Theory of War by Panagiotis Kondylis – Summary Notes

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(translation of book, “God Willing”, c. 2039-2042 = A Very Highly Unlikely Occurrence, if not an Impossibility)

Under no circumstances whatsoever are these Summary Notes to (Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης =) Panagiotis (Panajotis) Kondylis's Theory of War to be cited as representing Kondylis's position on any matter whatsoever. These Notes are the Translator's and were written to give English readers an idea of the contents of Theorie des Krieges = Θεωρία τοῦ Πολέμου = Theory of War, and for no other purpose!

The page references in these Summary Notes etc. are to the Greek 2nd edition by Kondylis of the book, Θεωρία τοῦ Πολέμου, 1998 (1st Greek edition = 1997), with only some consultation of P.K.’s German text when I deemed it to be absolutely necessary (If and when I do the translation into English I shall use the German text (published in 1988) as my primary source, whilst also consulting the Greek version).

[See, inter alia, Introduction to “The Philosopher and Power” (English translation by C.F.) pp. 28-29 re: social conflict and personal v. group wielding of power = relevant to conflict as a part of society which (at least potentially) gives rise to war, etc....]
These Summary Notes were completed in Two Parts: the first part is indicated by “DONE”, whilst the second part, included in this document, is in bold red:

Prologue DONE = p. 5 HERE

Prologue to the Greek Edition DONE = p. 6 HERE

1) I. War and politics (with two digressions/excursus: II. “Politicians” and “Soldiers”, and, III. “War of annihilation, total war, nuclear war”) DONE = p. 11 HERE

2) IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels (with a digression/excursus: V. “War and the Marxist-Leninist perception of history”) = p. 148 HERE

3) VI. War and revolution: Lenin (with a digression/excursus: VII. “The Soviet military dogma”) = p. 214 HERE

(The Chapters below are NOT in the German edition, but only in the Greek edition:)

4) VIII. Hot war after the Cold War DONE = p. 272 HERE
   a) Classical theory of war and the “new military revolution”
   b) The utopia of purely technological war
   c) The multiformity of war and its political aetiology

5) IX. Addendum to the Greek edition: Geopolitical and strategic parameters of a Greco-Turkish war = p. 316 HERE

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WARNING:

Comments in [[ ... ]] are the translator’s/note-taker’s and have ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with P.K. whatsoever SO readers can simply skip them or reject them BUT NOT associate them with P.K.

Some confusion might arise re: kinds and or forms of war:

The best way to think about it is:

“Barbarism” = pure/unmixed war  (= the most basic ideal type = the united concept of war, which inheres in all wars)

“Culture” = real (forms of) war(s) with two basic kinds/forms = war of annihilation, and, restricted/limited war  (= two ideal types as “sub-ideal types” compared to the most basic ideal type of pure/unmixed war) but then on a case-by-case basis there is an enormous multiformity of war combining elements of up to all three ideal types above...

Clausewitz in the earlier stages of his thought held Napoleonic War to be “absolute war”, but in his maturity separated pure/unmixed war, WHICH INHERES IN ALL WARS, from the two basic kinds (war of annihilation, and, restricted/limited war), and variant forms, of real war...
The basic contents, separated into chapters, of Theory of War are:

1) I. War and politics (with two digressions/excursus: II. “Politicians” and “Soldiers/Military Personnel-Officers”, and, III. “War of annihilation, total war, nuclear war”)

2) IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels (with a digression/excursus: V. “War and the Marxist-Leninist perception of history”)

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NOTE: “Soldier(s)” = military officer, military personnel, servicemen, members of the armed forces, etc.
The war phenomenon exists within its historical multi-dimensionality.

**It has barely been understood how Clausewitz founded his theory of war in anthropology and the philosophy of culture.**

That founding of the theory of war by Clausewitz is a unique achievement, and deserves its place in the important political understandings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, covering the central concepts which illuminate war’s texture in general whilst also being in harmony with strategic and tactical analyses.

The positive aspect of Marx and Engels’s views on war are that they go into social-historical and sociological observation much more than Clausewitz, and they even go into the sociology of the army, whilst examining the theory of history.

**Clausewitz did not only say essential things about the relationship between “soldiers” and “politicians”**

which have been widely misunderstood, **but he gave us through the concept of “friction” the thread to understand over and beyond the usual confusion surrounding “war of annihilation”, “total war” and “nuclear war”**.

Marx and Engels errd re power v. violence.

**Clausewitz greatly influenced Soviet military dogma.**

Mao Tse Tung etc. was left out because he did not offer anything original as theory of war (though he has importance re: tactics and strategy re: guerrilla
The guerrilla wars of the 20th century cannot be deduced from Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, Lenin.

**Theory to have any scientific value must relate to empirical reality, but empirical reality on its own can’t produce deep understanding.**

p.11

**Prologue to the Greek edition**

Many people think that the fall of communism renders Marx and Engels’s thought obsolete – that is not the case.

**Weber said in 1919 that without Marx and Nietzsche later social scientists could never have achieved all that they achieved re: scientific understanding.**

**Marx = key re: forms and mechanisms of ideology.**

**Just like Montesquieu, Tocqueville or Pareto, Marx’s thought = enormously valuable in the never-ending and always incomplete attempt to understand our human and social world. Just as Aristotle’s thought remained valuable post-ancient slavery, so too does Marx’s thought, post-Soviet communism.**

p.12

Many Marxist theoreticians of the 1960s-1980s were theoretically one-sided and spun fashionable ideas of little or no real value, and of course after Soviet communism, all of sudden started to follow other intellectual fashions!!!

They never read Marx as one would read Weber or Simmel, i.e. without focusing attention on personal and collective “liberation” etc.. **They went from Sovietism to Americanism... From “classless society” to “human rights”...**
If a “scholar” cares about personal career and self-projection, he won’t be a social scientist worthy of the name.

p. 13

Marx and Engels got the relationship between the political and the economic wrong, and thus also made their errors re: war.

Re: the Eastern question (Ottoman Empire etc.), Marx and Engels were often right re: the primacy of politics over the economy.

But in terms of theoretical generalisations, they lost the political in the economic and drew all sorts of wrong conclusions.

But Marxist economism was inherited from liberal economism with polemical and ideological motives.

And economism continued and intensified even after the fall of Soviet communism!!! – in the “globalist” version...

Kondylis puts liberal in “” as “liberal” when talking about the “liberal” opponents of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

p.14

The Chicago School of Economics [[about 1 in 3 of the 12 main players were Tribal Warriors, with a much higher ratio amongst the top 4 or so Economists!!! Surprise! Surprise!]] even went so far as to preach a whole range of inanities and absurdities on an economistic basis re: family, friendship, religion, etc.. more vulgar than vulgar Marxism!!! [[This obviously has something to do with, or as preparation for, the broad ideology of “globalisation” which really got going in the 1990s]]

Today = mainly American-inspired capitalistic liberalism which examines war and peace.

In practice, however, there are “forces of rapid/quick intervention”, electronic equipment, and the militarisation of Space, incl. zeal to protect strategic nodes or points all over the planet, whilst theory is spun about increasing world-wide
economic integration which will produce a united “globalist, global village”
world without (a need for) war!!! [[which only a total RETARD or total POWER-HUNGRY MANIAC would ever believe]]

The Communist Manifesto stressed the significance of the formation of a world market, which would then bring about classless society, without military clashes and national differences!!!

Today’s economistic and universalistic liberalism copies the same fundamental Communist Manifesto schema!!! – but without the ethical and humanistic demands of the Communist Manifesto.

Capitalistic liberalism = formal equality of opportunities (not equality of enjoyment) with endless social mobility, turning everything upside down, including the possessors of wealth. [[Hence, the much observed connection e.g. between NeoCons/largely or mostly Tribal Warriors and Trotskyism etc.]]

p. 15

Like original Marxism, capitalistic liberalism thinks wars will be abolished by the absorption of the political element by the economic.

The fact is that the political element very often is imposed on the economic, notwithstanding economistic dogma, and we can learn a lot about today’s world situation and conjuncture by studying Marx and Engels...

Unlike today’s American-based liberal utopia as ideology, at least Marx and Engels had a more solid foundation to their Utopia of requiring before the abolition of war, the abolition of classes and the solution to the problem of the distribution of goods.

But today’s capitalistic liberal ideologues just want unlimited horizontal and vertical social mobility without solving the problem of the distribution of goods.
They think as utopists, that the globalisation of production, communications and trade will bring about the desired peaceful result!!!

They say NOTHING about the problem of distribution, when in fact globalisation is probably making the problem worse.

*But the political element is tightly connected to the question of distribution* SO THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE OF OVERCOMING POLITICS when the distribution question remains unsolved and there are population explosions worldwide as well as ecological degradation.

There are huge dangers for our globalised world of intense anomic phenomena and wars on a grand scale.

p.16

Lenin, also, is not to be discarded in theory, just as Marx should not be.

Clausewitz comprehended the relations between war and politics. Lenin, built on this basic understanding, in the context of the imperialist epoch and the world economic system, with wars eventuating from the cracks in this system.

The future unfortunately is going to prove this idea of Lenin as correct.

Lenin was right that the European colonial empires would be dissolved through a long series of national-liberation wars, and this is what set Asia free to (potentially) challenge the West.

Just look at the world map in 1914 compared to 1945 or to 1995 and one will understand that the changes c. 1989 were not necessarily the most dramatic and fundamental.

Without its communist revolution, China would not be today what it is and what it will be in the 21st century.
It’s not a question of “socialism” and “capitalism”. It’s a fundamental question of the Rise of New world Powers capable of displacing other Powers.

Understanding that means that the triumphalism c. 1989 does not denote something fundamental.

p.17

Just as naive are those who believe in “freedom” against “totalitarianism” as those who once believed in “communism” and “classless society”.

The answers to historical problems are not to be found in constructed theories of “professional academics/thinkers” each one of whom thinks he is the Salt of the Earth!!!

The answers to theoretical problems are found in history.

In this book I provide the reader with systematic and conceptually clear cogitation, and thus, the Soviet military dogma, its formation and logic, is no less didactic in 1997 than in 1977 for the theory of war, nor even less didactic than the two world wars.

There is a more permanent interest from the perspective of history than from the perspective of journalism.

Genuine historical interest can begin to be developed with the exhausting of journalistic interest.
I. War and Politics: Clausewitz

(the edition of Vom Kriege (= On War) referred to is: by W. Hahlweg, Bonn 1980; when reference is made to other works by Clausewitz, I also give its title in abbreviated form – if there are only page numbers within parentheses then reference is being made to Vom Kriege)

[[ ... ]] = my comments, and have nothing to do with P.K.’s text or Clausewitz’s writings, so you can ignore them and place no weight on them... though some of my comments at least will definitely be helpful to some readers...

p. 19

1. Preliminary observation

Clausewitz belongs to no Side or Faction, not to “pacifists”, nor to “war-monger, bellicose sabre-rattlers”, neither to “liberals”, nor to “nationalists”, nor to “militarists”.

Clausewitz thought historically and was a strictly descriptive theoretician of war.

In his magnum opus, Clausewitz ascertains that wars occur and that they take different forms.

He did not advise or expect the abolition of wars, nor did he advise someone to wage war at the first opportunity.

Neither did he consider the hyper-intensification of forces or the as far as possible least effort to be desirable ends in themselves.
Clausewitz was used by the German General Staff after 1871 without people understanding what Clausewitz was really about.

Some German generals even insisted on the strategic primacy of attack/ offence over defence (which was military orthodoxy in France as well) against Clausewitz’s own position. – The French were hoping on discovering the “key” to German victory in 1871 and wanted a revanche.

p.20

After WW1, when Germany was seen as “militaristic Prussia”, Clausewitz fell out of vogue and was even accused of being responsible for the carnage!!! incl. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller.

National-socialist propaganda in Metzsch and Hierl simply reinforced that wrong view of Clausewitz as war monger etc..

The first systematic liberal interpretation of Clausewitz re: the primacy of politics is equated with the command of moderation was put forward by German military officers and political opponents of National Socialism. Beck, Rothfels against Liddell Hart and other Anglo-Saxon writers.

[[Liberal is not what is understood in the USA and elsewhere today!!! Liberal means oligarchic bourgeois society and life stances of 19th century Europe (and at most up to WW1 and the Interwar period) – it has nothing to do with western mass democracy seen in toto, i.e. sociologically-historically, but as ideology and in polemics “liberal” the word is obviously still used, as P.K. uses it as ideology incl. non-liberal/mass-democratic content as occurs immediately below.]]

The liberal interpretation of Clausewitz really took off after WW2, with the victorious forces claiming Germany lost due to its increasing militarisation of politics and its aims. Ritter emphasised that Clausewitz had foreseen the military calamities for Germany... both Leftists of the victorious forces and former nationalists of the Right enforced such a view. The latter blamed Hitler
for not showing moderation, and that is why a Greater Germany could not be formed.

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Apart from victorious Anglo-Saxons and Frenchmen, even the Soviets saw Clausewitz in a positive light, with some reservations, as a “progressive”!!! However, post-WW2 interpretations remained tied to the old ethical-normative way of looking at the problem of war, notwithstanding progress in philological research re: Clausewitz’s texts.

How can “rational” politics limit or eliminate war? is what researchers into Clausewitz asked themselves. How can political government control soldiers/generals and secure peace?

**But what was central for Clausewitz was the anthropological, cultural and historical depth of the relationship between politics and war, not the ethical surface.**

2. “Pure/unmixed” and “real” wars from the perspective of anthropology and the philosophy of culture

[[NOTE: πολιτισμός in Greek means both culture and civilisation, whilst German like English has Kultur = culture (but can also mean civilisation) and Zivilisation = civilisation (Zivilisation, as far as I can tell is not used by P.K. in the German text, or if it is used, it’s not prominent – if and when I translate the book, then we’ll find out!!!)... the point is that Clausewitz’s analysis of war makes a *sociological-historical*...**
distinction between raw/uncultivated/uncivilised peoples and cultured/civilised/educated etc. peoples, to illustrate the anthropological, not ethical, grounding of war, and is not concerned that STRICTLY SPEAKING in terms of social ontology so-called savage/wild/primitive/raw peoples have culture and are cultured too. That is an issue for P.K. in *The Political and Man*, and not here... Of course, in viewing so-called “primitive” peoples as “uncultured/savage” in the sociological-historical sense, Clausewitz is making a social-ontological/anthropological point of the phenomenon of war existing in all societies arising from societal conflict and the drives/urges/impulses “nature” of man etc., which in Kondylis’s social-ontological theoretical schema relates to the Friend-Foe spectrum of the social relation etc....]]

The first major mistake made of current dominant interpretations of Clausewitz is that Clausewitz at the beginning of his major work depicts war beyond reality as a kind of purely theoretical formulation or fictitious construct/ion (Rothfels, Kessel, Weil, Schmitt, Aron).

There is confusion re: violence and “abstract war-blind violence” and real war and rational, moderate political action.

p. 22.

It is seen that in politics if there is moderate action by non-military politicians who are clear-headed and responsible, then violence, war can be avoided, since war has a political character.
We shall prove however, against such a view, that **Clausewitz’s concept of war does not refer to some abstract entity or ens rationis separate and apart from reality, but contains an intensified reality which is comprehended as an abstraction from the rest of reality.**

The moderation of extreme, conceptually pure/unmixed/raw violence is due to factors completely different to political or military authority, but rather is due to anthropological and cultural constants, whose effect is independent re: the will and knowledge of governments and subjects. **And that is why ethical-normative statements have no place.**

Clausewitz formulates practical principles (politics as subjective acts and intentions) re: war of annihilation v. restricted/limited warfare, but not with ethical intent.

When Clausewitz defines war as an “act of violence to force the opponent to carry out our will” (Vom Kriege, p.191ff) he is taking into consideration existential magnitudes such as violence, opponent, will/volition, forcing others,... which are **constants** and found in all societies.

p. 23.

**There is always some kind of psychical operation in people** re: war such as hate, enmity, rawness, the unloading/discharging of enmity, hate etc.. even when there is no “inimical feeling” but “inimical intent” when one does not know the enemy personally (Kondylis cites pp. 192, 410, 213, 991, 952, 659, 468).

**Also, feelings of ambition, passion for dominance, every kind of enthusiasm, violence begetting revenge etc. are all human and animal aspects in all humans** (p. 285ff.).

**There is always the voice of raw, naked nature in war.**
All war-like phenomena can be reduced to the direct and ultimate existential contrasting between two men fighting body to body, man to man (p. 269).

Of course, war between advanced cultures can hide such elemental aspects of war but cannot eliminate such aspects.

Even when political decisions etc. have to be made about when to go to war and battle etc., the “nerve” which “moves the higher will” is the raw man to man combat (p. 449).

Once any battle is pulled apart, all that remains is the bare or naked meaning of the battle, i.e. an amorphous struggle (p. 374).

Clausewitz’s systematic starting point is therefore the existential source and dimension of war, which some of his contemporaries and theoreticians today avoid or downgrade as not being vitally important!!!

WITHOUT ENMITY, war is neither conceivable or possible. Once can subtract weaponry, organisation etc. from war BUT NOT ENMITY.

To be war, the enmity must be prepared for the use of extreme violence in the killing of another.

WITHOUT killing because of enmity, there can be no war.

Private murder due to private, personal enmity is not war.

[[It seems to me that War = violence involving killing others arising from the political not the plain personal/private-social BUT Kondylis does not say it in those terms... so I presume that gang violence is a kind of gang/criminal war of controlling turf/territory... though P.K. DOES NOT go into this... SEE p. 41 of these NOTES for Clausewitz’s definition of war re: large/great interests... + p.45 of these Notes = “Violence that is war must come from the social whole” so criminal gang violence CANNOT = civil war]]
For Clausewitz, the “philosophy” of war = the theoretical comprehension of war irrespective of war’s various forms.

There is no moderation when it comes to war as war (whether war of annihilation or restricted/limited war), **for Clausewitz, war = enmity and extreme violence culminating in the killing of the other by definition.**

*It is not a matter of extent of violence, but its intensity, for the definition of war (i.e. it’s irrelevant if one of the enemy is killed or thousands).*

p. 25

**Without the extreme violence of killing another, there is no war.**

Clausewitz emphasises the need to think of the whole along with the parts (p. 191).

**The whole or the essence/substance exists in every part, i.e. in every historical form.**

Clausewitz is not thinking of a fictitious construct(ion) or of an abstraction as an ens rationis.

So what does Clausewitz mean when he speaks of “abstraction”, “abstract” or “ideational” war? (pp. 196, 216, 199).

He uses such terms along with “simple”, “pure/unmixed”, “initial”, sense of war.

p. 26

His terminology does waver, but it seems he strove to find the differentiae specificae and pure/unmixed elements of the reality of war.

*The definition of war is abstract not because something abstract is being referred to, but because one must understand war as to its specific features of enmity and extreme violence in all forms of war.*
The abstraction shows the existential core of the war phenomenon just as in the case of an ideal-typical understanding of an “intensified reality” to remember Max Weber.

[[I cannot but express how great Clausewitz’s mind must have been to pre-date Weberian sociology by about 100 years!!]]

The ideal type synopsises/summarises the authentic reality of war, it is the reality of various wars in their uniqueness and individuality.

SO the ideal type is not a fictitious construct/ion.

p.27

*Reality as a whole is comprehended only through the ideal-typical abstraction if it can be comprehended at all.*

The enmity and extreme violence of war of course are never on-going, continuous and general/catholic/universal. Of course, peace has never been continuous and general/universal either. But our topic is war.

Why then is there a mix of different levels of human and historical-social reality?

Clausewitz saw that in the first phases of human history, in “uncivilised/raw/uncultured/uncultivated peoples” (P.K. German text p. 16 = rohen Völkern = raw/crude/brute/barbarous peoples), the real waging of war and the concept of war (as the continual and catholic/general exercising of extreme violence until the annihilation of the enemy), were identical.

Hitherto it has not been noticed in the literature on Clausewitz that for Clausewitz the contrast between the war of “uncivilised/raw” peoples and
that of “civilised/cultivated peoples” (P.K. German text pp. 16-17 = “rohen” and “gebildeten” Völker = “raw/crude/brute” and “cultivated/educated/cultured/ learned/refined” peoples) (pp. 192ff., 209, 232, 422) is key to understanding that

p. 28

we are dealing with different human situations to which the ideal type of war refers because such an ideal type encompasses both these kinds of war (of enmity and extreme violence), i.e. whether we have man-to-man confrontation or wars between “uncivilised/raw/crude/brute” peoples or whether we have human situations where the whole of the existential manpower/force cannot be concentrated because of insurmountable objective obstacles in the case of “civilised/cultivated/educated” peoples.

In the circumstances of life of “civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated peoples”, there is, along with the mixing with other elements, a deconcentration of existential factors which are synopsised/summarised in the pure/unmixed concept of war.

And it is precisely this deconcentration which makes in retrospect indispensable the abstract-ideal-typical comprehension of the act of war.

We should not forget that the above-mentioned existential factors continue to constitute the “nerve” of war in the circumstances of culture/civilisation as well, because without such factors, war in general would be inconceivable.

The main feature of culture is that society is differentiated and becomes all the more complicated such that – under the influence of the many varying and constant subjective and objective factors which define and set the cultural whole continually in motion – whatever constitutes war in its conceptual purity is thwarted/intercepted, channeled, broken up into pieces or in part covered
and disguised. The “dividing wall” which obstructs “total unloading/discharging” rests on “the great number of things, forces and situations which war touches in the life of states” so that no kind of “intellect/mind/brain” can keep culture within the confines of pure/unmixed, war-like/military, will/volition as in culture there is so much differentiation as to heterogeneous rational bearers, who cannot or do not want to do the same thing, that finally the “intertia of the mass as a whole” cannot be overcome/transcended (p. 953). That’s how “composed circumstances and forms of war between civilised/cultured/educated/learned peoples” are formed/shaped (Feldzüge von 1799). Of course, war’s simple nature as it is expressed in its definition, is not erased/effaced, nor does it paralyse, however from the time of the arrival/advent of culture it is covered by the “composed and variable texture of war” (p. 214).

What is the difference in the waging of war between the primitive/raw/crude and developed/educated/cultivated phase of culture? (P.K.’s German text says beim rohen und beim gebildeten Zustand der Kultur = raw/crude/brute and cultivated/educated state of culture, p. 18).

For Clausewitz, in the “simple circumstances of the life of savage/wild peoples” (German text by P.K. p. 18 = wilder Völker = wild/savage/fierce/ferocious peoples) state and armed forces are a unity, so that war is a one and only great battle, whereas “our wars” consist of many battles and this “fragmentation of the activity of so many individual/isolated acts is due to the great multiformity of the circumstances, which give rise to war”. Here the political goal is not united because there a number or many wills/volitions, but even if it were, what is sought is attempted in a number of different acts (p. 422).
For Clausewitz, it is crucial that there is for a “civilised/cultivated/educated people” an objective weakness in achieving “total mobilisation” (which was a term rather misused and abused in the 20th century) for the purpose of annihilating the enemy in one and only military act/act of war.

A duel as in the case of existences who hate each other can be repeated in magno between savage/wild peoples (wilden Völken p. 18 German text by P.K.) but not to the extent at which “our” peoples, states and armies function.

The command of a truly total and extreme military effort is for Clausewitz a “dream of logic” (p. 196) since in developed cultures there is no monolithic cohesion which is necessary so that a gigantic endless duel between two peoples-warriors can take place.

[[It seems to me that the extreme test of social cohesion is war, and whilst with highly advanced technology and professional armies a country/nation etc. is not necessarily “put to the extreme test”, the demographic-cultural make up of e.g. China today could, though not necessarily, give it some advantages over today’s Western “multi-cultural”, multi-racial, “diverse” countries...]]

Culture (p. 18 P.K. German text Kultur) when it advances not only multiplies forces, but also fragments them – if it is not based on weakness and if it does not produce weakness.

Any attempted total mobilisation in circumstances of more advanced culture would be for Clausewitz a “pointless spending of forces” (p. 196).

Clausewitz also says that if war is not born all of a sudden (p. 196ff..), but rather the inimical intentions of both sides appear already for some time, p. 30.

that is due to the organised society of peoples, whose members communicate either politically or otherwise with a code of understanding with one another, even if only symbolically, which precludes war as one strike.hit (p. 197ff.).
In such circumstances, the opponents are organised and ready, able to plan and act over the long run, and there is not just enmity and violence as an existential source of war which motivates people, but also other intellectual-spiritual factors, incl. weighing things up and foreseeing things.

This suggests the existence of a dichotomy between culture and man whose analysis will lead us to the focal point of Clausewitz’s anthropology and cultural philosophy (German text by P.K. = Kulturphilosophie = philosophy of culture, p. 19).

In the transition from pure/unmixed to real war (German text by P.K. p. 19 vom reinen zum wirklichen Krieg = from pure to real war), politics as subjective effort for the moderation of violence by the government or other power, politics plays no role.

What is decisive is the contrasting of the two types of society, that is, “uncivilised/raw/crude/brute” and “civilised/cultivated/educated” (p. 19 German text by P.K. “rohen” v. “gebildeten”) society

[[If one forgets today’s ideological understanding of reality, Clausewitz’s terminology points to reality: i.e. rural and proto-industrial based relatively stationary civilised/cultured society, v., nomadic/mobile uncivilised/raw and savage society (something which is making something of a comeback in today’s “globalised” world of endless movement and “open borders” etc.,.. cf. P.K.’s thoughts at the end of these Notes before the Addendum to the Greek edition)]]

[[It should be kept in mind that all human societies whether “savage/primitive/raw/wild” or “cultured/cultivated/educated/advanced/civilised”, share certain attributes such as culture, rationality, understanding, intellect, meaning,... which relate to power/identity,
the political and the friend-foe spectrum, as well as the mechanism of the social relation, which Kondylis outlines in *The Political and Man*, and was obviously not the business of Clausewitz in his theory of war. Of course, strictly speaking, even wild/savage peoples obviously display culture and intellect and are “cultured” with an intellect in that sense, as well as having or sharing at an elemental/fundamental level at least in the political/politics/political communication etc. just like “civilised/cultured” peoples, but NOT IN THE WAY the so-called civilised peoples do with their Institutions and/or Political Factions/Parties and Greater Societal Complexities – at least in terms of quantity if not quality compared to more “primitive tribes”, where differentiation re: culture and the political is not so extensive and deep... SO for the purposes of Clausewitz’s theorisation of war, the *sociological* differentiation between “raw/crude” and “civilised/cultivated/cultured” peoples stands, though it does not take into account the full notion of the *social-ontological* and anthropological commonalities of the
two basic kinds of peoples Clausewitz deals with... Kondylis DOES NOT comment about Clausewitz’s lack of knowledge of the social-ontological dimension, simply because the subject matter of the book is War, and Clausewitz, to put it mildly, displays ABSOLUTELY BRILLIANT ANALYSES of the human condition which I personally never cease to be amazed by and in relation to which I stand in awe... as obviously P.K. did too...

Furthermore, when Clausewitz refers to “human nature” he is referring, inter alia, at least in part to the social-ontological and anthropological, i.e. those factors and forces and constants discernible in all human societies and the humans that constitute such societies such as “the passions”, the intellect, the friend-foe spectrum of the social relation, etc....]]

Clausewitz says there can be politics only where there is a “social union” of men/people.

The term “politics” in that Aristotelian sense means the entirety of the social life of civilised/cultured/educated peoples (P.K. German text p. 19 = Kulturvölkern), and war conducted politically is every war between such peoples.
The contrast between war of annihilation and restricted/limited war is important only inside the state of culture/civilisation where politics plays a part in the sense of subjective intentions and goals.

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN pure/unmixed and real war SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED with the contrast between war of annihilation and restricted/limited war!!!

What then induces the transition from pure/unmixed to real war, since the transition does not take place based on a subjective and philanthropic effort at achieving the moderation of violence?

Clausewitz’s answer is anthropological: man is made in such a way that he cannot remove himself from extreme violence, i.e. the killing of another, whereas at the same time man cannot live continually with extreme violence.

[[Why are e.g. Kubrick, and many other artists, great? Because, apart from artistic-technical brilliance, “he got it” without being a “philosopher”. See e.g. A Clockwork Orange...]]

p. 31.

“Philosophical logic cannot get over/surpass the dichotomy which takes root in man himself” (p. 990)

[[That’s why the ethicists from e.g. Kant to Rawls and Habermas et al., ultimately GET IT WRONG...]]

Clausewitz was not however interested in the opposition between normative Reason and dark impulses/drives/urges as in the case of traditional ethical/moral philosophy BECAUSE Clausewitz saw that man is lead and driven and guided
by feelings/sentiments/emotions anyway, and not by strict logical consistency (pp. 252, 953).

For Clausewitz, there are two groups of feelings in his soul: “the pure/unmixed principle of enmity” and attendant ambition, lust for power, enthusiasm for this and that etc., which bring about competition and rivalry (pp. 286, 239).

On the other hand, there is man’s “incomplete organisation” and his “inconsistency, lack of clarity and lack of daring as regards his spirit/intellect” along with his “imperfect/incomplete ability and judgement” and his “dislike for making huge efforts”, and the “natural phobia and indecisiveness of the human spirit/intellect” etc. (pp. 197, 988, 954, 408, 199, 408, 992, 469).

Two qualities in general obstruct the all-out and active unfolding of enmity and competitive disposition or the “inner need for struggle” (p. 269).

They are: the finite character of the spirit/intellect, and, fear.

From early on, Clausewitz knew that the art of war “is about living ethical/moral forces” (p. 208; also in Feldzüge von 1799), and in his maturity knew that “theory must take the human element into account” (p. 208) and there was always a “political and human side to war” (p. 181).

“The natural fear of common people for large, great undertaking” (Strategie, p. 53).

Clausewitz opposed Bülow’s “clean/pure strategy” with his own “general strategy” which could formulate principles which “are founded on equally
Clausewitz even observed that *feelings of “hate and revenge... were very badly or wrongly connected absolutely to religious fanaticism” when in fact in times of great danger they provide man with courage and energy to act* (Epistle to his fiancé 11.9.1807 and “Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8 and 1809” = *Politische Schriften*, pp. 21, 66, 75 + “Bekenntnisschrift” 1812 = *Schriften* p. 739).

[[Being the great observer of human affairs that Clausewitz was, he knew or sensed that “hate” and “love” etc. belong to all people, and we could add that today’s slogans of “Imagine a world without Hate” etc. = PURE IDEOLOGICAL BULLSHIT so certain groups can wield grossly disproportionate forms of Power which it “just happens” to be the case that they fail to point out etc. etc. etc.]]

Clausewitz was convinced that the majority of the populace “stood in between the extremes of human nature” (Rothfels, *Clausewitz*, Anhang, p. 224 re: 1807 text). Man between fear and courage (*Schriften*, p. 707).

**Fear for Clausewitz “takes root in man himself”, which has an effect both in war and e.g. in a game of cards for “human nature remains the same, even in the most different circumstances”**.
Hence, war as seen from historical experience is “in general terms so little passionately wild”. In such a context, Clausewitz gives a brief history of the waging of war from “raw/crude/uncivilised peoples” to the French Revolution (“Über das Fortschreiten”, pp. 233, 235, 236 ff.). Clausewitz wanted to “give lucidity and coherence to strategy” in that history of waging war (Epistle to Gneisenau 4.3.1817).

War CANNOT therefore be confined to its pure/unmixed meaning because it is waged out of enmity AND with fear.

[[Of course, fear (and e contrario enmity) are what feature in Thucydides re: the general origins/causes of war (see later P.K.’s discussion of the causes of and reasons for war... matters are not so clear-cut...)]]

“Man seeks and creates the danger which he fears” = Clausewitz sees war as inseparable from human nature incl. from fear, human frailty and weakness, and enmity and passions etc. (p. 407, 465).

Clausewitz on this basis also sought to interpret the pauses/breaks in acts of war which he saw as related to “the natural fear and indecision of the human spirit/intellect” in the “imperfection” of the human intellect and judgement and only as the third factor the “superior power of defence” (pp. 408, 469).

The roots of the war phenomenon are in the whole of society and when Clausewitz understood the distinction between pure/unmixed war and real war, he included the notion of pauses/breaks in war within the wider societal context regarding anthropological perceptions (pp. 205/6).

It is not a coincidence that Clausewitz’s observation of the “dichotomy taking root in man himself” appears in the same chapter where for the first time he systematically presents the teaching of war as the continuation of political communication with the mixing of other means... the contradictory
elements in man find unity in the aforesaid teaching as such elements in part neutralise themselves (p. 990).

It is no coincidence that the “imperfections or incompleteness” of man = the “principle of moderation” of violence in the discussion on pure/unmixed v. real war (p. 197).

Clausewitz’s philosophy of culture: in culture (P.K. German text p. 23 = Kultur) (as objectification of divided human nature), there is a sufficient in practice balancing mechanism so that there can be peace, but there is also enough tension so that war cannot be excluded, but rather is being prepared for.

[[THIS IS UNBELIEVABLE STUFF. CLAUSEWITZ = TOTAL LEGEND...]]

This means that war and peace are mixed with each other in man and when there is peace, war is being prepared for, and when “cultured/civilised” peoples go to war, political goals and pauses/breaks in acts of war are always (potentially) present too.

The question is what “interests” hold sway on each and every respective occasion.

Thus, the state of culture/civilisation, the “social union” of man within which war and peace take place, is formed re: the two basic aspects of human nature and serves different human interests (p. 990).

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If there ever was a “social union” of people which had never experienced war, then we could say that it was based solely on feelings of fear and
weakness. It would be a pure/unmixed culture/civilisation as the exact opposite of pure/unmixed war.

But just as war as the representative of violence cannot be pure/unmixed in circumstances of culture (P.K. German text reine Kultur = pure culture p. 23), so too, culture as moderation of pure/unmixed war can bring about such moderation by it itself losing its pure/unmixed character as it gives birth to war from its own womb as culture (Kultur p. 23 German text).

The theoretical distinction between pure/unmixed culture, and, pure/unmixed war (reinen Krieges = P.K. German text p. 23), does not apply to reality in which both co-exist and interweave with each other, just as the dichotomy in man (the capacity for violence but also the inability to just be violent) does not prevent him from presenting himself as a united person or as a united people.

One could presume that the “moderation” of pure/unmixed war and the transition to culture/civilisation (P.K. German text p. 24 = Kultur) is due to progress in ethics and humanitarianism which go with culture/more advanced civilisation.

**Clausewitz would not have approved of such an interpretation of his thought.**

For one, he does not believe that the formation of the “intellect” in “civilised/cultured” peoples is accompanied by the retreat of the “element of rawness”. [[[How fucking brilliant is that...!!!]]]

**Hence the contrasting of barbarism and culture/civilisation, intellect and feelings/emotions, loses any moral/ethical connotation. SO THERE IS NO**
POSSIBILITY OF ANY MORAL/ETHICAL PROGRESS!!

[[THIS MEANS, RETARDS, THAT EVEN IF YOUR SOCIETY HAS MORE RIGHTS, BETTER MATERIAL STANDARDS OF LIVING, ETC. ETC. ETC., PEOPLE WILL STILL USE ETHICS/IDEOLOGY TO DOMINATE OTHERS, WHETHER PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND OR PHYSICALLY, BUT MOSTLY PSYCHOLOGICALLY-IDEOLOGICALLY... YOU CAN’T EVER GET AROUND POWER AND ITS FORMS, NOR THE FACT THAT E.G. A GROUP CAN PRETEND THEY ARE “EQUAL” WITH EVERYONE ELSE, WHEN ITS MEMBERS “JUST HAPPEN” TO GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY FIND THEMSELVES IN POSITIONS OF SOME FORM(S) OF POWER... AND THEN THEY DON’T UNDERSTAND WHY SO MANY PEOPLE ARE DISGUSTED BY THEM OR EVEN HATE THEM... WELL DONE, RETARDS...]]

Clausewitz writes that the primacy of emotions/feelings in barbarian peoples and the primacy of the intellect amongst civilised/cultured peoples “is not due to the same texture of barbarism and culture/civilisation, but to the concomitant circumstances, institutions etc.” because “even the most civilised/cultured peoples can break out into passions of one against the other” (p. 193).

Clausewitz even noticed that Medieval War of “all against all” “stopped finally not because people gradually became less war-like” but due to the establishment of the absolute monarchy (Politische Schriften, p. 54).

[[This is very interesting: so, one can foresee Western mass democracy increasingly breaking down under the strain of “diversity” and “multi-
culturalism” so that a kind of dictatorship/authoritarian regime will be its only choice to maintain social order until it finally breaks down all together...]

*Progress in education has nothing to do with stopping the discovery of gunpowder or firearms in order to annihilate the opponent* and... there are all-powerful passions which influence people in civilised peoples and amongst educated social classes too (pp. 194, 243).

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Culture (Kultur P.K. German text p. 24) does not mean the end of the existential source of war, but brings about the perfection of the art of war, the art of killing another. Precisely in epochs of “higher learning” did peoples stand famous for their art of war!!!.

**All that the refinement of the intellect does is to replace the “war spirit” of the “savage” with the “war genius” of the “civilised” person (p. 232).**

So, culture does not weaken the war inclinations of man, but for concrete, specific reasons does not allow for pure/unmixed war, and hence “intellect” which comes from “education” cannot have an ethical and humanitarian character, but just an instrumental character in rationally finding means to achieve a goal/end, irrespective of the ethics involved.

[[Oh my!!! Poor old (Tribal warrior) Horkheimer with his “objective rationality” HAHAHAHA!!!]]

The intellect however does influence the course of events since “struggle is the counting of spiritual-intellectual and bodily forces through the latter” (p. 269).

**For Clausewitz, “intellect” and “element of rawness” are not opposites, just like war and culture/civilisation are by no means mutually exclusive.**
In fact, “violence is armed with the inventions of the arts/technology and science” (p. 192).

The intellect can moderate violence, but it does so not because of ethics per se residing in the intellect etc., but because it weighs up the means in relation to the ends. [[= ABSOLUTELY BRILLIANT]]

**Pure/unmixed violence as in the case of “going in blind” and showing how brave you are as a “savage” can turn out to be totally counter-productive when situations are multifarious and multi-dimensional**

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**and require the combatant to weigh things up, calculate and make various unexpected moves to avoid defeat etc.**

“The avoidance of an obstacle is a human instinct” (Gustav Adolfs Feldzüge, p. 77) and the intellect is the refinement of such an instinct in circumstances of culture/civilisation as it allows for a surveying of matters and for orientation re: what action to take.

**For Clausewitz, the intellect has nothing to do with abolishing war, but makes action more effective by reining in uncontrolled violence.** “If we therefore see that civilised/cultured/cultivate/educated peoples do not kill captives and do not destroy cities and the countryside [WHAT on earth DID the USA, Russia and
the reason is that the intellect is involved more in the waging of war and has taught them more drastic means for the exercising of violence, than the raw manifestations of the instinct” (p. 226).

[I note that in Clausewitz’s day the term Instinkt was used (p. 25 of P.K.’s German text) when nowadays “instinct” is used for (non-human) animals, and “drive/urge/impulse” for humans]]

There should not be any “blind attack/offence” because intellect now allows for “greater more drastic action” (p. 226), and “blind passion” is subordinated to the political goal of war, with the intellect now operating more so in the context of civilisation/culture but still with an instrumental goal/purpose/end in mind and thus defines how great the sacrifices will be (p. 217).

[[All these distinctions between “savage” peoples and “civilised/cultured” peoples, to the extent that they apply – and they do apply to some extent at a sociological level as I have previously explained, even if the terminology is not fully appropriate, have enormous implications for e.g. mean/average IQ differences and levels of impulse control between races and other groups in our societies, and of course these matters are TABOO in Western mass democracies. But science is not interested in serving TABOOS and those who (grossly disproportionately) WIELD forms of POWER through ideology etc.. Science describes and explains what IS – just as the GREAT CLAUSEWITZ DID and which P.K. shows he did...]]

All that the intellect can do is rein in the “element of rawness” inside of the “social union” of people as a kind of service and not in opposition to the “element of rawness”.

The reining in happens incl. through social and military institutions etc..

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Clausewitz views inventions (for the purpose) of war, arms, organisation, tactics, principles of using troops in battle, etc. as limits and restrictions on the “natural instinct”, though the psychical forces remain necessary and need to
have some margin to operate (“Leitfaden zur Bearbeitung der Taktik”, in Vom Kriege, p. 1108).

**So enmity becomes more impersonal, more intellectual**

[wonder how and under what circumstances certain people can grossly disproportionately acquire positions of power etc!!!], if one will permit the phrase, and the same result arises from the perfection of weapons whereas the savage in man-to-man, body-to-body combat has weapons like the dagger/knife and war hatchet... whilst the weapons used to fight the foe from a distance are more so the “tools of the intellect; they leave the psychical forces and fighting instinct in nearly complete calm” (p. 1109).

War cannot be ever conceived of without “enmity”, “without the instinct of attack/offence and annihilation” (p. 1107), nor in circumstances of culture/civilisation can war be waged without the guidance and planning of the intellect. The intellect has as its motive force the will/volition to defeat outright the foe (without the nerve of will/volition, ideas just float in the soul/psyche, *Feldzüge von 1799*, p. 264).

At the highest military level, where the talented General displays a military genius, there is a “harmonic joining of forces (i.e. intellect and will)” as unity of courage and prudence/thoughtfulness which provides a genuine, well-aimed decisiveness (pp. 232, 236; + *Feldzüge von 1796* (conduct war not just with the mind/intellect, but as a whole man)).

“*Cultured/cultivated/educated/civilised*” peoples fight wars based on

1) hate and enmity, along with

2) “free psychical activity” as an intermediate field, where enmity is mixed with courage, and finally

3) the intellect.

Clausewitz calls this the “idiosyncratic triad”, and attributes
element 1) (hate, enmity) more so to the people,

2) (intermediate enmity mixed with courage etc.) more to the General and his army,

and 3) (the intellect) more to the government (p. 213).

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All 3 elements above exist in all combatants but in different doses. This means that governments e.g. using the intellect alone cannot abolish wars etc. (p. 193).

[[SO, ALL THE STUPID FEMINISTS and other DO-GOODERS, who think women represent “peace” are in their usual STUPID IDEOLOGICAL FANTASY WORLD, away from reality...]]

The said triad cannot hierarchise the 3 elements or magnitudes, and is not a new definition of war, but counts the variables which act in all wars between “civilised” peoples. [Remember for Clausewitz’s sociological typology “savages” don’t use their intellect, at least not through institutions like “civilised/cultured/cultivated” peoples do], and Clausewitz’s point in referring to these variables is not to show the essence of war, but to indicate the many forms of war (see Hepp who critiqued Aron, causing Aron to modify his initial position/theses. Aron’s mistake was to renew the misleading view of Ritter that Clausewitz’s thought was “idealistic” and “wholly soaked in the victorious belief in the power of Reason”).

With the formulation of the said triad, Clausewitz then refers to war as the “true chameleon”, and views the three elements of his formula like 3 poles of attraction (p. 213). All three elements operate in wars between civilised peoples and their internal relations are not a matter for norms, but for specific, concrete weighing up, which can vary a great deal from case to case.
3. War and politics or violence and power

From “instinct” v. “intellect” in relation to violence v. power.

Violence and power intersect in the same sense of war and politics in the context of the “social union” of peoples

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which is two-sided like human nature, since it is the objectification of human nature.

The “moderation” undertaken in the transition from pure/unmixed war to real wars has nothing to do with “humane or responsible” politics, but is due to a “politics” which = “social union” of people = political totality or political community.

“Politics” does not mean purposeful-expedient action, but means public-political communication of people within their “social union”, to a great extent in the Aristotelian sense, which was common in the beginning of the 19th century when the liberal and democratic concept of politics as “I do politics” had not yet been imposed.

Clausewitz is clear about the purely objective reasons for the “moderation” of pure/unmixed war, where the social situation both within and between states of civilised/cultivated/cultured/learned/educated peoples is very different to wild, savage peoples (p. 192).

However, the reduction in savagery etc. does not mean “civilised” peoples don’t engage in wars of annihilation. Nor do subjective intentions affect “friction”, to be discussed later.
We could say that the “moderation” of pure/unmixed war constitutes that friction which pure/unmixed war undergoes in the complicated “social union” of people.

Seen in this way, “politics” in the objective sense of public-political communication within political community, always has a moderating effect.

Interpreters such as Ritter are wrong in seeing “politics” as the beneficial and expedient activity of a non-military authority, and do not understand Clausewitz’s text at all. In their ethical/moralistic zeal

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they commit a logical leap and view the objective effect of the “social union” of people as the conscious achievement of a subject thinking normatively.

For us far more interesting than subjective political goals, is the intersection of anthropological observation, the philosophy of culture and the theory of war.

Just as we earlier explained Clausewitz’s perception of the unity of contrary tendencies within man and within culture, we can now outline the same unity in the relations between politics and war.

Generally, politics relates to war like man to violence. The former cannot renounce and go without the latter, nor can the former live continuously with the latter.

The “social union” of people cannot be in a state of perpetual, catholic/general violence, but its structure and functioning necessarily give birth to violence from time to time.

The necessity of peace between two wars is not due to ethical/moral, but to anthropological and cultural factors. That’s why there are pauses/breaks
during and within hostilities/battles/fighting and there is also the politicisation of war as the subjection of war to the general law-like necessities which dominate in the social union of people as the objectification of human nature.

Every conducting/waging of war in the complicated situation of civilisation/culture is of necessity politics in so far as it deviates from pure/unmixed war, by reining in blind violence and aggressive rabidity in order to take into consideration the multiformity of subjective and objective factors and act accordingly, i.e. by determining with cold logic the means which its ends demand.

The main issue is not if this is done “correctly” or with ethical/moral intent, but it is obligated to do it. To the extent that the political waging of war deviates from pure/unmixed war, the “inimical feeling” is covered by the “inimical intent”. even though the former (“inimical feeling”) continues to operate in the latter (pp. 193, 286).

The blind violence of pure war had as its only aim the subjugation of the enemy, which is a very abstract aim in a specific and complicated situation.

Calculating possibilities, i.e. the political waging of war means flexibility of behaviour and of the aim in accordance with the circumstances “taking into account the peculiarity of the states acting” (p. 201).

War of its nature is enmity and attempt to subjugate,

political waging of war = rational suspension, channeling and exploitation of essential elements of war within/into the framework of the calculation of
possibilities, and on the basis of knowledge of the complicated character of a peculiar network of relations on each and every respective occasion.

The political waging of war is war conducted in circumstances of culture.

War comes from “political communication”, making the general texture of war have an even deeper interweaving with politics.

Clausewitz writes that war “and indeed war between civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated peoples” comes “always [from] a political situation” and is induced “only by a political motive”, “only by the political communication of governments and peoples”; politics “gives rise or birth” to war (pp. 209, 990, 993).

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The “political goal” is not for Clausewitz the conscious choice of a subjective will/volition, but just the formal magnitude, which means that political communication must be expressed with subjective political goals and decisions in order to bring about war, but the content of the choice is still open at the said formal level. In the circumstances of culture/civilisation, there cannot be a decision to wage pure/unmixed war, but there can be a decision re: any kind of real war, from war of annihilation to simple armed ?observation? of the foe [[?not sure of the exact wording here?] (p. 201).

Politics is no normative intellect, but an intellect which operates when it can’t achieve its goals/ends without waging war. War is the continuation, the spawn/offspring of politics, and not something strange to politics, or an abrupt and inexplicable break from politics.

For Clausewitz war cannot ever be an entirely different situation compared to politics, for politics gives rise to
war, and war is not subject to laws different to politics (p. 990).

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Clausewitz focuses on the essential interrelation between political communication (as objectification of all facets of human nature) and war with its causes, in the light of the texture of political communication.

**Clausewitz avoids every comparison between “good” politics and “bad” war, nor does he demand the former put a stop to the latter.**

War could not constitute the continuation of political communication if such political communication were not made to beget, necessarily, or at least be capable of begetting, war.

The essence of political communication continues to exist in war (p. 991), so the essence of political communication is not pure/unmixed peace, which cannot beget or give rise to war.

**War is a part of politics, politics is not separate to war** (p. 991).

**War is a particular field in the broader field of politics, and war is thus a variation of the essential texture of politics, a certain form of political communication.**

The peculiarity of war is in the “peculiarity of its means” (p. 210).

For Clausewitz, war “is a clash of large/great interests which is solved bloodily, and only as to this [[shedding of blood]] does war differ from other clashes/conflicts” (p. 303).
Both politics and war can be jointly classified under the concept “clash or conflict” and politics is “the womb, from which war develops” (p. 303).

Shering is wrong to think that politics and war have only goals/ends in common whilst differing as to means, because both politics and war have in common a contradictory and multi-dimensional structure of conflict/clashes, regardless of the form of the conflict – Clausewitz compares conflict in legal give and take to war (p. 614).

**It is wrong however to consider that all aspects of politics are war and that all aspects of war are politics.** One must examine every specific, concrete situation to ascertain what aspect/s are paramount or ascendant at any given moment.

Clausewitz pragmatically saw the European balance/equilibrium of Great or Major Powers as an expedient correlation of forces, and did not connect such balance/equilibrium with the definition of war from the point of view of international law and reining in war.

[[ATTENTION: this means that there can be no such thing as the ludicrous “liberal world order” or “rules-based world order” etc., and any other such absurdities, because all correlations of forces in international politics are macro-historically temporary and are always related to distributions of forms of power (as are all human interactions for that matter, though within a state one can have more of a rules-based order over the long run, though never forever and ever and ever, because eventually a new social formation (perhaps even more relatively chaotic, though not necessarily) will eventuate, one way or another etc...)]]

Clausewitz refers to the appeasing influence of international law rather disparagingly, in that for him the mores of international law do not weaken
in essence the strength of force and violence [[in international relations]] (p. 192).

The differentia specifica of war for Clausewitz is in the exercising of violence, i.e. with the use of violent means.

It’s not enough to say there is different intensity of conflict, it’s violence that’s the key.

Clausewitz regarded that the “primary duty of theory” is the “separation of heterogeneous things” (p. 272)

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without meaning that the ascertainment of heterogeneity excludes the existence of similarities and closeness etc..

For Clausewitz, there is no need whatsoever to look at international law to define war and peace because they are concepts which do not accept gradations, i.e. they are distinct (p. 988).

In peace, regardless of whether preparations are being made for war, hic et nunc no violence is being exercised.

Peace is NOT free from conflict and clashes but it does not contain the violence that characterises war as (armed) violence.

[[Needless to say, it is implied that we are not talking about personal violence or criminal violence, though “gang violence” could be seen as a kind of “gang/criminal war/violence” (p.45 of these Notes = “Violence that is war must come from the social...]]
whole” so criminal gang violence CANNOT = civil war), but here the discussion is about countries as states and earlier about primitive tribes or “savages” in the case of “pure war”]

Clausewitz, in thinking that war = the exercising of violence, held that war is started first of all by the side defending itself, since the attacking/offensive side would prefer to conquer something without fighting/going to war (p. 644) – something Carrias saw as sophistry, and Lenin as a witticism.

Clausewitz’s just mentioned position also implies that peace is definitely not without conflict – there are always forms of conflict in peacetime.

For Clausewitz, the [military] undertaking/venture for the purpose of occupation is planned outside of war, being in part executed before war,
and the manufacture of weapons is peacetime activity, since the use of weapons happens in wartime (p. 269).

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War can only be a temporary, historically seen, continuation of politics because war cannot be a permanent state of affairs. Politics cannot be the continuation of war.

Endless and generalised violence cannot be a modus vivendi of a society.

For Clausewitz, one can classify both political communication and war under conflict/clashes.
Politics cannot be the continuation of war because war is not permanent and war is exercising violence, whereas politics isn’t.

[[This raises the issue of whether all forms of internal/domestic political violence come under the category of “civil war” – it would seem so... SEE BELOW!!!]]

If the formal distinction Clausewitz makes of

war = exercising violence, and

peace = not exercising violence

is not accepted, then indirectly the difference between peace and war must be the absence of conflict, which is absurd as peace incl. conflict.

Raymond Aron [[as great as he was overall]] makes this mistake of not accepting that both peace and war come under conflict. Aron also errs re: Soviet war dogma and Sokolowski.

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The question remains: what is that which is not violence and indeed often bridles violence, but which can beget violence?

Conflict is a situation in which violence is possible, but not necessary.

The common cause of conflict in general and war is striving for power.

“Power” permeates political communication, and politics can therefore give rise to violence as war.

Only politics can beget war.
Every other [[kind of]] violence which is not sparked off by politics, but by the narrower personal communication between individuals = a personal duel, which barely shakes the organised social whole.

Violence that is war must come from the social whole.

The absolute form of war “floats endlessly in the background” for all wars (p. 992).

whether it comes to the forefront or not.

Now, behind politics the image of violence floats, as well as that of war, since violence [[from the social whole and re: great interests]] = war, just as behind every restricted violence there hangs or floats the image of extreme violence.

There is for Clausewitz, a succession of calm and intensity in war itself until the decisive confrontation (p. 414).

Ethical-normative thought has always confused power and violence by equating striving for power with violence, by trying to convince itself and others that by renouncing violence it does not strive for power!!!!
But precisely because politics is striving for power, it must often bridle or rein in violence and war to achieve its goals.

*The end of barbarism and the start of culture/civilisation (see above) = the end of “pure/unmixed war” and blind aggressivity. Rather than inimical feeling, we have inimical intent, and the intellect controls the instincts, and channels the latter according to its goals.*

*The bridling/curbing/restraining of violence does not in the least constitute an achievement of peace-loving and philanthropic prudence.*

The intellect, by rationally pursuing its goals, understands that in a complex society, the direct and unreflected striving for what is desired can, or as a rule, break(s) up or undermine(s) one’s own power.

*So striving after power which is cautious, and blind violence which thirsts for immediate satisfaction,*
become two different things for the intellect that understands...

[[THIS is exactly the starting point as to how a tiny, potentially much less powerful group, can exert GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE power over a much larger, potentially much more powerful group – i.e. by getting the larger group to agree to live in the way it does, or at least not see, as a whole, any need to resist, or change things... SEE NEXT PAGE!!!]]

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Striving after power sets limits on violence, knows when to expediently use violence, and can also introduce pauses/breaks during an act of war.

There is thus no contradiction between the origin of war from politics and the “moderation” of war by politics.

The distance between power and violence, between politics and physical superiority, grows with the increasing complexity of culture, and what was inconceivable amongst “uncivilised/uncultured savages” i.e. war between physically unequal groups becomes a reality in culture/civilisation when there can be armed conflict between two states of unequal power (p. 216).
The combinatory nature of power with its innumerable variations and ways out presents many more shades than the crude mechanics of violence, and next to the struggle between foes, it gives rise to the game between friends, which makes the weak able to make claims against the stronger.

[[This is another absolutely brilliant passage by P.K. – no wonder nowadays e.g. elite women, elite homosexuals and elite “chosen people” from within their primitive secret society or “mafia” etc. can achieve, have and wield GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of power in conditions of massification and atomisation and “advanced” civilisation... whilst also leading us ALL as peoples of the West straight (within another 50 or 100 or 200 or... years?) to self-annihilation incl. through their collective madness, short-sightedness, stupid Greed re: international affairs, etc....]]

To understand the relations between politics and war, one must clearly distinguish between striving for power and violence, whose textures are different even if they have common goals.

Power is the genuine more comprehensive, more visionary and more demanding product of the state of civilisation/culture compared to the state of barbarism, in
which power and violence basically coincided, and so politics excels, surpasses and outweighs war, in fact war must be conducted taking into account all of “political communication”.

Raymond Aron [[as great as he was]] makes the mistake of thinking that Clausewitz, in subjugating war to politics, wants to subordinate politics to peace and to the renunciation and abandonment of power, and that the strengthening of military power in itself is not a goal of politics.

The latter notion is, of course, correct, however one CANNOT derive the inherent peaceableness of politics from the statement “the strengthening of military power in itself is not a goal of politics” without incorrectly equating the goals of the army as organised violence with the goals of power of politics by confusing power with violence. [[In other words, war, which (eventually) emanates from politics, is characterised by violence, and there is nothing politics can do about that]].

Such confusion is unknown to Clausewitz.

Clausewitz knew that the goals of political power are realised in ways soldiers/generals/military personnel, specialists in violence, do not have in mind,

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who as specialists, are tied to a one-sided and inflexible way of looking at things.

If there was a general will to be removed or detached from power, then politics would be a very simple matter.

Peace is presented or presents as acceptable only when it accompanies at least the securing of one’s
own power, which in complex “political communication” is not achieved only through military force.

Clausewitz of course was not concerned with finding the road from violence to moderate philanthropic politics, but was concerned with comprehending and assessing the function of violence politically, based on higher views/aspirations of power.

Clausewitz of course directly dealt with political communication and the Napoleonic Wars, but such wars were in the context of “civilised/cultured/cultivated” peoples, not in that of “pure/unmixed” war between “barbarous peoples”.

Clausewitz saw that Napoleon’s mode of waging war was not blameworthy itself, but the result of the seemingly new “political communication” born of the French Revolution (p. 997).

