

Die Entstehung der Dialektik

The coming into being / genesis of (the) dialectic(s)

Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung
von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802

An analysis of the intellectual-spiritual development (evolution)
of Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel (up) to / until 1802

Von / By

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Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1979

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BARBARIAN IDIOM BARBARIAN IDIOT

For G. T.

καὶ ὁ προστιθεὶς γνῶσιν προσθήσει ἄλγημα

ΕΚΚΛΗΣ. 1,18

and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.

(King James version, 1611)

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Foreword / Prologue

The thesis pertaining to the history of philosophy of this work can be summarised / summed up as follows. The dialectic(s) by Hegel (Hegel's dialectics), having become known and since then connected with his (Hegel's) name, comes / came into being on/in regard to the foundation / basis of a monistic world view, or else, of an (association, union) philosophy (of unification), which, for its part, absorbs / absorbed (into itself) strongly monistic approaches of the late German Enlightenment and simultaneously feels / felt compelled, forced to intensively confront, deal with the questions, problems as regards the theory of knowledge raised, posed, posited, set, put by Kant and Fichte. This (association, union) philosophy (of unification), and indeed in a comprehensive and systematic form, is the product of Hölderlin's autonomous, independent, self-reliant, self-contained intellectual (thought) endeavour, effort in the years 1795—1799. Schelling, informed about the new path taken by his friend [[i.e. Hölderlin]] at the end of 1795, undertook or else discovered (detected, spotted, discerned) himself, in / on the roundabout path of his personal confrontation with Fichte, the questionable, doubtful (association, union) philosophy (of unification) in the years 1799—1802, in order for it (the said (association, union) philosophy (of unification)) to simultaneously be converted, transformed, transmuted into a programmatically conceived construction resting / based on the/a schema of triplicity. Hegel's contribution to the formation, development of this first, but groundbreaking, pathbreaking, pioneering, revolutionary form of (the) dialectic(s) must be considered as minimal, if one would want to accept such a thing/thesis at all. Because his (i.e. Hegel's) Frankfurt writings represent and constitute an explication and application of the principles of Hölderlinian (association, union) philosophy (of unification), whereas / whilst his earlier Jena(ean) treatises receive(d) the version of the same Schellingian (association, union) philosophy (of unification) formed, developed in the meantime / meanwhile. Hegel's autonomous, independent, self-contained, self-reliant philosophical development, which also had important consequences for the form of (the) dialectic(s), begins only/first after 1802, and indeed with the decision that the absolute / Absolute is knowable or else the substance / Substance is the/a subject / Subject – a decision, which means/signifies the/a break with the common conviction of Hölderlin and Schelling, which Hegel likewise, also shared, that the absolute / Absolute is unknowable or

knowledge or else/and thought is (are) per definitionem separation and abstraction.

The essential new points of this thesis are three (There are three essential new points in this thesis). First of all, the unity, uniformity, consistency and consciously systematic character of Hölderlin's philosophical thought is described in detail / extensively, so that his influence on Schelling and Hegel can be / is made understandable in detail, but also can be shown in its whole depth. Secondly, against the widely dominant assumption of a turn / change of course by Schelling after 1803, the, -despite all more or less important shifts in tone-, existing continuity of his intellectual-spiritual development (evolution) is asserted – a continuity which not least of all goes back / is reduced to the striking, conspicuous, noticeable structural similarity which exists between Hölderlin's (association, union) philosophy (of unification) received by Schelling or else Hölderlin's newly discovered (association, union) philosophy (of unification) and his (Schelling's) later "positive philosophy" (the great common denominator is the thesis of the unknowability of the absolute / Absolute or else of the immanent, never to be overcome, transcended, surpassed negativity of thought). And thirdly, contrary to the unanimously prevailing, dominant, ruling, albeit differently justified, founded, perception, view that Hegel's thought is characterized by organic continuity, a radical break in its development, evolution is ascertained, identified.

