

Panagiotis (Panajotis) Kondylis

# The political in the 20<sup>th</sup> century

From utopias to globalisation

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### Editorial notice (note)

Panagiotis Kondylis had shortly before his death translated into, and published in Greek, a collection of his political texts written in German, under the [[Greek]] title “From the 20<sup>th</sup> to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Contributions to (or articles regarding) planetary politics at the turn of the millennium<sup>i</sup>) (Athens 1998). Apart from three journal (periodical) articles, this volume contains fourteen contributions ([[other]] articles), which appeared in the years 1994 to 1998 in *Frankfurter Allgemeinen*, in *Frankfurter Rundschau* and in *Tagesanzeiger* (Zürich).

Kondylis had the intention of publishing the same or a more extensive collection of his political texts in Germany. In a draft to the table of contents of the German edition, which was found in his unpublished notes, writings, etc., two further articles are included which treat two specifically German themes or topics: “The Right, the Left and Germany” and “The German “special way” and German perspectives (or prospects)”. Kondylis’s intention has been hereby complied with. This collection of political essays are introduced by the “Foreword” of the Greek edition (translated by Gaby Wurster).

*Markus Käfer*

## I. Prologue (Foreword)<sup>ii</sup>

*The purpose of a prologue cannot be the summarisation of the contents of a book, so that the hasty reader can be assisted by being freed (released, relieved) from (of) the efforts and exertions of critical study. Help ought to rather be provided to the diligent, studious reader in a dual form: by giving him the mark (brand) of the work within the overall opus of the author, and by providing the reader with additional (pieces of) information about the more general standpoint and method through which the topics under examination are approached. As to the first point, I can, fortunately, be very brief. The texts which this volume collects constitute an extension and deepening of thoughts formulated (propounded, articulated) in my works The Decline of Bourgeois Culture (Civilisation); Planetary Politics after the Cold War; Pleasure, power, utopia (see esp. the chapter: “Utopia and historical action”) and Theory of War (see esp. the chapter: “Hot war after the Cold War”). I am afraid that without knowledge of these analyses<sup>iii</sup>, to which I also refer, the comprehension of the texts below will remain fragmentary, disjointed, even if they have been written in such a way so as to constitute autonomous, self-contained wholes. However, nothing is so self-contained so as not to be able to be incorporated within a framework which is even broader, to be illuminated through even broader correlations and contexts.*

*And as to the second point, there is no need for me to expand, because everything that follows contains positions, theses and clues, hints (implications) sufficient for the author's standpoint and method to be reconstructed. And here, nevertheless, incorporation in a more general context or framework can help. In every epoch (era), the ideology of the victor is made – for the vanquished (defeated) – the interpretation of reality, that is, the vanquished side's defeat is marked, stamped and sealed with the acceptance of the victor's perspective. Thus, e.g. those who yesterday still ranted and raved about the “national-liberationist struggle of the Vietnamese people”, lit candles in honour and worship of Che Guevara's icon and did not want to hear a word about “blind anti-communism”, today, instead of condemning imperialism, go berserk and fulminate against “every kind of nationalism”, and embrace and adopt the victor's slogans as the interpretation of reality: universalism through the united world market and “human rights”. They do not ask themselves neither who will bindingly interpret on each and every respective occasion what these “rights” will mean and signify in regard to a specific (concrete) time and place, nor whether and to what extent “nationalism” is justified when someone of a small stature wants to resist the voracious, gluttonous and rapacious dispositions of someone of a great stature. In this manner, whilst ethicising incessantly, in reality they align themselves with the right and justice of the more powerful and stronger. But if the vanquished and defeated, accepting belatedly the victor's ideology, frequently becomes the most laughable, ridiculous and slimy bearer(s) of such an ideology, the said vanquished is/are certainly not the original inspirer and founder of this victor's ideology. The “Left”, having transformed into the tail, i.e. final, last, posterior, hindmost part, or the spongy accessory, i.e. pathetic, worthless, servile flatterer and bootlicker of Americanism, no longer draws from what was most alive, vital in the Marxist tradition, that is, the pitiless de-mythologisation of liberal ideologem(e)s, but is fed and nourished by a social theory which in part reflects, and in part covers up in an*

*idealising manner, the real relations of power (power relations) inside Western mass democracy. Since the latter (i.e. Western mass democracy) has various aspects and various ideological needs, the predominant in the West social theory appears in various tendencies too: theories about “justice” or about “communicative action” satisfy the more general moralistic (and sanctimonious) demands for the legitimisation of Western regimes; theories about the “system”, emerging from the intellectual(-spiritual) world of cybernetics and propping themselves up on such cybernetics’ conceptuality, are adjoined (attached) to the administrative and technical side of mass democracy, whereas the realities, but also the dreams and fantasies of the “free market” are echoed in theories of a universalistic inspiration, wherein the whole of society is constituted in accordance with the ideational (and ideal) model of the market. Despite the contrasts and oppositions between them, which move at a level of secondary importance as far as practice is concerned, even if the same theoreticians, for obvious reasons, accentuate such contrasts, all these theories, as products and legitimisations of the same society, expressly or tacitly share and favour or sympathise with the [[same]] basic perceptions, namely, they float equally between the related poles of atomism and of universalism by passing through the “free market” (even if with light “social-democratic” restrictions and limitations on such a “free market”).*

*The ideological character of these social theories is proved, in addition, by the following fact: none of them has been used until today as the conceptual, at least, context or framework of a serious analysis of the present and the future of our planetary world. They synopsis in terms of theory our planetary world’s ideational (ideal) self-understanding from the Western point of view, and even though, from time to time, they ascertain that between this self-understanding and today’s reality, there exists some sort of distance, nonetheless, they profess that the core and large sections of today’s reality contain clear propensities and*

*tendencies which are capable of leading us sooner or later to the point which the ideational (ideal) self-understanding (of the West) shows. As much as benefits the self-serving (self-interested, self-seeking), the naive propagandise (or: All that benefits the selfish, the naive propagandise). However, the selfish do not only have the legitimising needs, which the naive satisfy; they have practical needs, they must therefore, in contrast to their intellectuals, act continuously in specific, concrete situations, wherein enormous economic and strategic interests are at stake. When e.g. the American Pentagon draws up its plans, which already reach deep inside the 21<sup>st</sup> century, they do not of course call upon either Rawls, or Habermas, or moral (ethical) philosophers to listen to and follow their (pieces of) advice. In the carving out and the exercising of politics, the nebulae are dissolved and the jokes stop, and tangible data and visible trends are weighed up. Universalistic ideologies do not portend the real transition to a universalism of equivalent groups and individuals. Because, theoretically, universalistic ideologies apply to everyone, in practice however, they are bindingly interpreted by the powerful (strong and mighty) and they open for the powerful the doors to whatever interventions the powerful judge as expedient wherever. Whatever “proletarian internationalism” was for Russian communists yesterday, “human rights” are for Americans today. And in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as always in the past, whichever Power is in a position to bindingly define for the rest, the content and practical application of the dominant concepts (read: ideologem(e)s), will determine History.*

*The analyses of this volume aim at a radical dilation between ideology and reality. They do not seek to approach today’s planetary developments from within Western ideologies, but conversely, they seek to comprehend these ideologies from within the planetary conjuncture and the forces which form such a planetary conjuncture. Whoever does not want to be the mouthpiece of the powerful ought not accept the image which the powerful projects and*

*imposes in regard to himself or itself. Many, especially “leftists”, have the impression that they (continue to) reject the “system” only because they invoke the ideology of the “system” in order to censure and decry, in regard to certain points, its reality. But in that manner, whatever is rejected subjectively, is simply contradicted objectively: because the ideology of the “system” is equally a part of its reality as much as its perceived black spots (dark side)<sup>iv</sup>.*

*Fortunately, classical political, sociological and historical analysis, from Thucydides until today, supplies us with abundant and adequate tools to see things more profoundly and more soberly. Such analysis teaches us above all to centre our attention on the specific, concrete texture of active individuals and collective subjects, and to look at such texture in its historicalness (historicity).*

*A blatantly obvious, and of course not chance or coincidental, feature of the social theories to which we referred above, is the putting aside and elimination of the historical dimension and the historical way of looking at things. The at times concealed, and at other times exhibited and demonstrated intention of this elimination is to feed the impression, and the hope, that today’s social-political situation in the West constitutes an established, consolidated and fixed conquest of humanity which not only is not able to be overturned in the space of its formation, but in a foreseeable period of time will spread to and throughout the entire planet. But in history, neither permanent conquests, nor linear developments as the simple extensions and prolongations of today’s conjunctures, exist. The dissemination (dispersion, diffusion, spreading) of Western mass democracy on a world scale not only will not beget everywhere faithful copies, but will change Western mass democracy itself in the metropolitan countries, sparking off and igniting in parallel the acutest struggles of distribution. If the 20<sup>th</sup> century meant the falsification of the communistic utopia, the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be characterised by the collapse of the liberal utopia. Which specific, concrete events will constitute the great*

*propensities during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which, as I believe, will be the most shocking and most tragic in human History, we cannot know. One thing, nevertheless, is certain: History has not finished, nobody of those living today is going to die knowing that History will finish. The only thing we can do is to describe its driving forces, within the given short-term or long-term conjuncture. And this description is not the work of the ideologue and the moralist-ethicist; it demands eyes trained in viewing and looking into the historicalness and historicity of phenomena.*

## II. Communistic and liberal<sup>v</sup> utopia

### 1. Marxism, communism and the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century

The historical putting in order, i.e. classification of Marxism and of the communistic movement depends on how one judges the overall course of the planetary history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. To say it differently: a satisfying result in this particular historical sector of research presupposes a concrete perception and notion of that which in this century was acted out in terms of universal history, and indeed both at the level of social, as well as at that level of (inter)national and political history (*or*: as well as at that of national and international political history). This ceases to sound like a banal methodical (i.e. methodological) command as soon as we visualise and contemplate how contestable such an undertaking can become already after the first steps, above all if, through that, the ideological self-legitimation of today's "West (Occident, Western world)" as the victor of the Cold War is called into question. This self-legitimation rests, in fact, on the acceptance of certain historical continuities, that is, on express or implicit periodisations of the historical course (or, course of history), and refers to historically growing social entities, whose substance, as is thought, was preserved and survives despite all the changes, alterations and variations in the accidental occurrences (happenings, events, incidents). The broadest of these constructed entities is the

“West” as the epitome (or idea(tiona)l synopsis) of ancient-classical, Christian and liberal traditions, i.e. as the crystallisation of an almost three-thousand-year history<sup>vi</sup>. If one, however, as a historian grasped, or attributed to, the concept of the “West” such a breadth, then in Marxist theory and communistic praxis (practice)<sup>vii</sup>, as good as nothing is found which does not at least correspond with one aspect of the “West” – from historical eschatologies and various mixtures ([[made up]] out) of humanism and collectivism, up to the not very delicate dealings with, and handling of, dissenters, intellectual(-spiritual) prohibitions and mass murders (*or*: mass exterminations of humans); on the other hand, on the basis of this wide, broad concept of the “West”, it was never explained and clarified during the Cold War whether capitalistic and parliamentary Japan would be reckoned as belonging to the “community of Western peoples” rather (*or*: more so) than “communistically governed and ruled Eastern Europe”.

The historical picture becomes clearer if Marxism and communism are comprehended as the great adversaries of bourgeois liberalism as this was shaped and formed in the European New Times, above all after the French Revolution. From this perspective, it looks or seems as if (*or*: the impression arises or is born) that with and through the collapse of the communistic camp, the attack on bourgeois-liberal society had been finally and conclusively repulsed, and now in the process, this bourgeois-liberal society, enriched by a social(-welfare)-state dimension (*or*: the dimension of the social welfare state) and established and consolidated thanks to (by means of) general prosperity, will unfold world-wide (i.e. in and throughout all the world), and through its humanity will make the peoples felicitous in peace (*or*: with its humanity will grant peace and happiness to the peoples). Historical continuity stretches here from the age (epoch, era) of the Industrial Revolution, and it encompasses and includes in the first phase the putting aside, cleaning up and elimination (liquidation) of feudal-aristocratic remnants and leftovers, and in a second

phase, the defence against, and repulsion of, the revolutionary attack from the Left<sup>viii</sup> through the organic integration of the lower [[social]] strata in an indeed reformed and more open, but still bourgeois-liberal society.

Were things so, Marxism and communism would have represented and constituted at most crises of adaptation, or even mere blemishes and slip-ups on the regal path of Western liberalism – and re-issues/new editions of “oriental despotism” in lands and countries, which at any rate, had no stake and decisive participation in the Western modern era. On the other hand, my thesis reads that the West in the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has gone through a far-reaching, deep, profound social and intellectual(-spiritual) change, in relation to which oligarchic and hierarchical bourgeois liberalism was replaced by mass-democratic relations; that this change was interwoven with a number of paths and roundabout ways along with a just as drastic re-shaping and metamorphosis of the planetary landscape, which reached an until then unimaginable degree of social and political density; and that Marxism and communism were originally and constantly (i.e. from the beginning and always) inherent and deeply rooted in this double-sided (as to bourgeois liberalism becoming mass democracy, and, the drastic re-shaping and densification of the planetary landscape), yet united process; Marxism and communism aided, supported and promoted this process, and did not depart the stage or abdicate before – stated in terms of Hegel – their “historical truth” came to light, saw the light of day and were realised objectively (i.e. irrespective of the subjective wishes and expectations of the “historical truth’s” proponents): in other words, they do not constitute a, in the meanwhile, tumour successfully surgically removed from history’s body, but an integral part of a phase of world history that has already come to its end, which now stands before its mainly planetary epoch.

Only the proper and informed, in-depth apprehension of the aforementioned double-sided process allows us to intellectually come to grips with and

understand the truly dramatic distinction between the basic questions and problems of 1900 and those of 2000. If around 1900, the at that time “social question”, which as a result of the oligarchical nature and texture of bourgeois liberalism was invariably placed within each and every respective national framework, dominated the social-political theatre or arena of struggle, thus it is characteristic for the epoch around 2000 that disputes, controversies and conflicts appear on the (attained, existing or coming into being and being created) basis of high collective consumption and high productivity, which intensify both the interweaving, as well as the competition, of national economies, whilst at the same time the whole process is acted out inside of demographic and ecological boundaries and limits becoming ever narrower. To the extent that the “social question” – though in an essentially different form – continues to be posed, it is connected now with *these* factors (of high collective consumption etc.), and its handling and management on each and every respective occasion does not require or demand any (*or*: is not done with the slogan in favour of the) dismantling (toppling or demolishing) of class(-like) hierarchies as the 19<sup>th</sup> century knew them, but – since the egalitarian performance (or achievement) principle, at least nominally, has been pushed through and imposed – requires or demands the partial rearrangement (and or changeover in respect) of a functional whole. The in principle replacement (substitution) of the class(-like) hierarchy by the functional hierarchy entails, of course, not under all circumstances, a defusing of social conflict. The opposite can be the case, since the horizon of expectation(s), which is formed parallelly with that replacement (substitution), is determined by (or stands under the aegis of) the mass-democratic hedonism of consumption (mass-democratic consumption hedonism), and correspondingly gives rise to and begets claims at the global level. In any case, the 5 billion of the non-Western and non-highly (*or*: non-advanced) industrialised world does not want to attain and achieve what the West possessed anno (i.e. in the year) 1900, but that which the West

seems to be enjoying en masse today. In the manner in which the horizon of expectation(s) is created and constituted, as well as its content, the interweaving of social and planetary points of view is reflected, which characterises and stamps the mass-democratic social formation developing in terms of the economy, in(to) large (great, major) spaces.

(Western) mass democracy gradually (i.e. step by step, by degrees, in small increments) emerged and came, albeit relatively quickly, from the womb of (or bosom of or from within) bourgeois liberalism. And yet the caesura (break or turning point) is more important than the continuity, because the just mentioned problems on the horizon of [[the year]] 2000 revolve around or abut (attach/append to) social phenomena which exactly as the result of the said caesura now dominate. The latter caesura can of course be fully apprehended in its character, extent and scope only through ideal-typical extrapolation, and it remains in this case, as in others too, an elementary methodical (i.e. methodological) command to give preference and priority to the qualitative way of looking at events (things that happen) over quantitative consideration. Even if the elements of bourgeois liberalism as well as those of bourgeois civilisation and culture (*or*: of bourgeois intellectual(-spiritual) and material-technical culture/civilisation), continued to quantitatively predominate, this would have had little meaning for a dynamic understanding of things, if in the meantime social phenomena of another type had established themselves as the locomotives of development. Between the 13<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the way and mode of living and the mentality of most people in Europe by no means changed radically, i.e., *societas civilis* retained its fundamental hierarchies, and theology ruled and dominated the ideological terrain in an always undiminished and unabated fashion – and nevertheless, we distinguish with regard to exactly this period of time between “Middle Ages” and “New Times (Modern Era)”, whilst we, and rightly so, focus our attention on what is qualitatively new, knowing very well that it (i.e.

the qualitatively new) quantitatively continues to be inferior or continues to lag behind. Historically and sociologically interesting is the novel (the new) and what is decisive (promising) for the future, regardless of whether it temporarily or even for a long time appears to be a simple appendage (appurtenance, accessory) or variation of the old (what is old).

Assuming our contemporary Western mass democracy were in actual fact nothing other, and not more than, a further formation (i.e. transformation or restructuring) and continuation or meta-development/evolution of bourgeois liberalism, then the issue would have to still be clarified as to whether factors of further formation, transformation and meta-development/evolution have come into play, which thereafter took over the role of the social motor/engine (i.e. driving force) in a qualitative relation (*or*: from a qualitative point of view). Personally, I believe, nonetheless, that I can show that the transition from the bourgeois liberalism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to modern mass democracies was much more evident for all to see.<sup>1</sup> Thus, around 1900 a thorough, sweeping paradigm shift at the level of intellectual(-spiritual) production took place (from the natural-scientific world image, across philosophy and sociology, up to literature and the visual arts), which almost simultaneously unhinged and blew to smithereens all forms of bourgeois culture as they had been formed since the Renaissance. From within (*or*: In and out of) this comprehensive, multi-dimensional polemic, a thought figure (*or*: schema of thought) came into being, which through and by giving absolute priority and precedence in respect of the functional point of view vis-à-vis the substantialistic or substance/essence-based point of view, the atomisation of all entirities and totalities (*or*: the breaking up and fragmenting of all totalities and wholes into atoms, individual parts or

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<sup>1</sup> Panajotis Kondylis, *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform. Die liberale Moderne und die massendemokratische Postmoderne*, Weinheim 1991 (= *The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form. The liberal modern era and the mass-democratic postmodern era* (to be translated into English by 2025 or 2030? – “God Willing”)). P.K., *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992 (= *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*). P.K., „Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln“ (= “Utopia and historical action”), in: *Politische Lageanalyse, Festschrift für H. J. Arndt zum 70. Geburtstag*, Bruchsal 1993, pp. 163-175.

individuals), and the arbitrary (random, at will, of one's own volition) combinability (or, any kind of combinability whatsoever) of everything with everything, corresponded with the picture, image and the reality of an extremely mobile mass society, in which goods, social positions and values are constantly exchanged. This ideational and social paradigm shift has hitherto in its complete significance, implications and reality (yet it does not simply point beyond bourgeois liberalism, but beyond the European New Times as a whole) hardly become known (i.e. is hardly a part of people's consciousness and awareness) (*or*: This "change in example" in the area of ideas and at the level of social life never became until today known in all of its extent and radicality (since it signifies not only the end of European liberalism, but also the conclusion (closing and expiration) of the European New Times)), because the educated (and cultured, cultivated) portions of the population still draw on many elements of bourgeois culture, and frequently perceive the anti-bourgeois only against the backdrop of the bourgeois (*or*: and often perceive from bourgeois culture's perspective whatever does not belong to bourgeois culture)<sup>ix</sup>. Since (Because) one has the impression that the programme directors of private, commercial television and the patrons of discotheques know better in what kind of society they live than many sociologists and historians – to say nothing of classical philologists. This would certainly not be the first time in history in which something similar happened. Educated (and other) pagans (heathens) (*or*: Most of the educated and non-educated idolaters) had still in the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> century after Christ hardly noticed and registered the paradigm shift already having taken place for a long time, and continued to talk about the liveliness, vitality and the ability at renewal of their faith, roughly as many today rave on about an "unfinished project of the modern (era, age) (i.e. modernity or the New Times)".

Since the anti-communistic struggle of the West was conducted not least of all in the name of liberalism, thus the optical illusion was established, strengthened

and consolidated that the collapse of outdated communism was tantamount to a victory of evergreen liberalism. In the course of this, it is a matter of a vague and normatively coloured or charged concept of liberalism, which did not constitute an unequivocal social, but rather an ideological indication. Only the, in the propaganda battle, often added explication may be regarded as a social indication that Western liberalism does not mean class privileges, but the in principle and fundamental openness of society (*or*: but open society), equal chances and opportunities, and affluence (prosperity), but also social protection (shelter) for all (everyone). This implicit repudiation and denial of the original bourgeois class content(s) of liberalism (from the restrictions on voting up to the rejection of the welfare state) signaled in itself both the turn towards mass democracy as well as – since it was thought of, and imagined as, an answer to the communistic critique of capitalism – the influence which the threat of a red revolution had exerted on that turn towards mass democracy<sup>x</sup>. However, having an effect at least just as much as this threat was the gradual penetrating and permeating of the collective consciousness or collective unconscious mind and subconscious with the ideal of material equality, which from the beginning was summoned by all currents of socialistic thought, but most emphatically by the Marxists against the bourgeois-liberal insistence on merely formal-legal equality as the guarantee of freedom. Typically enough, people, factions and parties, who otherwise had not much or nothing at all in mind in respect of sympathising with communism as it was practised in Russia, became the mouthpiece, megaphone and trumpet of this ideal, in whatever different packaging (presentation, form, layout) and intensity on each and every respective occasion: social democrats of vague Marxist inspiration, who wanted against the communistic inimical and hated brother to prove they were better because they were “realistic” and “liberal” friends of the people; Christians, who now continued charitable traditions zealously and connected them with the social (welfare) state approaches, since they, after the decline, decomposition

and dissolution of theological metaphysics, saw in “social activity (actuation, action)” the great chance and opportunity for the maintenance of their religion’s influence; and not least “social liberals”, who undertook a reinterpretation of classical liberalism, by going beyond formal equality and deducing from the old individualistic principle(s) now a right of the individual to social protection and shelter (refuge) by way, and on the part, of the state. The strengthening, consolidation and dissemination of such perceptions went with the building and creation of the social (welfare) state and with the gradual displacement and replacement of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class, or class socially setting the tone, by in principle open economic and political elites of a changing composition. It would be a mistake to think that this all was going on and came about automatically as the result of the second and third industrial revolution, of increased productivity, and the mass production accordingly made possible, although these preconditions were objectively indispensable<sup>xi</sup>. Yet also social-economic processes are formed, shaped and moulded through what the people want participating in such processes, through how they perceive their social world and their own activity in it. If we look at and survey history in its entirety, the modern conviction that it is neither willed by God (divinely ordained), nor natural, that some have, whilst others have little or nothing, has become and constitutes one of the greatest upheavals (subversions, reversals) in the “realm of ideas” – and its consequences will perhaps be unforeseeable if such a conviction is militantly projected and represented by 5, 8 or 10 billion people (humans). Our contemporary “neoliberals” are kidding themselves in their assumption that extensive, far-reaching privatisation of the economy could bring about and effect a corresponding privatisation of expectations, a making do with what one has got (self-contentedness) as a result of insight into individual incapacity and into economic logic (*or*: on account of the ascertainment that certain people lack the personal credentials and capabilities in order to enrich themselves, and on account of conforming with economic

logic). Irrespective of the essential and substantial contribution of the state to the flourishing of the private economy in the West (*or*: in(side) Western countries), this private economy draws its legitimation from the certainty (or feeling) that *it* is the best means for the achieving of general prosperity, affluence and of a surplus which allows considerable, noteworthy redistributions and the blunting, diminution (reduction, dismantling) of the crassest material inequalities. Should such a private economy not have been able to fulfil any longer such mass-democratic expectations, then it and the “system” would be plunged into a crisis of legitimation (*or*: it would throw (plunge) itself together with the “system” into a crisis of legitimisation). So, the performance (efficiency, output, yield) of the private economy does not constitute – in other words – a private issue, but a public and highly political matter of concern – and it became that under the pressure of the anti-liberal demand for the material interpretation of the equality principle.

The broad, comprehensive way of looking at the social aspect therefore makes it clear which fallacies follow from the tendency to place little value on, or to disregard, the historical impact and influence of Marxism and communism, and indeed owing to a failure to appreciate the qualitative features and elements of the turn towards mass democracy. But the sober observer can draw the same teaching from the analysis of a second aspect, namely, of the planetary aspect.<sup>2</sup> The Enlightenment philosophy of history, especially in its Hegelian version, had unified world history due to the fact that it prescribed world history one single ethical-normative aim (goal, objective), towards which unified world history had to necessarily be directed<sup>xii</sup>. Marx of course held fast to this normative-eschatological unification of world history, but far more important was the fact that he explained the united character of planetary events and the planetary becoming on the basis of social and economic factors, and drew political

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<sup>2</sup> P. Kondylis, *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992 [= *Planetary politics after the Cold War*].

conclusions from such factors. He comprehended, like hardly anyone else before him, that capitalistic industry had brought about a deep caesura (break or turning point) in the course of history by having created a world network into which, with milder or harder methods, the said historical caesura forced all nations. The industrial bourgeoisie brought about in this sense a world revolution; that is why for its part it could now only be overthrown by a world revolution. And this new and conclusive world revolution – the proletarian – was supposed to realise, i.e. bring to fruition, a united social blueprint on, i.e. regarding or over, the whole earth. The planetary and the social dimension[[s]] were therefore thought about and understood together and in a unified manner, and in their unity, they connected with the real forces of historical development. The struggles of the nations with one another, as well as the struggles inside of the nations, took on now, through their being conducted and fought out on only one world stage, a new meaning; they became in part [[factors and phenomena]] for the setting and triggering off, in part for the condensing and consolidation of, universal tendencies. And the direction seemed to be singular and irreversible: continually narrower, tighter interweaving and continually more united methods of behaving and acting in terms of economics ((extra-)household stewardship and management) after the end of the agrarian-patriarchal pre-history of mankind.

If we want to apprehend the *historical* range (and consequences) of this concept(ual plan) (conception), then we must look at and judge it from the side, i.e. angle or point of view, of the driving forces carved/brought/worked out by such a concept(ual plan) (conception), and the socio-economic magnitudes correlated within it – not from its utopian-eschatological side. Liberal “realists” celebrate easy triumphs by emphatically highlighting and underlining the failure of the attempt at realising all-out the original utopian plan<sup>3</sup>. But can one dispute

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<sup>3</sup> P. Kondylis, „Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln“, *Festschrift für H. J. Arndt zum 70. Geburtstag*, Bruchsal 1993 [= “Utopia and historical action”].

the enormous historical effect of Christianity because neither the eschatological promise and pledge was kept or verified, nor did the command of love considerably influence social praxis (practice)<sup>xiii</sup>? Further still: can one doubt that its, i.e. the original utopian plan's real historical impact and influence was possible precisely through the invoking of the unrealisable and even supra-historical or unhistorical and extra-historical ideas or magnitudes? Such paradoxes and enigmas are solved only when one breaks with the habit having roots in the moral needs of taking normative ideas at (their) face value, and of judging them in accordance with their realisation or realisability, instead of tracking down, and uncovering, their functions and changes ((trans)mutations) corresponding to, and commensurate with, the social peripeteias of their bearers. A further rationalistic prejudice likewise hinders insight into the historical impact and influence of utopian plans. Namely, a schema for historical action (= a historical action plan) is taken as the starting point in which the ends (goals) and means are coordinated and remain in this, its symmetry, controllable at all times, so that between subjective intentions and the objective outcome of events and facts (becoming), no chasm pops or opens up. Obviously, however, according to this schema, action can only be directed (*or*: conform with this schema) which stretches over a relatively short period of time, and is borne by relatively few actors (*or*: and is processed by relatively few in number bearers). But the utopia of the planetary classless society had an almost one-and-a-half-century-long effect as a historical force and power, under considerably different circumstances and through the acts, actions and deeds (energies) of millions and millions of human existences, who connected it (i.e. this utopia of the planetary classless society) with different concrete content(s) on each and every respective occasion – that is, it had an effect under conditions, under which the long waves of historical action devour, gobble up the short waves of historical action, and the heterogony of ends submerges and destroys the symmetry of means and ends, plans and realisations. Consequently,

striving after the absolute utopian aim (objective, goal, end) splits up, ramifies (i.e. branches out) and is distributed, dispersed into riverbeds deviating and diverging from one another, whereby it is put into, or placed in (at), the service of relative [[= not absolute]] social-political endeavours. In so far as these latter endeavours are able to be distanced from the original absolute objective(s) (from the settings of the original aim), their character, nevertheless, is not left to chance and coincidence. Because every utopian plan contains, apart from the uncompromising dream of the overcoming of all conflict(s) and suffering(s), a critique of the existing state of affairs, and indeed in those sides, i.e. aspects or facets of it, which *par excellence* become perceived as a hindrance and obstacle on the road to utopia<sup>xiv</sup>. If private property e.g. is considered such a hindrance and obstacle, then not only is the final utopian state of affairs (situation) accordingly imagined and adumbrated, but just as much is the realpolitik (realistic politics) shaped which appears and is exercised in its name. The abolition of private ownership by the state and the possession of the state by the heralds of utopia can therefore *ipso facto* be made out to be the in principle realisation of this latter utopia. But also in countries in which such a thing does not happen, “progressive” real-political endeavours are concentrated on the dismantling of the privileges of the possessors of these privileges<sup>xv</sup>, on the creation of collective forms of ownership, or at least on the as far as possible tight binding and connection of pleasure to performance (efficiency).

In all these cases whose internal interrelation cannot escape or remain hidden to the attentive observer, it is seen how the utopian plan via its social-critical dimension becomes the instrument of concrete politics, that is, of power politics, which brings forth shifts and displacements in social stratification and not least of all in the positions of power of the elites. With the degree of density which planetary politics reached in the epoch (era, age) of European imperialism, the strong power-political impact had to take a world-political

dimension (*or*: the strong presence or power politics (the politics of power) within the utopian construct(ion), had to take planetary dimensions), whilst utopia became the banner of a great nation which strove for the position of a great and world Power, and beyond that, world domination. We are here dealing with a point of decisive meaning for the understanding of the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and of the place of communism in it. To the two fundamental aspects of this history mentioned above (until now), namely, the planetary and the social, a third is added: the national – and indeed not as the weakening or as the disconnection of both of the first two as regards each other, but rather in order to further condense their network (mesh or grid) and to bind and tie their additive impact and influence to concrete bearers. That means: the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century since 1917 was characterised by the appearance of great nations which want to impose (push through) a certain schema of social organisation (*or*: a social blueprint) at the world level, and heightens, intensifies the degree of density of planetary politics precisely through the tight connection of the social and the planetary with each other. Nations, which on account of their potential are capable of playing such a role, become bearers of universal values and of schemata of social organisation (*or*: of social blueprints) with claims of universal application, because they otherwise would not have the chance and opportunity to dominate or govern the planetary scene – and with the, in the meanwhile, attained density of the world network (mesh or grid), more modest aims and goals do not provide any absolute security and safety. Bearers of universal or world-historical ideas are therefore certain nations, not the whole world. Nonetheless, the difference between this new and more intensive phase of planetary politics and the epoch of European imperialism cannot be overlooked, for it is patently obvious. The imperialistic Powers indeed had certain ideas about the shaping and formation, or the partitioning and division, of the globe, and in fact talked of their self-imposed (self-appointed) civilizing mission; yet at the same time they assumed as self-evident the clear dividing

lines between “European” and “Asian” or “Negro” with regard to social needs and social or political possibilities. The thought and perception that the same plan of social organisation (*or*: social blueprint) can and should by and large find planetary application, rises and comes into sight peremptorily on the world horizon the moment at which two large, great nations step onto (appear on or enter) the world-historical stage: communistic Russia and the capitalistic United States. Both represent, pursue and promote – as nations wanting (*or*: with the ambition) to be great and world Powers – the programmatic connection of the social and the planetary (standpoint or aspect) with each other, albeit with opposing and opposed signs and symbolism. Which signs and symbolism would prevail and predominate depended on the outcome of the conflict between the great (large) nations, not for instance on the immanent “features of the system” looked at *in abstracto*. The planetary plan of social organisation (*or*: the planetary social blueprint) of the communists failed, shipwrecked, in other words, not because of its moral or economic inferiority, but because Russia’s national power ran into the superior national power of the United States. (One could say the same with regard to the reaching of national-socialistic Germany for world power). If capitalistic “logic (or Reason)” had been incarnated world-historically in Belgium and in Switzerland, and the planned economy’s “absurdity (or Unreason)” in Russia and China, then the preferences of world history would have been completely different than what turned out in 1989. This insight and ascertainment are of the utmost historical and methodical (i.e. methodological) importance: it shows how deeply political and social history go (flow) into each other, i.e. intertwine and interlock with each other.

The same thought can be formulated in reverse: the world-historical potency of communism, that is, the capacity and ability to champion a plan of social organisation (social blueprint) on a planetary scale, would have been equal to nil if it had to be condensed within Albania’s borders. However, communism

seized and conquered Russia and China – and *this* gave it momentum and seriousness; the planetary, the social and the national (standpoint or aspect) could and had to (*or*: could and, were in fact obliged to) now come and act together. In actual fact, the national endeavours and efforts of Russia (or of the erstwhile Soviet Union) at achieving world power were tightly connected with processes which changed the world map, and had as a consequence an unprecedented thickening and condensing of planetary politics. One is today easily inclined to forget the powerful influence that the October Revolution exerted on the colonised peoples of Asia and Africa. The October Revolution's contribution to the collapse of the colonial system existed not only in respect of political and military support, which it offered to the anti-colonial movements and to the corresponding elites, but it stretched to the ideologically and psychologically crucial field of the legitimisation of the philosophy of history. The proletarian peoples were supposed to, at a planetary level through their struggle against the colonial masters and rulers (i.e. colonisers), accompany or even anticipate the revolution of the proletarians in the developed capitalistic countries. The Stalinistic five-stage schema of historical development allowed and provided for (*or*: The Stalinist schema regarding historical evolution considered obligatory on a universal scale the crossing of five stages<sup>xvi</sup> and hence foresaw) the social convergence of all nations shortly before (*or*: at the threshold of) the completion (and consummation) of history, so that now historical praxis (practice) could refute and prove wrong the humiliating racist teachings. In any event, the former colonial masters and rulers (colonisers) were on the point of and under the pressure of the geopolitical competition of the Soviet Union – whether they liked it or not –, discovering the equal dignity and the equal rights of all men (i.e. humans). The coming into being of numerous subjects with equal rights under international law out of the process of decolonisation (*or*: through the process of the collapse of the colonial system) widened the world-political room to move of the Soviet Union (*or*: the leeway

or scope of the Soviet Union in the arena of world politics), and actually (topically) or potentially turned every corner of the planet into a place to fight over. Thus, the Cold War signified a high point in the form-related (i.e. formal-morphological) formation and completion of modern planetary politics, by strongly and vigorously driving forward, and keeping in mind as well as making clear every day, the tight interdependence of all regions of the world and of all aspects of world politics.

If Marxism and the communistic movement had an effect in the industrial Western countries and lands above all because of the fact that they spread the material interpretation of the liberal idea (notion, thought) of equality, and by soaking, saturating the social atmosphere of capitalism by the growing enmity towards the type of the “capitalist”, then they in the economically underdeveloped nations, in which they seized power, reinforced in a different way the planetary tendency of development (*or*: otherwise helped the planetary evolutionary tendency to [[achieve]] a breakthrough) towards mass democracy. Here the existing pre-capitalistic or half-capitalistic patriarchalistic social structures were smashed to pieces with violence, atomisation (the fragmentation and splintering of society into individuals) and at the same time the massification of individuals, were promoted not only through the dissolution and disintegration of the extended family and the incorporation (putting into order) of individuals into mass organisations of a vocational/professional/occupational and political kind, but also through policing (spying) and terror(ism). The character of authority as dominance was also changed fundamentally, in relation to which the heightening of its intensity and its strict, intransigent exercising accompanied a detachment from the sociological type of class domination and from the setting-up and establishment of a pure (unmixed) ruling and dominating elite. Namely, anyone in principle could reach, attain and acquire or occupy a superior or dominant position (and in actual fact nearly all

the members of the bureaucratic nomenklatura started in practice “from the absolute bottom” (*or*: started their career from the lower rungs of each and every respective hierarchy)), on the sole condition that he possessed and mastered the art of survival in a dictatorship and was in the position to optimally exploit the available pathways to ascension (primarily the mechanisms of the party)<sup>xvii</sup>. That can be called democratic in the sense that the person concerned had indeed at his disposal intellectual(-spiritual) and political capabilities, aptitudes, talents (qualifications, credentials), but did not have to fulfil and satisfy any social prerequisites (preconditions). There was no juristically i.e. legally safeguarded and inherited private property on a socially significant scale, and the in part sizeable and considerable differences in standard of living between “equal” and “more equal” animals (to remember Orwell) were mainly founded in, and arose from, the privileged access of the nomenklatura to the enjoyment of and pleasure in consumer goods, immovables (real property, real estate) and services.

The dictatorship of the party was exercised in the name of utopia, that is, with the declared aim of the realisation of the utopian plan of social organisation (= the utopian social blueprint). It was legitimised with the argument that political action in view of (*or*: which has as its aim) the establishment of utopia, but under conditions and circumstances under which this establishment *hic et nunc* is impossible, demands the taking of extraordinary measures. The domination of the party was made therefore not least crystal-clear in its responsibility and jurisdiction (powers, competence, scope) to bindingly define when conditions for the realisation of utopia were to be seen as ripe, and over and above that, when to postpone the realisation of utopia in the name of precisely this same realisation. It is obvious that the aforementioned argument was ideological, i.e., it gave the party the possibility of doing something other than that which it ought to have done on the basis of the narrow, strict interpretation of the same

argument in the sense of the utopian objective or setting of the utopian aim. Under “something other/something else” the acts and actions are of course meant which were everything other than utopian, namely, they were dictated by calculus, i.e. weighing up and calculation in terms of power politics, and served partly the strengthening and consolidation of new social hierarchies, partly the pushing through, i.e. the pursuit and achievement of national aims and goals. Hence, the critics of utopia commit a serious logical and historical error when they want to deduce the violent character of communistic domination straight from the striving after the establishment of utopia; this amounts to or entails a confusion between utopian or utopistic ideology and the legitimization of communistic domination, and, this communistic domination’s reality as determined by power politics. Violence, however, always arrives on the scene (there) where the distance between the present, existing and the striven after or pursued state of affairs (situation of things) appears to be so great that only by way of the cutting of the Gordian knot can the said distance be bridged; in other words, not merely utopian projects and undertakings beget violence, i.e. such which aim at the establishment and achievement of a perfect society, but all large-scale, grandiose ventures and undertakings which stand before considerable real obstacles and countervailing forces, and that is why such non-utopian but nonetheless grandiose and large-scale undertakings can be, or possibly are, unrealisable from the very beginning. The historical proof for that does not have to be sought for a long time: political action in the name of utopia has put no new kind of, exclusively its own and without a second thought, as such, knowable forms of violence in the world, that is, it did not beget any form of violence which would not have been exercised and applied in the pursuit of religious, national, social, racist etc. aims and goals. The great collective acts of violence of this [[the 20<sup>th</sup>]] century, i.e. both world wars, had nothing to do with utopian endeavours, although they coincided with the planetary unfolding of the communistic movement. And the other way around: it can be proven that the

most excruciating and harrowing paroxysms of communistic violence can be traced back, and are due, to reasons of realpolitik (realistic politics). Violent collectivisation and forced industrialisation in the Soviet Union were set in motion in the justified expectation of a great war, in which that internationally isolated giant land or big country would have to taste and suffer once again the bitter fate (lot) of 1853, 1904<sup>xviii</sup> and 1917/18 – and perhaps even worse –, had it sat and waited for the long, calm, tranquil development of the economy and society. Only the five-year plans put the Soviet Union in the position of setting and lining up on time a modern technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) army of an industrial power, and of winning the arms race and the war against Germany. Because of that, the course (flow) of world history in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was literally changed. This, – one may not want to see and admit out of anti-communistic pathos –, however, the taboo of this ascertainment is (*or*: the conversion of this ascertainment into a taboo constitutes) ideology and propaganda, not historical science. The Stalinist Soviet Union, not liberal France or parliamentary England, defeated national socialism. And the preconditions for the successful military intervention of the United States in Western Europe were created in Stalingrad.

Whereas now the “right-wing” critics of utopia tried hard to prove that the original/initial Marxism and Soviet communism belonged together in the same sense as utopia and violence (*or*: interweave with each other in the same sense as utopia with violence), on the “left-wing” side of the ideological spectrum, many and influential intellectuals were preparing to provide evidence of the opposite. According to them, Marx’s work contains an indestructible, indissoluble humanistic core, and a perception of the essence of man which cannot be absorbed and exhausted in “mechanicistic” schemata regarding the evolution of history (historical development), and should be released from its being embraced (taken or collected) by economistic Soviet Marxism-Leninism

in order to serve as the theoretical basis of a social critique of a new type, and of a corresponding renewal, of the socialistic movement. In view of their ethical prejudice, biases and their rootedness (roots) in the Western European cultural milieu<sup>xix</sup>, these intellectuals<sup>xx</sup> of course could hardly ever realise and understand the national and planetary necessities which guided the political action of the Soviet Union and of China; that is why they vacillated constantly between the naivety of the fellow-traveller, who overlooks a lot, beautifies, i.e. puts things into a favourable light, or simply swallows, and, the indignation and outrage of someone disappointed and let down, who then resorts to and latches onto downright daemonology as a method of explanation. All the same, they had the impression that the Soviet Union and China were, so to speak, obliged to realise the political programme of Western intellectuals already because they made use of the red flag and the rhetoric belonging to it (i.e. the red flag and the associated ideology). As intellectuals, whose power claim must consist in translating and applying certain (of their own) ideas and values fully, directly and bindingly (in)to social praxis, they could not and did not want to see that ideas and values in general have an effect on a larger scale only, that is, by being worked on (edited, processed, treated, handled) by (*or*: by, that is, becoming objects of processing on the part of) interested interpreters. By the way, not otherwise did the humanistic re-interpretation of original Marxism fare (*or*: Besides, that was the fate of the “humanitarian” re-interpretation of initial Marxism)<sup>xxi</sup>. The “alienation (and estrangement)” theorems achieved in the cultural-revolutionary 1960s and 1970s broad popularity (*or*: The theorems of “alienation” became most (or exceedingly) popular in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of the, in those days, “cultural revolution”), because they were understood in the light of a keyword or catchword (slogan), which in view of the hedonistic fundamental orientation of mass producing and mass consuming, anti-authoritarian and permissive mass democracy came to be a key function (*or*: which acquired a key-function on account of the hedonistic basic

orientation of mass democracy as social formation dominated by mass production, mass consumption and ethical (moral) tolerance and permissiveness): what is meant (what we mean) of course is the absolutely electrifying keyword/catchword of individual “self-realisation”.

The mass-democratic re-interpretation or meta-interpretation of Marxian humanism, which suited and went well with the above-mentioned material interpretation of the right to equality, was for one reason indispensable, which *prima facie* may strike someone as strange, or is perhaps paradoxical. Marx’s ideal of man (humans) or Marx’s ideal man stemmed from the bourgeois educational ideal as to its basic features, in which the classicistic perceptions and representations of harmony mixed with the anthropological utopia of *homo universalis*; the classless society, in which everyone would be able to develop unrestrained(ly) and uninhibited(ly), would abound, teem with great/major and small/minor Shakespeares and Goethes rather than with tone-setting (trend-setting) pop-stars, tourists living it up and living life to the full, and jet-set professors and intellectuals. The deep cultural rootedness and debt of Marxism in and to the bourgeois educational ideal and generally in and to bourgeois literary and artistic forms is seen during the 20<sup>th</sup> century in its fundamental rejection of the literary-artistic avant-garde and the modern (i.e. modernism), despite the sporadic and unfortunate, ill-fated or unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation. In the West, this rejection was frequently felt to be a sign (indication) of philistine or petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness and provincialism, however, this impression could only come into being because the West itself had, through the paradigm shift around 1900, turned its back on bourgeois culture. The Marxists could therefore now invoke the great realist traditions of bourgeois art, which socialistic realism was supposed to continue, in order to interpret the modernistic and avant-gardistic severance from and abandonment of such bourgeois realist traditions as the ideological expression

of the now progressive, i.e. ongoing and advancing bourgeois decadence; since they deemed or considered themselves to be the only historically conceivable, thinkable inheritor and heir of bourgeois society, they were hardly capable of the insight that after the bourgeois age (epoch, era), in the West, nevertheless, something other than communism was possible, something whose ideological projection constituted exactly the *anti-bourgeois* modern and avant-garde (or: the *anti-bourgeois* currents of modernism and the avant-garde). The Marxists, as the last to hold the flag of bourgeois traditions and thought figures (schemata of thought) high, did so also in the sector of the theory of history, where they insisted on the hypostatisation of History and the notion or perception of stage-wise (gradual, graduated) progress. All-round Man and the progressing History were, however, precisely the entities of the substances through which the bourgeois-liberal world theory (i.e. world view) drove out and displaced the theological world view. When the mass-democratic culture of the 20<sup>th</sup> century dissolved these substances into interchangeable and freely combinable functions, the bourgeois thoughts (intellectual) world (or world of ideas) was fatally struck. The collapse of Marxism anthropologically oriented in terms of the philosophy of history consequently sealed, stamped and confirmed the end of bourgeois culture. This must of course, from the perspective of ideologically determined interpretations and periodisations of the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century appear to be the greatest of all paradoxes (or: as the paradox of paradoxes).

In short, for it to be able to exert its historical influence and impact, Marxism had to be ideologised, i.e. converted into ideology – irrespective of whether under the influence/aegis, or taking the form, of “dialectical and historical materialism”, or anthropologically postulated –, in order to be able to have an effect historically. In this sense, Marxism is entirely absorbed by, or is totally fused with, the communistic or the “left-wing” political movements of the East and of the West, i.e. it has no existence outside of each and every ideological

expression of those movements, and it does not exist in any chemically pure form. Vis-à-vis the great scientist, which Marx was *inter alia* too, it would, nonetheless, be unjust, and for social science itself, a significant loss, if one did not add that certain basic or central ideas of his possess a lasting, permanent value, and are in themselves immune to ideological usage – in fact, on the contrary, they can serve as the key to unearth and expose the artifices (deceptions, clever tricks) of ideological thought. Never, do I believe, were certain basic positions of the Marxian way of looking at history so true and so topical as in the planetary history precisely starting now, and indeed the views that the level and character of the relation between natural being or creature, man, and, the rest of nature, have a decisive effect and impact on the constitution, composition and texture of the forms of socialisation (*or*: on the mode of the constitution and of the structuring or arranging of human society); that human relations, which are crystallised in these forms of socialisation (*or*: in social structuring/arranging), are apprehended and strengthened, consolidated or modified on the part of actors through ideologies, that is, they are reflected and echoed in(side) a “false consciousness”, which satisfies normative and at the same time polemical needs; that the discrepancy between false consciousness and real processes do not bring historical becoming to a standstill, but really drives historical becoming forward (propels historical becoming or pushes it along), and that the heterogony of ends represents or constitutes the natural mechanism for the unwinding or development of processes of *«longue durée»*. Undogmatically interpreted, these theses apply regardless of sociological preferences as to the priority of this or that material and ideational factors, and they can be connected or linked in a fertile manner to methodical (i.e. methodological), anthropological and social-theoretical approaches, which more or less differ from the corresponding Marxian approaches. Precisely this, however, demonstrates that Marx’s scientific work, even if one wants to apprehend it as a mere inventory of basic questions or

fundamental problems, belongs to the fixed stock of modern social science. No modern thinker has so deeply, profoundly and so vividly, graphically shown like Marx that history, economy, politics, philosophy and anthropology are basically taken as one single thing and one single discipline (*or*: basically constitute only one science) – irrespective of under which signs or symbolism Marx himself wanted to effect the great unification of all of the aforesaid sub-disciplines. If the mass of the contended and unperceptive “specialists”, who populate and flood the mass-democratic scene of knowledge, can no longer stand at the height of this achievement, and either mock and deride this same achievement, or can emulate it (or mimic/imitate/ape it) only through anemic constructs cobbled together (or made) from second or third-hand materials, then this is not the fault of that great thinker<sup>xxii</sup>.