[One is tempted to say that the Spykman/Brzezinski and “(Zio-)NeoCon” and “Left/Human Rights” forms of political communication, to the extent they overlap (and of course they don’t fully overlap), arise from the process of defeating the Soviet Union/the Russian Empire and then proceeding to “globalisation”, which we all know in the sense of American/Grossly Disproportionate (in part at least) “Chosen People”/ZIO Hegemony and Influence is BOUND TO FAIL, probably miserably sooner (within a few decades and with the destruction of all of the West?), or later e.g. in the 22nd century... though, of course, one can never know for sure... By the way, because ZBiggie the Polak had a brain, in his final article in The American Interest, he shows clearly that he was more than capable of thinking along realistic/scientific/non-ideological lines... https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignment/]]

The political character of war is crystal-clear for Clausewitz since “the political situation distances itself from the pure/unmixed opposition
between foes, and war itself has more periods of relative peace than usual” (*Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig*).

In wars between “civilised/cultured/cultivated peoples”, there are factors other than blind violence, so that’s why there can be restricted/limited wars which are not “pure/unmixed” war, *and not because of any kind of “humanism”*.  

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However, as violence increases, an optical illusion eventuates, and war of annihilation is confused with pure/unmixed war, and it even took Clausewitz a lot of time to rid himself of such an optical illusion (see sub-chapter 4 below).

Clausewitz gets things right in terms of our interpretation when he states that restricted/limited war “appears to be” more political than other forms of war (p. 211), and elsewhere he says that the two forms of war, restricted/limited war and war of annihilation, are both political (p. 211).

For Clausewitz, some wars = equating of politics and enmity and violence and annihilation (Epistle to v. Roeder 22.12.1827), whereas later he rejects outright the equating of “political” war with restricted/limited war, because in certain conjunctures political “calculation” must include the option of wars of annihilation, incl. in regard to his stance in 1812 (p. 212 and “Bekenntnisschrift”).

The above does not mean Clausewitz was in favour of wars of annihilation, but that he was not a moronic ethicist/moralist re: the so-called humanitarian obligations of politics.

Clausewitz NOT WITHOUT IRONY left it too “philosophers” to decide whether war in general or
new forms of war “benefit or not mankind generally” (p. 800), and would have said the same about politics too!!!

Clausewitz was convinced that politics is the struggle for power

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and it is a total waste of time to contemplate something invariable and anthropologically a GIVEN!!!


Clausewitz explicitly states he cannot blame any nation for wanting to free itself or to conquer other nations, incl. France kicking the boot into us (i.e. the Prussians/Germans)!!! (“Aufzeichnungen aus dem Jahre 1803” = Pol. Schriften, p. 2 + Geist und Tat, p. 11).

Clausewitz clearly saw the fundamental distinction between politics and ethics (Aufzeichnungen aus dem Jahre 1803” = Pol. Schriften, p. 3).

CUT the BULLSHIT, i.e. “in politics ... pure heart and knightly virtue are permitted to only someone who has conquered such a right through ACTION” (Gustav Adolphs Felzüge).
Of course, Clausewitz NEVER supported the violent choice when violence was avoidable,

and being suspicious or sceptical of the practical possibilities of international law.

he also NEVER declared any belief or faith in political subjects and dialogue/consensus.

Clausewitz prophetically foresaw the Liberation of Germany from Napoleonic Rule, and the Unification of Germany via the SWORD, when one of Germany’s states subjugates the other states (“Umtriebe” (1819-1823?) and also in “Bekenntnisschrift”).

Just before he died Clausewitz wrote against “philosophers” who thought they could rid the world of conflict/opposition etc....

“such a thing would be very anti-philosophical, because all of the natural and intellectual/spiritual world is kept in balance/equilibrium by its conflicts/oppositions”.

Even if “liberalism” defeated “despotism” and annihilated the latter, there would never be any “idyllic peace” established, nor would the rivalry between interests and passions fall silent. We cannot

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find contrasts/conflicts of peoples in axioms and principles, but only in the entirety of their material and spiritual/intellectual relations – and here we must ask history (“Die Verhältnisse Europas seit der Teilung Polens” = Pol. Schriften, p. 226).
In one passage (p. 993), Clausewitz writes that politics “unites and balances inside itself” everything which serves “humanity”.

Ritter and Paret interpreted that phrase as meaning that politics is not just power struggle.

Kondylis holds that an analysis of the context of the said phrase means that the Ritter and Paret interpretation was at least rushed.

To begin with, Clausewitz was referring to internal/domestic administration/governance and not to international relations. Politics in terms of internal administration/governance of a state happens against other foreign states. If a state does not stand on its own feet it cannot possibly guarantee the rights and well-being or prosperity of its own citizens.

“Humanity” does not dictate the state’s behaviour, but humanity itself is protected by the state via rights and freedoms.

Clausewitz however does not concern himself with what those rights and freedoms should be, and does not refer to ethics/morality and natural law.

Clausewitz writes: “there is no ethical/moral authority or dominance outside of the concept of the state and of law” (p. 192), and by that he means that peace and ethics/morality and “humanity” are established and protected ONLY by the state and its power, and the bindedness of the
state’s laws. So, you can’t have “humanity as humanitarianism” without the self-preservation of the state.

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For Clausewitz internal politics must be seen from the point of view of the necessities of external politics.

But re: external politics, which for Clausewitz is the pre-eminent grand politics, a “barbarous state of affairs or situation” holds sway, natural law and the law of power, as was known in Europe since at least the time of Bodin and Hobbes. [[All this reminds us of H. Morgenthau, H. Bull, K. Waltz, et al.,...]]

Weil makes the mistake of thinking that Clausewitz connected the mode of waging war with the polity and that internal politics has primacy.

The primacy of external politics/foreign policy rests on the fact that irrespective of the polity and internal politics, the co-existence and rivalry between states has its own logic and the struggle between states is ongoing, perpetual.

So internal politics/policy ought to be formed on the basis of the needs of external politics/foreign policy, so that the state can maximise its powers, AND NOT based on ethical/moral principles (no matter how respectable in themselves), or on the basis of the interests of one group against state power.

[[WHAT THE FUCK DOES THAT MEAN??? OH MY GOD!!! HAHAHAHA!!!!]]
Early on, Clausewitz recognised that “there is no more important political goal/end than the independence of the state and the nation” (“Ueber die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens gegen Frankreich”, Nov. 1807 – March 1808).

And as Clausewitz’s thought matured he saw that political community or the polity as a whole is based on the idea of defence against an external foe/enemy (Epistle to Gneisenau 9.9.1824).

Of course, the Marxist literature e.g. Engelberg, classified Clausewitz politically between monarchical reaction and liberal progressivism.

Clausewitz expressly wrote that the Prussian state should not “support its army and war with a few tonnes of gold in the treasury, but with the whole of the power/strength of the nation” (Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe” (1824/5), Polit. Schriften, p. 217).

[[WHAT THE FUCK DOES THAT MEAN?? OH MY GOD!!! HAHAAHAHA!!!!]]

Clausewitz personally was worried about internal political reform, and whilst he did not share in the class prejudices of the aristocracy, stood back from criticising the aristocracy as they were crucial for the Prussian Army (Rothfels). [[= political pragmatism on the part of the great Prussian general!!!]]

Nor was Clausewitz impressed by the “demagogues” (“Umtriebe”, Polit. Schriften, esp. p. 166ff.).

Clausewitz saw that the problem with anarchy was the paralysis of the state to act and the decomposition of its united will. “A large country with European
"culture can be conquered only with the help of internal division", Der russische Feldzug).

[[WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR YOUR “BEAUTIFUL” “DIVERSITY” and “MULTI-CULTURALISM”? OH MY GOD!!! YOU ARE GOING DOWN!!! IT’S JUST A MATTER OF TIME (50 years, 150 years,... whenever, whatever...)... (I and my tribe are already down and out, so obviously I am not claiming any victory, nor am I gloating – human existence is TRAGIC, ultimately for everyone... CRETIN!!! And by the way, monoculturalism and or relative homogeneity has never ever been a guarantee for the avoidance of the most brutal of Civil Wars... the point is, NO SOCIAL FORMATION PER SE is immune from the tragedy of human existence... it is simply a matter of TIME... depending on circumstances, correlations of forces, etc., etc., etc.,...)]]

For Clausewitz, the united will/volition of the state must overlook weaknesses and “private interests” of those governing (p. 993).

Clausewitz views the question of peoples’ war [[this must be a reference to both the American and French Revolutions???, but also to Spain!!!]] not as something to be rejected just because it is a “revolutionary means” but p. 57

he views the matter pragmatically, i.e. whether the peoples’ war is expedient as a “competitive means for struggle”. Clausewitz sees the civil guard/militia as an adjunct of, or assistance to, the regular army rather than as an autonomous force (pp. 799ff., 803). Clausewitz studied the popular uprisings in Spain or Bandeau (Schriften, pp. 604-611 and Übersicht des Krieges in der Vendée) and hoped in 1812 for the then government to remain in power and give the insurrection the “right direction” (“Bekenntnisschrift”).

Clausewitz was not in favour of universal conscription(compulsory military service because in the then current circumstances it would have caused such an internal commotion that it would have been a negative.

For Clausewitz, politics and war are two different degrees of intensity inside a totality, and not two
heterogeneous magnitudes [with war being characterised by violence].

War is a “part” of political communication, not vice versa. Political communication necessarily produces war, but such war can therefore not be pure/unmixed war, which is decided in one battle whilst mobilising all available forces.

The unity of politics and war within the state of war determines p. 58

Clausewitz’s structure of his study of war in the narrowest sense re: strategy and tactics, even though political communication with its conflicts, in terms of genesis, comes first.

Clausewitz’s philosophy of culture = in “the simple circumstances of life of wild/savage peoples” the whole of war was just “one and only battle/fight”, whereas today it’s a matter of a whole series of battles because of the great variety of situations in “culture/civilisation” (p. 422 + p. 224).

**Strategy arises only where there are many battles. One battle = war only requires tactics** (p. 270 + “Bekenntnissschrift” of 1812: the art of war in civilised peoples requires means (tactics) and strategy (goals/ends)).

For small wars, some kind of skill might be enough, whereas in great wars there is a need for “scientific and, put through a sieve, views” (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg” (1810/1811)).

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And strategy ends up identifying with the art of governing and politics (p. 347).

**Mutatis mutandis, the transition from pure/unmixed to real war = transition from tactics to strategy.**
But even in battles in the “civilised world” the battle is not like in the primitive/pure war situation, it becomes modified (p. 449).

Yet the element of pure/unmixed war of concentrating the absolutely necessary in every war existential magnitudes (p. 230) is also present.

“As multi-faceted as war is, as much as war has distanced itself from the barbaric unloading of hate and enmity in the struggle man to man, body to body, no matter what else gets involved that is not struggle as such, the concept of war always means that all that takes place in war, necessarily starts from struggle” (p. 222).

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The next battle is the reason armed forces are needed, if there were no next battle then war would be something beyond reality (which of course it isn’t) (Strategie, p. 62 + “Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg” and Epistle to Gneisenau 17.6.1811).

“Army” means “armed men” and the idea of struggle is fundamental (p. 222).

In war, armed men confront each other ready to die on a mutual basis, otherwise there is no war or theory of war. Raymond Aron refuses to confront this simple fact, believing and or hoping in other ways to achieve the goals/ends set. Aron made the mistaking of wishful thinking in trying to make war disappear. Aron engages, to this end, in logical and linguistic acrobatics and Aron misinterprets Clausewitz re: “means” because Clausewitz only meant military means and the annihilation of armed forces, conquering, occupation of regions or invading such areas, and other military undertakings, the acceptance of inimical strikes... and not non-military, non-war “means” or “paths” (p. 221).
Strategy must be determined based on its means and not on the basis of its goals because that means, the battle, cannot be eliminated with eliminating the concept of war, whereas the goals/ends are various, many, inexhaustible (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg” – the battle/fight is the only means of strategy (p. 293) + p. 847 = the significance of a battle is the soul of strategy).

SO, the complexity of political communication does not abolish the hard core of war, even though this core in real war is understood as a battle, whereas in the “strict” or “pure/unmixed” concept of war it = the concentration of all existential magnitudes.

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**War as a part of political communication means that strategy when it is concretised and specified must choose between defence and attack/offence.**

In pure/unmixed war there is no strategy, but just the blind clash or conflict of opponents in which perhaps the motives of those clashing distinguish between defence and attack/offence, but otherwise their struggle remains the same (p. 204).

**Defence and attack/offence as forms of the waging of war show only by way of their existence that the transition from pure to real war has already taken place, that political communication is in historical stage of “culture/civilisation”, that the multi-branched game of power has overshadowed simple violence and that clashes and conflicts can occur between very unequal opponents.** Now opens before us the broad field of combinations of defensive and offensive/attacking war (Rothfels rightly saw that Clausewitz discussed the concepts of defence and attack/offence in trying to answer how wars can happen between factions of very unequal power – and we are not here talking ethically in favour of defence). Clausewitz wanted to
encourage the Prussian movement against Napoleon with his theory of defence as the most powerful form of struggle (Bekenntnisschrift of 1812).

There is no such thing as absolutely passive defence, and defence must equally be struggle like attack/offence. There is also an explanation of pauses/breaks in the course of waging war, which are viewed as the consequence of the superiority of defence re: attack/offence, and consequently the advantage of the weaker at the beginning of hostilities (pp. 647, 649 (defence is not simply passive); 205 (superiority of defence and pauses/breaks inside war)) = in the early

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theorems of Clausewitz’s study of war (Strategie, p. 55 etc. (3 other sources)).

Now we shall describe how the early Clausewitz fits into his more mature ruminations to create one synthesis of thought on war.

4. The path/road to synthesis

General comments re: contradictions in thought, commentators, maturity in Clausewitz and synthesis.

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Clausewitz’s intellectual-spiritual development/evolution was rightly called “a process of distinguishing” (Kessel, who nonetheless also misses the mark re: some matters).

**Clausewitz came to a new comprehension late in his life** which overturned certain things he once accepted and until he could offer us a solid and broad conceptual construction and tie various parts of his thinking together.

Early on, Clausewitz opposed the so-called geometric waging of war.
The battle prioritised re: strategy means a theory of war as struggle (irrespective of whether we mean real or pure/unmixed war).

Initially, Clausewitz underlined ethical factors, but at least that let him have some kind of anthropological notion re: the actions and reactions of the human psyche.

His teaching re: friction also turned against the geometric perception that the waging of war can be planned down to every detail, and Clausewitz connected friction with his anthropology so that friction was finally understood as the necessary aftereffect/follow-up of innate human weakness(es).

From the chasm between tactics and strategy, Clausewitz started thinking about the determinative factors of strategy, i.e. about the “political goal” of war, from 1804, when Clausewitz makes a distinction between the goal of war and the goal inside war and points out that the political goal can “be double”, either the annihilation of the foe/enemy or forcing the foe to accept certain terms of peace (Strategie, p. 51. In his early text re: the campaigns of Gustav Adolph, Clausewitz calls war the “organ of political plans” (Werke, IX, p. 26; cf. p. 101 for the internal relation between war ventures and the “political goals” of Gustav Adolph).

If Clausewitz had just stuck to the opposition “strategy-tactics”, he would have just dealt with the aims and acts of acting subjects, and that would not have been converted into a general theory of “political communication” in which the war phenomenon would be based on anthropology and the philosophy of culture/civilisation.
But even that was not enough for the final synthesis. The mature Clausewitz had to combine “political communication” with an analysis of the historical forms of war starting with the Napoleonic Wars.

He managed to leave behind old terminology, and started to combine historical facts of war with anthropology and the philosophy of culture and a new conceptual framework/context, with the new concepts in part being modified, in part generalised and in part displaced.

**Historical research and historicisation** allowed Clausewitz to have a relativistic orientation, incl. detaching his thinking from the accepted until then Napoleonic rules/norms of conducting/waging war, and simultaneously from every rule/norm.

For as long as Clausewitz was impressed by the great victories of Napoleon and the Napoleonic waging of war

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he was convinced that such waging of war would be definitive into the future.

In 1812, he wrote of the present-day “war of all against all” and that “war only with difficulty changes its character, nor should we hope for a return of the old bloody, yet often boring chess, which was played with real soldiers”. Perhaps in the future things will change, but “in our epoch ... every war is considered a national matter and is waged in that spirit” (“Bekenntnisschrift”, Schriften, p. 750; cf. p. 751).

But by 1817 Clausewitz has lost his certainty about the immediate future.

His historical research had progressed, and his scepticism increased and he opined that based on history no-one can prove that “... today the decisive and speedy waging of war will necessarily remain a law of war” – just as the opposite can be proven; **only the future will show if governments and peoples**
will be more reserved in waging war and if wars will be formed accordingly, just as whether diplomacy “will bridle and rein in the quick god of war, especially after a generation, when the experiences of the most recent wars have been lost” (“Ueber das Fortschreiten” pp. 238, 239).

The previous phrase suggests that a return to peoples’ war and the war of annihilation is quite possible, though not at all certain (+ see p. 413).

Clausewitz changes tone, though, when he foresees as more likely, undertakings of observation [[?not sure of correct terminology in English?]] (p. 813), and that wars without a clear-cut outcome will be a “large part” of wars, if not an absolute majority of wars (p. 834), or that earlier circumstance of waging p. 66 war will reappear to a great extent (p. 856), or that it is impossible that wars in the future will have such a large-scale character that they will completely close the broad margins which opened up for them (p. 973).

We are not concerned here with Clausewitz’s vacillations on the future of war, but with the fact that he increasingly relativises the Napoleonic waging of war, as one amongst many forms of war.

Clausewitz, by going into history, did not prophesy/prophesise the future, but more so explained all of the past, by classifying conceptually all forms of war under one denominator.

Clausewitz now began to see Napoleonic war as the most extreme intensification of the war effort in historical context, i.e. that such war was not the only form of war, and thus he had to formulate a new concept of war which would encompass both Napoleonic war in all its intensity, as well as the restricted/limited wars of the pre-Napoleonic epoch/era. But to do that
logically, he had to discover similarities between types of war which he considered until then as toto coelo opposites.

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If one discovered similarities between Napoleonic and restricted/limited wars, then neither of those types of war could exclusively represent the concept of war in general. In other words, the dilation/expansion between the Napoleonic waging of war, and the general concept of war, was necessary so that both Napoleonic and restricted/limited war could come under **one concept of war, which is formal-general, and at the same time absolutely specific/concrete, enclosing all the variety of historically known forms of war**.

Clausewitz’s decisive moment in changing his thinking comes when he clearly distinguishes between “pure/unmixed” and Napoleonic war, with the former synopsising/summarising certain constants from which all the kinds of real war are deduced, by thinking deeply about anthropology and the philosophy of culture.

The basic materials/building blocks as the concepts of tactics, strategy and political goals, fundamental anthropological perceptions, the theory of friction(s) and pauses/breaks in war, the teaching of the two kinds of war [[pure war and real (forms of) war]] etc. already existed

BUT ONLY

when the concept of pure/unmixed war was separated from *all* the individual real forms of war, because it included all of them, and only when the concept of pure war obtained an autonomous ontological and epistemological hypostasis,

ONLY THEN
was a deeper interpretation and a theoretical, more demanding combination of the above materials possible. It’s not just talk of war anymore, but also anthropology and culture on a solid conceptual basis, taking in all individual facets of war and its problems.

Of course, all of that does not mean that Clausewitz stopped being a theoretician of war and became a “philosopher” [[When you read that and know P.K.’s mind, that is ABSOLUTELY HILARIOUS, HAHAHAAHAHA!!!]],

it’s just that Clausewitz reached the point of generalisations which enlighten the study of war in the light of the “political communication” between people.

We could say that in Clausewitz’s youth a “Napoleonic normative perception of war” holds sway, and that is found in the older p. 68 sections of his main work, esp. books 3, 4, 5.

By equating the general concept of war with the Napoleonic waging of war, and by endeavouring to deduce the ideal waging of war from the general concept of war, Clausewitz held that “the art of war is the most advantageous possible use of the available armed forces, so what is possible to be undertaken with those forces, should in reality be undertaken” (Strategie, p. 53).

[[Very interesting re: nuclear weapons – see P.K.’s discussion below, and of course every quote by Clausewitz must be seen in the context of all his stances and overall development in his thought as he approached maturity... as can be seen in the discussion which follows...]]
In 1817, Clausewitz still saw (Napoleonic) campaigns in real wars as rapid united acts, and in the case of Napoleon’s campaigns, they were the military consequence of the French Revolution, which had replaced “the rights of the natural element” (“Über das Fortschreiten”, pp. 234 ff., 237). There is an equating of the “natural element”, which is contained absolutely in the concept of war, and its tangible unfolding in real Napoleonic wars (= an equating of the concept of war with reality), and hence there is also an equating of the Napoleonic campaign in revolutionary war with “that absolute degree of energy/activity, which we viewed as the natural law of the element” (p. 407 + p. 408). “In more recent wars, i.e. in the campaigns we have been observing for the last 25 years, the war/military element acted in all its energy” (p. 566). This meant that pauses/breaks in war disappeared so that there could be “unstoppable/relevant violence” (p. 548). Clausewitz saw in the core of Napoleonic war the concept of war as the “unloading/discharging of enmity, of hate”

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with the whole of activity being unified in “one bloody struggle” and “concentrated in one and only point of space and time” (pp. 468, 469).

Also: “the great decision in a great battle” was the guiding principle Clausewitz derived from such a line of thought (p. 470).

At the time Clausewitz was equating the concept of war with the Napoleonic waging of war, he was expressing and formulating opinions which were contradictory.

He knew of wars in which the pauses/breaks in war/hostilities were longer than the actual fighting. Initially, he attributed such a phenomenon to anthropological reasons such as “fear and the indecision of the human spirit/intellect”, “imperfection of human judgement” (p. 408).
Why should there be such long pauses/temporary cessations of war/hostilities in prerevolutionary wars between monarchs and not in all wars, regardless?

And by asking himself that question, Clausewitz saw that there actually were pauses/breaks in all wars, though to varying degrees.

He started to think about the intensity of wars and the length of pauses/temporary cessations/breaks (pp. 414, 415).

A decisive battle can decide the outcome of a campaign but only very rarely the outcome of a whole

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war (p. 470).

Clausewitz started thinking that the FACTS, the DATA re: wars were such that his position about the certain waging of a war (i.e. Napoleonic) cannot possibly allow for a theoretical characterisation of all wars.

“The more war ... becomes something ambiguous, evasive, so much the more does its theory lose the necessary stable points and supports for its considerations, the necessities become all the fewer, the coincidences all the more [[common]]” (p. 410).

Historical observation got Clausewitz to think very deeply about the concept of war and how now the concept of war qua war must be separated from the Napoleonic waging of war, and that there must be a unification of all kinds/forms of war, from the war of annihilation to armed observation under the aegis of the concept of “pure/unmixed war”.

His reasoning can be seen in the 8th book of Vom Kriege. A teaching of war must regard not ideational, but real situations (p. 973; cf. p. 813). Either

1) we stick to trying to relate war in general to Napoleonic war, or
2) we orientate ourselves towards the multiformity of historical phenomena.

“Now we must make a decision”...

[[= THE ROAD TO GREATNESS!!]]

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If we go down the path of the first choice, then what are we to say about all the wars after Alexander and several Roman campaigns until Napoleon?

And during the next decade what happens if a war takes place like those before Napoleon?

Our present theory is totally defenceless re: such realities.

We must leave space for the various kinds/forms of war... the human mind is fraught with inconsistency, ambiguity, lack of daring... (p. 954).

= As much as the equating of the concept of war with Napoleonic war is attractive in order to come to a theoretical generalisation,

such thinking is superficial and misleading because it neglects HISTORY/HISTORICAL FACTS, both as to the past but also as to the future.

**In order to be fair to historical reality, we must admit that anthropological constants which bring about pauses/temporary cessations/breaks in and of war don’t just occur in prerevolutionary wars, but in all the human subjects when they develop war action – otherwise they wouldn’t be constants.**

So Napoleonic war is subject, albeit to a different degree, to the same laws as every other war

[[Kondylis in *The Political and Man* would not have used the term “laws” (since stricto sensu laws can apply to nature not to humans/human history/social reality...]]
(where constants, generalisations, regularities, causalities, causation, correlations etc. can apply...), but Clausewitz did use the term “law”, and in Clausewitz’s era “law” here can be taken to mean “constant”... Likewise, “human nature” is not a phrase/term/concept in *The Political and Man*, neither in *Power and Decision*... (though P.K. had used the term “human nature” in the 1970s when his thought had not fully matured... – it’s not a big problem in any event...), though if reference is being made to the drive of self-preservation, maintenance and expansion of power, the friend-foe spectrum, the sex drive, the existence of values, (paying lip-service to) values and the realisation of power claims, etc., etc., etc., essentially we are talking about aspects of “human nature”...]

*and can be classified under one concept of war, which can be deduced abstractly, not exclusively from*

p. 72

**Napoleonic war, but from all real wars.**

Clausewitz begins to modify his position re: Napoleonic war, by writing that from Bonaparte and thereafter, war “to a great extent approached its true nature” (p. 972 + cf. 997ff.: war “went through significant changes which brought it closer to its absolute form”).

Clausewitz dropped the term “absolute” war (p. 959).

His revised Part I does not contain the opposition “absolute-real war” (Title of Ch. VIII, p. 2).

Now, the general concept of war is referred to with the adjectives “pure/unmixed”, “clean”, “strict” or “initial”.

*The fundamental discovery of the 8th book that no real war can coincide with the concept of war, is repeated ipsis verbis in the 1st Book worked on anew, where it is stated that real wars could “greatly approach” or “approach” the abstract concept of war* (pp. 214 + 211).
Extremely important:

As we already know, the transition from pure/unmixed and real war is made necessary by only the existence of “civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated/learned society” or “political communication”, which HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO with the good intentions of political professionals and their success in eliminating the war of annihilation from political communication.

Whilst the distance between pure war and war of annihilation is smaller than that between impure and restricted/limited war, the said distance or gap exists even if active subjects want to abolish such a distance (i.e. lump war of annihilation in with pure war so it can’t take place in “advanced” societies of “political communication”).

THE current dominant position that the (allegedly) ideational and abstract character of pure/unmixed war converts the war of annihilation into a fictional construct(ion) too is totally misleading.

Two different levels of theory are mixed here, and that is tantamount of course to the complete failure to appreciate and understand the founding of this theory on a certain anthropology and philosophy of culture (Raymond Aron [[as great as he was]] contradicts himself by, on the one hand, acknowledging in the 8th Book the distinction between absolute and real war, and that theory is unified on the basis that all real wars have a political character, even wars of annihilation; on the other hand, he does not understand the details of the transition from absolute war in the 8th Book to pure/unmixed war in the 1st Book – he completely misses the anthropological and cultural side of things. And Aron thinks that only politics as subjective activity of non-
military authority/government remains as a factor for the moderation of pure war. Aron lumps war of annihilation together with pure war as fictitious construct(ion)s and he does not distinguish between absolute (pure) and real war, nor does he acknowledge the political character of all woods. This however means for Aron that (subjective) politics in this sense can ALWAYS exercise a moderating influence. Aron accuses Clausewitz of seeing the war of annihilation as political war, with political communication being objective, SO THAT politics in the subjective sense for Aron must always exert a moderating influence. Aron is unable to theoretically render war of annihilation understandable. Hepp pointed this out, but doesn’t have the analytical skills of Aron on other matters (Aron never denied in principle the political character of the war of annihilation), and Hepp’s reasoning is simplistic, even though he comes to the right conclusion that the war of annihilation is really possible. But Hepp does not understand the distance between pure and absolute war as war of annihilation. This is inexcusable, as the pure concept of war is included in all real wars, and not only in the war of annihilation (a mistake which Clausewitz had also made before the maturation of his thinking re: historical consideration etc., when he equated the concept of absolute war with Napoleonic war).

Hepp does not see Clausewitz’s development in thinking, and that in Clausewitz’s maturity, Clausewitz separated the concept of pure war from the idea of Napoleonic war by referring to anthropology and culture in a methodologically admirable manner.

One does not need to maim Clausewitz the theoretician to show, contra Aron, that war of annihilation is possible).
SO the concept of “pure/unmixed” war = anthropological reasons for the pauses/breaks in all real wars, albeit to different degrees.

As a fairly young man Clausewitz, still in his “geometric strategy” phase, observed that rarely in history does a general succeed in his strategic calculations to their full extent (*Gustav Adolfs Feldzüge*).

Clausewitz was scathing of those who completely forget the friction(s) of the whole machine in war and the difficulties obstructing the precise execution of systematic instructions – in war, execution is more difficult than in any other case re: theory (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg”).

Initially, “friction” was understood in the narrow war sense of the distance between plan and execution, with the negative influence of certain unforeseeable factors, related to one’s own or the opposing army. Clausewitz though fairly quickly started to attribute friction to anthropological constants incl. the [[Thucydidean-like]] feeling of fear incl. amongst the populace (p. 1081).

p. 75

**Apart from the superiority of defence re: attack/offence, ignorance of the state of the opponent, and fear of the big decision**, are referred to in making the real waging of war diverge from war’s concept as “rapid, unrelenting activity, unrelenting [[in its]] course towards the aim, i.e. hard, bloody, quickly done, decisive struggle” (“Über das Fortschreiten”, p. 234). In that way, friction is associated closely with pauses/breaks inside war, even though friction does not necessarily mean pauses/breaks.

Friction always presupposes a distance between plan(s) and execution, which is not necessarily the case in regard to pauses/breaks, which can be planned and voluntary. In contemplating friction, Clausewitz comes close to thoughts of
“pure” war, and, of “political” war e.g. when the act of war cannot be concentrated in one and only act (p. 1001).

If the absolute concentration/densification of the act of war is ideal-typically expressed in the concept of pure war, there can be no friction and pauses/breaks, since there is all-out confrontation with no time or space or ability to pause, or manoeuvres due to weakness etc..

Here there is only enmity.

But in every real war, time and space are widened and extended and expanded significantly, and we cannot talk of an act of war as if it were a duel as in the case of pure war (p. 950).

Not only are there now those anthropological qualities which lead to friction and pauses/breaks, but they interweave with an important aspect of “political communication”.

Political communication comes into the conduct/waging of war via friction and pauses/breaks.

There is friction and (human) inertia when

p. 76.

we go from pure to political war (p. 209ff.).

By broadening the notion of friction, Clausewitz connects it with human nature and with the complicated texture of the “social situation” or “political communication”.

Now, the theorising of war and cultural magnitudes are being merged with each other and war is interwoven with politics (Kessel talks about Clausewitz and friction, but doesn’t get the anthropological and cultural parameters, nor the difference between absolute and pure war, nor the sense under which pure war =
abstraction. Schering errs too, by implying that purposeful/expedient rational action can be connected with real, political war in order to bring about the “moderation” of real war in comparison to pure/unmixed war, which simply isn’t the case).

**Only the first chapter of the first book was considered complete by Clausewitz** (p. 181), incl. re: his definitive findings on the fixed/stable/firm/constant/steady texture and the historical forms of war, as well as the transition from pure to real war.

The 8th Book has an experimental character (p. 180, note of 10.7.1827) re: Napoleonic waging of war etc..

p. 77

The 8th Book contains the incorrect perception that war = Napoleonic “absolute” war, but this incorrect perception is not used thereafter.

Kessel was right in relation to Rosinski and Schering that Clausewitz didn’t work on Book 8 any further.

After 1827, Clausewitz studied the history of war more than working on *Vom Kriege* (Epistles to Gröben 1829, 1830 published by Kessel).

Book 8 however does support Ch. 1, Book 1.

Rosinski is wrong to think that politics, as having primacy, was discovered and articulated in Ch. 1, Book 1. Clausewitz nowhere says that Ch. 1, Book 1 cancels out other sections of his work.

p. 78

**The primacy of politics was stressed already in the note of 1827.** Kondylis also refers to Schering, Rosinski and R. Aron again re: interpretation problems regarding Clausewitz concluding that the war of annihilation is equally real
[i.e. just as real as other forms of war]], and is political war, as all other kinds/forms of war are, and which all are subject to the objective influence of “friction”.

All wars are phenomena of political communication which interweave with all facets of human nature, which is objectified in political communication.

If one interprets the primacy of politics as the priority/primacy of allegedly, by definition, a moderating government of politicians vis-a-vis, by definition, warmongering soldiers/military officers/generals, then one cannot understand how all wars are phenomena of political communication re: human nature.

[[Obviously, Clausewitz is NOT concerned with “to war, or not to war”? There will always be war, one way or another, sooner or later, but every case is up to the politicians in power, peoples, correlations of forces, and many other factors – anthropological, objectively (and subjectively) political,... etc....]]

5. The historical way of looking at things and praxeology

p.79

Clausewitz was aware that historical examples in themselves don’t prove anything (p. 339),

but are [[in toto]] the source and permanent point of reference of an autonomous way of looking at things/consideration/contemplation/observation with certain theoretical and praxeological consequences.

It is through historical consideration/observation that Clausewitz could break with the Napoleonic normative comprehension of the war phenomenon.
Of course, the ultimate logical consequences of his historical way of looking at things came to him only towards the end of his life. Clausewitz nevertheless had always a leaning towards seeing things historically.

As a historian, Clausewitz researched no less than 130 campaigns (Linnebach; cf. Schering).

**Clausewitz had invoked the Napoleonic model, and historical consideration**, against the geometric art of war (with its claim to formulate generally applicable rules/norms of war whilst ignoring the human element), but only later did he relativise Napoleonic wars via historical analysis.

Ethical factors had been proffered against geometric war (see Nohn re: those in Clausewitz’s intellectual circle), which led to the examination of the political character of war.

**Of course, historical contemplation and the multiformity of war implied or brought about a relativistic and anti-intellectualistic positioning, which was articulated in the teachings re: war as art/skill, and as the “tact of judgement” as the only reliable compass of acting/action.**

Delbrück refers to Clausewitz’s “historical sense/feeling” during the latter’s Napoleonic model period, which was in contrast to Clausewitz’s “law” as the annihilation of inimical armed forces, and following that, as the battle as the only decisive element of war, which he deduced abstractly from the Napoleonic waging of war “like Lessing deduced the laws of poetry from Homer”.

Clausewitz however was not fooled by the defunct ways of conducting war esp. because they falsified the geometric ideals of his theoretical opponents at that time.
Clausewitz never hesitated to defend Gustav Adolph as a military officer against all those who sought in the 30 Years’ War, the art of war, because Gustav placed importance on ethical factors, even though he was not “daring in attacks on the battlefield”, preferring rather, various manoeuvres (Gustav Adolphs Feldzüge).

Clausewitz in a fragment from his uncollected writings cited by Rothfels clearly expresses his view that according to time and place, the people, mores, political situations and the general “spirit of nations”, there were different kinds/forms of war, and Clausewitz was therefore against one-sided theorisations of war.

He looked into the “real reasons” for the different character of the 30 Years’ War and the monarchical “geometric” wars thereafter.

He even looked into wars of the Middle Ages, personal honour etc. (in Rothfels).

He knows that one cannot bring back the past with a magic wand, and that one cannot fully ever stand in the shoes of peoples and cultures of the past and their ways of thinking (whoever dreams of resurrecting ancient polities which they don’t understand, and after 2-3000 years no-one will understand, does not have Clausewitz’s sympathy (“Umtriebe”).

p. 81

Clausewitz even goes into a reliable, but not original, synopsis/summary of the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of the bourgeoisie (loc. cit.) without believing in any kind of Progress etc..

“Everything in this world is subject to change” (loc. cit.), and he does not as a man’s man seek support in the other life.
Clausewitz could even see that the most brilliant works of civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated society, no matter how many centuries they survive and influence things, “enclose in themselves the principle or start of their own destruction ... and no work can last forever, even that which would be subverted but not overturned by the same principles which initially gave it strength and grandeur” ("Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8).

"[HOW BRILLIANT WAS CLAUSEWITZ’S MIND!!! AMAZING STUFF!!!]"

Without theoretically weighty religious belief, and with an observation of human affairs from the point of view of power = the concomitants of Clausewitz’s historical-relativistic positioning.

Clausewitz asks himself “is perhaps the nature of war determined by the nature of situations, and which are these situations and what are the conditions/terms?” (Geist und Tat).

From such a question Clausewitz includes war in the great totality of “political communication” and in the 8th Book Clausewitz gives us his famous quote about the relationship between war and politics for the first time, having first described the historical forms of war and having underlined that
every epoch conducted war “in their way, differently, with other means and another goal”, and every epoch has its own wars, restrictive conditions, its own inertia and one-sidedness (pp. 962, 973).

**With such historical relativism, Clausewitz was able to state that war is the continuation of political communication and understand that all wars were of the same kind (i.e. from the point of view of the continuation of political communication) (p. 992).**

**The unification of wars at the level of theory on the basis of friction presupposes the ascertainment that the various wars take root historically in certain political situations. Thus, we can understand why friction exists.**

And pure/unmixed war [[concept]] comes about to show what a war is without friction(s) and pauses/temporary cessations/breaks, whereas friction takes place only in wars arising from the social life of “civilised/cultured/learned/ educated” peoples.

So, we have

1) historical relativism as to the many kinds/forms of war,

2) the theoretical unification of the historical multiformity of war through the ascertainment of the decisive role of “political communication”, and

3) the formulation of the pure concept of war.

**Only the ascertainment that war is an organ of politics makes understandable “how much wars differ**

necessarily according to the texture of their motives and of the situations from which they arise (p. 212).
Praxeologically, for Clausewitz, norms do not apply, history is not a magistra vitae of normative teachings.

One must exercise judgement, but no formulae are given, no principles, rules/norms or methods (p. 858).

Clausewitz’ theory is descriptive based on a normatively silent and relativised history.

Any actor must rely on his own “tact of judgement”, not on any advice coming from Clausewitz.

Initially, such a stance turned against the geometric conducting or waging of war, though Clausewitz still stuck [[at that time]] to his Napoleonic normative perception that “war must be conducted to the highest degree of necessary or possible effort” or “one should not concentrate all his forces in time and place, but gradually turn all one’s activity as far as possible to one and only point” (Strategie, pp. 51, 48).

The geometric school wanted to reduce all that happens in war to ponderable magnitudes in order to found fixed rules/norms of behaviour. Clausewitz however stressed the imponderable element

p. 84

and hence theory is “perhaps totally impossible” as regards practice in a battle where it’s up to the commanding officer to make decisions etc. (Strategie, p. 80).

“War manuals always arrived very late, and in all epochs constituted a dead search” (Strategie, p. 72). = there are no rules/instructions for all battlefields...
The art of war can command a general or other officer on the battlefield to do little ("Ueber das Fortschreiten").

Clausewitz asked himself in his maturity what is the meaning and what are the limits of his theoretical work. He drew the only consistent conclusion: "the opposition/contrast between theory and praxis/practice can be bridged only if theory is perceived as observation and not as teaching" (pp. 290, 292).

[[HOW GREAT WAS THE PRUSSIAN!!! WOE UNTO THE ETHICISING-MORALISING RETARD "WHO KNOWS EVERYTHING" AND IS CONSTANTLY PROVEN WRONG TIME AND TIME AGAIN BY (LONG-TERM) HISTORICAL REALITY...]]

Only a renunciation of norms would make theory able to comprehend praxis/practice. [= GENIUS]]

Only the tact of judgement helps man at the time of action (see below), and hence no stable theory can be constituted on the basis of such tact.

Clausewitz was both a theoretician of war, and a warrior/soldier [[that is, he had real life experience to the extreme, whereas the RETARDS = (most or nearly all) Professional Academics, “who know “everything””, all they can do is regurgitate moralising-ethicising GARBAGE as Sacks of Lectical/Verbal Shit, Day in, Day Out... whilst “noticing everything”, but they “just happen” not to notice...!!!!]], and only through time and effort could he separate the two.

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Clausewitz’s BRILLIANT mind led him to make three key distinctions:

1) separation of theoretical and practical goals. Science differs “from poetry and from real life because it contains its goal inside itself”; [[!!!!!!!!!!!!!!GENIUS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]
“whoever steps on the ground/earth of science should have absolutely no goal/ end. Otherwise we have an opinion formed in advance – something completely foreign to science” (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8),

[[WHAT CAN SOMEONE SAY ABOUT CLAUSEWITZ? HE WAS A SOLDIER AND HIS MIND WAS METHODOLOGICALLY FAR MORE ADVANCED AND IN TUNE WITH SCIENCE THAN THE VAST MAJORITY IF NOT ALL OF THE PROFESSORS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES POST WW2!!! Unbelievable Stuff!!!]]

2) separation of evaluations and causal explanations, and Clausewitz would even write: “we do not say this to praise or to blame... but only to find reasons of events inside the situation of things and only for that reason” (Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien).

3) separation of ethical from historical-political consideration, e.g. re: Poland and its division, and that one shouldn’t see it from an ethical, but from a historical-political point of view (“Die Verhältnisse Europas seit der Teilung Poles”).

The basically imponderable/incalculable character of human action is not due to only its emotional motives and related vacillations (man is not simply a machine executing his duties in his practical action (Die Feldzüge von 1799)).

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The field of possible events, the sequence of consequences which an act begets, is endless, and the final result of such contemplation remains incomprehensible for the human intellect (“Über die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens”).

There are thoughts about the act being carried out in twilight which obscures things, and, war as a form of a human act as “the field of coincidence”, “the field of uncertainty; ¾ of what we base our acts on in war are hidden in the clouds of smaller or larger uncertainty”, there is no “positive teaching” re: action/the act, just as the abstract formulation of laws of the art of war is...
pointless since the situations direct/affect/determine things etc. (pp. 289, 234, 233, 289 and other sources).

“In the political world, there is no certainty, rather one must be satisfied with a more or less high degree of probability/possibility” (*Der Feldzug von 1813*).

Two different people view “truth” differently re: their political or ethical contemplations (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8”).

**There’s an advantage to knowing about the relativity of knowledge and perspectives** [[obviously the great Prussian general overlooked that Scientific knowledge is not relative, but we get his point...]] so that one can ponder various possibilities and give oneself a chance of success, rather than being stuck in one’s own alleged “certainties” listening to only one’s own desires and “constituting easy prey for one’s enemies” (loc. cit.)

**In war, the act should orientate itself re: the “mean possibility” and there is no need for the “concept of law”** (p. 306).

p. 87

It’s not a question of “absolute truth” but the judgement of the practical person.

Each case is peculiar. Every situation is multifarious with different limits. So, all that is demanded is a “tact of judgement”, which hits or misses the mark according to how switched on every military commander is, incl. an
ability to sort out what is important and what isn’t, etc.. We are talking about a sense/feeling, a knack, as a judgement at a higher level (pp. 315, 283, 221, 962, 251, 182, 401, 961, 245, 257 and other pages as well as other texts).

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And with this “spiritual/intellectual instinct” re: tact of judgement, the activity of the intellect abandons “the field of strict science, logic and mathematics, and becomes ... art/skill” (pp. 298, 961).

Clausewitz knew that strategy does not concern itself “simply with the magnitudes which can accept mathematical calculation”, that it must step inside “the realm/territory of art/skill” and that strategic plans demand “great tact of judgement of the spirit/mind/intellect” (“Bemerkungen”, p. 19, Strategie, p. 60) (The tact and exercising of judgement, Clausewitz wrote a few years later, constitute the “soul of action”, not only in war, but in “every art and occupation of human life” (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg”) + pp. 39 (for the figure of the ingenious military commander in the philosophy of the 18th century and similar motifs in the thought of Barenhorst, who stressed the role of ethical factors and coincidence, see Höhn)).

In the light of such a relativistic historical way of looking at things, we can now come to understand Clausewitz’s analyses on the two sets of problems which constitute the two most important praxeological fields within the general theory of war:

1) the teaching re: ends/goals and means;

2) the teaching re: the two kinds of war [[pure war and real (forms of) war]] (and vice versa: Raymond Aron [[as great as he was, and despite his tremendous knowledge of historical sociology etc.]] did not see that historical consideration and praxeology are interwoven, but thought that the solving of theoretical matters determines the
content of praxeology. Schering knew well before R. Aron though that we should not expect any “advice” or “recipes” from Clausewitz).

Both aforesaid teachings interweave with each other and should be understood together with the theoretical axiom of the political texture of war, we shall now have a look at problems re: the act/action and the duties of the “tact of judgement” initially re: politics broadly understood, and then more specifically.

As we know, the primacy of politics is related to “political communication” in toto i.e. to the “social body” as a politically constituted whole. (It is not a question per se of politics being about non-soldiers, non-military officers).

The objective sense of politics is therefore in absolute ascendancy or is absolutely pre-eminent/supreme re: the subjective sense of politics, and correspondingly there is a transition from pure/unmixed to real war.

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If Clausewitz had just stuck to using politics in its objective sense and only in its objective sense, then obviously there would have been no praxeological matters.

The subjective sense of politics = the purposeful/expedient acts/undertakings of non-military bearers and authorities (the double meaning of politics in Clausewitz was covered long ago by Korfes, Kessel, R. Aron) = the way politics is talked about nowadays; however, since long ago the Aristotelian notion of politics, which was still alive c. 1800, has died = this is the reason for so many misunderstandings of Clausewitz (not being able to separate the (objective) notion of politics as social organisation as in Aristotle, and (subjective) politics today of politicians

[{{running around for “special interest groups” [e.g. Corporations, Big Money Bankers/Financiers (who grossly disproportionately “just happen” to incl. “chosen people” et al.), “Humanitarian” N.G.O.s funded and directed by, in GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE numbers, “circumstantial chosen people” because it “just happens to be that way” and of course “it’s good for the rest of us”... etc. and all of “the people” etc., etc., etc....}}]
It’s a question of the positive or negative relationship of subjective politics with the objective facts/data of political communication, and not a matter of any supremacy or dominating autonomy of subjective politics.

Clausewitz does not deny room for action of subjective politics, but he sets such politics some limits. For Clausewitz, ONLY objective politics (e.g. of state v. state) can be treated scientifically, so he does not go into subjective politics (p. 993) [[This is exactly what all very good to excellent analysts of International Affairs, inter alia, do...]].

What is important is not the “ethical” or “unethical” positionings, but the objective course of political communication.

On the other hand, the complexity and heterogeneity of such communication is always kept in mind, incl. the combinatory nature of its constituent parts from different points of view on each and every respective occasion, and the multiformity of the psychological sources of human action.

Indifference to subjective motives does not mean indifference to subjective politics in the sense of purposeful/expedient acts of subjects, which want to develop action on the basis of objective data/facts of a certain political communication, taking the objective facts into account as precisely as possible.

Only in that way do concepts such as “will/volition”, “end/goal” or “choice of means” obtain concrete historical reference and concrete historical content.

[[The above is basically THE Primer of what politics is... CONTEMPLATE IT, THINK ABOUT IT – AND if you want to engage in Science CUT THE FUCKING IDEOLOGICAL BULLSHIT, RETARDS!!! And it continues below...]]

p. 90

As we have already said, Clausewitz on the basis of general historical ascertainments about the character of war and also re: anthropology and
the philosophy of culture, ascertained that war is the continuation of political communication, and not on the various actions and reactions, machinations, successes and mistakes of various leaders and generals etc. who “shaped/ formed” politics in the subjective sense of the term.

Clausewitz’s ascertainment of the political nature of war, because he saw that objective politics is political communication, which – in contrast to the broadly vague, unforeseeable and non-classifiable original ideas and acts of subjective politics – does not resist, of its nature, scientific comprehension.

In Book 8 of Vom Kriege, the “character” of a war and “its general outline” must be defined/determined based on “political magnitudes and the political conditions” (p. 959). The ends/goals and means of him involved in war conform of course “with the absolutely personal features of his situation”, but bear within them “the character of the epoch and of the general circumstances/ conditions” (p. 974). And from p. 962ff. Clausewitz provides readers with a long historical excursus/digression into the dependence of the nature of war on the social situation of various peoples.

Even though Clausewitz did not in the least underestimate Napoleon’s personality as a driving force for the Napoleonic waging of war, Clausewitz never even considered attributing the new way of conducting wars to the peculiarity of the ingenious Corsican = Napoleon. What was crucial was the basic transformation of political communication after 1789, because even though Napoleon perfected revolutionary war, he did not create such war out of nothing.
It was the “change in politics” which mobilised “other means, other forces” which gave rise to the Napoleonic art of war (p. 998) + “new social situations and circumstances” for the new phenomena in the area of the art of war (p. 856; cf. p. 479). “The general circumstances from which a war arises” determine the “character” of war (p. 659).

Clausewitz writes of the “influence of the general and superordinate circumstances/conditions” on people involved in war, and that “whoever regards this influence as something coincidental, has not at all comprehended the authentic life of war and is not entitled to express judgements on the forces which unfold in a war” (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*).

[[DO YOU UNDERSTAND, CRETINS, THAT CLAUSEWITZ IS GIVING YOU A NON-NORMATIVE, VALUE-FREE WEBERIAN LESSON IN SOCIOLOGY 101, a hundred years before Weber????!!! MORONS!!!]]

The context/framework of an act exists independent of the will/volition of those acting, and the texture of the said framework determines the behaviour of the actors, no matter whether there is wider or narrower space for action re: subjective politics. Political communication is necessarily multi-dimensional and contradictory but allows the setting of different goals and the development of different moves.

On this side of *Ἐντεῦθεν* [[but not per se]] pure/unmixed war, i.e. in the reality of war at one extreme, there is the war of annihilation, and at the other extreme there is armed observation, it is up to the judgement of those concerned to ascertain the limits of their undertakings (p. 199).
And it’s not just about goals set, but also the available means which are a part of the objective facts/data of political communication (p. 573 incl. re: supplying the army).

Another limit on subjective politics is of course the two sides wanting to “impose its law” on the other (p. 194).

**Key is to understand the primacy of objective politics and the room to act re: subjective politics.** Clausewitz studied Friedrich the Great’s campaigns and emphasised the need to understand the circumstances at the time of the war being studied.

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Friedrich, in his failed attempt to crush Austria, had many problems re: supplying his troops and tremendous expenses for every armed soldier, which made it very difficult to make up for great losses in men. Thereafter, based on those objective realities, Friedrich took a “moderate” course which brought him the permanent occupation of Silesia (*Feldzugspläne Friedrichs* etc.).

**It was the general character of the conduct of war and the state of the enemy which determined to a great extent the subjective politics of Friedrich**,

but the latter would not have borne any results if it didn’t **weigh up the situation correctly** and do what needed to be done on a case by case basis.

[[THIS IS AT THE CRUX OF ALL POLITICAL MOVES/ACTIONS – FROM LOCAL POLITICS TO GEOPOLITICS – TO WEIGH UP THE SITUATION AND MAKE THE RIGHT MOVES TO BRING ABOUT MORE OR LESS THE REALISTICALLY DESIRED RESULT. This is why, at different levels of analysis and with variable but nonetheless usually at least realistic positions factually grounded, e.g. Paul Craig Roberts, Pat Buchanan, John Mearsheimer, K. Waltz, Paul Kennedy, Morgenthau, G. Kennan, Robert Merry, Lyle Goldstein, Michael Lind, A.
Lieven, et al. in the Anglo-American context, have taken positions many in the U.S. leadership don’t want to know about even though they have constantly made, obviously not always, many sensible, level-headed and valid points... And I repeat, carefully study ZBIG’s final words/thoughts in *The American Interest*... https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignment/ in conjunction with P.K.’s *Planetary Politics after the Cold War...* and below...]

**So, the “tact of judgement” is obliged to decide how it will orientate itself on the basis of the objective facts/data of political communication.**

The primacy of the latter (political communication), and the room to move of the former (tact of judgement), as understood as a unity (P.K. has another go at one of his “teachers”, whom he really respected and admired, as we all do, R. Aron, and refers to Hepp on the concept and primacy of objective politics in Clausewitz).

Regarding **ends and means** and the two kinds/forms of war re: tact of judgement there are no specific rules/norms for p. 94

the individual case.

**Clausewitz in his younger days proffered a somewhat rectilinear and simplistic perception of the relationship between ends and means, which he modified with a more flexible, elastic perception when his historical consideration matured.**

Clausewitz opposed Bülow’s stance that great results are best produced with small means. Clausewitz focused on available forces and their correct use to achieve the goals set. Such means/available forces are as far as possible independent of coincidences (“Bemerkungen”, pp. 13, 12; *Strategie*, p. 63).

**Clausewitz got himself into a bit of logical trouble, i.e. he in part contradicted himself, because on the one hand, he rightly highlighted**
coincidences and vacillating ethical factors against the rigid and abstract geometrical strategy, but on the other hand, wanted to obliterate the role of coincidences/accidents through precise calculation and the correlation of means and ends.

As far as Napoleon was concerned, his great ends/goals could only be achieved with great means.

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Such great means were connected with the central role of the battle against the preference of geometric strategy for manoeuvres. Clausewitz’ thought however vacillated between ethical factors and “passionate courage” as an “instinct of a powerful nature” which sometimes contains the “highest wisdom” (“Über die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens” + Epistle to his fiancé 20.9.1806).

He also talks of war as a game and repeats that the “highest daring can constitute the highest wisdom” (Die Feldzüge von 1799).

**For as long as Clausewitz concentrated on the Napoleonic way or thinking of the Napoleonic general/military officer, he had a narrower view of means and ends uninfluenced by historical and sociological problems.**

*Such a stance retreats as he begins to see the political character of war so that praxeology and the choice of ends and means was seen from*

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*a different angle.*

**After the ascertainment of the ontological interrelation between “absolute”-Napoleonic war and the rest of the real wars, and also after the ascertainment of the notion of “pure/unmixed war”, the matter of the means and the ends/goals could be examined only when taking into account the complexity of “civilised/cultured/cultivated/educated society” and**
“political communication” which was wrapped in a network of actions and mutual actions/interplay.

Wars waged between civilised societies are characterised by the fact that “the number of possible relations increases, and consequently their combinations, the multiformity of the arrangements/settlements/setting of accounts/reckonings/... multiplies, and with the hierarchical gradation of the ends/goals, the first means is distanced from the ultimate end/goal” (p. 224).

[[Clausewitz in his absolute brilliance, is basically pre-dating the notion of the Heterogony of Ends!!!!!]]

For Clausewitz, what’s needed to judge a war, the purpose/end/goal and its means, is an overall/general overview of the circumstances/conditions as well as the “individual features of the moment”. Such judgement can’t be objective because it is determined by “the intellectual/spiritual and psychical qualities of the hegemons, politicians and army officers” (pp. 962; cf. 974).

The military aim of a war is “equally variable ..., as much as its political goal/aim is and its particular circumstances” (p. 214). There is no clear-cut and fixed relation between political goal/end and military goal/end, which we shall see in the discussion between the two kinds/forms of war.

Clausewitz = the ends/goals of tactics = the means of strategy = strategy uses tactics to achieves its ends/goals (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen
Krieg”). At the top of the pyramid of considerations is the political goal/end.

But owing to the “great multiformity of circumstances” in culture/civilisation, the political goal/end cannot be “totally simple”, and even if it were, its dependence on a “multitude of circumstances and concerns” does not allow its realisation with “one and only one great act(ion)”, but demands more acts each of which has its own goal/end and is thus connected to the totality. (p. 422ff.).

Being a means or an end/goal is not a fixed predicate, but a variable and interchangeable function with the exception of the highest political goal/aim, which can never be converted into a means.

Every other means can be converted into an end/goal and vice versa.

“Nowhere else do end/goal and means mutually influence/interact with each other as much as in war” + The initial political motive in the said interaction can be overshadowed or overruled by the course of the mutual influence/interaction of all the motives etc. during the war (Die Feldzüge von 1799). This is very important re: praxeology in general.

The problem of the two kinds/forms of war interrelated narrowly with the broadening of the possible relations between end/goal and means in the sense that the theory of war must answer the question if the kind of war can be foreseen on the basis of ends/goals of war or on the basis of the means used.
Is the correlation between end/goal and means analogous/proportional and rectilinear or not? In a war in which the end/goal is the subjugation of the foe, do more means need to be used than in a war with moderate intent?

If the correlation between end/goal and means is not analogous/proportional and rectilinear (e.g. there can be restricted/limited war with massive means not restricted as means etc.), what determines the kind of war if not the precisely calculated correlation of goal/end and means determined by domination in political communication?

Already the simple enumeration of the four possible relations between ends/goals and means shows that only in the first two is there an analogous/proportional correlation:

1) when a great goal/end accompanies the use of great means,

2) when a small/little goal/end accompanies the use of restricted means.

The first case was prominent in the Napoleonic waging of war and was the focus of attention for Clausewitz (see Die Feldzüge Friedrichs).

Clausewitz wants to find a direct/rational proportionality between end/goal and means, and this actually helped him in his taxonomy/classification of phenomena within his theory of war in the light of historical-relativistic contemplation.

Clausewitz observed that really intense efforts can arise where they were not initially planned, but even if something like that happens, it won’t last long “because the existence of such intense efforts produces a corresponding grand plan” (Vom Kriege, p. 211). And since it won’t last long, can’t be sustained etc., then during the course of the war, even if such a lack of proportionality between means and ends occurred, end/goal and means balance each other out.
In the second case of small goal/end and restricted/small means, the smaller the political end/goal, the smaller are our efforts/means mobilised (p. 200).