This new thesis arises / results from a process ((methodical) procedure) which is new in a double, dual, twin regard. First, all texts of all three friends and jointly/commonly philosophising thinkers are analysed i.e. as an intellectual-spiritual unity, and indeed at the same time chronologically and systematically. Also, the thinkers, who influenced our heroesⁱ positively or negatively, from Schiller, Rousseau and Jacobi up to Kant and Fichte, are treated in excurses / digressions, which are supposed / ought to shed light on / illuminate the deeper contexts / interrelations pertaining to the history of ideas and [[relevant]] philosophical interrelations / contexts. It is obvious that with such a method(ological) option, choice, the/a confrontation, discussion, debate with (regard to) the sources must have the absolute primacy, priority, precedence, even though for (vis-à-vis) all important positions or else counter-positions in the older and newer secondary literature, a position is taken mostly directly, but also indirectly. Secondly, the sought-after, desired philological completeness, which even / also makes the relatively great, large extent, scope of this work unavoidable / inevitable, means / signifies no coming to a standstill at / in the philological process ((methodical) procedure) or else at / in the ascertainment of commonalities with the help / on the basis of identical (homonymous, conforming) passages. Rather, textual comparison occurs primarily

structurally, i.e. by (means of), through the form-related, formal processing of / working on the thought (intellectual) construct, which must / necessarily emerge(s) from a certain thought (intellectual) style. This structural way of looking at things here enables, makes possible for the first time detailed comparisons between texts like for instance Hölderlin's Hyperion and Hegel's Frankfurt Sketches or Shelling's later Jena Writings and Hegel's early Jena treatises. Previous / Former approaches to such comparisons hardly, barely remain fertile, productive, because they are restricted / limited above all to the indication of (selected) passages (already sought out) without i.e. studying structurally textual totalities as intellectual / thought totalities.

In terms of genre, this work belongs to the dinosaurs of textual scholastic scholarship, which flourish, thrive, prosper in Alexandrian timesⁱⁱ, in order to die shortly thereafter / afterwards. Nevertheless, its ambition remains, via results pertaining to the history of philosophy, to provide an insight into the process of the coming into being / genesis of philosophemes of a certain type, which were (had / have been) decisive, determinative for the / a previous, former philosophical tradition. It will be shown how a systematic thinking as the rationalisation of a basic / fundamental stance or decision (is) gradually crystallises (crystallised), and indeed in endeavouring / striving to argumentatively defeat counter-positions. It will moreover be described how, in the course of this, the interweaving of Is and Ought in the thought of the philosophising thinkers is reflected / expressed in the ontologisation of postulates of a normative-moral character, which, as it were, represent and constitute the axis around which the existing system revolves. The inclusion of the existential situation of the thinkers concerned in the understanding / cognitive analysis is near, close to / obvious in such a way of looking at things and must lead to the discussion of psychological and sociological factors. This indication of the concrete situation / position, in which fundamental / basic stances are moulded, shaped, formed, is supposed / ought to refute, confute, prove wrong, falsify the widespread, far-ranging / wide-ranging equation, equating, identification of the basic/fundamental stance or else decision and chaotic imponderability and incalculability. Basic / Fundamental stances or else decisions can be at least partially explained genetically both with psychological-sociological means as well as be pursued, followed, tracked purely logically-structurally in their intellectual unfolding, development. Because, once present, a basic / fundamental decision has its logic, which, seen in terms of form, is subject / subjugated / subordinated to the laws of the logic in general. Also, / Even under the above-mentioned method(ological) presuppositions, therefore, that which one, -

assuming / presupposing the higher logicity of philosophy-, is accustomed to call / usually calls / names “philosophical analysis”, is not neglected / does not come up short. But what lies beyond the possibilities of (“philosophical”) logic is exactly the founding, establishing, substantiation, giving of reasons, justification of (for) the content of the basic / fundamental stance or else decision — and that is what mattersⁱⁱⁱ. We shall see that fundamental / basic principles like “all / everything is good” or “all / everything is rational (reasonable, sensible)” were *constitutive* for the thought of the founders of (the) dialectic(s), and I can hardly, barely imagine that someone would want to seriously make such theses out / appear to be not decisions, but for instance “discoveries”^{iv}. The reader will judge, evaluate how far these general thoughts, considerations, reflections, deliberations can be confirmed by our text(ual) analysis. In any case / After all, the validity, soundness of the results pertaining purely to the history of philosophy summarised at the beginning is independent of whether the above-mentioned considerations, thoughts, reflections, deliberations are considered / held to be / regarded as correct, well-aimed or else taken into consideration / account or not.

