(s) whatsoever? Because precisely the generality and the ubiquity of certain form-related/formal features make it possible to subsume under the great common denominator of human subjectivity, beings which in every content-related comparison must prove to be more or less different. At the same time, the presence of these features is imposed or forced so directly upon the self-consciousness of the Ego that it (the Ego) itself and the Other cannot be comprehended as subjects other than as bearers of the same features. Still deeper than the dividing line between man and animal, runs that (dividing line) between man and the inanimate thing, and human subjectivity must descend and come down to this ontic depth, in order to define its own utmost self, and in a second run-up or approach (i.e. attempt) to specify it (its own utmost self) in such a way that “human” and “animal or bestial” can be distinguished or told apart at an ontologically subordinate level. The human subject does not merely see in its own (cap)ability at movement (many inorganic things can move as well), its essential contrast or opposition to a thing (to things), but rather (it sees its own ability) in the fundamental capacity to make or omit this or that movement, that is, to behave or comport itself in the same situation in this way, or in another way. In actual fact, there is no situation (or position) and no necessity, to which the subject must bow and obey, if it absolutely does not want to, i.e. if it is ready to accept its own death. Plato basically enunciated this truth, and not merely a prejudice of slave society, when he opined that the freeman differed from the slave exactly by his readiness and preparedness to die, in order to not let himself be enslaved, whereas the slave preferred his naked (i.e. bare) life to freedom⁴. The subject can, therefore, choose *as* a subject not only between individual *acts and modes of behaviour*, but in fact between Being (Is) and Not Being (Non-Is), and precisely this latter in principle

⁴ *Republic*, 387b, cf. 386b.

possibility seems to distinguish its subjectivity in a particularly drastic manner. The question “to be or not to be” concerns not merely the meaning and value of the life of a subjectivity brooding, ruminating melancholically, but the subjectivity in itself, and generally, as a specifically human ability to be.

In so far now as the I (ego) accords to the Other subjectivity in the same sense as it does to itself, that is, it attributes to itself and to the Other jointly and equally, the category “human subjects”, it (the I) thinks of him (the Other) as having the (cap)ability, under all circumstances and in all situations, of doing something instead of something other, of behaving in this way instead of differently, irrespective out of which “rational” or “irrational” motives; and even if the Ego assumes the Other would on the basis of practical constraints, or simply stable (or fixed) dispositions, follow with certainty this, and not that mode (manner or way) of acting, thus because of that, it (the Ego) does not deny him (the Other) a limine the natural talent, gift or aptitude to imagine, even under outer (external) or inner (internal) need and necessity in respect of acting (action), other options, choices and paths, and should the situation arise, even unexpectedly, to direct his deeds (doing, acts or action) towards these representations or notions. The mental acts of the I, which relate to the mental acts of the Other, and start from the conviction in respect of the equality of essence (essential equality or consubstantiality) of both (I and Other), consequently revolve, first of all, around the insight that the subject, the Other, is in general exactly like the subject, Ego, in the position to do or not do something, to behave in this way instead of otherwise and differently. This insight constitutes, accordingly, a first fundamental paraphrase of the (bilateral or mutual) knowledge (on both sides) regarding the subjective character of the Ego and the Alter, and rests or is based on the direct and immediate data of the self-consciousness of both. It is of decisive social-ontological meaning and significance that precisely the mental act, which makes the social relation

possible, and initiates, namely, the ascertainment on both sides of the equal, in terms of essence, subjectivity of the Ego and the Alter, is originally connected to the knowledge that the Ego and the Alter would, exactly in their common peculiarity as subjects, equally be deprived of an accurate and precise calculation (reckoning or estimation) of their (i.e. each other's) future behaviour. Knowledge of the, in principle, possibility of a social relation amounts, therefore, to knowledge that this relation must, as a relation of subjects, contain an element or factor of changeability and imponderability (incalculability), regardless of how high the likelihood of that, on each and every respective occasion, is estimated to be. And what characterises the starting point of the social relation is only confirmed in the course of the same (social relation). Inside the series of the mental acts of the Ego, which relate or refer to the mental acts of the Other, the special assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption)), namely the putting itself of the Ego in (and or empathising of the Ego with) the (inner (internal)) situation (or position) of the Other, now follows the general knowledge regarding the subjectivity of the Other. The subject, Alter, proves itself, in the course of this, on the basis of obvious (form-related, i.e. formal) comparisons with the subject, Ego, as the bearer of feelings, thoughts, intentions and action plans (plans of action), whose supposed or suspected great variety of form (multiformity) or ambiguity (equivocalness or multiple meanings), bears out or confirms the impression that the Ego stand across from someone, whose mental and outer (external) acts cannot be subjected to absolute control, and cannot be foreseen or anticipated with ultimate and conclusive certainty. Even at this higher level of the social relation, precisely that which constitutes the formal (i.e. form-related) presupposition of the process turns out to be the possible source of equivocations and doubts with regard to, in practice, decisive and crucial content(s).

Both in the elementary (independent movement and choice between opposed options and choices) as well as in the higher sense (a social relation through the assumption of roles), subjectivity contains, therefore, an indissoluble core or nucleus of impenetrability, opacity and obscurity, and imponderability (incalculability), which is not accidental (random) and inessential (immaterial), but belongs to it (the said subjectivity) in terms of its (the said subjectivity's) essence; it (the indissoluble core of impenetrability etc.) characterises it (the said subjectivity) *as* subjectivity. This does not have anything to do with "irrationalism", it is not able to be put down (traced back or reduced) to "blind drives", rather the linear and uniform effect of such drives (urges, impulses), can make the behaviour of the subject precisely foreseeable (predictable) and ponderable (calculable); it only means that the subject *as* subject, for whichever "irrational" or "rational" reasons, *can* at any time do something which runs counter to, and goes against, expectations and norms. The in principle and indomitable imponderability (incalculability) of the subject (of the Alter *and* of the Ego!) is seen, in other words, paradoxically, not so much in the fact that the Ego can never know with some certainty what the Alter will do, but in the fact that the Ego knows with absolute certainty that, on the basis of its character as subject, the Alter could just as well not do this same act or action, as unlikely as this may be under the given circumstances; finally, in fact, only subjects can be "insane" or "act insanely". In the framework of the social relation, imponderability (incalculability) is not necessarily connected with friendship or enmity (see below), rather it refers to the impossibility of bringing the behaviour of the Other under absolute control. Even at the moment in which the Other physically and outwardly (externally) completely submits, behaving in fact slavishly, the I can never fully determine (ascertain, detect or establish) with certainty whether behind the Other, contempt (disdain and or scorn) does not for instance stand – and exactly here we run or bump into the human and subjective element/dimension par excellence: because it cannot be imagined

that another animal can feel contempt for a stronger animal, to which it must be subject(ed) and subjugated, and in this contempt, it can maintain a piece of subjective freedom, that is uncontrollability and imponderability (incalculability). Generally, therefore, the (possible) outer (external) or the (presumed or supposed) inner (internal) resistance of the Other is the element in which the Ego recognises the boundaries of its own wishes, intentions and plans of action, and exactly for this reason, it sees itself compelled and forced to develop its own subjectivity consciously; in this same resistance it (the Ego) recognises, however, simultaneously, that the Other has equally and equally originally at its disposal, subjectivity. In the nature of this resistance, incidentally, the difference between human subjects and things is made noticeable from another perspective. The resistance of the thing [[i.e. inanimate object]] is static, it cannot, that is, in the course of confrontation of or by the subject, multiply, intensify and vary; it (the thing) is coped with, overcome and conquered as soon as the subject exerts (musters or summons (up)) the necessary effort, and the degree of this effort remains in principle the same for the same object. Things look differently regarding the resistance of the subject, whose (i.e. resistance's) multiplication (or intensification/potentiation) demands the multiplication/intensification of the effort of the other side up to a not-to-be-calculated-in-advance, or a once-and-for-all ascertainable, degree; here the boundary is death. Reflection upon the difference which exists between the imponderability (incalculability) of subjects and the imponderability (incalculability) of things, appears to be just as revealing or illuminating. Things become imponderable (incalculable) because they have properties (qualities) or aspects which the subject does not know; subjects, in regard to their behaviour, cannot always, and not with the same (or equal) certainty, be calculated, because knowledge regarding all possible motives and possible options (choices) cannot be tantamount to a prediction (forecast or prognostication) of subsequent acting (action); in regard to the thing, there is no grey zone between

properties, situations and behaviour, however, in regard to the subject there is a grey zone, which is only inferable hypothetically. Psychological observation of babies and infants has, by the way, proved the central function of the plexus (mesh or network) of imponderability (incalculability) and resistance for the early formation and development of the representation and notion of subjectivity. As long as the baby can make use of the Other without problems for the instant(aneous) satisfaction of its own wishes, it hardly notices its (the Other's) character as a subject; only resistance, that is, the non-fulfilment of the baby's wishes, awakens in the baby, consciousness regarding actors, whose intentions do not coincide or correspond with the baby's own intentions, and in these actors' independent movement, cannot be treated or handled like things.⁵

With regard to the spectrum of the social relation, the uncontrollability or imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity means that any subject can at any time occupy any place in the said spectrum of the social relation; otherwise, anthropologically predestined classes of subjects would always be found or met in the same place in the spectrum, against which every historical and social experience speaks (i.e. is contrary)⁶. The great variety of form (multiformity) of the spectrum lives off and on the versatility of subjectivity, in relation to which every ethics, but also every systemic arrangement of society and every eschatology of history limps along, i.e. lags, behind. The same facts and circumstances can be apprehended by the subjectivity as follows: the spectrum of the social relation potentially emerges or looms on the horizon in the constitutive capacity of the subjectivity to develop motives and to make practical choices, which can lead the subjectivity to all possible places in the spectrum;ⁱⁱⁱ every place in the spectrum of one's own potentiality finds, as it were, a counterpart in the spectrum of the social relation. That of course implies

⁵ Wolf, "Understanding Others", esp. pp. 304, 301.

⁶ See Ch. III, Section 2B, above.

no kind of priority of a subjectivity, comprehended in terms of being a substance, vis-à-vis the spectrum of the social relation; it is a matter here, genetically and structurally, of the same thing, which is seen from two different perspectives [[i.e. that of the spectrum of the social relation, and that of an actual social relation itself]], and in the course of this, is conceptually reconstructed in a number of run-ups (i.e. approaches, attempts or onsets). Beside both these perspectives of the scientific observer, incidentally, the perspective of the Ego exists, in relation to which the Other likewise appears as the bearer of a spectrum of potentialities, which can find expression in various forms of the social relation. The Ego, therefore, quasi automatically connects its perception or its analysis of the Other with the possibilities of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the social relation. The specific experience of the encounter with the Other exists, accordingly, in the opening up of a spectrum of possible relations with him (the Other), irrespective of which of them are regarded *prima vista* as more likely; that other sense or feeling, that, namely, already a false step at the beginning can give another turn to the matter or case, (counter)balances the sense of this (aforesaid *prima facie*) likelihood, after all. The, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) or opacity and impenetrability of the Other is combined, therefore, in the Ego's eyes, with the, in principle, openness of the social relation. On the temporal horizon of the social relation, this combination can only be solidified. Since the relation with the Other is seen from the crucial perspective of the future, the Ego cannot rely or count on, and be limited (restricted) by, the assessment of the Other's past behaviour, which corresponds with a certain possibility of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the relation. The Ego must let several possible modes of behaviour in various situations parade (pass in review) before it, so that finally the picture or image of the Other extends and expands into a spectrum of likely or probable actions and reactions; in the course of this, a more stable, steady or fixed image and picture in respect of character may or may not serve

as a backdrop and aid in respect of orientation; in any case, a tension between the same (image and picture regarding character), and the endeavour as regards more concrete prognoses of behaviour, often dominates. The temporal perspective consequently makes the image or picture of the Other all the more ambiguous (with many meanings), and turns the Other into an open object of interpretation rather than into a completed and self-contained product of interpretation. The changes in behaviour unfold and develop in time, whereby in the imagination, every fold (i.e. aspect) in time, is attributed to a fold (i.e. aspect) in the spectrum of the social relation.

Admittedly, we should not forget that this analysis moves on social-ontological terrain, that is, it is abstracted from historically and sociologically apprehensible constructs, and that is why those institutions and conventions do not come into view (and are not examined) which very often keep within certain relative boundaries the, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of subjectivity. Though, one would err in relation to this matter, and furthermore, would misjudge and fail to appreciate the methodical, i.e. methodological, meaning of the interrelation between social ontology and history or sociology⁷, if one wanted to bring to bear the seeming firmness, stability or fixedness of what is historically and sociologically ascertainable against the openness and fluidity of the social-ontological field, instead of apprehending the former (seemingly firm historical or sociological) from the point of view of the latter (open and fluid social-ontological). More fertile than every theoretical dispute, appears to us to be also in this case, the invocation of the innumerable testimonies and pieces of evidence from the collected wisdom in respect of life of all cultures and epochs, which prove beyond any doubt the representation or notion of the Ego in respect of the Other as a bundle of intentions to be worked out or deciphered, and still, in relation to that, as

⁷ See Ch. II, Section 3A, above.

variable, that is, the conviction that the imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of human subjectivity constitutes a commonplace of social experience, and at the same time the foundation of very common practical maxims. The age of this conviction prohibits here any references to alleged “modern processes of differentiation”, which jointly seize, cover and include society and the individual, and thus would have reinforced the complexity and the impenetrability, opacity and obscurity of both (society and the individual) as being in step (i.e. synchronised and in conformity with current society’s environment overall). Ethnologists have noted how much the question of the, on each and every respective occasion, presented mode of appearance vis-à-vis a fellow human, calls on or makes demands of the spirits in “natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)”. In the course of this, it is not a matter only of the socially acceptable conduct or behaviour, but over and beyond that, of the choice of the right manner of acting (action) vis-à-vis another, which of its essence or nature cannot be absolutely transparent; multiple proverbs and sayings make exactly this embarrassment, predicament or this knowledge the, i.e. their theme or topic (subject matter)⁸. The Zande^{iv} wonder rhetorically: “can one look into someone, like one looks through a widely-meshed basket?”⁹, and the Jabo^v formulate the same thought affirmatively: “one does not know what is going on in the head of the person next to him”¹⁰. The said theme or topic has in fact the semblance or appearance as if the certainty of the unrecognisability of the Other represents and constitutes a kind of a generally and universally acknowledged premise of social intercourse, in relation to which the deeper meaning of ritual and magic is supposed to exist exactly in bringing, with the usual means, the uncontrollable under control¹¹. One could fill many pages with vivid and graphic testimonies

⁸ Thurnwald, *Bánaro*, p. 47; Lienhardt, “Self: public, private”, esp. p. 146.

⁹ Evans-Pritchard, *Essays*, p. 228 (in the English version: “Can one look into a person as one looks into an open-wove basket?”)

¹⁰ Herzog, *Jabo proverbs*, p. 157 (in the English version: “One does not know his fellow’s mind”). Cf. Herskovits-Tagbwe, “Kru Proverbs”, p. 247 (in the English version: “A man’s not a bunch of palm-nuts, that you may sample him”).

¹¹ Munn, “Gawan Kula”, p. 284.

from the older and newer literature, which go into this social-ontological central theme in all its possible variations, and prove the ubiquity of the experiences and insights in question¹². However, here we must return to the language, and at the same time, to the methods of abstraction, whilst we disregard or refrain from the relieving conventions and the socially mediated pre-understandings of “daily normality”, in order for us to imagine the presence of the Other in that elementary openness, which directly or indirectly, more or less consciously creeps (sneaks or slips) into every convention and into every mediated pre-understanding too. This complete Other, who is still not a friend and not a foe, can exactly because of that, become or turn into both friend as well as foe; from him, help, just as much as danger, can emanate; in short, he represents in parvo the Janus face of sociality and of social reality in general¹³. Social experience and the view/perception of the Ego meets, therefore, anew with scientific knowledge, or the formation of hypotheses, in this case in regard to the thesis that subjectivity or personality must in principle be defined as potentiality in respect of acting and action, and the development of subjectivity as the development of the potentiality in respect of acting/action¹⁴. Formal (i.e. form-related) a priori knowledge regarding the immediate or particular circumstances and the individual aspects of the potentiality for acting and action, (that is, knowledge about the fact that the Other in general has motives, intentions, plans, means), does not, though, say anything certain about the concrete content of the to-be-expected acting or action as the each and every respective actualisation of the subject’s specific the potentiality for acting and action. The Ego can anticipate the said expected actualisation for lack of special knowledge and indications by projecting onto the image or picture of the Other all that it knows from personal or social experience, directly or mediatedly (i.e.

¹² “A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other”, Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Book I, ch. 3 (beginning).

¹³ Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Der Mensch*, esp. pp. 210, 220ff..

¹⁴ Sears, “Theoretical Framework”, esp. pp. 478, 480ff..

indirectly) about the intersubjective relations of socially living men/humans in general. This knowledge exists at this tier (level or stage) actually in regard to the banality that amongst men everything is possible; a banality, which indeed may be made fun of by some refined theoreticians, but which is of central meaning and significance in every, in practice, relevant social respect. Only as potentiality for acting and action in this breadth, is the Other capable of transferring or shifting the Ego into the state of affairs of attention (attentiveness) or even alertness, vigilance and watchfulness. And the immediate, direct general knowledge regarding the necessary ingredients in respect of the Other's potentiality for acting (action) (motives, representations, plans), sets in the Ego, the Ego's own potentiality for acting (action) in motion, the said knowledge constitutes [[does not (constitute)]]^{vi} in itself a reason for interaction. The Other's motives and intentions referring to the Ego and known to this Ego, must ipso facto call into being and bring to life the Ego's motives and intentions with reference and in relation to the Other.

The, in principle, impenetrability and imponderability (incalculability) of the Other is dealt with and managed, therefore, in respect of the Ego, first of all, through the summoning, enlisting and mobilising of personally acquired and socially mediated, general knowledge, which, of course, by no means is sufficient for the concrete handling and dealing with concrete Other. However, already this knowledge as the possibility of knowing the Other fairly generally, without having known him (the Other) in detail, attests to and shows that the Ego's social-ontologically fundamental positioning (attitude and stance) vis-à-vis the Other has two equally constitutive aspects. The inscrutable, unfathomable and imponderable (incalculable) Other is for the I (ego), the distant and the alien, yet as a being, which shares the property of subjectivity fully with the Ego, he (the Other) is for this (Ego) the nearest and the most familiar. As an Ego, one can just as well say to the Other, with Plautus, "Tam

ego homo sum quam tu (= Latin = I am a man as much as you [[are (a man)]]]"¹⁵, or call out to him (the Other) with Shakespeare: "O, the difference of man and man!"¹⁶. The aspect of nearness (proximity) and of familiarity in the fundamental intersubjective relationship stems from the common certainty of the subjects that the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation must be the same on all sides by virtue of their mere being as a subject; and the aspect of distance, of difference, of imponderability (incalculability) stems just as much from the firm knowledge that that commonly possessed mechanism is connected with the most different content(s), and can serve the most different intentions. The analysis of the taking on/over and assumption of roles rests or is based on this dual foundation (i.e. the just mentioned aspect of proximity and aspect of distance), as the next sections of this chapter will show. The anthropologically–social-ontologically given (cap)ability at the taking on/over and the assumption of roles, and at the understanding of the stranger (foreigner, alien) or others remains in itself form-related (i.e. formal) and cannot lift (i.e. abolish, remove, set aside or do away with) the factor "imponderability (incalculability)" and "inscrutability (unfathomability)" by means of their mere existence (availability or presence), that is, the said (cap)ability cannot vouch for and guarantee that the concrete behaviour of the Other can in principle be foreseen or anticipated in this or that concrete situation. The general form-related (i.e. formal) (cap)ability at the taking on/over and assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger or others, differs, therefore, essentially from the (cap)ability at the taking on/over and assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger or others in a concrete situation. Likewise, general knowledge about man as subjectivity, which is basically the same in the Ego and in the Other, differs from knowledge about the individual man in his concrete individuality. La Rochefoucauld hit the nail on the head in so far as he

¹⁵ *Asinaria*, II, 4, V. 490.

¹⁶ *King Lear*, IV, 2, V. 26.

opined that it is easier to know and recognise man in general than an individual (person)¹⁷.

Imponderability (Incalculability) as a basic or fundamental feature of subjectivity, as it must be treated, handled or examined at this social-ontological tier (level or stage) of abstraction, does not self-evidently mean that absolutely nothing can be foreseen and pre-pondered/pre-calculated in the institutionally structured life of society. Such a state of affairs would be just as irreconcilable or incompatible with the concept of social life itself as the proverbial war of all against all. But just as alien to reality would a concept of social life be, which does not want to admit that the imponderable (incalculable) penetrates (forces its way into), or is even always inherent in, the ponderable (calculable), in the same sense and to the same extent as the exception is interwoven with normality¹⁸. Max Weber did well in relation to that, to weave or work the word “chance (opportunity or prospects)” not only into the definition of “sociologically amorphous” power, but also into that definition of institutionally founded (authority as) dominance, which obviously is supposed to mean that not even punitive (i.e. disciplinary or penal) institutions are able to be certain of individual behaviour in every concrete case¹⁹. Generally, ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) in social life are subject to the same fluctuations and peripeteiae as the places of the actors in the spectrum of the social relation. Also, no fixed (stable and steady) interrelation between ponderability and friendship, or imponderability and enmity, can be established, made, manufactured or restored²⁰. A considerable difference does indeed exist between friendship and enmity in that the former (friendship) must be wanted

¹⁷ «Il est plus aisé de connaître l’homme en général que de connaître un homme en particulier», *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 436.

¹⁸ See Ch. III, Section 3B, above.

¹⁹ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28.

²⁰ As de Jouvenel wants to establish, make or restore it, by calling or naming the foe «agent imprévisible» – «imprévisible parce qu’il n’est point partie à notre ligue d’amitié» (= “unpredictable agent” – “unpredictable because he is not at all a party to our league (alliance, bonds) of friendship”), see *Souveraineté*, p. 152.

by both sides, whereas the latter (enmity) can (be created or produced and) come into being through the initiative of one side; yet this difference does not necessarily coincide with the difference between ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), (it is not certain in advance whether the otherwise unknown Other wants to be a friend or a foe, or whether the Ego wishes his/the Other's friendship); furthermore, the difference concerns the genetic priority of the social relation, not its course (sequence or order of events): friendships can, as is known, in their course, give bad or terrible surprises; on the other hand, some enmity proceeds, for instance as a result of the balance or equilibrium of forces, in or down relatively ordered and ponderable channels or courses and paths. One may not, therefore, confound and confuse ponderabilities (calculabilities) in general and as such with peace and security. Language use knows of "ponderable (calculable) friends" just like social life; however, enmity means the precise opposite of peace and security. Said differently: only within the framework of friendship is ponderability (calculability) synonymous with peace and security, and in this respect, one can define peace as the state of affairs which exists between friends²¹. This definition of peace has, though, the disadvantage that every enmity must be regarded as war, whereby the concept of peace can no longer be apprehended sharply (i.e. clearly) enough²². That is why it appears to be sensible and useful to stand the formula on its head (i.e. turn O. Brunner's phrase and wording upside down), that is, to start from peace instead of friendship, and to say along with the profound saying of the Yoruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship²³. This means: friendship is not founded on the lack or absence of subjective imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities), but in the lack or absence

²¹ Thus, e.g. Brunner, *Land*, p. 24 [[this is a very touching acknowledgement and reference to the great "NAZI" historian, Otto Brunner, by P.K., whose statement/thesis P.K. immediately proceeds to qualify as to its scientific validity = translator's remark = absolutely nothing to do with P.K.]].

²² See Ch. III, footnote 212, above.

²³ Ellis, *Yoruba-Speaking Peoples*, p. 219 (in the English wording or version: "peace is the father of friendship").

of objective dangers and risks. Furthermore, here, the bottom is knocked out of (i.e. the base is withdrawn from) psychological interpretations of the phenomenon by pointing out that friendship would not create good motives, but states of affairs in which bad or evil motives hardly could or would want to come to development (i.e. develop)^{vii}. Ponderability (Calculability) of states of affairs (situations) and ponderability of subjectivity are, however, two different kinds of thing(s).

Likewise, two different things, however, are a ponderability (calculability) of states of affairs (situations), which concern or apply to concrete actors, ambiance(s) (i.e. atmospheres or environ(ment)s) and periods of time, and, a ponderability (calculability) which apprehends social life all in all (as a whole or in total), and is supposed to end up in the equation and identification of this same social life with “normality” per se and as such. Under, or as, normality, the dominance of fixed (steady, firm, stable) norms, that is, immunity against the effects of the exception, or against the state of affairs (situation) in which the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity can indeed further exist, but is socially irrelevant, is understood here; the said imponderability of subjectivity simply belongs to the “environment”, not to the “system”. The theoretical attempt at equating and identifying ponderability (calculability), normality and social life was, of course, not only undertaken by systems theory, but in actual fact, also by the phenomenologists of the lifeworld. Representatives of so-called “ethnomethodology”, who wanted to harness and use Schütz for their own case, and correspondingly play him (Schütz) against Parsons, opined, however, that in the former (Schütz), typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) of perspectives as the basis of intersubjective communication remained constantly contingent, that is, dependent on the action of the actors; that Schütz does not attach any decisive effect to the common

cultural background to these same actors²⁴. That could be conceded and accepted in the sense that the typifications by Schütz avowedly apply to the wider with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) rather than to the narrower environment, with whose microscopic analysis the ethnomethodologists were concerned. During the transaction from the environment to the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), according to Schütz, a progressive or advanced anonymisation takes place, the personal type is transformed here from a concrete alter ego into an ideal type, and the "wealth of variations" of intersubjective relations is reduced and decreases²⁵. Schütz stresses in the course of this, that the ideal types of the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can often serve as "interpretive schemata (schemata in respective of interpretation) of the environment"; both the exchangeability and interchangeability of the perspectives – that is, the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the other (person) – as well as the agreement, on both sides, of the systems of relevance, rest or are based on idealisations, or the leaving aside and exclusion of the personal and the biographical²⁶. – However, Schütz does not go down the reverse path, i.e. he does not proceed in the opposite direction. Schütz does not, namely, investigate under which circumstances and effects the typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) and idealisations thus coming into being can become problematic anew or even invalidated (untenable), he does not thematise (i.e. make as his subject matter for examination) their instrumental, i.e. precarious and changeable character, he disregards the constant movements in the spectrum of social relations, under whose pressure, typifications and idealisations must make a place (i.e. make room or make way) to concrete

²⁴ Thus, e.g. Heritage, *Garfinkel*, p. 56.

²⁵ *Aufbau*, p. 256ff., 285; *Coll. Papers*, II, p. 37ff., 232ff..

²⁶ *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 11ff..

representations and notions. The distinction between environment and with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is by far not sufficient to make these complicated processes comprehensible, and is itself as extendable and expansible as one may like (or as it can be), and at all times, in need of interpretation. Schütz constructs, therefore, a "normality" beyond its ontological interweaving with the "exception", a "natural positioning or attitude" beyond the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity *as* subjectivity. This ontology of daily life grasps (apprehends and comprehends) social action primarily as the production of commonly and jointly divided and split, i.e. shared, meaning, not as the pursuit of the meaningful goals (ends or purposes) on the part of concrete actors, in whose framework and according to whose logic, exactly meaning is divided, shared or split and redistributed^{27 + viii}. In this important respect, Schütz comes closer to Parsons than he perhaps would have liked to. Schütz describes quasi automatised (i.e. automated) processes, which mean or signify action less, than a relief from, or relieving of, the tension and stress of existence *towards* meaningful and expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) action, and in regard to their (the said quasi automated processes), harmlessness is able to be shared between friends and foes, without the core of the social relation – the meeting of identities – having to be touched upon even only in the slightest^{ix}. The model of the question and of the answer, which is supposed to (graphically-vividly) illustrate and demonstrate the communicative context of (mutual) understanding, (pre)supposes a highly unreal self-sufficiency and possibility of self-isolation of the actor. In social life, this actor has little opportunity to reflect (muse or ponder), in full peace and seclusion, on academic answers to academic questions of others, which are registered (recorded, noted or taken down) by others without commentary and without reaction. The actor is not left "in peace" or "alone", but is frequently

²⁷ Cf. Zaret, "From Weber", p. 1192.

placed under direct or indirect pressure to do things which he would not have done of his own accord. Not one possibility of isolation or of retreat (withdrawal), which would have saved and protected him from such a thing (i.e. the said pressure), but the potency given to him with his subjectivity to offer resistance, fight back and say no, bears witness and attests to his (cap)ability at acting (action) – still more than a consensus, which could also be interpreted as a lack of will. In the same manner, however, the subjectivity, as well as the (cap)ability at acting (action) of the Other, are proved. Every request or entreaty, every exchange, every compulsion and coercion takes place thanks to the autonomy and independence of the Other, that is, of the possibility of his (the Other's) rejection or his resistance [[of and towards others]]. But Schütz, just as little as for instance Parsons or Mead, goes into this by no means ubiquitous, but definitely critical case²⁸.

One could now shove aside such thoughts in view of the benevolent effects of norms as stabilisers of expectations. Yet with that, only the just described model in its one-sidedness, and consequently unreality, is reproduced. Because the existence (availability and presence) of norms does not lift (i.e. revoke, abolish, annul, do away with) the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity and its action; “you should (or ought)” is no prognosis, but only an appeal²⁹.

Normative perceptions and views of society endeavour, nonetheless, to make out of appeals, prognoses, and for that reason, accordingly shut out, exclude or eliminate from contemplation what(ever) could blur a prognosis gained in such a manner. In an absolutely ponderable (calculable) world, though, the cognitive and normative expectations would coincide without any difficulty, but thus, as the world now just is, its essential difference to that (world of absolute ponderability) is already seen in the possibility of knowing that someone could

²⁸ I am following here Tyrell's excellent analysis, *Vergesellschaftung*, esp. pp. 374ff., 384ff., 396ff., 444ff..

²⁹ Loc. cit., p. 406ff..

violate or infringe norms. Over and above that, norms, which are supposed to regulate daily behaviour, frequently represent and constitute mere forms, whose content or tidings (i.e. message) which they communicate and transmit, depends on the subjectivity of those who make use of them (the said norms). One greets someone, e.g., by keeping to the outer/external form, but one does it in such a way that the corresponding gesture can betray or reveal indifference or even contempt, disdain and scorn. Every fairly experienced observer of social life knows that the art – during the keeping to the form – of remaining “hard and unbending in regard to the matter at hand”, belongs to the most refined [[(of) things]] in respect of what human – being together with one another (i.e. co-existence) – in the world has posited (or produced), and not only in the “differentiated modern”. Likewise, generally known, are the cases in which the form serves the purposes and ends of deception and deceit, or is kept to and observed, on both sides, in the knowledge of its substantial irrelevance. In general, it is thus, that the norms of the lifeworld are only valid and apply at face value as long as nothing or little is at stake, as, that is, the actual and real concerns (issues and affairs) of identity are in no way touched upon, as no-one deprives, or withholds from, themselves and refuses or denies, their self-understanding, due recognition. This is the decisive criterion, not for instance, the boundaries between the environment and the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one’s contemporaries), which, incidentally, are always defined anew with regard to that criterion. In themselves, norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. The age-old distinctions between legality and morality, on the one hand, between “actual” and “formalistic” morality, on the other hand, also attest to the fact that socially living humans have never confused the keeping to forms with the ponderability (calculability) of the Other.

What applies to the norms of daily behaviour in the narrower or wider lifeworld, applies likewise to the more elevated, lofty or upscale cultural norms and culturally constructed meaning contexts (contexts pertaining to meaning), that is, to the great systems of art, of science, of religion, of myth etc.. Schütz's statement, – it could also have emanated from Parsons, – that these systems “as interpretive schemata, pre-exist every interpretation of meaning of alien action (i.e. the action of others)”³⁰, must be understood *cum grano salis* (= Latin = with a grain of salt), they have, at any rate, fairly little to do with the ponderability (calculability) of alien action (the action of others). Because the culturally pre-given norms or meaning contexts (contexts of meaning) constitute, first of all, only a formal framework, inside of which very much is acted out (or takes place), namely, the spectrum of the social relation can unfold and develop in its entire breadth. The fact *that* the Ego commands and dominates the cultural language [[for itself(, not in general)]] in which the Other expresses itself as a social being, does not grant or offer him (the Ego) any certain and secure knowledge about *what* the Other will express. A German does not know in advance that another German will treat him in a friendly manner already because it is certain that this (German) speaks the same language as that (German); nothing else happens between Christians, scientists or artists, who think more or less within the same meaning contexts. Formulated theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory): the commonality of the meaning context (or context of meaning), inside of which a social relation takes place and is acted out, is not allowed to be confused with the ponderability (calculability) of the process of this same social relation. Moreover, this meaning context is not understood at all by everyone, and always, in the same manner. It (The said meaning context) constitutes at every moment an object of interpretation, and in the interpretations undertaken, the shifts in the spectrum of the social relation are

³⁰ *Aufbau*, p. 45.

reflected or shown. From that which occurs in this spectrum, the scientific interpretation of those interpretations must therefore start, not the other way around. The, in itself, correct talk of the intersubjective construction of cultural meaning contexts should not suggest the false impression that in this process everyone would participate as like-minded partners, and with equal rights. According to the movements in the spectrum of the social relation, everyone must reserve for himself here a right of interpretation and a right of deviation or divergence, – that is, everyone reserves the right to be imponderable and incalculable, and partakes of ponderability (calculability) on condition of imponderability (incalculability). This can take place in two opposed forms, which are already implied in our explications above. On the one hand, the subject in daily life does not pay attention to (i.e. it completely ignores) banal or lofty norms, because the subject is overwhelmed by the task of transforming and translating them (the said banal or lofty norms) into (or applying them to) each and every respective concrete situation. On the other hand, it (i.e. the subject) holds onto and clings to these (norms) because these are frequently proved to be neutral enough to promote acts and actions which “normally” are not regarded as “normal”; thus, for instance, robbers and blackmailers presuppose that rules and norms of language will be kept to by, and on, both sides, so that “(mutual) understanding functions”³¹.

Phenomenologists of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologists would come much closer to reality if they took as the starting point of their thoughts and considerations the image or picture which frequently-attested-to Common Sense makes of socially living humans regarding “(the) world and man”. Calming, reassuring and soothing anonymities and automatisms do not dominate this image/picture, but the feeling or sense predominates and preponderates that

³¹ See in relation to that, Goffman’s good remarks (comments and observations), “Interaction Order”, p. 5. This point is of central significance and importance for the judgement of normative communication theory, and we must come back to it, see Section D, below, in this chapter.

“normality” and “exception”, the ponderable (calculable) and the imponderable (incalculable), grip, grasp and intertwine with one another, that one indeed must, without [[doing]] any damage or harm to oneself, be courteous and obliging, but at the same time, forearmed and prepared for the unforeseen and unexpected, and “on guard”. The consequences of inattentiveness and naivety have to be attributed to every person himself. Common Sense, therefore, does not draw up, devise or plan two different pictures (images) of the social world, one for good weather conditions, and one for bad weather conditions, but one single relatively rich-in-nuances picture or image. At the centre or focal point of this picture, a likewise rich-in-nuances or ambivalent perception (view) of man as the object or reason/cause of/for trust, and at the same time of mistrust, of hope and at the same time of fear – as a ponderable and a “rational”, but at the same time, as an imponderable (incalculable) and an “affective” being, stands or is found. And even when the bright, light and dark tones of this united image or picture seems sometimes to become separated from one another, in order to emit, produce or constitute images or pictures independent from one another, then, nevertheless, one of these pictures (images) serves merely as the background of the other: the general representation and notion of the social and of man consequently remains mixed and ambivalent, even if it is placed under a vault (canopy, dome or arch) of a howsoever-put-together-and-made religious or secularised, in any case, relieving (as to the stress/tension of existence), theodicy. It is also not to be otherwise expected, if that “fundamental anxiety”, which Schütz himself rightly – but without drawing the necessary systematic conclusions from that – calls a “basic experience”³², is in actual fact fundamental, that is, it (the said “fundamental anxiety”) imbues (saturates and soaks) social behaviour in toto. Newer social-psychological approaches, which one subsumes under the rubric “dramaturgical model”, showed a finer and more

³² *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 228.

refined sensorium or sixth sense as regards the situation of tension (stress or intensity), which comes into being in every interaction on the basis of the fact that the Ego must reckon with and on seeing the possibility his claims to recognition of his publicly-put-forward identity being rejected, repudiated or relativised; that the Ego, therefore, must at all times be prepared and braced for an emergency or the worst³³. The said newer social-psychological approaches move, nonetheless, in the narrower horizon of that which Schütz called the environment; but for us here the knowledge is important that also the typified and anonymised with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is not merely grey and neutral or indifferent, but rather a further source of the same ambivalences and split expectations of the environment. The with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can likewise be insecure, uncertain and imponderable (incalculable); now here relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of existence can function as anonymisation and typification. But every relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of life and existence is a great weight on and weighs down that which is supposed to be relieved (as regards the tension and stress of existence).

The subject trusts the great systems of culture, and daily life or norms of culture, so little, that it probably develops its own "private scientific system"³⁴ in order to assess and evaluate the becoming and events, and accordingly to orientate itself in its action, in short, in order to become master of imponderability (incalculability). The social-ontological opening up, illuminating and reconstruction of this system appears to be possible, because it, in all subjects, revolves around ascertainable formal variables. The difficulty lies, not so much in its (this social-ontological opening up's) formation and development, which on the basis of anthropological aptitudes or predispositions,

³³ We shall concern ourselves and deal with these approaches in the discussion of the question and problem of identity in the 3rd volume of this work.

³⁴ Ruesch-Bateson, *Communication*, p. 26.

as it were, takes place spontaneously, albeit in a reflected way (i.e. as to cognitive reflection), but in its handling and treatment, that is, in the cases of well-aimed judgements about each and every respective content-related formation of those formal variables, depending on each and every respective Other and on each and every respective concrete situation. (It is a matter here, obviously, of another form of the above-described discrepancy or complementarity between the formal mechanism of the social relation and the great variety and diversity of the content(s) with which the said formal mechanism of the social relation can be connected – or as regards one further variation of the interlocking, interconnecting or intertwining of ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), whereby ponderability (calculability) more likely concerns the form, and imponderability (incalculability) more likely concerns the content.) As the foundation of this system, the knowledge of the Other functions as subjectivity, which does not constitute something to be merely manipulated, but an action centre, from which damage (harm and or hurt) and benefit or utility can emanate for the Ego – and indeed, in the widest sense of these terms, that is also unpleasant and pleasant, friendly and inimical etc.. The tracing back of the effects of alien activity (i.e. the activity of the Other) to the intention of the Other, now marks a decisive turn in the social relation, as this social relation is seen from the perspective of the I (ego). It (The said tracing back of ...) simultaneously marks a deepening of the understanding of the subjectivity of the Other. This subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active) but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. Since the I (ego) perceives in this wider sense that the I (ego) perceives, and the other way around, both sides ascribe to each other a higher degree of (self-)consciousness,

awareness and purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency). This of course means also a higher degree of dangers and risks, but at the same time it creates the basis upon which end(goal)-rational (purposeful and expedient) attempts for the influencing of the Other can take place. Since outer (external) action is founded on perception, and since perception directly interrelates with the rating (evaluation and assessment) and the formation of motivation, thus must the I (ego) want to influence the perception of the Other, that is, put himself in (and or empathise with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation in such a way that the putting of the Other in the position and situation of the I (ego) is carried out in accordance with the representations and notions of the I (ego). The Other endeavours for and aspires to, on his part, being in the knowledge of the same mechanism, the same aim, such that the behaviour and endeavour of one side turns into the motivating cause of or reason for the behaviour and endeavour of the other (side) (as well as the other way around), and the interaction is potentised (i.e. becomes more intense, dynamic,... multiplies and climaxes).

But the, in practice, usable system of orientation, which the subject constructs, cannot only exist in the conjectures and suppositions regarding alien intentions (i.e. the intention of (the) other(s)). Since the perception of the Other means on the part of the I (ego), a comprehensive putting of oneself in (and or empathising with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation, thus to the assessment of intentions as what is most subjective and most mobile and agile, an assessment of the more subjective^x and the more fixed (steady or stable), comes to be added. This objectification (or objectivisation), which obviously is supposed to serve the reduction of imponderability (incalculability), begins in the subjectivity of the Other itself, to which more or less stable dispositions being manifested in identically recurring modes of acting and behaving, are ascribed. Dispositions now appear as the

united invariable background or backdrop, from which individual positionings and acts spring, yet the reduction of these (individual positionings and acts) to that (backdrop (with dispositions)) remains too linear and simplistic in order to be sufficient for all situations as a model of explanation (i.e. explanatory model). Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject's (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. Depending on whether the acting and action is derived from the (supposed) discretion of the Other, or from the requirements and demands of an independent-of-it-(i.e. this (supposed) discretion) situation, the classification takes place, whereby the positioning and attitude of the I towards the Other is considerably influenced by the impression which the I (ego) itself has formed about the extent or degree of the conscious responsibility of the Other for its good or bad (evil) acts and deeds. The (supposed) intent(ion) of the acting (person, subject etc.) weighs so heavily and greatly during (the) judgement of the acting (or act(ion)), that one could almost think that inner or outer (internal or external) objective factors – that is, factors given without help or input from the subject concerned – would only be taken into account so that the effect of the intent(ion) can be isolated and assessed so much the more forcefully and or urgently. That is also not additionally surprising. Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity *as* subjectivity par

excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).

One could call this schema or system the “naive analysis of action”³⁵, which stamps (shapes or moulds) the social perception of subjects as actors and interacting (beings, entities). The immediate (or direct) nearness (proximity) of Common Sense to the fundamental insights of every scientific analysis is also noticeable (or also stands out) here, and this nearness would continue standing out and being noticeable, if we wanted to illuminate and investigate this same schema or system from other sides (i.e. aspects or facets), like for instance descriptions of alien (i.e. other) persons and self-descriptions of persons undertaken on the basis of the same, less numerous (i.e. small-in-number) categories of perception, and like the more general or vaguer categories for the description of persons differing from the more special (particular) or more concrete categories for the description of situations etc.³⁶. Instead of this, however, we want to linger or dwell somewhat longer on the central meaning (significance and importance) of (the) intent(ion) for the evaluation or judgement of act(ion)s, since precisely and primarily therein (i.e. the intention), the consciousness of subjects manifests itself and finds expression so that they meet or encounter one another *as* subjects, i.e. as bearers of identities and abilities, which cannot be interpreted and handled or treated in the same manner as what is objective in general (things or unalterable and immutable situations). From action, on the basis of intentions, the unexpected can be expected, since intentions at least *prima vista* are more arbitrary than the compulsions of the objective (i.e. what is objective), and at the same time, the said intention-based action’s assumption and acceptance founds and legitimises the classifications and reactions on the part of the Other, who can, as a result, be active and act

³⁵ According to an expression by Heider, see *Psychology*, esp. Ch. 3, 4 and 10. Cf. the concise remarks of Tagiuri, “Introduction”, esp. x-xi, xv, as well as the “theory of correspondent inferences” developed by Jones-Davis, “From Acts to Dispositions” subsequent to Heider’s analyses, esp. pp. 223ff., 226ff., 237ff..

³⁶ Hastorf et al., “Problem of Relevance”, p. 61.

also like a subject. Because only vis-à-vis a subject can the subject fully and completely be a subject. Investigation self-evidently at this level remains undiscussed, and irrespective of whether in actual fact things are thus, whether, that is, intentions are really autonomous, whether the subject has a free will and is, in the absolute sense, capable of calculation etc.. It is only of interest to which perception of the Other as subject, is the I (ego) inevitably and invariably driven by its own subjectivity. Subjects can look at and regard one another only thus – sometimes even when knowing better. There exists, though, no doubt, that in every fairly sober judgement or interpretation of an act/ing (action), the objective boundaries and compulsions (coercion(s) and constraints) are taken into account, and this, as well, in the smaller or greater mad rush and hectic situation of everyday life. Just as indubitable is, however, the fact proven by social-psychological investigations that in actors, the strong and intense proclivity exists to accord to objective factors less weight than that which would benefit them (such objective factors) inside a purely rational reconstruction of the process of acting and action. The meaning and content of an act(ion) preserve their intrinsic value irrespective of the circumstances under which these take place³⁷. The friendly or inimical attitude of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the Other accordingly depends essentially on an evaluation and judgement of the act(ion) of the Other by means of the criteria “intent(ion)”, “responsibility”, “justification”³⁸. That means that in regard to the imputation of good intentions to the Other, act(ion)s and modes of behaviour are not taken as being bad or evil, which would otherwise have to provide reason and grounds for conflict and enmity. Aggressivity increases normally, not with the extent of the damage suffered, but correspondingly with the presumed intensity of the Other’s bad or evil intentions³⁹. Conversely, thankfulness, gratitude or gratefulness for good

³⁷ Jones-Harris, “Attribution of Attitudes”, esp. 1, p. 22.

³⁸ Pepitone, “Attributions of Causality”, esp. pp. 259-264.

³⁹ Epstein-Taylor, “Instigation to Aggression”, p. 288.

deeds (and blessings) received depends on the assessment and appreciation of the intentions and of the unselfish and altruistic motivation of the do-gooder and benefactor, rather than on the material or other value of the gift (i.e. the thing given and donated)⁴⁰.

Naturally, the favourable or unfavourable evaluation or assessment of the intentions of the Other does not always translate linearly into friendly or inimical act(ion)s of the I (ego) vis-à-vis him (i.e. the Other). Because the I (ego) is at all times conscious of the difference between what is subjectively meant by the Other, and the objective effects, that is, the effects of the foreseeable (estimated or anticipated) meaning of his (i.e. the Other's) acts, and must often orientate his (the I's) own action towards this latter objective meaning of the Other's acts. The I (ego) will, consequently, normally defend himself if the Other made preparations and took measures to kill him (the I) out of love, and he (the I) can behave or conduct himself for reasons of purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) friendly vis-à-vis someone in respect of whom, the I (ego) knows that he (i.e. that someone) places little value on (despises and disdains), and wants for the I (ego) even something bad or evil (harm). Particular consideration of intentions, and the distinction between subjectively meant and objective meaning, or between intentions and the effects of alien action (i.e. the action of others), exist, therefore, in the social perception of the subject next to one another, and are combined in various ways. Nietzsche oversimplified things when he skipped (i.e. overlooked) that consideration (of intentions) and that distinction (between subjectively meant and objective meaning), and opined that the I (ego) clearly and obviously starts from the effects of alien act(ion)s (i.e. the acts of others) on himself (i.e. the I), he (the I) takes or infers from these effects, the intentions of

⁴⁰ Goranson-Berkowitz, "Reciprocity and Responsibility".

the Other, and from these intentions, he then judges the character of the Other⁴¹. The principal interrelation between subjectivity and more or less imponderable (incalculable) personal particularity inside social perception is seen, however, not only in regard to the particular interest in intentions in their distinction as to the effects of the (alien) action (i.e. action of others). It (The said principal interrelation between subjectivity and ...) is recognisable also in the interpretations of intersubjective constellations. In situations, e.g., in which those taking part/the participants behave similarly, behaviour is normally ascribed to the demands and requirements of the situation-position/ circumstances, rather than to individual proclivities and propensities, whereas diverging opinions and modes of behaviour by way of preference are in the habit of being put down and reduced to subjective peculiarities and particularities, rather than to objective conditions or compulsions (constraints or coercion)⁴². The weight and the imponderability of the subjectivity are only downplayed or denied when this is in the interest of a certain subject in dealing with another subject. Since the ascription or attribution of intentions or dispositions is, not least of all, a means of orientation and a possible instrument of control, the I (ego) directs, as expected, its attention to the Other, which can vary, and at the same time is influenced, and conversely, the I (ego) moves into the foreground (i.e. comes to the fore), itself, what more or less is supposed to appear unalterable and immutable. The I (ego) tends, therefore, in relation to that, to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant for the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances⁴³. All this can proceed

⁴¹ *Morgenröte*, § 102, cf. § 118 = Werke, II, pp. 1076, 1093. [[The Greek translator makes a comment here of some interest though I am not going to bother with it (it's not necessary; it's a bit "smart-arse"-like and does not affect the crux of P.K.'s point = translator's note = absolutely nothing to do with P.K. Further note: almost immediately after his comment, the Greek translator does not fully translate a phrase and FUCKS UP the meaning of P.K.'s text and line of thought/argumentation – he has done this a number of times throughout all of his translations of P.K., and such sloppiness is inexcusable, though overall the Greek Translator has done an excellent job, because overall he is an excellent, experienced, veteran translator.]]

⁴² Kelley, "Attribution"; cf. Jones-Harris, "Attribution", p. 23.

⁴³ Kelley, "Attribution".

in good faith, or via unconscious rationalisations, or else reflectively (i.e. with reflection) and calculatedly. Something else is, nevertheless, decisive. The downplaying of the weight and significance, and the role, of subjectivity, remains the work of subjectivity, and is one of subjectivity's possible social strategies. From strategy there will, of course, be no social-ontological fact. Because from the perspective of the Other, the matter appears to be different, and the constant mutual (reciprocal) replacement of the I-role (role of the I (ego)) by the Other-role (role of the Other), the constant interchange or exchange of the view of things and of the strategies in the subjects remaining the same, lets the predominance of the subjective factor in social perception stand out and become evident all to more clearly.

b. Alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and trust (confidence)

In the previous (sub-)section it was explained why ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) do not have to be considered as the simple correlates of friendship and enmity. Just as little may alienness (strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) be regarded as such correlates. The foe can be – from beforehand – familiar, – or in the course of an inimical relationship – a person who became familiar, whereas aliens (strangers) in principle enjoy hospitality, and can be regarded as untouchable, inviolable, sacrosanct and holy or sacred.^{xi} Neither, also, must the overcoming of alienness entail friendship, nor must alienness in itself necessarily entail enmity. In the alien or strange (foreign and unfamiliar), and in the uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious), though, the possibility of enmity is contained, or the tension, stress and intensity inhering or residing in it (the alien or strange, etc.) can be unloaded or discharged into enmity. It (The alien or strange, etc.) does not have to end up in enmity, as long as vital interests in respect of identity

are not endangered and put at risk; nevertheless, that which is detrimental (prejudicial, harmful and damaging) to those interests, has, as was rightly remarked and observed, only in the fewest of cases, the character of the uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious)^{44 + xii}. During the discussion of this question, as a rule, directly or indirectly, cultural yardsticks, benchmarks and criteria are taken as this discussion's basis, which creates a certain confusion. The alien and stranger can in fact just as well stem or emanate from one's own cultural circle; in this case, alienness and strangeness is related or refers to other (i.e. different) aspects, i.e. not to that abstract generality, which is called "culture" or "nation", but to narrower abstractions, which are meant to characterise subsystems of one's own lifeworld, or else, also to outlandish (strange, queer, odd or disconcerting) peculiarities and particularities of an individual's demeanour and conduct⁴⁵. Under certain circumstances, "human" alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) or alienation and estrangement grows into enmity as cultural distance^{xiii}. Admittedly, the culturally alien, strange and foreign is normally perceived as a provocation, since through its mere existence and presence the self-evidence of one's own cultural values is shown to be a lie or untrue. However, overlooking the fact that similar feelings can also turn against innovative phenomena inside one's own culture^{xiv}, that provocation by no means must lead to enmity. The automatic relativisation of one's own values by means of the existence and presence of

⁴⁴ Plessner, „Macht und menschliche Natur“, *Gesammelte Schriften*, V, p. 195.

⁴⁵ Thus, Simmel thought mainly of the person from a foreign culture who lingered, stayed and dwelled for a fairly long time in a certain society, but never quite became for it, a joining member, i.e. he (the person from a foreign culture) never quite joined it (grew close or affiliated and aligned himself with the said certain society), when he called the alien and stranger a "potential wanderer", who, although he had not moved on, had not completely overcome the relaxed manner or mood of coming and going. [[This is real P.K. JOO-Time Here! HAHHAHA!!! = Translator's comment, ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with P.K.]] Precisely in his quality and characteristic of representing the "unity of nearness (proximity) and farness (remoteness and distance)", he can objectively see the cultural community, in which he stays and spends his time, from the inside, and at the same time, from the outside (*Soziologie*, pp. 509, 510). Compared with this, Wood widened or extended the concept of the alien or stranger in that the alien/stranger is "one who has come into face-to-face contact with the group for the first time". Being an alien and stranger depends, therefore, not on the possible duration of the contact, not even on the provenance or origin(s) of the alien/stranger; prophets, geniuses or psychopaths etc. could likewise be aliens and strangers inside their own society, even if in another meaning or sense than that for those facing and appearing in a society for the first time (*Stranger*, p. 43ff.).

alien, strange, and just as firmly believed values, only sows, then, enmity, when the said relativisation of one's own values is seen as a sign that sooner or later real acts of attack against one's own identity must follow. Otherwise, the cultural distance between two individual or collective subjects does not represent and does not constitute a necessary or sufficient reason for enmity – in fact, extreme conflicts have existed, which have been acted out and taken place on a common cultural terrain (e.g. civil wars), or against the background of narrow lifeworld nearness and proximity (e.g. family vendettas). And the other way around; the frequent use in the history of ideas of alien, foreign and strange, even “primitive” models and examples (like that of the “noble savage” or of the “wise Chinaman” in the Age of the Enlightenment), as a means in the struggle against one's own cultural anomalies, abuses or deplorable states of affairs, proves that alienness, foreignness and strangeness as such by no means must repel and repulse people.

The encounter or meeting with the (culturally or otherwise) alien or strange (foreign and unfamiliar), awakens a spontaneous impression whose content depends less on the alleged original and unspoilt uncanniness, weirdness (eeriness or mysteriousness) of every alien, foreigner or stranger, but rather on the concrete momentous disposition and situation or position of that which encounters and meets the alien and stranger. Whoever is in danger of drowning is suddenly thankful to the appearing and helping stranger (i.e. the alien appearing and helping him not drown), as uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious) as the helping stranger may otherwise look. This same stranger or alien, with the same outer or external appearance, is experienced at first sight entirely differently if his going into and penetrating the area or territory of the I (ego), for whatever reasons, seems to always entail troubles, disturbances, dangers and risks, or if the exercising of dominance (or of dominant authority) over the stranger ought to be legitimised. “Prejudice” is an economical (as in sparing and

not wasteful) way of thinking, and, as such, is not to be got rid of and eliminated, as every other relieving typification (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) too, however the dynamic(s) of the social relation normally proves itself as stronger than the *original* prejudices, i.e. these dynamics do not (entirely) abolish, indeed, prejudice in general and as such; the dynamics can, however, fill the said prejudice, on each and every respective occasion, with other content, and put the prejudice at its (the dynamics of the social relation's) own service, depending on how the social relation unfolds and develops on each and every respective occasion. According to the fundamental or in principle subjection and subjugation of alienness to the dynamic(s) and logic of the social relation, also the ponderability (calculability) or imponderability (incalculability) of the course (or series of events) of a meeting and encounter or interaction with aliens, foreigners and strangers does not essentially differ from that encounter or meeting which adheres and attaches to, or is inherent in, the social relation in general. If we disregard the (pre)disposition, the situation (and or position) and the prejudices of him standing across or opposite from the alien, foreigner or stranger, and concentrate our consideration on the alien, foreign or strange Other, that is, at a relatively high level of abstraction, nevertheless, we can put forward and assert the following difference: the imponderability (incalculability) of the familiar (person) becomes noticeable and perceptible in the exchange of his (i.e. the familiar person's) already known place inside the spectrum of the social relation with another and unexpected (place); the completely alien, foreigner or stranger, who, though, is met and encountered only at the above-mentioned level of abstraction, possesses, first of all, no place at all in the spectrum, and by remaining temporarily outside of the same (spectrum), he refers to the spectrum's entire breadth; he (the alien, stranger etc.) is, as it were, at the zero or nought point of the social relation, and in this respect, is basically identical with the complete Other, of whom there was talk in the previous [[sub-]]section.

Schematically, it can be said: in the encounter or meeting with the imponderable (incalculable) familiar, a belated or ex post facto surprise predominates and prevails; during that encounter with the complete alien, foreigner or stranger, the initial tension, stress or intensity predominates and prevails. But this tension etc. does not last long, since the alien (foreigner or stranger), whether through the interaction starting, or through the newly confirmed prejudices or fresh, new impressions, quickly finds a place in the spectrum of the social relation.

In favour of this overall way of looking at things of being alien, foreign, strange and unfamiliar, from the superordinate point of view of the social relation, the fact that the “alien, stranger or foreigner” does not make up a statistical category of social existence (or social being (t)here), speaks for itself. Everyone can – in relation, or with reference to, everyone else – appear as a stranger or alien; everyone can become “estranged and alienated”, or the other way around, enter into a relationship of familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) with strangers and aliens.⁴⁶ The to and fro (i.e. back and forth) between alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) is reinforced both by ambiguity (with multiple meanings) and their gradations, as well as by their mixing and blending. Even the most alien, strangest, and first of all, most incomprehensible and unintelligible, has, as Husserl said, “a core or nucleus of the state of knowing and familiarity, without which it could not at all be experienced, even as an alien or stranger”⁴⁷. Just as much, also, does the familiar (and or intimate) have an aspect of alienness (strangeness and unfamiliarity), which either is (consciously) left aside and ignored, because it does not touch or impinge upon the vital points of the social relation in question, or only stands out and is noticed when the social relation falters, comes to a standstill or breaks down. In

⁴⁶ Tiryakian, “Sociological Perspectives”, pp. 53, 56.

⁴⁷ *Husserliana*, XV, p. 432.

fact, in accordance with the turn which a social relation takes, the aspect of alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) comes to the fore, something which is accompanied by a change of evaluations or ratings. Behind them stand, of course, the variable and mutable needs of the identity and the always – in the becoming – comprehended formation and development of the identity. If non-Greeks were not yet in Homer, barbarians, in the 5th century no doubt existed, in relation to that, that they were barbarians⁴⁸. Types of an attitude, stance or positioning towards the alien, foreigner or stranger can also be carved, worked or brought out depending on the tier, level stage or grade of social development and the overall character of the social formation⁴⁹. If one structures this historical great variety (of form) (or multiformity) with the help of social-ontological categories, thus one ascertains that both the treatment or handling of the alien and stranger, as well as the reaction of the alien/stranger in relation to that treatment, and to life in the alien and strange (i.e. life in an alien, foreign, strange and unfamiliar society), in general, stretches across the whole spectrum of the social relation. The alien and or stranger can therefore be killed, he can, however, also be treated like a quasi god, from whom himself the highest and holiest or most sacred privileges are not allowed to be withheld; in between [[the two extremes of killing the alien/stranger and treating him like a quasi god]], other forms of the relation lie or are found/exist, like for instance partnership through the exchange of gifts, adoption or blood brotherhood⁵⁰. If a friendly relation(ship) towards the alien/foreigner/stranger unfolds or develops,

⁴⁸ Dihle, *Die Griechen und die Fremden*.

⁴⁹ Thurnwald, „Fremder“; „Probleme der Fremdheit“, p. 51.

⁵⁰ Wood, *Stranger*, chap. III, cf. p. 17 and Tiryakian, „Sociological Perspectives“, p. 49. No different than in “folks of nature (i.e. primitive peoples)”, are things, seen as a whole, in today’s “West”; something which confirms the social-ontological stability of these attitudes, stances and positionings. Some would like most or best to crush the intruding alien, foreigner and stranger on the spot, if no punishment threatened them for doing that; others want to worship the alien/stranger virtually or actually like a god, and because of that, they want, in a first phase, to equip, vest or endow the alien/stranger with the features and characteristics of a suffering god. Idealisation and daemonisation represent and constitute also here both poles between which the mixed positionings and attitudes move, or binding and non-binding “contacts” are cultivated.

then he becomes in the case of a visit, like a guest; in the case of a temporary stay, like a resident; and in the case of a lasting, i.e. permanent, stay, like a newly accepted member of the community; if, however, the relation(ship) turns into something inimical, then one treats the stranger/alien, in the first case, like an intruder/interloper/penetrator/infiltrator/invader; in the second case, like an internal foe; and in the third case, like a pariah or outcast⁵¹. Not all these modes/ways of treatment and positionings or attitudes occur and are found, of course, in all polities or communities; some polities or communities e.g. receive and welcome guests, but do not grant any permanent rights of residence, and do not permit naturalisation; moreover, it is open whether the privileges or rights granted or accorded to the alien, foreigner or stranger, are granted or accorded to him as a person, or in principle to every alien/foreigner/stranger. For his (the alien's, foreigner's or stranger's) part, the alien, foreigner or stranger dwelling and abiding for a shorter or longer period of time amongst strangers, reacts to the pressure to adapt to the new yardsticks or criteria and modes of behaviour, either through zeal to conform, or else, above all, when he, in the course of this, founders and fails and endures or suffers frustrations, by growing aggressivity and contempt, disdain or scorn for those yardsticks or criteria and modes of behaviour. The fool's licence to do whatever one wants, which the alien, foreigner and stranger may enjoy, serves less as comfort, solace or consolation, and more as a valve (vent or outlet) for his aggressivity^{52 + xv}. The inimical pole of the social relation is, therefore, here occupied when the alien/stranger, in regard to all points, stresses the differences between himself and the new surroundings or environment; the friendly pole of the social relation is occupied when the alien/stranger wants to desperately and absolutely be assimilated, in relation to which he may express the same inability to really understand foreign (alien or strange) mores (manners, customs, morals) and ways of thinking, both

⁵¹ According to a schematisation by Levine, *Flight*, p. 83.

⁵² Zajonc, "Aggressive Attitudes", esp. pp. 207, 208.

in regard to exaggerated and overdone censure and reproach, or in regard to exaggerated and overdone praise. In between (the said two exaggerated and overdone extremes), there are stances like for instance outer (external) adaptation during inner (internal) distancing etc.⁵³.

Trust and mistrust are in no unambiguous, linear and stable relation with familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) and alienness (strangeness, unfamiliarity); trust presupposes indeed (a certain) familiarity, but mistrust can come into being both as a result of alienness/strangeness as well as familiarity. In general, trust and mistrust are as concepts and social relation just as ambiguous (with multiple meanings) and plastic as alienness and familiarity; they just as much are subject to the more comprehensive logic of the social relation, and take place against the background of the entire spectrum of the same social relation, or against the background of the in principle imponderable (incalculable) shifts and transpositions of the subjects inside this spectrum. Just as alienness is not always and unmediatedly a negative point of reference, so too trust does not represent and constitute an individually or collectively, essentially positive point of reference and any harbour and haven perceived and felt as a whole to be safe and secure. Trust is, namely, no primary social magnitude and no supporting pillar (i.e. mainstay) of society. It grows and increases *inside* already existing society, which, at any rate, is not a society close to being founded on mutual, reciprocal trust, and whoever loses trust, cannot, anyway, get out of social life. There is, incidentally, no kind of trust which specially applies to society as such and in general, regardless of the concrete subjects, and would solely and exclusively live off the presence of society as a whole; *knowledge* about the fact of society is self-evidently a completely different matter (and another story). Trust is always particular (i.e. a part or a portion as opposed to the whole), it relates to certain aspects of social life, certain subjects

⁵³ Michels, „Materialien“, esp. pp. 296, 300ff., 310.

or certain properties and qualities of these subjects, which, by the way, means that trust is regularly accompanied by mistrust against other aspects of social life, against other subjects, or against other properties and qualities of these subjects. Accordingly, the kinds of trust can be easily classified in accordance with two points of view, namely, according to extent (or scope) and the special point of reference. Even the most comprehensive trust, that is, the steady or firm confidence in, and assurance of, the adherence to socially recognised norms and rules, does not encompass society in toto, in which many things flourish which directly or indirectly are and run contrary to those norms and rules. That is why trust in general norms and rules resembles and is similar to partisanship in favour of the “healthy” or “genuine, real” part of society against the “unhealthy” or “ungenuine (false, fake)” part of society. In practice, what remains more important, after all, is a less extensive trust, i.e. towards persons, and the formal or informal practices, customs and habits of dealing with and handling the relevant environment, which, if need be, can serve as the ultimate refuge, shelter or sanctuary for the failure and breakdown or the uselessness of general norms and rules.

The proud trust of the citizen in the police and the courts is hardly of use, avail and benefit when one is robbed by one’s own son or taken for a ride and hoodwinked by a (work) colleague, associate or workmate. As far as the structuring, organisation or arrangement of the kinds of trust on the basis of each and every respective point of reference is concerned, thus, above all, the following distinction seems to be of significance and importance: trust can be connected with the expectation that the Other will perfectly and faultlessly perform and accomplish a technical achievement, or else, he will conduct himself and behave “no matter what happens”, “finely and meticulously”, “altruistically”, “tidily, neatly, pretty well” etc.. The particularity of the trust appears here to be especially clear. Because it is obvious and is also generally

felt that both these kinds of trust or expectations by no means have to interrelate or be connected, that the I (ego) can in fact cultivate and protect trust in one respect, and mistrust, in another respect. Accordingly related, but not identical, is the distinction between trust in the intentions and trust in the (f)actual behaviour of the Other. It is based upon the distinction which the social perception of the I (ego) between the subjective and the objective sense makes in respect of alien action (i.e. the action of others (incl. strangers))⁵⁴.

The word “expectations” is no coincidence when the talk is of trust, and this is the case, for many reasons. Ponderability (Calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) are defined obviously with regard to expectations, and trust is, for its part, basically nothing other than an ultimate or final irreducible statement about ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability): absolute trust applies to the absolutely ponderable (calculable); imponderability (incalculability) is synonymous, equivalent and tantamount to untrustworthiness and unreliability. On the other hand, the extent, scope, and the special point of reference, that is, the particularities of trust (mistrust), and expectations, necessarily accompany one another. And finally, the subject develops trust (mistrust), because it, *as* a subject, has intentions and aims. The aims of the subject can be described as expectations if one overlooks the aspect of the assessment of the situation, which is implicit in the “expectation”. Expectations can rest or be based upon trust, that is, grow upon the terrain of already existing trust. Expectations are, however, as to content, under no circumstances to be derived or deduced from the existence and presence of trust, because it cannot be made out and agreed in advance *what* the I (ego) expects of the Other, if it (the I) puts trust in it (the Other). The content of the expectation depends, therefore, on the intentions and aims of the subject, which,

⁵⁴ See the previous [[sub-]]section above. For the here proffered elementary classification of the kinds of trust cf. Barber, *Logic and Limits*, pp. 9, 17ff..

hence, must be classified as the primary factor. Trust in legality does not prejudice which legal activity someone wants to exercise, and trust in a person does not likewise prejudice if someone expects from that person their legal or illegal, moral or immoral services; amongst criminals, there can also be firm, solid, steady trust towards one another^{xvi}. The orientation of expectation to existing trust does not necessarily prove, therefore, the primacy of trust vis-à-vis expectation, or the indispensability of trust for the advent of expectations, (those who mistrust, harbour such expectations too), but rather, trust interrelates with that aspect of expectation which we described as the “assessment of the situation (or position)”. There are, though, also cases, in which the advent and content of the expectation quasi automatically is connected with the one-dimensional content-related offer of an already existing trust in an institution or in a person. But such cases are neither the rule, nor are they socially crucial and decisive; individual and collective life would in fact become paralysed if such individual and collective life were to rely for its development on that kind of trust. In any case, it is decisive that both most, as well as the fewest, cases, both the more comprehensive concept or notion of expectation, as well as the less comprehensive concept or notion of trust, are subject to the general logic and dynamic(s) of the social relation. As the implied assessments of the situation (or position) or, all the same, as wishes for the modification of the situation (or position), expectations can be translated into statements about the possible or aimed-at outcome of social relations between concrete humans: how would these relations seem and be, how would the spectrum of the social relation be shaped and formed if the intentions and the aims animating and fulfilling the expectations were realised? Trust is also tantamount to a judgement regarding which place an individual or collective (organised) subject occupies inside of the spectrum of the social relation. What is meant here no doubt is a place in the friendly half of the spectrum: the more fixed this place is, the steadier, firmer and more fixed the trust. This cannot get rid of and eliminate the social-

ontologically fundamental fact that the socially acting (individual and or collective subject) must act with regard to, and in view of, the entire spectrum of the social relation. It only assumes that in the concrete case, shifts and displacements in the spectrum are impossible or at least highly improbable. Trust does not, therefore, represent and constitute an original magnitude, but presupposes a certain shaping and formation of the social relation. Sometimes this shaping or formation is only imagined, i.e. trust is offered already before the coming into being of friendship, so that friendship can come into being. The goal remains, that is, again, a certain shaping and formation of the spectrum of the social relation, and the non-attainment of this goal must lead to the taking back of trust, unless trust has been transformed into a belief in the Other with masochistic features and characteristics. No psychical inevitability exists to return trust to trust (i.e. to reciprocate trust with trust), although this stands to reason: whoever gives or bestows trust, confirms his (i.e. the person being given trust's) identity, and the return or reciprocation of trust functions as the recognition for this recognition. If, however, the Other does not need this recognition or confirmation on the part of this concrete Ego, then he goes along with, and accepts, the offer of trust only because he positively judges and evaluates the possibilities of shaping and formation of the social relation. Even in regard to the few-in-number cases in which (one-sidedly) given, bestowed, shown or proven trust takes place before the shaping and formation of the friendly social relation, the course and series of events of the relation finally decides the said social relation's conclusive and definitive character – not differently than in most cases where trust only arises upon the basis of an already stabilised social relation.

The aforementioned possibility of trust amongst criminals proves in itself that trust is normatively colourless, that, therefore, under trust's cover, both socially sanctioned, as well as subversive, norms can be served; in conspiracies, one

needs acts of terror and coups d'état perhaps the most (i.e. more than in any other situation). Trust is based upon friendship and under certain circumstances, it initiates and inaugurates friendships, but the existence and presence of trust in society does not in the least mean that in the spectrum of the social relation, seen in terms of society overall, the friendly half of the social relation must outweigh and prevail over the inimical half of the social relation. As often and as long as this happens (i.e. the prevailing of the friendly half of the social relation), it does not, at any rate, rely on the effect of trust, because, as we have said, neither does trust connect or link the totality of the societal extent, scope or reference, nor does trust, at a certain moment, connect all members of society with all members of this same society. Social-ontological or sociological analysis cannot explicate in greater detail how trust is gained and acquired or can be gained and acquired; in relation to that, there are innumerable ways and paths (to gain/acquire trust), and only penetration into the concrete case permits a more or less successful reconstruction of the way or path pursued or adopted (to gain/acquire trust). Also, the individual or collective effect of trust constitutes a function of the concrete case and the object of corresponding investigations. Social-ontologically, of interest is the ascertainment that existing trust indeed promotes and reinforces friendship and co-operation, but by no means suffices to guarantee friendship and co-operation's smooth course; in very many cases, in fact, precisely this course constitutes the precondition and prerequisite for the emergence of trust. At the overall societal level, trust develops its effect not in chemical purity, but in its – from case to case – mix and blend of heterogeneous elements in different doses. Trust co-exists in a fortunate or unfortunate, at any rate, strained and tense relationship with a “rational mistrust”, which fulfils the important task of protecting and shielding trust placed in the Other from misuse and abuse, and interacts in various ways or alternates its effect with in part formal, in part informal, mechanisms of

social control⁵⁵. It cannot be reckoned or calculated in advance which mix or blend of these elements with one another is optimal; the mix/blend of these elements varies incessantly amongst the same subjects too. If one, in general, may at all dare a general judgement, then this would be the judgement: where the impersonal “rational mistrust” of institutions and of social controls most zealously keeps watch over the righteous and just, and, the unjustifiably wicked and unjust, there, also, trust flourishes between persons the best, that is, as it were, in a secondary function. Because the trust of the I (ego) in institutions stems from the fact that the Other has (a certain) angst and fear before these institutions, which the I (ego), incidentally, knows from its own experience^{xvii}. So, it is reasonable to confuse the ritualisation of the behaviour, which stems and springs from the visible or invisible effect of institutions, with subjective reliability and trustworthiness, that is, to look at – as a personal attribute – that which actually represents and constitutes an impersonal automatisisation (making automatic) or modeling (making a model) of behaviour for the purpose of the reduction in the imponderabilities (incalculabilities) constantly stirring, moving and being active in the background. In this sense, the Joruba are right: peace, that is, an institutionally fairly well-ordered state of affairs, not, for instance, trust, is the father of friendship. But intersubjective trust, as the other side or the supplement of impersonal “rational mistrust” must, for its part, likewise more or less seem to be impersonal, (*pact sunt servanda* [= Latin = agreements are to be kept/observed]), therefore I trust in you). That is why trust very often is precisely – in an obstinate and dogged way – personal, where the guarantees of “rational mistrust” are extensively lacking or play no role in the concrete case. A concept like “besë” [= Albanian = trust, faith (= Greek = *μῆσα* = being true to one’s word))] does not stem by chance from the Albanian. With that, of course, as we shall immediately see, there is not at all any talk of the contrast

⁵⁵ Loc. cit., p. 166ff., and Gambetta, “Can we trust trust?”, p. 223.

between “community” and “society”. The above constellations are social-ontologically meant, they have taken and take place in the same society^{xviii}.

The social-ontologically secondary status of trust is reflected not least of all in the logic of institutions, which all together build upon “rational mistrust”, and according to their character and their function, threaten milder or harder punishments – from showing someone the door, up to the exercising of violence. The passed or handed down (or traditional) wisdom in respect of life has always and everywhere taken into account this real situation, which, that is, commences from the social-ontologically secondary status of pure trust, and from the necessity of “rational mistrust”, as much as it also often regretted and deplored this necessity. Where with drawing up and putting forward of rules of wisdom, prudence and good sense, a moral claim and an educational-instructional striving and effort are connected, Emerson’s recommendation is taken to heart and heeded: “Trust men and they will be true to you”⁵⁶. If this recommendation were objectively correct, then it would, at the same time, be superfluous, i.e. one would have translated it from the beginning of the world into practice, and it would represent and constitute a self-evident, even unreflected-upon mode of behaviour. Because everyone wants that the other person vis-à-vis him be honest, sincere and genuine; everyone would, therefore, forever without further ado (or without a second thought) give his trust (i.e. entrust) another person, if this, and this alone, would automatically bring about the sincerity and honesty of the other person vis-à-vis him. Why do not people do precisely that which allegedly leads in such a straight and direct manner to the generally wished-for aim? Why must, therefore, the recommendation be repeated? Obviously not only because the moral teachers are tireless, indefatigable – the thousands-of-years-old failures in practice would have discouraged, disheartened and demoralised even them long ago –, but rather

⁵⁶ *Essays* (first Series), VII: “Prudence”, p. 147.

because, regardless of the hope for real success, in this recommendation the ideal self-understanding of society is expressed and carries on living, of which society has unconditional need in order to be able to function as a society. The pressure of reality, which extends on this side of (i.e. not beyond) this ideal self-understanding, makes itself felt where, despite all the, in principle, adherence to the moral claim, the advice and counsel is given to handle and manage trust sparingly and carefully. Already Democritus knew that the level-headed and prudent only trust proven people; on the other hand, the simple-minded and stupid trust everyone⁵⁷. Similarly, Seneca formulated the agonising dilemma of the person, who wants to be humane, but simultaneously does not want to be ruined; it is just as wrong to give one's trust to everyone as to no-one⁵⁸. Seneca also indicated – characteristically, immediately before an emphatic summary of elementary moral duties – the daily danger and risk which emanates from man to man, in order to explain the impossibility of a generalised trust⁵⁹. With that, Seneca indirectly addressed the existential angst and fear founded, established and based on the dangerous and risky imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, which is the ultimate source of, in practice, offered and shown “rational mistrust”. One could, in actual fact, comprehend mistrust as the sober angst and fear or conversely as angst and fear in statu nascendi [[= Latin = in the state of gestating (being gestated/born)]]]. In any event, trust is very often felt to be and described as the Other or the exact opposite of angst and fear⁶⁰. Then the grounding of wisdom in respect of life in mistrust seems like a logical consequence of angst and fear before the dangerousness and riskiness of man, as for instance in Chamfort⁶¹. It would be rash to brush aside and dismiss such

⁵⁷ Fr. 67 = Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente*, II, 158.

⁵⁸ *Epistulae ad Lucilium*, III, 4 (utrumque enim vitium est, et omnibus credere et nulli [[= in truth, it is a vice and flaw to (whether you) trust and believe everyone and no-one]]).

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., CIII, 2.

⁶⁰ See e.g. Shakespeare, *King Lear*, I, 4, v. 351: Albany “Well, you may fear too far.” Goneril: “Safer than trust too far.”

⁶¹ *Maximes*, Nr: 116: «Je ne conçois pas de sagesse sans défiance. L'Écriture a dit que le commencement de la sagesse c'étoit la crainte de Dieu; moi, je crois que c'est la crainte des hommes» [[= French = “I do not conceive

trains of thought(s) as the mere outcome of an anthropological pessimism; the Ashanti^{xix}, who little understand Western anthropological subtleties and Weltschmerz/world-weariness-moods, recommend: “fear your neighbour (or: be afraid of the person next to you)!”⁶²

The hardly noticeable role, which this concept and notion of trust played until relatively recently in social theory, corresponded with the actual social-ontologically secondary status of trust. Only mass-democratic social theory brought the status of trust, eminence, and this for reasons which have to do with mass democracy’s character or matters of concern. The sentimentality conceived and thought-of in terms of emancipation of mass democracy was theorised (i.e. made a subject/an object of theory) by means of terms like communication or trust, which exactly through their sentimentalisation found broader acceptance; on the other hand, precisely the confession of faith in the pluralism of values and in the pluralism in respect of the way of life, makes the search for a new kind of “putty (cement or filler)” for society essential, and “trust” could here just as much offer its good services like for instance “rationality” offered its own services; finally, the evolutionistic theorem of objectification, in the modern era (or modernity) differentiating itself, made the thesis plausible that increasing objectification means increasing ponderability (imponderability), and hence, more chances and opportunities for trust. This error (mistake or fallacy) was prepared by the functionalist Simmel^{xx}, who placed or set his analysis of trust entirely from the perspective of the contrast of “community” vs. “society”. According to his nice and attractive formulation, trust is “as a hypothesis, an intermediate state of affairs between knowledge and non-knowledge (i.e. ignorance) about man” – but, “which masses or quantities of knowledge and non-knowledge (i.e. ignorance) must be mixed”, so that trust

of wisdom at all without mistrust. Scripture has said that the commencement of wisdom is the fear of God; for me, I think it's the fear of men”]].

⁶² Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 148 (in the English version: “Fear him who is near you”).

can come about, should not merely depend on the individuals and fields of interest being considered, but also on the “age”. In the modern era (modernity), the institutions and the positions of the individuals inside society have become “so firm, steady and reliable” that “the motivation and regulation of behaviour has become so objective, that trust no longer requires actual personal knowledge”; in “less differentiated relationships”, one would know in respect of his partner, very much more in a personal respect, and very much less with reference to purely objective reliability (dependability and trustworthiness)⁶³. Not only the direct experience of modern men, and a vast amount of literary testimonies, provide evidence that here in mind is a schema of social evolution rather than a reality. Conversely, the manner with which, for instance, the Platonic Socrates speaks of the knowledgeable and well-informed person (i.e. expert) in regard to handiwork (the arts and crafts), medicine and philosophy, or how, for instance, a distinction is made between the function and the person of the magician in “natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)”, allows the justified guess that the objective and the personal are less new discoveries or realities, but rather manners of speech or ways of talking, which, for certain reasons, hold and occupy a purely key (i.e. central and crucial) function in the self-understanding of the modern (era) (or modernity)^{xxi}.

Now, we must say that Simmel, despite this error (mistake or fallacy), did not go so far as to completely detach trust from “rational mistrust”; on the contrary: mistrust resting mainly on objective reliability, and mistrust shrugging off and ignoring the personal (element or dimension), comes fairly close to “rational mistrust”. But Simmel’s error (mistake or fallacy) multiplies and intensifies, if one is able a limine to leave aside and exclude the real mistrust of foes, which can burst open or break up the “social system”, in the interest of the systematic fiction of unity, in order to regard trust and mistrust as equivalent possible

⁶³ Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 263ff..

“strategies” for the formation and development of social systems. At this level, wherever enmity is expelled or eliminated, by definition, by means of the effect of system rationality, and the system rationality is served by trust *and* mistrust, the essence of trust consists in that it is “given and bestowed (as a gift)”, whereas mistrust becomes noticeable in that one enters into risks only when one has taken preventive measures “for eventualities”, for instance by way of the threat of sanctions⁶⁴. Mistrust means, therefore, here “rational mistrust” or trust by virtue, or on the strength of, objective-institutional reliability (dependability and trustworthiness), which must be connected with sanctions. Precisely this, as a matter of preference, approach or approximation of the objective-institutional to mistrust turns trust into a free “gift”, whereby it is no longer apparent how trust can be called a “universal social state of affairs, facts and circumstances” and the “strategy with the greatest reach and range”. Is society grounded and based more in and on “given/bestowed/donated (as a gift)” trust and less in and on “mistrustful” institutions? That can – in no case – be empirically proved, and precisely the impossibility of objectively founding and establishing the primacy of trust before or vis-à-vis (rational) mistrust makes here the meaningless phrases, clichés and empty words unavoidable: trust is to be preferred, because it [[supposedly/allegedly]] constitutes “bottomless, indescribable thoughtlessness and frivolity/frivolousness”, “to delude or cheat proven trust”. Formulations, as is known, turn out and become all the more emphatic, the greater the thought gaps (the holes/lacunae in thought) are, which the said formulations are supposed to cover (up/over). Is it merely “bottomless, indescribable thoughtlessness and frivolousness” on the part of institutions when they threaten people with sanctions? Is every society known to us organised in such a manner only because men are bottomlessly, indescribably thoughtless and frivolous? It does not seem to be so. If we consider trust and

⁶⁴ Thus, Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 179ff..

mistrust from the broader perspective of the social relation and of the connected with that possible constellations and correlations of power, as we ought to also do, then more cogent and valid reasons come to light than seriousness and thoughtlessness or frivolousness, as to why trust is proved or deceived and feinted. Here, for example, are some of these constellations and correlations. The possibility that trust will be placed in someone grows with the relative difference in power; the stronger can, therefore, in possession of effective means of control, trust the behaviour of the weaker rather than the other way around. During equality of power, very probably to the unconditional trust of the one side, quite often – at least over the long term – by means of exploitative behaviour, will the unconditionally trusting side be reciprocated (i.e. the side not trusting unconditionally will often take advantage of the side trusting unconditionally in cases of equal or similar power); whereas conditional trust will run into the greater respect and the greater effort of the other side. To the more powerful, conversely, unconditional trust on the part of the weaker is to the more powerful's liking, and conditional trust is suspect⁶⁵. The weaker can, again, give the stronger unconditional trust, because they, anyway, are not in a position to control the stronger, and instead of that, the weaker want to gain at least the stronger's favour (goodwill or patronage), and through this option or choice the weaker will, in advance, have a good (i.e. clear, calm or tranquil) conscience for their part. In other cases, he who from the position of equal strength has been given and bestowed trust, is placed under pressure not only morally, but also to [[actually]] do what is expected, by the fact that the advance payment or reward (i.e. trust given in advance) is in the knowledge of third parties. Trust can be given in terms of mistrust, if the person giving trust is not at all certain of the result of his step or move, yet wants to undertake to give the said trust, because the aim is to gain or win over the Other's friendship

⁶⁵ Solomon, "Influence", esp. p. 229.

appearing to him more important than every – in the process – risk into which he enters and undertakes. And so on, and so forth. The reality of the social relation does not permit us, at any rate, to operate with concepts like “thoughtlessness or frivolity/frivolousness”. Social Common Sense has constantly seen “thoughtlessness or frivolousness” in the ill-considered and indiscriminate giving of trust, rather than in the deception or feigning of trust. And over and above that, whether the mistrust or the trust of a person in society is the more expedient (purposeful or goal(end)-oriented) positioning and attitude, a plebiscite takes place on a daily basis, when everyone in leaving their home, locks the door, and puts the key in their pocket.

C. Assumption and taking on/over of perspectives

a. Sociological and phenomenological preliminary work

The uncoupling of sociology from the philosophy of history opened in research, in principle, two schools of thought, which partly were represented by various researchers, and partly in the work of one and the same researcher, intersecting in various manners. On the one hand, the erstwhile tiers (or stages) of the development (unfolding or evolution) of history could now be reorganised and reconstructed into functional-structural systems up to the point where the functional-structural thought (i.e. idea or concept) is loosened and untied from every concrete historical reference, in order to define the social, per se, that is, in order to define every real and conceivable society. On the other hand, the same analytical spirit(-intellect), which corroded, decomposed and undermined the philosophically-eschatologically comprehended unity of history, was now transferred to society, which was now dissolved or broken up into its supposed

ultimate, last constituent elements or parts, namely, into actors, in order to then be reconstructed from the interactions (or mutual influences) between these actors. The concept of the interaction (as mutual influence) or of the interaction became, therefore, the focus of attention, and in the course of this, the old question had to emerge in a new context as to how then this interaction (or mutual influence) proceeds, unwinds and turns out; which mechanisms does the friendly or inimical meeting (or encounter) between humans set and keep in motion. In the course of this, it was inevitable that to the subjective sense, i.e. meaning, which actors connect with their interaction, a new rank, position or standing vis-à-vis the objective sense/meaning of their action be granted, allowed or conceded. The latter (objective sense/meaning) retained, logically, inside the philosophy of history, the upper hand, since here act(ion)s were judged and evaluated exclusively concerning their weight for a process, whose direction as to aim remained normally unconscious (i.e. not consciously known) in the actors. Objective meaning of course did not disappear with the philosophy of history. The heterogony of ends survived (outlived or outlasted) the philosophy of history, and the functional-structural perceptions and views could not, on their part, hardly manage or get by without the objective sense (i.e. meaning) of action, or without the channeling of the subjective doing and wanting inside the, and through the, comprehensive rationality of the social system. Nonetheless, the epistemological putting first of interaction (or mutual influence) after the turning away, break from, or renunciation of, the philosophy of history, brought an enormous revaluation of the subjectively meant meaning (or sense), and of all of that which enables subjectivity, from its predisposition, to develop subjective sense or meaning during interacting.

Pathbreaking or pioneering approaches, in relation to that, can be traced and tracked down already in the framework of formal sociology. The elementary definition of the social relation reads here that this social relation is “a mutual

and reciprocal effect, which in so far as it is given on one side, on the other side, it is suffered, endured or received and accepted”⁶⁶. Tönnies, the originator (creator or author) of this definition, obviously did not notice that – with that – strictu sensu, an outer (external) mechanic(s) applicable to inanimate bodies is described, rather than an inner (internal) mechanism which can connect social subjects with one another. However, insight into the existence of this mechanism, was nonetheless already well-founded, and Simmel’s hints or intimations confirmed it. The fact of the You belongs to the a priori preconditions of socialisation, however, at the same time, so does the ability of the I (ego) to transfer or transmit its own “absoluteness(es) (or absolute characteristics)”, namely, the certainty as regards its own reality and about the sovereign handling of its own content(s), to the You⁶⁷. At one point, at which, typically enough, there is talk of extreme enmity, Simmel opined, again, that a relationship between equal subjects towards one another rests or is based on the “knowing of the outer/external situation (position)” and the “sympathetic feeling within oneself and or empathy in regard to the inner (internal) situation or position”⁶⁸. This feeling within oneself and or empathy means, nevertheless, not the (temporary) dissolution or breaking up of one’s own I (ego), but rather the objectification^{xxii} of the You on the part of the I (ego), which for its (the objectification’s) part, seems possible because the I (ego) itself, or the human spirit in general, has the “fundamental ability” “to face and confront itself, and look at itself as another person”⁶⁹; Simmel did not want to decide whether this ability is spontaneous and inborn or a transference of the intersubjective relationship to the psyche of the I (ego) – already the formulation of the dilemma implies, however, the insight into the interrelation between reflexivity (i.e. reflectivity as the capability of quiet thought or contemplation;

⁶⁶ *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 3.

⁶⁷ *Soziologie*, p. 23.

⁶⁸ Loc. cit., p. 93.

⁶⁹ Loc. cit., p. 41.

reflectiveness; thoughtfulness) and intersubjectivity, as well as between the self-reference (reference to the self) and alien-reference (reference to the other) of the reflexivity, i.e. reflectivity. Yet Simmel did not get around to a deepening of this insight within formal sociology, despite sparse allusions⁷⁰. The gaining the upper hand and prevalence of the striving for formalisation (i.e. the effort at making formal constructs) did not leave any time for similar thoughts and considerations, so that even sociologists, who were kindly or favourably disposed to the basic thought or fundamental notion of this line of thought or intellectual tendency, had to accuse v. Wiese that he connects ready and closed- (united or unified)-in-themselves individuals, that is, v. Wiese barely notes their interpenetration as the precondition of their interdependence⁷¹.

A broader perspective was opened by M. Weber's translation of interaction (or mutual influence) into the language of social action and of the social relation, whereby the definition of action as the meaning-like or meaning-bearing (i.e. meaningful) [[element, quality or dimension]], and the equating of the meaning-like/bearing or meaningful, and the understandable, with each other, factually raised the question or problem of the mechanism of understanding also at the level of actors, as much as Weber was concerned primarily about understanding at the level of the scientific observer: the structural distinction between both is, anyhow, gradual (i.e. gradational or as to grades or degrees), rather than qualitative⁷². Social action, and very often also "inner (internal) behaviour or conducting oneself", refers to the action or behaviour of other people, and is oriented in its course to that action of other people; and the social relation comes about and takes place when this reference and this orientation occur on a mutual or reciprocal basis⁷³. Schütz could tie or

⁷⁰ Thus, Vierkandt defines "genuine interaction or mutual influence" as that in which "every partner... in regard to the effect exercised on him, as it were, receives back his own behaviour" (*Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 34).

⁷¹ Gurvitch, *Vocation*, I, p. 239ff..

⁷² Cf. below, Section 1C in this chapter.

⁷³ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 1, 11, 13.

fasten onto that, in order – with the help of phenomenological concepts and findings –, to grant or lend to this fundamental schema more concrete content. The meaning (sense) of action proves itself, upon closer inspection of the plan as regards acting (i.e. action plan), to be that action plan which concerns the Other and whereupon (i.e. in relation to which action plan) the Other must react. That is why the plan has no prospect of success if it does not take into account, in the form of an anticipation, this reaction, in relation to which it exactly aims. Since, however, the alien (i.e. other's) (outer or external) reaction is grounded in or based on that which is acted out and takes place in the alien/other's consciousness, thus, also one's own meaning-like/bearing and meaningful social action is of necessity based on the (presumed) insights into the alien/the other's (present and future) situation (or state) of consciousness. The alien/other's "experiences of consciousness" must, consequently, be anticipated *modo futuri exacti* [[i.e. in terms of the future]]^{xxiii} in the plan of the acting person; the alien attitude (i.e. the other's positioning) of the Other becomes necessarily the motive for one's own alien having an effect (i.e. the motive of the other having an effect upon, and acting vis-à-vis, oneself), and through that, a "backward-or-around-relation of the – included in the plan of my own action – alien (i.e. the other's) experiences of consciousness in relation, in fact, to my experiences of consciousness, takes" place⁷⁴. Through the real mediation (intervention or intercession) of the plan or acting (i.e. action plan), which connects the two – one way or another – motivated actors – one way or another – with each other, the context of meaning proves itself to be a context of motivation. But in the to and fro (back and forth) of the interaction, in which the I (ego), through its meaning-like/bearing (meaningful) or motivated action motivates the Other to a reaction, in order to then, on its part, through the – in such a way – motivated reaction, be able to motivate itself, the motives have an effect, in principle, as

⁷⁴ *Aufbau*, pp. 209, 223, 202 (here [[is]] the citation).

the motive-in-order-to [[think and or do...]] and the because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]]. With that, not two ontologically or psychologically different categories, but rather, two opposed directions inside the same interaction are meant. The motive-in-order-to motivates the I (ego) when the I (ego) strives for or aims at an alien effect (i.e. an effect on the Other), and consequently strives for a certain aim, which the plan of acting (i.e. action plan) is supposed to serve, in regard to which the reaction of the Other is anticipated. Now if the I (ego) acts (in a later phase) under the effect and influence of this reaction or under the effect and influence of an original action of the Other, then the I (ego) is motivated by a because-motive [[as to causality, reasons, justification(s),...]], it (re)acts, that is, because the Other has or had (re)acted. Now, the following happens: the I (ego) anticipates the motive-in-order-to of its own action as the because-motive of the expected reaction of the Other and, the other way around, it looks at the in-order-to-motive of the Other as the because-motive of one's own action⁷⁵. This process obviously presupposes, on both sides, the ability at the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of each and every respective Other, whereby alien understanding (i.e. understanding of the Other) and self-interpretation (or self-exegesis) must interrelate very closely. Because the mental operation basically rests on an exchange of persons: the I (ego) fathoms the experiences of alien (i.e. other's) consciousness by being placed in the position of the Other, that is, by being identified with this Other in the imagination, and by designing, sketching and planning the plans of acting (i.e. action plans) of the Other as one's own, whose aims of acting (i.e. action aims) are set as one's own in order to prepare oneself for the possibility of their realisation, and to orientate one's own action towards that realisation of such aims of acting of the Other. Alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of

⁷⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 116ff., 206ff., 226. Cf. Section 2Ab in this chapter.

another person) must, therefore, proceed through self-interpretation (or self-exegesis); nevertheless, by no means does this status of self-interpretation/exegesis in the process of alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of the Other/another person) vouch for the fact or guarantee that the I (ego) can recognise the peculiar mental texture, composition and constitution of the Other through the simple linear transference of the I's (the ego's) own individual experiences to the Other, or through "empathy". Here, a general ascertainment is achieved or attained regarding the structural equality of one's own and the alien/another person's course (or (out)flow(ing)) of consciousness, and the content-related classifications regarding the motivation and plans of acting (i.e. action plans) of the Other adhere/cling to the merely formal-structural too. In the construct of the I (ego) in respect of the plan of acting (i.e. action plan) of the Other, in fact, the behaviour of the Other as ideality and expectation is included, which can also remain unfulfilled⁷⁶.

Even so, there is, phenomenologically, no alternative for the self-interpretation or self-exegesis of alien understanding (i.e. understanding the Other). Schütz followed Husserl in regard to the perception that transcendence is to be gained through self-interpretation/exegesis or constitution. Whilst the Other, however, is constituted analogously towards the Ego, the Ego must perceive the Other as the bearer of intentionality. Self-interpretation/exegesis ineluctably leads, therefore, to the insight that being finds itself along with being "in an intentional community"⁷⁷. The ability to put oneself in the position (situation) of (and or empathise with) the Other, or to put oneself in the structure of the Other's intentionality, represents or constitutes a mere implication or even the mere paraphrasing and re-description or rewriting of this intentional community. "I know not only that he will act so and so, that he can

⁷⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 156ff., 239.

⁷⁷ Husserl, *Cart. Meditationen*, §§ 62, 55, 56 = pp. 175, 153, 157.

be motivated by me, and not only that I want that ... but he knows also that I have this intent(ion), and he accepts this intention as determined by the will in his will ... These are, therefore, the specifically social acts ...”⁷⁸

b. The reflexivity (i.e. reflectivity as the capability of quiet thought or contemplation; reflectiveness; thoughtfulness) of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, its two levels, and the spectrum of the social relation

Between the mechanism of the assumption (taking on/over) of roles (role-taking), and imponderability (incalculability) as the constitutive feature of subjectivity, there is an obvious interrelation: the need and the necessity of the Ego to move and transfer itself (in)to the position or situation of the Other, grow to exactly the extent the behaviour of the Other cannot be predicted or forecast with certainty already through mere perception and the unproblematic interpretation of unequivocal outer and external signs (marks, indications, signals and symbols/symbolism). Were this possible, we could spare ourselves of talk of the assumption (and taking on/over) of roles, and instead of that, much more simply, talk about an adequate reaction to existing stimuli, like those which are encountered in the rest of the animal kingdom, where an animal can indeed successfully confront and or go into action against the behaviour of another animal, and in fact can anticipate it, however, only because the course or breadth of possible actions and reactions on both sides are fixed, definite and certain, and in fact the manoeuvres of deception (bluff, deceit, or illusion) are

⁷⁸ *Zur Phänom. d. Intersubj., Hu IV*, pp. 171, 185 (here is the citation) = *Ideen*, II. Cf. the formulation of Löwith, *Individuum*, p. 79: “whilst the behaviour of the one person has intent with regard to the behaviour of the other/another person, the one person behaves towards the other/another person from the outset in anticipation of the other person’s behaviour’s possible recoil [[onto him]] ([[or simply,]] the other person’s possible reaction). The come-back or getting back of the other person to one person motivates the same tendency of his/the other person’s intended come-back or getting back being exposed and found out from the beginning”. See Eb below in this chapter.

largely typified. In man, though, behaviour is composed, on top of that, for the most part, of such adequate reactions, but in the specifically human field, which interests us here, this changes drastically by means of the complementary effect of two factors. It is a matter of the displacement or shifting of the instinctive processes recognisable in the outer or external signs (and indications) at a symbolic level, the level of verbalised thought or even speech which is thought, which remains invisible from the outside, and is managed by a consciousness; and of the, with that, accompanying ability at planning (for) the future, at precaution (i.e. taking precautions and making preparations) and farsightedness. The more pronounced, marked or distinctive and the more specific as to the human genus/species/race this ability is, the more certain the I (ego) and the Other are allowed to be that the – on each and every respective occasion – other side can forge or hammer out long-term and many-sided plans of acting (i.e. action plans), the more is the trying, endeavouring and making an effort at tracing, understanding and fathoming these plans intensified and refined; and since it is known with equal certainty on both sides that in the plans and action, the invisible symbolic level participates definitively, and that here all threads are gathered or converge in the hands of a guiding authority conscious of itself, then it is tenable and well-founded to seek the key for the working out and deciphering of alien (i.e. another's or other people's) act(ion)s – relevant for the I (ego) in practice or theoretically –, in the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the permanent or momentary situation (or position) of this authority.

Consequently, an inner activity unfolds and develops, which is reflexive (reflective) in multiple respects. First of all, in the fundamental sense, that the I (ego), in order to, in general, activate the mechanism of the assumption of roles, must behave towards itself reflexively (reflectively). It knows that it, as this certain I (ego), i.e. as the bearer of these certain interests in knowledge and of

this certain capacity and capability in respect of knowledge, makes an effort at the assumption of a role, as “subjective” or “prejudiced and biased” as the perspective may be from which it (the I (ego)) judges and evaluates those interests and that capacity and capability. Thereupon, in the likewise constitutive sense, that the reflecting (reflective) activity of the I (ego) not only has only itself, but parallelly, in relation to that, the reflecting (reflective) activity of the Other, as its object, in relation to which reflection about one’s own reflecting (reflective) activity, that is the – either way – achieved self-interpretation as the positive or negative starting and reference point, guides the reflection upon the reflecting activity of the Other. (We shall understand the extent to which the reference must be positive or can be negative, when we become acquainted with and get to know the two levels of the assumption (and taking on/over) of roles.) The activity of reflection experiences a wider multiplication and intensification (with)in the framework of the mechanism of the assumption of roles as soon as the Other, together with his/its (the Other’s) plans of acting (action plans) and his/its real act(ion)s, is taken (or classed) as a factor or element in the action plans and the real act(ion)s of the I (ego), as well as the other way around. The I (ego) and the Other touch, in this manner, as it were, upon the hard core of the social relation. The – on both sides – reflecting/reflective getting into and penetrating the reflecting/reflective activity of each and every respective Other must here take the concrete form that in the plan of acting or action plan of the I (ego), the presumed reaction of the Other – on the basis of that getting into and penetrating – must be jointly taken into account as the reflecting/reflective interpreter of the I’s (ego’s) plan of acting (action plan). The Other jointly takes into account, for his part, under the same premises, the I’s (ego’s) reaction to his (the Other’s) reaction, in regard to his/the Other’s plan of acting (action plan); the I (ego) responds to that, with an extending or expanding of the I’s own action plan as regards a presumption about the Other’s new reaction to the I’s own most recent reaction to the preceding reaction of the

Other, and so on, and so forth. The multiplication and intensification of the interpreting activity in respect of reflection (reflective activity) here rests or is based – on both sides – on the knowledge regarding the said reflective activity's two-sidedness (i.e. bilaterality, mutualness or reciprocity). And such reflective activity is strengthened for the additional reason, because the signs and indications, on the basis of which the reflecting/reflective interpretation of alien (i.e. another's) behaviour takes place, very often themselves are in need of interpretation. During the interpretation of these signs and indications, reflection upon one's own and alien (another's) inner processes is paired and combined with that reflection upon the meaning and status of outer signs and indications, which may give information about inner processes. – Over and above that, it (the said reflection upon one's own and alien inner processes) is paired and combined with reflection about outer situations (positions), which indeed are not necessarily the work of the Other, whose more or less proper or appropriate and objective apprehension, however, appears to the I (ego) to be necessary, in order to be able to move and transfer itself (in)to the Other's motivation and way of thinking. Regarding whether the process of the assumption and taking on/over of roles begins in respect of the judgement and evaluation of the outer or else of the inner situation and or position (for instance of the "character" or of the "disposition") of the Other, likewise, in every concrete case, the outer and the inner situation and position of the actors, or, the concrete constitution, composition or texture of their social relation towards each other, decides (i.e. is decisive).

The many-sidedness and the capacity and ability at the intensification of reflection in the process of the assumption (and taking on/over) of roles constitute in themselves strong indications for this process's active character. The I (ego) knows, of course, that in the Other, the same reflective process takes place, however, the I (ego) is just as certain of that which goes on in the Other,

– despite all intentionality and referentiality to an object –, has an autonomous and independent character, and aims at or aspires to the realisation of autonomous and independent plans of acting (action plans). The assumption (undertaking, adoption, taking on/over, takeover) of a role, i.e. the intellectual reconstruction of the perspective and the presumed mode, manner or way of acting of the Other on the part of the (i.e. by the) I (ego), is in no necessary relation(ship) with the readiness and preparedness of the I (ego) to play the role of the Other itself, to identify itself with the Other once and for all, and to allow one's own action to be fully engrossed or wrapped up in the imitation of the Other's action. That can, though, often occur, (in relation to which, imitation as a rule concentrates on certain aspects of the behaviour or of the action by the possibly idealised Other, which the I (ego) regards as particularly important). Nonetheless, that is due to psychological and social needs, which in themselves do not in the slightest have to do with the mechanism of the assumption (taking on/over) of roles, although this mechanism of the assumption of roles, at the same time and in the process, – as with any social relation too – must be presupposed. In actual fact, the structural differences between the assumption and taking on/over, and the playing, of a role, between role-taking and role-playing, immediately stand out. The former (assumption of a role or role-taking) remains an inner reflective activity; the latter (playing of a role, i.e. role-play(ing)) concerns outer behaviour; the former has the role of the Other (perspective, positioning (stance or attitude), presumed mode (manner, way) of acting or action) as its object, the latter basically revolves around the role which the I (ego) wants to or must play. During the assumption and taking on/over, the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other is only temporary; during the playing, the I (ego) tries, as it were, to sink into (or lose oneself in) the Other and, in the process, be forgotten⁷⁹. Generally,

⁷⁹ Coutu, "Role-Playing", p. 181 ff.; Flavell, *Rollenübernahme*, p. 43ff..

the assumption and taking on/over of roles is – in practice – non-binding, that is, in contrast to the playing of an already fixed and established role, the assumption of roles by no means prejudices the social behaviour of the I (ego), and does not in itself lessen the I's (ego's) imponderability (incalculability). The analysis of Mead's contradictions in the next section will remind us most forcefully (or urgently) of this necessity of distinguishing between the assumption and taking (on/over), and the playing, of a role.

The two levels, at which the process of the assumption of roles unfolds and develops concurrently^{xxiv}, can already be gathered or inferred from the said assumptions of roles' reflective structure, i.e. they can become the object of distinct or separate reflection, although they normally fuse or merge with each other in social praxis/practice just as reflecting (reflective) activity makes up one single whole. (The fundamental analytical distinctions of scientific description remain, of course, at the same time real thought and intellectual possibilities of the reflectively acting social subject, to which this subject, irrespective of each and every respective used or not-used nomenclature, if need be, falls back upon or resorts to^{xxv}). At the level which the scientific observer calls the social-ontic level, an I (ego) and an Other stand, which know in respect of each other, with certainty, that they are provided or supplied with the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles, and also that via the usage of the same (mechanism of the assumption of roles), they possess different places in the spectrum of the social relation, and in general, can do everything of which a human subject is (cap)able. This, in principle, and, first of all, purely formal knowledge or evidence seeks its concrete content, and finds such concrete content, at the second level, at which each and every respective interaction is acted out and takes place. With their own basic social-ontic equipment or potency (power and ability) presupposed on both sides, the actors pose themselves the question *what* is to be (under)taken or assumed as a role or

perspective on each and every respective occasion, *what* is the appropriate response or answer as a reaction to the Other's action, *what* is to be given as a place in the social spectrum, to the I (ego), and to the Other, as a result of their co-ordinated activity, which *rests* or *is based* on the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles (role-taking). The difference between That and What coincides with the distinction between social-ontic necessity and social contingency. The necessary exists here, though, always only at, in and with, the contingent, both in its already formed and developed form, when, that is, the mechanism of the assumption of roles functions in this way, [[1]] as is expected in a normal, mature human; as well as [[2]] genetically: because to the extent the said mechanism must be learnt, it is always learnt in contingent interactions, and can – despite all of its social-ontic necessity – be learnt so little before contact with contingency [[i.e. it is not learnt before contact with contingency]], like one before every contact with water can learn to swim [[i.e. you cannot learn to swim unless there is contact with water]]⁸⁰. At the social-ontic level, the I (ego) and the Other are bearers of the same mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles, which have, so to speak, the same formal (form-related) schema in mind, and they can also, with certainty, know of their necessary commonality (common ground), which goes back or is reduced to their unabolishable commonality as socially living human beings. At the level of the concrete social context, that is, of concrete interaction, where the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles must be activated, the content(s), however, come(s) to the fore, and since the commonality (common ground) was only formal, it now ceases to be necessary; it (the said commonality etc. as to form) can, indeed, carry on existing, however, it then has

⁸⁰ A baby makes its own, appropriates or becomes familiar with – within a few weeks – the basic mechanism of interaction. Certainly the baby does not see the light of the world already equipped with a finished, completed or ready conceptual schema for the interpretation of intersubjective processes; but it possesses the inborn or innate capacity and ability to develop such schemata, and accordingly, its advances and progress in this direction are quick; see Bruner, "Ontogenesis", p. 96.

content-related and contingent meaning. At the level of concrete interaction, the real question of alien understanding (i.e. understanding the Other) is in fact posed, and the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles is supposed to here provide information about whether the Other's plans of acting (i.e. action plans) and modes, manners or ways of acting and action will assign or allocate to him, this or that place in the spectrum of the social relation, whether they (the said action plans and modes/ways of acting/action of the Other) are, therefore, commensurable or incommensurable with the I's (ego's) action plans and modes, manners or ways of acting and action, and for what subjective or objective reason. The situation or position is, at this level, open, and the possible content-related non-commonality (lack of common ground) is ascertained exactly by virtue of – under all the circumstances – existing formal commonality at the social-ontic level, something which, conversely, implies that also the ascertainment of content-related commonalities in the concrete interactional context is an independent act, which does not in the least understand itself (i.e. which is not in the least self-evident) on the basis of formal social-ontic commonality. The formal social-ontic commonality is, therefore, at the content-related level of concrete interaction, completely neutral, because in everything, which belongs to the social-ontic, all places in the spectrum of the social relation and all conceivable concrete uses of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles are contained *eo ipso*. Here it is a matter of the That, not of the What. And the That as such does not provide or put at anyone's disposal any categorial apparatus whose mere application would yield, produce or result in each and every respective What, How, When, etc.. In terms of categories, the said mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles has as its own, only variables, whose each and every respective concretisation, however, (with)in the framework of social interaction, escapes and eludes absolutely certain and sure prognosis. In any case, attempts at such prognoses, which must rest or be based on concrete judgements and

evaluations of persons and of the situation, is no task, duty or mission of social ontology, but the matter or cause of historical-psychological and sociological analysis. Cum grano salis (= Latin = With a grain of salt), it can be asserted that the two levels of the fully developed mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles [[i.e. the common level as to the form of the mechanism, and, the level as to variable and varying content]] would relate towards each other like social ontology towards history and sociology. This makes one think about the social-ontic reasons for the structuring and constitution (texture and composition) of the scientific disciplines.