**Clausewitz, however, thought long and hard about the two cases where there was disproportionality between ends/goals and means** (“Neuer Standpunkt der Theorie des Krieges” in *Geist und Tat*, p. 309).

So:

3) either great means are mobilised for the achievement of a restricted goal/end (e.g. the military subjugation of the enemy without subjugating the enemy politically or when a small motive begets results beyond their nature (p. 201))

or

4) a great goal/end is sought/striven after, with restricted/limited means (Clausewitz showed little interest in this possibility as it was something Bülow believed in, and Clausewitz never took him or his thought seriously, because when there is a balance/balancing of forces of the two sides, the side in defence would never want to lose everything without first mobilising everything to make the other side put in a similar effort, and, if the offensive/attacking side was much stronger, that side would succeed, but it’s doubtful you could call that success, the realisation of a great goal/end, because the size of the goal/end is measured on the basis of the extent of the possibilities of that which sets the end/goal).

In 1827, Clausewitz continues to write about the two kinds/forms of war exclusively in relation to the end/goal (either the subjugation of the foe/enemy, or a few conquests along/around the frontiers/borders) (p. 179). Elsewhere he writes that despite the political character of war, the political goal/end ought to
be adapted to the “nature of the means”, and that such political character exerts its influence “only as much as the texture of the explosive forces which it encompasses” (p. 210).

Clausewitz stressed the central significance of the means for war, but comprehended their autonomous/independent dynamic(s) only when he became conscious of the political nature of war on a broad historical basis. This is paradoxical only superficially, or only from the point of view of the “liberal” interpretation of his thought.

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The breaking away from the Napoleonic normative perception, and the prevailing of the historical way of looking at things, place the primacy of politics on a broad basis, and sharpen the mind to look at other possibilities of the combining of means and goals/ends, rather than just great means/great ends.

So, the putting forward of the primacy of an objective politics came about as a need to not get bogged down in endless casuistry (case-by-case analysis) by focusing only on the goal/end and not on the means as well.

Clausewitz sometimes understood the means as the totality of the available military dynamic(s) = as the whole of the forces/powers/strengths of a nation incl. ethical factors,

and recognised the role of subjective political factors as having to conform with the autonomous dynamic(s) of the means. “War and its form arise from the ideas, feelings and circumstances dominating at that time” (p. 954).

This relativisation of the significance of the subjective goals/ends for the selection of the kind of war

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was ascertained in the thought that the impact/effect of the political goal/end depends on the texture of the political communication, and for that reason, the same political goal/end can “bring about at different points in time entirely different effects/impacts in different peoples, or even in the people itself”.

If the political goal/end is the initial motive of war, and as such ought to define the military aim and the use of means, the motive for war is really “the relation with the two states faced off against each other” (p. 200). So vital = the political community as bearer of the military dynamic(s) in its totality.

[ [ABSOLUTELY STUNNINGLY BRILLIANT!!!] ]

Example of Friedrich (p. 413).

There are never as such e.g. “healthy” and “humanitarian” goals/ends for a restricted/limited war to be necessarily chosen over a war of annihilation: what counts is that a war of annihilation has never been the norm in history because of objective reasons: “these general circumstances made war a vague/unclear/ambiguous thing, where authentic enmity was obliged to do various manoeuvres through conflicting factors, so that in the end all that was left was a very weak, sick element” (p. 659. Kessel interpreted Clausewitz as giving precedence to the subjective factor,
even though earlier on Kessel was correct that the two kinds/forms of war in
their interrelation with objective politics and the polity must be separated from
the “simple influence of the political end/goal on war”, since indeed the
end/goal of subjugation of the foe existed in the restricted/limited wars of the
18th century. If one is going to say that the distinction between the two kinds of
war is connected to the free, subjective choice of goals/ends, then one could not
say with any substance as to historical content, and with any theoretical
significance, that war is the continuation of politics (in particular against the
writings of R. Aron on the matter). Clausewitz by 1827 saw the
contradictions, and limited the range of the subjective factor. Kessel knew
that the mature Clausewitz had “particularly restricted the element of subjective
volition” and went on to do an admirable analysis of the objective preconditions
for the two kinds/forms of war (“Die doppelte Art”).

[[One could say that it seems, though it might not and definitely NOT necessarily turn
out that way, that China is “correctly” waiting for objective political conditions to
mature, and that the “Neo-Con”/”Left/Humanitarian” tendency in the USA’s
leadership, with a greater emphasis on the “subjective” side of things, and not
correctly weighing up the political communication and politics/society objectively,
could possibly hasten USA and the West’s losses – now the PROOF can only come
through the unfolding of Reality and neither I, nor P.K. are or were ever Pythia...
BUT EVEN IF time is gained in this Historical Conjuncture, other things will really
happen, and not “just happen”, in the more distant future, which always put
EVERYONE in their place... and of course we know that things only ever really
happen, and the “just happen” is really saying “let’s pretend not to notice and have
them not noticing, so we can continue wielding GROSSLY DISPOROPORTIONATE
forms of Power...]]

Of course, specific people and not the general circumstances decide when,
where and what kind of war will be waged. But such a decision depends on a
link in the chain of circumstances/conditions, and is based on the “tact of
judgement”, whose main criterion is the correct reading of the circumstances.

General circumstances are more than capable of determining the individual decisions of generals/military officers (*Feldzug von 1796*), but the political leadership decides what kind of war it will wage in accordance with each and every respective occasion and not based on preliminary preferences re: restricted/limited war v. war of annihilation.

The “peculiarity of the case”, “the tact of judgement” = will decide whether to prefer to choose anything from the annihilation of the enemy armed forces, to the passive waiting of the strikes of the enemy (p. 221 + 212).

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For Clausewitz, it is not an ethical matter re: e.g. calling blameworthy or barbarous the choice of war of annihilation over restricted/limited war (p. 410).

France (compared to Austria) has great goals/ends and great means so that in this case moderation would be like not acting at all (“Bekenntnisschrift”).

[[So e.g. in terms of USA v. Iraq (Hussein) – battlefield “victory” = guaranteed and sensible... though the wider geopolitical repercussions is the question... incl. as to the wisdom of the campaign and what eventuated re: Iran (which apparently increased its relative regional forms of power), as well as the mass displacement, maiming, killing of civilians etc..... and the waves of invasion/humanitarian incursion into Europe, ISIS etc., etc., etc.....]]

War does not, in any case, constitute something “philanthropic” (p. 586).

Clausewitz felt that the Allies could have beaten and made France smaller in 1814 but they feared making France stronger so... (“Die Verhältnisse Europas...”).

If one leans to moderation and restricted/limited war when it is not called for, then there is a weakness/sickness of the motives for action, whereas “politics”
does have an inclination towards the “dishonourable prudence” of restricted/limited war (p. 989 + p. 216 + 212).

Clausewitz never ever was concerned with being “nice or a do-gooder” because p. 105

for Clausewitz it’s not a question of being a “war-mongering soldier/general/military officer”. **Clausewitz thought descriptively. He sought not to plug an ethical gap, but to plug a gap in the historical way of looking at things.**

The distance between pure/unmixed war and war of annihilation intensified the notion of friction in all the kinds/forms of war, it unified the war phenomenon in all its historical forms, and rendered as equivalent kinds of real war, war of annihilation and restricted/limited war.

Since war was not just war of annihilation, then restricted/limited war was war too, and this meant a need to take into account the multiformity of these two kinds = forms of war and re: means and ends etc.

The ideal-typical treatment of the two kinds/forms of wars = there is no reason to prefer one kind over the other.

The rational, as to the decision re: ends/goals set, rests always on the “tact of judgement” as the judgement of him/the side acting.

**Reality as reality does not know of ideal types, so ideal types cannot give any practical normative advice or orientation.**

Clausewitz had a consciousness of the theoretical advantages of ideal-typical procedure.

**Since theory can “never include inside itself the authentic individual case”, it must “rest on categories of phenomena”** (p. 288).
Our perceptions constitute “clarity, certainty and strength” when we make the object of our observations “full”, “extreme” opposites – without forgetting we are dealing with helpful construct(ion)s and that “the concrete/specific situation of war is found for the most part in the middle, and is governed by the extreme only to the extent it approaches the extreme” (p. 859).

With the two kinds/forms of war as ideal types, there is also the knowledge that in reality as reality in concrete circumstances/situations there will be all sorts of situations in which the elements of the war of annihilation and of restricted/ limited war could and will be mixed with each other absolutely.

In Clausewitz’s historically oriented mind, it seems that the concrete multiformity prevailed over ideal-typical classification.

The term “two kinds” appears only once in the notes of 1827, though in the complete chapter of the main work, there is reference to “one kind” and “the other kind”.

The vast, historical multiformity of war with all kinds of gradations (p. 212; cf. Hintze).

It would be scholastic to put all the sorts of ends/goals and means into categories (pp. 211ff., 216).

There are no criteria which can be linearly applied to multifarious reality via a complex theory (In a note of 1803 (Polit. Schriften, p. 3) we read: “there are two kinds of coalitions in politics; without delay, the destruction or the subjugation of the foe, and, the intent to weaken, to break up etc. the state, against which the coalition turns, and the state, with which the coalition takes
place”. In *Strategie* (p.51) in 1804 Clausewitz writes that war can be of two kinds:

1) annihilation of foe/enemy and the dissolution of the state

2) the imposition of certain terms in a peace treaty.

In both cases the destruction of the enemy armed forces is sought).

[[One can definitely see though the source of Clausewitz’s two basic/fundamental kinds of war (for both barbarism and culture) as pure war and real (forms of) war potentially emerging in his stance of 1804...]]

**In this early phase of Clausewitz’s thought, the Prussian, as great as his mind was, could not and did not conceptually comprehend historical multiformity...**

RE: “tact of judgement”, the two ideal types [[of real war = war of annihilation, and, restricted/limited war]], as well as the synopsised within them infinite individual cases [[= various forms of war]], all belong to the united concept of war as the concept of pure/unmixed war.

No matter how much a real war diverges from the concept of war “it is found under this strict concept as its highest law” (p. 230. P.K. cannot understand how Kessel thinks Clausewitz thought there was only one kind of war, which does not belong to the absolute concept of war, not even to its modification (“Genesis”, p. 414). Kessel against Liddell Hart wanted the war of annihilation as proximate with the pure concept in the sphere of fictitious construct(ion)s. Clausewitz did not in the 8th Book do what Kessel thinks,

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for Clausewitz called the first kind of war as the subjugation of the enemy a “fundamental idea”, and the second kind of war as “its modification” (pp. 957ff., cf. p. 975). **What Clausewitz did in daring fashion in the 8th Book is that he took Napoleonic war which he used to call “absolute”, and said it is**
not and cannot be pure/unmixed war. And Kessel does not get that. Clausewitz wrote that pure war inheres in all wars, and thus Napoleonic war is not pure war, whereas Kessel said that pure war does not exist in the second kind of war which is separate from the Napoleonic war of annihilation.

Clausewitz NEVER said that extreme goals/ends are not allowed to be striven after, but he said that the extreme intensity of forces in the sense of pure war cannot be achieved – but it is permitted, and it can be achieved in the sense of war of annihilation “when the nature of the circumstances commands a war of the first kind” (p. 212).

The law that the outcome of war is determined by the weapons applies to both kinds of war and all possible variations [= other forms of war], even when there is no real battle (p. 225).

All wars are by means of weapons, but there is a “multiformity of application of the means [of weapons]” (p. 225).

The basic forms of armed struggle, defence and attack/offence, belong in all kinds/forms of war, but a variety of strategies and tactics are possible.

Strategic attack/offence is not precluded when the political end/goal is limited/restricted (p. 984), and even when we seek something negative [= ?expect to lose?], our military aim can still be the annihilation of p. 109

inimical armed forces (p. 228).

One cannot though subjugate the enemy when one choses strategic defence on a permanent basis.

[Whereas a pathetic, parasitic Protectorate with a pathetic, parasitic Elite (and people) = Greece... doesn’t even have permanent strategic defence... only permanent
strategic appeasement and conceding territory... as well as sucking Imperialist Overlord (USA and or German) ??k...]]

Delbrück believes that great ends/goals can be achieved only with manoeuvres under certain conditions, whereas Clausewitz is unclear. Perhaps the strategy of attrition/wearing down/corrosion [[which is a means]] could be used to subjugate a foe, though Clausewitz doesn’t either confirm or deny such a possibility expressly.

Rothfels, Schering, Hintze, Kessel; the four of them against Delbrück say:

the strategy of subjugation and the strategy of attrition [[i.e. a means]] do not coincide with the two basic kinds/forms of war because they constitute kinds of strategy and not kinds of war.

Delbrück’s other opponents, Hobohm and Szczepanski, thought that they could explain a kind of war based only on aims/ends.

Creuzinger correctly explained the disproportionality between goal/end and mode of waging war.

Leaning one-sidedly either towards the concept of end/goal, or the concept of means = insufficient, which Clausewitz at least sensed.

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No matter what is put down on paper, in the hour of ACTION, THE ACT, the end/goal and the means are shaped in the struggle of the active subjects whereby the supreme law is the maintenance/preservation and intensification of one’s own power, i.e. maintenance/preservation through intensification.

So much takes place as to perception, actions and reactions etc. in the heat of battle and each side “imposes its law on the other” (p. 194).

Ready made plans = subjective logic,
BUT the objective logic = armed struggle,

and the former retreats re: the latter.

And the actual armed struggle can culminate in extreme forms.

The continual intensification of preparation is bothered by the “counter-balance of the internal situation”, so a “middle path/road” needs to be found (p. 960).

There is great pressure in the heat of the battle. Even if one side want to use limited/restricted means, it must be prepared to go further, always in fear of what the enemy might do...

Subjective politics depends on objective politics, as the former cannot set goals/ends willy-nilly, i.e. regardless of the (supposed) ends/goals of the foe, nor can it not use the most effective means.

Whoever does not make the greatest possible effort runs the risk of his opponent doing so (Feldzugspläne Friedrichs); precisely because of that, “the simultaneous use of all the forces is found deep in the nature of strategy” (Feldzug von 1796).

Only rarely can someone get by with only manoeuvres when the foe seeks the decisive battle; the

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strategic manoeuvre presupposes a balance of forces and situations whereby the decisive outcome is avoided simply because neither of the two sides seeks such a decisive outcome (p. 183).

If one side wishes and strives to go to extremes, then it imposes its law on the other side, i.e. it negatively determines the means and ends/goals of the other side. Deciding to “go down the path of the great armed decision” most likely will succeed if the other side does not want to follow.
One can seek victory by limited/restricted means, but should not be caught out e.g. you go to engage in sword-fighting and the enemy turns up with heavy sabres (p. 229).

We must always follow the foe, what he is doing. And our behaviour is determined on the basis of his behaviour.

This does not mean a lack of originality, but a vitally necessary vigilance.

Because everyone is what his foe forces him to be – provided that one is in a position to leave the historical and social nought/zero/nothing and appear as the foe of someone.

The ultimate wisdom of praxeology is that there cannot exist any other praxeology, and any other teaching about means and ends, apart from that dictated to us by our foe on each and every respective occasion.

6. Method and philosophy

Clausewitz’s methods and methodology have a permanent value just as his positions on question of content.

Clausewitz combined simplicity with common sense and flexibility, and his overall method lacks in nothing compared to the best of the 20th century [[read: Max Weber, Simmel, von Wiese, Durkheim re: social facts (only), and ??]] without becoming lost in supposedly profound scholasticisms.

Clausewitz benefitted from the fact that in his times the sector of ideas did not suffer a methodological hypertrophy; and that kind of human who in all seriousness [[!!!!]] dealt exclusively with
methods and nothing else, was not in existence. The fact that Clausewitz did not have any relation to philosophy as a specific branch, probably benefitted his thought.

Clausewitz’s intellectual(-spiritual) achievement constitutes in itself a clear verification of the age-old supposition that philosophical education in the narrowest sense does not in the least constitute a conditio sine qua non of thought with high demands

\[\text{[[!!! P.K. can’t help himself!!! HAHAHAHAHA!!]]}\].

In his younger days, Clausewitz combatted the geometric method particularly because of its wish to enclose by force the vacillating, interchanging and polymorphous object (i.e. war) into a strict system, in order to impose universal and invariable laws to a material which of its nature was resistant to that.

Clausewitz stressed the “peculiarity” and the “extremely individual features” of each and every specific case, as well as the plasticity or vacillations of ethical factors.

In his maturity he combined such observations with a grand-scale historical way of looking at things and praxeology.

“In war so many insignificant, trivial instances appear, which also determine the act/action, such that for someone to try to include all of that duly in the abstract sentences of theory, he/that someone would seem like a great scholastic/pedantic/finicky person and would become commonplace to the point of disgust” (Strategie, p. 71). \[\text{[[Even Clausewitz felt disgust!...]]}\]
Re: *war*, we should not take logical types as seriously as in philosophy and mathematics;

rather, we ought to find the general in “most cases” (“Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg”) ... as opposed to those who invent theories and hasten to attribute to this or that axiom the predicate of the generality, showing that they don’t understand what the essence of a theory is (*Die Feldzüge von 1799*).

From such one-sided generalisations there result abstract, albeit “lustrous”, systems, which in the end lose contact with reality.

[[CLAUSEWITZ IN HIS SHEER BRILLIANCE IS DESCRIBING WHAT HAPPENS IN ALL IDEOLOGICAL THEORIES AND THAT WOULD INCL. ALL OF TODAY’S RIDICULOUS “THEORISATIONS” OF “DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, OTHERNESS, SUPREMACY, OPPRESSION ETC.”, WHICH HAVE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS MAKING SPECIFIC POWER CLAIMS OF CONTROL AND DOMINATION BEHIND THEM, AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING OR NEXT TO NOTHING OR NOT (THAT) MUCH (AT BEST) TO DO WITH SCIENCE]]

*Clausewitz wants theory to relate to the phenomena of the world as the world is*, what is understood must be united and merged with the existent; and

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according to the texture of the object, either the theoretical or the historical aspect will take precedence (“Charakteristik Scharnhorsts”).

How though do we avoid short-sighted infertile empiricism as well as empty theorisation?

*Clausewitz is convinced that it is not enough to look at an isolated fact = the surface of things, not the depth of reality.*
Every isolated fact needs to be illuminated from a higher vantage point with its inclusion in broader interrelations in order to find out what of essence is inside it.

“The nature of things” or the “internal interrelation” of things (pp.335, 339, 340) is emphasised, and he points out cases “where the deep hidden interrelation of things is not embodied in visible phenomena” (p. 330; cf. p. 640: “the general circumstances which dominate in the depths-depths”).

Also, the individual case in itself is not conducive to theoretical processing nor direct and full inclusion in theory. So, theory must be oriented to the “categories of phenomena” (p. 288).

And theory must be “the separation of non-homogenous things” (p. 271), and hence there must be reference to differentia specifica.

Which means that reality is fragmented into various poles, around which gather the formal and characteristic qualities/properties on each and every respective occasion.

It is of value to focus on those poles where the “extreme opposites” are visible or “the extreme form of every process”, and indeed in the knowledge of the fact that most concrete/specific cases are not acted out at those poles, but move somewhere between them (p. 859).

[[THIS IS NOT THAT FAR FROM SIMMEL AND KONDYLIS RE: THE SPECTRUM OF THE SOCIAL RELATION!!]]

Focus on the extremes is not to ignore the vast majority of phenomena = quantity,

but to focus on the qualitative differences which the extremes show us.
The intellectually intensified reality of theory has more internal truth than the reality of direct experience; if the latter wants to become theory, it needs to be intensified, to be concentrated, to be purified.

[[This (above and below) = the basis for the ideal type]]

Theory can comprehend the nature and the internal interrelation of things only through abstractions and fictitious construct(ion)s, and it does that always having a consciousness of the difference between the logical level, i.e. the level of cohesive intellectual comprehension, and the level where real cases are acted out.

P.K. gives us two examples by Clausewitz from Die Feldzüge von 1799 where Clausewitz acknowledges the gap between reality and the theoretical comprehension or way of looking at such reality.

The content of theory is not just about the logically faultless putting in a chain of autonomous fictitious constructs and abstractions, but rather arises from the ceaseless comparison of such construct(ion)s and abstractions with specific cases and situations in their individuality. That way, both the theoretical and real dimensions are continually present in their necessary connection and divergence.

Progress in theory happens not when we just distance ourselves from the individual and unrepeatable, but rather with the refinement of general concepts, which makes smaller such general concepts’ distance from the individual case, giving them the possibility of

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undergoing the test of comparison with experience.
In practice, all this boils down to the skill of the analyst/observer/scientist in selecting the material, covering all the relevant points in question, and presenting the material in a way which stands the test of reality/experience.

“The abstraction succeeds absolutely as to its purpose/goal, when by doing/making the abstraction nothing is lost in respect of all that belongs to the thing [[= phenomenon being observed]]” (Strategie, p. 82).

The intellectual skill and maturity needed to set out an adequate theory is the highest imaginable in order to be able to be logical and accurately observe human affairs. As in praxis/practise, so too in theory the “tact of judgement” is decisive.

Key is what happens in concreto with theory, not the plain abstract formulation. One only needs to think of Clausewitz’s “pure/unmixed war” to see how great he was. Clausewitz formed his method separate to/apart from classical German philosophy, in the light of the political and historical world. Herein is his essential difference from every philosophical, i.e. ontological or epistemological undertaking.

For Clausewitz, there is no philosophy as mater scientiarum. For Clausewitz, philosophical investigations seem to have an “unfortunate mania for abstractions”, and the Germans need to free themselves of such abstractions in order to learn from the French “to think clearly and specifically on the matters of the state and society” (“Umtriebe”).

Clausewitz felt he was only able to be really interested in historical and political matters/themes/topics (Epistle to his fiancé, 3.10.1807), and he was not at all interested in “unmanly mysticisms” etc. (Epistle to his fiancé, 17.8.1808).

[[HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!]]
Philosophy for Clausewitz is not content, but form. It’s the abstraction in theory that can be useful. Philosophy and experience are fused in theory just as conceptuality, logic and ideal-typical construct(ion) are fused with material reality (p. 184). Philosophy is not the whole body/corpus of theory but only its conceptual aspect. Empirical data/facts = another aspect. The continuous comparison of theory with experience depends more on the “tact of judgement” than on learned logical-philosophical rules/norms.

The little Clausewitz absorbed from the philosophy of his era (especially through the Kantianism of Kiesewetter) more than likely helped him through the formal principles of structuring and as a means of intellectual-spiritual disciplining (Rothfels; cf. Linnebach).

Yet no similarities can be ascertained betwixt Clausewitz’s analyses and the texts of known German philosophers of his epoch (Cf. Schering, Creuzinger’s amateurish, baseless attempt to convert Clausewitz into a Hegelian was exposed by and in Bleich).

There were various attempts to pigeon-hole Clausewitz according to ideological preferences e.g. as a part of “German humanism” in the liberal interpretation of Clausewitz, whereas the Marxist-Leninists wanted Clausewitz proximate to Hegel and the “progressive” thought of the times.

If we want to classify Clausewitz in the history of ideas, then he does not belong to a certain German intellectual-spiritual tendency, but rather is in the tradition of
European pragmatic political thought, whose starting point and high point, peak, pinnacle in the New Times is Machiavelli.

Clausewitz wrote: “no book in the world is so necessary for a politician than Machiavelli”, and when he characterises Machiavelli’s opponents with disdain he calls them “a kind of humanistic little teachers” and “humanitarian ethicists”, and had studied Machiavelli already in his youth (“Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1807/8” + Strategie, pp. 41, 42). Clausewitz shared in Machiavelli’s anthropological presuppositions, the related perception of politics as power politics, and a purely earthly of this world contemplation of human affairs, as well as the historical-political feeling of the peculiarity of every specific case, of the continuous transformations and displacements of every political conjuncture. [ [= ABSOLUTELY BRILLIANT]]

For Clausewitz, the second “top thinker” of politics was Montesquieu (Pol. Schriften, p. 4) [ [A pretty fucking good choice, I’d say!!!]]. In Montesquieu, Clausewitz saw the historical world unfold in its infinite material, political and intellectual-spiritual-ethical multiformity, and by observing that GRAND PANORAMA, Clausewitz could refine his own contemplation of things. It is doubtful though as to whether Clausewitz was taught anything by
the way Montesquieu develops his conceptuality in order to intellectually subjugate historical multiformity, even though there are some similarities (Cf. R. Aron).

Clausewitz’s method matured longer after reading Montesquieu, and reflected on Montesquieu as lacking in system, strict coherence,... in the presentation of his material, whereas Clausewitz wanted to analyse and systematise (p. 175). General Clausewitz was interested in the historical-sociological causal aspect of Baron Montesquieu’s thought, and not those aspects under the influence of natural law. The clash/contrast of/between causal and normative consideration as we see in Montesquieu (Kondylis, Aufklärung), is totally missing from Clausewitz’s consistent historical and descriptive positioning.

**Clausewitz’s proximity to the historical and sociological Montesquieu simultaneously shows his proximity to the Enlightenment as a whole. The Enlightenment first disclosed and opened up for investigation the historical universe in its multiformity and its multi-layered nature as well as its determination by material and social factors** (Kondylis, loc. cit.).

Clausewitz adopts some essential commonplaces of the anthropology of the Enlightenment: he sees man in his tangible corporeality and explains e.g. the differences in psycho-somatic constitution with the particular texture of the neurological system, that “amphibian”, which ties matter and spirit to each other (p. 241). **Clausewitz also, based on such an anthropological perception, attributes to feeling the most important role as motive force, and belongs to the anti-intellectualistic mainstream of the Enlightenment when he combats abstract systems, and vis-a-vis the logical activity of the intellect, he gives priority to the “tact of judgement”, to that peculiar refined instinct** (see Kondylis, loc. cit.).
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So, from the point of view of Clausewitz’s relationship with the Enlightenment, it is clear how little he owes to “philosophy”, and indeed to then current German philosophy.

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II. Excursus/Digression A: “Politicians” and “Soldiers/Military Officers”

The dominant liberal interpretation of Clausewitz confuses the issue of the relations(hip) between politics and war, with the issue of the relations between politicians and soldiers, and contends that from the theoretical subjugation of war to politics, automatically one deduces the practical command of the subjugation of military principles to policies/politics, which supposedly adopt a moderate stance, either by obstructing, hindering war or keeping policy within “logical” limits/confines.

Clausewitz by no means ever agreed that behind every war are warmongering soldiers/generals.

Clausewitz’s theory of the unity of politics and war came out of general historical musings, and was never put forward for the purpose of theoretically justifying the primacy of political government vis-a-vis military command (as liberal interpreters of Clausewitz do).

In any event in Clausewitz’s day, Napoleon was both military Chief and political Chief, and most of the political and military leaderships were from the same social classes which gave some internal homogeneity between “politicians” and “soldiers/military officers”.

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Clausewitz does not support political governmental primacy over the military because of the former’s popular “legitimacy” as liberals did, but because war is a part and continuation of political communication. Clausewitz is not concerned with the technical difference between politician and soldier but with the difference between the political and military perspective (pp. 994, 993). Since the political perspective comprehends all of the political communication as a whole, it must be imposed and decided what the character of the war will be in order to set out the war plan and determine the “guiding lines” of its conduct.

Clausewitz though is fully aware of the fluctuating complexity of reality, and highlights the very frequent political inadequacy of government e.g. when politics diverges from its destination (pp. 995, 993).

So, of course a soldier/general might support a more “political” position than a politician etc. and in any event, generals are aware of the political perspective as they are public men (p. 250).

And the most important politicians must be familiar with military matters so that the aims of war and the political goals are “adapted to the texture of the means” (p. 210; cf. Gembruch’s well-aimed observations).

Thus, unless there is some kind of “imperfection in the comprehension of things”, it is self-evident that the military command/principle must be subjugated to the political command/principle in the sense of understanding the whole mechanics and dynamics of political communication.
Such a perception is not in line with today’s liberal [as ideology] perceptions, and if we wanted to compare it to the 20th century, it is more in line with the Soviet rather than the Western model.

Clausewitz has no objections to the uniting of political and military leadership “in one person”, in fact he views such unity as more conducive to efficiency so that the politics can be in tune with the means of war etc.. In any event, at the very least, the Commander in Chief/Supreme General should sit on the Council of Ministers of the government (p. 669).

*Whatever the structure, the key is if political and military perspectives can see eye to eye and be co-ordinated* (see e.g. Oncken “Politics”; cf. Sczepanski, *Politik*).

A clash of perspectives can exist within the same person when the military commander is the political commander.

**And a clear separation between politicians and soldiers guarantees nothing of itself as to co-ordination.**

Sometimes political persons

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can weigh up military matters better than military officers and vice versa.

**Neither the recipes of the “rule of law state”, or the dictates of a dictator, can be substitutes for the “tact of judgement”**.

In the 19th century, the increasing professionalisation and specialisation of soldiers (Huntington), and the rise and imposition of the liberal perception of popular rule and the rule of law state for the first time created the problems between politicians and soldiers/military officers we know today. *The greater*
reliance on technology etc. made the gap in knowledge of military matters between soldiers and politicians greater than ever before, incl. because of the gradual abolition of the social domination of the aristocracy, which used to provide much of the military and civilian-political leadership. Also, there was a fragmentation of politics into factions and parties, so the military elite felt that they were in existence above and beyond petty party politics. However, P.K. knows of no case in 19th century European history where the military leadership doubted the right of the government of the day to declare and end war or to determine the extent of war preparations.

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Generals/Soldiers did claim a right to determine the means for the achievement of victory in war due to their specialist knowledge.

They were not though coup plotters. So, the difference between political and military perspectives does not coincide with the distinction between politicians and soldiers/generals/military officers.

The clashes between Bismarck and Moltke at the time of the Franco-Prussian war are indicative. In 1871, for Moltke, strategy might be used for political ends/goals, but the military means to achieve the political goals set was the business of the soldiers/generals.

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Moltke called for independence of action for the army for reasons of technical expediency, and not with any serious intent to co-determine long-term political decisions.

Von der Goltz, referring to Clausewitz, had a similar view. The reasons for war are political. Good politics is necessary. War serves politics best when the enemy if fully vanquished (Moltke, Scherff).
Likewise, v. Seeckt. A general has full responsibility to exterminate the enemy in accordance with the order received from politicians.

Sczcepanski distinguishes between management of war, management of the armed forces, and management of military units.

C. 1900, Moltke’s basic position was fully accepted by military authors who gave an even greater role to the political leadership, and hence diverged from Moltke: e.g. Verdy du Vernois opposed Clausewitz’s view on “full independence” of strategy from politics

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as to the conduct of the military undertakings. Of course, political goals often cannot be achieved without military might.

V. Caemmerer agrees with v. Verdy that politics had to influence the course of military ventures.

Blume went for a sophisticated intermediate position and in opposition to v. Caemmerer agreed with Moltke about military tactics during the siege of Paris, but was against full operational independence.

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In agreement with Blume re: the co-ordination of military and political leaderships and the circumstantial autonomy for the military during military campaigns, was v. Freytag-Loringhoven, agreeing with Clausewitz that what was damaging was not the influence of politics, but bad politics.

Likewise, Bernhardi, who wrote about the political character of war. When the political situation changes, then politics can set new duties for the waging of war and the Head General/Marshall/Chief of the General Staff cannot decide what is possible in war. Yet politics must take the military factors seriously into consideration and not get involved in the actual conduct of military operations.
Moltke = correct tactics during the Paris siege.

A number of military writers understood that what counted is what happened in concrete circumstances and not the various positionings as recipes on paper (Binder von Krieglstein incl. re: characters of both political and military personnel. But, of course, the system of war in place is most crucial of all – a good understanding between politicians and soldiers/generals means nothing if...).

In the context of the ideology of the victors of WW2, the view was promulgated that at least after 1870/71 German generals/soldiers had broken away from the spirit of Clausewitz and doubted the primacy of politics, leading to the final catastrophe (Marwedel, who cites texts out of context). Things are NOT so simple. The theoretical confession of faith in the absolute primacy of politics guarantees nothing (in terms of military victory), e.g. Hitler.

Clausewitz spoke of the influence of the political leadership on “basic points” of military activity and believed that one did not define patrols in accordance with political motives (pp. 996, 992).

Obviously, there is more autonomy re: tactics, but tactics are always connected to strategy which is connected to politics.

The drawing of boundaries between the competencies of soldiers/generals and politicians is essentially a matter of interpretation and it will always remain thus.

After the brilliant and much admired by friends and foes alike accomplishments of the Prussian military leadership in the wars of 1866 and 1870/71, a self-
conviction was created and reflected in the rich Prussian military literature of 1870 to 1914. Even the French General Iung refers expressly to the teachings of the “Prussians” and the relations between politics and war, saying that politics ought to define the goals/ends of war and thereafter their achievement is to be left to the soldiers/generals.

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Iung was of the view that politics only is involved in choosing the goal, and thereafter politics only functions indirectly via influence, otherwise tactics are the domain of military personnel.

Colonel Colin just before WW1 in a very widely read book (*Transformations*) = once a war begins, it’s very important the (Commanding) General/Field Marshal have complete freedom to wage war as he sees fit.

Foch as a war specialist felt like a stranger re: politics. See J. King re: when French military officers temporarily took over state power and in peace negotiations.

In Great Britain, the army had a big say on British world politics (McDermott).

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Engels wrote in the *New York Daily Tribune* of the particular role of the military factor against “politics” (2.2.1854). Diplomacy can’t do much without stuffing things up once military operations are underway.

Both Churchill and Stalin knew of military matters in quite a bit of depth (Possony re: Stalin).

Wallach admits that Hitler until 1941 correctly applied Clausewitz’s principles but did not listen to his generals as things turned sour for Germany.
There is no causal interrelation between the weakness of the political leadership vis-a-vis soldiers/generals, and the extreme intensity of war.

**What in the 20th century was called “total war” did not arise from the sudden strengthening of military personnel as opposed to the political leadership,** even though some events of WWI could give that misleading impression. Yet only after the war had become “total” did the generals get stronger. Before 1914, the military plans were for a short war.

In WW2, there were no Foch or Ludendorff, and the political leaderships were in full command. **In the national-socialistic literature, Schmithener condemns the attempts of military personnel to become autonomous vis-a-vis politics (just like an “anti-militaristic liberal”!!!)** and attacks Blume and Bernhardi on operational autonomy.

Foertsch went further and saw politics as determining even military operations, and not just deciding the start and finish of war, or the goals and the finding of means. Foertsch even criticises Ludendorff, supporting Bismarck against Moltke (Ludendorff misunderstands Clausewitz because the latter focused more on foreign policy than internal politics

because the first concern was the survival of the people, and [Clausewitz understood history primarily as the fighting between peoples](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clausewitz), Clausewitz however did look into the interrelation between foreign politics/policy and domestic/internal politics/policy esp. re: the wars of revolutionary France. Ludendorff also confuses restricted and non-restricted/limited war and total war. **Total war preparations were something that liberal governments did too,** so there is no necessary correlation between total war and totalitarian governments. Ludendorff made the common mistake made today that
Clausewitz held that politics = moderation. And we know that that is definitely not the case.

Peace cannot be supported by stupid arguments not based on (historical) reality.

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**III. Excursus/Digression B: War of Annihilation, Total War, Atomic/Nuclear War**

The key to Clausewitz and the subjugation of the military leadership to politics is understanding the notion of the primacy of the political perspective vis-a-vis the military perspective (which both politicians and soldiers/generals can have), and not the formal hierarchisation of authority and responsibilities in a liberal polity.

Clausewitz’s notion of friction referring to anthropology and the philosophy of culture, included everything between the notion of “pure/unmixed war” and all the possible forms of real war.

The most intense form of war for Clausewitz could never be like “pure war”. However, in the 20th century forms of “total war” and atomic war came about which were much more harmful than the real wars of Clausewitz’s day. What does this mean for Clausewitz’s theory and for friction?

There are many legends and misunderstandings surrounding the deduction of total and atomic war from war of annihilation, which drew a straight line from Moltke to Schlieffen and Hitler.

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We shall look at the historical character of the two world wars and the conceptual texture of atomic war.
In Clausewitz, the term “annihilation” exclusively refers to (inimical) armed forces, and of course does not mean their physical annihilation, but rather bringing them to a state in which they cannot continue armed struggle (p. 215).

Annihilation also referred to the morale of the armed forces, not just their physical situation (p. 226).

Various references to “annihilation” in Clausewitz (pp. 391, 392, 508, 510, 517, 228, 423, 225; cf. p. 949).

The fact that the main aim of acts of war is annihilation of armed forces which is done mainly in battle = the central significance of the battle in war (p. 467).

Though, the goal of the battle and the annihilation of enemy armed forces constitute a simple means in relation to the ultimate war goal/end (p. 221, 223, 225).

Not all wars are wars of annihilation only because in every war the goal of a/the battle is the annihilation of the enemy armed forces.

The war of annihilation is of course at the antipodes of armed observation and one must have the intention re: the former to subjugate the enemy (pp. 201, 200).

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Subjugation as a goal/end of a war of annihilation consists in the neutralisation of enemy armed forces, the conquering of the enemy country, and indeed the enemy capital city incl. the dissolution of state power and of political organisations, and the ending of enemy will/volition, so that the foe/enemy cannot continue resistance (pp. 214ff., 977).
Many have observed that Clausewitz does not talk of the destruction of animals and goods based on “total mobilisation”, which later was called “total war” (Linnebach, Boehm-Tettelbach).

Moltke had focused on destroying enemy forces and not gaining (a piece of) (any) land, nor on the extensive destruction of enemy human and economic forces. Moltke had in mind the relatively harmless example of 1870/71 re: economy, railways, food supplies, even prestige. Moltke was of the view that the need for speediness comes about from the fact that a modern developed economy is so complicated and sensitive that it cannot withstand a long interruption or an expensive war. Clausewitz referred to the importance of speed of war re: supplies (p. 586).

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Von der Goltz saw that the notion of annihilation was different in his day than in the Napoleonic age.

Von der Goltz did not differ much from Clausewitz on annihilation and re: economic war his positions were basically the same as Moltke.

The key to “annihilation” is to bring the foe to such a state that he himself feels he is unable to continue in war.

If need be, i.e. if there is still resistance, the capital must be occupied as well as ports, warehouses, the most important transportation arteries, forts, factories producing armaments. Economic war therefore comes last if the foe is still trying to battle on and still maintains hopes of...

“We do not defeat the enemy by totally destroying his physical existence, but by annihilating his hope to win” (von der Goltz).

This perception = key for wars of 1866 and 1870/71 whereby a strategy of annihilation was used for limited/restricted political goals/ends.
Delbrück went so far as to say that the final political goal/aim of war determines p. 139 directly, strategy. For the Prussian soldiers/generals there was no economic war at that time, and the army waged war without depending on the military mobilisation of the whole country (Ludendorff).

**On the lead up to WW1, Schlieffen’s military planning had as its major concern to avoid a protracted war.** [[Not a very successfully carried out plan!!!]] He wanted a quick victory via war of annihilation. His view was that because of the millions of people involved, prolonged wars could not be sustained incl. re: the economy. Also, since 1870/71, Germany had lost the numerical advantage re: France – another reason for a quick, decisive campaign.

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Front to front war would be prolonged and then what happened in the Russo-Japanese war would repeat itself – two mass armies with modern firearms/guns/cannons facing each other with no decisive victory.

What happened in September 1914 proved Schlieffen 100% correct on this point. And there was also the fear of intervention of other Powers, so a quick outcome was even more desirable.

Schlieffen’s critics focused on his underrating of the ethical factor and overrating of grand plans of a great circular movement (Bernhardi; Schlichtung; Mette).

Of course, the facts showed that high level of morale of themselves mean nothing. Reference to Craig.

**P.K. = if Germany had won quickly then very likely the fatal for Germany intervention of the Americans would not have taken place.**
Moltke had already stressed the need for the precise assessment of the general situation before deciding on a strategy of annihilation (the political situation determines whether one seeks the annihilation of the opponent, or one treads on a more secure path of a series of less decisive victories).

*It is sheer conceptual confusion to say that Schlieffen’s plan was not “political” or was “purely military” because it was set out/drawn up exclusively by military personnel and because it violated Belgium’s neutrality. Schlieffen provided his plans in good time to the political leadership so that it could approve or reject the plans.*

The fact is that before 1914 the German General Staff had not displayed aggressiveness re: war even in times of crisis. There is no reason whatsoever to exclude the possibility that even if in Germany there was less “military spirit” (which is a dubious accusation on the facts), a political government without a trace of “militarism” would not have opted for a rapid victory in a rapid war of annihilation.

In that case, the violation of Belgium’s neutrality would show that liberal governments are not necessarily less prone than “military-based” governments to violations of international law.

[[One only needs to think of the fate of international law under USA tutelage...
HahahahaHa... international law a la carte... etc. That’s not to say that having another World Super Power would make things any “better”!!! In fact, the likely outcome of a sudden shift in the world correlation of forces is a lot of trouble, to say the least...]]

E.g. the transgression of Norwegian neutrality at the beginning of WW2 by liberal governments of the West, which had the German invasion as a consequence (Liddell Hart).
There were inherent reasons for Germany to act the way she did incl. that if she did not violate Belgium’s neutrality and take advantage of that, there was no guarantee that France would have respected the neutrality, or that Great Britain would have depended on the said violation as to its participation for war. There was a numerical disadvantage on the German side as well, which placed serious obstacles in the way of a strategy of immediately breaking of the enemy’s Front. So, a liberal German government could just as easily for practical reasons followed the same course.

*Only very naive people without historical evidence connect the non-military to the ethical and the humanitarian.*

[[ONLY A RETARD WOULD THINK THAT E.G. IRAN, NORTH KOREA ETC. “SHOULD NOT” HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF ETHICS. THE ONLY FACTOR AT PLAY IS POWER AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES, AND ALL THE FAIRY STORIES ABOUT “HUMAN RIGHTS” AND “DEMOCRACY” ARE FOR THE RETARDED AND THOSE IN CONTROL (FOR NOW – and theoretically, that NOW could last for decades, or even centuries,... but somehow it doesn’t seem like it’s going to be centuries at the rate the WEST is SPINNING TOTALLY OUT OF CONTROL and EATING ITSELF FROM THE INSIDE...)]]

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**Cheap ex post facto wisdom is the wisdom of the victor.**

Especially in liberal France, but all over Europe, the military leadership had full widespread support for military build-up. See von der Goltz already before 1900.

Schlichting was of the view that the new firearms/guns/cannons would favour defence only in the first phase, but in the second phase they would provide the annihilation force in attack/offence.

The perfection of arms favours attack/offence more than defence = Hoppenstedt, which the European observers of the Russo-Japanese war thought (Howard).
Whilst Bernhardi agreed with Clausewitz that defence is a more powerful form of struggle vis-a-vis attack/offence, the modern firearms/cannons etc. aided attack/offence.

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Blume wrote about defence being made stronger by the new weapons technology, but attack/offence was given possibilities too, incl. re: ethical factors.

V. Caemmerer was in a minority in advising for moderation, following Clausewitz.

The military literature c. 1900 in France shows much more enthusiasm for attack/offence than in Germany. The French quoted many Germans, and one could say that French military thinking at that time was simply a radicalisation of German thinking.

Even the left-wing in France talked of revanche for 1870/71.

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But e.g. based on a genuine peoples’ army etc. without reference to German militarism (Jaurés).

Jaurés attacked French admirers of Clausewitz like Gilbert, and saw Napoleon as the burier of revolutionary war, and that the Prussians just copied Napoleon.

Foch frequently cites Moltke, Willisen, Clausewitz and von der Goltz to call modern at that time warfare “struggles between peoples” incl. mobilising all the intellectual-spiritual and material forces of a country at war.

Foch was not an original thinker on war. Nearly everyone in France c. 1890 agreed upon war of annihilation and the appropriation of the “Prussians”.

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General Derrécagaix in a much-read manual invoking von der Golz with full self-conviction wrote: “Attack/offence is the only possible
choice of a general if he wants to win”.

For Derrécagaix, a quick and intense war based on decisive attack/offence was absolutely necessary. However, Germany did have the advantage in Lorraine.

Bonnal and the school of “counterattack”, which was opposed by the supporters of pure/unmixed attack/offence... up to Joffre as Head of the General Staff and the war plan of 1913.

Foch too supported “pure attack/offence”, and emphasised the decisive attack/offence.

Following Foch,

Grandmaison rejected the school of counterattack, which became popular just before WW1.

By focusing on defensive “guarantees” in counterattack there would be a fragmentation of forces and a paralysis of the offensive/attacking spirit and the taking of the initiative. Defence = lower morale.

Attack/offence = strengthening the self-conviction of the troops and their mobility, incl. the advantage of surprise.

Grandmaison is simply reiterating the “Prussian” stance that only in attack/offence can one fully make use of the decisive ethical factor.

He laughs off accusations of Germanophilia, and says that he is radicalising German ideas to defeat the Germans.
For Grandmaison, Germans are not capable of moving into pure attack/offence mode because their spirit/intellect is too methodical and they take too long on the battlefield etc..

Colin found no preference in Clausewitz for defence over attack/offence, and saw attack/offence as the natural mode of action in war.

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In Great Britain, nearly everyone was in favour of the offensive/attacking character/basic stance and quick ending of a future war (Gooch, Howard) (with the exception referred to by General Bonnal in respect of the lieutenant-colonel of the artillery/firearms/cannons) Maver, who in 1902 under the pseudonym of Manceau wrote about the situation of not being able to successfully break through the enemy’s front and then getting bogged down with the two sides opposing each other at some point such as the sea, a mountain, at the borders of a neutral state [[= VERY, VERY INTERESTING STUFF!!]]

Schlieffen’s basic conviction, following Moltke, that prolonged war was impossible for economic reasons, was widely held in all of Europe incl. Freytag-Loringhoven in Germany.

[[WE ALL KNOW THOUGH WHAT REALLY EVENTUATED – PROLONGED WAR AND a phase in THE PRIMARY FORMATION of the corporate/managerial state and Western mass democracy, and in which in certain countries, particularly after WW2, a certain group GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY came to positions of power and influence...]]

Von der Goltz saw that governments would have to pressure armies to not pause in war for economic reasons, and due to mass armies etc.. Bernhardi did not see economic “catastrophe” from a long war, but a long war would weaken the economy.

Burchardt on the shorter duration of war, spoke of about a year.
French (the author) in Great Britain felt that economic catastrophe would shorten or even prevent a war.

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Schlieffen in almost 15 years never asked for an increase in military personnel for the German army (Ritter: Ludendorff hides the truth, but then makes an indirect admission in 1922 that no-one knew of how long the war would have lasted etc.).

In 1914, German resupplying depended on imports, so that the outcome of war had to be quick (Der Weltkrieg + Dix).

France had mobilised about 90% of its soldiers whereas Germany remained at around 50% on the eve of WW1 (Schmitt + Miksche (on state of armaments/equipment of the two main sides = Germany by no means was in the better position)).

Buat saw that Germany counted on a quick victory, but were not better prepared overall for war.

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Buat opined that if Germany had another 600,000 troops, which it could have had, it would have been able to circle off the left Franco-English wing up to the coast of the North Sea and the Channel Straits, and Great Britain would have been under direct threat as to naval bases etc.!!!

SO, the inadequate preparations for war contributed, somewhat paradoxically, to the prolongation of war, with both lack of arms and lack of supplies at telling points in the war (Wieland, Feldman).

The military situation had no way out when the war economy got under way (French, Woodward, Fontaine, Hardach).
The war of annihilation did not take place, and precisely the belief it was inevitable obstructed adequate preparation.

For the purposes of our way of looking at the problem, **WW1 can be separated into**

a quick first phase of unrealised war of annihilation,

and,

a second phase, which was much longer, in which the battles used up military material and featured an until then unknown and unforeseen intensification of the war economy on the home front.

**It is interesting that something similar applies to WW2, esp. by looking at the efforts of national-socialistic Germany.**

In the first phase of WW2, the war of annihilation on the part of Germany met with success (unlike in WW1) under the notion of “Blitzkrieg”, and this first phase lasted much longer than in WW1,

as well as

in relation to the second phase of “total war”.

**Both world wars show that the German side was economically unprepared for “total war”** (WW1 after the battle of Marni, and WW2 after the German Army got bogged down before Moscow).

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*and precisely because of the belief in a quick victory in a war of annihilation.*

[[One view of voices in the “dissident media” in the West is that if China, Russia, Iran and perhaps also Turkey, pulling Germany along as well, don’t even very loosely come together, then current GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO-led USA could lead everyone straight to HELL (in an attempt to strike before China becomes too powerful etc.)... On the other hand, things are not so simple and clear cut, and usually so many Powers do not just “come together”, and scientifically speaking, no-
one is inherently evil or good, though undoubtedly some appear inherently evil and disgusting to others with their monkey circus/ugliness/sick/vomit civilisation etc... purely as a matter of taste... which, however, is perfectly normal and acceptable to many hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people... “fair enough”... I think I need a Time Machine, and if not that, then the Time to say Good-bye is fast approaching!!! – And no-one here is supporting any kind of National Socialism/Communism, Retards. All that is Desired is Peace and Proportionality, the Golden Mean, but of course such is not the Destiny of Man and Mankind... In the beginning, the APE, in the End, the APE again...]]

Germany, in any event, was probably not in a position to win even with the best of preparation as the forces against it were far greater and e.g. Great Britain had a greater degree of war mobilisation (Carroll).

The National Socialists in attempting to learn the lessons of WW1, comprehended the essential difference between war of annihilation and “total” war. This was understood in East Germany rather than by the Allies as Ethicising Victors. The East Germans saw that the National Socialists were right about the initial phase of the war and about the significance of the air force, tanks, armoured vehicles and submarines (Das Moderne Militärwesen, which saw that whilst Germany got off to a flying start with its Blitzkrieg/war of annihilation, that alone could not decide the outcome of the war, which of course was the case).

**Blitzkrieg was just Hitler updating war of annihilation with modern**

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**weapons technology** etc..

Of course, Hitler’s traumatic experiences from World War One influenced his strategic thought greatly, so that avoiding a repeat of “total” war (or at least of war which was considered as such) became a strategic priority.

As was later observed, “total” war existed as Hitler’s Nemesis, and not as his initial plan (Carroll, who also writes “the inflexible insistence of England, Russia’s refusal to seek peace, and the intervention of the USA, forced Hitler
into conducting the kind of war that he had sworn he would never wage”. Cf. Milward: “Hitler was simply one of the many strategic planners who sought an alternative to the multiple deaths and obviously pointless battles of the artillery and foot soldiers from 1915 to 1918”).

[[NOW, this is very, very interesting, because it shows that Hitler’s subjective political and military campaign decisions did not come out of nowhere, or as the GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONALLY owned and controlled in the USA mass media would tell you “from EVIL” (HAHAHAHAHA), but arose from his interactions in concrete situations with the decisions of those opposed to him. THAT IS HOW social science works – Concrete Situations and Human-Social Interactions AND CUT THE FUCKING BULLSHIT ABOUT “GOOD” and “EVIL” – that is legitimate for the purposes of PROPAGANDA and CONTROL, incl. GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE CONTROL, but it is not SCIENCE...]]

Erfurth, who wanted to return to Schlieffen’s position, argued that military technology and the concentration of power was such that quick victory was possible. Gudrian, likewise, esp. re tanks/armoured vehicles as well as aeroplanes (cf. Eimannsberger). Whereas those who were sceptical about the new weapons believed in a lengthy war (Foertsch, the national socialist).

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National-socialistic Germany DID NOT get into full mobilisation of the economy for war mode because it felt the Blitzkrieg would hand it victory quickly, and only in 1942 did the war economy come into being (Klein).

From 1933-1938, military expenditure in the German economy was less than 40% of state expenditure and about 10% of GDP. This increased greatly in 1938/39, though Germany was producing about the same number of planes as Great Britain and less tanks on a monthly basis. (See Klein, Carroll who stresses that the German economy before 1938 was not a war economy. Cf. Milward).

*Only after the failure of the Blitzkrieg into Russia in 1942 did German armament policy follow in the footsteps of Western Powers*, but Hitler was
particularly reluctant (Milward). There were from 1939 problems with raw materials and production

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and e.g. less ammunition was produced in order to produce more armoured vehicles/tanks.

The view was outside of Germany that national-socialistic Germany was copying “Prussian militarism” re: economy, statism etc. (Szczot).

Some wanted to draw the correct “economic lessons” from WW1 (Hellmer, Korfes) so that Germany would not go unprepared into war ever again.

Quite often we have suggestions of Germany copying the tried and tested examples of Great Britain and the USA, whilst also stressing that the efforts of the state in the sector of the war economy has “limits”.

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So, a balance needs to be found between the necessary “organised war economy” and “peacetime economy” (Rothe).

State intervention in property is inevitable in times of war, but a “prudent government” should proceed carefully and cautiously, sparingly, only as much as necessary (Fischer).

Hellmer on the transition from peacetime preparing for the war economy to the wartime economy. + Korfes.

Hierl referring to France and USA, in agreement with Seeckt, emphasised that the peacetime economy can’t be fully ready re: arms, as arms technology changes rapidly, expenditure is massive,... so one needs to be ready for mass production in the hour of need. But there is rejection of the idea of a professional army.
General Ludendorff is a classic example of the ambiguity and inconsistency of economic preparation for war.

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Ludendorff continues that there are no general principles re: the economy for all countries, but every country should cater to both the people and the army, though he found planned economies to be abominable. “The centralisation of the economy [in WW1], the work of the Jew Walter Rathenau, detracted from everyone creativity and correspondingly acted in slowing down [the economy]”

[[Kondylis makes absolutely no comment about whether Ludendorff was right about Rathenau, and rightly so – it’s obviously not the point]].

The national-socialistic propaganda was geared towards the economy tying into the coming war, but the reality was different from the ideology. Reference to Billman and Blau.

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E. Jünger held that the defeat of 1918 came about because of the lack of truly total mobilisation. Jünger, the man of letters, did not go into details as to how the total mobilisation should have been achieved, and concentrated more on the aesthetic and existential category. The general stance of a Jünger or Ludendorff was like Foch re: WW1 “the extreme utilisation of inspired by flaming passions human masses, which should absorb all the activities of society and adopt totally to its needs the material parts of the system”. Cf. Ludendorf “the texture of total war literally seeks all the strength of the people”.

[[Thus, if the USA had a united home front re: the war in Vietnam, and if it then engaged in even more barbarous warfare (carpet bombings etc.), it could have “won” the war and tortured the Vietnamese people even more so (who in the South got tortured by the Northern forces anyway)... On the other hand, to be fair, the USA as a Power was in a Cold War with another Power and succeeded towards the end of the war in Vietnam to approach another Power, which it wanted to ensure was never close...]]
to the Power which was the main Foe at the time. So, one could say that Nixon/Kissinger displayed rather successful/effective pragmatism and realism from the point of view of the USA...]

The finding of the previous analysis is that the transition to “total war” in the First and the Second World War did not take place on account of the effort to apply the strategy of annihilation in a or b form, but rather because the strategy of annihilation could not be applied with consistency until the end; it is a historical and logical mistake to deduce “total war” from the war of annihilation (Such a deduction was carried out by Wallach. In his passion against the militarism in Schlieffen up to Hitler via Ludendorff, he does not see that even he acknowledged that in 1914 a new era in war had commenced, or that Falkenhayn strove after only restricted/limited ends/goals and did economise forces, and that Hitler in the Russian campaign diverged from the strategy of annihilation against the opinion of his generals).

From the moment the war is transformed into an essentially ceaseless battle of consuming war materials, in which the non-conscripted population participated in part directly (e.g. guerrillas), and in part indirectly (work on the home front), the one and only great and decisive battle with the goal of annihilating enemy forces forever becomes impossible. Such a battle can only take place when “total war”, long war, is not possible. Because “total” mobilisation

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before the war and during war brings about material and human forces, which cannot be annihilated in one and only battle or even in a few battles.

Both in WW1 and WW2 the most significant sides in the war had at their disposal forces able to survive a war of annihilation as they were industrial (potentially) equalised/equalising societies.
SO, the transition from war of annihilation to “total” war constitutes a clear case where – thinking of Clausewitz – objective politics overruled subjective politics. Confirmed in a dramatic way was the notion that enemies “impose their law on one another”, because sooner or later every side had to be totally mobilised for fear of not being able to effectively fight the foe.

Thus, the weakness of subjective politics and the subjugation of the logic of the goal/end to the logic of the means is due to the objective qualities and the dynamics of the situation itself, and NOT to war-mongering generals etc..

This kind of objectively given “political communication” and “social situation” applied to all industrial nations of the first half of the 20th century, and the theory of “total war” was NOT put forward first by representatives of “Prussian militarism”, but in France during WW1 by A. Séché 1915 and G. Blanchoy 1916, summarised by Carroll. + Leon Daudet 1918.