The -in the narrower sense- social-theoretical side of the early work of Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel is treated in this work marginally / peripherally / on the margins / in the periphery / at the fringes. This happened not only for understandable (space, spatial) reasons (as regards space), but above all for the reason (in respect) of the conviction gained, won in the course of a long exposure to (association with) these texts, that the birthplace, place of birth of the dialectical structures lies not in the social-theoretical [aspect, dimension], but in the metaphysical [aspect, dimension]. I could prove that social-theoretical perceptions of our heroes, seen structurally / in terms of structure, can be deduced, derived from the schema of their metaphysics and follow the latter in its occasional modifications. This proof could in the framework / context of this work, overlooking / disregarding some examples, not be provided thoroughly / extensively enough, because the complete, full, total understanding of the aforementioned perceptions presupposes clear and (social-historically founded) concepts (founded in terms of societal history in respect) of conservatism, liberalism and democracy^v, which, for their part, require, demand, necessitate, call for investigations of a(n) entirely, totally, completely different kind than those undertaken here. With very few exceptions, the philosophical discussion of recent years, which, as is (well-)known, almost exclusively referred to Hegel, has been characterised by conceptual unclarity in (regard) to this central question / problem [[of social history]], and because of this / accordingly, it, despite valuable / worthwhile contributions in detail / as to details (individual / in-part aspects), does not

provide the self-evident foundation of / for further research. That the lack in a concrete first-hand education, culture, formation pertaining to the history of society sometimes makes up / constitutes an important source of inspiration of / for philosophers active in social theory / the theory of society(,) should be known at least to non-philosophers^{vi}.

The assertion (claim) of the primacy of metaphysics in the dialectical thought structure does not stand / is not in any contradiction towards / vis-à-vis / with regard to the indication of the meaning of factors pertaining to the history of society and psychological factors for its (i.e. the dialectical thought structure's) coming into being / genesis. Above all, the neo-Marxist interpretation rests / is based on the confusion of the (right, correct) ascertainment of the influence of social-political factors on the kind of thought / mindset of the post-Kantians with (regard to) the (false) assumption that this would have first or primarily, mainly developed, formed in the field of social theory. Against that, it is valid to say / On the other hand, it must be argued that impulses, impetuses, which in the final analysis / ultimately are of social-political origin, at least in the philosophical (or for instance in the theological) area, realm find expression / manifest themselves / are reflected not primarily or not necessarily in autonomous and autarchic positions pertaining to the theory of society / soci(et)al theory, although their objective social-political relevance often flows into / end (up) in social-theoretical statements, propositions. Our thesis, that dialectics is a metaphysical construction, does not therefore at all aim at a brave defence of the philosophical spirit of the nobility against its supposed, presumed degradation, belittling, downgrading, disparagement, depreciation, devaluation by the proof of its multifarious, multiple, many-faceted social dependence – and yet / nevertheless it is to / must be assumed that the way in which the above-mentioned thesis is justified, substantiated here will not satisfy precisely those who indeed flirt with Marxism as long as they believe they are hearing the voice of their own heart in its emancipatory message, but who try, attempt to somehow go around / circumvent the strict sociological aspect and aspect critical of ideology of the work of Marx, since precisely in it (i.e. Marx's work) they scent, smell, sniff a danger / risk for “philosophy” as emancipatory theory with a claim to absolute truth (cf. footnote, p. 187 [[German ed.]], below). — It will be asserted, claimed, contended here, in any case, that the individual and social constellation in which the dialectic comes into being / is born, initially pushed for / towards the sketching, outlining, planning of a metaphysical schema, and that the opinion, statement, comment on each and every respective occasion vis-à-vis questions, problems pertaining to the theory of society / social theory or social-political questions, problems took

place or else corresponded structurally to it (the said schema) from the point of view of this schema. Said otherwise / In other words: certain concrete situations make the primacy of the metaphysical before / over / vis-à-vis the social-theoretical, i.e. that which pertains to the theory of society, in the ideational realm, area very likely, probable, although this area, realm in itself — at least for profane, secular eyes — belongs to the social and not to the metaphysical (dimension, sphere). This is actually not new, and no Marxist would dispute, contest that exactly this was / had (has) been the case with (regard to) the great theological or metaphysical systems of the pre-industrial past.