The necessity of the co-existence of both levels, that is, the necessary interweaving of necessity and contingency in this co-existence, explains an age-old and ubiquitous fundamental, basic human experience: that man, for man, is something very familiar and, at the same time, alien/foreign/strange-impenetrable(-inscrutable)⁸¹. Familiarity comes into being out of the social-ontically founded, established and substantiated certainty that in the Other, exactly the same abilities for the assumption and taking on/over of roles exist, are available and are present as in the I (ego); and alienness, foreignness and strangeness take root in the uncertainty about whether in concrete interaction those formal abilities will bear fruit in terms of content, whether, that is, the undertakings (ventures and enterprises) of the I (ego) to put itself in [[the position/situation of]] (and or empathise with) the Other (sich in den Anderen hineinzuversetzen), will make available all respective interesting (pieces of) information about it (i.e. the Other) and its (the Other's) plans of acting (i.e. action plans). The real or presumed, in any case, constantly possible differences in content(s) at the level of concrete interaction put the formal commonalities and formal common ground/common points at the social-ontic level, in the shade. Even if we wanted to accept, along with Hume, that men are always and

⁸¹ See footnote 16 and 17, above, in this chapter.

everywhere moved by the same motives and passions, that is to say, that the contents – understood in such a way – of human nature remain diachronically stable, thus it is again hardly possible to know from beforehand which motive and which passion – love or hate; angst, fear or aggression – will determine in every concrete case the behaviour of the I (ego) and of the Other. Hume, in fact, made it clear that the constant “passions” of the human psyche do not produce or constitute – in chemical purity and separated from one another, but only “mixed in various degrees” – the source “of all the actions and enterprizes”⁸². If individual behaviour and social processes could be explained by the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses, thus the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other would be a considerably simpler matter of concern than it is in actual fact. We want, at any rate, to raise [[the issue]] that the social-ontically constitutive human capacity for, and ability at, the assumption and taking on/over of roles, as well as the always present knowledge of the I (ego), that the Other has at its disposal the same and equal capacity and ability, do not in the least vouch for or guarantee the success of alien understanding (i.e. understanding another or others), or, in [[the case of]] success of this same understanding of others, consensus between the I and the Other at the level of contents or of concrete interaction. That means: an, in practice, sufficient consensus is even possible notwithstanding, on both sides, a deficient or even false and incorrect understanding of others; and dissent can come into being exactly as a result of an accurately (or absolutely) correct understanding of another or others. Discussion of the problem of communication will prove the importance of this distinction⁸³.

We shall dwell or linger, here, first of all, on the still elementary distinction between the social-ontically constitutive and – in all humans – in principle

⁸² “Human Understanding”, VIII = *Essays*, II, p. 68.

⁸³ See Section 1E in this chapter, below.

given capacity, capability and ability in regard to the assumption and taking on/over of roles, and the actual talent, knack or skill of every human at making use of this (cap)ability at the content-related level of concrete interaction, and accordingly, at making judgements about the plans of acting (action plans) and the possible movements of each and every interesting Other in the spectrum of the social relation. There is, therefore, a general and form-related (i.e. formal) and a special or content-related ability at the assumption and taking on/over of roles. The latter (special or content-related ability at role-taking/the assumption of roles) does not always and does not necessarily depend on individual intellectual talent or endowment (because it can vary greatly in the same individual from case to case), but it constitutes a resultant of several factors, which in every constellation is dosed (i.e. dispensed, measured or handed out) differently, and must be especially and specifically detected or ascertained – in so far as this seems to at all be possible without unprovable psychological presumptions. Of gaps, holes or mistakes in the understanding of others, there can be talk meaningfully only in connection with the special ability at the assumption and taking on/over of roles, since gaps, holes or mistakes point to content(s) which certainly are lacking at the formal level in respect of the general ability at the assumption and taking on/over of roles. That is why Common Sense, oriented in terms of practice, is accustomed – for good reason – to reducing the understanding of others in general to the special ability in relation to that assumption and taking on/over of roles, and the said Common Sense believes, likewise for good reason, in regard to the development of this ability that, not least of all, egotistical or even solipsistic inclinations and tendencies of the individual concerned are responsible. Since the oaf, clumsy idiot or fool, as one in the tribe of the Sechuana believes, regards all men as oafs, clumsy idiots or fools⁸⁴, thus it must be expected that in every concrete

⁸⁴ Cited by Hertzler, *Social Thought*, p. 383 (in the English version: “the lout considers all other people louts”).

case all men will behave just as oafishly, clumsily, foolishly and loutishly as him (i.e. the oaf referred to initially). Social-ontologically, this solipsism can be interpreted as the total mixing of the general and special ability at the assumption and taking over/on of roles. The I (ego), indeed, form-relatedly (i.e. formally or in terms of form) transfers (moves or puts) itself in(to) the position or situation of the Other, wherein it can, however, seek and find only its own content(s), and then it identifies the lingering and dwelling on these contents with the form-related (i.e. formal) putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other. Non-solipsistic self-reference can lead to quite or absolutely different results; such results, however, presuppose that the I (ego) is in a position to look at and regard as its own content(s) – not merely the, in it (i.e. the I (ego)), momentarily predominating content(s), but far-sightedly and retrospectively, by visualising and making clear the great variety of its own feelings, positionings, attitudes, etc., in order to then conclude upon a similar great variety [[of content]] in the Other. Solipsistic is the conviction that the Other would have to unconditionally select or choose from this great variety, the same content(s) as the I (ego).

Solipsistic behaviour is often socially punished, and thereafter it can be abandoned, at least in its socially unsuccessful form. It does not have to be abandoned when the identity has so closely connected its self-understanding and its will-to-live with this particular form, that the said identity prefers the task of decline and destruction [[to the abandonment of such solipsistic behaviour]]. Whether solipsistic to a “pathological” extent and degree or not, the assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives remains, anyway, a function of identity and its possible peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances). In this respect, there is an element or an impact of “normal” solipsism in every assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives; nevertheless, the social (not necessarily biological^{xxvi}) process of self-

preservation, in essence, synonymous with and tantamount to, identity – of the nature of its needs –, as a rule, leads way past solipsistic boundaries. Under or according to these needs, orientation and ponderability (calculability) are right at the top. They are attained and achieved on (or by way of) innumerable individual paths, whose great variety mocks and scoffs at rash or hasty classifications. Certain variables, nonetheless, reveal the close or tight interrelation between the magnitudes “identity”, “orientation” and the assumption and taking on/over of roles or of perceptions. The Ego prefers most of all to be moved, put or transferred (in)to a ponderable (calculable) Other. It is not enough for the Ego to anticipate this or that isolated plan of acting (action plan) of the Other, whilst exerting every time new spiritual(-intellectual) effort; the need for orientation is only satisfied when the entire behaviour and the Other’s character standing behind that behaviour becomes the object of the assumption of roles or role-taking, so that from this permanent basic given fact, all respective plans of acting (action plans) can then be derived, as it were, deductively – and without doubt, with greater intellectual(-spiritual) convenience or comfort –. The I (ego) puts, therefore, to the Other the claim of consistency and of consequence, whereby the claim does not necessarily take root in the actual constitution, texture or composition of the Other, but rather in the uncertainty of the I (ego), which allows or makes the Other to appear perhaps more ponderable (calculable) than he (the Other) is in reality. Whilst the I (ego) satisfies his need for orientation through recourse to law-like generalities such as “behaviour” or “character”, he commits or perpetrates precisely the same logical mistake as the advocates and proponents of the Covering Law Model lapse into and, as social experience abundantly and plentifully teaches, he lives through, in the process, often both pleasant as well as bad or awful surprises (of the kind: “I did not expect that of him”). Yet that need, for the most part, proves itself and turns out to be stronger, especially since the Other, even if he belongs to the unmediated, i.e. the immediate

environment, as a rule – anyhow – is experienced and class(ifi)ed via a personal ideal type, which, though, was formed as a response to certain questions of the I (ego) with reference and regard to the Other⁸⁵. That, (in)to which the I (ego) through the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives puts, moves or transfers itself, represents and constitutes a typification (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) or a construct, whose extent and scope vary greatly, and not seldom puts in the place of the concrete Other, completely general representations and notions about human essence and behaviour, in order to then from that draw conclusions about the Other and his action in the past and in the future. In practice, though, such representations and notions often prove and turn out to be more well-aimed and more useful than attempts at specified, specialised (i.e. specific) statements. Things can, however, also be the other way around – and this makes clear to us again the fact that there are no certain or secure recipes for orientation and the assumption and taking on/over of roles. Social-ontological analysis can only name the necessary (formal, form-related), not the sufficient (content-related), preconditions and prerequisites of the successful assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. These latter (preconditions and prerequisites) can be detected and ascertained, established or determined only a posteriori for every concrete case, and philosophers, who necessarily offer here their good services, sell an – in practice – useless, albeit pressingly, urgently or compelling necessary, requisite and, hence, much sought-after ware (i.e. product or goods).

Typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) in or at the service of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives vary greatly in their degree of generality and of abstractiveness or abstraction, depending on the social distance between the I (ego) and the Other, as well as

⁸⁵ For the “personal ideal type” see Schütz, *Aufbau*, esp. pp. 266, 270.

depending on the present or prospective and expected intensity and direction of the social relation, although the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of roles remains, in the course of this, structural: typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) and variations take place at the level of contents. The variable or mutable fate and destiny of the typifications follows the ceaseless changing and alternation of the centre of gravity, main emphasis or focal points and points of view of the assumption and taking on/over of roles in the dynamic process of interaction. The assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives constitute, especially in regard to the high intensity of the social relation, as it were, a permanent experiment, whose intermediate results can – again and again – be called into question, even if they, first of all, seem to be conclusive and definitive. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives takes place itself from a certain perspective whose breadth and direction depends upon which (peripheral or central) existential aspects of the I (ego) are activated in the social relation in question, and which (peripheral or central) existential aspects of the Other are of interest with regard to the course and outcome of the social relation. There is no question that interaction does not begin until only after the I – through the assumption and taking on/over of roles – has formed an image/picture of the Other. The assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives is a function of the interactive process, and it does not – at the same time – necessarily matter whether the (partial) image (picture) of the Other is “objective” or whether the I (ego), on the basis of its own life experiences, puts itself in (and or empathises with) the corresponding life experiences of the Other, so that the said I (ego) can “truly understand” the Other, but in regard to that, what matters is which experiences, properties (qualities or characteristics) and intentions of the Other, the I (ego) regards – in accordance with its own interpretation – as important, and allows to have a motivating effect on the I (ego). The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the understanding

of the Other as a whole person do not necessarily coincide. With regard to the Other, only one particular aspect can be of interest to the I (ego), an aspect whose apprehension and practical handling do not require any knowledge about the person as a whole. It is, however, also conceivable that the I (ego) demands such knowledge about the person as a whole. (In order to influence a public official for a certain goal, I find out and learn about “what kind of man he is.”) Much more than an empirically provable “true understanding” – and although the I (ego) views or looks upon its own understanding of the Other, and passes this understanding of the Other off, for obvious inner and outer reasons, as true – of interest here, in actual fact, is the aim of the interaction in the broader sense, which directly or indirectly determines the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. This perspective is crystallised or crystallises in the manner how – from many more extensive or wider objective interrelations and contexts – the features or elements become detached and stand out, which then constitute, in an independent combination, the construct of the inner and outer situation and position of the Other, in which the I (ego) puts itself or empathises with. Of course, it is self-evident that this process is acted out and takes place neither in regard to the schematisation, nor in the sequence or order, in which it must be outlined or sketched out at the analytical level. The attempt to tell apart and distinguish beginning and end, motive and aim, truth and fantasy (poetry) (or fact and fiction), in the said process, must involve, entangle or embroil the observer, in themselves, constantly renewing vicious circles. However, in general there is no doubt that the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives forces a choice and processing of the – for the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – necessary (pieces of) information in a certain direction, that the strategic focus of social perception shifts depending on the type of the social relation, and that simplifications and typification (i.e. rendering into (a) type(s) or classification(s) under (a) typifying form(s)) are subject to the same rich-in-

variants logic of the social relation, whereby inevitable, obligatory specifications of the typical and of the nuanced aspects of the simple elements take place, as soon as – in the concrete case – deviations are detected and ascertained in the behaviour of the, on each and every respective occasion, subjects having an interest, from the assumed and accepted model of behaviour (or behavioural model) of each and every respective supra-ordinate(d) (superior, higher) group, or in the behaviour of the individual from this model of behaviour which until then was the typical behaviour ascribed to him⁸⁶.

The depth and extent or scope of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives varies no less than the, in the course of this, unavoidable typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) corresponding to the extent and scope and to the intensity of the social relation. Before we call to mind the – in this regard – fundamental/basic variables, the most important situations will be mentioned, in which the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives does not seem to be a central or pressing task, although the I (ego) and the Other by no means stand indifferently across from (or indifferently face) each other. In an act(ion) or a plan of acting (i.e. action plan), one can distinguish the subjectivity of the creator or originator [[of the said action plan]] –, which lends to the (intended) act(ion) (acting) its subjective meaning –, from the objective course and the objective results of the same (act(ion)), which can be characterised as the objective meaning of the act(ion) (or acting). With regard to this distinction, three possibilities emerge and stand out: [[1]] the I (ego) is interested in a thorough assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, because for it (the I (ego)), the subjective meaning of acting (the act or action) is everything, and the objective meaning nothing, because it, that is to say, would accept for itself even the most unpleasant consequences of

⁸⁶ Regarding the content of this series of sentences or compound sentence cf. Jones-Thibaut, “Interaction Goals”, esp. pp. 151ff., 153, as well as Gage-Cronbach, “Conceptual and methodological Problems”, p. 413.

the act (action or acting), if it were convinced of the pure, sincere and genuine motivation of the Other^{xxvii}. [[2]] Or the I (ego) wants to, and must, enter into, take on/over, accept and go along with the perspective of the Other, because to the I (ego), otherwise, the objective meaning of acting (the act or action) would not be quite (i.e. sufficiently) clear; namely, the I (ego) does not know what it should do with the consequences of the acting (act or action) when it does not know what the Other has in mind as its object and aims at (bringing about) with that acting or act(ion). [[3]] With regard to the third possibility, in the I's (ego's) eyes, the objective meaning of the acting (act or action) solely and exclusively counts, and that is why the I (ego) shows no consideration for the motives and intentions of the Other. But, also, in this case, the I (ego) can be forced, at a later stage, into the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, when the reaction of the Other to the indifference of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the motives of that Other turns out to be so vehement, fierce, strong or violent and effective that such indifference cannot be ignored. Here, the relationship of power is decisive, and consequently the interrelation between the character of the social relation and the extent, scope or intensity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives appears and makes itself felt. With regard to a starkly (or strongly) asymmetrical power relationship, the superior [[side, person]] spares itself of – or puts aside – the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives when it does not expect of that assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, even over the long run, any unpleasant consequences – although we must note that already this assessment of the situation presupposes a putting oneself in (and or empathising with) – by the superior [[side, person]] – the mental state of the inferior [[side, person]], and that, hence, in the cold light of day, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can never be completely neglected. Nonetheless, the inferior [[side, person]] remains rather reliant on that assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, since its fate or destiny depends – to a much greater extent – on the more precise knowledge of the

situation, of the preferences or weaknesses of the superior [[side, person]]⁸⁷. In more or less symmetrical power relationships, again, a number of constellations, are conceivable: the I (ego) and the Other come only superficially into contact and conceive of, plan, or, pursue, in practice, their plans of acting (i.e. action plans) without having to put themselves in (or empathise with) the situation (or position) of each and every respective other (person). The I (ego) and the Other do not actually (really) have long-term, on both sides, positively or negatively interesting plans of acting (action plans), and act with regard to each other merely reactively, without any deeper and permanent assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The I and the Other foster, cherish or entertain more or less comprehensive aligned or oriented towards each other plans of acting (action plans), and, in the process, they must constantly, anticipatorily (i.e. in an anticipating manner), take into consideration in their planning regarding acting and action, and, their way, manner or mode of acting or action, the reaction of the other [[person and or side]] on each and every respective occasion⁸⁸. This latter case represents, as it were, the ideal type of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. However, it by no means makes up or constitutes the quantitatively predominant part of social interaction. And one gets a skewed and distorted picture (image) of social reality, when one assumes and presumes that the aforesaid ideal type is everywhere, on the assumption that the equality of the interaction partners in the ideal type of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives eo ipso vouches for and guarantees the consensual harmony of the

⁸⁷ Already texts from the time of the archaic high cultures provide evidence for the close connection between the knowledge of humans and the rules of wisdom and prudence for use by (the) weaker (people). The courtier or the underling (subject) puts himself in, and empathises with, the king's psyche, in order to detect, ascertain and determine what could be pleasant to him (i.e. the king), and to act accordingly: "laugh, if and when he laughs; this will be very much to the liking of his spirit and intellect" (cited in Hertzler, *Social Thought*, p. 55, cf. the author's remarks at p. 72; in the English version it says: "Laugh when he laughs. That will be exceedingly pleasing to his mind"). In the European courtly literature of the early New Times there is an abundance of similar motifs. The phenomenon, with which we are dealing here, certainly did not come to an end with courtly life. Upon that, does the grosser or finer, at any rate, immortal art of flattery, in all times and in all societies, build. And not only this immortal art of flattery.

⁸⁸ Jones – Gerard (*Foundations*, p. 506ff.) characterise these three constellations as "pseudocontingence", "reactive contingency" and "mutual contingency". In addition to that comes, "asymmetrical contingency", i.e. the unequal power relationship or relationship of power.

corresponding social relation. As will be shown, the ideal type is able to be applied just as much to an inimical as well as a friendly interaction.

The simultaneous development of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at a form-related (i.e. formal) and a content-related level procures for the actors a possibility, whose meaning for social life can hardly be overestimated: the possibility of suggestion and of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit). The I (ego) can only undertake the attempt to delude (deceive, fool or cheat) the Other because it knows with certainty that the Other, in terms of form (i.e. formally), has at its disposal and possesses the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The I (ego) puts, therefore, into the perspective of the Other, contents, in respect of which it believes that the said contents would trigger (off) in the Other, for it, that is to say, for the I (ego), pleasant reactions. The I (ego) gives rise to the impression, therefore – through feigned or fake signs, symbolism or acts (deeds) – of making as its own and of appropriating the perspective expressed (i.e. referred to), and wants to take its cue from, and comply with, that perspective in the future. The deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) succeeds when the Other assumes or adopts (takes on/over) this perspective, in order to take the said perspective as the basis of the Other's own perspective in regard to thoughts and acting (or action), i.e. in order to shape and form its (i.e. the Other's) own thoughts or actions as inner or outer reactions in relation to that perspective. Since the I (ego) suggests to the Other a deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)), it guides the behaviour of the Other in such a way that now the appropriate reaction to the Other's (re)action suggested by the deceptive image (delusive picture or mirage (hallucination)) is that action which the I (ego) in truth (i.e. in reality) intended, planned or aimed at. This many-branched, complex game is restricted not to the plans of acting (action plans) with goals, which are independent of the personality of the actors. The said

game extends (and stretches) just as much to the narrower field of intersubjective relations, that is thither (to there) where images and pictures of personality are negotiated or suggestively imposed, where identities, irrespective of outer objectives (and settings of an aim) (often accompanying such identities), seek to gain recognition and to make themselves felt, stand out (and or otherwise be effective). The I (ego) shapes and forms its image and its behaviour with regard to its evaluation by the Other. This is as old as the world, and the motivation can, in the process, vary significantly and substantially. The I (ego) may simply enjoy and take its pleasure in the art of (or skill at) deception (delusion, illusion or deceit), and show every individual Other, another (i.e. different) face. In the other extreme case, it can be that the recognition of a certain individual or collective subject (for instance, a beloved or a church) matters so much to the I (ego) that it (the I (ego)) can even internalise (“change or vary”) that which first of all was meant only as a mask. The Other can, for its part, react in various ways to the ascertainment that the I (ego) wants to deceive (delude, fool or cheat) him. It can punish the I (ego), or else leave it (i.e. the I (ego)) alone or let it have its own way, and silently (tacitly) take countermeasures [[against the I (ego)]]. Then the game of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives intensifies and the deceiver is deceived, the cheat is cheated, the swindler is swindled, the trickster is tricked. Not seldom, finally, does it happen that the I (ego) wants to suggest to the Other not a certain picture or image of itself (i.e. of the I (ego)), but such a picture or image of the Other. The I (ego) behaves vis-à-vis the Other as if the Other is this particular person with these particular properties, qualities or characteristics, or even tells the Other which is the I’s (ego’s) picture or image of him (i.e. the Other). This behaviour and this message, notice or announcement very often exercise an influence on the thought and action of the Other. If the I (ego) assesses this influence correctly, then it can motivate the Other towards such a behaviour,

that the appropriate reaction to that behaviour is the action originally intended, planned or aimed at by the I (ego)⁸⁹.

The fact that into the process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, questions and problems of power and of identity, as well as the – connected with them, affects (emotions or sentiments), so strongly flow, that they can determine in fact the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives –, does not stand in contradiction to the, of necessity, reflexive character of this same process^{xxviii}. We shall clear up, first of all, what, with that, *cannot* be meant. Of course, affects (emotions or sentiments) have their reflexive and cognitive components, they do not exist in the consciousness^{xxix} and that is why they cannot also serve as motives (or inducements) if they are not reflexively mediated (“*I* experience joy, pain etc.”). But this reflection has the content of the affect (emotion or sentiment) exclusively as its object; over and above that, it is not capable of making any (pieces of) information accessible, let alone meaningfully connect them with one another and with practical instructions. So-called “empathy” is likewise set tight and narrow limits and boundaries. If the concept, in general, is supposed to have a meaning, then it must point to the meeting of two affects, sentiments and (or) emotions of the same kind, and to the certainty of this state of being of the same kind (or uniformity). The uniformity (i.e. state of being of the same kind) of affects (sentiments or emotions) is ascertained in the different bearers, of course, only by a reflecting authority (i.e. authority engaged in reflection), which is indeed not identical with the cognitive component of the affects (sentiments and or emotions) themselves, but, likewise, has many restricted and limited competencies: the said uniformity must be limited/restricted to the aforementioned ascertainment regarding the uniform (i.e. of-the-same-kind)

⁸⁹ From these structurally central constellations it can be easily inferred how tightly the process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is interwoven with that of the formation or assertion of identity. One must, therefore, go into (or reopen) the same setting or posing of the question and problem also from this latter point of view (i.e. regarding identity), as we want to do it in the third volume of this work.

content(s) of the affects (sentiments and emotions). In contrast to the reflexive/reflective aspect of the affects (sentiments and emotions) and of empathy, reflexive (reflective) activity – during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – demands as-far-as-possible independence from the content of any particular and fixed or established affects (sentiments or emotions), and indeed exactly because the said reflective/reflexive activity, at the level of content(s), must be capable connecting the Other in terms of understanding, possibly, with any affect (sentiment or emotion) whatsoever. The said reflective activity is, also, in itself affect/emotion/sentiment-free, when it, at the form-related (i.e. formal) level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, apprehends the Other as the bearer of the corresponding mechanism, as well as an actor on the basis of the end/goal-means-schema. It can obviously do that regardless of whether the I (ego) loves or hates the Other. The place (locus or position), where affect-freedom (i.e. freedom from sentiments and emotions) is settled and established, can be detected if we linger over or dwell on the already-introduced-above distinction between the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The not-to-be-thought-away (i.e. the inseparable and indispensable) reflexivity or reflectivity of the former must not in principle be impaired or interfered with by the possibly affect-laden (i.e. loaded-with-sentiments-and-emotions) narrowness or tightness of the latter. The perspective, from which the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives takes place, may be so clouded and muddled under the effect of persistently or temporarily intense and strong affects (sentiments or emotions) such that the reflexive (i.e. reflective) element or factor is reduced here to the reflexive/reflective component of the affects (sentiments or emotions), and even so, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in itself functions very well. Thus, someone could, for example, fatally hate another person, and could, in a cold-blooded fashion, plan his murder, whilst putting himself in (and

empathising with) his habits (i.e. of the person to be murdered) as to thought and living; the Other is seen here from the – truly very narrow or tight – perspective of blind hate, without, in the course of this, the, in practice, relevant assumption and taking on/over of perspectives being hindered or hampered. This example is, of course, supposed to prove only the, in principle, theoretical possibility of the distinction or differentiation between the (very) reduced reflexivity/reflectivity of the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the developed reflexivity/reflectivity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives itself. It does not imply that in practice the reverse cannot also be [[the case]] – the social-ontic field is, in fact, precisely in this sense, always open. Naturally, the affect-laden (i.e. loaded-with-sentiments-and-emotions) perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can very often, in practice, suppress (smother or stifle, suffocate or choke) the reflexivity/reflectivity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at the level of content(s) (in relation to which, though, love can be as obstructive (or as much as a hindrance) as hate). However, important to us, is the ascertainment that this does not *have to* happen, that, therefore, to the reflexivity/reflectivity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, nonetheless, an independence or autonomy is to be ascribed, without having to infer, deduce or conclude from that, that the actor is “rational” in any ethical or anthropological sense whatsoever, that is to say, he should or ought to be – at will (or as he likes) and all along the line – master of his affects (emotions and sentiments), in order to be able to remain interaction-able (i.e. capable of interacting). Affectivity and reflectivity (reflexivity) have, as we have shown, their own place (locus or position) and part and separate from each other or meet each other in a different respect on each and every respective occasion. An absolute line of separation, which an absolute and many-sided incompatibility of both (affectivity and reflectivity) towards each other would show, does not exist. That is why the successful opposition and contrast between affectivity and

reflectivity (reflexivity) means no identity of the latter with “rationality” in the above-mentioned sense. The proof of the reflexive or reflective character of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives does not say a word in respect of any one-sided cognitive psychology, which then is supposed to serve as a bridge to an ethically meant rationality^{xxx}.

The possibility of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) with the full functioning of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives proves in itself that between interaction partners (i.e. partners engaged in interaction), equality in regard to intellectual talent and available information does not have to dominate or reign, and also that their aims are diametrically opposed; the said interaction partners, that is to say, can be foes too, without this impairing or detracting from the social-ontic structure of the interaction. These ascertainments apply, though, not only when deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) is present, but they remain fundamental for the whole process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives or of understanding and of communication. What concerns the first point, thus it can be asserted without great risk that only in few, in fact, rather rare (i.e. very few) cases, the interaction partners have the same level of information and the same intellectual talent (or endowment) at their disposal. The openness of the social-ontic field prohibits, however, also here, every certain prognosis about the outcome of the social relation. With regard to the inequality of the level of information, which favours the intellectually more talented person^{xxxi}, the outcome – *ceteris paribus* – should be clear. What, however, happens when this inequality turns out to be in favour of the less talented, and to what extent can the said inequality be redressed, atoned for and made good by the intellectual superiority of the more talented? Even this superiority can, if the same level of information is presupposed, become dangerous to its possessor within the framework or context of a simple or intensified (reaching a climax) assumption

and taking on/over of perspectives: the intellectually superior (person, side) can project the entire freedom and complexity of his own considerations, thoughts and deliberations inside the Other, consequently – during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – he puts himself in (and or empathises with) a fiction, and just the same or similarly, – albeit for the reverse reason –, errs like the less talented, who is not capable of following the Other in his flights of fancy (or high-minded, lofty thoughts)^{xxxii}. After all, it is open (i.e. it depends on the concrete case), in which respect and at which level, at which tier, grade or level of information, and with which intellectual talent (or endowment), the reflexive/reflective and affective (sentimental and emotional) components will jointly act and collaborate during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, or will be reciprocally inhibited, obstructed or hampered. Formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms) of the interaction process, which put the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives at the centre of attention, are, hence, in advance condemned in relation to that, to exclude precisely those factors which give interaction its each and every respective unique or one-time stamping or moulding and determine its outcome. Formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms or structuring(s) in terms of form) must, therefore, presuppose equal (or the same) intellectual talent/endowment, an equal or the same level of information and equal or the same affective (sentimental and emotional) neutrality in the interaction partners, because precisely the consideration of unending and infinite variations and combinations of talent, information and affectivity (sentimentality or emotionality) – by definition – break open or burst the framework of every formalisation (i.e. rendering(s) into forms or structuring(s) in terms of form). On the basis of the conceptuality developed here, we can say that formalisation (i.e. rendering into form(s) or structuring in terms of form) is possible only at the social-ontic level of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, but not at the level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in the content-

related sense. Formalisations (i.e. rendering(s) into forms or structuring(s) in terms of form), which beyond the social-ontic [[dimension, realm, sphere]], either way, were combined with content-related preferences for a certain outcome of the interpretation process (process of interpretation) or with attempts at prognoses of such outcomes, had to shut out and exclude the individualising, literally imponderable and incalculable factors, and start from the assumption and acceptance of equally talented, endowed, informed and “rational” actors^{xxxiii}. The best known amongst them are two, namely, Mead’s social psychology, and, game theory first sketched or drawn up in the mathematical framework without an apparent relation(ship) to Mead’s interactionist(ic) approach, but later mixed, in many ways, with it. Mead’s drive or urge towards formalisation (i.e. rendering into form(s) or structuring in terms of form) was in the service of ethics; the assumption and acceptance of equally talented, endowed and “rational” actors was, that is, in Mead, not merely an unavoidable theoretical convention, but actually an ethical postulate, or at least an ethical aim. Later versions of symbolic interactionism had to, though, nuance and modify Mead’s relatively simple schema⁹⁰. Game theory, on the contrary, was from the beginning put in and at the service of strategies and power-technical thoughts (i.e. technical considerations as regards power), whereby their formalism, – which resulted from the aforementioned inner necessities^{xxxiv} –, hindered and obstructed the said strategies and considerations pertaining to power, regarding that, of fulfilling their actual goal/end, namely of saying anything decisive in advance about the concrete case. Here everything remained thus, as it was already before game theory; the strategist, namely, carried on remaining dependent or reliant on the “tact of judgement” (Clausewitz). In terms of theory, game theory, especially in its refined interactionist(ic)

⁹⁰ See, in relation to that, Rock, *The Making*, esp. pp. 164, 166ff., as well as Goffman, *Strategic Interaction*, esp. pp. 72ff., 136ff., who underlines also, in terms of content, meaningless formalism as the great common denominator between Mead’s social psychology and game theory.

variations, in comparison to Mead's approach, is at an advantage in that it specifically underlines the effect of the same mechanism of the simple or intensified assumption or taking on/over of perspectives with regard to all basic forms of interaction (pure conflict, pure co-ordination, mixture of conflict and interdependence), and interrelating and connected with that, deduces (or infers) the special role of deception (delusion, illusion or deceit) as the means of struggle in conflict from exactly that effect, without social-ethical connotations⁹¹.

The questions and problems of power and of identity, which determine the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, can be described or paraphrased by the sentence that the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives will be defined during the attempt of the I (ego) to assume and take on/over the perspective of the Other, whilst bearing in mind the actual or presumed place in the spectrum of the social relation of that Other, that is, by bearing in mind the Other's actual or presumed friendly or inimical relation towards the I (ego). The spectrum of the social relation is/stands in the background as the shaping and formative representation or notion of the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in every assumption and taking on/over of perspectives; the inner mechanism of the social relation (the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) can unfold and develop only against the background of the spectrum of the social relation⁹². The perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives shows the place of the I (ego) in this spectrum; the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives through which the I (ego) is put in (and empathises with) the situation (and position) of the Other, is supposed or ought to show which place the Other will occupy in the spectrum. Through the assumption and taking on/

⁹¹ See e.g. Schelling, *Strategy*, esp. pp. 87, 96ff., 160.

⁹² See Section 1A in this chapter, above.

over of perspectives, the I (ego) interprets the thought and practical positioning of the Other; this assumption and taking on/over (adoption, undertaking, takeover) does not in the least, therefore, constitute a passive acceptance of the verbal and other signs or symbolism which the Other gives from itself, on the part of the I (ego) (i.e. the I (ego) does not passively accept the Other's verbal and other signs), no[[r does it constitute the]] automatic co-ordination of the actions of the Other and of the I (ego), or of reactions on the basis of such an acceptance, but a never-breaking off-and-never-stopping and rich-in-variations process of interpretation in always new concrete situations, in which all possible kinds of the social relation between the actors appear. This meaning of the activity of interpretation in the course of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives was emphatically and rightly asserted by the experts of symbolic interactionism against structuralist(ic) perceptions and views, and systems theories or theories of roles (role theories)⁹³. That was, however, only half of the job, which was not brought to an end (completed or finished) because the authority standing behind the activity of interpretation, namely, the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, was not apprehended sharply enough in its connection with the movement or motion of the actors inside of the spectrum of the social relation. It was not, therefore, understood how tightly, how originally and causally the functioning of the mechanism of the social relation, the extent, the scope and the depth of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives are connected with the – in the actors – always present polarity and continuity of that spectrum. This omission was no accident or coincidence. Mead's ethical legacy continued to have an effect also on those of his students, who wanted to protect him against a monopolising [[of him (Mead)]] by the consensual system(s) theory and theory of roles (role theory). Some amongst them, like for instance Blumer^{xxxv}, who in (the) place of Mead's

⁹³ Above all, Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism*, esp. pp. 52ff., 83ff.; "Mead", pp. 150, 154, 156.

term “social act” preferred the term “joint action”, in order to stress the interactive element, self-evidently counted amongst “joint actions”, a war, just as much as a commercial transaction, a court trial or a game or a marriage. In all these actions, the actors (would) do the same [[thing]], namely, interpret the basic or fundamental character of the common action and, accordingly, interpret their own and the foreign (alien or other) activity or role (with)in the said common action’s framework⁹⁴. Attention was not, here, nonetheless, directed to the tangible weight of the action and acts and their real consequences for the form (or shape) of the social relation, but to the activity of interpretation in itself, in relation to which social reality, as it were, was dissolved inside constructs of interpretation. This muted proceeding and action [[also]] being played-down, accepted – over and above that – in most symbolic interactionists, the same programmatic form as in the many sociologists of post-war-time [[i.e. after WW2]], who, if they did not directly deny or dispute, as regards enmity, in general, the property and quality of the social relation, then, nevertheless, they excluded extreme enmity from the circle of the theoretically relevant setting of the question and examination of the problem⁹⁵. Retrospectively, more sober authors, also qualified as specialists, beheld a serious deficiency and shortcoming of interactionist(ic) social psychology in regard to the assumption that actors *wanted* in principle to attune (i.e. co-ordinate) their activities as to one another, and would be hindered or obstructed only by problems of co-ordination in relation to that. That is why interactionist(ic) social psychologists, in practice, occupied themselves and dealt with only cases in which the motivation of co-ordination is high, but neglected the cases in which this motivation is low or entirely lacking, and finally they overlooked that often a questionable motivation stemmed from outside pressure or from the threat of punishment on the part of a socially stronger (person, side or party)^{xxxvi}. Also,

⁹⁴ *Symbolic Interactionism*, pp. 70, 71ff.

⁹⁵ See Ch. III, Section 4, above.

between the outer or external co-ordination of acting (action or the act) and the “complete” consensus resting on an intensifying (and climaxing) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, there is both an essential difference as well as several gradations⁹⁶. A usual logical and objective mistake of ethically-normatively adjusted symbolic interactionism is, moreover, the confusion of consensus at the level of the assumption and taking over/on of perspectives with consensus at the level of interests and the aims of actors, or else, the deduction of the later from the former. But the successful – on both sides – assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, i.e. the ability or capacity of two actors, to put themselves in (or empathise with) the situation and or position of each and every respective other (person), to correctly recognise this situation and or position in terms of content, and to come up with and achieve agreement over the correctness of this recognition, has not the slightest to do with an agreement between their intentions and plans of acting (i.e. action plans). The outer co-ordination of acting (i.e. outer action co-ordination), that is, friendship and co-operation, results from consensus with regard to the interests and the aims (objectives, goals or ends), not from the (equal) capacity or (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and from the consensus about the content-related findings of this assumption and taking on/over of perspectives⁹⁷. For that reason, the behaviour of an actor can be foreseen or predicted, not on the basis of the mere certainty the said actor is willing and able

⁹⁶ Scheff, “Toward a Sociological Model”, pp. 35, 33ff., 37. Some authors, who take as their basis the interactionist(ic) model, openly admit, incidentally, that in their analyses, phenomena of enmity are not taken into account at all, see e.g. Simon, *Formal Theory*, p. 210. This avenges itself. Because, by investigating friendship in isolation, it no longer stands out and is noticed that the factors, which should or ought to strengthen friendship or even constitute friendship, fulfil identical functions with regard to enmity. More intensive interaction, to which Simon ascribes the intensification of friendship (loc. cit., p. 203), can just as much entail more intensive enmity – therefore, the specific motor (i.e. driving force) of the friendly relation does not lie therein (i.e. in more intensive interaction). Homans, who from behaviouristic premises, in principle connects the frequency of interaction and friendship with each other, involuntarily and unwillingly confutes himself (proving himself wrong), when he thinks that during/in inimical relations, the frequency of interaction must be correspondingly slight – in order to equally add: “unless the form of competition requires interaction” (*Social Behaviour*, p. 144). The restriction or limitation does not abolish the rule as a whole [[translator’s addition: in other words, competition, enmity and friendship ... all require interaction – there is no way of getting out of (a form of) interaction when talking about human relations!]].

⁹⁷ Shibutani, *Society*, pp. 147, 165, 167ff..

to put himself in (and or empathise with) a certain role⁹⁸. On a social scale (or in regard to a social benchmark or yardstick), again, nowhere is that quasi material dividing line to be found, which the harmonising interactionism of the theory of roles and of systems theory wants to draw between norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms) and norm infringement (i.e. the violation of norms). Social-psychologically (and social-ontologically), there is no structural difference between actors, who behave in conformity with norms, and such actors, who ignore or ride roughshod over norms. The process of acting and reacting by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and, in general, the being aim-directed of behaviour (i.e. the direction of behaviour towards an aim, end, goal, objective or target), which is simultaneously shaped by perception, action, thought and affect (emotion or sentiment), remain in both cases the same⁹⁹. Models of interaction, which directly or indirectly start from the assumption that the I (ego) assumes and takes on/over (adopts or undertakes) the perspective of the Other because it wants to correspond to the expectations of the Other, and wants, in general, to behave in a norm-conforming manner, cannot raise (i.e. make) any theoretical claim to generality. Conformity with the expectations of the Other or with norms, constitutes a special case of a general principle of interaction, not the general principle itself¹⁰⁰.

Social-psychological critique in regard to the ethical-normative narrowing and constriction of symbolic interactionism made, obviously unknowingly, use of arguments and insights which were explicitly put forward and talked about, or implicitly unfolded and developed, already in (the) classical sociological theory of social action¹⁰¹. For a sociologist like Elias^{xxxvii}, who grew up in the intellectual(-spiritual) tradition of classical sociology, it was self-evident that

⁹⁸ R. Turner, "Role Taking, Role Standpoint", p. 324.

⁹⁹ Newcomb, "Discussion", p. 168ff..

¹⁰⁰ R. Turner, "Role Taking", pp. 33, 35.

¹⁰¹ See above Section 1Ba in this chapter.

friendship and enmity are equally interdependent, and in regard to enmity, this interdependence manifests itself in the compulsion, coercion or necessity of taking one's own decisions with regard to the foe's action¹⁰², of being put in (and or empathising with) the inner logic of these decisions and generally in the foe's situation or position. And it does not take a miracle for, or it is no wonder that, exactly the greatest theoreticians of enmity and of war pointed emphatically to the necessity and function of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. When Machiavelli puts forward the maxim: "you should never believe that Your Foe does not understand his thing (i.e. matter, cause, affair or business)" or: "you should look after and guard yourself from easily believing in things (sc.^{xxxviii} inimical acts and actions) which make little sense"^{103 + xxxix}, because precisely then the danger of deception and deceit is at its greatest – so Machiavelli implies that the Other as foe is not merely the bearer of the Other's own intentions and plans of acting (action plans), but also is in possession of the ability, during the practical realisation or implementation of the Other's aims and plans, of taking into account (or allowing for) the reaction of the I (ego) in order to guide the Other's behaviour in the desired direction. The I (ego) should or ought to constantly catch sight and be aware of this capacity and (cap)ability of the Other, and in the conviction (i.e. whilst having the conviction) that in the I (ego), this same capacity and (cap)ability exists, to see through and understand the plans of the Other on the basis of the same syllogistic reasoning which led the Other to the sketching (setting out or drawing up) of the Other's plans. Precisely the tacit, but – at the back of one's mind – effective assumption and acceptance of the anthropologically or social-ontologically same and equal constitution (composition and texture) ("rationality") of the (inimical) partners in interaction (interaction partners) prohibits every underestimation of the foe.

¹⁰² *Soziologie*, p. 80.

¹⁰³ *Arte della guerra*, V, p. 457 ("non hai a credere mai che il nimico non sappia fare i fatti suoi", "dei stare accorto di non credere facilmente a quelle cose sono poco ragionatevoli"; my [= P.K.'s] translation). Cf. *Discorsi*, III, p. 18.

As long as friendship, for these or those inner or outer motives and reasons, is not in danger or risk, the negligent or selective assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is not punished in practice; on the contrary: it can serve or be of use for the consolidation and strengthening of friendship in the event this friendship rests or is based upon – on both sides – pleasant fictions. But in enmity, the vital necessity of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is shown and seen in its entire extent and scope or range; here the unavoidable or avoidable weaknesses and gaps (or holes) prove to be life-endangering or life-threatening¹⁰⁴. In particular, the increasing (heightening or intensification) of enmity can be apprehended as a process of intensifying (and climaxing) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, in which the situation comes, or things go, to extremes in that both sides think and do the same (thing(s)). Clausewitz curtly described this, which he called “interaction (or mutual influence)”. First of all, Clausewitz underlines that it is a matter here of something which exclusively and specifically characterises the behaviour of human social subjects. An “interaction (or mutual influence)” like that between foes cannot be occasioned and caused by “the effect of a living force on a dead mass”, but comes into being only where “the impact of two living forces against each other” takes place. Its mechanism consists in that “every (side) gives the other (side) the law”, that, therefore, every side determines, by its own behaviour, the behaviour of each and every other (side). And every side can put itself in (and or empathise with) the thought of each and every other (side), because both sides start from the same premises and aim for (by setting their

¹⁰⁴ Whether for both sides or only for one, the relationship of power, which determines the possibilities and aims of the foes, decides about that danger or threat to life (cf. footnotes 86 and 87, as well as the [[relevant]] text, above). The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over perspectives must of course – anyway – function, irrespective of whether enmity stands under the aegis or influence of a symmetrical or asymmetrical relationship of power (or correlation of forces). But in the former case (of a symmetrical power relationship), the foes have before their eyes (i.e. in mind) the same aim, i.e. victory; however, in the latter case (of an asymmetrical power relationship), which in extremis (i.e. in the extreme case or in an extremely difficult situation) looks like a regular hunt for (or chasing after) fair game, the weaker (person, side) struggles merely for his or its bare survival: for *him* or *it*, the mistakes or gaps (holes) during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives are literally life-endangering or life-threatening. Regarding this distinction or difference between symmetrical conflict and the hunt/chase, see Couch, “Elementary Forms”, p. 121ff..

sights on) the same objective (and aim), only under or with reverse(d) signs (or symbolism). The one side wants, indeed, to hinder or obstruct the attainment and achievement of this aim/objective by the other side, exactly through that, however, both sides are pushed and forced into the same logic, which permits the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The ultimate and final aim of warlike or belligerent acting (i.e. the act of war), writes Clausewitz, that is, the throwing down (i.e. quelling, suppression and vanquishment or defeat) of the foe, “must be thought about by both parts (i.e. sides). Here is, therefore, again, interaction (or mutual influence). As long as I have not thrown down (i.e. quelled, defeated and vanquished) the foe, I must fear that he will quell and vanquish me; that is to say, I am not master of myself, but the other gives me the law, like I give the law to him”. Every side has a certain representation and notion of the powers of resistance of the opponent (in relation to which its spiritual(-intellectual) powers of resistance, that is, its capacity for and (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, is counted too), and accordingly it exerts, harnesses and extends its own forces (amongst such forces, also its own capacity for and (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) – “but the opponent does the same; that is, new reciprocal (mutual) heightening, exacerbation and intensification etc.”¹⁰⁵. The spiral of enmity heightens and intensifies precisely due to the fact that both foes put themselves in the situation and position – at ever higher tiers, levels, stages or grades – of the other (side) on each and every respective occasion.

Through that, the spiral of friendship can obviously heighten and intensify too. The full development of the mechanism of the social relation does not tell us anything at all about the place which the concrete interaction will occupy in the spectrum of the social relation, nothing about its friendly or inimical character. Irrespective of the friendly or inimical character of the interaction,

¹⁰⁵ *Vom Kriege*, I, 1, §§ 3-5 = p. 194ff..

likewise there is the content-related correctness or incorrectness of the results at which the actor arrives by activating the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. A content-related incorrect assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can awaken in the I (ego) the belief that the Other is his friend or his foe. As long as only the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives of the I (ego) is false in terms of content, the behaviour of the Other – sooner or later – will force the I (ego) to the necessary correction. However, it happens that the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives on both sides and in the same sense is false in terms of content; then, friendship or enmity can come into being for a shorter or longer time, which, irrespective of its fictive origin and substructure, unfolds and develops its own dynamic(s). In any case, friendship, like enmity, can rest and be based upon misunderstandings, which do not have to necessarily come to light. Neither does friendship identify with (i.e. is the same as) the, in terms of content, correct assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, nor enmity with the false (assumption etc. of perspectives). In both cases, the interaction partners (or partners in interaction) do not have (a) reason(s) only for misunderstandings, but also (a) reason(s) for the deepening and refining of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The friend wants to penetrate (and or force one's way) into the psyche of the friend, in order to give him that which he needs and requires most, without perhaps being able to articulate it clearly or even being able to only apprehend it. The foe wants to do the same, in order to detect and ascertain what could wound, hurt or offend the Other most. And as the selfless and unselfish friend wants to – during the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – relieve himself and get rid of egocentrism, in order to serve his friend, so must the foe endeavour to put himself in (and or to empathise with) the Other's situation or position, as much as possible, prejudice-freely and affect-freely (i.e. free of bias and of emotion or sentiment), in order to find the real and genuine weak points [[of the Other]]. Nowhere is the egocentric faith –

that the Other has to unconditionally (i.e. necessarily) think thus or be thus, as the I (ego) would like it – as dangerous as in a struggle relation (i.e. relation(ship) of struggle, competition or fighting). Naturally, neither all friendships are selfless and unselfish, nor all enmities prejudice-free (i.e. free of bias), when we are dealing with the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. Yet already the attested-to and witnessed real existence of such cases proves what we want to prove here.

The identity (i.e. sameness) of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in friendship and enmity sheds light on, from a very instructive and informative point of view, the distinction or difference between sociality and socialisation, which has been already pointed out¹⁰⁶. The direct or indirect mixing of both concepts with each other constitutes a just as usual or common trick of ethically-normatively oriented social theory like the muddling up and confusing of consensus related to content(s) with consensus related to expectations. Enmity and struggle unwind and uncoil no less than friendship via social acts, namely, such as those acts in which the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is at work, and guides or directs the meaningful action of subjects referring to one another and oriented towards one another. Enmity and struggle, however, are not only social in the general social-ontological sense of the word. Over and above that – albeit in connection with socialness in the general social-ontological sense of the word – enmity and struggle demand a degree of socialisation which in principle, and of the nature of the matter or thing, must not remain behind (i.e. be lower or less than) the friendly relation; already the connection of enmity with legitimations bears witness and attests to this¹⁰⁷. Only [[one]] can here determine or make out a lack of sociality or socialisation, who picks, gathers, thinks and understands from

¹⁰⁶ See above Ch. II, Sec. 3B.

¹⁰⁷ Tyrell, *Vergesellschaftung*, pp. 509ff., 82ff..

these concepts directly or indirectly norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms and rules) (and indeed conformity with ruling and dominant norms), [[and that]] the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives must lead to norm conformity and consensus regarding/over aims and expectations. If, however, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and norm conformity coincided, then the former (assumption etc. of perspectives) would be superfluous. The I (ego) could simply be oriented towards (rules and) norms and then it would automatically fulfil the (likewise norm(/rule)-conforming) expectations of the Other, without having to show the slightest consideration for the Other's psyche.^{x1}

c. Mead's ascertainties, aims and contradictions

Although the symbolic interactionists, who directly or indirectly stand in succession of Mead, did not discern and recognise the constitutive interrelation between the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation, they one-sidedly concentrated their interest – in respect of the in-itself-justified struggle against behaviourism – on the symbolic dimension of the interacting, and consequently, social-ontologically seen, came to a standstill at the half-way mark or point, they, nonetheless, took an appreciable step in the right direction, by counterposing to the normative model of the interaction of systems theory and the theory of roles (role theory), an interpretive model¹⁰⁸. They loosened, detached, removed and freed the assumption and taking on/over of roles and of perspectives from their quasi obligatory connection to the fulfillment of alien (i.e. others') expectations on the basis of jointly, collectively or commonly shared social-culturally transmitted norms, and vis-à-vis the consensual

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the contradistinction of both models in Th. Wilson, "Conceptions of Interaction", esp. pp. 699, 700ff..

definition of the interaction situation (or situation of interaction), with the help of such norms, they stressed the independent and potentially conflict-bearing interpretive activity of the actors, as it develops (with)in the framework of each and every respective unique situation, and under the effect and influence of personal motives, aims, etc.. These positionings demanded, nonetheless, an indeed respectful, but clear distancing from their master or expert [[i.e. G.H. Mead]], which, moreover, did not concern marginalia. The mere “roughly sketched and general” character of Mead’s central theorem in respect of the assumption and or taking on/over of roles or of the generalised Other was related to the lack of consideration of the creative aspects of action of the concrete actors in more and more new situations, in favour of a quasi ritualised behaviour, in which institutional values and norms have a decisive or determinative effect, although they, actually, make up only a part of the relevant backdrop or scenery of acting and action¹⁰⁹. This critique implied the admission or confession that the opponent, i.e. normativistic systems theory and the theory of roles (role theory), could not entirely unjustly invoke Mead’s core thought or notion, and in fact aptly interpreted the aim of this thought or notion, since Mead’s putting first of ritualised-norm-conforming behaviour obviously said and meant something. In comparison or in contrast to that, the symbolic interactionists remained convinced that they would more likely do justice to the inner logic of Mead’s ascertainments and insights, and could protect and safeguard the same (ascertainments and insights) from disfiguring, distorting kinds of one-sidedness. In the dispute and wrangle of the normative and of the interpretive perception or view of interaction with each other, the inner contradiction in Mead’s thought consequently came to light, that is, the contradiction between his normative aims and the independent of them (i.e. independent of the normative aims) logic of Mead’s social-psychological and

¹⁰⁹ Thus, Blumer, “Mead”, pp. 151, 168.

(social)-ontological ascertainties. The analysis of this contradiction touches upon some fundamental questions, and it is worth dwelling upon them.

Vis-à-vis the “narrow” behaviourism of Watson, who wanted to restrict and limit himself to the study of directly observable behaviour, Mead had in mind a social behaviourism, which would take seriously the “not external (or non-outer/outward) area or realm”^{xli} of societal/social acts¹¹⁰. The decisive widening of this area in man goes hand in hand with his capacity and (cap)ability of creating and using all kinds of symbols, that is of thinking: that is why this social behaviourism moves the symbolic-communicative dimension into the foreground. What later becomes a symbol, is, first of all, a gesture, i.e. a (corporeal or vocal) motion (movement) of an organism, which has an effect and acts as a specific stimulus upon another organism. The gesture is indeed still animal, however it points already beyond the animal and, by attaching, tying or making conditions or requirements between organisms, it sets the elementary mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in motion. Remarkably, Mead uses – even at this level of investigation and research – exactly the example of struggle, in order to make clear (or make us aware of) this so-to-speak pre-symbolic or half-symbolic function of the gesture: with regard to two dogs fighting (or struggling [[with each other]]), the acting or action of each dog turns into and becomes a stimulus which influences the reaction of the other, whereby through this reaction, every act, acting or action is varied (changed or modified) etc.¹¹¹. The development or shaping of the symbolic-reflexive component opens up to the actor the possibility of triggering and setting off in himself the reaction which his gesture triggers and sets off in the Other, and thereafter of controlling – with regard to the reaction of the Other – his own further behaviour. Even here, where it is a matter of

¹¹⁰ *Geist*, § 1, pp. 40, 44.

¹¹¹ Loc. cit., § 7, p. 81ff..

human behaviour, Mead draws on and uses – without hesitation or reservation – examples from the entire spectrum of competition and of enmity. The boxer, who begins with a punch, in order to open (i.e. break through) his opponent's cover, and makes use of the defensive and protective reaction induced by his opponent as a stimulus in order to execute or throw the, in actual fact, planned blow or punch, moves and transfers himself (in)to the position or situation of his opponent, he triggers and sets off an act(ion) (namely, the presumed reaction of the opponent to his attempt at deception or bluff), and gains, through that, the stimulus for his later reaction¹¹². The warrior, “who moves and transfers himself (in)to the position of his opponent”, is named in one breath with (i.e. at the same moment as) the teacher and the student, who in the framework of an entirely differently constituted or disposed relation, must do exactly the same [[thing(, of moving and transferring themselves (in)to the position of the Other/opponent)]]¹¹³. In general, the basic or fundamental experience of communication, namely the taking (capture or occupation) of the stance of other people, also then continues, when an identity “consciously asserts itself vis-à-vis other identities, in connection with a feeling of power or of predominance”. Exactly though that, the domination of a man differs from that (domination) of a leader of a herd¹¹⁴. Man remains, therefore, – also as a foe and oppressor of man – in a specific sense, man.

[[The fact]] that enmity uses, just like friendship, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, could perhaps be regarded as irrelevant for ethical-normative settings of an aim and objectives, if at least the permanent social weight of the former (enmity) was considerably less than that of the later (friendship). But Mead does not argue thus; on the contrary. He talks of two “main categories” of social-psychological “impulses or behavioural tendencies,

¹¹² Loc. cit., § 10, p. 112.

¹¹³ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 375.

¹¹⁴ Loc. cit., § 25, p. 237.

which are common to all men, and lead these men to form organised societies”: those, which lead to “soci(et)al co-operation” and those, which lead to “soci(et)al antagonism”, “that is, those which trigger and set off friendly stances and relations ... and those which entail hostile (inimical) stances and relations”¹¹⁵. Apart from the very questionable or dubious founding in respect of the anthropology of drives (urges and impulses) of friendship and enmity, which is present here, these formulations let no doubt arise about the fact that Mead attributes to enmity precisely the same socially constitutive function as friendship. He also sets out, argues and explains in greater detail how this function should be understood and, in the course of this, distinguishes two cases. In watered-down form, and on each and every respective occasion, in a different dosage, enmity is mixed or mixes with friendship in peaceful, at any rate, violentless (i.e. non-violent or bloodless) relations of competition and rivalry. In pure form, enmity forges, again, firm, stable or fixed social ties or bonds inside of a society, when it turns against an external foe. Thus seen, inimical stances are “everything other than forces of disintegration and of destruction”¹¹⁶. In both cases, there are in fact indications that the effect of enmity reaches and achieves deeper strata than that of the rest of the “impulses”. With regard to the imperative and essential combative, contentious or martial element in the politics of peace time, Mead believes that we are psychologically “reliant or dependent upon the game of low or base impulses, in order to functionally preserve our normal institutions (*or*: in order to preserve our normal institutions in a function-capable manner (i.e. in a manner in which the said normal institutions are able to function))”¹¹⁷. And regarding the cementing and reinforcing force of enmity, it is reported from a psychological point of

¹¹⁵ Loc. cit., § 39, p. 351.

¹¹⁶ Loc. cit., § 39, p. 353ff.. In another place (§ 31, p. 286), “mutual or reciprocal defence” and “common or joint attack” are equally counted and reckoned amongst “co-operative stances”; both are “situations, from which identity develops”.

¹¹⁷ Loc. cit., § 28, p. 264ff..

view, “the easiest way or manner of joining together and uniting” is “against a common foe”¹¹⁸. There must be a cogent and compelling reason such that this is precisely the easiest way or manner. In an essay/article in which Mead literally repeated the thesis: “There is no ground upon which men get together so readily as that of a common enemy”, he also names the (psychological) reason for that: “The instinct of hostility ... when fully aroused and put in competition with the other powerful human complexes of conduct ... has proved itself as more dominant than they”¹¹⁹. In the same text, the effects of that “instinct” for the formation of individual identity are emphasised, and the basic features and basic propositions of criminal justice are derived from enmity of the collective identity against the criminal. Mead, full of hope, adds that “evolution” will put in the place of “self-confirmation” through enmity, that “self-confirmation” through service, contribution and social respect or esteem¹²⁰. The invocation of evolution, nevertheless, is in contradiction with Mead’s social-psychological analysis, which did not want to be a mere description of a historical situation, but precisely raised, i.e. made a social-ontological claim.

The fundamental social-psychological principles referred to until now would have brought Mead into disrepute precisely in regard to his many later admirers, had Mead used them with this clarity and unambiguity for the basis of a logically closed, united and cohesive theory. But Mead does not do exactly this. Those fundamental principles crop up and appear in various places, as it were, as casual and in-passing observations, without discussion of their systematic place and their systematic consequences. The theoretical expositions and explanations stand, all in all, *expressis verbis*, under the influence – and in the service – of a starkly and strongly democratically coloured ethical-normative matter of concern, and Mead himself in fact names, without angst and or fear

¹¹⁸ Loc. cit., § 26, p. 252, cf. § 29, p. 265.

¹¹⁹ “The Psychology”, p. 599. Cf. *Geist*, § 39, p. 352.

¹²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 593. Mead’s theory of criminal justice will be dealt by us in the 2nd volume of this work.

before self-contradiction, the constructs by means of which he wants to – so to speak, in terms of theory – outwit and outsmart the aforementioned fundamental social-psychological principles. It is a matter, on the one hand, of an ethical definition of the social relation and, on the other hand, of a restrictive interpretation of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which builds upon a schematic theory regarding the structure of identity. The former (definition of the social relation) reminds [[us]] of several similar attempts^{121 + xlii}, and it appears in Mead as the distinction between two meanings of the soci(et)al. In its “widest (most extensive)” sense, the soci(et)al encompasses both inimical as well as friendly positionings, in its “much more narrowly grasped definition, in which ethical values befit it (i.e. the soci(et)al)”, the soci(et)al relates or refers, on the other hand, only to friendly positionings and attitudes¹²². However, the matter does not remain with the mere distinction. Mead wants to – over and above that – suggest that this distinction is connected somehow with the better or worse functioning of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives; wherever, that is, the soci(et)al is (i.e. ought) to be comprehended in the narrower ethical sense, only there can communication achieved through that mechanism come to its full development too. For that, Mead does not offer any objective arguments, he does not explain, therefore, in which sense and [[to what]] extent the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and communication, must structurally vary in accordance with both meanings of the soci(et)al. The sole presuppositions or preconditions, which he names for their (i.e. the assumption of perspectives and communication’s) execution and carrying out, are the development of the nervous system and organised soci(et)al activity, obviously in the “widest, broadest” sense of the word¹²³. On the other hand, he manufactures, makes or

¹²¹ See Ch. III, Sec. 4, above.

¹²² *Geist*, § 39, p. 352.

¹²³ Loc. cit., § 42, p. 384ff.

restores, again and again, an interrelation between the fact that the individual takes up the stance of other people or members in the group, and, “the normal presuppositions or preconditions”, i.e. the co-operative norm-conforming behaviour of the members of the group, in relation to which the lifting (i.e. abolition) of these normal presuppositions or preconditions is tantamount to a loss of, or deficit in, the (cap)ability at the taking up of alien (i.e. other) stances¹²⁴. Or, he protests as a democrat against the influence of social “castes”, which erect walls between those belonging as members of a community, and “it makes it impossible for people to assume and take on/over the stance of other people”¹²⁵. Only in the “ideal society”, we subsequently read, is “ideal communication” possible; only there can individual people move and transfer themselves (in)to the position and situation of all other people in an unhindered and undistorted manner. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the thereon founded and established communication constitute, therefore, one time, a “social-psychologically” constitutive function, another time, a yet-to-be-reached-and-achieved norm, which can be realised under present-day circumstances, conditions and relations only partially and intermittently. The ambiguity would be defensible and justifiable if Mead could make plausible that the difference between present and future communication concerns the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives itself, that with growing norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms) and ethicisation at the level of contents of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, sooner or later, an essential perfection (completing and perfecting) of the mechanism itself must occur as a form-related (i.e. formal) structure. Nonetheless, no – as we showed in the previous [[sub-]]section – necessary interrelation can be made out between the form-related (i.e. formal) and the content-related level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. When Mead, therefore, talks of

¹²⁴ See e.g. loc. cit., § 27, p. 254.

¹²⁵ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 376.

the ideal communication, then he can only mean contents in their norm bindedness; he hopes for a future identification and equating of the socie(ta)l in the wider sense with the soci(et)al in the narrower (and stricter) sense of the word. The lifting (i.e. abolition) of the present partial and intermittent character of communication wants to mean that communication will become entirely and constantly norm-conformingly and ethically oriented. However, if the constitution, composition and texture of the contents of communication has nothing to do with its mechanism, and if the latter (mechanism) remains structurally, in any case, the same, then it cannot be logically legitimised to derive or deduce expectations with reference to those contents from thoughts and considerations about the aforementioned mechanism, i.e. an Ought from an Is. If, though, already in the present-day existing structure of this same mechanism, the soci(et)al in the (i.e. Mead's) narrower/stricter sense, that is, friendship, is absolutely possible, then obviously the reasons for the emergence and appearance of friendship or enmity may not be sought in the mechanism's perfectiveness or imperfectiveness, especially since not only enmity, but also friendship, can occasionally come into being through content-related mistakes in the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. That is why the conclusion appears to be unavoidable that the mechanism of the social relation can be consistent or compatible with all contents which are conceivable in the spectrum of the social relation. And we must do justice to Mead, and admit he was right in regard to his neutral ascertainment that the man or person who takes on or over the stance of another (man, person), "adapts to (the other man/person's) own identity, or assumes, accepts and adopts (the) struggle"¹²⁶.

This sentence contains a quite clear admission or confession that the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives as such cannot vouch for and guarantee the ponderability (calculability) of the human subject –

¹²⁶ Loc. cit., § 25, p. 237.

in the end, the said human subject was developed, in fact, with regard and in view of its imponderability (incalculability). Mead himself indirectly concedes or admits this, by looking out for additional guarantees for the safeguarding of ponderability (calculability). He believed to be able to put these guarantees into such a construction of identity, which would bind or tie the assumption and the taking on/over of perspectives with the greatest possible probability and likelihood in the taking on/over of certain contents. What the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in itself did not accomplish and achieve, was supposed to now be accomplished and achieved through the guidance of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives on the part of a correspondingly structured self. This self is supposed to be founded and established structurally on a positive or negative relation, at any rate, on the necessary co-existence of “I” and “Me”¹²⁷, whereby the “I” provides the sense or feeling of “freedom” and “initiative”, and exactly because of that, “it [[i.e. the “I”]] is never completely ponderable (calculable)”. One has it “never fully in one’s grip (i.e. under control)” and it is “always a little different from that which the situation itself demands or requires”¹²⁸. Whereas, therefore, the “I” dominates, when the “normal presuppositions, prerequisites or preconditions” are put out of force (i.e. are annulled and not in force), and “the identity asserts and imposes itself only in opposition to other identities”¹²⁹, the task falls to the “Me” to make the identity as a whole, socially ponderable (calculable), by the “Me” exercising “soci(et)al control” inside of the area or sector of identity, by the “Me” constituting the “control organ” (or “organ of control”) for one’s own acts and actions, and indeed due to the fact that the “Me” takes up the stance of other people and solidifies, reinforces and strengthens the said stance to scale (i.e. as a yardstick). It (The “Me”) is therefore clearly outlined and objectively given,

¹²⁷ Loc. cit., § 23, p. 225.

¹²⁸ Loc. cit., § 22, p. 221; § 26, p. 247ff.

¹²⁹ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 254.

whereas the reaction of the “I” to the thus created yardsticks and the control activity (or the activity of control) of the “Me”, remains more or less undetermined¹³⁰. The “Me” represents and constitutes, as a whole, all those perspectives from which the person knows that the person is seen from those perspectives by the other persons. The “Me” represents, thus, the positionings which the identity assumes and takes on/over vis-à-vis itself, when the identity assumes and takes on/over the role of another person vis-à-vis itself. The “Me” is, as Mead opines, comparable with Freud’s I (ego), the “Me” rules and prevails in the office of the censor (i.e. the “Me” censors) and lends (or grants) to the “I” the “conventional”, namely the norm-conforming form¹³¹.

This notion of the basic or fundamental structure of the self is, though, not particularly original. It starts from premises pertaining to the anthropology of drives (urges and impulses), and offers or provides a new edition of the age-old dichotomy between an often explosive and always suspect potential in respect of drives, urges and impulses in the individual, and controlling authorities or tiers of jurisdiction, which the “voice of society”, that is, of the collective interest or of collective norms, articulates, and at the same, internalises.

Contemporary philosophers and sociologists have developed similar dichotomous concepts or conceptual plans, in which the personal-individual and the impersonal-social inside of the self are contrasted with each other, and at the same time, are connected, and Mead might (should or must) have known about some of them¹³². But it is not a matter here, for us, of intellectual(-spiritual)

¹³⁰ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 254; § 25, p. 240; § 22, pp. 218, 219.

¹³¹ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 253.

¹³² James uses the terms “I” and “Me” differently to Mead, but with related intent. The “I” represents here the “pure Ego” or the “pure principle of personal identity”, it bears, as an inseparable thought or idea, knowledge regarding the unity and continuity of this same thought or idea. The “Me” means the empirical self, which, for its part, is put together or composed out of a material, a social and a spiritual self. The social and the spiritual self relate with each other approximately like that of Mead’s “Me” and “I”: the social self varies depending on all respective relevant persons in its environment or surroundings, it sees its own image or picture in the spirit of the Other; the spiritual self is the active element, which affirms or rejects (*Principles*, I, pp. 371, 400ff., 296, 294, 324, 321, 297). Bergson distinguishes between the «moi fondamental, réel, concret» (= the “fundamental, real, concrete Me”) and the «moi conventionel» (= the “conventional Me”), which is formed in view of, or with regard to, social demands, and is supposed to satisfy or fulfil them; it is a «représentation symbolique»

influences. The social-ontologically relevant question is whether Mead, with the help of his conceptual instruments or equipment, succeeds in the proof that the “Me” is in the position to exercise upon the “I” the expected by it (the “Me”) ethical-normative influence, regardless of which meaning the “Me” may otherwise have for the “I”, or which reasons may otherwise motivate the “I”, to behave ethically and in a norm-conforming manner. Put differently: how far, or to what extent, are the achievements, feats or performances of the “Me”, that is, the content-related findings and results of the taking on of the stance of other people, binding for the “I”, indeed cognitively, but not at all ethically-normatively? How far, or to what extent, does the “I” need the cognitive services of the “Me” even when it wants to step over (i.e. transgress, infringe, contravene or violate) the ruling, dominating and dominant norms (knowingly)? In Mead’s fundamental conceptuality, there is nothing which would force us to exclude the possibilities indicated or insinuated in these questions. Precisely, then, it is forbidden to do this, when we take this conceptuality seriously. If the “Me” represents and constitutes basically merely a “situation”, in(to) which behaviour drains off (i.e. unfolds and merges), whereas the entire “factual reaction” to (or in) this situation is concentrated on the “I”¹³³, then in actual fact the “Me” can, beyond the erecting or setting up of objective obstructions, barriers and hindrances determined by the situation, hardly influence the outer/external, let alone the inner/internal, positioning of the “I” – so much the less, as Mead does not want to know about the simple stimulus-reaction-schema, and

(“symbolic representation”) (*Essai sur les données*, p. 97ff.). Cf. Scheler: “to every finite person, an individual person and an overall or total and whole person, belongs”, (*Formalismus*, p. 509ff., esp. p. 511ff.). Finally, let us recall Durkheim, whose social-psychological dualism, incidentally, was connected with the same normative representations and notions as Mead: «Il y a en nous deux consciences: l’une ne contient que des états qui sont personnels à chacun de nous ..., tandis que les états que comprend l’autre sont communs à toute la société...» (= “There are in us two consciences, awarenesses or consciousnesses: one contains only states which are personal to every one of us ..., whilst the states that the other (conscience, awareness or consciousness) understands are common to all of society...”) (*Division*, p. 74, cf. p. 99). Also, the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives became a theme or topic in the social psychology at the turn of the century [[i.e. from the 19th to the 20th century]], see e.g. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 185ff., where in fact the question or problem was treated in an interrelation with (or in relation to) the formation of identity.

¹³³ *Geist*, § 35, p. 325.

emphasises, against Watson, the constant imminence of “alternative reactions”¹³⁴. Under these circumstances, the “I” indeed is necessarily bound and tied to the “Me”, or to the content-related findings of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as these are assumed or taken on/over by the “Me”, however, what the “I” does with these findings, is another matter. To the “I” of the burglar, the taking in or including of the stance of his victims of his (i.e. the burglar’s) “Me”, serves as the authority of control and organ of regulation of his (the burglar’s) behaviour. The burglar shows, in the literal sense of the word, consideration for other people, he takes them into account at every turn, no less than a mother who walks on tiptoes in order to not disturb the sleep of her children. That means: the (impersonal) assumption and taking on/over of an alien (i.e. another’s) perspective by the “Me”, and the (personal) affirmation and approval of the same “Me” by the “I” are two different things, the assumption and the taking on/over of perspectives takes place in full consciousness of the difference of the identities concerned. (It must, in fact, take place thus, when the I (ego), as norm-conforming man of honour stands opposite or across, for instance, a criminal.) And only a false, – but still frequent –, confusion of the perspective with processes of positive, emotional fixation on the Other can make every difference out of sight (i.e. not perceived). Particular talent or endowment and marksmanship, shrewdness or accuracy in the assumption and or taking on/over of perspectives does not limit or restrict in itself, in the least, the probability of a contrasting or opposition of the settings of the aim or aims (objectives or targets), and just as little does such talent etc. strengthen and reinforce altruistic propensities automatically. The fundamental, or in principle, difference between the matter or case of the “I” and that of the “Me” becomes immediately clear, if one considers and reflects that the “Me” indeed assumes and takes on/over a number of perspectives and roles

¹³⁴ Loc. cit., § 2, p. 50; cf. § 5, p. 67, regarding the selective character of consciousness.

simultaneously, but the “I” can only identify with a single perspective amongst the said number of perspectives and roles (if at all)¹³⁵.

Another reason why the “Me” does not have to necessarily influence the stances and act(ion)s of the “I”, is partially or entirely in opposition to the above-mentioned case, i.e. it partially or entirely concerns other concrete cases. Until now it has been assumed and accepted that the “I” registered the findings of the “Me” soberly, irrespective of how it (i.e. the “I”) positioned itself in relation to those findings and results. However, it should not be forgotten that the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, for its part, takes place from a certain perspective, that the latter (certain perspective) can be, at times, broad and bright, at other times, narrow and cloudy, turbid, dim, especially when the identity, for any motives whatsoever, has less angst and fear before the danger or risk of solipsism than before other dangers and risks. If now, the “Me” is the taking on of alien (another’s or others’) stances, that is, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, then the “I” represents the perspective inside of which the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives should, is supposed to or ought to, take place. When this perspective heavily pressures the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, then what happens is that the “I” indeed bends and submits to the control by the “Me”, but only after the “I”, in advance, has indirectly censored the contents of the “Me” and, hence, has controlled how the authority of control is supposed to turn out, to which the “I” must submit or be subjected and subjugated: still before the “Me” can bind and tie the “I”, the “I” has brought the “Me” therein to where the “I” would like to have the “Me”. The “I” functions not merely as a reaction to the “Me”, but as the force of shaping and forming of the same “Me”. How far this activity in respect of shaping and forming goes, depends on the individual case. (The empirically attested to and witnessed spectrum stretches from solipsism up to the

¹³⁵ Cf. R. Turner, “Role-Taking, Role Standpoint”, p. 319.

establishing, determining or fixing of a certain horizon of interests with the greatest possible cool registration of that which is acted out (with)in the said spectrum). Mead alludes – in passing – to the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, by having to ascertain that the world of the “Me”, that is, the organisation of the community, “is expressed in the particular (cap)abilities and the particular soci(et)al situation of the individual”, which has “a certain inheritance, legacy or heritage” and “a certain standpoint” which distinguishes the individual from all other members of the community”¹³⁶.

Mead, nonetheless, does not want to go into the implications of this ascertainment for the relations between the “I” and the “Me”. He is, in principle, interested in the objectivity of the “Me”, so that this can have at its disposal, so-to-speak, enough prestige in order to be able to have a credible effect on the “I”; if this effect fails to materialise, then the “I” is to blame for the consequences. Here, starkly or strongly simplifying and simplistic hypostatisations or personifications of processes of consciousness are present, which are mixed with one another beyond recognition (*or*: up to indecipherability or unrecognisableness); the mere stressing of the necessity of their co-existence passes by the real question or problem. If the “Me”, at least up to a certain degree, represents and constitutes the objectivised optics (i.e. point of view) of the “I”, or even the self-reflection (or self-mirroring (up to narcissism)) of the same “I”, thus, the taking in of alien (i.e. another’s or others’) stances cannot be separated so neatly from the reaction to that taking in as Mead would like [[to separate]] it. The differences between individuals are not reduced merely to the “I”, but at least partially already to the constitution of a “Me”. The putting itself of the I (ego) in the position and situation of the Other depends in every case on that image or picture which the I (ego) has of the Other and the Other’s actions and reactions, regardless of the I’s (ego’s) (cap)ability or readiness and

¹³⁶ *Geist*, § 26, p. 244.

willingness to examine (check, test, validate or prove) this image or picture against, or in respect of, data and (pieces of) knowledge¹³⁷. And the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives does not self-evidently mean that, that which the I (ego) assumes and takes on/over is necessarily and always the perspective or stance meant in actual fact by the Other. This is to be grasped or recorded above all with regard to an aspect which Mead rightly and justifiably highlights. The I (ego) develops self-control, not least of all, because its self-image (or picture of itself), which essentially belongs to its constitution, is shaped and formed in the tightest contact with that which the I (ego) – through the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – believes has to make up the image or picture of the Other by this I (ego). Social experience, nevertheless, proves that precisely the gulf between self-assessment, and, the assessment of the self by other people, very often turns out to be greater than other wrong assessments, miscalculations and misjudgements in respect of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. If such a gulf becomes known (i.e. people become conscious and aware of it), then as a rule this gulf leads to alienation, estrangement or open enmity, when the I (ego) feels downgraded, disparaged and belittled^{xliii}. If it remains unconscious, then this proves that the “Me” can be a fiction constructed by the “I”, and, despite all that, a functioning fiction. In Mead’s schema, which wants to describe the predominant and prevailing mechanisms of the manufacture, making, production or restoration of equilibria, the so-called everyday life of the identity (self-description, self-understanding, fluctuations of or in the same (self-description and self-understanding)) falls by the wayside and is passed over, or rather, falls into the area or realm of the “I”, whereas the “Me” seems to remain untouched by that.

Mead places, in actual fact, particular value on the compact and united character of the “Me”, probably with the intent, through that, of lending or

¹³⁷ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 366; § 28, p. 258.

conferring additional authority to, or upon, the normative commands of this tier of jurisdiction (or authority). The “Me” is, in fact, not merely the stance taken in – of this or that Other – but over and above that, the “generalised Other” or the voice of society: it constitutes “that which is common to all”; the “Me’s” values are the values of society¹³⁸. Mead knows, though, about the differentiation of this society, about its separation into groups, strata, classes or even castes, but even in regard to this last case, he wants to – in his way of looking at things – give priority or preference to the uniting factor, i.e. what unites over the separating factor, i.e. what separates¹³⁹. He knows also that organisms construct their natural environment or surroundings via mechanisms of selection¹⁴⁰, and that human consciousness is likewise the constructive choice of an environment, yet Mead does not want to see the social milieu or the “Me” disintegrate on the basis of this insight. It is, however, an unworldly abstraction to assume and accept that concrete people in concrete positions and situations can orientate themselves merely with the help of that which is common to all members of society. The latter constitutes a frequently imaginary or make-believe background which one swears to, conjures up or invokes in times of crisis – when, namely, it (what is common to all members of society) threatens to crumble and disintegrate and should or is supposed to be rescued – rather than consulting it in everyday life. Decisive or crucial in concrete action remains the, on each and every respective occasion, Other, whether the Other is an individual or a group. Correspondingly numerous must the “Me” be, whereby they either come into conflict with one another, or are hierarchised by the actors and/or are distinguished from one another as cleanly as possible. That which is common to “all, everyone” or is postulated as such, represents and constitutes a formal structure, which constantly requires content-related specification by relevant

¹³⁸ The “(f)actual” actions and reactions of the Other do not, in fact, matter, but the manner the I (ego) itself perceives and interprets, see Miyamoto-Dornbusch, “Test”, pp. 399, 403.

¹³⁹ See e.g. loc. cit., § 41, p. 367; § 20, p. 198ff..

¹⁴⁰ Loc. cit., § 21, p. 208, (foot)note 10; § 17, p. 170ff..

Others, even when taken at face value, of or by itself, it refers to a content (e.g. “good manners”, “equality”, “human dignity”)^{xliv}. We can, however, also turn the tables and assert that the “Me” does not have to fulfil its foreseen ethical-normative task, duty or function, not only because of deficient unity, cohesion and generality, but also when such predicates are generously ascribed or attributed to it. When talking about the “Me”, Mead always presumes normality, i.e. the more or less smooth following, observance and complying with norms of general validity in the “civilised” daily life of a society of, in principle, that is, individuals with equal rights and – in respect of the Fundamentals (or Fundamental Matters and Issues) – like-minded individuals, that is, “rational” individuals¹⁴¹. In this case, as abstract as it may be, the “generalised Other” has to, in actual fact, spread, disseminate, diffuse and propagate the message of norm conformity (i.e. conformity with norms). What, however, does Mead have to teach people seeking social orientation in a society lying under the intolerant spell (or being in the intolerant grip) of a charismatic dictator or of collective psychosis?^{xlv} What happens when “rational individuals” are transformed into a violent and inquisitorial “mob” – possibly, incidentally, by invoking the (religion of) rationality itself?^{xlvi} It is illuminating or instructive how Mead argues or rather contradicts himself, when he attempts to explain the phenomenon of the violent mob. The “Me” is not here at work, in which the “I” is lost, but it is a matter of the unleashing of the “I”, of the failure of its “integration”. In the same characteristic and distinctive style or manner, the relation(ship) of the individual towards, or with, the mob is described as follows: “He is one with the community and the community is one with him”¹⁴².

However, the issue or matter is tricky, awkward or thorny, not only if and when norm conformity and subjugation to the logic of the mob do not coincide.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Stryker’s remarks and observations, “Conditions”, p. 58ff..

¹⁴² *Geist*, § 28, p. 262ff..

It is also difficult when the “I” is confirmed ethically-normatively in the present-day sense, that is, to do “the (i.e. what is) good” for Others, but, in the process, by no means wanting to identify with the norms and values of the generalised Other. In the course of this, the relevant “Me” may be narrower than the “Me” in the sense of this latter generalised Other (e.g. a heretical sect or a revolutionary party), or it can also occur that the individual, the hermit and recluse, or the fiery prophet, revolts and rebels against the totality or whole, and circumvents the disapproval of the entire community, by erecting, setting up or establishing a higher ideational community (e.g. the afterworld)¹⁴³. Regarding such phenomena, only the reference to the “I” as the source of spontaneous and creative stances (e.g. artists) comes to Mead’s mind¹⁴⁴, in relation to which, for Mead, systematic criteria for the distinction or differentiation between the genius and the criminal are lacking. A real explanation of the uprising or insurrection of the ethically-normatively meant “I” against the “Me” as the generalised Other would require or demand of Mead precisely that which he does not want to do: to detach the generalised Other and its norms from every particular content, making them or turning them (the generalised Other and its said norms) into, as one likes and wants, interpretable empty formulae or words. Then the “I” can define the generalised Other in such a way that out of, or from the declared will to bow and submit to social norms, the assumption and acceptance of precisely ruling and dominant norms does not have to follow. The generalised Other amounts, in other words, to a mere confession of faith in the necessity of social norms in general, not to a confession of faith in the ruling or dominant social norms; the “Me” orders and commands only *that* there should be norms, not *what*, for norms, this must be (i.e. what these norms ought to be). When the voice of the generalised Other is internalised in the sense of this form-

¹⁴³ Mead mentions this case (loc. cit., § 21, p. 210ff.) – again, incidentally, and without explaining how it can be reconciled with his perception and view regarding the formation of identity (or identity formation).

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. loc. cit., § 28, p. 258.

related (i.e. formal) That, then the renegade or apostate “I” feels, precisely by invoking the “Me”, responsible and in a position to determine the What based on its own power (i.e. without anyone’s permission, or, just like that), and at the same time in fact, having a good (i.e. clear) conscience on its side (i.e. for its (= the I’s) part). Precisely such an interpretation and internalisation or taking in of the generalised Other can encourage an uprising or insurrection against the present-day or current “Me”. The uprising and insurrection of the revolutionary or of the prophet, of course, constitutes only the most exalted, sublime, lofty or eminent shape and form of this game of interpretation and of power (*or*: this power and interpretation game), which in the everyday life of the very often resourceful and imaginative “little man” does not in the least flow into the questioning or contesting of the generalised Other, but probably or definitely into the – on each and every respective occasion – opportune handling of the generalised Other’s commands.

In cases, in those of the “I” determining or wanting to determine the content of the “Me”, that is, the What of the That, a fusion or merger of “I” and “Me” is present and exists. However, Mead does not think about those cases when he talks about such a “fusion or merger”. Rather, he means the – in his mind, imagined – normatively ideal case, in which the stance triggered and set off in another person stimulates and prompts in the same “I” the same stance, whereby the “Me” needs to control the “I”, and the common co-operative effort or exertion can allow everyone a “high feeling (i.e. feeling of elation or exhilaration)” to come into being^{145 + xlvii}. Otherwise, a competition, rivalry or a “dialogue” between the “I” and the “Me” takes place, and the “situation” decides which of both (competition/rivalry or dialogue) predominates and prevails¹⁴⁶. In any case, this dialogue is constitutive for identity, because the

¹⁴⁵ Loc. cit., § 35, p. 320ff..

¹⁴⁶ Loc. cit., § 25, p. 242.

interactions (or mutual influences) with (regard to) Others contribute to the formation of identity only in so far as they are taken in and absorbed by the said dialogue¹⁴⁷. Now, however, the “Me” in this dialogue has a lead, head start or precedence, in this dialogue, for structural reasons, over the “I”. The psychical forces which lie beyond the self-consciousness and result in “that we never are entirely conscious of ourselves (*or*: our same selves), that we are surprised and astonished by our own actions”, are categorically (wholesale or across the board) allocated to the “I”¹⁴⁸. On the other hand, the “Me” means just as much as self-consciousness and identity, because these come into being through the taking over/on or assumption of the stance of the Other vis-à-vis itself (i.e. the Other’s self), not simply through “organic sensations (feelings and perceptions)” of which the individual is conscious^{xlviii}. In other words: self-consciousness is present and exists only when the self puts itself in (and or empathises with) other people and looks at itself with the eyes of other people, that is, it has developed the notion and representation of a “Me”¹⁴⁹. To the obvious question, *who* then is that who develops this notion and representation, Mead does not answer at all; he believes and opines, in fact, that such an answer is impossible: at every attempt at an approach, the “I” is transformed automatically into a “Me”, the “I” has a part and participates in its self-consciousness only as a “Me”, and in our inner experience, the “I” does not appear directly, but as a historical figure in our memory¹⁵⁰. But the absolute identification of the self and the “Me” remains not without consequences for the unity of the former. As the taking in of the stance of other people, the “Me” must change its contents and stances according to these other people, “that is

¹⁴⁷ Loc. cit., § 23, p. 222. This very correct and important thought can – with regard to the plexus, network or mesh of the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation, be rewritten, paraphrased or described as follows: the correlation of “I” and “Me” in the Ego determines which place the Ego occupies in the spectrum of the social relation. And the determination of this same correlation in the Other through the Ego’s assumption and taking on/over of perspectives should (or ought to) foresee or explain the place of the Other in the spectrum of the social relation.

¹⁴⁸ Loc. cit., § 22, p. 217.

¹⁴⁹ Loc. cit., § 21, p. 209; § 18, p. 180.

¹⁵⁰ Loc. cit., § 22, p. 217ff.

why we split ourselves up into the most varied identities” and “it depends on the soci(iet)al reactions appearing, which identity we shall have”¹⁵¹. But as the everyday experience of consciousness teaches, all people can know that they play vis-à-vis various persons, various roles, and, at the same time, they remain the same person, especially since the successful appearance in various roles vis-à-vis various persons, absolutely presupposes the consciousness of the identity remaining the same: the roles must be co-ordinated with one another, and there is also a very perceptible and noticeable authority (or tier of jurisdiction) which does this co-ordination. Mead does not show that he is inclined to think about and reflect upon the said authority in greater detail. The systematic place of the “I”-concept is downgraded through that, and functions in Mead’s theoretical schema like a kind of collecting, collective category for everything, which the “Me”-concept, despite the striving to stretch and expand the “Me” as far as possible, cannot contain in itself. The reason for this vagueness of the “I” cannot be its above-mentioned historical character, i.e. it cannot be the “I’s” presence in mere memory. Because if Mead’s perception or view is right that we can have no consciousness of our action before we react reflexively/reflectively to this action, then this must equally concern the “I” and the “Me”: the “Me” has, in this respect, also a merely historical presence in the consciousness. Over and above that, Mead’s vague “I” not once fulfils the assigned task, namely to take care of the originality of the reaction or of the acting and action. When the “I” constantly must be transformed or converted into a “Me”, when the same psychical act means, one time, the “I”, and the next time, a “Me”, then one does not know anymore from where the actor should draw or create his originality¹⁵².

¹⁵¹ Loc. cit., § 18, pp. 184, 185.

¹⁵² Kolb, “Critical Evaluation”, esp. p. 292ff.; cf. Meltzer, “Mead’s Social Psychology”, esp. p. 20ff..

This partly unclear, partly weak status of the “I” comes or stems, though, from Mead’s decision to tackle and solve the problem of identity in accordance with an ethically-normatively inspired paedogogics of socialisation. Only with regard to an all-sided socialisation of the self can Mead equate identity and society, that is, call “the structure of the complete identity” a “mirroring of the complete soci(et)al process”, and behold and see in the aspects of identity, aspects of the soc(iet)al process¹⁵³. Behind this thought, the conviction stands that the structure of identity is “selfless-soci(et)al”, its individual content is “self-seeking (selfish and egotistical)”¹⁵⁴. These statements or propositions mean, if one takes them seriously, that individuals only distinguish themselves from one another because of their selfishness and egotism, and that the ethically-paedagogically wished-for overcoming of this selfishness and egotism would have to bring about the far-reaching, extensive homogenisation of individuals inside of a far-reaching, extensive homogenised society. When morals and morality are generally or universally applicable and are the same for everyone, then the equating of “organised identity” with “character in the moral sense”¹⁵⁵ must end up in, or boil down to, the identity (i.e. equating) of identities with one another. Mead would certainly broadly reject or repudiate such levelling ideals. He believes in the value or worth of individuality, though under the condition that individuality distinguishes itself and stands out “functionally”, i.e. through charitable achievements beneficial to the public¹⁵⁶. The ultimate logical consequences of Mead’s position must, however, not necessarily be compatible or in accord with his sympathies, above all when he cannot indicate or point out any criteria for that which is supposed to be a charitable service or achievement of benefit to the public in the field or area of politics or of art, without being entangled or embroiled in – in practice – unsolvable questions and problems of

¹⁵³ *Geist*, § 18, p. 186.

¹⁵⁴ Loc. cit., § 30, p. 276, footnote 2.

¹⁵⁵ Loc. cit., § 20, p. 204ff..

¹⁵⁶ Loc. cit., § 26, p. 252; § 36, p. 332; § 40, p. 346.

interpretation. Moreover, his individualistic sympathies should or must often come into contact with his ethical sympathies during the judgement of concrete cases. Ethical sympathies find expression when Mead characterises the identity, which “exploits” the group, as a “narrow(ed) or constricted identity”¹⁵⁷. (How should, however, “exploitation” and “narrowness” be defined here objectively and bindingly?) And what should we do when precisely an “exploitative” positioning gives wing to, spurs on and inspires individual creativity, or conversely, consoles inner wretchedness by means of morals and morality. Mead himself stresses, incidentally, what significance and meaning for the “realisation” of identity, the striving to occupy certain positions inside of groups has – and behind this striving is the “feeling” or perhaps the “to everyone, common conviction” that “we are basically better than other men”, as well as the “demand for one’s own identity to be realised by some kind of superiority over fellow men surrounding (or around) us”; this demand is “constant”, that is, obviously ineradicable and simultaneously regrettable and morally reprehensible¹⁵⁸. If that is so, then society consists inevitably and always of “narrow(ed) and constricted” identities, and only of such identities.

Mead’s comprehensive programme of socialisation does not, however, suffer under, i.e. from, the contrast and opposition between the content of social-psychological ascertainties and the height of ethical expectations. It rests and is based on a confusion which results from the, in principle, connection of the concept of socialisation with ethical contents. From this point of view, it looks as if successful socialisation and the “realisation” of identity in the just described regrettable and unfortunate manner would have to stand in contrast and opposition to each other, as if the refusal to follow the voice of the generalised Other went back or was reduced to deficient, inadequate and faulty

¹⁵⁷ Loc. cit., § 27, p. 255ff..

¹⁵⁸ Loc. cit., § 26, pp. 249ff., 250, 252. The feeling of superiority steps backwards and recedes in situations in which the continuing existence and survival of the individual depends upon the group (§ 39, p. 355).

or defective socialisation. In relation to that, two remarks are called for and appropriate. A socialisation, which precisely in Mead's sense should or ought to be regarded as successful, can e.g. proceed in the womb (bosom or belly) of a sect, which takes a negative, disapproving or rejective attitude and stance to the institutionally anchored (embodied, fixed or embedded) and approved – by the majority of the society concerned – norms. The, in this case, relevant generalised Other is not generally sufficient to steer, direct or guide the behaviour of the socialised individual beyond demarcations, delimitations, inner splits and outer conflicts. That is why the extent and scope of each and every decisive and determinative “Me” constitutes a self-sufficient and independent factor having an effect, which irrespective of the quality of the socialisation, has an effect, and its determination and definition by no means is in the hands of, and up to, the adolescent (becoming an adult). Even if the socialisation is oriented to dominant and ruling norms, i.e. it starts from the widest possible extent and scope; through that, the problem connected with the “Me” is not solved forever; it is posed only in the reverse(d) sense. The successive and consecutive concrete situations and positions in which the socialised individual finds himself, require and demand of him to more or less constrict the extent and scope of the “Me”, to specify the norms, in terms of content, transmitted to him at the widest level of socialisation, and, in the course of this, often to modify them purposefully and expediently, or even to rationalise them away (i.e. neutralise the said norms through rationalisation). The generalised Other, as Mead would like to comprehend it, could only in a closed-undifferentiated society be an always valid, applicable and useful authority of and for socialisation; such a society, however, has never existed. On the other hand, a successful socialisation offers, just as little as a particular capacity for, and (cap)ability at, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, guarantees for ethical-norm-conforming behaviour. Just like the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, so too does socialisation have its formal and its content-

related level, which do not necessarily coincide. A perfection at the form-related (i.e. formal) level is impossible without successful socialisation, if we remove from the latter concept (of socialisation) the ethical connotations, and thereunder (i.e. in relation to socialisation), understand the ability to make someone feel comfortable and familiar “in society” and “amongst humans”, and quietly do – on each and every respective occasion – what is “right (correct and proper)”, irrespective of with what intent and whether with (i.e. for) or against the will of Others. Such a differentiation of both levels of socialisation from one another is extremely important for theoretical goals or ends, and also not foreign to the common or usual social understanding, which does not regard the misanthrope ascetic in the desert, despite all the admiration for his ethical stance, as the model of successful socialisation. Conversely, everyone knows that a con man (fraud or confidence trickster), whose socialisation in the formal or form-related sense limps (i.e. is faulty or flawed), and has repulsive (revolting or repellent) manners, is not destined to have any great prospects of a brilliant career. The appropriation or acquisition of forms, in which a successful socialisation is recognisable, can show the inner or internal subjection and subjugation of the individual under the dominant or ruling norms, however, it can just as well serve as the means for the outwitting, outsmarting, outflanking or duping of these norms; the “Me” is here transformed and converted into a factotum (i.e. an assistant or employee who serves in a wide range of capacities and or does all kinds of work) of the “I”. Through that, not only are material aims better promoted, especially if under the given circumstances, the use of force (or application of violence) is out of the question. Even the striving – underlined by Mead – after superiority is quite often damaged or harmed by arrogant and presumptuous “asocial or anti-social” appearances, manners, demeanours or behaviour. Bindedness to form in the expectation of striven-for, aimed-at or aspired-to recognition: one does not have to search long in order to

find examples of that. And we already know that even the more general need for sociality can be founded on the same expectation^{159 + xlix}.

The preceding critical analysis does not aim at the proof (i.e. proving) that normatively sanctioned equilibria are impossible in a society, or that the mechanisms of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the processes of socialisation founded upon them (i.e. the said mechanisms of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) would play no role in their (i.e. normatively sanctioned equilibria's) manufacture, making, production or restoration. The said preceding critical analysis wanted to make readers aware that Mead's conceptual instruments are neither consistently nor comprehensively sufficient in order to satisfy social-ontological claims. Undoubtedly, they (Mead's conceptual instruments) can be applied to many, important and permanent phenomena of social life, but their (Mead's conceptual instruments') boundaries and gaps or holes become noticeable as soon as these phenomena are classified, or put in order, in a broader social-ontological framework, and, hence, are relativised. Mead's social psychology found, of course, in part, spreading, dissemination and supporters precisely because of its ethically-normatively determined one-sidedness and ambiguity. As we said at the beginning, symbolic interactionism did not become Mead's social psychology's sole legitimate successor. If one puts at the centre of attention the ethical-normative aspect, then the, regarding that (i.e. Mead's social psychology's legitimate successor), claims of Parsonian system(s) theory are still more legitimate, which is marked by the equal or same one-sidedness and ambiguity. Mead's constant oscillations and swings between the "wider" and the "narrower" concept of the soci(et)al finds its correspondence in Parsons's double talk of "interaction". Parsons's "interaction's" structure rests upon the "complementarity of expectations", which in themselves refer to both friendship

¹⁵⁹ See Ch. III, footnote 71.

as well as to enmity, since also the behaviour of two foes mutually and reciprocally complement each other in regard to expectation and in the outer or external act(ing) – there is no enmity without an antagonist or opponent. Quite often, however, the magnitude, “complementarity of expectations”, establishes a connection or link exclusively with interactions which are founded on common norm orientation (i.e. orientation as to norms)¹⁶⁰. Also, the radical-democratic intent brings Mead’s social psychology and Parsons’s system(s) theory together (i.e. into contact, or reconciles one with the other). The comprehensive norm system (or system of norms), which binds or ties individuals to one another via the complementarity of expectations and the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and or roles, shoves, pushes or thrusts both social models of classical liberalism aside – both the model of the invisible hand, as well as that model which builds on ethical insight into, or ethical understanding of, autonomous individual Reason.

D. Social-ontic foundations of social-scientific understanding

Since the Age of the Enlightenment, all the more frequently have – above all in the sociological context and context pertaining to the philosophy of culture – the “social backgrounds” of the formation and development of scientific paradigms and scientific concept formation been pointed out. Accordingly, cogent and convincing partial insights arose, which, however, could never be built up and extended (in)to a closed, cohesive and united theory which takes into account all the thought and intellectual constructs attested to and witnessed in the history of ideas. It mostly remained unclear not only how then “social influence” ought

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Toward a General Theory*, p. 16ff., with *Social System*, p. 252.

to be understood in regard to the formation and development of the thought or intellectual construct, but also, whether and to what extent the overall formal structure or individual contents in regard to the said thought construct is/are affected. And no-one can still say with ultimate and utmost certainty whether, and in which sense, categories of thought (or intellectual categories) like, for instance, causality, or mathematical magnitudes, are subject to “social influences”. Philosophers discovered, as usual, with some delay, these question formulations and examinations of the problem, which found entry, i.e. became established, in Husserl’s matters of concern as regards bringing to light the pre-scientific roots of scientific conceptuality. Husserl, nonetheless, hardly contributed something concrete to the solution of the just mentioned puzzle, enigma or conundrum. The “ontology of the lifeworld” was indeed supposed to – beyond the “constant change of/in relativities” – open up and disclose the until then incomprehensible background of the self-evident (pieces of) evidence of the objective sciences – including logic and mathematics –, however it was not said how one has to imagine the bridge between the lifeworld and those pieces of evidence. The centre of gravity or main focus was placed also in this late phase of phenomenology on the, in part, thankless question and problem of constitution, especially since Husserl was interested – for ethical reasons – in deducing and deriving from the constitution of intersubjectivity itself the prototype of an ideal community of communication¹. Still less than the lifeworldly (i.e. lifeworld-related) origin, provenance and shaping or moulding of “objectively scientific” conceptuality, was that shaping or moulding of the social-scientific conceptuality brought up for discussion. But precisely where the human aspires, seeks or strives to make out and recognise man, does the specifically intersubjective, that is, the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation stand out, come into play and make itself felt – this only happens in that special area of human praxis, which we are accustomed to calling “theory”. What in the social-ontological way of looking at the social relation is

called, in general, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, is referred to in the language of social science as understanding. In order to be able to intellectually (or in terms of thought) apprehend social action in the present and past as the object of knowledge, the social scientist has at his disposal basically the same social-ontically pre-given equipment, of which he makes use as a social subject in the present of his own lifeworld. As a result, though, something completely different to the assumption, acceptance or adoption of relativistic vulgar sociology is meant, according to which the social scientist basically projects his own judgements and prejudices onto alien, foreign, strange and other worlds and times. Because it is not a matter here at all of the level of the variable and constantly varying contents, but of the unchanging and immutable structure of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The arrangement of the social world or of the lifeworld, in which social-ontologically apprehensible components and sociologically or historically apprehensible components stand next to one another, corresponds with this difference in the levels of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, – i.e. they stand next to, or are beside, one another in separating or separative scientific abstraction, not in the real social space. The uncritical transference of sociologically and historically apprehensible components to alien or strange lifeworlds necessarily causes confusion, and the other way around: the starting from the – common to all lifeworlds – social-ontic component constitutes precisely the prerequisite, precondition or presupposition for the understanding of alien, strange and foreign (or other) lifeworlds¹⁶¹. Irrespective of where and when he lives, no matter how he calls himself on each and every respective occasion (sociologist, historian, philosopher, poet etc.), the interpreter of social phenomena and social action cannot [[do]] otherwise; he must be active or busy himself as the natural bearer of that social-ontic component; that is, he must aim

¹⁶¹ On that, more in Ch. V., Sec. 2.

at understanding via the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. In the process, he may – as is possible from every perspective – strike upon the (i.e. what is) right and correct, or, err and be wrong and mistaken. But that is not the issue. Social-scientifically, understanding is no methodical (i.e. methodological) recipe, which can in certain circumstances be exchanged for (or replaced by) another recipe, but a necessity, which arises from the fact that an (admittedly, one-sided) social relation exists, that men (i.e. humans) (as theoretically acting interpreters of human act(ion)s) stand across from other men/humans (whose theoretical or practical act(ion)s are supposed to be interpreted). In this social-ontically anchored or fixed sense of social-scientific understanding, the achieved or attained tier (level, stage, degree or grade) of methodological reflection and refinement is irrelevant; historicism or Max Weber did not first make (or turn), therefore, understanding (into) the key for the interpretation of social action¹⁶². We want, incidentally, to show that precisely the social-ontic origin, provenance and shaping or moulding of social-scientific understanding lends to this social-scientific understanding those reflexive/reflective character(istic)s which distinguish it from so-called “empathy (or insight)”, “intuitive” sympathy.

Before we move on and proceed to the discussion of these character(istic)s with the help of known theoretisations of understanding, some things ought to be made clear. The necessary use/usage of the understanding (cognitive) access or approach to the social-sciences does not in the least mean that the latter (social sciences) do not have any other methodical (i.e. methodological)

¹⁶² In ancient historiography, we find numerous examples of conscious attempts of authors to move and transfer themselves (in)to the inner and outer situation of historical persons. The speeches, which Thucydides puts into the mouth of several protagonists of the Peloponnesian War are basically ideal-typically prepared understanding (cognitive) explanations of meaningful action. Thucydides says it also in his manner quite clearly: “I have reproduced the speeches in such a way as it seemed to me that every individual had to express themselves about each and every respective situation most appropriately and reasonably, whereby I as far as possible kept to the overall sense and meaning of what was said in reality” (I, 22, 1; my translation [[i.e. P.K.’s translation kept to the German from the Greek «ὥς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἔμοι ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.»]] Cf. Sec. 1F in this chapter.

instruments apart from understanding at their disposal. It refers only to the fact that understanding as the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives can only be at home in the social sciences. Consequently, two problem circles (i.e. problem areas) arrive on the scene (or come to the fore). The possible and often fertile methodical (i.e. methodological) great variety in the social sciences, above all, the being next to each other (i.e. parallel existence or co-existence) of “quantitative” and “qualitative” analyses of materials, does not constitute any necessary concomitant of the real being next to each other (i.e. parallel or co-existence) of ontically heterogeneous facts. Historical and sociological facts are, therefore, not in themselves understandable and not understandable (i.e. non-understandable), but they are dependent on the methodical (i.e. methodological) approach, for which the researcher opts. The investigation of, or research into, demographic data does not get by on and manage e.g. without statistics and quantification, but it can, simultaneously, be pursued or carried out/on from the understanding (cognitive) point of view, as soon as the obvious question is posed as to which positionings and attitudes regarding life and death, regarding age and race, regarding technique (i.e. technology) and medicine shape and form the general demographic picture or image. Seen in the cold light of day, demographic quantities prove to be synopses or summaries of qualities, although this proof does not have to be brought up or regurgitated in every research context¹⁶³. Over and above that, the arbitrary or vacuous, insignificant or meaningless statistical correlations can only be avoided if the preparative understanding (cognitive) thought and intellectual activity has given information as to which meaningful act(ion)s may, should or ought to be correlated with which meaningful act(ion)s, and which not¹⁶⁴. Between understanding and social quantities, it (i.e. the case) is similar, *mutatis mutandis*, as it is between understanding and social facts, which arose and

¹⁶³ Cf. Gruner, “Understanding”, p. 154ff..

¹⁶⁴ Tucker, “Weber’s Verstehen”, p. 165.

resulted out of/from the effect and operation of the heterogony of ends, and now are present as objective constructs and overarching, general and comprehensive impersonal contexts of meaning. These (general and comprehensive impersonal contexts of meaning or meaningful contexts) can be studied even/also without the understanding (cognitive) assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, however, methodical understanding is in such a study not only absolutely possible, but also necessary. Because only knowledge of the original, subjectively meant meaning provides proof and evidence that here the unintended consequences of action are present, and the same knowledge illuminates the causal context between the action of the subjects concerned and this action's unwanted, unintended objective outcome, since not any kind of action whatsoever entails any kind of outcome of the course of acting and action whatsoever¹⁶⁵. What constitutes the objective social fact is accordingly not the ontic stuff (i.e. matter, material), but the point of view. The relations of the I (ego) towards or with third parties do not differ e.g. in their quality as social relations from the relations of the I (ego) towards and with the Other. However, in these latter (relations of the I (ego) towards the Other), they (i.e. the relations of the I (ego) towards third parties) are taken (i.e. incorporated, encompassed or classified) as an objectively existing magnitude, which does not have to necessarily be reduced through understanding (cognitive) thought (or intellectual) acts to subjective content(s) (meaning, goal or end), although they can (be) it (i.e. be so reduced to such subjective contents) at any time. The Janus face (i.e. duplicitous or two-faced character) of social facts, as well as the possibility of apprehending – in terms of understanding – overarching, general or comprehensive meaning contexts (or meaningful contexts) (see below), let us recognise (and know) that methodical understanding and methodological individualism are two different things, which simply very often go hand in

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Ch. II, Section 2A, above.

hand. Ex negativo, incidentally, their (i.e. methodical understanding and methodological individualism's) different nature or quality is shown and seen in the forceful and powerful effect of a behaviouristic variant of methodological individualism inside of the social theory of the second half of the twentieth century.

We come now to the second of the problem circles (i.e. problem areas) mentioned above by means of the observation that the practised (i.e. the carried-out and put-into-practice) method of understanding forces or compels the (complete) assumption and acceptance of the old idealistic contradistinction between the natural sciences and the humanities just as little as the (complete) assumption and acceptance of methodological individualism. The necessity of the methodical (i.e. methodological) great variety and diversity in the social-scientific field already indicates this, in which the various ontological levels or strata next to – or on (top of) – one another (social facts and individuals, normalities or regularities and exceptions etc.) are directly or indirectly expressed, despite all the identity (i.e. equating or sameness) of the social-ontic stuff (i.e. material or matter). Statistical and quantifying procedures or form-related (i.e. formal) thought or intellectual necessities (typification (i.e. rendering into types or classification under typifying forms) and formalisation, thought experiments and the hypothetical isolation of factors for the investigation, detection or ascertainment of causal interrelations and contexts) bring the natural and the social sciences closer together than the ontic constitution, composition or texture of the corresponding fields or areas [[of both the natural and the social sciences]] seemed to allow this in the old historicism. Simultaneously, the advancing or progressive historicisation of the natural sciences made clear that in their (i.e. the natural sciences') formation and development, not merely an – in itself – categorially unchangeable subject pertaining to the theory of knowledge, but at least just as much, a variable or

changing historical-social subject, is massively or all-out involved, so that also in this respect, the ontic difference between the natural and social sciences could be relativised or seen in a different light¹⁶⁶. Finally, the much conjured-up or invoked same-kindness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) of the subject and the object in the social sciences must be understood with the necessary differentiations and limitations or restrictions. As a social subject, man does not stop being a piece of nature, which is subject to the same kinds of law bindness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) of Nature, – something which also influences his social behaviour. And his same-kindness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) with the object of his social-scientific study indeed constitutes the presupposition, prerequisite and precondition of an understanding (cognitive) apprehension of this object, but by no means the guarantee for the content-related correctness or rightness of this apprehension. (Were this so, then we would call the social sciences rather than the natural sciences, the “exact sciences”:) The difference between the certainly existing and present presupposition or prerequisite and precondition, and the by no means certain guarantee, corresponds precisely with the difference between the form-related (i.e. formal) and the content-related level of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. The same-kindness (i.e. uniformity, homogeneity or similarity) of subject and object enables or makes social-scientific knowledge possible, but it does not make it easy (or does not facilitate it).

Given these differentiations and limitations and restrictions, the elementary fact remains that methodical (and methodological) understanding is connected in a specific manner with the work of the social sciences, that it must often also then be practised (i.e. carried out and put into practice) silently or tacitly, even if this is not intended methodically or methodologically, and that it mostly can

¹⁶⁶ In relation to that, Kondylis, „Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung“ (= “Science, Power and Decision”).

then also be practised/carried out and put into practice when the stuff (i.e. material or matter) concerned can, first of all, be handled and treated even with the help or on the basis of other methods. As a theoretical-scientific actor, the social scientist moves in a field or area, which is populated or inhabited with beings, who are capable of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and move (i.e. enter) into (or have) corresponding relations with one another. Those acting practically-socially (i.e. in practice and socially) must move and transfer themselves (in)to the position of each and every respective Other; and the theoretically-socially acting social scientist (i.e. the social scientist acting in terms of theory, as well as socially) wants or must move and transfer himself (in)to the position of those who have moved and transferred themselves (in)to the position of Others. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is intensified at the social-scientific level, or the perspective of the acting subject handled and treated by social science, is absorbed by or totally wrapped up and embodied in the meta-perspective of the social scientist etc.; however, the mechanism does not change: the social scientist cannot, in principle, encounter or face his specific objects, that is, human subjects, differently than how the latter (human subjects), amongst and as between one another, encounter or face one another. Everyone, observers and those acting (i.e. actors), are equally *social* subjects. That is why the form-related (i.e. formal) basic given (actual) facts of the *social*-ontic are equally valid for and apply equally to everyone – entirely irrespective of what happens at the level of content(s), (where e.g. the social scientist may (i.e. is able to) handle and treat the socially acting (i.e. the social actor), whom he is supposed to study, as a friend or a foe, on the basis of pleasant or unpleasant to/for him (i.e. the social scientist) findings *of his* assumption and taking on/over of perspectives). Since in the natural sciences, the objects of the theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory) acting social subjects (of the scientist) are not social subjects, and do without and lack the capacity and ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, so that also no

observer can move and transfer himself (in)to their assumption and taking on/over of perspectives meta-perspectively (i.e. in terms of a meta-perspective), thus, here, methodical (or methodological) understanding has by definition no place. Tendencies, approaches or dispositions become, nevertheless, in in-between (i.e. intermediate) areas, noticeable, as soon as e.g. an ethologist believes that the existence, presence or availability of an elementary capacity for and (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is necessarily ascertained in animals¹⁶⁷. The parameters which determine the reflective/reflexive character of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives likewise belong to the social-ontic common property (or heritage/inheritance), which the theoretically-scientifically acting person (i.e. actor) shares with his object, i.e. the person acting in practice (who can just as well be another theoretical, aesthetic etc. acting person/actor). The reflexive/reflective distance, which necessarily accompanies understanding, and distinguishes it before every “empathy (or insight)” – if it (i.e. such empathy or insight) exists –, springs from the elementary consciousness of the I (ego) that its own self, together with its own thought acts and aims, is different to or distinct – in terms of content – from the self of the Other together with its thought acts and contents, or, that the partial or even total content-related agreements on, in, over or in regard to these fields could be lifted, i.e. canceled or abolished. That means: knowledge about the possibility of content-related differences vis-à-vis the Other already belongs to the form-related (i.e. formal) equipment of the consciousness of the I (ego). The Other can, therefore, at any time, occupy another place in the spectrum of the social relation than [[the place of]] the I (ego), and the reflective (reflexive) understanding of the I (ego) aims, in relation that, to determine in advance this place, bearing in mind the motives and aims of the Other, or to explain in retrospect [[these motives and aims of the

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Lorenz, *Er redete mit dem Vieh den Vögeln und den Fischen*

Other]]. The consciousness of the reality or the possibility of the difference nourishes and feeds the reflectivity (reflexivity) of the understanding (cognitive) endeavour. And this consciousness is founded, for its part, on a knowledge, which likewise belongs to the form-related (i.e. formal) equipment of the consciousness of every socially living (human subject) and consequently to the human subject, subject (and subjugated) to social-ontic(al) necessities. The knowledge, namely, that subjectivity *as* subjectivity evades, defies, escapes or is beyond absolute calculation, reckoning or estimation, that it (i.e. subjectivity) under the same or equal circumstances does not necessarily behave in the same or equal manner. The growing and increasing imponderability and incalculability of subjectivity and the refinement of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives go hand in hand. To this social-ontic basic given (actual) fact does, in the end, the reflexive/reflective character of the intensified assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in social science go back (i.e. is reduced), namely, to that (social-ontic basic given fact) of understanding. Because also this understanding strives and endeavours to explain the place of an acting subject in the spectrum of the social relation, bearing in mind its (i.e. the said acting subject's) motives and aims, or else, bearing in mind the logic of the said acting subject's assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – always in the knowledge of the fact that this place could be another place. Would this possibility not exist (i.e. if this possibility did not exist), then the understanding (cognitive) detection, establishment and ascertaining of the motives and aims would be superfluous, just as such detection and ascertainment of motives and aims is superfluous when it is a question of explaining the fall of a body.