And in the Second World War, the logic of the available means = the logic of the destructive possibilities, which provided the objective politics guiding the action

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of the political governments of the West, which set as their strategic goal the complete annihilation of the foe and oriented themselves more with military than with political motives (see Armstrong’s excellent work incl. why democracies are suited to the ideology and the psychical intent of total war. + also see J.F.C. Fuller).
Going from war of annihilation to “total” war means that in principle the aim now is not the destruction simply of the foe’s armed forces, but the destruction of all of the material and ethical/moral forces of the enemy nation.

[[So, when a Super Power or great Power seeks “regime change” in another country, it is trying to achieve something fundamental without necessarily waging war, i.e. to change the direction or content of the “material and ethical/moral forces of the enemy nation”, i.e. get a change in subjective politics/political communication and at least an adjustment in the objective political communication/politics of that nation, by using and expending local forces/people rather than its own military personnel (which can cause its own domestic political problems), such that that nation comes within the Imperial Orbit or Bloc of the great Power in question... with its “disgusting monkey circus values destroying traditional collective identities”, for instance,... otherwise known as “(individualistic) human rights”... etc., etc., etc.,...]]

There are traces of the notion of “total” war before 1914 in e.g. Delbrück writing about the strategy of wear and tear/attrition rather than subjugating the foe, with two poles, the battle and the manoeuvre, incl. economic damage through destruction, imposition of taxes, impeding trade, and re: naval powers, blockades. Fifteen p. 160

years before WW1, Delbrück in relation to wear and tear/attrition as above held that there could be a prolonged war.

He believed that economic damage could intensify war. Paralysing economic life could make the opponent surrender.

Delbrück never discussed it himself, but the third possibility existed of combining war of attrition/wear and tear of the “manoeuvre” with the idea and goal of the subjugation of the enemy. Others observed that as soon as “manoeuvres” commenced, war tended to intensify and included the most
terrible things that humans were capable of doing (Hobohm; cf. Schering). And Delbrück more or less agreed e.g. re: Falkenhayn and the battle of Verdun.

*There were of course in the pre-Industrial age many instances when armed forces destroyed civilian forces of the economy* etc.

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BUT there was not the degree of mobilisation of the whole economy for the war effort.

During war, the home front was not obliged to systematically work for the war front in the pre-industrial era.

Also, there was no expectation of significant replacement of weaponry during the war – you used what you had and often that was it.

Loss of arms often meant loss of the soldier.

In the industrial age, things change as weapons and ammunition are made en masse to be supplied... to mass armies. There is not the same kind of personal attachment of the fighter to his weapon as in the past.

**Hence, in “total” war, the home front works for the war front and much of the economy is geared towards this purpose. Soldiers now use more weapons than in the past, which along with the ammunition, require continual replacement, renewal and improvement. The large-scale industry which makes the weapons also makes the means for the destruction of the weapons.**

If weapons are quickly destroyed, the home front can now quickly replace them.

Only an industrial society can provide for mass armies, mass supplies of weapons etc.
and that is how the “home front” is connected to the “war front”.

The countries which approached the most total mobilisation were Great Britain and Germany in the period 1942-1944. In Great Britain armaments were about 63% of GDP and in Germany around 60% of GDP (Carroll).

**SO, the question is, is such a war pure/unmixed war in Clausewitz’s sense or is it still political war as the continuation and expression of a certain form of political communication?**

**THERE was no one and only ceaseless and non-decreasing intense act of violence in the so-called “total wars”**

in which the combatants were involved in one and only clash into which all their forces went.

The hostilities had longer or briefer “pauses/breaks” or “friction” so the “total wars” were NOT simple manifestations of hate and passion.

**Thus, according to Clausewitz’s criteria, the two “total” world wars were not pure/unmixed, but real wars.**

If there was a lack of “moderation”, the reason is that the combatants adopted certain absolute political goals/ends, and not because they lacked a political character.

They approached, like Napoleonic wars, the form of pure war, leaving behind the classical war of annihilation, and reducing significantly the pauses/breaks.

**Today’s possible major wars between great industrial nations theoretically should be “total”, but there has been a novel development of a technical nature.**
Today, the relationship between the “home front” replenishing the “war front” can be put out of action by destroying the home front to the point that it can’t operate.

**HENCE, an atomic war carried out consistently could not be a “total war”**.

Things are so if we are clear re: our definitions of terms.

**In “total” war, there is “total” mobilisation** and any destruction could be made up for within a reasonable amount of time.

**In an atomic war, one could deprive the opponent of any possibility of mobilising anything.**

All this depends on the direct, ceaseless and full use of atomic weapons, giving the other side no chance.

There would be no pause/break, no friction between the various hostilities and acts of war.

From this point of view, Clausewitz could consider an atomic war to be pure war.

*But technically it’s still not pure/unmixed war in Clausewitz’s sense because not all the means to wage war go into the war in total hate etc., i.e. the atomic weapons are used, but not more conventional weapons etc..*

*Also, in the case where the atomic weapons were not continually and effectively used, there are possibilities of “friction” as in the collapse of information systems.*
Perhaps Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the field of coincidence applies to a large extent to possible atomic war. Atomic war would not probably just be a war of buttons, which cold monsters push etc.. One cannot exclude the possibility of the retreat of one side after the first exchange of atomic strikes or the abandoning of the struggle by both sides, if the first round indicated all that could be achieved is a macabre draw.

Also possible is mutual exhaustion if both sides hit the atomic centres of the foe.

And there could be various combinations of atomic and conventional warfare that we could imagine, which have already been planned (see Excursus D).

**CONSEQUENTLY, the fundamental conceptuality propounded by Clausewitz in distinguishing between pure/unmixed and real war, together with the criteria which found it, was not surpassed by the experiences of “total” war or the possibility of atomic war.**

[[THAT IS CLAUSEWITZ’S GREATNESS IN A NUTSHELL. I BOW IN REVERENCE...]]

Clausewitz is still highly relevant as a theoretician for another reason: that one side imposes its law on the other side. We saw in the “total” wars of the world wars how objective politics held sway over subjective politics.

*It’s not a question of moderate politicians overruling war-mongering soldiers/generals and misinterpreting Clausewitz.*
What applies is that it CANNOT be proved that atomic war could never arise from political communication and that nuclear powers would only ever engage in conventional warfare.

Anyone who says that atomic war is not possible is DUMB and understands politics in the subjective sense of moderation and not in its objective sense.

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We saw atomic war in action in 1945.

It was a continuation of politics in the objective sense because the country dropping atomic bombs had the general ability to construct atomic weapons etc..

That atomic weapons constitute a means of politics, is proved by their deterrent force/power.

The restricted/limited wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were not the outcome of a certain psycho-spiritual/intellectual positioning or prudence and sobriety but of objective social-political factors – from the mainly aristocratic composition of the officer corps, to the relative unloading of the European Front due to colonial expansion.

Whoever formulates hinc et nunc the demand for restricted/limited war, has to first ask what form of (world) political communication makes it possible; of slightest use here is the nostalgic reminiscing of the (idealised) ius publicum europaeum.

[[Kondylis is inter alia implying that Europe’s days of imperial pre-eminence are well and truly OVER, and that another era is approaching... with other Powers outside of European culture etc.,... even though European culture of itself obviously does not guarantee any kind of inherent peaceful, less warlike inter-state relations, though it did give rise to certain “humanitarian” laws of war, rules of engagement, etc.,...]]
IV. War, economy and society: Marx and Engels

1. General Observation

Marx and Engels’s statements on the phenomenon of war are mostly scattered and opportunistic/in passing... a non-Marxist seeking to find in such statements theoretical coherence would probably end up stressing the relative autonomy of the political factor over the (supposedly, in terms of Marxism, deterministic) economic factor, in relation to war. Whilst such a view has solid foundations and is inevitable, one should not overlook the wealth of Marx and Engels’s ideas about war.

We shall concentrate on the drawing up of typologies capable of including historically and sociologically paradigmatic cases, rather than simply “revising or rejigging” for the umpteenth time, historical materialism.

The point is not to have a fixed hierarchy based on the “primacy” of factor a or b, but to have material useful for general orientation, whether we’re talking about the mutual influence between war conquering/martial conquest and the structure of the social formation, or, the social functioning of the army, for instance = which will also allow theoretical access to analogous matters in respect of history, of the sociology of the army etc..

From this point of view, Marx and Engels – not only methodologically, but as to the content of their thought, must be counted amongst the great pioneers of contemporary historical and social science.

When looking at specific/concrete cases, it is clear there is no fixed/law-like
priority of factor a or b, but by the same token, we cannot overlook factors like politics and the economy, whether put in terms of factors of power and economic magnitudes, or not.

There needs to be a clear definition of what is meant by “power” or “economy”.

**Herein lies the problem:** what is the texture, function and the preconditions of economic activity examined with the criteria of politics and power, and what are (/is) the economic back-ups (support), constituent elements and prerequisites of social and political power? [[AAA-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!]]

The question what is the differentia specifica (distinguishing/distinctive feature) of (the) politics (of power) and what of economy, is not simply answered by pointing out their intertwining. And just contrasting one with the other is problematic too.

**The paradoxical element here is that Marx, in his effort to bring to our consciousness the economic background of the processes of politics and of power, widened and dynamicised/reinforced i.e. politicised the notion of the economy, giving to the “productive relations” a meaning not very different to what Clausewitz named “political**
communication”; and also in some social formations, Marx believed that war constitutes the natural form of economic communication. [[AAA-HAHAHAHAAAAA!!!!!!!!! Talk about Military-Industrial Complex and “Deep State” ZIO-USA etc.,... which has its equivalents in Russia, China, etc., etc., etc.,.....]]

What prevented Marx from seeing the economy from the perspective of the factor of political power was probably an excessively narrow or superficial view of the character of power in general (and not an inability to see a symmetrical or an asymmetrical nexus between economic and political power)...

In attacking the weak points of Dühring, Engels shrunk the concept of power to violence and connected the lack of naked/raw/bare physical/natural violence in society with an advanced economy, capable of producing weapons/arms...

[[This is the point (i.e. of power not being what characterises them re: an advanced hedonistic, consumerist economy, which nonetheless has a massive war machine) on which the Pscyho-JOO-Conjobbers-DemZIOtard-SATANISTS rely (i.e. by brainwashing or otherwise getting the masses “to agree” etc.), to spread their Evil Hate-filled FeminoFaggotisation of society with all the JOO-DEVIL/EVIL-SATAN lies about “equality” etc. whilst not saying a single meaningful or in practice telling word about GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE ACCUMULATIONS, CONCENTRATIONS AND CRYSTAL(LISATION)S OF FORMS OF POWER AND WEALTH... in the hands of the ZIO-SATANISTS, the most disgusting and sickest animals ever known to mankind (as a subjective matter of Taste – and not a few people agree worldwide)... DUE TO PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING AND A HISTORY IN BANKING, FINANCE, CORPORATIONS AND ALLYING WITH THEIR PROTESTANT AND PAPIST AND ATHEIST COCKSUCKING PALS....]]
In reality, the economy, the same as the ideological sphere in its totality, contributed substantially with its economic development to the conversion of violence into power, to the substitution of violence with [[non-violent forms of]] power and to the (partial) displacement of violence through (legalised) relations of power (power relations); only in circumstances of civilised/cultured societies was it possible for the physically weaker person to be able to dominate the physically stronger person, only thus could domination/dominant authority and power be wielded (exercised) without the permanent exercising or (direct) threat (of direct) violence.

[[That’s exactly where the JOO-DEVIL-SATANIST-MAMMONIST and other FEMINO-FAGGOTISERS come in, in particular ZIO-ANGLO/FRANCO countries... which of course applies to other countries and contexts too...]]

Marx, Engels and some of their critics remained fixed to the infertile and narrow contrast between economy and political (power) to the degree they absorbed and took onboard the bourgeois-liberal perception of the basically
apolitical homo oeconomicus, who exercises his activity beyond the field of politics and power. [[= IDEOLOGY]]

The eschatological dimension of the Marxist conception of history does not obstruct a productive discussion regarding Marx and Engels’s views of war. The “end of history” or the “end of pre-history” foresees that wars be abolished, but on the basis of the imposition of certain economic and social-political circumstances.

If the [[so-called, supposed]] abolition of wars takes place on account of the arrival of certain circumstances, and not with regard to ethical/moral appeals or the internal ethical/moral improvement of people, then the scientific observation of the fact of all the wars taking place until the [[supposed]] abolition of wars, has no relationship with ethical/moral concepts and explanations, and is dependent on political and social criteria, and also is based on the analysis of the stage of history (and its causally determined circumstances) and of the forces which act inside history.

Engels writing in 1849 saw that “justice, humanity, freedom” sound good, but prove nothing re: historical and political matters. And the mature Engels said something similar about war, exploiting and dominant peoples or social classes etc.. Marx and Engels – like Clausewitz – were neither peaceniks, nor warmongers. War is often not historically fertile/productive and welcome, war often causes only meaningless destruction, but if war promoted social development/evolution, they (Marx and Engels) did not complain about wars and violence. This applies in particular because war is like a catalyst, and history frequently opens a path/road inside the “ruins of empires, crushing whole generations”...
Engels re: Turkey and Europe c. 1853 = if there has to be war to “solve a problem”, let there be war... in a decayed Europe, war shakes the healthy elements and awakens secret forces (Marx-Engels, 1854).

Marx 1855 = *wars condemn the organisation of a society, which has lost its vitality.*

Marx and Engels did not at all take seriously the retarded liberal-economic pacifism of replacing war, with trade. They saw behind this pacifism, the revolting bourgeois with his unmanly, cowardly indecisiveness, his love of money, his pig-headedness and his selfishness (1533 re: Cobden by Marx + 1855 profits above nation etc.)...

[[Quite clearly in the mid-19th century in the Anglo and Central-North European world, the main players were Protestants, Papists and Secularists/(Crypto-)Atheists... there was no relative GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE dominance of the JOO as in ZIO-USA from about WW1 or WW2... even though the elite JOO was part of the elite scene GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY in 19th century Europe (and America)...]]

Bourgeois trade pacifism and bourgeois individualism necessarily interweave with each other: Marx in *Theories of Surplus Value* comments about war and killing people not being permitted where there is prosperity...

But Engels sees in 1852 that such an individualistic-pacifistic view cannot withstand the test of war.

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Marx 1855 = industry and trade do not change the war/martial character of a people.

**Marx and Engels did not think that by controlling the generals, wars could be avoided by the politicians. They correctly saw that wars have far deeper causes by the warmongering of men in uniform.**
During the Crimean War they considered a revolutionary situation possible by means of a European war, and were gladdened by the failure of diplomacy to avert war... 1854

They (Marx and Engels) say that political-diplomatic interventions into the conducting/waging of war by military men as doing more harm than good (1854), and they also considered thoroughly the relationship between diplomacy and military men/officers.

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Engels 1855 opined that a war leader concerned with politics would lose his army... In an 1854 letter to H.-S. Lincoln, Engels stated that in war one needs to exert all one’s energy and speed to defeat the foe and make the foe submit to the terms of the victor. Allied governments should not tie the hands of the generals etc.. Military science does not – like mathematics and geography – have its own political point of view...

Marx and Engels distinguished between strictly military and political-diplomatic consideration with the former being subordinated to the latter when expedient. In 1859, Engels called on Austria to leave Lombardy, and saw the Italian problem from within the broader perspective of the German problem, and he explained why that withdrawal from Lombardy would not necessarily mean a threat to Germany from France incl. taking into consideration geography etc.. Engels was concerned not to alienate 25 million Italians etc..

Marx and Engels similarly argued in 1870/71 against the politics of annexations.

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Key = the separation between military and political-diplomatic criteria.
From a military point of view, Germany annexing Metz and Strasbourg gains for Germany a “defensive front of enormous power”.

The political problem with such annexations was that not only France and Germany could not reconcile with each other, but the alliance of France and Russia became inevitable, which would put Germany in a corner.

Of course, notwithstanding all their insights, Marx and Engels still also saw things from within the prism of historical materialism. And that’s why their analyses are both positively and negatively instructive.

2. The social-economic framework of war and the relations of economic and of political power

At the highest level of historical abstraction, beyond mono-dimensional explanations and dogmatic intent, war for Marx and Engels = an acute form of clashes and conflict connected with the nature of class society. The programmatic position: “all clashes (conflicts) in history come from the contradiction between productive forces and the form of communication” (*The German Ideology*) can be reversed, and that means that every society, where the contradiction between productive forces and form of communication dominates, i.e. every society separated into competitive classes, necessarily produces from inside itself, clashes and conflict.

A plethora of factors, which Marx and Engels recorded with historical sensitivity, gives to these conflicts the most different forms and intensities, but this does not alter their view that all these conflicts stem in the final analysis from the above-mentioned basic contradiction.
Irrespective of the correctness of such an aetiology of conflicts/clashes, the great methodological advantage of this view rests on that it touches upon the issue of the structural and causal relationship between internal/domestic and external/foreign politics/policy, war and revolution (civil war)... something which came to seem self-evident because of the work of Marx and Engels.

Marx and Engels use the term “war” not only for wars between states, but also generally for the extreme intensity of a clash/conflict, including both between states and within a state, incl. “class war”. Engels even expected the bloodiest war of all time as being between the poor and the rich, (likewise Marx). Marx in 1846 wrote of horrific wars between various classes of a nation, and between nations, implying that the notion of conflict and clashes was built into class societies.

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“War” here is the collective exercising of armed violence with the goal of achieving collective goals, where the collective subjects can equally be classes or nations or both. There have been “peaceful revolutions”, or at least there has been talk about them, whereas “peaceful wars” have never been witnessed in reality or in language use (so “revolution” is not necessarily a form of war)... 

For Marx and Engels, if wars – at least “in the final analysis”, stem from class oppositions and the contradictions between productive forces and forms of communication, then they must disappear from history once such oppositions and contradictions cease... if wars were not due only to the above-mentioned causes, then the paradox would have arisen of wars in an international and classless society.
Of course, the interrelation between the Marxian aetiology of wars and of eschatological expectation is not logically convincing because we can accept that, on the one hand, wars are due to class oppositions, but those will always exist forever and ever, so then on the other hand, wars must remain a permanent phenomenon of human history. Marx and Engels however don’t think of this...

**However, since wars and classes have a common destiny, it seems strange that “war is as old as the parallel existence of many groups”** (Engels, *Anti-Dühring + Origin of the Family*), i.e. in so-called primitive classless society.

**Wette saw this internal contradiction of the materialistic view of history, and we must examine the reasons Marx and Engels did not have any sense of contradiction re: something which at first glance stands out like a sore thumb as contradictory (war = class war, but wars existed in classless societies too).**

First of all, **wars between classless tribes** differ from those between class societies due to two features.

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1) wars were waged by the whole tribe, by the “self-organised as an armed force population” (Engels, *Origin of the Family*), and consequently did not constitute the specific duty of a specially trained group in the framework of a society with a (developed) division of labour and class divisions... thus, the waging of wars, or the decision to wage wars, does not reflect some clash of interests between classes. Because **“at that time, when every male and adult member of a tribe was a warrior, there was still no public authority as dominance separate from the people”** and leaders of the army were selected only based on merit, whereas “real dominant authority” was found in the popular assembly and the council of the tribe, which decided re: peace and war, even though from time to time certain warriors engaged in warfare on their own initiative (Engels,
loc. cit.). The lack of social classes accompanied the underdevelopment of the division of labour, and with self-sufficiency in the labour force and in products of labour there was no need to wage war to seek additional captive labour or for exploitative reasons of a class nature. **No slaves were needed, so the point of war was to extinguish/liquidate/kill off the inimical tribe, or to exile them from their tribal homelands.** There were no margins for rules and slaves in tribal existence (Engels, loc. cit.).

**The reasons for tribal warfare were mainly economic. Nomadic peoples wanted to defend their territory for their purposes of hunting etc..**

Sedentary peoples cultivating the land were concerned about keeping their lands and or to obtain new lands when needed (Marx, *Grundrisse*).

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**Economic was the reason for wars between small tribes too. A shortage of goods and lack of productivity meant an inability to sustain more populous societies.** When there was no express peace treaty, the tribes found themselves in a state of war with other tribes (Engels, loc. cit.). **Unlike tribal classless society, future classless society was supposed to be based on an abundance of goods and on the created by capitalism world market.**

Engels (loc. cit.) saw war as being waged by tribes “with that savagery which characterises man in relation to the rest of the animals, and which was moderated only later out of self-interest”. **This “self-interest” in “civilised class society” brought about “base greed, an animal mania in respect of pleasure, the dirty love of money”... [[AAAAAAAA-HAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!]] which replaced the raw savagery of Tribesmen...**
pp. 179-180

Nevertheless, it is not at all self-evident why we should explain in this way the succession and the causal determination of socially dominant feelings, why therefore one savagery, which obviously is given without the culpability of class society, and indeed surpasses that of the rest of the animals, should not be perceived as a stable magnitude, modified of course under the influence of social development (thus, the optical illusion arises that it is influenced and moderated by “self-interest” so to speak from the outside [[i.e. “by “unfair” society”]])], but nevertheless, is maintained as to its essence in the form of the power claims and in the kind/species of the anthropological support of relations of domination.

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Cf. Marx’s epistle to Lassalle 1861 in which he states that “Darwin’s work is most important, and it is convenient to me as a natural-scientific footing/foundation to historical class war”, though Marx overlooked that the so-called “footing/foundation” is something given in and of nature and immutable and invariable, whereas class war, as he himself believed, would one day cease to exist of necessity. If the struggle for existence in nature is a constant, then it must exist also when there are no social classes at the level of direct existential confrontation between humans, who group themselves accordingly, but not on the basis of class criteria [[SATAN, SATAN, MONKEY, MONKEY, SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY and all the other non-class-“war” groups]]]. We’ll return to these issues re: Engels’s critique of Dühring.

Marx and Engels saw relations of master and slave developing in a dual manner: 1) the birth of slavery as the consequence or product of the division of
labour, and of the increase in production when the common ownership of land was missing, and 2) with the gradual autonomisation (becoming autonomous) of the servant organs of society vis-à-vis society itself. This becoming autonomous was carried out “in part with the inheritability of offices, which is almost self-evident in a world where everything is regulated in accordance with nature, and in part with their increasing necessity due to the multiplication of clashes with other groups” (Engels, *Anti-Dühring*).

If a community is more or less in a continual state of war, then war leaders will distinguish themselves and they’ll have a certain amount of autonomy to act, and gradually their status will become institutionalised.

From a historical and sociological point of view, the ascertainment is significant that authority as dominance (dominant authority) – regardless of its class content and what gain/profit it brings its possessor – cannot come into being, or last for a long time, if it does not fulfil certain functions of common benefit serving the self-preservation of the given community in the struggle against nature and other communities (cf. Engels, loc. cit., incl. with reference to oriental despotisms, irrigation and “legality/legitimacy”). Marx in a letter to Engels of 1853 held that a ruling class cannot so rule if it cannot defend the role of the nation in the world.

Sometimes the war chiefs of tribes set up their own tyranny, and this separation from the main body of the tribe meant eventually the end of the people’s freedom and the commencement of royal dominance and the hereditary aristocracy, and had to engage in continual bandit wars to remain in power (Engels, *The Origin of the Family*).

[[DON’T FORGET: P.K. IS NOT SAYING THAT MARX AND ENGELS ARE NECESSARILY RIGHT OR NECESSARILY WRONG

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Reference to Germanic tribes and the Greco-Roman city. War is a huge factor in the conquest of the objective terms of life or for the purpose of the protection of what has been conquered.

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Ref. from *Grundrisse*.

War and conquest both belong to “the essential economic prerequisites of the community itself”. Conquest in such communities has the same results as the development of slavery, the concentration of land ownership, exchange or money (Marx, *Grundrisse*). In land ownership communities often there’s a need for colonisation due to increases in population and not enough land to go around, which also includes wars of conquest, enslavement etc..

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War, and not just the development of production and of the division of labour, was necessary to obtain the needed labour power. And in even earlier times, war was needed for the obtainment of the necessary living space.

Whereas in the wars between savage barbarian-classless communities, captives were killed, because there was no “room/margin of for enslavement”, now war captives are converted to slaves and provide the necessary labour power/force (Engels, *Origin of the Family*).

With the use of slaves, a ruling class is embedded in society, and the notion of wealth is discovered. And war becomes a permanent feature for the “obtaining of animals, slaves and treasures” (Engels, *Origin of the Family*).
War played a greater role than what Engels thought, if we ask ourselves why the in-coming labour force of slaves was not exploited collectively by the community, but mainly by the few.

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We have to guess that even without social class distinctions, societies already had differentiations in part due to the war achievements of individuals. So, war lords would exploit their positions to capture slaves who would free them (the war lords) from regular work in times of peace.

[[One understands now (e contrario) the crucial importance of political power incl. brain-washing power, and not just economic activity... for the maintenance of group power... you have to get the slaves to agree or begrudgingly accept to be slaves...]]

Once there are slaves, a mode of production is needed adapted to slavery (Marx, Grundrisse – elsewhere in this book, Marx reduces slavery exclusively to conquest).

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Also, in the Grundrisse, Marx saw slavery and serfdom as the meta-developments of ownership based on tribal organisation, e.g. if you are Tribesman and your Tribe owns land, then Tribesmen of other Tribes are in relation to us, over/regarding our land, landless.

Marx and Engels recognised war’s essential role in social history, but at the same time chastised those who held that “violence, war, pillaging, banditry along with murdering etc. were a driving force of history” (The German Ideology) = a contradiction not apparent to Marx and Engels, because they saw war as an aspect of economic activity, of socially necessary and socially carried out “labour”. Re: population see Marx, 1853.
But even for peoples with high culture, war can constitute a form or continuance of economic communication with violent means, as the trade wars of 16th-18th century show (more to be said below).

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When roughly socially equal tribes go to war against one another, the basic social-economic structures of society remain the same, even though there are also long-term catalytic consequences of war.

When collective subjects of different development go to war, who wins can mean that “invasions of barbaric peoples can be enough to drive a country with developed productive forces and needs to the point where it must start from the beginning” or at least a lot of time is needed to recover from damage. Hence e.g. with Alexander’s conquests, the inventions of the Phoenicians were lost (The German Ideology).

Engels saw that the 30-year war “annihilated the most important sector of the productive forces of agriculture”, and was a key reason in Germany’s belated economic development compared to other European countries.

Christians did not know how to use and destroyed the irrigation works of Mauritian Spain (Engels, Anti-Dühring).

1853 epistle of Engels to Marx: in the East “one only destructive war could lay barren a country for centuries and strip it of all its civilisation/culture” because of dependency on fertilising the soil.

Both Marx and Engels saw that when the conqueror conquers a more advanced mode of production, he necessarily adapts to that more advanced mode of production. Incl. the phrase 1853 by Marx “the barbarian conqueror, with an eternal law of history, is conquered himself by the superior civilisation/culture of those subjected to him”
There’s the example of Romans creating cities and markets around the permanent camps of the Roman army, and the consolidating of foreign domination through peaceful communication (Engels).

There is much discussion regarding the wars of conquest of the New Times in connection with the opening of the world market and the great social upheavals.

Way back in time, wars of conquest destroyed everything. “Today they have the opposite effect, at least on the great peoples: over the long run the defeated sometimes gains economically, politically and ethically more than the victor” (Engels epistle to Schmidt 1890). [I AM NOT SURE ABOUT THIS. I SUPPOSE IT COULD A REFERENCE TO USA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND BRITAIN GOING ON TO BECOME GREAT ETC....]

Engels was not at all impressed by “ethical arguments” against war, as in the case of the USA against Mexico, because that war was “in the interests of civilisation/culture”. [[SO ACCORDING TO TODAY’S LOGIC, ENGELS WAS A FAR-RIGHT FASCIST!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]

“Or is it an accident that superb California was detached from the lazy Mexicans, who did not know what to do with it? That the energetic Yankees with the rapid exploitation of gold mines multiplied the means of circulation of capital” they built cities, ships and railways “and for the third time in history, gave a new direction to world trade”. The fact that ethical principles were violated, does not count in view of “such world-historical facts” (Engels, 1849).
Marx used similar arguments re: the Brits conquering India. What was of interest to Marx is that the previous conquerors of India – Arabs, Mongols, Tatars – represented a less-developed society and they thus were subordinated to the culture/civilisation of the conquered (Indians), whereas the British were “the first conquerors who were superior vis-à-vis Hinduistic civilisation/culture and that is why they were untouched (the Brits) by its influence” (Marx, 1853).

Marx believed that the “Asiatic form” of production, which was based on a “self-feeding/nourishing unity of small industry artisanship and agriculture” was less exposed to the influence of conquest and war than the Greco-Roman “ancient form”, where agriculture dominated (Grundrisse).

1853 Marx: in despotic Asia, war was the “pillaging of the external/foreign space” and the finances of the state was supported by the “pillaging of the internal/domestic space”... and so Asians in Asia remained at the surface of society, whereas British conquest went to the core depths of society and “shattered the whole framework of Indian society”.

Marx saw 3 types of conquest as to social-economic consequences: 1) the conqueror subjects the conquered to the conqueror’s mode of production (the English in Ireland, in part in India too). 2) The conqueror leaves things as they are and is satisfied with extracting tax (Turks and Romans). 3) There is mutual influence and something new is born, a synthesis (in part re: the Germanic conquests). Whatever the case, there is a new distribution re: the mode of production. (Grundrisse)

By “distribution” Marx does not mean the distribution of products, but a distribution which precedes the distribution of products and determines it. It is a matter of the distribution a) of the tools of production and b) of “the members of
society between the various kinds of production”. So, what we have is the subjugation of individuals under certain relations of production, and this distribution is an “element of production”, as it “is included itself in the productive process” (*Grundrisse*).

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Marx’s notion of distribution here is as broad as the concept of productive forces. What therefore can the conqueror not do if as conqueror he can distribute the means of production and people (through the imposition of land redistribution, enslavement and making slave labour the foundation of production etc.)? First, the conqueror does not create out of nothing, new means of production, but has to work with what exists after that space’s historical development, whether based on the conquered [[people]]’s mode of production, or on the conquering side’s mode of production, or on a mix of both. So, Marx sees a priority of production over distribution, and this can take place on foreign territory, e.g. the quick rise of capitalism in USA or in the completion/ending of feudalism with Norman conquests as e.g. in England and Napoli. The “secondary form” of the system surpasses everywhere the primary form (*The German Ideology*).

**For as long as there was no world market as the unifying force of world history, war and conquering made the course of history much more open...**

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**when there was a genuine variety of form of modes of production and communication, having developed more or less independently in their own relatively detached living space.**

Whilst there is no guarantee that the encounter between conqueror and conquered will produce a new stage in historical development/evolution, it can be the case.
Engels alluded to a historical vicious cycle, where the continual crisis of a mode of production or of a social formation would end up in a conquering[conquest of others]].

More powerful societies conquer weaker societies – Macedonia and the Rome conquer Greece [[to us, and to non-Greek historians engaged in historical science, ancient Macedonia was clearly Hellenic (with absolutely nothing to do with Slavs and or the Bulgarian language), so unlike the Hun-Kraut-Teuton Engels, I’d say Hellenic Macedonia and Rome conquer the Greek World Space]], and eventually slavery in Rome is replaced by another form of production (Engels, Preliminary sketches for the Anti-Dühring).

The coming into being of feudalism under the influence of the Germanic conquering/conquest of other peoples [[and betwixt their foul Teuton-Hun-Kraut selves]] exemplifies the combining of various factors. Marx and Engels look at the results...

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the part played by various factors in the causality of the historical process is not sufficiently discerned. “Feudalism did not at all come ready from Germany, but on the part of conquerors, had its origin in the martial/war organisation of the army during the conquering/conquest; this organisation meta-evolved/developed after the conquering/conquest under the influence of the existent in the conquered countries, productive forces, and gave us authentic feudalism” (The German Ideology).

Of assistance to the above-mentioned process, was the existent Roman Empire concentration of land ownership (Grundrisse).

Old Germanic forms of the Tribe could be retained e.g. in common ownership of forests and valleys.
The state of Athens was seen as resulting from class oppositions, whereas in Rome the society of Tribes formed an aristocracy with regard to a people without rights.

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Engels saw feudalism as having its origin in military organisation. And Marx also saw that “military relations of subordination” facilitated relations of land ownership. In feudalism, it was by no means for Marx just a matter of “personal relations” (*Grundrisse*). Engels found the Russian and Turkish “system of governing” to be “military occupation, where political and judicial hierarchy is organised in a military manner” and the people “pays for all of that” (1853). + free villagers having to seek protection from violence etc..

**Charlemagne used military service to convert free German villagers into dependents and serfs** (Marx, *Das Kapital*).

So, we return to the key theme of the relationship between politics or state violence and economy.

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We see in the trade and colonial wars of the New Times, the important role played by war in the genesis and coming into being of capitalism. Artisanship and industry + wars, protectionist tariffs and prohibitions = trade has political significance (*The Germany Ideology*).

The colonial system as well as the system of state lending and of protectionism all contribute to primary accumulation. All these methods “use state power/dominance, the concentrated and organised violence of society, to artificially promote the process of conversion of the feudal mode of production to the capitalistic mode of production, to shorten the transitions. **Violence is the**
midwife of every old society which gives birth to a new society. Violence itself constitutes an economic force” (*Das Kapital*, Marx).

Violence here is like the continuance of economic activity with other, bloody means, precisely as it was in the wars between primitive and ancient tribes, even though now its works at a far more complicated level. The East India Company is a prime example of the co-action of economic factors, military conquest, with a commonality of interests and with a monetary-economic and political-military oligarchy [[HAHAHAHAHA!!! SOUNDS VERY FAMILIAR!!!]] (Marx, 1853).

Marx (1859) reminds us that the conquest of Punjab and the Asiatic Wars following opened markets unknown until then. + Marx saw the war zeal of the “British trading classes” in 1857 had the expectation of “huge commercial/trade profits by the violent opening of the Chinese market” [[AND YOU THINK THE CHINESE MAO-MAO-MAO-MAO-ELITE AREN’T AWARE OF THAT, SATAN?]]

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**Marx (1853) saw that the Brits had even a greater appetite for war in Asia if the cost of war could be loaded upon the shoulders of the local Asiatic populations, whereas in Europe war had become too costly.**

Marx did not believe that the Crimean War caused the trade crisis in Great Britain, and quoted, but did not comment upon, Malthus’s view that large armies and costly wars create “sufficient demand” [[SOUNDS FAMILIAR?]] Europe in 1853 for Marx was passive because of prosperity and he hoped War and Revolution would eventuate from an economic crisis.

Marx and Engels **DID NOT** believe in the naive view that all wars have economic reasons and participants just want tangible economic profits.
Only to economic reasons, are wars due, if they take place in an environment where political, class and national oppositions translate into another language, the more fundamental contradictions between the mode of production and mode of communication. In this version, Marxian theory does not help us much re: concrete, specific situations.

Engels in regard to political violence and economy saw 3 cases: 1) trade and colonial wars – political violence aids economic development and the latter proceeds more rapidly. 2) The economy is shattered by 1). Large industry means that political violence must take the economy much more into consideration. 3) Political violence in part promoting, in part hindering economic development but eventually becomes 1) or 2).

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All this means that macro-economic developments are determinative/crucial and non-reversible. Engels adds that the struggle for the political dictatorship of the proletariat is conducted basically with the purpose of the reformation of the economy (1890) based on Marx’s notion of violence and state power/dominance as economic force/power/strength.

Those like Semmel who see in Engels inflexible determinism for viewing violence (political power or war) as in part a product of, and in part the executive organ of, the inherent logic of economic development, are wrong. Marx and Engels had formulated the theses of 1878 much earlier. Engels critiqued Maurer precisely

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because “they disregard violence and its role excessively” (1882).

Let us distinguish 5 aspects/facets to better understand things:
1) The economic motives of violence. Violence was always for Engels a means and never an end-in-itself. In accordance with Engels’s reasoning, violence is the cause of social and political circumstances, and violence is caused by the appropriation of products of foreign labour and foreign labour power (*Anti-Dühring*).

2) The economic determination of the kind of violence exercised. = “Violence can transform the consumption of goods, but not the mode of production” (*Anti-Dühring*). Violence actually has to adapt to the given mode of production if it wants to spend/expend long-term its products. You take as is determined by the object to be taken etc..

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3) The economic prerequisites of the (successful) exercising of violence. The importance of tools and implements to wield violence. One needs production to produce weapons to exercise violence etc. (Engels, loc. cit.). Athens’s hegemony over its allies collapsed because of an inability to conduct “long and bitter wars”, and Napoleon was defeated by the English benefactions coming from the new large industry (preliminary sketches of loc. cit.).

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4) The economic determination of the organisation of violence. War strategy etc. goes hand in hand with the level of weapons technology and production etc.. Marx: The means of production determine the organisation of labour. So, in terms of war, firearms invention affected “not only the waging of war, but the political relations between master and slave” so that there was an alliance between bourgeois and monarch against feudal aristocracy (Engels, loc. cit.).

5) The methodological aspect/facet. Long-term historical developments overall are seen from the point of view of productive forces developments, rather than looking at political violence.
For Engels political violence cannot explain the distinctive features of a society since such political violence has always existed. It is the “products and the productive forces of every epoch” which are the magnitudes which can explain “different social and political forms” (preliminary sketches, loc. cit.). Whereas the abstract notion of “violence” has a relationship of neutrality towards the historical variety of form.

One cannot argue the opposite of the five aspects above. All that can be done is that they are modified, relativised or supplemented and included in a broader framework.

First of all, it is undoubtedly correct to point out the ascertainment of the economic preconditions of the (successful) exercising of violence, especially after the beginning of the industrial age. Those nations most advanced economically and with the best weapons had the clear advantage.

Also, indubitable is the nexus between weapons technology and changes in strategy and tactics – Marx and Engels are backed up on this point by the best thinkers on these matters of the 20th century (Fuller + Allen).

Just as convincing is the notion that banditry and pillaging cannot explain historical development/evolution. There cannot just be banditry, as there must be production, and what is pillaged has no necessary relationship with the character of the bandit.

Clausewitz, as we know, took it for granted that society cannot exist or develop under conditions of the permanent exercising of violence, of ceaseless war, even though the texture of violence makes war inevitable from time to time.
Marx and Engels rightly deny the equating of society or history with the exercising violence, at the same time however, they held that post-barbarism, all societies revolved around the master-slave relationship, which in itself is a power relationship. Power relationships and the exercising of power DO NOT coincide with and amount to the exercising of violence.

Marx and Engels wrongly equate violence with relationships of dominance and in that way claim the primacy of the economy (the mode of production).

The primacy of the economy vis-a-vis naked violence is obvious (one must eat before exercising violence, and the production of food can and must be continual (unlike violence)), so the equating of dominant authority/dominance (power) and violence ends up eo ipso in the claim of the primacy of the economy vis-a-vis dominance/power.

This confusion of concepts and levels makes the multi-dimensional comprehension of motives and goals of the exercising of violence. Even if we accept that the goal of exercising violence is the appropriation of the products of foreign labour, and also the appropriation of foreign labour power, again we do not explain for what is this appropriation useful, and for what it will be used.

There is an issue of producing more than what is needed for one’s own state or nation and then using that produce in competition with other states or nations. The purely economic motives of the exercising of violence stem mainly or exclusively from natural needs of self-preservation or comfort (e.g. wars between primitive classless societies), but what goes beyond that gives a new and wider meaning to violence and its exercising. This conclusion is imposed by Engel’s description of the coming into being of private property.
containing a logical contradiction. According to Engels, private property first appears not as a result of banditry and violence but “for economic reasons” and indeed “on account of the conversion of the relations of production and exchange in the interest of the increasing of production and the promotion of communication” (Anti-Dühring).

It’s the development of the division of labour and of production which creates a surplus of products and labour power, which is exchanged with other products inside and outside of the community, then is it detached from common ownership and is embodied in private ownership. This is correct re: the material preconditions for the genesis of private property, but not the subjective motives which push towards this genesis. Thus, it remains unexplained why a nexus is necessary between the surplus in the field of production and private appropriation in the sphere of distribution. Going from the former to the latter without any mediation = μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος = a transition/change to another kind/genus or a conceptional saltus...

**Why does not the surplus produced remain the collective ownership of the community and is not equally distributed to its members, why do individuals fall on that surplus like vultures at the same time of its production and they pursue it exclusively for themselves?** What makes them do it since they lived for generations, as it is claimed, in classless societies and had been taught in accordance with its social manners and its principles? The pursuit of private appropriation **cannot come to the fore if we do not presuppose the existence of the impulse towards appropriation, which until then was latent or could be released and defused in another way.**
Engels (Origin of the Family) saw civilisation/culture as releasing undisclosed greed above other tendencies from the very first day until today (+ Marx Theories of Surplus Value = the Tree of Sin is at the same time the Tree of Knowledge... and the world market could not have been born without national crimes...).

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Yet Engels had referred to that characteristic human “savagery” with which classless societies fought one another. So, it would follow that the savagery condensed in the warrior turned from the external foe to greed in the light of new-found surpluses of products and labour power within a society.

Engels accepted that before the birth of private property there was social differentiation in the physical sense of the warriors being stronger etc..

Yet this means that the pursuit of the private appropriation of the surplus must mainly be attributed to the influence of the claim for social imposition and power, which existed already before the creation of a notable surplus, and was based on an anthropologically given impulsive dynamic/potentiality.

In the early phase of this evolution, social precedence and physical superiority usually went hand in hand, so that the exercising of power coincided with the exercising of violence.

The decisive turn takes place when power and violence are separated, not in the sense that power does not need violence anymore, or that as a rule power turned against violence or violence against power (even though, naturally, power is obliged to suppress every violence, in the case it does not control it, itself, whereas violence exercised on the part of all those who oppose the possessors of power, does not still constitute – entirely – power, but rather temporarily combats organised power), however simply in the
sense that the exercising of power and the exercising of violence do not constitute any longer necessarily simultaneous and interwoven processes.

**The full formation of culture/civilisation goes hand in hand with the separation of power from (almost) ceaseless naked raw violence.**

**As dominance/dominant authority with**

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**the help of material and ideological means, power is two things.**

At the level of subjective motives, power constitutes the ultimate goal of those whose direct goal is the appropriation of the surplus of the products of labour and of labour power – that is why every permanent and effective appropriation at the economic level necessarily ends up in a direct or indirect
At the level of social organisation, again, power appears as system or institutionally consolidated structure whereupon the ceaseless exercising of violence, and the together with that requisite physical superiority becomes superfluous, even when the exercising of violence remains in the background as ultima ratio, and frequently appears in the forefront.

The fact that the exercising of violence is removed through power makes the development of culture and civilisation possible.

[[As in the case of Clausewitz, Marx and Engels saw classless-society tribal savages as being in primitive social states before culture and civilisation, when strictly speaking, social-ontologically and anthropologically seen they were NOT, i.e. they too were necessarily, as humans, within culture. The distinction, however, is useful for sociological-ideal-typical comparisons.]]
So, the attempt at the technical/technological perfection of the exercising of violence puts the latter at the service of culture/civilisation (the connection between the war economy and the development of technology etc.).

The external features of the conversion of violence into power are two:

a) inside the system of power, violence is not exercised (necessarily) by the same possessor of power, but by armed organs which act in accordance with his orders and commands

[[AAAA-HAHAAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!! what does that mean in ZIO-USA? AAAA-HAHAAHAHAHAHAAAA!!!!!!!!! And of course re: China, Russia, etc., etc., etc.,...]]

b) power is not exercised exclusively through violence or through material organs, but with ideological means, which form or encourage modes of behaviour welcome to each and every respective system of power

[[AAAA-HAHAAHAHAHAHA in the Age of the JOO-SATAN in Western countries, FeminoFaggotisation Circusification Negrification and ApeJunglefication is the Order of the Day! From the Age of the JOO-SATAN to the Age of the APE]]

If we understand thus the separation and at the same time the internal nexus between power and violence, then we can answer Engels’s
question to Dühring as to how a minority can dominate a majority much stronger from a physical point of view, if violence really constitutes the decisive factor.

[[ISN’T THIS AT THE CRUX OF WHAT GRAMSCI RE-HASHED DECADES LATER AS HEGEMONY AND THEN ALTHUSSER RE: STATEIDEOLOGICAL APPARATUSES (WHICH SHOULD HAVE READ: STATE AND CORPORATE ZIO-JOO-SATAN-DEVIL-EVIL APPARATUSSSES RE: USA, UK, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, CANADA + ??) TOO??]

If social power and naked bare raw violence were the same, as Engels presupposes here erroneously, then of course the domination of the minority over the majority would be inconceivable.
However, in circumstances of culture and civilisation, the texture of power has distanced itself greatly from the texture of violence – so much that the power claims are projected in the name of the denunciation of violence – and that is why power can succeed in whatever raw, naked, bare power can’t achieve.

Engels was absolutely correct regarding the dependence of military superiority on economic superiority, as this is expressed in technology and the production of arms.

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Are the weapons produced and perfected simply and only because the available technical-economic potential makes it possible, or, is it the case that their abundant and more perfect production appears to be compulsory because power sets goals which can only be realised by virtue of such weapons. [Isn’t it and or both?] Of course, this production does not take place through violence (violence cannot be armed of and by itself, and in this sense, is always dependent on the economy), however it takes place in view of goals of power – and this takes us into another sphere.

Only this distinction between the economic level of development and the goals of power can explain the frequent and historically significant phenomenon (esp. of the industrial age), that states, which are under political pressure, do not at all await autonomous advances in the economy in order for perfect(ed) i.e. up-to-date, latest technology arms to be acquired, but rather reinforce the branches of the economy which have direct military significance.

Marx and Engels themselves pointed out the economically and socially progressive function of the state in underdeveloped countries. Cf. Engels attributing early capitalistic modernisation of German agriculture to the defeat of the nobles by the hegemons who became stronger since the epoch of the Reformation. The nobles had no choice but to extract greater incomes from their landholdings.

Engels also saw that the defeats in the Crimean War made it clear to the Russians for the need of rapid industrial development. Railways and domestic great industry where needed above all. To achieve that, thought, the
villagers and peasants had to be “liberated”. “From the moment the conduct of war became a branch of great/large industry (warships, movable (tuggable, towable, haulable) firearms and (smaller) canons, rapid-fire repeating canons and blasters, repeating rifles, large shells, smokeless gunpowder, etc.), large industry, without which all of that cannot be produced, became a political necessity.” ((1892).

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So, the real interweaving of technical-economic development with the factor of power diverges from the simplistic schema that autonomous economic development = production of means to exercise violence, which then serve the goals of power.

Marx emphasised the importance of “the means of production” for the “organisation of labour” (1866) and or for “social relations” generally (1849).

The “organisation of labour” and “social relations” are two different things, and what is key is that the means of production is first of all the function of factors of power, which are all the more obvious the more we take into consideration the social whole in its hierarchical structuring.
Social reality throughout history has shown that not all aspects of human activity are connected to economic activity and associated labour.

When we do talk about the production of goods, then labour must be organised in view of the texture of the productive means, which are in this sense the determinative factor.

If, however, the organisation of labour was in truth the core or the in miniature state of the model of social organisation in its totality, then societies with similar levels of technology would have to have the same political-institutional organisation.

At the very least, this does not always happen, and often in history it has not happened at all.

A final observation as regards the methodological founding of the primacy of the economy as it is attempted by Engels. When it is said that violence always remained the same in history, whereas production evolved/developed, and thanks to production’s development, the development of other sectors of society can become understandable, then two different cognitive/mental levels are confused, i.e. the permanent functioning of acting/doing, with its each and every respective content.

Whoever considers violence to be an invariable and consequently neutral constant, can say the same as
regards economic and productive activity in abstracto. This too is a category of acting/doing which is lost in the beginnings of human history and accompanies human history since then.

The social-political context in which violence was exercised in history changed from epoch to epoch not less than what the means of production changed.

Only the reduction of power to violence gives the impression that what counts is the use of arms and therefore the production of arms, technique/technology and economy. And we inevitably return to the dogmatic and infertile matter of principle of what is “the” primary and primordial factor of human history.

The naive equating of power with violence along with eschatological concerns, and the belief that the development of the productive forces, would eliminate the dearth of goods and the need for distribution and domination, seemed like the only objective basis for the institution of a classless society (beyond ethicism and the expectation of ethical betterment) = stems to a large extent from the ideological armoury of liberal economism incl. homo oeconomicus, the hope of replacing war with trade and the intense economic distinction between productive and non-productive labour.

Marx and Engels did not accept the liberal pacifism, but they did have in mind from early on, the image of man as an animal who makes tools and works whilst separating economics from politics and the military factor.

Engels was against permanent armies taking young men at their most productive age from labour.
Marx argues similarly in 1860 re: Prussia preparing for war. He did acknowledge an ad hoc need for an army to protect productive activity and defended A. Smith against the accusation that Smith had overlooked the said need. Yet Marx and Engels both soberly saw the multi-sided functions of the army.

3. The army and its social functions

As we remember, already from early on, Marx used the example of the army in order to clarify his theory about the determination of the organisation of labour, and more generally of social relations by the means of production.

But this example proved the correctness of his theory only if we take the organisation of labour in its narrowest sense.

Marx found that the army was like a precursor to overall societal-economic development, e.g. “[with war developing before peace] ... how through war and through armies etc. certain economic relations like wage labour [[first in Rome]], mechanical equipment, for instance, were developed before than in the inner space of bourgeois society” (*Grundrisse*).

Also, the division of labour within a branch was carried out for the first time in armies. So, in armies we see synopsised the whole history of political societies (1857).

By focusing on the army and armed conflict, Marx is in effect shifting economic development away from certain positions of historical materialism.

However, the fact that in the army the correlation between productive forces and social relations is in existence, in itself means nothing as to the importance
of the army as to overall economic development, including as to such development’s extent.

Essentially economic-related phenomena within the army support and or reflect rather than create the new within society.

The army, its equipping and its organisation is not referred to anywhere as the motive/driving force for general economic development.

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What was referred to above about wage labour within the Roman army did not lead to the prevailing of the monetary economy inside the totality of the ancient economy,

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whilst there were essential differences between a wage relation in the Roman army and under a capitalistic regime:

“In regard to the Romans, the army was a mass – already separate from the people as a whole – disciplined as to labour, whose surplus of time belonged to the state, which (mass) sold to the state all its labour time in exchange for wages (not capital). Here (in the army) we have the free selling of labour on the part of armies. However, the state does not buy this labour for the purpose of the production of (kinds of) value(s) [[e.g. exchange value/capital]]. Thus, even though the wage relationship first appeared in armies, nevertheless, it differs essentially from wage labour” (Grundrisse). 
Hence, the above economic phenomenon pertaining to the army was on the margins of the then society and its dominant mode of production, and the state was not a capitalist, nor the soldier a proletarian.

“\textit{The Roman Empire, in the epoch of its greatest development, was based on tax in kind and on supplies in kind. The monetary economy had been developed fully only in the army. Never did it embrace the whole of labour.}” \textit{(Grundrisse)}.

We’ve already referred to Engels and primitive tribes as social groups and in large part as armies simultaneously in a constant struggle for survival. The separation between people and army is institutionalised for the first time in class society whereupon each and every respective composition and organisation of the army depends on the physiognomy of the ruling class and on the outcome of the class struggle on each and every respective occasion, on each and every respective correlation of forces between classes.

\textbf{Greco-Roman society}, Marx showed, created the city/polis as the centre for landowners who developed a tempestuous political life, and the shifts in power and the redistributions of wealth of a stratum of free citizens had as the result significant transformations of military organisation.

\textbf{The influence of trade and industry brought about} the gradual replacement of the old phalanx with the light infantry and mercenaries as well as changes in military tactics in ancient Greece (Engels).
The replacement of the civil guard/militia incl. the participation of all citizens, by professional soldiers mostly from the poorest social classes after the Second Carthaginian (Punic) War in Rome = due to “significant social changes”. (Engels).

But military service turned the plebeians into debt slaves of the usurers and the patricians, and it made the transition from the army of the citizens to the army of mercenaries inevitable (Marx).

Marx and Engels saw something similar happen in the Charlemagne Age re: the free villagers/peasants and the transition to feudal armies.

Since the beginnings of capitalism, 3 major changes:

1) the replacement of feudal armies with royalists. In the feudal army the hereditary aristocracy monopolised the possession of arms and the soldiers were much, much closer to their feudal lords than the king and the royal administration of the army. A new structure appears in part based on money, in part based on industrial technique (technology). Both symbolise the new age.

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The cities now have workshops to manufacture firearms and kings use money to recruit and rent a greater part of their troops from strata of society not under feudal lords, such as free villagers/peasants and residents of the cities (Engels).

[[It is quite clear. At this stage of capitalism the spreading of monetisation to various sectors of life gives opportunities for the SATANISTS. But the cause of this monetization is NOT the Satanists, but the social relations and Christians driving those social relations...]]

2) The second great turn is the victory of the bourgeois revolution and the related birth of an army of a radically new kind. The bourgeoisie produces from its bosom the stratum of educated military officers, and thanks to the development of the productive forces, it secures the monetary-economic and material bases of the army. Peasants freed from feudalism along with the
bourgeoisie are conscripted into the new mass armies (Engels). This is before
the proletariat entered armies en masse.

3) Proletarian recruitment into mass armies. + Universal conscription.

There are parallels, in that the workers in factories are “organised militarily”,
“they enter as simple industrial soldiers under the supervision of the full
hierarchy of sub (non-commissioned) and full officers”. For Engels, such
organisation helped the French workers at the barricades of 1848.

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Marx and Engels saw the army as the central tool in the hands of the ruling
class, as the embodiment of the inhumanity of class society. “The legislative
power, the judicial power, the armed forces, are all the phantoms of crooked
social circumstances and hinder those arrangements between people, which
render useless the necessary intervention of a third superior force”.

Marx explained the armies of the second half of the 19th century as being
against the militarism of feudal armies, but then turning against the proletariat
etc.. On the other hand, Marx, Engels could not but admit that even if an
army internally was “reactionary”, externally in regard to certain states,
armies did “progressive” work etc. e.g. against counter-revolutionary
forces. So, Marx, Engels were ambiguous about the role of armies...

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So, against Russia, having permanent standing armies is now justified and not
seen as something absolutely oppressive to the proletariat (Marx, 1867 speech).

And Engels justified having the Prussian army ready, both ag. French and ag.
Russians.

Key was foreign policy and the competition between states which takes
place irrespective of the polities of those states (Engels).
Engels complained that the Prussian army remained at 1820 levels, when France had advanced far ahead.

**SO, the army was NOT simply just an organ of the ruling class, as it had national tasks towards the outside.** E.g. the Bonapartist

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Dictatorship. The army gained in self-conviction vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie as it saw it was indispensable for the state as a whole. Since the time of Napoleon, France was ruled by the army, on the basis on the villagers-peasants, then later the landowners, and then after 1830, the bourgeoisie. Change occurred again in 1851 with the army autonomising itself (becoming autonomous) in power (Marx).

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The army pushes things towards war, being in command of politics. Engels and Marx saw the Dictator now beholden to the desires of the army for war and loot etc..

The French army was seen by Engels as superior to the British. But this ended when the French army succumbed to corruption etc..

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Then followed lack of discipline. SO, Marx called Bonaparte the 3rd, “Little”, as he had to engage in bribery etc. with the defeat of 1870 being the consequence.

The relative autonomy of the army was not though considered to be by Marx and Engels the core or nucleus of a novel and historically autonomous social formation. **It is over-the-top for researchers to transform the Marxian analysis of Bonapartism into the archetype of modern theory regarding bureaucratic-military dominance.**
Marx and Engels recognised that after the French Revolution, nationalism had become a political and historical force of the highest order. Nationalism aided the morale of armies since Napoleon. The royal army of Napoli, Engels opined, collapsed before Garibaldi because “it did not have life, spirit, patriotism, faith. It did not have tradition. It is not a national army. It is purely a royal army.”

SO, Marx saw the army in e.g. India under British command as being the means for Indians to organise and liberate themselves from the British. The problem for the Indians were the internal fights and the lack of united leadership.

In Spain too, the army is what played a key role in overcoming the provincialism of the country as a whole.

The national manifestations/demonstrations/protestations of 1812 and 1822 came from the Spanish Army. Eventually though the various regional leaders etc. sapped the Spanish Army’s effectiveness.

The primacy of external/foreign policy/politics is seen in that competition with foreign powers leads to economic development related to weapons development etc.. E.g. Prussia, in seeing the French successes against Austria, had to see things anew etc..

It was not enough anymore to follow the old army ways of fanfare and parades without modernising and adapting to the international environment etc..

Engels saw the cultural-civilisational level as being decisive in the differences between European armies and countries. The Russian army e.g. was not in sync with more backward semi-barbaric Russian society overall.
Likewise re: Caucasian mountain peoples and Turks. The western part of Turkey, with French and Prussian training, has more efficient troops and army administration, even though favouritism of a patriarchal kind etc. “holds things back” etc.. For the Chinese, their pre-industrial ways are a real difficulty in terms of modernising the army etc..

There’s always an ongoing problem – Engels again saw – of modernisation in backward Oriental countries in respect of pig-headedness, impatience, prejudice etc. etc. etc..