The wish to make out of (the) dialectic(s) an exception (exceptional case) springs from ideological needs / requirements. For the Marxists, it was (has) always (been) a theoretical annoyance (irritation, offence) that (the) dialectic(s) saw / caught sight of / espied / perceived the light of day precisely within that much-lamented German “misery”, whose ideological superstructure, in accordance with the orthodox schema, was (exactly) not allowed to shine (precisely) through / by means of progressivity, progressiveness and modernity. Did the “algebra of the revolution / Algebra of the Revolution” smell of the Tübingen Stift^{vii} (to remind us of Nietzsche) or else was the leader of liberation none other than the priest of the absolute spirit, “turned upside down / made to stand on his head” (the admitted boldness of the act lay exactly in the paradox of the situation) and hastily dressed in a red robe? During the theoretical predominance of German social democracy, the / this embarrassing (painful, awkward, distressing) question / problem was displaced by the far-reaching, wide(spread), extensive, to a great/large extent convergence, approximation, drawing near(er) of Marxism to positivist(ic)-scientist(ic) positions(;) but / however it (the said embarrassing question / awkward problem) had to be posed / asked / put / posited / set / addressed acutely as soon as the rediscovery of the Hegelian roots of Marx's teaching(s) / doctrine(s) / theory(,) accompanying / which accompanied the existentialist movement(,) became apparent / announced (manifested) themselves. Lukács saw / recognised / had insight into and comprehended the theoretical dilemma, that the progressiveness, progressivity of (the) dialectics in the Marxist sense could be of service only through / by means of the proof of its coming into being / genesis, not merely out of a “progressive” positioning / stance, but above all out of / from the confrontation with the most modern question formulations. This task, job, mission was particularly urgent, imperative, pressing, compelling, exigent after 1933(,) when important aspects of (the) Hegelian body of thought / intellectual corpus / ideas was threatened / in danger of being “usurped” by national-socialistic or else right-wing

tendencies; Marcuse's rescue of Hegel / the saving (salvaging) of Hegel by Marcuse, undertaken simultaneously with, and independently of, Lukács, bears witness to / is evidence (testimony) of this^{viii}. For the general ideological function and importance of this deduction, derivation of (the) dialectics from / out of "the greatest achievements of its time", the fact is most eloquent that it ((the) dialectic(s)) (though/admittedly: reduced to its existential component) found entrance, access, acceptance as the only / sole / single of all (intellectual) accomplishments (achievements, feats, performances) (in/of thought) of – otherwise treated / handled with suspicion or else contempt – neo-Marxism in the Orthodoxy of the Eastern Block too / as well.

We cannot here investigate (examine, explore) the reason for which the neo-Marxist interpretation in [[its]] various / different variations owes its spread(ing) in the course of / over the last few / recent years, so that it could even tamper with, captivate (bribe, corrupt) the irresistible persuasiveness of fashion / the fashionable. It is also not worth going into its (the neo-Marxist interpretation of dialectics') source-based/related foundation / founding, especially since even Lukács's warmest friends have never publicly praised, extolled his philological conscientiousness, scrupulousness. To underline / emphasise is only an elementary — albeit / even though obviously, apparently not generally as such known — fact^{ix}. When the insight of the young Hegel into the contradictions of capitalist(ic) society is vaunted, praised and its fertility, fruitfulness for (the) dialectics is asserted, then namely it is not taken into consideration / account that the young Hegel's explications, explanations concerning this —((what is) meant here are the – for the coming into being of (the) dialectics – critical / crucial years 1798—1803, in which Hegel represents perceptions, views as to social theory / the theory of society, which, for instance, his Bernese^x political convictions structurally and in terms of content precisely contradict — something, though, which closely / narrowly interconnects with the in the meanwhile radical philosophical-metaphysical reorientation carried out / undertaken / executed (in respect) of his thought)— to a great / large extent / for the most part are a(n) takeover, taking over, undertaking, modification or further development of commonplaces of the noble / aristocratic-conservative critique of early capitalism. Lamentations, Complaints about the industrial division of labour or else about "mechanical work / labour" in regard to the consequences of the "essence / substance / nature / character of man"; warnings about the appearance of a proletariat dangerously splitting, dividing, splicing social unity and pity, compassion with (regard) to / for its (the proletariat's) fate/lot; resisting / resistance against the general, not only estate-based / class