Understanding becomes the main question and chief problem of social-scientific methodology (or approach pertaining to method) when its social-ontic foundation, as well as the historical character of human social activity, remain conscious or in our consciousness (i.e. when we remain aware of

understanding's social-ontic foundation and the historical character of human social activity). In unhistorical, i.e. non-historical social-theoretical constructions, understanding, against that, becomes a topic or theme at most in the context of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (and) or roles at the level of actors. For the social-scientist, who for instance looks into and deals with "systems" and does not look into and deal with historically acting men (i.e. humans), he does not have to also "understand" the latter (historically acting men/humans). Renunciations or refusals of methodical (or methodological) understanding are legitimised often scientifically by their general, wholesale or global – and ignorant – interweaving with an irrational, quasi-mystical "empathy (or insight)" or "intuition", which one contradistinguishes to the advantages of rational-behaviouristic transparency. (This custom or practice of Anglo-Saxon^{li} authors is followed by those German authors – with pleasure – who would like to get rid and dispose of, or away from, the "irrationalism" of their own inheritance (legacy or heritage) pertaining to the history of ideas.) Let us, however, look at a well-known attempt in much greater detail of the dissolving or breaking up of understanding into behaviouristic categories and, in the process, of using and applying the Covering-Law-Model. Accordingly, "Operation Understanding" succeeds if the person understanding carries out or executes three inner acts: he internalises the stimulus, he internalises the reaction, and he uses maxims (in respect) of behaviour (behavioural maxims) in order to connect both acts of internalisation with each other. I see e.g. and understand that someone is cold (or freezing), I see and understand too, that he, thereupon/as a result, makes (i.e. lights) a fire, and I apprehend, in the end, the overall process through the maxim in respect of behaviour/behavioural maxim: whoever is cold, lights a fire¹⁶⁸. Two false assumptions underlie this behaviouristic theory of understanding, that, namely,

¹⁶⁸ Abel, "Operation", esp. p. 215ff..

internalisations of alien experiences (i.e. the experiences of others) take place on the basis of one's own experiences, and that becoming and events become comprehensible only in the light of certain maxims in respect of behaviour (behavioural maxims). Let us assume that someone is cold/freezing and, notwithstanding that, lights no fire because he is hardening and toughening his body for hygienic reasons (i.e. for reasons of wanting to become healthier), because he wants to save money, or because he – due to a sin he has committed – wants to punish himself by means of asceticism. When the I (ego) does not know of these motivations and positionings from its own experience, then the said I (ego) can understand the act(ion)s of the Other only through the enrichment and expansion of its own experience, it (the said I/ego) must break through the narrow behaviouristic circle of stimulus and reaction. And in the course of this, the I (ego) must constantly find itself in the search and on the lookout for explanatory maxims (in respect) of behaviour, because every one of these maxims is suitable obviously only for one single case, or one single category of cases. We know, in fact, already of the weakness of the Covering-Law-model¹⁶⁹, because the actor does not have to act on the basis of the Covering Law, which is supposed to have had an effect in the concrete case, [[and so the Covering Law]] is named in retrospect on the basis of knowledge of the act or action already executed and carried out. If the actor in (regard to) the imponderability (incalculability) of his subjectivity, decides in favour of another course of acting/action, then he must – for the explanation of the same course of acting/action – be responsible to provide another maxim in respect of behaviour, which, for its part, again, would have no absolute claim on/to generality. The task of understanding is not solved through maxims, but is only set or posed, because such maxims are not suitable.

¹⁶⁹ See Ch. II, Section 2Cd, above.

Behaviouristic or cybernetic models of understanding celebrate easy victories or preach to the converted when they underline that in understanding (cognitive) communication, no transference of the same thought or feeling from the inside/interior of one of the communication partners (or partners in communication) takes place on the inside/interior of the other partner in communication. Rather, it is a matter that every side has at its disposal lists of meaningful act(ion)s and wants to recognise in its own lists the act(ion)s of each and every other side, which it wants to understand. The conclusions extracted and gained through such a comparison regarding the intentions and deeds of the other (side or person) would have to then be proven with the help of additional data¹⁷⁰. However, one by no means must make this version one's own (i.e. one does not at have to appropriate this version), in order to sharply demarcate and delimit understanding as an, of necessity, reflexive/reflective process, against and from the representations and notions in respect of the interweaving and fusion of spirits(-intellects) or of the psyche in the medium of the same content(s) – representations and notions, incidentally, which no somewhat or fairly systematic theory of understanding has ever represented and supported. On the contrary, the precisely referred perception or view makes the possibility of understanding dependent on the existence and presence of identical mental content(s) on both sides, so that every one of them – only with recourse to one's own list – can decipher, decode or unscramble the individual keywords of the alien, i.e. other, side. And the ascertainment that the findings of the comparison of the lists would have to be proved, checked and tested in (regard to) external data, indeed implies a recognition of the boundaries of the behaviouristic schema; it cannot, however, make clear the smaller or larger extent of the enrichment and expansion of one's own content(s) or (thought-)experiences, which can become inevitable or essential in the process of understanding.

¹⁷⁰ Warriner, "Social Action", p. 509.

Contents are not, in reality, the starting point of understanding, but rather its end or final point, and in this end point the said contents are no longer quantitative and qualitative themselves as at the beginning/start of the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought). In this beginning, [[what]] stands or is found – as the absolute prerequisite, precondition and presupposition and motivation of understanding – [[is]] the in-itself empty-of-content social-ontically fundamental representation and notion of the Other as subjectivity with the, by definition, capacity for meaningful action, for the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and for more or less (im)ponderable ((in)calculable) movement inside of the spectrum of the social relation. This representation and notion of the Other certainly corresponds with the representation and notion of the I (ego) of its [[own]] self; however, it remains decisive that the recognised common ground or commonality, which the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought) must unconditionally and necessarily presuppose, first of all, encompasses the field, area or sector of the stable social-ontic form, not that of variable and mutable (thought) experiences. Understanding means, in this respect, pre-given correspondence or identity (i.e. equating) in regard to the formal (i.e. what is form-related or at the form-related level), and a journey of discovery in the content-related (i.e. what is related to content or at the content-related level), whose aim it is to also make, manufacture, create, produce or restore an identity in the sense that that I (ego) which proceeds and happens in the Other, wants to reconstruct itself (or to be reconstructed in itself) as faithfully as possible with the help of reflexion/reflection. If the I (ego) renounces from the outset this voyage of discovery and believes that its already available mental content(s) would suffice for the coming to terms with the task of understanding beyond the form-related, then it may sometimes be right, but often also not right, because the tempting and alluring, enticing, seductive trap of solipsism always lies in wait and lurks. Nonetheless, the recognised common ground and commonality with regard to

the Other at the form-related (i.e. formal) social-ontic level invites [[the I (ego)]] to go on a voyage of discovery in the field, area or sector of content(s), and with that, to the enrichment and expansion of one's own content(s) in the thought act of understanding. Because understanding is inseparably connected with the insight that the Other, just like the I (ego), in principle, can appropriate a great deal of content (multiple contents), and or, in regard to the very different motivations and settings of the aim and objectives, can occupy several places in the spectrum of the social relation – in short, that the Other, not despite, but precisely because of his social-ontic-form-related/formal common ground and commonality with the I (ego), can more or less differ from this (I (ego)) in regard to the content-related. The, in itself, empty-of-content notion and representation of the Other, which stands and is found at the beginning of the understanding (cognitive) process, consequently pushes, of its own accord, to the detection and ascertainment of those contents which concretise understanding, and in the framework of the given social relation, is supposed to make (understanding) useful in practice – irrespective of whether the contents in question are already familiar or new to the I (ego).

Already the transition from the formality of the constantly presupposed social-ontic common ground and commonality with the Other, to the content-related level, at which both common ground and commonalities, as well as the differences between the I (ego) and the Other are possible, demands reflexive/reflective work. At the content-related level, reflection (reflexion), again, is not only set in motion by the ascertainment of differences and by the consciousness of content-related otherness or alterity. Also, content-related commonalities and content-related common ground do not – in any case – abolish the factual circumstances that the understanding by the I (ego) of the acts of consciousness of the Other is accompanied by the consciousness that here it is a matter of not one's own, but of alien, i.e. the Other's or others' acts of consciousness. To the

understanding of alien (i.e. others') acts of consciousness, belongs the knowledge that the alien/others' acts of consciousness's alienness, strangeness and unfamiliarity is constitutive in relation to that (i.e. such understanding of alien and others' acts of consciousness), and the inclination or proclivity of the I (ego) to – in regard to far-reaching and extensive content-related common ground and commonalities – feel like “one heart and one soul”, goes back and is reduced to psychological needs and wishes, which are connected with the shaping, formation and course of the concrete social relation, that is, they move between independence, security and optimism as to goal, purpose and end. The consciousness of alienness, strangeness and unfamiliarity of alien (and others') acts of consciousness can, however, under all circumstances (i.e. whatever happens or at all events), get or bust out of displacement (repulsion, repression, suppression or denial), and be knowingly put beside every act of consciousness of one's own referring to alien or others' consciousness. In relation to the act of reflection, which founds and establishes the knowledge that the streams (currents or rivers) of consciousness from the I (ego) and to the Other are not identifiable, or else that the acts of consciousness of the Other are comprehensible by the I (ego) only as acts of consciousness of the I (ego), two other things automatically join up, i.e. flow or are added. The I (ego) experiences its own acts of consciousness as the reflective interpretation (or exegesis) of the I's/ego's own acts of consciousness' meaning, or as self-interpretation, self-exegesis (or as the interpretation of the self) – and the said I (ego) also interprets the acts of consciousness of the Other by interpreting, through reflective activity, the Other's acts of consciousness' meaning. Alien understanding (i.e. the understanding of the Other or others) procures or imparts just as little as self-understanding, any “intact” and “original” acts of consciousness whatsoever; it is constituted through the detection and ascertaining or establishment of meaning, and this detection etc. takes place – for its part – on the basis of a more or less incomplete reconstruction of alien or

the Other's/others' stream (current or river) of consciousness, from whose continuum only discontinuous segments can be apprehended¹⁷¹. As we shall see later, in this structure of intersubjective understanding, two basic or fundamental features of social-scientific understanding emerge and stand out; on the one hand, this social-scientific understanding – of necessity – constitutes the reconstruction of an alien, foreign or other interrelation of meaning (or meaningful context) through the acts of consciousness of the researcher; on the other hand, the reconstruction occurs from the perspective of a particular interest (in respect) of knowledge (i.e. of a particular cognitive interest), and with the help (and or on the basis) of – accessible to the researcher – segments of alien (i.e. of others') streams (currents or rivers) of consciousness, the aforesaid reconstruction must, therefore, remain partial and determined by interest (or interest-dependent). Finally, an essential commonality lies between intersubjective and social-scientific understanding in that – in both cases – the reconstruction of alien (the Other's or others') acts of consciousness must rest and be based upon the interpretation of external or outer signs (signals or symbols), of “behaviour”, and over and above that, of objective situations and positions; only through that can it become hardened (i.e. can understanding be founded and consolidated). The said reconstruction must be revised as a whole when new “data” and “testimonies” demand a new interpretation of “behaviour”

¹⁷¹ Cf. Schütz's excellent, superb analysis, *Aufbau*, pp. 140ff., 146ff., 159ff., which of course could be supported on (or underpinned by) phenomenological findings. Husserl set forth, explained in clear words the reflective character of self-perception and alien-perception (i.e. the perception of the Other or others): “As we apprehend solely in terms of themes and topics our subjective (character or nature) through reflection, so, obviously, [[do we apprehend]] the alien (the Other's or others') [[subjective character or nature]] through reflection in empathy (or insight)” (*Hu*, XV, p. 427). The subjective sphere of the individual cannot be given in any other sphere “originally”; the a-presence, i.e. after(-the-fact)-presence of alien, the Other's or others' experiences in the I (ego) is – under no circumstances – transformed into an “original presence”. For the ego's act of consciousness, which refers to an original act of consciousness of the Other, but as one such act of consciousness which the ego itself cannot execute or carry out originally (i.e. from the very beginning), Husserl uses the term “empathy (or insight)”; “empathy (or insight)” as a “reproductive act” means also in the same context, the understanding of alien-personal motivation (i.e. the understanding of the personal motivation of another person), or the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the [[position of the]] other/another subject (*Ideen*, II = *Hu*, IV, pp. 198, 199, 228ff., 274ff.; *Ideen*, I = *Hu*, III, p. 347ff., vgl. *Phänom. Psychol.*, *Hu*, IX, pp. 506, 510). Occasionally, Husserl found this term “slightly or a little suitable, appropriate or apt”, and he spoke of “perception through original interpretation” and “apprehension through interpretation” (*Erste Phil.*, *Hu*, VIII, 1, p. 63). Regarding Husserl's theory of understanding cf. Waldenfels, *Zwischenreich*, pp. 269ff., 374, 155.

and of the “situation (position)”. The illumination and elucidation of motives and goals/ends makes sense only in their connection with the analysis of a concrete situation or position; the (corporeal, linguistic (language) etc.) signs, signals and symbols, which allow or permit inferences and conclusions as regards these motives and goals/ends, appear to be the context in respect of meaning only against the background of a broad objective context, that is, of one which exists regardless of the to-be-understood subject. Above all, here the reflective character of understanding comes into view and becomes apparent. It is also clear that social-scientific understanding, which for the most part seeks to enter into and penetrate temporally and spatially distant subjects, is still more dependent than topical, current or relevant (to a particular occasion) intersubjective understanding, on this indirect path or way to understanding (cognitive) reconstruction.

Understanding is therefore no “irrational” operation; it is no unreflected immediacy, and indeed for the simple reason because it *cannot* be such an unreflected immediacy. The always still persistent quarrel between rather “irrationalistic” or “intuitionistic” and rather “intellectualistic” or “rationalistic” positions in matters of understanding has nothing to do with the actual process of understanding, which, incidentally, runs, flows or drains off (i.e. proceeds and takes place) in both parties (i.e. both the “rationalists” and the “irrationalists”) – for social-ontic reasons – in precisely the same manner, but it goes back to and is reduced to world-theoretical sympathies. As so often [[is the case]] in the history of ideas, also this time, behind the pleading and advocacy in favour of the intuitive immediacy or reflective mediation, in favour of “irrationalism” and “rationalism” are content-related pre-decisions (i.e. preliminary decisions), which are then projected onto questions and problems of knowledge and of methods, or, are connected with these (questions and problems of knowledge and of methods) symbolically-confessionally (i.e. in a

confessional manner)¹⁷². It is now a completely different matter or another story that certain men/humans in certain situations and positions develop feeling, or, in any case, assert that they would understand other subjects by means of direct empathy (or insight), that is, they know one another in mind and spirit (i.e. absolutely). As we implied above, in such feelings or assertions, euphoric impressions or wishes regarding the character and intensity of a social relation – rather than psychological and cognitive realities – are reflected. Just as obvious and, at the same time, misleading, is the talk about empathy (or insight) and intuitive apprehension of subjective factual circumstances and contexts in respect of meaning, if, with that, a very thick and quick process of reflection is actually meant, which during long-lasting exercise and practice, and unusual combinatory talent, aptitude or endowment, becomes still thicker and quicker. That is why the phenomenon of the ingenious and brilliant researcher or interpreter in the social sciences and in general, wrongly and without justification, gives wings to (i.e. inspires) “irrationalists” or “intuitionists”, and, it brings, rightly and justifiably, many “rationalists” into a predicament and state of embarrassment and perplexity, who naively believe that clearly formulated methodical (i.e. methodological) rules could – for the handling and treatment of “materials” or for the “understanding” of social and historical actors – shove or push aside the factor [[of]] “personal talent, endowment and formation (education, learning, cultivation)”, and serve as weapons in respect of compensation for mediocrity. The question or problem of the reflective character of the apprehension of subjective and objective contexts of meaning, and the question or problem of social-scientific genius or ingenuity have, however, not the slightest to do with each other. Reflecting and thinking (thought) do not necessarily constitute the area or realm in which the non-ingenious flourish, and “intuition” does not necessarily lead to ingenious

¹⁷² Dazu Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 36ff..

discoveries or insights. Where the boundary and the border between genius and golden or wooden mediocrity runs, we shall perhaps never find out. Yet it certainly does not coincide with that (boundary or border) between reflection and “empathy (or insight)”, especially as we cannot know whether “rational” thought proceeds in terms of an ability to standardise [[things]] “rationally”. And perhaps it is a genuine feature of genius or ingenuity when anyone – justifiably (in the manner of giving reasons) – that is, on the basis of his performances and achievements or accomplishments, can elevate himself above such contrasts and oppositions.

This feeling may have prompted or given cause to Max Weber to stress the role of “phantasy” in the construction of ideal types as the main instrument of understanding¹⁷³, and simultaneously to define methodical (i.e. methodological) understanding precisely starting from the demarcation or delimitation against intuitionism and psychologism. Remarkable and noteworthy here is how Weber can found the theory of social-scientific understanding on a perception or view of the reflectivity of the acts of consciousness, and on this detour or roundabout way, – without being able to be systematically clear about the implication –, touch upon the social-ontic background of the examination of the problem of understanding. Under this somewhat neglected point of view, and thanks to the preceding analysis, we now should explicate his theses. The starting point is – already in the earliest methodological essays – the conviction that even one’s own experiences (as (or of) going through life) or “moods” elude, escape or are beyond immediate, that is, reflectively unmediated interpretation. As soon as they are supposed to be apprehended, they are transformed and converted into an object of judgement and accordingly subjected to, in fact, a structural change by being seen from a new perspective and being put in order (and classified) in new contexts. The same process takes place when it is a matter of the – of

¹⁷³ *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 194.

necessity interpreting (i.e. interpretive) – apprehension of the alien (i.e. the Other’s and others’) experience. One could perhaps imagine that in (or during) the execution, carrying out and fathoming of purely mathematical thoughts, an identity (i.e. equating) of acts of consciousness of two persons exists (is present and available), but otherwise, every attempt at the “empathising with (or having insight into)” the Other must lead to an act of thought, to a consciousness and or contemplation on (i.e. in regard to) the Alien (i.e. something strange, foreign or different) as an object. What, in the course of this, comes about, is a thought (intellectual) construct, produced, made, fabricated or manufactured “by a generalising abstraction or by isolation and synthesis” – a thought and intellectual construct, that is, which can be founded on “purposefully (end/goal-rationally or expediently) chosen constituent elements or parts” of the alien, strange, foreign or other experience, not on their entirety (wholeness or completeness)¹⁷⁴. In accordance with these ascertainments, now the construction of ideal types as the methodical (i.e. methodological) instrument for the interpreting (i.e. interpretive) apprehension of supra-individual constructs and contexts of meaning (“average (or mean) types”), of historical events – but also of the meaningful action of individuals, is adjusted and regulated (or put in order), because also this time it applies that through the “increased or enhanced unambiguity or explicitness of the concepts” of the social-scientific way of looking at things an – in itself – confused material is to be opened up and revealed: real action, seldom, if at all, achieves that clarity of the meaningful, which would amount to a social-scientific (piece of) evidence/proof and, hence, social-scientific interpretations and constructions would be made superfluous¹⁷⁵. Methodical (i.e. methodological) understanding as the social-scientific assumption and taking on/over of perspectives must therefore of its nature be just as ideal-typical as for instance the social-scientific understanding of

¹⁷⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 104, 280, 110, 107, 108, 96 footnote 1.

¹⁷⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 560-62.

“feudalism”. It (i.e. such methodical/methodological understanding) shows or contains the basic features which characterise every ideal type, however over and above that, such basic features structure already the pre-scientific apprehension of alien experiencing as (or of) going through the living or lives of the Other and of others), that is, the social-ontically pre-given assumption and taking on/over of perspectives! It is, namely, not any faithful or true re-living and re-experiencing of alien living and experiencing life (i.e. the living and experiencing of life of the Other and others), but a construct of thought (or an intellectual construct), which came into being or was created and produced on the basis of selections and abstractions, that is, it does not represent the Other in his (its) totality as a person, but aspects of him come to the fore (or move into the foreground), which are regarded as decisive in the concrete context. Those selections and abstractions articulate, in fact, both in extra-scientific, as well as in scientific praxis, a certain interest of a certain subject – in the former case, the interest of a certain shaping and moulding of the social relation, in the latter case, a theoretical interest in respect of knowledge (i.e. a theoretical cognitive interest) – (in which, though, the practical interests of the researcher with regard to the shaping and moulding of the – *for him* – relevant social relations slip, sneak or creep in, in the form of value judgements and corresponding kinds of censorship or distortions). In the unavoidable selections and abstractions, the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in regard to social-scientific research consequently asserts itself, which, as is, in fact, well known, can be carried on and conducted – according to Weber – only under the influence or aegis of a “value relation”, that is, a decision on the, in general, or on each and every respective occasion, values of knowledge (i.e. what is worth knowing). It is patently obvious how much the choice of a scientifically fertile value relation depends on the “irrational” extra-methodical (i.e. extra-methodological) presuppositions of knowledge, that is, on the personal talent and learning (education, cultivation, formation) of the researcher.

The ideal type, which is supposed or ought to guide the understanding of the alien experiencing of life and action (i.e. the living and experiencing of life and action of the Other and others), is certainly determined social-ontologically, not only as to its formal structure, but also as to its content. The question formulations, around which the ideal type is constructed around stable axes, concerns magnitudes, in respect of which it is pre-scientifically and generally known that they cannot be thought away or divorced from (i.e. they are integral to) socially living human subjectivity: meaning, end (goal) and means, (the) orientation of action to the supposed reactions of Others, action in concrete and only in concrete situations. Understanding succeeds only to the extent it is capable of covering – in its gradual (or stage-by-stage) extension – all these aspects one after the other, i.e. consecutively. The conceptual differentiations, which Weber introduces in the context of understanding, refer or point to just as many steps in the sense of this extension. First of all, the distinction between “topical, current, relevant” and “explaining (cognitive)” understanding, in relation to that, achieves the transition from meaningful action looked at in isolation, to the broader area, sector or field of the setting of the goal and end, or, of the motivation of the person acting. “Topical, current, relevant” understanding refers exclusively to the inherent meaning of an acting, act or action, which makes this what it is, irrespective of who functions as the actor. Explaining (cognitive) understanding, however, strives and endeavours to put in order and classify the topical, current, relevant or objective meaning of acting, action or the act in contexts of meaning (or meaningful interrelations), which can be outlined or delineated through the exploration of the subjective motivation or setting of a goal/end (end-goal setting and objective) of the actor¹⁷⁶. Now, therefore, it is asked to which goal or end does the actor

¹⁷⁶ Loc. cit., p. 546ff.. Regarding the difference between the meaning and the goal (end) or the motive of an act, action or acting cf. the useful remarks and observations of Munch, “Empirical Science”, p. 29, and Tucker, “Weber’s understanding”, p. 161.. Weber undertook or adopted the distinction between the objective understanding of meaning and the interpretation of subjective motives from Simmel, against whom he means or

undertake the act or action (acting), which has this topical, current or relevant meaning, and which motivation brought or carried him to that. A second conceptual distinction leads then from the setting of the goal/end (end-goal setting, objective or target) of the actor to concrete situations and positions, inside of which the actor must realise his goals and ends. A distinction is (*or*: Distinctions are) made, this time between subjective end-goal-purposeful/expedient rationality and objective as to correctness (or accuracy) rationality. Understanding must account, regarding that, for how the actor imagines the course of acting (action or the act) through which he wants to attain and achieve his goals (and ends); how he – in the course of this – thinks of relating means and ends/goals to one another. (To this complex belong, obviously, also the thought acts (acts of thought), through which the actor moves and transfers himself (in)to the situation and or position of other persons, and takes (i.e. includes) the others' presumed reactions in(to) his (i.e. the said actor's) action). During the investigation of or into the subjective end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality of the actor, just as much as beforehand during the inquiry into and ascertaining or determination of his (i.e. the actor's) goals/ends and motives, the person understanding obviously assumes and takes on/over the perspectives of the person to be understood. This is no longer necessary during the concluding phase of the understanding (cognitive) thought act (act of thought), in regard to which the objective rationality as to correctness (or accuracy) of the acting (action or act) is supposed to or ought to be judged and evaluated. Such judgement and evaluation constitute the result of a comparison between the subjective end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality and the requirements of the concrete situation and or position, from

opines, however, that the objective understanding of meaning would not be restricted or limited merely to theoretical sentences or propositions; in their objective meaning, sentences or propositions could be understood, which aim at – in regard to that – “begetting and generating an action and feeling (or sense) becoming immediately practical (i.e. put(table) into practice)”, e.g. commands, instructions or orders, *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 93ff..

which it is evident to what extent the means chosen by the actor for the attainment and achievement of his goal/end in actual fact were suitable for the attaining and achieving of the goal/end, or even to what extent the end/goal itself had chances or prospects at all or in general of realisation. The analysis of the situation (and position) consequently rounds off and completes the understanding (cognitive) thought act or act of thought. Subjective rationality and objective rationality as to correctness (and accuracy) can – it is understood – be investigated only with the help of ideal-typical constructions, whose rational structure, however, may not be confused or confounded with the real structure of real acts or actions (kinds of acting); precisely for the understanding of “irrational” acts or actions (kinds of acting), are rational means of help and assistance needed¹⁷⁷. Consciousness about that shows how high the level or standard is which reflective activity reaches during methodical (or methodological) understanding, since here both the thought acts (acts of thought) of the person acting as well as those of the researcher, must be *simultaneously* considered, thought over, borne in mind, taken into account and thematised (i.e. made a topic or subject of contemplation and or discussion). An act of *thought (thinking)* is, however, also understanding because of its character as *causal* explanation. The theoretical interpretation of “personal action” exhibits – qua (i.e. as) causal knowledge – no in principle differences vis-à-vis the forms of “objectifying” knowledge; it makes use of control through experience (i.e. it is empirically tested) “in the logically same sense as the hypotheses of the natural sciences”¹⁷⁸.

In the eyes of many, in particular Anglo-Saxon positivists, whose knowledge of German philosophical texts often rests or is based on hearsay, Dilthey stands as, i.e. is, the main exponent of the “typically German”, “irrationalistic” etc.

¹⁷⁷ Loc. cit., pp. 434ff., 544ff..

¹⁷⁸ Loc. cit., pp. 102, 111, 95, 436. For conformation of his doubt on the specific “certainty” and the “higher content in respect of reality of inner experience”, Weber refers to Husserl *Logische Untersuchungen*, loc. cit., p. 102 footnote 2, p. 109 footnote 2 and 3.

perception or view of understanding. The misinterpretation begins already in the key concept of “experience (as (or of) going through life)”, which is accustomed to being quickly associated with the “living, lively, vital” emotional aspect of psychical activity in its contrast with and opposition to abstracting/abstractive and abstract thought. This was by no means Dilthey’s opinion. His terminology can, of course, be misleading for today’s readers with an altered and changed sense of (or feeling for) language and speech, and furthermore, overlooked is that the contradistinction “concept-life” in the Diltheyan context very often describes, paraphrases or outlines merely the fundamental separation between the natural sciences and the humanities (sciences of the spirit/intellect), and does not denote or describe a fatal dichotomy inside the latter (humanities). This means: the natural sciences must exclusively be a construct of abstract-conceptual thought, because the deep ontological chasm between its object, subject matter and human being (t)here (or existence) can only be bridged in this manner – not in actual fact and reality, but in and through science, it goes without saying. On the other hand, the (abstract) thought pertaining to the humanities (*or*: intellectual-spiritual-scientific (abstract) thinking) relates and refers to an object (subject matter) whose apprehension is not reliant and dependent merely on essentially alien and foreign to it intellectual constructs (e.g. mathematical natural laws), and, in this respect, is in itself “living, lively, vital”. The conflict between “experiencing and going through life” and “reflection” or “thought” does not constitute, in any case, by and large, a topic or theme and a weak point in Dilthey’s methodical/methodological approach pertaining to the humanities, which in its development and unfolding towards maturity tended towards more and more of a multi-dimensional perception (and view) of understanding. The concept(ual plan) of “experience as (or of) going through life” did not under any circumstances stand in the way. Because the said concept(ual plan) of “experience as (or of) going through life” did not mean a specific act of consciousness in its demarcation and

delimitation against other specific acts of consciousness, not for instance a “feeling” in contrast to “perception” or to “thought”, but the mode of consciousness in general – not, that is, the content of the act of consciousness, which can consist equally in an imagined quality in respect of meaning, a feeling/sense of pain (grief, ache or hurt) or a mathematical relationship, but “the kind (of feeling/sense), as it is there (i.e. as the feeling/sense exists)”, and indeed as the smallest unity with a united meaning in the flow of time. The experience as (or of) going through life represents and constitutes now an absolute identity (i.e. equating) of the act of consciousness and (of each and every respective) content of consciousness; the consciousness of experience as (or of) going through life and its constitution, composition and texture are one and the same. When experience as (or of) going through life, therefore, cannot stand across or opposite from or face the I (ego) like an image, then it must in retrospect turn into and become the object (or subject matter) of reflection. On this point, I find Dilthey’s position ambivalent, but the matter is in itself so touchy, tricky and thorny that one can hardly hold the ambivalence against him (i.e. Dilthey). Because, on the one hand, Dilthey writes that experience as (or of) going through life will “first of all, be illuminated by elementary intellectual performances of functions (or achievements and accomplishments in thought)”; on the other hand, he affirms and reassures that experience as (or of) going through life shuts (encloses or embodies) these elementary intellectual performances of functions (or achievements and accomplishments in thought) “in themselves”, that it has at its disposal and possesses its own “intellectuality”, which becomes evident and noticeable independently and autonomously with the “increase, heightening and intensification of the state of being conscious (i.e. consciousness or awareness)”¹⁷⁹.

¹⁷⁹ See the pertinent or relevant passages in: *Aufbau*, GS, VII, pp. 26, 136ff., 194ff..

The hint, suggestion or indication regarding the specific intellectuality of experience as (or of) going through life refers to Dilthey's original intent(ion), namely, of overcoming the dualism of (sensory) perception (sensation, feeling, sense or emotion), and, understanding in the classical theory of knowledge by means of a psychology of a new type: this intent(ion), not the one-sided defence of the rights of "life" against the tyranny of "thought", underlies the struggle by "experience as (or of) going through life". But the reflectivity inhering (inherent, innate or immanent) in experience as (or of) going through life or the reflectivity directly connected to it (i.e. experience as (or of) going through life) cannot leave behind (i.e. surpass) the bound(arie)s of the immediate, that is, it cannot perform or bring about any understanding, and Dilthey also sees into and recognises – not least of all via his own analysis of temporality (existence in time) –, that no thesis in respect of any immediacy with regard to understanding can be maintained, perpetuated, stood by or upheld. That is why he increasingly turns his attention to the necessary mediations, and in the unity of experience going through life, expression and understanding, he finally finds a formula, which appears to him to be sufficiently comprehensive and flexible¹⁸⁰. The "basic or fundamental relationship" of the expression (of experience as (or of) going through life) with experience as (or of) going through life, which is expressed in it (i.e. the expression of experience as (or of) going through life), does not constitute a conclusion of an effect on a cause, but it founds and establishes understanding. Understanding, however, at this level still remains "elementary", and moreover, expression can in itself be unreliable and untrustworthy ("adjustment as pretending and feigning; lie and falsehood; deceit, illusion, delusion, bluff and deception"), contradictions and uncertainties, obscurities and ambiguities come into being, and the henceforth required – in greater detail – "examination, test or trial (proofing)" leads to a

¹⁸⁰ See Rossi's solid, sound analysis, *Storicismo*, esp. pp. 60ff., 71ff..

“higher” understanding, which does not only find expression in judgements regarding the character and (cap)abilities of individual humans, but over and above that, must apprehend the milieu (i.e. environment, setting and surroundings) and the circumstances. It (i.e. the aforementioned “basic or fundamental relationship” of the expression (of experience as (or of) going through life) with experience as (or of) going through life, which is expressed in it (i.e. the expression of experience as (or of) going through life)) brings, in short, “from given expressions – in a conclusion or inference of induction – the context of a whole, to understanding”¹⁸¹. Only higher understanding lifts (i.e. abolishes or cancels), therefore, “the restriction, limitation or confinement of the experience as (or of) going through life of the individual”, and consequently puts aside the danger of turning one’s own experience as (or of) going through life into the yardstick and measure for the decipherment or decoding of alien (i.e. the Other’s or others’) experiences as (or of) going through life. In relation to that, we, as Dilthey observed and remarked, being all the less justified, when by no means self-experience (i.e. personal experience as (or of) going through life) distinguishes itself and stands clearly out: “we do not even understand ourselves. To us ourselves, everything, in fact, is self-evident; on the other hand, we have for ourselves no yardstick and measure”¹⁸². That is why in the context of higher understanding “re-living (*or*: experiencing going through life again)” cannot simply mean that the I (ego) re-encounters or meets again in the Other, experiences as (or of) going through life, which he already knows from his own (personal) experience. It is a matter rather of an activation of possibilities, which in the real life of the I (ego) did not appear, and are opened for him/it only in his/its striving to understand the Other. A historical process or series of events like the Reformation is beyond all the daily possibilities of experience as (or of) going through life – “but I can re-live it (or experience it

¹⁸¹ *Aufbau*, GS, VII, p. 200ff..

¹⁸² Loc. cit., pp. 141ff., 347.

again as (or in respect of) going through life). I move or transfer myself into the circumstances”. Precisely because re-living (*or*: experiencing going through life again) is something more and something other (i.e. different) than a copy of my own experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life, necessary or requisite for a higher understanding is a “particular personal genius, ingenuity or brilliance”, which, though, does not have to be (i.e. is not necessarily) lost in the “irrational”: this higher understanding “becomes or turns into a technique”¹⁸³. This binding or tying of genius, ingenuity or brilliance to a technique is supposed to vouch for and guarantee that the understanding (cognitive) humanities (i.e. sciences of the spirit and intellect), being far from renouncing or abjuring rational thought, can achieve “the objectivity of scientific knowledge”. Understanding leads “from the narrowness and subjectivity of experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life” to the region “of the whole and of the general” or of “general truths”; understanding demands and requires “for its completion (and perfection), systematic knowledge or knowing”¹⁸⁴.

Dilthey hints at and suggests, fleetingly or in passing, also the social-ontic background of understanding. This arises “first of all, in the interests of practical life”, in which people are dependent or reliant on one another, and everyone must know what the other person wants. In addition, we do not behave/act understandingly (i.e. with understanding) only vis-à-vis other people, but also vis-à-vis ourselves¹⁸⁵. This insight obviously applies to and is valid for all times, ages, epochs, eras and all cultures, diachronically and universally-historically (i.e. world-historically as regards the history of the universe (of mankind)). The greatest weakness of Dilthey’s argumentation regarding the prerequisites or preconditions of understanding consists in the un-reflected (i.e. lacking in reflection) to and fro, back and forth between the

¹⁸³ Loc. cit., p. 214ff..

¹⁸⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 135, 143, 146.

¹⁸⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 200, 196.

social-ontic level of the diachronic-universally historical (or world-historical), and, the social-historical level of each and every respective culture and society coming into question and being considered. As Dilthey writes, understanding constitutes a “finding again of the I (ego) in the You” – but on the common or joint foundation of the spirit-intellect objectified in supra-individual constructs through participation in it (i.e. the objectified (in supra-individual constructs) spirit-intellect) on both sides. This founds and establishes the “(self-)sameness of the spirit-intellect in the I (ego), in the You, in every subject”, and this also founds and establishes the identity (as equating) of the subject of knowledge with its object (or subject matter), as well as the identity (as equating) of the object (or subject matter) with itself (i.e. the object) “at all tiers, levels, stages, degrees or grades of its objectification”¹⁸⁶. In regard to (or amongst) the objectifications of the spirit-intellect, Dilthey now counts – without distinction – both every “community” and “every system of culture”, as well as the “totality of the spirit-intellect and of universal history”. It is, nevertheless, evident that the spirit/intellect, which is – totally and universally-historically or world-historically, that is always and all over, everywhere – objectified, cannot coincide with that which experiences and undergoes its specific objectification in every culture and every community. The common denominator of both can only be a form-related (i.e. formal) common denominator, otherwise the former (total and universal-historical or world-historical, always and all over, everywhere objectification) would have to coincide in toto and in terms of content with the latter (specific objectification in every culture and every community), which in view of the great variety and multiformity of cultures and of the community (i.e. human associations) would be an absurdity: if the universal-historical or world-historical (i.e. universally applicable throughout all of human history) spirit-intellect was objectified (or objectified itself) in every

¹⁸⁶ Loc. cit., p. 191.

culture and community in toto and in terms of content, then social and historical individuation would never have come about. The identity (i.e. equal and same nature) of the spirit-intellect as such and in general, that is, in its generally valid and applicable form-related (i.e. formal) structure, can, therefore, only make up (or deliver) the necessary, not the sufficient condition of the “finding again of the I (ego) in the You”; it does not in the least vouch for or guarantee the understanding of content: the Eskimo is not in a position to understand the Zulu’s culture in terms of content, although he has social-ontically at his disposal the same equipment. If the universally-historically (i.e. as regards the whole historical universe of mankind), world-historically, or, social-ontically intended, meant, imagined, thought and conceived (of) identity of the spirit (or of “human nature” or whatever else) were sufficient for understanding absolutely or per se and as such, then every understanding, even the most arbitrary, would be – in terms of content – correct, because every understanding, even the most arbitrary, has as its basis, that identity (of the spirit-intellect as such and in general, that is, in its generally valid and applicable form-related (i.e. formal) structure). In general, Dilthey’s explanations or observations regarding the presuppositions of understanding only preserve [[their]] coherence and meaning when one recognises in the mystifying talk of the “(self-)sameness” of the spirit being objectified or objectifying itself, the remaining-always-the-same, constant and invariable social-ontic formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), and at the same time, clearly separates this level of understanding from the content-related level of understanding – when one, in short, duly bears in mind the difference between the social-ontological and the social-historical way of looking at things.

We can assume why Dilthey did not bear the said difference between social-ontological and social-historical consideration in mind. The dividing line, which dominated his thought, was that between the natural sciences and the sciences of the intellect and spirit (i.e. the humanities), between the ontic heterogeneity of subject and object in the former (natural sciences), and, the ontic homogeneity of the subject and the object in the latter (humanities). Since what mattered was that this homogeneity was to be brought out and underlined as the precondition of understanding pertaining to the humanities with all possible emphasis, thus, the necessary differentiation between understanding pertaining to the humanities' social-ontic and its (i.e. understanding pertaining to the humanities') social-historical sense was not made as it should have been (and was thus done an injustice), especially as such a differentiation necessarily has a relativising effect and impact: it (i.e. the said differentiation with a relativising effect) shows that the homogeneity of the subject and the object in itself and in general cannot be a sufficient condition of and for understanding. Dilthey certainly inherited this weighty, serious and grave unclarity from historicism, which already made or turned the – resting and being based on the “essential uniformity” of all humans amongst one another (i.e. as between themselves) – “congeniality” between the subject and the object of social-scientific research into the real prerequisite and precondition of understanding pertaining to the humanities in contrast to natural-scientific explaining (i.e. explanation)¹⁸⁷. Droysen questioned, just as little as Dilthey after him^{lii}, at which level – on each and every respective occasion – this “congeniality” extends, and how it, on each and every respective occasion, is to (or should) be comprehended. But Droysen was, just as much as Dilthey, far away from confusing this same “congeniality” with an identity (i.e. equating) of spirits, intellects and psyches constituted, composed and textured in such a way that methodical (or methodological)

¹⁸⁷ Droysen, *Historik*, p. 328ff..

understanding could be replaced by effortless and at the same time absolutely accurate and perfectly or well-aimed intuition. Historical understanding is “just as much synthetic as analytical, just as much induction as deduction”, whereas “immediate and direct intuition” takes place only during the “understanding” of certain factual circumstances, which, though, clearly differs from the “logical mechanism of understanding”¹⁸⁸. The question of how [[the aforementioned]] congeniality [[between the subject and the object of social-scientific research]] acts towards or relates with methodical or methodological reflection, was of interest, as is understandable, most of all with regard to the assessment of the function of one’s own subjective experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life for the understanding (cognitive) apprehension of (the) other (kinds of) experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life. Here Simmel created or established the necessary conceptual clarity, which highly probably did not miss its effect (i.e. did not miss out on having an effect) also on Dilthey’s late explanations regarding the topic or matter and theme. The, in that case, – adopted and undertaken by Weber, and modified in terms of content – distinction between topical, current or relevant understanding, and, explaining (i.e. explanatory) understanding,¹⁸⁹ served Simmel first of all, exactly in relation to that, in contrasting the possibility of a direct reproducing of alien or foreign experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life in and during theoretical thought/ intellectual content(s) with the impossibility of such a reproducing in and during all other acts of consciousness. Whereas during the understanding of the theorem or proposition $2 + 2 = 4$, the certainty, in practice, exists that the I (ego) can reproduce the acts of consciousness of the Other faithfully, in all other cases, in which the I (ego) moves and transfers itself (in)to [[the position of]] the Other, a “re-shaping, re-moulding or transformation” is carried out and takes

¹⁸⁸ Loc. cit., p. 329.

¹⁸⁹ See footnote 174 above. For the description of this distinction, Simmel later used the terms “objective/ factual” and “historical” understanding, *Wesen*, p. 18.

place, whereby attention is not directed merely to the content of the (i.e. what has been) understood, but likewise or even principally to the fact that here it is a matter of acts of consciousness of another subject. Already because of that, the way to linear psychological projections is blocked, especially since alien experiences (as (or of) going through life) (i.e. the experience of others (as (or of) going through life) are typified (i.e. rendered into types or classified under typifying forms/ types) and are apprehended only via the agreement of one's own with the alien (i.e. the Other's or others') type of experience (as (or of) going through life) at the level and in the manner of reflection. The understanding of a historical personality can be formed (and/or developed) so much the less as the projection of one's own properties, qualities and characteristics or experiences (as (or of) going through life), as it requires and demands a "putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the entire/whole great diversity of an enormous system of forces".^{liii} In order for Caesar to be understood (*or*: In order to understand Caesar), one does not, therefore, have to be Caesar – such "congeniality" could in fact vitiate, impair or reduce the sharpness, clarity and depth of understanding: because even if the I (ego) finds its own experiencing as (or in respect of) going through life with certainty in the Other, who guarantees that the I (ego) also *understands* itself away from or beyond all bias, prejudice and self-satisfaction, complacency or smugness¹⁹⁰?

Simmel touched upon the social-ontic origin or provenance of social-scientific understanding, when he opined that the latter (social-scientific understanding) differs from daily inter-subjective understanding only "gradually i.e. by degrees", or "quantitatively". He also pointed out that in the "reproduction" of alien (i.e. of others') acts of consciousness, two conceptually separable from

¹⁹⁰ *Probleme*, p. 317ff; *Wesen*, p. 8ff.. It looks or seems to be puzzling that Collingwood wants to support the thesis: "in order to understand Caesar, one must be Caesar" against Simmel and Dilthey, with whom he actually largely agrees in the matter [[of understanding (others)]] (*Idea of History*, pp. 170ff., 172, 174, 297, 215). The puzzle or enigma has, though, its psychological explanation. When Collingwood, towards the end of the 1930s, wrote his book, his political-philosophical struggle against "German irrationalism" reached a high point.

each other strata of one's own acts of consciousness take part: the "natural forces and categories" as well as "the (f)actual experiences, which give these categories content".¹⁹¹ Finally, he lent, gave or conferred upon understanding, an ontological status, by calling it an "original, primordial, primeval phenomenon", "in which a relationship of man in respect of the world is expressed"¹⁹². Heidegger could pick up the thread of that in order to then, though, – in the framework and in the name of a "fundamental ontology" –, remove from the concept of understanding every concrete *social*-ontological content, which is its content par excellence. Thus, in Heidegger's analysis of this concept of understanding, the genetically and structurally solely fertile standpoint, namely, the social inter-subjective relation, does not play any role, but "understanding" means in him (i.e. in Heidegger's thought regarding the concept (of understanding)) just as much as the capability of the being (t)here (or existence) at orientating itself in the world of subjects and objects. Understanding makes up and constitutes the "view (or perspective)" of being (t)here (or existence), through which this understanding is capable of opening up and revealing both its own being in the world as well as its being-with with Others as the constitutive elements (or factors) of its (i.e. understanding's) existence¹⁹³. For the character of "understanding" it is not here, therefore, decisive whether the understanding (cognitive) being (t)here (or existence) stands across from or faces another being (t)here (existence) or natural things. Heidegger in fact writes that "understanding", in his sense, is more original or primordial than "understanding" in the sense in which it is assumed and accepted within the epistemological contradistinction between "explaining or accounting for" and "understanding"¹⁹⁴: but this contradistinction rested and was based precisely on the difference between man and all other beings in the

¹⁹¹ *Probleme*, pp. 330ff., 325.

¹⁹² *Wesen*, p. 29.

¹⁹³ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 146.

¹⁹⁴ Loc. cit., p. 143.

world. From the equating of understanding with the general capability at orientation of the being (t)here (or existence), understanding's "project character (*or*: character in respect of a project (draft, outline, plan or blueprint))", in which "the manner or kind of being of the being (t)here (or existence) as being able to be" is seen. As the being-seen of this being-able-to-be, and as the project (draft, outline, plan or blueprint), understanding again is "pushed through and imposed completely and totally by possibility", that is – expressed in the language of temporality – (understanding is) "primarily in the future or future-related"¹⁹⁵. In a purely conceptual and terminological respect, this considerable content-related widening and extension of "understanding" would probably bring about confusion rather than clarity. In regard to this point or matter, fairly little is won or gained. Because Heidegger's bringing, carving and working out of the – directed towards the future – project character (*or*: character in respect of a project (draft, outline, plan or blueprint)) in respect of understanding basically constitutes merely quite a long-winded and awkward paraphrasing or re-description of that which one already knew since long ago from historical, Marxist and pragmatist approaches regarding the genetic and structural primacy of the praxis of a subject, which is compelled and forced into constant orientation and re-orientation in the world, vis-à-vis every "explaining" or "understanding" in the narrow theoretical sense. Typically enough, Heidegger – precisely in the framework of his thoughts and considerations regarding understanding – fires at (i.e. attacks) the priority or primacy of pure looking-at[[-things]], and opines that looking-at[[-things]] and thinking are "both already distant and remote derivatives of understanding"¹⁹⁶. That may be [[so]], but the question is *how* looking-at[[-things]] and thinking or thought have sprung from understanding, and *how* understanding must be understood so that this derivation can at all be understandable. Here the answer should or ought to

¹⁹⁵ Loc. cit., p. 145, 146, 337.

¹⁹⁶ Loc. cit., p. 147.

be clear: only understanding in the *social*-ontological sense of mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives could, through its reflectivity, which must be intensified in the intersubjective relation, enable and qualify man for higher achievements in language and thought (*or*: higher linguistic and intellectual performances and accomplishments). Instead of taking and going down this path, Heidegger, for whom the specifically *social*-ontological setting, posing or formulation of the question, or examination of the problem, and its implications, remains alien, foreign and strange, explicates the interpretation (that is, the “education, training and development of understanding”), on the one hand, in regard to the mute and silent “being available”; on the other hand, in regard to “historical interpretation”. Precisely the interpretation of the being (t)here (or existence) by the being (t)here (or existence) against the background of the spectrum of the social relation, and by the effect or result of the social relation’s mechanism, does not come into consideration and is not examined.^{liv} But precisely this latter (mechanism of the social relation) sets things in motion and or pulls the strings both in the interpretation of being-available, as well as in historical interpretation. How a piece of furniture, a tool or a device, instrument or apparatus is to be interpreted, social relations decide about that or about the circumstances of its/their invention, fabrication and use, which is founded on the interpretation of the being (t)here (or existence) by the being (t)here (or existence), that is, they imply the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and mutual and reciprocal expectations, whether now primitive man swings his club against primitive man, whether the refined use of knife and fork is supposed to signal and be indicative of social distinctions, or whether tractors cultivate the soil. The same applies to, and is valid for, – and indeed *fortiori* (i.e. more strongly) –, historical interpretation. It is a tautology, to describe or outline the hermeneutic circle as a dependence of interpretation on the “location, position or site of the observer” and/or else as an “expression of the

existential pre-structure of being (t)here (or existence) itself”¹⁹⁷. The interpreting (interpretive) being (t)here (or existence) is pre-structured and/or else it structures its interpretation by several friendly or inimical positionings or stances towards other positionings and stances, already existing or, for its part, interpretations simultaneously coming into being, whose every interpretation is borne and carried by another concrete being (t)here (or existence), which interprets the alien or foreign being (t)here (or existence). The interpretation of alien being (t)here (or existence) as a bearer of interpretations belongs constitutively to the formation and development of one’s own interpretations about the (i.e. what is) historical – and *thereon* is the hermeneutic circle founded. Allusions to the result and effect of tradition and to the “pre-understanding”¹⁹⁸ stamped by tradition are – precisely as the talk of the “existential pre-structure of being (t)here (or existence)” – abstractions, which cut out the *social*-ontological backgrounds or backdrops of understanding. Tradition stamps (shapes or moulds) the “pre-understanding” (read: the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) only, in so far as present-day people are interpreted in such a way, and accordingly, related to one another, that in the eyes of each and every respective Other, they appear as bearers of a certain content, namely of “tradition”, or of a certain interpretation of the same tradition. This is not supposed to mean that tradition is necessarily pure fiction, or that tradition can be conjured up in accordance with one’s sheer will out of nothing. It also does not mean that traditions do not contain unreflected pieces of self-evidence (*or*: not-reflected-upon self-evident elements). However, the ad hoc invention of traditions constitutes also a fact – and indeed an age-old or ancient fact –, whereas the traditional pieces of self-evidence (or self-evident elements), for their part, are normally subject to topical, current or relevant purposeful and expedient interpretations, and to

¹⁹⁷ Loc cit., pp. 148ff., 153.

¹⁹⁸ Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, pp. 250ff., 261ff..

more or less strict supervision. In this respect, tradition represents and constitutes that product of interpretation, which in accordance with the – on each and every respective occasion – ruling or dominant interpretation of certain subjects, which interpret the traditional contents, *and*, at the same time, the present-day positioning of other subjects towards these traditional contents, has to be regarded as the precondition or prerequisite of interpretation. How much tradition is the function of the mutual or reciprocal interpretation of contemporary people is seen in the most direct manner when tradition directly, and in terms of content, becomes the topic, subject matter or theme, when, therefore, friends and foes of (thus, and not otherwise interpreted) “tradition” clash with one another. Also, this phenomenon, incidentally, is age-old and ancient – already in the archaic high cultures one constantly raised complaints owing to the contempt, disdain and scorn for traditional customs and conventional morals and manners or ways of thinking – and one overlooks its significance and meaning because one is caught up in and labours under the schema in respect of the contradistinction: “community vs. society”, which suggests the impression that only during the transition from socially and intellectually-spiritually immobile agrarian society to all-round mobile industrial society, a break has taken place in the matter of “tradition”. The problematic character of tradition is likewise so old as tradition itself (more precisely: as the invocation of tradition), and it stems from the primacy and priority of factors permanently having a social-ontological effect – the unceasing interpretation of the being (t)here (or existence) by the being (t)here (or existence) against the background and backdrop of the social relation, and under the effect of its mechanism – vis-à-vis every institutional or habitual crystallisation, which is sociologically or historically apprehensible.

E. Communication

- a. Preliminary remarks and observation: boom and ambiguity (or multiple meanings) of the concept

In accordance with the research programme of this chapter, the concept of communication must be illuminated here in its connection with the phenomenon of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which, for its part, refers to the specific character of human subjectivity. For our introduction some conceptual differentiation seems essential, since the inflationary (i.e. expanding or increasing) usage of the concept of communication in recent decades has as a consequence its (i.e. the concept of communication's) ambiguity (and multiple meanings). The reasons for the new lustre, sparkle, splendour, glow, glory or shine of the concept of communication takes root deeply in mass-democratic reality and in the predominant and prevailing in it (i.e. in mass democracy) thought/intellectual models. They (i.e. such predominant mass-democratic thought models) have already been discussed¹⁹⁹; the reminding and recollection of them interrelates, nonetheless, not immaterially and not inessentially (i.e. interrelates materially and essentially) with the conceptual differentiation which we want to make and carry out. Since the source from which the concept of communication flows in contemporary discourse was a dual source, thus its usage was channelled chiefly in two directions. The question how human subjectivity, especially in the form or shape of the Other, is to (or ought to) be comprehended, came into contact with the concept of communication inside of approaches which directly or indirectly refer to phenomenological or dialogical theories of communication, and were characterised by their ethical impulse. On

¹⁹⁹ See Ch. I., Sec. 2, above.

the other hand, cybernetically inspired systems theories, which in a systematic respect, put absolutely first the concept of communication, pursued declaredly the aim of driving away, ousting and expelling the classical examination of the problem of subjectivity and of action from the field or area of social theory. This was thought and conceived of or imagined as the radical final reckoning with subject philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of the subject) and of anthropology in accordance with the logic of the mass-democratic thought figure. The talk of acting, the act and action henceforth serves primarily in relation to that, to play man as protean actor against man as invariable and immutable substance, in order to then break up and dissolve – in a further step – acting, the act or action itself in a processing and working on, of signs and symbols²⁰⁰. The manner in which the social-theoretical primacy of communication was gained before [[and over]] acting, the act and action, was based, of course, merely on conceptual decisionism or else on a conceptual artifice, trick or contrivance. Because one shortened, curtailed or reduced action – quite behaviouristically – to externally observable orders, courses or sequences of events, and thereupon, it was an easy thing for communication to be declared an extensive, comprehensive and fundamental concept.^{iv} This should in fact, according to its definition, encompass not only information, the communication (as notification and transmission) of information and the understanding of such communication or notification, but also the – connected with these three [[elements, dimensions or factors]] – selections, that is, it encompasses in contrast to acting and the act, next to the observable communication and notification, many more unobservable [[elements, dimensions or factors]]²⁰¹. Areas, which earlier were attributed to acting, action and the act, thereunder (i.e. amongst them), also the intellectual(-spiritual) acts of giving meaning, choosing and understanding, are

²⁰⁰ See e.g. Warriner, *Emergence*, chap. 1, and p. 72: “Action takes place in a sign situation in which there are a wide variety of signs. The action therefore [!] is a product of the processing of the various signs and their meanings in relation to each other”.

²⁰¹ Luhmann, *Soz. Systeme*, p. 225ff..

now therefore, without much ado and without wasting any time, classed with and assigned to communication, and the concept of acting, action and the act is literally constricted up to [[the point of and within]] meaninglessness. If, nonetheless, action and acting or the act did not have exactly those invisible components, which traditional theory in the narrowest alliance with every social experience ascribes to them; if, therefore, meaning, goal (end), the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives etc. do not constitutively belong to their (i.e. action, acting's and the act's) essence, and they constituted a mere epiphenomenon "on the basis of the fundamental becoming or series of events of communication", thus they would hardly be in a position to bring about and cause that which even must be ascribed by systems theoreticians, and even if only indirectly, to their (i.e. action, acting's and the act's) effect: the making asymmetrical of communication through the insertion and incorporation of an understanding of acting, the act or action in the communicative becoming or series of events²⁰². The objective yield, return, fruits or profit from the reversal or inversion of the social-theoretical priorities consequently remains unclear and can also basically be asserted merely by invoking the general superiority of the system-theoretical paradigm (i.e. the paradigm pertaining to systems theory) – that is a typical circle of argumentation (i.e. typically circular argumentation). Otherwise, either plausible banalities are summoned (neither communication nor action would have been capable of evolution independently of each other), or easily reversible statements or propositions, like e.g. that, the social system, which is constituted as a system of acting, the act or action, must presuppose the communicative context of action, or that, communicative carrying on and continuing presupposes the communicative value of acting, the act or action²⁰³. However, it can be said with just as good grounds (i.e. just as justifiably), that acts of communication objectively and subjectively presuppose the existence of

²⁰² Loc. cit., p. 227.

²⁰³ Loc. cit., pp. 240, 233.

acting men, or the said acts of communication would sooner or later become value-less, i.e. worthless (or without value), if they were fully missing and lacking or deprived of their specific value in respect of acting, the act and action. That would even in fact apply if one wanted to reduce the acting, action and the act to their external course; because precisely this creates – in a real, actual and true sense – the absolute, accomplished, consummate and irrevocable facts, which in the eyes of actors, as is known, counts so much that these actors often gear their wishes and endeavours, – with conscious disregard of, or disdain for, all inner components of acting, action and the act, or, communication – exclusively to them (i.e. the aforesaid absolute and irrevocable facts)^{lvi}. Communicative effects or actions – no matter how broadly (i.e. how much) one grasps them – can incomparably more easily be abolished, reversed, canceled or made up for than real acts or actions – [[and]] one may grasp such real acts or actions as narrowly as one wants. The hard core or nucleus of acting, action and the act remains socially the ultima ratio (i.e. the final reason, argument, reckoning, account or last resort), irrespective of how the ratio (Reason) of social theoreticians thinks about that. Since systems theory compensated the conceptual narrowing of action through (or with) the conceptual widening of “communication”, it could, by virtue of this conceptual decisionism, refuse to tolerate a limine the obvious objections, which assume a different and indeed narrower concept of communication, like e.g. that, which says and means that the logic of exchange and understanding of (pieces of) information via messages, notifications and announcements is subject to the logic of the social relation of acting humans, and not the other way around^{lvii}. Systems theory could have also avoided difficulties which someone necessarily runs into, [[and]] who indeed wants to found the social process on communication, but who has not sufficiently and adequately freed himself from

the straitjacket of the behaviouristic way of looking at things²⁰⁴. But this conceptual widening and flexibilisation of communication occurs around (i.e. by paying) the unavoidable price, at every turn, of brushing against and touching upon factors and given (actual) facts which point to acts, actions and the plans or designs in respect of the acting (*or*: of the action plans) of concrete actors. If, for instance, the understanding of a message, notification or announcement also belongs to communication, then [[one]] must – during each and every respective message, notification or announcement – be able to distinguish between the message’s or the notification’s or the announcement’s nominal and its real value in respect of acting, action and the/an act. Both values indeed often coincide; they do not, however have to, and then understanding leads one astray, unless it is extended and concerns and applies to – through the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and through the assessment of the concrete situation (and position) – the motives, ends, goals and plans of acting (or action plans) of the Other requiring interpretation. Understanding is here, therefore, to be performed, achieved and accomplished not from communication, but from action. The same content in respect of the message, notification or announcement can serve different ends and goals of acting, action and the act, and the same goals and ends of acting, action and the act can make use of different contents in respect of the message, notification or announcement. And this possible or potential asymmetry between content of the message, notification or announcement and the goal and end of acting, action and the act constitutes a strong indication or sign of the (f)actual primacy of action, as everyone knows^{lviii}. Because everyone seeks the unraveling or decipherment of the former (content of the message etc.) with the help or on the basis of the latter (the goal of the acting etc.); no-one is content with messages,

²⁰⁴ As regards Mead’s difficulties concerning this, see Zaner, “Theory”, p. 76ff..

notifications or announcements when real, even incomprehensible, acts or actions flagrantly contradict them.

If we disregard, from the beginning, the above-mentioned reasons, talk of communication in the mass-democratic context gained popularity because it gave sustenance and nourishment to the pious wish that the shifting and displacement of action at (or to) the level of communication would allow reducing real conflicts to communicative (kinds of) disfunction(s), and eliminating such real conflicts with – likewise and at the same time – communicative and “rational” means²⁰⁵. Despite the converging favourable conditions, objective and factual obstacles and hindrances, which we just indicated, however, stand in the way of that shifting and displacement^{lix}. And since the concept of acting, action and the act could not be eradicated from social theory, it came to (*or*: there were) between the concept of acting (action and the act) and the concept of communication, various terminological and content-related combinations, whereby the extent, range or scope of both (i.e. the concept of acting and the concept of communication) was enlarged and increased, or reduced and decreased, symmetrically, albeit in, on each and every respective occasion, a reverse(d) relationship. That is why the definitions of communication swung, oscillated and fluctuated between communication as a one-sided process, in and during which the transmission of a (piece of) information or of a sign (signal or symbol) by the communicator to the recipient takes place, and, communication as a two-sided process, which in the extreme case is equated absolutely (or *par excellence*) with interaction²⁰⁶. The first definition reminds [[us]] directly of the origin or provenance of that language,

²⁰⁵ See e.g. the characteristic formulation in Duncan, *Symbols*, p. 130: “Disrelationships are not reflected in communication; they originate in communication... It is not differences of status, rank, sex, age, class or condition that create pathological states in society (as well as in individuals), but a lack of symbols we might use to express differences yet subordinate them to some great social principle of order”. But why are precisely *these* symbols lacking? [[Translator’s addition (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): AAAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!]]

²⁰⁶ See the useful classification of the definition of communication in Merten, *Kommunikation*, Part I.

which via cybernetics and informatics, that is, from isolatable technical processes, penetrated (and or forced its way into) the description of intersubjective phenomena. The absolute identification (i.e. equating) of communication and interaction, i.e. in intersubjective action, reduces again the whole to a terminological matter of concern without theoretical importance and significance, although the feeling for and sense of language is reluctant (or hates) to hear that the murderer and the murdered “communicated” with each other. However, the widening (extension or expansion) of the concept of communication made (or came to) – via its technical-formal (i.e. technical and form-related) meaning –, as a rule, a stop precisely before such cases; the said widening of the concept of communication was executed and carried out, therefore, through the one-sided inclusion or incorporation of the *inner* (*internal*) mechanism of the social relation in the process of communication or, turned (i.e. put or said) otherwise (and on the other hand), through the connection of the transmission of signs (signals or symbols), and, of expressive acts, with the – on both sides – act of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. According to that, interpersonal communication consists of three components: an expressive act, the perception of this same expressive act by the Other, and the perception of the I (ego) that an expressive act was perceived, so that the – as of now – acts of the Other become perceived as answers to the latter (expressive act). The system of communication is manufactured, created, produced, fabricated or restored by the mutual and reciprocal knowledge that every partner in communication has entered into the field of perception of the each and every respective other (partner in communication)²⁰⁷. To the extent that communication is supposed to mean something more than the mere exchange of information, of interest in it (i.e. communication) is not the semantic, but the pragmatic aspect, i.e. its effect on behaviour, so that behaviour

²⁰⁷ Ruesch-Bateson, *Communication*, pp. 15, 23.

in the sense of observable interactions (or mutual influences) and communication may be considered synonymous (i.e. as having the same or equal meaning)²⁰⁸. When one, pushed by the logic of the matter, case, cause or thing, – and matter (etc.) here means the dynamic social relation of acting subjects –, arrives at this point, then one must pose the question or set the problem of communication against a concrete background, and must at least indicate that it, in the course of this, is a matter of the communicants “defining” “the nature of their relation”²⁰⁹. Consequently, our above-mentioned thoughts and considerations on the social-ontological status of the hard core/nucleus of action are confirmed. Because a definition of the social relation, which neither directly nor indirectly says and signifies something about the weight and gravity of registered (i.e. recorded) or supposed concrete acts and actions, during the past or future shaping, moulding or forming of the relation concerned, lacks subjective meaning and practical interest. It represents and constitutes only during fleeting, or, in any case, not vital and not capable-of-development encounters, a more or less static inventory of stable signs (signals or symbols), which, as it were, exist of their own accord, and are exchanged with no consideration for what stands “behind” them. In such cases, expressive acts and acts in general are, in actual fact, fused with one another. Yet this is merely a socially indispensable economical (i.e. not wasteful, and sparing) course (process, progression or sequence), which presupposes a possible, probable or closed process of several (of one’s own and alien or others’) acts and actions, and consequently points to concrete plans in the spectrum of the social relation. Human acts are naturally, for the most part (and usually), symbolically and expressively loaded or charged, but for the dividing line to be blurred between such acts which have an effect through their expressive-symbolic aspect, and such acts which do not do this (i.e. have an effect through their expressive-

²⁰⁸ Watzlawick, *Kommunikation*, p. 22ff., 50ff..

²⁰⁹ Loc. cit., p. 116.

symbolic aspect), is [[something]] tantamount to a breaking up or dissolution of social processes into signs (signals or symbols), and thus is tantamount [[also]] to a playing down or minimisation of these same social processes. Precisely this, of course, is quite often pursued and aimed at. The sober analytical way of looking at things does well, in relation to that, by not letting itself be carried away by the dominant vocabulary together with its technical or ethical connotations, however – bearing in mind the isomorphisms (i.e. similarities in form, but differences in content) and equivalences between communicative processes and those which concern the distribution of social influence and social power²¹⁰ – by defining communication as the “medium of social interaction”, whose shape and form is determined by the level at which interaction takes place, i.e. the level of sensorial perception, of feelings and of emotions or of ideas and of symbols²¹¹. Regarding this containment and limitation of the concept of communication, which its precise social-theoretical usage can only be beneficial, one feels encouraged by the fact that only through the usurpation of much older theoretical achievements and accomplishments of sociological and phenomenological theory of acting (action or the act) could one lay claim to a higher theoretical status. The concept of communication’s confinement and limitation might, therefore, be comprehended also as an act of justice pertaining to the history of ideas, apart from being comprehended as an objective necessity.

²¹⁰ See e.g. King, *Communication*, esp. p. 14.

²¹¹ I borrow this definition from the since long ago forgotten sociological work: Park-Burgess, *Introduction*, p. 341 ff.. [[Translator’s note (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): the fact that the book in question was published in 1921 says a heck of a lot, as the transition was then starting to be slowly, but surely, made to language-communication-based ideologies and attendant Lobotimisation/Brain Washing based on mass Konsum and Hedonismus (Exotismus, Toleranz, Pluralismus, Drugs etc.) within the context of ZIO-USA Hegemony, which really got going from the 1960s and 1970s etc.. In other words, there was still room in the 1920s up to the 1970s for real sociology to take place until the Retarded Joos and their Allies totally GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY took over ...]]

b. The Other as subject and as object or as end/goal and as means

The fact that “communication” as a buzzword symbolically crystallises the deeper matters of concern of the zeitgeist (i.e. spirit of the times), [[which]] many times was put on or applied (displayed and exhibited) as a shield or label for contents of an older and heterogenous origin, is seen not only in systems theories, whose inspiration was cybernetics and informatics (information technology). Even the ethical-normativistic theory of communication (or communication theory) led (conveyed, guided or steered), at least in part, its content-related theses – despite the influence by means of the linguistic turn – away from older approaches, which had been articulated in the area of phenomenological and dialogical thoughts and considerations on the nature of intersubjectivity. The great common denominator between this theory of communication (communication theory) and its phenomenological-dialogical precursors, forerunners and predecessors exists in the conviction that the Other as human subject is an end-in-itself, and should under no circumstances be looked at or used as a means for the achievement of other ends and goals.^{1x} What is social-ontically set up, invested or laid out in intersubjectivity comes into its own only where it becomes acted upon in accordance with this conviction that ethical action constitutes, that is, basically, action according to the real, actual nature and logic of the ontically “genuine (true, authentic, real)” social relation. On the other hand, a distinction lies between the older dialogical school and the newer normativistic theory of communication (or communication theory) in that the former (dialogical school) emphasised and underlined in an existentialistic manner the character of intensity, of suddenness and of directness and of immediacy or even of revelation of the meeting and encounter between the I and the You, whereas the latter (normativistic theory of communication) sought quasi impersonal regularities and normalities, which in the course of events of ethical-communicative action were supposed to be made

immune against the onset of the imponderable (i.e. what is imponderable and incalculable) and of the exception. Here “genuineness and authenticity” and the “state of being real and actual (or realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness)” live as thoughts and ideas corresponding to the impetus for further moral renewal; however, they take (on), assume and adopt other forms and shapes than the existentialistic forms and shapes, and demarcate or delimit themselves, in fact emphatically, against the latter existentialistic forms (and shapes)²¹². With some right (i.e. justification) we can say that here personal and intensive intersubjectivity had to give way to (and make way for) norm-regulated/adjusted/controlled/governed (i.e. normative) and extensive intersubjectivity. Consequently, the threads which bind and tie the normativistic theory of communication to Kant’s transcendentalism, came more clearly to light. However, the relation(ship) with Kant, from whose ethical inheritance, anyway, everyone who wants to lend or grant to (or confer upon) the Other the attribute of the end-in-itself, must draw, remains just as ambivalent as that of the dialogical approach, since simultaneously – in the course of the transition from bourgeois to mass-democratic philosophy – the philosophy of the subject and of consciousness was supposed to be replaced by the philosophy of intersubjectivity. And it was not, in the course of this, proven without doubt that the transference or shifting of the ethical examination of the problem to the area or field of intersubjectivity was the only possible path in order to found propositions of Ought (i.e. deontological propositions), which originally – and logically conclusively – were formulated according to the premises of the

²¹² The reason for that is the following. The existentialistic negation of normality as the area, sector or realm of impersonal norms, and the corresponding glorification and apotheosis of the “marginal/border situation”, which (i.e. both the existentialistic negation of normality as ... , and, the “marginal/border situation) turned against the social-theoretical metamorphoses of “natural-scientific” thought, could be interpreted not only in the interests of an intensive meeting or encounter in regard to love and friendship, but just as much in the sense of an “exception”, in which friendship as the existential high point breaks through the normality of regulated social or personal everyday life. It is well-known which authors and schools of thought supported both these logical possibilities. For us, the ascertainment remains important that the opposition or contrast between normality and (the) exception, and that (opposition and contrast) between friendship and enmity, are, relate or act asymmetrically towards each other. But the normativistic communication theory (theory of communication) prefers to play it safe and shuts out and excludes preventively, apart from bad, also good exceptions.

philosophy of the subject. In this and the next (sub-)section it will be shown to what extent that transference or shifting amounted to a badly concealed attempt to achieve something which Kant would have rightly (or justifiably) rejected and repudiated: a (social-)ontological founding of ethics.

Without losing sight of this ambivalence in the structural relation between the dialogical approach and the normativistic theory of communication (communication theory), our analysis starts from their common denominator. Because the thesis that the Other is – precisely in its specific property, quality or characteristic as a subject – an end-in-itself, (the said thesis) implies that already insight into the character of the subject, or of the person of the Other, compels and forces us towards its consideration (i.e. the way we look at the Other) as an end-in-itself, that is to say, that the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which affords or achieves this insight, and over and above that, specifically manufactures, produces or restores and supports the relation between human subjects, somehow must interrelate with such a consideration and way of looking at the Other. Otherwise, the thesis remains an ethical postulate which does not need and require any direct or indirect social-ontological founding, and whose validity and soundness is (i.e. ought) to be judged at the level of Ought independent of that (social-ontological founding), as Kant already knew it. The wish that the ethical thesis of the Other as an end-in-itself anchored in social-ontological structures or in the original given (actual) facts of intersubjectivity, had as the a consequence that the dialogical approach, amongst other things, got involved in or tangled and mixed up in aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) pertaining to the theory of knowledge, since it (i.e. the said dialogical approach) now had to solve the phenomenological question and matter of constitution with regard to and in view of that (aforesaid) anchoring, and had to find (i.e. see or regard) every other solution as the reduction and lowering (i.e. debasement, disparagement or

downgrading) of the ethically understood subjectivity of the subject. At the same time, the dialogicians opined that Heidegger's fundamental ontology was thought of "monologically"²¹³, that precisely the self-consciousness, bias and prejudice of the fundamentalist (i.e. the studier (scholar and academic et al.) of what is (philosophically, ontologically) fundamental) is responsible and to blame therein (i.e. in regard to thinking "monologically") within the horizon of the Husserlian question and problem of constitution. The syllogistic reasoning reads as follows: just as in Husserl's teaching, theory or doctrine of constitution, the constitution of the alter ego rests and is based on the constitution of the thing world (i.e. the world of things), to which, accordingly, priority is given (or comes to be seen as prior and or better), thus, in Heidegger the meeting/encounter of the being (t)here or existence with the being (t)here(/existence-)with hardly differs from its meeting/encounter with (the) being at hand (i.e. whatever is close by, near and readily available), which, incidentally, in the framework of (the) being-in-the-world is originally equal and the same as the alter ego. Both this, as well as the fact resulting from this, – that the meeting and encounter of the being (t)here (or existence) with the being (t)here as a meeting-with occurs in the being with a character which is not related to being (t)here (or existence) –, deprives it (i.e. the said meeting and encounter of the being (t)here (or existence) with ...) of every immediacy²¹⁴. The dual wish to sketch or outline a structure of a concept (*or*: a conceptual structure), from which the [[relevant]] ethical desideratum emerges or arises with ontic necessity, and at the same time everything which seems to stand and come against this desideratum, is to be subsumed under another likewise closed – and subsequently equally recognisable structure of the concept or conceptual structure – leads here to a dual misunderstanding. Because neither the position

²¹³ The word stems from Buber (*Das Problem*, p. 102), the objection in terms of content goes back to Löwith (*Das Individuum*, p. 80ff.).

²¹⁴ This is Theunissen's argumentation, *Der Andere*, esp. p. 169ff.. Cf. already [[in]] Zeltner, „Das Ich und die Anderen“, esp. p. 311.

(standing or status) of the phenomenological question or problem of constitution implies any ontic priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better) whatsoever of inanimate or animate(d) things in the world, nor does the solution in Husserl have anything to do with the revaluation, upgrading or “degrading, degradation, downgrading or demotion” of the alter ego in the wider and broader ethical sense. And this already because the cognitive and the ontic priorities under no circumstances have to intersect, in fact, precisely the reverse can be the case. If one subsumes the different aspects of the here implied or suggested complex – wholesale (and across the board) – under the keyword “degradation, downgrading or demotion” of the alter ego, thus, the decisive points of view (aspects, perspectives or factors) are moved from sight (i.e. are lost from sight (and are not known about)). The false coupling of the supposed priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better) of the thing world (i.e. the world of things) or of worldliness (or secularism) (in its opposition or contrast to the alter ego), with the question and problem of constitution, that is, the deduction of the Heideggerian handling or treatment of the being-with from the keeping and holding tight or adherence to phenomenological premises, covers, first of all, the objective and important fact pertaining to the history of ideas, that Heidegger precisely through the by-passing and circumvention of *Husserl’s* question and problem of constitution, and the shifting and displacement of the philosophical examination of the problem to another level, could assert the equal/same ontic originality of (the) being-in-the-world and (the) being-with or (the) being (t)here(/existence-)with. And exactly this by-passing, circumvention or shifting and displacement he (i.e. Heidegger) shared – in his manner – with the approach of the dialogicians^{215 + lxi}. Still further (i.e. moreover), the assertion of Heidegger’s supposed insistence and persistence on the theoretical horizon of the Husserlian question and problem of constitution is founded not on the

²¹⁵ See ch. II, p. 1, above.

objectively correct understanding of this latter (Husserlian question/problem of constitution), but it constitutes rather a retrospective construction, which *ex post facto* is supposed to make understandable and explain why Heidegger from his talk of being-with and being (t)here(/existence-)with does not draw the same ethical-normative conclusions as the dialogicians, for whom, those terms may only mean and signify the “genuine (true, authentic or real)” meeting and encounter. Only under this by no means (necessarily) compelling premise can the accusation or reproach be made against Heidegger that he defines (the) being (t)here(/or existence-)with as the existential determination and definition of the being-in-the-world and paints (depicts, imagines or visualises) – at the same time – a picture and image of the thinning out (i.e. isolation) and loneliness (and seclusion) vis-à-vis the somebody (people or the They) (dem Man) as the precursor or forerunner to death²¹⁶. Finally, only he who can postulate the character of immediacy and of directness of the meeting and encounter between the You and the I, or, regards that character of immediacy/directness as an accepted fact (or foregone conclusion) can call into question and doubt the ontic equal/same originality of the being at hand (i.e. whatever is close by, near and readily available), or of (the) thing world (i.e. world of things) and being (t)here (or existence). But every experience and every thought and consideration proves that it is an unavoidable (and absolutely essential) fact that every relation between men – one way or another – must refer to (the (i.e. what is)) socially and naturally concrete and objective, and only the general ascertainment that our world consists of pure men/humans/people and the pure meeting (and encounter) between these humans, would bring down or trip up the assumption and acceptance of that equal/same originality.^{lxii} But such an ascertainment cannot be made – otherwise immediacy and directness would not be a desideratum – and the prospects for its realisation

²¹⁶ Thus, Theunissen, *Der Andere*, p. 176ff..

would appear again to be (only ever so) slightly conceivable. Because if the thesis in respect of the intentionality of consciousness stands in contradiction to (i.e. is inconsistent with) the concept(ual plan) of the “genuine (true, authentic, real)” dialogical approach²¹⁷, then the latter (“genuine and authentic” dialogical approach) is eo ipso unrealisable amongst men. From the point of view of each and every respective later and more radical dialogical concept(ual) plan, it can of course be proved that the earlier or previous (dialogical concept(ual) plan) was not able to consistently eradicate, wipe out or eliminate the mediate(d)ness of the meeting and encounter, owing to its conceptual design (construction, arrangement, layout, structure, tendency or disposition)²¹⁸. Such critique, however, if it is meant as an “overcoming”, can put in the world (i.e. give rise to or beget) merely new conceptual combinations, which on paper look (or are made out to be) irrefutable and incontrovertible if one accepts the premises without question – and otherwise nothing happens. Objectively much more illuminating (instructive or informative) is the confession or admission of some “philosophers of existence (i.e. existential philosophers)”, who in principle regard unmediated communication as the momentary (immediate or instantaneous) “becoming (of) one” as possible, [[but also]] that this same communication without the mediation by means of the contents of the world (world contents) [[i.e. content from the outside and external vis-à-vis the individual/subject world]] would have to fall into (a state of) impoverishment²¹⁹.

Let us now explain briefly why Husserl’s question and problem (in respect) of constitution has fairly little to do with the social-ontic problem of the “meeting or encounter”, and its real or imagined ethical implications, although it seems that (the) starting from the constitution of the I (ego) “degrades, demotes or downgrades” the other to an object, which the I (ego) meets and encounters

²¹⁷ Loc. cit., p. 375.

²¹⁸ Thus, Theunissen regarding Buber, loc. cit., p. 279ff..

²¹⁹ Jaspers, *Philosophie*, pp. 502, 504, 353ff..

during the progress of constitution amongst other objects. Even in his last writing (i.e. text), and in accordance with his deepening and absorption into the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of inter-subjectivity, Husserl stressed that (the) starting from the I (ego) and the systematics (or systematic approach) of its transcendental functions and achievements or accomplishments are “methodically (or methodologically)” essential and imperative even when it is a matter exactly of the solution of those aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes)²²⁰. The constitution of (the/what is (in)) being does not in fact disclose or reveal simply the inner or internal composition, texture or nature of it (i.e. what is in being), but its manner of appearing (i.e. appearance) for the – directed towards that (internal composition etc.) – consciousness; that is why it (i.e. the constitution of what is in being) is the constitution of (the) being/to be *for* consciousness, and, as such, a function or achievement of consciousness, a creation of (the) being/to be through the functions and achievements of the setting of consciousness²²¹. The averting and distancing of philosophical reflection from a naive positioning can, in general, take place only by virtue of the insight that we inevitably make our way from the level of the objective external/outer world to that world of the (transcendental, that is, raised over and beyond personal psychological coincidences) I (ego), that is to say, in the place of the “natural” order of things steps and goes the cognitive order of constitution. In actual fact, it is not seen or appreciated (i.e. it is unclear) how the phenomenal world *in its manner, way or mode as a phenomenon* could otherwise be explained than through retreat or retrogression to that “performing and functioning subjectivity”, which as the only one (i.e. subjectivity) (*or*: which alone) constitutes and sees phenomena (not things). And, likewise, it is unclear how philosophical reflection, at the same time, could jump/skip over or leap/go beyond the I (ego), in order to take the Other as the starting point of its

²²⁰ *Krisis, Hu*, VI, p. 189ff..

²²¹ See Landgrebe, *Weg*, p. 146 ff., who calls and draws on Fink’s interpretation authorised by Husserl.

observations or its constitution. Such a decision would in fact, again, be a decision of the I (ego); the constitutive performances, functions and achievements of the Other would have to, again, be constituted by the I (ego) etc. and so forth. The Is/being of the transcendental I (ego) “precedes in an obvious and self-evident manner – *for me*, the person philosophising – *in terms of knowledge*, all objective Is/being”²²². The sheer, complete, absolute or pure cognitive necessity in/during which constitution starts from the ego (Ego), or else the constitution of the phenomenal world is able to accompany the constitution of the transcendental ego, does not prejudge anything regarding ontic priorities in the absolute metaphysical sense; it (the said absolute or pure cognitive necessity) does not found any real or ethical priority of the I (ego) (Ich) vis-à-vis the thing world (i.e. the world of things) or vis-à-vis the Other. On the contrary, only insight into the nature of this necessity gives to transcendental phenomenology vis-à-vis natural consciousness the lead, head start (advantage or edge), in being clear about the I(ego)-relativity of the world (i.e. the relativity of the world as such relativity pertains to the I (ego)²²³, that is, in mistrusting the metaphysical claims of absoluteness of the I (ego). If philosophical reflection wants – in a natural positioning, to start from the fact of the world or being-with, then this does not automatically mean that it would, in the absolute metaphysical sense, be false (or wrong and in error). It means, however, the It has gone around (circumvented or bypassed) the question and problem of constitution. This going around (circumvention or bypassing) may (or should) not, though, be misunderstood as the solution of the *same* problem [[of constitution]]; rather, through that going around, the setting of the question (or question formulation) is shifted and displaced to another level, and if this shifting or displacement takes place in an unreflected manner, then it is tantamount with, or amounts to, a confusion of the cognitive with the

²²² *Cart. Meditationen*, *Hu*, I, p. 11 (my punctuation and italics).

²²³ Husserl, *Hu* vol. IV, *Ideen*, II, p. 182.

ontological way of looking at things (more precisely: of naive (ontology) with phenomenological-transcendental ontology).^{lxiii}

It is not, therefore, to be dared or allowed, to see in constitution as a philosophical procedure and method, a “degrading, degradation, downgrading or demotion” of the Other, because the I (ego) in the course of this, by constituting the Other and, consequently, asserting priority for itself (or coming to be seen as prior and or better), with that, breaks free and detaches itself from, or evades and is beyond, equal (or same) originality with the Other²²⁴. Equal (or the same) originality exists (and the ascertainment of its existence is objectively correct) only from the perspective of the social ontologist or of the theoretician of the dialogical approach. However, from each and every respective perspective of the I (ego) (as I (ego)) and of the Other (as I (ego)), from which the question and problem of constitution is posed and *must* be posed, the partners of the dialogue or of the meeting and encounter *cannot* be equally original. The just mentioned [[dialogical]] theoretician imagines in his ethical eagerness and zeal that the partners would as the constituting (i.e. constitutive) I (ego) be able and should or ought to behave in accordance with *his* (i.e. *the said theoretician's*) perspective of equal (or same) originality, and, accordingly, regards the change of the theoretical concept(ual plan) or the shifting and displacement of the theoretical level as a sufficient condition for that. But even if the I (ego) wanted to grant to (or confer upon) the Other, the predicate of equal (and same) originality, or even of absolute originality in reference/regard to itself (i.e. the I (ego)), thus, this would not in the least change in relation to that the fact that from the perspective of the question or problem of constitution, the I (ego), and only the I (ego), can braid (i.e. weave) such predicates into the constitution of the Other. Because *I* constitute nature in me as [[being]]

²²⁴ Thus, Theunissen, *Der Andere*, p. 153.

constituted by the Other²²⁵, and by means of the – in my own self – constituted alien, foreign or other and different constitutions, the – for us all – common world is constituted *for myself*²²⁶. What the I (ego) transcends, becomes absorbed or assimilated by – always from the perspective of the question and problem of constitution – the immanence of the I; “transcendence is an immanent, inside of the ego – constituting itself –, character of being”²²⁷. The thus understood priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better) of the constituting (i.e. constitutive) I (ego) continues to exist and persists, therefore, even when the I (ego) as an ethical person altruistically devotes and dedicates himself (or itself) passionately (completely and with abandon) to the Other; it (i.e. the said priority etc.) is, therefore, (a priority etc.) irrespective of each and every respective place of the interaction partners (or partners in and of interaction) inside of the spectrum of the social relation. The master (lord or ruler) must constitute the servants (and slaves) just as much as – and understand, see the next (sub-)section – the servant (and slave) must constitute and understand the master (lord or ruler). And something else must be explained here. With regard to the cognitive unavoidability and inevitability of that priority (or coming to be seen as prior and or better), it is completely indifferent how the transcendental I (ego) carries out (implements and enforces) the constitution, and indeed the constitution of the Other in its individual details, whether it, therefore, gains (gets, reaches or attains) the Other through (i.e. by means/way of) an analogism (or argument by analogy), as Husserl suggests, or whether it, in the process, proceeds (methodically) otherwise and differently, or whether, finally, the You is present and exists as an original (re)presentation²²⁸, and intersubjectivity is not at all derivable or deducible from the performances, achievements or functions of the consciousness of the transcendental ego (Ego),

²²⁵ *Cart. Meditationen*, § 55 = *Hu*, I, p. 155.

²²⁶ Loc. cit., § 41, p. 120.

²²⁷ Loc. cit., p. 32.

²²⁸ Simmel already meant this, *Wesen*, pp. 11, 8. Cf. ch. II, footnote 12, above.

but simply is a given fact of the life world²²⁹. Without wanting to go much deeper into the matter, let us remark here that the thesis as regards immediacy and directness does not have to have any specific reference to the examination of the problem of the You and inter-subjectivity since it can just as well be applied to the thing world (i.e. the world of things). Husserl's analogism (or argument by analogy) may have problematic aspects, on the other hand, he rightly places, as I believe, value on the fact that the Other, first of all, must have a real presence in space, and irrespective of this presence, which it shares with the rest of things, is not of this world^{lxiv}. The emphasis on this fact has, of course, nothing to do with an ethically suspect "degradation, downgrading or demotion" of the person. Finally, the objection that inter-subjectivity cannot be gained from the performances, achievements and functions of the consciousness of the transcendental Ego, might be the case and true in the narrower sense of textual criticism; however, its objective relevance is not unconditionally and definitely great. Because in the context of the question and problem of constitution, it is not a matter – anyhow – of proving, with metaphysical strictness, the reality of the social world, but rather of concretely grasping the constitutive sense and meaning of the assumption and acceptance of this reality, that is of pointing out and demonstrating that constitution cannot be achieved under solipsistic presuppositions (or conditions). Solipsism is indirectly rejected for lack and want of a better solution²³⁰. And it is not certain that one directly rejects it (i.e. solipsism) through the thesis of the immediate and direct pre-givenness (or pre-existence) of inter-subjectivity.^{lxv}

We might or shall have to be content with these suggestions or comments, since we are interested in the social-ontological relevance or irrelevance, and not in the special, specific and particular suitability of Husserlian constitution in

²²⁹ Thus, Schütz, „Problem“, esp. pp. 94, 97ff., 100ff..

²³⁰ Cf. Hutcheson, "Husserl's Problem".

founding inter-subjectivity on a phenomenological fundamentum inconcussum [[= firm (unshaken, unshakeable, solid) foundation]]. Social ontology starts, indeed, during or in already constituted inter-subjectivity, and must presuppose the fact of inter-subjectivity just as much as it (i.e. social ontology) reflects some biological and anthropological given facts, or tacitly has (such biological and anthropological given facts) as a basis. If now it could be shown that the constitution of the Other by the I (ego) in no case prejudices an object character (i.e. a character as an object) of the Other, then a further point of view can be confirmed with the help and on the basis of Husserl's observations, which we have already gained in the discussion (as argument) of or about the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and which we must again pick up in the discussion of this (sub-)section. Husserl made it clear that neither the social, nor the subject character (i.e. character pertaining to being a subject) of human relations depends upon whether they (i.e. the said human relations) stand and are under the sign (i.e. influence or aegis) of friendship or of enmity. "Regarding and concerning their social character", men (humans) in my surroundings, vicinity or environment are "my 'friends' or 'foes', my 'servants' or 'superiors (bosses)', 'strangers (foreigners, aliens) or 'relatives (related or affiliated)' etc."²³¹; the "specifically social communicative acts", through which "sociality" is constituted, encompass likewise acts "of love and of counter-love (or anti-love), of hate and counter/anti-hate, of trust and counter/anti-trust etc." – and the communicative [[element, factor or dimension]] lies in them (i.e. the aforesaid various (specifically social communicative) acts), in the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives occurring here, and during which the I (ego) turns to (and addresses) Others, to those who it (i.e. the I (ego)) knows that they understand this turn, expression, phrase or figure of speech, accordingly aligning themselves in their action, and "turn themselves

²³¹ *Ideen*, I, § 27 = *Hu*, III, p. 59ff.

back (i.e. reciprocate and address the I (ego)) in acts of the same voice (i.e. agreement) or of the contrary voice or counter-voice (i.e. disagreement)”²³². In other places, Husserl connects, likewise, the mechanism of the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives (“as soon as we know now both in one (i.e. we both know), not only one (in respect) of the other, but we also know as one knowing of the other, mutually, reciprocally or alternately”), indiscriminately, with “loving” and “hating” acts, and stresses subsequently, such acts would “connect the subjects *as subjects*”²³³. How little the content of the social relation determines its specific subject character (i.e. character as a subject), Husserl shows unintentionally, but highly instructively, when he draws on and uses exactly the example of the master and the servant, in order to illustrate how through the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of “an inter-monadic [[being]] in(side) one another of I-related (or egoic, egoical or ego-like) living, life and acting, having an effect” is manufactured, made, produced or restored, and a common consciousness comes into being, “in which his [[i.e. the Other’s]] intentionality and mine (i.e. my intentionality), notwithstanding and irrespective of the separation of experiences (i.e. the segregation and distinction(s) in experiences), comes towards or into [[a state of]] unity”²³⁴. With the same words, an intimate, sexual relationship (or love affair) can also be described in a purely form-related (i.e. formal) respect. And this is not paradoxical, if only one can clearly distinguish the form and the content of subjectivity and of the specifically (inter)subjective mechanism, i.e. of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives.

The example of master and servant, as Husserl interprets it, is quite particularly suitable as a transition to the discussion of dialogical fundamental or basic theses, because it codifies, as it were, their pure negation. The core or

²³² *Ideen*, II, § 51 = *Hu*, IV, p. 194.

²³³ *Phänom. Psychol.* (Beil. XXVIII) = *Hu*, IX, p. 512ff. (my italics and emphasis).

²³⁴ Loc. cit., (Beil. XXV) = *Hu*, IX, p. 484ff.. Cf. *Zur Phänom. d. Intersubj.*, II = *Hu*, XIV, p. 181: „Sklavenverhältnis“ als „Willenseinheitlichkeit“.

nucleus of the dialogical approach (and of (the) normativistic communication theory (theory of communication)) lies in the conviction that an ethically not (fully) acceptable social relation does not entail merely a content-related deficiency or shortcoming, but, absolutely, a distortion and reversal or twisting of fundamental social-ontological factors, a shrinking of (the) social-ontological (not merely content-related) potential (and possibilities). The thought or consideration reads: as long as the Other does not enjoy the ethical status of the end-in-itself, it cannot also be a subject in the full sense of the word, it becomes or is, therefore, “degraded, downgraded or demoted” to an object, in relation to which the need for forcing one’s way into and penetrating its psyche and its world decreases and diminishes, and the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives comes to [[a state of]] languishing and waning. From the ontic realm of subjects, ethical incapacity and in(cap)ability brings us to the ontic area or realm of objects, in regard to which an essentially other type of relation, the instrumental (type of relation), predominates. According to this schema, (the) dialogical approach-related or normativistic theory of communication (or communication theory) put at the centre or focus of attention, the contrast and opposition between the dialogical-communicative [[dimension, factor or element]] and the instrumental [[dimension, factor or element]], whereby the characterisation of the instrumental [[dimension etc.]] stems from a perception or view of the technical-natural-scientific habitus, which decisively influenced (the) criticism/critique of culture (cultural critique) of the twentieth century. The two most well-known chief or main motifs of cultural criticism and the critique of culture frame and serve as a setting for e.g. Buber’s first and most important (proper) formulation of the dialogical approach, which wants to diagnose the “illness of our age” and initiate, inaugurate, usher in and mark the beginning of the “movement of reversal,

turning back, the counter-march or about face”²³⁵. On the one hand, that is, from the perspective of the history of philosophy [[pertaining to]] the contradistinction between community and society, “the advancing, progressive increase, growth and rise in or of the It-world” and the “decrease and reduction of the force, strength or power of the relation of/between men/humans” is lamented²³⁶; on the other hand, the type of (hu)man, who flourishes, thrives and prospers in the It-world is described as one who wants to experience, use and conquer all (things) (i.e. everything) as an object; objectification (or reification), i.e. “renunciation and relinquishment of all immediacy and directness”, accordingly, characterises the whole of life in the economy and the state^{237 + lxvi}. Consequently, the present-day human world becomes (or turns into) the image, likeness, reflection, portrayal, reproduction or copy of the universe, as natural science apprehends this same universe: in it (i.e. the universe), “causality rules and prevails unrestrictedly and without limits”²³⁸; and now it is a question of in the place of this It-world, which has “cohesion in space and in time”, to put the You-world, which does not know (of) such cohesion. The dislike for or aversion towards the “fixed and beneficial, congenial chronicle or annal” and the preference for “strange, peculiar or wondrous lyrical-dramatic episodes” go, in fact, so far that Buber means that the person hating directly is nearer to the (“real, genuine, true or authentic”) relation than the love(-less) or hate-less (i.e. without hate) person, and “violence and force in the really experienced being” is better “than the ghostly, spectral and eerie care and welfare in faceless numbers”²³⁹.

²³⁵ *Dial. Prinzip*. pp. 58, 60.

²³⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 39, 41.

²³⁷ Loc. cit., pp. 43, 49ff. Like the bent, tendency and inclination towards “actuality, authentic being and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit)” (see ch. II, sec. 1 above), thus, these motifs pertaining to cultural critique and the criticism of culture also constitute further points of contact with Heidegger.

²³⁸ Loc. cit., p. 53.

²³⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 37, 20, 28.

The reminding of these banalities pertaining to the critique of culture, cultural criticism, and existentialistic banalities, offers, of course, no gain in knowledge; it helps us, however, to come to the ascertainment that the dialogical contradistinction between the real, genuine, true or authentic relation, and, non-real, ungenuine, untrue or inauthentic (fake, artificial, false) relation, between the You-world and the It-world, does not in the least rest and depend upon the concrete analyses of the interaction between humans, but represents and constitutes a conceptual schematisation or rather an emotional, lofty, dramatic (and or pathetic) stylisation, which was constructed in accordance with a preconceived pattern, model or specimen pertaining to cultural criticism and the critique of culture. In this contradistinction, a relation, which has as its goal and end “its own essence, being or nature”, that is, is an end-in-itself, contrasts with or forms a contrast to another relation, which makes the It “serviceable” to (i.e. puts the It at and in the service of) the case of the I (ego)²⁴⁰. The character of those relating to one another turns out accordingly (*Entsprechend fällt der Charakter der sich aufeinander Beziehenden aus*). Where the “basic word (term or expression)” means I (ego)-It, and above all, where with this It, “he” or “she” is meant, there a “point/dot/spot-like” and “functional” I (ego) without “subjectivity” has an effect, whereas the I (ego) of the basic word (term or expression), I (ego)-You, may be called exactly “subjectivity” and “person”; “in subjectivity the intellectual(-spiritual) substance of the person matures”²⁴¹. The functional I (ego) remains, in fact, – according to conventional language use –, a “subject”; however, its real, actual properties, qualities, characteristics and possibilities of subjectivity as subjectivity come to light and appear only in the “person”. For the explication and founding of this aphoristic dichotomy, Buber undertakes, though, no empirically verifiable investigation and exploration of the inner/internal and outer/external mechanism of the social relation. The in

²⁴⁰ Loc. cit., pp. 65, 70.

²⁴¹ Loc. cit., pp. 7, 12, 65, 71, 66 ([from] here the citation/quote).

itself correct thesis, that the social relation takes place in the area and realm of the [[in-]]between, is too general, and otherwise says and means absolutely nothing about the ontic or ethical quality of the relation. It (i.e. the said in itself correct thesis) was, incidentally, supported in form-related (i.e. formal) sociology without any normative connotation²⁴². Just as little are there for the “essential meeting and encounter” ultimate anthropological guarantees. Because no man (person/human) is a “pure” person and no man is entirely “real” or “unreal, i.e. non-real or not real”; “everyone lives in the twofold I (ego)”, and that is why on every You in the world [[it]] is “imposed that [[it/the said You]] becomes a thing or still always goes back into thinghood (i.e. a state of being a thing)²⁴³. Thus, the essential meeting and encounter, and with it, the full unfolding and development of subjectivity, if it, overall, is possible, necessarily remains in a statistical respect a marginal, secondary (and peripheral) phenomenon; the founding of a comprehensive social ontology with the help (or on the basis) of the model of such a meeting and encounter must likewise fall into a void²⁴⁴ – and yet, the aphoristic dichotomy applies: “subjectivity or end-in-itself – thing or means” continue as the fundamental criterion in the classification and judgement of social relations in their totality and entirety.

It (i.e. the said dichotomy) becomes invalid as soon as we carry out the necessary conceptual differentiations, which, above all, must aim at telling and keeping apart and distinguishing the ethical and the social-ontological aspect. That can, otherwise, also be formulated the other way around: the ethical and the social-ontological aspect automatically fall apart from each other (i.e. they are separated), as soon as it is seen and insight is had that the structures of the relation, which the social-ontological aspect means, remain the same, whether the I (ego) wants to handle and treat the You as a “person” or as a “thing”, as a

²⁴² L. v. Wiese, *System* esp. p. 5 (the [[in-]]between human[[s]] as the social).

²⁴³ *Dial. Prinzip*. pp. 67, 21.

²⁴⁴ See Ch. II, sec. 1, above.

friend or as a foe. The ascertainment that the foe cannot, *in a social-ontological respect*, be by definition a “thing”, should or ought not to mean that the decision to handle and treat the Other as a friend or foe, *in an ethical respect*, is indifferent. It (i.e. the said ascertainment) implies, however, that the social-ontological level lies and is deeper than the ethical level, that is, it equally encompasses moral and immoral positionings, attitudes and stances, no matter howsoever one defines them – and precisely because of the existing formal-structural (or form-related-structural) commonalities and common ground between them. The equating of both levels, which we also met and encountered in the shape and form of the direct identification as equating of the “real, genuine, true or authentic” social relation, and, friendship²⁴⁵, constitutes one of the most usual, common and oldest clever tricks or sleights of hand of ethical-normative thought, as soon as it (i.e. such ethical-normative thought) in the search for ultimate objective arguments must spill over into or overlap with and spread to the ontological [[domain, sphere, field]]. Now, the dichotomous contradistinction of the subject character (i.e. the character of being a subject) of the friend towards the thing character (i.e. the character of being a thing) of the foe, leaps and jumps over the distinction between social ontology and ethics. It overlooks, as a result of this, also the distinction between the will of the I (ego) to handle and treat the Other as a thing, and its (i.e. the I’s (ego’s)) real possibility of doing this as well. Because, in an ethical respect, it comes and boils down to the same thing whether one says that the I (ego) uses the Other as a mere means for the achievement of one’s own ends and goals, or whether one says that the I (ego) looks at the Other as an object. But socio-ontologically, it is by no means thus. In order to be able to successfully instrumentalise the Other, the I (ego) must find out – via the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives – the specifically human-subjective qualities, properties

²⁴⁵ See Ch. III, Sec. 4, above.

and characteristics of the Other – even when the power relationship (or relationship of power) appears to be extremely asymmetrical, when the I (ego), therefore, “does not have to take into account” the Other. Because such thoughtlessness, recklessness or ruthlessness has often or is often avenged by “completely and entirely unexpected” explosive reactions^{lxvii}. It is, therefore, not conceivable that there is any state of affairs, also any coercive relationship (or relationship of compulsion and constraint)²⁴⁶ amongst humans, in which the including of possible reactions of the Other in one’s own action plan (or plan of acting) would be completely superfluous, and [[one]] would be able to treat and handle the Other literally as a thing, irrespective of whether he (i.e. the Other), ethically seen, is used as a means. Using the Other as a means, and handling and treating the Other at the same time as a thing, happens at the I’s (ego’s) peril, risk or danger, and does not go back (i.e. is not reduced) to a social-ontological necessity, but to subjective properties, qualities and characteristics, i.e. to the negligence or arrogance of the I (ego)²⁴⁷. In any case, the Other must, regarding that, react as a subject to the fact that the I (ego) wants to look upon or handle and treat him (i.e. the Other) as an object. Over and above that, however, not even the terms “means” and “thing” may or can be comprehended literally here. Because they can only mean that the I (ego) expects the full subjugation of the Other under and to its own will. But this subjugation must be concretised in stances and act(ion)s for which only a human subject is (cap)able. The effort and endeavour of the I (ego), for the Other to be subjugated (fully and) completely [[to it/the I (ego)]], would be meaningless if the I (ego) could attain

²⁴⁶ Nisbet, *Bond*, p. 71 ff.: “... what the coercer does is in some part conditioned by what he expects the effect of coercion to be on the one coerced. Similarly, the response of the coerced is in some degree conditioned by the effect he expects it to have on the person doing the coercing.”

²⁴⁷ Hegel’s master, who is completely fixed upon the pleasure of the thing, and uses the servant/slave merely as a means, in order to come into (i.e. attain and achieve) pleasure, misjudges and fails to appreciate the priorities so much, that in contrast to the servant/slave, he appears to be unreal (i.e. beyond and not aware of reality); thus, the spoiled and careless, reckless son of the master might have behaved or might behave rather than the master himself, who knew how to and was able to subjugate the servant/slave and keep the servant under subjugation. Social realities stand and are nearer to Xenophon’s tyrant, who imagines and visualises during sleepless nights how every citizen thinks, and how he would probably react to this or that action of his tyrannical reign and government (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, IV, A, bzw. *Hieron*, ch. II-VI).

the same achievements (accomplishments and performances) from a non-human being (creature or essence). Slaves are humans like all other humans as well, because only humans can be slaves. And the foe can be a foe only because he (i.e. the foe) is a human, because, that is, from him (the foe) dangers and risks start and arise, which can only start and arise from specifically human act(ion)s. The (cap)ability at and of distinguishing between the resistance of a thing and of the resistance of a human, as well as the knowledge that to and against each one of both types of resistance, a particular type of acting, action or act is and ought to be opposed and set, belongs to the field kit or pack (i.e. equipment) of every (cap)ability at and of orientation and at and of survival (with)in society.

This and similar observations suggest and make plausible the conclusion that the factor which decides, regarding that, whether the subjectivity of the Other becomes and is registered and recorded as specifically human subjectivity, is not the “dialogical” or “monological”, friendly or inimical quality of the social relation, but its (i.e. the social relation’s) intensity. The quality of the relation determines only under which aspect that which is looked at might be regarded as a feature of human subjectivity par excellence: the richness and wealth of its (i.e. human subjectivity’s) possibilities in thought and action. No relation, even the most intensive, can exhaust this richness and wealth, since intensity can be achieved either as friendship or as enmity, and in both cases the I (ego) can get to know and learn about the Other – so to speak – only as to (the) (one) half – although abrupt or slow changes in the relation show the Other “entirely as he is”. Whatever the case may be, intensity remains in this context the decisive and determinative point of view. The intentional, wanted, but also the unintentional, unwanted nearness of the Other brings the I (ego), in relation to that, to more and more clearly contrasting the Other from the rest of the subjects, which and who people and populate the social environment, to perceiving by means of contrasting and comparing his (i.e. the Other’s) personal qualities, properties

and characteristics, from each and every respective interesting perspective (i.e. perspective of interest (for the I (ego))). Whoever crops up and appears on the horizon of the I (ego) as friend or foe in a privileged place and position, raises and makes a claim on the constant and lively, active attention of the I (ego), even if it is a matter of getting out of his (i.e. the I's (ego's)) way (i.e. avoiding the I (ego)). Also, the process by which the Other achieves this privileged position varies structurally, not essentially on the basis of the different quality of the relation. One has described the shaping of the "dialogical" relationship as a development which starts from the tier (level, stage or degree) of common topical (objective or property) interests, and reaches its peak when the interest in the Other gains "in living and vital originality", the absolute upper hand²⁴⁸. The dynamic(s) of the relation can, of course, be imagined otherwise and differently, but here it is a matter of something else. Namely, an inimical relation too can take precisely the same course, which does not at all have to be based on "hate at first sight", but on the contrary, on common topical (objective or property) interests, in relation to which it turns out that (the) Ego and the Other have claims and aspirations, endeavours or efforts on the same field, which cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Because the question is posed "who this man is" and "what he in actual fact wants" or "is up to" – a question which some gourmets of enmity answer (or respond to) by way and means of binding personal dealings and relations. Self-evident is that the intensity of the relation constitutes only a guarantee for the fact that the I (ego) pays especial attention to the Other (i.e. as a matter of prime importance), [[but]] not also for the "correct" understanding of the Other on the part of the I (ego)²⁴⁹. The depth and

²⁴⁸ Thus, e.g. Waldenfels, *Zwischenreich*, p. 219ff..

²⁴⁹ Jaspers wants to contradistinguish to "psychological understanding", which converts or transforms the Other into an object of observation, "complete and perfect understanding", which becomes possible or is facilitated and enabled by love, but also hate (*Psychology*, pp. 125, 127). The contradistinction is rhetorically built and constructed rather than objectively explicated; it presupposes, in any case, a level at which the reflective objectification of the Other ceases, and immediacy and directness kicks in and starts as a result of the intensity. The error obviously interrelates with the explanation of friendship and enmity pertaining to the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses, which minimalises the reflective/reflexive potential and capabilities of both (the "psychological understanding" and the "complete and perfect understanding").

sharpness of such an understanding likewise remain (are left over or linger), irrespective of the quality of the relation^{lxviii}. Enmity can come into being because both sides tellingly and successfully apprehend the motives and aims of each and every respective other side, whilst friendship lives from and off even consciously constructed fictions not seldom gladly (and willingly) believed. The opposite can, of course, occur just as much during friendship as during enmity. Psychologically relieving or – in practice – functional, effective and expedient typifications (i.e. renderings into types or classifications under typifying forms) equally crop up or happen in both cases. The foe then becomes typified (i.e. rendered into (a) type(s) or classified under (a) typifying form(s)) around the axes of [[those elements or factors]] doing the separating; the friend becomes typified around those axes of [[those elements or factors]] (which are (held) in) common, under (i.e. with) the elimination or exclusion of disturbing and disruptive elements and factors. And just as friendship can sometimes like to deceive, and willingly idealises [[people and or things]], so too does enmity like to drive on and carry on with distorted images, and mislead through that which seems to confirm the original and initial mistrust. These symmetries indicate that attempts to explain friendship as the privileged or exclusive place or locus of subjectivity in the specifically human sense, are indeed ethically praiseworthy, but social-ontologically groundless, unfounded and baseless.