But precisely if one assesses Marx’s scientific feat and value in this way, one must know that the logic of the scholar’s study, and, the logic of social evolution, social development and of social struggles are two different kinds of things. The key for the understanding of this latter logic of social evolution and social struggles cannot be the self-understanding of the actors<sup>xxiii</sup> – this self-understanding constitutes only one of the factors having an effect. The self-understanding of the defeated and vanquished, namely, of the communistic movement, which historically appeared in the name of the realisation of utopia, cannot explain amongst other things why utopia could not nevertheless be realised. And the self-understanding of the victorious West can neither make the historical influence of the communistic foe on the moulding and shaping of today’s West clear (nor interpret the said historical influence of communism as the West’s foe), nor account for or shed light on the perspectives, i.e. prospects of this world, which by no means are deduced from the mere summation of the features and advantages of the West minus the evils of communism. Regardless of what today is fashion and conformism, and also regardless of how many

scientists succumb and are subordinated, and how much, to fashion and conformism: Marxism and communism cannot be judged historically as if the ideology of the Western camp were the precise expression of the sole faithful interpreter of historical movement. Should this in actual fact be the case, then this correspondence of Is and consciousness would be a historical novum (novelty), that is, the West would have realised (made reality) what the Marxist mythological dialectic expected of the proletariat: that the proletariat's own self-understanding coincides with the knowledge of the objective course of history, and the proletariat is constituted as the self-understanding of this latter objective course of history. Of course, the victor always feels the right to the assumption or belief that his victory is tangible proof of the coincidence of his self-understanding with history's meaning. The West would, indeed, like to present its victory simply as the victory of freedom (FREEDOM) writ large (*or*: Freedom with a capital F), however, at the same time it is about something much more concrete: it must accomplish and finish, under its aegis and with its signs, i.e. symbolism, the interweaving of planetary and social (*or*: it must see the interweaving of the planetary and the social element through), which the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has set as order of the day – it must, therefore, push (carry) through and impose its own social plan (*or*: plan of social organisation) on a planetary scale. The discrepancy between its self-understanding and the objective course of history will manifest itself in the contradictions and the conflicts which this undertaking will display (*or*: will beget/give birth to). In itself, that interweaving of the planetary and the social element, which through the driving force of the motors and engines of mass producing and mass consuming mass democracy reaches its greatest density, proves that the New Times have come to their end, since they were a specifically European phenomenon – and with it, bourgeois-liberal culture is also at an end, which put its stamp (seal) on (*or*: which stamped) the epoch from the Renaissance to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Despite the propagandistic sweet nothings, honeyed words and

beautiful-sounding eloquence, and ideological self-deception, the West is today flooding the rest of the world not with this bourgeois-liberal culture, but with mass-democratic technicism and economism, on the one hand, and with the hedonistic mass culture of Kitsch, on the other hand<sup>xxiv</sup>. Even if we want to disregard the grave, serious reasons which threaten the social plan of the West (*or*: the Western plan of social organisation) exactly in its growing planetarisation – ecological and demographic factors, the world-wide spreading and dissemination of anomie, the sharpening (exacerbating) of the struggles of distribution both amongst the great, large nations as well as inside of the Western nations exactly because of the intensifying (*or*: more intense) competition and rivalry from the outside; the dissolving, abolishment or annulment of the conjunction or coupling (political package deal) of the free (market) economy and parliament –, the possibility is not to be dismissed out of hand that the economic and political principles which the West today champions, could be turned against it. Free trade will appear in a different light when the first exporting country (exporter) will no longer be called the United States or Germany, but China<sup>xxv</sup>; and freedom of movement will trigger historical and barbaric reactions should or when hundreds of millions set off to cross, and or, actually cross the borders of the industrial<sup>xxvi</sup> countries. Whereas the victory of the principles of the West in the bourgeois-liberal and imperialistic epoch meant eo ipso the victory of the West, the victory of the principles of today's mass-democratic West can bring about at a planetary level the decline or collapse (destruction, breakup, downfall, ruin) of the West (Occident). That can proceed or happen slowly, but it can also happen quickly. The most rapid disintegration (decomposition) of the communistic imperium (empire) does not merely show that communism was a giant with clay feet (feet of clay), as dominant opinion in the West says (*or*: as the public opinion of the West believes). The teaching is much more general and means: states and regimes, no matter of what name (*or*: no matter what they are called), are of

their nature fragile construct(ion)s or assemblies and can be broken up in a flash.

## 2. The next treason (betrayal) of the intellectuals<sup>xxvii</sup>

The old lament and complaints about the seducibility and “treason (betrayal) of the intellectuals”, that is, their compliance with, and yielding to, the temptations of dominance (as authority) and violence, must after the collapse of communism, be started in particularly shrill tones (*or*: must after the collapse of communism, be heard again with particular intensity, as should have been expected). These complaints are in our [[20<sup>th</sup>]] century at least as old as the renowned book by Julien Brenda (1927). Too often and for too long, many intellectuals in fact have, and not always the least significant, as apologists or – the more cowardly – as fellow travellers, connected their hopes and their own social claim of leadership (or their leadership claims), in one way or another, with the outcome or course of the communistic experiment. Most of those surviving, endeavour now through the ostentatious beating of their own breast or through foolhardy and at will re-interpretations of their old words, phrases and deeds to make what has happened, unhappened (what has been done, undone), in order to not lose (to maintain) contact with the flourishing business/shop or bazaar of the spirit (spiritual(-intellectual) life). Across from the self-flagellations, self-accusations or alchemistic arts, stands the arrogance and conceit and the sometimes inquisitorial know-it-all attitude (or bulging stance) of those who had always stood on the – conclusively determined, i.e. adjudicated and decided in 1989 – right side (*or*: who had from the very beginning chosen the “right” (according to the judgement of 1989) camp). Amongst these are again often those who are the most brusque and insolent, who arrived on the scene and appeared publicly late enough to be able to decide free of risk in favour of the victorious cause, i.e. victor.

The difference between the remorseful and repentant communists or the philo-communists (friends of the communists), and triumphant Westerners is supposed to have been according to common, popular opinion (*or*: as is often said), that the former were prepared to overlook inhumanity or even to welcome it, if only it was committed in the name of Utopia, whereas the latter served through their anti-utopian pragmatism, the liberal cause of humane (philanthropic) tolerance. From another perspective, nevertheless, the subjectively perceived distinction is eclipsed (overshadowed) by an objective commonality. “Progressive” therefore intellectuals thinking in terms of the philosophy of history and accepting of the philosophy of historical progress, sided with militant Utopia in the belief that Utopia will in the future be reality, that is, History will prove them right (*or*: that Utopia will become, in the future, reality, that is, History will vindicate (justify) them). And pro-Western intellectuals can today blame the sins of the opposite side with such self-conviction because they opine that History proved them right by 1989 at the latest. In both cases, world History appears as, or is called – as Schiller said – the world court, in both cases the assumption is made that one’s own each and every respective self-understanding ideationally articulates the objective course of history. Just as the Marxist mythological dialectic equated the self-knowledge of the proletariat with the self-knowledge of History to its end (*or*: in its final phase), so the “liberal” party of intellectuals (*or*: “liberal” intellectuals) today opines/opine that the self-understanding of the West (that means its “values”) could make up the basis of a social blueprint or programme with, in practice, universal application, and really constitute, or felicitously finalise and consummate, History as universal History (*or*: the basis of a universally applicable social programme and drive universal History to a happy end).

The aforementioned self-understanding of the West therefore amounts to a claim of universalisation. Intellectuals, who embrace and espouse human rights or tolerance as Western values, are thinking of, and champion, not merely a reality in the present, but also a future project, namely, the realisation of the Western social blueprint or organisation on a world scale. And since in their mind or thoughts world, already for polemical reasons, the contrast and opposition of “totalitarianism and freedom” dominates, thus they are not conscious (do not take account) of either the origin or provenance of their vision from a certain philosophy of history, or the relationship and pertinence of their beloved/favourite panhuman society (*or*: the world society they have in mind) with regard to universalistic utopias – and first of all with regard to the Marxist universalistic utopia, which originally was a variation of the liberal dream of the political-ethical unification of the world under the aegis of an open economy.

However, since they (i.e. Western-thinking/minded intellectuals) have learnt to confuse the anti-utopistic and the anti-communistic positioning with each other, they will thus not and cannot perceive and admit to the utopian components (or dimension) of the Western promise, which is now meant to be kept (*or*: of the Western pledges, which now ought to be realised): six, eight or ten billion humans are supposed to consume per capita as much as the blissful and blessed in the highly industrialised continent[[s]] (*or*: advanced industrial countries), and can settle wherever they want. Because an ice-cold commercial sense or calculation, and a highly sensitive or tender consensual-communicative culture, will equally contribute, as is believed, to the abolition of borders and wars. Compared with such perspectives or prospects, the ideal states, i.e. utopias, of More and Bacon, but also in part the socialistic social representations and visions at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, look like provincial Spartan work groups or communities. Today’s Western vision of, and pledge for, the future is, of its universal scope, and its material content hardly to be outbid or

outdone in its radicality (*or*: is infinitely more radical, both as to its universal extent, as well as to its material content). Whoever has accepted and prescribed it, has accepted and prescribed, whether he knows it or not, a new Utopia supported in terms of, and based on, a certain philosophy of History.

These interrelations are concealed by the ethicisation of the discourse (*or*: are usually covered up/cloaked by the one-sided orientation of interest in the ethical side of problems). Intellectuals were already always primarily proponents and promulgators of values, and that is why they welcome the utopian social blueprint (or utopian social pledge) of the West in a moral sense of a conclusive or final rejection of every “totalitarianism” by individualistically comprehended human rights, peaceful regulation and settlement of all conflicts and so forth. Thus, the engagement and commitment apply to the ethical such that (*or*: Since mobilisation is inspired by ethical perceptions,) the intellectuals themselves, who stand up for Western values, often otherwise turn away from this same West, since they consider its form of the economy (economic system) ecologically or humanly pernicious and disastrous. The dichotomy is psychologically understandable – one wants to have the meat without the bones –, but historically-sociologically untenable. Even at the risk of scandalising our ethicists, that is, the ideologues of *our own* society, one must ascertain that universalistic-human rights principles, which ascribe to all individuals *as individuals* equal autonomy and dignity, can only flourish in societies in which a highly differentiated division of labour atomises the collective (i.e. fragments and breaks up the totality into individuals), and mass production and mass consumption run at full speed. If these preconditions are lacking, then the free spaces must shrivel up, i.e. dwindle, in which individualistic self-realisation, tolerance, consensus unfold, develop and flower. Such principles or stances are in fact the concomitants of a secured prosperity and affluence, in which for no

individual is it existentially decisive and crucial what the person next to him believes or is up to (is doing/does).

Some intellectuals liken or comprehend the inner coherence (belonging together, common bond) of such an ethics with such a form of the economy (or economic organisation) – only they comprehend this under/with optimistic signs and symbolism. Precisely in the name of ethics, they therefore defend in principle and in a wholesale fashion the Western system – including the formerly frequently despised “Americanism” (which they today see far more forgivingly and indulgently) – and its future prospects in the name of panhuman ethical values; they condemn every “cultural pessimism” and every pessimistic prognosis regarding Western culture and civilisation, and behind the sallies against the “civilisation of money” they smell and sense nostalgic “blood-and-soil” rhetoric (*or*: and they condemn the rejection of the Western apotheosis of “money” as nostalgia for fascistic rhetoric, which also contradistinguished to “money”, “blood and soil”). They thus leave the traditional left-wing critique of culture and of capitalism as well as the sobering reminder of the “tragic in history” to the so-called “New Right”, without in the process noticing that they likewise are paying homage to and indulging in a hackneyed philosophy of history – the optimistic –, and this not out of insight, but out of (i.e. in) defiance (out of spite, just to be stubborn).

Piquantly, amongst them people are found who still yesterday were constantly babbling about or sucking on ideologem(e)s of “alienation and estrangement” and held under their armpits the “Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts” of the young Marx, but in the atmosphere of 1989 took the long ago due and specified final step towards reconciliation with the “system”, with the “free market” etc.. The source of ethical and political inspiration was also in this case the normative force/power of the actual (*or*: what is called by legal practitioners (lawyers and jurists) the “normative power of the real/actual”). After the

shipwreck of the Utopia of the East, the domesticated remnants of the “Left” made the Utopia of the West thoroughly its own, and without further ado, exchanged left-wing “anti-fascism” with liberal “anti-totalitarianism”. They will for the second time in succession be deceived should globalisation of the Western (form of the) economy and ethics not entail the realisation of the corresponding Utopia, but tremendous, colossal struggles for distribution and catastrophes of a planetary magnitude or range. Nonetheless, intellectuals were and are not, in relation to that, in a position to see clearly with a scientific mind and aim (or to scientifically comprehend) the mechanisms of the heterogony of ends in history, but simply yield and provide the ideological catchwords which set these mechanisms in motion (*or*: through which these mechanisms function). That is why they are predestined to treason (*or*: That is why betrayal is their fate/lot/destiny), if one with the word (term) “treason (betrayal)”, apart from the bowing (obeisance) before the victorious cause, i.e. victor on each and every respective occasion, may/should denote (means) also the distance between the declared aims or goal of the engagement (commitment and mobilisation), and the long-term outcome of historical events and developments.

### III. The ethical veneers of liberal utopia

#### 1. Universalism, relativism and tolerance<sup>xxviii</sup>

This is another P.K. “tour de force”, absolutely unique in theory, and apparently it will be published at:

<http://journal.telospress.com/>

later in 2018 or in 2019. If it’s not, I’ll translate it with the greatest of pleasure!

Some major points (I’ve used words and phrases P.K. would never use, so you need to read the full article, properly translated!):

Of great interest is the relationship between tolerance and universalism and relativism, that latter two being ancient, whereas tolerance is a product of the European New Times.

Initially, tolerance in favour of Reason turned against theology.

Reason, however, was still tied to what is ethical so that nihilism and libertarianism could not become accusations against the advocates of Reason.

P.K. provides us with another one of his not infrequent hilarious comments, this time regarding theology in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The social context of mass democracy is given.

Self-realisation, having triumphed over Christian asceticism, was accompanied by an uprising against the “totalitarianism of Reason”.

P.K. then goes into the *modus operandi* of combining tolerance both with universalism *and* with relativism!

There are real-world practical reasons why relativism has rarely ever wanted to take the form of consistent nihilism.

Relativism against universalism, universal principles against specific ethics.

Both sides of the “Reason”-relativism debate have accepted pluralism and tolerance; each claims it is the better means to achieve such tolerance.

Universal understanding does not mean universal values.

Communicative action talks of “rationality” and “language”, but conveniently forgets anthropology.

Panhuman characteristics does not equate with universal agreement on norms.

All that applied universalism could ever achieve, e.g. everyone living in one “global village”, is the conversion of all wars into civil wars.

Only an ideologue (and or retard) would ever believe that war-free or conflict-free utopia is achievable.

On the other hand, neither does the acknowledgement of the relativity of positionings (perspectives) and values as an empirically verifiable *Is* guarantee any *Ought* per se as the “post-modern” cretins believe.

In practice, tolerance (incl. “human dignity”) becomes a dominant ideology and is not applied because tolerance qua tolerance arises from relativism.

The “end of ideologies” is part of mass democracy’s own ideological self-understanding.

Between universalistic and relativistic positions, mass democratic and planetary-globalist ideology engages in polemics, but cannot or does not want to see its fundamental contradictions.

At the end of the day, Western mass democracy is tolerant of other cultures, but always with a hierarchisation of cultures for the benefit of the West (and once such tolerance is not of benefit,...).

There is no one fixed objective, scientific method.

One can neither draw normative results from historical-relativistic consideration, nor will universalistic perceptions ever be able to satisfactorily explain historical praxis.

## 2. “Human rights”: conceptual confusion and political instrumentalisation (or exploitation)<sup>xxix</sup>

This short article has already been translated into English and is available at:

<http://journal.telospress.com/content/2014/166/161.extract>

There is a rather exorbitant fee, but it's something by P.K., so if you are interested in what you've read by P.K. on my site for free, you have nothing to lose but US\$20! (I have not and will not ever read this translation or any other English translation not produced by myself, so I cannot vouch for its faithfulness to the original).

Some major points (I've used words and phrases P.K. would never use, so you need to read the full article, properly translated!):

There are no human rights.

P.K. goes into his incomparable “let's have a laugh mode”.

For there to be real human rights, i.e. rights which every single individual on the planet – all humans – can claim and enjoy, every single human being must have such rights wherever he may be. And in reality, that is not the case.

P.K. really can't help himself. Absolutely hilarious stuff re: primitive tribes!

If a state allows the whole world to enter it, then it won't be a state anymore.

Only a world state recognising the equal relations between all people everywhere in the world would be able to provide real (in practice, not just as ideological bullshit, “signalling”, etc.) human rights.

But even if a world state eventuated, if there was not “enough to go around” (as would most likely be the case), then such a world state would grant rights which have nothing to do with Western mass-democratic ideals.

The expulsion of illegal immigrants is done on the basis of national sovereignty and not in regard to the rhetoric of “human rights”.

More hilarity about telephoning humanity and the festive appearance of high-minded philosophers!

Conceptual confusion and ambiguity will be the order of the day for as long as there are interests behind the ideological sloganeering (i.e. in effect, in one way or another, forever!)

Only the strong can impose “human rights” on the weak, and not vice versa (this is pure Thucydides!)

From the collapse of the Utopia of the East, to blind belief in the Utopia of the West.

From the left-wing “useful idiots” of the Kremlin, to the “useful idiots” of multinational corporations and universalistic Americanism.

Still more “philosophy and laughs”!

The billions of the “South” and of the “East” are interpreting “human rights” not formally, but materially.

Redistribution of the world’s wealth, now!

P.K. even expressly states that the internal logic of “free trade”, as well as the internal logic “human rights” will soon turn against the West, and the West will abandon today’s ideological positions.

But even then, it is doubtful if the West will win the terrible struggles of distribution which will shake the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## IV. The global economy, global democracy and the global struggle over distribution

### 1. Globalisation, politics, distribution (*or*: Globalisation: politics, economy and distribution)

From the materially interested side, but also from the gullible, [[those]] who (*or*: Circles with tangible material interests<sup>xxx</sup>, but also various gullible people, who) out of temperament and idiosyncrasy, are inclined to warm up to and embrace more hopeful perspectives and prospects, it is propagated (*or*: propagandise the view) that growing, progressing globalisation would entail and bring about the ever increasing equalisation of the collective circumstances, relations and collective aims and goals of life, and consequently create commonalities between humans, necessarily making bloody conflicts obsolete and superfluous; because, as is said, globalisation is supposed to in fact weaken or even dissolve and abolish exactly the alleged, putative originators and causes of such conflict, i.e. nations and states. This perception or view was proclaimed as, and advanced to – above all after the collapse of communism – an article of faith and self-evident truth, so that this perception or view's premises and its inner conclusiveness, i.e. logical consistency, are not sufficiently questioned.

## The sermon (preaching or homily)

Not any activity whatsoever, e.g. the preaching of brotherhood and love, is regarded as the vehicle and bearer of globalisation and of the equalisation of circumstances and of goals (values), but one activity completely concrete: the expanding and intertwined economy. A first premise of the above-mentioned perception and article of faith is therefore the assumption of, and belief in, the primacy of the economic, i.e. the economy, and indeed in its contrast and opposition to the political, since politics is equated with power politics (“the politics of power”) and is contradistinguished to the allegedly immanent peacefulness of the economy. But this dichotomy between politics and economy appears only possible, if one defines both sectors so narrowly (that is, economy is reduced to the technical process of production and politics to administration and management), that the reference to, or any substantive relation with, social praxis gets, i.e. is lost. Historically and sociologically, the dichotomy is untenable and baseless; it constitutes an ideological construction or weapon, which first of all, as is known, was used by ascendant liberalism against the absolutist state, and today remains popular with, and the favourite argument of, supporters of the economy and various economic circles, who of course otherwise do everything in order to instrumentalise and mobilise politics and governments for their own goals in order to not come off worse or lose out regarding orders from the state (*or*: for their own goals, and by no means do they thumb one’s nose at state orders and credits). The construction was, incidentally, already since the 17<sup>th</sup> century connected with the world-historical prognosis that trade and commerce will replace war. What has happened since then, we know well.

## Reason for conflict

The general reason why the economic and the political (politics and the economy) – in every socially and historically important sense of the terms – are and remain inseparable, is obvious. Economy and politics equally concern the concrete relations of concrete people with one another, and every economic change effects a shifting and displacement of the correlation of forces (i.e. balance of power) for the benefit of certain people and to the cost of others. Economic aims and goals are not pursued and achieved in a social-political vacuum, but are measured in the performance(s), efficiencies and output of the competitors, and are accordingly evaluated. Whatever all people can accomplish, and whatever all people can enjoy<sup>xxxi</sup> is just as economically as politically valueless (*or*: has neither economic nor political value) – because value always means: *particular* value. For that reason, absolute gains and profits, i.e. such which indicate a betterment in comparison to an earlier state of our own affairs, are, or appear to be, far less important than relative gains and values, i.e. such which are achieved in comparison to the present state of affairs of our competitors. If one side believes that its relative disadvantages cannot in the foreseeable future be made good/made up for through any kind of economic effort whatsoever, then it must choose between capitulation before the power of the “invisible hand” (A. Smith), and, the politicisation of economic conflict. Because since primeval times, there are only two possibilities of acquiring goods: by producing them, or by taking them from those who have produced them, irrespective of whether with the sword (spear) or through trade quotas. The concept of “vital interests” exists just as much in the economy as in politics, in fact, one could characterise and consider this concept their great common denominator. Wherever the political is thoroughly economised (or economised throughout), i.e. turned into a part of the economic sphere of

human-social activity, the economic, of all things, can therefore rapidly change and turn into the political<sup>xxxii</sup>.

### Where peace ends

These facts of the case or this situation can also be grasped and summarised as follows: the political penetrates (forces its way into, infiltrates, permeates) the economic not so much via the question or processes of production and of communication, but primarily via the question or problem of distribution. Typically enough, the debate over globalisation revolves around processes and suggestions which concern the interweaving and intertwining of world industry and of world trade, as well as the condensation/condensing (thickening) of the worldwide network of communication – the secret of a generally, i.e. on a world scale, acceptable distribution of resources, goods and wealth, nobody has hitherto let out and revealed. However, peace between political units and entities or humans in general is put in danger not so much through the manner globalisation produces and communicates (is produced and communicated), but primarily through how globalisation distributes (is distributed) [[resources and goods are distributed]] (*or*: not so much on account of the mode of production and of communication, as on account of the terms and of the inequalities of distribution).

The globalisation of production and communication exacerbates and aggravates the question and problem of distribution in a double respect (*or*: from two points of view). On the side of those rising (ascending) (*or*: In the interior of the rising (ascending) economic powers), social processes are triggered or set in motion, which can more rapidly increase and multiply rather than satisfy the expectations for *relative* gains and profits – and, as is known, the half-satiated are often more aggressive than the half-hungry (half-starved)

(*or*: half-dead from hunger). Even the limited satisfaction of those expectations creates, after all, in view of the vast (enormous) human masses standing behind such limited satisfaction, a significant wealth, in relation to which the relative (pro)portion of those who have made it in world income a long time ago, is constantly sinking (i.e. going down or getting less) (*or*: in relation to which the relative portion of the developed countries in world wealth continuously decreases), and indeed with the result that the global struggle over distribution is transferred into the interior of the rich nations, which now have to tighten the belt (of the greater part of the population (*or*: of at least broader strata of the people)) in order to remain competitive.

Whoever believes that here it is a matter of a short-term or medium-term restructuring to be carried out and managed, which *has to* succeed with some patience and skilfulness, has hardly comprehended the extent of the planetary transformation going on and being effected. The highly industrialised “West or North” continues to look at the process of globalisation from the confident and misleading vantage point of that part of the world which still has at its disposal more than a good three quarters of world(’s) wealth<sup>xxxiii</sup> and of world energy – and crucial, in the course of this, is moreover the American view of things, which of course, despite ideological confessions of faith in the automatic mechanism and automatic effect of the economic (*or*: the economy), rests on today’s political-military giant lead (*or*: military and diplomatic precedence) of the United States. The by far superior Power tends in relation to that, to see globalisation first of all as the widening of its own unfolding space or field of action/activity, and can or will hardly imagine the long-term consequences of a reversal of the trend. Yet in the confidence and self-conviction of the “West”, the first doubt – and the first shudder (shiver) – have already, especially in Europe, crept in, where coming into consciousness all the more intensely is the fact that the deeper cause of the permanent crisis is the intensity of world trade

and the continual decline in the particular European weight within the world economy. The doubts and the shudders (shivers) will be reinforced under the pressure (of imported and self-made or endogenous) demographic and ecological factors. The borders, which the trends and tendencies of globalisation have in the meanwhile torn down, as a result of the sharpening (exacerbating, aggravating) of the struggles over distribution will be erected anew, regardless of where they will go this time (*or*: even though we do not know exactly by whom and where they will be put this time)<sup>xxxiv</sup>.

### New borders (boundaries, bounds)

This sharpening or exacerbating is to be expected all the more so, since the second premise of the article of faith or perception referred to at the beginning, that namely, the equalisation of the circumstances, relations and aims (goals) of life must lessen and diminish conflicts, is simply false. The commonality of aims and goals begets or brings about friendship if the aim/goal is supposed to be pushed or carried through, i.e. imposed or attained, against a third party; however, it (the said commonality of aims/goals) sows enmity when the attainment or achievement of the common aim/goal by the one side makes the common aim's attainment (the common goal's achievement) by the other side either impossible or even worthless (i.e. without value, valueless). Friendship, therefore, does not arise out of the common setting of the aim/goal (or common objective) as such, but out of the agreement over which rank (i.e. position [[in the pecking order or hierarchy]]) or turn each side will take up or have in the pursuit of the common aim/ goal, and which advantages and benefits it will draw, i.e. extract, out of the common aim's realisation. If regarding this no agreement is reached, then exactly as a result of the commonality in regard to the aim/goal, conflict must be sharpened and exacerbated (aggravated) (*or*: If on

this crucial point no agreement is achieved, then conflict will become more acute exactly because the goal is common), and indeed for the same reason for which the butcher does not become the foe of the fruiterer across [[from him/the street]], but of the butcher next door (next to him). Commonality of aim or goal means struggle over the same resources, same markets, same spaces and the same prizes. And if the commonality as regards the aims/goals of consumption is extended, then the Chinese and the Indian must use just as much energy and raw materials as the North American. With what consequences? (*or*: And if the commonality of the goals is extended to the goals of consumption as well, then the Indian and the Chinese will have to consume as much energy and just as many other raw materials as the North American. What will be the consequences for the planet?)

Equalisation as a result of globalisation is also considered and declared in another sense the precursor and harbinger of peaceful developments (evolution, unfolding) such that its mental effects would contribute to the reduction and dismantling of national cultures, and consequently nationally and culturally determined conflicts. Whether the global alignment or equating of the methods of economising, i.e. economic activity, and the way of life of people will necessarily generate and form a united world culture, may remain an open question here (*or*: we do not need to examine here). At any rate, this world culture could only then provide or constitute a guarantee of peace only if bloody conflicts until now (*or*: in the past) had taken place between nationally and culturally different collective subjects. Civil wars teach us something else (*or*: However, history has known of very many civil wars, and they also were often the worst). So, the only thing for which economic and cultural globalisation vouches (*or*: the only thing which economic and cultural globalisation can guarantee) is merely the transformation of all wars into civil wars.

Whoever anticipates world peace from the weakening or breaking up in itself of nation-states forgets that war was not put in the world first by nation-states (*or*: wars are a phenomenon much older than nation-states). He forgets that the nation-state by no means represents and constitutes the sole conceivable sovereign political collective, and that is why the world-historical alternative choice does not have to read “world society or nation-state”. And finally, he forgets that far worse than every conflict between organised political collectives can be the direct fighting (struggle) of man with man under conditions of global anomie<sup>xxxv</sup>.

## 2. Trade (Commerce) and war<sup>xxxvi</sup>

Barely a year (*or*: Only two years)<sup>xxxvii</sup> before the outbreak of the First World War, a newly published book drew the attention of a broad public (*or*: the wider reading public), it became the talking point of the European and American political-economic elite, and was immediately translated into several languages. Its author was the British publicist Norman Angell, and its original title, “The Great Illusion”, was rendered in the German version reviewed and discussed multiple times and positively, by means of [[the title]] “The false reckoning (bill, invoice, account, calculation)”. False was, according to Angell, the reckoning of (*or*: Victims of this great illusion were) those who anticipated from war(s) and conquest(s) the increasing of the power and of the affluence (prosperity) of their nation. The attained extent of the world-economic interweaving, the henceforth dense and rapid communication(s), and not least of all the international character of the finance and credit system<sup>xxxviii</sup>, had already made the traditional means of power politics (politics of power) obsolete, and had turned economically robust small nations into the equivalent competitors of the great nations.

Although Angell in principle contested every meaning (*or*: radically disputed the significance) of military might (power) for the development of trade (commercial) activity, and castigated the British exponents of such perceptions and views with the same sharpness (acuteness, severity, acerbity, ferocity) as the German ones, he nevertheless approved and accepted the use of non-economic means of power and pressure if these were used for the purpose of the “restoration and maintenance of order”, and consequently would open the road of trade and commerce (*or*: and were for the protection of free trade). Wherever

public order already existed and held sway, as in civilised Europe, conquest(s) were superfluous; on the other hand, Germany would for example have the right to follow the example of Great Britain in India and, for instance, take care of, and impose, order in the Ottoman Empire (*or*: in the Ottoman domain/in Ottoman territory). Angell did not say or did not examine what would have to be done, or what would occur, if one side reserved for itself or claimed the role of the custodian of order in all crucial zones.

This was also not the sole gap (hole) or discrepancy (error) in his argumentation. He was, in economic terms, right in his ascertainment that colonial expansion as it was conducted from the 16<sup>th</sup> until the 19<sup>th</sup> century was from now on, owing to military-administrative costs, unprofitable, and at best to be replaced by direct or indirect (*or*: more or less direct) economic control. This ascertainment could not, nevertheless, alone and in itself support the general thesis of the, already having taken place, world-historical reversal of relations between economic and political-military power (*or*: However, this ascertainment did not suffice on/of its own to prove the general thesis that at a world-historical level, the relations between economic and political-military power had definitively been reversed). The leap in logic (logical leap) was, incidentally, tacitly or indirectly admitted, since (when) Angell declared that he did not want to assert the impossibility of great wars in the future, but simply to prove that war had become once and for all economically useless, in fact damaging<sup>xxxix</sup>.

But also here, his syllogistic reasoning did not remain consistent. Because in several places (excerpts) he expressed and made known his conviction that the progress of the interweaving of the world economy (economic intertwining(s)) would of itself (of themselves) render war impossible and would substitute physical violence with co-operation. This prognosis was obviously logically and historically something other than the diagnosis regarding the economic

meaninglessness and uselessness of wars. So that prognosis and diagnosis could coincide, it had to still be proven that all people in all cases give priority to immediate economic utility and benefit, and at the same time believe that one's own victory in war would also over the long run harm one's own economic interests<sup>xl</sup>. The war which broke out when the publishing (and journalistic) success of Angell's book was still ongoing and lasting, showed that this proof had not been adduced, i.e. it was not proven that war could not break out.

Accordingly, despite all of that, the book did not in the least lose [[anything]] in topicality (timeliness, relevance), nor its adherents and supporters. When three years ago in Berlin [[i.e. 1994]], an American journalist put forward in a speech, similar thoughts, and I reminded him of Norman Angell, he readily confessed the source of his inspiration. Angell's theses attained popularity so easily because in an era in which international economic circulation/intercourse and international economic intertwining(s) had gained considerably (*or*: greatly increased) in volume and density, the early liberal topos or commonplace of the replacement of war by trade seemed to be confirmed with new evidence, that is, with resorting to, or holding the thread of, a long intellectual(-spiritual) tradition, and to fall on ground prepared long ago, i.e. on fertile ground. Nothing other than that is taking place in our days. In any case, around 1900 that evidence or those theses were regarded as irresistible – and indeed not only by liberal politicians, but also by most European military officers and strategists (strategic planners).

Few know today – and still fewer want to know it –, that the almost uncontradicted and undeniable predominance of the offensive military doctrine in regard to all European general staffs before 1914 was founded on the general conviction that economic life had in the meantime become so complex and delicate (sensitive) that it could not countenance and withstand a long war, that is, the decision must be sought as quickly as possible and fall, i.e. be acted upon

and put into practice, as soon as possible (*or*: war must be waged offensively and aggressively and have a quick outcome). In Germany, Moltke had already said this, but it can also be proven by [[scholarly]] research that Schlieffen had such thoughts as the basis and starting point of his strategic planning. An interrelation between the violation of Belgian neutrality and liberal-economistic points of view may seem to be an extreme paradox (*or*: may appear to be entirely paradoxical) in regard to which, however, only familiar, prevailing and easy schematisations are guilty (*or*: are to blame). The true – explainable in retrospect of course – paradox, lies in that the endeavours of all sides for a short war, ended up in a long war (*or*: in its (war's) prolongation).

In the period 1900 to 1914, German-French trade increased about 137 percent, and German-Russian trade about 121 percent. The trade between Germany and Great Britain doubled from 60 to 120 million pounds, and made up nine percent of British trade; more than half of the international cartels of production existing at that time were of joint German-British ownership, one of which in fact produced explosives (B. R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750-1988*, New York 1992). If the economic signs and omens pointed to peace, thus the war, notwithstanding all of that, then breaking out, must have sprung from a logic which was not covered by, i.e. which was different to, the logic of the economy. The investigation of several historical examples does not allow, at any rate, the assertion that there exists a fixed causality, that is, a law in respect of the relations between trade and war, to be ascertained: all possible positive and negative correlations of both these magnitudes are historically attested to and witnessed. Theoretical generalisation may not (cannot) here go or proceed further than accepting (*or*: than the statement of) the parallel existence here of two different logics and two different motivations, which can coincide, but by no means must. On the contrary, both the liberal expectation that trade must replace war, as well as the vulgar-Marxist deduction (inference,

derivation) of war from economic causes, tacitly presume or presuppose the existence of empirically unprovable kinds and forms of law bindedness (determinisms or law(rule)-based necessities). In both cases what is apodictic, i.e. demonstrative (or, the manner of proving) rests on an economic determinism, in relation to which the liberal position, even this time, as so often, turns out like (*or*: the liberal positioning, if examined more carefully, is revealed as) vulgar Marxism with reversed signs (i.e. symbolism). Because only he who believes that economic antagonisms would exclusively give rise to wars, may also assume (or has the right to accept) that economic co-operation will definitely abolish war(s). The latter (economic co-operation abolishing wars) could, by the way, be regarded as the effective antidote to war if it originally would be inaugurated and cultivated with the express intention of functioning as the alternative to bloody conflicts. Regarding that, there are, however, no certain indications, only belated (*ex post facto*) rationalisations.

What drives men in relation to that, to co-operate economically are (*or*: Humans are driven to economic co-operation by) objective economic needs and necessities, which as such are not connected to any peaceful or inimical intention; only the positive or negative course or turn of the co-operative relation suggests such a connection with similar intentions, without this of course being inevitable. Towards the end or close of the twentieth century, the deeper objective reason of the growing global interweaving of the economy is the same which kept (and perhaps set) in motion the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth century: an unprecedented and constantly increasing and constantly being reinforced population density, this time not on a European and limited, but on a planetary, scale. Precisely because in the next century the world-economic interweaving and intertwining will be under the aegis or influence of this objective pressure or factor, the struggles over, and problems of, distribution threaten to be sharpened and made more acute, rather than be

softened, moderated and tempered. After 1989, the voices increased which wanted to (inter)connect or interrelate (correlate) the impossibility of great wars between great nations with the growing global interweaving(s) of the economy (economic intertwining(s)). As the example of the First World War teaches (*or*: Just as the example of the epoch before 1914 shows), such an (inter)connection or interrelation is everything other than necessary. On the contrary, the reason in terms of power politics and world politics, is obvious in respect of that impossibility for the time being [[1997]]. One amongst the great nations, namely the American, is today so economically and militarily superior to all the rest, that taken individually, against America's will, neither alliances ready for (capable of) war can be formed or put together, nor does a resolute lone (rogue) great, in terms of power politics, nation appear to be conceivable (*or*: nor can another nation decisively exercise, also to an extreme extent, the politics of power (power politics)). Whereas the world situation was characterised around 1900 by an approximate parity of forces between the world-political crucial nations, around 2000 the world situation is determined by the (f)actual hegemony of one single nation.

Nobody can know how long this state of affairs or conjuncture will last, and under which circumstances it will be brought to an end and terminated, especially since the constellation (*or*: world) after the Cold War does not have fixed contours yet. In any case, today it is certain that not the economic co-operation of many equivalent states, but the political hegemony of one superior state is preventing a world war. What concerns Europe in particular then is that closer co-operation arose out of the impossibility of a new war between the great European nations, rather than the reverse. Since Europe lost world domination, the inner-European (intra-European) antagonisms also lost their world-historical meaning and significance (whoever dominates or rules in Europe no longer dominates or rules over the whole world), and that is why

such antagonisms' intensity has to abruptly fall, especially under the patronage (guardianship, tutelage) of the United States. In the imperialistic age, these antagonisms did not only prevent overall European expansion, but even intensified it, since every European Power wanted and took care to keep pace with expanding rivals (competitors). At the time of European world domination, the planet was grouped around the axes of inner-European (intra-European) antagonisms; now the European nations must be grouped, or rather team up (form an alliance, unite, merge), with regard to the planetary antagonisms. In Europe, in other words, until 1945, war was the illness (sickness, disease) of strength, and after 1945 it (i.e. war between great European Powers) was impossible because the continent was stricken with the illness (sickness, disease) of weakness. Since no European nation possesses the power and the will (volition) to bring about a historically viable unification of Europe under its own hegemonial administration and management, i.e. hegemony, then united Europe must, if at all, be built through the consensus of its two or three greater (larger) nations. In the course of this, i.e. on the road towards European union, it will be seen once more how much the business of trade differs from that of war and peace. Economic osmosis will not necessarily and obligatorily end up in political osmosis, especially if historically tired Europe, for reasons of convenience, decides to live under American hegemony. And the other way around: retrogressions (regressions, reversions) in the attempt at a tighter interweaving of European economies, given the overall European illness of weakness, does not at all necessarily lead to war. The alternative [[choice between]] (*or*: The dissociative solution) "monetary union or war", as Helmut Kohl and others have formulated it, may paedagogically be expedient, however its historical value is slight. Not only because just a short while ago in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Empire (Soviet Union), peoples pounced upon one another and tore one another to pieces (lacerated one another), [[peoples]] who had enjoyed for many decades the blessing(s) (boon,

benediction, godsend) of a common currency, but also because of the implication that in today's Europe there are no powers at all capable of, and willing to wage, war (*or*: but also because what is implied – that therefore today in Europe nations exist with the volition and the strength to wage war – is not valid).

The present-day dilemma of the continent [[of Europe]] is not (called), like before 1945, “unity or war”, but “unity or decline (fall, ruin, extinction)”. The great difference of these two things as [[compared]] to each other certainly only becomes recognisable if one does not confuse the logic of trade (commerce) and that (i.e. the logic) of war, at any level with each other. Still more generally, one would be well advised (*or*: it must be said that those interested would do well) not to leave world peace to the automatisms, i.e. automatic mechanisms, of the economy, but to seek world peace's prerequisites (preconditions, presuppositions) in the political balances of power (correlation of forces) of the world Powers.

### 3. “Democracies do not wage war on one another”<sup>\* xli</sup>

Western politicians (e.g. M. Thatcher and B. Clinton) have time and again voiced their conviction that democracies would not wage war on one another. They have basically only varied and repeated the one-hundred-year-old topos or old commonplace of liberalism that trade replaces war, or that trade will succeed war: since democracies grant precedence (priority) to the welfare, well-being and prosperity of the people (folk) and consequently to the economic [[element/sphere]], i.e. to the economy, they are of their essence and of their nature, peaceable (peaceful). The wars taking place, nevertheless, are to be put down (*or*: If wars still take place, they would have to be attributed) to the effect of pre-bourgeois or anti-bourgeois forces and to atavisms. Philosophers, who believe they have to grant to this banality a higher solemnity or consecration invoke Kant (*or*: who often think that they are uplifting and elevating commonplaces when they present them as classic sayings, hurried too, to add Kant). Now Kant indeed, in the emulation of many others before him, praised the beneficial influence of the “spirit of trade and commerce”, but nowhere did he write that democracies in general would not wage war, or at least not against one another. He had merely suspected or speculated that in comparison to the ease with which wars were declared by a cabinet (*or*: the monarchies at that time), democracies “thought long and hard before beginning such a bad, nasty game (*or*: such nasty games)”. However, this [[will take place]] only if the democracies concerned are “republics”, which means in Kant’s terminology: if they respect the separation of powers<sup>xlii</sup>. Because as is known, in Kant’s terminology, the term “democracy” meant in itself war-lustful, i.e.

warmongering and bellicose ochlocracy and “despotism”, as the ancient examples proved in his opinion<sup>xliii</sup>.

And indeed, the ancient democracies by no means demarcated themselves from oligarchies and tyrannies because they boasted of their own peaceableness (peacefulness); Thucydides believed in fact that the worst paroxysms of violence (violent acts) and atrocities in the Peloponnesian War were to be blamed on, and were due to, the imponderable, erratic and wholly irresponsible passions of the democratic mass of Athens. The cult of antiquity in the French Revolution did not apply or refer to the peaceable (peaceful), but rather to the patriotic defence-ready (fortified) and combat-ready republics, which knew [[how]] to appreciate the virtues of war, and in fact did not shrink back and cringe before “just” wars of offence, attack and aggression. The programmatic coupling of democracy or rather republic, and peaceableness (peacefulness), is therefore a relatively new and specifically liberal-economic perception. In this respect, it is right and justified when researchers, who want to follow up the question and elucidate the problem with statistical means, direct and concentrate their attention primarily to and on the last two-three centuries. In the course of this, some deduce and document the peaceable (peaceful) character of democracies from the findings or ascertainment that seen overall, considerably fewer democracies have declared or conducted (waged) war(s) than other kinds of regimes (*or*: than different regimes). Others, however, relativise the value of these findings (and this ascertainment) by pointing to, or underlining, the lack of clarity of the concept of democracy, as well as to the fact that in a world in which democracies constituted a small minority, most wars must also start from, and be conducted by, non-democratic states. Only in an entirely democratic world can the question be answered conclusively and the problem be solved definitively.

## Capable of enthusiasm for war

Nevertheless, one does not have to wait in vain so long[[, i.e. for the whole world to consist of democracies]]. Instead of this, it is recommended to seek compelling indications in the hitherto war praxis (i.e. practice regarding the waging of war) of states, which in accordance with the dominant understanding, were or are democratic (that is, they practised and applied or practise and apply parliamentarism, the separation of powers, a free public (space), free publicity, and so forth). An indication or clue for the essential peaceableness (peacefulness) of democracies would be for example the ascertainment that democracies, anyway, have never been capable of conducting and waging war(s) with a similar concentration of forces and doggedness, persistence, perseverance as for instance dictatorships; already their structural unsuitability and inappropriateness for the conducting and waging of war would have had to dispose them hence to peaceableness (peacefulness), since every act(ion) of war (war activity) would entail an unpleasant internal restructuring or change and about-face. However, there can be no talk about this. Great Britain has for example *inter alia* conducted two world wars, without changing its political constitution, i.e. polity<sup>xliv</sup>, in the slightest, and in the Second World War it in fact reached, at the high point of the [[war]] effort on both sides, a higher degree of mobilisation as to its war economy than national-socialistic Germany (*or*: and in the Second World War, when precisely the war effort on both sides was reaching its peak, Great Britain managed to achieve with its economy a higher degree of war mobilisation (mobilisation for war) than Nazi Germany). Something similar can be said about the United States. 1914, moreover, proves that democracies are capable no less than autocracies (but was Germany at that time an autocracy at all? (*or*: if we accept that the Germany of that epoch/era did not constitute a constitutional state in the Western sense)) of being sucked in by enthusiasm for war – and nobody surely wants the blame for France's fear of

war (timidity, inhibition and shyness regarding war) of 1940 to be pinned on the democratic constitution, i.e. polity, as such, like the national-socialistic propaganda did that. Conclusion: democracies, *as* democracies, can therefore conduct and wage war with full force, i.e. with the catholic (universal, general) mobilisation of their forces.

A second indication of the peaceableness (peacefulness) of democracies, *because* they are democracies could lie or be found in the experience or ascertainment that democracies in war would have always allied themselves with other democracies, *because* these were democracies, and fought against despotisms, *because* these were despotisms. But one can only come to such a conclusion if one takes the propagandistic rhetoric regarding war aims (the aims of war *or* the objective goals of each and every respective war) at (their) face value. Can it seriously (in earnest) be asserted that the United States had (through the annexation of Texas) attacked Mexico and later Spain only because these countries were “despotisms”? Did England and France in 1914 ally themselves with Russia because Russia was more democratic than Germany, or for instance, were the German social democrats more in the right and more justified, when they rationalised their participation in the war as a (*or*: by invoking the) struggle against Russian despotism? Was the decisive factor for the renewal of the alliance of Western democracies with Russia in the Second World War the fact that Stalin’s concentration camps in the year 1941 were humaner than Hitler’s? And how would have the alliances probably turned out (precipitated, taken shape) if Stalin had the time and possibility as the first to raise, i.e. make a great hegemonial claim on ((in regard) to) the continent (*or*: if Stalin had e.g. prevailed in Spain and if in the West the circles had prevailed which recommended an anti-communistic alliance with Hitler)? It has therefore been demonstrated that (*or*: Conclusion:) also when democracies’ conduct and wage of war, geostrategic and or economic points of view remain decisive.

## The dangers of mixing

If this dual conclusion is correct[[, i.e. that democracies are more than capable of waging war to the maximum intensity of any polity, and, that democracies wage war like other polities in the main for geostrategic and or economic reasons]], then war is not in the least a priori to be precluded in a world which consists of sovereign democracies, in the event one amongst them should exercise a policy (politics) which another democracy would find to be an existential threat. Regarding the fact of such a threat – as, on the other hand, regarding the concept of vital interest – a democratic consensus could thoroughly and wonderfully dominate. In regard to the (within the framework of NATO) allied and at the same time inimical democracies of Greece and Turkey, such a consensus dominates for example on both sides<sup>xliv</sup>. The most recent fishing dispute between the likewise allied democracies of Spain and Canada, during which one was reminded of the usefulness of war ships notwithstanding [[that they belonged to democracies]], contained, in regard to this, obvious lessons for a future which would have to confront a scarcity of resources. The assumption or view that democracies of all polities would never find themselves or end up in such situations is simply absurd, especially when one thinks of the interrelation between modern democracy and consumption. And the assumption or view that in such a situation, democracies would then react towards the outside with the same political habitus (i.e. predisposition towards consensus) as in the regulation of internal matters of concern, presupposes the so-called “primacy of internal politics (policy)”. However, such a primacy exists just as little as the primacy of external politics (policy). There are only situations in which this or that factor in accordance with each and every binding interpretation is regarded as decisive.

And if, finally, someone retorts that modern democracies would of themselves tend towards world democracy, that is, towards the blurring of the boundaries between internal and external political space, and towards the internationalisation of the internal political rules of the game, then one could also again recollect Kant's text about eternal peace – this time, of course, a passage which, for obvious reasons, is hardly cited: precisely the “mixing” or “fusing, merging, amalgamating and melting together” of peoples seemed to the philosopher to put peace in danger. Yet even if democratic peoples (folks) remain in “separation or segregation” like good neighbours, as Kant preferred, they would not be lost for arguments in favour of war (bellicose/belligerent/warlike/martial arguments), if they needed them<sup>xlvi</sup>. Nobody would rattle at or call into question the principle that “democracies do not wage war on one another”, but probably would deny that one's partner in war (war partner) – as the foe is supposed to be called, in the best communicative manner, in the future<sup>xlvi</sup> – is a “genuine” democrat.