differences, but allegedly also the “vital / living / vibrant / exuberant variety, diversity” of leveling legislation, which must be connected with an also united-impersonal bureaucratic state apparatus: all the basic / fundamental motifs of this critique of culture / cultural criticism(, which is) still so explosive, volatile today under the most diverse circumstances / various signs (types, kinds), is thus (can) already (be) found in J. Möser and then in Novalis, A. Müller and Fr. Baader (to stay/remain/mention (with) Germans only), and originally, initially represent and constitute an ideological sublimation of the power position / position as regards power or else of the power claim of the patriarchal landowner, who feels threatened in his existence by the dissolution of *societas civilis* by (means of / through) the modern state on the one hand, and modern industry, on the other hand. This early organicist(ic) conservatism had dissolved, broken up still / even before the death, dying (out), perishing of the nobility (aristocracy) as a socially relevant group (and indeed forever: today’s / present-day attempts to revive it (i.e. the said organicist conservatism) as a programme spring from a particular kind of intellectual-spiritual coquetry amongst apologists of the right wing of liberalism^{xi} and are not to be taken at (their) face value). Their argumentative arsenal remains since the time / age of Restoration^{xii} freely available and was in certain situations also/even used by the radical-democratic or else socialistic movement^{xiii} for its own anti-capitalistic purposes, ends, goals (I recall / recollect / remind ourselves only of the influence of Carlyle’s critique of capitalism on the young Engels), which, though, by no means implies that its meaning in this regard was constitutive, although it can be easily be seen / it is easy to see which / what form the ideal of the folk / popular / national community, the perception of the unified, united natural man / man of nature and, and not least of all, the historicist approaches intertwined with all this have taken within the intellectual-spiritual construct of Marxism(,) next to / alongside / beside in part radically heterogeneous elements. The striking, conspicuous, noticeable commonalities pertaining to the critique of culture / cultural criticism between Rousseauism and organicist(ic) conservatism in the 18th century are exactly a harbinger, precursor, herald, presage of the above-mentioned later appearance (occurrence, phenomenon) — and the same constellation can *mutatis mutandis* also explain the “understanding” which some modern “conservatives” would like to offer (bring) to the critique of culture / cultural criticism of the New Left. However, as just indicated, these conservatives are all too closely entangled with the industrial bourgeoisie to be able to raise the long-buried and rotten, decomposed, moulded flag/banner of (the) *societas civilis* again/anew. The original / initial noble/aristocratic-conservative critique of culture and the interconnected / interrelated with that plans, designs, outlines, sketches of an “organic

community” on a new basis are accordingly / because of that nowadays / in our times mainly spun / woven further by a politically homeless intelligentsia, whose utopian dreams or else concrete ambitions have no prospects of realisation either in the framework of late capitalism or in that framework of real / actual / extant [[Soviet/Chinese etc.]] socialism. So strange (odd, weird, bizarre) — and so instructive (informative, educational, salutary) — can the fate (destiny, lot) of ideas be.

The indication of / reference to the early conservative origins / provenance of Hegel’s critique of capitalism does *not* mean that Hegel (above all after 1803) was a conservative in the sense of A. Müller or [[as]] Fr. Baader (remained [[a conservative]]), but only that his anti-capitalist(ic) theses in themselves were not capable of founding, establishing any “progressivity” of (the) dialectic(s) in the sense of the Marxist schema of the ascending, ascendant, rising, soaring motion, movement of history. This optical illusion comes into being only because noble / aristocratic conservatives and socialist(ic) anti-capitalism are confused with each other on account of the commonality of some leitmotifs, themes. But also conversely, Hegel’s historical legitimisation of the new bourgeois society^{xiv} by no means suffices / is sufficient for the interpretation of the coming into being and the structure of (the) dialectic(s). Those researchers inspired by neo-Marxism, who insist on the central relevance of (the) political economy for Hegel’s thought, are indebted to provide / owe an explanation / explication of / for the fact that no approaches to a dialectic(s) can be found in the early classics of this science [[of political economy]]. If political economy and (the) dialectic(s) belonged together structurally, thus such approaches to dialectics should have been present. However, (the) dialectic(s) was introduced to / brought into (the) political economy first by the Hegelian Marx, and Hegel, for his part, utilised his intellectual-spiritual loans from this latter political economy inside of a framework / context which came into being independently of it (i.e. (the) dialectic(s)). One could reply, retort that only (pre)occupation / dealing / being concerned with it (i.e. dialectics) had opened for him (Hegel) his eyes to (the) new soci(et)al developments and consequently dynamicised (made) his thought (much more dynamic). But this does not yet clarify / make clear the reasons why Hegel (at least after 1803) affirmed this development (under certain important preconditions), whilst / whereas others, who knew A. Smith just as well and even earlier than he / Hegel did, partly remain with / insist on their original rejection of the new, and partly transform themselves from its (the new’s / what was new’s) followers into its foes / enemies. (Pre)Occupation / Dealing / Concerning oneself / Engaging with (the) political economy does / is not, therefore, in itself suffice / sufficient for

the explanation / explication of the / one's *stance, opinion* on its object, i.e. the new bourgeois society (it should be noted in passing that this ((pre)occupation / dealing / concerning oneself / engaging with (the) political economy) was not a groundbreaking, pioneering achievement of Hegel's; A. Müller wrote at the time with regard to the great popularity of A. Smith amongst the reading public, that in Germany the situation was (things had become) similar to Kant's (situation), of whom the poets of the *Xenien*^{xv} had said: "(for) one sole/single rich man feeds so many poor people!"). In Hegel, the legitimation of the new bourgeois society occurs, takes place, ensues, follows on the basis of an already existing, present theodicy with implications pertaining directly to the history of ideas. Also, because the legitimation of the (what is) bourgeois (element, phenomenon) was undertaken not least of all with means from (the) pre-bourgeois thoughts / intellectual world / ideas, it remained highly ambivalent.