The British army representing the British oligarchy, brought about a conjunction of land-owning and monetary-economic/financial aristocracy, privileges of blood, and privileges of money,... with blood, nepotism and favouritism playing their roles. With money buying places in the army too etc.. The poorer have to go into debt to get to the upper echelons in the army (Marx).

All this had an effect on the quality of the military officers, who were more like “gentlemen” rather than professionals, with much talent being shut out of higher places (Engels) [[HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA]]

The ruling class was not too bothered though, e.g. Palmerston saw the fact that most officers having “assets and relations” was a guarantee (in respect) of/for the British polity, and put up with the purchase of positions up to the punishment of being whipped as the natural consequence of

this fact (Marx). The political control of the oligarchy was secured by the right of the PM to intervene wherever. Marx saw a division of powers, rather than a
division of labour, which amounted to the army not being as mobile and effective as it could have been.

Cat’ o’ Nine Tails and other barbaric methods were employed so that an aristocratic character could be maintained in the British army, notwithstanding the desertions etc. in Crimea... if such punishment were abolished, the great distance between officers and soldiers would be eliminated etc..

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**Democratisation of the army would lead to the loss of the governmental monopoly of the oligarchy.**

Engels in particular researched the possibility of the army being used for revolutionary social purposes. So did Marx.

Engels saw the British Volunteer Force c. 1860 as made up of bourgeois with workers only when vetted by employers etc..

In one study re: the Prussian army, Engels saw that the bourgeoisie could either ally itself with the lower classes or buy off the upper classes to come to power

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[[AAAA-HAHAAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!! Satan, Satan, Monkey,
Monkey, Satanic Circus Monkey!!! WHAT THE FUCK HAS
CHANGED, EVEN IF ITS’S A DIFFERENT CONTEXT!!! AAAA-
AHAAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]]
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**There was a progressive bourgeois-fication of the Prussian army and the liberal propaganda about trade and peace was belied by the reality of the bourgeoisie taking over the army** etc. = THE REAL FUCKING WORLD, NOT THE IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA WHICH THE COCK-SUCKERS IN THEIR VARIOUS “FINANCIAL NEWSPAPERS” SIT AND CHURN...
And Bismarck came to POWER.

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General military service would make the army less prone to coups and to the ethos of feudal-bureaucratic party before and after 1848. **Engels and Marx saw universal conscription as a step towards democratisation** etc.... The vast majority of the population was not called upon to serve, though, because the Prussian dynasty feared the people under arms.

Whilst Engels overestimated the possibilities of universal conscription etc. in order to take army from the control of “reaction”, he did not believe that universal military service would automatically convert the permanent army into an approximately revolutionary organisation.

That would just be a desired outcome, requiring a lot of work.

Engels: “in politics, there are only two decisive forces: organized state violence, the army, and, the unorganised elementary violence of the popular masses”.

Marx, 1851, saw the loosening of military discipline as being a prerequisite for revolution. Decomposition of military control and command = deep crisis in the ruling class, etc..

Engels saw that without a majority of support amongst the people, in the hour of crisis, what is going on/happening in the army would be crucial [= key to the Communist Parties which took power from 1917 to 1949 to 1975 etc.!!] Even today the USA c. Feb. 2019 is calling on army officers to leave Maduro to go to their preferred ruler of Venezuela etc....]]
Engels saw the importance of secret societies in the army. Whether this was realistic or utopian, the fact is that Marx and Engels saw many possibilities in the army as being either a reactionary or revolutionary force, depending on the circumstances.

4. War and revolution

Marx and Engels were fairly upbeat c. 1848 re: war and revolution, but the experiences of the European wars of 1853-1866 put a huge dampener on the prospects of workers’ revolution arising from war etc.. Yet it was foreign policy which Marx and Engels saw – i.e. international politics – as holding the key to igniting domestic uprisings etc..

Engels to Marx in 1860 re: Lasalle and the English ultra-reactionary Urquhart commented that what is subjectively reactionary, in international politics, can be objectively revolutionary.

Marx even contemplated the situation in which, if domestically the revolutionary situation had died down, it was important to “hang on” to the achievements of a state’s army in foreign relations if those achievements enhanced future “progress” and revolutionary prospects... so e.g. in 1859 a revolution would make the German army disorganised and would favour Russia and Bonaparte, and not revolution... likewise 1874 re: Commune... European war comes first... before the working class can do anything...

So, the matter of the nation as the primary magnitude of foreign policy and international politics under certain circumstances becomes the matter of
revolution, the revolution succeeds because it can lead the nation in the struggle of the nations

[[Where the FUCK does Lenin’s national liberation stuff come from DICKHEADS? What the FUCK does Marxism-Leninism have to do with Satanic CIRCUS MONKEY ZIO-OTHERISATION, ZIO-NEGRIPTION AND ZIO-OPEN-GLOBOHOMOFEMINOFAGGOTISED-SOCIETY-HATE-“NO” BORDERS (EXCEPT “OF COURSE” FOR THE SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY COMPOUND AND SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY BUNKER, OF ZIO-JOO-SATANISM-DEVIL-EVIL-MAMMONISING-LUCIFERISM), ZIO-“ONE WORLD”-SATANISM AND ZIO/USA-HATE, FUCKING SCUMBAGS?]]

Engels 1859 = the most ruthless and decisive party can save the nation.

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The ruling class is the guiding class of the nation, so no ruling class can last domestically/internally if it cannot reinforce the place of the nation in the external struggles, i.e. internationally. E.g. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War made reforms re: tsarism inevitable (Engels). Or, Engels in 1859 saying that a German defeat against Bonaparte in a war would cause revolution in Germany, which would also affect Bonaparte. Likewise, re: France, Austria and Italy... with Engels opining in 1892 that all those who suffer defeat have the possibility and duty to revolt, which is not exactly the WW1 position of “revolutionary defeatism”, but on the way to such a position... even though Engels was not calling for defeat to be sought programmatically, but was saying a defeat should be used to do x, y, z, re: revolution...

1848 and Marx and Engels saw war as revolutionary in uniting all of Germany so that then revolution could follow, which could not take place in monarchical/princely statelets etc. in a coordinated fashion etc....
1848 Marx: in war’s tempest and in revolution’s storm, is the unity of those elements (breaking up the Germanic monarchies) forged...

Incl. war with Denmark, victory for Germany as victory for democracy (Engels, 1848).

Marx saw the German democratic movement as having to absorb “traitorous” Prussia, and ag. Russia which was backing Denmark... Marx saw that clashing with Russia would strengthen Poland, which would in turn weaken tsarism in Russia... Russia was viewed as being “super/hyper-reactionary”... (Engels, 1848).

Every war England is involved in, is in effect a “world war”... so the expected German revolutionary war constitutes a part of a “European war” or “world war”, which will eventuate first off from a victorious French Revolution of the French workers. (Marx 1848)

Engels, 1849, emphasised that every local clash is part of great and decisive war, as all the sub-wars, so to speak, interconnect... Engels expected that the narrower national interests would subside re: the significance of the fight between freedom and oppression across all of Europe...

Marx, 1849, expresses the view that every local revolution will eventually fail if the revolution does not spread successfully internationally in a world war...

And the English proletariat, at the centre of the world power/economy = key...

1853, Marx was convinced that every general European war will necessarily bring about a revolution... + Engels 1854 (hoped for Napoleonic-like wars)
Marx and Engels were disenchanted that the Crimean war remained local...
1855, many, or rather most, people, whether bourgeois or poorer, were not interested...

1854, Marx = there was no fight between freedom and despotism... the Great Powers were more interested in Equilibrium...

Nevertheless, Marx emphasised that the Russian loss in the Crimean War weakened the Tsar and he had to make concessions to the serfs

Marx 1858... the pressure of revolution and war on undertaking social reforms...
+ Engels 1893

Notwithstanding the defeat of the Paris Commune, Marx saw that class opposition was now stronger than national opposition...

Marx and Engels saw a new historical epoch emerging after German unification following the war of 1870... and the centre of gravity went from the French to the German proletariat...

From 1848 Marx and Engels

believed that the war against Denmark was being abused by the Prussian government to channel German youth in a non-democratic direction...

They saw a war against Italy’s and Poland’s independence as a “Machiavellian artifice” [[AAA-HAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]], to paralyse the democratic dynamism and to channel revolutionary lava down the drain (1848)...
Marx and Engels interpreted repeatedly internal political-revolutionary pressure as the cause of the military intention of reactionary governments, especially in relation to the Tsar’s Russia and Bonapartist France... (Marx 1860)

+ Marx 1854 + 1852 re: Bonaparte and having to go to war to avoid revolution at home and or for economic reasons... + 1859 again

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+ Engels 1895 + Marx 1859, 1864

**For Marx and Engels “just” wars were wars conducted/waged by revolutionary or at least progressive historical-political subjects in order to achieve corresponding goals**

[[So, in the case of ZIO-PSYCHOJOOCON-JOODEMTARD-USA you get wars for the 1990s and 2000s justified as being for “PROGRESSIVE/ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY” “Democracy” and “Human Rights” and other such absolute inanities which only a FUCKING IMBECILE would ever believe... that’s not to say other Powers are any “better” at justifying their wars, on the contrary...]]

**Marx and Engels didn’t go into the difference between “just” and “unjust” wars in any greater detail, but this distinction was very important for Lenin**, so here are the few references of Marx 1864: the “war of the enslaved against their oppressions” as the “only just war in history” meaning class struggles and civil wars... BUT IN THE SAME CATEGORY, ONE COULD PUT WARS BETWEEN OPPRESSIVE AND OPPRESSED NATIONS...

Marx saw the British war against China as “extremely unjust” 1857, and Engels rejected

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“reactionary wars” e.g. of Austria against Italy (1848). As we shall see later, Lenin saw a war as just or unjust as having nothing to do per se whether strategically it was defensive or aggressive/offensive.
Marx and Engels don’t discuss this topic. **Over time, Engels lost his enthusiasm for revolutionary wars**, so his tone was very different between 1853 and his letter to Kautsky in 1882 where he was clear a “victorious proletariat cannot impose on any foreign people happiness without undermining its own victory. This of course does not exclude defensive wars of varied form”. He opined in 1848 that a communist society can only wage defensive wars...

Marx and Engels see war as a negative, not for pacifistic reasons, but for tactical reasons as to how a war would affect the revolutionary movement. In 1859 Marx

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against Lasalle, saw war as favouring in the beginning Bonapartism in France, and reaction in Germany and Russia... Again in 1859, Marx said something unusual for him in rejecting si vis pacem para bellum (= Latin = if you want peace, prepare for war), as this put all of Europa on a war-footing and created mercenary fanaticisms...

Without war, Bonaparte’s position would be weakened, and the opposition in Prussia would be strengthened (Marx, 1864, 1867).

Engels in 1879 saw that European war buries the German social-democratic party under the inevitable struggle of every people for their national existence... With “chauvinism” being re-ignited (1882, letter to Bebel).

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There’s also a reference to a letter to Bernstein, 1882.

Marx and Engels, 1880, 1886 and 1887, believed that the tide of history was definitely evolving in an irreversible fashion, and war – whilst having, for the time being, negative consequences – would nevertheless in the end favour
historical evolution, notwithstanding the “pointless expenditure of forces”, the “waste of time”, and the “victims” or war...

Engels to Bebel, 1885, went so far as to state “the complete collapse of the class state”... and 1891 esp. against Russia, war would have to be waged “with all revolutionary means”...

Engels foresaw “the outcome of tragedy” as a “world war of an inconceivable until now extent and intensity”... and notwithstanding the millions of dead, despite the hunger, the epidemics, general infuriation and bankruptcy,... in the end, the old states and the crowns would collapse and the proletariat would prevail...

Cf. 1859, similar thoughts by Marx and Engels re: the Italian war.

But it was the Franco-Prussian war which seemed like being “the mother of all wars”...

Re-arming was increasing continuously, and the great bulk of the armies required spending cutbacks... Engels, 1870. From the inside, militarism would collapse, 1875 (Engels).

**The prospect of an**

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**economic catastrophe because of the military burdens and of a “general war of annihilation” with an uncertain outcome, were the two foreseeable phantoms of militarism.** Also, there would be an inevitable conversion of the dynastic army into a popular/people’s army, which would be capable of not obeying commands (Engels, 1893, etc.).

But in regard to the dual prospect of the bourgeoing of miltarism and of an abolition of militarism because of militarism’s swelling, peace seemed like the best choice for the workers’ movement. Marx and Engels were not alone, and
for these reasons considered a great war to be impossible, or at least more impossible than previously (this was the general conviction in Europe between 1870 and 1914. The reason they shared this conviction is because Marx and Engels themselves had adopted certain facets of the liberal perception about the texture of economic activity and the mode of functioning of a contemporary economy, however, a few years after their deaths, Luxemburg and Lenin formulated the position that the capitalistic economy would only, with militarism and war, overcome its contradictions, at least temporarily.

5. Strategy and Tactics

Engels against Dühring said that strategy and tactics do not emerge from the minds/heads of ingenious war-leaders/commanders, but mainly are determined by the level of the technique/technology of the arms with examples re: firearms, and how the infantry changed functions incl. re: battle arrays/arrangements e.g. from what was similar to the ancient phalanx to the long sparse lines... incl. re: mobility in the American War of Independence

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+ e.g. from Franco-Prussian war.

Engels indirectly, however, accepts that changes in weapons technology do not of themselves entirely explain changes in tactics. He talks also of human material. The levée en masse was prone to disobedience and desertion etc.. Clausewitz held that the influence of the French Revolution “must be sought much less in the new means and the new perceptions regarding the waging of
war, and more in the wholesale change of politics and of administration, in the character of government, the state of the people”.

Engels quotes Hegel: “in the nineteenth century, whenever need for something is born, and the need is justified by the circumstances, it is certain it/this need will be satisfied”...

This line of argumentation is another example of in part contradiction in the theses of (Marx and) Engels.

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There is still a long way to go in firearms technology (Engels, 1860). Yet in another passage, Engels sees the new (then) weapons as not able to be further developed (Anti-Dühring, but in 1893, Engels spoke again of the uninterrupted revolutionisation of the technical bases for the waging of war).

Engels in 1854 considered the scientific waging of war as “a work of Western civilisation” and considers Napoleon as that man who “fully formed” the contemporary art of war so that others had to mimic him.

**Marx and Engels were very rarely critical of Napoleon as to military matters and generally viewed him as an authority on all things military** (1853). But they emphasised that the Corsican’s achievements were due to certain social preconditions... Napoleon got the mass army to be disciplined, and used it with decisive energy and at the same time flexibility, which characterise his strategic undertakings, reflecting a clear and well-aimed politics – just as conversely,

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indecisive strategic undertakings = ambiguous politics (1855, Marx-Engels).

Marx and Engels compared the Napoleonic achievements e.g. to the 18th century running around in circles tactics of generals and not getting anywhere...
They want to see “a quick concentration of forces, quick marches”, moves on a grand scale, and changes in the base and line of war undertakings (1855). Quick moves impressed them a lot incl. to exert pressure on the foe rather than the other way around (1854, 1853).

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All this was needed until one was in a position to strike the fatal blow etc. Generally re: attack/offence, a) the foe is tricked by manoeuvres b) one’s own forces are concentrated in decisive positions c) the foe is struck at his weaker point d) inimical forces are broken up and crushed in sections (1855, 1853).

The concentration of one’s own forces and the breaking up of the foe’s forces = highest strategic and tactical command just as the breaking up of one’s own forces = disaster. Marx gave an example of British error re: Indian uprising and the British lack of numbers made their lack of organisation even more disastrous for them (1857). Engels recommended that the Austrians strike at the Italians and French before they could get their shit together (1859). Both Marx and Engels were aware of the peculiarities of war in America (e.g. a book by Ripley re: vast tracts of land and relatively few troops, mostly volunteers in the Mexican war etc.).

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Re: the American civil war, they reproached the Southerners for fragmenting their forces by trying “to retain everything”. E.g. instead of shoring up and defending Kentucky, The South set up 3 camps which the Yankee Foe picked off in succession, and the battle was then transferred into the open to the disadvantage of the South (Marx-Engels, 1862).

The North also had wrong ideas e.g. The Embrace of the Anaconda = The Anaconda Plan... which would be easy for the South to break through... emphasis on lack of speed to move things and strike, Engels 1862 + 1870 re:
Bonaparte... for Engels, 1866, the two most important laws of strategy = 1) don’t divide your army in such a way that parts of it cannot be supported mutually by other parts, but keeps the various sectors of the army close to one another, and 2) when marching via different routes, you have to reunite at a point outside of the range of the enemy...

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References to Moltke, Goltz, Schlichting et al....

So, Marx and Engels placed emphasis on initiative and flexibility. Engels 1859, 1862 = Napoleonic attack/offence = necessary when want decisive victory. Engels saw both war and uprising as “art” subject to certain rules... and if the rules are not respected = no hope.... 1) one ought to never

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play with uprising if you haven’t decided to take full responsibility for all the consequences of the game.

Engels 1860 = as Danton said “Daring, daring, and one more time daring!” in order to go on the attack and surprise the foe etc. re: armed insurrection

**There is a primacy of attack/offence in war and revolution, but also when in defence you need to be able to go on the attack/offence. The worst defence is passive** (Marx, 1854).

1871 Marx = needed is the aggressive defence of Paris...

**Defensive war should not be confused with defensive undertakings** (Marx to Engels, 1870)... Notwithstanding the great exceptions of attacking/aggressive-offensive war as in the case of Epaminondas and Napoleon, “the history of the greatest battles seems to show that where the army defending itself shows solid and persistent resistance, capable of allowing the said army to resist unshaken until the fire
of the attacking/offensive side starts to weaken, whereupon follows exhaustion and reaction, since that goes in its turn onto attack/offence – there defensive energy is more secure.” Engels + 1857 Engels probably took from Clausewitz the notion that in mountain war from a strategic point of view, attack/offence is decisively superior to defence, and the Prussian took it from Archduke Carl/Karl (Die Feldzüge von 1799). P.K. cannot locate any other specific instances of influence of Clausewitz on Marx and Engels... re: Lenin it’s a different story, and we shall see later...

Bombarding fortresses and opening the road for the infantry... the main role of artillery which is for trained officers, but the infantry is the main Arm which will decide the outcome of battles (Engels 1860, 1858, 1870)

Marx and Engels saw clearly the importance of the industrial revolution re: war.

Especially the American Civil War, showed Marx and Engels that the industrial potential is now the decisive factor in the organisation, the equipping and the movement of modern mass armies. The Northern States will DEFINITELY prevail due to industrial superiority, whereas the South only had the advantage at the start of the war based on quick attacks etc.... Marx and Engels 1862...

Engels 1859, steam changed war more than anything since Napoleonic times... railways, steamships, + 1848 examples re: France and USA... + 1859 chains of fortifications assisting in the war effort... 1885 = from passive to aggressive/attacking-offensive defence by having chains of fortifications...

Engels 1854. 1855. 1853 etc. = the importance of fortresses and the mistakes those besieging them make in depleting their forces, but mobility was still
overall even more important on the battlefield and then forts etc. become tools e.g. when retreating or to launch an attack etc..

6. Guerrilla war(fare) and the civil guard/militia

Marx and Engels are supposed to be in relation to revolutionary war and guerrilla warfare at the start of a path leading to Mao and Ho (Wallach). Marx and Engels did write about 19th century guerrilla warfare in Europe, Asia and North America, but they did not add anything new in their observations, nor did they theorise a new form of war capable of displacing the regular army in order to then go onto seizing political power on the part of a nationalistic or socialistic revolution.

Like Clausewitz, Marx and Engels explain guerrilla warfare as a supportive means in national uprisings, but dependent on co-operation with the regular army. The three of them refer to guerrilla war as people’s war = as all wars not conducted and waged by the regular army, but Clausewitz not with revolutionary implications (Vom Kriege). Tasks as seen by Gneisenau and Clausewitz include to continually harass the foe, to interrupt his lines of communication, to take over or destroy the foe’s re-supplying, but to avoid normal attacks and before the assembled tactical army, to withdraw into the forests or the marshes (swamps, quagmires).

The civil guard/militia was just a “great reserve of the army” and a “defensive institution, so that attack/ offence with it, is possible only as the continuance of the successful repulsion of an invasion as in 1814 and in 1815” (Engels). The prospect of revolution was not
found to be dependent on the constitution of the civil guard/militia, but through the widening and the democratisation of the regular army by means of general compulsory military service.

Marx and Engels had no international law etc. delusions about war. They were very aware of (foreign) ideologies and “legalities” and all the bullshit surrounding that in the international arena.

For Engels (1870) the whole nation takes part in “real war” (as in the case of “barbarians” (tribes of the Caucuses, Algerians, et al.) and not in “purely conventional wars”, of an easy peace when the war machine no longer works, and of Europe guided by rules and conventions and due to economistic-capitalistic spirit, not as enthusiastic ethnically. Marx and Engels (1870), like Clausewitz, held it was no crime for the people to continue defending itself when the regular army had been dissolved. In such a case, the saving of the nation commands a revolutionary war, where revolutionary means are demanded and revolutionary dynamism.

Marx to Lafargue 1871. Engels 1857, 1858 and Marx 1857 fully justified local peoples’ resistance to colonial/imperial aggression, no matter what the locals did [[unlike a TOTAL SCUMBAG LIKE THAT ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTING ZIO-JOO, ADORNO, WHO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BEING CRUEL TO CAPTIVE AMERICANS ETC.]]. + The legalistic hypocrisies as in the case of China, Marx 1859, 1860. Reference to Grob and The Relativity of War and Peace.

War and Sea. Marx 1861 + 1870 incl. re: so-called “humanitarian reasons”...
War and Peace in the real world intertwine and cannot be neatly separated. Engels gives four examples of when guerrilla warfare failed, even when the people backed it. E.g. the Spanish guerrilla war had British and Portuguese backing [[cf. the North Vietnamese with Soviet and Chinese arms]] ag. the French [[+ ag. ZIO-USA]]

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Kurdish and Bedouin cavalry would not have been effective ag. the Russians if it were not for the Turkish army backing them during the Crimean War (Engels, 1853). For Engels the regular army was invariably superior compared to irregular combat formations.

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Engels 1849, guerrillas to aid the regular army [[e.g. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army]], with Engels giving example of Brescia region ag. Austrians. Marx too, 1854, saw the rebels in Spain as being necessary because the regular army was smashed... mixed in the deserters from the French Army and contraband bandits et al., who were in it for their own purposes...

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and in cases when the rebels were not organised back into co-ordination with a regular army they fairly easily became roaming criminal-like gangs [[cf. Latin America Columbia, Peru etc.]].

Marx understood the Tai-Ping but was very sceptical of their chances of success. Likewise, with guerrilla war in India post-Sepoy (?). Engels 1858. Lack of organisation eventually was the undoing of the rebels....

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with villagers even turning against them... similarly with regard to Moors (Engels 1860) without national consciousness etc. and lack of co-ordination... =
ineffective... short-sighted.... and the Algerians, notwithstanding their heroism and self-sacrifice, could only delay French conquest of Algeria... [[but 100 approx. years later...]]

Engels 1860 felt that the experiences of Algeria helped the French later beat the Italians...

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The huge difference in regard to workers’ revolution centred in the great cities... requiring speed like Napoleonic war and without the long-term patience of guerrilla warfare... **guerrilla-based successes of coming to power in the 20th century were basically nationalistic in socialistic guise.** That kind of guerrilla war is now over... and always in coming to power, the guerrilla troops were basically a regular army in the end fighting another regular army...

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shrinking in size and dissolving... Proletarian civil guard/militia as in the case of a communistic society (Engels) ... 1848 Marx and Engels wanted the people armed etc.... but experience showed Engels that the regular army was the more effective operator....

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Carnot and Napoleon. **A victorious revolution for Engels cannot create and form a new art of war in the real world... so wars must be fought like Napoleon with a regular army supported by a proletarian civil guard/militia.**

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A civil guard/militia cannot secure strong discipline and organisation like a regular army. There’s a need for intense training with examples from the
American Civil War, Engels 1860s... so that his conclusion was that only communistically organised and trained society can approach the system of the civil guard/militia etc..

Engels 1870

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re: Paris and lack of organisation. Engels contradicted himself in different periods of his life and in the 1890s naively expressed belief again in a civil guard/militia as he concentrated on the notion of the regular army suppressing revolution.

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**Marx and Engels notion of people’s war was more or less based on a model of France, 1793.** Marx and Engels were no “fathers” of modern “total war” (Neumann). Marx and Engels’s thinking was well within the 19th century overall framework, even though their followers presented them differently.

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**V. Excursus/Digression C: War and the Marxist-Leninist perception/view of history**

From what I (= P.K.) know, only Kautsky tried to theorise war. Western Marxism concentrated on “alienation” [[which then flowed into all the narcissistic-femininofaggotised hedonistic-atomistic-narcissistic JOO/ZIO nonsense, whilst leaving behind any prentence of socialism, since the goal was corporate and banking and GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE JOO/ZIO/JUDAS FORSM OF WEALTH AND POWER IN ZIO-USA],] and the Soviets and Chinese had their “official” view of war etc. in the 1960s. Kautsky was influenced by Gumplowicz, with war as having a decisive historical function in the birth of
classes and the state. He differed with Engels re: a number of matters such as inheritance in tribes

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as such inheritance must have presupposed autonomisation (becoming autonoms) from society. + issues of rich and poor, and functions in society, and slavery must have come from war and not simply from the division of labour in classless society. Differences in wealth, for Kautsky, were reduced to participation in looting arising from war. There was never any brotherhood between the poor and slaves. The state, from war, separated people into classes etc..

Marxist-Leninist theory of history revolved around the Asiatic mode of production and “Oriental Despotism”, which meant that even official Party dogma could accept that not all people had to go through the five stages of history [[primitive/savage society-ancient slave society-feudalism-capitalism-communism]] to get to the end of historical evolution.

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It’s not the history of every people, but the overall course of humanity which supposedly confirms the Hegelian-like view of history. Instead of the World Spirit, we now have the Advanced Mode of Production. And since not all peoples go through the same stages, one must examine exogenous factors such as technical-economic and cultural influences as well as conquest and war.

This version on the more orthodox 5-stage Marxist-Leninist historical schema was formulated by the East-German Professor of ancient history, Elisabeth Welskopf. The first developed civilisations/cultures peaked in Asia and North Africa, and in the Mediterranean we had slave-society. Western Europe gave rise to feudalism, and capitalism migrated from Western Europe to North America, where it reached its zenith, whilst in Eastern
Europe, we have socialism. All this is explained by the factor of “extra-economic” violence and revolutions, and wars brought things “forward” only from Western Europe to capitalism, and from Eastern Europe to socialism.

By analysing economic relations, Welskopf claimed we arrive at the “intersection of economy, law/right and politics”, and we are dealing with “man in his totality”. She saw an absolute fusion of economic and political domination in Oriental Despotism.

The Hungarian Tökei concentrated on the functioning of wars during the great historical transitions, without accepting Welskopf’s schema.

He remained true to Orthodoxy, and held that Asiatic, Ancient and ancient-Germanic forms of property ownership were a united evolutionary line from which the second comes from the first and the third from the second. With barbarian conquests in between. **But still the level of the productive forces was always the underlying factor.**

In Soviet publications, there was an in part acceptance of Welskopf’s theses. Sawyer (who did not know Welskopf’s works) errs when she interprets Zhukov’s confession that the German conquerors leaped over the slave stage, and several Soviet peoples, the stage of capitalism, as the adoption of the Hegelian-like version of the teleological, eschatological schema. Zhukov attributes the said leaping over to the “intense influence of the
environment” but still held that “there exists a general trend of successive change of all social-economic formations in all nations”.

Semyonov held that the evolution of human society whose successive stages are the social formations, reproduces

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the internal logic of evolution of all social organisations considered in their totality. But only human history as a whole passes through all stages, not every single social organisation separately. [[all this seems to be fairly irrelevant, as what remains of the West is heading towards full-spectrum APE elimination incl. the ZIO-JOOs too, eventually]] He does not explain how continuity happened, and just implies one stage is destroyed, and another stage arises. He does not mention war and conquest. Tacitly, he was supporting the Orthodox Marxist emphasis on endogenous factors. And such theorists equated the Asiatic mode of production with Slave-Owning Society. Thus, war and political violence were not decisive historical forces and were not able to create a new social form nor destroy a viable social system.

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VI. War and Revolution: Lenin

1. Preliminary observation

No-one has doubted that Lenin was a theoretician of war esp. in the epoch of imperialism. There is however no agreement as to whether he was a military expert in the narrower sense of the term. In Soviet publications, Lenin was characterised the founder of Soviet military science, and as the father of basic principles of military art, whilst analysing specialist matters of military theory and tactics. The praising of Lenin of course was connected to political goals within the Soviet and Soviet ideological overall system. At first, Lenin was
praised to combat Trotsky’s contribution to the founding of the Red Army, and post-Stalin, to demote Stalin etc. after Stalin’s successes 1943-1945.

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Stalin wrote that Lenin never thought of himself – unlike Engels – as a military expert, and Lenin read Clausewitz not as a military expert, but as politician who thought about the connection between war and politics. During the Civil War there was no doubt that Lenin was not just a political leader, but also a military director of operations, he took an active part in the military action plan. He collaborated closely with the Highest Levels of Military Command. He even often decided upon action at the local level. (Erickson). **This level of involvement in war time is common for a political leader either in a dictatorship or in a parliamentary regime.**

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The fiasco of the campaign in Poland started from the political (not military) expectation of a soon to occur revolution in central Europe which would have added that revolutionary proletariat to the Red Army.

For Lenin, both politics and military action were forms of struggle. **This allowed Lenin to be specific and concrete and direct re: what he wanted to achieve in specific circumstances. The foe had to be tangible. The course of action specific. Lenin’s fixation with certain philosophical, sociological and economic tropes never stopped him from being a realist re: specific problems. [[= Lenin’s “greatness” or strongest point.]]**
1918: “every abstract truth becomes an empty phrase if you apply it to any specific/concrete situation”. This = the genius of Lenin, of being able to hone in specific foes in concrete situations. Truth for Lenin is a function of the basic political situation, i.e. of struggle (and not airy-fairy bullshit of and for professors etc.).

**War revolves around the central political problem, the problem of gaining and maintaining POWER/DOMINANCE.** Lenin posed the problem from the point of view of a concrete political subject, the “proletariat”, or even more specifically and concretely, from the point of view of the “Party”, which he would use for his own military/war-political ends/goals. Theory and Praxis are equated.

**2. Politics and War or Lenin and Clausewitz**

If Lenin’s war talk does not revolve around the art of waging war in the strict/ narrower sense, but around the relations between war and politics, then the best way to get to the essence of Lenin’s war-related thought, is through an examination of how Lenin understood Clausewitz.

Lenin shares/agrees with two central views with the GREAT Prussian General-War Theoretician:

1) politics and war jointly fall under the lying-above-them concept of clash and conflict or of struggle, and politics IS NOT equated eo ipso with “moderation”, but the distinctive feature between politics in times of peace and politics in times of war, exclusively rests in the use, or in the non-use, of military and organised violence.
2) the primacy of politics does not mean some decisive influence of subjective intentions and goals during the causing/provoking and the conducting/waging of war, but the absolute precedence of the objective concept/sense/meaning of politics vis-a-vis the subjective sense/concept of politics.
Of course, Lenin does NOT grasp the united essence of politics and war by comprehending all the details of Clausewitz’s argumentation.

Lenin does not enter into conceptually refined talk about the distinction between pure or unmixed war and real war, nor does he comprehend the anthropology and the philosophy of culture/civilisation, upon which Clausewitz bases his theses regarding the united essence of politics and war.

As a Marxist, Lenin is convinced from the beginning [[whereas the younger Clausewitz had not fully formed his understanding of politics and pure war etc.]] that the notion of the clash/conflict or of the struggle is much broader than the notion of war as organised armed confrontation, and accordingly comprehends Clausewitz’s position regarding war’s provenance from politics – without being wrong. Also, as a Marxist, Lenin gives to the concept of politics another meaning, or rather another factual dimension than Clausewitz, however this does not at all hinder agreement with Clausewitz as to the precedence of objective politics.

Lenin’s understanding of Clausewitz is SUPERIOR to the mainstream understanding of Clausewitz in the West today [[Theory of War was published in 1988]], because in Lenin’s thought, politics does not appear as the moderate or moderating element which has as its mission to bridle, rein in, hold back war, but a state or situation of continual struggle, in which wars are born/come into being every so often. The concept of struggle is at the (epi)centre of Lenin’s political thought, and Lenin ascertains that struggle can take on many forms, one of which is war (cf. Davis).

Politics (as it is conducted in times of peace), and war, are jointly subject to the superordinate notion of struggle, so that peace and struggle are not opposite concepts as between themselves, whilst peace and war are opposite
concepts only from a certain point of view: whereas struggle in times of peace is conducted without the use of organised armed violence, war is struggle characterised precisely by this use/usage of organised armed violence.

Just as in Clausewitz, so too in Lenin, the difference between war and peace is not equated with the difference between clash/conflict and the absence of clashes/conflicts, but corresponds with the difference between violence and non-violence, armed and non-armed striving after power. By referring to and commenting upon the fundamental

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claim Clausewitz makes, Lenin stresses that war is the continuation of politics (in times of peace) with “violent” means (1915, Lenin’s

On/About/Regarding War) [[P.K. refers nearly exclusively to German-language, and very much less to French-language, translations of Lenin’s texts. P.K., nor I, read Russian [[Also, it could be that Lenin wrote in German (and French?) too... so if that’s the case, then P.K. in relation to those texts, is using/referring to Lenin’s actually words]]]: the criterion of exercising violence draws therefore the dividing line between politics in times of peace, and politics in a state of war – however, this criterion exclusively concerns the means which are used on each and every respective occasion in both these situations/states of affairs, and by no means the essence of these states.

Because for Lenin, the common essence is struggle, Lenin comprehends, like Clausewitz, war and politics as an inseparable unity. Lenin records or writes down in his notebooks that war is a part of a whole, i.e. a part of politics (Clausewitz’s Werk, p. 37).

Lenin also makes other similar references: “politics gave birth/rise to war”, and politics is “the womb/bosom from which war develops; inside politics, the characteristics of war are already delineated” (loc. cit., pp. 39, 19).
THE MEANING IS QUITE CLEAR: if politics and war as forms of struggle were not related as to their very essence, then it would be impossible for war to come out of the womb/bosom of politics. War continues politics (of peacetime) precisely because it judges/adjudicates with the means of organised armed violence the already existing in politics competition/kinds of competition.

Lenin was in complete agreement with Clausewitz that it is ridiculous to think that an entirely different state of affairs comes into being with war as compared to the historically prefabricated relations between peoples and classes (1915).

Even when referring to the term “dialectic(s)”, Lenin explained that war’s “dialectic(s)” as the intensification and gradation of war, applies to the notion of peace too (Clausewitz’s Werk, pp. 31, 35).

This means that not only intensity in times of war, but also intensity in times of peace, can be increased

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or decreased, without ever intensity being eclipsed or eliminated, ever.

There can be no pure peace without conflict which can lead to war.

Lenin CORRECTLY interprets Clausewitz’s axiom about politics as the continuation of war, rejecting the [in Lenin’s colourful language which I still find funny personally having not read him for about 25+ years!] “petty bourgeois and moronic prejudice” that war can be considered a “simple attack out of nowhere which interrupts peace”, and he emphatically adds “Clausewitz poured scorn on the view that: the peoples lived peacefully between them and suddenly were at one another’s throats!” (1917).

History teaches that periods of peace not infrequently were intermissions in order to take a breath and to gather one’s forces for new battles (1918).
Especially in the imperialist epoch, alliances in times of peace serve preparation for wars and are themselves born from circumstances which wars form.

Alliances and wars determine one another, peaceful and non-peaceful means of fighting flow into one another with all sorts of actions and reactions, connections and relations (Fr. ed: *L’impérialisme, stade suprême du capitalisme* = *Oeuvres* v. 22, p. 319ff.)

"As every war is only the continuation of politics with violent means, that is, of that politics which was exercised for many years and at times, many decades before war by the warring states and their ruling classes, so too, peace, which comes at the end of every war, can only be the recording or registering (writing down) of the real shifts of/in power, which were carried out and took place in the course of and in the ending of the war" (1916)
An imperialistic war can only lead us to an imperialistic peace (loc. cit.), peace between capitalistic states can “only be considered as a cease fire, as an interruption, as a preparation for the new slaughter of (the) peoples” (1917).

**SO, peace and war are classified under the concept of POLITICS, sealed by the given of eternal struggle, and politics and war can only be understood as different degrees of intensity of the same fundamental competitive relation(ship).**

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In an inimical act (regardless of whether it is about revolution or an inter-country confrontation), nothing happens other than a transformation of the political situation into a military situation (1917).

**In the transition from politics to war, politics is not transformed, it does not cease to be politics.**

“The ruling class determines politics also in war. War is through and through politics, it is the continuation of the realisation of the same goals (ends) by the same class in another way” (1917).

**In regard to Clausewitz, Lenin [[also]] rejects the view that politics and war constitute opposing magnitudes so that the prevailing of the political factor will necessarily bring about the restriction of the war factor, and vice versa.**

It is mere “appearance/pretence” that war is more political the less violent and intense it is... in actual fact, war is more war-like the more deeply political it is... *(Clausewitz’s Werk*, p. 16).

There is no possibility of there ever being a “genuine politics” seeking moderation or the restriction of the military effort.
The second great common/joint position between Clausewitz and Lenin concerns, as we have said, the primacy of objective politics, i.e. of politics in the sense of “political communication” or of “social conditions”.

Lenin believed Clausewitz had taken a step towards Marxism by not reducing war to subjective intentions and dispositions, ambition, personal interest, the vanity of those ruling (loc. cit., p. 39).

Lenin agreed with Clausewitz that “the general conditions, from which a war emerges

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and which constitute war’s natural foundation, determine its character too” (loc. cit., p. 25).

Every era has its own wars + need to take into consideration the peculiarities of every age to understand military leaders etc. (loc. cit., p. 33).

Marx and Engels also saw war as above (1915) and as the continuation of the politics of the Powers concerned – and of the various classes within these Powers – in the corresponding epoch” (1915). In the same line of thought, Lenin regarded Clausewitz as spiritually-intellectually related to Hegel (his ideas, “Hegel fertilised them”, Lenin writes), and indeed by invoking the “dialectical” character of his fundamental axiom (re: the continuation of politics...). Of course, “dialectics” in this context is understood primarily in the sense of a historical method of investigation and of the exposition of things...

footnote: (Lenin’s Über Krieg = About war, p. 453): “Dialectics demands the all-round investigation of a given social phenomenon in its development/evolution as well as the reduction of the external and of the superficial to the fundamental driving forces”.
Lenin assumed that Clausewitz had been influenced by Hegel in obviously accepting Mehring’s theses which was published just before Lenin had read Clausewitz and which Lenin knew because Lenin regularly read the periodical *Neue Zeit*. Mehring held that Clausewitz wrote, not with Hegel’s words, but with Hegel’s spirit, and that war and his genuine historical sense made Clausewitz protected from idealistic slips... (Dec. 1914 – Jan. 1915)

A few weeks prior to that, Mehring had published in the same periodical the following (which Lenin must have read): “war is never an isolated act, which veers from the natural course of things; it is the necessary consequence... of every society constituted on the basis of class conflicts/oppositions. War is the discharging of historical contrasts/oppositions which have become so sharp that there is no other means for them to be dealt with” (1914).

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cont. footnote: war is not “an autonomous matter and end-in-itself, but an organic part of a politics, to whose preconditions it is tied and to whose needs it must adapt its successes”. Mehring’s influence on Lenin’s reading of Clausewitz,... Ancona had already pointed out. It’s possible that Mehring was motivated to compare Clausewitz with Hegel by Creuzinger’s book, which had been published in 1911, although from this confused text, he did not take the individual positions, but just the basic motif. If this is true, then Creuzinger’s book achieved its purpose, even if this happened imperceptibly and indirectly, i.e. through a much later occurring Marxist-Leninist interpretation, which systematically expanded a fleeting allusion by Mehring adopted and stressed by Lenin, so that eventually we got a whole philosophical construction with ideological expediencies. In the Marxist-Leninist philology, Clausewitz appears within the framework of extremely risky/shaky comparisons, as a dialectical methodologist who organised his scientific work similarly to Hegel and Marx; it is said, indeed, that Clausewitz’s “highest” theoretical achievement rests on the
“application of the dialectical method of thought” (Engelberg), and with this what is meant is in part the unity of opposites/contrasts, in part the constitution of a systematic theoretical whole moving up from the abstract to the concrete/specific, i.e. from the simplest element of war, which at the same time brings with it all its contradictions, up to the concrete/specific totality, which contains its essence and at the same time the whole of its historical great variety of form (see e.g. Roth-Türpe + Türpe). Often, and parallelly, simply the historical interpretation of the dialectical method is adopted, as Lenin undertakes it, and then Clausewitz is praised because he broke off from inflexible dogmatic-metaphysical consideration in order to see war in terms of Hegel and dialectics, i.e. in the movement and its great variety of form as a historical phenomenon (Korfes, Savkin, Rothe-Türpe). [[end of footnote]]

The interpretation of Clausewitz’s fundamental axiom in light of the precedence of objective politics, means for Lenin that war does not continue the politics of chance personages with chance positionings, but the politics of collective historical subjects, i.e. of states or classes whose texture and activity emerge with internal necessity from the structure of each and every respective given phase of historical evolution/development: “war is the continuation of politics with other means. Every war is unbreakably connected with the political class of things, from which it emerges. The same politics, which a certain state has exercised, which a certain class has exercised inside this state a great deal of time/long before war, this class continues this politics during war too, changing only the form of action.” (1917).

Lenin only attributes particular meaning to the elimination of psychological factors when the aetiology of wars is investigated; he continually underlines that “the social and political character of war is not determined by the
“good will” of persons and groups or even of peoples, but by the position of the class which conducts the war, by politics, whose continuation is war” (1917).

From this perspective, the analysis of the economic causes of war is seen as the best way/method in order to illuminate problem examination re: war objectively, without mixing in subjective motives (so much the more since in the Marxist-Leninist framework, the collective historical subjects are defined programmatically on the basis of their economic position and function).

In other words, the materialistic conception of history, in its strictly economistic version, wants to constitute the methodological basis of a radical founding of the primacy of objective politics. If we see things in this way, the diplomatic explanations of the cause and of the course of wars remain at the surface of subjectivistic explanations: Lenin quote re: not looking at the diplomatic history of war but at the real class character of a war, at analysing the objective situation of the dominant/ruling classes in all warring states as well as by taking into consideration the totality of the elements related to the bases of the economic life of all warring Powers and of the whole world (1917, 1916).

For Lenin, war emerges from the objective data of the economy and not from the soul of individuals. War under a capitalistic regime is unavoidable “not because every capitalist as an individual is a bad person – every one of them is a human like all others – but because personal property leads and will always lead to war” (1920).

“In order to understand war, we must ask: whom does war benefit?” (1917) [[of course,
there were not a few war pre-capitalism, so Lenin is not dealing with deeper anthropological matters Clausewitz dealt with...]]

Lenin understood WW1 from the standpoint of the precedence of objective politics, by deducing its causes and its course from the physiognomy of the historical epoch: “we cannot understand current war if we don’t understand the epoch” (1916). “This war came from the circumstances of an epoch, in which capitalism reached its highest point of development” (1915). In order to comprehend deep down whatever takes place in war, we must first study “all the politics of the whole system of European states in their economic and political mutual relations”, the since decades ago politics of the two groups of warring states, and the nexus/connection, interrelation of this war with the pre-war politics so as not to be led astray by isolated examples/cases and “chance occurrences” (1917).

[[we can clearly SEE that notwithstanding the dogmatic “class war” and “all is reduced to the economy” trope, in general, Lenin, having studied Clausewitz, was on the right path to grasping overall the interrelation between war and politics as the political within society]]

According to Lenin, if we take seriously the fundamental principle that “every war is only the continuation of politics by other means” and if we apply this principle as an analytical tool for the historical and sociological comprehension of the world war, then the solution is obvious: the world war is “the continuation of the imperialistic politics of two groups of Great Powers, and the circumstances of the imperialistic epoch in its totality gave rise to and nourished or fed this politics” (1916).

[[THIS, DICKHEADS, WHICH IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT, SCIENTIFICALLY SEEN, DICKHEADS, MEANS THAT WHETHER A REGIME IS “ETHICALLY AND MORALLY SUPERIOR” E.G. AS A PARLIAMENTARY OR A “DEMOCRATIC” REGIME OR “ETHICALLY...]]
AND Morally inferior” e.g. an authoritarian dictatorship, etc. is absolutely irrelevant as to the causes of war. So, Germany neither in WW1 or WW2 is simply as “the embodiment of evil” responsible for the world wars. All major powers involved are responsible. Which side we’re on, is another matter altogether. But war is going to break out anyway, whether all regimes are “democratic” or some or many are dictatorial. When a hegemonic or imperialistic power like Zio-USA wants allies to be “democratic”, all it means is that it wants allies it can control and manage, and as a hegemonic or imperialistic-like power it will engage in all sorts of co-operation with non-“democratic” regimes anyway. None of this is to say that other imperialistic or hegemonic powers are any better than Zio-USA. On the contrary…]

The violation of Belgian neutrality etc. = just the surface. What is decisive is the competition between the imperialist Powers in a historical epoch, whereupon capitalism could only be developed as imperialism. England, which had outflanked in the past both France and Holland as colonial Powers, had to now fight against the “quick development” of a “young and vibrant bandit”, i.e. Germany = a matter of “the distribution of the loot which the two conspiracies had grabbed” (1917) [[AAAAA-HAHAAAAHAHAHAHA!!!!! CLASSIC LENIN!]] + 1918, it’s impossible to lay the blame for war on individuals etc..

If it were a matter of individuals, and not of objective social-political criteria, then the individuals could be simply replaced in order to have peace

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again etc. which = total bullshit. And that is why – according to Lenin’s logic – socialism was the only way out (1917) [[so, Lenin was more or less right on the causes of war, but his claim he had the “solution” = BULLCRAP and just a disguise for his own power claims]].

The common points between Clausewitz and Lenin, have never until now been analysed, as we are now so doing/analysing.
The basic reason of this is the deficient or incorrect comprehension of Clausewitz, which started from the incorrect premise that politics is equated with moderation and that subjective politics has precedence.

AND the relationship between Lenin (student) and Clausewitz (teacher) was shown in a way which did an injustice to both = from the character of war based on Clausewitz’s fundamental axiom, thereafter Lenin deduced from here the duties of the revolutionary movement and finally, following strategic and tactical recipes reduced to Clausewitz, organised the uprising of the Bolsheviks and won the civil war (Possony + Hahlweg + Blasius cf. Ancona’s well-aimed objections + Milovidov who objected to presenting Lenin and a pupil aping its teacher Clausewitz).

This one-sided and false exposition of the relations between Lenin and Clausewitz presupposes an extremely one-sided perception regarding the way with which revolutions come to a victorious end; i.e. overestimated is the organisational and conspiratorial side of things, and the impression is created that a good general staff constitutes the decisive element of success, as long as the correct recipes are applied.

Anyone who knows Clausewitz’s work well, will know that what is sought are not the recipes but the “tact of judgement” on the part of the enforcers of such judgement (i.e. those making/taking the decisions).

What Clausewitz actually wrote about defence and offence/attack was no guarantee that Lenin would organise civil war defence and offence/attack successfully. Starting with the same

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knowledge, but with faulty judgement, the outcome could have been different.
What Lenin gained from Clausewitz is what Clausewitz considered as the only possible practical gain/benefit from being engaged in theory: the refinement and the exercising of judgement, so as to gain the necessary tact of judgement.

Re: theory of war, whatever Lenin found in Clausewitz, he knew already as a Marxist. As a Marxist, Lenin regarded it as self-evident that war and peace, that is, politics in times of peace, and politics in times of war, do not constitute opposing magnitudes, but are equally subject to the laws of (class) struggle. And as a Marxist, Lenin also knew from the beginning, war was the violent continuation of the politics of certain historical subjects.

Well before Lenin had studied Clausewitz, in 1900 when the Boxer Rebellion was being suppressed with the help of Russian troops, Lenin asked “How must the socialists behave in this war? In whose interest is it being conducted? What is the real meaning of the politics which the Russian government is following?”

Of course, Lenin’s Marxist identity was also part of the differences between the two. Their differences re: the philosophy of history and of culture/civilisation as well as in regard anthropological matters, were so obvious, that any comment is superfluous. We shall briefly, though, go over the consequences of such differences as concerns the relationship between war and politics.

If the philosophy of history Lenin advocated foresees the end of wars, the reason is because here the abolition of
classes is considered possible, and indeed historically necessary.

This means that the war phenomenon primarily functions with the division of human societies into classes and not with the clash/conflict of peoples, nations and states, since these are considered in their turn as social constructs corresponding with certain forms and gradations of the formation of classes and destined to be abolished and to lose every political meaning/significance with the abolition of classes.

[[What’s actually happening c. 2019 is not the abolition of classes in the sense of the abolition of hierarchies, but the turning of societies into APE JUNGLES OF INCREASING ANOMIE. And from this point on there are TWO STARK BASIC CHOICES: further APE JUNGLEFICATION or far greater Authoritarianism (and or both, in the case neither one of the two choices gains the clear upper hand)]]

However, they have to be attributed mainly to the factors of domestic politics – and precisely the primacy of domestic/internal politics opens up at the level of the philosophy of history, the perspective of the abolition of war in future classless society.

**Whereas for Clausewitz, the oppositions/contrasts in the field of domestic/foreign politics-policy ought to be subjected to the superior command of the conservation of the nation or of the state, since the nation or the state sees the common denominator of the interests of all the members of the given collective subject irrespective of social class**, Lenin, the Marxist, remains convinced that nation and state carve their politics mainly or exclusively in accordance with the interests of the ruling class and that the oppressed classes of various nations and states have more common interests between them rather than with “their own” ruling classes.

[[This was the broad general position of the Marxists-Leninists. However, in practice we had strong Marxist-Leninist involvement in de-colonialisation and anti-imperialistic nationalism, as well as being used and abused for the purposes of Great Russian Nationalism in the guise of the Soviet Union. In any...]}
event, the actual “abolition” of states and classes in a classless society never also came with the notion of abolishing nations as such – such a notion is the product of the minds of THE SATANISTS = JOOs and their COCK-SUCKING PROTESTANT, PAPIST AND ATHEIST “PALS” = MONEY = THE MEANING OF LIFE AND THE ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTING FILTHY ANIMAL, THE elite ZIO-JOO, IS SOMEHOW “ZIO-SPECIAL” WHEN IN REALITY HE IS TOTAL ZIO-FILTH, ABSOLUTE VOMIT. VOMIT. VOMIT. (GROSSO MODO, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ODD EXCEPTION ETC. AS A SUBJECTIVE “MATTER OF TASTE”...)]

This fundamentally different view as regards the co-existence of humans leads, therefore, to fundamentally different judgements as to the primacy of internal/domestic or of external/foreign policy-politics.

Clausewitz, of course, accepted that the internal/domestic situation of a nation or of a state is connected with the nature/character/physiognomy of every war, but not in the sense that war serves a particular ruling class, but in the sense that every society necessarily wages its war with the means and in the mode which allows it or which its general developmental/evolutionary level allows.

Clausewitz’s position is that every people ought to stand by its government, whereas Lenin welcomes national cohesion only in “just” or “progressive” wars – this national cohesion for Lenin does not constitute a value in itself or an end in itself.

Regarding Clausewitz’s description of monarchical war becoming people’s war through the French Revolution, Lenin notes that “people” here only means the bourgeoisie (Clausewitz's Werk, p. 32).

If the people in the sense of the broad masses of the oppressed does not participate in
war in order to serve the ruling class, but for its own ends/purposes, then genuine people’s war must be converted automatically into class war which will affect war between states too.

Having in mind the primacy of the concept of class and the related primacy of internal/domestic policy/politics, as Lenin sees it, we can now reconstitute the latent differences between Lenin and Clausewitz as regards the principle that war constitutes the continuation of politics.

Their agreement is based, as we saw, on the fact that both of them interpret politics in the objective sense of “social circumstances” or of “political communication”. The differences appear once the question is posed as to which facets/aspects or what elements of political communication are continued inside war, and bring on war.

For Clausewitz, political communication, if with this we mean social-economic magnitudes, determines the general form of the waging/conducting of war, nevertheless these magnitudes do not constitute in themselves the deeper causa belli, which rather emanates from the having taken
root anthropologically seeking/pursuit of self-preservation and power.

On the contrary, for Lenin, the social-economic magnitudes determine not only the mode of waging war, but also its deeper causes, so that foreign policy/external politics in the form of war constitutes the necessary extension of the war-creating internal/domestic structure of a country.

Clausewitz does not attribute to this structure great importance as a war-creating factor, because he believes that – one way or another – every collective subject wages/conducts and will wage wars.

Conversely, Lenin’s belief that wars could be abolished under certain circumstances pushes him to concentrate his attention on social-economic factors which he considers war-creating and whose effacement would have to bring about the abolition of wars.

“Politics” means for both of them, struggle and clashing/conflict, otherwise politics could not, or rather would not be in reality obliged to give rise/birth to wars.

There is no valid comparison between Clausewitz being in favour of a “moderate” politics, and Lenin “irreconcilable” and “destructive” politics (Schmitt).

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In summary, between Lenin and Clausewitz, there are two central differences as regards anthropology and the philosophy of history and or culture/civilisation.
One concerns the state or class character of politics, whose continuation is war. The other concerns the primacy of internal/domestic or of external/international/foreign politics/policy. These two differences are pointed out in terms almost of stereotypes in Soviet publications Marxisme-Léninisme sure la guerre; Milovidov; Soviet Military Encyclopedia; Savkin). See White re: the difference between Lenin’s concept of politics and that of Clausewitz was stressed early on in the Soviet Union.

After WW2, Clausewitz was frequently presented as a representative of German-Prussian militarism and his significance as a theoretician of war was downgraded in the Soviet sphere (Garthoff). Stalin wrote that the War proved Clausewitz wrong [[HAHAHAHAHAHA!!! Stalin = Truth lies with the Victor, which is what all Victors more or less do, including all that ZIO-USA-Protestant-Papist-Atheistic EXCREMENT (this is from a Greek Orthodox point of view DICKHEADS. It’s not a scientific statement, IMBECILES)]]

With De-Stalinisation, Clausewitz was viewed more favourably in the Soviet Union (Rasin), even though Soviet commentators still stressed “militaristic”, “idealistic” and “reactionary” aspects over the “positive” (Milovidov; Soviet Military Encyclopedia). Downgrading Clausewitz was sometimes accompanied by praising Russian military tradition (with Suvorov as precursor and teacher of Napoleon in Savkin). In East Germany, there were warnings against the “feudal-bourgeois” sides of the thought of the Prussian Reformists (Rehm). See also Maass re: the “socialistic cultivation of national traditions” and Clausewitz. (end of long footnote)

If wars between states have to finally be attributed to the structure of their domestic politics, i.e. in regard to their class structure, if war and domestic politics and policy are connected primordially and causally, then there is no reason not to consider as wars in the full sense of the term, armed conflict within a country, i.e. civil wars. If, again, wars constitute the continuation of class politics, which can appear in domestic and foreign politics, then there are
no boundaries between wars domestically and wars internationally, a war between states can be converted into a war between social classes of the same state and conversely.

Lenin understood all of that. In regard to the sociological character of civil wars p. 290

he wrote: civil wars too = wars. If one recognises class struggle then one recognises civil wars, which constitute in every society a natural, under certain circumstances inevitable, continuation, meta-development and sharpening of class struggle (1916).

For Lenin, the common points between inter-state and civil war are not limited to the genetic aspect/facet, i.e. to their common provenance from the class character of society; they also concern their texture and course.

Civil war in Lenin’s words = “the more/most acute form of class struggle..., whereby a series of economic and political fights and clashes are repeated, accumulated, expanded and made more acute until they are converted into the armed struggle of one class against the other (1917).

“A revolutionary epoch is for social democracy the same as times of war for an army” (1905) [[notice how “social democracy” back in 1905 was roughly the same as democracy and socialism (or overlapped with the notions of democracy and socialism) as opposed to oligarchic bourgeois liberalism and more laissez-faire-like capitalism]].

Various examples of Lenin’s use of war/military-like language in relation to class struggle, civil wars etc..

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Revolution is war (1905).
1905 Lenin considered the possibility of a Russian loss in the Russo-Japanese war as the catalyst of a revolution.

Also, with the onset of WW1, from imperialistic war to social revolution (1914).

+ 1915 imperialistic war commences the era of social revolution, especially as wars now are people’s wars etc.

+ Lenin 1914 = we won’t follow the chauvinism, but we’ll release the revolutionary energy against the chauvinism which governments make the peoples go crazy with... [[Lenin used the term “chauvinism” – and if I’m not mistaken – not “racism”]] and that can only happen with military defeat. Revolution during war = civil war, which will contribute to defeat in war (1915 = the revolutionary class must hope in regard to a revolutionary war, the defeat of its own government....)