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#### ANNOTATION

P. 67: Headline (Introduction, Lead-in) of the FAZ: “The American president Bill Clinton in 1994 declared: “democracies do not wage war on one another.”^ On this account, he characterised global democratisation as the “third” pillar of his foreign policy. Clinton with that followed the traditional self-understanding of liberal and commercial society, as it was formed, developed and cultivated in the eighteenth century. The principle “democracies do not wage war on one another” is an echo of the liberal Utopia, which historically proceeded the modern totalitarian Utopias. After the caesura (break or turning point) of the year 1989, this liberal Utopia seemed to be buoyed once again for a short time. An obvious and distinct symptom of this was that the thesis of the principled peaceableness (peacefulness) of democracies reappeared in politological discussion.”

^ [[A quick Google search of the internet reveals that Clinton's actual words were “democracies rarely wage war on one another”, and, [democracies] “tend not to abuse their citizens' rights or wage war on one another”].]

#### 4. Conflict of cultures or conflicts without culture(?)<sup>xlvi</sup>

When Samuel Huntington<sup>xlix</sup> – in adopting an expression by Bernard Lewis – declared the “clash of civilisations” to be the key phenomenon of the world-historical epoch beginning, a shudder and shiver descended upon many (*or*: went through wide circles) in the West. Not so much because Huntington as one more scholar next to many others, doubted the ending of history, i.e. that the end of history had come about, through economic universalism (*or*: the universalism of economic liberalism and of “human rights”), but rather because of the suspicion that a conflict of cultures (*or*: a clash between civilisations) must be grimmer and harsher than other conflicts and clashes, that is, a kind of race war, and hence more dangerous for mankind than every simply economic or political antagonism. Thus, to the prophet of more awful things and new woes one pitted partly (at times) humanistic empty words and meaningless phrases, partly (at other times) the belief and conviction in respect of the weakening and dismantling of cultural contrasts and oppositions through the mental and intellectual-spiritual consequences of a united world economy. In that way, however, Huntington’s thesis can at the very outside be spirited away or exorcised. One can directly refute it only with a counter-thesis which likewise indeed reckons with, and includes, conflicts in the future, and at the same time makes plausible that precisely because of these conflicts’ character, the cultural aspect cannot dominate – that therefore precisely the character of the conflicts determines the role and particular weight of the cultural factor and of the cultural self-understanding and of the cultural consciousness of the actors and subjects – not the other way around.

Whoever against that considers cultural differences to be the deeper causes of conflicts, must demonstrate which characteristic elements of the cultures concerned drive towards conflict and why the said elements develop this effect today (*or*: act in particular today with such intensity). Otherwise, the cause of conflict does not have to then be cultural even if the parties of the conflict represent different cultures. Yet Huntington did not proceed methodically so stringently. He talks as if cultures are basically stable substances, conflictual because of their irreducibility (*or*: which beget conflicts because they do not accommodate alteration). Of course, the mere existence of a foreign (alien) culture could be perceived as a provocation, since it belies the self-evidence and bindedness of one's own values (*or*: since in itself it falsifies the conviction that our values are self-evident and generally binding). However, this is not a necessary or sufficient cause of conflict. Because on the one hand, there are extreme conflicts, which came into being or emerge (originate, arise) on common cultural ground – for instance civil wars –, on the other hand, the unease and discomfort as a result of the relativisation of one's own values by foreign (alien) values turns into and becomes (a sense/feeling of) an existential threat and enmity only when that relativisation as a symbolic act is comprehended (*or*: only when a cultural community comprehends this relativisation as a symbolic act), in regard to which sooner or later real acts would have to follow (*or*: tangible acts as opposed to tangible riches, assets and goods will follow). No community lives in fact alone from values, and that is why none wants to die in war for values without any existential reference.

If cultures were the necessary result of irreducible substances and conflicts, then the dividing lines between the cultures would have to be unshakable and unalterable, that is, friendships and enmities eternally, i.e. which would live forever. Also, their self-consciousness would have to outlast the changing of the outside and inside world (*or*: survive every internal and external change).

Historical experience, nonetheless, teaches otherwise (*or*: something very different)<sup>l</sup>. The setting or placing of a culture vis-à-vis (across from) others, and vis-à-vis (across from) itself, can change slowly or quickly, through the double change in position in the constellation, and subversion of the arrangement, of the historical subjects. The logic of this constellation is in essence, or of its essence, a *political* logic. That is why political logic ultimately determines the historically relevant or weighty interpretations of culture. Because cultural differences cannot flow into, or are not even able to end up in, conflicts if the cultural subjects are not constituted as political collectives or political groups, which for their part interpret culture in accordance with their own goals. Political settings of a goal (i.e. political goals and political objectives) – especially if they are connected with the endeavour and effort at self-preservation – normally prevail against the voice of culture (and of race). A collective or group may wave (fly) the flag of culture as often as this appears to be politically opportune, yet cultural considerations and concerns do not at all determine the said collective or group’s specific acts, and indeed such considerations and concerns are pushed aside when (as soon as) they stand in the way of vital settings of a goal, i.e. goal settings, objectives, goals. It would be absurd to assume that Japan (or at least the Chinese of Taiwan<sup>li</sup>) would in the future determine or regulate its stance and relations vis-à-vis the United States on the one hand, and China on the other hand, in accordance with the criterion of cultural nearness (proximity). One would also err greatly if one would politically and militarily put pressure on Russia in the belief it belongs to the Christian cultural circle, and could because of that never ally with China against the “West (Occident)”. The United States would rather see the Turks than the Russians in the role of peacekeepers or regional governors, deputies (deputy power of (keeping) order) in the Caucasus, and many Arabs make common cause with “unbelievers” against fundamentalists (*or*: “fundamentalist” co-religionists and people of the same ethnicity).

Huntington put the concept of the cultural circle or culture (civilisation) at the centre of attention in order to underline the fact that the boundaries and limits of the nation-state had now been broken open (blown up, blasted). The combining or equating of the planetary-supra-national dimension of world events (world becoming) with the cultural dimension is, however, by no means compelling (*or*: does not at all constitute, however, a logical necessity). “Culture” is not logically or historically the direct or immediate generic term (supra-concept) vis-à-vis “nation”<sup>lii</sup>. That is why after the – supposed – overcoming of the nation, culture does not definitely constitute the next political criterion for grouping<sup>liii</sup>. Yet still more than the underestimation of the national (factor), the conflict of cultures (clash of civilisations) is guilty of talking about an overestimation of, i.e. it is guilty of overestimating, the cultural factor, and this at a historical moment in which the modes, ways and manners of living and life, world-wide, have approximated (neared) one another so much, and narrowed cultural differences so much, like never before, even if they continue to be considerable. How can the paradox be explained that some political actors exactly now stress cultural differences, and accordingly, mislead some political observers? Why can the specific weight of the real or invented cultural peculiarity increase and grow subjectively, even though it objectively is becoming slighter (*or*: is being decreased)? The emphasising and stressing of this peculiarity serve demarcation (delimitation). Demarcation means, nevertheless, in today’s world of necessity, not hermetic encapsulation, i.e. shutting and cutting oneself off, or isolation, which would amount to historical suicide. Rather, it should form or create an as far as possible favourable starting position with regard to a struggle over distribution of a planetary extent and magnitude (*or*: of planetary dimensions). That it is a matter of that struggle, and not of culture in itself, arises from a simple and fundamental fact. No political movement which champions its own cultural values against “Western” cultural values, has hitherto neglected or failed to adopt and introduce as quickly and

comprehensively as possible, Western technologies and forms of organisation, into the civil and military sector, in order to consolidate, strengthen and increase its own position of power, regardless of the consequences for its indigenous (native, local, home-grown, domestic) traditions. The cultural difference is then summoned (*or*: Cultural differences are then mobilised), when the main external foe belongs to a foreign (alien) cultural circle and culture, or when it appears to be expedient to stamp and denounce (decry) the internal foe as the marionette or pawn of such an external foe<sup>liv</sup>. Sociological investigations have proven that the fundamentalist avant-garde in the Muslim lands and countries, for the most part recruit from the intelligentsia as well as technical experts (i.e. the intelligentsia of technicians). They make use, incidentally, of words of the cultural struggle for the mobilisation of the masses similarly to how formerly (in days gone by) the Leninist avant-garde made use of the catchword of class struggle. Elites ruling already, who for instance stand up for and make much of their “Asian (Asiatic) values” (e.g. Singapore), may do this from a position of power, which they have secured through a really (as a matter of fact) revolutionary reshaping and conversion of their respective societies. If they had not succeeded in this field, then the invocation of their own cultural values would rather have seemed like pathetic, pitiable compensation and over-replenishment, something which is often also the case for those who have failed – the Greek reader does not have to search far to find examples<sup>lv</sup>. If success is presupposed, the invocation of culture is tantamount to the claim to be regarded as an autonomous subject and no longer as a – colonial – object.

The struggle over distribution in certain situations must be dressed up (*or*: is necessarily disguised) as a cultural struggle (struggle over culture) after two other great contentious issues have been omitted. Since, in fact, the most hard-boiled, the most fanatical or staunchest traditionalist cannot get around being equipped, armed, supplied and fitted out in terms of what is modern (*or*: the

necessity for modern technical equipment), the alternative: “tradition or modern technique (technology) and economy”, has become obsolete. Likewise obsolete, however, at the latest since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, is the question of whether the developed countries ought to decide in favour of the “Western” or the “Soviet” social model. Generally, the disappearance of the Marxist-Leninist(ic) vocabulary from the rhetoric of world politics effected a shift or displacement of the centre of gravity and main focus of political argumentation. The contrasts and oppositions are no longer articulated in the terminology of analyses of class or of imperialism, but increasingly in the language of cultural values, for instance “human rights”<sup>lvi</sup>, in relation to which of course there is no lack of direct or indirect references to the past and to the present of colonialism and of imperialism. Whereas or whilst technique (technology) in its world-historical colourlessness is universalised and globalised, and through its compulsions (coercions, constraints) unifies the form of economic organisation, the concept of culture becomes a means of delimitation in the struggle over distribution, which is sharpened and made acute exactly as a result of that universalisation, globalisation and unification. And as soon as the struggles are sharpened and made acute, every difference is built up, bloated and politicised, as long as it possesses symbolic and mobilising value. Even when the parties of the conflict belong to different cultural circles and cultures, and invoke their cultural identity, this is no proof of the cultural cause of the conflict. Thus seen, it is certainly also conceivable that that which one today calls the “North-South-opposition”, tomorrow could come on the scene in the shape or form of an opposition between Western-Christian and Muslim or Confucian culture. Yet even then, there would be significant national exceptions.

The talk of the conflict of cultures (*or*: So the theory about the clash of civilisations) contains therefore at most and at best a partial, distorted, twisted and badly formulated truth. It could, nonetheless – and I think this is

Huntington's intention —, serve as an ideological polariser of the West (under American leadership)<sup>lvii</sup>, if this West, for economic and strategic reasons, should come into intense and or violent conflict with non-Western Powers. Then the public mood and spiritual(-intellectual) climate in the West would change abruptly. And those who preach the present-day media-legitimate and media-righteous “understanding between cultures”, and who they themselves aspire to promote — through financed and paid-for participation in congresses — the exotic multi-cultural assembly and get-together in attractive environments and ambiances, would defend themselves and fight (if they defended themselves and fought at all) against this abrupt change in the public mood and spritual(-intellectual) climate, in vain. A verbal understanding at a round table still before the solution of contentious material issues and material bones of contention does not cost anything, and for that reason, has no effect and does not bring about anything as well. Because not “mutual understanding” in itself makes the solution of the contentious issues and bones of contention possible, but the reverse: only this (appearing on the horizon, at least) solution creates or begets the willingness and readiness for that understanding of the other. The manner which a culture — through its significant and influential representatives — interprets another culture is a function of the actual, real relations between the cultures, and accordingly changes and is transformed. The same applies to the declaration itself of wanting to understand the other as “an equal towards or vis-à-vis an equal”. If the same world Powers, which in 1919 turned down and rejected Japan's request, and would not give written form to, codify, establish and sanction the equality of the races in the Treaty of Versailles, in 1996 officially make a great effort at the understanding of foreign (alien) cultures, then this does not necessarily mean that an advance or progress has occurred in understanding. But it does indicate a dramatic shift in the world correlation of forces<sup>lviii</sup>.

## V. The political and (the) geopolitical backgrounds (subjects)

### 1. The Right, the Left and Germany<sup>lix</sup>

The tone of political-intellectual debate in Germany is always touchy and irritated, and this [[occurs]] not without reason. It is in fact a matter of the orientation of a country, which has a key position in Europe and could play a not insignificant role in planetary politics. In an irritated tone, however, are expressed not only common cares and concerns, but opposed world-theoretical, personal and other preferences. Whilst official German politics tries hard in a nebulous rhetoric to reduce “healthy” patriotism, European unification and the universalism of the market and of values to a common denominator, both opposite poles (counter-poles) of the present-day debate stand out or distinguish themselves through their more one-sided “national” or “universalistic” preferences. Consequently, they remain negatively dependent on each other; they share not the solution, but for the most part the dilemma. It is a question of whether the dilemma is real or whether history has already disregarded or overcome and ridden roughshod over it<sup>lx</sup>.

The suspicion that the latter is the case is borne out by the preferred self-description on each and every respective occasion. One [[side]] wants to still be the “Left”, although simultaneously it claims for itself “genuine liberalism”, while at the same time inadvertently indicating only its adaptation to, and

conformation with, Western mass-democratic reality. The other [[side]] demarcates and delimits itself against that by clinging to the spectre (phantom, ghost) of a “conservatism”, which has long been dead and which cannot rise again (be resurrected) by means of any “conservative revolution”. After all, the invocation of, or appeal to, the revolutionary and pioneering or trailblazing, creates opportunities and possibilities for loose alliances with forces, which indeed are understood not as “conservative”, but probably as “national” or “anti-Western” forces. The ambivalence generates on both sides mistrust or derision (mockery, ridicule), at any rate, it essentially contributes to the strengthening, amplification and reinforcement of uneasiness and confusion. But these (uneasiness and confusion) stem in reality neither from the in the meanwhile subjugation carried out of the “Left” to the “Western” logic of the free market, nor from the conspiracy of the incorrigible “Right” with nationally minded social democrats or liberals<sup>lxi</sup>. They, i.e. the uneasiness and confusion, stem therefore not from effects, but from causes – from that which still was thought in the political categories of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although these can no longer have any real social reference and bearers<sup>lxii</sup>.

### The West is no more

Western political conceptuality did not all of a sudden become – through the national factor’s gaining of the upper hand and becoming rife, or through the machinations, scheming and the arts of disguise of the nationalists<sup>lxiii</sup> –, obsolete. It, i.e. Western political conceptuality, was a constituent element or part of the thoughts world or universe of ideas of the European New Times<sup>lxiv</sup>, and with the European New Times, the said Western political conceptuality perished during the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nonetheless, I want to here use for the sake of understanding, the terms “nationalistic Right” and “cosmopolitan

Left” – which of course show or signal that the political dividing lines have now been drawn with regard to the overall planetary constellation rather than in accordance with the positioning of the parties towards the “social question”<sup>lxv</sup>.

The end of the Cold War did not only bring to light the antiquatedness of the political vocabulary, but also sooner or later brought on and brought about the end of the West. The “West” was the anti-communistic camp (otherwise Japan and South Korea were not “Western”). Those (above all the cosmopolitan “Left”), who believe in a cohesion of the West on the basis of the mere commonality of values, are politically and historically naive<sup>lxvi</sup>. The commonality of values causes in itself no commonality of interests – in fact the opposite can be the case – and has never prevented bloody conflicts between Christian or liberal peoples, just as little as it, i.e. the commonality of values between e.g. Christian or liberal peoples, has put off or deterred alliances with unbelievers or tyrants.

The *politically* relevant question is: which binding West is meant on each and every respective occasion, and what can binding West mean for Germany, if the West were supposed to split, and Germany for example would have to choose between engagement in, and commitment to, a large (great) European space, and, friendship with the United States; or the other way around, if European unification took place under conditions which the majority of the German people (folk) would turn down and reject? (Because the Hour of Truth for Europe will strike (or ring) when one no longer must distribute affluence and prosperity, but burdens and debts, liabilities). In both cases, which no historically thinking person can exclude in advance, the confession of faith in Western values would help politically only slightly<sup>lxvii</sup>. Germans will, therefore, spare or save both disappointments as well as panic reactions if and when they duly, in a timely manner and soberly reconcile themselves with the thought that the unity of the West and consequently the sweepingly and categorically

binding West sprang from a unique situation, which must not be regarded as an eternal historical yardstick or benchmark, even if its prolongation and extension appears as temporarily desirable and possible.

Although the German cosmopolitan “Left”, as from now in an alliance with multi-national concerns, stands up for the overcoming of nationalisms, it nevertheless remains fixed, i.e. focused on its own national past. It scoops (draws or creates) those values from the contrasting with, and opposition to, this past, into whose logic it wants to force the historical future. No less fixed or focused on this same past appears to be the nationalistic “Right”. It does not merely endeavour, try and strive to get a revision of the image of history (historical picture) sanctioned by the victors. That is scientifically thoroughly, absolutely and perfectly legitimate, and personally I believe – although I am no “right-winger” – that the construction of the “German special way (path or German Sonderweg)” is untenable. Over and above that, this Right moves back and puts itself – not expressly, but with recognisable longing and yearning – to and in those positions and situations, which it wants to illuminate historically anew, in order to take from there a new run-up (approach path or start).

That politically cannot lead very far. Because the world was until 1945 characterised by Europe’s unambiguous and unequivocal preponderance and predominance, whereas in the present constellation, the demographic, geopolitical, economic and military weight of our continent is constantly decreasing, lessening, diminishing. The degree of density attained of planetary politics turns the consideration of the planetary dimension into a political task of prime importance: relations with the European nations must be seen and shaped from the perspective of this dimension. Europe’s survival is not so self-evident as one would like to think, and it is not least of all a *German* question and problem. One may as a German “right-winger” not particularly like Frenchmen or Englishmen, however, the Chinese (Chinamen) can be liked even less.

But precisely under (in view of) the neglect of the planetary dimension, the thinking of the nationalistic “right-wingers”, who tend towards navel-gazing, suffers. Because of that, the Right’s thinking remains politically less fertile and less productive. The strategic question reads: will the most important European nations, through consensus or through reciprocal or one-sided concessions, constitute a political unit (entity, unity) capable of acting, which can exist within world competition and world rivalry, or, will the actual hegemony of one nation over the other nations prove to be for this purpose necessarily – something in itself more desirable than what the joint (common) decline of all the European nations would be? In the former case, the nationalistic “Right” will rethink its positioning and stance towards Frenchmen and Englishmen, in the latter case however, it must rethink the resentments of the vanquished against the Americans. Because as long as the Americans are the single genuinely planetary Power, their backing and support for the achieving of such a hegemony is indispensable, just as their interventions in the past could prevent this same hegemony [[of the Germans over other Europeans]] twice.

A third development seems to me, though, to be more likely: that for the foreseeable future the national tug of war in Europe under the motto “whoever can, save yourself” will continue, and older combinatory games (games of combination and ensemble) [[i.e. various (changing) manifestations of teamwork between nations]] – to the satisfaction of nationalistic “Right” – will be revived anew<sup>lxviii</sup>. The world-historical relevance, as well as the intensity of such games, would be nonetheless far less than previously. The provincial deeper meaning (profundity or melancholy, pensiveness) of the nationalistic “Right” would then be the mere other or reverse side of the cosmopolitan superficiality of the “Left”. Both would not be able to pose and to answer the decisive political question: which is today, under European circumstances, the planetary political unit (entity, unity) capable of surviving? This question is

posed irrespective of how one evaluates the future and the necessity of the nation-state.

### Beyond the critique of culture (cultural criticism)

The anti-Americanism of the nationalistic “Right” stems indeed politically from the resentment of the vanquished, but it takes root in the history of ideas in the far older anti-capitalistic critique of culture, which also had inspired the “Left” until recently. The “Right and right-wingers” do not want to admit that that which is called “Americanisation”, is no import or no octroi [= (formerly, in some European countries, esp. France) a tax, tariff or duty levied on certain goods brought into a town or city]], but the normal way of living (mode of life) of modern mass democracy, whether one likes it or not. It is no coincidence that “the Right” does not push, drive and propel its analysis so far and wide.

Because just as little as the “conservative revolutionaries” of the twenties, i.e. 1920s, do they dare to connect their critique of culture with a critique of that which lies at the root of the much-lamented, much-bewailed evil of (post)modern culture, that is, with a critique of the “free market” and the logic of the market<sup>lxix</sup>. The entirely inner contradiction of today’s “conservatism” is here within reach, becoming palpable, which is exceeded and surpassed only by the reverse(d) contradiction in the thought of the cosmopolitan “Left”. This “Left” has indeed adapted itself to the existing, i.e. to that which exists – stamped, shaped and moulded by the logic of the market; on the other hand, however, the “Left” wants to reserve the monopoly of the critique of culture for itself and becomes nervous when others fill the vacuum, which its own cushy arrangement has left behind. Plagued by a guilty conscience or remorse, the “Left” represses the well-known to it fact of old, that the critique of culture and the critique of civilisation today, for very many real reasons, meet with

approval, and not merely because a pair of “right-wing” aesthetes wants this to be this way.

Our conclusion reads: planetary history is open, its forthcoming peripeteiae [[= sudden changes in a course/courses of events and or circumstances]] and combinations can be apprehended neither through projections of the present into the future, nor through ethical-universalistic or through conservative-nationalistic stereotypes. Just as the current political conceptuality stems from the thoughts world or universe of ideas of the coming to an end and perishing, or already at its end or already perished, European New Times. The “tact of judgement”, of which the great Clausewitz spoke<sup>lxx</sup>, is not to be, i.e. cannot be replaced, by a confession of faith and by a proud militancy. It is a pity and shame that regarding these questions, in this country[[, Germany]], most intellectuals, who necessarily cart and drag along their needs as to raising their profile in every debate, express themselves without having expertise and an overall view at their disposal. Political thinkers of calibre and stature are not in sight. And the otherwise prosperous Homunculus politicus [[= little politician]] is busy and preoccupied otherwise and elsewhere<sup>lxxi</sup>.

## 2. “Nation” in the planetary age (era) (The nation in the planetary epoch)<sup>lxxii</sup>

To talk unobjectively, partially and ideologically about the nation is the rule, and will surely remain the rule. Nonetheless, it does not hurt or do any harm if one every now and then breaks this rule, even if one is in danger of getting caught between two opposing sides firing at him. On the one side of the battlefield stands the nationalistic “Right”, which sees in the nation the natural framework of living (life framework) for humans, without of course explaining how collective life and survival had been possible for centuries and millennia without nations in the newer sense of the term. Over and above that, the “Right” often mixes and confuses the right to life of the nation with the sovereignty of the state, not wanting to leave the fate and destiny of the nation possibly to a multi-national state, although many historical examples prove and certify that nations under such circumstances preserve and maintain themselves (*or*: can admirably keep themselves and stay alive), and in fact can flourish. But the “Right”<sup>lxxiii</sup> apparently does not bring so much unshakeable trust to, i.e. does not have so much unshakeable trust in, the indissoluble resilience of the nation as against, i.e. so as to be indifferent to, the fate and destiny of the (more or less national) state, i.e. nation-state<sup>lxxiv</sup>. Its concept of the nation becomes so much more abstract, so much more an aesthetic construct pertaining to the critique of culture (cultural critique/culture criticism), the more national cultures pale, fade. There is no lack of a certain piquancy that many a “right-wing” nationalist, who still likes to call himself (*or*: One cannot help but smile when one sees today in Europe that some “right-wing” nationalists, who moreover call themselves) “conservative”, put(s) forward, advance(s) or use(s) against “Maastricht”

partially the same arguments as the classical conservatives against the founding of the German Reich in those days (*or*: of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century against the formation of contemporary nation-states)<sup>lxxv</sup>; precisely these conservatives, i.e. the representatives of classical conservatism, incidentally, gave their preference always to the multi-national state held together by means of dynastic loyalty before, i.e. compared to, the national state or nation-state (*or*: rejected the ethnically and nationally homogeneous state and gave their preference to the multi-national state, whose cohesive tie was loyalty to the dynasty and the crown (e.g. Austro-Hungary)).

On the other side of the riverbank stands the cosmopolitan and pacifistic “Left”, which expects and hopes for, from the disappearing and vanishing of nations, stable peace. The fallacy is patently obvious: there were wars just as much as in the pre-national past (*or*: before the creation of nations<sup>lxxvi</sup>), and no statistic(s) has or have substantiated and corroborated the thesis that through nationalism wars (would) have multiplied. Still not before long, mankind stood on the brink of atomic devastation not because of unchecked and unbridled nationalisms, but because of the competition and rivalry of two camps, which both invoked universalistic ideologies<sup>lxxvii</sup>. Of course, national clashes and conflicts have once again become topical<sup>lxxviii</sup>. It is an optical illusion to hold to, i.e. regard, at a given point in time, a precisely active source of unrest as the single and as the final source of unrest[[, i.e. just because war is happening because of nationalism/geostrategy-geopolitics now, that does not at all mean that war has always or will always happen because of nationalism/geostrategy-geopolitics; on the contrary.]]

Although now the “Left” would like to neutralise, or preferably rub out and wipe out, the obviously vital nationalisms, it busts its chops (tries very hard) at the same time to prove that there are no nations of pure water, i.e. pure nations, at all, that is to say, sweat and blood, i.e. blood, sweat and tears are shed for

nothing, and the madness and lunacy (insanity) is perfect<sup>lxxix</sup>. The facts, which in the course of this and in that regard, are noted (registered and recorded), must undoubtedly be taken very seriously. It has really proven to be a futility, and in vain, to define pure races and [[pure]] nations, or to lay down and establish a fixed list of objective and generally valid features on the basis of which a nation could be defined. What on each and every respective occasion was cited and referred to as such a feature (origin (ancestry, descent, provenance, extraction), language, religion and so on) was neither always existing, nor (fully) commensurate with reality, or it did not constitute a necessary or sufficient condition of the founding of a nation. We cannot examine here, perhaps not even in general ascertain, to what extent the concept (and notion) of a people is natural and racial; what is certain is that it does not coincide with the concept (and notion) of the nation (ethnos), which is to a determinative degree or crucial extent, a political concept<sup>lxxx</sup>.

That can all, without a second thought, be accepted – however, it is politically totally irrelevant. The politically burning question reads, or is, whether concrete collectives have the need and are disposed and ready – if necessary under or with the summoning and mobilisation of, in relation to such collectives, suitable mythologems –, to be defined as a nation, and in the name of this nation to act, that is, to live and to die. If they do this, and in fact in the process, cannot be put off by the question of truth, i.e. whilst being indifferent as to what is truth and what is a lie, then they obviously must have their – good or bad – reasons, and it is asked (*or*: the only essential matter is) whether they also in the future regard this construct as the better path for the protection of their interests. Should this be the case, then historical proof and counter-proof would be to no avail. Also, in the past, the nation did not step onto and appear on the political stage because it had in actual fact just been shaped, but because a certain elite had invoked the idea of the nation, and masses were aware of, and appreciated, being mobilised

in this sense (*or*: and managed in this way to mobilise masses). Thus, the French nation was not non-existent in 1788, and in 1789 it was all at once, there (*or*: in 1788 in order to appear in 1789); it was also not the case that the French nation had to first constitute the state (*or*: had to create the state from the absolute beginning). The state was there long before, and had pre-existed for centuries, and the invocation of the nation served two goals: to shape or render the internal space of the state – through the putting aside and eliminating of feudal particularisms and feudal localism – homogenous, and to replace the dynastic principle with the principle of the sovereignty of the people (folk). It is difficult to see how one here could deny to nationalism its political usefulness and practicality (*or*: could doubt the political expediency (effectiveness) of nationalism).

But the mass-democratic and planetary age is a different one than (as compared to) the liberal and European age (*or*: But the mass-democratic and planetary epoch does not at all coincide with the liberal and European epoch). Today the internal spaces of the states are homogenised<sup>lxxxii</sup>, even Caesars and usurpers shoot their mouth off and invoke the sovereignty of the people (folk). If the nation is meant to survive, then its invocation must correspond with the new relations and circumstances, and serve the – connected and related with such relations and circumstances – new aims and goals. The answer to the question of whether and in which form the political units (entities, unities) known to us as nations will be preserved, depends on the definition of the relations and circumstances, and of the aims and goals. The core and key feature of today's world situation is the planetary spreading, diffusion and extension of producing and consuming mass democracy (*or*: of mass democracy as a social formation established and based on mass production and mass consumption), the constant growing of, or growth in, material expectations in the world, and

hence also a sharpening of competition and rivalries, which under the pressure of ecological and demographic factors can become dubious and dangerous.

The question is thus: will the nation and the nation-state prove to be the best form of organisation (organisational form) for participation in the struggle over distribution; will they prove to be the most competitive political and economic unit (entity, unity) at the planetary level? If one formulates the question in such a way, it becomes evident that the answer ought to be dictated by the concrete case, not by in principle sympathy and incurable love for “the” nation, or, by the blanket ban, wholesale excommunication and blind curses in respect of and against the nation. In other words: the question is not whether “the” nation in abstracto (*or*: generally and abstractly) can or should survive, but whether this or that existing nation fulfils or not the terms and conditions of the political unit (entity, unity) capable of surviving (*or*: the viable and sustainable political unit) in the planetary age. Considered thus, we must apply different yardsticks and use different weights and measures from nation to nation, from continent to continent, from region to region. China, typically enough, stands not under the political compulsion (*or*: is not politically pressured) to decide and choose between national and planetary ability at survival (*or*: its national and planetary viability), provided of course it remains a united centralistically ruled and governed, i.e. centralised, state (the course of history in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as I believe, to a great extent will depend on whether China remains such a state or not). At the other end of the spectrum<sup>lxxxii</sup>, nation-states are found which are in all actually dependent in a political and economic respect. Whether they will agree with and accept such dependency and their fate, so that at least through and with their subjugation (subjection, subordination) to a great Power, or to a stronger power (more powerful force), they will not totally lose contact with, or be totally detached from, planetary events and (the) planetary evolution (development(s)); or, whether they will revolt against such events, evolution,

developments and that fate, because they see in the universalism of the great Powers a means of expansion and a means of blackmail and extortion – that will not be decided always by means of end(goal)-rational, expedient calculus and calculation, and the cold logic of interest, but by feelings, emotions and sentiments with deep roots. It also remains open as to whether their revolt, uprising and insurrection will be suitable for, and better serv(ice), the protection of conventional identities, traditional identity and traditional/conventional ways of living (modes of life), rather than subjugation, i.e. being subjugated to great Powers in order to serve and protect one's traditional identity<sup>lxxxiii</sup>. Because the revolt can, if it wants to be successful, demand a rapid, quick modernisation, whereas voluntary subjugation may be accompanied by the fostering, cultivation and renovation of traditionalistic facades as trade, business, industry and as psychical compensation (*or*: pseudo-facades for reasons of psychical over-replenishment and touristic exploitation (example, today's Greece)). In any case, the fate of the smaller nation-states decisively depends on the importance of their geopolitical position (situation). The geopolitically insignificant nation-states could more than likely be left in peace or disquiet (*or*: The more insignificant from a geopolitical point of view will probably be left alone in peace or in their internal unrest and turmoil).

With regard to Europe, the national question appears complicated because the leading Western and Central European nations are, according to planetary measures (criteria, yardsticks, benchmarks), middle Powers, that is, such Powers which can neither stand aside, nor can they assert themselves alone – or even against all others (all other middle Powers) – (*or*: nor can they maintain their position autonomously from every one of the other [[middle]] Powers (much less so, if every one of them turns against the rest<sup>lxxxiv</sup>)). The new situation is only gradually dawning upon these Powers, because old habits of thought (thought habits, habitual ways of thinking) and mind-sets (casts of

mind, mentalities) hinder, hamper and obstruct the clear consciousness regarding, and comprehension of, the above-mentioned measures and the now planetary dimensions of problems, and also because one[[, i.e. as a former European imperialistic Power,]] still lives in part from and on the giant lead, advantage and reserves of the imperialistic epoch. During this epoch, the antagonism of the great European nations with one another did not impede or hinder Europe's great global predominance (preponderance) – completely on the contrary: the antagonism was an impetus and propulsion (drive) towards expansion, in order to keep pace with the expansion of the competitors and rivals (*or*: in order to not fall behind in relation to the expansion of one's competitors (rivals)).

This situation, which lasted for a good four hundred years, has now changed in a twofold manner (doubly): both Europe's specific (economic, demographic, geopolitical) weight, as well as the world-historical meaning of inner-European antagonisms, decrease and diminish. The globe (planet) does not group itself any more around the axes of these antagonisms, but the European nations must group themselves (be grouped) in view of global (planetary) antagonisms. Paradox, but true (*or*: It is paradoxical, yet also true): the great inner-European wars were possible because Europe dominated and ruled (in) the world; today they are no longer possible, because Europe has stopped being the motor and driving force of world history. This *factum brutum* (= heavy, raw fact or deed) – not “Reason” or “the bitter historical experiences”, as the Sunday orators, i.e. grandiloquent speakers, want or would have it – poses, puts and sets the question and problem of nationalism in Western and Middle, i.e. Central Europe on a new basis. As certain as this is, just as uncertain remains through which supra-national forms of organisation (organisational forms) can the challenge of the times be managed and even overcome. Equilibrium, condominium (i.e. joint sovereignty and domination; especially joint rule of territory by two or more

nations and or states), and hegemony, are just as conceivable as various mixed forms of national and multi-national statehood (*or*: the national and multi-national state) (because, as we said at the start: the survival of the nation is by no means identical with the preservation of the classical nation-state, just as the disappearance of the nation does not have to necessarily bring about the end of statehood, i.e. the end of the state as a form of political organisation<sup>lxxxv</sup>).

However, it is also conceivable that pressure from the outside, or an internal hegemony (i.e. the attempt of a part to impose its hegemony<sup>lxxxvi</sup>) activates and reinforces centrifugal forces. That could please some nationalists over the short-term, however, a good piece of European vitality would be used up with that (*or*: Such a development could perhaps gladden some short-sighted nationalists, but it would pointlessly spend a great part of European vitality).

From the point of view of an economistic liberalism (with which the cosmopolitan “Left”, despite its holding onto and continuing to use hackneyed meaningless phrases and emancipatory empty words pertaining to the critique of culture (cultural critique or criticism), in practice identifies<sup>lxxxvii</sup>), it appears as if the question (issue) of the nation and of nationalism will be taken care of and solved by itself thanks to the interweavings and intertwining of the economy, and the international division of labour. Just as the division of labour in the highly technicised, i.e. technologically advanced and hyperdeveloped, mass democracies effected and brought about an atomisation, i.e. splintering and fragmentation of society into individuals, which broke up the social classes of the liberal age (epoch, era), so too now it is said, the same process through its planetarisation, i.e. extension to the whole of the planet, is supposed to cut up, carve up, dismember and fragment nations into individuals, and will make feelings of national belonging together vanish into thin air<sup>lxxxviii</sup>. We do not want to recall here the cogent and valid arguments, which in the sociological discussion of recent decades, were put forward against those who wanted and

tried to interpret and explain “collective action” on the basis of economic utility (use, profit, benefit) calculus/calculation or the weighing up of benefit and damage<sup>lxxxix</sup>. Let us start with or take up the question (*or*: Let’s better see the matter/thing from the standpoint of the issue) of distribution. Even if we remain with, or are restricted by, this economic criterion, the possibility is not to be dismissed out of hand (*or*: we cannot at all exclude the possibility) that this or that human collective comprehends the nation and the corresponding form of political organisation as the best means in order to enforce and defend its interests, in relation to which of course, a policy or politics of economic interests could be effectively connected with nationalistic ideologem(e)s and or ideologies [[a nationalistic ideology]]. If the nation, again, appears to be out-of-date, then the collective must be widened and extended and decide and choose in favour of another form of organisation of the political unit (entity, unity). But collectives will, anyway, always remain in the game, unless every political organisation becomes altogether superfluous<sup>xc</sup> (*or*: However, collective entities will always exist and act for the purpose of safeguarding for themselves an advantageous position in the struggle over distribution – except if every political organisation is now rendered superfluous). Economistically thinking liberals, who reckon on and expect something like that, should read Adam Smith more attentively (carefully).

Whether or how the nation as a political or also as a cultural unit (entity, unity) will remain preserved, does not depend on any unchangeable and immutable substance it has, which is supposed to inhere in it, but on the long-term demands of the planetary situation – more precisely: on the manner which the actors or active subjects will comprehend and prepare to confront these demands. Several combinations and variations are, in the process, conceivable and imaginable, and at an advantage do nations find themselves which on the basis of their potential can also constitute, in the planetary age, competitive

political units (entities, unities). For Western and Middle, i.e. Central Europe, the national question, because of the peculiarity of national composition, is particularly delicate. And for Germany – as the largest country (land) in this space, yet at the same time as a middle planetary Power – perhaps still more delicate (*or*: And even more delicate does this national question present itself in the case of Germany as a country which is, on the one hand, the most populous in this space, but from a planetary point of view, it is nothing above a middle Power)<sup>xci</sup>.

### 3. Europe at the threshold of the 21st century: a world-historical and geopolitical consideration

#### I

According to the myth, which the Sunday orators, i.e. grandiloquent speakers, in the European Union feed on and live off (*or*: which feeds the festive speeches of European politicians), the peoples of the European continent, taught by bitter experiences, have now finally taken the path (*or*: entered and started going down the road) of Reason, and they have underpinned their firm will towards peaceful living together through economic and political institutions (*or*: they embodied in economic and political institutions their volition for peaceful co-existence or cohabitation). The establishment and consolidation of these same institutions would accordingly come to, i.e. amount to, work for the sake of peace, whose undermining would be equal to a return to times of ill-fated, disastrous and awful remembrance (memory). The myth is smug and self-complacent, in so far as it underlines the teachability and ethical-rational motivation of the actors or orators (public speakers) concerned (*or*: because it presupposes the ability of the acting subjects (or at any rate of the rhetoricians) to be taught by the past and to act on the basis of ethical and rational motives). The truth seems more prosaic – and more painful. The bloody conflicts between the great Western and Central-European nation-states have in our days become inconceivable because Europe has lost world domination, so that also the inner-European antagonisms now lack determinative, serious and weighty significance; that is why their intensity necessarily perpendicularly falls (falls perpendicularly (vertically)). In the imperialistic age (epoch), the antagonism of

European Powers with regard to one another not only did not prevent overall European expansion, but even intensified it, since every one of these Powers wanted to keep pace with their expanding competitors and rivals (*or*: did not want to lag or fall behind in relation to the others). At the time or in the epoch of European world domination, the planet grouped itself therefore around the axis of the inner-European antagonisms; now the European nations have to, in view of planetary antagonisms, group themselves, i.e. form their own group(s) or join (band) together, unite or merge (*or*: form a coalition or coalitions). This world-historical caesura (break or turning point) underlies, or forms the basis of/for, Europe's reshaping and rearrangement (new arrangement). It constituted at the same time for Europe a predicament or state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation), which indeed as the result of the explosion of mass production and mass consumption after 1950, as well as the giant reserves from the imperialistic era, was not perceived materially (from a material point of view) as such, but whose political aspect became visible and recognisable in the weighty, momentous occurrence (*or*: determinative fact) that precisely both great Powers, which after 1945 replaced Europe in planetary events (*or*: which succeeded Europe at a planetary level), stood positively and negatively as godfathers (in regard) to the European efforts and endeavours at unity and unification. Positively, the patronage of the United States, and negatively, the angst and fear before the Soviet Reich or Empire, set in motion a process, which even after the previous (recent) catastrophes, pure Reason by itself would hardly have triggered amongst the calm, relaxed and the otherwise safe (not in danger, not at risk) Europeans (*or*: the pure Reason of the Europeans would not at all by itself bestir, if the Europeans had been left alone and they did not run any risks from the outside).

The character of the predicament or state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation) of the aforementioned world-historical caesura (break or turning

point) also stood out from a broader perspective. The end of Europe's world domination temporally coincided with the end of the European New Times, just as the beginning of these same New Times<sup>xcii</sup> initiated the epoch of European world domination. This means: the New Times were not only a (seen in terms of the history of ideas) specifically European (*or*: European in the specific, distinguishing sense of the term), but just as much an (economically and politically understood) Eurocentric phenomenon. The driving out or outflanking of the European coefficient by the planetary coefficient and, interrelating with that, of oligarchical and imperialistic liberalism by mass democracy (as the first social formation in history until now with a genuinely planetary claim, or of a planetary range) had to thus accompany the dilution (attenuation), debilitation or evaporation (disappearance (into thin air)) of the content pertaining to the history of ideas of the New Times, and flowed into or ended up in an essentially new world situation. The detailed circumstances, particular forms and individual implications of this turn cannot be discussed here (*or*: We cannot discuss here the details, the particular forms and the separate, in part consequences and repercussions of this world-historical turn).<sup>4</sup> However, the reminder of the overall process remains necessary in order to be able to make clear to ourselves the entire extent of the European predicament or state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation) at the latest after 1945 – of which one should be mindful. Because depending on whether the European process of (or attempt at) unification is comprehended as an answer to the state of need (emergency situation), or as a victory of Reason, different tasks, deontologies and strategies arise. Whoever above all saw peace-loving Reason at work (*or*: Whoever considers that peace-loving Reason held sway), is poorly immune to

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<sup>4</sup> I would like to refer the reader to the following works of mine: *Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform* (= *The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form*), Weinheim 1991; *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg* (= *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*), Berlin 1992; „Marxismus, Kommunismus und die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts“ (= “Marxism, communism and the history of the 20th century”), in: H. Fleischer (Hg.) *Der Marxismus in seinem Zeitalter*, Leipzig 1994 [see here Ch. II, I]; „Was heißt schon westlich?“ (= “The universalisation of technique (technology) and world culture”), *FAZ* of 19.12.1994 [see here Ch. VI, 3].

or poorly prepared for bad, malign and nasty inner-European surprises and developments, and moreover runs the risk (*or*: is exposed to the danger) of expanding his view to the whole planetary landscape or scene, i.e. of ascribing (attributing) to the European Union the character of a model, and to expect and hope for the solution to world problems by a world state, which, would be based and rest on consensus, and would be (constitute) a European Union in magno. However, it is not readily understandable why nations like for instance China, which have confidence and believe in their independent and in practice unlimited possibilities of unfolding and development, should appropriate or adopt the Reason or logic of a demographically weak(ened) continent, which for several decades after the loss of its empires was (stood) in the shadow of Americans and Russians, and is still dependent on the former (i.e. the Americans). And furthermore: who will undertake with regard to the world state, the same positive and negative role, which Americans and Russians played with regard to Europe?

## II

The precise visualisation and comprehension (conceptualisation) of the European state of need/(emergency) (emergency situation) in the world-historical context (*or*: in the context of world history) constitutes only the beginning of a substantial or substantive question formulation (or examination of the problem) – and leaves, incidentally, in praxis (practice) all possibilities open<sup>xciii</sup>. Because the state of need (emergency situation) and crises can activate both centripetal as well as centrifugal forces, bringing about both solidarity as well as discord (disputes, strife, conflict). A group of individuals or of nations must, if it wants to be competitive, beforehand make or adopt an organisational form, that is, [[it]] must clarify the question/problem of the bearer of the

decision (*or*: distinguish how and by whom the decisions will be made and taken). Solidarity (in the sociological, not for instance in the psychological sense) comes about when this question and problem is solved bindingly, regardless of where the bindedness rests; otherwise, either a direct conflict comes into being, or centrifugal forces prevail according to (*or*: on the basis of the) principle “whoever can, save yourself (he who saves himself, [[so]] save yourself = every man for himself/run for your lives)”. Which of both directions or roads, Europe will take, still is in 1995 not to be said with final certainty. Until recently, affluence and prosperity could still be distributed, and everyone profited from that absolutely, i.e. in absolute magnitudes, to an absolute extent, although some in comparison to the rest (others) drew a greater benefit. However, the hour of truth will first strike (sound, ring), when the order of the day will not be the distribution of affluence, but that (distribution) of considerable burdens (weights, encumbrances, loads). A guilty conscience, which had at least indirectly motivated the hitherto German willingness to pay (*or*: the hitherto generosity of the German cash register), could be converted into an unwillingness or aggressivity, if the lesser performance, output and efficiency of others would require extraordinary sacrifices by the Germans as a counterbalance (equaliser, kind of balancing) on a pan-European scale. Until today, there are hardly any clear signs on the part of other European nations that they are ready for privations (*or*: to make sacrifices) for the sake of third parties; and the propensity towards (inclination to) social behaviour [[marked by]] solidarity ebbs (waned, diminishes) for the time being also inside of the individual (*or*: various) European nations.

To these considerations, the structural or internal logic of a unification process is added. The first steps are, in the course of this, always the easiest, and the last the most difficult to take. However, without the final steps, the first steps more or less hang in the air, they do not commit to anything decisive (*or*: they do not

constitute definitive or decisive commitments), even if they are not reversed and canceled; one must constantly keep in mind, nevertheless, the possibility of a retreat or retrogression after a long stagnation, especially if one considers (thinks) that even multi-national construct(ion)s, which made up one single economic and political unit (entity, unity), broke up and disintegrated in no time (in a flash) during severe crises (*or*: in epochs of deep crisis) (the Soviet Union provides (is) the latest example of that, and one would be deluded if one wanted to ascribe to its crumbling simply the rebelling of its peoples (folks) against “totalitarianism”: the economic-political unit (entity, unity) was in fact abolished, [[and]] not founded anew in circumstance of freedom). The, anyhow, increasing or greater difficulties during the final steps of a unification process will presumably or probably increase and intensify in Europe’s case because of a strategic mistake committed relatively early on. What is meant is the widening and extension of the original nucleus (core) through the admission (intake) of weaker, nevertheless equivalent, coequal members, i.e. with equal rights (whether already the admission of Great Britain constituted a strategic mistake as de Gaulle thought, may remain an open question, i.e. unexamined, here). Very probably, the speedy deepening of economic and political unity between the countries of the original nucleus, as well as the demonstrating to the outside world of this deepening in regard to deeds with planetary weight, would have unfolded, developed or exercised the effect of a magnet which the remaining European nations would have been drawn to like iron filings. In such a case, longer waiting times/periods for candidates would then not have substantially harmed them, given the, anyhow, growing interweavings, intertwinings and dependencies existing in all actuality. Present-day suggestions and actions, which aim at an economically and politically staggered (graded, graduated) Europe (*or*: a Europe “of two or more speeds or gears”), seem like attempts to make up and atone for those early mistakes, of course under considerably worse(ned) and more difficult circumstances. Nonetheless, the mistake does not

have to be irreparable, rather one can say in retrospect that it could not have been avoided in so far as the European, above all German dependence on the United States at the time of the Cold War, set in and of itself certain limits and boundaries to a qualitative deepening of European unification, which did not exist in regard to the quantitative widening, extension or expansion. In any event, the European Union today has reached a point where a renewed widening should or would have to be interpreted only as flight or an escape before the compelling, urgent task and duty of deepening, and as an indication of organic weakness. Quantity in politics is not necessarily converted into quality; very often the contrary to that in fact happens: the qualitative element is dissolved in the pulp, mush, mash of quantity.