In regard to the history of ideas, this work must start / begin / commence in *mediis rebus* (in the middle of things). Certain important points, which had to be / were necessarily referred to (referenced) here (the coming into being and function of the dualistic thought / intellectual structure in the Enlightenment in general and the strong monistic tendency in the late German Enlightenment, in particular; the structure of the Enlightenment concept of nature as the interweaving of Is and Ought; the anti-intellectualist(ic) character, attribute, trait, pull of the Enlightenment and accordingly / through that the determined, conditional, conditioned character of its rationalism; the sense, meaning of the rehabilitation of sensoriality (sensuousness, sensuality (as regards all the senses, not just sexually)) and the systematic meaning, signification of the question / problem / issue of the relations between spirit and sensoriality, and indeed in regard to the question, problem, issue of (the) norm(s)), can be satisfactorily discussed only inside (of) a conceptual reconstruction of the European Enlightenment. I hope to be able to soon present such a reconstruction, and that is why I have restricted, limited myself here to the absolutely necessary suggestions, allusions, indications, hints. Perhaps it is / will be helpful to the reader to know that these suggestions, allusions, indications, hints are the results, outcome(s) of research and not for instance unverified, unproved generalisations.

The following text offers the slightly shortened, and supplemented with a few notes, comments, remarks, version of a work, which in the summer of 1976 was completed and was accepted in the Winter Semester (October-March) 1977/1978 by the philosophical faculty / Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Heidelberg as a dissertation. I have to thank Dr. F. Horst, whose fine remarks, comments, observations made this text readable, Mr. Charitakis

for much / multiple technical help in / during the completion, finalisation of the manuscript and not least of all the German Academic Exchange Service for the grant(ing) of a two-year scholarship, stipend and a printing cost subsidy. My particular, especial thanks, thank you I owe / goes to Prof. Dr. / Professor W. Conze, who encouraged (promoted, fostered, facilitated, furthered) the publication of the / this work.

Chapter I

(The) Tübingen Axiomatic(s) and its sources

1. Introductory comments / remarks / observations

The aim of this chapter is the description, depiction of a dualistic thought structure, under whose aegis, influence the earliest intellectual-spiritual efforts, endeavours by/of Hölderlin, Hegel and Schelling, as well as the ideas / body of thought they acquired in all of the(ir) various respective forms, stand. The function and the specific texture, composition, constitution, character of this thought structure will arise, ensue in, during the course of our analysis. Its origins, provenance pertaining to the history of ideas, whose complete explication, explanation actually, really, genuinely needs, requires a reconstruction of the European Enlightenment, however, can only be suggested, alluded / pointed to here^{xvi}. First of all it must / is to be stressed that this dualistic thought structure by no means can be identified with the thought of “the” Enlightenment, if by / under Enlightenment we want to understand not for instance — abstractly — a moral(ist)(ic)-emancipatory ideal, but — concretely — the contradictory great variety of European spiritual-intellectual currents of the 2nd half of the 17th century. As a thought structure, it exists next to / alongside other thought structures / others, whose most consistent variations do not shy away from materialist(ic) or spiritualist(ic) monism. In order to be able to elementarily comprehend this constellation, we must bring to mind the revaluation or else rehabilitation of sensoriality / the senses, which was carried out / executed / performed as an emancipatory act in the struggle against Christian asceticism, without of course restricting, limiting, confining ourselves to the area, field of morality, morals, ethics; also in the neuralgic (i.e. critical, crucial, central) field / area of anthropology, research gradually shows the biological conditions of the spiritual-intellectual texture, composition, constitution of man / humans, whilst the science coming into being of history, for its part, is increasingly interested in the interrelations, contexts between cultural phenomena, occurrences, appearances with factors like the climate, race,