The Bolsheviks’ success in 1917 was in large part due to “revolutionary defeatism”, and Lenin rushed to make a generalisation as historical law “Has there ever been in history even just one great revolution not accompanied by war? We do not live in a state, but in a system of states.” (1919) [[THIS re: “system of states” IS FAIRLY CLOSE TO PRECEDING A KENNETH WALTZ-LIKE POSITION!]] At other times he saw revolutions coming from wars as a special category (not in the sense of a general “law”), particularly weighed down by history etc.. (1918 – a revolution emerging from world war will undergo a particularly difficult birth).
3. Function and typology of war

Just as in Marx and Engels, so too in Lenin, the historical function of war is appraised from the dual perspective of the given in advance framework which their philosophy of history defines. Wars, on the one hand, are connected with the existence of classes and will cease only when classes will disappear, but in the interim – and only that counts from a practical-political point of view – wars are seen with the criteria of rational expediency and e.g. whether they are going to promote this or that desired short-term or long-term development.

So, wars and violence in general can belong to the great motive/driving forces of history, so that their wholesale ethical-moral condemnation cannot but emanate from political-historical ignorance and naivety.

Only “tearful/crocodile tears priests” – Lenin says – are not in a position p. 293

to apprehend which necessities govern war, and indeed precisely “in an epoch where history is about to solve the greatest problems of humanity with struggle and war” (1918 Lenin’s letter to American workers!).

Of course, war brings about indescribable suffering etc. but it still remains a “historical driving force of tremendous magnitude” which forces peoples “to intensify to the maximum/extremes all their forces” with radical measures being necessary etc. (1917).

The outcome of a war judges the strength of a people (1911).

Of course, wars are not waged with the intention of uncovering one’s own [[people’s]] weaknesses and to commit suicide by knowing one’s inability to historically survive; capitalistic circumstances in particular smash whatever is outmoded and surpassed. So, war tests the strength of a capitalistic state (1915).

Russia was judged harshly by the court of the Russo-Jap war (1904, 1905).
Especially apparent was the disharmony between government and

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the people (1905). The second aspect of war is that not only does the old sink
irrevocably into oblivion, but at the same time the new is also formed

[[HEY, WHITE NATIONALISTS!!! THE WHITE SUB-RACES EXTINGUISHED THEMSELVES
IN THE TWO WORLD WARS AND THEN UNDER CONDITIONS OF ZIO/SATANIC-USA-
MAMMON IMPERIALISM!!! IT’S ALL OVER!!! (IN TERMS OF “PURE” WHITENESS). THE
ONLY “CONSOLATION” IS THAT THE ZIO-EXCREMENT WILL EVENTUALLY GET
WHAT’S COMING TO IT... IT’S JUST A MATTER OF TIME... ONE HUNDRED YEARS... ONE
THOUSAND YEARS... WHATEVER...]]

See Lenin 1915 re: war and others up, others down etc....

So, the proletariat, if it wants to rule, it’ll have to do so in war too (1919).

Lenin wrote that WWI hastened the demise of capitalism in the sense it
promoted the conversion of monopoly capitalism to state-monopoly capitalism.
The former = a gradation of imperialism, the latter, a pre-gradation of socialism
(1917) [[THIS IS ACTUALLY NOT THAT WRONG, IF WE CONSIDER
THAT MASS DEMOCRACY AS SOCIAL ORGANISATION IS A FUSION
OF LIBERALISM AND (aspects of 19th century understood (SOCIAL)
DEMOCRACY/SOCIALISM]]

Lenin regarded that in the past, wars also occurred which, notwithstanding all
the destruction and suffering, “benefitted the development/evolution of
humanity” (1915).

Lenin felt this to be the case re the Russo-Jap war.

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So, Tsarism was undermined, and Russia got to modernise its army after a deep
political crisis brought about by defeat in war to a more advanced Power (1905).
For Lenin, war like peace = a deterministic/law-bound form of capitalistic life and not a matter of “sin” as the priests said (1915).

There’s no possibility of disarmament under capitalism as the petty-bourgeois CRETINS would want (1919).

These imbeciles don’t understand the nexus/connection between politics and class domination but think abstractly in terms of “war is bad, peace is benefaction.”

Every peace like every war seeks certain goals (1905).

There have been just wars in history. Just wars are exclusively about goals/ends and purposes, not about the conduct/waging of war (1916). So the “just” war is not in the fighting of the war (which is about direct violence), but about the goals etc.. Civil war can never be ethically condemned by Marxism (1906).

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There is no getting out of war. Only when the bourgeoisie are defeated all over the world will wars become impossible (1916) [[= TOTAL BULLSHIT. IT’S NO DIFFERENT TO A ZIO-USA JOO SAYING ONCE ALL COUNTRIES BECOME “DEMOCRATIC”’ WITH JOOS WIELDING GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORMS OF MAMMONISED ZIO-POWER (WHICH THEY DON’T SAY TO US, BUT ONLY BETWIXT THEMSELVES), EVERYONE WILL BE AT PEACE = TOTAL ZIO-LOBOTOMY NONSENSE FOLLOWING THE TOTAL MARXIST/LEVINIST NONSENSE ON THIS POINT OF ENDING ALL WARS... BASED ON LIBERAL FREE TRADE ENDING ALL WARS NONSENSE ETC....]]

 Lenin did not believe in the possibility of avoiding war over essential differences or in the possibility of a nation isolating itself from the rest of the world to avoid friction/s.
Lenin pours only scorn on “international order/arbitration” arguments etc. = TOTAL BULLSHIT (in terms of not being related to Power and Interests), and of course on that point he was right.

1917 Lenin emphasised European peoples’ domination over the rest of the world etc... incl. massacres etc....

Boundaries between combatants and non-combatants get even more fluid in civil wars (1906).

The forms of war in civil war are

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more varied, and civil war knows not of neutral parties etc. (1905).

**Lenin never considered discussing and distinguishing between restricted and non-restricted wars.** Lenin concentrates on imperialism and war, an only briefly goes through 19th century nationalistic wars (Davis).

Every war is the continuation of a politics (1916). So, the politics must be studied before the war, and the politics which lead to war. Imperialistic politics leads to imperialistic wars.

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From a politics of national liberation, we get wars of national liberation (1916).

So, the historical basis is wars between ruling classes and oppressed e.g. Spartacus (1905, 1918).

Imperialistic wars occurred in ancient times (Rome against Carthage) and in the Middle Ages or in the epoch of mercantile capitalism (1917).

Of course, now the imperialistic wars are related to the capitalistic economy, crises of surplus value and over the share of the world market.
For Lenin, imperialistic wars destroy democracy and only socialism can offer hope (1916). Lenin against the German “social chauvinists”

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and their bogus claims of democracy. Wars from the end of the 18th century and in the 19th century were national wars as a necessary step of the rise of the productive forces within developing capitalism (1915, 1914).

Lenin = cannot compare the national wars against feudalism and absolutism with the imperialistic wars of the imperialistic bourgeoisie (1915).

For Lenin, 3 phases: 1) rise and complete victory of the bourgeoisie (1789-1871), 2) full domination and coming decline of monetary-capitalistic bourgeoisie (1871-1914), and from 1914 = imperialistic wars (1915).

What Marx and Engels said about phase 1) cannot be transferred to later phases. Lenin rejects the notion that Engels’s 1891 call on Germany to wage war against Russia, still applied in 1914. In 1891

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Germany and its progressive working class was still under threat by Tsarism, in 1914 Germany was fighting for world prevalence and in 1905 Tsarism had lost the ability for foreign campaigns (1917).

In 1914, all that was left of the progressive bourgeoisie was Serbia ag. Austria. And Serbia could be supported only if she was not tied to the English and Russian bandits etc. (1915).

[[QUITE CLEARLY, IN THE ERA C. 1900 TO C. 1970, THE COLONIES ETC. WITH MEN IN AGRICULTURE AND PROLETARIANS OF HARD, HEAVY LABOUR, COULD FIGHT FOR LIBERATION, WHEREAS WHAT REMAINS OF THE PATHETIC “WESTERN” COUNTRIES TODAY, WITHOUT STREAMS OF MALE VIRILITY, CAN ONLY WAIT TO DIE OUT AND BE OVERRUN BY THE APE, GIVEN THAT WHITE WOMEN ARE NOT HAVING WHITE CHILDREN WITH WHITE MEN TO A SUFFICIENT DEGREE ON THE BASIS OF WHITE-NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS, ETC..]]
Lenin held that just wars involve national wars, civil wars and the wars of socialistic countries against capitalistic powers in the age of imperialism (1916).

There’s no possibility of just being peaceful. Socialists must participate in just wars (1916), incl. the policy of “revolutionary defeatism”

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which becomes nonsensical and destructive in relation to just/revolutionary wars.

“National wars of colonies and of semi-colonies are inevitable in the epoch/era of imperialism. Every war is the continuation of politics with other means, incl. national wars against imperialism.”

It’s not of significance who attacks first, if its Morocco ag. France, India ag. England, Persia or China ag. Russia, as they would be defensive wars (1915).

Capitalistic development is asymmetrical. The victorious proletariat in one or just a few countries would have to fight the capitalistic countries incl. by getting on its side the oppressed classes of other countries etc. (1915, 1916). [[HERE LENIN WAS BEING MUCH MORE IDEOLOGICAL THAN REALISTIC, THOUGH THERE WERE “SUCCESSFUL” NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN CHINA, VIETNAM, CUBA, KOREA, ETC.]]

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Just wars... and the defense of the oppressed fatherland (1918).

“We are not peaceniks and we cannot deny a revolutionary war” (1917).

For Lenin, under imperialism, reactionary and unjust war can turn into progressive and just war, with eventually progressive/just wars winning out. Yet, Lenin [[the shrewd, cunning fox he was]], also acknowledged that backward steps were more than possible, incl. on a long-term basis.
From Napoleonic wars of initially national-revolutionary wars of the young French Republic, to imperialistic wars, which in turn brought about national wars as a reaction. (1916)

*Lenin = all “just wars” = “defensive”, regardless of who attacks first... This = distinction between politics and the strategic notion of attack/offence and of defence.* Lenin referred to Clausewitz’s distinction between the political and the strategic notion of defence (*Clausewitz’s Werk*, pp. 34, 42). Cf. Sinowjew.

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In 1908, Lenin had already written (and thus not taking from Clausewitz) “the only possible standpoint” for the political appraisal of a war are the “interests of the class struggle of the proletariat and not the defensive or offensive character of war” (in the strategic sense of “defence” and “offense/attack”).

From WW1, Lenin had the “social-chauvinists” in his sights, who justified war just on the basis that their nation had been attacked first. **So, Lenin detached the notion of just war from defensive (in the strategic sense) war, and in 1914 wrote it was meaningless to talk of defensive and offensive wars, as the historical-political character of wars is never a matter of defense or offense/attack per se. [[THIS MEANS, THAT EVERY SIDE SEES THEIR WAGING WAR AS “JUST”, ANYWAY.]]**

For Lenin, the “petty-bourgeois” only cares who attacked first, and does not look into the political purpose/goal and the class character, the historical-political character of war (1916). It’s – for Lenin – a question of politics as to who is “reactionary” or “revolutionary” and not who attacked whom first etc. (1918).
Lenin also made a distinction between proletarian and bourgeois countries [[in this sense, China and India today would be considered proletarian countries, and the USA and Germany would be considered parasitical-hegemonic (“ZION-Satanic-MAMMON-Devil-Evil-Lucifer”) countries]], and the difference between defensive and offensive/attacking wars definitely and conclusively loses all of its meaning (1919). And, of course, this line of argumentation was used by Lenin to support a revolutionary offensive war against “counter-revolutionary” countries (1915) [[it became relevant re: the Soviet Union and Poland, if I’m not mistaken (?)]]

Of course, the distinction between just and unjust wars was ultimately made on the basis of the view of history which distinguishes between good and bad. In Lenin’s polemics, the foe was not only unjust but also offensive/attacking (regardless of the strategic sense of offense and defense).

4. Army and tactics

In the preliminary remarks of this chapter, we already explained why Lenin should probably be regarded as a politician with an acute sense of military matters, rather than as a military specialist and theoretician.

Lenin said next to nothing about the strategic and tactical matters widely discussed in light of WW1... He did though make good use of commonplaces re: concrete/specific situations e.g. he stressed that in a modern war, economic organisation is crucial/decisive (1917), that whoever has more resources and more support in the masses (of the common people) incl. their mobilisation, wins (1919, 1918, 1919).
+ Importance of moral, the concentration of forces at the right place etc....

Marx and Engels were admirers of Napoleon, whereas Lenin never expressed a preference for the kind/form of war to be waged/conducted.

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Lenin however had the advantage of being a realist in practice etc. like Clausewitz, incl. that every concrete-specific situation requires special strategy and tactics and that the practical value of generally recognised principles depends on the degree of their embodiment in this specialist strategy and tactics.

Lenin knew – in other words – that no military theory can be a substitute for the “tact of judgement”, and Lenin knows this just as much as Clausewitz, even though as a Marxist he is continually under the pressure of the need to theoretically justify whatever the tact of judgement dictates in practice.

Lenin – being the cunning shrewd operator he was – keeps Marxist theory flexible enough when having to theorise his politics in order to justify more or less convincingly all his possible tactical manoeuvres.

[[HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!]]

Not by chance, therefore, Lenin was very attracted to Clausewitz’s sayings on the tact of judgement and the military commander/general. AND NOT ONLY IN WAR, must one weigh up, based on the tact of judgement, all that is happening around him in war (Clausewitz’s Werk, p. 25). + importance of trained and exercised judgement, rather than abstract theorisations etc.... and this applies to the art of war too.

In Clausewitz, the gnosiotheoretical/epistemological/theory of knowledge primacy of the
tact of judgement accompanies the more general historical-relativistic way of looking at things, and this applies to Lenin too only to the extent Lenin as a Marxist thinks historically [[and concretely]].

1906, Lenin = “the Marxist definitely demands the historical approach to the problem of the forms of fighting/combat” and in different eras of economic development, there is also dependence on various political, national-cultural/civilisational conditions, and various forms of combat/fighting come to the fore.

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So, any insistence on a ready-made general theory re: combat = nonsensical. Need to look at concrete/specific instance.

Lenin 1906 states “Marxism decisively rejects all abstract formulae, all dogmatic recipes, and demands the careful analysis of real data/facts of mass struggle, which gives rise to ceaselessly new and more varied forms of defence and offence/attack”.

The other essential common point between Lenin and Clausewitz has nothing to do with the Marxism of the former, but with Lenin’s genuine political instinct. = The endless change in the forms and of the situations of combat, making the tact of judgement absolutely necessary, as determined by the necessary orientation of our act to the act of a foe, who imposes his law on our act.

When our act is carried out having continually in mind what the foe is capable of doing, he forces us to choose undogmatically, forms of fighting/combat and degrees of intensity, in pre-empting the foe, + regarding our readiness for struggle both in war and in politics. **One must be fully ready for war with all necessary weapons and all available means and methods of fighting.** Ditto
re: politics, even though in politics, it’s far more difficult to know what means of combat will be for us possible and advantageous under these or those future circumstances. **If we’re not accordingly equipped, then the defeat could be devastating** (1920).

**Lenin (correctly) found no one-sided primacy in Clausewitz of offence/attack or of defence, unlike, at that time, generals and military theoreticians.**

Lenin was interested in the fluid transitions, “in which the difference between defence and attack/offence” disappears, and he was interested in the “continual alternation

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and connection of defence and attack” (*Clausewitz’s Werk*, pp. 28, 31).

**In regard to Clausewitz, during the civil war, Lenin said if our forces are few and weak, we have to retreat into the inner part of the country (1918).**

+ 1921 (need to adapt to all circumstances, incl. need to retreat if necessary to avoid total defeat).

In every war, there’s a need for stepping back, manoeuvring, deviating etc. in order to be able to go back on the offense/to attack (1918).

**Of course, at other times in the civil war, Lenin supported armed insurrection (1917) with the secret of victory being to win the first success and to proceed from success to success without ceasing attack/offence against the foe (1917).**

**Once you start the insurrection, you have to go all the way.** Daily victories, even if small = necessary (1917). *October 1917 proves Lenin’s superb judgement of*
when to move re: decisive action = real evidence of “tact of judgement”.

Already in 1905/06, Lenin referred to Marx and Engels, and again in 1917 re: “insurrection is an art and the basic rule of this art is attack/offence which is conducted with rash/reckless daring and the greatest of decisiveness (1906); + 1905.

the vanguard takes the lead in times when “the full ethical/moral and political bankruptcy of the old government” has become obvious (1917).

Lenin deemed the principle of “only from below, never from above” to be anarchistic and not Marxist (1905). So, organisation = expedient, disciplined and planned action = extremely important (incl. other references from 1905), which despite the

confession of faith in the determinism/law-bindedness of historical development /evolution. left much room for “politics” [[in the narrower sense, and not in the broader sense of “the political”]], i.e. for the weighing up of concrete/specific situations and for action on the basis of (subjective) decisions.

1905 = Lenin was explicit, it’s not enough for the objective, social conditions to be “mature”; decisive action is needed at the right time.

The culmination of the organisational factor in an uprising, is the creation of a revolutionary army. (1905) However, what Lenin called “guerrilla war(fare)” is something completely different to what we got used to in the 20th century 3rd world.

There is no direct link between Lenin and Mao, as there is no direct link between Marx and Engels and guerrilla warfare.
For Lenin, fighting from the barricades had been transcended by the development of military technique/technology with mobile groups of 10, or even just 2 men (1906). See also Fischer.

1906, such small groups are inevitable, particularly during the large intervals between the “great battles” of civil war.

**Lenin never absolutely rejected the Russian tradition of terrorism.**

1906, **though he was not generally enthused with intellectuals detached from the masses and terrorism...**

One can see how the later development of guerrilla war(fare) was foreign to Lenin in the civil war, when he dropped his plans for a proletarian militia/civil guard in favour of the constitution of a disciplined regular army which he considered to be superior not only for military,

but also for social and economic reasons.

1916 The army is key.

So universal conscription was seen as a democratic measure + necessary etc. (1901)...

to hasten armed insurrection against capitalism (1916).

Lenin hoped via the army, troops would be exposed to revolutionary currents, and that part of them would come over to the Bolshevik side etc. (1905).
The mass movement must also include up to taking over the army (1906).

During WW1 he called for more social-democratic work in the army (1916).

And from within the army there could be “a political “task force” which would ensure decisive superiority in the decisive place at the decisive moment” (1919).

1903, he wanted eventually a civil guard/militia to take over the permanent army, but as a 1916 genuine proletarian civil guard/militia...

... of 95% workers and peasants for army and police duties, for discipline and order, to distribute food, and would enforce a general obligation to work

[[LENIN WASN’T INTO DOLE BLUDGING AAAA-HAHAHAAHAAHAAHAHAAHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA], and also to train the masses to be involved in all state matters (1917).

BUT UNDER THE TOUGH/HARD NEEDS OF THE ORGANISATION OF BOLSHEVIK DOMINANT AUTHORITY/GOVERNMENT AND IN RESPECT OF PREVAILING IN THE CIVIL WAR, Lenin was forced to “silently” put aside his old conviction that military science pointed to the civil guard/militia to be the best means for both defensive and offensive war (1905).

1919, Lenin saw guerrilla warfare as of no use and a waste, and rejected Left Social Revolutionary and Anarchist calls for a people’s war.

What was needed was organisation on a mass scale = regular army (1918).

= Centralised Regular Army = NOT guerrilla warfare (which is a leap, centuries backwards), with the regular army being based on latest technology etc. and conducive to long, detailed planning, railroads etc., etc. (1918).
Regular army does not = guerrilla bodies/militias for the “besieged fort of the Soviet Union” (1918, 1919).

The need for a Red Army against “world imperialism” (1918).

1915 calls for a modern army.

**After 1917, Lenin repeatedly called for the necessity of transferring the model of military organisation to the organisation of the economy incl. for food distribution and for industrial reconstruction.**

Workers’ militias and organising everything militarily = the key (1920). The fact that in the army, “bourgeois specialists” were at first used, appeared to constitute a good example of the suitability of the army as a field of innovative social experiments: “the same experience, we must apply also to industry” (1920).

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**VII. Excursus/Digression D: The Soviet Military Dogma**

The mature/late Soviet military dogma comprehended itself as the creative application and meta-development/further development of Lenin’s war talk.

The Soviets distinguished between military dogma (general teachings re: war and politics (as being united)) and military science (the art of war,
strategy and tactics) (see below), however the two directly related to each other.

To the extent specific military decisions concerned concrete circumstances in the atomic/nuclear age, reference to Lenin took the form of the very abstract expression of the repetition of his thoughts on the historical determination of the forms and means of combat/fighting and on the need to adapt them to each and every respective historical and political situation (Lénine et les forces, p. 217 ff.).

All that could be derived from Lenin = serious analysis of a situation. The individual measures needed to be taken = entirely different matter p. 318 which the said analysis is obliged to become concrete/specific.

Like Lenin and Clausewitz, so too did Soviet military theory locate the differentia specifica of war in the use of armed violence.

Politics in times of peace was characterised therefore not by an absence of clashes and conflict but by an absence of armed violence.

Armed struggle is not the denial/negation of politics, but “the tool/instrument of politics under circumstances of war” (Militärische Theorie, p. 306).

The difference between struggle/conflict-clashes in peace and in war = different intensity and different means.

Thus, are the genesis/birth of wars explained. Wars are born from the womb/ bosom of politics, consequently, it is the same politics, not the elimination of politics, but only politics with violent means (Milovidov; Marxisme-Léninisme sur la guerre).
The concept of politics includes equally both peace and war, but on the other hand it is obvious armed violence is not exercised ceaselessly so that one must conclude that politics also exists which does not consist in/of war.

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Politics therefore has at its disposal a large armoury of non-violent means, with whose help it can succeed in its goals without having recourse to war (Sokolowski, Strategie).

This position also was against Liddell Hart and others, who tried to include in the concept of war, also non-military means of combat/fighting, from exercising economic pressures up to illegal activity.

Sokolowski, absolutely correctly held that including means which are used also in times of peace in the concept of war “would necessarily lead to the absurd conclusion that war is a continuous situation of human society”.

Peace is a situation too of clashing and struggle, and within peace one has economic wars and illegal activities etc.. The differentia specifica of war is in the use of armed violence.

If, however, in the atomic age, the violence is exercised via atomic/nuclear weapons to what extent does

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war remain the continuation of politics?...

The use of nuclear weapons, though, seems to extinguish the possibility of using war as a means of politics to achieve a political goal/end/purpose. Even if things
got a bit carried away in war, it was still believed that the victor could impose
under his control the consequences of the previous exercising of violence.

**The problem with nuclear war is that even the victor cannot benefit from
winning if the destruction is mutual etc.**

1954, Malenkov declared that an atomic war would mean the end of human
civilisation. Of course, the Marxist-Leninists immediately retorted that such a
war would only mean the end of capitalism! (Dinerstein).

Under Khrushchev’s reign, adopted semi-officially was

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Malenkov’s position, and general Talensky wrote that war had been surpassed
as a means of politics.

But Talensky had to backtrack because of the uproar, and he went on to state the
superior socialism would ensure victory in a WW3.... see also Wolfe, *Soviet
Strategy*.

After the Cuban missile crisis and Khrushchev’s ousting, general Y/Gepisev (?)
stated that the fundamental principle of war as the continuation of politics
applies in relation to nuclear war too.

Atomic weapons are not merely organs of suicide, but are means of politics and
the fear that there won’t be a victor in a nuclear war was condemned

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as theoretically erroneous and politically dangerous, fatalistic and damaging to
the morale of the army (Dahm, Kolkowitz, Warner).

Insistence on the unity of war and politics had to be harmonised somehow with
the necessities of the politics of “peaceful co-existence”.
A number of convoluted arguments followed, incl. the issue of how “the imperialist camp” [= ZIO-USA – hahahahahaha!!!! we know as well that the Soviet world was basically the result of Russian imperialism and relatively great Russian chauvinism etc., so fair is far...] should be brought to heel and taught the right lessons etc. + to avoid nuclear war via politics notwithstanding that USA imperialism tended towards nuclear war.

Samkowoj = nuclear/atomic war would still be the continuation, expression, organ and result of the criminal politics of imperialism as to the achievement of its goals/ends etc.

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1978, East German study = which on the one hand agrees with Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by other means, but also agrees with Western commentators that absolute war tends to spin out of the control of politics... and so bourgeois circles end up in “realistic ascertainments” when taking into account nuclear/atomic war. Such a nuclear war would be just on the part of the socialistic countries, though it is not expressly stated that the socialist bloc would necessarily win (Türpe).

The Soviets were ambivalent overall re: Clausewitz. Apart from accepting the Prussian general’s fundamental principle of war being the continuation of politics by other means, they also accused Clausewitz of inspiring “imperialistic” strategic minds, who were preparing for an “imperialistic” nuclear/atomic war, yet on the other hand, Soviets supported Clausewitz against the representatives of the “Western camp”, who, wanting to exclude atomic/nuclear war as a means of politics, did not recognise that war constitutes the continuation of politics, and thus doubted the correctness of Marxist-Leninist theory!!! (Marxisme-Léninisme sure la guerre)
In the first case, the Western opponent is accused of the factual lack of a peace-loving politics in the subjective sense, and in the second case, of the theoretical denial of the primacy of politics in the objective sense!!!

If we consider the objective sense of politics (i.e. social-political conditions overall incl. anthropological constants), then the teaching of war as the continuation of politics in the nuclear/atomic age means that atomic/nuclear war – like every other war in the past, would have to have its social causes and its social content, its class character.

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Nuclear weapons would not break the framework of politics and politics would activate the possibilities which technology has at its disposal (Milovidov).

Nuclear/atomic war as the continuation of the politics of a state or of a class (Sokolowski; Skirdo; *Militärische Theorie*), whilst it was acknowledged that atomic/nuclear weapons changed considerably the meaning of the continuation of politics through war (*Marxisme-Léninisme sur la guerre*), in relation to “imperialism”, but not as to its consequences in relation to “socialism”.

Such a war would decide the fate of a whole social system on a world scale – something totally new in world history – so both sides would seek the clearer and more definitive political and military goals/ends/purposes (*Das moderne Militärwesen*; cf. *Marxisme-Léninisme sur la guerre*; Skirdo).

The Soviets felt pressed to renew the three main branches of the defence forces (army, navy, air-force) in the light of atomic/nuclear weapons.

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Stalin was blamed for underestimating the significance of nuclear weapons (Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko). 

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Only in 1962 was the phrase “revolution in military affairs” used in the Soviet literature (Galay), even though in 1968 the “new theory of the art of war” was considered a new achievement and a “transformation” in Soviet strategic thought (Das moderne Militärwesen).

The result was a combination of “traditional” views re: war and a recognition of the uniqueness of nuclear/atomic weapons.

Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko = the initial phases of war are usually crucial, but not necessarily always...

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The element of “surprise” becomes important (Dinerstein), but also the ability at timely prevention (Lomow), incl. through a fatal blow to the side which wanted to strike first (Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko).

Which side would start an attack if it knew that the other side could strike back decisively and fatally at the attacking side? (Wolfe = there’s a tension or insecurity in the Soviet stance re: attacking first and or being ready to strike back decisively etc.).

After the failure of the German Blitzkrieg in Russia, Stalin developed the position that the factors of stable effects (i.e. the social-economic and the ethical/moral-ideological potential of a country or the gradation/level/degree of historical evolution/development), and not the, in passing/incidental, chance elements (e.g. the element of surprise) decide the outcome of war (Dinerstein).

After 1945, this theory

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served also the attempt at downgrading the significance of the American monopoly of atomic/nuclear weapons (Kissinger).
Some time after Stalin’s death, there was Soviet talk playing down the stable effects, and the reality of possibly being wiped out by a chance element... abolishing whose historical “laws”...

However, the criticism of not respecting the unity of politics and war was made, esp. the Marxist-Leninist view of historical determinism, and war as the continuation of politics (in the objective sense of social-political conditions, not subjective party politics etc.), for the sake of a purely technical military consideration (Dinerstein).

See also Garthoff; Dahm; Wolfe re: the formation and development of Soviet military dogma.

This dogma did not want nuclear/atomic weapons to become a “fetish” as the “bourgeois” ideologues were in the habit of doing. The key question was in whose hands the nuclear/atomic weapons were (Zav’jalov).

Unlimited use of nuclear weapons [[the text says “missile weapons”, but it seems to me to be a typo, atomic/nuclear weapons must have been meant]], would affect the course and the outcome of the war (Lomow). But the theory of stable effects had not been surpassed, and conventional weapons related to social-economic and military-political circumstances were still very important, and the “determinative/decisive” factor in the outcome of war (Lomow), even though with nuclear weapons there are some new peculiar features (Skirdo).

This restoration of factors of stable effects was consistent with the Leninist perception/view of war as the continuation of politics.

As we know, this = politics in the objective sense, which means acceptance of Clausewitz’s and Lenin’s fundamental axiom also in the atomic/nuclear age,
with war as the continuation of politics as society in toto, and can’t be reduced to the exchange of nuclear strikes. This now = Soviet dogma.

At play in regard to the military potential under the
p. 329 circumstances of modern war, are the scientific-technical, the political-ethical and the military potential (*Das Moderne Militärwesen*).

The primacy of objective politics and of the factors of stable effects = victory for the socially and politically superior was certain and so strategy should be geared towards victory and be offensive/attacking [[well, history proved that the Soviet Union LOST! HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!]]

Notions of “nuclear omnipotence” were deemed to be “metaphysics” and “one-sided” because you can’t ignore the factor of the people, the masses, i.e. the collective bearer of objective politics, which appeared as the passive objects of the action of nuclear weapons (Milovidov).

The people/mass creates the economic power of the country and provides self-sacrifice, morale etc. (Skirdo). The involvement of the people/masses in war would in circumstances of nuclear/atomic war take place more quickly and more broadly than in previous wars (*Das Moderne Militärwesen*).

From an economic point of view, in the nuclear age, what you do before war = key, whereas during the two world wars, key was economic performance during the actual hostilities, and in a longer war, economic achievements during war cannot be disregarded (Skirdo, *Marxisme-Léninisme sur la guerre*).

The intensity of the war effort of all the people would correspond with the political goals of a nuclear/atomic war
“In these circumstances, the political goals/aims of the factions in the future world war will be achieved not only by crushing the armed forces, but with the full disorganising of the opponent’s economy and by discouraging his population. So, the essence of war is the continuation of politics through the exercising of armed violence as well as the peculiarities of war (Sokolowski).

Of primary significance for the Soviets in nuclear war was the morale, the fighting readiness and the ideological motives of the people.

Soviet authors stressed that nuclear/atomic war could not be the impersonal clash/conflict of nuclear-atomic systems; man will prove to be also in nuclear war an equally decisive factor, because military-technological revolution does not abolish, but on the other hand, enriches the content of a basic law of the conducting of war, i.e. the dependence of war readiness, of the course and of the outcome of war on the ethical-political situation of the civilian population and of the civil guard/militia (Milovidov).

The course and outcome of war are determined by the so-called four “laws of military science”:

a) the law of the correlation of military means which every side has at its disposal at the state of war;

b) by the law of the correlation of the entire military potential of the warring sides;

c) by the law of action of the political content (and political character) of war;

d) by the law of the correlation of the moral/ethical-political and psychical qualities of the warring peoples and armies.

The principles of the art of war are based on c) and d) which are most closely connected with each other, esp. since in the continuation of politics through
war, psychical sparks are provided and the people is mobilised and war as politics is waged/conducted by the people, and man remains the decisive power in armed struggle (Savkin).

If in the West the view was widespread that man is the simple accessory of the machine, the reason is the inability of imperialism to offer high ethical/moral motives to the people (Grechko).

In reality, the role of motives and generally of the human factor became more significant in the nuclear/atomic age-epoch. Because nuclear/atomic war will obviously constitute the most difficult possible test for a people, and the duties which enormous losses and destruction will set, can be fulfilled only by a people with sufficient motives and with necessary means (Milovidov; Lomov).

In the most highly advanced technicised/technological war, only the greatest of specialists can handle the complicated equipment, the arms and the armed systems, whilst at the same time the significance of intellectual/spiritual factors are parallely increased with the advances in military technology (Lomov; Skirdo; Milovidov).

The Soviets viewed as “pointless undertakings” the attempts of various Western strategic heads to put war into forms/types, and to predetermine the course of war with the help of game theory and mathematical means, in general; just a few things can one put into forms/types and predict when “the field of action of machines is always narrower and poorer than the field of the activity of humans” (Militärische Theorie). In Clausewitz’s language, this means that friction is possible also in nuclear/atomic war, just as in every other war.

The necessity of mass conventional armed forces was deduced in terms of theory from this view/conception as regards the priority of the human-moral/
ethical factor, and by the related rejection of “non-scientific bourgeois theories”
regarding the “war of buttons” and small professional armies (Milovidov;
Sokolowski). For the Soviet discussion at the beginning of the 1960s, which
ended in a compromise, but also by leaving some matters open (see Wolfe, cf.
Dahm).

The Soviet military dogma did not share the prognosis that in a nuclear/atomic
war there shall not exist either strategy or tactics. War, it said, would be
conducted/waged with mass armed forces notwithstanding the “decisive role” of
nuclear/atomic arms, and victory would be achieved “only with the common
efforts of all sections of the armed forces” (Savkin; Tschukow; cf. Lomov;
Lomow).

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Even the most prescient bourgeois military people accepted such an
understanding incl. in rejecting the absolute power of a certain branch (army,
navy, air force) (Bondarenko).

Victory can’t just be based on annihilation of inimical armed forces, but also on
the occupation of inimical land, which obviously only land forces/army can
undertake to achieve (Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko + Das Moderne
Militärwesen).

Land war requires great spreading out in space, the rapid deployment of forces
in different directions, the simultaneous use of various forms of manoeuvres and
quick attacks on a wide front with every mobile/flexible motorised/automobile
troops (Tschujkow; Sokolowski; Lomov; Savkin).

It was considered also a given that the small and great units of Soviet land
forces could “for a long period of time develop a successful activity in regions
of high contamination and radius” (Tschujkow; Lomov).
From the unity of politics (in the objective sense) and war, as well as from the primacy of the factors of stable effects, still two more central points of Soviet military dogma were deduced: the attacking/offensive character of the conduct or waging of war, and the certainty of victory.

A war, which constituted the continuation of communist politics, was obliged to be conducted offensively and aggressively on account of the objective character of this politics.

Literally: “the offensive/attacking character of Soviet strategy is explained by and large by the nature itself of the revolutionary proletariat and of its army, by the active nature of communistic ideology”.

+ The Marxists stressing always the primacy of attack/offence against defence is due the objective needs of the conducting/waging of war. Attack constitutes the fundamental type of military campaigns, and its purpose/goal is the **wholesale annihilation of the foe** (Milovidov; cf. Lomov; Lénine et les forces, p. 229 “not so the opponent can understand, but to be annihilated”). For the precedence of attack/offense in Soviet military thought before and after WW2, p. 333 see generally Garthoff incl. the fundamental principle of the annihilation of the foe).

It was expected though that in a nuclear war, the boundaries between defence and offence would not be as crude/broad/rough as previously, but the already existent superiority of offence vis-a-vis defence, would be reinforced even more by nuclear/atomic war (Sokolowski).

However, beside the rest of the basic principles of tactics (flexibility and the speedy development of ventures/undertakings, surprise, concentration of the major efforts and of the major forces in the decisive place and time), the
offensive/aggressive conduct/waging of war has a particular weight. It enables the taking of the initiative, the bending of the foe’s morale and the decisive victory; defence must be exercised/conducted actively-aggressively in order for it to have long-term success (Savkin. Of interest here is that in conjunction with the primacy of attack/offence and of the moral/ethical factor, the ascertainments of “Prussian militarists” are praised like Bernhardi and Ludendorff (loc. cit., pp. 27ff., 247, 48). Let us recollect, incidentally, that the absolute precedence of the human factor vis-a-vis the machine constituted the commonplace of national-socialistic philology [[!!!!!!]] see e.g. Hierl, Grundlagen, p. 17).

Finally, the offensive/attacking conducting/waging of war concentrates all the superiority of the factors of stable effects, which “guarantee the deterministic victory of the progressive communistic social and economic system over the reactionary capitalistic system (Sokolowski; Skirdo; Marxisme-Léninisme sur la guerre; Das Moderne Militärwesen; Samkowoj).

Historical determinism is revealed thus as the purest form of that objective politics, whose continuation would be nuclear/atomic war and the victory of socialism following that. On this basis, the Soviet military dogma realised the synthesis between the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of history and Clausewitz and Lenin’s war talk.

As the Soviet armed forces expanded to a great extent with modern weapons in order to challenge the USA for primacy, many Western commentators believed that such a development could only be due to the increase in the influence of Soviet military personnel/generals.

They (The said Western commentators) presupposed in this manner the liberal view/perception, in accordance with which political governments represent by
definition the moderate element, whereas the military people represent the savage and war-mongering element.

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In translating this view into sociological language, the Western commentators contrasted to elitism, professionalism, nationalism, social isolationism and to the tendency towards heroic symbolism, which supposedly characterised the military people/generals,... the equalisation/equalising principle, the precedence of ideology, proletarian internationalism, social mobilisation/enlistment and the tendency to anonymity, which allegedly flourished in the ranks of the Party (Kolkowitz).

Starting with this dichotomy, they thereafter argued that the Soviet army became a state within a state, that it usurped, in practice and gradually, the hegemonic position of the Party, in order to replace the Party in the case of a crisis, and contended that the Soviet army promotes the militarisation of society (Kolkowitz).

The above view = wrong, because the ruling Soviet elite was not set up to be judged on the basis of liberal criteria. The Party was no less elitist or nationalistic than the military personnel of the Soviet Union, and those of the Party pragmatically weighed up matters – as Western leaders found –, in order for it to take its decisions.

The army had more and more been connected with modern technology/technique, and with the corresponding strata of the intelligentsia, and with the active presence within youth, and the education system (Odom).

In the way it functioned, the army was less of an autonomous power/force and more of a particular bureaucracy next to the others, and indeed only for the reason that the ruling Party had incorporated in the field of its own duties, many
more military functions of a non-technical character than what a political
government of liberal countries could include/incorporate.

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From here, the possibility of the politicisation of the army arose to the extent
that the political leadership was militarised. This new construct had nothing to
do with Western distinctions between the two sectors [[political leadership, and, army]], and concepts such as “politicisation” and “militarisation” could only be
used in the sense of Western conventionality and Western distinctions.

In the Soviet Union, military + Party jointly deal with the Soviet Union’s
international role and internal/domestic matters of nationalities etc.. So KEY =
the great ends/goals of political power. Never were all the military officers of
the Soviet Union united against the Party. There were all kinds of differences of
opinion within both Party and army. The only advantage the army people had
was in a kind of “collective bargaining” over privileges etc..

Thus, was the way of living of the ruling elite post-Stalin, and de-Stalinisation
was first of all about getting to an equilibrium between the above groups so that
there was no need for the IMPONDERABLE WHIP OF A CAESAR.

After Stalin’s death, it is one-sided to say that the military people obtained
autonomy from the Party (after being under full control of Stalin/the Party), and
established their own power position re: the necessities of the technological
revolution (Erickson; Kolkowitz).

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The absence of a Dictator made inevitable a new modus vivendi, whereby some
freedom of movement and balance/equilibrium of forces was equally demanded.

The competition amongst the ruling Soviet elite, 1953-1957, actually did
increase the relative weight/position of the military, but always in conjunction
with a wing of the Party, and not totally separate from the Party (Garthoff; Wolfe).

The military had no autonomous power. General Zhukov was easily brushed aside in 1957... incl. by a significant portion of the armed forces... and the overturning of Khruschev was not an Army vs. Party matter (Kolkowitz), but was prepared and realised in the framework of the Party – again, with the help of a significant part of the military, but which differed over matters such as heavy industry, or individual strategic matters, incl. the relationship between defence and attack/offence – opinions were divided inside the ranks of the military people (Erickson. Wolfe. Warner)

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The Brezhnev era = mostly routine relations between Party and Army, though the reliance on new technology, army upgrades etc. made the army’s role greater, though there was never any independent action against the Party; at most the strongest military men could aid a faction in the Politburo predominate (Wagenlehner). The main focus of attention for everyone was for the Soviet Union to become a world Power (Mackintosh).

There was a whole lot of overlap between Party members and military personnel and vice versa etc. (Grechko; Lénine et les forces; Marxisme-Léninisme sure la guerre; cf. Kokowitz; Brzezinski).

The CPSU continually assured everyone it was in full control of the Army (Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko; Milovidov; Lomow; Skirdo; Dahm. The subjection of the Army to the Party incl. the invocation of Clausewitz’s fundamental axiom, something which = the liberal, and not the Leninist interpretation of Clausewitz. Trotsky had already enlisted Clausewitz’s axiom to support the position that the army is simply an organ of every politics on every occasion of the state (Die Geburt, pp. 87, 171, 182).
In military theory, the hierarchy of powers, and at the same time the hierarchy of political-military priorities, were reflected in the distinction between military dogma and military science. Military dogma includes the “prevailing” or “formally accepted” views in/of the state regarding the fundamental matters of war in relation to the whole plexus of domestic/internal and external/foreign politics-policy and with regard to all the material and intellectual-spiritual possibilities of the state (Sokolowski; Koslow).

Military science ought to investigate, for its part, the laws of struggle inside war; since, however, this last does not only include armed confrontation, but also other forms (political and diplomatic, ideological, economic, psychological, etc.), which “exist also outside of war, but in the period of its conducting/waging, gain peculiar form”, that is why mainly the art of war, i.e. the art of armed struggle, constitutes one only – the central, of course – sector of military science, and is sub-divided, in (its) turn, into strategy, the art of military undertakings and tactics (Koslow; Sokolowski).

Now, military dogma ought to be determined by the political leadership of the state (Sokolowski; Skirdo), with the participation of upper military organs (Koslow), as was written sometimes, but not always, in Soviet publications. However, strategy, which makes concrete and specific, the principles of military dogma at the level of military science, had to emanate from the collaboration of politics and military leadership (Sokolowski).

Strategy is of course the means and organ for the achievement of set political goals, but these goals must correspond with the available military possibilities, just as at the disposal of military people, sufficient means must be made available in order to achieve the set goals (Lomov; Marxisme-Léninisme sure la guerre; Sokolowski; Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko).
So, obvious is not only the dependence of military strategy

on political goals, but also the dependence of the political goals on military factors – since indeed “today not even the economy can be developed if it does not take into consideration the strategic facts/data” (Sokolowski-Tscherednitschenko).

Invoking Engels, Soviet generals/military people underlined that “the violation of laws of military strategy, or the ignorance of these laws on the part of politics, can lead to the collapse of the army, and to the defeat of the state. During a war, military factors exercise influence on politics. At times, the military factor obtains decisive significance” (Sokolowski. Cf. Zav’jalov + military-technical changes can have an effect on military-political goals and the duties of the state and of the armed forces in times of war, and can influence politics in constituting the army and the way the war is conducted/waged).

= Mutual influence/interaction between politics and strategy and the potential for autonomy of the military factor = reappraisal of the role of military personnel/generals.

Since Soviet military dogma was based on Lenin’s teaching of the unity of politics and war (whereby the determinative/crucial element was that politics became perceived NOT as “moderation”, but in its objective sense), it was not tempted to give absolute precedence to military technology, indeed to atomic/nuclear weapons, which would, in terms of theory, greatly reduce the role of politics vis-a-vis apolitical technique/technology.

Because of the relativisation of nuclear/atomic weapons, for the Soviets, the American logic of deterrence, was foreign, with such logic of deterrence being based on the idea that a nuclear/atomic war is completely absurd and has no victor (Lambeth).
The Soviets also avoided the error of underestimating the need for conventional forces in the nuclear/atomic age by being fixed upon the essentially inflexible and passive perception/view of mass atomic reprisals.

So, this combination of conventional and nuclear/atomic forces gave the Soviets a strategy of flexible response – even though for propagandistic reasons p. 340

they made this appear to be not their own idea, but a response to the corresponding notion of NATO (Tschujkow).

It would be short-sighted to attribute Soviet military modernisation in the 1960s and 1970s to a military lobby. It was clear to the political-strategic heads of the Party, that conventional weapons, armoury etc. would always be needed barring nuclear/atomic Apocalypse.

The Soviet Union, with conventional weapons superiority, could also at will do “campaigns of peace” (nuclear disarmament campaigns), making the opponent go on the defensive.

The continual Soviet demands for nuclear disarmament were real, because the Soviets had the upper hand in conventional weapons.

**Whoever possesses a shotgun and a knife, will logically-reasonably call upon his foe to sign a declaration regarding the abandonment of the possession and usage of shotguns, if his foe only has a shotgun.**

[[The Soviet Union of course started unravelling the year after this book was published in 1988, though Perestroika had begun in 1985. Obviously (?), the Soviet leadership felt they could not keep up with American (military) technology etc. (and any other reasons the public will never know about). Given, though, Soviet losses in WW2, and where Russia was at c. 1900-1920 compared to the USA, all I can say is that – from the point of view of assessing POWER – the Soviet Union for about 35+ years gave the USA a run for its money on the world stage. **Not an insignificant achievement** (again, in terms of POWER, and not “humanitarian” concerns).]]
VIII. Hot war after the Cold War

1. The classical theory of war and the “new military revolution”

The ideological charging of the Cold War and the connecting of political clashes with panhuman concerns, also brought the interweaving of strategic discussions at a higher level with the classical theory of war.

There was a huge increase of interest in Clausewitz in the 1960s and 1970s.

Laulan held that the planet was heading towards Balkanisation with frequent, low intensity and amorphous military clashes... and Creveld that Clausewitz’s analyses and teachings have become irrelevant.

Before we explain why such positions are wrong, we’ll see why they might appear to be sensible, especially in a transitional epoch.

There was a more or less homogeneous construction of European strategic thought with 5 or 6 major Powers in a tense or strained balance in the 19th century, with the generally accepted source for strategy being the Napoleonic art of war

and these Powers waged war against one another on the basis of certain diplomatic and military rules/norms, and programmatically kept the boundaries between the state of war and state of peace clear, and between the army at war and the unarmed civilian population.

There were campaign rules/norms (rules of engagement) incl. in relation to the infantry and artillery. This system came to an end in 1914 with the first “total war”. Yet again a united strategic perception/view emerged starting
in England with J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart, which planted roots in Germany by way of Guderian.

It’s axis was the transcending of war of array/line-up/deployment/moving into position (battle array) [[?not sure of the exact terminology?]] by a war of movement, which could make greatest use of new weapons such as tanks, armoured vehicles, aeroplanes.

The Cold War though made the field of high strategy the whole planet and not just Europe.

And the weapons were of planetary radiuses/ranges: nuclear warheads on intercontinental missiles. There was discussion of surprising the enemy with these weapons use (e.g. Kahn).

In the West, because of a deficiency in conventional equipment, there was a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, whereas the Soviets developed their Dogma based on conventional weapons advantages and nuclear weapons.

Yet mutatis mutandis both sides thought along the same lines, even though in the periphery of the two main camps there were various wars and guerrilla wars which did not at all have the strategic logic of the two great camps.

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Three great phases of strategic thought in the 19th and 20th century.

First two phases with a common and broad political-military field of action involving more than one great Power with common rules of the game, no matter how destructive = Europe Ruling the World.

Third phase = the whole planet, with two Superpowers competing against each other.
After 1989, things are not so clear, as planetary politics are more dense/thick than ever before (see Kondylis, *Planetary Politics after the Cold War*), but the various Powers are not at the same level, with all sorts of differences in geopolitical, economic and military dynamism, and with different strategic possibilities.

I [[=Kondylis in 1997]] find the expression of a multipolar world coming about straight after the bipolar Cold War imprecise and misleading, esp. as regards the European present and foreseeable future.

Multi-polar suits the European system until 1914 with relatively more or less equivalent major Powers.

But today [[1997]] “Europe”, which Europe? British? French? German? and Japan, are not planetary poles equivalent to the USA; the former powers’ diplomatic and military dependence on the latter [[Super Power]] did not at all end with the Cold War, and will continue to exist through NATO.

Russia, China or India are quite lower down the scale than the USA which is the world Hegemon, world firefighter or world gendarme or countryside/rural policeman according to the image/picture one choses [[obviously China’s (relative) position in 21 years to 2018 is moving UP!]].

The USA is the only country for the time being [[1997]] which wraps with its military net the whole world and has the ability to strike with p. 344 its arms every corner of the globe or conduct war at any point in the world.

The USA is unique based on unique facts [[which won’t last forever; cf. Mearsheimer and of course P. Kennedy]] and can’t be the model for other Powers.

The ground/basis for the formation of a similar high strategy will arise if and when Powers like China for instance approach today’s level of the USA.
and project analogous hegemonic claims, when planetary politics become multi-polar in essence.

Until then, the USA remains the great laboratory of the new, fourth phase of strategic theory.

and esp. after the Gulf War there is an orgy of strategic planning with the express aim of securing American global reach – the ability of the USA to intervene militarily anywhere and to protect their global hegemony from any decisive doubts (see e.g. Colson).

Whatever happens with strategic thought, it is not at all true that the classical theory of war will become useless.

Because the theory of war and strategy move at different logical levels, the former develops a conceptuality to which all strategies, no matter how different, are subjected, even in the most amorphous wars the distinction between strategic (general or long-term) and direct tactical aims remains whole/integral/undivided.

Clausewitz’s immortal achievement was precisely that he logically dilated/enlarged/opened up the theory of war from[[, i.e. compared with and in relation to]] the concept and the content of strategy.

Decisive for Clausewitz’s thought was the disconnecting of the concept of war from the Napoleonic waging of war, with which initially he had equated the general concept of war, and thus created a theoretical framework for the inclusion of all forms of war, irrespective of strategic direction and p. 345 quality. We have already seen that Clausewitz’s fundamental conceptuality applies absolutely even in the case of an atomic war to its extremes.
The same applies to an amorphous war, or to the “new military revolution” of exceptionally technicised war depending on, as to its waging, to large extent, services of contemporary informatics/Information Technology.

[[Tribal Warrior]] Toffler = 3rd wave of the Revolution of Informatics/I.T. (after the Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions),

confirms the classical theory of war that war everywhere and forever is the continuation of politics – politics meant as the whole of the social communication of people in the necessary intertwining of its various sectors.

As the continuation of politics, war is a phenomenon of its essence historical and mutable, its historicity inevitably intersects with the historicity of technique/technology.

But this intersection does not ever mean the simple reduction of war to technique/technology esp. if we examine the facts/data of the “new military revolution” in the light of the crucial concepts of classical theory: “friction”, “coincidence” and the “chameleon” texture of the war phenomenon.

Clausewitz’s conceptuality is for the past, the now and the future (i.e. the only possibility of seeing into the future is through Clausewitz’s conceptuality).

The term “military revolution” was first used in the Soviet discussion of the 1960s, when technological progress

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in the sector of atomic weapons made an issue of whether the role and specific weight of conventional weapons changed.
Today in the West, the term “military revolution” is used re: the consequences of the mass use of electronic means and informatics/I.T., both in the structuring of the Armed Forces and in the character of the weapons systems, as well as in the conduct of war ventures (such a use of the term though was in place at the end of the 1970s in the Soviet Union e.g. Commanding General/Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Orgakov spoke of a “new military revolution” in expressing his concern that the technological pre-eminence of the West gave them the possibility of neutralising great masses of armoured vehicles/tanks and motorised/motor-driven equipment through electronically remote-controlled weapons, destroying the Soviet advantage in having more tanks etc.. Orgakov realised that the “military revolution” [[in the 1960s Soviet sense]] belonged to the past, and the Soviet Union had to adapt to electronics and related non-nuclear weapons systems (Petersen-Trulock).

**But the term “new military revolution” meant in the West the greatest change ever in the kind of war re: the whole history of the war phenomenon.**

*However, the “new military revolution” does not cancel the classical theory of war* and it begins even in the pre-electronic age in the Interwar Period with practical application in WW2, from Ardennes and North Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

The central idea behind it was avoiding strategic dead ends and the pointless bloodletting of 1914-1918 through a fast war of movement and (circular) manoeuvres, whereby the armoured fighting vehicles/tanks and motorised/motor-driven units would take the lead in breaking through enemy lines without having the old problems of being re-supplied.
From quantitative consideration to qualitative, i.e. from “mass” to “flexibility” and “nimbleness, rapid movement”, and the breaking up of the old unified battlefield into many and dispersed battlefields.

*The risk and danger of confusion is now expected to be taken care of by communications (wireless communications, telephones) = invisible cohesive web of operationally autonomous units unfolding in wide spaces.*

There is also the organic co-ordination of the action of the infantry, of the armoured fighting vehicles or motor-driven forces and of the Air Force.

The infantry loses its traditional primacy and is no longer a mass infantry, and now becomes mobile to “get inside” the spaces opened up by tanks etc., whereas the Air Force has in its sights enemy armoured fighting vehicles, the enemy’s heavy artillery, which can stop the forward movement of one’s own armoured vehicle forces with barriers of fire, and the network of inimical communications and lines of re-supplying.

The autonomy of tanks etc. depends on the co-ordination of a mass of such units through thick/dense communications (Liddell Hart emphasises that in 1940 the French had more heavy tanks than the Germans, but the latter had modern organisation, having totally broken with the notion that the armoured fighting vehicles are simply a helpful weapon for the infantry. On the other hand, the Germans got the surprise of their lives when they ascertained that on the Eastern Front, the Soviet T-34s were quicker, more durable, even though their construction was simpler without a satisfactory system of communications).

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Already before the Second World War, the supporters of the new strategy, incl. then Colonel de Gaulle [[Love that man! Great Common Sense ethno-patriot. Whoever has Malraux as a Minister of Culture must be a total fucking LEGEND!!!] (Bond-Alexander), called for the replacement of mass armies by small and professional units/armies like those
today who draw the ultimate conclusions flowing from the “new military revolution”.

Also new weapons, technological developments,... all contributed...

However, mass armies continued, and non-motor-driven sectors continued to play a decisive role in WW2 battles, as WW2 in general evolved into something which the new strategy wanted to avoid: i.e. evolving into “total war”.

Of course, WW2 differed from WW1 because it did not become a war of positions, it started and finished as a war of movement. Yet wars very different from a strategic point of view, can be or become “total” wars.

“Total” war, as we know, is the way of conducting/waging war between nations which were in a mature phase of the Second Industrial Revolution.

There was an abolition of the previous distinction between peaceful “home front” and the warring “war front”, and now the mobile “home front” could continually supply the “war front” with gigantic qualities of war material, being exhausted very quickly in battles which precisely demanded the consumption of such quantities.

That such “total” war dragged on for a long time is because no warring party had the means to strike from the beginning and decisively the inimical/enemy “home front” as the source of the ceaseless re-supplying of the “war front”.

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Nuclear weapons, of course, rendered “total war” impossible in practice. Because now the “home front” could be quickly put out of action, and because the decisive production of nuclear weapons was undergone in the period of Peace, so that there is no need for “total” mobilisation as in the case of the
continual production during wartime of armoured fighting vehicles, aeroplanes and ammunition.

**With less social labour, a greater firepower was secured. Because of this nature of nuclear weapons, the West could succeed in the Cold War against the Soviets, who had greater quantities of conventional weapons, i.e. the sector requiring more social labour.**

**From the late 1970s**, in the zone between conventional and nuclear weapons, the appearance began all the more frequently of weapons and weapons systems of great precision and great firepower, which at least as between military targets can achieve results equally drastic as in the case of nuclear weapons, whilst at the same time imposing/requiring significant readjustments to the structure of the armed forces.

Especially the remote-controlled/teleguided missile systems of every size, range and kind, together with the use of new electronic methods of collecting and disseminating information, constitute the technological trunk of the in part done/completed, in part being planned, and in part expected, “new military revolution”.

**Today we have an extreme form, in the context of the whole history of war, of what we could**

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**call “avoidance of bodily contact with the foe”.**

**Such contact was direct for as long as armed struggles were carried out with sharp and pointed weapons, e.g. axes, swords, spears.**

**It becomes laxer with projectile weapons, from the slingshot to the bow and arrow, to the gun and the cannon, but even then at least optic i.e. eye contact is necessary.**
The qualitative change occurs when eye contact is no longer necessary. Already, in 1918 the German tele-cannons/firearms/guns had a range of 120 kms. In our times [= mid 1990s], the American submarine “Trident II” can target half the planet with 192 missiles with a margin of error re: the target of 10 metres.

= continual improvement in Greater Distance and Greater precision in Strikes. The “revolution in precision” went with the so-called “revolution in energy”. Non-nuclear priming/charging [[=?correct word? unsure?]] adapted to all sorts of missiles can replace nuclear warheads. What once was the target of nuclear weapons, can now be struck by precision weapons, and since the precision weapons are centred on one point, leaving the periphery untouched, doubts and indecision about their use lessens.

So, the firepower used can come from sources outside of the combat zone/field of military undertakings in the narrower sense.

