

5. The world Powers and the world stateⁱ

The idea of the world state is equated by its advocates with the idea of eternal peace, and is commended and praised in this sense. The overcoming of the political fragmentation or dismemberment (cutting(dividing, breaking)-up, breaking into pieces) of humanity – it is said – is supposed to, or will, put an end to the friction(s) coming into being out of such political fragmentation, and will turn general(universal)-human interests into (*or*: will render/make pan-human interests) a world-encompassing and by definition irrefutable, irrevocable and conclusive political organisation. In this respect, one may or could call or characterise the idea of a world state “politically articulated pacifism”, that is, that (*or*: a) pacifism, which to the evil of war does not contradistinguish simply the individual ethical act of conscientious objection to war (*or*: the ethically inspired denial of the use of armed violence), but a positive institutional plan. Whoever, on the other hand, as an anthropological pessimist, as a nationalist, or for whatever other reason, does not share (in) the pacifistic ideal, as a rule tends, in relation to that, to reject the possibility of a world state, to put the world state’s realisation at a level, i.e. to equate the world state, with an – inconceivable or undesired – dying out or eclipsing of politics, or to regard as the prerequisite of this realisation, the – improbable – appearance of a common foe of the whole of humanity. Both these perceptions [[**a**] of the world state bringing eternal peace, and, **b**] of the world state being a priori an impossibility]] dominate, in diverse variants, the political discourse, and mark the fronts, i.e. mark out or draw the boundaries between the opposing factions. Yet none of them (*or*: neither of the two) is compelling. Because the world state is not a logical and historical impossibility, it is not a fantasy, regarding which

only unpolitical dreamers are supposed to be lost in thought and [[only for whom]] it would be worth their while to deal with. At the same time, however, the possibility of the world state's realisation offers no guarantee for the arrival of eternal peace and of universal freedom, as well as no guarantee for the leaving out (discontinuance) or eclipsing of politics, as we know it. Much of that which thought, or the pious wish (desire) as the father of thought, anticipates, is in fact in history either not realised at all, or is realised in such a way that the expectations connected and related to that, fall by the wayside and remain unfulfilled, and the earlier state of affairs appears to be – in a nostalgic retrospective view, i.e. from the perspective of nostalgic recollection – more bearable and sufferable.

The emerging or coming into being of a hegemonial Power

The character of a future world state would depend on, and be determined by, the circumstances of its erection, institution and establishment. Three possibilities are conceivable here: [[1]] free consensus, [[2]] consensus in a state of need (want, distress, hardship), i.e. state of emergency, and [[3]] the hegemony of one nation or of an alliance of nations. All three imply acts of political will or political volition: in the case of consensus, on the part of all of the participants or sides; in the case of hegemony, on the part of the prospective (would-be or budding) hegemon(s). From the perspective of an economic universalism, though, it appears that the world would have to be unified not through political acts of the will, but on the contrary, through their increasing irrelevance, that is, as a result of the gradual absorption of the political (with)in(side) the functionality of the economic (*or*: Of course, economic universalism believes that the world will not be unified with acts of political volition, but, contrariwise, because political volition will become an all the

more negligible quantity, since the political element – step by step – will be absorbed by the economic element and its functional needs)ⁱⁱ. World-economic interweaving and global informatics (information technology) would, in the course of this, make those boundaries and borders obsolete, from whose widening, extension or defence, politics has hitherto lived and maintained or conserved itself. Here it is obviously not primarily a matter of the establishment of a world state, but rather of the creation of an open world society, which could perhaps make use of a political organisation in a world-state form, but would degrade, i.e. demote this political organisation in world-state form to the role of a mere instrument. What bourgeois society in a national framework never achieved, namely, to push itself through, or to impose itself against, the state fully and completely, seems now to be feasible and practicable on a world scale. The syllogistic reasoning summoned for that [[purpose]], postulates a strict determination of the political by the economic, which reminds one of the grossest, crudest and coarsest versions of historical materialism. To those who are versed in the history of ideas, of course, it ought to be known that the provenance of central components, or essential elements, of Marxism is from the thoughts world or universe of ideas of economic liberalism; that is why it is not disconcerting or paradoxical that after the political collapse of Marxism, the economistic interpretation of behaviour and of history survives under liberal signs, i.e. with liberal symbolism. The American Nobel Prize winner Gary Beckerⁱⁱⁱ has for example suggested economic interpretations of social phenomena – from marriage and the family to religion –, which outstrip in vulgarity^{iv} everything which so-called “vulgar Marxism” had thought of in its time.