It appears to be still more difficult to bind and tie “subjectivity” and the “end-in-itself” in principle to each other. Because a further necessary conceptual differentiation or distinction teaches that not even inside the area, sector or realm of friendship, which is in general narrower than subjectivity, the partners must mutually take themselves (i.e. each other) as an end-in-itself. Without over-the-top, excessive or exaggerated malice we can in fact support the opinion that the world would still await the blessing or godsend of friendship, if the friend had to be a pure end-in-itself^{lxix}. Buber admitted to at least the difference

between friendship (in the social-ontological sense of the word) and the end-in-itself, by demarcating and delimiting, for instance, erotic love on account of its strong and intense “monological” components from and against the “dialogical approach”²⁵⁰. The area, sector or realm where relations can flourish and thrive as an end-in-itself, was consequently conceivably narrow; furthermore, the possibility of such relations was not proved by any concrete example and any psychological or ontological analysis. In regard to the thought of the concept of the end-in-itself, the end-in-itself is connected with the representation and notion of a beautiful rose, from which one already does not want anything, because it cannot give anything, rather than with the representation and image of a man, who precisely during a “dialogical” relation can, in a pure form, gift or give that for which the psyche of the other person craves and longs the most: for recognition and the confirmation of one’s own identity, even at the price of modifying this same identity in accordance with the demands and the process of the “dialogue”. In general, the successful dialogue, in which the I (ego) and the You through the effect and impact on each other develop their real, actual subjectivity, can hardly be imagined other than as the full mutual, reciprocal recognition and confirmation of the partners [[in the said successful dialogue]] as persons and identities, wherein even the tacit or explicit leadership role of one of both (e.g. in the teacher-student-relationship) would not change what is essential and of the essence. If, again, only the one side treats the other side as an end-in-itself, then a “monological” altruistic positioning is possibly available and present, but not a “dialogical” relation. One does not have to directly parallelise the relation of the I (ego) towards and with the Other with that relation towards and with stuff and things²⁵¹, in order to gain insight and

²⁵⁰ *Dial. Prinzip*, pp. 144, 168ff..

²⁵¹ As Husserl does it in a graphic, vivid and descriptive comparison: I (ego) concern myself with people “as with stuff and things. I want their being different (i.e. I want them to be different) [[Crazy Man Addition (nothing to do with P.K.): typical fucking JOO!!! HAHAAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Which, of course, Stupid Adolf also thought with the shoe on the other foot ...]], I want to handle and treat them in changing them, changing them in the same broad sense as for (i.e. in the case of) things. E.g. they should or ought not to be here, but

understand that talk of the Other and of the I (ego) as mutually and reciprocally recognised pure “ends-in-themselves” can barely be concretised social-ontologically. The Other can, in fact, be a “means” even when the I (ego) therefore looks at, considers and handles, treats him/it as an “end-in-itself” in order to be able to put to the proof and prove that it (the Other) is thus, or should or ought to be thus (i.e. an “end-in-itself”). The Other becomes and turns into an end-in-itself, therefore, as the case of the application of the general principle “the Other is an end-in-itself”. This is no paradox, but the ideational background or backdrop of every educational and paedagogical dictatorship exercised consciously or unconsciously, mildly or wildly, directly or indirectly, in good or in bad faith. Whoever wants to educate, in relation to that, other people so that they hold and regard people to be ends-in-themselves, cannot eo ipso class or classify the to-be-educated person in his present state of affairs as an end-in-himself, otherwise it would be absurd and non-sensical to want to change him “with good intent” and “for his own good”; precisely the shaping, formative urge, drive itch and longing, however, cannot help but reify and objectify people^{252 + lxx}. Whoever, therefore, would like to handle and treat people as “ends-in-themselves”, would have to do without, renounce and relinquish every paedagogics or paedagogy, and consequently leave or keep and retain in its present being-so and being-thus (state or essence) a world, which in

somewhere else, they should or ought not to be ‘qualitatively’ so and thus, but be otherwise... they should or ought not to be... thus, I can want to kill a man.” (*HU*, XV, p. 508).

²⁵² Cf. Valéry, *Regards*, p. 82: «Mais toute politique tend à traiter les hommes comme des choses... Même l’intention sincère de laisser à ces individus le plus de liberté possible, et de leur offrir à chacun quelque part du pouvoir, conduit à leur imposer, en quelque manière, ces avantages, dont il arrive, parfois, qu’ils ne veulent guère, et parfois qu’ils pâtissent indirectement... De toute façon, l’esprit ne peut, quand il s’occupe des ‘hommes’, que les réduire à des êtres en état de figurer dans ses combinaisons. Il n’en retient que les propriétés nécessaires et suffisantes qui lui permettent de poursuivre un certain ‘idéal’ (d’ordre, de justice, de puissance ou de prospérité ...) ... Il y a de l’artiste dans le dictateur, et de l’esthétique dans ses conceptions.» (= “But every politics or policy tends to treat people as things... even the sincere intention to allow these individuals the most liberty/freedom possible, and to offer every one of them a part of power, ends up imposing upon them, in some way, these advantages, which they sometimes hardly want (at all), and sometimes they suffer indirectly ... in any case, the spirit/intellect-mind cannot – when it occupies and concerns itself with “humans” – but reduce them to beings in a state of featuring within/in(side) its (i.e. the spirit/intellect’s) combinations. It retains only the necessary and sufficient properties which permit it to pursue a certain “ideal” (of order, of justice, of power or of prosperity ...) ... There is the artist in the dictator, and aesthetics in his conceptions.”).

its praxis is far off from handling and treating man as an end-in-itself. The contradiction is social-ontologically insurmountable and impregnable, and that is why – generally speaking – always only someone other than the concretely existing and present man/person will be able to be an “end-in-itself”: “man” [[in general]]. Thus seen, the broad ethical use or usage of talk of the end-in-itself is explained from the fact that precisely the “end-in-itself” can very easily be converted into a “means”.

From the comments of the last [[few]] paragraphs, it has hopefully become apparent and evident why – apart from the dialogical (direction, tendency or school of thought), also an anti-dialogical direction, tendency or school of thought errs, which (anti-dialogical school of thought) believes and opines that mutual and reciprocal reification, objectification or concretisation is the necessary structure of the inter-subjective relation.^{lxxi} The description of the “meeting and encounter” turns out to be in Sartre no less unreal (i.e. non-real or not real) and melodramatic than in Buber, only the signs and symbolism are reversed. I live with and experience the Other as subjectivity with an evident nature and obviousness, not because my own subjectivity, in the course of this, lives with and experiences its (i.e. the Other’s) state of being real and actual (or realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness), but on the contrary, because the Other already by his glance or view [[at or of me]] converts me into an object, and in general occupies the world, which was my world as a subject; by defending myself against him, I must, for my part, convert the Other into an object. As long as the Other is activated (i.e. acts) as a subject, I have no knowledge of him and no influence on him; and as soon as I am activated and act as a subject, and my influence on the Other is asserted, that Other sinks down and descends into the world of objects²⁵³. For Sartre, there can just as little be a mediation between the Other as an Object, and the Other as

²⁵³ *Être*, p. 298ff., esp. p. 349.

a subject, as between me as a subject and me as an object. Seen structurally, the contrast and opposition between being a subject and being an object as possible positions, situations and attributes of human actors remain just as rigid, fixed, inflexible and unforgiving and irreconcilable as in Buber, even though the line of (the) dichotomy runs and proceeds differently in each case: in Buber between I-You and I-It, in Sartre between I and You. But Buber and Sartre equally equate the being an object of the I (ego) in the Other's eyes with a degradation, demotion or downgrading or even a threat to the ontic substance and potency of the I (ego) by the Other, and overlook that the being a subject does not necessarily mean a state of affairs in which subjectivity can fully develop its "state of being real and actual (or realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness)" or "freedom", but plainly and simply the consciousness of the subject at being a subject (or that it is a subject). And man (i.e. a human) comes to this consciousness exactly by way of the fact that another man directs his attention (irrespective, how) at/to him. Subjectivity is specifically lived through and experienced only when it – under whatever conditions – stands and is opposite and across from another subjectivity – when it becomes and turns into the object of another subjectivity, if one puts and understands it so, but without wanting to formulate a normative connotation. Sartre forgets that the I (ego), which under the Other's gaze feels degraded, demoted and downgraded to an object, and rebels and revolts against that, can only do this because it is already a constituted subject and was or became such a thus constituted subject by means of intersubjective meetings and encounters (how (then) otherwise?). And during these meetings and encounters it (i.e. the I (ego)) exercised something social-ontologically considerably deeper and more important than that "shame" (honte), that "angst or fear" and that "pride", which, according to Sartre as regards that, propels it (i.e. the I (ego)) to put up resistance to the Other's gaze, and to move onto or proceed to a counterattack, that is, to convert, for its part, the Other into an object: it (i.e. the said I (ego))

has exercised the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. However, during the perspective of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, the Other is simultaneously [[both]] subject and object, because only as an object (in the value-free sense, that is, without consideration for ethical or existential “realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness”), can it (i.e. the Other as an object) generally be perceived and observed, and only as a subject (again in the value-free sense), does it have a perspective, which is supposed to be assumed and taken on/over. Buber skipped, jumped or leaped over the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, because this could not play any central role both during the degradation, downgrading or demotion of the You to an It, as well as during the absolute immediacy of the “essence-related meeting and encounter”. Sartre does the same, or else leaves or entrusts the shaping, formation and moulding of the meeting and encounter preferably to the feelings of shame, angst (or fear) and pride, because he holds and considers the struggle on both sides around the degradation, downgrading or demotion of the Other – on each and every respective occasion – to the status of an object, to be an unalterable ontological pre-givenness (or pre-existence). The original intersubjective relation must be called conflict, when already the fact of the free existence of the Other sets, puts or places boundaries and borders on my free existence, when, that is, the “blueprint or project of/for the recovery, recapture or re-attainment of my I (ego)” must basically be a “blueprint or project of/for the absorption of the Other”; the I (ego) is here for the Other, forever an object as well as the other way around²⁵⁴. After our comments and exposition about the continuity in the spectrum of the social relation²⁵⁵, we do not have to especially explain why such a perception hardly does justice to the fact and the great variety and multiformity of social life. The mechanism of the assumption and taking

²⁵⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 413ff., 459ff., 465.

²⁵⁵ See Ch. III, Sec. 3, above.

on/over of perspectives, that is, the simultaneous objectification and subjectification of the Other lies (goes or comes) before the friendly or inimical relation, *it* (i.e. the said mechanism of perspective taking) only gives insight into this quality and its possible changes, and unfolds and develops in such breadth because it must reckon with a number of/multiple possibilities, – after all, friendship and enmity, co-operation and conflict are equally original in social life, and that is why they are at all times taken into account as (the) horizons of orientation of (the) plans of acting (or action plans). Wherever the social relation is restricted, limited and confined from the very beginning to one single possibility, every reference to the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is also superfluous; the I (ego) and the Other know, anyhow, how the meeting and encounter are going to proceed. But as we have said, this has merely melodramatic, not social-ontological value or worth.

Ethical-normativistic critics have declared Sartre's description of the intersubjective meeting and encounter as a process of mutual and reciprocal objectification, as one-sided and or false, and pointed to the – at the same time and in the process – necessarily subjective-communicative components having an effect²⁵⁶. The critique hits the mark and is correct, but from the bringing out of these components up to the – through that – intended proof of the ethical-normative quality of the meeting and encounter, it is a long way. Only whoever connects value judgements with subjectivity and objectivity – and therein between Sartre and his critics, unspoken and presumably unreflected negative agreement prevails and dominates – can accept that the overcoming of the objective character of the meeting and encounter ipso facto accentuates and bears out (or brings to bear) “good” subjectivity. Subjectivity, however, *as* subjectivity is no less rich in real and possible content than its specific inner/internal mechanism for the manufacture, production or restoration of

²⁵⁶ See e.g. Taylor, „Negative Freiheit?“, pp. 9ff., 29ff.; Honneth, *Die zerrissene Welt*, p. 149ff..

intersubjectivity, namely the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. As the possible bearer of all values, subjectivity in itself is value-free, i.e. free of this or that concrete value^{lxxii}. Sartre, by the way, in a later work, expounded and explicated the subjective essence (character or nature) of the social relation, and its specific unfolding and development via the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, in (regard to) the example of the struggle, of all examples. The choice of the example goes back and is reduced, of course, to the old one-sided assessment of the social-ontological status of the struggle, but already the inclusion of the factor of the “mutual/reciprocal perspective” in the analysis of the intersubjective relation brings about, causes or effects an essential change in (regard to) the point which primarily interests us here. It makes, namely, clear that an intersubjective relation, may never be ascribed exclusively an object character (i.e. character as an object), unless in the term “object”, ethical or existential value judgements have been inserted or put. During the mutual/reciprocal action of the struggle, which rests and is based upon the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, being an object and being a subject are simultaneously and originally given on both sides, and the necessity of being »objet-sujet« for someone, who faces and or opposes him as »sujet-objet«, sets and keeps the great variety and multiformity of »dimensions humaines« in motion. The being a subject is connected in the same actor with the being an object in the sense that the person struggling, who in fact – in the eminent sense – is a subject, sees himself with the eyes of his own foe, that is, he must turn himself into an object in order, for his part, to be able to force his way into [[knowing]] and penetrate the foe’s plans of acting (i.e. action plans). To be converted under the gaze of the Other into an object, is not only merely a passive state of affairs, but an aspect or phase of the struggle activity (i.e. the activity (in respect) of struggle) of two subjects *as* subjects. Not feelings like shame or angst and fear are in this activity of struggle, the social-ontologically decisive element or factor, as

heavily and seriously as they may also weigh psychologically, but the (cap)ability at understanding is the social-ontologically decisive element or factor. The mutuality and reciprocity of the struggle is the function of the mutuality and reciprocity of understanding, and only when one of both sides loses the (cap)ability at understanding, does it become and turn into a mere object in the eyes and at the hands of the other side²⁵⁷. The mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives proves consequently to be the decisive factor, and already its ubiquitous effect deprives talk of the degradation, downgrading or demotion of the Other through its objectification, of every social-ontological sense, i.e. meaning.

c. The community of communication of honest, sincere and genuine subjects

The theory of communicative action is a loose, slack and heterogeneous construct, whose chief components belong neither logically, nor in terms of content, or as regards the history of ideas, together. Its journalistically omnipresent author tried to underpin his ethical-normative matters of concern through everything which crossed precisely his path, and thus he could take inventory and stock of (i.e. record) not only a certain zeitgeist (i.e. spirit of the time(s)/age), which carried and swept along even his opponents, but also the current and ongoing philosophical and social-scientific debates; this explains, for the most part, the great journalistic (and publication-related) success of the theory, which was often denied to – in terms of logic and of content – more demanding, exacting and ambitious creations (or: which was often denied to creations with greater claims to logic and as to content). The commonplaces, which the theory shares with other versions of mass-democratic social theory, as

²⁵⁷ *Critique*, p. 745ff., esp. pp. 747, 750, 753: «...la lutte comme réciprocité est fonction de la réciprocité de compréhension. Si l'un des adversaires cesse de comprendre, il est l'objet de l'Autre.» (= “...the struggle like reciprocity is a function of the reciprocity of comprehension. If one of the adversaries ceases to comprehend, he is the object of the Other.”)

well as its components pertaining to the history of ideas, have been already discussed²⁵⁸; the theory of communicative action's precarious underpinning as regards language and linguistics, which could not be absent in the years of the linguistic turn (or fashion), will again have to be briefly dealt with in another context²⁵⁹. Here, it is a matter of this theory's ethical and social-ontological hard core, which exists independent and irrespective of its outer shells (wrappers or casings) pertaining to the history of ideas and linguistics – just as, incidentally, both these outer shells in themselves have nothing to do with each other. Thus, speech acts (or acts of speech) in today's form exist since time immemorial, whilst with and to the evolution of history, expectations were tied, linked, combined or connected, which from today's point of view, were never to be realised in “pre-modern” societies. The hard core of (this communicative action) theory is very close to the dialogical approach and goes back (or is reduced) to the same sources pertaining to the history of ideas; Habermas has in fact himself recollected the religious-mystical origins of the “fundamental intention” of the theory of communication (or communication theory)²⁶⁰, and consequently betrayed (i.e. divulged or revealed) what is illuminating about the character and the roots of every ethical *rationalism*. He (i.e. Habermas) has also, with commendable, praiseworthy openness admitted and confessed that the main representatives of American pragmatism, to whom he owes a deep intellectual(-spiritual) debt of gratitude, “elevated or promoted (raised or lifted) to the philosophical rank” the “religious motive of alliance or confederacy” in the form or shape of these theories^{261 + lxxiii}; Habermas is deeply indebted to Peirce as the originator, author and creator of a “consensus theory of truth” and to Mead as the originator, author and creator of a “theory of communication or communication theory of society”^{lxxiv}. “Ideal communication” and “universal

²⁵⁸ See Ch. I, Sec. 2 and 3, above.

²⁵⁹ See Ch. V, Sec. 2, below.

²⁶⁰ *Neue Unübersichtlichkeit*, p. 202.

²⁶¹ *Diskurs*, p. 378.

speech” as a “process of organisation (or organisation process)” of a through and through democratic “ideal society” had been Mead’s secularisation of that motif and at the same time Habermas’s declaration of principle(s)²⁶². At the same time, however, there were also other (kinds of) secularisation(s), which wanted to marry and wed “Reason” and “intersubjectivity” partly within the framework of a politically militant liberalism²⁶³, partly from a broadly grasped humanistic perspective. To the latter (kind of secularisation) belongs Husserl’s plan, outline or blueprint for a “universal sociality as a space for all I(ego)-subjects”, in which “latent Reason” attains and achieves an evident nature or obviousness, and the entelechy^{lxxv} of Reason would develop – in mankind and humanity on an inter-subjective basis –, all its potentialities, in order to finally overcome monological-subjective distortions; this was the plan or blueprint, outline of and for an “ontology of the life world”²⁶⁴.

The theory of communicative action has not failed or neglected to appropriate and make its own the Husserlian secularisation of the religious motive of alliance and confederacy next to the rest [[of various kinds of secularisation]]. In the course of this, it (i.e. the theory of communicative action), incidentally, let in (i.e. embodied) one of its (i.e. the said secularisation’s) many internal contradictions, because the life world was supposed to, on the one hand, be the place or locus in which communicative action unfolds and develops principally through the critique and counter-critique of claims of validity, but on the other hand, through and by means of its pre-reflective backdrops and backgrounds and solidarities (i.e. kinds and forms of solidarity), serves as “the conservative

²⁶² *Geist*, p. 376 ff.. A good decade before the appearance of his main work, Habermas programmatically cites this passage („Universalitätsanspruch“, p. 100).

²⁶³ See e.g. Hayek, *Individualismus*, p. 27: „Reason does not exist in the singular..., but it (i.e. Reason) must be imagined as an interpersonal process in which everyone’s contribution is proofed and corrected by others.“

²⁶⁴ *Krisis*, pp. 9ff., 13ff., 126ff., 175ff.; cf. *Zur Phän. d. Intersubjektivität*, III = *Hu*, XV, p. 378ff., 403ff.. 593ff.. [[Translator’s addition (nothing to do with P.K.): typical JOO!!! He wants **GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE** accumulations of forms of power and wealth for his Tribe, but also “universal intersubjective human Reason” so everyone can simply accept that **ZIO SUPREMACY** “just happens”!!! On the other hand, Husserl was one of the better minds overall – and there can be no doubt about that.]]

counterweight to the risk of dissent in respect of ongoing processes of understanding regarding and via claims of validity (validity claims)’’²⁶⁵. That the given actual facts of the life world are either socially neutral and, in this respect, irrelevant as concrete motives of acting, action and the act, or else in need of interpretation, and consequently conflict-prone or pregnant with and bearing (potential) conflict, we already know, and we do not have to come back and refer to that; finally, in fact, civil wars break out precisely against the background of common lifeworlds²⁶⁶. Regardless of that, the communicative appropriation of the Husserlian concept rests and is based on an important and significant philosophical question. The theory of communication (or communication theory) attributed its own performances and achievements to the decision to free itself and break away from the paradigm of the philosophy of the subject. Now, Husserl’s effort teaches us that there are means and ways to deal with the examination of the problem of intersubjectivity by starting from a subject-philosophical position (i.e. a position pertaining to the philosophy of the subject). The presupposition for that remains, incidentally, the purely transcendental consideration of the individual and of the collective Ego, through which, by definition, everything is distanced from the former (individual Ego) which could make the latter (collective Ego) in itself contradictory and brittle or fragile. The founding of intersubjectivity on Reason rests and is based, for its part, on the bringing, carving and working out of the components of Reason in the transcendental Ego as the element and factor which the I (ego) shares with the rest of the I-s (i.e. egos) in the same sense and to the same extent. This yields, and results in, the epoch (die Epoche), i.e. the way of looking at and consideration of the I (ego) under and by means of the putting aside or elimination of the (i.e. what is) individual and the (i.e. what is) accidental^{lxxvi}.

²⁶⁵ Thus, Habermas, *Diskurs*, p. 379, cf. p. 365; regarding the power claim cf. Matthiesen, *Dickicht*, esp. pp. 64, 79. See also Ch. I, footnote 60, above.

²⁶⁶ See Section 1Ba in this chapter, above.

Transcendental orientation is, finally, more decisive than the form-related (i.e. formal) starting point of the subjectivity or of the inter-subjectivity when, anyhow, harmonising-communicative aims are borne in mind and aimed at, in regard to whose realisation, Reason-gifted or Reason-talented (i.e. rational) humans were summoned. The theory of communication (or communication theory) sets [[as its task]], indeed, already at the beginning, that which the old and new theory of the subject wanted to achieve at the end. However, the theory of communication must equally make use of the transcendental epoch at least in the form that it at least disregards the irreducible (individual, accidental etc.) differences of subjects as between one another, in order to prepare the ground – for everyone, common, and in (regard to) everyone, equal – communicative Reason. Whoever attempts to imagine the participants in dominance-free discourse (i.e. discourse free of dominant authority) in all its particulars, can connect with the said participants' shape and form, concrete persons as little as with Kant's or Husserl's transcendental Ego; some followers and supporters of the theory of communication identify and equate, by the way, in their imagination, often the participants in dominance-free discourse with their own ideal Ego, and since they are also not capable of recognising between their ideal Ego and their empirical Ego any great or major differences, thus they consider dominance-free discourse thoroughly doable and feasible also on this side of transcendence pertaining to the theory of communication. The transcendental bridges between the philosophy of the subject and theories regarding communication communities (or communities of communication) of rational subjects are, by the way, very old. Classical subject philosophy (or philosophy of the subject) produced its own (kinds of) secularisation(s) of the "religious motive of alliance or confederacy", e.g. by the young Hegel in the phase of his radical Kantianism and in connection (or contact) with Fichte's perceptions and

views pointing the way forward or to the future [[for (German) philosophical thought]]²⁶⁷.

A further thought or consideration likewise shows that the renunciation of the philosophy of the subject in itself does not in the least suffice in order to found all the normative claims of the theory of communicative action, rather these (normative claims) have to be presupposed separately. Because every [[such]] renunciation would only then bring about the (theoretical) freeing or liberation of the subject from its isolation and encapsulation, and only then (theoretically, i.e. in terms of theory) eliminate the tendency or proclivity of the isolated and encapsulated subject to handle and treat other subjects end(goal)-rationally (purposefully, rationally or expediently) as objects, if intersubjectivity and communication amongst subjects could mean nothing other than a relation which would have to stand and be under the aegis and influence of ethically-normatively comprehended communicative action. This is not the case. The area or realm of intersubjectivity and communication is co-extensive with the spectrum of the social relation in its entire breadth. Kant, who knew of this breadth and its necessity (“unsociable or asocial sociability”), did not feel impelled, precisely because of that, to search for and seek the cause of (or reason for) ethics and of moral behaviour beyond Reason and the subject’s insight and understanding. And in actual fact: if and when the moral demand, before the conscience of the individual, does not last (and has no existence), then no other guarantees for its (i.e. the said moral demand’s) realisation can be recognised. That is not supposed to mean that it is realisable, it means however, only in this manner is its realisation conceivable and imaginable. Compared with and in contrast to this, the renunciation of subject philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of the subject) must shift or transfer the cause of, or reason for, the (i.e. what is) ethical to the intersubjective level, and it may [[do]] this logically

²⁶⁷ Regarding that, Kondylis, *Entstehung*, p. 424ff..

only if this level – in accordance with its essence or nature – constitutes a favourable terrain for the tree of ethics. That is why the necessity [[arises]] of occupying the concept of communication a limine with ethical-normative content(s). Habermas was also not the first, who did this. In Mead, approaches can be clearly recognised in relation to that, and an American sociologist^{lxxvii}, who argued in his (i.e. Mead's) spirit, had in fact defined "communication" as the counter concept of "competition"; he meant that the former (concept of "communication") is the principle of integration and of socialisation; the latter (concept of "competition") that principle of individuation²⁶⁸. In an essentially different tradition, Jaspers – varying the existential contrast and opposition between the authentic (real, actual, genuine or true) and inauthentic (non-real, unactual, ungenuine or untrue) – distinguished between "existential" communication, which is supposed to describe or refer to becoming real and being oneself jointly and in common with the Other, and the mere "communication of being (t)here or existence", during which subjects remain substances separated from one another²⁶⁹.

We, consequently, approach and draw nearer to the social-ontological essence of the matter, case or thing, and at the same time, the hard core of the theory of communicative action. The ethical-normative concept of communication does not want to be a mere call, request or exhortation towards or for (the purpose of) corresponding action, but raises or makes the claim of describing, outlining or portraying a social-ontologically autonomous type of action, which can be demarcated and delimited structurally against the type of strategic action^{lxxviii}. Under both these types, entirely concrete acts, actions and kinds of acting are able to be classified, not for instance, different aspects of one single act, action or (kind of) acting²⁷⁰. The theoretical analysis starts here during and in this

²⁶⁸ Park, "Reflections", esp. pp. 192, 195.

²⁶⁹ *Philosophie*, pp. 305ff., 338ff..

²⁷⁰ Habermas, *Theorie d. komm. Handelns*, I, p. 385ff..

decisionistically imported dichotomy, i.e. by ignoring the in itself obvious (suggesting itself) question [[as to]] whether between both types of acting or (the) act(ion) there are form-related (i.e. formal) structural commonalities, and what these are: on the basis of which criteria may or should one otherwise characterise both types equally, as it happens in fact here, as types of *social* action? In the place (i.e. instead) of a detailed and thorough discussion of the social-ontological depth dimension (i.e. dimension of depth) there is the vague supposition that communicative action is the genuine and original type of action, the act or acting; on the other hand, strategic action is a kind of falling away, decline and deterioration from (and compared with) this model, pattern or sample. However, how did it (i.e. strategic action) come to this decline and deterioration, and indeed to such an extent that the genuine and original [[element or dimension]] from now on – admittedly²⁷¹ – hardly or slightly determines social reality? The mere formulation of such elementary aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) would of course blow up, blast or burst open the foundations of the theory of communicative action^{lxxix}. The silence regarding that leads [[us]] again to an unintentional or unwanted acknowledgement of the fact that thus, as things just are now, they must start, emanate and originate, in terms of practice and of theory, from the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation. Whoever underlies or takes as his basis the dichotomy “strategic-communicative action”, has basically signed, underwritten or subscribed to the dichotomy “enmity-friendship”. With the one difference, that in Habermas, the concept of communicative action is understood in a still narrower sense than friendship, social-ontologically understood. Strategic action encompasses in fact, as game theories report, relate or tell, not only action in conflict situations (situations of conflict), in which one’s gain or win must entail another’s loss, but also co-ordinated action, in which conflict and co-ordination

²⁷¹ Loc. cit., pp. 150, 198.

go and accompany each other, that is, both sides draw unequal gains and wins from the co-operation²⁷². Normatively meant communicative action aims not at friendship in the sense of strategic co-ordination, and still less in the sense of strategic co-operation. In such a case, amongst other things, the contrast and opposition between “system” and “lifeworld” would take care of itself, because the former (“system”) can exclusively and solely live from and on co-ordinated (and co-operative) act(ion)s and kinds of acting. Regarding the fact that the theory of communicative action cannot be satisfied with such calculatedly selfish and self-serving friendship, there is only one single reason or cause: its ethical impulse and its ethical character.

The primacy of the ethical factor explains, finally, why the social-ontological depth dimension (or dimension of depth), in which exactly this factor is lost and dies out and perishes, is simply leapt over, and the analysis only starts at the tier or level where ethical distinctions and differentiations are possible. In taking a closer and more detailed look, in fact, the difference between communicative and strategic action does not turn out or prove to be one such difference of form-related (i.e. formal) structure, but a difference of ethical content(s), i.e. of the ethical positionings, stances, attitudes and intentions of the actors. And here the theoretical proposition is restricted and limited to old platitudes. Habermas defines the contrast and opposition between communicative and strategic action with the help and on the basis of the same criteria which Buber took as his basis in order to conceptually tell apart and distinguish between the basic word (term or expression) I (ego)-You and the basic word (term or expression) I-It. In his (i.e. Buber’s) definition, the *social-ontological* fact that in strategic action, not differently than in communicative action, the Other *must* be handled and treated as a *subject*, that is, as an essence which constitutively has at its disposal the (cap)ability of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and

²⁷² See e.g. Hardin, “Social Evolution”, p. 359ff..

correspondingly of flexible acting and reacting, does not count in any way. It (i.e. Buber's said definition) exclusively and solely counts (i.e. takes into account) the *ethical* point of view that the I (ego) *intends* to use the Other as an object or as a means for the attainment and achievement of its goals and ends. That is why the strategically acting person does not make any "ontological" (!) distinction between physical objects and men/humans, it starts from an undifferentiated "one-world-concept"^{273 + lxxx}. Instrumental rationality, which is after (i.e. seeks to attain and aims at) "self-assertion" and "making [[something, things]] available", does not stand out from, and contrast with, strategic rationality through the (decisive and determinative) manipulatory intention, but merely through the object of this intention: there, in the one case, it is a matter of nature and technique (i.e. technology), here, in the other case, it is a matter of human antagonists and opponents. The "instrumental" and "strategic" [[element or dimension]] seem in a decisive respect to be passing, blending or turning into each other so much that from "communicative" action, "instrumental" action is often contradistinguished as such²⁷⁴. The obvious structural nearness and proximity of this position to the premises of the dialogical approach becomes also terminologically tangible, when, for instance, the non-communicative concept of acting, action and the act is characterised as "monological"²⁷⁵. Here Weber is meant, who allegedly or supposedly defines and determines subjective sense (i.e. meaning) as a "pre-communicative" intention in respect of acting, action and the act, and hence, cannot introduce or import the concept of social action by means and way of an explication of the concept of meaning. Nonetheless, Weber stresses that in *social* action, the subjectively meant meaning refers and relates to other people's behaviour. This fully and completely suffices for the manufacture, making or restoration of a constitutive

²⁷³ *Theorie d. komm. Handelns*, I, p. 131ff..

²⁷⁴ Loc. cit., I, pp. 28, 385, 525.

²⁷⁵ Loc. cit., I, p. 378, cf. p. 455.

interrelation between meaning and social action if one – in the interest of the “communicative” formation and elaboration of acting, action and the act – does not want to suggest that the actor should, regarding the normative meaning of his own act, achieve consensus with other people. Social-ontologically seen, the meaning of action is formed, shaped and moulded in fact, anyway, in talk, conversation or discussion with the rest of the actors, irrespective of whether this talk, conversation or discussion is aloud or silent, real or constructed (i.e. manufactured or fabricated): it is the talk, conversation or discussion which makes the reflective and the intensified assumption and taking on/over of perspectives unavoidable. Whether the actor wants to give this talk, conversation or discussion the (narrower) meaning of the express search for a normative consensus with other people or not – this is an ethical, not a social-ontological matter of concern.

The background and backdrop of this simplistic contradistinction between instrumental-strategic and communicative action constitute the – also in the dialogical approach – old motifs pertaining to cultural critique having an effect, i.e. the stylised contrasts and opposition(s) between technique (technology) and humanity, on the one hand, between society and community, on the other hand, which now live through and are experiencing their umpteenth metamorphosis in the form and shape of the opposition and contrast between system and lifeworld. The communicative end-in-itself is set against the end/goal-means(or means-ends)-schema of instrumental-strategic rationality. Of course, Habermas makes clear and clarifies – rather incidentally – that the communicative acting, action and act shares the teleological structure of all (kinds of) acting, action and the act, that it (i.e. communicative acting/action) is not absorbed by or assimilated in the act of understanding (in communication, up to agreement), and that actors have different aims, which they pursue via this act²⁷⁶. More

²⁷⁶ Loc. cit., I, pp. 150, 151, 385.

emphatically, Habermas underlines, however, that the acts of understanding (in communication, up to agreement), which tie together, link, combine and associate the plans of acting, action and the act of several actors to and with an interaction context (or interrelation and context of interaction), “for their part are not able to be reduced to teleological action”, that understanding (in communication, up to agreement) is no mere “solution of a problem of co-ordination”²⁷⁷. With the matter of concern, wish or desire of freeing communicative understanding (in communication, up to agreement) from the load, weight or burden of practical cares, troubles and worries, goes the methodical (i.e. methodological) decision to study the structure of this understanding exclusively and solely at the level of speech acts (or acts of speech). And here again the search for “realness and actualness, authenticity, genuineness or trueness” and “originality (or naturalness and the unspoilt state)” is made noticeable, whilst – without historical-genetic(al) or empirical speech analyses – it is ensured or assured that language use oriented towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement) is the “original mode”²⁷⁸. However, the elevation or raising of communicative acting, action or the communicative act to the status of the end-in-itself or of the highest goal and end, notwithstanding prosaic considerations, is implied already in the fundamental division of all act(ion)s into “success-(oriented)” and “understanding-oriented” act(ion)s. Were, namely, the admitted teleological structure of all act(ion)s decisive in the context of theory, so, the “end and goal” would have to serve as a supra-concept (i.e. generic (or major) term), and the concepts “(orientation towards) success”, as well as “orientation towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement)” would have to then be found at the same logical level, or else be equally subordinated to the supra-concept (i.e. generic (major) term) of the goal and end, such that they would

²⁷⁷ Loc. cit., I, p. 388.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

signify two in principle methodical procedures with equal rights in attaining and achieving a goal/end. The preference for one or the other methodical procedure would then be a purely technical question, matter or problem. The dichotomy, however, does not mean: success via strategy *or* success via understanding (in communication, up to agreement), but success vs. understanding (in communication, up to agreement), in relation to which already the equating of “strategy” and “success” classifies the teleological components unilaterally under strategic action, and makes the communicative component correspondingly goal/end-free. Communicative action is not defined by the end/goal, but by the manner of its constituting and constitution; here, therefore, the “unconstrained and unforced” character of understanding (in communication, up to agreement) and the motivation of the person acting by means of reasons, exclusively and solely counts²⁷⁹. For success-oriented action, success is by definition everything. Understanding (in communication, up to agreement) can, however, also during practical failure (i.e. failure in practice) succeed perfectly, it (i.e. understanding) does not go back and is not reduced to intersubjective difficulties in respect of understanding (in communication, up to agreement), but to a false judgement of data and of the situation (and position) shared by all communication partners (i.e. partners in and of communication). This case shows *ex negativo*, yet very graphically, descriptively, clearly and demonstratively, in which sense and to what extent understanding (in communication, up to agreement) is conceived of as an end-in-itself.

If understanding as an act of ethical rationality is an end-in-itself or, in any case, the highest value, thus it is explained why social act(ion)s are not classified in accordance with the objective criterion of their end-goal rationality or their effects and side effects, but merely or only with regard to the subjective “positioning” and the subjective intentions of the actors. Either one is “oriented”

²⁷⁹ Loc. cit., I, p. 525.

towards success, or towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement); and this latter orientation presupposes (and has as a prerequisite), again, a good moral quality, that is, the subjective honesty and “truthfulness”²⁸⁰ of actors. It is indeed admitted that on occasion the strategically acting person also pursues his aims, yet in principle, hushing [[things]] up and hypocrisy belong to his trade. On the other hand, truthfulness is the constitutive feature of communicative action oriented towards understanding (in communication, up to agreement). Concerning truthfulness and deception, illusion and deceit or self-deception, a long [[form of]] casuistry can, though, be developed, which has to do with real dilemmas, or with the psychology of ethical action, and in itself already can ruin simplifications of the theory of communicative action alien, strange and foreign to life. However, we want to leave that to one side (or leave it open), and raise the question as to whether and how far or to what extent understanding (in communication, up to agreement) resting on mutual and reciprocal truthfulness represents and constitutes a sufficient condition for the attainment and achievement of the ethical aims of communicative action. Two men who look at each other in the eyes, and both say “I hate you”, understand each other perfectly and completely and in complete and perfect truthfulness, however, with that, obviously nothing is achieved which communicative action would have liked to achieve with regard to human living together and co-habitation^{lxxxix}. From the example, in any case, to be gathered and inferred, we must clearly distinguish between (truthful) understanding (in communication, up to agreement) about the situation (or position) and (truthful) understanding (in communication, up to agreement) about the aims of the those acting. But even if this distinction is made, the specific difference between strategic and communicative action has not yet been stated, since also those strategically acting can openly confess their faith in (contrary and opposed) aims, and

²⁸⁰ Loc.cit., I, p. 412.

moreover, can share (in) the [[same]] judgement or assessment of the (common) situation (or position). The sole [[thing]], whereby those who are communicatively acting stand out from and are contrasted with these (strategically acting people), is their (i.e. the communicatively acting people's) content-related agreement regarding aims, and if only be it in the form of the generally practiced conviction that consensus or peace are in all cases and under all circumstances to be preferred to dissent or (bloody) struggle. For the definition of communicative action, not in the least does the proposition "all participants adjust their individual plans of action or acting to one another" and pursue unreservedly their illocutionary, i.e. truthfully and honestly expressed aims, suffice²⁸¹. Because this "adjusting" can mean two kinds of things: "formally (i.e. in terms of form) adapting and adjusting to each other or one another", as strategically acting people must do it by means and way of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, anyhow; and "in terms of content, to bring each other or one another into line (i.e. to harmonise content mutually and reciprocally)", agreeing, in terms of content, about the aims, as only friends can do it. Habermas hardly takes any notice of all these fundamental distinctions, because in his zeal to carve, work and bring out understanding (in communication, up to agreement) as the "original mode", and at the same time to prop up and support – through the ontological dignity of the original mode – the ethical claim of communication theory (i.e. the theory of communication), he equates and identifies understanding (in communication, up to agreement) with agreement (approval or consent)²⁸², although already common and popular lexicons and dictionaries cleanly and conscientiously distinguish under the lexical entry "understanding (in communication, up to (but not necessarily with) agreement), the meaning "to make oneself understood" from the meaning "agreement". With that goes the fact that Habermas only in

²⁸¹ Loc. cit., I, p. 395.

²⁸² Loc. cit., I, p. 386ff.

passing and parenthetically touches upon the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and then only as the confirmation of the understanding(-related) capacity for consensus of those acting. Mead's ambiguity on this important point eludes Habermas completely, or else the reading of Mead helps him get past and go beyond the content-related double-sidedness of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives²⁸³.

One could now believe and or opine that understanding (in communication, up to agreement) as consensus can be attained and achieved both regarding and concerning the judgement of the position and situation (or situational assessment), as well as regarding and concerning aims, by way and means of the putting forward, formulation and discussion of "criticisable claims of validity" on the part of all partners in communication. That which neither truthfulness, nor understanding (in communication, up to agreement) could offer, afford, achieve or accomplish, namely, drawing an absolutely clear dividing line between strategic and communicative action, is supposed to now be ensured and guaranteed by means of the critique of each and every respective raised and made claim of validity, which allegedly specifically characterises communicative action. This does not hold true. Claims of and to validity are always criticisable, regardless of whether they want to be criticised or not. Foes do not, in fact, do anything other than criticise and critique (negatively) the claims of validity of each and every respective other side, so that again, neither the concept "claim of validity", nor the concept "critique", are capable in themselves of yielding, making up and constituting the ultimate and absolutely autonomous criterion for the distinction and differentiation between "communicative" and non-communicative act(ion)s. Only the fact, or in any case, the certainty, of a consensus after critique specifically befits communicative action, however, this comes down to, ends up in or amounts to a

²⁸³ Loc. cit., II, p. 23ff..

– by the way, unavoidable, see below – tautology. Apart from that, one can, as Habermas repeatedly reassures [[us]], take a position as regards a claim of and to validity with a Yes or a No. We learn nothing [[about]] how things are supposed to continue, carry on and proceed after a No. Obviously, to negation, a second claim of validity must be counterposed and said in reply, to a new negation, a third claim of validity, and so on, and so forth; one steps into (i.e. enters) a vicious circle, and with that in the best case boredom [[arises]], and in the worst case, aggressive nervousity (i.e. nervousness). Be that as it may, the putting forward, formulation and critique of always newer claims of and to validity throws (i.e. sends) those communicating back to the problem of understanding (in communication, up to agreement) and to the level of understanding. Because every new claim of validity must be more comprehensive than the earlier claim of validity, it (i.e. every new claim of validity) must therefore contain it (i.e. the previous claim of validity) and found it (i.e. this new claim of validity) at a higher level of generalisation, wherefore also understanding (in communication, up to agreement) will be concerned with always more fundamental questions, until this understanding touches upon the ultimate questions and problems of meaning and legitimation, which can hardly be separated from questions and problems of identity and recognition.^{lxxxii} In regard to the critique of claims of validity, a linear course is possible, in which the founding of claims of validity directly or via logical mid-stations or halfway stations take place by invoking the highest authorities (“that is God’s will”, “ethics demands that”, “rationality commands that”). Several divergences, deviations or digressions from a linear schema and combinations are, however, also conceivable. Ultimate questions and problems can remain left aside, ignored and excluded, be it because both sides (nominally) confess faith in and profess the same fundamental principles and values, be it because – conversely – they consider, their, regarding this fundamental principle, opposition to be unbridgeable, and pragmatically, that is, on the basis of the existing correlation

of forces, want to concentrate on the “doable and feasible”^{lxxxiii}. For (i.e. as regards) the course of the relation it is, though, in terms of practice, indifferent whether the highest claims of validity, on both sides, are approved of and endorsed, and consequently are outside of the (i.e. what is) criticisable, or whether they do not do it (i.e. approve of and endorse the highest claims of validity). Because in the latter case, critique of them (i.e. the highest claims of validity) are – in practice – irrelevant(,) when the communication in the field of interest functions perfectly – that is, in accordance with the rules of the theory of communicative action. In the former case, again, dissent concerning the critique of a claim of validity, which, logically and in terms of content, is more or less narrower than the highest claims of validity, can bring about and lead to consequences which can be as regards the logical and content-related extent of the claim of validity in question not at all analogical (i.e. consequences which do not proportionately correspond to the said dissent concerning a critique of a claim of validity). The extensity and intensity of claims of and to validity stand and are in fact in no necessary relation with each other, and accordingly no table can be set up which will show or indicate in advance with what persistence, perseverance and thoroughness may every claim of and to validity be criticised. Regarding that, every time, concrete actors in concrete situations (and positions) decide and make a decision anew, according to which place the – on each and every respective occasion – brought-forward or put-forward (or proposed) claim of validity occupies in their (the said concrete actors’) horizon of expectation on each and every respective occasion; in relation to which, this place influences the course of the communication normally more than the logical and content-related extent of the claim of validity, looked at absolutely (i.e. in absolute terms).

These thoughts and considerations were supposed to have explicated our thesis that the announcement of a criticisable claim of validity must – every

time – unroll or re-open anew the problem of the level of understanding (in communication, up to agreement). That means that [[such]] understanding as the critique of claims of validity presupposes a critique of the claim of validity of every logical and content-related level, at which the claims of validity should be criticised. Communication contains a meta-communicative component, that is, a tacit or expressive understanding (in communication, up to agreement) about the conditions under which communication as the critique of claims of and to validity takes place. If one starts from the not in the least self-evident – and to boot rather naive – conviction that meta-communicative claims of and to validity are criticisable in this manner like communicative (claims of and to validity), that is to say, that in meta-communication and communication the same rules of argumentation apply, then one merely exposes the communicative process in its totality all the more to the danger of an argumentative vicious circle^{lxxxiv}. The theory of communicative action does precisely this by ignoring the meta-communicative problem and consequently suggests that all levels and fields would be argued and would proceed with the same presuppositionlessness (or lack of (a) presupposition(s)). On the other hand, it (i.e. the theory of communicative action) avoids, prudently and very wisely, to give information about the case in which the criticisable claim of validity or of dissent concerns the meta-communicative level. It a limine restricts and limits the search for consensus to cases in which not abstract-general norms, but “conflicts (in respect) of acting, action and the act” are up for debate “in a concrete situation”²⁸⁴. Apart from the fact that this restriction and limitation does not necessarily influence the intensity of a conflict, in a concrete conflict in respect of acting, action or the act, the possibility always inheres of the transforming and converting [[of this concrete conflict]] into an (explicit) conflict regarding the norms of acting, action and the act. The (fundamental) principle of

²⁸⁴ Habermas, *Moralbewußtsein*, p. 113.

universalisation, that, namely, all people concerned accept the consequences which arise and result from the general keeping to and following of the norms of acting, action and of the act, for the interests of every individual, cannot help [[us]] along [[in solving the problem]]; it merely shifts the criticisable claims of and to validity to a higher and more comprehensive logical and content-related level. Because it is now asked whether the disputed norm of acting/action and the act is in actual fact universalisable or whether its application is correct. The fact that even in norms of acting, action and the act recognised generally as universal, material points of view, in practice, are decisive, is incidentally, conceded and admitted – although without reflection, thought and consideration of the implications²⁸⁵. In which catch-22 situation or dilemma, the critique of claims of validity find themselves, can be recognised when we visualise, picture or make clear to ourselves both standpoints from which it (the said critique of claims of and to validity) is undertaken: it either touches upon the legitimacy of the claims of validity or upon their legality²⁸⁶. Since legitimacy concerns “moral” issues and affairs, then in a certain deepening of critique, the levels of understanding (in communication, up to agreement), sooner or later, both as regards the fundamental discussion of the norms of acting, action and the act in connection with ultimate questions of meaning and value(s), as well as with regard to the meta-communicative dimension, must be widened, extended and expanded and, consequently, continuously go on and on forever. If, again, the claim of and to legality stands and is under critique, thus, this implies the acceptance of a limit in respect of and to critique, since the legality standing and being on this side of (i.e. within) legitimacy, at least in the framework of current understanding (in communication, up to agreement), must be regarded as given

²⁸⁵ Loc. cit., p. 76. Here we read that the universal norm of acting, action and the act “makes possible” an “agreement in practical discourses always when and if matters can be managed, controlled or regulated in the uniform, even, equal, symmetrical or well-proportioned interests of all those concerned”.

²⁸⁶ *Theorie d. komm. Handelns*, I, p. 405.

and unalterable and irrevocable; this, of course, must detract from, and be detrimental to, the dignity and the omnipotence of rationality^{lxxxv}.

The form-related-structural equating of the meta-communicative and communicative levels, of the preconditions and the course of communicative action, with one another, takes on the shape and form of a postulate that for the unimpeded handling and processing of the critique and counter-critique of the claims of and to validity, the having and bearing equal rights (or the equivalence or equality) of the partners in and of communication and the lack of every relationship of dominance (and dominant authority) or of power guarantee and vouch for [[this state of affairs of equality]] amongst them (i.e. the said partners in/of communication); (equal and same rationality, intelligence and education, learning and formation are regarded as self-evident and are not a theme, topic or matter (of concern and for discussion).^{lxxxvi}) Dominance freedom (i.e. being free from dominant authority) and equality constitute the presupposition, the structural basis or fundamental feature and happy, felicitous or fortunate result of communicative action in one. In this manner, the meaning of this, which could be considered to be the main thing and the most difficult, i.e. the clarification of the content-related points of contention by critique, is starkly and strongly lessened and downgraded, whereby theory hopes for relief from the painful burden of the proof of practical testing (i.e. testing and proving (itself as theory) in practice). Because if freedom from dominance (as dominant authority), and equality, are present and exist already at the beginning, and if it is agreed that they will also ride things out and come out alive unscathed and unharmed, then there is no content any longer in the world, which could seriously summon and muster the spirits and intellects earnestly against one another. The content-related dissimilarities, varieties and differences in and of opinion have, in fact, anyway, their meaning not of themselves, but because their course and outcome determines the relative position of the subjects

concerned within each and every respective framework in question. If this position is steady, stable or fixed and – above all – is not after and behind (i.e. is not inferior or subordinate to) any other position, the contents lose very much from their potential as the stuff (i.e. subject matter) of conflict. In addition to that [[is]] the circumstance or fact that already the dominance-free and egalitarian preconditions of communicative discourse anticipate the most important of all content-related decisions. That decision, namely, that there may be no conflict which goes beyond and surpasses the harmlessness of the arguing (i.e. what is being argued or argumentation)^{lxxxvii}. What, therefore, the theory of communicative action offers in reality is a *description* of the mode and manner of the function and existence of an ideal community of communication, *provided that* it (i.e. such an ideal community of communication) can exist. It (i.e. the theory of communicative action), however, offers neither a *proof* that it (i.e. an ideal community of communication) can exist, nor a concrete direction for its realisation. If one makes or renders a proof in respect of reality from the (pr)offered description, then one must – absolutely theologically – put in the effort, struggle and fight for a thought structure and a (methodical) thought procedure, which, for its part, characterised the ontological proof of God^{lxxxviii}: from the attribute of perfection, reality or realisability must be derived and deduced as the inseparable quality, property or characteristic of perfection²⁸⁷. Said more banally, it is a matter of a more extensive version of the age-old interweaving of Is and Ought, of which ethical-normativistic thought as a rule makes use, in order to be founded (and established) with ultimate arguments. The “real, genuine or authentic” and “true” being/Is, is here the “original mode” of communication, as it allegedly arises or is produced already out of the “original mode” of language. The Ought, in fact, fulfills with its essence and its

²⁸⁷ This remark equally concerns Apel’s plan or outline of and for a community of communication (or communicative community) (*Transformation*, II, p. 220ff., 359ff.), whose particular explanation is not here worth [[our while/time]]. Cf. Burger’s incisive and acute critique, „Lob“, esp. p. 448ff..

effect or impact not the quantitatively far more overriding and predominant area or realm of the “rotten, decayed, foul, putrefied existence” (this is Hegel’s expression, Habermas uses adjectives like “wrong, amiss, miscast” or “misguided and led astray”), but definitely or absolutely the qualitatively unscathed, intact and ontologically decisive field. Against the background (or on the basis) of the thus thought-of and conceived interweaving of I and Ought, a confusion of the level of communicative action takes place or proceeds with the level of the communicative theory of acting, action and the act. Since the theory tellingly (or in a well-aimed manner) describes communicative action, and since such action contains ethical-normative claims, so the theory wants, from its ethical-normative essence, of which it speaks, to derive and deduce its own right to formulate ethical-normative instructions. However, the level of description and that of reality, in which such instructions have to be tried and tested, are obviously two different kinds (of level). We subsequently return on a new roundabout way to the old aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) of the ontological proof of God.^{lxxxix}

From the structural equating and identification of the preconditions and the course of communicative action a (further) conclusion is still to be drawn. Communicative action as the model or blueprint which is supposed to ensure or verify peace between men (humans), can either totally and globally realise peace, or cannot realise peace at all. Because we can imagine that mankind (humanity), or a certain society as a whole broken up into groups, inside of which consensus is manufactured, produced or restored in accordance with all the formal rules of communicative action, but every one of these consensus(es) differs – in part or completely – in terms of content, from the other. Said otherwise: if “formal pragmatics”^{xc} remains really formal (i.e. form-related), and it contains in actual fact no content-related ethical pre-decisions (which would throw theory back (*or*: return theory) into the arms of the traditional

teaching or doctrine of virtue), then a – in terms of formal pragmatics – flawless consensus, but a consensus capturing and taking in only a fraction of mankind (humanity) or of society, can bring into the world the war of all against all because of different or even opposed content(s). The difference or contrast and opposition of the contents towards or vis-à-vis one another, can again, as indicated or intimated above, come into being either from a diverging interpretation of the same fundamental principles, or from the confession of faith in different fundamental principles. And the contents themselves do not necessarily have to have an ethical character, so that their proponents, advocates and champions can mutually attest truthfulness, and can share the same judgement and assessment of the situation and position as regards an unforced, unconstrained or casual discourse. Thus seen, and remaining strictly with criteria pertaining to formal pragmatics, it could be said cum grano salis [[= with a grain of salt]] that this image or picture is not very far from historically attested and witnessed human-social reality. Because those who face other people as foes are amongst themselves friends, i.e. – at least in regard to the questions and problems which separate them from their foes, and to the extent that this separation is important and effective – they mutually and reciprocally hold and consider one another to be truthful and rationally arguing partners of and in communication (*or*: communication partners who are truthful and argue rationally)^{xci}. But the theory of communicative action obviously wants to be something other than this, and since its matter of concern cannot be attained and achieved purely in terms of formal pragmatics, then it smuggles into its premises the ethically correct content(s). In actual fact, only the certainty that all partial communities would have to – already on the basis of the following of and adherence to (or compliance with) the same discursive (methodical) procedure – come across the (one) truth, and, in the course of this, could never err, can found, justify or give reasons for hope in peace amongst them (i.e. the

said partial communities). Habermas is of the one (and same) opinion with the prophet Mohammed: “my community will never agree upon an error”^{288 + xcii}.

If the course of communicative action is dependent on its preconditions and prerequisites, what determines then, these preconditions and prerequisites? The answer means simply (*or*: is simple): the decision of the actor, as the theoretician, of course, likes to imagine or visualise [[things]]. Whoever wants to behave communicatively in the ethical-normative sense is bound to norms, however, no norm [[in itself]] prescribes and dictates that one should or ought to act at all or generally, communicatively²⁸⁹. The formulation (putting forward, setting or making up) of norms, which (a communicative action) of that sort commands, amounts or is tantamount to the construction of an ethics, and the appeal to respecting and paying attention to the norms of this ethics must be directed to the insight, understanding and the conscience of the individual in order to set this individual in motion (or drive this individual) to the decision to act communicatively and not strategically. In other words: if the factor “decision” and “moral consciousness” cannot be got around or circumvented, then the striven-for overcoming of the philosophy of the subject proves to be a fiction. Certainly, one could make the decision to act communicatively out to be the mere return to the realness and actualness (or authenticity, genuineness and trueness) of the “original mode”, and ascribe to the latter (realness, actualness, authenticity etc.), not to the subject, the energy for such a decision. Under such circumstances however, under which, admittedly, “wrong, amiss, miscast” or “misguided and led astray” interactions have buried or submerged the “original mode” extensively, the ethical force and powers of resistance and the determination or resoluteness of the individual has to still make up for and rectify – up to a point and to some extent – the ontological damage. And just as

²⁸⁸ Rosenthal cites the saying, *Pol. Thought in Medieval Islam*, 37 (English version: “my community will never agree upon an error”).

²⁸⁹ Cf. St. Lukes, “Of Gods and Demons”, p. 145.

at the start of communicative action, despite the in principle ostracism of decisionism, a decision must stand (i.e. a decision must be taken and made), so too, dominance(as dominant authority)-free discourse must end with a decision in the event it (i.e. the said discourse) does not lead to the consensus of all with all (i.e. everyone and all parties (concerned) with everyone and all parties (concerned)). We do not mean here the decision by means or by way of the demonstration of power, show of force or passage at arms (i.e. military engagement, engagement with weapons), but precisely a procedure, which is generally regarded as the best conceivable regulation for the peaceful-dialogical settlement (arbitration, arrangement or (re)conciliation) of conflicts and, notwithstanding that, is pregnant and burdened by a deep mistrust vis-à-vis the effectiveness of dominance-free dialogue (i.e. dialogue free of dominant authority) amongst equals, although it nominally rests and is based upon the dialogical principle. It is a matter of parliamentarism and parliamentary discussion. One knows how the dialogical principle was summoned by liberal parliamentarism in order to – as the incarnation of collective rationality and transparency – expel and drive out the dark arcana imperii, which were kept, guarded, protected and looked after in cabinets (i.e. councils advising a sovereign or a chief executive; groups of persons who help to manage governments; executive and policy-making bodies of countries, consisting of all government ministers or just the senior ministers; bodies of persons appointed by heads of state or prime ministers to head the executive departments of governments and to act as official advisers. etc. [[see standard dictionary definitions]])^{xciii}. The polemical summoning and the consistent practical application of a principle constitute, however, two entirely different things^{xciv}. In dominant, ruling and practised parliamentarism, governing was never made dependent on the attainment and achievement of a consensus of all with all (i.e. everyone and every party with everyone and every party) as the result of rational discussion. Its (i.e. parliamentarism's) saving worldly or life wisdom

(i.e. wisdom in respect of life) was shown and made known in the precaution(ary measure) and provision that discussions were to be put and brought to an end relatively quickly through decisions of and by the majority (i.e. majority decisions), and as a result of rational discussion, in recognising that which on each and every respective occasion seems to be right and correct to the majority. At the end of a discussion, a decision, not a consensus must stand (i.e. be taken or made and exist; or: there must be a decision, not (necessarily a decision arising from) a consensus); – thus is (or means) the life-preserving/sustaining principle of parliamentarism, as well as the sovereignty of the people (or folk)^{xcv}. This is no fault, flaw, shortcoming or deficiency, and it founds or justifies no accusation; it is matter, simply, of a necessity. Foes of parliamentarism, who reduced its (i.e. parliamentarism's) essence to actless (i.e. without act(ion)(s)) joyfulness and gladness in respect of talk, conversation and discussion, have confused its (i.e. parliamentarism's) ideological self-understanding with its praxis and practice. The theory of communicative action does the same, even if with different intent. It (i.e. the theory of communicative action) likewise takes the ideal of dominance-free rational discourse at face value; it only wants to, from that, make a consistent praxis under (i.e. during) the failure to appreciate (or whilst misjudging) the relations and circumstances of power and inequality^{x cvi}. Such a positioning is indeed, as a well-known sociologist remarked, “hopelessly naive”²⁹⁰, yet behind the naivety, which considers the power claims of other (people and parties) to be revocable (repealable, abrogable, rescindable or voidable), hides a power claim of its (i.e. the theory of communicative action's) own, which models the concrete subjects in accordance with its own normative notions and representations, and – beyond all accidental (random, chance) and inessential (or immaterial) elements,

²⁹⁰ J. Turner, *A Theory*, p. 98. [[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE, NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.: FOR P.K. TO CALL J.H. TURNER A “SOCIOLOGIST” (JUST LIKE ROBERT E. PARK AND NORBERT ELIAS), THERE MUST BE SOME QUALITY TO HIS WORK, UNLIKE THE VAST MAJORITY OF CLOWNS AND RETARDED COMICS (JOQ OR NOT) POSING AS “SOCIOLOGY” AND “PHILOSOPHY” ETC. PROFESSORS IN “THE WEST” UNDER (ZIQ-)USA (IMPERIALISTIC AND OR HEGEMONIC) DOMINATION.]]

features, characteristics, attributes, traits and dimensions – makes and turns them into bearers of a sole and exclusive, and for all (i.e. everyone), binding Reason; the foreground is dialogical, the decisive and determinative transcendental level, monological^{xcvii}. We have already explained in which sense and in which way the consideration of man as end-in-himself can flow into and end up in that which is supposed to be put aside and eliminated: his (i.e. man's) objectification (or reification)²⁹¹. The ethically motivated theoretician opines and believes, with good and clear conscience, that people as actors or factotums in his rational plan, design or blueprint, are being served well and correctly, and they are “real, genuine or authentic subjects”. But precisely because people are, anyhow, real, genuine or authentic subjects, they do not fit into any plan, design or blueprint.

F. Excursus (i.e. Digression): pity and sympathy. Regarding the pre-history of the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives

Like the concept of the social relation, also that (concept) of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives or (the concept) of understanding was always already influenced or even shaped, moulded or stamped by ethical-normative considerations. The social relation had to just as much mean and signify friendship and co-operation in order to be able to equate and identify enmity with asociality and anti-sociality. And the (cap)ability as regards the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives was already in Mead looked at as the basis

²⁹¹ See footnote 252 in this chapter, above.

for a democratic programme of socialisation. One has often also used “understanding (Verstehen)” and “understanding (in communication, up to agreement) (Verständigung)” one-sidedly in the sense of “agreement (Einverständnis)”, something which suggested the conclusion that conflicts were put down and reduced to “misunderstandings”²⁹². Not otherwise was it with the concepts, to which befell (or went) a noteworthy and conspicuous role in the pre-history of the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. “Pity (Mitleid)” and “sympathy (Sympathie)” have in all ages, eras and epochs, in most authors and in general language usage, ethical connotations; in some cases, they had to, in fact, make and constitute the foundation and basis of ethics²⁹³. However, the social-ontological components of these concepts, which build the bridge towards and for the modern theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, were hardly perceived, and they can be brought or carved out from the doxographic tangle, maze, jumble and confusion only when and if the decisive structural points of view serve as the guide (guideline or guiding thread) for the overview of the history of ideas. With the help and on the basis of the same structural points of view, we can schematise the development (or evolution) [[in the history of ideas]] as follows: in one phase, in which antiquity and the early New Times coincide, the concept of pity stands and is at the centre of attention, which indeed is regarded as an immediate and direct relation of feeling, however, at the same time, its mechanism is described in such a way that today’s reader can gather and infer from that, by means of a more precise analysis, the reflective character of this supposed or alleged relation of immediacy and directness. The express ascertainment of this reflectivity constitutes a preliminary stage (pre-tier, pre-

²⁹² Cf. footnotes 282 and 205 in this chapter, above. Cf. from the older sociological literature, Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 233ff.; Stok, „Nähe und Ferne“, pp. 246ff., 259. Also, Shils, “Calling”, p. 1431: “...empathy, which is the essential constituent of consensus.” Regarding a value-neutral use of the term “empathy”, see Sec. 1F, the final/last paragraph, below.

²⁹³ Regarding Rousseau’s and Schopenhauer’s attempts at the founding of an ethics of pity, and regarding the history of the concept of “pity” in general, see Hamburger, *Mitleid*.

level or pre-grade) towards the modern theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and it is encountered in the 18th century in the concept of sympathy, which now dominates in the vocabulary, even though it, of course, is mixed and interchanged with the on-going common concept of pity. The going into each other, fusion, merging or alternating of both concepts was, of course, through that, facilitated and made easy by the fact that “sympathy” frequently gets and catches (i.e. has) the same ethical connotations which the earlier “pity” had, and, accordingly, it occasionally takes on/over and adopts the tasks and functions of founding in ethics. Only seldom is their ambivalence lost. Social-ontologically pathbreaking and pioneering, remains, nonetheless, the fact that now the content-related spectrum of the concept of sympathy is widened, and the more this (concept of sympathy) is opened up for psychical states of affairs, which vary and differ from one another, or in fact stand and are in contrast to one another, so much the clearer does the reflective-value-neutral character of sympathy come to light. Because only a reflective-value-neutral sympathy can in principle be moved, transferred and shifted to, in themselves, opposed psychical situations (and positions), or else accompany different positionings and stances vis-à-vis the same situation (and position). The fact that the pain of the Other, can give rise to and cause in observers just as much “pity” as schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) too, tries, tests and proves that (reflective-value-neutral) character of sympathy. Hence, both levels of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives already emerge, in the way we explained these same levels of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives [[above]]²⁹⁴; the form-related (i.e. formal) mechanism unfolds and develops uniformly, irrespective of how much points of reference, references and positionings or stances may vary at the content-related level.

²⁹⁴ See Sec. 1Cb in this chapter.

Mind you, the talk here is of the theory and its development (or evolution). If the theory was completed and perfected relatively late (in coming), then this is not in the least supposed to mean and signify that people handle and deal with the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives before the formation and development of the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, differently, than after its (i.e. the theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives') formation and development. The social being is not shaped and formed in accordance with the ups and downs (or highs, and lows and depths) of social ontology, and people speak prosaically long before they learn what prose means. Naturally, there are – since ancient times – untheorised testimonies, reports and evidence of a clear consciousness of the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and indeed not only since Marcus Aurelius asked of, and requested from, himself: “Get used to following very carefully the talk of other men and move and transfer yourself, as well as you can, into the psyche of he who is speaking [[to you]]”²⁹⁵. Already Calypso assured Odysseus that she was thinking about how she would advise herself (i.e. decide for herself) as regards getting into such a state of need and hardship (or dire straits) as he (was in)²⁹⁶. Her (i.e. Calypso's) reflection, consequently, moves at three levels simultaneously: [[1]] she speaks or talks of that which she precisely is bearing and has in mind; [[2]] she moves, transfers and shifts herself into the situation and position of the needy, suffering-deprivation Odysseus, and finally, [[3]] she pictures, imagines or visualises a future state of affairs, in which she – against this same need and hardship – would have to struggle, which at that moment descends upon (strikes, ravages and haunts) Odysseus.

²⁹⁵ *Ad se ipsum*, VI, 53 [[Translator's addition: = «Ἐθίσον σεαυτὸν πρὸς τῷ ὑφ' ἐτέρου λεγομένῳ γίνεσθαι ἀπαρενθυμήτως καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ λέγοντος γίνου.»]]

²⁹⁶ *Odyssee*, V, 188-191 [[Translator's addition: = ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν νοέω καὶ φράσσομαι, ἄσπ' ἂν ἐμοὶ περ/αὐτῇ μηδοίμην, ὅτε με χρεῖῳ τόσον ἴκοι·/καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ νόος ἐστὶν ἐναΐσιμος, οὐδέ μοι αὐτῇ/θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι σιδήρεος, ἀλλ' ἐλεήμων» = “Nay, I have such thoughts in mind, and will give such counsel, as I should devise for mine own self, if such need should come on me. [190] For I too have a mind that is righteous, and the heart in this breast of mine is not of iron, but hath compassion” (Homer. *The Odyssey* with an English Translation by A.T. Murray, PH.D. in two volumes. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1919 (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0136%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D145>)).]]

She (i.e. Calypso) does all that, however, as she declares and explains – in relation to which the clarification implies that this reason does not have to always be given, when or if thought about in this manner – because she is “well (kindly or in a friendly manner) disposed” to him, she feels, in fact, “pity” for him. These propositions of natural speech already contain Aristotle’s theoretical description of pity, which likewise touches upon the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. This cannot in fact be avoided if one takes into account that pity is actually a special case of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives generally, which appears or takes place under two conditions. If, namely, the person pitying (another) stands near (i.e. is close (physically and or emotionally) to) the person suffering, and moreover thinks that this person suffering would be undeservedly affected by suffering. Aristotle names these conditions²⁹⁷, and points to and emphasises the reflectivity of the pitying and compassionate assumption and taking on/over of perspectives through the remark that pity ceases where personal nearness and proximity to the person suffering is so narrow and tight (i.e. close), that his (i.e. the person suffering’s) suffering without any distinction in regard to quality (or without any qualitative difference) becomes one’s own suffering²⁹⁸, where, that is, in the place of a relationship of non-immediacy and indirectness goes a relationship of immediacy and directness. Irrespective of whether this is true, and of whether the conversion of alien (i.e. another’s) pain into one’s own suffering annuls, cancels or puts out of action the mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, pity is still tacitly or implicitly described against the backdrop or on the basis of this mechanism. This is to be indirectly gathered and inferred from the fine (delicate, nice or subtle) observation that whoever is already terrified does not feel any pity, because he is already dealing with his

²⁹⁷ *Rhetorik*, 1385b 13-15.

²⁹⁸ Loc. cit., 1386a 18-24.

own affect and emotion²⁹⁹ – that is why he does not have either the appetite, desire or craving, nor the time to move and be transferred into the situation and position of another (person). The process of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is directly characterised by the application of verbs like οἷεσθ[([θ])]αι, φαίνεσ[([θ])]αι, λαβεῖν^{xcviii}, in order to apprehend what is going on or taking place in pity: one thinks, one supposes that one imagines that one could *in actual fact* find oneself *in the future* in the situation and position of the suffering Other³⁰⁰, and one finds this possibility terrifying (horrible, terrible, awful or dreadful) because one *presently* and *in thought* takes in and adopts the stance of the other person. The imagined identification of one's own stance with the alien (i.e. other person's) stance therefore follows this taking in and adoption of the alien (i.e. another's) stance, and this is added to the rest of the conditions which make out of pity, a special case of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. This special case shares with the rest of the cases, though, a quality, property or characteristic that the intensity of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as well as the positioning towards the content taken in and adopted of this same assumption and taking in/over of perspectives, that is, towards the Other's stance, are more or less dependent on the (supposed and assumed) power relationship (or relationship (in respect) of power) between the I (ego) and the Other³⁰¹. Aristotle takes this into account by restricting and limiting the effect and impact of pity in principle to the circle of those who live in similar circumstances, conditions and relations, and that is why they can understand themselves more likely as a community of [[the same or common]] fate and destiny, no matter whom it (i.e. fate or destiny) hits (i.e. affects and or attacks) today, and whom it (hits, affects or attacks) tomorrow. On the other hand, the absolutely weak person is incapable of pity, who (i.e. the

²⁹⁹ Loc. cit., 1385b 32-35.

³⁰⁰ Loc. cit., 1385b 16-18, 1386a 26-29.

³⁰¹ See Sec. 1Cb in this chapter.

absolutely weak person) is absorbed by and in his own suffering, as well as that person who in his present and current selfness (as sameness regarding one's own identity) and power thus looks from above down upon alien (i.e. another's or other people's) suffering, as if it could never concern him personally³⁰². This stance can be accompanied by an entire scale of feelings, emotions and sentiments, which range from condescension up to contempt and disdain (for allegedly deserved suffering). Accordingly, the co-existence of the always-the-same, constant and invariable formal (i.e. form-related) mechanism of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives with varying, in fact, opposed contents and positionings, is confirmed once more.

We must now make a giant leap in time, which, nevertheless, will not tear off or cut the threads of our setting of the question (and problem examination). The European reception of Aristotle in the 16th century and 17th century has, in fact, two different faces. The ontologist and metaphysician is regarded by the advocates and proponents of new ideas as the foster father of scholasticism, and hence as a persona non grata; on the contrary, the teaching of affects and emotions of the (i.e. Aristotle's) *Rhetoric*, is evaluated with or on the basis and in accordance with the needs of the new primacy of anthropology for the corresponding studies. The classic example of this ambiguous Aristotle-reception (i.e. reception of Aristotle) is none other (or: no less [[a thinker]]) than Hobbes, who in his own teaching and theory of men (i.e. humans) and their affects and emotions, appropriates the Aristotelian definition of pity³⁰³. This may appear to be strange, odd or peculiar, and indeed in view of the fact that Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian perception or view of the sociality of man (i.e. humans). But the explanations and observations of the Greek about pity could be reconciled (or harmonised) with the anthropological primacy of self-love

³⁰² *Rhetorik*, 1385b 19-23.

³⁰³ Vol. IV, *Human nature*, IX, 10: "imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity."

(egoism or amour-propre) by means of the thought or notion that the person pitying and being compassionate is basically thinking about himself and about himself alone, when he can only take an interest and sympathise with the suffering of another person only because of the fact that he must necessarily imagine his own analogous suffering. Hence, we understand why precisely La Rochefoucauld defines pity for the most part in an Aristotelian manner³⁰⁴. The rise of the Enlightenment philosophy of (the) sentiment(s) (emotion(s) and feeling(s)) shifted the examination of the problem in as much as the inclusion and incorporation of pity in the group of spontaneous natural sentiments (emotions and feelings) repelled and drove away its reflective structure from the focal point of theoretical attention. From now on, pity would be classified (or rated) ethically in accordance with a basic and fundamental anthropological decision³⁰⁵. Whoever considered men controlled by sentiments, feelings and emotions “egotistical” or “bad and evil”, could look at pity indeed as an “Impulse of Nature” amongst others (i.e. amongst other “Impulses of Nature”), but deny it every ethical relevance, since even a murderer at the sight of an infant, which will be eaten by a sow (i.e. an adult female pig), feels pity³⁰⁶. Presuming the natural goodness of man (i.e. humans), on the other hand, pity could be declared the foundation stone of ethics resting and being based on sentiment(s), feeling(s) and emotion(s). Still before Rousseau, the British opponents of the Hobbesian image and picture of man, mapped this path, who, of course, sought the direct counterweight to egotistical self-love (or amour-propre) in natural “benevolence”, yet, in the course of this, summoned pity too. Thus, for instance, can Hutcheson’s position³⁰⁷, but also Butler’s, be outlined or

³⁰⁴ *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 264: «La pitié est souvent un sentiment de nos propres maux dans les maux d’autrui. C’est une habile prévoyance des malheurs où nous pouvons tomber.» (= “Pity is often a sentiment or feeling of our own ills (troubles, difficulties, evils and wrongs done to us) in the ills (troubles, difficulties, evils and wrongs done in respect) of others. It is a clever (skilful, deft, shrewd or cunning) foresight of the troubles, ills or misfortunes where (i.e. upon which) we can fall.”)

³⁰⁵ Regarding the anthropological ambivalence of the Enlightenment philosophy of (the) sentiment(s), see Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, esp. p. 337ff..

³⁰⁶ Thus, Mandeville, *Fable*, pp. 91, 264ff..

³⁰⁷ *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, Sect. I = Selby-Bigge, I, pp. 393 ff., 398.

sketched. This (i.e. Butler) interestingly looks at “compassion” from the double point of view of altruistic spontaneity and self-referred reflectivity, and comes to the result (i.e. conclusion) that only the former (altruistic spontaneity) expresses “real sorrow and concern”, however, there can be no talk of that (“real sorrow and concern”) where the sight of alien (i.e. another’s) suffering brings about either contentment and satisfaction as regards our own happy, fortunate and felicitous state of affairs or else merely a reflection as regards one’s own human predisposition against (or sensitivity to) such suffering³⁰⁸.

“Compassion” constitutes the linguistic middle (or connecting) point between “pity” and “sympathie (i.e. sympathy)”. Before we study, in regard to the example of Hume’s texts, the ambivalence of the concept of sympathy, which carries the burden (or spreads the load) of the founding of ethics in respect of the philosophy of (the) sentiment(s) (feeling(s) and emotion(s)), whilst it at the same time does the groundwork and prepares the ground for insight into and the understanding of the – in principle – value-neutral character of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, we must record and make clear that the problem examination, settings of the question and discoveries of the Enlighteners (i.e. Enlightenment philosophers), contrary to a superficial impression³⁰⁹, did not advance and penetrate up to the decisive point of the theory of interaction (interaction theory) of our century [[i.e. the 20th century]]. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is here, namely, described one-sidedly from the point of view of the I (ego), that is, it remains – apart from and disregarding fleeting intimations – undiscussed that the Other likewise and simultaneously moves and is transferred into the position and situation of the I (ego), and that the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives of the I (ego) is influenced precisely through the knowledge about that, as well as the other

³⁰⁸ Sermon V: *Upon Compassion*, § 1 = *Works*, II, p. 81ff.. Cf. the polemic(s) against Hobbes loc. cit., Note I, p. 78ff..

³⁰⁹ See e.g. Shott, “Society, Self and Mind”.

way around. On the other hand, the older one-sided theory of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the newer theory of the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, grew and developed on the terrain of a common anthropological assumption, which, incidentally, has enabled and facilitated the transition from the former (older theory of ...) to the latter (newer theory of perspective-taking). Hume formulated this (anthropological) assumption emphatically: “the minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations”³¹⁰. They (i.e. men, people, humans) are also similar in that they all have at their disposal the capacity to be aware of the similarity amongst themselves. It is a matter here of the “imagination”, the force or powers of imagination which grants and affords every man a direct access to the feelings of other men, and to that which happens in (regard to) other men, on the basis of which can be concluded what we feel and perceive immediately and directly in us³¹¹. The similarity of the spirits as the presupposition of sympathy, says, though, nothing concrete about its essence. Similarity can, in fact, be apprehended both as the simultaneous predominance and prevalence of the same thoughts and feelings in all spirits and intellects, whereby sympathy must have an effect and operate as the direct and immediate transference of feelings and thoughts, as well as the in the sense of the availability, existence and presence of several predispositions, aptitudes and contents in all spirits and intellects, which enable every one of them (i.e. those predispositions, aptitudes and contents) amongst them, in relation to that, to apprehend the processes in every other person, irrespective of whether he is ruled, dominated, controlled and commanded by the same feelings and thoughts as the other person. Reflective recourse to the general and universal human reservoir at each and every respective point in question suffices then in order to manufacture,

³¹⁰ *Treatise*, III, 3, 1. Put another way: “the minds of all men are mirrors to one another” (II, 2, 5, cf. II, 1, 11). The direct connection of this thesis with the “principle of sympathy”: II, 2, 7 (beginning).

³¹¹ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9 (beginning); II, 2, 1 (end); II, 2, 7.

produce, make or restore the sympathetic relation towards another spirit(-intellect) with regard to (and in view of) each and every respective topical and relevant interrelation and or context. Hume oscillates between both these perceptions and views in accordance with the strength and intensity of his momentary interest in a founding of ethics pertaining to the philosophy of feeling(s) (emotion(s) and sentiment(s)). He sometimes equates and identifies sympathy with mutual contagion or transmission through and by means of emotions (i.e. with the reciprocal transmission of emotions), and in this “easy communication of sentiments” or “passions” he beholds and sees the medium of the instincts of herds (i.e. herd instincts), which have an effect and operate in the animal kingdom and likewise bear the human “desire of society”³¹². As (an) emotional contagion or transmission, sympathy is understandably “easy and agreeable” between “similar characters”, it explains the positive influence on the I (ego) by the feelings (emotions and sentiments) of the Other, it accompanies “liking” – and passes, turns, blends or merges into “compassion”³¹³. We come, consequently, to that – crucial for ethics – special case of emotional contagion or transmission, in which the I (ego) can be infected (i.e. tainted) by the suffering of the Other. In so far as it is in actual fact a contagion or transmission, alien (i.e. another (person’s)) suffering must necessarily be felt and perceived like one’s own suffering, it (i.e. another’s suffering) must, that is, set off and trigger feelings (emotions or sentiments) of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) which are akin to wrath, anger and hatred/hate (against the source of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance)). Why does the I (ego) suffer with the Other, instead of turning away from him (i.e. the Other), or (instead of) even hating him as the source of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance)? Hume indeed poses the question, however, since he knows that the fate and

³¹² Loc. cit., II, 2, 12; II, 2, 5.

³¹³ Loc. cit., II, 2, 4; III, 3, 2.

destiny of the ethics of pity depends on his answer, and he wants to avoid an open break with it (i.e. the ethics of pity) and, consequently, identification with the notorious Hobbes, thus he pulls himself out of (i.e. withdraws from) the admitted difficulty with a conceptual distinction. Only “weak sympathy”, which stands still and stops at (or with regard to) the first awkward, painful or nasty impression, gives rise to and causes feelings (sentiments and emotions) of aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) and of hate and hatred; “strong, stark” or “complete” sympathy (complete sympathy), on the other hand, can jump over (i.e. overcome) (or disregard and ignore) this impression, and be converted into pity and goodwill (pity and benevolence)³¹⁴. Thus, reads and is the founding of the ethics of pity through and by means of sympathy, and one can easily see why it (i.e. the said founding of the ethics of pity through sympathy) rests and is based on a *petitio principii*^{xcix}. Because the simultaneous increase in morally active pity and sympathy may be assumed only under the condition that both these psychical factors (in respect) of effect and impact (i.e. these psychical factors bearing an effect and having an impact) are somehow interrelated from the beginning. The suggested solution does not cancel, therefore, the aforementioned objection, especially since in regard to their premises it is unclear on what basis which criteria of weak and strong sympathy generally belong together, and may bear the same name [[i.e. of sympathy]]: which is the genus, whose species they both (i.e. both kinds/species of sympathy) are? If, in any case, this genus is supposed to or ought to continue being called “sympathy”, then it (i.e. sympathy) must behave and act neutrally (i.e. be neutral) towards pity and hatred/hate, which characterise both its (i.e. sympathy’s) species in terms of content^c.

In so far as Hume founds his ethics of pity on sympathy, he cannot accept that sympathy is something other than emotional contagion or transmission, and that

³¹⁴ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9.

it leads to something other than pity and goodwill or benevolence. It (i.e. sympathy) vouches for and guarantees the positive moral relation with or towards with-men (i.e. fellow humans), as long as it operates in a pure form and alone without the with-effect (i.e. synergy, co-operation or collaboration) “of another principle”³¹⁵. This principle is called “comparison”, and it is responsible for the fact that once imagination introduced us into the interior or inner realm of an alien, foreign or another’s spirit (and intellect), our own spirit and intellect cannot be infected by the alien, foreign or another’s (spirit and intellect) (or have something transmitted to it from the alien spirit), but on the contrary, takes on and adopts a reflective stance, and in the course of this, feels and perceives the opposite of that which makes up and constitutes the feeling and perception of the alien or another’s spirit and intellect: its (i.e. the alien spirit/intellect’s) joy is to it (i.e. our own spirit and intellect) a (kind of) suffering, and its suffering (to us, is) joy, because it suggests and urges the comparison of one’s own situation and position with the alien or another’s situation and position³¹⁶. Thus, in place of pity; malice, evilness, wickedness and schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) come into being, as soon as sympathy under the effect, impact and influence of the comparing, comparative principle is converted from a (kind of) emotional contagion or transmission into a reflective act. It is asked whether the conversion of the concept of sympathy is necessary, in order to account for the change or transformation of the positioning towards the Other, and, if it is not the case, which of both concepts of sympathy is best suited as the overall explanation of the conceivable positionings towards the Other. As we know, Hume did not succeed in asserting, affirming and maintaining the inner belonging together and co-existence of pity and sympathy without the help of the problematic distinction between weaker and stronger sympathy. Just as little can he conclusively prove that the coming apart and

³¹⁵ Loc. cit., III, 3, 6 (Anfang).

³¹⁶ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9 (Anfang).

disintegrating of pity and sympathy merely is and ought to be ascribed to the effect and impact of an external factor, namely, of the comparing and comparative act. This implies that this reflective act resides and inheres in every sympathetic process without exception, which, in other words, means that sympathy represents and constitutes in every concrete case the function of a social relation and itself in terms of content, that is, in accordance with the finding of a comparison which the I (ego) does and engages in between itself and the Other, it (i.e. sympathy) directs and aligns itself towards this social relation. The introduction of the reflective component into the sympathetic process becomes even more unavoidable, the more clearly we envisage, consider or contemplate the factor “social relation” and or “power relationship (relationship (in respect) of power)”. We recollect how Aristotle took it (i.e. the said factor of the “social relation” and or “power relationship”) into consideration in his description of pity, and indeed precisely because he assumed and granted (as given) reflectivity here.^{ci}

Let us now explain in greater detail why Hume, out of (i.e. for) objective reasons, cannot restrict and limit the reflective act of comparison exclusively to negative positionings of the I (ego) towards the Other, and how he – despite his philosophical intentions and premeditations pertaining to morality, morals and ethics – sketches, outlines or portrays a neutral concept(ual plan) in respect of sympathy next to the just explicated and expounded (one). It is first of all to be repeated that already the relation of exclusivity between sympathy as emotional contagion or transmission, and, pity is not in the least compelling. Pity constitutes merely a special case of such a contagion or transmission – assuming it comes about through it (the said contagion or transmission) at all. Hatred or hate can be another special case. It stands out and is really obvious with what decisiveness Hume renounces the traditional – also represented by the spectre of

(and the bogeyman) Hobbes – perception and view of pity³¹⁷, which rested and was based exactly on the assumption of a comparison of the I's (ego's) own situation and position with that of the person suffering, regardless of whether the comparison flowed into sympathy for or sharing in the said suffering, or into hubris. By overturning that perception and view, he (i.e. Hume) holds the comparing, comparative act (comparison) to be a force which breaks up (disintegrates and decomposes) pity. Comparison must in fact bring about and effect a reversal of the sentimental and emotional positioning which comes about through transmitting sympathy (i.e. sympathy which is contagious or is transmitted). This transmitting sympathy awakens and arouses in us, naturally, pleasure, joy (lust or desire) at the sight of alien (i.e. another's) pleasure etc., and suffering at the sight of alien (i.e. another's) suffering; comparison entails that a greater alien pleasure or joy (i.e. pleasure or joy of another person) causes one's own aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance), and greater alien suffering (i.e. suffering of another) causes one's own pleasure or joy etc.. It generally applies that every comparison calls forth and gives rise to the opposite feeling from that which an object or subject effects, induces and brings about directly and immediately, i.e. without the mediation and intercession of comparisons with other objects or subjects³¹⁸. Here Hume puts forward and establishes an untenable generalisation only because he wants to, in terms of theory, underpin, shore up and substantiate an ethically critical and touchy special case. He manufactures, produces or restores, that is, a necessary relation between comparison and reversal in order to e contrario conclude that sympathy as pity is the direct emotional contagion and transmission through and by means of alien (i.e. another's) suffering. The aforementioned generalisation might, in fact, structurally explain malice, evilness, wickedness and schadenfreude (i.e.

³¹⁷ Loc. cit., II, 2, 7 (“Those philosophers, who derive this passion [pity] from... our being liable to the same miseries we behold...”).

³¹⁸ Loc. cit., II, 2, 8; II, 2, 10.

malicious glee or joy, gloating) (in them (i.e. malice and schadenfreude), in actual fact, a reversal of alien (i.e. another's) suffering through and by way of comparison with one's own situation and position without suffering, does take place), after the fulfilment of the especial task pertaining to moral philosophy (or the philosophy of morality and ethics), for which it (i.e. the said generalisation) was conceived or conceptualised, (the said generalisation) does not, however, always prove to be apt, well-aimed or useful.^{cii} One does not get around and avoid the question or problem as to whether in the sympathetic identification and equating with alien (i.e. another's) suffering, comparisons can completely fail to materialise: whence (*or*: how) then should the I (ego) without a – and be it (i.e. without an at the very least) implicit – comparison know that it feels the same *as* the Other? Only as a result of a literal dissolution of the I (ego) in the Other, a comparison would here be superfluous. An example that is supposed to confirm, support, corroborate, reinforce or endorse Hume's thesis implies not merely the possibility of comparisons of situations without the reversal of feelings, sentiments or emotions, but it goes, rightly interpreted, a step beyond this implication, and says and means that such comparisons can take place even before the sympathetic equating and identification with the Other^{ciii}. Hume speaks of two merchants and traders, who as residents of the same city are competitors, but from afar co-operate, since their interests do not, because of nearness and proximity, come into conflict with each other. In both cases, the motivation is "concern for our interest", however, sympathy is present and exists in the case of co-operation, since the pleasure, joy (lust or desire) and aversion and displeasure (listlessness and reluctance) of the partners simultaneously decreases and increases; on the other hand, in the case of competition, the pleasure and joy of the one side entails the aversion and displeasure of the other side, as well as conversely³¹⁹. What can we learn from

³¹⁹ Loc. cit., II, 2, 9.

that? That sympathy did not bring to life partnership in the sense of an emotional contagion and transmission, but the other way around: from the comparison of one's own situation and position with the situation and position of each and every respective other situation and position, both sides came to the conclusion that the partnership lies and is in the interests of and on both sides. And one must accept that a sympathy, which comes into being on the basis of a comparison, is kept up and maintained through and by means of constant (tacit or silent) similar comparisons in the course of the co-operative relation.

We come, consequently, to the already broached theme, topic or subject of reflexivity in its interrelation with the factor "social relation". As mentioned, Hume believed and opined that the reversal of feelings, sentiments and emotions takes place under the impression of the ascertainment that alien (i.e. another's) pleasure and joy, or, alien (i.e. another's) suffering is greater than the pleasure and joy or that suffering of one's own. Only a superficial consideration or way of looking at things would, nonetheless, comprehend this process quantitatively. It cannot here be a matter of the comparison between the exactly measured own and alien (i.e. another's) feelings, sentiments and emotions, which would be weighed up, balanced or carefully considered against one another in isolation and irrespective of their bearers on each and every respective occasion. Entirely on the contrary, the quantitative comparison of feelings (sentiments and emotions) ("greater" pleasure and joy, "greater" suffering) says and means something about the situation and position of two subjects in their reference towards each other, it sketches a social relation or a power relationship (relationship of power). The parameter "social relation" puts, for its part, the act of comparison on a multi-dimensional basis, and provides for the great variety of its possible outcomes, so that the simple automatic procedure or mechanism of reversal can no longer function under the pressure of complexity. Hume himself speaks of comparisons, which do not concern

feelings (sentiments and emotions), but qualities, and by stressing that these qualities are judged or are compared with one another always in their reference (or relation) to concrete subjects, he lets the social relations standing behind these said qualities shimmer and come through. Pride or humiliation awaken and stir up, in fact, not by objects and qualities in themselves, but only the comparison with that which other subjects possess, awakens (it) or stirs it (i.e. pride or humiliation) up³²⁰. The spectrum of the social relation is, though, in Hume – as [[was]] usual and common in the 18th century – attributed to the language of the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses. To the I (ego), which is compared with other (subjects or I's (egos)), pride and humiliation are related; to the Other, the love or hate/hatred of the I (ego) is related³²¹. As one sees, it is a matter of intersubjective positionings in regard to these basic and fundamental feelings (sentiments and emotions). If one now visualises and makes clear to oneself the possible combinations of these basic and fundamental feelings (emotions and sentiments), and moreover, incorporates in this combination or combinatory game (i.e. game of combinations), the many conceivable correlations of persons and properties, qualities and characteristics, both with regard to the I (ego), and also to the Other, then, in practice, already the whole and entire spectrum of the social relation spreads and stretches out, unfolds and extends before our very eyes. Inside its (i.e. sympathy's) great variety and multiformity, and on the basis of the great variety and multiformity of the psychical acts, which the encounters in it (i.e. such great variety of sympathy) demand, sympathy would soon lose the ubiquity which Hume ascribes to it, if it were merely that emotional contagion or transition, out of whose potency, strength and power, pity draws, allegedly, its (i.e. pity's) ethical force and strength. Said otherwise and put differently, in the great variety and multiformity of intersubjective relations and psychical acts, sympathy can

³²⁰ Loc. cit., II, 1, 2; II, 1, 6.

³²¹ Loc. cit., II, 2, 1.

develop all over and everywhere only under the precondition and prerequisite of its reflectivity and value neutrality. What in the ethical context was emotional identification with the person suffering, becomes now the reflective putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the alien spirit (*or*: another's intellect(-spirit)), irrespective of what its content is, and how the I (ego) places itself in relation to that (alien, foreign or another's spirit(-intellect)). Identification with the Other converts itself, therefore, from a strong and stark emotion to a cool reflection, and furthermore, it concerns from now on only each and every respective content, not necessarily the positioning connected with this content on each and every respective occasion.

Not coincidentally, Hume formulates this alternative concept(ual plan) of sympathy precisely in the chapters of his book in which he, with the help of conceptuality pertaining to the anthropology of drives, urges and impulses, draws up and sets out an elementary inventory of intersubjective relations, and in the course of this, touches upon the central question and problem of recognition. Do others hold us in contempt and disdain and scorn us, or do they share with us our self-understanding? We experience and learn that, in both cases, through and by means and by way of the mechanism of sympathy; in the former case, discomfort and discontent (uneasiness) follows, of course, the sympathetic act, in the latter case, satisfaction (follows, of course, the sympathetic act). Sympathy means, therefore, here, merely the understanding of an alien or another's positioning, no matter what content it has, and no matter how the positioning of the I (ego) towards the positioning of the Other vis-à-vis the I (ego) will be (*or*: turns out). Sympathy *must* be value-neutral, when a subject, which knows itself uniformly (i.e. which knows it is a united entity), is supposed to move and transfer itself into different content(s) without every time having to forget itself or be split. Both are impossible. Shortly before his staying and lingering at or in both extreme cases of intersubjective recognition, Hume

had in actual fact described the sympathetic (cap)ability of man in such a way that the difference between the in itself neutral understanding and fathoming of alien or another's thoughts or feelings (sentiments and emotions) and his own stances in relation to that, had emerged and become clear: "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, but in itself and its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, *however different from, or even contrary to our own*. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition". The temperament of the I (ego) and the I's (ego's) own disposition do not essentially influence the *construction* of the contents, which the I (ego) takes up regarding communication with other people. Nonetheless, these clear statements or propositions fall (i.e. are made), as it were, casually and in passing, and do not at all serve as the foundation for systematic explanations³²². In the same context, Hume underlines, especially, in fact, the similarity of the nature of all humans, and over and above that, the similarity of their customs, conventions, morals, mores and characters as a factor which considerably simplifies the act of sympathy; the unifying and homogenising (element) continues to concern him more than the distancing element. Not the clear philosophical intent and purpose, but the inner logic of his setting of the question or problem examination, drives him (i.e. Hume) to the form-related (i.e. formal)-neutral concept of sympathy^{323 + civ}.

This circumstance is explained, of course, above all through his (i.e. Hume's) already stressed (i.e. underlined and emphasised) ethical concerns and worries, however, his view of the I (ego) as a "bundle, cluster, package or collection of various perceptions" has a reinforcing (intensifying and amplifying) effect too.

³²² That is why one transfers (i.e. conveys) a very one-sided impression of Hume's ambivalent overall position, if one only cites this, see e.g. Hamburger, *Mitleid*, p. 111 ff..

³²³ The analysis of this paragraph rests and is based upon the *Treatise*, II, 1, 11. The italicisation in the citation stems from me.

Such a fluid I (ego) naturally tends, in relation to that, to be assimilated with (i.e. into) its (sensorial) perceptions or to give itself up to them sympathetically (i.e. with sympathy), if, especially, alien, foreign and another's or others' feelings (sentiments and emotions) are perceived. Thus seen, the lacking (or lack of) ((in the) exerting of) influence of the I (ego) on its perceptions constitutes not the consequence of its – resting and based on potency, strength and power – (cap)ability at distancing, but on the contrary, the result of its weakness, of its ontological characterlessness (i.e. lack of character)³²⁴. Hume does not worry at all about the difficulties in reconciling this I (ego)-theory (or theory of the I (ego)) with the formidable, mighty, enormous and ubiquitous presence of self-love (i.e. amour-propre and egoism as vanity and self-importance), which he constantly emphasises. Widely understood self-love creates, through and by means of its strategic calculations, that distance between the psychical contents of the I (ego) and the alien or another's psychical contents, which founds form-related (i.e. formal)-neutral sympathy. Did not exactly the discussion of the intersubjective question and problem of recognition bring Hume the nearest to this concept(ual plan) of sympathy? Furthermore, to self-love (or amour-propre) belongs the unceasing comparison between the self and another person; the comparing, however, for its part, likewise, points to the same concept(ual plan) of sympathy. Hume himself calls an ethically inspired contradistinction between sympathy and comparing into question when he (re)assures [[us]] or affirms that comparing is “an *original* quality of the soul”³²⁵, and equally encompasses the comparing (or comparison) of objects or properties, qualities and characteristics as that comparing of persons with one another – we, in fact, tend to compare “at every moment” in

³²⁴ Thus, must, for instance, the sentence: “in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves” be read, and not as evidence of the distance of the I (ego), as Hamburger thinks and opines in ignorance of the context (*Mitleid*, p. 111). To (and after) this sentence, incidentally, the remark: “Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing”, attaches and follows. (II, 2, 2).

³²⁵ Loc. cit., II, 2, 8 (Hume's italics and emphasis!).

relation to that, ourselves with other people³²⁶. Reflective acts, which can implausibly appear to be a perception of sympathy as emotional contagion or transmission (i.e. it is implausible that reflective acts can appear to be a view of sympathy as emotional contagion or transmission), are acted out and take place, however, also at a level which lies deeper than that of comparison. We may call it (i.e. the said level) the level of the constitution of sympathy, and its description occurs with the help of the fundamental concepts of the Humean theory of knowledge, i.e. of “ideas” and “impressions”. Cognitively looked at, sympathy consists in a transition from ideas to impressions, it is, in this respect, “exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding”. As Hume says, in the sympathetic act, first of all, alien (i.e. another’s) feelings (sentiments and emotions) and passions appear in our spirit(-intellect) as mere ideas “and are conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact”. The idea is completely and perfectly objectively and neutrally registered and recorded as alien, foreign and strange. Only the ensuing conversion of ideas into impressions can make the I (ego) sympathise with the other person in an affective and emotional sense. Noteworthy (or remarkable), however, is the founding of this conversion. It “arises from the relation of the objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us”³²⁷. The spectral and flowing, fluid I (ego), which lives off/on/from its (sensorial) perceptions and gives in to them (the said perceptions) all the more spontaneously, here makes a place (i.e. makes way) for an I (ego) which is constantly present in the spirit(-intellect). The self-reference (i.e. reference to the self) of the I (ego) facilitates and makes possible the reference of the I (ego) to external given (actual) facts and the – on the basis of this (obviously reflective-selective) reference – conversion of ideas

³²⁶ Loc. cit., II, 1, 6. Cf. III, 3, 2: “no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves”. The pastoral [[dimension or aspect]] gains the upper hand anew when Hume, contrary to such anthropological statements teaches that the rational and reasonable man is satisfied with himself, and only the fool needs comparisons in order to confirm (and validate) himself (III, 3, 2).

³²⁷ The analysis rests and is based on II, 1, 11.

into impressions occurring and taking place. But ideas must already be there (present and existent) beforehand – even before a possible or potential emotional contagion or transmission.

In the construction of sympathy – always (with)in the framework of Hume’s information, description and statements – still further authorities of reflective mediation can be incorporated; for instance, the force or powers of imagination and representation, or the necessary precursory interpretation of alien (i.e. another person’s or other persons’) behaviour³²⁸. All these materials for a form-related (i.e. formal) theory of sympathy remain, nevertheless, in Hume, scattered and unevaluated. Ethical concern, care and worry preponderate, and it (the said ethical concern) is taken into account by two different concepts of sympathy, which embroil and entangle the philosopher^{cv} into two structurally different contradictions. The precarious distinction between weaker and stronger sympathy was supposed to explain unmediated (i.e. direct and immediate) sympathy with the suffering Other, and stood/was in contradiction with the approaches towards the formal (i.e. form-related) concept of sympathy. Hume, however, also introduces or imports a second ethically meant concept of sympathy, this time, of course, with the opposite and opposed intent(ion): irrespective of the general ethical duties and the common (general) good, a psychological-anthropological support or prop is supposed to be created by concrete pity. This “disinterested sympathy” wipes or casts off (and gets rid of) every unmediatedness (i.e. directness or immediacy) and inconsistently moves into nearness and proximity to Reason as force, strength, which can successfully oppose the stirrings, motions, impulses and movements of feeling (sentiment and emotion) and of self-interest. This does not have to here be pursued in

³²⁸ “No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes and effects. From *these* we infer the passion: And consequently *these* give rise to our sympathy.” (Loc. cit., III, 3, 1; Hume’s italics and emphasis).

greater detail³²⁹. In any case, Hume does not succeed and manage in (providing) compelling proof that “extensive Sympathie” is something more, or has more of an effect, and is something other than enlightened self-love (or amour-propre). The intensive and dense, thick sympathy of pity, with difficulty, rhymes (i.e. matches) with the extensive and thin, slim or scant sympathy of moral judgements, and in addition, neither of both (kinds of sympathy) is in itself logically or psychologically sound or conclusive.

Adam Smith can avoid the back and forth, to and fro between the ethically stamped, shaped or moulded, and the value-neutral, concept of sympathy just as little as Hume, however, regarding and concerning the latter value-neutral concept, he goes a few steps further than Hume, and contemplates its reflective structure. He finds that the sympathetic act, as Hume describes it, reminds [[one]] of a rather “well-contrived machine”, and regarding that, he (i.e. A. Smith) wants to develop a concept of sympathy through which “we enter into the motives of the agent” and, at the same time, can share the feelings (sentiments and emotions) which are touched or affected by alien (i.e. another’s or others’) act(ion)s or kinds of acting³³⁰. He in principle uncouples or disconnects sympathy from “pity and compassion”, irrespective of historical and etymological affinities, in order, with that, to describe “our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever”³³¹. A further important conceptual clarification concerns the difference between the sympathising with alien (another’s or others’) feelings (emotions or sentiments), which we approve and endorse, and sympathy as the possibility of moving and transferring ourselves (in)to the situation and position of someone whose feelings (sentiments or emotions) we

³²⁹ See in relation to that, Kondylis, *Aufklärung*, p. 499ff. [[translator’s addition: issues of morality and justice, inter alia, are addressed by Hume, with the former being natural and giving the latter (as artificial, but not independent of morality), and with relativism being avoided in favour of the common good, etc.]]. Cf. Mercer, *Sympathy and Ethics*, p. 66ff..

³³⁰ *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, VII, 3, 3, § 17.

³³¹ Loc. cit., I, 1, 1, § 5.

do not want to share³³². That is why the intellectual reconstruction of the situation and position in which the Other finds himself, on the part of the I (ego), and the putting of it (i.e. this I (ego)) into the situation and position of the Other through and by way of imagination is decisive for the sympathetic act. Regarding that, Smith as the first [[to do so,]] uses— as far as I can see – today’s current expression, and the fact that he varies it many times³³³, proves his consciousness of the meaning and significance and importance of this situation and fact(s) of the case. As the reconstruction of an alien (foreign or another’s) situation and position in imagination, the sympathy of the I (ego) can never attain or reach and achieve the intensity of feeling (emotion and sentiment) which the other person precisely lives through and experiences. The sympathising I (ego) knows at all times that it is a matter here of something which is acted out and takes place in an alien (i.e. another person’s) psyche, and even the meeting of the psyches by means of the imaginative exchange of the situation (or: the imaginative exchange of situations) lasts merely a moment³³⁴. Already for that reason, sympathy does not have anything to do with an emotional contagion or transmission. But also because it (i.e. sympathy) actually comes into being not so much from the sight or view of alien (or another’s) feelings (sentiments or emotions), but rather thanks to the situation which these feelings (sentiments or emotions) give rise to and create³³⁵. Only the apprehension of the situation can fully understand the motives and the reaction of the Other; the putting oneself in(to) the situation and position of the Other means, therefore, both its inner/internal as well as the Other’s outer/external situation and position. The reflection of the person sympathising must move at several levels simultaneously, before it (i.e. the said reflection of

³³² Loc. cit., I, 1, 3, § 1.

³³³ “By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation”, “by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the same situation”, “what would be our own [way], if we were in his case” (I, 1, 1, §2); “by changing places in fancy” (I, 1, 1, §3); “by bringing the case home to myself” (I, 1, 1, §4). Similar formulations [[are]] in III, 1, §§2, 6. Cf. VII, 3, 1, §4: “an imaginary change of situations” etc..

³³⁴ Loc. cit., I, 1, 4, §7; VII, 3, 1, §4.

³³⁵ Loc. cit., I, 1, 1, § 10.

the person sympathising) can reach and attain a somewhat (well-)rounded (or: all-round and comprehensive) image and picture of that which precisely represents and constitutes its object.

Smith now makes use of two means in order to incorporate into his conceptual plan of sympathy his ethical positions, and through that, procure for them (i.e. Smith's ethical positions), anthropological rank (status, authority, prestige, repute or dignity). On the one hand, he makes as far as possible the extent, range, scope and depth of the sympathetic act dependent on the nature of all respective feelings (sentiments and emotions) in question, so that "true" sympathy finally applies to feelings (sentiments, emotions) and positionings which seem to be conducive and beneficial for morality, morals, ethics and good customs, conventions and mores. Feelings (sentiments and emotions) would be considered decent and proper, or indecent and improper, precisely to the extent that mankind (humanity) would feel inclined to sympathise with them. We feel, asserts Smith, most likely, sympathy for feelings (sentiments and emotions) which cause and give pleasure and joy to the Other himself, however, such are precisely those feelings which lead men to one another and do not bring them away from one another (i.e. which unite people and do not separate people); sympathy with asocial or unsocial feelings runs and bumps into the greatest inner inhibitions³³⁶. Disregarding the mere assertoric identification of pleasant (enjoyable and agreeable) feelings (sentiments and emotions) with socially beneficial (feelings, sentiments and emotions), Smith does not directly explain how the privileged relation of sympathy towards exactly these feelings (sentiments and emotions) can be reconciled with his own thesis that sympathy would be (or is) distinguished from approval, approbation or endorsement, [[given]] that the latter (approval) is always pleasant and agreeable, the former (sympathy), however, is both pleasant and agreeable, as well as unpleasant and

³³⁶ Loc. cit., I, 1, Introduction; VI, 3, §§ 14-16; I, 2, 3.

disagreeable, in accordance with the nature of its object, just as with his observation that our sympathy (as condolence or empathy) with or towards alien (i.e. another's) suffering would not stand in the way of [[us sympathising with (or sharing in)]] its unpleasant and disagreeable character³³⁷. Smith's indirect response or answer to this aporia (doubt, contradiction or paradox) is a new selective handling and treatment of concepts: the predicate of the unpleasant and disagreeable with regard to sympathy is reserved exclusively and solely for the unmoral (i.e. immoral or amoral). Apart from that and otherwise, humanity consists in sympathising not only with the joys, and in general, the interests, but also with the suffering of other people³³⁸. Presupposing the moral positioning of all sides, sympathy may, consequently, be moved into or within nearness (i.e. proximity) of emotional contagion or transmission. And in its ethically stamped, moulded and shaped determination or definition, it (i.e. sympathy) becomes one-sided and now has a counter-concept, for an inappropriate and unsuitable behaviour, namely, sympathy is completely lacking and missing, and in(to) its (i.e. sympathy's) place steps (or goes) antipathy³³⁹. – On the other hand, Smith asserts precisely the reflective character of the sympathetic act, in order to derive or deduce (infer) from that a kind of collective ethical Reason; here he (i.e. Smith) stands (i.e. is) much nearer and closer to Mead. By moving and transferring the I (ego) (in)to the situation and position of the Other, it (i.e. the said I (ego)) learns of and experiences what for it is pleasant and agreeable and good, and it (i.e. the said I (ego)) acts accordingly. The Others do the same with regard to the I (ego), and the overall result is the dominance of virtue in social life, since the main feature of virtue consists exactly therein, to earn or deserve the love of other people and recompense on the part of society. The I (ego) judges, therefore, other people on the basis of the same measures, criteria,

³³⁷ Loc. cit., I, 3, 1, § 9, Note; II, 1, 2, § 5.

³³⁸ Loc. cit., IV, 2.

³³⁹ Loc. cit., II, 1, 5, § 4.

yardsticks and benchmarks as other people judge the I (ego); these collective yardsticks etc. make up and constitute the basis of the ethical, and are represented by an ideal “impartial spectator”, who, as it were, as the harbinger (precursor, forerunner or herald) of the generalised Other watches over and supervises the effect and impact in foro interno (i.e. in the inner court (of justice and conscience)). Because the reflective structure of sympathy becomes internalised in the form that the I (ego), as it were, is split into two persons, one of which, the observer, is moved and transferred into the situation and position of other people, [[i.e.]] of actors, and their act(ion)s are judged in accordance with the (afore)mentioned yardsticks³⁴⁰. Whereas sympathy and ethics in the argumentation analysed beforehand were connected through and by the exclusive receptiveness of the former (sympathy) as regards certain content(s), Smith now builds an entirely different bridge between sympathy and ethics. The concept of sympathy remains in principle formal, and just as formal are the attributes of ethics, which it (i.e. the said concept of sympathy) is supposed to found. But the orientation of the I (ego) to that which is supposed to be pleasant, agreeable and dear, also applies to the member of a band of thieves or (burglary/robber) gang, and cannot in itself found and establish any material distinction between good and bad/evil.

In the ambivalences which adhere to the concept(ual plan) of sympathy in Hume or A. Smith, different aspects of its (i.e. the said concept(ual plan) of sympathy's) manifold usage in the 18th century appear, which are combined on each and every respective occasion with one another in a different manner. An interesting variant of this game of combination(s) (or combinatory game) is found in Hartley^{cvi}. He indeed hardly discusses the form-related (i.e. formal) mechanism of sympathy (and it can in actual fact be seen and appreciated with difficulty how his (i.e. Hartley's) mechanical theory of association would have

³⁴⁰ The analysis rests and is based on III, 1.

been able to make that mechanism entirely understandable), however, he tacitly builds upon Hume's conceptuality and points to the function of the "imagination", yet above all he notices and calls our attention to "comparison", which can be explained as positive or negative association. If Hume through the act of comparison wants to demarcate and delimit *schadenfreude* (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating) and malice, wickedness against the unmediatedness (i.e. directness or immediacy) of pity, then Hartley gains his concept of sympathy through a dilation and expansion of the act of comparison to all sympathetic acts. He can, consequently, ditch and abandon the assumption of a spontaneous and at the same time positive sympathy, and comprehends, instead of that, sympathy in general, and in all cases, as the unity of understanding and opinion or statement [[in relation to all cases]]; it is a matter here, therefore, of all "possible ways in which the happiness or misery of one [[person]] can be combined with the happiness or misery of another [[person]]"³⁴¹. The form-related (i.e. formal) character of the act of sympathy results indirectly from the fact that understanding can be accompanied by both positive as well as by negative "pleasing and tormenting, moral and immoral"³⁴² opinions or statements, and although Hartley condemns the immoral or inimical (opinions or statements) amongst them (i.e. all positive and negative opinions and statements), nonetheless, his systematisation encompasses all four possible classes of "sympathetic affections". We are glad about alien (another's or others') luck and happiness, and we suffer under (i.e. as regards) alien (another's or others') suffering, or else, we are glad about alien (another's or others') suffering and we suffer under (i.e. as regards) alien (another's or others') luck and happiness. In both the former cases, sociality, good will, benevolence, and, pity are present; in both the latter cases, the opposite of that

³⁴¹ *Observations on Man*, I, p. 471.

³⁴² Loc. cit., I, p. 482.