The classical battlefield was characterised by the concentration of available forces in one place and with the purpose of a confrontation whereby the firepower played its part, however the technique/skill/art and the correct choice of the manoeuvre was more important.

The hitherto unheard-of increase of the strength and precision of the firepower changes this relation, destroying the outlines of the battlefield.

The confrontation at the level of manoeuvres is replaced by one duel of artillery/ordnance [[?not sure of exact expression?]] (Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare”).

The term “artillery” here incl. all the kinds of weapons of all the available ranges, from ballistic missiles to “smart” bombs and
“smart” mines. This of course affects how infantry is used = downsizing and becoming more mobile.

Fewer soldiers must now use advanced technology and achieve more. Futurists of war have already planned for an absolutely autonomous soldier, incl. use of mobile microtechnology with access to central information systems, and the ability to strike at will within its surroundings, which it has analysed first.

In Napoleon’s time, a division of 15-20,000 men occupied 3 square miles, today [[c. 1997]] a square with a side of 25 miles can be covered with that many men, and after another 20 years [[= 2017]] a side of 100 miles [[Someone who knows can send me an email and I can add a note!!!!!]].

The united battle array is fragmented in several clashes in all the depth of space with or without the aid of armoured fighting vehicles/tanks, manoeuvering or falling with parachutes. There is also the erasure of the classical “line for the Front/Frontline”, the use of aeroplanes becomes very important, which opens up fronts in the enemy’s “Home Front”, and informs [[Base]] of to what extent penetration into space can go. Of course, air power is not enough for everything, and often all Arms/Branches of the Military must play a part or change parts/roles etc..

One of the ambitions of the “new military revolution” is to erase the traditional boundaries between the three Arms/Branches of the Military with the help of modern informatics/I.T. and electronic communications systems and increased firepower.

Land targets can be hit by ships, land supports air (e.g. with land-air missiles), whereas the assistance of land operations by air has been going on for decades.
The marine and parachuter/parachutist symbolise the trend beyond the traditional demarcations between the three Arms/Branches of the Military. Likewise, re: helicopters incl. as flying armoured vehicles.

**SO, today’s perceptions of operationally using all the depth of space and whilst co-ordinating air, land and sea forces = a meta-development of strategic plans of the Interwar Period and WW2.**

*Of course, there have been great increases in range, firepower, collecting (often from very far away) and disseminating information. A dense communication network is absolutely necessary.*

American Admiral William Owens called “system of systems”, the full covering of a square with a side of 200 miles incl. the recording of signs/signals acoustically and optically, as well as thermically/thermally.

**Obviously, technical infrastructure is needed in place in order to make**

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**decentralisation possible.** This brings to our attention certain weak points in the “new military revolution”, as we shall later see.

*With all the technology etc. it is less likely or impossible for there to be the old “war-mongering” general, because now the emphasis is on professionalism and on specialisation in violence, just as there is specialisation in tax matters.*

This is particularly the case in information gathering and logistics. Something like Western society having a larger “service” industry than in the past, with a drop in numbers of old style soldiers like there has been a drop in workers in “production”.

All this adds to showing that war remains the continuation of [[primarily objective]] politics [[e.g. women in front-line combat, transexuals, etc. in the Army etc. because of subjective politics/ideology based on objective political conditions.]]
There is a tendency for the hierarchies in the army like in society to get smaller/shorter in the middle so that the pinnacle approaches the base, and now with the appearance of webs of teams etc..

De-centralisation will stop, like in the past, whether a dictatorship, oligarchy or constitutional parliamentary democracy, before the top of the pyramid, i.e. the upper echelons of the political-military regime make the telling decisions re: general strategy and war plans etc. [[will always exist, regardless of polity]].

*It doesn’t matter whether the regime is parliamentary or Caesarian, the top of the hierarchy decides re: crucial war matters.*

Of course, there are more general political criteria taken into consideration as well as military capacity etc..

The logic of weapons systems is such that defensive intent at the political level might in some instances only be achieved by an offensive/attacking strategy militarily.

*Of course, the problem of the First/Preventive Strike is as old as the history of war.*

*But the existence of precision weapons makes the question of the First Preventative Strike pressing, existential.*

This was understood from the time of the construction of the first intercontinental atomic missiles.

Whoever has them, is at a great advantage and the side on defence without them is more or less stuffed.

The attacker will strike at the enemy’s information centres and
communication systems, and without those system no advanced technology weapons will be able to be used.

**The more advanced the weapons technology, the more vulnerable one becomes, as we shall later see – for as long as one is on the defensive.**

[[No wonder there’s so much media attention re: Russian S-400, S-500 etc. as counteracting offensive Strike Power...]]

It is no surprise e.g. that Handel would maintain that with advanced weapons technology of the “new military revolution”, Clausewitz’s position that the strongest form of war is defence has been put out of date.

But we have seen Clausewitz’s position on this matter never had the most supporters either in WW1 (See Excursus B and add Miller, v. Evera) or WW2, though in the Interwar period, Liddell Hart thought of a defensive strategy based on tanks/armoured fighting vehicles.

**Due to the nature of modern weapons systems, defence in essence means attack/offence and vice versa, so the boundaries between war and peace are effaced and the distinction between defensive and offensive wars, which never was binding in International Law, becomes academic and philological.**

2. The utopia of a pure/unmixed technological war

Already from [[Francis]] Bacon’s Atlantis there was technocratic and utopian thought in that Nature had to be subjugated to technique/technology;
the Marxist classless society would provide to people the development of the productive forces, which would efface forever the shortage of goods,

_and today’s Western Promises in essence say_ that the united world market will do what the communistic regimes did not do: _on the basis of continual technological progress, secure the general prosperity by tying together at the same time nations and races in one_

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_panhuman community_ (see my article: “Blühende Geistesgeschäfte” [[to be translated into English in 2018 or 2019 from the book _The Political in the 20th century_]] [[HOW FUCKING RETARDED OR SIMPLY OVER THE TOP GREEDY AND DELUSIONAL ARE THESE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE SUCH TOTAL BULLSHIT??!! There must be some kind of Evolutionary Missing Link, particularly amongst a certain group of Tribal Warriors!!]]

_In its peace-loving version, utopian-like thought intersects today with the fetishism re: technique/technology through the expectation of the technicisation of war, generalised universally, so that war can be a series of calculations on an electronic board, whereby the inferior, seeing that his defeat is night, abandons the confrontation without suffering defeat with practical confirmation, which an experienced chess player does for instance from about the middle of the game of chess._

_Or, there will be clean surgical wars because of technology, with few human losses since the foe will be quickly and effectively disarmed._

All this RUBBISH in thought presupposes that the “good”, and not the “evil”, will have the most advanced weapons and = _wet dreams in today’s western euphoria [[1990s]]._
There is no such thing as a technologically perfect war, without “friction”, i.e. without no divergence between the strategic plan or vision and the reality of war.

For Clausewitz, “friction” would only be excluded in a “pure/unmixed” war, where all the animate and inanimate forces of the foes would be used in one and only concentrated act of war without pauses.

Since that is impossible in a war between complex societies, “friction” is the indispensable aftereffect

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of every real war – and the concept of “pure/unmixed” war helps us understand the texture of real war, it pushes us e contrario towards the phenomenology and aetiology of “friction”.

The one and only wipeout of the foe = strategic ideal, but reality is multifarious, with many forms of war and various causes/reasons.

The historical circumstances are of course many and varied, imponderable and unforeseeable, as are the forms of war.

**The causes of/reasons for war:**

1) anthropologically given

2) socio-political

3) coincidental/chance (whereby “coincidence” means the obstructional or helpful intersection of a chain of causes and results/effects, whose existence we
ignore or see as indifferent vis-a-vis that causal chain we want to put together with our acts).

**These three causes of friction have acted in many different ways in all historical wars until today, and there is not the slightest reason to believe they will stop acting in a war technicised in the sense of the “new military revolution”.

These three causes appear in all wars.

So, we need to view them re: highly technicised war.

**There are four points:**

1) the inevitable existence of gaps in information

2) the need for the analysis and use of information during and leading up to war

3) the elimination of advanced technology by advanced technology

4) the elimination of advanced technology by more or less inferior technology.

When technology becomes a Religion, it is inevitable it will be viewed like a God, and all sorts of Wet Dreams will abound. For we know that satellite technology does not cover and clearly see everything.

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There are even meteorological issues.

The use of satellites also presupposes domination of air space, and the Americans may not always have it so easy, for instance, as in the case of Bosnia.
There’s also a gap in time from collecting data from satellites and their use in aiming weapons (Gulf War – up to two weeks) [[not sure what all this means in terms of today’s technology]].

Also, no recognizance/recognition system could locate the Somali resistance leader whilst Mogadishu was under American occupation in 1992, neither in Iraq in 1991, which was already paralysed military, could the hidden bases for the launching of missiles be found, nor could the fairly primitive Scud missiles be tracked 100% all of the time. Then there are human errors etc. as well (Postol).

In regard to 2) above, as we have said, the path from the information material to commands to weapons systems is at times longer

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than what many think.

There’s also another problem. Information of itself does not give a criterion of orientation in the plethora of information, especially when time presses etc..

Nor does information/I.T. from satellites etc. tell us about the morale or intentions of the enemy, the quality and conditions of his weapons.

In such cases, there needs to be checking of information from other sources etc..<br><br>And, of course, there is the production of misleading information by the enemy, which could have all sorts of repercussions. In all such cases of weighing up and judging the quality of the information, Clausewitz’s “tact of judgement” still fully applies.

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There are also a whole range of other problems with collecting information in various situations, some of which are referred to by P.K.
In relation to 3): where the “new military revolution” in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia was applied, the gap between advanced technology and the enemy was massive and decisive. An omnipotent Goliath executed in cold blood a David stuck to the ground. *One should not rush to universalistic conclusions.* In the future, other foes might be much better equipped, incl. technologically, and then the matter is not one of technology, but of politics.

Kondylis refers to Munro and electromagnetic energy etc..

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P.K. refers to the fact that most information can be intercepted by the other side, the enemy, in any event.

The technological advantages the USA has today [[1997]] won’t necessarily be at all around tomorrow.

*And even if one is in command in space, one cannot at all guarantee that one is not vulnerable to weapons on earth.*

So, we come to 4) and note that never in any era has more advanced weaponry made older weapons totally useless.

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*Neither arrows, nor guns and cannons, nor nuclear weapons have ever been able to replace the simple knife, and in e.g. commando attacks/offens(iv)es etc. the knife is much more useful than nuclear weapons.*

There are therefore many reasons to see that there will never be a utopia of pure technological warfare, esp. if older weapons can destroy the information, communications etc. of the typical weapons of the “new military revolution”.

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One and only nuclear explosion... can render a lot of advanced technology useless... and even older than nuclear weapons or other weapons which can paralyse or blind the foe can also cause a lot of strife for the bearer of advanced technology... See Géré and Mathey.

And even today, technological microsystems (cruise missiles) can relatively easily strike military

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megasystems like aircraft carriers. There are also other options to attack such as vehicles firing high technology weapons, or the relatively cheap conversion of older weapons into “smart” weapons, etc., etc., etc..

None of the above means that the latest, post-nuclear technology and the “new military revolution” will not bring about significant and potentially drastic changes to the conduct of future wars.

Yet the concepts of the classical theory of war remain completely in force and relevant, i.e. war will continue to be characterised by the phenomenon of “friction”. and will remain “the field of coincidence”; and in terms of practice. war will always be “chameleon” as it cannot fit into any pure/clean schema of technology and utopia, and will move at many levels. incl. “primitive” and “super-modern” elements. Neither are two combatants the same, nor the historical circumstances absolutely the same.
In abstracto, it seems there is no need for mass armies, and all that is needed is well equipped and well trained “Rambos” with the latest technology and information and air cover etc..

Yet such professional armies cannot have numbers below a certain level, which is not that low, so they will remain fairly large armies of more or less hundreds of thousands

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if they want to be ready to fight effectively.

The occupation of enemy land etc. will always require a large number of soldiers.

For even the complete domination of the skies does not necessarily mean victory in the sense of the complete inability of the foe to put up resistance.

In Bosnia, after air dominance, there had to be soldiers on the ground incl. motor-powered to secure victory/peace.

In Iraq, infantry was used on a mass scale, despite the advanced technology, and most of the 3000 aeroplanes bombing Iraq were of 1960s and 1970s technology, and with 1950s technology bombs.

And the military undertakings ended in fairly traditional fashion with a circular manoeuvre and the pitiless slaughter of trapped Iraqi troops on the ground and from the air (there were more than 100,000 victims of the slaughter which were not covered by the usually very loud-mouthed, babbling Western television networks, and it would seem by the TV coverage that no more than 200 died during the Gulf War).

And never forget: behind every machine and technology/technique no matter how refined there is a person. And the functioning of advanced technology requires a whole lot of infrastructure...
War, like the economy, politics, religion and art is of its essence a relation of people.

*From an anthropological point of view, the purpose of high/advanced technology is to form a human relation whereby the foe is kept as far away as possible and is neutralised before he bridges the distance.*

Because if he makes it across, then the knife might be the most useful weapon.

And technology will NEVER be able to exclude political and psychological factors and influences.

The overall correlation of forces incl. the “ethical magnitudes or magnitudes of morale” as well, of which Clausewitz spoke in rejecting the geometric perception of war. The same arguments fully apply today against the utopia of pure/unmixed technological war.

3. The multiformity of war and its political aetiology

In this context re: war, “political” [[as/qua social]] does not mean in opposition to “economic” or “ideological” causes/reasons, but that war is the continuation of politics as the general character of political subjects, whether they are states, or movements and teams, whether within a nation or internationally.

The general character of a political subject constitutes a resultant of many factors (economic, national, historical, ideological, political in the narrower sense etc.).
Now, the necessary correlation between the multiformity of wars and the mutifarious character of political subjects does not mean wars are waged because the character of political subjects differs

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and that wars will cease once political subjects become homogenous !!!!

That is a **patently ABSURD** argument, because if all political subjects were homogenous as imperialistic and anti-democratic there is no reason to believe there would be no wars, just as if they were democracies of a western kind [[and we all know that “democracies”/parliamentary regimes wage war too]] (see my article: “Ein so schlimmes Spiel” [[to be translated into English in 2018 or 2019, “God Willing”]]; cf. Gowa and Faber-Gowa).

**Just as there are many forms of political subjects, there are many forms of war,**

and there are also many causes of/reasons for the outbreak of war, varying from epoch to epoch and case to case,

so that there is no way to work out any laws for the cause(s) of wars in general as fixed chains of causes and results of causes.

Even if one could produce a table of the causes of all the world’s wars, they would be hierarchised, interrelated and would act differently in every case.
Wars don’t have one clear-cut, unmistakable cause, nor can they be “cured” as in the case of treating an illness.

The liberal [[ideologically]] politicians and economists, who, despite the continual factual falsifications of the last three centuries, continue to purport that trade will replace war, and as a result make a tremendous logical and historical mistake. [[How fucking Retarded are these people, who think they are so sophisticated?!!!]]

*ONLY* he who supports an economic determinism, i.e. who attributes wars to economic competition only, will logically believe that economic co-operation would abolish wars.

On this crucial point, as well as on others, economistic liberalism is just another form of vulgar Marxism with reversed signs/symbolism.

After 1989 and the armed conflict in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, many said that the threat of a nuclear holocaust was succeeded by the reality of many smaller national wars and that the two kinds/forms of war cannot co-exist.
Nothing could be further from the truth. After 1945, there were 146 wars with more than 30 million dead. Between about three quarters and four fifths of those dead were civilian non-combatants.

Europe enjoyed the peace of nuclear terror, whilst in Asia, Africa and Latin America there were anti-colonial wars and wars of national liberation, as well as civil wars, racial and national wars (e.g. between China and India, India and Pakistan, Israel and Arabs).

There were a whole range of wars, from wars where the combatants were at roughly the same technological etc. levels (e.g. Iran and Iraq) or where the differences were huge (e.g. USA and Vietnam).

The planetary phase of human history commenced when the colonial expansion of Europe brought nations which were slowly entering the industrial era against pre-industrial nations.

In the 19th century and first half of the 20th century, whilst in Europe the major Powers had mass armies and the latest weapons and military means, outside of Europe, these same Powers conducted campaigns and wars of another form.

In today’s planetary conjuncture, there are no notable/distinguished major or regional Powers which have not to a or b degree stepped over the threshold of the second, but also the third industrial revolution.

The divergence though between them is still significant, which affects their military possibilities and strategic plans.

Any search for one and only strategic model for the 21st century, or at least for the next few decades = pointless, in vain. The Gulf War and other wars of recent times cannot be a source for general and binding strategic teachings.
All that one can do is observe the technical possibilities of newly designed and in practice until today untried weapons systems.

**As the continuation of politics, the war of the future will take**

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**various forms in expressing the (inimical) relations of various political subjects.**

Today’s [[1997]] planetary conjuncture is not defined/determined by the equilibrium of three, four or five more or less equal/equivalent (ἴσοσθενέις = covalent) poles, i.e. major spaces around an equal number of major Powers, but the characteristic and in practice decisive feature is the undoubted supremacy of one and only one great Power, which does not limit itself to its own major space, but finds itself or intervenes or would like to intervene at every point on the globe.

The hegemony of this Power, i.e. of the USA, is directly exercised in the most developed regions of the world, in Europe and in Japan, where no political-military decision of substance is taken without the approval of the USA, and where also significant economic matters, e.g. international trade, is regulated under its pressure and dictates.

**In this hierarchy in the upper levels are Powers which in the future would like to compete with the USA (Eurasian Russia, China, perhaps India), and upcoming regional Powers also exist (Turkey, Iran, Brazil), and in the lower rungs are nation-states or states with fluid internal composition and a correspondingly fluid political and military activity (especially on the African continent).**
For as long as Europe dominated the world through their colonial empires, the contrasts, clashes and conflicts between the great European Powers constituted the axis around which the rest of the planet would group itself in accordance with the friend-foe relation.

The clash of the two protagonists of the Cold War was also such an axis, or a criterion for the grouping of friends and foes on a planetary scale.

If with the end of the Cold War something changed, it is that an axis with a similar function has been eclipsed (this is what is probably meant by those who talk rather stupidly of a multi-polar world today), whereby the world regime of international relations appears to be “anarchical” [[Obviously, a reference to the great Australian, Hedley Bull]].

It would cease being anarchical if we assumed the world would (once again) become bipolar or (really) multi-polar, if i.e. hegemonic Powers safeguarded peace within their corresponding major spaces, with the most likely result, of course, of the military and other clashes between those Powers being much more acute.

For as long the planetary field is not arranged thus, the one and only really planetary Power, the USA will, at least potentially, be omnipresent UNLESS internal factors paralyse it [[THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING POINT AS TO E.G. “DIVERSITY” and what such “diversity” might mean for Internal Political Cohesion and thus the ability to Act as a major interventionist Power...]].
The USA’s first concern will be to constitute regional alliances which it will control and direct, either directly or by overseeing its proxies solving local and regional problems.

Behind e.g. the countries of ASEAN vis-a-vis the expansionist views of China, will be as ultimate guarantor, the diplomatic and military power of the planetary hegemonic Power, which if it wants to maintain this place/position as planetary hegemonic Power, will have to intervene as ultimate adjudicator in every major clash.

In this sense, it can be said that the planetarily crucial, or at any rate significant, wars of the immediate future will be American wars.

And since their extent, intensity and texture will vary, the hegemonic Power will be obliged to correspondingly escalate its military reactions or initiatives, giving its armed forces their duly elastic structuring.

Current [[mid 1990s]] American executive plans aim at the possibility of the simultaneous conducting of two wars of the magnitude of the 1991 Gulf War, as well as one further smaller deterrent intervention (Colson).

Such aims require the permanent support of fixed strategic forces placed at key points in continents and on oceans,

they require air superiority and the free movement of aircraft carriers and fleets,

and the ultimate safety valves/switches: ballistic nuclear weapons.

No rising Power will be able to doubt today’s [[1997]] planetary hegemony of the USA, if it does not compete against it at all those levels – without of course that meaning that the USA won’t or can’t
meet with potential defeats in secondary theatres for as long as they hold their world hegemonic role

[[SO the question is can China (with Russia?) by about 2030 to 2050 be in a position to be more than a regional Hegemon? Kondylis of course, and rightly so, does not engage in any specific/concrete speculation as to who, when, how and what challenge will arise for the USA...]].

The doubting of the planetary hegemon does not necessarily mean that a new hegemon defeats head-on and replaces the old hegemon;

it could mean, more restrictedly, that the rising regional Power gradually constitutes around it a major space and forbids the planetary hegemonic Power from intervening in any way whatsoever in that space.

Something like that might be possible in the near(ish) future

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China in relation to South-East and central Asia

[[Kondylis does not give a time frame, and his “nearish” could mean say within 50 years from 1997]].

The greater spectrum of cases a Power is in a position to face, the more it increases its specific weight in planetary politics. The narrower the spectrum, the more shrinks its significance to regional and local limits/boundaries.

That a hegemonic, but also an up and coming planetary Power, is obliged to have at its disposal the full scale/gambit of military capacity/force/potency/
power, from ballistic missiles to the forces of rapid development/unfolding (rapid development forces) [[not sure of the technical term?]], it does not mean that in every war, in accordance with its specific/concrete texture, it would mobilise one only grade/gradation of this scale; even in restricted clashes the use of nuclear weapons can become inevitable.

The multiformity, the “chameleon” nature of the war phenomenon does not refer only to the totality of wars, but also to the inside(s)/internal space of every war separately.

If we formulate the hypothesis that a military conflict/clash breaks out between two great planetary Powers which equally possess the very latest in technology of the “new military revolution” and the corresponding structure in the sector of informatics/I.T., we can imagine in principle that war would be waged essentially at that level e.g. in space and in/on the ocean with the use of automated air means and ships on the surface of the sea and submarines.

What would happen if both the combatants already in the initial phases of the conflict were able to neutralise on both sides the satellites and other recognizance systems (of recognition) and communications systems, such that the clash would come to a dead end?

There are two possibilities:

either they would step back/retreat/become conciliatory in a situation of terror of nuclear balancing/equilibrium, so that even if they did not immediately use the nuclear weapons, at any rate, again they would have recourse to them as ultima ratio – or they would get involved in a necessarily long, drawn-out conventional war until the end or mutual destruction/exhausting; the threat of using nuclear weapons could even be used and could have an effect after the (relative) exhausting of the one side in such a conventional war.
Whatever the case may be, the “chameleonic” metamorphosis/ transformation of any kind of war, even the technologically most advanced, from its initial strategic conception is inherent and very possible.

Wars between great Powers with highly advanced military technology remain of course essentially impossible for as long as today’s planetary hegemony of the USA lasts

[[which of course means e contrario that such hegemony one day will end, and of course P.K. does NOT give any time frame, though PPatCW and/or, if I’m not mistaken, one of P.K.’s articles in The Political in the 20th century implies during the course of the 21st century if China remains a centralised state]]; as we have pointed out, this hegemony is exercised in one sense more directly precisely in economically more developed regions of the world, i.e. in Europe and Japan.

Of far greater practical interest for the foreseeable future are two other cases: the clashes/conflicts of the planetary Superpower on the one hand, with small and, on the other hand, with middle and major Powers, especially in connection and interrelation with two burning issues: the issue of terrorism and that of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The general criterion for the distinction between small and middle or major Powers is, obviously, the geopolitical, demographic and economic capacity/ potency/dynamics/power/force on each and every respective occasion.
More specifically and on a narrower basis, we shall look at the matter of competition and future wars between Powers re: the possession or not of ballistic missiles (with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads).

The ability of a Power to strike any point on the planet is crucial when planetary politics has become so dense/thick as in our days; because one essential part of a unified globe is the ability of a number of Powers to strike with military means everyone or many [[countries]].

In regard to the relationship of middle and major Powers with the planetarily hegemonic Power, schematically speaking, the dispersal/proliferation of ballistic missiles, and in particular nuclear weapons, appears to be central, whereas the small Powers do not seem to be able to strike the hegemonic Power on its own home turf with means, re: what is available today, other than terrorism.

A great planetary Power does not have any reason to have recourse to terroristic acts or to minor acts of sabotage/damaging infrastructure, property etc..

Whoever can bomb, (almost) without being hampered, military targets and entire regions, does not need the restricted means of terrorism in order to do damage or to overawe/intimidate the civilian population.

But the weak or just less powerful, i.e. not only small but also at times even middle Powers, will need the means of terrorism etc..

**A general goal of every combatant is for the clash/conflict/battle to be conducted on that field where he himself has the advantage or at least is not behind or below the other side(s).**

SO necessarily less technologically advanced countries are going to try and draw more technologically advanced countries into wars at their own less technologically advanced level/more “primitive” forms of war.
High/Advanced technology, giving the possibility of annihilation of the foe/enemy from a greater distance and in that way lessening (significantly) the losses of this advanced technology’s possessor, provides Western governments in particular the political advantage that public opinion is placated to a degree which as a rule is not willing to make sacrifices in faraway countries/lands and for purposes foreign to its own concerns and cares.

[[WHAT THE FUCK DOES THAT MEAN? HAHAHAHAHA!!!]]

Contrarily, the side which is technologically subordinate seeks the lessening of the distance, if possible, so that battle can be face to face, hand to hand, man to man, which will allow bringing about greater casualties of the foe and make things difficult from a political point of view.

So, we come back to the earlier ascertainment that latest technology weapons, no matter how advanced, never render old weapons totally useless, even the oldest of weapons. The suitability of a weapon is determined by the situation, and the advantage is gained for him who puts the foe in a situation where his weapons are more suitable than the enemy’s weapons.

In the event of armed conflict/clash between a world hegemonic Power and one up and coming middle or major Power, the crucial question is: can the latter, even if it had no prospects of prevailing in an all-out struggle against the former, nonetheless bring about so many casualties and losses such that that will have a deterrent effect?

And since the most painful casualties would occur obviously on the home turf of the world hegemonic Power amongst civilians, the question is concretised as follows: can a middle or major Power strike with ballistic missiles and nuclear and other warheads the world hegemonic Power at its very own base?
The course of planetary politics will be substantially influenced by the answer which the future will give to this question.

[[All this means that if China remains a centralised state with its population more or less under control, the USA is going to have to concede more and more territory in Asia, and perhaps even further afield, as the century moves on, unless of course the USA gains an extreme advantage in technology and or strikes first decisively to cripple China – which of course we can’t know for sure... one way or another... all that matters, is what Reality is...]]

As to how dramatic would a change be at this level, the head of the Indian General Staff alluded, when asked about the Gulf War. His answer: “do not ever wage war against the USA if you don’t have atomic weapons” (in Delmas).

So, the key for an up and coming middle or major Power to be able to compete militarily-politically is to possess atomic weapons and ballistic missiles of the required range, even though other Powers have an overall economic and military capacity/potency much greater.

The advantage of possessing atomic weapons and ballistic missiles of the required range is that it’s much easier and cheaper than having conventional armed forces with

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modern technology and education/training in all grades/gradations. Also, atomic weapons etc. can be used without mobilising the entirety of the armed forces as well as their deterrent effect even after a defeat, whereas conventional weapons are not in the position to bring about significant casualties to a foe even after defeat (Posen).
How true and bloody bleeding obvious all that is, we can see from how the USA reacts to attempts to obtain atomic weapons (and long-range ballistic missiles) by non-friendly countries.

Such reactions are the result of power claims without a stable logical or ethical basis, since it is neither logical or ethical to deny to others the right which you self-evidently reserve for yourself. According to the universalism of “human rights”, which the USA proclaims along with their European hangers-on, all people have the same rights, because all people have as of birth the same dignity and all equally take part in Reason (rationality).

[[ABSOLUTELY FUCKING HILARIOUS STUFF!!!]]

Starting from that universal principle, one cannot argue that the Western Powers or Israel have the right to possess nuclear weapons, because they are by definition in a position to use them “rationally”, whereas Iraq and Iran are denied such a right because it is from the very beginning certain they won’t make “rational” use of such weapons.
Of course, no nuclear Power with planetary or just regional ambitions has ever suggested there be a universal/catholic renunciation and abandonment of nuclear weapons.

Because renunciation or abandonment by today’s atomic Powers of their advantage would entail the risk/danger of becoming later captive to atomic blackmail by Powers with much smaller military and economic capacity/powers/potency. One cannot expect any complete nuclear disarmament ever.

However, the potential for the proliferation of nuclear or roughly equivalent/covalent weapons is very probable, because it arises from the very character of world politics and technological developments.

As to political developments, we must stress that today’s world [[1997]] is not multi-polar, that is, grouped around basically equivalent/covalent poles, but climaxes in a pyramid whose highest gradation is occupied by one hegemonic Power, whereas other higher positions are occupied by up and coming major Powers with widening ambitions.

All these Powers, but especially the hegemonic Power, seek regional allies, wanting to use them, case by case or as the case may be or comes about, as conduits/ducts/channels of influence or as surrogates/regional governors-representatives with policing responsibilities.

They equip them accordingly, and give them on occasion the opportunity to construct, over the medium term at least, atomic weapons. They certainly make them participate in advanced weapons technology.

Regional Powers even have the opportunity from the free market of obtaining many kinds of weapons, up to nuclear weapons, which any middle of the road industrial country is now in the position to construct (Reiss).
See Garrity re: prestige etc. of having nuclear weapons.

**Thanks to the Third Industrial Revolution and the progressive merging of military and civilian technology**, the obtaining of nuclear weapons and other high/advanced military technicisation more generally is made all the easier. See Samuels.

And countries at lower levels of development without the ability to obtain nuclear weapons can still do damage to the planetary hegemon e.g. via chemical and biological priming/charging which under p. 375 certain conditions can bring about as many casualties as nuclear weapons (Fetter; cf. Carus).

**Thus, the problem shifts from the possession of nuclear weapons to the possession of long-range ballistic missiles.**

The USA foresees that apart from China, no Power will be able to strike the USA with ballistic missiles until about 2010 (Lewi Hua-Di re: China’s ballistic missile programmes) [[don’t know if it turned out that way or not]].

But today, already 35 non-NATO countries have ballistic missiles of a shorter range, and 18 can arm them with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads (67 non-NATO countries have cruise missiles, mostly short-range. Argentina sunk two British war ships with French cruise missiles in the Falklands wars

[[this is obviously P.K.’s humour in referring to ancient European enmites in an Age when Europe is not even a Shadow of its Old Self, and will never ever be so again!!]]

So, the development of anti-missile technology is crucial, esp. for the USA [[and we know that Russia seems to be doing a fairly good job of such technology of late – at least that is what media reports seem to indicate, though I personally can’t really know or be sure...]].
There are a whole lot of technical issues with such defence systems incl. trying to neutralise missiles fired at you early on in their trajectory etc., or when they have warheads which break off etc..

Very likely so-called “surgical” wars, will only be able to take place when the “surgeon” is overwhelming more powerful. Otherwise, “surgical strikes” won’t be that simple or effective.

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Powers invoking “humanitarian” and “peacemaking” purposes for military interventions, could incur the wrath of terroristic acts coming from smaller Powers as the answer of the poor to the military might of the rich.

Any general definition of terrorism is on shaky conceptual ground, not only because of the plethora of forms and sources of terror, but because it is difficult to avoid anathema as a foe, or beautification as a friend.

Terrorism today is not possible as the attempted murders of individual/isolated persons, as was the case in the 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th century in Russia,

but also in the rest of Europe, and as it happened in part in the 1970s and 1980s in Germany and Italy.

All these cases were of small groups internally against the regime.

But if terrorist actions are directed by an external centre, and seek to do harm to a foreign Power, use can be made of highly technicised societies which at first glance are infinitely complicated, intertwined and fragmented, whereas in reality their functioning depends on relatively few energy and information centres.
That is why such societies as a whole are more vulnerable than any society of the past.

An official/officer of the American Forces Information Service [[I think that is what P.K. means, though I could be wrong]], recently said that with 1 billion dollars and 20 able hackers he could paralyse the USA (in Laqueur).

So potentially terrorists could bring a modern society to its knees.

Crucial nodes are not only

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electronic systems of every kind, but the large energy stations or the water reservoirs, which easily can be contaminated with viruses.

There’s also the potential use of chemical and biological means, and with 30 kilos of anthrax, 30,000 people can be killed.

P.K. in 1997 refers to small countries who want to engage in terrorism in developed countries having a lack of information [[though that c. 2018 seems to have changed with the mass Mohammedan etc. influx into the West]], and it is noted how easily, well-fed, relatively comfortable societies addicted to prosperity and security can be thrown into hysterics over any attacks etc..

Again, P.K. says that imported terror won’t be able to find a broad circle of sympathisers in the country to be attacked [[though that seems to have changed with the mass Mohammedan/African/Arab/Asian “elite and lobotomised/cretin-assisted invasions” or “humanitarian refugee influxes” into Europe]].

Guerrilla war is defined as the armed calling into question of a regime in power, whereas terrorism, as flashy as it is, is not in a position to seek regime change.
The guerilla war, though, has lost its ground/basis for development because today’s advanced societies are concentrated in cities etc., and this is more and more the case even in Asia and Latin America.

We have gone beyond the historical phase of national liberation and anti-colonial struggle.

The only hope for guerrilla war is if there is a pan-national movement against a foreign Power, or where there is no resistance because the internal regime has collapsed, but it can never prevail against an organised and unbroken, cohesive tactical army.

*Because of worldwide urbanisation, there are possibilities of movements floating between terrorism and guerrilla warfare if they find support by broad sections of the populace* (e.g. Algeria in the 1950s and today).

Mao’s perception of guerrilla war has possibly died, but Lenin’s lives on.

There are all sorts of clashes, conflicts, wars which can take place between middle or major Powers, and, middle or major Powers,

between middle or major, and, small Powers,

between small, and, small Powers.

The outcome of such armed conflicts will correlate with technological superiority or inferiority of one or the other side (see e.g. Klare).

*but not only with technology.*

There are also factors of culture and the general ability of the masses to fight, their courage, heart etc. = traditional considerations.
There are many possibilities for amorphous wars, prolonged and wasteful in inanimate and animate material, if I may say so, as in the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s.

It’s not just chaotic conflicts as in Afghanistan that the 21st century is faced with.

**There are also possibilities of armed conflicts in circumstances of generalised anomie**

[[of course we could add that the absolutely STUPID AND IRRESPONSIBLE SHORT-SIGHTED ELITE OF THE WEST SUCKING ?????? MON?EY C??? has brought the POTENTIAL FOR ANOMIE RIGHT INTO THE WEST WITH THE INVASIONS/WELCOMING OF HORDES OF INCOMPATIBLE MOHAMMEDANS, ARABS, ASIATICS AND AFRICANS ETC.]].

**P.K. gives the example of whole regions of Colombia or in Russian cities, whereby there is something much worse than armed states waging war, which well-fed people living in cushy suburbs don’t understand, and that is ANOMIE with all sorts of war-mad actors.**

**In a world characterised by great inequalities in wealth, ecological crises and mass movements of populations, the vast proliferation of light weapons carried and used by one or two people, might**
perhaps in the future be as significant as the proliferation of high/advanced military technology.

300 companies in 50 countries make light weapons today, and with them there could be massacres of people by the hundreds of thousands as occurred recently in Rawanda.

“Globalisation” will not be one-sided, as the greedy and selfish or naive supporters of it believe; it will not just be about monetary and investment projects or “human rights”, but it will be extended equally to anomie, to organised and unorganised crime, **to the revenge of everyone against everyone**

[[Remember the Zbigie article I referred to earlier and combine that with radical Mohammedans and Populist/Far-Right-Wingers et al. – GOOD LUCK WITH ALL OF THAT, RETARDS!!!!]]

whereby the struggle between states and nations will be succeeded, at least in part, by the struggle of man against man.
Then the concept of “total war” will change as well.

It will not mean as in WW1 and WW2, the direct or indirect conscription and mobilisation of all the able population, either at the war front or at the home front for the production of weapons and war supplies, without, however, there definitely being an abolition of the distinction between combatants and civilians.

Exactly the opposite will be meant: since the weapons are produced relatively cheaply and quickly, and since the firepower increases continuously at all weaponry levels, there is no need to conscript masses for their production and proliferation. But at the same time the legal monopoly of armed violence is lost, the boundaries between combatants and civilians are erased, between war and criminal act, between war and peace. And when the boundaries
between war and peace are lost, peace does not absorb war: war gulps peace down, and becomes “total” in the most nightmarish sense of the term.

[[All I can say is that the knife, gun and acid attacks, mass, daily crime in London, Sweden, Paris, Belgium, Germany,... of late... and Mexico, Central and South America etc. (for decades now)... DOES NOT BODE WELL... P.K. is obviously referring to all of the 21st century and in 2018 we have not even entered the 3rd decade YET. NOT LOOKING GOOD. NO GOOD. NO NOT GOOD.]]
IX. ADDENDUM TO THE GREEK EDITION: GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PARAMETERS OF A GRECO-TURKISH WAR

War constitutes the continuation of politics under two fundamental concepts.

When the term “politics” is understood with its objective significance, in order to characterise the formed-in-time historical-social physiognomy of a collective political subject,

then war continues politics in the sense that it formulates as a matter of fact/based in reality, and independent of the current concerns and wills of active persons, this physiognomy which we can see from many sides and, correspondingly, name it the cultural/civilisational or social or geopolitical situation, economic or military potential/capacity etc..

In its subjective sense, again, “politics” suggests the goals and the aspirations of specific persons with a weighty/important say in the political affairs of a collective subject;

then war continues politics as a means towards the fulfilment of these goals and these aspirations.

At this level, the problems of “high strategy” are put, and the most important of all can be formulated as follows: to what extent can politics in the objective sense of the term allow
the realisation of the goals of politics in the 
subjective sense of the term?

Or: how must the goals of subjective politics be formed so that they correspond with the goals/data of objective politics?

Or: towards which direction and to what extent must the data/facts of objective politics be influenced (if they are indeed adverse/unfavourable) in order to serve the goals of subjective politics?

If as a means for the realisation of the goals of subjective politics, war must be chosen – irrespective of whether voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e. for offensive/attacking or defensive goals/ends, then a second strategic question is posed: in what way must war be conducted/waged, so that indeed a means towards the realisation of political aims is proved to be suitable? And more concretely/specifically: how total a victory must someone achieve if he wants to wholly accomplish his goals/aims? Because, if it is obvious that total goals (the full subjugation of the opponent) demand total victories, p. 382

however, it is not at all obvious that limited or restricted goals (e.g. the simple defence of borders) are achieved everywhere and always with restricted/limited only victories and restricted/only wars; most frequently what is demanded is, in the case of a limited/restricted goal, a victory so total as if the goal was total.

Then, as we know from Clausewitz, the internal logic of the means (of war) unfolds autonomously/independently and, from within bloody unfolding, it outflanks political goals.
Just as politics as a goal conforms with the logic of war as its means, so too does war as a goal conform with the logic of its own means, i.e. the technical texture/composition/nature of wars and war systems, which on its own can impose a strategic decision, e.g. a decision on the aggressive/offensive or defensive conduct/waging of war.

The above is not a matter of theory without regard to reality. Every politician, guided by the “tact of judgement” which he has at its disposal, has to take the above into consideration and hierarchise it, etc..

The above = magnitudes not to be “played with” in the word games of “theoreticians” and “philosophers” with their heads in the clouds, fetishising words, etc., to be varied ad infinitum as fashion etc..

We are here dealing with weighty and irrevocable decisions.

Poincaré, the great French mathematician, said that war is an experimental science in regard to which experiments cannot be conducted.

The margins for experiment are even narrower in countries like Greece, if we see things from a medium-term historical perspective, which are walking on a knife’s edge.

In precarious historical situations, being accompanied by diffuse decadent phenomena, strategic thought becomes all the more blurred, the more intensely a nation needs it.

Just as the very/heavily sick does not ask what he shall do in ten years, but asks whether he’ll make it through the night, so too, the historically weak is characterised by the lack of far-sighted conceptions and by fixation on immediate data/facts; the difference between someone who fights with death biologically
and someone who decomposes historically, is of course that the dedication of the former to the direct facts/data appears as the attempt at the overcoming of (a) pain, whereas in the latter case such dedication to facts appears as a short-sighted eudaemonistic pursuit.

**The tendency of denying or rejecting the long-term factors and developments, i.e. the data/facts of politics in the objective sense of the term, becomes stronger when these data/facts touch upon crucial psychological points, in other words, national smugness and delusions...**

this leads to the overestimating of the significance of the real or fantastical dimension as to Greece being “European” and “democratic” is at an advantage compared with Turkey being “Ottoman”, “barbarian”, “fascistic” etc.,

and then the power of Turkey is attributed to the Great Powers favouring Turkey, to the anti-Hellenism of the West etc.. [[P.K. IS SAYING **ONE IS ALWAYS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE’S OWN PLIGHT** = ABSOLUTELY TRUE... in the sense that the only person who would ever “automatically” take responsibility for someone is the very same person as to his own self etc., and notwithstanding that the context overall, including the actors within that context and network of relations, play their parts too...]]

Such phenomena are to be expected particularly when the mechanisms of mass psychology and the formation of collective identities are at work.

And they would not even be dangerous if there were serious indications that the political leadership of this land/Greece in its totality and diachronic continuity thought and acted on the basis of entirely different categories and representations.

This does not take place – at least not sufficiently.
The system of client-politician relations, of give and take, gulped down historical and strategic dimension in thought, and so now we just have “dialogue” – “dialogue” of everyone with everyone about everything in all places and at all times.

Whoever is not a part of these dialogues, had the freedom and obligation to strategically weigh up a possible Greco-Turkish war in the light of the conceptual scale which we developed by way of introduction [[to this chapter]].

From the macro-data/facts of objective politics, one must move to the goals of subjective politics, examining by how much and in what form war can constitute a means for these goals’ realisation.

Everyone is as serious as seriously as he regards his foe, and as seriously as he confronts him. Ethicisations are an easy way to make one’s foe worthy of contempt. That is why they only prove the political lightness of that person or side using them.

Let us summarise the macro-data/facts of objective politics with regard to the term “geopolitical potential/capacity”... having various levels of generality which in total are p. 384

three... and none of the levels of “geopolitical potential/capacity” can be equated with naked/bare geography in the, outdated/outmoded by now, Anglo-Saxon and German geopolitical thought, which whilst being based on a geopolitical determinism, drew its political acts and perspectives of states and of nations from their geographic position [[THIS BY NO MEANS = THAT GEOGRAPHY IS ABSOLUTELY IRRELEVANT... ON THE CONTRARY...
Politics can sometimes determine geography (Suez Canal or Panama Canal) but normally not.

Nor does geography define politics (though geography’s influence can be essential, e.g. the island position of Great Britain).

Yet politics must be developed in close connection with a concrete/specific geographic space, and in history, politics must decide in what sense and in what deviation this relation will be made bi-directional.

So, at the broader level of generality we can define the geopolitical potential/capacity as the historical-social presence of a collective subject, which with its political and remaining dynamic, fills a certain geographic space.

In this sense, the geopolitical potential/capacity of the Greek side was expressed in the 19th century and up to the pivotal year of 1922 much more in the nation than in the state. The nation was something much wider/broader than the state, it stretched from the Ukraine up to Egypt and from Caucasian countries (along the fringes of the Caucuses) up to the flourishing communities of the Balkans and central and Western Europe.

The state wanted to expand and enclose within itself as many sections of the nation as were found on each and every respective occasion on the edges of the state, and it achieved this after the unification of the Ionian islands, especially with the Balkan Wars [[of 1913-1914]], reaching an unrepeatable peak or culmination in 1920 [[Greek troops had liberated Smyrna and other sections of]]
Asia Minor with Greek populations (notwithstanding the crimes committed by Greek troops, and of course at a time when the mass slaughters of hundreds of thousands of Pontian and other Greeks-Romans-Hellenes, as well as one and a half million Armenians had taken place just a few years prior to this temporary 

LIBERATION, including P.K.’s grandfather, who, if I’m not mistaken, was killed or otherwise died on DUTY]].

Since 1920, the reverse or countdown [[to oblivion]] started, which has lasted until today [[1997 – and I would add that in 2019 IT IS QUITE CLEAR IT IS ALL OVER RED ROVER. EVEN E.G. JUST KEEPING SAY HALF OF TODAY’S GREECE AS THE STATE OF THE GREEK PEOPLE AND NOT THE INVADING APE-ANOMIC-MUHAMUT AFRO/ASIAN-ANIMAL-APE SEEMS LIKE A TOTAL IMPOSSIBILITY. WHAT REMAINS OF THE PEOPLE HAS BEEN SO FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA-TEUTON/FRANC-LOBOTOMISED, THAT NOTHING CAN BE SALVAGED, AND OF COURSE RUSSIA (THIRD ROME) – AS THEY SHOULD – LOOKS AFTER RUSSIA’S INTERESTS – AGAIN, AS THEY SHOULD.]]

The nation eventually coincided with the state, not because the state expanded, but because the nation was broken up and crippled and shrunk, because the Hellenism of Russia (after 1919), of Asia Minor (after 1922), of the Balkans and of the Middle East (especially after 1945) was made to vanish or was displaced. Following that, the expulsion of Hellenism from Constantinople (1955) and northern Cyprus (1974), whilst today we are witnesses to the decomposition of and the mass fleeing of Hellenism in Northern Epirus [[if I’m not mistaken, about up to 190/200,000 Northern Epirus/Southern Albanian Greeks migrated to Greece in the 1990s and only about 50/60,000 remain in Northern Epirus/Southern Albania]].
The above amounts to an especially dense chain of national catastrophes inside a very short while from a historical point of view – in only 70 years. And these catastrophes cannot be replenished or counterbalanced. Today’s Greek communities of the USA and Australia are so far and are in p. 385 societies so different that they probably need the reinforcement of the Greek state so that they can retain bonds with the Greek state rather than them being in a position to give substantial material support or intellectual(-spiritual) propulsion [[I can assure everyone that about up to 90-99% of second and third generation children and grandchildren of Greek migrants who were in the childhood of the second generation Greek migrants 99%+ Greek in their world outlook, have become FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA-ANGLO-LOBOTOMISED THROUGH THE ENDLESS, NON-STOP BRAINWASHING OF THE SATANISTS VIA “EDUCATION” INDOCTRINATION, TV, ETC., SO THAT THEIR LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS LIKE THE AVERAGE PERSON UNDER 40 YEARS OF AGE IN GREECE... = NO HOPE. NO FUTURE. THE END.]]

The employees and workers of Sydney are not Benakis-like people [[Super Rich benefactors of the Nation c. 1900]] and Cavafians [[the poet Cavafy = ONE OF THE GREATEST POETS OF ALL-TIME FOR ALL READERS OF GREEK]] of Alexandria [[Egypt]] NOR COULD THE SO-CALLED GREEK-AMERICANS EVER EXERCISE IN THEIR CURRENT HOMELAND DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN FAVOUR OF THE INTERESTS OF THE GREEK STATE AND NATION [[THIS IS OBVIOUSLY
APPARENT WHEN YOU COMPARE ZIO-USA AND THE ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP AND HOW ISRAEL HAS GROWN SINCE ITS MODERN INCARNATION, WHILST GREECE/CYPRUS IS CONTINUALLY SHRINKING AND LOSING GROUND TO TURKEY, GERMANY,... AND SATAN, SATAN, MONKEY, MONKEY, SATANIC CIRCUS MONKEY... PROBABLY TO ISRAEL TOO (THOUGH IT’S NOT AS OBVIOUS (YET))...]].

At no stage = this is the grievous, bleak, doleful ascertainment = was the Greek state capable of effectively protecting broader Hellenism and to suspend/delay its shrinkage and its disappearance.

On the contrary, indeed, in 1974 the catastrophe was provoked, at least directly, by the disastrous coup-related act which came from metropolitan Greece.

And if dictators did that, parliamentary governments certainly have no reason to be proud for their lax up to non-existent reaction vis-a-vis the uprooting of the Greeks of Constantinople, of Imbros and of Tenedos.

The proven inability of the Greek state to defend the Greek nation – i.e. to carry out its primary and pre-eminent mission – constitutes the most concerning omen regarding the future.
Because already the Greek state appears gradually to be unable to protect even also the nation which is found within its borders.

As the Greek nation shrunk ceaselessly in order to coincide with the state, whose boundaries had essentially been formed already from 1913, Turkey followed the precise opposite path: the borders of the Ottoman state shrunk to coincide more or less, on the morrow of WW1, with the borders inside of which the Turkish nation ought to have lived/existed from now on.

Thanks to Kemal’s great personality, this abrupt and dolorous transition not only did not bring about political fragmentation, but on the other hand, was connected with a reformatory work, with a new sense of revival and with a new collective mythology, from which Turkey can directly draw even also today, more than half a century later.

On the other hand, vital remnants of Ottomanism remained active, diffuse and from time to time, pressing currents of Musulman/Mohammedan populism, problems of minorities, regional inequalities/lack of symmetry and social bottlenecks and difficulties – and all of that constituted and constitute a contradictory plexus. These contradictions by no means necessarily have a
negative effect on Turkey’s geopolitical potential/capacity [[COULD THIS ALSO TOO APPLY TO ZIO-USA AT IT BECOMES MORE MEXICANIFIED/LATINISED??]]  

Machiavelli, who of course knew something about politics [[HAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]][], stressed/underlined that the uninterrupted expansion of Rome towards the outside was provoked and brought on by the  

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continual conflict/fights between plebians and patricians internally, precisely therefore what could have otherwise been considered the incurable sore/wound of the city.

SO, internal friction(s) and contradictions in certain, at least, cases, set in motion a torrential expansive/conquering impulse. If this occurs in actual reality, then what in the “biassed” eyes of the “modernisers” and “civilised” “democrats” is seen as “underdevelopment” and the denial of “civil society (the society of citizens)”, is changed into the ideal mix for the exercising of an aggressive/attacking foreign/external politics/policy with all available means.

Masses of semi-full in the tummy or half-hungry/starved, capable of being fanaticised, knead and ferment with patriarchal values – such masses, guided by shrewd, cunning, long-term and coldly/coolly thinking diplomatic and military elites, constitute the organ of expansion which is much more adaptive than a flabby, loose social body floating around the average of general prosperity, where the highest mission of the political leadership is precisely to guarantee the maintenance of this average and of this flabbiness and looseness.

IN relation to today’s Turkey, it is in practice indifferent into which crucible or cauldron/melting pot the contradictions will fall/be thrown in, into what riverbed they will flow/go/enter, and with what symbolism they
will be projected, if they therefore will take an Islamic (Musulman), or rather military-Kemalist or rather economic-political “Western” hue/complexion.

Before the expansive unfolding of the geopolitical potential/capacity, all these things above are superficial and chance/coincidental, much more because whichever elite takes the reins into its hands over the long run, in order to attract as far as possible broader masses, it will have recourse to an elastic ideological eclecticism. The “Kemalist” military officers, who in 1997 combat “Islamism” fearing that they can no longer control it, encouraged after the coup of 1980 moderate religious tendencies by wanting to use them as a counterweight against left-wing radicalism; Prime Minister Ozal did the same thing shortly later, notwithstanding his liberal-economistic orientation.

Generally, the internal contradictions have a paralysing effect on the weak forces, whilst they unbind expansive-expanding forces for those who have as a matter of fact/reality such a geopolitical potential/capacity, so that the weak forces cannot leap/jump anywhere or go forward with force. In other words: the deeper strata of historical and social existence of a collective subject determine how its internal forces will work.

In today’s Turkey there are unbridled elemental forces at work, which push the internal contradictions towards expansion. And first amongst them is the population explosion, whose basic facts/data we shall summarise in their diachronic development/evolution and in contradistinction with the corresponding Greek developments. Shortly after the establishment of Turkey and of
Greece within roughly today’s borders and after the population exchanges c. 1922-23, Greece in 1928 had 6,200,000 residents and Turkey 13,600,000 in 1927.

1961 Greece: 8,400,000
1964: Turkey 31,100,000
1991: Greece 10,200,00
1991: Turkey more than 62,000,00

The endemic demographic situation in Greece already has perceptible consequences for the economy and defence.

In Turkey the population increases at least 2% per annum (1993). Every year more than 1,000,000 people are added to the active/working pool of Turks [[also implying that Greece has a much older population]] = one whole Greece every 7-8 years, because Greece has become a country of aged people, and it is under the pressure of a much younger, growing and larger neighbour.

Around 2020 Turkey will have a population of or more than 100,000,000

[[THIS IS WRONG: THE CURRENT FORECAST FOR 2020 IS JUST UNDER 84,000,000 (http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/turkey-population/). OF COURSE, IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO P.K.’s ARGUMENTATION. Greece is looking at just under 11 million in 2020 but probably 1 million of these are alien people who have no Greek consciousness and shouldn’t be in the country, more than half of the population is old or very old, and out of the 1-2 million or so younger Greeks left in the country, perhaps more than half are FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA-LOBOTOMISED AND INTO APE-FEMINOFAGGOTPOOFTER-JOOJEW-ANIMAL-WORSHIP ETC. (http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/greece-population/) =

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NO FUTURE. IT’S JUST A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE
MOHAMMAD PEOPLE TAKE OVER TO WORK FOR TURKEY,
GERMANY, ZIO-USA AND PROBABLY ISRAEL TOO.]]

P.K. states that the total Albanian population in Albania, Kosovo and
Montenegro and in the former Republic of Macedonia [[P.K. had no problem in
saying the term... he didn’t even write Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia]]
will be almost 6,000,000. Again, P.K. is wrong (but it makes no difference to
the overall argument, so P.K. again, as (nearly) always, IS RIGHT). It
seems to be around the 5,000,000 mark

P.K. states that it was politically reckless for the Greek state to not support the
state of Skopje [[HE DOES NOT SUGGEST A NAME, THOUGH IT SEEMS
HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE OBJECTED TO “SLAVIC
MACEDONIA” OR “NEW MACEDONIA” IF THAT WAS IN GREECE’S
INTERESTS]]. The future danger for Greece will more likely come from
Albania [[P.K. DOES NOT consider the possibility of Germany or Turkey with
ZIO-USA approval getting behind the Skopjeans.]] P.K. foresaw a Muslim bloc
of Bosnians and Musulmen in Skopje/FYROM and he noted that tensions
between Slavs and Albanians in FYROM had already began. He also refers to
the added tensions or even uprising of Albanians of Kosovo.

It is historically and sociologically baseless to accept a linear causal
relationship between population explosion and the expanding/expansive
aspirations with the tangible military meaning of the term.

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However, we cannot just ignore such data. After the older analyses of Colin
Clark and the more recent research regarding the relationship of
demographic developments and the industrial revolution during the 18th
and 19th century, it’s quite clear how population pressure contributes to the take-off of industrialisation and of economic development more generally.

P.K. then compares economic data between the two countries, and there is no comparison both as to aggregate industrial and other output, but also to rates of development etc.. Mention is made also of possible Turkish nuclear facilities with military implications.

P.K. stresses that many Turks are under 25 years old, and apart from their economic activities, they’ll be channeled by the government patriotically and in terms of Turkish identity too, whereas in the Greece of “easy living”, intellectuals produce ideology of “easy and happy living” and pacifism supposedly superior to the “primitivism” of Turkey’s nationalistic youth.

Yet most of the clashes between Turkey’s many factions will merge in a common perception regarding Turkey’s mission and Turkish greatness, whereupon their clash is referred to the question of which flag and identity Turkey should be under in light of the population explosion and the geopolitical dynamism (seeking outlets in broader spaces) which flows from the economic dynamism related to the sharp increase in population etc..

Precisely this is the crucial historical difference between today’s Greece and today’s Turkey.

In the case of Greece, since the nation essentially coincided with the state, Greece does not have vital/living historical and political aims outside of its borders, it lacks, therefore, precisely whatever keeps a collective political subject in tension and vigilantly alert, in obliging it to transcend ceaselessly itself (as e.g. occurred in the Balkan Wars).

Such aims are not rearguard battles in regard to Cyprus, where most frequently need is converted into “pride”, nor is “European inclusion i.e. joining the EU”, which essentially is nothing but the spiced-in-different-ways and disguised desire for others to feed us and for others to guard our borders [[WE CAN SEE WHERE THAT STANCE HAS GOTTEN GREECE. TO FULL APE FLOODS OF APE ANOMIC AND DISEASE-SPREADING HELL, WITH TURKEY MOHAMMEDISING WHOLE FORMER GREEK ISLANDS AND TERRITORIES FOR FUTURE INSTRUMENTAL USE BY TURKEY AGAINST HELLENISM. AND WHAT DO A LARGE NUMBER OF FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA/TEUTON/FRANK LOBOTOMISED “GREEKS” DO? THEY – LITERALLY FOR PEANUTS – BECAUSE THEY ARE BY AND LARGE TOO FUCKING LAZY TO WORK AND SMOKE SO MUCH (REAL AND METAPHORICAL) DOPE (IT’S NO “ACCIDENT” THAT, INTER ALIA, THE IDIOT SON OF A ZIO-JOO MOTHER HAS BEEN PROMOTING THE USE OF DOPE FOR YEARS) – ARE AIDING IN SPEEDING ALONG GREECE’S OWN DEMISE AND OUR OWN AUTO-GENOCIDE.]]
So, entering the EU could have been part of national aspirations provided there was a pulsating geopolitical potential/capacity. Under conditions of geopolitical shrinkage, all of that is just substitutes, and for the most part shadow fighting (shadowboxing).