To the methodical (i.e. methodological) weaknesses of the liberal-economistic perception of the world economy and world state, a further and very real weakness is added. The unification of the world is seen from the standpoint of

production, trade and the flow of information; however, the central question of distribution remains left aside or hushed up, and it is not revealed by anyone how out of the mere fact of unification in the aforementioned fields, a mode of distribution is supposed to come into being with which those concerned, or all sides, would not merely absolutely – in comparison with their own previous state of affairs (of every one of them) –, but also relatively – in comparison with the present-day state of affairs (of others) – be satisfied. If the unification of production and of trade would automatically bring with it a generally acceptable distribution, then that would have become noticeable in the inside or interior (internally (inwardly) in respect) of the national markets. On the other hand, it is obvious that the relative profits and gains within the framework of distribution, which inside of the given constellation, i.e. the world correlation of forces, determines the position of the actor, i.e. the hierarchical position of every side, politically is more (highly) charged and explosive than the absolute profits and gains. This is decisive (*or*: Here lies the decisive point). Because the unification of the world must sharpen, or necessarily make more acute, the question and problem of distribution, as now everyone is struggling over the same goals and the same prizes. Therefore, the political factor finds its way, and penetrates deeply, into the economic factor via the multiform, multifarious (variform) question and problem of distribution. This fact makes the political act of will (volition) for the erecting and establishment of a world state – even inside of an economically united world society – indispensable. At the same time, however, it can be supposed or guessed (*or*: However, this same fact also allows the well-founded guess) that this act of will, or such a political act, can hardly be that of, or will not coincide with, a free consensus of all sides. Because such a free consensus presupposes the generally satisfying and accepted solution to the question/problem of distribution. And this, i.e. such a (re)solution, is in turn only possible if the stronger and more powerful renounce and forego their relative advantages vis-à-vis the weaker.

Thus, an insurmountable paradox comes into being: precisely those Powers would – through the establishment of a world state, suffer losses or lose the most – which today are strongest, and because of that, would have to furnish or constitute the driving and motive force for such a project, if it were supposed to have any prospects at all of realisation. This paradox can take economic, but also political-military forms – depending on which goods are on each and every respective occasion running short/in short supply, and which paths to their attainment and acquiring appear to be most expedient. Yet the paradox exists in any case, and can be summarised thus: the world Powers stand in the way of the world state. From a simple (mere, bare) numerical perspective, one could gain the impression and think that the replacement of a greater number of political collectives by a small number would bring or lead us nearer to a state of unity. However, one can also evaluate this situation differently. Conflicts between few world Powers must indeed remain restricted as to number (i.e. be numerically limited), simultaneously however, these conflicts will increase and expand in extent and scope, since now they potentially stretch across the entire planet, and furthermore, they are hardly able to be decided in the short term. The last (final) steps which should be taken towards world unity, are therefore, by far, more difficult than the previous steps, which have temporarily come to a halt in regard to the oligarchy of the world Powers. Within the framework of this oligarchy, every world Power possesses more than that which would be possessed in a world state resting and based on the principle of just distribution. What could entice the United States for example in relation to that, to exchange its leading role in today's world for joining, i.e. accession to, a world state, in which the representation of citizens would be set, fixed and regulated in accordance with the principle of number? Of "One World", one talks with pleasure from a superior position of power out of which and when one knows that the opening of borders will primarily bring about a growing and widening of one's own possibilities of influence and own field of action. The hour of truth

strikes or comes only when one discovers that this same opening abruptly multiplies the relative advantages of other Powers, whereas one's own advantages in economic and political goods shrinks (shrivels, dwindles, atrophies), (and) if only to be adapted or to adapt itself to the commands of the principle of equality. The United States and the "West" in general have yet to have this experience before them (*or*: have not yet tasted in all seriousness (in earnest) this experience). That is why their principles and ideological declarations have not yet passed the acid test and gone through a baptism of fire. One, at any rate, could confidently put forward the proposition (*or*: At all events, it is not difficult for someone to divine) that the USA would not readily accept and swallow without objection a realisation of "One World" under China's direction, management, aegis and control, and in accordance with China's perceptions, ideas and presentations.