However, he who weighs up the possibilities of European unification has to detach and release himself, or break away, not only from quantitative criteria. Just as much, must he make himself free of rectilinear notions, representations and perceptions regarding the course of the unificatory process. This is supposed (or ought) to mean: not everything which taken at face value, promotes and boosts unification, in actual fact benefits and favours unification too. Not even agreement and consensus in themselves offer more of a guarantee than dissent and disagreement in respect of that [[possibility]], that one is coming, i.e. is drawing nearer, to European unification. Because there is a consensus which applies to platitudes and signals inertia (sluggishness, lethargy), and a dissent or even a splitting from which those emerge, who can thereafter function as locomotives of further development (evolution). The same applies to individual organisational plans or institutional projects. The monetary (currency) union constitutes e.g. a step or undertaking which logically and in abstracto promotes the unificatory process. Yet should its imposition put in the world, i.e. beget, severe and fierce struggles over distribution and major instabilities, then that which was thought and planned to be the path or road to

unification, turns into the cause of hopeless strife (dispute(s) and a battle without a way out). On the other hand, economic inconveniences and troubles could be accepted, or one could run the risk of such economic troubles, if favourable political effects and results were expected from monetary union – in this case, however, a concrete bearer would have to, in relation to that, take care and ensure that these effects actually take place (*or*: the anticipated results become reality). Thus, causes, plans and ways of acting and behaving are ambivalent. Because ideological prejudices and partialities do not constitute the best practical advisor and counsellor; especially when it is not a matter of the frequently disguised ideology or ideologies of (national) economists, but of the blatant, screaming ideology of those who pontificate for or against the national state, i.e. nation-state. Also here, at first glance, it seems as if the (at least actual) abolition of the nation-state *eo ipso* will clear the way for European unification. Whoever believes this, expects from such states only narrow-minded and egotistical acts/actions (yet nation-states for their part founded the European Community (European Union)!), and that is why he equates and identifies the positive with the putting aside and obliteration of the negative. A narrow, effective and long-term co-ordination of the action of two or three of the more significant nation-states would, nonetheless, be for the European cause much more beneficial and helpful than a unification which primarily would reflect the paralysis or the abdication (resignation) of the nation-state governments (governments of the nation-states). And the other way around: the overall European, i.e. pan-European authority, which would successfully take over (take charge of) the essential sovereign competencies of the nation-state governments, would have to, given the extraordinary weight, load and burden of its tasks and duties, in a number of respects, be considerably stronger or more powerful than those governments of nation-states.

This is most often overlooked both by the friends as well as the foes of the nation-state, since both, even if under or with reverse(d) signs, i.e. symbolism, conceptually confuse nationality or the nation, and, statehood or the state, with each other. The compound or composite term “nation-state” seems to lead to and favour such confusion, although it in reality says or connotes that the nation-state makes up only a species – amongst other states – of the genus “state”. The advocates and proponents of the nation-state fear, on the one hand, the lack of statehood or the absence of the state, that is ungovernability (ungovernableness), if the governmental power is exercised from a distant centre outside of the nation; on the other hand, they expect a wasting or withering away of national forces and consequently a general levelling and cultural impoverishment in the event the nation should be deprived of the support of the state. However, effective governing is a question or matter of political will and organisational form, not of nationality, as much as it must take this nationality into consideration; and national cultures, which in themselves can even flourish in a multi-national state, are today undermined by planetary forces, against which the nation-state as such is not capable of doing much (*or*: undertaking many things) anyhow. The nation-state’s foes share for the most part all of the diagnoses and prognoses above – only that these foes of the nation-state welcome the result. In the putting aside of the factor “nation”, they (and therein the cosmopolitan “Left” enters into an only seemingly paradoxical alliance with multi-national concerns) behold – and they also regard this putting aside of the factor “nation” as – a pleasing step for the weakening or abolition of traditional statehood in general, towards the development of a post-national or trans-national consciousness of autonomous citizens as the new ideational basis or foundation of political activity etc. etc.. Now, the “mature citizen’s” consciousness draws, as a rule, its intellectual-mental-spiritual nourishment from commercial television rather than from the refined offering or sophisticated proposals of political ideologues such as “communitarians” or

“liberals”, so that the dwindling or disappearance of nationalistic fanaticisms does not necessarily benefit a superior public spirit and sense of citizenship (*or*: does not necessarily amount to a higher political spirit, morale or mindset). On the other hand, a – for the European Union, long-term fatal – ungovernability, can only be avoided through the fact of not only simply evaporating the sovereign rights of the nation-state, but of such sovereign rights being assigned or transferred to a new *sovereign*. The end of the sovereign nation-state and the end of sovereign statehood in general remain two historically and logically different magnitudes, even if Europe leaves behind or divests itself of the political forms of the past, without being able to create clear new ones. However, every step to such new forms raises questions which only a new sovereign, that is, a state at least coming into being, can answer. Not least, it must clarify bindingly the question: “who belongs to me by way of right?”, which appears in diverse, multifarious variations (“who may (*or*: who has the right to) jointly decide or co-determine [[things with me]]?”, “who may wander in, i.e. immigrate (*or*: who has the right to enter as a migrant)?”). This specific question must be posed and answered by every political collective, regardless of how it is structured and how extensive it is (*or*: irrespective of its structuring and its size), because it concerns its very own constitution. That is why those who believe that with the nation-state, this supposed originator of all evils (trials and tribulations, woes, suffering), every border and every separation or segregation will also come to the end, are greatly mistaken, erring woefully. The direct opposite of that can be the case under circumstances which are clear as day and easily portended: European unification is carried out and takes place – logically (*or*: as is reasonable and plausible) – in a time of growing globalisation, but precisely growing globalisation brings with it growing pressure on Europe.

### III

In principle, one can imagine that Europe in the foreseeable future will grow together, and succeed in self-compressing, towards a sovereign acting political entity (unit(y)), or that it will not succeed in this. In the first case, it is asked whether unity could come about and be realised through the hegemony of one nation or on another path, i.e. in another way, manner or mode. For the place or role of the hegemon only two candidates (since all indications in relation to that are that Great Britain wants to be content or satisfied in preventing the hegemony of another European Power), are obviously brought up for consideration: France, because it raises, i.e. makes the claim regarding that (at least in the diplomatic and military field), and Germany, because it possesses the material prerequisites and preconditions for that, and moreover enjoys or has at its disposal an in actual fact acknowledged precedence in the economy (*or*: economic sector). Yet an open struggle between France and Germany as regards European hegemony cannot today, already because of the – spoken of at the outset – drastic change in Europe's position in the world, develop a genuine dynamic anymore; on the path of direct confrontation against the background of the possible exercising of violence, no hegemon is to be ascertained anymore (*or*: from direct confrontation given the possibility of armed conflict (clashing, clashes), a hegemon cannot be established any longer). One side can certainly influence the other significantly and permanently, or over the long run “be head and shoulders above” and able to dominate the other side; however, it is doubtful whether from that a real, regular hegemony could be formed and would come into being. European hegemony calls for more than decisive influence on the shaping of the monetary (currency) union, or on the organisation and carrying out of a military deployment and or intervention; Europe's hegemon would have to represent, to the eyes of the world, Europe with deeds (*or*: before the eyes of the whole planet, the European continent,

with acts), which would concern the entire world. In relation to that, neither France, nor Germany will be in a position in the future to do something like that, and with the passage of time, in fact, their planetary weight as individual countries will be diminished (decreased) rather than augmented (enlarged, increased).

The German side could, after several disappointments (disenchantments) on the old continent, flirt with the thought of achieving hegemony in Europe with American help, that is, of steering and directing European fate or destiny in agreement and harmony with the Americans – after all, it was due in fact (also) to American resistance that two German hegemonial efforts or attempts in this century failed. American circles have in fact expressed the wish for a privileged relationship with a reunified Germany.<sup>5</sup> Yet at the same time, it remains unclear whether they have in mind a Germany which would use American support primarily to achieve Europe's unification in accordance with its – as well as of course American – perceptions, or a Germany, which basically should take on the role of the American regional governor (i.e. deputy) in Eastern Europe against Russian cravings and desires for expansion (*or*: expansive aspirations), regardless of what became of European unification. Either way, an energetic and if need be aggressive American option, i.e. choice in favour of America, by Germany, would be a highly interesting, but (probably) daring, risky and dangerous game. Not only because it, sooner or later, would lead to a rapprochement between France, Great Britain and Russia, but also because of the reason that no conclusive and lasting stance could or would be expected from the American side on this question. The legend of the “special relationship” of Great Britain and the United States may perhaps be exaggerated and overdone, however, the British always have their certain discreet influence in Washington. And the influence of forces and lobbies inside of the United

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<sup>5</sup> See, e.g. D. Hamilton, *Jenseits von Bonn. Amerika und die „Berliner Republik“*, Frankfurt/M.-Berlin 1994. The author is a close collaborator of the American ambassador in Bonn.

States, who would not be indifferent to (*or*: vis-à-vis such a turn in) American foreign policy precisely on this point, can prove to be essentially stronger. Amongst the shapers, i.e. planners, of American foreign policy, a – just like that, without a second thought – agreement could be entered into [[regarding a very close relationship with Germany, which would lead to a rapprochement between France, Great Britain and Russia]], only as to the general principle that the United States could make use of a strong Germany inside of a NATO led and absolutely controlled by the USA itself. In a similar sense, the USA has in the past and in the present, encouraged European efforts and attempts at unification under the (not always) tacit condition or presupposition that Europe will constitute an integral constituent part or element (*or*: complete section) of a West led, subjugated and commanded by the United States. The logic of leadership calls for the general giving orders (commands, directions, instructions) (sooner, preferably) to brigadiers and colonels, not to sergeants and corporals (non-commissioned officers).

Naturally, no-one can absolutely exclude that a future Germany, with the goal of achieving a hegemonial position in Europe, will enter into a close and privileged alliance with the Americans (*or*: United States), and (pre)conditions can be imagined under which such an undertaking or venture could even be met with success. But the success would demand political abilities, which are not precisely the strong side of Germans, i.e. political abilities which do not flourish in Germany. The lack of centuries-long world-political experiences of the great imperialistic nations of Europe (above all of England and of France (*or*: headed by England and by France)), can be compensated for with difficulty (*or*: is not replenished or made up for easily), and, as is known, the fine mixtures, blends, assortments out of the demonstration of power, flair and effective rhetoric, i.e. the fine combinations which the demonstration of power, sensitive handling and effective rhetoric jointly constitute, do not represent and have never been the

usual products of German political laboratories in this century. The present-day dominating and ruling partly universal-ethical, partly economistic basic tenor of German world politics (*or*: today's foreign policy of Germany) constitutes actually a new variant of the same old flight into simplification, another expression of the same old perplexity, bewilderment and embarrassment vis-à-vis the immense complexity of the political – only this time with reversed signs and symbolism. The really dogged, determined and obstinate turn towards the ethical and the economic is supposed to make possible breaking away and detachment from the “special way or path (Sonderweg)” of “power politics (the politics of power)”, and the affluence and prosperity of the last forty years seems to prove, to the general satisfaction [[of Germans]], that ethics not only does good to the soul, but also to the tummy (stomach, belly). The dichotomy of economy and politics is nonetheless mere fiction, since the economy is just as much as politics, the concrete relations of concrete people with and towards one another; the economised political is no less political than the theologised, moralised or aestheticised political (*or*: politics which has been converted into economy is no less political than politics which is converted into theology, ethics and aesthetics). If, that is, the German side indeed wants the political unification of Europe, yet it mainly strives after and wants it for reasons of economic effectivity (effectiveness), then it must know that such a unification understood in this way can even intensify the economic struggles over distribution and re-distribution. The economic element, which today is adored, extolled and idolised as the remedy for, or panacea contra, power politics and nationalism, will then prove to be the tough, slow-moving and dogged vehicle, i.e. conduit, exactly for nationalistic-power-political aspirations and tendencies (*or*: for nationalistic aspirations and tendencies pertaining to the politics of power (power politics)).

In light of the ascertainment that Germany today knows most probably just as little as in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century what it should set about doing with its remarkable and most significant potential, one would almost like to regret that God apportioned the «vingt millions de plus» (= “twenty million more [[in population]]”<sup>xciv</sup>) to this people (folk) and country, or [[state]] that France does not have at its disposal the demographic and economic assets and advantages of its envied neighbour. The land (country) of Richelieu and of de Gaulle would have also had most probably – with sufficient material preconditions – enough self-confidence, self-conviction and skill, to in itself snatch or grab hegemony in Europe, and to represent the continent in the world both worthily, as well as energetically (*or*: both with dynamism as well as with dignity). The Germans have, at any rate, much to learn from the politically superior elite of France, and they would be making a mistake of the first order if they here – with raised finger – played the role of the moral praeceptor, i.e. paedagogue – and indeed despite the fact that they in the meanwhile have advanced to being the second-largest weapons exporter in the world, and with that, already belong to the dubious group of the *demi-vierges* (= half-virgins). France’s open or secret claim(s) may be greater than its actual possibilities, but Germany also constitutes, seen planetarily, a fairly middle Power, whose movements moreover are under constant supervision, and will probably continue to be so in the future too. *Rebus sic stantibus* (= Matters standing, i.e. being the way they are), and in view of the above-mentioned world-historically determined antiquatedness of a sharp hegemonial conflict between leading European nations, one can only conclude that if a substantial European unification ever came about at all, it would have to proceed via a close German-French joining together and co-operation with each other. It is to be underlined (*or*: We are obliged to underline) one more time that the external/outward<sup>xcv</sup> institutional form of this joining together and co-operation in itself counts for little in itself, and that under certain conditions the harmonic and dynamic going, i.e.

proceeding, together between two separate(d) nation-states, which would be conscious of their position and situation, and would be capable of carrying along the other nation-states, could potentially serve the European cause more than a half-hearted and limp political union.

#### IV

Remaining with the assumption or hypothesis that Europe could in the future act planetarily, i.e. at the planetary level, as a closed and cohesive political collective, we must pose the obvious question: where and to what (*or*: where and for what purpose or goal)? In a multi-polar world, with [[the passing of]] time, competition and rivalry are sharpened and made more acute, because every active participant must (*or*: will be obliged) to measure his forces with those of several others. The planetary character of all that is happening, i.e. of events, and of action, does not of course mean that the actors or acting subjects ought to spread themselves equally (isomerically) across the whole globe, and declare and show that they everywhere have the same vital interests. As is self-evident, they have their more or less fixed home base (house basis (foundation)), out of which they mainly operate with regard to certain focal points or centres of gravity (*or*: from which they start acting by concentrating their attention on certain weighty, significant fields). Even for a planetary power of pure water, i.e. a purely planetary power, as the present-day United States is, Afghanistan is not as weighty and serious, i.e. important, as the Middle East. It is no different for a planetarily active Europe. Politicians and entrepreneurs, but also observers, who nowadays (these days) keep an eye out for, and seek, the most favourable unfolding space or field for the unfolding of Europe, set their sights, as a rule, on the Far East, perhaps not so much out of a geopolitical thirst for action, but rather for reasons of convenience, if one considers that it is far

simpler and cheaper to profit through the participation in an upswing or upturn already set in motion, than paving the way for and initiating such an upswing or upturn on one's own (i.e. according to one's own direction and management), and with long-term European settings of an aim, i.e. objectives and goals. Certainly, the presence of European forces in a space, in which what is truly promising, or rather what is of great significance for the future – happens, is recommended in every respect. However, Europe could only have an appreciable or considerable weight there in the event it does not merely sell know-how, which is to be bought, or can be bought, from the genuinely Pacific Powers (the genuine Powers of the Pacific (Ocean)), Japan and the United States, but holds all the trumps (aces, cards), which both with regard to its own development, unfolding and activities, as well as in far-Eastern eyes (in the eyes of the Far East), are immediately recognised as such.

We are talking about Russia, and indeed, Siberia. Siberia (and Central Asia) constitutes the last rich-in-raw materials and in practice (in reality) empty-of-men great surface on an already densely populated planet<sup>xcvi</sup>. Whoever believes that “knowledge” and “information” have made raw materials and the question of space obsolete, is merely falling for (*or*: has fallen victim to) the modish, i.e. stylish and in fashion, and not unselfish, cyberspace mythology. The very same United States, which through their scientists and futurologists proclaim the “overthrow of matter”, simultaneously sustain a political-military network spanning the world, which secures them privileged access to crucial resources.<sup>6</sup> Americans and Japanese promptly took advantage of and exploited the weakening, and then the collapse, of the Soviet Union in order to make their economic entry into (or to economically invade) Siberia, for the time being, or

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<sup>6</sup> The Janus face, or double face, of American ideology and politics is patently visible if one compares the cyberspace manifesto (E. Dyson, G. Gilder, G. Keyworth, A. Toffler: *The Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Charta for the Knowledge-Age*, Progress for Freedom Foundation, Washington 22.8.1994) with publications like e.g. the following: K. Kessel: *Strategic Minerals: U.S. Alternatives*, Washington DC, National Defence, UP 1990. Cf. on this theme or topic P. Kondylis: „Die verflüchtigte Materie“, *FAZ* of 4.10.1995 [here Ch. VI, 2].

first of all, of course in the form of ruthless deforestation, but always with the tremendous reserves of Arctic oil and of industrially or strategically important minerals and ores in mind.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, the great and first aspirant (or suitor) to the Siberian (and Central-Asian/Central-Asiatic) space and its riches is called – China. China is not, in the course of this, driven to this space merely by distant memories and historically founded claims, which played their role in the armed confrontations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, but by really elementary forces. To the, for instance, 1,2 billion residents (inhabitants) of today's China, roughly a further 500 million are to be added<sup>xcvii</sup>, and already their feeding, nutrition and nourishment, especially in view of the constantly rising standard of living, will put world agrarian resources to an extremely hard or tough test.<sup>8</sup> The hunger for energy and raw materials will grow at least at the same tempo. Many hundreds of millions will stand before an almost empty immense space, which offers much of that which they urgently need most. The temptation and the need will be so great as to bend or buckle the ability to withstand or resist such temptation and need, and the world-political constellations and combinations, which would form, develop or arise around this disputed or controversial issue, would of course exert a determinative and decisive influence on the course of planetary history in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – especially if China remains a united state and simultaneously announces and projects Asiatic-continental and Pacific-Oceanic ambitions, i.e. projects claims in the Asian-continental space and in the space of the Pacific Ocean<sup>xcviii</sup>. As soon as such a situation would be delineated and emerges (would emerge), Russia would come under pressure and would proceed to seek allies. If it does not find such allies, then Russia will be forced to make concessions to China, or

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<sup>7</sup> D. Lee, J. Blair: "Oil in the Wilderness: An Arctic Dilemma", *National Geographic Magazine* (December 1988), pp. 858-871; especially V. Kvint: "Eastern Siberia could become another Saudi Arabia", *Forbes* 17 (September 1990), pp. 130-133.

<sup>8</sup> L. Brown: *Who will feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet*, W. W. Norton, New York 1995.

even to enter into a joining together, i.e. union or combining with China, from which an almighty bloc (*or*: coalition) would be created and come into being.

A long-term European politics vis-à-vis Russia should orientate itself to these geopolitical perspectives or prospects. It is undoubtedly the perfect or clear right of the United States to want to safeguard its planetary autocracy<sup>xcix</sup> *inter alia* through the constant holding down or even through the dismemberment or breaking up of Russia (into pieces). However, a united Europe would have little to gain if it came on the scene basically as the strategic representative or regional governor (i.e. deputy) of America in Eastern Europe, and as the proponent and supporter of all the separatist tendencies in the territory (realm or dominion) of the former Soviet Union. European, especially German short-sightedness, as it is made apparent and has made itself felt in the support for the American plan for NATO-expansion up to Russia's borders, cannot but, in relation to that, nourish and feed absolutely legitimate Russian mistrust, and push, drive that gigantic Eurasiatic land (country) into aggressive isolation, or into the arms of China. Whoever only halfway knows about (*or*: Whoever is even just superficially familiar with) Russian history must know that no stable *entente cordiale* (= *cordial (genial) agreement, understanding or concord (amity)*) with Russia is possible, if the right is not a *limine* recognised to it to function as the great Power of order, i.e. to maintain and keep order, in the Caucuses, in Central Asia and in the whole of the Siberian space. Europe would have nothing to lose if Russia successfully fulfilled this function; completely on the contrary in fact. The danger of a Russian hegemony over a united, politically closed (and unified), active/acting, highly industrialised Europe of 350 million people would not exist (*or*: And there would not exist any danger of Russian hegemony on a rich and united/unified Europe, capable of acting politically in a united manner). *Such* a Europe would have nothing to fear from Russia, whilst Russia would have everything to hope for from *such* a Europe.

And in the framework of a large-scale geopolitical re-ordering of, or new order, in Eurasia, questions like Russian influence on Eastern Europe or the angst and fear of Eastern European peoples would be taken care of and solved of their own accord.

The great planetary and world-historical chance or opportunity of a united Europe would therefore be, or go by, the name of Eurasia. First of all, and in principle, of course, in the tangible sense of the securing of sources of energy and indispensable raw materials at a time in which, regarding this, bottlenecks and narrowness loom on the horizon, and the related antagonisms are sharpened and made more acute. But over and above that, in the sense of the mission driving and propelling things forward, which broadens horizons, and accordingly awakens and mobilises forces. Naturally, that the chance or opportunity would objectively exist does not in the least self-evidently mean that it would also have been recognised as such, and moreover perceived in order to seek its exploitation. Its practical utilisation and exploitation would, in other words, presuppose something more than the perspicacity (sharp eye) of a government. Tasks, jobs and works like the geopolitical reordering (new order, rearrangement) of Eurasia and the opening up of further and enormous areas and spaces in its north and in its east (*or*: in its northern, eastern and central section) are not executed and managed by ageing and spoilt populations. Hence, in a demographic respect, China will have the decisive advantage vis-à-vis Europe, should both sides lay claim to (raise/make a claim on) the Siberian and Central Asian space<sup>c</sup>; and even if the use of superior technique (technology) could balance (or even) out or obliterate to some degree or to a certain point this advantage and factor, then Europe would be under time pressure (the pressure of time) anyhow (*or*: Europe again would be pressured as regards time or temporally). In relation to these and such difficulties or hindrances and obstructions, one can still think further, and refer to others. However, this does

not change or transform the certainty that in Europe, without its own sources of energy and raw materials, a Europe, whose ageing population at most will make up three or four percent of the world population<sup>ci</sup>, and a Europe cut off from the great strategic theatres of planetary history in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – such a Europe would sooner or later wither away and be erased<sup>cii</sup>. Mackinder's theorem regarding Eurasia still always retains for the most part its value. But the thesis that whoever dominates Germany, would also be the Master (Lord, Ruler) of (over) Eurasia (*or*: whoever possesses Germany, possesses Eurasia too), was meaningful only in a Eurocentric world. In a planetary world, in which the formidable (enormous, tremendous, immense, powerful, mighty) shadow of China spreads out more and more, the Siberian space could deliver (hand over, provide, yield or constitute) the key to world dominance or world rule (domination) (*or*: the key to world domination could be the Siberian and Central Asian space)<sup>ciii</sup>.

Eurasia would be the great *positive* centre of gravity of the planetary politics of a politically united or unitedly lead, i.e. jointly governed, Europe. However, there would also be *negative* centres of gravity, i.e. such, where primarily defensive tasks would have to be dealt with and managed (*or*: where on the first line of defence, defensive duties would have to be processed). North Africa might or can, in this context, be named as the such an example of prime importance. In Central and Northern Europe, one is not so conscious and aware perhaps of the significance of the consequences which demographic, ecological and political developments in North Africa could have for European equilibrium (equilibria) as for instance in France and Spain. Looking away does not defuse (neutralise or tone down) the problem one bit. The manner in which the European nations will confront such challenges, will show to what extent they are ready to practise solidarity through a common mindset and unanimous and coordinated action – as well as exercising sovereign rights (rights of

sovereignty), which, as we have said, not least of all consist in demanding a binding answer to the question: “who belongs to these European nations (*or*: who belongs to this political entity and who does not)?”<sup>civ</sup>.

## V

Let us now turn to the opposite possibility that, namely, a concrescence of Europe, i.e. [[the]] growing together [[of Europe’s member nations and or states]] into a sovereign political collective, also capable of united and independent acting, fails to materialise. Three reasons could lead to that. First, it would be possible that the development of planetary politics as a whole degrades, i.e. downgrades or demotes Europe’s political unification to a subordinate matter of concern, in relation to which the European nations would have to hurriedly accede to a broad “Western” camp under extra-European leadership. Beloved, languid convenience and habits, and abhorrence of and before the dangers of autonomy and/or sheer necessity could, in other words, stabilise the political-military – not least of all exercised through NATO – hegemony of the United States in the West for a long(er) time, above all if and when the opposition between rich Powers and poor Powers (or those striving and aspiring upwards, i.e. ambitious, rising Powers), irrespective of in what form, would become so sharp(ened) and acute that the former (rich Powers) would have to, or would prefer (*or*: would be obliged or would desire (like)), to carry on and conduct their common struggle in closed form and under a united leadership, not for instance as an alliance of two blocs with equal rights. In such a case, European unification would basically only make such progress and advances which would facilitate the American leadership, i.e. simplify the work and tasks of such leadership; for that (*or*: in exchange), the Americans would take care of the access of their allies to sources of raw materials and of energy;

the freedom of trade routes, and, fire-extinguishing services in regions alight and burning [[with trouble]]. If some European believes that he can leave the basic world-political dirty work (i.e. the basic dirty work of world politics) for the most part to the Americans, and that he, i.e. the European, is better served with American leadership than with his own autonomous effort and exertion, then he will naturally tend to not look at Europe's political sovereignty and planetary ability at acting, i.e. action, as the most urgent matter of concern, and would push such sovereignty and ability along (or advance such sovereignty and ability) to the extent that this would not thwart or militate against the American claim(s) to leadership. Such a strategy, which one might or could name the strategy of voluntary (and) selfish subordination, could obviously come to pass only under three long-term conditions: [[1]] that the quid(s) pro quo or trade-offs expected from the Americans (for instance in international trade) do not essentially exceed the bearable, i.e. tolerable, measure or amount and limits; that the Americans would also be prepared to throw their own forces and powers fully onto the scale(s), i.e. that the Americans would also be ready and willing to fully bring to bear, or bring into play, their own forces, even if exclusively European concerns and interests were at stake or at risk; and that the United States perhaps on a not all-too-distant day (*or*: in the foreseeable future) will not be under the pressure of phenomena and manifestations of internal disintegration, decomposition and dissolution (decay, breaking down and breaking up), paralysing them world-politically i.e. paralysing them as a factor of and in world politics. And still one more remark is appropriate or called for here (*or*: And we must observe something else here). Even if a polarisation of planetary politics drove towards and forced a union (joining together, merger) or coalition of the "West" (read: today's highly industrialised North) under American leadership, the particular form of polarisation could put/place the struggle around the control over the Siberian and Central-Asiatic (Central-Asian) space in the foreground, i.e. bring such a struggle to the fore. For the

“West” it could, in other words, be in the future vital and essential to prevent the formation or creation (development) of a Russian-Chinese bloc or front.

[[2]] The second reason, which could turn the coming into being of a European sovereign political collective into a secondary (incidental, peripheral, irrelevant) or even obsolete (outdated) matter of concern, would be rapid advances in a world society (*or*: the quick unification of world society), which would have absorbed all at once, i.e. gobbled up and devoured, limits and borders, nation-states and large spaces. I hold this expectation to be unrealistic, and I want to explain very briefly why this is so. Those who harbour and cherish such expectations are thinking of the present-day globalisation of production and communication taking place; however, they hardly speak about the decisive question and problem of distribution. Yet concord and peace between nations and political units (entities, unities), or between humans, is not at all placed at risk and in danger so much through the way, manner or mode humans produce and communicate, but primarily through how that which is produced and communicated is distributed (*or*: as on account of the mode of distribution). One constantly reads suggestions regarding the deepening of the international division of labour in industry and trade, and regarding the condensing of the world-wide communication networks – but the secret of the generally acceptable distribution of resources and of goods, no-one has revealed until now, not even the rich and wealthy “West”. It is to be assumed or supposed that the sharpening of struggles over distribution will limit, restrict and confine the globalisation of production and communication; nonetheless, prior to that, this same globalisation will have sharpened the struggles over distribution. Because this globalisation sets off and triggers social processes which can raise expectations without being able to completely satisfy them – and the half-satiated is more aggressive than the half-hungry and half-powerless (*or*: and he who’s belly is half-full is more aggressive than he who is half-dead from

hunger). The borders, which have been torn down by the tendencies of globalisation, will consequently be erected anew through violent struggles over distribution (*or*: will be re-erected and re-established by frightful struggles of distribution). That of course does not mean that the future struggles over distribution must be conducted by means of the present-day political collectives or subjects. The alternative (solution) does not simply read: “world society or nation-state”, as both the adherents and supporters of the latter (nation-state) fear, who identify and equate the nation-state’s abandoning with the abandoning of the nation, and this again with a colourless cosmopolitanism; or, as regards also the proponents and fans of the former (world society) in assuming that every blow against the nation-state is the harbinger and precursor of eternal peace. Nonetheless, the nation-state does not constitute the sole conceivable sovereign and political collective delimited from the rest of the political collectives, and no statistic(s) has proved that war between nation-states has been more frequent or crueler, more terrible and wilder, than other wars. Even the replacement of all political collectives by the political collective “world society” could obligatorily entail the discontinuation, ending and abolition of wars, only if history had known merely of wars between ethnically different political collectives, and no civil wars. The sole thing for which a world society can vouch (*or*: The only thing which a world society can guarantee) is, first of all, simply the conversion of all wars into civil wars.

[[3]] Thirdly, the European unification process (process of unification) can be thwarted by the imponderable forces (and powers) of anomie. These forces are not necessarily in the planetary age homemade, i.e. of European origin, they – or at any rate their direct triggers or catalysts – can just as well be imported. The import(ing) of world-wide, ecological adversity or catastrophes gone out of control can of course hardly be warded off and averted (*or*: cannot of course be prevented or obstructed), however, the import(ing) of unbearable demographic

loads, encumbrances and burdens, is not completely beyond the possibilities of the acting, i.e. action, of the political will (*or*: constitutes at least in part a matter of political volition), unless the burden has in the meantime ruined, destroyed or sunk political will. One may, in pardonable humanistic naivety somewhat underestimate the significance of the demographic factor or, immersed in sublime thoughts, simply pass that factor by (*or*: absorbed in lofty thoughts, simply overlook it). Yet whoever openly and in earnest wanted to assert that the wandering in, i.e. immigration of 30 or 40 million people into today's France or Germany would not bring about any anomic phenomena or manifestations, he is – I cannot express it differently – an idiot. Here, the sheer quantity is crucial, and the determination of this quantity constitutes a question of sovereign political judgement. Such a judgement has for its part not the slightest to do with “racism”, i.e. we are not talking about the racial or cultural quality of the immigrants, especially since the anomic phenomena and manifestations would equally occur and appear if one would like to regard the immigrants as racially or culturally of equal value and or even superior. Demography already has as quantity its fatalities (i.e. inevitabilities, mischiefs or mishaps) (*or*: its logic) and triggers or provokes specific actions and reactions. In calm and harmless seminar rooms, i.e. studies, academic reading rooms etc., where ethical universalists (*or*: where the fans and supporters of ethical universalism) are encountered, one can in total comfort and with every convenience feel like a supra-national pure human amongst supra-national pure humans, but already in the throng and congestion of humans in a public means of transport, one tends not to be so spontaneous and one loses one's willingness, in relation to that, to interpret the process in the public means of transport and all that is happening around and above him [[as signifying]] that here merely one human dignity is found amongst several others (*or*: by saying that he is participating simply in a gathering of humans of equal ethical eminence and dignity). Only the certainty that it is temporally limited makes one such process or suffocating situation

bearable, and it can easily be imagined what would follow if this certainty no longer existed, and if permanent and large population density was supposedly paired, or went, with massive impoverishment and pauperisation as a result of intensifying global economic competition. Some European countries would then take the authoritarian path (*or*: the road of authoritarianism), some others would react by entrenchment[[, i.e. defensively insisting on its own course of action, etc.]]; in any case, the naked and blind drive (urge, impulse) of self-preservation would choke back and stifle every common, joint or mutual European sense or spirit of solidarity. As we remarked: pressure and crisis can let loose centripetal forces; however, they can just as much let loose centrifugal forces too.

## VI

The reader will hopefully have observed that here we are neither making known (*or*: neither have expressed) personal preferences or apprehensions and aversions, nor have we attempted to prophesy (prophesise) concrete events or incidents – such prophecies constitute, incidentally, as a rule, exactly only the objective (or objectified) expression of preferences or of apprehensions and aversions. We described possible constellations and combinations of pre-given or already given factors, and we conjectured (guessed) the possible outcomes of a multi-dimensional dynamic, without being able, or wanting, to exclude one or another outcome amongst them, i.e. amongst all possible outcomes. The description of open constellations and combinations of course seems in comparison to the prognosis of events or incidents, to be simpler in the sense that there are a number of possibilities, but only one reality (*or*: since there are several possibilities, whereas the reality is one [[reality]]). Nonetheless, already the apprehension of possibilities demands not merely the logical ability of a combinatory game (*or*: the ability at a logical game (game of logic) of the

combination or of combinations), but above all, the eye or sense for driving forces and great interrelations and contexts. As to the practical value of such thoughts and considerations, one can at the very most say the following: for the acting subject(s), some imagined constellation or hypothetical combinations can be a motive or motives; some others can be the hindering or hampering of action (*or*: inhibitory factors in respect of their acts). All the same, he who acts, or those who act, must orientate their action to the intellectual(-spiritual) option or choice in favour of a certain constellation and or combination. Options and choices are necessary because history is open – but again, not so very open that every mistake can be atoned for all of the time (*or*: so that any error whatsoever can accommodate rectification whensoever).

#### 4. Mirror, not lever: the United Nations<sup>cv</sup>

When in the Autumn of 1995, the 50 years since the founding and establishment of the UN were celebrated<sup>cv</sup>, the public rhetoric one more time followed a beaten path, formulating and expressing wishes and exhortations. Nonetheless, the subject, to which such wishes and exhortations are addressed, remains vague and indefinite, and the more vague and indefinite is the hypostasis or being(ness) (existence) which is called the UN, so much the more comfortably does one move at the rhetorical level. However, rhetorical needs do not suffice on their own to keep alive fictitious hypostases (being(nesse)s or existences). In this case, the tendency to hypostatisation, or to the personalisation of an organisation which has many members, is connected with the retrogressive projection of a desired future reality in and onto the present. In other words, the UN<sup>cvii</sup> is considered to be, or is looked at, as a thinking and acting subject to the extent that one is meant to have to see in it the germ (*or*: it is apprehended as the core) of a sovereign world state, and at the same time the lever of this sovereign world state's realisation.

It is a matter here, of an optical illusion. This optical illusion does not come into being out of, or is not created by, the fact that a world state is theoretically and historically inconceivable (unthinkable), but out of an, in the best case – optimistic as to goal – interweaving of two very different things with each other (*or*: but by the fact that two different things are connected, in the best case [[scenario]], with hurried optimism). Because neither the existence of the organisation of the United Nations confirms the possibility of a world state, nor could the lack thereof (i.e. of a world state), or its startling failure, prove its impossibility. The existence of the organisation, i.e. the UN, is in fact founded

and established on the – by statutes or constitutionally – safeguarded, secured respect of the state sovereignty (sovereignty of the state) of its members, and these members with state sovereignty understand their membership primarily not, for instance, as a contribution to the achievement of a world state, but exactly as the protection of their own sovereign rights, with their festive and celebrated recognition on the part of the international community overall; whenever they want to, or must, relinquish or forego a part of those rights, they do it in all practical cases through agreements amongst one another, not for instance through the direct cessation of these rights to the United Nations.

This United Nations as an organisation of voluntary members (or of states who are members of their own free will), would barely survive the abandonment of (*or*: if it relinquished) the principle of state sovereignty, which represents and constitutes literally the accepted by all lowest – irrespective of human rights and of other accomplishments – common denominator (*or*: lowest common denominator, beyond the achievements of every member in the sector of “human rights” etc. etc.); no other right of say, participation and of co-decision (i.e. jointly deciding with others) would compensate the loss of sovereignty, above all in the eyes of the weaker nations, for which the equal sovereignty of all [[nations/states]] remains the most effective form of having equal rights, i.e. of legal and real equivalence.

### Universalism and particularism

Since now, for these and for other reasons, no spontaneous and simultaneous relinquishment by all states of the central rights of sovereignty can be expected, the establishment of a world state via the United Nations is only conceivable if the hegemony of one Power or the condominium (i.e. joint sovereignty and domination) of some Powers inside of this organisation (of the UN) would

actually stand the UN's principles in force today on their head (i.e. turn these principles upside down). In this sense, we mean (*or*: With this concept we said) that a failure of the United Nations by no means proves the impossibility of a world state, but such a failure would possibly become conducive to the matter of a world state (*or*: but indeed it could promote a world state's realisation). Because the world state – howsoever it is structured – could namely be founded and established through other (different) methods than through the general (i.e. by all states) voluntary renunciation of sovereignty, and indeed with other (different) aims and goals than those which are formally propagated by the United Nations, provided that a planetary Power or an alliance of such Powers would have at its or their disposal the economic, military and demographic potential to force and impose the unification of the planet for its or their own goals.

Now if the United Nations and the world state constitute two very different things, how is then the fact to be explained that there exists between the presence and existence of such a world organisation (i.e. the UN), and, the growing (progressive) unification of the world, that is, the increasing degree of density of planetary politics, nevertheless, a really obvious interrelation? Also, this time or on this point, one should beware (*or*: we must protect ourselves from) a second widely disseminated optical illusion, which incidentally frequently underlies the optical illusion mentioned above, i.e. between the UN and the world state. One confuses the (in actual fact) growing and progressive unification and homogenisation of the planetary field of tension with the (hypothetical) growing and progressive commonality of interests of the collective actors, or put differently: out of the necessary unification of processes and of questions and problems on a world scale, the necessary unification of the aims, goals and of the answers and solutions, is erroneously concluded and documented. This impression can come into being because the constantly

increasing degree of density of planetary politics in the twentieth century forces its determinative and crucial subjects, in relation to that, to formulate their matters of concern in the vocabulary of universal objectives, goals (settings of their aim), and universal social models spanning the entire world.

Therein lay the basic feature, and at the same time the forward-striving basic contradiction (i.e. the basic contradiction moving things forward), of that politics at the latest since (*or*: particularly after) 1917, when the United States and the Soviet Union entered upon the world stage and came to (arrived at) the world fore(front): universalisms and universalistic ideologies were represented especially by the great nations, which, in the course of this, wanted to secure and ensure a planetary pre-eminence, as well as a monopoly of the interpretation of universalistic ideas. In the roundabout way of, or through, this interpretation, exactly the universalistic proclamations were particularised and specialised end(goal)-rationally and expediently, i.e. in accordance with the goals and the interests of the interpreter. The relation(ship) between universalism and nationalism could therefore not be grasped generally and abstractly, but it varies according to the international weight and the claim and aspirations of the nation (coming) in(to) question on each and every respective occasion.

The Second World War constituted an until then unprecedented condensing of planetary politics in the sense that it was ultimately a matter of world domination (*or*: here domination over the whole globe was at stake) – and the Cold War, which followed it, likewise showed that from now it, i.e. planetary politics, could only be about world domination (*or*: the much-sought-after, enviable prize of major[[-league]] (large-scale) international politics would be world domination). The initiative of the United States in regard to the founding and establishment of the United Nations indicated the willingness of the West's leading nation to continue to remain active in world politics (*or*: to continue to

play an active world role) in the name of universalistic principles; and the co-acting, i.e. participation or involvement of the Soviet Union, expressed its determination and resoluteness to be present in that world forum, and with the shaping of world events, to assert its own universalistic standpoint (*or*: to impose its views, forming world politics, from its own universalistic point of view). It is not at all surprising and paradoxical that a common forum came about precisely at a time when the tensions between the protagonists were already emerging, becoming delineated and looming on the horizon; possibly hiding in this circumstance was the true core (kernel, nub, essence) of that which the United Nations had to represent anyhow (*or*: in this fact, the true character of the UN was probably hiding). To the double-sidedness, i.e. ambiguity, of a world situation, in which universalistic principles and world-political endeavours and pursuits of the leading nations were no longer to be separated from one another[[, i.e. both Great or Super Powers were acting on the same battlefield – the whole world, globe, planet]], corresponded the ambivalent character of an organisation, which offered (a) common ground in the form of principles (required for interpretation, i.e. to be interpreted), and simultaneously a framework for various kinds of probing and sounding out, manoeuvres and propagandistic appearances. Certainly, this ground and this framework always constituted a meeting place – but the festival ground or fairground is a meeting place; the battlefield is also a meeting place; and the United Nations has served until now – as an institutionalised meeting place – all possible goals. Its main function has consisted in being the mirror of, or the mirror in which one saw, the constellations, i.e. correlations, of forces, which were (being) formed outside of it. That can easily be proved: the United Nations did not exert any remarkable or significant influence on the course and outcome of the Cold War; it acts or behaves conversely: the peripeteiae [[= sudden changes in events and or circumstances]] of the this same Cold War decisively stamped the United Nations' history.

The question is now whether the world organisation, i.e. the UN, after the Cold War, could be transformed from a mirror to a lever, which would achieve, or be capable of contributing particularly to, the creation of a world order. What is meant is of course a world order according to the principles proclaimed in 1945, because another world order would actually imply the dispensability of the United Nations (*or*: that the United Nations is superfluous), even if these above-mentioned principles would have been used by the originators and creators of the new world order simply as means for a purpose or goal. If the question is posed thus, the reminding is inevitable – and instructive –, that the United Nations never made its own existence dependent on the preservation of those principles, in whose name it, i.e. the UN, was founded and established. It never occurred to anyone to demand the expulsion of a member-state because of the worst breaches of human rights, because of flagrant violations against (of) international law in force, or even because of the flouting of resolutions of the United Nations. Whoever believes, after the Cold War, this would be different, is wrong and kidding himself. Wherever, of course, the spirits are fed and nourished with universalistic rhetoric, there the banality moves out of sight and out of mind, i.e. is forgotten, that principles of “human rights” and of international law can only turn into principles for acting (action), when their keeping and observance is guaranteed. Right, i.e. law, becomes right/law not through its declaration, but through its (f)actual and uninterrupted, unfailing legal recoverability and fundamental, in principle, legal enforceability (*or*: possibility of being demanded, and of enforcing its application). For that reason, until today there are in fact no human rights, but merely civil rights: human rights could only be proclaimed and granted by a world state, vis-à-vis which all humans would be directly and immediately of the state, i.e. citizens of the world state, that is, their rights would be obtained directly from such a world state as the representative of the whole of mankind (humanity), and not through the mediation and intervention of a particular, separate state; because only he who

represents the whole of mankind can look at and consider a human in his mere property, i.e. characteristic and quality as a human, free of, or beyond, national attributes<sup>cviii</sup>.

With that, a second reason interrelates, as to why the universalistic principles in themselves declared by the United Nations are hardly suitable as a lever of action and of practice with regard to, and for the purpose of, a generally acceptable world order: their need for interpretation, or their vagueness, grows and increases exactly to the extent of their spreading, diffusion and (nominal) application. This applies in particular to so-called human rights, whose interpretation becomes, or is made, all the more elastic and unbinding, the more they dominate world-political discourse. Especially their material (economic and ecological) interpretation makes the distance between poor and rich possessors of human rights visible, whereby exactly that is proven to be a point of contention which should have constituted the basis of understanding. The Climate [[Change]] Conference of Berlin (1995) was, regarding this, exceptionally instructive for anyone who wants to be taught.

Something different to contempt for, or the arbitrary – as one likes – interpretability of, principles, yet just as widespread and paralysing (crippling, inhibitory, suspensory) for the United Nations, is these same principles' selective application, that is to say, action in accordance with two measures or yardsticks. Hence, it is the full right of the United States to be worried about the supposed atomic weapons of North Korea or of Iran much more than about Israel's real atomic weapons; however, this behaviour hardly seems in the eyes of others, i.e. third parties, to be appropriate to commend someone as an impartial executor of universal principles. Undoubtedly, the partiality of the small [[Powers, actors, subjects]] is not less than the partiality of the great [[Powers, actors, subjects]], yet this is (or strikes one as) all the more unpleasant (to behold), the more the great [[Powers etc.]] with reference to (*or*: by invoking

(self-appointedly or unsolicitedly)) their own world-political responsibility, claim privileges for themselves, which must remain denied to other states.

### The monopoly of violence and self-interest

With regard to its ability at taking a decision (making decisions) and at acting (action), the United Nations had the good idea, or felicitous inspiration, to shelve the principle of the unanimity of the League of Nations, and to vest in the Security Council of the Great Powers special competencies, authority and powers. This, just like the right of veto of every Great Power, implied (implies) of course the admission that universalistic principles are primarily the matter of the Great Powers, yet on the other hand, one wanted with the institution of the Security Council to take a step in the direction of a kind of world government. Voices which, or those today who, plead in favour of an assigning of the monopoly of violence (monopoly on violence) to the United Nations (read: the Security Council), pick up the thread of, and espouse, such notions and views, which for their part are traced back and reduced to the idea (notion) of the world state. With similar logic, the striving and endeavour are founded and established to restrict the possession of atomic weapons to the permanent members of the Security Council. Yet works or deeds, which according to Locke are always the best interpretation of words, show that this restriction is not necessarily to be comprehended as a constituent part, or aspect, of a comprehensive strategy for the monopolisation of violence, or for disarmament. The proof is obvious: in the Security Council sit in personal union, i.e. in a relationship of being the same and identical person, or both, the sole possessors of atomic weapons<sup>cix</sup>, and at the same time, the greatest exporters of weapons in the world.

The indication of this duplicity or hypocrisy is not supposed to be here a moralistic accusation (*or*: does not happen here with an intention of ethical

censure or reproach). It is not a matter of a sin which would or could be overcome through repentance and asceticism, but is a matter of a necessary functional concomitant of the fundamental datum, or basic given fact, which is established in, and marks, the United Nations itself; namely, the interweaving between universalistic principles and particularistic matters of concern at the level of action of nations with planetary interests and a planetary radius of action. This interweaving and its variations become visible and are evident both in that which is bemoaned as the “failure” of the United Nations, as well as in that which is notched up, registered or recorded as its “success”. This “success” one sees above all in interventions for peace-making and the consolidation of peace, or for the redress of injustice in relations between states. Yet the United Nations acts also in such cases not as a self-sufficient, self-reliant (independent) lever, which can if necessary re-dispose, i.e. rearrange, a constellation or a certain correlation of forces, but as a mirror of the existing correlation or arrangement of forces, especially in the circle of the Great Powers. Such interventions have hitherto borne fruit when a Great Power out of its own interest, took in hand the matter of concern, and could carry through and finish off the said matter[[, project or job]], in relation to which no other Power had a vital interest or a real possibility to stand in the way and obstruct it (e.g. the Gulf War). Common or joint action can also be initiated and taken on, when in the case concerned, the interests of no side are directly affected, or when no side amongst them (i.e. amongst the two or more sides) fears a decisive predominance of another side. Then – with as less expenditure and effort as possible – good will can be demonstrated, and the role of the protagonist can be justified in world politics (e.g. Cyprus)<sup>cx</sup>. The ability at acting or action shortly, i.e. quickly, achieves or runs and bumps into its limits (there) where, under the pressure of this role, something must be undertaken and happen, but for lack of vital interests, no clear concept(ual) plan exists or is developed (e.g. Somalia, Rawanda), and over and above that, the participants have just as vague as

different ideas, notions and sympathies at the back of their mind (e.g. Bosnia, where in the end whatever we said in the case of the Persian Gulf was repeated).

The interrelation between the ability at acting and action, and the readiness and willingness to pay the corresponding toll in blood (i.e. blood toll, death toll, toll of lives) has also been, in the meanwhile, emphasised; only one does not rightly know in the West through which loyalties should the said toll in blood be made reasonable (plausible, convincing) and should make sense (stand to reason) (*or*: In the meanwhile, everyone knows that the ability towards/vis-à-vis action is appended to, or abuts with, the willingness to pay the corresponding toll of blood. Nevertheless, the West does not know on the basis of what legality and loyalty (consciousness of the law) can it make understandable to people, the necessity of paying this toll). Whoever no longer feels the slightest desire or disposition to die for one's own nation, will do it even less so for the peace of other nations, or even for the still more abstract peace of a still more abstract humanity, especially when it runs, bumps into and encounters the obstinate resistance of humans who, against consumeristic refinement, want to be primitive enough to sacrifice their life for that which they see as their national cause or matter (affair). The ideological and practical difficulties of the West on this point spring from the fact that even in the age (epoch) of money, some things still must be (are necessarily) measured in (*or*: certain things continue to be measured with) blood.