(is present), namely, malice, malevolence, revenge, vengeance, envy, jealousy, cruelty, competition, rivalry etc.³⁴³.

The most important contributions of the 20th century to the theory of sympathy and of pity (Sympathie- und Mitleidstheorie) can structurally without [[much]] difficulty be apprehended on the basis of the thus reconstructed discussion of the 18th century, as differently as the basic or fundamental motives may also be nuanced. In Scheler, the in principle separation of the understanding and of the emotional aspect in the act of sympathy (im Sympathieakt) from each other, stands or is in contradiction to the attempt to think of love and sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) together, which again for its part, comes to a standstill at half way (i.e. at the half-way stage or mark, and thus is incomplete). The “component of understanding”, also called “after-feeling or post hoc feeling” and “after-living or post hoc life”, according to Scheler, captures and includes the facts (of the matter) of alien (i.e. another’s or others’) feeling (sentiment or emotion), and of the – belonging to that – “value behaviour or behaviour or conduct as regards values”, whereas sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) represents and constitutes a “reaction” of the I (ego) to the apprehension of this state of these facts of the matter, i.e. “in coming up to join” the already understood alien experiences (i.e. experiences of another person or of others). After-feeling or post hoc feeling is therefore no “morally and ethically relevant act”, and can be accompanied not merely by indifference, but also by (acts of) cruelty (and atrocities), since the cruel person patently feels pleasure (joy or lust) only when he can feel post hoc or afterwards alien (i.e. another’s or others) suffering^{344 + cvii}. The “sharp, acute or hard” separation between after-feeling or post-hoc feeling, and, sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) should, nonetheless, not at all mean or signify

³⁴³ Loc. cit., I, p. 471 ff..

³⁴⁴ *Wesen und Formen*, pp. 19, 20, 24ff..

that reflectivity and ethical neutrality are restricted or limited only to the former (after-feeling or post-hoc feeling). Sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) is neither unmediated (i.e. immediate and direct) sympathy (as compassion or commiseration), in which two people, driven (propelled, forced, prompted or goaded) by the same external cause, feel the same, nor mere contagion or transmission of feeling (sentiment or emotion), nor the setting up, establishment or institution of one's own I (ego) with an alien (i.e. another's) I (ego). It is rather with-joy (i.e. feeling joy and delight along with another or others) or pity, and exactly because of that, it excludes, just like after-feeling or post hoc feeling, real identification with the Other. Because "pitying is suffering in (regard to) the suffering of another (person), as this other (person)"; in understanding we experience what is being understood "in no manner really (i.e. in no way which is real)", and that is why no imitation or copying and no contagion or transmission of alien (i.e. another's or others') affects and emotions takes place³⁴⁵. Scheler distinguishes, moreover, between "mere sympathising or commiserating", which is basically identical with "after-feeling or post hoc feeling" or the "act of understanding" and is in itself "value-blind, i.e. blind to values", and, actual, real sympathy (as compassion or commiseration), which he calls "positive-valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value", which he contradistinguishes to "negative-valent, i.e. having a negative valency or value" (sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)). Through this contradistinction, he (i.e. Scheler) wants to take into account the fact that the act of understanding also precedes and comes before such feelings (emotions or sentiments) which "represent and constitute the precise opposite of actual, real sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)", like, for instance, (acts of) cruelty (and atrocities), envy, jealousy or schadenfreude (i.e. malicious glee or joy, gloating). The "ambiguity and equivocalness rich and replete with

³⁴⁵ Loc. cit., pp. 22, 23, 44, 48.

(regard to) fate and destiny” in the concept of sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) come into being from the fact that on (i.e. after) the in itself value-free acts of understanding, both “positive-(valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value)” as well as “negative-valent, i.e. having a negative valency or value” positionings or stances can follow, i.e. ensue. Here, Scheler considers and contemplates the same four “classes” as Hartley: “there is a rejoicing, being happy, glad and pleased in (regard to) alien (i.e. another’s or others’) joy, pleasure, happiness and delight”; and a suffering in (regard to) this joy, pleasure etc.; a suffering in (regard to) alien (i.e. another’s or others’) suffering; and a rejoicing, being happy, glad and pleased in (regard to) alien (i.e. another’s or others’) suffering”, and he ascribes the attribute of the positive-valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value, or actual and real sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) to the first members of these (pairs of (the)) opposite(s)³⁴⁶. The dominant language usage indeed already commands and demands this^{cviii}, but the philosopher^{cix} wants to go beyond that and recognise and acknowledge in “genuine, real, true, veritable sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)”, an intensity which leaves the structure of reflectivity behind. The “psychology of the Enlightenment”, opines Scheler, who explained behaviour by means and by way of egotistical motives, had to assume and accept that sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) is mediated by the thought or consideration: “yet how would it be if it came out (i.e. happened) to me thus (i.e. in the same way)?” The “founding” of sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) by love, however, makes out of it (i.e. sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)) an “unmediated (i.e. immediate and direct) direction as to feeling, sentiment and emotion towards the other (person) as another (person)”, therefore, it puts aside thoughts, considerations and mediations, intercessions or interventions. Love is a spontaneous act, differing and varying from sympathising or commiserating in

³⁴⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 17ff., 139-141.

the sense of “taking in, absorbing, assimilating, taking up, entering into or incorporating”, and, despite that, [[is]] determinative for the measure, extent, degree and depth of sympathising or commiserating. After this explanation of genuine, real, true, veritable sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) by means and by way of love, it is odd and strange that Scheler assures [[us]] that we would also sympathise or commiserate with people whom we did not love³⁴⁷ – unless he does not mean here the spontaneously loving person, but indeed the positive-valent, i.e. having a positive valency or value, yet still always reflective sympathy (as compassion or commiseration). His terminology varies, fluctuates and vacillates, and accordingly, the attribute of genuine, true, veritable or real and actual sympathy (as compassion or commiseration) is ascribed, at times, to the former (spontaneous love and being happy for someone who is happy), or to the latter (reflective love and suffering for those who are suffering). And this, lends, finally, to sympathy (as compassion or commiseration), in general, an ethical colouring, tint or hue, which differs from the mere act of understanding.^{cx}

The philosophical and social-psychological terminology oscillated, and swung, and fluctuated, in general, between the identification (as equating) of “sympathy” and value-free “understanding” as regards each other, and the use of “sympathy” for the description of value-laden and judgemental positionings and stances which follow the act of understanding. In this latter case, again, to and in the area and realm of “sympathy”, either the entire spectrum of affective (emotional and sentimental) positionings and stances, or else only its (i.e. the said spectrum’s) positive half, was attributed and classed, and then the negative half of the spectrum was called “antipathy”. It must, though, be emphasised that terminological distinctions by no means here have to mean objective varieties, dissimilarities and differences of opinion, and that often, despite the opposite

³⁴⁷ Loc. cit., pp. 50ff., 146ff..

use of terms, the same view or perspective is, as matter of fact, being supported and represented. Several examples are able to clarify and elucidate this. As we know, Husserl, despite occasional reservations, spoke of empathy (or insight) in order to name the I's (ego's) putting oneself in [[the position and situation of]] (and or empathising with) the Other, regardless of value-laden and judgemental positionings and stances. "Sympathy" was to him (i.e. Husserl), on the other hand (or compared to this), "the real, actual domain of the concepts [[of]] love and hate/hatred", that is, the domain of "value", which the I (ego), of course, can enter (into) only after it (i.e. the I (ego)) through empathy (or insight) manages and achieves "the putting" into the [[position and situation of]] the Other^{348 + cxi}. Litt^{cxi} especially related "sympathy" to the widely grasped [[notion of]] love, and "antipathy" to the widely grasped [[notion of]] hate/hatred, and distinguished both ("sympathy" and "antipathy") from understanding through and by means of the observation that this understanding is dependent neither exclusively on love, nor on hate/hatred, or else, the person hating, just as much as the person loving, can come to the understanding of the Other, but obviously not because he hates or loves, but irrespective of whether, and (the fact) that, he hates or loves³⁴⁹. Where "sympathy" has "antipathy" as its counter-concept, we find ourselves nearest and closest to the common and familiar language use. One then imagines the process as follows: the I (ego) tries to think and to feel what the Other thinks or feels, and when it (i.e. the I (ego)) suspects or ascertains that a commonality or common ground in the thinking and feeling [[of both the I (ego) and the Other]] is present, then it (i.e. the I (ego)) develops sympathy for the Other, otherwise antipathy arises. Pseudo-sympathies and pseudo-antipathies come into being when the I (ego) projects its own feelings (sentiments or emotions) into the Other or misunderstands it (i.e. the Other) in the negative sense. In any case, the I (ego)

³⁴⁸ *Zur Phänom. d. Intersubj.*, II, Beilage XXIV = *Hu*, XIV, pp. 191, 186. Cf. footnote 169, above.

³⁴⁹ *Individuum*, p. 192ff..

does not get around real or imagined understanding as the presupposition of sympathy and antipathy³⁵⁰.

If “sympathy” and “pity” in principle are distinguished from each other, as a rule, “sympathy” means and signifies as much as value-neutral understanding. Thus, for instance, in (regard to) Cooley: “Sympathy is not compassion, it denotes the sharing of any mental state that can be communicated”³⁵¹. From that follows that sympathy does not have to be connected with any particular feeling (sentiment or emotion), it can, thus, be “hostile as well as friendly”. Cooley uses, by the way, the expression “hostile sympathy” in order to describe a relation in which the I (ego) understands very well what the Other means when it (i.e. the Other) in reference to something says “mine”, which the I (ego) also looks at as “mine”³⁵². Where the value-neutral character of sympathy is extracted or derived through its demarcation and delimitation against and from pity, there we may talk of a continuation of the debate of the 18th century. Incidentally, reference to it (the said debate of the 18th century) often takes place expressly, and some noteworthy attempts to bring and work out the reflective components of sympathy and pity have drawn from a direct confrontation with Hume. Thus Mercer writes that the concept(ual plan) of “cognitive sympathy (as compassion or commiseration)” (cognitive fellow-feeling) is for the concept(ual plan) of sympathy, fundamental. In such sympathy (as compassion or commiseration, or as fellow-feeling) – totally different than in [[the case of]] an emotional contagion or transmission – an intellectual(-spiritual) exercise, in which both self-consciousness, as well as the imagination of the I (ego), takes part and is involved, and whose form-related (i.e. formal) character is compatible and goes together with feelings (sentiments and emotions) of hate/hatred, as well as with (feelings (sentiments and emotions)) of love.

³⁵⁰ See e.g. Bryant, “Antipathy and Sympathy”, pp. 366, 365.

³⁵¹ *Human Nature*, p. 136.

³⁵² Loc. cit., pp. 158, 192.

Sympathy (Sympathie) accordingly has very little to do with pity; pity can, in fact, express hardly veiled, disguised contempt, disdain or scorn³⁵³.

Hamburger^{cxiii} emphatically pointed to such pejorative attributes of pity in order to make clear the “distance structure (or structures in respect of distance)” of pity. But her main argument, however, derives from the “objectivity of sympathy”, namely, from the possibility of a value-neutral understanding, which must likewise underlie pity (*or*: take pity as its basis). Pity remains, in this respect, alien-understanding (i.e. understanding of the foreigner, stranger or of another (person or other people)) as the I (ego) pities because it does not itself suffer, because it, therefore, indeed knows about alien suffering (i.e. the suffering of another person or other people), but it cannot feel this same suffering originally [[i.e. as the person suffering feels his suffering]]³⁵⁴.

The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives or “role-taking” is sometimes characterised in the Anglo-Saxon literature by the term “empathy”, which sounds more value-neutral than “sympathy”, although it is not always used value-neutrally³⁵⁵. Empathy demonstrates its objectivity when it – apart from the subjective element or factor which the actor brings into a situation – apprehends the features, characteristics or attributes of the situation, and consequently makes its real, actual object (or subject matter), the interaction (or mutual influence) of the actor and the situation³⁵⁶. The main emphases are distributed somewhat differently when empathy is defined in the psycho-analytical context as vicarious and representative self-observation (vicarious introspection). If self-observation and introspection, as Freud taught, is the first duty and best school of the psycho-analyst, then it is patently obvious that the

³⁵³ *Sympathy*, pp. 8, 10, 12, 18ff.. A “practical concern” for the Other, according to Mercer, should also belong to sympathy (as compassion or commiseration, or as fellow-feeling), however, he (i.e. Mercer) cannot found and justify in greater detail and more precisely the necessary interrelation between the value-neutral-cognitive and the positive-practical aspect of sympathy (as compassion or commiseration, or as fellow-feeling).

³⁵⁴ *Mitleid*, pp. 81ff., 106ff.. Cf. footnote 324, above.

³⁵⁵ See footnote 292 in this chapter, above.

³⁵⁶ See e.g. Vernon-Stewart, “Empathy”, p. 48ff..

empathic acts, through which the therapist moves and transfers himself into the psyche of his patients, represents and constitutes a broadening of his self-observation and introspection, or a transference of introspection into the Other and consequently a vicarious (and representative) introspection³⁵⁷. If, though, empathy and self-observation and introspection are connected so tightly with each other, then self-observation/introspection means and is just as much as empathy itself (or: then self-observation/introspection is a kind of empathy); empathy (means and is) just as much as self-observation/introspection of or in regard to the Other. The empathic act actually, really consists in (the fact) that the I (ego) observes in itself that feeling (sentiment or emotion) which is supposed to represent the feeling (sentiment or emotion) of the Other. In order to observe the Other, the I (ego) must observe itself, but in such a way that it knows that that which it observes in itself stands for something which is going on, proceeding and happening in the Other. The I's (ego's) notion that its vicarious and representative feelings (sentiments or emotions) would more or less correspond and be identical, in terms of content, with those feelings (sentiments or emotions) of the Other, is accompanied by the notion that the I (ego) itself remains at all times a different subject than the Other³⁵⁸.

³⁵⁷ Kohut, "Introspection, Empathy", p. 463. The expression "vicarious experience" was, as far as I can see, first coined by Znaniecki, see *The Method of Sociology*, p. 167 ("a specific kind of information which the natural experimenter... ignores altogether").

³⁵⁸ Agosta, "Empathy", pp. 51, 55.

2. The outer (external) mechanism

A. Action: inner (internal) and outer (external)

a. Action and social action

Hitherto in this chapter, there was talk about both mental acts or processes ((series of) events and occurrences) which are absolutely vital, essential and imperative for the coming and bring about or achieving of a social relation, namely the perception of the Other as a subject, which sets or determines a specific horizon of expectation(s), and the subsequent assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, which in its (i.e. the said assumption and taking on/over of perspectives') form-related (i.e. formal) and content-related dimension, apprehends in greater detail the character and the intentions of this [[Other as a]] subject. These acts can indeed be separated or segregated from the rest of the aspects of the social relation in actual fact only for the goals and ends of theoretical description (representation or portrayal), yet on the other hand, they constitute neither its (i.e. the social relation's) sufficient conditions, nor their specific features (or characteristics) (*differentiae specifica*e). Of course, they are social acts, since they relate and refer to another social being (or creature (i.e. human)), but they can be carried out and executed unilaterally, i.e. without the knowledge of the Other (i.e. with the Other knowing), and even their – on both sides, mutual and reciprocal – carrying out and execution does not have to flow into and lead to a social relation, that is interaction, as long as the I (ego) and the Other do not know of this both-sidedness (i.e. mutuality and reciprocity). If, however, they know about it (i.e. the said mutuality), then they must have lived through and experienced it through some signs (signals or symbols), that is, through outer (external) (kinds of) acting or act(ion)s, and this means already

the transition from the social inner (internal) act to the interactive social relation, which in contrast or opposition to the former social inner act, which can be limited and restricted to inner-mental acts, must be put together, assembled or composed both from inner, as well as outer, act(ion)s. (In praxis (practice), though, the transition to the social relation quite often runs, (i.e. proceeds and goes) the other way around, when, namely, one's own or alien (i.e. another's or others') outer act(ion)s prompt, induce in, cause and lead the I (ego) to the more or less deeper(-going), far-reaching and intensive assumption and taking on/over of perspectives). Social (kinds of) acting(s) and act(ion)s have, therefore, an inner and (potentially, possibly) an outer aspect, but only in the interplay (synergy or having an effect together) of both aspects in the knowledge of both sides involved, is a social relation constituted. Outer act(ion)s, which are directed or turn to(wards) the Other without his (i.e. the Other's) knowledge, always remain in the framework of social action without stepping over the threshold of the social relation *stricto sensu*. If, now, in the social relation, inner and outer action are necessary and simultaneously present, if, that is, the social relation cannot be thought of without the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and without motor activity (mobility), and even if only verbally (with regard to the said motor activity), then its (i.e. the social relation's) specific concept or notion does not in the least encompass everything which belongs to inner and outer action. Apart from the fact that action in itself and in general must not always and not exclusively mean and signify reference to other subjects, although it can be shaped and moulded *as action* only in human societies (see below), for social action and for social relations, over and above the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, mental acts (inner (kinds of) acting(s) and act(ion)s)) are relevant, which are not connected specifically with them (i.e. social action and social relations), but characterise the whole and total, entire and overall field of human action *as action*. "Motives", "reasons", "intentions" constitute just the same or exactly such acts,

and it now applies and is valid, from a social-ontological perspective, to illuminate and elucidate the interrelation which exists between these latter (acts such as “motives”, “reasons”, “intentions”), and the mental acts related specifically to social action in general and the/a social relation in particular (i.e. the perception of the subject as subject and the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives). The insight or understanding that both these types of mental acts (i.e. mental acts related to social action in general, and a social relation in particular) would belong together to the social-ontologically directly relevant fields, amounts or is tantamount to an understanding of the question and problem of motivation, namely, concerning the constant striving of the/an identity for the protection and preservation and conservation or changing of its place in the spectrum of the social relation, as this (spectrum of the social relation) is shaped and moulded anew in every individual relation towards and with other identities on each and every respective occasion. In order to find the location or place of the social-ontological setting of the problem or question formulation inside and within the broader field of the theory of (kinds of) acting, the act or action, of course, a closed and relatively long row of conceptual distinctions must be put forward.

Let us begin with mental acts. Mental acts constitute in innumerable forms, combinations and (kinds of) interweaving(s) the never ceasing intentional activity of consciousness or of unconsciousness. Regardless of their otherwise anthropological or psychological weight, which is not for debate (i.e. discussion) here, they (i.e. mental acts) obtain social-ontological relevance as soon as they are connected with social acts, actions or kinds of acting in general or with social relations in particular. That already implies a certain degree of rationalisation or reflectivity, so that our first thick dividing line (or line of separation) must run between those mental acts, which on the basis of their lack of filtration in the consciousness come to a standstill before the threshold of the

act or action of a *social* being (or creature, i.e. human), as much as in certain cases they may make up and constitute the elementary background of inner and outer social action, and, those mental acts which through reflective work become relevant to acting, action or the act, that is, come on the scene as motive, intent(ion) or the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, irrespective of how gross, rough, coarse, hasty, hurried or affect-laden and emotion-charged (emotionally charged) that job, task or work may look like. It is self-evident that the same intentional activity of the psyche or of the intellect(-spirit) can, at times stir, move in the former form of lacking filtration and stopping before action, at other times, stir, move in the latter form of reflectivity leading to action, although according to location, place, time and actor, certain mental acts are accustomed to entering into or making habitual connections with the one or the other of the said forms. As regards the more or less reflectively filtered or rationalised mental acts, it must be remarked that they also have a direct or indirect social reference, when they *prima facie* do not link, combine or tie themselves to or with action related to other subjects. Regarding this distinction, there will be something to be said in the discussion of the concept of social action; at this point, something else must claim and occupy our attention. A mental act (*or*: mental acting or mental action) is something other than (the) acting (act or action) in mente (i.e. in the mind), irrespective of whether it serves, in relation to that, to sketch, outline or plan an acting (action or act) in mente (i.e. in the mind). The field or area of mental act(ion)s and kinds of mental acting is, therefore, more comprehensive than that field or area of mental plans of action, of acting or of the mental act, and closes the latter (field of mental plans of action) in itself. In reflectively insufficiently processed mental acts, the intentionality connected with those reflectively insufficiently processed mental acts can now at most act as a “blind wish” or “blind aversion” without flowing into and ending up in a somewhat concrete plan of acting (or action plan), and without being exercised in the assumption

and taking on/over of perspectives, in the case the wish or the aversion relates or refers to other subjects. As we shall see in the next [[sub-]]section, this pre-rational or pre-reflective psychical activity absolutely has its own logic. But every manifestation of its (i.e. the said pre-rational or pre-reflective psychical activity's) energy towards the outside, even the rawest, in fact, even its mere entry into the realm or area of conscious(ness), needs and requires reflective mediation (intervention or agency), and consequently its at least partial subjugation or subjection under the other kind of (i.e. different) logic of the plan of acting (i.e. action plan). This elementary intentionality can go past or pass by the vaguer or more concrete action plans (or plans of acting), but not (entirely) reflection, either by means and by way of dreams in which wishes and the fulfilment of the same dreams coincide, or by means and by way of nightmares in which (kinds of) angst or fears proceed to or turn into catastrophes. [[Things are]] otherwise and different in that class or category of reflective mental acts, which directly or indirectly, are connected, via more or less thorough and exhaustive thought and consideration, with action plans (or plans of acting). Here we have to do with (to some extent) reflectively clarified motives and corresponding aims of acting (or action aims). These reflectively clarified motives and corresponding aims of acting can stem from the pre-rational realm or area as rationalisations of its (i.e. the said pre-rational realm's) intentionality, but they can come and emerge just as much from the reflectively apprehended logic of the situation, and they must be supplemented by an assumption and taking on/over of perspectives when the acting (action or the act) is directed towards subjects. Just as mental acts do not necessarily have to bring or call into being (kinds of) acting (action or acts) in mente (in one's/the mind)^{cxiv}, so too plans of acting (i.e. action plans) do not necessarily or have to put or place outer (external) (kinds of) acting (action or the act) into the world. The absence of a practical conversion of action plans (or plans of acting) does not go back and is not reduced always, again, to real hindrances or obstacles, but is now and

then explained from (i.e. by) the anthropologically specific surplus of the imagined plans as regards practical realisations, so that outer action is imagined at various levels and in various forms and shapes, often, or even more so, in (regard to) the notion, idea or concept(ion) when the person concerned knows that he will hardly be in the position or situation to take the short or long step (i.e. to make a quick or long-winded move) from notion, idea or concept(ion) to reality. This as-one-likes or at-will great surplus of imagined action vis-à-vis the real outer action taking place constitutes an exceptionally important phenomenon, which makes many a trait, attribute or characteristic of human action in general understandable. We shall come back to that [[later]].

We have just pointed to the distinction between reflective mental acts, which link, combine or tie themselves to action plans (or plans of acting), and such reflective mental acts which do not do it (i.e. link, combine or tie themselves to action plans). Under/With action plans (or plans of acting), here, first of all, plans towards, for or as regards outer action are meant, in which objects or subjects are analysed. Since action plans, which set their sights on or take aim at objects are social-ontologically of interest only in so far as they interrelate with inter-subjective relations, the question now remains as to whether action plans which concern other subjects are constitutive for the concept of social action, or whether reflective mental acts, which indeed relate and refer to other subjects, without, however, – along with this reference –, being connected to the action plans of their bearer, already deserve the designation or appellation of “social” action. The affirmation (i.e. an affirmative answer in respect) of this question may, in view of the dominant casual language use, sound paradoxical, (in relation to) which, on the one hand, action is accustomed to being put in the one and same category with outer action; on the other hand, social action is accustomed to being put in the one and same category with interaction. Max Weber, who distinguished in principle between “outer (external) action” and

“inner circumstances, situations or facts (of the case)” (“affect(-related) (kinds of) acting, actions or acts (or act(ion)s of (the) emotion(s))” appears (crops up or is found) in his vocabulary too), finally also restricted, limited and confined his definition of social action to the former outer/external action. Because he did indeed recognise and acknowledge as a feature of social action the “meaningful relatedness or reference” with and to alien (i.e. another’s or others’) behaviour, however on the other hand, he took note, in the course of this, of the same meaningful relatedness or reference only in so far as it influences the outer (external) course of action through its orientation to(wards) alien (i.e. another’s or others’) action. According to that, he defined in some places “social action” exclusively on the basis of the criterion of this orientation, without mentioning a lot or particularly the reference to meaning. He (i.e. Weber) thinks of, e.g. a producer or manufacturer, who makes the “foundation of his orientation” the needs and requirement of third parties, who know nothing about him (i.e. the producer), and otherwise he (i.e. the producer) knows little of them³⁵⁹. Without doubt, the one-sided meaningful reference of the I (ego) to the Other completely suffices in order to justify talk of “social action”; must one, however, in the course of this, unconditionally, absolutely and definitely [[always]] suppose or assume the plan of acting, action or of the act, and, outer or external action on the part of the I (ego)? [[The fact is]] that one ought not, we believe and opine, when one – despite all the social-ontological priority of outer/external action (see below) – wants to take entirely into account the importance, significance or status of inner (internal) action in social life. Its (i.e. inner action’s) aforementioned surplus vis-à-vis outer or external action already constitutes an indication as regards that; on the other hand, its autonomy, does not, though, impair or reduce in the slightest its social character, in so far it, in actual fact, is social. We may indeed find fault with Weber’s statements and references that he

³⁵⁹ The relevant passages: *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 429ff., 562ff..

misjudged and failed to appreciate this social character of inner/internal action to the extent that he allowed the definition of social action be dependent on the execution and carrying out of outer/external action. Prayers, which in solitariness (or loneliness) are directed to God, are for Weber, expressly, not social act(ion)s (or kinds of social acting), since here the orientation of one's own behaviour to alien (i.e. another's or others') behaviour seems to be lacking. But is that really so? The person praying belongs from his birth or out of conviction to a certain religious community or else, in the case he himself is supposed to have invented the prayer, he delimits and demarcates himself, accordingly, from the community of non-praying persons, whom he holds to be incapable of satisfying the deepest needs of his thus shaped and moulded identity. Of the greatest and coldest solitariness and loneliness, [[i.e.]] of death, something similar can be said. [[It is]] not the relation of man towards or with death [[which]] determines his relations towards or with with-men (i.e. (his) fellow humans), but things go/are precisely the other way around. The manner, namely, he goes towards and goes to meet death, essentially depends on his relations towards and with concrete with-men (i.e. fellow humans), irrespective of whether he falls (i.e. dies) heroically as a member of a revolutionary party before a firing (or execution) squad, whether he, as a venerable abbot in his monk's or monastery cell, departs or leaves this life of worldly things, or whether he, as a life-insured petty bourgeois, has his last breadth and expires in the corresponding class or category of a hospital³⁶⁰. In all these and many similar cases, the action or the behaviour of the individual has as its basis a direct or indirect, but formative or shaping and moulding social reference, so that social action and/or behaviour is rightly talked about, although there are, in the strict(er) sense, no plans of acting (i.e. action plans) or act(ion)s oriented towards alien (i.e. another's or others') behaviour. Through consideration of the

³⁶⁰ Cf. Ch. III, Sec. 2A, above.

social reference, consequently, the concept of social action is widened, extended and expanded, and indeed towards its inner dimension. And this widening, extension and expansion enables and makes possible a more proper conceptual putting in order, ordering or classification of important mass-psychological phenomena, like, for instance, emotional contagion and transmission or imitation on a broader basis, which Weber wants to withdraw or detach from the competency, authority of jurisdiction (as area of concern) of sociology as (the) science of social action. Towards (or for the purpose of) this narrowing of the concept of social action, he (i.e. Weber), as is (well-)known, had his methodological reasons, and (or) he regarded it (i.e. the said narrowing of the concept of social action), on the basis of the ideal-typical superiority of end(goal)-rational (i.e. purposeful or expedient) action, a methodological necessity. But irrespective of the validity, soundness and cogency of the methodological argument, we are here dealing with the carving, bringing and working out of ontological aspects. It will, incidentally, be proved that the widening, extension and expansion of the concept of social action through social reference not only concerns the side (or aspect) of inner/internal action, but moreover, opens up new perspectives towards the outside, namely, for the determination and definition of the objective sense (i.e. meaning) of social act(ion)s (or kinds of acting), as well as the relationship between action and mere or bare behaviour.

There is a rightly characteristic case, (Weber reckoned, counted or classified it also within social action), in which undisputed social action, without any outer or external action takes place. The effect(uat)ing, bringing about or causing of an event, incident or occurrence through and by means of refraining or abstaining from (or not carrying out and omitting) its obstruction and hindrance, is meant. The phenomenon of refraining or abstaining from (not carrying out and omitting) (or of tolerating, putting up with, condoning) carries, therefore,

the usual conceptual distinction between plan of acting (i.e. action plan) and outer/external action, which is normally comprehended as two phases of the same process, to extremes (i.e. the phenomenon of refraining etc. (or tolerating etc.) sharpens, intensifies and aggravates the said conceptual distinction); it makes out of it (i.e. the said conceptual distinction) a contrast or opposition. Because plans of acting (or action plans) are conceivable, which in fact demand abstinence from outer/external action. Omission takes place, indeed, on the basis of a representation and notion of the possible course of acting (or action course), and takes into account certain motives and goals or ends. Its plan of acting (i.e. action plan) commands to do nothing towards the outside (outwardly, externally), the plan and action (as the avoidance of an imagined acting, action or act) coincide already in the intellect(-spirit) of the I (ego) concerned. The relation between plan of acting (action plan) and outer or external action in the area and realm of social action must, but not always (i.e. the said relation does not always have to) be that action plan of complementarity or that action plan of contrast and opposition. There is even a third possibility, which is partially sketched or drawn out in the structure of an omission: the plan of acting/action plan and the acting, action or act fuse and merge with each other because the mental act itself, despite all its reference to the behaviour of (a) third party, is regarded as an end-in-itself. One can here, again, distinguish between two genera, species or kinds of such mental acts. To one genus or species belong those mental acts which consciously serve as replacement act(ion)s (i.e. acts of compensation and substitution), i.e. they offer psychological compensation for outer and external act(ion)s, which the I (ego), in the face of real hindrances, obstructions or inner inhibitions, cannot or will not execute and carry out: in phantasy, he (i.e. someone) takes revenge on his foe or conquers his beloved person, and in general gives free rein to his emotions and wishes vis-à-vis third parties, without his outer or external behaviour being influenced (directly) by that. This normal schizophrenia

constitutes, by the way, an important means of stabilisation in social life. Because social life would not only be impossible without outer or external action; it would likewise be exposed to, in practice, unbearable and intolerable strains and tensions if every single (kind) of its mental activity found expression in an unmediated manner (i.e. immediately and directly), and accordingly acted (i.e. was expressed in, or took, action). The other genus, kind or species encompasses mental acts in which the observation of the behaviour of third parties without (express) reference to one's (i.e. the observer's) own plans of acting (i.e. action plans), dreams and emotions takes place, e.g. he (i.e. the observer) serves theoretical and analytical goals and ends. This, though, stands to reason, only provided that theoretical activity, in whichever version and at whichever tier, level or stage of abstraction, is understood as a form of human action (see below). On the other hand, the mental acts of theoretical activity are distinguished and singled out, including those which are dedicated to the observation and analysis of social action, vis-à-vis those mental acts which aim at the planning of practical action, namely through their (i.e. the said mental acts of theoretical activity's) in principle capacity for and (cap)ability at being – as far as possible – completed in foro interno (= in the internal forum, i.e. internally, mentally), irrespective of whether they (i.e. the said mental acts) are thereupon communicated and announced by means of outer and external signs and symbolism. They represent and constitute, in a form-related (i.e. formal) respect, full and complete kinds of acting, actions and acts, since they themselves (through questions) are motivated, set themselves aims (through answers to these questions), and finally, seek means and ways (thought experiments, thought combinations, “methods”), in order to achieve or attain the aims set. Inner action, plans and executes, carries out, here, inner action – and the social reference makes out of such action, social action. Such inner action does not, of course, entirely restrict and limit itself to theoretical activity in the strict or narrower sense. Also, the praxis/practice of the socially living

individual has its own, more or less worked out and elaborated theory, which in mente (i.e. in one's mind) stretches beyond plans of acting (i.e. action plans), and very often co-determines the shape and form of the same action plans. It (i.e. the said praxis) consists – not least of all – of generalities about the character, the possibilities and the limits of human beings (or creatures) and of action itself, and occasionally (or variously) flows into the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the, connected with that, assessments regarding present or future movements of the actors in the spectrum of the social relation. However, irrespective of how we estimate or assess the weight of such a rudimentary theory (with)in inner and internal social action, to this action belongs the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as well as representations and notions regarding the spectrum of social relations. The transition to outer/external action is here by no means necessary, and this illuminates from another point of view, the meaning of our talk of the inner/internal mechanism of the social relation. The surplus of inner (internal) action vis-à-vis outer/external action is made, incidentally, noticeable also in the fact that through the mind of the actor a lot more can go/pass via or regarding the social relation than what he unconditionally and necessarily needs for his on each and every respective occasion plan of acting (action plan).

One does an injustice to the wealth and the social-ontological weight of inner or internal action when one connects social acting, action or the social act as a whole conceptually to an outer/external expression, which is supposed to make recognisable and discernible the meant reference to meaning as regards the behaviour of third parties, for or to these third parties. With the definition of social acting, action or the social act as the relation of the expression between a psychological and a physical given (actual) fact, by the way, the [[said]], in themselves, right and correct ascertainments do not rime (i.e. do not make sense or match) in that the connection of the outer and external course of acting,

action or the act and the sense (i.e. meaning) of the acting, action or the act with (and as regards) each other can be ambivalent and have multiple meanings or interpretations, and already, because of that, the teaching, doctrine or theory of society can look at the latter (meaning of the acting) separately, and must seek in it (i.e. the said meaning of acting) its actual and real object³⁶¹. It is self-evident that social action in general is not identical with inner action in its contrast and opposition to outer action. Rather, the contrast and opposition or distinction between inner and outer action goes, passes and runs through the whole area and realm of action, as well as the particular areas and realms of social action and of the social relation. If social action stands out conceptually from action in general through the reference to meaning of the person acting in regard or with reference to other subjects, then an essential conceptual distinction between social action and the social relation lies therein, that for the definition of the former (social action), a one-sided and unilateral reference to meaning suffices, whereas in the latter (social relation), this reference to meaning must be two-sided or bilateral. In this respect, Weber saw things correctly, he erred only in his opinion that the transition from inner action to outer action had already been executed and carried out through the concept of social action. That is not the case, although, as [[we have]] said, social action is not necessarily acted out and does not necessarily take place in *foro interno* (i.e. mentally), but it can manifest itself in all its one-sidedness and unilaterality outwardly and externally, too. When e.g. someone admires someone, he takes him as a role model or example, and accordingly shapes his behaviour; his idol then does not necessarily ever have to learn of or find out about his (i.e. the person admiring's) doing i.e. deed(s) or activities, or even only something of his existence. The conceptual specific difference between social action and the social relation is not exhausted, therefore, in the contrast of one-sidedness (or

³⁶¹ These comments and remarks are directed against Sander, „Gegenstand“, esp. pp. 346, 347, 367ff., 376ff., 387ff..

unilaterality) and two-sidedness (or bilaterality). To this, the clarification must be added that only with the appearance of the social relation does the transition from the inner to outer action become obligatory, – obligatory in the conceptual sense, it is understood, because genetically and really (i.e. in reality) such transitions, if any (or: whenever they have taken place), in view of the ontic primacy of outer and external action, (have been/were (and are)) executed and carried out more likely in the reversed or opposite direction [[i.e. from outer to inner action]] (see below). No social relation comes about if the I (ego) has not received knowledge of, and has not experienced (or found out about), any external and outer (verbal or motor) signs or symbolism that it (i.e. the said I (ego)) has drawn the attention of the Other. Through and by means of this knowledge, the I (ego) itself steps into or enters the social relation even when it decides to act by way of omission, that is, to not return and reciprocate the signs (and symbolism) [[of the other side/subject]] and to break off, abort or terminate the relation before it (i.e. said relation) can unfold and develop. If the attention is mutual and reciprocal, thus a process of the mutual and reciprocal assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and influence starts, which can proceed symmetrically or asymmetrically and can show and exhibit several grades and degrees of intensity: from now on, the logic of the spectrum of the social relation makes itself felt. The signs and symbolism which the I (ego) gets, receives and obtains from the Other and this Other from the I (ego), do not have to be caused or brought about through and by the physical presence of the actors. Social relations can come into being through mere knowledge about the physical existence of the invisible Other, provided the assumption that, from this existence, effects and impacts upon one's own existence emanated, and these effects and impacts could be told, read or recognised from certain external, outer signs or symbolism. As such giving of signs, outer and external action is not to be thought away or detached from the social relation (i.e. the giving of signs and outer action are absolutely essential for the social relation).

The inner or internal mechanism, i.e. the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives constitutes its (i.e. the social relation's) necessary, [[but]] not in the least, its sufficient condition. The social relation necessitates and requires as the sole form of action, by definition, the inner and the outer aspect, and exactly because of that, it (i.e. the social relation) is social-ontologically decisive and determinative.

A relation between two subjects, in which these two subjects take note of each other over a somewhat longer time, and through the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives go into, delve, become wrapped up or engrossed in each other, without through some signs and symbolism making an announcement about it (i.e. such going into etc. each other), represents and constitutes a marginal or borderline case of the social relation, in fact, a mere thought (or intellectual) construct³⁶². A social relation, which would be totally wrapped up in and absorbed by inner action, that is, it would be a pure meeting or encounter of entirely expressionless intellects(-spirits), has, because of that, no prospects of continued and on-going existence in the social world, because the notion or idea of the Other as a subject is always connected with certain objects or objective positions and situations, which concern either the Other or the I (ego) or both. Amongst such objects, not only material things or interests, but also all kinds of preferences, values etc., and not least of all, third persons can be found³⁶³. The common reference of subjects to the object X makes outer action unavoidable, regardless of whether, in the course of this, the I (ego) is interested more in the Other or in X, whether the I (ego) and the Other are interested equally in X or not etc.. The positioning or stance to(wards) X and its (i.e. the

³⁶² Stok describes or else constructs such a relation and calls it a “split (gap or cracked) relation”, see „Das Wesen“ (I), p. 349ff.; vgl. (II), p. 22ff..

³⁶³ Cf. Husserl, *Ideen*, II, § 51 = Hu, IV, p. 191: „In der komprehensiven Erfahrung vom Dasein des Anderen verstehen wir ihn... als personales Subjekt und dabei auf Objektivitäten bezogen, auf die auch wir bezogen sind...“ (= “In the comprehensive experience of the existence (being (t)here) of the Other, we understand him... as a personal subject and, in the course of this, related to objectivities, to which we are also related...”); see p. 197 too.

said positioning's or stance's) nuances or fluctuations offer both subjects indications about the character or the development of their own relation to(wards) or with each other. An asymmetrical positioning can take root or become firmly fixed and implanted in accordance with the each and every respective outer or psychical relationship of power (power relationship)^{cxv}, or the I (ego) can, through various strategies, attain and achieve the wished-for by it (i.e. the I (ego)) symmetry: it (i.e. the I (ego)) can, namely, influence the positioning or stance of the Other towards X in its sense (i.e. in its (the I's or ego's) own terms), or simply overlook or misunderstand it (i.e. the Other's stance towards the X); it can modify its own positioning towards X in accordance with the notions and representations of the Other, or else it can revise its own positioning towards the Other and at the same time abandon its hitherto image or picture of the Other or of itself in favour of a new image or picture etc.³⁶⁴. The great variety and multiformity of the possible combinations shows, just as much (i.e. likewise), ways and paths, on which the necessity towards (i.e. regarding) outer/external action makes its presence felt due to the common reference of the I (ego) and of the Other to the X. The X refers, in the final analysis, to the presence of a tangible social world, inside of which tangible social beings sooner or later, voluntarily or unwillingly and begrudgingly, with more or less careful consideration, have to come (i.e. proceed) to tangible action. Consequently, we anticipate once again the thesis of the social-ontological primacy of outer and external action, which we want to explicate later in this [[sub-]]section.

That which in the area or realm of inner acts has an effect as pre-reflective intentionality, has also in the area and realm of outer and external acts its correspondence (i.e. analogue or counterpart, match or equivalence). It is called behaviour and is contradistinguished to a concept of action, which has both

³⁶⁴ Newcomb, "An Approach", esp. pp. 394, 395, 398, 401.

inner (reflective) as well as outer (motor) components. The common language use or linguistic usage means, though, quite often with regard to “behaviour”, a relatively stable mode of acting, conduct or way of action or of the act, which encompasses the inner (i.e. internal elements) and the outer (i.e. external elements), interrelates with the personal character of the actor, and gives his individual act(ion)s their particular moulding or stamping. This fundamental or basic meaning can be particularised in order to characterise or describe the mode of acting, conduct or way of action or of the act of an actor in a particular situation. Deviation and divergence from this language use, in which action and behaviour are synonymous, can be justified by the need to grasp, terminologically clearly, a social-ontologically important distinction. –

Incidentally, it seems to be unavoidable, if one ponders that not only Max Weber, but also later Anglo-Saxon, – amongst others –, philosophers³⁶⁵, who knew obviously knew little of him (i.e. Max Weber), kept apart and distinguished between “behaviour” and “action” in order to represent, reflect and convey the facts (of the matter) or circumstances in question. Behaviour, accordingly, is those outer or external acts which one does not equate and identify with action, because one, behind them (i.e. the said outer and external acts), does not assume, expect or suspect any inner reflective-meaningful act, that is, no intention [[= one does not suspect there is any kind of intent(ion)]]: to cough as the consequence of a cold is behaviour; a cough, in order to irritate, confuse or muddle up a speaker (i.e. someone talking) is acting, an act or action. To be taken from this example is the fact that action and behaviour are not able to be necessarily distinguished on the basis of certain outer/external features, traits or characteristics of activities coming into question (i.e. under examination) on each and every respective occasion. Something purely externally or outwardly, in one case, constituting behaviour, can in another case

³⁶⁵ See e.g. v. Wright, *Explanation*, p. 86ff.; Davidson, *Essays*, p. 229; Taylor, *Explanation*, p. 28ff..

be action. Behaviour does not constitute any fixed physical muscular-motor substratum (or substrate) to which a heterogeneous element must be added in order to yield or make up and constitute action; however, action is comprehended, originally, as a unity, to which the – on each and every respective occasion – more or less suitable motor activity, but possibly not exclusively bound to this action – or solely conceivable – motor activity (mobility), belongs [[i.e. a certain motor activity or mobility can be part of various actions]]. In any case, action is something more and something other, i.e. different, than the mere sum of individual outer (external) movements, which physically compose, assemble it (i.e. action) or put it (i.e. action) together. On the other hand, it (i.e. action) is not in the least totally wrapped up in and absorbed by or does not at all come undone in, in its totality, the element which specifically distinguishes it from behaviour. That means: action contains both in its inner, as well as in its outer aspect, elements, which isolated and in themselves belong to behaviour, that is, (they, i.e. those elements) are pre-reflective inner and, motorically outer acts. It (i.e. action) is always behaviour *as well*, but behaviour is not always a (necessary) concomitant of an action. Its (i.e. behaviour's) own main area or realm consists of uncontrollable acts, which partly need a particular attentiveness in order to be perceptible (e.g. a heartbeat or pulse), partly are directly perceptible (e.g. tics, convulsions, spasms), [[and]] partly are not accessible to any perception (e.g. physiological functions, mechanisms of sensorial perception itself). In this, its main area or realm, human behaviour can, for the most part, be observed on the basis of the same methods as animal behaviour too; comparing, i.e. comparative research of or into behaviour (i.e. ethology or behaviourism or behavioural research) has the capacity today, in fact, in this way to penetrate marginal zones in which the specifically human is pre-cultivated. To certain part-areas (or partial realms) of behaviour, culture has no access, in other part-areas (or partial realms) of behaviour, it (i.e. culture), again, determines more or less changeable and

mutable rules of execution or carrying [things, matters] out of that which must be, anyhow, executed and carried out. It (i.e. culture) intervenes, above all, where behaviour has a social reference, and also where behaviour is social behaviour. Because behaviour divides (or is divided) just as much as action into such behaviour which relates specifically to subjects, and into such behaviour which does not do this (i.e. does not relate specifically to subjects). We count or rank among social behaviour spontaneous reactions vis-à-vis other people (e.g. elementary feelings of sympathy and of antipathy), which reflexively (i.e. in a sort or kind of way in terms of reflexes) reach or come to the surface. Their (i.e. the said spontaneous reactions') controllability is indeed, in principle, greater than the (above-)mentioned main area or realm of behaviour, it can, however, be subject or subjected – from subject to subject, as well as in the same subject – to stark and strong fluctuations and oscillations, and can at times reach a zenith, at other times, a nadir or rock bottom.

The example mentioned beforehand already implied where the specific difference between behaviour and action is best sought: namely, in the intent(ion) of the person acting, which for its realisation in the nearer or more distant future requires not merely a smaller or greater effort, exertion or endeavour, but also a certain pre-plan (i.e. preliminary plan, sketch or outline), which, for its part, must pose the question of choice or selection of means and give an answer (i.e. answer that question of the choice of means). Whereas reflexive-like(i.e. as regards reflexes)-uncontrollable behaviour does not have to be especially and specifically explained, and that is why questions regarding the meaning of that thing or case, matter, affair or cause are made superfluous and redundant, the intentions or motives which the observer suspects behind an act, action or kind of acting drive towards the formulation of the question “why?”³⁶⁶. Now, the definition of human action on the basis of intentions, towards whose

³⁶⁶ Regarding the question “why?” in this sense, see Anscombe, *Intention*, chap. 5.

realisation meaningful and expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful, functional) plans (or designs) are supposed to be of use and serve, is, as is very well known, age-old and ancient and immemorial and as old as the hills, and is implied already in the rule of good sense (shrewdness, astuteness and cleverness) that one should consider things accurately, meticulously and carefully before one goes or crosses over to (outer) acting, action or the (external) act³⁶⁷. And its unbroken continued existence over thousands of years, in fact its irreplaceability, despite all its reformulations, bears witness, – next to and besides its objective reasons and grounds which speak for it (i.e. advocate in its favour) –, to the fact that here something has been arrived at or encountered which specifically characterises man socially living and acting in society, and that is why it makes up and constitutes the inevitable starting point of every theory of acting, action or the act. Animals, beasts do not *act* (or engage in *action*), Aristotle opined³⁶⁸, and with that, already articulated the fundamental insight that talk of action marks an ontological and at the same time epistemological boundary, border or limit, it shows or indicates a specific difference. And since the being (or creature) which is capable of action, is simultaneously a social being (or creature), thus, action means social action and a social relation par excellence, especially since concrete, graphic, representational or objective action of a social being in its unfolding and development is determined not least of all by each and every respective character of the social relation (see below). Seen from this broad perspective, the theory of acting, action or the act leads us directly into the core field or central area of social ontology. [[With]] the epistemological rule in mind, that the theoretical analysis of an ontic field or area must be oriented to the specific

³⁶⁷ See e.g. Democritus, Fr. 66 = Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente*, II, p. 158. [[translator's addition: προβουλευέσθαι κρείττον πρὸ τῶν πράξεων ἢ μετανοεῖν = it is better to be prudent before our acts, rather than regretting our acts.]]

³⁶⁸ *Nikom. Ethik*, 1139a 20 [[translator's addition: Aristotle's text reads: «δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν (= it is obvious that beasts have sense, but do not render social any act (or: do not engage in social action))» (Beware, this does not mean that non-human animals are not social. They are not (human-)rationally social)]]].

difference of this same field or area, and may (i.e. ought) not, in the process, be put off (course) or disconcerted by the empirical presence of given facts and factors which, of their specific character, are to be classified in other fields and areas of being – with this rule in mind, the quantitative question as to whether specifically human action as a fine crust sits on several strata and layers of behaviour which man shares with other animals, appears to be irrelevant. It is also irrelevant – and just as little to be denied – that the specifically human [[element or dimension]] takes root in a particular bio-structure as its absolute physical (and genetic) precondition and prerequisite.

However, on the other hand, the sober knowledge that the specifically human [[element or dimension]] comes into being and has an effect on a terrain (soil or earth), which, in an epistemological respect, is that of general research of or into behaviour (ethology or behaviourism or behavioural research), forbids and prohibits every open or latent intellectualism in regard to the definition of action through its delimitation and demarcation against behaviour. We shall shortly now name four points of view under (or with regard to) which the clear conceptual distinction between behaviour and action must be relativised in a manner which takes into account the realities on the social-ontological field³⁶⁹.

1. Just now we explained in which sense the theory of acting, action or the act and social ontology belong together. This belonging together (affinity or propinquity) can also be understood in the way or manner behaviour must, in human societies, (partially) through or by action, be driven out, displaced or covered over (masked, concealed or obscured), because precisely here stands (i.e. (there) is) a – under an otherwise unknown – pressure (in respect) of rationality and rationalisation, which, during the transformation of wishes and proclivities (inclinations or propensities) into practical intent(ion)s, as well as

³⁶⁹ These points of view are discussed in greater detail partly in both the next [[sub-]]sections, partly in the next chapter, Sec. 1.

during the pursuit of these intent(ion)s, takes effect and has an effect and impact through the expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) choice of means on the basis of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives and the assessment of the situation. The capacity for and (cap)ability at participation and involvement in the social through the (in part) coping and coming to terms with the pressure (in respect) of rationalisation (or rationalisation pressure), accordingly constitutes an important criterion for the differentiation and distinction of behaviour from action. Nonetheless, the pressure and process of rationalisation or the performance or achievement of rationality is not at all restricted and limited to the end(s)-mean(s)-relationship, but they encompass strata and layers of consciousness which, from the point of view of a narrow perception or view of rationality, would be described as irrational or as the domain of uncontrolled behaviour. The widening, extension or expansion of the concept of rationality – amongst other things/inter alia, through its de-coupling from narrowly grasped or understood “end-goal-purposeful/expedient rationality” – would consequently show the relationship and boundaries between behaviour and action in another light. **2.** A carving, bringing or working out of expressive elements or factors, which accompany every end(goal)-rational (purposeful and expedient) action, and very often gain the upper hand in such a manner that the end(s)(goal(s))-mean(s)-calculus or calculation enters their (i.e. such elements or factors’) service, would end up in a similar widening, extension or expansion of the concept of rationality, and in an analogous approach or reconciliation between behaviour – in some of its dimensions – and action. **3.** Intentionality builds an additional bridge between behaviour and action. Its (i.e. intentionality’s) effect and impact stretches, extends and expands from the lowest bound, border, boundary or limit of the psychical [[dimension or sphere]] up to the highest or most supreme performances or achievements of the intellect, and, by giving to each and every respective inner act, direction and an aim; it (i.e. intentionality) sets or lays

down the intent(ion) of acting, action or of the act, how it (i.e. the intent(ion) of acting) is (or ought) to proceed. The “meaning (something)-beyond-the self” and the “structure of the horizon” (Husserl), which befits, falls or is due to intentionality, set in motion acts whose character prohibits that the transition from behaviour to action is (i.e. ought) to be comprehended purely and simply as the transition from the realm or kingdom of a mechanical necessity to the realm or kingdom of an immaterial freedom. The classical problem examination of the freedom of the will and of volition is for the social-ontologically oriented (or aligned) theory of acting hardly fertile or productive.^{cxvi} 4. The criterion of social reference introduced above, as well as the earnestly or seriously taken category of objective sense, i.e. of objective meaning, make possible or enable an inclusion of behaviour in the social-ontological way of looking at things, which goes way beyond that which a social theory may allow itself, which connects action to a relatively narrow or narrowly and tightly applied concept of rationality, and it (i.e. the said social theory) then, thus connected, considers it (i.e. the said narrowly/tightly applied concept of rationality) as its singular object.

After these conceptual distinctions, which are supposed to make clear the fundamental dimensions of action, something or a few things must now be said about action in general as that field inside of which exactly all these conceptual distinctions lose their sharp contours and are relativised. Because human action in its reality and totality is distinguished and singled out by the fact that its analytically isolatable dimensions constantly pass, turn or blend into one another, no matter which dimension, on each and every respective occasion, sets the tone. Over and above that, one can hardly talk about action in general with social-ontological intent, without taking into consideration anthropological points of view, something which calls to mind both the anthropological aspect of social ontology, as well as those aspects of anthropology which are detached

from the epistemological competency (or responsibility) of social ontology^{370 + cxvii}. The anthropological statement, saying or proposition that man is an acting being or creature must first of all be understood as the rejection of the classical contradistinction between *vita activa* [[i.e. active and practical life]] and *vita contemplativa* [[i.e. contemplative and theoretical life]], that is, as the assumption of a primacy of praxis (practice) vis-à-vis theory, but in such a way that theory is not eliminated, but in fact is recognised in its finest branching((s) out) and ramifications as a form of – widely grasped – praxis or practice (Praxis). We already mentioned in which sense certain mental acts, structurally seen, are closed (cohesive, united or self-contained) (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts, which (have to) display independent motives, intent(ion)s and plans. This is not the point this time (i.e. here), and also here it is not about the fact theoretical activity, just as in *mente* (i.e. in the mind) conceived practical action, normally must be externalised by or through a certain motor activity (mobility), that motor activity of speech, speaking or writing. More likely it is meant that theory is shaped or formed inside the spectrum of the social relation and in consideration of the movements, motions of actors in this spectrum, i.e. as affirmative or assenting (approving or consenting), rejecting or mediating positionings towards (i.e. vis-à-vis) other subjects' theories. As society in *magno* (i.e. on a large scale) can be comprehended as the sum of individuals and collective subjects, which are distributed as friends or foes across the entire spectrum of the social relation, and act accordingly, so too can the small society of theoreticians be imagined as an ensemble of gifted and educated, instructed, trained or cultivated subjects, who are grouped and behave like members of society in *magno* (i.e. on a large scale) and as bearers of the generally practised mode of acting, conduct or way of action or of the act in accordance with essentially similar points of view [[i.e. in regard to the friend-foe spectrum,

³⁷⁰ See Ch. II, Sec. 3C, above.

etc.]]. This is not to (or ought not) be confused with the usual or common sociological allusion to the influence of social-political forces or currents on theoreticians and their theorems. This influence may be undisputed, nonetheless, theory is not social in the sense that its specific (set of) instruments and its specific content can be deduced or derived from the – on each and every respective occasion – “social”, that is to say, extra-theoretical factors (i.e. factors outside of and beyond theory) having an effect and impact, but in the sense that the same mechanism is at work which, otherwise, shapes and forms the social relation. It’s (i.e. theory’s) specific features or characteristics constitute the resultant of discussions, debates and clashes between specifically, in relation to that, talented and educated subjects, who make up and constitute a particular society and look into and deal with particular questions, and do not make up and constitute a simple reflection or mirroring of the social-political and ideological relations or correlation(s) of forces in society in magno (i.e. on a large scale)³⁷¹. Moreover, the same relationship can be observed, *mutatis mutandis*, between theoretical and practical action in society, if one here wants to draw a conventional dividing line, [[just]] as between inner and outer action. There is, namely, a surplus of theory vis-à-vis praxis (practice), i.e. theory tolerates, suffers or brooks many more fantasies, illusions, conceits, contradictions or simply nonsense than everything which praxis (practice) may allow itself in relation to that (i.e. in relation to illusions, contradictions and nonsense); practical faux pas, lapses, aberrations and blunders are accordingly punished more harshly, whereas theoreticians can be certain of their fool’s licence (or freedom to be a fool), at least within certain boundaries, even under strict supervision.^{cxviii}

The definition of man as an acting being means, secondly, that also real action overall vis-à-vis the totality and entirety of existing needs on each and every

³⁷¹ In greater detail, in relation to that, [[see]] Kondylis, „Wissenschaft“.

respective occasion, is superfluous. That means that human action represents and constitutes something more and something other and different than an activity which is brought to life by a need in order to be interrupted, suspended or abandoned after the satisfaction of this need, and until the coming into being of a new need. Rather, the great variety and multiformity and continual succession or struggling with one another of the needs results and arises from the irresistible urge to act unceasingly and uninterruptedly, to do something. To the goals and ends which the subjects set themselves on each and every respective occasion, action is not subjected in its entirety, but only the corresponding individual kinds of acting, actions or acts are ([[thus]] subjected), to which also the attribute of end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality in this or that sense and (to this or that) extent can be ascribed. But as such and as a whole, action has no – beyond any doubt – ascertainable ultimate goal and end, it (i.e. action), therefore, is not subject to any measurable and testable end/goal and purposeful-expedient rationality. It (i.e. action) simply constitutes an anthropological necessity, so that the individual person acting always acts in regard to a double quality or characteristic, namely, as a being or creature which cannot *not* act, and as a concrete bearer of action and of a decision, who can do or leave this or that. The surplus of action vis-à-vis needs and hence its (i.e. action's) qualitative difference towards (i.e. as regards or from) the sum of actions and acts executed and carried out testifies or attests to its (i.e. action's) fundamental uncertainty and insecurity, the constant unsatisfaction, i.e. dissatisfaction – or the merely temporary satisfaction – of actors. This uncertainty and insecurity, which makes (more) difficult, impedes and hampers the inner guidance or direction of acting, action and of the act, and at the same time, seeks relief from, or relieving of, the tension/stress of existence in all kinds of rationalisations, goes back and is reduced, for its part, to two factors, and moves at two levels: anthropologically, it lies in (i.e. is due to) man's openness to the world (or world openness) and the lack of security in respect of

man's³⁷² instinct, and historically-sociologically, it lies in (and is due to) the in principle openness and changeability or mutability of all situations and positions in which socially living man may find himself. The insecurity and uncertainty or the permanent, albeit varying, changeable or alternating, tension, stress or intensity, which always seeks, searches and looks for new ways and ways-out, must, furthermore, be strengthened and reinforced, turning action not least of all into an unceasing, incessant, unremitting, relentless testing and proving of the actor's identity, which is shaped and moulded in action in order to be put in(to) action (or: in order to face up to or be exposed to action). The concept of action is connected elementarily with the concept of power, if we under (i.e. by or with regard to) power – again elementarily – understand that which the actor can make, i.e. do. Since action always presupposes that the actor can make, i.e. do something, that is, he has a certain quantum of power at his disposal, thus it (i.e. action) always refers to the question and problem of power potential (i.e. the potential (capacity, capabilities or possibilities) for and in respect of power), which eo ipso is a question and problem of identity, since it (i.e. the question and problem of power) must at every turn be translated into the question: how much power do I possess, who am I so that I possess so much power, and in which relation do I stand or am I as a possessor of this power as regards the goals and ends of my power? From the answer to the question or problem, to what extent can my goals and ends be achieved, the answer to the question of my identity decisively depends, irrespective of whether I determine and define my identity in accordance with my goals and ends, or rather determine and define the (i.e. my) goals and ends in accordance with my identity. Action refers, nonetheless, not only to power potential(s) (i.e. potential(s) (capacities, capabilities or possibilities) for and in respect of power), but just as much to

³⁷² See Tenbruck's nice article (or essay) „Zur Anthropologie des Handelns“, which works on and processes Plessner and Gehlen's results and findings. The topic or theme will be dealt with in the third volume of our work.

power relations (or relations of power), since the I (ego's) capacity and (cap)ability, to make (i.e. do) something, quite often runs or bumps into the analogous capacity and (cap)ability of the Other. Also, in this respect, identity must be put to the test and pass its (acid) test with success, and the manner or ways it (i.e. the said identity) has to unfold and develop in the framework of the social relation of its (the identity's) power potential (i.e. the potential (capacity, capabilities or possibilities) for and in respect of power), in order to push through and impose its ends and goals vis-à-vis other identities, determines its place in the social – institutional or ideational – order of rank(s) (i.e. order of precedence or priority, ranking, pecking order or hierarchy). This, again, directly interrelates with the outer and external form of action. As we know, every social relation demands and requires outer and external action, a certain motor activity (mobility), which can range from the minimal motor activity (mobility) of the tongue or of the glance (or look), up to the maximal heaviest corporeal and bodily effort, exertion or endeavour. In all human societies, social hierarchy was hitherto connected with the form of the outer and external action practised by every actor, and indeed, in such a way or manner that completely and entirely above (i.e. at the top [[of the social hierarchy]]) stood that person who through minimal motor activity (mobility) could demand from other people maximal motor activity (mobility), irrespective of how this possibility was really (i.e. in reality or objectively) secured (or ensured). Culture began, in any case, with this possibility, which in sublimated speech was described as the victory of the spirit over physical strength and force.

Vis-à-vis the individual act which, isolated and ideal-typically reconstructed, has a fairly clear outline, action has been often and rightly compared with a stream inside of which (i.e. the said stream), actions, acts or kinds of acting are formed and constituted on the surface, in order to then go under (i.e. sink, die out and perish), and make space or way for new acts, actions and kinds of

acting. The said comparison also implies that individual acts, actions or kinds of acting would in the end be determined by the force, strength and direction of the broad stream of action. Now, action can in its various narrower and wider or more extensive meanings be contradistinguished to the individual act, action or kind of acting, whose extent, scope or range likewise can starkly (i.e. greatly) vary in accordance with each and every respective interesting (i.e. of interest) context. [[1]] Action as an anthropological category, [[2]] action as the overall and entire, total activity of a society in its historical being-so or being thus, [[3]] action as the sketch, model, blueprint, plan or project (in respect) of the life of an actor planning for the very long-term, or [[4]] action as the methodical organisation of a series of individual actions, acts or kinds of acting for the attainment and achievement of a certain end or goal, must [[all]] analytically be distinguished from one another, as much as they are also in general related as to essence or character (i.e. they are agnate, akin or all come from a common source). From (or out of) none of these kinds of action do, with absolute necessity, all forms and content(s) of another kind of action follow – the anthropological compulsion, coercion, obligation or force towards action yields, produces, makes or results in various, different, distinct, differing forms, shapes and styles of action in historically existing societies;^{cxix} inside and within the same society, there are, in turn, various, different, distinct, differing sketches, models, blueprints, plans or projects (in respect) of life, and these do not interrelate, for their part, in every individual actor, necessarily objectively or even only psychologically with action, around or about which he (i.e. the said actor) groups his individual or separate kinds of acting, acts or actions in a certain situation or position. Action as sketch, model, blueprint, plan or project (in respect) of life merges and fuses with the processes of the constitution of identity and world image, which (i.e. identity and world image) make up and constitute the more or less fixed framework inside of which the activity of the actor is supposed to in principle unfold and develop. The (for the most part,

unconscious) decision in the sense of that (aforesaid) constitution precedes the individual and separate (for the most part, conscious) decisions, (in regard to) which one makes a choice between alternative ways, modes and manners of acting, action and the act, and one guides, directs or conducts one's individual or separate kinds of acting, action, and acts³⁷³. No individual or collective life in society can, however, lead a for all time (i.e. all of the time) decided, settled or agreed sketch, model, blueprint, plan or project without the slightest deviation or digression and the slightest compromise, no matter how the latter (deviations or digressions and compromises) are justified or made plausible vis-à-vis other individuals. Generally, the discrepancy between sketch, model, blueprint, plan or project, and execution in regard to action, is widened and expands, so much the more the sketch, model, blueprint, plan or project is long-term and comprehensive (large-scale or extensive). The chances or possibilities of an action being divided into and concretised in strictly end/goal and purposeful-expedient kinds of acting, actions or acts, stands (i.e. is) in a reverse relationship to its range or scope. We now better understand the meaning of the analytical distinction above between the various kinds and levels of action: the relation between action, and, kinds of acting and acts, depends exactly upon the kind, sort and level of the former (action). This same relation determines which sector of in itself continual human activity should or ought to function in which context as acting or an act. The acting or act as more or less closed unity can consequently give or provide outlines (in different ways) and be defined variously; its components change and vary according to position, status or function. Because it (i.e. the said acting or act) is often itself composed of individual and separate operations, whose co-ordination constitutes the micro-structure of action, just as its macro-structure consists of its interrelations,

³⁷³ Regarding both these concepts and notions of the decision [[i.e. the collective decision corresponding to the pre-existing social and the individual existing in regard to such pre-existing social, and an individual's decisions regarding his concrete individual action against the backdrop of the pre-existing social]], see Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung* [= *Power and Decision*], Ch. I.

correlations or mutual and reciprocal relations towards individual and separate kinds of acting and acts³⁷⁴.

Already from the great variety of meanings and of possible (kinds of) interweaving(s) of action, and acting or the act, with each other, it is evident that constructions pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act, which take as their basis a (recti)linear schema in respect of end-goal-purposeful / expedient rationality, no matter their heuristic value in some clearly structured cases, have rather modest services of assistance to offer to the person acting and the observer. They find their most unconstrained, uninhibited, casual application in technical processes, and lose in clarity, clear arrangement or layout to the extent in place of ποίησις [[making, creating]], goes πράξις [[doing, deed, act(ion)]] with its imponderabilities and incalculabilities. Through this contrast, Aristotle hit upon (i.e. arrived at or discovered) something deciding (i.e. decisive), that was confirmed by those classics (i.e. classical thinkers) of political-social thought, who tended, in relation to that, to comprehend action as “art”, which ought to be tested in the concrete case, and not least of all depends on the actor’s personal skill, talent and ability. General statements and propositions are, here, banal and empty, only concrete (statements and propositions) contain truth³⁷⁵. A common paradox in regard to action arises from the fact that, notwithstanding the banality and emptiness of general concepts, the person acting relies and depends on exactly such concepts as help in respect of orientation, in fact, as an unavoidable, inevitable and absolutely essential formal thought framework (or form-related framework (in respect) of thought). To that formal/form-related thought framework belong the concepts of end(s), goal(s), and, means, which for their part, imply the thought-related or intellectual use of basic or fundamental categories like causality, identity and

³⁷⁴ I take, gather or infer this distinction between operation and acting or act from Veličkovskij, *Wissen*, p. 49.

³⁷⁵ *Nikom. Ethik*, 1104a 1-10, 1107a 29-31.

contradiction. In actual fact, a genetic analysis of the fundamentals (i.e. foundations or bases) of formal logic could in a relatively direct way prove the origin of the same (aforesaid concepts and categories) from the realities and the necessities of practical orientation (with)in the world. If, however, every action and every acting (action or act) has to take as its basis, in a general sense, the “end(s)/goal(s)-means” schema, then the at all time imminent shift of (or in) the level of acting, action and the act effects or brings about a continual change of its content, and, consequently, the ideational orientation of the person acting cannot tell us anything concrete about his action, that is, in himself (i.e. of his own accord) he says nothing at all as to what he holds to be (an) end(s)/goal(s) and what he holds to be means, and accordingly, what he has in mind to do. And the uncertainty does not only apply to the observer, but also to the actor himself, who knows only all-too-well that the necessity of his orientation towards the end(s)/goal(s)-means schema, and his (f)actual (cap)ability to do (or at doing) this orientation satisfactorily, are two different things, that between his behaviour in the planning of action and that behaviour in the execution and carrying out of his plans, there are no obligatory relations or transitions. In view of the immense, vast, incalculable variety or multiformity of concrete situations and positions, it would be pointless to want to set up, erect or establish a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases), in order to apprehend at least the most important cases in which outer or inner factors, that is, alien (another’s or others’) kinds of acting, actions and acts, or one’s own thoughts and considerations, have an effect or influence, in the continuous revisions and reformulations of the end(s)/goal(s)-means-schema in (i.e. during) the course of action. Not seldom it follows from that, that action in retrospect hardly seems or appears to be the realisation of an intent(ion), and the actor only through a self-satisfying, complacent or smug interpretation ex post facto and or through a formation of a personal legend is able to ascribe his success to his

original planning (in respect) of acting, action or the act³⁷⁶. That is why to acting (action or the act) belong not only its (i.e. acting's) unintended consequences, but also its intentional (deliberate or on-purpose) interpretations. But, notwithstanding the impossibility of a casuistry (i.e. a sophistry or a complete case-by-case list of cases) of action, we must here particularly point to a case, namely, in regard to which the nature and logic of means determine or simply outstrip (i.e. leave behind) the nature and logic of ends/goals. Means of kinds of acting, actions or acts are either kinds of acting, actions or acts or objective (concrete, graphic or representational) means (equipment (devices, implements, organs, apparatus(es)), instruments); they are either created by the person (or group) acting, or they already exist in the surroundings and the environment in a neutral state (of affairs), and obtain and achieve the function of means as soon as the end/goal comes into being for which they are suitable as means. They (i.e. means of kinds of acting, actions or acts) can, finally, either be connected with a goal/end in a specific manner or way, and be absolutely necessary for the said goal/end's realisation, or can be replaced by other (means of kinds of acting, actions or acts)³⁷⁷. Either way, they (i.e. the said means of kinds of acting, actions or acts) can develop such a dynamic(s) of their own that they overshadow the natural precedence or priority of the end/goal in the person acting's notion (perception, conception or vision), and unhinge the proportional correlation between end/goal and means in the original plan of acting (i.e. action plan). In certain correlations of forces (or relations and circumstances of power(s)) within the social relation, even the attaining and achieving of restricted and limited ends/goals demands the use of extreme means, whereby conflict is sharpened, reinforced and intensified to such an extent [[to be like the conflict]] which would rather have been expected in the pursuit of absolute ends/goals^{cxx}. This setting of the problem (or question formulation) has, as is

³⁷⁶ Cf. in relation to that, the good remarks of Schwemmer, "Aspects", esp. pp. 177ff., 183ff., 190ff..

³⁷⁷ Cf. Tönnies, „Zweck und Mittel“.

(well-)known, an especial status (value position or position of value) in the theory of war³⁷⁸; however, its relevance stretches, extends and expands to the theory of acting, action and the act as a whole.

Action constitutes the more comprehensive concept which as (the) concept of the genus (i.e. generic concept) takes hold of and grasps within itself, i.e. includes, the concepts of social action and of the social relation. This conceptual order of ranks, precedence or priority (i.e. ranking or hierarchy) does not, admittedly, found or justify any *social*-ontological primacy of action in general vis-à-vis an action which is connected with the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation. The genetic and functional-structural precedence, priority or primacy – always in a social-ontological respect – is (i.e. ought) to be attributed rather to the narrower concept [[of social action as regards the social relation (and not to the generic concept of action)]]]. What characterises action in general (intent(ion), end(s)/goal(s)-means-relation) must, self-evidently, be taken up/in, absorbed or included/incorporated in the concept of the social relation: but the narrower concept needs and requires additional specifications (e.g. the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives) for its logical demarcation and delimitation, it is, therefore, content-rich (i.e. rich in content). Really (i.e. in real terms or in reality), the *social*-ontological primacy of the social relation vis-à-vis action is founded, established, set up or based on two factors. Socially living human beings (or creatures) learn only through the social relation what action means in general, and thereafter, subsequently they (i.e. the said socially living human beings) act always directly or indirectly in respect of a social relation. Turned (i.e. put or said) otherwise and differently: The social relation makes human beings capable of specifically human action; over wide, broad stretches (i.e. to a great and large extent), action remains – in human societies – synonymous with the social relation, and in fact objective (i.e. object-related,

³⁷⁸ Kondylis, *Theorie des Krieges*, esp. p. 83ff..

concrete, graphic or representational) action, i.e. the relation between subject and object is normally shaped and formed in these [[human]] societies through the mediation or intercession, intervention of the relation between subject and subject. This applies principally to the social-ontologically fundamental relation between subject and object, i.e. to technique (technology) as the product and expression of each and every respective state, condition, situation, position, level or status in the struggle of man with nature, which since the earliest of times is conducted and waged collectively and in terms of the division of labour. The social and historical parameters of development of technique / technology point exactly to the intersubjective background of the relation of the social subject towards or with a natural or artificial object. The same applies, however, to that forming or shaping of materials and stuff ((subject) matter or topics) which is called art and articulates positionings towards the object, which at the same time represent and constitute positive and negative positionings to analogous positionings of other subjects (of lay people (laypersons or the laity, i.e. non-specialists as regards art) and of artists). The anti-bourgeois tip, spike or peak of modern and abstract art lets us discern or recognise that even in a dissolution of the object, the logic of the social relation carries on having an effect in an undiminished, unabated and unrelenting manner³⁷⁹. On the other hand, the social relation has precedence, priority or primacy because social-ontologically, it (i.e. the social relation) constantly must be connected with outer and external action, in which and through which, in the end, decisions over or about the shaping, moulding of social life in magno and in parvo (i.e. on a large and on a small scale) are made. External or outer action is, though, also objective (concrete, graphic or representational) action, however, the social reference belongs, as we showed above, not specifically, but only per implicationem (i.e. by implication), to its concept: thus, Robinson indeed acts

³⁷⁹ Kondylis, *Niedergang*, esp. p. 90ff..

objectively (concretely, graphically or representationally), but not socially^{cxxi}. Social outer or external action is, in a social-ontological respect, the hard core of action and its (i.e. action's) ultima ratio (i.e. final word/argument, the last resort or the last suitable means)³⁸⁰. What is acted out and takes place as action in foro interno (i.e. in the inner court (of justice and conscience)), remains socially irrelevant, as long as it does not find its expression through the means of external or outer action. These means of external/outer action can be either corporeal and bodily, or, objective (i.e. object-related, concrete, graphic or representational) or both. On the overall field (or in the total area or sector) of action, cum grano salis (i.e. with a grain of salt), that which Clausewitz described in respect of war can be applied, that, it (i.e. action), namely, is a measuring of the intellectual-spiritual and corporeal/bodily forces and powers and strength(s) mediated, arbitrated or by means of the latter (corporeal/bodily forces)³⁸¹. The measuring of an actor's inner and internal action with regard to that inner action of another actor takes place through outer and external action, irrespective of whether, in the course of this, it is a matter of a friendly or inimical relation. And this measuring consists not in a contradistinction of the overall and total inner and outer action of an actor with the overall and total action of another actor, but in the contradistinction of concrete kinds of acting, actions or acts, which, as it were, stand or are representative of the actor and all of his action. More or less important kinds of acting, action or the act decide over or judge, therefore, the fate and destiny of the overall and total action and of the actor, precisely as – in order to recollect Clausewitz once again – concrete battles can determine the outcome of a war, although they in themselves are merely parts of the overall and total, entire process^{382 + cxxii}.

³⁸⁰ See Sec. 1Ea in this chapter, above.

³⁸¹ *Vom Kriege*, II, 1 = p. 269.

³⁸² Loc. cit., I, 2 = pp. 225ff., 229.

b. Reasons (grounds) and causes, intent(ion)s and motives of action

The reaction in recent decades against behaviourism and neo-positivism led not only to a rehabilitation of epistemologically unavoidable (inevitable) “metaphysics”³⁸³, but also to positions pertaining to the theory of acting, action or of the act, which are through-and-through analogous to those positions which the struggle against the materialism of the 19th century, at that time and in those days, produced, occasioned and brought forth, and codified [[as]] neo-Kantianism. In regard to the long and frequently, or in many cases, deep-ranging, profound older debate [[of neo-Kantianism against 19th century materialism]], the (for the most part, Anglo-Saxon) representatives of this position [[of rehabilitated “metaphysics” against behaviourism and neo-positivism]] could, though, hardly know their way around, when they, namely, asserted the fundamental distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities (the sciences of nature and the human sciences), or that distinction between the law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessities)-related process of nature and intentional human action. Following Wittgenstein’s late work, they (i.e. the aforesaid mostly Anglo-Saxon philosophers) more likely had the impression of stepping onto new land and discovering unknown territory (i.e. of breaking new ground), and of first founding the hermeneutic direction (i.e. line or school of thought, trend or faction) against physicalism and positivism³⁸⁴. The following example,

³⁸³ Regarding this paradoxical outcome of the positivistic critique of metaphysics, see Kondylis, *Metaphysikkritik*, p. 454ff.. [[Translator’s addition (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): inter alia, we read this classic crystallisation of the notion that every position or starting point of knowledge or basic-fundamental knowledge framework (whether traditional theological-metaphysical or positivistic or mainstream Enlightenment-“Reason/Facts empiricism” or Kantian or “Scientific Marxism” or language-JOOttgensteinian or grossly disproportionately ZIO-JOO / post-modern JOOKS-JOORIDA-JOODITH JOOTLER-POOFTACAULT, etc., etc., etc.). is a fiction, since there is no inherent meaning to life from a strictly empirical-scientific logically consistent point of view, and all knowledge frameworks flow from (irrational) world-theoretical de-cisions, and power (relations): „Solche Gedanken wurden in der positivistischen Schule nicht wesentlich vertieft, zumal die Sorge noch ausschlaggebend war, die Fiktionen der Metaphysik aufzudecken und nicht etwa die eigenen „positiven“ Auffassungen in den Verdacht der Fiktion geraten zu lassen.“ (S. 457 = p. 128, vol. II of the Greek edition).]]

³⁸⁴ See e.g. v. Wright, *Explanation*, chap. I; Winch, *Idea*, esp. p. 72ff..

nonetheless, may make clear and elucidate to what extent they (i.e. the mainly Anglo-Saxon hermeneuticists) – from the logic of their position – merely repeat old insights, or necessarily had to vary such old insights. One of their – incidentally very (i.e. absolutely) correct – main arguments against behaviouristic interpretations of acting, action and of the act consists in the contradistinction between acting, action and the act, and, movement (or motion), deed and event/incident, that is, the meaningful and the physical, which, for its part, was founded by means of the empirical pointing out that the same outer/external physical course can be connected in various situations and positions with various kinds of acting, actions and acts, that is, with a different meaning, just as the same act(ing) or action can be executed and carried out by various physical movements and motions. The outer and external course of acting, action or the act cannot recognise or discern at all whether an act(ing) or action is also and actually an act(ing) or action, whether it, namely, has meaning and serves an intent(ion)³⁸⁵. Max Weber, who could here, in fact, invoke Simmel's explanations, had already stressed, highlighted and emphasised that. This (man, i.e. Weber) wrote that extremely various and different contexts of meaning could underlie outer and external processes of action, which we regard as the same or similar³⁸⁶. In a short, but logically fine analysis, he (i.e. Weber) showed why the teleological and the causal way of looking at things cannot – without something further, i.e. just like that – be applied to the same process (or series of events), and or cannot simply be two equally possible ways of looking at things in respect of the same process or series of events³⁸⁷.

Natural events or phenomena, and intentional human action, were contradistinguished from each other by the new hermeneuticians (i.e. hermeneutists or representatives of hermeneutics), with the declared aim of

³⁸⁵ See e.g. Hamlyn, "Behaviour"; Peters, *Motivation*, p. 12ff..

³⁸⁶ *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 548; referring to Simmel's *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*.

³⁸⁷ Loc. cit., p. 128, footnote 1.

extracting, pulling or taking out, and removing the latter (intentional human action) from the realm or area of blind causality, and subjecting/subjugating it (i.e. the said intentional human action) to the command of sovereignly (i.e. in terms of ruling and dominance) well-considered and well-thought reasons (and grounds). Whereas the natural events/phenomena can be explained as cases of the application of unchangeable general laws, they said very much in neo-Kantian terms, a human acting, action or act constitutes the consequence of an intent(ion), which (i.e. the said intent(ion)) could have turned out otherwise or been different too. The detachment of the theory of acting, action and the act from causal notions and representations reached a maximum (level or height) when one accepted a merely logical relation between intent(ion), and, acting, action or the act³⁸⁸. The victory of intentionality over causality was, nonetheless, achieved with relatively gross or crude means, and because of that, was not destined to have any great or long duration. Because one expressly meant natural-scientific causality (i.e. causality pertaining to natural science), and indeed in the somewhat simple(-minded) perception or view, which became popular amongst philosophers through Hume: according to that, the cause does not only necessarily and temporally precede the effect, but is separated also really (i.e. in real terms and objectively) from the effect, and simultaneously, is contingent with (regard to) it (i.e. the effect)^{389 + cxxiii}. The rejections of the causal explanation of acting, action or of the act are normally accompanied by (the) emphatic (kinds of) contrasting(s) of nature and culture, and or of natural science and of the humanities (the sciences of nature and the human sciences), in relation to which one has to admit or concede sometimes that the word “cause” can potentially or possibly be used in explanations of acting, action or the act, if it would be interpreted appropriately or proportionally only³⁹⁰. The

³⁸⁸ See e.g. v. Wright, *Explanation*, p. 93ff..

³⁸⁹ *Treatise*, I, 3, 2.

³⁹⁰ See e.g. Peters, *Motivation*, p. 14; Melden, *Free Action*, p. 16ff..

new hermeneutic direction split up into two parties of “intentionalists” and “causalists”, when many of their followers and supporters, who did not dispute, contest or deny the fundamental and basic ontological and epistemological difference between the natural sciences and the humanities (*or*: the science of nature and the human sciences)^{cxiv}, yet came to the conviction that also in the field, area or sector of the theory of acting, action or of the act, a meaningful application of the concept of causality was in actual fact possible. The reasons or grounds of and for (kinds of) acting(s), action and of the act could, according to that, then be looked at as the causes of (kinds of) acting(s), action and of the act, if cause no longer meant the necessary and sufficient condition for an acting, action or act, but, in a very general sense, the means in order to bring forth and produce a certain outer and external event, incident or occurrence. The hypothetical question as to what would happen if the cause had not existed can conclude, i.e. come to a conclusion regarding, or deduce, the effect of the cause³⁹¹. The “causalists” loosened and slackened, therefore, the concept of causality, in order to be able transfer it to the theory of acting, action and of the act, whereas the “intentionalists” stuck and clung to their own Humean version, in order to make such a transfer(ence) as difficult as possible. They (i.e. the “causalists”) asserted and contended that in contrast to Hume’s clear separation between cause and effect, which permitted a separate(d) account, portrayal or description of both cause and effect, during the description of (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts, there could be no separation or division between reasons/grounds, and, the outer and external process or event, since in fact acting (action or the act) without reason/ground is an absurdity and preposterous. The reason/ground is contained in the (whole and entire and complete) acting, action or act, it (i.e. the reason or ground) does not come as a

³⁹¹ Hart-Honoré, *Causation in Law*; cf. MacIntyre, “Antecedents”, under or at 3.

motive (or consideration) from without and from the outside³⁹². Now, the reason/ground and acting, action or the act are (i.e. ought) obviously to be attributed to one and the same actor (whereas in natural events or phenomena of nature, cause and effect must have separate(d) (i.e. different) bearers); from that, however, by no means does it follow that they (i.e. reason and acting) cannot be distinguished (kept or told apart) conceptually and objectively. Reason, ground, and, acting, action and the act necessarily belong together in their description of an acting, action or act only when and if the outer and external acting, action or act is performed, carried out or executed. If it (i.e. the external act(ion) or acting) fails to materialise, then indeed the actor continues to have his reasons (grounds) to do A, nevertheless, an (entire, complete and whole) acting, action or act is not present or available and does not exist. Conversely, the fact that the relation between reason, ground, and, doing, deed or act is first of all logical and not necessarily real (since the doing, deed or act can fail to materialise), in no way and by no means points to the impossibility of a real causal relation, whether contiguity, in whichever form, is regarded as the precondition or prerequisite, presupposition for the latter (real causal relation)³⁹³.

The unwillingness of the “intentionalists” to recognise and acknowledge the reasons and grounds of action as causes of the same action was expressly or tacitly founded, established or based on the fear that, with that, door and gate would be opened to determinism (i.e. determinism would be given free reign), that is to say, the free actor would be filed away, shelved, considered finished (and non-existent). They (i.e. the “intentionalists”) did not only, therefore, assume a narrow or tight concept of causality, but, over and above that, coupled

³⁹² Thus, e.g. Melden, *Free Action*, pp. 114, 128; already [[in]] Gardiner, *Nature*, p. 121ff.. Cf. also M. Cohen, “Motives”, p. 331.

³⁹³ Davidson, “Actions”, esp. IV, under i.e. in/at B. A causality without contiguity of cause and effect with (i.e. as to) each other, is for Ch. Taylor (“Explaining Action”, p. 86) the *causa finalis* [[i.e. the final cause]], which, for that reason, can support causal explanations of acting, action and the act. Other “causalists”, on the other hand, gave priority to the *causa efficiens* [[i.e. the effecting or effectual, “efficient” cause]] (e.g. R. Taylor, *Action*, p. 39).

or burdened, loaded and encumbered causal explanations with the acceptance and assumption of various kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities), – although only in order, with that, to be able to support all the more easily the counter-position [[against determinism]]. Consequently, they returned to the dubious logic of the Covering-Law-Model (*or*: Covering-Law model / covering law model; Covering-Law-Modell)³⁹⁴, and opined that causally explained individual (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts had to be looked at as cases of the application of supra-individual laws in respect of acting, action and the act, or the same causes (motives) had to always bring about/forth, produce, occasion the same (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts³⁹⁵. To that, one could counter only what already had been brought (i.e. put) forward beforehand against the Covering Law model in general. That namely a causal explanation in principle applies to the concrete case, and the causality of a case does not have to stand, i.e. be in any necessary relation to(wards) i.e. with a law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) which determines a whole or a complete and entire row, series or range of cases. That is why causal explanations are also possible without the invocation of general laws³⁹⁶. A particular paradox was noticeable in Ryle's argumentation, who to the causal explanation of (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, counterposed an explanation by dispositions. He understood "cause" in the narrow Humean

³⁹⁴ See Ch. II, Sec. 2Cd, above. [[Translator's addition (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): suffice it to say, social ontology does not share the POP! POP! POP GOES THE WEASEL! Covering Law model's ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-JOO-ET AL. zeal to "guide, direct and bring about in law-like fashion" events and (the actions, behaviour of) (groups of) humans. Regularities (co-existing with exceptions), and in relation to human intentionality and action as regards the mechanism and spectrum of the social relation, and as regards the political, in the human world, do not constitute laws (even though the mechanism and the spectrum of the social relation, the political per se can be viewed as laws or constants). + Hempel was married to a JOO-essa; Berlin (who made a few pertinent points of criticism regarding his fellow-SATANIST-MAMMONIST "Open Society" POP! POP! POP! POPPER) was a JOO, and Hayek was a very good friend of JOOZ and ANGLO-JOOZ !!! What a fucking JOO-ANGLO-GERMANO-ZIO-JOO GANG-BANG AAAAAAA-HAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! AND DEFINITELY PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW AND CAUSALITY (GESETZ UND KAUSALITÄT) ON PAGES 166-167 OF THE GERMAN EDITION (= PAGE 225 OF THE GREEK EDITION) OF *THE POLITICAL AND MAN*.]]

³⁹⁵ See e.g. M. Cohen, "Motives", p. 328.

³⁹⁶ Davidson, "Actions", esp. IV, under i.e. in/at C; Gean, "Reasons", p. 668ff.; MacIntyre, "Antecedents", p. 223.

sense, and that is why he had no difficulty in asserting that dispositions cannot be causes. On the other hand, however, he lapsed – through that – exactly into the potentiated, i.e. intensifying, increasing, climaxing or multiplying causality of the Covering Law model: because dispositions are, structurally seen, behavioural patterns (*or*: samples, models or specimens of behaviour), according to which individual (and separate) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts are directed; they (i.e. dispositions), as it were, float and hover, therefore, over individual (and separate) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts like law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) over the individual case. They (i.e. dispositions) can, incidentally, explain the individual (and separate) acting, action or act [[just]] as little as a law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) can do it (i.e. explain the individual act(ing) or action). No disposition has the capacity or is able – under the conditions and circumstances of social life – to always, fully and at will, as it likes, unfold and develop, that is, to guide, conduct and direct (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts without consideration of and for the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation^{397 + cxxv}.

This reconstruction of the debate between “intentionalists” and “causalists” permits or allows [[us to make]] some useful and beneficial conclusions. In the widely and broadly understood sense, there can, then, be talk of “causality” in connection, conjunction or interrelation with action; motives and reasons, grounds in respect of and for (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts can, therefore, be regarded as causes of the same (acting(s) and act(ion)s) when, thereunder (i.e. in relation to that), simply something is understood, which must be there so that something other can occur (and or appear), without, however, this occurring (and or appearing) being absolutely necessary. Every attempt at determining here more closely (i.e. in greater detail and with more precision)

³⁹⁷ *Concept*, chap. 5; cf. Ch II, footnotes 156-158, above.

the kind, sort and course of the causal effect, must run and bump into insurmountable difficulties, and sooner or later, makes noticeable and felt the old boundaries of knowledge anew³⁹⁸. The usual and common language use, in any case, does not hesitate or waver in restoring between the motives and or reasons, grounds of the actor, and his (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, emphatically, and at the same time, in terms of content, vaguely, a causal relation. The actor “causes, brings about or induces”, “occasions”, “gives rise to, evokes, calls forth”, “effects” etc. something, “because” he wants or intends, plans or aims at something, “on the basis” or “as a result of” his motives or subjective reasons, grounds³⁹⁹. Of course, we do not say “I have my causes, in order to do X”, but always only “I have my reasons”, in the course of this implying or else saying too, that our reasons, grounds have an effect causally on what we (want to) do, that we, therefore, would not have acted otherwise, differently or at all if we did not have especially these reasons, grounds. Our implicit or explicit founding of action rests and is based on, in the final analysis, ultimately, on a contra-factual–hypothetical judgement, which, for its part, is founded and based on a general assumption and acceptance of causality, precisely like the historian or the sociologist does it, in order to isolate, and thereafter, subsequently, to assess, the causal effect of a certain, particular factor (“what would be (i.e. what would happen), if A or B had not taken and had an effect?”). Moreover, we know⁴⁰⁰ that the I (ego) perceives the subjectivity of the Other primarily as his (i.e. the Other’s) capacity and ability to move at his own discretion and as he sees fit, i.e. to determine his outer and external action on the basis of his own motives and intent(ion)s, which can turn out to be thus (i.e. one way/thing), but also otherwise; because of that, [[there is]] the narrower,

³⁹⁸ Very rightly (i.e. absolutely correctly), Chisolm remarked on the occasion of (i.e. with regard to) “causalistic” and “intentionalistic” explanations in respect of acting, action and the act: “in one very strict sense of the terms, there can be no complete science of men”, see “Freedom and Action”, p. 24. Thus seen, one can, in actual fact, characterise the entire debate as a “red herring”, as Ch. Taylor did (that) in passing (“Explaining Action”, p. 86).

³⁹⁹ A list of corresponding English words and expressions is found in Hart-Honoré, *Causation in Law*, p. 24ff..

⁴⁰⁰ See Sec. 1B in this chapter.

tighter or looser, slacker, but constantly present, available and existing connection of subjectivity and imponderability (incalculability) with (i.e. as to) each other, in the eyes of all acting subjects; because of that also, [[there is]] the judgement of other subjects and alien, others' (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, on the basis of the presumed or supposed capacity and ability of the actor to steer, guide or direct his own action. It is, in the course of this, indifferent that socially living men have no concrete notions, ideas or representations regarding the causal mechanism of the action, and it is also – as has been proved – for their (i.e. the said socially living men / humans') practical behaviour, indifferent as to whether they – for world-theoretical reasons, grounds – lean or tend towards the assumption and acceptance of a “ghost in the machine”, rather than whether they, for instance, as “functional materialists” constantly shift the/a material *primum movens* backwards. Their spontaneous belief in the causal dependence of the (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts of an actor on his motives and or reasons, grounds manifests itself and finds expression in their endeavour and effort to influence the motives and or reasons of/for acting, action or the act of the Other in regard to the conviction that as a result of their influencing and influence, the outer and external course of acting, action and of the act [[of the Other]] is with necessity changed^{cxvii}. The consciousness of socially living humans has, furthermore, since time immemorial (or all along), distinguished between two basic or fundamental types of causality in respect of acting, action and the act. (Kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, whose cause is seen in motives or reasons, grounds, are, in principle, judged otherwise and differently than such kinds of acting and act(ion)s, which obviously or probably, likely, plausibly or presumably were caused by corporeal, bodily properties or qualities (for instance, disability, affliction, ailments), or empirically ascertainable factors (for instance external material pressure, the effect and impact of alcohol).

Likewise, generally known, and since primordial or ancient times, the legal-

juridical and institutional consequences of this same distinction are in the [[public's]] consciousness. Every criminal law must start from the greatest possible precise differentiation between *actus reus* and *mens rea*, that is, [[every criminal law must]] set, fix or lay down punishment on the basis of the well-founded and justified presumption or supposition that the criminal acting, action or act had stood or was in a causal interrelation with the actor's intent(ion) in itself independent from the acting, action or act⁴⁰¹. Every society, i.e. which in its decisive tier of jurisdiction (or authority) [[i.e. pre-state or state group of people who possess the authority of deciding between right and wrong, lawful and unlawful act, etc.]], distinguishes, therefore, for its own ends, goals between behaviour and action (as intentional, deliberate, on-purpose behaviour), even though the dividing line or line of separation here is shifted and displaced in many respects by (means of) historical and social influences. This tier of jurisdiction (or authority) also regards (the) intent(ion), i.e. the connecting (or coupling) link between reason or ground for acting (or of acting or of the act), and, outer, external acting, action or act, as the cause of acting, action or of the act, and accordingly assumes and accepts that at least at this level, the actor can normally determine his own causality in respect of acting, action or the act. That is not supposed to mean that society has solved, in a philosophically or scientifically satisfactory way or manner, the problem of freedom of will. When it (i.e. society), however, handles and treats its members in principle as if they, at least with regard and in view of certain socially decisive (crucial, substantial and important) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, were shapers (designers, creators, organisers, moulders, formers or stylers) of their own causality in respect of acting, action and the act, i.e. bearers of a free will, then it, i.e. society, makes only the insight into (and understanding of) the imponderability

⁴⁰¹ Regarding the fundamental meaning of the distinction between willed, voluntary and unwilled, involuntary act(ion)s or kinds of acting in criminal law, see, amongst other texts, Fitzgerald, "Voluntary and Involuntary Actions".

and incalculability of the subject its own (i.e. it appropriates or adopts the subject's imponderability/incalculability), in order thereafter to turn the tables, and to demand of the subject, on the basis of the same capacity and (cap)ability which makes it imponderable and incalculable, (namely, the capacity and (cap)ability to decide in favour of, i.e. choose, pick or select this instead of that acting, action or act), to steer, direct, guide, drive or lead its (i.e. the said subject's) way and manner of acting and action onto the tracks (or down the path) of ponderability (incalculability) or socially recognised good action. Society's attention is directed, therefore, to that – narrower or tighter – level, which stretches between the reason or ground for acting, action or the act and or the intent(ion), and, external and outer action. The further level underlying this narrower level, upon which the determination of the reasons and grounds for acting, action and the act or intent(ion)s themselves takes place, is taken into consideration usually only when the first-assumed self-determination of the subject in the former, i.e. first, field, area or sector, can no longer be understood (or is no longer clear). Causality has an effect, presumably, at each of both of these levels differently – for instance, reasons, grounds as causes have an effect differently, and drives, urges, impulses or dispositions as possible causal determinations of these reasons, grounds have an effect differently –, and at the deeper and broader level, the contours and outlines of the free will are gradually, step by step, bit by bit, lost in a twilight (dusk or dawn) or in a darkness (eclipse and obscurity)^{cxvii}. But through that, the social-ontologically interesting process changes little. Because the opposite of the free will is not in the least the absolute lack of will and a blind mechanism. Regardless of what freedom or determinism may mean and signify here in general; regardless of whether (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts are free or determined: in any case, they (i.e. the said (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts) must be set in motion, – in contrast or contradistinction to(wards) merely reactive behaviour –, by (means of and through) acts of will; the forces taking and having an effect in

the acting, action or act, have to, anyhow, be condensed in(to) the shape or form of an act of will, so that the acting, action or act can come about and occur at all. In other words, the will must be there, i.e. exist, no matter whether as [[in the case of]] a free actor or as the final, last, ultimate link in the chain of determination. Even the highest intensity of the will does not presuppose (or is not a prerequisite or precondition for) its freedom. Even the choice between alternative (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts does not contradict that, since the freedom of the will must be reflected and expressed already in the determination of the way, manner or mode, alternatives (i.e. alternative choices) are formulated^{cxxviii}. The end-goal character of (kinds) of acting(s), actions or acts has, therefore, in itself just as little to do with freedom of the will or lack of freedom of the will as both freedom of the will and lack of freedom of the will have to do with the question or problem of whether the “spirit(-intellect)” and the “body” constitute ontic antipodes or, on the contrary, various, varying, distinct, differing, varied or different modes and ways of function(ing) of the same matter^{cxxix}. Also, the elegant hypothesis of perplexity and embarrassment of an “anomalous monism”⁴⁰² does not shed more light on this, anyhow, social-ontologically irrelevant subject, case or matter^{cxxx}. With regard to the connection of corporeal and bodily motor activity and mobility, and, acting, action and the act, two things are, in any case, certain. The already mentioned observation that the same end or goal of acting, action or the act can be achieved by (means of) and through different motor activity/mobility, and or, the same motor activity/mobility can serve different ends or goals (in respect) of acting, action or the act, proves only the difference between motor activity / mobility, and, acting, action or the act, which (i.e. the said difference) is invoked, induced or caused by the will as the constitutive element or factor of acting, action and the act, it (i.e. the said observation), however, cannot at all be

⁴⁰² Thus, Davidson, *Essays*, p. 231.

put forward as an argument for the thesis that reasons, grounds are not causes⁴⁰³. On the other hand, the in principle or fundamental difference or distinction between corporeal/bodily motor activity/mobility, and, acting, action or the act in no case signifies or is a numeric difference. The actor knows that his acting, action or act seen from outside (or outwardly), must flow into and be fused and merged with a certain or particular expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) motor activity and mobility, and in fact understands the direct or indirect possibilities of his motor activity and mobility as the fundamental factors of the shaping, moulding and forming of his plans of acting, action and the act (i.e. action plans); he can of course only act (with)in the framework of these possibilities.

The question and problem of will is often darkened, obscured, clouded and obfuscated by the usual or common confusion of unwilled, involuntary with unwished, undesired (kinds) of acting, actions or acts. However, whoever under outer, external, or, inner, internal coercion, compulsion, duress or constraint does something which goes against and runs counter to his wishes, does not act involuntarily and against his will; he has wanted and willed to subject and subjugate himself to the coercion, compulsion, duress or constraint, that is, he has preferred to live and act under coercion, compulsion, duress or constraint, rather than, for instance, wanting to accept and put up with the risks and dangers or die. Wanting (willing or the will, volition), and, wishing or liking, are two (different) kinds of things, if we consider and ponder that wanting (and intent(ion)) belong unconditionally, i.e. essentially and necessarily, to the chain of acting, action and the act – not, however, wishing or liking (see below). The likewise usual mix-up of the actor's instinctive wishes with the motives of his action does not cause and bring about less confusion. In regard to that, more likely less to blame are linguistic conventions and language practices than

⁴⁰³ Thus, Hamlyn, "Causality", p. 129ff..

psychologies of (the) urge(s), drive(s) or impulse(s), which allow, grant or concede absolute precedence and priority to “primary processes” (in the Freudian sense) vis-à-vis secondary processes, and comprehend the latter (secondary processes) above all as channels for the outflow, draining, drainage and discharging of the energy of the former (primary processes). Philosophers and sociologists often make use of the same terminology. For them, motivation means the same as affects (emotions or sentiments) or elementary needs, and that is why they contrast them to the reasons, grounds which do not merely explain an acting, action or act, but also can argumentatively justify [[the said acting, action or act]]⁴⁰⁴. Otherwise and differently than in the psychology of (the) urge(s), drive(s) and impulse(s), here the rationality of the reasons, grounds is supposed to be emphasised by (means of and through) the equating of motive, and, drive, urge, impulse or affect (emotion and sentiment); the, through that, introduced duality [[between reasons and urges/affects]] is, however, no less misleading than the monism pertaining to the psychology of (the) drive(s), urge(s) and impulse(s). The impression should not arise (crop/spring up) as if drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments) take and have an effect nakedly, and that entrance into the realm and area of rational reasons, grounds eo ipso must entail a radical break or rupture with drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions or sentiments) – precisely as, conversely or the other way around, the force of primary drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments) often runs or bumps into the superior force of rational reasons, grounds, which then makes debatable or contests with success the place of the motive of acting, action and of the act of those drives, urges, impulses, and affects (emotions or sentiments). The motive (as consideration or motivating factor) of an acting, action or act can,

⁴⁰⁴ See e.g., amongst many others, Winch, *Idea*, pp. 81, 82; Giddens, *New Rules*, p. 85, cf. p. 83ff.. Husserl called motivation also the “affective, emotional, sentimental foundation or basis/base” of the intentional relation, *Hu.* Vol. IV, *Ideen*, II, p. 189, cf. p. 211ff..

consequently, be both something which effectively resists a primary drive, urge, impulse, or, affect (emotion or sentiment), as well as something which rationalises such drives, urges or impulses, or, affects (emotions or sentiments), in a more or less refined manner. The positive or negative, direct or indirect relation to(wards) or with drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments) does not constitute, therefore, in itself a sufficient criterion for the apprehension of the character and of the function of motives inside or within the chain of the factors of acting, action or of the act. It is nonsensical and absurd to talk of primary drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments) as “motives (Motiven)” if one – rightly and justifiably – does not want to admit or concede that all (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts are motivated by such drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments); it is, therefore, nonsensical and absurd to entirely, completely or in part withdraw or take away from the term “motive”, the original meaning of the motive (as consideration or motivating factor). If one remains, on the other hand, at or with this meaning, then one can meaningfully call a “motive” not only the rationalised drive, urge or impulse, and or, (rationalised) affect (emotion or sentiment), or the rational reason, ground resisting this rationalised drive or affect, but just as much or just as well, an unmediated-elementary (i.e. always: only minimally reflected, not: fully and completely unreflected) drive or affect going or passing over and into an external, outer drive or affect. This would, incidentally, be the sole conceptually legitimate connection between motive, and, drive, urge, impulse or affect (emotion or sentiment). The motive must – exactly because of that, in terms of the theory of acting, action and the act – be seen in its independence or autonomy, and cannot be assigned, classed or classified unilaterally to or in (i.e. under) this or that psychical-intellectual(-spiritual) capacity and (cap-)ability, because it is not bound and tied unilaterally to any of these latter (psychical-intellectual(-spiritual) capacities and (cap-)abilities), but accompanies alternately all alliances [[between motive and the various kinds of psychical-

intellectual(-spiritual) capacities and (cap-)abilities]]. Elucidated and illuminated from this is (i.e. from this it is clear) why all attempts to set up, establish or install closed, cohesive, uniform or united theories of motivation in the sense of a fixed hierarchisation of motives defined in terms of content(s) failed and will fail in the future. Such attempts constitute, in the anthropological-psychological field, the precise structural counterpart to endeavours and efforts pertaining to the history of ideas or sociological efforts and endeavours to carve, bring and work out a – for all times and places – current, accepted and prevailing hierarchy of factors having an effect historically-socially, and to concede, grant, allow a certain or particular factor amongst them precedence, priority or primacy. However we know: here there is only causality, not law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity), all, i.e. everything, can, therefore, become a cause, and indeed the primary cause, if and when the given constellation (i.e. conjuncture or correlation of forces) allows or demands it⁴⁰⁵. Likewise, everything human can become a motive of action, and temporarily occupy the uppermost or supreme place in the in principle and fundamentally changeable, variable and mutable hierarchy of motives. Also, there is no law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessity) here, only causality and greater or lesser probability or likelihood. A motive can, therefore, be determined by several possible causes, which we conventionally call affect (emotion or sentiment), feeling (sense), disposition, calculus or calculation, etc., however, no man is in a position – on the basis of a hierarchy existing in terms of law bindedness (determinism or law(rule)-based necessities) in respect of these causes – of predicting and forecasting with certainty how and when every one of these causes will take and have an effect. All psychical-intellectual(-spiritual) strata and layers, in which these causes take root and have their roots, are synchronous and in principle equivalent and of the

⁴⁰⁵ See Ch. II, Sec. 2B; 2Cd; 3A, above.

same value, every one [[of them]] can temporarily gain the upper hand; a permanent overcoming or elimination (or switching and turning off) of one amongst them by the others, or the rest (of them) by one sole cause, is out of the question⁴⁰⁶. Just as little as in history or sociology, general rules cannot also here be set up, established or laid down as leitmotifs, guidelines of (or main threads running through) research, which could at least in part replace the analysis of the concrete case. At most, conceivable and thinkable is an approximately or roughly complete inventory of factors or forces having an effect, which in the analysis of the concrete case, serves and is of use for the orientation or the formulation of questions. And just as in history and sociology, also here, a one-dimensional, firmly or fixedly hierarchised effect and impact of causes is thwarted, frustrated, foiled or prevented not least of all by the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) and imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of the social relation, which puts and places the actor under pressure to modify and adapt his motives, and to draw the same motives, at times, from this, at other times, from that psychological(-spiritual) stratum or layer. No disposition can withstand, resist or defy this pressure over the short term or over the long term, as stable as it may be.

Motives do not, therefore, represent and constitute the stratum or layer of the drive-urge-impulse-like and the affective (emotional or sentimental) [[sphere, realm, dimension or element]], which lie or are found under the stratum or layer of rational reasons and grounds, but rational reasons, grounds in respect of (and for) acting, action and the act belong to motives in general. Precisely, or strictly speaking, we may in fact, for the most part, equate motives, and, reasons / grounds, if the criterion in respect of/for rationality is, in terms of form (i.e. formally), applied. Reasons, grounds as motives exist, and are present or

⁴⁰⁶ See Ch. I, Sec. 3, above.

available, without doubt, where drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments) have to be delayed, held back, impeded, hampered, checked or stopped and overcome (surmounted, conquered or vanquished). But even the coarse, crude, gross and transparent, clear or refined and imperceptible rationalisation of drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions or sentiments), so that they (i.e. the said drives, urges and impulses) can be served even in the name of (their) rejection, calls into being (i.e. brings to life), logically (i.e. in terms of logic), more or less coherent constructions, which in the actor's eyes, and very often not only in his (i.e. the actor's eyes), definitely and absolutely have the status and the weight, importance of reasons, grounds (in respect) of (and for) his action. Finally, in relation to what concerns the case in which drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions and sentiments) make up and constitute or yield the unmediated and direct, immediate motives of acting, action or of the act, we should thus guard against the usual and common short circuit, i.e. rash, perfunctory or flippant viewpoint that the actor acts "without any consideration or thought", "without knowing what he does" etc.. These expressions are (i.e. ought) not to be taken literally, however, they want to indicate that the consequences lying and existing beyond the acting, action or act of this same acting, action or act have not been taken into consideration calmly and in peace, in order to be – in practice or in practical terms – the decisive factor, as they ought to have been, in the case one had taken them into consideration thoroughly, extensively and profoundly. They (i.e. the aforesaid expressions), however, are senseless and meaningless, when they want to say that someone, who e.g. in a fit of rage and heightened anger killed someone, did not know what his movements, motions would cause and effect. Because they (i.e. the said movements, motions) have precisely caused, effected and brought about that which the actor at that moment wanted to do. Anger, rage or wrath as motive could, therefore, develop its own expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) rationality, as every reason, ground in respect of

(and for) acting, action or an act can also do it. The precondition, prerequisite or presupposition for this rationality in respect of affects, emotions, sentiments and drives, urges, impulses is, though, their reflectivity, namely the fact that they (i.e. the said drives, urges, impulses), as soon as they have overstepped / stepped over and passed the threshold of consciousness, have to already, hence, lose their character of absolute unmediatedness (i.e. immediacy and directness). As much as from the point of view of higher or supreme thought functions (or intellectual feats and achievements), their (i.e. such drives, urges, impulses and affects, emotions, sentiments') expedient, useful, relevant, purposeful, serving-(an-)end(s)/goal(s) rationality and reflectivity may appear to be elementary: reflectivity is present and existent, available, and knows of several, in practice, very important degrees, grades and levels of gradation. Apart from borderline (or marginal) cases, whose status remains dark, vague, dim, shady, murky, and the cases otherwise not social-ontologically counting or crucial^{cxxxix}, drives, urges, impulses and affects (emotions and sentiments), which become effective and effectual in a social relation, that is, reach, attain, gain or achieve the status and importance of motives in respect of and for acting, action or the act, are exposed to the pressure of rationality and reflectivity, i.e. they now have concrete aims and seek suitable means; (in order to remain with our example: whoever in a fit or outburst of rage and anger kills, is still sufficiently conscious and aware to, in relation to that, use a knife and not, for instance, a feather.) That distinguishes such motives in respect of acting, action or the act in principle from drives, urges, impulses and affects (sentiments and emotions) which have not passed over to acting, action or the act, i.e. they do not serve as motives (in respect) of (and for) acting, action or the/an act, and hence they hover, float (are suspended or hang) between the conscious and the unconscious in a diffuse state of affairs. Drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments) as motives (in respect) of (and for) acting, action and the act share in actual fact an important feature, trait or characteristic with the rest of motives

in general, namely their aim(/goal)-directedness (or purposefulness)⁴⁰⁷. The same drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions and sentiments) as motives as “primary processes” represent and constitute, on the contrary, a mere reservoir or potential (capability or capacity) for the motive in respect of (and for) acting, action or the act, which condenses and is concentrated to the extent that it – through increasing and growing aim(/goal)-directedness (or purposefulness) – is subjected to an inner selection or sifting (and, so to speak, looking through) in order to finally make from the, on each and every respective occasion, decisive part or aspect emerging or arising from that selection or sifting, a motive for acting, action or the act. The latter (motive for acting etc.) is connected with the aim of acting, action or the act in the sense that a single concrete aim corresponds to it (i.e. the said aim of acting etc.), that it can be a motive only with regard to this one aim; a – through this motive – motivated acting, action or act can, therefore, have only this aim. This perception or view for the necessity of the connection between the motive of acting, action or the act and the aim of acting, action or the act differs, though, very much from the thesis referred to above of the “intentionalists” that (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts would in themselves contain their motives or reasons, grounds. Because the objection persists that motives do not always and necessarily have to be translated, i.e. converted into outer and external (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts. The criminalist (i.e. detective investigating (a) crime(s)), who first of all seeks his (prime) suspects amongst those who have a corresponding motive, simultaneously knows that not all (people) (i.e. not everyone) have/has been able to follow and have followed this motive in regard to an outer and external acting, action or act, even if they liked and wanted to come up with such thoughts. Motives motivate one towards such acting, action or act, they do not, in relation to that (acting etc.), force, compel and coerce (anyone); from the

⁴⁰⁷ Cf., in relation to that, Peters, *Motivation*, p. 31ff..

perspective of the acting, action or act carried out and executed, they (i.e. motives) are, therefore, its (i.e. the said acting, action or act's) necessary, not sufficient reasons, grounds.