Thus, something stands in the way of the free consent and acquiescence of the world Powers in regard to the world state, which cannot at all be considered to be given. It will be just as difficult to obtain the unforced consent of smaller nations in the event they should fear the actual dominance of the larger nations inside a world state. However, let us now assume that consensus is not free, but will be manufactured or commanded in a state of need, i.e. state of necessity and emergency, for example under circumstances of an ecological or demographic catastrophe of a planetary extent and range, and with a lasting, sustained effect, impact or long-term consequences. States of need (emergency or necessity) and crises, can unleash or give rise to both centripetal, as well as centrifugal, forces. Hence, it is not a foregone conclusion that in this situation the wish for political co-ordination would hold sway over the old maxim for action "whoever can, save yourself (he who saves himself, [[so]] save yourself = every man for himself/run for your lives)". Whatever the case may be, for the achievement of political coordination, a – for all sides – binding definition of

the situation would be necessary, and to the side which would formulate this definition, a power of attorney would have to be granted to take the requisite measures. Were this state of need (emergency/necessity) hard, i.e. severe and harsh, enough to compel the establishment of a world state, then it could only be dealt and coped with, and controlled, by a very hard, i.e. tough and strong, world state. Irrespective of declarations and intentions, the logic of the situation would lead to the formation of a hegemonial power, which would act according to the principle “equality in (de)privation”, or in accordance with national sympathies. In this case, hegemony would come into being through the usurpation of far-reaching and extensive powers of attorney in a state of need and emergency (necessity), which, as such and of its own accord, would have to favour the concentration of uncontrollable political power at the world level and on a world scale. Nonetheless, hegemony is not only conceivable as the misuse and abuse of consensus, but also without consensus: as the result of the planetarily noticeable and perceptible preponderance and predominance of a world Power vis-à-vis the rest of the (world) Powers and/or through the successful waging of war against these same Powers. A hegemony which aims at the erection and establishment of a world state, and therefore at the abolition of the sovereignty of all other political subjects, is in principle something other than a hegemony which is – as a matter of fact – exercised in a world of at least formally sovereign political units (entities, unities). The latter does not necessarily require the waging of war(s) against the subordinated world Powers, whereas that former case of the establishment of a world state etc. can be established and consolidated without the waging of war only if its opponents have become so weak(ened) that they prefer unconditional capitulation to resistance.

Hence, the dream of the world state can under certain circumstances be realised only through bloody conflicts of unprecedented intensity and extent

(expanse). Between the ethical-humanistic premises of the demand for a world state, and, of the real-political, i.e. pertaining to realpolitik, implementation or transubstantiation of this demand, no interrelation or correlation exists. Whoever manufactures or restores such an interrelation or correlation, erroneously derives and deduces from the hoped-for, desired state of world peace, which the world state is supposed to bring about, the peaceful character of the means, through which the world state would have to be erected and established (instituted). And even if the world state could enduringly, i.e. permanently, establish and consolidate world peace, this would not necessarily be a peace in regard to (*or*: it would not at all be certain that the peace would be based on) the free self-determination of all groups and individuals. The ethical-humanistic pleading and advocacy in favour of the world state stands under the signs, i.e. symbolism, of a contradiction (*or*: suffers from a fundamental contradiction). On the one hand, one propagates the world state as the – as from now – overripe, i.e. overdue overcoming of the nation-state and of nationalism, which are declared the source of all evils and of all ills (suffering, trials and tribulations) – as if these evils etc. were unknown in the pre-national world, i.e. before the appearance of nation-states. On the other hand, this same nation-state serves as the prototype for, and of, the world state, whilst this world state is supposed to have at its disposal the monopoly of/on legitimate violence, and moreover, secure the legal equality of all humans through a united and universal legislation. The modern European nation-state has, as the first and the sole state in history^v, programmatically sought and also largely and to a great – at least – extent, realised and imposed the monopoly of/on legal violence and legal equality, the so called “(constitutional state under the) rule of law (state of justice)”. However, there can be no historical guarantee that a world state would be adapted (adjusted) to, and would comply (be brought into line) with, the political-legal model of the European nation-state, unless it came into being and was established through free consensus in accordance with this prototype. Yet