And whilst Greek national aims have been de facto restricted to a passive self-preservation, whereupon various rhetorical elations and excitements have de facto been restricted to the psychological functioning of over-replenishment, **Turkey, still largely amorphous with all its contradictions and asymmetries, but with eminent sources of elemental geopolitical energy – continuously looks beyond its borders into wider/broader spaces**, towards which very fresh and active hegemonic memories push it, as well as still living/vital racial, linguistic and historical kinships/affinities. SO, the Turks can easily build bridges between the most recent past and the direct present, whilst Greek tradition needs many more invigorating injections and expansive/expanding interpretations in order to support today’s tangible political desiderata. This, of course, we do not know, but many others see it.

**The broader spaces, in which a nation unfolds in its primary energy with various (economic, cultural, military etc.) modes/ways, but always in conjunction with superior political goals, constitute the geopolitical potential/capacity in a second sense**, narrower than the first sense and at the same time intersecting with it. **These spaces, obviously, are not chosen abstractly, but are interrelated with the radius of the primary energy of a nation, with geography and its historical antecedent happenings/myths etc.**. **They also correlate with the movement of inimical forces, whereupon one space, which in itself would interest one side only very little, comes to the centre of attention because the opposing**
side penetrates (into) this space. In the case of small or medium/middle Powers, their geopolitical potential/capacity, in this second sense, has an essential meaning as to the determination of their relations with planetary Forces, which seek regional satellites, deputies or partners.

**Indirectly, thus, the small or middle/medium Power becomes a factor of planetary politics and, irrespective of this primary energy it has.**

From this point of view, Turkey has at its disposal most incredible advantages vis-a-vis Greece, which geopolitically does not present, especially after the ending of the Cold War, a vital interest for any existent or up and coming planetary Power [[HERE, P.K. IS SAYING THAT GREECE VERY EASILY WILL BE SACRIFICED, BECAUSE WHAT COUNTS FOR ZIO-USA AND GERMANY (AND RUSSIA AND EVEN CHINA) IS TURKEY, SO GREECE IS BASICALLY A PATHETIC AND A DISPOSABLE PAWN, PARTICULARLY OF ZIO-USA (AND ISRAEL) AND GERMANY]].

For various reasons, I have set out elsewhere (“Europe at the threshold of the 21st century” = see “The Political in the 20th Century” page at www.panagiotiskondylis.com), Central Asia (including Caucasus and the Caspian Sea) and Siberia will play a crucial role in the planetary developments of the 21st century. As it seems, the USA [[= ZIO-USA, but P.K. never wrote that]] cottoned onto that relatively quickly, **and they attribute to Turkey corresponding significance as a country with historical and always more or less live roots in this infinite, sprawling, vast area and space.**

Turkey’s recent approaching of Israel under American aegis [[this obviously has changed since about c. 2016 if I’m not mistaken, but who’s to say it won’t be reinstated sometime in the future... we’ll just have to wait and see]], **shows with how much long-term framework thought the Americans view Turkey’s strategic**
exploitation/usage; likewise, in the case of Northern Iraq being offered to the discretion of the Turkish armed forces.

As I believe, the intensity between “Islamist” and “Kemalist” military officers during the first half of 1997 deep down was not due so much to crucial matters of domestic/internal politics, as to the question of whether Turkey ought to in the following decades connect its own geopolitical and military aspirations with America’s geopolitical and military aspirations, or not. The military personnel of Turkey – quite rightly – view collaboration with America as being infinitely more important than having very close relations with Pakistan, Indonesia or Libya, for instance.

They also see that American support can be useful not only in Caucasia and Central Asia, but also in the Aegean and in the Balkans, where the Americans, on the one had do not have vital interests to the extent as they have in the East, they however always have the power/dominance of doing or not doing whatever they want, and of giving authority and not giving authority to whomever they want, to bomb and to make peace.

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Historical and political analysis can, in the best case, ascertain the currents and the motive (driving) forces. It cannot foresee facts.

[[NOW, THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING STATEMENT (the statement following) BY P.K., COMING FROM 1997!!!...]) No-one knows today with absolute certainty if after some years, the attempt of most Turkish diplomats, military officers/personnel and business people to connect the geopolitical unfolding/development of their country with the aims of the planetary strategy of the United States, will go well and flourish, or if it will have the fortune of the regime of the Shah of Persia. No-one knows whether the very same USA will have the will/volition and the power to persist re:
current strategic aims at a planetary level. And no-one knows whether what
today seems like difficult and inconceivable, will happen: will perhaps an
“Islamic” Turkey choose to go with the USA as the most expedient to Turkey
solution, since historical experience teaches that foreign policy/external politics
has its own logic, which survives both regimes and polities.

**Whatever turn things take, Turkey in no case will proceed in the current
phase, or in the future, together with the USA as the USA’s unwilling
inferior, accepting and executing American orders.**

Even if Turkey undertakes to act as regional deputy for the USA, it will do
so in its own interests and to promote its own positions, in order to have
access to hyper-modern/i.e. the latest military technology, and so as to be
close to decision-making centres.

This will not be the first time in history when a small or medium/middle
Power works for its own plans from the position of a deputy to a Great
Power – under the wings of the Great Power, BUT NOT WITHOUT ITS
OWN WINGS.

**When the only Greek politician WITH BALLS, Eleftherios Venizelos,**
asked for Greece to be aligned/allied, no matter what the sacrifice – even at
the price of civil war – on the side of Western Powers, he did so because he
foresaw that the country only as deputy to the victorious Great Powers
would be able to realise its major national dreams.

And he did not hesitate to move/provide the Greek army even to the
mercenaries of the Anglo-French (e.g. in the Ukraine), in order to get in
return a Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas.

Such decisions are not dictated by toadying and voluntarily being a slave,
but by political genius and political greatness, the instinct of the Great
Player in the great game of politics. These characteristics of course do not
have nationality and a race [[QUITE CLEARLY, P.K. ACCEPTS THAT THERE ARE SUCH THINGS (SOCIAL-in part at least also BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENA) AS SUB-RACES TO THE HUMAN RACE WHICH CAN BE JUST CALLED “RACES”...]], and the Turkish national leadership will need the said characteristics to a great extent/degree, if it goes down the path of geopolitical unfolding/development as the self-willed deputy of the world Hegemon – otherwise, Turkey runs the risk of suffering what Greece suffered after 1920 [[SO HERE P.K. IS INDIRECTLY REFERRING TO TURKEY LOSING TERRITORY, WHICH (possibly? probably?) IMPLIES TO KURDS e.g. WITH ZIO-USA-ISRAEL BACKING.]]

Indeed, the greatest future danger for Turkey – and the greatest, if not only hope for Greece – rests/is based on the possibility of the rise of Powers capable of competing with American-Turkish influence both in the Caucuses and in Central Asia as well as in the Balkans [[IT WOULD APPEAR, THAT ROUGHLY P.K. GOT IT RIGHT, BECAUSE WHILST ZIO-USA CLEARLY HAS ITS SATANIC ZIO-USA UPPER HAND IN THE BALKANS, AND CARES NOT ABOUT HELLENISM AND ORTHODOXY BEING ERADICATED, AND OR EVEN ACTIVELY PROMOTES HELLENISM’S ERADICATION (PROTESTANTS, PAPISTS, ZIO-JOOS, ATHEISTS AND COCK-SUCKERS WERE ALWAYS THE ENEMIES OF HELLENISM (ALONG WITH ALL THE TURKIC MOHAMMEDAN AND OTHER EXCREMENT – EVEN THOUGH TACTICAL, EVEN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS ARE ALWAYS POSSIBLE, IF THE CONDITIONS ARE RIPE ETC.!!! IT’S ONE THING TO BE VERY RUDE, AND IT’S ANOTHER THING TO DO BUSINESS... BUSINESS IS BUSINESS...) – NOTHING HAS CHANGED ON THAT FRONT), IT WOULD SEEM THAT IN THE CAUCUSES AND IN CENTRAL ASIA, RUSSIA HAS DONE QUITE A BIT TO PISS OFF THE ZIO-PSYCHO-CON-JOBBERS AND ZIO-DEM-TARDS OF ZIO-USA, I.E. THE SATANIST COMPONENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHEREAS GOOD, DECENT WHITE JACKSONIAN AMERICANS WHICH GAVE WORLD CULTURE SUCH GREATS AS JOHN FORD AND JOHNNY CASH ARE REALLY VERY ENDEARING PEOPLE.]]

**Only a powerful, nationalistic and expansive/expanding Russia could constitute a drastic dam to Turkish ambitions in the Balkans** [[PERHAPS
NOT. WE’LL SEE. THIS IS DEBATABLE]] (where the old Russian bonds with Serbia and Bulgaria would re reignited) [[IT SEEMS THAT WHILST BULGARIA IS LOST TO ZIO-USA-GERMANIC/FRANCO SATANISM, RUSSIA HAS DONE STUFF IN SYRIA... – DON’T FORGET, THESE NOTES IN BRACKETS ARE BY A LOONY AND SUPER-MAD LITERARY PERSONA BORN MORE THAN 1000 YEARS AGO IN HELLENIC ROME...]], and in the East (where also the old anti-Turkish axis of Russia and Iran would be reactivated) [[this means that it’s possible that at some point, Russia will discard Turkey and Turkey could possibly be broken up in returning to the ZIO-USA fold. On the other hand, Turkey may not be broken up at all and could return to the ZIO-USA fold and or continue “balancing” between Russia and ZIO-USA. If ZIO-USA drops the ZIO (GLOBALIST SATANISM ETC.), approaches Russia and becomes the USA in order to balance with HAN-MAN CHINA, then that could change things too.]]

It is unknown whether this possibility will take place or if Russia will stagnate over the long run.

However, with a “liberalism-fection” of Russia [[don’t forget, under THE DRUNK Yeltsin, Russia in the 1990s was FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA LOBOTOMISED AND ZIO/USA-crippled by the hate and horror of ZIO-neoconjobber-ziodemtard-satanic-protestant-papist-atheist-cock-sucking zio-joop-DEVIL ANIMALS]] in the sense of adaptation to American models and to American desires/wishes, it would probably mean Turkey becoming impudent and presumptuous, and also = fatal blow to the essential/substantial/significant, if not also for the formal, independence of Greece. [[THIS HAS TAKEN PLACE ANYWAY, BECAUSE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELITE OF GREECE HAVE BEEN FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA-GERMAN LOBOTOMISED AS PARASITIC NON-PRODUCTIVE ZIOFIED-LOBOTOMISED ANIMALS IN A VERY INTENSE VERSION THEREOF AT LEAST FROM THE 1980s/1990s...]]

All those who think liberally and economistically will obviously find it difficult to understand this, but it is true. A Russia which would gradually
enter or fit into the skin of the old Soviet Union – that is what really scares Turkey, and not opponents like the ill-fated Kurds which at no point in time have even in the least threatened more than a little the Turkish army. Rather, the Kurds, are of use for the Turkish army to do its military exercises and so that the Turkish army can remain battle-hardened and combat-ready.

We now move onto the [[3]] third and narrower concept of geopolitical potential/capacity, which is more directly connected to the geographical data and must be analysed comparatively, because geography gives advantages and disadvantages only in relation to someone else [[and their space(s)]]], and whatever is from one point of view an advantage, can from the other point of view constitute a disadvantage or the reverse;

Russia’s continental bulk was fatal for Napoleon and Hitler [[SEE P.K. REFERS TO HITLER AS HE WOULD TO ANY OTHER LEADER. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENCE, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS “INHERENT GOOD AND OR EVIL”. THERE IS POWER, FORMS OF POWER AND RELATIONS OF POWER + IDENTITIES ETC..]], however that very same continental bulk deprived Russia of access to the warm waters [[c.f. many of I. Mazis’s analyses re: Spykman etc..]]

Thus, the comparative analysis of the geopolitical potential/capacity of Greece and Turkey in this narrower sense is connected in particular with the problem of the possible strategic physiognomy of a Greco-Turkish war in the near or more distant future.

Greece’s fatal dilemma in the Asia Minor campaign of 1920-1922: in order to hold onto Smyrna, Ankara had to be occupied – and again without a greater certainty of final victory than what Napoleon had in trying to occupy Moscow. This means: the depth of the space gulped down the Greek army, even if it was fighting in a space not altogether foreign [[WHAT THIS
MEANS IS THAT EVEN WITH THE GREEK TROOPS INTO ASIA MINOR BEING CLEARLY A WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, IT PROBABLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STARTED AT ALL... AS THERE WAS NO MILITARY WAY TO SEE IT THROUGH TO VICTORY...]].

And even though much has changed since then, the depth of space Turkey has is still important in terms of war. = elementary geographical

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given/fact/datum which is dual. On the one hand, the extent/area of the Turkish state is six times that of the Greek, on the other hand, it is almost (apart from the European component) a space which is compact and all-round-full (re: its sections), whereas the Greek space (and indeed the crucial as a theatre of war region of the whole of the Aegean, as well as Northern Greece from Evros up to Thessaloniki) is constituted by scattered and isolated lands (islands) or narrow [[islet]] strips (of land). **The strategic advantage which this gives to the Turkish side is obvious.**

**The fragmented Greek space can be occupied and held section by section, even also very small sections; the foe is not obliged to get involved in a military adventure of occupying all of the Greek state in order to break any one section off which it might want or be able to break off.** If it occupies one section, it has the possibility, since it is predominant militarily, to consolidate a new situation, by creating in a relatively quick period of time a fait accompli.
Conversely, the Greek side does not have the possibility (with the slightest of consolatory exceptions, of which we shall speak later), of detaching from the great and compact Turkish geopolitical bulk, a smaller or larger piece without getting entangled mutatis mutandis in the tragic dilemma of 1922.

If e.g. for reasons of distraction/diversion/decoying it constructed bridgeheads to the coastal Asia Minor space, Turkish forces could even totally ignore it completely, turning against them/the Greek side only after the outcome of the major theatres of war [[elsewhere]] have been decided; because such bridgeheads would be cut off and could not be used either way as a springboard for further penetration of the Turkish space. The occupation of Turkish lands by the Greek side runs into the depth of space, but not the occupation of Greek lands by the Turkish side [[SO E.G. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EASILY – IF AT ALL TAKE – AUSTRALIA, WITHOUT E.G. HAVING SERIOUS E.G. CHINESE BACKING AND WITHOUT ALSO AUSTRALIA HAVING INTERNALLY BECOME A HEAP OF “MULTI-CULTURAL” SHIT WITHOUT ANY AUSTRALIAN IDENTITY (WHICH AS THINGS STAND, IT LOOKS LIKE IN 2019 THAT’S EXACTLY WHAT AUSTRALIA IS BECOMING. THOUGH I SUPPOSE WITH INTENSE BRAIN-WASHING – ZIO OR NOT – THOSE LEVELS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS COULD CHANGE FAIRLY QUICKLY (?))]]

So, how can Greece overcome, neutralise in the case of war, its serious geographic disadvantages?

We shall highlight four points, without meaning them hierarchically even though the last two points need to be particularly stressed/underlined, nevertheless, only the energetic co-existence of the four can give to the Greek side real possibilities of victory. As is self-evident, this analysis is limited only to the fundamental strategic magnitudes, and simply touches upon, where it seems to be indispensable, military undertakings (i.e. major military actions through the co-existence of many units), whilst the tactical level is not discussed at all, and nor can it be discussed: because in a general military conflict/war between Turkey and Greece
there would not just be one battlefield, upon which – if one considered it to be known from the beginning, the movements of the combatants would be calculated in detail, but rather there would be various broader theatres of war with essential differences between them.

Let’s begin with the matter of losses of land and of gains/wins, since it seems to me to be obvious that the Turkish side will connect its justification and conduct/waging of war on its part with territorial claims. If this applies, then the Greek side would do very badly to be restricted to the defence of her violated lands. If these lands were more than one, and if the successful defence of all of them were not possible, then the Turks would in the end have a clear gain/win, even if that were small and ex post facto seemed to be “disproportionate” (the concept is of course relative) as to the corresponding sacrifices. For this reason, the Greek side must as far as possible seek autonomous land gains, either as a counterweight for its own permanent losses or for possible exchange in subsequent and posterior negotiations.

Where these gains should be sought, given the basically compact and all-round-full (re: its sections) character of the Turkish national space, a quick overview of three possible theatres of war shows us: Thrace, The Aegean and Cyprus.

In Thrace, or rather Evros, the dense concentration of troops on both sides [[of the border between Greece and Turkey]] means that whoever will be able to break (up/open) first the opposing lines, will have the possibility of cutting off immediately, in a cyclical manoeuvre almost on the spot, large enemy units.

However, this is not the only reason for which the Greek forces will have to from the beginning seek, whilst making every sacrifice (and the dense concentration will demand in all probability serious sacrifices), the breaking up
of the inimical front, and not be satisfied with one passive defence [[THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH GREEK YOUTH WITH ENOUGH GREEK CONSCIOUSNESS FOR US TO FUCKING DO ANYTHING. AFTER DECADES OF OUR OWN NON-PRODUCTIVE CONSUMERISTIC PARASITISM ALONG WITH ZIOJOO-USA BRAIN-WASHING AND FEMINO-FAGGOTISATION, WE ARE BASICALLY DEAD.]]

A quick advance of armoured units in Eastern Thrace [[Turkey]], which the flat ground and the limited distances favours, could bring to Greece the most significant counterweight vis-a-vis whichever losses of land occur in other areas. Indeed, nowhere else except in Thrace, does the Greek side have the possibility of evaluating/assessing [[the possibility of]] the obtaining/obtainment of lands, as limited/restricted as someone judges this possibility; and yet it exists, and since it’s the only possibility, it must be exploited to the maximum and with consistency.

In the theatre of the Aegean, as we said, it is of no meaning to create bridgeheads into the Asia Minor coast, even if the bridgeheads could be held for a little while; the only act, which could bring here land gains, would be the occupation of Imbros and Tenedos, provided that the Greek navy would be in a position to cover (the air cover p. 395 we consider fundamental and self-evident both as regards a landing on the islands, as well as re: an advance into Thrace; however, the problem of domination of the air space is so crucial, that we shall talk about it later).

Finally, in Cyprus, the Greek side has very little to await. And if it can defend something, that is possible only if the Cypriot population in its totality appears to be prepared to go to war, if need be, tooth and nail. This, unfortunately, did not occur in 1974, when we saw of course the tragedy of the Cypriots, but we did not see a persistent people’s resistance until the end/to extremes. However, this time there is no South to flee to. Only the sea exists.
The second point, which we desire to underline is the need for the concentration of forces. The geographical fragmentation of the Greek space easily gives rise to the temptation in respect of the corresponding fragmentation of the armed forces, so that the as far as possible more complete cover of that space can be achieved. This temptation can prove to be fatal, besides, the goal is in itself utopian. The numerical superiority of the Turkish side and the multitude of possible aims/objectives, gives it, objectively, certain margins of choice and execution of misleading landing-related and other moves with the goal of the – either way – existent temptation of the Greeks re: the fragmentation of forces.

The Greek side must be vigilant and aware it cannot defend everything, and owing to numerical disadvantage and the absolute necessity of air presence at all the crucial points of military undertakings, must also put on the backburner the defence of cities and civilians and concentrate what it has available not in the covering of space, but exclusively in the obliteration of the main bulk of inimical armed forces, there where they will add their weight, and if possible before they are able to develop fully.

In order for this upmost goal to be fulfilled, possibly the numerically inferior [[Greek side]] will need to run the risk of the loss of lands and or the carrying out of military undertakings with one’s side open [[to attack by enemy fire]], something which it must supplement/replenish with flexibility and speed. However, the final outcome on the basis of all that which will take place at that level touches upon the same/very essence of war.

War means first of all and primarily the seeking of the crushing of inimical/enemy armed forces,... on and from that does everything else depend and flow. And if this is achieved, then sooner or later everything else is achieved, re: all that one sacrificed wanting to concentrate his forces at the decisive moment at the decisive point/place.
Thirdly, the Greek side will not be able to weigh up its geographical disadvantages vis-a-vis the Turkish side’s, if it does not cover with satisfactory firepower the totality of the Turkish territory and not simply the theatres of war and the limited depth of the space around the said theatres of war. The small depth of the Greek space gives to Turkey the possibility of striking the whole surface with shorter-range weapons (already Turkey is obtaining American missiles ATACMS with a radius of 120-300 kilometres) along with aeroplanes they have of a smaller beneficial radius of action/action radius than the Greek planes. And conversely: the comparatively great depth of the Turkish space allows Turkey to withdraw into its inner space, i.e. beyond the radius of Greek firepower (Turkey has even started discussing with China the purchase of long-range land to land missiles) as well as aeroplanes of a greater beneficial radius of action/action radius. Let it be noted that the Turkish aeroplanes can, starting from the furthest to us airports of Anatolia (Batman, Erzouroum), be fueled in the air whilst they are still in Turkish air space and thus execute missions inside the Greek territory as if they had taken off from airports of Asia Minor coasts.

So, in case of war, even if the Greek side wanted to surprise the Turks with a pre-emptive (preventive, anticipatory, prophylactic) strike [= FIRST MENTION OF THE TERM “PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE” ABOUT HALF WAY THROUGH THE CHAPTER]], it is not at all certain that it would find the main body of its air forces at the closest airports. This crucial problem can only be solved by missile systems of a suitable range and with essential possibilities of fueling/resupplying of the Greek aeroplanes in the air (e.g. between Crete and Cyprus).

**Matters would have been far simpler if Greece and Cyprus were not countries with limited and reduced sovereign rights**, if actually their
decisions were not dependent directly or indirectly on what the [[Zio-]]USA accepts and what Turkey considers casus belli.

In the case of actually having state sovereignty, the sovereign Cypriot government would call the sovereign Greek government to install aeroplane forces on its land, which could strike directly the heart and the underbelly of Turkish territory. Greece like Turkey is a guaranteeing power of Cyprus and legally can have its air force and airpower present in Cyprus like Turkey has [[in the Northern Conquered Part]]. But such brave moves are not possible or even a dream when a side has to beg for every spare part and every bolt [[owing to Greek bankruptcy and not producing those parts and bolts itself as Greece]].

[[4]] Fourthly and finally, in view of the general advantageous position of Turkey, the Greek side would not have serious possibilities of military p. 397 victory if it did not find the strength and the decisiveness to bring about the first (mass) strike by surprising the foe. The first strike is imposed as a necessity today not because of “war-mongering” disposition, but by the logic of modern weapons systems: the logic of the means is autonomised (made autonomous and independent), as we refer to our introductory observations, and essentially determines the orientation of military strategy.

If the Greek side, by saying “defense dogma” means that, by being scared of being exposed in the eyes of international public opinion [[which in the West is GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY ZIO/JOO AND ZIO-USA MANIPULATED ANYWAY]] and of allies, is prepared in whatever case of (general) war to leave the initiative as to movements and the advantage of the first (mass) strike to the foe, then it has in all probability signed itself, and from the beginning, its own condemnation and conviction.
Given Turkish superiority of military forces and more general Turkish geopolitical superiority, a (mass) first strike from the East will paralyse technically, but also psychologically the Greek side.

In older wars, conducted on land, the offensive/attacking initiative could be left to the foe until he exhausted his powers. However, this presupposed that he defending himself possessed positions naturally or artificially fortified, which allowed him to keep his own forces relatively untouched/undamaged until he could go on the counterattack.

Today, the power and the range of fire from every direction towards every direction, and the displacement of the military centre of gravity from the land to the air cancels this presupposition. There are no hiding places anymore for the armed forces, and the (mass) first strike aims precisely at the obliteration of the means of counterattack on a broad scale. These same technical factors make time the decisive magnitude, in other words they give to the beginning phase of every war, a crucial significance.

Whatever is not won or whatever is lost in this phase is most difficult to be obtained and replenished subsequently. That is why the first strike, which inaugurates the decisive initial phase of war must be as far as possible more massive and all the more timely. The first strike in the strategic sense of the term, is not the first chance shot which is fired during the first “hot episode” of a military confrontation; it is a co-ordinated and
immediate act of all branches of the armed forces towards the annihilation of the vital points of the inimical (enemy) military potential/capacity, especially of those which appear crucial inside the given conjuncture.

It can be brought about within the framework of the culmination of a local “warm episode”, but very much sooner even, when indeed it is ascertained that an inimical/enemy strike is about to happen; the executive plan of the first strike must therefore be in the drawer from during times of peace, without that meaning at all that whoever has designed it and mapped it out

and whoever will apply it, is necessarily the attacker in the historical and political sense of the term.

As the geopolitical potential/capacity of Turkey in reinforced over the long run, whilst Greece’s is shrinking long-term, the offensive/attacking side in the historical and in the political sense cannot be anyone else but Turkey; irrespective of
national mythologies, this fact has no relationship with moral, ethical or racial properties, but is due to the formation of the correlation of forces, and things would turn around, only if the correlation of forces turned around.

But whoever, wanting to or not, adopts a defensive strategy at the historical and the political level, is not for this and only this reason obliged to adopt a defensive strategy at the military level. The two levels should not be confused in any way whatsoever.

Defence is one thing as a historical-political goal, and another thing is defence as a military means, one thing is the defensive character of a war, and another thing, the defensive conducting/waging of a war.

Besides, from a military point of view, the purely defensive conduct/waging of a war is deprived of meaning and is in practice impossible.

If we took it seriously (i.e. the purely defensive conduct of war), it would mean that the offensive/attacking side can do whatever it wants without punishment, by running the risk of coming back to its initial position and to get itself ready to try again.
No defense is effective if it does not contain a dramatic punishment of the offensive/attacking side, however, this punishment cannot but consist of acts which, if seen in insolation, are characterised by the powerful presence of offensive/attacking elements: he who is on the defensive fires in the same manner and for the same purpose/goal/end as he who attacks.

In regard to the above four points, we synopsised the preconditions under which Greece could win a war against Turkey. **CAUTION: we are not saying that Greece is in a position to do it, or will do it;** we are saying that if Greece does it, it can do it only under those preconditions.

In their turn, however, these preconditions presuppose other things, that is certain military potential/capacity, certain firepower and a certain **structuring of the armed forces.** [[So, all of this applies – mutatis mutandis and ceteris paribus – to Taiwan and China; Ukraine and Russia; Judea and Persia, etc., etc., etc..]]

The keeping of the rule/norm of the concentration of forces has no value when one’s forces are paltry; and the first strike also does not bring great profits when you did it with a hunting rifle [[AAAA-HAHAHHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]] – that is why, incidentally, also the underlining of the strategic significance of the first strike does not at all include some indirect encouragement for someone to start a war out of youthful, virile, admirable male enthusiasm and whenever one feels like it; it **means that only if a combatant has at his disposal sufficient means for a crucial first strike, he must use such means, since he wants to win a war, given modern and ultra-modern technological circumstances.**

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Since, therefore, the strategic presuppositions/prerequisites of a victory are not even possible to be collected if the necessary military potential/capacity
does not exist, the question is put automatically in which state today is the Greek state found, from this point of view, always in comparison to the Turkish side.

And since the Turkish geopolitical potential/capacity (in our already known triple sense of the term) is superior to that of the Greek (potential/capacity), the question is posed as to what extent the Greek side equalises its organic disadvantages with its superiority in the economic sector and sector of armaments and equipping itself; to what extent does Greece’s qualitative precedence make up for qualitative shortcomings and deficiencies. The answer is clear: **Greece does not have at its disposal sufficient means of deterrence, if we define deterrence – as we ought to define it – as the ability to bring about a timely first strike and to paralyse for a long period of time, the foe.**

Neither the qualitative superiority of the Greek side [[which definitely does not exist today (2019), that’s for sure, and I doubt very much it existed in 1997, and if it did, it only barely existed]] counterbalances its quantitative disadvantages, nor does Greek firepower cover the totality of Turkish territory, and thus is unable to effectively protect Cyprus as well.

**And the worst is not even today’s picture in itself. It is the dynamics of development/evolution if we follow it during the last fifteen years and if we make plausible projections into the future based on the already present and weighty indications.**

Then we shall see that the expansion of the distance between the military capacity/potential of Greece and that of Turkey roughly faithfully depicts the extension of Turkish geopolitical potential/capacity and the shrinkage (shrinking) of Greece’s corresponding geopolitical potential/capacity.
The numbers are overwhelming and symmetrically cover all the sectors, from the economic, in the wider sense, to those affecting re-armaments and military equipment in the narrower sense.

1980: Greece GDP was 80% of the Turkish GDP, but in 1995 it was 40% approx. of the Turkish GDP.

1980 Greece industrial production/output constituted 60% of Turkish industrial production/output, in 1995 it was not more than 30%, and in particular in regard to the production of engineering equipment the relationship went from 70% of Turkey’s in 1980 to 35% in 1995.

1980 Greek exports were nearly three times those of Turkish exports, in 1995 they were only 60% of Turkish exports.

**Such massive economic changes = also massive changes in comparative military expenditure.**

From 1985 per capita military expenditure increased by 80% in Turkey, and decreased by 20% in Greece. P.K. then gives some comparative dollar figures.

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1980 Greece per capita was above Turkey in military expenditure by 1% but in 1995 is down cf. Turkey by 40%!

In regard to crucial – not general – military equipment expenditure(s), from Greece spending double c. 1980, to Turkey spending three times that of Greece in 1995.

Also, 1977 Greece imported $753 million and Turkey 245; in 1987 Greece $187 million, Turkey 925!

**More important over the long run is the fact that Turkey connected its military equipment/armament(s) programme to the development of its own**
military industry through extensive programmes of co-production. Thus, today [[1997]], Turkey is about 30% self-sufficient, moving up, and with an exporting direction/orientation (Egypt bought a while ago Turkish-produced F-16 aeroplanes).

Conversely, the Greek degree of autarky/self-sufficiency dropped from 15-20% in 1980 to 5% approx. and I fear that 5% includes useless costly SHIT like the anti-aircraft ARTEMIS 30. + other political errors re: co-production, planes, etc..

Whereas Turkey bought 160 F-16s and immediately instituted a programme of co-production.

Whilst there is a relative equilibrium re: naval forces, the scales are seriously in favour of Turkey on land and in the air, particularly if one considers that Greece will urgently need a success in Evros and incursion into Eastern Thrace in order to counterbalance losses in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

Turkey has more than four times the infantry [[that’s probably more than ten times c. 2019!]], Turkey has more than three times the firearms and two times the tanks.

On the Evros front, things are better for Greece as it can gather more forces there than Turkey. But Turkey has a great advantage in 3rd generation tanks etc. esp. re: a terrain “made for such tanks etc.”.

Of course, crucial will be the fight/combat in the air as the first strike will have a huge bearing on the outcome of war. Turkey is fully aware of all of that and its armament programme provides about 50% of the budget for the air force incl. the modernisation of the older planes e.g. of the F-4 with the assistance of Israel.
Talk re: planes, radars, re-fueling etc., all in favour of Turkey. Greece won’t even have dominance over the air space over the Aegean, nor will it be able to strike the totality of Turkish territory, nor bring about a crucial strike.

Talk of purchasing American F15-E or Russian SU-27. That would be a first step in the right direction, but nowhere near enough, because in the next decade Turkey will spend about three times that of Greece. And also because for any military armament programme there are huge economic and political preconditions...

because it is obvious that “the defence of the country demands a flourishing national economy”.

An economy is flourishing when it produces with increasing tempi/rhythms tangible goods, to both satisfy internal/domestic needs, as well as for export in order to pay for other goods, which a country cannot or does not consider in its interest to produce itself, with as much as possible a greater surplus.

The economy consists essentially in the production of goods and in all the services which are offered on this basis (in both Greece and the USA, services are approx. 60% of the economy, but the productive bases of the two countries are absolutely different [[even allowing for comparative mutatis mutandis ceteris paribus adjustments]]. The economy does not consist of indicators of all kinds of magnitudes and or of money. Development indicators of 2% or 3% do
not mean much when development means increase in “services” (which in Greece = fresh air/=nothing).

And the reduction in inflation, i.e. “healthy money”, also is a small achievement, when it emerges from the shrinking of the economy. Wherever no-one buys anything, and no-one does not sell anything, there, there exists naturally no inflation. In Greece, inflation might be down to 5 or 6% [= still with the Drachma], but industrial production remains stagnant for more than 15 years (it’s not a typographical error), whereas the yearly deficits of balance of trade are already at 16, 17 and 18 billion dollars yearly (this is not a typographical error either). I doubt very much this is the Path to a flourishing economy able to support the defence of the country.

The reduction in inflation does not in the least constitute a sufficient condition for the encouragement of productive-industrial investments, and this will be proved shortly [[IN THE EU, THERE’S NO FUCKING PRODUCTION AT ALL FOR GREECE!!! – though I don’t see how Greece can move outside of the Euro and or the EU and achieve independence. There’s not enough youthful “cattle” with sufficient Greek consciousness...]].

**What is needed to have capital for investments is cutting back on parasitical consumerism.** And as much capital is saved, then in turn it must be really invested productively, to give to the country

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a noteworthy contemporary industrial substructure/infrastructure.

Such investments are of course much more difficult than investments of all kinds of “public works” of often dubious usefulness, because they touch much more intensely upon the problem of education, of technological know-how and of productivity. The cutting back on parasitic consumption,
with which the whole social texture of the country runs up against = absolutely necessary, + again, the insurmountable obstacle of the functioning of the political system on a client-politician basis = a disaster.

Only under European pressure have some cutbacks been made, but the client-politician character of the political system does not at all essentially change, despite the change in government rhetoric. (For the deeper nexus re: parasitic consumption, political system and geopolitical shrinkage/shrinking in post-1975 Greece, see Kondylis, *Planetary Politics*... Addendum [[available at www.panagiotiskondylis.com ]]

**A flourishing, productive economy on a contemporary industrial basis gives a country the possibility of deterrence.** For this possibility to be realised, a country must or, at any rate, its leadership must really believe in the necessity of deterrence, i.e. to have correctly diagnosed the character and the extent of the threatened clash.

If the diagnosis is in error and deficient, if it attributes clashes to transitory or secondary causes, then belief in the necessity of deterrence is reduced correspondingly.

It is the greatest of errors to think that increasing Turkish pressure on Greece is not due to the widening of the difference between the geopolitical potential/capacity of the two countries, but for dynamic Turkish expansiveness in conquering others, as being attributable to “Ottomanism” and to the “Asiatic character” of Turkey etc., and then by drawing the conclusion that when Turkey follows our enlightened examples and gets over “nationalistic atavisms” it will take the “European Path”, and substitute military activities with economic activities, and the threat by Turkey to Greece will automatically be overcome.
More and more [[idiots, fuck-sticks, parasites, FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA-GERMAN/FRENCH/EU LOBOTOMISED AUTOMOTONS]] in Greece think in that way, having the impression that in this way they can get over nationalistic confrontations, and that in opposition to nationalistic ideologem(e)s, they can suggest realistic solutions etc.. They are right and justified when they say that the nationalists start from an abstract model regarding the nation, to which they often subject even also p. 404

superior commands of political realism. The politically damaging monopolistic pursuit of the name of Macedonia showed this recently [[so in 1997, it seems P.K. would have been “fine” with New Macedonia or Slavic Macedonia, if the rest of the “deal” was in Greece’s interests. We cannot of course ever know what he would have thought about 2018/2019’s “Northern Macedonia” etc., though we can hazard a guess...]].

However, what one sees in his opponent, one does not see in himself. The opponents and combatants of nationalistic ideologem(e)s do not understand how whatever they contradistinguish themselves to nationalism or rather to its caricatures, are also ideologem(e)s, abstract ahistorical models, and indeed = today’s dominant mixing of universalism and economism, where the cosmopolitism of “human rights” and of “civil society” is intertwined in different ways with the individualism (atomism) of the capitalistic homo
oeconomicus and with the old liberal utopia that trade will replace war.

Just like nationalism, so too, its opponent universalism and economism have specific, concrete bearers, inspirers and propagandists, both selfish and also naive.

In certain cases, indeed, not only selfishness, but also the naivety of the latter surpasses that of the former.

The same takes place, for instance, also as to the appraisal of Greco-Turkish relations. The nationalists are found much closer to reality who believe that the opposition between Turkey and Greece is unbridgeable rather than those who believe such opposition can be ended with a “European” and economistic solution – even if the former are lead to their diagnosis by false presumptions.

Let us note that both nationalists, as well as “Europeans” or economists, agree as to the fact that Turkish expansionism is due to the “Ottoman” and “Asiatic” past, to the “anti-democratic” or “fascistic” texture/composition of the military state etc., with the difference that the former consider these features permanent and insurmountable, whilst the latter see them as variable characteristics of a historical phase already long outdated; they never tell us of course when they will be changed (the said variable characteristics): because if this takes place in one or two centuries, then the fight has no practical object.
The ideological belief that economic collaboration or intertwining necessarily leads to the blunting of geopolitical and political oppositions/conflicts has no historical backing. I refer to a very blunt example. From 1900 to 1914, French-German trade increased by 137%, German-Russian by 121%, and German-British by 100%, whilst most of the then international cartels of production constituted a common German-British ownership (one of those actually produced explosive materials). All of those impressive rising indicators did not obstruct the above countries from getting embroiled in one of the most murderous wars since the beginning of [[known historical]] time. Economic collaboration is born in itself from economic needs and necessities which
do not have a necessary relationship with friendly or inimical intentions from a political point of view; it (economic collaboration) constitutes an indication of good political relations only with the precondition that any chance geopolitical loose ends have been solved, i.e. who is permitted to unfold in a sovereign and dominant manner over which space.

And as the data/facts of economic collaboration do not determine deterministically (even if they frequently influence) the formation and the exercising of a national foreign policy/external politics, thus neither the form
nor the quality/characteristics of the domestic/internal regime necessarily
determines it. **Liberal and the economistic logic contends: the development of an economy gives rise to an order of liberal business people** [[who in certain countries are flea-vultured-parasite-banking-usury-ZIO/JOOified]], who promote modernisation and democratisation, whereupon the country becomes peace-loving, because only non-democratic countries are expansive/conquering. **This syllogism is ideological and incorrect all along/down the line.** Even if we accept that the business class everywhere and always prefers the parliamentary regime to a direct or indirect dictatorship made to measure for its own purposes, needs, wants and capacities/abilities (this is extremely doubtful, but is of no interest here), and again it has no reason to hold back national expansion, if it judges it to be in its interests. Which business class has not benefitted by the expanded political and military power of its country?

What does the zeal show which today’s Turkish businessmen have their eye/focus their attention on, = on there where the [[Turkish]] diplomatic-military leadership has its eye/focuses its attention, e.g. on the Caucuses, on the Middle East, on Central Asia – also on Greece? The armament programmes of their country, they also welcome, as they welcome them everywhere and always, businessmen (and workers), when they are connected with investments, employment and state orders.

**More generally, the components of geopolitical potential/capacity, which determine the diachronic resultant of foreign policy/external politics, only by chance/coincidently and externally are connected with the democratic or semi-democratic, dictatorial or semi-dictatorial form of the domestic/internal regime.**

**History shows that democracies can be equally expansive/conquering and battle-ready as tyrannies.** The English Empire was constituted precisely in
parallel with the establishment, consolidation and the deepening of the parliamentary polity in the metropolis. And American imperialism

[[HAHAHAHAHA!!!! HE CALLED IT “IMPERIALISM” –
HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!]] [[IF WE’RE GOING TO CALL A PARLIAMENTARY
REGIME WITH ELECTIONS A “DEMOCRACY”, THEN WE CAN CALL A HEGEMONIC WORLD
POWER, AN “IMPERIALISTIC” POWER, EVEN THOUGH IT FORMALLY-OPENLY HAS NO
COLONIES AS SUCH]], is found today at the climax of its world power by flying

the flag/displaying the banner of panhuman democracy and of “human
rights”. [[= ZIO(JOO)USA FEMINOFAGGOTISED OTHER-WORSHIPPING FULL-SPECTRUM
FREAK-SHOW-CIRCUS-HEDONISED-DRUG-FUCKED-TATTOOED-ZIO-LOBOTOMISED
SATANISM]]

The “left-wing” version of universalism and of economism in particular
confuses the levels of internal/domestic and of foreign/external politics,
which argues as follows: Turkish expansionism constitutes

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basically the attempt of the ruling class to deflect/divert the attention of the masses away from insoluble internal problems; it will recede when these problems are solved by democratic and socialistic forces, because all peoples have nothing to divide between one another (i.e. have nothing to fight over)

[[vea, good one. Smoke some more DOPE]]

This argumentation goes limp/is lame from the very first step, because it does not explain the reasons for which the diversion/deflection of the people through nationalism and expansionism often has such good results.

Why, in truth, is the people allowed/free to be diverted in this way, what does it/the people particularly like in this deflection/diversion, so that this and not some other diversion is chosen, so that it/the people can be misled? Before 1914, very powerful socialistic parties declared in Germany and in France that they will abort/call off/frustrate the war and that “the two peoples have nothing
to divide between themselves (i.e. nothing to fight over)”. When, however, war actually broke out, then not only socialists, but even also nationalists themselves “lost it” before/in view of the patriotic enthusiasm of the masses on all sides [[of the political spectrum]].

If, from the historical examples, we move onto sociological generalisation, we can say that – irrespective of what the demographically declining and spoilt populations of weak/impotent countries do, where nationalistic stupid slogans frequently simply serve the need for psychical replenishments – masses of young people in countries with a great geopolitical potential/capacity spontaneously and honestly take onboard the expansionary/conquering slogans. On 11 September 1882, Engels wrote to Kautsky from London: “You ask me what the English workers think about colonial politics? The same as what the bourgeois think... the workers too, eat jovially/cheerfully from England’s monopoly in the world market and in the colonies” (Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 420). [[Engels, in regard to his “good bits” was a FUCKING LEGEND!!! He made MANY pertinent observations – far more than people usually give him credit for.]]

In our contemporary Turkey, there is no evidence that sections of the people disapprove of Turkey’s policies re: the Aegean and Cyprus.
I have never heard of any group demonstration [[by Turks]] re: the expulsion of the Greek element from Constantinople, from Imbros and from Tenedos, nor in respect of the colonisation of Northern Cyprus. That does not at all mean that every Turk hates every Greek; nor every Greek, every Skopjean, when the Greek denies the Skopjean the right to call his state “Macedonia”. They are two entirely different things, that is why Greeks lapse into a serious optical illusion when over a get-together and piss-up with bouzoukia between Greeks and Turks, Greeks rush to jump to political conclusions – without of course having ever detached from p. 407

their collocutors, co-drinkers and co-players a binding declaration in favour of a specific/concrete Greek position(, and) against a Turkish position. (Let me provide readers with personal testimony, with a meaning perhaps instructional for readers. I have engaged/interacted with over the last 25 years on many occasions with Turks from various social and educational strata and of very different political convictions. Since I am unable to say anything other than what I think [[I HAVE MY GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THAT ONE!]], my interlocutors knew that I had no “nationalistic prejudices” [[THAT’S TRUE. IF A NATION IS FUCKED (NEAR) DEAD IT’S FUCKED. IT DOESN’T MATTER WHAT “SPIN” SOMEONE PUTS ON IT]], and that I never hesitated to openly castigate and everywhere whatever I felt to be erroneous on the Greek or Cypriot side. But I never hear on the Turks’ part, not even in a gallant/courtly kind of reciprocation, a corresponding express acceptance for Turkey’s behaviour vis-a-vis the Hellenism of Constantinople or re: Armenians, for instance. The current 1982 Constitution of Turkey, in its German translation, speaks of the “eternal Turkish fatherland”, the “holy Turkish state” and the “historical and spiritual values of Turkism and nationalism”, whilst the President of the Republic swears not only to God etc. but to “the great Turkish nation and to history”. Realistically, in
such words, honest convictions are echoed, prejudices and fanaticisms (no matter what we call them, it is in practice-politically indifferent) of the greatest majority of today’s Turks.)

The principle that “the peoples have nothing to fight over”, does not constitute an invention of peoples, but of intellectuals, that is why, incidentally, it is never withdrawn, as much as experience falsifies it.

On the contrary, experience is meta-interpreted suitably so that the principle can remain uninjured. As is known, when in 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus took place, the PM of Turkey was the Socialist Ecevit of an admirable Western education and with poetic accomplishments worthy of being translated into several European languages. And Greeks said he was not a “genuine” socialist, but an “Ottoman” and “Attila”, like Turkish non-socialists. However, the correct and much more worrying political conclusion ought to be the following: in the great matters of foreign/external policy/politics, the Turkish socialists think like Turkish military personnel, just as the French socialists in 1956 ordered as government the intervention in the Suez Canal, or when slightly earlier they started a savage colonial war in Algeria whilst the teachings of the catastrophe in Indochina were still fresh [[in their memories]].

The taming of Turkey through its inclusion in Europe, is closely connected with the hopes and with the errors of Greek politics. The very same Greek side itself continually confesses, and involuntarily, how pointless the hopes are p. 408

when on the hand, it is asserted that the acceptance of “European values” will make Turkey a “civilised” and peace-loving country, whilst at the same time, on the other hand, it ascertains in practice that the European bearers of its “values”, use these values very flexibly and go beyond them with ease whenever they
judge it to be advantageous/in their interests; so the acceptance of “European values” does not seem to improve in itself mores and manners (morals)
[AAAA-HAHAHHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

There is a wrong appraisal [[by Greeks]] of the significance of “Europe” for Turkey. Because Greece, unable to stand alone on its own feet [[TO WRITE OFF YOUR MASSIVE DEBT AND TO E.G. RETURN TO THE DRACHMA YOU HAVE TO HAVE AN ELITE AND YOUTHFUL PEOPLE FULL OF DETERMINATION AND PASSION, AND EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS WHAT GREECE HAS = BEING TORN TO SHREDS IN EVERY CRUCIAL RESPECT, FROM THE ECONOMY TO THE APE INVASION AND EXTENSIVE FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-USA-GERMAN ANTI-HELLENIC FEMINOFAGGOTISED DEEP CIRCUS-FREAKSHOW OTHERISED NEGRO-FETISHISED MOHAMMEDAN-BLIND LOBOTOMISATION, ETC..]], tends to project its own situation and disposition onto the situation and disposition of others, thinking that e.g. “Europe” has for Turkey the same absolute meaning as for Greece. **Turkey undoubtedly will try to get as much out of the EU as possible; but for Eurasian Turkey, Europe is only a field of activity amongst other fields of activities**, whereas for Greece, Europe is essentially the only field of activity. **Because in the Balkans, Greece does not have either the economic or the military to play a hegemonic role**, and this is not achieved because ten or twenty small or mid-level businessmen make profits in Rumania or in Serbia. **Turkey’s relationship is more composite with the EU than Greece’s: the EU can’t satisfy all of Turkey’s demands, however the EU’s vital interests do not allow it to fully disenchant Turkey.** Turkey remains to a significant degree independent of the EU, parallely, however, Turkey’s own vital interests dictate to it to make of Europe, various, mainly economic demands.

Over the next one or two decades there’ll be a continual bazaar between Turkey and the EU, with tensions and lulls, whereupon Turkish demands will be supported by the USA [[THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO BE THE CASE c. 2019!, though it probably occurred until c. 2016 if I’m not mistaken]], which indeed asked the EU to accept Turkey as a full member [[SO ZIO(JOO)-USA OF
GLOBALIST SATANISM IN THE 1990s WAS IN FULL DESTROY CHRISTIAN EUROPE VIA MOHAMMEDANISM SWING-MODE...]].

The EU (its most powerful members), not being able to satisfy Turkey, most likely will use Greece [[like ZIO-USA too]] incl. in pressuring Greece to accept Turkish positions re: the Aegean and Cyprus. I most intensely fear this [[OBVIOUSLY P.K. COULD NOT FORESEE THE TURKISH-USA TENSIONS OF c. 2016 ONWARDS, THOUGH THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE (YET in early 2019) GREECE WILL GAIN ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT AND OVER THE LONG-RUN OVER SUCH TENSIONS]], = another one of those tragic ironies, which History seems to come up with. Whilst Greece body and soul gave herself to “Europe”, in order to safeguard

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herself from the Turkish danger, precisely its European orientation will convert Greece into a de facto organ of converting Greece into Turkey’s satellite [[THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT’S HAPPENING SINCE 2015, WITH THE APE-FLOOD ZIO-GLOBALISING SUPER-HATE-MOHAMMEDISING-EVIL-DEVIL-SATANIC DE-HELLENISATION OF THE MAJOR GREEK ISLANDS NEAR TURKEY!]].

Through European and American struggles, Turkish influence will be exercised on Greece not directly, but somewhat moderated [[THIS BASIC NOTION OF “THROUGH EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STRUGGLES” WHICH CAN OBVIOUSLY INCLUDE STRUGGLES AGAINST RUSSIA AND CHINA ETC., SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE BASIS FOR P. HEFAISTOS’S MANY OUTSTANDING ARTICLES ON THIS THEME]].

And, of course, the Greek side being weak, in seeking consolations and rationalisations (justifications), will commence sometime to consider concessions to Turkey as a self-evident part and self-evident duty of its “Europeanisation” – since “civilised humans”, who have gone beyond “nationalistic atavisms”, do not commence wars for things as antiquated in our refined world as rights of sovereignty [[AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA-
Does this mean that Greece should break from today’s alliances. Of course not, as no alternative exists. But the Greek side must comprehend in practice, factually, not just in words, that the value of an alliance for one of its members is determined by the special weight of the latter inside the totality of the alliance. More fine-tuned: allies are of as much value to you, as you are to them. No alliance and no protection secure whomever is found in the alliance to be in a state of unilateral dependence.

No-one is impressed by Greece’s “just claims”, for as long as behind such claims is a pariah with a permanently held out hand, someone who lives with loans, subsidies and “programmes of support”.

National viability = a matter of a productive, not an accounting, basis, and also for the exercising of a serious foreign policy/external politics. National resources must be countered/confronted with geopolitical and strategic criteria, not as numerical “indicators”. 1% of the national income which comes from an increase in tourism is not the same as 1% which the contemporary armaments industry gives. I do not understand how Cyprus with levels of 5% yearly over the last 15 years of economic growth does not contribute economically to Greece’s armaments programmes [Cyprus has not an effective defence force itself]. However, whoever feels he is a part of Hellenism proves it by lifting national weights. [In actual fact, things have gone in the opposite direction, with Cyprus and Greece collaborating far less than what they should if they really wanted to survive, and with Cyprus committing suicide, and Greece standing by and applauding, whilst waiting for its own suicide – as a very wise man puts it...].
Now is the time, with Greece down [[HEAVEN FORBID IF P.K. KNEW THE SITUATION c. 2015-2019 – OH MY FUCKING GOD!!! DEAD, DEAD, DEAD. FORGET ABOUT IT!!! GO TO THE BEACH, HAVE SEX IF YOU WANT, EAT A SPINACH AND OR CHEESE PIE, AND FORGET ABOUT IT!!! – AND THAT’S EXACTLY MORE OR LESS WHAT’S BEEN HAPPENING...]] ... since things need to be put back on track without any further loss of ground, in the hope that future realignments in the planetary correlation of forces will weaken the geopolitical potential/capacity of Turkey and will allow Greece to take a historical (deep) breath [[THIS DID NOT HAPPEN! THINGS ARE GOING FROM BAD TO WORSE!!!]]

If, however, territory is lost in the near future, the losses will be irreparable and most likely fatal [[YOU CAN SAY THAT AGAIN!!!]]

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Naturally, hopes do not amount to certainties. We underline again, one more time, that the deeper cause of increasing Turkish pressure on Greece is neither cultural nor narrowly political and transitory, but depends on the continual widening of the difference between the geopolitical potential/capacity of the two countries.

**In crucial sectors like the demographic sector, the game is already LOST.**

**In other field of strategic significance, irreversible developments have started to become fixed.** Greece is being transformed steadily into a country with restricted and limited sovereign rights, i.e. rights whose sovereign exercising is dependent on the volition and reactions of third parties, whilst in parallel its stance is becoming all the more passive or contradictory [[ALL OF THIS HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE P.K.’s DEATH, AND DEEPENED ETC....]]

The declaration that “we concede nothing” has no practical reward or positive result when the country begs in crucial times the mediating attempts of the USA, knowing that they will be paid with concessions, or e.g.
Such acts are simply erroneous or at least controversial ways of handling affairs. They constitute the epiphenomena of a deeper historical tiredness, of a progressive, hedonistic indeed paralysis.

To the extent that Greece is made imperceptibly the geopolitical satellite of Turkey, the danger of war is distanced, the delusions will run riot/grow, and the paralysis will become even more hedonistic since conceding ground will be recompensed by American and European praises, which the modernised Balkan needs urgently, and
also with loans and gifts so that parasitic consumerism can be funded [[THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAS HAPPENED – THE FULL-SPECTRUM FEMINO-FAGGOTISED ZIO/USA CONSUMERISTIC-NARCISSTIC ZIO-MAMMOM FREAKSHOW FULLY FUCKED IN THE HEAD AND TOTALLY BRAIN-WASHED NEGRO AND MOHAMMUD OTHERISING ZIO-USA LOBOTOMY. WHY DOESN’T ISRAEL, E.G., FULLY OPEN ITS BORDERS TO 6 (SIX) MILLION “NEW ISRAELI” BLACK AFRICANS AND OR BROWNISH MOHAMMEDANS? WHY? WHAT WAS THE REASON AGAIN?]].

So, what will actually be a bending of Greek resistance under the pressure of superior Turkish potential/capacity, Greeks will get used to slowly-slowly calling “civilised behaviour” “the transcendence of nationalism” and “Europeanisation” [[LOOK, P.K. HAD HIS OWN INCOMPARABLE WAY OR WRITING AND DEALING WITH ISSUES, BUT BASICALLY HE’S BEEN SAYING WHATEVER I’VE SAID – ABSOLUTELY FUCKING PATHETIC WITH A FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO/USA-ZIO-GERMAN/FRENCH LOBOTOMY OF BEING A HEDONISTIC CONSUMERISTIC DEBT-SLAVE FREAKSHOW CIRCUS OTHERISING OTHER-WORSHIPING PARASITE = GONE, FINISHED, FUCKED, DEAD.]]

**In reality, today’s dilemma is objectively horrifying and psychologically unbearable:** peace means for Greece, satellite-ification, and war means being CRUSHED. [[TURKEY DOES NOT NEED TO FIGHT A WAR WITH GREECE. IT HAS BEEN GETTING WHAT IT WANTS, BIT BY BIT, BY CONTINUAL CONCESSIONS OVER THE YEARS, AND WHEN THE TIME IS RIPE, IT CAN THEN MOVE IN FOR THE KILL, IF NEED BE.]]

**It would be a Herculean Labour/Task for Greece to overcome and transcend this dilemma re: today’s geopolitical and strategic correlations, which Greek society, the way it is, DOES NOT HAVE THE BALLS.**
The mediocrities, the LOW hypo-mediocrities and the even lower or anti-hypo-mediocrities which jointly make up the Greek political and para-political world, do not have the stature to set and solve historical problems of such an extent and such a depth – perhaps they will collapse even in the case where they are found to be before the great decision to conduct/wage a war. Because if war is the continuation of politics, which war will continue a spasmodic politics?

The broader masses, guided by the same instinct of short-term self-preservation, have found their own psychologically convenient solution: service to the nation in the white and blue which does not cost anything, but whilst continually stealing in all kinds of manners:

by not paying taxes, by inordinate/gross profiteering and the “abstract housing [= in Greece, where by bribery of officials buildings are (half-)built without regard to planning, local laws etc.]”, up to the easily obtained degrees [= through Party channels, getting one’s degree without studying etc.], the low productivity of labour (not even 50% of the average of the EE!), and the screaming/blatant/vociferous inequality between whatever is produced and whatever is consumed, with the results of the debt-enslavement and the political dependence of the country.

If we take into consideration all that is done, and leave entirely aside the picture which those who act/do have of themselves, then it seems we find ourselves in the collective search for our historical euthanasia, on condition that things are
directed (cinematographically) in such a way that no-one has direct responsibility, and also on condition that I make with skill and artistry invincible, soothing rationalisations/justifications (no matter whether, “Hellenocentric” or “Europeanising”). Perhaps others will write the tragedies or the comedies which can describe with the appropriate hues/tints/shadings this particular social and psychological situation.

What comes to my mind is the trite/banal but always straight-shooting wise and psychologically calm saying: “the way one makes one’s bed, is the way one also goes to sleep” [[= if your Group’s/Tribe’s/Nation’s collective action is based on parasitism, auto-lobotimisation, self-denial of Identity and Cultural Continuity etc., then you’ll get – one way or another – what the Aboriginals or the Red Indians GOT, and which the Satanic Circus Monkey People will also get too, when their time comes around (but for now, they are comparatively well organised and relatively strong, and that – as a question of Power – is all to their credit, skills, abilities,...)]]
ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ


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