At the level of the higher achievements, feats, performances and functions of reflection and thought, i.e. at that level of action resting and based on far-sightedness, the formation of the motive (i.e. motive formation, creation, forming or setting up) normally becomes definitive only when the I (ego) has tested (checked, tried and examined) whether insurmountable obstacles and hindrances stand and are in the way of its (i.e. the I (ego's)) spontaneous wishes and affects (emotions and sentiments). One can with the necessary reservations assert that here motives towards / vis-à-vis outer and external action develop, form or evolve only on the basis of the assumption of the in principle achievability of the aims. The real or presumed, supposed, assumed or suspected course of acting, action or of the act then dominates in the imagination of the person acting so much that his motives on each and every respective occasion are directed at it (i.e. the said real or presumed course of acting), or at least worked on, dealt with or processed such that they (i.e. his motives) do not have to come into conflict with it (i.e. the said course of acting, action and of the act). The motives (in respect) of acting, action and the act rest or are based, therefore, on a judgement of the situation – or at least connected with it (i.e. the said judgement of the situation) –, something which, again or in turn, is tantamount to a judgement of the character, of the chances and opportunities, and of the possible movements and motions of the relevant actors in the spectrum of the social relation⁴⁰⁸. If one takes into consideration and

⁴⁰⁸ How the actor behaves vis-à-vis the ruling and dominant social rules depends on this judgement. It is, hence, false to presume the following and keeping or adhering to the same social rules, and to consider or think of them (i.e. the said social rules), in fact, as the specific feature (or characteristic) (*differentia specifica*) of action in contrast to mere behaviour, as Melden has suggested (“Action”). See, on the other hand (against that or compared with that), Hamlyn, “Causality”, p. 133. [[Translator’s addition (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): for the distinction (related to pre-reflective intentionality and reflective intentionality) between behaviour, strictly defined, and action, see Chapter IV, Sec. 2A(a) of *The Political and Man*, already translated at www.panagiotiskondylis.com. (Obviously, (social) rules(, laws etc.) can be, and are, broken).]]

contemplates all these parameters in respect of the formation of the motive (i.e. motive formation, creation, forming or setting up), thus one may define it (i.e. the said motive formation) (along) with Max Weber as a “meaning (sense) context (interrelation)” which appears to the person acting himself, or the observer, as a meaning-like, meaning-bearing, meaning-related or meaningful “reason, ground” of a behaviour⁴⁰⁹. Meaning, sense and motive are not connected, though, with each other, only via the direct, but also via the indirect effect, impact of the social relation, which is made noticeable above all in various, different mechanisms of rationalisation. Motives serve through the manner and way of their formulation as justifications in foro interno (i.e. in the inner court (of justice and conscience), or, internally, mentally) and in foro externo (i.e. in the outer court (of justice and the public), or, externally, expressed towards others), they (i.e. motives) offer self-interpretations (i.e. interpretations of the self) of (kinds) of acting(s), actions or acts of the I (ego) ex post facto, and out of, or from, i.e. because of motives (as considerations or motivating factors or inducements) of outer or external action, motives are converted into components of it (i.e. the said outer or external action), whilst they (the said motives) – through their suitable (re)presentation towards the outside or outwardly, win over, bring around, convince or predispose other actors for (i.e. as regards) the I’s (ego’s) behaviour; in the reverse(d) direction, the I (ego) internalises motives which are ascribed to it (i.e. the said I (ego)) by other actors(,) in order to correspond to/with alien (i.e. another actor’s or other actors’) expectations⁴¹⁰. This is additional pieces of (or supporting) evidence and proof of the deciding, i.e. decisive function of the social relation in the rationalisation of motives, that is, for (or as regards) the refinement, diversion, detour(ing) or overcoming of affects (emotions or sentiments) and drives, urges and impulses in motive formation (or in the formation, creation, forming or

⁴⁰⁹ *Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 550.

⁴¹⁰ Gerth-Mills, *Character*, p. 116ff..

setting up of motives). A motive as the motivating factor or inducement of action condenses in itself all these inner, internal and outer, external processes and can, hence, be apprehended in its meaningfulness only against its background or backdrop. An essential shortcoming of the philosophical debates of recent decades was the truly starry-eyed, dewy-eyed, i.e. naive passing by, in a social-ontological aspect, of the theory of acting, action and the act, with the consequence that the dynamics and multi-dimensionality of motives vanished or disappeared behind the more or less monotonous static(s) which the fixation on the individual actor and search for guarantees against the breaking-in (i.e. incursion and invasion) of “irrationality” brought on and provoked^{cxxxii}.

Motives must be thought of in a narrow, tight or strict interrelation with goals and ends, in fact, in men’s (i.e. humans’) imagination, notion or idea, they turn or blend into goals and ends seamlessly. Because irrespective of whether the actor steps and goes towards outer and external acting, action or the outer and external act, or not, he can hardly apprehend a motive as such without reference to that whereto, i.e. towards which, he is motivated by this special motive; the same applies to the observer. That is why common language use or linguistic usage rightly uses expressions like “what was his motive?”, “on what ground / for what reason did he do it?”, “what was he, in the course of this, aiming at?” or “what was he, in the course of this, thinking of?” in a far-reaching manner, i.e. largely, synonymously. The formation of ends, goals in connection with motives effects and brings about a splitting of functions, which within or inside of the motive were connected. Whereas the impetus function (*or*: function (in respect) of drive(s), propulsion and incentive(s)) in a motive in the strict sense remains, the orientation function (or function in respect of orientation) passes and goes over to the end and goal⁴¹¹. Drive, urge, impulse theories (i.e. theories in respect of drives, urges and impulses), which treat drives, urges and impulses

⁴¹¹ Veličkovskij, *Wissen*, p. 48.

like motives, are concentrated mono-semantically, i.e. clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously on the impetus function (or: function (in respect) of drive(s), propulsion and incentive(s)), and neglect the social-ontologically deciding, decisive orientation function, that is, exactly that dimension which compels and forces the direct transition of the motive into the goal and end. If we want to distinguish between motive and end/goal, we should or ought to do it on the basis of the already mentioned fact that often motives are developed and arise only via orientation towards supposed or presumed really existing possibilities in respect of acting, action or the act, that is, with regard to possible aims and ends, goals. An end/goal would then be the at least in part motivating factor or inducement coming from the outside and orientating itself towards the outside (i.e. externally); the motive would consist in the inner, internal reasons, grounds which bring the actor, in relation to that, to precisely set this end or goal. This certainly often artificial, but analytically just as often useful classification, arrangement, distribution, division or apportionment of motives into outer, external and inner, internal motives can conceptually be grasped also as a distinction between because- and in-order-to motives (i.e. motives pertaining to: because of (something) ... and motives pertaining to: in order to (do something) ...). A because-motive (i.e. a motive pertaining to: because of (something)) constitutes an actor's motivating factor or inducement, who plans or carries out and executes an acting, action or act because outer and external circumstances, e.g. another's planned, scheduled, intended or carried out and executed (kinds) of acting(s), actions or acts, bring him, in relation to that, to plan an execution and carrying out of an act(ing/ion). The in-order-to motive (i.e. motive pertaining to: in order to (do something) ...), does not, on the other hand, refer (directly) to outer and external circumstances, but it is interpolated and inserted into where the action plan (plan of acting or of the act) is conceptualised with regard to the attainment and achievement of the put-

forward, i.e. projected (expected, predicted or in-the-pipeline), end or goal⁴¹². Because- and in-order-to motives (i.e. motives pertaining to: because of (something) ... and motives pertaining to: in order to (do something) ...) are not, therefore, mutually excluded from the actor's perspective; rather they mark two varying and different phases of motive formation. From the observer's perspective, the in-order-to motives normally dominate when he, i.e. the observer, otherwise, does not know the actor, and is capable of drawing conclusions or inferences in respect of the actor's because-motives (i.e. motives pertaining to: because of (something)) only on the basis of the outer and external aim-setting or setting of the aim of the said actor's perceivable (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts. If he (i.e. the observer), on the other hand, is in knowledge (i.e. knows) of the actor's because-motives (i.e. motives pertaining to: because of (something)), then he can guess or presume how the in-order-to motives will look like or seem. To in-order-to motives (i.e. motives pertaining to: in order to (do something) ...), however, precedence and primacy is attributed in the shaping and moulding of the social relation through and by means of interaction in so far as every actor, in view of the social-ontological priority of outer and external – i.e. of hard – action, must finally orientate his own behaviour to what the Other is thinking and intending of doing regardless of his because-motives (i.e. motives pertaining to: because of (something)). Welcoming, approving of and sanctioning the harmful, deleterious, injurious, detrimental or damaging consequences determined by the in-order-to motive (i.e. motive pertaining to: in order to (do something)) of a deed or act, falls, i.e. is, difficult even for a friend in the long run.

Motives and ends/goals remain in themselves (with)in the area or realm of inner and internal action. The transition to outer and external action requires and

⁴¹² Schütz, *Aufbau*, p. 116ff.. Cf. Sec. 1Ca in this chapter. Schütz's distinction was taken up and varied by several authors, see e.g. Sorokin, *Society*, p. 44ff.; Tucker, "Weber's Verstehen", p. 159ff.. It goes, in its turn, back and is reduced to Sander's analysis of societal acts, see „Gegenstand“, p. 360ff..

needs the intent(ion) of translating and converting – either way, i.e. in any way – motivated ends and goals into praxis (practice). That is why an intent(ion) is an independent and self-sufficient category pertaining to the theory of acting, action and the act, which precisely must be distinguished from motives and ends, goals, like the latter (ends, goals) from drives, urges, impulses, and, affects (emotions or sentiments), and or wishes, in general. The scale, which ranges, reaches, extends and passes from raw wishes via motives, ends, goals and intent(ion)s up to the motor activity and mobility of the acting, action or act being carried out and executed, must, in its conceptual unity, uniformity or cohesiveness, be kept and borne in mind as a schema of orientation (or orientation scheme), although action is, from case to case, structured differently, that is, it partly shortens (reduces or cuts down) that scale, [[and]] partly attaches a different value, status or importance to the tiers, grades or levels of this same scale. Conceptually, it is, above all, a loss, by or in wish and intent(ion) being mixed up, muddled and confused in the assumption that action serves the fulfilment of wishes. Wish and intent(ion) can, though, coincide in respect of their content, however, their conceptual identification with each other disregards, ignores or pays no attention to the most important cases in which the wish, as it were, runs dry or is idle before it is connected with an intent(ion) in respect of acting, action or an/the act, or else, must recoil or back, step, move away before (i.e. in view of) the intent(ion) to act against one's own primary, i.e. initial, wishes. Actors are, in any case, normally conscious of the difference between wish and intent(ion), since they not seldom (i.e. since they often and frequently) orientate their own action to the presumption or conjecture, guesswork that the Other will not – on the basis of the objective situation and position – be able to act (entirely and completely) in accordance and corresponding with his actual, real wishes, but his (i.e. the Other's) intent(ion), which will guide, conduct or lead his expected acting, action or act, must necessarily be determined by the needs and requirements of that situation and

position. The acting, action or act is, therefore, not without anything further, to be deduced, derived or inferred from a with-effect/impact (i.e. co-operation, collaboration or synergy) of the wish to attain and achieve X along with the conviction resting and being based on a certain judgement of the situation and position so that to attain and achieve X, Y must be done⁴¹³. In other words: the with-effect/impact (i.e. co-operation, collaboration or synergy) of “desire” and “belief” does not constitute any intent(ion) as unmediated, i.e. immediate and direct, lever of acting, action or the act; an intent(ion) is not totally wrapped up in and absorbed or exhausted by an “all-out pro-attitude” or in the judgement that X is to be preferred to Y, but it (i.e. the said with-effect) concretises an engagement (i.e. commitment and involvement) of actors for the bringing about, effect(uat)ing and causing of future things, and, through that or accordingly, it confirms par excellence its consciousness as acting being (or creature)⁴¹⁴.

As we have said, thinking and knowing (thought and knowledge), the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, and the judgement of the situation or position, belong to the formation of motives and ends/goals. This knowing / knowledge and judging / judgement is, indeed, no work of the intent(ion) *stricto sensu*, it (i.e. this knowing and judging), however, flows into the intent(ion), so that we may say of it (i.e. the intent(ion)) – if we grasp it more widely and broadly and extensively – that it unites, joins, combines or unifies (amalgamates, consolidates or merges) a cognitive and a volitive component. The latter (volitive component) is, likewise, to be understood or

⁴¹³ As Davidson believes and opines, “Actions”, under (i.e. at/in) II. Already Sander wrote [[i.e. before Davidson]] that societal acts are motivated by wishes, and at the same time, are expressed as judgements which say something about attaining and achieving the wishes’ object, see „Gegenstand“, e.g. p. 351ff.. [[Translator’s addition (absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): However, this is incomplete and inadequate, and at best, only partially correct, because the whole situation / position, with all its objective relations (inter-actions, mutual influence etc.), circumstances and correlation(s) of forces must be taken into consideration on each and every respective occasion, and as we shall see (and already know), will and thought are ultimately (or rather, in the real world, and not as intellectual-thought abstractions) intertwined and inseparable.]]

⁴¹⁴ As far as I can see (and know), Sellars was the first to emphasise the particular status of the intent(ion) as (a) “mental event”, and as a “cause of action” (see the article or essay “Actions and Events”). Following him was Brand, *Intending*, esp. pp. 31, 121ff., 147ff., as well as Moya, *Philosophy*, esp. chap. I, IV, V, XII.

ought to be understood in a narrower, stricter or wider, broader sense: it leads, guides, steers or directs the – on each and every respective occasion – motor activity and mobility of the outer and external acting, action and the act going and proceeding from it (i.e. the volitive component), and simultaneously makes, produces, fabricates, manufactures or restores the connection between the overall action plan (or plan of acting) and its practical implementation, application or realisation. But the bond or tie which binds, ties or connects the cognitive and the volitive component to or with each other cannot in the least be comprehended in the simplistic manner, way or fashion according to which the willing-wanting or will / volition carries out and executes that which knowing / knowledge or judging / judgement selected, chose and planned, amongst alternative possibilities, beforehand. There is – anthropologically – no stratum or layer, as deep as one may put it into position or fix it – in which the cognitive [[element, sphere or dimension]] and the volitive [[element, sphere or dimension]] would not be fused and merged with each other. Age-old metaphysical and ethical considerations, which frequently were underpinned and supported in terms of the theory of knowledge, have drawn an arbitrary dividing line or line of separation between thinking / thought, and, wanting-willing / the will or volition, which, though, upon every and any (much) closer and more detailed inspection, must necessarily become all the more blurred, fuzzy, unsharp, out of focus, hazy, fuzzy and vague. From the bio-psychical reason or ground (foundation, bottom or depths) upwards, the will(ing) (wanting or volition) fulfils recognising-knowing (i.e. knowledge-related and cognitive) functions and can, in fact, only want as a recognising-knowing (i.e. knowledge-related and cognitive) will, wanting, volition and function; and only wanting, willing thinking/thought can constitute motives and prepare action plans (or plans of acting). The same fusion (merger, amalgamation, blending) of thinking / thought, and, wanting/(the) will(ing), volition can be tracked down, unearthed, uncovered, traced in the constitution, composition and texture of individual or

collective identity images and world images (i.e. images or pictures pertaining to identity and the world)⁴¹⁵. Aristotle got it right once again in terms of the theory of acting, action and of the act, when he put down and reduced the intent(ion) being founded, established or based on a decision as a selection or choice between a number of possibilities to do something, which he called προαίρεσις, to a striving (effort or endeavour), and at the same time, to a reflection over and regarding the goal or end of action; the interweaving of striving and reflection with each other seemed to him again to be so narrow that he paraphrased or expressed that decision as a selection and choice, or intent(ion), in different terms along with (i.e. as) “striving, endeavouring thinking or thought, or, (as) thinking striving or endeavouring”, and put or inserted the source of this inseparable, but also ambivalent, unity in(side) or within human nature⁴¹⁶.

c. Action and the dimensions of its sense (i.e. meaning)

When we are dealing with action, it is, in practice, unavoidable and inevitable to connect talk of sense, i.e. meaning, with the (re)presentation and notion/idea of the end/goal (and means). An action without ends and goals can be characterised as meaningless; consequently, the evidence of the togetherness (belonging together or shared identity) of end/goal and sense/meaning arises

⁴¹⁵ Cf. Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, p. 29ff..

⁴¹⁶ *Nikom. Ethik*, 1139a 31-33, 1139b 4-5. [[Translator's addition, absolutely nothing to do with P.K.: in 1139a and b, inter alia, we read these classic thoughts of the great Greek, Aristotle, which are often not 100% applicable to strictly empirically-based and logically consistent scientific observation (given that ethics, values, virtue etc. are normatively mixed in with non-normative value-free observation), but do go a very long way towards such strict scientific observation: «... δὲ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον ... Τρία δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν.... **πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις – ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα – προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος.** διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἔστιν ἕξεως ἢ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτικὴ. αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τινός) τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. **διὸ ἡ ὁρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.** οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται ἴλιον πεπορθκέναι· ...»]]

and ensues from the evidence of the togetherness (belonging together or shared identity) of goal(-lessness) or end(-lessness) (pointlessness) and of meaninglessness. The sense/meaning of action has, though, a different, varying and varied range, scope or extent, according to whether it relates to partial aims attainable and achievable by means of and through individual (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts, or to ends/goals, whose realisation needs the co-ordination of several individual and separate (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, or, whether it can be understood isolated and in itself, or whether its understanding demands its putting in order and incorporation in all the more broad contexts pertaining to meaning (sense/meaning contexts and interrelations). It (i.e. action's meaning) exhibits (shows or features) different degrees of clarity, since sense/meaning fall or accrues to (or befits) both interest-determined as well as affectual, emotional and value-like or value-related action (i.e. action pertaining to interests and affects (emotions) and values). The connection of meaning/sense and end/goal, as well as the elementary division of meaning (sense) according to its extent, scope or range and degree of clarity constitutes, since Max Weber, a sociological commonplace⁴¹⁷, however, a social-ontological way of looking at things must, over and above that, explain the conditions under which the question and problem of sense/meaning becomes central for every social life. Action is, in the final analysis, understandable in light of the ascertainment of man as an acting being (or creature), and the sense/meaning of sense/meaning is revealed under, i.e. in regard to the assumption and acceptance that man is a sense/meaning-producing being/creature – that is to say, such a being/creature which can pursue, follow, observe, justify and understand his own action only in sense categories (i.e. categories pertaining to meaning). Man acts and produces

⁴¹⁷ Weber, though, expressed himself, remarked or commented in regard to that very briefly, see the relevant, pertinent passages in *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 545, 547, 562. Girndt, *Handeln*, esp. pp. 26, 28, offered a useful and beneficial systematisation of these expressions (i.e. remarks, comments, observations or statements).

sense/meaning as one and the same being/creature and in the framework of one and the same process. If the connection between sense, meaning and end, goal in itself proves to be too narrow in order to make the status, importance, value and function of sense/meaning in a society of sense/meaning-producing beings/creatures comprehensible^{cxixiii}, thus, on the other hand, that connection between sense/meaning and action is social-ontologically fundamental. Sense / meaning, which beyond the end/goal of individual (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts or contexts (in respect of) (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, belongs constitutively with action as an anthropological fundamental or basic category, encompasses strata, layers and realms, areas, which ultimately and in the final analysis indeed came into being also out of (and from) the settings of the end/goal (or end/goal-setting) of concrete men (i.e. people), however, in terms of categories, they (i.e. the said strata, layers and realms, areas) have far-reaching and much greater implications (consequences or repercussions). Through the wide-ranging and far-reaching, broad, extensive translation or conversion of human bio-psychical basic or fundamental given facts into the language of meaning/sense, the transition from nature to culture is carried out and executed, and society reaches (attains, gains, achieves) only then (or for the first time) the level at which its life can be acted out and take place as human society. Above all, the elementary drive, urge and impulse of self-preservation is transformed and converted into belief (or faith) in meaning/sense and the ideational value of life, so that everyone and anyone who wants to preserve himself as a *social* being/creature, must share, or at least behave as if he would share, this belief. Belief in meaning or in the ideational value and worth of life bears or carries, for its part, the (socially acceptable and usable, realisable) ethic(s), as well as the philosophical, religious etc. views, opinions (notions, perceptions and conceptions) directly or indirectly springing from an ethical end/goal, but also from socially indispensable, essential legal (lawful, legitimate) and further, other institutions. Sense/meaning-producing and sense /

meaning-like living beings (creatures) are ready, prepared and willing to reconcile themselves over the long term with power and dominance as dominant authority over / above them only under the condition that these (power and dominance as dominant authority) are legitimised. Accordingly, they (i.e. sense/meaning-producing and sense/meaning-like living beings) found their own endeavours, efforts and exertions at exercising power and dominance as dominant authority over other (people) with ideological or institutional, but also physical means, by invoking the ultimate, highest etc. meaning/sense of human living together (co-existence or co-habitation). And since, as we have said, action in all its forms, anyhow, presupposes the possession of a certain quantum of power (power quantum), since action means just as much as the power to do something, thus, the sense/meaning of action as action, irrespective of the special sense/meaning of individual acting, action or of the individual act, lies or is found therein, in confirming that the actor lives in terms of meaning / sense, i.e. he exists socially. In the meaning/sense-likeness (i.e. the related-to-meaning nature or meaningfulness) of action, the meaning-likeness of life is expressed; man lives in terms of meaning only as long as he acts. In a society, though, more meaning/sense is produced than that which social life necessarily (unconditionally) needs and requires for its running, i.e. on-going and current unwinding, handling, processing or unfolding. Just as inner, internal action exhibits a surplus vis-à-vis outer, external action, so too, does meaning/sense exhibit a surplus vis-à-vis everyday social needs and requirements. But the social surplus in meaning and sense represents and constitutes, for its part, also a social necessity⁴¹⁸.

The turn of phrase or expression, “the actor connects his action with a certain meaning/sense” is sometimes inevitable, unavoidable and always imprecise or

⁴¹⁸ The anthropological (settings of the question or problem examination) and the settings of the question or problem examination pertaining to the critique of culture (cultural criticism) of this paragraph will be discussed in much greater detail in the 3rd volume of our work. Cf., in principle, Kondylis, *Macht und Entscheidung*, Ch. II.

inaccurate, inexact. Because meaning/sense is precisely that which action turns and converts or makes into action, and action represents and constitutes the sole conceivable vehicle through which sense/meaning can be constituted at all (or generally) and expressed. The already – several times – mentioned observation that the outer or external course of action does not necessarily prove something about the sense/meaning of an acting, action or act, since the same sense / meaning can accompany different and varied-varying outer/external courses of acting, action or of the act, as well as the other way around, conveys, gives or imparts an idea, notion and representation of that which is meant with, i.e. by, the statement or expression that sense/meaning turns action into action, that is, into something which has (with)in itself, in contrast to mere behaviour, a – on each and every respective occasion – certain motive and a certain intent(ion). This observation constitutes, incidentally, social common property, since every person receives and welcomes tokens of affection with inner, internal or even outer, external reservation(s) when and if, for instance, behind them (i.e. the said tokens of affection) he gets wind of, smells or senses self-interest. On the other hand, the obligatory adjustment and adaptation of the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) of sense/meaning to the peripetiae (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of circumstances) of action bears witness to the fact that sense/meaning can spring, jump or leap over action just as little as man (can spring, jump or leap over) his own shadow. The actor cannot connect a certain sense/meaning with any kind of acting, action or act whatsoever, that is, act thus and have something different in mind – precisely in regard to deceptive (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, this may and necessarily does not happen. The inseparable unity of sense, meaning and acting, action or the act, in short, is noticeable and perceptible in regard to the impossibility of dividing or splitting sense/meaning, in accordance with other, different criteria, from (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts, or the other way around. Sense/meaning is limited, restricted (reduced, moderated or cut down)

or is widened, broadened, extended or expanded to(wards) sense contexts (i.e. contexts and interrelations of meaning) and whole, complete, entire chains of contexts and interrelations of meaning, according to and depending on the determination and definition of the place (location, locus or reach) of the acting, action or act inside of and within the action as a continual overall process, and bearing in mind the fact that acting, action or the act is a construct of interpretation⁴¹⁹. Since the boundary lines between meaning/sense, and, acting, action and the act, coincide, since meaning/sense, and, acting, action or the act rest and are based equally and in the same way upon a choice between alternatives, thus must the choice of meaning/sense be congruent, coincide, tally and correspond with the choice of the acting, action or of the act. The sense / meaning-like, meaningful and sense/meaning-giving choice in the ideational [[sphere or realm]] guides (steers, directs, leads) and legitimises – if need be, if necessary, when needed – the choice in the field of outer, external action; sense / meaning is the brain(s) or mind, and at the same time, the conscience of acting, action or the act as a choice between alternatives. The surplus in meaning/sense or in inner/internal action at the level of the individual actor is activated in (the fact) that sense stocks (i.e. supplies and reserves of meaning) have been accumulated in regard to a number of possible (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts, and courses of acting, action or of the act, since the inevitability and unavoidability and indispensability of action is fixed, anyhow, to an earlier or later point in time. These stocks, supplies and reserves of meaning/sense are, above all, penetrated, pervaded and permeated with reflections regarding the present or future shaping, moulding or forming of the spectrum of the social relation, whereby or in relation to which, the actor takes a position either towards a certain meaning/sense corresponding to or in accordance with his already existing, present and available or wished-for social relation towards or

⁴¹⁹ Lenk, „Handlung als Interpretationskonstrukt“.

with other actors, or else, through and by means of his position-taking or taking of a position towards and vis-à-vis a certain meaning/sense, awakens (stirs up, prompts, arouses, works up or evokes) the friendly or inimical interest of other actors, and consequently brings to life a social relation. That is why we must, already because of that, be on our guard against interpreting the surplus in meaning/sense as evidence of the categorial precedence, primacy and priority of meaning/sense before (i.e. vis-à-vis) action. Mass-democratic social theory^{cxxxiv} asserts this primacy, precedence or priority [[of meaning over action]] in the same respect in which it (i.e. mass-democratic social theory) also, and in tight, close, narrow interrelation with it (i.e. the said primacy of meaning over action), puts communication before action⁴²⁰: the hard core of action is to be dissolved in symbolic air [[by mass-democratic social theory/ideology]], in order, thereafter, in all its comfort, ease and convenience, to shrug off, ignore, disregard and dismiss the concrete bearers and the historical conditions and circumstances of action (Den harten Kern des Handelns in symbolische Luft aufzulösen, um sich daraufhin über die konkreten Träger und die geschichtlichen Bedingungen des Handelns in aller Bequemlichkeit hinwegzusetzen)⁴²¹.

⁴²⁰ See Sec. 1Ea in this chapter.

⁴²¹ Accordingly, society is an “Organization of Meanings” (thus, Buckley, *Sociology*, p. 92ff.), which functions by virtue of the “self-mo(va)bility of the sense-becoming (i.e. becoming and events of meaning)” (thus, Luhmann, *Soz. Systeme*, p. 101). An example may make clear, elucidate and explicate on the basis of which intellectual-thought sleights of hand, the precedence, primacy and priority of meaning/sense before/vis-à-vis action is won, gained, obtained or extracted here. Luhmann writes: “Parsons breaks down, decomposes, dismantles, dissects, takes apart the unit act into analytical components (actor, object, orientation, modality). These constituents are, for their part, no longer (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts, but are all still full of meaning (meaningful). Through that, sense/meaning becomes the most abstract and final, ultimate, last unifying category of theory” („Temporalstrukturen“, p. 37). But full of meaning/meaningful are those terms only in their quality, property or characteristic as terms inside of and within an already constituted connotation-rich language (i.e. language replete with connotations), and only from the point of view of an observer, who must place and put or set separations and abstractions in the service of his analysis. On the other hand, in social reality, the term “actor” means absolutely nothing, if one wanted to imagine the actor without orientation and without an object; only as a corpse does the actor not need orientation and any object. The same applies to and is valid for the rest of the terms: no object exists without an oriented actor, no orientation exists without an actor and object etc.. What for the observer, on the basis of his terminological takings apart, dissections, i.e. analyses, yields, and results in, meaning/sense, does not found and establish any meaning/sense which at the level of social reality precedes action – and social theory wants to apprehend precisely this level [[of social reality]]. The asserted, primacy, precedence or priority of meaning/sense means, therefore, here, nothing other, else or different than a

Every meaning/sense is connected with inner, internal and outer, external action, but not every talk of meaning/sense must make reference to action as a social-ontological category. Whoever states or expresses something about the meaning/sense of the world and of life, can directly or indirectly perceive, detect, recognise (appreciate or understand) what he himself regards as the/an appropriate life stance (or attitude (in respect) of life), and what he expects from others / other people as acting men / people (humans); in the course of this, he does not have to enter into and deal with the mechanisms of action. This is the task (duty, mission, job or assignment) of social ontology, which behaves indifferently or is indifferent (in regard) to the varied, multifarious and diverse ethical contents of the talk in respect of meaning/sense in different, various and varying social contexts, although it (i.e. social ontology), simultaneously, has to explain the social necessity of the linking, tie(s), link(s) or nexus of that talk [[of meaning]] with ethical content(s)^{422 + cxxxv}. How action is, now, connected with meaning/sense, cannot be grasped in a single, sole formula, but the form and extent, range or scope of this connection, as well as the – accordingly – attained and achieved social effects, depend upon the actor's constitution, composition or texture, upon the range, significance and implications and or the declared or

substitution of the real level of acting, action or the act by the terminology of the observer. Similarly behaves, i.e. goes and is, the conceptual separation of the thing/object- and time-dimension (i.e. the dimension pertaining to objects, matters, causes, cases, things and to time) from its social dimension (Luhmann, *Soz. Systeme*, p. 130). As helpful and useful (also) as an analytical instrument as it (i.e. the conceptual separation of the object- and time-dimension) may be, yet through it, the real primacy, precedence and priority of the social dimension before, i.e. over or vis-à-vis the rest of the dimensions is not in the least lifted, i.e. abolished, annulled, set aside or done away with. If one believes in earnest, i.e. in all seriousness or seriously, that the double, dual or twin horizons of this – other (thing/object dimension) and past – future (time dimension) could be apprehended in the *social* context on the other side of, i.e. beyond or outside of the double, dual or twin horizons (of) I – you or dissent (disagreement) – consent (agreement), then one commits and perpetrates the same mistake and error of the “philosophy of consciousness” denounced, branded, pilloried and smeared by system(s) theory of wanting to deduce and derive the object and time from the thought performances (i.e. intellectual feats, achievements and functions) of an isolated subject. [[TRANSLATOR'S ADDITION (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): IN OTHER WORDS, SYSTEM(S) THEORY, LIKE ALL NORMATIVE(-LEARNING) THEORIES, WANTS TO CURTAIL OR EFFACE THE FOE HALF OF THE FRIEND-FOE SPECTRUM, AND CURTAIL OR EFFACE THE UNPREDICTABILITY ALWAYS POTENTIALLY EXISTENT IN THE MECHANISM OF THE SOCIAL RELATION, IN ORDER TO ASCRIBE A KIND OF HISTORICAL PERMENANCY TO MASS DEMOCRACY, INSTEAD OF RECOGNISING, IT – JUST LIKE ALL SOCIAL FORMATIONS – HAS / WILL HAVE A USE-BY DATE.]]

⁴²² In relation to that, more in the 3rd volume of this work.

implied social ambitions of the meaning/sense, and finally, upon the assessment of the objective consequences of the action in contrast to, or in contradistinction with, his (i.e. the said actor's) subjective motives (as considerations, inducements or motivating factors) and ends, goals. The elementary magnitudes, which, in the course of this, are (i.e. ought) to be considered and combined with one another, in order for each and every respective concrete case to be correctly analysed, can be structured in three pairs of contrast or opposition (i.e. three contrasting or opposing pairs): individual actor – collective actor, subjective meaning/sense – objective meaning/sense, meaning/sense with an individual claim of orientation – meaning/sense with a collective claim of orientation. It should be clear why the first of these pairs of contrasts or opposites must – to a certain extent or somewhat – make up, constitute or yield the main, connecting thread or guide in the formulation of both other contrasting or opposing pairs, which refer directly to a meaning/sense. Only collective social action lends, gives, confers or grants – through its unforeseeable entanglements, involvements, complexities, complications, confusions, embroilments or intrigues – (to, upon) the (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts of certain actors, an objective meaning/sense, which can differ more or less from their (i.e. the said act(ion)s of certain actors) subjectively meant sense^{cxxxvi}. Without the collective dimension of action, and without the heterogony of ends (goals), action would be totally wrapped up in, absorbed and assimilated by its subjectively meant meaning/sense, and the interpretation of its meaning/sense would not need or require any outer/external retrospective observer. And only the taking root of the actor in a collective [[plexus-nexus of social/cultural and or political relations of humans in, and in part, so to speak, apart from nature]] makes it for him – depending on the situation, position and (his) personal (pre)disposition – natural to make and turn the meaning or sense of his action (into) the guiding, steering and directing of the action of other people, that is, to expect or even to demand of them as social individuals to act

privately or publicly in his spirit or sense (i.e. in terms of his meaning (and his understanding of things, society and the world)). Although all (kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts of socially living beings/creatures, strictly speaking, have an objective meaning/sense, i.e. (have) consequences going beyond the subjective setting of the end/goal (or subjective end/goal setting(s)), and although all ((kinds) of acting(s), actions and acts) are connected directly or indirectly, actively or passively with a supra-individual meaning / sense, nevertheless, the separation between subjective and objective meaning / sense, between meaning/sense with an individual and a collective claim (in respect) of orientation, is objectively justified and heuristically useful. It (i.e. the said separation between subjective and objective meaning/sense, between meaning / sense with an individual and a collective claim (in respect) of orientation) practises, exercises and drills the eye for or with regard to the different, various, varying and differing dimensions of meaning/sense in their possible (kinds) of interweaving(s) with one another, as well as in relation to the fact that meaning or sense can be apprehended only from different, various, varying and differing perspectives, and be weighed up, considered and pondered in (i.e. as to) its effect.

Let us think, for example, of the perspectives in which the subjectively meant meaning/sense of action can be seen. The original and natural source of this meaning and sense is patently and obviously the actor himself, but this should or ought to not mean that he has amongst (i.e. in) all circumstances the clearest insight into, and understanding of, the factors which flow into what he holds to be and regards as the subjective sense and meaning of his action. Already from the perspective of the actor, the/his subjective meaning or sense, hence, constitutes at least in part an expedient, useful and convenient interpretation schema (or schema of interpretation), inside of which the so-called “end(goal)-rational (purposeful and expedient)” points of view, factors and aspects are

mixed in – on each and every respective occasion – varying and differing forms and dos(ag)es with what the actor holds to be and regards at the (i.e. any) given moment, the indisputable, indispensable, essential and inalienable core or nucleus of his identity. Without consideration for or (in respect) of the self-understanding of the actor, i.e. exclusively with consideration for or of the end/goal of the acting, action or act in a given situation, the subjective sense/meaning of the same (acting, action or act) is only apprehended incompletely. The ends/goals of acting, action or of the act, or sense/meaning giving (i.e. the giving of meaning or interpretation) vary according to and depend upon the vacillations, fluctuations or changes of the self-understanding and of the identity, and this is already clear to an actor who has at his disposal sufficient self-knowledge. This two-dimensionality of the subjectively meant meaning/sense can, however, stand out and be noticed from a second perspective, in which subjectively meant meaning/sense is seen inside of and within social life. We mean the perspective of the with-acting person (i.e. the co-actor, as the person acting together with the initial/principal actor), which likewise rests and is based on an interpretation schema (or schema of interpretation), that is, the said co-actor's perspective produces sense/meaning in order to intellectually deal with, manage and overcome already produced sense/meaning, regardless of with which success and with which refractions, i.e. mutations (or transformations). The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives constitutes – so to speak – a meeting or encounter of meaning / sense with meaning/sense, which can end in the (partial) absorption of one meaning by the other meaning, or in the coming into being, production or creation of a third, fourth etc. meaning/sense. Finally, the apprehension of the subjectively meant sense / meaning from the perspective of an observer, who can simultaneously include in his way of looking at things, the perspectives of those acting and of those with-acting (i.e. of the co-actors in respect of the people acting), and is not in the least obliged in himself to share in the

subjective sense/meaning coupled with both these perspectives, occurs and takes place. Which subjective sense/meaning will the observer, for his part, summon in order to reveal the subjectively meant sense/meaning of the observed actors, depends upon his own (i.e. the observer's) self-understanding. If he understands himself as a scientist, and his end/goal is scientific, then in the place and instead of the more or less unreflected interpretative schemata (or schemata of interpretation), which the actors in reference and in relation to themselves make use of, he must put more or less reflected interpretive principles (or principles of interpretation), which he must refine, if possible, on the basis of the existing proof, (pieces of) evidence, documents or indications, signs and circumstantial evidence, and in ever newer attempts, tries (or approach runs, i.e. starts). From this conceptual contradistinction of non-scientific and scientific interpretive schemata (schemata of interpretation), one may, though, in no case or way draw the conclusion that interpretations of alien, i.e. another's or others' meaning/sense, which ex cathedra raise or make a scientific claim, would come ipso facto nearer, closer to the true facts (or factual circumstances) than other interpretations [[not making a claim to scientific validity]].^{cxxxvii}

Research into and exploration of subjectively meant meaning/sense stood at the (epi)centre of social-psychological and social-theoretical approaches, like symbolic interactionism and ethno-methodology⁴²³, which in or despite all their one-sidedness or unilateralness, and notwithstanding their unhistorical character, presented and offered some useful or beneficial insight into the social relation's mechanisms in connection with the self-understanding of the actors. In a programmatic delimitation or demarcation from them (i.e. symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology), functionalistic system(s) theoreticians,

⁴²³ Cf. e.g. Douglas, "Understanding Everyday Life"; Denzin, "Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodology".

to whom the functions of acting mean just as much as the “concomitants of the act”⁴²⁴, gave precedence to and preferred the objective, that is, system-relevant meaning/sense of action. We already know why the alternative [[choice between the subjective and the objective meaning/sense of action]], is false: even for the direction of the heterogony of ends having an effect over the long term, it is not at all indifferent which subjective meaning/sense and which subjective ends/goals stood at the beginning of the historical process concerned; that is to say, not any subjective meaning/sense or end/goal causes, effects or brings about this (i.e. a particular) concrete result or outcome; water is neither hydrogen nor oxygen; alone, i.e. solely and only, these elements, however, can generate, beget, engender or produce – through their having an effect together, or acting in combination, in the appropriate dosage – water⁴²⁵. Social-ontologically, but also historically and sociologically, neither with the criterion of the subjective, nor with the criterion of the objective meaning/sense, is it (i.e. water[[, or the business of scientific observation]]) alone done/made (i.e. neither subjective meaning, nor objective meaning suffices alone social-ontologically, historically and sociologically). And that does not constitute even a labouriously, arduously, onerously achieved and gained (or hard-won) social-scientific ascertainment, but belongs already to the Common Sense of the person acting, who knows very well that the consequences of his (kinds of) acting(s) (actions or acts) – because of the meddling and interference of unforeseen factors –, can deviate, diverge, differ or vary considerably from or vis-à-vis his own ends/goals. He knows also that other people very often judge his (kinds of) acting(s) (actions or acts) by/with regard to their tangible consequences, and not by/with regard to their intent(ion)s. In the perception of society, by the way, the consequences can possibly, perhaps (or if need be) count so much that it appears to be indifferent or immaterial whether they are

⁴²⁴ Thus, Warriner, *Emergence*, p. 25.

⁴²⁵ See Ch. II, Sec. 2A and Cbc, above.

consequences of action or consequences of mere behaviour. Carelessness, recklessness or negligence is, in fact or even, in some cases, punishable. The question as to how wide, i.e. far consequences stretch in time and in social space, how accurately and precisely, that is, the objective meaning/sense of (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts can be determined, can only be relatively and incompletely answered. The actor can, though, ascertain the distance between the subjective and the objective sense/meaning of his act(s), action(s) or (kinds of) acting(s),— if at all —, then, only afterwards, i.e. in retrospect, as the observer of the same act(ion)s or (kinds of) acting(s). With a certain temporal or social distance of the observer from the acting, action or act, this (observer (and previously actor)) is transformed or converted into a historian or sociologist, for whom the question of the objective meaning/sense moves or comes to the fore(ground) for two reasons: because the subjectively meant sense/meaning perhaps can no longer be so clearly detected, traced, determined and ascertained, and/or, because the — in the meanwhile — clearly emerging objective sense/meaning looks historically or socially more interesting.

A first reason for the covering over/up of the subjective meaning/sense of acting, action or the act by its objective sense/meaning lies or is (found) in the structure of the acting, action or act itself, namely, in its double-sidedness, in respect of which the actor can never entirely be the master. We remind ourselves or recollect the difference or distinction between current, topical or actual, and, motivation-like/related or motivational understanding of an acting, action or act⁴²⁶. The latter (motivation-related understanding of an act(ion/ing)) orientates itself to the subjective sense/meaning, i.e. to the motives or ends / goals of each and every respective actor, the former (current and actual understanding of an act(ion/ing)) presupposes that the acting, action or act, as structure, and looked at independent, regardless and irrespective of each and

⁴²⁶ See footnote 174 in this chapter, above.

every respective concrete actor, is not entirely wrapped up in, absorbed or assimilated by those motives or ends/goals, that it, therefore, in principle it (i.e. the acting, action or act) goes and is consistent with a number of motives and ends/goals. Because if there were a direct and exclusive correspondence between the structure or the outer/external course of acting, action or of the act, and, the actor's motives and or ends/goals, then motivation-like/related or motivational understanding, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives etc. would be superfluous. The acting, action or the act remains as structure and autonomous reality more comprehensive than all/everything which the actor as subjective sense/meaning can connect with it (i.e. the acting, action or act), and this, its objective dimension, which lies beyond the actor's motives and or ends / goals, and consequently is withdrawn or taken away from his control, in fact, often also from his knowledge, unfolds and develops, possibly, perhaps, if need be, its independent or autonomous effect, it (i.e. the said objective dimension) is channeled into the riverbeds of social action, of which the actor did not know or did not want to know, or it even and in fact breaks new ground. The objective sense/meaning of the acting, action or act gains, obtains or wins, therefore, the upper hand vis-à-vis the subjective sense or meaning because the acting, action or act as such represents and constitutes something more than that which the actor invests in it. This objective sense/meaning gains, obtains or wins, however, the upper hand, also because the acting, action or act makes up or constitutes something less than action. The individual (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts swim or float, as it were, in the stream, river or current of the individual, but above all, of collective action, and this stream, river or current drives them (i.e. the individual (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts) to where they did not necessarily want to go^{cxviii}. Thus, the now acting, action or act surviving and continuing to live as an acting sequence, act succession or series of action is detached from its actor, in order to be united inside the stream, river or current of action with other (kinds of) acting(s), actions or acts, which were

likewise detached from their actors, and transformed or converted into an acting sequence, act succession or series of action towards (i.e. in) a new construct, namely towards/in a new comprehensive objective meaning (sense) context (interrelation). The originally and initially clearly delimitable and demarcatable sense unity (i.e. unity of meaning), which was called acting, action or the act, gradually loses its outlines or contours, it distances itself from that which at the start, in the beginning, initially, was constitutive for it, namely, the identity and the self-understanding of a concrete bearer of the decision (who does or can leave (i.e. not do and omit) something), in order to step into, i.e. enter, a field, area or sector, in which the impersonal law of the genus (i.e. the species or the human race) stands and is: it is this, of not being able to not act. The compulsion (coercion, constraint, force, pressure, duress or obligation), under which action stands/is, namely, of having unconditionally to continue, overwhelms, overpower, overcomes, subdues, vanquishes the individual acting, action or act, and sooner or later comes into conflict with the actor's self-understanding, which supported this acting, action or act. Because the actor wants to understand himself as much/far as possible as someone who, (whilst) acting, clears away and removes obstacles and hindrances, and creates, makes or produces conclusive, concluded (final and definitive) facts corresponding to and in accordance with his ends/goals. This is, however, not granted to him. The unceasingly, incessantly acting being/creature in the actor undermines all individual ends/goals and achievements, feats of the action originator (i.e. prompter, begetter and creator of acting and the act), which (i.e. the said action originator), nevertheless, lives in the same breast (bosom or heart) [[as the acting being/creature]] too; this being/creature obeys and submits to the impersonal law of the genus, species (i.e. the human race), and entwines and involves his alter ego, that is, the action originator (i.e. prompter, begetter and creator of acting and the act) in always new and ever newer practical contradictions, which only can be (re)solved at the level of objective meaning

(sense) contexts (interrelations), or rather can be detached from the contradictions which are typical and characteristic of, particular and specific to, or inherent at this level. That does not mean that the actor's self-understanding would not have any conscious or unconscious points of contact with the – either way – existing objective meaning/sense contexts and interrelations; [[it does mean]] that he can squeeze or wedge himself into these objective meaning/sense contexts and interrelations, therefore, only under loud protest (i.e. by protesting a lot). These points of contact, however, are different, in terms of content, from case to case, and according to or depending on where the subjective and where the objective sense/meaning is to settle and become established. Because both subjective and objective meaning are to be encountered both in individual, as well as in collective praxis and practice. But the comprehensive objective meaning/sense contexts and interrelations are constituted and flourish par excellence in the field, area or sector of the latter collective praxis, and indeed in synchrony, just as in diachrony. Subjectively meant meaning/sense does not yield, produce, make or result in – on its own or by itself – either the heterogony of ends or social facts, which constitutively belong to society in its (society's) and their (the heterogony of ends and social facts') historical becoming.

B. Situation and Time

It is acted (i.e. action takes place or humans act), inwardly, internally, and, outwardly, externally, without exception, in concrete situations. The situation-determined(-related, -dependent or -conditioned) boundaries of action offer or provide the guarantee for the fact that this action is not lost in boundlessness,

endlessness or limitlessness. At the same time, they (i.e. the said boundaries) represent and constitute a compulsion, [a kind of] coercion, force, constraint or pressure, under which action must be refined and rationalised. An actor, namely, who fully takes into account and fully bears in mind the situation in its concreteness, participates in it (i.e. the said situation) through his motives and ends, goals, rather than through his wishes and spontaneous drives, impetuses or urges. And, in general, behaviour and action differ from each other by means of the fact that only the latter (action) takes place in situations, that is to say, is shaped, moulded or formed in accordance with concrete situations. Since man (i.e. humans) can act only from a certain standpoint, thus he does not have to stop, halt and put an end to only diffuse and fluctuating, wavering and vacillating affects (sentiments or emotions) or wishes, in order to be able to gain a stable standpoint at all, but he must also limit, restrict and confine, reduce or cut (down) his constitutive world openness (or openness to the world) precisely through his action⁴²⁷. The ambivalent structure of the situation obliges, accommodates, complies with, comes towards or approaches and is responsive to that. It (i.e. the ambivalent structure of the situation) offers an action field (or field of action) so or such that it can correspond to and with the pushing, pressing, urging, insistence of the acting being (or creature) towards action, and simultaneously necessarily entails a demarcation, boundary, perimeter, marking, restriction, limitation and delimitation (dissociation or separation) of this same action field / field of action. The offer, proposition or supply of possibilities of acting, action or of an/the act (acting / action possibilities) in general, and the channeling of action into a certain riverbed, belong inseparably together in the situation. The – anthropologically seen – absolute openness of the field of acting and the act (or action field), and the chances, opportunities or prospects of acting and the act (or action chances, opportunities or prospects) is converted

⁴²⁷ Rothacker, *Anthropologie*, p. 146.

through and by means of the getting in the way, interposing or intervening of the situation, into a relative and problematic ([“absolute”] openness (of the action field)), whereby or in relation to which precisely the relative (i.e. relativity) and problematical dimension, in the process, has an orient(at)ing effect. This relative and problematic openness of the situation can, of course, once and for all quench the thirst for new action and experiencing, experiences. Under the pressure of the never wholly and completely unfolding and developing and – in the background – constantly simmering, bubbling, swirling or seething potential, capabilities and capacity for acting, action or the act, the relative and the problematic, that is, the situation, is always delimited, demarcated and defined anew. Through more and more, always new shifts and displacements of the situation horizon (or horizon of the situation) it is, so to speak, attempted to give again to action that totality which in principle becomes and befits it, due to the absolute world openness (i.e. openness of the world) of the human actor, but which must remain denied to and withheld from it (i.e. action) because of the necessity of the being-in-(a) situation. In praxis (i.e. practice), though, these displacements and shifts, or the new definitions of the situation, are not carried out and executed as the romantic longing and yearning for that which is present in the relative, and, after all, the not present absolute, but rather due to noticeable, perceptible and tangible compulsion(s), constraints, (kinds of) coercion or interests. The situation also means situation compulsion, constraint and coercion (the coercion, constraint and compulsion of the situation), and the actor’s reaction thereof (i.e. to the situation compulsion / constraint / coercion) can consist in the adaptation or adjustment of his means, or else of his ends and goals, to the given facts of the situation, it (i.e. the said actor’s reaction) can envisage, set its sights on and aim for a change / changing of the situation, and finally, it can show and manifest itself in the striving and endeavour to replace this situation with a more favourable situation.

The expression, the “actor’s reaction to the situation” suggests the false impression, as if between the actor and the situation, the same relationship existed as between a subject and something objective (i.e. object-related, concrete, graphic or representational). One should rather imagine the state of affairs (facts, factual circumstances or situation) thus, as if the situation, as it were, stood and was between the subject and the objects, yet so, thus, that the subject and its (i.e. the subject’s) objects first of all are concretised in it (i.e. the situation)⁴²⁸. In abstracto (i.e. abstractly), one can enumerate the components of the situation, and recognise in it (i.e. the situation) for instance a subject, which perceives the situation and thereupon reacts one way or another; a theme or topic, whereupon (i.e. in regard to which) interaction relates; spatial-temporal conditions and circumstances and relations inclusive of the interaction partners (or partners (in regard) to the interaction); and finally, a horizon, which refers beyond the given facts and data to the future (i.e. something of the future) as the result of the expected actions and reactions of the subjects. Nevertheless, such a correct enumeration hides and conceals the essential circumstance and fact that the concept of the situation actually does not mean its own (i.e. the situation’s) components, but rather the relation between the same components, above all, the way which certain subjective or objective given facts are given for a subject^{cxix}; that which in a situation applies from the point of view of the actor as an object, i.e. intentional reference point of his action, and is either a thing or a man (i.e. human), can hardly be described without consideration of exactly this point of view and this intention of acting, action or the/an act, if one wants to talk of a *situation*⁴²⁹. Irrespective of where the dividing line between “objective” and “subjective” factors of the situation runs and passes in the eyes of the actor, and to what extent this actor feels, in the course of this, to be (a) subjective shaper and moulder of objective given facts or not, the acting-in-a-

⁴²⁸ According to a fortunate (felicitous) formulation by Finke, *Untersuchungen*, p. 190, cf. p. 252.

⁴²⁹ Cf. Dreitzel, *Leiden*, p. 152ff.; Bahrtdt, *Industriebürokratie*, pp. 5, 6.

situation subject remains from the standpoint of the observer, an objectively given factor of this same situation, i.e. one such objectively given factor, from which, like from all the rest of the objectively given factors too, causal effects can start (and have as a starting point). In other words, this means that the contradistinction between the I (ego) and the situation can often have meaning from the perspective of the I (ego), but never from the perspective of social-ontological analysis. In accordance with the being and the being able (or ability) of the acting subject, the situation is also on each and every respective occasion another and a different situation, that is, that being and being able (or ability) must be included and incorporated in the situation's description as a form-related (i.e. formal) variable. In order to take up a good terminological distinction: the "object situation", that is, the situation without the actor, is something other and different than the "total situation", namely, the situation in view and consideration of the actor and of the causal effects starting from him⁴³⁰. Since being and being able (or ability) are never identical in two different actors, then one may, in view of the necessary inclusion of the actor in the total situation, venture and dare (to make) the assertion that no actor ever finds himself in precisely the same situation as another actor, and indeed even during the identity (i.e. sameness) of the object situation (or situation as regards the object or objects). The "objects" of the situation can, for their part, be classified from two points of view: some objects amongst them (i.e. all of the objects) favour the ends and goals of the acting, action or the act of the actor (i.e. the actor's acting or action goals and ends), others not; some objects can be influenced by the being and the being able (or ability) of the actor, others not. Already, this gross, coarse, rough division reveals and shows that the actor's positioning and stance vis-à-vis the object situation (or situation of the objects) can never be one-dimensional and unambiguous (i.e. monosemantic with just

⁴³⁰ According to Sheldon, "Some Observations", p. 31.

one meaning). Even in regard to an activist basic or fundamental positioning and stance, adjustments and adaptations are unavoidable, even keen-and-enthusiastic-to-adjust-and-adapt philistines [or money-hungry petty-bourgeois] pursue, in their way and manner or mode, aims which go beyond the present and current object situation (or situation of objects). The situation is neither the field of activity of the “freedom” of an ideal, conscious and self-conscious actor, as existentialistic daemonology sees it⁴³¹, nor the cemetery or graveyard in which the compulsions, constraints and coercion(s) of adjustment and adaptation bury all great action plans (or great plans as regards acting or an / the act). It (i.e. the situation) must be distinguished from the merely passively registered “situation or position of things”, and simultaneously, thanks to the “situation or position of things”, be defined from the point of view of the possibilities of acting, action or the act, as these are offered in accordance with the actor’s being and being able (or ability), – even if they can be perceived only through modest, meagre, unassuming, simple or small-minded, pettifogging endeavours and strivings at adjustment and adaptation. A situation is, accordingly, a situation or position of things, which, is seen from the perspective of the in it (i.e. the situation) putative or supposed possibilities of acting, action or the act, that is, the situation is judged by its capacity, potential and capabilities for acting, action or an act. What possesses only actuality, i.e. what is already realised, but does not possess potentiality to be realised, might or can be apostrophised or mentioned as the “situation or position of things”, it is, in any event, no situation in the social-ontological sense (and meaning) meant here. In the situation, actuality and potentiality are interwoven with each other, one checks, curbs, slows down, restricts, limits (or puts the brakes on) this one i.e. the other, this (i.e. the other) pierces or undermines(, makes and shoots holes in) that (i.e. the first one). The tension, stress or intensity between

⁴³¹ See e.g. Sartre, *Être*, p. 608 and passim.

actuality and potentiality, which dim, dull, blur and cloud the image or picture of the situation, sometimes more, sometimes less, prohibits and forbids the deducing or deriving from the so-called “logic of the situation”, a mechanical rationality, to whose commands the actor would have to adapt and adjust, or whose commands would be completely unambiguous, crystal clear and binding for every rationally acting person, i.e. actor. Said otherwise: the rational motives (as considerations, inducements or motivating factors) which are to be told, seen or read from each and every respective logic of the situation, by no means look or are made out to be, in the same way, compelling, cogent and necessary for all actors or even for the same actor, so that with reference to them (the said rational motives as considerations, inducements or motivating factors), a kind of rationalistic behaviourism can be founded (and justified).

This is so much less the case, since the situation, just as acting, action or the act, to a certain extent, can be comprehended, understood, grasped and interpreted as an interpretive construct (or construct of interpretation). The definition of the situation on the part of an actor or a number of actors is constitutively contained in the situation next to the other “objective” and “subjective” components – even in this sense, it is a matter of “his” or of “their” situation. The definition of the situation represents and constitutes a necessary presupposition, precondition or prerequisite for every (kind of) acting, action or act. That means that on it (i.e. the said definition of the situation), not only does the character of the acting, action or act depend, but the fact itself that it (i.e. the acting, action or act) is acted (i.e. done and realised). It suffices that people really define situations (i.e. in and as reality) so that these situations have real consequences, irrespective of whether and to what extent or sense they have (continued) existence outside of the actors’ imagination (notion, idea or conception)⁴³². The phenomenon of the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy

⁴³² Thomas, *Person*, pp. 147, 84ff., 19ff., 29; cf. Rothaker, *Anthropologie*, p. 149ff.

reveals, shows or indicates that and how a definition of the situation can bring about, induce or lead to situations which at the time of the formulation of the [aforesaid] definition possessed no reality. A particularly drastic example of the self-fulfilling prophecy is the case in which from an entirely and completely false or purely invented or completely fabricated definition of the situation, the corresponding, real consequences ensue. There does not exist, nonetheless, any necessity that such prophecies, predictions or forecasts be connected one-sidedly and unilaterally with false definitions of the situation⁴³³, especially if we consider and take into account that even apt, well-aimed definitions of a situation do not necessarily and especially – because of their truth – lead to, bring about and occasion certain consequences, but rather because of the psychological effects of their (the said apt definitions’) true content [[they bring about certain consequences, i.e. certain consequences are perceived as having been brought about^{cxl}]]. The important thing here is not truth or untruth, but it is a matter of the transubstantiation of mere representation into tangible reality. Notwithstanding the possibility of such transubstantiations, the assertion would go too far that through an interpretation, the situation is transformed into something imagined, and only through this loss of its raw facticity (or factuality), only through its (i.e. the said situation’s) transfer or removal to the level of the derivative, does it gain and obtain its specific reality as a situation⁴³⁴. But also in the situation as imagination, facticity / factuality carries on and continues living and having an effect (which is) disguised and sublimated; it (i.e. facticity / factuality) can, moreover, at any time, enter or invade, in its intellectually (thought-related) unprocessed shape and form, the imagination, in order to assert its rights. The distance or distancing of the situation as imagination from the situation as facticity / factuality, (i.e. the

⁴³³ As Merton does it, *Social Theory*, p. 477. Cf. the critical remarks and comments, observations by Krishna, the “Self-Fulfilling Prophecy”, esp. p. 1105ff..

⁴³⁴ Cf. Finke, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 224, 225.

ensemble of the objectively existing and present factors, that is, of the things and of the actors), may only with, on some occasions, high or great risks, exceed, overstep or surpass a certain extent, degree or measure. Incidentally, it (the said distance or distancing) serves and is of use to the uninvolved or disinterested (i.e. neutral or dispassionate) observer often as a criterion, on the basis of which he (i.e. the said uninvolved observer) judges the action of the actors in the situation concerned. For their part, the actors are able, nolentes volentes, to get to the bottom of and suss out the fact that the transformation or metamorphosis of facticity and factuality into imagination, just as they concretely practice, pursue it or carry it on, does not at all suffice for the coping or coming to terms with the situation in accordance with their ends and goals. They do not, however, have to do it, and sometimes they – even after a catastrophe – are caught on (i.e. they stick to) their earlier imagination and representation (idea or notion) of the situation.^{cxli} In short, one should not comprehend the constitutive meaning of the definition of the situation for the action of the actors as a *carte blanche* for wishes; certainly, for some actors, it is exactly this (*carte blanche*), but in principle it is not excluded that the actor precisely through his own definition of the situation recognises the unfulfillability (i.e. unfulfillable nature) of his wishes, and consequently, determines his motives and ends, goals in divergence and deviation from those wishes.

The most important thing for man (i.e. humans) always remains man (humans), what man directly or indirectly says about men, how man directly or indirectly reacts to men / humans. That is also why in a situation, the social relation counts the most, including the factors, as is understood (and obvious), in respect of which every actor may presume they (i.e. the said factors) would exert influence one way or another on the shaping and moulding of the social relation, namely, the positionings, attitudes, stances and values of the with-

acting persons (i.e. the co-actors, as the persons acting together with the initial / principal actor), as well as the dominating, dominant modes of behaviour, customs, conventions, mores and institutions⁴³⁵. The narrow, in fact, privileged social-ontological affinity (or relationship) of the social relation and the situation comes therein to light or to the surface in relation to the fact that the mere meeting (or clashing) of people, regardless of the objective surrounding or attendant circumstances of the meeting, brings to life a genuine (real or true) situation, i.e. it (the said mere meeting of people) simultaneously makes actualities and potentialities visible. In an already existing situation, the precedence and priority or primacy of the social relation becomes apparent in the fact that the situation as a rule and primarily is accustomed to change primarily when one of those involved and participating announces a new end, goal and or claim, demand. The components of the situation are, henceforth, assessed from the point of view as to whether they could be useful or obstructive to the announced claim / demand, and the positioning, stance of the actors vis-à-vis the situation is determined by the anticipation of the realisation of that claim / demand, that is, by the answer to the hypothetical question or problem as to how the situation – after the realisation of the announced claim or demand – will appear or look. The smaller the expected changes seem to be, so much the less does the announcement of new claims and demands influence the situation. The constitutive meaning of the definition of the situation, for the situation, finds expression, manifests itself and is reflected in the endeavour and effort of every side to strengthen and consolidate or change the situation in its sense (i.e. according to its desires), first of all due to the fact that it has a corresponding or an analogous effect or influence on the other side's definition of the situation. The struggle over the definition of the situation is an essential or central, main point (crux) of the struggle over the shaping and moulding of

⁴³⁵ Thomas, *On Social Organization*, pp. 155, 290.

the social relation. Standardisations of the interaction on a smaller or greater scale occur via definitions of the situation, which with-enclose (i.e. include with the said definitions of the situation) an organisation of the intersubjectively binding meaning. Thus seen, the problem of order is solved by a common assumption in respect of a certain definition of the situation on the part of the actors concerned, which is accompanied (and comes with) an express or tacit definition of that which is to be regarded as disorder⁴³⁶. It must, of course, be made clear that without a – for all sides – binding organisation of meaning, (that is, of values and of duties, obligations coming into being and arising from them (i.e. those said values and duties)), the definition of the situation shared by all sides in itself by no means suffices for the guarantee (i.e. ensuring) of order and or of friendship. Foes can just as much share the essential objective aspects of a definition of the situation, and nonetheless, draw very different normative and practical conclusions from that situation. Because precisely the agreement over the objective aspects of the situation in fact strengthens and reinforces them both in the view and perception that their contrast and opposition towards each other is unbridgeable. The extent and the aspects of the agreement or non-agreement in regard to the definition of the situation varies according to and depending on the depth and the breadth of this latter (definition of the situation); the reason for the agreement or non-agreement itself lies in the manner how those who define the situation, at the same time, define their own identity, and put in combination (i.e. connect) this definition (of their own identity), either way, with the definition of the situation. Identity does not have to be completely and fundamentally (thoroughly, through and through, entirely) constituted and defined (with)in the framework of the topically interesting situation; they (i.e. the actors concerned) can feel that already before their entry into the latter (i.e. topically interesting situation) their identity is conclusively, finally and

⁴³⁶ McHugh, *Defining the Situation*, esp. chap. III-IV.

definitively constituted and defined, and behave accordingly in their new situation. On the other hand, the constitution and definition of identity cannot be thought away (i.e. they are absolutely essential) in respect of the constitution and definition of concrete situations, no matter how this takes place and is acted out in each and every individual case, no matter how the relative weight of the “borderline or marginal” and of the “normal” situation is distributed from case to case.

Just as (kinds of) acting(s), actions and acts are temporary, transient, transitory crystallisations in the aura, atmosphere, or flow of action, so too, situations are striking, prominent, clear-cut, distinctive sectors (clippings or cuttings, i.e. parts, extracts, excerpts) from the continuum of social life, areas or realms with changing (varying, variable) boundaries, upon which, on each and every respective occasion, a glaring, flashy, dazzling, or very bright light falls, whilst all around those situations, the grey of irrelevance and of indifference spreads. Since the situation always constitutes the field of acting, action or of the act coming into question (i.e. of interest), thus, no distance can be made out (and determined) between the – on each and every respective occasion – particularly or especially active field or area of social action in toto, and the particular field or area of social life, which – on each and every respective occasion – is called a situation. It is a matter of the same thing, affair or cause under different names, it is a matter, also, of the same area or realm of relevance in which a certain order of preference in respect of given facts and of behavioural modes (or modes and ways of behaviour) dominates⁴³⁷. The central theme, which in each and every respective area or realm of relevance entails or draws to it the attention and attentiveness of actors, can just as clearly be defined as the area or realm of relevance itself, however, it can also be the case that (the said central) theme and area or realm of relevance exhibit differently

⁴³⁷ Regarding the situation as “area or realm of relevance”, see Schütz, *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 227ff..

their clear contour / outline. Then, the definition of the situation must – be it on the part of actors, be it on the part of the observer – turn out correspondingly vague, until it loses the predicate (i.e. property, characteristic or attribute) of a definition⁴³⁸. The vagueness of the definition of the situation is, however, also in a certain respect, immanent and insurmountable, since the outer and external boundaries of every situation remain partly extensible, expansible, partly permeable. Often, the bound(arie)s of a situation function merely as transitions or crossings to another situation, they represent and constitute, as it were, vantage points or outlooks to discover new horizons, since the dynamics of a situation exactly consist(s) in pointing beyond the bound(arie)s or borders of the topical situation. The extensibility, expansibility and permeability of the situation constitute a function of the identity of the actors, that is, of their claims and (cap)ability at (and capacity for) acting, action and the act or interaction. Actors, whose social action radius (or radius of action) is restricted and limited, must adapt and be geared to or be prepared and make arrangements for situations of a smaller extent, scope, radius, on a smaller scale, and lesser intensity. However, notwithstanding the immanent difficulties in completely clearly drawing the bound(arie)s of every situation, one can in general gain a clear concept or notion / idea of the situation when or if one sets it apart from related concepts or notions / ideas, or differentiates it from important points of view. If the situation, in principle, represents and constitutes a sector (clipping or cutting, i.e. part, extract, excerpt) from the continuum of social life, thus, one may first of all distinguish between the situation and its surroundings or environment / milieu: the former is the topical or actual, the latter, merely the possible, yet potentially or possibly the – having an effect from afar – field of acting and the act (or action field) of the actor⁴³⁹. The actor is, as a rule,

⁴³⁸ Dreitzel, *Leiden*, p. 180.

⁴³⁹ According to Sheldon, “Some Observations”, p. 31. Cf. Bales’s distinction between (the) “inner” and “outer situation”, *Interaction*, esp. p. 43..

conscious of this integration or incorporation / embodiment of his topical and actual situation in a comprehensive environment (or extensive surroundings); not seldom (i.e. often), he must, in fact, regulate his action bearing in mind the influences which stem from this environment or from these surroundings. Institutional or ideational factors (ethical, world-theoretical, political etc. convictions), which originate, come and stem from the wider social milieu, penetrate and force and or find their way into the narrower situation, and determine very often the behaviour of actors towards one another to a considerably and substantially greater extent than the endogenous given facts of the situation (endogenen Gegebenheiten der Situation) would be able to do, or be capable of doing, it. Mind you, or certainly, those (aforesaid institutional or ideational) factors may be comprehended and described as the components of the topical and actual situation, on the other hand, it remains heuristically and objectively fertile, to separate the endogenous and exogenous components of the situation from one another. The situation, indeed, possesses its autonomy and independence (self-reliance and self-sufficiency), however, this exists and flourishes on a social terrain (or: in a social soil) which exists independent or irrespective of it, and can support and bear a number of different situations. With that (or as a result), the elementary question of the relation between the historical and sociological way of looking at things is raised anew merely from another point of view: how far do “structures” or supra-individual meaning contexts decisively (and in a determinative manner or fashion) reach inside situations which at least prima facie stand or are under the influence of the action of concrete actors? Certainly, from the outside, not only do the effects of overarching (spilling over, overlapping, spreading) structures penetrate and permeate the situation, but likewise the consequences of action of localisable (i.e. locatable) subjects; nonetheless, obviously the first case (of the effects of overarching structures) has, imparts or is of, greater methodological relevance. Duration situations, i.e. durable, lasting or enduring situations, if one may speak

thus and call them that, whose most durable, lasting and enduring situation is the “situation humaine”, which, however, can be terraced or arranged in steps, i.e. layered or graded and scaled, not only from anthropological and social-ontological, but also from sociological or historical points of view, often have a decisive influence on that which one could name the open or closed character of a temporary, transient topical and actual situation⁴⁴⁰. Consequently, we come back or return to the ambivalent structure of the situation mentioned (spoken about or referred to) at the beginning.

The situation is a spatio-temporal continuum. In it (i.e. the situation) something occurs, happens and takes place, or is pregnant, expectant with occurrences, events or incidents; the occurrence, event or incident, however, lifts, i.e. abolishes (as a social relation) the sovereign independence or autonomy of fixed or stable and – as between one another – separate(d) things (objects and subjects), which likewise occupy or fill fixed or stable and – as between one another – separate(d) places inside of an absolutely comprehended (understood, conceived, interpreted, taken in) space and an absolutely comprehended (understood, conceived, interpreted, taken in) time. Where it is no longer a matter of fixed or stable, independent, stand-alone and autonomous things, but of occurrences, events or incidents (social relations), then time and space are merged into (or absorbed and assimilated by) a spatio-temporal continuum which grips (i.e. includes) the changing (varying, changeable, variable) relations between the occurrences, events or incidents. The relations of the occurrences, events or incidents here found, establish, cause, create or bring about (social) space and (social) time. Occurrences, events and incidents do not,

⁴⁴⁰ In another sense, Boudon (*Désordre*, p. 165ff..) uses the terms “situation ouverte” and “situation fermée”. In that (i.e. “situation ouverte”) no agreement dominates between those involved or the participants over the state of affairs to be brought about, so that several combinations of interaction, as well as innovative efforts and endeavours are imaginable and thinkable; in this (i.e. “situation fermée”), on the other hand, a fundamental agreement dominates, which numerically reduces the necessary combinations, and makes innovations extensively or largely superfluous. Cf. our explanations above regarding the struggle over the definition of the situation, above.

therefore, take place simply *inside* of an already existing space and of a since eternity (i.e. forever or eternal) time proceeding linearly and uniformly. The density and the intensity of the occurrences, incidents and events in particular and especially determine the density and the intensity of time – from each and every respective perspective of the actors, it is understood (i.e. it goes without saying). Existentialists have in various, different and miscellaneous variations thought about the concept of the situation together with the greatest possible density and intensity of the occurrences, events or incidents, and, of time. According to their perception or view, the “typical” situation contains “constantly and permanently, an element or factor or moment of crisis”, which makes clear decisions indispensable, so that, finally, the situation and the decision must be seen as “complementary concepts”; in pointed, sharpened i.e. exaggerated or intensified situations of the decision (or decision situations), “the essence” of the situation can be more clearly recognised, and even situations, which seem to be familiar and normal, would conceal and hide in themselves a component of the decision⁴⁴¹. This tellingly or in a well-aimed manner, describes some situations, not all, and also not the “typical” situation, because precisely the “typical” situation does not exist. The connection between the situation and the decision loses much of its striven-for or sought-after dramaticity, i.e. dramatic nature or drama, if we recall, visualise or imagine that the situation is a field of acting and of the act (or an action field), and the decision, concretised as an intent(ion), represents and constitutes the specific feature (or characteristic) (*differentia specifica*) of action vis-à-vis mere behaviour. That connection is, therefore, not original, but it comes about and materialises via the concept of acting, action and the act, which does not necessarily mean action in crises(-situations) or “typical situations”. The contradistinction, situation – non-situation, or, decision – non-decision, means,

⁴⁴¹ Instead (i.e. in lieu) of many others, Finke, *Untersuchungen*, p. 10ff..

in actual fact, in the existentialistic context, the contradistinction normality – exception, whose problematic character we know about⁴⁴². As far as the dimension of time (or time / temporal dimension) is concerned, thus it is generally correct and right to say that the situation differs in general from the surroundings and environment exactly through or with the condensing and intensification of time in it (i.e. the situation), it (i.e. the situation) entails a greater and potentially or possibly growing time pressure and decision pressure (i.e. pressure as to time, temporal constraints, and as to making a decision or decisions). Whereas time in the environment and surroundings is at a standstill, i.e. has stopped, or flows, passes, runs slowly, because the occurrences, events or incidents over there more or less seem indifferent, time in the situation, in which the occurrences, events and incidents concern the actor, runs and passes constantly and noticeably, perceptibly, it forces, coerces or compels the actor to run or pass in relation to that, more softly / more gently or harder / (more sharply, more violently, more harshly), and punishes him (i.e. the actor) sooner or later, if he does not do it. Since action can never cease^{exlii}, thus the pressure of time, loads and burdens and weighs down upon both “normal” situations as well as situations of crises (i.e. crisis situations), even if to – in each and every respective situation – a different extent. The pressure of time (time or temporal pressure), in this or that form, remains the normal state of affairs amongst mortal men (i.e. humans), who exactly because of their finiteness are situation-bound, and time, only from the perspective of a situation, can really (i.e. in reality) be lived through and experienced. It (i.e. the said time pressure) comes into being in the distance between intent(ion) or decision, and, execution or carrying out, and grows, increases to the extent that the absence of execution and carrying out influences the shaping and moulding of the social relation to the disadvantage or detriment of the actor. It reaches a high point or summit

⁴⁴² See Ch. III, Sec. 3 B, above.

when the reaction of the I (ego) to the action of the Other is set in motion even before the completion of this latter (action of the Other), or even has to appear on the scene and manifest itself as preventive action. The assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, the process of the (taking of a) decision and outer or external action then fuse and merge with one another in a very dense and intensive course of time. Time runs and passes more slowly when the situation is supposed to be managed and taken care of through and by means of long-term projects and correspondingly divided-up and apportioned action, which goes with or is compatible and consistent with well-thought-out or well-planned (partial) revisions and modifications of the original intentions. Precisely the time factor, which in packed and compact crisis situations (or situations of crises) compels and forces resoluteness, determination and decisiveness, devours and gobbles up, then, the consequence, which in those situations is indispensable already because in them (i.e. in those situations) there is no time for thinking things over and for rethinking things (or a shift in thinking and a change of one's ideas). In the situation, the actor, therefore, lives in various times (i.e. different periods of time), and indeed both in diachrony as well as in synchrony; because he simultaneously enters into and undertakes several social relations, of which every one (of those social relations) possesses its own particular temporality and existence in time, i.e. it develops and unfolds in an – on each and every respective occasion – particular situation. The particular temporality of the situation and or of the social relation determines which temporal or time dimension (i.e. dimension as to time), on each and every respective occasion, gains the upper hand. If in a general sense, the dimension of the future must dominate in the imagination of an acting being or creature⁴⁴³, thus both other dimensions of time or time / temporal dimensions [[i.e. the past and the present]] in certain situations move temporarily into the foreground (or

⁴⁴³ Regarding this, more in the 3rd volume of this work.

temporarily come to the fore), without, though, completely and entirely losing direct or indirect reference to the future. In situations in which the actors believe that the outcome of the present-day becoming or series of events would determine the relevant [[to them]] future totally and conclusively, definitively, they concentrate – exactly because of that – everything on the present. If less is expected from the future, thus the intensity of the present-day confrontations also sinks (i.e. falls, declines, drops), and correspondingly, the past gains in weight and gravitas, because normality, i.e. the lack of crises in the present, means as much as continuity with (regard to) the past. If the presence of the exception refers to the future, thus the presence of the normal refers rather to the past. These orientating schematisations regarding the determination of the situation (in respect and by virtue) of the dimensions of time do not in the least call into question or place in doubt the anthropological primacy of the future. This primacy results from the necessary orientation of action, which cannot possibly turn towards the past, and stretches out and extends at another level other and different than the three dimensions of time, as they are – on each and every respective occasion – ordered, arranged and organised in the actor's imagination. Even the primacy of the past in the imagination of an (e.g. traditionalistic) actor does not at all contradict the factual orientation of his action towards the future. Because in the past, norms are sought which are supposed to guide action, which, no matter what their chances of success, cannot be anything other than future(-related). To act with regard to the past, does not mean to act in the past.

In the situation, finally, every principle and every idea which raises, i.e. makes a universal claim, must be particularised, historicised and consequently subjected to temporality. Because in the situation they (i.e. every principle and every idea which makes a universal claim) must be interpreted concretely, i.e. with regard to the strategic and tactical needs of the actor and his identity.

Universal principles or ideas, which do or manage without the particularisation of – on his part – a concrete interpreter inside of or within a concrete situation, remain, in practice, completely irrelevant. The struggle over the definition of the situation is connected, thus, directly or indirectly with the struggle over the binding interpretation of such principles and ideas. Whoever invokes them (i.e. the said universal principles or ideas) must simultaneously do both (i.e. these two things): he must assert their universality and general validity, since he otherwise cannot found and justify his own power claim and claim to validity with ultimate or final arguments, and he must expediently particularise them in order to be able to correspondingly make them (i.e. such universal principles or ideas) usable or useful in accordance with the constitution, composition or texture and the requirements or demands of the situation. What is supposed to apply to all situations, adjusts, conforms and adapts to the logic of a sole concrete situation. Universalisms, of course, first saw the light of day in a particular situation, unhistorical or ahistorical ways of looking at things are, for their part, products of historical situations. The situation, however, also signals in a second respect the dominance of historicity or historicity and temporality. It (i.e. the situation) brings about and causes every time through the singularity or uniqueness of its structure a new hierarchisation of the factors causally having an effect, so that accordingly no kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) can be constituted, which would apply to all situations. And the other way around / conversely: causal factors have an effect in every situation otherwise, i.e. differently (at least they can have an effect differently) and can be determined by the rest of the causal factors on each and every respective occasion differently. Even the social relation of the same actors towards one another can be changed from situation to situation. The situation constitutes, therefore, an – every time – new combination or hierarchisation of causal factors permanently having an effect or causal factors being newly added (to the causal factors permanently having an effect)^{cxliii}. Whoever, therefore,

invokes historical kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities) is just as badly advised as the advocate, champion, promoter of universal principles or ideas – his determination of the situation (or situation-relatedness and situation dependency) is such that he must deny or dispute the determination of the situation (i.e. (his) situation-relatedness and situation dependency). The epistemological consequences of that were discussed in another context⁴⁴⁴. The praxeological consequences are, again, just as banal as the fundamental consequences. Machiavelli pointed to them in the call, request or exhortation to direct or adjust one's mode of behaviour and conduct (or modes of acting) to the texture, nature or composition of the time(s) (i.e. the epoch or era one lives in), which he underpinned and supported with the observation that two persons acting differently could – because of their different situation – reach and attain the same aim, or, two identical persons acting could for the same reason^{cxliv} achieve or attain very different results and outcomes⁴⁴⁵. A great student of him (i.e. Machiavelli), who thought about and pondered long and intensively (or hard) praxeological questions and problems, knew (of) only one sole kind of help as to orientation (or orientation aid / assistance) in regard to the singularity or uniqueness of the situation: the “tact of judgement”⁴⁴⁶.

C. Dyad and triad

The individual in a situation is indeed conceivable, imaginable and thinkable,

⁴⁴⁴ See Ch. II, Sec. 2 B and Cd, above.

⁴⁴⁵ *Il Principe*, XXV. The concept of the situation is rendered, related by or reflected in expressions like “qualità de' tempi” [[= “the quality of the times”]] or “li tempi e le cose” [[= “the times and the things / affairs / matters / business (of those times)”]].

⁴⁴⁶ Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, pp. 182, 263ff., 401, 663, 945, 961.

but is social-ontologically irrelevant, because the situation in which he can be found as an individual, and only as an individual, can only and merely be a situation in nature. Belonging to, and required for, the social situation – apart from the spatio-temporal framework, as well as the things perceivable in it (i.e. the said spatio-temporal framework) (objects and subjects) – are at least two actors, who stand and are in a social relation with or towards each other; the social-ontologically decisive or determinative component of the situation is, therefore, the social relation. Its (i.e. the said social relation's) outer or external mechanism can be set in motion and put into effect and be active only in social situations in which two or more actors meet or encounter one another, and it (i.e. the said social relation) realises the possibilities which fan (i.e. spread) out in the spectrum of the social relation. The discussion of the manner as to how the social relation is shaped and moulded inside of dyads and triads affords a fundamental or basic insight into those possibilities, in fact it contains in practice everything which can be said about these same possibilities at the form-related (i.e. formal) level and in abstracto; everything else, social ontology must leave to the sociological and historical analysis of the concrete case, which, though, for its part, may expect from the social-ontological discussion a first help in respect of orientation (or orientation assistance). Such help or assistance is all the more valuable when the form-related (i.e. formal) discussion of the possible interactions inside of the dyads and triads does not necessarily mean (or intend (to be about)) individual actors; its (i.e. social ontology's help as to (our discussion's) orientation's) findings applies, in other words, irrespective of whether the actors are individual or collective, whether, that is to say, the social relation is acted out and takes place between two or three individual or collective actors. Older and newer actors have rightly emphasised, underlined and stressed that in inter-group, inter-national and inter-personal relations, the same formal (i.e. form-related) structures and combination or combinatory

possibilities (possibilities of the combination) can be ascertained⁴⁴⁷. This indicates already that the formal, i.e. form-related, reconstruction of possible social relations inside of dyads and triads does not amount – and is not tantamount – to a real reconstruction of the societal or social whole from interactions between individuals at the micro-structural level; societies can take part or participate as collective actors in social relations inside of dyadic or triadic interactions, however, they do not come into being additively from or out of dyads and triads, which are put together, assembled or composed from or out of interacting, interactive individuals. Macro-structures do not represent and constitute the mere sum of micro-structures, and the relation between two individuals becomes or turns into a social relation only against the background of an already existing society. Also (or even) Robinson and Friday had already their socialisation in the societies of their origin behind them, when they met and encountered each other as individuals⁴⁴⁸. The social-ontological investigation, examination or study of that which can be acted out and take place interactively inside of dyads and triads results, therefore, in very little (or yields very little), in a genetic respect, rather it serves analytical ends or goals, whilst from or out of elementary given facts, it constructs basic or fundamental constellations which we can find again in every society, even on the smallest scale. It (i.e. the said social-ontological investigation) sharpens, furthermore, the eye for the qualitative aspects of seemingly merely quantitative changes, variations, alterations or modifications in the social field. In particular, or especially, the widening, broadening or extension and expansion of the dyad into a triad, that is, the advent, emergence or appearance of the third (party or actor) sets off and triggers qualitative effects and results, which determine, cause, give rise to or presuppose a whole series of social-ontologically

⁴⁴⁷ See e.g. Laing-Phillipson-Lee, *Interpersonelle Wahrnehmung*, p. 45ff. (the talk here is of dyadic systems). Cf. already Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 58.

⁴⁴⁸ See above, Ch. II, Sec. 2 Ce and 3 B.

fundamental phenomena. For good reason, the exploration of or research into dyadic and triadic constellations since Simmel drew the attention of a number of sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists and strategists (or researchers into strategy), so that henceforth a handsome (i.e. considerable, impressive and respectable) literature is available and in existence, from or upon which one can build.

From or out of the dyad, by far or by a long shot, not all constructs can of course be derived or deduced, which are indispensable for social life, but indeed the whole and entire spectrum of the social relations can be obtained, extracted, gathered or gained theoretically (i.e. in regard to theory). Two actors in interaction in principle suffice so that we can imagine everything that lies between the pole of extreme friendship and that pole of extreme enmity. The essence or nature of association and dissociation, of co-operation and estrangement (or alienation) comes to light in dyadic constellations, as it were, in chemical purity, whereas triadic interactions, rather, are suitable for the study of chemical combinations. In the formal (i.e. form-related) structure of the dyad there is not something which in itself would point to friendship or enmity. In it (i.e. the formal structure of the dyad), every form and every intensity, also every imaginable, conceivable and thinkable outcome of the social relation is potentially contained. In order to avoid the wrong conclusion or fallacy that this all is necessarily laid out, invested, moored, docked, set and tied up or embedded in psychical dispositions, we must once again visualise the function of that X, which, so-to-speak, stands and is found between the subjects and lays claim to their common interest, in other words: mediates, intervenes and intercedes in their relation. Since we are still at [[the examination of the]] dyad, it is a matter, in the process, not of a person [[as regards the aforesaid X]], but of a desired object, that is, a material interest. This presupposes that the relation of two actors towards each other can be looked at and considered on the basis of

several criteria. Friendship and enmity, or association and dissociation, or co-operation and antagonism in their many (kinds of) gradation(s) (shade(s) and nuance(s)) and degrees or grades of intensity represent and constitute only one amongst these criteria, which indeed overlaps with the rest of the criteria, but is not identical with the said criteria. Let us think about and consider the criterion of the dependence or independence of actors on or from each or one another. Two friends or two foes, two actors co-operating or two antagonists, can be equal with each other, and, independent of each other, i.e. they appear as friends or as foes in the possession of the same material and ideational power potential (i.e. the potential (capacity, capabilities or possibilities) for and in respect of power) vis-à-vis each other and, in the case they work together or co-operate and collaborate with each other, they can interrupt or disrupt their co-operation at any time, without, because of that (interruption), having to fear a weakening (reduction, dilution or attenuation) of their own relative position vis-à-vis the Other's position. However, not every co-operation rests and is based on the equality of the partners with each other or with one another and their independence from each other or one another. Common actions can be undertaken voluntarily, they can, however, also be imposed and forced upon the weaker party on the part of the stronger party, whereby that weaker side loses his or its independence⁴⁴⁹. There are, in short, symmetrical dyads, in which both sides are equally dependent on or independent of each other, and asymmetrical dyads, in which the one side depends on the other side totally or, in any case, more than this (other side) on it itself. That is why one should not see the difference between a dyad and a triad in the fact that in the dyad coalitions by definition would be out of the question, that is, the "majority" would have to come about only through the consensus of both (i.e. two) sides⁴⁵⁰. This would

⁴⁴⁹ Regarding "independent action", "cooperative joint action" and "imposed joint action" in the dyad, see Kelley-Thibaut, *Interpersonal Relations*, p. 283.

⁴⁵⁰ Thus, Bales-Borgatta, "Size of Group", p. 502ff..

imply a permanently existing equilibrium or balance/balancing of forces, as this is often postulated in groups of test persons or experimental subjects, in which the power potential (or potential regarding power) cannot fully unfold and develop, – the existence or presence of a predominance or supremacy can, on the other hand, lead to a coalition or co-operation without consent or consensus; incidentally, a numerical majority and predominance and supremacy do not in the least go together, as the example of the triad teaches, in which one side can conquer, defeat, beat, overcome or vanquish both other sides, even when these other sides unite their forces (or join their forces together). Sociological observations yield or result in additional points of view, amongst which, dyads can be put into order, ordered or classified. First of all, there is the point of view of the division of functions, which can take place, occur or happen, either on the basis of external or outer (for instance, culturally determined) standards, yardsticks, criteria or benchmarks, or on the basis of internal or inner standards, yardsticks, criteria or benchmarks (determined as to personality, whereby or in relation to which the latter (criteria determined as to personality) not seldom turn out in such a way that they go against or run counter to the former culturally determined criteria. Then, the said sociological observations yield or result in the point of view of the extent, scale or degree, in regard to which something is claimed from, demanded of, called for or made use in respect of the personality of the actors inside of a dyadic relation. Finally, (the aforesaid sociological observations yield or result in) the point of view of the fixedness, stability and steadiness or fragility and brittleness of the dyad, which, above all, appears to be important in relations which, indeed, normally run to, i.e. proceed in accordance with or follow, a certain pattern or example, simultaneously, however, they demand and require a conflict-bearing, intensive personal contact⁴⁵¹.

⁴⁵¹ Becker-Useem, "Sociological Analysis", esp. pp. 13, 17ff., 20.

The discussion of the morphology of the dyad refers to the morphology of the spectrum of the social relation, in which we tacitly assumed two-limbed or two-limb-like (i.e. two-tier, two-part, binominal or dyadic) social relations. Thus, some repetition can be avoided. The analytical transition from the dyad to the triad now means and signifies, as we have said, not simply a quantitative widening and broadening of the setting of the question or problem (or question formulation) around a third leap, but a regular, proper (downright or absolute) qualitative leap. This can be deduced already theoretically (i.e. in theory), but also empirical investigations or studies of small groups have yielded and resulted in [[the finding]] that most of the variables, which one uses in the course of these investigations and studies, are gained or obtained only from the observation of triads⁴⁵²; the necessity of essentially enriching the instruments (i.e. of investigation, study and research) rests or is based, though, on the need of taking into account new qualities. The appearance of the third party awakens, certainly, in the I (ego) and in the Other, previously completely unknown hopes or fears, it opens up until then undreamt-of, unexpected possibilities of acting, action and the act, it complicates the relations, circumstances and the modes of behaviour. Two people, who, whether as friends or foes, stand and are found in the center, at the focal point or midpoint of attention and of the horizon in respect of each other, must now, for their part, count upon the possibility of their transformation or conversion into a third party; they must deal or grapple with the third party, as with a possible role of one's own as a third party, they must widen, broaden and refine their (cap)ability at the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives; the multi-dimensionality of the social now becomes visible, the actor must henceforth take multiple and numerous (things, matters, affairs) into consideration, and live with multiple and numerous cares, concerns. Because the presence of the third party withdraws and takes away from the

⁴⁵² See e.g. De Lamater et al., "Conceptual Orientations".

relation between two people (or the dyadic relation), its elementary directness, it (i.e. the said presence of the third party) makes from that a mediated process in which the I (ego) and the Other also or only communicate with each other via their relation towards or with the third party. Additionally, it coerces, compels or forces the I (ego) to objectify its particular relation towards and with the Other; i.e. to see and handle and manage it in light of parameters which lie on the other side of, i.e. beyond subjective feelings and affects (emotions or sentiments). The objective component of inter-subjective relations is strengthened, reinforced or fortified, moreover, through the increased chances or possibilities of the division of labour. This division of labour creates, makes or produces surpluses in products as well as possibilities of pleasure and reward (i.e. remuneration or recompense), which appear in the social space irrespective of the individual qualities of their (i.e. the said surpluses in products and possibilities of pleasure and reward's) originator or creator, and make up and constitute independent motives of acting, action or the act and of the relation⁴⁵³.

The appearance of the third party means and signifies the beginning or start of social life *stricto sensu*, the indispensability of his (i.e. the third party's) functions for social life substantiates, backs up, proves or verifies once again our thesis that only against the background of a society does the relation between two people (or the dyadic relation) yield and result in a *social* relation. This catalytic effect or result of the third party in view of the constitution of the social is made noticeable, on the one hand, in the fact that the I (ego) and the Other can only unite, merge, team up or come together in an ideational We when they stand face to face with, across from or opposite to a third party, and indeed irrespective of whether they see or espy in him a common foe or not; his mere being (t)here and existence as an alien, foreigner or stranger motivates the

⁴⁵³ For, i.e. regarding this point cf. Thibaut-Kelley, *Social Psychology*, p. 220 [[TRANSLATOR SAYS (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): WHAT A F***ING MAJOR POINT !!!]].

I (ego) and the Other, in relation to that, to become conscious of the particularity and the bound(arie)s of the situation necessarily shared between them, whilst they (i.e. the said I (ego) and Other) suddenly feel being looked at and considered from the outside⁴⁵⁴. On the other hand, the active participation of the third party in the activities of the I (ego) and of the Other, i.e. the transformation or conversion of the dyad into a triad creates, makes or produces a construct from which, it must be said, it (i.e. the said construct) bears supra-individual and impersonal or un-personal (i.e. non-personal) characteristics, attributes or traits, and also from it, those concerned (i.e. the participants in the triad) have the feeling that inside or within its (supra-individual and impersonal (i.e. non-personal) characteristics, attributes or traits, or from inside of the triad) things could happen, which more or less take away, withdraw or revoke control on the part of (i.e. by) every one of the members of the tripartite or three-member relation. In the dyad, every actor has his unmistakable, distinctive individuality, so that his replacement or substitution by another actor can entail a reversal of the dominant or ruling relations and circumstances. The play-room (i.e. room to play, move and act, or leeway) for individually determined modifications is considerably and substantially narrower in a triad, in which the possibilities of combination (or combinatory possibilities) and the power constellations (or correlations of power) have been leveled-off and settled-down on a supra-individual basis. The triad already constitutes a collective which can survive the replacement or substitution of an actor by another actor⁴⁵⁵. The stabilisation of the possibilities of combination (or combinatory possibilities) and of the power constellations (or correlations of power) is, though, to be understood in a form-related (i.e. formal) sense, i.e. it (the said stabilisation) does not necessarily mean and signify the happening, occurring or taking place of a peaceful normality, but the necessity of confirming in every content-related

⁴⁵⁴ In relation to that, Sartre, *Être*, p. 470ff.; *Critique*, p. 194ff..

⁴⁵⁵ Caplow, *Two Against One*, p. 9.

conflict between the actors the same (multi-dimensional) form-related (i.e. formal) pattern or model, no matter which practical course the actors take (up) and which course their relation towards one another takes. The triad can, just like the dyad, close (with)in itself, i.e. include, friendship or enmity, antagonism or co-operation; the third party behaves, therefore, in relation to that, indifferently (*or*: the third party is, therefore, in relation to that, indifferent), in the sense that its effect can bring about, cause or favour both the one party of the original dyad, as well as the other party of the said original dyad. The specific (i.e. what is specific or like a *differentia specifica*) in it (i.e. the triad) is not at all the fact that it brings to life the temptation of war only by getting and procuring predominance and supremacy for an actor through and by means of the support, assistance and or counsel of the a third party – as Rousseau believed, who was interested in proving that not the lonely, solitary naturally living person (*or*: human living in (accordance with) nature), but socialisation is the cause of all evil⁴⁵⁶. Completely (or quite) on the contrary. The triad offers as a specific performance (i.e. result, achievement or contribution), that is, in respect of the entrance into the state (of affairs) of society and of culture, more possibilities for the hampering, checking, obstruction or stoppage and the channeling of violence through the creation of complexity, free spaces [[i.e. space to be oneself in the sense of choosing for oneself from what is available rather than being ordered directly what to choose]], and permits flexible behaviour. The war of all against all could take place between two actors; between three actors, however, it (i.e. the war of all against all) would only be in the long run a hostility (animosity or malevolence), no war of all against all would be conceivable, imaginable or thinkable. Because soon, two would ally against the third, something which seen from the point of view of the whole of society, would offset, balance (out) or equalise enmity through and by means of

⁴⁵⁶ «Que l'état de guerre naît de l'état social», : «Ce n'est qu'après avoir fait société avec quelque homme qu'il [l'homme] se détermine à en attaquer un autre.» *Oeuvres Complètes*, III.

friendship^{cxlv}. As the model, perfect example, embodiment, epitome, quintessence, incarnation or type of the social, the triad proves that the talk of war of all against all can only have a metaphorical meaning⁴⁵⁷.

This specifically socio-cultural performance, result or accomplishment of the triad can also be described thus: in it (i.e. the said triad), a transformation or conversion of strength into weakness, and of weakness into strength often takes place. The strong becomes weak when two weak parties form a coalition against him / it^{cxlvi}, and the weak becomes strong when it – through and by means of its potential – as little as it is in itself, tips the balance, deciding the issue as the decisive factor in a conflict between two strong parties⁴⁵⁸. The victory of intellectual-spiritual superiority over physical strength is indeed already possible inside of the dyad; the triad, however, conveys, gives, provides or imparts first, a decisive teaching (in regard to the said victory) for the use of social beings. Namely, that solely the development of social virtues like the (cap)ability at co-operation and at [forming a] coalition are able to, and may, put things right, redress or remedy matters, things for and in favour of the weak party; the physically strong must, under these circumstances, likewise learn by experience that with strength alone, in society, nothing is done. Accordingly, it is not a given, or it is by no means certain, that in every triad coalitions must be formed and constituted: a co-operative or solitary co-existence of the three actors in distinct, varying and different gradations, shades and nuances occurs at least for limited periods of time, just as temporary aggressive single-handed efforts (going it alone based on a solitary and independent initiative) of all three sides are not excluded. Much can be said for and in favour of the assumption or supposition, presumption or conjecture that the co-operative, conflictual or dominance(-related) character of the triad depends upon the relation between

⁴⁵⁷ See Ch. III, Sec. 3 A, above.

⁴⁵⁸ Caplow, *Two Against One*, p. 3.

both actors who, inside of the triad, act and or interact most intensively and most consistently⁴⁵⁹. The formation and constitution of the coalition remains, in any case, the statistically more probable and more frequent outcome of the interacting in triads, in relation to which or whereby a coalition is to be defined as the co-ordinated action of two sides for the purpose of the influencing and or determination of the behaviour of the third side. A coalition is formed and constituted therefore where the co-operation of all three sides with all three sides is absent or turns out unsatisfactorily; a coalition means the aim/goal-directed, purposeful, restricted and narrowed-down (to aims and goals) selective co-operation, from which two conclusions are yielded (i.e. ensue or arise): that the strongest motive of two sides for the forming of a coalition is the contrast with and opposition to a third side, and that every side in a triad must regard the outwardly excluding (i.e. closed to the outside) approach(ing of each other) (or reconciliation) of both other sides as the greatest danger for itself. It is self-evident that the coalition partners (or partners to or of the coalition) neither have to be equal as between each other, nor share in all matters and things the same perspectives, views and aims. They strive inside of the coalition for the most advantageous position for themselves, so that the principle may be laid down and established that every actor in a triad would desire, first of all, to be the dominating member in a coalition, dominating maximally in the / a situation⁴⁶⁰.

The above-tendered and proffered definition of the coalition must remain vague. Because from coalition to coalition, and from alliance to alliance, in every coalition and in every alliance, the degree of cohesion vacillates and changes constantly; the willingness, readiness and preparedness to be engaged in favour of the concerns, issues, affairs and interests of the ally also vacillates and changes, as soon as these (concerns, issues, affairs and interests) begin to

⁴⁵⁹ Th. Mills, "Power Relations".

⁴⁶⁰ Loc. cit., p. 356; Kelley-Thibaut, *Interpersonal Relations*, pp. 301, 312; Thibaut-Kelley, *Social Psychology*, p. 221.

separate from one's own concerns, issues, affairs and interests. The meaning of the objective concerns, issues, affairs and interests themselves vacillates and changes also for every partner for whom the coalition should or ought to be taken into account. Just as little can coalitions be defined on the basis of fixed hierarchisations of objective motives which brought them (i.e. the said coalitions) into life^{cxlvii}. Power factors (i.e. factors related to power), in the widest sense of the word are undoubtedly in regard to motive formation (or the formation of motives) decisive, which does not always mean, nonetheless, very much in concreto. Because it is a question exactly of what the actor holds to be and regards as power, in other words, how he defines his own identity, and which claims he deduces or infers from this definition; if, e.g., an identity is connected with the renunciation of material claims in favour of ethical-ideational claims, thus he/it must look at and regard the power-(question) and consequently the coalition question (i.e. the question and problem in respect of power and coalitions) differently than an identity which does the opposite of that. Accordingly, it remains open in every concrete case as to how the actor assesses the dangers and threats, or also the advantages, for himself, for whose sake he (i.e. the said actor) would enter into a coalition. He must also measure the power of the other sides not in accordance with absolute and unchangeable criteria, but in correspondence to their supposed or putative readiness, preparedness or willingness and (cap)ability to make use of their objectively available power potential (or potential as regards power). In short, the decisive factor in every coalition formation and constitution is the subjective perception of the Other on the part of the I (ego) and of its subjective definition of the situation, not for instance – in any case not always and not necessarily – an accurately and precisely verifiable and provable calculus (i.e. calculation) of the objective correlation of forces (or relations and circumstances of strength, energy and power), which every “rational actor” must share [in common], as

quite a few rigid, stiff, inflexible a version of game theory alleges, supposes or assumes⁴⁶¹.

After this has been made clear, it is permitted to comprehend the possible constellations or coalitions inside of the triad as the function of power relations (or circumstances in respect of power), and to develop the corresponding casuistry (i.e. a (complete) case-by-case list of cases)⁴⁶², which starts from Simmel's knowledge (i.e. insight, discovery, finding, realisation, idea, notion or research) that whereas two can be only one party, three are accustomed to and in the habit of straightaway, immediately and at once forming and constituting three parties – in twos (or two-by-two [[i.e. AB, AC, BC]])⁴⁶³. In approximate equality of force, strength, energy or power between A, B and C, consequently, in principle, the coalitions AB, AC, and BC equally come into consideration. Coalitions encompass two actors who want to turn against or demarcate and delimit themselves against a third actor, they, however, do not necessarily come into being in every [case of] inequality in the correlation of forces (or relation(ship)s and circumstances of strength, energies or power). Also, then, a «ménage à trois» is imaginable or conceivable, or else a “romantic triangle”, in which an actor equally pours out or shows his affection and liking to both other – inimical and hostile amongst and as between themselves – sides or parties⁴⁶⁴. Most probably, there is an absence of a coalition in the triad when the power of A by far exceeds, excels, goes beyond, outmatches, transcends, outstrips and surpasses the united power of B and C, regardless of whether B and C amongst (i.e. as between) themselves are equal or unequal. The quasi (i.e. more or less, virtually or as it were) classic coalition case (or classic case pertaining to coalitions) is present, on the other hand, when B and C through and by means of

⁴⁶¹ Against such versions, Vinacke-Arkoff, “An experimental study”, p. 413; cf. Walt, *Origins*, viii, p. 5.

⁴⁶² The most complete amongst them are found in Caplow, “Theory of Coalitions”, and Kelley-Thibaut, *Interpersonal Relations*, chap. 9.

⁴⁶³ *Soziologie*, p. 69.

⁴⁶⁴ Regarding that, Dittmer, “Strategic Triangle”.

their united forces, energy, strength or powers can overpower and overcome the in itself superior power of A, or can keep [[it, i.e. the in itself superior power of A]] in check. In or during a relatively smaller power difference (or difference as to power) between A and B, which both outclass, outshine, tower above and eclipse C; A and B will have to – each for themselves – strive for, aim at and aspire to a coalition with C etc.. In the latter case, C stands and is before a dilemma, which for the weakest side in a triad is typical: should or ought it (i.e. C) ally itself with B in order for both C and B to go into action against and counter the superior A, or is it more advantageous to side with and go over to A in the belief that this A will impose itself, predominate and prevail anyway? The weaker C is, all the more inclined and (pre)disposed it (i.e. C) is to join and connect with and attach itself to the strongest side, i.e. A; it (i.e. C) regards as, in the course of this, the price of dependency mixed with protection, more bearable and tolerable than the price of self-extermination, self-destruction and self-annihilation. The stronger, on the other hand, an actor is, the more inclined and (pre)disposed he / it is to ally himself / itself with relatively weaker actors, which he / it can bring under control more easily⁴⁶⁵. Let us stress once again that all these objective power calculi (or calculations as regards power) cross through, traverse one another or intersect through and by means of subjective assessments of the situation (and position) or through and by means of identity needs (i.e. requirements pertaining to identity). A weak C can “against all Reason” take to the field and go into battle [in co-operation or alliance] with B, or even alone, against a powerful A, if he/it (i.e. C) e.g. is prepared, ready and willing to pay with his or its life for his perceptions and views of “honour and respectability (decency, decorum, manners)”.

Two parties compete, accordingly, for the favour of a third party, because they are inimical to each other – or they become it (i.e. inimical to each other)

⁴⁶⁵ Walt, *Origins*, pp. 17ff., 29.

because they are competing for the favour of a third party⁴⁶⁶. In both cases, a decisive value, worth and importance is attached by two sides to the third side. The competition between A and B can, however, not only have as its object the favour, but also the subjection or subjugation of the weaker C, who, hence, would prefer foregoing and doing without such an interest of the other parties in regard to himself.^{cxlviii} He (i.e. C) must, on the other hand, woo, court, compete or vie for the interest of the stronger parties, i.e. A and B when these stronger parties get along well with each other, or in any case, have found a bearable and tolerable *modus vivendi* amongst and between each other, and fear that the active presence of a third party would bring forth or produce and lead to disturbances and interruptions, with unforeseeable consequences; the consequence of that is the marginalisation of the third party⁴⁶⁷. One has spoken of rigid bipolar systems which do not grant, allow or concede to the third party any chance or possibility of unfolding and development, and of elastic systems, in which this third party can undertake e.g. more or less modest and small roles of mediation⁴⁶⁸. In any event, the tendencies towards an oligopoly and/or towards a monopoly are strengthened by the exclusion of the third party, as soon as the question of the distribution of the spoils, booty or loot after the victory of a coalition is posed. An important reason for the brittleness and fragility and in the end, eventually, the breaking up and splitting up and coming apart of coalitions lies, in actual fact, in the assessment of the future on the part of the coalition partners (*or*: those in a coalition), and indeed, of the chances and possibilities which every side or party in the coalition reckons it has with regard to the relative gains, advantages, benefits, profits and proceeds (returns, earnings, winnings) in comparison with the rest of the sides and parties in the

⁴⁶⁶ Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 83.

⁴⁶⁷ Portinaro, *Terzo*, p. 233ff.. Regarding the “subordination of the third party” both by means of interest [[in the third party]], as well as by means of disinterest (i.e. indifference and apathy [[towards the third party]]), cf. Molseed, “Time and Form”. Caplow regards the marginalisation of the third party as a rather marginal case, “Theory of Coalitions”, p. 492.

⁴⁶⁸ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 36ff..

coalition⁴⁶⁹. A coalition does not, therefore, have to mean either equality of power at the beginning, or equality of enjoyment, pleasure or consumption at the end. The distribution of the spoils, booty or loot can turn out to be to every side's general satisfaction, it can satisfy one side more than the other side, and it can, finally, thus come to pass and occur that one side pockets, rakes in and takes everything, whilst the other side goes away empty-handed. The future comes into and penetrates as a representation, notion or idea into the present, and the distribution of the spoils, booty or loot becomes or turns into a theme or topic (i.e. subject of interest) already before the spoils, booty or loot is there (i.e. present, extant and available). But the present also contributes, as is (well-)known, independently, its (share and contribution), to the brittleness and fragility of coalitions.

In conclusion, we want to offer a short and concise phenomenology of the third party (side), irrespective of the dynamics and of the mechanics of coalitions, even though this question and problem (i.e. of the dynamics and of the mechanics of coalitions) must always be touched upon when there is talk of the third party (side). Simmel, rather, concentrated on (i.e. paid close attention to) this phenomenology with the relative neglect and ignoring of the possible games of combination (or combination games) in the triad, and in the course of this, he distinguished between three main forms of the third party: the mediator, the *Tertius gaudens* [= the rejoicing third party who benefits from a conflict amongst the two other parties]], and the virtuoso of *divide et impera* [= divide and conquer/rule]]⁴⁷⁰. In all three cases, discord, a dispute or quarrel, and conflict between the first party and the second party is assumed, whereas every main form of the third party behaves differently towards the triad as a whole: the mediator is interested in its (i.e. the triad's) cohesion, the *Tertius gaudens* in

⁴⁶⁹ Generally, in relation to that, Riker, *Theory of Political Coalitions*.

⁴⁷⁰ *Soziologie*, p. 75ff.. [[TRANSLATOR'S ADDITION (NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): The super-**JOO** Simmel is basically describing, inter alia, **JOOZ** !!! AAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]

the continuation of the discord between the first and second party, the virtuoso of divide et impera in the cohesion of the triad (under his direction (management or administration)), and at the same time, in the continuation of that discord. Accordingly, the power potentials (i.e. the respective capacities as regards power) differ: the mediator can be stronger than, equally strong as, or weaker than the first party and the second party, the same applies to the *Tertius gaudens*, but the virtuoso of divide et impera cannot dominate if he is not stronger than both other sides. If we disregard the necessity of these clarifications, Simmel's phenomenology of the third party is also, otherwise, partly faulty (defective, poor, inadequate, unsatisfactory, imperfect, insufficient), [and] partly can be put in order and classified in more comprehensive classes and categories. These classes and categories can, again, for instance, be set or drawn up, established and laid down according to the following criteria. The third party can be put in order and classified in accordance with the character of his relation towards and with the first party, or towards and with the second party, i.e., he is connected with the first party or the second party; he does not ally himself with any of both (of the other two parties) and remains neutral; he does not ally himself with any of both (of the other two parties) and mediates between them. Whereas, however, the ally and the mediator are active third parties, the neutral party is *stricto sensu* passive, that is, activity or passivity yields and results in a second criterion for the putting in order and classifying of the third party⁴⁷¹. A further criterion overlaps and intersects with these: the positioning, stance and attitude of the third party towards a current, running conflict between the first party and the second party. When he (i.e. the third party) participates in this conflict, thus, he can be an ally of the one or other side, the protector of the one or the other side, and finally a *Tertius gaudens*. To these, the interested third party who connects his own

⁴⁷¹ Regarding both these criteria, Portinaro, *Terzo*, pp. 17ff., 69ff..

interests, concerns, issues and affairs with the outcome of the conflict must be added, and he who observes the sequence of events and circumstances accurately and precisely, first of all, without getting involved and meddling or mixing himself up in the said sequence of events and circumstances, but also without precluding or excluding that he can be transformed and converted from one moment to another (moment) into an ally, protector or *Tertius gaudens*. If the third party does not take part or participate in the conflict, thus he appears either as an impartial, unbiassed, disinterested and even-handed, non-partisan party, who through his mere presence exercises a certain appeasing, placating and pacifying influence on both sides, or as the impartial, unbiassed, disinterested and even-handed, non-partisan party in the role of the mediator, or finally, as a temporarily or permanently, armed or unarmed, neutral party⁴⁷².