not even the nation-state came into being in this manner. In any case, its coming into being was not, or did not constitute, a (recti)linear process in which the monopolisation of violence and a united legislation followed unconstrainedly, but inescapably followed the condensing (thickening, deepening, heightening) of economic circulation. Because in some, or certain, historical cases, the field of the state, i.e. the area or space of sovereignty, and the concept of the state, existed already before the appearance of the nation^{vi}, and then the nation, as it were, conquered the state from the inside. In other cases, on the contrary, the nation-state emerged only from the conquering of the politically dismembered and divided-up nation by one of the states which was known and familiar to the nation concerned (*or*: the nation-state was formed when one of the states, in and amongst which the corresponding nation was dismembered, conquered the totality of the states of the same nation)^{vii}. Since there were multiple nation-states, many roads or paths could also be taken towards the establishment of a nation-state. However, the world state must be one single (a singular/unique) state, and that is why multiple historical experiments cannot be conducted simultaneously and jointly with the world state. Between the coming into being of nation-states, and that of the world state, no parallelism, at any rate, necessarily exists.

Just as little does an analogy in the structural result and outcome have to occur (*or*: Also, however, no analogy of structure and of texture is necessary). If the assumption, or our conjecture, holds true that a world state is most likely to be founded by the hegemony of a world Power over the rest of the Powers, then the supposition appears in fact to be plausible that its political-legal structure would remind us of the empires of the pre-national past rather than of the modern nation-state. Because no matter how strong – in a demographic, technical-economic and military respect – the hegemonial world Power would be, it would hardly be in a position, or in a situation, to directly control every

individual on/in the globe, that is, to practice the immediacy of the state in respect of the individual in accordance with the kind, i.e. sort, species or type, of the nation-state (*or*: then again it would not absolutely be in the position of directly controlling every individual on the planet, that is, to put into action the direct relationship of state and citizen, as we know it from the nation-state), which would level out all earlier cultural and national differences. The hegemonial world Power would be dependent on, and obliged to set in motion, both the politics of divide et impera (= divide and rule), as well as the services of regional governors (i.e. deputies), which would be recruited, as its (i.e. the hegemonial Power's) local vassals, either amongst the conquered, subjugated world Powers, or between various regional middle Powers. These regional governors and deputies would certainly not possess any sovereign right(s) vis-à-vis the holder or bearer of hegemony – therein would the statehood of the world state be founded (*or*: and according to this, the world state would be a *state* (= κράτος/κράτος = *kratos* = *power, dominion, rule*)). But as delegated custodians of the law (local guards and protectors of order) or satraps, the said regional governors and deputies would have to have at their disposal the means of legal violence as well as – limited and restricted; and on the part of the supreme authority with jurisdiction, revocable – legal competencies and powers. Thus, the inner-state – i.e. internal as regards states – pyramid of the feudal or half-feudal empires, which the modern nation-state in Europe, and also for the most part in Asia, had levelled, would be set and built up again, and re-established, in a new sense, with new functions. The loose and slack relationship or bond between the apex and the base of the pyramid would have as a consequence that outside of the economically and strategically vital centres, which would have to directly come under, and be subordinated to, the control of the imperial world Power, anarchic and anomic states of affairs and circumstances could, or in all likelihood would, hold sway and dominate. The world hegemon would have no pressing interest to abolish (eliminate, get rid of) them, and the world

hegemon's vassals would not have sufficient power to do that (i.e. eliminate anarchic and anomic states of affairs and circumstances).

All wars would become civil wars

A world state, therefore, would hardly achieve the institutional cohesion of the nation-state. Yet precisely on that (institutional cohesion of the nation-state) would its (a world state's) suitability and ability depend, in order to ensure security and peace. Also, the content, handling and implementation of human rights would depend on such cohesion. Because human rights were for the very first time spoken about against the backdrop of the "constitutional state under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat)", and the first "constitutional state under the rule of law" was the modern Western nation-state. However, the nation-state cannot grant that which we casually, generally and abstractly call "*human rights*" to all *humans*, but only to its own citizens. In this respect, talk of human rights is juristically misleading. Because in this expression of "*human rights*" the legal aspect, which is bound and connected to a delimited constitutional state under the rule of law, is mixed with the ethical-humanitarian aspect, which relates to the ideal universality of all humans *as* humans. Human rights in the legal sense could only be granted by a world state, since only in it (from within this world state) would the concept "human" and "citizen" coincide and be equated. Promulgated or institutionalised law(/right) would only in the world state concern all humans in their mere capacity, property and quality *as* humans, without the mediation and intervention of a certain descent or nationality and citizenship. From the fundamental distinction between the legal and the ethical-humanistic aspect of human rights, [[it]] now follows that human rights in the ethical-humanistic sense could already as civil rights – and without the erection, institution and establishment of a world state – be realised by all states being