economy etc.. However, materialism, turning out to be / resulting as an extreme possibility for the rehabilitation of sensoriality, the senses, and whilst even appearing in a nihilistic^{xvii} form during the Enlightenment, seems, however, to endanger, put at risk all / everything that most leading spirits, intellects, minds understand as new values to be defended / worth defending^{xviii}. Progressive / Advancing insight into the dependencies of the spiritual-intellectual on the sensorial / senses, which was first of all used as an argument against theological spiritualism (or as its caricature planned, sketched out, outlined designed with polemical intent), now seems / seemed to be turning against its dedicated, devoted advocates: because without freedom of the spirit or else of the will / volition, talk of morals, morality, ethics must / necessarily lose(s) its concise, succinct sense / meaning. In (regard to) this dilemma, the dualistic thought / intellectual structure comes into being, of which here the talk is / which we are talking about here (we shall see the fundamental difference between this dualism and the consistent Kantian dualism / one below). Its representatives cannot renounce, forego, do without, abstain from the rehabilitation of sensoriality / the senses because they are not ready, prepared, willing to capitulate to “bad, evil, wicked”, i.e., church(-based)-traditional Christianity or else to let the emancipatory message fall, go silent, cease, die away, subside or to ignore the (various kinds of) knowledge of the new science. On the other hand, however, they may not / cannot / ought not lapse, fall into, succumb to lurking materialism when they do not want to confirm, validate, acknowledge, verify, affirm, corroborate the main / chief / principal argument of (the) conservative theologians, [[since]] the new position logically leads to the abandonment, relinquishment, abandoning of spirit(-intellect) *and* morality, morals, ethics. Spirit(-intellect) or else morals, morality, ethics and the rehabilitation of sensoriality, the senses or else the rejection, denial, refusal of asceticism must, therefore, simultaneously be rescued, saved, salvaged. Logical contradictions, i.e. a continual, continuous conflict between sensoriality, the senses and the spirit-intellect (between the causal and the normative, between Is and Ought) are the result of this endeavour, effort, whereby / in relation to which the question/problem, issue, matter of being directly or indirectly is converted, transformed into a question/problem, issue, matter of value(s).

**ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY P.K., EXCEPT FOR [III], WHEREAS DA ENDNOTES
ARE KRAZY MAN TIME STUFF ...**

ⁱ I.e. Hölderlin (1770-1843), Schelling (1775-1854) and Hegel (1770-1831).

ⁱⁱ This time, though, I would not at all be certain of centuries of ZIO-USA as "Rome" is to follow circa 1979. Back then (starting in the fourth century B.C.), the multi-ethnic society was based on every ethnicity retaining its distinct identity based on distinct descent / race and distinct culture, whereas today the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ of the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN via ZIO-USA and ZIO-JOO-ROPA-CHANNEL want to ethnically cleanse and genocide everyone out of existence under the ruling ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-EXCREMENT-FAECES AND VOMIT, and China, Russia, India and others are not accepting that.

ⁱⁱⁱ Obviously, P.K. had formulated the basis for his *Power and Decision* (1984) by circa 1975-1977-1979, i.e. the time of his doctoral dissertation which became this book.

^{iv} This goes to the core of the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID modus procedendi. As a rat-rodent-parasite, the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID takes / steals whatever it can from others (including ideas, not just money) and then does its "dialectic" of taking up positions on all sides of the social-political spectrum to lead everyone into a state of submission to the filthy, absolutely disgusting inbred, incestual rat-tunnel vomit-faeces ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID where the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGIE believes that under the CAVE FILTH OF THE ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID, and with the "discoveries" of the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID (e.g. Einstein, Freud as "authorities" etc. – when they're just ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YIDZ full of ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-BULLSHIT), "all is good" and "all is rational", and that means for piss-weak and retarded tribes: OVER. DEAD. ZIO.

^v Meaning here mass democracy. Cf. endnote iii, above, in regard to mass democracy, conservatism and liberalism and *Conservatism* (1986) and *The decline of the bourgeois thought and life form* (1991).

^{vi} This is P.K. taking a side-swipe and having a larf at "post-modern" "philosophers" and other ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID AND OR ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-ZOMBEE-STOOGIE "I deconstruct everything except for ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-power" "deconstructionists".