Even these forms of the third party need and require partly explication and clarification, [and] partly supplementation. Just like the typologies, so too the forms of the third party differ, i.e. the same form can simultaneously take part and participate in several typologies, and intersect, moreover, with other forms, or act and operate under the influence of different motives. Thus, the neutral third party can abstain from interference, meddling and intervention, either out of weakness, or else in, i.e. with the intent(ion) of saving, keeping or reserving his forces, powers, energies and strength for a later point in time. The *Tertius gaudens* appears at times as a contriver (machinator, designer, intriguer, plotter, schemer) and an intriguer (schemer, machinator, plotter), at other times as a peacemaker (troubleshooter) and a neutral party, at times as an ally, at other times, in regard to all these properties, qualities and characteristics together. As an oscillating, swinging third party, who has in mind, thinks of and imagines an equilibrium in which he lives well or can merely survive, he takes at times, this

⁴⁷² Regarding this typology, Freund, *Sociologie du conflit*, p. 290ff.. As regards the concept of the interested third party, Schroers, *Der Partisan*.

side, at other times, that side, he takes a neutral stance or position, or he slips temporarily into the role of the mediator, the *Tertius gaudens* etc.. When the circumstances demand or allow it, out of indecisiveness, out of angst and fear or calculus, i.e. calculation, the third party can be a mere spectator, before whose eyes two actors, who are stronger or weaker than him himself (i.e. the third party), act and interact, without taking him into consideration, or else with a sidelong glance at him, and with the intent(ion) of impressing him and of winning him over for themselves; they tend, in relation to that, to forget him (i.e. the aforesaid third party) when their enmity or love towards each other or one another claims them fully (i.e. absorbs and overwhelms them)⁴⁷³. But when, rather, they look at and consider him (i.e. the third party) as a bone of contention, then it is very possible or probable that the third party cannot escape from, avoid and elude the fate and destiny of a *Tertius miserabilis* [= a third party who is miserable, pitiable and wretched]] or a *Tertius dolens* [= a third party who is in pain and hurts]]. Because the bone of contention is often transformed and converted into a crying, weeping third party, who must foot the bill for the dispute and quarrel between both other parties, [[i.e.]] into a scapegoat (fall guy, whipping boy), or else, fall guy (patsy, whipping boy), and finally, into a slave with two masters⁴⁷⁴. This is, though, the lowest tier, stage or level which the third party can reach. At the highest tier, stage or level, he is situated or posited in the role of the mediator, and indeed when this role is institutionally secured and protected (safeguarded and guaranteed). If it is thus, then the third party is a *Tertius supra partes* [= a third party over and above and superior to the parts (i.e. other parties)], for instance, an *ex officio* impartial and unbiassed judge. The ubiquitous factual or formal (i.e. form-related) institutionalisation of the judicial office speaks volumes for and in favour of the

⁴⁷³ Hence, Freund thought and opined that only in an agonistic state of affairs, i.e. state of affairs of competition, not in a state of affairs of war, there is a place for a third party, see *Sociologie du conflit*, pp. 85, 287. Cf. Portinaro's justified and (well-)founded objections, "Storicizzazione", p. 295ff..

⁴⁷⁴ See Scharmann's excellent work, *Tertius miserabilis*, esp. p. 22ff..

social importance of this form of the third party. As a *Tertius inter pares*, the mediator has, on the other hand, no permanent institutional backing and support, he is, as it were, a judge of the occasion, chance and opportunity, who in himself (i.e. as such) can both be weaker than each of both sides arguing, fighting, quarreling and in dispute with each other, (then these two sides arguing subjugate themselves willingly to his jurisdiction or can throw his decision overboard, i.e. out the window, i.e. jettison and discard his decision), as well as stronger, (then he himself can summon the parties in dispute and force, compel and coerce respect of, deference to, and observance of the arbitration verdict)⁴⁷⁵. He (i.e. the said mediator) can, it is understood, simultaneously to be a *Tertius gaudens*, in any event, he must appear as a peacemaker in times of unrest, whereas the third party as an author and creator of discord is active and acts in times of peace. In general, the mediator is accustomed to be active and act in the anteroom (foyer or lobby) of his own arbitration (conciliation, mediation, settlement) work in a threefold and triple respect: he requests, asks and challenges the parties in dispute for symbolic conciliatory gestures as a sign of serious and earnest readiness, preparedness and willingness in respect of negotiation(s); he initiates confidence-building measures; and he caters for the greatest possible smooth flow of communication by means of the choice of the suitable place and of the fitting and apt moment [[for mediation to take place]]⁴⁷⁶.

⁴⁷⁵ Regarding the *Tertius supra partes* and the *Tertius inter pares*, above all in terms of international law, see Portinaro, *Terzo*, pp. 79ff., 137ff..

⁴⁷⁶ Young, *Intermediaries*, esp. p. 49ff..

D. Mutuality (or reciprocity) and exchange

a. The social-ontological status (importance, significance, value and weight) of mutuality (or reciprocity)

Just as dyads and triads bring to light, show and exhibit their social-ontological possibilities only through outer and external action, so too mutuality, reciprocity and exchange cannot be thought (about) and conceived without the component of outer and external action. That is why they (mutuality, reciprocity and exchange) offer just as much as dyads and triads, a privileged standpoint from which the outer and external mechanism of the social relation can be illuminated, and indeed in its working together (co-action, inter-play and collaboration or co-operation) with the inner social relation. The on-both-sides, mutual, bilateral assumption and taking on/over of perspectives in regard to mutual and reciprocal actions or exchange actions (or actions in respect of exchange) reckons, i.e. calculates and estimates [[things]] with possibilities which extend and stretch to, i.e. across the entire spectrum of the social relation. Before we discuss in which sense mutuality, reciprocity and exchange imply reference to the entire or whole spectrum of the social relation, and not merely to its friendly half, it is to be noted (marked or made a note of) that the necessity of their (i.e. mutuality-reciprocity and exchange's) interrelation (association, interconnection or link) as forms of external or outer action with the (cap)ability of and capacity for the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives was registered and recorded since very old (i.e. ancient) times. The Golden Rule presupposes that an actor can put himself (or imagine he is) in (or think his way into) his partner's place and picture, imagine or visualise his (i.e. his partner's) reactions in a concrete situation, in relation to which it (i.e. the said Golden Rule) assumes a far-reaching and extensive psychical similarity of all men (i.e. humans) in regard to certain fundamental properties, qualities and

characteristics⁴⁷⁷. At the level of the formulation of the Golden Rule, apparently or obviously not even an individually refined psychology is necessary and needed; one makes do, manages and gets along with the elementary psychology. The necessary starting point is, here, one's own I (ego), which uses its experiences as the basis for the setting and drawing up and formation of a useful inventory (i.e. list or table of rules), in regard to which, then, the positionings, stances, attitudes and wishes of his with-men (i.e. fellow or co-humans) will be read: "think of yourself in order to understand what concerns other people"⁴⁷⁸, and suppose or assume that other people would wish and desire for themselves exactly what you wish and desire for yourself⁴⁷⁹. The starting from one's own I (ego) is also or even recommended, advised or commended, when the command and requirement of reciprocity and mutuality demands nothing less than love for the other person: the other person you should and ought to love, in fact, *like (you love) yourself*⁴⁸⁰. Self-love or amour propre (Selbstliebe) is, therefore,

⁴⁷⁷ Dihle, *Goldene Regel*, pp. 11, 84. In a particularly noteworthy passage (VI, 6), Polybius derives and deduces the origin(s) of justice (equity or fairness) amongst men (i.e. humans) from the combined effect or impact of three factors: the (cap)ability at and capacity for relating present and current action to the future, the (cap)ability at and capacity for putting oneself in the psyche and situation and position of other (actors, persons), and in respect of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity. Whoever does not reciprocate good with good, draws and pulls towards him (i.e. he attracts and incurs) the wrath of third parties who spontaneously identify with the ungratefully and thanklessly treated and handled party, whilst they (the aforesaid third parties) picture, imagine and visualise what could come to pass and happen to them in the future under similar circumstances. Notions and ideas and representations of justice and duty are strengthened, consolidated, secured and solidified on the basis of the principle of justice as a result of the wish, desire and the striving, endeavour in respect of disapproving, scorning, frowning and looking down upon behaviour regarding the future, whose consequences everyone can relate to through and by means of understanding, empathy, sympathy (and or intuition).

⁴⁷⁸ My own [i.e. P.K.'s] translation (cf. Sirach 31.18, Luther's bible, or Sirach 31.15, unity (i.e. standard) translation). Cf. footnote 296, above [(Greek Translator's addition (nothing to do with P.K.) = in the Septuagint: «νόει τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἐκ σεαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ πράγματι διανοοῦ»)]

⁴⁷⁹ Thus, it is called (or referred to) in the *Mokshadarma*: "what a man / person does not want done to himself by other people (in terms of being hurt or harmed), he does not do to (or inflict upon) other people either too, since he has experienced, found out and learnt himself what is unpleasant and disagreeable"; cit.(i.e. cited in) Philippidis, *Goldene Regel*, p. 76.

⁴⁸⁰ The famous and renowned formula (i.e. wording or set phrase) appears already in 3. *Mose* 19, 18 [= Du sollst deinen Nächsten lieben wie dich selbst = Λευιτικόν: «καὶ ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν»]]. Two passages from Indian texts express very nicely the interrelation between self-love (amour-propre) and the just or considerate, lenient or indulgent treatment and handling of the Other: „if one goes through all areas, regions or parts of the country whilst thinking and reflecting [upon things], then one will nowhere find something more beloved or dear than oneself. The I (ego) is equally dear or beloved to other people. Whoever now loves himself, ought not and should not do injustice to other people.“ And: “How I am, those (people) are it (i.e. how I am) there; as those (people) are, I am it (i.e. how they are) here. Whoever takes himself as a parable (simile or standard of comparison), may not murder, kill me”; cit. Philippidis, *Goldene Regel*, p. 90. Something similar is read in the *Mahabharata*, cit. Hertzler, *Social Thought*, p. 345 (in the English version: “a man obtains the proper rule by regarding the case as like his own”).

presupposed and taken as the absolute standard for alien love, i.e. the love of others; mutuality and reciprocity, though, is not founded directly on this transformation or conversion of self-love into love of others, but in the obvious expectation that the Other, who must in fact love himself exactly so (i.e. just as much as the first person), would behave accordingly. In actual fact, mutuality and reciprocity, introspection and the assumption and taking over of perspectives belong, not least of all, together in the same sense that the putting oneself in [[the position and situation of]] (and or empathising with) the Other shows to the I (ego) that the demand of mutuality and reciprocity in regard to the Other must be just as strong and powerful and compelling as the demand of mutuality and reciprocity is in him himself (i.e. the first person). Before the I (ego), through introspection and the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, has ascertained, detected, found out, established and determined what are all the respective contents of mutuality and reciprocity, it (i.e. the said I (ego)) can win, gain, obtain or get in exactly the same way [of understanding that the Other has (potentially at least) the same demand of mutuality and reciprocity based on his own self-love etc.] the principle of mutuality and reciprocity itself.

Mutuality, reciprocity and exchange maintain reference to the entire spectrum of the social relation, indeed, because they can be accompanied both by friendly as well as by inimical intent(ion)s and acts, actions or kinds of acting. If one strictly defines the concepts, that is, takes away from them every normative connotation, thus it stands to reason that and it is obvious why mutuality and reciprocity, mutuality and reciprocity are available, present and exist both in the unconditional (i.e. without conditions) helpfulness and co-operativeness (or preparedness and willingness to render help and assistance) of a friend for (i.e. in respect of) another person, as well as in the demand of “an eye for any eye, a tooth for a tooth”. Mutual and reciprocal (kinds of) relief, respite and alleviation

or tactically motivated mutual and reciprocal concessions between foes often happen and occur too, just as the exchange of material goods, i.e. economic exchange by no means has to mean friendly relations at other levels [of interaction]. Total friendship as total mutuality and reciprocity exists where two identities recognise each other mutually, reciprocally and totally; total enmity as total mutuality and reciprocity exists where this recognition is refused and denied mutually, reciprocally and totally. That is why mutuality, reciprocity and exchange do not determine in themselves the content of the social relation, but they are subject to its (i.e. the social relation's) own independent and autonomous logic; that is why the social relation represents and constitutes the more comprehensive concept. With that, it is also said (i.e. that also means) that not every outer and external interactive action can be subsumed under the rubric of “mutuality and reciprocity” and “exchange”, and precisely from this ascertainment, the meaning and value of the analysis of mutuality, reciprocity and exchange results and ensues in respect of the understanding of the outer and external mechanism of the social relation: it is demonstrated that this (i.e. mechanism of the social relation) does not adhere and cling (i.e. is not connected) to kinds of acting, actions and acts of a certain type, as much as these also may suggest, nominally, an equilibrium, but it (i.e. the mechanism of the social relation) uniformly and evenly (and equally, steadily and regularly) finds expression, manifests itself and is reflected in the entire spectrum of the social relation; the outer and external mechanism of the social relation bears, supports and nourishes, in other words, just like the inner (mechanism of the social relation), the (afore)mentioned spectrum in its totality. An influential, even though heterogeneous, ethnological and sociological direction, tendency and school of thought of our century [[i.e. the 20th century]] has, nevertheless, believed that interactive action in general can, might or should be called, described and referred to as mutuality, reciprocity or exchange. It (the said ethnological and sociological school of thought) paid and suffered for this

venture because of the fact that it widened and extended and expanded these concepts up to the point of meaninglessness; thus, “mutuality and reciprocity” had to serve as very unequal social relations and “exchange” had to serve as not economically-materially determined social relations. Every time when the social relation as a whole is supposed to be characterised by a concept which originally and literally means a certain, particular (i.e. specific [not general]) type of social relation, the objective pressure of the – despite any terminological (clever) tricks – widely and still existing great variety, diversity and multiformity of the social relations has an effect in respect of the increasing and growing vagueness of that concept. The magic word, which is supposed to and ought to function as a passe-partout (i.e. like a master key that permits one to pass or go at will, a word which encompasses all possible and relevant meanings, notions and concepts), must now be connected with so many different types of interaction (or interaction types), that it, finally, includes and incorporates within itself the entire and whole spectrum of social relations. The theoretical gain is equal, identical and the same as zero, nought or nill; only the striving and endeavouring in respect of translating the entire and whole social-theoretical examination of the problem into the ethically-normatively or ideologically wished and desired language is served. One does know it in actual fact: *nomen est omen* [[= the name (i.e. the word one calls things) is an omen]], in social theory too; that is why also here, around and as regards the name, things are fought over no less hard (or: the struggling and fighting is no less hard and fierce) than in sorcery, wizardry, witchcraft and magic. The theoretical cul-de-sac, dead end and impasse, into which the attempt led and headed and drove in comprehending the social as a function of mutuality and reciprocity, was, in any case, complained of in the field and area in which that attempt – mind you, in connection with and following Durkheim – was undertaken most thoroughly, exhaustively, extensively and profoundly: in the field and area of

ethics⁴⁸¹. Even fewer prospects and chances of success are understandably destined for or granted to the theoretical effort and endeavour to genetically deduce or to reconstruct society out of and from the special type of interaction which is called mutuality and reciprocity. Reciprocity, mutuality and exchange take place only inside (or between) existing societies, they do not gradually, bit by bit, step by step and piecemeal bring about such societies. Also, in terms of game theory, it cannot be shown and demonstrated that the evolution of reciprocity and mutuality as the foundation of living together, i.e. co-existing, can over-step, i.e. exceed and transcend the bound(arie)s of small groups. Where numerous actors participate in the game (in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma), the mechanism of mutuality and reciprocity fails too when it is left to itself and to its own devices, when it, that is, is supposed to function without sanction(s) and binding structures, which must be formed and developed without its (i.e. the said mechanism of mutuality and reciprocity's) help, encouragement or contribution⁴⁸².

Into the temptation of declaring mutuality and reciprocity the constitutive principle of social life, one could be led by the remarkable and noteworthy fact that the Golden Rule was set up, established, laid down or put forward since the oldest and most ancient of times in all cultural circles (i.e. cultures) and in, on many occasions, identical positive and negative formulations⁴⁸³, in the conviction that it yields and makes up the sole evident and generally useful

⁴⁸¹ Thus, Pospisil asserted against Malinowski that mutuality and reciprocity would motivate only aspects of behaviour, not social behaviour in toto, and, moreover, it (i.e. mutuality and reciprocity) could hardly account for social control mechanisms (or the mechanisms of social control) (*Anthropology of Laws*, p. 30ff.; cf. our next note). Firth called the mutuality and reciprocity concept valuable or worthwhile as a research instrument, but "misleading" as an axiomatic principle ("The Place of Malinowski", p. 218).

⁴⁸² Boyd, "Evolution", pp. 352, 353.

⁴⁸³ The positive version of the Golden Rule reads: "do to men (humans) what you wish to happen to you" (*Mt.* 7, 12) The negative (version): "what you abhor, detest, loathe and hate, do not do to anyone" [[Greek translator, Λ.Α.'s addition (nothing to do with P.K.): Septuagint: «καὶ ὃ μισεῖς, μηδενὶ ποιήσεις»]] (*Tob.* 4.16 [[or 4.15]]). An abundance, plethora and wealth of documents and evidence from high cultures, of antiquity as well as from Islamist, Indian and Chinese cultural circles (i.e. cultures) is found in the works of Philippides and Dihle. This material is (i.e. ought) to be supplemented by proverbs, adages and sayings of primitive peoples, see e.g. Evans-Pritchard, "Meaning in Zande Proverbs", p. 4; Claridge, *Wild Bush Tribes*, p. 254; Herskovits – Tagbwe "Kru Proverbs", p. 241. Hertzler, *Social Thought*, p. 385.

guiding principle of moral and ethical social behaviour. It is here indifferent with which socio-cultural content(s) the Golden Rule has been connected as the graphic (illustrative, demonstrative, descriptive, concrete, vivid, clear) epitome, embodiment and quintessence of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity on each and every respective occasion. Its ubiquity at the level of current, conventional (popular) social ethics is indisputable, and it must be explained why it, nevertheless, at the social-ontological level may not be led (i.e. cited, given or quoted) as evidence of the constitutive role of mutuality and reciprocity. To this discrepancy, obviously, a disproportion (disparity and incongruity) between the ideal self-understanding or the normative code of society, and, social praxis / practice, corresponds, in relation to which it must be made clear that this disproportion does not represent and constitute any chance, accidental, coincidental or revocable evil, but virtually or absolutely a condition of the functioning of society. Accordingly, it is not merely in general that social ideology creates and makes a balance (or compensates) for (i.e. balances out) the shortcomings, defects and flaws of social reality, because the question and problem is exactly why the content of current, conventional (popular) social ideology or (social-)ethics primarily and preferably revolves around the principle of mutuality and reciprocity, whereas higher and more demanding commands like the love command (i.e. command to love) are praised, extolled and held up high as an ideal; their observance, however, is not expected as being self-evident, nor is their non-observance punished or avenged. What, therefore, gets, procures and makes possible for the principle of mutuality and reciprocity a social acceptance in which something more than the mere unbinding confession of faith in an ethical ideal going over and above and beyond [[everything]] is invested, in the middle of or hides? Which social-psychological mechanism lends or provides it (i.e. the said principle of mutuality and reciprocity) a practical bindedness and an evidence (i.e. evident nature and obviousness), which, for instance, the love command (i.e. command

to love) can never attain, reach or achieve? The latter (command to love) must also, as we have said, presuppose self-love and amour propre; in its (i.e. self-love's) extreme and pure versions it can, however, demand, claim, desire and ask for the fully altruistic, that is, one-sided and unilateral self-giving up or self-abandonment (i.e. surrender (or erosion) of one's identity, self-abnegation), and then is separated fully from the principle of mutuality and reciprocity (see below). Precisely in this consequence lies and is its (i.e. the command to love's) socially weak side, whereas the social strength of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity springs and emanates precisely from its ambivalence, which comes towards, complies with, makes concessions to and or is convenient for the real and fundamental ambivalences of the action and of the acting identity. Every actor must reckon with two extremely contrasting and opposed outcomes of his efforts and endeavours: he can win everything which he wants, and he can lose everything for the benefit and in favour of other actors. He must already in childhood and infancy make (i.e. have and live (through)) the formative and moulding, shaping experience that he has to accept limitations and restrictions in respect of or on his wishes and desires for the benefit and in favour of third parties. Since this happens often or almost always, thus he needs a permanent strategy for such cases, which should or ought to guarantee that if he himself cannot win or gain everything, this (i.e. winning everything) is denied and refused to others people too. This principle is called justice or mutuality and reciprocity, and rests upon the principle of equality as the solely acceptable, stable compromise between hopes and fears⁴⁸⁴. The confession of faith in mutuality and reciprocity secures for the I (ego) the necessary minimum without *deminutio capitis* (i.e. the lessening up to the extinguishment of a person's status and legal capacity), and at the same time it signals to the Other the he does not have to fear the worst if he gives up and abandons the claim to and on

⁴⁸⁴ Cf. the fine analysis pertaining to child psychology in Isaacs, *Social Development*, esp. p. 223ff..

everything. Mutuality and reciprocity functions as a guarantee for the minimum when the maximum is unreachable, unattainable, inaccessible and unachievable. However, since the one-sided and unilateral achievement of the maximum in social life more likely represents and constitutes the exception, thus mutuality and reciprocity become and turn into the (declared) rule.

These are, though, starting positions (or points of departure), which in the course (i.e. with the passing) of time and according to the needs and the requirements of the situation and position, are, at times, openly given up (surrendered or sacrificed), at other times, re-interpreted meaningfully and expediently (i.e. in an end(goal)-oriented manner, purposefully and usefully) – or are defended by some actors in and on principle (i.e. as a matter of principle) and in every case. Society can, in any case, offer no more than starting positions and points of departure. Mutuality/reciprocity, however, does not only enjoy and have the advantage and privilege of immediate obviousness, convincingness and cogency, since it takes into account [[peoples’]] hopes and fears simultaneously. Moreover, it has the advantage and benefit of moving and transferring the social-ethical (dimension or element) from the opaque, impenetrable and obscure realm and area of the mindset, mentality and way of thinking to the field and area of outer, external, verifiable action, and it, through that, objectifies [[the aforesaid social-ethical]] in a generally understandable way and manner. Love can neither be ascertained and determined perfectly, flawlessly and impeccably, nor be demanded or attributed and ascribed [[to someone]], but mutuality and reciprocity can do it, and the detachment of social-ethical duties from obligatory feelings provides to actors a welcome psychological relief from or relieving of the tension and stress of existence. This objective character of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity (or mutuality-reciprocity principle) gives it, then, an edge, advantage or head start vis-à-vis other social-ethical views and perceptions, above all if it is a matter of the

regulation of the relations between individuals and the collective, in regard to which feelings, still less can emit, yield and make up a stable ethical basis than in regard to relations between individuals. Mutuality and reciprocity mean here, first of all, that no individual, who damages, harms, hurts or injures the collective, (no matter how damage, harm, loss is defined on each and every respective occasion and who is authorised and competent to bindingly set up, establish, draw up and lay down such definitions), may expect protection and mercy. Over and above that, it means, however, that the individual, for his part, is supposed and ought to protect the to-be-protected collective in accordance with all his forces, strength(s), energies and powers, and sometimes in fact with the use, deployment and commitment (i.e. sacrifice) of his own life. Just like the principle of mutuality and reciprocity between individuals, so too this regulation of the relations between the individual and the collective is actually only a starting position or even a basis of/for negotiation – but the sole (such starting position or basis for negotiation) which as such can be accepted at (its) face value without anything further (i.e. just like that and wholesale). The really existing interrelation between practised mutuality, reciprocity and the collective or the (“we feeling”) (i.e. feeling or sense of being part of a collective “we/us”) makes itself, in any case, particularly noticeable in times of crises or times of war, when the willingness, readiness and preparedness to share equally in “civilised” peoples, as well as in “primitive” peoples, grows markedly⁴⁸⁵. A major part of public, just like private, social relations must, therefore, be unwound and uncoiled (i.e. transacted, carried out and completed) via the vocabulary and the ritual of mutuality, reciprocity, no matter what “hides behind that”, i.e. no matter under which compulsions or kinds of coercion mutuality, reciprocity is (stuck), and no matter how one-sided, unilateral it (i.e. mutuality, reciprocity) may be in reality^{cxlix}. Only in this way do those

⁴⁸⁵ In relation to that, Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, pp. 215, 267.

concerned and in question get (hold of), procure, find or gain the testimony, i.e. evidence or the alibi of the socially acceptable. Though, they do not require or need it (i.e. such evidence or alibi) always.

The contribution of mutuality and reciprocity or rather of the fiction of mutuality and reciprocity to social stability and disciplining exists in the increase of the chances and possibilities of making action ponderable and calculable^{cl}. Functioning mutuality, reciprocity constitutes calculable and ponderable action par excellence, and the command of mutuality and reciprocity contains a call, appeal or invocation to all members of society to free, liberate, release and relieve their with-men, i.e. fellow humans from the torment, agony, ordeal, pain, anguish and torture of imponderability and incalculability; because as Hume rightly thought and opined, only the confidence, trust, optimism, hope and faith resting on mutuality and reciprocity in regard to the “future regularity” of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) keeps us moderate, measured, restrained and temperate⁴⁸⁶. Expectations of mutuality and reciprocity belong to the constitutive components of the formation and development of trust⁴⁸⁷; they do not, though, grow out of the in principle ethical belief in the command of mutuality and reciprocity, but the representation, notion and idea of mutuality and reciprocity in general is formed already at an early age on the basis of the experience that one has to expect of others this or that when one (i.e. people generally and oneself) behaves thus or otherwise (i.e. one way or another). The correspondence of the expectations on both sides can then give rise to the practised mutuality and reciprocity as well as the concept of that practised mutuality and reciprocity⁴⁸⁸. Now trust accompanies the mutuality and reciprocity between friends, however, there is also mutuality and reciprocity in enmity, which, as we shall see immediately, likewise has its social-ontological

⁴⁸⁶ *Treatise*, III, 2, 2.

⁴⁸⁷ Garfinkel, “A Conception”, p. 190.

⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Brittan, *Meanings*, p. 40ff..

meaning and its social use. The boundaries between both types of mutuality and reciprocity are likewise fluid (and flowing), like those between friendship and enmity or else between trust and mistrust; trustful or trusting behaviour implies the risk of being deceived, fooled, tricked and misled; the acceptance of a risk which is accompanied by mistrust, and blind trust (confidence, faith, belief) in reality constitute the two sides of the same coin⁴⁸⁹. The Janus face of mutuality and reciprocity and the, in the course of this, different kinds and variety of mixings, mixtures and blends of trust and mistrust with each other coming into being already yield and make up a first criterion for distinguishing and differentiating mutuality, reciprocity and altruism conceptually from each other. Because not only is any altruism between foes not conceivable and thinkable (i.e. any altruism between foes is not conceivable) – chivalry and gallantry (of knights) is another matter^{cli} – but also trust or mistrust in regard to the Other do not play in themselves, in the altruistic act, any role. The altruist is exactly an altruist because he does not expect any reciprocation of services rendered or bestowed and any reward, recompense or remuneration⁴⁹⁰; where, however, any and every expectation is lacking, mistrust or trust is understandably out of place (or has no place) too, since these relate exactly to the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of expectations. A further criterion which allows and permits a clear distinction between mutuality, reciprocity and altruism arises and results from the consideration of the motivation of acting, action and the act. At the level of the formal (i.e. form-related) observation of an altruistic act, it is simply ascertained that in actual fact such acts take place, which do not aim at any reciprocation or reward, recompense or remuneration in the vulgar (i.e. common) sense, especially since they often entail the ultimate sacrifice, the sacrifice of one's own life. Here, one can spare oneself, at least as the recipient

⁴⁸⁹ Regarding this complex, see M. Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion", p. 266ff.; cf. sec. 1Bb in this chapter, above.

⁴⁹⁰ The expression "mutual and reciprocal altruism" contains, therefore, a *contradictio in adjecto* [[= "a contradiction between parts of an argument"]], see e.g. Trivers, "Evolution of reciprocal altruism".

of the altruistic act, the question as to whether the motives of altruism are altruistic in an absolute sense, or whether, perhaps, the need for the confirmation of one's own identity is still stronger than the angst and fear before material losses or even before the ultimate sacrifice – the question may, incidentally, in the dual sense of the word, be thankless (ungratifying, unrewarding and in vain). At the level of praxis / practice which is called mutuality and reciprocity, it does not appear in the least, however, indifferent to know what motivates the Other, since from exactly this knowledge, both the assessment of his (the Other's) readiness, preparedness and willingness to reciprocate, as well as the assessment of the debt of gratitude vis-à-vis him (i.e. to the Other) depends. The inclination, propensity, proclivity or disposition of the I (ego) to reciprocate is, as a rule, slighter and less when behind the preliminary work or concessions of the Other, it (i.e. the I (ego)) gets wind of and senses pure self-interest and expedience or pure need and pure want, or when it (i.e. the I (ego)) e.g. thinks, means and opines that in view of the considerable quantitative differences between one's own and alien (i.e. Others') resources, the loads, burdens, strains and encumbrances during the reciprocating are distributed very unequally and unevenly (non-uniformly and asymmetrically) in favour of the Other. During such considerations, reflections, deliberations and ideas, material interests often step into the background^{491 + clii}.

If mutuality/reciprocity and altruism are two completely different things, thus from the supposedly socially constitutive importance of the former (mutuality and reciprocity), no praise for the altruistic nature of man can be deduced and derived, as is occasionally suggested. And irrespective of the actual social importance of mutuality and reciprocity, the supra-individual level, at which certain comprehensive social functions unfold (are completed, carried out, uncoiled and unrolled) or are reconstructed, is in no case to be confused with

⁴⁹¹ Cf. Goranson-Berkowitz, "Reciprocity", p. 232.

the level of motivation understood in terms of the psychology of the individual or anthropologically. Such a mistake, mix-up and confusion has as its consequence that the description of a social whole capable of functioning is equated with an interpretation of human behaviour: socialised men play their roles and act in regard to mutuality and reciprocity in accordance with the functional needs of that whole. However, neither does the individual found through and by means of his reciprocating with others society, nor does he reciprocate with regard to the same society as a hypostasis [i.e. as if the individual were hypostasised separately and outside of society]. Society is (t)here, irrespective of whether the relations between individuals are shaped and moulded on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity or not, and the individual draws from the existence and presence of society an (indirect) benefit, use, advantage and utility, irrespective of whether he (i.e. the individual) enjoys the advantages of mutuality and reciprocity or not, and or whether he loses out and is done an injustice in his relations with and towards others or not^{492 + cliii}. The difference between both these points of view makes itself, though, particularly noticeable in which the individual advantages of life in society are accompanied by disadvantages which inflict and cause a violation or breach of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity on the part of third parties in regard to the individual^{cliv}. The individual optimum is, as a rule, the combination of the general advantages of social life for the individual person with gains, wins, earnings from his (i.e. the said individual person's) relations towards and with other individuals. The individual would profit maximally if the whole of society functioned on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity *and* he (i.e. the said individual) as an individual could violate, infringe, contravene and break the principle of mutuality and reciprocity; under such circumstances, he would

⁴⁹² Already Pareto distinguished between “utilità diretta [=direct utility, usefulness, use, benefit]”, which the individual possibly, in certain circumstances or eventually draws from his relations with and towards others, and “Utilità indiretta, ottenuta perché l'individuo fa parte di una collettività [=Indirect utility, obtained because the individual is part of a collective and or community]” (*Trattato*, § 2115).

literally be all-powerful and omnipotent. In reality, however, he has to do with many more complex relations and circumstances, because very many individuals simultaneously dream of an omnipotence of this kind, and simultaneously live in two worlds, one of which looks and seems as if it would be based and rest upon the collective praxis and practice of mutuality and reciprocity, but the other world leaves open individual room-to-move and leeway for the violation of it (i.e. this praxis of mutuality and reciprocity). Correct in this dualism is the underlying assumption that the “normal” functioning of society in magno will not (directly) through and by means of this or that “asocial or anti-social” individual acting, action or act, be in danger; one could therefore, look at and regard that “normal” functioning in fact as the framework or precondition of this “asocial/anti-social” individual acting, action or act. The more excruciating, agonising, unbearable, distressful, tantalising or worrisome for a collective this objectively existing, present and subjectively often exploited (i.e. exploited by an individual subject(s)) ambivalence is, so much the more strongly is the social-ethical reaction articulated against it/^{clv}. Beyond the strict observance and following of and keeping to the principle of mutuality and reciprocity as the social-ethical minimum, in fact often love for one’s foe or one’s foe’s careful, gentle and considerate handling and treatment and the repayment and recompense of evil with good is demanded. This thought and idea by no means came into the world only through Christianity, although it (i.e. the said thought and idea regarding love etc.), for concrete polemical reasons (i.e. because of the contrast and opposition to the aristocratic ethic of paganism and heathenism) was most particularly and most notably stressed and emphasised in Christianity. Corresponding social-ethical commands are found, however, already, diversely and differently varied and founded and justified in

high (and developed) cultures⁴⁹³ and in the rough, coarse, raw, bitter and severe world of the Old Testament⁴⁹⁴, as well as in the teachings and doctrines of the Buddha⁴⁹⁵ and Lao-Tse⁴⁹⁶. We know indeed why they cannot compete with the principle of mutuality and reciprocity from the point of view of social functionality. Their setting up and enunciation means, nonetheless, something more than a socially parasitical defiance, stubbornness, obstinacy and pigheadedness of the ideal vis-à-vis an untameable and indomitable reality. Because they are based too, of course only partially and indirectly, on higher and superior considerations of mutuality and reciprocity, or rather, hopes (in respect of mutuality and reciprocity): that love, finally, cannot otherwise be reciprocated, returned and repaid other than by love; that love, therefore, constitutes only an advance payment, preliminary work or outlay, in regard to which contra-love (i.e. the reciprocation of love or love in return) as a return favour and *quid pro quo* *must* follow. However, that is already the logic of the gift, of which we want to still speak [below]⁴⁹⁷.

Mutuality (and reciprocity) has a Janus (i.e. dual) face because it encompasses both friendly as well as inimical reciprocating. Although it (i.e. mutuality (and reciprocity)) does not underlie all individual social relations, it stretches and extends to and across the entire and whole spectrum of the social relation, and precisely this procures and makes possible for it, inside of social praxis and practice, an additional substantial advantage vis-à-vis love. Without punishments (penalties and retribution) in this or that form, no society makes do and manages, but punishments certainly cannot through and by means of the command of love be justified logically and in accordance with general opinion

⁴⁹³ See the Babylonian text cited by Hertzler (*Social Thought*, p. 106) (in the English version: “Harm not in any way thine adversary/Recompense the man who doeth evil to thee with good/Oppose thine enemy with righteous dealing”).

⁴⁹⁴ See footnote 480, above; cf. *Sprüche Salomos*, pp. 25, 21.

⁴⁹⁵ V. Glasenapp, *Die Weisheit*, p. 105 ff..

⁴⁹⁶ *Sinnsprüche*, p. 191, cf. p. 186.

⁴⁹⁷ Under d in this (sub-)section [i.e. in Chapter IV, Section 2D(d)].

and feeling so plausibly and convincingly as through and by means of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity, which always and everywhere meant the repayment of friendly acts with friendly acts, and the repayment of inimical acts with inimical acts⁴⁹⁸. Punishment is, of course, no act of friendship (what then would forgiveness and a pardoning be?), and it is imposed as a counter-act against an inimical act, i.e. such an act which caused and inflicted damage and harm to an Other. The strict application of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity during punishment demands an “eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”, i.e. an exact symmetry between damage, harm, and, making good or making amends (i.e. reparation, redress, compensation, atonement). On the basis of this objectively measured and weighed up retribution and retaliation, punishment could, naturally, justly be executed, carried out and enforced only in simple social circumstances, conditions and relations by the person immediately and directly concerned, and indeed, without consideration for the distinction between guilt (blame, fault), and, liability, responsibility. Although every act of retribution / retaliation and every punishment ultimately, in the end must orientate itself to the model of talio [[i.e. punishment as retribution on an equal, mutual, reciprocal basis of an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth]] (because of that, still today, negligent killing e.g. is punished more severely and harshly than negligent bodily harm, injury, wounding, hurting), nevertheless, the consideration of the circumstances and motives of an objectively harmful,

⁴⁹⁸ Thus, Aristotle cites Socrates in *Rhetorik*, 1398a 24-26 [[TRANSLATOR’S ADDITION: «ὄβριον γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόντας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς»]]. Cf. Platon, *Gesetze*, 870e [[TRANSLATOR’S ADDITION: «τὸ τῶν τοιούτων τίσιν ἐν Ἄιδου γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πάλιν ἀφικομένοις δεῦρο ἀνγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν δίκην ἐκτεῖσαι, τὴν τοῦ παθόντος ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔδρασεν, ὑπ’ ἄλλου ταιαύτη μοῖρα τελευτῆσαι τὸν τότε βίον»]]. In Isidor of Seville, he calls it precisely: “Talio non est solum ad iniuria referenda, sed etiam pro beneficio reddendo ponitur; est enim communis sermo et iniuriae et beneficentiae” [[Translator’s English version: “Retribution (reprisal) does not only refer to injury, but is also considered to repay a benefit [received from another / others]; it (i.e. retribution = repayment (as mutuality-reciprocity)) is, indeed, talk, discourse or a word common to and for both injuries, and, beneficial acts (kindnesses and liberalities)”]] (*Etymologiae*, 5, 27). Montesquieu considers repayment in respect of good, with good, and evil, with evil in regard to the eternal commands of natural law (*Esprit des Lois*, 1). In the language of a “natural or primitive folk, people, tribe” as e.g. the Tikopia, the term *tauvi* characterises both forms of repayment (as mutuality-reciprocity) (Firth, *Polynesian Economy*, p. 373). Cf. *Pantschatantra*, IV, § 17 = II, 290: for the second time, man is born who repaid him who in misfortune offered him help, and the other man who ridiculed him.”

detrimental and damaging, i.e. objectively punishment-worthy and punishable acting, action or act brings about a refinement of the thought and idea of retribution and retaliation⁴⁹⁹. The deviation or divergence from its (i.e. retribution's) narrower and stricter version increases and expands simultaneously to the extent that the execution and carrying out of the punishment goes over to the competence, jurisdiction and responsibility of the collective, something which goes well with our thoughts and considerations above regarding the application of the principle of reciprocity and mutuality to the relations between the individual and the collective. On a collective basis, mutuality and reciprocity are posited, though, in practical terms, already by the obligation, commitment and duty of the family, kinship group or clan to avenge and take revenge for an injury, damage, hurt, harm, loss [done or suffered], above all for a murder, in relation to which one of its (i.e. the said family, kinship group or clan's) members fell victim. Whereas, however, a vendetta often opened up a vicious cycle, the imposition and execution and carrying out of the punishment by the institutionalised organs of society struck and affected only one sole, namely, the guilty, individual. Nonetheless, the blood feud (blood vengeance, blood revenge or the vendetta) of the family, kinship group or clan moved beyond the narrowly and strictly comprehended principle of mutuality and reciprocity, since the person immediately and directly concerned, i.e. the person to be avenged, in the meanwhile, was dead; on the other hand, competent and responsible for (i.e. in favour of) revenge were actors who had socially recognised ties and bonds to the victim, something which again implied that the collective in principle approved this kind of retribution, and consequently, looked at the preceding crime as a deed and act which called into question the order of the collective. The collective interest appears, emerges and makes itself felt more strongly when permanent organs of society exercise retribution (and

⁴⁹⁹ Dihle, *Goldene Regel*, pp. 15ff., 48ff..

retaliation), in relation to which the element of the spontaneous action of defence and of revenge is excluded, and a considered equivalence between damage, injury, harm, loss, and, revenge, is produced, made, fabricated or manufactured⁵⁰⁰. It is true that the manufacture, making, fabrication, production, and, pushing through and imposition of (the said) equivalence by institutionalised third parties takes away from mutuality and reciprocity in its strict sense, since here it is no longer a matter of two independent sides, which regulate their relation(ship) on the basis of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity understood as being inimical. Above all, the psychological elan (verve, pep and vigour) belonging to that principle of mutuality and reciprocity diminishes, dwindles and drops off, since from now on, both the crime as well as the punishment are actions basically taken (as being) one-sided and unilateral⁵⁰¹. Nevertheless, that principle of mutuality and reciprocity continues to have an effect, work, act and operate in the background, because the organs of the collective take care of, look after and provide exactly for retribution (and retaliation), no matter how this principle of mutuality and reciprocity – through the direct institutional involvement (interpolation and insertion) of the collective – is (re-)shaped and (re-)moulded. Mutuality / reciprocity through and by means of representation (and deputising) (as understood in the imposition of the concerns, issues, affairs and interests of the representative or deputy), constitutes one of the socially necessary shortenings, curtailments and reductions or disguises of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity. There are, however, also the spiritualisations and sublimations of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity, whose most well-known are the reward(ing) (and recompense) of good and the punishment of evil. As long as the execution, carrying out, completion, settlement and handling of this task lay and was in God's hands, this (i.e. God) exercised retribution and retaliation deputising for, standing in

⁵⁰⁰ Kelsen, *Vergeltung*, pp. 58, 52.

⁵⁰¹ Cf. the remark and comment by Seagle, "Primitive Law", p. 279ff..

the place and as a representative of the other side, not differently to the institutional organs of society, albeit in another place and in another time. Paradoxically, the spiritualisation or the sublimation of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity reaches exactly then its high-point, when that reward(ing) (and recompense) or punishment is up to man left to his own devices, i.e. to his own “conscience”.

In spite of that, talk of mutuality and reciprocity remains meaningful only when one goes back and reduces its multiple and manifold metamorphoses to its original hard core, that is, when one uses the term *stricto sensu* and, accordingly, means the symmetry of performance and consideration (i.e. the *quid pro quo*), payment/remuneration, and, repayment/recompense with friendly or inimical intent. Then, there is, though, no ground or reason and no place for lifting and raising (i.e. making) mutuality and reciprocity (to) the constitutive principle of society. The social-ontological problem consists therein, in making comprehensible that and how, under the social-ethical roof (i.e. cover) of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity, and precisely by the invoking of this same (principle of mutuality and reciprocity), factual and actual deviations, departures and (kinds of) divergence(s) from the strict sense of mutuality/reciprocity, and corresponding gradations in the social relation, can come into being. The consistent application of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity (it remains an open question whether it is in practice possible) would not, obviously, allow any hierarchies and any split(ing)s (fissions, schisms and divisions) in the social body to arise, emerge and appear; such (splits etc.) come to light when the pure component of mutuality and reciprocity in the social relation is covered over by (and overlaid with) the multifarious, variform, multiform and multi-faceted element and factor of complementarity⁵⁰². Whereas in the social relation of mutuality/reciprocity, both sides have the same rights

⁵⁰² Cf. Bateson, “Culture Contact”, esp. p. 181ff..

and obligations, in the complementary relation, the rights of one side represent and constitute obligations of the other side without (full) reciprocating and reciprocation; the narrowness and the stability of social relations do not, though, necessarily depend on their character of mutuality, reciprocity or complementarity. The already mentioned attempt by older functionalists to derive and deduce social life from the principle and the praxis, practice of mutuality/reciprocity, failed not least of all in the lacking and wanting distinction between mutuality/reciprocity and complementarity, so that (in regard) to mutuality/reciprocity, social relations were reckoned and attributed, which rested and were based upon status differences (i.e. differences in status) or complementary rights and obligations flowing from them (i.e. the said differences in status). However, obligations of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the Other, which result and arise from the status of it (i.e. from the Other's status), are something essentially different than such obligations which come into being from previous and preceding actions of the Other in favour of the I (ego). (That should and ought not to mean that the status-wise – i.e. in terms of status – superior Other has done, does or must do absolutely nothing for the I (ego); the important thing here alone is the symmetry^{clvi} of the relationship). The (tacit) identification, i.e. equating of mutuality/reciprocity and complementarity with each other was, of course, no finding of empirical investigations and research, but followed from the general theoretical premises of functionalism, which has to comprehend the “social system” as an equilibrium of functions or of in principle independent and equivalent actors⁵⁰³.

Which factors determine – in certain, but socially serious cases – the transition from mutuality and reciprocity to complementarity or the mixing and blending of mutuality/reciprocity and complementarity with each other in a social relation? Why does symmetry yield and give way to asymmetry, and to what

⁵⁰³ Gouldner, “Norm”, esp. pp. 163ff., 168ff., 170.

extent can symmetry assert itself, persist and hold its ground in asymmetry? For the answer to this question, it is methodically (i.e. in terms of method and methodology) advisable and wise to distinguish between two points of view, whose (f)actual belong together, togetherness, or shared identity does not have to be specifically or especially explained; it (i.e. the said belonging together) makes, incidentally, the interplay of symmetry and asymmetry so complicated, rich in nuance(s), and on occasion, unforeseeable. The one point of view concerns the object or the good, which the actors exchange on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity, or, complementarity, the other point of view has to do with constitution, composition or texture, i.e. the social identity, the self-understanding and the power potential (or potential for power) of the actors themselves. If one puts the first point of view at the centre of attention, thus, mutuality and reciprocity can be described rather as the mechanism of payment or remuneration, and, repayment or recompense, on the other hand, if the constitution, composition or texture of actors is considered paramount and of high priority or prime importance, thus one must look at mutuality and reciprocity rather as the mechanism of interaction (interaction mechanism) or mechanism of “social interlocking or gearing”⁵⁰⁴. The state of affairs (facts, factual circumstances or situation and facts of the case) seems, in the first case, *prima facie* to be simpler. It, nevertheless, becomes considerably more complicated when we consider that the exchanged goods are not only equal in kind and number, but very often can also in respect of quality and quantity be very different. Then, the thorny question in accordance with the common denominator as to values or in accordance with equivalence, which in every concrete case must be answered differently or at least can be answered differently, is posed. Where quantitative criteria are lacking, or no agreement regarding the definition of the quantitative and of the qualitative dominates and

⁵⁰⁴ According to Thurnwald, „Gegenseitigkeit“, p. 102ff..

holds sway, since the kind and volume of performance and consideration or the quid pro quo become an interpretation to be questioned (i.e. a matter of interpretation), i.e. they are evaluated, assessed and judged in accordance with the supposed needs, resources and presumed or actual motives and plans of the actors; accordingly, every actor defines his rights and his obligations, unless he wants to behave and act altruistically, and think solely about the needs and requirements of the Other. In the assessment and evaluation of payment or remuneration, and, repayment or recompense, not least of all, the time factor (i.e. factor regarding time) is inserted and interpolated, and indeed in a dual, double form: as time pressure (i.e. the pressure of time), according to how urgent and pressing the performance and consideration or the quid pro quo necessarily becomes, and as time gap, space, distance or interval (i.e. the interval or lag in (regard to) time) between the performance and consideration or the quid pro quo. The more easily the question or matter of interpretation can be managed, the smaller this time interval.

The possible or potential qualitative difference between performance and consideration or the quid pro quo refers already to the qualitative differences between the actors. Because obviously every actor assesses, evaluates and appraises his own and alien (i.e. another's or others') performance and consideration or quid pro quo in accordance with his own self-understanding and his own social power potential (i.e. potential as regards power). At the moment of payment or remuneration, and, repayment or recompense, he (i.e. every actor) acts, consequently, as this concrete identity, irrespective of whether he sees the process of payment or remuneration, and, repayment or recompense from the perspective of his long-established identity (i.e. his identity settled, fixed and set a long time ago), or whether his identity adapts and adjusts to the particular physiognomy and the tactical or strategic needs and requirements of this process. The interrelation or connection between the qualitative differences

of the goods to be or being exchanged, and those qualitative differences of the identities exchanging (i.e. doing the exchanging), influences, in regard to a double relation, the formation and development of asymmetrical relations, conditions and circumstances. The convertibility of the qualities grants, allows, gives, offers or affords room to move for the extraction, production, exploitation and winning of added or surplus value (i.e. an increase in value), that is, for the attainment, obtainment and reaching of goods, which in the concrete situation count qualitatively more than the goods given away (i.e. exchanged) (thus, e.g. ideational goods can, for instance, in the form of a strengthening and reinforcement or boosting of the feeling or sense of identity, contribute to the renunciation, renouncement, abandonment of or abstention from material goods^{clvii}). And the complementarity moves all the more rapidly and quickly in the asymmetrical direction, the rarer and more desired the goods are, which the one side has at its disposal⁵⁰⁵. In these cases, the difference in respect of power potential (i.e. potential regarding power) does not have an effect and make itself felt as a *primum movens*, because the asymmetry results directly from the quality of the good which the one side needs more or more urgently and more desperately than the other side; thus, can, for instance, solely the I (ego) produce precisely that which the Other needs, or solely the I (ego) can consume that which the Other produces. It goes without saying that the skills, proficiencies and workmanship, or the needs and requirements, of the I (ego) and of the Other are indispensable parts or strengths and weaknesses of their identities. If we now disregard the goods of interest (or the qualifying or imaginable goods), and look at the identities which enter a relation of mutuality and reciprocity or complementarity, from the point of view of their power potential (i.e. potential as regards power), thus, three cases can be thought of (i.e. are possible). Two of them are extreme cases, when, namely, the one side is so strong and

⁵⁰⁵ Cf. Lebra, "An alternative Approach", p. 555ff.

independent that it without noteworthy (kinds of) consideration or quae pro quibus (quid pro quibus or quid pro quos), can take from the other sides everything which it wants, and when the mutual, reciprocal dependence brings about an equilibrium or a balance of forces, which finds expression and manifests itself in the approximate equality of performance and consideration or quid pro quo. The middle case is present and exists when the difference in the power potential (i.e. potential pertaining to power) suffices in order to enforce and compel the inequality between performance and consideration (or quid pro quo) in favour of the stronger side. Both extreme cases are the hobbyhorse or favourite pastime of social theorists, who exclusively bet on the power factor or on mutual and reciprocal dependence and on the insight and knowledge springing from that in regard to the necessity of “rational or reasonable and logical” co-operation^{clviii}; these social theorists would preferably entirely exclude the power factor, but the sole thing which they can do is tacitly start from the assumption of equal power potentials, because talk of independent or equally dependent on one another actors does not actually mean anything else than the assumption of equal power potentials^{clix}. Be that as it may, neither of both these extreme cases can serve as the model for generally valid explanations. The great majority of relations of mutuality, reciprocity and or complementarity move between them (i.e. the said two extremes), in relation to which the pendulum, at times swings to one extreme, at other times, to the other extreme. How formative the social-ethical influence of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity to stronger (sides, parties) and to weaker (sides, parties) is, can be judged, evaluated and assessed only from case to case. Undoubtedly, every resistance, rebellion, insubordination or mutiny against oppression, repression, suppression and exploitation contains a confession of faith in the principle of mutuality and reciprocity. From that, however, its (i.e. the principle of mutuality-reciprocity’s) innate being or inborn existence or the necessity of its general and equal internalisation cannot be derived, inferred or

concluded without anything further. Most real situations are asymmetrical and complex exactly because such internalisation is lacking, and because even trust (confidence and faith) relatively seldom is won, gained and obtained through the mere effect of normatively definable factors⁵⁰⁶. On the other hand, one ought or should not necessarily heed, follow and take to heart the anthropologically exceedingly and extremely optimistic assumption that man in principle tends to avoid debts, blame, guilt and obligations, that is, man tends to accept dependencies only through external and outer pressure^{clx}. Whether man loves “independence” or “dependence” appears to be a futile, useless question^{clxi}. More interesting is to know what he (i.e. man, humans) on each and every respective occasion holds to be and regards as independence and what as dependence, which independence or which dependence he gives preference to on each and every respective occasion.

Mutuality and reciprocity can be practised at or between a number of levels of interaction. Whoever has at his disposal the greater power potential (i.e. potential pertaining to power), determines this level according to his own optimal possibilities of unfolding and development. In this case, a fundamental readiness, preparedness and willingness to reciprocate exists on both sides, however, the who, where and with what/by which (means) are subject to the direct or indirect compulsion, coercion, constraint, pressure or force of the stronger side. Compulsion, coercion, constraint, pressure or force can likewise be exercised when that readiness, willingness and preparedness on the weaker side is lacking, and the relation of mutuality and reciprocity is initiated by the wanting and being able to of the stronger side. One cannot say precisely and without knowledge of the concrete case, to which of both of these kinds of compulsion, coercion, constraint, pressure or force, asymmetrical relations of mutuality and reciprocity, like for instance the feudal bond between master and

⁵⁰⁶ Ellis, “Hobbesian Problem”, p. 699ff..

vassal, owe their coming into being. The founding of the mutuality and reciprocity in regard to the exchange of protection and obedience, military service (i.e. service as regards war) and economic performance, constitutes in some respects and ways a paradigmatic relationship, whose logic, *mutatis mutandis* can be found again in many other private and public, newer or older relationships. The different quality of performances, output, services, achievements and accomplishments, which both sides need exactly because of their qualitative difference, are accompanied by qualitative differences of power potential (i.e. potential as regards power); but the bilateral need for a good simultaneously places upon the one-sided compulsion, coercion, constraint, pressure or force, certain bound(arie)s, mutuality/reciprocity and complementarity; mutuality/reciprocity and complementarity partially mutually and reciprocally cancel each other out, (and) partially co-exist in a relationship of tension, intensity and stress. The direct exchange of material goods is converted into an indirect exchange of material goods, or, into such an exchange of material goods, in which the direct material performance, output, service, achievement and accomplishment is returned and reciprocated by an indirect and not regular and not regulated performance, output, service, achievement and accomplishment. This can, in regard to a considerable and substantial difference in power potential (i.e. potential as regards power), take the form such that the stronger side makes use of the weaker side as an instrument for his own (i.e. the stronger side's) glorification, whereas he (i.e. the stronger side) reciprocates only symbolically, in order to assert, make felt and put forward his own status through the symbolic cost, expense, effort or the announcement and summoning of symbols⁵⁰⁷. An asymmetric mutuality and reciprocity which goes back to and is reduced to the difference of the power potential (i.e. potential as to power), must, though, signify oppression, suppression or repression. In certain

⁵⁰⁷ Firth, "Themes", p. 14ff. ("The recipient repays by serving as an 'instrument of enhancement' for the giver").

constellations (and conjunctures), it (i.e. the said asymmetric mutuality and reciprocity) can be reconciled with genuine solidarity from above, i.e. with protection without oppression, suppression or repression. Solidarity and friendship can also exist between unequal actors, sides, not symmetrical mutuality and reciprocity. Conversely, symmetrical mutuality and reciprocity can, as already remarked, be acted out and take place against the background of inimical relations. Such relations are, in fact, often initiated and inaugurated through the mechanism of mutuality and reciprocity, in which triggering and reciprocating action follow one another, and the triggering action determines the future character of the relation exactly because the mechanism in question functions. Inimical mutuality and reciprocity can, however, also be set in train already before the advent and emergence of a tangible triggering action. Preventive measures, in order to prevent and guard against such an action of the other side, are, for their part, not always intended as the triggering action of an inimical mutuality and reciprocity, but they very often have an effect in such a manner. If through the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, a preventive measure is answered with a preventive counter-measure, thus, mutuality and reciprocity take place not at the level of real, but of potential acts, actions or kinds of acting. Real mutuality and reciprocity in enmity is both positive (blow against blow) as well as negative (agreements and arrangements of a tactical character, bilateral, on both sides, abstention from kinds of acting, actions and acts which would be damaging, harmful, injurious or uncertain for both sides).

A very large, in fact the greater part of social relations consists in asymmetrical kinds of mutuality and reciprocities with or without physical coercion, compulsion and force. This reality found expression already since antiquity in the theoretical supplementing and complementing of the strict principle of mutuality and reciprocity through and by means of the principle of

distributive justice. With his excellent and outstanding sense of differentiations and corresponding typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms), Aristotle arranged and structured his own concept of justice around the axis of the distinction between social relations under (i.e. according to) in principal equal people and under (i.e. according to) really unequal people, whereby and in relation to which he also distinguished between the levels in relation to which in principle equality and real inequality dominate, rule and hold sway. In regard to regulatory (i.e. corrective) justice (*justitia correctiva*), which stretches and expands to contractual and in general legally regulated relations, the law looks at and regards the persons concerned and in question as equal, whilst it (i.e. the law) consciously disregards, ignores and pays no attention to their real (concrete and tangible) variety, diversity, dissimilarity and distinctness. This variety, diversity, dissimilarity and distinctness of persons are asserted, put forward, brought to bear and make themselves felt of necessity in business and commercial relations, where different, various, varied and diverse kinds of performances (i.e. services) or products are exchanged, but they are here neutralised by a balancing and evening out, which takes place, occurs and is effected on the basis of the comparison with a third [[thing]], i.e. money; thus, retributive and repaying (i.e. commutative) justice (*justitia commutativa*) comes about^{clxii}. In the social-political field or area, persons (i.e. people) are, finally, unequal, and obviously no law and no balancing (balance, equalisation or compensation) can be thought of and conceived in order to, regarding that, bring about an equality between them; thus, every person gets, obtains or receives, in accordance with distributive justice (*justitia distributiva*) that which is “proportionate, appropriate, reasonable, proper and fitting” for and to him⁵⁰⁸; Aristotle does not fail to remind (us) of the constant dispute, quarrel and strife regarding the

⁵⁰⁸ *Nikom. Ethik*, V, 5-8.

binding interpretation of the “proportionate (appropriate, reasonable, fair, commensurate)”, and it would out of place and misguided to accuse and reproach him that through and by means of his typology he creates the false impression that asymmetry (or, according to his terminology, geometric proportion(ality) in contrast to numeric proportion(ality)) dominates, rules and holds sway only on and in the social-political field and area, whereas contractual and commercial relations then remain unscathed. He knew that this could not really be right, however, he had to disregard and overlook it, since his topic and theme was justice, which even in its unequal, that is, distributing and distributive form and shape demands ethical legitimations (for instance through and by means of earnings, gains, merits and services)^{clxiii}. Of lasting importance, significance and meaning is his insight into and understanding of the social complementarity of symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of mutuality and reciprocity with regard to each other, no matter how one weighs them on each and every respective occasion. Finally, it is conceptually and in reality exaggerated in regard to the in itself correct intent(ion), to emphasise and underline the influence of the power potentials (i.e. potentials and potentialities regarding power) on the outcome of processes of mutuality and reciprocity, by explaining mutuality and reciprocity as the a “special case” of distributive justice⁵⁰⁹. The more or less strictly applied principle of mutuality and reciprocity runs through and pervades, in every society, a smaller or larger number of social relations, and it cannot only get away from and be maintained beyond the predominance and preponderance of asymmetrical mutuality and reciprocity or even the abolition of every mutuality and reciprocity in certain fields and areas of social life, but also comes into play and is effective only via various mediations, intercessions, interventions which correct the initial appearance and impression that it would have or has fallen by the wayside^{clxiv}. Thus, a short-

⁵⁰⁹ Thus, Chadwick-Jones, *Social Exchange Theory*, p. 243.

term asymmetrical mutuality-reciprocity, long-term, i.e. over the long run, becomes and turns into a symmetrical relation, whilst inside of the asymmetry, regardless of the will(ing) and volition of the superior party or side, objective mechanisms develop which push towards symmetry, or else symmetry is produced, made, manufactured and fabricated via the interpolation and involvement of a third party/side, i.e. via the triadisation of the relationship of mutuality and reciprocity (i.e. the turning of the mutual-reciprocal relation into a tri-partite relation) or even its (the said mutual-reciprocal relation(ship)'s) distribution to other actors. The third party can be a higher and superior tier of jurisdiction (or authority), which through the threat of sanctions commands the strict observance and following of and keeping to the principle of mutuality and reciprocity; an intermediary, mediator and go-between who acts for his own moral or selfish and self-serving reasons; or a competitor who through his higher offer to B, forces, coerces and compels the until then superior A into symmetrical mutuality and reciprocity vis-à-vis B. Triadisation (i.e. the turning of the mutual-reciprocal relation into a tri-partite relation) or multiplication of the relationship of mutuality and reciprocity can of course also have the effect – negatively – on existing symmetries in regard to the relation of mutuality and reciprocity of two actors⁵¹⁰.

The continuing to exist of actual, i.e. symmetrical mutuality and reciprocity under all circumstances, and mutuality and reciprocity as the constitutive principle of social life remain, nonetheless, two different things. In the chasm and gulf between the full-of-gaps and incomplete putting into practice of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity, and its social-ethical ubiquity and omnipresence, a phenomenon, which one may call “moralistic aggression” or else blackmail, now thrives and flourishes. The general acceptance of a social-ethical principle does not necessarily mean a disadvantage for someone who

⁵¹⁰ Lebra, “An alternative Approach”, p. 559ff..

violates it, it (i.e. the said general acceptance of a social-ethical principle), however, entails and brings with it disadvantages for someone who openly calls it into question. Moralistic aggression or blackmail is present when the Ego through and by means of skillful, deft, clever and cunning behaviour manoeuvres the Other into a situation and position in which this (Other) acts either in the sense and terms of the Ego (i.e. as the Ego wants him to act) or else must come into open conflict with a social-ethical principle of general acceptance. In our case, the Other must *nolens volens* (i.e. wanting to or not) act on the basis of the principle of mutuality and reciprocity, although the Ego's consideration (or *quid pro quo*) is fictive or hypocritical^{clxv}: it (i.e. the Ego) offers sham help (i.e. help and assistance only as appearance and pretence, not substantive, real, tangible help), in order to get real help, it simulates, fakes and feigns a wretched, miserable and pitiful state of affairs in order to awaken compassion, pity and sympathy or repentance, remorse and regret regarding the fraud, scam, deception, cheating and deceit committed, in order to be able to continue to commit fraud, scam, deceive and cheat^{clxvi}, (the ideational prior concession or preliminary and advance payment, service or performance of repentance, remorse and regret is, in the process, reciprocated by the real consideration (and *quid pro quo*) of granting and allowing fraud, scamming, deception, cheating and deceit^{clxvii + 511}). Of moral(istic) aggression or blackmail, likewise, there is talk when the victim puts the culprit, perpetrator and offender under pressure to atone, pay and make amends for an injustice committed, over the long term, or with (kinds of) compensation, which go(es) beyond the normally recognised, or simply beyond the bearable, tolerable and endurable^{clxviii}. In the background, of course, stands and is the social-ethical principle of repayment and recompense; the calculation and reckoning, nonetheless, does not always work out^{clxix}. Because the penitent, repentant,

⁵¹¹ Regarding "moralistic aggression" see Trivers, "Evolution", esp. p. 50ff..

remorseful, or, in any case, culprit acting under the influence of that (aforesaid social-ethical) principle, show and proves himself very often ready, prepared and willing to perform, i.e. make and pay compensation only to the extent he holds and regards it (i.e. such compensation) to be adequate (suitable and proportionate); demands of the victim perceived as exaggerated, unreasonable, overdone, excessive and extreme bring forth, yield and lead to aggression per se and as such against the moralistic aggression^{512 + clxx}.

b. Exchange: the diffuse economisation of social theory and the social relation as the parameter of the calculus (i.e. calculation) of benefit (utility, use and advantage)

We need a strict concept of mutuality and reciprocity in order to both not succumb to the temptation of beholding the constitutive principle of society in mutuality and reciprocity, as well as in order to apprehend the value, importance and status of symmetrical and asymmetrical mutuality/reciprocity inside of society properly and correctly. We equally need a strict definition of exchange in order to not improperly, and not incorrectly, stretch, extend and enlarge the social-ontological boundaries of the effect and impact of this particular form of the social relation. The social relation encompasses as a concept mutuality / reciprocity, and this is, for its part, conceptually more comprehensive than exchange. Every exchange rests and is based on mutuality and reciprocity, not every mutuality/reciprocity means, however, a(n) (kind of) exchange. Mutual and reciprocal respect e.g. is something different than the exchange (or interchange, barter, substitution, replacement) of services or of goods on the basis of mutuality/reciprocity, and the distinction remains and continues even when we visualise and make clear to ourselves that exchange, just like reciprocity and mutuality, can be asymmetrical, that is, it can diverge and

⁵¹² Berscheid-Walster, "Compensate", p. 440.

deviate from its strict concept and notion; asymmetrical mutuality/reciprocity, e.g. the hegemon's relationship with his protégés (charges, wards) inside of an alliance (or coalition), does not have to entail unequal exchange relationships (or relationships (in respect) of exchange). Mutuality/reciprocity and exchange do not, therefore, differ with reference to their possibility of deviating and diverging from their strict concept and notion, (completely on the contrary, precisely this possibility provides them their considerable and substantial space for development (i.e. unfolding space or room to move) inside of and within society, whereby and in relation to which the constant tension, stress and intensity between their strict concept/notion and their social praxis/practice has thus a motivating effect on actors); mutuality/reciprocity and exchange differ, rather, with reference to their extent, scope and their object. Mutuality and reciprocity can prevail also during the exchange (interchange, barter, substitution, replacement) of qualifiable (i.e. calculable, countable, reckonable, specifiable) and measurable material goods or analogously assessable services; over and above that, however, it (i.e. mutuality/reciprocity) stretches and extends and expands to the critical field and area of "social invisibles" (above all in respect of the recognition of alien (i.e. foreign, strange or another's) identity according to their own self-understanding), in regard to whose sign / symbol(s) (i.e. under whose influence) exchange very often stands and is. These socially decisive invisible magnitudes cannot be quantified and measured, they also cannot be reduced to a third (party, thing, phenomenon) as a common denominator, as this is the case in regard to those goods and services which make up and constitute the object of exchange; and since this exchange, in the strict sense rests and is based on mutuality/reciprocity, thus, mutuality / reciprocity refers and relates to only its quantifiable and measurable aspect, that is, it is narrowed down and restricted and limited conceptually, in order to

correspond, tally and be identical with exchange⁵¹³. The pure form of exchange is, accordingly, economic exchange or perhaps (the) exchange, thus, as the pure teaching, doctrine and theory of the economy must apprehend it: the exchange of economically (i.e. pertaining to the economy) valuable goods resting and based on equivalence (the equal standard, parity, equal value) and mutuality / reciprocity, which conceptually clearly differs both from compulsion, coercion, force, as well as from the gift⁵¹⁴. The best way, now, to step up to and act against (i.e. oppose and counter) an economisation of social theory is exactly that of holding onto, sticking and adhering to the (wider) economic meaning of the concept of exchange. Precisely economistically minded social theoreticians smuggle and bring into the same (i.e. concept of exchange) extra-economic content(s), and indeed, in such a way that these appear to be functions of the fundamental and basic economic meaning; thus, the social in general is forced and pressed into the conceptual framework of the economic [sphere, dimension], with the consequence that the specific differences dissolve, liquidate, disperse into what is vague (i.e. into vagueness), whereas simultaneously the new supreme and paramount concept serves, or acts and is used for, all aspects of the social relation, that is, it often has to absorb and include within itself directly opposed content(s). When it (i.e. the said supreme concept of exchange) applies such that everything can be exchanged with everything, then it always seems to be possible that everything ex post facto is

⁵¹³ I find it terminologically and factually/objectively false to reduce mutuality/reciprocity to the equal exchange of goods, even if this occurs, takes place and ensues with the in itself correct intent(ion) of contradicting those “tender-hearted” sociologists, who – through improper and unseemly widenings, extensions and expansions of the concept of mutuality/reciprocity – want to make of it (i.e. the said concept of mutuality and reciprocity) the constitutive principle of social life (thus, Pryor, *Origins*, p. 26ff., cf. p. 95). The widening, extension and expansion of that concept in the direction of “social invisibles” has in itself nothing to do with its consideration as (a/the) socially constitutive principle [[TRANSLATOR’S ADDITION (NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): BECAUSE ONTOLOGICALLY E.G. INDIVIDUALS A AND B EXIST IN RELATION TO SOCIETY, THE SOCIAL RELATION CAN E.G. BE BETWEEN A (AND OR SOCIETY) AGAINST B, I.E. GOING FURTHER THAN BEING MUTUAL/RECIPROCAL BETWEEN A AND B AS DOMINANCE ON THE PART OF A (AND OR SOCIETY) AGAINST B, OR, BETWEEN SOCIETY AND A / B, WHEREBY A / B HAVE NO SAY, I.E. NO MUTUALITY-RECIPROCITY WHEN DOMINATED BY SOCIETY (E.G. WHEN SOCIETY (THROUGH THE POLITICAL) DOES NOT ALLOW A AND B TO SPEAK PUBLICALLY, OR, SIMPLY EXECUTES THEM ETC.).]].

⁵¹⁴ Cf. Perroux, *Zwang*, p. 118.

(i.e. ought) to be interpreted as exchange⁵¹⁵. There is, however, no objective reason, but only a symbolic reason to turn the social relation into an [act of] “exchange”: to signal that social theory should and ought to stand and be under the influence of an economistic positioning, stance and attitude. Over and above that, one can also presume an ethical-normative reason, which might or is supposed to and should be regarded as a pendant, i.e. counterpart to/of the old liberal belief in the replaceability, detachability, removability and commutability of trade by means of war [[i.e. trade can, therefore, also replace (the need for) war]]. Since exchange, in the strict sense, must rest and depend on mutuality and reciprocity, or, since two – exactly calculating (i.e. calculating with precision) and guided and led by “rational choice” – specimens of homo oeconomicus would never get involved in and agree to an unequal, that is, harmful, injurious and detrimental exchange, thus, the equating and identification of exchange with the social relation comes down and amounts to an equating and identification of the social relation with mutuality and reciprocity, which, consequently, is elevated to the constitutive principle of society^{clxxi}. Economism can now, in fact, produce and show better ethical results than ethics itself, something which leaves a good impression^{clxxii}.

The economisation of social theory with the help or on the basis of the concept of exchange and the theory of “rational choice” standing behind it (i.e. such economised social theory based on the concept of exchange), throws up, i.e. raises aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes), which are both of a methodical (i.e. methodological), as well as of an objective nature. The cradle of this epistemological “economic imperialism”⁵¹⁶ was the field and area of the micro-economy (or micro-economics), in regard to which processes of exchange, as a result of rational choices, can understandably be described with

⁵¹⁵ Weinstein et al. “Obligation”, p. 11.

⁵¹⁶ Swedberg, *Economics and Sociology*, passim.

particular and especial clarity. The transition from the narrow, strict to the broad and weak version of theory was carried out and executed via drastic abstractions, which went far beyond something which was for the construction of the original micro-economic core or nucleus a legitimate abstraction. The dilution and watering down of the concept of exchange was exactly one such abstraction, because concretely that concept of exchange could only remain in the micro-economic context, not in the micro-social and macro-social context. The abstraction functions, however, also as one-sidedness (partiality and bias) in respect of certain aspects, when, namely, it is abstracted for the sake of other aspects without consideration for empirically ascertainable (kinds of) interweaving(s). Since exchange is undertaken through and by means of “rational choice”, thus, this kind of abstraction served in the construction of an anthropological foil, i.e. background for “rational choice”, whereby and in relation to which the narrowing and contraction of the perspective allows in fact the older utilitarianism to appear as a virtually and actually multi-dimensional theory. The utilitarianism of “rational choice” does not have much time, namely, not only for matters of concern in respect of the public welfare (*or*: charitable causes) of classic(al) utilitarianism, but it also shortens, abbreviates and reduces individual motivation to some extent regarding the breadth and depth of the dimension of individual motivation (sympathetic processes, ethical and institutional considerations), which was present in A. Smith’s, Bentham’s or Mill’s thinking⁵¹⁷. The drastic abstractions were indeed, here, justified with reference to the principles of the economy of thought⁵¹⁸, yet their concrete application can hardly withstand the demands of a scientifically legitimate use of abstractions. Because these (aforesaid drastic abstractions) function less as a stopgap in view of the fact of the real impossibility of enumerating, listing and

⁵¹⁷ Lechner, “New Utilitarianism”, pp. 94ff., 101. Parsons was already guilty of a false shortening and curtailment or reduction of classical utilitarianism as regards the history of ideas; this false shortening etc., though, was done with polemical intent, see Camic, “Utilitarians Revisited”.

⁵¹⁸ See, regarding that, the good remarks, comments and observations of Hirschman, “Against Parsimony”.

itemising all aspects of the (i.e. what is) concrete, one after the other and in succession, and more as statements and assertions regarding real actors and real behaviour; their setting up and putting forward is not covered in retrospect by the proven empirical validity, soundness and conclusiveness of the theory as a whole, but they are supposed to underpin, substantiate and corroborate the validity, soundness and conclusiveness of the theory, something which is all the easier, since this theory does not venture or dare to come out of its own idealisations (perfect rationality, perfect competition etc.)⁵¹⁹. With this function and this status of abstraction and idealisation, the inclination increases to confuse and mix up (as between) each other, scientificity (i.e. the application of scientific methods and principles, a scientific nature and scholarliness), and, the technique of formalisation (i.e. rendering into form(s) or structuring in terms of form) with the help of a logical-mathematical set of (conceptual) instruments (i.e. a logical-mathematical (conceptual) apparatus or equipment); to regard the mere translation of qualitative magnitudes or relations into symbolic formulae, and in general, the reformulation of – on many occasions – banal facts and circumstances better known elsewhere into a new jargon, as progress in understanding. Naturally, there are cases of rationally instrumental behaviour which can be subsumed under such formal (i.e. form-related) models; however, their methodical (i.e. methodological) claim to exclusivity can be justified through that just as little as the use of an economic vocabulary for the apprehension of social relations from areas and fields outside of the economic [sphere, dimension], and very often inside of its (i.e. the economic's) field and area too. To such methods, procedures and processes (or methodical procedures), at most a certain heuristic value may be attributed and ascribed in the analysis of certain phenomena⁵²⁰.

⁵¹⁹ Cf. Moe "The workshop", esp. p. 222ff..

⁵²⁰ Benn-Mortimore, "Technical Models"; Heath, "Exchange Theory", p. 113ff.. *Rational Choice*, p. 172; Emerson, "Social Exchange Theory" (1976), pp. 336, 359; Barry, *Sociologists*, pp. 31, 33. For "rational choice theory" see further details in Ch. V Sec. 1D of this volume.

We shall explain and illustrate with the main thread and leitmotif of the concept of exchange, the objective weaknesses of the economisation of social theory by means of typical examples. Let us recollect, first of all, that the equating and identification of exchange and the social relation, before it obtained in recent decades a positive overtone, was common much earlier in terms of the critique of culture / cultural criticism, and, indeed, as the expression of regret as regards the subjugation and subjection of everything human to the law of money in capitalism. We encounter the interface between the critique of culture/cultural criticism and the sociological way of looking at things in Simmel – not by chance in that work in which his (i.e. Simmel’s) earlier functionalism reached and attained a high point and summit with conscious reference to the realities of the money economy (or economy of money)⁵²¹. Here Simmel means and opines, therefore, that, although interaction (or mutual influence) in itself is the wider concept, [and] exchange the narrower concept, yet in human relations, the former interaction (or mutual influence) is “completely predominant” in forms which allow it (the said interaction (or mutual influence)) to be viewed as exchange⁵²². The downright happy, cheerful and joyful reduction of the social relation to exchange came, though, a little later on the national-economic side (i.e. the side pertaining to the national economy), which approved of and affirmed the capitalistic economy fully and without any trace, hint or touch of cultural criticism (or the critique of culture). Thus, v. Mises reached and attained this position by denying the distinction of the “classics (i.e. classical economists and economic theorists)” between economic and non-economic behaviour (action); he postulated the identity (i.e. equating) of behaviour (Economics) and rationality^{clxxiii}, and finally, defined economics (i.e. as economic activity) in general, that is, every disposal of goods, also that disposal of goods “of the isolated landlord (proprietor,

⁵²¹ See Ch. III, Sec. 1 B, above.

⁵²² *Philosophie des Geldes*, p. 34.

innkeeper or publican)”, as exchange⁵²³. Exchange, economics (as economic activity), action and rationality, therefore, represent and constitute one and the same thing (and affair/business). Present here is, already, that immoderate, intemperate, boundless and excessive widening, extension and expansion of concepts, which since then plagues and afflicts all “social exchange theories”. The latter (“social exchange theories”) came into being a generation later in the American milieu and at a moment when against Parsons’ static system, the “open” – and against its (i.e. Parsons’ static system’s) normativism – economistic (and behaviouristic) utilitarianism was rising in protest⁵²⁴. That is why they (“social exchange theorists”) had to deal with the (then) running / current sociological question formulations (and settings of the problem), and consequently, put to the test the theoretical range, scope and significance of the now central exchange concept (or concept of exchange) in accordance with several aspects (and points of view). The main difficulty was, certainly, of a fundamental nature, and consisted in making plausible the commensurability of the exchange relationship with the entire spectrum of the social relation, or at least showing and demonstrating that kinds of incommensurability were, in terms of social theory, justifiable (reasonable, defensible and tenable) or unimportant. That, in the process, could not come off without gaps, limits and (kinds of) vagueness. For the claim to generality of an exchange theory (or theory of exchange), it does not come, in any case, to any good (or it is not, anyway, of any benefit or opportune) if its author must a limine admit or concede that a transfer or translation of the exchange concept (or concept of exchange) (in)to the totality of the social modes of behaviour would deprive this concept of exchange of its distinctive sense and meaning⁵²⁵. Such an

⁵²³ *Grundprobleme*, pp. 58, 136, 138.

⁵²⁴ The main or chief argument of the Parsonians (i.e. students and followers of Parsons) against exchange theories was: exchange can only in non-institutionalised societies or situations be the fundamental social relation; institutions and norms withdraw, revoke and take away from exchange relationships the primary role in social life. See Bierstedt, “Review”, p. 790. [[English translator’s note (nothing to do with P.K.): this argument is at least in part true, generally speaking.]]

⁵²⁵ Blau, *Exchange*, p. 89.

ascertainment would only be helpful for a social theory which defines exchange precisely and could delimit and demarcate it (i.e. exchange) likewise accurately against the rest of the social modes of behaviour. Our author cannot perform and do this. As the criterion for exchange, he (i.e. Blau) specifies voluntariness, and on this basis he points to which social modes and ways of behaviour cannot belong to exchange: the exercising of physical violence and action in accordance with internalised norms – in order to add restrictively (i.e. in terms of limiting what he just said) that just as asymmetrical power relation(ship)s can rest and be based on exchange^{clxxiv}, so too social conformity promotes, encourages and fosters “indirect” exchange⁵²⁶. Voluntariness in exchange concretely means and signifies that actors only enter into relation(ship)s of exchange (or exchange relationships), from which they expect and hope for – on the basis of alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) – their own gain, profit and win(nings), and can give up and abandon them (i.e. the said exchange relationships) as soon as gain, profit and win(nings) and or the corresponding alien behaviour (i.e. the behaviour of others) fails to appear and materialise (and does not take place)⁵²⁷. Behind that stands and is, obviously, the model of the free market and of the free contracting parties, which at will can come and go, whilst they (i.e. the said free contracting parties) may, in fact, unilaterally cancel, terminate, renounce and discontinue an exchange relationship (or relation(ship) of exchange). However, exchange relationships are not considered which indeed (momentarily) lie beyond the exercising of physical violence and bring gain, profit and winnings, yet can neither be entered into freely nor be redeemed (i.e. cashed in, kept, honoured, realised and or ended) freely^{clxxv}.

This gap (or hole) entails quite a few difficulties, as we shall immediately see. It (i.e. the said gap or hole), however, stems ultimately from an ambiguity

⁵²⁶ Loc. cit., p. 91ff..

⁵²⁷ Loc. cit., p. 6.

which concerns the status of exchange in the entire spectrum of the social relation or its relation towards and with (regard to) violence, force or power. On the one hand, the exchange relationship (or relationship of exchange) is supposed to make up and constitute the one major and great type of social process, whereas competition (and rivalry) represents and constitutes the other (major type of social process); on the other hand, we are again assured that within and inside of the exchange relationship itself, both conflict as well as co-operation occur, exist and are found, just as inside of and within “social association” as a whole, love and war equally exist⁵²⁸. If, however, power and violence/force take root in the wider circle of social life, which encompasses the narrower circle of the exchange relationship, how can one merely and always derive and deduce the latter (exchange relationship) from voluntariness, and exclude that the – in it (i.e. exchange relationship) – admittedly often existing conflicts and power inequalities (inequalities of power) come and stem from factors which pour and stream in, from the outside, into the in itself voluntary and freely dissolvable and revocable exchange relationship? Because Blau, who (very) well knows about the possibility of the I (ego) forcing the Other towards exchange (i.e. forcing another to exchange with the I (ego)), nonetheless, goes to a lot of trouble, in terms of his starting position and his conviction in respect of the social primacy of the exchange relationship vis-à-vis the power relationship (i.e. relation(ship) as to power), of proving that at least in the normal case, power inequality (i.e. inequality as to power) would come into being and arise, emerge and be produced only in the course of exchange, and indeed when someone who needs something from the Other (i.e. another person), for lack of material exchange values, agrees to his own subjection and subjugation as consideration (and *quid pro quo*). Hence, the (state of) imbalance and disequilibrium which results from the logic of the mutuality and reciprocity

⁵²⁸ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 331, 4, 12.

of the exchange relationship itself and can lead and flow (in)to socially striving-forward (i.e. propulsive) stresses, tensions and strains⁵²⁹. That logic is not, though, the deepest moving (i.e. motive) force of the exchange process, but it is rather the “existential conditions and circumstances” of the same exchange process which lies beyond the mutuality norm (i.e. the norm regarding mutuality and reciprocity), that is, in the final analysis and ultimately in [one’s own] “self-interest”⁵³⁰. But one’s own interest (i.e. self-interest) and voluntariness are two different kinds of things, because self-interest demands and commands indeed (quite often) to prefer subjection, submission and subjugation to death or serious disadvantage; this, however, is a long way off from the supposed, alleged and reputed state (of affairs) of the freely contracting party in a free market. The voluntary entering into an equal exchange relationship (or relationship of exchange) is, in other words, something essentially and substantially different than the voluntary bearing, enduring, putting up with and suffering an inequality in order to not voluntarily have to bear, endure, stand and tolerate [something] worse. The level and the object of the voluntariness takes place differently every time, and this depends, again, on the relative power position of the contracting parties, that is, on the character of the social relation. Either we must, therefore, drop, ditch and abandon voluntariness as a criterion owing to its content-related vagueness, which would take from exchange its market-economy impression, stamp (i.e. character and look), or else we must, especially in regard to unequal exchange relationships, methodically and objectively put first the concept of the social relation, including and along with everything which this social relation contains, comprises and implies in regard to that concept of exchange. That would signify and mean the failure of the attempt to widen, broaden, extend and expand the

⁵²⁹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 20ff., 28ff., 313, 314.

⁵³⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 92f.

exchange concept / concept of exchange over and above and beyond its economic content.

The uncomfortable and uneasy feeling that here something is not right, rather than insight into the nature of the discrepancy and inconsistency (in respect of what is right), pushed Blau, in relation to that, to add to the (above-)mentioned restrictions and limitations concerning the general social importance, significance, value and status of the exchange relationship; restrictions and limitations, too, which arise, ensue and result from ascertainments regarding the differences between social and economic exchange. The most important of these differences is supposed to be that social exchange does not entail defined and quantifiable obligations and duties or gains and profits, and in the process, can give rise to feelings of trust and of personal guilt. It is, moreover, recognised and acknowledged that such exchange in its character and course is influenced by the situation, by the status and roll of the actors, by collective standards and by coalitions. Nevertheless, Blau adheres to the principle of the fundamental similarity and likeness of the essence (substance and nature) between social and economic exchange: in both cases it is a matter of the same striving after utility (or value) maximisation (*or*: maximisation of benefits) and of the same behaviour, as the political (national) economist observed, especially in the sphere of consumption, in which, otherwise and differently than in production, not all magnitudes and preferences can be converted and translated into monetary values; in spite of this, incidentally, the wish is expressed and the attempt is made to introduce (or import) mathematical-economic models into the study of social exchange⁵³¹. During this constant back and forth, to-and-fro, coming and going, the overall result does not go beyond general analogies between economic and social exchange or behaviour, whereby and in relation to which the in principle existing readiness, willingness and preparedness as

⁵³¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 93ff., 104ff., 154, 168ff..

regards the application of economic models and economic models of thought in general, can only superficially be concretised because of the constitution, composition and texture of the material and (subject) matter in question⁵³². Incidentally, of interest, basically, is not so much the detailed clarification of these analogies, but their use in themselves, not the concrete sense and meaning of the term “exchange”, but its use in itself together with the connected with that world-theoretical symbolism. It is not explained once why most of the social relations should and ought to all of a sudden be described as *exchange*, which new insights are necessary for this re-naming, or which new insights are to be gained and won from this re-naming. Things are done, handled and dealt with the other way around. Old perceptions and views, presented and founded and justified in different thought (intellectual) frameworks (or frameworks of thought)^{clxxvi}, which were substantiated, proven and verified by means of citations and quotations from Aristotle, La Rochefoucauld, Simmel or Machiavelli, re-appear now in the guise of an economic jargon.

Blau’s palinodes (i.e. abjurations, recantations and retractions) bear witness to the objective untenability of his position, and simultaneously to the inner insecurity of an author who a few years later abandoned the methodological individualism of exchange theory in favour of a “structural” way of looking at the social⁵³³. The open and logically actually obvious espousal (i.e. conjoining) of economism and behaviourism with each other gave exchange theory another impulse, but not in the least lent and gave it greater clout. Homans, the main exponent of this school of thought or (intellectual) direction or tendency, declares “elementary” economic principles (as being) “completely reconcilable” (“perfectly reconcilable”) with the principles of “elementary social behaviour”. He does not stay and linger at the question as to how the frequently and in many

⁵³² Cf. Chadwick-Jones, *Social Exchange Theory*, p. 313; Heath, "Economic Theory", pp. 286, 290.

⁵³³ *Inequality and Heterogeneity*; cf. Ch. II, footnote 220.

cases qualitative transition from the elementary to the complicated is (or ought) to be made, established, restored or manufactured, what weight and gravity elementary explanations have for complicated facts and circumstances, and to what extent economic principles in their elementary form in general have a specifically economic character or can easily be translated into commonplaces of universal application, and, consequently, lose their particular heuristic value. Also here, we move, therefore, at the level of very general analogies, which do not at all suffice for the construction and building of a content-full, substantial, profound social theory (i.e. a social theory full of and rich in content). However, even at this level, Homans feels obliged and duty bound to pre-empt and anticipate obvious objections, and to restrict, limit and confine the “perfect and complete compatibility and reconcilability” of economic principles and principles in respect of behaviour (behavioural principles) with regard to some conspicuous and noticeable differences. Economic exchange concerns stable material goods; on the other hand, social exchange frequently concerns variable and immaterial goods; the former (economic exchange) has at its disposal the common measure of money, the latter (social exchange) does not; finally, the economic way of looking at things can make use of the simplifying (i.e. simplistic) abstraction of the perfect market, however the social market is not perfect. Nonetheless, the same effect and impact of the laws of supply and demand or of marginal utility remains in both areas or fields (i.e. of the so-called “perfect market” and of the so-called unperfect “social market”) in principle untouched⁵³⁴. A re-interpretation or opening of homo oeconomicus, who structurally definitely reminds us of the simultaneous conversion and transformation of the “static” system into an “open” system in other schools of social theory^{clxxvii}, comes to the aid, assistance or rescue of the above-mentioned “perfect compatibility or consistency”. Whereas the classical homo

⁵³⁴ *Social Behaviour*, pp. 64ff., 68ff..

oeconomicus, meant Homans, was anti-social and one-sided, that is, materialistic in his value preferences (i.e. preferences pertaining to values), the “new economic man” stands out through or is distinguished by his openness vis-à-vis all kinds of values, even altruistic values; nonetheless, his behaviour continues not to deviate, diverge, differ or vary from economic principles, since he must take into consideration his resources in pursuing and striving after these [non-economic] values⁵³⁵. The watering down and dilution of homo oeconomicus is compensated, though, by the economisation of social theory (i.e. making social theory revolve around (features of) the economy), in fact, it (i.e. the watering down/dilution of homo oeconomicus) is at this (economisation of social theory’s) service, and accordingly may not over-step and exceed certain bounds, confines and limits. Also, it (i.e. the watering down/dilution of homo oeconomicus) does not stand in the way of the market model (or model of the market) because, despite the aforementioned distinction between the economic and the social market, Homans wants, furthermore, to start from the representation and notion of exchange partners with equal and the same rights, who do not have any monopoly at their disposal^{clxxviii} and are “always free”^{clxxix} to avoid or to break off an exchange relation (or relation of exchange)⁵³⁶.

Now, precisely the simultaneous openness of homo oeconomicus (who from now on, no longer follows the pattern and model of the avaricious, money-grubbing, greedy-for-money and obsessed-with-money ascetic fixed upon accumulation, but on that type of the modern consumer, lost, full of relish and of pleasure, in the great variety and diversity and multiformity of what is on offer vis-à-vis a number of qualitatively different values, who moves into the foreground and makes come to the fore the aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) into which economistic behaviourism must run or bump (i.e.

⁵³⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 79.

⁵³⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 78.

encounter and deal with) as soon as it (i.e. economistic behaviourism) wants to appear in the form and shape of a comprehensive social theory. If exchange takes place via values, and if its explanation is supposed or ought to be behaviouristically-economistically performed, achieved and accomplished, thus, values would have to be measurable, comparable and symmetrically relatable, referable and relationable as between one another, exactly as stimulus and reaction are that. However, everyday experience already teaches that things are very often otherwise, and Homans must concede and admit this as well. In social praxis / practice, he (i.e. Homans) writes, men (i.e. humans) maximise their utility (benefit, value, advantage and use) differently than in economic praxis / practice, and the comparison between both forms of praxis / practice is inappropriate because we can never measure with enough precision values in order to find out and discover whether men (i.e. humans) maximise their (i.e. values') social utility (benefit, value, advantage and use) in the same sense as economic utility. Socially contracting parties start normally from different assessments of the costs and of the rewards/recompense, they break off and terminate an exchange at different points in time, and they, during their rewarding, recompensing and punishing are related and refer to the behaviour – on each and every respective occasion – of the other side. That is why, when the talk is of values, only the manner of the striving for and after them (i.e. values), not their nature on each and every respective occasion, is up for debate^{537 + clxxx}. The nature of values cannot, though, be of interest in their interrelation and connection in the ethical-normative sense, but indeed they are of interest in a genetic and functional regard, and Homans, who passes by and ignores this distinction, entrenches and fortifies himself behind the explanation that the nature of values cannot be defined, in order to make use of the concept of values circularly (i.e. in a circular manner). At times, it looks and seems as if a value

⁵³⁷ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 72, 76, 80.

invokes, induces and gives rise to stimuli, and at other times the impression is given that stimuli produce, generate and give rise to values; in the first case (of a value inducing stimuli), the value determines which stimuli arise and appear, and behaviour can be predicted in the knowledge of the motivating value; in the latter (case of stimuli giving rise to values), on the other hand, stimuli determine and condition the values, and from behaviour one deduces and infers the motivating values. The danger and risk of tautologies is probable when empirically ascertainable behavioural phenomena (or phenomena as to behaviour) are translated into behaviouristic conceptuality (“value”, “reinforcement”) in order to then deduce and derive from it (i.e. the said behaviouristic conceptuality) the phenomena concerned^{538 + clxxxi}.

The behaviourist cannot weaken and refute such arguments by means of the repeated affirmation and solemn declaration that he admits to individual-subjective differences in the evaluation and rating of values⁵³⁹. Because the question is exactly how the different evaluation and rating of a value from subject to subject can be consistent and compatible with fundamental behaviouristic premises, especially if these are supposed and ought to be transferred to economic exchange processes, which presuppose an agreement of the contracting parties regarding the value of the values to be exchanged. Only such an agreement determines common stimuli and reactions, that is, a common perception and view regarding rewarding and punishing (rewards and penalties) as the fixed and steady guiding principle of the exchange relationship. But Homans himself mentions values – and those are for him the most difficult to explain in accordance with his own words, – which already contain in them the reward for the I (ego), that is, they (i.e. the said values) apply as values regardless of the rewarding or punishing reaction of the Other (“pride, altruism,

⁵³⁸ Alexander, *Sociological Theory*, p. 177; M. Deutsch, “Homans”, p. 161.

⁵³⁹ Thus, Homans, “Commentary”, p. 222.

aggression”)⁵⁴⁰. The exchange (read: the social relation) is shaped and formed at least in these cases not in accordance with the orthodox behaviouristic version of the schema “punishment-reward”. The I (ego) adapts and adjusts its behaviour to its value scale; the uppermost and supreme command is, therefore, the defence of one’s own identity, and for its sake, can consciously take upon itself (i.e. take on, shoulder, absorb, burden itself and carry) everything which the Other regards as a punishment and imposes as punishment. One could naturally object as a behaviourist that the confirmation of one’s own identity, even under punishment, is enough reward, yet this already means that the source, content and justification of the reward can be moved and shifted randomly and arbitrarily in regard to every actor without consideration of other actors, which can be something not without consequences for the conciseness, pithiness and the theoretical useability, usefulness and practicability of this concept of reward. For what reason are stimulus and reaction generally distinguished from one another, in order to then place them in a necessary relation, when the stimulus ipso facto induces, causes and gives rise to the desired and wished-for inner/internal reaction, that is, the stimulus does not expect any outer/external rewarding reaction?^{clxxxii} As a thesis, this question and problem can be reformulated as follows: the confirmation and the defence of one’s own identity as a non-exchangeable good can be a primary end/goal in a social relation, from which the positioning, stance and attitude towards the Other depends, regardless of what rewards and punishments this (Other) has up his sleeve and or has at his disposal. Cases, in which the consideration of alien (i.e. another’s) rewards and punishments gain the upper hand over the protection and safeguarding of the existing identity, are naturally also numerous; in certain fields of activity, in fact, they are more numerous; they, nonetheless, do not suffice in order to put to the proof and prove the ubiquity of

⁵⁴⁰ *Social Behaviour*, p. 45.

the behaviouristic basic and fundamental premises: just as exchange in the strict (economic) sense, so too the circle in which those (behaviouristic fundamental premises) apply, encompasses only a fraction of social relations. An essential dimension of the fundamental imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity consists in that we never – not even with reference and in regard to one and the same identity – can know in advance with absolute certainty whether the I (ego) in this or that situation and position will grant, allow and concede priority, precedence and primacy to the question and problem of identity or to the consideration of rewards and punishments in the behaviouristic sense. Homans, though, unintentionally and always within the framework of his conceptuality, typically enough, takes into account that dimension when the to some extent more or less ponderable and calculable symmetries “reward for (by or round) reward” and “punishment for (by or round) punishment” come and fall apart and go to pieces. This happens and takes place in the case of “reward for (by or round) punishment or the threat of punishment”, which appears as soon as the I (ego) bows, yields and submits to the superior wanting and will and or power potential of the Other, and consequently rewards the Other, in order to escape, avoid and get out of its punishment (i.e. the I (ego)’s punishment by the Other). Homans feels and senses that – with the mere description and characterisation and label(ling) of such social relations as “exchange” – nothing is to be gained from the mere description and characterisation and label(ling) of such social relations as “exchange”⁵⁴¹ and he leaves the outcome, i.e. the reaction to the stimulus quite open; “any behaviour that avoids punishment” comes into consideration here, and when he (i.e. Homans) himself as an alternative to subjection, submission and subjugation names the avoidance of the Other, then nothing hinders, blocks and prevents us from thinking also about opposition,

⁵⁴¹ The formulation is remarkable and noteworthy: “But though we can make this out technically to be an exchange, its consequences are obviously different from the exchange of rewards”, *loc. cit.*, p. 58.

insubordination, resistance, rebellion or mutiny willing, ready and prepared to make sacrifices.

From the theoretical weakness of behaviourism, the impossibility of an application of behaviourism's (elementary) principles to (elementary) economic behaviour does not in itself (i.e. as a matter of principle and necessarily) follow; however, the frailty and invalidity of these principles follows as soon as we leave and abandon the area of this behaviour or of economically (i.e. pertaining to economics) understood exchange. Against that application, the proposition that economic calculus (i.e. calculation) rests and is based on long-term planning was put forward, whilst the reward, as behaviouristic psychology comprehends and understands it, must occur immediately and directly⁵⁴². However, the distinction between short-term and long-term effort and exertion or satisfaction applies both to the economy as well as to psychology; the inability of behaviourism to make understandable long-term and symbolically mediated planning, concerns, hence, not only and not specifically behaviourism's economic utilisation and or exploitation, but only the concept of the economy, which makes possible such utilisation and or exploitation. The latter (concept of the economy) is, though, for its part, also theoretically vulnerable, i.e. just as elementary and narrow as the behaviouristic premises themselves are vulnerable (as elementary and narrow). The substantial problem lies, accordingly, not so much in the relation between behaviouristic psychology and elementary forms of economic behaviour, but in the social range, scope and significance of these elementary forms themselves, i.e. in the relation between the economic and the social, as this relation is – on each and every respective occasion – concretised in the interweaving of the economic process, which is called exchange, with the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. In order to track down, unearth and uncover (kinds of) interweaving(s), we must,

⁵⁴² Thus, Ekeh, *Social Exchange Theory*, pp. 116ff., 198.

though, first define what is inter-woven with what, we must, therefore, at least in vitro (i.e. “within the glass” and as it were, from the point of view of laboratory research) have a clear fundamental and basic notion, concept, perception, idea and representation of the difference between economic exchange and (other) social relations, if the contrast between short-term and long-term planning does not necessarily correspond with this difference. The latter (difference between economic exchange and (other) social relations) is indeed multi-dimensional; the enumeration of its dimensions can, however, begin in regard to the ascertainment that exchange revolves around an object which can be separated from the relation of those exchanging [[goods, things]] with one another, and as such, a separable object can sometimes completely and perfectly dominate, control and master and shape, form and mould this relation; an (other) social relation contains nothing which could be thought of absolutely separately from it (i.e. that other social relation); its individual and separate aspects or themes belong to its essence as this concrete relation between these concrete actors^{clxxxiii}. Economic exchange can, consequently, at least at the ideal-typical level, proceed and run its course impersonally, and be directed as much in accordance with general criteria, to the extent an (other) social relation could hardly do that, which (i.e. another (non-economic exchange) social relation) – either way – must proceed in accordance with its own specific logic on each and every respective occasion, and raise identity questions (i.e. problems of and pertaining to identity)⁵⁴³. Exactly because of this, that which in an (other [i.e. non-economic exchange]) social relation is typical, characteristic and constitutive, in an economic exchange appears as a source of (kinds of) resistance and friction. And whereas social theory lives, also and even, off or on the endeavouring to catalogue and typify such imponderables (i.e. render such imponderables into types or classifications under typifying forms), economic

⁵⁴³ Heath, “Economic Theory”, p. 285.

theory loses its clarity and strictness / rigour as soon as it is at the point of, and sets about, taking such imponderables into account; that is why it prefers to stick to a fiction – it is called the free market or perfect competition –, which foresees the equal power potential for all actors and long-term stability in their relations⁵⁴⁴. This neutralisation of the identity and power factor (or factor in respect of identity and power) does not, though, mean that exchange takes place in a social vacuum or that those exchanging [[goods, things, objects]] with one another have neither power potential, nor identities at their disposal; it occurs and takes place merely in a theoretical construction, which postulates exchange in a pure form. This fiction has, nevertheless, reality for itself (i.e. on its side) in so far as exchange between real equals can exclude power and identity questions (or problems as regards power and identity) and concentrate on its (isolable) object, because that question (as regards power and identity) is regarded as already solved at another level, i.e. it is regarded as not being relevant in the current, topical and actual narrower context [of exchange]. The reality of power relationships, circumstances and conditions are not, therefore, overcome by exchange, but are simply presupposed – whereas in (other) social relations the important thing is exactly to shape, form and mould those relationships, circumstances and conditions (anew). Exchange can, in other words, only flourish and thrive on a basis which did not come into being through and by means of exchange, irrespective of whether it (i.e. the said basis) is stamped (i.e. formed, moulded or determined) either by friendship or either by enmity. With regard to the ideal shape and form of economic exchange, the object is in actual fact, as we have said, everything, and friendship and enmity is nothing. A wider and broader intensification, heightening and aggravation of the economic exchange relation as its breaking off, dismantling, abandoning, stopping or termination, and the splitting up, dispersing and going their separate

⁵⁴⁴ Emerson, “Social Exchange Theory” (1976), p. 350ff..

ways of the actors (concerned) in peace is not, incidentally, examined at all^{clxxxiv}: that makes up and constitutes an additional aspect of the (ideal) economic exchange relation's difference from (other) social relations.

The separability of the object as the specific feature (or characteristic) (differentia specifica) of economic exchange in contrast with or in contradistinction to the social relation in its other forms signifies and means not only the exclusion of the spectrum, but also that of the mechanism of the social relation: the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is unnecessary and superfluous when both sides concentrate on the exchanging objects (i.e. the objects being exchanged or the objects of exchange), and their practical decisions are made dependent exclusively on the comparison of these objects, that is, on the assessment of their relative exchange value. This implies that economic exchange in itself, i.e. as an autonomous, independent, self-sufficient and self-reliant act (with)in a form, can instill and inspire neither mistrust and suspicion, nor trust and confidence, because these are only caused, provoked or induced by the (supposed and putative) knowledge of alien (i.e. someone else's) intentions by means of the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives. Both the generally known frequent in(cap)ability of friendship in bridging i.e. reconciling differences of opinion over the exchange value of objects, as well as the normal course, sequence and order (of events) of economic exchange in inimical, even extremely inimical social relations, shows and demonstrates how little, on the other hand, the spectrum of the social relation as such has and exerts an influence on economic exchange. The age-old, ancient and widespread⁵⁴⁵ phenomenon of so-called silent trade (silent barter, dumb barter [[“dumb” here = “mute”]], or depot trade (silent trade, commerce par dépôts) bears witness to and is evidence of that. Small communities, which live relatively isolated in the middle of an inimical environment, which look at the

⁵⁴⁵ (Pieces of) evidence in Grierson, *Silent Trade*, p. 41 ff..

alien (the foreigner, the stranger, the Other) in principle as a foe, and take no offence or exception to his (i.e. the alien's) destruction, annihilation, extermination and plunder, pillage, sacking, are, on the other hand, neither strong enough in order to take from the foe with violence and force everything which they need and require, nor autarkic and self-sufficient enough in order to not need and require anything, and in order to avoid every willed (deliberate and studied) contact with the foe. Since the exercising of violence, therefore, can have unpleasant consequences, whilst simultaneously needs and requirements must be satisfied without the abolition of enmity, thus, the road, path and way of silent trade is entered upon and pursued, which is conducted either via middle-men (intermediaries, go-betweens) or else, due to the fact that one side lays and puts down its wares and goods in a certain place, it then withdraws within sight (or also not within sight), and accordingly gives to the other side the opportunity, chance or occasion to draw nearer and approach, to carry out the exchange and then to go undisturbed and unhindered; belligerent and warring parties also stop and discontinue hostilities for a short period of time in order to drive/push, i.e. do/engage in trade⁵⁴⁶. As we must emphasise, it is not here a matter of a phenomenon which only has historical value, that is, it characterises exclusively certain "tiers, grades, levels and stages" of the development of history (or historical development and evolution). On the contrary, it illustrates and exemplifies with archaic simplicity the social-ontologically ascertainable possibility of an extreme asymmetry between economic exchange and the social relation. The very fast and lightning development and unfolding of German-French or of German-British trade relations in the decade before the First World War, or of the lively and active exchange of wares and goods between the Soviet Union and Germany until 21st June 1941, was basically nothing other than silent trade. Those, who in

⁵⁴⁶ Loc. cit., pp. 40, 86 ff., 47, 51, 59 ff..

accordance with the old liberal mythology regard trade as the chief and main means for the ending and termination of war, should and ought to bear in mind, think over and consider these facts. What, however, drives, pushes and propels men (i.e. humans) in relation to this, to co-operate economically (i.e. as regards economic relations), are objective economic needs, requirements and necessities, which as such are not connected with any friendly or inimical intent(ion); only the positive or negative course (order or sequence) of events of the co-operative relation suggests such a connection, without that meaning that this connection would have been certainly unavoidable and inevitable⁵⁴⁷.

We shall now leave the area or field of conceptual distinctions and of theoretical fiction(s), which only help us along in the cases in which questions of power and of identity (*or*: power and identity problems) can be excluded or step (i.e. are put) into the background (and take a back seat), because they (i.e. such questions of power and identity) already have been resolved at the other level of the social relation, and are not regarded as topical, current, relevant and acute, urgent and pressing at the moment of exchange. We shall now turn towards those cases in which those distinctions and fictions do not stand firm and do not stand up to the pressure of the social interweaving of the social relation and economic exchange with regard to each other. Here, other distinctions are called for. First of all, we must separate the social-historical and economic-historical content (i.e. the content pertaining to the history of society and the history of (political) economy / economies) of the (above-)mentioned interweaving from its (i.e. the said interweaving's) social-ontological sense. The former (i.e. history of society and political economy) is determined by the form and weight / gravity of the economic exchange inside of a historically given societal formation; not all social structures are equally dependent on such exchange, and this exchange is not carried out in all social structures in the

⁵⁴⁷ Kondylis, „Die falsche Rechnung“.

same manner and from the same points of view – the general character of the social relations, conditions and circumstances always has an effect determinatively (or always has a determinative effect)⁵⁴⁸. The social-ontological dimension of the interweaving appears, emerges and makes itself felt, for its part, in two forms often passing over and merging into one another: a secondary form, when, namely, the power question (or problem as to power) is posed still inside and within an economic exchange relationship (or relationship of exchange), and in a main form, when, namely, the economic exchange stands and is directly under the aegis and influence of the friend-foe-relation, that is, it should and ought to serve the confirmation or the changing of such a relation (of friend and foe). Let's look at both these forms in turn. There are many cases in which exchange, although it moves (with)in an economic framework and remains in it, takes a course and shows, i.e. it has an outcome which is determined by extra-economic factors. Two absolute monopolists, who/which stand opposite each other without the mediation and intercession or intervention of a market, and cannot orientate themselves to any "market laws (or laws of the market)", indeed equally need, in an economic respect, the wares and goods of the other side on each and every respective occasion, but they, however, are possibly (or should the occasion arise) not equally gifted, talented, able and motivated at negotiating; they harbour, have and entertain different expectations or they connect different plans with (regard to) exchange. Not the economic aspect alone, in order to express ourselves carefully, cautiously and conservatively decides the issue and is the deciding factor here, although it is exclusively a matter of the economic [sphere, sector, field, area, dimension]. This applies a fortiori, when a) the purely economic value of the exchange is assessed considerably and substantially differently from the point of view of the other side, b) the one side has at its disposal more alternatives than the other

⁵⁴⁸ In relation to that, Pryor, *Origins*, esp. Ch. 4 and 7.

side; when there is the same assessment of that value, the available alternatives obviously decide [[matters, things]]⁵⁴⁹. The beginning which an exchange has, depends, likewise, on which side of the exchange needs the exchange the most; the weaker (side, party) makes the beginning/start [[i.e. the first move]] because it needs a ware / good pressing and urgently; the stronger (side, party) begins the exchange, because it, by means of and through the initiation of an unequal relationship of exchange wants to bring the other (side, party) into a state of dependence. The outcome of the exchange is judged and evaluated, again, by every side, thereafter, whether the gain / profit was distributed equally and or unequally; absolute gains / profits from an exchange quite often seem unsatisfactory if the relative (gains / profits) (i.e. those (gains/profits) which were obtained and achieved in comparison to the gains / profits of the other side) come up short⁵⁵⁰.

It is difficult to determine the point at which the – one way or another – acquired or claimed, asserted and maintained advantages during economic exchange have an effect on the shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation. However, it is always difficult to go down, pursue and take the reverse path and opposite way/road, and generally determine in which sense and to what extent (scope, range) economic exchange stands and is under the influence and aegis of the social relation. Yet we know that this happens at least in many cases, and we can also state and specify or indicate what, in the course of this, is decisive. For instance, the relationship between absolute and relative gains and profits is not to be taken into account here as such, but of interest is primarily the general relationship of two identities towards each other, the overall situation, and the overall potential of the one identity is measured with regard to the overall situation and the overall potential of the other identity, and in the

⁵⁴⁹ Emerson, “Social Exchange Theory” (1976), p. 352; “Social Exchange Theory” (1981), p. 62.