converted (*or*: as long as all states were changed and transformed) into “constitutional states under the rule of law” in accordance with the Western ideal pattern (*or*: with the (at least ideal) Western model or prototype). On the other hand (*or*: Contrariwise), the announcement or proclamation (promulgation) of a general human right (*or*: of “human rights”) on the part of a world state would by no means necessarily imply that what today in the West makes up the ethical-humanistic content of so-called “human rights” would be automatically adhered to and preserved. Hence, legally the law/right of the world state would definitely be a human right or the source of “human rights”, however, ethically-humanistically it would not necessarily be this, i.e. the source of “human rights”. Because it is not at all certain that the world state will be constituted in accordance with the model or prototype of the national “constitutional state under the rule of law”.

These reflections do not contain any prognosis regarding whether the world state will become reality or not. They put forward the justified and substantiated hypothesis that a world state could be established under/in circumstances under which the frequently connected hopes with it, will not be allowed to come to fulfilment. What for every state until today has applied, would apply for the world state too: it could in certain places and at times be stable and inwardly cohesive, or fragile and incoherent; it could protect or oppress. Above all, however, it would not bring about any stationary end state (*or*: final situation and final state of affairs). And just as little as any other state, would it be in the position to guarantee eternal peace. Such a guarantee could only be deduced from a world state’s (continued) existence only if in the past there were only wars (*or*: wars had only ever occurred) between states. However, there have also often been terrible, nasty civil wars, which even the state monopoly of/on violence could not deter. Therefore, the only thing which the world state could

a human social phenomenon could have been possible without the existence of a society or societies, communities, etc.. Obviously, P.K.'s definition of "nation" here is one which encompasses a collective consciousness arising from a political decision from within the political, which in turn can be state-free or with a state, depending on the particular social-historical-biological conjuncture in question.

^{vii} Relatively recent historical examples of three of perhaps the main types of basic relationship between state and nation in the formation of the nation-state mentioned by P.K. are – most famously – 1) the USA (the state forms a national consciousness out of nearly exclusively white, Christian, northern European Anglo/Scottish (and later Irish, German, Scandinavian et al.)-based peoples); 2) Germany (Bismarck and Prussia invite, coerce and or force other Germanic states and (former) principalities into a united Germany (Reich), with a more than millennia-long pre-existence of Germanic peoples, ethnē or tribes); and 3) France and Greece (the nation-state is formed and or "renewed" via Revolution and War based on a ***clearly pre-existing nation***. In relation to France, there was also a centuries-long pre-existing French state before the Revolution (something similar applies, mutatis mutandis, to England)). In the case of Greece or the Hellenic world, for example, one could say that national consciousness existed from the time of Troy, the Olympic Games, defensive wars against Persia, etc.. Qin in China's history can also be viewed as symbolising ancient Chinese-Han national consciousness. In any event, even if one defines "nation" so narrowly as to exclude the ancient examples of Greece and China, we are still indisputably talking about Greek civilisation and Chinese-Han-based civilisation related to Greek and Han (and some other) peoples, (sub)-races, ethnē. It is no accident that Gellner and Hobsbawm – who obviously have a number of qualities, particularly the latter – as nonetheless Tribal Warriors (and "surprise, surprise" never setting their sights with any critical disposition on the Hebrews (Jews) and or Israel), spearheaded the ideological campaign of LIES and PROPAGANDA against historical European nations because certain ZIO-imperialistic, ZIO-USA interests, incl. globalising-imperialistic "open societies" want more and more and more GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of Wealth and Power at the expense of, inter alia, the historical European peoples. Hence, we are talking about anti-White, pro-White-potential-genocide manifestations of SATAN – and nothing less. They will get what's coming to them – either by the Han, and or by the Ape. AND THEY WILL DESERVE EVERYTHING THEY GET – ***ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTING ANIMALS!!!***