Definitely the main reason for the lack of ability at acting and action of the United Nations lies, nonetheless, not first of all therein (i.e. in the fact that some things are still measured in and with blood and not in and with money), but in the already stressed (aforementioned) interweaving of universalism and nationalism at the level of the Great Powers; hence, the necessity of achieving a harmonisation of interests of the latter Great Powers before – at the planetary level – there can be dealings, or action is undertaken, by invoking universalistic

principles. The momentary superiority of an interested Great Power, especially in a certain case or large space (region), may or can indeed chop this Gordian knot in two, but untie it, [[it can]]not (*or*: cut this Gordian knot, but it is not possible for anyone to untie it). If we understand by (*or*: By saying) ability at acting, i.e. action, not the occasional interest-led actionism, i.e. activism (*or*: occasional and selfish feverish acts), but coordinated long-term activity for the application of declared principles, thus it is hardly to be expected that also an – already considered and studied – organisational reform of the United Nations could bring about something in this sense or direction. It would merely take into account, and record, the transition from bi-polarity to multi-polarity, and in this respect, it would democratise the world organisation, i.e. the UN. However, democratisation, and, the ability at acting/action, are two different things, particularly if – together with the new World and or Great Powers – their antagonisms towards the old World/Great Powers, or amongst one another, would creep and nest in(to) the highest bodies or organs of the United Nations.

### Political provincialism

Whoever thinks in respect of the longer term, must keep in mind that the world in 1995 or 1998<sup>cx</sup> still finds itself in a state of awkwardness and embarrassment, and of orientationlessness, i.e. lack of orientation, after the unexpected end of the Cold War. This awkwardness etc. often manifests itself and appears as a peaceful and peaceable voice or disposition, which will retreat to the extent new fixed poles of attraction and clear alternatives on the basis of clear contrasts and conflicts of interests are formed. What a multi-polar Cold War will look like, no-one can say with certainty. What is certain is that the United Nations will depict or reflect a multi-polar Cold War, rather than obstruct it. Such thoughts and prognoses are of course in Germany, for well-known reasons, largely taboo

(*or*: are most often repelled on account of ethical and humanitarian qualms). The reader of American or French political and strategic journals and periodicals notes with relief<sup>cxii</sup> that not everyone in the West is ready and prepared (*or*: Whoever, however, closely follows the more authoritative political and strategic publications (printed materials) knows that not everyone in the world is willing) to lapse into political provincialism in the name of ethical universalism. Since those who are actually ready for that, most often invoke and stress the role and possibilities of the United Nations, it appears to be useful and beneficial (*or*: for that reason, we are obliged) to repeat: the United Nations is a mirror, not a lever. Every political situation creates the institutions in which this same political situation is reflected (mirrored), or which reflect (mirror) it, and the unprecedented degree of density of planetary politics after the Second World War, found expression in a world organisation. That is not a blessing in itself, but it also does no harm. In mirrors, one can only see that which is reflected and mirrored in them.

The present and the future of the world are decided by means of the relations of the great (and middle) Powers towards (with, vis-à-vis) one another, and the age-old (long-ago) known secret of peace is the equilibrium (balance, balancing) of their interests. If this exists, then universalistic principles also find their generally acceptable interpretation<sup>cxiii</sup>; if it does not exist, then these same principles are converted into points of contention and weapons. Sluggish and languid thought takes a liking to the simple representation of a higher, superior Power, which, guided by noble intentions and principles, creates, as it were, order from above. With regard to that, in practice it is required to start construction from the roof. But order, in so far as it is possible in human affairs, lies in the foundations, and order is capable of being jointly shaped, moulded and formed only by those who themselves stand on firm foundations. That is why the decisive and leading European nations would therefore be ill-advised

(*or*: would not be doing any good) to use their eager and diligent participation and involvement in undertakings and ventures of the United Nations as a substitute and alibi for their own inability to obtain (lay) solid planetary foundations under their own feet (*or*: inability towards (*vis-à-vis*) the constitution (formation, composition) of firm and solid planetary foundations).

## 5. The world Powers and the world state<sup>cxiv</sup>

The idea of the world state is equated by its advocates with the idea of eternal peace, and is commended and praised in this sense. The overcoming of the political fragmentation or dismemberment (cutting(dividing, breaking)-up, breaking into pieces) of humanity – it is said – is supposed to, or will, put an end to the friction(s) coming into being out of such political fragmentation, and will turn general(universal)-human interests into (*or*: will render/make pan-human interests) a world-encompassing and by definition irrefutable, irrevocable and conclusive political organisation. In this respect, one may or could call or characterise the idea of a world state “politically articulated pacifism”, that is, that (*or*: a) pacifism, which to the evil of war does not contradistinguish simply the individual ethical act of conscientious objection to war (*or*: the ethically inspired denial of the use of armed violence), but a positive institutional plan. Whoever, on the other hand, as an anthropological pessimist, as a nationalist, or for whatever other reason, does not share (in) the pacifistic ideal, as a rule tends, in relation to that, to reject the possibility of a world state, to put the world state’s realisation at a level, i.e. to equate the world state, with an – inconceivable or undesired – dying out or eclipsing of politics, or to regard as the prerequisite of this realisation, the – improbable – appearance of a common foe of the whole of humanity. Both these perceptions [[**a**] of the world state bringing eternal peace, and, **b**) of the world state being a priori an impossibility]] dominate, in diverse variants, the political discourse, and mark the fronts, i.e. mark out or draw the boundaries between the opposing factions. Yet none of them (*or*: neither of the two) is compelling. Because the world state is not a logical and historical impossibility, it is not a fantasy, regarding which

only unpolitical dreamers are supposed to be lost in thought and [[only for whom]] it would be worth their while to deal with. At the same time, however, the possibility of the world state's realisation offers no guarantee for the arrival of eternal peace and of universal freedom, as well as no guarantee for the leaving out (discontinuance) or eclipsing of politics, as we know it. Much of that which thought, or the pious wish (desire) as the father of thought, anticipates, is in fact in history either not realised at all, or is realised in such a way that the expectations connected and related to that, fall by the wayside and remain unfulfilled, and the earlier state of affairs appears to be – in a nostalgic retrospective view, i.e. from the perspective of nostalgic recollection – more bearable and sufferable.

#### The emerging or coming into being of a hegemonial Power

The character of a future world state would depend on, and be determined by, the circumstances of its erection, institution and establishment. Three possibilities are conceivable here: [[1]] free consensus, [[2]] consensus in a state of need (want, distress, hardship), i.e. state of emergency, and [[3]] the hegemony of one nation or of an alliance of nations. All three imply acts of political will or political volition: in the case of consensus, on the part of all of the participants or sides; in the case of hegemony, on the part of the prospective (would-be or budding) hegemon(s). From the perspective of an economic universalism, though, it appears that the world would have to be unified not through political acts of the will, but on the contrary, through their increasing irrelevance, that is, as a result of the gradual absorption of the political (with)in(side) the functionality of the economic (*or*: Of course, economic universalism believes that the world will not be unified with acts of political volition, but, contrariwise, because political volition will become an all the

more negligible quantity, since the political element – step by step – will be absorbed by the economic element and its functional needs)<sup>cxv</sup>. World-economic interweaving and global informatics (information technology) would, in the course of this, make those boundaries and borders obsolete, from whose widening, extension or defence, politics has hitherto lived and maintained or conserved itself. Here it is obviously not primarily a matter of the establishment of a world state, but rather of the creation of an open world society, which could perhaps make use of a political organisation in a world-state form, but would degrade, i.e. demote this political organisation in world-state form to the role of a mere instrument. What bourgeois society in a national framework never achieved, namely, to push itself through, or to impose itself against, the state fully and completely, seems now to be feasible and practicable on a world scale. The syllogistic reasoning summoned for that [[purpose]], postulates a strict determination of the political by the economic, which reminds one of the grossest, crudest and coarsest versions of historical materialism. To those who are versed in the history of ideas, of course, it ought to be known that the provenance of central components, or essential elements, of Marxism is from the thoughts world or universe of ideas of economic liberalism; that is why it is not disconcerting or paradoxical that after the political collapse of Marxism, the economistic interpretation of behaviour and of history survives under liberal signs, i.e. with liberal symbolism. The American Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker<sup>cxvi</sup> has for example suggested economic interpretations of social phenomena – from marriage and the family to religion –, which outstrip in vulgarity<sup>cxvii</sup> everything which so-called “vulgar Marxism” had thought of in its time.

To the methodical (i.e. methodological) weaknesses of the liberal-economistic perception of the world economy and world state, a further and very real weakness is added. The unification of the world is seen from the standpoint of

production, trade and the flow of information; however, the central question of distribution remains left aside or hushed up, and it is not revealed by anyone how out of the mere fact of unification in the aforementioned fields, a mode of distribution is supposed to come into being with which those concerned, or all sides, would not merely absolutely – in comparison with their own previous state of affairs (of every one of them) –, but also relatively – in comparison with the present-day state of affairs (of others) – be satisfied. If the unification of production and of trade would automatically bring with it a generally acceptable distribution, then that would have become noticeable in the inside or interior (internally (inwardly) in respect) of the national markets. On the other hand, it is obvious that the relative profits and gains within the framework of distribution, which inside of the given constellation, i.e. the world correlation of forces, determines the position of the actor, i.e. the hierarchical position of every side, politically is more (highly) charged and explosive than the absolute profits and gains. This is decisive (*or*: Here lies the decisive point). Because the unification of the world must sharpen, or necessarily make more acute, the question and problem of distribution, as now everyone is struggling over the same goals and the same prizes. Therefore, the political factor finds its way, and penetrates deeply, into the economic factor via the multiform, multifarious (variform) question and problem of distribution. This fact makes the political act of will (volition) for the erecting and establishment of a world state – even inside of an economically united world society – indispensable. At the same time, however, it can be supposed or guessed (*or*: However, this same fact also allows the well-founded guess) that this act of will, or such a political act, can hardly be that of, or will not coincide with, a free consensus of all sides. Because such a free consensus presupposes the generally satisfying and accepted solution to the question/problem of distribution. And this, i.e. such a (re)solution, is in turn only possible if the stronger and more powerful renounce and forego their relative advantages vis-à-vis the weaker.

Thus, an insurmountable paradox comes into being: precisely those Powers would – through the establishment of a world state, suffer losses or lose the most – which today are strongest, and because of that, would have to furnish or constitute the driving and motive force for such a project, if it were supposed to have any prospects at all of realisation. This paradox can take economic, but also political-military forms – depending on which goods are on each and every respective occasion running short/in short supply, and which paths to their attainment and acquiring appear to be most expedient. Yet the paradox exists in any case, and can be summarised thus: the world Powers stand in the way of the world state. From a simple (mere, bare) numerical perspective, one could gain the impression and think that the replacement of a greater number of political collectives by a small number would bring or lead us nearer to a state of unity. However, one can also evaluate this situation differently. Conflicts between few world Powers must indeed remain restricted as to number (i.e. be numerically limited), simultaneously however, these conflicts will increase and expand in extent and scope, since now they potentially stretch across the entire planet, and furthermore, they are hardly able to be decided in the short term. The last (final) steps which should be taken towards world unity, are therefore, by far, more difficult than the previous steps, which have temporarily come to a halt in regard to the oligarchy of the world Powers. Within the framework of this oligarchy, every world Power possesses more than that which would be possessed in a world state resting and based on the principle of just distribution. What could entice the United States for example in relation to that, to exchange its leading role in today's world for joining, i.e. accession to, a world state, in which the representation of citizens would be set, fixed and regulated in accordance with the principle of number? Of "One World", one talks with pleasure from a superior position of power out of which and when one knows that the opening of borders will primarily bring about a growing and widening of one's own possibilities of influence and own field of action. The hour of truth

strikes or comes only when one discovers that this same opening abruptly multiplies the relative advantages of other Powers, whereas one's own advantages in economic and political goods shrinks (shrivels, dwindles, atrophies), (and) if only to be adapted or to adapt itself to the commands of the principle of equality. The United States and the "West" in general have yet to have this experience before them (*or*: have not yet tasted in all seriousness (in earnest) this experience). That is why their principles and ideological declarations have not yet passed the acid test and gone through a baptism of fire. One, at any rate, could confidently put forward the proposition (*or*: At all events, it is not difficult for someone to divine) that the USA would not readily accept and swallow without objection a realisation of "One World" under China's direction, management, aegis and control, and in accordance with China's perceptions, ideas and presentations.

Thus, something stands in the way of the free consent and acquiescence of the world Powers in regard to the world state, which cannot at all be considered to be given. It will be just as difficult to obtain the unforced consent of smaller nations in the event they should fear the actual dominance of the larger nations inside a world state. However, let us now assume that consensus is not free, but will be manufactured or commanded in a state of need, i.e. state of necessity and emergency, for example under circumstances of an ecological or demographic catastrophe of a planetary extent and range, and with a lasting, sustained effect, impact or long-term consequences. States of need (emergency or necessity) and crises, can unleash or give rise to both centripetal, as well as centrifugal, forces. Hence, it is not a foregone conclusion that in this situation the wish for political co-ordination would hold sway over the old maxim for action "whoever can, save yourself (he who saves himself, [[so]] save yourself = every man for himself/run for your lives)". Whatever the case may be, for the achievement of political coordination, a – for all sides – binding definition of

the situation would be necessary, and to the side which would formulate this definition, a power of attorney would have to be granted to take the requisite measures. Were this state of need (emergency/necessity) hard, i.e. severe and harsh, enough to compel the establishment of a world state, then it could only be dealt and coped with, and controlled, by a very hard, i.e. tough and strong, world state. Irrespective of declarations and intentions, the logic of the situation would lead to the formation of a hegemonial power, which would act according to the principle “equality in (de)privation”, or in accordance with national sympathies. In this case, hegemony would come into being through the usurpation of far-reaching and extensive powers of attorney in a state of need and emergency (necessity), which, as such and of its own accord, would have to favour the concentration of uncontrollable political power at the world level and on a world scale. Nonetheless, hegemony is not only conceivable as the misuse and abuse of consensus, but also without consensus: as the result of the planetarily noticeable and perceptible preponderance and predominance of a world Power vis-à-vis the rest of the (world) Powers and/or through the successful waging of war against these same Powers. A hegemony which aims at the erection and establishment of a world state, and therefore at the abolition of the sovereignty of all other political subjects, is in principle something other than a hegemony which is – as a matter of fact – exercised in a world of at least formally sovereign political units (entities, unities). The latter does not necessarily require the waging of war(s) against the subordinated world Powers, whereas that former case of the establishment of a world state etc. can be established and consolidated without the waging of war only if its opponents have become so weak(ened) that they prefer unconditional capitulation to resistance.

Hence, the dream of the world state can under certain circumstances be realised only through bloody conflicts of unprecedented intensity and extent

(expanse). Between the ethical-humanistic premises of the demand for a world state, and, of the real-political, i.e. pertaining to realpolitik, implementation or transubstantiation of this demand, no interrelation or correlation exists.

Whoever manufactures or restores such an interrelation or correlation, erroneously derives and deduces from the hoped-for, desired state of world peace, which the world state is supposed to bring about, the peaceful character of the means, through which the world state would have to be erected and established (instituted). And even if the world state could enduringly, i.e. permanently, establish and consolidate world peace, this would not necessarily be a peace in regard to (*or*: it would not at all be certain that the peace would be based on) the free self-determination of all groups and individuals. The ethical-humanistic pleading and advocacy in favour of the world state stands under the signs, i.e. symbolism, of a contradiction (*or*: suffers from a fundamental contradiction). On the one hand, one propagates the world state as the – as from now – overripe, i.e. overdue overcoming of the nation-state and of nationalism, which are declared the source of all evils and of all ills (suffering, trials and tribulations) – as if these evils etc. were unknown in the pre-national world, i.e. before the appearance of nation-states. On the other hand, this same nation-state serves as the prototype for, and of, the world state, whilst this world state is supposed to have at its disposal the monopoly of/on legitimate violence, and moreover, secure the legal equality of all humans through a united and universal legislation. The modern European nation-state has, as the first and the sole state in history<sup>cxviii</sup>, programmatically sought and also largely and to a great – at least – extent, realised and imposed the monopoly of/on legal violence and legal equality, the so called “(constitutional state under the) rule of law (state of justice)”. However, there can be no historical guarantee that a world state would be adapted (adjusted) to, and would comply (be brought into line) with, the political-legal model of the European nation-state, unless it came into being and was established through free consensus in accordance with this prototype. Yet

not even the nation-state came into being in this manner. In any case, its coming into being was not, or did not constitute, a (recti)linear process in which the monopolisation of violence and a united legislation followed unconstrainedly, but inescapably followed the condensing (thickening, deepening, heightening) of economic circulation. Because in some, or certain, historical cases, the field of the state, i.e. the area or space of sovereignty, and the concept of the state, existed already before the appearance of the nation<sup>cxix</sup>, and then the nation, as it were, conquered the state from the inside. In other cases, on the contrary, the nation-state emerged only from the conquering of the politically dismembered and divided-up nation by one of the states which was known and familiar to the nation concerned (*or*: the nation-state was formed when one of the states, in and amongst which the corresponding nation was dismembered, conquered the totality of the states of the same nation)<sup>cxx</sup>. Since there were multiple nation-states, many roads or paths could also be taken towards the establishment of a nation-state. However, the world state must be one single (a singular/unique) state, and that is why multiple historical experiments cannot be conducted simultaneously and jointly with the world state. Between the coming into being of nation-states, and that of the world state, no parallelism, at any rate, necessarily exists.

Just as little does an analogy in the structural result and outcome have to occur (*or*: Also, however, no analogy of structure and of texture is necessary). If the assumption, or our conjecture, holds true that a world state is most likely to be founded by the hegemony of a world Power over the rest of the Powers, then the supposition appears in fact to be plausible that its political-legal structure would remind us of the empires of the pre-national past rather than of the modern nation-state. Because no matter how strong – in a demographic, technical-economic and military respect – the hegemonial world Power would be, it would hardly be in a position, or in a situation, to directly control every

individual on/in the globe, that is, to practice the immediacy of the state in respect of the individual in accordance with the kind, i.e. sort, species or type, of the nation-state (*or*: then again it would not absolutely be in the position of directly controlling every individual on the planet, that is, to put into action the direct relationship of state and citizen, as we know it from the nation-state), which would level out all earlier cultural and national differences. The hegemonial world Power would be dependent on, and obliged to set in motion, both the politics of divide et impera (= divide and rule), as well as the services of regional governors (i.e. deputies), which would be recruited, as its (i.e. the hegemonial Power's) local vassals, either amongst the conquered, subjugated world Powers, or between various regional middle Powers. These regional governors and deputies would certainly not possess any sovereign right(s) vis-à-vis the holder or bearer of hegemony – therein would the statehood of the world state be founded (*or*: and according to this, the world state would be a *state* (= κράτος/κράτος = *kratos* = *power, dominion, rule*)). But as delegated custodians of the law (local guards and protectors of order) or satraps, the said regional governors and deputies would have to have at their disposal the means of legal violence as well as – limited and restricted; and on the part of the supreme authority with jurisdiction, revocable – legal competencies and powers. Thus, the inner-state – i.e. internal as regards states – pyramid of the feudal or half-feudal empires, which the modern nation-state in Europe, and also for the most part in Asia, had levelled, would be set and built up again, and re-established, in a new sense, with new functions. The loose and slack relationship or bond between the apex and the base of the pyramid would have as a consequence that outside of the economically and strategically vital centres, which would have to directly come under, and be subordinated to, the control of the imperial world Power, anarchic and anomic states of affairs and circumstances could, or in all likelihood would, hold sway and dominate. The world hegemon would have no pressing interest to abolish (eliminate, get rid of) them, and the world

hegemon's vassals would not have sufficient power to do that (i.e. eliminate anarchic and anomic states of affairs and circumstances).

### All wars would become civil wars

A world state, therefore, would hardly achieve the institutional cohesion of the nation-state. Yet precisely on that (institutional cohesion of the nation-state) would its (a world state's) suitability and ability depend, in order to ensure security and peace. Also, the content, handling and implementation of human rights would depend on such cohesion. Because human rights were for the very first time spoken about against the backdrop of the "constitutional state under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat)", and the first "constitutional state under the rule of law" was the modern Western nation-state. However, the nation-state cannot grant that which we casually, generally and abstractly call "*human rights*" to all *humans*, but only to its own citizens. In this respect, talk of human rights is juristically misleading. Because in this expression of "*human rights*" the legal aspect, which is bound and connected to a delimited constitutional state under the rule of law, is mixed with the ethical-humanitarian aspect, which relates to the ideal universality of all humans *as* humans. Human rights in the legal sense could only be granted by a world state, since only in it (from within this world state) would the concept "human" and "citizen" coincide and be equated. Promulgated or institutionalised law(/right) would only in the world state concern all humans in their mere capacity, property and quality *as* humans, without the mediation and intervention of a certain descent or nationality and citizenship. From the fundamental distinction between the legal and the ethical-humanistic aspect of human rights, [[it]] now follows that human rights in the ethical-humanistic sense could already as civil rights – and without the erection, institution and establishment of a world state – be realised by all states being

converted (*or*: as long as all states were changed and transformed) into “constitutional states under the rule of law” in accordance with the Western ideal pattern (*or*: with the (at least ideal) Western model or prototype). On the other hand (*or*: Contrariwise), the announcement or proclamation (promulgation) of a general human right (*or*: of “human rights”) on the part of a world state would by no means necessarily imply that what today in the West makes up the ethical-humanistic content of so-called “human rights” would be automatically adhered to and preserved. Hence, legally the law/right of the world state would definitely be a human right or the source of “human rights”, however, ethically-humanistically it would not necessarily be this, i.e. the source of “human rights”. Because it is not at all certain that the world state will be constituted in accordance with the model or prototype of the national “constitutional state under the rule of law”.

These reflections do not contain any prognosis regarding whether the world state will become reality or not. They put forward the justified and substantiated hypothesis that a world state could be established under/in circumstances under which the frequently connected hopes with it, will not be allowed to come to fulfilment. What for every state until today has applied, would apply for the world state too: it could in certain places and at times be stable and inwardly cohesive, or fragile and incoherent; it could protect or oppress. Above all, however, it would not bring about any stationary end state (*or*: final situation and final state of affairs). And just as little as any other state, would it be in the position to guarantee eternal peace. Such a guarantee could only be deduced from a world state’s (continued) existence only if in the past there were only wars (*or*: wars had only ever occurred) between states. However, there have also often been terrible, nasty civil wars, which even the state monopoly of/on violence could not deter. Therefore, the only thing which the world state could

vouch for and guarantee, would be the conversion (transformation) of all wars into civil wars.

## 6. The German “special way” and German perspectives (or prospects)<sup>cxxi</sup>

The question of German prospects (perspectives) cannot be discussed independent of the question of the German “special way (Sonderweg or exceptionalism)”<sup>cxxii</sup>. One in fact must accept an interrelation between the past and the future, irrespective of how one interprets the words "special way", even if with that just the necessitated unique path, which leads to the present situation and consequently has determined the framework for future action, is meant. With today's prevailing negative use of the concept of the German "special way", one poses the question regarding the interrelation between the German past and future not, however, merely with historical, but also with political intent. Here, it is namely a matter of the instrumentalisation of the perception of a German "special way" leading Germans astray, with the aim of forcing German prospects (perspectives) into a certain, normatively defined direction. Hence, these prospects are indeed influenced by the German "special way" – but not by the German "special way" in the objective historical sense explained above, but by the theory of the "special way", which is a political weapon. It would also not be expected that the "special way" theory could have had an effect differently. Because, as the retrospective review of the history of ideas shows, the said "special way" theory in all its versions was from the beginning polemically motivated and meant. However, this "special way" theory can only be understood as pure polemics if one becomes aware of the untenability of its fundamental assumptions through epistemological and historical critique.

Before we undertake this critique within the context of conciseness afforded here (i.e. within the confines of an article), it must be reminded that the thesis of

the German "special way" was not always represented in the negative sense, and that the positive version, just as much as the negative version, had both domestic and foreign origins. The positive version is the original version, and it can be tracked down already in the statements with which prominent German thinkers in the 18th century sought to outline the specific element (feature or difference) of the German intellect(-spirit) vis-à-vis the "West", and thereby contributed to the formation (or shaping) of the (German) national consciousness. A long list of famous authors, who praise in the highest tones the partly philosophical and metaphysical, partly aesthetic and education-like (i.e. educational) superiority of the products of German thought vis-à-vis the "shallow" Enlightenment of the West, could be put together. The atrocities of the revolutionary Terror<sup>cxxiii</sup> were often interpreted as the inevitable result of this kind of Enlightenment and seemed to confirm the self-righteous perception that their higher culture had protected the Germans from such inhumanity. Those who since about 1750 had expressed themselves in such a way about the "West", and above all about the French neighbours, were for the most part liberal and humanistically minded literati (men of letters) who, however, in view of the at that time political haziness of the German nation, could fight for (achieve) a national identity only in the cultural field, and only by means of the schematic demarcation against a neighbour whose splendour and wealth aroused mixed feelings in them. That is why it would be wrong and unjust to see in their remarks a bad omen, and entirely unhistorically, to misjudge the psychological and ideological mechanism through which *every* formation (or shaping) of the national consciousness is carried out. Incidentally, one at that time in general hardly took all this and the Germans the wrong way. Since land and sea were ruled by others, so, as the great poet<sup>cxxiv</sup> already knew, the Kingdom of Heaven of culture built on ideas and ideals was gladly left to the Germans, and precedence in what is politically non-binding was laudatorily acknowledged. The self-assessment of German bearers of culture (e.g. literati

and artists) was even shared by broad strata of the European public at large, and the positive German version of the "special way" theory already started early on to have on its side (i.e. in its favour) a foreign theory of the German "special way". French and English exponents of the Romantic-counterrevolutionary intellect(-spirit) glorified the Germans because they were supposedly spared from the influence of the "shallow" Enlightenment and from capitalistic intoxication and remained true to what is Higher and Holy. The admiration for German accomplishments in the fields of humanities, but also in the natural sciences, later joined such predilections, and talk of a "people of thinkers and poets" became a household word.

The founding of the (German) Reich<sup>cxv</sup> largely put an end to the willingness of foreigners to follow the Germans in their self-understanding. Because now this self-understanding was extended to a dimension which appeared dangerous to (European) foreign countries so that their response to the Germans' self-understanding was inevitable. The response consisted in the gradual moulding of that negative version of the "special way" theory, which prevails today. The victories of the Prussian army, and the political and economic strength of the young Reich, brought about (the situation) that the until then decisive cultural aspect of German (ideological) self-understanding was combined with another aspect at least of equal value, at whose centre stood the idea of military virtue and power. This conglomeration cobbled together from heterogeneous, and in terms of content, vague or fragile materials, constituted the basis for the nationalistic mythology of the professors and the literati of the First World War, and was then adopted in large part by national-socialistic propaganda. Here the "German idea" could be portrayed as the ideal union of the warrior and of the thinker, which counters the Western "ideal of the trader", and is far superior to this Western ideal. The German "special way" accordingly by-passed this "trader" as well as the entire "shallow" Western Enlightenment whose alleged

narrow-minded rationality supported the world theory (i.e. world view) of the "trader".

One must believe in the vulgar Marxist perception of ideas as reflection of reality in order to want to measure the actual historical distance of Germany from the modern era by means of these mythologems. However, ideas, especially normatively charged ideas, are not reflections, but weapons, and their content is negatively determined by what is supposed by each and every respective foe. Just as from the confessions of faith of English and French ideologues in the humanistic "Enlightenment", a strict moral praxis of these nations may not at all be inferred, so too it must be seen that the polemics of the ideologues of the positively conceived German "special way" against the inverted caricature of this same "Enlightenment" and "of the West" in general was supposed to strike (and hurt) a foe who for traditional reasons had occupied the ideological terrain of the "Enlightenment". The ideological constellation could under other historical circumstances (have) look(ed) entirely differently, since both the "Enlightenment" in the German intellectual(-spiritual) pantheon, as well as "reaction" in that of the "West", were richly represented. We cannot spare, by the way, a certain piquancy in ascertaining that many "progressive" adherents of the theory of the German "special way" backed up their theory by invoking the "reactionary" statements of the ideologues of this same "special way" as if these ideologues were the most reliable interpreters of historical movement. However, it is a very naive methodological principle to deduce from the polemically conditioned self-understanding of actors their real relation with the course of history. For the apprehension of the state of affairs it is, at any rate, highly misleading to confuse the theory of the "special way" with the special way as historical fact.

A negative "Western" version opposed the extended positive German version of the German "special way". This negative version was formed, just like the

German ideological conglomeration, on the basis of dissimilar and nebulous materials, and first of all served the understandable psychological and propagandistic needs of the French, who as a reaction to the defeat of 1870, thirsted for revanche, as well as those of the English, who dreaded the imperial competition of the dynamic (German) Reich. The negative rating (i.e. evaluation) of the "special way" appeared in the Anglo-Saxon and French war propaganda since 1914 with the claim to an interpretation going a long way back (in time) of a German terrible or dreadful state of affairs, in order to be constituted after 1933 as a regular systematic construction, which was supposed to make clear the fateful course of German history from Luther to Hitler via Friedrich the Great and Bismarck. It is certainly no coincidence that the long and rich history of ideas of this construction has not so far been the object of in-depth investigation (or research), although the topic is extremely explosive: scientific insight into the circumstances surrounding this construction's formation or its polemical-ideological character - to say nothing of its manifold spitefulness - would inevitably exert disruptive effects on "re-education"<sup>cxxvi</sup>, which was, in terms of content, based not least on this construction.

In so far as we should now pre-empt the conclusions of such an investigation, we can *grosso modo*<sup>cxxvii</sup> distinguish between the two variants of the foreign negative "special way" theory. The first version argued almost in terms of racist categories. It wanted to see in Germans the Germanic blonde beast or even the "Hun", who put the means of modern technology (technique) at the service of a barbaric appetite (or desire) for destruction, which was supposedly always typical of his essence (nature) and had to lead him into permanent conflict with civilised mankind. The second version, which was of course often mixed with the first, at least in its pure form, exclusively asserted a social-historical point of view and seeks the reasons for the German "special way" in the incomplete or arrested development (hypoplasia) of the bourgeoisie, and in the weakness of

the bourgeois-liberal intellect(-spirit), which was accompanied by the corresponding strength of the reactionary-military cast of mind as a result of the social predominance of semi-feudal strata. Though this social-historical variant of the negative "special way" theory had already been formulated in Germany itself at an earlier point in time, i.e. in the period (of German history) from 1815 until the March Revolution of 1848. We remind ourselves here of Karl Marx's well-known formulation that the Germans have shared in the restorations of modern peoples, without sharing in their revolutions. Originators and the first public advocates of such a variant of the "special way" theory was a Young Hegelian – but also liberal in the broader sense – inspired group of intellectuals, very active and intellectually(-spiritually) sophisticated, which appropriated the notion of Progress in order to immediately turn it into a sharp weapon against the Establishment: the "monarchical-feudal" or "bourgeois-philistine" order not only lagged behind the demands of the historical future, but also vis-à-vis the social level of the European present, that is, it was at an outdated stage of development, and left the mark of belatedness on the nation.

The original crossing over (i.e. interweaving or intersecting) as regards the history of ideas, and logical crossing over (i.e. interweaving or intersecting), of the negative "special way" theory with the notion of Progress, as well as with the idea of a stage-like course of history, points to the already fundamental epistemological dubiousness of the whole concept. Because it does not make sense to talk of a "special way" if one does not base a certain, essentially teleological schema of historical development on historical development's unity (uniformity), whose conclusiveness one could prove empirically. In other words: before special ways in a scientifically or epistemologically tenable sense may be spoken of, the difficult question of historical evolution must be convincingly and definitively solved. I know the long debate over this question, yet I know nothing of such a solution. The course of the debate has hitherto

rather confirmed the impression that there is no problem in itself at all, and that a problem can only arise from the perspective of the Progress-believing philosophies of history of the 18th and 19th century. If, however, "development" in the sense of these philosophies of history constitutes a mere construct, then what one might call with pragmatic-descriptive intent "historical development", only consists of special ways - and then the "special way" is not in the least a shortcoming or an affliction.

The methodologically highly dubious working method of the "special way" theory's exponents inevitably springs from the fundamental and unabolishable epistemological flaw of the social-historically justified negative "special way" theory. In order to be able to sensibly accept a German "special way", it does not namely suffice to compare German (historical) development with a general and moreover idealised schema of liberal parliamentarism, which in the final analysis was distilled from the aforementioned teleological perception of ideal historical development, (and) not from the historical reality of parliamentarism. It also does not suffice to compare German (historical) development with that of another nation. Over and above that, comparisons must be made between the most important national forms of (historical) development beyond Germany in order to ascertain the supposedly generally binding type from which Germany fatefully diverged. However, such comparisons would demonstrate the impossibility of working out such a uniform (unified) type. The paths of England and France to parliamentarism were e.g. completely different, and besides, on closer examination it turns out that the prevailing of parliamentarism by no means has to automatically coincide with the social predominance of the liberal-industrial bourgeoisie. In England the formation of the parliamentary system preceded the social rise of this bourgeoisie; on the other hand, in bourgeois-shaped France of the 19th century until 1870 an – incidentally strictly oligarchic – parliamentarism ruled only during the few years of the July

Monarchy<sup>xxxviii</sup>, and the situation changed not for instance through the resistance of the French bourgeoisie against the Bonapartist dictatorship, but through Prussian weapons.

There is therefore no generally valid historical prescription, and no obligatory composition of social forces, leading towards the prevailing of parliamentarism. That is why one cannot assert that the social structure of the (German) Empire is in itself the reason for the absence (non-materialisation) of parliamentarisation, i.e. the sovereign rule of parliament – quite apart from the fact that a sovereign parliament did not have to be eo ipso "more liberal" or "more progressive" than other forms of government. If again one does not seek the reason for the special development in the social structure of German society in itself at that time, but in the partly forced political predominance of a pre-capitalistic and anti-liberal minority, then one must on the one hand explain why the liberal bourgeoisie did not revolt against this minority, and on the other hand weigh up what the long-term tendencies of political development were. As far as the first point is concerned, the political readiness to compromise or the indifference of the bourgeoisie was not the result of its weakness, but – conversely – rather of the fact that in the socio-economic realm the bourgeoisie developed rapidly and could take over the undisputed leadership; *this* leadership in fact interested first and foremost the bourgeoisie as a historically concrete class, and not for instance the normative tasks with which "progressive" historians have commissioned it in retrospect. Its loyalty was also not to "reaction" in itself and in general, but to a Crown which, despite all the anachronistic, bizarre or even burlesque characteristics, remained open to the bearers of industrial progress and to the bourgeoisie of education and culture. The socially perfectly natural alliance of the bourgeoisie and Junkerdom (i.e. the (Prussian) landed gentry) as the possessing or ownership classes against the strongest and most demanding social democracy of Europe took place - and this is decisive - not for instance

on a semi-feudal social basis, but on the terrain of modern capitalism, to which the owners of large estates had now also adapted.

Under these circumstances, parliamentarism could be delayed, but only because its bourgeois supporters did not have any urgent *socio-economic* reason to press for it with extreme means. As domestic political (policy) developments during the course of the First World War let us recognise, the breakthrough of full parliamentarism would nevertheless have been in practice inevitable even in the case of a German victory. But even full parliamentarism's unfortunate connection with the fact of defeat would not have necessarily proven to be fatal if the foreign policy situation after 1918 had been a different one. The great economic crisis would not have been able to take the well-known political turn in Germany without the nationalistic radicalisation of the bourgeoisie and broader masses of people as a reaction to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, the occupation of the Ruhr and the refusal of the right to self-determination for *all* Germans. After 1945 though, it was hardly possible in Germany to talk about these facts openly and impartially, i.e. to objectively assess their psychological and ideological repercussions. Future historians will, however, have to come to the conclusion that National Socialism was not the outcome of irresistible currents of German history, but the product of a concrete and unique historical constellation. As a product of a specifically German situation it had to, of course, bear German characteristics, and in its world-theoretical presumption it had to even lay claim, for itself, to the whole of German history. From that, however, no historical necessity can be derived.

The social-historically oriented negative "special way" theory puts the German catastrophes of 1918 and 1945 ultimately down to the social backwardness or the "belatedness" of the German nation, i.e. it deduces foreign policy from domestic policy. In addition to its epistemological leaps of its actual false assessments is, therefore, the still questionable (at best, one-sided) notion of the

"primacy of domestic policy (politics)", which is then moreover connected with a normatively understood political confession of faith. The basic idea (notion or thought) of this is: liberalism and parliamentarism are of their essence tolerant and humane; that is why a liberal, parliamentarily answerable government could not ever pursue an aggressive and expansionistic politics. This hymn of praise for liberalism and parliamentarism does not of course anachronistically apply to the oligarchical doctrine of rule or dominion of the bourgeoisie in the 19th century, but to a very modern democratic ideal. But even if we disregard that fact, it must remain enigmatic from this perspective as to why the heyday of English and French liberalism coincided with the zenith of the imperialistic expansion of these nations. Also in need of explanation remains why on the German side rather national-liberal matters of concern were behind the (already demanded by the bourgeoisie in 1848!) building of fleets, and why in fact the demand for parliamentarisation, even in its Weberian version, sprang from the express wish to overcome at last the imperial incapability of provincial Junkerdom (i.e. the (Prussian) landed gentry) in order to be able to appear as a "master people (or race)" next to other "master peoples (or races)". Accordingly, a liberal and parliamentary Germany would most likely have been exposed to the same geopolitical and foreign policy temptations and difficulties as a "semi-feudal" or "militaristic" Germany. Moreover, Social Darwinistic, racist and related ideas belonged in many cases to the thoughts world (i.e. ideology) of the liberals before 1914. Only a gross ignorance of the English and the French history of ideas allows the conclusion that these ideas originally came into being in Germany or thrived best on German soil. Of course, these ideas in Germany were eventually connected in the end with the offence of genocide, which however was the result of the concrete decisions of concrete people and not the outcome of an unavoidable historical necessity in this ideological packaging.

The present dominant negative "special way" theory with its dogma of the "belated nation" prevailed in Germany after the Second World War, however not as the result of a gradual acceptance and working out of notions which the Left or liberal intelligence had developed here in the past, but first of all through the inevitable dominance of opinions which the victors had about the essence (nature) and history of the vanquished. Even in the communistically governed part of Germany the concept gained the upper hand through the interpretations which the Soviet occupying forces introduced. But it would be incorrect to interpret its imposition as a forcible octroi (i.e. tax, tariff or duty) of the ideological will of the victors and as a concomitant of a political diktat. Rather, it is a matter of a very complicated social and psychological process which won through to the extent that the economic and institutional foundations of the old Federal Republic (i.e. West Germany) were consolidated and proved a success. In other words: the new consciousness of success of the Germans did not come into conflict at all with the perception of the "belated nation" and the negative picture of Germany, but consolidated both.

This apparent paradox must be explained. If one reverses the outlined relation, it would follow that a longer period of misery and squalor and of social hopelessness would have entailed a much more sceptical or even hostile stance vis-à-vis the negative "special way" theory, especially a predominantly imported one. However, under the conditions of the "economic miracle" and of growing affluence, the negative "special way" theory turned not merely into a widespread article of faith, but over and above that it was connected with an admission of guilt to those crimes which were supposed to have inevitably resulted from the "special way". In the dual form of the social-historical construction and of the admission of guilt, the "special way" theory became a fixed constituent part of (German) national life, and a positioning in relation to

it betrayed the position of the intellectual(-spiritual)-political parties and (the course of) where the battlefronts are on each and every respective occasion.

This phenomenon has been possible on a broad social basis only because a deeper relation could be manufactured between the collective admission of guilt and collective affluence. The "one-off crimes" were in fact punished in a truly one-off way: a people made up of criminals was allowed to export, consume and travel to an increasing extent, but it was not allowed to possess for instance atomic weapons or bear world-political responsibility. That is, next to material well-being, a far-reaching political carefreeness was also secured for this people made up of criminals. The louder one admitted to collective crimes, the more certain one could be that one did not have to take any risks, but could enjoy affluence, as it were, away from or out of the way of history. With that, I do not want to at all play down the purely moral aspect of the problem, although it must equally be noted that for very many people the moral ritual was rather a compulsory exercise or an act of social conformism which did not demand sacrifices, but on the contrary, met with useful social recognition. In any case, the purely moral aspect is not, as is known, sufficient in order to bring into being and keep alive ideologem(e)s (i.e. kinds of sub-ideology) supporting a state. For that social conditions are also and above all called for, with which collective morals (i.e. ethics) can be maintained. Precisely this was achieved through the linking of the collective admission of guilt and collective affluence. Whoever embodies this mechanism must of course deny its existence, because such mechanisms can only function when they, through their effect, precisely confirm the ideal self-understanding of actors. However, even a naive observer would have to conjecture that the negative "special way" theory in its combination with the collective admission of guilt would have a considerably different status in German national life were Germany not the first but for instance the fortieth exporting country in the world. And this naive observer

would have to also expect that with decreasing affluence, willingness for the admission of guilt will also decrease. One more likely feels guilty in Tuscany or in Alsace than as a welfare recipient (recipient of social assistance (i.e. income support or welfare)).

That morally underpinned or embellished prescription of collective happiness became theoretically framed by sociologists and political theorists to the effect that politics and economy, of their character, are different activities. Whoever, that is, in political modesty exclusively devotes himself to economic activity finds himself on the best path to elude the confusion (or chaos) and crimes of politics. The convenient dichotomy between politics and economy flows therefore directly or indirectly into a coupling of the economic (economics) with the ethical (ethics). Also, here the aforementioned connection of morals (i.e. ethics) and affluence becomes noticeable. Because the exclusive or, according to preference, preoccupation with the economic (economics) seems to simultaneously guarantee both: the ethical way of life beyond the atrocities of power politics *and* affluence. Thus, an imperative was formulated which summarised the practical teachings of the "special way" theory. According to that imperative, the thorough (universal) democratisation or ethicisation of politics and society on the basis of a prospering economy was supposed to henceforth complete Westernisation, consolidate ties to the West and make every special way impossible *a limine*<sup>cxxix</sup>; it is characteristic that the central meaning of the economic basis has not been disputed until now even by those inspired ethicists who contemptuously pass by such prosaic questions.

The tragedy (or tragicality) of the Germans often consisted in that their theoretical concepts and prescriptions were far superior to reality so that they, in their properly thought-out perfection, had to founder on all the confused imperfection of real life. The theoretical idealisation of politically lukewarm affluence by means of the dichotomy of economy and politics likewise

constitutes an ethereal construction which has little to do with the downsides of the life of nations. Not because the political (politics) must someday catch up with the economic (economy) – as romantic decisionists believe, who heed the aforementioned dichotomy with inverted signs (i.e. symbolism) –, but because the economic is no less political than the political itself is, i.e. it constitutes just like the political (in the familiar narrow sense of the word) a question of concrete relations and power relations (relations of power) (or the correlations of forces) between concrete people<sup>cxxx</sup>. Even if all of Europe or all people should decide to dissolve their states and nations into a gigantic public limited company or corporation, the question would again be posed as to who will possess which parcel of shares. Since Germans in general have internalised the dichotomy of the political and the economic in such a way that this coincides with a notion of happiness and morals (i.e. ethics), then they will probably find their way in the planetary situation after the Cold War not without difficulties. In this way, they want to grasp the problem of European unification in principle in respect of economic or political-economic categories, and to the extent of their powers, put up a fight against the bewildering and embarrassing, yet gradually pressing insight that after German reunification and the cessation of American patronage, with every central economic question, like e.g. the question of monetary union, the question of political hegemony inevitably appears on the horizon at the same time. That is why Germans confuse their present-day undoubtedly existing good will with the dynamics of the historical situation, and in a genuinely moralistic manner they make a direct connection between their subjective intent and the objective outcome of events<sup>cxxxi</sup>.

Concerning this, the French and the English are much more realistic, and they are absolutely right when they do not want to deduce the course of history from the assurances of each and every respective Mr. Kinkel<sup>cxxxii</sup>. Because from their point of view, they see what the Germans cannot admit: that these assurances

are able to be given so sincerely and so generously today only because the assurances are expressed from the position of the objectively stronger side – the stronger side in the present and presumably the even stronger side in the future. The formation of the future balance of power (forces) against the background of the inescapable question of hegemony, not bygone "special ways" worry them – although discrete and indiscrete references to the past necessarily add spice to every European debate. In reality, the past would have faded long ago if the present Germany was a moderately mechanised rural country. That is why it is not very helpful to greatly emphasise the difference between the German past and present with respect to morals (i.e. ethics) and political intent, when the problem of the balance of power awakens in others a mistrust which is thoroughly understandable: it is that mistrust which 55 million Germans would feel vis-à-vis 80 million more productive French with a vast unfolding space in the East. The French and the English therefore grasp, with such self-understanding, the problem of European unification not least as a question of hegemony and as a question of the "integration" of Germany, because they are old imperialistic peoples with considerably longer world-political traditions and correspondingly richer experiences as well as a finer diplomatic instinctive feel than the Germans. As for the Germans, on the other hand, it is possible that the ungainliness in respect of power politics of the past will now be superseded by a moralistic ungainliness which will likewise necessarily lead to dead ends. Qualities, which could protect from that, do not exactly belong to the merits of the German national character. The Germans indeed possess, as has been proved, the virtues of the plebeian (industriousness, thrift, ethical earnestness, action in accordance with orders or instructions and a plan); however, in general they lack the virtues of the aristocrat: ironic and self-ironic sovereignty (i.e. the irony and self-irony of the sovereign), composure in the event of the failure of orders or instructions, the superior way of dealing with all sorts of norms.

The future fluctuations and prospects (perspectives) of the European unification process or other forms of political co-existence will therefore determine who will make use of the "scientific" or the "vulgar" versions of the negative "special way" theory. The outcome of European events does not however depend simply on the will of the participants, but rather on the overall planetary situation. Were "Europe" as a large space surrounded by other large spaces and this were felt by broad masses in the larger European nations to be a threat and a provocation, then there would be little room for "special ways" in praxis and in polemics. If on the other hand, the whole planet heads – perhaps with a few oases – towards a Balkanisation, then the centrifugal forces inside of Europe will gain in intensity, and the national paths will be described anew by all the respective injured parties or outcasts as "special ways" and will inevitably be correlated with the past. However, they are merely two extreme intellectual possibilities. It is in itself unlikely that the first scenario can be simply realised so quickly and so dramatically that the question of hegemony in Europe will not apply within the framework of a collective survival effort. Therefore, the national tug-of-war will continue for the foreseeable future - and it is also very questionable whether a comprehensive and genuine political unification, should it ever come about under external pressure, would take place on the path of the planned procedures. At all events, such a comprehensive and genuine political unification will not come about in normal times if the economically stronger nation would not be ready to cede political-military precedence as compensation and a guarantee. However, that does not only presuppose a lasting harmony of interests, but also that dichotomy between economy and politics, whose dubiousness, especially under today's mass-democratic conditions, we already explained. With a high degree of interweaving of "politics" and "economy", the political-military decisions would directly touch upon the interests of the economically stronger nation so that this nation, already in order to guard its undisputed terrain, will have to make a demand for political co-determination

(i.e. the mutual determination of politics as between nations), a demand which however in view of its economic supremacy will sooner or later suddenly change into an actual demand for the hegemonic (political) position. That is why it is to be expected that the Germans will take a highly political and perhaps conflict-ridden path on the seemingly unpolitical roundabout way of the defence of their affluence against overall European wishes for redistribution. They will do it in good conscience because they have learnt in past decades to closely connect affluence or the economy and morals (i.e. ethics) with one another. Sensitive observers have known for a long time how much history takes delight in such strange games.

If at the same time, Balkanisation at a global level makes progress, then it must be expected that such foreign policy tendencies will be further reinforced and – especially under the pressure of the repercussions of the population explosion as well as the chronic social crises as a result of an unstoppable spreading of "new poverty" – will be accompanied by crises in domestic politics, which would probably have as a consequence a change in today's (political) party landscape. In this case, the negative "special way" theory will not only be summoned in and from abroad, but will also become inside of Germany an important ideological point of contention – then however the number of its opponents will also (still) significantly increase. That the negative "special way" theory was and is a mere weapon in a great political debate, should today be clearer than ever. Because today the social structures of Germany are of course by no means perfect, yet they are probably the most advanced (in a mass-democratic sense) within the European Community. Already because of that, it is from now on obsolete and in fact meaningless to carry on talking of a "reactionary" German "special way". The supporters of the negative "special way" theory, who, in the sense of the primacy of domestic politics asserted by them, would like to argue consistently, would have to hence expect a "reactionary" foreign policy from

today's Great Britain or Portugal rather than from present-day Germany. However, this debate has never been about (logical) consistency, and it will also never be about that. Only the naive can have confidence that the aggressive instrumentalisation of the "special way" theory belongs to the past in view of the democratisation of German society that has taken place and bearing in mind the moral behaviour of Germans. There will always be someone at home or abroad who will reserve the right to judge whether and when this society might be called "truly" liberal or democratic, and whether and when the behaviour of Germans is "truly" moral or not. The shadow of the negative "special way" theory will therefore still accompany Germany in the foreseeable future. Whether as a reaction to that a positive, self-satisfied-mythological "special way" theory comes into being anew, is not so much a question of incantations and educational programmes, but is dependent on the concrete situation. Nothing can be excluded in advance and forever. The monsters of today have often become the gods of tomorrow, yesterday's atrocities, today's models.