^{vii} The **Tübinger Stift** ["Stift" = pin, pencil, tack, crayon etc. + seminary, diocese, abbey, monastery, cathedral chapter, collegial body, institution, foundation]] is a hall of residence and teaching; it is owned and supported by the [Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Württemberg](#), and located in the university city of [Tübingen](#), in South West Germany. The Stift was founded as an [Augustinian monastery](#) in the [Middle Ages](#). After the [Reformation](#), in 1536, [Duke Ulrich](#) turned the Stift into a seminary which served to prepare [Protestant](#) pastors for Württemberg. To this day the scholarship is still given to students in preparation for the ministry or teaching in [Baden-Württemberg](#). Students receive a scholarship which consists of boarding, lodging and further academic support. Some of the well known "Stiftlers" are the astronomer [Johannes Kepler](#) and his associate, statesman [Hans Ulrich von Eggenberg](#), the poet [Friedrich Hölderlin](#) who had as roommates the philosophers [G. W. F. Hegel](#) and [Friedrich Schelling](#) (although the latter was five years their junior), the theologians [David Friedrich Strauß](#), [Johann Albrecht Bengel](#), [Friedrich Christoph Oetinger](#), [Ferdinand Christian Baur](#) and [Eberhard Nestle](#), and the philologist [August Pauly](#). The curriculum included two years of philosophical studies and three years of theological studies. The teaching staff imparted a traditional type of education, applying strict discipline and considerable censorship on the students' readings. Nonetheless, during Hegel's tenure, students privately had access to the 'forbidden' texts of [Spinoza](#), [Kant](#) and [Voltaire](#). (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCbinger_Stift)

The point P.K. is making here is that objective reality has never been or happened fully in accordance with Marxist or other ideological interpretations of that reality.

^{viii} Question : is this just another massive ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-GANG-BANG-FUCK FEST like Sanchez torking to Johnson and Ritter ? Answer : Yes, it is. Further Question : is there any way for Krazy Man to live in a world without the ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-EXCREMENT-VOMIT-FAECES being there everywhere ? Further Answer : Yes, by getting in a time machine and going back in time at least a thousand years, and even then, unless one just sits quietly in his village, you'll encounter at the very least ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LIZZARD-ENTRY-ISTS. In other words Krazy Man is not just JOO-ED, he's also ZIO-FUCKED ? Yes, that's the case. That's what The Fall means, IDIOT!!!

^{ix} The ideologue regurgitates the same old shit again and again and again. Outcome : boredom and nothing (of substance) is ever contributed to understanding.

^x Hegel's Bern period is 1793–96. Unless I'm mistaken, he went from "conservative" to "radical" and back to "conservative" – something not uncommon for intellectuals of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If I'm making some kind of mistake, sorry, I can't be fucked further researching the matter. I'm not

P.K., I'm a turd and terd – so don't yooz forget dat. Actually, P.K. explains at the end of p. 16 going into p. 17 that Hegel as a conservative in the sense of A. Müller and Fr. Baader, esp. after 1803, is an optical illusion ...

^{xi} As understood by ZIO-JOO-KIKE-YID-LED/CONTROLLED (KONTROL)-mass democratic ideologues-rhetoricians, given that actual liberalism was over by circa 1900.

^{xii} The Bourbon Restoration was the period of French history during which the House of Bourbon returned to power after the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1814 and 1815. Dates: 6 Apr 1814 – 21 Jan 1830.

^{xiii} 19th century radical democracy and socialism / communism fused into mass democracy (incl. the welfare state) from circa 1900, which then, in turn, had not only its parliamentary, universal suffrage, communistic, fascist / national-socialistic variants, but also variants in the non-“Western” world.

^{xiv} One that is moving towards, or already is aligned with, the Industrial Revolution and the massification of society with a massive increase in trade / commerce, banking-financial services, monetary-Mammon-ification / commodification etc., destroying, along the way, what was left of “feudalism”, in contrast to “burgher” bourgeois society from the (12th /) 13th / 14th centuries, which co-existed with “feudalism” until the 18th century.

^{xv} The poets of the Xenien (or Die Xenien (Greek Xenia "host gifts")) were Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), who collaboratively wrote these satirical epigrams in the late 1790s as literary weapons against their critics, sparking a major literary feud and shaping German literature. Inspired by Roman poet Martial (1st cent. A.D.), these witty couplets targeted literary mediocrity and rival poets, appearing first in the Musenalmanach [a Musen-Almanach ("Muses' Almanac") was a kind of literary annual, popular in Germany from 1770 into the mid-19th century] and causing a sensation.

^{xvi} See P.K.'s Enlightenment (1981) book for the said complete reconstruction.

^{xvii} I.e. no values, and not meaning “go and destroy” etc..

^{xviii} Those who don't want to live on “the outskirts of town”, have to go with the flow of the mainstream, which in 17th and 18th century Europe, still meant being part of the overall Church “community”, even though “Tolerance” and “Liberty” and “Equality” and “The Rights of Man” etc. were (on the cusp of) making headway.