⁵⁵⁰ McClintock, “Social Motivation”.

course of this, economic exchange is evaluated and judged primarily or exclusively from the point of view of its influence on that relationship [of overall situation and overall potential of the relevant identities]. That is something more and something different than that calculatedly generous shaping, forming and moulding of economic exchange, in which one displays and applies in regard to the “personal relation” possibly greater value than in regard to the formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) aspects, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs))^{551 + clxxxv}. As much as such (personal) relations may count, they remain secondary in comparison with the economic setting of the goal and end, and they do not survive significant and noteworthy setbacks during the realisation of these settings of a goal and end. Things are entirely different when the social relation comes to the fore as the measure of two identities in relation to each other: then, even great economic losses are more or less willingly and ungrudgingly taken into account and accepted in order to assert one’s own identity in the social relation in question, that is, the social relation is to be shaped, formed and moulded in such a manner as the interest of one’s own identity commands and demands. The reverse case, namely, the giving up, quitting, abandonment and relinquishment of one’s own – until then – identity for the sake of economic advantage and at the same time to want another identity, does not necessarily mean a priority, precedence or pre-eminence of the economic vis-à-vis the social in the wider and broader sense; it only indicates that an identity connects its *social* self-understanding to economic factors, that it feels, therefore, to be weak when it falls behind, is inferior, subordinate and or in second place economically. The application of the behaviour of an individual to the demands and requirements of economic exchange does not constitute, hence, any sound, conclusive and decisive

⁵⁵¹ As a Chinese entrepreneur expressed it recently: “You do not negotiate a contract, you negotiate a relationship”, *The Economist*, 9.3.1996, insert/supplement, “Business in Asia”, p. 10.

argument for the *theoretical* primacy of the latter (economic exchange). Behind such an application stand and are reasons which ultimately go back and are reduced to the shape and form and the endeavour and effort in respect of the shaping, moulding and forming of the social relation. The same (reasons) are merely conspicuous, eye-catching, obvious and evident, and have an effect in a more uninhibited and more unchecked manner as soon as purely economic priorities have to be ignored, disdained or despised in order to take into account other matters of concern in respect of identity in the framework of its (i.e. the said identity's) social relations. Ethnologists have proffered excellent descriptions of concrete processes of exchange (exchange processes) in which, sometimes imperceptibly and indiscernibly, all kinds of psychological-social, in any case, extra-economic considerations had in them (i.e. the said exchange processes), for those standing outside of them (or for those being outsiders in regard to such exchange processes), a decisive effect⁵⁵². Economic transactions are personalised and build up and turned into questions and problems of prestige, however, the individual-psychological aspect is not decisive here, but the fact which is decisive is that the code of behaviour (or behavioural code) in such transactions remains subordinate and subject to that code of behaviour which applies to all social relations⁵⁵³. These are not "primitivisms" long since overcome, outgrown and gotten over, but social-ontological constants, which, for instance, today have an effect in the praxis / practice of powers, which preach, lecture and sermonise at the ideological level about the sacrosanct autonomy of the economic [sphere, dimension], however, they (i.e. such powers) simultaneously imposed "trade sanctions" or prohibit profitable, lucrative and money-making arms sales to politically unpopular and disliked / disliked customers and buyers. The social relation asserts here, as always, its

⁵⁵² See the precise analysis of such an example in Herskovits, *Economic Anthropology*, pp. 156-159.

⁵⁵³ Firth, *Polynesian Economy*, p. 355.

precedence, primacy and priority vis-à-vis exchange.

We have already explained why the distinction between short-term and long-term calculus (i.e. calculation) in itself cannot stand in the way of an application of elementary behaviouristic principles to elementary economic behaviour, or only becomes topical, current and relevant as soon as the concept of the economy is widened, expanded and extended beyond the concept of the individual or single, isolated exchange. As also mentioned, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives is superfluous and unnecessary during such exchange. From this it is evident and can be seen *e contrario*, that a more comprehensive concept of the economy, which is oriented towards the whole series or plexuses, networks and meshes of acts of exchange, must take into consideration the inner mechanism of the social relation, that is, the assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, as well as long-term calculus (i.e. calculation), and, consequently, the social dimension, looked at as to the overall economic way of looking at things (i.e. in terms of the economy), must be included in exchange itself⁵⁵⁴. In social relations, the behaviour of actors in general depends more on the manner as to how they interpret alien and others' behaviour, and less on the immediate and direct advantages and disadvantages of an individual / single [form of] exchange; the latter (advantages and disadvantages) are quite often overlooked when the behaviour of the Other otherwise gives reason for mistrusting or trusting⁵⁵⁵. What now regarding that applies to the way of looking at and consideration of economic transactions from an extra-economic standpoint, likewise applies inside of and within the broad economic as a series or plexus, network and mesh of exchange acts.

⁵⁵⁴ It is to me incomprehensible how Emerson rejects the looking at and consideration of economic transactions as independent, and at the same time can explain long-term calculus (i.e. calculation) as the specific feature (or characteristic) (*differentia specifica*) of "social exchange" (i.e. of the social relation) in contrast to economic exchange, cf. "Social Exchange Theory" (1981), p. 35, with "Social Exchange Theory" (1976), p. 353. The latter thesis has the narrow concept of the economy as its basis, which the former (thesis) contests and disputes and denies.

⁵⁵⁵ Blumer, "Mead", p. 155; Heath, "Exchange Theory", p. 109.

Long-term calculus (i.e. calculation), which does not merely rest and is not merely based on expectations in terms of the frictionless and smooth functioning of an impersonal mechanism, but at least likewise, or even principally, on concrete assumptions and (various kinds of) taking on/over of perspectives, neutralises short-term disadvantages or uncertainties⁵⁵⁶. The continuity of the exchange acts consequently makes, produces or restores equilibria which in part or wholly are lacking from individual exchange acts – though the reverse case does not constitute a rarity too. Long-term assumptions and (various kinds of) taking on/over of perspectives during economic exchange looked at as a series or plexus, network and mesh, are, however, nothing other than an introduction of the temporal dimension into the economic becoming or series of events, an additional socialisation of this becoming or series of events. The social relation, in other words, comes into and penetrates – simultaneously with the temporal dimension – economic exchange, so that it (i.e. the said economic exchange) can change in accordance with the temporal perspective of the actors. A restricted and limited temporal perspective (or perspective as to time), especially when it is not certain, definite and it has not been settled which exchange act will be the final in the series, makes uncooperative behaviour and selfish leaps and plunges (away) from the exchange relationship more probable and more likely. Co-operation, on the other hand, is based and founded (established and set up) on certainties with regard to the future, that is, on a greatest possible wide and extended time perspective, in relation to which and whereby durability, permanence and endurance proves to be in practice more important than the personal friendship between the (people, parties, sides) co-operating. Even the knowledge about the point in time of the last exchange act (or act of exchange) in a long series of such exchange acts strengthens and reinforces the possibility of an unfair and unsporting defection on both sides.

⁵⁵⁶ Cf. Firth, *Polynesian Economy*, p. 348ff..

Because for both, defection during the last exchange act would be the optimal solution for the protection and security of one's own advantage, the same (protection of one's own advantage), however, would apply to the penultimate act of exchange etc. back until the first act of exchange⁵⁵⁷. The limited and restricted time horizon would, therefore, from the beginning make co-operation precarious, and through its having an effect on the action of the actors would show and reveal that the spectrum of the social relation ultimately represents and constitutes the background upon which economic exchange is acted out and takes place.

The manifold, multifarious and varied (kinds of) interweaving(s) of the social relation and economic exchange with each other point to fundamental question formulations (or settings or (kinds of) posing of the problem), which concern the inner interrelations, connections or correlations and contexts between the organisation of the economy and politically constituted society: the institutional preconditions and prerequisites or the framework-related conditions of economising, i.e. engaging in economic activity, the non-contractual components of the contract, connections and links of economic and political magnitudes with regard to each other via the division of labour and the distribution of goods belong to these question formulations (or settings of the problem), with which we want to deal and concern and occupy ourselves in the second volume of this work^{clxxxvi}. Here we must be limited and restricted to what our topic (subject (matter)) unconditionally and absolutely requires, desires and demands – and the topic and subject is the social relation, whose outer mechanism unfolds and develops, amongst other things, as mutuality / reciprocity and exchange. The reminder of the fact that exchange, and indeed as actual and real exchange, i.e. as economic exchange, only makes up and constitutes one amongst several forms of unfolding and development of that

⁵⁵⁷ Rapoport-Dale, “‘End’ and ‘Start’ Effects”, esp. p. 364; Axelrod, *Evolution*, pp. 83ff., 162ff., 169.

mechanism, and as such, precisely like all other forms (of the unfolding and development of that outer mechanism), cannot remain uninfluenced by the incessant and ceaseless shifts and displacements in the spectrum of the social relation – this reminder becomes necessary when the economistic version of methodological individualism sets about reconstructing society as a whole out of the exchange acts of individual actors. In the process, it (i.e. the economistic version of methodological individualism) makes the mistake that every methodological individualism must make: it will not believe and refuses to accept that exchange acts like *social* relations in general can take place only inside of a howsoever shaped, formed and moulded social life, that therefore men (i.e. humans), who per definitionem are *social* men / humans (people), must be found already inside of the plexus (mesh or network) of social relations before they undertake exchange acts; the being/Is/to be of society precedes – not ontically or materially, but no doubt ontologically – individual social phenomena, and no “game theory”, which accumulates, piles up and amasses “exchanges” in its accumulation station (storage (or memory) unit) and combines them with one another in accordance with various patterns, will ever be able to deduce and derive from them the “supergame” of society. Economistically inspired “exchange theory” also makes, however, a second mistake, which specifically characterises it. Since it cannot ignore or deny that not all social relations are of an economic character, thus, it avoids, sidesteps and eludes this obstacle, barrier and hindrance on the path to the economisation of social theory due to the fact that it describes all social relations by using a very generally formed/content-related (i.e. a very general) economic terminology. Hence, the intended and desired optical illusion, as if social action and the social relation would have to seek their prototype in the structure and the motivation of economic exchange, comes into being. Yet the reduction of all possible content(s) of the social relation to one single content gets its revenge / own back: so that the latter (single content as to economic exchange) can

encompass all other content(s) in itself, it must (this time unintentionally) give up, abandon and relinquish its own specific features, characteristics, attributes and traits at least in part, whereby and by means of which the whole and entire economistic undertaking is watered down and diluted. Through conceptual thinning down and dilution, though, “exchange theory” experiences such an expansion, spread and extension that it can reject the reproach and accusation of narrowness and of one-sidedness and assert and claim that it takes into account all important social phenomena, and in this respect it is not inferior or second to any other theory⁵⁵⁸. However, it is never satisfactorily explained why this of all things must happen (with)in a conceptuality which can gain, attain and reach the striven-for and aimed-at breadth only at the price of metaphoric expressions and banal generalities. Typically enough, someone who tries to achieve the reconciliation of “exchange theory” with symbolic interactionism, at the end of his efforts and troubles admits that the reconciliation sought could be attained only on the basis of the “most general premisses”; “the most general premisses of any theory, however, are ultimately tautological”⁵⁵⁹. And just as typical and characteristic is when precisely national (i.e. political) economists, who have a stricter concept than sociologists of economic exchange, want to put next to the “exchange system”, a “threat system” and a “love system”, so that the overall picture or image of society can be drawn up, outlined and sketched in more satisfactory completeness⁵⁶⁰. Even in this in itself welcome correction and rectification, nonetheless, nothing other than a re-writing, para-phrasing and or circumlocution of since long-ago well-known facts and circumstances is present. The “threat system” and “love system” represent and constitute somewhat amiable and charming expressions for enmity and friendship; they refer, therefore, to the spectrum of the social relation, from which economic

⁵⁵⁸ See e.g. Waldman’s “Response” to the objections by Easton (“Some limits”).

⁵⁵⁹ Singelmann, “Exchange as symbolic interaction”, p. 423. Regarding “social exchange” as tautology cf. the good observations and remarks by P. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, pp. 124, 125.

⁵⁶⁰ Boulding, “An Economist’s View”, p. 460.

exchange can only break free and go independent or become autonomous only in so far as the power relationships (i.e. circumstances and conditions of power) in the meanwhile have been cleared up, clarified and sorted out at other levels and through extra-economic means.

It was noticed that exchange theory offers “a ‘soft’ interpretation of power” by placing in the foreground the probably – on both sides, bilateral – beneficial exchange, and explains asymmetries of power coming out of asymmetries of – continually and on-going on both sides, bilateral – utility and benefit (use, profit, gain, advantage)⁵⁶¹. This was no by-product or spin-off of the theory, but rather a central intent(ion), which corresponded with an up-to-date, keeping-with-the-times ideological thought style^{clxxxvii}. Here, the sociological jargon demands and calls for the playing down and minimising of power phenomena and dominance phenomena (i.e. phenomena relating to power and dominance as dominant authority) by calling e.g. the relation between slave-traders and slaves “exchange”: this comes about already through the fact that the slave receives and gets from the slave trader a piece of bread, which saves (and protects) him from dying a wretched death and kicking the bucket. The power relationship is, in other words, explained by the thesis that the weaker regards the unequal exchange as more advantageous than opposition, insubordination, resistance or rebellion. Accordingly, however, it is only explained why the opposition, insubordination, resistance or rebellion does not take place and fails to materialise, not how the power relationship had come into being in general. That is why it has been rightly remarked and observed that exchange theory lives “in the eternal present”, it analyses power phenomena only in the shape and form which they would have *hic et nunc*, and which could be described or paraphrased as exchange, without one having to be concerned about the historical conditions and circumstances of their, i.e. the power phenomena’s

⁵⁶¹ Emerson, “Social Exchange Theory” (1981), p. 59.

coming into being^{562 + clxxxviii}. Behind that hides, though, the old liberal belief that through the mere transition from the “political” to the “economic”, which should or ought to be for the time being anticipated (and taken for granted), the social relation gets and preserves a number of more pleasant properties, features and characteristics and discards and casts off a number of unpleasant ones. This transition, however, has not been realised yet, and accordingly one is content for the time being with the transition from the vocabulary of politics to the vocabulary of the economy, in the conviction that one helps, with that, the wished-for tendency towards a breakthrough, and achieves, with that, one’s contribution to the rationalisation, and consequently the ethical betterment and improvement of the relations between men (i.e. humans and people), since the economic [sphere, dimension] by definition is regarded as the area and realm in which rational and ponderable (and calculable) calculus (i.e. calculation) pushes the irrationalities and imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of power politics aside. But things are precisely the reverse. Economic exchange is distinguished and singled out by its own rationality only when it is acted out and takes place against the background of already clarified and cleared up power relationships (conditions and circumstances), and accordingly, can leave aside, ignore and exclude the same (power relationships, conditions and circumstances), that is, when it, as it were, represents and constitutes an island in the sea of social relations. The ubiquity and alone-dominance (i.e. autocracy) of the economic would put an end precisely to this seemingly privileged status, i.e. the logic of the social relation would then force its way and penetrate into the economic itself, it would then also flood and inundate the island and bring to light the fact that economic relationships (circumstances and conditions) are in the end and finally relations between men (i.e. people and humans) too; to the extent that the economic would totally assert itself and prevail, the spectrum and

⁵⁶² Brittan, *Meanings*, p. 145.

the mechanism of the economic relation would coincide with the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation in general. The socialisation of the economic would then follow the economisation of the social – though, only at the level of social-theoretical fictions. Because direct or indirect osmosis is always present, available and existing, and if economicised social theory sometimes is clear, obvious and makes sense in terms of content, thus, the reason for that does not lie in its specific theoretical advantages and merits, but in the fact that the social relation also lives fully and completely in the economy, that one, therefore, also, then, finds access to it when one wants to start from the economic. But that is only a superfluous roundabout way and detour, which, moreover, brings with it a narrowing and contraction of the theoretical horizon. Because exchange is a social relation; not every social relation, however, can be comprehended as exchange.

Exchange, understandably, obtains and receives a social-theoretical status in a highly technicised, at base, in the beginning and or potentially already “post-industrial” society, which has extensively, largely and in a far-reaching manner solved the age-old problem of scarcity (shortage, scarceness, paucity, dearth and want) at the level of production, and now directs its attention mainly and first and foremost to the exchange and the distribution of goods. Said otherwise: the translation of the given facts of the social relation into the language of economic exchange must grow and flourish in a society in which mass production and mass consumption have condensed, compressed and intensified enormously the network of exchange acts (or acts of exchange) and spread the belief that the economic is displacing, replacing, ousting or superseding the political; other modern social theories make absolute, as we know, other particular “dense, thick and compact” aspects of mass-democratic being (t)here (i.e. existence), thus e.g. “communication”⁵⁶³. It will be repeated that it is not a matter here of

⁵⁶³ See Sec. 1 Ea in this chapter.

the generalisation of empirical findings by means of the suitable and appropriate conceptuality, but of the endeavour and effort by means of the use of a certain conceptuality to awaken the impression that the empirical findings would confirm the economistic image and picture of social reality. But already the principles of economic liberalism (or the liberalism of the economy), from which economistic social theory starts, do not represent and constitute any empirically founded truths, which after existing, enduring and passed (i.e. successful) examination, checking, testing and inspection, could be transferred from one social area and realm to another. Rather, they rewrite or paraphrase an apriori thought schema which would really (i.e. in reality) apply only under the tautological presuppositions that today's Western economy is a pure market economy, and such an economy is the only thinkable (i.e. conceivable, possible and imaginable) and desirable economy. Such normative sentences (i.e. propositions) cannot, however, be deduced and derived from a description of economic realities; they arise and result from a comprehensive ideological construction, inside of which the economic principles of liberalism^{clxxxix} are fused with its political beliefs, dogmas, doctrines and articles of faith: as if the economic and the political system represented and constituted symmetrical structures founded equally on the free play of supply and demand^{564 + cxc}.

c. The fiction of generalised exchange and the incest taboo

In the ethnological discussion, the concept of the taboo (or the taboo concept) was connected already early – i.e. since Thurnwald, Malinowski and Mauss^{cxc} – with a concept of the gift (present) and mutuality/reciprocity, which beyond economistic narrowing (constriction and contraction), was supposed to give insights and an explanation about the holding-sticking-keeping together (i.e. cohesive) forces in the social life of nature folks (i.e. “primitive” (indigenous)

⁵⁶⁴ Albert, *Ökonomische Ideologie*, pp. 21ff., 31ff., 116f..

peoples), and at base (i.e. at its roots), in accordance with every social life. Whilst in the later economic social theory, the exchange concept (or concept of exchange) lost its specific content in the attempt to transfer it to social relations of a non-economic character, many a prominent ethnologist mixed up and confused the levels of social reality and concepts, because they a limine (i.e. from the very beginning) equated exchange, mutuality/reciprocity and social order, whereby and in relation to which they ascribed and attributed to exchange, content(s) which blew up, exploded and broke up its (i.e. exchange's) conceptual boundaries, and overtaxed and overstrained its (i.e. exchange's) social significance, range and reach. Lévi-Strauss took this step by placing and putting alongside "limited and restricted exchange", a "generalised exchange", which, for its part, was supposed to coincide with a more structurally than personally comprehended mutuality/reciprocity as the basis of social living together (i.e. co-habitation); because it meant exactly that the giving (i.e. those who give) and at the same time the taking (i.e. those who take) during exchange do not have to come anymore into personal contact with one another, but on the basis of an institutionalised mechanism, the giving (i.e. those who give) can take from another (person) rather than from him who he himself has given. Accordingly, Lévi-Strauss saw exchange as a mere aspect of a global mutuality / reciprocity structure (or structure of mutuality and reciprocity), which was apprehended also as such, directly and intuitively from socially living man, not, for instance, as a particular institution inside of a row, series and succession of development of many institutions; (just) like the gift, the archetype of this concept, exhibits and shows a synthetic character by creating a social meaning beyond its economic value, so too goods during exchange do not constitute merely wares, but rather instruments and vehicles, via which realities of another kind unwind, unfold and uncoil⁵⁶⁵. These realities indeed have their concrete

⁵⁶⁵ *Structures*, pp. 159, 98, 63ff..

bearers and take place and are acted out in concrete situations (locations and positions), yet Lévi-Strauss is not concerned and does not deal with this. His way of looking at things and consideration aims at a level which often withdraws and pulls away from the conscious action of actors, and exchange is de-economicised (i.e. loses its econom(ist)ic character) and generalised exactly to the extent that the scope and range of this level stretches, expands and extends up to the entirety and totality of the social. The concept of exchange (or the exchange concept) is, consequently, subject, subjugated and subordinated to the logic of the great structuralist(ic) hit (i.e. (popular) success and projection), however it is never beyond any doubt clear why this hit ((popular) success and projection) should and ought to be – of all things – initiated on the basis of the concept of exchange (exchange concept)^{cxcii}. Exchange takes place inside of or between existing societies, it is, in this respect, always limited and restricted / confined exchange, and from the (theoretical) generalisation of a (real) limited / restricted/confined exchange, what (really) makes and constitutes the framework of every [act of] exchange, namely, a society, which *cannot* consist only of acts of exchange, cannot be deduced and derived. That ubiquitous hypostasis, which the structuralistic claim of totality wants to call “generalised exchange” does not automatically arise and result from a number of limited-restricted and confined acts of exchange (or exchange acts). Lévi-Strauss, in the course of his research (investigations and inquiries), emphasised and highlighted all the more starkly (i.e. strongly) the priority of “generalised” vis-à-vis “restricted/confined and limited exchange”, until he in this (“restricted, confined and limited exchange”) merely beheld, saw and perceived “un cas particulier” of that (“generalised (exchange)”) ⁵⁶⁶. This meant a state of being in love and of infatuation^{cxci} with the (above-)mentioned hypostasis and an increasing neglect of the empirical interrelations, connections and contexts, a

⁵⁶⁶ *Anthropologie*, p. 167.

neglect which felt encouraged and emboldened through and by means of the faith and belief that the real (i.e. what is real) lies, anyway, in the invisible underlying structure⁵⁶⁷. Lévi-Strauss was, incidentally, by no means, the first who made the observation that primitive societies directly or indirectly put their members under pressure to not limit, restrict and confine their exchange acts (or acts of exchange) to relatives and tribesmen, but to stretch, expand and extend (the said exchange acts) to neighbours and even strangers (foreigners, aliens and other people), in order to widen and broaden the action radius (or radius of action) of the collective through the extraction (i.e. winning (over)) of friends⁵⁶⁸ + cxciv. He believed and opined, however, that he could or might clean this observation of disturbing, annoying and disruptive accidental (random, chance) and inessential (or immaterial) elements, features, characteristics, attributes, traits and dimensions in order to be able to design, draft, sketch, draw up and plan a pure structure as a generally applicable and valid pattern, specimen and sample of explanation (or explanatory model) as regards the coming into being of systems of kinship and relations/relatives (or kinship, kindred, kinfolk and relatives systems) through wife exchange (or the exchange of wives). The barely structurable accidental (random, chance) and inessential (or immaterial) elements, features, characteristics, attributes, traits and dimensions (i.e. the accidental and inessential elements, which could hardly form structures) proved themselves to be, though, in the process, quite often more decisive and determinative than the structural “essence”, as we shall now see.

Let us put forward the observation, remark and comment that Lévi-Strauss offered a genetic and a structuralistic interpretation of mutuality and reciprocity, which have just as little to do with each other as the barely structurable accidental (random, chance) and inessential (or immaterial) elements, features,

⁵⁶⁷ See, in relation to that, Sahlins’s sharp (i.e. severe, harsh and fierce), but not unjustified critique/criticism, “On the Delphic Writings”.

⁵⁶⁸ See e.g. Firth, *We, the Tikopia*, p. 460ff.; *Polynesian Economy*, p. 311.

characteristics, attributes, traits and dimensions (i.e. the accidental and inessential elements, which could hardly form structures) with the structural “essence” ; the former (genetic interpretation of mutuality/reciprocity) is founded, namely, on the constantly and always iridescent (or equivocal, ambiguous and elusive) (or ever-shimmering) character of the social relation; the latter (structuralistic interpretation of mutuality/reciprocity), on the other hand, is founded on the fiction of a fixed, steady and stable in itself closed system. Genetically-psychologically, the inclination and propensity and tendency and trend towards mutuality and reciprocity goes back and is reduced to the angst (and fear) before the uncertain outcome of the social relation: since the I (ego) does not know in advance whether he/it can push through and impose his/its maximal demands against and on the Other, thus, he/it prefers the safe and secure solution of mutuality and reciprocity in equality⁵⁶⁹. Structurally-objectively, mutuality/reciprocity offers the compelling logic, and at the same time, the *conditio sine qua non* of social cohesion, whereby and in relation to which actors, knowingly or not, through their acts, actions or kinds of acting, which are now looked at as facts from the outside, serve this logic, and strengthen and consolidate this indispensable condition. That is why the discrepancy comes from the fact that – according to the genetic interpretation – mutuality / reciprocity appears as a stopgap (solution or measure; provisional (or temporary) solution) which at any time can be annulled when the I (ego) – rightly or not – fancies, imagines and assumes (it, i.e. the I (ego)) is in the position and capable of fully and completely pushing through and imposing its will, especially as Lévi-Strauss admits, the urge, drive, itch and longing (need and desire) – in relation to that – never dries up, ebbs, dwindles or fails; structurally, on the other hand, the abolition of mutuality and reciprocity and or

⁵⁶⁹ *Structures*, p. 99ff.. Lévi-Strauss follows here the findings of Susan Isaacs [[TRANSLATOR’S ADDITION, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K. : AAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!], see footnote 484 in this chapter, above.

of exchange acts (acts of exchange) taking place on its (mutuality's and reciprocity's) foundation and basis is impossible, since it would have to bring about (lead to, cause and force) the collapse and breakdown of the system. Lévi-Strauss can get on top of this discrepancy through an ambiguity. He speaks, indeed, of generalised exchange as a source of inequality, but only on the basis of an initial and in principle equality, and only because of the advantages and merits of the system itself, i.e. of its flexibility and of the (great) variety and multiformity of the combinations offered by it (i.e. the said system), which allow and permit a satisfaction of partial wishes (i.e. a part of wishes) in compliance with and in the observance of general rules⁵⁷⁰. But the ascertainment that exchange puts in the world inequalities does not in the least mean that every inequality is secondary, i.e. it grows only in the soil and on the terrain of an original equality as a weed (i.e. as something unwanted and negative and or malign, damaging). Lévi-Strauss does not take primary causes of inequality into account^{cxcv}. And his fiction pairs and mates (i.e. is combined) with an abstraction; namely, gifts, presents and donations are one-sidedly looked at as symbols of the familial and kinship relation(ship) brought about and established by means of marriage, not as economic or social-political goods, whereby and in relation to which the relative weight which women have inside of generalised exchange is falsely evaluated. In any case, it (i.e. the said relative weight of women in generalised exchange) cannot be determined, detected and ascertained on the basis of an originally applicable principle of equality or of strict mutuality and reciprocity, when the already present and existing differences in status between families must be brought and carried into the marriage (ceremony) (and wedding), in fact when the marriage (ceremony) / wedding serves as a means to assert and bring to bear and make felt such differences; quite often, therefore, inequalities do not mean the degeneration of

⁵⁷⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 305ff..

an egalitarian exchange system (or system of exchange), as Lévi-Strauss wants to make [[us]] believe, but they (i.e. the said inequalities) determine an exchange, which precisely because of existing inequalities, stretches and extends across and covers several levels and (includes many) goods⁵⁷¹. To the primary inequalities, the very different friendly or inimical motivations of the exchange partners and the asymmetry and unevenness of the overall result are added⁵⁷². The preponderance, supremacy and predominance of the social relation vis-à-vis the exchange act (or act of exchange), as well as the mixing of the exchange of women with the exchange of other goods, explains the substantial and considerable deviation(s) and divergence(s) of the kinship systems (or systems of kinship and relatives) from one another, and moreover make understandable why the best theories which we have regarding them can find (i.e. have) only partial application. Lévi-Strauss does not, incidentally, found the application of the universal applicability of his theory on exhaustive and flawless, perfect and impeccable proof and evidence, but on an occasionally skilfull confusion of the levels of discourse^{excvi}: only the structuralistic pattern or model, in which the facts are put in order (classified and categorised), is all-embracing in its (i.e. Lévi-Strauss's theory's) inner / internal unity, uniformity and homogeneity. The harmony of the pattern/model alone suggests also the in principle harmony of the real preconditions and of the real results of generalised exchange, especially since here the time / temporal dimension is excluded^{excvi}. The exclusion of the time dimension means exactly that the acts of reply (i.e. reciprocation) instantly, right away and mechanically follow the acts of giving, and that in-between-time or intermediate time is omitted, which is pregnant with (i.e. will bring into being) the formation and development of new subjective positionings, stances and intentions on the basis of (a) new evaluation of the

⁵⁷¹ Leach, "The structural implications", esp. pp. 45, 52; cf. Forge, "Golden Fleece", esp. p. 536ff.

⁵⁷² Herskovits, *Economic Anthropology*, p. 159.

situation and position, in short, (is pregnant) with (and will bring into being) all kinds of imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities)⁵⁷³.

However, not only the mixing of the exchange of women with other exchange objects (i.e. objects of exchange) in a succession of exchange acts (or acts of exchange) in time and during different starting conditions (i.e. circumstances as regards the beginning) reveals how wide the logic of the social relation juts out, projects [itself] and protrudes into the logic of exchange. The exchange of women itself is executed and carried out with regard to the possibilities which exist in the spectrum of the social relation and all sides at all times are aware and conscious that it (i.e. exchange in the social relation), therefore, depends on who wants to have whom as friend and who wants to have whom as foe. Lévi-Strauss has himself pointed to that in some successful formulations⁵⁷⁴, and a critique / criticism of him would be here out of place (and misguided) if his ascertainments concerning this had not been rather casually, in passing and by the needs and requirements of the symmetry of the structuralist(ic) construct de facto revoked, canceled, rescinded and abolished, that is, had not remained and stayed largely irrelevant for his research praxis (practice). And in fact: if this construct, which is supposed to describe the exchange of women and the – through that – relations of kinship and relatives (or kinship, kindred, kinfolk and relatives relations(hips)) coming into being, would correspond with the facts, then one would have to conclude from that, that the exchange of women is not a means towards something other (the ending and termination of an enmity and the sealing and confirmation of an alliance), but is a goal/end – an end-in-itself in fact inside of a social order which is existentially dependent on lively exchange, that is, can exist only as generalised exchange^{cxviii}. The logic of the construct, consequently, stands the facts of the case on their head, and indeed in

⁵⁷³ Bourdieu, *Entwurf*, p. 218ff..

⁵⁷⁴ «Les échanges sont des guerres pacifiquement résolues, les guerres sont l'issue de transactions malheureuses»; «une transition continue existe, de la guerre aux échanges, et des échanges aux inter-mariages», *Structures*, pp. 78, 79.

regard to two essential points. On the one hand, the specific weight and functional meaning of exchange inside of social orders (or kinds of social ordering) are overvalued (overestimated), which in general are self-sufficient, and also want to remain it (i.e. self-sufficient) if possible, by limiting and restricting exchange with aliens (foreigners, strangers, other people(s)) (= foes) to the absolutely necessary and unavoidable. On the other hand, the specific weight and functional meaning of violence, force and war are undervalued (underestimated) or downplayed and understated. In other words, a supra-ordinated (superior, higher) reality pushes and presses towards exchange, the in practice unceasing waging and conduct of war, which leads either to mutual and reciprocal exhaustion and hopelessness, which command the drawing nearer to and approaching the Other i.e. (reconciliation, rapprochement) as the sole mode of survival (survival mode), or else, the search for allies against third parties; in both cases, war is the godfather of (i.e. the inspiration for and behind) the exchange or the exchange of women – war does not come into being, therefore, from hindered and prevented exchange as the *primum movens* of social movement/motion, but things are precisely the reverse^{575 + cxcix}. The legend of the Rape / Abduction / Kidnapping of the Sabine Women⁵⁷⁶ speaks volumes here: owing to the mistrust that Rome's growth and demeanour, behaviour and conduct instilled in its neighbours, these (neighbours of Rome) turned down the Romans as to their pleading for (ex)change / alternation marriage (i.e. inter-marriage between Romans and their neighbours) and for an alliance, that is, the exchange of women was clearly handled in accordance with the supra-ordinated point of view of the social relation; thus, the Romans had to replace exchange with violence (force). Proverbs and sayings of natural folks (i.e. indigenous “primitive” peoples) attest, likewise, to the fact that the abduction of women did not in the least lag behind the exchange of women; in the course of this, one /

⁵⁷⁵ Clastres, *Archéologie*, pp. 72ff., 74ff..

⁵⁷⁶ Titus Livius, I, p. 9ff..

they killed the men of a tribe in war in order to then carry off (i.e. abduct) the women⁵⁷⁷. The widespread saying: “we marry those^{cc} with whom we wage war” or “we marry our foes”, shows / demonstrates, moreover, that even where it did not come to war and abduction, but things, matters, affairs took a happier, luckier and more fortunate turn, reconciliation was felt [[to best come about]] through (ex)change / alternation marriage (i.e. group inter-marriage / marriage between two different groups of people) as the alternative to mutual and reciprocal destruction, annihilation and extermination, at least as the avoidance of an uncertain outcome of war. Blood relations (as consanguinity) and kinship relations through and by means of marriage represent and constitute two different things, exactly because only the latter (i.e. kinship relations through marriage) interrelates and is connected – in one way or another – with war, whereas between blood relations / blood relatives, as fiercely, intensely, severely and violently as they may (also) argue, quarrel and fight with one another, precisely war appears to be unimaginable and inconceivable; only that which can produce and generate war can be – contractually, that is, by means of marriage – be regulated; where wars cannot be found and occur, no contracts can be spoken of too⁵⁷⁸. What applies to and is valid for the exchange of women, applies to and is valid for, understandably, also exchange in general, regardless of its (i.e. exchange’s) each and every respective object. There is only a somewhat (to some extent) stable and comprehensive exchange between communities where the intent(ion) of an alliance exists, in other words, the question and problem of the social relation is in principle clarified in view and consideration of constantly and permanently and continually imminent war⁵⁷⁹.

⁵⁷⁷ See e.g. Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 184: “If the men are not slain, the women are not carried off.”

⁵⁷⁸ Fortes, *Kinship*, p. 234ff.; Leach, *Social Anthropology*, p. 171. Taylor had already brought the essence of the matter to the concept: “savage tribes must have had plainly before their minds the simple practical alternative between marrying-out and being killed out”, “On a Method”, p. 267, cf. Hoebel, *Law*, p. 124.

⁵⁷⁹ Occasional, casual, now-and-then, limited and restricted and economically thought-of exchange (i.e. exchange which was occasional, limited and thought about in terms of economics), which could take place even amongst/between warring and belligerent parties/sides was something different, obviously, and was mixed up, in fact, with war as a form of communication. See Bettini-Borgini, “La guerra e lo scambio” and cf. footnote 546 above.

Colonial rule and domination (dominance) put, though, the in practice permanent state of (affairs with regard to) war to an end^{cci}; the satisfaction of compulsion and coercion (i.e. forced pacification) separated and divided war and exchange from each other; non-war(-like) (or non-belligerent / non-martial) forms of competition and of exchange (Potlatch, Kula) moved into the foreground, i.e. came to the fore, and that is why some ethnologists gained i.e. formed the impression (in respect) of the autonomy and of the constitutive function of exchange – all the more easily, understandably, as they were – anyway – inclined to drive out, expel and banish war and enmity from their image and picture of (primitive) social life (living)^{580 + ccii}.

The treatment and handling of the incest taboo is likewise characteristic and typical of Lévi-Strauss's method. The empirical phenomena were incorporated and included in a clearly outlined structure, and their function and their telos (i.e. their end of a goal-oriented process or their ultimate purpose or end) inside of the same clearly outlined structure is inquired about (i.e. is of interest), not their origin(s), whereby and in relation to which the priority, precedence and pre-eminence of the teleological [[aspect, dimension]] before (or as regards) the genetic [[aspect, dimension]] amounts and is tantamount to an indifference (and disinterest) vis-à-vis the concrete shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation. That is why the incest taboo is not explained in itself, but is pre-supposed and is looked at as the first limb or member (i.e. link, component or element) of a chain of exchange, to which alone the theoretical interest applies. Said otherwise: exogamy is looked upon, considered and regarded as the expression of a positive exchange need (or positive requirement of exchange), not as the consequence of a negative incest taboo⁵⁸¹. In any case, the incest taboo is connected only externally with mutuality, reciprocity and exchange, it

⁵⁸⁰ Dalton, "Aboriginal Economies", p. 200ff..

⁵⁸¹ Leach, "The structural implications", p. 38.

is not shown or demonstrated that it must in actual fact set in motion the exchange of women, but he (i.e. Lévi-Strauss) suggests that it must exist because it allegedly and supposedly has functional consequences and or can be understood because of these functional consequences. And the teleology is not exhausted in the highly questionable, dubious and doubtful assumption that the imposition of an institution can be explained by its beneficial effects and impact(s); it (i.e. the imposition of an institution) is there, as it were, planted in the heads of the actors themselves, to whom a quasi-intuitive capacity and (cap)ability is ascribed to somehow foresee and suspect what is good for the collective and to direct their action accordingly (i.e. towards that (good))⁵⁸². This teleological functionalism indeed looks consistent and cohesive, uniform and self-contained on paper, i.e. as long as it moves inside of its own framework, the setting aside and elimination of the genetic aspect in its connection with the dynamic(s) of the social relation in each and every respective situation and position, leaves, however, important factual questions, problems and issues unanswered. One such question amongst these reads: why were these and not those women specified, designated and marked out for exchange, [i.e.] on the basis of which criteria or under the pressure of which factors, therefore, did the selection of the women, whom the community was able to and might exchange for other women or goods, take place? From the point of view of the principle of generalised exchange, it seems as if the incest taboo would have been forced and imposed upon [[the community]] from the outside, so-to-speak, as the consequence of the legitimate claim of alien, foreign and other (functionalistically thinking) communities for exchangeable goods. But why did not a community not simply give away the for-the-time-being available women, but underwent the additional trouble and effort of an internal

⁵⁸² Homans-Schneider, *Marriage*, pp. 4, 17, 19. It is no wonder and not surprising that functionalists like Parsons, who took up Lévi-Strauss's theory promptly, expressly excluded "the problem of origins" in order to devote themselves to the "functional aspect" alone. This means: "the incest taboo operates to 'propel' the individual out of the nuclear family" ("Incest Taboo", pp. 115, 108, 106ff.).

disciplining, which sometimes in fact was not in any apparent, evident or clear interrelation or connection with the exchange mechanism (or mechanism of exchange)? The universally strictest incest taboo, which concerns the sexual intercourse (fornication, coitus and coition) between mother and son, can, e.g., hardly be deduced and derived from the needs and requirements of generalised exchange. Strictly speaking, exogamy too is not found in any necessary relation with the institution of the family and the incest taboos accompanying it.

Because it would in abstracto be thoroughly and absolutely conceivable that communities which live in promiscuity declare women an exchange good as soon as these women in the one or the other community are in short supply and lacking. However, the functionalistic theory of generalised exchange assumes and believes the existence of the institutionalised family and the incest taboo to be pre-given, that is, it does not distinguish, tell and keep apart exogamy and the incest taboo, from which the very precarious conclusion must follow, that the demand for virginity and chasteness, both of the bride as well as of the bridegroom, is dictated by the voice of nature itself, and that the father and mother hear and listen to this voice, and, like all other members of the same community too, abstain and refrain from sexual intercourse with their daughters or sons in order not to endanger and put at risk exogamy. The necessity to think of exogamy and of the incest taboo separately from each other, is illuminated and elucidated by one simple consideration: in matrilineality, the sexual intercourse between father and daughter, in patrilineality, that (sexual intercourse) between mother and son, would not in the least stand in the way of exogamy⁵⁸³.

Whilst Lévi-Strauss postulates the incest taboo without going into the genetic aspect, he leaves – in terms of theory – open the possibility of a biologicistic

⁵⁸³ Seligman, "Incest", pp. 313, 306.

interpretation of the phenomenon⁵⁸⁴. Such preferences lie, though, far from him, and they were, incidentally, long ago discredited by the work of American cultural anthropology. Lewis White, who shortly before Lévi-Strauss had treated in a very similar way the incest taboo, named some compelling reasons why this (incest taboo) cannot be founded on observations of biological degeneration (degeneracy and devolution) because of incestual sexual intercourse throughout the generations, and he rightly opined that strict prohibitions would here be superfluous, were the biological aversion against it (i.e. incestual sexual intercourse) inborn, i.e. innate and strong; moreover, he pointed to the different interpretation and application of the incest taboo according to place and time (i.e. from place to place and from epoch to epoch) as evidence of the incest taboo's historical and social conditionality and determination. According to his perception and view, it (i.e. the incest taboo's historical and social conditionality and determination) ought to be understood from the incest taboo's function in promoting the co-operation between families and communities, whereby and in relation to which economic motivation in regard to marriage was classed and assessed as decisive⁵⁸⁵. The fact that exchange is called co-operation and the urge, desire and need for mutuality and reciprocity, economic motivation, does not change the fundamental and basic concept much; accordingly, the aporia (doubt, contradiction or paradox) remains the same too: exogamy presupposes the incest taboo, it does not explain it. Precisely the refusal and rejection of biologicistic interpretations and reference to the historical and social relations, conditions and circumstances, makes the task all the more urgent and pressing of tracking down, unearthing and uncovering the shaping, forming and moulding of the social relation which pushed and pressed towards the incest taboo, and which served as the background for and basis of the exchange of women following and subsequent

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. Fox, "Sibling Incest"; already Westermarck, *Ursprung*, II, p. 300ff..

⁵⁸⁵ "Definition", pp. 416ff., 424ff.; cf. already Frazer's critique of Westermarck, *Totemism*, IV, p. 97.

to that incest taboo. We must, in other words, seek an endogenous explanation of the incest taboo instead of a functionalistic-exogenous explanation. In the course of this, one can simply put forward demographic factors, namely a considerable and significant deviation and divergence in the birthrate between male and female family or clan/tribe members, which demanded and required exogamy as a means for the restoration of the equilibrium between males and females⁵⁸⁶. However, already the strain, stress, effort and endeavour as regards such an equilibrium presupposes a fairly regulated [[pattern of]] sexual intercourse, which can only rest and be based on existing taboos. A consistent endogenous explanation must concentrate itself on tensions, strains and stresses, which indeed came into being under the pressure of sexual needs, yet soon took on the dimension of a social relation, since the satisfaction of these needs was connected with power factors and hierarchical relations, conditions and circumstances; one must highlight that were there no power factors and power differences (i.e. factors and differences in relation to power), thus the sexual needs of everyone could have been satisfied by unlimited and unrestricted promiscuity, and the dimension of the social relation would hardly have arisen. Sexuality and the social relation meet and encounter each other as soon as the stronger [person, party, side] makes a claim on and in relation to the sole ownership (and (monopolistic) possession) of the sexual object, and the social relation unfolds and develops due to the fact that he is forced and compelled by evenly matched, equal and equivalent individual or counter-forces and opposing forces allied with one another to renounce and forego and relinquish this claim, on condition that the renunciation and relinquishment will flow into and end up in a generally (and universally) binding order; the foundation and basis of this order is a comprehensive incest taboo which needs and requires exogamy as its

⁵⁸⁶ Thus, Wallis in an in itself apt and well-aimed critique of White's exogenous interpretation, see "Origin", esp. p. 278.

counterpart⁵⁸⁷.

The process, occurrence and phenomenon [of the incest taboo] could, therefore, hardly be reconstructed if we did not put at its beginning a dynamic connection and combining between sexual satisfaction and the exercising of power, which, in the form which it takes inside of human social life and under the influence of specifically human (“spiritual(-intellectual-emotional)”) properties, qualities and characteristics, ensures and provides for in the spectrum of the social relation a certain kind of agitation, excitement and stirring. Now, the power which, in the course of this, was used, was according to its bearer on each and every respective occasion, of a different kind. The male head of the family possesses, first of all, the physical and, for instance, as a hunter, the economic strength in order to impose two prohibitions which secured for him the exclusive sexual possession of the female members of the family, i.e. the prohibition of the sexual intercourse between mother and son and between son and daughter, or else brother and sister. The former prohibition is obviously the oldest and the most grave, weighty and serious; the original end/goal of the latter is attested to in the fact that still under relatively developed (agrarian and agricultural) relations, conditions and circumstances, the father had a tacitly tolerated and sometimes, in fact, a socially recognised and acknowledged privileged access to his daughters. The compulsion and coercion towards the renunciation and abandonment of this privilege, and consequently

⁵⁸⁷ It is self-evident, as well, that an endogenous explanation of the incest taboo must remain free of functionalistic ulterior motives, i.e. we should and ought to orientate ourselves exclusively to the dynamic(s) of the social relation. Malinowski (*Sex*, p. 243ff.) pleads and advocates, indeed, for an endogenous explanation whilst he tellingly and in a well-aimed manner characterises exogamy as a mere “extension” of the incest taboo, however, in the process he argues teleologically: without the incest taboo, he opines the family would be dissolved and disintegrate, break apart, and since without the family no culture can be thought of and conceived or imagined, thus the incest taboo must exist in order to guarantee and ensure the existence of culture. He is thinking here retrospectively, i.e. he starts from the completed and executed fact of the family and of culture, against which development, unfolding and evolution must counteract and be steered and driven. The endogenous explanation, consequently, is unofficially and on the sly, i.e. secretly, transformed and converted into an exogenous explanation. [[TRANSLATOR’S NOTE (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): AND WE ALL KNOW THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION, NOTHING, INCLUDING THE FAMILY AND SPECIFIC FORMS OF CULTURE, APART FROM MAN, NECESSARILY ARISES OUT OF THE EXISTENCE OF MAN AS MEN IN NATURE.]]

towards the completion (and rounding off) of the incest taboo came not, for instance, from the allied insurgent and rebellious brothers⁵⁸⁸, who killed the tyrannical father, but rather on the part of the wives, who – in relation to that – made use of a new kind of power; patient and persevering, persistent and explosive jealousy, as well as their (i.e. the wives') stronger social position because of the development of agriculture, farming and horticulture, which assigned and allocated, i.e. gave to them a considerably and substantially more important economic function than hunting. The heads of families had to gradually hand over and cede their sexual rights to the son of their sister [[i.e. the sororal nephew]] or to the son of the sister of the son of their sister [[i.e. the sororal grand/great nephew]] over their own daughters, whilst the clan was simultaneously split in two halves which exchanged women with each other and, accordingly, avoided incest in their own lines⁵⁸⁹. In regard to female jealousy, though, the same claim to the sole possession of the sexual object, like in regard to the behaviour of the family head, was articulated – only from the position of the physically weaker, and to top it off, with the legitimation that the principle of mutuality/reciprocity can grant and allow: the mother required and demanded from the father the same sexual renunciation and abandonment of the daughters which she, anyway, since long ago had to practise and exercise with reference to the sons. As a power claim which fastens onto and attaches to the sexual object, and brings to the spectrum of the social relation unrest (restlessness, disturbance, alarm, unease and anxiety), jealousy is not, though, any slight or frivolous matter of concern. Without jealousy, at any rate, the introduction and institutionalisation of the incest taboo remain

⁵⁸⁸ Freud's explanation of exogamy by means of patricide (*Totem*, Ch. IV, 5) is based on the questionable and dubious psychological hypothesis that the sons had resolved out of remorse for what they had done to maintain and keep up the incest taboo introduced by the father, i.e. to continue foregoing, doing without and abstaining from the sexual possession of their mother and of their sisters, and to renounce the aim of the revolt and rebellion precisely after its success. Another outcome seems, nevertheless, to be more likely or probable: fratricidal warfare and the substitution of the dead father by the victor – i.e. the vicious circle.

⁵⁸⁹ Thurnwald, *Gemeinde*, p. 186ff..

incomprehensible, unintelligible and obscure⁵⁹⁰, i.e. if sexual promiscuity inside of the family did not have any influence at all on the social behaviour of its members, thus, the family and its main educational-socialising function would not be in danger and at risk. It ought to be assumed *e contrario* that incest taboos would lose their practical meaning, if the family abandoned that (educative-socialising) function, i.e. if it (the family) was broken up and dissolved. Where no family exists, nothing stands in the way of the sexual intercourse of everybody with everybody.

The elementary schema, which was sketched and outlined above, offers a fundamental and basic aid/assistance as regards orientation for the explanation of the decisive incest taboos inside of the nuclear family and or of the clan. There are, however, several forms of such taboos, which no single theory can apprehend⁵⁹¹. To the extent that through and by means of exogamy, systems of kinship and relations/relatives (or kinship, kindred, kinfolk and relatives systems) were formed and developed, new considerations and new prohibitions appeared, which could hardly be explained by functionalistic points of view of ubiquitous application and validity. The precedence, pre-eminence, primacy and priority of genesis also belongs (i.e. applies) here, not the retrospectively ascertainable function. Because the rules were set up, established and laid down in accordance with the – on each and every respective occasion – locally ruling and dominating contingent constellation (correlation and conjuncture (of actors and forces)), and from this time on were seen and followed and adhered to as sanctioned necessities, not least of all out of angst and fear before the arrival of new confusion(s), bewilderment(s), perplexities and quarrels, squabbles,

⁵⁹⁰ Already in regard to apes (monkeys), which obviously do not have any natural aversion to incest, the sexual jealousy of the males or of the females forces and imposes the introduction of the [incest] taboo. What concerns man (i.e. as far as humans are concerned), “the only human behavior mechanisms needed are the simple ‘struggle’ responses a child gives when his movements are interfered with and the closely allied jealousies developed from them later. The ape merely shows us our own emotional behaviour without the superimposed conventions...” (Vetter, “Incest Taboos”, pp. 239, 240).

⁵⁹¹ Needham, *Remarks*, p. 61ff..

disputes. The pedantry in and during their observance, keeping and following offered and provided a guarantee against that (i.e. those new perplexities and disputes); on the other hand, a drastic change in the constellations [[of incest-taboo(s), exogamy, kinship and familial relations]] pushed and forced and urged (those concerned) towards the modification of the rules, often in the form of their free interpretation, so that their reduction to fixed structures must go by and go past (i.e. overlook) the realities of their coming into being and development⁵⁹². Only the genesis of the first and decisive incest taboos can grosso modo be reconstructed, and here the case is clear: These incest taboos came into being through and by means of certain relations, circumstances and shifts (displacements) in the spectrum of the social relation, as this came up and presented itself inside of the nuclear family and or of the clan, and ended a permanent tension, stress and strain, which now could be shifted, transferred and moved to new concerns, worries and cares (in respect) of exogamy. This tension, stress and strain in the deepest root of the social, i.e. where this social [sphere, dimension] has to be mixed and blended with naked biology, remains forever in the memory in the form of a collective abhorrence (horror, disgust, revulsion, repulsion and loathing) before incest as a cause and simultaneously symptom of extreme moral degeneration and simultaneously of social disorder: not without reason, the Chinese term for the incest taboo (*luan lun*) is put together out of and composed by symbols (signs) which mean / signify “disorder” and “social relation” (order, class, sequence)⁵⁹³. However, not only are the origins of the incest taboo to be sought in the social relation, as it had to be shaped, formed and moulded in connection with biological factors. Also, the open transgressions, infringements and violations of this taboo, and indeed in its own fundamental and basic forms, ought to be traced back, put down and reduced to the situation in the spectrum of the social relation. Only the oldest

⁵⁹² Lane, “Varieties of Cross-Cousin Marriage”, esp. p. 289.

⁵⁹³ Needham, *Remarks*, 64ff.

and strictest of all taboos, which is reserved for and imposed in relation to the sexual intercourse between mother and son, seems to have applied strictly overall (i.e. everywhere). Incest between father and daughter under patriarchal social relations, circumstances and conditions was, on the other hand, practised until modern times, and tolerated to a not exactly specifiable and namable extent whilst grinding one's teeth (i.e. grudgingly and with a great deal of discomfort), whereas marriages between siblings, which were not only practised in Ancient Egypt, above all were supposed and ought to demonstrate two kinds of things: that prohibitions only bind the little man / people, not the powerful, godly, divine etc., and that the high race (i.e. superior race) of the ruling and dominant dynasty could only be polluted and contaminated by exogamy⁵⁹⁴.

d. Gift and *Kula*

The logic of the gift can be understood more directly than that (logic) of economic exchange, which arises out of the social relation, since the latter (economic exchange arising out of the social relation), as we have said, *stricto sensu*, neither demands and requires an assumption and taking on/over of perspectives, nor a friendly or inimical relation; in the ideal-typical extreme case, the exchanging-with-one-another parties neutrally (i.e. in a neutral manner) concentrate on the exchange object (*or*: object of exchange). It is, though, false to hermetically separate both exchange from the social relation as well as drawing the conclusion from the in principle and fundamental difference between the gift and the economic exchange object, that the former (gift) lacks every economic relevance, or else that its economic aspects may, should or ought to be neglected in its researching, study and investigation. When Mauss called the gift a “*prestation totale*” [= total offer(ing) (service, allowance, benefit, performance)], he had, nonetheless, precisely this in mind: to let the

⁵⁹⁴ La Barre, *Human Animal*, pp. 123, 125.

individual aspects of the gift, under which the economic aspects were too, be – in their totality – completely wrapped up in and absorbed by an entirely particular and autonomous, self-contained phenomenon, which was supposed to represent and constitute the miniature of a social order which led (i.e. carried on) its being (t)here and existence, undamaged by, and intact in respect of, the supposedly typical estrangements and alienations of the Western modern (i.e. Western modernity), that is to say, by and in respect of the separation and the division between the economy and ethics, or person and thing (cause, matter, affair, business). This social order was for Mauss, besides, no irrevocable tier (i.e. stage) of development, but rather a model and example in accordance with which (the) split and unhappy modern / modernity was supposed to be directed; from the “return to the archaic and the elements”, an overcoming of our “abstractions and inhumanities” was expected, which, ultimately and in the final analysis, sprang and arose from the logic of buying and selling⁵⁹⁵. Under these circumstances, Mauss could not and did not want to believe and accept that the – enthusiastically adored by him – “totality”, as it was symbolised, personified, typified and represented in the gift, probably or definitely had its aspects [which were] separable from one another, and that “happier, more fortunate, luckier” people, whom he fancied and imagined in other times or in other places, were definitely in the position of accordingly distinguishing them (i.e. the said separable aspects) as soon as it came to the crunch and it really mattered – they knew, in other words, at which level of the social relation they moved on each and every respective occasion, and whether the question and problem of the social relation had to be posed or clarified anew, or whether it (the question and problem of the social relation) could be regarded on both sides as sufficiently clear in order (in and during economic exchange) to be in part or totally excluded. The difference between the gift and economic exchange (buying –

⁵⁹⁵ *Le Don*, pp. 193, 228, 258ff..

selling) was in quite a few “primitive” / native peoples in fact proverbial⁵⁹⁶; however, alongside it stood a second difference, no less important: the difference between the economic, ceremonial, prestige-related, affective etc. dimensions of the gift. These did not merely constitute the – in retrospect – separable (i.e. discreet) dimensions of a totality, which objectively and in the eyes of the actors concerned was a constantly-identical-with-itself unity, but they overshadowed and cast a cloud over one another in accordance with the concrete constellation [correlation (of forces)], whereby, to the participants, it was more or less conscious (i.e. in their awareness and knowledge) which dimension was in the foreground (or has come to the fore), which posed the theme of the topical, current and relevant social relation. The economic aspect of the gift could be interwoven with the rest of the aspects of the gift, but it could also be intentionally separated and isolated from them, especially since the gift, because of the practical certainty that a counter-gift (i.e. return gift or gift in return) would sooner or later follow, often functioned as a loan, only with the difference that the return gift took place and occurred by means of an object of another quality⁵⁹⁷. It is not a matter here of the statistical frequency of the case (which should not be estimated as low), but of the in principle possibility of such differentiations and conscious shifts of the centre of gravity and main emphasis. The gift certainly always has a qualitative aspect, which contrasts it with, and makes it stand out from the narrowly quantitative character of merely economic exchange. Yet this does not mean that every gift encloses within itself the entire and whole palette (i.e. range and gamut) of the social given facts, which the concept of «prestation totale [[= total offer(ing) (service, allowance, benefit, performance)]]» means⁵⁹⁸.

⁵⁹⁶ See e.g. B. Ellis, *Yoruba-Speaking Peoples*, p. 223 (in the English version: “a gift is a gift and a purchase is a purchase”).

⁵⁹⁷ Herskovits, *Economic Anthropology*, pp. 159ff., 169, 192ff..

⁵⁹⁸ Firth, *Polynesian Economy*, p. 313; “Themes”, p. 9.

The second mistake which – owing to his strongly idealised concept(ual plan) of the gift – Mauss made (*or*: which crept into Mauss[‘s thinking]), existed in the mystification of the social relation. That means: what objectively and also in accordance with the opinion (or the way of seeing things) of the participants in the social relation belongs to the social relation, was ascribed and attributed to the gift as an entity which is independent, autonomous and free (in respect) of the actors; the gift no longer represents and constitutes an “inert thing” (chose inerte), but it is mixed (up) and blended with the psyche and the dispositions, in short, therefore, with the essence and nature of the person giving (the gift), and consequently exercises a magical influence on the person taking (i.e. the recipient [of the gift])⁵⁹⁹. The obligation and duty of returning the gift is supposed to spring and arise, accordingly, from the belief that the spirit haunting the gift (or residing in the gift) of the person giving, strives for and aims at the return [[of the gift]] to its original bearer; if this does not take place, in this manner, the said spirit will avenge itself by means of sorcery, wizardry, witchcraft and magic. The existence of this belief is, though, not properly and impeccably documented, accounted for and evidenced (or proven by evidence)⁶⁰⁰, and still less definite and certain is its motivating force. More characteristic or typical than the weak empirical basis is, however, for Mauss’s method, the interweaving of idealisation, totalisation and mystification. In the magic, witchcraft, charm or spell of the gift, or more precisely, in the totalising concept(ual plan) of the gift, which rests and is based upon the assumption and acceptance of its all-in-all and overall magical character, its aforementioned concrete aspects dissolve and are broken up, and consequently the concrete positionings and attitudes of the actors fade or are lost from the sight of the actors, namely, who put or keep in motion the games of power and of force and

⁵⁹⁹ *Le Don*, pp. 159, 161, 173, 253 ff..

⁶⁰⁰ Experienced researchers assure [[us]] that they could not find “any trace” of it (i.e. the said belief), see e.g. Firth, “Themes”, p. 9; cf. *Primitive Economics*, p. 412ff..

strength in the spectrum of the social relation. The magic (witchcraft, charm or spell) which holds the actors spellbound, seems, on the other hand, to vouch for and guarantee the more or less smooth course, order and sequence (of events) of the hoped-for mutual and reciprocal «prestations totales [[total offer(ing)s (services, allowances, benefits, performances)]]». The obligation and duty of the giving, of the taking, of the repaying and rewarding is distributed by the effect and impact of the magic (i.e. the magical effect) equally, in the same way and uniformly to all actors; therefore, virtually, an automatic mechanism or process system of behaviour comes into being which flows into and leads to a collective ethical habitus (of dispositions and habits), and consequently (in)to a social equilibrium, whereby primary, i.e. still before the exchange of gifts, existing differences in status and power are hardly looked at and considered. It is not questioned in accordance with quantitative magnitudes, how for instance the relationship between the value of the gift / present and the total range, extent and scope of the material possibilities of the person giving the gift, determine very often the readiness, preparedness, willingness and purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) of the giving, of the taking and of the repaying and rewarding. And finally, already here – as later in Lévi-Strauss – on the basis of the logic of the social model in mind, the dimension of time (or temporal dimension) is excluded, that is, that in-between, which separates the giving from (the) taking (or not taking), and the taking from repaying and rewarding (or not repaying and not rewarding), and in which uncertainty, hesitation, calculation as regards one's own or one's own group's interest as benefit and advantage have their place with these or those practical consequences. Friction(s), breaks or conflicts are described from this point of view as the failure of the supra-ordinate(d) (superior, higher) magical forces (or forces of magic) cementing the collective rather than as *peripetiae* (i.e. sudden changes of events or reversals of

circumstances) of the social relation⁶⁰¹. The totalisation of the phenomenon, which makes use of its mystification and has as its object its idealisation, drives and edges out the true totality, i.e. the entirety of all the – in the spectrum of the social relation – given possibilities in their interweaving with the entirety of all of the only possible (material and ideational) content(s). Hence, Mauss is mistrustful and suspicious vis-à-vis social relations in which the exchange of gifts has from the very beginning and in respect of intent, an expressly conflictual character; Potlatch is for him “a kind of monstrous product of the system of gifts”⁶⁰². On the other hand, he must occasionally without circumlocution (i.e. without further ado) describe the background in front of which the gift or gifts are given and repaid, i.e. reciprocated: the gift constitutes the price for peace when the sole visible alternative is enmity and when the refusal of giving and of taking [a gift or gifts] is tantamount to a declaration of war; the exuberance and enthusiasm of the giving [of something as a present] can precisely be the counterpart to the exuberance and enthusiasm of enmity; in the final analysis, giving can indicate superiority and taking can indicate subjection (subjugation)⁶⁰³. Between casual, passing and incidental ascertainties and the idealised social model in mind, the same gap (gulf, chasm) yawns (and opens up) in Mauss as in Lévi-Strauss^{cciii}. His heart beats for Rousseau, his analysis must, however, sometimes follow Hobbes’s tracks (or trail), and see in the decision in favour of friendship an evasive manoeuvre in the face of constantly imminent extreme enmity⁶⁰⁴. Contrary to his Durkheimian presuppositions as well as to the obvious temptation to convert actors into factotums of a mystical collective, Mauss refers then to concrete and concretely motivated acts, actions and (kinds of) acting, which burst open, demolish and explode the framework of pre-established role distributions (i.e. role

⁶⁰¹ Loc. cit., p. 10ff..

⁶⁰² *Le Don*, p. 213.

⁶⁰³ Loc. cit., pp. 161-163, 168, 277, 269ff..

⁶⁰⁴ Sahlin, *Stone Age Economics*, esp. p. 168ff..

allocations)⁶⁰⁵.

Reflection on Mauss's theory teaches what should be avoided and in which direction what should be sought. The gift together with its (supposed) dispositional preconditions and prerequisites is not the glue or cement which holds together and coheres a balanced social order. The gift is suitable for this function (of holding together and cohering a balanced social order) just as little as trust or mutuality and reciprocity; the gift, by the way, belongs exactly like them (trust, mutuality) only under (i.e. with) certain restrictions to the socially acceptable modes of behaviour. Trust and mutuality / reciprocity are not socially tolerated amongst criminals, and in fact, are punished; gifts are, likewise, disapproved-of, scorned and frowned-upon when they amount to a case of bribery – and this not only (or not first) under the effect and impact of new-times (modern era) European legalism. Behind them is, incidentally, no united society-supporting positioning and attitude or approach, but a great variety and multiformity of stances, which positively or negatively correspond to the great variety and multiformity of the possible constellations (correlations (of forces) and conjunctures) in the spectrum of the social relation. Here one must differentiate (i.e. make distinctions) in accordance with multiple respects (i.e. from a number of points of view). Across or opposite from the standpoint of the person giving (i.e. the giver or donor) is that standpoint of the person taking (i.e. the recipient of the gift); across or opposite from the situation, condition and position of the social relation before the giving or the taking is the same situation, condition and position as it probably will be shaped, formed or moulded – always from the point of view of the person giving or of the person taking – after the giving or the taking. One has since time immemorial praised and extolled the power of the gift to inspire and instill trust and confidence and

⁶⁰⁵ Ingold, *Evolution*, p. 264ff..

to create friendship, in fact to end and terminate enmity⁶⁰⁶. This may – above all – occur when the I (ego) and the Other enter into a social relation which, as it were, begins *ex nihilo*, that is, is not loaded and weighed down by any unpleasant pre-history and by any foreseeable friction(s); if it is thus, the Ego seizes the initiative of the giving and the Other accepts the gift. But even when enmity is a great weight on and weighs down the pre-history of the social relation, and accordingly promises the future only hopelessness, a gift can break the vicious circle. But that is only [a matter of] probabilities, whose realisation constantly remains the function of the situation and position, intentions and identity of the actors. In any case, above all in such cases, when it is, namely, a matter of the initiating of a friendship or of the ending of an enmity, that ingenuity of the giving is necessary, of which Ovid spoke⁶⁰⁷. Neither the ingenuity of giving, nor the value of the gift can, on the other hand, bring about and achieve much if the enmity appears to be unalterable and irrevocable and the attempts at the approaching and coming close (as rapprochement with) the foe can sow only additional mistrust; as Laocoön in Virgil believes and opines, one fears one's foes even when they bring gifts with them (i.e. bear gifts (to them))⁶⁰⁸; their gifts indeed are not true gifts⁶⁰⁹, but they rather remind us of the plentiful, abundant and copious bait and lure, which the fishermen offer to the fish on the hook⁶¹⁰. Inner (internal) tensions, stresses and strains and antagonistic positionings and attitudes can, however, in him taking (i.e. being a recipient of a gift/gifts) come into being too, once he out of need or greed has accepted the gift. He appears, namely, to himself to be independent, obligated and committed to lasting, enduring gratitude and thankfulness, which goes

⁶⁰⁶ “The magnificence, splendor and glory of the gift! as it straightaway and immediately generates trust and confidence ! through its power, in the blink of an eye, it will transform and convert the foe into a friend”, *Pantschatantra*, III, § 52 = II, p. 166.

⁶⁰⁷ “Res est ingeniosa dare”, *Amores*, I, 8, V. 62.

⁶⁰⁸ “Timeo Danaos et dona ferentis”, *Aeneis*, II, V. 49.

⁶⁰⁹ Sophocles, *Aias*, V. 605 (ἐχθρῶν δῶρα ἄδωρα [[= foes' gifts are without gifts, i.e. are not gifts]]).

⁶¹⁰ Martial, *Epigr.*, VI, 63, V. 5 (‘Munera magna tamen misit.’ Sed misit in hamo; Et piscatorem piscis amare potest? [[= ‘He sent, however, great gifts’. But he sent them on a (fish)hook; and can the fish love the fisherman?]]

against and runs counter to a fundamental requirement and demand of every identity, namely, the demand and requirement for the greatest possible (self-)contentedness (and self-sufficiency), despite all the bonds and ties in respect of which this same identity at the same time needs; the hand, which nourishes someone, hence, runs the risk of being bitten⁶¹¹. The giver [of the gift], on the other hand, looks independent and contented, satisfied with one's lot and self-sufficient; his act or deed has moved, transferred and shifted him *eo ipso* into an advantageous position⁶¹². Into one such awkward, tricky or delicate position and situation can the person taking (i.e. receiving the gift) move (i.e. arrive, come or be placed) sometimes only out of shyness, awe, fear or timidity in refusing and rejecting the gift bluntly and forthrightly. Because he knows that rejection, refusal and denial [of the gift] here normally must be interpreted as the breaking off, termination and discontinuation of the relation or else as a declaration of enmity, in any case, as the non-reciprocating of the alien, i.e. other's or others' good will⁶¹³. The consideration of the – in the spectrum of the social relation – existing possibilities determines also in this case the positioning and attitude of the person taking (i.e. receiving the gift). He can, however, all the same, accept (and put up with) a breaking off and termination of the relation or put up with an enmity, and reject the gift, if he behind that gift does not smell and get wind of, i.e. sense a good, even if perhaps annoying and burdensome to him, will and intention, but the intent(ion) to humiliate and degrade him. Because the gift, just like other in themselves friendly gestures (e.g. the greeting and salutation), has the quality, feature, characteristic and property of being able – despite formal (i.e. typical) correctness (i.e. properness) – to be converted and transformed into an instrument of substantial competition and rivalry; enmity can be exercised with the means of friendship just as much as friendship can be exercised with

⁶¹¹ Emerson, "Gift", *Essays*, I, p. 336; cf. Brehm-Cole, "Effect", p. 421.

⁶¹² Issacs, *Social development*, p. 273ff..

⁶¹³ Cf. Radcliff-Brown, *Andaman Islanders*, p. 237ff..

the means of enmity (watchfulness / vigilance, mistrust). E.g., a gift is felt as an unfriendly gesture or is also in actual fact meant thus, when the said gift in comparison with gifts to other people seems less valuable, and the person giving the gift or the person taking ((receiving) the gift) reads into the difference in the value, an assessment, evaluation and appraisal or rating of the persons (i.e. individuals concerned and involved). The same effect occurs when the gift amounts to a seeing of somebody off the premises (i.e. as a getting rid of them), that is, the handling of and dealing with a formality for the purpose of cooling down or even the breaking off and termination of the relation. It (i.e. the gift) can, finally, directly aim at the humiliation and degradation of the person taking (i.e. receiving the gift), when it is supposed to make clear to this person taking / receiving the gift by means of its quality how great the superiority of the other (i.e. person giving the gift) and how irredeemable, indelible and ineffaceable is his (i.e. the person taking / receiving the gift's) own guilt⁶¹⁴. That is why, not without good psychological and social reason, one – in many a tribe or clan – reaches agreement on a maximal value of the gift and present (donation)⁶¹⁵.

In view of the presence of the whole spectrum of the social relation in the gift, it is no wonder that proverbial expressions which praise and extol the omnipotence of the gift, very often merely point to and emphasise the well-known force or powers of persuasion of bribery⁶¹⁶. From the point of view of the person giving (the gift), to which we shall now turn, not seldom, the gifts which he gives and offers to more powerful godly, divine or human beings are more or less veiled, hidden and disguised forms of bribery, i.e. no gift is expected from the person taking (i.e. receiving the gift) as a return favour, quid pro quo and consideration, but the aim here is the influencing of his (i.e. the

⁶¹⁴ Schwartz, "Gift", p. 5ff..

⁶¹⁵ Bourdieu, *Entwurf*, p. 29.

⁶¹⁶ In this sense, the worldly-wise Sancho Panza cites the saying: "dádivas quebrantan peñas" (= gifts break rocks (i.e. undermine, shake and disrupt hardship(s)), *Don Quijote*, Part II, Ch. 35), whereas Euripides lets his Medea say: «πεῖθειν δῶρα καὶ θεοὺς λόγος» (= as it is said, presents and gifts convince even the gods), *Medea*, V. 964).

person receiving the gift's) will or simply his mood, in relation to which the motives differ in accordance with the time reference (i.e. period of time in question): the request, appeal and plea for help in this or that scheme, project or plan means the future; endeavours and efforts at appeasement, pacifying and calming down point to sins or faux pas, blunders, lapses or indiscretions in the past. Gifts for the appeasement and pacifying, calming down of an offended or somehow damaged or injured more powerful (person or side) are usual and customary in nature folks (i.e. "primitive" peoples)⁶¹⁷, but it is worth here for the rounding off (i.e. completion) of the picture of recalling [[the fact]] that over and above that, attempts at appeasement, pacifying, calming down, soothing and easing by means of gifts or acts, actions and kinds of acting in solidarity, are directed to all persons who could cause damage through witchcraft or sorcery, wizardry or magic⁶¹⁸; even ostensibly smiling friendliness, which is conspicuous and stands out in many clans and tribes, is due to the constant angst and fear of being suspected of witchcraft or sorcery as a morose and sullen person⁶¹⁹. Certainly, not only does the weaker (person, party, side) or the person in danger offer gifts without the expectation of tangible counter-gifts (i.e. gifts in return or return gifts). The powerful (person, party, side) and he who is extremely secure and assured of himself and of his position can do the same, although out of an entirely different motivation, i.e. in order to partly demonstrate, partly confirm or partly increase his power and his security and assuredness. By giving presents, gifts, he lets his own superiority and greatness reach – via the gift and present – those who are gifted (i.e. those who are given and received the present and gift)⁶²⁰. The temporary, passing and transitory contact through the act of the giving (of the gift and present) serves here for the

⁶¹⁷ See e.g. Firth, *We, the Tikopia*, p. 544.

⁶¹⁸ Colson, *Tradition*, p. 47ff.

⁶¹⁹ Dole, "Anarchy without Chaos", p. 74.

⁶²⁰ Cf. Ovid, *Epist. ex Ponto*, IV, 9, V. 68: "Majestatem res data dantis habet" [= the gifts have the majesty, grandeur and greatness of the (gift-)giver = TRANSLATOR'S TRANSLATION, NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.]].

reminding and recollecting of the permanent distance; it is a matter of the more subtle and elegant art of sensing and perceiving the existing power inequality (i.e. inequality of power between the two [or more] parties concerned)⁶²¹. That is why it becomes understandable why gifts in primitive societies are frequent to exactly the extent in such primitive societies strata are formed and developed which develop a kind of activity of entrepreneurs (i.e. entrepreneurship), and work on the building up, extension, consolidation and strengthening of their own (i.e. the said strata's) social status⁶²²: gifts can, therefore, also promote, encourage, further and facilitate tendencies which undermine and erode the (fake(d), bogus, made-up) solidary (i.e. in-solidarity) society of the in principle equals (i.e. equal members of such society)^{cciv}. The antagonistic exchange of gifts (e.g. Potlatch) between the "Big Men", i.e. the great men of two tribes or clans, does indeed appear as the struggle of prestige between the representatives of two opposing groups, however, simultaneously it creates a community of interests of the great men against the foot-folk (i.e. the rank and file (infantry)): because by exchanging gifts with each other, they (i.e. the great men of the tribes/clans in question) prove that they both on each and every respective occasion stand and are above their "own" crowd (multitude, herd or flock), and at the same time they strengthen and consolidate their position of leadership by accepting gifts and presents from their followers in order to raise (i.e. to get hold of) the means for the antagonistic exchange of gifts⁶²³.

Naturally, there is, and indeed to a great extent, the exchange of gifts between in principle equal (persons, side, parties) as regards power; a multitude of old and new testimonies in fact prove that one saw and sees in the said exchange of gifts the sole solid foundation or basis of a friendship or of an alliance⁶²⁴. But

⁶²¹ Lenoir, «Les expéditions», p. 409.

⁶²² Belshaw, *Traditional Exchange*, Ch. 2

⁶²³ Forge, "Golden Fleece", p. 534.

⁶²⁴ Already, in *Edda*, p. 192: "'gift' and repayment (as reciprocation) found and establish the alliance (union, league, confederation)."

also under these preconditions and presuppositions, a tension, stress or strain and a dynamic(s), which springs from the objective and suspected or presumed possibility of shifts and displacements in the spectrum of the social relation, is lodged or is hidden in the exchange relation. In societies or in social situations and positions, in which stratification(s) are present and exist only in their beginnings (in a weak form), i.e. rudimentarily, and are easily revocable (i.e. undone), in any case, are highly suspicious, a positioning or attitude predominates and prevails which can be apostrophised (i.e. mentioned and characterised) as “competitive equality”⁶²⁵. The gifts here must be returned and reciprocated through approximately equivalent gifts, and constitute barely veiled and disguised challenges and provocations to the other side to prove its beliefs, in terms of practice, in the principle of equality⁶²⁶. The behaviour hardly changes when the social peak or summit is lacking and it is only or mainly a matter of private relations. The gift is constantly and continually bound to the open expectation of a counter-gift (i.e. return gift or gift in return); if this is not (entirely) fulfilled, thus, anger, wrath and rage soars, and it occurs and happens that the gift is demanded back (i.e. to be returned)⁶²⁷. The strategy of the gift consists, in other words, in sounding out and exploring the Other and to wrap him up and envelop him in a network (mesh or plexus, web or netting) of future obligations and duties, from which he can get out of [[only]] with difficulty; services and gifts are in fact offered in the absence or against the express will of the Other in order to then legitimise [the gift-giver’s] own demands in the near or more distant future; mutuality and reciprocity are here forced and imposed in an almost inimical manner, and one practises (i.e. learns and trains) in relation to that to outmanoeuvre the manoeuvrer through gifts (i.e. the person or party /

⁶²⁵ Woodburn uses the expression “Egalitarian Societies”, p. 446.

⁶²⁶ Forge, “Golden Fleece”, p. 533.

⁶²⁷ Grierson, *Silent Trade*, p. 18ff.; Goldfrank, “Historic Change”, p. 76ff.; Radcliff-Brown, *Andaman Islanders*, p. 83ff.; Herskovits, *Economic Anthropology*, p. 168.

side doing the manoeuvring by means of gifts)⁶²⁸. Sometimes the aim set is achieved due to the fact that the gift of the one side pulls and drags the other side into a state of being / an involvement as an accomplice, which disarms him (i.e. that other side) morally⁶²⁹. In every case, the gift and the counter-gift (return gift or gift in return) mark out an action field (or field of acting) in which the reckoning (i.e. calculation with deliberation), farsightedness and calculatory (cap)abilities are asked for and can be accordingly refined. One gives a gift and present with regard to one's own needs and requirements, which the counter-present (i.e. return gift or present and gift in return) has to cover (i.e. offset and satisfy) only after a few months⁶³⁰, and above all one puts the gift in order (or categorises and classifies the gift) in regard to long-term plans, concerning the shaping, moulding and forming of the social relation as regards certain persons or circles of persons; debt (liability, guilt, blame, fault) and the repayment or redemption of the debt, preliminary or advance payment or performance (work) and the expectation of consideration (or *quid pro quo*) do not consequently constitute isolated acts any longer, but parts of a more or less comprehensive network (mesh or plexus (web and netting)) which is evaluated, assessed and judged as a whole and is wanted and rejected as a whole⁶³¹. Certainly, the real acts of the giving and of the taking continue to represent and constitute the knots and nodes of this network, mesh or plexus, web, netting, and when they fail to materialise and do not take place, this network, mesh or plexus (web or netting) sooner or later dissolves, breaks up and disintegrates. Altruistic behaviour, i.e. one-sided giving, can always crop up, be found or occur to this or that extent, but does not decisively influence the overall picture. It makes its presence felt mainly where a vacuum exists in the social relation, which one

⁶²⁸ L. Marshall, "Sharing", p. 239; Turnbull, *Mountain People*, p. 146; Holmberg, *Nomads*, p. 87.

⁶²⁹ According to a saying of the Bushmen of the Kalahari, "if you wish to sleep with someone else's wife, you get him to sleep with yours", L. Marshall, "Marriage", p. 360.

⁶³⁰ Belshaw, *Traditional Exchange*, p. 38.

⁶³¹ Cf. Leach, *Social Anthropology*, p. 152ff..

side wants to fill on its own initiative. However, the repetition of the altruistic act leads after some time to its institutionalisation (e.g. charitable activity); otherwise, it can drag on endlessly only in very rare or exceptional cases⁶³². The altruist – always with very few world-theoretical or psychologically binding exceptions – seems to himself in the long run to be ridiculous, laughable and absurd when his gifts are never reciprocated (or returned)^{ccv}, [[and]] obviously accepted out of self-interest or in fact received unwillingly. Incidentally, altruistic gifts can, precisely amongst friends, flow and circulate more and more sparsely and scantily, since the relation is regarded as fixed, firm, stable and protected; they (i.e. altruistic gifts) are directed rather to strangers or even foes, whom one wants to win over⁶³³, and they retain and maintain the appearance of altruism only for as long as they do not run into or come across counter-love (i.e. there are no altruistic gifts in return from the side / party / person receiving altruistic gifts in the first place).

In an account which became renowned and famous, Malinowski attempted to describe or outline how gifts and counter-gifts (return gifts or gifts in return) constitute a comprehensive system of mutual and reciprocal rights and duties and obligations, the Kula ring. In the course of this, he touched upon important questions and problems concerning the relation between the economic [sphere, dimension] and the social [sphere, dimension]. His insights regarding that must be discussed in another context⁶³⁴, here something else is of importance and matters. Malinowski could, precisely as a result of the priority which he – with some simplification of the concepts – granted and conceded to the social [sphere, dimension] vis-à-vis the economic [sphere, dimension], seek, track down and find the effects and impacts of the social relation during the exchange of gifts. On the other hand, however, he mistakenly and erroneously wanted to

⁶³² Leeds, “Altruism”, pp. 232, 236ff..

⁶³³ Trivers, “Evolution”, p. 52.

⁶³⁴ See the 2nd volume of this work.

see and behold the essence of the social – despite all ascertainable social asymmetries – in mutuality and reciprocity⁶³⁵, something which found expression and was reflected and manifested itself in his interpretation of the Kula ring. He separated, that is, first of all, Kula and trade sharply from each other and he underlined that this separation was for the actors just as familiar and common, since this trade was carried on and driven only parallelly with regard to the ritual exchange of gifts, in which the Kula existed and consisted⁶³⁶. In addition, he highlighted the social aspect of this exchange, i.e. the fact that the gifts exchanged only obtained their actual and real value only as envy-rousing status symbols (or symbols with regard to status causing envy and jealousy), and corresponded with the idea and notion and (re)presentation of the persons or parties concerned as regards their own position, standing, status and dignity⁶³⁷. On the other hand, the background of the exchange of gifts looked from the broader point of view of the social relation fairly pale and faint. Malinowski spoke, in passing, of “old times” in which dangers and risks lurked and lay in wait, above all in foreign, alien and strange regions, and that is why one urgently needed friends as the main guarantors of one’s own security and safety⁶³⁸. It did not escape and elude him that some exchanging of gifts in fact could serve as a trap in order to kill (off) a foe⁶³⁹; he remained, however, fixed on the leading notion or guiding idea that here it is a matter of a stable and permanent partnership, which rested and was based upon mutuality and reciprocity, that is, clearly defined and ritually sanctioned mutual and reciprocal rights and duties (and obligations)⁶⁴⁰. The functional way of looking at things made up and constituted a vehicle of an idealisation, whilst [[as regards]] the consideration and way of looking at the matter from [[the point of view of]] its

⁶³⁵ See footnote 481 above.

⁶³⁶ *Argonauts*, pp. 83, 95 ff..

⁶³⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 511.

⁶³⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 92.

⁶³⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 292ff..

⁶⁴⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 85.

idealised functional end-stage or final stage, and with the neglect of the genetic factors, he covered over, i.e. masked or concealed the fluctuations and imponderabilities of the social relation, which only by means of the orientation of the description towards incessantly and unremittingly reproducing – or at least imitated – genesis could come into play, stand out and make themselves felt. What brought about and resulted in the mystification in Mauss, was in Malinowski the work of functionalisation⁶⁴¹.

As the fleeting, i.e. passing reference to the “olden days” shows (reveals or suggests), Malinowski describes a present-day stabilised state of affairs, which, moreover, stood and was under the aegis of pacification by means of colonial rule and dominance⁶⁴². The comparative analysis of multiple Kula rings shows, nonetheless, that also this late state of affairs cannot be unified in accordance with functional criteria, and that its local modifications and variations exhibit multiple outcomes, which are not exactly foreseeable⁶⁴³. The – by Malinowski – distinction not made sharply enough between Uvalaku and Kula, and the interpretation of the latter (Kula) against the background of the former (Uvalaku) and not conversely, provide an insight into and understanding of the archeology of Kula, and at the same time, into and of the real dynamic(s) of the social relation⁶⁴⁴. The distinction or differentiation concerns both the extent of the undertaking as well as the degree of intensity of the enmity, because

⁶⁴¹ Mauss attempted to apply his mystical concept(ual plan) of the gift to Kula, see *Le Don*, esp., p. 179, footnote 3, and p. 180ff.. For the critique [[of this]], see footnote 598 above. This critique in regard to the matter must be supplemented by a methodological remark and observation. The assumption and acceptance of a causal interrelation and connection between the exchange of gifts and world-theoretical convictions resembles the obviously and patently absurd deduction of the praxis and practice of ancient trade or war from the principles of polytheism. The practical weight, but also the real function of the ideational in social life are here thoroughly missed. Regarding that, more in the 3rd volume of this work [[TRANSLATOR’S ADDITION (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): Obviously, (groups of) men act and justify their actions ideationally-ideologically. However, language, ideas and ideology are not “exogenous” to man, nor do they “come first” in order to generally and always cause human behaviour and action (every situation must be examined on its own merits). There is constant inter-action and mutual influence between actions and notions, but the latter are impossible without the former, no matter how influential ideas and ideologies can be. After all, and in the final analysis, man (as far as we know with scientific criteria) comes from apes or non-man creatures (with biological needs, passions etc.) and not from the stratosphere or higher (E.g. full-spectrum ZIO-lobotomisation could not have occurred without ZIO-USA’s real world deep-visible state / military, industrial, economic, financial and “soft power” projection strengths compared to other powers since circa WW2 until our days)].

⁶⁴² See not 578, above.

⁶⁴³ Leach, “The kula”, p. 536ff..

⁶⁴⁴ Lenoir, “Les expéditions”, p. 392.

Uvalaku goes back to maritime expeditions for the purpose of the imposition of tribute duties (i.e. obligations to pay tribute) in various forms (in the form of gifts, too); the expeditionary corps (force) did not, of course, proceed, in the course of this, to hostilities straight away, but attempted first of all to achieve and attain its aims through intimidation and browbeating. Kula takes the place of Uvalaku only gradually, i.e. to the extent that communication becomes more dense and condensed, and an equilibrium of forces comes into being, which makes one-sided, i.e. unilateral actions in respect of war more uncertain and more dangerous. Uvalaku then loses its threatening character, and the overcoming of enmity, however, (and) at the same time, the recalling of this enmity, is manifested and finds expression in the corresponding rituals, which simulate the mutual and reciprocal hate and the reconciliation. The ceremony of the Uvalaku reminds us of the ceremony of the conclusion of a peace treaty, but this, with [the passing of] time, is also shortened, and indeed around those formulae, set phrases and acts which were supposed to exorcise the dangers and risks of the enmities⁶⁴⁵. Various folk sayings which relate to the Kula process or procedure speak of the original bond or tie between Kula and war directly, they refer to war alliances as the source of the Kula⁶⁴⁶. Characteristically, the objects, which seal the Kula-alliance immediately and directly gain and attain their highest value after the end of the hostilities. And really, there was good reason to celebrate. Because the Kula-alliance signified the extension and expansion of the prohibition on killing and homicide beyond the boundaries of the community or communal collectivity, something which brought about and led to no slight reduction in enmity within a region, in which the cannibalistic atrocity, savagery and cruelty was traditionally widespread; the Kula partnership meant in fact that the cannibal excluded from his legitimate menu

⁶⁴⁵ *Loc. cit.*, esp. pp. 389, 394ff., 396, 400, 402ff., 405.

⁶⁴⁶ Macintyre, "Kune on Tubetube", p. 376ff..

those with whom he entered into a partnership⁶⁴⁷. But the reduction of enmity towards the outside allowed internal [[i.e. in-group]] conflicts freer rein so that the Kula-expedition and the exchange of gifts itself served the clarification of the power relationships, circumstances and conditions inside of the community or communal collectivity. Whoever showed himself, then, as more skillful, clever and adept, and maintained better relations with foes, was vis-à-vis the others [in his in-group] at an advantage, and he made use of this advantage for personal goals/ends, regardless of the otherwise necessary and required group solidarity. The participants in the expedition competed with one another for the favour of every individual in the alien and foreign community or communal collectivity; consequently the Kula-expedition gained a dimension which differs from the collective peacemaking function by means of its individualistic and conflictual character⁶⁴⁸. Partnerships between the members of different communities aim at strengthening and consolidating the position of the corresponding individual member inside of his own respective community; they (i.e. the said partnerships) are, therefore, concluded ad hoc and often prove to be unstable, since they are subject to the changing of the constellations between the communal collectivities and inside of these same communal collectivities; in any case, the individual member, in the course of this, gets involved and caught up in a many-sided and multifaceted game, and must take decisions of an economic, political, personal etc. character⁶⁴⁹. This conflictual aspect connects and combines Kula and Potlatch, and indeed in a dual respect. In both cases, the conflict constitutes the form of an attenuated war, which does not take place or is not supposed to take place in the future, whereby and in relation to which the absence of war towards the outside is accompanied by the expression, shaping and moulding or clarification of social hierarchies, that is, by an emerging and

⁶⁴⁷ Uberoi, *Politics*, pp. 135, 95ff..

⁶⁴⁸ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 69, 108, 124, 146ff., 160.

⁶⁴⁹ Sh. Campbell, „Kula“, pp. 203, 205.

standing out of the contrasts and oppositions in the inner [realm, domain, sanctum, sphere] of the (collective) community. Potlatch replaces war as a means of measuring the relative wealth and the relative power of two (collective) communities; their (i.e. the said (collective) communities') boundaries are allowed to become visible and accordingly, are allowed to sound out, probe and explore the on both sides (i.e. bilateral) readiness, willingness and preparedness to compromise. Whoever, here, can represent his own (collective) community with the most dignity, deserves also to lead it; a chief(tain) who cannot withstand, endure, overcome and come through the Potlatch-competition/rivalry with regard to another chief(tain), loses his status⁶⁵⁰. Yet through Potlatch it can be determined, ascertained and established inside of the (collective) community who deserves which social rank and position. Everyone is free to set in motion this kind of social competition and rivalry if he wants to direct public attention to his prestige and power claims (i.e. claims in respect of his own prestige and power), and by means of his extravagance and the effort he puts in and makes, he wants to prove he is entitled and has a right to an analogous social status. The expenditure as extravagance has the character of the gift without that being connected to the expectation of a material counter-gift (return gift or gift in return), that is to say, direct or indirect economic considerations are not here crucial and do not play any role⁶⁵¹. Both in and during Potlatch, as well as in and during Kula, even though under – on each and every respective occasion – different presuppositions, preconditions and prerequisites, and with – on each and every respective occasion – different objectives and settings of an aim, the logic of the social relation equally has an effect. With regard to the possibilities of its (i.e. the social relation's) spectrum, gifts and counter-gifts (return gifts or gifts in return) are given; hence, these are and ought not to be comprehended as

⁶⁵⁰ Lenoir, "Potlatch", pp. 248, 253, 258ff..

⁶⁵¹ Barnett, "Potlatch", p. 351ff..

manifestations of an automatism (in respect) of mutuality and reciprocity, which holds together and coheres collectives. That would already stand in the way of the social-ontological importance, significance or status of exchange and of mutuality and reciprocity, which must take place inside of a society and cannot constitute society. That means: exchange and mutuality/reciprocity (as regards gifts) take place against the background of (material and immaterial) goods which are regarded as unexchangeable, as much as the relation between the exchangeable and the unexchangeable may change from society to society and from time to time (i.e. epoch to epoch)⁶⁵².

⁶⁵² Regarding this point, see Weiner, *Inalienable Possessions*; Godelier builds on that, *L'énigme* (p. 232: «pour qu'il ait mouvement, échanges, il faut qu'il existe des choses soustraites à l'échange, des points fixes à partir desquels le reste... puisse tourner, circuler [= for them (i.e. exchanges (/ gifts)) to have movement, things subtracted, withdrawn and excluded from exchange must exist, [in respect] of fixed points from which the rest... can turn, circulate]]») [[TRANSLATOR'S ADDITION (ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.): That means that just as there are always interests and power claims and crystallised power hierarchies etc., so too the inimical half of the social relation cannot be effaced.]]

NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.. DON'T FORGET, THE TRANSLATOR WAS BORN MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND YEARS AGO AND HAS GONE INSANE. DON'T WASTE YOUR TIME READING HIM AND HIS STUPID NOTES (THOUGHTS, COGITATIONS, RUMINATIONS).

ⁱ I.e. social ontology only takes into consideration the inner mechanism of the social relation's formal (not content-related, psychological) course.

ii If one does not have some sort of idea what e.g. a “friend’s” or “foe’s” or “indifferent person’s” position is in regard to one’s own positioning, then one has not an – obviously to many different and varying degrees – a friend or foe or someone indifferent before him, as the case may be (on a case-by-case basis, of course).

iii Don't forget, this is from the point of view of the subjectivity. In actual fact, the social (and the spectrum of the social relation) pre-exist the subjectivity, for there can be no human subjectivities without society and its (previous to this subjectivity) subjectivities.

^{iv} “The Azande (plural of "Zande" in the Zande language) are an ethnic group of North Central Africa. They live primarily in the northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in south-central and southwestern part of South Sudan, and in southeastern Central African Republic.”

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zande_people)

v “Jabo ... is the self-designation of an ethnic group located in the South-Eastern part of the Republic of Liberia in West Africa. They have also sometimes referred to themselves as Gweabo ... or Nimiah tribe.”

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jabo_people)

^{vi} The German text does not have a “nicht” = “not”. Given the context, one could agree with the Greek translator Λευτέρης Ἀναγνώστου (who includes a «δὲν» = “not”) that the text was supposed to include a “not”.

Alternatively, the clause/phrase could read: “it (the said knowledge) can (potentially, but no definitely) constitute in itself a reason for interaction”. On the other hand, the clause/phrase also makes sense as it is, because we are talking about constituting a **reason** for (inter)action and **not** constituting actual (inter)action.

[illegible]

viii Obviously, we all know by now which particular group of humans in particular benefitted from this state of affairs in a particular country which dominated much of the world scene for much of the 20th century (and beyond, though...).

^{ix} ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ-ΗΑΗΑΗΑΗΑΗΑΗΑΗΑ!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Καὶ ὁ νοῶν, νοεῖτω!

^x The Greek translator states “more objective”, which in German would mean „Objektiverem“ rather than „Subjektiverem“ as provided by the German text. Given the overall context, there is probably more than a possibility that the Greek translator is right and the German text as is, is presented in error as regards the word in question, though on the other hand “more subjective” is actually more objective than “most subjective”, and it could very well be that the German text is correct as it is.

^{xi} ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ-ΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗ!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Καὶ ὁ νοῶν, νοεῖτω!

xii Obviously, for there to be a dominant ideology and false consciousness in existence, through and behind which lie concrete interests of concrete, specific groups of people (including cases of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations, concentrations and crystal(lisation)s of forms of elite-level Power and

sociology and elite academia in ZIO-USA had to wait before it “really got going” from c. 1960/1970 (grosso modo = the after Talcott Parsons dominance period), with the likes of Erving Goffman, who as far as I can tell and know, was a significant thinker and worthy of serious study and consideration (and the Satanic Super Trio of Horkheimer-Adorno-Marcuse, because of their Marxist background and their comparatively broad learning, also have their analytical value, and not just their Satanic value). The “Circus”, though, took off with the Arch-ZIO-JOO-Satanist DER-RI-DA and those of the FREAK SHOW around him, who “de-constructed” everything Western except as it “just happens” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of ZIO-JOO (HEBROO-JUDAS-MAMMON) power and wealth centred in the key former and current Imperialist Centres of ZIO-UK, ZIO-France and ZIO-USA (the non-JOO Poofster Foucault had some analytical, albeit limited value, whereas the JOOs Durkehim, Simmel, Löwith, Kantorowicz, Aron, even L. Strauss, are either worthy of not insignificant respect up to being ALL-TIME SUPER LEGENDS, notwithstanding some very serious flaws). It goes without saying that the Greatest of the Greats in terms of modern Western sociology include Montesquieu, Ferguson, Marx, Pareto, Weber, Mannheim et al., who were mostly not of the Ultimate EXTREMIST HATE TRIBE of the Joos (Judas-Mammon-ZIO-HEBROO-Excrement-POO-Faeces-DUNG (= seen as a subjective Matter of Taste in relation to the Objective Fact of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ZIO-JOO-MAMMON-DEVIL-EVIL-EVIL-DEVIL-SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY-HEBROO-JUDAS forms of power and wealth, including through Primitive Secret Society networking and centuries in Banking, Finance and later Corporations at elite level etc.).

xxxvi **AAAAAA-**
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!
!!

xxxvii For P.K. to call Norbert Elias (22 June 1897 – 1 August 1990) a “sociologist” it means at the very least he had some respect of him, and more than likely had a lot of respect for him, as he should have, because Elias might have been ZIO-JOO filth (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste), but his work overall has definite value when compared to the “post-modern” Excrement-“icons” of ZIO-USA c. 1970 and later.

xxxviii “Sc.”, abbreviation for “scilicet”, Latin for “it is permitted to know”, which means, depending on the context, something like: “namely”, “that is to say”, “to wit”, “which is”, or “as follows”.

xxxix **AAAAAA-**
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!
!!

^{xl} This is exactly what Brain-Washing and (FULL-SPECTRUM) Lobotomisation want to do, whether ZIO-centric or ZIO-biassed or otherwise ZIO-inclined or not, and can never ever do all of the time and forever, no matter how relatively and or apparently successful during particular historical conjunctures.

^{xli} For whatever reason, P.K. consulted the German translation of Mead’s *Mind, Self and Society* and I can’t be bothered finding what Mead’s exact English terminology is, so if there is any reader “out there” you will have to do your own research in regard to Mead’s actual words and phrasing, because I’m translating into English from the German, rather than finding out what Mead’s actual wording and phrasing was.

^{xlii} V. Mises, Radcliff-Brown, Coser, Dahrendorf, P. Blau, Luhmann, Vierkandt, Schütz, Gurvitch, Sorokin, McIver-Page, Bales, Shils, Lipset (six out of these 14 (mostly, but not all) monkeys are JOOS! Fucking HELL!).

^{xliii} **AAAAAA-**
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!
!!

^{xliv} This has very significant implications for how “equality” and “racism” and “sexism” and “human dignity” and “good manners” and “-phobia this” and “anti-that” etc. are interpreted, and what content-related definitions they are given ... Satan, Satan, Monkey, Monkey ... Satanic Circus Monkey ... Satan, Satan, Monkey, Monkey ... Satanic Circus Monkey ... Satan, Satan, Monkey, Monkey ... Satanic Circus Monkey ...

^{xlv} **AAAAAA-**
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!
!!

^{xlvi} **AAAAAA-**
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!
!!

^{xlvii} This is exactly what Satanic Circus Monkey people think is going to happen “just because they say so”, etc..

^{xlviii} Unless I’m mistaken, this could well be a reference to, inter alia, Locke.

^{xlix} The references here are to “keeping up appearances” and being “right and proper”, but actually “trying to get away, or getting away, with other shit (of an egotistical, self-interested nature)” etc..

ⁱ I could very easily say that Husserl was a “typical JOO”, here, but he was obviously one of the more significant Jooish (ZIO, Judas, Devil-Evil-Evil-Devil, etc.) thinkers, though I don’t know enough about him to say with certainty that he was semi-great, quasi-great, almost great, or simply interesting, but not great; though, I do have a strong feeling that he was probably semi-great.

^{li} I call them “English-American-Zionised FOUL MEN (and assorted Protestant-Papist-Atheist COCK-SUCKERS)” = same difference.

^{lii} Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884); Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).

^{liii} It is exactly the psycho-pathologising by absolutely Maniacal and Psychopath (absolutely insane and rabid-for-power) JOOs and ZIO-Excrement in General, particularly in ZIO-USA (ZIO-UK, ZIO-FRANCE, ZIO-GERMANY), along with their many allies and FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISED STOOGES, which characterises the inability of the Retarded JOO and his retarded friends to understand the actions of a historical leader in the circumstances of the various relations, forces etc. pressuring him in order for him a) to remain in power himself, but also b) to keep his nation and or state and or group in the best possible position regarding other states, nations or groups. We all know that Stalin, Hitler and Mao were responsible for the suffering and deaths of tens of millions, but to put such behaviour down to “evil” or “insanity” is a sure sign that the “analyst or historian” writing in those terms has not the slightest ability to understand the circumstances and relations of the unfolding of history and that in all those three cases the actions of up to hundreds of years of (industrial-)capitalistic parliamentary imperialisms are crucial factors in bringing about the actions of the aforesaid tyrants. It’s very easy to present Churchill and FDR as comparative “angels” when the very dirty work of capitalist-imperialist-incl. ZIO accumulation of forms of power and wealth went on in various ways and manners and to various degrees for up to hundreds of years prior to their reigns, including the up-root, de-root displacement, super-exploitation and (premature) deaths of tens and tens and tens of millions of peasants and proletarians (+

lxxviii

[illegible]

lxix

A

[illegible]

lxxx

[illegible]

1xxx

[illegible]

1xx:

lxxxii

[illegible]

(and this is precisely why nearly all “professors, doctors and pundits” watch what they say, even if they are fully aware of “what is actually, (*Satan, Satan, Monkey, Monkey, Satanic Circus Monkey*), going on” ...) ...

1xxx

lxxxv

lxxxv

[illegible]

lxxxvii

[illegible]

This is precisely the framework for public discourse under all regimes. The difference is that the ANGLO-ZIO-USA “democratic” oligarchic-plutocratic model normally allows a higher degree of freedom of speech at the level where GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ZIO-JOO-POO WEALTH AND POWER IS NOT DISCUSSED AND AFFECTED ON A MASS SCALE (EVEN THOUGH UP TO MANY A PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY-MONEY-TAX-CRIME-HONEY TRAP-SLANDER-LOSE-YOUR-JOB-ETC. ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO SHUT UP EVEN SMALL SCALE “DISSENTING VOICES”), WHEREAS A MORE AUTHORITARIAN AND DICTATORIAL REGIME HAS THE DISCRETION TO MORE READILY IMPRISON, TORTURE AND OR EXTERMINATE ANY “THOUGHT-OPPOSITION” BY “NIPPING THINGS IN THE BUD”, SO TO SPEAK, OFTEN IN A FAR MORE RAW AND BRUTAL MANNER.

lxxxviii

[illegible]

lxxxix

[illegible]

^{xc} The Greek translator of P.K.'s text, Λεβτέρης Αναγνώστου (Lefteris Anagnostou), explains "formal pragmatics" as "the use of signs by the communicators or interlocutors" («χρήση τῶν σημείων ἀπὸ τοῦς ἐπικοινωνοῦντες») at p. 555 of the Greek translation of *Das Politische und der Mensch* (= S. 418).

^{xc1} This, inter alia, refers to “mainstream political discourse” and how it frames the acceptable and “rational” parameters for public and political discourse, and in our case in the former “West”, the Christian God is now replaced by the Holy Satanic Circus Monkey JOO, as if this vile excrement poo faeces dung filth were “chosen, special, exceptional, of a **ZIO-COST SATAN TENT HOUSE OF SATAN** master race with The Bacon on the Hill” under FREAK-SHOW MULTI- KULTI **DIE**-VERSIFY EXTREME GENOCIDAL SELF-RACIST, SELF-PHOBIC, SELF-HATING **ZIO-JOO**-PRIVILEGE, **ZIO-JOO**-SUPREMACY DIVIDE AND RULE, DIVIDE AND CONQUER PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY DEEP STATE CORPORATIONS-BANKS-FUNDS-TRUSTS-MASS MEDIA/ENTERTAINMENT-BRAIN WASHING-LOBOTOMISING-LOBBYING-TAX-CRIME-ETC., ETC., ETC. circumstances of totally **grossly disproportionate** **ZIO-JOO** HATE of **ZIO-USA** cultural and military “HUMAN RIGHTS-DEMOCRACY” imperialism and hegemony, etc..

xcii **AAAAAA-**

[illegible]

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

xciii Like everything in the Anglo-American capitalistic world, before DA JOOS were allowed to GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY take over the running of things, the English and Anglo-Americans themselves had developed the institutions and or philosophy-related thinking etc. upon which DA JOO PARASITE FLEA LEECH VULTURE VOMIT ANIMAL CANCER latched.

xciv **AAAAAA-**

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

AAAAAA-

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

AAAAAA-

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

[illegible]

^{xcv} I note that P.K. does not refer to “democracy” here.

xvii It's like DA SUPER "PHILOSOPHA" **JOO**, **JOO**-REE-DA OR JO-DATH JOOTLA et al. saying that "I am going to DE/JOO-CONSTRUCT "everything"", apart from **GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE JOO**-ISH,

1108

^{xcix} In classical rhetoric and logic, **begging the question** is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it. It is a type of circular reasoning: an argument that requires that the desired conclusion be true. This often occurs in an indirect way such that the fallacy's presence is hidden, or at least not easily apparent. In modern vernacular usage, however, begging the question is often used to mean "raising the question" or "suggesting the question". Sometimes it is confused with "dodging the question", an attempt to avoid it. The phrase begging the question originated in the 16th century as a mistranslation of the Latin **petitio principii**, which actually translates to "assuming the initial point". (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question).

**АААААА-
НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!
!!**

^{cxi} Theodor Litt (* 27. Dezember 1880 in Düsseldorf; † 16. Juli 1962 in Bonn) war ein deutscher Kultur- und Sozialphilosoph und Pädagoge. Litt entwickelte in der Auseinandersetzung mit Dilthey, Simmel und Cassirer einen eigenständigen Ansatz in der Kulturphilosophie und philosophischen Anthropologie, der von der dialektischen Sicht des Verhältnisses von Individuum und Gesellschaft, Mensch und Welt, Vernunft und Leben bestimmt war. Zugleich projizierte er diese Gedanken in eine geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik, die ihren Ausgangspunkt in der Reformpädagogik zu Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts hatte und über Litts Schüler Klafki bis

[illegible]

cxlix

[illegible]

cl

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!

cli

cli

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!

cli

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!

cli

[illegible]

clv

clv

clv

clviii It's very easy to talk about what is "rational" and "reasonable" and "logical" when your side **grossly disproportionately** controls the overall context and correlation of forces !!!

clx Given how susceptible he is to FULL-SPECTRUM **ZIO**-OR NON-**ZIO**-LOBOTOMISATION/BRAIN WASHING.

clxiii Obviously, the discussion here is at the most abstract-general level. We are not here e.g. discussing M-C-M capitalism and the grossly disproportionate role of Jews for varied historical and organisational (legal and criminal) reasons in controlling the circulation of money through capitalism-imperialism and the deep-visible centralising state, though, a telling reference to surplus value (Mehrwert) was made earlier in this sub-section, which, of course, implies the (super-)exploitation of labour, usury, rent collection, “skimming” i.e. stealing taxpayer’s money through controlling the deep-visible state, as well as in and through charities, and in the underworld (drugs etc.), whilst also controlling monopolies/oligopolies and “the free market” through governmental business administration and tax (and law enforcement), in addition to full-spectrum ZIO-lobotomisation brain-washing of the masses, creating the consumptive/emotional “needs” and life-stances of the masses, etc., etc., etc..

^{cxliv} This all leads to, as we shall see immediately, the fact that mutual-reciprocal relations (whether asymmetrical or (less frequently) symmetrical, or one of asymmetrical/symmetrical becoming the other) between two parties are not necessarily a matter of “distributive justice” and proportionality as meant by Aristotle (inclusive of inequality) and Aristotle’s ZIO-ANGLO-ET AL.-JOQ-ideological (retarded or semi-retarded) interpreters. In other words, depending on the situation and who has what power and what he does with that relative power, relations (and their “balance/equilibrium/equilibria”) are “adjusted” accordingly.

[illegible]

**AAAAAA-
НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!
!!**

[illegible]

cLxx AAAAAAAAA-
НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!
!!

**AAAAAAAA-
НННННННННННННННННА!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!**

[illegible]

[illegible][illegible]

A

^{clxxxii} In other words, the relationship between values and stimuli depends on the situation and the point of view from which the observer is looking at things. Reality does not and cannot generally fit within any kind of ideologically charged and loaded “behaviouristic” or any other kind of ideologically charged and loaded schema or theory.

[illegible][illegible]

1116

clxxxvii **AAAAAA-**

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!

clxxxviii How fucking **ZIO**-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-**JOO** CONVENIENT !!! !!! !!!

AAAAAA-

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!

clxxxix As ideology.

^{cxc} When we all know (given we are not FULL-SPECTRUM **ZIO**-LOBOTMISED) that “da whole ding iz one **GREAT SATAN grossly disproportionately ZIO-CONTROLLED** asymmetry ov orgiez ov **ZIO-ANGLO-GERMANO-GALLO-ET AL.-JOO SUPREMACY-RACISM-PRIVILEGE AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN EXTREMIST TERRORISTIC HATE**”.

xcxi That's one Austrian/German, one Pole of aristocratic descent and one French **JOQ**, with Lévi-Strauss another FROG-**JOQ**, so again, less than 1% of Europe's total population makes up 2 in 4 (50%) !!! of the major ethnologists. SO BE FUCKING IT ... **AAAAA-HAHAHAHAHA !!!!!!!!!!!!!**

^{cxcii} Because structuralism's “godfather” was a ***JOO*** and ***ZIO***-USA and the last of the ***ZIO***-West was ***grossly***

disproportionately under **JOOZ** !!! **AAAAAA-**

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!!

cxci **AAAAAA-**

НАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНАНА!!!!!!!!!!

!!

^{exciv} That sounds very pre-JOO-ie JOO-ie to me !!! **AAAAAAA-**

[illegible]

^{CXCV} When da ***ZIO-ANTI-CHRIST-SATANIST-JOOZ*** possess ***GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE*** wealth and

power going back centuries, why would he? **AAAAAA-**

[illegible]

cxvii **AAAAAA-**

[illegible]

cxcvii **AAAAAA-**

[illegible]

^{cxcviii} Given the history and progress of toxic femino-faggotisation in the West in the 20th century, all one can say

is : **AAAAAA-**

[illegible]

excix I.e. Lévi-Strauss's approach is wrong: war can arise because exchange is not agreed upon, and is not necessarily avoided because of exchange.

^{cc} Obviously, of the opposite sex.

^{cc} This does not mean that “in the (Hobbesian) state of nature” there is permanent war between men, but that in lands where European colonial rule took hold, the regular warring between “savage / primitive” tribes, eventually, came to an end, given that such tribes were wiped out or severely restricted in terms of their movement and power.

ccii This all means that there is no original or perpetual state of (peaceful) exchange or state of war, that both war and exchange can and do occur in societies (at least potentially and regardless of incidence rate), and that each and every concrete situation must be examined concretely and specifically without ideological / normative-ethical assumptions.

cciii **AAAAAA-**

[illegible]cciv **AAAAAA-**[illegible]

^{ccv} This is very different to the “altruist” putting on **ZIO**-American dollar-imperialist-primitive secret society and savage tribe-organised criminal and kleptocrat-based theatrical freak show for very obvious “his such a good person” **ZIO**-ANGLO-ET AL.-**JOO**-ideological-**Great Fucking Satan**–“let’s brain wash and pull the wool over the eyes of and stooge the masses”-etc.-reasons.