## VI. Technique (technology), informatics (information technology) and culture

### 1. Paths to (in) helplessness (cluelessness, perplexity, bewilderment)<sup>cxxxiii</sup>

Politicians from all of the continent of Europe, who presumably would not entrust any computer whatsoever with many a secret of their vocation and profession and of their career, increasingly make (*or*: recently have made) concerted efforts regarding a worldwide interweaving of information channels (channels or conduits of information), for the free flow of, and free access to, various kinds of information beyond all boundaries and borders. The information society constitutes in their eyes the crowning moment, but also a Western driving force of the society of the economy (economic society) (*or*: the bright or shining capstone, but also an essential motive force of that society in which the dominant element is the economy). Consequently, their efforts seem to realise the perceptions and representations of social theoreticians geared to, or positioned towards, economism and systems theory. According to those perceptions and representations, social complexity is supposed to determine or cause a higher level of reflection, as well as the growing importance of knowledge in society (*or*: the more complex a society becomes, the more does

its reflexivity with reference to its own functions intensify, and the more does the significance of knowledge for these functions' processing grow).

Knowledge, however, means information, and information becomes (or turns into) society's brain (mind) and heart – just as “communication” becomes (or turns into) the central concept of mass-democratic social theory.

This view has an (unspoken (unexpressed)) background pertaining to the (*or*: Such views take root, whether they know it or not, in a certain) philosophy of history, they expect, that is to say, a happy end to history, which shows through in the (declared) belief that the “knowledgeable society” will overcome pre-modern political-ideological “primitivisms” by distinguishing itself through the preponderance and predominance of the cognitive element, and will be able to be guided with the help of, or based on, scientific knowledge. Certainly, in no previous or earlier society was the amount of various kinds and pieces of information, and the rapidity (quickness, swiftness) of their transmission, so great. Such phenomena often serve as the starting point(s) of (recti)linear projections into the future; they are interpreted as milestones of radical, groundbreaking (pathbreaking, pioneering) ruptures (breaks) or radical turns, and it is assumed and believed that their appearance will cancel out and neutralise the effect and impact of hitherto determinative and decisive factors, and will necessarily make, i.e. produce, a regular or downright rewriting of social ontology (*or*: and imposes that the ontology of society be rewritten from the beginning). Were things so, then one would have to have been able to prove that fundamental human behaviour would have – with every revolutionary turn in the density of information and in the transmission of information – been modified accordingly, thus for instance as a result of the invention and introduction of writing, or as a result of the discovery of typography (the art of printing). There can be no talk of that (*or*: However, such a thing did not occur at all). The changes taking place were historical and secondary, they hardly

touched upon the primary anthropological and social-ontological sector or area (realm). The logic of information was always subjected, for the most part or in general, to the logic of the dominant relations between humans (*or*: ruling intra-human relations) and related ideological positionings.

The cybernetic vocabulary blocks or conceals insight into this decisive banality by using – everywhere and without exception – the term “information”, which actually and essentially points to a new cognitive content, instead of the general term “announcement (or notification)”, which can refer to the known, i.e. what is already known, and non-cognitive, i.e. something without cognitive significance<sup>cxxxiv</sup>. The growing, greater quantity of announcements (notifications) does not necessarily mean the increasing quality of the various kinds and pieces of information in the sense of a society centred on knowledge (*or*: in the way a society based on knowledge needs such information). Because the worldwide, universal networks do not under any circumstances whatsoever, or exclusively, serve the transmission of information with, in practice, feasible and u(tili)sable knowledge (i.e. cognitive) value. Very soon, they will be transformed into the mirrors and inventories of the spectrum of public opinion; in them, one will again find that same world which was supposed to be overcome through their cognitive help. In the source of the “information flow”, one will encounter specific humans, for example the American neo-Nazis<sup>cxxxv</sup>, who are – according to journalistic information – are excellently “networked”. It is not coincidental or by chance that the quarrel or strife has long been under way (afoot) over what may be transmitted and what not. Information and manipulation will remain also in the future Gemini, i.e. twins (*or*: Information, deceit (conjuring tricks, sleights of hand, guile, craftiness, etc.) and the attempt at influence will remain also in the future inseparably connected as between themselves).

The expectation that through the growing and quicker flow of information, the cognitive-rational element will be pushed through, imposed and will prevail in society, must, however, also be frustrated and not realised for other reasons (*or*: But for other reasons, whoever expects that with the greater and faster flow of information, the cognitive-rational element inside society will predominate, will be disappointed and lose heart). The conviction underlies this expectation that whoever finds himself in the possession of more kinds and pieces of information, also thinks and acts more rationally, whereas “archaic” modes of behaviour flourish mainly in intellectual(-spiritual) derangement, or in the night of the lack of information. The short circuit, i.e. the leap in logic, is obvious: not the mere use/usage of information in itself, but only the kind and the quality of the use/usage turn information into the cognitive foundation of rational action; the rationality of the person acting must, therefore, be presupposed as a predisposition (installation, investment, payment) and as a self-sufficient (autonomous, independent) magnitude<sup>cxxxvi</sup>. To that leap in logic, a pragmatic mistake as to the evaluation of things (matters) is added. The manufacturing (making) of a connection between a greater amount of information, and a stronger cognitive-rational potential, implies the assumption that one actually makes use of that amount of information, that is, one takes no practical decision before one goes through all existing kinds and pieces of information (*or*: Whoever connects the increase of the amount of information with the reinforcement of the cognitive-rational potential of society, of course presupposes that the amount of information is used in actual fact, that is to say, no practical decision is taken without all the available information being thoroughly scrutinised or sifted). However, the use of information takes place in concrete situations, that is, under the pressure of time and of the decision, which increases to the extent that the “information society (society of information) (*or*: society of informatics and information technology)” is, or simultaneously constitutes, an “economic and competitive society (society of the economy and

of competition) (*or*: a society of intense economic competition)”. The faster the transference of information (information transfer) (*or*: the transmittal and conveyance of the information), so much the greater is the temporal pressure of the decision (*or*: the greater the pressure of the time factor on the taking of decisions). Accordingly, the main concern of the person acting is not always and not necessarily the amount of available kinds and pieces of information, but the available timespan (period of time) (*or*: the finding of time) for their perusal, sighting (looking through, sifting), for familiarisation with them, and their evaluation. During scarcely allocated time (*or*: When time is short), the fullness of the theoretically available kinds and pieces of information offers rather (more likely) random, chance or coincidental advantages as to selection (selection advantages). That is why that supply of information saved and stored in/on the computer (*or*: For that reason, as much information as is accumulated in computers) benefits the person acting just as much or just as little as that which stands by, i.e. has been shelved, in the libraries and archives of hoarded knowledge. That applies equally for the politician as well as for the stockbroker<sup>cxxxvii</sup>. In the ever increasingly higher swelling surging waves of information, one can drown. And here on the other hand, nothing in the end but only the conscious or unconscious effect and impact of the anthropologically determined and conditioned, stable and stabilising, mechanisms of relief and release, help, regardless of at which level of complexity they unfold and develop (*or*: mechanisms which our intellect summons or recruits in order to simplify – albeit arbitrarily – a complicated situation (of many compositional layers or strata) and to render in that way possible our practical orientation).

The cognitive element in a highly and exceptionally complex society could – despite the increasing flow of information – in fact be weakened in a certain, but perhaps decisive, respect. We mean here knowledge regarding the long-term overall outcome of the precisely short-term and medium-term part-processes or

partial processes being acted out, that is, not so much (the) knowledge regarding the – likewise sometimes opaque (obscure, non-transparent) – present, but above all, knowledge surrounding the future. The general direction of the overall events (becoming, happenings) can and possibly must move all the more out of sight and become more uncertain, unstated, unknowable, to the extent in part knowledge about individual interrelations becomes deeper (deepens), and this again begets and has as a consequence, considerable content-related differentiation, or the merely occasional crossing and intersection of subjective perspectives (*or*: that the subjective perspectives obtain different content and intersect only symptomatically). The complexity of the social, or the complicated character – with many compositional strata – of society, makes the unintentional, involuntary and unsuspected, unforeseeable overall consequences of collective action more probable; to wit, it intensifies the effect of the heterogony of ends. This effect was traditionally (*or*: in the tradition of liberalism) considered from the standpoint of the “invisible hand”, according to which individual irrationalisms (too) bring about through their interweaving a rational collective outcome (*or*: which supposedly ensures that even (individual) irrationalisms, through their intertwining, would give a rational collective result). But also the opposite can happen or prove true: the sum of the partial rationalities can lead or give rise to an irrational overall result<sup>cxviii</sup>, whereby the speeding up and acceleration of action through the rapid flow of information might speed up and accelerate the occurrence and appearance of undesired outcomes and results.

The “knowledgeable society” can solely then be constantly and continually reproduced only if the subjective expectations for the most part, or generally, are satisfied not only in respect of the (mode of) behaviour of each and every respective partner of interaction (*or*: all respective social partners), but also in respect of the overall performance (achievement/return) of the “system”. If it

comes to a situation in which indeed reciprocal expectations are fulfilled and satisfied, yet the expected overall or general result of the collective action fails to materialise, then this means (or would signify) for a highly complex society (with many compositional strata) as much as a state of absolute helplessness (cluelessness, perplexity, bewilderment). Because the Archimedean point, at which one could start (place oneself into position) in order to reverse the trend, will have someday been buried somewhere in the thicket of complexity (*or*: upon which one could step in order to reverse the current, will have itself also been lost sometime, somewhere inside the infinite aspects of complex society (with its many compositional strata)). At the decisive moment, the decisive information will be lacking – or else it will have been in the meanwhile converted into a point of contention. The doggedness, obstinacy and stubbornness with which intellects(-spirits) separate and are divided when it is a matter of the evaluation of information which touch upon massive interests, and, ways, habits and customs of life – for instance regarding information on the ecosystem<sup>cxxxix</sup> –, should get us thinking, and make us very sceptical.

## 2. Dreams of cyberspace<sup>cxl</sup>

*American scientists published in 1994 a manifesto based on the theses of futurologist Alvin Toffler and of George Keyworth, former scientific advisor of president Reagan. The manifesto delineates the vision of universal cyberspace and announces a new epoch (era) as the consequence of the predominance of knowledge vis-à-vis matter.*

Societies can only assure themselves of their own reality when they imagine themselves in the shape of (*or*: Societies then are only confirmed or make sure of themselves that they really exist, when they imagine themselves as) mythical hypostases. Because in such hypostases, which are unskilfully cobbled (lumped, put) together (compiled) out of both real magnitudes and elements, as well as the wish-projections of the same, i.e. these magnitudes and elements' desired future extensions, their self-understanding is condensed (compressed). If the self-understanding of bourgeois society referred – after the death of God – to mythical hypostases like for instance “Nature”, “History” or “Mankind (Humanity)”, now then, after the death of Man, i.e. after the death of the Human<sup>cxli</sup>, mass democracy characterises itself as a “structure” or “functional system”, which is apprehensible and guidable cybernetically (*or*: which someone can comprehend and direct through cybernetics). From the point of view of global informatics (information technology), this system was recently baptised or named “cyberspace”, in relation to which the search for an emphatic name corresponded precisely with the need for the impressive hypostatization of the thing. As an autonomous and self-contained entity with its own law bindedness (determinism, law(rule)-based necessity), cyberspace subjugates human action to its logic, and at the same time presents features which are

supposed to mark an epochal turn (*or*: which, as is said, mark a turn towards a new historical epoch). The “overthrow of matter” – no less than that! – is proclaimed, which means the increasingly economic irrelevance (*or*: the ever so smaller economic significance) of material factors, and the gaining of the upper hand of the “forces of the spirit(-intellect)” or of knowledge (*or*: the “forces of the spirit(-intellect)”, of knowledge and of information), hence the Cyberspace Manifesto (see. F. A. Z. from 26. 8. 95)<sup>cxlii</sup>.

### Communicatively instead of productively

This proclamation especially requires (a) commentary. It is trivial if one ponders that already the pyramids were erected and built not by the resources “sandstone” and “forced (hard) labour” as such, but [[by]] the – conscious of its domination – dynastic-sovereign/dominating “force of the spirit(-intellect)” standing behind such “sandstone and forced labour”, which directed for its own purposes those resources, as well as [[by]] (the) corresponding knowledge. The proclamation above is on the other hand (*or*: furthermore) misleading because it is completely wrong in relation to that, and conceals that the asserted volatilisation (evaporation) and liquefaction of matter has very material preconditions, prerequisites (presuppositions), implications and consequences. Not coincidentally (Not by chance/accident), the new message or Good News comes from the highly industrial continent[[s]] and regions of Earth, which with one sixth of the world population have at their disposal for instance four fifths of world wealth and world energy<sup>cxliii</sup>. As an “American Dream”, as its originators and authors name it, the cyberspace-plan/design (*or*: the cyberspace manifesto/the manifesto of cyberspace) stems more specifically from a country in which four percent of the world population consumes, uses up or wastes and squanders one quarter of world energy, and every resident attaining the average

age has required and expended, amongst other things (inter alia), one thousand trees for the satisfaction of his needs.

These data (facts) do not in the least mean that that continent[[s]] and these regions of the Earth owe their high proportion (share, stake or quota) in world wealth to an equally high (direct) proportion etc. in the material resources of the planet; in their wealth undoubtedly hides (*or*: their wealth encloses undoubtedly) much technical knowledge, expertise and much political-military energy and vigour. However, such knowledge and such energy were never decisive in the sense that their bearers could leave, cede or hand over with impunity (unpunished) to the rest of the world, all material resources. On the contrary, such knowledge and such energy proved themselves determinative because they at any time granted and ensured a privileged access to exactly these resources, and indeed irrespective of to what extent they really depended on these same resources on each and every respective occasion (*or*: independent of whether these resources were needed at any given moment or not). A presumed shortage set off here always the effects of an actual shortage, and this will probably stay so/this way (remain the case) (*or*: The possibility of a lack of material resources always provoked the same reactions just as a real lack of such material resources, and this of course is not bound to change in the future). Only on the basis of the secured material reproduction of a highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) society, can knowledge become the essential factor and motor (driving force) of precisely this same reproduction, whereas (the) interest in such knowledge necessarily subsides as soon as the absolutely indispensable material basis appears to be in danger. No know-how and no cyberspace will be able to maintain and safeguard Japan's economic position in the world, if one cuts the country, i.e. Japan, off completely and consistently from all raw materials. And the other way around: without its own formidable, enormous potential in regard to material resources,

and also without the politically-militarily covered (*or*: political-military cover in respect of) access to the required resources at a world level on each and every respective occasion, the United States would never have become the pioneer in cyberspace. Incidentally, the United States watches over this access Argus-eyed, i.e. like a hawk (extremely observantly and vigilantly), and Western Europeans and Japanese have so far (until today) not lived badly from this watchfulness, alertness and vigilance, and have benefitted; a guarantee for the future cannot of course be deduced or derived from that (*or*: today's situation does not at all constitute, of course, a guarantee for the future).

All the same, in regard to the mass-democratic perception of the social, the factor “information” or “communication” puts the factor “resources” or “production” in the shade. That seems obvious or plausible when agriculture and industry have achieved such productivity that the labour of a relatively small minority can vouch for, i.e. guarantee, the copious (plentiful, ample, abundant) material supply (provision, providing) in respect of the whole, whilst the great majority carries out their work primarily via the exchange of signs and symbols<sup>cxliv</sup>. “Communication” ideationally autonomises itself (i.e. becomes autonomous), in other words, in the same sense – and to the same extent – vis-à-vis “matter”, that increasingly less people produce that which they themselves consume, and as a result, the material production of goods is for the most part more than covered or even (and or) absorbed by symbolic exchange – exchange of information and money, but also of services, which can be considered and comprehended, in the language of contemporary sociology, as symbolic interaction. The impression that through this, “matter”, and concern over its possession, have vanished into thin air, indeed makes the picture of the future rosier, but it is nevertheless false. Because the surplus in “communication” is due to a specific texture and composition of the – in the end, dependent on material resources – (mass-)production, which permits and in fact demands it

(*or*: precisely the texture of production permits, and indeed demands, communicative glut (excess, surfeit, repleteness)). However, the network of exchange(s) and kinds of information would have to all at once become much more wide-meshed or much more sparse, should the production of goods suffer heavy setbacks and seriously retreat, or if a shortage/scarcity of material factors underlying this production of goods emerged and became apparent. Cyberspace revolves, therefore, around a hard and not at all small material core (nucleus), with regard to which the process of communication and of information is acted and carried out in the broader sector or area (realm) of the economy.

#### Borderless and Boundless only for the [[what is]] unimportant

If the “*beati possidentes* (= blessed possessors)”<sup>cxlv</sup>, the rich, can afford to look down on ungainly and crass matter (*or*: can allow themselves the luxury of considering base, despicable matter from on high), in order to extol the force and strength of the spirit(-intellect) (of their own), then the five (soon seven or eight) billion who want and have to emulate them (i.e. the “*beati possidentes*”) will push without further ado for the ruthless, reckless exploitation and depletion of material resources in order to acquire tangible material goods. With the existent demographic pressure, it is quite (*or*: essentially) indifferent whether they – in their wild struggle for survival and development – destroy or economically “sensibly” consume and use (up) material (as well as ecological) resources. In both cases, the significance of the latter would have to increase, and possible technical advances and progress, which could enable energy saving (the saving of energy) (*or*: reduce the consumption of energy), and lessen environmental burdens, would hardly equalise (offset, balance out) the side-effects of the rapid industrial rise of giants like China, India or even Brazil, which moreover will crop up as strong competitors and rivals of the present

leading nations in all sectors or fields – not least in that (sector or field) of access to world resources. Cyberspace, as a promoter of economic growth (growth in the economy), will only accelerate this development, and consequently will contribute unwillingly to the revaluation (i.e. appreciation as increase in value) of exactly those factors which cyberspace supposedly will push aside. Not only can cyberspace by no means guarantee the growing rationality of action in the sense of the “system” (see “Humanities” from 5<sup>th</sup> July<sup>cxlvi</sup> (= the previous article [[of this volume]] regarding the society of informatics/information technology)), but it, furthermore, will bring into being new imponderab(i)l(iti)es (*or*: imponderable data). Cyberspace’s proclaimers (or announcers) draw their optimism from the conviction that cyberspace will abolish borders. Nonetheless, the borders, which the global flow of information is supposed to efface, will be erected anew by the most acute struggles of distribution, regardless of where the dividing lines now run (*or*: which the new dividing lines will be), and how the new borders will be defined and set (fixed). In the distribution of goods, one is even less generous than in the exchange of information. And in the distribution of vital material resources (important/essential for life) – including air and water – the cyber-fun completely stops (*or*: then the delights which the electronic short walks grant in cyberspace will be cut abruptly).

### 3. The universalisation of technique (technology) and world culture<sup>cxlvii</sup>

The technicisation of the economy and of the lifeworld (*or*: of life), which has been carried out and executed since approximately a century ago in an increasingly quicker tempo at the planetary level, was and will often be interpreted as the concomitant, or at least as the harbinger and herald, of a universal imposition and predominance of Western culture shaped and formed (moulded) by the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This interpretation rests on two interrelated assumptions, which at least more often than not are unreflectedly taken as a basis (*or*: which usually become accepted without examination). On the one hand, a not merely temporal, but a content-related and qualitative continuity of Western culture is postulated (*or*: the continuity of Western civilisation, and indeed not only from a temporal point of view, but also from the point of view of quality and content, is axiomatically accepted)<sup>cxlviii</sup>. Western culture, it is said, is supposed to have by and large preserved the unity of its constitutive components, and these are supposed to, for their part, belong together because they spring from one and the same rational intellect(-spirit) (*or*: and these again owe their coherence to [[the asserted/claimed fact]] that they are the aftereffects of the same rational intellect(-spirit)). This intellect(-spirit) acts indeed at times technically and economically, i.e. in terms of the economy, at other times, politically and ethically, but always ultimately wants and effects the same thing, as for instance the parallel development of technique (technology), of the free economy and of political freedom, and of humanity under the rule of law (*or*: the humanitarian state under the rule of law), respectively, are supposed to prove.

The second assumption arises from this conceptual and historical connection between material civilisation and ethical-political culture, that namely already the predominance and imposition of technical civilisation – which requires a certain division of labour, that is to say, social mobility (*or*: a certain division of labour and social mobility), and hence corrodes, undermines and abolishes patriarchalisms, i.e. authoritarian patriarchies – necessarily entails the advent of the corresponding ethical-political culture. This correlation holds true (applies, is correct) in the general sociological sense that in actual fact between technical development, form of economising (i.e. form of economic activity), and form of social organisation, an interaction (or mutual influence/influencing, interplay, alternating/changing effect) exists and can be observed, which certainly can look very different and appear in multifarious versions and manifestations, and in particular does not make any kind of binding statement, or signify absolutely anything binding, as regards the polity (constitution). Here, it is not, however, a matter of whether the sociological correlation in general is right and holds true, but whether the correlated magnitudes regarding their content, their specific weight and their mode of combination, i.e. their manner or their way of being combined with one another, have remained more or less stable over recent centuries of Western history. According to my perception (view), that is not the case. Since the final decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a radical break or rupture took place, changing and modifying the form, content and composition of Western culture shaped and moulded until then in terms of the bourgeoisie (*or*: of Western – until then bourgeois as to its basic character – culture) – and only (*or*: precisely) this break and rupture enabled the universalisation of some aspects of this culture, which now of course were torn and pulled out of (severed (cut away) from) their original context or framework, developed their own dynamic(s), and frequently turned against other aspects with which previously they stood, or were found to be, in a relationship of ideal harmony<sup>cxlix</sup>. In this way, the universalisation of the Western – or righter: from or out of the Western

– accompanied a dissolution of that which from the Renaissance until approximately the First World War was Western-European (*or*: Thus, the universalisation of Western culture/civilisation –more correctly: certain aspects of it– went with the disintegration of that which from the Renaissance until roughly the First World War constituted the Western-European element in the distinguishing sense, i.e. in the sense of a *differentia specifica*)<sup>cl</sup>.

### The polytheism of consumption

The complicated process of universalisation of the Western [[element as *differentia specifica*]] (*or*: of (aspects) of Western culture/civilisation), during the parallel disintegration and dissolution of the Western cultural synthesis shaped and moulded in terms of the bourgeoisie (*or*: of the Western, basically bourgeois cultural/civilisational synthesis), can be followed very well or very nicely in regard to the key question (central problem) of technique (technology). Inside that [[formerly distinctly Western cultural]] synthesis, technique (technology) appeared as the act (deed, feat) and achievement (acquisition or action) of the Promethean dimension of a *homo universalis* (*or*: of a Promethean *homo universalis*), who could only maintain his multi-dimensional unity by connecting his technical activity with endeavours of another kind, and knew how to subordinate his whole doing (all his doings and deeds), i.e. his entire activity, in turn, to higher aims (*or*: maintain his multi-dimensional unity thanks to his ability at connecting his technical activity with occupations of another texture, and at subordinating, moreover, his whole action to superior goals). There cannot, of course, be any talk of an alleged “fact” (*or*: It cannot, of course, be asserted) that *homo universalis* was ever a social reality worth mentioning, i.e. a socially weighty reality, or that the determinative synthetic-harmonising approach of the bourgeois thought figure in itself demonstrates the

actual superiority of bourgeois culture over other cultures<sup>cli</sup>. But such ideals or ideologem(e)s stand for, and symbolically represent, the fact that – as long as, in accordance with today's yardsticks and benchmarks (measures), the technique (technology) of the New Times was and remained elementary, and above all, as long as the life of broad masses had not still been covered and encompassed by such technique (technology) – the technically usable mechanistic perception of Nature remained interwoven with a mythical representation, notion and conception of this same Nature. The latter (i.e. mythical representation etc. of Nature) functioned as the ethical and aesthetic norm, which directly or indirectly supported the hierarchisations of oligarchic bourgeois liberalism, although it could be interpreted against such liberalism too.

In view of this constellation (*or*: On account of this conjuncture), which in the eighteenth and nineteenth century had been socially decisive and determinative, despite all important opposed tendencies, the substitution of oligarchic liberalism by modern mass democracy effected the decline (downfall) and eclipse of the mythical representation, perception and notion of Nature. And this occurred to the extent that technique (technology) was detached or cut away from the Promethean endeavours and efforts of *homo universalis*, in order for it to be put at and in the prosaic service of the satisfaction of mass needs, that is, to be connected with the process of mass production and of mass consumption<sup>clii</sup>. The autonomisation (= making autonomous) of technique (technology) from or vis-à-vis the old ideological context, and its interweaving with the vital functions of mass democracy, had as a consequence a considerable shift in the cultural main emphasis (*or*: the displacement of the centre of gravity of civilisation/culture), which, amongst other things (*inter alia*), manifested itself in a double-sided (dual, twin) crisis of the concept of rationality. The contrast and opposition between technical and ethical-normative rationality, which conceptually (i.e. in terms of concepts and conceptual

meaning), was known long ago, did not however particularly trouble or perturb either the eighteenth or the nineteenth century; only in the course of the twentieth century did such a contrast and opposition become a pressing, urgent theme, matter or topic. On the other hand and at the same time, it became apparent (or proved) that both processes of mass production and of mass consumption are indeed equally indispensable for the continued existence of the mass-democratic social formation, but are coupled with attitudes and modes of behaviour which neither ethically nor psychologically, necessarily belong together (*or*: however, are connected with stances and behaviours which are different from an ethical and from a psychological point of view) – and this [[is the case]], even though such attitudes, stances and modes of behaviour/ behaviours exist and necessarily have an effect – side by side – in the same society and most often in the same person. Mass production demands an activation of pure technical rationality, which for its part does not exhaust itself in the narrower productive process (process of production), but extends and expands into economic calculus/calculation in general: it commands accumulation and the foregoing and renunciation of immediate pleasure. On the contrary, in relation to that, mass consumption in the West has promoted and favoured a hedonistic ethic(s), which in very different variations – from vulgar-materialistic to high(ly)(-)spiritualistic (*or*: extremely spiritualistic) – threw overboard, i.e. set (put) aside and jettisoned, the more or less ascetic, that is, oriented towards abnegation (self-denial), Christian or bourgeois ethic(s), and at the same time elevated and made a world-theoretical and ethical polytheism and pluralism an almost normal and natural, in any case, decisive and determinative thought form and life form (form and way of thinking and of living). Now, all kinds of “rationalisms” and “irrationalisms” co-exist and compete against or interweave with one another. Only [[that]] technical rationality is not permitted to stand for any nonsense and does not take any jokes; rather, technical rationality must keep its distance and cut itself off from the carryings-on and

freedom to do whatever one feels like in respect of the sphere and field of consumption, although technical rationality absolutely needs the sphere of consumption as an unfolding space, i.e. in order for technical rationality itself to unfold.

This ascertainment is significant and meaningful (telling and crucial) in order to be able to correctly evaluate the cultural aspect of the universalisation of Western technique (technology). If the autonomisation (= making autonomous) of technical rationality accompanies a programmatic, not merely occasional bursting or breaking (blowing) up of the unity and the bindedness of the cultural sphere, which now as mass culture is absorbed by the sphere of consumption (*or*: becomes mass culture and is absorbed by mass consumption), then we cannot expect any longer from the achievement of technical rationality any uniform and unambiguous cultural content(s) (*or*: that the achievement of technical rationality will be connected with monsemantic, i.e. unmistakable, unequivocal and clear cultural/civilisational contents)<sup>cliii</sup>. The spreading of that (*or*: those elements) which formerly was (were) connected culturally with the technical-industrial intellect(-spirit) does not, therefore, necessarily follow the planetary spreading of Western technique (technology). Cultural development can in fact go in the reverse(d) (opposite) direction, as (or to which) the growing amounts in respect of esotericism, meditation, magic or, at intellectually-spiritually more sophisticated and more demanding levels, in artistic primitivism<sup>cliv</sup>, attest (bear witness), which the West since decades ago imports to the extent it exports technique (technology)<sup>clv</sup>. Formulated more generally: whereas technique (technology) as type of rationality and as type of praxis (practice), presents itself and is seen unitedly on a planetary scale or at a planetary level, the cultural content of acts and actions, which constitute the broad sphere of consumption, varies very greatly and intensely. Or put otherwise (said differently): the more the cultural content(s) varies/vary, to

which material and intellectual-spiritual consumption relates, the more colourless and unbinding does technique (technology) become in a cultural respect. That is why the expectation is premature and rash that through its planetary imposition and predominance, technical reality will bring about a world culture oriented towards such technical reality's specific needs and commands. The chasm or gulf between technically-rationally directed and dominated production, and, hedonistically (that is, through the aim and goal of "self-realisation") shaped and moulded consumption, could be even or perhaps deepened and extended through the progress of technique (technology)<sup>clvi</sup>. Because increased productivity will free more and more humans from direct dealing, engagement and occupation with production to (*or*: to make the transition to) the possibility of an anti-technical/technological way of thinking and anti-technical/technological way of living (*or*: an anti-technocratic way of thought and of life). Accordingly, the pantheism or the pandaeonium of consumed culture would become still more broken, unclear, confusing and chaotic. Thus seen, present-day technical rationality, in or by itself, and without the coaction or collaboration of other social factors, can unify under its aegis the cultural sphere in regard to its signs and symbolism, just as little as the common (joint) use of the wheel and of the plough could bring ancient Egyptian and ancient Chinese culture down to a common denominator (and unify the aforesaid ancient cultures[[, i.e. make them the same or very similar]]); nor the use of the same alphabet in a society could ever engender agreement over the "true" meaning of controversial and disputed concepts<sup>clvii</sup>.

The experience(s) with the spreading of Western cultural property (cultural possessions or assets, culture or civilisation) in the twentieth century shows clearly (or makes obvious) that the more successful this was, the more the "West" distanced itself from the canon of (*or*: the more the "Western" elements were cast out from) the culture shaped and moulded by the Renaissance and the

Enlightenment<sup>clviii</sup>. A comparison of the relative achievements of both main representatives of the “West” in the modern world, namely, Europe and the United States, is illuminating and instructive. Europe culturally dominated the world in its liberal and imperialistic age, when present-day mass culture existed only in its beginnings; that is why European culture outside of Europe influenced for the most part only members of the higher, upper strata, who, incidentally, very often were plagued and tortured by an identity crisis (crisis of identity)<sup>clix</sup>. Things were different as to the United States, which, as Tocqueville<sup>clx</sup> already perceived, fairly or very early on, entered into the mass-democratic phase: the United States confronted the dangers which, because of its multi-national mix(ture), threatened its cohesion, amongst other things (inter alia) through the assimilating force of a mass culture<sup>clxi</sup>. The flooding and inundation of the globe by American culture, above all after 1945, is due not merely to the worldwide political-military presence of the United States. The reasons for that flooding etc. must also be sought in the texture and composition of this culture itself, which despite all of its great variety and multiformity, represents and constitutes a medley, mixture (miscellany and jumble) out of nonchalant technicism and kitsch usable for all kinds of consumer purposes and goals of consumption, whereupon and over which the bad conscience of betrayal of time-honored traditions casts no shadow (*or*: without a shadow being cast all over that, by a conscience burdened with the betrayal of respected traditions)<sup>clxii</sup>. The fact that the “Westernisation” of today’s world, in so far as it is real, was conducted, carried on and achieved as Americanisation rather than as Europeanisation, has, therefore, a deeper meaning for the history of society and of culture. Certain elements of the European New Times likewise, of course, made their world journey, i.e. such elements travelled and spread across the world, and in fact planted roots here and there. However, this fact is not decisive in the present-day context, but rather, the broad framework of the cultural pantheism, in which these elements are put in order, classified and

incorporated in part next to other elements, entirely heterogenous [[is decisive]]. They are appropriated and assimilated, in other words, not as samples or specimens of a higher and separate culture (exactly this, however, was the self-understanding of European culture until approximately 1900), but as constituent parts of equal value, and should the situation arise, interchangeable constituent parts (*or*: as equivalent and possibly interchangeable parts) of a fluctuating, flowing whole<sup>clxiii</sup>.

### Endlessly combinable and colourless

All in all, the West through its technique (technology) exported something which indeed was culturally relevant (*or*: had significance for culture), but at the same time, by virtue of its combinability with very different cultural content(s), it is culturally colourless. A coherent and independent, self-contained cultural ensemble was not exported, whose planetary imposition would have secured the superiority of the West over the long run, but an isolatable and freely usable instrument, which can soon, as a weapon, turn against the West itself (just as, by the way, “free trade” or “human rights”, in as much as these imply an unrestrained (unlimited) freedom of movement and freedom of settlement (relocation)). The exporter finds itself, of course, in the beginning, with the advantage. It, i.e. the USA leading the West as the exporter, through short-term gains and profits, easily loses sight and loses touch with the internal logic of (the) development[[s]] ((the) trend[[s]], evolution). It, however, necessarily quickly notices that imitations can have a more resounding success than its own original creations. Even if we assume that conflict-laden(/pregnant/riddled) and or explosive backlogs[[, i.e. in relation to the macro-historically determined gap between the “developed” First World and the Third “developing” World]] and imbalances could be avoided for all sides, and on a

world scale, a uniform and even development of technique (technology), and a homogenous world society, could be achieved and secured, then this again would culturally bring about, over a longer period, an expansion and consolidation of syncretism and of pantheism, not the gaining of the upper hand of its Western components, whatever this expansion of syncretism and pantheism may look like after some (a few, several) decades.

Nonetheless, high obstacles and hurdles stand in the way of the realisation of this possibility, with (upon) which the optimistic cosmopolitans today reckon (count) (*or*: Nevertheless, the realisation of this possibility, about which optimistic cosmopolitans dream, runs into serious obstacles). The inescapable question and problem of distribution forces every actor or subject on the international stage, in relation to that, to remember and reflect upon his own self-assertion and self-preservation – and self-assertion and self-preservation include cultural identity as a symbolic connective tissue. Even if we take into consideration the significant ideological free spaces, i.e. margins of ideological freedom, which befit every more or less atomised consumer (consumption) society (society of consumption) (*or*: which every consumer society splintered, broken up and fragmented into individuals, leaves), again, it can be well imagined that cultural osmosis at the planetary level will be kept within certain elastic boundaries. This would correspond with the formation of a number of basic types of mass democracy. This differentiation of such basic types of mass democracy would possibly not even stop at the coupling and conjunction (package deal) between the free economy and parliamentarism of the Western type, i.e. the said differentiation would possibly dissolve, break up or take apart the said coupling and conjunction. It should be noted that the question and matter of distribution – even in the case of general growth and affluence – is posed, and indeed (then) when the absolute gains and profits in the eyes of those concerned count less than the relative gains and profits, that is to say, those

which someone achieves in comparison to others. However, should the question and matter of distribution be posed under conditions of acute shortage as a result of dramatic ecological and demographic developments, then the perceptible diminution of mass consumption would lead to corresponding restrictions (limitations) of and on cultural pantheism. The cultural demarcations and delimitations between different types of mass democracy would therefore be exacerbated, aggravated and intensified. And then of course, merely or simply a political legitimization (*or*: a legitimization of the political regime), which ultimately is founded and based on reality or, at any rate, on, or from the perspective of, growing affluence and prosperity, would not [[just]] collapse. A world-theoretical reorientation would also be needed, because nothing less than the pride and motor (driving force) of mass-producing and mass-consuming society: technique (technology), would have failed, broken down or gone bankrupt. Already today, technique (technology) in part lives on or off the fact that it combats its own side-effects. Accordingly, its advances and progress become all the more fictive. And the great aporias and dilemmas of the Western world-plan(/design/project) or Western social model/blueprint in the age of mass democracy, and of culturally colourless technique (technology), more and more come to the fore (into the foreground) (*or*: come into sight (come up) all the more clearly).

#### 4. From mass culture to world culture<sup>clxiv</sup>

Europe's colonial spreading and expansion had already spanned and embraced the planet when the question of world literature, united as to its human content, was raised by Goethe. Even deeper material interweaving(s) and intertwining(s), which accompany or go with the globalisation of mass democracy as the world-historically first planetary social formation, force and oblige us today towards reflection on the possibility and character of a world culture. Reason and stuff, i.e. motives, occasions and material, in relation to that, will surely exist over the next number of decades, perhaps even centuries. Because those interweavings and intertwining(s) are irreversible and irrevocable in so far as they take place on a planetary scale, under the pressure of the growing and increasingly greater population density, which is hardly going to subside and retreat (tail off and die down) in the foreseeable future. The perfection (perfecting) of the means of communication and of transportation (circulation, traffic) (*or*: of communicative and transportive means) constitutes simply the technical pendant (i.e. counterpart) of a world situation, in which spaces empty of humans and "natural borders" have largely disappeared (vanished). Clearly distinguishable – and separate from one another – cultures presupposed, i.e. had as their precondition or prerequisite, however, exactly such spaces and borders, every one of which grew in its own greenhouse.

"World literature" became a theme (topic) or concept when the new-times European culture was still striving towards its high point. On the other hand, world culture was put on the order of the day (agenda) because European culture surpassed its high point or zenith long ago, that is, because the circle of the European New Times as an epoch with specific features closed, and that

(epoch) of the planetary age opened. This can also be recognised in that the general concept of culture or of “paideia ((ideal) rearing and education (learning, cultivation))” shaped and moulded by European culture since the Renaissance and thereafter, in the twentieth century has been gradually decomposed and dissolved, so that nowadays it is not possible to use such European culture as the main thread (i.e. guide) for the investigation and examination of the problem of world culture; at most this European culture is now to be contrasted, i.e. it is useful for comparative purposes. Of course, not every culture and every civilisation develops, processes or forms a descriptive or normative concept of culture (civilisation). In any case, no culture has dedicated (devoted) itself with similar or such intensity to the working and carving out or processing of such a concept of culture as the newer, i.e. new-times (modern-era), European culture. This European culture sketched or designed an ideal of culture (cultural ideal) as an ideal of education (paideia as rearing and (highly literate and intellectually advanced) cultivation) (educational/paedagogical ideal) (*or*: This European culture correlated the cultural ideal with an ideal of paideia), which indeed was obliged to be directed and oriented towards a normative concept of nature, and was supposed to be built or founded on refined and cultured (ennobled) natural installations (or facilities (constructions, systems, laying out, origins) provided by nature), yet simultaneously aimed at the autonomisation (= making autonomous) and higher positing (i.e. elevation) of the cultural/civilisational sphere vis-à-vis the material sphere of social life. This was a novelty (newness) (*or*: This constituted something new) not only in comparison to cultures which little appreciated education (cultivation, paideia, learning) (or held education/paideia in low regard)<sup>clxv</sup>, but also in comparison to other cultures, which indeed knew how to distinguish between the educated (learned, cultivated) individual man (person) and the uneducated (unlearned, uncultivated) people (folk), yet under (or by) education (cultivation, learnedness, paideia), primarily understood ethical

perfection, and expected of such perfection a national-educational effect (i.e. an effect educative and favourable in respect of the edification and educating of the people and folk)<sup>clxvi</sup>. Socrates and the orientalist guru were, in this respect, not very far apart (at a very great distance) from each other.

### Socrates and the guru

Conversely, education (paideia, learning, cultivation) in the newer (i.e. of the New Times) European sense, was a cultural end-in-itself, detachable from direct practical-ethical cares and concerns, and in fact was a possible ally of the Devil<sup>clxvii</sup>. Accordingly, it was expected that the said new-times European education or paideia would bring about and lead to ethical side-effects in the wider (broader) sense, especially since this education or paideia's attainment or conquest, like that (attainment of conquest) of virtue, demanded a self-overcoming, willpower and self-disciplining<sup>clxviii</sup>. This education (paideia) was an individual good, that is, it constituted a value within the framework/context of an, in principle, declared as individualistic culture, [[i.e.]] bourgeois culture<sup>clxix</sup>, which wanted first of all exactly through this value to be demarcated and delimited against that which it apostrophised as the rawness, apaideia, i.e. lack of, or inadequate, paideia, and barbarity of the feudal war aristocracy<sup>clxx</sup>.

Consequently, the concept of culture, via the concept of education (paideia, learning, cultivation), gained a dimension which visibly and perceptively distinguished and separated it from that which we could call the "objective concept of culture". Under that (i.e. by the "objective concept of culture"), the more or less unreflected way of living of a collective is to be understood (*or*: This here means/signifies the more or less self-evident and unexamined mode of life of a collective entity), its long- and short-lasting (long-lived and short-lived) mores, manners and customs (conventions, traditions), its – in art or in worship

– objectified perceptions of good and bad (evil), its way and manner and kind of enjoying and of dying (*or*: of taking pleasure in life and of receiving, and reacting to, death). This objective concept of culture applies equally to “pre-modern” and “modern” societies, and makes today’s common dichotomy between them still more problematic than it is anyhow. It has – as “folk, i.e. the people’s, culture” – also played a role within the bourgeois framework and bourgeois thought, by calling into play and being useful for – in each and every respective different form, version and dosage or emphasis – the underpinning of the in itself political concept of the nation (*or*: the founding of the nation, even though this latter concept is essentially a political concept). Since, however, the bourgeois-liberal and the anti-liberal concept of the nation already early on went their separate ways, thus the idea (notion, (re)presentation) of the, as it were, earthy, i.e. native, rooted-to/in-the-soil, primeval and indigenous, and in its essence, unchangeable and immutable “folk, i.e. the people’s, culture”, found its most decisive supporters more likely amongst old-conservatives, i.e. representatives of classical conservatism and of right-wing nationalism, who mistrusted the individualistic and at the same time cosmopolitan connotations of the ideal of education (paideia, learning, cultivation) (*or*: of the bourgeois educative-paedagogical ideal); whereas this ideal was (inter)mixed by socialists and communists on several occasions with the concept(ual plan or conceptualisation) of “class” (*or*: socialists and communists, again, frequently (inter)mixed the concept of “folk, i.e. the people’s, culture” with the concept of “class” and “class consciousness”)<sup>clxxi</sup>. In any case, the fatal blow against the bourgeois concept of culture and of education (paideia, learning, cultivation) came not from these sides (i.e. classical conservatives and right-wing nationalists on the one hand, and, socialists and communists, on the other hand<sup>clxxii</sup>), but from the literary-artistic modern (modernism) and avant-garde.

## Extinct folk (i.e. peoples') cultures

Cultural individualism was here, first of all, driven or pushed to extremes by the creative individual (person) laying claim for himself to the sovereign right of using (*or*: the creative individual seeking for himself the right to use) cultural goods from all times (periods, epochs, eras), and lands (countries), as equivalent building blocks and materials within the framework and context of increasingly newer combinations – further still: of regarding (to regard) everything and anything possible as such building blocks and materials, irrespective of (which) origin and of (which) initial inspiration. Through that, that chasm or gulf, as the proponents of such views believed, between “art” and “spirit” was supposed to be bridged, which (i.e. such chasm) arose from the higher position or priority of the cultural element and of education (*paideia*) vis-à-vis the rest of the social spheres or sectors<sup>clxxiii</sup>. The paradoxical consequence of these positionings and activities was that exactly that extreme individualism, which the new directions heeded, had its ground to stand on, or its foundations, taken away (*or*: was that precisely the extreme individualism which they declared was undermined)<sup>clxxiv</sup>. Wherever everything can be or constitutes art and culture, and or a cultural good, there, no artists and bearers of culture (cultural bearers/carriers/vehicles) in the bourgeois sense of the terms exist. Advertising, consumption, entertainment and culture can thus coincide. This all has led, in different variations on each and every respective occasion, to a rehabilitation or restoration of the objective concept of culture<sup>clxxv</sup>. What once was called folk, i.e. the people's, culture, was now called mass culture<sup>clxxvi</sup>, and although the former more likely stood under the sign, i.e. was under the influence, of tradition, whereas the latter more likely lives a changing mode, i.e. is adapted to alternating fashion<sup>clxxvii</sup>, nevertheless it is a matter on both sides of concepts of

culture which are so far-ranging or broad that they can stretch across all areas of social life, that is, the separation between culture or education (paideia, learning, cultivation) and life does not apply and is effaced<sup>clxxviii</sup>; that is why today one speaks of the “culture of the body”, the “culture of protest”, the “culture of the horoscope”, the “culture of General Motors” and or the “culture of Disney Land”, without having the feeling or sense that these are false or meaningless expressions (*or*: that such expressions are incorrect or lacking in meaning)<sup>clxxix</sup>. On the other hand, the objective concept of culture which related to the traditionalistic folk, i.e. the people’s, culture, in our century was made, and became increasingly, popular<sup>clxxx</sup> not least of all through the work of American “cultural anthropology”<sup>clxxxi</sup>. In any event, the ascertainment that world culture in the age of globalised mass democracy could only gain acceptance and forge ahead against the background of the imposition and predominance of the objective concept of culture weighted and assessed in this way or that (i.e. otherwise), remains decisive (*or*: What remains decisive is the ascertainment that the road of world culture in the epoch of universal mass democracy could open only from within the prevailing of the objective concept of culture in its a or b version). The formation and spreading of the world culture cannot therefore be reconciled with any concept of culture whatsoever, but especially requires the driving out and superseding (ousting, dispelling, displacement) of the – in the European New Times (or Modern Era [[say, for the purposes of this article: c. 1500 – c. 1900]]) – dominant bourgeois concept of culture and of education (paideia, learning, cultivation). World culture must, therefore, go on its way or pass over the corpse of the latter (bourgeois concept of culture and of education/paideia), and take as its approach run, or starting point, the objective concept of culture, and indeed in the sense of mass culture<sup>clxxxii</sup>. Not only because in the meanwhile the folk, i.e. peoples’, cultures have either gone extinct and died or have become sterile, but likewise for reasons which are traced (go) back or reduced to the structural differences

between folk (the people's) culture, and mass culture. Whereas a folk (the people's) culture could flourish only under the geographical and demographical conditions hinted at the beginning<sup>clxxxiii</sup>, and already because constitutively in itself mass culture contained or entailed a delimitation and demarcation against other folk (peoples') cultures, modern Western mass culture is distinguished and characterised by its in principle unlimited ability at assimilation and at combination, i.e. its unrestricted assimilatory and combinatory ability<sup>clxxxiv</sup>. Its Western origin by no means stands in the way of its globalisation or universalisation. Because the mass-democratic culture of the West had already at its beginnings – when it, namely, was being shaped and moulded still at the qualitatively elevated level of the literary-artistic modern, i.e. modernism<sup>clxxxv</sup> and the avant-garde – opened (wide-open) a wide and broad door to the global game of the combination, i.e. to a universal combinatory game, by putting simultaneously and parallelly both the bourgeois, as well as the Eurocentrism of bourgeois culture/civilisation, under (or in the line of) fire [[incl. up to bombarding them]], something which incidentally lay in the logic of the thing/matter [[at hand]]. The mass-democratic objective concept of culture – which ruined or put aside the remnant(s) (residues, relic, carcass, remains, leftovers) of folk (the people's) culture, above all however, destroyed or dissolved the bourgeois concept of culture and of education (paideia, learning, cultivation) – [[and]] consequently represents and constitutes the necessary historical and structural condition for the coming into being of a world culture<sup>clxxxvi</sup> – just as the mass-democratic dynamic(s) in the American and European West constituted and continues to constitute the motor for the globalisation of mass-democratic relations and circumstances (*or*: the driving force for the universalisation of the mass-democratic social formation). Only where culture as the combination of everything with everything is carried on without a fixed canon (rule, law, code, norm), and regardless of (*or*: whilst being indifferent towards) qualitative criteria – as bourgeois culture defined

these same qualitative criteria –, may one expect that the hitherto or former folk (peoples’) or national cultures will be dissolved or decomposed into their component elements or parts, which then serve as the building blocks of a combination of a global or universal extent and breadth – irrespective of which individual culture will quantitatively excel and predominate in this super-combination or will set the tone, call the tune; and which individual culture gets the short end of the stick<sup>clxxxvii</sup>. And only where such culture and living are identified with each other at least tendentially (*or*: where such culture and life are identified with each other, or at least tend to identify with each other), the extensive, far-reaching homogenisation of the external courses and sequences of life (*or*: the homogeneity of the material conditions of life) in itself suffices in order to bring about a more or less united world culture<sup>clxxxviii</sup>.

A world culture can therefore only come into being if culture in general and as such is no longer comprehended as the super-ordinated sphere, which is expressed in education (*paideia*, learning, cultivation) as an individual acquisition on each and every respective occasion. Its main function would of necessity be that of the melting pot, it would have to therefore *mutatis mutandis* pull off and bring about (carry out), on a world scale, the same thing which the mass culture inside of the multi-ethnic state of the United States performed, effected and achieved: to be the force of levelling, and through that, of integration (*or*: to level, flatten and thus to unify). For the solution to (For the solving of) such a task (an exercise), the greatest possible common denominator appears to be far more important than separating (dividing/separative/divisive) qualitative elements (*or*: For such a function to be fulfilled, the greatest possible common denominator, of course, has far greater significance than that which the qualitative elements and the separations (demarcations, severances) which are entailed in them, have). The individual would have to participate in the world culture with the same self-understanding and effortlessness as he today

participates in mass culture, or yesterday had participated in folk (the people's) culture. In short: today's Western mass culture on a world scale – is that culture which would be the sole conceivable world culture (*or*: the only possible world culture would not be any culture other than today's Western mass culture on a universal scale). Content-related differences (*or*: Differences in form and content) from continent to continent, and from land to land (country to country), would, in the course of this, count just as little as the analogous deviations, deviances and divergences inside of the framework and context of today's Western mass culture. It matters not so much as regards contents, which are almost interchangeable in any way one likes (*or*: What is essential here is not the content or the form), but the free game of the combination, i.e. the free combinatory game, itself, corresponding to the topical and current context in respect of life, of interest (*or*: topical and interesting sector of social activity), on each and every respective occasion<sup>clxxxix</sup>.

If now the formation of Western mass culture is a necessary condition (and at the same time a structural pattern or model) for (the) world culture, then on the other hand, such Western mass culture does not represent and constitute a sufficient condition for that world culture<sup>cxc</sup>. A world culture, in which all world citizens would participate with the same self-understanding as the members of erstwhile tribes and nations in the folk (peoples') cultures of days gone by, would require and demand – over and above and apart from the mass character of the culture – that the fundamental questions of culture (cultural questions) will not be turned into points of contention and battlefields. This would be possible because of either the ceasing, not happening or effacing and eliminating of major conflicts inside of a harmonious world society; or because of the extensive and far-reaching excluding/exclusion of the cultural dimension from the agenda of conflicts. However, neither of both of these possibilities has in the foreseeable future any prospects – to be taken seriously – of realisation.

The world society will necessarily effect and bring about worldwide solidarity just as little as national society in itself was able to achieve the solidarity of social classes and of groups (class and group solidarity)<sup>cxci</sup>. And for as long as within the framework (context) of world society, acute conflicts will take place, which will go and be beyond the level of animal/bestial struggles over naked, bare survival, the collective societies concerned will, in relation to that, tend to give emphasis and legitimation to their material aims and goals by invoking symbolic-cultural magnitudes. Inside or in the framework/context of a world culture, whose values on every side were indeed acknowledged in principle, but would be interpreted differently, things would be similar, therefore, from this point of view, to the situation which prevailed inside of national or folk (peoples') cultures.

Cultural state of affairs of the hermaphrodite (Cultural hermaphroditic condition)

However, all of this concerns the distant hypothetical future<sup>cxcii</sup>. The present and the foreseeable future are characterised by (stand under the sign of) a mixed, ambiguous or conflicting constellation or conjuncture. The global spreading of Western mass culture has increasingly weakened the national and folk (peoples') cultures; and given the thickening and condensing of international circulation and communication, and the growing equalisation and homogenisation of external life forms and the external way of life, their (i.e. national and folk (peoples') cultures') renaissance on the earlier/previous basis<sup>cxci</sup> is hardly to be reckoned, expected or is extremely unlikely. On the other hand, however, their[[, i.e. the now defunct life forms and ways of life of national and folk (peoples') cultures']] remnant(s) (residues, remains, leftovers) are still strong enough to serve as symbolic weapons and hinder, obstruct and

prevent the frank, point-blank and open collective (*or*: unambiguous and straight-out catholic/general/universal) confession of faith in one single world culture. Collective subjects today live – as well as in the foreseeable future[[, will live]] – in a cultural state of affairs of the hermaphrodite (cultural hermaphroditic condition), which is capable of explaining some schizoid features in their behaviour. Whereas bourgeois culture and education (*paideia*, learning, cultivation) in the lands and countries of their origin and flourishing and peak, draw their last breath (are at the last gasp), the everyday habits (and ways of life) dictated by modern consumption, the modes of work and labour determined and imposed by modern technique (technology), and the kinds and forms of entertainment interrelating with electronic means, flow and converge together into a more or less homogen(e)ous world culture<sup>cxciv</sup>. Above this objective cultural basis, do the frequently and in many ways stereotypical national and folk (peoples’) cultures – and the national and folk (peoples’) cultures for their part already translated by and large into the image-language [[i.e. imagery (with audio)]] of mass culture – float, which nevertheless also in this in part ghostly, spectral shape or form can (*or*: which nevertheless also are as phantasms in a position to) have an effect of mobilising masses, if other factors drive and propel [[things]] and press towards or in that (direction). The worldwide unification of the technological equipment in daily (everyday) life and at the (one’s) place of work, will not be able to in itself put aside this cultural dichotomy, division and conflict. Because modern technique (technology), despite its Western origin, is world-theoretically neutral, and very different cultural contents can exist against the same technological background (*or*: co-exist on the same technological basis) – not to mention at all that exactly in the free spaces of a highly technicised society, there is much space, or a large place, or a wide field of action, for positionings inimical to technique (technology). In any case, a return to the more or less primeval (native, self-sown) and self-sufficient (independent, autonomous) cultures is excluded as

long as the population density on a world scale makes an intensive world circulation and world communication unavoidable and inevitable. Under these circumstances, preconditions or presuppositions, great cultural variety and cultural multiformity with regard to collective bearers can have continued existence (exist) only as cultural conflict, not as the being side-by-side (next to one another) (*or*: not as the parallel existence) of autonomous cultures.

## 5. Technique (technology) and the changes, transformations in and of humanity (= So that the cannibals stay out)<sup>CXCV</sup>

The latest (more recent) debates over/on technique (technology) can be classified into (assigned to, classed within) two large circles in respect of themes (topics) (two large/great thematic circles) (*or*: revolve around two great themes). On the one hand, it is a matter of the effects of the technical mode of thought and behaviour (the technical act) (the technical way of thinking and of acting) on or as regards the “essence” or the “humanity” of man as a person; on the other hand, it is a matter of the consequences of technical development for mankind as a whole, which now – in so far, in the course of this, there must be talk of life and survival – is looked at and regarded as a collective (entity) and as a biological species. In relation to both question formulations (examinations of the problem, central themes), all conceivable optimistic or sceptical and pessimistic views were put forward and expressed, and one can hardly say something about that without repeating what has been already said. We do not want to do that here (*or*: This is not our intention). Rather, what interests us more is the symptomatic value of the fact that in the course of recent decades, the centre of gravity and main emphasis of the debate on technique (technology) gradually (was) shifted from the former (as regards the effects of technique/technology on the “essence/humanity” of man as a person), to the latter thematic circle (of the consequences of technical development on mankind as a whole). Certainly, both thematic circles cross – and intersect with – each other on important points, especially if one believes – nursed in the spirit of the humanistic tradition – that survival is meaningful (plausible, reasonable), in fact possible, only as an ethically good life (*or*: as a morally benign (good) life).

However, the difference between the examinations of the problems and question formulations (central themes) remains conceptually clear and recognisable as well as heuristically (methodically, methodologically) useful. And the transition from the ideal of the all-round (well-rounded) educated (learned, cultivated) personality, to the ideal of collective survival, marks a historical caesura (break, rupture).

### First-class funeral

The increasing distance between humanistic and technical education (paideia, learning, cultivation, formation) was expressed and manifested itself in the 1960s in the well-known slogan or saying in respect of “two cultures”. It gave or generated the impression that two approximately equally strong tendencies (lines (schools) of thought) would be measured precisely with each other, and the outcome would still remain open. The impression deceived. The rapid, meteoric development of technique (technology) after the Second World War had presaged the collapse of humanistic education (paideia, learning, cultivation), and only the effect of the law of inertia secured the relatively long survival (living on) of the bourgeois world of the spirit(-intellect) (the bourgeois intellectual(-spiritual) world) in the mass-democratic world (*or*: inside the world of mass democracy). Out of the collapse, thus, there was a gentle death with a first-class funeral (*or*: Thus, the collapse took the form of a painless death, which was followed by a luxurious funeral). Exactly when that above-mentioned slogan or saying cropped up or was first-formulated, humanistic education (paideia, learning, cultivation) lost precisely its final (last) battle against the united forces of the cultural revolution<sup>cxcvi</sup> and of the economy, which despite all their opposition (i.e. between the cultural revolution and the economy), hit upon the motto that education (paideia, etc.) should be put at/in

the service of “praxis” and “society”. Thereunder (*or*: With these words), each side (i.e. humanistic education vs. the united (vis-à-vis humanistic education) forces of the cultural revolution and the economy) understood, incidentally, something different. However, it was easy (not difficult) to foresee whose interpretation would prevail (predominate or be victorious) [[as between humanistic education vs. cultural revolution/economy – to the extent the latter two were united against humanistic education]]. But the cultural revolution of the 1960s and the 1970s went deeper (proceeded even further). It took up and adopted the basic motifs of the earlier (older) artistic avantgarde, and led to (*or*: paved the way for) “postmodernism” by knocking down, wrecking and smashing – through the legitimization of the trivial and surrealistic “aesthetic of the flea market (or junk shop)” – the hierarchies of the humanistic canon. Parallely in relation to that, the ideal of the personality, built upon these hierarchies, was dissolved and decomposed in order to make way for the perception and notion of a fluid, flowing I (Ego) open to all chances, possibilities and opportunities of “self-realisation”. The intention was, at the same time, emancipatory, however the tangible result was that mental-spiritual stances were formed and reinforced which support and interweave with the functioning of a mass-producing and mass-consuming mass democracy.

The contrast and opposition between the “two cultures”, in the sense of two educational (paedagogical) ideals, was taken care of and dealt with therefore, of itself, as late and as reluctantly (i.e. notwithstanding how law and how reluctantly) those who had grown up with, and were nurtured (nourished, fed) by, the humanistic world of education (paideia, learning, cultivation), wanted or liked to really perceive and understand this. To(wards) this drastic solution pushed objective social reasons (*or*: Objective reasons imposed this drastic solution), and not for instance an original and incurable irreconcilability of humanistic education (paideia, learning, cultivation) with technical matters of

concern as such. Inside the bourgeois-humanistic hierarchy of intellectual-spiritual values, science stood (absolutely) at the top (*or*: possessed a highest place); technique (technology) was connected closely with science, and the great technician, whether as a solitary (lone(ly)) inventor or as the vanquisher, conqueror or tamer of the forces of nature (natural forces) for economic purposes (goals and ends in respect of the economy), figured as a new Prometheus next to the artist and the philosopher in the pantheon of great individuals. He was, that is to say, himself a striking, clear-cut embodiment and incarnation of the bourgeois ideal of personality, and his work (labour) was supposed to create the material preconditions for the free development of personality in general. Therefore, technique (technology) was supposed to serve the development of that which the humanistic ideal of the personality held to be worthy of development. Thus, did the bourgeois-liberal synthesis of technique (technology) and humanity look, in terms of theory, and in the Marxist utopia of a highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced and hyperdeveloped) society of free all-round (well-rounded) individuals, this synthesis was merely eschatologically thought [[about]] and conceived of (reckoned) (*or*: and the Marxist utopia of a technicised society of free all-round individuals was nothing but the eschatological version of this synthesis). Not the bourgeois, and or not the humanist, viewed technique (technology) as *hubris*, but the patriarchal aristocratic great landowners and representatives of classical conservatism, whose world was destroyed and came to an end with the second industrial revolution, raised this complaint and formulated this censure and reproach first of all. Later foes of liberalism opined and maintained, by the way, that technique (technology) is to (should (ought to)) be comprehended as *fate and destiny (predestination, lot)* rather than as *hubris*, and the affirmation of this fate, predestination etc. – beyond humanistic hopes or conservative curses (and conservative principles)<sup>cxcvii</sup> – could enable and equip the “Worker (Labourer)”

(Jünger) or the “Caesars of Industry” (Spengler) for great historical achievements.

After the dissolution, disintegration and decomposition of classical conservatism, the accusation (censure, reproach) of *hubris* hibernated or wintered in various “right-wing” and “left-wing” refuges. It (i.e. the accusation and reproach of *hubris*) acquired new topicality (*or*: It again became topical) when the competition (rivalry) between the “two cultures” came to an end on the basis of the atrophy of one [[i.e. humanistic education/paideia]], and one began to handle and examine the question and matter of technique (technology) no longer from the individualistic perspective of the humanistic educational (paedagogical) ideal, but mainly in connection with collective survival. This turn was the effect and result of a double angst and fear: before atomic world war and before an ecological collapse. The paradox, rich in consequences, exists in both cases in that with regard to growing angst and fear, technique (technology) becomes increasingly indispensable and essential, so that a return to circumstances (relations, conditions), in which the dangers having been caused by this technique (technology), would be absent, is excluded.

### Compulsion to retreat

The existence of atomic weapons drove or forced the protagonists of the Cold War to of themselves – in relation to that – build up, broaden and perfect their arsenals, already in order to be able to deter [[the other side]] (*or*: already in order to have the possibility of deterrence at their disposal). The possibility and the presumed destructivity of an atomic war grew parallelly with the efforts at deterrence, that is, efforts at the turning away from – and averting – war, through further technical (technological) progress. The vicious circle did not fall through, or was not terminated, by way of the internal logic of this constellation

or situation, but by way of external factors<sup>cxcviii</sup>, which compelled and forced one of both rivals (competitors) to retreat. Far less is the intervention of a *deus ex machina* to be reckoned on, in the ecological sector or area. If here there is a way out at all, then that is that technique (technology) itself will move its own undesired side-effects out of the way – i.e. technique/technology will eliminate its own undesired side-effects. Nevertheless, technique (technology) brings about these side-effects because the reproduction of social life depends more and more on technical processes and developments. Even the most vehement (fiercest) accusers of modern technique (technology) will not be able to dispute that the supplying and provision of the mass societies of today would necessarily break down and collapse without high technicisation (i.e. advanced technological (hyper)development). Already the feeding and nourishment of six (soon eight or ten) billion humans makes far-reaching technical interventions in natural processes unavoidable (*or*: renders inevitable extensive technical interventions in nature), and ecological burdening must grow to the extent that the expectations of consumption will be oriented worldwide towards the Western model. The angst and fear before the consequences of technique (technology), and the social need for technique (technology), will grow parallelly with each other, in relation to which the angst and fear, as well as the need, will be determined existentially-biologically (*or*: will be reduced to existential-biological causes). Making a virtue out of necessity is not always recommended, however, current ideological needs often command or demand it. According to the self-understanding and self-legitimation of the West, technique (technology) is not merely something socially indispensable, but it is also connected with the Western ideal of freedom. On the one hand, it is supposed to be the creation, and at the same time, the confirmation of that rationality which protects (the spirits-intellects) from obscurantist “metaphysics”, and therefore promotes and reinforces pragmatic or tolerant stances (attitudes, positionings), and consequently consolidates pluralistic

democracy. On the other hand, technique (technology) interrelates with another basic pillar or mainstay of democracy, [[i.e.]] with the free market. This free market unconditionally and definitely needs technical progress, and constantly drives such technical progress forward through the competition of enterprises (businesses, companies).

### Learning from the sorcerer's apprentice

This extremely generous coupling and connection of technique (technology) with a rationality, which is supposed to serve freedom, undoubtedly contributes, in relation to that, to the appeasing of existential angst and fears, and lets or makes the comforting feeling arise that one is at least doing the politically-ethically correct thing, even if one cannot know whereto it leads (*or*: where this correct thing is leading us). Were not the ideological-psychological factor at play or in the game, i.e. present and operative (*or*: If the ideological-psychological factor did not slip in), then the complaints and grievances (reproaches and censures) of the guardians (keepers) of political correctness against “enmity towards technique (technology)” as an expression of an anti-democratic irrationalism, would turn out and prove to be milder. However, the complaints and reproaches will become more vehement to the extent that the angst and fear living and surviving on, or existing behind, appeasement, reassurances and consolation(s), threaten to get out of control.

Yet, despite the ideological justifications, the prestige of technique (technology) has sunk in the last twenty years. In terms of practice, what is decisive remains, nonetheless, the fact that a realistic alternative to technical (technological) progress is not suggested by any side. The clearer, behind Prometheus, is the sorcerer's apprentice delineated, the more dependence on the sorcerer's apprentice's ideas and inspirations is reinforced. One must rely on

technique (technology) without praising it and without being able to completely trust it (*or*: without totally overcoming an inner mistrust of it). Most people in Western societies, in so far as they at all reflect and cogitate upon such questions and matters, obviously hope that technique (technology) will find the solutions required in time. One can also resign oneself to hope [[in general]], if much worse forms of resignation are supposed to be avoided (*or*: Hope as a form of resignation seems to be the psychologically more appropriate and expedient way out, when one wants to avoid much worse forms of resignation). In any case, there are not many possibilities to choose from. If technique (technology) capitulates at the world level before demographic and ecological burden[[s]] and weight, then with certainty cannibalism stands before us. In this sense, humanity remains reliant and continues to be dependent upon technique (technology). But a humanity, which must struggle with its back against the wall will, because of that, narrowly avoid the worst catastrophic eventualities – and so that the biological substance of the species “man” is saved (survives, pulls through, stays preserved) – is already for that reason a reduced and truncated humanity. The bourgeois-liberal humanistic ideal collapsed through the unleashing of technique (technology) (*or*: owing to/on account of technical progress), which made the transition to mass-producing and mass-consuming mass democracy possible. If technique (technology), despite all that, continues to remain the last guardian and custodian of humanity, then the reason is only because the meaning of this humanity has in the meantime radically changed<sup>cxix</sup>.

## ADDENDUM

### IDEOLOGIES AND GREEK NATIONAL STRATEGY

Since the time the Cyprus question (matter of Cyprus)<sup>cc</sup> came to the fore until today – that is to say, for half a century – Greece has accumulated (including haphazardly) not a few defeats because of the, incidentally – admitted by everyone –, non-existence of a long-term national strategy, accepted by the main body (trunk) of the [[Greek]] political world, and worked upon thanks to the joint action, collaboration and co-operation of politicians, diplomats, military officers/personnel and scientists. Having this experience, one does not need to have at one's disposal the prophetic charisma or gift to predict (foresee) that, in the future, much will depend on whether things will be done and realised now, which did not occur in the past. Two factors influenced, and will continue to influence, matters most negatively: the functioning of the political system, and embroilment in ideologem(e)s. The Greek political world did not step up to the mark and rise to the challenge of the circumstances, not only because its a or b representatives often took a or b erroneous decisions regarding a or b issue/matter, but because as a whole, the Greek political world did not manage to create a fixed and quiet (noiseless, silent) institutional framework capable of neutralising as far as possible the temptations of political party exploitation of national matters/affairs. Inability at self-restraint is a quintessential feature of

pubescent (teenage) immaturity. And the fact that one lays the blame on the other [[side]] simply proves that all [[sides]] are guilty.

The influence of ideologem(e)s on matters of national strategy is most generally reduced or put down to the fact that the modern-Greek statelet was forced from the very beginning to offset or counterbalance its historical sickness with hyper-self-complacent(/smug/self-satisfied/self-important) myths. Thus, we became a people which pleases itself by producing nonsensical babble and getting its fill by consuming vain and useless (infertile/unproductive) epics. Aetiology does not, however, constitute justification, nor is it commended as praxeology. The reverse [[applies]]: he survives who resists and counters his own myths, and he who believes such myths to the last (to the end point of their unfolding) sinks into the mire(/oblivion). In today's conjuncture, two ideologem(e)s set against each other, obstruct – next to (/alongside) the functioning of the political system – the drawing up and application of a sober national strategy: vague – and becoming all the more weaker – elements of a native(/indigenous) nationalism; and equally vague – but being all the more reinforced – rehashings of a pacificism and universalism brought into Greece from foreign sources. The nationalistic views, whose prevailing in different phases of the Cyprian question and the Macedonian question, substantially damaged the country (i.e. Greece), tend to e.g. explain the conflict between Greece and Turkey with reference to the historical past and with regard to racial or cultural factors, attributing the behaviour of the latter (i.e. Turkey) to its “Asiatic” and “barbarian” character, which they contrast to “Greek/Hellenic civilisation/culture” and to its “three-thousand-year-long history”. One case suffices for us to see how unsupported all of this is. If Serbia, which is of the same Christian denomination as us (Orthodox), had 60 million residents and exercised hegemony over the Balkans, wanted to descend onto (/upon) Thessaloniki, and if Turkey had 20 or 30 million residents and felt it

was equally being threatened by Serbian expansion, then Greece and Turkey would be bosom buddies (the closest of/wholehearted friends) and allies. Geopolitical parameters and national interests determine foreign policy (external politics) – not the past, nor race and culture (civilisation). The racial and cultural disparagement (underestimation, undervaluation) of Turkey contains the risk of Turkey’s strategic underestimation, since what is entailed is that supposedly superior Greek quality can neutralise Turkish quantity; it is of course known that the strategic underestimation of the opponent is punished when, e.g. it lures [[a country]] to the declaration of war. The increasing general superiority of Turkey in recent years has forced the nationalistic arrogance of many Greeks to perceptibly lower this arrogance’s [[or their]] tone(s), i.e. make less noise/speak more softly. Nevertheless, as a whole, the Greek side has not yet become conscious of the magnitude and of the consequences of the rise in population as well as the economic rise of Turkey, and indeed of the gradual conversion of Turkey into an industrial power.

The pacifists and universalists or “Europeanists” have their own way to evade painful and doleful realities and the cool, dispassionate strategic analysis of such realities. These same people imagine that they are greater realists, since they have gotten over “national atavisms”, and jointly proceed and move forward along with the new world order, where allegedly trade and dialogue will replace war<sup>cci</sup>. These theses and positions, however, are by no means more realistic than the nonsense (babble, blather, claptrap, bombast, hot air) of nationalism; they simply constitute the reverse ideology, and indeed an ideology not in the least original, since it does not contain but commonplaces of capitalistic liberalism formulated 300 years ago and falsified repeatedly ever since. Being ideology, they fulfil the psychological functions of ideology, that is, they permit “progressive” light-weight intellectuals and funny small-time journalistic hacks to upgrade their own small egos by appearing as

representatives of lofty ideals; at the same time, they harbour in low-to-medium level politicians the relieving illusion that they can shrink politics to management(/the mere handling of “business”), and dialogue, throwing off (absolving) their slim and weak shoulders (from) the weight of ultimate historical responsibilities. Such intellectuals and such politicians argue their case in matters of national strategy whilst making the fatal mistake of anticipating (or taking for granted) more general developments, which are not at all certain and which, even if they do successfully take place, are still at their start(/beginning(s)), and hold in reserve a lot of unexpected developments, happenings etc.. They talk and they act, therefore, as if a united Europe already existed, as if a united world already existed, and as if it were not possible for the trends to be reversed; particularly as to a united Europe, they err by identifying (equating) in advance Europe’s interests with the interests of Greeks. When more general developments are taken for granted optimistically, then strategic discussions cannot proceed deeply. For that reason, most pacifists and universalists openly express their enmity vis-à-vis such discussions, in particular when they enter into military matters and war contingencies(/possibilities of war). They think that they are solving problems only because they campaign against “nationalistic fanaticism”. Their most frequently, however, intolerant behaviour proves one more time that fanaticism against fanaticism can be even more pig-headed than mere fanaticism.

No substantial strategic discussion is possible if it does not leave aside both nationalistic as well as pacifistic ideologem(e)s; such a discussion’s aim is precisely the transcendence of nationalism and pacifism. National strategy is neither “right-wing”, nor “left-wing”, neither “nationalistic”, nor “internationalistic”. It is everything, in accordance with the commands of the specific (concrete) situation. Woe betide the country and its political leadership if it interprets the specific situation on the basis of “right-wing” or “left-wing”

preferences, instead of adapting its preferences to the as far as possible cold (completely dispassionate) interpretation of the specific situation. Every national strategy, in the event it is limited to planning for desired developments on each and every respective occasion, is condemned to one-sidedness and inflexibility, that is, to a practical dead-end. The reason for such national strategy's existence is to cover all possibilities, contingencies and eventualities, the more and the less pleasant ones. And a responsible leadership records the spectrum of contingent and possible outcomes, listening without prejudice (biasses) to all the spectrum of views and spectrum of proposals, from whomsoever they may come. Just as various "Hellenocentric" pundits ought to learn that the "West" is not just "technique (technology)" and the "worship of matter", to which they counter with hyper-simplifying ease the "spirit" and the "soul" of the "orthodox East", so too, all those whom it behooves to be "Europeanised" would do well not to delude themselves by identifying (equating) the West with Western propaganda ("rationalism", "dialogue", "human rights", etc. etc.). They would benefit Greece more if, e.g., they imitated the way in which strategic discussions are conducted in France, in England or in the USA. Everything, even the most improbable war scenarios, here become an object of examination and weighing up, and the main concern of the analysts is not to express their ideological tastes (as if there is nothing in the world more serious than those), but rather to sift through data and possibilities in order to make the job of the leadership responsible, easier. The attempt at imposing ideological censorship on strategic discussions, as much as it is veiled behind highfalutin (pompous, grandiose) moralising, does not just constitute an indication of intellectual-spiritual provincialism. Above all, it does damage to our locus(/place), i.e. realm (country).

There are objective reasons why our national strategy is today obliged to have before its eyes, i.e. in view/sight, a widest spectrum of possible developments,

which starts with conciliation (compromise) – even with losses, and ends with war. I am referring in particular to relations with Turkey. The difference of the geopolitical potential between the two countries continually increases in favour of Turkey, and in 20-30 years it will be unbearable for the Greek side. From this perspective, it seems obvious to me that conciliation (a compromise) would constitute for Greece the lesser evil, even if Greece conceded something from what it considers for now to be its sovereign right. Of course, the nationalists will fume, be indignant and exasperated at such a thought, however, they are mandated to contemplate two things: that later the negotiating position of our country will be worse, and that the delays or the errors of previous decades have their own hefty price to pay (or, their bitter pill to swallow). Those two things, however, do not in the least mean that the pacifists are entitled to speak triumphantly and crow in advance. Because, for such a compromise to be entered into, the certainty that it will be conclusive is required, that is, that the other side will not use it as a springboard for new claims, whereby in a few years, or in a few months, the situation would deteriorate in relation to the prior situation. All those who today suggest various compromises are in a most general sense right on the basis of macro-political data (even though these same people think less about such data and are more motivated by the desire to appear to be “civilised”), however, none of them can politically guarantee the viability of compromise (conciliation). And the pacifists overlook something else: since they naively consider compromise to be dictated by “logic” and by “ethics”, and not by a harsh correlation of forces, they underestimate the significance of military-deterrent power precisely for the purpose of entering into a decent [[/dignified]] compromise. But the nationalists however, the patriots etc., who do not make the mistake of underestimating deterrent power, for reasons of political party vote-seeking, perpetrated something especially detrimental: they reinforced for two decades the economic policy/politics of parasitic consumption, with the result being that the more general dependence of the

loan-fed/nourished country, i.e. the country (Greece) being dependent on loans to feed itself and function as a country, and, the undermining of the defensive effort. Thus, if the former (pacifists) beautify today's weakness of Greece with pacifistic and anti-nationalistic smokescreens, the latter (nationalists, etc.) bending and bowing to the logic of politician/voter-as-politician's-client relations, and by perpetuating the malfunctions/malfunctioning of the political system, subtract the essential content from their positions. And just as the latter are obliged to comprehend in practice, and not merely rhetorically, that only the rationalisation of the economy on a productive basis, that is the economising and investment of resources thanks to the overcoming of parasitic consumerism and the system of politician-client/voter relations, can support the defence of the country, so too the former (pacifists), when they counter and oppose with the passion of preachers, armament programmes, are obliged to comprehend that it is, in practice, the same whether you have armed forces with inadequate and obsolete arms and weaponry, or do not have arms etc. at all. If the pacifists were consistent, they would have to expressly call for the disbanding of the armed forces, since they, at any rate, preclude war and believe in the omnipotence of the "dialogue between logical people". It is obvious why they do not dare to do it: even ethicists are afraid of unused lemon residues, i.e. being humiliated, disgraced, laughed at, made fools of, etc.. From a pragmatistic point of view, the armed forces can be just as much a means of peace, that is, of deterrence, as well as a means of war. May it be the first/former (means of peace/deterrence). But, whether it is the first/former, or the second/latter, the same completeness, thoroughness and absolute readiness is required. And completeness etc. does not mean, as many people imagine, to spend and possess as much as one's opponent. It means the ability at a decisive (first) strike – even from the position of the weaker side. Only the country which(/he who) has this ability at its(/his) disposal, is not afraid of dialogue today, and will not be afraid tomorrow to proceed to internationally guaranteed and fixed compromises. Contrariwise, the

weaker one is, the more one panics over the idea of irresistible, inescapable compromises, fearing, and rightly so, that this will be the beginning of the end.

The above is not suggesting some kind of solution, but a framework and a process for finding the solution [[to Greece's woes and chances of surviving in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as Greece]]. I repeat: our country finds itself today before a broad spectrum of contingencies and possibilities, and the meaning of a strategic discussion is the weighing up of everything for and everything against, in the light of, i.e. given, the specific/concrete situation, and not "nationalistic" or "pacifistic" sympathies. I wanted to show, with as much brevity as the space at our disposal imposes, that both these ideologem(e)s contain contradictions and erroneous interpretations. The worst that our locus/place, i.e. country, could suffer today would be to substitute serious strategic discussion with/for recriminations between nationalists and pacifists or "Europeanists", with/for a witch hunt and with/for intellectual-spiritual terrorism [[going]] in one or another direction. I most intensely fear that this is precisely what will happen. Because God(/the Lord) makes mad(/drives insane), him who He wants to destroy(/slaughter), so too does a people lose its ability at strategic thought precisely when it needs it the most.

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## ENDNOTES

All endnotes are by the translator, and *have nothing whatsoever to do with P.K.. Readers can and in fact **probably must** simply ignore them and draw their own conclusions from P.K.'s texts only, though some of the endnotes might be useful to some readers, and other endnotes – which could deliberately be (partly) wrong and or unfair – are really only for the very few people who can look at themselves in the mirror and say “Oh my God, I’m really ugly, and retarded”. I do it every day, and it’s the only way to prepare yourself to be a truly profound thinker, and not a propaganda-spewing mouthpiece.*

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<sup>i</sup> The German translation of the Greek is “somewhat creative”! It should read “Caesurae (breaks or turning points) in planetary politics around 2000” rather than “Contributions to (or articles regarding) planetary politics at the turn of the millennium”. Also: throughout the English translation of P.K.’s articles and foreword (as well as the Editorial notice), alternative words and phrases either to the German and or the Greek are given in parentheses ( ... ) incl. as (or: ...), whereas any text in double brackets [[ ... ]] is the translator’s – hopefully explanatory and or useful for the reader – interpolation into P.K.’s text.

<sup>ii</sup> The German translation of P.K.’s Greek was not consulted for the translation of the foreword, given that it was not done by P.K., and the Greek is P.K.’s text.

<sup>iii</sup> *The Decline of Bourgeois Culture (Civilisation)* has not yet been translated into English (I might translate it after I complete *The Political and Man*, “God willing”, c. 2023); *Planetary Politics after the Cold War; Pleasure, power, utopia* (incl. the chapter: “Utopia and historical action”) have been translated and are online, whilst there are notes available in regard to *Theory of War* (incl. the chapter: “Hot war after the Cold War”).

<sup>iv</sup> I.e. the so-called “leftist opponents” of the status quo are not even offering, let alone acting in regard to, any real, tangible, concrete resistance to the status quo, but simply are subsumed within the ideological and real-world dominance of those who are most powerful. On the other hand, P.K. is not saying that someone should do x, y or z, rather he is highlighting the actual relations of power and supposed “resistance” to them in the form of a broad outline of the current state of affairs in the West. Nor is P.K. saying that “things would be better if only...”. That’s not his task or “job”. P.K.’s task is total or “full-spectrum” dominance in theory – i.e. to not be defeated and defeatable in the (scientific, non-normative) description and explanation of human affairs. The “what is to be done?” part of life is for the power-hungry in both the production of ideology, and ultimately far more crucially, in the exercising and wielding of real-world, successful, dominant forms of power.

<sup>v</sup> Throughout the site [www.panagiotiskondylis.com](http://www.panagiotiskondylis.com), I have explained a number of times that “liberal” and “liberalism” stricto sensu and scientifically refer to the ideal type of the basic social formation between *societas civilis* (feudalism) and mass democracy (incorporating social democracy). Liberalism’s heyday was in the 19<sup>th</sup>

century, it was Western European, oligarchic, capitalistic, formal-legalistic, imperialistic, highly crudely racist against Africans, Asians, Native Americans, Aborigines et al., in ways different to today's dominant anti-white racism whose logical, if not always avowed programmatical, endpoint is the genocide of historically white peoples and nations. "Liberal" in this volume can also refer to "liberal utopia" as an ideological programme of world "free markets" and "individual rights" so that (Zio-)America can try to dominate the world in imperialistic-like fashion, incl. through regime change, regime control, cultural and propaganda projection through the Other-worshipping and "degeneracy and fem(in)o-faggot"-worshipping GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ???ish and or ???nist owned and or controlled mass media and mass entertainment centred in, but not limited to, the USA. "Liberalism" in the sense of its common use in today's mainstream discourse is totally misleading, and what is really meant is Western mass-democratic ideology with GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ???ish and or ???nist input. P.K. quite rightly never referred to ???s and ???nism in the context of mass democracy, because apart from living and working in Germany, he left the particulars and the who is who of individuals and groups to specific sociological-historical study which is undertaken to widely varying degrees of success, quality and accuracy within sites like Prof. Kevin MacDonald's <https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/> or Ron Unz's <http://www.unz.com/>. Obviously, P.K. had absolutely nothing to do with such sites and probably would have considered them as being of very poor levels of analysis and scholarship overall, but not necessarily with regard to everything contained therein. Also, obviously, we cannot expect any seriousness and self-reflection from "The Academy" which at elite level in the West is staffed GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY (owing, inter alia, to primitive secret society(-like) networking, nepotism, collusion, etc.) by ???ish and or ???nist "Academics and Professors", who, again, obviously, defend their own. Hence, the scientific understanding of the concept of "liberalism" is very different to today's ideological use of this concept. Something similar happens with the concept of "conservatism", which I have explained elsewhere within my site.

<sup>vi</sup> P.K., as always, writes from the point of view of Europe, and it would never have occurred to him to use the USA-centred highly ideologically loaded, representative of the Zionist-Protestant/Evangelical alliance, "Judeo-Christian". On the other hand, for the purposes of this article, it is not a major issue, in any event.

<sup>vii</sup> Until the end of the Cold War, it was common to refer to the Soviet Block and Eastern Europe, and not only to China, Vietnam, etc., as the "East" compared to the "West", which in turn somehow also, at least sort of, included Japan and South Korea!

<sup>viii</sup> Obviously "the Left" here is meant in accordance with its 19<sup>th</sup> century and 20<sup>th</sup> century (until c. 1945/1968/1991) meaning of social democracy, socialism and communism, and not in today's Western mass-democratic sense, which is hardly distinguishable from the Western mass-democratic "Right".

<sup>ix</sup> This is another "unbelievable insight" by P.K., which not only has cultural and demographic implications, but political as well. The present article was published in 1994 and P.K. died in 1998, and at around that time and for about another 10 years it never occurred to me how rapidly the West was "spinning out of control" (I then thought that all would be sort of "good" until c. 2050 when I would die, barring premature death!), so that c. 2015 we have reached a stage where "intellectuals", incl. those who GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY belong to a particular group, are openly calling for white genocide based on "white privilege" etc. when members of the same particular group GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY occupy positions of relative power and influence. It appears that – notwithstanding that a few people have "woken up" – matters have proceeded to a point where hardly anything inherited from the West will be salvageable within a few more decades simply because there won't be enough Western people (taught how) to connect with the cultural achievements of the West, though a kind of "intermediate period" before total collapse, lasting for a number of decades or longer, is still a possibility, if not probability.

<sup>x</sup> Of course, it "just happens" that both the Bolshevik and the Menshevik leaderships, which grosso modo symbolise and or refer to both the creation of the Soviet Union and the social-democratic, i.e. Western mass-democratic response to communism, GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY contained – just like international bankers and financiers and the avante-garde of the 1960s and 1970s cultural revolution, etc. – people of a particular group. Historical causation of course is a far more complicated matter, and involves decades and centuries-long processes of social and intellectual(-spiritual) change, and in Western Europe that means (nominally) Christian Europeans taking the lead from the 13<sup>th</sup> century until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, without the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE degree of involvement of members of the aforesaid (tiny minority, but very effectively networking) group until the mid to late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, when *they* (at elite level) really "got cracking" with incredibly high levels of efficacy and achievement as to forms of power, influence, and control.

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<sup>xi</sup> There is your “clue” as to how macro-historical chains of causation can take place over two or three or more centuries and then converge and fit in with “parasitical-like”, “primitive secret society-like” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystallisations of forms of power within a particular group, whose members at the level of elites seize the opportunities presented to them, including by using their clear advantage in the banking and finance sectors, etc..

<sup>xii</sup> I have opted for the clear meaning of the Greek text, because the German text reads in a manner which can be confusing: “The Enlightenment philosophy of history, especially in its Hegelian version, had unified world history by prescribing to it a single normative aim/goal, which it (the Enlightenment philosophy of history) had to steer against or counteract as a whole.” This obviously means, when you analyse the phrase, that there was a Hegelian dialectic in progress through which world history ends up – like it or not – at the said single normative aim/goal.

<sup>xiii</sup> I.e. the command of Love did absolutely nothing to alter the human propensity for conflict, violence, war, etc..

<sup>xiv</sup> E.g. today, and for the last 30 or so years, we have had the (originally Trotsky/Parvus-inspired) Zio-Neocon-Nutters and totally Lobotomised “Missing Link” Fanatics, fantasising about eternal Zio world domination via the USA but always for the purpose of Israel – in the name of “democracy” and “human rights”, etc., and not only will they not get anywhere near to realising their utopian(-like) fantasies ever, they will contribute greatly to destroying the West once and for all, including through gradual, but nonetheless on-going and progressing race and or ethnos replacement and (potential) white genocide. And not withstanding all that, they are “amazed” and “astonished” that some “tribalist-nationalist-NAZI” people, who are mostly just normal ethno/racial-patriots recognisable throughout much of European and Asian history, are pushing back, even though it would appear that it is far too late already.

<sup>xv</sup> It goes without saying that here P.K. is talking about the Cold War period, and that since the collapse of communism, “progressives” have been highly selective – to say the least – about which and whose “privileges” they seek to “dismantle”.

<sup>xvi</sup> From primitive communism to slavery to feudalism to capitalism to (socialism)/communism (whether European, or Asiatic, or African civilisation).

<sup>xvii</sup> P.K. very wisely leaves matters of who’s who to historians and does not get involved in the specifics and minutiae of history (and one should not forget that he is talking here of China and other countries, just as much as of Russia). At the end of the day, science as scientific observation explains what is, and does not have any kind of programme in focusing *normatively* in on group dynamics and inter-group relations etc.. And, of course, ideal-typical sociological-historical macro-level analysis, of its own nature, leaves the details to specialist historians and researchers.

<sup>xviii</sup> The Greek text incorrectly states (presumably as a typographical error or misreading of P.K.’s handwriting), “1914”, whereas the Russo-Japanese War took place in 1904-1905.

<sup>xix</sup> I have to admit that I smiled upon re-reading this... HAHAAHAHA!!!

<sup>xx</sup> See endnote immediately above – by no means are we talking only about Sartre!

<sup>xxi</sup> This passage indicates that what has become known as “cultural Marxism” is not really Marxism at all, but a reflection of (aspects of) Western mass-democratic ideology and praxis.

<sup>xxii</sup> P.K. very rarely calls anyone a “great thinker”, and off the top of my head he has only ever called Aristotle and Marx “great thinkers”, though he has also highly praised with enthusiasm Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Clausewitz, Weber, Aron, and very few others.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Presumably a reference to one of Max Weber’s not exactly “perfect” points.

<sup>xxiv</sup> As explained in my comments on “The multi-dimensional Enlightenment”, various clowns who parade as “professors” at elite universities, and more often than not seem to belong to a particular group, do not have the slightest idea of what they are talking about with regard to either the “Enlightenment” or the notion of “liberal”,

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and really just seek to justify their own and their own group's GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE possession of forms of power.

<sup>xxv</sup> This was written in 1994!

<sup>xxvi</sup> This could be partly ironical, because we all know that the West is not compared to up to the 1980s very industrial anymore! Otherwise, once largely industrialised, but now largely service economies, must be meant, though Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Italy, have kept their main industries, whilst Spain sort of industrialised post-Franco, if I'm not mistaken. As to the "hundreds of millions", P.K. definitely had his own sense of humour!

<sup>xxvii</sup> The original German title was: „Blühende Geistesgeschäfte“ = “Blossoming (blooming, flourishing) transactions of the Spirit (intellectual(-spiritual) business)”.

<sup>xxviii</sup> The original German titles (the article was published twice: in a philosophical journal (1996) and in the *FAZ* newspaper (1994)) were: „Universalismus, Relativismus und Toleranz in der westlichen Massendemokratie und in ihrem geistigen Leben“ (= “Universalism, relativism and tolerance in Western mass democracy and in its intellectual(-spiritual) life”), and, „Ohne Wahrheitsanspruch keine Toleranz“ (= “Without a truth claim (claim to truth), no tolerance”).

<sup>xxix</sup> The full original title in German is: „Des Westens weiße Weste: „Menschenrechte“ – Begriffliche Verwirrung und politische Instrumentalisierung“ (= “Of the West white vest (The West's white vest): “human rights” – conceptual confusion and political instrumentalisation”). The “white vest” reference might be some kind of allusion and/or play on words regarding 1990s “humanitarian interventions”. If someone knows, they can email me with the information so I can provide better information in this endnote. I suspect something in relation to Yugoslavia/Bosnia, etc., but I'm not sure.

<sup>xxx</sup> I love the use of the term “circles” – with “tangible material interests” (HAHAHAHAHA!!! – what the fuck does that mean? HAHAHAHAHA!!!) in the Greek text, written especially for us Greeks – because P.K., notwithstanding the incomparable scientific rigour of all his analyses, was always a human being with a Tribe (!) and when one has a Tribe, one is very, very, very aware of *other* tribes.

<sup>xxxi</sup> E.g. all human activity under “communism” as dreamed about by the communist utopians.

<sup>xxxii</sup> In his usual unique fashion, P.K. is basically telling the reader that there is no such thing as “let's all trade with one another, and then – even though in practice and in effect we're total atheists and live only for and in This World – as if “by magic”, it will “just happen” that everything will be alright, and everyone will become more prosperous, but especially us, because globalisation (because we said so) and we ourselves are “beautiful” even though many people think we are “disgustingly ugly” (and we deal with that problem by psychopathologising them, even though we are the absolute and total psychos believing in our own fairy stories, all along serving our own in-group interests). And of course, anyone with half brain knows exactly where all this GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-led Madness is going to End.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Unless I'm mistaken, that has dropped to about 50% today.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> P.K., always cautious and precise, does not give a time-frame for borders going up again, nor exactly where they will be erected (e.g. they might still be open in some or many places in 2018, but in 2048? 2088?). Nor does he exclude the possibility of pathetic states like the former Greece euthanising themselves out of existence.

<sup>xxxv</sup> P.K. with his usual mastery does not go into whether nations or which nations will survive, be substantially transformed, go extinct, or which states will continue and which will be broken up or set up. That is up to reality and its interrelations, interactions and correlations of forces. One thing, however, is certain. Reality owes absolutely nothing to anyone: not to individuals and not to groups, but death. The rest is struggle (co-operation and/or conflict). The next victory will be one victory closer to the next defeat.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> The German title in the *FAZ* was „Die falsche Rechnung“ (= “The false reckoning (bill, invoice, account, calculation)”).

<sup>xxxvii</sup> It seems that the book in question was published under the title “The Great Illusion” in 1911, so perhaps P.K. should have written “three” rather than “two” years. The “two” years of the Greek text, I assume is a

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correction of the “Barely a year” of the German text. It’s not really important anyway, and P.K., given his workload, is entitled to – a very rare, I have to admit – “inaccuracy” – if it is an inaccuracy... (and I have no doubt there are or could be other such inaccuracies, but... I still haven’t been informed by anyone of any material or substantial error, anywhere in his work, ever!)

xxxviii HAHAAHAHA!!!

xxxix This basically means that any kind of “peace theory”, i.e. any kind of utopian “crock of shit” is just that, BULLSHIT. War, like violence, is a constant (potentially to be manifested – always under the surface if not being actuated) phenomenon of human behaviour – like it or not! Study Clausewitz (*Theory of War* – Summary Notes), study *The Political and Man*, chapter. 3; and then if you have the guts: study *Power and Decision*.

xl Let’s retrace Angell’s basic positions: 1) A nation cannot increase its power and prosperity through war and conquest. 2) Traditional power politics has been rendered useless by the “globalisation” of the 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> century, incl. the internationalisation of finance and credit. 3) Great Britain and Germany could, nevertheless, impose order on India and the Ottoman region. 4) The case where one European Power wants to impose its will over all crucial regions was not examined. 5) Colonial expansion due to military expenditure was no longer viable; now was the time for economic-financial control of the colonies. 6) But 5) on its own does not prove that great Power war is not possible. 7) The progress in the globalisation of the day would however make war a non-starter (= contradicting 6), 3) and 4)). 8) If war is economically useless and globalisation renders war impossible, then all people should be against war as it is against everyone’s interests.

xli The German title in the *FAZ* is: „Ein so schlimmes Spiel. Das Prinzip „Demokratien bekriegen sich nicht““ (= “Such a bad, nasty (evil, wicked, naughty, terrible) game (match, play, performance). The principle “Democracies do not wage war against one another””). The Greek title is: “Are democracies necessarily peace-loving (pacifistic)?”

xlvi I assume that Kant’s understanding of the separation of powers would have been far more like Montesquieu’s (see P.K.’s related book) than today’s common understanding, though I am not certain because I haven’t researched it, and won’t ever have the time to research it.

xlvi This is simply raising the issue of what is the definition of a democracy. I have discussed this at various points of the site [www.panagiotiskondylis.com](http://www.panagiotiskondylis.com), particularly on the “Translator’s Page – Prelude”.

xlvii Everyone knows England has never had a “constitution”, etc.. Here, though, we’re using German terminology which amounts to “polity”.

xlviii What P.K. is therefore saying is that the relations of Power or the correlation of forces is always the deciding factor – and not whether polities are democracies (howsoever defined) or not. Needless to say, e.g., the USA not once thought of how “democratic” Greece or Turkey were whilst overseeing or being Pontius Pilate with regard to the pogroms of 1942, 1955, 1965, the “absorption” of Imbros, Tenedos and Northern Cyprus by Turkey, etc.. All that matters are interests and Power. All the rest is Smokescreens and or Stardust for the Naïve and or Retarded. And another country in the USA’s position would have done exactly the same, or at least what it interpreted as being in its interests.

xlix The causes of war, as we know from *Theory of War* and elsewhere, have absolutely nothing to do with polities as such.

l The HAHAAHAHAHA!!! P.K. can’t help himself. This acerbic and or aggressively sarcastic sense of humour is the greatest gift from Nietzsche and others, who were otherwise so lacking in the sociological-historical understanding of humans and societies.

li The *FAZ* title: „Globale Mobilmachung. Konflikt der Kulturen oder Konflikte ohne Kultur?“ (= “Global mobilization. Conflict of cultures or conflicts without culture?”). The German text in the book does not have a question mark, whereas the Greek text has a question mark. The Greek title could actually be translated as “Clash of civilisations or clashes in the absence of civilisation?”.

lii Poor old Samuel, who was not without at least some merit as a thinker, receives some fairly brutal treatment from P.K. in a footnote regarding the concept of “conservatism” in P.K.’s monumental – and a personal favourite of mine: *Konservativismus*. To be translated into English by 2040-2045, if alive and “sane”?

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<sup>i</sup> P.K. now commences a discussion which, apart from underlining the primacy, but by no means necessary exclusivity, of the political in determining group friendships and enmities at the planetary level vis-à-vis the cultural (and the racial), also refers, inter alia – and at least indirectly, to dominating, dominant and or imperialistic cultural projection and influence which can accompany (geo)political power projection more generally (including by way of implication when immigrants are assimilated into a culture of the country migrated to), but with strictly scientific phrasing, for even in relations of dominance there are interactions which flow both or many ways, and which (can) include elements of acceptance by the side being dominated, and some degree of influence on the dominant side by the weaker side(s), etc.. What is interesting is that only in the Age of European Imperialism, but more significantly of American Hegemony do we see all the traditional cultures of the West – but also further afield – homogenised to an extent hitherto unheard of in world history. And if someone has a sense – albeit subjective, as ultimately it must be – of the historical, but even only recently, clear superiority of one’s own culture compared to a “barbarian” culture, as in the case of the few remaining Greeks today with high levels of collective consciousness, then one becomes absolutely DISGUSTED by at least some aspects of the foreign (e.g. Anglo-Zio-American; also cf. Powell and Pressburger’s Englishness vs. Americanism), particularly if the dominating foreign includes the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE input of a particular historically repulsive group which no-one “in their right mind” can stand or put up with even for one second as a group (particularly as regards their elites), even though one can deal with individuals on an ad hoc basis, “no problema”. Of course, reality owes nothing to no-one, today we die, tomorrow *you* die, and grosso modo that’s the way it works – albeit the deaths not infrequently are separated by centuries or longer. “Disgust” then is not a psychological state per se which can be “cured” – because all human states of thinking are one way or another “psychological states” and any “cure” or “therapy” is a matter ultimately of degree of socialisation – but ultimately is related to the aesthetic choice or decision one makes and or accepts as being made by the collective before him as to one’s fundamental world view, values and anti-values, likes and dislikes, etc., i.e. it is a question of relations of forms of power which make up culture and identity. The psychopathologising which certain people purport to be so good at is just another way for *them* to try and rationalise and justify their GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE crystal(lisation)s, accumulations and concentrations of forms of power. But *their* turn will come, sooner or (much) later. That is certain. (My discussion here on “disgust” and values/anti-values, likes/dislikes, the aesthetic aspect of existence, has to do with the fundamental questions of rationality-irrationality, culture, power, identity, understanding and meaning, group-individual, which in parvo are dealt with in *Power and Decision*, and in magno in *The Political and Man*). – And to be fair, because “fair is fair”, throughout all of human history there is a myriad of examples of “disgust” arising from relations of forms of power felt by individuals and or groups towards other individuals and or groups across a whole spectrum of social classes, castes, (sub-)races, nations, ethne, (sub-)religions, etc.. The phenomenon is universal because it is social-ontological/anthropological. The phenomenon is concretised in concrete circumstances of relations between concrete people(s). The group I referred to above will *meet their destiny* either by the acts of the Chinese, Mohammedans, others and or some combination thereof. If my group is dead and can’t do anything, then I curse and point the bone at your group. YOU are not going to assimilate me any more than is absolutely necessary for me to survive in the society in which you wield GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of power. (Obviously, “disgust” in the much narrower sense of feeling repulsion at e.g. discovering a piece of shit in one’s sandwich etc. is not of interest here).

<sup>ii</sup> P.K. wrote this article in 1996, so given Mearsheimer’s and L. Goldstein’s thoughts on Taiwan’s possible future (see articles at: [www.nationalinterest.org](http://www.nationalinterest.org)), Taiwan may have no choice in the future but to contemplate very carefully its cultural nearness to mainland China! By the way, some of Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s movies are so (racially-ethnologically) patriotic in their deeper meaning that he – to me at least – is indistinguishable from Mao and Deng, no matter how paradoxical that might seem at first glance!

<sup>lii</sup> Whilst all “nations” must sit in human culture understood generally, universally and social-ontologically, a specific “nation” does not mechanically and hierarchically relate with a specific “culture”. Relations are interrelations, they are interactive, mutually influencing one another, and it is the political and the outcome of its interrelations and interactions at any given historical point in time which defines “nation” for that particular historical point in time, etc..

<sup>liii</sup> What is very interesting is that even if the forces of The Satanic Circus Monkey, i.e. advance hyper-imperialistic globalisation, succeed in keeping USA and European borders relatively open or fully open, eventually so much anomie will be unleashed that forces of very strict, blood-drenched law and order could come to the fore, or, simply things will descend into Chaos, wilde and eternal Anarchie and Pandaemonium of which Milton, mutatis mutandis, wrote so famously and brilliantly.

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<sup>liv</sup> HAHHAHAHAHA!!! “Poor old Trump”... politics will always be politics, particularly when we are leaving times of “normalcy” and entering “times of trouble”.

<sup>lv</sup> I would add that since 1996, de-Hellenisation has proceeded to such an extent under the dominant Zio-USA-Germano-Euro-Lobotomised model of “good globalisation” vs. “bad nationalism” – whilst Israel, for instance, does what it does – that nowadays even that pathetic compensation P.K. referred to is not even sought. Today we have full spectrum Zio/American-Lobotomy. There’s no other way for me to describe it. Of course, no-one is saying Greece should not be in the EU or in NATO. What is being said is that Greece has done nothing to survive both demographically and as a Greek (Hellenic) state within those international structures (productivity, exports, technology, education, administration and government, secure borders, etc.). It has actually done the exact opposite, and is now facing break-up. That means nothing to non-Greeks, but to the few Rhomioi remaining it means Historical Death Time.

<sup>lvi</sup> P.K. does not refer to “human rights” as legal rights because in a previous article he explained that *sensu stricto* there are no “human rights” as a matter of real-world law for all humans simply because they are humans, and which could only be granted by a world state, which is obviously non-existent, and currently only a theoretical or speculative – if at all a – possibility. What exist are “civil rights” – provided by specific, concrete states – which people call, as a kind of cultural value signalling, “human rights”.

<sup>lvii</sup> The Trump-Bannon-?rei?art-?evan?-J. ?e?er?on-et al. side of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-Elite Rule appears to be at least in part in favour of this approach, whereas the Satanic Circus Monkey ?ew ?or? ?imes-?as?ing?on ?ost-??ardia? Homo-Globo-Globo-Homo Neo-Psycho-Con-Dem-Tard side of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-Elite Rule insists on the Femino-Faggot-Zio-Lobotomy-Psycho-Utopia narrative. Serious realists, whilst not using my language of course, hope for a world-wide Equilibrium or Blocpolitik, etc., – leaving the more specific matters of cultural texture and politics to the minutiae of every Bloc, Sphere, Space and or state – and obviously there are a whole host of positions in between. Whatever the case, it seems to me that the West as fundamentally White Greco-Roman-Christian-Secular-based-evolved Culture is OVER, and it’s a question of what can be “saved”. And with a continuing Universal Western Mass-Democratic Hedonistic-Consumeristic Zio-Lobotomy, and with hundreds of millions of Africans and Asians et al. potentially on the march in the coming decades, I am very sceptical that much at all can be saved, let alone salvaged.

<sup>lviii</sup> I direct this particularly to “white nationalists”: you are in your own “dream world”. Even in Spengler’s day, it was clear that world-historical momentum had turned against the almost exclusively relatively white nations. These nations through the two world wars and mass democracy exhausted and auto-lobotomised themselves out of existence. Now, absolutely realistically, the question is what can be saved with what remains and obviously the first thing that “needs” to be done, if someone wants to do something, is to end the dominant Zio-lobotomy model of the circumscription, apeification and disorientation of society in a cultural and not just racial sense, though the latter is one of a number of major factors, clearly. And that might only happen primarily because of external factors, and events and occurrences arising externally. In any event, scientific observation as people engage in Science, does not care – it only describes and explains, non-normatively, like P.K., and not in the language I use. Someone engaged in a normative realist analysis, would normally try to engage in science in terms of description and explanation, but adds a normative component because he chooses to support a particular side, e.g. his nation.

<sup>lix</sup> This is the second extended piece of German text by P.K. I’ve translated without the assistance of a Greek version. Exciting times for me!

<sup>lx</sup> This to me clearly indicates that we are dealing with a Western mass democracy in the era of Planetary Politics and most of, if not all of, the so-called “far-right” parties in Germany and Europe which enter parliament in general are simply “right-wingish” manifestations of the same Western mainstream mass-democratic social formation, and only some of them are at most much more *potentially* than actually anti-parliamentary, para-military “fascistic” types of parties. After all, until the end of the Cold War virtually the whole of the political spectrum in parliament in the West was in favour of more or less very tightly policed and guarded borders and fairly tightly controlled immigration programmes – or at least could not do anything effective about such programmes then in force.

<sup>lxi</sup> My understanding is that since 1994 the German social democrats or liberals, but especially the former, have become far less “nationally minded” and more or less fully in tune with the Zio-Globalist Agenda of Hate and Satan. It remains to be seen in which direction the “winds” will take things in coming decades.

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<sup>lxii</sup> According to the Kondylisian historical ideal-typical schema of: from *societas civilis* to liberalism and then to mass democracy, the 19<sup>th</sup> century belongs to the heyday of liberalism in which the “Left” meant (social) democracy (up to communism), and the “Right” conservatism in the sense of trying to maintain as many feudal privileges and features of *societas civilis* as possible.

<sup>lxiii</sup> Reference is obviously being made to the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Mr P.K., I have a question. Do you mean before the French Revolution, and if yes, how long before? From the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the modern absolutist state came into being and the first stirrings of “conservatism”? I think, in fact I’m sure, that’s what you’re saying. Cf. *Konservativismus*, though unless I’m mistaken, the Left/Right divide, i.e. with the actual words “Left” vs. “Right”, is a product of the French Revolution and where the bums went on seats in parliament.

<sup>lxv</sup> This is another clear-cut, brilliant insight by P.K.. Since all main sides of the Western political spectrum are more or less accepting of the Western mass-democratic agenda of multi-culturalism, Zio-lobotomy or Zio-worship, “anti-racism”, femino-faggotism, all kinds of “degeneracy” and “abnormality”, etc., etc., etc., what really is at stake is how quickly Western societies will Zio-lobotomise themselves totally out of existence through mass invasions, low birth rates, etc., etc., etc.. And concern for “the social question”, i.e. workers’ rights etc., has almost totally been forgotten since most people can participate at some level in hedonistic consumerism, “I shop, I consume (plastic) garbage, therefore I am”.

<sup>lxvi</sup> It would be fair to say that by about 2005-2010 most of the mainstream “Right” P.K. refers to had moved to the positions of the mainstream “cosmopolitan” Left. And hence the appearance of the fledgling “far Right” and or “identitarian (“alt- or white nationalist”) Right” with its various colours, shades, hues and differences in pragmatism (Zio-acceptance) vs. “authenticity” (Zio-repulsion), etc.. In any event, at this stage it would appear that they have next to no chance of ever coming to power and causing fundamental change, though, one never knows what the Future brings! (My gut feeling is that they’ll just remain fringe book and social clubs at best, though my gut could be wrong...).

<sup>lxvii</sup> Never forget, P.K. always writes with a vista stretching right into and through the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

<sup>lxviii</sup> It seems to me that e.g. (attempted) BREXIT and Salvini and Co. are examples how P.K.’s method of analysis is able to encompass concrete phenomena when they arise even more than 20 years after the article was written, when in 1994 most, if not all, were “waxing lyrical” about this or that thought manifestation of Deep Zio-Lobotomy, i.e. Utopian Zio-Insanity in the Zio-NeoPsychoCon/DemTard-USA era – even though thinkers like Huntington had the good sense to say things people did not want to hear, notwithstanding his weaknesses highlighted by P.K. in the previous article.

<sup>lxix</sup> P.K. is basically saying that so-called “right-wing” theorists might express their cultural and aesthetic rejection of Western mass democracy, but have no overall social, incl. economic, basis to ground their political power claims so that people can live in a society with strong roots in *societas civilis*, i.e. rural, God-fearing, strictly hierarchical and mostly static society up to the 18<sup>th</sup> or late 19<sup>th</sup> century at the very latest. The mass-democratic “futurist” attempts of the “Right” were tried, failed and have vanished into history like Soviet communism. Today one can see that the vast majority of people in – let alone the elites of (!) – Western mass democracies – regardless of race – are not interested in non-consumeristic, extra- or non-“free”-market life based on Tradition and Countryside, let alone a new version of managed-“free”-market Fascism or National Socialism.

<sup>lxx</sup> “Spake”! Not “spoke”! It’s Clausewitz... going back in Time, always relevant, always constant are his insights into human affairs and human nature. Both (inter)relations and biology. Neither can be separated in reality, but obviously can and must be separated conceptually. The question is for what purpose?

<sup>lxxi</sup> Unsurpassable P.K.! The 21<sup>st</sup> century requires and will require politicians of all-time greatness, wisdom and vision – neither Zio-lobotomised Imbeciles, nor narrow-minded, hyper-nationalistic-racialistic Dingbats. And it seems that on the Western side of things, Germany is totally lacking in such leadership; and Trump may not be able to do much to steer the ship in the right direction or even avert total catastrophe, notwithstanding all the rhetoric. You wanted Zio-lobotomy; we shall all see (if we’re alive) the Results.

<sup>lxxii</sup> The FAZ title: „Die Zukunft der Nation“ (= “The future of the nation”).

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<sup>lxxiii</sup> In today's "objective" journalistic lingo, "far Right".

<sup>lxxiv</sup> = The "Right" wants a state *and* nation, because it does not have any confidence that the nation can survive without the state, which somewhat ironically means that the "Right" does not have that much faith in its nation, which it thinks is "eternal" and "special", etc.,...

<sup>lxxv</sup> Classical conservatives were focused on conserving as many aspects of *societas civilis* (feudalism) as possible, and were opposed to nationalists who wanted nation-states with their formal-legal equality, etc.. So, theoretically and *mutatis mutandis*, "Maastricht" is something a conservative should not have had so much of a problem with, rather than having recourse as a "nationalist" to the nation-state, which once upon a time was Anathema for a conservative. In other words, you are arguing against "Maastricht" as a "conservative" against the nation-state, whilst supporting your own nation-state against "Maastricht"!

<sup>lxxvi</sup> As discussed throughout [www.panagiotiskondylis.com](http://www.panagiotiskondylis.com), a "nation" can be defined as that created c. the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries on the basis of x, y, z criteria, or far more broadly on the basis of a, b, c criteria as a social phenomenon, i.e. social fact in Durkheimian language, which has existed since ancient times, and can be seen as similar to the notion of civilisation. All of this is a matter of defining the concept at hand in relation to concrete historical and or present social phenomena. What is, though, absolutely laughable in terms of scientific understanding, is the solely polemical usage of "conservative" vs. "liberal", when both refer to virtually the same social fact: Western mass democracy.

<sup>lxxvii</sup> "Proletarian Internationalism" vs. "Human Rights".

<sup>lxxviii</sup> Following the break-up of the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia, for instance.

<sup>lxxix</sup> The point is that nations have never been "pure" in the first place, and the "Left" is protesting against "nationalisms" when the latter cannot possibly exist without nations!!! Ditto: "racism", "sexism", etc..

<sup>lxxx</sup> I note that this sentence including a reference to nature and race and a people (folk) was not included in the German text – for obvious reasons! In any event, P.K. is saying that as far as the science of concepts is concerned, there is a difference, i.e. *differentia specifica* between a "people" and a "nation". That of course does not mean that a nation cannot have a relatively high degree of racial relative homogeneity, which of course it can as all the historical evidence shows, but it also means that a nation does not as a nation, *qua* nation, necessarily have to have such a relatively high degree of racial relative homogeneity. Every case must be examined concretely as to its specific circumstances in its specific time and place, historical and or spatio-geographical context.

<sup>lxxxi</sup> This still holds true from the point of view of formal-legal equality, a national or European currency, a national language, etc., notwithstanding all the inroads of multi-culturalism, multi-racialism, mass invasion and or immigration and enhanced-reinforced mass ZIO-Lobotomy or ZIO-MassMedia-brainwashing and Retardism Gone APE, e.g. "everyone is equal", "everyone is the same", etc., whilst we know exactly who wield GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms or elite-level Power (incl. through GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations of Big Money Wealth).

<sup>lxxxii</sup> Oh God! Here we go! P.K. is about to tell us that WE ("Greece") ARE basically DEAD....

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> P.K. is alluding here to the fundamental national-patriotic and absolutely pragmatistic implications of Lenin's anti-imperialistic stance (into which Stalin's "socialism in one country" and "Great Patriotic War" fit, notwithstanding all of Stalin's unbelievable and horrendous, ultra-cruel blunders – he really was a Great Oaf-midget), as opposed to the Zio-Trotsky-Lobotomised side of Lenin's "World Revolution" thought, which trans-spasticated itself into Zio-Neo-Psycho-Con-Dem-Tard form – known in America as "The Blob" (and because I am not American – it's a totally foreign culture to me, I don't understand why, but they have their Reasons, obviously...), which of course could lead the world to Nuclear Conflagration if Real Patriots and People with Brains do not TAKE CONTROL, NOW, YESTERDAY!!! So, stay tuned to when or if I get around to the Lenin section of the "*Theory of War* – Summary Notes"! On the other hand, the Huge Damage already done to Europe and perhaps also to the USA by Totally Fucked-in-the-Head Zio-Lobotomised Globalisation and Globalising Satanic Circus Monkey Zio-Freaks already seems to be irreparable, unfortunately (for those of us who are not Zio-Zombies and Zio-Psychos). [[IF YOU'RE "SENSITIVE", DON'T FORGET TO IGNORE ALL ENDNOTES AND TEXT YOU "ARE NOT EXACTLY FOND OF OR IN AGREEMENT WITH"!!! NEITHER P.K. NOR I WANT TO CONVINCE YOU OF ANYTHING, AND P.K. ABSOLUTELY REJECTS

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ALL OF THE ENDNOTES, AND WHATEVER HE DID NOT WRITE, AND RIGHTLY SO!!!  
FURTHERMORE, THAT YOU SUPPORT YOUR FUNDAMENTAL WORLD VIEW AND YOUR  
GROUP'S FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IS YOUR RIGHT AND PREROGATIVE, EVEN DUTY, SO IF YOU  
ACTUALLY UNDERSTAND *POWER AND DECISION*, YOU'LL HAVE NO PROBLEM WHATSOEVER  
WITH MY RAVINGS...]]

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> My understanding of this sentence is that: if the middle Powers of Europe turn against one another, then no middle Power will be in a position to be a significant Power or player in planetary politics.

<sup>lxxxv</sup> Thanks Mr. P.K. for reminding us! The Third Historical Main Phase of the Greek nation is DEAD, but a so-called "Greek" state still exists containing – apart from the innumerable Invaders, Occupiers, Conquerors, Objects of Turkish and German and Zio-USA foreign policies and various other "NGOs" and associated Organised Criminal Gangs – what purports to be the Fourth such phase, which is so ZIO-USA-GERMANO-SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY-LOBOTOMISED-DE-HELLENISED, I'd rather just go back in time in my mind... IT IS TRULY SICKENING STUFF!!! VOMIT!!! YUK!!!

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> I suppose this is approximately what Germany has done with its handling of the EU, though we must await for Reality to tell us what the "end" result is going to be, until the next "end" result, until...

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> P.K. is basically saying that the whole spectrum of the so-called "Left" incl. the Psycho-Zio-Neo-Cons pretending to be the "conservative Right" (I mean, is there nothing these Satanic Circus Monkey People won't do to obfuscate reality with their Hocus Pocus and Retarded Magic Satan Tricks?) and Dem-Tards, all the way to SJWs and AntiFa, are just lackeys of International Capital or "Multi-national" Corporations and International Usury and the International Markets, and we all know who exactly GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY wields all manner and forms of Power over those social phenomena. On the other hand, don't for one minute think there is a viable alternative. YOU SHOULD NEVER FORGET THAT. Revolutionary Change sounds good or can sound good to immature and or stupid ears and minds, but always leads to making things worse, or much, much, much worse, until if and when things get better again...

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> This is so sickening. Obviously, the work of SATAN. It cannot be explained any other way. (I retain my sense of humour!)

<sup>lxxxix</sup> No, we don't want to do that because GUESS WHO, SURPRISE SURPRISE, IS GROSSLY OVER-REPRESENTED amongst the economic hyper-ideologues?!!! A-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!

<sup>xc</sup> This to me seems somewhat facetious. P.K. is playing with us. If the political is part of the social, then the only social formation where there are no political collectives of any kind with very clear contours are (small) primitive tribes, i.e. a situation where the remaining humans in the year 2100 or 2200, for example, are nomadic bands of "scavengers".... or even worse: the virtual "return to the animal kingdom" where the remaining humans are literally isolated individuals or very small groups "worse than scavengers". Of course, I could be totally wrong on this point, though... he actually gives us the answer in the next sentence! He's referring to the ideology of individuals "with no group reference or characteristics" in the "free market" etc., which like all ideologies is partly, largely or TOTAL BULLSHIT!

<sup>xci</sup> And if you add to that the "invited" or "encouraged" by the Zio-Lobotomised Vulture Homo-Globo Elite the mass invasions, in addition to the "mass legal invasions" which "just happened" to be "pushed through" notwithstanding public opinion... Good Luck with all of THAT, "intelligent, erudite, cosmopolitan, sophisticated, nuanced" "people"... – The reality is however, that P.K. died in 1998 just when the great Zio-Lobotomised Demographic Changes to Europe were gathering steam, including unbelievably RETARDED mass Mohammedan and African immigration, viz. Tony Blair (and his party's Big Money Donors, and Ministers), et al. (is there no such thing as lessons to be learned from History, Moronic Spastics?), so we can't know what P.K. would have written. All that can be said is that if you let a particular Group at elite level wield GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of Power on public policy, you are going to end up with a LOBOTOMISED SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY MESS in relation to which the "impartial Mass Media" in "democratic polities" is going to (try to) convince you that all is well, just because SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY *says so*, and notwithstanding all the mass rapes, assaults, murders, home invasions, dangers to public health, etc., etc., etc.. Well Done RETARDS! A job very well done! Give yourselves a pat on the back, and a beautiful brand new PRIZE – stupid, ridiculous ANIMALS!!! [[DON'T FORGET – FEEL FREE TO REJECT ALL OF THE CONTENT OF THIS ENDNOTE, ALL THE ENDNOTES AND OR P.K.'s TEXTS. NOBODY WANTS TO CONVINCE YOU OF ANYTHING. NOR IS ANY POLITICAL AND OR IDEOLOGICAL

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CHANGE SOUGHT. AN EXPRESSION OF OPINION(S) AND OR DISGUST OR SIMPLY DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION (BY P.K.), IS A PART OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, IS IT NOT?]]

<sup>xcii</sup> 1492 is a convenient date as regards Colonial Exploration and Conquest, though in the history of ideas, Kondylis starts mainly with the 13<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Aquinas).

<sup>xciii</sup> I have to admit, upon proof-reading this article it occurred to me that today's Western-led, i.e. Germano-Franco-led Europe is, *mutatis mutandis*, before a demographic and geopolitical crossroads not unlike when my people last projected Power, in the 11<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> centuries before 1204 and the mass (i.e. for those years) build-up of Turkic forces which culminated in 1453. That means, the West qua Europe – and it can just as easily be because of Rampaging Ape Hordes as Bearers of Full Ape Anomie as compared to a more Organised Invading and Conquering Army – is probably DEAD.

<sup>xciv</sup> The 2016 difference in population between Germany and France is about 15 million.

<sup>xcv</sup> The Greek text reads “internal/inward”. I suppose both are potentially correct.

<sup>xcvi</sup> I am aware of the potential resources of the Mediterranean Sea and elsewhere which have come to light since P.K.'s death, but I do not see how they alter his basic argumentation – apart from perhaps adjusting things by a few or some decades, or by moving the loci and foci of (potential) competition and conflict around somewhat. Ditto re: the renewal of shale oil extraction in our century.

<sup>xcvii</sup> It turns out, or at least it seems, that P.K.'s information in 1995 was TOTALLY WRONG! The projected population of China in 2030 is said to be 1.45 billion, so P.K.'s “500” should have read “250”, though the “mistake” makes no difference whatsoever to his analysis.

<sup>xcviii</sup> I'm not sure that by about 2030 the said pressures re: population, agrarian and other resources, energy and other raw materials, will be (fully) in effect and at play, though they could be by about the middle of the century due to a whole range of other factors, including much higher levels of consumption of the then existing population, and notwithstanding that it is said China's population is set to decline by the year 2100 to 1.1 billion. Of course, the “ambitions” and “claims” referred to, would no doubt include the New Silk Road or One Belt, One Road.

<sup>xcix</sup> In so far as, in the 1990s, the USA was in a position to “pick and choose” who it wanted to bomb, etc., or did “whatever it wanted” with that disgusting fully Zio-lobotomised drunk, Yeltsin, etc..

<sup>c</sup> Let's not forget that this was written well-before the coming to power of Putin.

<sup>ci</sup> In 1820, Europe had about 21% of the world population, 28% in 1913 and 13% in the year 2000 (but this figure is probably inflated because it certainly includes a large slice of non-Europeans (less than or around 10% is probably the real figure), and of course FULL SPECTRUM SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY ZIO-LOBOTOMY and all the DISGUSTING ANIMALS (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste) associated with that LOBOTOMY, control Wikipedia – everyone knows that:  
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_population\\_estimates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_population_estimates)).

<sup>cii</sup> Therefore, from one point of view, there is some logic to the Elite and Governments of Europe facilitating the Great Invasions, esp. from 2015, BUT the Ape-Anomie Effects is the pay-off, and such Effects are by no means Trivial – in fact there is already ample evidence, that long-term, such Effects can be Fatal, and who would in his right mind ever believe or trust the SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY that “everything is going to be alright because we are all humans who belong to the human race” and other such empirically and factually vacuous, ideologically sharpened statements and imbecilic FULLY RETARDED, MORONIC, CRETINOUS, FULLY ZIO-LOBOTOMISED slogans of anti-White and anti-Christian HATE, anyway?

<sup>ciii</sup> P.K.'s vision obviously goes very deep into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and perhaps even beyond.

<sup>civ</sup> Prescient re: what happened in Libya and the great African (incl. invited) Zio-Lobotomised Mass Ape-Anomie Invasions of Europe (i.e. pushed by the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Satanic Circus Monkey Western USA-centred Mass Media and associated SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY BILLIONAIRES of TOTAL FULL-SPECTRUM BRAIN-WASHING AND OUT-OF-CONTROL ZIO-LOBOTOMISED HATE FOR WHITE CHRISTIAN AND WHITE SECULAR PEOPLES); P.K. probably could have mentioned the sub-

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Saharan African population explosion too. Elsewhere, i.e. incl. in other articles, he does that, and also mentions the Middle-Eastern Arab world. In any event, in the year 2018, it seems Hungary, Poland, etc. and perhaps Italy, are putting up or starting to put up some resistance to the Great, inter alia, FULLY FUCKED-IN-THE-HEAD AND GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO-PUSHED EFFACEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES FROM THIS WORLD. If the Satanic Circus Monkey succeeds in this Task of Satan it has Set Its Devil Self, then IT can be rest assured that IT'S TURN WILL COME, FOR THE APE and or HAN MAN and or SOMEONE ELSE, but a MAN and not a woman or any other kind of filthy pussy or anal cavity, **WILL SPARE NO-ONE!**

<sup>cv</sup> Initial title in the *FAZ*: „Der Traum vom Weltstaat“ (= “The dream of a world state”).

<sup>cvi</sup> The German text starts with “The United Nations, whose fifty-year continued existence is to be celebrated this year”, but because the Greek opening paragraph includes about ten lines not in the German text, I had to use the Greek text since the German opening sentence is not grammatically consistent with the rest of the Greek-language opening paragraph.

<sup>cvi</sup> This is the point where the Greek and German texts coincide again.

<sup>cvi</sup> Of course, even if such a world state or e.g. a European state did that, it doesn't mean that all or even most of its people would necessarily see themselves as just world citizens or European citizens. Personally, I could be a citizen of *x* state all of my life, and even live there all of my life, and yet MY SPIRIT, SOUL, HEART, EMOTIONS (and nearly all of my MIND) belong TOTALLY AND ABSOLUTELY AND WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION WHATSOEVER TO MY ANCESTORS, who are DEAD on the other side of the planet. So, things are “not that simple” – to put it mildly.

<sup>cix</sup> Under the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, only the permanent members of the UN Security Council: the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China are meant to have nuclear weapons – though apparently – or it is alleged – India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have them too.

<sup>cx</sup> P.K. is saying that for the USA (or rather Zio-USA) and the (Zio-)UK, it is irrelevant whether Turkey controls historically Hellenic lands or not – all they care about is that they have their (part-)Control over the region, and that from the point of view of Greece and Hellenism, if you're not good enough to militarily etc. defend – let alone unite – your lands, well, then you're FUCKED and that's that, because REALITY is not going to be “nice” to anyone, and definitely does not “owe” anyone anything.

<sup>cx</sup> The Greek version says “1998” which suggests P.K. might have put together the Greek version of this book in the months before he died.

<sup>cxii</sup> Does this mean that P.K. was not disinterested in the fate of the West? Or simply that for the sake of Science, the German Scene was “laughable” – to put it mildly?

<sup>cxiii</sup> This can, inter alia, exist when one Super Power can impose its own Ideological Principles over a large part of the world, e.g. the USA from 1945 to c. 2010/2020 or to ?.

<sup>cxiv</sup> The original *FAZ* title: „Ausschau nach einer planetarischen Politik“ (= “Looking (out) for a planetary politics”).

<sup>cxv</sup> It seems to me that e.g. somebody like that Absolutely Disgusting Animal who represents Satan Book and who Presents his Satanic Self as “nice and friendly” in T-shirt and blue jeans “just like a normal, miscegenating guy or dude”, and who only just wants to “Connect the World” etc., is simply the Manifestation of Satan wanting to Accumulate more forms of Power and Wealth from within the Political – internationally – on the basis of “Free Trade” and Zio-USA Imperialism and the American Dollar, etc., which “just happen” to be GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY distributed – at elite level – to members of his GROSSLY DISGUSTING, VILE, REPUGNANT AND ABSOLUTELY UGLY, VOMIT-INDUCING TRIBE. The “Good News” is that the Chinese and others are onto SATAN's Cancerous-Parasitical Outgrowth, and have Many a Chinese and Other Delight in store for all of these SICK ANIMALS. Of course, if and when Han Man or Ape Man or Another Man do eventually come out ON TOP, things will actually become a lot WORSE – but it is BOUND TO HAPPEN, because no HUMAN with any PRIDE and DIGNITY RE: his own Group would ever put up with bowing to SATAN'S ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTING ARSE-HOLE – NO MATTER WHAT THE COST – EVER!!!







ancient culture, had been ZIO-FUCKED and Negrified/Otherised with the Advent of mass democracy centred in the ZIO-USA-SATANIC Hegemon decades before the end of the Cold War. Of course, talking about “ZIO-” and “SATAN” is very crude – and a bit unfair – but nowhere near as unfair as that particular group at elite-level through PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING and common Mob-like behaviour based inter alia on Centuries of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY leading International BANKING AND FINANCE and TRADE (cf. Sombart) being able to “weave its way” in and on top of Protestants (cf. Weber) and then Catholics to be able to have GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of Power, Influence, etc. in the Anglo-Franco and other parts of the Western World, but especially in the USA. Of course, every individual person has the prerogative to be OK with this, but because I come from a 4,000-year old civilisation and because I love MY PEOPLE and CULTURE and its HISTORY much more than my LIFE, and because I view my Group as SUPERIOR and everyone else as BARBARIAN, even though I respect all High Achievers, i.e. I have a high degree of In-Group-Collective Consciousness, and because I am aware of our End, as P.K. was, the only thing that I can feel is ABSOLUTE DISGUST at those FILTHY, DISGUSTING, VILE and REPREHENSIBLE, ULTRA-UGLY ANIMALS (at elite level), and wish that the remaining Western Men in general, incl. Russian Men, can Stand UP and take back some control, and that Han Man and Hindu Man do the right thing by their Peoples. Black Africans in general, unfortunately but truly, are going to always be Black Africans, and Musulman Mohammedans are going to always be prone to Hyper-Violence, though they can – at times – produce some High (and Low) Culture of note.

<sup>cl</sup> So, P.K. is here telling us and or implying (with reference to his other works) that the main historical periods in European history are:

- 1) the Ancient Greco-Roman (and other Pagan/Heathen) worlds,
- 2) Christianity (Eastern and then also Western), in the West as Feudalism/societas civilis [[and in the East according to Contogeorgis, not Kondylis, a form of continuation of ancient democracy, i.e. real community-based (commons) democracy incl. around the Ekklesia, etc.]],
- 3) and then what stands out as distinctly Western European, the Late Middle Ages/New Times/Renaissance/Bourgeois/Industrial Capitalism-Imperialism (with the USA arriving on the scene),
- 4) and finally – say since c. 1900 or WW1 and esp. WW2 – mass democracy (with (Zio-)USA now dominating), which by the end of the Cold War had effectively totally killed off the West as we entered into the mass-democratic (with different kinds of regimes) Planetary World, otherwise known as “globalisation”, with different versions of mass democracy taking root and taking place across the whole world (many, if not the (vast) majority, based on Cold War era developments).

Don’t forget, all these Periodisations and Classifications (in ideal-typical form), are somewhat fluid and GROSSO MODO, because in reality the different periods have different elements which carry over into – and overlap with – other periods depending on time and place and or are transformed and or die out in all sorts of different ways and in all sorts of different time-frames and in all sorts of different loci – which then become the object of specialist historical and or sociological investigation. What P.K. is giving you is the “GRAND VIEW” or “macro-” view of history in terms of Weberian ideal-typical analysis and his own Conze-Koselleck-influenced and absolutely incomparable history-of-ideas/concepts-in-the-context-of-social-history analyses.

<sup>cli</sup> Don’t forget, in the Kondylian typology, “bourgeois” culture since the Renaissance is (increasingly) “liberal” culture – oligarchic, urban-based/urbanising/massifying-(proto-)capitalistic, imperialistic, patriarchal, white-European (though he never expressly mentions that, for understandable reasons) and generally – not always – racist against non-whites, with individualistic tendencies which do not though break totally from strong collective consciousness, extended families, etc., to end up in the mainstream at “degenerate” individualistic hedonism, etc.. And that is why “liberal democracy” is totally wrong scientifically (cf. “mass democracy”), even though we understand why people use “liberal democracy” in polemics and or because it is too much trouble to explain things otherwise, etc.. Of course, “liberalism” as ideology, i.e. free-market trade for the whole globe, even though “we-know-who” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY benefit from such “free-market global trade” until of course it becomes really apparent that others have benefitted (a lot more than was expected!), and, a state under rule of law (even though we know exactly who “behind the scenes” GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY wields forms of Power), continues to this day – though it is extensively confused or co-exists with “liberalism” as the Western mass-democratic programme (– erroneously also called “cultural or Western Marxism” when Marxism died with the last vestiges of bourgeois Liberalism c. WW2 or at the end of the Cold War at the very latest –) of Femino-Faggotisation, Otherisation, potential White genocide, Negrification, Multi-Culturalism, Multi-Racialism, DieVersity, full-spectrum Zio-Lobotomisation, etc..

<sup>clii</sup> So, what P.K. is describing is that in the broad transition from the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> bourgeois-liberal-oligarchic centuries to the 20<sup>th</sup> century of mass democracy, there is a comparatively great levelling and flattening out both

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of “spiritual” matters, as well as material matters – notwithstanding all the very great differences that still existed. Macro-historically seen, the overall tendency was a loosening and (gradual) collapsing of hierarchies.

<sup>cliii</sup> As we can see today in relation to the the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY Zio-led anti-white hysteria of Zio-USA-centred mass culture, some “forces” are using technology to push other messages. Whether they will have any kind of success, or whether the Zio-USA-centred part of the world will descend into increasing authoritarianism and or Ape-Anomie Chaos, remains to be seen.

<sup>cliv</sup> Is P.K. OK here? Or are we just being very, very, very FUNNY!!!

<sup>clv</sup> To me this quite clearly indicates that in terms of macro-historical causation, the West itself brought itself to this point, inter alia, through (first in part but significantly Protestantisation), massification, atomisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, feminisation, secularisation, commodification, monetisation, faggotisation, Otherisation, negrification, Zio-lobotomisation, etc., etc., etc., and that the fact in recent decades there is undoubted factual GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE involvement of a particular – subjectively seen as a matter of Taste – HIDEOUS GROUP at elite level, has little to do with macro-historical causation qua multiple long-term chains of causation based on innumerable interrelations, interactions and the macro-historical operation of the Heterogony of Ends and the continual waves of unintended consequences ensuing therefrom.

<sup>clvi</sup> This is one of the reasons I keep on saying that for as long as “I shop, I consume garbage, therefore I am” continues, and there is no major breakthrough in what is an accepted part of public discourse, things are looking very, very, very GRIM – to say the least – for the Remainder of Westernish “culture or civilisation”.

<sup>clvii</sup> This means that relations of power are ultimately behind all forms of meaning.

<sup>clviii</sup> Which of course is a perfect opportunity for Satan and Satan’s representatives to do what they “have to do” in order to destroy everything valued by an increasingly smaller “majority”, or rather by now minority, given that at least half of the remaining whites have gone over to the APE, i.e. they are blind to APE-ANOMIE (even when they experience it personally!), and think in line with SATAN.

<sup>clix</sup> This can happen to migrants and their children too, though in my case it was never an identity crisis but a reality of having to “live fake” in the sense of engaging in theatre and role play over and above the role play people ordinarily engage in when they live in their “natural” cultural environment.

<sup>clx</sup> The first volume of *De la démocratie en Amérique* (= *Democracy in America*) was published in 1835, and Tocqueville had spent 9 months in America in 1831 (about 80 years before it became apparent that things in the USA had started to get out of control with *them*), when the “multi-national” mix was – as far as whites were concerned – British Anglophone-based, with some Irish and other Northern Europeans. Let’s not forget that the great Frenchman viewed “democracy” – as was common from ancient times up to about the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century or up to about WW2 at the latest (grosso modo) – as a whole social/sociological phenomenon, and not just as a “system” or form of government.

<sup>clxi</sup> If one is able to study P.K.’s *Decline...* then it becomes very clear how the mobilising, interchanging force of the mass culture from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century contains within it the germ and sperm of racial replacement, since it is not at all concerned as a matter of guiding, fixed principle, with history, continuity and biology-ancestry, in the course of “mixing everything up” in society. Hence, you arrive at present-day circumstances (under the aegis of ZIO-USA geopolitical, military and cultural imperialism or hegemony, if you prefer) where the Satanic Circus Monkey People do their Primitive Secret Society networking amongst the elite incl. re the Mass Media of SATAN, and nearly everyone else has been fairly easily Bamboozled into thinking that the average newly arrived African Black and or Mohammedan is the same as the average native White, whose ancestors have been White for up to thousands of years in a particular region of Europe, whilst the Satanic Circus Monkey Compound/Bunker keeps its Borders Fully SHUT. This will almost certainly “end” in a Disaster for everyone, and if I were Chinese I’d keep on reminding myself not to get too complacent, but I still would not be able to stop LAUGHING!!!

<sup>clxii</sup> That in itself means the end of the European-based West. So, if you want to survive as a white-based ethnicity in Europe, you’re going to have to get a hell of a lot of things done, and I personally don’t see how you’re going to ever make it. Things have already gone way too far, people in general are way too Zombified or Zio-Lobotomised, for enough people to wake up. The elite – which obviously is the most crucial group you need to get on-board – seems to be either fully ZIO-compliant or simply not interested in anything other than

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continuing the current regime of profits year-in, year-out. So, inevitably, the jolts to the “system” are going to have to come from without – but when? And will it be way too late by then, anyway?

clxiii Think about it. If whole peoples can “chuck out” centuries of traditions, beliefs, customs, etc., based on certain social-economic fundamental changes pertaining to mass production and mass consumption (“I shop crap, therefore I am ZIO-LOBOTOMISED RETARD”), why wouldn’t they completely Zio-Lobotomise themselves and “chuck out” their attachment to racial-identity continuity?

clxiv FAZ title: „Symbolische Waffen in der globalisierten Gesellschaft“ (= “Symbolic weapons in (the) globalised society”).

clxv E.g. (nomadic) “savages” without writing or without an advanced written culture – if I’m not mistaken.

clxvi E.g. “wise” Chinamen, “floating” Hindumen or ancient and Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Greeks. This means that the classics of the European New Times centred in the regions of present-day Italy, Germany, France and England/Scotland, added a further dimension of a relatively greater degree of “individualism” compared to the ancient-based cultures mentioned (which tended to be – grosso modo – far more tribal when considering individuality, with the individual probably breaking out more in ancient Greece (cf. Homer) than in ancient China and ancient India), and this European new-times relatively greater degree of “individualism” can at least in part tie in with Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” thesis. Never forget, though, in all societies (no matter how relatively “tribal-collectivist” or “individualist”), there are always individuals and the group/collective/society. See P.K.’s *The Political and Man* for further theorisation and scientific non-normative description and explanation thereof.

clxvii Reference, inter alia, to the end of the squarely Christian (Medieval-Feudal)-centric Era (with very limited Secularisation at best and with a Strict Limitation on the Activities of the Representatives of Satan (HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!)), as well as to Goethe’s *Faust* (?).

clxviii And, of course, what we have today are **FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMIES** FROM PROFESSORS AND TEACHING STAFF TO THE SMARTEST STUDENTS AND PUPILS, LET ALONE THE DUMB ONES AND THE RETARDS.

clxix Of course, bourgeois individualism is individualism compared ideal-typically to *societas civilis*, and by no means has anything to do with mass-democratic atomisation; i.e. the ideal-type of the bourgeois still included patriarchal (extended) family, nation and or broad ethnological-racial collectivity, Church-Religion – notwithstanding the Secularisation and Agnosticism, the operation of the “free market” and the lack of a social welfare state, as well as all the “moral hypocrisy”, the separation of the public and private spheres, etc., etc., etc..

clxx And in recent decades we’ve had not only generalised APE-LIKE-DUMBING DOWN, but the Western mass-democratic INDUSTRIAL-MILITARY COMPLEX ZIO-WAR LOBOTOMY!!! WELL DONE!!! 10 POINTS!!! GIVE YOURSELVES A PRIZE!!! (Of course, *they* are well within their rights of retorting: “But apart from the fact that the masses and the people were always dumb more or less, wars have always taken place, including outside of “the ZIO-USA system” and well before the Advent of ZIO” – and *they* would be absolutely correct in saying that as a General Statement of Truth – whilst of course AVOIDING the specific, concrete questions in respect of the specific, concrete recent decades...).

clxxi Obviously, P.K. is here talking about “socialists and communists” at the very latest until about the end of the Cold War – but more accurately until about the end of the Second World War and before the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, which has its roots planted firmly in the period c. 1900 (say: c. 1870 to c. 1930), and not about “left-wing” supporters of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO-influenced USA “One World, Global Village, Homo-Globo, Fem(in)o-Faggotised” imperialism and its FILTHY, DISGUSTING, EVIL, PERNICIOUS SATANIC ENDLESS AND UNENDING AND INFINITE HATE AGAINST THE HISTORICAL PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND THEIR HISTORICAL TRADITIONS AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES, CONSCIOUSNESSES, MYTHS, ETC..

clxxii I repeat again, that P.K. is talking here about “political sides” which stretch back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century in so far as “classical conservatives” are concerned (see *Konservativismus*), but with the main focus being from c. 1750 to c. 1950 (with the socialists and communists becoming significant and then prominent “players” in the political arena from c. 1850).





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So, from that point of view, we are all kind of locked in. Because even if you have a degree of White and or Christian Consciousness, the Constant POUNDING of everyday existence of SATAN'S CREED and SATAN'S VALUES into the masses means that they fully or mostly accept the FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMISATION, FEMINO-FAGGOTISATION, APE-ANOMIE-OTHERISATION. The masses think its "OK and NORMAL" – in fact they BELIEVE it's "OK and NORMAL", so no matter how much "meta-politics" you do, without MASSIVE JOLTS to the combined "Base-Superstructure" of "THE SYSTEM", things will just continue Down the Path of the APE as ANOMIE, and civilisation to the extent it exists will be for the Han or the Hindu or ??? if they can manage to keep things somewhat UNDER CONTROL. And so and thus and hence and therefore it seems...

<sup>cxv</sup> YES!!! THE HOPE FOR LIBERATION – UNFORTUNATELY NOT FOR MY TRIBE, THOUGH, WHICH IS ALREADY EFFECTIVELY DEAD. BUT HAN MAN AND OR HINDU MAN AND OR APE MAN AND OR ??? MAN, IT'S YOUR TURN NOW TO SHOW US HOW GOOD AND TOUGH AND DURABLE YOU REALLY ARE!!! **DEATH TO SATAN!!!**

<sup>cxvi</sup> Anyone who can remember the 1970s and earlier will recollect, notwithstanding the overall relative stability of (most) Western mass democracies, that a lot of "shit" i.e. conflict still took place fairly regularly incl. between workers, unions and "capitalists/managerial elite/government/big business et al."

<sup>cxvii</sup> Which – as far as a world society with a world culture is concerned – of course will never come (about). I can (almost absolutely) guarantee you that, as can some Professors, who are not Mickey Mouse "Professors", mentioned throughout the site: [www.panagiotiskondylis.com](http://www.panagiotiskondylis.com).

<sup>cxviii</sup> E.g. until c. 1920 or c. 1960 at the latest.

<sup>cxix</sup> I.e. the tendency is there, and very real, of movement towards a more or less homogenous world culture, but...

<sup>cxv</sup> FAZ title: „Damit die Kannibalen draußen bleiben“ (= "So that the cannibals stay (remain) out(side) (outdoors, out there, abroad)"). The Greek title in English reads: "Technique and the swings (changes, transitions) of (in) the humanistic ideal".

<sup>cxvi</sup> P.K. is referring to the 1960s and 1970s cultural revolution in Western mass democracies described in his *Decline...* book, and obviously not to the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

<sup>cxvii</sup> Obviously, P.K. is referring to classical conservatives or "real" conservatives (where there were actual differentiae specificae as to societal content, and not e.g. being one "flavour" of mass democracy), who were in favour of the retention of as much of pre-industrial *societas civilis* and attendant feudal privileges as possible.

<sup>cxviii</sup> What the fuck are these "factors" exactly? Why didn't you Mr. P.K. tell us who are not so smart, so we can know too? Is it because these factors constitute "implied knowledge" and were not fully disclosed and "proven" through the ZIO-LOBOTOMISED mass media and the Satanic Channels of FILTH AND HATE-FILLED PROPAGANDA? Or is it simply that the leadership of the Soviet Union felt it could not keep up with the USA and just decided to "throw in the towel", hence "Comrade" (or rather CIA-operative?) Beetroot Head.

<sup>cxix</sup> Get it through your thick fucking heads – there is no significant continuity of Western bourgeois-liberal (Renaissance and Enlightenment) man anymore: only mass democratic man, which as we can see in practice, is increasingly transitioning from Satanic ZIO-Lobotomised-hedonistic-consumeristic man, to Ape Man, i.e. man in a state of anomie who is increasingly an Other man both racially-ethnologically and culturally, and as a consequence has increasingly less or nothing to do with Western bourgeois man c. 1500 to c. 1900/1950. If you're going to "save something Western" it's going to have to be on a new basis that looks to the future as a time of group survival more so than continuing distinguishing features of Western man from the past. The bond to the past has been torn so much and is now almost fully broken, so Western man will have to survive in the form of Repelling-Ape-Anomie Man, whilst trying to salvage aspects of his cultural-racial/biological inheritance to the extent possible, etc..

<sup>cc</sup> After World War 2, from the Referendum on Union with Greece and the start of the War of National Liberation against (Zio-)British Colonialism and Zio-USA Imperialism-Hegemony, in particular from c. 1950 to c. 1975, but continuing to the present.

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